



The discourse of liberalism in Saudi context:

A diachronic corpus-assisted discourse study of the construction of 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi press

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Abstract

The broad aim of this study is to investigate the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi socio-political context. 'alibrāliyah', corresponding to liberalism in English, is a loanword to Arabic that started to be contested recently amongst opposing groups who attempt to charge it with their own ideological meaning. Due to the lack of studies that investigate the ideological battles between the groups in contesting movements in Saudi context, it is found significant to examine the recent movement of 'alibrāliyah' as identified by different groups, mainly conservatives and progressives, in their battle to gain or maintain hegemony. This thesis designs a framework for examining the diachronic construction of 'alibrāliyah' at macro and micro levels. It combines Corpus Linguistics methods with Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and Discourse Theory (DT). The thesis employed the developed model by examining the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in a corpus of Saudi newspaper articles that discuss mainly the issue of 'alibrāliyah'. The macro corpus analysis of 575 articles has revealed that 'alibrāliyah' is mainly associated with the discourse of religion and the discourse of human rights in which it shifts from being associated with the religious discourse to associating it with the discourse of freedom and human rights at the end of the period. The micro discourse analysis of a sample of texts shows in general that the construction of 'alibrāliyah' shifts from being secular and contradictory to Islam into being compatible to non-fundamental Islam in which 'alibrāliyah' can be adopted within Islam to guarantee the freedom of individuals. It is concluded that this shift in meaning represents the success of liberals to establish their identity and to have power in Saudi society. It is also concluded that the developed model for this thesis can help by intricately investigating the construction of ideological movements and the relation between the groups struggling for hegemony.

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Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
List of Publications	v
Table of Contents	vi
The Transliteration system	x
Table of figures	xii
List of tables	xiii
1. Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Rationale of the study	2
1.2 Aims and objectives.....	3
1.3 Content and structure of thesis	4
2 Chapter 2: Discourses of Modernisation in Saudi Arabia	6
2.1 Introduction.....	7
2.2 Saudi Arabia: The State, the Society and the Dominant Discourse.....	8
2.3 The Sides of the Conflict.....	10
2.3.1 The Religious Conservative Group.....	10
2.3.2 The Progressives group	12
2.4 Conflicts over Modernisation.....	14
2.4.1 Debate over Modernism	14
2.4.2 The Conflict over Secularism	18
2.4.3 Moderate discourse	20
2.4.4 The contestation of ‘alibrāliyah’	22
2.5 Summary.....	24
3 Chapter 3: Theoretical framework	25
3.1 Introduction.....	26
3.2 Williams’ cultural keywords	27
3.3 Corpus-based Cultural keywords	30
3.4 Critical approaches to the analysis of keywords.....	33
3.4.1 Discourse Theory.....	35
3.4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA)	44
3.5 The integration of CL, DT and CDA	51
4 Chapter 4: Methodology; The corpus and the methods for analysis..	55
4.1 Introduction.....	56
4.2 Data.....	56
4.2.1 The data sources	56
4.2.2 The corpus.....	59

4.3	Methods of analysis.....	62
4.3.1	Corpus linguistics methods	62
4.3.2	Critical discourse analysis: Discourse-Historical Approach.....	66
4.4	Translation considerations	73
4.5	Summary of the chapter	73
5	Chapter 5: The Corpus Analysis.....	75
5.1	Introduction.....	76
5.2	The frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah	76
5.3	Key discourses in the corpus of alibrāliyah	78
5.3.1	Top 100 lexical items in the corpus of alibrāliyah	78
5.3.2	Usage of the keywords over time	82
5.4	Collocation analysis: discourse preferences of alibrāliyah	85
5.4.1	Collocates of alibrāliyah	85
5.4.2	Usage of the top collocates over time	88
5.5	Conclusion.....	91
6	Chapter 6: Discursive Analysis of the Texts of the Religious Theme .	92
6.1	Introduction.....	93
6.2	Discursive analysis of the text ‘أسلمة الليبرالية’ /‘The Islamisation of ‘alibrāliyah’; (Religion 2007)	94
6.2.1	Main arguments in the text.....	94
6.2.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	97
6.3	Discursive analysis of the text ‘المتشددون.. الأذكى عند الشدائد’ /‘The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity’; (Religion 2009)	98
6.3.1	Main argument in the text.....	98
6.3.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	101
6.4	Discursive analysis of the text ‘الليبرالية امتداد للحدائثة’/‘alibrāliyah is an extension to ‘hadāthah’; (Religion 2011)	102
6.4.1	Main arguments in the text.....	102
6.4.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	105
6.5	Discursive analysis of the text ‘من هو الليبرالي الإسلامي’ /‘Who is the Islamist’s Liberal?’; (Religion 2013).....	107
6.5.1	Main arguments in the text.....	107
6.5.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	109
6.6	Discursive analysis of the text ‘حقوق الإنسان و التوظيف السياسي’ /‘Human Rights’: between Man and Political Employment’; (Religion 2015).....	111
6.6.1	Main arguments in the text.....	111
6.6.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	114

6.7	Discursive analysis of the text ‘الليبرالية او ما بعد الإيديولوجيات’ (Religion 2016)	116
6.7.1	Main arguments in the text	116
6.7.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	119
6.8	Discussion and Conclusion	121
6.9	Summary	123
7	Chapter 7: Discursive Analysis of the Texts on the Theme of Human Rights	124
7.1	Introduction	125
7.2	Discursive Analysis of ‘الليبر و الليبرون المكبوتون المخدوعون’ ‘alibrāliyah’ and the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal Figures’; (Rights 2007)	126
7.2.1	Main arguments in the text	126
7.2.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	128
7.3	Discursive Analysis of the text ‘هل الليبرالية مناسبة لكل المجتمعات؟’ ‘Is alibrāliyah Suitable for all Societies?’; (Rights 2009)	130
7.3.1	Main arguments in the text	130
7.3.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	132
7.4	Discursive analysis of the text ‘الليبرالية حرية أم فوضوية؟’ ‘alibrāliyah, is it Freedom or Chaos?’; (Rights 2011)	134
7.4.1	Main arguments in the text	134
7.4.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	136
7.5	Discursive Analysis of the text ‘الليبرالية بنكهة سعودية’ ‘alibrāliyah with Saudi Character’; (Rights 2013)	138
7.5.1	Main arguments in the text	138
7.5.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	140
7.6	Discursive Analysis of the text ‘كسر التماسك بين الحرية والليبرالية’ ‘Breaking the Engagement Between Freedom and alibrāliyah’; (Rights 2015)	141
7.6.1	Main arguments in the text	141
7.6.2	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	143
7.7	Discursive analysis of the text ‘الحرية الليبرالية و سوء الفهم التقليدي’ ‘Freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ and the Conventional Misunderstanding’; (Rights 2016)	145
7.7.1	Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory	148
7.8	Discussion and Conclusion	149
7.9	Summary	152
8	Chapter 8: Conclusion	153
8.1	Summary of objectives and methods of analysis	154
8.2	Findings of the Study	155
8.3	Original contribution	156

8.4	Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research.....	157
8.5	Final Remarks	158
9	References	159
10	Appendices	168

The Transliteration system

The Arabic utterances throughout this thesis are transliterated using Latin scripts. The transliteration system follows The Library of Congress Transliteration system¹. The following list presents firstly the Arabic consonants followed by the vowels.

Arabic Consonants

Arabic	Transliteration	Arabic	Transliteration
أ	a	ض	ḍ
ء	'	ط	ṭ
ب	b	ظ	ẓ
ت	t	ع	'
ث	th	غ	gh
ج	j	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	dh	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	هـ	h
س	s	و	w
ش	sh	ي	y
ص	ṣ		

¹ <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsa/romanization/arabic.pdf>.

Arabic Vowels

Arabic	Transliteration
ا	ā
َ	a
ي	ī
ِ	i
و	ū
ُ	u
َ	an
ِ	in
ُ	un

Table of figures

Figure 5-1: Number of articles per year in the corpus (2007-2016)	77
Figure 5-2: The frequency of the lemma 'liberali' (2007-2016).....	78
Figure 5-3: The usage of the top collocates over time.....	88

List of tables

Table 4-1: Information about the selected newspapers.....	57
Table 5-1: Top 100 most frequent lexical items in the corpus	80
Table 5-2: Thematic categories of the top frequent keywords	81
Table 5-3: The usage of keywords over time	85
Table 5-4: The 50 most frequent collocates for 'alibrāliyah' with a span of -5 to +5	86
Table 5-5: The 50 most frequent collocates categorised into thematic groups	87
Table 5-6: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic'	89
Table 5-7: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom	89
Table 5-8: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic' in two periods (ordered by frequency)	90
Table 5-9: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom in two periods (ordered by frequency)	90
Table 6-1: Main discursive strategies used in 6.2.....	98
Table 6-2: Main discursive strategies used in 6.3.....	102
Table 6-3: Main discursive strategies in 6.4	106
Table 6-4: Main discursive strategies in 6.5	110
Table 6-5: Main discursive strategies in 6.6	115
Table 6-6: Main discursive strategies in 6.7	120
Table 7-1: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.2.....	129
Table 7-2: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.3.....	133
Table 7-3: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.4.....	137
Table 7-4: Main Discursive Strategies in text 7.5	141
Table 7-5: Main discursive strategies in 7.5.....	144
Table 7-6: main discursive strategies in text 7.7	148

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Rationale of the study

The socio-political arena in Saudi Arabia is an area of limited detailed research. There has been restricted scope in studies of the clashing ideologies in the area and their power struggle to achieve hegemony in Saudi society. According to Alkhedr (2012), there is a lack of research examining the Saudi socio-political discourse. The clash of ideologies in the region started in the early 1980s during a period when the country's development plans began implementation. This was a clash between religious conservatives and progressives over the discourse of modernism, at the time society was dominated by a religious group. The conflicts over modernisation have occurred in a series of movements namely 'ḥadāthah' / *modernism*, 'ilmāniyah' / *secularism* and alibrāliyah / *liberalism*. Alkhedr stated that these conflicts take the form of the clash over ideological keywords in which each group attempts to discuss what it could mean from their own perspective (2012: 633-634). In this sense, the groups in the Saudi socio-political field attempt to position themselves through charging these key terms with meanings, either positively or negatively, in order to obtain or maintain power.

This is most definitely the case with the recent movement of 'alibrāliyah'. In this scenario, the conflict over domination and supremacy have been characterised by the battle between different factions in line with the concept of 'alibrāliyah'. This research is derived from this observation and aims to examine the construction of the keyword 'alibrāliyah' and the means by which each group defines it to achieve hegemony. The study of the contestation of 'alibrāliyah' would contribute by clarifying the nature of the conflict between the groups in the Saudi socio-political field. In particular, the study of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' would provide an insight into the general discourse of modernism in Saudi culture and the features of the recent dominant discourse.

The study of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' is conducted by developing a theoretical-methodological framework which traces the meaning of the keyword 'alibrāliyah' at macro and micro levels. In particular, it aims to study diachronically the discourse of liberalism in terms of the way the keyword 'alibrāliyah' is articulated by different groups and whether its articulation shift over time. This is carried out through conducting a corpus analysis combined with a discourse analysis of newspaper texts written between 2007-2016. It is concluded that this theoretical framework can be used to study comprehensively the ideologically contested key terms by clashing groups in different contexts.

1.2 Aims and objectives

The broad aim of this study is to investigate the discourse of liberalism in Saudi context with a focus on diachronically examining the construction and development of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' and the identifications of any shift in its construction over time. It also aims to examine the mechanism by which 'alibrāliyah' is articulated by different groups and how the process of defining it is merely a struggle over hegemony. To identify the diachronic identification of 'alibrāliyah' and the struggle over power in identifying it, a theoretical- methodological framework is developed. This framework combines linguistic Corpus Analysis with Discourse Analysis. This framework integrates the corpus analysis of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' at the macro level with discourse approaches of Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and Discourse Theory (DT) at the micro level. This framework is based on the assumption that the contestation of 'alibrāliyah' represents a power struggle between the groups that each aims to charge it with their own meaning. This assumption corresponds to Discourse Theory view that considers contested words such as 'alibrāliyah' as empty signifiers. In line with this, groups in conflict evolved personalised interpretations of the term in order to gain power. The objectives are summarised in the following key points:

- To identify diachronically the construction of 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi context.
- To develop a comprehensive framework to examine the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society.
- To examine the mechanism by which 'alibrāliyah' is identified including the relation between the groups in identifying it.

The study of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' is going to be conducted through the analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles that discuss mainly 'alibrāliyah'. Initially, these articles will be analysed using Corpus Linguistics methods to identify the meanings associated with 'alibrāliyah' over time at the macro level. A qualitative analysis of a sample of articles using Discourse-Historical approach and Discourse Theory is then conducted. DHA will enable the researcher to look at the discursive strategies which are used to construct arguments about 'alibrāliyah'. Discourse Theory also allows the researcher for interpreting the arguments on the basis of the semantic meanings used to fill 'alibrāliyah' and the construction of the groups in each article. Looking at these articles diachronically would enable the researcher to identify whether there is any shift in the construction of 'alibrāliyah' or the groups involved in the debate. The evolution of the assessment relating to 'alibrāliyah' within newspapers is not necessarily a priority. However, the focus is to examine the composition of 'alibrāliyah' within the press platform. It is also worth

noting that as the context and data of this thesis is based on Arabic language, it is found necessary to transliterate some of the Arabic utterances using Latin scripts. This process of transliteration follows The Library of Congress Transliteration system²

1.3 Content and structure of thesis

In this study, a framework is gradually developed to investigate the meaning of discourse through examining the main ideological keyword contested amongst groups to define this discourse. Information of the contest for power between socio-political groups in Saudi Arabia forms the foundation for the evolution of this framework. This struggle over power in Saudi society is identified in terms of contesting ideological keywords in which each group aims to charge it with their own meaning. This was the case with the recent movement of 'alibrāliyah'. Therefore, the aim of this study is to trace its meaning over time. The process of tracing the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' will be conducted through looking at it at the macro level using corpus analysis, plus examining it at the micro level through employing approaches of discourse analysis.

Chapter 2 presents a socio-historical review of the discourse of modernisation and the conflicts surrounding it in Saudi society. It provides information about the establishment and structure of Saudi society, including the opposing sides in the conflict over modernisation and provides a chronological outline of the conflicts that have occurred in different periods. These include conflicts over modernism and secularism as well as a brief introduction of the emergence of the recent conflict over 'alibrāliyah'. The review facilitates the realisation of the features of the historical battle for supremacy and power within the socio-political platform in Saudi Arabia.

In chapter 3, a theoretical-methodological framework is developed to investigate the contested ideological word of 'alibrāliyah'. It reviews and discusses several theories relevant to the study of the meaning of keywords and their shifts across time. Firstly, it presents a discussion on macro level approaches on the subject of keyword analysis which have been examined synchronically and diachronically in line with the connotations of cultural key terms in particular contexts using Corpus Linguistics. The discussion moves then to micro level approaches introducing the Discourse Theory (DT), which considers contested keywords as a case of struggle for gaining hegemony. Discourse-Historical Approach is also discussed as it offers an empirical discursive analysis of the strategies used in constructing discourse as part of the struggle to gain

²The Library of Congress Transliteration system is available at: <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsd/romanization/arabic.pdf>.

power. The chapter concludes by proposing a framework that combines these macro and micro approaches in order to investigate comprehensively the construction and development of ideological keywords which is in the case of this study; the keyword 'alibrāliyah'.

The corpus and methodology are discussed in chapter 4. Firstly, the criteria of the data selection and the process of the compilation of the corpus are discussed. In the second part of the chapter, the analytical methods are discussed. These represent a combination of macro approaches using corpus linguistics methods and micro approaches using historical-discourse approaches. I discuss in detail the methods that are employed for the data analysis providing examples from data that illustrate the application of these methods.

Chapter 5 presents the macro analysis of the corpus of 'alibrāliyah'. It starts with the analysis of the frequency of the usage of 'alibrāliyah' across the corpus of Saudi newspapers over time. This reveals any peaks or troughs in the discussion of 'alibrāliyah'. The results of the analysis of the wordlist and the collocations around 'alibrāliyah' reveal the key discourses associated with 'alibrāliyah' and the shift in these discourses. The results provided by the corpus macro analysis serve as a basis for the qualitative micro analysis. This provides a general understanding of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide the results of the micro qualitative analysis of the construction of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah'. They present an analysis of numerous articles which are selected with the assistance of the corpus analysis. The analysis of the articles follows a diachronic approach in which each article is analysed in terms of the discursive strategies following Discourse-Historical Approach. Thereafter, the semantics of the word 'alibrāliyah' and the groups involved within the debate are examined following the Discourse Theory. This analysis will reveal how 'alibrāliyah' as an empty signifier is charged with meanings over time and the way the different groups attempt to charge it in order to gain or maintain hegemony.

Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the objectives and the methods of the macro and micro analysis, along with the main findings of the study. It also discusses the contribution of this thesis to study comprehensively contested ideologies in a site of power struggle. The imitations of the current study and future research will also be discussed.

Chapter 2: Discourses of Modernisation in Saudi Arabia

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a socio-historical review of the discourse of modernisation, and the conflicts surrounding it in Saudi society. It conveys information about the establishment and structure of Saudi society, outlining the opposing sides in the conflict over modernisation between the religious conservatives and the progressives, and providing a chronological outline of the conflicts that have occurred in different periods.

This review addresses the discourse of modernisation in Saudi society, specifically in relation to the social or ideological terms used, which are an essential component of the modernisation debate, as apparent throughout this chapter. This review is not straightforward, as, according to Alkhdr, the Saudi social situation is particularly complex, even when compared to other Arab societies (2012: 23). This complexity comes to the fore when reading about Saudi social and intellectual transformations; the historical conflicts and the discourses that took place at each stage, and when comparing the transformations in other Arab countries with the Saudi situation. According to Alkhdr (2012: 23), The complexity of understanding the Saudi social situation results from the lack of a systematic and professional recording of the Saudi social case, specifically where no organisations or institutions exist with the purpose of recording the social situation in Saudi Arabia.

Another major factor that complicates readings of the Saudi social situation is the country's successive and accelerated development progress, the relatively recent unification of society, and the phenomenon of "the overlap of ages" when viewing it relative to other longer-established societies (Alkhdr 2012: 32). The overlap of ages is apparent in the disproportionate development of Saudi Arabia over a short time frame, and its fast-paced movement from a traditional society to a modern one, especially in the economic domain, which has driven rapid social development. This overlap of ages makes the Saudi social case unique among the Arab and Islamic countries, which have been in contact with the West and gradually introduced to its approaches, lifestyle, and products over a period of more than a century and a half. The transformation in Saudi society only began after the 1960s, leading to enduring conflicts over modernisation, which first arose over the course of less than two decades. Alkhdr (2012) also observed that the Saudi social situation is particularly difficult for foreign researchers to explore, because they have not been subject to this type of accelerated development.

According to Alkhdr (2012), there is a dearth of studies addressing the Saudi social situation and its socio-political discourse. This prompted Alkhdr to write a historical biography of the Saudi state and society, which is the principle source for this

section. As will be seen in this review, foreign researchers started researching the Saudi case after the West, and specifically the U.S., began to notice the influence of Saudi society following the attacks of September 11th 2001. A foreign researcher known for examining the Saudi historical and socio-political context, specifically Islamist movements, is Lacroix, whose published PhD and the interviews reported within it form an important source for this review. Based on the literature found, this review will attempt to analyse and explain the Saudi social situation relative to the discourse of modernisation, as a way of providing the ideological context to the debate over 'alibrāliyah' that provides the focus of the present thesis.

2.2 Saudi Arabia: The State, the Society and the Dominant Discourse

Saudi Arabia is a relatively recently established kingdom and consists of different regions that were unified over a thirty-year period (1902-1932) by King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud. To this day the country is governed by the Al-Saud royal family. It was established by an alliance between the religious institution of Wahhabism, led by Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab (Lacroix 2011; Moaddel 2013) and the House of Saud. Before the establishment of Saudi Arabia, the region comprised of different self-governing tribes and large families, who were autonomous in the different regions. In order to unite people from groups of relatively diverse traditions and identities, King Abdul-Aziz saw religion, Islam, as the key to constructing a shared identity as a single state (Vassiliev 2000; Al-Farsy 2003). Undeniably, Wahhabism, as a religious institution, has played a crucial role in legitimising the political rule of the Al-Saud royal family by enforcing Al-Saud authority, and ensuring political rule in the kingdom abides by the true tenets of Islam (Moaddel 2013). The 'Wahhabists' offered a religious justification for establishing the Saudi state, encouraging King Abdul-Aziz to launch several wars to unify the country. The unification of Saudi Arabia created a new identity for its inhabitants, i.e. Saudi national identity. This is in addition to individuals' pre-unification tribal and family identities and subservient to their Islamic identity (Al-Farsy 2003).

Diversity in Saudi Arabia is complex, as the kingdom consists of five main regions, whose residents come from a range of tribes and religious groups and hold a variety of individual positions. The main regions are Najd (the central area), Hijaz (the western area in which the holy mosques are located), Alahsa (the eastern region), and the northern and southern regions. A number of tribes are located throughout these regions, and their local governors are members of the Saudi government. In addition, Saudi Arabia is home to people from the two main Islamic sects, the 'Sunni' and 'Shia'.

Sunni Islam is the majority sect in Saudi Arabia, whilst the Shia sect is in the minority, but distributed across the regions.

Despite the complexity and diversity in Saudi Arabia, the society is considered uniformly conservative (Fandy 1999; Raphaeli 2005; Alkhedr 2012; Moaddel 2013). In addition, Islam represents a prominent component of the culture in Saudi Arabia, especially as Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and its Kings are the protectors of the holy mosques and rule according to Islamic law (Fandy 1999). This has been empirically investigated by Moaddel (2013), who concludes that Saudi society takes a significantly religious conservative stance when compared to other Islamic societies; specifically, in terms of their commitment to performing the daily prayers, and in that the population consider their religion as the most important aspect of their identity. One of the main factors that has led society to remain conservative religiously in contemporary times has been the routine exposure to a single dominant type of discourse; i.e. Wahhabi or Salafi discourse (Raphaeli 2005; Beranek 2009; Meijer 2010; Alkhedr 2012:481; Moaddel 2013).

The dominance of Wahhabi religious discourse in Saudi society has taken many forms. For instance, Alkhedr, mentioned above, a Saudi historian who has tried to record the contemporary social history of Saudi Arabia, has stated that official Wahhabi religious dominant discourse does not allow for other kinds of religious teaching to coexist in Saudi Arabia (2012). In addition, religious discourse has dominated many official fields, including primary education and the legislative arena (Alkhedr 2012). Moreover, religious discourse dominates some forms of media, such as books, audio productions and leaflets (Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012; Alghathami 2015). Book publishing and imports, for instance, are censored in Saudi Arabia; in particular, books that deal with social and religious non-Wahhabi subjects are banned. These books are confiscated when found, in accordance with Wahhabi standards (Alkhedr 2012: 481). This domination of religious discourse has been considered a hindrance to Saudi society's communications with the outside world.

Despite the dominance of conservative religious discourse, some forms of modern discourse have started to gain a foothold, having been introduced by a number of 'intellectuals' and progressives³. The first appearance of progressives in 1970 resulted from the rapid development the Saudi state was experiencing. In fact, in the early 1970s,

³ I prefer to use the term 'progressives' which indicates the opposite meaning of conservatives and as the term is not only limited to 'intellectuals' but could involve other classifications as well, such as 'modernists', 'secularists', 'reformists' and 'liberals', as we will see in the following sections.

Saudi society witnessed a development revolution in many fields, transforming the whole of society to a great extent, from a simple society to a modern one, especially in the economic field (Clarke 2007; Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012). This rapid development results in the need to evolve socially to modernise. These attempts have led to confrontation with the proponents of the dominant religious discourse, as they refute all the progressives' attempts to modernise Saudi society (Fandy 1999; Raphaeli 2005; Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012). Alkhedr (2012) added that religious discourse is the most powerful force counteracting change and modernisation in Saudi society, resulting in underdevelopment in the intellectual and social fields, at a time when the country is developing rapidly economically. Before reviewing the discourse of modernisation and the conflicts arising between the religious conservatives and progressives, a historical identification of these two groups, their emergence and their activities is necessary. This will undoubtedly lead to a greater understanding of the Saudi social situation and the intricate aspects associated with these disputes.

2.3 The Sides of the Conflict

2.3.1 The Religious Conservative Group

The dominant religious conservative group in Saudi Arabia adheres to Wahhabism or Salafism teaching. Wahhabism, or Wahhabi Islam, is based on the Islamic teachings of Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahab, an 18th century Islamic scholar from Najd, the central region of today's Saudi Arabia (Salama 2011; Lacroix 2011). Ibn Abdulwahhab called for a revival of what he viewed as *the true Islam* in the Najd area, as he believed some practices and innovations had ruined the creed, which could only be purified by the restoration of true Islam (Lacroix 2011: 11; Salama 2011).

When distinguishing between referring to the religious dominant group as Wahhabi or Salafi, it should be noted that the difference is in the term, not the concept. Abdulwahhab and his companions prefer 'Salafi' over 'Wahhabi', due to the view that 'Wahhabism' could be considered as a new form of religion, and because the 'Salafi' label indicates the meaning of purity of Islam, which serves to legitimise acceptance of them as a group (Alshoi'r 2000; Commins 2015). Wahhabism integrates several principles, which have contributed to the legitimising of the Wahhabis as a religious authority. One of the main principles is that of 'alamr bilm'rūf w anahy 'an almunkar', *commanding right and forbidding wrong*. This principle proceeds from the idea that Muslims should encourage each other to adhere to the true Islam, admonishing those who deviate from the right path (Lacroix 2011). Based on this principle, an official organisation was created in 1926 and is still running today which is 'hay'at alamr bilm'rūf

wa anahy 'an almunkar', *the committee for commanding right and forbidding the wrong* which operates as a religious police force (Lacroix 2011: 12). Another principle Wahhabism has employed to authorise its teaching and to delegitimise other beliefs is the principle of 'alwala' wa albara', 'allegiance and rupture'. This principle entails that a true Muslim, following Wahhabism, must have complete loyalty to his co-religionists and break completely with infidels (Lacroix 2011: 13). It has been exploited by the religious group in their battles against change and modernity, as we will see throughout this chapter.

Besides adopting particular Islamic principles to appear religiously legitimate, Wahhabism's teaching and discourse are completely dependent on Quranic and prophetic texts, without recourse to reviewing or discussing them. According to Alkhedr, this dependence has made it difficult for traditional Wahhabis to review the texts on the basis of contemporary needs, especially since Saudi Arabia has started to develop in many fields (2012: 59). To fill this gap, and continue the religious dominance over Saudi society, a group of educated Wahhabis called the 'Sahwa' have emerged as opponents to the advocates of modernisation, offering some solutions to meet modern needs, such as those related to the economic field.

The 'Sahwa' 'awakening Islam' movement is part of Wahhabism's doctrine, and it serves as an educational group, explaining the contemporary issues Saudis face in their modern lives by confronting modernisation and the new trends in society (Lacroix 2015; Alkhedr 2012). In fact, 'Sahwa' members emerged in the 1980s, representing the educated religious in many fields who tried through education to dominate Saudi society (Lacroix 2011). Most are graduates of Saudi universities who later taught at these universities and also engage in other extracurricular activities, such as preaching and occupying offices at many official institutions, one of which is 'the committee for commanding right and forbidding wrong' (Lacroix 2011).

'Sahwa', as a religious conservative movement, emerged with a strict practice of observing Islamic norms not only limited to clerics but applicable to everyone (Lacroix 2011). Unlike its origin in Wahhabism, 'Sahwa' tried to impose its ideology at the social level. Educated 'Sahwists' main concern was to homogenise society under their ideology (Lacroix 2011: 78). Part of homogenising society in modern times involves imposing the belief that Islam as an overall system has an answer for every detail of daily life (Lacroix 2011: 60). It is through this belief that 'Sahwa' has started addressing subjects relating to daily life, as well as preaching about afterlife issues (Alkhedr 2012: 78). Another main strategy that 'Sahwa' undertook in order to impose its ideology is charging the society

against what they consider the conspiracy of *westernisation* and *intellectual invasion*, which views any new unfamiliar conceptions as products of the foreign western culture (Alkhdr 2012:73). 'Sahwa' also prompted a new language, combining the language of the intelligentsia and the clerics (Lacroix 2011: 79). This ideology has resulted in what Lacroix (2011) called the rising presence of 'Sahwa' in the social field, leading to what has been called 'Ji l Alsahwa', *the Sahwa generation*. As part of the emergence and growth of 'Sahwa', they have viewed intellectuals or progressives as the main group to encounter to test their ascendancy, resulting in many confrontations between the two groups (Lacroix 2011).

When practising their dominance, Sahwis emphasise expressing a negative attitude towards other sources of knowledge; especially the media, such as satellite broadcasts and the internet (Alkhdr 2012). Although the Sahwa have warned against some media forms, their discourse has been communicated via cassettes, books and leaflets and also on satellite TV and the internet (Alghathami 2005; Lacroix 2011; Alkhdr 2012). Indeed, at the beginning of the Sahwa movement, Sahwis relied mostly on cassettes to communicate their ideology (Lacroix 2011) and had a major effect on shaping public opinion and views in society on various subjects (Alkhdr 2012). One of the main concerns the Sahwa has sought to impose on society through the media is a warning against modernisation and the progressives, as will be discussed throughout this chapter.

2.3.2 The Progressives group

Unlike the Wahhabi conservatives, the influence of the progressives was felt later in the Saudi state, following the launch of *development/ 'tanmiyah'* plans, driven by the necessity of modernisation to compete with neighbouring nations (Lacroix 2011: 14; Alkhdr 2012: 491). The emergence of this group is associated closely with scholarships for Saudi students to foreign schools and universities outside Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2011: 15; Alkhdr 2012). Lacroix (2011) indicates that Saudi scholars were initially sent to Arab countries in the 1940s and 1950s, mostly to Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. Later, influenced by Arab movements, such as Arab nationalism and leftism, the government chose to alter scholarship destinations to Western universities, as it was wary of Arab movements promoting nationalism and leftism, as they had led to revolutions and coups against monarchies in the 1950s, creating political turmoil in the region. According to Lacroix (2011), Saudi students who were affected by the Arab political movements represented a disturbance in their political institutions and felt repressed by the government who sought to maintain political stability (2011: 16). Subsequently, in the

late 1960s, the government felt a need once more for educated people to push forward development plans, due to pressure from the United States to maintain development. When the scholarship programme resumed, sending students to Western countries (Alkhedr 2012: 499), it was notable that Saudi scholars returned to Saudi Arabia having adopted beliefs, such as nationalism, socialism and communism. Unlike previously, where changes focused on the political field, this time concerns related to social matters, specifically social values and attitudes. All these classifications contributed to Saudi society under one category, which was 'muthaqaf' or *intellectuals*, indicating the meaning of the educated group (Lacroix 2011: 17).

Progressive discourse started to appear in the early 1970s, when some intellectuals started discussing literary theories in Saudi newspapers, such as Okaz, Al-Riyadh and Al-Yawm (Lacroix 2011). These newspapers include allocated cultural attachments, where intellectuals can publish literary works and discuss literary theories; these are not censored in the same way as mainstream newspapers (Lacroix 2011). Although progressive discourse at first was confined to a literary context, Lacroix (2011) has indicated that progressives later started to imply a need for social change and openness.

In 1975, the intellectuals gained some space to practice their literary activities when they were allowed to establish 'literary clubs' across the kingdom under the governmental institution of the General Directorate of Youth Affairs (Lacroix 2011: 19). Intellectuals were able to freely practise their literary activities until the mid-1980s without any interference from the proponents of the dominant religious discourse. Lacroix attributes this to many reasons, including that before that time the conservatives had lacked the kind of education that would enable them to debate with intellectual scholars (2011). Another reason Lacroix provides is that religious conservatives were not able to produce literary works as an alternative to those of intellectuals. Moreover, at that time, clerics and intellectuals spoke two different languages; whereas the Wahhabi clerics' discourse dealt with issues of theology and law, the intellectuals were focusing on initiating concepts such as 'ḥadāthah', *modernism* and 'tanmiyah', *development* (Lacroix 2011: 24). This was until the late 1980s, when the 'Sahwa' emerged with a different discourse that, unlike the Wahhabi issues limited to creed, extended to include several arenas of particular interest in the social and intellectual fields (Alkhedr 2012). This led to multiple conflicts in the social arena, where the dominant 'Sahwis' opposed any other types of discourse, including that of modernisation headed by progressives. These conflicts have been reported mainly by the press, which recorded different points of view with regard to specific conflicts (Alkhedr 2012). However, it must be noted that the Saudi

press was censored, so it could not publish all the details and stances present in these conflicts. In recent years, the internet has also played a major role in addressing such conflicts, as it offers the privilege of being able to access information readily with no limitations (Alkhedr 2012). The confrontation between the conservatives and the progressives created the first notable conflict, the ‘Sahwa-ḥadāthah’ battle (Lacroix 2011; Alkhedr 2012) dealt with in the following section.

2.4 Conflicts over Modernisation

This section presents the conflicts between the religious conservative group and the progressives in the Saudi socio-political site over two decades. It first discusses the initial conflict between both groups over the trend towards ‘ḥadāthah’, *modernism* in the 1980s and how the religious group ‘Sahwa’ won this conflict. This was followed by the 1990s conflict over ‘ilmāniyah’, *secularism*, which ‘Sahwa’ used as an accusation against progressives as a strategy to keep in power and delegitimise progressives’ attempts at modernisation. A discourse of moderation was presented in the early 2000s after the decay of ‘Sahwa’ and the incident on the 11th of September, which concerns the call for moderate discourse and religious reform. These attempts at moderation led then to the contestation of alibrāliyah in 2007, which then led to a debate over its meaning and the way it can be employed in Saudi society, which the current research aims to investigate. Therefore, the presentation of these historical details of the conflicts between the religious and the progressives would help further understanding of the nature of the conflict over power between the groups in general, and in relation to the discourse of alibrāliyah in particular.

2.4.1 Debate over Modernism

In the late 1970s and early 1980s a new type of discourse was formulated, called ‘ḥadāthah’, *modernism* by a group who viewed themselves as *modernists* “Hadathyon”. Their discourse was limited to literary criticism and writing. According to Lacroix, ‘ḥadāthah’ was the first remarkable intellectual trend in Saudi society apparently actively criticised and produced modern literary works (2011: 134). Its emergence coincided with the time when the country’s development plans started to be distinctively fulfilled, and at that time the ‘Sahwa’ movement had not yet been completely formed. In fact, the modern literary work was commonly associated with modernising form, such as writing poetry in free verse. Modernist discourse in Saudi Arabia was based principally on writing literary works in a free style, whose meaning was indirect and based on involving many symbols, whose interpretation could be left to the reader (Alfifi 2005). By modernising content and using literary symbols, Fandy (1999) has argued that the Saudi modernists used literary

writing to disguise their protests against the dominant religious discourse. This was further emphasised by Lacroix, who stated that the modernists' literary criticism implied social criticism, calling implicitly for social modernisation (2011: 134). Alkhedr also referenced the idea of modernists' tendency for social modernisation, by arguing that modernist activities were limited to literary production and criticism, because there was limited freedom to discuss ideological trends in the media and the press (Alkhedr 2012: 396).

'ḥadāthah' as a term relates to *modern* meaning, and it is a translation of *modernity* indicating the meaning of development, and a translation of 'modernism' when using it as a concept to indicate a trend or a meaning for a movement (Almahmood 2012). According to Lacroix (2011), the term 'ḥadāthah' was first used by Arab intellectuals outside Saudi Arabia in the early twentieth century to indicate the tendency of criticising the literary tradition and adopting new free literary styles. Therefore, it could be argued that Saudi modernists are to some extent influenced by the literary modernism of other Arab countries. Another point of importance is that ḥadāthah' as a term was not used by modernists initially. It was only later that they explicitly described their literary criticism as under the concept of 'ḥadāthah' (Lacroix 2011: 135). This use of the 'ḥadāthah' name was considered scandalous and exploited subsequently by the 'Sahwi' conservatives in their fight against modernism (Lacroix 2011). This impression of 'ḥadāthah' as a term indicates how the use of terms, particularly ideological ones, creates a genuine problem in Saudi society. In fact, one of the main reasons the 'ḥadāthah' term has been considered problematic could be due to what Alkhedr has mentioned, i.e. that the 'ḥadāthah' term, as with other terms such as 'ilmāniyah' / , *secularism* and 'Qawmīyah' / *nationalism*, is an ideological term that has raised the ire of traditional Sahwi conservatives who consider these ideologies as infidelity (2012: 409). Another factor leading to the announcement of the 'ḥadāthah' name being considered a scandal in conservative Saudi society may be the view, commonly held by conservatives in the Arab world about the 'hadathah' concept. Conservative Arabs view 'ḥadāthah' as led by pioneering Arab modernists influenced by Western modernists, citing it as a Western ideology that seeks to destroy Arabic and Islamic heritage and traditions (Almahmood 2012).

In fact, the emergence of the 'ḥadāthah' trend originally did not receive much attention or interference from the dominant religious discourse. According to Lacroix (2011), religious conservatives at that time lacked an appropriate level of education that would enable them to confront and fight modernists and modernism. He stated that the modernists were experiencing a rapid evolution and progress in the mid-1980s, and thus,

the 'Sahwa' religious movement appeared to oppose modernism as a movement and modernists. Thus, when the 'Sahwis' began to take on the intellectual modernists as their main opposition, they questioned them about their intention in stating that they are 'ḥadāthywn' or *modernists* (Lacroix 2011: 137). The 'Sahwis' did this by imposing their presence where the modernists were, such as in literary clubs and in academic lectures (Lacroix 2011). Some of these 'Sahwi' conservatives fought the modernists, by asking the government to ban modernist columnists from writing in the newspapers (Fandy 1999: 131). In addition, the 'Sahwis' extended their fight through multiple media channels, such as books, cassettes, leaflets and Jum'a' prayer speeches. In Jum'ah prayers, a campaign commenced targeting the modernists, accusing them personally, giving the example of Alghathami, a Saudi modernist and academic, who they called "bd alshayṭan", *the son of Satan* (Lacroix 2011: 140). In addition, a cassette by a 'Sahwi' named Saeed Alghamdi was widely distributed denouncing modernists and their inclinations (Fabdy 1999; Lacroix 2011).

The 'Sahwa' had a major influence in their fight against modernism when a Sahwi named Awad Alqarni published a book called 'alḥadāthah fī mīzan alislām', *Modernism in the Scale of Islam* (Alqarni 1988). This book was written in a dialogic style, speaking to society and trying to mobilize public opinion against the modernist trend. According to Alsamadani, modernism has been associated with concepts of "ilḥad", "mārksīyah", "dārwinīyah", "shiwīyah", in English atheism, Marxism, Darwinism and communism respectively (2013: 37). This association is a strategy used to relate Saudi modernism to Western modernism, which implicitly excludes modernists from being part of the in-group or members of Islamic conservative Saudi society. 'alwalā' wa albarā", as a Wahhabi principle, has also been referred to. The author, Alqarni, has used it to state that Saudi modernists' loyalty to Western and Arab modernists makes them representatives of a concept of otherness, whether they apply Western modernist principles or not (Alsamadani 2013). In addition, the book appeals to the authorities to legitimise the self by using Quranic and prophetic texts, and the grand mufti's introduction. According to Alkhedr, since the 1980s the Sahwa have used the grand mufti to legitimise their spread as an official and religious authority in society (2012).

After this conflict, the term 'ḥadāthah' was banned by the Ministry of Information in all forms of media (press, TV and radio), due to the major conflict that use of this terminology had caused (Alghathami 2005: 33; Lacroix 2011: 157; Alkhedr 2012: 675). Alghathami (2005) indicated that the term 'ḥadāthah' was then replaced in the media by terms such as 'tajdīd' / *renewal*, 'tatwīr' / *development* and 'taqadum' / *progress*. In fact,

the ban was not upheld, as 'ḥadāthah' was used once more, after people started to forget about the conflict, as there was no official outlawing of the term (Alghathami 2005: 32).

After the publication of Alqarni's book (1998), the modernists did not reply immediately to the Sahwa group, as they feared any response might worsen the situation, at a time when the majority of society was enraged about the new trend. Alghathami (2005) argues, as a modernist, that he did not offer any response to the book because its content and style were weak, and it had been written in a subjective, aggressive way. This was criticised by Alkhedr (2012), who stated that the modernist trend had no comprehensive method to base their defence on, and this weakness hindered them from explaining themselves, especially given the effect the book had caused (2012: 397). He adds that the modernists had failed to define what is meant by the term 'ḥadāthah' in the Saudi context, indicating that this is part of a larger problem in the Saudi case, which involves the difficulty of defining concepts and attitudes towards them in the conservative Saudi society (2012: 413). This failure has been exploited, as seen by the Sahwa, who defines 'ḥadāthah' as modernism in the Western context.

Alghathami sought to explain the 'ḥadāthah' story 17 years after the conflict in a book named *The Story of Modernism in Saudi Arabia* (2005). He opened his book by stating that modernism has no fixed meaning, but that it is an intellectual state that brings together intellectual ideas as well as management tools and lifestyles, and that its definition depends on the social situation. In his book he alternates between using 'ḥadāthah' to mean modernism, indicating the meaning of the literary trend, and using it to mean modernity and the development of society, commenting that 'ḥadāthah' is an inevitable reality. Alghathami has indicated that the term "hadathah" is not limited to literary discourse but can be used to refer to other kinds of discourse. He adds that recent use of the "Hadathah" term in Saudi society to indicate the meaning of literary modernist theory does not mean it cannot be used to refer to earlier development plans the country adopted after its establishment (2005: 38). In fact, Alghathami has persisted in speaking about "Hadathah" in the context of development; citing in detail the various development plans the country has carried out, such as settling Bedouins, managing the oil boom, and implementing overseas scholarships. Referring to 'ḥadāthah' as a literary theory, Alghathami offers no clear explanation about what it could mean anything other than his personal conflict with anti-modernists. By blending concepts, it is apparent that the writer has attempted to deviate the reader away from explaining what 'ḥadāthah' as a trend actually means; especially as he has noted that the term can be used in the Saudi context to indicate the meaning of literary theory. It can be argued that, even though he blamed the Sahwa for not understanding the concept of 'ḥadāthah', he failed to define it in the

Saudi case. This indicates how modernism as a trend in Saudi Arabia has not been completely formulated, and the writer covered this methodological weakness by avoiding defining the 'ḥadāthah' trend by mentioning development plans.

2.4.2 The Conflict over Secularism

The modernisation debate was intensified at the time of the Gulf War, with the arrival of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990 (Fandy 1999). A group from the Sahwa movement also opposed the presence of American troops on Saudi soil, accusing Saudi supporters of the American presence of 'ilmāniyah', in English, secularism. In fact, the term 'ilmāniyah' was first used by the Sahwa to accuse progressives, before spreading as a label to all progressives. *Secularism* or 'ilmāniyah' as a trend had started before, in other Arab countries, as some Arab governments had started applying secularism derived from the West, to become modernised (Nikki 2004). Nikki (2004) stated that the Western colonisation of Arab countries did not affect Saudi Arabia, which has never been a colony and so was never introduced to secularisation and modernisation. The word 'ilmānī' / *secular* was first used widely in Arab countries in the middle of 20th century, when secular nationalists with political power became leaders in the various Arab countries, adopting secular programmes as part of their practice of modernisation (Nikki 2004). Nikki (2004) added that the secular trend in Arab countries is relatively socially weak, due to its association with Western colonial values and the fact that the majority of Arabs identify themselves with Islam, and thus, anti-secular trends have been exploited in their campaigns against secularism.

However, Saudi Arabia has never been colonised, or undergone a secular programme. The Sahwa conservatives started using the term 'ilmāniyah' / *secularism* to accuse their opponents of being secularists, in their efforts to fight and exclude progressives. Alsolaiman (2011) tried to deconstruct the term 'ilmāniyah', concluding that in Arabic it denotes secularism, i.e. the separation between religion and society; whereas on a general ideological and political level, it means 'laïcité', the French term that indicates the separation of religious institutions from state institutions. In the Saudi case, the term 'ilmāniyah' is associated with 'secularism', since Saudi Arabia is far from adopting 'laïcité', especially given the fact that it was established on the basis of an Islamic state structure.

The secularism conflict occurred in the early 1990s, when the 'Sahwa' started fighting against one of those who they believed was 'ilmānī', named Ghazi Algosaibi. Algosaibi was an effective and popular figure, working as a poet, a writer and an ambassador. At the time of the Gulf War, he started supporting fights against the

religious 'Shawa', discourse for their negative attitude regarding the use of American troops. Algosaibi also started writing articles in 'Alsharq Alawsat' newspaper, under the column heading 'in the eye of the storm', where he discussed ironically, issues relating to opponents of the war besides some social issues and their association in the religious field. His articles opposed the 'Sahwa' discourse, because the 'Sahwa' at that time were using cassettes to orient public opinion regarding the danger of using Western power in the war, questioning their interest in political subjects (Alkhedr 2012). He also opposed the 'Sahwa' for their involvement in social issues, such as the women driving, labelling them 'usūlyūn', *fundamentalists*, as he himself translated the word, and urging them to concentrate only on religious matters (Algosaibi 1991). The 'Sahwa' immediately fought back with cassettes, accusing him of being 'ilmānī', and speaking negatively about the official government for permitting Americans to participate in the war (Lacroix 2011: 161). Among the 'Sahwa' who accused Algosaibi of 'ilmāniyah' were Alawda, Alomar and Alqarni, who saw in Algosaibi's articles a secular conspiracy designed to exclude religion from all other fields. Alawda, for example, countered Algosaibi on a cassette entitled '*Islamic cassette; its advantages and disadvantages*' (1990), where he tried to disprove Algosaibi's views regarding the misuse of Islamic cassettes. Alawda started his speech by quoting Algosaibi's statement that he wished clerics would stick to the religious field and not address political subjects. After that, using an interrogative style and exclamations, Alawda questions the quote, stating it is possible to separate politics from religion. Following this, he states that Islam is a complete system, of which politics is just a part which cannot be separated, as such separation is 'ilmāniyah'. After that, Alawda started using the dialogic style, speaking personally to Algosaibi and asking him how he is able to serve as a poet, a politician and an administrator at the same time, while asking the clerics to stick to a single field (Alawda 1990).

Unlike the conflict over modernism, when the modernists did not immediately reply to the 'Sahwa' conservatives, Algosaibi chose to reply to the 'Sahwa' with written letters, three were directed to three 'Sahwa' clerics; Alawda, Alomar and Alqarni, and two to Saudi society. Algosaibi chose to publish these letters in a book he 'ḥatta lā takūn fetnah', '*For the prevention of dissension*'. The title of this book is a Quranic verse, indicating his use of religious language throughout the book (Lacroix 2011: 161). He debated with them generally, by saying that he is not an 'ilmānī', as 'ilmāniyah' is defined by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth as a 'call for separating the government institutions from religious institutions' as based on this definition he stated that 'ilmāniyah' is infidelity. He further denied being 'ilmānī', since his writings are wholly unrelated to 'ilmāniyah' (Algosaibi 1991). In particular in his reply to Alawda, his use of religious

language was clear from the beginning, where he uses a prophetic saying that indicates the importance of obeying one's political leaders. He continued by explaining that the country's establishment was based on religion, and its leaders' rule with Islam, and, therefore, secularism does not exist. He added that what he was cautioning against were the kind of political clerics who disobeyed their leader's commands, as had happened in their opposition to the Gulf War. Algosaibi replied to Alawda, switching between an impersonal third-person style and an involved first-person style, by first clarifying the nature of Islam in Saudi Arabia, besides the reality of political clerics, and then by speaking personally to Alawda to refute his claims.

According to Alkhedr (2012: 420), Algosaibi used a similar discourse to that of his adversaries when dealing with the 'ilmānīyah' concept, on the basis of its meaning in religious discourse, rather than discussing other meanings of 'ilmānīyah' from alternate perspectives, showing that he did agree with them on the religious definition of 'ilmānīyah'. Arguably, Algosaibi was trying to speak with a similar discourse to that of the conservatives, discussing 'ilmānīyah' with them from their own perspective, especially given the fact that they had accused him of being 'ilmānī'. The use of religious language can also be attributed to the realisation that religious discourse is largely effective in Saudi conservative society as it is dominant. After this conflict, Algosaibi's popularity declined, since society was influenced by the accusation made by the members of the dominant religious discourse, especially their questioning of the validity of his religious faith. The label 'ilmānī' continued to be used by the Sahwa against progressives until the late 1990s, which coincided with what Alkhedr (2012) considers the decay of the dominance of the 'Sahwa' discourse.

2.4.3 Moderate discourse

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the internet became available in Saudi Arabia, and Saudis started discussing the social situation they faced in blogs, forums and social networks, leading to a kind of plurality of thought, whereby the 'Sahwa' are no longer the dominant discourse in society (Alkhedr 2012; Otterbeck 2012; Algathami 2015: 10). The internet allows for this plurality of discourse through an accessible and impartial display of different subjects (Alkhedr 2012; Alghathami 2015). This open access to the internet has offered new sources of knowledge, undergoing no official censorship or religious control. In addition, this open access operates as an informational tool for Saudis that the local media has failed to provide (Alhargan 2012). Alkhedr (2012) specified that this plurality of thought agrees on one main thing, i.e. formulating a new kind of moderate

discourse that discusses problems with fundamental religious discourse and offers solutions to radicalisation (Alkhedr 2012).

This call for a moderate discourse and religious reform was also a result of external pressure, specifically from the United States, after the September 11th 2001 terror attack (Lacroix 2005; Beranek 2009; Meijer 2010; Alkhedr 2012) and after several terror attacks occurred in 2003 inside Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2005; Raphaeli 2005; Meijer 2010; Alkhedr 2012). This trend towards moderation, or in Arabic 'wasatīyah' has been led by progressives or reformists who have called for revisions to Wahhabi religious doctrine, in particular on the matter of radicalisation (Lacroix 2005; 2011). This new call for moderation has not only been debated on the internet but has also been discussed in newspapers. To date, Alwatan newspaper has devoted the most coverage to the moderation discourse debate (Alkhedr 2012: 605).

Within the climate of local and global pressure calling for a moderate discourse, the Saudi government has found an opportunity to establish social and religious reform. In 2003 around 100 Saudi intellectuals appealed to the government to establish social reform, by making demands that included acknowledging freedom of speech and establishing civil society institutions (Raphaeli 2005). The government responded to the demands for reform by establishing the National Dialogue Conference in February 2003 (Gause 2004; Raphaeli 2005; Lacroix 2005). This National Dialogue Conference brought together clerics of different religious sects (Salafists and non-Salafist Sunnis, Sufis and Shiites) and concluded with some recommendations, one of which was the acknowledgement of intellectual and religious diversity in the Saudi nation, which clearly contradicts Wahhabi religious dominance (Lacroix 2005; Raphaeli 2005). According to Raphaeli (2005), promises of reform were not fulfilled immediately, and, therefore, in September 2003 a group of around 300 intellectuals signed a petition to the government, arguing that the late adoption of reform plans would lead religious groups to maintain their dominance. The political leadership responded to this argument by holding a second national dialogue conference in December 2003, entitled 'Extremism and moderation: a pragmatic vision' (Raphaeli 2005). This meeting proposed many recommendations, including ordering academic religious institutions to conform to defining the terms and concepts related to 'extremism', such as 'terrorism' and the 'elite sector', asking for a revision of the religious discourse in a manner that suits the contemporary situation with an understanding of the situation in the external world, calling for openness and communication as a means to improve the education curriculum in a manner that would invoke tolerance and moderation (King Abdulaziz Center of

National Dialogue 2003). Also, this conference discussed the issue of the 'Alwala' wa albara' principle, and how it should be revised.

In this same period, as part of the reform process and insistence on plurality in discourse, Meijer (2010) indicated that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs warned Imams about addressing their conflicts against progressives on mosques' podiums. When the conservatives felt reformists or intellectuals were starting to gain some new power through reform policies, they started delegitimising reformists and their discourse by applying several labels (Meijer 2010). Reformists have been referred to as 'intellectual terrorists' and 'corrupts on earth', and of concealing their purpose under the devious terms of 'reform' and 'nationalism'. Their discourse has been labelled as "*decay*", 'inḥilāl' instead of "*progress*", 'taqadum', since, according to the conservatives, the reformists' progress is based on the decay of religion (Meijer 2010). The progressive reformists responded in an outspoken way at this time, describing the conservatives as reactionaries opposing both reform and modernity. They also accused conservatives of destroying the country's image by seeking to detach the country from the rest of the world (Meijer 2010).

Raphaeli (2005) and Meijer (2010) have argued that many of the reform promises have probably failed to be achieved because Saudi Society remains too conservative to embrace full reform. Reformists have also failed to exert sufficient influence to drive change, as they, according to Meijer (2010), speak a language alien to Wahhabism and the majority of society. Alkhedr has another view of this failure; he indicates that, despite the flaws in moderation discourse, attempts at moderation have been genuine communicating objective critical views (2012: 652). Part of this failure can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the concepts of 'wasatīyah', *moderation* and 'iṣlāḥ', *reform*. Gause (2004) indicated that the 'iṣlāḥ', *reform* term, that the government committed to in its agenda, never specified clearly what it would include. This led to it having different meanings to different people. It is was also considered by Meijer (2010) as a buzzword in Saudi Arabia in 2005. Lacroix (2011) has further indicated that the term 'iṣlāḥ' was an ambiguous word, which each person interprets as they choose, and religious conservatives interpret as bringing things closer to Islam. This failure seems to have been a disappointment to progressives and later on, they introduced a new term, which was contested in Saudi society, alibrāliyah.

2.4.4 The contestation of 'alibrāliyah'

In 2006/2007, a call for new trend emerged; this was the call for alibrāliyah. It started as a desirable alternative for some people seeking moderate Islamic solutions

(Alkhedr 2012). The emergence of the trend was due to a number of factors, including its prior rise in Arab states and then neighbouring Gulf countries, along with the attempts at enlightenment following the September 11th attacks. According to Alghathami (2013), alibrāliyah first emerged in Arab countries in the 1960s and was resisted as representative of western colonisation. However, the concept in the Gulf countries, i.e. Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai represented liberation from the British coloniser who was seen as having interfered with their internal affairs (Alrimizan 2009).

As Saudi Arabia never underwent a period of colonization, alibrāliyah emerged later there than in the surrounding countries. It emerged after 11th of September 2001, when attention was being drawn to the practices of extreme Islam in Saudi Arabia and the dominance of the 'Sahwa' group in society. This afforded freedom of expression to the opponents of 'Sahwa', who agree upon the necessity of getting rid of 'Sahwa' who shift people's attention from matters of daily life to focus on the afterlife, along with asking people to oppose the progressives (Alrimizan 2009). These factors combined led to the emergence of alibrāliyah, which liberals saw as an optimistic view to build success in Saudi society. Supporters of the liberal trend first used the internet to call for alibrāliyah, by establishing a number of online forums; one of the most prominent being 'alshabaka allibraliah alsaudia' / 'Saudi liberal network' (founded in 2006). At this time alibrāliyah was not a popular term in society; however, it was highly contested after a TV series called 'Tash' broadcast an episode on alibrāliyah (Alkhedr 2012). 'Tash' was a sarcastic series that dealt with Saudi social issues and was broadcast daily in the month of Ramadan and seen by the majority of the society. It broadcast an episode in September 2007 entitled 'libralion wa laken...' 'Liberals but...' portraying Saudi liberals as stray, devious people (Alkhedr 2012: 641). After this episode, the debate took to the newspapers, as columnists started discussing what alibrāliyah could mean and how it might be applied to Saudi society (Alkhedr 2012). This contestation of the meaning of alibrāliyah arose partly because the term is not of Arabic origin, which creates a difficulty identifying it.

The religious conservatives showed a negative attitude towards the term alibrāliyah. When one of the clerics, named Saleh Alfawzan, was asked about alibrāliyah, he explained it is a collusion made by others without showing any understanding of the concept or discussing objectively what it means (Alkhedr 2012: 637). Alfawzan brought alibrāliyah into confrontation with Islam, stating that being liberal and Muslim at the same time is a contradiction (Alfawzan 2007). The fatwa prompted a reaction in newspaper column articles, where writers were divided in their attitude into opponents and proponents (Alkhedr 2012). However, in relation to the definition of alibrāliyah in the Saudi context, the writers stated that alibrāliyah cannot be defined. Alkhedr commented

that this can be justified in terms of avoidance, whereby liberals avoid defining alibrāliyah, as its real meaning could irritate conservative Saudi society (2012: 638). Despite Alkhedr (2012) discussing the alibrāliyah as an emergent contested term, he did not mention any of the liberals' names, or what alibrāliyah could mean as he had done with secularism and modernism.

2.5 Summary

This review has examined the history of modernisation in Saudi Arabia. It has demonstrated the history of conflicts between the conservatives and progressives, in relation to aspects of the discourse of each period. Throughout the review, it was apparent that the conflicts centred on resistance among the dominant religious conservative group to the existence of other types of discourse. This was apparent through the opposition to new trends regarding the use of ideological terms, such as the 'ḥadāthah', and through the use of ideological terms as a strategy to demolish progressives through a process of secularisation, using the term 'ilmāniyah'. The appearance and use of the ideological term alibrāliyah is to some extent different, in that it has started to be used a lot and contested without any clear idea of what it might mean in the Saudi context.

Alkhedr has paid attention to this issue in Saudi society which is the contestation of ideological terms. He states that this problem is an extension of the religious conservative's misunderstanding of ideological concepts, as they contested the terms as a strategy in their fight against modernisation activities (2012: 633-634). He adds that the problem of using some concepts such as alibrāliyah appeared in an environment in which the concepts had not been fully formulated. In addition, the terms were only used widely with great reluctance by the majority of conservative society, which led to a broadly negative representation and misinterpretation. Furthermore, when the terms were introduced, they met with no objective investigation of their meaning, and little understanding of how they could be applied in a way that suited Saudi society. Thus, this study will investigate objectively, from a linguistic perspective, how alibrāliyah as a contested term has been represented in the Saudi context. This phenomenon needs to be investigated for an additional reason, which is the lack of Saudi discourse studies. Alkhedr has stated that there is a lack of research describing the social, religious and political discourse in Saudi Arabia. Saudi researchers have routinely failed to describe the Saudi situation objectively and independent foreign researchers have failed to describe it in sufficient depth or critically (Alkhedr 2012: 34).

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss several selected theories known to be relevant to the study of the meaning of keywords in particular contexts. It aims to provide a theoretical framework to explain how socio-political keywords can be examined within the wider contexts in which they occur. Since the aim of this thesis is to examine the discursive representation of the key term 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi socio-political context, this research is necessarily related to more than one discipline. It is interdisciplinary, as it aims to analyse more than one layer of the context in which alibrāliyah is used; i.e. the immediate co-text, the intertextual context and the broader historical and socio-political contexts. Therefore, this chapter will combine various approaches including socio-historical approaches with approaches in linguistic analysis, CDA and Discourse Theory (DT).

In the first part of this chapter, I review the central work of Raymond Williams *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, which examines cultural keywords in society. The focus will be on the socio-historical model Williams (1983) established and the primary level of his analytical approach. The review then presents a discussion on macro level approaches on keywords analysis; i.e. Michael Stubbs' (2001) linguistic approach to the meaning of social keywords and the relevant literature that has examined synchronically and diachronically the connotations of cultural key terms in particular contexts using corpus linguistics. The discussion moves then to micro level approaches introducing critical theories that examine the meaning of contested keywords within their ideological contexts. This includes a review of DT, which considers contested keywords as empty signifiers, constituted within the social struggle for gaining hegemony. In DT an empty signifier is a signifier without a particular signified and charging it with meaning is a hegemonic practice (Laclau 1996; 2007). Since DT does not provide a methodological guideline for a textual analysis of keywords, it was necessary to conduct a review of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, as this affords a textual-oriented approach that considers language use as a site of power struggle, and so combines with the theoretical concerns of DT. Special attention is given to reviewing the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as it offers an empirical discursive analysis of texts taking into account the historical and the socio-political contexts. I conclude by proposing an empirical methodology to combine corpus-based analysis with CDA approach which can help in analysing the textual and the discursive construction of the keyword alibrāliyah in the Saudi context.

3.2 Williams' cultural keywords

In his book *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1983), Raymond Williams provided a socio-historical analysis of the meanings of cultural keywords in a specified period in the English society. In it Williams attempts to understand and characterize the English culture in the post-war years, as he had noticed that it was undergoing a rapid transition. Williams chose to study English culture through the use of language, and in particular in reference to keywords that were frequently used and contested. Thus, he devised a list of around 130 keywords that he attempted to examine synchronically and diachronically. In particular, he undertook an analysis of their origin, how their meanings had changed and developed over time and their current meanings, as used in society. In addition, he explored the relations between these keywords and how their meanings interconnect over time on the basis of the social context.

Williams observed that certain words' usages had changed noticeably, commenting that "...meanings are offered, felt for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qualified and changed" (1983:12). Williams adds that he found himself preoccupied by a single word 'culture' that he was hearing more frequently, noting that "it was just a difficult word" to analyse (1983:13). Williams started exploring the meanings of the word 'culture' linking it to four other keywords: 'class', 'art', 'industry' and 'democracy', perceiving of these "five words as a kind of structure". This process of analysing keywords in association with others led Williams to identify 130 interrelated keywords. Each keyword in his work was analysed individually, listing the different meanings, and relationally in association with other keywords. These keywords were grouped under the label of keywords of culture and society. These are the keywords Williams identified as "a shared body of words and meanings in our most general discussions, in English, of the practices and institutions which we group as culture and society" (1983:15). In Williams view, they are keywords because of their significance within culture and society, and together they reflect how culture and society are seen and perceived (Williams 1983:15).

To analyse the meaning of these keywords, Williams focused on examining the socio-historical meanings of the keywords. In order to examine the socio-historical dimensions of the meanings, he relied on the commentaries he wrote over a period of 20 years; for each keyword he chose and considered it as a cultural keyword. These commentaries are supported by etymological data in the Oxford English Dictionary, which has been used as an evidence of historical shifts in meaning, based on his own extensive reading. These commentaries reveal Williams' deliberate decision to analyse the meanings of cultural keywords. This was based on his intention that his main

emphasis would be on analysing the meanings of the keywords and historical shifts in meaning (1983: 23). This argument is made as a statement that his analysis was not intended to include looking at the factors surrounding the meanings, such as the categories or contexts of the chosen words, or the social controversies around the use of these key terms. This type of analysis includes some limitations that should be addressed in detail.

It is apparent that Williams had attempted to provide an approach to studying keywords in their socio-historical context, but nevertheless the methods he employed had limitations, some of which Williams also admits. These include limitations of theory and limitations of methodology. At the theoretical level, there is an absence of a theory of meaning in Williams approach. Moreover, Williams himself could not identify the field of the approach he provided. However, he initially indicated that his method belongs to more than one discipline, without being able to identify these disciplines (Williams 1983:13-14). He attributed the difficulty of identifying the disciplines to the variety of the specializations of these keywords, stating that they belong to several disciplines. However, Williams at the end of his introduction referred to his approach as historical semantic (1983:23). This indetermination of the field of study indicates a lack of theory of meaning in Williams approach. Stubbs (2008:4) referred to this limitation and lack of theory, contending that Williams' work had not provided a theory of studying vocabulary in a comprehensive way nor had the words of a language been organised clearly and related to particular types of texts. Stubbs concludes that Williams' work can be considered within the field of cultural studies and so "was not intended to be a linguistic analysis" (2008:4).

In addition, Williams admits his method has a theoretical lack in terms of signification (1983:21). This made it problematic for Williams to identify the relationship between a word and its meaning, or in other words between the signifier and the signified; especially relative to what the process of signification might include, as e.g. in relation to Saussure's concept of signification (1983). According to Williams, this relationship becomes more difficult to identify when meaning is generated and controlled by social rules. Thus, as the process of significations relies on the supposition that a word as a signifier acquires its meaning (the signified) on the basis of the context it occurs in, Williams did not identify any particular type of text or context for the analysis of the meanings of keywords. Instead, he relied on an arbitrary selection of words that he felt to be significant, by looking at their decontextualized etymological variations in Oxford English Dictionary and making his own commentary on the historical and contemporary meanings of these keywords. Describing this theoretical problem, Williams deliberately,

limited his analysis to the salient meanings of the keywords, without focusing on a particular process of signification or the context that the keywords occurred in.

With regard to the methodological problem highlighted in Williams' approach, this relates to the data the approach relied upon. Since the data was based on Williams' personal commentaries on the etymological variations in OED and his own reading, the approach lacks the objectivity needed to explicate the socio-historical meanings of these keywords. In addition, Williams admits that there was a lack of the data in terms of the examples of usage of some keywords, and thus he contributed a number of examples of his own (1983:19). This implies that the analysis of the development and the senses of the keywords was based on personal preferences, which led to the possibility of the work not being completely objective. Furthermore, this reliance on personal data was expected to trigger a larger problem, contradicting the primary mission of the book in terms of studying keywords, which is not reflective of the wider use of the keywords by different people in additional contexts.

