

# **Screen Architecture:**

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## **A Phenomenology of Dread Atmospheres in Thriller Films.**

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

### **Lama Bilal Abuhassan**

Bachelor of Architecture, University of Science and Technology, Jordan

Masters of Architecture, University of Science and Technology, Jordan

Masters of Fine Arts in Cinematic Arts, Red Sea Institute of Cinematic Arts,  
Jordan

Main Supervisor: Oriel Prizeman

Second Supervisor: Ross Garner

Welsh School of Architecture

Cardiff University

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# Screen Architecture: A Phenomenology of Dread Atmospheres in Thriller Films

## ABSTRACT

By looking at thriller films, and establishing their relationship to suspense, my thesis examines the construction of *dread atmosphere* and how it enables the viewer to become part of that atmosphere.

The aim of the thesis is to develop a comprehensive reading of the atmosphere of dread by adopting the approach of *phenomenology*, and through an investigation and analysis of its definition of the process of *embodiment*, in order to identify some of the *atmospheric corporeal situations* in dread spaces that are used to increase the corporeality of the viewer, so as to ultimately reveal the experience of suspense. By doing that, this thesis elaborates on Hanich's analysis and description of *cinematic dread's atmosphere*.

The thesis builds a structure of *embodiment* based on Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and on the work of other phenomenologists from different fields including film, architecture and video games, to create a framework whereby the viewer's embodiment with the screen is understood. In addition, it adopts Shīrāzī's approach of *Phenomenal Phenomenology* to read a dread scene from *the Silence of the Lambs* phenomenologically. This reading identified new *atmospheric corporeal situations*, named as *quasi-things* in Griffero's terms, which have not previously been discussed in the context of film under the framework of the phenomenology of text, of transparency and of surveillance. The research found that any situation that is linked with the senses, such as through 'sensorimotor verbs' and 'sensorial transparency', is experienced more corporeally, consciously, affectively, and eventually increases the sense of embodiment. The researcher extends the conception of these phenomena by means of a horizontal reading of other films to make the observations more objective and generalizable to thrillers in general and the dread atmosphere in specific.

The significance of my research lies in making a contribution to the understanding of the kinesthetic experience of cinematic space and to promoting its potential in theorising related arts such as architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games.

## NOTE ON DEFINITIONS

The researcher has followed a specific procedure in writing some jargons and expressions; whenever the expression is in *italic*, it refers to other theorists, or it means to stress on an *issue*. Whenever the expression is enclosed by 'single quotation mark', it means that it belongs to the author of this research.

To make it easier for the reader, Appendix A is provided with glossary for all the expressions used in this thesis.

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# INTRODUCTION



## Dread

*It is night outside, when a middle-aged private detective sneaks into a dark old house off the beaten track somewhere in the Californian countryside [...] man slowly and cautiously climbs a flight of stairs, venturing deeper into the eerie place. Apart from quiet string music barely anything can be heard, when upstairs a door slowly opens, [...]. The detective, however, moves on unsuspecting.*

(Hanich 2010 p.155).

The foregoing paragraph is a description of a scene in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960). It is a scene that describes one of the prototypes of fear in film presented by the film scholar Julian Hanich (2010). This prototype is called *Cinematic Dread*. It is a scenario that represents a vulnerable character who is slowly and quietly entering a dark, forsaken place harboring threat. Hanich considers this form as the highest degree of suspense and the strongest level of immersion in film because of its role in achievement and sanctification of the *spatial*, *temporal*, and *emotional* forms of immersion. (Hanich 2010; Hanich 2014).

## The Researcher's Personal Interest in Dread

For the researcher, there were various main reasons behind choosing Dread. These are personal interest and curiosity to know more about thrillers. In 2009, the researcher wrote her master's thesis about 'Cinematic Architecture', which mainly concerns architecture expressed in cinema. This thesis opened the gate for her to study filmmaking. Working on that subject and thesis opened her mind to the idea that architecture as a setting is not the only facet of architecture which can create a mood while watching a film, but that architecture of the screen can also create affective, corporeal, and memorable experience.

During her study for the Masters of Fine Arts degree in Cinematic Arts, the researcher wrote a feature thriller film titled *Sight*. Senses played a pivotal role in her film, and much as in the case of any thriller film, the researcher incorporated suspense with elements such as the staircase, following Hitchcock who used the staircase as a means to create suspense, where “each step advances but also delays the denouncement” (Jacobs 2007 p.28).

What was behind the senses, the staircase, and other thriller elements? How did those elements make viewers attached to the edge of their seats?

### Why Thrillers?

Saricks defines thriller as a plot-centered story that places the characters in dangerous situations. It is one of the genres that share elements with the adventure, suspense, and mystery genres. But it is distinguished from them in the frame of the story, the details, and how the hero or heroine use their skills and knowledge to extricate themselves from that dangerous situation (Saricks 2001).

The salient characteristic of thrillers is based on suspense. During a lecture in Columbia University in 1939, Hitchcock said: “I am a great believer in making the audience suffer [...] in making the audience play their part. Such exquisite torment is one of the key emotional pay-offs that the audience desires from participating in the game of suspense” (Hitchcock 1995 p.272). For Hitchcock, suspense is a strategy of engagement that facilitates the encountering between cinematic narration and the viewer, thus helping in bringing the viewer into the film by energizing, mobilizing, and producing desires, wishes, and fears (Hitchcock 1995).

Suspense then turns the viewer from a passive subject into an active participatory one because, according to Krutnik (2013), it entails two integrally-connected key characteristics. The first characteristic is that it is a state of pleasurable anxiety that stirs the nerves, hence resulting in a mode of affect. The second characteristic is that it builds up uncertain outcomes that induce tension, suspicion, uncertainty, and emotional disturbance to create an affective intensification (Krutnik 2013).

Hanich's book *Cinematic Emotion in Horror Films and Thrillers: The Aesthetic Paradox of Pleasurable Fear* was a critical reference for the researcher in recognizing that phenomenology, as the way of thinking from Hanich's point of view, expresses her (the researcher's) own way of thinking and analysis of both film and architecture. That book marked the beginning of the researcher's effort to dig deeply into phenomenology of dread.

Then came the book of Shīrāzī (2013), *Towards an Articulated Phenomenological Interpretation of Architecture: Phenomenal Phenomenology*. His book made the researcher realize that phenomenology is the most helpful conceptual and methodological approach for both architects and filmmakers to express and design a lived experience. Accordingly, phenomenology, in this thesis, is the main approach to understanding the essence of *cinematic dread* in order to look further into the construction of the atmosphere of dread.

### Phenomenology and Embodiment

*Phenomenology* is a philosophical approach that describes the lived body experience and presence of the body in the world. It was founded in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by Edmund Husserl. Afterwards, it was expanded by a group of his followers, namely, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Social sciences, humanities, arts, and architecture use phenomenology to uncover, understand, and describe latent aspects of everyday experiences that are hidden beneath habits. The experiences people go through when exploring and describing a special phenomenon provides a rich description of their lived body experiences. According to the phenomenologist Seamon (2007), this makes the phenomenon reveal itself to the subject in all its concreteness and particularity. In consequence, phenomenology is a very suitable approach to follow for exploring and describing the nature of spatial encounter.

The subject, the role of the body, and the subjective experience are the principal pivots of phenomenology. Although the process of consciousness has been handled early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was only in the last few years that philosophers

developed a deep philosophy of body and embodiment, specifically after the nineties, and built their theories on theories of the phenomenologists.

*Embodiment* in research is the process of encountering between the body and the physical environment inhabiting particular time and space (McCardell 2001 p.36; Marin and Leder 2013).

The phenomenological features of embodiment have received extensive support by contemporary biological and neurological research, in addition to psychology, film studies, architecture, video games, and Virtual Reality, because this notion focuses on the body and on its sensorial and lived experience and because it strengthens the relation of the body with the physical environment to create an atmosphere.

The applications of embodiment are many. However, as a new field, it is still flexible for researchers to create new modes of representations, especially in the interdisciplinary fields where one can combine different phenomenological perspectives drawn from differing fields and recruit them to create a different lived experience.

### Phenomenology and Embodiment Discourse in Film and Architecture

Walter Benjamin (2007 [1935]) deliberated on the connection between film and architecture in his essay *the work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. He contended that both of them are communicated primarily through the tactile realm and suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful kinesthetic experience that “hit (s) the spectator like a bullet” (Benjamin 2007) felt in the muscles and skin as they are seen by the eyes.

Many architects supported the connection between film and architecture, including Tom Duncan, Noel McCauley, and Nezar AlSayyed, who used the film

as a medium for research into, and analysis of, the built environment. However, Pallasmaa (1994, 2001, 2007, 2012) is one of few architects who related architecture to film and other fields via the role of the body as a locus of perception, thought, and consciousness, and the sensory experience in articulating, storing, and processing sensory responses. Accordingly, he gave a clear account of the crucial phenomenological dimensions of human experience in architecture.

In architecture, Muhammad R. Shīrāzī (2013) conducted a study in an effort to illustrate phenomenology through museums, especially the work of Tadao Ando. Johnathan Hale (1994, 2012, 2017) and Candice Hiu-Lam Lau (2012) used the phenomenological features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment to read how people actually perceive their designed environments in architecture and in museums. Also the work of Professor François Penz, who believes that the moving image provides people with new perceptual equipment to grasp the complexity of architectural and urban phenomena.

In film studies, the philosophy of phenomenology has been used to gain insight into embodiment of the spectator with the screen, with a focus on the senses in the visual experience. Studies in this domain include the works of Vivian Sobchack (1990, 1992), Laura Marks (2000), Tarja Laine (2006), and Paul Elliott (2011). Based on a prolonged, in-depth reading of horror films and thrillers, Hanich (2010) developed prototypes of experiences to approach the common structure of fear.

Establishment of the link between the two arts (architecture and film) is recent and related studies are rare. These two fields of human knowledge and scientific research require further multi-disciplinary research to enrich the lived experience in both arts and in other related fields.

## Research Problem

Julian Hanich (2010) identified five phenomenological cinematic prototypes that cover the horror and thriller films. These prototypes are *direct horror*, *suggested horror*, *cinematic shock*, *cinematic dread*, and *cinematic terror*. However, his discussions of interaction of the subject with the object, and, hence, the associated conclusions, emanated from a *phenomenological point of view*, not from an *embodiment perspective*. In his discussion of *cinematic dread*, he described the atmosphere in dread through the filmic space only; he described the constricted atmosphere through certain elements such as the low height of a ceiling and its role in constricting the characters and through a closet that is used for hiding the character(s) inside. His description of constriction was justified by the lack of oxygen to breathe, not by the corporeal effect of the settings on both the character and the viewer. Such spaces raise questions of why and how they create a constricting atmosphere if someone is describing their essence; does a low ceiling affect the weight of the body? Does it evoke a cautious movement? Does it awaken any sense? Does it tense any muscle(s)? And how is it encountered?

He also looked at the isolating filmic spaces from a wide angle and at the macro level, for example, being away from a city or in a situation that makes the character alone and away from people. He highlights the phenomenon of isolation as it enhances the potential of dread and builds the anxious expectations of the future. Hanich proposed the labyrinth as an example of a constricted and isolated atmosphere. He proposed different shapes of settings to function as a labyrinth. Examples include long corridors and endless corridors. However, he did not describe their role of constriction and isolation in creating the atmosphere. Then, how is isolation lived? There should be a bodily exchange with the character as

the phenomenologist in film studies, Sobchack (1992) declares, to feel it and eventually create a constricted atmosphere.

In another section, Hanich described constricting and isolating atmospheres through the weather and daytime. One of his examples was darkness as a phenomenon that affects the sense of vision and the lived body as a whole. However, he was very brief in describing it and did not tap on its effect of the viewer's engagement with the character, whether it is a sympathy or empathy that affects the whole atmosphere.

Then, he only tapped on few constricted elements in terms of setting, architecture, and mood to creating the atmosphere of fear and suspense, not constricted atmospheres. Then what is a constricted atmosphere? Griffero's (2014) study of the aesthetics of the atmospheres showed that the atmosphere is more than a setting; it is more related to embodiment, to the *felt-body*, and to the internal and external relationships with the world and into a corporeal phenomenon that increases the embodiment of the subject than being a setting. This thesis will extend and describe the constricted atmosphere through the definition of Griffero relating it to phenomenology and New—Phenomenology.

In other respects, the philosopher Daniel Frampton (2008) criticized the lack of examples and illustrations taken from films to apply the various related theories to film. Few theorists such as Laine (2006) and Elliott (2011) applied theories of phenomenologists to film in an attempt to create new phenomenological perspectives. In this regard, Hanich (2010) recommended future research to combine theory with practice in thrillers. Consequently, this research fills the gap of *cinematic dread* atmospheres from an embodiment perspective and on the basis of a practice-based approach.

## Desirability of the Research

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the atmosphere of dread through an investigation and analysis of its process of embodiment and identification of some of the *atmospheric corporeal situations*, namely, *quasi-things*<sup>1</sup>, in dread spaces that are used in thriller films to increase the corporeality of the viewer so as to ultimately reveal the experience of suspense. The findings are intended to have relevance to related fields like architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games.

## Significance of the Study to Architecture and Related arts

The significance of this study is embodied in two aspects. The first aspect is its wide and potential application to architecture and related arts, and the other aspect is its significance to film studies.

Phenomenology is a flexible science whose focus is describing different phenomena. According to Van Manen (2007), it opens up possibilities for establishment of creative formative associations among subjects and objects for a phenomenology of practice.

Architecture is a field that assures the spaces and places to be engaged with or lived in. Some buildings require pure functionality, e.g., hospitals, schools, and libraries. Other buildings require experience, suspense, and stories to be told. Examples of such buildings include museums, memorials, and exhibitions. Steven Greenberg, who is one of the international museum designers, claims that

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<sup>1</sup> Griffero defines *quasi-things* as a situational constraint demonstrated by motor reactions and traced or suggested by the situation itself, *they* provide an accessible aesthetic and phenomenological account of feelings based on the paradigm of atmospheres. The term created originally by Schmitz in 1978, but Griffero extended it (Griffero 2014; Griffero 2017).

the museum is a performance space like the theatre in that it requires the same kind of thought and perception. He emphasizes the significance of the space to be creative, meaning a place of vital engagement; an audience space experiencing objects, setting then the building (Hanks et al. 2012). Although he states that the space has to be collaborative and to bring a range of creative disciplines, he did not describe the process of collaboration engaged in increasing the engagement of the user with the space.

In 2014, Emma Waterton and Jason Dittmer focused on the lived experience in museums. They claim that adopting the assemblage theory, which views the entities as composed of heterogeneous elements irreducible to their role within the larger assemblage to work together in the museum, guarantees creation of an affective atmosphere that is responsible for turning the user into a participant, like the case in the Australian War Memorial (Waterton and Dittmer 2014). The examples of the rooms they proposed in the Australian War Memorial were based on dread. They mainly focused on (i) sensory stimuli such as the case in the Royal Air Force Bomber Command chamber; (ii) shock, like the case in the Dust Off hall; and (iii) stillness, like the case in the Roll of Honour and the Hall of Memory. Their analysis was not more than a description of the spaces with their emotional effect. However, they did not describe the phenomenology of the atmosphere itself or how it affects the users, in other words, how the body of the user is extended in the atmosphere to absorb it and to be part of it.

Then, understanding the essence of the dread atmosphere, whether it is in film, or in a painting, or in a building, can be applied to any setting that requires dread, even to Virtual Reality and video games.

Pallasmaa wrote many books about architecture and its relation to cinema. However, his discussions and arguments were general and did not take into

account an embodiment perspective. In view of this, this thesis, up to the time of its submission, can be seen as a report of the first research that carried out this kind of analysis and linking into the essence of the dread atmosphere.

In addition to that, this study develops a new method within the new framework drawn to read, describe and criticize films. Writers, filmmakers, and architects can use this proposed method in the process of designing a dread atmosphere. While this study employs theories of embodiment and perception in film reading, It provides different perspectives of relevance to filmmakers, writers, Virtual Reality designers, and architects to enable them creating corporeal affective atmospheres that embody the viewers, users, and players. These perspectives are important as they address embodiment, a concept to which scientific research in various domains of human knowledge has high potential to contribute.

Benjamin (2007) suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful kinesthetic experience. Therefore, this study makes a contribution to the understanding of this kinesthetic experience and to promoting it in related arts such as architecture, Virtual Reality, and video games. Additionally, this study opens the door and possibilities for other researchers to perform similar studies in other genres than thrillers and uncover other phenomena and *quasi-things*.

### Research Questions

The central question in this study is to examine the nature of the atmosphere of dread and how it is created. This question is addressed through the following secondary research questions:

-Can an improved understanding of atmosphere and embodiment lead to identification of new situations (*quazi-things*) to address so as to enhance the dread experience of the viewer of thriller films?

-How is the subject's body, as a viewer, extended to be part of the dread atmosphere while watching a dread scene in a thriller film?

-Does this atmosphere allow the subject to feel her/his body corporeally and consciously to achieve the sense of embodiment?

-How can the spectator be engaged and affected by a screen?

-Why are some elements (e.g., stairs, doors, corridors, and tunnels) always linked with fear in the horror films and thrillers?

## Research Method

This research is multi-disciplinary in that it used theories from film, architecture and theories related to the video games so as to build comprehensive knowledge of embodiment because it is a recent philosophy and because these fields relate to each other.

To address the research questions, it followed a methodology that leaned heavily on review of relevant literature on the atmosphere of fear. In addition to this, the research methodology comprised theoretical and practical measures and steps, including a phenomenological reading of a dread scene as a case study.

In general, this research is a text-based qualitative research that adopted phenomenology as its approach to observation and description. As regards the literature review, the researcher built her analysis mainly on the concepts of Merleau-Ponty (2002), especially those presented in his book *Phenomenology of Perception*, originally published in French in 1945. Accordingly, the researcher followed Merleau-Ponty's structure of linking between the subject and the object, adopting it as the subject is the viewer/spectator and the object is the screen.

Merleau-Ponty (2002) provided a model of perception, cognition, and movement as a primary mode of engagement with the world. This study adopted this structure, and extended it. According to embodiment, perception in cinema consists of *perceptual perception* and *synaesthetical perception* (Sobchack 1992; Marks 2004). This means that perception has a level of cognition; sub-cognition. In addition to that, Sobchack (1990) stressed the interactive character of film viewing as an exchange between two bodies; the body of the character and the body of the viewer, according to that, the structure of Merleau-Ponty's (2002) model was expanded, for the first time, in this research to include a shared and interpreted perception, movement and action to create a new comprehensive framework and structure of film embodiment to follow in order to read and describe the case study.

In order to describe the case study, which is the last dread scene in *The Silence of the Lambs* (Demme Jonathan 1991), the researcher followed the *phenomenal phenomenology* method of Shīrāzī (2013). *Phenomenal phenomenology* is a first-person phenomenology describing the Langen Foundation Museum designed by Tadao Ando, which Shīrāzī (2013) distinguished with some characteristics based on mixed, comprehensive phenomenological theories that describe architecture for the purpose of making the reader as traveler perceives and feels, with all the senses, Shīrāzī's experience. Hence, this research adopted Shīrāzī's method in reading the scene, because it is based on a lived experience of one case study. However, it followed the framework structured in the literature background in part one of this thesis, in order to extract those characteristics to enable the researcher of this thesis to read the scene and to transfer its lived experience to the reader again.

Having one dread sequence will enable the research to have a *phenomenology from within* as Husserl names it, meaning, it will present a comprehensive reading of one case study, instead of having different phenomenological concerns. The reading will guide the research to look for the phenomena as they have been found, then understand their concerns to enable their appliances in other fields.

### *Reflectivity of Subjectivity*

The reading of the last dread scene in *The Silence of the Lambs* is not a universal reading because this reading is the researcher's own reading of the scene, guided and supported by her background in film and architecture. In phenomenology, Hanich considers this accepted because the description used in such approach is a thick description that creates the ground of lived experience and for research (Hanich 2017b). Accordingly, those who follow the experiences and objects which arouse their curiosity go to where those experiences and objects take them, rather than deciding on where those experiences should go. Besides, what makes phenomenology the best approach is that it does not provide a means to reach closure, as a result, through observations of experience, phenomenology leads to very close descriptions and, as a consequence, interpretations of the phenomenon under consideration (Hanich 2017b).

In other respects, to avoid any bias towards any particular phenomenon, the researcher has established characteristics, from the new framework created from the literature, to steer her reading of the case study scene. This means that the researcher drew a structure to follow in description. On the other hand, Griffero (2014) states that one atmosphere may be viewed, felt, or lived from differing viewpoints by the different viewers. Nonetheless, this does not mean

that ten different people will perceive ten atmospheres. Also, Hanich (2010) states that phenomenology is based on commonalities not on differences, then there must be something shared in common, in these viewpoints by those persons. Moreover, the researcher agrees with Hanich (2010), and Griffero (2014) in that it is rare for the one atmosphere to be completely different for all the people and that there is always a common point of view which may vary in its level. Lastly, since the philosophy of embodiment has been used in many fields other than arts, including psychology and neurophysiology, then research can borrow experiments from those fields to describe, and probably justify, a certain phenomenon in film from an embodiment perspective. As a final stage, the researcher extends the conception of these phenomena by means of a horizontal reading of other films to make the observations more objective and generalizable to thrillers in general and the dread atmosphere in specific, ultimately to elaborate Hanich's (2010) findings regarding the cinematic dread.

#### Limitations of the Study

As an approach, phenomenology is very flexible and open to all objects and to other methodologies. For instance, it can "reformulate certain Freudian concepts in the framework of a better philosophy" in order to help psychoanalysis "to be completely itself" (Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69). Within this context, any bounds to the scope of research do not preclude it from borrowing any concepts from other methodologies as long as they support the research inquiry under consideration, which this study actually sought to do.

This study did not incorporate aesthetic theories of meaning, or the sublime because these theories pertain to the function of beauty and sublime. They

address the relation between art and society and the truth content in the art object, not in the perception of the subject or the lived experience.

Furthermore, this study did not include psychoanalysis theories since they focus mainly on the subject and deny the dualism between the body and mind. Freud and Lacan are the pioneers of psychoanalysis. They both relate the subject and her/his repression to the moment of unconsciousness via understanding the language. Psychoanalysis is an interesting field for those who seek to understand the characters of the film and their desires and representations. On this account, psychoanalysis does not fit with phenomenal reading and the spatial focus of this study.

In addition, feminism and political agendas, which are two major dimensions of psychoanalysis, were not addressed in this study although they relate to the spectator, e.g., in voyeurism, the gaze, and visual pleasure. These dimensions of psychoanalysis discuss when the screen becomes a site for the spectator's projection of her/his fantasies and desires. For example, feminism discusses the issue for a one-way relationship between the spectator and the screen where the spectator is a male and the film text is written in such a way as to give a preferred reading as discussed in Laura Mulvey's works (Mulvey 1975, 1996). On the contrary, the present study is based on the assumption that the relation of the subject with the object is a one-way relationship, coming from the screen, because one of the main goals of this study is to understand the corporeality of the dread atmosphere and its embodiment on the viewer.

Theatre can be close to cinema in some respects but the limited space and potentials of the theatre and the position of the viewer can affect the phenomenology of the dread atmosphere. As a consequence, the corporeality of the viewer may differ in the case of the theatre from her/his corporeality in the

case of cinema. Moreover, the atmosphere is not controlled in theatre as it is in film.

## Structure of Thesis

In addition to the introduction and the conclusions chapters, this thesis is divided into three parts. Part One is an extended literature review aiming at answering a main question: how can the body of the viewer be embodied, extended and immersed in the screen, while watching a dread scene in a thriller film? Part Two is the practical part of this thesis, demonstrating the framework developed in Part One and applies it into a phenomenological reading of a scene that is described as a dread scene taken from *The Silence of the Lambs*. Part Three develops and identifies some atmospheric corporeal *quasi-things* appeared in the case study, and highlights them in the context of thriller film from other different films.

Part One of this thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter One aims at understanding phenomenology. It introduces the work of Hanich (2010) showing how phenomenology was used to identify and define prototypes of horror films and thrillers. It mainly clarifies one of his prototypes, that is, *cinematic dread*, and expands it on the basis of its atmospheric qualities, which this study has aimed to focus on.

Chapter Two draws the main framework of embodiment based upon the concepts of Merleau-Ponty (2002) and other phenomenologists. It illustrates how the subject and the object can be encountered. Accordingly, this chapter begins with an explanation of *engagement* as the major factor that controls the level of interaction between the subject (viewer) and the object (screen and atmosphere). In this study, engagement was defined in terms of the concepts of *sympathy* and

*empathy*. While a variety of definitions have already been formulated for sympathy and empathy, this study adopted the definitions that are broadly used in film studies according to Smith (1994) and Hanich (2010). The elaboration on engagement is followed by an attempt to realize the body as the subject of perception. The related material is intended to clarify how the body communicates with the world to *be-in-the-world* according to Heidegger (1996 [1927]) and how it responds to familiar and unfamiliar situations according to Merleau-Ponty (2002). In order to have appropriate insight into the corporeal experience of the subject, this chapter presented and discussed the *New-Phenomenology* of Hermann Schmitz. This model corresponds to a novel, in-depth look at phenomenology of the *felt-body* and compares it with the material, or *physical, body*. It was assumed that the point of view of Schmitz will help the researcher know exactly how the body can be contracted or expanded in certain encounters, e.g., in joy or fear, and how this affects the viewer's feeling to create an atmosphere.

After that, the chapter attempts to determine how the body can be existent, conscious, and present *in-the-world* because the subject does not all the time exist with all the tools. Sometimes, the subject uses a tool as an extension to its body, such as the cane of the blind person. In that way, the cane does not exist and, hence, the subject is not conscious of it. This issue is discussed in this chapter from the perspective of Heidegger (1996). Thereafter, a discussing of the logic and *structure of existence* from Merleau-Ponty's (2002 [1945]) standpoint, posits that the subject passes through different stages until reaching a state of existence.

After addressing the issue of the subject, Chapter Two discusses the *atmosphere* as an object and as the whole feeling that results from encounter with the subject.

In this discussion, the researcher follows the concepts and views of Griffero (2014) as he presented a recent perspective on the atmosphere that builds upon the *New-Phenomenology* of Schmitz. This section gives a definition of the atmosphere, an account on its perception, and an illustration of how to energize it. Meanwhile, it demonstrates how watching a screen is in itself also an atmosphere. Then, the chapter concentrates on a very specific atmosphere concerning dread, which is the constricted atmosphere. After that, it draws the distinction between *space* and *place*, which is a reflection of the subject's *existence*.

Chapter Three handles three main themes, namely, the process of encountering between the subject and the object; perception; movement; and action. It addresses the issue of how the subject can have a lived experience while she/he is sitting on a chair and is embodied in the dread atmosphere.

Perception is discussed according to the *perception of perception* concept of Deleuze (1992) and the *phenomenology of perception* concept of Merleau-Ponty (2002) and according to other theorists who built on these concepts, with particular emphasis on the sensory experience and the *synaesthetic perception*, which directly address all the senses, believing in the unity of them. However, on the basis of the importance of knowing how each sense can be captured on screen, this study adopted the means of Elliott (2011) in dividing the experience of the senses. This part of the study was concluded by an account of *haptic perception*, a tactile and *kinesthetic perception* and a mode of seeing through all modes located on the skin and a mode of bodily *consciousness* and corporeality.

Movement is defined in this study in the light of the thoughts of Sheets-Johnstone (2011 [1999]) who founded her ideas on those of Merleau-Ponty (2002), Husserl (1980), and Heidegger (1996). She constructed a structure of movement

presenting the spatial and temporal aspects of movement that start with the *kinesthetic experience* and end with a *corporeal consciousness*. By relating her work to that of Schmitz (1964-2005), this study extends her structure of movement to describe what happens during watching a film and how movement can be revealed while sitting and watching.

Action is discussed in this chapter in view of the *action-image* concept of Deleuze (1992) and on the basis of its mirroring on the viewer. Other studies are used as well to identify the implicit and explicit actions affect the atmosphere.

Chapter Four concludes the essence of the experience; *Affective experience*. It mainly discusses the driving forces that trigger the encounter between the subject and the object, i.e., issues of affordance and motivation. It also discusses theories of immersion to find out how the subject can be part of a virtual world for few minutes that may in fact last through memory for ever. This is then an experience that can be described as an *affective experience*.

Not only does part one present a literature review of embodiment within the screen, but it also expands theories to fit the viewer's relationship with the screen because not all theories discuss the very specific relationship of the viewer with the character in a dread atmosphere. In addition to that, Part One of this thesis overall sets a theoretical framework from which the case study in Part two can be systematically read. It makes available the characteristics which this study needs in order to read and describe a dread scene.

Chapter Five, the only chapter in Part Two of this thesis, applies the theoretical foundations to a case study and is as such, the practical part of this research. It demonstrates use of the framework developed in the first part of this study and explains how its characteristics were used to have a deep reading of a dread

scene taken from *The Silence of the Lambs*. Since no one can define the atmosphere of fear until she/he lives in it, this chapter narrates a lived experience by adopting the *phenomenal phenomenology* of Shīrāzī (2013) to transfer the reader of this thesis into a spectator.

The aim of Part Three is to extend the discourse and to develop the definition of atmospheric corporeal *quasi-things*. It identifies these as appearing in the dread atmosphere of the scene selected from *The Silence of the Lambs*, and shows them to have the ability to *enhance* the experience of the viewer and increase her/his corporeality and consciousness. The identified atmospheric corporeal *quasi-things* are discussed phenomenologically in an attempt to capture the essence of each phenomenon. As a consequence, the researcher extends the conception of this phenomenon through the means of a horizontal reading of other films to make the observations more objective and generalizable to thrillers in general and the dread atmosphere in specific, ultimately to elaborate Hanich's (2010) findings regarding the *cinematic dread*. This part is divided into three chapters. While Chapter Six discusses the phenomenology of text and some words that can be perceived in dread atmospheres, Chapter Seven deals with the phenomenology of transparency and Chapter Eight discusses the phenomenology of surveillance. These in turn connect with other theoretical bodies of knowledge and help to embed the findings of the thesis in a broader context.



## Part One: Theoretical Context

### Understanding the Phenomenology of Embodiment Created in the Atmosphere of Dread

This part of the thesis is a theoretical background on the process of encountering and experiencing the dread atmosphere that is intended to qualitatively add to the findings of Hanich (2010) related to *Cinematic Dread*, which is one of the phenomenological practices in film making. In line with this, the researcher structured this part of the thesis in a way that answers the following main questions: What is the atmosphere of dread? How is the subject's body, as a viewer, extended to be part of the dread atmosphere while watching a thriller film? And does this atmosphere allow the subject to feel its body corporeally and consciously?

To answer these questions, the researcher organized this part of the thesis in four chapters. Chapter One presents phenomenology as the method that is used in this study to look with new eyes into certain spatial encounters. This chapter also introduces a recent study in the film research conducted by Julian Hanich in 2010, on which the researcher builds and fills a gap in Hanich's research. Hanich (2010) used phenomenology to establish prototypes of experiences to approach the common structure of fear. This chapter explores and clarifies one of his prototypes, namely, *Cinematic Dread* and expands it on the basis of its atmospheric qualities.

Chapter Two draws the main framework of embodiment. It illustrates how the subject and the object can be encountered and it describes the ontology of the atmosphere of dread and fear.

Chapter Three complements the discussions of the process of embodiment given in Chapter Two by broadening the process of encountering between the subject and the object, which manifests itself in a non-ending, serial process of perception, movement, and action.

Chapter Four discusses the affordances and motivations that are necessary to trigger the actions that establish the encounter between the subject and the object. Furthermore, this chapter describes the *affective experience* through which one can say that 'this subject is completely embodied in this atmosphere'.

This part of the study addresses the three aforementioned questions and the associated literature review helps the researcher create the relevant criteria to follow in the second part of this study which reads a dread scene and describes it according to the spectator's lived experience.

## PART ONE:

Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

Chapter Two: Embodiment

Chapter Three: Structure of Encountering

Chapter Four: The Affective Experience



## Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

### 1.1 What is Phenomenology?

Phenomenology has been employed in many fields, including architecture and film, both in theory and practice, as a means to describe certain phenomena. There is no common definition of phenomenology as a philosophical approach. So, different researchers have defined it in different ways. For instance, Heidegger (1996) defined it as a method or a way of seeing. On the other hand, Husserl (1999) described phenomenology as a return to the things themselves, whereas Merleau-Ponty (2002) described it as the essence of perception, and Glendinning (2007, p. 38) described it as a “description of something we already understand or in some way familiar with.” Hence, phenomenology may be simply read as a stance which seeks to answer the question: “What is going on here?” Merleau-Ponty (2002) understands phenomenology as a rejection of science; when science explains, constructs, and looks for answers, phenomenology describes. It describes phenomena as they occur and allows people to describe experiencing them as “presupposition-less” as possible (Hanich 2017b p.11). In that sense, phenomenology is one of the best approaches to understanding phenomena in architecture, film and related arts.

On one side of the argument, architectural theorists believe that phenomenology can catch the essence of the things and phenomena and bring the user closer than before to being and existing. Seamon (2015, 2017), a phenomenologist who believes that phenomenology helps one to see with new eyes, a stance which conveys careful description. He contends that phenomenologists hope to understand instances of the same phenomenon in the lived experience in order to point out more general qualities and characteristics to describe the nature and

essence of the phenomenon because, as Hanich asserts, phenomenology is based on commonalities not on differences (Hanich 2010). On the other hand, in the social sciences, humanities, and the arts (e.g., film studies), phenomenology is used as a means to uncover aspects of everyday experiences that are “buried beneath habituation and institutionalization and thus are known implicitly” (Hanich 2010 p.44). These two views are alternatively the faces of one coin and the proponents of both indicate the same ultimate goal.

Phenomenology can be considered as a subjective approach since it is an approach that is based on the lived experience. However, as Julian Hanich interprets, it is not subjective in some chaotic or thin sense. Rather, “it is a thick description that creates the ground of lived experience and for further, if secondary, research” because those who follow the experiences and objects which arouse their curiosity go to where the experiences and objects take them, rather than deciding on where those experiences should go (Hanich 2017b p.16). He adds that what makes phenomenology the best approach is that it does not have closure, as through observations of experience it leads to very close descriptions and then interpretations of the phenomenon under consideration (Hanich 2017b). Moreover, according to Van Manen, phenomenology opens up the possibilities for establishment of creative formative associations among subjects and objects to relate them as phenomenology of practice (van Manen 2007). In effect, the exceptional features of phenomenology are that it allows one to consider any object and that it does not act hierarchically because it is open and generative. In addition, it is flexible. That is, it is reflected by the lived human body experience and existence, and is amended by experience (Hanich 2017b; van Manen 2007).

Seamon believes that the key point of phenomenology has been identified as a means to allow the phenomenon to reveal itself in the ways it needs to (Seamon 2017). Thereupon, what signifies phenomenology is that it complements other philosophies, such as psychoanalysis, and theories, such as the Cognitivist Theory and Deleuzian Theory, as Merleau-Ponty regards it to be completely itself (Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69) because, referring to Hanich, what usually happens is that the other methodologies, which are considered as objective methods, come after, not before, the description (Hanich 2017b).

In order to understand phenomenology in practice and in film, this study focused on the phenomenology of cinematic fear as has been described by the film scholar Julian Hanich (2010), who, in his book *Cinematic Emotions in Horror Films and Thrillers*, developed prototypes of experiences to approach the common structure of fear. He used phenomenology as his methodology to find out and capture those types of experiences which he categorized into *direct horror*, *suggested horror*, *cinematic shock*, *cinematic dread*, and *cinematic terror*.

For Hanich, *direct horror* occurs when the viewer experiences horror as a frightening and overwhelming confrontation with the threatening event or monstrous object, directly and in full vision, as in the case in the famous shower scene in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960). *Suggested horror*, on the other hand, relies on imagining violence or a monster through verbal description, sound effects, or blurry vision such as the scene in *Unbreakable* (Shyamalan 2000) in which the doctor tells the nurse before the audience sees the baby: “Inform the ambulance that we have a situation... I have never seen this.” In other respects, the *cinematic shock* is a highly compressed type of fear that responds to a threat of a situation, suddenly and unexpectedly, e.g., when a car hits the character suddenly. This form of fear is more common in horror films than in thrillers. According to Hanich

(2010) both *cinematic dread* and *cinematic terror* are the frightening versions of suspense, but thriller films in general focus more on dread since, it is the larger category of suspense, followed by terror. Thereupon, this research has concentrated on the cinematic dread.

## 1.2 Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

To distinguish *dread* from *horror*, Hanich illustrates this example; if the last man on earth is sitting and someone knocked on the door, then the moment before opening the door is described as *dread* but the moment when he opens the door and faces the danger is described as *horror*.

*Cinematic Dread* according to Hanich is a scenario called “alone in the dark scenario”. In terms of narrative content, dread is represented by a vulnerable character who is slowly and quietly entering a dark, forsaken place harboring threat. It works under the scenario of “here and now” (Hanich 2010 p.156). He considers suspense in dread scenes as responsible for creating uncertainty that makes the audience predict and imagine different outcomes for the character(s). He also believes that dread enables the strongest form of immersion in all films because of its role in achievement and sanctification of the spatial, temporal, and emotional forms of immersion.

Hanich regards the *spatial immersion* to the movement into or through space, although the visual access in dread scenes is often strongly restricted, but he asserts that the filmic space plays a crucial role as an atmosphere to suck the viewer in. Due to *temporal immersion*, the dread scenes are much more extended than scenes of *shock* and *horror* owing to that the viewer experiences the threat to the same extent to which the character in the film does. Thus, the scene becomes a “thickening”, inner time experience (Hanich 2010 p.160). As a result

of *emotional immersion*, Hanich acknowledges that the viewer expects the threat and imagines the worst. Hence, she/he is glued to the screen and captivated in an anticipatory type of fear, as the larger category of suspense, to a higher extent than in the case of the scenes that use aesthetic strategies like *horror* or *shock* only as in the horror films (Hanich 2010; Hanich 2014).

Hanich asserts that *cinematic dread* usually tends to end with *shock* or *horror*. In *Psycho*, when the detective gets inside, the audience feels *dread* because they fear for him. This fear feeds the dread and lets the audience think of either a *shock* (the lady appears) or *horror* (the knife).

Hanich considers *horror* and *shock* to be boring activities whereas *dread* is regarded as an active activity because the narrative of dread works more cognitively than that of horror or shock as *dread* gives the viewer time to think and anticipate the outcome and forthcoming narrative events to allow for a cognitive activity. This delay is an “arousal by itself for more cognitive interest between lived body experience and direct cognition” (Hanich 2010 p.165).

Hanich (2010) distinguished between horror and dread in terms of the time, intention, and emotion. Temporally, the dread points to the future while horror points to the present. He adds that because of the temporal immersion in dread the moments are longer and more extended than the moments of horror or shock. Hence, the dread increases the inner time experience. Therefore, in horror, the character faces the danger directly from the other side in whereas in dread, there is a split in reaction either of shock or horror.

Emotionally, Hanich believes that building fear through dread is more effective than creating fear only from shock or horror. As Hitchcock (1995) confirmed, it is easy to scare viewers but is more brilliant and successful to bring them into

suspense, that is, to involve, release, and engage them affectively (Hitchcock 1995).

Based on the technical issues and camera movement, Hanich concludes that the dread scene is often quite intense, yet very quiet. It is known for its long shots, few camera movements, and little movement within the *mise-en-scène*. Additionally, it is known that dread scenes lack spatial information, where the composition of the frame is tight and there is no establishing shot (Hanich 2010).

### 1.3 Phenomenology of Cinematic Terror

*Cinematic terror*, which is the fifth prototype of the fear experience according to Hanich (2010), is called the “chase and escape scenario”, where a vulnerable, extremely frightened character is escaping from a threat. While dread is considered as deadly silence, the terror is an experience of inner acceleration and agitation. However, like dread, it is an anticipatory type of cinematic fear, with the difference being that terror ends with horror only because the viewer knows the nature of the threat; actually she/he sees it and can perceive how close is the threat and estimate the approximate time for the arrival of the horror. Yet, Hanich maintains that dread and terror may overlap and that they usually do to intensify the moments of fear (Hanich 2010).

### 1.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced phenomenology as a reasonable approach for understanding the essence of the things which the subject is used to. Phenomenology is flexible and open to all arts, including film and architecture, but this research adopted the phenomenological approach in order to gain a deep insight into the essence of *cinematic dread* because it is the fear experience that

creates the highest degree of suspense and the strongest level of immersion in film.

In his analysis of *cinematic dread*, Hanich (2010) extracted many common features of the *constricted atmosphere*, the camera work, and the narrative structure. However, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, he could only identify few elements in terms of the setting, architecture, and mood that are necessary for creating the atmosphere of fear and suspense. As a result, he has recommended combining theory with practice and conduction of further research to determine additional elements of the setting, architecture, and mood that are necessary for creation of the atmosphere of fear and suspense. Within this context, future research is due to dig deeper in the *cinematic dread* by further researching the spatial qualities of the atmosphere of fear and into how the spectator, as a subject, can be immersed in the world of the dread such that she/he will experience spatial, temporal, and emotional immersion



## **PART ONE:**

Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

**Chapter Two: Embodiment**

Chapter Three: Structure of Encountering

Chapter Four: The Affective Experience



## Chapter Two: Embodiment

*True reflection presents me to myself not as idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but as identical with my presence in the world and to others, as I am now realizing it: I am all that I see, I am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and historical situation, but, on the contrary, by being this body and this situation, and though them, all the rest.*

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.525)

The previous chapter introduced phenomenology and discussed the example of its practices given by the film scholar Julian Hanich, namely, the phenomenology of the cinematic experience in horror films and thrillers. This chapter investigates the phenomenology of embodiment created by the atmospheres of thriller films, (i.e., embodiment) which is responsible for extending the relations of the body with itself and with the physical environment in a particular time and space. The next chapter clarifies how a subject can be converted from a passive subject into a corporeal, active one that is embodied in an atmosphere. Therefore, the present chapter mainly discusses three principal issues: *engagement* as the framework that controls the level of interaction between the subject and the object; the *subject*, who is the central component of this process; and the *atmosphere*, which is an object with which the subject will interact and is the overall experience that is responsible for creating the sense of fear. By the end of this part of the study (chapters one, two, three and four), one can have a deep insight into how the spectator can be bodily and mentally part of the dread atmosphere.

### 2.1 Definition

As it has been discussed earlier, the main pivot of phenomenology is the subjective experience and the role of the body. Although philosophers such as

Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have handled the body and the difficult problem of consciousness within the Cartesian mind-body dualism framework, it was only in the last few years that philosophers developed a deep philosophy of body and of embodiment. Dealing with subjects and their bodies was chiefly contributed to by cultural studies from the 1970s onwards, dominated by the work of Foucault (originally in 1975) who presented the body as a passive victim in institutional practices such as the Panopticon prison plan. For him, subjectivity is primarily an effect of discourse, that is, a cultural construction where the subject plays according to the rules established by others (Foucault 1995). In the nineties and thereafter, social theorists like Chris Shilling, Nick Crossley, and Ian Burkitt developed the construction of subjectivity and considered it as a construction emerging from the interaction between the individual and the society, an interaction that takes place within the medium of the lived body (Hale 2012). This shift in view on the body influenced architects like Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman to design in such a way as to further enrich the experience beyond the functional performance through the sensory experience and materiality (Hale 2012).

The body, lived body, subjectivity, and sensory experience are the core of embodiment in interaction with the world. The philosopher Merleau-Ponty was the pioneer in the aesthetics that relate to sensuous appearance, experience, and the process of interaction with the atmosphere. In his book *the Phenomenology of Perception* (2002), he structured the process linking the subject and the object by providing a model of perception, cognition, and movement as a primary mode of engagement with the world, and according to this model, he came out with *body-schema*, *immersion* and *motivation*. However, he did not mention embodiment as a hypothesis or as a theory of consciousness,

it was only concerning the sensory experience in articulating, storing, and processing sensory responses for the lived body.

Only in recent studies did philosophers and researchers combine Merleau-Ponty's philosophy with that of embodiment. Accordingly, the embodiment hypothesis has gained some experimental support in social psychology, psychology, and neurophysiology (e.g., Foroni and Semin (2009, 2013), Oosterwijk et al. (2010), Spadacenta et al. (2014), and Portch et al. (2015)); film studies (e.g., Sobchack (1990) and Marks (2000)); architecture (e.g., Bruno (2002), and Kenderdine (2007)); and video games (e.g., McCardell (2001) and Marin and Leder (2013)).

In 2002, Naoya Hirose, a human scientist, explored the relation of embodiment with cognition from an ecological point of view and noted two basic meanings of the word embodiment. The first meaning is the state of *being embodied*, which is a static condition under which the subject is part of the world. The second meaning is the *act of embodying*, which is a dynamic dimension of embodiment that helps in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of the experience so as to help the subject to shift to the state of embodiment (Hirose 2002).

Both the psychologists McCardell, Marin and Leder acknowledge that being embodied is being co-emergent with others, cultures, and the physical world as a consequence of going relational encounters. It means having unique history and situated relations with certain milieu, physiology, and perceptual perspective. It has to do with the relation of the body with itself and with the physical environment. It means inhabiting a particular time and space, i.e., a *here-now* milieu (McCardell 2001 p.36; Marin and Leder 2013).

Both definitions are used in discussion of video games to unpack and explain the complexity of the experience for players by Bayliss. “Embodiment as a state is a baseline from which to consider this dynamic nature of the body, and it opens up the moment of transition from one state of embodiment to another during the course of the act of embodying where the player takes up the interface as an extension to his body to take an action” (Bayliss 2010 p.54). In conformity with that, and according to Merleau-Ponty, who believes that “there is not a perception followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.127), this defines *embodiment* as a process, not a result, where the type of experience is not an account based on a linear cause and effect description of the body apparatus, but an indication of the lived body experience, where the body is considered as the center of the experiment with all its capacities to interact with the environment, to exist in the world, *here and now*.

In her digital museum making, Kenderdine emphasizes embodiment. She supports the notion that embodiment is the experience of the world through all the senses and that it explodes narrative and other modes of representation which prioritize one sense over the other or emphasize a certain aspect over the other (Kenderdine 2007; Schettino 2013). Also, Marchese, a theorist in phenomenology, addressed the fundamental premise of the importance of the lived body experience and suggested that the embodied subject and its ways of sensing, feeling, knowing, performing, and experiencing offer dynamic means of perceiving the object (Marchese 2012). In this context, many interdisciplinary researchers showed interest in the sensory and phenomenological engagement with the built environment. Although they both look Merleau-Pontian, however, they miss describing the process itself and looking into its essence, also they did not relate it to the proposed structure of Merleau-Ponty in engaging with the

world. Embodiment in Film and Cinema was slightly different since it relates to the spectator.

## 2.2 Cinema Spectatorship and Embodiment

Many recent film theorists showed interest in the audience in an effort to understand their embodiment with the screen such as Laura Marks and Vivian Sobchack. They built their theories upon Deleuze's (1992 [1983]) theory of *Affection- Image*, which in general refers to the state of emotions. In their way of thinking, both theorists support the *post-modern scopic regimes* towards the sensory experience as the main approach for the sense of embodiment.

### 2.2.1 Modern and Post-modern Scopic Regimes

During the period of modernity, the concept of *the self* was linked with what it sees; the individual's perspective was only affected by the power of vision (Crary 1992). In this context, any optical toy, trick, or device used to create an individual's perception such as the camera and stereoscope count only on the use of sight (Elliott 2011). Foucault and Freud are considered to be two of many theorists who follow this way of thinking.

In the postmodern era, theories relating to the perceptual faculties of vision opened up to include other senses and the lived experience of the body in an effort to take care of the subject as well as of her/his senses (Elliott 2011). Paul Elliott addresses that the *post-modern scopic regime* supports the notions of embodied perception and of synesthesia. It looks for ways not only to see, but also to understand, taste, and feel, in order to make the subject more active and involved than being detached or passive (Elliott 2011). In that context, thinkers such as Juhanni Pallasmaa and Merleau-Ponty may fit with such a way of

thinking, and some means as Virtual Reality may be one of the technological assemblages that fits the post-modern scopic regime as well.

In film, Elliott notes that the post-modern theories have re-defined the spectator's body as "the embodied knowledge, allowing the full thickness experience to be examined[...] the spectator exists as a conscious self, [...] a site of affect, an archive of bodily experience past and present, a corporeal sense-making machine and a surface of intensities" (Elliott 2011 p.45).

Following is a briefing on two post-modern thinkers who studied the embodiment of the cinema spectator.

### *Laura Marks*

Marks built her idea of embodiment on Deleuze's *affection-image* concept to create the recollection-image notion, which was proposed to connect emotion and memory with sensuality. She used a wide range of sensual inputs in the process of spectatorship for examining how touching, smelling, tasting, and hearing interact to enhance the visual experience (Marks 2000). Through exploring avant-garde films or those of independent directors, she underlined the importance of embodiment by stating that the cinema viewer can undergo a series of, sometimes, conflicting sensual experiences. In her book *The Skin of the Film*, she focused on touch and on *haptic visuality* in relation to bodies and images. She argues that in contrast to *optical visuality* which "tends to be one of mastery, in which the viewer isolates and comprehends the objects of vision," haptic visuality is tactile and kinaesthetic. Furthermore, it functions like organs of touch, where "viewer is more likely to lose herself in the image, to lose her sense of proportion" (Marks 2000 p.184). Hence, this way of interacting with the image changes the viewer from a passive subject into a corporeal active subject.

*Vivian Sobchack*

As a post-modern scopic thinker, Vivian Sobchack focused in her *The Address of the Eye* (1992) on the lived body of the spectator and on how it grounds and formulates new theories of meaning and sense experience in cinema. She considers the spectator as a synaesthetic subject, i.e., a site of reception, where its sensorium can provide visual images with multi-sensory and synaesthetic thickness. For her, the body of the spectator is actively involved in the creation of meaning instead of being passively affected by the film according to the notion of the *cross-modality* of the senses. This involvement triggers cooperation of all senses, not only seeing, such that they become fleshed-out to make the body feel through the skin before the eye, where the spectator haptically anticipates the image. She thinks of *cross-modality* as a key tool for understanding the cinema experience which has been missing in many contemporary film theories (Sobchack 1990; Sobchack 1992).

This research adopted Marks and Sobchack's theories since they set the foundation of embodiment in film studies, believing in the role of the body of the viewer through the sensual experience and the cooperation of the senses to have a haptic experience to interact actively, not passively, with the screen. A detailed discussion of the sensual experience of embodiment is provided in the subsequent chapter when discussing perception of the process of interaction with the object while discussing Marks and Sobchack's theories on Merleau-Ponty's structure of the subject to engage with the world. However, their research was only a first step towards further discovery of the interactive relationship between the subject and the screen since they did not clarify how the exchange between the body of the viewer and the body of the character occurs. Now, the question

emerges: How can the viewer or the spectator engage with the screen to be corporeally extended and become part of the whole atmosphere?

## 2.3 Engagement

Embodiment denotes a form of participative status of the subject and the object, namely, the observer and the one observed. According to Merleau-Ponty, this interaction creates an active participation that incarnates and shapes the subject's experience, and, at the point of encounter, constitutes a "new whole" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.13), but never in a static sense.

In describing the bodily reaction in the experience of architecture, Pallasmaa suggests that architecture is not only a series of images and that the elements of architecture are not visual units or *gestalt*. Rather, they are defined as confrontations. The encounter between the subject and the object is what matters to complete the experience. "Architecture directs and frames behavior and movement" (Pallasmaa 2012 p.44).

In this confrontation and encounter, Pallasmaa suggests "action in images in architecture as the moment of active encounter" (Pallasmaa 2012 p.44). What matters for him is recognizing the verb essence of architectural experience by speaking of the act. Copying his example, in Alvar Aalto's essay *From the Doorstep to the Common Room*, he argues that what matters is the act of entering the room, not the formal characteristics of the door itself (Pallasmaa 2012 p.45). Moreover, in recognition of the essence of the verbs and as another example, Fred Thompson is described as using the units of architectural experience as *verb-nouns* such as using the notion of 'spacing' instead of 'space' and 'timing' instead of 'time' (Pallasmaa 2012 p.45). In an example of film, Pallasmaa described the viewers in the film *Vertigo* (Hitchcock 1958) as citizens of the

space; “we enter the haunting edifices in the steps of the protagonist, we become citizens” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.48) because the viewer is entering, climbing, walking, and running with the protagonist to complete the experience of the space. In addition to that, the viewer spends much effort in performing many action verbs to complete the experience of watching; “All experience implies the acts of recollecting, remembering and comparing” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.50). Pallasmaa is obviously influenced by Merleau-Ponty according to action and movement. He discussed it as *immersion*, although he did not declare that. Meaning that he focused only on one process to engage with the world, neglecting the motivation and the habitual body in the process of interaction. However, his analysis of time consuming through the verb-noun is very essential to this research.

Therefore, *verb* or *verb-noun* is what matters in encountering the subject with the object, and this can complete Hirose’s (2002) hypotheses for defining the dynamic aspect of embodiment, which is the act of embodying, where the verb can be used to help in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of the experience so as to help the subject to shift to the state of embodiment. For Hirose (2002), engagement is a moment because it takes place when the body takes up the charge to act to embody, and, accordingly, motivations and affordances are necessary to trigger the action verb in encountering. The researcher discusses affordances later in Chapter Four.

Engagement is also accompanied by attention to the context of situation of the subject. As Brady notes, the experience of the individual, and her/his emotions, values, beliefs, associations, and memories become as important as the aesthetic environment. Thus, the aesthetic response, including any judgments

the subjects make, is determined as much by what the subject brings to the experience as by the environment (Brady 2003, 106 as cited in (Axberg 2011)).

### 2.3.1 Personification and Bodily Identification

Personification and identification are other forms of engagement of the subject with the object, where the body of the subject identifies with the object and sometimes projects part of its characteristics towards the object to identify with it again. Pallasmaa confirms that architecture plays a significant role in creating this engagement for the user or the viewer. It can serve as a metaphor for the human mind according to the traditional psychoanalytical view, which posits that the characteristics of architecture are reflected in mental structures and the mental structures are projected in architecture (Pallasmaa 2001). An illustrative example, Pallasmaa presents the fear that Kubrick built in *The Shining* (Kubrick 1980). He created the mounting fear in architectural structures and metaphors in the setting itself (e.g., the repeated image of blood flooding through the elevator doors, corridors, and twins, and the endless corridors) instead of being a succession of frightening events (Pallasmaa 2001). On account of this, architecture shifts the emphasis from external horror to an internal fear in the minds of the characters and the spectators.

Holl argues that the sense of gravity could be defined as the essence of all architectonic structures. Great architecture strengthens verticality of the subject's experience of the world and makes it conscious of gravity and earth (Holl et al. 2007). When the subject internalizes a building in her/his body, the movement, balance, and scale are felt unconsciously through the body as tension in the muscular system and in the positions of the skeleton and inner organs (Holl et al. 2007). Thereupon, Pallasmaa argues that when one gets in contact with the

space or encounters it, one mentally visualizes a complex form from all around oneself and in looking one feels and identifies oneself with its center of gravity (Pallasmaa 2001).

Pallasmaa also highlights that Melanie Klein's (1979) notion of projective identification suggests that all human interaction implies the projection of fragments of the self onto the other person (Pallasmaa 2012 p.46); when experiencing a structure, the subject unconsciously mimics its configuration with bones and muscles to identify with the object. Macleod, Hanks and Jonathan give an example that increased the identification with the space to create an *affective experience* is keeping the diary of Anne Frank in her house until today to create an authentic narrative. Anne Frank hid with her family in a secret annex off the office of her father during World War II until the annex was stormed and the occupants were arrested and deported to concentration camps. Her diaries were found and the annex and the adjacent buildings were together converted into Anne Frank House Museum (Macleod, Hanks & Jonathan 2012). The rooms of the annex have been preserved in their original state with some personal items from the eight residents to recreate real event in a real physical setting in order to make the visitors identify with Anne and all the war victims. Steven Greenberg, an architect working mainly on museums, regards this kind of engagement as active participation, and he calls it *associative identification*. He indicated another kind of identification, namely, *sympathetic identification*, which is the identification that occurs when the visitor expresses a kind of solidarity with a figure who is usually suffering without recourse to active participation (Macleod, Hanks & Jonathan 2012).

Another form of identification is empathy. It was used in the study of aesthetics to describe the way in which observers are able to project themselves into a work

of art, or a thing, or beauty. However, McCardell notes that with the shift in the field of aesthetics, the indication of empathy has moved from the realm of sense-perception to a moral cognitive one (McCardell 2001). In *The Problems of Aesthetics* (1965), Elliseo Vivas refers to the psychologist Anstruther-Thompson who is describing her engagement with the *Venus of Milo* statue noting her bodily reactions and describing her sensations:

*My eye falls on the Venus of Milo. . . . The pressure of my feet on the ground is pressure that I see in a marked degree in the feet of the statue. The lift-up of my body I see done more strongly and amply in her marble body, and the steady pressure of my head I see in a diminished degree in the poise of the statue's beautiful head. These movements I may be said to imitate, but I should find them and imitate them equally in a Renaissance monument or a mediaeval chalice. They are at the basis of all art. Another connection that I feel with her is by the balance and shifting of my weight from side to side in order to follow her balance.*

(Vivas 1965 p.320)

This kind of identification is more bodily and is felt corporeally. It also allows an opportunity to increase engagement so as to offer a more embodied experience.

In film, Hanich believes that the interpretive experience is justified by engaging the spectators via *empathy* and *sympathy* that are facilitated by a character to whom the spectators relate and whom they like, where the spectator shares with the character a congruent emotion (Hanich 2010).

### 2.3.2 Empathy vs. Sympathy

In film studies, Sobchack (1992) and Marks (2000) have shown, based on their theories, that watching a movie is an embodied and emotional experience

that stimulates the senses and makes the spectator react affectively and corporeally. Sobchack (2004) maintains that the emotional response of the viewer is based on the experience of its own embodiment according to its identification with protagonist(s), which shifts her/his gaze into a direct embodied experience that is responsible for the affective response in the filmic experience.

Carl Platinga, a professor of film and media, is interested in cognitive film theory and the role of *affect* in film viewing, emphasizes the significance of the film's formal and textual features for an affective and emotional engagement. Accordingly, narrative and technical practices such as camera angles and shot size are responsible for framing the spectator's possible engagement with characters (Platinga 2009). He follows Murray Smith (1995) who applied a combination of narrative and cognitive approaches to cinema and who made a central contribution to film studies of character engagement.

From the perspective of Smith (1994), the cognitive construction of narrative is a process that has three levels of engagement to create a structure of *sympathy*; *recognition*, *alignment*, and *allegiance*. The weakest level of engagement in sympathy is *recognition*. It is concerned with identifying the characters and their presence on screen in terms of the number of times they show up to make the viewer recognize them. *alignment* describes "the process by which spectators are placed in relation to characters in terms of access to their actions and what they know and feel" (Smith 1994 p.41). Within this context, Smith (1994) proposed two interlocking functions for *alignment*; *spatial attachment* and *subjective access*. *Spatial attachment* is related to the capacity of the narration to restrict itself to the actions of a single character (Smith 1994) whereas *subjective access* relates to the degree of access the viewer has to the subjectivity of characters, which varies from character to another within a narrative (Smith 1994). On the other hand,

*allegiance* concerns the moral and ideological evaluation of characters by the spectator. While *recognition* and *alignment* provide the viewer with an understanding of certain mental states and traits on screen, *allegiance* comprises emotional and intellectual response to the characters and their actions. Accordingly, he demonstrates that *allegiance* to a character causes a form of engagement that positions the viewer within the discursive and textual frame of the film (Smith 1994).

Merleau-Ponty states that “I can understand the function of the living body only by enacting it myself, and only in so far as I am a body” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.75). As the other form of engagement, *empathy*, which is attributed to imagination, is the capacity for entering imaginably into the situation of another person or animal (Axberg 2011), and the mental entering into the feeling or spirit of a person or thing (McCardell 2001). In the context of movement and the memory of movement, Axberg (2011) confines *empathy* to the higher senses of seeing and hearing, and McCardell (2001) refers it to touching, to make it appreciative perception or understanding

In Hanich’s (2010) opinion and drawing upon Smith (1994), there are two forms of *empathy*: *imaginative empathy* and *somatic empathy*. They support each other in the film experience and both can be separated heuristically. *Imaginative empathy* is the empathy which emerges when the viewer takes over the perspective of the character so as to imagine the character from inside and feel what she/he feels at the moment. It has a cognitive component because the viewer has to assess and evaluate the situation of the character (Hanich 2010).

On the other hand, the *somatic empathy* works with the body physically. Hanich (2010) defined three forms of *somatic empathy*; *sensation*, *motor mimicry*, and *affective mimicry*. *Sensation* has to replicate the sensation of the character for

example when a hot needle is pierced in the character's eye. In *motor mimicry*, the viewer mimics the muscular actions of the character, which can have a tension or relaxing effect, or even the character's breathing. As Hanich sees it, in dread scenes, mimicry is actually fearful experience that usually results in the viewer's own lived-body constriction because of the stillness in the dread. *Affective mimicry* comes from the anticipation of fear and is reflected in facial expressions. Thus, when the viewer mimics a fearful face, it physically feeds the emotional experience to increase the feeling of fear or suspense to be similar (if not identical) to the fearful character (Hanich 2010, 183).

In the genre of film, Hanich (2010) looked into the somatic experience of the spectator, the body reactions, and the related pleasure. He suggested that the components of fear do not elicit fear and that the fear-related lived body experience of constriction supports the constrictive tendency of fear (Hanich 2010).

According to Van Manen, empathy and sympathy form a certain type of relational understanding that correspond to engagement in other people's lives. This understanding is relational, situational, corporeal, temporal, and actional (van Manen 2007), and that is what makes the phenomenology of practice a better approach to understanding these relations. Hanich asserts that in *empathy*, the viewer feels with the character while in *sympathy*, on the other hand, the viewer feels for the character, not with the character, because of the vulnerability of the character in dread (Hanich 2010 pp.183–185). Consequently, *empathy* is powerful in feeding the action as the viewer holds the situation in *empathy* to act or to want the character to act. The shot sizes and the technical devices in film, in addition to the narrative, lead to generation of *empathy* and *sympathy*. In general, Deleuze (1992) and Hitchcock (1995) consider the close-up shots as the

shots that create an *affection-image* (Deleuze 1992; Hitchcock 1995), and, as a result, increase the *empathy*. Nonetheless, this is not a rule as the situation is different from film to another, from context to another. Subsequently, once the researcher starts describing scenes taken from different films they will be described in more detail. Having introduced and discussed the philosophy of engagement, in the next two sub-sections the researcher touches upon the entities involved in the encounter, namely, the subject and the object.

## 2.4 Subject

*The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects.*

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.499)

The main pivot of phenomenology is the subjective experience and the role of the body in this experience. In consequence, the subject is the central component of embodiment. In defining the relationship between subject and object, Merleau-Ponty (2002) illustrated that sensation and perception cannot exist except by being a perception and sensation of something. Although the object is determinate as an identifiable being and has an open series of potential and possible experiences, it only exists for a subject to carry out the identification. Merleau-Ponty (2002) counted the subject as a significant factor in perception and acting towards the world, in contrast with the empiricism researchers and their view on the subject. He founded his ideas on the thoughts of Kant and took them further. Kant has been defined by Kristensen (2015) as intermediate between empiricism and intellectualism. He took the empirical sense experience as the base for all knowledge while holding the rational thought to see the world

in the first place to give the ultimate value to the objective and universal way of seeing and understanding the world; things in themselves. Merleau-Ponty took this hybrid idea further and put the human body in the center. He recognizes the value of seeing the world as 'we' see it, i.e., subjectively, not objectively. He sees the person as a spatio-temporal creation with access to ever-changing perspectives and views of the world (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999; Kristensen 2015; Seamon 2017).

According to Merleau-Ponty, the subject engages with the world through a process that includes perception, cognition, movement, and action (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999). In film, Elliott considers the spectator as a subject, who exists as a conscious self, namely, "a site of affect, an archive of bodily experience past and present, a corporeal sense-making machine and a surface of intensities" (Elliott 2011 p.45). This means that the subject is necessary in recording the body experience and its situation of existence, or in Heidegger's term, of *being-in-the-world*. This takes place and stresses the constitution of the sense of *being*, in which Heidegger refers to every particular mode of being finds its source and ground. Knowing for him is a mode of *being* because every moment of practical acting and knowing takes place to involve the subject in the world (van Manen 2007; Heidegger 1996).

For further understanding of the subject, this research progressed to investigate concepts of the body and its process of consciousness through the notion of a corporeal experience.

#### 2.4.1 The Body

MCcardell states that by the 17<sup>th</sup> century the concept of the body had acquired cultural objecthood. Bodily experiences that drop in and out of

consciousness and awareness, gave rise to theories of dualism (duality in mind and body) for Descartes. Then, in the rise of science in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and under the influence of Cartesian thought, theories identified the body with all aspects such as mind, desire, emotions, and affordances (McCardell 2001). While in Film, Marks and Hanich concur that any project that speaks of embodiment speaks of the flesh in which corporeality speaks (Marks 2000; Hanich 2010).

Many theorists have subsequently discussed the body and its role in experiencing the world, including Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl (2001) raised attention to the role of the body in perception, but Carman argues that Husserl for granted the cognitive attitudes than the body skills (Carman 1999). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty based his entire phenomenological approach and understanding on notions of body intentionality and skills. He did not deny or doubt the existence of the mental phenomena but insisted on the premise that thought and sensation occur only against a background of perceptual activity in which the subject understands in bodily terms by engaging with it (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

Schmitz and Griffero concludes that Husserl's account of the body, which is a field for localization of feelings, not a subject of experience, is an account of the personal body or the *felt-body* defined as (*Leib* in German language), not of the physical or material body defined as (*Korper* in German language) (Schmitz et al. 2011; Griffero 2014). From his viewpoint, what locates sensations in the body is the tactile sensations involved in touching, not the visual or auditory sensations, because by means of touch, the body can locate tactile sensations, which cannot be located by the eye or the ear. Thus, for Husserl, the touch is the main sense to create the experience of the body. He clarifies that after perception, the body turns from *Korper* into *Leib*, then the sensations proceed to act corporeally.

But since Husserl concentrated only on touch and its concerns such as pain and cold, the body of eyes is not a body for him. In order to understand the body as a subject experience, the object, its perception, and awareness have to be considered in the process. In view of this, Merleau-Ponty broadened his look at the body to consider it as a “system of definite powers” that is “suddenly decentralized, broken up and reorganized under a fresh law unknown to the subject or the external witness, and one which reveals itself to them at the very moment at which the process occurs” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). In addition, the human body has the power of appropriating or taking up “significant cores which transcend and transfigure its natural powers” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). In other words, the human body, based on the different external powers, copes with new situations, turns into a new locus of metastable possibilities, and becomes the center of a world of new meanings that can call to its powers that the interaction of the body with the world is continuous and never-ending changing process. This power of the body makes it act as a work of art.

#### *2.4.1.1 The Body as a Work of Art:*

Merleau-Ponty proposes that the body should be understood as a work of art, not as an object, which implies that he thinks of the living and acting body. Just like the work of art, the body, as a negotiation of impersonal forces, turns it through a creative operation into an individual to turn the past into a harmonious gesture towards a future or into a physical action while interacting with the world. Accordingly, the meaning of the body is tied to the networks of meaning that surround it to make up its cultural and historical milieu (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999).

In his study of engagement of the body with the world, Merleau-Ponty (2002) suggested a model of perception, cognition, and movement. He described *immersion*, the merging of the subject with the object, where there is no distinction between them; the movement and action happen unconsciously.

Merleau-Ponty's concept of *body schema* is developed by the *Gestalt* notion. *Body schema* is a group of skills and capacities that establish the precognitive familiarity of the body with itself and with the world it inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 2002). This process turns the unfamiliar situation into a familiar situation. Merleau-Ponty interprets that the subject responds to, and anticipates, familiar situations as typical instances, stereotypes or habits. The *body schema* is, therefore, neither a mere copy of the existing parts of the body nor the global consciousness of it. Rather, he defines it as a dynamic system that "appears to me as an attitude with a view to a certain actual or possible task" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.100). Therefore, the body schema is the reference point that establishes a stable perceptual background for the perceived object and it can respond to changes and movements in any environment.

Merleau-Ponty argues that the concept of *body schema* is essential to the concept of *habit*; a group of skills that are ready to anticipate the world prior to the formation of thoughts and judgment (Merleau-Ponty 2002). *Habit*, as Landes defines according to Merleau-Ponty, makes the body take up meanings towards the world through catching of a set of potentials that may or may not express themselves in the future (Landes 2013). Accordingly, *habit* is defined by Merleau-Ponty as consisting of non-cognitive, pre-conceptual motor intentionality. This is considered as a manifestation of the perceptual body that understands in the acquisition of habit, but it does not react as a reflection to consciousness and is not a function of a reflective thought (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Based on the concept

of habit, there can be a *habitual body*, which is a body that performs the meaning unconsciously on the basis of the familiar situation. On the other hand, there is the *actual body*, which is the body that reacts to the meaning of the world consciously and at the moment (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999; Landes 2013).

The concept of habit is necessary in film. It is built from the beginning to put the viewer in the world of the film, in order to understand what the familiar is and what is not. Accordingly, in dread, the viewer can take up meanings towards the world and catch the potentials to be more engaged to the screen. All those meanings create a base for the body to act towards the narrative.

Merleau-Ponty (2002) described how the body acquires a *habit*. He stated that “to learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of one’s own body: it is to enrich and recast the body schema” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.177). Landes notes that this implies that the acquisition of a *habit* is a process of compiling unconnected movements into a particular gesture that will remain hidden in the body until a situation calls for its unified powers (Landes 2013).

In his illustrative example of how one falls asleep, Merleau-Ponty clarified that it is not a decision which the subject reveals, but is a process through which the subject enters the world to prepare its body for sleep; “I lie down in bed, on my left side, with my knees drawn up; I close my eyes and breathe slowly, putting my plans out of my mind” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.189). Those preparations have the potential to enact a bodily recognition of these possibilities where the subject acquires the habit of sleeping. Stated otherwise, the body works as art and negotiates to enact and communicate to be in a *situation* “which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, now becomes my very being, and sleep, until now aimed at as a significance, suddenly become a situation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.246).

If one tries to relate the work of the body according to Merleau-Ponty to the conception of Hirose, then the moment of acquiring a *habit* looks like the *act of embodying*, which is a dynamic process. Once the body sleeps and turns into the sleeping situation, its state looks like the state of *being embodied*, which is a static condition, where all the body is surrendered to that particular situation. The way how the body reacts to some motivations which affect its being in the world is enough to make the body a *work of art*. Now the research should distinguish between the felt-body and the physical body to understand the corporeal experience.

#### 2.4.1.2 *Korper and Leib; the Corporeal Dynamics*

Hermann Schmitz is a German phenomenologist who outlined a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena to involve them in the human experience. During the period 1964-1980, he worked on a system of philosophy the central part of which was the *felt-body (Leib)*. This system offers a phenomenology of the felt-body and other forms of embodied experience to produce the phenomenological theories of subjectivity, emotions, and feelings (Schmitz et al. 2011). The *felt-body (Leib)* for Schmitz manifests in the affective atmosphere. It lacks the surface space but occupies an *absolute* and non-geometrical space and exceeds the skin contour to occasionally coincide with the material body (*Korper*). For Schmitz, the material body is a stable extended object of natural science that is endowed with a surface (Schmitz et al. 2011; Griffero 2014).

Schmitz's new approach of looking at the body created a *New-Phenomenology*. The central concept and organizing principle of his philosophy is the *felt-body* and any key idea or concept comes into focus with it. It is necessary for Schmitz not

“to reify the felt-body and dualistically oppose it to the material body” (Schmitz et al. 2011 p.244). In his *New-Phenomenology*, he focused on human experience in the *felt-body* by discussing the *vital drive*; the corporeal dynamics in expansion and contraction. Expansion is defined as the openness of the felt-body to the social surroundings whereas contraction is what happens when the felt-body hides itself from the gaze of the surroundings (Schmitz et al. 2011; Hanich 2010; Griffero 2014). This *vital drive* of contraction and expansion is necessary in the process of eliciting feelings like anger, sorrow, guilt, joy, and shame. In anger, for example, the felt-body hides itself from the surrounding (contraction, or narrowness, or constriction). Then, it expands and opens itself to the social surroundings (expansion or vastness). In shame, the opposite occurs, that is, the felt-body starts with expansion and ends with contraction (Schmitz et al. 2011). Hanich adds that Joy has a tendency of expansion of the lived body, while in sorrow and guilt the lived body experiences constriction only (Hanich 2010).

Griffero outlines that Hermann Schmitz considers the head, the chest, and the sole of the foot as *corporeal isles* in which the felt-body identifies itself each time. He considers them as *felt-body isles* that, with the help of the *bodily schema*, merge at a certain point in a person’s development to become physical body (Griffero 2014). By so doing, Griffero concludes that a corporeal communication can be achieved with all what is perceived, be it mobile or immobile. This explains for him how the body can perceive and feel what is seen and how it can perceive the atmosphere as oppressive or elating character of a given environment (Griffero 2014).

Julian Hanich has drawn upon the *New-Phenomenology* of Hermann Schmitz. He further explained that fear is mainly located at the constrictive end; the viewer experiences the fright of the threatening object as a constriction lived body. While

trying to understand Schmitz's expansive *Away!-tendency*, he adopted the view that fear is also characterized by constricted expansion that creates tension. He distinguished between *relative* and *absolute* locations where the subject's position in geometrical space is the *relative location*. In fear, the subject tries to escape the *relative location*. As an example while watching a film, looking away and covering the ears looks like escaping from the *relative* space. However, one cannot escape the *absolute location*, i.e., the lived body's phenomenological 'here', which is the absolute phenomenological location when one experiences constriction in the moments of fear. So, Hanich highlights that the body is trying to escape its skin by expanding away somewhere. However, it cannot flee the lived body's constriction. This produces tension between constriction and the attempted expansion that feeds the experience of the viewer (Hanich 2010 p.103). This explains Griffero's argument that the felt-body communicates with the surroundings, and turns the emotion into a spatial atmosphere, presenting an *absolute location* of subjective orientation in order to create the dimension of surfaceless space (Griffero 2014).

In the opinion of Schmitz, the oscillation between the lived body constriction and expansion and its affective involvement with the atmosphere will lead eventually to corporeal feelings and, accordingly, to self-consciousness (Schmitz et al. 2011). This kind of engagement will increase the *somatic empathy*, since it is felt, and also the *imaginative empathy*. Subsequently, it will increase the corporeality of the viewer.

#### 2.4.1.3 *The Aesthesiological Body*

In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty addressed the notion of the body that slips underneath consciousness. As a pre-reflective, it is the body that

exists under the subjects' egos, which combines sensing and thinking, where the mind thinks and the flesh feels. He refers to this body as the *Chiasm* (Merleau-Ponty et al. 1968). Paul Elliott thinks of the *chiasm* as the flesh of thought, or perhaps the thoughts of the flesh, because it posits a body capable of autonomous sense making and of sub-conscious, pre-reflective action, which, in turn, grounds the body within the world and increases its consciousness and corporeality (Elliott 2011). This concept can be applied to that of the construction of *cinematic dread*. It complements experience through spatial and temporal characteristics, where the expectations of the viewer start to build a scenario that will create constriction, mainly because of fear. So, the body is corporeally present with full consciousness waiting for the horror or shock, or for the character to act.

#### 2.4.2 Corporeal Presence: Consciousness

For Merleau-Ponty, objects take a relative location and they always exist in the world, irrespective of whether the subject does, or does not, perceive them. The subject always occupies a relative location in the world, but it does not exist the whole time. Merleau-Ponty could not be more explicit by saying that "If we therefore say that the body expresses existence at every moment, this is in the sense in which a word expresses thought" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.192). In other words, the body does not exist at every moment and there are moments that make the subject is existence to *be-in-the-world, here and now*. These moments of existence contribute to the *consciousness* of the subject as Merleau-Ponty states "Consciousness is existence for itself" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.253).

From Merleau-Ponty's perspective, the *expression* of the body is the mirror of its existence and its mystery spreads the obscurity to the perceived world. He believes that the mind is a medium for interaction between being and the world:

*Expression, then, is both a transformation of the world and a being in intersubjective relationships with other embodied subjects. The body is its expression, and meaning exists only in the act of the body in relation to the object of the gesture (the word being read or spoken) and the world that is intended...Expression shows us that there is no 'other' place for meaning or ideal objects, and the problem of the world, and, to begin with, that of one's own body, consists in the fact that it is all there.*

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.230).

Merleau-Ponty (2002) connected the *expression* with meaning. He illustrated that bodies are not like houses which have numbers that indicate their modalities the whole time, but the proper understanding of *expression* is an account of meaning in action.

Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore stated in their book *Body, Memory and Architecture*, one of the first books that survey the role of the body and the senses in architectural experience, that each place can be unique if it affects the subjects' bodies and if it creates a personal world that makes it remembered. This happens when there are transactions between body, imagination, and environment (Bloomer and Moore 1977).

From Merleau-Ponty's point of view, there is *consciousness* of the object and *consciousness* of the self. Consciousness of the object presupposes consciousness of the self. They may be synonyms as well. He elaborates that it is not enough to gaze at the object because the subject should know herself/himself watching or seizing in order to be conscious. If she/he is unaware of herself/himself, then it will look as if it is a third party who is doing so (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

An alternative view was provided by Vivas and Krieger who addressed this tendency towards movement when perceiving specific shapes in architectural building. They ordered the *process of consciousness* into stages to create the empathic response. They stated that “when the bodily feelings are not perceived as localized in the body, they seem to fill the object.” If those feelings or sensations are too weak to induce the attention of the subject, then the subject will project part of itself in the object. However, when the feelings are stronger, then they will make the subject conscious and there will be no projections from the subject’s side towards the object (Vivas and Krieger 1965 P. 321) as cited in (Axberg 2011)). In light of this, one can relate to Merleau-Ponty’s observation that when there is consciousness of something, then this is because the subject is nothing, and the sensations and the material of knowledge are not phases of consciousness, but are part of the constituted world (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.276).

Gerald Edelman, chairman of the Department of Neurobiology at the Scripps Research Institute, maintains that consciousness is a fluid word. He suggests a list of its properties rather than a definition for it. He supports the notion that it is a form of awareness and that it is not a thing but a process whose personal property is possessed by individuals. Consciousness is a continuous and changing process. It deals with objects independent of the self and is selective in time. He also underlined that it is bound up to some degree with volition and decision. Therefore, he argues it relates to intentionality (Edelman 1989 p.4).

What matters in consciousness is the moment; the time. Merleau-Ponty states that “My body takes possession of time: it brings into existence a past and a future for a present; it is not a thing, but creates time instead of submitting to it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.279). He considers the gaze and the look at the object as they give the subject a segment of time; “the synthesis which it effects are themselves

temporal phenomena which pass, and can be recaptured only in a fresh act which is itself temporal” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.279). He confirms that the act of looking must be renewed, otherwise it falls into unconsciousness.

The act of looking as Merleau-Ponty thinks of it is both *prospective*, and *retrospective*. It is prospective because the object is the final stage of the subject’s action of focusing. On the other hand, it is retrospective because it will present itself in its own appearance and as the stimulus, the motive, or the prime mover of the process from the beginning (Merleau-Ponty 2002). In this case, the object is based on this idea of unfolding in time, which, in turn, justifies creating it instead of submitting to it. Building on that, one can consider the time in dread scenes to be extending according to the oscillation between what is understood to be a conscious and an unconscious subject.

The concept of *habit* has been discussed earlier as a group of skills that are ready to anticipate the world prior to the formation of thoughts and judgment (Merleau-Ponty 2002). By definition, this means that habit does not meet with consciousness. It is absolutely what the subject does and what she/he perceives and does unconsciously. Merleau-Ponty points to some objects that appear to act as an extension of the body, as in his famous example, the blind man’s stick, which he considers as an extension to his body, not as an object, that is no longer perceived, that is an example of withdrawal from consciousness into unconsciousness.

This issue of tools has been explained by Heidegger. He distinguishes between two kinds of tools. The first type of tool is one which he calls *present-at-hand* if they are used as tools and *Ready-to-hand* if they are used as extension to the body (Heidegger 1996). In the light of this, the blind man’s stick starts as a *present-at-hand* tool which he feels, then, after getting used to, it disappears from

the his consciousness, and becomes part of her/his body. The withdrawal of the object as a tool has attracted some theorists to put theories to relate the action with awareness. Examples include *Flow Theory* and the *Immersion Theory* which the researcher discusses in Chapter Four.

To sum up, in dread, consciousness of the subject increases the corporeal presence of its body because of fear. Fear involves bodily and cognitive preparation according to the *felt-body* constriction and expansion, which create tension in return. Tension increases with uncertainty in terms of when and how the threat is anticipated as coming. Accordingly, it does not include any aspect of *habit*. This uncertainty and tension increase the level of *consciousness*, and once the body feels the tension in its *corporeal isles* (e.g., the chest and the feet) this tension turns into a corporeal presence of fear. If there is any mimicry with the characters, then the viewer will experience the *somatic empathy*, which is also reflected corporeally.

#### 2.4.3 The Logic and Structure of Existence

Merleau-Ponty set a structure for existence depicting the subject's experience of being inside and yet shaping a metastable structure of potentials. The notions or *aspects of existence* pass through three stages: *ambiguity*, *indeterminacy*, and *transcendence* (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

*Ambiguity* is the essence of human existence, where everything the subject lives or has in her/his mind has several meanings (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). *The indeterminate* nature of any situation is not an imperfection of knowledge, but rather "[e]xistence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning... in so far as it is the act of taking up a de facto situation"

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196). *Transcendence* is the process by which existence takes up to its own account and transforms from a volunteer into a situation (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196).

*Expression* according to Merleau-Ponty, as it has been discussed above, is regarded as the subject's taking up of a position in the world of its meaning (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.225). One can also consider that in order to reach a state of embodiment, the *act of embodiment*, as has been defined by Hirose (2002), is making another form of *transcendence* because the subject interfaces to take an action. Therefore, these three stages can be considered as the gate to an embodied experience that will eventually result in consciousness and corporeal presence.

To summarize in conclusion, the process that occurs when engaging with a dread scene as follows: the subject perceives the world; she/he enters the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* stages because of the uncertainty; the felt-body identifies itself and, through the *corporeal isles* with the help of the *bodily schema*, merges to become a physical body; with contraction or expansion, the subject is conscious; she/he feels, exists, then takes up; and she/he then expresses an expansive *Away!-tendency* to act, because it cannot escape the *relative space*. On that ground, thriller films and dread spaces can count on using this structure to manipulate the body of the viewer both consciously and corporeally.

## 2.5 Atmosphere

So far, this chapter introduced two major components of the process of embodiment. It started with analysis of the process of encountering, namely, the process of *engagement*, which is responsible for extending the relation between the subject and the object as well as with their mutual encountering. Then, it

introduced the subject and how it can be read as a corporeal entity to be embodied. Subsequently, this section addresses the object which the subject encounters through the medium of atmosphere.

The object can be one thing and it can be a whole situation. What matters in this study is the issue of encountering the subject (the viewer) with the screen. Physically, the screen is an object, but it contains a series of images, narratives, and motion that affect the body of the viewer. For that reason, the object will be discussed as an atmosphere. It can be understood both as an object and as the whole experience produced by the process of engagement.

### 2.5.1 Definition and Ontology of Atmosphere

The phenomenologist Dufrenne (1973) reflected on the concept of atmosphere. Although as Anderson points out, he did not settle on a clear definition of what atmosphere is, he used approximations to support the description of experience. For him, the atmosphere of the aesthetic object elicits feeling or emotion in the viewer. Hence, he counted atmosphere as a singular affective quality through which the subject creates an intensive *space-time* because the atmosphere creates a space of intensity that overflows into a represented world combined from subject and objects or other subjects (Anderson 2009).

Böhme (1993) developed the concept of atmosphere. He viewed it spatially as the ambience where things, situations, and surroundings appeal to the subject. He underlined three aspects regarding the atmosphere. First, the ambience works and creates a specific relation between object and subject. Second, ambience is experienced as a coherent unit; no one can separate the surroundings from the perceptual background and the sensuous experience,

which is the reason why atmosphere can be understood phenomenologically. Third, ambience cannot only be experienced, but it can also be made or manipulated aesthetically to give things or people a certain quality to be perceived in a certain controlled way (Bohme 1993; Norman et al. 2010).

Holl, Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) describe atmosphere as a synthesis of foreground, middle ground, and distant view with the interlocking of time, light material, and details, in addition to the subject to create the *whole* where no one can distinguish the individual elements. They named it the *Enmeshing Experience*, the final condition that makes it impossible to break the perception into a simple collection of geometries, activities, or sensations.

Griffero (2014) developed the concept of atmosphere in his book *Atmospheres: Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces*. He built his ideas on those of Hermann Schmitz and Merleau-Ponty. His book is a key reference for this research regarding Schmitz's philosophy since most of his writings are in German. Griffero considers the atmosphere as emotions arguing that they lose meaning when someone tries to describe them. On that basis, one has *to live in them* in order to understand them. He described the atmosphere as external feelings effused into a "not yet clarified" spatial dimension and tied to situations (Griffero 2014 p.31).

To clarify the definition of atmosphere, Griffero (2014) listed some characteristics of the atmospheric ontology. First of all, he argues that atmospheres do not act as cause of the influence because they are the influences. The atmosphere lies somewhere in-between the co-presence of a subject with her/his felt-body and the object. Consequently, they are not a third party. However, they enter the corporeal communication and are interpreted by both of them. Second, the atmospheres are pure phenomena that exist only when they coincide with their appearance, unlike properties, which exist if they are only thinkable. As a

consequence, atmospheres can have boundaries; *fiat boundaries*, established by the subject's cognitive activity dependent on the perception, or *bona fide* boundaries, due to an immanent qualitative and spatial discontinuity. This makes any change or replacement in the details of the atmosphere threaten that the atmosphere could be changed (Griffero 2014 p.126). Third, atmospheres are not the property of some object, they coincide with their own phenomenic character. Atmospheres most condensed with objects coincide and show themselves through situations. These situations can arouse the atmosphere or take charge of it. Griffero (2014) confirms that anything can be mentioned as atmospheric, only when it grasps a feeling in the surrounding space, i.e., when it makes a difference in the felt space, filled by atmosphere not as material object, but rather as a vibration in which the perceived entity and the perceiver meet and merge.

#### 2.5.2 Perception of Atmosphere

From the standpoint of Schmitz (2002), perception is a “communication of the felt-body [*Leib*] with meaningful impressions” (Schmitz 2002, 38 as cited in (Griffero 2014 p.17)). Griffero (2014) stresses that through the external situations the atmosphere can arouse affective and corporeal conditions in the subject in order for it (the atmosphere) to be perceived. Griffero (2014) adds that the situation is intensely perceived when it escapes ordinary pragmatic relationships. So, what is perceived according to him, and in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's framework, is the significance and the sensible properties of the situation, disjointed from the physical stimulus with emotional salience.

According to Griffero, perceiving the atmosphere is not the elementary sensing of data that happens after the state of things, but is being involved in the things themselves. In other words, it is a holistic and emotional *being-in-the-world* with what is *now-here-for me*, both affectively and corporeally. He also argues that the

intuitive perception of situation is a seventh sense that develops through synesthetic and sensory unity of experience (Griffero 2014 p.17).

Merleau-Ponty (2002) qualifies that the atmosphere works as one unit and cannot be segmented. In this regard, the viewer perceives the atmosphere of dread as a whole, which helps to increase the engagement without segmenting it, to be more embodied while watching. However, Merleau-Ponty states that the subject can divide the atmosphere or describe it according to the moments and meanings that make the objects recognizable to allow its sensible properties to appear (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Then, how those moments affect the subject?

### 2.5.3 Affect of Atmosphere

Griffero argues that what the subject perceives is an atmospheric quality, based on the aesthetics of empathy which the subject refers to. Thus, the atmosphere can be the antagonist that the subject resists or surrenders to. On the other hand, it can be supportive of the subject (Griffero 2014). Griffero argues that sometimes, there are feelings that fill the sentimental space. Such feelings are called *objective feelings* that is, a halo in determined objects, and are felt among one another, such as the bliss of an evening sky or the silence of a gloomy house. He argues that these atmospheres give rise to reactions (i.e., the image-motor effect) to create the mood of the subject (Griffero 2014 p.101).

He argues, that the most affected atmosphere is the one connected to corporeality, and he calls them *corporeal atmospheric affections*. According to him, those affections occur even through the corporeal isles, and they can be produced kinesthetically and synaesthetically (Griffero 2014).

From Schmitz's point of view, the felt-body has corporeal isles through which one can feel the atmosphere and express it through the physical body which

attributes an external and semi-objective existence, not to all feelings, but to the atmospheric ones (Schmitz 1967, as cited in (Griffero 2014)). Griffero interprets the bodily affection through this example, “sadness weighs down the heart and breaks one down, the object of admiration cancels the space that separates us from it, the shame leads to lower one’s gaze and contraction[...]the object of awe pushes us to withdraw and leave[...]the euphoric leads to jump” (Griffero 2014 p.102). Griffero stresses that what matters is the atmospheric qualities not the metaphoric ones. For instance, the qualities rugged, massive, heavy, light, hard, and soft are not metaphoric, metrical, or measurable, but are *corporeal atmospheric affections* that can only be compared in language. As an example, “admiration is less deep than reverence” and “aversion is less deep than despair” (Griffero 2014 p.110). He concludes that in addition to the corporeal isles, corporeal atmospheric affections can be produced kinesthetically in muscles, skin, and eyes to introduce the state of mind. For instance, in pride, the subject straightens up the backbones to produce a muscular sensation akin to the attitude of pride (Griffero 2014). He acknowledges that when the subject experiences spaces that enlarge her/his heart, this happens kinesthetically, not metaphorically; in walking in the forest, the subject breathes freely to expand the thorax, which increases the size of the heart (Griffero 2014 pp.118–119). In another example, Griffero (2014) shows that the *corporeal atmospheric affections* can be produced synaesthetically like the case of the atmosphere of brightness in which brightness is not metaphorical and is not measurable since no one can identify the amount of the solar radiation, but it is given by optical-auditory, olfactory climatic corporeal, where one describes it as the free expansion of the felt-body and, as a result, opens the *absolute location* (Griffero 2014 p.111). The ultimate purpose of those atmospheric affections is *existence*. As Böhme states,

*[there is] the environment that irradiates a qualitatively specific mood, on the other hand [there is] me, who, by feeling a certain way, participate in this mood and realize that I am here now.*

(Böhme 1995, 96) as cited in (Griffero 2014 p.118)).

#### 2.5.4 Energizing Atmosphere

Theorists in geography, criminology, and environmental management like Emma Waterton, Jason Dittmer, Ben Anderson, Tim Edensor, Jennifer Turner, and Kimberley Peters suggest that atmosphere can be engineered along with the effects it is intended to induce, and that the atmosphere can be shaped and co-produced according to the subject as individuals or as groups (Edensor et al. 2015; Waterton and Dittmer 2014; Anderson 2009; Edensor 2012). They suggest that this can be achieved by creating and arranging the light, sounds, and symbols. In fact, Anderson asserts that the atmospheres can also be enhanced, transformed, intensified, and shaped (Anderson 2009). Waterton and Dittmer (2014) maintain that the atmosphere becomes known as it stabilizes subjects to feel its effect and grasp its meaning. In harmony with Duffrenne (1973), Anderson (2009) sees that atmospheres are perpetually forming and deforming, appearing and disappearing, as bodies enter into relation with one another since they are never finished, static, or at rest, and that through this they give the rhythm for movement.

Shaping spatial constructs and imagination is conceived by Labelle as *pluralization*. It is no longer a visual perspective or a graphical language of architecture, but a collaboration of the dynamics such as temperature, weather, lighting, and other sensorial motifs to thicken the atmosphere (Labelle 2011). In

consequence, all kinds of details, in addition to the spaces and their occupants, engineer the atmosphere.

#### 2.5.5 How the Screen and Watching a Film Constitute an Atmosphere

Griffero considers the atmosphere a virtual movement in that it unconsciously “excites in the subject the stimulus to make the same movement” (Griffero 2014 p.49), and he confirms that the intensity of the atmosphere refers to some elements or moments that work as *anchor points* to create a *field of condensation* that make it perceived. One can consider those *anchor points* in film as the points that are generally perceived by the majority of viewers, such as stairs, doors and walls, that filmmakers always work around them to support the film’s atmosphere. As Hanich (2010) sees it, the dread atmosphere is very intense in its story and in its environment and is endowed with an emotional tone in order for fear and anxiety to be presented in an objective space. But the fundamental questions for this thesis are: How, and to what extent can the subject surrender to atmosphere? Can this surrender guarantee all the subjects to experience the same atmosphere? Griffero notes that although the perception of an atmosphere does not imply the recognition of the object in its entirety, but simply its perception happens according to its assessment of its important aspects (Griffero 2014 p.131).

Hanich states that the experience of watching a film is almost guaranteed for the majority of people (Hanich 2010). But how is it guaranteed? Griffero (2014) confirms that no two people can perceive the atmosphere in exactly the same way, but this does not mean that ten people will perceive ten different atmospheres. He refers to the coincidence between the form of perception and its content, for example where there is a common spatial-sentimental-

atmospheric quality that intimidates vastness or contraction. In addition to that, and in agreement with Hanich (2010), he confirms that it is rare for the atmosphere to be completely different and that there is always a common point of view but that it may vary in its extent.

#### 2.5.6 Constricted Atmosphere

From the perspective of Hanich, the atmospheres exist as diffuse emotive colorations of the lived body without concrete object. But some atmospheric elements suggest viewing an experience of constriction and isolation. Hence “the atmosphere of constriction and isolation do not *create* but *facilitate* and *enhance* dread and are therefore almost always part of it” (Hanich 2010 p.171). He describes confined spaces, endless spaces, and labyrinths as examples of *constricted atmosphere* (Hanich 2010). Hanich notes that the constricted filmic space can be confined through tangible elements, such as a cave or a tunnel, or through shots that enclose the character as the technique of frame within a frame as in *Dark Water* (Salles 2005). He also considers desert as in *The Hills have Eyes II* (Weisz 2007), oceans as in *Open Water* (Kentis 2003) and woods as in *Blair witch Project* (Daniel Myrick 1999) as examples of endless spaces. Hanich describes endless space as evoking immediate immensity, which is going deep in the space and staying in real film time with the characters, e.g., in their swimming, walking, or fighting under water (Hanich 2010). As another example, He (2010, 171) counts the labyrinth in its bewildered arrangements as a constricted atmosphere because of the disorienting arrangement and the disturbing feeling they evoke.

Although Hanich in his book pointed briefly to some constricted atmospheres used in dread, but his perspective counted only on architectural settings, without

getting deep in the concept of atmosphere and its relation to the subject or the felt-body as Schmitz and Griffero consider to contribute to the atmosphere. In order to fill this gap and to grasp specific elements of atmosphere phenomenologically, and realize their affect in creating an atmosphere, the research has to address the concepts *thing*, *quasi-thing*, *space* and *place*, in order to enhance the experience of the dread atmosphere, and to come out with other perspectives towards the constricted atmosphere.

### 2.5.7 Thing and *Quasi-thing*

It has been argued that atmosphere is a whole and that it is perceived as a unity. Nevertheless, there is/are always specific item(s) that make(s) atmosphere more perceived in specific moments. Some of the philosophers call such items the *bridge* (e.g., Heidegger), *anchor point* (e.g., Schmitz), *motif* (e.g., Hitchcock), or *encapsulated object* (e.g., Ng).

Heidegger (2001 [1971]) explored the notion of the *bridge* that manifests events and creates places; where the *bridge* connects between banks to make the bank manifested as a bank. In this regard, he notes that the *bridge* preserves the banks against each other and links them together. However, it does not link in a single way, but in a changing and unique way. As such, bridges are always different. Thus, for him, the bridge can gather the environment; the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. This combination is defined by Heidegger as the *thing* (Heidegger 2001; Shīrāzī 2013). Hence, not every single object in the atmosphere can be called a *thing*, but one can assume the atmosphere of fear as a *thing* in its totality according to its nature and the affect it creates for the audience and the character in film. Underneath that *thing* can be other *things* that manifest themselves the atmosphere of fear.

Sometimes, there is a *situation* that makes an atmosphere be perceived in a specific way that cannot be segmented to specific *thing*. This is what is referred to as the *quasi-thing*. Griffero defined it as a situational constraint demonstrated by motor reactions and traced or suggested by the situation itself (Griffero 2014, 35). In this context, Merleau-Ponty (2002) defined the *situation* as a horizon of significance, where the sensory system gives a certain theme and style to look. Drawing from this, Griffero formulated a new definition for atmospheres stating that they are feelings poured out into space; “they are modes of a corporeal communication that at times super subjective and super objective; at times it is dependent on the subject, or condensed into (or anchored to) preferential objects” (Griffero 2014, 108). As a consequence, he concluded that atmospheres are *quasi-things* “whose ecstasies are expressive characters or qualities; these qualities belong where we find them” (Griffero 2014 p.109). This motivates the research to look for *quasi-things* in dread atmosphere, since the atmosphere is a whole and cannot be segmented, in order to collaborate on the constricted atmosphere of Hanich’s (2010). The question now is, how can these qualities affect the subject’s perception of the space?

#### 2.5.8 Place and Space

Seamon states that phenomenologists have become interested in the phenomenon of place, “because it is a primary contributor to the spatial, environmental, and temporal constitution of any lifeworld, past, present or future” (Seamon 2017). Bloomer and Morre (1977) highlighted that each place can be unique, depending on what effects it creates in the subject to be remembered (Bloomer and Moore 1977). In view of that, understanding the difference between space and place is of high importance for this research because the main goal of

embodiment is to engage the subject with the environment *here* and *now*, where, in turn, memories, desires, and emotions are created in the experience.

The meanings of space and place are relative to the user and the moment of experience.

As concluded by Shīrāzī (2013), Heidegger focused more on *place* than on space, because he considers the originality of place-making in the *bridge* establishes a place *over there*. The thing that gathers the four elements of sky, earth, divinities, and mortals establishes the *place*, and, consequently, a space is provided. *Space* for Heidegger is where there is a room for something to exist *within a boundary*, not the boundary at which something stops, but when something begins its process of presenting itself. Therefore, the space finds its essence in locations, not in spaces. Shīrāzī concludes that the *space* is existential not physical. He points out that *making room* is the yielding of places to arrange and prepare an openness in which things belong together and make dwelling possible (Shīrāzī 2013).

Pallasmaa (2001, 2012) contended that the space is not necessary to be geometrized within good shapes and forms, since the most important issue for it is to be habituated and full of emotions within physical boundaries to be considered as lived space. He states that when one perceives the memory, the fear and desire, the value and meaning, then she/he can perceive the lived space (Pallasmaa 2012; Pallasmaa 2001). Pallasmaa (2001) pointed out two kinds of architecture; the *architecture of image* and the *architecture of essence*. The *architecture of image* is the architecture which gives less in the actual encounter than in its photography picture; it offers mere images of form and leaves the audience as spectators only (Pallasmaa 2001). He notes that this is what Lefebvre (1991) was interested in and what he called the *abstract space*. On the

other hand, the *architecture of essence* is defined by Pallasmaa as rich when experienced in an embodied manner; it projects narratives of culture, history, tradition, and human existence, and turns the audience into participants (Pallasmaa 2001).

Seamon (2017) pinpointed the difference between phenomenological definitions of *place* and *environment*. For him, the *environment* always exists, regardless of whether there is, or there is not, a subject to engage with, and as a result, it suggests a separation, objectively and subjectively. But the concept of *place* he argues is more apt phenomenologically because it offers means highlighting that the subject is always immersed in its world that makes it a *lived body* (Seamon 2017). For that reason, he defined *place* as “any environmental locus that gathers human experiences, actions, and meanings spatially and temporally” (Seamon 2017). In light of that, the definition of place ranges from the intimate to the urban scale. For him, the bench in the park can be considered as a place, and a geographical location for regular vacation can be a place as well. However, he argues it is not only the spaces that are appreciated that can be called *place* but also the spaces that are not appreciated (Seamon 2017).

Fiddler is a philosopher in Criminology at the University of Greenwich. His recent research focused on spaces associated with crime and punishment. He looks at the reality of the lived experience in what he terms *vacant space* in the meaning of concepts of *space* and *place* in prisons. He argues that space is the more abstract of the two notions due to the fact that it corresponds to areas and volumes and relates more to the sense of the geometry of an area. Consequently, he counted corridors and doors as *places* and regarded the cell as a *space* only, unless it has a lived experience for the prisoner. Moreover, he suggested that through intervention the *space* turns into a *place* (Fiddler 2009).

In *Short Introduction to Geography*, Creswell (2004) suggested two ways to turn a *space* into a *place*: those of naming and movement. Naming, he argues is one of the ways by which the space can be given meaning and become a place. Movement through a space and the way in which various patterns build-up become meaningful and make a value for space to change it into a place (Cresswell 2004). The movement in dread becomes part of a time-space routine. Hanich determines that the dread atmosphere in film is well known for its *spatial immersion*, which involves movement (Hanich 2010). According to that, the hesitating movement of the character while walking in the dark makes the viewer experience part of this movement and, in consequence, make meanings for those moments and the attached places in the film.

Movement helps the subject to exist and to *be-in-the-world*. *Being-in-the-world* is suggested by Heidegger to express the subject's existence, he argues that it can be achieved by two ways; through *de-distancing* and through the sense of *directionality*; in order to create what he termed the spatiality of *Da-sein* (Heidegger 1996). In the German language, *Da-sein* means being there; to bring things close in the sense of bringing them within the range of its concern. In English Oxford dictionary, it can be translated to mean *existence* (Press 2018).

Heidegger highlights that the act of bringing near requires *de-distancing*, i.e., moving towards the things to shorten the distance. This requires *directionality* in movement, namely, to move to the right or to the left, and/or up or down. *Da-sein* employs these directions together to be grounded *in-the-world* (Heidegger 1996; Shīrāzī 2013). As for the distance and the moment of existence, Merleau-Ponty states that "besides the physical and geometrical distance which stands between myself and all things, a 'lived' distance binds me to things which count and exist for me, and links them to each other. This distance measures the 'scope' of my

life at every moment” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.333). One can conclude that the distance which sums up according to not moving in the space absolutely does not create any engagement between the subject and the world, and, consequently, it will not turn the space into a *place*. Consistent with that, this *Da-sein*, through movement in space, enhances the potential for turning the space into a place.

Definitions of space and place can be a little bit different according to Schmitz, because he considers them with reference to the *material body (Korper)* that belongs to the space of surfaces, and the *felt-body (Leib)* that belongs to surfaceless space (Schmitz et al. 2011 p.245). Griffero summarized his definition through three levels of experiencing space. The first level is *Local Space*, which is founded on relative dimensions devoid of their own features like surfaces, lines, and distance. This space develops its own potentiality to influence the feelings and this potentiality can be called atmosphere, which entitles it to be a lived space. The second space is *Directional Space*, which is a pre-geometrical state of motility, that is, the starting point of a corporeal communication with the surrounding environment, which works according to a motor suggestion to move, but not yet reduced to be a local space. It is a space that is founded on the narrowness and vastness dynamic that is able to create a *vector atmosphere*, one which can be described as “unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or undecided atmosphere” (Griffero 2014 pp.45, 47). The last space is the *Absolute Space*. This space is devoid of surfaces and dimensions. It is the space of the felt-body that has no surfaces and cannot be measured, such as climatic space, the space of silence, and the space of the corporeal isles. Corresponding to this space, Griffero suggest to name those atmospheres as moods. If these moods

are full, then they express a satisfaction. However, if they are empty, then they may express desperation (Griffero 2014).

### *Phenomenal Zones: Heidegger's Things in Film and Architecture*

In another way to change *space* into a *place*, Shīrāzī defines *phenomenal zones* as those which address realms or places where the *thing* is manifested as a *thing*; a gatherer or materials by which a phenomenon reveals its essence (Shīrāzī, 2013). Walls, tunnels, corridors, doors, windows, cellars, basements, staircases, and many other phenomenal zones have been discussed and used by both filmmakers and architects to attach an associational meaning (e.g., Evans (1982), Furuyama (1996), Pallasmaa (2001, 2012), Jacobs (2007), Hanich (2010), Pike (2010), Pheasant-Kelly (2013), Shīrāzī (2013), Eleanor et al. (2015), and Benson-Allott (2015)). As *things*, *phenomenal zones* are named *motifs* by Hitchcock, or *encapsulated elements* defined by Ng (2002, 2009), and termed *phenomenal zones* by Shīrāzī (2013). The following introduce some of the *phenomenal zones* that have been used both in film and architecture.

#### *STAIR [ness]*

The film director, Peter Greenway calls the composition of the scene that contains stair as *stairness* (Bruno 2002). The stair is not an architectural element, but rather one of the primary architectural images. It is a powerful architectural threshold that is employed for linking the exterior with the interior of a building and connecting different living zones. It can provide a place for lingering and loitering (Bruno 2002 p.311), a place for encounters and clashes (Schaal, 2010 as cited in (Eleanor et al. 2015)), and as defined by Shīrāzī a *place* where man is awakened to his body and when he senses his corporeality, and through moving, he encounters other bodies and other people (Shīrāzī 2013). For

example, the staircase in Chikatsu-Asuka Museum leads to nowhere but is meant to intensify the sense of the body and stimulate an experience of space in the physical realm (Shīrāzī 2013).

In literature or film, this architectural feature holds considerable power. In many forms of narrative, the staircase may lead up to a frightening secret locked behind a closed attic door or may descend to a dark mystery cellar, and offer a setting for communication. The meaning may vary and the *mise-en-scène* and cinematography are responsible for supporting its meaning to serve the narrative (Eleanor et al. 2015). As noted earlier, Hitchcock used the staircase as a technique of suspense where “each step advances but also delays the denouncement” (Jacobs 2007 p.28).

Pallasmaa considers the image of a staircase to resemble the imagery of a vertical labyrinth, like David Lynch who looks at the staircase from the point of view of ascending and descending in addition to the camera location while shooting it (Pallasmaa 2001; Martin 2014). Ascending or descending may have semantic meanings, which are referred to as an *expressive space*; rising stairs end in heaven whereas descending stairs lead down to the underworld (Hanich 2010; Pallasmaa 2001; Eleanor et al. 2015). The stairs may also signal a passage into an entirely private and forbidden realm, or a final journey for disclosing a secret. Descending a stairway expresses self-presentation, joining a group, and entry into the public sphere (Martin 2014; Pallasmaa 2001).

The formal characteristics of stairs may have further representational meanings. For instance, the form, height, material, and location of stairs can create a dangerous platform and pose a threat. The staircase in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960) is an example where the staircase was leading to unfamiliar, threatening place for both the detective and the lady. Jacobs and Eleanor note that the location of

the staircase in this Victorian house helped to make the staircase both unknown and unfamiliar for the victims (Jacobs 2007; Eleanor et al. 2015).

### *Corridors*

The director and the film scholar Caetlin Benson-Allott (2015) considers the use of corridors in film as a form of dreadful architecture based on their spatial gravitational pull towards an ending, in addition to the lighting, materials, and dimensions. She argues that they make a non-structured narrative before any character's interpretation in the frame. As an example, she discussed the corridor of *Alien* (Scott 1979). She described the scene as an atmosphere where every component counts to create fear such as the long shots of the camera and the tracking shots which embody the spectator and pull her/him towards an endless space. Benson-Allott (2015) added that those corridors pull the spectator to become physically embodied in the uncanny space until she/he occupies an anthropomorphic space and views it from an anthropomorphic height. She claims that the darkness in the corridor invokes the unknown and that it is, thus, a type of dread architecture (Benson-Allott 2015). The corridor of *Alien* has a visible ceiling that makes it more confined and constricted to look more like a tunnel than a hallway. She describes that this, by turns, affects the perspective and the vanishing point to create a compressed space, providing the viewer with a feeling of entrapment and claustrophobia to accompany a perceptual uncertainty. Thereupon, there is no way else to go but to go in deeper (Benson-Allott 2015). In architecture, Fiddler (2009) discussed the corridor as a growing complex component of movement in prisons in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. He contends that the core logic of the prison is for keeping the individuals within a clearly-bounded area and that the corridors create a series of discrete events when the individuals move within them. In this regard, corridors are considered as places, not spaces, more

than their individual cells, because of those moments of intersection and congregation that are reflected there (Fiddler 2009). Pallasmaa (2001) thinks of the corridor as one path of many doorways that carries a meaning of escaping and a suspense of surprises (Pallasmaa 2001).

### *Doors and the Illusion of Choice*

Doors, as exits and entrances, become highly important in film and theatrical scenographies. In this respect, Ernst Lubitsch is a director who uses doors in a specific way in his films, considering them as charged motifs and as surprise elements. As a theatrical scenography, doors are key scenic elements to be used to frame narrative, suggest circulation, and mark transition. For Macleod, Hanks and Jonathan, they signal beginnings and endings (Macleod, Hanks & Jonathan 2012). Pallasmaa (2001) considered revolving doors as elements of horror. He argues that they generate a feeling of a disorientation and dizziness because of their added motion and surprises.