Another consideration in reference to Williams' analysis is the focus on the salient senses of the keywords, without considering their complex or discursive variations. Williams referred to the difficulty of analysing the meanings of the keywords used in conflicts. He stated that he found a major issue to be that he found they "could not really be thought through" due to the social conflicts and controversies around them (1983:16). Although he was aware of the existence of the social disputes over the meanings of some keywords and the significance of analysing the contested meanings in the social context, he did not conduct such an analysis. Instead, he chose to analyse the salient meanings of the keywords, although his central aim was to "show that some social and historical process occur within language" (1983:22). This limitation could be considered as an extension of the problem of signification, since no particular text-type or context could be identified for analysis. Additionally, this could be considered a key consequence of the lack of a theoretical frame of meaning to this method of analysis, as referred to above.

The theoretical and methodological limitations of Williams' approach discussed highlight the necessity to introduce other approaches to keywords analysis. Thus, alongside Williams' approach, other approaches offer theories and methods that to some extent can resolve the deficits of Williams' approach. They include approaches that consider the discursive meanings of keywords and/or the socio-political context beyond that meanings. One of these approaches is the Stubbs approach, which will be discussed in detail in the following section.

3.3 Corpus-based Cultural keywords

Drawing on Williams' approach to keywords analysis, Michael Stubbs (2001) proposed a systematic approach to studying cultural keywords. Stubbs' approach intended offered a linguistic analysis method to investigate the meaning of *cultural keywords* using Corpus Linguistics. Cultural keywords are "nodes around which ideological battles are fought" (2001:188). By utilising Corpus Linguistics, Stubbs aimed to present linguistic evidence for the meanings of the analysed keywords. Unlike Williams' analysis, which was based on personal commentaries, Stubbs' use of a large corpus provided a relatively objective analysis.

In Stubbs' analysis of cultural keywords, he chose to examine the meaning of some of Williams' (1983) keywords, such as *ethnic, standards and community*, in order to demonstrate how these keywords can be analysed using corpus linguistics. Similar to Williams' objectives for keywords analysis, Stubbs wanted to examine synchronically and diachronically, the meaning of keywords in use and in relation to other words. Thus, the data used for the analysis includes etymological data from a large historical dictionary and a 200-million-word corpus of contemporary English. A major difference between Williams' and Stubbs' analysis lies in that the latter analysed the meanings of the keywords on the basis of the context in which they were used, co-occurrences, and in relation to a particular text-type, by providing examples of the uses from particular discourse. In other words, Stubbs' linguistic analysis of the corpus data was conducted in relation to various semantic features, examining the meaning of keywords according to how they co-occur with other lexical, grammatical and semantic units. In particular, he analysed them using Sinclair's (1991) units of meaning model, which includes collocation, colligation, semantic preference and semantic prosody. It is a model Stubbs (2007:177) considers to be "a powerful model of phrasal units of meaning".

This model of Sinclair's is based on Firth's contextual theory of meaning which views that the meaning of a word is dependent principally on its relationship with co-occurring words (1957). Following Firth, Sinclair proposes a model of four types of lexico-semantic relations that can help with analysing particular words in terms of their co-occurring words. On the basis of Sinclair (1991), Stubbs (2001: 64-65) addressed the structure of these types of relations. The first point was the *collocation* relation, which is a lexical relation between a node word and its collocates, i.e. surrounding words. *Colligation* on the other hand concerns the relationship between a lexical unit and a grammatical one; i.e. how a lexical item frequently co-occurs with a grammatical category. The other two units of meaning, semantic preference and prosody, are the

most essential to consider, as they are strongly related to the analysis of the salient semantic and discursive features of words in which they are partial relation to, which is the scope of this research.

Following Stubbs (2001), semantic preference units concern the relation between a word and a set of semantically related words. An example of this is Stubbs' analysis of the semantic preferences of the cultural word *Standard* in a 200-million-word corpus. He found that it co-occurs with other words to indicate the meaning of 'normal' such as (method, practice and routine) and with other set of words to signal the meaning of 'moral principles' such as (decency, fairness and morality) (2001:155). Semantic prosody relation, on the other hand, or what Stubbs preferred to call 'discourse prosody' is the expression of a speaker's attitude towards a particular word or expression. Stubbs preferred the term 'discourse prosody', since he argues that it implies a relationship between speakers and other people, through attitudes expressed and based on a speaker's assumptions and his view of the world, which is important for identifying the authorial stance towards a particular discourse, based on deliberate selection of lexical items. Another reason Stubbs highlights, is that the term 'discourse prosody' has a role in creating discourse coherence (2001:66). Another typical definition of semantic prosody was introduced by Louw (1993: 30), as "consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates". Louw's definition of semantic prosody implies discursive levels of underlying meanings, which then support Stubbs' view, entitling it *discourse prosody*. An example Louw gives is that of a corpus-based analysis, which he conducted on the word 'utterly'. This analysis revealed that the word has negative semantic prosody, as it co-occurs with words of negative meanings. Considering that Stubbs (2001) and Louw (1993) address Sinclair's (1991) units of meaning, several other scholars, mainly corpus linguists have employed the units of meaning model in their examination of the meaning of particular keywords, such as *feminism* (Jaworska and Krishnamurthy 2012), *elderly* (Mautner 2007), *Muslims* (Baker 2010), *sleaze* (Orpin 2005) and *Wahhabism* (Salama 2011).

These studies attempted to combine a macro and a relatively micro analysis in order to examine how particular keywords are represented. This was specifically conducted by combining statistical corpus linguistics tools to the units of meaning model, with a specific focus on semantic preference and prosody relations. By utilising corpus linguistics, these studies were able to analyse an extensive body of decontextualized corpus data. In particular, their analysis was dependent on text fragments, collocations and the concordance lines, from a large corpus rather than investigating whole coherent texts. This reliance on largely decontextualized data cannot provide a critical in-depth

examination of the preferences or prosodies in the text. This criticism was generally taken into account by Widdowson (1998). He argued:

This analysis yields many a fascinating fact about frequency of occurrence and patterns of co-occurrence. But what it cannot yield is information about how the texts thus analysed interacted with contextual conditions to realise discourse. (1998:712)

This issue could be more problematic than this, especially in critical studies that require analysis of the social context. Mautner (2008:141) has pointed out that wide-scale discursive phenomena that can be found, e.g. in argumentative texts, cannot be captured through corpus techniques alone, and thus there is the need to examine the full texts. Therefore, in the context of analysing socially contested keywords, corpus analysis techniques cannot be used in isolation, and thus it is necessary to conduct a critical analysis of a sample of whole texts to comprehend the whole picture.

Another consideration here is that Stubbs (2001), as well as the authors of these studies, has argued that the keywords they aim to analyse are ideologically contested. Despite this argument, these studies have not investigated the ideological context, nor have they examined in depth how keywords are contested and debated. Instead their analysis was limited to the salient semantic meanings and the changes in these meanings across texts and over times. An exception to this is the study conducted by Salama (2011). Salama (2011) attempted to examine how the node *Wahhabism* (Saudi Islam) has been ideologically contextualized across opposing discourses by looking at collocation. This study involved a corpus-based analysis of the units of meanings combined with a CDA approach. In particular, Salama attempted to analyse the recontextualisation of 'Wahhabism' through the application of Sinclair's (1991) model within a particular theoretical CDA framework called 'classification schemes' as identified by Fairclough (2001:114) as how "vocabulary is organised in discourse type". This 'classification scheme' used by Salama relies on two relations: textual synonymy and textual apposition, which serve the functions of re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation respectively. For example, Salama found the node 'Wahhabism' to be represented negatively in the first text collocating with words such as *infiltration*, *lobby*, *regime* and *state* constituting the meaning preference of 'policing' through the process of re-lexicalisation, while it was used positively in the other text, collocating with *teachings*, *writings* and *works* suggesting 'scholarliness' via the process of over-lexicalisation. By the use of the two methods, Salama concludes the relations between collocations can ideologically contribute to the recontextualisation of one discourse topic in opposing

texts, revealing at the same time the opposing discursive voices concerning the same topic. However, although Salama (2011) considered the ideological clash over key terms, he did not take his analysis beyond the collocation level. This implies that he critically analysed the meaning of the keyword on the basis of its collocates without considering the co-text, or the whole text in which the keyword has occurred. This relates the argument to the earlier point made by Salama (2011), whereby the method of analysis did not represent an in-depth examination of the context since it was affected by the level of collocation.

One of the chief advantages of Sinclair's corpus-based model is that it provides an objective textual model for keywords analysis. Specifically, based on an analysis of large corpus, the model makes it possible to examine synchronically and diachronically the salient semantic and discursive features of keywords, including changes in their meanings across texts and time. In other words, this model gives a general sense of the textual trends and patterns surrounding the construction of particular lexical items (Baker 2010). In general, corpus-based analysis offers an objective analysis, in the sense that it allows the user to access a wide range of textual patterns. In this regard, Baker (2010:313) has argued that reliance on corpus data helps to "reduce research bias", as it is based on a large number of texts rather than a choice of just a few articles with a particular stance. O'Halloran and Coffin (2004), on the other hand, referred to the use of large corpora for the analysis of critical studies. They state that corpus-based analysis plays a crucial role in avoiding the over-interpretation caused by too focused analysis on a low number of texts in critical studies. However, they pointed out that too heavy dependence on corpus analysis could lead to an under-interpretation of the discursive phenomena under critical analysis. Thus, in order to achieve a balanced analysis and avoid the over-interpretation and under-interpretation of a text, they suggest combining Corpus Linguistics methods with critical linguistics methods (2004). Thus, it can be said that Corpus Linguistics techniques provide a general insight into textual trends across a corpus, but still do not offer an in-depth examination of the socio-political implications informing these lexical patterns. Therefore, there is a need for critical approaches to analyse critically what is beyond the text, and the socio-historical and socio-political contexts beyond a particular representation of a keyword.

3.4 Critical approaches to the analysis of keywords

Several scholars have attempted to provide a qualitative analysis of ideologically contested keywords. In particular, they have sought to analyse the context behind a particular usage of ideological keywords in-depth. Some of these studies did not rely on

a particular theoretical framework, such as those by Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) and De Beaugrande (1999). Amoretti and Fuentes (2012), for instance, attempted to examine diachronically how the node 'Islah'/reform has been ideologically contested in authorial contexts in Maghreb states. On the basis of a critical review of literature on the historical and socio-political contexts of the Maghreb, Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) attempted to find out how the meaning of 'Islah' has been shaped and developed by reformists from different ideological and political parties. For instance, they reviewed the historical development and socio-political usage of the word 'Islah'; how it was initially used by the end of colonisation era and its use by two main political trends; the liberals and the Salafists.

These two political groups have assessed the term 'Islah' within the modernity debate, resulting in two conceptual trends whereby the liberals linked the 'Islah' concept to the term 'tahdeeth' (modernisation), and the Salafists adopted the term 'nahdha' (renaissance) to describe the project of 'Islah'. Amoretti and Fuentes (2012) conclude that 'Islah' has been used dichotomously by the two ideological trends, which resulted in a conceptual duality represented in the case of 'Islah' by the use of the concepts of 'Tahdith' and 'Nahda'. The positive aspect of this study is that it is based on a context analysis of the literature, which makes it a critical contextualised study of the keyword, unlike the previously discussed corpus of non-contextualised studies. However, since this study was based on a review of a literature, no textual data or methodological and theoretical framework was used, and they failed to provide a well-grounded analysis for the use of ideological nodes in their socio-political contexts. In addition, the analysis of the study was generalised in terms of the contexts of the three states of Maghreb without distinguishing between the regional contexts addressed by the three states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, which have different political and social systems.

De Beaugrande (1999), undertook a comparative analysis of the ideological keyword 'liberalism' in three specific regional contexts, the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. For the analysis, he suggested using a large number of texts with particular focus on examining qualitatively the concordance lines of a particular ideological expression; interpreting its meaning on the basis of the context it occurs in, and then suggesting in-depth investigation of some uses of that particular ideological expression in various contexts. This suggestion is based on arguments De Beaugrande posited in relation to how ideology or ideological expressions should be investigated. He argues that ideology is a component of unconscious human awareness, which is difficult to recognise and to inspect. Therefore, he concludes that ideology should be investigated explicitly, within the order of discourse, by analysing the terms that indicate an ideology

such as Liberalism. These arguments comprise part of De Beaugrande's criticism of discourse analysis approaches in terms of their view on investigating ideology. He criticised in particular the CDA view of ideology, which states that ideologies cannot be read explicitly from texts because texts are open to different interpretations that might vary in their ideological meaning. De Beaugrande's (1999) criticism entails the CDA investigation of the implicit ideology in texts, with different interpretations that are partial, since the analysis is dependent on the interpreters' choice and analysis of a small number of texts. This reliance on just a few texts also reduces confidence in the results of research, since it does not reflect the wider ideological significance possible that can be revealed when examining a larger number of texts providing the same discourse. Therefore, De Beaugrande (1999) suggested investigating ideology explicitly, by examining a large set of contexts for a particular ideological key term on the basis of large number of texts. De Beaugrande (1999:273) also suggested using corpus linguistics with discourse approaches to investigate ideology, to "find unexpected leads toward relations between discourse and society", which can then only be identified when investigating a large body of authentic natural data. However, while he refers to the possibility of using corpus linguistics to complement discourse studies, he points out that CDA cannot possible be combined with corpus studies. De Beaugrande attributed this to the different nature of the analysis of both approaches discussed earlier, in which CDA analysis is based on personal intuition about only a few texts, while corpus analysis is based on a confident objective analysis of wider texts and contexts. However, this argument regarding combining CDA and corpus analysis has been addressed recently by many scholars (Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Baker 2012; Salama 2011; Amer 2012). Before discussing studies that have combined a large number of texts with discourse approaches to investigate particular expressions or nodes, a review of some discourse approaches and their views regarding ideological keywords and meaning is necessary.

3.4.1 Discourse Theory

Discourse Theory was developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Drawing critically upon Marxist theory of ideology and discourse, Laclau and Mouffe view discourse as not limited to language but including all social practices and power relations. Thus, they consider language as a part of these practices, in which they all constitute "worlds of related objects that form the identities of social actors" (Howarth 2000:101). In general, DT is predicated on the notion that all social practices, including language are meaningful, and that their meaning is obtained through systems of significant differences. These meanings are subjects of ongoing contestation or in Laclau's terms, they are

“constantly negotiated and constructed” (1988:254). The articulation of the meaning of these practices, or in other words the formation of discourse is determined by what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) called ‘articulatory practice’. Articulatory practice concerns the formation of relationships among elements that formulate discourse, in which these elements fix partially the meaning of this discourse. In Laclau and Mouffe terms (1985:113) articulatory practice is identified as:

The construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity.

It is apparent from this definition that the elements that formulate discourse in the practice of articulation can be referred to as ‘nodal points’. They have been defined by Laclau and Mouffe as “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain” (1985:112). In concrete terms, nodal points are central signifiers around which discourses are organised. They constitute together a particular system of meanings (discourse) or a ‘chain of signification’ that assign meanings to other signifiers within that discourse (Rear and Jones 2013). For example, the discourse of Thatcherism is constituted and organised through nodal points such as ‘free economy’, ‘monetarism’ and ‘strong state’ (Howarth 2000). While these nodal points constitute the meaning(s) of particular discourse, these meanings are not fixed but are of partial fixation. In this regard, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have argued that full fixation of meaning is impossible to achieve. The fixation of meaning remains partial because of the openness of the social context, which results from the continuous overflow into discourse by the field of discursivity. Otherwise, the full fixation of meaning would lead social actions to repeat an existing system of meanings, which would make it impossible to construct new nodal points that partially fix meaning (Howarth 2000: 103). In contrast, full openness of meaning would lead to a large number of meanings, in which case the construction of meanings or discourse would be impossible: “a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of the psychotic” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112).

This issue of the fixation of meaning within the openness of society was tackled by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their distinction between the concepts of ‘contingent elements’ in a discursive field and ‘necessary moments’ of a particular discourse. ‘Contingent elements’ are part of the discursive field, in which the discursive field that existed outside discourse is open and holds an overflow of meanings. ‘Necessary moments’, on the other hand, are part of particular discourses, in which these discourses

offer partial fixation of social meaning with a particular order in that field of meaning. The existence of these contingent elements in the discursive field affect particular discourses preventing complete closure. These contingent elements penetrate into discourse and become 'necessary moments' in that discourse, which is then partially fixed. Thus, a particular discourse that constitutes a system of meanings cannot be fully closed, as it is vulnerable to the contingent elements that exist in the discursive field, which enter discourse and construct new meanings in that discourse. This process has been called by Laclau and Mouffe (1985:110-111) the 'discursive exterior' as the 'necessary moments' of discourse are penetrated by 'contingent elements'. This indicates that the full closure and openness of meaning is impossible in the view of DT as full closure would exclude all other meanings that exist in the discursive field, and full openness would provide no meaning for a particular discourse or society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:112). An example of this process was provided by Howarth (2000) in reference to the British state, whereby contingent elements, such as the political project by Mrs Thatcher entered discourse and articulated a new system of meaning, or nodal points, for the British state.

However, this view on the partial fixation of social meaning led to problems determining the extent of the partiality the meaning or discourse should adhere to. In particular, if the discourse cannot be closed, how is the formation of society, as a meaningful system, then possible? In other words: if the social practices in discourse are relational and open for contingent meanings, how can the identity of a society be realised? This issue was addressed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) by asserting Gramsci's (1971) view on the primacy of politics in their social ontology. This posits that social systems, which are realised as constructed sets of discourses, are political formations including the constitution of antagonism and of social struggle for power. As these systems of social relations are of a political nature; they obtain their meanings, or social practices, via the struggle for social power, while being vulnerable to the contingent forces that attempt to construct and gain power in the social site. In concrete terms, the construction of society or discourse is a result of competing hegemonic struggle attempting to impose their projects on society (Howarth 2000:120). This conception of the political construction of society is what Laclau and Mouffe base their political theory of discourse on. Thus, they introduce three main concepts, which are social antagonism, political subjectivity and hegemony (Howarth 2000), as will be explained below.

The first of these concepts, social antagonism has to do with conflicts where social agents are unable to acquire their identities and interests because they represent an enemy who is responsible for this failure. In other words, this process of antagonism occurs when a particular identity - or discourse - is opposed by another where the

formation of these identities cannot be fully articulated as they are contested by these forces preventing it from a full closure. This indicates that each identity is threatened by other antagonistic identities, in which case it represents these identities negatively in order to be stabilised as a meaningful discursive system (Howarth 2000:106). Within this political process of antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have introduced two main cases in which antagonism is constructed in a discursive field of opposing discourses, including the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. The logic of equivalence occurs when more than one existing identities or discourses construct a negative identity, or a discursive exterior, representing it as a threat that attempt to dissolve the solidarity of these identities. An example of this is the national liberation movements oppressed by the apartheid system in South Africa; when they united against apartheid referring to them negatively as white racists (Howarth 2000:107). On the other hand, the logic of difference accounts for lessening the differences between different social groups instead of displacing them in order to maintain dominance and hegemony. This can be made possible by breaking the existing chains of equivalence and integrating the disarticulated elements in a particular formation. An example of this is contrary to the earlier point, as in this case the apartheid system attempted to disrupt the chain of equivalence made by the national movements in an attempt to dislocate calls for a democratic South Africa to maintain the dominance (Howarth 2000:107).

Political subjectivity as the second central concept in DT, concerns how social actors attain and live out their identities, as well as their role as agents in the construction of social structures (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). This process emerges out of the contingency of discourses that would alter their identities. In other words, the identity of social actors can be constructed and transformed through contingent discursive forces, in which case the social actors are forced to identify with new identities. For instance, capitalism has added new fields of meaning to particular societies dislocating pre-existing identities and imposing an identity crisis on social actors (Howarth 2000:109).

The third concept which is hegemony, and which is the most related to the scope of this thesis, includes combining different identities and political powers under a common project, as well as the construction of new social orders from various scattered elements. The objective of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilize nodal points that form the basis of a social order, the main aim being to become a social imaginary, i.e. the horizon that "is not one among other objects but an absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility of the emergence of any object" (Laclau 1990: 64). This view of hegemony is based on Gramsci's (1971) conception of it, which is not only limited to the common notion that views hegemony as

a struggle between social classes for particular interests. Instead, Gramsci (Cited in Howarth 2000:109) extends this narrow conception of hegemony to include the articulation of different social institutions and forces in a new hegemonic bloc. Herein, Gramsci (1971) transforms the interests of social classes into the interests of the whole of society as a 'collective will' that constitutes universal interests and forces. This concept of hegemony was developed by Laclau and Mouffe in three stages, in which they linked it (especially in the final stages) to the discursive construction of social practices. In the first model, Laclau (1977) and Mouffe (1979) based the hegemony concept on the role of fundamental social classes that aim to transform the whole nation according to their interests. In this model, they challenge the view that ideological appeals and calls to the nation belong to a particular class, but instead they are contingent elements articulated by antagonistic hegemonic projects that attempt to assign classes with particular meanings and connotations.

This notion of hegemonic practices as contingent elements was developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their second model of the conception of hegemony. They argued that all ideological elements and social agents in discourse are contingent and negotiable. The articulatory practices of these contingent elements are possible because of the openness of social relations, whereby these contingent elements penetrate from the open field of discursivity to enter a particular discourse and become nodal points. Specifically, hegemonic practices occur within the presence of antagonistic forces in the social field and within the existence of contingent elements articulated by opposing forces, in an attempt to hegemonize them (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:136). Laclau and Mouffe (1985:142) view these hegemonic practices as serving the function of stabilising systems of meaning or discourses or 'hegemonic formations'. Thus, when these hegemonic formations are achieved, they become organised and centred upon the articulation of nodal points that constitute privileged signifiers and condense meanings that are partially fixed.

The third model of hegemony, which is the most recent and relates most to this thesis is the notion of the contingency of elements which has been furtherly developed to be formed around the concept of 'empty signifiers'. Laclau, at this stage, viewed hegemony as a procedure of filling empty signifiers with meaning. Thus, empty signifiers have been identified as signifiers without a particular signified and charging a concept with a meaning is recognised as a hegemonic practice (Laclau 1996; 2007). 'Empty signifiers' emerge through dislocations where a discursive exterior attempts to be hegemonic in a particular society (Laclau 1996; 2007). In particular, the emergence of empty signifiers presupposes the presence of a social structure with unknown entities,

in which these entities are both constituted and threatened by a discursive exterior. According to Laclau (1990:44), these indeterminate entities represent a constitutive impossibility in a society in which they can only be obtained and constituted through the production of an empty signifier that can be filled with absent objectives and meanings in society.

In other words, empty signifiers emerge within the existence of antagonism in which they play a crucial role in uniting different groups in the chain of equivalence (the logic of difference) and they function as a threat to the existing groups in the chain of difference (the logic of equivalence). In the case of the chain of equivalence, an empty signifier is produced by different groups, in which each attempt to fill it with their own meaning to unite under one project and gain hegemony and acceptance in society. An example of this is the concept of 'nationalism', which can be used as an empty signifier by different groups to centre their identities on a common project and ensure hegemony (Laclau 1996:100). On the other hand, within the chain of differences, a particular system of meaning or identity dominates society and excludes the other entities that see it as a negative threat. Due to the openness of society and the contingency of meaning, these dominant entities are vulnerable to the discursive exterior which represent a threat to the system. Thus, in this case, an empty signifier is imposed by excluded entities struggling for power; therefore, this empty signifier constitutes "a signifier of pure threat, of pure negativity and of the simply excluded element" (Laclau 1996:38). It is through the empty signifier that excluded entities can achieve hegemony and acceptance in society, while at the same time constituting a threat to the dominant group. This latter case of the empty signifier is important in this thesis, since it concerns the contestation of *alibrāliyah* as a key signifier between antagonistic groups within the logic of equivalence.

Within the latter case of the concept of an empty signifier, other related concepts have been introduced by Laclau (1996), which are *dislocation*, *myth* and *social imaginary*. These are related, in the sense that they constitute and elaborate upon the process of the contingency of elements from the field of discursivity, to a particular discourse or system of meanings. Thus, dislocation concerns those events that do not exist in the discursive order, and which act to disrupt that order (Laclau 1996). These dislocations are operated by a discursive exterior that attempts to serve as a contingent element in a particular discourse or society. Myth and social imaginary result from this disruption, as they emerge through the spaces they create. Thus, Myths are "new spaces of representations which attempt to cover over dislocations" (Howarth 2000:111). In Laclau's terms, the mythical space represents "an alternative to the logical form of the dominant structural discourse" (Laclau 1990:62). In concrete terms, it represents a

disrupting element to the dominant social structure, through attempting to impose absent social demands on the social structure as an alternative. Thus, if a myth succeeds in overcoming dislocations and incorporating a significant set of social interests, it becomes hegemonic and thereby transformed into a social imaginary. Thus, Laclau (1990:64) defines the social imaginary as an “absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility of the emergence of any object” due to the openness of the social space and the contingency of elements.

The relationship between the concept of an empty signifier and the concepts of dislocation, myth and social imaginary were interpreted by Norval (2000) in his theoretical study of how ideology can be investigated, and its process of decontestation. Norval (2000) focuses particularly on explaining the process of the decontestation of conceptual formation of ideology, and how it is transformed from a contested empty signifier to a decontested hegemonic system of meaning. This is achieved by discussing the concept of empty signifier, as a form of the attempt of dislocation, which relates to the ideological discursive construction of socio-political identities. He argued that the ‘empty signifier’ concept is strongly related to the study of ideology since “the study of ideology is the study of the mechanism which makes the illusion possible” (Norval 2000:18). He clarified further, by stating that each new ideology that emerges out of dislocation in a society, such as nationalism and populism, should be linked to a particular set of social orders. These ideologies become hegemonic and decontested when the existing social order is dislocated and overcome by myth. This myth works to re-establish the closure of meaning when a social order has been dislocated, and it then succeeds in becoming a social imaginary. Thus, if ideology fails to introduce a particular set of orders or objectives it then becomes an empty signifier. It is an empty signifier in this case as it fails to fill the signifier with the interests and objectives it should carry out. Therefore, ideological struggles are “struggles over the filling out of such empty signifiers” (Norval 2000:19). Though he discussed the relationship between these concepts in relation to ideology, he did not clarify the particular relationship between empty signifiers and myth. In particular, if myth and empty signifiers are used to dislocate and disrupt the dominant social order or discourse, we ask what the differences are between the two concepts. In other words, if the empty signifier represents a signifier that needs to be filled with meaning, we must ask if myth serves as an element of dislocation that functions to fill an absence in the social structure by contributing meaning to the empty signifier.

This problem with the explanation and application of DT concepts in the literature has been addressed by Howarth (2000). He states that these theoretical concepts

remain overly abstract and vague, and thus were difficult for researchers working with DT to apply. Howarth (1998) stated that Laclau and Mouffe set these theoretical concepts without providing a methodological guideline for researchers, moreover, they did not clarify these concepts through a set of questions and hypotheses. In order to overcome this, Howarth suggested using DT as a theoretical basis for case studies closely related to the assumptions and concepts of DT. A number of studies have since attempted to use the theoretical concepts of DT (Brown 2015; Carpentier and De Cleen 2007; Stavrakakis 2000).

For example, Brown (2015) attempted to analyse the different contexts of the 'sustainability' concept, by seeking to discover whether it is an empty signifier or not. Drawing on Laclau's (1990) theory and on literature that concerns the concept of 'sustainability', Brown argues that sustainability is an empty signifier, as it has been contested, throughout history, amongst different socio-political groups, who use it for their own interests to maintain power and fail to fill it with particular meaning or objectives. This is based on the factor that 'sustainability' has been imposed by different political groups to maintain their hegemonic power, serving as dislocation of current progress objectives and acting as an empty promise for a better future. In particular, sustainability has been imposed as a promising alternative to the existing socio-economic structure, proffering empty objectives for ecological, social, economic, political and moral fields. Sustainability as an empty signifier in this case is consistent with Laclau's (1996) view of the empty signifier as it is a process that emerges out of dislocations within a discursive order, and this process is subject to hegemonic struggle within the existence of antagonistic forces. Although, this study attempted to analyse the discourse of particular case studies in relation to DT concepts, it did not base its analysis on empirical data or textual analysis. This is because the linguistic analysis of discourse is not of his primary concern, although it can assist in providing an empirical analysis of discourse as a meaningful system.

For a textual analysis of DT concept, Howarth (2000) suggested the possibility of using CDA with DT, although he did not clarify how these two approaches can be combined. He points to the idea that discourse analysis approaches, such as CDA might be helpful as a mechanism for providing ways into investigating the theoretical concepts of DT empirically (Howarth 2000:142). An attempt to combine both approaches by means of employing textual analysis was conducted by Montessori (2011) and Rear and Jones (2013). Rear and Jones' (2013) study was situated in the context of a struggle between two dominant discourses, new-liberalism and conservatism, which evaluated a number of key signifiers in the texts of education policies in Japan produced by the office of the

prime minister. In their textual analysis of 10 education policy documents, Rear and Jones (2013) attempted to employ the CDA notion of intertextuality while employing the DT concepts of hegemony, nodal points and articulation. In particular, they attempted to identify the key signifiers or the nodal points in opposing discourses in the 10 texts, to identify the two distinctive discourses and the hegemony achieved through the fixation of meaning. Their analysis demonstrated that neo-liberalism and conservatism discourses are marked by a number of signifiers, while neo-liberalism is marked with nodal points, such as 'individual freedom', 'rights' and 'critical thinking', whereas conservatism discourse is centred around the nodal points of 'patriotism', 'traditional norms' and 'morality'. Although this study refers to the aim of investigating intertextuality and changes in discourse, it does not show a diachronic shift in discourse nor the mechanism of this shift.

Additionally, even though Rear and Jones (2013) study made a good attempt at relating the theoretical concepts of DT to the textual-oriented approach of CDA, it highlighted a major point in terms of how they identified the nodal points in texts. The study did not identify the base, in which the assigned terms can be considered nodal points in discourse. This explains the difficulty with applying theoretical concepts of DT in textual analysis, as in this case of identifying the nodal points in existing dominant discourses; in the chain of equivalence.

Montessori (2011) developed a theoretical-methodological framework to analyse hegemony in discourse by means of combining DT with CDA. In the context of her study, which concerns the struggle for power between president Salina and the EZLN Party in Mexico, she integrates the theoretical view of DT on hegemony with methodological approaches to CDA developed by Fairclough and Wodak. In particular, she analysed speeches from both groups, comparing the narratives of each to identify the DT concepts of hegemony, which are the nodal points, and the empty signifiers along with the myth and social imaginary. By employing content analysis, and the analysis of strategies based on DT, she suggests that the keyword 'modernisation' operates as a nodal point in Salina's narratives, since it has been achieved, while the word 'democracy' operates as an empty signifier in EZLN narratives as it is represented a promise for the future not yet realised. She also concludes that Salina's narrative represents an imaginary, while EZLN narrative operates as a myth since, it has not been achieved as yet.

As Montessori (2011) study that combines DT with CDA focuses on the case study of the power struggle in Mexico, the combination between both approaches can be tackled in different ways depending on the case study. This view is supported by

Howarth (2000:142) who states that the success of the application of Discourse Theory concepts along with its integration with empirical methods such as CDA depends on its close relation to the case under study. Thus, in the case of this study, the aim is to employ the theoretical concepts of empty signifier and dislocation to the presence of antagonistic relations between two groups, within the logic of equivalence, attempting specifically to study how *alibrāliyah* has been imposed as an empty signifier by antagonistic forces in their struggle for power. In order to apply these concepts and overcome their theoretical limitations, they will be combined with textually-oriented methods of CDA especially as both approaches view discourse as a social struggle over power in the theoretical level. Before explaining how the theoretical concepts of DT can be combined with CDA, a review of the CDA approach is necessary, as will be discussed in the following section.

3.4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA)

The Critical Discourse Analysis approach (CDA) primarily concerns how language usage reflects the ideological relations of power and dominance. It considers language as a crucial form of social practice that ideologically affects the power relations among social groups in social institutions, as well as representing those power relations (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). CDA is also considered a problem-oriented approach, and thus it is interdisciplinary (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This is because it is driven by a particular problem positioned in a particular social context, and therefore attempts to analyse the causes of the existence of the problem on the basis of discursive strategies and the ideology that produced it. Thus, it is necessarily interdisciplinary, due to its broadly set objective to analyse the relationship between language use and social theory.

This main notion of CDA has been prominently developed by Norman Fairclough. Fairclough's main interests include discourse as the major component of social struggle and its effect in the eras of globalisation, new-liberalism and new capitalism (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 2000). Other major contributors to CDA are Teun Van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. Van Dijk provided a socio-cognitive theory with a special interest in subjects related to the discourse of ethnicity and racism (1998, 2008). Wodak, on the other hand, developed DHA from the perspective of an interest in the discursive construction of identity and nationalism (1999, 2007). However, in this review, the focus will be on CDA, and how it views language (discourse) as the main locus of social conflict and struggle. In particular, Fairclough's theoretical view on the relation between language use (the micro) and the social context (the macro) will be reviewed in reference to DHA that operationalises this relationship through the linguistic analysis of the discursive strategies used in texts.

Fairclough (1989) attempted to demonstrate the relationship between the micro and the macro by introducing the relationship between the concepts of the common sense of discourse and ideology and how these are generated in the course of social struggle. It is not a straightforward relationship but an interconnected one, which can contribute to an understanding of how discourse (language use) reveals the ideological power relations. Common sense, according to Fairclough (1989) refers to the meanings or assumptions that are drawn from texts and made by interpreters on the basis of their background knowledge. From a CDA position, these assumptions lead to discourse coherence; a coherence situated by the interpreter himself based on his assumptions and expectations. These assumptions are implicit, and this implies that they are to an extent also ideological.

Fairclough (1989) argued that common sense is to varying degrees ideological, to the extent it contributes to sustaining unequal power relations or establishing solidarity among the members of a particular social group. Therefore, if common sense is ideological, it is part of the social struggle for power. The interconnection of the relationship here lies in Fairclough's (1989) statement that common sense either exists primarily in the interpreters' minds or is imposed by an ideology. This implies that the text here is the most crucial aspect, as assumptions and the meanings of language expressions are either imposed ideologically in the text by the text producer and/or exist primarily in the interpreters' minds. In other words, the ideological struggle is evidenced in texts, as these texts are generated in the course of social struggle. Thus the meaning of discourse is subject to constant change as ideologies vary and represent a struggle for social power. Otherwise, the meaning would be fixed, which according to Fairclough will then indicate the uniformity of ideology; whereby one discourse of power gains dominance over another.

The relationship between common sense and ideology can be simplified by providing an example of the meaning of words, and this is the main objective of this thesis. Fairclough (1989:93) argued that the meaning of a word is one dimension of common sense and that it is frequently mistakenly treated as a matter of fact. In order to demonstrate that meanings are not simply definite, he discussed two aspects of the meaning of words, which are; 1) the variability of meaning and 2) the nature of meaning systems.

The variability of meaning arises because a word has a range of meanings within society. This opposes the general tendency to underestimate the extent of variations of the meanings of a word within society as represented in the fixed variations provided in

a dictionary in which Fairclough argues that a dictionary “is very much a product of the process of codification of standard languages, and thus closely tied to the notion that words have fixed meanings” (1989:93). Fairclough also demonstrated that the meanings of a word vary ideologically in the course of social struggle. This ideological variation is closely associated with the second aspect of the meaning of words, which is the nature of meaning systems. According to Fairclough, the meaning of a word is not isolated or independent but is dependent on the meaning of the neighbouring words in the text. This is a view originally introduced by Firth in his contextual theory of meaning (1957), (see section 3.3). Fairclough’s notion differs from Firth’s, in the sense that the meaning of a word is, discursively rather than semantically, dependent on the meaning of the adjacent words in a text produced at the site of an ideological struggle.

These two aspects of meaning, the variability of meaning and the nature of meaning systems, were demonstrated by Fairclough when exemplifying the meaning of the word ‘ideology’. In terms of the variety of meanings, he stated that the word itself has no single fixed meaning, but has a large variety of meanings depending on the ideological context it is produced in. He gave the example of the meaning of ‘ideology’ in the American post-war sense. He stated that it was then used as a synonym for the word ‘totalitarianism’, in which the latter is used to subsume words such as fascism, communism and Marxism and where the word ‘ideology’ was structured as ‘a weapon against Marxism’ (Fairclough 1989:94). The point Fairclough wanted to stress here is that the meanings of the word ideology are not randomly generated but are produced in the course of the struggle for power between two or more meanings. Additionally, the meaning of the word ideology depends on its relationship to other words in the ideologically produced text.

Moreover, the assumptions made by the interpreter about a variety of meanings is ideological and are interpreted in relation to other words that are also ideological and based on how items are structured and how assumptions are met by interpreters. This is to say the meanings of words are mutable, and whenever meanings such as ‘ideology’ appear to become fixed, this indicates that the social struggle over the contestation of the word has ended as one power has gained dominance; a process which Fairclough termed naturalisation. Consequently, if words like ideology become fixed this would indicate that its fixed meaning is ideological as it is a result of a social struggle where one power became dominant. According to Fairclough, this process of naturalisation, which results in a closure of meaning is “reflected in the fixity of the dictionary of the meanings of words” (1989:107). This indicates that all words from the CDA view are ideological, whether socially contested or fixed as a result of a social struggle.

This notion of CDA in relation to the ideological meaning of words has been reflected in Fairclough's (1995) study of the meaning of 'enterprise' in the British socio-political context. Fairclough argues that notions of 'enterprise' are not fixed as they appear in a dictionary. Instead, they are promoted notionally by an ideological set of tendencies as part of the social struggle to gain a sort of power. These ideologically articulated set of notions affects the order within society, and thus is part of cultural change. This argument by Fairclough drew from his analysis of three speeches given between 1985 and 1988 by Young; the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at that time. In particular, he examined how notions of the node 'enterprise' had changed over time and the ideological strategies behind such use and change.

To analyse the speeches, he looked first at the salient features of the use of the term 'enterprise'. In particular, he looked at the verbal context, including collocations of the node 'enterprise'. The analysis revealed varying verbal contexts and changes in the senses associated with the node 'enterprise' across the three analysed speeches, which according to Fairclough reflects a change in political strategies rather than meaning. Fairclough made an interesting point regarding the nature of the varying senses of enterprise provided in the speeches (1995:114).

Different speeches highlight different senses, not by promoting one sense to the exclusion of the others, but by establishing particular configurations of meanings, particular hierarchical salience relationships among the senses of 'enterprise', which can be seen to be suited to wider strategic objectives of the speeches.

These interrelated configurations have been strategically exploited in speeches as part of a process Fairclough labelled 'intertextuality'. Intertextuality constitutes the links between the texts of a particular discourse and the other categories of these texts (1995:119). Thus, the use of intertextuality in speeches indicates the ideological potential of positing different meanings for 'enterprise' to serve political strategies.

Fairclough concluded the study by discussing the ideological production and interpretation of the text or discourse. He argues that the examination of a particular meaning of discourse cannot be located in a single text. Instead, evaluating more than one text is necessary to analyse the transformation of discourse over time, so as to achieve an understanding the broader strategies behind such use or changes in the level of text production. In this argument, Fairclough pointed out the necessity of investigating the historical dimension of discourse or in other words the development of discourse over time. This historical analytical dimension was provided by Wodak, a CDA scholar, in her

model of Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to CDA. Thus, in relation to the CDA approach, this thesis will employ the methodological tools of DHA within a broader theoretical framework of CDA, introducing elements of both DHA and CDA. In general terms, DHA offers an empirical model for analysing the discursive construction of particular discursive phenomenon through analysing the linguistic features in texts and providing ways to explain how discursive phenomena are nominated, assigned and justified. A detailed review of DHA is presented in the following sub-section.

3.4.2.1 Discourse-Historical Approach

DHA was developed at the University of Vienna by Ruth Wodak and colleagues as a component of their interdisciplinary study into the construction of 'post war antisemitism' in Austria (Wodak et al 1990). It is an interdisciplinary approach combining linguistic analysis with historical and sociological approaches. Similar to the main approach of CDA, DHA views discourses as context-dependant semiotic practices, including language, which are sites of social struggle for power (Reisigl and Wodak 2009:89). In its analysis of discourse, DHA integrates the historical and social dimensions to the linguistic analysis, in order to analyse critically the change in discourse over time, taking into account socio-political and historical contexts.

Following CDA, DHA accounted for the relation between discourse or language and ideology. It views ideology as a "one-sided perspective or world view composed of mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluation, which is shared by members of a specific social group" (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Ideology functions as a means of establishing and maintaining uneven power relations (hegemony) through discourse. Thus, discourse serves as means of producing and reproducing ideology in various social institutions. In other words, discourse or language use is a means by which people in power can obtain and maintain power relations. Thus, in order to unfold these ideological power relations, DHA focuses on analysing the discursive linguistic practices situated within this struggle for power. In particular, it provides a methodological model for analysing discursive linguistic features that are used when expressing and constructing social power.

To analyse discourse, DHA follows a triangulation approach and thus it is interdisciplinary (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). This includes looking at data from various analytical perspectives and considering various methods, theories and background information relating to the topic under study. The DHA triangulatory approach is grounded on the concept of 'context', which consists of four levels that can be analysed recursively (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, p.93). These four dimensions of context include:

(a) the immediate, language or text-internal co-text; (b) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse; (c) the extra-linguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific context of situation; and (d) the broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to. The analysis of these four levels of context serve the function of unfolding the contextual meanings embedded in a particular discourse and related texts.

In the analysis of the context, DHA pays special attention to the relationships of intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisation as a means of exploring how discourse and texts change in relation to socio-political change (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Intertextuality signifies that texts are connected to other texts in the past and the present. These connections between texts are constructed in various ways: through explicit or implicit reference to a topic or a social actor, and by making references to the same events or through transferring key arguments from one text to another. Recontextualisation, on the other hand, concerns transferring particular elements of discourse to new contexts. Within this process, a particular element partly obtains a new meaning, since it is transferred to another context of meaning. The third process of interdiscursivity relates to how discourses are linked to each other. This can be realised through the integration of topics or sub-topics of other discourses to a particular discourse, which is due to the openness and hybrid nature of discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). These three processes would be of particular assistance in tracing and understanding how particular elements of discourse are constructed and transform as they are intertextualised, recontextualised and interdiscursive.

Moreover, within the recursive contextual analysis of discourse, DHA offers an operationalised method for analysing discourse through analysing the context-dependent linguistic features in texts. In particular, DHA identifies several discursive strategies that can be realised through textual analysis (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). These strategies indicate the practices that are adopted for particular social or political purposes. Some of these strategies include referential strategies, predicational strategies and argumentation strategies. These discursive strategies present the arguments of a particular group or social phenomena, which are either constructed positively or negatively. They can be realised when asking questions such as: (a) How are persons, objects, phenomena, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?; (b) What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes?, and (c) what arguments are employed in the discourse in question?. To clarify how these strategies can be analysed

in texts, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) undertook a detailed methodological account of the procedure in which these discursive strategies can be examined in their studies of the discourses of racism and nationalism. For example, a nomination strategy which is used for representing social groups is constructed in the text using lexical devices such as tropes, metaphors, metonymies or synecdoches. Predicational strategy, on the other hand, is closely related to referential strategy in which it represents how constructed social groups and phenomena are linguistically provided with predications. In particular, it can be realised as “evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:45).

The third discursive strategy, which is argumentation strategy, considers how positive and negative attributions are justified, as in, for example, when justifying the socio-political inclusion or exclusion of particular group. It comprises premises which are content-related warrants that connect arguments with the concluding claim in the text. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001:55) the identification of these three strategies is interrelated, in which e.g. the first two strategies, referential and predicational, are often employed as premises within the argumentation strategy. Thus, argumentation strategies could be considered of great importance when analysing discursive practices in texts especially, in that they constitute coherent discursively connected arguments by which the evaluative attributions toward social groups and phenomena are constructed and justified. Overall, the textual analysis of these strategies, along with the analysis of the other layers of context would be expected to reveal the ideological constructions of social identities and phenomena in discourse that are embedded in socio-political and historical contexts.

A clear application of these notions of DHA was conducted by Richardson and Wodak (2009) in their study of the recontextualisation of fascism in the discourse of employment in the UK and Austria. In this study, they traced the historical development of the concepts used in the extreme right-wing discourses regarding issues of un/employment. Drawing upon Discourse-Historical methods regarding the levels of context and discursive strategies, Richardson and Wodak (2009) argued that slogans such as ‘British Jobs for British workers’ and ‘Austria First’ were recontextualised into contemporary political rhetoric, while carrying historical context-dependent meanings, derived from pre-World War II fascism and antisemitism ideologies. For example, when tracing the history of the ideologically loaded slogan ‘British Jobs for British workers’, the analysis of texts produced by the national party BNP revealed the slogan is associated with meaning that jobs are only for white people and that Britain is threatened by alien immigrants, suggesting the British people are a white race and immigrants are aliens. In

light of the historical context, the authors argue that these contemporary meanings of the slogan are a recontextualisation of anti-Semitism as practiced by British fascists against Jewish immigrants, who were described as aliens in the slogan 'Britain for the British' pre-World War II. In the case of Austria, the slogan 'Austria first' was used by the right-wing German party DVU to refer to the 'real Austrian' as white and Christian arguing with a fallacy that Austria is not a country for immigrants. According to Richardson and Wodak (2009), this slogan allowed a recontextualisation of antisemitism national-socialism and Austro-fascism after World War I, which considered Jews as a danger and a threat to Austria. This notion of tracing the historical development of textual expressions is similar to the main scope of this thesis. Thus, DHA will prove useful for analysing the discursive construction of ideological expressions; considering how they are nominated, referred to and argued within socio-political and historical contexts. However, this extended work is going to be studied in light of more than one approach; both theoretical and methodological.

3.5 The integration of CL, DT and CDA

At the theoretical level, this thesis is grounded on the theories of DT, CDA and the DHA to CDA. In relation to the scope of this thesis, DT represents an appropriate foundation to ground this research on. This is because it provides a theory of the process by which discourse is generated through antagonism. In particular, it explains the procedure by which concepts such as the empty signifier are articulated and contested by antagonistic forces in the struggle to attain hegemony. This particular situation is closely related to the case of this thesis, as it attempts to investigate how *alibrāliyah* as a contested signifier is represented by opposing sectors of society, conservatives and progressives, as imposed by progressives in the project to gain hegemony in Saudi society. However, as DT did not present methodological guidelines to explain how discourse can be examined, CDA and its approach DHA are suitable tools for analysing discourse; especially as they are textually-oriented approaches.

Theoretically, CDA and DHA consider discourse or language as the principal site of the social struggle for power. It is within this notion that CDA is similar to DT, as they both consider discourse as a means to achieve hegemony. Additionally, they both agree that discourse as a system of meanings is unfixed, and only becomes fixed when the ideological struggle for power ends and one gains hegemony. However, DT and CDA disagree regarding the ontology upon which discourse is generated and articulated. For instance, DT's main view of the articulation of discourse, or in other words the emergence and maintenance of power, is predicated on the conception of the contingency of

meaning, in which contingent elements enter discourse and become partially fixed due to the openness of the social world. Unlike DT views on discourse as constituted by an unconditional contingent element, the CDA ontological view of discourse is based on the impression that discourse constitutes and is constituted by society (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). According to this notion, CDA criticizes DT's ontological view of discourse, in which Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:121-126) discussed the DT problem of insistence on the unconditional openness of the social and the contingency of discourse. They argue that this view implies the problem of distinguishing between what is discursive and what is non-discursive, especially as DT rejects this distinction by considering all articulatory practices to be discursive. This notion of the contingency of meaning would make it difficult to explain how articulated discourse relates to context. For example, it would be hard to explain what "social forces have greater capacity to effect articulatory changes and why" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999:125). However, despite this limitation, DT is still useful at the theoretical level, as it offers a number of concepts to explain the processes in which social forces are struggling to achieve hegemony. In this respect, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) refer to the viability of DT, stating that:

Laclau and Mouffe provide valuable resources for theorising and analysing the openness and complexity of late modern social life - they capture the instability and flux of social practices and identities, and the pervasive dissolution and redrawing of boundaries, which characterise late modernity.... We regard Laclau and Mouffe as providing valuable conceptual resources for the analysis of change in discourse - in particular their conceptualisation of 'articulation' and 'equivalence/difference'. (124).

This statement implies use of theoretical DT concepts of 'articulation' and 'equivalence/difference' with CDA, to analyse articulation and change in discourse. Thus, to avoid the theoretical ontological limitations of DT concepts and due to its similarity to CDA, it can be integrated with CDA to resolve the issue of distinguishing between what is discursive and what is not discursive. Since this thesis concerns processes in which the *alibrāliyah* signifier is articulated and contested in the chain of difference among antagonistic forces, and DT concepts of hegemony, the logics of equivalence and difference and empty signifiers continue to be important. However, to operationalise these concepts and relate them to the historical and socio-political contexts in which they are constituted, CDA theory concerning the distinction between what is discursive and non-discursive remains necessary. This examination of context can be achieved through the employment of DHA theoretical conceptions of the layers of contexts discussed

earlier. These concepts explain the process by which the articulation and rearticulation of discourse in different texts and discourses can be examined relative to historical and socio-political contexts.

In light of the theoretical concepts of DT and CDA, this study uses empirical methods to assist in analysing textually and discursively the construction and articulation of a particular signifier, *alibrāliyah*, as contested in the chain of difference. In particular, the empirical analysis of this study is based on Corpus Linguistic approaches (CL) and the methodological model of DHA. Within CL analysis, the Sinclair model will be employed, which includes relations of collocation and semantic preferences. The employment of this textual-based analysis model will be useful as a means of analysing the salient linguistic features in the text which would assist with delivering a general idea about the meaning of the keyword *alibrāliyah* within the immediate co-text in which it occurs. In particular, CL would make it possible to examine quantitatively the collocation and the semantic preferences of these collocates along with their usage over time, which will give a general insight into the main discourses associated with *alibrāliyah* in the large data set. This macro quantitative analysis will also help in the objective selection of texts for the micro discursive analysis. The analysis of micro discursive construction of the keyword *alibrāliyah* and its embedded meanings within the historical and socio-political contexts will follow the DHA method of discursive strategies to analyse the texts as whole. In particular, the discursive strategies of nomination, predication and argumentation should allow the researcher for analysing how *alibrāliyah* and the social actors in texts are discursively nominated, attributed to and legitimised. The application of argumentation strategy will be of importance as it makes it possible to examine the discursive practices and rhetoric employed in texts when discussing the *alibrāliyah* concept, which would allow for analysing critically how *alibrāliyah* is contested in different texts, and intertextualised and as a result of the shifts of meaning and the changes of discourse within the socio-political context.

This methodological combination of CL and DHA methods was suggested in a study conducted at Lancaster University by Baker, Wodak and colleagues (2008) who studied how the discourse of refugees can be examined by combining Corpus Linguistics with critical discourse approaches specifically DHA. In combining the two approaches, they discuss the strengths and limitations of each approach, and how those strengths can be exploited while eliminating weaknesses. For instance, they argue that CL is a useful approach for a quantitative descriptive analysis of a large number of texts, which can give a degree of generality and confidence about the study findings. However, while CL concerns the descriptive dimension of the text, it is not sufficient to explain why

particular lexical patterns were found, as it does not take into consideration the social, political and historical contexts. Thus, to examine the context in which these lexical patterns are constructed closely, the study found that the DHA approach to CDA in particular is helpful, as it analyses the discursive strategies centred on the use of these patterns. In particular, DHA strength represented how “It builds on a network of referential, predicational and argumentative strategies along with analysis of metaphors, presuppositions, mitigation and hyperboles, etc. in deconstructing a text, all of which require a close analysis of context” (Baker et al. 2008:295). However, DHA has been criticised for its analysis of a small number of texts, which represents a problem in terms of the representativeness of results to the wider social context. Thus, the combination of CL and DHA can benefit both approaches and assist in conducting a descriptive textual-based analysis of a large representative number of data, while contextualising these results on the basis of the context-based analysis of DHA.

Thus, since the combination of the discussed approaches can be used to evaluate the textual and the discursive construction of particular social phenomenon, these approaches will be employed to answer the main research questions that follow:

- How is ‘alibrāliyah’ articulated as an empty signifier by different groups in order to gain or maintain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field?

This question will be answered by asking the following sub-questions:

- 1) What are the fields of discourse associated with the discourse of alibrāliyah and do they change over time?
- 2) What are the semantic preferences around the term alibrāliyah and do they change over time?
- 3) What discursive strategies are used to construct alibrāliyah and to legitimise the different views towards it?
- 4) What are the mechanisms through which the strategic discursive constructions of alibrāliyah shift over time?

To answer these questions a detailed methodological elaboration including the choice of the data of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Methodology; The corpus and the methods for analysis

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the different approaches to examining the meaning of contested keywords, concluding with a proposed methodological framework. This chapter will now elaborate on this framework by presenting the data and the methods of analysis. The chapter will begin by discussing the criteria for the selection of the data and the compilation of the corpus. In the second part of the chapter, the methods of analysis are discussed; these are a combination of macro approaches that use corpus linguistics methods (Sinclair 1991) and micro approaches that use historical-discourse approaches (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). I discuss in detail the methods that have been employed for the data analysis and provide examples from data that illustrate the application of these methods.

4.2 Data

4.2.1 The data sources

The most prominent platform for engaging in and reporting on socio-political debates in Saudi Arabia is the press. This is true of the debate over *alibrāliyah*, which is the topic of this thesis, as Alkhedr states that the contestation of *alibrāliyah* in Saudi society has been reported widely in the press and that different authors, either proponents or opponents, hold a range of attitudes towards it (Alkhedr 2012:640). Therefore, it was decided to investigate the contestation of *alibrāliyah* in the Saudi newspapers by examining the different discourses surrounding it and the mechanisms by which its discursive construction is changing.

Four newspapers were selected as the source of data for this study, namely *Alriyadh*, *Aljahirah*, *Okaz* and *Alyaum*. These newspapers are amongst the leading Saudi daily newspapers (BBC 2006; Rugh 2004:59). They are privately-owned newspapers but must be licenced by the Ministry of Culture and Information in order to operate. These newspapers were chosen for several reasons, including the accessibility of the archive, the region of publication, their general orientations, and their readership.

Newspaper	Location	Year of Establishment	Publisher
Alriyadh ⁴	Riyadh	1965	Al-Yamama Corporation
Aljazirah ⁵	Riyadh	1960	AlJazirah Corporation
Okaz ⁶	Jeddah	1958	Okaz Corporation for Press and Publication
Alyaum ⁷	Dammam	1965	Dar Al-Youm

Table 4-1: Information about the selected newspapers.

These newspapers were originally published in broadsheet format and have recently started to be published online. The fact that these publications are available online makes it easier to access and search for articles, especially if the website provides an archive search feature. These archives provided by each newspaper allow for advanced searching and make it possible to search by the issue of the newspaper, the type of article, or using specific query terms. It is also possible to search for articles published within a defined period of time. Other leading newspapers, such as Alwatan and Almadinah, do not provide an accessible online archive of the issues of the newspaper. From a logistical perspective, it would not be feasible to obtain digital articles for a period of ten years from these newspapers, and this is one of the reasons why they have been excluded from this study.

In addition, the selected four newspapers are published across various regions in Saudi Arabia. Alriyadh and Aljazirah, for instance, are published in the capital city, Riyadh, which is located in the central region of the country. Okaz is published in Jeddah, which is in the western region. Alyaum, on the other hand, is published in the eastern region of the country, in Dammam city. This coverage of different regions would reflect and represent the discussion of this study subject, alibrāliyah, across the country.

The selected newspapers differ in their orientations and in the content that they publish. For example, Alriyadh and Aljazirah, which are produced in the capital city of Saudi Arabia, tend to cover reports related to the public sector (Alkarni 2006:36). However, these newspapers differ in their orientations when covering socio-political issues: Alriyadh is generally considered to be a progressive newspaper (Alkhedr 2012), while Aljazirah is more conservative (Rugh 2004:66). In addition, Okaz and Alyaum are similar in their tendency to cover regional news (Rugh 2004). However, Okaz is considered to be outspoken and provocative, whereas Alyaum tends to be conservative when dealing with socio-political issues (Rugh 2004:67; Baytalmal and Altayash 2003).

⁴ <http://www.alriyadh.com/>

⁵ <http://www.al-jazirah.com/>

⁶ <http://www.okaz.com.sa/>

⁷ <http://www.alyaum.com/>

Despite the differences in the orientations of these newspapers, the focus of this study will be on the way alibrāliyah is contested across these newspapers, as Saudi national newspapers, without comparing the way in which they discuss the issue.

The newspapers included in this study all have a high rate of readership in Saudi Arabia. According to Baytalmal and Altayash (2003) Alriyadh, Aljazirah, Okaz and Ayaum have particularly high rates of readership in the regions in which they are published. Thus, Alriyadh and Aljazirah are highly read in Riyadh, Okaz in Makkah province, and Alyaum in the eastern province. The most recent circulation report, which was carried out in 2003 (Rugh 2004:61) revealed that these are the four most circulated newspapers. Alriyadh has the highest readership rate, with an average circulation of 170,000, followed by Okaz (147,000), Aljazirah (80,000) and Alyaum (80,000).

These newspapers all deal with local issues, especially socio-political issues. According to Alkhedr (2012), they reinforce the social role of the press in shaping the public's attitude. Initially, these issues were primarily related to the public sector, such as the issues of education, health, and employment. Government censorship of the content of publications (Alkhedr 2012) meant that these issues were discussed with reservations. The government, represented by the Ministry of Information had the right to close a newspaper if it published something that contravened the print law, which states that 'the government has no right to interfere with any newspaper except for the sake of general welfare' (Rugh 2004:71). This included the ability to criticise government services, but without accusing or criticising the top leadership. This criticism must not extend to criticising Islam, and the published content must not contradict Islamic beliefs and rituals (Rugh 2004:66; Alahmad 2012:413). However, this direct censorship by the government was lifted in 2002 and the restrictions of the publications law were minimised, thereby giving the press more freedom (Rugh 2004:67; Alahmad 2012:434). This given freedom is based on the non-immediate censorship on the published content. Newspaper publishers are expected to carry out self-monitoring of their publications, but any reported content that contradicts the set law will still be investigated by the Ministry of Culture and Information (Alahmad 2012). This minimisation of censorship enabled newspapers to discuss socio-political issues affecting Saudi society more freely (Alshalhob 2006; Alkarni 2010). Thus, newspaper articles started to be able to criticise systems, such as the religious system, and to discuss controversial issues, such as reform and modernisation (Alkarni 2010).

This discussion of socio-political issues is particularly prevalent in the column articles of these newspapers (Alshalhob 2006; Alkarni 2010; Alkhedr 2012). Column

articles in Saudi newspapers tend to discuss the issues that reflect the concerns that give rise to major discussion in Saudi society (Alkhedr 2012; Alshalhob 2006). Thus, they have been selected as the type of articles that will be used for the purpose of the analysis; other newspaper content, such as news reports and editorials, will be excluded. Although editorials reflect the newspaper's attitudes towards a particular issue, they were excluded for the reason that no articles discussing alibrāliyah were identified. Having discussed the selection criteria for data sources, the methodology for compiling and analysing these newspaper articles will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2.2 The corpus

To examine the construct of alibrāliyah, a specialised corpus has been specifically compiled for the purpose of this study. This corpus consists of column articles in the four Saudi newspapers mentioned above that discuss alibrāliyah. The data were retrieved from the archives of these newspapers by searching using the lemma 'liberali' (liberal) and saving all the articles in which alibrāliyah was a major topic of discussion. As this research aims to provide a focused analysis of the way in which alibrāliyah is discussed and contested, and also because a large number of articles containing the lemma 'liberali' were found, it was decided to include only the articles in which alibrāliyah was the major topic of discussion, or one of the major topics. Thus, articles in which the word was only mentioned in passing were excluded. Since this study aims to identify the changes in the construal of alibrāliyah, it was decided to diachronically collect articles that were published during a period of 10 years, from late 2007, when alibrāliyah started to be contested in the Saudi context, until late 2016, when the collection of data ended.

Although corpus linguists normally tend to favour collecting a large corpus for reasons of representativeness (see Sinclair 1991, Stubbs 2001, McEnery and Gabrielatos 2006), Ooi (2001: 178) argues that there is no optimal size for a corpus, as this depends on the aims of the study. Ooi has also pointed to the fact that a corpus does not necessarily have to be large, "since there are some genres of texts restricted in scope and time" (2001: 178). This corresponds to Mautner's (2005: 815) argument that some studies, such as corpus-assisted critical discourse studies, do not require a large quantity of data. This is particularly the case in studies that focus on analysing special type of texts, e.g. those concerning a particular authorship, time of publication, as well as cultural, or national origin. According to Baker et al. (2008), CDA studies that use corpus analysis usually use small, specialised corpora and focus on examining the contextual features through the analysis of collocations and concordances. Examples are Partington and Morley's (2002) 500,000-word corpus of newspaper editorials on political

matters, Partington's (2003) 250,000-word corpus on the White House press briefings, and O'Halloran's (2009) 26,000-word corpus of quasi-campaign texts from The Sun. The data size of the above-mentioned studies is similar to that of the current thesis, as the total number of articles for this thesis is 575 (505,122 words). Although this represents a relatively small corpus, it is sufficient for the purpose of this study. Therefore, my specialised small corpus, which consists of all the texts in which *alibrāliyah* forms a significant part of the discussion, is adequate for the purpose of the current study, since it is intended to be used within the CDA qualitative framework in order to examine the salient features of the discourse of *alibrāliyah*.

The corpus was manually collected and annotated for time. Since this is a specialised corpus for a qualitative study, it required a manual search and selection for the type of articles relevant to the scope of this study. As stated earlier, the corpus consists only of the articles in which *alibrāliyah* is discussed in the Saudi context. Thus, articles in which *alibrāliyah* was mentioned in reference to other nations (such as the Liberal party in the UK or Japan), were excluded. To retrieve the articles included in the corpus, the online archives of each newspaper were accessed and searched using the lemma 'librali', and the web search feature provided by each newspaper's website was used to retrieve all the results in which *alibrāliyah* and its derivations were mentioned. Each article that appeared in the results was viewed and skim read in order to determine its relevance, before being copied and pasted into a txt file. Each file then was annotated for time (quarter of a year), saved into a UTF-8 format, and named according to the source and date of publication (e.g. R01Jan16, which stands for Al-Riyadh 1st of January 2016). This manual process was quite time-consuming but it was a feasible method of compiling a small specialised corpus and, given that there are no available tools that can perform this complicated process, it was necessary in order to be able to compile a specialised corpus.

The corpus then underwent the processes of lemmatisation and part-of-speech (POS) tagging. These processes were automated using the Madamira tool, which is a morphological analyser tool for Arabic data (Pasha et al. 2014). Owing to the high complexity of the Arabic language in terms of its richly inflectional and cliticizational morphological system, Madamira was designed as a tool for the morphological disambiguation, lemmatisation and part-of -peech tagging of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), the formal language that is used in the news and in the press. It is necessary to subject the data of the current study to Madamira processing in order to enable the researcher for searching with the lemma or by a particular part of speech, and also for obtaining highly accurate, lemmatised, POS tagged, or morphologically disambiguated

results when conducting the corpus analysis for collocates or concordances. Pasha et al. (2014) indicate that this tool performs highly accurate tagging in terms of the percentage of words that are correctly tagged, with 96% accuracy in lemmatisation, 95% in POS tagging, and 84% in morphological disambiguation. The 505,122-word corpus was processed using Madamira, thereby producing an output of tagged words. This output was then converted into a format specified by the corpus query tool SketchEngine and was then used as the input for the next process, namely the upload into SketchEngine.

To conduct the corpus analysis, the tagged corpus was uploaded into SketchEngine⁸, a powerful corpus query tool developed by Kilgarriff et al. (2004). SketchEngine was specifically selected for use in the present study because it offers a number of distinct features that meet the needs of this study. The primary reason for choosing SketchEngine was that, unlike other corpus query tools, SketchEngine fully supports the analysis of Arabic written data. Alfaifi and Atwell (2015), in their study on the evaluation of Arabic corpora analysis tools, revealed that SketchEngine is one of the best tools that support the Arabic language. This result is based on an evaluation of six corpus query tools (Antconc, WordSmith, SketchEngine, IntelliText, Khawas and aConCord) on the basis of eight criteria (reading Arabic UTF-8 and UTF-16 files, displaying Arabic diacritics, Arabic text in R-to-L direction, normalising diacritics and Hamza, and providing an Arabic interface and Arabic personal corpus). The study concluded that the tools SketchEngine and Khawas satisfied most of the criteria, with a result of 7/8. However, although this study based its evaluation on the support of the Arabic language, it did not further indicate the other features that distinguished each of the tools from the other. Although Khawas was equal to SketchEngine in terms of the efficiency of supporting Arabic, Khawas (Al-Thubaity et al. 2014, 2015) was not found to be as efficient as SketchEngine in relation to the corpus analysis features. Khawas is a basic tool, run by Java, which is limited in functions and includes the simple functions of collocation and concordance analysis (Al-Thubaity et al. 2014). The support of the Arabic language, in addition to the various other advanced features, made SketchEngine the primary choice of tool for the present study.

Another special feature in SketchEngine is the 'trend analysis' function. The present study made particular use of this feature for the diachronic analysis of the corpus. As SketchEngine is constantly undergoing development, the trend analysis feature was added quite recently, and was developed by Kilgarriff et al. (2015). Trends analysis is

⁸ <https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/>

“an implemented system for corpus-based diachronic analysis” which is designed to make it possible to examine language change (Kilgarriff et al. 2015). This feature functions automatically by calculating the frequency of each word in each time period. It then normalises the frequency per million words before measuring the trending of the word over time using linear regression or Theil-Sen gradient estimation statistical tests and providing graphs that show the trend line for the trending frequent lexical items.

The analysis in the present study made use of the trend feature alongside the primary features of collocation analysis that can be approached and viewed in various ways, such as date of publication, the source, the node form, and many other means.

4.3 Methods of analysis

4.3.1 Corpus linguistics methods

Before discussing the procedure for analysing the data using corpus linguistics methods, the types of corpus linguistics approaches and the differences between them are illustrated. These approaches can be divided into corpus-driven, corpus-based, and corpus-assisted approaches. For the current study, a corpus-assisted approach has been adopted. The distinction between these approaches is a subject of debate in the field of corpus linguistics, especially in terms of the relationship between theory and data in corpus linguistics research (McEnery and Gabrielatos 2006). McEnery and Gabrielatos (2006) have specifically illustrated the difference between corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches, which are the approaches that have been used most frequently by corpus linguists and which have most frequently been debated. Studies that adopt a corpus-based approach use the corpus to test theories that were formulated before the corpus was constructed or used to inform the study. On the other hand, research that follows a corpus-driven approach uses the corpus data to identify evidence of language use independent of pre-existing theoretical frameworks, with the aim of developing an empirical theory. Although these represent two opposing approaches with regard to whether or not they should depend on theory, their applications do, however, usually tend to fall between two end-points of a continuum, rather than the pure version of one of these approaches being used. McEnery and Gabrielatos add that it is impossible to use a theoretical approach in language research, such as the use of the pure form of corpus-driven approach, as linguists usually approach data with assumptions and intuitions (2006:313).

The third most common approach in corpus linguistics research is the corpus-assisted approach, which is a relatively new field of research that considers corpus linguistics as an empirical quantitative method that can be used to support the qualitative

analysis of language use (Baker et al. 2013). It is often used in the context of what Partington (2004; 2008) calls corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS), which generally aim to examine the features of discourse by integrating corpus linguistic analysis methods. Earlier pioneering research in this field includes that of Hardt-Mautner (1995) and Stubbs (1996). Other studies that adopt this approach include Baker (2004; 2010), Orpin (2005), Baker et al. (2008), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012), and Baker et al. (2013). Partington also coined the term Modern Diachronic Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (MD-CADS), which is a sub-discipline of this field and is concerned with “the study of changes in linguistic habits or in social, political and cultural perspectives over a brief period of contemporary time, as illustrated in a particular discourse type or set of discourse types” (2010: 104). The present study falls under the broad umbrella of the MD-CADS approach as it examines the usage of *alibrāliyah* over a short period of contemporary time (2007-2016) and also uses a corpus-assisted approach to assist the qualitative analysis of the diachronic and discursive usage of *alibrāliyah*. However, this study does not follow the same methodological design that Partington often uses in his MD-CADS studies (2010; 2012). For example, Partington’s framework for examining changes in language is based on identifying the keywords by comparing two corpora that represent distinct periods of time, rather than, for instance, examining the trends of frequent keywords over time. Furthermore, he analyses the decontextualized concordance lines to uncover the features of discourse, or what he calls the ‘non-obvious meaning’, without examining the discourse critically through the analysis of full texts. Thus, this corpus-assisted discourse study follows a special set of methods designed to provide information about the salient and the hidden features of the discourse of *alibrāliyah* over time, on the basis of a large number of specialised corpus texts. These methods include the analysis of the trends of the keywords list, the collocations, and a qualitative analysis of a sample of full texts. These methods are illustrated in detail in the following sections.

4.3.1.1 Frequency of usage of *alibrāliyah* over time

In order to gain a general understanding of the usage of *alibrāliyah* both diachronically and across the corpus, an initial analysis of the frequency of its usage was conducted. This had the specific purpose of revealing whether there are any peaks or troughs in the discussion of *alibrāliyah* between 2007 and 2016. This analysis was carried out in two steps. Firstly, since all of the articles collected for the corpus are mainly on the subject of *alibrāliyah*, a diachronic analysis of the frequency of these articles across the newspapers was carried out. Secondly, an analysis of the frequency of the

lemma of the term *alibrāliyah*, i.e. 'librāli' was performed, both across the corpus and over time.

4.3.1.2 *Wordlist analysis*

The analysis of the wordlist was carried out in order to obtain information about the key discourses associated with the discourse of *alibrāliyah*. It aims specifically to analyse the usage of these keywords over time, in order to discover whether there have been any changes in the discourses associated with *alibrāliyah*. This analysis is based on the procedure of extracting the 100 statistically most frequent keywords in the corpus and then grouping the words that have similar meaning preferences. The wordlist can be automatically extracted and displayed in frequency order using the software tool SketchEngine. However, because the software extracts the most frequent words, regardless of their form, the focus in the analysis is only on the lexical words, meaning that grammatical words are excluded from the analysis. This procedure of analysing the lexical words is often adopted by corpus-assisted discourse studies (see Baker 2004; Baker et al. 2008; Partington 2012; Jeffries and Walker 2012). Hunston (2002:68) has also emphasised the fact that the analysis of the lexical keywords as a starting point helps in identifying the key topics in a specialised corpus.

After the lexical words had been extracted, the items with similar meanings were manually grouped together in order to uncover the discourses most frequently associated with the discourse of *alibrāliyah*. This procedure follows Sinclair's (1991) approach of semantic preference, which is often used by corpus linguists to identify the key themes in the corpus (see section 3.3). The identification of thematic groups follows an abductive approach, as it looks at the extracted keywords and categorises them into themes coined in relation to this study. By adopting this approach, the study is eliminating predefined approaches that would not provide accurate identification of the discourses related to the study.

The analysis of the meaning preference was followed by an analysis of the usage of these keywords over time. The aim of this was to discover whether there have been any changes in the discourses associated with *alibrāliyah*. This was conducted using the automatic trends analysis feature provided by SketchEngine, which measures the relative frequency of each keyword per quarter-year. In this way, we can see whether or not there have been any changes in the usage of a keyword and if there has been any increase or decrease in usage over time.

4.3.1.3 Collocation Analysis

In order to identify diachronically the meanings closely associated with the term *alibrāliyah*, the analysis of the collocation was conducted around the node 'alibrāliyah'. This was carried out using SketchEngine, which is able to calculate the collocations of a node word. The procedure followed in this research was divided into two main processes; firstly, the associated semantic preferences were analysed and, secondly, the diachronic usage of the top collocates of the top semantic preferences was analysed. The analysis of the semantic preferences was carried out by searching the corpus using the lemma 'librāli' and then calculating the collocations surrounding this node word within a 5-word span either side of the node. This calculation displayed the collocates in order of their co-occurrence frequency. From this, the top 50 lexical collocates were selected for the analysis and then categorised manually into thematic groups, following an abductive approach. This model of analysis has been found to be useful in identifying the different meaning preferences of a word, particularly when grouping the collocates according to their similarities in meaning features (Sinclair 1991; Stubbs 2001; Hunston 2002:76; Baker et al. 2008). This analysis was followed by an analysis of the diachronic usage of the top collocates of top themes. The purpose of this was to identify whether, over time, there has been any shift in their usage in association with *alibrāliyah*. In doing so, the frequency of these top collocates over time was first examined, and their collocates were then looked at in order to identify the salient topics associated with these two collocates in association to *alibrāliyah*. This analysis of the top collocates was also carried out for an essential purpose, namely to narrow down the corpus for the qualitative analysis, as is illustrated in the following section.

4.3.1.4 Narrowing down the corpus for the qualitative analysis

Following the macro corpus analysis of the texts, this research intended to carry out a detailed qualitative analysis of the discursive construction of *alibrāliyah* in a sample of whole texts. The selection of the sample was aided by the corpus analysis of the texts. In this regard, a number of decisions and steps were followed in order to reduce the corpus of 575 texts to a more manageable sample. The procedure was based on a systematic selection of a sample of 12 articles based on a) the key themes informed by the collocation analysis and b) the factor of time. For the first criterion, it was decided that the chosen texts should contain frequent occurrences of the two most frequent key themes, and that six articles would be selected for each key theme. This selection on the basis of themes takes also into consideration the aspect of time, as the selected articles should be representative of the whole period (2007-2016).

To exemplify this procedure, the selection of the sample follows the following steps. Firstly, a collocation analysis of words surrounding *alibrāliyah* should be conducted to identify the associated key meanings (see section 4.3.1.3). Then, the top two key discourses in terms of frequency are selected as the basis of selection, in which the most frequent word 'collocate' in each discourse is used to select the articles. In other words, these top collocates of each key discourse will be used as the basis for selecting the articles in which they co-occur with *alibrāliyah* more frequently. Given that time is an important factor, this selection of the articles that contain the most frequent collocates will also be based on time. As the selection process intended to choose six articles for each key theme, these six articles will have been published in six different years. One article will be chosen for every second year during the relevant time period, including the first and last years of that period. In other words, articles will be selected from the years 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2016 in order to trace the diachronic change of the discourse and to look at the mechanism of the construction of the meaning of *alibrāliyah* over time. This procedure is relatively straightforward, as SketchEngine allows for viewing of the co-occurrence frequency of collocates for each article. In this tool, the articles are ordered by time and labelled by source and date. Once the sub-corpus had been selected according to these criteria, it was subjected to a detailed qualitative analysis that both allowed for a richer understanding of *alibrāliyah* and its collocates as they are used in real time, and also enabled an analysis of the different discourse strategies used to validate different construals of *alibrāliyah* in individual texts and across time.

4.3.2 Critical discourse analysis: Discourse-Historical Approach

In order to analyse the argumentation strategies used in discussing *alibrāliyah*, I adopted DHA as a tool for CDA, as developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009). DHA offers an empirical model for an in-depth discursive and linguistic analysis of texts. This is represented in the developed model of discursive strategies that can be realised through a variety of linguistic devices. Thus, these methods are used to identify the discursive strategies used to construct *alibrāliyah* over time.

4.3.2.1 Discursive strategies

Discursive strategies are the practices that are adopted for particular social or political purposes (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). These strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity and, thus, can be realised through a close linguistic analysis of texts. In the case of this study, this model will be used to identify the discursive strategies employed in the texts to construct *alibrāliyah* and to legitimise the

different views towards it. According to DHA, five principal discourse strategies are used to construe key concepts, each of which will be explained in more detail below: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and mitigation/intensification⁹.

Nomination strategies

Nomination strategies can be recognised in a text by asking the question: How are persons, objects, phenomena, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically? It is a discursive strategy whose analysis uncovers the ideological orientation behind the linguistic expression. It is also a strategy that can reveal the means by which nomination is used to legitimate a particular claim or action. In this study, the analysis of the nomination strategies aims to identify the way in which alibrāliyah and the relevant social actors and phenomena are discursively labelled in the texts. Nomination strategies can be realised in texts through linguistic means such as deictics ('نحن'-we), collectives ('المجتمع'-the society), metaphors ('العالم الحر'-*the free world for the European countries*), toponyms ('الدول الأوروبية'-*the European countries*), negationyms ('التقليديون'-traditionalists), and ideologonyms ('الليبرالية'-liberalism). The identification of these nominations would help us to analyse the means by which alibrāliyah is identified, and also the way in which these nominations are used to discuss alibrāliyah and to legitimate the different views towards it. alibrāliyah itself can be considered as an ideologonym, or what Reisigl and Wodak (2005:69) consider to be an expression of social practice that implies the involvement of social actors. Thus, the social actors involved within the debate of alibrāliyah are considered for the analysis of the nomination strategy. The analysis of social actors will also follow Van Leeuwen's (2008)¹⁰ socio-semantic approach of identifying social actors, as it provides a detailed categorisation of the actors in terms of the ways in which they are linguistically and socially identified. This will help in identifying the way in which actors are constructed across texts and over time in the discussion of alibrāliyah.

Predication strategies

This strategy can be recognised in texts by asking the question: What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes? It represents the way in which the constructed

⁹ For a detailed illustration of the procedure of identifying these strategies see (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, chapter 2)

¹⁰ For a detailed account of Van Leeuwen categories of social actors see (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23-54)

social groups and phenomena are linguistically provided with predications that aim to label social actors or phenomena more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively. In other words, these predications represent “evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates” (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:45). In the current study, the focus will be on the way alibrāliyah and the related social actors and phenomena are predicated and attributed to in the texts. Predication strategies can be identified in texts through the use of attributes (in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups), by predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns, by collocations, by explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures and by more or less implicit allusions, evocations and presuppositions/implications. (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:54)

An example of the predication strategy is the attribution to alibrāliyah of *تصطبغ* 'بلون واقعها' *limbues with the colours of reality*; this represents a positive predicate through the use of a metaphor that indicates the flexibility and eligibility of alibrāliyah. As with the nomination strategy, the analysis of predication strategies would reveal the underlying ideologies in the construction and dis/legitimation of alibrāliyah.

Argumentation strategies

Argumentation strategies can be realised by asking what arguments argumentation schemes are used in relation to the discourse of alibrāliyah in order to legitimise and justify the different views towards it. Argumentation strategies can be considered as central discursive strategies as, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2005:55-56), they are based on the convincing devices that are used to legitimize the other discursive strategies, such as predication and perspectivisation strategies. Argumentation strategies can be analysed by first analysing the principal claims in the text and then the premises that justify these claims. These premises are content-related warrants that connect the arguments with the concluding claim in a text. These argumentation schemes can be reasonable, and can thus be labelled as 'topoi', or they can be fallacious, and thus labelled as 'fallacies', as is explained below.

Topoi

Topoi are “parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises” (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:74-75). They are “content-related warrants” or “conclusion rules” that link the arguments to the conclusion or the main claim and thus, they play the role of justifying the transition from the arguments to the conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak 2005:75). As topoi are content-related warrants, their

identification is, to an extent, dependent on the type of discourse or the context in which they occur. As such, this means the set of particular topoi construct the text in such a way that it is placed within a particular discourse and set of world views or values. For instance, the list of topoi identified by Reisigl and Wodak (2005:27-80) was intended to be related to the discourse of racism, although some are generally considered to be common across different types of discourses. In this regard, they state that the list they identify is “incomplete and not always disjunctive” and thus, other types of topoi can be coined by the analyst, depending on the type of discourse under analysis (2005:75). For example, in the contested discourse of alibrāliyah in the Saudi socio-political context, the general topoi that are identified by (Reisigl and Wodak 2005), such as the topos of definition, and the topos of positive and negative consequences, are found recurrently. However, the topos of freedom, which is commonly found across the texts is coined by the researcher to state the rule that, if a belief or action helps to achieve freedom, then one should adopt or perform it. Thus, the analysis of topoi in this study will rely on the general common topoi from the list compiled by Reisigl and Wodak (2005), alongside several other coined context-dependent topoi that are identified and explained throughout the analysis. The analysis of topoi will reveal the different moral frameworks within which different authors contest the concept of alibrāliyah and will demonstrate the chronological shift in the prominence of different worldview frameworks. The general common topoi identified by Reisigl and Wodak (2005: 75-80) and quoted below include, but are not limited to:

a) The topos of advantage or usefulness: if an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it.

b) The topos of uselessness/disadvantage: if one can anticipate that the consequences of a decision will not occur or if other political actions are more likely to lead to the declared aim, the decision has to be rejected.

c) The topos of definition: if an action, a thing, or a person is named as X, the action, thing or person carries, or should carry, the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the meaning of X.

d) The topos of danger or threat: if a decision could have specific dangerous or threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it. Or, if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something about them.

e) The topos of humanitarianism: if a decision does or does not conform with human rights and values, one should or should not perform or make it.

f) The topos of responsibility: because a group of persons is responsible for specific problems, they should find solutions to those problems.

g) The topos of reality: because reality is as it is, a specific decision should be made.

h) The topos of authority: X is right because an authority says that it is right.

i) The topos of history: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation comparable with the historical example referred to.

j) The topos of culture: because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2005:80), this form of topos is sometimes employed in combination with the topos of danger or threat when referring to the danger of changing the identity of the culture in specific situations.

k) The topos of abuse: if a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be changed or the help should be withdrawn, or measures against the abuse should be taken.

Fallacies

Fallacies are argumentation devices directed against the antagonist in order to justify a particular action or idea (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). They are based on violations of the rules of rational disputes (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:71). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) refer to the rules identified by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992); these include the freedom of argument, the obligation to give reasons, correct reference to previous discourse by the antagonist, the obligation to be 'matter-of-fact', correct reference to implicit premises, the use of plausible arguments, and the need for logical validity, acceptance of the discussion's results, clarity of expression, and correct interpretation. These ten rules for rational arguing form the basis of discourse ethics, and the violation of these rules is fallacious. An example of a fallacy can be found in a text fragment from the data that says:

"عندنا، يتحدث [] نكفائيون ثقافياً – بحماس بالغ - عن (الخصوصية السعودية)؛ محاولين تثبيت الراهن الثقافي لصالحهم، فإنهم يستخدمون وجهاً من أوجه الحقيقة، بعد كثير من التدليس والتزييف"

Which can be translated into '*the cultural regressives speak with great enthusiasm about the Saudi speciality, trying to secure the current culture for their interest using one aspect of truth after a lot of fraud and counterfeiting*'. This text includes a reported fallacy as the antagonist that is referred to as [] نكفائيون ثقافياً" *the cultural regressives* violates the rule of

obligation to 'matter-of-factness' and the rules about clarity of expression and correct interpretation. This rational argumentation device is used to delegitimise the 'others' view of securing the culture, thus constituting a fallacious threat of cultural change.

Concerning the use of argumentation devices, it should be noted that the construction of the argumentation devices of topoi can be sometimes fallacious, as these can sometimes be based on a fallacy. This can be found when a speaker makes implicit attempts in some arguments to legitimise a particular action or belief using a particular topoi in order to delegitimise the opposing argument using a fallacy. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009:110), it can be difficult to distinguish whether a particular argumentation scheme is employed as a topos or as a fallacy. This could be why some examples of arguments in a text can be considered to be both a topos and a fallacy at the same time. An example provided by Reisigl and Wodak (2009:102) is the text fragment 'what I am really concerned about is the way the environmental topics have been misused by certain political pressure groups'. This fragment includes an argumentation device of a topos, or a fallacy, of abuse, which is based on the speaker's concern about this abuse and implies that a specific course of action should be taken. He explicitly states that the actions carried out by the others are a fallacy. It should be also noted that fallacies in texts are either committed or reported. Committed fallacies are the fallacies that are committed by the author, such as using a strawman fallacy against the antagonist to delegitimise their view. Reported fallacies, on the other hand, are the fallacies that are reported by the author as having been carried out by the antagonist, such as the use of fallacy of threat when the antagonist makes a false claim that there is a threat. Here, the author also points out the fallacy committed by the other person in order to delegitimise their view and to legitimise his concluding claim.

Perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification strategies

Along with the analysis of the nomination, predication and argumentation strategies, this study will also analyse the perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification strategies. Unlike the first group of strategies, which are based on the representation of particular phenomena or social actors (us vs. them), the latter group of strategies are concerned with the way in which speakers express their involvement or position their point of view in discourse, as well as with the way they 'qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:81). Thus, the analysis of these strategies in this study aims to provide information about the ways in which alibrāliyah is represented by different views and the means by which these views contribute to the discursive construction of alibrāliyah. These strategies can be realised by asking the

question: From what point of view are nominations, attributions and arguments expressed and whether these views are intensified or mitigated?

Perspectivisation strategies refer to the relative degrees of involvement or detachment across a text. Involvement strategies aim to express the speakers' attitudes and feelings in order to emotionally and cognitively engage the hearers in the discourse (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:82). This can be recognised through the linguistic means of intensification, such as the use of adjectives and adverbs that express the degree of feeling and attitude, and through the use of personal deictics. Involvement strategies can also be realised by repetitions of morphemes, words, collocations of words, phrases, and even longer sequences of discourse. It can also be indicated through the use of direct speech and free indirect speech. Detachment strategies, on the other hand, are achieved through the linguistic means of relative and complement clauses, a sequence of prepositional phrases, the abstractive passive voice, nominalisations, or distancing personal and temporal deictics. These linguistic devices increase the level of detachment by constructing a distance between the subject or actor and the action, thereby shifting the responsibility of the actor or the speaker of the argument being made. Detachment strategies are also associated with mitigation, as they can be indicated through the use of indirect speech.

As with perspectivisation strategies, the relevant mitigation and intensification strategies can be indicated through other linguistic means. They can be represented, with different degrees of intensification through the use of modality, verbs of thinking and saying, questions, negation, and assertion. In particular, intensification strategies can be realised through emphasising, as well as by amplifying particles and morphemes, intensifying quantifiers and verbs, the use of adjectives and adverbs that show the speaker's emotions and feelings, and the use of the superlative form. Mitigation strategies, on the other hand, involve the analysis of mood and modality. Therefore, they can be achieved by using linguistic devices such as modal verbs and verbs of feeling that indicate a level of reservation, rather than assertion. Mitigation can also be identified through the use of constructed questions instead of assertion, assertion with 'we' or 'it', by tag questions, hesitation, and self-correction.

It should be noted that along with the DHA strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation and intensification strategies that are used in texts to legitimise particular actions or ideologies, Van Leeuwen's (2007) categories of legitimation strategies are also employed to identify the means by which 'alibrāliyah' is legitimised/delegitimised. According to Van Leeuwen these categories include

authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis. Authorisation deals with legitimation by referring to an authority social norms, law or persons. Moral evaluation concerns legitimising a statement or action through referring to discourses of value. Rationalization is a legitimation by reference to the goals of institutionalized social action or by the social knowledges that is cognitively valid. Mythopoesis finally is the legitimation that is delivered through narratives¹¹.

4.4 Translation considerations

As the analysis is conducted on the Arabic data, the translation of these data is provided for illustrative purposes for non-native speakers of Arabic. The translation attempts to deliver the overall meaning as accurately as possible. The process of translation involves the translation of single words, such as the keywords and collocate findings, as well as the translation of whole texts, in which the delivery of the meaning of the arguments was of particular importance. According to Mona Baker (1992), it is impossible to deliver the whole meaning through the process of translation, some meanings are lost due to the differences in ways of expression from language to language and, thus, it is impossible to have an equivalent translation. To assure that the translation is adequate, the translated data was presented to a qualified translator who checked, reviewed and certified the translation (see Appendix C). The translation of the single words, keywords and collocates, can be found in the corpus analysis chapter, while the translation of the individual texts can be found in the appendices.

4.5 Summary of the chapter

This chapter has discussed the type of data used (newspaper articles), the compilation of the corpus and the processing of the data in the corpus tool SketchEngine. The methods of analysis have also been described. The main aim of this chapter has been to illustrate the combined methods of CL and DHA used in this thesis to examine the construal of *alibrāliyah* and the mechanism of its shift over time. As discussed, the reason for analysing the keywords and their collocations was to discover the meaning preferences associated with *alibrāliyah* at the macro level. This analysis also informed the selection of articles to be analysed at the micro level. For the micro analysis, the DHA approach of discursive strategies will be used to analyse the strategies by which *alibrāliyah* is discussed and legitimised over time. This will be carried out through the analysis of the strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, and perspectivisation, and will demonstrate the ways in which *alibrāliyah* and social actors

¹¹ For the detailed account of legitimation strategies see (Van Leeuwen 2007)

are nominated, the argumentation devices used in dis/legitimising alibrāliyah, and the authority and evaluation over time. Both levels of analysis will provide information about the discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi society and will reflect on the broader project of modernisation in the Saudi social field. The application of the methods is thoroughly illustrated in the following analysis chapters.

Chapter 5: The Corpus Analysis

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed, in detail, the selection of the corpus data and the methodology employed for this study. This chapter will present an assisted macro analysis of the 'alibrāliyah' corpus, based primarily on Sinclair's (1990) units of meaning model. The analysis will employ a diachronic approach to explore the usage and shift in meaning of the discourse on alibrāliyah, which will provide general insight into the struggle of articulating alibrāliyah in discourse surrounding modernity. This chapter will therefore start by analysing the frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah across a corpus of Saudi newspapers over time to reveal whether there are any peaks or troughs in the discussion of alibrāliyah. This will be followed by a presentation of the results of the corpus analysis, including the wordlist and the collocations around alibrāliyah, which reveal the key discourses associated with alibrāliyah and any changes in these discourses. The results of the corpus macro analysis will then serve as the basis for a subsequent qualitative micro analysis, which will provide a general understanding of the discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi society. As the corpus data analysed is Arabic language, an English translation is provided for the excerpts for increased readability and clarity of analysis.

5.2 The frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah

Before discussing the preferences concerning the discourse of alibrāliyah, an initial statistical analysis of the frequency of the usage of alibrāliyah across the corpus is necessary. This frequency analysis will provide a general understanding of the diachronic usage of alibrāliyah across the newspapers and, more specifically, will reveal whether there are any peaks or troughs in the discussion of alibrāliyah within the time frame 2007 to 2016. This analysis will be conducted in two steps. First, as all the articles collected for the corpus are primarily focused on alibrāliyah, a diachronic analysis of the frequency of these articles across the newspapers will be carried out. Second, an analysis of the frequency of the lemma for the term 'الليبرالية'/alibrāliyah i.e. 'ليبرالي'/librāli' will be performed, both across the corpus and over time.

In regard to the frequency of articles over time, Figure (5-1) shows that the number of articles that discuss alibrāliyah was highest in 2010. This indicates that alibrāliyah was mostly debated across newspapers in the year 2010. The graph also shows that there was an increase in the number of such articles since the beginning of the contestation of alibrāliyah in 2007 until 2010. However, there was a general decrease in the number of articles published after 2010, with a few high peaks in 2012, 2014, and 2016. Looking at each newspaper, it is clear that Aljazeera published the largest number

of articles contesting alibrāliyah compared to other newspapers. However, it is important to note that this study will not focus on analysing the attitudes of the newspapers, but rather on examining the representation of alibrāliyah across the newspapers, since the opinion articles that make up the corpus represent the attitudes of the authors rather than the stance of the newspaper in which they are published (see Section 4.2.1).




Figure 5-1: Number of articles per year in the corpus (2007-2016)

In regard to the frequency of the usage of the lemma ‘librāli’ over time, Figure (5-2) shows similar results to Figure (5-1) in that the highest peak in the usage of alibrāliyah is in the year 2010. It also shows an increase in the frequency of the usage of the lemma ‘librāli’ from the beginning of 2007 until 2010, which was followed by a decrease until 2016, and a high peak in 2014. However, although there is a similarity between Graphs (5-1) and (5-2) in the patterns of frequency of usage per year, it can be seen that there are also some differences, due to the fact that the frequency of the lemma might differ from one article to another.




Figure 5-2: The frequency of the lemma 'liberali' (2007-2016)

5.3 Key discourses in the corpus of alibrāliyah

This section will be divided into two subsections. The first part aims to identify the main discourses associated with alibrāliyah, which will be identified by extracting the 100 most frequent lexical items and then categorising them into thematic groups. The second part aims to diachronically investigate the discourses associated with alibrāliyah over time. This will be carried out through a trend analysis of the top 100 lexical items in the corpus. Both levels of analysis aim to discover the salient discourses associated with the use of alibrāliyah, and the usage and shift of these discourses over time. The results will also reveal, in general, which fields are discussed and contested within the discourse of alibrāliyah in the struggle over modernism in Saudi Arabia.

5.3.1 Top 100 lexical items in the corpus of alibrāliyah

An analysis of the wordlist was conducted to identify the key discourses associated with the use of 'alibrāliyah'. Table (5-1) shows the 100 most frequent lexical items in the corpus, ordered by frequency. As the table shows, the word 'ليبرالي', which is the lemma of the term under investigation, 'alibrāliyah', is the most frequent keyword in the corpus (5,406 occurrences). This is followed by the word 'مجتمع' (society), which suggests that the discussion of alibrāliyah is closely connected to the social context. The word 'حرية' (freedom) is also very frequent, which would indicate that alibrāliyah is frequently discussed in association with freedom. The wordlist analysis also yielded

interesting results in regard to the word 'إسلامي' / *Islamic*, which occurs frequently in the corpus, suggesting that the discourse of religion is also significant in discussions of alibrāliyah. For a complete account of the analysis of the keywords list, these keywords were categorised into thematic groups following an abductive approach, in order to identify the salient discourses associated with alibrāliyah (see Table 5-2). The most frequent keyword, 'ليبرالي' / *liberal*, was excluded and not included under any thematic categorisation, since its meaning is the one under investigation.

No.	Word	Translation	Frequency	No.	Word	Translation	Frequency
1	ليبرالي	Liberal	5,406	51	مسلم	Muslim	453
2	مجتمع	Society	1,852	52	غربي	Western	450
3	حرية	Freedom	1,571	53	حالة	Case	450
4	قال	Say	1,492	54	موقف	Position	449
5	فكر	Intellect	1,381	55	تقليدي	Traditional	446
6	إسلامي	Islamic	1,024	56	قضية	Issue	443
7	فكري	Intellectual	1,013	57	معنى	Meaning	442
8	حق	Right	942	58	وجود	Existence	439
9	اجتماعي	Social	918	59	سؤال	Question	436
10	تيار	Trend	914	60	وعي	Awareness	434
11	دين	Religion	898	61	مقال	Article	433
12	سياسي	Political	894	62	تم	do	429
13	ديني	Religious	875	63	مستوى	Level	427
14	إسلام	Islam	869	64	خاص	Special	426
15	ثقافي	Cultural	850	65	صورة	Image	421
16	إنسان	Human	805	66	عرف	Know	420
17	واقع	Reality	802	67	ضد	Against	411
18	خطاب	Discourse	784	68	رجل	Man	409
19	عربي	Arab	781	69	فعل	Do	405
20	سعودي	Saudi	760	70	عمل	Work	403
21	رأي	Opinion	757	71	إنساني	Humanitarian	403
22	وجد	Find	752	72	جعل	Make	401
23	الله	Allah	743	73	قول	Saying	393
24	كتاب	Book	681	74	يرى	See	390
25	ثقافة	Culture	681	75	تاريخ	History	372
26	مفهوم	Concept	677	76	شكل	Form	371
27	أمر	Matter	670	77	نقد	Criticism	368
28	ديموقراطي	Democratic	664	78	فكرة	Idea	368
29	قيمة	Value	639	79	حال	Situation	347
30	فرد	Individual	632	80	قام	Stand	346
31	دولة	Country	607	81	كبير	Large	345
32	عقل	Mind	605	82	مختلف	Different	341
33	عام	General	595	83	حوار	Discussion	339
34	ناس	People	585	84	اختلاف	Differences	338
35	يوم	Day	578	85	وقت	Time	336
36	مثقف	Intellectual (person)	556	86	علم	Science	336
37	عنى	Mean	553	87	نص	Text	331
38	مرأة	Woman	552	88	أصل	Origin	331
39	حياة	Life	540	89	صراع	Conflict	329
40	مصطلح	Term	511	90	علماني	Secular	322
41	عالم	World	503	91	علاقة	Relation	319
42	أصبح	Become	493	92	نظر	Look	318
43	حقيقة	Fact	490	93	دعا	Call	317
44	أراد	Want	490	94	مسألة	Issue	315
45	جديد	New	469	95	دكتور	Doctor	314
46	سبب	Reason	467	96	علمي	Scientific	311
47	حديث	Modern	464	97	حكم	Judgment	308
48	نظام	System	462	98	رؤية	Vision	304
49	حد	Limit	460	99	استطاع	Can	304
50	مبدأ	Principle	453	100	حركة	Movement	303

Table 5-1: Top 100 most frequent lexical items in the corpus

As can be seen from Table (5-2), the thematic groups reveal the salient discourses in the alibrāliyah corpus. It can be seen that the discourse of religion is particularly prominent in the corpus, as words equivalent to the terms 'Islamic', 'religion', 'religious', 'Islam', 'Allah', and 'Muslim' are amongst the most frequent lexical items. Also, lexical items that indicate social discourse also feature in the wordlist, such as 'اجتماعي'/(*social*), 'ثقافي'/(*cultural*), and 'قيمة'/(*value*). The discourse of humanitarianism and human rights is also found amongst the salient discourses, indicated by lexical items such as 'حرية'/(*freedom*), 'إنسان'/(*human*), 'حق'/(*right*), and 'إنساني'/(*humanitarian*) appearing frequently in the corpus. It can also be observed that words referring to national and regional entities, which are equivalent to the terms 'Saudi', 'Arab', and 'Western', are frequently used in the corpus, which suggests that discussions of alibrāliyah make reference to both the local Saudi and Arab context and the foreign/global Western context, although the corpus data primarily discusses alibrāliyah in the local context.

The 'conflict' theme indicates that there is a conflict regarding alibrāliyah, where the terms 'difference', 'against', and 'relationship' suggest that there are conflicting relations between different elements associated with alibrāliyah. It is also noticeable that key terms indicating mental objects and communication are found amongst the most frequently used items, which suggests that there is ongoing debate regarding the meaning of alibrāliyah as a 'term', a 'concept', a 'discourse', or an 'idea' and so on. Similarly, the 'science' theme suggests debate regarding the meaning of alibrāliyah in terms of its objective 'scientific origin'. In addition, a number of evaluative keywords are used, which can be considered representations of the discourse prosody. These terms do not indicate a specific meaning on their own but could suggest that there are some elements within the alibrāliyah corpus that are attributed to, such as 'reality', 'modern', 'traditional' and so on. Approximately 10% of the wordlist does not refer to a particular theme, including words equivalent to the terms 'life', 'limit', 'case', and 'article'. Overall, this analysis of the key discourses reveals significant results, in which alibrāliyah is associated with a number of salient discourses, including the discourses of religion, social practices, human rights, and political movements. This indicates that the key term alibrāliyah is contested and discussed in relation to the religious, social, humanitarian, and political fields in the Saudi social context. This reveals that the debate over liberalism is concerned with similar discourses to the previous modernist trends, specifically the socio-religious discourse, which also indicates that attempts at modernism are struggling as a result of challenges from socio-religious norms.

Thematic categories	Keywords
Religion	اسلامي/'Islamic', دين/'religion', ديني/'religious', اسلام/'Islam', الله/'Allah', مسلم/'Muslim'
Social and cultural notions	مجتمع/'Society', اجتماعي/'social', ثقافي/'cultural', ثقافة/'culture', قيمة/'value', نظام/'system', ناس/'people'
Humanitarianism	حرية/'Freedom', إنسان/'human', حق/'right', فرد/'individual', إنساني/'humanitarian'
Political movements	سياسي/'Political', ديموقراطي/'democratic', علماني/'secular', حركة/'movement', تيار/'trend'
Ethnic/national and regional entities	سعودي/'Saudi', عربي/'Arab', غربي/'Western'
Social groups (sex/occupation)	مرأة/'Woman', رجل/'man', كتاب/'authors', مثقف/'intellectual', دكتور/'doctor'
Conflict and engagement	صراع/'Conflict', علاقة/'relationship', ضد/'against', اختلاف/'difference'
Science	علم/'Science', علمي/'scientific', أصل/'origin'
Mental objects	مفهوم/'concept', رأي/'opinion', مفهوم/'concept', رأي/'opinion', مبدأ/'principle', سبب/'reason', عقل/'mind', أمر/'matter', قضية/'issue', سؤال/'question', وعي/'awareness', صورة/'image', رؤية/'vision', موقف/'position', مسألة/'issue', فكرة/'idea', حكم/'judgment'
Communication	قول/'saying', مصطلح/'term', معنى/'meaning', خطاب/'Discourse', حوار/'discussion', نص/'text', إقال/'say'
Mental processes	يرى/'see', عرف/'know', أراد/'want', عنى/'mean', وجد/'Find'
Action processes	فعل/'do', استطاع/'can', عمل/'work', جعل/'make', أوجد/'Existence', أتم/'complete', دعا/'call', أصبح/'become', حقق/'achieve'
Areas and places	دولة/'Country', عالم/'world'
Time	تاريخ/'history', وقت/'time', يوم/'Day'
Evaluative	حديث/'modern', جديد/'new', حقيقة/'fact', واقع/'reality', عام/'General', تقليدي/'traditional', مختلف/'different', كبير/'large', خاص/'special', مقال/'article', مستوى/'level', حالة/'case', حد/'limit', حياة/'Life', شكل/'form', نقد/'criticism', حال/'status'

Table 5-2: Thematic categories of the top frequent keywords

5.3.2 Usage of the keywords over time

To identify the usage of the above discussed key lexical words over time, a trend analysis of the usage of these keywords was conducted using SketchEngine's trend feature (see Section 4.2.2). As can be seen from Table (5-3), words equivalent to 'Islamic', 'Islam', 'religion', 'religious', and 'Allah', which indicate the discourse of religion, show a general decrease in usage over time. The graphs and the trend values clearly show the levels of use of these religious terms, where the trend lines show a decline of use and the trend values show negative values followed by the (-) symbol, which indicates a general decrease in the usage trend. All the religious discourse terms show a decrease in use, in terms of the trend value, except for the keyword 'مسلم'/(Muslim),

which shows a generally positive value. However, the graph for the keyword 'Muslim' shows that there is a decrease in usage of this term towards the end of the defined period. This reveals that, overall, there is a decreased prevalence in religious discourse in the corpus of alibrāliyah, which indicates that the discussion of alibrāliyah in relation to religion has generally decreased over time.

The trend analysis also revealed interesting results in regard to terms that indicate the discourse of humanitarianism or human rights, which show a diachronic increase in usage in the corpus of alibrāliyah. As can be seen in the graphs, usage of words such as 'حرية'/(freedom), 'إنسان'/(human), 'حق'/(right), and 'إنساني'/(humanitarian) increased over the defined time period. In regard to the trend values of these terms, the values are generally positive for the keywords in the discourse of humanitarianism, except for the terms 'حق'/(right) and 'فرد'/(individual), although the graphs for these two terms do show an increase towards the end of the period. This increase in usage of humanitarianism keywords indicates that the discussion of alibrāliyah in relation to human rights discourse has increased over time.

It is also notable that terms that indicate social discourse show a steady trend line. As can be seen in the graphs, the keywords 'مجتمع'/(society), 'اجتماعي'/(social), 'ثقافي'/(cultural), and 'ثقافة'/(culture) show a steady usage throughout the period, which suggests that alibrāliyah is consistently discussed in relation to social discourse. However, usage of words that indicate political discourse fluctuates and thus does not show a changing trend over time. For example, the term 'ديموقراطي'/(democratic) shows a fluctuation in usage in the graph, with a trend value of 0.0000, which indicates that there is no trend in its usage over time. In addition, the usage of the keyword 'علماني'/(secular) fluctuates, but with a general negative value, which indicates an overall decrease over time. Thus, it can be said that alibrāliyah is discussed in relation to political discourse from time to time, and inconsistently.

Other notable results include that the 'conflict' terms, such as 'صراع'/(conflict), 'ضد'/(against), and 'اختلاف'/(difference) decrease in use, with spikes at the beginning and in the middle of the defined period. Another salient finding is that keywords that indicate national and regional entities, namely 'Saudi', 'Arab', and 'Western' decrease in usage.

Keyword	Translation	Trend	Graph	Keyword	Translatio	Trend	Graph
ليبرالي	Liberal	0.1227+		مسلم	Muslim	0.1051+	
مجتمع	Society	0.0349		غربي	Western	-0.1051-	
حرية	Freedom	0.4877+		حالة	Case	-0.3249-	
قال	Say	0.0000		موقف	Position	-0.4040-	
فكر	Intellect	-0.1405-		تقليدي	Traditional	1.0723+	
إسلامي	Islamic	-0.4244-		قضية	Issue	-0.2679-	
فكري	Intellectual	-0.1583-		معنى	Meaning	0.1051+	
حق	Right	-0.1763-		وجود	Existence	0.3443+	
اجتماعي	Social	-0.2679-		سؤال	Question	0.2493+	
تيار	Trend	-0.1051-		وعي	Awarenes	0.4244+	
دين	Religion	-0.1227-		مقال	Article	-1.1503-	
سياسي	Political	0.2308+		تم	Complete	0.0524	
ديني	Religious	-0.4244-		مستوى	Level	0.2308+	
إسلام	Islam	-0.4663-		خاص	Special	-0.0699	
ثقافي	Cultural	0.2125+		صورة	Image	0.2308+	
إنسان	Human	0.2679+		عرف	Know	0.0699	
واقع	Reality	0.1943+		ضد	Against	-0.6248-	
خطاب	Discourse	-0.1405-		رجل	Man	-0.3057-	
عربي	Arab	-0.1227-		فعل	Do	-0.3639-	
سعودي	Saudi	-0.5773-		عمل	Work	-0.5317-	
رأي	Opinion	-0.4040-		إنساني	Humanitaria	0.3249+	
وجد	Find	0.0524		جعل	Make	0.1051+	
الله	Allah	-0.4663-		قول	Saying	-0.4040-	
كتاب	Book	-0.3639-		يرى	See	-0.0349	
ثقافة	Culture	0.0874		تاريخ	History	-0.6008-	
مفهوم	Concept	-0.5095-		شكل	Form	0.1405+	
أمر	Matter	-0.3639-		نقد	Criticism	-0.4877-	
ديموقراطي	Democratic	0.0000		فكرة	Idea	-0.9325-	
قيمة	Value	-0.0174		حال	Situation	0.2308+	
فرد	Individual	-0.3639-		قام	Stand	0.2308+	
دولة	Country	0.5543+		كبير	Large	-0.0874	
عقل	Mind	-0.5543-		مختلف	Different	-0.3443-	
عام	General	0.4877+		حوار	Discussion	-1.0723-	
ناس	People	-0.2308-		اختلاف	Difference	-0.1051-	
يوم	Day	-0.1405-		وقت	Time	0.3838+	
مثقف	Intellectual	-0.1405-		علم	Science	-0.5317-	
عنى	Mean	0.6008+		نص	Text	-0.0524	
مرأة	Woman	-0.7812-		أصل	Origin	0.4877+	
حياة	Life	-0.5317-		صراع	Conflict	-0.0174	
مصطلح	Term	-0.4663-		علماني	Sect	-0.0524	
عالم	World	0.4877+		علاقة	Relation	-0.2679-	
أصبح	Become	-0.1583-		نظر	Look	0.1763+	
حقيقة	Fact	-0.4040-		دعا	Call	0.1943+	
أراد	Want	0.5317+		مسألة	Issue	-0.4877-	
جديد	New	-1.0355-		دكتور	Doctor	-0.6248-	
سبب	Reason	-0.2308-		علمي	Scientific	-0.2867-	
حديث	Modern	-0.1227-		حكم	Judgment	-0.1227-	
نظام	System	-0.1227-		رؤية	Vision	0.4877+	

حد	Limit	0.5317+		استطاع	Can	0.0349	
مبدأ	Principle	0.1405+		حركة	Movemen	0.0699	

Table 5-3: The usage of keywords over time

5.4 Collocation analysis: discourse preferences of alibrāliyah

This section aims to examine the top lexical collocates around alibrāliyah over time. The first part aims to identify the meaning preferences around alibrāliyah. This was achieved by extracting the 50 top collocates and categorising them into thematic groups. This was followed by a diachronic analysis of the top collocates in the top themes to closely examine their usage in association with alibrāliyah, and whether there is a shift in the construction of alibrāliyah. This was carried out by first identifying the top lexical collocates in the top two themes, and then conducting both a trend analysis and a collocation analysis. The results of the analysis in this section will provide an overview of the usage of alibrāliyah, and any shifts in usage, which in turn will reveal the general nature of the debate over alibrāliyah.

5.4.1 Collocates of alibrāliyah

To identify the meaning preferences of alibrāliyah, a collocation analysis of the top 50 most frequent lexical collocates around the lemma of alibrāliyah, 'librālī', was conducted in a span of 5 words to the left and right. As can be seen from Table (5-4), the collocation analysis shows relatively similar results to the keywords analysis, in that the top five collocates are 'الليبرالي'/'liberal', 'حرية'/(freedom), 'سعودي'/(Saudi), 'مجتمع'/(society), and 'إسلامي'/(Islamic), which were all amongst the top 10 collocates in the keyword analysis. However, the collocate 'علماني'/(secular), for example, is found amongst the top 10 in the collocation analysis, but came low down in the ranking of the keywords list (90th), which suggests that alibrāliyah is closely associated with the meaning preference of secularism, as revealed by its lower frequency in the overall corpus and by its high frequency in collocation with alibrāliyah. It is also notable that the lemma 'الليبرالي'/'liberal' is the most frequent collocate, which suggests that a number of derivatives of alibrāliyah are used in collocation with each other recurrently across the corpus. Another interesting result is that the word 'حرية'/(freedom) is the second top collocate, which indicates that the meaning of alibrāliyah is closely associated with freedom. The top collocates, 'سعودي'/(Saudi), 'مجتمع'/(society), and 'إسلامي'/(Islamic) indicate that alibrāliyah is linked to the cultural context and is discussed in relation to Saudi society and to Islam. To enable an overall examination of the meaning preferences of alibrāliyah, the collocates were categorised into thematic groups, as seen in Table (5-5). This excludes the lemma 'الليبرالي'/'liberal', as this is the lemma of the keyword being analysed.

No.	Collocates	Translation	Frequency	No.	Collocates	Translation	Frequency
1	ليبرالي	Liberal	680	26	حقيقي	Real	87
2	حرية	Freedom	325	27	اجتماعي	Social	86
3	سعودي	Saudi	320	28	دولة	Country	83
4	مجتمع	Society	215	29	فكرة	Idea	83
5	إسلامي	Islamic	207	30	حق	Right	82
6	تيار	Trend	207	31	معنى	Meaning	80
7	فكر	Intellect	206	32	حقيقة	Fact	76
8	قال	Say	196	33	وجود	Existence	76
9	مفهوم	Concept	194	34	جديد	New	74
10	علماني	Secular	137	35	محافظ	Conservative	73
11	إسلام	Islam	136	36	يرى	See	73
12	خطاب	Discourse	135	37	دعا	Call	69
13	عنى	Mean	134	38	علمانية	Secularism	68
14	مبدأ	Principle	129	39	تقليدي	Traditional	67
15	وجد	Find	123	40	أصبح	Become	65
16	مصطلح	Term	113	41	فرد	Individual	64
17	غربي	Western	107	42	عالم	World	63
18	عربي	Arab	106	43	حديث	Modern	63
19	سياسي	Political	106	44	فلسفة	Philosophy	62
20	قيمة	Value	96	45	ثقافي	Cultural	61
21	فكري	Intellectual	93	46	نظام	System	61
22	واقع	Reality	91	47	يوم	Day	60
23	دين	Religion	90	48	إنسان	Human	60
24	ديموقراطي	Democratic	88	49	عرف	Know	60
25	ديني	Religious	87	50	أراد	Want	59

Table 5-4: The 50 most frequent collocates for 'alibrāliyah' with a span of -5 to +5

As can be seen below in Table (5-5), the collocates are categorised into thematic groups, with the overall frequency of the collocates of each theme calculated. The table shows that alibrāliyah is most frequently associated with the discourse of human rights, followed by the discourse of religion, and then social discourse. The collocates that indicate the meaning preference of human rights - 'حرية'/'freedom', 'حق'/'right', 'فرد'/'individual', 'إنسان'/'human' - suggest that alibrāliyah is used in connection with human rights concepts. The close and frequent association to religion also suggests that alibrāliyah is closely connected to Islam and discussions of religion. Furthermore, the association between alibrāliyah and social discourse indicates that it is closely related to social and cultural matters. The political movement collocates suggest that alibrāliyah is also relevant to the meanings of terms such as 'secular', 'democratic', and 'conservative'. In addition, the table shows that a large number of collocates signify the meanings of thoughts and beliefs, e.g. 'فكرة'/'(idea)', and communication and communicative processes, such as 'مصطلح'/'(term)' and 'معنى'/'(meaning)'. These words might not indicate any particular meanings on their own, however, they do suggest that alibrāliyah is often discussed at a metalinguistic level, which might be due to the high contestation over its meaning by different groups.

Theme	Collocates	Overall frequency
Religion	إسلامي/ 'Islamic', دين/ 'Islam', ديني/ 'religion', ديني/ 'religious'	520
Human rights	حرية/ 'Freedom', حق/ 'right', فرد/ 'individual', إنسان/ 'human'	531
Social discourse	مجتمع/ 'Society', قيمة/ 'value', اجتماعي/ 'social', ثقافي/ 'cultural', نظام/ 'system'	519
National, ethnic, and regional groups	سعودي/ 'Saudi', غربي/ 'Western', عربي/ 'Arab(ic)'	506
Political movements	علماني/ 'Secular', سياسي/ 'political', ديموقراطي/ 'democratic', محافظ/ 'conservative', علمانية/ 'secularism',	472
Thoughts and beliefs	فكر/ 'Intellect', فكري/ 'intellectual', فلسفة/ 'philosophy', فكرة/ 'idea'.	444
Communication	مفهوم/ 'Concept', مصطلح/ 'term', خطاب/ 'discourse', معنى/ 'meaning'	445
Communicative processes	قال/ 'Say', عنى/ 'means'	385
Mental objects and processes	يرى/ 'See', عرف/ 'know', أراد/ 'want', تيار/ 'trend', مبدأ/ 'principle'	510
Action processes	وجد/ 'Happen', وجود/ 'existence', دعى/ 'call', أصبح/ 'become'	392
Evaluative	واقع/ 'Reality', حقيقي/ 'real', حقيقة/ 'fact', جديد/ 'new', تقليدي/ 'traditional', حديث/ 'modern'	458
Areas and places	دولة/ 'Country', عالم/ 'world'	146
Time	يوم/ 'Day'	60

Table 5-5: The 50 most frequent collocates categorised into thematic groups

The collocation analysis shows interesting results, where alibrāliyah is mostly associated with the meaning preferences of human rights and religion. For the purpose of down-sampling the analysis of the large corpus, these top two themes were selected for an in-depth analysis. To this end, the top collocates for each theme, namely 'إسلامي'/(Islamic) and 'حرية'/(freedom), were selected to down-sample the corpus data into a number of individual articles to allow for a micro investigation of the meaning of alibrāliyah in relation to the meaning preferences of Islam and freedom over the whole period (2007-2016). The process of selecting the articles was based on the frequency of the top collocates over time, whereby the articles that most frequently include these collocates with alibrāliyah were selected for the micro analysis (see Section 4.3.1.4). Before conducting the micro analysis of alibrāliyah, a statistical analysis of the usage of the two top collocates - 'إسلامي'/(Islamic) and 'حرية'/(freedom) - over time was conducted to determine whether there have been any diachronic changes in their usage in collocation with alibrāliyah.

5.4.2 Usage of the top collocates over time

To identify the diachronic usage of the top lexical collocates, 'إسلامي'/(Islamic) and 'حرية'/(freedom), a frequency analysis of their usage over time was conducted. As can be seen from Figure (5-3), the trend line shows a general decrease in the usage of the collocate 'إسلامي'/(Islamic) over the defined period. By contrast, it shows a general increase in the usage of 'حرية'/(freedom) in association with *alibrāliyah* over time. As seen in the graph, both collocates show a steady increase in usage from the beginning of the defined period until 2009. This is followed by a fluctuation in use of the two collocates from 2010 to 2013, in which the collocate 'Islamic', for example, shows a sharp increase in 2013. However, towards the end of the period, specifically from 2014 to 2016, the usage of the collocate 'freedom' increased dramatically, while there was a sharp decrease in usage of 'Islamic'. This indicates that *alibrāliyah*'s association with Islam decreased over time. On the other hand, the increased usage of 'freedom' as a collocation to *alibrāliyah* indicates an increase in the association between *alibrāliyah* and the meaning of 'freedom' over time. This suggests that, over the time period in question, there was a general shift away from discussions of *alibrāliyah* within the discourse of religion and towards discussions with the discourse of freedom and rights.




Figure 5-3: The usage of the top collocates over time

To examine in particular the salient topics associated with the two collocates 'Islamic' and 'freedom', a collocation analysis was conducted for the two terms. As Table (5-6) shows, the collocates around 'Islamic' were primarily concerned with political discourse, as evidenced in the words used (تيار/*trend*, سياسي/*political*, علماني/*secular*, صراع/*conflict*), but also with social and national discourses (as seen in the words Saudi,

and society). This suggests that the collocate Islamic is discussed as part of political and social discourses. On the other hand, the collocates around freedom, shown in Table (5-7), are primarily words associated with the discourse of rights (فرد/individual, مساواة/equality), and with words referring to mental objects (مفهوم/concept, مبدأ/principle, معنى/meaning), as well as one word that indicates the opposite of rights (traditional). This suggests that freedom in relation to alibrāliyah is discussed in terms of rights, and its meaning is expressed by collocating it with the words meaning, and concept, and is

Collocates	Translation	Frequency
عنى	Means (v)	24
مطلق	Absolute	21
مفهوم	Concept	19
فردى	Individual (adj)	18
مبدأ	Principle	17
معنى	Meaning	12
قيمة	Value	11
فرد	Individual (n)	11
تقليدى	Traditional	10
مساواة	Equality	10

discussed in relation to traditional social norms.

Table 5-6: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic'

Collocates	Translation	Frequency
تيار	Trend	18
سعودى	Saudi	10
مجتمع	Society	9
مصطلح	Concept	9
إسلام	Islam	9
سياسى	Political	9
واقع	Reality	8
علمانى	Secular	7
صراع	Conflict	7
فكرة	Idea	6

Table 5-7: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom

An examination of the usage of the collocates 'freedom' and 'Islamic' at the beginning and the end of the period 2007-2008, 2015-2016, reveals interesting results. As seen in Table (5-8), the collocate إسلامي/'Islamic' at the beginning of the period was collocated with words indicating political discourse (state, democratic, system, Western). However, at the end of the period, it was collocating with evaluative words (e.g. حكم/judgment, عنف/violence), and with words relating to rights (such as تحرر/liberation, طالب/call for). This suggests that the collocate إسلامي/'Islamic' is associated mainly with political discourse at the beginning of the period, and with the discourse of rights at the end of the period.

Collocates of Islamic in 2007/2008		Collocates of Islamic in 2015/2016	
Collocates	Translation	Collocates	Translation
دولة	State	معنى	Meaning
منهج	Method	تحرر	Liberation
نظام	System	تيار	Trend
كتابة	Writing	إسلام	Islam
فشل	Failure	تطبيق	Application
اتخذ	Adopt	طالب	Call for
فرصة	Opportunity	غربي	Western
سمع	Hear	اختلف	Differ
غربي	Western	حكم	Judgment
ديموقراطي	Democratic	عنف	Violence

Table 5-8: Top 10 collocates of 'Islamic' in two periods (ordered by frequency)

On the other hand, Table (5-9) shows the collocates of حرية 'freedom', which collocates with words associated with different fields in the beginning of the period, e.g. words for mental objects (عنى/mean, معنى/meaning), the word اقتصادي 'economic', and words that indicate progress and rights (تقدم/development, تحرر/liberation, مطلق/absolute). However, at the end of the period, حرية 'freedom' collocates mainly with words related to rights (including فرد/individual, دعا/call for, مطلق/absolute, إنساني/humanitarian). These findings suggest that the word حرية 'freedom' in relation to alibrāliyah was not associated with a particular discourse at the beginning of the period, but came to be discussed in association with the discourse of rights. The identification of the use of alibrāliyah in association with rights at the end of the period suggests that the concept of alibrāliyah begins to be linked with meanings of rights, which indicates the beginning of the success of liberals in their fight against conservatives, and overall the success of the attempts at

Collocates of 'freedom' in 2007/2008		Collocates of 'freedom' in 2015/2016	
Collocates	Translation	Collocates	Translation
معنى	Meaning	فردى	Individual
عنى	Means	عنى	Means (v)
اقتصادي	Economic	تقليدى	Traditional
مطلق	Absolute	مطلق	Absolute
أراد	Want	مفهوم	Concept
كبير	Big	قيمة	Value
تحرر	Liberation	دعا	Call for
تطور	Development	إنساني	Humanitarian
يوناني	Greek	فرنسا	France
ديموقراطي	Democratic	قيدي	Restriction

modernism through the project of alibrāliyah.

Table 5-9: Top 10 collocates of 'Hurria'/freedom in two periods (ordered by frequency)

It should be noted that as the selection of the articles for the qualitative analysis was based on these two collocates, it would reveal the mechanism by which the terms Islam and freedom are used in association with alibrāliyah, as well as the shift in the

construction of alibrāliyah in general and in association with these two collocates in particular.

5.5 Conclusion

The macro corpus analysis of alibrāliyah has yielded interesting results in terms of its diachronic usage over time, and its association with key discourses and the primary meaning preferences. Both the keywords and collocation analyses reveal that alibrāliyah is mainly associated with the discourses of religion and human rights, across the whole corpus. The results also show that there was a shift in the usage of alibrāliyah in relation to these two discourses, in which the salient construction of alibrāliyah changed from being associated with religious discourse to being associated with the discourse of freedom and human rights. Just as this corpus-assisted analysis helps in examining the salient construction of alibrāliyah across a large data set and over a 10-year period, it also assists in the down-sampling of data for a micro analysis of the mechanism by which alibrāliyah is constructed and changed over time. Therefore, a sample of whole articles will be examined in detail in the next chapter using the concepts of critical discourse analysis and discourse theory to investigate the means by which alibrāliyah is constructed and changed over the specified period.

Chapter 6: Discursive Analysis of the Texts of the Religious Theme

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of six articles that discuss the concept of 'alibrāliyah' in relation to the field of religion. These texts are selected with the assistance of the corpus analysis in which it is considered to select the articles where 'alibrāliyah' collocates frequently with the word 'Islam' over time (see section 4.3.1.4 for the detailed procedure). The analysis of the articles is presented chronologically to identify whether there has been any shift in the debate over 'alibrāliyah' in relation to Islam over time. These articles presented in chronological sequence are:

- 'أسلمة الليبرالية' 'The Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah' by Mohammad Alkanan, *Aljazeera* newspaper, 14/10/2007; tagged (Religion 2007)
- 'المتشددون.. الأذكى عند الشدائد' 'The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity' by Faris Hizam, *Al Riyadh Gazette*, 01/09/ 2009; tagged (Religion 2009)
- 'الليبرالية امتداد للحداثة' 'alibrāliyah' is an extension to 'ḥadāthah' by Abdulrahman Alshehri, *Aljazeera* newspaper, 27/01/2011; tagged (Religion 2011)
- 'من هو الليبرالي؟ سلامي؟' 'Who is the Islamist's liberal?' by Abdulrahman Al-Habib, *Aljazeera* newspaper, 17/06/ 2013; tagged (Religion 2013)
- 'حقوق الإنسان: بين نسيان و التوظيف السياسي' 'Human Rights': between Man and Political Employment' by Mohammad Al-Mahmood, *Al-Riyadh Gazette*, 19/03/2015; tagged (Religion 2015)
- 'الليبرالية أو ما بعد' 'alibrāliyah' or Post-Ideologies' by Mohammad Almahmoud, *Al-Riyadh Gazette*, 14/01/2016; tagged (Religion 2016)

Each article is analysed in terms of discursive strategies using the Discourse-Historical Approach¹², and then in terms of the semantics of the word 'alibrāliyah' and the groups involved in the debate according to Discourse Theory. In particular, the analysis of each article begins with a summary of the main arguments presented in the text, in order to provide an overview of the discussion. Then, the stages of the arguments are presented, including the claims made by the author to legitimate their main views. This is followed by a discussion of the discursive strategies used in the articles, including the topoi and fallacies. The nomination and perspectivisation strategies are also presented to determine the overall worldview of the authors and the implications of using such strategies. The discussion of the arguments and the strategies used is then followed by a presentation of the analysis of the semantics around the term 'alibrāliyah' and the construction of the groups involved in the debate. This is carried out in order to

¹² For a detailed analysis of the texts in terms of DHA see Appendix (B) for the analysis of texts in Arabic and Appendix (D) for the translated analysed texts.

focus on the way 'alibrāliyah' is articulated semantically within the arguments and how the groups position themselves and others in their attempts to fill 'alibrāliyah' with their own meanings. This analysis reveals how 'alibrāliyah' as an empty signifier is charged with meanings over time and the way the different groups attempt to charge it in order to gain or maintain hegemony.

6.2 Discursive analysis of the text 'أسلمة الليبرالية' / 'The Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah''; (Religion 2007)

6.2.1 Main arguments in the text

The main argument in this article concerns the idea that it is impossible to Islamise 'alibrāliyah'. In constructing this argument, the author sets up an opposition between Islam and 'alibrāliyah'. He argues that Islam and 'alibrāliyah' are two different value systems with different sources of legislation and thus that 'alibrāliyah' cannot be adopted within Islam. He also adds that 'alibrāliyah' and Islam are not only different but also antagonistic in the sense that they cannot co-exist in one society. This idea of the impossibility of co-existence is explained through the author's argument that the existence of 'alibrāliyah' means the dislocation of Islam, which implies that the 'alibrāliyah' concept is a threat to Saudi religious society.

To legitimise the argument that it is impossible to Islamise 'alibrāliyah', the author begins the article with the claim that the process of Islamisation has been exploited to gain intellectual concepts acceptance in religious society. He justifies this claim by providing a historical overview of the process of Islamisation that has been applied to various cultural concepts and artefacts before being assigned to intellectual concepts. In this way, he argues that the act of Islamisation has moved from being acceptable, assigned by 'التيار الديني' / *the religious group* to concepts such as 'الأدب الإسلامي' / *Islamic literature* and 'الإعلام الإسلامي' / *the Islamic media*, to being unacceptable as others trends have started to assign it to intellectual concepts. He goes on to argue that the Islamisation carried out by religious groups has been rejected by 'العلمانية' / *the secular trend*, whose objections received no consideration from the religious group. With this argument, the author creates a division between two groups; the secular group and the religious group by observing that the Islamisation of intellectual concepts is conducted by the secular group to gain acceptance in the society he identifies by its religious identity, 'Ummah'. The negative representation of the secular group's action of Islamisation is emphasised with reference to extreme cases of Islamisation, 'اليسار الإسلامي' / *Islamic left* and 'الاشتراكية الإسلامية' / *Islamic socialism*, which are concepts that have never been contested in Saudi society.

After the negative representation of the Islamisation of intellectual concepts, the author moves to introduce 'alibrāliyah' as one of these concepts that is now undergoing a process of Islamisation. He refers to 'alibrāliyah' as 'حديثة' / *new* to the public; newer than the older concept of 'alilmāniyah' / 'secularism', which the author claims have subsided and failed to be established in society. Comparing 'alibrāliyah' to 'alilmāniyah' in this way implies that 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as an extension to secularism and viewed as a secular concept. 'alibrāliyah' is also described as 'طرية' / *soft, tender* and Islamised in order to be acceptable and palatable to the public. In this way, the actor responsible for the Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah' is made clear and labelled as 'الكتاب و المتفقين السعوديين' / *liberal Saudi intellectuals and writers*. Islamic liberalism is represented by the author negatively as 'هجين' / *hybrid* for attempting to combine 'alibrāliyah' and Islam, implying the impossibility of integration between them. The author then presents the view of the Saudi liberals regarding "alibrāliyah", before refuting it in the next section. He states that Saudi intellectuals consider 'alibrāliyah' an adjustable means to the religion of the society to achieve the freedom of individuals. By presenting the Saudi intellectuals' view of "alibrāliyah", the author sets up a number of concepts, such as the cultural flexibility of 'alibrāliyah' and the possible Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah', which he construes as fallacious in the following section.