### *Walls*

Walls are one of the most common elements that are used in different genres of films. For Henri Lefebvre, the 'wall' manifests the Cold War principle of a divided world in the lived space of the city. It expresses a conceptualized representation of space that cannot impose its conception as a spatial reality. The contingency of the division of the city was symbolized physically and psychologically through the wall. Pike explains that it was symbolized physically in the way it is represented as a form and material as a fortified, escape-resistant medium. For example, in film, the 'shoot to kill' orders as in many examples of the old castles are set against walls. On the other hand, walls are symbolized

psychologically in cases like the Great Wall of China as a visible distinction of bounded space to protect its people from invasion (Pike 2010).

Shīrāzī describes how the wall is considered as a central and basic element in architect Tadao Ando's work *Architecture of Wall* (Furuyama 1996). For him the wall symbolizes the sense of separation, and, thus, creates domains and places. The wall affects both rejection and acceptance; rejecting what is needed and accepting what is vital (Shīrāzī 2013). He notes that Tadao Ando gave walls different functions; to cut the sky, light, wind, and landscape, and accept them under powerful conditions, thus allowing natural phenomena to appear. He shows how he used to create subtle openings in the wall to allow the light to be manifested, to allow the landscape to be seen through it as a frame of specific scenery, and to perceive the darkness through the composition of thick walls (Shīrāzī 2013).

In the *Fabrication of Virtue*, Evans (1982) categorized the wall as architecture of barriers, apertures, and interception, and as volume and surface of distance in prisons. As an example, he described some of the prison walls stating that the walls are battered and buttressed on the exterior where no foot can go inside and the tops of the walls left few courses of brick in loose mortar that make the penetration possible only through or from below the wall itself. The wall was heavy because of the dense bricks which offer no option to go through it but only for water to go beneath it to make the floor more muddy (Evans 1982 p.143). As another point of view related to the prison, one can perceive the conflicted function of the wall as the separation of people affected by Berlin's wall and that affected by the proposed wall between the United States and Mexico.

In film, the purpose of presenting the wall varies. It can be a symbol of separation between two worlds, e.g., death and life. Thus, it is described as the blockage of

any passage between the worlds as in *Der Tunnel* (Bernhardt 1933), or the protector of a city from invasion as in all the historical and phantasy films (e.g., *The Lord of the Rings* (Jackson n.d. 2001; 2002; 2003)), where every single wall expresses the city architecturally and metaphorically (Abuhassan 2009).

Hanich (2010) considers the wall as an isolator; the sound is absorbed within it to create no sound in the outside, which makes it a restricted place. He exemplifies a scene from the *Silence of the Lambs*(Demme Jonathan 1991) when Clarice was getting down to Lecter's cell, where the walls of the cellar were buried and five metal doors were shut behind her to become totally isolated and on her own.

### *Tunnels*

In contrast to walls, tunnels can provide the underground connections across a division that is caused by walls or other similar barriers. The tunnel is used as a means of escaping in real life and in some films. It is sometimes used as a trap because of its constricted atmosphere. For example, Pike traces in symbolic history that the underground has always functioned as the negative image of the world above, as an agitation, and as a homeless place (Pike 2010) as in *The Third Man* (Reed 1949).

In film, Pike argues that the function of the tunnel differs according to the genre it follows and the condition of the tunnel. For instance, in war films and in prison films the tunnel serves as a metaphor for the resonance of a rebirth (Pike, 2010), e.g., *The Shawshank Redemption* (Darabont 1994) and *Les Misérables* (August 1998). In regard to its condition, a dry tunnel means an un-conflicted passage while a wet, muddy, and smelly tunnel is a space with moral issues. In his article, *Wall and Tunnel: The Spatial Metaphorics of Cold War Berlin*, Pike (2010)

confirms that the metaphor of underground passage asserts the equality of everyone, either negatively or positively (Pike 2010).

### *Basement*

Eleanor argues that the basement is different from the cellar in that it is an underground floor that has windows whereas the cellar is an underground floor that functions as storage place and does not have windows. However, in film both words are used to denote the meaning of cellar ( Eleanor et al. 2015).

Lefebvre equates basement with the space of death since “it has a secrecy” (Lefebvre 1991 p.236). He highlighted that the secrecy of the basement creates a horrific effect for its occupier as in *Psycho* and *The Silence of the Lambs*. Eleanor points out that Gaston Bachelard argues that darkness, as a feature of the basement is what makes it horrifying (Eleanor et al. 2015). Mulvey (1996) and Pheasant-Kelly (2013) describe the basement as an abject space that has allegories and metaphor. *Psycho*, for example, uses the metaphor of Pharo’s tombs, where the basement was the real identity, not the super ego or even the ego (Jacobs 2007). In view of this, the basement was the space for threat, caution, and illicitness for what it corresponds to in terms of its phenomenology. In addition to the darkness and metaphor, the location of the basement adds another factor to help in identifying its role and affordances. Martin (2014) underlined that those factors steer the character to perform in a specific way and that they frame her/him an activity as a performance. For Lynch, the basement functions as “a sanctuary, attitude and behaviors allow the protagonist to break free from the restrictions placed on them and it becomes a site of expressivity and performances, belies their social status outside of that space” (Eleanor et al. 2015, 56).

The aim of employing phenomenal zones confirms the concept of the *thing* and its effectiveness in creating a *place* instead of a *space*. But does having phenomenal zones in any space guarantee the wanted experience? And how can using the same elements create different experiences every time?

Answers to these two questions will be discussed in the subsequent section in the light of the concept and practice of *creating an event*.

## 2.6 Phenomenology of Event

The concept of *event* was introduced in architectural terms by Bernard Tschumi in 1980. He defined it as the activities that actually happen in the space. He argued that architecture and its social relevance and formal invention cannot be disconnected from the events that occur in it (Tschumi 1994). He explored the *event of architecture* through the theme of violence and did this under two scenarios: *formal violence* and *programmatic violence*. *Programmatic violence* is related to occasions when actions, events, and programs, by accident or design, serve evil purposes like designing narrow corridors for a big crowd of people. On the other hand, *formal violence* deals with conflicts between objects and forms, which take place when the forms attack each other geometrically to create some gaps (Tschumi 1994).

What relates to this thesis, is the perspective of the psychologist Rune Mølbaek who had further elaborated the process of creating the *event* architecturally. He defined the 'event' as a creation of place, i.e., bringing something into being in a period of time (Mølbaek 2012). As such, the event transcends the subject with its perceivable experience and the object as a state of affairs into something that can happen within *space-time*. In Mølbaek's opinion, the phenomenology of the

*event* can be created by means of an experience between the subject and the object. The subject may have an experience, but in order to create the *event*, Mølbak (2012) suggests creating *the* experience which the subject undergoes, not the experience she/he has. He considers surprise, shock, and similar experiences are important factors to create *the* experience, and this strengthens the relationship between the subject and the object in an encounter (Mølbak 2012). Ahmed defined the term *encounter* as a meeting between the self and the unknown (stranger) that involves surprise and conflict (Ahmed 2000). Oakley considers shock and conflict are able to change the subject to create a new experience, which is, in turn, able to violate the familiar view; to unsettle, to challenge and transform the subject (Oakley 2001 as cited in (Mølbak 2012)). Paul Carter, a pioneer in sonic ambiguity research, confirmed that having the phenomenal nature of shock and surprise is necessary to produce the productive ambiguity in order to energize the atmosphere (Carter 2000 as cited in (Labelle 2011)). This is interesting in the context of film, especially in dread, because the ambiguity and uncertainty grab the viewer's body forcing it into action to go into a new *situation*. With the help of *empathy* and *sympathy*, this ambiguity will increase the corporeality and the *consciousness* of the viewer. Subsequently, the ambiguity can be productive in creating *the* experience, which in turn, engages the viewer, creates *places* more than *spaces*, and eventually embodies the viewer.

Mølbak (2012) holds that every event is unique and never repeated exactly the same because of the different interactions between the subject and the object. He also supports that every event is a transformation of another event; it is a pure creation and that is why it is called experience. That justifies how using a

*phenomenal zone*, such as stairs or a door, is different every time it is designed and can create a different experience every time it is used.

## 2.7 Conclusion




Diagram 2-1: Process of Embodiment

Diagram 2-1 summarizes the process of embodiment used in this thesis, which structures the relationship between the viewer and the screen, to turn the subject into a corporeal, active subject and extends her/him to be part of the world. This chapter discussed three main elements of the process of embodiment: engagement, subject, and atmosphere. Engagement is the process of encountering between the subject and the object, which is necessary for a lived experience. This chapter introduced some notions of engagement in architecture and film, but what matters for the purpose of this thesis is the engagement through *sympathy* and *empathy*. The subject is the viewer or the spectator and is the central component of the engagement process. The literature reviewed in this chapter paved the way for a realization of how the body can exist *in-the-world*. The atmosphere is the object and the whole experience produced by the engagement process. This chapter presented some situations and objects that have the ability to enhance the dread experience by virtue of their motor reactions so as to create an atmosphere of fear to create a corporeal experience.

Discussion of the phenomenology of *place* was necessary because it is a primary contributor to the spatial, environmental, and temporal constitution intended to

engage the subject with the world. When a *space* turns into a *place*, this indicates that the constitution affected the subject consciously and corporeally.

This chapter also mentioned phenomenological characteristics of some elements that are generally used in film and architecture, such as stair, wall, door, and corridor. These elements have the quality to be named *phenomenal zones* because they have a corporeal effect and can turn the *space* into a *place* if energized by the whole atmosphere, but what matters to create *the* experience within an event of fear, is not only the *thing*, but the situation of the *thing*; *quasi-thing*. The following chapter elaborates on the process of encountering that connects the subject to the atmosphere.

PART ONE:

Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

Chapter Two: Embodiment

Chapter Three: Structure of Encountering

Chapter Four: The Affective Experience



## Chapter Three: Structure of Encountering

The previous chapter discussed embodiment as a process involving the subject, and the object/atmosphere. It also introduced philosophical readings of their engagement in film studies; as means to evoke *sympathy* and *empathy*. Understanding the phenomenology of embodiment entails an understanding of the process of encountering between the subject and the object. The relationship between the subject and the object passes through three reciprocal, never-ending processes: perception, movement, and action. This chapter deals with the embodiment of the spectator while watching a dread scene in a thriller film where the subject is the spectator and the object is the screen. It addresses the issue of how the subject can have a lived experience through perception, movement, and action while she/he is sitting on a chair and is embodied in the dread atmosphere. To begin with, it establishes the phenomenological reading of perception by Merleau-Ponty in the context of other theorists to relate its role in film construction.

### 3.1 Perception

Merleau-Ponty (2002) described perception as the key for all knowledge. For him, perception is seeing, tasting, hearing, and sensing, or doing any act to provide the subject with knowledge about the world. He considers perception as a process of *knowledge-bringing event* (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.35). Merleau-Ponty (2002) calls for finding the value of anything by perception, which opens a fundamental foundation to all knowledge, and the key is in describing knowledge, not constructing it (Carman 1999; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Seamon 2015).

In order to get access to the *knowledge-bringing event*, one has to know the relationship between subject and object; the more the subject interacts with the

object, the more knowledge she/he gets (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Many theorists agree with Merleau-Ponty and describe this kind of perception as *active perception* and relate it to early learning. Some of them consider toddlers as providing the best example of active perception as they do not just touch their toys while playing, but they also bite them and try to decompose them so as to learn more about them (Macrae et al. 2013; Duncan and McCauley 2008; Holl et al. 2007; Whitney 2014).

### 3.1.1 The Structure of Perception

Merleau-Ponty focuses on the relation between the subject and the object as an intertwined and non-separable relationship that exists in order to grasp meaning from the context. He concentrates on *perceptual consciousness* since the subject is a conscious being and also on the structure of the object itself (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Landes 2013).

As a *gestalt* concept, *structure* is defined by Landes as a whole whose parts cannot be defined independently of their place within that whole. It points to a certain unity or internal harmony that is held by a system (Landes 2013). In this context, it is important to mention that Merleau-Ponty uses the terms *structure*, *form*, *system*, and even *order* interchangeably to refer to the *structure*. However, as Whitney points out, he uses the word *structure* when he speaks of higher level behavior or consciousness (Whitney 2014). For Merleau-Ponty, the *structure of perception* is the structure of the seen and the structure of subject's consciousness, where this combination guides the subject to grasp what perception is and to describe the essence of perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Landes 2013).

For further realization of the concept of structure, one has to differentiate between two kinds of perception: *natural perception* and *analytical perception*. Merleau-Ponty (2002) gave an illustrative example to determine the difference between these two kinds of perception by describing a landscape on a misty day where the sky is not clear and is gradually becoming a monotonous grayness. From the *analytic perception* perspective, as discussed by the Cartesian empiricists and intellectualists, he argues that the landscape is there and it is determinate on the basis of logic and the rational thought, and the object exists, even if there is no one to interact with it. However, temporarily, at the moment, based on the thick grey mist, the landscape does not exist in the *natural perception* and is, thus, indeterminate, unclear, and vague. This form of perception refers to the subject, not to the object, and follows the experience of the subject. Merleau-Ponty does not neglect the role of the mind since by discussing the concept of *analytical perception*, augmented by paying more attention, he highlights that the subject can perceive the landscape even if it is misty (Merleau-Ponty 2002 pp.35–37).

Natural perception is not the opposite of Analytical perception, but it is different, and the subject's perception differs from day to day and from person to another. So, natural perception is indeterminate and the perceived object is vague, uncertain, and undefined. Furthermore, the object cannot be seen as separable from its context and can be understood in more than one way (Merleau-Ponty 2002). In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty argues that the *structure of perception* is constructed of the whole perception between the structure of subject's consciousness and the structure of the seen. The structure of the object is contextual and equivocal in its meaning. This denotes the ambiguity and the shifting of the structure of the subject consciousness as an opening towards the process of learning. According to a phenomenological approach, *describing* is the

path for knowledge rather than *construction* or explanation of it (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

The indeterminate action or event is a positive phenomenon for Merleau-Ponty because “It is in this atmosphere that quality arises. Its meaning is an equivocal meaning; we are concerned with an expressive value rather than with logical signification” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.7).

### 3.1.2 Complete Perception vs. Incomplete Perception

In *Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture*, Holl, Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) clarified that *complete perception* is formed by the synthesis of foreground, middle ground, and distant view, taken all together, with the subjective qualities of material and light. They added that the merging of all these details creates the final condition and that this makes it impossible to break an atmosphere into a simple collection of geometries, activities, or sensations. They call this condition the *enmeshing experience*. On the other hand, they consider experiencing a city as an example of *incomplete perception* because the perspective is fragmented and incomplete, that is, its parts are not equally represented (Holl et al. 2007 p.48). But, they point out, this does not stop the subject from perceiving it because of the *bodily schema* that completes its spatial layout. Therefore, perception of the object changes continually as the viewer shifts its attention (Holl et al. 2007). This framework does not contradict Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual structure since the concept of *incomplete perception* supports and confirms the ambiguity and uncertainty of perception based on the subject’s consciousness. It also explains why perception may be different from one person to another. However, the idea of *complete perception* can oppose Merleau-Ponty’s understanding if it is considered as a

Part One: Structure of Encountering  
state of determinate and concrete perception. However, if one understands it as the *enmeshing experience*, then it will still support the concept of the *perceptual engagement* of the subject with the world.

### 3.1.3 Perceptual Engagement

Merleau-Ponty (2002) regards perception as the manifestation of consciousness in one's daily bodily engagement with the world. This interaction occurs according to the sensory mode of engagement with objects and spaces. In *Affective Atmospheres*, Anderson (2009) confirmed that what is most important is to create more sensed than understood architecture, which can be achieved by revealing smell, touch, movement, and walking, or even dark voids, to create memory because creating new sensations creates memories.

Merleau-Ponty confirms that senses and sensory experience are the first reasons and methods of knowledge acquisition, which is a reading that opposes and undermines Cartesian-based intellectualism and empiricism as sources of true knowledge, where they consider rational thought as the first reason for knowledge and that the senses come second.

### 3.1.4 Synaesthetic Perception

The *Phenomenology of Perception* investigates the existence of a person's body that refers to the sense experience. Merleau-Ponty stated that the "sense experience is the vital communication with the world which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.61). He thinks of the ears and eyes as only instruments of bodily excitation, not of perception, because they cannot ensure any cognitive power for the notion of perception. Therefore, the eyes see and the hand touches (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.246), but

alone they do not contribute to the world of experience (Merleau-Ponty 2002). So, what about blind or deaf people? How can the senses contribute to their perception?

Merleau-Ponty (2002) maintains that all the senses are spatial if they are to give accessibility to the form of existence and being and that they are not separable in terms of the sense of communicating. They, all, must open up to the same space. For example, if someone sees a blue ocean and hears the sound of movement of its water, then she/he will perceive it as a whole, without connecting it to relevant sense. The unity of the space can be discovered only in the interplay of the sensory realms, and this can create “concrete moments of a comprehensive configuration which is the one and only space, and the power of going to it is inseparable from that of cutting oneself from it by the sequestration of a sense” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.257).

Merleau-Ponty (2002) argues that the senses are spatial, but not equally so. For example, sight is more spatial than the sense of touch. This has been pointed out after a blind man performed an operation and expressed his enjoyment at *seeing* the space. But what conclusion does that draw? Merleau-Ponty confirms that each organ explores the object in its own way; the blind person uses touch instead of sight because it opens up to the setting of the visual data. Hence, it is argued by Merleau-Ponty that sight is nothing unless the subject uses it.

Merleau-Ponty states that colors are the first thing captured by the blind person after she/he is enabled to see. Once colors are learned, the gaze shifts, but the subject deals with them in the way she/he uses her/his hands for touch. What proves this is for Merleau-Ponty is the fact that to distinguish a circle from a rectangle by sight the person runs her/his eyes round the figure. She/he will do that with the hands. Thus, the blind person tends to take hold of objects by the

hands before the eyes, which explains why touch presupposes a setting for visual data to exist (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.259).

The study of the blind person's experience of vision led Merleau-Ponty to the conclusion that touching is not seeing and that tactile perception never has the fullness of visual perception and never presents its visual parts. In addition, he concluded that touch has another structure which neither sight, nor any other sense, has and which influences its presentation, and that each sense has a type of synthesis that transfigures the object. Merleau-Ponty believes that the senses are distinct from each other and from intellection as each sense brings with it a structure of being which can never be exactly transposed. However, he assures that there is no threat in the unity of the senses. He thinks that even one sense can be unstable and alien to *natural perception*. He cited the example of looking at white sheets (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.263) to support his point of view. The sheets are white, but if the gaze gets closer, then the subject will not see them as purely white. Likewise, if one looks again at the big picture, then these sheets will not be equally white and will appear to be grey. He justifies this by stating that the sensory experience is unstable and is alien to *natural perception*, which is achieved by the whole body at once, and which opens up a world of interacting senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

Merleau-Ponty defined the *perceptual field* by stating that "[T]he perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.4). So, Seamon acknowledges that the perceptual field means that the lived experience is not the sum of isolated sensory inputs, but an integrated lived possibility in each moment of experience where the senses mutually resonate to create a synaesthetic perception, which, by its nature, evokes and engages meaning from the world (Seamon 2017).

Moving on from this in Merleau-Ponty's terms, the sensory experience is defined as a synaesthetic experience because sometimes one can see or listen to an instrument. Further, it speaks directly to all senses and, then, at a subsequent stage, the subject can distinguish the appropriate sense. Merleau-Ponty calls the first stage the *primary level*; a sense experience that precedes its division among other senses. For example, when a flute or violin is playing, "an atmospheric sound between the object and my body, a sound vibrates in me and finally as a last stage in which the acoustic element disappears and becomes highly precise experience of a change permeating my whole body" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.264).

Merleau-Ponty relates directly to movement image experience in stating that the *synaesthetic experience* is responsible for creating this ambiguity of experience. When "such that an audible rhythm causes cinematograph pictures to run together and produces a perception of movement whereas, without auditory support, the same succession of images would be too slow to give rise to stroboscopic movement" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.264). Similarly, sounds have the ability to modify pictures and colors; "a louder note intensifies them, the interruption of the sound produces a wavering effect in them, and a low note makes blue darker or deeper" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.265). In light of this argument, Merleau-Ponty (2002) opposes the Cartesian *constant hypothesis*, which allocates one sensation, and only one, to each stimulus because it is less verifiable as *natural perception* and because the subject cannot limit the stimulus to its specific sphere (the acoustic one in this case).

Merleau-Ponty (2002) attempted to show that senses intercommunicate up opening on to the structure of the thing that appeals to all senses besides sight. "One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the springiness

Part One: Structure of Encountering of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of shavings” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 pp.266–267). He refers that to the data acquired by different senses that belong to separate worlds but communicate through *significance core* properties of the thing. He also underlined that via a *synaesthetic experience* the object expresses itself in the *lpesity* of the thing; “each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, is only an invitation to perceive beyond it as a moment in the perceptual process. And if the thing is reached as ‘reality’ it will be that moment that snatches our grasp” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.271).

From the standpoint of Griffero (2014), all the qualities of the *synaesthetic experience* discussed by Merleau-Ponty can be considered as atmospheric qualities, not metaphoric ones, since they are not measurable but corporeal affections that can only be compared by language. Griffero (2014) calls these qualities *Sinaesthesias*. He, accordingly, states that the “sharp noises, the bright sounds and the sweet events” have synthetic nature and are atmospheric (Griffero 2014 p.113). From his viewpoint, the atmospheric coldness of environment can be a sound, a color, or a temperature. Griffero interprets that it is an inter-subjectivity of effective involvement that expresses emotional and corporeal involvement, which is not a cause-stimuli or the merging of the five senses. Rather, it denotes the “possibility of a significance that [gives itself] immediately on the sense level” (Hauskeller 1995, 69 as in (Griffero 2014 p.113). As a consequence, and concordant with Merleau-Ponty, based on this kind of experience and by means of the atmospheric synaesthicity, Griffero describes the sound as “velvet, voluminous, earthy, grinding, polished” than high and low (Griffero 2014, 113).

### 3.1.5 Multi-Sensory Experience:

Pallasmaa agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the senses intercommunicate to complete a *synaesthetic perception* and each sense opens to the other to give a spatial atmospheric corporeal relation with the body for it to engage with the world. He confirms that every touching experience is multi-sensory. The space, scale, and qualities of matter are measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue, skeleton, and muscle (Pallasmaa 2012). He states that the “sense stimuli seem to shift from the more refined senses towards the more archaic , from vision down to hearing , touch and smell, from light to shadow” (Pallasmaa 2012 p.33). Few psychologists (e.g., James J. Gibson) regard the senses as aggressive seeking mechanisms rather than passive receivers. Therefore, instead of thinking of the five senses as detached senses, Gibson (1954) categorized them into five sensory systems: visual, auditory, taste-smell, basic-orienting, and haptic. Thereupon, in this framework, Elliott asserts that perception cannot be merely reduced to sight alone and to what the subject sees because it is also related to what she/he smells, tastes, touches, and hears to specify the sense of closeness or distance to some extent (Elliott 2011).

Benjamin (2007) deliberated on the connection between film and architecture. He stated that both are communicated primarily through the tactile realm. He suggested that the cinematic space is a powerful kinesthetic experience that “hit (s) the spectator like a bullet” (Benjamin 2007) and is felt in the muscles and skin as it is seen by the eyes. Elliott explains that sound, for example, does not have to be loud to invade the body. For example, a whisper in a soundtrack in a film hints to the timbre and breathiness linked to a face and its sweat, which subsequently offers a smell, and so on, as a kinetic point of mimesis (Elliott 2011).

Sobchack (1992) counted the spectator as a *synaesthetic subject*. That is, a site of reception, where its sensorium can provide visual images with a multisensory and synaesthetic thickness. For her, the body of the spectator is actively involved in the creation of meaning instead of being passively affected by the film on the basis of the *cross-modality* of the senses. This triggers cooperation of all the senses, not only sight, such that they become fleshed-out to make the body feel through the skin before the eye, where the spectator haptically anticipates the image (Sobchack 1992).

Although sensory experience is synaesthetic and the senses intercommunicate to come up with the structure of perception, the related research separates the components of the senses from the whole so as to understand the role of each sense in perception. Looking at each sense independently is necessary for the next discussion to grasp the effect of the whole.

#### *3.1.5.1 Sound and Acoustic Intimacy:*

In comparing sound to sight, Pallasmaa states that sight alone makes the subject's body solitary and unsocial because it is about the gaze, whereas sound creates a sense of connection and solidarity because it measures the space and makes its scale comprehensible. He adds that every sound has its intimacy or monumentality, rejection or invitation, and hospitality or hostility. In other respects, sound reflects other dimensions than information itself. For example, the sound of a vacant, unfurnished house is totally different from that of a furnished one. It reflects the other surfaces of the house (Pallasmaa 2012).

In film studies, many theorists have written about sound and its experience. For instance, Doane (1980) discussed projected sound in film and how it alters the perception of characters. Some other theorists have written about the relationship

between vision and hearing, such as Pudovkin (1929) who was concerned with sound as a carrier of semiotic meaning (Elliott 2011). What is of particular interest to this research is the use of sound as a factor of embodiment that affects consciousness and corporeality.

In the context of horror films, Anna Powell states that “sound waves, as well as light waves, travel through us and work strongly on the sensorium, bypassing the cerebral cortex and mainlining into our central nervous system.” (Powell (2006) as cited in (Elliott 2011 p.146)). Therefore, sound is a motor stimuli and an atmospheric energy.

The film study of Sonnenschein (2001) dealt with the physical aspect of the reception of sound, namely, sound energy transformation; where sound is a carrier of meaning and a flow of physical energy. He investigated how different frequencies can be utilized in film and illustrated that “Sound can affect our body temperature, blood circulation, pulse rate, breathing and sweating. Loud music with a strong beat can raise body heat, while soft, floating, or detached abstract music can lower it” (Sonnenschein 2001 p.71). Thereupon, sound has a significant effect on the body and on its conscious and reaction, and, accordingly, on its movement.

Elliot (2011) pointed that sound can be characterized by two features: its pitch, which is measured in Hertz (Hz), and its intensity, which is measured by decibels (db). Humans detect sounds in the range of 20 to 18,000 Hz and 0 to 120 db. Sonnenschein (2001) clarified that low frequencies such as 65 Hz will resonate in the lower back, thighs, and legs and Elliot (2011) highlighted that the lower the frequency, the lower down in the body the subject feels.

In the famous shower scene in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960), the music supported the picture and fed the pain. Within this context, Eisenstein (1994) discussed the movement in the picture and the accompanying music. He employed a pictorial diagram to show the synchronisation between Norman's arm and the violin's score on Ez, which continues to drop until Norman's face is seen in the bath. Eisenstein (1994) argued that montage is important in that it touches every sense, except taste, in addition to supporting the sense of movement.

Elliott (2011) described the spectator's body reaction to sound in cinema as a process to form a corporeal mimesis and transitivism based on a mimetic rather than a semiotic process. He analyzed the experience of the subject when hearing a loud scream in cinema and reported that the subject first receives the sound at the top of the neck (a physiological experience). Second, the subject associates the sound with various social and cultural codes, like the body schema, in an attempt to familiarize the sound (e.g., pain, stress, and fear), which makes the body react physiologically, e.g., by changing the heart rate, creating tension in muscles, or probably sweating. The last step is understanding the initial stress, not through a physiological process but through a form of corporeal mimesis, where the spectator mimics the character(s) (Elliott 2011). Marks (2000) discussed the idea of *haptic sound* which is experienced internally, not semiotically or interrogatively, in which vision and sound work in union (Marks 2000). Based on her study, she found that sound provides a corporeal knowledge for the spectator and eventually results in conversion of a corporeal experience into a haptic sound (Marks 2000).

## *Sound Synonyms*

### *Silence*

Much like high-intensity sound and high-pitch sound, Hanich and ~~İlçak~~ point to the fact that the absence of sound creates tension and provides a special moment in film experience, especially in dread (Hanich 2010; ~~İlçak 1992~~) Hitchcock is one of the filmmakers who plays on silence with his audience to produce tension and nervousness (Hitchcock 1995).

Hanich (2010) pointed to the use of sound as strategy to underscore off-screen space. He argued that silence by itself is a form, or synonym, of sound and that silence in films stands out as a void that the viewer can fill, especially in dread scenes. “Distant birds, chirping crickets, ticking clocks or dripping faucets” and reverberations add to isolated sounds, for instance, footsteps in a street. Furthermore, he underlined that these synonyms of silence can have the same effect of silence because they raise the viewer’s expectations that there will be a break in the silence anytime soon (Hanich 2010).

Hill and Hanich note that suspension and suppression of sounds are other forms of silence that exist when there is a regular sound which the viewer may not consciously realize but she/he feels emptiness without it and starts to behold the image “more actively and interrogatively” (Hill 2003; Hanich 2010 p.166).

### *Sonsign*

Deleuze (1992) defined *Sonsign* as a “pure sensory image” that signals the collapse of the sensory motor process and seeks other paths towards filmic involvements. As an example of that, Elliott points to the sound of the birds in *The Birds* (Hitchcock 1963) invites the viewer to experience a film in a more sensual way as it spreads between the viewer and the film rather than facilitating or adding

Part One: Structure of Encountering visual aspects (Elliott 2011; Deleuze 1992). What is special about sound is that it has no boundaries within a frame in contrast to visual effects, it can be off frame and still effective. As a result, its impact in feeding a sense of dread is very high. The sense of hearing is an embodied sensation. It can be experienced and internalized when it envelops the subject. It may hurt if too loud, it frustrates if too low, and carry a meaning or freezing the subject when it does not exist. It is a form of knowledge and, above that, it is a haptic and bodily sense.

### 3.1.5.2 *Smell*

Pallasmaa highlights that odor is considered as the strongest sense connected to the memory of space through surfaces, textures, and materials. Indeed, it is this what makes the smell of abandoned houses different from old towns and a theatre (Pallasmaa 2012). So, smell is connected to *place* and identity.

Smell is very natural and tied to other senses. It leads to colors, taste, touch, and sight. Elliott states that “It is not just based on a chemical character but is linked to socio-economic and socio-political discourses. It is known as a post-modern sense as a way to fight against modernity with its transparent and spatial atmosphere” (Elliott 2011 p.125). Smell motivated many post-modern philosophers as a subject. For example, in their classic work *AROMA* (2011), Classen, Howes, and Synnot described the power of smell in invading private and public spaces without contest (Elliott 2011).

Marks (2000) studied the reception of smell images in cinema. She considers smell as a mimetic sense that uncovers a “continuum between the actuality of the world and the production of signs about that world” (Marks 2000 p.139). In order for smell to be registered, she pinpointed that it needs to be physically absorbed

into the body. Afterwards, it creates a *time-space* memory (Marks 2000; Elliott 2011).

The spectator cannot actually smell what is in the film. Marks (2000) suggested some tools supporting the idea that smell can be conveyed in film. One tool is identification with a character that is actually smelling or sniffing on screen. Based on her belief in *gestalt* and the synthetic nature of some images, she argues that the audio-visual scene can grasp smell because the “mimetic and synesthetic relationship to the world underlies language and other sign systems. Once that relationship is mediated through an image, multisensory experience is condensed into visual form” (Marks 2000 p.214), e.g., scene of sizzling sausages. This constitutes the second tool for conveying smells in film. Elliott presented the third tool for conveying smells in film, which is through close-up images on any scent object are able to stimulate a sense of smell (Elliott 2011).

Elliott (2011) realized that the interaction of the physical body with smell was important in film. He indicated that smell was the only sense that the subject feels and thinks of at the same time because of the cerebral cortex and limbic system in the body whereas in other senses feeling and thinking are separable “even exclusive or sequential” (Elliott 2011 p.133), which justifies the strong relation between memory and smell. Elliott (2011) cited an example from *Shadow of a Doubt* (Hitchcock 1943), where pollution was behind the smell and behind the narrative. Before the arrival of one of the main characters (Uncle Charlie), the town was framed with apple trees and blossom. Upon arrival of this character with the train, the frame was covered with smoke as if he brings the city smoke, the crime, and money pollution to the other family in the town.

### 3.1.5.3 Taste

Pallasmaa (2012) suggested that some visuals (e.g., the marble of the statue) and certain colors may transfer to taste. In film, Elliott (2011) demonstrated that there are two concepts connected to taste. The first one is *abjection* and *rejection*. He relates having bad cultural habits in eating or actions like vomiting being used to keep the audience away from the character. This is exemplified in *The Exorcist* (1973) and *Super Size me* (2004). The second concept relates eating to feminism and sexuality. It is more about introducing the character. The camera decoupage and the editing techniques help in showing how the character is eating in a way that produces disgust for the spectator. Prior to a rape scene in *Frenzy* (Hitchcock 1972), the rapist was filmed eating in front of the female character who was raped at the end. The spectators, much like the character, “suspended their physical selves for a moment to avoid the full corporeal horror of the situation, and this accomplishes Deleuze (Affection-images) where perceptions extends the action into the feeling and emotion” (Elliott 2011 p.111).

### 3.1.5.4 Touch and the Skin Ego

Touch is the sense most frequently argued in most of arts including film and architecture because of its capacity in creating a haptic memory. It has been argued that touch is a medium for perception, for feeling and for thinking.

Likewise Husserl, Pallasmaa (2012) considers touch as the main sense. He regards vision as an extension of the sense of touch since it is the interface between the skin and the world. He also states that vision reveals what the touch already knows, hence agreeing with Merleau-Ponty (2002) in that touch presupposes the setting for visual data. As a consequence, he sees the senses

as not only information mediators, but also as channels that explode the imagination and articulate other sensory thoughts, thus confirming the intercommunication by the senses that create the *synaesthetic experience*. Holl, Pallasmaa, and Perez-Gomez (2007) contended that every touching of architecture is a multi-sensory experience. Their justification was that the qualities of matter, space, and scale are measured equally by all the five senses in addition to the skeleton and muscles to make the architecture involve seven realms of sensory experience that interact and infuse each other.

In his analysis of the work of Bernard Berenson, Samuels highlighted the *tactile values* that describe those qualities in paintings which he regarded as stimulative of the sense of touch, namely, qualities that relate some visual images to the knowledge and experience of the flesh and skin. He holds that *tactile values* exist in representations of solid objects which let the subject come closer to look, touch, and walk around, or to understand (Samuels 1981). In that sense, Pallasmaa claimed that the eye touches in the sense that gaze implies unconscious touch and that the haptic experience seems to penetrate the visual regime through its tactile presence. He described this experience as walking in the city in a car, which does not allow the subject to follow the images for analytic observation but, instead, enhances her/his haptic sensation (Pallasmaa 2012).

In film, Elliott points out that close-up shots are considered as images that increase *tactile value* like the money in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960), the knife in *Blackmail* (Hitchcock 1929), and the glass of milk in *Suspicion* (Hitchcock 1941). Such images increase the empathetic narrative and enable the spectator to recognize the physicality and tactility of a murder (Elliott 2011).

Recent film theorist such as Vivian Sobchack and Laura Marks link tactile values with the *haptic vision* concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari who used this

term for discussing nomadic arts such as carpet making and metal working in which the hands and touch support the eyes to see (Sobchack 1992; Marks 2004). Consequently, Elliott argues, vision is not only a method for recognizing shape, color, light, and spatial relationships, but is also a sense “twinned with touch, in discerning texture, movement, three dimensional form and even kinetic energy” (Elliott 2011 p.168). In this theory, the notion of vision is expanded.

Elliott concurs that what makes touch a remarkably important sense is that it is the first sense the subject develops and the last one the subject loses (Elliott 2011). In addition to that, touch is a means to establish a sense of reality. For instance, Samuel notes that the subject cannot persuade herself/himself of the unreality of a looking-glass until she/he has touched the mirror (Samuels 1981). Moreover, in addition to texture, both Pallasmaa and Elliott confirm that touch gives a spatial depth because it senses the weight, temperature, density, sharpness, and distance so as to orient the subject in the world (Pallasmaa 2012; Elliott 2011).

If the eye is the sense of separation, then Pallasmaa argues, touch is the sense of nearness, intimacy, and affection (Pallasmaa 2012). Benjamin (2007) suggested that bringing things closer is a challenge for the optic-cognitive process which evokes the other senses, especially touch, and memories. In other words, what is near motivates the subject to move and get closer towards the object to touch. Samuels confirms that this movement is sensed by the muscular sensations that teach the subject to appreciate depth in space (Samuels 1981). Relating this to Heidegger’s (1996) term *Da-sein*, which means being, and which happens through *de-distancing* and manipulation of *directionality*, one can conclude that touch is a very essential sense to increase embodiment and corporeality for the subject.

Not only touch is twinned with vision to create the notion of *haptic vision*, Marks highlights that there is also the concept of *haptic sound* that is used to suggest the closeness and the distance of the surroundings (Marks 2000). In this context, touch is twinned with sound, as an example, Elliott (2011) illustrated how Hitchcock used to combine *empathy* and identification with mimesis and embodied affect through the tension made apparent between closeness and distance in film *Rear Window* (Hitchcock 1954); the sound in the dark scene suggested the proximity of the intruder; his weight over the steps was felt, which increased the anxiety of feeling him very close to Jeffry (Elliott 2011).

In dread, the spaces are mostly dark, the visuals are limited and sight is paused. Under these circumstances, the synaesthetic nature of the senses, as Merleau-Ponty (2002) clarified, opens up the other senses and evokes them to intercommunicate to perceive qualities that help the subject fill some blanks in the images in order to complement the experience of fear.

In another perspective of embodiment, touch is related to skin and its effect on the subject. In 2000, Marks studied the importance of the skin and touch. She elaborated on the *haptic vision* of Deleuze and Guattari and used this term in very specific sense. Her *haptic vision* involves thinking in skin, for cognition and a sensation, not only for information. Consequently, haptic images have to be experienced, not analyzed (Marks 2000). Also Elliott maintains that touch is an embodied sense that cannot be localized in any one part as it is a shifting experience that spreads itself over the skin, forming an interface with the environment (Elliott 2011).

Tarja Laine is a recent film theorist who built her ideas on those of Laura Marks and Vivian Sobchack. She argues that corporeality can only be experienced by touch owing to the fact that when touch is felt by skin haptically, the haptic

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experience increases the *kinesthetic consciousness* and, in turn, increases the corporeality, to make the skin a synonym of touch (Laine 2006).

In this light, touch in the context of film, does not mean a physical touch, but a haptic sensation that is felt on the skin. Laine (2006) advocated the idea that camera movement is a way of creating proximity of touch for the spectator of the film. The movement of the camera is the way by which the spectator encounters the world of films and by which it discovers the tactility that increases her/his consciousness (Laine 2006). According to that, camera movement, sound, and/or image in film can invade the space of the spectator to contribute the experience of dread. It can cause a physical sensation felt on the skin. Hence, what matters in perception for the complete experience is the *haptic perception*.

### 3.1.6 Haptic Perception

Marks stated that “while optical perception privileges the representational power of the image, haptic perception privileges the material presence of the image” (Marks 2000 p.163). She focuses in her research on *haptic visuality*, which is in contrast with *optical visuality*, the *haptic visuality* is tactile and kinaesthetic, and it functions like touch (Marks 2004; Marks 2000).

Vision may be the sense used the most in the cinematic experience. However, it is not isolated from the other senses. Sobchack argues that it is the *cross-modal* activity that makes the world meaningful, not only by vision, but also by cooperation with all the sensorial means (Sobchack 1990, 1992). Thereupon, she argued that the cinematic experience is felt by the entire body, not only by the eyes.

Laine argues that *haptic perception* is not vision that is translated to other senses, but is a mode of seeing through all modes located on the skin and therefore is a

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mode of bodily consciousness and corporeality (Laine 2006). She argues that what happens to the body of the spectator when watching a scene of horror or disgust, for instance, is shivering. The body defends itself by multiplication and the skin transforms into a kind of resonating membrane (Laine 2006). As to this transformation, Connor (2004) said:

*Why do we say that things give us the creeps, or that they make our skin crawl, unless it is that we sense a commingling, a commensality, a mimetic charming or fascination of the skin by the movement that it finds so aversive? Sensing the crawling taking place over it, the skin itself begins to crawl: it squirms into the shape of an insect or the worm—or rather, the multiple form of the insect or worm—in order to escape the touch of insect or worm”*

(Connor 2004, 247) as cited by (Laine 2006)).

Accordingly, Laine defines *skin*, then, as no longer primarily a membrane of separation between subject and object, inner and outer, or the self and the world, but as a medium of intersubjective connection (Laine 2006). Laine (2006) concluded that skin is what structures the perception beyond the inside and outside and gives the shape of *affective engagement* with a film, i.e., spreading an affect over the entire body. Since the skin has no optical point of view, then the subject sees through the entire skin. As a result, she argues that the skin becomes an entire environment and a visual tactile surface that is inseparable from the sense of embodiment. It becomes the ground against the other senses and the platform where the inside and the outside encounter one another (Laine 2006). This interaction of the inside and the outside makes the body a subject of encountering and also an object in the world. Therefore, it is no longer clear where the outside of things is to be found, which is, in Laine's (2006) opinion, what creates the corporeality for the *haptic perception*. Furthermore, the senses

are fully embedded in each other, which, in turn, supports the subject's being as a body and increases the sense of consciousness (Laine 2006). As a consequence, when watching a horror or a dread scene, all what matters for the spectator is that the antagonist does not touch the protagonist. This touch, according to Laine (2006), is the reason behind fear and fear is the moving force that is experienced as touch and the force with which the subject's body responds and starts to crawl.

Fear, as has been discussed earlier by Hanich and Schmitz, is characterized by expansive *Away!-tendency*; it enters the *felt-body* to experience *constriction*. The body then tries to escape the skin, but it cannot. And so, tension is produced (Hanich 2010; Schmitz et al. 2011). In light of this, the fear of touch and the experience of touch during which the body starts to crawl, in addition to the expansive *Away!-tendency* to escape the skin, constitute a very *affective engagement* that increases the sense of corporeality and of consciousness, which, by turns, increases the level of embodiment.

### 3.1.7 Deleuze's Perception-Image

Before moving on to the other procedure that relates the subject to the object, this research introduces Deleuze's (1992) philosophy of the image, since it is related to film studies. The *Movement-Image* for Deleuze is the "a centred set of variable elements which act and react on each other" (Deleuze 1992 p.217). He refers to all the variable elements that act and react in the frame and in the narrative. He developed this concept while criticizing the classical cinema that centered more on the human beings than on images, which, accordingly, created a gap between the received movement and the executed movement on the screen, namely, a gap between the action and the reaction (Deleuze 1992; Harris 2016). As a response to that gap, Deleuze (1992) proposed a set of

variables that are connected to human action in an additional stage. First, they are linked through the *perception-image*. Deleuze (1992) defined this as ensemble of elements which act on a center and which have a relation with it.

The *perception-image* is then assembled from what the spectator hears and sees and what the character(s) see(s) or hear(s). The subjective point of view of a character reflects what and how she/he sees things. So, there is what the character sees and then there is what the spectator sees. Harris states that the point of view shots are necessary for the spectator to see what the character sees, but there are other shots that are necessary to give the spectator the illusion of seeing what the character sees (Harris 2016). Thus, the *perception-image* is not a single image, but is a sequence of images that put together point of view shots, the subjective shots, and external shots (the objective shots or the third-person shots) to create the world of the scene. The *perception-image* then uses subjective and objective shots in combination, in order to let the audience perceive what the character perceives. Then, the spectator's mind takes the image coherently to know what the character sees. Deleuze (1992) confirms that this image does not reflect feelings, but it is an objective experience concretely realizing the character's subjective experience, and he names it the *perception of perception*.

According to Deleuze, those perceptions have effects on characters, they are shown in the *affection-image*, which is usually a close-up shot that reflects the impact on the character, which fills the gap between action and reaction, to end the sequence by an *action-image*; the reaction of the character to the world of that scene (Deleuze 1992).

Because of the way that dread scenes are shot, perception as a process of encountering between the spectator as a subject and the screen as an object is

considered in this research as an interpretive lived experience that interacts with the characters. It contains an individual perception of the spectator and a shared perception with the character when the camera movement represents the eyes of the character, or as Hitchcock names it a *subjective treatment shot*.

After illustrating the phenomenology of perception from Merleau-Ponty's perspective and its expansions in film studies, in the following section the researcher discusses the phenomenology of movement and its role in increasing corporeality and consciousness in an effort to elaborate on the embodiment process in dread scenes of thriller films.

### 3.2 Movement and Kinesthetic Experience

The definition of movement as a phenomenon differs from one theorist to another. However, it is always tied to a change, internally or externally. According to Husserl (2012 [1982]), the *natural attitude of movement* means the ordinary way of *being-in-the-world*. It is the physical change in the location of particular object between two points, where under the absence of movement the subject will be at rest (Husserl 2012).

Merleau-Ponty et al. (1968) were conservative about Husserl's (1913) definition of movement since it destroys the unity of the movement. They defined movement as a *phenomenon of locomotion*, which is the awareness of one's own motion in the world, and interior flux, and a revolution of being other than changing position in place or displacement (Merleau-Ponty et al. 1968). Merleau-Ponty (2002) viewed it as a power of locomotion that extends the intention of the subject to *be-in-the-world* (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.169). He looked at the body of the subject and pointed to the significance of consciousness for experiencing

movement. He also confirmed that the basic bodily unity in movement is learned or processed when it is incorporated into the world;

*A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its 'world', and to move one's body is to aim at offering us a representation, presents itself to our body as a specific practical possibility.*

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.160).

In addition to that, Landes highlighted that Merleau-Ponty looked at movement as a structure of expression, a whole that cannot be divided and which is based on consciousness (Landes 2013). Merleau-Ponty (2002) strived to overcome the *natural attitude of movement*. Consequently, movement, as he conceives it, cannot be considered as a qualitative happening, but as an *event* that must be harmonized with moving objects and with points in time. Then, movement is in the end tied to the displacement of an object through space and time.

Considering *being* entails recalling the concept of *Da-sein*. Heidegger (1996) counted *being* or *being-in-the-world* as a key point on the line of movement. He considered movement with its two aspects; *de-distancing* and *directionality*, as an engagement with the world, or as encountering process where the moving body acts with the world by walking, holding, lifting, or any bodily movements and actions to engage with the world (Heidegger 1996).

Heidegger noted that elimination of the distances such that the object will be closer to the thing and the orientation towards it make the object appear *here* and *now* or *there* and *then* (Heidegger 1996). Merleau-Ponty touched upon this issue by highlighting that “our body and our perception [...] take as the centre of the world that environment in which they present us” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.333). For the architect Tadao Ando, this is a point of existentiality and *spatiality*

because when distance is perceived the “surrounded space becomes manifested as a thing endowed with various meanings and values” (Ando 1995, 453) as cited in (Shīrāzī 2013)). Then, that movement, as Heidegger highlighted, is a process of *giving space* or *making room* in which the *space* is discovered in the world (Heidegger 1996; Shīrāzī 2013).

Shīrāzī noted that the architect Tadao Ando (1995) concentrated in his studies on the body. He believed in the union of the subject and object, that is, the body and mind, and used a Japanese concept, *Shintai*, to express the body. *Shintai* means the union of flesh and spirit to acknowledge the world at the same time of acknowledging the self (Ando 1995 as cited in (Shīrāzī 2013)). Ando (1995) was of the opinion that to perceive an object, the distance between self and object must be changed, which is fulfilled through movement. Shīrāzī notes this is very obvious in his building designs, especially in his museums, where he never reaches the main entrance directly, he always celebrates moving towards it to *make room* and so as to create *spatiality* for the subject for the purpose of increasing its *existentiality* in the space (Shīrāzī 2013); “Spatiality is the result of multiplicity of directions of vision from a multiplicity of viewpoints by the movement of the *Shintai*.” (Ando (1995) As cited in (Shīrāzī 2013)). In other words, the process of movement in different directions creates different viewpoints and eventually creates *spatiality*.

In regards to *spatiality*, Sheets-Johnstone (2011), a phenomenologist and dancer who built her philosophy on the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists in looking for the *primacy of movement*, agreed with Heidegger and added that if the subject does not move in space, it qualitatively creates certain spatial characters by the nature of its movement, for instance, “large space, open space, tight space, resistant space” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011

p.124). This issue will be further explained in this thesis in the *Structure of Self-Movement* section. But before proceeding to elaboration of Sheets-Johnstone (2011) on the phenomenology of movement and its structure, it is necessary to identify two concepts concerning movement that collaborate to form a shape of body awareness: *proprioception* and *kinesthesia*.

### 3.2.1 Proprioception

*Proprioception* is described in neuroscience and cognitive science by Cole et al. as the position sense, i.e., a sense that has to be delivered by receptors inside the muscles and the nerves to the tactile sub-cortical regions of the brain to tell the brain how contracted or how relaxed every muscle is in the entire body. Consequently, it tells the brain where the body's position is in space. A loss of proprioception causes the loss of sense of position (Cole et al. 2002). Gallagher, an Irish-American philosopher who works on embodied cognition, social cognition, agency and the philosophy of psychopathology, states that proprioception is a cognitive and a sub-conscious sense that one can feel it if she/he focuses on it (Gallagher 2006).

In phenomenology, as a contribution of embodiment to cognition, proprioception is used by Merleau-Ponty and Gibson in the same definition of the sense of position, but in a different mold; it is used as a perceptual system and as a mean of knowledge (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Sheets-Johnstone 2011; Gibson 2014 [1979]).

Merleau-Ponty (2002) considered proprioception as a sense that provides the perceiver with a sense of locomotion while motion, while Gibson considered it in static positions. James Gibson is a psychologist and an important contributor to the field of visual perception. In his book, *The Senses Considered as Perceptual*

*Systems*, he recognized the perceptual system of proprioception and proposed the concepts of muscular, articular, vestibular, cutaneous, auditory, and visual proprioception. His notion of proprioception is both static and positional, and is not tied to movement as a dynamic experience that is bodily happening as in running, pushing, kicking, and stretching (Gibson 1966). His major work is thus related to the idea of visual proprioception. On this account, he considered movement as an instrument enfolded in perception itself, which is the means the subject uses to pick up information from the world. Hence, he describes movement as *kinetic affordance* (Gibson 2014). Sheets-Johnstone (2011) criticized Gibson for focusing only on the senses for proprioception and for overlooking the qualitative structure of movement. In view of that, she judged his work as having made a limited contribution to the definition of the experience of movement because it neglected the idea of motion (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.205).

### 3.2.2 Kinesthesia

*Kinesthesia* shares with *proprioception* one common thing, which is the awareness of the body in space. But if proprioception concerns balance in position, Gallagher and Sheets Johnstone argue that kinesthesia concerns movement more as a behavioral activity than proprioception. By kinesthesia the body learns to detect how to move, unconsciously, as in sports, or walking on stairs, or eating with a spoon, where the body moves in a way that serves the action it does without thinking of it (Gallagher 2006; Sheets-Johnstone 2011), which also serves Heidegger's (1996) concept of *ready-to-hand* which occurs when the body uses any tool available as an extension to it and moves accordingly (e.g., the spoon or the bat).

Although *kinetic* has directionality definitions, Sheets-Johnstone notes that kinesthesia is a sensory function or content with no clues of directionalities, it does not give hints of ups, downs, tilts, or horizontals. What is most important in this regard is that kinesthesia is a sensation of the perception of motion; a perception of one's own body, through a muscular effect felt in its limbs and muscles (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).

As for the foundational significance of kinesthesia, Sheets-Johnstone (2011) referred to Landgrebe (1977) who placed emphasis on kinesthesia and who referred to movement as kinesthetic motion. She argued that through kinesthetic motion the subject makes itself *be-in-the-world*. By this, she confirms that the self-movement is experienced kinesthetically and that kinesthesia is at the core of consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.128).

Husserl (2012) discussed kinesthesia and compared it with touch in that it has an indeterminate localization. In other words, the body can be constituted only in tactility and in everything that is localized with the sensation touch (Husserl 2012). In a closer look at the philosophy of Husserl, Sheets-Johnstone (2011) argued that he did not actually consider self-movement and that he only considered movement with respect to external perception, namely, movement relating to perceived objects in the world. In addition to that, she found that his kinesthetic flows are connected only to eye movement. On account of this, she concluded that his estimation of kinesthesia is restricted. Therefore, she elaborated on the self-movement by correcting and amplifying Husserl's discussion (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). However, Husserl's philosophy meets part of this thesis in considering the eye movement for the viewer because its movement creates a virtual *spatiality* which leads to a sense of *being-in-the-world*.

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone suggested a *structure of movement* that has a qualitative nature that fills the gaps in Husserl's and Gibson's views. She also shed light on the significance of those qualities in order to have a corporeal consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Understanding the qualitative nature of movement will justify the effect of the character's movement in film upon the viewer.

### 3.2.3 The Structure of Self-Movement

In the view of Merleau-Ponty, Landes notes that *structure* is both a process and a whole, and the use of the word *structure* signifies the role of consciousness in the process (Landes 2013). The structure of movement, according to Sheets-Johnstone (2011), has four main phases. It starts with a *kinesthetic experience* and ends with *corporeal consciousness*. Diagram 3-1 below illustrates visually Sheets-Johnstone's structure of movement. It has been drawn to make it easier for the reader to follow and understand her phenomenology of movement, which will be discussed soon.




Diagram 3-1: Sheets-Johnstone's Structure of Movement

Along with the body's role as the center of orientation, Husserl (2012) considered some verbs to act as a verbal expression of kinetic movement and corporeal consciousness. As an example, for him, *I am* expresses a *corporeal consciousness* and *I can* indicates a *kinetic possibility of movement* (Husserl 2012). On the basis of the structure of movement proposed by Sheets-Johnstone (2011), the body is then oriented from *I can* to express the *kinesthetic experience* to *I am* to express its *corporeal consciousness*. The following four sub-sections elaborate on the major phases of the structure of self-movement concluded by Sheets-Johnstone: *kinesthetic experience*, *transcendental subjectivity*, *kinesthetic consciousness*, and *corporeal consciousness*.

### 3.2.3.1 *The Kinesthetic Experience*

Sheets Johnstone defines *kinesthetic experience* as a dynamic process that evolves during movement or when one is about to move, where the body brings a certain play of forces to life to encounter the world. She argues that those forces have spatial and temporal qualities and aspects that have the ability to affect the senses and the corporeality. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) identified four essential qualities of movement: *tensional*, *projectional*, *linear*, and *amplitudinal qualities*. She argues that those aspects of movement are qualitative, not quantitative, characters inherent in movement and experienced unconsciously, but in general, they bear upon effort, space, and time (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). The kinesthetic experience is a key for creating a corporeal experience. It works in the domain of *I can*. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) confirmed that it is not necessary to have a change in position to create a kinesthetic experience and maintain consciousness. Only in standing can the subject have these spatio-temporal qualities to have a kinesthetic experience and, consequently, a kinesthetic consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).

Before proceeding to the next phase in the structure of movement of Sheets-Johnstone, namely, *transcendental subjectivity*, the research discusses the spatio-temporal forces and aspects of kinesthetic experience, discussed by Sheets-Johnstone, to identify their roles in creating the *proprioception* and *kinesthesia* that affect the senses in the *transcendental subjectivity* phase.