The author argues against the liberals' view of the possible Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah' by listing the similarities and differences between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam and the reasons they cannot be integrated. He states that they are similar in that both concepts include the values of 'freedom', 'justice', and 'equality'. However, he argues that their relationship and integration is not decided by these values but the source that legislates these values. According to the author, the source of legislation for both concepts is different: the source of 'alibrāliyah' is 'العقل' / *the human mind*, and the source of Islam is 'الوحي' / *prophecy*. Thus, their integration is impossible. He clarifies this argument from a philosophical perspective, stating that the 'human mind' legislates the freedom of individuals in 'alibrāliyah' by opposing any doctrine, including religion, that would take away this freedom. On the other hand, he argues that freedom legislated by prophecy in Islam is restricted, because Islam includes rules with restricted freedom in terms of human behaviour. This comparison between freedom values legislated by the human mind and prophecy establishes an opposition between 'alibrāliyah' as a secular concept that opposes all sorts of doctrines, including religion, and between the religion of Islam. Therefore, to the author, 'alibrāliyah' cannot be Islamised due to the fundamental difference and antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and 'Islam'.

The author concludes the article by emphasising the impossibility of Islamising 'alibrāliyah'. He disproves the notion that 'alibrāliyah' is an adjustable means that can be adopted in any society by arguing that 'alibrāliyah' is an independent concept that is legislated by 'the human mind' to achieve individual freedom. He implies that 'alibrāliyah' is a threat by stating that, as the concepts of 'alibrāliyah' and Islam are independent, adopting 'alibrāliyah' would lead to the dislocation of Islam. Furthermore, the author emphasises the impossibility of Islamising 'alibrāliyah' by re-referring to the secularity of what he terms philosophical concepts such as 'alibrāliyah', which he argues eliminate and reject religious texts and sources; thus, it is impossible to Islamise them and to integrate them within Islam.

To justify the main argument of the impossibility of Islamising 'alibrāliyah', the author employs a number of discursive strategies. Throughout the article, the author uses the reported fallacy of the Islamisation of intellectual concepts including 'alibrāliyah', stating that integrating Islam with intellectual concepts is a false argument because they represent separate independent concepts from different sources. The argumentation scheme of the topos of abuse is also used against the group responsible for Islamising 'alibrāliyah' – labelled as 'liberal Saudi intellectuals' – to demonstrate how they deceive religious Saudi society by Islamising 'alibrāliyah' in order to gain acceptance within society. In this regard, Saudi religious society is identified through the strategy of nomination, with its religious identity implying that it would not accept a secular movement and stressing that Islamising intellectual concepts to make them appeal to a religious society is an unacceptable action. Another main strategy used to justify the impossibility of the Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah' is the use of the topos of threat by means of stating that 'alibrāliyah' is a threat to the 'Ummah' and its adoption will lead to the dislocation of Islam since both concepts cannot be integrated. The constructed argument is mainly made using detachment strategies with the use of the third person voice. This non-involvement of the author is strategically employed to strengthen the arguments by making them appear objective and factual to the reader. Overall, it can be argued that the main argument of the impossibility of adopting 'alibrāliyah' within Islam is made from a religious perspective, through constructing an opposition between 'alibrāliyah' as a secular concept and Islam as a religion. This is carried out through the legitimation strategy of moral evaluation – comparing the values systems of Islam and 'alibrāliyah' and concluding that 'alibrāliyah' as a secular concept cannot be integrated with God's superior system of Islam. Establishing this opposition between 'alibrāliyah' as a secular concept and Islam represents a rejection and resistance against 'alibrāliyah', which is construed as a threat to Saudi religious society.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Association: 'Ummah' -Functionalisation: 'intellectuals' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Claim: the impossibility of Islamising 'alibrāliyah'. -Topos of the history of Islamisation. -Topos of the abuse of Islam. -Fallacy of the cultural flexibility of 'alibrāliyah'. -Fallacy of the relationship between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam. -Topos of the threat of 'alibrāliyah' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detachment strategies -Third person voice. -Indirect speech. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moral evaluation: Comparing two systems of values – 'alibrāliyah' and Islam – and concluding that 'alibrāliyah' is a secular system whereas Islam is God's system and therefore they cannot be integrated.

Table 6-1: Main discursive strategies used in 6.2

6.2.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In 'The Islamisation of 'alibrāliyah'', 'alibrāliyah' is articulated in relation to two main concepts: Islam and secularism. It is constructed in opposition to Islam to signify the impossibility of the co-existence of the two concepts in one society. 'alibrāliyah' is also articulated in relation to secularism to present it as a non-religious concept, the adoption of which constitutes a threat to Saudi society – which the article refers to as 'Ummah', a term that implies the conflation of national and religious identity.

In constructing 'alibrāliyah' as associated with secularism, the concept is articulated with a number of elements that connote secularity. It is first articulated as one of the intellectual/philosophical concepts that is formed by non-religious groups. This reference to 'alibrāliyah' as belonging to non-religious groups indicates its attribution to the meaning of secularism as a threat against its existence in religious society – 'Ummah'. Furthermore, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed in the article as an alternative to the failed concept of secularism and thus they are part of the same project. 'alibrāliyah' is also articulated by the author as a product of an anti-religious source – 'the human mind'. Constructing 'alibrāliyah' as a product of a source that opposes religion gives it an anti-religious secular sense. In this way, 'alibrāliyah' and secularism are articulated within the logic of difference, as both concepts are represented as one bloc against Islam, and their attempt of formation constitutes a threat to the religion of Saudi society.

Therefore, articulating 'alibrāliyah' with the meaning of secularism signifies its opposition to religion. Throughout the article, 'alibrāliyah' is collocated with Islam, with both concepts constructed as antonyms. The concept of "'alibrāliyah' / *Islamic*

liberalism is also used recurrently in the article. As this concept has been coined by the 'liberal Saudi intellectuals', the author uses it to refute the liberals' idea of the possibility of Islamising 'alibrāliyah'. To the author, Islam is misused when assigned to 'alibrāliyah' by the liberals to gain acceptance in the religious society referred to in the text as 'Ummah'. This view represents the author's rejection of the formation of 'alibrāliyah' and of assigning it to the dominant religious ideology. In his rejection of the concept of Islamic liberalism, he articulates 'alibrāliyah' as different from Islam and as antagonistic to it. In this regard, 'alibrāliyah' is articulated through the fallacy of definition: that it is 'not an adjustable means' to be integrated with religion and to be adopted. 'alibrāliyah' is also constructed as different and antagonistic to Islam through the author's argument that they are concepts from different sources. The author refutes the existence of a relationship between Islam and 'alibrāliyah' by stating that the source of 'alibrāliyah' is 'the human mind', whereas the source of Islam is 'prophecy'. 'alibrāliyah' and Islam are even constructed as antagonists of each other, since to the author 'the human mind' source rejects and stands against the religious doctrine in legislating the principles of 'alibrāliyah'. This construction of antagonism is emphasised through the author's argument that the existence of 'alibrāliyah' means 'the dislocation of Islam', which not only indicates the impossibility of Islamising it, but also the impossibility of its co-existence with Islam. Thus, in discourse theory terms, 'alibrāliyah' and Islam are articulated within the logic of equivalence as their antagonism entails the polarity of the two concepts and the existence of one means the dislocation of the other.

The articulation of 'alibrāliyah' with the meaning of secularism and in opposition to Islam is made to resist and prevent the formation of the liberal group in Saudi society. This is made apparent through the construction of 'alibrāliyah' and secularism as one bloc in opposition to Islam. The explanation of 'alibrāliyah' as a threat, whereby its existence entails the dislocation of Islam, also reveals the hegemonic conflict between the religious and the liberal groups and demonstrates the vulnerability of the dominant religious group to being displaced by the liberal group attempting to gain power in Saudi society.

6.3 Discursive analysis of the text 'المتشددون.. الأذكي عند الشدائد' / 'The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity'; (Religion 2009)

6.3.1 Main argument in the text

In this article, the author argues that the voices of the Islamists are louder than those of the liberals except during terror attacks, when liberal voices become louder and Islamist voices are weakened. According to the author, unlike liberals, Islamists keep

silent when a terror incident occurs and do not condemn it. This opposition set up between the two groups is manifested discursively in the article through a negative representation of Islamists as dangerous and positive representation of liberals as harmless.

From the beginning of the article, Islamists are represented negatively through the author's nomination of them as 'متشددون' / *extremists*. The text begins with the author's statement that the rise and fall of the voices of Islamists and liberals is conditioned by the time of a terror attack incident. When a terror attack occurs, the voices of the liberals are raised to condemn the incident, but the voices of the Islamists are lowered. Then, a while after the incident, the liberal voices decrease, and the Islamist voices increase. The return of the Islamist voices is portrayed in the article through an exaggerated metaphor: 'to the level of ignition', which emphasises the voices' strength and volume.

The argument of the rising and falling of the voices of both groups is supported by the author's assertion that this is the case in the Saudi state, and the use of an example of a terror attack carried out on an important figure in Saudi society – His Royal Highness the Minister of Interior. The author argues that when the incident took place, liberals condemned the attack and Islamists occupied themselves with side issues. By arguing that Islamists were busy with side issues, such as the 'Tash' series, rather than the terror attack, the author is implying that Islamists are ignorant by considering the actors from 'Tash' more dangerous than the terrorist attacker. This statement also demonstrates the author's construction of Islamists as a danger, which is emphasised through a constructed metaphorical image, in which the author portrays the Islamists' returning after the effects of the incident have subsided as coming out of their 'خنادق' / *trenches* with spears to throw towards their opponents with all their 'force', 'incitement', and 'betrayal'. The usage of the word 'خنادق' / *trenches* creates an impression that Islamists are dangerous by hiding and staying calm during terror incidents and only afterwards coming out in all their power to attack their opponents. Through this image, the author is intensifying and repeating the argument of the fall and rise of the voices of both groups. He emphasises this by stating that the conflict between both groups has not changed over the past 75 months.

By representing the Islamist group as dangerous, the author questions why their voices are low at the time of terror incidents and become 'نثرس' / *aggressive* once again afterwards. This question implies the danger of Islamists through the nomination of Islamists as 'المتشددون' / *extremists* and the description of their voices as 'نثرس' / *aggressive*. Notably, the author does not answer the question, but instead makes the Islamists

responsible for answering it, particularly 'imams' and school teachers, which implies that they are both characterised by the author as members of the extremist Islamist group. He illustrates this responsibility by arguing that imams should have condemned the latest terror attack of the attempted assassination of the Minister of Interior at their 'juma'a' speeches, which occurred eight hours after the attack. To intensify this blame, the author questions the number of imams who condemned the attack and gives the reader the responsibility of answering this by asking them to recall the juma'a speeches in their neighbourhoods. The author also makes an example of the imam of the Prophet's Mosque, who did not condemn the attack in his speech.

The author further stresses the danger of the Islamist group by questioning the number of imams who spoke about the 'Tash' series rather than terror attack. He states that the answer is a 'كارثة وطنية' / *national disaster*, as more mosques spoke about the series than condemned the most dangerous terror attack in the state. The use of the term 'national disaster' demonstrates the author's construction of Islamists as a danger to the Saudi state as a nation. This is also revealed through the personification of the 'mosques' portrayed as 'speakers', which implicates mosques as the platforms of the religious group that is a danger to the nation. Moreover, emphasising the attack as the most dangerous incident that has not been condemned by Islamists intensifies the author's depiction of the religious group as dangerous.

The author concludes the article by repeating the argument that religious group voices are louder than their opponents', the liberals, except when terror attacks occur. He describes the religious group as 'الأذكى' / *smarter* than the liberals as they know when to speak and when to keep silent. He also represents them as a danger by labelling them 'الأقوى' / *powerful* in their extremism. He finally emphasises the danger of the power of Islamists with a metaphor in which the extremists are going to flip the table on liberals a while after the time of the terror attack.

Overall in this article, the author employs a national framing in his construction of both groups, in which the religious group is constructed as a danger to the nation of Saudi Arabia but liberals are constructed as harmless and nationalist by condemning the terror attack. Throughout the article, the author uses the predication strategy, whereby his construction of liberals as harmless is discursively implied through their opposition to the dangerous Islamists. This discursive construction of both groups is employed through strategies of argumentation – predominantly the use of the topos of the danger of Islamists, in which they are portrayed as 'extremists' who by not condemning the terror attacks taking place in the country are a powerful threat to society. The author also uses

the topos of responsibility, by positioning the Islamists as responsible for extremism because they kept silent during the time of the attack described. A nomination strategy is also employed, with particular use of the strategy of appraisal to magnify the danger of the Islamists by characterising them as extremists. Representing Islamists as a danger is also manifested through the involvement strategies of intensifications, metaphors, and repetition. An overall legitimation strategy of moral evaluation is also employed through the negative evaluation of Islamists as dangerous to the nation and extremist, and the positive evaluation of liberals as harmless and nationalist. In constructing the religious group as a danger in opposition to the liberal group, these strategies represent the power struggle of liberals attempting to gain power in Saudi society by dismissing the Islamists' loyalty to the nation.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Classification: 'liberals', 'Islamists' -Appraisal: 'extremists'	Claim: In opposition to liberals, Islamists constitute a danger to the Saudi nation. -Topos of history. -Topos of the threat of Islamists.	Involvement strategies: -Intensification. -Metaphors. -Repetition of argument.	Moral evaluation: Arguing that Islamists are extremists and dangerous to the nation whereas liberals are harmless and nationalist.

Table 6-2: Main discursive strategies used in 6.3

6.3.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In 'The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity', 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as antagonistic to the extremist religious group. It is articulated as being harmless and nationalist, in opposition to the danger Islamists and Islamism pose to the Saudi nation. In this sense, 'alibrāliyah' is identified through creating an antagonist bloc – the religious extremists Islamist group.

Throughout the article, 'alibrāliyah' is not identified or articulated explicitly. Instead, it is constructed as antagonistic to the moment of Islamism. By constructing Islamists as extremists, 'alibrāliyah' and liberals are then implicitly articulated as non-extremist and harmless. Furthermore, the author constructs the voices of Islamists as louder than their liberal opponents', except when terror attacks occur, when the liberal voice is heard while Islamists keep silent. This construction of voices reveals the power and dominance of Islamists and Islamism and the weakness attributed to liberals. It also signifies 'alibrāliyah' with the meaning of nationalism, by constructing Islamists as non-nationalists for not condemning the attack and liberals as nationalists for doing so. In this sense, Saudi society is identified with the concept of nation rather than with the aspect

of religion. By such identification, the author is excluding the religious Islamist group from society. 'Imams' and 'school teachers' are established as examples of the Islamist group that the author excludes from the nation who form a bloc against liberals and 'alibrāliyah'.

The construction of extremist Islam as an opponent to 'alibrāliyah' represents a hegemonic conflict between both groups in which it is particularly difficult for liberals to gain hegemony. This is apparent through the author's construction of the Islamists as smarter and more powerful than the liberals. The struggle to gain hegemony is also made clear by articulating Islamists as a threat to the nation. These constructions of the Islamists as 'powerful', 'smarter', and 'extremist' demonstrates the author's implication of the religious dominant group as responsible for blocking the formation of the liberal group. Moreover, the author's positive construction of liberals as nationalists and harmless in opposition to Islamists reveals the liberal attempt to gain hegemony and acceptance in religion-dominated Saudi society through the concept of nationalism.

In summary, in discourse theory terms, 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism are articulated within the logic of equivalence as two polar groups. While Islamists are articulated with the meanings of danger and non-nationalist, liberals are construed as harmless and nationalist. Constructing Islamism as a national threat suggests the implication that the author regards Islamism as responsible for blocking the existence of liberals. Thus, liberals are articulated as the opposite to this threat to gain hegemony and acceptance in Saudi society.

6.4 Discursive analysis of the text 'اللبرالية امتداد للحداثة'/'alibrāliyah is an extension to 'ḥadāthah''; (Religion 2011)

6.4.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author argues against the critics of 'alibrāliyah' and its existence. He presents 'alibrāliyah' as an ideal concept that should exist in Saudi society. He also places the responsibility of the struggle of liberals to exist on the Islamist group. He argues that the resistance of Islamists to 'alibrāliyah' is similar to their resistance to the concept of 'ḥadāthah'. Using this argument, the author establishes an opposition between the liberal group and the Islamists, which is manifested discursively in the positive representation of liberals and 'alibrāliyah' and the negative representation of Islamists and Islamism.

The author begins the article by using the topos of history to argue that, similar to 'ḥadāthiyūn', liberals are criticised for their adoption of the concept of 'alibrāliyah'. He claims that liberals should not be criticised because any group cannot completely

represent concepts they belong to. He supports this argument with the topoi of logic and experience, by claiming that logic and life experience prove the impossibility of complete agreement between concepts such as 'alibrāliyah' and the people adopting this concept. The argument is further supported by the author's falsifying of the assumption of the infallibility of liberals through the use of the reported fallacy of human infallibility to state that as all human liberals are fallible, they cannot wholly represent the ideal concept of 'alibrāliyah'. This notion of the impossibility of representing a concept due to the fallibility of human beings is illustrated with an example related to the religious belief of the critics of 'alibrāliyah', whereby the author proposes the idea of the impossibility of the complete representation of religions by their followers. Through the use of the topos of comparison, the author argues that if liberals do not exist because they do not represent 'alibrāliyah', then it follows a priori that Muslims do not exist as no Muslim can commit completely to the ideal principles of Islam.

The author legitimises his positive representation of 'alibrāliyah' by quoting a speech given by Dr Alrashed – a liberal intellectual – on the concept of 'alibrāliyah'. This direct speech attributes 'alibrāliyah' as a simple concept that promotes freedom of choice. It also uses the topos of freedom to state that freedom in 'alibrāliyah' is determined by a majority, so if the majority chooses to be conservative, then this is their freedom of choice. A topos of example of 'alibrāliyah' in Western countries is used to support the notion of the freedom of 'alibrāliyah', whereby an example is given of marijuana, which is legal in the Netherlands but not in the UK as the result of the choice of the majority. The notion of the freedom of the majority is presented as an advantage, because the author argues that this notion of freedom establishes liberals as the most closely aligned with all societal groups, as they believe in the rights of Islamists, communists, conservatives, nationalists, and socialists.

The author then moves on to discuss the problem of the existence of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society. He argues that there is a strong resistance by the Islamists against 'alibrāliyah'. He states that this resistance is realised through the debate between Islamists and liberals, which continues to focus on the relationship between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam. The strawman fallacy is also employed to demonstrate that Islamists criticise the intentions of liberals instead of criticising or discussing the concept of 'alibrāliyah'. Then, the author attacks the Islamist group, accusing them of eliminating 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society. Through the use of the topos of abuse, the author states that Islamists practise means of suppression against liberals by accusing them of planning to destroy religion and spreading immorality in society.

The positive representation of liberals and the negative representation of Islamists is then discursively used by the author to illustrate the nature of the conflict between the groups and the reason for the emergence of 'alibrāliyah'. The author argues that the emergence of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society is a call for freedom which is not supported by the dominant Islamist group. He addresses the Islamist argument that 'alibrāliyah' is unnecessary because Islam supports freedom by countering it with the argument that 'alibrāliyah' supports freedom as Islam does, and thus it does not oppose Islam. He argues that the opposition is not towards Islam as a religion but towards Islamists as a group that stands against the freedom of others. Indeed, he labels Islamists 'extremists' because they suppress and eliminate the existence of liberals. The topos of freedom is then used in combination with the topos of abuse to state that liberals call for freedom but they cannot succeed in the presence of Islamists who prevent this freedom. In this sense, the author makes Islamists responsible for the struggle of liberals to exist in society.

The author concludes with the employment of the topos of history to state that the suppression and elimination practised by Islamists against liberals is the same suppression 'ḥadāthah' encountered in the past. He argues that both 'alibrāliyah' and 'ḥadāthah' share the same project of social reform, though they differ in form – 'ḥadāthah' was based on literary form while 'alibrāliyah' is based on wider intellectual and cultural form. Finally, the author claims that despite these differences, 'alibrāliyah' is an extension of 'ḥadāthah' and complementary to it because they are part of the same project.

In summary, the author presents the conflict between liberals and Islamists, through which liberals are represented positively and Islamists negatively. He nominates liberals as advocates for freedom and Islamists as extremists who stand against this freedom and who seek to eliminate the existence of 'alibrāliyah'. The author also refers to the idea that this suppression practised by Islamists has occurred before, against the concept of 'ḥadāthah'. In this sense, he presents 'alibrāliyah' as an extension of 'ḥadāthah' and both concepts as opponents of Islamists. This argument is discursively supported by the topos of history, the topos of abuse enacted by Islamists, and the topos of freedom. Involvement strategies are also employed throughout the article, which uses a predominantly first-person perspective and personal deictics, particularly when addressing the problem of the obstruction caused by Islamists seeking to prevent the existence of 'alibrāliyah'. Nomination strategies are also used, including the strategy of classification, whereby the author classifies the different trends that are accepted by liberals – 'socialists', 'conservatives' and 'communists' – along with the strategy of appraisal which nominates Islamists negatively as 'جماعة متطرفة'/*extremists*. The

legitimation strategy of moral evaluation is also employed in which liberals are as equally fallible as religious people, and Islamists are presented negatively as suppressive and extremist. All these strategies are used throughout the article to legitimate the positive representation of ‘alibrāliyah’ and liberals and the negative representation of Islamists as extremists who suppress the freedom of liberals to exist. Overall, this demonstrates the struggle of liberals to exist and gain power in Saudi society.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Classification: ‘liberals’, ‘Islamists’, ‘communists’, ‘conservatives’, ‘nationalists’, ‘socialists’ -Appraisal: ‘extremists’	Claim: Whereas liberals are advocates for freedom, Islamists suppress this freedom as they suppressed ‘ḥadāthah’. -Topos of history. -Topos of abuse. -Topos of freedom.	Involvement strategies: -First-person perspective	Moral evaluation: -Liberals are as fallible as religious people. -Islamists are suppressive. Authorisation: By reference to the authority of an expert.

Table 6-3: Main discursive strategies in 6.4

6.4.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In this article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is constructed in relation to two main concepts: ‘Islamism’ and ‘ḥadāthah’. ‘alibrāliyah’ is articulated in opposition to the concept of Islamism, whereby both concepts are made opponents of each other through the author’s presentation of Islamists as an oppressor of the liberal group. On the other hand, ‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are articulated as sharing the same objective of social reform and as oppressed by the same opponent – the Islamist group. ‘alibrāliyah’ is also articulated in relation to other elements that give it positive meanings, in order to for it to gain acceptance and hegemony.

In presenting ‘alibrāliyah’ positively, the author establishes it as an ideal concept that seeks freedom. In this way, ‘freedom’ is a node used to create a meaning for ‘alibrāliyah’ and is articulated in terms of the freedom of the majority. According to the author, this freedom aligns ‘alibrāliyah’ with all other groups, including Islamists, because it guarantees their freedom. Thus, this sense of the freedom of ‘alibrāliyah’ makes it a transcendental signifier that can unite all other identities under it in Saudi society.

By discussing ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to transcendental freedom in the article, the author observes the obstruction of the dominant Islamist group, arguing that ‘alibrāliyah’ emerge for this sense of freedom is not supported by Islamists. Indeed, the author

articulates Islamists as ‘oppressors’ of ‘alibrāliyah’ and, as a result, oppressors of freedom. This antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamists is manifested around the node of freedom, whereby liberals call for freedom, tolerance, and pluralism but Islamists do not believe in this sense of freedom. In this regard, the author articulates Islamists as ‘extremists’ who stand against the freedom of others. Articulating Islamists with the meaning of extremism implies their construction as a threat to the existence of freedom and ‘alibrāliyah’ in society. In this sense, the concepts of ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism are constructed within the logic of equivalence, by which the Islamist group is constructed as an oppressor to the formation of the liberal group.

‘alibrāliyah’ is also constructed in relation to the concept of ‘ḥadāthah’, as they both share similar experiences in their struggle over hegemony in Saudi society. ‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are both represented via the chain of equivalence and in opposition to the Islamism of the author’s opponents. This is made clear by articulating ‘alibrāliyah’ as an ‘extension’ of ‘ḥadāthah’. They are constructed as concepts that are different in form but similar in objective, along with sharing the same antagonist. They are different in that ‘ḥadāthah’ emerged in a literary form while ‘alibrāliyah’ exists in a wider cultural form. However, both identities are made equivalent by the author who argued that they have the same demand, which is to call for social reform in Saudi society. ‘alibrāliyah’ and ‘ḥadāthah’ are also constructed as one bloc, as they are both oppressed by the same antagonist – the Islamist group that prevents them from existing and obtaining hegemony. In this sense, they are articulated within the logic of difference, whereby they are constructed as different concepts that share the same objective of social reform and are oppressed by the same antagonist – the Islamist group.

Overall, the construction of antagonism between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism is clustered around the node of *حرية/freedom*. While the liberal identity is articulated in association with the meaning of the transcendental freedom of groups, the Islamists are represented as oppressors of this sense of freedom. This notion implies the strong polarity between both groups, in which the existence of one means the dislocation of the other since they are in disagreement regarding the sense of freedom. This antagonism between Islamists and liberals is also made apparent through the construction of Islamists as a threat to the existence of ‘alibrāliyah’, which demonstrates the liberal struggle to gain hegemony. This struggle is also represented by the author establishing ‘ḥadāthah’ and ‘alibrāliyah’ under one bloc, in which both identities encounter resistance and oppression from the antagonist dominant Islamist group in Saudi society.

6.5 Discursive analysis of the text 'Who is the Islamist's Liberal?'; (Religion 2013)

6.5.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author argues that liberal Islam is the future in the cultural context. This fusion between Islamism and 'alibrāliyah' is based on the historical progression of culture in the Arab region, whereby it was first characterised by national liberal tendencies and then transformed into Islamist movements. He presents the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' / *Islamic liberalism* as a modern progressive fusion, as 'alibrāliyah' conforms with the principles of Islam. He also argues that this combined concept could resolve the conflict between Islamist and liberal groups, but it encounters resistance from both groups attempting to limit its existence. These arguments are strategically justified with premises and predicates that back these arguments.

The author begins the article with the claim that the trajectory of the Arab cultural scene reveals the state of fusion of the opposites 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism. This claim is made from a historical perspective using the topos of history to state that this fusion is a result of a historical progression in which the evolution of Arab culture from liberal nationalism to Islamism will lead to Islamic liberalism in the future. This is further backed by Hegel's historical dialectics, which is based on the idea that unity evolves through contradiction, through a process in which an idea turns into its opposites and then this contradiction dissolves the idea to produce one united idea. Hegel's philosophy of historical progression is illustrated in this article through the use of the topos of example, whereby the author provides contemporary examples of states that have successfully transformed from Islamism to 'alibrāliyah' whilst retaining the essential values of Islam, such as the Islamist liberal parties that are gaining power in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.

The author moves to define the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah', presenting it positively through the employment of predication strategies and a number of positively constructed topoi. He argues that 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is based on the idea that Islam conforms with 'alibrāliyah' because liberal values are inherent within Islam. This argument is supported with the assertion that 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is nominated as so as the liberal values are essential to Islam. The topos of rights is also used to present 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' as a concept that concerns human rights because Islam conforms with the main principles of 'alibrāliyah', such as 'الحرية' / *freedom* and 'المساواة' / *equality*. In this sense, the author states that 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' focuses on interpreting religious texts in relation to these humanitarian values. This is supported by the notion that Islamic liberalism is a progressive concept that focuses on, the

reinterpretation of religious texts in a way that suits the current modern circumstances rather than relying on the old fundamentalist interpretations.

The positive representation of the concept of Islamic liberalism is further supported by the author's presentation of the disadvantages of the concepts, 'alibrāliyah' and Islam, as separate and the advantages of combining it in under one concept. Here, the author employs the topos of the disadvantage of the lack of religious texts that deal with political issues in detail. Thus, using the topos of advantage, he argues that this issue can be resolved by the adoption of 'alibrāliyah' within Islamic rule, because 'alibrāliyah' addresses political issues in detail and at the same time conforms with the basis of Islam. In this regard, the author also refutes the idea that adopting 'alibrāliyah' is a secular practice, and instead suggests that its adoption indicates the return to the essential principles of Islam that is liberated from the interpretations of fundamentalists. In order to stress the positivity of the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah', the author uses the topos of history combined with the topos of authority to state that the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is not new but was proposed theoretically in earlier centuries by renaissance Islamic scholars under a different name; the only difference being that their theories have only been acknowledged recently.

The author then argues that there is a resistance against the existence of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' by two groups – Islamists and liberals. He addresses the viewpoints of each group and counters them using fallacious premises. He argues that liberal resistance is based on an objection to combining the terms 'الإسلامي'//*Islamist* and 'الليبرالي'//*liberal* in one concept. According to liberals, the term 'الإسلامي'//*Islamist* means 'أصولي'//*fundamentalist*; thus, fundamentalists and liberals cannot be combined under one concept. On the other hand, Islamist resistance is expressed through the topos of Islamic law; the author states that they view 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' as ignorant of the fundamental ideologies of Islamic jurisprudence, such as consensus and analogy, and as substituting Islamic values for universal ones. The author counters these oppositions through the employment of the fallacy of resistance combined with the topos of existence to state that this resistance will not eliminate the existence of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'. He also uses the strawman fallacy against both liberals and Islamists, stating that they go beyond the rational criticism of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' to accuse the intentions of Islamist liberals.

The author concludes the article by emphasising the positive notion of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'. He presents Islamist liberals as modernists since they adopt the Islamic rules that are compatible with modern life and society rather than the fundamental

traditional rules. He also refers to Islamist liberals as believers in the right of freedom of Muslims to select the system that best suits their interests.

Overall, the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ is proposed by the author as a progressive concept that suits modern Islamic society by combining ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam. The argument is made from a historio-political perspective and predominantly uses the topoi of history, rights, and authority. The nomination strategy of ‘appraisalment’ is used mainly for a positive representation of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ and for a relatively negative representation of its opponents – Islamists and liberals who resist the concept. By not being personally involved in the argument, the author employs detachment strategies to demonstrate an objective factual perspective of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. This objective view is made further apparent through the use of legitimisation strategies of authorisation, whereby the article refers to Hegel’s historical dialectics on the fusion of concepts alongside the strategy of theoretical rationalisation that is used to present the reasons for articulating the concept of Islamic liberalism. It can be argued that this article presents a remarkable shift in the discourse of ‘alibrāliyah’ and its relation to Islam because, unlike the previous articles, the author attempts here to dissolve the opposition between ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam. This case can be explained in detail from the perspective of discourse theory.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Classification: ‘liberals’, ‘Islamists’ -Appraisalment: ‘fundamentalists’ 	<p>Claim: ‘Islamic liberalism’ is a progressive concept for modern Islamic society</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of history. -Topos of rights. -Topos of authority. 	<p>Detachment strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Third-person voice. -Indirect speech. 	<p>Authorisation: By reference to Hegel’s historical dialectics.</p> <p>Theoretical rationalisation: By justifying the reasons for defining and articulating the concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’.</p>

Table 6-4: Main discursive strategies in 6.5

6.5.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In ‘Who is the Islamist’s Liberal?’, the author constructs ‘alibrāliyah’ in association with the concepts of Islam and Islamism. ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism are made equivalent within one concept – ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’. In this sense, the proposed concept of ‘alibrāliyah alislāmīyah’ represents a dispersal of the opposition between the two poles ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islamism. This is represented by the author’s key claim that ‘alibrāliyah’ is compatible with the essence of Islam and thus they can be combined under one bloc.

In constructing 'alibrāliyah' in relation to Islamism, the author breaks down the antagonism between the two concepts with new articulations.

The concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is mainly articulated in the sense of modernity and modern Islam. According to the author, it is through the adoption of 'alibrāliyah' within Islam that modernity and progression can be achieved in Islamic societies. 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is articulated in the sense that Islam and 'alibrāliyah' are compatible concepts, because Islam adopts the general values of 'alibrāliyah'. These values concern human rights, with a particular focus on freedom and equality. However, although both concepts are similar in terms of their essential humanitarian values, the author argues that they differ in terms of dealing with these values, because Islam deals with them broadly in the religious texts but 'alibrāliyah' considers them in detail. Thus, the author articulates 'alibrāliyah' as a concept compatible with Islam since it can offer a detailed legislation of the essential values of Islam. In this sense, he excludes the idea that 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is a secular notion, arguing that 'alibrāliyah' is adopted by retaining the essential values of Islam and that is employed to interpret these values. The author also indicates that a reliance on 'alibrāliyah' in the interpretation of the religious texts would lead to the renewal of Islam and the creation of a modern version that suits current culture. Furthermore, that it would provide liberation from the interpretations of fundamentalists, which are based on judgments that were historically suitable but are considered now outdated.

The author argues that 'alibrāliyah' needs its antagonist, Islamism, to be articulated in modern Islamic societies. In discourse theory terms, Islam here represents a necessary antagonistic element to the concept of 'alibrāliyah' for it to be formed and accepted. It is through this chain of equivalence that the possibility of the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' is made. To the author, the antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism can bring them together, whereby their differences and similarities could be exploited to unite them under one identity: 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'. In this sense, 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism are articulated within the logic of difference as both concepts are made equivalent under one concept: 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'.

According to the author, there are two antagonistic frontiers that prevent the formation of the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' – the liberal and the Islamist fundamentalist groups. Fundamentalists are articulated in the article as 'extremists', as they adhere to the old interpretations of religious texts and object to the progressive reform of Islam. On the other hand, liberals are constructed as objecting to combining 'alibrāliyah' and Islam in one concept, as they view this as a hidden intention for Islamists

to gain power under the label of 'alibrāliyah'. Both groups are constructed as conducting hegemonic practices through which they prevent each other from gaining or maintaining power, thus preventing the dispersion of antagonism under the bloc of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'.

To sum up the argument in terms of discourse theory, the articulation of the concept of 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' represents an attempt to dissolve the antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism. This demonstrates a hegemonic practice of giving 'alibrāliyah' a meaning associated with Islam, constructing it as a desirable modern concept for Islamic religious societies. By constructing 'alibrāliyah' in association with Islam, 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah' is articulated as non-secular since it adopts 'alibrāliyah' but retains the basic principles of Islam. This construction of 'alibrāliyah' and Islamism under one bloc in opposition to fundamentalists and liberals reveals a possibility that 'alibrāliyah' could shift from being completely antagonistic to Islam and Islamism to equivalent and compatible with Islam in a conservative religious culture such as Saudi society.

6.6 Discursive analysis of the text 'حقوق الإنسان بين التوظيف السياسي' (Human Rights: between Man and Political Employment'; (Religion 2015)

6.6.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author's key claim is based on the relativity of the concept of 'alibrāliyah'. He argues that the adoption of Western-based human rights in any culture – including freedom, which is the basis of 'alibrāliyah' – should not be absolute but could be modified according to the cultural circumstances. In this sense, the author presents 'alibrāliyah' positively, as a concept that adopts human rights and could be relatively adopted in the Saudi culture. This is achieved through the employment of discursive strategies, particularly the strategies of argumentation and perspectivalisation.

The author begins the article by presenting a historical account of the emergence and development of human rights in the West. He argues that during the Renaissance era, European civilization started to move away from concerns of abstract metaphysics towards the reality of the human. This focus on the human in the West led to the formation of principles of human rights. The author refers to the notion that the construction of these principles was first relatively linked to theological conceptions. By this notion, he implies the possibility of forming human rights initially in association with religious perspectives. However, through the topos of advantage he indicates that these

humanitarian principles reached their clearest form at the time of the French Revolution, which he describes as the beginning of the era of humanity. By linking the achievement of humanity to the French revolution, the author implies that human rights can be achieved through liberation from the authority of doctrines, including religion.

The author then claims that the success of the French Revolution led to the global spread of human rights. He argues that this spread was also because human rights are based on a shared universal human principle, in which all humans are of the same origins and are created equal, as well as Western colonisation, which carried the West's vision of rights to the whole globe. The author also attributes the success of the spread of rights to globalisation caused by the development of transport and the media, which are viewed as products of Western civilization.

However, despite acknowledging the success of the Western model of human rights, the author argues that the adoption of these rights should not be absolute but relative. By combining the topos of universality and the topos of relativity, the author argues that the Western vision of human rights is universal in terms of its main principles but relative in terms of the application and implementation of these principles. He stresses the notion of the relativity of these principles in two dimensions: space and time. He also indicates that the details of the application of these rights have been modified and changed by the West itself over time as the result of critical reviews that seek progression and development. With regard to the relativity of these principles in terms of space, the author claims that non-Western cultures can adopt fundamental Western rights but adjust the application of these principles according to the circumstances of their culture. Up to this point, the author employs the detachment strategy through the usage of the third-person perspective, through which he gives an account of the history of rights in the West and the relativity of their application outside the West.

Through the employment of involvement strategies, the author then introduces 'alibrāliyah' as a concept that concerns the right of freedom. With the use of first-person plural deictics ('نحن'/we, 'نا'/our, us), he emphasises the relativity of the Western model of human rights by noting how they can employ the concept of 'alibrāliyah' that he presents positively as 'the comprehensive philosophy of freedom'. In this argument, he constructs an ingroup through the use of collective personal pronouns to highlight the possibility of adopting a special version of 'alibrāliyah' for inner Saudi culture that is different from the Western version. This strategy of the ingroup construction of Saudi culture that is distinguished from the Western culture legitimates 'alibrāliyah' as a concept that can be adjusted to Saudi society. In this regard, the author discusses in

detail the means by which 'alibrāliyah' could be adopted in Saudi culture. Using the topos of relativity in combination with the fallacy of absoluteness, the author argues that the sense of freedom in 'alibrāliyah' is not absolute but differs from one culture to another, depending on their particularities. Thus, it is relative in the sense that it is impossible to copy the Western experience of 'alibrāliyah' due to the different cultural circumstances. He emphasises this idea by constructing the inner 'alibrāliyah' of Saudi culture as distinctive from the 'alibrāliyah' of other cultures, such as the Western world (France, Sweden, USA) or the Arab and Islamic world (Tunisia and Egypt).

The author continues to legitimate 'alibrāliyah' by creating the ingroup and outgroup. At this point, he objects and condemns external interference with Saudi affairs in terms of the adoption of human rights (lines 158- 207, in Arabic lines 99-130). The creation of the outgroup is emphasised through the use of the topos of the abuse of external interference. Using Sweden as an example, the author argues that the country attempts to impose its vision of rights on Saudi society without understanding the complex nature of the Saudi culture. Furthermore, he establishes external attempts to interfere as a threat that would affect the sovereignty of the Saudi nation. This notion of outgroup threat is followed by establishing the responsibility of the ingroup to avoid this threat by working to develop a unique version of rights that suits the inner culture. Using the topos of responsibility, the author makes the ingroup, including the reader, responsible for cultural changes and social reforms in accordance with human rights, using the justice system and women's rights as an example by claiming that these systems are flawed and undergoing reform due to the sense of responsibility inner groups have towards the development of their cultures. The author concludes the article by emphasising the responsibility of the ingroup to establish and develop a system of human rights that is based on Saudi cultural conceptions and not imposed by external powers.

Overall, the author in the article intends to convey the idea that the adoption of human rights, with emphasis on the concept of 'alibrāliyah', should begin from the inside, through an adjustment of universal rights to the cultural conditions of Saudi society. In order to legitimate 'alibrāliyah' as a concept that focuses on the right of freedom, the author employs the topos of history to provide a positive historical account of human rights, the topos of relativity to position these rights in space and time, and the topos of the responsibility of the ingroup to adopt these rights within Saudi culture. Nomination strategies are also used, whereby the author employs the process of 'association' using the pronoun 'we' to implicate himself and the reader as members of Saudi society, and the process of 'disassociation' to separate Western and Saudi cultures. Similarly, the

involvement strategy of the use of first-person plural pronouns is used to create a division between the ingroup and outgroup, in which the non-Saudi outgroup is represented as a threat to the Saudi nation by imposing their specific models of rights and thus the ingroup is responsible for adopting 'alibrāliyah' and creating social reform. By presenting the adoption of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi culture as necessary to achieving the right of freedom, the author delivers these arguments and strategies through the legitimization strategy of rationalisation.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Association: 'نحن/we' -Disassociation: 'الغرب/West'	Claim: 'alibrāliyah' is a relative concept based on cultural factors. -Topos of relativity. -Fallacy of absoluteness -Topos of responsibility. -Fallacy of interference.	Detachment strategies: -Third-person voice. Involvement strategies: -First and second-person voice.	Rationalisation: By reference to the necessity of 'alibrāliyah' to achieving freedom in the culture.

Table 6-5: Main discursive strategies in 6.6

6.6.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In this article, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as a concept that concerns the right of freedom. It is articulated as a relative concept that can be adopted and modified according to the conditions of a particular culture. In constructing the relative meaning of the originally Western concept of 'alibrāliyah', the author creates a logic of difference between Western culture and Saudi culture, in which both groups can adopt 'alibrāliyah' differently in practice yet still share the same universal principles of human rights. A logic of difference is also created between 'alibrāliyah' and Saudi culture through the author referring to the notion of the possibility of adopting 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society, which indicates a dispersal of the antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and conservative Saudi culture.

'alibrāliyah' is introduced in this article as the comprehensive philosophy of freedom. In this sense, it is articulated around the node of 'freedom', which is presented as relative according to different cultures. Furthermore, the freedom of 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as not absolute but differing according to time and space. The construction of 'alibrāliyah' in relation to time is determined by diachronic development and change over time. In this regard, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as an evolving concept that ceases

to be 'alibrāliyah' when it stops evolving. 'alibrāliyah' in relation to space is articulated around the word *ثقافة/culture*, whereby it is a product of cultural conditions and meanings. To the author, the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' is determined by culture, as each culture has a distinctive identity that should be considered when adopting 'alibrāliyah'. Thus, 'alibrāliyah' is seen as a concept that can be modified by a culture to achieve progress rather than an absolute static concept imposed on a society.

It also around the node of culture that the antagonism is created between Saudi and non-Saudi cultures, which is established in the article to legitimate the possibility of 'alibrāliyah' existing in a distinctive form for Saudi society in a way that does not contradict the essential values of the culture. In this regard, a difference is created between the form of 'alibrāliyah' that would exist in Saudi society and the liberalism of Western culture that produces it, as they differ in their cultural conditions. A difference is even created between the 'alibrāliyah' of Saudi society and the 'alibrāliyah' of Islamic and Arab countries in order to emphasise the distinctness of Saudi identity and the need to adopt and develop a special version of 'alibrāliyah'. Legitimising 'alibrāliyah' through its antagonism towards Western cultures is emphasised with the example of the Swedish state, which attempts to impose its vision of rights on Saudi society. This interference is presented as unacceptable by the author, as it does not consider the reality of Saudi culture. The antagonism is even stressed when establishing this Western interference as a threat to the sovereignty of the Saudi nation. Thus, through this antagonism the author has attempted to convince the reader that the adoption of 'alibrāliyah' and human rights should be accomplished from the inside rather than the outside, and the Saudi nation is therefore responsible for achieving progress through the implementation of human rights in its society.

It is worth noting here that there is a lack of explicit reference to Islam as a cultural component of Saudi society. Unlike the articles previously discussed, which primarily focus on the relationship between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam, this article is characterised by the absence of a debate on Islam. The word 'Islamic' is used once in the article to refer to the difference between Saudi culture and other Islamic countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia. This suggests that the author does not consider religion to be the core identity of Saudi culture; instead, national identity is used to identify Saudi society. This is apparent in the difference created between Saudi and non-Saudi cultures and in the representation of any non-Saudi attempt to impose rights as a threat to the nation. However, there is an implicit reference to religion as impeded through the presentation of the history of rights in Europe and the claim that these rights were first linked to theological perspectives before they reached their purest form at the time of the French

Revolution. This claim reveals the author's impeded analogy between the development of rights in the West and in Saudi society, suggesting that human rights including 'alibrāliyah' could be implemented first in relation to cultural religious conceptions and then developed in isolation from religion. Overall, this explicit ignorance of Islam as a religion suggests that it is not the main element of discussion regarding 'alibrāliyah' anymore, and the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in the article shifts to be considered in relation to national discourse.

In summary, 'alibrāliyah' in this article is constructed around the nodes of 'حرية'/*freedom* and 'ثقافة'/*culture*. It is articulated as a concept that concerns the human rights of freedom universally. However, it is constructed in relation to the element of culture in order to state the notion of relativity in its application, which can differ from one culture to another. This notion of 'alibrāliyah' as relative to culture is constructed through the creation of a difference between Saudi and non-Saudi cultures, including Western and Islamic/Arab cultures. Saudi culture is articulated in this article through national identity rather than religious identity. This is made clear by the author holding Saudis responsible for adopting rights and constructing any interference from other cultures as a threat to the Saudi state. These strategies of articulation indicate the author's intention to legitimise 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society by shifting the debate to the national discourse in order to gain acceptance and hegemony for 'alibrāliyah'.

6.7 Discursive analysis of the text 'الليبرالية أو ما بعد الإيديولوجيات' 'alibrāliyah' or Post-Ideologies'; (Religion 2016)

6.7.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author argues that 'alibrāliyah' is an alternative to totalitarian ideologies, including religious ideologies. By suggesting 'alibrāliyah' as an alternative to collective ideologies, the author sets up an opposition between 'alibrāliyah' as a post-ideology and fundamental Islam as an ideology. This opposition suggests that 'alibrāliyah' is equal to non-fundamental Islam against ideological fundamental Islam. In this regard, the author views 'alibrāliyah' in the sense of non-fundamentalism as the solution to the conflicts caused by fundamental clashing ideologies in the Islamic and Arab world.

In setting up an antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and collective ideologies, the author represents 'alibrāliyah' positively and 'ideology' negatively. Just after beginning the article with the argument that 'alibrāliyah' is the alternative to clashing ideologies in the Arab and Islamic world, the author justifies this argument by introducing the concept

of 'ideology', representing it negatively (lines 14- 38, in Arabic lines 10-27). Through the use of the topos of disadvantage, the author attributes ideology as 'الوعي الزائف' / *false consciousness*, which represents the opposite to science and rational thinking (line 17, in Arabic line 12). This attribution of ideology as false consciousness is supported by the author's justification that ideology is naturally 'dogmatic' as it includes a set of ideas represented as assumed facts that does not allow for scientific or rational thinking. In this sense, dogmatic ideologies are constructed in opposition to science and rationality, with religion given as an example of a dogmatic doctrine (lines 19-21, in Arabic lines 14-19). The author also justifies his attribution of ideology as false consciousness by referring to the ideological practice of using utopian premises to present an imagined alternative to what he calls the actual misery situation by speaking to the emotions of the crowd rather than their minds.

On the other hand, 'alibrāliyah' is represented positively as a good alternative to the concept of ideology (lines 38-70, in Arabic lines 28-47). Using the topos of advantage, the author identifies 'alibrāliyah' in contrast to ideology, attributing it as relative, non-dogmatic, and self-criticising. By introducing 'alibrāliyah', the author demonstrates that 'alibrāliyah' has some of the negative features of ideology, including the promotion of utopian ideas. However, it opposes ideology in its collective sense by being non-dogmatic and instead a subject of constant criticism and change. In this sense, the author presents 'alibrāliyah' as a relative concept that, unlike collective ideologies, is dependent on the latest scientific research rather than emotions or imagination. Through this positive characterisation of 'alibrāliyah', the author argues that 'alibrāliyah' opposes collective ideologies through its concern with the notion of individuality. This opposition is made clear with the argument that 'alibrāliyah' is not an ideology in the negative sense of collectivity, and that it can be considered an ideology only in the sense of freedom of individuals, The opposition between 'alibrāliyah' and collective ideologies is further stressed in the article through the identification of 'alibrāliyah' as the ideology of liberation from collective ideologies.

The author then highlights these negative and positive representations by identifying first the negative consequences of ideology followed by the positive consequences of 'alibrāliyah'. Through the employment of the topos of negative consequences, ideology is described as resulting in 'أوهام' / *illusions* through which nothing is achieved, especially at an individual level. Negative consequences are also illustrated by the author using the topos of the example of the Muslim world, which lives in conflict as a result of dominant religious collective ideologies. By referring to Islam as a collective ideology, the author highlights the notion that religion can only be considered

an ideology when it includes fundamental ideas. This demonstrates the author's distinction between Islam as a non-collective ideology and fundamental Islam, which represents an ideology in the negative sense.

'alibrāliyah', on the other hand, is characterised positively as resulting in the liberation of individuals from the conflicts of fundamental religious collective ideologies . According to the author, this liberation entails moving the individuals from conflicts with others to conflict with the self. In this sense, he constructs 'alibrāliyah' as a transcendentalist notion in which individuals are capable of achieving success for humanity through relying on the self rather than depending on collective ideologies that result in conflicts and corruption. It is through this sense of transcendentalism that the author proposes 'alibrāliyah' as an alternative to fundamental Islamic collective ideologies, arguing that it guarantees the progress of the world where individuals work on self-conflicts, needs, and intuitions.

By concluding the article with the positive consequences of 'alibrāliyah', the author is strategically intending to give the reader a final positive impression of 'alibrāliyah' as a good alternative to collective ideologies. This argument of altering fundamental collective ideologies with 'alibrāliyah' as a post ideology is also strategically manifested through the topos of the advantages of 'alibrāliyah' in opposition to the topos of the disadvantages of collective ideologies. The topoi of the negative consequences of ideologies and the positive consequences of 'alibrāliyah' are also employed to give a negative representation of ideology and positive representation of 'alibrāliyah'. Furthermore, predication strategies are used by the author to present ideology negatively as dogmatic and false consciousness in contrast to 'alibrāliyah' as relatively non-dogmatic and self-criticising. 'alibrāliyah' is also referred to as a transcendental concept in separation from collectivity, in which social progression can be achieved by relying on individuals striving for success. These arguments and predicates are made using detachment strategies whereby the author uses the third-person voice. This use of detachment strategies gives the argument an objective factual dimension, which constitutes a persuasive strategy. The arguments are also constructed using the legitimisation strategy of 'instrumental rationalisation', whereby the author refers to the advantageous consequences of 'alibrāliyah' in contrast to the disadvantageous consequences of collective ideologies.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Identification: 'ideologised', 'ideologiser'	Claim: 'alibrāliyah' is an alternative to collective ideologies. -Topos of the advantages of 'alibrāliyah'. -Topos of the disadvantages of ideologies. -Topos of consequences.	Detachment strategies: -Third-person voice.	Instrumental rationalisation: -By reference to the consequences of 'alibrāliyah' and collective ideologies.

Table 6-6: Main discursive strategies in 6.7

6.7.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In a general sense, 'alibrāliyah' is discursively constructed in this article as antagonistic to the signifier of ideology, particularly Islamic fundamentalist collective ideology. In this sense, the author constructs 'alibrāliyah' and non-collective Islam under one bloc against collective Islam. By constructing 'alibrāliyah' and non-fundamental Islam in opposition to fundamental Islam in this way, two blocs are created within the logic of equivalence which can be considered two antagonistic poles. On the other hand, the construction of 'alibrāliyah' and non-collective Islam in one group implies a logic of difference by which the dispersal of antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam is represented by the equation of 'alibrāliyah' with Islam in terms of non-fundamentalism. These antagonistic constructions are employed mainly through the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' with elements that indicate the meaning of individuality in opposition to fundamental ideologies that are constructed in association with the meaning of collectivity.

'alibrāliyah' is articulated in the article through the disadvantages of its antagonist collective ideologies. As the concept of fundamental collective ideology is constructed with the moments of dogmatism, irrationality, and emotions, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed with the opposite elements: through the advantages of being non-dogmatic, relative, rational, and scientific. These moments of ideology are used to represent the negative meaning of collectivity, through which the collective is driven by a dogma advocated for through speaking to the emotions of those collectives. On the other hand, 'alibrāliyah' is articulated as opposite to collectivity; that is, with the meaning of individuality. In this sense, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed with the meaning of individual freedom through the presentation of it as relative; it is shown to be non-dogmatic and subject to constant change, and interactive with the latest scientific research.

'alibrāliyah' is also articulated through the elements of the consequences of the opposing collective ideologies. According to the author, fundamental collective ideologies result in illusions and conflicts. Therefore, 'alibrāliyah' is presented as an alternative to collective ideologies because it would result in the liberation of individuals from these conflicts and the achievement of progress for human beings. In this sense, 'alibrāliyah' is proposed as a transcendental concept that would guarantee individuals success and achievements to the world they live in. It is through this transcendentalism that the author suggests 'alibrāliyah' as a dislocation of collective ideologies, in which its transformation into imaginary will result in positive consequences for Saudi society.

The author conveys this idea of altering collective ideologies with the transcendental concepts of 'alibrāliyah' by suggesting substituting fundamental Islamic ideologies that cause conflicts in the Muslim world with 'alibrāliyah'. This establishing 'alibrāliyah' as antagonistic to fundamental Islam suggests that 'alibrāliyah' in its transcendental sense is equivalent to non-fundamental Islam, though this later sense of Islam is absent in the text. This absence of Islam in the non-fundamental sense indicates that Islam is no longer an element of the discourse of 'alibrāliyah'. In the articles previously discussed, 'alibrāliyah' was constructed as antagonistic to Islam, then as complementary to it, and finally it was discussed in isolation from any religious discourse. In "alibrāliyah' or Post-Ideologies", 'alibrāliyah' is constructed at a higher level of articulation in relation to Islam, through an equivalence across difference, whereby 'alibrāliyah' is constructed in antagonism with fundamental Islam and in agreement with non-fundamental Islam. This higher level of articulation suggests a shift in the construction of 'alibrāliyah' from being antagonistic to Islam in general to an antagonist of fundamental Islam in particular. This shift in the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' demonstrates a hegemonic practice by liberals to gain acceptance and success in forming a liberal identity.

Overall, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as an antagonist of collective fundamental ideologies, and primarily in opposition to fundamental Islam. It is articulated in relation to individuality, which includes non-dogmatic, relative, and scientific meanings that oppose the nature of fundamental Islamic ideologies. Through this antagonism of 'alibrāliyah' to fundamentalism, the author implies the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' in equivalence to non-fundamental Islam. This sense of the individuality of 'alibrāliyah' in relation to non-dogmatic Islam implies its association with transcendentalism and individual religion. This indicates a shift in the discourse regarding 'alibrāliyah', whereby it has become linked to non-fundamental Islam and individuality in religious practice in contrast to the earlier debate in which it was seen simply as antagonistic to Islam. This precise

articulation of 'alibrāliyah' and its diachronic shift suggests that 'alibrāliyah' is signifying success and transformation from a myth based to a social imaginary in the modern Saudi Arabia.

6.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Throughout the articles analysed in this chapter – which were written in the time span of 2007 to 2016 – the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in relation to Islam shifts. At the beginning of the period, 'alibrāliyah' is seen as antagonistic to Islam, shifting into being an antagonist of Islam in its fundamental form and then as equivalent to non-fundamental Islam towards the end of the period. This shift in the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' is carried out through filling the signifier of 'alibrāliyah' with meanings to create an identity for progressives in the Saudi socio-political field. These articulations are even created by the opponents of 'alibrāliyah', whereby its proponents intertextualise some of these articulations and counter them with a number of argumentative devices to identify them positively with the opposite meanings. These meanings form the features of the discourse of liberalism in relation to religious discourse in Saudi Arabia, which can be illustrated and summed up by the following themes identified within the articles.

- **Relativity**

In terms of the notion of relativity, 'alibrāliyah' has shifted from being non-flexible with Islam at the beginning of the period into being a flexible concept that can be relatively employed within the religious culture of Saudi Arabia. The text labelled (religion 2007), argues that 'alibrāliyah' is not a relative concept that can be integrated with the system of Islam. This argument is made from the perspective that 'alibrāliyah' represents a different value system to Islam in which the system of 'alibrāliyah' stems from a human source whereas the source of Islam is prophecy. However, in the middle of the period, specifically in text (religion 2013), 'alibrāliyah' is viewed as a flexible concept that can be integrated with Islam to construct a concept called 'alibrāliyah alislamiyah'. This argument suggests that 'alibrāliyah' conforms with Islam as both systems have shared values; thus, 'alibrāliyah' can offer modern interpretations of Islamic texts that suit modern societies. The relativity of the concept of 'alibrāliyah' is discussed in detail towards the end of the period, in which it is viewed as an originally Western universal concept that is not absolute in application but relative based on cultural circumstances. In the text (religion 2015), the author argues that the universal concept of 'alibrāliyah' can be adjusted to the cultural conditions of Saudi society so it does not contradict the essential values of Saudi culture. However, in contrast to text (religion 2013), which presents the religion of Islam as the essential system, the text (religion 2015) considers Saudi culture the essential

system through which 'alibrāliyah' should be adopted. This suggests that the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' is less linked to Islam as a religion towards the end of the period and more linked to the broader concept of culture at the national level.

- **Secularity vs. Fundamentalism**

Throughout the articles, the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' shifts from the meaning of secularism to the meaning of non-fundamental Islam. For example, in the text (religion 2007) 'alibrāliyah' is equated with the concept of secularism. It is presented as a non-religious concept that is derived from a secular origin that constitute a threat to Saudi society, nominated with the religious identity 'Ummah'. However, in text 6.5 'alibrāliyah' is considered a non-secular concept in the sense that it conforms with the essential values of Islam. It is also presented as against fundamentalism and old fundamental interpretations of religious texts. At the end of the period, 'alibrāliyah' is constructed in opposition to fundamentalism and fundamental Islam. In this sense, the author in text (religion 2016) equates 'alibrāliyah' with non-fundamental Islam that seeks the freedom of individuals against fundamental totalitarian ideologies.

- **Individuality vs. Collectivity**

With regard to the sense of individuality and the freedom of individuals, the first five articles associate 'alibrāliyah' in general with the value of freedom without discussing it specifically in relation to the concept of individuality. The author of the text (religion 2016) discusses this in detail, by linking 'alibrāliyah' to the notion of individuality in opposition to the sense of collectivity. 'alibrāliyah' is presented in the text as an alternative to collective ideologies, including fundamental Islamic ideologies. It is articulated as a non-ideology that seeks to liberate individuals from dogmatic totalitarian ideologies. In this sense, it is associated with the notion of transcendentalism that believes in the independence of individuals to achieve success and progress for the world they live in.

The articulation of the meanings of 'alibrāliyah' cannot be separated from the construction of the groups involved in the debate. With the shift identified in the meaning of 'alibrāliyah', from being an antonym to Islam to a synonym to non-fundamental Islam, the articulation of the groups has also shifted; the relationship between liberal progressives and religious groups shifts from the liberals being antagonistic to Islamists to being antagonistic to fundamental Islamists. In Discourse Theory terms, a notable antagonism exists at the beginning of the period between the religious group and the liberal group, which is created within the logic of equivalence, whereby both groups

represent two antagonistic poles. However, by the middle of the period, this antagonism is dissolved and 'alibrāliyah' becomes equivalent to Islam and constructed under one bloc named 'alibrāliyah alislāmīyah'. Towards the end of the period, the relationship between the groups achieves a higher level of articulation, in which liberals are created as antagonists of fundamental Islamists and equivalent to non-fundamental progressive Islamists.

The mechanism of the shift in the relationships between the groups can be discussed in particular in terms of the presentation of these groups in the articles. For example, in the article labelled (religion 2007) liberals are presented as seculars who constitute a threat to religious society (Ummah). This forms a rejection of the formulation of the liberal group, implying that the existence of liberals means the dislocation of religious identity. However, texts (religion 2009) and (religion 2011) stand with the liberals against the religious dominant group, by referring to the religious group as a dangerous extremist group that opposes the formation of the liberal group. By constructing the groups within the logic of equivalence, these three articles present the struggle to maintain or gain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field. This antagonism is dissolved in text (religion 2013), which proposes that liberals and Islamists can be united under one identity. This construction further shifts in texts (religion 2015) and (religion 2017), in which the articulation of the liberal group becomes more defined: Saudi liberal identity is presented as dependent on cultural conditions based on non-fundamental Islam against fundamental Islam. This shift suggests that liberals could be successful in finding a way to form an identity in the Saudi socio-political field and to turn 'alibrāliyah' into a social imaginary.

6.9 Summary

The analysis of the texts in this chapter has yielded a number of results in relation to the way alibrāliyah is articulated along with the relation between the groups over time. It reveals that the articulation of alibrāliyah shifts from being opponent to Islam in general at the beginning of the period into being opponent to fundamental Islam plus equivalent to non-fundamental Islam at the end of the period. This shift presents the process of filling alibrāliyah with meanings to either gain or maintain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field. It suggests that liberals succeed in their attempt to create an identity in the Saudi society through charging alibrāliyah with their own meaning and attempting to transform it into a social imaginary. The overall suggestions of these findings will be drawn on, in combination with the results of chapter 7, at the end of chapter 8.

Chapter 7: Discursive Analysis of the Texts on the Theme of Human Rights

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will present an analysis of six articles that discuss the concept of 'alibrāliyah' in relation to the field of human rights. The texts were selected based on the corpus analysis, in which it was decided to select the articles where 'alibrāliyah' collocates frequently with the word 'حرية' / *freedom* over time (see Section 4.2.1.4 for the detailed procedure). The analysis of the articles will be presented chronologically in order to identify whether there is any shift in the debate over 'alibrāliyah' in association with the notion of freedom over time. The selected articles, presented in chronological order, are:

- *الليبريون المكبوتون المخدوعون 'alibrāliyah' and the Deceived and Oppressed 'Liberal Figures'*, by Tawfiq Alsaif, Okaz Gazette, 17/10/2007; tagged (Rights 2007)
- *'Is 'alibrāliyah' Suitable to All Societies?'* by Abdulrahman Alhabib, Al-Jazirah newspaper, 22/06/2009; tagged (Rights 2009)
- *'alibrāliyah': Freedom or Chaos?'* by Abdullah Alsa'wi, Al-Jazirah, 27/01/2011; tagged (Rights 2011)
- *'Liberalism with Saudi Flavour'*, by Ahmed Fakeah, OKAZ Gazette, 21/04/2013; tagged (Rights 2013)
- *Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and 'alibrāliyah'*, by Mohammad Alkana'n, Al-Jazirah newspaper, 31/12/2015; tagged (Rights 2015)
- *'Freedom of 'alibrāliyah' and the Conventional Misunderstanding'*, by Mohammad Al-Mahmoud, Al-Riyadh Gazette, 15/09/2016. ; tagged (Rights 2016)

Each article will be analysed in terms of the discursive strategies used, following the Discourse-Historical Approach¹³, and then in terms of the semantics of the word 'alibrāliyah' and the groups involved within the debate following the Discourse Theory. The analysis of each article will begin with a summary of the main arguments in the text in order to provide an overview of what the text is debating. This will be followed by presenting the different stages of the arguments, including the claims made by the author over the course of the article to legitimate their overall views. This will be followed by a discussion of the discursive strategies used in the articles, including the topoi and fallacies used; in addition, the nomination and perspectivisation strategies will be presented in order to determine the overall worldview and the implications behind the use of these strategies. The discussion of the arguments and underlying strategies will be followed by an analysis of the semantics surrounding the term 'alibrāliyah' and the

¹³ For a detailed analysis of the texts in terms of DHA see Appendix (B) for the analysis of texts in Arabic, and Appendix (D) for the translated analysed texts.

construction of the groups involved in the debate. This is carried out in order to focus on the way 'alibrāliyah' is articulated semantically within the arguments, as well as how the groups position themselves and others in their attempt to fill 'alibrāliyah' with their own meanings. This analysis will reveal how 'alibrāliyah', as an empty signifier, is charged with meanings over time, and the way that the different groups attempt to charge it in order to gain or maintain hegemony.

7.2 Discursive Analysis of 'الليبر و الليبرون المكبوتون المخدوعون' / 'alibrāliyah' and the Deceived and Oppressed 'Liberal Figures'; (Rights 2007)

7.2.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author's key claims are based on refuting the argument of an anti-liberal columnist, Ayed, in relation to the meaning of 'alibrāliyah'. The author employs a process of intertextuality through which he counters the arguments made by Ayed in an article on alibrāliyah published in Alwatan newspaper. The author argues that defining alibrāliyah by reducing it to the concept of freedom, as Ayed had done in the article, is 'useless', stating that the meaning of a word extends beyond its etymological definition. The author also counters the arguments that Saudi intellectuals do not understand the meaning of alibrāliyah and that the principles of alibrāliyah are deceptive slogans, concluding that these are false arguments. The counter-arguments the author puts forth represent a challenge to the legitimacy of anti-liberals defining 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi context.

The author begins the article by presenting a counter-argument to Ayed's claim that 'alibrāliyah' means freedom, describing this definition as useless. This fallacy is used to undermine the etymological approach of Ayed, implying that 'alibrāliyah' is more meaningful than suggested and has contextual meanings beyond its etymological meaning. The author also undermines Ayed's argument regarding the meaning of alibrāliyah by using the topos of uselessness to state that this useless definition is not needed by Saudi newspaper readers and 'intellectuals', suggesting that they are sufficiently knowledgeable about alibrāliyah. The author here implies that key social and philosophical signifiers such as 'alibrāliyah' do not derive their meaning from their historical origins alone, and that consequently it is the duty of intellectuals to define them in more sophisticated ways than is offered by Ayed. This act of undermining Ayed's definition is constructed through a very high-level use of involvement strategies, most particularly the ironic tone that runs throughout the article, for example when the author states: "فجزى الله الكاتب خيرا على هذه الفوائد العظيمة" / "May Allah reward Ayed for these great benefits'. This involvement strategy of using an ironic tone presupposes a shared

superior knowledge in readers, as the author is suggesting that both he himself and the readers can see the uselessness of the etymological definition and that they are therefore more sophisticated than Ayed and in a better position to participate in learned discussions on the topic.