#### *Tensional Quality and the Projectional Quality*

Sheets-Johnstone states that the *tensional* and *projectional* qualities of movement describe a temporal aspect of movement because they are expressed kinesthetically. Tensional quality relates to the sense of effort since any effort to

be produced (e.g., walking or lifting) awakens the kinetic energy that drives the movement of the subject (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Copying her example, if a subject wants to lift a case and she/he expects it to be heavy but it was actually lighter than expected, then this awakens the kinetic energy of the body. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) describes this as *making the familiar strange*. In this case, the subject generates less energy and, eventually, it produces a fluid and smooth movement. The temporality is different in this example in light of the time difference between expectations (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.123).

The reliable expectation in the previous example is necessary to build the sense of *I can* so as to stimulate the ability to move, but what if the subject does not have any reliable expectation of the weight of the case? In this case, Sheets-Johnstone argues that the subject will be kinesthetically at a loss to move the case effectively. However, in this case too, the kinetic energy in the body is awakened and a higher energy than normal is required to lift the case. Thus, the process will be more time consuming (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).

It is necessary to mention that the movement is not of a single part of the body but of the whole body. To lift, push, pull, or climb, the whole body is engaged in the movement. Another related key point raised by Sheets-Johnstone (2011) is that the *tensional quality* is not only connected to movement, but also to stillness, or being still, because in stillness the body prepares itself to move, irrespective of whether now or later.

So, how can watching a dread scene produce the *tensional quality* of movement for the spectator who just sits and watches? Hanich and Smith set out that the first effort the spectator makes is to follow the narrative and the character. The second effort is paid within the framework of engagement as the subject can have *somatic empathy* and/or *imaginative empathy* with the character (Hanich 2010;

Smith 1994), depending on the narrative and/or the camera techniques, which ensure(s) reflecting up on the spectator the same effort of the character in moving, swimming, climbing, or descending the stairs, especially since *dread* is still relative to other cinematic experiences and the associated movement of the character is very cautious.

From another perspective of embodiment, it has been documented in different fields such as social science, psychology, and neuroscience that observing an action can create a mirroring in motor movements, such as a smile. Perceiving a smile activates the facial muscles to produce a smile (Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000) as cited in (Foroni and Semin 2009)). This also suggests that a tensional quality can be transferred from the character to the spectator in film.

The *projectional quality* of movement is the description which Sheets-Johnstone gives to the effort produced in the previous example, e.g., ‘a sharp and even striding’ or ‘flat but heavy clumping’. This projection of force is measured qualitatively, not quantitatively, and is deliberate and unhesitant (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.126).

This projectional quality can be referred to the *synaesthetic experience* discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), where the senses intercommunicate to open to the structure of the *thing* that appeals to senses, such as seeing the hardness of glass (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.267), and to the atmospheric qualities discussed by Griffero (2014), which are metaphoric qualities and corporeal affections that can only be compared by language. Griffero argues that these qualities are intersubjectivity effective qualities that express an emotional and corporeal involvement, which is not a cause-stimuli or the merging of the five senses, but an expression of the “possibility of a significance that [gives itself] immediately on

the sense level” (Griffero 2014 p.113). Understanding this quality in Merleau-Ponty’s and Griffero’s points of views is necessary to read how this quality and the other qualities proceed to the next level in the structure of movement, that is, *transcendental subjectivity*.

After this explanation of the two temporal aspects of the kinesthetic experience, namely, the tensional and projectional qualities, the next sub-section addresses the spatial aspects of movement, i.e., the *linear* and *amplitudinal* aspects.

### *Linear Quality*

Sheets-Johnstone outlines that *linear* and *amplitudinal* qualities describe the spatial facets of movement. The *linear* quality has to do with the paths that the subject senses while describing the process of movement such as linear, curved, twisted, diagonal, zig-zag, straight, and circular paths, and a felt linear contour of the moving body, such as bending the body, turning the head, leaning the body forward, walking or marching with vertical body, and bending the body in a circle. All these aspects are directional aspects that orient the body and the movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.264). The directional, linear, and spatial aspects of the movement have been discussed in a very interesting way by Yudell (1977) through an analysis of the dancers’ body movement and a discussion of the axiality of directions.

Yudell (1977) traced the importance of the body’s corporeality by discussing its role from the perspective of the dancer’s experience in movement. He discussed the feeling of space which the dancers use their entire bodies to touch. He viewed their movement not as a vague set of reflex actions, but as an “articulately felt interaction with the positive stuff of space,” and, hence, the effect of dancing on their outer and inner movements (Yudell 1977 p.58). He argues that a dancer’s maintenance of a sense of body center while moving in space was a

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manifestation of their continuous awareness of the *pull of gravity*; describing it as if their response to gravity is always intense and almost obsessive (Yudell 1977).

Yudell also (1977) connected the spatial characteristics of body movements with the haptic sense and tactile qualities of surfaces. For instance, “smooth surfaces invite closer contact while the rough materials generate movement in wide radius around corners” (Yudell 1977 p.71). Additionally, he argued that a change in texture has the ability to slow or quicken one’s pace.

### Axiality

Another interesting concept of movement that was discussed by Yudell (1977) is that of *axiality*; how many axes does the subject use to move physically or visually? And does the number of axes affect the experience of space?

Yudell (1977) supports the idea that all human movements trace complex spatial configurations, each having its own significance and meaning. First of all, there is a vertical axis and a horizontal one. The vertical axis has relationships with sky and earth. So, moving up is a metaphor for growth, longing, and reaching, whilst moving down is a metaphor of absorption, submersion, and compression. On the other hand, the horizontal axis refers to earth and, hence, relates to communication and social interaction (Yudell 1977).

The number of axes of movement from Yudell’s (1977) point of view is necessary for delineation of spatial configuration. He regarded the curvilinear and diagonal movements as movement on two axes; only horizontally and only vertically, respectively, which are the most common movements as in the case of walking, running, or diving. Each motion has its own meaning or refers to a special character. As an illustration, a diagonal motion, which is the most common motion, appears to be related to a quick change in, or an upset of, an existing

order. Diving, as another example, is very tightly defined and restricted referral of movement, accordingly, one can conclude that its description can be applied to corridors as well, and probably that is the reason behind using corridors a lot in dread scenes.

On the other hand, spiral and helical motions are examples of three-axis movement. Yudell (1977) considered the spiral motion as the most spatially-complex configuration for body movement. He gave an example of Tatlin's monument in Russia, where the movement is in two axes and then it shoots out vertically and symbolically into space and the future (Yudell 1977 p.66). This example points to vision which acts as a call for moving. Thereupon, it is not necessary to have a physical movement to create *spatiality*, which is a conception that is in line with Husserl's philosophy of the eye movement and spatiality.

In another example, that of the foyer of Berlin Philharmonic concert hall, Yudell (1977) elaborated on the relationship between orientation and the sense of order, arguing that in this space there is a slipping cascade of stairs with diagonal relationships. Yudell argues that this complexity of relationships challenges the sense of order and orientation, which, in turn, heightens the subject's senses and quickens bodily responses because the spatial configuration is energized and awareness of one's own movement and of spatial relationships to one another is increased (Yudell 1977). In other words, the multi-axis directional space creates disorientation forces in the senses and awakens them to be aware of movement, which, subsequently, creates a bodily response.

### Architectural Promenade

The linear aspect of movement is the aspect used the most in the work of architecture. There are many names behind the concept of an *architectural*

*promenade*. The action of movement was an icon in practice and theory for some filmmakers and modern architecture pioneers. Eisenstein (1994) established a crucial link between the architectural ensemble and the moving spectator. He also created the concept of the *path* to guarantee the best location for a viewer to perceive the Acropolis in its best frame. The *path*, according to him, can be a physical or imaginary path that is followed by the eye.

Bruno notes that Eisenstein's (1994) concept of *path* influenced many architects to celebrate movement, including Le Corbusier in his *axis* in *Villa Savoye* and Bernard Tschumi in his *cinematic promenade* in *The Manhattan Scripts* (Bruno 2002). The movement through space becomes such an engaging experience that without it one cannot experience the compositional arrangements in the same way. All these promenades; path, axis, and ramp, are another face of Heidegger's *bridge* concept that was discussed earlier. The movement on that *bridge* facilitates the experience of *de-distancing* and *directionality*, which, by turns, helps the subject to exist, namely, to *be-in-the-world*.

The *architectural promenade* has been one of Ando's central devices to encourage and celebrate movement, such as the large staircase in Chikatsu-Asuka Museum as noted by Shirazi. The sense of movement, in conjunction with a large staircase, is meant to stimulate a physical reaction by the visitor. Ando regarded the staircase as a place which itself intensifies the sense of the body and stimulates an experience of space in the physical realm; a place where one is awakened to her/his body and where she/he senses her/his corporeality (Shīrāzī 2013).

### *Amplitudinal Quality*

It was underlined earlier in this chapter that Sheets-Johnstone (2011) was of the opinion that the movement of the subject creates spatial characters that can affect the atmosphere, such as large space, tight space, and constricted space. This can be realized more in the other spatial aspect of movement; the *amplitudinal* quality, than in its spatial quality. Spatial characters are associated with both the felt expansiveness or contractedness of the subject's moving body and the spatial extensiveness or contractedness of the subject's movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). For example, when the subject sits down, she/he contracts herself/himself into a smaller volume. On the other hand, the subject expands her/his body to reach something high. Running creates an extensive space, but if the subject paces down, the movement creates a tight and constricted space. For Sheets-Johnstone, the *amplitudinal* quality can be described as a magnitudinal quality in terms of "controlled but unconstrained bodily spatiality, controlled but unimpeded range of movement" (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.127).

After this review of the spatial qualities of the *kinesthetic experience*, namely, the linear and amplitudinal qualities. It is possible to extend the reading of these qualities by combining them with Schmitz's (1974 to 2005) definitions of *directional space* and its *vector atmosphere* existing in Griffero (2014). The directional space is described as a pre-geometrical state of motility. It is the starting point of a corporeal communication with the surrounding environment, which works according to a motor suggestion to move, but not yet reduced to be a *local space*. The directional space aligns the character's movement and is responsible for creating felt properties such as the narrowness or vastness of the atmosphere so as to create a vector atmosphere, which can be described as "unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or undecided atmosphere"

(Griffero 2014 pp.45, 47). Consequently, the space can be described as large or tight as in the amplitudinal aspect. From the viewpoint of Yudell (1977) and Husserl (2012), the eyes are enough for completion the perception of spatial movement. Therefore, *directional space* in film is what matters in cinematic experience since it has the aspect of a linear quality. However, Schmitz argued that directional space is expressed and experienced internally as a reproduction of movement because of the directional tensions that are perceivable in static lines and forms, where the *felt-body* and the perceived form coincide (Schmitz 1996:42 as in (Griffero 2014 p.48)). In view of the foregoing discussions, the *gravity pull* in the mise-en-scène of a film can be a shape, a path, something that pulls the character's movement, or even the character's movement itself.

To sum up the previous discussions of the spectator's experience in movement, it can be stated that the spectator experiences temporal qualities of movement, e.g., *tensional quality*, through the effort which she/he produces to follow the character or to be the character when *empathy* with her/him is very high. The effort produced awakens kinetic energy and stimulates it to move, physically, as in holding breath, or visually, e.g., when moving the eye to somewhere else on the screen. The effort then provokes the senses. The *projectional* aspect of movement also imparts importance to the level of sensing because it refers to the *synaesthetic experience* and the corporeal atmospheric qualities connected to the effort it produces.

The spectator also experiences spatial aspects while watching a film through the *vector atmosphere* because of the *linear quality* of the movement which is responsible for prompting the body or eye to move. The spatial configuration of the scene, even if it is produced by shapes and lines of the mise-en-scène or according to a character's movement, has the ability to awaken and heighten the

senses, especially if it has a complex configuration. This eventually is reflected on, and by, the body of the viewer, where she/he feels the narrowness and vastness of that space. This contributes to the awareness of body *locomotion*, which, in turn, feeds *kinesthesia* in the motion of the character and *proprioception* in stillness.

Sheets-Johnstone (2011) highlighted that kinesthesia is the core of the kinesthetic experience. This research has a contribution to her philosophy according to the foregoing discussion and in relation to Schmitz's philosophy; while watching film, especially a dread scene, when stillness is a major aspect, proprioception is the other significant core of kinesthetic experience because it provides the perceiver with locomotion and a sense of balance and position.

### 3.2.3.2 *Transcendental Subjectivity*

With reference to *kinesthetic experience*, research has shown how spatio-temporal qualities have the ability to awaken kinetic energy in the body by producing *kinesthesia* and *proprioception* which in turn stimulate the body to move. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) defined movement as an action by which the subject discovers its sense of aliveness and of being grounded. It is the source of the senses in space and time to create the subjectively *felt-time* (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.134). *Transcendental subjectivity* is then the second phase in the *structure of movement* discussed by Sheets-Johnstone. It occurs when the senses are evoked and heightened. It can be manifested in spatio-temporal qualities, such as the effort in stillness, or when there is a complex spatial configuration. In relating this phase and its role of existence, with Merleau-Ponty's *logic of existence*, one concludes that the name of this phase, namely, *transcendental subjectivity*, is actually linked with the third act of existence

according to Merleau-Ponty (2002), that is, *transcendence*, which is the act that transforms the *volunteer* into a person in a *situation*.

### 3.2.3.3 Kinesthetic Consciousness

Sheets-Johnstone defines *kinesthetic consciousness* as the consciousness developing when the spatio-temporal aspects of movement awaken the senses and the subject transforms her/his attention to movement. In such cases, “Movement awakens transcendental subjectivity in the form of kinesthetic consciousness[...] when we turn our attention from the world into our own movement of our bodies, we experience ourselves kinetically” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.119). This sort of consciousness is the foundational source of the subject’s concepts of space, time, and force (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.206). *Time*, then, is another facet that thickens the lived-body experience. It was addressed by many philosophers including Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and Hanich.

Deleuze utilized Henri Bergson’s philosophies in discussing the *movement-image*. He stated that in the phenomenological field, Bergson in his *Matter and Memory* (originally in 1896) defined *time* not as a clock or a calendar, but as a *duration*. *Duration* is about a lived moment that can last for a year or for few seconds. Deleuze referred to lived time as a real time, which he termed as the “impure combination of homogenous time” (Deleuze 1992 p.22). What signifies *duration* in comparison with *time* is that duration can be mathematically described and broken down, but cannot be divided into segments. Deleuze argued that duration can be divided only spatially according to the lived moments, which can be expressed as a memory (Deleuze 1992).

Sheets-Johnstone (2011) extended the understanding of time and categorized it into *ordinal time* and *cardinal time*. The *ordinal time* is quantitative. It can be described by such expressions as now, at some time, lately, and just now. She argues that the word *now*, for example, is sophisticated. In addition, it imposes a “division that does not exist, a division that disrupts the qualitative dynamic experience” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.156).

On the other hand, *cardinal time* is a qualitative experience of temporality that can be described using such expressions as *creeping*, *rushed*, *prolonged*, and *suddenly*. Furthermore, she argues, it is more *felt* than *non-felt* time. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) discussed the adverb *suddenly* and included it in the category of qualitative temporality because it is not an interval of time and is qualitatively experienced, much like the terms *rushed* or *creeping* (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 p.156). What matters for her is the feeling of movement which expresses a *felt-time*. For example, the evenness in walking and the unevenness in walking with a limp are examples of a movement that is described temporally (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Hence, what the subject experiences as a *kinesthetic consciousness* via self-movement is *cardinal*, not ordinal, time. This clarifies why kinesthetic consciousness is the foundation of time; in the unevenness of walking with a limp, the body turns its attention to the movement and experiences it temporally. Thus, the time can be felt and the body increases its subjectivity. This also clarifies the argument of Deleuze when he stated that that *duration* for Bergson (1896) produces subjectivity (Deleuze 1992), which is created when an attention to bodily movement is felt because the subject feels herself/himself and the experience then becomes corporeal and conscious.

Pallasmaa (2012) suggested using *action verbs* in images as a device to denote an *active encountering*, e.g., to use the noun verb *entering* instead of the verb

*enter* (Pallasmaa 2012). The action verbs express time in addition to the action. They have qualitative temporal characteristics that point to the *process* of entering more than the image of the door, which is what matters in film, especially in the formulation of dread scenes.

Hanich (2010) pointed to the time experienced in film, which is similar to the concept of duration in that neither can be measured. He argued that the *experienced time* can only be described in relation to other categories. He considered it to be central to the pleasure of watching frightening films. What is significant in the movement of dread is that the character's movement is full of pauses in addition to some (limited) flow. Husserl (2012) argued that the subjective body experience in the *now* does not correspond to mathematical models of separation in time, but are "varying forms of continuous flow, of permanent goings-on, and when more moment are outstanding, they are experienced as thicker than others" (Husserl and J 2012 pp.188–189). Within this framework, and drawing upon Pallasmaa's (2001) view on action verbs in dread (e.g., walking), the pause of the character gives rise to heaviness in walking or in going on in the action. This heaviness expresses an extended experience of time; *lived time*, and the duration of a moment that can be memorized. Moreover, it expresses an effort in the stillness whilst preparing to move. Besides, on the basis of the restricted movement options that are common in dread spaces, only contractedness and narrowness are produced in the *felt-body* and in the *absolute space*. This pause gives time for the spectator to think and feel his or her position and balance in the space. It also increases the *locomotion* of its body to create, eventually, a corporeal consciousness. In addition to the oscillation between consciousness and unconsciousness in watching a dread scene, as was discussed in Chapter Two, this notion can provide a fair justification for the

extended time experience felt through fear and the *temporal immersion* of dread scenes in thriller films. Once the character moves, all the effort mentioned in the pause will be *relatively* released and time will be less clearly experienced, unless a moment of *shock* coincides with the flow to create a qualitative aspect of felt-time.

#### 3.2.3.4 Corporeal Consciousness

*Corporeal consciousness* is the last element in the structure of movement that follows the notion of kinesthetic consciousness of Sheets Johnstone (Sheets-Johnstone 2011). It is what happens when the action verb *I can* turns into *I am*. It is what happens when the volunteer turns into a person in a situation. It is the highest level of *existence* because when it occurs, it reflects pure subjectivity according to the movement and the senses awakening, reflecting a thick felt-time experience, an effort, and a kinetic energy, and, eventually, it creates a corporeal experience.

In short, according to Sheets-Johnstone (2011), the body learns by moving. It creates and constitutes spatio-temporal dynamic aspects that stimulate movement. Movement is the ground for sense-making, the originating ground for *transcendental subjectivity*, where the subject turns its attention to its movement and constitutes time and space in her/his *kinesthetic consciousness* of movement. Ultimately, this creates a *corporeal consciousness*. Sheets-Johnstone's *structure of movement* guided this research to develop a deeper insight into the corporeal consciousness that occurs in the creation of a dread atmosphere in the case study section in the second part of this thesis, with one addition; conceptualizing the movement as a *process of embodiment* in film that

is connected to the character's movement; the character's movement in dread is responsible for creating the sense of vastness and narrowness for the viewer.

### 3.3 Action-Reaction

Merleau-Ponty (2002) developed many models for understanding the body, mind, and the world. Influenced by the *gestalt* idea, he developed the *body-schema* concept to identify the relationship between perception and action. According to the body-schema concept, the subject has a group of skills that establish the body's precognitive familiarity with itself and with the world it inhabits. This familiarity turns any unfamiliar situation into a familiar one and, as a consequence, the subject responds, or acts (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999).

As a process of encountering between the subject (the spectator) and the object (the screen), the action takes different shapes since the subject does not move physically in the screen. Therefore, the question arises as to what kind of acts does the subject then produce?

As a start, one has to recall the *action-image* act as the third act in the construction of the *movement-image* with respect to the reaction of the character that has been suggested by Deleuze (1992). According to him, the reaction of the actor has a duality of impacts; a large form of *action-image* and a small form of *action-image*. The large form of the action-image is the impact that flows from the environment towards the actor, which is indeed Deleuze's point of view and the one that characterises most classical films and most of genres like gangster and noir films. On the other hand, the small form of the action-image is the impact that flows from the actor into the environment, i.e., when the character tries to change the world (Deleuze 1992).

The *action-image* is an image that pertains to the character, not the spectator. It is not within the scope of this research to justify the character's actions in the film. All what matters is how the character guides the spectator by her/his actions and stimulates her/him to act or respond for the construction of dread atmosphere.

Various studies in psychology and neuroscience have adopted the *Perception-Action Model* (PAM). Examples include Preston (2007), Foroni and Semin (2013), Macrae et al. (2013), and Spadacenta et al. (2014). In view of the findings of these studies, this research found a way to relate cinema spectatorship to this psychological model.

As a motor behavior, Preston interprets that the Perception-Action Model addresses the fact that there are representations shared in common by the subject and the object for perceiving and generating action (Preston 2007). The term *representation* has been used in psychology to express the pattern of activation in the body and the brain that corresponds to a particular state that attempts to repeat the same pattern (Preston 2007).

Under the philosophical reading of *empathy* and *sympathy* that has been formerly discussed in this part of the thesis, *activation* and *representation* in the brain can now be related. This is especially true when the spectator spends a lot of time with the main character to reach to an *alignment of sympathy*. Smith argues that sympathy occurs when the spectator is placed in relation to the character through being given access to the character's actions by *spatial attachment* and also *subjective access* (Smith 1994). In addition to the *alignment of sympathy*, Smith argues that there is an *allegiance sympathy* by which the subject makes an emotional and intellectual response to the characters and to their actions. For Smith (1994), this form of sympathy positions the spectator within the discursive and textual frames of the film.

Then, what kind of action does the spectator experience while watching a film? Preston argues that according to the notion of *activation of shared representations*, and if the situation is strong enough to generate a response or to lead to conscious awareness, the action refers to *overt acts* and imagined acts (Preston 2007). As an example of an overt act, if the object displays a facial expression, such as smiling or breathing, then the areas in the subject's brain will represent those movements and, as a result, create a similar act (Feroni and Semin 2009, 2013; Preston 2007). The overt act can be not only be a mirror of the object, but it can sometimes also be a *representation* of an expected behavior of the object. Consequently, the subject creates *ideomotor* actions. For example, Preston illustrates if a soccer fan watches a player running toward the goal and then stopping, the expected action is for the player to kick the ball. If the action does not fit the expectation, then an error signal is generated in the mind of the subject, resulting in an actual kicking movement being generated by the subject (Preston 2007).

Ierna, Jacobs and Mattens highlighted the *imagined act* according to Husserl's (1976) philosophy, which is an object or a theme of the subject's consciousness (Ierna et al. 2011). To grasp the imagined act concept within the framework of the internal emotions and images, this research discusses the concept from the perspective of Schmitz's philosophy.

When the spectator perceives an action that cannot be mirrored by the subject, the subject will experience it internally in the felt-body, where the corporeal dynamics of expansion and contraction are elicited based on the situation. The dread atmosphere is motivated by the *fear* emotion, which in turn *constricts* the lived body. This constriction or narrowness is identified by the *corporeal isles* of

the body, in Schmitz's terms, head, chest, and feet. But what actions will this lead to?

In light of the elaboration of Hanich (2010) on the thoughts of Schmitz (1964 to 2005), there are two apparent actions. The first action is related to the *relative space* of the subject, in which the subject tries to escape by looking away or by covering the eyes. The other action occurs internally; when the subject cannot escape the relative space and cannot escape the *absolute space*, it tries to escape its skin "by expanding Away somewhere, but cannot flee the lived-body's constriction" (Hanich 2010 p.103). The action in this situation turns into a feeling (e.g., tension) that can be felt in the head, chest, or feet, that is, a corporeal inner act.

Since the spectator is following the character in a dread scene and the character carries out actions such as walking and hiding, then each action performed by the character will be transferred to the spectator, based on *empathy* and *sympathy*, and then moves her/him into a new *situation*. This situation is what Merleau-Ponty (2002) called the *transcendence* stage, namely, the stage at which the volunteer enters into a situation that increases the *existence* of the subject. In other words, each action performed by the character transfers the subject into a situation and as it does this, an inner dynamic process of contraction and expansion in the felt-body turns finally into an emotion or a feeling. This is exactly Griffero's (2014) definition of the atmosphere, that is, emotions and feelings that lose meaning when someone tries to describe them. Thereupon, he argues one has to live in these emotions and feelings in order to understand them. "They are effused into a not yet clarified spatial dimension and tied to situations" (Griffero 2014 p.31).

### 3.4 Conclusion

This study drew on the concepts of the *phenomenology of perception* and of *lived experience* that were developed by Merleau-Ponty (2002). It extended the definition of this concept by using other philosophers' interpretations in an effort to elaborate on the relationships that emerge among those of perception, movement, and action, as fundamental processes in achieving embodiment through the encounter between the subject and the object.

Sobchack's (1990) phenomenology of cinematic experience stresses the interactive character of film viewing as an exchange between two bodies; the body of the character and the body of the viewer. She states that the relationship between spectator and film is fundamentally *mimetic* in that it is experienced through the body. However, she did not clarify how the exchange between the two bodies occurs. Accordingly, the spectator in this research is considered as a subject who has an *interpretive lived experience* that interacts with the character when enveloped by the dread atmosphere in a thriller on screen. This encountering is related to an individual's perception and a perception shared with the character. The relationship is also based on the movement of the character in the scene and how it is reflected on the viewer's internal movement to create a sense of expansion or contraction. Finally, it is based on the character's action which is responsible for creating the *transcendence* of the viewer to *exist* in that moment *corporeally* and to be in full *consciousness*, namely, to transfer her/him into a *situation* in which to act or to wish to act.

It should be borne in mind that perception, action, and movement happen in a reciprocal, never-ending, non-sequential process involving the subject and the object. As Merleau-Ponty states "there is not a perception followed by a

Part One: Structure of Encountering  
movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.127). This means that perception can precede an action and that action can precede the perception of something else, and so on. That is the reason behind naming this chapter the *Structure of Encountering*, i.e., consciousness is behind the encountering process.



## **PART ONE:**

Chapter One: Phenomenology of Cinematic Dread

Chapter Two: Embodiment

Chapter Three: Structure of Encountering

**Chapter Four: The Affective Experience**



## Chapter Four: The Affective Experience

The previous chapters presented the phenomenology of embodiment as the process of encountering that take place between the subject and the object and discussed its three main stages: perception, movement and action. What matters in understanding the process of encountering is the concept of engagement because it takes place when the body takes up acting in order to embody the object. Hirose (2002) stresses that *affordances* and *motivations* are necessary for triggering the act of encountering in order to help with the act of embodying.

This chapter gives an account of the theories of *immersion* and of *flow theory* and discusses *affect* and the *affective experience* as the ultimate limit of embodiment. The chapter also discusses affordances and motivations and emphasizes the difference between them using examples from different fields.

### 4.1 Affordances and Motivation

*Affordance* is an ecological psychological term set out by James J. Gibson originally in 1954. It describes how people visually perceive their environment and considers any resource encountered by the subject in the environment such as surfaces, objects, substances, and events that might provide an opportunity for action (Gibson 2014). For example, a flat horizontal surface supports walking or standing and a smelly rotten apple provides intentions for throwing.

Based on movement, Yudell (1977) categorized affordances into two types: *static fit* and *dynamic fit*. *Static fit* is the affordance that informs the subject where and how to sit while *dynamic fit* is the affordance that informs the subject where and how to move (Yudell 1977).

Gibson was influenced by Koffka's (1935) work on *Gestalt* psychology. He states that "each thing says what it is." (Gibson 2014; Good 2007). Zaff argues that by looking at objects, people perceive their affordances, not their physical qualities such as size or color, and in turn perceive a push to *act*. Therefore, what is particular in the concept of affordances is their focus on the realization of *action-relevant* properties of the environment (Zaff 1995).

Good notes that many researchers (e.g., Lakoff (1987), Norman (1988), and Gaver (1991)) believe that Gibson's theory is incomplete because it neglected the role of cognition and focused only on the role of perception. As a consequence, these researchers updated the theory of affordance in such a way as to derive from it a mental interpretation of things based on people's knowledge and past experiences in addition to the roles of the culture, social setting, and intentions that determine the perception of affordances (Good 2007). On the other hand, although researchers disagree on the beginning of the process; whether it starts from the information the subject has or the affordance the environment has, all of them agree that affordances end with an *action*.

From a phenomenal perspective and influenced by Husserl (1976), Merleau-Ponty (2002) relied on the notion of *motivation*, not of affordances, as motivation describes the unity of movement and perception. He considered motivation as a continuous unconscious process of a balance in the body orientation that adjusts it to integrate experience and engage with the environment (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

As Carman and Griffero note, in Husserl's (1976) theory of perception, the concept of *motivation* was introduced in his account of *signs* and *indication*. Indication, he argued is neither rational, nor causal, but phenomenal. For him, it

is perception and judgments that define it. In his book *Ideas I and II*, he expanded the concept of motivation to cover kinesthetic sensations but limited it to *tactile* sensations; only those aspects of tactile sensations involved in touching were deemed responsible for rendering the perceptual object in the subject's consciousness and corporeality (Carman 1999; Griffero 2014).

Consciousness is a very important entity in perception structure for Merleau-Ponty. He stated that the subject "becomes fully aware of itself only through the experience of certain natural signs" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.49). The *natural sign* mediates the subject's perceptual experience that lies in her/his precognitive bodily engagement with the world, and he argues that what mediates the synaesthetic experience is that the object expresses itself in the *Ipesity* of the thing; "each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, is only an invitation to perceive beyond it as a moment in the perceptual process. And if the thing is reached as 'reality' it will be that moment that snatches our grasp" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.271).

As a conclusion, it is clear that what mediates perceptual and synaesthetic experiences is a *motivation* for Merleau-Ponty. Motivation, as he states, is a *raison d'être* that orients and "guides the flow of phenomena without being explicitly laid down in any one of them, a sort of operative reason" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.57).

After this review of different perspectives of affordance and motivation, the next sub-section highlights some of their applications in different studies.

#### 4.1.1 *Attributes, Shapes, and Surfaces as Affordances*

In the human environment, Reed identified some of the basic properties of affordances that constitute elements in systems of “combination, recombination and transformation” (Reed 1996 p.123). He divided the properties of affordances into three main categories: *attributes*, *shapes*, and *surfaces*. Attributes, such as durability, might give the subject reason for pounding and chopping, while massiveness gives her/him reasons for crushing and breaking and sharpness gives her/him reasons for scratching, drilling, and cutting. Shapes of lines might point to tying, and binding, concave shapes indicate holding liquids and making sounds. On the other hand, smooth and rough surfaces suggest rubbing, polishing, and smoothing while the shape of a naked furry animal suggests a need for keeping it dry and warm (Reed 1996 p.120).

#### 4.1.2 *Tactile Values as Affordances*

Theorists such as Bernard Berenson (2005) formulated *tactile values* that describe the qualities of affordances in paintings which he regarded to stimulate a sense of touch by relating some visual images to the knowledge and experience of the flesh and skin. Samuels has noted that the tactile values, from his point of view, exist in representations of solid objects, such as motivations, and let the subject come closer to look, touch, and walk around, or to understand (Samuels 1981). Elliott highlighted that in film, close-up shots are considered as the images that increase *tactile value* (Elliott 2011), for instance, the money in *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960).

One may conclude that motivation can be thought of as affordance in so far that they lead to action. However, the main acts for motivation are movement as a

perceptual experience and feeling as a synaesthetic experience whereas the main act for affordance is action and/or thinking.

## 4.2 Immersion and the Flow Theory

Affordances and motivations are triggers to engage with the world and act accordingly. Once the subject acts according to them, the affordance stops from being a trigger and turns into a background of the atmosphere where the subject can lose the self-consciousness and be embodied in the world until a new trigger awakens its consciousness. Seamon states that Merleau-Ponty understands the relationship between the body and the world it encounters and perceives that through a continuous *immersion*, awareness and actions (Seamon 2017).

In phenomenology, Seamon highlights that *immersion-in-world* is a term used to describe the lived embeddedness of human beings in the world in which they find themselves (Seamon 2015). In video games, Salen and Zimmerman developed the notion of immersion, they considered it as a mental process of engagement based on the approach of “transporting the participant into an illusory, stimulated reality” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004). But experiencing video games requires a limited understanding and more experience. Hence, *immersion* does not fit with the definition of the means to construct a state of playing since it turns the player into a state of *passive surrender*. As a consequence, *flow theory* is applied to video games. Bayliss points out that video game is a type of active engagement, that doesn't require any effort of attention to the activity of playing or the tools that engage all aspects of the interface, accordingly, the player plays in unity with the game, but with full awareness (Bayliss 2010).

Bayliss confirms that the loss of self-consciousness is an aspect that is shared between immersion and flow theory. However, in flow theory the player's action

and awareness merge for a more an expanded experience; the player is unified with the game in a way that keeps her/him aware of the contextual situation, and she/he is not lost, but expanded and aware (Bayliss 2010).

It has been discussed in Chapter One that Hanich (2010) regarded the significance of *cinematic dread* to its *spatial, temporal, and emotional immersion*. But in light of understanding flow theory, the spectator is expanded and aware. He probably has used the term *immersion* to express the lost self in the film, as a character within the framework of *empathy* and *sympathy*, not according to loss of consciousness, or unless, he will be contradicting himself.

#### 4.3 Affect and the Affective Experience

The architect Peter Zuthmor (2010) stated that architecture can be experienced differently from one person to another and that experiences are often charged by the flow of energies that contribute to the atmosphere, which eventually contribute the meaning and the feelings for a *place* and its effect on the subject.

According to Griffero (2014), the first impression is always atmospheric. It is an affective corporeal involvement “interrupting the habitual observational and pragmatic flux” to give the subject an identity (Griffero 2014 p.29). It is important to question what *affect* or *affective experience* is in this context.

*Affect* is a Freudian theory that has been used by many philosophers such as Deleuze (1992) who employed this theory in coining his *affection-image* concept. Deleuze (1992) considers affect as an internal phenomenon through which the self is called into presence in relation to an encounter with the outside world, and Green relates that moment of *affect* as the moment that *snatches* the body from silence (Green 1995). The affect, then, is inherently embodied. Matthews adds

that it is not only a mental state but a feeling or emotion of bodily nature, such as the heart rate and muscle tension (Matthews 2013).

Matthews highlighted Freud's indication of *affect*, which has two overlapping dimensions; it is both somatic (of the body) and psychological (of the mind) phenomenon. It is an emotion encountered but not yet named as emotion (Matthews 2013). In light of this, Bayliss pointed out that researchers refer it to a way of describing the feeling or the intensity of the experience (Bayliss 2010).

Although the role of *affect* and emotion in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is ignored, some researchers (e.g., Sue Cataladi) could identify the role of affect and emotion in his philosophy. Cataladi (1993) noted that Merleau-Ponty defined affect as a mode of embodied meaning allied to movement and *spatiality*. Thereupon, affect is always connected with a *situation of kinesthetic consciousness* that leads to corporeality. The questions emerge: how is affect created in film? And what is the cinematic affective experience?

In the film experience, and drawing upon the thoughts of Sobchack (1992) and Marks (2000), Laine (2006) considers the *skin* as the medium that "we see, we feel and we think", and, accordingly, *skin* is the medium of *affect* that gives shape to the subject's *affective engagement* with the film and spreads *affect* over her/his entire body (Laine 2006). She clarified that in the way in which skin relates to cinema it works as "perceptual surface that travels through the senses and between the self and the world," where one cannot define the border between inside and outside (Laine 2006).

Some researchers have connected the *affective experience* with *immersion*, but *flow theory* has enhanced this thinking by adding to it the sub-cognitive aspect and the notion of the expansion of the body aspect. In relating this to Sheets-

Johnstone's structure of movement, one concludes that this expansion of the body includes *proprioception* and *kinesthesia*, which refer to the awareness of the body in position and in movement that can be felt on the muscles, which, in turn, create *kinesthetic consciousness* and *corporeal consciousness* eventually.

In addition to movement, senses and sensual experience are considered to be key players in creating an *affective experience*. Anderson (2009) confirms that the most important issue is to create more sensed than understood architecture, which can be achieved by means of revealing smell, touch, movement, and walking, or even dark voids, to create the memory because creating new sensations creates memories.

Griffero (2014) concluded that *atmospheric affection* is corporeal and that it can be produced kinesthetically by muscles, and synaesthetically by the expansion and contraction of the felt-body that can change the *absolute space*. This is then, the *affective experience* (Griffero 2014).

#### 4.4 Conclusion

Cinema provokes a range of experiential and affective potentialities that fuel all kinds of movements and feelings. This chapter handled the concepts of *affordance* and *motivation* because they promote potentials for acting, moving, or feeling in order to create an *affective experience*.

This research considered motivation similar to affordance as both are stimuli that evoke the subject to act, but the kind of action it prompts is different from the one which affordance stimulates, since motivation is more phenomenal than affordance. Accordingly, actions associated with motivation are movement as perceptual experience and feeling as a synaesthetic experience whereas the act(s) concomitant with affordance is/are action and/or thinking.

It was illustrated in Chapter Three that the anticipation of touch is the motivation behind fear in thriller and horror films and that fear is the force that is experienced as touch and to which the subject's body responds and *starts to crawl* (Laine 2006). This *motivation* is responsible for influencing the spectator to live with the character *spatially, temporally, and emotionally*, hence identifying with the character under the framework of *empathy* and *sympathy*, this then turns into a *kinesthetic corporeal* experience because *fear* awakens the senses and stimulates a state of *proprioception* to create a *transcendental subjectivity* that is felt on the skin. All this experience will be reflected as a contraction the felt-body, which will tighten the *absolute space* of the spectator. This constitutes an *affective experience* felt *kinesthetically* and *synaesthetically* that can turn any *space* into a *place* that cannot be forgotten.

The foregoing discussions mark the end of this part of this thesis. The elaborations given on the process of embodiment and on how the subject experiences a corporeal conscious experience have laid foundations for reading a scene to describe a lived experience and to capture its associated corporeal moments.



## PART TWO: Methodology



## Part Two: Methodology

### Introduction

In Part One, the research has drawn upon the phenomenology of perception and lived experience developed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), and extended the structure of embodiment through understanding the relationships among perception, movement, and action, where the viewer is considered as a subject who has an interpretive, lived experience that interacts with the character who is encountering the dread atmosphere in a thriller on screen. This encountering, that happens *here* and *now* counts on *empathy* or *sympathy* as a process to blend the viewer with the character and its environment. The process of encountering is related to the individual's perception of the events and a shared perception with the character. The relationship is also based on the movement of the character in the scene and how it is reflected on the viewer's internal movement to create expansion and contraction. It is also based on the character's action that is responsible for the *transcendence* of the viewer to *exist* in that moment corporeally and to be in full consciousness, that is, to transfer her/him into a situation to act or to wish to act.

### Phenomenology as a Methodology

Phenomenology is commonly used as an approach to opening to the thing itself through a qualitative evidence as a descriptive and interpretative basis for substantive conclusions and discoveries. Seamon, Shirazi, and Pallasmaa, to name but a few, are phenomenologists who used description as a method to approach phenomenology, e.g., in describing A Passage from García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (Seamon 2017), The Langen Foundation Museum (Shīrāzī 2013), and the case of Villa Mairea (Pallasmaa 1998).

When using phenomenology as a method, Seamon (2017) summarizes the steps of phenomenology research in three steps. The first step is about looking and trying to see. This involves an empathy with, an openness to, and kindness to the thing; one allows the thing to present itself as if it can speak. He states that the aim of using phenomenology is empathetic awareness and engagement that allow the thing studied to be as fully present, describable, and understandable as possible (Seamon 2017). The second step is trying to describe what one sees. The description is intensive and thorough, and is mainly given through a first-person description of one's own experience, namely, reading and describing an experience with all its details from the moment of walking to entering, seeing, smelling, hearing, touching, encountering, and so forth, will lead to a comprehensive and articulated understanding of the lived experience. Using one whole experience to describe through one main case study is called by Husserl (2012) *phenomenology from within*, which, according to Shirazi (2013), is better to use than having separate phenomenological concerns from many case studies. Seamon states that this reading of one main experience through one person can help other researchers to look for other patterns or observations and it may open other possibilities of phenomena (Seamon 2017). The third step is interpreting the description by using specific instances to identify the underlying structure and order in order to seek for commonalities in the midst of the individual experiential descriptions.

Hanich (2010) used phenomenology to look for the prototypes of experiences in an effort to approach the common structure of fear. He mainly considered the multi-observations and commonalities in films to come out with the five prototypes mentioned in Chapter One. His method of discussing the constricted atmosphere in cinematic dread was more into suggesting phenomenal concerns than a

*phenomenology from within*. This means that he performed latitudinal and horizontal readings and observations of many films instead of discussing one film. Thus, this thesis employed phenomenology as a tool for description of one dread scene in an attempt to understand the phenomenology of dread.

While conducting a phenomenological interpretation in architecture, Shirazi (2013) tried to make a comprehensive reading, taking into consideration the shortcomings of some existing methods, and to consider common phenomenological concerns during the interpretation. He mainly proposed a framework to transfer his lived experience to the reader by considering the reader as a *traveler* in a phenomenological journey. He provided the traveler with some phenomenological concerns and characteristics to keep in mind for her/him to be able to see and feel what Shirazi is experiencing. Shirazi's lived experience was presented in the Langen Foundation Museum. His study began from the macro level; from reading the environment, its characteristics, and specialties. By approaching the building from the outside to the interior, keeping in mind the phenomenological concerns, the traveler experiences the environment phenomenologically from varying positions and views via movement. The careful reading, which considers all aspects and dimensions of the work, enables the traveler to develop numerous feelings and draw her/his own image. As a result, *sub-images* are created that, eventually, lead to the overall *image* in the mind of the traveler (Shīrāzī 2013).

### Phenomenal Phenomenology

Shirazi's method of reading the Langen Foundation Museum is referred to as *phenomenal phenomenology*. This study followed Shirazi's *phenomenal*

*phenomenology* approach in order to read a dread sequence from a thriller film and, ultimately, transfer the reader into a viewer.

By adopting Shīrāzī's (2013) method, and following the theoretical framework of the present research, which places the viewer (as a subject) in the position of encountering the screen (as an object) via the processes of perception, movement, and action, the phenomenal reading is intended to develop a narrative with careful reading of the details. In addition, this reading took into consideration multiple aspects systematically, including the *multi-sensory experience* and the *synaesthetic perception* that let the senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the thing that appeals to all senses to capture the *haptic perception*. The expansion and contraction of the felt-body [*Leib*] that reflect the *kinesthetic* and *corporeal consciousness*, which is guided by the movement of the character are traced. It can be argued that the first impression (viewing) is necessary to grasp the atmosphere, which is true, but the second, third, and fourth impressions are necessary as well because they give rise to less intense atmospheres.

Reading a building is, to a great extent, similar to reading a film. They both count on a lived experience, a body in movement, a multi-sensory body, and action and reaction. However, to guarantee that the lived experience is lived as it should, and because of the changing nature of cinematic atmospheres, one has first to fix and control the subjectivity of the viewer and, then, the objectivity of the screen in order to overcome any subjective projections of the atmosphere. Therefore, the following section discusses the factors that can control the atmosphere as a first step to discussing its embodiment.

## Factors for Controlling the Atmosphere of the Screen

Griffero stated that “It can be argued that atmospheres are changing according to the atmosphere itself and the subject mood” (Griffero 2014). However, for the purpose of this study it can be claimed that the atmosphere of the screen is controlled. It is not a changing situation because the objective space is controlled; the intentionality of the subject who wants to watch a film prepares the body to perceive it as it is, and the intensity of the object is itself a guarantee that this atmosphere overcomes the subjective feeling and any projection from the subject. The following discussion supports these claims.

Atmospheric perception is at least partly cognitively penetrable and not totally deterministic according to Griffero (Griffero 2014). The researcher agrees with this and underlines that the atmosphere is prototypical for the first impression (viewing) whereas the second, third, and fourth impressions give rise to less intense atmospheres. Although Griffero (Griffero 2014) supports the idea that the impact of the spatial context suffices because of adding factors or changing the perspective, this research maintains that the atmosphere of the screen is controlled and that it cannot be changed unless the viewer did not intend to come to watch a film, which is very unlikely. The following discussion supports how the intentionality of the subject and the intensity of the material of the screen create controlled atmospheres. It should be noted that for the purpose of this study, the researcher assumes an unbroken experience in watching films, i.e., an experience without any distractions.

### *Intentionality (of the Subject)*

There is a duality in the atmosphere between the *introjection* (feeling outside spread inside) and the *projection* (the feelings from inside spread outside)

(Griffero 2014). This research considers that the viewer who watches thrillers has the intention to gain pleasure from fear and to live a different experience. So, *projection* from the subject is very unlikely and most of the experience will be *introjection*. This has been discussed by Hanich (2010), who discusses the *aesthetic attitude* of the viewer to complete the *aesthetic experience* in cinema. The *aesthetic experience* for Hanich is the experience of the pleasure of horror that is produced by the *aesthetic attitude* of the viewer. He considers this sort of experience as a voluntary encounter with the screen as an object to become an *aesthetic object*, which, without the perceiver, remains a mere object. He adds that constituting the aesthetic object requires a *self-constitution*, that is, a deliberate placement of the viewer-self in a position to be attached to the screen whereby it can open itself to be affected more. This deliberate decision s/he makes sets the *aesthetic attitude* apart from other activities, it temporarily sets aside everyday life, and allows herself/himself to be “sensitive and vulnerable to what the aesthetic object might *do*” (Hanich 2010 p.53).

To understand the way in which the body prepares itself for a situation, Merleau-Ponty (2002) stated that the body has the potentials to acquire certain habits to help it act, as in the example of how a person falls asleep, where it has the ability to surrender itself for sleeping. “[...] which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, now becomes my very being, and sleep, suddenly become a situation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.246). Consequently, going to the movie theatre, waiting in line, paying money for tickets, and switching cell phones off to watch a film, or buying a DVD to watch a film at home, are only deliberate decisions the individual takes to prepare herself/himself for the *aesthetic object*. Hanich (2010) described this process as an *active attention* coming from the *aesthetic attitude* of the subject. One can advocate a different, and more favorable, experience in watching a film

at the theatre, a non-stop flow experience, more than the experience of watching the same film on DVD at home, but the *active attention* and *aesthetic attitude* to watching the film are still considered the same. But to avoid the undesirable and unpredictable effects of distractions to having a continuous lived experience, in this study the researcher only considers a non-broken watching experience.

### *Intensity (of the Object)*

One cannot reduce atmospheres to mere products of subjectivity, Griffero adds: “but the intensity of the atmospheric is the best proof of the objective effectiveness of the atmosphere we react to” (Griffero 2014 p.135). Film, as well as architecture, video games, and Virtual Reality, focus on condensed preferential objects and the intensity of the objects so as to guarantee the maximum effectiveness and effect on the viewers and the users. Colors, forms, style, organization, and the visual and audio effects are only few examples that these media can manipulate to intensify the *aesthetic experience*.

The intensity of the object (the thriller film itself) comes from two main resources. First, the time, where one hour and a half to two hours of experience of a whole story with a beginning, middle, and end obliges the viewer to hypothetically be absorbed. Within these two hours, the sequence of events and power of pushing and pulling the viewer towards the plot by *empathizing* and *sympathizing* with the character create an internal intensity in the subject which makes the object become in charge of the atmosphere. Second, the appearance of the object (the total look of the film from the picture, sound, special effects, performance, directing, and camera angles besides their pace, rhythm, and exaggeration in the time the viewer is just sitting) makes the film itself what is responsible for affecting the viewer without being interrupted from her/his projection. Hence, the intensity

of appearance is important to create the aesthetic perception to enhance its presence and its perception.

Exaggeration in forms, music, or any representation within the film has one main goal; a desire to be perceived *here* and *now* in order to create the right ambiance. For instance, in 1920, German Expressionist filmmakers brought intensity to film settings in order to express more inner and outer forces to threaten the characters and, sometimes, to reflect their inner moods (Schaal 1996). *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (1920), *The Golem* (1920), *Nosferatu* (1922), and *Metropolis* (1927) are few examples of German Expressionist films in which Gothic architecture was used as a reference for fear. Some other films used mixed architectural styles to suggest the timeless background of the setting and to intensify the atmosphere such as the description of Gotham City in *Batman Begins* (2005), which used modern brutalist, Gothic architecture, Italian futurist, and early brownstone buildings (Abuhassan 2009). Moreover, some films intensify their forms so as to give an authentic historical appearance such as the use of the spiral shape for *Minas Tirith* in *The Lord of the Rings* (Lee 2003).

When the ambiance and the total work of art of film have the *pervasive quality* of a *situation as a whole*, as Thibaud describes them, he argues that they get inside the perceiver to catch her/him up towards particular actions and expressions (Thibaud 2011, 209 as cited in (Edensor 2012). Thus, through various aesthetic techniques, e.g., editing, lighting, camera movement and position, sound design and performance, these various factors make the film itself and its context of screening responsible for controlling the relationship with the viewer. Subsequently, the screen atmosphere is controlled and not changing.

## Extending Phenomenal Phenomenology

The aim of Shirazi's reading was only to create images in the mind of travelers that are only originally and fundamentally phenomenological. His reading did not aim at highlighting new phenomenological concerns that have not been discussed. In response to that, and with reference to the third step in phenomenology as methodology, according to Seamon (2017), the researcher highlights specific situations after the phenomenal reading where the atmosphere was injected more into dread.

Based on that, the following chapter; Chapter Five, discusses the characteristics that can guide transfer of the reader into a viewer, followed by a phenomenal reading of a dread scene. Chapters six, seven, and eight present few situations, or quasi-things, that were responsible for increasing dread in the analyzed scene.



CHAPTER FIVE:

Implementing Phenomenal Phenomenology

*The Silence of the Lambs*



## Chapter Five: Implementing Phenomenal Phenomenology

This chapter paves the ground for relating some theories of phenomenology and embodiment of the subject encountering an object, through presenting a comprehensive reading of a dread scene from film *The Silence of the Lambs*. This particular reading has been developed through the framework provided in Part One in order to describe the lived experience under the notions of perception, movement, and action, in order to interact with the screen. Thus, it adds to film analysis and criticism by establishing a new method for understanding dread atmospheres and describing them, it then uses this method to enhance the spatial atmospheric qualities of any experience that requires suspense. As such, this method extends Julian Hanich's (2010) concept of *cinematic dread* and elaborates on finding its essence, namely, the phenomenology of the atmosphere of *cinematic dread*.

After this reading, it should be possible to determine the most memorable *situations* that caught the body up and affected its existence and corporeality to come out with new *quasi-things*. By so doing, the researcher attempts to develop a deeper understanding of the phenomenology of atmosphere of dread that was created and designed by the filmmaker and the writer so as to ultimately elaborate on Hanich's characteristics of the *constricted atmosphere of cinematic dread*.

### 5.1 The Silence of the Lambs

The application of embodiment is endless; it can be used in film, or architecture, or Virtual reality and in many different fields. This research used one case study only to be consistent and continuous in the whole experience faced in encountering one dread atmosphere and to have a phenomenology from within. The atmospheric corporeal *quasi-things* that can be grasped from this case study

only are proportionate to the length of the thesis and can open possibilities for applying findings to other films and grasping further corporeal *quasi-things*.

### 5.1.1 Film Synopsis

A psychopath known as Buffalo Bill (Ted Levine) is kidnapping and murdering young women. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sends the agent Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster) to interview a prisoner who may provide psychological insight into, and clues to, the killer's actions. Dr. Hannibal Lecter (Antony Hopkins) is a brilliant murderous psychiatrist prisoner who will only help Clarice if she feeds his curiosity with details about her own complicated life. This twisted relationship forces Clarice to face Buffalo Bill, who is also named James Gumb, alone in his own place.

Main cast: Jodie Foster as Clarice Starling, Anthony Hopkins as Dr. Hannibal Lecter, and Ted Levine as Buffalo Bill.

The film was directed by Jonathan Demme, and written by Thomas Harris for the novel, and by Ted Tally for the screenplay.

Duration of the film is 118 minutes, aspect ratio is 1.85 : 1, filmed by Panaflex Camera and Lenses by Panavision in color, Dolby SR for audio, and printed on film 35 mm.

The Film had harvested my film awards; Best Picture, Best Actor in a Leading Role, Best Actress in a Leading Role, Best Director, Best Writing, Screenplay Based on Material Previously Produced or Published, Best Sound, and Best Film Editing in the Oscar 1992, in addition to many other awards at Golden Globe, BAFTA Awards, Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy & Horror Films, best

motion picture at Awards Circuit Community Awards, and many others (IMDB,2018).

### 5.1.2 Why this Film?

*The Silence of the Lambs* is one of the most recognizable thriller films because of its broad overlapping with horror. However, Jancovich notes that arguments about classifying the genre of film are a little ambiguous owing to the fact that many audiences and theorists use the term *genre* to connote user groups on the basis of similarities in the subjects (Jancovich 2000). Based on these differences, some people have considered *The Silence of the Lambs* as a serial killer movie (Jancovich 2000); as a psychological horror movie (Hanich 2010; Blair and Mitchell 2005); and as a horror film (Tharp 1991). However, what unifies them all is the required construction of an atmosphere of dread.

Hanich highlights that after 1990, concepts of killing without motivation were interpreted with in the story of the *Silence of the Lambs*. He considers it to be the film that most sparked the cycle of this overlapping with horror, a hybrid form, equalizing it with other films: *What Lies beneath* (Zemeckis 2000), *The Sixth Sense* (Shyamalan 1999), *Seven* (Fincher 1995), *The Blair witch Project* (Daniel Myrick 1999), *Sleeping with the Enemy* (Ruben 1991), and *The Da Vinci Code* (Howard 2006), which were all enormous successes (Hanich 2010).

Many books and articles have mentioned this film in particular. As an example, Boyd and Palmer (2006) wrote about the influence of Hitchcock films on contemporary directors and films and made a comparison between *The Silence of the Lambs* and *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960) because the two films employed similar cinematic elements such as photos, mirrors, camera angles, cinematography, colors, and the use of a basement, which was another major

issue discussed and tied to death, secrets and to the site for performance and transformation (Scott 2015).

Hanich (2010) states that *The Silence of the Lambs* is dominated by dread divided into many sequences in addition to some direct horror and frightening scenes. He regarded the selected scene as a *cinematic dread* and a prototype, where a vulnerable character slowly and quietly enters a dark place harboring a threat in which stillness and slowness dominate. An intense, but quiet, atmosphere is made that can lead to anticipation of an ending with horror or shock (Hanich 2010 p.154). He experienced the six-minute scene as longer because it was a protracted time experience due to the isolated and contracted atmosphere. He considered the *descent* as a major character of the basement in which the character goes down and where the walls are buried to isolate her/him from the sound of the external world, the day light, the weather, and season (Hanich 2010). However, his description was very broad and based on a phenomenal perspective with common experiences in different films, and he did not interpret the embodiment as a mean to define more the atmosphere of that dread scene.

Laine (2006), in her article *Cinema as Second Skin*, discussed the importance of touch in corporeality and the haptic experience for seeing as a mode of corporeality, where consciousness arises when one touches another. She considers the camera movement as a method for generating proximity and developing the sensation of touch (Laine 2006). She took the last scene in the selected sequence only in which Clarice is seen from Buffalo Bill's side and focused on sharing skin where the viewer was being drawn under the skin of Buffalo Bill to recognize and perceive his feelings. The movement of the camera is sensed on the spectator's skin as proximity and the fear is made more intense as a consequence (Laine 2006). Her research did not discuss the atmosphere of

dread or how that feeling of touch elaborates on creating the dread atmosphere. However her findings built a very good base for this research to read the scene and to combine her findings with other ones to develop the spatial understanding of dread atmosphere. On this account, this film, taken as a case study for this kind of research, opens up the possibilities for extending the concept of atmosphere of dread.

### 5.1.3 Scene Description

The selected scene from *The Silence of the Lambs* (Demme Jonathan 1991) extends from 1:42:36 to 1:49:20 when the FBI agent Clarice Starling enters the house of the serial killer Jame Gumb (Buffalo Bill). The actual dread scene starts from the moment she discovered that he is the wanted person and that she has to arrest him and rescue the kidnapped girl, Catherine (Brooke Smith).

This scene is regarded as a dread scene in Hanich's (2010) book. In terms of narrative, it represents a "vulnerable character slowly and quietly entering a dark forsaken place harboring a threat" (Hanich 2010 p.156). According to his definition of *Cinematic Dread*, the general stillness and slowness, the little camera movement, the movement within the mise-en-scène, the *temporal* structure, and the *spatial* and *emotional* immersions qualify it to be regarded as an example of *cinematic dread*.

### 5.2 Phenomenological Concerns and Characteristics

The following characteristics are necessary to turn the reader into a viewer and move her/him into the lived experience of the dread scene in the selected thriller film. All these characteristics are built on the literature review in part one of this thesis. However, in this sub-section, these characteristics interact in a comprehensive way to clarify and support the phenomenology of embodiment to

describe how the viewer's body was extended in the atmosphere of dread and made able to become *embodied*.

The researcher brings to notice that she used her filmmaking and architectural background in the analysis because they, to a great extent, contribute to her perception of the scene. Moreover, since this research looks on the dread atmosphere phenomenally, it is very important for it to look for the *essence* of the experience and to make it lived for the reader. Hence, the researcher uses the pronoun *I* to describe her own experience and the pronoun *We* to indicate the experience shared with the character.

- While watching a dread scene in a thriller film, I prepare myself and my body to live a difficult experience with a character for two hours. I am a lived body that perceives the world of the film and moves and acts to encounter it. I experience the scene in spatial and spatio-temporal relations with my felt-body; *Leib*, and my Physical body; *Korper*.
- Perception is shared between me as a viewer and the character in some scenes when there is a *subjective treatment* shot, e.g., when the viewer and character face a threat for the first time together.
- As a filmmaker, I understand the film language and the sizes and meanings of the shots. Furthermore, since this part cannot be separated from my identity, then my perception is a wholeness of what I am. Thus, my perception will be affected by the director's and cinematographer's decisions, and this will be reflected on the description and analysis of the *perception of perception*.
- The *structure of perception* is the structure of the seen and the structure of the subject's consciousness. Accordingly, perception describes a space

that may be a mere *space* or a *place*, and which has physical and tangible characteristics, architecture, furniture, texture, etc., that are mediated in the context of camera by the screen frame.

- Perception occurs via the senses. Drawing upon the thoughts of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists, the experience is defined as *Gestalt*. In other words, the senses work *synthetically* together. Vision and hearing may be the most privileged senses in cinema but they are not isolated from other senses which enrich and feed the vision to have a haptic experience to touch, smell, and taste as well, which, according to Sobchack (1992), is defined as a *cross-modal* activity that results from the cooperation of the senses. In addition to that, the preference of one sense over the other is related to the *significance core*.
- I will describe what *I* see, hear, and touch, not what *my eyes* see, or *my ears hear*, or *my skin* touches. This means that I will describe what is attracting my eyes and stimulating my feelings in the *felt-body*, which is something that usually follows the character in dread according to the *haptic perception*.
- My skin is a medium of intersubjective connection and it gives the shape of my *affective engagement*.
- Perception includes perceiving the phenomenal factors that violate familiar events and turn the experience into the sort of experience that will increase corporeality and consciousness such as surprise, conflict, and shock.
- Perception concerns *things* rather than objects, where everything is situated in its position for a reason and is manifesting the space to be perceived in a certain way. The *thing* combines all of my senses, my body,

and mind to experience the atmosphere and establish the *place* instead of a *space*.

- *Phenomenal zones, motifs, or encapsulated* objects are all definitions of the *thing*. Stairs, corridors, and doors are only some of the *things* in thrillers that are continuously used to dramatize the plot.
- *Affordances* are *things* in the scene that stimulate and motivate the character to look, to move, to choose, to make a decision and to act.
- *Motivation* is the emotions and the feeling that concern me, which will be described as *action-reaction*.
- Movement is the way in which we allocate and experience the space to be perceived and lived. The movement inside the screen is achieved through the character who transfers me virtually from a space into another, and because of my *empathy* and *sympathy* as an engagement with the character, the movement of the character produces contraction and expansion, tension and relaxation for me to create inner movements that affect my *absolute space*.
- The character experiences the antagonist's space *spatially* and moves, *de-distances*, and *directs* herself/himself to the right, to the left, up, or down, thus composing the *here* and *now*, and *there* and *then*.
- The flow and pause of the character reflect her/his engagement with space and the *habitual body*. The flow means that she/he recognizes the space or starts to recognize it. The pause or freeze means that she/he is not engaged, hesitant, or about to do something. It expresses preparation for

movement, stands as a sign for *affect* or *affordance*, and expresses a *time extended experience*.

- Each flow and pause for the character is a trigger for me to feel and act, and because of my *empathy* and *sympathy* with her/him, it will be seen as if I am the one who flows or pauses. Sometimes, this will make me wish or desire to choose, walk, run, or stop. Her movement is what increases my *spatiality* in the world of the film, which, in turn, has the ability to produce *places* instead of *spaces*.
- The moment I am transformed from *I can* into *I am* is the moment of corporeality and consciousness.
- Movement has temporal and spatial qualities; *tensional*, *projectional*, *linear*, and *amplitudinal* qualities. It is not necessary for me to change my position so as to have a *kinesthetic experience* and consciousness. Only through watching a thriller with all my body, and the movement of the character, I have *kinesthesia* and *proprioception* because I will be aware of my body.
- The *tensional* quality has to do with the sense of effort that I am producing to follow the character's flow and pause, especially since I am following her/him with *empathy* and I expect to face the threat of which I know its nature but I do not know when it appears, which increases this effort. My whole body is engaged, even in stillness.
- The produced effort awakens my *kinetic energy* and stimulates it to move, physically, as in holding my breath, or visually, to move my eye to somewhere else in the frame.

- The *projectional* quality is a metaphoric quality, and *corporeal affection* that can only be compared with language. This quality is an *intersubjectivity effective* that expresses an emotional and corporeal involvement referring to the *synaesthetic experience*. For example, to describe how heavy and smooth the action is.
- The *linear* aspect of movement is directional and spatial, and the most recognizable, aspect that is shaped according to the directionality of the character and which describes the movement itself as straight, curvilinear, twisted, etc. The linear aspect of movement can be achieved on one axis, two axes, and perhaps three axes. The more axes in the frame, the more the energy space heightens the senses.
- The spatial configuration of the scene, even if it is produced by the shapes and lines of the mise-en-scene, or if it is produced according to the character's movement.
- The *directional* space aligns the character's movement and is responsible for creating *felt* properties such as narrowness and vastness of the atmosphere to create a *vector atmosphere*.
- I will consider the *gravity pull* as the center that attracts my senses, which can be most of the time attached to the movement of the character. Consequently, the gravity pull can shape the movement of the character, namely, where to go, where to stand, and where to pause. As a result, it is the pull of gravity of myself.
- The *Amplitudinal* quality is the one that concerns the *felt-body (Leib)* in contraction and expansion, and spatial contraction and expansion. It can

sometimes be reflected in my physical body (*Körper*) by tension and relaxed body reactions.

- *Proprioception* or *kinesthesia* are described by the narrowness or vastness of the space; *kinesthesia* occurs in motion of the character and *proprioception* occurs in stillness.
- I will discuss the cognition state according to *sub-cognition* because in many films I may lose details that make me understand the plot completely because of the spoken language or because I am focusing on some representations in the frame. So, with sub-cognition, I will try to relate what I have seen, without necessarily understanding why.
- *Ambiguity, indeterminacy* and *transcendence* are the notions for *existence* according to Merleau-Ponty (2002). The sub-cognition understanding is created accordingly.
- I use action verbs with adjectives to describe the action such as *entering through the door... hesitant entering through the door*. This, in turn, will reflect *cardinal time* and action.
- Action is connected to the character's action, where each decision and action she/he makes creates *transcendence* according to Merleau-Ponty (2002) and transfers me into a *situation* turning me into a conscious state, where *I am*. This will increase my sense of *existence* and of *embodiment*.
- Action is mimicry, it may create *overt acts*, such as breathing or holding the breath, and it can be an *imagined act* expressed in the narrowness of the felt-body.

- In some cases, the action can be attached to me, not to the character, like moving my head away from the screen, or getting down from the chair. However, these are exaggerated re-actions that are reflecting the inside, felt-body contraction and expansion. These reactions to the action happen in the frame and turn into a feeling such as *tension* because I cannot escape my skin!
- I will in no way live the dread scene unconsciously. However, the level of consciousness varies from high to low, depending on the stimuli in a specific scene and moment, which may increase the level of consciousness or reduce it. If, after a while, the body and mind cope with the situation, then a new trigger can awaken the body and increase its consciousness.
- The scene will be divided into segments where each segment is given a set name in order to avoid confusion between the scene numbers.
- The description will follow the character's experience chronologically, from one set into the other, until the end of the dread scene. To visualize the characteristics, please see the table below

Table 1: The characteristics used in the phenomenal reading

	Characteristics	The Researcher	Clarice
Perception	Space	√	√
	Senses to communicate with atmosphere	√	
	Phenomenal factors Surprise, shock, conflict	√	
	Phenomenal zones	√	
	Affordances		√
	Consciousness H M L	√	
Movement	Flow pause speed weight		√
	Tensional Qu.	√	
	Projectional	√	
	Linear		√
	Amplitudinal (Leib) Expanded/Contracted	√	
	Gravity pull that forms the movement of the character		√
	Kinesthesia/Proprioception	√	
	Corporeality H M L	√	
Action	√	√	

Table 1 summarizes the characteristics that help in reading the scene as discussed in the phenomenological concerns and characteristics. It indicates the particular characteristics that belong to the researcher and those that belong to the character in the scene. Some of the listed characteristics apply to both the researcher and the character.

### 5.3 A phenomenal Phenomenology in *The Silence of the Lambs*<sup>2</sup>

To facilitate it for the reader, a sketch of my perception of the scene is displayed in figure 5-1 and figure 5-2. It shows the set names and numbers to engage the reader with the whole experience. This sketch may not comply with what was designed for the film but is the way that I have seen and experienced the sequence.




Figure 5-1: 2D plan drawing; Clarice's experience in Buffalo Bill's basement

Source: The author

<sup>2</sup> The source of all the frames inside this section is : DVD (Demme Jonathan 1991)




Figure 5-2: Isometric drawing; Clarice's experience in Buffalo Bill's basement

Source: The author

I looked at each scene many times to formulate a comprehensive phenomenal description. This is what Griffero (2014) means by the second, third, and fourth impressions that give rise to less intense atmospheres. The following is a careful reading of the scene based on the preceding characteristics.

	<p>Once Clarice Starling, the FBI agent, had stepped over the threshold of the house of Buffalo Bill and the door was closed behind her, she entered Buffalo Bill's world, experiencing <i>being-in-his-world</i>. The door, as a threshold, created a boundary which does not stop a place but extends it to invite me to <i>be-in-his world</i> as well and to feel <i>sympathy</i> for her at that moment; I know that she is in the wrong place, facing the wanted criminal alone. The difference between my knowledge as a viewer and her knowledge create a feeling of <i>sympathy</i> for her.</p>
	
	

Figure 5-3: Clarice enters Buffalo Bill's house

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #1



An external, long-establishing shot appears for the first time immediately after the door has shut behind her and shows the location of the house. The music of the previous scene is still on, full of tension and worry. It is autumn. The leaves on the trees have fallen. The sky is a little foggy and the colors are dull. The atmosphere looks sad and it is very calm outside. The tweets of the birds and the breeze of the air can be heard although the non-diegetic music which is still on. The camera pans slowly from the right to show part of a forest, where an old caravan is set, interrupted by a vacant train track line heading into an unknown empty forest. The camera pans to the left to show four separated houses of wood and brick and Clarice's car. This endless space of forest is just a constricted isolated space, enabling me to dwell and inhabit the character in isolation from the outside world. I know now, as Clarice knows, that she is isolated and alone, but I know more than her that the quiet, peaceful look of the house hides the power of deception, as in the houses used in

	<p>David Lynch films in which he translates a safe situation into its opposite through using the look of a peaceful skin (Martin 2014). This, in turn, increases my worry about Clarice because she is not ready to confront Buffalo Bill.</p>
--	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 5-4: Camera pan, establishing-shot of the location of the house



I am entering the living room with Clarice, with the non-diegetic music still on, and walking with her while she asks Buffalo Bill about the previous inhabitant of the house.

A tracking shot is used to *de-distance* herself and me, to create the *Da-sein's spatiality*. She is getting closer and closer to Buffalo Bill. At this moment, as I am facing her, it looks as if she pushes away the boundary in order to be closer. I wish I could stop her from moving forward. Then, she stops looking in, and checking his place more closely. I see a photo of a butterfly framed on the wall behind her. We see a very messy, dusty, and dirty desk full with old papers and files, and a cling film wrap. Meanwhile, Buffalo Bill is checking the cards while asking her if the police have found any clues as to the identity of the criminal. We see a butterfly landing on strings of different colors. This is when



Clarice realizes that this man is the wanted criminal. An extreme close-up is showing her sparkly eyes. The sense of fear is increasing. Buffalo Bill is asking if they have any fingerprints. Clarice looks as if she is up to the challenge. She prepares her gun and prepares herself to fight. Her ambiguity and initiation to determine his identity is absolutely over. Now, she is in the third aspect of the notion of *existence*, i.e., the *transcendence* stage, where she is transferring herself from a volunteer *I can* to the position of confronting him alone; *I am* in a *situation*.

Figure 5-5: Doubt in the living room

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #2

	<p>I see a gun in the kitchen, the room next to the living room. This informs me that he has a gun. This gun inhabits my body and mind as the music becomes louder in <i>sympathy</i> for Clarice. Going back to the living room, Clarice, in an extreme close-up shot, asks Buffalo Bill to use his phone. He smiles, and that is the moment when Clarice takes out her gun and asks him to freeze. We see him escaping through the kitchen. Clarice follows him quickly.</p>
	
	

Figure 5-6: The moment of revealing his identity

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #2



I see into the kitchen through a *stage frame* shot where Clarice is framed within three doors, two opened and one closed. The flat composition informs me that she is trapped in herself. I also smell old food and leftovers which stimulate an urge to vomit. Although there are three doors through which to anticipate which way to choose, since Buffalo Bill may be hiding behind one of these doors there is anxiety, however the light outside and being at the level of the main street, make me feel safe. Additionally, the *spatial aspect* of the kitchen is simple; a simple space facing towards the door. Therefore, at this point, I still feel that I am *extended* and that I can breathe. Clarice stops in the middle of the frame, taking off her coat and preparing herself for the next movement. The doors in this scene are *things* that let me guess for a moment which door is best to go through, and the openness and closeness of the doors make me anticipate the threat of invasion at any moment. That pause provided me with a *kinetic energy*

	preparing me for the next <i>situation</i> ; it is a <i>tensional</i> temporal aspect of movement.
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Figure 5-7: The kitchen

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #3

Filmmakers use flat frames when they want to show that the character feels trapped. She was trapped in the kitchen. The dirty dishes and pots on the stove and the fast food and ready meals on the table are what Paul Elliott (2011) calls an *abjection* and *rejection*. They provoked the bad smell to serving the narrative and function of killing and associated disgust.

By opening the door, which goes down, Clarice transferred *me* at this moment into a new *situation*. My *consciousness*, *empathy*, and *existence* are all increasing. For me, that was the moment of *transcendence* which Merleau-Ponty (2002) describes. It increased my consciousness and corporeality and prepared my body and mind to move to the new *situation*. This change occurred because of two reasons. The first is that she is following him alone, and by choosing the door behind her, there will be no return unless she kills him first. The second reason is subtle and depends on the recollection of an earlier moment in the film when Clarice failed a training task by not considering doors as important. Therefore, choosing doors will be the transitional moment that will *snitch* our silence, for a more corporeal experience, and make her closer to the moment of confrontation.



A transitional *thing* bridging between the upper world and the underworld is transferring Clarice into an entirely private and forbidden realm that reflects Buffalo Bill's true identity. While the music is still on, but dropping gradually as if it is about to finish, Clarice is enclosed within a corner of the frame where she is checking the space. We see two closed doors with an old washing machine and dirty old metal. The tight frame traps Clarice from her face to her feet while she is descending the old wooden staircase with a creaking sound. The close-up shot of her feet while descending gives me details of the material and her weight; it is a *haptic* shot that increases my *kinesthetic corporeality*, I feel how *heavy* her feet are and I am producing the same effort as her to be quiet while descending. This shot ends by enclosing Clarice within the wall where she stands and looks carefully. The one flight of old wooden stairs ends with a small landing and two closed doors. We together are confused as to which door to choose until Clarice is tracking me with her movement;

	de-distancing to the right door, while her breathing is becoming audible. At that moment the music is very low and the intensity of her breath is increasing very clearly.
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Figure 5-8: Descending the staircase

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #4

The tight and close-up frames enclosing Clarice while descending and the vertical movement downwards affect the *linear spatial* aspect, where the *pull of gravity* increases and the *axes* of walking increase to become *three axes*; the horizontal axes and the vertical axis. These axes push together as *disorientation forces*, challenging the sense of order and orientation, to energize the spatial configuration and heighten the body senses and responses. Accordingly, the heaviness in her feet and the sound of her breath are mirrored as a *contraction* in my body through holding my breath.

Her *spatiality* in that scene; leaning down, descending, freezing, and moving towards the right door, created high *kinesthetic consciousness* for me. This *spatiality* achieved *kinesthesia* as I felt my limbs and muscles and because it achieved a sense of *proprioception*; of being frozen, framed, and confused between two closed doors which increased my sense of my position and my balance in space. Actually, I was her in that moment because I was in the middle; between those doors, until she took me out by moving forward. In addition, the sense of decay and neglect from earlier moments becomes heightened through having to choose between two doors, which appear to be the beginning of a labyrinth, a return!

	<p>I am now inside a dark space facing a closed door. I thought for a moment that I am the eyes of Buffalo Bill waiting for Clarice to open the door. Then, I see Clarice opening the door. The eerie sound of the door is high and it is calm, but a sound of diegetic rock music is playing and Clarice's breath is high.</p>
	<p>We see a partially lit corridor of brick ending with a window. As we get closer down the corridor, the sound of the music gets louder and we can hear the sound of Catherine with her dog barking from the other side of the corridor. We are moving towards the left door that has a map. Clarice stops to decide, then she opens the door. The linear, simple, straight spatiality of this corridor of one-axis movement decreased the corporeality of my body, which was then awakened when Clarice stopped to open the door.</p>
	

Figure 5-9: Walking in the first corridor

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #5

	<p>I am inside a lit room with photos of Buffalo Bill on the frame of the door and music is played in this room. Clarice opens the door framed in a medium shot. She is in full shock and surprise because she has discovered something.</p>
	<p>We see a mannequin with real skin standing in front of an opened wardrobe where some pieces of newspapers about killings are hanging. It looks like an actors' preparation room, with many models, wigs, lights, colors, and a camera.</p>
	<p>She did not move an inch and the voice of Catherine steals Clarice out of her shock and out of the room.</p>

Figure 5-10: The exhibition, his work place

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #6

This space gives us extra information as to what Buffalo Bill is doing with the skins of the kidnapped girls and remains as a *space* not a *place* for me at this moment. Once Clarice decides not to go in, and because of her standing still, just passively observing without participating or interacting with the space, she does not create *Da-sein* in Heidegger's definition, because only by *directionality* and *de-distancing* she could bring the viewer *in-the-world*. As a consequence, I do not experience any *kinesthetic experience*, hence, my corporeal presence remains down here. This space remains as a *space* that does not matter for now. It does not make me feel any kind of *sympathy* or *empathy* towards Clarice

because Buffalo Bill is not there and because Catherine takes our attention away by shouting.

	<p>Going back to the corridor, Clarice is walking towards the other door while the music is still playing and Catherine's sound is getting louder. We become closer together to opening the last door in this corridor, which means that the threat is very close and about to appear. The corporeal presence is becoming higher, and I am living again <i>in-the-world</i> of Buffalo Bill. Clarice's breathing is more audible again and I am back in a state of <i>contraction</i>. We are about to get into a confrontation situation.</p>
	
	

Figure 5-11: Going back to the corridor

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #5



I am facing the door which Clarice is about to open. Her action of holding the gun makes me understand that the killer is not here (yet). The music in his room is still playing.



We see this room, which is called *the Oubliette Chamber* in the original script. It is a circular space with three doors, brick walls, and natural stones and rocks. It looks like a cave; rough rocks and a space that echoes.



I have been in a real cave, and I know that it is a very cold space. In the middle, there is a pit, a circular well, where Catherine is. Clarice for the first time now speaks aloud:



“Catherine Martin, Its FBI...” She is closing the door on the left by an axe she has found. The music in his room has disappeared now.



An opening in the wall enables Clarice to look through and discover that there is a fourth open door. The room is not completely circular. It has been cut by a wall, and a door. Clarice closes the door. Once

	<p>she has closed all the doors, she feels safer and starts speaking loudly. Speaking aloud was a relief for me. I feel more <i>expanded</i> and I can breathe now. I am now waiting to know which door Clarice will choose. That</p>
	<p>was a kind of respite, a momentary break that eases the sense of isolation which Clarice experiences. The music is back again. And because of this technique I know</p>
	<p>that we are in the head of Clarice who is ignoring the sound of Catherine and focusing on Buffalo Bill. The track-shot heads in the direction of the fourth door which she had closed before, which is located beside the wall that has an opening. We are getting closer to it, <i>de-distancing</i> again and about to open it. She reminds Catherine to be quiet again, her screaming adds extra tension from another perspective.</p>

Figure 5-12: The oubliette chamber and the pit

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #7

Clarice's *spatiality* in this room, moving back and forth between the doors, shutting them or standing behind them, complicates the *linear aspect* and increases the complexity of the *spatial configuration*, and her movement makes me disoriented in the space. But because of the wideness, the cold environment, and control of the space by Clarice, I felt as if I was *expanded*, especially since Clarice had talked, which means that she communicated with the space, which made me breathe. That can refer to the *directional space* defined by Schmitz that is responsible for creating the *vector atmosphere*, in which, a space can be described as centrifugal; moving away from the center, and that can explain the expansion of my *felt-body here and now*.

The *situational constraint* or the atmospheric constraints (Catherine's shouting, dogs barking, the killer being missing, etc.) are all corporeal suggestions that push Clarice to speak loudly in reaction and to move in circles. These corporeal suggestions, as Schmitz states, are demonstrated by the motor reactions but can be traced back to, or suggested by, the situation itself (Schmitz 1990: 67 as cited in (Griffero 2014 p.35).

The doors shape the movement of Clarice as she moves according to her intention in shutting them and then talks to Catherine. There was an opening in the wall that made Clarice look through it and choose that door as the extent of basement has not apparently ended. This basement is not a chamber but is a labyrinth of corridors and doors. This constitutes a *shock* for me because time is passing and the possibility of finding the right door to arrest Buffalo Bill is seeming very limited.




Figure 5-13: The second corridor

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #8

I have been before in a place where butterflies and moths are raised. Such places are very hot and so humid in order that they are good environments for moths. Further, earlier in the film, it was mentioned by the scientists in the museum that this kind of moth lives in Asia and that their habitat has to be kept warm. The wood color (reddish) can also reflect the temperature. This temperature shock from the cold oubliette chamber to the hot humid corridor amplifies the sense of touch and smell for me. Thus, this has increased my corporeality and consciousness. The *kinesthetic experience* referring to the spatial aspect is low because of the simplicity of the corridor's *axiality*. Hence, I refer my corporeal presence here to the temperature shock and the color contrast that awakened my senses and let me feel my *subjectivity*. Now I am *contracted* again.



Clarice is moving hesitantly and slowly, standing behind the opened door (the first door in the scene that is already opened), in a room that is lit with daylight (blue and green). The moths are everywhere and their flying sound is very loud. The music is also getting louder. Very weird pieces of furniture are scattered in the space. Watching Clarice in a long shot makes me expanded a little bit, knowing that she is safe as I do not see Buffalo Bill. But a sudden cut to medium shot from her behind with a shocking sound contracts me immediately. It was a moth. We see a sign on the door saying: "America: Open your eyes" with a Nazi symbol beside the fridge. This sign *affected* me very much as an *Affection-Image* whereby a reverse shot of Clarice tracking her face shows that she has been caught with this text. The statement "Open your eyes" amplified my




Figure 5-14: The skinning room

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #9

Although the space is wide, its colors, the moths, and the text increase my sense of consciousness and corporeal presence. I feel that my senses are all open to live the *space* which is turning into a *place*. My understanding of the text, and with the help of the camera movement towards Clarice standing still in her position, make me feel my own *proprioception* in this moment and increase my *kinesthetic experience* and the weight of my body. It seems that this sign and the text were an *affect* that pulled me towards the *gravity* of Clarice's situation and, as a consequence, mine also.




Figure 5-15: The third corridor

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #10

The Dutch angle is used commonly in thrillers to show a lack of balance, which can be increased in the present case by the command to “Open your eyes.” This angle will make me feel unbalanced as well. Another surprise for me is seeing Buffalo Bill’s room (the exhibition) from this new angle, which reveals to me that the whole basement is a labyrinth of doors and corridors, leading eventually to his workplace; it is a trap. This *unintentional return* has been acknowledged by Freud (2003) as the definition of the *uncanny*. He states that *unintended repetition* increases the presence and *existence* of the body. In effect, this moment can change my point of view on Buffalo Bill’s room as *space* into a *place* at that moment, which, by effect of its role, heightens my consciousness and corporeality; I am definitely contracted.

“The spaces are not only different by culture, gender, [...] but the moments of interiorization of the spatial manifestation through which the house takes shape” (Klages 2005, p.24 as cited in (Griffero 2014, p.38).




Figure 5-16: The bathroom and the corpse

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #11

	<p>I feel disgust when I see the corpse. But this feeling soon switches to <i>fear</i> and <i>contraction</i> once everything turns black, while I still hear the breath of Clarice. Then, a sound of Buffalo Bill's goggles is heard, followed by</p>
	<p>watching Clarice through the eyes of Buffalo Bill who had switched into his night detective goggles. By this time, I have become part of Buffalo Bill's body and, hence, I only hear and</p>
	<p>see Clarice through the night vision getting out of the bathroom touching the walls.</p>

Figure 5-17: Getting out of the bathroom

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #11

	<p>I know to what extent Buffalo Bill is close to Clarice, but Clarice does not. In a medium-long shot, I see her touching and feeling the walls to walk. Then, I see Buffalo Bill coming</p>
	<p>closer to her, and the frame is becoming tighter to see her in medium shot. She is turning around herself, feeling the space. She is very calm. I hear her loud breath, the moths, and the hum of the fridge. This can be</p>
	<p>understood as what she is hearing as well. Clarice falls down at the threshold of his room. She walks inside the room, not seeing anything. But I know how close Buffalo Bill is</p>
	<p>and that he is getting closer now! He is about to touch her! Once he stretched his arm to touch Clarice, non-diegetic music starts and I see Clarice in close-up because Buffalo Bill is</p>
	<p>very close. She is totally vulnerable. It seems as she is fainting; revolving around herself with heightened breath. Once Buffalo Bill clicks the gun, she spots the source of sound and shoots him immediately.</p>

Figure 5-18: Proximity, trying to touch

Refer to Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, #12

This scene in particular has been described and analyzed by Laine (2006), who built her study upon Sobchack and Marks to understand the role of skin in Cinema. Her analysis was targeting only the sense of touch and its role in increasing the corporeality. However, she did not discuss its affect on the felt-body. According to her, we, as viewers, are distorted because we are in the skin of Buffalo Bill, but hearing the heavy breathing of Clarice from the inside, invites us to join her perceptual subjectivity as well. The proximity of the camera (as Buffalo Bill's point of view becomes closer to Clarice) is experienced as a touch, and his arm interrupting the frame confirms that, i.e., to touch and be touched via a skin shared by the viewer, Buffalo Bill, and Clarice (Laine 2006).

In view of this, the senses in this scene, as an experience shared by me, Clarice, and Buffalo Bill, were *beyond vision*. Not only touch was the only sense, however, the hearing sense also was essential to embody me through hearing her breath and for her to focus on all the details that were transferred to me such as the sound of the moths and the hum of the fridge. The risk of touch was the motivation behind fear; I am afraid that he will touch her! That fear is the moving force that is experienced as touch as well from which my skin *starts to crawl*. The *touch* transferred the whole experience into a *haptic* one for me. Here, the *skin* and the sense of touch work as an *Affect* that raise my consciousness and corporeality to the maximum as I am in the position of encountering; I was experiencing an expansive *Away!-tendency* that I want to get out of my skin, and Buffalo Bill's skin as well, but I could not, and that introduced the maximum contraction of my body of the whole sequence, and tension eventually.

I also refer my corporeality to the *imaginative empathy* for Clarice's *proprioception* where in darkness one senses the balance and position in the space to the maximum. Further, and based on my proximity to her, I have felt

this *proprioception* and *kinesthetic experience* as transferring into my *corporeal consciousness* that which was reflected in my extreme contraction.

The *proximity* of me to Clarice through Buffalo Bill, by touching her, made me very conscious of *being-in-his-world*. That space definitely has changed from a *space* into a *place*.

## 5.4 Conclusion

Merleau-Ponty states that “I can understand the function of the living body only by enacting it myself, and only in so far as I am a body” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.75). In light of this, this research set out from a personal reading of the researcher who is using the first-person phenomenology to grasp the concept of atmosphere and to create a relevant framework for it through her own lived experience in encountering dread atmospheres on screen. This means that the framework presented here is not a universal perspective, but a subjective point of view that followed characteristics and guidelines that were drawn from the critical literature review in part one, and is supported by a horizontal reading of different theories of phenomenology and various examples of thriller films to make it more objective.

By conducting phenomenological research and developing a phenomenal reading of the viewer’s lived experience, the aim is not to create a technical tool or model that informs people how to create the atmosphere of fear and dread. Rather, according to Van Manen, “it opens up possibilities for creating formative relations” (van Manen 2007) between the *things* in order to explain, interpret, and highlight *phenomenal zones* and *quasi-things* to help in building suspense in the dread atmospheres.

The sequence in *The Silence of the Lambs* was motivated in general by an urge to formulate *cinematic dread* according to Julian Hanich’s (2010) definition of an; *alone in the dark scenario*. However, it was overlapped with moments of *cinematic terror* and *suggested horror*. Hence, that did not affect the *spatial*, *temporal*, and *emotional immersion* that are related to *dread*, which in turn elaborated on Hanich’s definition of the ‘Atmosphere of Dread’.

As to *spatial immersion*, the arrangement of the house, especially in the cellar, is made in such a way appear to be a labyrinth. Corridors and (closed/open) doors create dizziness and disorientation for the viewer, which results in restricted visual access for the viewer and restricted movement for the character. Regarding *temporal immersion*, the time was real and dense; it was *extended* in order that the viewer can live second by second with Clarice. With respect to *emotional immersion*, the viewer expects the threat at any moment, and this fear feeds the sense of dread and keeps the viewers on the edge of their seats.

The whole atmosphere fed the *uncertainty* contribute to the suspense; the sound, silence, lighting, darkness, textures, texts and *phenomenal zones* have all served to create a restricted atmosphere.

Applying the thoughts of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists made it possible to realize the role of common spatial *things* such as stairs, corridors, and doors in affecting the embodiment of the viewers, their *existence*, and their *corporeality*. In addition, the phenomenal reading opened up possibilities for establishing relations and explaining, interpreting, and highlighting some of the *atmospheric corporeal situations* that have the ability to make the atmosphere be well perceived and *felt* and that have the ability to enhance the atmosphere of dread; these are the *quasi-things*. Those *corporeal atmospheric affections* were produced for the viewer *kinesthetically* and *synaesthetically*; *kinesthetically* by muscles and skin, *synaesthetically* by the continuous expansion and contraction felt by the *felt-body*, accordingly, the continuous opening and closing of the *absolute space* increased the tension of the viewer and increased its embodiment in that atmosphere.

According to the phenomenological reading of the present case study, one may choose many corporeal *quasi-things* to discuss their *affect* on corporeality. For

this thesis, only three *quasi-things* will be discussed; the text, transparency and surveillance. The following part discusses those *quasi-things* in deep and supports the argument through borrowing examples from other thriller film.



## Part Three: Analysis and Discussion, In Relation to the Atmospheric Corporeal *Quasi-things*

Previewing approaches to the phenomenology of embodiment in part one, helped this thesis to establish the *essence* of the reciprocal relationship between the subject and the object and their interaction in film. Body, its senses, and its corporeality are at the center of this situated relationship and the overall relational encounter. This attempt has drawn on the conceptions of many phenomenologists, mainly Merleau-Ponty and those who built their theories upon his. This understanding has created a framework that helped the researcher to interpret the lived experience of the viewer with the character in describing a dread scene from *the Silence of the Lambs* in part two, in order to describe the atmosphere of dread in that particular scene.

The description demonstrates that every single detail in the atmosphere of the selected sequence in film *the Silence of the Lambs* was used as a key for the viewer and Clarice, as well as for any effort aiming at understanding the killer's world. Only a few significant details and *phenomenal zones* worked more effectively than the others in increasing the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer, such as the use of stairs and of some doors. It is necessary to underline that having those *phenomenal zones*, or *quasi-things* in Griffero's terms, is not a prerequisite for the atmosphere to change into *dread*. However, they *enhance* the potential for this atmosphere, together with all other factors, to create the dread experience since the experience is a holistic one.

Griffero (2014) considers phenomenal zones as *anchor points*. He claims that anchor points are responsible to generate a *field of condensation* which in turn elaborates to create an atmosphere. As a result, he defined the whole

atmosphere as a *quasi-thing*, namely, a *situation* or an orientation “whose ecstasies are expressive characters or qualities and those qualities belong where they are found” (Griffero 2014 p.109). However, it is important to stress that these anchor points cannot always create the same affect, and what is grasped is the totality of the atmosphere. For example, the doors in some locations in the scene segments discussed in the previous chapter were anchor points as was the case in the basement. However, the two doors that were framing Clarice in the kitchen are not anchor points, yet they helped the viewer to understand Clarice’s emotions; flat and confused.

Griffero confirms that the first impression is always atmospheric. In other words, it is an *affective corporeal involvement*; “interrupting the habitual observational and pragmatic flux to give the subject an identity” (Griffero 2014 p.29). According to the style of shooting in dread scenes, and the mimicry relationship, the viewer shares the character the first look and the first impression. They both live in an *affective* and *corporeal perception* that undergoes immediate evaluation and has consequences for its expression (Hanich 2010). This can be the reason behind the exaggeration of the forms or the experience that offer an *affective, corporeal*, first impression. But, as has been mentioned before, the second, third, and fourth impressions help in looking more, understanding more, and exploring more than the first impression because perceiving is not simply the elementary sensing of data that is performed after the state of things, but is a process of being involved in the things themselves.

In order to elaborate on the atmosphere of dread that has been discussed by Hanich (2010), the phenomenal reading of the dread scene in *the Silence of the Lambs* helped this research to define and develop some *quasi-things* that were behind the constricted atmosphere in that scene. Some of them are not common,

and are rarely talked about in the context of film, such as the ‘phenomenology of text’ and ‘the phenomenology of transparency’, and some of them could be common at the first impression, but they suggest a new phenomenal perspective in order to reveal their influence on embodiment to affect the atmosphere of dread, such as ‘the phenomenology of surveillance’. Having these *situations* as part of the definition of an atmosphere transfers *space* into *place* that is approached, corporeal, and memorable.

This part of the thesis discusses these *situations* and highlights how they are used to increase the sense of *embodiment* in dread atmosphere; chapter six discusses the phenomenology of text, chapter seven discusses the phenomenology of transparency, and chapter eight discusses the phenomenology of surveillance.



## PART THREE:

Chapter Six: The Phenomenology of Text in Film

Chapter Seven: The Phenomenology of Transparency  
In Film

Chapter Eight: The Phenomenology of Surveillance  
In Film



## Chapter Six: The Phenomenology of Text in Film

This chapter presents the first *quasi-thing* that has been concluded from the phenomenal reading in part two of this thesis.

The use of Nazi logo was obvious in the scene of *the Silence of the Lambs*, but it was accompanied by a statement “America, Open your eyes.” Images in general have specific messages to communicate with the viewer. Sometimes, physical and direct language is used to support a concept or deliver a meaning. Maryvillegov argues that language is divided into semiotics, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. Semantics focuses on what words mean while semiotics is concerned with signs. On the other hand, Syntactics is related to the structural relations between signs and pragmatics is the relation of signs to interpreters (Maryvillegov 2009).

In this research, signs and codes are not discussed for two reasons. The first reason is that many studies have tackled the signs and their meanings and representations in film and architecture such as (Danesi 2004; Leeds-Hurwitz 1993; Trifonas 2003; Walsh 1993; Tilghman 1980; Hurford 2007). The second reason is that having codes and signs requires a previous experience of the viewer. Therefore, interpretations of codes and signs will be different between the viewer who knows the sign and its meaning and the viewer who does not. Meanwhile, the aim of this phenomenal reading and discussion is to guarantee an approximately equal experience for most of the viewers. Accordingly, this study concentrated on reading representations, namely, texts, which are divided in this study into words and numbers.

## 6.1 Words

From an embodiment perspective, it has been documented in different fields of social science, psychology, and neuroscience that observing an action can create a mirroring in motor movements. As noted in chapter three some call the mirrored behaviors as *representations* as Preston (2007).

Some experiments (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi (1996), Rizzolatti & Arbib (1998), Gallese & Lakoff (2005), and Fischer & Zwaan (2008)) have demonstrated that the verbal stimuli related to emotional expressions should be regarded as embodied elements. Additionally, language has a role in embodiment and its understanding points to a mental process driven by the *mirror-neuron* system (Feroni and Semin 2009). Furthermore, some researchers (Spadacenta et al. 2014; Oosterwijk et al. 2010; Portch et al. 2015; Feroni and Semin 2013; Feroni and Semin 2009) suggest that, as a way of communication, written language is not merely symbolic, but also somatic. The different dimensions of psychology, social psychology, and neurophysiology of the aforementioned studies are beyond the scope of this study, but their findings and experiments support the argument of the *somatic response* of the viewer and some of their experiments will be referenced in order to prove the arguments of the current study. The following discussion addresses the power of words in preparing the body and transferring it into a new situation under the phenomenology of the perception of words according to Merleau-Ponty (2002) and the art of using paratexts in media studies according to Gray (2010).

For Merleau-Ponty, the word is not a geometrical structure in a segment of visual space, but is a presentation of a form of behavior and a linguistic act in its dynamic fullness, which can prepare the body for an action or transfer it into a *situation*

that eventually creates the corporeal experience. He explains that because of the nature of words, which induce a kind of experience that produces physical tensions on the muscles of the body (Merleau-Ponty 2002). He believes that words have a *motor physiognomy* because one adopts with regard to them and with regard to each person a form of behavior to make the complete appearance the moment each word is given. For example, if someone is able to read the word *hard* in a short time, it “produces a stiffening of the back and the neck, and only in a secondary way does it project itself into the visual or auditory field and assume the appearance of a sign or a word” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.273). He considered it as an *event* that “grips the body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference.” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.273). Thus, encountering a word, as part of the atmosphere, fuels special kind of experience in perception, movement, and action.

Merleau-Ponty states that in preparation, there is a certain bodily attitude, a specific kind of tension to give structure to the image for it to be recognized as a pattern. As an example, when one reads the word *warm* the body prepares itself for heat and when one reads the word *damp* a feeling of dampness and coldness invades the body and, at the same time, imparts to one's mouth (Merleau-Ponty 2002). In this respect, what is brought by the behavior of the word is an identity. Hence, for Merleau-Ponty the body can be said to have a *behavioral pattern*.

In his book *Show Sold Separately*, Gray (2010) talks about *paratexts* that are used for promotional films and other media contexts, in which for example, an introduction can be told verbally or orally for preparation, in order to tell the audience what to expect and establish the *faith* in the subsequent transubstantiation. He states that these paratexts create worries, hopes, and

expectations and offer a chance to be experienced but do not ultimately guarantee the experience.

In *The Poetics of Space*, Bachelard defines a special quality of language in poems that brings the reader closer to the sense of *being*, which he called *phenomenological reverberation* (1964 xxiii, as cited in (van Manen 2007)). In this, Van Manen notes that the power of a text understanding feeds the reader with a pre-discursive and pre-cognitive mode of *being*, which may give rise to evocative images that can move the reader. They “inform us by forming us and thus leave an affect on us” to bring a change of *being* (van Manen 2007).

Before starting to make claims and provide examples, it is important to stress the significance of understanding words as a process to guarantee the experience, supporting *grounded cognition* theories which predict that processing conceptual or linguistic cognition of emotion may be accompanied by bodily reactions. So, recognizing words of fear and retrieving their meaning is a basic reenactment of fear (Spadacenta et al. 2014; Oosterwijk et al. 2010; Fino et al. 2016; Portch et al. 2015).

As Hanich suggests, dread is built upon *spatial*, *temporal* and *emotional immersion*. The phenomenology of text as observed in this thesis is mostly attached to *emotional* immersion, because it prepares the viewer for anticipations, hopes and worries, which in turn increase their *being* and consequently their corporeality and embodiment. The discussion below will divide the phenomenology of words upon their use in three parts; ‘preparation’, a way ‘into-a-situation’ and for ‘being-in-situation’.

### 6.1.1 Preparation: One Word Signals Different Uses

There are some words that, once perceived, may have the same meaning and indications for specific anticipation, but only using them in different contexts can change the meaning. For example, the word “Exit” always has the meaning of getting out. In a terror scene, a chase scene, or an escape scene, as found in *The Italian Job* (Gray 2003) and *I am Legend* (Lawrence 2007), a sign saying “Exit” will lead the character to move in a specific direction. In the meantime, it induces a breath of air for the viewer. It does not, however, create a moment of pause. It produces a flow of motion that relieves both the character and the viewer.

However in a different example “Exit” sign is shown in the film *Se7en* (Fincher 1995), but it provided the entrance for detective Mills (Brad Pitt) from the beginning of the film. He did not escape those serial crimes because the last murder was the murder of his wife, and then he had to kill the serial killer John (Kevin Spacey). This case did not leave him and he could not get out of it. Hence, the word “exit” has the same meaning, but in the last example, it was used differently.

In real life, one can see an “exit” sign in any public place but not at home; in the garage of any shopping centre, in a museum, or in a library. Therefore, reading the sign indicates the opportunity of finishing a temporary experience (that may be good or bad) and leaving it to move towards home, which produces an ending to that experience. It is important to acknowledge that the meaning of that written signs are impacted by their placement in different contexts.

### 6.1.2 Preparation: Emotional Words (Arousals)

In the beginning of *The Silence of the Lambs*, Clarice is exercising in the woods. In one scene, only the audience see some writing on a tree log, including the words “Hurt”, “Agony”, “pain”, and “love it”. This kind of preparation is for the viewer, not for the character. The same applies to “exit” and “keep out” signs used in *Se7en*, where the detective does not see these writings, but the viewer does. This kind of preparation is, most probably, feeding the viewers’ *sympathy* from the beginning. It is preparing them for the experience which the character will go through.

In a social psychology experiment, Oosterwijk et al. have proven that *conceptual fear knowledge* can invoke a bodily reaction and enhance subsequent bodily reactions to fearful stimuli (Oosterwijk et al. 2010). The results of using unscrambled sentences relating to fear such as “he bleeds to death” have supported the *Grounded Cognition Theories* which predict that processing conceptual or linguistic expressions about emotion may also be accompanied by bodily reactions. According to these theories, those words, which have emotional content, work as a means to *arousal*. Research has shown that “simulation processes that occur while processing conceptual fear knowledge prepare the body for fear signals, resulting in a heightened bodily sensitivity to fearful stimuli” (Oosterwijk et al. 2010, 70).

Some experiments have supported the embodiment hypothesis that processing an emotional concept (e.g., sadness, anger, agony, etc.) produces an emotional reaction. In the experiment of Niedenthal et al. (2009), those emotional words resulted in facial activity, and in other experiments, they produced body posture while generating disappointment in words (Oosterwijk et al., 2009) or body

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Text in Film movement when reading sad or angry sentences (Mouilso, Glenberg, Havas, & Lindeman, 2007) as in (Oosterwijk et al. 2010). In summary, those studies show that emotional concepts can serve as contextual cues, or, in other words, *corporeal atmospheric affections* in Griffero's terms.

Stanley Fish pointed in his book *Affective Stylistics* to the idea that literature is kinetic, i.e., it moves; "it refuses to stay still and doesn't let you stay still either", where it has temporal flow. Whenever it is read, the first word takes the reader to the second and the third, and so on (Fish 1980, 80 as cited in (Gray 2010 p.41). Gray argues that considering the role of texts in this framework, is that they may talk to, and revise, other texts, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to connect meanings to previous texts, and that they always make sense through the frames offered by other texts or frames (Gray 2010 p.31). Merleau-Ponty refers to this as the *relational image* of the words since they may induce behavioral patterns once they are spotted (Merleau-Ponty 2002). The kinetic nature of the word and its connection with other events can be responsible for transferring the sense of the body into a *situation*, because it awakens the senses and accordingly, its *transcendental subjectivity*. This, in turn, confirms the significance of the use of written text in construction of a dread scene, where its position and the timing to perceive it offer an opportunity to transfer the viewer into a new *situation* which can be manipulated according to its *relational image*.

### 6.1.3 Into-a-Situation: The Same Words but Different Levels of Affect

Despite the fact that the word has a *relational image*, it may not induce the same behavioral pattern every time. For instance, the sign "Bates Motel, **Vacancy**" appears twice in the film *Psycho* (Hitchcock 1960). The first time one sees it, it gives the viewer relief because the character (Marion Crane) will be

safe from the weather and from any potential car accident. However, it does not produce any kind of engagement with the character, neither *sympathy* nor *empathy*. But the second time the viewer sees it, it works as a *motivation* for fear related to the *sympathy* that has been developed with the characters. This motivation turns into a *kinesthetic experience* that awakens the senses to be felt as a *transcendental subjectivity*, providing the viewer with recognition of its *locomotion* which then turns into a *kinesthetic consciousness*. This, as a consequence, turns the motel from a *space* that has a function into a *place* that has a memory. In this way, the repeated word is only one way to transfer the viewer into a *situation*. The other method for transferring the viewer directly is the use of ‘sensorimotor verbs’, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

#### 6.1.4 Being-in-Situation: Action Verbs vs. Adjectives

To be more specific in discussing the use of words in film, this research focused on action verbs and adjectives. Recent research in neuroscience and psychology have shown that those parts of speech have different effects on the sense of corporeality and hence, the experience of the body.

The neuroscientists Francesco Foroni and Gün R. Semin (2009) have investigated whether semantic stimuli do, or do not, induce *motor resonance* in facial muscles comparable to that triggered by the facial expressions of emotion. Motor resonance regards any movement in the muscles of the body. They have also explored the somatic reactions that emerge as a study of embodiment. They chose to work on the difference of impact between action verbs such as “smile” or “frown”, and adjectives such as “funny” or “annoying”. The results revealed that reading both the action verbs and adjectives created corresponding somatic responses in the facial muscles of the participants (i.e., zygomatic major and

corrugator supercell muscles). However, motor resonance was significantly weaker in intensity in the case of adjectives than it was in the case of action verbs being interpreted. In their experiments, they have bridged between different fields of social cognition and affective processes research (e.g., Strack et al., 1988), psychophysiological work on mimicry (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000), and neuroscientific work on language (e.g., Pulvermuler, 2005). Their findings were specifically related to the comprehension of language. For example, understanding the verb “smile” leads to the physical simulation of the events to be comprehended. They have clarified that not all linguistic expressions have the same consequences, as some categories induce more resonance than others and may contribute to more embodiment (Foroni and Semin 2009).

Another study in psychology carried out by Fino et al. confirmed that it is necessary to understand the word in order to have the motor response (Fino et al. 2016). They found that emotional sentences, including descriptive action verbs (e.g., to smile, to laugh, to frown, and to scowl) and emotional state verbs (e.g., to enjoy, to be excited, to be enthusiastic, to get angry, and to irritate) both have effects on the emotional ratings and the corresponding facial muscle activations, but that the effect was greater in the emotional state verb sentences than in the descriptive action verbs. Portch et al. have compiled a huge list of verbs and studied the extent to which they evoke specific emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear. For example, the verbs cry, hide, and shiver are action verbs that induce fear (Portch et al. 2015).

#### 6.1.5 Sensorimotor verbs

In *The Silence of the Lambs*, the notice “America, Open your eyes” is hanging on one of the doors of Buffalo Bill’s basement. Clarice and the viewer

both have read. It serves to literally enlarge the opening of the eyes and to amplify the sense of sight for both. Buffalo Bill is seen to have personalized the message by adding “America” to add extra political and personal meaning, this may be relevant to a semiotic reading of the film, which is beyond the scope of this research.

Some images can affect and stimulate the eyes to look more carefully, but they may hook some people and not others. Writing a statement in an imperative form works directly on the senses and works more effectively in one way, which is through stimulating the opening of the eyes and subsequently focusing on any visible details. This can be considered as a both cognitive perception and a somatic unconscious reaction that, in reciprocation, can amplify the sense of sight. In this research, any action verb that works on the senses is called a ‘sensorimotor verb’.

Senses, as discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), are significant for perception and for their eventual embodiment. So, speaking to a sense (e.g., vision) can work directly without any indeterminacy or ambiguity of meaning as, for example, there is only one way to open the eyes. With reference to the framework that has been drawn previously, one can determine the reasons behind the high corporeality found in verbs than in adjectives, in which relate to the *act of looking*, the *determinate transcendence*, the *consciousness of the act*, the *somatic empathy*, and the *external and internal movements*.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty (2002), *the act of looking* is either *prospective* or *retrospective*. It is indivisibly *prospective* because the object is the final stage of the process of focusing, and *retrospective* because it will present itself in its own appearance, i.e., as the stimulus, the motive, or the prime mover of the process, since the beginning. This is what happens when the stimulus is

an action verb that urges one to “open the eyes” and look for Buffalo Bill, who is known to be at the final stage of looking (i.e., to find him). The sign “Open your eyes” works as both a *prospective act*, a command to look for Buffalo Bill and as a *retrospective act*, because the act of looking is the stimulus itself.

The logical *structure of existence* has been described by Merleau-Ponty (2002) contains states of *ambiguity*, *indeterminacy*, and *transcendence*. *Ambiguity* means that everything has several meanings. *Indeterminacy* means that the nature of the situation is uncertain which prompts one to act. The associated act in which the body takes up and transforms into a situation is called the *transcendence stage*. Using ‘sensorimotor verbs’ grasps the senses to jump directly into the *transcendence* stage, followed by those of *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy*. The command to “Open your eyes” lets the body act immediately by opening the eyes and looking, but where and how to look creates the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* that, altogether, feed the sense of *existence* (i.e. of being).

Merleau-Ponty notes that existence and consciousness are not necessarily accompanied by a sense of corporeality. However, when using the ‘sensorimotor action verbs’ the body acts in consciousness and corporeality. It is not enough to gaze at the objects. In order to be conscious, one has to know that he/she is seizing or watching in order to be aware of herself/himself, otherwise it implies that it is a third party who looks (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

In *the Silence of the Lambs*, when the viewer opens the eyes after spotting the sign “Open your eyes,” the action of the body is unconscious, but after the intensity of opening it will be conscious of the opening itself. Then, it merges in a way with the objects Clarice is looking at, but the intensity of keeping the eyes open in order to look amplifies the sense and makes the mind work in two ways.

This dual thinking may create confusion and may, thus, be the reason behind reflecting this confusion in the use of a Dutch angle to shoot the following scene.

Action verbs are talking to the *somatic* form of *empathy*, not the *imaginative* one. The *somatic* forms, according to Hanich (2010), are divided into *motor mimicry*, *sensational*, and *affective mimicry*. The viewer opens the eyes as Clarice does, and they do this together at the same time, not as a reflective image. Once the viewer sees the reaction of Clarice in a close-up, this creates motor mimicry; the viewer mimics Clarice's look and her way in opening the eyes, and because of the duration of the look, the motor mimicry transforms into a *sensational mimicry*, in which the viewer feels the enlargement and tension of the eye's muscle. Accordingly, the viewer feels with Clarice. The *affective mimicry* comes from the anticipation of fear. Consequently, the facial expressions of Clarice and the enlargement of the viewers' muscles and senses feed the emotional experience of dread.

The final reason behind the intensified effect of the verbs can be the fact that the external and internal movements happen within the body. These verbs force one to call all the *spatial* and *temporal* forces in order to encounter the environment. Asking anyone to do something with any part of the body, such as opening the eyes, creates physical movement in the muscles. The physical movement according to Sheets-Johnstone awakens *transcendental subjectivity* to increase the feeling of the senses in the form of *kinesthetic consciousness*. If the viewer turns the attention to herself/himself (e.g., by looking, hearing, or touching), then this will provide the body with kinetic experiences to generate *corporeal consciousness*. In addition to the fear attached to the atmosphere, Griffero and Hanich note that the subject experiences inner movement that creates a contraction that shuts the *absolute space*; the space of the *felt-body* (Griffero

2014; Hanich 2010). Accordingly, the 'sensorimotor verbs' produce *kinesthetic* and *synaesthetic affective* corporeal atmosphere.