The author continues to delegitimise Ayed's ideas through counter-arguing the claim that Saudi intellectuals do not understand what 'alibrāliyah' means. In this argument, the author employs a number of reported fallacies. Through their use of irony and overenthusiastic praising of Ayed's evidence, the author makes it clear that he views Ayed's arguments as arising from the fallacy of definition, that is to say, that Ayed assumes that because a word has certain origins or etymology, that its meaning should be clear and constant in relation to these origins. The author also suggests that Ayed's arguments are invalid as they employ the fallacy of knowledge. This fallacy of knowledge is reported to delegitimise Ayed's rationality and authority to define 'alibrāliyah'. These fallacies comprise an implicit topos of non-legitimation that aims at indicating that the anti-liberal Ayed does not have the authority to define alibrāliyah. The reference in this argument to 'muthaqafeen'/intellectuals, who Ayed claims do not understand alibrāliyah, indicates that intellectuals are the actors identified amongst Saudis by Ayed as not understanding what 'alibrāliyah' might mean. This indicates Ayed's opposition to intellectuals, in which the latter includes the author, who is aligned to the reader.

The author's ironic praise also extends to Ayed's claims that 'huriah'/freedom and 'musawah'/equality are also terms that have deceived intellectuals. The implicit rebuttal of this claim relies on a topos of freedom and therefore situates the argument within the realms of an egalitarian and humanistic intellectual tradition, rather than an authoritarian and theological tradition. The topos/fallacy of uselessness is used by the author in an ironic style, stating that the that politicians and intellectuals are easily deceived by liberal principles, more easily even than fishmongers. The author is here clearly suggesting that Ayed's undermining of politicians and intellectuals is false, and that, contrary to Ayed's claim, both groups are knowledgeable and critical in their thinking. The fallacy of threat of liberal principles is also used sarcastically to indicate that the principles of freedom and equality do not lead to 'الماسونية' / freemasonry. Instead, using the topos of humanitarianism, the author indicates that freedom and equality are the highest human values, in order to delegitimise Ayed's argument regarding the threat of these values.

The author ends the article by highlighting grammatical error to reaffirm the uselessness of Ayed's definition. Specifically, the author refers to the grammatical mistake made by Ayed when he wrote that the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' will not come from

'librāliūna', instead of 'librāliīna'. The author states here ironically that Ayed might mean by 'librāliūna', the wrong grammatical plural form of liberals, people other than 'librāliīna'/'the correct grammatical plural form of liberals'. By highlighting this grammatical mistake, the author is not only delegitimising Ayed's knowledge but undermining his ability to construct grammatically correct sentences, thus representing him as entirely unfit to participate in an intellectual debate.

Throughout the article, the author employs several argumentation strategies, though primarily uses the reported fallacy of definition, the fallacy of the threat of 'alibrāliyah', and the topos of uselessness to delegitimise Ayed's anti-liberal vision of alibrāliyah. Within this argument, the author also uses nomination strategies to ironically construct Ayed's view on liberals through the process of over-determination, for example 'the deceived oppressed', and uses the first-person plural pronoun in order to align with the reader. The latter decision indicates the use of attachment strategies, through which the author identifies with the reader against the anti-liberals. Intensification strategies are also used, such as in the repetition of the main argument. All of these strategies are delivered in a rhetorical ironic style intended to undermine the anti-liberal definition of 'alibrāliyah' through, in Van Leeuwen (2007) words, the delegitimation of theoretical rationalisation.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
- over-determination 'the deceived oppressed liberals'	Claim: limiting the definition of 'alibrāliyah' to the concept of freedom is useless - fallacy of definition. - fallacy of threat of 'alibrāliyah' - topos of uselessness	Involvement strategies -First-person voice -Sarcastic style -Repetition of argument	Theoretical rationalisation; By refuting anti-liberals definition on 'alibrāliyah'

Table 7-1: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.2

7.2.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

The author in this article delegitimises the anti-liberal authority to define 'alibrāliyah'. In so doing, the author opposes the meanings of 'alibrāliyah' provided by anti-liberals, though this is not articulated at this stage as a single definition but left open to extend beyond the etymological definition. Thus, the author's articulations are based on opposing the antagonist's definition of 'alibrāliyah', along with challenging their authority to define it. Accordingly, this article is concerned with which group is entitled to

define 'alibrāliyah', and so creates an antagonism between the group that is legitimately able to define the concept and those who are not.

The opposition to the anti-liberal definition of 'alibrāliyah' is constructed by undermining the provided meaning in terms of its simplicity and perceived uselessness. The author states that 'freedom' as a connotation of 'alibrāliyah' is false, especially in the negative sense claimed by anti-liberals. The author also made reference to the uselessness of the summarised etymological definition of 'alibrāliyah' by anti-liberals, which does not fully describe the meaning of 'alibrāliyah'. Hence, the author is simultaneously keeping the meaning and use of 'alibrāliyah' open while delegitimising the right of Ayed to define alibrāliyah and undermining the etymological meaning he provides.

Though the author does not offer any explicit definition of 'alibrāliyah', it is implied that some concepts are connotations of 'alibrāliyah'. In particular, the author opposes Ayed's anti-liberal view that the concepts of 'freedom', 'brotherhood' and 'equality' are deceiving concepts of 'alibrāliyah', instead implicitly identifying these concepts as the highest human values. This indicates that these concepts are seen by 'alibrāliyah' advocates at this stage as related to the concept of 'alibrāliyah', though in a general sense. Accordingly, 'alibrāliyah' is here linked by the author to these three concepts, which represent the semantic domain of humanist principles of social justice. In addition, the author's argument that politicians and political scientists are those who are legitimately able to debate alibrāliyah indicates that alibrāliyah is seen as associated with the semantics of politics and political science. Through this argument, the author is suggesting that the semantics of 'alibrāliyah' go beyond etymology and involve the contextual domain of politics.

By delegitimising and undermining anti-liberal view on alibrāliyah, the author is creating an antagonism against anti-liberals. This antagonism is created within the logic of equivalence by setting anti-liberals as the opposing pole. This means that anti-liberals are positioned as the antagonist bloc that is opposed by the author, who constructs them negatively through a number of elements. The opposition is specifically between the anti-liberal group, who are seen as not legitimately permitted to define 'alibrāliyah', and between philosophers and political scientists, who are considered able to legitimately debate the concept of 'alibrāliyah'.

Throughout the article, this anti-liberal antagonist bloc is constructed through the use of the ironic style by means of arguing for the uselessness of the anti-liberal perspective of alibrāliyah, and their general lack of knowledge regarding alibrāliyah. On

the other hand, the author has not provided a definition of who liberals are at this stage. Instead, he opposes anti-liberals' perspective on 'alibrāliyah' and liberals. This is also apparent through the author's indication that alibrāliyah is related to the domain of politics, where he awards the responsibility for and legitimacy of defining alibrāliyah to political scientists, without himself defining what 'alibrāliyah' means. This indicates that liberal identity at this time is not yet clearly shaped. However, it can be argued that, at this stage, the liberal identity is created through the opposition against the anti-liberal group.

In summary, in this article 'alibrāliyah' is primarily articulated through opposing the anti-liberal view on 'alibrāliyah'. In the general sense, the author delegitimises the idea that 'alibrāliyah' is limited to meaning freedom in the negative and simple sense and implies that it has contextual meanings beyond the etymological sense. However, alibrāliyah is implicitly constructed with the connotations of 'freedom', 'brotherhood', and 'equality' in the general sense. In this sense, the author associates 'alibrāliyah' with the semantic domains of humanitarianism, social justice, and politics, and assigns scientists in these fields the legitimate authority to debate this concept. These meanings are also articulated in order to construct anti-liberals as antagonists within the logic of equivalence, positioning them as the opposite bloc who lack the knowledge that would enable them to legitimately define the term. The other pole, liberals, is not explicitly constructed within the article, which indicates that, at this stage, liberals' identity is constructed in opposition to anti-liberals rather than providing a clear statement on their identity.

7.3 Discursive Analysis of the text 'هل الليبرالية مناسبة لكل المجتمعات؟' / 'Is alibrāliyah Suitable for all Societies?'; (Rights 2009)

7.3.1 Main arguments in the text

In this article, the author is attempting to find a meaning for 'alibrāliyah' and determine whether it is a universal concept that is suitable for all societies. The arguments relating to the definition of 'alibrāliyah' are based on citations from liberal scholars rather than providing a novel definition of the term. The author also discusses the applicability of 'alibrāliyah' at a universal rather than a local level. In this regard, it is concluded in the article that alibrāliyah is based on the principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. The author also states that 'alibrāliyah' is not a universal concept and thus its use is not appropriate in all countries.

The article begins by arguing that 'alibrāliyah' has no specific definition. The author then provides a general definition of 'alibrāliyah', arguing that it is based on the broad principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. However, he also notes that liberal trends differ in application, ranging from the right to the left of the political spectrum. Based on this view, the author argues that 'alibrāliyah' can be defined on the basis of the Stanford Encyclopedia entry. In this attempt to define 'alibrāliyah', the author is using the topos of authority of knowledge by means of citing the encyclopedia to legitimise his arguments in relation to the meaning of 'alibrāliyah', and whether or not it is a universal concept. He also uses the topos of number to indicate that 'alibrāliyah' has many applications and that there is a lot of discussion around its meaning.

The author then goes on to argue that 'alibrāliyah' is not relevant for all countries, using the topos of authority by basing this argument on the view of a liberal scholar named John Rawls. Rawls' argument is based on the idea that some societies have their own hierarchical working systems in which individuals are collaborative rather than being equal, as in liberal societies. The author also counters the notion of the universality of 'alibrāliyah' by reporting negatively on other scholars who believe in the suitability of 'alibrāliyah' for all societies.

The author also specifically questions the possibility of all countries having a unified system of 'alibrāliyah', citing Kant, who argues that 'alibrāliyah' cannot be unified globally. He also quotes Kant's view on the impossibility of humanitarianism being encapsulated in one political form such as 'alibrāliyah', explaining that, instead, each state should guarantee equality and freedom regardless of their political system.

The author continues to ask questions about 'alibrāliyah' and its application in states, including questions about the way liberal countries should treat non-liberals. In this regard, he argues that liberal groups should not interfere in the affairs of non-liberal groups. This argument is justified by quoting Mill's view that objects to the interference of liberal states in non-liberal states to protect liberal principles. However, the author makes an exception in regard to the treatment of extremist groups who violate the law and ignore basic human rights. He here uses the topos of responsibility, the topos of consequences, and the topos of rights to indicate that these extremist groups are responsible for their actions and the consequences of those actions, as they do not respect human rights.

The author ends the article with another related question that concerns whether non-liberal groups should participate in decision-making in liberal states. His answer to this question is based on two different views of liberal scholars. First, he quotes Rawls'

view that liberal countries are rational and therefore they cannot be involved in decisions made by collective or religious systems. On the other hand, he quotes the opposing view of Eberle and Berry that the non-involvement of other groups in the decision is an exclusion of religious groups. This referencing of different views towards the end of the article is intended to show that liberals are not united under one view but rather hold conflicting standpoints.

Though the author uses a negative tone to imply towards the end of the article that liberals have conflicting views, throughout the article he uses objective language. This is manifested in a detachment strategy using indirect speech style to cite the views of liberals. The topos of authority is also employed throughout the article for detachment purposes and to give the arguments an objective factual foundation. Other topoi used throughout the article include the topos of definition, the topos of rights, and the fallacy of exclusion. All of these argumentative devices are used to argue that though ‘alibrāliyah’ is theoretically based on freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making, it differs in application to the extent that it becomes contradictory to these principles by not guaranteeing them to other non-liberal groups.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Functionalisation ‘philosopher’, ‘liberal intellectuals’ - Categorisation ‘liberals’, ‘religious’ 	Claim: ‘alibrāliyah’ is not a universal concept and thus it is not suitable for all countries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Topos of authority - Topos of definition - Topos of rights - Fallacy of exclusion 	Detachment strategies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - third-person voice - indirect speech 	Authorisation; by reference to experts’ ‘liberal views’.

Table 7-2: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.3

7.3.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In this article, ‘alibrāliyah’ is defined generally in relation to the broad principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. However, the author explains that the application of these principles differs in different liberal states, as well as in different liberals’ views. In this regard, he cites different views of alibrāliyah concluding that these differences indicate that ‘alibrāliyah’ is not a universal concept.

The author defines ‘alibrāliyah’ in relation to the three main principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. To illustrate the meanings of these

principles he quotes different liberal views related to the way these principles can be applied. In relation to the meanings of 'freedom' and 'equality', the author chooses to illustrate these concepts by citing Rawls' view that these liberal principles are not suitable to all non-liberal states, as non-liberal societies can apply their own humanitarian principles without relying on liberal versions of the same principles. This view is also supported by Kant, who argues that humanity is not formed according to one political system such as 'alibrāliyah', as freedom and equality can also be found in other systems. The concept of freedom is also discussed in relation to the way liberals treat non-liberals in terms of these principles. The author argues that liberal states should not interfere with or restrict the freedom of non-liberal states, as a number of liberals claim. In terms of the participation in decision-making principle, the author argues that non-liberal groups should not participate in decision-making in liberal countries. All of these arguments are selected to imply that liberal principles are contradictory in application in the time these humanitarian principles exist in other systems than 'alibrāliyah'.

In his identification of the contradiction of freedom principles, the author identifies a number of groups, primarily liberal and non-liberal groups. This is manifested through the implication that liberals as a group are not in agreement, and thus 'alibrāliyah' should not be adopted. In this case, the author draws a distinction between the liberal system and collective systems, including religious systems. Through this distinction, he creates an antagonism between the collective and the liberal systems. This antagonism is created within the logic of equivalence, whereby 'alibrāliyah' is positioned as a bloc against collectivism and religion.

In this antagonism, the author is favouring collective systems, especially religious ones, over liberal systems. This is explicit in his argument that the principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making do not exist only in 'alibrāliyah' but also in collective systems. Through this argument, the author implies that it is unnecessary to adopt 'alibrāliyah' if its principles exist in religious collective systems. This also indicates the lack of any need for 'alibrāliyah' in religious societies, such as the Saudi society, especially when the religious collective systems guarantee the principles of 'alibrāliyah'.

In summary, in this article 'alibrāliyah' is defined generally in relation to the principles of freedom, equality, and participation in decision-making. In discussing the application of these principles, the author concludes that 'alibrāliyah' is a contradictory concept since it does not guarantee its principles. In dismissing 'alibrāliyah', he indicates that its principles are not limited to this concept alone, but also exist in collective societies, such as religious societies. Through this distinction, the author creates a logic

of equivalence between 'alibrāliyah' and religious systems. This antagonism highlights the author's view regarding the lack of any need to adopt 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi religious society, and moreover that it is not a suitable system for this society.

7.4 Discursive analysis of the text 'الليبرالية حرية أم فوضوية؟' / 'alibrāliyah, is it Freedom or Chaos?'; (Rights 2011)

7.4.1 Main arguments in the text

The key claim in this article is based on the notion that there is no need to adopt 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society. This is based on the argument that Saudi society has its own Islamic system of values that include the value of freedom which the author argues is superior to the concept of freedom in the 'alibrāliyah' system, and thus 'alibrāliyah' should not be adopted. In constructing this argument, the author makes a comparison between the value of freedom in 'alibrāliyah' and in Islam, concluding that freedom in Islam is absolute, but in 'alibrāliyah' is unrestricted and thus distorted. This argument concludes by stating that there is no need for freedom in 'alibrāliyah' as Islam guarantees freedom and thus the latter should not be substituted.

The article begins by appraising the Islamic value system with a specific focus on the value of freedom. On this point, the author argues that freedom is an important Islamic value. In justifying this argument, he employs the topos of authority, citing a Qur'anic verse that states "إكراه في الدين" "there is no compulsion in Islam". By citing this verse, the author indicates that Islam supports humanitarian values, including the value of freedom such as in converting to Islam and practicing its rituals

The author then moves on to explain that freedom in Islam is precedent, and that freedom in Islam precedes freedom in 'alibrāliyah'. In his support of this argument, he states that this precedence of freedom in Islam is ignored by many authors, as if freedom were the exclusive product of 'alibrāliyah'. He also employs the topos of culture to state that freedom in 'alibrāliyah', as coined by Western philosophers, is not compatible with Islamic freedom, due to the differences between the structures of both cultures. He further describes freedom in the system of 'alibrāliyah' as distorted to the extent that has become chaos.

The author continues to represent the concept of freedom in 'alibrāliyah' in a negative way. However, he argues that the value of freedom has been distorted by 'alibrāliyah' due to the unrestricted tendency of this kind of freedom, which is used for subjective purposes. He further explains that 'alibrāliyah' has broadened the concept of freedom to the extent that it has come self-contradictory. Through provides an example

of usury that he argues is based on individual freedom with no set restrictions. The argument that freedom has been distorted by 'alibrāliyah' is also supported by a comparison between freedom in 'alibrāliyah' and in Islam. The author argues that unlike 'alibrāliyah', freedom in the Islamic system has a high value due to the restricted nature of this kind of freedom. Continuing this argument, he questions the benefit of adopting 'alibrāliyah', which has been created in a culture different from 'Ummah', which has a superior version of freedom guaranteed by Islam.

The author continues to represent 'alibrāliyah' negatively by illustrating the meaning of freedom in 'alibrāliyah'. In defining freedom in 'alibrāliyah' as unrestricted, he justifies this with the statement that freedom needs some restrictions in order to be considered a value. If it is not restricted, as in 'alibrāliyah', then it becomes too broad and empty to the extent that it becomes chaotic. The author argues that the unrestricted freedom of 'alibrāliyah' is entirely different from freedom in Islam, as the latter is absolute since it has restrictions that create its meaning. This categorisation of freedom in 'alibrāliyah' as unrestricted and in Islam as absolute is intended to create a gap between the two concepts in which the former is described negatively and the latter positively.

The author then begins to positively present the concept of freedom in Islam, arguing that freedom in Islam is superior since 'Islam' means 'سُتْسِلَامٌ' *submission*, and this submission can only be achieved through freedom. This is further explained by stating that freedom in Islam means the absolute liberation from any obedience but to Allah. Using the fallacy of freedom, the author goes on to compare 'alibrāliyah' to Islam by stating that in 'alibrāliyah' there is no obedience, and that obedience and freedom in 'alibrāliyah' are opposing concepts. However, in Islam, freedom and obedience are inseparable and integrated to the extent where the more obedient a person is the more freedom they have.

The author ends the article by arguing that, as freedom exists in Islam, there is no need to borrow the concept from alibrāliyah. The author justifies this argument by stating particularly that as freedom is an essential value in the Islamic cultural system, there is no need to borrow a lesser value from a lower system. He also uses the reported fallacy of the false alternative to claim that it is illogical to substitute the system of Islam with 'alibrāliyah' when the former is superior to the latter.

In summary, the article is primarily based on comparing freedom in 'alibrāliyah' and in Islam, concluding that it is essential and superior in the Islamic system and thus there is no need to borrow it from outside that system. To support this argument, the author uses the legitimisation strategy of authorisation, basing the argument on the topos

of authority in regard to Quranic texts, as well as the legitimation strategy of moral evaluation through reference to the value of freedom in both systems, and using the topos of humanitarianism, topos of culture, and topos/fallacy of abuse of values by ‘alibrāliyah’. Nomination strategies are also used, specifically categorization, identifying freedom in ‘alibrāliyah’ as unrestricted and chaotic, and in Islam as absolute. In addition, the Saudi culture has been nominated with its religious identity associating them as ‘Ummah’. In terms of perspectivisation strategies, the author mainly employed the detachment strategy, presenting his arguments from a third-person perspective. However, towards the end of the article the author is involved using first-person when discussing the lack of any need or justification to substitute Islam with ‘alibrāliyah’. All of this indicates that this article associates ‘alibrāliyah’ with a negative sense of freedom, representing it as a foreign and negative concept that should not be adopted.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
Association ‘Ummah’ - Dissociation ‘alibrāliyah’	Claim: Islam should not be substituted with ‘alibrāliyah’ - Topos of authority - Topos of humanitarianism - Topos of culture - Topos of abuse	Detachment strategies third-person voice	Authorisation; by reference to Qur’anic texts Moral evaluation; by comparing the value of freedom in Islam and ‘alibrāliyah’

Table 7-3: Main Discursive Strategies in 7.4

7.4.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

‘alibrāliyah’ in this article is constructed in relation to the concept of freedom. It is specifically articulated in comparison to the value of freedom in the Islamic system. In this regard, the author presents a detailed account of the meaning of freedom in both systems, ‘alibrāliyah’ and Islam, concluding that freedom in Islam is superior and thus alibrāliyah should not be adopted. In this sense, the author creates an opposition between alibrāliyah and Islam in which alibrāliyah is represented negatively and Islam is represented positively.

The author associates freedom in alibrāliyah with a number of elements. Freedom is constructed in association with the negative connotations of being unrestricted, distorted, and contradictory. The notion of unrestrictedness is illustrated through the idea that ‘alibrāliyah’ has no limit on freedom, to the extent that it becomes self-contradictory. This contradiction resulting from its unrestrictedness is due to the broadness of a freedom that has no controlling factor to limit this freedom. According to

the author, this makes 'alibrāliyah' chaotic as it has no set system of values that define it.

On the other hand, freedom in Islam is associated with the positive concept of 'absoluteness'. To the author, this absoluteness is derived from the contrasting value of obedience, which controls and defines freedom in the Islamic system. In discourse theory terms, obedience represents the necessary antagonism that articulates the meaning of a particular concept. The relation between absolute freedom and obedience is illustrated through the idea that a person becomes absolutely free by choosing to worship no one but Allah. This relation is correlative, whereby the more one obeys Allah, the freer one will become.

In discussing the meanings of freedom in both alibrāliyah and Islam, the author constructs these meanings by means of contrasting the two systems. In this sense, the author constructs an antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam in terms of the value of freedom. This antagonism is created within the logic of equivalence, through which Islam and 'alibrāliyah' are constructed as completely antagonistic concepts. This antagonism is created primarily from a cultural perspective, where Islam is constructed as the inner cultural identity while 'alibrāliyah' is constructed as the outsider, Western concept that constitutes a threat to Islamic culture.

The construction of groups, on the other hand, is represented in two main camps: 'us', which represents the Islamic culture, or 'Ummah', and 'them' represented by the Western liberal group. This is manifested throughout the author's argument that the concept of freedom that is constructed by Western liberals is not compatible with Islamic cultural values, and that Islam has its own value of freedom. This antagonism is also apparent in the negative construction of freedom in 'alibrāliyah' as unrestricted and chaotic, and in the positive construction of freedom in Islam as absolute. In addition, the opposition between groups is articulated in the argument that 'alibrāliyah' should not be adopted as it is a product of an inferior group, and that the value of freedom already exists as part of the superior inner culture of Islam.

In summary, 'alibrāliyah' in this article is defined as antagonistic to Islam in relation to the value of freedom. While 'alibrāliyah' is associated primarily with chaos, Islam is associated with the absolute freedom and as being a system of values. The antagonism between 'alibrāliyah' and Islam is apparent through the primary argument that 'alibrāliyah' should not substitute the Islamic cultural system. This antagonism is created within the logic of equivalence, where 'alibrāliyah' constitutes a dislocatory threat to the Islamic culture of Saudi society. In this sense, the author is warning against

transforming 'alibrāliyah' into an imaginary in Saudi society and against being hegemonic in a religious society.

7.5 Discursive Analysis of the text 'الليبرالية بنكهة سعودية' / 'alibrāliyah with Saudi Character'; (Rights 2013)

7.5.1 Main arguments in the text

The author in this article is primarily discussing the status of the debate around 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society and argues that 'alibrāliyah' has been discussed only superficially in Saudi society instead of objectively and in depth. He defines 'alibrāliyah' generally in relation to the concept of freedom and argues that in order to employ 'alibrāliyah' in society, it should be discussed in depth in relation to freedom, instead of limiting the discussion to the field of religion.

The article starts with the argument that there is ongoing debate regarding 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society. This argument is constructed by employing the topos of number stating that there is a lot of discussion around the concept in the cultural, intellectual, and social spheres, in order to indicate the significance of the debate. The author states that this discussion has even been referenced in the television series 'Tash ma Tash', using sarcastic language. Here, he uses the reported fallacy of ignorance to state that a concept such as 'alibrāliyah' should not be approached in this disgusting, sarcastic way, but rather should be discussed in great depth in order to understand its meanings and applications.

The author then provides a philosophical definition of 'alibrāliyah' so that the concept can be discussed in depth. He argues that 'alibrāliyah' is primarily associated with the concept of freedom, and illustrates this by citing an Arab philosopher who states that freedom is the core meaning of 'alibrāliyah' (lines 15-34, in Arabic lines 12-19). The author adds that the word 'حرية' / *freedom* is the word most closely associated with 'alibrāliyah' in the Arab world, along with other synonymous words including 'استقلال' / *independence*, 'ديموقراطية' / *democracy*, and 'تنمية' / *development*. In addition, the author associates the meaning of freedom with the political field, stating that the slogan of freedom can be used for various political purposes. In this sense, he considers the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' to overlap with the concept of freedom to mean the freedom of individuals, which can be used in a political sense and associated with the concept of the state, organisations, and the economy.

The author continues by discussing the case of alibrāliyah in the Saudi context, explaining that the group of people who label themselves 'liberals' in Saudi society are not true liberals since they do not apply the principles of 'alibrāliyah'. He argues that Saudi liberals are living in the past by adhering to traditions and by standing in the way of the freedom of others. He ends the article by suggesting the adoption of the principles of 'alibrāliyah' in order to be labeled as liberals. This is explained through the call for analysing in depth the concept of 'alibrāliyah' along with a focus on the present and future rather than the past.

Overall, the article is written using mainly the strategy of argumentation and employing the topos/fallacy of ignorance, the topos of authority, and the topos/fallacy of definition to argue that the issue of 'alibrāliyah' is ignored in Saudi society due to it being only superficially discussed, and that it should be adopted on the basis of a deep understanding of its background origin in the West. This argument is constructed through the use of involvement strategies by using direct speech to report the views of a philosopher and first-person plural voice to emphasise the importance of an in-depth

The author moves on to discuss the situation of 'alibrāliyah' at the local level of Saudi society. He argues that 'alibrāliyah' has been considered only superficially since its recent arrival in Saudi society. Using the fallacy of ignorance, he states that the issue of 'alibrāliyah' has been ignored in society by means of dealing with it at the service level through linking it exclusively to the domain of religion, as was previously the case with 'ḥadāthah'. The author suggests that alibrāliyah should be considered in more depth, by studying its socio-historical context in the West and discussing the ways in which it can be employed in Saudi society.

treatment of the concept of alibrāliyah in the inner Saudi society. The legitimation strategies of this main argument comprise two main types: authorisation and theoretical rationalisation. Authorisation is provided by referring to the view of an Arab philosopher who has worked on defining 'alibrāliyah'. This reference to a scholar from the inner Arab circle is intended to promote acceptance of the argument amongst readers. The legitimation of theoretical rationalisation, on the other hand, is used throughout the article by means of referring to the way things should be ordered; in this case, the way Saudi society should approach the outsider concept of alibrāliyah.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Functionalisation 'intellectual'	Claim: 'alibrāliyah' has been approached only superficially in Saudi society - topos/fallacy of ignorance - topos of authority - topos/fallacy of definition	Involvement strategies - first-person plural voice - direct speech	Authorisation; by reference to an Arab philosopher Theoretical rationalisation; - by reference to the way Saudi society should approach alibrāliyah

Table 7-4: Main Discursive Strategies in text 7.5

7.5.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

The author in this article has associated 'alibrāliyah' primarily with the concept of freedom. Specifically, he relates alibrāliyah to the notion of the liberation from the past and from old traditions, and associates alibrāliyah with the temporal notion of present and future. These notions comprise the author's view of what Saudi liberalism should look like. In this regard, he draws a comparison between Saudi liberalism, which is viewed as superficial, and Western liberalism, considered as the profound root of 'alibrāliyah'.

In general, the author ascribes a number of positive attributions to alibrāliyah. First, he considers the notion of freedom to be the basis of alibrāliyah. To the author, freedom in alibrāliyah is based on the notion of freedom of individuals and differs in different applications related to the domains of politics and the economy. alibrāliyah is also linked to the concepts of 'independence', 'democracy', and 'development'. The author further equates the notion of alibrāliyah with the concept of modernism. In this sense, he associates alibrāliyah with a temporal notion, in particular with the notions of the 'present' and the 'future'. In the same regard, he links alibrāliyah to the meaning of the liberation from the past and from old traditions.

The meanings are articulated to construct an idea of how Saudi liberalism should look. To this end, the author draws a comparison between alibrāliyah in Saudi society and liberalism in the West, arguing that alibrāliyah in Saudi Arabia is superficial, and that Saudi liberals do not represent the concept of alibrāliyah. On the other hand, Western liberalism is seen as the original liberalism as it emerged and spread from the west. The comparison is made clear through the argument that liberalism is treated superficially, as a consumer product, in Saudi society and not as an intellectual concept that is related to the issues of the individual, as it is in the West. This comparison indicates an

articulation of the Saudi group and the West within the logic of difference. The logic of difference is evident in the author's attempt to dissolve the boundaries between both groups by relating them to the common project of Western liberalism. In other words, the author suggests reviewing the contextual background of liberalism in the West and incorporating it within the Saudi society in order to construct and develop a concept of liberalism for Saudi society. This equivalence between alibrāliyah in the Saudi context and Western liberalism marks a significant shift in the discourse of alibrāliyah in Saudi society, in which the articulation of alibrāliyah shifts toward equating alibrāliyah in the Saudi context with Western liberalism within the logic of difference, instead of the previous antagonism with Islam, within the logic of equivalence.

Overall, in this article 'alibrāliyah' is associated with the general meaning of freedom. In particular, the author relates 'alibrāliyah' to the concepts of 'independence', 'democracy', 'modernism', and 'development'. These meanings are articulated to suggest ways in which Saudi liberalism can be identified instead of the current superficial treatment of the concept. In addition, the meanings of individual freedom, social, economic, and political fields are also associated to the ideal concept of liberalism in the West. The notions of Western liberalism are articulated in order to suggest ways in which Saudi liberalism can evolve by incorporating the original, Western liberalism. In this regard, alibrāliyah in Saudi society and Western liberalism are articulated using the logic of difference through the suggestion of incorporating Western liberalism into Saudi society.

7.6 Discursive Analysis of the text 'اشتباك بين الحرية والليبرالية' Breaking the Engagement Between Freedom and alibrāliyah'; (Rights 2015)

7.6.1 Main arguments in the text

The author in this article argues against the claim that 'alibrāliyah' means 'حرية'/freedom, claiming that those who view alibrāliyah as freedom have an intellectual deficiency. In this way, the author attempts to disconnect alibrāliyah from the meaning of freedom, through a number of points, including a discussion of the etymology of 'alibrāliyah', of the precedence of the value of freedom than 'alibrāliyah', of the ambiguity of the concept of alibrāliyah, and of its negative historical background.

The author begins the article with a discussion of the idea that alibrāliyah is associated with freedom. This is justified through the reported fallacy of definition, whereby the author states that intellectuals, journalists, and Twitter users consider 'alibrāliyah' to mean 'حرية'/freedom, in both etymological and in actual contexts. The

author states that those groups consider any implementation of the value of freedom to be an implementation of alibrāliyah. Employing the psychogenetic fallacy (*argumentum ad hominem*), the author argues that this view represents an intellectual deficiency in the minds of those groups. Therefore, the author offers to declare the facets of this deficiency by means of breaking the association between ‘freedom’ and ‘alibrāliyah’.

The first facet concerns the etymology of the word ‘alibrāliyah’. The author argues that ‘alibrāliyah’ is a non-Arabic word that derives from the English word *liberalism*, which is of Latin origin. He further states that, etymologically, the word ‘alibrāliyah’ means freedom; however, by employing both the fallacy of definition and the fallacy of relevance, he argues that the etymological equivalence of alibrāliyah and freedom does not necessarily mean that this is the case in context. To this end, the author employs the topos of reality to claim that the actual application of alibrāliyah over time shows that it does not represent the value of freedom.

The author then moves on to introduce the second reason why alibrāliyah’ does not mean freedom, arguing that the existence of the value of freedom precedes the existence of alibrāliyah. In particular, he employs the topos of history to state that civilizations, cultures, and religions spoke of freedom before the emergence of alibrāliyah in Europe, adding that the concept of freedom in alibrāliyah is related to the Western civilization and to its cultural development over history. This is followed by stating that freedom in alibrāliyah is self-contradictory, providing the example of a philosopher of alibrāliyah named John Locke, who was a slave trader.

The article then discusses the third facet, which concerns the ambiguity of the concept of alibrāliyah. Through the use of topos of number, the author argues that alibrāliyah has various definitions, leading to the issue of it having two main meanings: ‘التحررية’/*liberation*, and ‘الفردانية’/*individuality*. He states that the issue is mainly with the meaning of individuality, and whether this means individuality against collectivity, or the self against the other. In this regard, the author cites a philosopher who states that ‘alibrāliyah’ can mean ‘individualism’, which means the reliance of the individual on the self, or ‘selfishness’, which means that self-interest is the basis of behaviour.

The author continues to discuss the reasons why the association between alibrāliyah and freedom should be broken, referring to the fourth facet which is in regard to the historical background of alibrāliyah. Through representing ‘alibrāliyah’ negatively by means of employing the topos of history and the topos of abuse, the author argues that the liberalism that appeared in Britain led to the colonisation of the world, allowed Jews to occupy Palestine, and led also to many massacres around the world. The author

also refers to the current references on the failure of ‘alibrāliyah’ to represent the value of freedom. This is justified through the topos of reality and the reported fallacy of freedom and justice, to argue that the issue of religious freedom in Western countries is presently the most prominent concern. In this regard, he provides the examples of Islamophobia, the Prophet cartoon, and the objection to building mosques. This argument is driven to the conclusion that though freedom in alibrāliyah is an ideal concept, in application it fails to the extent that it becomes a contradictory concept.

Overall, the author attempts to disengage freedom from alibrāliyah by employing the argumentation strategies of fallacy of definition, the topos of history, the topos of authority, and the topos/fallacy of abuse. To justify this argument, he mainly employs the involvement strategies by means of personally accusing the liberal group of being psychologically deficient, using the psychogenetic fallacy (*argumentum ad hominem*). Nomination strategies are also used to construct ‘the others’ through a process of functionalisation in which alibrāliyah supporters are identified as ‘متقفين’/*intellectuals*, ‘إعلاميين’/*journalists*, and ‘مغردين’/*Twitter users*. All of these strategies are legitimised through the legitimisation mode of moral evaluation through which the author discusses the reasons alibrāliyah does not represent the value of freedom, and through the mode of authorisation, through which the author makes reference to an expert to legitimise his main argument.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Functionalisation ‘intellectuals’ ‘journalists’, and ‘Twitter users’	Claim: ‘alibrāliyah’ does not mean freedom - fallacy of definition - Topos of history - Topos of authority - Topos/fallacy of abuse	Involvement strategies evaluative language	Authorisation; reference to an expert. Moral Evaluation; - by reference to the reasons ‘alibrāliyah’ does not represent the value of freedom

Table 7-5: Main discursive strategies in 7.5

7.6.2 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

In this article, the author attempts to disassociate the notion of freedom from ‘alibrāliyah’. This is articulated mainly by arguing that the etymology of ‘alibrāliyah’ as meaning freedom does not mean that this is its actual meaning based on the present social practices and historical events, which prove the opposite. This argument is constructed to counter the group of Saudi intellectuals who argue that ‘alibrāliyah’ means freedom. Thus, an antagonism is created against this group by means of the subjective

argument that they have an intellectual deficiency. Another antagonism is also created against the Western culture, which the author views as a threat to Saudi society, by arguing that alibrāliyah is a negative Western product.

To disassociate 'alibrāliyah' from the meaning of 'حرية' / freedom, the author argues that the semantic meaning of alibrāliyah contradicts its contextual practices, stating that the semantic connotations of freedom lead people to view 'alibrāliyah' as meaning freedom. In this regard, the author states that the historical and the present context of alibrāliyah indicates the opposite, and associates alibrāliyah with the meanings of violence and brutality when reviewing the history of alibrāliyah, which is associated with invasion of various parts of the world. He also links alibrāliyah to the meanings of hate and injustice when discussing the present practices of liberal states, including their treatment of others, especially Muslims.

The author also refers to the semantic ambiguity of the concept 'alibrāliyah', which means it is morally illegitimate for it to mean freedom. He states that 'alibrāliyah' has two semantic meanings: 'individuality' and 'freedom'. He argues that the issue is with the sense of individuality, as it could indicate one of two meanings, either individuality against collectivity, or selfishness against selflessness. To the author, both meanings are negative and oppose, in practice, the value of freedom.

In breaking the link between alibrāliyah and freedom, the author creates an antagonism against two main groups. First, he constructs an antagonism against the local group of intellectuals, journalists, and Twitter users who believe in the freedom of alibrāliyah. The author accuses these groups of having an intellectual deficiency in an attempt to delegitimise their belief in 'alibrāliyah'. This represents a complete antagonism towards intellectuals, which is created within the logic of equivalence. The logic of equivalence is also used against the 'Western' group, which first proposed the concept of alibrāliyah. This antagonism is apparent through the representation of the Western application of alibrāliyah throughout history as violent and brutal. In addition, the author portrays the current employment of alibrāliyah by Western countries with an image of injustice and hatred, especially against Muslims' freedom to practise their religion. This antagonism towards intellectuals and the West was used to create and position them as one bloc that represents a threat to society.

In summary, the author attempts in this article to separate out the value of freedom from alibrāliyah by means of imbuing alibrāliyah with negative meanings. In particular, he associates 'alibrāliyah' with the contradictory notions of 'violence', 'injustice', and 'hatred', which the author views as the actual evidence of alibrāliyah. He

also negatively associates the concept of alibrāliyah with the meanings of 'individuality' and 'selfishness'. These meanings are articulated to create an antagonism first against the Saudi intellectuals who call for alibrāliyah, and also against the Western culture that invented the concept. This is based on the view that alibrāliyah is a threat to Saudi society and the fear of substituting the Islamic system with alibrāliyah.

7.7 Discursive analysis of the text 'الحرية الليبرالية و سوء الفهم التقليدي' / 'Freedom of 'alibrāliyah' and the Conventional Misunderstanding'; (Rights 2016)

The author in this article is arguing against the traditionalists' view of alibrāliyah, who are seen as ideologised and to have misunderstood the concept of alibrāliyah. He argues that alibrāliyah is not based on the notion of unrestricted freedom, as the traditionalists claim, but is instead based on the notion of relativity, and depends on the cultural features of a particular society. The author also refers to the point that, unlike other systems, freedom is the central value of alibrāliyah and does not contradict the principles of Islam. In this sense, he concludes that alibrāliyah would assess the Islamic system by means of its relative application based on the cultural factors.

In justifying the main arguments of the article, the author starts by making the claim that alibrāliyah is currently clear to critical readers but is still misunderstood by the ideologised traditionalist public. Using the topos of knowledge, the author states that those interested in the subject of alibrāliyah understand its meaning. However, using the topos of ignorance, he further states that the ideologised public, which he labels 'تقليديون' / *traditionalists*, do not understand the meaning of alibrāliyah as their readings are based on ideologised sources that are against alibrāliyah. In this sense, he uses the topos/fallacy of abuse to refer to the abuse of clerics, who are seen as the producers of the ideologised sources that represent alibrāliyah in a negative way. Through labelling those clerics as 'وعاظ التقليديين' / 'the clerics of traditionalists', the author accuses them of speaking to the emotions of the public in order to ideologise them against alibrāliyah.

The author continues to argue against traditionalists by countering their view of the unrestrictedness of freedom in alibrāliyah. The author states that 'alibrāliyah' could mean theoretically unrestricted freedom, however, according to the author this is impossible in practice as unrestricted freedom would result in the opposite of freedom, complete restriction. Through illustrating the notion of freedom in alibrāliyah and its relation to the notion of unrestrictedness, the author makes a comparison between alibrāliyah and Islam. He positions alibrāliyah as similar to Islam by arguing that Islam emphasises the theoretical notion of unrestricted freedom. This is achieved by referring to an Islamic rule that states that all things are originally permitted unless otherwise

stated in holy texts, which indicates that freedom in Islam is theoretically unrestricted but controlled in practice by a number of rules.

The author argues that this is also the case in *alibrāliyah*, in which its unrestrictedness is in fact limited by some practices. He states that *alibrāliyah* is not only restricted by the requirement not to harm others, as some traditionalists claim, but that in fact the restrictions go much deeper than that. The author argues that *alibrāliyah* is restricted by cultural factors that makes freedom relative, and dependent on social norms. Using the topos of relativity and the topos of culture, he states that the boundaries regarding harm to others are relative based on the boundaries of the culture, including religion. The author here includes religion as part of culture, stating that cultural norms that are based on religion could be fixed or changing, depending on the nature of the practices of that religion. The author supports this argument with the topos of cultural examples, from both the West and from Islamic culture. In terms of the Western culture, the author provides the example that it is unacceptable in London or Paris to walk naked in the street, as this violates the norms of these cultures. On the other hand, cultures that are characterised by their Islamic identity do not allow adultery, as this practice is not compatible with the Islamic culture. These examples are used to make the point that freedom is relative and bounded by cultural rules, and not based only on not harming others, as traditionalists claim.

After comparing the notion of the relativity of freedom in *alibrāliyah* and Islam, the author moves on to argue that while the value of freedom is subsidiary in other concepts it is central in *alibrāliyah*. He states that each system has its own primary interest and that the primary interest of *alibrāliyah* is the freedom of individuals. This is further supported with the topos of example, in which the author argues that as freedom is central in '*alibrāliyah*', justice is the central concept in 'شترابية' *socialism*, which makes both systems distinct and unique.

The author returns to discuss the notion of relativity of freedom in *alibrāliyah*. He argues against the traditionalists' claim that this relativity makes *alibrāliyah* a myth as it has no fixed definition. He argues that *alibrāliyah* is a trend or a state, which makes it relative, and can be integrated within other systems such as liberal Islam or liberal Christianity. This is supported with the topos of existence of *alibrāliyah* in all societies and the topos of ignorance of this existence. In this regard, the author explains that *alibrāliyah* exists to different extents in all societies, though this is ignored by these societies. He gives the example of an Iranian cleric, Khamenei, who is seen as liberal because he holds less extreme views in the extremist state of Iran. The author also uses

the topos of culture to emphasise the idea of the relativity of alibrāliyah to cultural circumstances. He illustrates this with an example of freedom to travel in relation to age, where he argues that liberals would choose a younger age e.g. 18, while the conservatives would choose an older age, for example 22.

The author ends the article by arguing that the examples provided of the relativity of alibrāliyah do not contradict Islam but instead assess the application of Islamic principles. Using the topos of culture, he argues that liberals will not discuss the main principles of Islam but could offer liberal views on the way these principles might be practised. The author also uses the fallacy of exclusion to state that having fixed views on Islamic principles rather than liberal ones is a form of exclusion, especially as the application of these principles is a subject of debate.

Overall, the author in this article argues mainly for the relativity of alibrāliyah on the basis of cultural factors, including Islam, which he states is not contradictory. In justifying this argument, he uses the topos of relativity, the topos of culture, and the fallacy of definition of alibrāliyah by traditionalists. The author also uses perspectivisation strategies, specifically employing the involvement strategy using first and second-person perspective to address traditionalists, followed by detachment strategies to explain from a third-person perspective the notion of the relativity of alibrāliyah and its relation to Islam. Nomination strategies are also used through the processes of functionalisation, categorisation, and association. Legitimation strategies are also employed. using the strategy of theoretical rationalisation through which the author attempts to convince the reader that the truth of the relativity of alibrāliyah and that it is adopted by all societies whether they know it or not.

Nomination strategies	Argumentation strategies	Perspectivisation strategies	Legitimation strategies
-Functionalisation 'professional readers', 'cleric' -Appraisal 'dull layman' -categorisation 'traditionalists', 'conservatives', 'liberals' -Dis/association 'us', 'them'	Claim: 'alibrāliyah' is relative and does not contradict Islam - Topos of relativity - Topos of culture - Fallacy of definition of 'alibrāliyah'	Involvement strategies first and second-person voice Detachment strategies -third-person voice	Theoretical rationalisation - by reference to the relativity of alibrāliyah

Table 7-6: main discursive strategies in text 7.7

7.7.1 Articulation of meanings and groups in terms of Discourse Theory

The author in this article relates alibrāliyah primarily to the notion of freedom, and in particular to the meaning of individuality, which the author argues it is bounded to the cultural circumstances that control it. He regards Islam as part of culture and argues that alibrāliyah does not contradict Islam but instead assesses its application. These articulations of meaning are used to counter the traditionalists' view on alibrāliyah that it is contradictory to Saudi society and to their religion.

The main articulation of alibrāliyah concerns the notion of its relativity to the culture in which it is employed. In this sense, alibrāliyah is articulated according to the restrictions imposed by the culture it is applied within. This freedom of alibrāliyah is associated with the freedom of individuals, and it is practised according to the cultural norms that view these practices as acceptable. These liberal practices are articulated as non-contradictory to Islam as they offer liberal resolutions to Islamic principles that are under constant debate. In this regard, the author positions Islam as part of the culture that is shaped by and shapes the concept of alibrāliyah.

These articulated meanings of alibrāliyah are used to argue against the traditionalists' view of alibrāliyah. While the traditionalists argue that alibrāliyah is unrestricted, the author argues that it is restricted by cultural norms, including religion. Through this argument, the author is creating an antagonism against traditionalists within the logic of equivalence, in which traditionalists are positioned as the antagonistic pole. This antagonistic pole of traditionalists includes, according to the author, the ideologised conservative public and their extremist Islamic clerics, labelled as 'ideologisers'. On the other hand, the author articulates a logic of difference between alibrāliyah and liberal modernism Islam. In this sense, he presents alibrāliyah as equivalent to progressive

Islam, in which alibrāliyah is relative to the Islamic culture it is practised in, which can provide liberal views for less extremist Islam.

Overall, alibrāliyah in this article is associated with the meaning of freedom of individuals, which is relative to cultural norms, including Islam. These meanings are created to argue against conservatives' view of alibrāliyah, in which it is seen as unrestricted and with no identity. The author, in countering the conservative public, creates an antagonism against them within the logic of equivalence. However, the author equates alibrāliyah with progressive Islam by referring to the relativity of the concept, which can be employed to provide a modern, progressive Islam. These relations of antagonism are intended to advocate for alibrāliyah and to suggest the notion that alibrāliyah is a social concept and not a myth, as traditionalists claim, based on the author's view of it as a culturally relative concept that represents progressive Islam in the Saudi context.

7.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Throughout the above-discussed articles, written in the period 2007-2016, the discourse of alibrāliyah shifts in relation to the theme of freedom. It changes from simply meaning freedom without explicitly clarifying what this freedom might include, to being associated with the meaning of unrestricted freedom, and then, by the end of the period, to meaning a relative freedom that is restricted by cultural conditions. This link between alibrāliyah and freedom is found in Islam, in which it is discussed mainly in relation to the necessity of having the freedom of alibrāliyah at the time freedom exists as a value in Islam. At the beginning of the period, this discussion in relation to Islam primarily constructs freedom in alibrāliyah as antagonistic to Islam in general, which then shifts to become equivalent to progressive Islam and antagonistic to fundamental Islam at the end of the period. The construction of the relation between alibrāliyah and freedom in relation to Islam is found to be relevant to the following main themes, which are found across the articles.

- **Relativity vs. Absoluteness**

In terms of the notion of relativity, alibrāliyah has shifted from being an independent concept that cannot be integrated with other systems to being a relative concept that can be adapted according to the values of the culture, i.e. Islam. Text (Rights 2009), written at the beginning of the period, refers to the notion that the concept of 'alibrāliyah' that is seen as concerns freedom and human rights is not a universal concept, and cannot be adopted relatively in different states. Instead, it is suitable only

for the Western states that created it. This idea is further developed in Text (Rights 2013), in which the author views the concept of freedom in alibrāliyah as a Western, unrestricted, chaotic system that cannot be employed universally, and especially not in Islamic religious states. This is illustrated in the idea that Islamic societies have their own Islamic system that includes the value of freedom, which is restricted and absolute in contrast to the unrestricted freedom in the alibrāliyah system. However, Text (Rights 2016) at the end of the period explains that alibrāliyah, with its main value of freedom, is a relative concept that can be adopted within Islamic cultures to provide liberal resolutions to Islamic issues that are under constant debate. This shift suggests the success of liberals in shifting the meaning of alibrāliyah toward being a relative concept that can be restricted by the Islamic cultural values in order to offer a liberal progressive Islam as an alternative to fundamental Islam.

- **Modernity**

The notion of modernity is discussed later in the period in which alibrāliyah is constructed in relation to the meanings of modernity and progress. For example, Text (Rights 2013) indicates that 'alibrāliyah' means modernity and development. This is illustrated through the notion of liberation from the past and old traditions, toward working for the present and the future. This notion is constructed to imply that Saudi liberalism should be concerned with discussing the means for achieving modernity instead of arguing over its relation to Islam and social norms. While this article focuses on the total separation of alibrāliyah from cultural norms, Text (Rights 2016) shows a shift in the notion of modernity, in which it is constructed in relation to the progressive Islamic culture. It equates alibrāliyah with the meaning of modern Islam, according to which alibrāliyah can be adopted in Saudi religious society by means of providing more flexible and liberal choices for practising Islam. In this sense, alibrāliyah is not separate from Saudi religious identity, but rather conforms with the cultural norms of the society, including its religion.

- **Individuality vs. Collectivity**

In terms of the notion of freedom of the individual in opposition to freedom of the collective, the concept of alibrāliyah has shifted over time from the meaning of collective freedom to the meaning of individual freedom. The freedom of the collective meaning is noted in text (Rights 2011) and text (Rights 2013), which state that freedom of the group exists within the system of Islam, which is superior to the freedom of the individual meaning in alibrāliyah, and therefore it is not necessary to substitute Islam with alibrāliyah. However, in text (Rights 2013) this notion shifts, and the meaning of freedom

of individuals in order to achieve social progress is put forth. Published at the end of the period, text (Rights 2016) specifically defines the meaning of individuality in relation to Saudi cultural conditions. It refers to the point of the freedom of the individual to conform to the existing cultural norms, including religion, by following the liberal progressive choices that suit them. This notion of individuality represents the meaning of transcendentalism, whereby individuals are independent and free to practise their religion to achieve progress for the world they live in.

The process of filling the empty signifier of 'alibrāliyah' with signifiers entails a conflict between groups that aim to maintain or gain hegemony through charging the concept with different meanings. As the meaning of alibrāliyah shifts from being antagonistic to the Islamic system to being equivalent to progressive Islam, the articulation of the groups has also shifted, from the liberal group being antagonistic to the conservative Islamist group in general, to intellectual liberals being antagonistic to populist religious conservatives and equivalent to progressive Islamists in particular. In discourse theory terms, the groups are constructed at the beginning and middle of the periods within the logic of equivalence, in which Saudi liberals are equated with Western liberals under one bloc in antagonism to the Islamist conservative group. However, towards the end of the period, a greater articulation of an equivalence across difference is found, in which liberals are articulated as antagonistic to Islamist populists within the logic of equivalence, and as equivalent to progressive Islamists within the logic of difference.

The mechanism of the shift in relations between the groups can be discussed in terms of the positions each group takes in regard to the self and others across the texts. In text (Rights 2007), the author positions anti-liberals as the antagonist group through challenging their authority to define the concept of alibrāliyah, without the author himself providing a definition. At this early stage, this indicates that the identity of liberals has not yet been shaped, other than themselves positioning the anti-liberal conservative group as the antagonists. The position taken in texts (Rights 2009) and (Rights 2011) is the opposite, in which the authors position liberals as the antagonist group, whose existence constitutes a threat to society by substituting Islam with alibrāliyah. These three articles construct the groups using the logic of equivalence, which represents the groups' struggle to either gain or maintain hegemony. The antagonism is dissolved in text (Rights 2013), in which the Saudi liberals are equated with Western liberals with a view to achieving modernity and progress. This view is opposed in Text 7.6, in which the author attempts to dissolve the relation between Western liberalism and freedom by taking a weak position and accusing Saudi intellectuals of being psychologically deficient in

adopting the concept of alibrāliyah. The relation between the groups becomes more defined in text (Rights 2016), in which the Saudi liberal identity is viewed as being dependent on progressive resolutions of Islam identified by the culture in opposition to the fundamental conservative Islam of the populists. This shift in the construction of liberal identity suggests that liberals are succeeding in forming their identity and gaining hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field through filling the concept of alibrāliyah with the meaning of non-fundamental progressive Islam.

7.9 Summary

The analysis of the texts in this chapter has shown several results in terms of the means by which alibrāliyah is identified and the relations between the groups in constructing it over time. It reveals that alibrāliyah has been associated with Islam in general at the beginning of the period and then linked to progressive non-fundamental Islam at the end of the period. This shift in meaning suggests a shift in the relation between the groups in which liberals start to succeed in forming their identity through this shift. This suggests that liberals also succeed in turning alibrāliyah from a myth into a social imaginary. Other suggestions related to the wider Saudi socio-political field will be drawn on at the end of chapter 8.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Summary of objectives and methods of analysis

The key objective of this study is to discover the meaning of the contested term 'alibrāliyah' and to investigate the power struggle of the different groups in identifying it in the Saudi socio-political field. In particular, it aims to find out whether there is a diachronic shift in the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' in the period (2007-2016), and as a result whether any change can be identified in the articulation of the groups struggling for hegemony in this ideological debate. In Discourse Theory view, 'alibrāliyah' is considered an empty signifier in which each group aims to fill it with their own meaning to gain or maintain hegemony. In order to trace the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' as articulated by different groups over time, a methodological framework has been developed. This framework is designed to investigate the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' at the macro and micro level by means of combining the Corpus Linguistics methods and Discourse-Historical Approach. In particular, Corpus Linguistics methods has enabled the researcher to look at the meaning of 'alibrāliyah' at the macro level in which it has revealed the salient meaning of 'alibrāliyah' across time. The discourse-historical approach allowed to look at the construction of 'alibrāliyah' at the micro level in which it has demonstrated the underlying meanings in whole texts and the strategies used to construct these meaning. The combination of both approaches allowed for providing a reasonably comprehensive picture of the highly debated discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in the Saudi society.

This methodological framework has been employed to investigate the representation of 'alibrāliyah' in the platform of Saudi press. Thus, the data consist of a compiled corpus of 575 newspaper articles which were examined at two levels. Firstly, the entire dataset was analyzed using corpus linguistics methods of keywords and collocation analysis to identify the key meanings of 'alibrāliyah' across the whole corpus and over time. Secondly, a set of 12 articles, down-sampled from the corpus on the basis of the top themes which are the religion and the rights, were analysed using the discourse-historical approach (DHA). DHA enabled the researcher to identify the underlying meanings across time through the analysis of the discursive strategies including the argumentation strategies used along with the nomination, predication and perspectivization strategies. This analysis is followed by an interpretation that is based on the theoretical lens of discourse theory in terms of struggle over hegemony in identifying 'alibrāliyah' and the semantic meanings each group articulate to fill the empty signifier of 'alibrāliyah'. Discourse Theory has also enabled the researcher for looking at whether the shift in the articulation of 'alibrāliyah' turns it from being an empty signifier into being a marker of social imaginary in the Saudi socio-political field.

8.2 Findings of the Study

The findings of this study can be discussed first at both the macro and the micro levels before going into discussing them in combination and revealing the implications they both tell about the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society. At the macro level, the corpus analysis has yielded interesting results in terms of the key meaning preferences associated with 'alibrāliyah', and in relation to the diachronic shift of these meanings across the period (2007-2016). In particular, the corpus analysis has revealed that 'alibrāliyah' is mainly associated with the discourse of religion and human rights, in which the salient construction of alibrāliyah has changed over time from being associated with the religious discourse to being associated with the discourse of freedom and human rights. It has been found that this interesting salient finding needs a micro qualitative analysis in order to test whether these results represent the discourse of 'alibrāliyah' at the micro level, and to investigate the mechanism of the shift of meanings in detail. Therefore, with the assistance of the corpus, 12 articles were selected for the qualitative analysis in which 6 articles represent the theme of religion and the other 6 represent the theme of rights.

The micro analysis of the articles presenting both themes, religion and rights, has revealed a shift in the discursive construction of 'alibrāliyah' and the liberal group. This is revealed through examining the meanings the different groups attempt to charge 'alibrāliyah' with to obtain or maintain power. In particular, the empty signifier of 'alibrāliyah' has been filled with meanings related to the notions of relativity and individuality. In terms of the notion of relativity, the articulation of the term 'alibrāliyah' has shown a shift over time in which 'alibrāliyah' changes from being a non-relative, non-flexible concept to the religious conservative Saudi culture into being a relative concept that can be adopted to the norms of the Saudi culture. 'alibrāliyah' is also associated with notion of individuality against collectivity at the end of the period through referring to the need for 'alibrāliyah' in guaranteeing the freedom of individuals to achieve progress. In this sense, 'alibrāliyah' is articulated in the sense of the concept of transcendentalism in which individuals are independent and free in practicing their belief to achieve progress for the world they live in.

The articulation of 'alibrāliyah' has also shown a shift in relation to the concept of secularity in which it shifts from being a secular concept that contradicts the religion of Islam into being a non-secular concept that is compatible to non-fundamental Islam. 'alibrāliyah' is also articulated in terms of the concept of modernity later in the period, constructing it as a modern progressive concept that conforms to the progressive Islamic

culture by means of offering liberal choices that suits the circumstances of the modern life. From discourse theory perspective the shift in the articulation of the meaning of discourse suggests a shift as well in the articulation of the groups involved in the conflict over hegemony.

Therefore, it is found that in both set of articles of different themes, there is a shift in the relation between the groups; the liberals and the Islamists. The first half of the period revealed a complete antagonism between Islamists and liberals created within the logic of equivalence in which both groups represent two antagonist poles. This antagonism is then started to disperse and redefined in higher articulation in a difference across equivalence in which liberals are constructed as antagonists to fundamental Islamists and as equivalent to non-fundamental Islamists. It is suggested that this shift in the articulation of the discourse and the groups indicates the success of liberals to establish their own identity and to gain hegemony in the Saudi socio-political field.

Having presented the shift in the construction of 'alibrāliyah' at the macro and micro levels, it can be argued that both approaches are complementary to each other and are necessary together in investigating the shift of a discourse in a comprehensive way. While the corpus analysis in the current study shows the salient meanings of 'alibrāliyah' over time, the discourse analysis uncovered the diachronic discursive construction of 'alibrāliyah' and the hegemonic conflict over defining it.

8.3 Original contribution

The main contribution of this study concerns offering a developed a methodological framework for investigating the construction of ideological movements and the relation between the groups struggling for hegemony. This framework traces diachronically at the macro and the micro levels the salient and the discursive meanings of a movement through examining the keyword of the ideology and its contextual meaning based on collocation and whole text analysis. It is a comprehensive framework for the phenomena under study that has allowed for investigating diachronically the ideological word of 'alibrāliyah' and the way its construction shifts over time by different groups. It has also enabled the researcher to look at the mechanism of the articulation of the relation between the groups at the micro level and the way the shift of the relations has changed the hegemonic positions of the groups. As discussed above, this framework has been developed through combining Corpus Linguistics methods with Discourse-Historical Approach and Discourse Theory.

Another contribution made by this this study is providing a further literature for the socio-political context in Saudi Arabia. As evidenced by the review of the literature,

few studies have examined the socio-political discourse in Saudi context and the power struggle of the groups in the area. Thus, this research provides an analytical study on a recent conflict on modernisation that is particularly on the discourse of liberalism and the mechanism by which it is articulated and shifts the relations between the groups in Saudi Arabia. This study should thus be helpful to researchers interested in the Saudi ideological contexts, allowing them to build on an analysis of a discourse formation, in this case 'alibrāliyah' in Saudi society and the nature of the ideological conflicts of the groups in the region.

8.4 Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research

A number of limitations can be identified for the current study despite the effort made to comprehensively analyse the meaning of the ideology and the power struggle over hegemony. One of the limitations concerns the focus of the study on the analysis of the movement of 'alibrāliyah' in one platform which is the press. This is due to time and space restrictions in which other platforms were intentionally excluded. A multi-genre analysis would be considered in future research based on this study by means of conducting a comparative analysis.

Another limitation that is worth noting is the issue of translation. Since translation cannot transfer the whole meaning, it was not found easy to interpret the analysis into the target language. As the analysis was based on the source language which is Arabic, the best effort has been done by the researcher to translate the texts which is validated by a certified translator (see appendix C). For this limitation, the translation was undertaken to be as much accurate as possible to deliver the overall meaning into English language effectively.

For the future research, it can be argued that the developed model for this study can be applied in further studies to investigate the articulation of movements and the struggle of groups in articulating them to gain power. This would improve knowledge on the mechanism of the construction of movements in different contexts. Also, it would be helpful to extend this study and conduct a longer-term diachronic study on the different movements of modernity in Saudi society. Studying the movements on a longer term would allow for a more detailed understanding of the historical and socio-political context of the movement under study and the factors surrounding the formation of these movements.

8.5 Final Remarks

Drawing on the results of this research, these results are significant in terms of understanding the nature of the conflicts between the groups in Saudi society along with the development of these conflicts. It is through the main result of this research that shows a shift in the meaning of *alibrāliyah*, a one can understand that the recent success of liberals went through a discursive contestation and debate on the term. This conflict cannot be detached from the previous conflicts, discussed in chapter 2, in which the conflict around *alibrāliyah* can be considered an extension to them as *alibrāliyah* here allows progressives to establish an identity in the region. Up to this point, liberals link their identity to the religious field to gain acceptance and exitance. However, to distance and distinguish themselves from the Islamic religious group, they identify themselves in terms of being non-fundamental progressive Islamists. Thus, their success is based on filling *alibrāliyah* with their ideological meaning related to religion to gain power in the socio-political field. This power that appears now in the region would affect the recent Saudi social site in terms of their identity construction plus the diversity in attitudes. The effect would be clear in terms of the Saudi social tendency towards progressive moderate Islam that consequently would allow policy makers to issue policies that suit these tendencies in the region.

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Appendices

Appendix (A): The list of the newspapers' articles.

Appendix (B): The analysis of the Arabic texts (newspapers' articles) in terms of DHA discursive strategies.

Appendix (C): Translation certificate.

Appendix (D): The analysis of texts translated into English in terms of DHA discursive strategies.

Appendix (A): List of the newspapers' articles

- Al-Habib, A. 2013. Who is the Islamist's liberal? من هو الليبرالي الاسلامي? *Aljazeera*.
- Al-Mahmood, M. 2015. "Human Rights": between Man and Political Employment' حقوق الانسان بين الليبرالية و التوظيف السياسي *Alriyadh*.
- Al-Mahmood, M. 2016a. "Allibraliah" or Post-Ideologies' الليبرالية او ما بعد الايدلوجيا *Alriyadh*.
- Al-Mahmood, M. 2016b. Freedom of 'Allibraliah' and the Conventional Misunderstanding, الحرية الليبرالية و سوء الفهم التقليدي *Alriyadh*.
- Alhabib, A. 2009. Is 'allibraliah' Suitable to All Societies? هل الليبرالية مناسبة لكل المجتمعات? *Aljazeera*.
- Alkanan, M. 2007. 'The Islamisation of 'allibraliah'. *Aljazeera*.
- Alkanan, M. 2015. Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and 'allibraliah', فض الاشتباك بين الحرية والليبرالية *Aljazeera*.
- Alsa'wi, A. 2011. 'Allibraliah': Freedom or Chaos? الليبرالية حرية أم فوضوية? *Aljazeera*.
- Alsaif, T. 2007. 'Allibraliah' and the Deceived and Oppressed 'Liberal Figures' الليبر و الليبرون المكبوتون *okaz*.
- Alshehri, A. 2011. 'Allibraliah' is an extension to 'Hadatha', الليبرالية امتداد للحداثة *Aljazeera*.
- Fakeah, A. 2013. Liberalism with Saudi character. *okaz*.
- Hizam, F. 2009. 'The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity' المتشددون.. الأذكي عند الشدائد *Alriyadh*.

Appendix (B)

The analysis of the Arabic texts (newspapers' articles) in terms of DHA discursive strategies.

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>ولأن الفكرة (الليبرالية) لا زالت حديثة في الوعي الجماهيري، خاصة بعد انحسار المد العلماني وفشله الذريع من واقع كثير من الأنظمة العربية التي تبنت هذا الفكر ضمن أنظمتها، فقد سلك بعض الكتاب والمثقفين السعوديين من الليبراليين أو المخدوعين بالفكر الليبرالي إلى (أسلمة) هذه الفكرة الطرية كي يسهل على الجماهيري استساغتها، فسمعنا بمصطلح جديد هو (الليبرالية الإسلامية)، التي لا تعدو أن تكون فكراً هجيناً يحاول الجمع بين الإسلام والليبرالية، أو بالأصح قولبة الليبرالية حسب القيم الإسلامية، تحت زعم أن الليبرالية في أصلها (وسيلة) وليست ديناً أو فكراً، لذا فهي لا تتعارض مع دين المجتمع، الذي يستطيع أن يكييفها حسب قيمه وأعرافه، فمنذ شيوع مصطلح (الليبرالية) في منندياتنا الثقافية وترديده في الميادين الإعلامية، ومن ثم انعكاسه التأثيري على الأوساط الاجتماعية بين القبول والرفض والحياد، والليبرالية تخضع ولا زالت لكثير من الكتابات التحليلية التي ترصد موقف الإسلام منها، في محاولة فكرية لإيجاد علاقة حضارية بينهما، وكذلك المقالات النقدية التي تناولت الجانب الفلسفي لليبرالية مع معالجة نقاط الاتفاق والاختلاف بين الفكر الليبرالي والفكر الإسلامي، فظهرت كتابات ركزت في محورها الرئيس على أن الليبرالية مفهوم إنساني يعبر عن (وسيلة متغيرة) من اختراع العقل البشري (العلمي) لإدارة الصراع سلمياً مع العقل الكهنوتي الاستبدادي، لتحقيق (غاية ثابتة) هي ضمان حرية الفرد ومن ثم التطلع إلى إقامة نظام متكامل من العدل الاجتماعي الشامل، لذا فالليبرالية (وسيلة) لا تتعارض مع روح الإسلام وغاياته الأساسية .</p> <p>من ذلك ولدت مسألة (أسلمة الليبرالية)، وهنا يتجلى الفهم المنكوس، لأن الذين يحكم العلاقة بين الإسلام والليبرالية، ليست المقاصد الحياتية أو القيم الإنسانية (حرية وعدالة ومساواة وغيرها)، التي نجد أن طرفي العلاقة متفقان عليها، إنما الحكم بينهما والفصل في هذه العلاقة يكون ب(المرجعية الحضارية)، التي هي ثابتة في الفكرين الإسلامي والليبرالي،</p>	<p>-Saudi liberal intellectuals</p> <p>-Soft idea></p> <p>‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Claim2: Islamisation of ‘allibraliah’ is improper and unacceptable (fallacy of Islamisation)</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse (manipulating the public through the Islamisation of ‘allibraliah’ new idea)</p> <p>-Topos of reality of failure of the older concept of ‘ilmaniah’ (secularism).</p> <p>- Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’.</p> <p>-Fallacy of cultural flexibility of ‘allibraliah’.</p> <p>-Topos of number.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of relation (between ‘allibraliah’ and Islam)</p>	<p>Detachment:</p> <p>-Third person perspective</p> <p>-relative clauses</p> <p>-indirect speech</p> <p>Detachment:</p> <p>-Third person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-adjs> new, deceived, soft, effective.</p> <p>-adverbial clauses</p> <p>-evaluative prepositional clause</p> <p>Intensification:</p> <p>Adj> regressive</p>
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45	<p>فهي بالنسبة لليبرالية، تتمثل في (العقل البشري)، وفق تقرير فلاسفة التنوير ودعائه الأصليين: (إنه لا سلطان على العقل إلا للعقل وحده)، حتى يبقى الإنسان في المقام الأول حر الضمير، مالكا لنفسه ولعقله ولحريته في التصرف والاعتقاد، ضد كل من يريد انتزاعها منه، سواء أكان سلطاناً دينياً أو إقطاعياً أو استبدادياً أو مذهبياً، العقل البشري يصوغ (القوانين الوضعية) ويشعرها لحماية فردية الإنسان وحرية. أما في الإسلام فالمرجعية الحضارية (دينية) متمثلة بالوحي (قرآن وسنة)، من خلال النصوص والتشريعات التي تتضمن أحكاماً مقيدة بالنسبة للتصرف البشري وإن كانت متحررة بالنسبة للاعتقاد الإنساني .</p>		<p>-Topos of similarities (of values) -Topos of differences (of source).</p>		
50	<p>على ذلك فالليبرالية ليست (وسيلة متغيرة) كي يسهل بلورتها وفق حاجات مجتمع معين، إنما هي فكر له جانب فلسفي هو (تحقيق الحرية الفردية)، لا يتم إلا بشكل مواز مع جانب حضاري هو (تحديد العقل مرجعية وضعية)، وأي إخلال بأحد الجانبين يعني انتفاء الليبرالية، أما اعتمادهما معاً فيعني ببساطة استبعاد الإسلام، وهذا يقرر بالتالي (استحالة) أسلمة الليبرالية، فإن كان العقل يرفض (أسلمة العلوم الطبيعية والإنسانية، من منطلق أن العلوم إرث إنساني عام يشترك في منفعته كل البشر، الذي يشمل المسلمين وغيرهم، فهو أيضاً يرفض أسلمة الأفكار والعقائد ذات الجذور الفلسفية الخاصة والمرجعيات الحضارية المستبعدة للنصوص الدينية، وعليه يرفض (أسلمة الليبرالية) للخصوصية الفكرية بين الإسلام والليبرالية، والتضاد الجوهرى بينهما.</p>		<p>-Topos or Fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah'. -Fallacy of flexibility of 'allibraliah' -Topos of danger (of replacing Islam with 'allibraliah') - fallacy of Islamisation of 'allibraliah') -Fallacy of relation</p>	<p>Detachment -Third person perspective -Distancing personal deictic -Passive voice</p>	<p>Intensification -adverbial clause -certainty</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
العلمانية	- التي تؤكد على فصل الدين عن كل مناحي الحياة فما لله لله وما لقيصر لقيصر - انحسار المد العلماني وفشله الذريع من واقع كثير من الأنظمة العربية التي تبنت هذا الفكر ضمن أنظمتها
أمة	- تميل نحو دينها وما يتصل به
الليبرالية	- لا زالت حديثة في الوعي الجماهيري - ليست (وسيلة متغيرة) كي يسهل بلورتها وفق حاجات مجتمع معين - هي فكر له جانب فلسفي هو (تحقيق الحرية الفردية)، لا يتم إلا بشكل مواز مع جانب حضاري هو (تحديد العقل مرجعية وضعية)
الليبرالية الإسلامية	- التي لا تعدو أن تكون فكراً هجيناً يحاول الجمع بين الإسلام والليبرالية - أو بالأصح قولبة الليبرالية حسب القيم الإسلامية - تحت زعم أن الليبرالية في أصلها (وسيلة) وليست ديناً أو فكراً، لذا فهي لا تتعارض مع دين المجتمع، الذي يستطيع أن يكييفها حسب قيمه وأعرافه
الكتاب والمثقفين السعوديين الليبراليين	- سلكوا إلى (أسلمة) هذه الفكرة الطرية كي يسهل على الجماهيري استساغتها

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>المتشددون.. الأذكي عند الشدائد</p> <p>عند كل حادثة أمنية، يرتفع الصوت الليبرالي إلى أقصاه، ويخبو الإسلامي المتشدد حتى تهدأ العاصفة، وحينها يتراجع الليبراليون قليلاً، ليعود الإسلاميون المتشددون إلى درجة الاشتعال.</p>	<p>The extremists</p> <p>Liberals vs. extremist Islamists</p>	<p>Claim 1: Unlike liberals, the Islamists voice go down at the time of a terrorist attack and raise after that.</p> <p>-Topos of time+ Topos or fallacy of consequences.</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-evaluation and quantification</p> <p>-exaggerating metaphor</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-superlative 'smartest'</p> <p>-quantification 'to its maximum'</p> <p>-evaluative adjective> 'extremist'</p>
5	<p>هذا تحديداً ما يجري في السعودية، منذ حادثة الاعتداء على سمو مساعد وزير الداخلية. الأصوات الليبرالية في أقصاها عبر مواقع الإنترنت، وعلى الفضائيات، والإسلاميون يشغلون أنفسهم بقضايا جانبية، ويزيدون التركيز على "طاش"، فيخيل إليك أن ناصر القصبي أو عبدالله السدحان أخطر من الانتحاري عبدالله عسيري.</p>		<p>-Topos of reality</p> <p>-Topos or Fallacy of neglect of main issues</p>	<p>-repetition</p> <p>-personal deictic</p>	<p>-comparative 'more dangerous'</p>
10	<p>هي أيام قليلة، ويهدأ الليبراليون، وسنرى المتشددين يخرجون من خنادقهم برماح، يرمون بها مخالفيهم بكل قوة وتحريض وتخوين. وهكذا إلى أن يحين خبر آخر؛ إيقاف خلية، أو تسجيل حادثة أمنية جديدة، لا قدر الله، فيعودوا إلى صمتهم.</p> <p>المراجعة على مدى ٧٥ شهراً، تعزز هذه الرؤية، من دون أن يحدث أي تغيير جلي في صراع الفريقين، لتحقيق أهدافهما.</p>		<p>Topos of time+ Topos or fallacy of consequences.</p> <p>-Topos or Fallacy of threat or danger of Islamists</p>	<p>-repetition</p> <p>-personal deictic 'we'</p> <p>-exaggerating metaphor</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>Nominalisations</p>	<p>-qualification</p>
15	<p>السؤال: لماذا يخفت الصوت المتشدد هذه الأيام، ويعود شرساً بعدها؟</p> <p>إجابة السؤال تبدأ من خطيب جمعة ولا تنتهي عند معلم في مدرسة. فبين الإعلان عن محاولة الاغتيال وقيام صلاة الجمعة في المملكة مسافة لا تتجاوز ٨ ساعات. أظنها كافية لأي خطيب ليستبدل موضوع خطبته. لكن كم خطيباً فعل ذلك؟ على كل قارئ أن يتساءل، ويستذكر عنوان خطبة الجمعة في جامع حارته. وعلى سبيل المثال، خطيب الحرم النبوي الشريف لم يفعلها.</p>		<p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos of responsibility</p> <p>-Topos of example</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-reader perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'extremist', 'aggressive'</p> <p>-quantification</p>

20	<p>لكن، في الحال ذاته، كم خطيباً تحدث عن الدراما الرمضانية، ومنها حلقة مسلسل "طاش" عن التعليم؟ لعل الإجابة ستبدو بمثابة الكارثة الوطنية، إذا تبين لنا أن الجوامع، التي تحدثت عن المسلسلات، أكثر عدداً من جوامع قرر خطباؤها استبدال عنوان الخطبة إلى العملية الانتحارية. والأكثر إيلاماً أن يكون هناك خطيب جمعة يتحدث عن حلقة "طاش"، بعد ١٢ ساعة من تسجيل أخطر عملية إرهابية عرفتها البلاد في العصر الحديث.</p>		<p>-Topos of number</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of danger of Islamists to the nation</p> <p>Claim 2: extremist Islamists are smarter than their liberal opponents.</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos of danger</p> <p>-Topos of time</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>- personal deictic 'us'</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>- personal deictic 'we'</p>	<p>-evaluation 'national disaster', 'painful'</p> <p>-superlative 'most dangrous'</p> <p>-quantification</p> <p>-comparative 'smarter'</p> <p>-intensifying propositional phrase 'with full strength'</p>
25	<p>الواضح في الصراع الإسلامي الليبرالي حول الإرهاب في البلاد، أن الإسلاميين المتشددين أكثر نكاه من خصومهم الليبراليين. يعرفون متى يتحدثون ومتى يصمتون. ومسيرة ٧٥ شهراً تشير إلى أنهم لم يخسروا كثيراً مثلما كان منتظرا. فهم في تشددهم حاضرون بكل قوة. وما علينا إلا الانتظار قليلاً، أسبوعين أو نحوهما، لنرى المتشددين يقبلون الطاولة على الليبراليين!</p>				

Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الإسلاميون	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - يشغلون أنفسهم بقضايا جانبية - يخرجون من خنادقهم برماح، يرمون بها مخالفهم بكل قوة وتحريض وتخوين - أكثر نكاه من خصومهم الليبراليين - يعرفون متى يتحدثون ومتى يصمتون - لم يخسروا كثيراً - فهم في تشددهم حاضرون بكل قوة - يقبلون الطاولة على الليبراليين!
الليبراليون	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - الأصوات الليبرالية في أقصاها عبر مواقع الإنترنت، وعلى الفضائيات

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	الليبرالية امتداد للحداثة		Claim1: similar to 'hadathah', liberals are criticised on the definition of 'allibraliah' though they agree upon its definition and aims.	Involvement -free indirect speech	Intensification superlative>most prominent
5	في السابق كانت أبرز مشاكل الحداثة ومعوقاتها هو تعريفها وتحديد ماهيتها، وكانت المعركة حول الحداثة معركة حول المصطلح تحديداً وليست حول مضامينه، ولذلك كان يترقّع الغدامي عن تسمية الصراع حول الحداثة بأنه حوار لغياب الشرط المنهجي للحوار وهو الاحتكام إلى تعريف محدد يمكن الانطلاق منه.. ولأن الشرط المنهجي والعلمي يقتضي ألا يُلزم الناقد المنقود بتعريف لا يُقر به، فإن الغدامي يقفز - علم أو لم يعلم - عن هذا الشرط المنهجي والعلمي فيمارس نقده اللاذع لليبراليين - وليس لليبرالية - ويُلزم المنقود بتعريفاته واشتراطاته دون أن يسمع منهم تعريفاً واحداً لليبرالية مع العلم أنهم بينوا في كثير من كتاباتهم ومقالاتهم بل كانوا أقرب إلى الاتفاق على تعريف الليبرالية وتحديد أهدافهم بعكس الحداثيين.		-Topos of history -Topos or fallacy of definition -Fallacy of abuse (of ignoring the counter-argument)		-adj> harsh
10	وبالمنطق العقلي والتجربة الواقعية فإن المصطلح - أي مصطلح - لا يمكن أن يتمثله أي فرد على وجه الدنيا بكل ما فيه بحيث يكون هو المصطلح والمصطلح هو، بل المنطق والعقل وبرهان الحياة يقول إن أي إنسان لابد أن يكون خارجاً - بطبعه وطبيعته - عن أي مصطلح يتسمى به أو ينسب نفسه إليه، وكل النقد الذي وجّه لليبراليين لم يكن منطقياً ولا عقلياً لأنه قائم على افتراض التماثل والتطابق بين الليبرالية والليبراليين وهذا ينطلق من افتراض عصمة الليبراليين عن الخطأ وتجاوز المصطلح، وإذا كان الأمر كذلك فإن نفي وجود مسلمين أو يهود أو نصارى على وجه الأرض يكون أولى بالحكم لأن الأديان السماوية في أدبياتها تطرح النظرية المثالية للعيش وتدعو الفرد لمقاربتها قدر الإمكان مع استحالة مطابقتها، وهذا لم يقل به أحد منذ فجر البشرية..		Claim2: groups e.g. 'liberals' cannot completely represent concepts they belong to i.e. 'allibraliah' as human beings are not infallible. -Topos of logic + topos of experience	Detachment -third-person voice	-evaluation>'not logical or rational' -rhetorical figure> analogy -hyperbole
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25	<p>من هنا أقول لكل الناقدِين إنكم تخطئُون باعتقادكم أن الليبراليين معصومون فهم بشر مثلكم يخطئُون ويصيبون وأخطأؤهم في ممارساتهم أو تطبيقاتهم العملية للليبرالية لا تعني عدم وجودهم كفكر وثقافة؛ فالليبرالية مبدأ عظيم يُفترض بكل إنسان أن يدعو إليه ويتبناه ويتشرف بالانتساب إليه، والليبرالية باختصار وببساطة وكما قال المفكر الليبرالي د. عبدالرحمن الراشد:</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of definition -Topos or fallacy of human fallibility -Topos of comparison</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'I', 'you'</p>	<p>-Adj> great -Intensifying Modal verb> should</p>
30	<p>"هي مفهوم إنساني بسيط يؤمن بحرية الاختيار فقط، وهذه الحرية تضيق وتتسع وفق رؤية كل فرد.. فإن اختارت الأغلبية أن تكون محافظة، فهذا حقها وخيارها، وإن فضلت العكس، فالأمر لها. لهذا تسمح هولندا بتدخين الحشيش، في حين تسجن الشرطة البريطانية من يتعاطاه. فحرية الفرد مقيدة في النهاية باختيار الجماعة، فإذا كانت أغلبية المجتمع محافظة، فخيرها هو الذي يسود. لهذا فالليبراليون، من الناحية النظرية، أقرب الناس إلى الجميع، حيث يفترض أنهم يؤمنون بحق الإسلاميين والشيوعيين والقوميين والمحافظةين الاجتماعيين."</p>	Islamists vs. liberals	<p>Claim3: 'allibraliah' is a great humane concept that is based on freedom of choice -Topos of definition -Topos of right of freedom -Topos of example -Topos of the advantage of 'liberals'</p>	<p>-direct speech</p>	<p>-Superlative 'closest'</p>
35	<p>وللأسف الشديد فإن واقع الحوار - إن جاز تسميته بذلك - بين الإسلاميين والليبراليين لا زال يهتم في الأساس بموضوع العلاقة بين الليبرالية والإسلام، ولا يزال الجدل بينهما كثيراً مع أن بقاء موضوع العلاقة يحتل الصدارة في النقاش يحمل دلالة على كون النقاش بينهما لم يتطوّر ولم يتقدّم قيد أنملة.. مما يدل على ممانعة قويّة للفكر الليبرالي في المملكة، وهذه الممانعة في وجهة نظري نابعة عن قفز في الحوار والنقاش من مستوى الظاهر والمعلن إلى مستوى الباطن والسر، بمعنى أن كل هذه الممانعة والمناهضة قائمة على افتراضات وتوقعات أخذت على محمل الجد والتصديق فأصبحنا أمام محاكمة للنيات وما تُخفي الصدور .</p>		<p>Claim4: the debate between Islamists and liberals has not evolved indicating the strong resistance against 'allibraliah' -Topos of reality (of debate) +topos of consequence -Strawman Fallacy</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'in my opinion', 'we become'</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'unfortunately', 'strong'</p>
40					

<p>45 ورغم كل هذا إلا أن هنالك أخطاء كبيرة يقع فيها التيار الإسلامي دون أن يعلم، وهي تكمن في محاولاته المستمرة للنيل من الليبرالية والحد من انتشارها، ويستخدم في ذلك وسائل القمع المختلفة ومن أبرزها الاتهامات المتكررة التي تطال الكثير من الليبراليين في كونهم يهدفون إلى هدم الدين ونشر الفسوق والإباحية والتحلل الأخلاقي في المجتمع، وعلى الرغم من عدم وجود أدلة موثقة على هذه التهم سوى كتابات متفرقة لأسماء مستعارة - قد تكون إسلامية عميلة - إلا أن التيار الإسلامي يصر على هذه التهم، وقد شاهدت الكثير من الحوارات والندوات التي تُقام ويكون موضوعها عن الليبرالية ورأيت أن الأدلة هي لم تتغير منذ زمن طويل، حتى النصوص التي يستشهد بها المعارضون لم تتجدد إطلاقاً، مما يدل على ضعف الأدلة التي يستندون عليها أو قلّتها في أحسن الأحوال!..</p>	<p>Opponents>Islamists</p>	<p>Claim5: Islamists are attempting to eliminate 'allibraliah' through various means of suppression. -Topos or fallacy of abuse -Topos or fallacy of accusation+ Topos of time+ Topos of number</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'I saw, I found' -repetition of word 'the same, the same'</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'big mistakes', 'repression', 'at best'</p>
<p>50 أعتقد أن نشوء التيار الليبرالي في المملكة - وغايته الوحيدة هي الحرية - سببه الأول هو أن التيار المسيطر والموجود لا يدعم الحرية - كقيمة ثقافية وفكرية - ولذلك فإن بعض الإسلاميين ينكرون على التيار الليبرالي هذا الأمر فيقولون : ما فائدة الليبرالية إذا كانت موافقة للإسلام..؟! والحقيقة أن الليبرالية لا علاقة لها بالإسلام ولا بأي دين آخر بل هي فكر مستقل بذاته، لكنها لا تتقاطع معه من حيث هو دين يدعم الحرية ويعطي الحق</p>		<p>Claim6: the emergence of 'allibraliah' is due to the existence of the dominant Islamic group that does not support freedom. -Topos of culture -Fallacy of ignoring the counter-argument</p>	<p>Detachment -Third person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'in fact'</p>
<p>55 للآخر في أن يعتقد بخلافه، بل لا يقبل الإكراه في الدين وإسلام المُكره، فالشرط الضروري لصحة الإسلام هو الحرية في الدخول إليه والرضا به كدين للإنسان.. إذن فالمخالفة لم تكن للإسلام كدين بل للإسلام كتيار يتزعمه الكثير من الرموز، ومن هنا يمكن فهم وتعليل وجود التيار الليبرالي وإحاحه في الظهور والمطالبة بحريته في التعبير عن آرائه وأفكاره، لكن العائق أمام الليبرالية في المملكة هو أن رموزها يُطالبون باحترام حرية التعبير في حين هم يقفون أمام تيار لا يؤمن بهذه الحرية ويحاول قمعهم وإقصاءهم ويستخدم في ذلك كل الوسائل المتاحة ومن أشدها تهم التكفير والتخوين - التي تستعدي كل أطراف</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of relationship between Islam and 'allibraliah' (differences) -Topos of definition of Islam</p>		

65	<p>المجتمع عليهم - وهو السلاح الذي لا يستخدمه أحد سوى الجماعات المتطرفة التي لا تؤمن بالتعددية الفكرية والثقافية، وهذا العائق يجعل الليبرالية تُضرب في قلبها ومحركها الأساس - والذي هو الحرية - حيث لا يمكن أن تدعو للحرية والتسامح مع طرف يحاول إقصاءك ونبتك، ففي حين يؤمن الليبرالي بحق الإسلامي في التعبير لكن الإسلامي يصادر حرته وحقه في التعبير، والمفترض أن تكون المعادلة متساوية: (أعطني حريتي أُعطِكَ حريتكَ)!!..</p>	<p>Extremists> Islamists Obstruction>Islamists Freedom>'allibraliah'</p>	<p>-Topos of right of freedom of expression -Topos or Fallacy of abuse (suppression and elimination by Islamists)</p>	<p>Involvement -second person voice 'you'</p>	
70	<p>لكن - وبقراءة تاريخية - ما يواجهه التيار الليبرالي اليوم من معارضة واجهها قبله تيار الحداثة واستطاع تجاوز المرحلة بأقل الخسائر الممكنة، مع وجود فارق أن التيار الليبرالي يحاول التغيير على المستوى الفكري والمجتمعي وهذا ما جعل مهمته أصعب وعسيرة جداً، فهو يحتاج إلى وقت أطول حتى يتجاوز كل العقبات التي أمامه ويخرج بأكثر المكاسب الممكنة .. برأيي الشخصي لو أننا أخذنا الحداثة على اعتبارها صيغة نقدية نصوصية تخصصية فإن الليبرالية هي الصيغة الفكرية والثقافية للحداثة، ومن هنا فإن الليبرالية امتداد للحداثة في المملكة ومكملة لها مع اختلاف في الرموز والشخصيات أما المشروع فهو واحد بلا شك.</p>	<p>Claim7: 'allibraliah' is an extension to 'hadatha' as they have the same project. -Topos of historical comparison. -Topos of difficulty of progress and change+ Topos of time - Topos of similities and differences between 'Hadatha' and 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Claim7: 'allibraliah' is an extension to 'hadatha' as they have the same project. -Topos of historical comparison. -Topos of difficulty of progress and change+ Topos of time - Topos of similities and differences between 'Hadatha' and 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Detachment -passive voice -third person perspective Involvement -personal deictic 'in my personal opinion'</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'harder and very difficult' -assertion 'undoubtedly'</p>
75					

Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - مبدأ عظيم يُفترض بكل إنسان أن يدعو إليه ويتبناه ويتشرف بالانتساب إليه. - هي مفهوم إنساني بسيط يؤمن بحرية الاختيار فقط، وهذه الحرية تضيق وتتسع وفق رؤية كل فرد. - رموزها يُطالبون باحترام حرية التعبير في حين هم يقفون أمام تيار لا يؤمن بهذه الحرية - تُضرب في قلبها ومحركها الأساس - والذي هو الحرية. - هي الصيغة الفكرية والثقافية للحدثة - امتداد للحدثة في المملكة ومكملة لها
التيار الليبرالي	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - فهم بشر مثلكم يخطئون ويصيبون - وأخطأؤهم في ممارساتهم أو تطبيقاتهم العملية لليبرالية لا تعني عدم وجودهم كفكر وثقافة - أقرب الناس إلى الجميع - يؤمنون بحق الإسلاميين والشيوعيين والقوميين والمحافظين الاجتماعيين - وغايتة الوحيدة هي الحرية - يؤمن الليبرالي بحق الإسلامي في التعبير - يحاول التغيير على المستوى الفكري والمجتمعي - يحتاج إلى وقت أطول حتى يتجاوز كل العقبات التي أمامه ويخرج بأكثر المكاسب الممكنة
الإسلام	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - دين يدعم الحرية - يعطي الحق للآخر في أن يعتقد بخلافه - لا يقبل الإكراه في الدين وإسلام المُكره
التيار الإسلامي	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - في محاولاته المستمرة للنيل من الليبرالية والحد من انتشارها - ويستخدم في ذلك وسائل القمع المختلفة ومن أبرزها الاتهامات المتكررة التي تطال الكثير من الليبراليين - في كونهم يهدفون إلى هدم الدين ونشر الفسوق والإباحية والتحلل الأخلاقي في المجتمع - لا يدعم الحرية - كقيمة ثقافية وفكرية- - يترعمه الكثير من الرموز - لا يؤمن بهذه الحرية - يحاول قمعهم وإقصاءهم (الليبراليين) ويستخدم في ذلك كل الوسائل المتاحة ومن أشدها تهم التكفير والتخوين التي تستعدي كل أطراف المجتمع عليهم - لا تؤمن بالتعددية الفكرية والثقافية - يحاول إقصاءك ونبتك - الإسلامي يصادر حرّيته وحقه (الليبرالي) في التعبير

الحدائة تيار الحدائة	- صبيغة نقدية نصوصية تخصصية -استطاع تجاوز المرحلة بأقل الخسائر الممكنة
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	من هو الليبرالي الإسلامي؟				
5	ناقش المقال السابق تغيرات الرأي الثقافي العام العربي بالقرن الماضي من حيث أنها كانت ذات ميول تحديثية بصبغة ليبرالية وطنية وإسلامية نهضوية سيطرت على المشهد السياسي، ثم في منتصفه تحول المشهد إلى القومية، وبنهايته مال إلى حركات الإسلام السياسي.		Claim1: The future of Arab cultural scene indicates a state of fusion of political opposites; between 'allibraliah' and Islam	Detachment -Third-person perspective	
10	فما هو مستقبل هذا المشهد؟ ثمة حالة من اندماج الأضداد السياسية بين الليبرالية والإسلامية؛ فهل يمكن أن تتآلفان في رؤية سياسية واحدة، على طريقة جدلية هيجل في تفسير الصراعات الفكرية عبر التاريخ بصراع الأضداد واندماجها؟ أي نشوء فكرة تحمل نقيضها بداخلها عبر فكرة تنفيها، لينتج بعدها فكرة ثالثة تنفي الثانية وتجمع النقيضين وتآلف بينهما في فكرة جديدة؛ لتعاود السلسلة كرتها في صيرورة حتى نهاية التاريخ. لكن هل هناك فعلاً ليبرالية إسلامية؟ وما هي؟ وكيف يراها أصحابها والآخرين؟.		-Topos of history -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of antagonism + Topos of definition	-passive voice	Mitigation; Question instead of assertion
15	ما نراه من تصدر أحزاب الإسلام السياسي بالانتخابات كما في تونس (حزب النهضة)، والمغرب (حزب العدالة والتنمية)، ومصر (حزب الحرية والعدالة)، يعني أنها قبلت بالنظام الديمقراطي الليبرالي والتعددية الحزبية وتداول السلطة؛ فماذا بقي من أصوليتها؟ يمكن القول إنها تتحول إلى الليبرالية سياسياً ولكنها تحافظ على سلفيتها الثقافية والاجتماعية؛ أي أنها في طور التحول إلى أحزاب مدنية محافظة على غرار حزب العدالة والتنمية في تركيا.		-Topos of example	-Third-person perspective	

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>والآن هناك قطاعات أساسية من الإسلاميين تتوجه نحو الليبرالية السياسية وبعضها دخل في شراكة سياسية حتى مع تيارات يسارية كما في تونس. وهناك أحزاب مناصرة للإخوان المسلمين تصنف كأحزاب ليبرالية مثل حزب الوسط في مصر. بالمقابل هناك الحزب الليبرالي المغربي الذي يعلن أنه يرفض ويستبعد أي موقف يتنافى مع التعاليم الإسلامية. إذن، ثمة اندماج سياسي يتشكل في الليبرالية الإسلامية.</p> <p>فما هي الليبرالية الإسلامية؟ رغم أنها ليست تياراً واحداً بل أطراف وحركات متفاوتة ومفكرون متفرون، إنما يمكن وضع المنطلقات الأساسية لها. بعد المنطلق الديني وهو الإيمان بالمبادئ الأساسية للإسلام، كالعقيدة الإسلامية وأركان الإسلام؛ فتلك الحركات ترى أن الإسلام يتبنى القيم الليبرالية العامة كالحرية (الرأي والتعبير والاعتقاد) واستقلالية الفرد والمساواة بين البشر وحقوق الإنسان؛ مركزة في تفسيرها للنصوص الدينية على هذه القيم. وهي تدعو للتفريق بين آراء الفقهاء وبين الإسلام، وإعادة تفسير النصوص الدينية وفقاً لظروف الزمان والمكان وعدم الاقتصار على التفسيرات القديمة. واختلافهم مع الأصوليين هو في تفسير القيم الإسلامية الأساسية للحياة الحديثة بشكل عام وللسياسة على وجه الخصوص.</p> <p>وفي السياسة يرى بعضهم أنه ليست هناك نصوص محددة في الفقه الإسلامي تتناول الأمور السياسية باستثناء الشورى، وحيث إن الليبرالية تتفق مع روح الإسلام فهي تغدو مرغوبة لبناء الدولة. والبعض يرى أن إنشاء مؤسسات سياسية ليبرالية (كالبرلمان والانتخابات والحقوق المدنية) وسياسات الرعاية الاجتماعية، لا يتناقض مع أي نصوص دينية، بل يمكن اعتبارها تطبيقاً لبعض المبادئ الإسلامية المنصوص عليها في بعض النصوص القرآنية، والتي يمكن استخلاصها أيضاً من سير الخلفاء الراشدين (السيد يسين نقلاً عن كتاب "الليبرالية الإسلامية"، ليونار بايندر).</p>	<p>-Fundamentalists> Islamists</p>	<p>-Topos of example</p> <p>Claim2: 'Allibraliah alislamiah' (liberal Islam) is based on that Islam conforms with 'allibraliah' as it adopts the general values of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of definition -Topos of human rights (humanitarianism) + topos of authority (religious texts) -Topos of modernisation (of reinterpreting the religious texts to suit the current time and place)</p>	<p>Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Indirect speech</p>	
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية الإسلامية	<p>- ليست تياراً واحداً بل أطراف وحركات متفاوتة ومفكرون متفرقون</p> <p>- ترى أن الإسلام يتبنى القيم الليبرالية العامة كالحرية (الرأي والتعبير والاعتقاد) واستقلالية الفرد والمساواة بين البشر وحقوق الإنسان؛ مركزة في تفسيرها للنصوص الدينية على هذه القيم.</p> <p>- تدعو للتفريق بين آراء الفقهاء وبين الإسلام، وإعادة تفسير النصوص الدينية وفقاً لظروف الزمان والمكان وعدم الاقتصار على التفسيرات القديمة.</p> <p>- واختلافهم مع الأصوليين هو في تفسير القيم الإسلامية الأساسية للحياة الحديثة بشكل عام وللسياسة على وجه الخصوص.</p> <p>- مرغوبة لبناء الدولة.</p> <p>- لا تفصل الدين عن الدولة.</p> <p>- ترى أن الدين الإسلامي لم يتدخل في تفاصيل السياسة أو طريقة بناء الدولة.</p> <p>- يتبنون الاجتهادات الإسلامية المتكيفة مع الحياة العصرية والقادرة على بناء المجتمع الحديث دون الاعتماد على الاجتهادات الفقهية التقليدية التي يجدونها متحفظة جداً أو متشددة أو متخلفة.</p>
الليبراليون	<p>- هم في ميدان السياسة مدنيون يرون أن الإسلام ترك للمسلمين حريتهم واجتهاداتهم في اختيار أنظمتهم وفقاً لمصالحهم وظروفهم.</p>
الإسلاميون	<p>- يشددون على التمييز بين مصطلحي: "مسلم" و"إسلامي"</p> <p>- يشكون بأن الليبراليين الإسلاميين يستخدمون الديمقراطية الليبرالية كتكتيك مرحلي للاستحواذ على السلطة ثم نسف كل القيم الديمقراطية.</p>
	<p>- يعترضون على الليبرالية الإسلامية اعتراضاً شرعياً</p> <p>- لا يكتفون بالنقد الشرعي لليبراليين الإسلاميين بل يتهمون نواياهم ومقاصدهم التغريبية الخبيثة.</p>

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	«حقوق الإنسان» بين الإنسان والتوظيف السياسي				
5	يُمكن اعتبار القرن الثاني عشر الميلادي هو القرن الذي بدأت فيه الحركة الإنسانية تفصح عن نفسها في أوروبا، كحركة ثقافية عامة أخذت تطرح أسئلتها على الحراك الواقعي، من خلال الحراك الفكري – الأدبي. وقد تصاعد هذا الحرك وذاك الحراك بالتضافر - نموا - ليخلقا ما يسمى ب: عصر النهضة، ذلك العصر الذي وضع اللبنة الأولى للحضارة الغربية/ العالمية المعاصرة، بعد أن انتقلت فيه – نسبيا – محاور الهم والاهتمام من سياق المتعالي/ الميتافيزيقي/ المجرد إلى سياق واقع الإنسان.		<p>Claim1: The concept of Human rights has been developed in the west.</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>- Topos of culture (western culture)</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
10	ظل الإنسان محل اهتمام واضح طوال عصر النهضة؛ حتى وإن لم تتبلور له رؤية واضحة محددة لماهية الحقوق الإنسانية المتوخاة. لقد بقي هذا الاهتمام يجترح رؤاه العالمية في محاولة منه لدفع الظلم الواقع على الإنسان، على الأقل فيما بدا واضحا – آنذاك – أنه ظلم ينتهك الحق الطبيعي للإنسان.		<p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
15	مع سيطرة الهم الإنساني وتمدده إلى مجمل الحقول المعرفية، ومن ثم الفضاءات الاجتماعية/ السياسة، أخذت مجموعة من المبادئ الإنسانية العامة تتشكل كمرجعية للجدل الحقوقي الذي لم يكن بمعزل عن التصورات اللاهوتية؛ حتى وإن لم يتطابق معها في مستوى الطرح المباشر (لأن ثمة رؤى تحليلية ترى أن الأطروحات العقلانية/ الطبيعية آنذاك تنتظمها في العمق اللاواعي/ اللامباشر تصورات لاهوتية).		<p>-Topos of right (human rights)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
	لقد وصلت هذه المبادئ العامة إلى صورتها الأوضح – ولا أقول الأكمل – في إعلان الثورة الفرنسية الحقوقي الذي كان فاتحة عصر جديد للإنسان. على ضوء عمومية هذه الحقوق ومشاركاتها اشتغلت المسارات الفكرية والمسارات العملية المهمومة بالإنسان؛ من أجل		<p>-Topos of history of relation between human rights and theology</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	

20	<p>خلق عالم جديد يكفل الحقوق الإنسانية الأساسية للجميع؛ ارتباطا بأصل الأصول الإنسانية، المتمثل في أن الناس جميعا ولدوا أحرارا ومتساوين.</p>	<p>-Topos of history of human rights + Topos of advantage of human rights + Topos of definition of human rights (freedom and equality)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification -Qualification</p>
25	<p>اتسع فضاء الجدليات الحقوقية منذ الثورة الفرنسية وشعاراتها التحررية/ الإنسانية وإلى اليوم. بعيدا عن المنعرجات والانتكاسات، بل والخيبات، كان الرهان – الظاهر والمضمر – متوفرا على مدى إمكانية تشكّل منظومة متكاملة طبيعية (اتكاء على مبدأ الأصل الطبيعي الواحد) لحقوق الإنسان، تستند إلى المشترك الإنساني العام. استمر الراهن، وتساوق مع نجاح لا ينكر في تحقيق منظومة شبه متكاملة، زاد من فُرص نجاحها تصاعد الهيمنة الاستعمارية للحضارة الغربية التي عولمت – أو حاولت أن تُعولم – رؤيتها الحضارية، ومن ثم الإنسانية، خاصة بعد إنشاء المنظمات الدولية الراحبة للحقوق السيادية، والطامحة إلى فض كل أشكال الصراع بالطرق السلمية، أو بالقوة التي تتغيا السلام العام.</p>	<p>Claim2: human rights debates spread globally</p> <p>-Topos of time</p> <p>- Topos of universality</p> <p>-Topos of power (western power) + Topos of culture + Topos of rights (human rights)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Mitigation -Self-correction: 'but still', 'to great extent'</p>
30	<p>لكن، يبقى النجاح الأكبر لعولمة هذه الحقوق مرتبطا بتطور وسائل النقل التي ساهمت في التواصل الإنساني والثقافي، ومن بعد تطور وسائل التواصل الإعلامي، فضلا عن المؤثرات العامة المتعولمة التي ترافق عولمة التقانة واقتصاد السوق. مما نتج عنه شيوع الرؤية الغربية لحقوق الإنسان وتعولمها بحكم أن العالم المعاصر - بمنظوماته الدولية وقواه المعرفية والعلمية والاقتصادية، فضلا عن الهيمنة العسكرية - لا يزال غربيا إلى حد كبير. بقدر ما حققته عالمية حقوق الإنسان من نجاح في العقود المتأخرة؛ بقدر ما واجهته من أسئلة باتت تُطرح عليها تباعا، والاطراد مع حجم نجاحها. بل إن فلاسفة التنوير، فضلا</p>	<p>-Topos of advantage (of globalisation)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
35	<p>عن فلاسفة ما بعد التنوير، كثيرا ما طرحوا الاستشكلات حول مشروعية اعتبارها مبادئ طبيعية/ إنسانية عامة؛ يجب على الجميع في كل مكان/ بيئة، وفي كل زمان (بالإشارة إلى الجدل حولها من حيث تعاليها على التاريخ)، كما طرحوا الاستشكلات حول تفاصيلها التي تتجاوز المشتركات الإنسانية العامة، كما تتجاوز المبادئ العامة إلى حيث التفاصيل التي ترتبط أكثر فأكثر بالمتغير الزمان والمتغير المكاني.</p>	<p>Claim3: The western vision of human rights is not absolute but relative.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of universality (of human rights)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>هذا يعني أن هذه المنظومة الحقوقية التي يبدو أنها اكتملت كمرجعية عامة، كانت – في كثير من محاورها - محل استشكل من داخل الحضارة الغربية التي أنتجتها. فكثير من تفاصيلها (تلك التفاصيل التي لا يمكن تنزيلها في الواقع العملي بدونها) لا تزال – وستبقى – محل جدل كبير، يصل في بعض الأحيان إلى عصب المبادئ العامة. كما لا تزال مسألة تعاليتها (صلاحيتها من حيث إطلاقيتها بوصفها عابرة للمتغيرات الزمانية والمكانية) محل جدل أيضا؛ لأن عصر التنوير الذي أنتجها، والعصور اللاحقة التي اكتملت فيها، ليست بمعزل عن المراجعات النقدية؛ فضلا عن كون فكرة التقدم التي نهض عليها عصر التنوير تقضي بضرورة تحوّل/ تطور الفكرة تبعا لمتغيرات الواقع؛ انطلاقا من كون الواقع متغيرا بتغير مسار الأفكار. أي أن الرؤى الحقوقية في النهاية لا بد وأن تكون متطورة/ متغيرة؛ ما يقضي – في النهاية - أن تكون نسبية في الزمان. وإذا تأكد أنها نسبية في الزمان؛ فمن المحتم أنها ستكون نسبية في المكان.</p> <p>طبعاً، لا تعني النسبية الزمانية، ولا النسبية المكانية (التي كانت تجليتها والحجاج حولها من أبرز معطيات الدراسات الأنثروبولوجية المعاصرة) أن ليس ثمة مرجعية إنسانية عامة، هي محل اتفاق، ولا بد من توفرها؛ لتوفير الحرية والعدالة للإنسان، ولو في حدود المتاحة إنسانياً. الاشتغال الإنساني كله على النسبيات، وكون أمر من الأمور نسبياً، لا يعني تفرغه من محتواه، ومن ثم إهماله؛ بقدر ما يعني ضرورة الاشتغال عليه؛ مع الوعي بنسبيته، واستغلال ما يُتيحه البعد النسبي من أجل تحقيق أكبر قدر من المواءمة الظرفية، تلك المواءمة التي تتغيا الإطلاق من زاوية التكيف مع نسبية النسبي.</p> <p>هنا يأتي العالم اللأغربي، من حيث هو ظرف مكاني/ بيئي، لا ليثير إشكالية التقابل بين إطلاقية حقوق الإنسان ونسبيتها فحسب، وإنما ليثير إشكالية تنزيل الحد المتفق على إطلاقيته (= المشترك الإنساني موضع الاتفاق فيها) في واقع مغاير/ واقع اللأغرب. فالمبادئ الإنسانية العامة التي تتوفر على مستوى من الإطلاقية، ومن ثم مستوى عالٍ من التوافق العالمي، لا تنتزّل على واقع مادي محايد، لا تنزل على صفحات بيضاء، بل تنتزل</p>	<p>-Topos of advantage of western human rights + Topos of disadvantage of controversy</p> <p>-Fallacy of absoluteness + Topos of relativity and change + Topos of reality</p> <p>-Topos of universality of human rights</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of relativity</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الحرية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - مبدأ إنساني - أصبحت من بدهيات المشترك الإنساني. - من حيث مفهوماتها وتطبيقاتها تسبح في خضم مسارات جديدة في الغرب قبل الشرق.
الليبرالية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - هي فلسفة الحرية الأشمل - تختلف باختلاف المتلقي، وباختلاف الفاعل الثقافي - لدينا لن تكون هي التي في فرنسا، والتي في فرنسا لن تكون هي التي في السويد، والتي في السويد لن تكون هي التي في أمريكا. - لن تكون ليبراليتنا هي ليبرالية تونس، وليبرالية تونس لن تكون هي ليبرالية مصر، وهكذا دواليك.
نحن	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - أحوج ما نكون إلى الحرية - ندعو لليبرالية وللحرية - نحن قبل هذه الاتهامات التي وجهها ويوجهها هؤلاء إلينا، كنا قد دخلنا في نقاش علني حول كثير مما يتداوله الإعلام الغربي عنا، ومنذ أمد ليس بالقصير. - لسنا مجتمعات صامتة، كما هي الصورة النمطية عنا هناك - لسنا نتعاضد عن الأخطاء التي تتخلل تجربتنا - إدراكنا نحن لضرورة التطوير - نؤكد، وسنظل نؤكد، أننا نستثمر - عن وعي - في التأسيس ثقافيا ونظاميا لحقوق الإنسان - يجب أن نكون على المستوى الإنساني اللائق بنا. - نحن ملتزمون بضمانة حقوق الإنسان، بل وملتزمون بتطوير المنظومة الحقوقية ذاتها، - التزامنا المبدئي بحقوق الإنسان نابع من تصوراتنا نحن.

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)						
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation			
1	<p>الليبرالية أو ما بعد الإيديولوجيات</p> <p>قَرّر عنوان هذا المقال طرح الليبرالية كبديل متجاوز لكل الإيديولوجيات المتصارعة على رأس المال الاجتماعي/السياسي. وبهذا يبدو - ابتداء - وكأنه ينزع عن الليبرالية صفة (الإيديولوجيا)؛ مع أنها لا تعدو أن تكون تَوَجُّها/تيارا/مذهبا فكريا يسعى إلى التغيير بواسطة الإقناع بحزمة من الأفكار المتعاضدة التي يجري الحشد لها باستمرار. فهل الليبرالية -</p>	<p>'allibraliah'= ideology of the non- ideology</p>	<p>Claim1: 'allibraliah' is an alternative choice to totalitarian clashing ideologies. -Topos of definition of 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>Mitigation -Questions instead of assertion</p>			
5	<p>كمبرر لترحها خيارا بديلا - هي المقابل الضدي للأدلجة، وبالتالي، هي غير إيديولوجية من حيث طبيعتها الأساسية، أم هي إيديولوجيا، ولكنها (إيديولوجيا اللاإيديولوجيا)، ومن ثَمَّ، يصح طرحها كخيار للخروج من هذا الصراع المحتدم بين التيارات الشمولية السائدة في العالمين: العربي والإسلامي؟</p>					10	<p>إذا كانت الإيديولوجيا في الأساس تعني - كمفهوم - منظومة من الأفكار التي تحاول أن تكون متسقة، بحيث تعبر عن رؤية تتغيا تفسير الواقع، أو تسويغه، أو تغييره، فإنها بالمفهوم المتداول/السلبي، تُطرح كمقابل للعلمية والتفكير العقلاني: الوعي الزائف. أي أنها بهذا المفهوم السلبي تعني ما هو أكثر من (منظومة أفكار، أو نسق فكري)، إذ لا بد - حتى ينطبق عليها هذا الوصف بالمفهوم السلبي الراجح - أن تكون الأفكار فيها أفكارا ذات بُعد</p>	<p>-Topos of definition of ideology + Topos of disadvantage of ideology -Topos of disadvantage of dogmatism+ fallacy of rationality. -Topos or fallacy of abuse of emotions by ideologies + Topos of disadvantage of utopianism</p>
10	<p>إذا كانت الإيديولوجيا في الأساس تعني - كمفهوم - منظومة من الأفكار التي تحاول أن تكون متسقة، بحيث تعبر عن رؤية تتغيا تفسير الواقع، أو تسويغه، أو تغييره، فإنها بالمفهوم المتداول/السلبي، تُطرح كمقابل للعلمية والتفكير العقلاني: الوعي الزائف. أي أنها بهذا المفهوم السلبي تعني ما هو أكثر من (منظومة أفكار، أو نسق فكري)، إذ لا بد - حتى ينطبق عليها هذا الوصف بالمفهوم السلبي الراجح - أن تكون الأفكار فيها أفكارا ذات بُعد</p>	<p>-Topos of definition of ideology + Topos of disadvantage of ideology -Topos of disadvantage of dogmatism+ fallacy of rationality. -Topos or fallacy of abuse of emotions by ideologies + Topos of disadvantage of utopianism</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>					
15	<p>عقائدي (ليس دينيا بالضرورة)، أي أن تتضمن مستوى من الدوغمائية التي تطرح نفسها كجزء من اليقين اللامسؤول، وأن تخترق الشرط العقلاني أو العلمي (كشرط لتحصين اليقين اللامسؤول)، وأن تتضمن عناصر خيالية وعاطفية تلامس المشاعر والعواطف والغرائز قبل العقول؛ كجزء من آلية الحشد الجماهيري، وأن تتضمن وعودا طوباوية، بوصفها مشروعا يقدم بديلا متخيلا عن البؤس/الجحيم الواقعي أو المفترض.</p>							

20	<p>طبعاً، كل هذا لا يتأتى؛ ما لم تكن هذه الأفكار أفكاراً شمولية، عابرة للفرد (الفرد، وليس من الفرد) إلى المجموع، ذلك المجموع الذي يجري الرهان عليه كقوة قادرة على إحداث التغيير، الذي هو - في الغالب - تغيير قصير النفس ولكنه حاد، تغيير ثوري يحرق المراحل؛ لأن كل المراحل، وبكل ضرورتها هي - في تصور هذا الإيديولوجي - داخلية في التصور العقلاني للواقع، وهو التصور الذي لا يحظى بأي تقدير من قبل الإيديولوجي/المؤدج، بل وأكثر من ذلك، هو محل رفض ضمني، إذ يراه مُعيقاً للفعل الجماهيري الانفعالي الذي يوجهه في كل الأحوال.</p>	<p>-ideologized/ ideologiser</p>	<p>-Topos of disadvantage of collectivism</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>
25	<p>هذه معالم/ملامح الإيديولوجيا، من حيث هي - في النهاية - وعي زائف. ولا ريب أن بعض صور الليبرالية تتضمن بعضاً من هذه الملامح السلبية المرافقة لعمليات الأدلجة أياً كان نوعها. نحن نعرف أن في الليبرالية أفكاراً طوباوية تتضمن منزعا حشدياً بالضرورة، وبالتالي، فليس غياب العنصر الخيالي والعاطفي واقعاً مُسلمًا به في كل مسارات الترويج للأفكار الليبرالية. لكن، ومهما تلبست الليبرالية بشيء من هذه الملامح السلبية، إلا أنها تؤكد - أول ما تؤكد - على أن كل أفكارها ليست مكتملة ولا يقينية، بل هي أفكار مطروحة على بساط النقد/المساءلة في كل الأحوال؛ حتى مفهوم (الحرية الفردية) الذي يكون أساس الرؤية الليبرالية، يجري الاشتغال عليه نقداً وتطويراً داخل الفضاء الليبرالي؛ ما يعني أنه ليس ثمة دوغما تطبع أفكار الليبراليين، بما فيها الأفكار المؤسسة ذاتها، فضلاً عن غيرها.</p>			<p>-Topos of disadvantage of utopianism in 'allibraliah' + Topos of advantage of individual's freedom + Topos of advantage of lack of dogmatism.</p>
30	<p>إن النقد - كشرط عقلائي أولي - ليس ترفاً في التقليد الليبرالي، بل هو فعل تحرري يشتغل داخل فضاء العقل الليبرالي على أوسع نطاق. بل إن اشتغال الليبرالي على نقد الليبرالية لا يقف عند حدود المتاح علمياً وفكرياً في لحظة زمنية ما، وإنما هو نقد يتجاوز ذلك، ليتفاعل - بجدية - مع أحدث ما ينتجه العقل البشري من نظريات، وما تنتجه مراكز</p>	<p>-Topos of advantage of self- criticism in 'allibraliah' + Topos of relativity of certainty</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	
35	<p>الأبحاث من نتائج علمية في كل الحقول. وهذا بلا شك، يحدّ من اليقيني؛ حتى في نتائج العلوم التي يجري الاتكاء عليها في (ظرف نقدي)، أو في (واقعة نقدية)، ما يجعل (اليقينية)</p>		40	

45	<p>هنا، ظرفية/نسبية في كل الأحوال، فضلا عن كون هذا التفاعل الحيوي مع التطور العلمي والمعرفي يحد من البُعدين: العاطفي والخيالي، اللذين ترتفع جِدَّتَهما في كل الإيديولوجيات الشمولية، إلى درجة أن يكونا – بسلبيتهما - جوهر الخطاب.</p> <p>الأهم في كل هذا التفصيل، هو أن الليبرالية تتضمن - جوهريا - ما يحد من كونها إيديولوجيا بالمعنى السلبي. فهي - إن كانت إيديولوجيا - تبقى إيديولوجيا الفرد، من حيث هي في الأساس: إيديولوجيا الحرية الفردية.</p>	<p>-Topos of rationality in 'allibralaih' + Fallacy of rationality in collective ideologies</p>	
50	<p>ولا يخفى أن الإيديولوجيا كي تتضمن كل تلك الملامح السلبية التي تحيلها في النهاية إلى وعي زائف؛ لا بد أن تكون شمولية، تشتغل على مفاعيل لا يمكن لها أن تتحقق إلا من خلال تأطير شمولي للأفراد. وهو التأطير الذي لا يتحقق إلا بانتهاك الفردية، فضلا عن انتهاك كثير من محددات العقلانية.</p>	<p>-Topos of advantage of individuality in 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>
55	<p>إن الليبرالية، من حيث انحيازها المبدئي للفرد الحر المستقل، تتمرد على أي تأطير ينتقص من الاستقلال الفردي. وهذا ما يجعلها مناهضة لفعل التأدلج ذاته من حيث هو سلوك جمعي.</p>	<p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse by collective ideologies to individuals.</p>	
60	<p>الليبرالية تستعصي على الأدلجة، من حيث هي تستعصي على الشمولية، تلك الشمولية التي لا تتحقق الأدلجة إلا من خلالها. وإذا كان لا بد من توصيف الليبرالية كإيديولوجيا، فهي - تحديداً -: إيديولوجيا التحرر/ الاستقلال الفردي، أي هي إيديولوجيا التحرر من الإيديولوجيات التي تتضمن الشمولية ابتداء. وعلى هذا، فهي ليست المقابل المغاير لهذه الشموليات فحسب، بل هي المقابل المناهض لمبدأ الشمول، الذي لا بد أن يأخذ من الحساب العيني المتيقن للأفراد، لصالح الحساب المتخيل للجماعة المتخيلة؛ لتنتهي الجماعة (باستثناء القلة القليلة من أفرادها) إلى إفلاس إنساني على كل المستويات؛ فتنتقل من بؤس إلى بؤس، ولا تجد العزاء إلا في بضعة شعارات ليست في النهاية أكثر من أوهام. الشموليات بأنواعها هي مجرد شعارات، تبدأ بأوهام، وتنتهي بأوهام على مستوى واقع الأفراد. لا يمكن أن تنطلق من الجماعي لتصل إلى الفردي، بينما الفردي غائب عن أصل</p>	<p>-Topos of the resistance by 'allibraliah' against collective ideologies</p> <p>-Topos of antagonism against collectivism</p> <p>-Topos of negative consequences of collectivism.</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>

<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p> <p>85</p>	<p>المعادلة. وهنا، لا شيء يتحقق، هذا إذا كنت تريد من الإيديولوجيا الجماعية تحقق شيء إيجابي في عالم الفرد، الذي هو العالم الحقيقي/الواقعي. وعلى العكس، فكل تحقق إيجابي في عالم الفرد، هو منجز حقيقي وواقعي، فضلا عن كونه يشكل - بالضرورة - إضافة إلى المجموع.</p> <p>ولا يغيب عنا في هذا السياق أن الليبرالية إذ تحد من طغيان المبدأ الشمولي بدهاء؛ فإنها تحد من طغيان المبدأ الفردي أيضا؛ إذ تشترط تحرر الفرد بمبادئ إنسانية عامة وحاكمة، تكفل ذات الحق الفردي الخاص لكل الأفراد، ما يعني أن ثمة توازنا بين الحريات الفردية لصالح حرية كل فرد، ومن ثم، لصالح التحرر العام.</p> <p>إن العرب والمسلمين يعيشون عالما صراعيا مع أنفسهم ومع الآخرين، نتيجة هيمنة الإيديولوجيات الشمولية على مسيرة النهوض، وعلى مسيرة التحرر أيضا. وهذه الشموليات هي - بالضرورة - أصوليات، أو - على الأقل - تتضمن عناصر أصولية بدرجة ما، سواء أكانت دينية أم قومية. وهذا يعني أن الاشتغال الصراع/الاحتراي ليس عرضاً طارئاً، بل هو مُكوّن أساسي فيها، بحيث لا تتحقق شرعيتها إلا من خلال صراع أو دعوة إلى صراع، سواء أكان صراعا بينيا مع مكونات الذات، أم كان صراعا مع الآخر، وسواء أكان صراعا عينيا/واقعيًا، أم كان صراعا على مستوى الأفكار والتصورات وحجج الاتهام ذات المنزع الهجائي.</p> <p>لقد أصبح من الواضح أنه لا يمكن الخروج من هذه الأنفاق الصراعية الاحترايية التي تستنزف الطاقات العقلية والروحية والمادية، إلا بالانحياز إلى الإنسان في وجوده الفردي، الوجود المجرد من الأطر الجماعية، أي الوجود الواقعي/العيني المجرد من الإيديولوجيات الشمولية: الدينية والقومية. وليس غير الليبرالية بمبادئها المنحازة للفرد - بصرف النظر عن هوياته المسبقة - تكفل مثل هذا التحرر من الوهمي لصالح الواقعي؛ لتنقل الفرد من حالة الصراع مع الآخر/الآخرين (الصراع المدمر للذات وللآخر)؛ ليصارع نفسه وعوالمه المشروط بها، من خلال الصراع مع مستقبله/وجوده، وصراعه مع آفاق العلم/الفكر،</p>	<p>Totalitarianism= Fundamentalism</p>	<p>-Fallacy of ignorance of individuals by collective ideologies.</p> <p>- Topos of negative consequences of collectivism+ Topos of positive consequences of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of example of negative consequences of collective ideologies</p> <p>-Topos of advantage of individuality + Topos of disadvantage of collectivism.</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-Assertion: 'It has become clear'.</p>
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90	<p>وصراعه مع الطبيعة؛ فتكون انتصاراته في هذا المضمار إضافة إيجابية له بالأصالة، وإضافة إيجابية للنوع الإنساني، على اعتبار أنه لا يشتغل على نفسه في فراغ، وإنما في فضاء إنساني لا يعدو أن يكون إضافة فيه؛ أيا كان ما يتمتع به – أو ما يعتقد أنه يتمتع به - من استقلال.</p>		<p>- Topos of positive consequences of 'allibraliah'.</p>		
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية	<p>- تكون توجّها/تيارا/مذهبا فكريا يسعى إلى التغيير بواسطة الإقناع بحزمة من الأفكار المتعاضدة التي يجري الحشد لها باستمرار.</p> <p>- تؤكّد - أول ما تؤكّد - على أن كل أفكارها ليست مكتملة ولا يقينية، بل هي أفكار مطروحة على بساط النقد/المساءلة في كل الأحوال</p> <p>- تتضمن - جوهريا - ما يحد من كونها إيديولوجيا بالمعنى السلبي.</p> <p>- - إن كانت إيديولوجيا - تبقى إيديولوجيا الفرد، من حيث هي في الأساس: إيديولوجيا الحرية الفردية.</p> <p>- تتمرد على أي تأطير ينتقص من الاستقلال الفردي.</p> <p>- مناهضة لفعل التأدلج ذاته من حيث هو سلوك جمعي.</p> <p>- تستعصي على الأدلجة، من حيث هي تستعصي على الشمولية</p> <p>- هي - تحديدا -: إيديولوجيا التحرر/ الاستقلال الفردي</p> <p>-هي إيديولوجيا التحرر من الإيديولوجيات التي تتضمن الشمولية ابتداء.</p> <p>-هي ليست المقابل المغاير لهذه الشموليات فحسب، بل هي المقابل المناهض لمبدأ الشمول</p> <p>- إذ تحد من طغيان المبدأ الشمولي بدهاءة؛ فإنها تحد من طغيان المبدأ الفردي أيضا</p> <p>- تشترط تحرر الفرد بمبادئ إنسانية عامة وحاكمة</p>
الإيديولوجيا	<p>- تعني - كمفهوم - منظومة من الأفكار التي تحاول أن تكون متسقة</p> <p>- تعبر عن رؤية تتغيا تفسير الواقع، أو تسويغه، أو تغييره،</p> <p>- بالمفهوم المتداول/السلبي، تُطرح كمقابل للعلمية والتفكير العقلاني: الوعي الزائف.</p> <p>-بهذا المفهوم السلبي تعني ما هو أكثر من (منظومة أفكار، أو نسق فكري)</p> <p>-إذ لا بد - حتى ينطبق عليها هذا الوصف بالمفهوم السلبي الرائج - أن تكون الأفكار فيها أفكارا ذات بُعد عقائدي (ليس دينيا بالضرورة)</p> <p>- كي تتضمن كل تلك الملامح السلبية التي تحيلها في النهاية إلى وعي زائف؛ لا بد أن تكون شمولية، تشتغل على مفاعيل لا يمكن لها أن تتحقق إلا من خلال تأطير شمولي للأفراد. وهو التأطير الذي لا يتحقق إلا بانتهاك الفردية</p>

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>الليبر والليبرون المكبوتون المخدوعون</p> <p>كي يتلافى سوء الظن ، بدأ زميلنا الاستاذ عبد الكريم عانض مقالته بالتاكيد على انه لا يهتم بالليبرالية ولا يأبه لها (الوطن ١٠ - ١٥) بل انه استدل على ذلك بدليل يفلق الصخر لو تجلى له ، وهو انه لم يطالع حلقة طاش ما طاش المشهورة عن الليبراليين . وهذا لعمرى دليل فات كل عالم . ثم ان الكاتب الكريم رأف بحالنا نحن الذين ابتلينا بالاهتمام بالليبرالية والبحث عنها ، خاصة بعد سقوط سوق الاسهم ثم ارتفاع اسعار الاغذية ، فعوضنا عن كل ذلك بشرح مختصر عن الليبرالية التي لم يأبه بها ابدأ ، فأخبرنا ان اصلها كلمة "ليبر" وانها لاتينية تعني الحر ، وان "ليبراليسم" تعني الحرية (او تعني الحرية حسبما ورد في نص المقال – والله العالم ايهما الصحيح) .</p>	Deceived, oppressed >liberals	<p>Claim1: the argument that 'allibrahiah' means freedom is useless.</p> <p>-Fallacy of neglect of 'allibrahiah'</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of 'allibrahiah'</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-metaphor</p> <p>-adverbial clause</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-Hesitation, self-correction</p>
10	<p>فجزى الله الكاتب خيرا على هذه الفوائد العظيمة التي كان قراء الجريدة ومثقفو البلاد متعطشين لها ، وايماء عطش . اخبرنا ايضا زاد الله فوائده ان الحرية كلمة ساحرة وان الدعوة اليها بهرت الكثير من المساكين من اخواننا الذين عانوا قبل سفرهم الى بلاد الله من الكبت، فاقبلوا عليها اقبال الطفل على جمرة يظنها حلوى ملونة . ولا يخفى على القارئ ان الاستاذ عانض قد توصل في هذا التحليل البارح الى تفسير لم يسبقه به احد من فلاسفة الغرب والشرق ، في قديم الزمان وحديثه ، ولهذا فمن الممكن ان يسجل كراي مرجعي يأخذ به الفلاسفة والباحثون حين يتحدثون عن الليبرالية واسرار اقتتان الناس بجمالها ، رغم اعراض كثير من العلماء عن نظرية فرويد المعروفة في التحليل النفسي التي تركز على الباعث الجنسي للافعال والميول الانسانية .</p>		<p>-Topos of uselessness.</p> <p>-Fallacy of disadvantage of freedom.</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-Adj>great</p> <p>-adjectival clauses</p>
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20	<p>ولم ينس الاستاذ عائض تذكيرنا – جزاه الله خيرا – بأن الباحثين واساتذة العلوم السياسية السعوديين وغيرهم من المثقفين الذين قرأوا الفلسفة الغربية وربما كتبوا عن الليبرالية ، لم يفهموا الليبرالية ، بل ربما لم يفهموا حتى معناها ، ولهذا تفضل علينا – اكرمه الله – بتوضيح ان اصل الليبرالية هي كلمة “ليبر” اليونانية اي الحر وان الليبرالية تعني الحرية ، كما اوضحنا اعلاه.</p>	<p>Intellectuals> liberals</p>	<p>Claim2: The argument that Saudi intellectuals do not understand what ‘allibraliah’ means is false.</p> <p>-Fallacy of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	
25	<p>فله الحمد على ان اكرمني وغيري من طلبة العلوم السياسية بقراءة مقال الاستاذ عائض ، فعرفنا بعد سنين طويلة اضعتها في الدراسة والبحث والكتابة ، ان اصل الليبرالية هي ليبر وانها يونانية وتعني الرجل الحر وان ليبراليسم معناها الحرية. وربما يسمح لنا الاستاذ عائض باضافة المرأة الحرة ايضا ، خاصة للغربيات واشباههن من نساتنا المسترجلات.</p>		<p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-repetition</p>
30	<p>فيمكن – اذا سمح الاستاذ – ان نقول لهذه : “يالبيره” على وزن “ياحرمه” الذي نقوله لانسائنا العفيفات اللاتي لم يخذعن بالليبرالية وبلاويها . كما نقول للرجل المخدوع بالغرب وألعيه : “ يالبيير ” ، على وزن “ياولد” الذي يقوله بعضنا للصبيان حين يغضب عليهم .</p>		<p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p>		
35	<p>ولا تنتهي فوائد مقال الاستاذ عائض عند هذا الحد ، فهو يستثمر المناسبة لاخبارنا ايضا بأن مبادئ الحرية والإخاء والمساواة هي شعارات خداعة انبهرت بها شخصيات فكرية وسياسية فوقعت في فخاخ الماسونية. وهذا لعمرى اكتشاف اعظم من سابقه ، فقد ظننت قبل مقال الاستاذ عائض بأن السياسي والمفكر لا يخذع بسهولة ولا ينيهر بجميل الكلام ، بل يجادل كل فكرة قبل تبنيها . لكنني اهتديت الان الى قلة بضاعتي وجهلي بالامور ، فالمفكرون والسياسيون ، حتى الدهاة منهم ، يقعون في شرك الخديعة ، ربما بصورة اسهل من باعة السمك في سوق القظيف . لاني اسمع ان احدا لم ينجح حتى اليوم في مخادعة هؤلاء البانعين ، فله الحمد والمنة على ان عرفنا قبل فوات الاوان بأن باعة سوق السمك احسن من مفكرينا</p>		<p>Claim3: The argument that the principles of freedom, brotherhood and equality are deceiving slogans is a false argument.</p> <p>-Topos of uselessness.</p> <p>-Fallacy of danger or threat.</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-adjectival phrases</p> <p>-adverb>‘easily’</p> <p>-verbal</p> <p>-propositional phrase</p>
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<p>45 ومتقفينا ، لا سيما حين يتعلق الامر بأرفع القيم الانسانية، مثل الحرية والمساواة والاخاء . ولا نكرر ذكر الليبرالية لان الاستاذ عائض قد اخبرنا سابقا بأن ليبراليسم معناها الحرية ، والظاهر من المقال ان تلك الحرية هي نفس هذه الحرية التي انخدع بها دهاء السياسيين والمفكرين ووقعوا بسببها في حبال الماسونية واشباهها . الحقيقة ان فوائد مقال الاستاذ عائض لا تحصى وربما تحتاج الى مجلدات لشرحها ، ولا سيما تعيينه لمعنى الليبر والليبراليسم ، ثم الاسئلة التي طرحها (وربما لم يهتد اليها احد قبله فضلا عن ان يجيب عليها)، وتأكيد به بأن الاجوبة لن تأتي من عند ليبرالينا (كتب في نص المقال "من عند ليبرالينا" ولعله يقصد شخصا او مكانا او اناسا اخرين غير "ليبرالينا" الذين نعرفهم ، او ربما هي شيء اخر غير الجمع العربي لكلمة ليبر- ليبرالي المشار اليها اعلاه) .</p>		<p>-Topos of humanitarianism -Fallacy of definition of 'allibrahiah' -Fallacy of threat of freedom -Topos of uselessness (of definition). -Topos of uselessness -Fallacy of threat of 'allibrahiah'</p>	<p>Involvement: -personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification: -Repetition - adverb>especially -adjectival phrases>to indicate quantity (uncountable). Mitigation -Uncertainty> the use of 'apparently'</p>
<p>50 وخالصة القول ان الاستاذ عائض قد سجل هدف الموسم في هذا المقال الذي ارى ان تعاد طباعته وان يوزع على المثقفين واساتذة الجامعات والكتاب ، حتى يفهموا معنى الليبر والليبراليسم وما تقود اليه الحرية والمساواة من بلاء الانزلاق في شرك الماسونية.</p>				