An interesting study in neurophysiology researched the effect of using linguistic material without any emotional connotation on arm-reaching movements. The study used arm/hand related verbs that describe negative connotation (to shoot, to strangle, and to whip) that modulate different reaching movements from arm/hand or leg/foot neutral connotation action-related verbs (to comb, to color, to march, and to hop). The arm reaching movement was shown to be corresponding to higher arousal than other movements (Spadacenta et al. 2014). This experiment of Spadacenta et al. (2014) provides evidence of the interplay between motor responses and action language away from any emotional connotations. So, this experiment supports the notion that actions and reactions of the 'sensorimotor verbs' can be applied to any body action just as illustrated in the action triggered by the command "Open your eyes."

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## Don't Breathe

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The only action and/or reaction the readers might have had just on seeing the written command “don’t breathe” is to have held their breath for a second or may be more until reading this sentence. These imperative forms of verbs may have been repeated even in a film itself or in the title of a film. It controls and embodies the body, prepares and guides it to communicate under one condition for the whole movie.

*Don’t Breathe* is a title of a thriller film (Fede 2016) that traces the action of some burglars who are trying to steal money from a blind man who lives alone with his dog. Breaking in to the house of the blind man, who was once a soldier, is shown as a thrilling scary adventure. *Hold your Breath* is a horror film (Jared 2012) about a group of friends camping for a weekend who find themselves picked one by one when one of the group refuses to hold his breath while passing cemeteries to abide by a superstition that he might be breathing in evil spirits. *Hush* (Mike 2016) is a thriller film about a deaf and mute writer who retreats into the woods to live a lonely life. She fights for her life in silence when a masked killer appears at her window.

These three films and many similar ones ask their viewers from the beginning to be silent and to hold their breath. The titles serve as a means of ‘preparation’ of the viewer from the beginning. Then, they take the viewer into a situation once the action in dread requires and acquires a state of silence. Since the body, according to Merleau-Ponty (2002), is a work of art and is a negotiation of impersonal forces, then it turns through a creative operation to take the past to the future or to the action. The way the body prepares for the moment that can be turned into a *situation* looks like the *acquisition of habit*; it collects unconnected movements into a particular gesture that will remain dormant in the body until a situation calls for its powers to unity (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

According to Oosterwijk et al., whose experiment supports the argument that using action verbs that have knowledge of fear intensify the embodiment (Oosterwijk et al. 2010), and with reference to Merleau-Ponty (2002), these verbs create an event that can grip the body. As a consequence, the body absorbs the event and transforms it into a *situation*; the *transcendence* stage of *existence*. This imperative action verb of not breathing, in addition to mimicking the actors and the silence in the film, embodies the viewer from the beginning of the film. It creates a conscious action that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the film and which is connected to the body is heart rate and muscles.

Ackerl, Kerstin, Atzmueller, Michaela and Grammer explain how holding one's breath deprives the body of oxygen and stops carbon dioxide from exiting. This, together with tension in the muscles while watching, makes the body produce the adrenalin hormone, which, in turn, increases the heart rate. Since the heart needs oxygen, which is in short supply under these conditions, then it takes blood from the hands and feet to compensate that loss. This, in return, will make the body weaker when it releases itself for a breath (Ackerl, Kerstin, Atzmueller, Michaela & Grammer 2002). As a consequence, this experience that is intensified by holding the breath amplifies the tension and embodies the viewer consciously, first as a reaction for not breathing as an *overt act* that the viewer carries out, then unconsciously following *empathy* with the character to leave the viewer in total corporeality.

With reference to Gray (2010), one can consider the action verbs as universal codes that guarantee a universal unified action. On the other hand, adjectives cannot guarantee the same reaction of the viewers as they can express a mood of an atmosphere or something about the character that can increase *sympathy* but they cannot embody the viewer. For instance, the term 'Silence' in the title of

*the Silence of the Lambs* just adds something to the reading of Clarice's personal life and suggests that breaking this silence will set her free. It does not have the same effect of the silence that was asked for in the action verbs above (i.e., hush), but the silence and stillness of the film is revealed by the actions, the spatial arrangement of the basement, and the silent movement of Clarice.

There are other kinds of writings and texts that embody the viewer, but in a different way and to varying levels. "I can see you," "I still can see you," and "I know what you did last summer," are titles of horror and/or thriller films. This kind of text encourages embodiment because it addresses the vulnerability of the character of them being seen by the villain. The current study discusses this part of embodiment in detail in chapter eight; the phenomenology of surveillance.

#### 6.1.6 Numbers

Like words, numbers are considered in film as a special case of text that help in energizing the atmosphere and preparing the body for anticipating, or getting into, a *situation*. Numbers which appear in films as a clock, a bomb clock, a thermometer, or any other form are only an indication of measure; time or temperature.

Although numbers may be more common in *terror* scenes or *suggested horror* scenes than in *dread* scenes, they can be applied in dread scenes to embody the character and the viewer both consciously and corporeally. *Untraceable* (Hoblit 2008) is a thriller film about an FBI agent who is tasked with hunting down an untraceable serial killer who streams live videos of his victims on the Internet. The webpage starts with "Kill with me? ENTER" (The command here is an invitation for the participation of the characters, not the viewers. Hence, it is not counted as a sensorimotor verb). The criminal involves the characters in the act of killing with

him, and the more viewers there are of the webpage, the faster the victim is killed. The numbers of viewers appear on the webpage and in front of the victim who is tied alone in darkness enclosed by the means of torture. In addition to the editing technique that shows the increasing number of participants and, besides the reactions of the FBI agents and the victim, the number itself was the stimulus to embodiment in that scene since it was the indication of time where the increase in the number of participants makes the killing faster.

Other examples of numbers to serve in counting can be found in thriller films but as part of a *terror* or a *suggested horror* scene as is the case in the film *In Time* (Niccol 2011), where the number, a clock attached to the skins of the characters, is an indication of lengths of their lives. Number is used in a similar way in the *Brickworks Museum* in Germany. The architects Thomas Duncan and Noel McCauley created an oval kiln installed with numbers indicative of the temperature on the brick walls to create a *haptic* experience for the visitor. The visitors are invited to pick up a glowing white brick, which turns into red whenever the heat is up while walking through the tunnel. Actually, the heat does not change and does not reach 100 °C, but the numbers on the walls and the changing color of the brick create a *haptic* experience and increase embodiment of the visitor in that atmosphere.

## 6.2 Names

As noted in Chapter Two, Tim Cresswell suggests two ways to turn *space* into *place*; in addition to movement that is responsible to create *spatiality*, naming is the other way by which space can be given meaning and transferred to a *place* (Cresswell 2004). But names are different in that they may sound, mean, and serve different purposes according to the context in which they are delivered.

However, they all share in common their role in 'preparation' of a base for the reader or viewer only under one condition; that the name is recognized and its meaning is retrieved for the viewer. So, one can consider the name as a special case in 'preparation'.

### 6.2.1 Names and Meaning

Braiman argues that naming characters or places can be considered as one form of foreshadowing, it is a literary technique that prepares the reader for an ending (Braiman 2007). The author chooses to name her/his characters and places for a literal, abstract, or figurative purpose. The names may have a *denotative meaning* (the literal meaning of a word) or a *connotative meaning* (suggestions and associations resulting from a word or group of words). In addition, Maryvillegov argues that several words may have the same denotation while differing significantly in their connotations (Maryvillegov 2009). The practice of naming has been used by many filmmakers, writers, and architects such as with great deliberation.

Alfred Hitchcock, took care in naming his characters. In *Psycho*, he named the female character Marion Crane, and the male character Norman Bates. Cileone highlights that Crane is a type of bird and Norman has an interest in stuffing birds because, according to him, they are passive creatures. He comments on her, saying that she "eats like a bird." Marion's last name foreshadows that she will become one of these dead creatures (Cileone 2015). The name *Norman* also suggests the word *normal* since the character looks very normal and peaceful on the surface to make the viewer sympathize with him. It may also suggest *nor man*, according to his psychological state due to that he is neither woman nor man. Cileone goes on to suggest that *Bates* and *baits* as homophones may be meant

by the writer because Bates has an innocent appearance that is trapping someone behind it (Cileone 2015).

In architecture, museums are the most common relevant type of buildings that names can be applied for their spaces to induce a dimension of special and spatial experience. This is reinforced by a process of what Thrift calls *imitative contagion*, “which is an infectious, though often unconscious, response to atmosphere that primes us to act in certain ways” (Thrift 2008, 231) as cited by (Waterton and Dittmer 2014). Waterton and Dittmer suggest that names are augmented by the behavior of the user specific through somatic routine that eventually enables certain assemblages to emerge and to create *place* (Waterton and Dittmer 2014).

#### 6.2.2 Names and Sound

Griffero notes that the heavy first syllable of the town *Parma* in Italy made Proust imagine that it was compact, glossy, violet, and tinted because in pronouncing the word, no breath of air is stirred (Proust 2010, 467) as in (Griffero 2014 p.117). Names for Proust expressed an atmospheric-synaesthetic halo from their pictures, the brightness or darkness of their sounds, and their colors. It is as if he is visualizing the sound in colors and pictures. Thereupon, sounds create a sensible quality accompanied by the *motor physiognomy* that may produce action or movement. To some extent, this accords with Merleau-Ponty (2002) who thinks of colors as a sensation or a sensible quality. So, this philosophy can be applied to sounds of names because they may affect the subject’s reaction, depending on the heaviness or lightness of the syllables that create a sensation which has a motor accompaniment such as in colors.

The movement when one sees blue and green, according to Merleau-Ponty, is inwards towards the stimulus, but it is in the opposite direction when seeing red or yellow; “The significance of abduction is that the organism turns towards the stimulus and is attracted by the world (green and blue)--- of abduction that it turns away from the stimulus and withdraws towards its center (red and yellow)” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.243). He states that colors present more than *sensible qualities*, they “present themselves with a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped in a living significance. It has long been known that sensations have a ‘motor accompaniment’, that stimuli set in motion ‘incipient movements’ which are associated with the sensation of the quality and create a halo round it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.243).

Merleau-Ponty also suggests that colors have motor significance only if they suggest a new manner of evaluating that affect consciousness and movement. Consequently, not every word or syllable can create this reaction and response and what is most important is that sensation is intentional “because I find in the sensible a certain rhythm of existence is put forward (abduction or adduction) [...], and stealing into the form of existence which is thus suggested to me, I am brought into relation with an external being” whether to open myself into it or to shut myself from it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.248). From Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) point of view, the sensible element is a vague thing before the body synchronizes itself to experience it. Thus, one can conclude that sensation is a reconstitution that prepares the body to get into the experience which embodies it unconsciously.

These observations rise questions as to whether the syllables of *Gumb* and *Buffalo Bill* are heavy or dark. Do they have colors?

### 6.3 Conclusion

It has been argued that words, once recognized in film, have the *motor physiognomy* that is capable of preparing or transferring their reader/viewer into a new *situation*. This conception has created a platform for this study to consider text as a powerful approach to corporeal experience in viewing dread scenes. Observation of different thriller films led to the researcher to conclusion that text is used for 'preparation', a way 'into-a-situation' and for 'being-in-situation', as a way for *emotional immersion in cinematic dread*.

Texts that are meant for the 'preparation' of the viewer only, not the character, can be considered as tools that enrich *sympathy* with the character. They are usually very common words that have one meaning only. However, their function can be manipulated to have the opposite meaning when using them differently like the case of entering from an "Exit" point.

'Into-a-Situation' is regarded as a reflection of the *sympathy* for the character, which happens when experiencing discovery of the same text but with different timing. It feeds the anticipation of *dread*. 'Being-in-Situation' is a direct engagement with the body of the viewer, and the character, such as the use of action verbs that have a direct relationship with the body and senses, which the researcher calls 'sensorimotor verbs' in this thesis. These verbs have the highest cognitive perception among the texts, such as "Open your eyes." The researcher discussed these verbs on the basis of their causing the *act of looking*, the *determinate transcendence*, *consciousness of the act*, *somatic empathy*, and *internal movement*. They serve to intensify the somatic resonance and can be seen to create direct intensified effects on the viewer who is experiencing this with the character the whole time.

When the 'sensorimotor verbs' are used as a title of the film, e.g., *Hold your Breath*, they serve in both 'preparing' and 'transferring into a situation' to the viewer. They start to embody the viewer from the beginning to create a conscious action that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the film as a reflection of the empathy with the character.

Numbers or the act or counting are regarded as a special case of text that can energize the atmosphere because of their relationship with time. Their use is very common in *terror* scenes and *suggested horror* scenes. Moreover, they can be applied in the formulation of *dread*.

Use of the naming strategy to turn *space* into *place* can be regarded as offering subtle clues, especially in the case of names of characters because of the different cultural backgrounds between the viewers. In addition, the sound of a name can create an unconscious sensible quality that, in return, creates a certain rhythm of *existence* that prepares the body to open itself to it, or to shut itself out of it.

In conclusion, text has characteristics for preparation which start consciously and increase intentionality and anxious anticipation to force the viewer to interact with the screen and sympathize with the character. Once the text transfers the viewer *into a situation*, which happens unconsciously, it physically embodies the body and intensifies the experience of the dread atmosphere while the viewer experiences *empathy* with the character.



## PART THREE:

Chapter Six: The Phenomenology of Text in Film

Chapter Seven: The Phenomenology of Transparency  
In Film

Chapter Eight: The Phenomenology of Surveillance  
In Film



## Chapter Seven: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film

### 7.1 Phenomenology of Transparency

This chapter presents and extends the second *quasi-thing* that has been concluded from the phenomenal reading in part two of this thesis.

Buffalo Bill was walking towards Clarice, by using night vision goggles, he was given confidence as if he, by blinding her, had deleted all the spatial barriers; everything was transparent for him to spot Clarice, and space was under his control. On the other hand, it looks as if the total darkness surrounding Clarice created walls enclosing her and stopping her from moving forward. This observation provokes the concept of transparency to be understood phenomenologically as another *quasi-thing* that has enhanced the dread atmosphere in that scene.

This chapter discusses the phenomenology of personal, spatial and sensorial transparency in film and its role in increasing the corporeality of the viewer. In the beginning, this section defines transparency as a state and condition with rich interpretations in art and contemporary architecture, then it uses its characteristics to develop a new *situation* for film.

#### 7.1.1 Literal and Phenomenal Transparency

Many theorists have observed in architecture that since the beginning of the twentieth century, the notion of sight, its technologies and its relation to power and control have affected the form of the built environment and its progress. Buildings for prisons, factories, and many institutions used transparent architecture for the administration of power and control; where prisoners,

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film employees, and workers were to be seen and heard very clearly (Foucault 1995; Hancock and Jewkes 2011; Fiddler 2011). Issues of *power, control, Superimposition, communication and interaction* became signals for the modern era that have concerned philosophers such as Guy Debord commenting on *The Society of Spectacle* (1967), and Foucault in his striking contrast with modern forms of power in his famous analysis of Bentham's *Panopticon* (Foucault 1995; Leach 2005). Bentham's designated transparency through the design of the Panopticon as discussed by Foucault is just a matter of a network of power relations retaining control through anxiety based upon the surveillance of individuals; the prisoners. This has been identified repeatedly as being reflected in other modalities in modern architecture such as in some factories (Gerbino 2012; Lamming et al. 2004; Foucault 1995; Hancock and Jewkes 2011)

In research, *transparency* has been used and described as a means for experiencing something through something else, which allows for all the layers to be detected, by vision, audibly, by touch, by smell and even by taste (Gerbino 2012; Leach 2005). The concept of transparency has been used by vision theorists, such as Kepes (1944), and Gibson (1954), to express the double experience. In his *Language of Vision*, Kepes (1944) interpreted transparency as a condition to be discovered in art; when two or more figures are overlapping each other, and each one of them claims for itself the common overlapped part, the figures are endowed with transparency, which means they are interpenetrated without causing the optical destruction of one another. This condition implies more than an optical characteristic. It implies a broader spatial order, the perception of different locations, and equivalence in the position for the overlapped figures; the close one has the same meaning of the further one (Kepes 1944) as cited in (Gibson 1954). Beside visual arts, the emphasis on

perceiving sounds through other sounds has been shown to have heightened the audible transparency such as in the work of the neurobiologist Bergman (1996). In terms of touch, transparency has been analyzed by Katz (1925, 1935), where it is seen as the means to resolve any conflict that occurs from the visual perception of double layers (Krueger 1970).

The artist Moholy-Nagy in his *Vision in Motion* points to issues of time and space, highlighting the idea that transparency leads subjects to travel through different layers of space in a fixed time. Those layers transfer “insignificant singularities into meaningful complexities” (Moholy-Nagy 1947 p.210) because the transparent quality of the superimpositions suggests a transparency in the whole context that is able to reveal the unnoticed structural qualities in the object (Moholy-Nagy 1947).

Shonfield has argued that the classical notion of depth of field in photography has been revitalized by the *depth of time* enabled by advanced technologies (Shonfield 2003), whereby the transparency of technology, and consequently the mediation of the natural world through the built environment can be directly linked to the occupant’s ability for physical engagement with architecture (Patterson 2010).

In the literature of contemporary architecture, transparency has been discussed by Rowe and Slutzky (1963) in *Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal*. They argue that *transparency* is loaded with many possibilities of meaning and misunderstanding. Accordingly, they have distinguished between two forms of transparency; (i) *literal transparency*, which is an inherent quality of substance, that of being penetrable to air and light, as in a glass curtain wall, and (ii) *phenomenal transparency*, which is an inherent quality of organization; a “result of an intellectual imperative, of our inherent demand for that which should be

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easily detected, perfectly evident, and free of dissimulation” (Rowe and Slutzky 1963).

They derived those distinctions from the theories behind cubist paintings and the rules whereby literal transparency was defined in cubist representations. Whenever transparency applies to the literal rules of cubism (i.e., frontality, suppression of depth, contraction of space, definition of light sources, tipping forward of objects, restricted palette, and oblique and rectilinear grids), it corresponds to the existence of literal transparency. On the other hand, when the transparency applies to the intersections, overlapping, interlocking, and building up of the composition in cubist paintings and larger and fluctuating configurations, they demonstrate that the rules allow for the creation of the typically ambiguous cubist motif which generates the *state of transparency* (Rowe and Slutzky 1963).

The architectural analogy of material qualities of glass produces literal transparency. Rowe and Slutzky notes that glass is able to create compositions of superimposed layers that are produced by the reflections and accidents of light playing upon a surface (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). Spuybroek confirms that such a consistency of material generally leads what modernists call transparency, since the internal structure is exposed at the exterior, in addition to that, the internal structure transforms while being exposed (Spuybroek 2016).

Rowe and Slutzky illustrate the workshop wing of the Bahaus as an example of literal transparency. The visitor can see all the interior while standing outside the building because of the glass façade. However, they confirm that Glass does not always guarantee transparency. For instance, Le Corbusier’s Villa *Stein-de Monzie* at Garches is an example of phenomenal transparency although it has wide windows that permit visual access. Rowe and Slutzky describe, its

transparency is not brought about by the windows, but rather by “our being made conscious of primary concepts which interpenetrate without optical destruction of each other” (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). The villa is divided by five vertical layers and four horizontal layers. The researchers define phenomenal transparency in this villa according to the fact that the “deep space is constantly opposed by the inference of shallow space”, the whole experience of the house, after reading all those layers according to experience, claim attention “and this gridding of space will then result in continuous fluctuations of interpretation” (Rowe and Slutzky 1963). In short, the user feels the transparency of the layers by experience and movement not only by the penetration of their eyes.

According to the above definitions, the transparent material or object tends to be that which is perfectly clear, and becomes ambiguous because of the optical destruction and re-composition of space and meaning. Under this reading, this research claims that *literal transparency* can create a *surprise* for the viewer for the first time encountered that lasts for minutes. However, *phenomenal transparency* causes *attention* that lasts longer than for literal transparency since it regards the lived experience that is contributed by movement.

In film theories, transparency is known as a key concept about the truth and myth of what the spectators are watching (Hayward 2013). This chapter contributes to film studies by accumulating other definitions and forms of transparency, related to phenomenology and the lived body experience.

Understanding how the body encounters transparent atmospheres becomes a critical issue in this research. Accordingly, the question arises as to how transparency is reflected in film? How can the viewer grasp the *affect* of transparency both corporeally and consciously? The following section in this chapter will seek to understand the phenomenology of transparency; its essence.

It will address its affect on the viewer and it will seek to provide a new reading of the use of spatial transparency in film.

### 7.1.2 Proximity, Accessibility, Touch, and the Kinesthetic Experience

To understand the phenomenology of transparency; i.e. its essence, it is important to focus on what Kepes (1944) stressed in his *Language of Vision* regarding the spatial arrangements and the equivalence of the *close* and the *further*; whereby the close has the same meaning as the one that is further away (Gibson 1954). He focusses on a very significant point, namely, *proximity* to objects behind a transparent surface and the concept of *visual accessibility*. The definitions and applications of transparency discussed above may look different, but they are all based on the fact that all the objects, once they are seen, then open the opportunity to be *accessible*, and to be *close* enough to *be reached* eventually.

Proximity leads to accessibility; the short distance to the character opens the accessibility to him/her. In the context of film it can be argued that proximity works at two levels; the level of distance between the characters, which can be tangible and intangible, and at the level of filming and framing the characters.

In film, the tangible distance between the characters is assessed based on nearness of the characters and if there is a barrier between them or not. Meanwhile, the intangible distance is described in terms of the strengths of the relationships amongst the characters. For example, a close relationship, e.g., the case of a husband and wife, a boyfriend and girlfriend, cousins, etc., adopts accessibility and allows the character to reach to the other.

In relating proximity, as a motivation for movement, to Heidegger's (1996) *Da-sein*, it has been discussed earlier that movement increases *spatiality* and

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film increases corporeality which in turn increases the sense of embodiment to *be-in-the-world*. According to that, proximity between characters and proximity with the viewer foster the presence of the viewer and increase her/his corporeality. Consequently, the shooting style and the framing size is highly important so as to reflect the relevant distances for the viewer, because, as Metz and Laine argue, they have the power to position the viewers by providing them with an imaginary vision at the center of the visual field of the photographic image (Metz 1974; Laine 2006). The various techniques that have been used will be underlined during the following discussion of different forms of transparency.

The short distance between the protagonist and the antagonist raises the possibility of *touch*, and all that matters for the viewer is to keep the two characters apart.

It has been discussed earlier that Laine (2006) considers the fear of touch as the main factor that awakens the skin of the spectator, in which she considers skin as a medium of *intersubjective* connection that is able to create the *affective engagement* with the screen because it forms the structure of *haptic perception* that represents a mode of bodily consciousness (Laine 2006). But how can this proximity and its possible touch improve the corporeal consciousness?

### 7.1.3 Transparency as a Kinesthetic Experience

Proximity and accessibility are aspects of transparency, they both lead ultimately to touch. This section will clarify how proximity, leading to touch, can be a *kinesthetic experience* that ends with a *corporeal consciousness* experience.

The viewer experiences the *kinesthetic experience* of movement in dread through two main ways, the first one is the actual movement of the antagonist,

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film especially when he *de-distances* and *directions* himself towards the protagonist. The second movement is created by *fear*, the fear of the atmosphere, or the fear for the characters. However, both experiences are able to create a kinesthetic and corporeal experience to increase the embodiment of the viewer. To understand both means' relation to the kinesthetic experience and corporeality, it is important to recall the phenomenology of movement that concerned Sheets-Johnstone (2011) who has drawn upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and relate it to the expansive *Away!-tendency* of Schmitz discussed by Hanich (2010).

Movement itself, according to Sheets-Johnstone (2011), is the source of the senses in space and time. When the antagonist physically moves towards the protagonist, the viewer produces a *tensional* quality of movement because of the effort produced internally to stop, or delay, the antagonist from touching the protagonist, especially when the proximity is shot from a *first-point* perspective as in *the Silence of the Lambs*. Here, the desire to stop Gumb/Bufalo Bill triggers the body to add force and an intellectual effort to push, stop, or remove that touch. Not only his movement, but also his pause, expresses an effort for the viewer in stillness building the anticipation to move. This tensional quality can be better described as a heavy movement produced by the *synaesthetic experience* of the subject. The effort produced awakens kinetic energy and stimuli to move, physically, as in holding a breath or in stillness, or visually, by focusing on the screen. The effort then provokes the senses and heightens them in a way that *extends time* and makes that moment count to produce *transcendental subjectivity*. The subject then turns its attention to the body itself to feel its *locomotion*, and accordingly, the experience becomes corporeal and conscious.

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Laine argues that touch is the motivation behind fear and that fear is the moving force of the dreadful, which is experienced as touch to which “our skin responds and starts to crawl” (Laine 2006). Fear, as has been discussed earlier by Hanich and Schmitz, is characterized by expansive *Away!-tendency*; it enters the felt-body, which is the *absolute* phenomenological location, to experience constriction in the moments of fear, the body tries then to escape the skin, but it cannot, accordingly tension is produced (Hanich 2010; Schmitz et al. 2011). This in turn, will create an *amplitudinal* aspect of the *kinesthetic experience*, a *felt contractiveness*, and a *spatial contractiveness* of the body of the subject.

According to that, the fear of touch, and the experience of touch that *starts to crawl* in addition to the expansive *Away!-tendency* to escape the skin, is a very *affective engagement* that increases the corporeality and the consciousness, which in turn increases the embodiment.

According to that, transparency that is fed by proximity and touch can create a *corporeal atmospheric affection* produced *kinesthetically* by the muscles and skin, and *synaesthetically* by the contraction of the *felt-body* according to closing the *absolute space*.

The engagement of the spectator with the character is necessary to build the *kinesthetic experience* above which leads eventually to a corporeal experience. In order to be embodied, the spectator has to *feel for* or *feel with* the characters; *sympathy* and *empathy* are two forms of engagement that have been discussed in part one.

By understanding the concept of transparency spatially in art and architecture, the concept of proximity and its relation to the roles of accessibility and touch in developing the *kinesthetic experience*, and then relating to Hanich and Smiths

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film understanding the relationship between the spectator and the character from the perspectives of *sympathy* and *empathy* helps this research to distinguish three forms of transparency for the purposes of this study that can be found altogether or separately in thrillers in general or in dread in specific, these are; ‘personal transparency’, ‘substance transparency’, and ‘sensorial transparency’. These three concepts will be set out here and illustrated in the context of the case study of *the Silence of the Lambs* and similar thriller films.

## 7.2 Personal Transparency

‘Personal transparency’ is an intangible form of transparency that stems from the close relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist, e.g., a husband as in *Sleeping with the Enemy* (Ruben 1991), a boyfriend as in *Hush* (Mike 2016), or a family friend as in *The Glass House* (Sackheim 2001), and *Wait until Dark* (Young 1967). The close relationship leads to physical proximity in the body and mind, which makes the antagonist capable of identifying the weak points in the protagonist.

An unexpected and unanticipated disruptive outcome of a scene, such as through ‘personal transparency’, is responsible for creating *surprise* for the viewer. Although the study of emotional impact is not within the scope of this study, it is worth briefly touching upon the notion of *aesthetic strategies*, because they will affect the creation of a dread atmosphere.

According to Hanich (2010), the *aesthetic strategies* such as *surprise*, *shock*, and *attention*, aim to produce emotions of the same name, as a decision made at the film level, to affect the viewer and evoke her/his emotions. Mølbak (2012) considers those aesthetics in increasing the relationship between the subject and the object in creating the event by creating *the* experience that the subject

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film undergoes *not* has (Mølbak 2012). In addition to that, those aesthetics have the ability to produce *productive ambiguity* and uncertainty to energize the atmosphere, as Labelle (2011) notes, and accordingly, relating to Merleau-Ponty, the uncertainty and *ambiguity* increase the sense of *existence* since they lead to the final stage of *existence*; the *transcendence* stage.

*Surprise*, according to Hanich (2010), is not a type of fear since the viewer does not in every case of surprise respond to something threatening by comparing it with the *shock* and *attention*. Accordingly, this form of transparency; 'personal transparency', can enrich the *suggested horror* prototype of fear, discussed by Hanich (2010), more than *dread*.

The nature of 'personal transparency' and its relation to the characters, demands that one can consider it more in terms of psychoanalysis than of phenomenology. Accordingly, this area of research is outside the scope of this thesis, but, as Van Manen argues, phenomenology opens up a new possibility for creative relations between subjects and objects in other fields (van Manen 2007). Therefore, this finding opens the opportunity for further research concerning 'personal transparency' in psychoanalysis.

### 7.3 Substance Transparency

'Substance transparency' in film is probably the closest form of transparency to the concept of *literal transparency*, as discussed by Rowe and Slutzky (1963), where the protagonist and antagonist exist in the same space but are separated by a transparent obstacle that allows them to see, hear, smell, and, sometimes, touch each other. The material condition is what controls this form of transparency, such as a glass wall, window, door, or any partition that is penetrable by air and light such as a jail's bars. 'Substance transparency' can

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film also be attached to objects, not only to transparent walls. The key point in this form of transparency is that both of the characters realize sensing each other and communicate. Therefore, its engagement with the viewer may create more *sympathy* than *empathy*, depending on the way that the film is shot.

In *The Silence of the Lambs* (Jonathan 1991), there were two special scenes that express ‘substance transparency’, both associated with the meeting of Clarice with Dr. Lecter. The first scene is the one showing Clarice passing through five gates to reach the cell of Dr. Lecter, (Figure 7-1). All the way down, the FBI agents and the officers warn Clarice against being touched by Dr. Lecter; “don’t go near the glass!” All the cells have literal transparency where sight, sound, touch, and smell are possible. Clarice walks closer to the wall to avoid being touched by the prisoners. Dr. Lecter’s cell is made of clear glass with small holes at the head level and the glass wall serves to superimpose all the layers behind to let Clarice see him and see his paintings, bed, sink, etc.



Figure 7-1: Dr. Lecter's Cell, 'Substance transparency'  
Source: DVD (Demme Jonathan 1991)

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The first shots are filmed as medium shots with the *over the shoulder* technique for both of the characters until Dr. Lecter asks Clarice to show her ID, and asks her to come closer to be seen, in a first point of view in close-up as if they are close to each other. Even after she had sat down, she could still see him in close up, but he was only able to see her in medium close up shot. The more he talks to her, the tighter they are placed in the frame as if he is reaching her body by knowing more about her; Clarice says: "You see a lot Dr." and that comes after both of them are in close-up shots while he talks about her father. The shots are reflections of their *proximity*, not spatially, but in terms of how he sees her; once he knows everything about her, she becomes closer, touchable, and vulnerable, but the glass wall she is kept behind reassures the viewer and the character.

Drawing upon Murray (1994) in *sympathy*, the close-up shots with clear glass separation place the viewer in a close relation with Clarice that embraces both *spatial attachment* and *subjective access* to feel for her; *sympathy* is what the viewer relates in this scene, specifically, fear for Clarice that she should be touched by Dr. Lecter or by the other prisoners.

The other scene that applies 'substance transparency' is when Clarice visits Dr. Lecter in the hall, where he sits inside a cubical cage (Figure 7-2). Although Clarice was not physically close to him, she was shot in close-ups and extreme close-up as if there were no bars separating them; the more he talks to her, the tighter she appears in the frame. Close-up shots in film give the proximity of body, mind, and thought; Dr. Lecter broke her aura and became closer. This penetrated the barrier between them and opened the opportunity for Clarice to be touched by him, and that actually happened later when she took her case file and Dr. Lecter touches her finger.




Figure 7-2: Touching Clarice via the cubical cage, 'Substance transparency'  
Source: DVD (Demme Jonathan 1991)

The phenomenal proximity which is produced by the close-up shots and which breaks the aura of the character is a very successful way to approach greater *spatial alignment* and the *subjective access* which serve to increase *alignment* and *allegiance sympathy*.

'Substance transparency' is not only attached to architectural decisions such as the placement of partitions and walls, but also to other elements that are connected to characters as in the case of the *Sleeping with the Enemy* (Ruben 1991) where the husband's attendance (Martin Burney) is connected to objects such as the well-organized towels in the bathroom and cans in the kitchen. As has been discussed above, the critical issue in this form of transparency is that both characters recognize that they are set within in the same space.

*Hush* (Mike 2016) is about Maddie, a deaf writer who lives alone in the woods. She is the girlfriend of the killer and she faces him from behind a glass door all the time. This film is another dense film that applies transparency at three levels: (i) the level of 'personal transparency' because the antagonist (the man) is the

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film protagonist's (Maddie's) boyfriend; (ii) the level of 'substance transparency' because of the separation of the characters by, and their communication through, a glass door; (iii) and the level of 'sensorial transparency', which is the third form of transparency that will be discussed soon. Most of the events happen beyond the glass door; meeting him, seeing him killing people, cutting the phone and network cables, and creating a hole in the tires of her car. She sees him disconnecting her from the world. From its beginning, the scene behind the glass door increases the *sympathy* for the viewer, especially because Maddie is a deaf woman; the viewer feels for her, but there is a kind of perceived assurance once he cannot touch her thanks to the glass door and wall which will keep him away. Everything is transparent to him. He could see, smell, hear, and touch.

The first time Maddie meets the masked-man, she runs to the doors and windows to shut them; the first moment they meet behind the glass was *shocking* for the viewers, reflecting and mimicking the *shock* of Maddie, that was built upon their *sympathy* and worrying about her.

Considering Hanich's (2010) perspective on terror, 'substance transparency' can best be used to connote *terror* rather than *dread*. The nature of terror is hectic, loud, and fast and it demands running, escaping from danger since the threat's nature is known (Hanich 2010). The nature of terror and the time spent in that event can be described as *shock*. As an *aesthetic strategy*, the psychological *shock* bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts only briefly, and the moment of shock is rooted in the present. It does not include any thoughts or anticipations of the future as in the formulation of a dread atmosphere (Hanich 2010). In this regard, Hanich (2010) considers *shock* produces more of fear than of *surprise* although both aesthetics share "unexpectedness as a characteristic of their

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film intentional object”, because not every type of surprise is fearful, but a moment of shock makes the viewer frightened, even if only briefly.

An interesting study testing the role of transparent walls in their capacity to increase feelings of shock, anxiety, and fear has been conducted by Hagenbuch, Feldon, and Yee (2006) and Albrechet-Souza et al. (2005) using the elevated plus maze test. The *Elevated Plus Maze* (EPM) is one of the most widely employed tools for the behavioral screening of anxiety. In this test, a rat or a mouse is placed in a transparent elevated maze consisting of two opposing open arms and two opposing enclosed arms. Then, behavior of the rat or mouse is compared to its behavior in another elevated plus maze assembly equipped with opaque walls made from black foil. In general, the mice tended to stay longer in the open arms of the transparent EPM than in those of the opaque EPM, and the test showed that they were less active. Accordingly, the researchers concluded that transparent walls will be more suited to assess manipulations expected to be anxious, while an EPM with opaque walls will be suitable for manipulations with potential anxiety (Albrechet-Souza et al. 2005; Hagenbuch, Feldon, and Yee 2006). In these experiments, both groups of researchers described the induced *anxiety* which the mice felt, but they didn't define a reason behind it. Here it is suggested that one can apply what happens in the scenes of *terror*, where *shock* is induced first, followed by *anxiety* and *sympathy* for the viewer.

'Substance transparency' can be calm but therefore also full of anxiety as in *The Silence of the Lambs* which fits with the *suggested horror* category defined by Hanich (2010). In addition, it can be fast and hectic as in *Hush* for a *terror* scene. In both examples, the *aligned* and *allegiance sympathy* are the form of engagement between the viewer and the screen after being shocked. *Shock* is

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the *aesthetic strategy* that is used in this form of transparency to feed the *sympathy* of the viewer.

#### 7.4 Sensorial Transparency

This form of transparency can be seen as the closest to the notion of *phenomenal transparency* discussed by Rowe and Slutzky (1963), whereby intersections of layers are responsible for creating transparency. In film, it corresponds to a temporary or permanent loss of a sense, which makes the character reachable and touchable because of that missing sense. This form of transparency can be the more intense form of transparency since the character does not realize the threat. This raises attention and it takes longer to make it suitable for creating an atmosphere of dread. It is related to losing all senses but that of touch, where touch is understood to be the reason behind fear and the reason for a sense of corporeality.

##### 7.4.1 The Sense of Touch and Corporeality

“Sense experience is the vital communication with the world which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.61).

In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty investigates the *existence* of a person’s body that refers to the sense experience. Merleau-Ponty (2002) considers ears and eyes as instruments of bodily excitation only and not of perception because they cannot ensure any cognitive power for the notion of perception. So, one’s eyes see and her/his hand touches but those senses alone do not put the subject into the world of experience. He argues that what matters in understanding the nature of perception is reading its *structure*; both the structure of the object and the consciousness of the subject (Merleau-Ponty 2002).

The sensory experience can be described as both *synthetic* and *haptic* in that it creates the required perception in terms of dread. As a *synthetic experience* it speaks directly to all senses at the same time at primary level, a sense experience that precedes its division among other senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Afterwards, and as another stage, Merleau-Ponty argues that the subject can distinguish which sense it talks to. The cooperation among the senses is necessary for perception. Many recent studies (e.g., Marks (2000)) emphasize that one sense modality may respond to information normally used for another sense modality. This is called *Synesthesia*, that is, “the perception of one sensation by another modality, such as the ability to distinguish colors by feel,” the yellow color, for example, is associated with male procreative power and with the merry melody of the flute (Marks 2000 p.213).

*Synesthesia* alters to deliver a corporeal knowledge and contributes to the development of a corporeal experience because the senses intercommunicate by opening to the structure of the thing itself to capture the *sensible significance*, e.g., to see the hardness of the glass or the softness of the wool (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.267). According to Laine, this creates a *haptic perception*, which is a mode of seeing through all modes located on skin, and a mode of bodily consciousness and corporeality where the body perceives and feels (Laine 2006).

Merleau-Ponty argued that the body can be seen as a *ready-made* system of equivalents offering transposition from one sense to another. The senses translate each other without an interpreter and are comprehensible without the intervention of an idea (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Accordingly, one understands that her/his eyes see, her/his ears hear, and her/his hands touch, but that she/he as a subject perceives. The senses are not separable but they *transform* the perception from a form to another. They may transfer it visually or audibly, or in

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the form of odor or a tactile signal or message. Since touch is the last thing that can be lost, it is the sense that extends the area of *synaesthetic perception* and feeds the corporeal experience and consciousness. In terms of 'sensorial transparency', the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same space without physical barriers and the possibility of touch is high, because of losing one sense or more.

#### 7.4.2 Examples

In the selected scene, in part two, in the *Silence of the Lambs* (Demme Jonathan 1991), Buffalo Bill cuts the power off to blind Clarice when she reaches the corpse in the bathroom. She loses her sight in an unknown world, and he controls both darkness and power to navigate the space physically by wearing night detective goggles, and psychically because he owns that place. This scene is shot from the killer's point of view where the viewer sees Clarice and recognizes what is happening to her and how close to her Buffalo Bill is. The shots become tighter moving from medium shots, to medium close-up, to close-up in order to reflect the *proximity* of Buffalo Bill. As a result of shooting this scene from a first point perspective, Laine (2006) describes it as the viewer stepping into Buffalo Bill's skin to experience his spatiality and proximity to Clarice.



Figure 7-3: Sight transparency. Source: DVD (Demme Jonathan 1991)

In this scene, Buffalo Bill is physically with Clarice, but losing her sight prevents her from spotting him in order to run or to escape. All the space becomes transparent for Buffalo Bill enabling him to spot her first and then to touch her. Sight for Clarice is transformed into sound and touch. All the other senses but sight are employed to break the transparency and to build a barrier between her and Buffalo Bill such as the click of the gun that breaks the transparency enabling her to spot him.

The viewer knows more than Clarice of how close Buffalo Bill is. This produces *aligned* and *allegiance sympathy*, but because of the way it is shot, inside his skin, and being saturated with her breathing, the viewer experiences both *imaginative* and *somatic empathy*. The viewer experiences *imaginative empathy* because she/he realizes the *proximity* of Buffalo Bill to Clarice and because he is about to touch her, especially when Buffalo Bill puts his arm in front of the frame, trying to touch her shoulders and face. Meanwhile, the viewer experiences *somatic empathy* because she/he is saturated with her breathing covered by the silence of the atmosphere, where the viewer mimics the muscular actions of Clarice. It was a very corporeal and very intense scene to live with because of the proximity of Buffalo Bill, whom the viewer lives inside, and for Clarice, where there is an intellectual effort from the viewer to stop Buffalo Bill from touching her. According to Schmitz's *New-Phenomenology*, the fear of the current situation works on creating *constriction* in addition to the expansive *Away!-Tendency*. The viewer, as Hanich explains, cannot escape the *absolute location* i.e. "the lived-body's phenomenological Here", and what s/he is trying to do is to escape its skin, "by expanding Away somewhere, but cannot flee the lived-body's constriction", and this produces a *tension* between constriction and attempted expansion that feeds the experience of the viewer (Hanich 2010 p.103).

Two other key examples of 'sight transparency' are found in the films *Don't Breathe* (Fede 2016) and *Wait until Dark* (Young 1967). *Don't Breathe* is a film about some burglars who are trying to steal money from a blind soldier who lives alone with his dog. In the beginning of the film, all the barriers are transparent to the burglars since the soldier is blind. The only action required from the blind man was an audible click to break this transparency, and the only action required from the burglars was not to breathe so as to maintain the transparency for them. Once the blind soldier cuts the power off, the burglars become blind and he regains full sight because he knows the *place*. The burglars need touch and sound signals from him to help guide them to survive, but for him, only a sound was enough. In darkness, once the silence is broken, touch is the only way to get out. The shooting style in this scene was very different from that in *The Silence of the Lambs*. In *Don't Breathe*, there is no optical point of view, and it is shot from a third person perspective which results into more *sympathy* than *empathy*. One can assume that more sympathy is intended because the viewer knows more than the characters do about where the blind soldier is standing. Meanwhile, empathy is clearly also intended, this can be seen in the mimicry of the characters in holding their breath, which forms a *somatic empathy* and increases the sense of corporeality for the viewers in that moment.

In *Wait until Dark*, the protagonist (Susy Hendrix), who is a blind woman, faces an interpreter in her house. She removes all the light bulbs from the house to black it out, forgetting to remove the bulb in the fridge. In that scene, she threatens the antagonist who is fully-covered with gasoline by holding a lit match. She asks him to keep tapping threatening to throw the match at him if he stops. The whole screen is dark and the viewer lives in darkness too as Susy only hears the tapping from the intruder. The tap in the scene, with the darkness used in a *haptic way*,

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film reflects what Marks (2000) calls a *haptic sound*. A term used to refer to the sound which is experienced and internalized (Marks 2000), suggesting closeness of the intruder for the viewer. Once the tapping has stopped and it is still dark, silence increases the sense of fear. Then, the door of the fridge is opened and transparency is created again! Now Suzy can be located and she can be touched easily. Sympathy and empathy are both experienced in this scene; in light, *sympathy* prevails since the viewer knows more than her, and in darkness, *empathy* is induced, and probably the *imaginative empathy* only dominates where the viewer goes through the same experience as Suzy.

In *Hush* (Mike 2016), Maddie is a deaf, not blind, woman, and she is the girlfriend of the killer and she faces him from behind a glass door all the time. The film is dense in terms of the use of transparency due to the fact that it applies modes of 'personal transparency', 'substance transparency', and 'sensorial transparency' because of Maddie's loss of the sense of hearing. In the dread scene at 1:21:44, she is alone in the bathroom sitting and waiting for her boyfriend to come through the door and fight. Silence covers the atmosphere making the viewer as deaf as her. Then, the viewer sees her boyfriend coming from the ceiling; he breaks the ceiling and reaches towards her. Now the viewer is sitting behind her, through the boyfriend's optical point of view, the viewer sees her closer as he is about to touch her. She does not feel him, but once he laughs and sighs (in sarcasm) his exhalation breaks the transparency and enables her to locate him. In this scene, the duality of sympathy and empathy increase the corporeality of the viewer; *sympathy* occurs when the sound breaks and when the viewer realizes the proximity of the killer to the protagonist. Meanwhile, *empathy* occurs when the viewer experiences the deafness of Suzy; it was a *sensation empathy* (feeling with her exhalation) and an *example of affective mimicry* (anticipating that the

worst is coming). In another scene, she works on robbing him of the sense of hearing by starting the fire alarm, which is so loud that he could not tolerate it. In that moment, she reaches to him through his hearing as a form of transparency.

The use of 'sensorial transparency' feeds the fear of the viewer because the barrier between the heroine and the antagonist is removed and the possibility of physical touch is very high, which will increase the sense of corporeality for the viewer. This, in turn, feeds the sense of sympathy, especially when the character does not know that she is in the same space as the antagonist. It also feeds the sense of *somatic* and *imaginative empathy* according to the way in which it is shot because of the realisation of proximity and the high potential for her to be touched. 'sensorial transparency' is the transparency that fits with the formulation of *dread* the most. It emerges gradually and can go on for a considerable period of time. In addition, it creates both sympathy and empathy and, above all, it raises *attention*.

#### 7.4.3 Attention

*We may say that whatever attracts our attention... surely becomes more vivid and more clear in our consciousness. This doesn't mean that it becomes more intense. A faint light to which we turn our attention does not become the strong light of an incandescent lamp. No, it remains the faint, just perceptible streak of lightness, but it has more impressive, more distinct, more clear in its details, more vivid... it has come to our consciousness.*

*(Sobchack 1990 p.28)*

Attention is described as a lived body movement that does not involve movement through space (Sobchack 1990). For Merleau-Ponty, it is a "consciousness in the act of learning", that is, a creative act in terms of the subject's relationship to the

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film world. He argues that “attention [...] as a general and formal activity, does not exist. There is in each case a certain liberty to be acquired, and a certain mental space to make the most of. There is literally a question of creation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.28). According to that notion, ‘sensorial transparency’ can be viewed as a creative and transformational activity of consciousness because it articulates the senses that were otherwise absent and presents them as new formed objects. Furthermore, it creates a distinct experience because it is lived in silence with the character, mixing between *empathy* and *sympathy*. Sobchack (1990) has drawn upon Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) concept of *attention* and found that the optical movement in cinema such as the zoom, track-in, and track-out, is what brings this active and constitutive function of attention into focus; it transforms the visual field and the objects within it to create a new figure-ground relation between the subject and the object. Originally, this has been noted by Munsterberg (1970) who pointed out how the close-up functions to make these features of perception visible.

Munsterberd (1970) considers the optical active movements for attention such as close-up, zoom, and rack focus, which all are used to intensify the object and make it more vivid and center it in the spectator’s consciousness of the film (Münsterberg 1970). A missing sense provokes the optical movement to use special optical point of view to intensify it and make it more vivid, and the fear of touch is the motivation behind this.

What is interesting in shooting the transparent shots of scenes using close-ups, medium close-ups, and a first person perspective, or what Hitchcock calls *subjective treatment*, is that it leads to mimesis, which, as Marks describes it, shifts the hierarchal relationship between the subject and the object in such a way as to dissolve between the two and by which “the subject comes into being, not

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film through abstraction from the world, but through compassionate involvement in it” (Marks 2000 p.141). Accordingly, this action feeds the *somatic empathy*.

Comparing the concept of *attention* to that of *surprise* or *shock*, neither of which can be viewed creative acts in that they stop the subject from thinking, it can be argued that *attention* is, by contrast, a creative act because it transforms the mental field, and when it comes to senses and the prospect of losing a sense, it motivates the mimesis and then penetrates the skin and the sense itself to be considered and felt, that is, to be more corporeal and conscious.

## 7.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, the concept of transparency is presented as a state that allows close visual accessibility to an object. In film, transparency has been demonstrated to act as an element that allows for accessibility of the body and/or mind to reach the characters eventually by touch.

The key for increasing the sense of the viewer’s embodiment here is to create a corporeal lived experience with the character, full of *empathy* in its forms; *somatic* and/or *imaginative*, and *sympathy* in the form of *alignment* with its interlocking functions, i.e., *spatial attachment* and *subjective access* and the *allegiance sympathy*. This has been demonstrated through a series of illustrated examples.

*Proximity* is shown to be both a consequence of transparency and its motivation. Heidegger’s *Da-sein* explains the way the subject can be seen to *be in-the-world*; that movement by the characters and movement of the camera are capable to pull or push the viewer to be also *in-the-world*. In addition, according to the phenomenology of movement discussed by Sheets-Johnstone (2011), the movement of the characters and the style of shooting can also create *tensional*, *projectional*, and *amplitudinal* qualities of movement for the viewer to induce an

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internal movement that is responsible for stimulating senses of corporeality and embodiment. According to that, one considers transparency as a *corporeal atmospheric affection* produced *kinesthetically* by the muscles and skin, and *synaesthetically* by the contraction of the *felt-body*.

Reading the concept of transparency through Rowe and Slutzky's definitions (1963) in terms of art and architecture helped this research describe the use of transparency in film from different perspectives. This research then identified three forms of transparency; 'personal transparency', 'substance transparency', and 'sensorial transparency'. Whereas one or all of these transparency forms can be found in thrillers in general, this chapter concludes that 'sensorial transparency' is the form of transparency used the most in the creation of *dread* scenes.

'Personal transparency' is defined here as a *phenomenal transparency* which stems from the close relationship that is established between the protagonist and the antagonist, where the latter can reach to the former because of knowing her or his weak points. This form of transparency can be best found in the *suggested horror* prototype of Hanich (2010). The *aesthetic strategy* of this transparency is to create *surprise* for the viewer that develops *sympathy* with the character. This form of transparency does not follow the concept of phenomenology as a process for creating embodiment. In view of this, the current research does not discuss the issue in detail but the observation highlights the opportunity for future research in the field of psychoanalysis.

Here, the concept of 'substance transparency', which is been seen to fit *terror* and *horror* scenes more than *dread* scenes, is shown to be very close to the architectural notion of *literal transparency*, whereby a penetrable barrier (e.g., a glass wall) separates the characters, thus allowing for penetration of all the

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film senses except touch. This form of transparency is characterized by the fact that it allows both characters to perceive and recognize each other. Accordingly, the viewer, much like the characters, knows the positions and actions of each one of them. *Shock* is the *aesthetic strategy* that can be experienced in this form, and, as a type of fear, psychological shock bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts only briefly. However, the feeling turns into *anxiety* after the shock is experienced putting the viewer in the state of pure *sympathy* with the character.

It has been demonstrated here that 'sensorial transparency' is the form of transparency fitting the emulation of *dread* the most. It is based on the concept that one character only controls the space and that the space for her/him is transparent, which in turn enables her/him to locate the other character(s) easily because of missing one sense or more. In such a case, the most thrilling experience for one of the characters is that both characters exist in the same space without separating barriers. This form of transparency can be very intense according to its style of shooting, which, most of the time, using the first point view perspective and close-up shots, which, as a consequence, raises the *attention* of the viewer. The possibility of touch in this form of transparency is high, and it is shot in a way when puts the viewer in the position of the antagonist most of the time. In addition to *sympathy*, *somatic* and *imaginative empathy* are shown to be the engagement form that can be created in this form, and this will feed the cultivation of a sense of fear, internal body movement, *kinesthetic experience*, *consciousness*, and, accordingly, a *corporeal consciousness*.

According to Hanich (2010), *dread* provides the quality of *spatial immersion*, *temporal immersion*, and *emotional immersion*. This form of transparency is shown here to feed the three forms of immersion, which it is argued makes it the optimal form of transparency to be used in the creation of dread scenes. The

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Transparency in Film collaboration of senses is shown to be significant in this form of transparency because the perception that is needed from the viewer is a *haptic perception*, one where the viewer perceives and feels himself or herself to be under the aura of consciousness at the same time.

As Marks has noted, the “sensorium is formed by the culture” it is grown in (Marks 2000 p.203), therefore, it is not possible to guarantee an equivocal response from the viewer, especially for the senses of smell and taste. This leaves sight, sound, and touch to be the universal senses that the film experience can build on. Besides sight as the main sense of engagement, sound is shown here to have an intermodal influence. *Synesthesia* is shown to others the possibility of a corporeal knowledge and, eventually, to make a corporeal experience. Moreover, silence, much like sound, is shown to be used to elaborate on the filmic experience in order to reveal greater tension. Touch is shown to be the destination in any scene in thriller films as it increases the *haptic* experience of anticipation. The increased potential for touch is demonstrated to relate to an increase in *kinesthetic consciousness*, which eventually also increases the potential for a sense of corporeality.

Finally, through reading these three forms of transparency, it is shown to be possible to combine them to create an ‘Intensified Transparency’ which is shown in the case of the dread scene in *Hush*. This is formed to demonstrate all three forms of transparency and as a result to create the ability to embody the viewer corporeally.

## PART THREE:

Chapter Six: The Phenomenology of Text in Film

Chapter Seven: The Phenomenology of Transparency  
In Film

Chapter Eight: The Phenomenology of Surveillance  
in Film



## Chapter Eight: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film

This Chapter describes and explores another *quasi-thing* extracted from the phenomenal reading in part two; Surveillance.

Surveillance was observed in the selected scene of *the Silence of the Lambs* in various forms. First, it appeared when Buffalo Bill blinded Clarice by cutting the power off and then used his night vision goggles to watch her and try to touch her. Second, the concept of surveillance was induced by the spatial configuration of the basement; a labyrinth-like arrangement controlled by Buffalo Bill to entrap Clarice. This reading of the scenes helps the research in developing an understanding of the phenomenon of surveillance and examining its effect on corporeality of the viewer.

This section starts with tracing the theoretical framework around surveillance to track its development as a concept in different fields, then it opens possibilities for an understanding of different notions of *seeing* and *looking* according to a range of theorists in different fields including film. After that, the chapter describes the essence of surveillance in order to relate it to the logic of body existence that has been discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2002), to create 'docile-body-viewers'. Following this, the chapter explores new panoptical forms of surveillance in dread spaces through a horizontal reading of relevant scenes drawn from different thriller films.

### 8.1 Theorizing Surveillance

The concept of surveillance was developed in the late eighteenth century but it was not a key theoretical focus until 1970s when many theorists proposed and suggested new modes of surveillance as a means to explore concepts of power and control. Early social scientists mapped the field of surveillance drawing

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film attention for modernist disciplines and their preoccupation with *watching*; the necessity to watch others in factories and cities. Examples include Marx (1867) who addressed the modern disciplines of capitalist supervision, Simmel (1903) for the eye in the urban metropolis, Durkheim (1916) for the disciplinary response to growing social inequality, and Weber (1947) for bureaucratic record keeping (Lyon 2006). In the post-modern era, the work of Michel Foucault and his discussions of Jeremy Bentham's concept of the Panopticon in the 19<sup>th</sup> were the most prominent related developments. They stimulated new approaches to understanding surveillance and explored and defined new modes of its practice. His book, *Discipline and Punish- The Birth of the Prison*, which was originally published in French (1975), was essential to the new debates on surveillance and other notions of *looking*.