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	هل الليبرالية مناسبة لكل المجتمعات؟				
5	رغم كثرة الندوات والنقاشات والمقالات حول الليبرالية، لا يزال السؤال قلقاً وحذراً وربما متربصاً في عالمنا العربي: ما هي الليبرالية؟ وماذا تريد؟ حسناً، المبادئ العامة لليبرالية هي الحرية والمساواة والمشاركة في القرار، وما بعد ذلك تتفرق التيارات الليبرالية ذات اليمين وذات اليسار، وتختلف كثيراً خاصة في الاقتصاد..		Claim 1: The general principles of 'allibraliah' are freedom, equality and participation in decision making and it specifically varies in application -Topos of number - Topos of definition	Detachment -third person voice	Intensification -quantification
10	ما فائدة هذا التوضيح الفضفاض طالما أن أغلب النظم الاجتماعية الحديثة تؤمن بتلك المبادئ بشكلها العام.. فماذا بقي من معنى لمصطلح الليبرالية؟ في الواقع ثمة كثير يزخر به، لأن أي مصطلح لا يتضح من تعريفه العام، بل في توصيفاته وتطبيقاته ومواقف المقتنعين به.. أسئلة الليبرالية متنوّعة، وسبق أن ناقشت بعضها.. هنا محاولة للفهم من خلال علاقة الليبرالية السياسية مع غيرها، ترجمتها بتصرف مع إضافات توضيحية لا تخلُّ بالمضمون، من موسوعة ستانفورد للفلسفة (٢٠٠٧).		-topos of number -topos of definition -Topos of authority of knowledge	-third person voice Involvement -personal deictic 'I'	-quantification
15	نبدأ بالسؤال الأولي الذي يُقلق كل مذهب سياسي: هل الليبرالية السياسية مناسبة لكل الجماعات السياسية والدول في العالم؟ كلا! يجيب جون رولز (Rawls)، أحد أهم المفكرين الليبراليين المعاصرين، طارحاً فكرته الجريئة في كتابه (قانون الجمهور) عام ١٩٩٩، بأنه يمكن أن يكون هناك مجتمع هربي لائق (عقلاني) غير مبني على المفاهيم الليبرالية التي تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساوون، وعضواً عن ذلك يكون الأفراد مسؤولين ومتعاونين داخل جماعاتهم، ولكنهم ليسوا متساوين. فالمفهوم الليبرالي الكلي للعدالة لا يمكن بناؤه من الخارج دون المشاركة الفكرية للناس في داخل		Claim 2: the political liberalism is not suitable for all countries -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of definition -Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism	Detachment -indirect speech	-evaluation 'important', 'bold'

<p>حرياتهم الدينية والفكرية.. إلخ. هل من السليم للجماعة الليبرالية أن تعرقل السيطرة الداخلية للجماعة المتشددة؟</p> <p>45 إذا افترضنا أن الفئة المتشددة هي جماعة سياسية أو دولة.. هل يمكن لليبراليين التدخل في شؤون الدول غير الليبرالية؟ يجيب الفيلسوف ملّ في مقالة خاصة بذلك عام ١٨٥٩م، أن البلدان المتحضرة وغير المتحضرة ينبغي أن يتم التعامل معهما بطريقة مختلفة، فلا حق للبرابرة كأمة.. فظالما أن الأخلاق الدولية تبادلية فإن الحكومات الهمجية لا يمكن حسابها وليس لها حقوق متساوية للحكومات المتحضرة. هذا المنطق التعسفي كان متناغماً مع الروح الإمبريالية لبريطانيا</p>		<p>Claim 4: liberal countries or groups should not interfere in the affairs of the non-liberal groups to protect 'allibrahiah' principles.</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	<p>Evaluation>'arbitrary'</p>
<p>50 دولة أخرى من أجل حماية المبادئ الليبرالية.</p> <p>إذا كانت الليبرالية تؤمن بحق الجماعات في اتخاذ قراراتها الخاصة، فهل يحق أخلاقياً أن يتدخل الليبراليون في الجماعات غير الليبرالية لتتكيف مع مبادئهم الإنسانية في الحرية والمساواة؟ فكما يؤمن الليبراليون بحرية الأفراد، فإنهم أيضاً قد يؤمنون أن للجماعات الحق في ارتكاب الأخطاء الإنسانية لإدارة شؤونهم الجماعية الخاصة بهم. فالأفراد الذين تُصادر حرياتهم داخل مجتمعات معيّنة هم أنفسهم قد يعترضون على إقحام مبادئ الحرية الليبرالية أو حتى يتضررون منها (مارجاليت وراز، ١٩٩٠؛ تامير، ١٩٩٣).</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of justice</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of rights</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	
<p>60 لكن رولز يعتقد أن الليبراليين يجب أن يميّزوا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة بين تلك العقلانية وبين الخارجة على القانون، الأولى يمكن التعايش معها على عكس الثانية؛ فالمجتمعات العاقلة لا تتسامح مع الدول الخارجة على الشرعية التي تتجاهل</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	

65	<p>حقوق الإنسان؛ فمثل هذه الدولة قد يحق أن تكون عرضة للعقوبة بالقوة والتدخل الخارجي. إلا أن رولز يصرّ على أن العقلاء الذين يرفضون مبادئ الحرية الليبرالية ينبغي تشجيعهم وليس إرغامهم على تلك المبادئ. أما شاندران كوكاش (٢٠٠٣) وهو مفكر ليبرالي كلاسيكي فيميل إلى التسامح الكامل مع الناس الذين لا يؤمنون بمبادئ الحرية الليبرالية مع تحفظ أن تكون هناك حقوق اعتراض.</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of law+ - Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos of encouragement + fallacy of compulsion -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of tolerance</p>		
70	<p>وتتمد أسئلة العلاقات إلى داخل الدولة الليبرالية: إلى أي مدى يحق للجماعات المتعصبة دينياً أو ثقافياً أو سياسياً أن تُعفى من متطلبات الدولة؟ الدولة الليبرالية لها تاريخ طويل في استيعاب الجماعات المتعصبة، لكن جلاستون (٢٠٠٣) يطرح أن المشكلة الكبرى هي مع الجماعات المتعصبة التي تربي وتعلّم الأطفال، فلا يمكن النظر إليها على أنها جماعات تطوعية نقية لها حق خيار رفض متطلبات الدولة الليبرالية: فهم يمارسون القوة الإكراهية على الأطفال، لذا فإن المبادئ الليبرالية الأساسية حول حماية الأبرياء من الإرغام غير العادل ستلعب دورها هنا. وهنا سنواجه صداماً حاداً بين السلطة الأبوية المتعصبة وحقوق الأطفال وفق الفهم الليبرالي. هذا</p>		<p>-Topos of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos or fallacy of danger of extremist -fallacy of compulsion -Topos of responsibility+ topos of consequence</p>	-indirect speech	
75	<p>يجعل التسامح مع الجماعات المتشددة التي تعيش محلياً داخل الدولة الليبرالية (بما فيه حقها في الاعتراض) يبدو أقل جاذبية من التسامح معها على النطاق الدولي. ورغم ذلك فيظل بعض مفكري الليبرالية (لوكاس سوين ٢٠٠٦) مقتنعاً أن الليبراليين يجب أن يضمنوا شبه سيادة للجماعات المحلية غير الليبرالية، تسمح لهم بحرية التصرف بشؤونهم على حسب طريقتهم.</p>		<p>-Topos of consequences of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of rights</p>		
80	<p>ثمة سؤال آخر، إلى أي مدى يسمح للجماعات الراضية لمبادئ الليبرالية أن تشارك باتخاذ القرارات في الدولة الليبرالية. في كتابه (الليبرالية السياسية)، يذكر رولز أن مجتمعاتنا تتصف بأنها جماعية عقلانية، ومن ثم لا يمكن إرغامها على التغيير بمبرر</p>		<p>Claim 5: non-liberal groups should participate in decision making in the liberal countries -Topos of authority of knowledge</p>	-indirect speech	

85	<p>يستند على أساس إيمان بأخلاقيات شمولية أو نظم دينية. ولكن بعض الليبراليين المقترين من الأوساط الدينية (إبريل ٢٠٠٢ ويبري ١٩٩٣) يطرحون أن مثل هذا الاعتراض هو إقصاء واضح للمتدينين. ومرة أخرى يتباعد الليبراليون في مواقفهم لدرجة أن يتساءل المرء هل ثمة ما يبقى يوحد الليبراليين...؟</p>		<p>-Topos of rationality+ fallacy of compulsion -Topos or fallacy of exclusion -Topos or fallacy of variance of liberal attitudes</p>	<p>-distancing voice 'one'</p>	<p>Mitigation -Question instead of assertion</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - المبادئ العامة لليبرالية هي الحرية والمساواة والمشاركة في القرار - تتفرّق التيارات الليبرالية ذات اليمين وذات اليسار، وتختلف كثيراً خاصة في الاقتصاد.. - ثمة كثير يزخر به - هل الليبرالية السياسية مناسبة لكل الجماعات السياسية والدول في العالم؟ كلا! - تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساون - تنطبق على كل الدول. - توزيع الثروة لبلوغ العدالة الاجتماعية - لها تاريخ طويل في استيعاب الجماعات المتعصبة
الليبراليون	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - يجب أن يميّزوا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة بين تلك العقلانية وبين الخارجة على القانون - يجب أن يضمنوا شبه سيادة للجماعات المحلية غير الليبرالية، تسمح لهم بحرية التصرف بشؤونهم على حسب طريقتهم. - يتباعد الليبراليون في مواقفهم

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	هل الليبرالية مناسبة لكل المجتمعات؟				
5	رغم كثرة الندوات والنقاشات والمقالات حول الليبرالية، لا يزال السؤال قلقاً وحذراً وربما متربصاً في عالمنا العربي: ما هي الليبرالية؟ وماذا تريد؟ حسناً، المبادئ العامة لليبرالية هي الحرية والمساواة والمشاركة في القرار، وما بعد ذلك تتفرق التيارات الليبرالية ذات اليمين وذات اليسار، وتختلف كثيراً خاصة في الاقتصاد..		Claim 1: The general principles of 'allibraliah' are freedom, equality and participation in decision making and it specifically varies in application -Topos of number - Topos of definition	Detachment -third person voice	Intensification -quantification
10	ما فائدة هذا التوضيح الفضفاض طالما أن أغلب النظم الاجتماعية الحديثة تؤمن بتلك المبادئ بشكلها العام.. فماذا بقي من معنى لمصطلح الليبرالية؟ في الواقع ثمة كثير يزخر به، لأن أي مصطلح لا يتضح من تعريفه العام، بل في توصيفاته وتطبيقاته ومواقف المقتنعين به.. أسئلة الليبرالية متنوّعة، وسبق أن ناقشت بعضها.. هنا محاولة للفهم من خلال علاقة الليبرالية السياسية مع غيرها، ترجمتها بتصريف مع إضافات توضيحية لا تخلُّ بالمضمون، من موسوعة ستانفورد للفلسفة (٢٠٠٧).		-topos of number -topos of definition -Topos of authority of knowledge	-third person voice Involvement -personal deictic 'I'	-quantification
15	نبدأ بالسؤال الأولي الذي يُقلق كل مذهب سياسي: هل الليبرالية السياسية مناسبة لكل الجماعات السياسية والدول في العالم؟ كلا! يجيب جون رولز (Rawls)، أحد أهم المفكرين الليبراليين المعاصرين، طارحاً فكرته الجريئة في كتابه (قانون الجمهور) عام ١٩٩٩، بأنه يمكن أن يكون هناك مجتمع هرمي لائق (عقلاني) غير مبني على المفاهيم الليبرالية التي تقول بأن كل الأفراد أحرار ومتساوون، وعضواً عن ذلك يكون الأفراد مسؤولين ومتعاونين داخل جماعاتهم، ولكنهم ليسوا متساوين. فالمفهوم الليبرالي الكلي للعدالة لا يمكن بناؤه من الخارج دون المشاركة الفكرية للناس في داخل		Claim 2: the political liberalism is not suitable for all countries -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of definition -Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism	Detachment -indirect speech	-evaluation 'important', 'bold'

20	<p>ذلك المجتمع الهرمي، رغم أن حقوق الإنسان الأساسية تنطبق على كل البشر. إلا أن مفكرين أمثال توماس بوجي ومارثا نوسبوم (٢٠٠٢) يرفضون موقف رولز المضاد لعالمية مبادئ الحرية والمساواة الليبرالية، ويرون أن المبادئ الإنسانية الليبرالية تنطبق على كل الدول.</p>		-Fallacy of suitability	-indirect speech	
25	<p>السؤال السابق لا ينبغي أن يخلط مع سؤال آخر: هل الليبرالية نظرية لدولة معينة أم أنها على الأقل مثالياً نظرية سياسية عالمية لكل الجماعات البشرية؟ الفيلسوف كانط (١٧٩٥م) يرى أن كل الدول ينبغي عليها احترام كرامة مواطنيها كأفراد أحرار ومتساوين، ولكنه ينكر أن الإنسانية تتشكل في نمط سياسي واحد؛ ويعترض على فكرة توحيد الليبرالية في مجموعة عالمية تشترك ضمناً في دساتير وتتحد كدول في كونفدرالية لضمان السلام.</p>		<p>Claim 3: 'allibraliah' cannot be unified as one system shared globally -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism</p>	-indirect speech	
30	<p>بالنسبة لليبرالية الكلاسيكية ليس مهماً التفريق بين عالم مجتمعات ليبرالية والمجتمع الليبرالي العالمي، لأن هدف الحكومة في المجتمع هو ضمان حقوق الحرية الأساسية والملكية لمواطنيها، فلا تصبح الحدود الدولية ذات أهمية كبرى (لوماسكي ٢٠٠٧). بينما الليبرالية الحديثة تلجّ على مبادئ توزيع الثروة لبلوغ العدالة الاجتماعية، بغض النظر أن تلك المبادئ تنطبق داخل مجتمعات معينة أو يتم بلوغها عالمياً. لذا ظل</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of freedom for citizens</p>	-indirect speech	
35	<p>الخلافاً كبيراً بين مفكري الليبرالية المعاصرين في وجوب تطبيق مبادئ الليبرالية داخل الدول الليبرالية فقط أم ينبغي تطبيقها عالمياً لأنها مكاسب إنسانية عالمية (رولز، بوجي، بيتز).</p>		-Topos of justice		
40	<p>ويمتد الخلاف بين الليبراليين في طريقة التعامل مع المجتمعات والفئات المتشددة التي قد تنكر الحقوق الأساسية لبعض أفرادها أو تمارس عليهم الوصاية أو تصادر</p>			-indirect speech	

<p>حرياتهم الدينية والفكرية.. إلخ. هل من السليم للجماعة الليبرالية أن تعرقل السيطرة الداخلية للجماعة المتشددة؟</p> <p>إذا افترضنا أن الفئة المتشددة هي جماعة سياسية أو دولة.. هل يمكن لليبراليين التدخل في شؤون الدول غير الليبرالية؟ يجيب الفيلسوف ملّ في مقالة خاصة بذلك عام ١٨٥٩م، أن البلدان المتحضرة وغير المتحضرة ينبغي أن يتم التعامل معهما بطريقة مختلفة، فلا حق للبرابرة كأمة.. فظالما أن الأخلاق الدولية تبادلية فإن الحكومات الهمجية لا يمكن حسابها وليس لها حقوق متساوية للحكومات المتحضرة. هذا المنطق التعسفي كان متناغماً مع الروح الإمبريالية لبريطانيا</p>	<p>45</p>	<p>Claim 4: liberal countries or groups should not interfere in the affairs of the non-liberal groups to protect 'allibrahiah' principles.</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	<p>Evaluation>'arbitrary'</p>
<p>الاستعمارية آنذاك. ولكن ملّ يعود ويوضح أنه يعترض على تدخل دولة في شؤون دولة أخرى من أجل حماية المبادئ الليبرالية.</p>	<p>50</p>	<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of justice</p>		
<p>إذا كانت الليبرالية تؤمن بحق الجماعات في اتخاذ قراراتها الخاصة، فهل يحق أخلاقياً أن يتدخل الليبراليون في الجماعات غير الليبرالية لتتكيف مع مبادئهم الإنسانية في الحرية والمساواة؟ فكما يؤمن الليبراليون بحرية الأفراد، فإنهم أيضاً قد يؤمنون أن للجماعات الحق في ارتكاب الأخطاء الإنسانية لإدارة شؤونهم الجماعية الخاصة بهم. فالأفراد الذين تُصادر حرياتهم داخل مجتمعات معينة هم أنفسهم قد يعترضون على إقحام مبادئ الحرية الليبرالية أو حتى يتضررون منها (مارجاليت وراز، ١٩٩٠؛ تامير، ١٩٩٣).</p>	<p>55</p>	<p>-Topos or fallacy of rights</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of freedom</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	
<p>لكن رولز يعتقد أن الليبراليين يجب أن يميّزوا عند التعامل مع الجماعات المتشددة بين تلك العقلانية وبين الخارجة على القانون، الأولى يمكن التعايش معها على عكس الثانية؛ فالمجتمعات العاقلة لا تتسامح مع الدول الخارجة على الشرعية التي تتجاهل</p>	<p>60</p>	<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	

<p>65 حقوق الإنسان؛ فمثل هذه الدولة قد يحق أن تكون عرضة للعقوبة بالقوة والتدخل الخارجي. إلا أن رولز يصرّ على أن العقلاء الذين يرفضون مبادئ الحرية الليبرالية ينبغي تشجيعهم وليس إرغامهم على تلك المبادئ. أما شاندران كوكاش (٢٠٠٣) وهو مفكر ليبرالي كلاسيكي فيميل إلى التسامح الكامل مع الناس الذين لا يؤمنون بمبادئ الحرية الليبرالية مع تحفظ أن تكون هناك حقوق اعتراض.</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of law+ - Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos of encouragement + fallacy of compulsion -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of tolerance</p>		
<p>70 وتمتد أسئلة العلاقات إلى داخل الدولة الليبرالية: إلى أي مدى يحق للجماعات المتعصبة دينياً أو ثقافياً أو سياسياً أن تُعفى من متطلبات الدولة؟ الدولة الليبرالية لها تاريخ طويل في استيعاب الجماعات المتعصبة، لكن جلاستون (٢٠٠٣) يطرح أن المشكلة الكبرى هي مع الجماعات المتعصبة التي تربي وتعلّم الأطفال، فلا يمكن النظر إليها على أنها جماعات تطوعية نقية لها حق خيار رفض متطلبات الدولة الليبرالية: فهم يمارسون القوة الإكراهية على الأطفال، لذا فإن المبادئ الليبرالية الأساسية حول حماية الأبرياء من الإرغام غير العادل ستلعب دورها هنا. وهنا سنواجه</p>		<p>-Topos of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos or fallacy of danger of extremist -fallacy of compulsion -Topos of responsibility+ topos of consequence</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	
<p>75 صداماً حاداً بين السلطة الأبوية المتعصبة وحقوق الأطفال وفق الفهم الليبرالي. هذا يجعل التسامح مع الجماعات المتشددة التي تعيش محلياً داخل الدولة الليبرالية (بما فيه حقها في الاعتراض) يبدو أقل جاذبية من التسامح معها على النطاق الدولي. ورغم ذلك فيظل بعض مفكري الليبرالية (لوكاس سوين ٢٠٠٦) مقتنعاً أن الليبراليين يجب أن يضمنوا شبه سيادة للجماعات المحلية غير الليبرالية، تسمح لهم بحرية التصرف بشؤونهم على حسب طريقتهم.</p>		<p>-Topos of consequences of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of rights</p> <p>Claim 5: non-liberal groups should participate in decision making in the liberal countries -Topos of authority of knowledge</p>		
<p>80 ثمة سؤال آخر، إلى أي مدى يسمح للجماعات الراضية لمبادئ الليبرالية أن تشارك باتخاذ القرارات في الدولة الليبرالية. في كتابه (الليبرالية السياسية)، يذكر رولز أن مجتمعاتنا تتصف بأنها جماعية عقلانية، ومن ثم لا يمكن إرغامها على التغيير بمبرر</p>			<p>-indirect speech</p>	

85	<p>يستند على أساس إيمان بأخلاقيات شمولية أو نظم دينية. ولكن بعض الليبراليين المقترين من الأوساط الدينية (إبريل ٢٠٠٢ ويبري ١٩٩٣) يطرحون أن مثل هذا الاعتراض هو إقصاء واضح للمتدينين. ومرة أخرى يتباعد الليبراليون في مواقفهم لدرجة أن يتساءل المرء هل ثمة ما يبقى يوحد الليبراليين...؟</p>		<p>-Topos of rationality+ fallacy of compulsion -Topos or fallacy of exclusion -Topos or fallacy of variance of liberal attitudes</p>	<p>-distancing voice 'one'</p>	<p>Mitigation -Question instead of assertion</p>
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>الليبرالية: هل هي حرية أو فوضوية؟</p> <p>البنية العميقة للثقافة الإسلامية تنطوي على منظومة قيمية ذات بعد نوعي مغاير ومن ذلك قيمة الحرية حيث تتبوأ رتبة سامقة في تراتبية القيم. تلك القيمة استوتحت مركزيتها من النص المقدس الذي رفع سقف الحرية الى درجة أنه حظر كل اشتغال يروم الإكراه على اعتناق الديانة الأسمى «لإكراه في الدين» فهل ثمة أبعد من تلك الحرية؟! حتى</p>		<p>Claim1: Freedom is a high Islamic value.</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification -rhetorical question</p>
5	<p>التكليف ذاته يُرفع عن الإنسان - من الناحية التشريعية - إذا لم يتوفر على مناخات من الحرية تتيح له إيقاع مأكلف به على جهة الامتثال فحينئذ يرتفع التكليف بارتفاع شرطي القصد والاختيار بحسبهما يحملان المكلف على ماليس بمقدور له ولذلك فلو تفوّه فاقد الحرية بما يكفره أوحى لو طال بالإساءة أحد الشخصيات ذات البعد التقديسي فلا يُثرب عليه شرعا كما هو مفاد النص: «إلأمن أكره وقلبه مطمئن بالإيمان.»</p>		<p>-Topos of authority (Quran text)</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p>		
10	<p>تلك الحقيقة الناصعة - المتمثلة في أن مادة الحرية في النص المنزل متقدمة في الوجود الذهني وبالتالي الوجود الواقعي على الحرية في الليبرالية - يجري جهلها أوتجاهلها من قبل كثير من الأطروحات التي تتناول قيمة الحرية وكأنها منتج ليبرالي صرف، وكأنها حق حصري! أو فتح قيمي ليبرالي مذهل ولأريب أن هذا تحكم سيعييه العثور بأي لون من ألوان</p>		<p>Claim2: Freedom in Islam precedes the existence of freedom in 'allibrahah' and thus the latter should not be adopted.</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation 'spotless truth'</p>
15	<p>التبرير المعرفي؛ لأن الحرية في الأصل مفردة مبنوثة في ثنايا بنود التشريع وفي طيات المقدمات النظرية لتراثنا المعرفي و العبارة العمرية: «متى استعبدتم الناس وقد ولدتهم أمهاتهم أحرارا؟! «ليست عنا ببعيد، ثم أيضا فإن الحرية التي يرفع شعارها فلاسفة الليبرالية الغربيين ليست هي الحرية التي تنسجم ومكونات الإطار التشريعي الذي ننتمي له وارتضينا طائعين الصدور عن حيثياته وهذا طبيعي لتباين مظهرات التركيبة الثقافية لكل</p>	<p>-western liberal philosophers vs. us</p>	<p>-Topos of reality</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of ignorance</p>		

20	<p>مجتمع فكل تجمع بشري له معايير في التعاطي مع مفهوم الحرية ومن هنا لايسوغ لنا استنساخ نَصُّور تمت ولادته في ظل ظروف وملابسات لاتتناغم والخصوصية التي ننبعث على ضوء إملاءاتها؛ فمصطلح الحرية في الليبرالية - وأكرر: الليبرالية بنسختها الأساس - مغيب المعالم مُزهق الحدود عديم الضوابط على نحو يحيله إلى فوضوية في سياق أو هو إلى الفوضوية أقرب في مساق آخر.</p>	<p>Freedom in 'allibraliah' > chaos</p>	<p>-Fallacy of exclusiveness of freedom to 'allibraliah' -Topos of culture -Topos of authority -Topos of differences - Topos or fallacy of chaos +implicit topos or fallacy of cultural threat</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictics 'us', 'we' -repetition 'I repeat'</p>	<p>-metaphors -accumulation</p>
25	<p>الحرية قيمة أساسية، إنها مطلب إنساني وحاجة فطرية لامراء، والإنسان يحتاجها كما الطعام حيث لاتستقيم حياته بدونها، لكن الإشكالية هنا في الليبرالية أنه بفعل هيمنة النزعة الانفلاتية يتم تشويه هذا المصطلح الأخاذ- مصطلح الحرية - فثمة توظيف مغرض لحيثياته وعدول به وبحقيقته وميل بمداليه عن الحقيقة الموضوعية الثابتة له بالأصل.</p>		<p>Claim3: Freedom is an essential human value distorted and exploited in</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'Awesome'</p>
30	<p>في الليبرالية يجري استرسال مُفرط مع هذا المعنى وطُرِد لمادته حتى يدلف في محتواه مايتضاد وكنه حقيقته الأساس. المصطلح هنا يوسّع حتى ينضم إليه من الوقائع الثقافية ومن تمظهرات الماصدق التي تتلبس بما يمنع إلحاقها في أصل الحكم!</p>		<p>'allibraliah' to mean 'unlimited' and 'unrestricted' freedom.</p>	<p>Involvement -local deictic 'here'</p>	<p>-accumulation</p>
35	<p>والأمثلة كثيرة خذ مثلاً: الجانب الاقتصادي فالحرية الليبرالية ليس لديها أي تحفظ على مقارفة جريرة الربا فهذا أمرعائد إلى الرغبة الذاتية فإن شاء الفرد أقدم وإن شاء أحجم، فالربا هنا داخل تحت شعارالحرية، أما النظام الإسلامي فهو مع أنه يعلي سقف الحرية في هذا المجال لكنه يبدي قدرا كبيرا من التحفظ الملحوظ في هذا الوجه من التعاطي المادي، وهكذا. إذا فمصطلح الحرية في السياق الليبرالي مشحون بما يلوث نقاءه حيث ثمة توظيف فوضوي متصاعد لهذه المفردة البراقة وهل نتصور من فعاليات فلسفية تشكل فكرها في ظل مناخات مناوئة في أسسها المفاهيمية للنسق العقدي للأمة المنعوتة نَصِّيا بالخيرية هل ننتظر من تلك النماذج أن تسكّ لنا مفاهيم متناغمة مع مقتضى الإطار المفاهيمي</p>	<p>-Umma vs 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>- Topos of humanitarianism+ Topos of right -Topos or fallacy of abuse of freedom concept by 'allibraliah' -Topos of example -Topos of difference (comparison btw Islam and allibraliah'</p>	<p>-evaluation -imperative style -local deictic 'here'</p>	<p>-accumulation -evaluation: 'excessive' -quantification: 'a lot', 'great'</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>الحاكم لسلوكتنا العام؟! هل نتصور أن الحرية التي ينادي بها أولئك تنضبط في بعدها المفاهيمي بالمقاييس المعيارية التي تحكم طبيعة الوعي المبرمج على أولوية الإذعان اللامشروط لمعطيات الرؤية السماوية؟! إن الحرية الليبرالية تنطلق من أولوية ألهنة الإنسان والانكفاء المطلق على المادة وتتعاطى موقفاً متشنجاً من بواعث انطلاق الروح ولذا فهي تبدو مفتقرة للقيم التي تحكمها؛ تبدو متخمة بحمولة مولغة في السلب؛ لأنها تقع في جريرة التعميم والإطلاق فهي تُذكر بإجمال وإبهام على نحو يعكس بُعداً بالغ الفوضوية حيث تبدو مفردة لفظية ذات ماهية عامة ومطلقة من دون أي إشعار بالتخصيص أو بالتقييد كضابط تزول به صفة الإطلاق. إنها حرية تُغايّر بالحدِّ وبحقيقة السمات طبيعة الحرية التي يجري تعاطيها في أدبيات التشريع وثمة بون شاسع بين الحريتين، فإذا كانت الأولى تتحدث عن الحرية المطلقة فإن الأخرى تتحدث عن مطلق الحرية، وشتان ما بين الحريتين نعم بينهما قدر من التشابه والاشتراك ولكنه في أصل المفهوم، في أساس المعنى، في ظاهر المصطلح، هذا المشترك مطلق كلي والمطلق الكلي كما هو معروف لا يلزم منه التضارع في الماهية بل لازمه يوجب المغايرة بحسبها الأصل هنا.</p> <p>في الإسلام هناك حرية ولكن في مقابلها عبودية - لأن الإسلام معناه الاستسلام - ولن تتحقق تلك العبودية في أنقى صورها إلا بالحرية، أي بتجاني كافة أنساق التبعية من خلال التحرر المطلق من كل عبودية لسوى المعبود الحق جل في علاه.</p> <p>الحرية في الليبرالية لا مكان فيها لتلك العبودية، بل هذه العبودية تعد مؤشر جلي على تراجع نهضة الإنسان، أو هي آية حصرية على المجتمع التقليدي المحافظ!. الحرية والعبودية هنا قيمتان متنافيتان وفي عامة دوائر الحياة، بينهما انفكك فلا تجسد الحرية في الليبرالية إلا بنفي مُطبق لسائر مظاهر العبودية وتغيب تام أو شبه تام لكافة تشكلاتها، الحرية والعبودية هنا بمثابة جزيرتين منفصلتين لاتلتقيان؛ في حين أن النظام الإسلامي يلح على أنهما قيمتان متلازمتان ومن هنا يكامل بينهما فيوظفهما على الوجه الموضوعي الأسنى</p>	<p>Freedom in Islam> (worship + loyalty)</p>	<p>- Topos of definition of freedom in 'allibraliah' + Topos or fallacy of abuse of freedom concept + Topos or fallacy of chaos</p> <p>-Topos of cultural threat of 'allibraliah'</p> <p>-Topos of authority (Quran).</p> <p>-Topos of cultural threat of 'allibraliah'</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of unrestricted freedom (Topos or fallacy of definition of freedom)</p> <p>-Topos of differences and similarities btw Islam and 'allibraliah' in freedom</p> <p>-claim4: Freedom in Islam is based on absolute freedom</p> <p>-Topos/fallacy of freedom</p> <p>-Topos/Fallacy of relationship between freedom and obidence.</p>	<p>-personal deictics 'us', 'we'</p> <p>-evaluation</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'chaotic', 'rising', 'glamorous'</p> <p>-rhetorical questions</p> <p>-accumulation</p> <p>-evaluation 'extreme chaos', 'vast distance'</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-self-correction (similarities)</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-metaphor</p>
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65	<p>وعلى نحو ينعكس وبشكل ملحوظ على روح الفرد بالطهر والنماء، وكلما ترقى المرء في مدارج العبودية كلما كان ذلك أدعى لفاعلية الحرية كقيمة جوهرية في الحياة بكل تفاصيلها. ومحصول القول: إذا كانت الحرية ذات بعد مركزي في نظامنا القيمي فلماذا نتسولها من بيئات تتلبس بوضاعة وجودية أليس هذا من تحصيل الحاصل؟! أكررا الصياغة الاستفهامية ولكن بطريقة منطقية: لماذا يصار إلى البديل - البعد المجازي حاضر بكل كثافته هنا - مع وجود المبدل منه - إلا إذا كان ثمة تحفظ عليه!- أليس هذا مناف لمقتضيات أحكام المنهجية؟!</p>	<p>Freedom in 'allibraliah'> substitute Freedom in Islam> substituted</p>	<p>Claim5: As freedom exists in our system of values i.e. (Islam), there is no need to borrow it from other systems e.g. (allibraliah). -Topos of advantage of freedom + Topos of culture. -Fallacy of the false alternative (altering 'allibraliah' with Islam)</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictics 'our', 'we', 'I' -repetition: 'I repeat'</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'the highest' -rhetorical questions -Evaluation: 'central', 'ignoble' -trope</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الحرية في الإسلام	<p>-تتبوأ رتبة سامقة في تراتبية القيم</p> <p>-تلك القيمة استوحت مركزيتها من النص المقدس</p> <p>- الحرية في النص المنزل متقدمة في الوجود الذهني وبالتالي الوجود الواقعي على الحرية في الليبرالية</p> <p>- مفردة مبنوثة في ثنايا بنود التشريع وفي طيات المقدمات النظرية لتراثنا المعرفي</p> <p>--تحدث عن مطلق الحرية</p> <p>- في مقابلها عبودية</p> <p>- بتجافي كافة أنساق التبعية من خلال التحررالمطلق من كل عبودية لسوى المعبود الحق جل في علاه.</p> <p>-- ذات بعد مركزي في نظامنا القيمي</p>
الحرية الليبرالية	<p>- الحرية التي يرفع شعارها فلاسفة الليبرالية الغربيين ليست هي الحرية التي تنسجم ومكونات الإطارالتشريعي الذي ننتمي له</p> <p>- فمصطلح الحرية في الليبرالية مغيب المعالم مُزهق الحدود عديم الضوابط على نحو يحيله إلى فوضوية</p> <p>- قيمة أساسية</p> <p>- في الليبرالية يتم تشويه هذا المصطلح الأخاذ- مصطلح الحرية - فثمة توظيف مغرض لحيثياته وعدول به وبحقيقته وميل بمداليه عن الحقيقة الموضوعية الثابتة له بالأصل.</p> <p>- في الليبرالية يجري استرسال مفُرط مع هذا المعنى وطُرد لمادته حتى يدلف في محتواه مايتضاد وُكُنه حقيقته الأساس.</p> <p>- فالحرية الليبرالية ليس لديها أي تحفظ على مقارفة جريرة الربا فهذا أمرعائد إلى الرغبة الذاتية.</p> <p>- فمصطلح الحرية في السياق الليبرالي مشحون بما يلوث نقاءه حيث ثمة توظيف فوضوي متصاعد لهذه المفردة البراقة</p> <p>-الحرية الليبرالية تنطلق من أولوية ألهنة الإنسان والانكفاء المطلق على المادة</p>

<p>الحرية</p> <p>الليبرالية</p>	<p>-تتعاطى موقفاً متشجعاً من بواعث انطلاق الروح</p> <p>-تبدو مفتقرة للقيم التي تحكمها</p> <p>-تبدو متخمة بحمولة مولغة في السلب؛ لأنها تقع في جريرة التعميم والإطلاق</p> <p>-تُذكر بإجمال وإبهام على نحو يعكس بُعداً بالغ الفوضوية</p> <p>-تبدو مفردة لفظية ذات ماهية عامة ومطلقة من دون أي إشعار بالتخصيص أو بالتقييد كضابط نزول به صفة الإطلاق.</p> <p>-إنها حرية تُغايّر بالحدّ وبحقيقة السمات طبيعة الحرية التي يجري تعاطيها في أدبيات التشريع</p> <p>- تتحدث عن الحرية المطلقة</p> <p>- لا مكان فيها لتلك العبودية، بل هذه العبودية تعد مؤشراً جلياً على تراجع نهضة الإنسان</p> <p>- فلا تتجسد الحرية في الليبرالية إلا بنفي مُطبق لسائر مظاهر العبودية</p> <p>-إنها مطلب إنساني وحاجة فطرية لأمراء</p> <p>-والإنسان يحتاجها كما الطعام حيث لا تستقيم حياته بدونها</p> <p>- استرسال مفترط مع هذا المعنى وطُرد لمادته حتى يدلف في محتواه ما يتضاد وكنه حقيقته الأساس.</p>
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	ليبرالية بنكهة سعودية				
5	<p>كثير الحديث في المجتمع السعودي في الآونة الأخيرة عن الليبرالية وأصبحت محل نقاش وسجال في الحياة الاجتماعية والفكرية والثقافية ووصل إلى حد أن أحد الباحثين والمثقفين البارزين في بلادنا وهو الدكتور عبدالله الغدامي يكتب كتابا كاملا جاء تحت عنوان «الليبرالية الجديدة» وتناولت إحدى أبرز حلقات المسلسل الشعبي الشهير «طاش ما طاش» قضية الليبرالية في المجتمع السعودي بلغة ساخرة وسطحية بتهكمية مقززة دون عمق ودون فهم حقيقي لمعنى الليبرالية وتجلياتها، في كتاب «مفهوم الحرية» للمفكر المغربي عبدالله العروي ثمة إضاءات مهمة وجديرة بالتوقف والتأمل وفهم مغزى ومعنى الليبرالية والمجتمع المدني .</p>		<p>Claim1: There is a major debate around 'allibraliah' in Saudi society.</p> <p>-Topos of number</p> <p>-Topos of authority</p> <p>- Fallacy of ignorance</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-evaluation: 'disgusting', 'Important and worthy'</p>
10	<p>لا يمكن التحدث عن الليبرالية دون ربطها في سياقها الخاص والعام بالحرية، إذ الليبرالية تحمل في أسها وأساسها قضية الحرية في المعنى الشامل والكامل والعميق، يقول عبدالله العروي: «لعل كلمة حرية أكثر كلمات القاموس السياسي استعمالا عند عرب اليوم حتى الكلمات التي تنافسها في الذيوع كاستقلال، وديموقراطية، وتنمية تستعمل في الغالب مرادفة لها بحيث لانكاد نجد لها إلا ملتصقة بها وموضحة لها .</p>		<p>Claim2: 'allibraliah' is mainly associated with the concept of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos of definition of 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-direct speech</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'essentially', 'whole, complete and deep'</p>
15	<p>ويضيف: «يرفع الفرد شعار الحرية داخل أسرته والمرأة في وجه زوجها والطفل إزاء أبيه والأقلية في وجه الأغلبية والأمة في مصارعة أعدائها، ويخفي الشاعر أهدافا متباينة أشد التباين، يفهم الفرد من الحرية الانفلات من العادات والمرأة والاستقلال بآرائها .«ويفصل العروي القيم الكبيرة التي يقوم عليها مفهوم الحرية المرتبطة جذريا وعمقيا.. بمفهوم الليبرالية التي تضيء في أفكارها ومعانيها قضايا تتداخل وتتشابك مع مفهوم الدولة ومفهوم المؤسسة والحرية السياسية والاقتصاد وتتصل اتصالا مباشرا بحرية الفرد.</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of freedom</p>	<p>-direct speech</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'deeply'</p> <p>-metaphor</p>

20	<p>إن الليبرالية جاءت في السنوات الأخيرة إلى بلادنا مثلها مثل كل منجز فكري وسياسي واقتصادي وتعاملنا معها كما لو أنها حالة استهلاكية أخرى لم يتم التعامل معها بوصفها حالة فكرية ترتبط بقضية الفرد والمجتمع فلا تتم قراءاتها في السياق الاجتماعي والتاريخي الذي ظهرت فيه في الغرب ولكن يتم التعامل معها برؤية مسطحة وفهم قاصر تماما كما تم التعامل مع الحداثة لا كمفهوم شامل وحضاري ولكن بجزئية صغيرة وربطها بالدين بطريقة مبتسرة وموجزة.</p>		<p>Claim3: 'Allibraliah' has been dealt with superficially since it arrived in Saudi society.</p> <p>-Topos of time</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignorance.</p> <p>-Topos of example (of Hadatha)</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignorance (cherry picking fallacy)</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'Our country', 'we',</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'you'</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'we'</p>	<p>-evaluation:</p> <p>'completely minor'</p> <p>-Metaphor</p> <p>evaluation:</p> <p>'the strangest', 'constantly',</p> <p>-Metaphor</p>
25	<p>من أغرب الأمور صعوبة أن تجد أن هناك من يلوكون كلمة الليبرالية ويرددونها بشكل متواصل ومتصل دون أن يعيش هؤلاء قضية إشكالية معايشة وسلوكا، إذ كيف يمكن أن تكون ليبراليا دون أن تعيش حياة ليبرالية كيف يمكن أن تكون متخلقا بكل قيم الحداثة والليبرالية والحرية قراءة وفهما في حين أنت تعيش داخل سجن ذاتك القديمة وما زلت أسير ثقافة القبيلة ولا تزال في العمق تعيش في الماضي أكثر مما تعيش في الحاضر والمستقبل، لا يمكن أن تكون حدثيا وأنت تعيش حياة قديمة ولا يمكن أن تكون ليبراليا وتدعو إلى الحرية وأنت تقف ضد حرية الآخرين .</p>				
30	<p>المفاهيم فهم وممارسة، ومفهوم الليبرالية ومفهوم الحرية والحداثة قضايا من الأهمية بحيث لا يتم التعامل معها بخفة واستخفاف، إذا كنا نريد أن نكون حدثيين وليبراليين يجب أن نكون أبناء العصر وأبناء المستقبل لا أبناء القبيلة وأبناء الماضي</p>				

Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية	<p>-أصبحت محل نقاش وسجال في الحياة الاجتماعية والفكرية والثقافية</p> <p>- تحمل في أسها وأساسها قضية الحرية في المعنى الشامل والكامل والعميق</p> <p>- تضيء في أفكارها ومعانيها قضايا تتداخل وتتشابك مع مفهوم الدولة ومفهوم المؤسسة والحرية السياسية والاقتصاد</p> <p>-تتصل اتصالا مباشرا بحرية الفرد</p> <p>- جاءت في السنوات الأخيرة إلى بلادنا مثلها مثل كل منجز فكري وسياسي واقتصادي وتعاملنا معها كما لو أنها حالة استهلاكية أخرى</p> <p>- لم يتم التعامل معها بوصفها حالة فكرية ترتبط بقضية الفرد والمجتمع</p> <p>- فلا تتم قراءاتها في السياق الاجتماعي والتاريخي الذي ظهرت فيه في الغرب</p> <p>-يتم التعامل معها برؤية مسطحة وفهم قاصر تماما كما تم التعامل مع الحداثة</p> <p>-ربطها بالدين بطريقة مبتسرة وموجزة.</p>

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>فض الاشتباك بين الحرية والليبرالية</p> <p>في حواراتي الشفهية مع مثقفين وإعلاميين حول (الليبرالية)، أو خلال مناقشاتي مع عدد من المغردين في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي عنها؛ لاحظت أنهم يضعون الليبرالية متلازمة للحرية، حتى أنهم يتجاوزون تقارب الدلالة اللغوية إلى تطابق المضمون الفكري، والتعبير الواقعي.</p>	<p>Intellectuals and journalists and twitter users > liberals</p>	<p>Claim1: Associating 'allibrahiah' with freedom is an intellectual fault.</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition (false equivalence)</p> <p>- Fallacy of definition</p> <p>- psychogenetic fallacy (argumentum ad hominem)</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics 'my'</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-Evaluation 'intellectual fault'</p> <p>-metaphor</p>
5	<p>بمعنى أنهم يرون الليبرالية مُعبّرة عن الحرية في الواقع المعاش. فكل موقف تتجلى فيه الحرية هو موقف ليبرالي، وكل ممارسة تتسم بالحرية هي صورة من صور الليبرالية، أو أحد تطبيقات قيمها. وهذا خلل فكري من عدة وجوه، الأمر الذي يتطلب فض الاشتباك بين الحرية والليبرالية في عقول أولئك المثقفين والإعلاميين والمغردن، أو من يرى رأيهم ويتبنى وجهة نظرهم.</p>				
10	<p>أول وجوه ذلك الخلل؛ أن كلمة (الليبرالية) غير عربية في أصلها، فهي ترجمة للكلمة الإنجليزية LIBERALISM، ومعناها (التحررية)، المشتقة من الكلمة الإنجليزية LIBERTY، التي هي (الحرية)، من هنا جاء الارتباط اللغوي بين مفهوم الليبرالية وكلمة الحرية عند البعض، مع مراعاة أن كلمة LIBERTY أصلها لاتيني هو LIBER، وتعني طبقة الرجال (الأحرار). إذاً هذا التقارب اللغوي هو الذي أوجد الإشكال المعرفي لدى من يجعل الحرية هي الليبرالية أو العكس. وهذا خطأ منهجي، لأن هذا التقارب لا بُدَّ أن يعززه البعد التاريخي</p>		<p>-Topos of definition (etymology)</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	
15	<p>لليبرالية، ويصادق عليه مضمونها الفكري، والتطبيق الواقعي لقيمها. فهل تاريخ الليبرالية يؤكد أنها فعلاً كانت تُجسّد الحرية؟ وهل مضمونها الفكري يُحقق ذلك؟ وهل تطبيقات قيمها اليوم بالنسبة للدول والأنظمة الليبرالية يُرهن على أنها بالفعل تُحقق الحرية؟ قطعاً</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of definition + Topos of reality+ Fallacy of ignorance (fallacy of relevance)</p>		<p>Intensification</p> <p>-assertion 'absolutely not'</p>

45	<p>الليبرالية الأمريكية بعد إعلان الاستقلال في القرن الثامن عشر الميلادي، شاركت في إبادة الهنود الحمر، واحتلت الفلبين منتصف القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي، أما الثورة الفرنسية التي تباها بها الليبرالية الغربية فقد أهدت العالم نابليون بونابرت بغزواته المدمرة وحملاته الصليبية على البلاد العربية.</p>				<p>'Genocide', 'brag'</p>
45	<p>أما الشواهد الواقعية على أزمة الليبرالية مع قيمة الحرية فهي عديدة، أبرزها مسألة (الحرية الدينية)، بالنسبة الجاليات المسلمة الكبيرة في الدول الغربية، فقد زادت وتيرة (إسلام فوبيا)، وكثرت القضايا والمواقف المتطرفة ضد الإسلام، فمن ينسى قضية (الرسوم المسيئة) المتكررة، ومحاربة الحجاب، ورفض المآذن، ومحاولة حرق القرآن، ومعارضة بناء المساجد، والقائمة قابلة للزيادة في ظل ليبرالية غربية هي أساساً (متناقضة) في واقعها</p>		<p>-Topos of reality + Topos of number+ Fallacy of freedom + fallacy of justice</p>	<p>Involvement -evaluation</p>	<p>Intensification -quantification -accumulation -evaluation</p>
50	<p>وإن كانت مثالية في فلسفتها، فالحرية الدينية لديها ناقصة العدالة وانتقائية الممارسة، فالليبرالية تحقق (التسامح) وتمنح ممارسة (الكراهية) في ذات الوقت ومع ذات الشيء، تنادي باستقلالية الأفراد وحماية حرياتهم وتمارس انتقائية القانون ضد أديانهم وحياتهم، وأبسط مثال موقف الليبرالية الأمريكية، التي أيدت إقرار قانون (معاداة السامية)، ورفضت إصدار قانون يجرم الإساءة للأديان، وقس على ذلك كثير، ويكفي موقف الليبرالية اليوم من</p>		<p>-Topos of tolerance + Topos or Fallacy of abuse (hate) Fallacy of freedom + fallacy of justice</p>		
55	<p>الثورة السورية، وكيف سكتت هذه الأنظمة الليبرالية على ما يجري من ذبح وتدمير للإنسان السوري وفق حساباتها الإقليمية ومصالحها القومية.</p>		<p>-Topos of example - Topos or fallacy of abuse</p>		

Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
<p>و متقفين وإعلاميين و مغردين</p> <p>الليبرالية</p> <p>الحرية</p>	<p>- يضعون الليبرالية متلازمة للحرية، حتى انهم يتجاوزون تقارب الدلالة اللغوية إلى تطابق المضمون الفكري، والتعبير الواقعي.</p> <p>- يرون الليبرالية مُعبّرة عن الحرية في الواقع المعاش.</p> <p>- غير عربية في أصلها</p> <p>- فهي ترجمة للكلمة الإنجليزية LIBERALISM ومعناها (التحررية)، المشتقة من الكلمة الإنجليزية LIBERTY، التي هي (الحرية) مع مراعاة أن كلمة LIBERTY أصلها لاتيني هو LIBER، وتعني طبقة الرجال (الأحرار).</p> <p>- مرتبطة بتجربة الغرب الحضارية خلال مسيرته التاريخية.</p> <p>- مفهوم الليبرالية ملتبس لدى كثير من الباحثين والمفكرين بحكم تعدده.</p> <p>- تحقق (التسامح) وتمنح ممارسة (الكراهية) في ذات الوقت</p> <p>- تنادي باستقلالية الأفراد وحماية حرياتهم وتمارس انتقائية القانون ضد أديانهم وحياتهم</p> <p>- قيمة إنسانية سابقة لليبرالية</p> <p>- موجودة في الثقافات، وقررتها الأديان، وعرفتتها الحضارات قبل ظهور الليبرالية.</p> <p>- واضحة الأبعاد لا تحتمل أكثر من معنى أو تفسير</p>

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>الحرية الليبرالية وإساءة الفهم التقليدي</p> <p>حاولت في المقالين السابقين إيضاح معالم رؤيتي لتحرر الليبرالي، وجاء الكلام فيهما اشتباكاً معرفياً مع التجاذبات النظرية التي تشغل أذهان المهتمين بهذا المجال الحيوي المتجدد دائماً وأبداً. لهذا جاء الكلام تنظيراً يُحيل إلى أفكار ومفاهيم ومصطلحات يعرفها القراء المحترفون، بينما تستغل على غيرهم -قليلاً أو كثيراً-.</p>			Involvement	
5	<p>وسأحاول في هذا المقال أن يكون الكلام عاماً/ جماهيرياً/ شعبوياً، قدر ما يحتمله الموضوع؛ لأن أولئك الذين يقرأون عن الليبرالية في المراجع العلمية المتخصصة "غير المؤدلجة"، لا يحتاجون إلى إيضاح مثل هذه الأبيجديات التي ناقشناها وسناقشناها في مسألة حدود الحرية الليبرالية. لهذا، سأحاول إيضاح الواضح -ببعض الأمثلة- لأولئك الذين لا يقرأون، أو لا يقرأون إلا قليلاً، وقراءاتهم إن وُجدت -على قلتها- تبقى محصورة في مقالات/ مُلخصات/ منشورات/ كُتّيبات الصراع الإيديولوجي التقليدي مع الليبرالية؛ فتكون متخمة بالجهل الفاضح، والتناقضات الصارخة، والتدليس الغبي، والهجاء الإيديولوجي المشحون بالتضليل والتفسيق، وربما التكفير.</p>	- professional readers -public	-Topos of knowledge by critical readers -Topos of ignorance of the public -Topos or fallacy of abuse by traditionalists' ideologies	-first-person perspective	
10					Intensification
15	<p>لا يُخاطب وُعَاظ التقليدية جماهيرهم البائسة إلا بما يُهَيِّجهم عاطفياً؛ لأن الطريق إلى عقل "العامي" البليد معرفياً، لا يمكن أن يكون إلا من خلال عاطفته الدينية والاجتماعية المتأججة. يقول الوُعَاظ التقليديون لجماهيرهم في تعالم مخادع: صحيح أن الليبراليات في كل دول العالم لا تُطلق للحرية عنانها بالكامل، ولكن، لا يستطيع أي ليبرالي أن ينكر أن "الحرية المطلقة" هي أصل "الحرية الليبرالية" التي يدعو إليها. وبالتالي -وفق طرح التقليديين التدليسي- فكل الليبراليات تسعى إلى الحرية المطلقة؛ لأنها هي الأصل الذي تصدر عنه تفاصيل النظرية الليبرالية.</p>	-Traditionalists -layman >dull	<p>Claim1: 'allibraliah' is clear for critical readers but still misunderstood by the ideologized public whose knowledge is based on traditionalists' ideologies.</p> <p>Claim2: 'allibraliah' is not based on unrestricted freedom as the traditionalists claim. -fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah' by the traditionalists.</p>		-qualification -evaluation -evaluation

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>لا ريب أن كلام الوعاظ هنا، أوله صحيح، وآخره كذب صريح، أو جهل فاضح. إن التقليديين يستغلون الصحيح فيه؛ لتركيب الجهل الفاضح، أو الهجاء البُهتاني عليه. نعم، الأصل في الحرية الليبرالية -الأصل الذي تتشرعن به نظرياً- أنها حرية مطلقة بلا حدود؛ لأن الإنسان وُجد -طبيعياً/ في الطبيعة- حُرّاً. ولكن، هذا لا يعني أن الليبرالية تسعى لذلك، بل ولا أن هذا ممكن أصلاً، لأن الحرية الطبيعية تعني الحرية الوحشية، هي تأكل الحرية الحرة؛ فينتج عن ذلك الأسر الطبيعي التام.</p> <p>وللتوضيح أكثر؛ أقول: لا غرابة في تأكيد الليبرالية على الحرية المطلقة؛ كنقطة انطلاق نظرية، فالإسلام يؤكد على هذه القاعدة المبدئية نظرياً: الحرية المطلقة. عند الأصوليين "أصول الفقه، لا الحركات الأصولية"، نجد تلك القاعدة الأصولية التي يكررها علينا الشرعيون باستمرار، وهي أن الأصل في كل شيء الإباحة، مؤكدين أن "المباح" لا يحتاج إلى دليل؛ لأنه هو الأصل، بينما "المُحرّم" هو الذي يحتاج إلى دليل؛ لأنه خروج عن الأصل: الإباحة العامة. وهنا، هل يجوز لأي أحد أن يقول إن الشرع الإسلامي يُبيح كل شيء؛ لأن الأصل فيه الإباحة؟! . طبعاً، لا يقول بهذا أحد، فالكل يعلم أن التأكيد على أصل الإباحة مبدأ نظري فقط؛ لضبط أصول التحريم الاستثنائي.</p> <p>هنا، يعود الوعاظ -متراجعين قليلاً-؛ فيقولون: صحيح أن الحرية الليبرالية مُقَيّدة، ولكنها مقيدة فقط بما لا يضرّ الآخرين، أي أن الإنسان حر أن يفعل ما يشاء؛ ما دام لا يضر بالآخر. وهذا صحيح مبدئياً أيضاً. لكن، يبقى السؤال الأهم، السؤال الإشكالي: ما هي حدود الإضرار بالآخرين؟. كلنا ندرك أنها ليست مجرد حدود الاعتداء المباشر، المادي أو المعنوي، بل هي أوسع من ذلك بكثير.</p> <p>إن حدود الإضرار بالآخرين غير محددة أصلاً في كل زمان ومكان، بل هي إشكالية، من حيث هي نسبية وظرفية؛ لأنها حدود ثقافية، أي تصنع الثقافة "بما فيها الدين" معالمها وآفاقها، فإذا كانت ترجع إلى أسس إجماعية في دين ثابت، بقيت ثابتة، وإن كانت خلافية، أو في</p>		<p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse by traditionalists.</p> <p>-Topos of definition of 'allibraliah' + topos or fallacy of freedom in 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of comparison (similarity between 'allibraliah' and Islam in freedom)</p> <p>Claim3: freedom in 'allibraliah' is relative based on cultural factors but not based on not harming others as traditionalists claim.</p> <p>- fallacy of definition of freedom .</p>	<p>-free indirect speech</p>	<p>-evaluation</p> <p>mitigation</p> <p>-agreement with the antagonist</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>دين متحول؛ أخذت في التحوّل والتبديل فوق مقتضيات الحال، الحال الإنساني والحال الواقعي.</p> <p>أظن أن هذا واضح. لكن، مع أنه واضح، إلا أنني سأمعن في التوضيح والتبسيط بالأمثلة، بل وبالصور الساذجة أحياناً؛ ليدرك العامي البسيط ملامح الصورة. يقول التقليديون: إن الليبراليين لا يضعون قيماً على الحرية إلا حدود الإضرار بالآخرين. والحقيقة أن الثقافة هي التي تصنع رؤيتنا لمفهوم الضرر. فمثلاً -وسأختار من الأمثلة ما يُشكّل هاجس الإنسان التقليدي-، لو أن إنساناً اختار بحريته أن يمشي عارياً في شوارع لندن أو باريس أو نيويورك، هل سيُسمح له بذلك، لو وقف هذا الإنسان العاري تماماً في المطار أو ركب الطائرة...إلخ، هل سيُسمح له بذلك، مع أنه -من حيث المبدأ التقليدي- يمارس حريته الشخصية التي لا تضر بالآخرين؟. طبعاً، جميعنا يعلم أن المجتمعات الليبرالية لا تسمح بذلك، وترى في هذا السلوك اعتداءً صارخاً على الفضاء العام الذي هو حق للجميع. ومن ثم، فهذا السلوك/ التعري في الفضاء العام هو عدوان صريح -ولكن غير مباشر- على الجميع، عدوان يعاقب عليه القانون، لاختراقه الآداب العامة الصادرة عن المواضع الثقافية التي ارتضاها الجميع -وهي مواضع ثقافية تشكلت بفعل عوامل كثيرة، ليس الدين المسيحي بمعزل عنها-. ما يعني أن مثل هذا السلوك ليس خياراً فردياً، رغم أنه لا يشكل "عدواناً مباشراً" من أحد على أحد.</p> <p>إذا جئنا إلى المجتمع المسلم، نجد أن الإسلام حاضر بقوة في تشكيل الرؤية الثقافية. مثلاً، لا يمكن أن يصدر في مجتمع مسلم قانون نظام يُبيح الزنى، ويجعله مشروعاً/ مُشرعاً. لكن -وهنا تأتي التفصيلات الثقافية، فالقانونية- هناك فرق بين تجريم الزنى، وبين فرض قوانين مراقبة اجتهادية تدعي الوصاية على السلوكيات العامة التي تكون -من حيث الأصل- مباحة؛ بدعوى سد الذرائع. فالأنظمة التي تحاول ضبط الاختلاط، أو ضبط حدود وظروف الخلوة...إلخ، كلها اجتهادية، بمعنى أنها ليست من الأصول القطعية، كما هو الأصل القطعي في تحريم الزنى. وبالتالي، فمثل هذه الأنظمة الاجتهادية تخضع للتنازع</p>	<p>-topos of relativity of freedom in 'allibraliah' + Topos of culture</p> <p>- fallacy of definition of freedom in 'allibraliah' by the traditionalists.</p> <p>-topos of culture.</p> <p>-topos of example (in the west).</p> <p>-Topos of example (local Islamic)</p>	<p>-first-person perspective</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-second-person perspective</p>	
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65	<p>المستمر بين أصحاب الرؤية الليبرالية، تلك الرؤية التي تمنح الإنسان الفرد حرية مسؤولة، وبين أصحاب الرؤية المحافظة التزمته التي ترى أن تفاصيل تصرفات الأفراد، يجب أن تبقى تحت رقابتها الصارمة التي تشكل هوية المجتمع الوصائي.</p> <p>أيضاً، يُجادل/ يُشاعِب التقليديون على الليبرالية بزعمهم أن الحرية موجودة في كل المذاهب، أو في معظم المذاهب، ومن باب أولى، هي موجودة في الإسلام، فلماذا تدعي الليبرالية اختكار التنظير للحرية، ولماذا تدعي الليبرالية أن التأكيد على الحرية هو ما يميزها عن غيرها؟. والحقيقة أن لكل مذهب أو توجه بوصلة اهتمام أساسية، تميزه عن غيره، فالحرية الفردية هي بوصلة الاهتمام الليبرالي. ولكن، لا يعني هذا أنها لا توجد عند الآخرين. إنها موجودة -بقدر ما- عند كل تيار فكري، ولكنها في الليبرالية أولوية، وعند الآخرين مفردة من مفردات الخطاب.</p>		<p>Claim4: individual freedom is central in 'allibraliah' but subsidiary in other concepts.</p> <p>-fallacy of comparison btw 'allibraliah' and other concepts.</p> <p>-Topos of difference (of 'allibraliah' from other concepts) + Topos of advantage of freedom in 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of example</p> <p>-Topos of existence of freedom in most concepts + Topos of centrality of freedom in 'allibraliah'</p> <p>Claim5: relativeness of freedom in 'allibraliah' does not mean that 'allibraliah' is</p>	<p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-second-person perspective</p>
70	<p>إن محور الأطروحة الليبرالية حول "الحرية الفردية" هو ما يميزها، كما أن "العدالة الاجتماعية" هي ما يميز الاشتراكية مثلاً. ففي الاشتراكية نجد إرادة تحرر، تُعاقب -في النهاية؛ كما تدعي نظرياً- التحرر الفردي، ولكنها تعترف أن هذا التحرر الفردي ليس هو محور اهتمامها. ومن هنا، تميزت الاشتراكية بالتمحور حول شيء، ليس هو محور اهتمام الليبرالية، والعكس صحيح، ومن هنا تمايزتا.</p>			
75	<p>ولمزيد من توضيح الواضح نقول: إن التأكيد على الحرية الفردية موجود في معظم المذاهب والتيارات والأديان، ولكن الليبرالية تجعل من هذه الحرية الفردية بؤرة اهتمامها، بل هويتها التي تميزها. وإذا كان كل ما تقدم يشير إلى أن "الحرية الليبرالية" نسبية، وظرفية، ومتحولة، فهذا يعني أن حدود الحرية الليبرالية ليست محددة سلفاً. وهنا، سيخرج الواعظ التقليدي علينا مُنكرًا ومُستنكرًا، فيزعم أن عدم القدرة على التحديد، تعني أن الليبرالية ليست أكثر من وهم، أو هي طرح لا هوية له، بحيث لا يعرف أصحابه ما يريدون أصلاً.</p>			
80	<p>لنفهم الليبرالية لابد أن ندرك أنها "توجه عام"، هي "حالة"، هي "نزعة تحررية"، وبالتالي فهي نسبية بالضرورة. فمثلاً، يُقال في الغرب: التيار الليبرالي المسيحي. ويعنون بهذا: التيار</p>			
85				