The Panopticon prison architecture plan, produced by Jeremy Bentham, became a set piece for Foucault's work on surveillance despite all the critiques it faced (e.g., Bauman 1992; Bogard 1996; Lyon 1993; Mathiesen 1997) as cited in (Lyon 2006). Evans, Hancock and Jewkes state that Bentham's influence on the design of prisons of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries was noted to have extended to other public buildings such as schools and libraries, where surveillance was the main strategy placed at the heart of those institutional architecture (Evans 1982; Hancock and Jewkes 2011).

Foucault maintains that the Panopticon relies entirely on its "investment in its visual aspect" (Foucault 1995 p.204). Accordingly, the Panopticon concept still appears in surveillance discourse and plays the role of an arbiter in surveillance studies. The Panopticon consists of a circular arrangement of cells, all of which open onto a central watchtower where it is possible to observe all the prisoners all the time. The cells are lit in a way that prevents the occurrence of blind spots

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in order for them to be seen only through the watchtower. The sidewalls of the cells make the prisoners invisible to one another to increase their alienation and isolation, the prisoner is “the object of information, never subject to communication” (Foucault 1995 p.203; Evans 1982).

From the viewpoint of Foucault, power was revealed in the Panopticon through the architecture which obstructs communication, enhances fragmentation and the art of distribution by creating enclosures that are heterogeneous to all others whilst being closed in upon themselves to separate them from the others (Foucault 1995 p.141).

Lyon highlights how Foucault understands the Panopticon as an ideal model of the surveillance relations involved in modern technologies of penal power (Lyon 2006). Thus, the function of power that is revealed through visibility aspect because a critical of the consideration of spatial arrangement in the modern era. The Panopticon creates a rich and complex concept according to the interpretation of emphasis; it encapsulates an emphasis on the self-discipline of the prisoner and a focus for the different treatment of the sovereign power of prisoners. Moreover, it highlights the enlightenment of vision, especially in the modern era, as a way to order and control under the complex dialogues of *watching* and *being seen*. This has been identified behind many schemes from urban planning to military intelligence that took different shapes from the centralized tower. With the emergence of new vision technologies, and their use for security, the concept of surveillance grew into a critical political issue to take a different form from the panoptic tower, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and the phone call center (Lyon 2006).

Hancock and Jewkes have revealed ways in which these Victorian concepts can be observed as driving later modern buildings such as Frank Lloyd Wright's

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Larkin building in 1905 in New York. It was distinguished by its vast enclosed space that restricts movement by means of fixed furniture. The space represented a medium of discipline and authoritative symbolism because the arrangement of the desks, which were also designed by Wright, restricted movement as they were attached chairs in a way that has been described to ensure a non-sociable, controlled, and bureaucratic labor process (Hancock and Jewkes 2011).

Architects began using new materials in the modern era such as glass, iron, concrete, and steel, which enabled translucency and framing and were used in clean and neat designs to suit the aesthetics of modernity and to guarantee the *silent system* environment for labor such as the factories of Albert Khan (1869-1942). The Ford car Glass Factory in Dearborn Michigan, which was designed according to the rational principles of standardization and enabled uninterrupted mass production through the integration of human and non-human technologies, where the order and regulation, in addition to the *silent system*, were enforced (Hancock and Jewkes 2011).

In the post-Panopticon regime, Webster, Robins and Zuboff highlight that new technologies and new political regimes went beyond Foucault to understand the contemporary electronic technology under which the arrival of *data-surveillance* creates another form of surveillance (Webster and Robins 1986; Zuboff 1988) as cited in (Lyon 2006)<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> An example of data surveillance is the 'Permit Book' which recorded details of each purchase of alcohol in Toronto, where a copy was held by the permit holder, another by the vendor, and a third by the Permit Department in Toronto, to allow for double control and surveillance for both the vendor and the individual (Cartwright 2005).

### 8.1.1 New Notions of Seeing

In 1975, the same year that Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* was published and afterwards, other modes of surveillance were explored with different dimensions under the umbrella of psychoanalysis. Notions such as the *gaze* and *voyeurism* which hold different meanings and have different goals for the concept of the look. These definitions carried moral, psychiatric, and political connotations in different studies that could include sexual dimension in addition to gender roles in looking (Laura Mulvey 1975; Axberg 2011; King 2014; Lindqvist and Tishelman 2015).

The *gaze* is the exchange of looks that takes place in cinema. It is used in psychoanalytic theories when discussing the relationship between the spectator and the screen, justified by the concept of the *mirror stage*. An idea drawn from the theories of Freud and Lacan about image mimicry that works at the level of the unconscious mind (Hayward 2013). Some theorists such as Christian Metz (1975) and Raymond Bellour (1975) discussed this mirroring, but both of them focused on the identification of the self with sexual interest and acquisition of sexual differences. This debate was taken further by the British feminist Laura Mulvey (1975), who wrote an essay *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema* (1975). Mulvey discussed the *gaze* between the male and female, drawing upon Freud's (1905) notion of *looking and touching*. She was one of the first to link *the look* in narrative cinema with the psychoanalytical needs of the spectator, such as *voyeurism* and *exhibitionism* where the woman is the object and the man is the active bearer of the look (Laura Mulvey 1975). In this context, King states that the *gaze* turns the subject into an object which regulate the social behavior (King 2014).

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*Voyeurism* is known as “the act of viewing the activities of other people unbeknown to them” (Hayward 2013 p.446). It refers usually to the behavior of repeated interest in viewing or observing unsuspecting people with fantasies that may or may not include sexual activities (Sadock and Sadock 2007 p.677). It can be one of the suitable terms used to describe the way of incorporating the spectator in Hitchcock’s films *Rear Window* (1954) and *Psycho* (1960). Mulvey (1975) considered his gazing across the courtyard in *Rear Window* as an instance of *voyeurism*. She related his behavior psychoanalytically to sexual motivations (Laura Mulvey 1975). However, other theorists conceptualize the *voyeurism* a pure mechanism of filmmaking that aims at serving the natural process of looking. For example, Sharff notes that using long shots to represent the *ordinary* eyes, then using binoculars and photo lenses to make closer shots so as to create a shared narrative and distance for the spectator as the actor (Sharff 2000), and Shaw confirms that Hitchcock’s interest in the act of looking was a means of discovering its capacities and producing a cinematic technique that effectively engages the spectator with the character who looks out. His use of purely technical methods is his way of exploring this; “Hal Jeffries is everyman, while the cinematic screen operates as the panorama of the world stage, and the audience members are the role of curious onlookers” (Shaw 2014).

The *gaze* and *voyeurism* theories are only two example theories of psychoanalytic background that are relevant to the pleasure and displeasure of some narrative films. There are more theories than these two theories, e.g., the *scopophilic instinct* and the *ego libido* as can be seen in *The Surveillance of Desire* (Henelly Jr. 1998), but the scope of this thesis does not include the investigation of the motivations behind the watching, or, as Freud (1905) expresses it, *aim of looking*. The aim of this part of the thesis is rather to

understand the phenomenology of surveillance, to open possibilities for different panoptical forms that have been used to create dread spaces in thrillers, and to find out how these forms increase the embodiment of the viewer. Therefore, the other issues which this research sought to examine under Foucault's panoptical concept are how surveillance affects the prisoners and how they experience it. Addressing these issues will help in relating surveillance to the viewer since the lived body experience is what matters in phenomenology and embodiment.

### 8.1.2 Docile Bodies

The emerging discourse of Freudian psychoanalysis can be thought of as embodying the importance of seeing and being seen in the modern period. Foucault (1995) has theorized the relationships among the subject (prisoner), the viewer (watch tower), and the *panoptic power* of spatial relationships in creating a *situation* wherein the subject surrenders herself/himself to the power effect only through being conscious of the possibility of being seen (Foucault 1995). The *panoptic power* is the "effect achieved through the realization that one is subjected to the gaze." (Foucault 1995 p.203). Foucault (1995) adds that the prisoner experiences a feeling of constant surveillance and, in this sense, produces *docile subjects*:

*He who is subjected to the field of visibility, and knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.*

(Foucault 1995 pp.202–203).

From Foucault's (1995) point of view, this kind of power and control creates *docile bodies*, i.e., "calculated manipulation" of the body (Foucault 1995 p.202) where

*[D]iscipline increases the forces of the body and diminishes these forces; it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection*

(Foucault 1995 p.138).

The effect of the *look* is described by the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1992) in terms of *alienation*. He states that to experience the *look* is to experience oneself as "no longer belonging to oneself but as belonging, as an object, in the project of the other" (J-P 1992 p.112). Therefore, it does not matter who watches and what is the motivation behind watching. Rather, what matters is the "anxious awareness of being observed." (Foucault 1995 p.117). In her empirical study of the Washington State Supermax prison (2004), Lorna Rhodes observed that this kind of surveillance creates more than a *docile body*. She clarifies that the disciplinary spaces invite and magnify disorder to create *disturbances*, not as a docile body, but a *destructive body* that becomes a spectacle, a new self for the observer to see a "vision that undermines vision" (Rhodes 2004; Rhodes 1998 p.287).

In short, the surveillance, or the panoptic power in this context, manipulates the body of the prisoner by dissociating her/his power from her/his body, alienating her/his body, or producing disturbed and destructive body. The question is now: Can watching someone in a dread scene under surveillance create a 'docile-body-viewer'? It is expected that there will be no discipline that concerns the viewer, but there will be a mind manipulation of the body of the viewer that can affect it, depending on the setting and the mimicry of the image. Consequently, this study addresses the three *aesthetic strategies* that have been discussed

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## 8.2 Phenomenology of Surveillance

The previous section sought to provide an overview of theories of surveillance and how different philosophers look at it, and to consider how prisoners experience being seen the whole time. This part of the research goes beyond Foucault's discussion of the Panopticon and extends it through analyzing the phenomenology and essence of surveillance. It is anticipated this process will help to find different panoptical forms in film and to determine how they can create a *panoptic power effect* on the viewer. First, a discussion of atmosphere should be made in order to discover the nature of surveillance in term of phenomenology. Griffero notes that in order to feel atmosphere, the subject has to co-perceive the affective corporeal situation *pre-categorically* according to the setting and previous experience, *synaesthetically* by stimulating the senses, and *kinesthetically* by being positioned internally and externally he/she realizes that feeling is *here and now* (Griffero 2014). The perception of an atmosphere does not require recognition of the object in its entirety, but simply to recognize and assess the important aspects and the corporeal affections such as perceiving how heavy, light, hard, or soft the atmosphere is (Griffero 2014). Hence, the *constricted atmosphere* which Hanich (Hanich 2010) discussed in the context of film does not create a dread atmosphere but facilitates and enhances the apprehension of dread to make it be perceived *here and now*. Usually, the *unfamiliarity* of space stimulates the body to make it "reactive to the effusion of

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sensory affordances” and “actively engages with the things it beholds” (Edensor 2007 p.229). Therefore, a *constricted atmosphere* can be a cave, a tunnel, a labyrinth, or an endless space (Hanich 2010), or it can be constricted according to its properties and characteristics that constricts the *felt-body*. Benson-Allott argues that the space that restricts the power of perception and reveals its limited agency gives the feeling of entrapment and claustrophobia accompanied by perceptual uncertainty (Benson-Allott 2015).

In the light of all the previous readings, the atmosphere of surveillance is then seen as combination of the atmospheres of power, control, entrapment, claustrophobia, isolation, and alienation. Thus, the phenomenology of surveillance will be discussed based on the experiences of ‘power and control’ and ‘isolation’.

### 8.3 Experience of Power and Control

The power and control experience intended by the design of the Panopticon is “entrapping rather than liberating” the prisoners (Urrichio 2002, 112 as cited in (King 2014)). In this respect, Merleau-Ponty states that power is affected and stabilized in the panopticon because the surveyor is *inaccessible* (as cited in King 2014) and the surveyed person, according to Foucault, is an “object of information, never the subject of communication” (Foucault 1995 p.200).

Hancock and Jewkes assert that the hyper-organizational institutional spaces of the 19<sup>th</sup> century have been identified as sharing one common feature: a strictly designed and regulated physical environment oriented towards the production of appropriate employee behaviors, bodies, and identities to express their power (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Moreover, the architecture of bureaucracy

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film associated with Weber's (1947) metaphor of the *iron cage* counted on a reading of hierarchy in human relationships based on particular principles. As a consequence, the power and control experience is manifested through 'Sensorial Control' and 'spatial Control'.

### 8.3.1 Sensorial Control

Power partly functions by making people visible. In this regard, Foucault states that "visibility is a trap;" it involves a "complex ensemble of practices which individualize persons and which constitute those individuals within a field of visibility, such that they can be observed and kept under surveillance" (Foucault 1995 p.117).

The notion of 'sensorial control' focuses on the power of making the subjects always accessible by entrapping and interpreting the senses of the surveyed personnel in watching and hearing, and sometimes through touching them. This can be revealed even through use of some special objects, such as binoculars or other tools, or architecturally through the arrangement of space.

Power that is revealed through both *visibility* and *watching* was an issue that has been observed in many signs and forms in the modern era. In order to watch the prisoners well, architecture supported fragmentation against communication between the prisoners by creating individual enclosures to separate them, as in the example of the Panopticon (Foucault 1995). The *silent system* environment is the other shape of power and verbal control over the labor in spaces that echo, such as in Ford Glass Factory in Dearborn Michigan (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). In addition to that, transparent and clear materials (e.g., glass) supported both visibility and hearing in these projects and similar ones in the modern era.

Dale and Burrell note that certain characteristics such as protection and enclosure, positioning, and codification are other architectural actions that make surveyed people always *accessible* to the surveyor (Dale and Burrell 2008), which in turn increase the *proximity* of the surveyor and supports the possibility of *touching* the prisoner as a result of the vulnerable situation he/she is experiencing.

'Sensorial Control' is initiated by the surveyor to make the surveyed person accessible and vulnerable as the surveyor can see but cannot be seen, can hear but cannot be heard, and can touch but cannot be touched, which is enough to create a *docile body* of the prisoner or the labourer under this surveillance because she/he is conscious and aware of her/his weakness and vulnerability. Although the surveyor may not always be watching or hearing, the occupancy of the "watchtower" and the "apparition of a surveyor" are sufficient to secure the panoptic effect (Foucault 1995 p.117).

### 8.3.2 Spatial Control

Creating boundaries in space is what guides the movement of the users and restrict them as well. As an example of that, Hancock and Jewkes describe the fixed furniture in Wright's Larkin Building as a medium of discipline and authoritative symbolism because of the arrangement of the attached desks, which restricted movement to ensure a non-social, controlled, and bureaucratic labor process (Hancock and Jewkes 2011).

The continuous watching, and hearing, and the potential for touching by the surveyor, in addition to the limitations of the movement in space by effect of its spatial design, function as a form of power and control. The question emerges as how to explore the experience of the surveyed person?

## 8.4 Experience of Isolation

The above discussion addressed the phenomenology of surveillance on the basis of the power and control of the surveyor. According to Foucault, the excessive pressure of control in both of its forms, i.e., the 'sensorial' and 'spatial Control', will create a *docile body* subject that turns it into a subject of isolation and alienation (Foucault 1995 p.203; Evans 1982). Hence, this part of this study attempts to develop further insight into the essence of isolation, since 'isolation' is the situation that usually faces the character in dread atmosphere.

### 8.4.1 Sensual Disengagement and Sensual Deprivation

Hancock and Jewkes have asserted that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the *sensual disengagement* that was completed through the modernist aesthetics of grandeur, were achieved by the brutal scale of high-rise architecture that affected the skyline (Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Dale and Burrell state that these "great phantasmagoria in the sky" both asserted power and created a highly-productive workforce (Dale and Burrell 2003 p.169). As a consequence, they argue that sensual disengagement is produced as a result of the *non-synched* senses and/or the *not-fit* body in the space that should be in somewhere else. These appear similar notions to Jonathan Hill's *sensual gap* concept in which there is no synchronization between senses or there is a missing sense to engage with the object (Hill 2003). Some prisons built in the 19<sup>th</sup> century featured corridors that echo, naked gas light bulbs, and eventually decaying walls as means of psychological compression to keep the prisoners away from spatial circulation (Fiddler 2009; Hancock and Jewkes 2011). Solomos and Koumparoulis note that these compressions work psychologically on the *not-fit* body and/or the *non-synched* senses to increase the pain and deprivation and sense to exhaust the

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film prisoners psychologically and emotionally (Solomos and Koumparoulis 2011). In many cases, Hancock and Jewkes argue that the sensual disengagement and the power of incarceration depress the senses (e.g., space light and color) so as to create a psychological compression to be turned into *sensual deprivation* (Hancock and Jewkes 2011).

Bowker argues that the physical assaults which occur in these environments are themselves an assault on the senses (Bowker 1980). As a torture method, *sensual deprivation* causes the loss of critical capacity, disorientation, enfeeblement of resistance, and makes thinking to be less clear. This is what the social activist Naomi Klein calls a *state of shock*, in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, in which the prisoners cannot think rationally or protect themselves. Therefore, they may become vulnerable and eager to make confessions and give information (Klein 2010). According to the unfamiliarity of *dread* spaces for the subject and its *spatial immersion*, one can relate the *not-fit* body and/or the *non-synched* senses as a characteristic of dread atmosphere that can be grasped. This should be recalled when relating to the scene description in *the Silence of the Lambs*.

#### 8.4.2 Spatial Deprivation

Hollier presents the work of George Bataille, who in his writings (1971-1988) considered the prison as a *project*, and describing it as a labyrinth because of its psychological depression since if the prisoner wants to get out of it, then she/he has to close it and close herself/himself inside it. This metaphor came from the spatial structure of the labyrinth; “one never knows whether one is being expelled or enclosed, a space composed uniquely of openings, where one never knows whether they open to the inside or the outside, whether they are for leaving

or entering” (Hollier 1993 p.61). Hollier adds that in such a space the categories of subjectivity and objectivity do not exist. Thus, the distance looks like proximity and the separation looks like the adhesion. Prison, like the labyrinth, is a space in which the future is a threatening and un-representable guise of the unknown, a state that will induce anxiety (Hollier 1993). The prisoners are then experiencing psychological compression that produces *sensual deprivation* which may lead them to a *state of shock*. They are also experiencing continuous *anxiety* based on *spatial deprivation*. How does this lead to a sense of isolation and alienation?

#### 8.4.3 Fear

Fear is the means that feeds the experience of dread, and it is the reason for isolation. Hanich defines fear as an emotion that carries a sense of personal phenomenological detachment of feeling, which becomes separated because it centripetally constricts the lived body. As previously discussed in chapter two, Hanich considers fear as a form of resistance, and that *tension* is produced according to the expansive *Away!-tendency* (Hanich 2010). As a consequence, the body feels enclosed and separated (Hanich 2010 p.196; Schmitz et al. 2011). Julian Hanich, like Hermann Schmitz, considers the experience of personal isolation as an aspect of fear, and argues that a movie may support the emotion of fear by evoking an atmosphere of isolation through use of tight frames (Hanich 2010). Relating to the literature in part one, the isolation of the character is mirrored by the viewer because of the *somatic empathy* through mimicry and the *alignment* and *allegiance sympathy*, together with the *haptic perception* that is felt as an internal contraction movement, inducing a *kinesthetic experience*, and a *corporeal consciousness*.

Since in film the physical assaults which take place in the staged environments are themselves an assault on the senses (Bowker 1980), the power and control of the antagonist, in addition to the vulnerability, weakness, and isolation of the protagonist, can be felt and experienced by the viewer under the aesthetics of *empathy* and *sympathy*.

If one is to describe Buffalo Bill's basement in *The Silence of the Lambs* objectively and in light of the previous reading, then the spectator will find that this basement was spatially controlled due to its labyrinth-like arrangement. This is, hence, responsible for creating a *spatial deprivation*, both for Clarice and for the viewer. That basement became *sensorially controlled* when Buffalo Bill cut the power off and blinded Clarice. By so doing, she became totally *accessible* for Buffalo Bill without being able to access him. She was seen, heard, and touchable. The dark-echoing corridors, the naked bulbs, and old walls, as in the 19<sup>th</sup> century prisons, depressed the senses and produced a *sensual deprivation*. Thus, the basement of Buffalo Bill provides a clear example of the use of surveillance in film that is experienced by the viewer.

As Benson-Allott states, the setting, space, and decoration precede the narration and characters and also provide information (Benson-Allott 2015). However, in dread scenes, most of the time there is no establishing shot; the character experiences it moment by moment (*here and now*). Voids are used to operate as a spatial and architectural effect through which some techniques in filming allow the viewer to occupy a space *there*.

### 8.5 Panoptical Forms in Thriller Films

After discussing the phenomenology of surveillance in terms of power, control, and isolation, this section explores further panoptical forms in dread

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film scenes and thriller films. It categorizes the panoptical forms and discusses them according to 'sensorial' and 'spatial' forms.

### 8.5.1 Sensorial Panoptical Forms

The sensorial form of the Panopticon counts on the senses. As it has been discussed before, for Merleau-Ponty (2002), eyes and ears are only instruments for bodily excitation, not for perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002), and the phenomenology of perception involves the *existence* of the subject's body that refers to the sensory experience. One that can be a *synthetic* or a *haptic* experience.

Sobchack (1990) describes the film viewer as a *cinesthetic subject* whose body is affected by the film in order to be involved in understanding it and its meaning. This takes place through the effect of Sobchack's *cross-modality* activity, one which triggers the cooperation of all senses, and in return creates the *haptic perception* to make the body feel through the skin before the eye does.

The key point to understand with regards to surveillance, even if it is visual or audio-visual surveillance, is that it makes the subject *accessible* and approachable, hence raising the possibility of *touch*, as Laine argues, is always the reason behind the fear and the reason for corporeality (Laine 2006). Since touch is the last thing that can be lost, then it is the sense that extends the area of *synaesthetic perception* and feeds the corporeal experience and consciousness. The fear of touch awakens the skin while watching a horror or thriller film, and the only way that the viewer defends herself/himself is by multiplication, which transforms the skin into a kind of *resonating membrane* to think and feel at the same time. As Steven Connor puts it:

*Sensing the crawling taking place over it, the skin itself begins to crawl: it squirms into the shape of an insect or the worm—or rather, the multiple form of the insect or worm—in order to escape the touch of insect or worm.*

(Connor 2004 p.247)

This type of surveillance takes two forms: 'textual surveillance' and 'sensorial transparency'.

### *Textual Surveillance*

In chapter six, the concept of written notes was described as a *quasi-thing*, where both the character and the viewer may read notes simultaneously at certain moments in thrillers, which increases the sense of embodiment. They were used for (i) 'preparation' such as agony, pain, danger, and exit; (ii) preparation 'into-a-situation' (e.g., *Bates Motel Vacancy*); and (iii) 'being-in-situation' such as the 'sensorimotor verbs' that place the viewer in a situation such as in the films 'Open your eyes' and 'Don't breathe'. With respect to the concept of surveillance, a very special type of expression and particular sentences inform the protagonist that she/he is being monitored, for example, "get out" in *The Boy* (2006), and "I know what you did last summer," and "I know" in *I Know what you did Last Summer* (1997) and *I still Know what you did Last Summer* (1998). All these are sentences that the protagonist spots in certain moments, however she/he cannot spot their sender or writer. In this thesis, they are called 'Someone-is-Watching-notes'. This kind of communication reflects the proximity and nearness of the antagonist (the watcher) and the vulnerability of the character, and gives an idea that the moment of touch may be very close.

This 'note' is experienced and perceived, although sometimes it cannot be literally seen or read. This is what Merleau-Ponty identifies as the *perceptual field*, which

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film is always in the middle of something else and forms part of a *field* that develops between *things* and *spaces* between *things* (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.18). This *perceptual field* means that it is an integrated, lived body experience where the senses mutually resonate in their *synaesthetic perception*. This, by its nature, evokes and engages meaning from the world. Thereupon, the 'note' that is perceived with the character and which shows that someone is watching enters the perceptual field of the scene first, followed by the synaesthetic perception according to the mimicry of the character and the fear of touch.

In most of the examples above, which in many cases contain the title of the film itself, the characters, like the viewers, do not see the watcher. This means that after the moment of *surprise* of knowing that someone is watching, the viewer enters into a stage of mimicry with the character. In this, the viewer may enter the *logic of existence* as defined by Merleau-Ponty (2002). This event starts with a sense of *ambiguity* followed by one of *uncertainty* of 'who wrote this note' and 'where is he/ she now'. Thereafter, the viewer enters the last stage of existence; the *transcendence* stage, where the body has become in a *situation*, where it should stand up and act; to look somewhere else on the screen, and to guess who sent it, in addition to induce certain feelings. This process will increase the consciousness of the viewer and her/his corporeality based on its role in anticipation.

Usually, these written notes are shot even before or after a reverse shot of the characters, followed by a subjective point perspective looking around or a reverse shot on the face of the character again such as in "get out" in *The Boy* (Bell 2016). The *surprise* in reading the written note and the *ambiguity* of its source engage the viewer through both *empathy* and *sympathy* with the character. It forms an *imaginative empathy*, which, according to Murray (1994), is an emotional

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film simulation that occurs when the viewer takes over the perspective of the character to imagine the character from inside and feel what it feels at the moment (Smith 1994). Furthermore, surprise is experienced as a *somatic empathy* on the basis of the mimetic relationship with the character. The closeness of the watcher and the fear of touch can be experienced in the viewer's skin which responds and *starts to crawl*. Based on the *subjective access* to the character, the viewer can have an *aligned sympathy* that gives access to the character's actions and to what they know and feel. This kind of surprise clarifies how surprise energizes the atmosphere to produce a *productive ambiguity* (Carter 2000 as cited in (Labelle 2011); it produces the *ambiguity* and *uncertainty* for acting and getting into a new *situation*. In addition to *empathy* and *sympathy*, this contributes to increasing the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer.

### *The Sensorial Transparency*

This form of transparency has been discussed in chapter seven as a very intense form that corresponds to a temporary or permanent loss of a sense, which makes the character vulnerable and reachable from the missing sense. In 'sensorial transparency', the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same space without physical barriers and, hence, the possibility of touch is very high.

In an example of sight transparency, Buffalo Bill (Gumb) was watching Clarice through his night vision goggles. He was one meter and less far from her, and she was blinded by effect of the power being cut off. With reference to the experience of isolation that was discussed earlier in this chapter, this power cut can be seen as the *power of incarceration*. The senses are depressed to create *sensual deprivation*, which, in turn, causes a loss of critical capacity, disorientation, enfeeblement of resistances. This less clear thinking, is in effect

what Klein (2010) calls a *state of shock*, as could be experienced as *synthetic* and *haptic shocks*. The viewer has an *aligned* as well as an *allegiance sympathy* and both *imaginative empathy* and *somatic empathy* with Clarice. As a result of the way that the scene was shot, from inside the skin of Buffalo Bill, the viewer is saturated with Clarice's breathing, the subject experiences *imaginative empathy* because she/he realizes the *proximity* of Buffalo Bill to Clarice and that he is about to touch her, especially when Buffalo Bill puts his arm in front of the frame, trying to touch her shoulders and face. Meanwhile, the viewer experiences *somatic empathy* because the scene is fueled by the sound of her breathing covered by the silence of the atmosphere, where the viewer mimics the muscular actions of Clarice.

The very corporeal and very intense scene is challenging because of the proximity of Buffalo Bill, whom the viewer lives inside. There is an intellectual effort on behalf of Clarice from the viewer to stop one or other from touching her. In this scene and a similar scene in *Hush* (2016), which was based on 'hearing transparency', the viewer was watching the heroine as the antagonist. The *somatic empathy* and the *aligned* and *allegiance sympathy* boost the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer on the basis of the fear of touch and accessibility, and in view of the *spatial attachment* and *subjective access* of the antagonist. Worse yet is that the antagonist is inaccessible, at least for few moments.

It has been argued in the previous chapter that this kind of transparency produces *attention* as an *aesthetic strategy*. In fact, it produces an activity of consciousness because it articulates the senses that were absent and presents them as a new object. The viewer feels the character and lives in the body or eyes of the antagonist, and all that the viewer is trying to do is a tense internal (*Leib*) effort to

stop the antagonist. However, she/he cannot. The *state of shock* experienced by the viewer can be described as a *docile body* experience. This is similar to Foucault's *panoptic power* in dissociating the power of the viewer from its body to stop the antagonist. It establishes a disturbing and destructive body experience because the viewer experiences it through the body of the antagonist saturated with the protagonist's body reactions (breathing or shaking) to create a 'docile-body-viewer'.

### 8.5.2 Spatial Panoptical Forms

The previous section discussed the 'sensorial panoptical forms' that can increase the *empathy* and *sympathy* with the characters and increase embodiment of the viewer seeking to explore the 'docile-body-viewer'. This section discusses different panoptical forms that are based on the spatial arrangement of the setting that is intended to create a *constricted atmosphere* for both the character and the viewer. The constricted atmosphere encourages isolation and supports fear and as Hanich argues, also increases the viewer's *empathy* (Hanich 2010).

#### *Substance Transparency*

This form of transparency was discussed in chapter seven, where the antagonist and the protagonist exist in the same space and realize presence of each other but are separated by a transparent obstacle. Most of this is a material that controls the level of transparency that is penetrable to allow the characters to communicate.

One of the examples of 'substance transparency' that fits with the surveillance concept is the scene in the film *Hush* (2016). Maddie was separated from the

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man in her house by glass doors and windows, watching him killing her friends, and disconnecting her from the world. *The Glass House* (Sackheim 2001) is another example of 'substance transparency' that also serves the concept of surveillance. The house is made of glass walls, glass railings, glass stairs, and glass doors with vast and wide spaces that penetrate sight and sound to make it almost impossible to hide in that space. Mr. Glass was able to monitor the kids' behaviors by seeing and/or hearing them. In one scene he states: "everything is heard in the Glass house," including the whispers. In addition to the house materials, Mr. Glass's room overlooks the whole space, therefore enabling him to watch everybody in the house.

These two examples represent spatial settings that allow the antagonist and the protagonist to watch one another. They are argued much like in the Panopticon in terms of its capacity to exert power and control over the characters, not the viewers, entrapping them and shaping their future actions. It induces *shock* at the beginning for the viewer as a physiological response and an *aesthetic strategy* that lasts only briefly because of the setting. This is followed by a sense of *anxiety* and *aligned* and *allegiance sympathy* with the characters in view of *spatial attachment* and *subjective access* to the character. This form of transparency can be close to the *spatial deprivation* that has already been discussed in this chapter because of the limitation of movement for the character. The character is enclosed and all her/his behaviors are monitored. The space looks as Hollier describes it where the future is threatening and offers an un-representable guise of the unknown, one which will develop anxiety (Hollier 1993). Thereupon, this form of transparency does not create a 'docile-body-viewer' but an anxious viewer, one who sympathizes with the character because of the antagonist's control.

*Labyrinth-like Spaces*

The power and control effect that is produced in labyrinths naturally makes them a good setting for entrapment of the victim and the viewer. Pallasmaa notes that most of the time, as a setting, the labyrinth or the maze is used as a metaphor for a disturbed mind because of its spatial complexity (Pallasmaa 2001), and Hanich concludes that, because of the sense that there is no way out, labyrinths are disorienting and disturbing supporting the feeling of isolation (Hanich 2010). In horror films and thrillers, the labyrinth may be shown either literally or figuratively. *The Shinning* (1980), *The Maze* (2018), and *The Maze Runner* (2014); and the maze in the garden of the castle in *Perfume: The Story of a Murderer* (2006) are examples where literal labyrinths are used. Generally these are used to express the disturbed mind of the antagonist as affected by factors ranging from being trapped in a real maze to kidnap, or to games of hide and seek. They serve to disturb the protagonist who needs to get out.

Pallasmaa notes that Kubrick (1980) in *the Shining* used the physical maze outside the lobby of a hotel and a miniature model inside of it to give mythical depth and significance to the protagonist. This was used to demonstrate how he changed from a father to a state of psychosis through his creative sterility, dissatisfaction, and sense of detachment (Pallasmaa 2001 p.99). The entire spatial configuration of the hotel: its corridors, mirrors and things seen twice, doubles. It is a maze that is seen figuratively. The figurative labyrinth can be found in many films, Hanich (2010) lists numerous examples of this figurative labyrinth; such as the bewildering arrangement of rooms (*The Relic*, 1997), the long and endless corridors (*The Haunting*) the dark, constricted tunnels (*The Third Man*,

1949), and the narrow rooms (*A Nightmare On Elm Street, 1984*) (Hanich 2010 p.173).

In *the Silence of the Lambs*, the bewildered arrangement of Buffalo Bill's basement acts as a figurative labyrinth that helped in entrapping Clarice. It was provided with only one entrance from the kitchen side and it then expanded through a series of corridors and doors to give Clarice the illusion of choice and to entrap her in his work place. The spatial experience which Clarice goes through opens other perspectives of interpretation for what purpose of the labyrinth purpose is. It isolates, controls, and embodies the character and the viewer in order to open up possibilities for other forms of surveillance to co-exist. Next, two major themes that can contribute to the constricted atmosphere of control and isolation will be discussed. These are instances of *unintended repetition* and the concept of *double experience*.

#### *The Unintended Repetition and the Double Experience Concepts*

The role of phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty (1983) articulates it in his Preface to Hesnard's *L'Oeuvre de Freud* (1983), is to "reformulate certain Freudian concepts in the framework of a better philosophy," in order to help psychoanalysis "to be completely itself." (Merleau-Ponty 1983 pp.67–69). Additionally, Seamon argues, a key aspect of phenomenology is the capacity for the phenomenon to reveal itself in the ways it needs to (Seamon 2017). As a consequence, phenomenology in this thesis has used some Freudian concepts in the lived body experience; *unintended repetition* and *double experience* are used as means to explain the *uncanny*. Understanding and embedding their essence could be a means to express how they increase the sense of corporeality.

*Unintended repetition* was defined by Freud when he described walking through a small Italian town whilst avoiding moving in circles. Even though he avoided walking in circles, he spotted the same women who had been seen in the windows of the little houses. Freud has an interpretation for his confusion and loss of bearings: "it is only the factor of unintended repetition that transforms what would otherwise seem quite harmless into something uncanny and forces us to entertain the idea of fatal and the inescapable, when we should normally speak of 'chance'" (Freud 2003 [1919]).

Freud states that *unintended repetition* increases the presence and the *existence* of the body (Freud 2003). The most important objects in this repetition are the *women*, they are the reference point which made Freud aware of the repetition. It increased his consciousness that had come back to the same place even though he was trying to avoid it. His consciousness increased the existence both of his body and of its corporeality.

The town which Freud walked through and the basement which Clarice walked through have something in common; the issue of *doubling*. That is, a doubling up of things; doubling up of situations, double experiences, and double spaces. In *the Silence of the Lambs* Clarice experiences the doubling of doors and corridors because in each scene in the basement she is in a position to choose between two doors. Then, in the oubliette chamber she is presented with four doors and, again, has to choose between doors until she reaches his work place. As Pallasmaa states, the excessive use of corridors and doors creates a confusing, endless labyrinth that generates a feeling of disorientation and dizziness (Pallasmaa 2001 p.107). That is made obvious in the film. When Clarice reaches the last point she is viewed from a Dutch-angle that is used to reflect her imbalance and disorientation.

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The concept of *doubling* also belongs within the Gothic literary tradition of narratives and novels (Cartwright 2005). Linda Dryden, in her study of literary doubles in Gothic literature, claims that *double* was a new Gothic mode that appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. Its narratives focus on the urban present and use it to refract the contemporary concerns through the lens of a literature of imagined terror (Dryden 2003 p.19). In his essay *The Uncanny*, Freud offers explanation, not only of what is uncanny, but also of the function of *doubles*, which he defines as

*[T]hose unfulfilled, but possible futures to which we still like to cling in phantasy, all those strivings of the ego which adverse external circumstances have crushed, and all our suppressed acts of volition which nourish in us the illusion of Free Will.*

(Freud 2003 p.236).

Dryden argues that protagonists in Gothic novels revisit events and each time they believe that they can affect the outcome to their advantage. While the *doubling* of characters and exploration of alter egos is an integral part of the Dystopian novel, such novels of future possibility are also strongly shaped by the recurrence of situations where the characters appear trapped, being doomed to revisit situations again and again (Dryden 2003).

Visually, mirrors and shadows can also be used as a form of doubling in films. For instance, in *The Shining* (1980), Kubrick used mirrors to create in the form of a double, both literally and figuratively as a theme in the film. One instance of *literal doubling* was the appearance of the word "MURDER" as "REDRUM" in the mirror image on the bathroom door. Meanwhile, an example of *figurative doubling* was the case of using twins, Pallasmaa describes how "Kubrick deliberately confuses the categories of reality, myth, hallucination, dream and memory, in

order to make a maze like-narrative that leads any attempt to trace a string of logic into a cul-de-sac" (Pallasmaa 2001 p.100).

Hanich (2017) suggests referring to the shots which have mirrors as *complex mirror shots* because they actively raise the viewer's attention to the reflected objects or events. He justifies the spectator's attention by the fact that the mirror shots function as a magnetizing frame-within-the-frame that "channels the viewer's look into the anterior depth of the mirror" and refer the viewer to look off-screen beyond the image (Hanich 2017a p.133). The layered experience of perception and imagination challenges and complicates the effort to read the image. He argues that the spatial complication of those shots leads to a sense of disorientation which in return transforms the way in which the viewers look at and perceive the filmic image (Hanich 2017a).

Many films were based on the concept of the *double* as a device to reveal certain personalities such as *Black Swan* (Aronofsky 2010) and *Shutter Island* (Scorsese 2010). From Freud's perspective, the meaning of the double is related to the concept of alienation, namely, the self and the other, that one requires one's ego and perceives oneself as an autonomous and compact self, that is, the *I* (Freud 2003). Cartwright confirms that the doubling is confusing and is experienced as a loss of the self, where the person creates a double image to dilute and dissolve the essence of her/his individuality (Cartwright 2005).

Hanich (2017) supports the argument that the double shot (*the complex mirror shots*, for example) puts the viewer in an ambiguous and fluctuating position because the image is stimulated by a range of affordances in terms of what they can do. He argues that *affordances* invite or force the viewers to oscillate between the modes which affect their attitudes. The ambiguity and fluctuation of the *double* induces an attention for it to be perceived and spotted in pure consciousness.

Merleau-Ponty (2002) considers that the *double* has potential as a new articulation of repetition. He outlines how it makes a crucial shift for drawing attention to a phenomenon:

*To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. [ . . . ] The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they destroy it*

(Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.35).

In view of the foregoing arguments, one can consider the *double* as one salient characteristic of repetition that can be used to represent ambiguity, duality, and opposition. At the same time, the double and repetition can be used to cause the disorientation, dizziness, confusion, and loss of bearing which are characteristics of the navigation of a labyrinth. In the same way doubling and repetition work in real life, they have been used to work on spectators. That is confirmed in a recent study by Hanich (2017) who states that mirror shots have the potential to unsettle the ways spectators look at the image by making them insecure about the status of the image or the spatial construction in a *mise-en-scène* (Hanich 2017a).

Based on the previous literature, one can recognize that the *double* concept works for both Clarice and Buffalo Bill in *the Silence of the Lambs*. The doubles of doors and corridors that helped in creating a labyrinth in the basement of Buffalo Bill's house were used as a reflection of his double personality. In addition that the psychopath Buffalo Bill has been denied a sex change operation reiterates this notion. So, he is killing the young female victims and using their back skin to sew himself a female skin, where he has used the caterpillar as a

symbol to indicate the transforming. This kind of mirroring is substituted for the imaginary and the symbolic conception to reflect the invisible parts of the image.

The double experience was lived by Clarice in the situations she had faced and revisited again and again in the cellar; walking through a spatial disorientation stimulated by complex systems of doors and corridors she finds herself walking in a labyrinth with a dead end. The constricted setting (labyrinth-like setting) and the way this scene was shot, which mixed between first-point perspective and reverse close-up shots on Clarice, put the viewer in a shared lived experience with Clarice to leave her/him in pure *somatic empathy*; the sensation of fear, the *motor mimicry* in copying her breath and her face reactions, and *affective mimicry* in the anticipation of realizing Buffalo's appearance. Above all, by realizing the power and control of Buffalo Bill and recognizing the isolation of Clarice from the world, the *sympathy* of the viewer with her is also created.

*Attention* is the *aesthetic strategy* used in this scene as has been discussed in chapter seven, and according to the logical *structure of existence* that has been described by Merleau-Ponty (2002), each time Clarice faces a choice of doors, the viewer faces his or her ambiguous and fluctuating position to live in the *indeterminacy* that Clarice lives through. The first-point perspective of the shooting enables the viewer to share her thinking and anticipation; in particular Clarice's pause before selecting the door and the over-shoulder shot bring the viewer and Clarice together under the confusion of choice until Clarice moves and pulls the viewer with her through a track-in shot. The viewer is thereby moved with her into the *transcendence* stage at which the body switches to address a *new situation*.

On the basis of the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* of the *double* as they were described in the preceding paragraphs, employment of the *double* plays

excessively and directly on the concept of the first two stages of existence. The double moved into the third stage of existence, which offers *transcendence* at two scales; the first was based on Clarice's decision which moved the viewer to a new *situation*, and the second took place due to the *repetition* of the *situation*. Hence, the viewer enters this stage indirectly and consciously again and again. Eventually dizziness, disorientation, confusion, and alienation are stimulated in the body of the viewer serving to trap her/him in Clarice's body and mind.

As was illustrated by Hollier in the foregoing paragraphs, the device of a labyrinth enables a form of a *spatial deprivation* that creates psychological depression as a result of its unknown and threatening future which constitutes *anxiety* (Hollier 1993). In the way that it was shot, experienced, and shared with Clarice, this scene created a dissociating power from the viewer's body because it gave the viewer the chance to choose as Clarice in some shots. In addition, it created a disturbed body due to the repetition of the situation and the anxiety concomitant with its *spatial deprivation*. Accordingly, in this scene, a 'docile-body-viewer' is created.

#### *Through-Wall Surveillance and Through-Floor Surveillance*

Cartwright outlines how a special case of *repetition* and *doubling* has been used in Gothic novels as a framing device in narration to find a story within a story (Cartwright 2005). Even plays, used this concept of repetition; the play within a play, such as in act three in scene two in *Hamlet* attempting to "catch the consciousness of the king", to create a psychological state of guilt for the king (Musolf 2009). Building upon the understanding of the essence of the labyrinth from *doubling* and *repetition*, this thesis has identified a new form of surveillance delivered through *constricted atmospheres* that are used in many thrillers and horror films. 'Embedded structures'; such as walls within walls and floors within

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film floors. Most of the films that use this form of surveillance relate to psychopaths who live behind a wall such as *The Resident* (2011) and *The Boy* (2016), or as ghosts under the floor as in *The Conjuring* (2013). The double structures of walls and doors express also the double personalities of the character.

*The Boy* (Bell 2016) is a horror, mystery, and thriller film that describes a boy who is actually a life-sized doll that should needs a nanny (Gretta) during his parents' absence. During this film, the nanny and the characters start to believe that the doll is really alive. When the doll's head was broken, all the walls shook and the real boy revealed himself to show that he was living behind the walls all the time because he had a burned face.

The discovery moment for the character and audience is when the boy comes out through the mirror on the wall. Gretta and Malcom (Lauren Cohan and Rupert Evans) run away until they see a passage to escape.

Afterwards, they walk through series of internal walls and passages till they reach a room that has all his belongings. While Gretta runs inside the passages, she and the viewer gradually realize how he used to communicate with her; mainly through a form of surveillance through walls. The moment she discovers these details is shot from her first-point perspective, followed by reverse close-up shots showing her *shock*. She comments to Malcom: "he was living in the wall the whole time watching me!"

The perception of this scene is shared by the characters and the viewers because it uncovers all the mysteries inside that house. By crossing through the walls until they reach the boy's room, all the place looks like they were running in a labyrinth. *Anxiety* is created for the viewers because of the *constricted space* they walk through and also because of its *spatial deprivation* which, in turn, feeds the

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film viewers' *empathy*. In addition, *sympathy* for the characters is increased because they believe that the boy knows the walls and the way out and that he can catch them very easily. As a result, after revealing this truth, a sense of *shock*, followed by *attention* through a perception is shared by the character and the viewer.

The unexpected disruptive outcome of the scene is responsible for creating shock for the viewer. Shock, as has been discussed in chapter seven, according to Hanich (2010), is a type of fear that supports dread that bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts only briefly, and it does not include any future anticipations (Hanich 2010). But based on the above-mentioned scene, this shock is followed by *attention*; an activity of consciousness that combines past events with anticipated future events. This kind of setting and atmosphere has the power to jump the subject to the third stage in *existence* according to Merleau-Ponty; *transcendence*, as a result of the *shock*. Then, the subject returns back to the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* stages. Therefore, this kind of surveillance increases the corporeality and consciousness of the viewer.

*The Resident* (Jokinen 2011) is another example of 'through-wall surveillance'. Dr. Juliet (Hilary Swank) rents an apartment in New York City and later starts to suspect that something is unusual in the apartment. In this film, the viewer can see hints of Max (Jeffrey Dean Morgan), her landlord, walking through tight corridors, lined with water pipes and unfinished paintwork. However, it is not revealed until the very end that these corridors are only walls behind Juliet's apartment. And that he used to live behind them the whole time to watch her.

Juliet discovers through video tapes that her landlord, Max, rapes her while she is sleeping. However, she could not figure out how he always managed to stay close. When she faces him, he locks her in the apartment from the outside, then suddenly he appears inside it. When she hides in the bathroom, she looks at the

mirror to check her eyes until suddenly the mirror breaks and Max pulls her towards the 'embedded walls' in which he hides. She could run away from him but she walks in an unknown world to see her living room from one small hole and the rest of her apartment from other positions. In this moment, the viewer, as the character, relates all the past events to the present and understands that Max was watching her the whole time from those walls. Then, Max shouts and says: "there is no way to get out!" Finally, after many trials, Juliet goes back to her apartment. The walls behind the walls were used to make a labyrinth where the entry and exit are only possible to and from her apartment. When she realizes that she is locked in and disconnected from the world, she takes the pin drill as a weapon to fight Max. For a moment, he catches her and tells her: "Juliet, I saw you. You could pull me out of these walls.... I am sorry... But you betrayed me!"

The use of some first-point perspective shots in the eyes of Juliet show the scale of the walls or the pipes that she crawled inside enabling the viewer feel the space, and, thus, increase the level of her/his *empathy*. But most of the shots were taken through a moving camera following or proceeding Juliet as if it was Max's eye that is about to catch her. Sobchack (1990) has drawn upon Merleau-Ponty's (2002) concept of *attention* and found that the optical movement in cinema such as the zoom, track-in, and track-out, is what brings this active and constitutive function of attention into focus; it transforms the visual field and the objects within it to create a new figure-ground relation between the subject and the object.

The track-in the shots in this scene was very effective in creating *sympathy* for Juliet; increasing the anticipation of the viewer and the anxiety that Juliet is almost caught. In this example too, the *shock* was followed by *attention* that is

responsible for moving the viewer to a state of *transcendence* first, followed by one of *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* in Merleau-Ponty's terms.

In *The Silence of the Lambs*, Clarice walks through a labyrinth in a place that did not belong to her, which explains why the body's existence of the viewer followed the *logic of existence* described by Merleau-Ponty. That is a sequence starting with *ambiguity*, followed by *indeterminacy* and *transcendence*. On the other hand, Gretta and Dr. Juliet in *The Boy and the Resident* lived in places they used to know very well. However, discovering that there is another life behind the walls created a *shock* that puts the viewer's body directly into the *transcendence* stage followed then by *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy*. In general, the moment of revealing a *fact* in the story can create an *aligned sympathy* for the character because the viewers know that since the character has been watched for so long then she/he will be vulnerable and easily touchable. This is similar to the case of 'personal transparency' which was discussed in chapter seven, which in brief concerning the transparency that results from the close relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist, such as a husband and wife. As the antagonist knows his victim very well, he can anticipate her behavior and control her survival possibilities. In addition to that, the antagonist (e.g., Buffalo Bill, Max, and The Boy) can be seen to have power and control over their labyrinth. Only the style of shooting can determine the quality of this engagement; if it is shot in first-point perspective, then it will create *empathy* as with Clarice. Otherwise, engagement will remain as *sympathy*.

The experience of the 'embedded structures' in *horror* is totally different from that in *dread*. Taking *The Conjuring* (Wan 2013) as an example, a paranormal investigator works to help a family terrorized by a dark presence in their farmhouse. A combination of double walls and floors are used to hide the children

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film by ghosts and unnatural powers. The *aesthetic strategies* used in this film in particular and the way the viewer is engaging with the characters can be distinguished as different from the *attention* discussed in the previous examples. In *The Conjuring* and similar horror films, the *aesthetic strategy* is only based upon *shock*. This is probably because *attention* works more cognitively in dread than in horror in that it gives the viewer time to think and anticipate the outcome and forthcoming narrative events, thus allowing for cognitive activity, which does not develop in horror films.

### 8.5.3 Digital Panoptical Forms

A very literal form of surveillance can be seen in horror films and some thrillers through the depiction of CCTV monitoring (e.g., *SAW I, II, III, and IV*). But this kind of surveillance only injects the viewers with *anxiety* and *sympathy* since they know their characters are being watched and controlled. This form of surveillance functions exactly as the Panopticon for the characters, not viewers, in that they are watched but cannot access the surveyor and in that it only creates *docile body* characters in terms of psychoanalytical study. Therefore, this research does not address this form of surveillance in detail, but highlights it as a theme for future studies.

## 8.6 Conclusion

In this part of the thesis, surveillance is identified as a *quasi-thing* and as a *situation* that has the ability to increase the embodiment and body corporeality of the viewer. The Panopticon prison presented through Foucault's discourse is relayed as a signifier of power and discipline in the modern era seen to have influenced the architecture of many institutions. Foucault's book *Discipline and Punish* in turn related to other modes of surveillance discussed in psychoanalysis

Part Three: The Phenomenology of Surveillance in Film (e.g., *gaze* and *voyeurism*) that are of significant interest to a study of the motivation for watching. But according to the goal and scope of this thesis, it was not necessary to dig deeper in to such modes. The motivation for watching does not however matter, rather it is understanding how a surveillance atmosphere is constructed for the surveyor and the surveyed person(s) in order ultimately to perceive the essence and phenomenology of surveillance as a tool in film.

The atmosphere of surveillance is a combination of the atmospheres of power, control, and entrapment of the surveyor, and the atmospheres of claustrophobia, isolation, and alienation for the surveyed person(s). The power and control of the surveyor are divided into 'Sensorial Control' and 'spatial Control'. 'Sensorial Control' expresses the ability of the surveyor to see without being seen, to hear without being heard, and to touch without being touched. Fragmentation against communication; the individual enclosures; the vast, wide spaces; and the use of glass and transparent materials are factors that support the 'sensorial control' and visibility of the surveyor. 'spatial Control', on the other hand, can be achieved through the arrangement of furniture in such a way as to restrict the movement of the prisoners or the workers and ensure a non-sociable environment. Although the surveyor cannot be always watching or hearing, occupancy of the watchtower and the apparition of a surveyor are sufficient to secure the *panoptic power* effect, which is triggered by the prisoner's realization that he is subjected to the gaze (Foucault 1995 p.117). This power increases the awareness of the subject of being observed and turns the subject who surrenders himself to the surveyor into a *docile body* subject experiencing alienation and isolation.

The spatial arrangement that supported the surveyor in his 'sensorial control' and use of some features such as echoing corridors and naked electric lights have the power to depress the senses of the surveyed person. The effect starts as a

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*sensual disengagement* in the space that turns into a *sensual deprivation* as a result of the psychological compression. This will, in turn, cause loss of critical capacity, disorientation, enfeeblement of resistances, reduced clear thinking, and increased vulnerability of the subject. The fear triggered by this atmosphere constricts the subject's body and disassociates her/his power from her/his body to create more disturbed, destructed, and alienated body; a *docile body*.

Understanding the phenomenology of surveillance helped the researcher to find other panoptical forms in film that can be seen to apply power and control for the surveyor and isolation for the character. Analysis provided evidence that such devices can be used to create a 'docile-body-viewer'. The most important finding is that these forms of the 'docile-body-viewer' are experienced *haptically* through the aesthetics of *empathy* and *sympathy* for the viewer where touch can be seen as the motivation for fear. These forms of the 'docile-body-viewer' are categorized into 'sensorial panoptical forms' that concern the senses inside the scene and 'spatial panoptical forms' that concern the constricted atmosphere of the scene.

### *Sensorial Panoptical Forms*

As a sensorial panoptical form, the use of 'Someone-is-Watching-note', such as "get out," is a 'textual surveillance' mode that informs the character, and the viewer, that the character is watched. They literally read the note together. This kind of communication reflects the proximity of the antagonist (the watcher) and the vulnerability of the character and gives the message that the moment of touch is very close. This sensorial panoptical form creates *surprise* for the viewer that is experienced as *imaginative empathy* and *somatic empathy* based on the mimetic relationship with the character in addition to *aligned sympathy*. This sensorial panoptical form applies the *logic of existence* according to Merleau-

Ponty; it starts with *ambiguity* and *uncertainty* of who and where the sender is, then turns into a *transcendence* stage that follows the action of the character.

The other sensorial form is 'sensorial transparency'. where the protagonist misses a sense, the antagonist encounters the protagonist in the same space without physical barriers and the possibility of touch is, therefore, very high. In light of the way that 'sensorial transparency' is shot, that is, through the body of the antagonist, and based on its one point perspective, it creates a *state of shock* for the viewer because of the *attention* it raises. The raised *attention*, in turn, increases the consciousness of the viewer who lives in the body of the antagonist. Similar to the effect given by *panoptic power*, in the present case, the viewer, through the effect of a *state of shock*, tries internally to stop the antagonist from touching the protagonist because 'sensorial transparency' is experienced subjectively, but he/she cannot. The intensity of this moment, in addition to the *somatic empathy* and *aligned and allegiance sympathy* with the character, disassociates the power of the viewer's body and disturbs her/him to become a 'docile-body-viewer'.

### *Spatial Panoptical Forms*

'substance transparency' is a spatial panoptical form that occurs through the use of glazing materials or through any spatial arrangement that allows people to look through. In these cases, the antagonist and the protagonist are in the same space, recognizing each other, but may be separated by a glass partition. This panoptical form may induce *shock* at first followed by *anxiety* due to the lack of spatial divisions. However, it does not create a 'docile-body-viewer'. Rather, it creates an anxious viewer who sympathizes with the character.

'Labyrinth-like spaces' are the other spatial panoptical form that increases the corporeality of the viewer. The Panopticon of Bentham is the opposite of a labyrinth, however in film, and according to reading the phenomenology of surveillance including power and isolation, the labyrinth is considered as a panoptical form in film that increases corporeality of the viewer. *Repetition* and *doubling* are identified in Freud's terms as the main features of the labyrinthine experience that can cause disorientation, dizziness, confusion, and loss of bearing. The way of shooting this spatial panoptical form controls the docility of the viewer but it does not have a greater capacity for creating a 'docile-body-viewer' than the use of 'sensorial transparency'. However, this spatial panoptical form is characterized by two specific forms which control the logic of bodily existence according to Merleau-Ponty. The first is what can be observed in the case of Clarice in Bill's basement, where the *aesthetic strategy* employed is to demand *attention* only. This makes the character conscious of Clarice anticipating Bill at any moment. The *structure of existence* here starts with *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* in Merleau-Ponty's terms. Then, it moves to the *transcendence* stage according to Clarice's actions. A second form of spatial panoptical arrangement is identified here for the first time. This spatial panoptical form corresponds to the identification of 'embedded structures' where there is a 'wall within wall' and a 'floor within a floor' which serve to create 'through-wall surveillance' and 'through-floor surveillance'. One may consider the film sets of Peter Greenway as offering a form of a 'through-wall surveillance', but it is not the case here since this form concerns the panoptical form in film setting for the actors, not for the audience. In this spatial panoptical form, the antagonist lives with the protagonist, without her/his knowledge, behind a wall or under floor. The moment of revealing this fact is experienced by the viewer at the same time as

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the character and inspires a *shock* followed by *attention*. This means that the viewer is moved to the *transcendence* stage first increasing her/his corporeality, it then moves her/him to the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* stages.

In summary, analysis of the phenomenology of surveillance here has helped to identify the use of panoptical forms in dread scenes in thrillers. It serves to demonstrate how these forms can heighten the corporeality of the viewer.



Conclusion



## Conclusion: The Embodied Experience of Cinematic Dread

The main goal of the current study was to develop a comprehensive conception of the *atmosphere of dread* in thriller films, to fill a gap in Julian Hanich's research. Accordingly, the thesis ultimately offers a critical analysis of the construction of the atmosphere of dread from a phenomenological perspective based on embodiment and the relationship between the viewer and the screen.

The main findings can be classified under 'theoretical' contribution and 'methodological' contribution:

### Theoretical Contribution

The thesis builds upon the work of Merleau-Ponty, and extends it in order to develop an approach to embodiment in film. On one hand, Merleau-Ponty (2002) structured the process of engagement in the world through linking the subject and the object by providing a model of perception, movement, and action. However, he did not consider *embodiment* as a process and a theory of consciousness, also he had not extended his work to address that of film. On the other hand, other philosophers and researchers had recently combined Merleau-Ponty's philosophy with that of embodiment. However, their treatments of embodiment in these studies concentrated on one component of the process or only a few components, not on the *process of encountering* between the *subject* and the *object*. For example, Marks (2000) focused on memory and sensual inputs while Sobchack (1992) concentrated on the *cross-modality* of the senses. Laine (2006) studied the role of *skin* in perception to create the *affective experience*, and Paul Elliott (2011) used the knowledge of many film phenomenologists including Marks and Sobchack to describe the sensory experience in Hitchcock films. What is

critical to the thesis is decomposing the *process of embodiment* according to the conception of Merleau-Ponty and *injecting* it with recent theories of embodiment so as to create a new comprehensive framework that enabled the researcher apply this to film and so to read a dread scene and then draw a corporeal map for her lived experience.

The key contribution in this framework is in linking the perception, movement, and action of the *character* with the perception, movement, and action of the *viewer*, in film, a connection that is justified by the *interactive exchange* between the two bodies.

According to the process of Perception as outlined above, it relates that of the individual viewer to the shared one of the character according to the concept of (*perception of perception*) of Deleuze (1992). Shots that are taken from the character's point of view or the shots that Hitchcock named *subjective treatment* are essential in dread scenes to bond the viewer so that she/he will experience the perception of the character. However, in film, perception is shown here to take place as a *haptic perception* on the basis of *synaesthetic perception*, which means that perception of the character is felt on the viewer's skin.

The relationship is also based on the movement of the character in the scene and on how it is reflected on the viewer's *felt-body* movement to create *expansion* and *contraction*. This relationship is created according to the contribution of Sheets-Johnstone in her discussion of self-movement in the real world, and the philosophy of Schmitz's *New-Phenomenology* and the *felt-body*.

Finally, the process of encountering is based on the character's action that is responsible for the *transcendence* of the viewer to *exist* in that *moment*

corporeally and to be in full consciousness, namely, to transfer her/him to a *situation* in which to act or to wish to act.

This framework clarified how fear can be translated into more corporeal moments when watching a dread scene; fear, as a motivation, is responsible for influencing the spectator to live with the character spatially, temporally, and emotionally, hence identifying with the character under the *empathy* and *sympathy* framework turns into a *kinesthetic corporeal experience*. The reason behind this being that fear awakens the senses and stimulates *proprioception* to create a *transcendental subjectivity* felt on the skin. All this experience will be reflected as a contraction of the felt-body, which will tighten the *absolute space* of the spectator. This constitutes an *affective experience* felt *kinesthetically* by muscles and *synaesthetically* by the contraction of the felt-body.

This framework helped the researcher to read a dread scene from *the Silence of the Lambs*, which helped to produce three new phenomenological themes that represent corporeal atmospheres that were then shown to be related to a construction of *cinematic dread*.

Since phenomenology opens up possibilities to understand other fields, or to explore further phenomena, this thesis found out the following conclusions:

- 1- The *logic of existence* of Merleau-Ponty (2002) formed an essential framework for this thesis. See diagram 3 and 4 below. He claimed that the logic of existence starts in *ambiguity*, *indeterminacy* then ends in *transcendence*. But in this thesis, it has been observed, that in film, whenever the viewer reaches the *transcendence* stage first, it heightens the senses and increases consciousness and corporeality whilst engaging in a *dread* scene. Subsequently it moves into the other

stages of the logic of existence to maintain that consciousness and corporeality. This observation helped the researcher to clarify several aspects in various phenomenological theories, such as the one of Mølbaek (2012), who claims that in order to have *the* experience to create an *event*, there should be *phenomenal factors* that are used to *de-familiarize* the familiar situations, such as *shock* and *surprise*. This thesis contributed to his claim by relating the phenomenal factor to the *transcendence* stage of Merleau-Ponty, to demonstrate that its application could be even wider.



Diagram 3: Merleau-Ponty's Logic of Existence



Diagram 4: Another arrangement of Merleau-Ponty's Logic of Existence found in Cinematic Dread

- 2- Any form of transparency linked with the senses, such as 'sensorimotor verbs' and 'sensorial transparency', is experienced more corporeally, consciously, and *affectively* because it hits the senses and awakens them immediately. Accordingly, the 'sensorimotor situations' (verbs and transparency) work as an *affect* that snatches the body from silence to create an *event*. They help the object to jump to the *transcendence* stage first, then to reach the stage of *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy*.

- 3- Doors, corridors, and stairs are considered as *things* that have a special effect in any scene. However, on the basis of conceptions that are phenomenological, atmospheric, and related to embodiment; what matters is creating *situations*, namely, *quasi-things*, in Griffero's terms, not *things*. Situations can allow for the atmosphere to be perceived and felt corporeally, as a whole. Hence, this thesis has established that one cannot define an element of corporeality, but one can define an 'atmosphere of corporeality'.

From another point of view, the thesis, on the theoretical aspect, has elaborated on explaining and clarifying the role of certain phenomena through their contribution to the process used in reaching the main findings. They can be summarized as the following;

- Relating the ideas and thoughts of Schmitz (1964-2005) to those of Sheets-Johnstone (2011) is a contribution of this research. Sheets-Johnstone (2011) discussed self-movement. However, through an understanding of the body within the framework of Schmitz's *New-Phenomenology*, the researcher demonstrated how Sheets-Johnstone's structure of movement can be applied to the reading of the felt-body as well.

- Sheets-Johnstone (2011) pointed to the significance of *kinesthesia* as the core of *kinesthetic experience*. As a contribution of this research, and through Sheets-Johnstone's structure of movement, the researcher proved that *proprioception* in *cinematic dread* is the core of *kinesthetic experience* precisely because of the pause and the slow movement that is required of the character in dread scenes.

-Another contribution of this research is that it determined the reason behind the *extended-time experience* in a dread scene by relating the philosophy of Sheets-Johnstone (2011) to those of Hanich (2010), Pallasmaa (2010, 2012), and Schmitz (1964-2005). First, the viewer follows a character who is walking (walking as a continuous *action verb*). While following the character as she/he is moving, the viewer spends time. Second, hesitation in walking and slowness have *qualitative cardinal* time, which lead the viewer to pay additional effort to follow the character in moving and in stillness, preparing to move. Additionally, because of the restricted movement options in the dread spaces, only contractedness and narrowness are produced in the felt-body and in the *absolute space*. This pause gives time for the spectator to think and to feel its position and balance in the space, which increases the *locomotion* of her/his body to eventually create a *corporeal consciousness*. As a consequence, the experience of *time is extended*.

-A further contribution of this study is to reveal the embodiment behind the structure of the labyrinth and the analysis and explanation of how it is understood through lived experience and its relation to *un-intended repetition* and Freud's concept of the *double*, which were demonstrated to be the acts that explain the *uncanny* nature of the labyrinth and substantiated its use in thrillers and horror films. This led to another contribution, which is the identification of 'embedded structures' and the 'through-wall surveillance' in film.

### Methodological Contribution

Taking the framework established above as a means to identify characteristics of encountering, the last dread scene in *The Silence of the Lambs* (Demme Jonathan 1991) was used as a case study by adopting the *phenomenal phenomenology* method of Shīrāzī (2013) for a phenomenal reading. Griffero (2014) defined the atmosphere as emotions and feelings that loose meaning when someone tries to describe them. Thereupon, he argued one has to live in these emotions and feelings in order to understand them. Subsequently, the researcher followed the characteristics which she identified earlier very carefully as a road map, narrated to transfer her lived experience to the reader.

The first impression drawn while watching the scene was very effective in plotting a corporeal map of events. The second, third, and fourth times of watching the same scene helped the researcher to describe the phenomena in the corporeal map. There were many corporeal moments in that scene, but the ones that affected the researcher the most were “AMERICA, open your eyes”, the blinding of Clarice, the experience of touching Clarice and the return back to the same room with the mannequin. Those corporeal phenomena urged the researcher to examine their phenomenology in an attempt to find new *situations* or *quasi-things*, as Griffero (2014) calls them, that were not discussed in film studies before and to try to look at certain phenomena from another perspective in a way that has not been discussed in film studies previously either.

Three key phenomenological themes emerged which were then discussed in subsequent chapters: Phenomenology of Text, of transparency and of Surveillance. They were related to the construction of *cinematic dread* through relating to case studies and other secondary literature.

## Phenomenology of Text

In Chapter Six, the researcher sought to undertake a literature review of the use of text in film, but according to the available resources, it was not found a single article talks about that. Therefore, the other sources that addressed the role of the language in embodiment were sought. Experiments from psychology and neuropsychology were reviewed. In addition, Merleau-Ponty's perspective on words, that they have a *motor physiognomy*, qualified the use of text in film to be considered as a powerful approach to establishment of corporeal experience that can 'prepare' the viewer and/or the character and 'transfer' them into a new *situation*.

Observation of different thriller films led to the researcher to the conclusion that text is used for 'preparation', a way 'into-a-situation' and for 'being-in-situation'. 'Preparation' text is meant for viewers not for characters, even if it is one word with different functions such as the use of 'Exit' as an entrance or as an emotional arousal such as 'pain' or 'agony', where these arousals prepare the body of the viewer for fear signals, resulting in a heightened bodily sensitivity to produce facial activity or any body movement. The reason behind fear in such experience is shown to be through sympathizing with the character.

A way 'into-a-situation' is regarded as a reflection of the *sympathy* for the character, which happens when exposed to the same text but in different timing. It feeds the anticipation of *dread*.

'Being-in-Situation' is a direct engagement of the body of the viewer with that of the character. Such situations can be created by the use of action verbs that have direct relationships with the body and senses, which the researcher called 'sensorimotor verbs' in this study. Of all text types, these verbs result in the

highest cognitive perception, e.g., “open your eyes!” It has been proved that those verbs can intensify the *somatic* response based on *somatic empathy*, and according to that, they jump to Merleau-Ponty’s *transcendental* stage of *existence* first, then move to *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy*. They produce *kinesthetic* effect in the muscles to increase the consciousness and the *felt-body* movement to create *synaesthetic experience*.

When the ‘sensorimotor verbs’ are used as the title of a film, e.g., *Hold your Breath*, they serve in both ‘preparing’ and ‘transferring situation’ for the viewer. They start to embody the viewer from the beginning to create a conscious action that is practiced unconsciously over duration of the film as a reflection of *empathy* with the character. The numbers and names are also considered in this research as special text that is used to prepare viewers and lead them to sympathize with the characters.

### Phenomenology of Transparency

In this thesis, transparency is addressed as an atmospheric *quasi-thing* that allows for accessibility and proximity to, and touch of, the characters. In film, this research has identified three forms of transparency: ‘personal transparency’, ‘substance transparency’, and ‘sensorial transparency’. Whereas one or all of these forms of transparency can be found in thrillers in general, this study found that ‘sensorial transparency’ is the transparency form most commonly used in creation of *dread* scenes.

‘Personal transparency’ is defined in this research as a *phenomenal transparency* that stems from the close relationship that is established between the protagonist and the antagonist, which makes the protagonist closer and more reachable. This form of transparency can be readily found in the *suggested horror* prototype of

Hanich (2010), experienced through *sympathy* for the character. The present study did not discuss this form of transparency in detail. However, the literature review highlighted high opportunity for future psychoanalysis research into it.

'Substance transparency' in this research refers to the physical barrier that separates the protagonist from the antagonist, such as glass, which allows for penetration of all the senses except touch. In this form of transparency, both the protagonist and the antagonist realize each other. This leads to some loud and hectic actions such as running or escaping, which makes it a transparency form that is more suitable for *terror* and *horror* than for *dread*. In this form of transparency, the viewer engages with the character through sympathizing with her/him through the effect of *shock* that can be experienced at first, which then turns into *anxiety*, that is; worrying about the character.

Analysis of the case study in this research led the researcher to conclude that 'sensorial transparency' is the transparency form fitting *dread* the most. This is the transparency form that occurs when both characters exist in the same location without any barriers, where one of them, which is usually the antagonist, controls the space because the other one misses one sense or more. This situation makes the surroundings transparent for the antagonist to spot the protagonist, to move towards her/him, and to touch her/him at last. *Touch* proved to be the end point in any scene in thriller films as it increases the *haptic experience* of anticipation. The increased potential for touch has been shown to relate to an increase in *kinesthetic consciousness*, which, by turns, increases the potential for a sense of corporeality.

The 'sensorial transparency' can be very intense, depending on its style of shooting in film, which, are most of the time the first-point view perspective and close-up shots, and which, as a consequence, raise the *attention* of the viewer,

therefore creating *imaginative* and *somatic empathy* engagement in addition to *sympathy*. All this makes the viewer produce extra intellectual effort to stop the antagonist from moving forwards. This awakens the senses and turns the *kinesthetic experience* into a *transcendental subjectivity* in which the viewer feels its body *locomotion* and experiences the moment corporeally and consciously. The possibility of having the three forms of transparency is high and this points out a new dimension of transparency; the 'intensified transparency'.

### Phenomenology of Surveillance

In the light of the importance of watching in terms of film, Foucault's analysis of the spatial consequences of the Panopticon prison and the main institutions of the modern era were identified as critical relevant. The atmosphere of surveillance has been described from another point of view that supports a phenomenological way of thinking. As a consequence, this research concluded that the phenomenology of surveillance for *dread* in film is a combination of the atmosphere of power, control, and entrapment of the surveyor, and the atmospheres of claustrophobia, isolation, and alienation for the surveyed person(s). The power and control of the surveyor are divided into 'sensorial control' and 'spatial control'. 'Sensorial control' expresses the ability of the surveyor to control the senses of the surveyed person, which means to see without being seen, to hear without being heard, and to touch without being touched. Fragmentation of communication, the individual enclosures, the vast wide spaces, and the use of glass and other transparent materials are factors that support the 'sensorial control' and visibility of the surveyor. 'Spatial control', on the other hand, is shown to be achieved by restricting the movement of the prisoners or the workers and ensuring a non-social environment. Both the

'spatial control' and the 'sensorial control' create a *sensual disengagement* that turns into a *sensual deprivation* for the prisoner/worker, which increases the vulnerability of the subject and creates disorientation, the enfeeblement of resistances, and reduces clear thinking, so as to create fear triggered by that atmosphere and a body disassociated from its power to be more destructed and alienated body, i.e., a *docile body* (Foucault 1995). This understanding enabled the researcher to look for panoptical forms in film which involve the power and control of the surveyor and the isolation of the character and to determine if that can, or cannot, create a 'docile-body-viewer'. Therefore, the forms are categorized in the thesis into 'sensorial panoptical forms' that pertain to the senses of the character and 'spatial panoptical forms' that relate to the *constricted atmosphere* of the scene.

The first 'sensorial panoptical form' observed in thriller films is 'someone-is-watching-note', which is defined as a 'textual surveillance' mode in this thesis, which informs that the character is being watched. It reflects the proximity of the antagonist and the vulnerability of the protagonist. In view of Merleau-Ponty's *logic of existence*, this panoptical form is defined to start with *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* of who and where the sender is, then turns into a *transcendence* stage that follows the action of the character. This sensorial panoptical form is shown to create *surprise* for the viewer that is experienced as *imaginative empathy* and *somatic empathy* based on the mimetic relationship with the character in addition to *aligned sympathy* and *allegiance sympathy*.

The other sensorial panoptical form is 'sensorial transparency' that has been identified here. On the basis of the character's loss of one sense or more, and in the light of shooting this panoptical form, which is a subjective point of view from the antagonist perspective, 'sensorial transparency' is shown here to create a

*state of shock* for the viewer because of the *attention* it raises, which is experienced as pure *somatic empathy*. As a result, the viewer tries internally to stop the antagonist from touching the protagonist, but she/he cannot. All what the *felt-body* does according to fear is expanding the *Away!-tendency* as if she/he is escaping the skin. However, instead, it turns into *tension* that awakens all the senses and constitutes a very *affective engagement* that increases a sense of corporeality and consciousness, which, by turns, increases the embodiment. By not escaping the skin, the body looks like the *docile body* because fear disassociates the power of the viewer's body, which is reflected in a physical contraction of the body due to tension, in which it creates a 'docile-body-viewer'.

'Substance transparency' is defined here to be a form of 'spatial panoptical surveillance' that occurs as a result of the *spatial deprivation* that restricts the protagonist's movement because of the 'seen-through' materials that separate the protagonist from the antagonist. This form of transparency creates *shock* in the beginning, followed by *anxiety*. Hence, this form of transparency does not create a 'docile-body-viewer', but an anxious viewer who sympathizes with the character.

A further spatial panoptical form defined in this thesis is that of the labyrinth. It is related to the 'embedded structures', e.g., the wall within a wall. Although the labyrinth is the opposite of the Panopticon as a result of its spatial deprivation that restricts the 'sensorial control', but based on the conception of surveillance in film, it can be stated that the labyrinth applies the power and control of the surveyor and achieves isolation of the character, and, accordingly, the viewer, if the scene is shot in a way that reflects empathy. With reference to *the logic of existence* of Merleau-Ponty (2002), following a character who is walking in labyrinth starts with *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy*. Then, it jumps into the

*transcendence* stage whenever a shock occurs, which mainly happens by effect of the experience of doubling and the unintended repetition; when one returns back to the first point. This experience raises the *attention* of the viewer and may, and may not, end with a *shock*.

The final new form of surveillance identified by this thesis for dread space is the 'through-wall surveillance' or 'through-floor surveillance'. This form of surveillance manifests itself when the protagonist lives all the time behind the wall or under the floor of the protagonist. In most of the thriller films discussed, the character and the protagonist discover this fact together. This creates a *shock* followed by *attention*, which means that the protagonist jumps directly to the *transcendence* stage of *existence* and then moves into the *ambiguity* and *indeterminacy* stages. Depending on the way of shooting the shock, the viewer may develop *sympathy* or *empathy* with the character.

### Significance of the Previous Contributions to Architecture and Related Arts

Pallasmaa (2001) pointed to two different architectures; *the architecture of image* and the *architecture of essence*. The architecture of image is the one that gives less actual encounter with the objects or the buildings. It offers a form only and leaves the user as a viewer, not as a participant, unlike the architecture of essence.

What has been grasped from this thesis is that understanding the phenomenon in its essence helps in using this understanding in any field. For example, the concepts of *sympathy* and *empathy* can be used in museums to connect and involve the user more with the objects. The differences between people in using this understanding can be ascribed to differences in its application, that is, in how to make it; through the space itself, or the objects, or the display of the objects.

According to that, the theoretical framework that has been used in the phenomenal reading can play a significant role in defining the relationship between the subject (a user) and the object (a statue, a model, a painting, or even the space itself). Understanding how perception, movement, and action work for a more corporeal interaction can open up possibilities for directing the users to guarantee the lived experience.

The phenomenology of text, transparency, and surveillance are effective and powerful and they can be easily and literally applied in architecture.

It has been proved that the words, especially the 'sensorimotor verbs', have power and direct effect and that they end up in amplifying the senses. Does a big sign saying: "Open your eyes" in a museum affect the users? According to the literature cited in Chapter Six, this verb will open the eyes of the users and create ambiguity and indeterminacy of where, and how, to look.

'Substance transparency' can also be literally applied to architecture. How does a glass partition affect the user if it is separating many layers of actions or events without giving her/him the opportunity to reach them?

Bernard Tschumi has named the experience of narrow corridors filled with high crowd of people as an *event of violence*. This is very close to what the labyrinth creates according to the double and repetition characteristics, and, hence, the *unintentional returns*. Then, one can apply the double experience to add more corporeal experience in museums or exhibitions, especially the ones that are categorized under experiences. Can adding another passage make the user stand a while to choose? If so, then what kind of kinesthetic experience will it create?

### Recommendations for Future Research

This research has suggested a theoretical framework for understanding the embodiment of the viewer while encountering a dread scene in a thriller film in an effort to develop a spatial understanding of the atmosphere of dread. This framework has potential for revealing other phenomena in other context. For example, researchers may further investigate the *phenomenology of descending* and *ascending* in a dread scene so as to complement the discussion of the roles of movement and inner effort in potentially exhausting the body of the viewer.

Since so far there is limited integration of theory with practice in film studies, the framework suggested by the present study offers an opportunity to researchers to apply it to other films and to films of other genres and to assess its applicability and generalizability to those films.

This research determined the role of 'personal transparency' in creating surprise for the viewer and increasing her/his sympathy with the character. But it did not pursue this in greater details because this phenomenon is related to the character, not the viewer, meaning, that it is a phenomenon that falls within the field of psychoanalysis. This is an opportunity for other researchers to attempt to develop this phenomenon from the perspective of psychoanalysis and to try to find out how 'personal transparency' works and describe its related psychological dimensions. The same applies to the 'digital surveillance' in film, where other researchers can relate it to characters' performance.

In architecture, one can apply the framework proposed by this study to test or read dread spaces in war museums, memorials, or immersive exhibitions, for example, *The London Bridge Experience*, which are generally designed based on narrative, in order to assess the potential embodiment of the subjects in such

cases. This may expose various further dimensions and aspects to investigate in the engagement process, in the subject's movement pattern (quick or slow), in the overt and implicit actions of the users, or even in their perception of these spaces.



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## Appendix A: Glossary

<b><i>Absolute location:</i></b>	A space without surfaces that belongs to the felt-body, it can be described as contracted or expanded space (Schmitz et al. 2011).
<b><i>Absolute Space:</i></b>	This space is devoid of surfaces and dimensions. It is the space of the felt-body that has no surfaces and cannot be measured, such as climatic space, the space of silence, and the space of the corporeal isles (Schmitz et al. 2011).
<b><i>Abstract space:</i></b>	The space that has no meaning, which makes the users as spectators only (Lefebvre 1991).
<b><i>Act of embodying:</i></b>	a dynamic dimension of embodiment that helps in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of the experience so as to help the subject to shift to the state of embodiment (Hirose 2002)
<b><i>Action-Image:</i></b>	Re-action of the actor to the world of the scene. It has two forms: The large form of the action-image is the impact that flows from the environment towards the actor, the small form of the action-image is the impact that flows from the actor into the environment (Deleuze 1992).
<b><i>Active attention:</i></b>	A process coming from the aesthetic attitude of the subject when he takes up some deliberate decisions (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Active perception :</i></b>	the perception that relates to learning, when the subject interacts with an object in its ultimate way (Macrae et al. 2013; Duncan and McCauley 2008; Holl et al. 2007; Whitney 2014).
<b><i>Actual body:</i></b>	is the body that reacts to the meaning of the world consciously and at the moment (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Seamon 2017)
<b><i>Aesthetic attitude:</i></b>	The attitude comes from the viewer who intends to experience a pleasure while watching a film, all what he or she does counted as attitude to complete the aesthetic experience (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Aesthetic experience:</i></b>	The experience of the pleasure of horror that is produced by the aesthetic attitude of the viewer (Hanich 2010).

<b><i>Aesthetic object:</i></b>	The screen when the cinematic experience is revealed, the screen becomes from a mere object into an aesthetic object (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Aesthetic strategies:</i></b>	Aim to produce emotions of the same name, as a decision made at the film level, to affect the viewer and evoke her/his emotions such as surprise, shock, and attention (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Affect:</i></b>	A Freudian theory that has been used by many philosophers such as Deleuze (1992) as an internal phenomenon. Green relates that moment of affect as the moment that snatches the body from silence (Green 1995) which is not yet named as emotion (Matthews 2013). Researchers refer it to a way of describing the feeling or the intensity of the experience (Bayliss 2010).
<b><i>Affection- Image:</i></b>	The image that refers to the state of emotions and fills the gap between action and reaction. It reflects the impact on the character, usually appeared in close-up shots (Deleuze 1992)
<b><i>Affective Atmospheres:</i></b>	The ones that create more sensed architecture than understood architecture, in other words, they can be achieved by revealing smell, touch, movement, and walking, or even dark voids, to create memory, because creating new sensations creates memories (Anderson 2009).
<b><i>Affective engagement:</i></b>	The ultimate engagement with film that happens through skin, spreading an affect over the entire body and through the expansive Away-Tendency! (Hanich 2010; Laine 2006).
<b><i>Affective experience:</i></b>	the corporeal affect that is produced kinesthetically by muscles, and synaesthetically by the expansion and contraction of the felt-body that can change the absolute space (Griffero 2014)
<b><i>Affective mimicry:</i></b>	One type of empathy comes from the anticipation of fear and is reflected in facial expressions (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Affordance:</i></b>	Is an ecological psychological term set out by James J. Gibson. It describes how people visually perceive their environment and considers any resource encountered by the subject in the environment such as surfaces, objects, substances, and events that might provide an opportunity for action (Gibson 2014).

<b><i>Allegiance sympathy:</i></b>	To a character causes a form of engagement that positions the viewer within the discursive and textual frame of the film. is the strongest form of sympathy (Smith 1994).
<b><i>Ambiguity</i></b>	Is the essence of human existence, where everything the subject lives or has in her/his mind has several meanings (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b><i>Amplitudinal quality of movement:</i></b>	A spatial aspect that is associated with both the felt expansiveness or contractedness of the subject's moving body and the spatial extensiveness or contractedness of the subject's movement, such as describing the space as large space, tight space (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
<b><i>Analytical perception:</i></b>	Perception that is based on logic, rational thought and the object existence in space, even if there is no one to interact with it. It was discussed by the Cartesian empiricists and intellectualists (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b><i>Anchor points:</i></b>	Elements or moments that make the atmosphere perceived (Griffero 2014).
<b><i>Architecture of essence:</i></b>	The architecture that is experienced in an embodied manner; it projects narratives of culture, history, tradition, and human existence, and turns the audience into participants (Pallasmaa 2001).
<b><i>Architecture of image:</i></b>	Is the architecture which gives less in the actual encounter than in its photography picture; it offers mere images of form and leaves the audience as spectators only (Pallasmaa 2001).
<b><i>Assemblage Theory</i></b>	makes the entities composed of heterogeneous elements irreducible to their role within the larger assemblage to work together in the museum (Waterton and Dittmer 2014).
<b><i>Attention:</i></b>	Is considered as an aesthetic strategy. For Merleau-Ponty, it is a "consciousness in the act of learning", a creative act in terms of the subject's relationship to the world (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b><i>Axiality:</i></b>	The axis or axes that the subject use to move physically or visually (Yudell 1977).
<b><i>Being embodied:</i></b>	Is a static condition under which the subject is part of the world (Hirose 2002).

<b>Being:</b>	a mode of existing, happens when every moment of practical acting and knowing takes place to involve the subject in the world (Heidegger 1996)
<b>Be-in-the-world:</b>	An expression for existence and being in the world (Heidegger 1996).
<b>Body schema:</b>	is a group of skills and capacities that establish the precognitive familiarity of the body with itself and with the world it inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carman 1999)
<b>Bona fide boundaries:</b>	Boundaries established due to an immanent qualitative and spatial discontinuity (Griffero 2014).
<b>Cardinal time:</b>	Is a qualitative experience of time, describes temporality that can be described using such expressions as 'creeping', 'rushed' (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
<b>Chiasm:</b>	Flesh of thought, or perhaps the thoughts of the flesh, because it posits a body capable of autonomous sense making and of sub-conscious, pre-reflective action, which, in turn, grounds the body within the world and increases its consciousness and corporeality (Merleau-Ponty et al. 1968).
<b>Cinematic dread:</b>	A vulnerable character who is slowly and quietly entering a dark, forsaken place harboring threat. It works under the scenario of "here and now". The strongest form of suspense, and it relates to moments in the near future (Hanich 2010).
<b>Cinematic shock:</b>	Is a highly compressed type of fear that responds to a threat of a situation, suddenly and unexpectedly, e.g., when a car hits the character suddenly (Hanich 2010).
<b>Cinematic Terror:</b>	An anticipatory type of cinematic fear, 'chase and escape scenario, an experience of inner acceleration and agitation scenario' (Hanich 2010).
<b>Cinesthetic subject:</b>	the subject whose body is affected by the film in order to be involved in understanding it and its meaning (Sobchack 1992)
<b>Complete perception:</b>	Is formed by the synthesis of foreground, middle ground, and distant view, taken all together, with the subjective qualities of material and light (Holl et al. 2007).

- Conceived space:** Is the representation and image of the space (Lefebvre 1991).
- Conceptual fear knowledge:** Any fearful stimuli (a word, an action) that can invoke a bodily reaction and enhance subsequent bodily reactions (Oosterwijk et al. 2010).
- Consciousness:** Is existence for itself. One of the ways to reveal it, the act of looking must be renewed, otherwise it falls into unconsciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Constant hypothesis:** Cartesian way of thinking, which allocates one sensation, and only one, to each stimulus (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Constricted atmosphere:** Atmospheric elements or zones suggest viewing an experience of constriction and isolation, such as confined spaces, endless spaces, and labyrinths (Hanich 2010)
- Corporeal atmospheric affections:** Affections that are not metrical, measurable and metaphoric. They occur when the subject is connected corporeally to the atmosphere through the corporeal isles, and they can be produced kinesthetically and synaesthetically (Griffero 2014).
- Corporeal consciousness:** The ultimate experience created by movement and it is the last phase in Sheets-Johnstone's structure of movement. It is what happens when the action verb 'I can' turns into 'I am'. It is what happens when the volunteer turns into a person in a situation. It is the highest level of existence (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Corporeal isles:** The head, the chest, and the sole of the foot which the felt-body identifies itself each time (Schmitz et al. 2011)
- Cross-modality:** Cooperation of all senses, not only seeing, such that they become fleshed-out to make the body feel through the skin before the eye (Sobchack 1992)
- Da-sein:** German expression that means being there; to bring things close in the sense of bringing them within the range of its concern (Heidegger 1996).
- De-distancing:** Moving towards the things to shorten the distance in order to create 'existence and being; Da-sein' (Heidegger 1996).
- Direct horror:** The viewer experiences horror as a frightening and overwhelming confrontation with the threatening event or monstrous object, directly and in full vision,

as in the case in the famous shower scene in Psycho (Hanich 2010).

- Directional space:*** A pre-geometrical state of motility. It is the starting point of a corporeal communication with the surrounding environment, which works according to a motor suggestion to move, but not yet reduced to be a local space. The directional space aligns the subject's movement and is responsible for creating felt properties such as the narrowness or vastness of the atmosphere so as to create a 'vector atmosphere'. Schmitz's (1974 to 2005) as cited in (Griffero 2014).
- Directionality:*** To move to the right or to the left, and/or up or down to engage with the space in order to create 'existence and being; Da-sein' (Heidegger 1996).
- Docile bodies:*** The prisoners bodies according to panoptic power, which creates calculated manipulation of the body, where discipline increases the forces of the body and diminishes these forces; it dissociates power from the body, and accordingly it leads to alienation (Foucault 1995 p.202).
- Docile-body-viewer:*** In film, a disturbing and destructive body experience because the viewer experiences a deep contraction without the possibility to escape the absolute location. Usually it is created through the body of the antagonist saturated with the protagonist's body reactions. The author.
- Doubling:*** The repetition, the illusion of free will when revisit the same events every time. It could be literal or figurative. It usually relates to the concept of alienation, namely, the self and the other, that one requires one's ego and perceives oneself as an autonomous and compact self, that is, the 'I' (Freud 2003).it draws attention to a phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Duration:*** The lived moment, the memorable one. Henri Bergson's philosophies in (Deleuze 1992).
- Dynamic fit:*** Is the affordance that informs the subject where and how to move (Yudell 1977).
- Embedded structures:*** The structures that integrate from the same category; such as walls within walls and floors within floors. (The author)

<b><i>Embodiment:</i></b>	As a process, not a result, where the type of experience is not an account based on a linear cause and effect description of the body apparatus, but an indication of the lived body experience, where the body is considered as the center of the experiment with all its capacities to interact with the environment, to exist in the world, 'here' and 'now' (McCardell 2001 p.36; Marin and Leder 2013; Bayliss 2010; Hirose 2002).
<b><i>Emotional immersion:</i></b>	One of the cinematic dread characteristics. The viewer expects the threat and imagines the worst. Hence, she/he is glued to the screen and captivated in an anticipatory type of fear (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Empathy:</i></b>	The viewer feels with the character (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Encounter:</i></b>	Meeting between the self and the unknown (stranger) that involves surprise and conflict (Ahmed 2000).
<b><i>Enmeshing Experience:</i></b>	Atmosphere as a synthesis of foreground, middle ground, and distant view with the interlocking of time, light material, and details, in addition to the subject to create the whole where no one can distinguish the individual elements (Holl et al. 2007).
<b><i>Environment:</i></b>	Always exists, regardless of whether there is, or there is not, a subject to engage with (Seamon 2017)
<b><i>Event:</i></b>	Bringing something into being in a period of time in order to create a new experience for the subject. It can be revealed through some phenomenal factors such as shock and surprise (Mølbak 2012).
<b><i>Expansive Away!-tendency:</i></b>	The expansion that occurs when subject experiences fear. If the subject cannot escape the physical location, it will transfer to its felt-body, as if it wants to escape the skin, but it cannot (Schmitz concept elaborated by (Hanich 2010).
<b><i>Expression:</i></b>	Is an account of meaning in action (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b><i>Fear:</i></b>	an emotion that carries a sense of personal phenomenological detachment of feeling, which becomes separated because it centripetally constricts the lived body (Hanich 2010; Schmitz et al. 2011)
<b><i>Felt-body:</i></b>	The opposite of the physical body, it concerns sensations, Husserl and Schmitz focus on felt-body

more than the physical body (Husserl 2012; Schmitz et al. 2011)

- Fiat boundaries:*** Boundaries of the atmosphere established by the subject's cognitive activity dependent on the perception (Griffero 2014).
- Field of condensation:*** What the anchor points create to make the atmosphere perceived (Griffero 2014).
- Flow Theory:*** When the subject's action and awareness merge for a more an expanded experience; for example, in video games, the player is unified with the game in a way that keeps her/him aware of the contextual situation, and she/he is not lost, but expanded and aware (Bayliss 2010).
- Formal violence:*** Deals with conflicts between objects and forms, which take place when the forms attack each other geometrically to create some gaps (Tschumi 1994).
- Gaze:*** The look that focused on the identification of the self with sexual interest and acquisition of sexual differences (Hayward 2013).
- Giving space:*** Is the yielding of places to arrange and prepare an openness in which things belong together and make dwelling possible, and accordingly, the space is discovered in the world (Heidegger 1996).
- Grounded theories:*** ***cognition*** Theories predict that processing conceptual or linguistic cognition of emotion may be accompanied by bodily reactions (Oosterwijk et al. 2010).
- Habit:*** A group of skills that are ready to anticipate the world prior to the formation of thoughts and judgment (Merleau-Ponty 2002)
- Habitual body:*** Is a body that performs the meaning unconsciously on the basis of the familiar situation (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Haptic perception:*** Is a mode of seeing through all modes located on the skin and therefore is a mode of bodily consciousness and corporeality (Laine 2006; Marks 2000).
- Haptic sound:*** When vision and sound work in union, they create a corporeal experience that is experience internally, not semiotically or interrogatively, (Marks 2000).
- Haptic vision:*** When vision is "twinned with touch, in discerning texture, movement, three dimensional form and even kinetic energy, developed by Deleuze and Guattari, and used then by Sobchack and Marks. The haptic

vision is tactile, kinaesthetic, and it functions like touch (Sobchack 1992; Marks 2000).

- Ideomotor actions:*** The action that is created when the expectation doesn't fit the real. Preston illustrates if a soccer fan watches a player running toward the goal and then stopping, the expected action is for the player to kick the ball. If the action does not fit the expectation, then an error signal is generated in the mind of the subject, resulting in an actual kicking movement being generated by the subject (Preston 2007).
- Imaginative empathy:*** The empathy which emerges when the viewer takes over the perspective of the character so as to imagine the character from inside and feel what she/he feels at the moment (Hanich 2010).
- Imagined act:*** An object or a theme of the subject's consciousness that is perceived in the felt-body, felt in corporeal isles (Ierna et al. 2011).
- Imitative contagion:*** An infectious, though often unconscious, response to atmosphere that primes subjects to act in certain ways (Thrift 2008)
- Immersion:*** The merging of the subject with the object, where there is no distinction between them; the movement and action happen unconsciously. Merleau-Ponty used it as a term to describe the lived embeddedness of human beings in the world in which they find themselves (Seamon 2015)
- Indeterminacy:*** "[E]xistence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning... in so far as it is the act of taking up a de facto situation" (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.196).
- Ipesity of the thing:*** When each aspect of the thing falls to our perception, is only an invitation to perceive beyond it as a moment in the perceptual process (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Kinesthesia:*** An awareness of body in space while movement, and it is a sensation of the perception of motion; a perception of one's own body, through a muscular effect felt in its limbs and muscles (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Kinesthetic consciousness:*** The consciousness developing when the spatio-temporal aspects of movement awaken the senses

and the subject transforms her/his attention to movement (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).

- Kinesthetic experience:*** A dynamic process that evolves during movement or when one is about to move, where the body brings a certain play of forces to life to encounter the world. Sheets-Johnstone have spatial and temporal qualities and aspects that have the ability to affect the senses and the corporeality. Sheets-Johnstone identified four essential qualities of movement: tensional, projectional, linear, and amplitudinal qualities (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Knowledge-bringing event:*** A process of perception, where the key is in describing knowledge, not constructing it (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Korper:*** In German: Material and Physical body
- Leib:*** In German: the felt-body
- Linear quality of movement:*** Has to do with the paths that the subject senses while describing the process of movement such as linear, curved, twisted, diagonal, and zig-zag (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Literal transparency:*** Which is an inherent quality of substance, that of being penetrable to air and light, as in a glass curtain wall (Rowe and Slutzky 1963).
- Lived space:*** The space that provides conditions for creative social practice to have the associational meanings and symbols, it include subject-object, mental-material, and imagined-real spaces (Lefebvre 1991), and depth, movement, and meaning directions, are great affective entities for creating it (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Local Space:*** A space which is founded on relative dimensions devoid of their own features like surfaces, lines, and distance (Schmitz et al. 2011).
- Locomotion:*** The awareness of one's own motion in the world and interior flux, and a revolution of being other than changing position in place or displacement (Merleau-Ponty et al. 968).
- Logic of existence:*** Three stages for being: ambiguity, indeterminacy, and transcendence (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Making room:*** Is the yielding of places to arrange and prepare an openness in which things belong together and make

dwelling possible, and accordingly, the space is discovered in the world (Heidegger 1996).

<b>Material body:</b>	The physical body
<b>Mirror stage:</b>	An idea drawn from the theories of Freud and Lacan about image mimicry that works at the level of the unconscious mind (Hayward 2013).
<b>Modern scopic regimes:</b>	Any agenda encourages the power of vision (Elliott 2011).
<b>Moments:</b>	The spaces that come out through inhabitation where memories fixed to places (Lefebvre 1991).
<b>Motivation:</b>	A continuous unconscious process of a balance in the body orientation that adjusts it to integrate experience and engage with the environment, it describes the unity of movement and perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Motor mimicry:</b>	One type of empathy, when the viewer mimics the muscular actions of the character, which can have a tension or relaxing effect, or even the character's breathing (Hanich 2010).
<b>Motor resonance:</b>	Regards any movement in the muscles of the body (Feroni and Semin 2009).
<b>Movement-image:</b>	A centered set or ensemble of variable elements which act and react on each other. Deleuze presents time through the medium of motion and he created Perception-Image, Affection-Image and Action – Image (Deleuze 1992).
<b>Natural attitude of movement:</b>	<b>of</b> It is the physical change in the location of particular object between two points, where under the absence of movement the subject will be at rest. It is the ordinary way of being-in-the-world. (Husserl 2012).
<b>Natural perception:</b>	This form of perception refers to the subject, not to the object, and follows the experience of the subject based on What the subject sees or hears. If anything is not seen, this mean it doesn't exist (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>New-Phenomenology:</b>	Schmitz's phenomenology that relates to the felt-body (Schmitz et al. 2011)
<b>Objective feelings:</b>	A halo in determined objects, and are felt among one another, such as the bliss of an evening sky (Griffero 2014)

<b><i>Ordinal time:</i></b>	Quantitative description of time that disrupts the qualitative dynamic experience. It can be described by such expressions as now, at some time, lately, and just now (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
<b><i>Overt acts:</i></b>	Acts that are created in a similar way according to the situation, such as smiling or breathing (Preston 2007).
<b><i>Panoptic power:</i></b>	The effect achieved through the realization that one is subjected to the gaze (Foucault 1995 p.203).
<b><i>Perceived space:</i></b>	The empirical, measurable, and map-able phenomenon. It is what an eye can describe. It refers to both the built and the natural environments (Lefebvre 1991).
<b><i>Perception of perception:</i></b>	The perception-image when using subjective and objective shots in combination, in order to let the audience perceive what the character perceives (Deleuze 1992).
<b><i>Perception-image:</i></b>	Deleuze (1992) defined this as ensemble of elements which act on a center and which have a relation with it (Deleuze 1992).
<b><i>Perceptual consciousness:</i></b>	The perception that is integrated with consciousness, where the subject knows himself/herself perceiving (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b><i>Perceptual field:</i></b>	“[T]he perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 p.4)
<b><i>Personal transparency:</i></b>	Is an intangible form of transparency that stems from the close relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist. The author
<b><i>Phenomenal phenomenology:</i></b>	A method created by Shīrāzī (2013) , which is a first-person phenomenology describing the Langen Foundation Museum designed by Tadao Ando, which distinguished with some characteristics based on mixed, comprehensive phenomenological theories that describe architecture for the purpose of making the reader as traveler perceives and feels, with all the senses, Shīrāzī’s experience (Shīrāzī 2013).
<b><i>Phenomenal transparency:</i></b>	Which is an inherent quality of organization, which its experience and layering work as it is transparent (Rowe and Slutzky 1963).

<b>Phenomenal zones:</b>	Phenomenon things that reveal themselves in the context, such as stairs, doors, corridors (Shīrāzī 2013).
<b>Phenomenology Within</b>	<b>from</b> To have a comprehensive reading of one phenomenon, through taking one whole case study instead of having different phenomenological concerns (Husserl as in (Shīrāzī 2013).
<b>Phenomenology of Event:</b>	Can be created by means of an experience between the subject and the object. The subject may have an experience, but in order to create the event, Mølbak suggests creating 'the' experience which the subject undergoes, not the experience she/he has. He considers surprise, shock, and similar experiences are important factors to create 'the' experience (Mølbak 2012).
<b>Phenomenology of practice:</b>	Aims to explain, interpret, and highlight phenomena and aims to open up possibilities for creating formative relations between things, being and acting (van Manen 2007)
<b>Place:</b>	Where one perceives the memory, the fear and desire, the value and meaning, it offers means highlighting that the subject is always immersed in its world that makes it a lived body (Seamon 2017), it is any environmental locus that gathers human experiences, actions, and meanings spatially and temporally (Seamon 2017; Fiddler 2007; Lefebvre 1991; Heidegger 1996; Pallasmaa 2001).
<b>Pluralization:</b>	Collaboration of the dynamics such as temperature, weather, lighting, and other sensorial motifs to thicken the atmosphere (Labelle 2011)
<b>Post-modern regimes:</b>	<b>scopic</b> Any agenda encourages the other senses beside vision (Elliott 2011).
<b>Present-at-hand:</b>	The tools that are perceived as tools, with consciousness of the tool and the action (Heidegger 1996).
<b>Primary level:</b>	A sense experience that precedes its division among other senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Programmatic violence:</b>	Is related to occasions when actions, events, and programs, by accident or design, serve evil purposes like designing narrow corridors for a big crowd of people (Tschumi 1994).

<b>Projectional quality movement:</b>	ofIs the description which Sheets-Johnstone gives to the effort produced, e.g., 'a sharp and even striding' or 'flat but heavy clumping' (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
<b>Proprioception:</b>	An awareness of the body in space, as a sense that provides the perceiver with a sense of locomotion in stillness, a sense of balance and position (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Prospective looking:</b>	The looking where the object is the final stage of the subject's action of focusing (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Quasi-things:</b>	As a situational constraint demonstrated by motor reactions and traced or suggested by the situation itself, they provide an accessible aesthetic and phenomenological account of feelings based on the paradigm of atmospheres. The term created originally by Schmitz in 1978, but Griffero extended it (Griffero 2014; Griffero 2017).
<b>Ready-to-hand:</b>	When tools are used as extension to the body such as the blind's cane or the mouse of the computer. The subject unconsciously deals with and focus on the action only (Heidegger 1996).
<b>Relational image:</b>	The words that may induce behavioral patterns once they are spotted (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Relative location:</b>	Subject's position in geometrical space (Schmitz et al. 2011).
<b>Representation:</b>	Has been used in psychology to express the pattern of activation in the body and the brain that corresponds to a particular state that attempts to repeat the same pattern (Preston 2007).
<b>Retrospective looking:</b>	The looking that will present itself in its own appearance and as the stimulus, the motive, or the prime mover of the process from the beginning (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Sensation empathy:</b>	Happens when the viewer replicates the sensation of the character for example when a hot needle is pierced in the character's eye (Hanich 2010).
<b>sensorial control:</b>	A notion that focuses on the power of making the subjects always accessible by entrapping and interpreting the senses of the surveyed personnel in watching and hearing, and sometimes through touching them. The author.

- Sensorial transparency:** In film, it corresponds to a temporary or permanent loss of a sense, which makes the character reachable and touchable because of that missing sense it could be sight transparency or audible transparency. Both protagonist and antagonist are located in the same space without separated barriers. The author.
- Sensorimotor verb:** Any action verb that works on the senses such as “open your eyes”. It creates a cognitive perception and a somatic unconscious reaction that, in reciprocation, can amplify the sense of sight. The author
- Sensual disengagement:** Is achieved when the body experiences ‘non-synched’ senses and/or the ‘not-fit’ body in the space that should be in somewhere else. This disengagement creates a psychological compression to be turned assault on the senses (Hancock and Jewkes 2011).
- Shintai:** Means the union of flesh and spirit to acknowledge the world at the same time of acknowledging the self (Ando 1995 as cited in (Shīrāzī 2013).
- Shock:** An aesthetic strategy, that bursts into the scene suddenly and lasts only briefly, and the moment of shock is rooted in the present (Hanich 2010).
- Significance core:** The property that one can distinguish the sense according to (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Sinaesthesias:** Metaphoric and not measurable qualities that have the synthetic nature, they create corporeal affections that can only be compared by language, such as sharp noise (Griffero 2014).
- Situation:** An expression of being, of existence, Merleau-Ponty says: “which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, now becomes my very being”. He also considers it as a horizon of significance, where the sensory system gives a certain theme and style to look (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Skin:** Is a medium of intersubjective connection that structures the perception beyond the inside and outside and gives the shape of affective engagement with a film (Laine 2006).
- Somatic empathy:** The empathy that works with the body physically, it has three types: sensation, motor mimicry, and affective mimicry (Hanich 2010).

<b>Sonsign:</b>	As a “pure sensory image” that signals the collapse of the sensory motor process and seeks other paths towards filmic involvements. Such as the sound of the birds in <i>The Birds</i> (Hitchcock 1963) invites the viewer to experience a film in a more sensual way as it spreads between the viewer and the film (Deleuze 1992)
<b>Space:</b>	areas and volumes and relates more to the sense of the geometry of an area with no emotions related to (Fiddler 2007; Pallasmaa 2001)
<b>Spatial attachment :</b>	One of the interlocking functions for alignment sympathy, related to the capacity of the narration to restrict itself to the actions of a single character (Smith 1994).
<b>Spatial Control:</b>	Creating boundaries in space is what guides the movement of the users and restrict them as well. The author.
<b>Spatial immersion:</b>	One of the cinematic dread characteristics. Although the visual access in dread scenes is often strongly restricted, but the filmic space plays a crucial role as an atmosphere to suck the viewer in, in addition to that, it has movement into or through space (Hanich 2010).
<b>Spatiality:</b>	One way to increase the existentiality in place, and it is fulfilled through movement in general and through movement in different directions to create different viewpoints and eventually this creates spatiality (Heidegger 1996).
<b>State of shock:</b>	A state related to prisoners, when sensual deprivation causes the loss of critical capacity, disorientation, enfeeblement of resistance, and makes thinking to be less clear (Klein 2010).
<b>Static fit:</b>	Is the affordance that informs the subject where and how to sit (Yudell 1977).
<b>Structure:</b>	Is defined by Landes as a whole whose parts cannot be defined independently of their place within that whole. It points to a certain unity or internal harmony that is held by a system. When it relates to Merleau-Ponty, it is always connected to consciousness (Landes 2013; Merleau-Ponty 2002).
<b>Structure of movement:</b>	Defined by Sheets-Johnstone that tells movement has a qualitative nature. It is divided into four phases; kinesthetic experience, transcendental subjectivity,

kinesthetic consciousness, and corporeal consciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).

- Structure of Perception :** Is the structure of the seen and the structure of subject's consciousness, where this combination guides the subject to grasp what perception is and to describe the essence of perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002)
- Subjective access:** One of the interlocking functions for alignment sympathy, relates to the degree of access the viewer has to the subjectivity of characters, (Smith 1994).
- Subjective treatment shot:** The shot that shows first point perspective when the camera movement represents the eyes of the character (Hitchcock1995).
- Substance transparency:** A situation when the protagonist and antagonist exist in the same space but are separated by a transparent obstacle that allows them to see, hear, smell, and, sometimes, touch each other. The author
- Suggested Horror:** Relies on imagining violence or a monster through verbal description, sound effects, or blurry vision such as the scene in Unbreakable (Hanich 2010).
- Surprise:** An aesthetic strategy that is not a type of fear since the viewer does not in every case of surprise respond to something threatening (Hanich 2010).
- Sympathy:** The viewer feels for the character (Hanich 2010).
- Synaesthetic experience:** The experience that is created according to the sensory experience that is felt once without the ability to distinguish the sense, and it is called as 'synthetic experience' it speaks directly to all senses at the same time at primary level, a sense experience that precedes its division among other senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Synaesthetic nature:** When the object speaks directly to all senses (Merleau-Ponty 2002)
- Synaesthetic Perception:** Perceiving the object directly with all senses and, then, at a subsequent stage, the subject can distinguish the appropriate sense. this perception is responsible for creating the ambiguity of experience (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Synaesthetic subject:** Describing the spectator as a site of reception, where its sensorium can provide visual images with a multisensory and synaesthetic thickness. The body

of the spectator is actively involved in the creation of meaning instead of being passively affected by the film on the basis of the cross-modality of the senses (Sobchack 1992).

- Synesthesia:** Is the perception of one sensation by another modality, such as the ability to distinguish colors by feel. The yellow color, for example, is associated with male procreative power and with the merry melody of the flute (Marks 2000 p.213).
- Synthetic experience:** The same as 'synaesthetic experience'.
- Tactile values:** Qualities that relate some visual images to the knowledge and experience of the flesh and skin. It is stimulative of the sense of touch (Samuels 1981).
- Temporal immersion:** One of the cinematic dread characteristics. The dread scenes are much more extended than scenes of shock and horror owing to that the viewer experiences the threat to the same extent to which the character in the film does (Hanich 2010).
- Tensional quality :** A temporal aspect of movement, relates to the sense of effort since any effort to be produced (e.g., walking or lifting) awakens the kinetic energy that drives the movement of the subject (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Thing:** The bridge that can gather the environment; the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals (Heidegger 1996). In this thesis it also refer to any element that affect the space. Such as staircase, wall, or even objects that affect the atmosphere and gather the environment.
- Transcendence:** Is the process by which existence takes up to its own account and transforms from a volunteer into a situation (Merleau-Ponty 2002).
- Transcendental subjectivity:** Is then the second phase in the structure of movement that occurs when the senses are evoked and heightened (Sheets-Johnstone 2011).
- Unintended repetition:** It occurs when someone spots the same thing from another place, by finding the same reference point which makes the body aware of repetition. It creates confusion and loss of bearings and leads to uncanny (Freud 2003).
- Vacant space:** Reality of the lived experience in prisons' cells (Fiddler 2007).

- Vector atmosphere:** the vast and narrow atmosphere that is created from the directional space, for which can be described as unilateral, omnilateral, centrifugal, centripetal, or undecided atmosphere Schmitz's (1974 to 2005) as cited in (Griffero 2014).
- Vital drive:** Corporeal dynamics from expansion and contraction on the felt-body (Schmitz et al. 2011).
- Voyeurism:** The act of viewing the activities of other people unbeknown to them. It usually refers observing unsuspecting people with fantasies that may or may not include sexual activities (Hayward 2013; Sadock and Sadock 2007).
- Work of art:** Merleau-Ponty looks at the body of humans as a work of art because of the body's capabilities to negotiate with all the potentials surrounding it such as body-schema and habit (Merleau-Ponty 2002).