<p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p>	<p>الذي يتماهى مع القيم المسيحية، ولكن بروح تحريرية تعلي من قيمة الفرد. كذلك في العالم الإسلامي، يقال: الإسلام الليبرالي، أو التيار الليبرالي الإسلامي، تمييزاً له عن إسلام المتشددين، أو إسلام الكُتَّابانيين من جهة، وتمييزاً له عن ليبرالية مستغربة بالكامل، تحاول القطع مع واقعها، والبداية من درجة الصفر كما تدعي، وهذا هو عين المستحيل.</p> <p>وإذا كانت الليبرالية "حالة"، "ظرفية"، "نسبية"، فهذا يعني أنها توجد -بنسبة ما- في كل المجتمعات، وإن لم تفصح عن نفسها صراحة، وربما لا تعي نفسها. في إيران مثلاً، نجد أن الهيمنة السياسية والاجتماعية هي لرجال الدين. ومحمد خاتمي، الرئيس الأسبق، يلبس العمامة الدينية، ما يعني أنه من رجال الدين. لكن خاتمي يوصف -في إيران وخارجها- بأنه ليبرالي، فهل يعني هذا أنه يتبنى رؤية أشد التيارات الليبرالية تحراً في الغرب، لمجرد حيازته هذه الصفة: ليبرالي؟. طبعاً لا. ومن هنا، فوصف خاتمي بأنه ليبرالي هو وصف نسبي، أي أنه استحق هذا الوصف لكونه يُمثل اتجاهاً تحررياً انفتاحياً داخل منظومة وضائية مُغلقة/ منغلقة على نفسها. ولو أن خاتمي انتقل إلى إحدى عواصم الغرب بنفس الفكر وب نفس تفاصيل الرؤية دون تغيير؛ لكان يمينياً محافظاً.</p> <p>إن الليبرالي الواعي لا يخترق المواضع الثقافية/ الاجتماعية بالكامل. إنه يُعملُ رؤيته من خلالها. مثلاً، لو تم تكوين لجنة من عشرة أشخاص، للنظر في السن التي يجوز للشباب السفر فيها للخارج دون إذن أحد/ ولي أمر/ وصي. عالمياً، يستقل الفرد في حدود ١٨ تقريباً. لو كانت اللجنة أمام الخيارات المطروحة على النحو التالي: يأخذ حريته في السفر بعمر ١٨ / ١٩ / ٢٠ / ٢١ / ٢٢، سنجد أعضاء اللجنة يختلفون وفقاً لطبيعة المرجعية الثقافية التي تحدد رؤيتهم للأشياء. الليبرالي، ومن باب تأكيده على الحرية الفردية المسؤولة، سيختار عمر ١٨، ويؤكد أن الفرد بمجرد بلوغه السن القانوني؛ يتحمل مسؤولية نفسه بحرية تامة. وهو إذ يؤكد هذا الخيار، لا تغيب عنه الأخطار، ولكنه يرى أن الحرية أهم، ولها الأولوية، وأن السلبيات الناتجة عنها تعالج من مداخل أخرى، لا تتجاوز حدود تلك السلبيات.</p>	<p>a myth as the traditionalists claim.</p> <p>-Topos of definition of 'allibrahah'+ Topos of relativity.</p> <p>-Topos of example</p> <p>-Topos of existence of 'allibrahah' in all societies + Topos of ignorance of this existence.</p> <p>-Topos of example.</p> <p>-Topos of culture.</p> <p>-Topos of example.</p>	<p>-second-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification -evaluation</p>
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110	<p>هكذا سيكون اختيار الليبرالي. ولكن، في المقابل، سيختار الإنسان المحافظ سن ٢٢، ولو كان هناك سن أعلى لاختاره؛ لأنه يؤمن بضرورة ضبط سلوكيات الأفراد، ويؤمن أن الحرية المتاحة لهم ستفسدهم بالضرورة. ولهذا رأينا في كثير من الدول الكليانية -ومعظمها دول شيوعية/ اشتراكية التوجه-، تجعل من عدم السفر أصلاً، ومن السفر استثناء. ولهذا، من يريد السفر من مواطنيها للخارج ولو كان في عمر ٣٠، أو ٤٠ فعليه أن يأخذ تصريحاً خاصاً مُعقداً، لا يتاح إلا للقليل النادر.</p>	<p>Liberal vs. conservative</p>		<p>-third-person perspective</p>	
115	<p>مثال آخر: لو تم تكوين لجنة للإشراف على "معرض كتاب". هنا، ستجد أن عضو اللجنة الليبرالي لا يمنع إلا القليل النادر جداً، وربما لا يمنع شيئاً. وفي المقابل، ستجد المحافظ الوصائي يريد أن يجعل المنع هو الأصل، وأن يكون كل كتاب في المعرض يحمل تصريحاً خاصاً. وطبعاً، بين هذا وذاك، ولنسبية التوجه الليبرالي، ستجد الليبرالي المحافظ، وستجد المحافظ ذي النفس الليبرالية يقعون في المنتصف. وبديهي أن الليبرالي عندما يؤكد على ضرورة السماح بكل الكتب إلا ما ندر، لا يعني أنه يوافق على مضامين كل ما يُعرض في المعرض، بل يعني فقط، أنه يمنح الأفراد حرية مسؤولية، بحيث يُقرّرون بأنفسهم الضار والمفيد، بل وأن من حقهم خوض التجربة بكل مخاطرها، فهم المسؤولون -وحدهم- عن اختياراتهم في نهاية المطاف.</p>	<p>Liberal conservative - conservative liberal</p>	<p>-Topos of example</p> <p>Claim6: 'allibraliah' does not contradict the main principles of Islam but assess the relative application of these principles on the basis of the cultural factors that support the freedom of individuals.</p> <p>-Topos of culture.</p>	<p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation</p>
120	<p>يمكنك أن تلاحظ في الأمثلة السابقة أن الليبرالية لم تطرح ما يناقض أصلاً دينياً مُجمعاً عليه من جميع علماء الإسلام. لن يناقش أحدهم في أصل وجوب الزكاة مثلاً، لكن، سيكون ثمة نقاش في طريقة أدائها، وفي تفاصيل خطوات الإلزام بها؛ إذا تقرر الإلزام. والمقصود أن أعضاء اللجان المتخيلة، يطرحون آراءهم في حدود الممكن دينياً وثقافياً/ اجتماعياً، وهو ممكن ظريفي نسبي. وبما أن الأمر مرتبط بالسياق الثقافي العام، فمن الطبيعي أن تكون بعض الآراء الفقهية حاضرة، ومن الطبيعي أن يختار الليبرالي أقربها إلى الحرية الفردية؛ حتى لو كان رأياً لبعض الفقهاء مقابل رأي أغلبية الفقهاء، فوجود الخلاف يعني بالضرورة أن</p>				
125					
130					

	<p>المسألة ليست أصلاً، وأنها تمتلك فضاء تؤولاً يجعل الاحتكار -مهما كان مبرره- نوعاً من التطرف الإقصائي</p>		<p>-Topos of relativity of Islamic law. -Fallacy of exclusion.</p>		
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
الليبرالية	<p>- الأصل في الحرية الليبرالية -الأصل الذي تتشرعن به نظرياً- أنها حرية مطلقة بلا حدود؛ لأن الإنسان وُجد طبيعياً/ في الطبيعة- حُرّاً.ولكن، هذا لا يعني أن الليبرالية تسعى لذلك، بل ولا أن هذا ممكن أصلاً، لأن الحرية الطبيعية تعني الحرية الوحشية، هي تأكل الحرية الحرة؛ فينتج عن ذلك الأسر الطبيعي التام.</p> <p>- الحرية الفردية هي بوصلة الاهتمام الليبرالي.</p> <p>-إن تمحور الأطروحة الليبرالية حول "الحرية الفردية" هو ما يميزها.</p> <p>- الليبرالية تجعل من هذه الحرية الفردية بؤرة اهتمامها، بل هويتها التي تميزها.</p> <p>- لا بد أن ندرك أنها "توجه عام"، هي "حالة"، هي "نزعة تحررية"، وبالتالي فهي نسبية بالضرورة.</p> <p>- أنها توجد -بنسبة ما- في كل المجتمعات، وإن لم تفصح عن نفسها صراحة، وربما لا تعي نفسها.</p> <p>- الليبرالية لم تطرح ما يناقض أصلاً دينياً مُجمعاً عليه من جميع علماء الإسلام.</p>
الليبرالية عند التقليديين	<p>-يجادل التقليديون على الليبرالية بزعمهم أن الحرية موجودة في كل المذاهب، أو في معظم المذاهب، ومن باب أولى، هي موجودة في الإسلام، فلماذا تدعي الليبرالية احتكار التنظير للحرية.</p> <p>- الليبراليات في كل دول العالم لا تُطلق للحرية عنانها بالكامل، ولكن، لا يستطيع أي ليبرالي أن ينكر أن "الحرية المطلقة" هي أصل "الحرية الليبرالية" التي يدعو إليها.</p> <p>- فكل الليبراليات تسعى إلى الحرية المطلقة؛ لأنها هي الأصل الذي تصدر عنه تفاصيل النظرية الليبرالية.</p> <p>- يقولون: صحيح أن الحرية الليبرالية مُقيدة، ولكنها مقيدة فقط بما لا يضرّ بالآخرين، أي أن الإنسان حر أن يفعل ما يشاء؛ ما دام لا يضر بالآخر.</p> <p>- يقول التقليديون: إن الليبراليين لا يضعون قيداً على الحرية إلا حدود الإضرار بالآخرين.</p> <p>- يزعم أن عدم القدرة على التحديد (الحرية)، تعني أن الليبرالية ليست أكثر من وهم، أو هي طرح لا هوية له، بحيث لا يعرف أصحابه ما يريدون أصلاً.</p>

Appendix (C) : Translation certificate

PROFESSIONAL TRANSLATION

Proprietor: Khalid Hadaidi

License No. 408

J.C.C. No. 226726

C.R. No. 4030283743

5/2017

مكتب المحترف للترجمة

لصاحبه / خالد بن حسن حدايدي

رقم الترخيص ٤٠٨

رقم العضوية ٢٢٦٧٢٦

رقم السجل التجاري ٤٠٣٠٢٨٣٧٤٣

3055

إقرار


يقر مكتب المحترف للترجمة بأن النص المرفق باللغة الإنجليزية هو
ترجمة للوثيقة المرفقة باللغة العربية أو العكس

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

*This is to certify that the enclosed English text is
a translation of the enclosed Arabic document or vice versa*

مدير المكتب

Office Manager



خالد بن حسن حدايدي

Khalid .H. Hadaidi



المرجع: 2/ 2647

Appendix (D)

The analysis of texts translated into English in terms of DHA discursive strategies.

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>The Islamisation of 'allibraliah'</p> <p>In the 80's, a great debate had been occurred among intellectual circles over the concept of "Islamic literature", where some rejected Islamization which has no relevance to literature as it is a human product. On the other hand, some others were supporters for it as being representing a special type of literature that commits to the Islamic values, calls for them and stands in the way of each literary creation that violates the sanctities or push for shamelessness.</p> <p>That debate has not ceased, but has subsided as another debate emerge inside a circle wider than the intellectual circle and more attached to the public, related to the concept of the (Islamic media) especially after the spread of the culture of (the Islamic cassette) and the press of (the Islamic magazines) among the social circles since the 80s and until the era of the satellite TV, so the justifications of the religious trend in relation to literature have recurred with this media, with no conviction of that held by other trends especially secularism, that That emphasizes on separating religion from all the aspects of life, so what is for Allah is Allah's and what is for Caesar is Caesar's, but a large number of Islamists did not care about that secular objections, continuing the project of Islamization in various life</p>	<p>The religious trend</p> <p>Other trends>Secularism</p> <p>Islamists vs. Secularism</p>	<p>Claim 1: Islamisation has been used for different cultural, social, and intellectual fields (Topos and fallacy of Islamisation)</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos of history</p>	<p>Detachment:</p> <p>-Third person perspective.</p> <p>Detachment:</p> <p>-relative clauses</p> <p>-Third person perspective.</p>	<p>Intensification:</p> <p>-adj> great</p>

<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>norms, so since the spread of 'Liberalism' term in our cultural forums and repeating it in the media fields, and then its effective reflection on the social circles between acceptance and rejection and neutrality, 'Liberalism' is still a subject to a lot of analytical writings that discuss the position of Islam from it, in an intellectual attempt to find a cultural relationship between them, and also the critical articles that have dealt with the philosophical side of 'Liberalism' while addressing the points of similarities and differences between the liberal thought and the Islamic thought, so several writings emerged that mainly focused on 'Liberalism' as a human concept that represents a (variable mean) invented by the (scientific) human mind to manage the conflict with the dictatorial priestly mind peacefully, to achieve a (solid goal) which is the assurance of the individual freedom and then looking forward to establishing an integral system of a total social justice, thus 'Liberalism' is a (mean) that does not contradict with the core of Islam and its primary objectives.</p> <p>From that, the issue of the (Islamization of Liberalism') was born, and here is where the overturned understanding, because what determines the relationship between Islam and 'Liberalism' is not the life purposes or human values (freedom, justice, equality etc.), which we find that both sides agree upon, but what determines this relationship is the (cultural source), which is fixed in both Islamic and</p>		<p>- Fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-</p> <p>Fallacy of cultural flexibility of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of number.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of relation (between 'allibraliah' and Islam)</p> <p>-Topos of similarities (of values)</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>Detachment: -Third person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification: Adj> overturned</p>
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p> <p>85</p>	<p>liberal thoughts, as for 'Liberalism' is represented in the (human mind), according to the statement of the original Enlightenment philosophers and callers : (that there is no authority over the mind, but only the mind), until the human primarily remains soul-free, an owner of himself, his mind and his freedom in behaviour and belief, against all who want to take it from him, whether this authority is religious, feudal, dictatorial or sectarian, the human mind formulates the (positive law) and legislate them to protect the individuality of the human and his freedom. However, in Islam the cultural source is (religious) represented in prophecy (Quran and Sunna), through the texts and the legislation that include restrictive rules for the human behaviour though free for the human belief.</p> <p>Therefore, 'Liberalism' is not a (variable sense) to adjust it to the needs of a particular society. Rather, it is an idea that has a philosophical side which is (achieving the individual freedom), that can only be achieved in parallel with a cultural side which is (assigning the mind as a positivist source), and any misuse of one of the sides means the absence of 'Liberalism', while adopting both together simply means the exclusion of Islam, so if the mind rejects the (Islamization of science), based on the logic that science is a general human heritage that all human beings share including Muslims and others, then it also rejects the Islamization of ideas and beliefs that</p>		<p>-Topos of differences (of source).</p> <p>-Topos or Fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Fallacy of flexibility of 'allibraliah'</p> <p>-Topos of danger (of replacing Islam with 'allibraliah)</p> <p>- fallacy of Islamisation of 'allibraliah')</p> <p>-Fallacy of relation</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third person perspective</p> <p>-Distancing personal deictic</p> <p>-Passive voice</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-adverbial clause</p> <p>-certainty</p>
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90	have philosophical roots and cultural sources that excludes the religious texts, and therefore the (Islamization of Liberalism) is rejected due to the intellectual speciality of Islam and 'Liberalism' and the fundamental antagonism between them.				
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
'ilmaniah' Secularism	-That emphasizes on separating religion from all the aspects of life, so what is for Allah is Allah's and what is for Caesar is Caesar's
Ummah	- recession of the secular tide and its catastrophic failure
'allibraliah'	- leans toward its religion and what relates to it
	-That is still new in the public awareness
	- It is not a variable mean to adjust it to the needs of a particular society.
	-It is an idea that has a philosophical side which is (achieving the individual freedom), that can only be achieved in parallel with a cultural side which is (assigning the mind as a positivist reference)
Islamic liberalism	-is merely a hybrid thought that attempts to combine between Islam and 'allibraliah'
	-or rather forming 'allibraliah' according to the Islamic values, under the claim that 'allibraliah' is a mean and not a religion or a thought, thus it does not contradict the religion of the society, that can adjust it according to its values and norms.
Saudi liberal writers and intellectuals	-They seek to the Islamisation of this soft idea to be easy for the public to like.

The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity, Al Riyadh Gazette, 2009,By Faris Hizam

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1 5 10 15 20 25 30	<p>The Extremists... The Smartest at Adversity</p> <p>At each security incident, the 'liberal' voice rises to its maximum, while the extremist Islamic goes down until the storm subsided, and then the 'allibration' fall back a little, so the extremist Islamists return to the point of ignition.</p> <p>This is exactly what is happening in Saudi Arabia, since the assault incident on his highness the assistant of the minister of interior. The 'liberal' voices are in their highest through the websites and satellite channels, while the Islamists occupy themselves with side issues, and they increase their focus on "Tash", so it appears to you that 'Nasir Alqasabi' or 'Abdullah Alsadhan' are more dangerous than the suicide bomber 'Abdullah Asiri'.</p> <p>It is just a few days, and the 'allibration' will calm down, and then we will see the extremists go out of their trenches with spears that they throw towards their opponents with full force, incitement and betrayal, and so on until another news comes; arresting a cell, registering a new security incident, Allah forbid, so then they return to their silence.</p> <p>A review over 75 month, reinforce this vision, without any obvious change in the two parties conflict, to achieve their goals.</p> <p>The question is: why does the extremist voice go down these days, and return aggressive later?</p> <p>The answer of the question starts from the Friday sermon preacher with and does not end at the school teacher. As between the announcement of the assassination attempt and the Friday prayer in the kingdom a distance that does not exceed 8 hours I think it is enough for any preacher to replace the topic of his talk. But how many preacher have done this? Each reader should question, and recall the topic of the Friday talk in the mosque of his neighbourhood.</p> <p>For example, the orator of the holy mosque did not do it.</p>	<p>The extremists</p> <p>Liberals vs. extremist Islamists</p>	<p>Claim 1: Unlike liberals, the Islamists voice go down at the time of a terrorist attack and raise after that.</p> <p>-Topos of time+ Topos or fallacy of consequences.</p> <p>-Topos of reality</p> <p>-Topos or Fallacy of neglect of main issues</p> <p>Topos of time+ Topos or fallacy of consequences.</p> <p>-Topos or Fallacy of threat or danger of Islamists</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos of responsibility</p> <p>-Topos of example</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-evaluation and quantification</p> <p>-exaggerating metaphor</p> <p>-repetition</p> <p>-personal deictic</p> <p>-repetition</p> <p>-personal deictic 'we'</p> <p>-exaggerating metaphor</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>Nominalisations</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-reader perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-superlative 'smartest'</p> <p>-quantification 'to its maximum'</p> <p>-evaluative adjective> 'extremist'</p> <p>-comparative 'more dangerous'</p> <p>-qualification</p> <p>-evaluation> 'extremist', 'aggressive'</p> <p>-quantification</p>

35	However, in the same case, how many preacher have talked about Ramadan drama series, one of which the “Tash” episode about education? Perhaps the answer will seem like a national disaster, if it is obvious for us that the mosques that spoke about the series are more in number than the mosques that their orator decided to replace the topic of their talk to the suicidal bombing incident. And what more painful is to have a Friday sermon preacher that speaks about “Tash” episode after 12 hours of recording the most dangerous terrorist attack in the country.		-Topos of number	Involvement - personal deictic 'us'	-evaluation 'national disaster', 'painful' -superlative 'most dangrous' -quantification
40	The obvious in the conflict between the Islamists and the 'liberals' around terrorism in the country, is that the extremist Islamists are smarter than their 'liberal' opponents. They know when to speak and when to remain silent. And the march of 75 months indicates that they did not lose much as was expected. And with their extremism they are present with full strength. And what we have to do is to wait a little, two weeks or so, to see the extremists turning the table on 'allibraleen'		Claim 2: extremist Islamists are smarter than their liberal opponents. -Topos of history -Topos of danger -Topos of time	Involvement - personal deictic 'we'	-comparative 'smarter' -intensifying propositional phrase 'with full strength'
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
Islamists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - occupy themselves with side issues - go out of their trenches with spears that they throw towards their opponents with full force, incitement and betrayal - are smarter than their 'liberal' opponents. - They know when to speak and when to remain silent. - they did not lose much as was expected. - with their extremism, they are present with full strength - turning the table on 'allibraleen'
Liberals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The 'liberal' voices are in their highest through the websites and satellite channels

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1 5 10 15 20	<p style="text-align: center;">‘Allibraliah’ is an extension to ‘Hadatha’</p> <p>In the past, the most prominent problems and obstacles of ‘Hadatha’ was defining it and determining its meaning, and the battle around ‘Hadatha’ was a battle around the term specifically and not around its meanings, and therefore Alghathami was concerned with naming the conflict over ‘Hadatha’ as a discussion for the absence of the rule of argumentation of the obligation to a specific definition that they can discuss.. and because the argumentation rule requires the critic to not oblige the one criticised with a definition he does not approve, Alghathami -aware or not- jumps this rule so he criticises harshly ‘allibrallyeen’ (liberals)- but not ‘allibraliah’- and he obliges them with his definitions and terms without hearing from them a single definition of ‘allibraliah’ though they show in many of their writings and articles and they were closer to agreement on the definition of ‘allibraliah’ and setting their goals unlike ‘alhadatheen’ (the modernists).</p> <p>And in terms of the logic and real experience, the concept -any concept- cannot by represented completely by any individual, so he is the concept and the concept is him, but the logic and experience say that any human being must be outside -naturally- any concept</p>		<p>Claim1: similar to ‘hadathah’, liberals are criticised on the definition of ‘allibraliah’ though they agree upon its definition and aims.</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p> <p>-Fallacy of abuse (of ignoring the counter-argument)</p> <p>Claim2: groups e.g. ‘liberals’ cannot completely represent concepts they belong to i.e. ‘allibraliah’ as</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person voice</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>superlative>most prominent</p> <p>-adj> harsh</p> <p>-evaluation>’not logical or rational’</p>

<p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>he labels himself with or belongs to, and all the criticism to ‘allibrallyeen’ was not logical as it is based on the assumption of uniformity and conformity between ‘allibrallah’ and ‘allibrallyeen’ and this stems from the assumption of the Infallibility of ‘allibrallyeen’ from error and from transgressing the concept, and if this is the case then the denial of the existence of Muslims, Jews or Christians on earth is the priority to the rule as heavenly religions set the ideal theory for living and call the individual to approach them as much as possible with the impossibility of matching them, and this has not been said since the dawn of the mankind.</p> <p>From here, I say to all criticsers you are wrong by thinking that ‘allibrallyeen’ are infallible as they are human beings like you that make mistakes and corrections and their mistakes in their practices or practical application of ‘allibrallah’ do not mean they do not exist as a thought and a culture; so ‘allibrallah’ is a great principle that each human being should call for, adopt and has the honor for belonging to it, and ‘allibrallah’ in sum and simply as the liberal thinker Dr. Abdulrahman Alrashid said:</p> <p>“it is a simple human concept that believes only in freedom of choice, and this freedom is narrowed or widened according to the vision of every individual”.so if the majority chose to be conservative, then this is their right and choice, and if it prefers the opposite, then it is theirs. Therefore, Netherland allows for smoking</p>		<p>human beings are not infallible.</p> <p>-Topos of logic + topos of experience</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of human fallibility</p> <p>-Topos of comparison</p> <p>Claim3: ‘allibrallah’ is a great humane concept that is based on freedom of choice</p> <p>-Topos of definition</p> <p>-Topos of right of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of example</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictic ‘I’, ‘you’</p> <p>-direct speech</p>	<p>-rhetorical figure> analogy</p> <p>-hyperbole</p> <p>-Adj> great</p> <p>-Intensifying</p> <p>Modal verb> should</p>
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45	<p>weeds, while British police arrest who deal with it. So the freedom of individuals is limited by the choice of the group, so if the majority of the society is conservative then its choice is the one that prevails, thus 'allibralyon', theoretically, are the closest people to all, as they are supposedly believing in the rights of Islamists, communists, nationalists and social conservatives"</p>		<p>-Topos of the advantage of 'liberals'</p>		<p>-Superlative 'closest'</p>
50	<p>Unfortunately, the reality of the discussion -if it is so called- between Islamists and 'allibralyeen' is still primarily on the relationship between 'allibraliah' and Islam, and there is still much debate between them though the fact that the issue of the relationship remains at the forefront of the debate indicates that the discussion between them did not develop and did not progress at all..which indicates a strong opposition to the liberal thought in the kingdom, this opposition in my opinion is based on a jump in discussion from the level of the apparent and declares to the level of the hidden and implicit, which means that all this opposition and resistance is based on assumption and expectations taken seriously so we become in front of the judgment of the intentions and what the chest hide.</p>		<p>Claim4: the debate between Islamists and liberals has not evolved indicating the strong resistance against 'allibraliah'</p> <p>-Topos of reality (of debate) +topos of consequence -Strawman Fallacy</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'in my opinion', 'we become'</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'unfortunately', 'strong'</p>
55	<p>And despite all of that, there are huge mistakes that the Islamist trend make without knowing, which lies in its continuous attempts to undermine 'allibraliah' and limit its spread, and he uses in that various means of repression, notably the repeated accusations</p>		<p>Claim5: Islamists are attempting to eliminate 'allibraliah' through various means of suppression.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'I saw, I found'</p>	<p>-evaluation> 'big mistakes', 'repression', 'at best'</p>
60					

<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p>	<p>against 'allibrallyeen' that they aim to destroy the religion and spread the moral corruption in the society. And although there is no evidence on these accusations other than a number of writings for anonymous writers -that could be traitors working for Islamists- the Islamic trend insists on these accusations, and I saw many discussion and seminars around 'allibraliah' and I found that the evidences have not changed for a long time, even the texts that the opponents cite have not changed at all, which indicates the weakness or the evidences they rely on or the lack of evidence at best.</p> <p>I think the emergence of the 'librali' trend in the kingdom -with its single purpose that is freedom- is mainly due to that the dominant existent group does not support freedom -as a cultural and intellectual value- and therefore some Islamists criticize the liberal trend for this matter so they say: what is the benefit of 'allibraliah' if it agrees with Islam..?! and the truth is that 'allibraliah' has no relation with Islam or with any other religion as it is an independent concept that does not intersect with Islam in terms of that it is a religion that supports freedom and gives the other the right to believe in others', but it does not either accept coercion in religion and the Islam of the compelled as the necessary condition to the validity of Islam is the freedom to enter it and to accept it as a religion of man.. Thus the disagreement was not for Islam as a religion but for Islam as a group led by many figures, and from here</p>	<p>Opponents>Islamists</p>	<p>-Topos or fallacy of accusation+ Topos of time+ Topos of number</p> <p>Claim6: the emergence of 'allibraliah' is due to the existence of the dominant Islamic group that does not support freedom.</p> <p>-Topos of culture</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignoring the counter-argument</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of relationship between Islam and 'allibraliah' (differences)</p> <p>-Topos of definition of Islam</p> <p>-Topos of right of freedom of expression</p>	<p>-repetition of word 'the same, the same'</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third person perspective</p>	
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<p>85</p> <p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p>	<p>the existence of the 'liberal' trend and its insistence to emerge and call for its freedom to express his views and ideas can be understood and justified, but the obstacle to 'alliberal' in the kingdom is that its figures call for the respect of freedom of expression at the time they are standing in front of a group that does not believe in this freedom and it attempts to suppress and exclude them and uses all available means most powerful of which is takfir and treason -that make all the spectrums of the society an enemy to them- which is the weapon that no one use except the extremist groups that do not believe in the intellectual and cultural pluralism, and the obstacle hits 'alliberal' in its heart and motive base -which is freedom- as you cannot call for freedom and tolerance with a party that attempts to exclude and dismiss you, so while the liberal believe in the Islamist right of expression, the Islamist confiscates his freedom and his right of expression, and the equation is supposed to be equal (give me my freedom I give you yours)!..</p> <p>But -with a historical review- the opposition that liberal trend encounter today was encountered before by the Hadatha trend that was able to pass that stage with minimal losses, with the difference that the liberal trend is attempting to make change at the intellectual and social level and this what made its mission much harder and very difficult, as it needs longer time to overcome all the obstacles in front of it and come out with the most possible gains..</p>	<p>Extremists> Islamists</p> <p>obstacle>Islamists</p> <p>Freedom>'alliberal'</p>	<p>-Topos or Fallacy of abuse (suppression and elimination by Islamists)</p> <p>Claim7: 'alliberal' is an extension to 'hadatha' as they have the same project.</p> <p>-Topos of historical comparison.</p> <p>-Topos of difficulty of progress and change+ Topos of time</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-second person voice 'you'</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-passive voice</p> <p>-third person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation></p> <p>'harder and very difficult'</p>
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110	<p>In my personal opinion, if we take Hadatha as a form of specialised literary criticism then 'allibraliah' is the intellectual and cultural form of Hadatha, and from here 'allibraliah' is the extension to Hadatha in the kingdom and complementary to it with a difference in the figures and characters, but the project is undoubtedly one.</p>		<p>- Topos of similarities and differences between 'Hadatha' and 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'in my personal opinion'</p>	<p>-assertion 'undoubtedly'</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - is a great principle that each human being should call for, adopt and has the honour for belonging to it -it is a simple human concept that believes only in freedom of choice, and this freedom is narrowed or widened according to the vision of every individual - its figures call for the respect of freedom of expression at the time they are standing in front of a group that does not believe in this freedom. - hit in its heart and motive base- which is freedom- - is the intellectual and cultural form of Hadatha - the extension to Hadatha in the kingdom and complementary to it
Liberal trend	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -are human beings like you that make mistakes and corrections -their mistakes in their practices or practical application of 'allibraliah' do not mean they do not exist as a thought and a culture -the closest people to all - are believing in the rights of Islamists, communists, nationalists and social conservatives -its single purpose that is freedom - believe in the Islamist right of expression - is attempting to make change at the intellectual and social level -it needs longer time to overcome all the obstacles in front of it and come out with the most possible gains..
Islam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -a religion that supports freedom -gives the other the right to believe in others', - it does not accept coercion in religion and the Islam of the compelled
Islamists trend	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -its continuous attempts to undermine 'allibraliah' and limit its spread

<p>Hadatha</p> <p>Hadatha trend</p>	<p>-and he uses in that various means of repression, notably the repeated accusations against ' allibrallyeen' that they aim to destroy the religion and spread the moral corruption in the society.</p> <p>- does not support freedom -as a cultural and intellectual value-</p> <p>-a group led by many figures</p> <p>-does not believe in this freedom</p> <p>-it attempts to suppress and exclude them and uses all available means most powerful of which is takfir and treason</p> <p>-do not believe in the intellectual and cultural pluralism</p> <p>-attempts to exclude and dismiss you</p> <p>-confiscates his (liberal) freedom and his right of expression</p> <p>-a form of specialised literary criticism</p> <p>- was able to pass that stage with minimal losses</p>
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>Who is the Islamist-liberal</p> <p>The previous article discussed the changes of the Arab cultural public opinion in the last century in terms of that they were of modernist tendencies with a liberal national and Islamic revival nature that dominated the political scene, then in the middle of the century the scene turned into nationalism, and in its end, it leaned towards the political Islam movements.</p> <p>So what is the future of this scene? There is a state of a fusion of the political opposites; between 'allibraliah' and Islamism; so can they unite in one political vision, as in Hagel dialectical way of interpreting the intellectual conflicts over history by the conflict of the opposites and their unity? I.e. the emergence of an idea that carries its opposite inside it through an idea that negate it, then a third idea is produced that negate the second and unite the opposites in a new idea; so the chain of ideas returns by re-establishing itself until the end of history. But is there really an Islamist 'liberaliah'? and what is it? And how its advocates and the others see it?</p> <p>What we see of the Islamist political parties taking the lead in the elections as in Tunisia (Nahda party), Morocco (Justice and development party), and Egypt (Freedom and justice party), means</p>		<p>Claim1: The future of Arab cultural scene indicates a state of fusion of political opposites; between 'allibraliah' and Islam</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos of antagonism + Topos of definition</p> <p>-Topos of example</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-passive voice</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Mitigation;</p> <p>Question instead of assertion</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>that they accepted the liberal democratic and the multi-party system and the peaceful transition of power; so what remains of their fundamentalism? It can be said that they are politically converting to ‘allibraliah’ but they conserve their cultural and social heritage; which means that they are in the process of transition to become civil conservative parties similar to the justice and development part in Turkey.</p> <p>And now there are fundamental sectors of Islamists that are oriented towards the political ‘allibraliah’ and some have even entered into a political partnership with left-wing movements like in Tunisia. And there are pro-Muslim Brotherhood parties that are classified as liberal parties such as Al-wasat party in Egypt. On the other hand, there is the Moroccan liberal party which declares that it rejects and eliminate any position contrary to Islamic teachings. Thus, there is a political integration that forms in the Islamist ‘allibraliah’.</p> <p>So, what is the Islamist ‘allibraliah’? though it is not one trend but different spectra and movements and various intellectuals, their basic premises can be placed. After the religious premise which is the belief in the basic principles of Islam such as the Islamic creed and the pillars of Islam; that movements view that Islam adopts the general values of ‘allibraliah’ such as freedom (of expression and belief), independence of the individual, equality and human rights;</p>		<p>-Topos of example</p> <p>Claim2: ‘Allibraliah alislamia’ (liberal Islam) is based on that Islam conforms with ‘allibraliah’ as it adopts the general values of ‘allibraliah’.</p> <p>-Topos of definition</p> <p>-Topos of human rights (humanitarianism) + topos of authority (religious texts)</p> <p>-Topos of modernisation (of reinterpreting the religious</p>	<p>Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>focusing on their interpretation of religious texts on these values. And it calls for the distinction between the views of Faqih and Islam, and for the reinterpretation of the religious texts according to the circumstances of time and place and not to be restricted to the old interpretations. And their difference from the fundamentalists is in the interpretation of the basic Islamic values for the modern life in general and for politics in particular.</p> <p>So, in politics, some see that there are no specific texts in Islamic jurisprudence that deal with political issues except the principle of consultation, and since 'allibraliah' conforms with the essence of Islam then it is desirable to build the state. Some see that establishing liberal political institutions (such as parliament, elections and civil rights) and social care policies do not contradict any religious texts, but can be considered an application of some of the Islamic principles that set forth in some Qur'anic texts, and that can also be drawn from the conduct of caliphs (Mr. Yassin, quoting the book "Islamic Liberalism" by Leonard Binder).</p> <p>And in this sense, it does not separate religion from the state, but it views that the Islamic religion has not dealt with the details of politics or the process of building the state as Islam set the general moral principles and left the details for the human jurisprudence. The Islamist liberals sees in that a return of the Islamic main principles that are free of the authority of the politicized clerics, of</p>		<p>texts to suit the current time and place)</p> <p>-Topos of disadvantage (of lack of religious texts dealing with politics)+ Topos of advantage of 'allibraliah' in politics.</p> <p>-Topos of rights</p> <p>- topos of authority (religious texts)</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of secularism</p>	<p>-Indirect speech</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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65	<p>the deviations accumulated over the centuries and of the jurisprudence that was appropriate in its time, but is no longer the case at present.</p>				
70	<p>And this is not new, as this emerged before in the so-called Renaissance era that had Islamic thinkers that put forward such general ideas, such as: Kawakibi, Afghani, Mohammed Abdo, Khairuddin Tunisian, Ibn Badis, Ali Abdul Razek, Malik bin Nabi; However, these ideas were in the realm of thought and not in the political application. The new thing is that these ideas start to see the light on the ground.</p>		<p>-Topos of history (of the concept) -Topos of emergence (of the concept)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
75	<p>Opponents of the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ are many. First, there is a conceptual rejection on the integration of ‘liberali’ and Islamist terms in politics. So liberals emphasize on the distinction between the concepts: “Muslim” and “Islamist”, as a Muslim is the one who believes in the religion of Islam and most liberals in the Islamic world are Muslims, while Islamist is a modern political concept which means the one that belongs to fundamental political movements; so how can the fundamentalist meet with the liberal in one political vision? Hence, the concept should be ‘Muslim liberal’ rather than ‘Islamist liberal’.</p>	<p>-Fundamentalists> Islamists</p>	<p>Claim3: The opposition against liberal Islam cannot eliminate ‘Allibraliah Alislamiaiah’ -Topos of resistance -Fallacy of definition by liberals (of combining Islamist and liberal concepts)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
80	<p>The Islamists, in turn, object to the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ legitimately summarized by the Islamic writer Tamer Bakr in three points. The first is the ignorance of the Islamic sources of legislation, such as the</p>		<p>-Fallacy of Islamic law by Islamists (‘Allibraliah Alislamiaiah’ violates the rules of Islamic law)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	

<p>85</p> <p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p>	<p>abolition of the consensus on the grounds that it is impossible to achieve it, and as the abolition of the Qiyas on logical basis rather than fundamentalist jurisprudence one, and also the division of legislation into general and temporary, resulting in the principle of the historicity of Hadith e.i. the affairs of politics and management came in the time of the prophet for its appropriateness in that time. The second is to consider any dispute between Islamic jurists as an indication of the absence of a specific jurisprudential rule on the disputed issue, which makes it easier to adopt a composed method in the sharia laws and to claim that this approach is the method of moderation. The third is to replace the system of Islamic values with the universal system of values, that is, to achieve the universal values of Islam, not the supreme values of Islam.</p> <p>These objections of negation cannot eliminate the existence of the Islamist ‘allibraliah’ in the arena, but they have caused confusion and ambiguity in defining the concept and its followers. The majority of those who belong to Islamist ‘allibraliah’ avoid to be classified to avoid being accused of the political fluidity or political opportunism by both Islamists and liberals. The fundamentalists do not only criticised the Islamist liberals legitimately, but also accuse their vicious westernised intentions. Liberals, in turn, suspect that Islamist liberals use liberal democracy as a provisional tactic to seize power and then blow up all democratic values.</p>		<p>-Fallacy of resistance against ‘Allibraliah Alislamia’ + Topos of existence of ‘Allibraliah Alislamia’</p> <p>-Topos of definition - strawman fallacy</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>110</p> <p>115</p>	<p>But the accusation of intentions is difficult to prove before the appearance of its features, and it is apparent in the discourse of Islamist liberals that they adopt Islamic jurisprudence that are adapted to modern life and able to build modern society without relying on traditional jurisprudence that they find very conservative or strict or regressive. In the field of politics, they believe that Islam has left Muslims free in deciding upon their systems according to their interests and circumstances.</p>		<p>Claim4: Islamist liberals adopts the modern Islamic law rather than the traditional one.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of modernisation - Topos of rights (humanitarianism) 	<p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Mitigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Anonymisation by means of impersonalisation 'It is Apparent that'
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
The Islamist 'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - it is not one trend but different spectra and movements and various intellectuals -view that Islam adopts the general values of 'allibraliah' such as freedom (of expression and belief), independence of the individual, equality and human rights; focusing on their interpretation of religious texts on these value. - it calls for the distinction between the views of Faqih and Islam, and for the reinterpretation of the religious texts according to the circumstances of time and place and not to be restricted to the old interpretations. - their difference from the fundamentalists is in the interpretation of the basic Islamic values for the modern life in general and for politics in particular. -it is desirable to build the state. -it does not separate religion from the state -it views that the Islamic religion has not dealt with the details of politics or the process of building the state. - they adopt Islamic jurisprudence that are adapted to modern life and able to build modern society without relying on traditional jurisprudence that they find very conservative or strict or regressive. - In the field of politics, they believe that Islam has left Muslims free in choosing their regimes according to their interests and circumstances.
liberals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - emphasize on the distinction between the concepts: "Muslim" and "Islamist"

Islamists	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- suspect that Islamist liberals use liberal democracy as a provisional tactic to seize power and then blow up all democratic values. - , object to the Islamist 'allibrahiah' legitimately- not only criticised the Islamist liberals legitimately, but also accuse their vicious westernised intentions
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1 5 10 15 20 25	<p>“Human Rights”: between Man and Political Employment</p> <p>The 12th century is considered the century wherein the human movement began to manifest itself in Europe, as a general cultural movement whose questions are being asked for real mobility through the intellectual-literary mobility. This movement and that evolved through combination to create the so-called Renaissance, the era that established the first building blocks of the contemporary Western / global civilization, after which, relatively, the themes of concern and attention shifted from the transcendental / metaphysical to the human.</p> <p>The human has been the subject of clear interest throughout the Renaissance, even if he has not had a clear vision of what human rights are. This interest has kept up his vision in an attempt to push injustice against the human, at least in what seemed clear -then - that injustice violates the natural right of the human.</p> <p>With the overriding of the human concern and its extension to the whole of the knowledge fields, and then the social / political spaces, a set of general human principles emerged as a reference to the rights controversy that was not isolated from theological perceptions; even though it did not correspond with them at the level of direct ideas (as that the rational / natural theses at the time are based on theological conceptions in the underlying indirect subconscious).</p> <p>These general principles have reached their most obvious form - and I do not say the most complete one - in the Declaration of the French Revolution of Rights, which marked the beginning of a new age for</p>		<p>Claim1: The concept of Human rights has been developed in the west.</p> <p>-Topos of history</p> <p>- Topos of culture (western culture)</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p> <p>- Topos of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos of right (human rights)</p> <p>-Topos of history of relation between human rights and theology</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	

<p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p> <p>45</p> <p>50</p>	<p>the human. In the light of the universality of these rights and their commonality, the intellectual paths and the practical processes that are important to human beings work to create a new world that guarantees the basic human rights for all, linked to the origin of human assets, that all people are born free and equal.</p> <p>The space of human rights debates has expanded since the French Revolution and its liberal / humanist slogans till today. Apart from the setbacks, hindrances and even disappointments, the bet - the apparent and the implied - has been available to the extent that a natural integrated system (based on the principle of the natural one origin) of human rights can be based on the general human commonality. The bet continued, and in tandem with the undeniable success of a semi-integrated system; in which the chances of success increased through the rise of the colonial domination of the Western civilization, which has - or has tried to - globalized its civilizational and humanitarian vision, especially after the establishment of international organizations that sponsors the sovereign rights, and aspires to the peaceful resolution of all forms of conflict by peaceful means, or by force that aims for the general peace.</p> <p>However, the greatest success of the globalization of these rights is linked to the development of means of transport, which contributed to human and cultural communication, and to the development of the means of media communication, as well as the general globalized effects that accompany the globalization of technology and the market economy. This has resulted in the widespread of the Western vision of human rights and its globalization because the modern world - with its international organizations, knowledge, science and economics powers, as well as military hegemony - is still largely Western.</p>		<p>-Topos of history of human rights + Topos of advantage of human rights + Topos of definition of human rights (freedom and equality)</p> <p>Claim2: human rights debates spread globally</p> <p>-Topos of time</p> <p>- Topos of universality</p> <p>-Topos of power (western power) + Topos of culture + Topos of rights (human rights)</p> <p>-Topos of advantage (of globalisation)</p> <p>Claim3: The western vision of human rights is not absolute but relative.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of universality (of human rights)</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-Qualification</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-Self-correction: 'but still', 'to great extent'</p>
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<p>55</p> <p>60</p> <p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p>	<p>As far as the universality of human rights has been in the past decades of success; the more questions that have been posed to them in succession. The Enlightenment philosophers, as well as philosophers of the post-Enlightenment, have often questioned the legitimacy of general natural / human principles; for everyone everywhere / environment, and at all times (referring to the debate about it in terms of transcending history). They also raised questions about their details that go beyond the general human commonality, as well as the general principles in terms of the details that are more and more related to time and spatial variables.</p> <p>This means that this human rights system, which seems to have been completed as a general reference, was -in many of its themes- a subject of dispute inside the Western civilization that produced it. Many of its details (those details that cannot be applied in practice without them) are still - and will remain - the subject of great controversy, sometimes reaching the base of the general principles. And the issue of its transcendence (its absoluteness in terms of its validity for all times and places) is still a subject of dispute as well; as the era of enlightenment that produced it, and the subsequent eras in which they have been completed, are not isolated from critical reviews; in addition to the fact that the idea of progress on which the Enlightenment era is based Requires that the evolution of the idea is necessarily according to the variables of reality; from the fact that the reality changed by changing the course of ideas. In other words, in the end, human rights visions must be developed/changing; and ultimately, they must be relative in time. If it is confirmed as relative in time, it is inevitable that it will be relative in place.</p> <p>Of course, temporal and spatial relativity (which is the most important data of contemporary anthropological studies) does not mean that there is no universal human reference, which is in</p>		<p>-Topos of advantage of western human rights + Topos of disadvantage of controversy</p> <p>-Fallacy of absoluteness + Topos of relativity and change + Topos of reality</p> <p>-Topos of universality of human rights</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>85</p> <p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p> <p>110</p>	<p>agreement, and must be provided, to provide freedom and justice to the human, even within the limits availability to the human. The work on humanity is all on relativity, and the fact that it is relative, does not mean emptying it of its contents, and then neglecting it; as far as it is necessary to engage in it; with awareness of its relativity and exploiting what this relativity offer in order to achieve maximum situational harmonization that aims for absoluteness through adapting with relativeness.</p> <p>Here comes the non-western world, in terms of being a spatial situation / environment, not only to raise the problem of the confrontation between the absoluteness of human rights and its relativity, but also to raise the problem of applying the agreed-upon limit of relativity in a different reality/ the reality of non-Western. The general humanitarian principles that exist at a level of absoluteness, and thus a high level of global consensus, do not descend on a neutral physical reality, does not descend on white pages, but rather descends upon a living human reality that is saturated with all kinds of human uniqueness and difference, that does not result in difficulty in the application of these common general principles, but rather results -initially- in the difficulty of understanding and interpreting these principles, and then an agreement on this understanding and this interpretation.</p> <p>Let us take one of the most important principles of human rights: freedom, for example. Freedom in terms of human principle has become one of the Axioms of the human commonality. But, in terms of its concepts and applications, it swims in the midst of controversial paths in the west before the east. And even the agreed upon in the west and east, its application in reality turn to an intellectual dilemma, before becoming a real dilemma. If you have always talked about 'allibraliah' and demanded that it to be activated in practice, in</p>		<p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of relativity</p> <p>-Topos of universality + topos of relativity</p> <p>Claim4: The adoption of human rights principles including 'allibraliah' should be relative (by accounting for the cultural differences</p>	<p>-Third-person perspective</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics 'Us', 'you', 'we', 'I'</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-evaluation: 'needed most'</p>
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<p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p> <p>130</p> <p>135</p> <p>140</p>	<p>terms of that it is the broader philosophy of freedom (and we are in most need for freedom), I argue with the illiberal who claim that what is wrong with 'allibraliah' lies in the inclusion of the unlimited freedom, by emphasising the diversity of their intellectual and practical representations, as it varies according to the recipient, and the cultural factor, and I in all of this refer to the diversity and variety of applications from place to place in the West itself, the West which agree upon its common principles, while differs - the most different – in the details and the conditions of applying it in reality.</p> <p>As I said in my arguments on 'allibraliah', I say today about the system of the General Human Rights: The consensus on the general principles does not mean the reproduction of an experience - however successful in its environment - and its cultivation in another environment. 'allibraliah', freedom, or perceptions of justice (such as the Amartya Sen thesis that makes justice wider than an ideal theory = in his response to Rawls' thesis...etc) are no longer absolute principles, although they must be emphasized in their general principles. As we call for 'allibraliah' and freedom we realize - at the same time - that our 'allibraliah' will not be that in France, which in France will not be that in Sweden, which in Sweden will not be that in America. Even within the Arab / Islamic framework, our 'allibraliah' will not be the 'allibraliah' of Tunisia, and the 'allibraliah' of Tunisia will not be the 'allibraliah' of Egypt, and so forth. On the day that 'allibraliah' is a static 'allibraliah' on a unified experience, that will not be allibraliah' in any case, and the paths of liberation will be strangled in the straits of coercion and thus will be in contradiction with many of the rights of choice. These rights are linked on the one hand to the development of the individual in terms of being an individual and a member in a society, as it is linked, on the other hand, to society in terms of being a consensual space that involves many options, and in</p>		<p>rather than copying others' experience)</p> <p>-Topos of example of human rights (freedom)</p> <p>-Topos of relativity of 'allibraliah' + Topos of definition of 'allibraliah' + Fallacy of absoluteness of freedom in 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>- Topos of variance in application of 'allibraliah' principles.</p> <p>-Topos of comparison (similarity)</p> <p>-Topos of universality of principles + Topos of relativity + fallacy of absoluteness of principles</p> <p>-Topos of culture and cultural difference.</p>	<p>-personal deictics 'our', 'we', 'I'</p>	
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<p>145</p> <p>150</p> <p>155</p> <p>160</p> <p>165</p> <p>170</p> <p>175</p>	<p>terms of being a specific framework for consciousness that imposes much of the path of perceptions.</p> <p>From this specific point of view, there is a need to take into consideration the circumstances of cultural differences, as every environment has its own cultural law, which cannot be skipped; even with the will to change it, as changing it cannot be achieved without working on it from the inside and not the outside. Thus, the critique directed to our societies and systems as being out of the standards of universal human rights is a critique of a transcendental standard that claims absoluteness, and does not foresee the fact that it was created in a different circumstance that is far from our cultural / social circumstance.</p> <p>As we reject and condemn the external interference (as is currently the case of Sweden) that tries to impose its vision on our reality without being aware of the nature of this complex reality and its complex problems. We do not reject and condemn for the claim that we have reached our aspiration for freedom, justice and rights, but motivated by the awareness that we are working to develop our positives, and eliminate our negatives, which we do not deny, but we deny the use of them against us for purposes beyond the details to the public position against us. Hence, our rejection of these interventions stems from our awareness that political wills are behind the human rights banners deliberately aiming for crowding and raiding, not to modify or reform the legal / rights process here or there. Rather, to impose political options on the sovereignty of the nation, whose sovereignty remains a fundamental principle that cannot be debated by the parties.</p> <p>Before these accusations directed by these to us, we have entered into a public debate about much of what the Western media is talking about us, and not long ago. We are not silent societies, as is the</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah'+</p> <p>Topos of negative consequences + Topos of advantage of human rights.</p> <p>-Topos of culture and cultural differences</p> <p>-Topos of responsibility for cultural change</p> <p>-Fallacy of abusive attack</p> <p>-Fallacy of attacking others (interference)</p> <p>- Topos of culture and cultural difference</p> <p>- Topos of responsibility (for cultural change and adopting human rights)</p> <p>-Fallacy of interference +</p> <p>Topos of threat (external threat)</p>	<p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'our'</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'our', 'we', 'us'</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>'our', 'we', 'us'</p>	
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<p>180</p> <p>185</p> <p>190</p> <p>195</p> <p>200</p> <p>205</p>	<p>stereotype of us there, we are not blind to the mistakes that permeate our experience as any human action exposed to many mistakes. For example, our judiciary has been in development for years, a development that stems from our awareness of the need for development, not because there are those who curse it in the West or the East. As the judiciary is under development, it is exposed in our local media to criticism that touches on some of its shortcomings; for further reform.</p> <p>Also women's issues, we have never assumed that the status of women is at a satisfactory level, we did not keep silent about the shortcomings, We have not stayed in our position as being optimal, but our media - of all kinds – have an extensive discussions on our women's issues, No newspaper, nor a magazine, a satellite channel, as well as websites and social media are free from an open and strong debate about the negatives of our feminist reality. We are aware of the extent of our negatives, whatever its field, and we try to reform it ourselves while we refuse that others impose on us their solutions that if spared from political employment, have not escaped the ignorance of the complexities of our societies and then the ignorance of the issues considered in the course of development.</p> <p>We emphasize, and will continue to emphasize, that we are investing - consciously - in the cultural and systematic establishment of human rights, not under pressure from here or there, but because we must be at the human level appropriate to us. We are committed to human rights and are committed to the development of the human rights system itself, we are, and we will continue to do so; they said or did not, cursed or did not, because our primary commitment to human rights stems from our perceptions of our sincere desire to be always the best; without ignoring the positive, even in the critical positions</p>		<p>-Fallacy of abusive attack</p> <p>-Fallacy of hasty generalisation</p> <p>- Topos of responsibility (for cultural change and adopting human rights)</p> <p>-Topos of example (justice field)</p> <p>-Topos of example (women issues)</p> <p>-Topos of responsibility</p>	<p>-personal deictics 'our', 'we', 'us'</p> <p>-personal deictics 'our', 'we', 'us'</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-assertion (negation)</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-emphasis</p>
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	of some humanly honest, those who differ from politicized people who use human rights criticism for political employment.				
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a human principle - has become one of the Axioms of the human commonality -it swims in the midst of controversial paths in the west before the east
'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - it is the broader philosophy of freedom - it varies according to the recipient, and the cultural factor -will not be that in France, which in France will not be that in Sweden, which in Sweden will not be that in America. -our 'allibraliah' will not be the 'allibraliah' of Tunisia, and the 'allibraliah' of Tunisia will not be the 'allibraliah' of Egypt, and so forth -
'we'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -are in most need for freedom -call for 'allibraliah' and freedom - have entered into a public debate about much of what the Western media is talking about us -are not silent societies, as is the stereotype of us there -are not blind to the mistakes that permeate our experience as any human action exposed to many mistakes. -our awareness of the need for development -emphasize, and will continue to emphasize, that we are investing - consciously - in the cultural and systematic establishment of human rights -must be at the human level appropriate to us. -are committed to human rights and are committed to the development of the human rights system itself -our primary commitment to human rights stems from our perceptions of our sincere desire to be always the best

‘Allibraliah’ or Post-Ideologies, Al-Riyadh Gazette, 2016, By Mohammad Almahmoud

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	‘Allibraliah’ or Post-Ideologies				
5	The title of this article decided to introduce ‘allibraliah’ as a transcendent alternative to all competing ideologies on socio-political capital. In this way, it seems –initially–as it dismisses that ‘allibraliah’ is an ideology; however, it is only a trend/ideological doctrine that seeks to change by persuading through a package of mutually reinforcing ideas that are constantly being mobilized. So, is ‘allibraliah’ - as a justification for offering it as an alternative option - is the opposite to ideologization ; therefore, it is not ideological in terms of its basic nature, or ideological but it is an ideology of non-ideology, and then it can therefore be presented as an option to get out of this conflict raging between the totalitarian trends in the two worlds : Arab and Islamic?	‘allibraliah’= ideology of the non-ideology	Claim1: ‘allibraliah’ is an alternative choice to totalitarian clashing ideologies.	Detachment -third-person perspective	Mitigation -Questions instead of assertion
10	If ideology essentially means a system of ideas that tries to be consistent, to express a vision that dictates the interpretation of reality, to justify it or to change it, it is then in the common / negative sense presented as opposed to scientific and rational thinking: false consciousness. In this negative sense, it means more than a system of thoughts, so this description in the negative and popular sense applies when that the ideas are the ideas with a doctrinal dimension		-Topos of definition of ‘allibraliah’ -Topos of definition of ideology + Topos of disadvantage of ideology -Topos of disadvantage of dogmatism+ fallacy of rationality.		
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<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>(not necessarily religious), which means they include a level of dogmatism that posits itself as part of irresponsible certainty and to penetrate the rational or scientific condition (as a condition for fortifying the irresponsible certainty), and to contain fictional and emotional elements that touch feelings, emotions and instincts before minds; as part of the mass mobilization mechanism, and to include utopian promises, as a project offering an imagined alternative to real or supposed misery / hell.</p> <p>Of course, all this cannot come about unless these ideas are totalitarian, passing the individual (the individual, not from the individual) to the total. That total being bet on as a force capable of bringing about change, which is often a short but sharp change, a revolutionary change that burns the phases, because all the phases with all its necessities, are in the perception of this ideologized are included in the rational perception of reality, which is a perception not appreciated by the ideologized/ideologiser, moreover, it is implicitly rejected, as he sees it a hindrance to the public emotional action that he is directing in all cases.</p> <p>These are the features of ideology, in terms of being - in the end - false consciousness.</p> <p>There is no doubt that some forms of 'allibraliah' include some of these negative features associated with the processes of ideologization of any kind. We know that in 'allibraliah' there are</p>	<p>-ideologized/ ideologiser</p>	<p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse of emotions by ideologies + Topos of disadvantage of utopianism</p> <p>-Topos of disadvantage of collectivism</p> <p>-Topos of disadvantage of utopianism in 'allibraliah' + Topos of advantage of</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>utopian ideas that necessarily involve a mass movement, and therefore the absence of the imaginary and emotional element is not an unrecognized reality in all the tracks of the promotion of the ideas of 'allibraliah'. But no matter how negative these aspects of 'allibraliah' are, it emphasizes, first of all, that all its ideas are not complete nor certain; they are ideas that are on the table of criticism / accountability in any case; even the concept of "individual freedom" that the liberal vision is based on is being pursued with criticism and development within the liberal space; this means that there is no dogma that shapes the ideas of the liberals, including the founding ideas themselves, as well as others.</p> <p>Criticism - as an initial rational condition - is not a luxury in the liberal tradition, but an act of liberation that operates within the space of the liberal mind on the widest scale. In fact, the work of the liberal on the critique of 'allibraliah' does not stop at the limits of scientific and intellectual availability at a certain point in time. It is a critique that goes beyond it, to react seriously with the latest theories of the human mind and the scientific research produced in all fields. This, no doubt, limits the certainty; even in the results of the sciences that are based on (critical circumstance), or in (critical fact), what makes (certainty) here, circumstantial / relative in all cases, as well as the fact that this dynamic interaction with the scientific and cognitive development limits the two dimensions: the emotional and the</p>		<p>individual's freedom + Topos of advantage of lack of dogmatism.</p> <p>-Topos of advantage of self-criticism in 'allibraliah' + Topos of relativity of certainty</p> <p>-Topos of rationality in 'allibraliah' + Fallacy of rationality in collective ideologies</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p> <p>85</p>	<p>imaginary, which are so high in all totalitarian ideologies that they constitute, by their negativity, the essence of discourse.</p> <p>What most important in all this detail is that Liberalism or ‘allibraliah’, in essence, includes what limits its being an ideology in the negative sense. It is, if it is ideological, the ideology of the individual, in terms of being in basis: the ideology of individual freedom.</p> <p>And it is not secret that for Ideology to contain all those negative features that eventually turn it into a false consciousness; it must be totalitarian, working on effects that can only be achieved through a totalitarian framing of individuals. It is a framing that can only be achieved by violating individualism, as well as by violating many determinants of rationality.</p> <p>‘Allibraliah’, in terms of its initial bias towards the free independent individual, rebels against any framing that detracts from individual independence. This is what makes it against the action of ideologization in terms of being a collective behaviour.</p> <p>‘Allibraliah’ cannot be ideologized, in terms of its impossibility to be totalitarian, that totalitarianism through which only ideologization can be achieved. If ‘allibraliah’ must be characterized as an ideology, it is precisely the ideology of liberation/ individual independence, that is, the ideology of liberation from the ideologies that include totalitarianism. Therefore, it is not only the different opposite to thesetotalitarianisms, but also the antagonist to the principle of</p>		<p>-Topos of advantage of individuality in ‘allibraliah’</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse by collective ideologies to individuals.</p> <p>-Topos of the resistance by ‘allibraliah’ against collective ideologies</p> <p>-Topos of antagonism against collectivism</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p> <p>110</p>	<p>totality, which must take from the self-assured real account of individuals, in favour of the imagined account of the imagined group; the group (with the exception of a few of its individuals) which ends into a human failure at all levels; so it moves from misery to misery, and solace can only be found in a few slogans that are ultimately not more than illusions.</p> <p>Totalitarianisms of all kinds are mere slogans, begin with illusions and end up with illusions on the level of the reality of individuals. They Cannot be launched from the collective to reach the singles, while the individual is absent from the origin of the equation. Here, nothing is achieved, that if you want a collective ideology to achieve something positive in the world of the individual, which is the real world. On the contrary, every positive achievement in the world of the individual is a real and actual achievement, as well as necessarily - an addition to the sum.</p> <p>And it does not miss us in this context that while ‘allibraliah’ is limiting the tyranny of the principle of totalitarianism, it also limits the tyranny of the individual principle as it requires the freeing of the individual by universal and governing human principles that guarantee the individual right of all individuals, which means that there is a balance between the individuals’ freedoms in favour of the freedom of every individual and, therefore, for the benefit of public freedom.</p>		<p>-Topos of negative consequences of collectivism.</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignorance of individuals by collective ideologies.</p> <p>- Topos of negative consequences of collectivism+ Topos of positive consequences of ‘allibraliah’.</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	
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<p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p> <p>130</p>	<p>Arabs and Muslims live a world of conflict with themselves and with others, as a result of the domination of totalitarian ideologies on the march of development, and the march of liberation as well. These totalitarianisms are - necessarily - fundamentalism, or - at least - contain elements of fundamentalist degree, whether religious or national. This means that the conflict action is not an emergency case. Rather, it is an essential component in itself, so that its legitimacy can be achieved only through a conflict or a call to conflict, whether it is an internal conflict with the components of the self, or was a struggle with the other, or was a struggle at the level of ideas, perceptions and arguments of the accusation.</p> <p>It is clear that it is not possible to get out of those overlapping tunnels that drain the mental, spiritual and material energies, except by being aligned to the human in his individual existence, the existence that is devoid of the totalitarian frameworks, that is the real existence that is devoid of the totalitarian ideologies: religious and national. And there is nothing other than 'allibraliah' with its aligned principles to the individual - regardless of his previous identities—that can guarantee such freedom from the illusion to the real; to move the individual from the state of conflict with the other / others (self-destructive conflict to the other); to struggle to himself and his conditional worlds, his presence, his conflict with the horizons of science / thought, and his conflict with nature; his victories in this</p>	<p>Totalitarianism= Fundamentalism</p>	<p>-Topos of example of negative consequences of collective ideologies</p> <p>-Topos of advantage of individuality + Topos of disadvantage of collectivism.</p>	<p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment -third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification -Assertion: 'It has become clear'.</p>
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135	regard are a positive addition to him by originality, and a positive addition to the human type, as he does not work himself in a vacuum, but in a human space that is no more than an addition;whatever he enjoys - or believed to enjoy - of independence.		- Topos of positive consequences of 'allibraliah'.		
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -it is only a trend/ideological doctrine that seeks to change by persuading through a package of mutually reinforcing ideas that are constantly being mobilized. - it emphasizes, first of all, that all its ideas are not complete nor certain; they are ideas that are on the table of criticism / accountability in any case. -includes, in essence, what limits its being an ideology in the negative sense. - if it is ideological, the ideology of the individual, in terms of being in basis: the ideology of individual freedom. -rebels against any framing that detracts from individual independence -against the action of ideologization in terms of being a collective behaviour -cannot be ideologized, in terms of its impossibility to be totalitarian - it is precisely the ideology of liberation/ individual independence - is, the ideology of liberation from the ideologies that include totalitarianism - it is not only the different opposite to these totalitarianisms, but also the antagonist to the principle of totality -is limiting the tyranny of the principle of totalitarianism, it also limits the tyranny of the individual principle -it requires the freeing of the individual by universal and governing human principles -means a system of ideas that try to be consistent
Ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -express a vision that dictates the interpretation of reality, to justify it or to change it. -it is then in the common / passive sense presented as opposed to scientific and rational thinking: false consciousness. -it means more than a system of thoughts. - this description in the negative and popular sense applies when that the ideas are the ideas with a doctrinal dimension. -to contain all those negative features that eventually turn it into a false consciousness; it must be totalitarian, working on effects that can only be achieved through a totalitarian framing of individuals.

‘Allibraliah’ and the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal Figures’, Okaz Gazette 2007, By Tawfiq Alsaif

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1 5 10 15	<p>‘Allibraliah’ and the Deceived and Oppressed ‘Liberal Figures’</p> <p>In order to avoid mistrust, our colleague Mr. Ayed Abdul Karim began his article with stressing that he does not care about ‘allibraliah’/ Liberalism (Al Watan 10-15) but even he inferred to that with an evidence that can split a rock if exposed to it which is that he did not watch the popular episode of ‘Tash ma Tash’ about ‘Allibralyeen’. And I swear that this evidence has been missed out by all scholars. Then, the gentle writer has sympathized with our situation; we who are plagued with caring about ‘allibraliah’ and looking for it, especially after the fall of the stock market and then the rise of groceries prices, so he compensate us for all of that with a brief explanation of ‘allibraliah’ that he has never care about, so he told us that its origin is “liber” and that it is Latin means the free, and that “liberalism” means freedom (or means freedom as stated in the text of the article- and Allah knows which is correct).</p> <p>So, May Allah reward the writer for these great benefits that the readers of the newspaper and the intellectuals were thirsty for, and what a thirst! He also told us, may Allah increase his benefits, that freedom is a charming word and that the call for it astonished a lot of the poor of our brothers who suffered before travelling all the world</p>	<p>Deceived, oppressed >liberals</p>	<p>Claim1: the argument that ‘allibraliah’ means freedom is useless.</p> <p>-Fallacy of neglect of ‘allibraliah’</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p> <p>-Topos of uselessness.</p> <p>-Fallacy of disadvantage of freedom.</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-metaphor</p> <p>-adverbial clause</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-Hesitation, self-correction</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-Adj>great</p> <p>-adjectival clauses</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>from oppression, so they went for it the way a kid went for an ember thinking it is a colorful candy. And it is obvious to the reader that Mr. Ayed has reached in this master analysis to an explanation that has never been reached before by any of the west and east philosophers in the past and the present, and therefore it can be registered as a reference view that can be taken by the philosophers and researchers when they talk about ‘allibraliah’ and the secrets of the peoples’ fascination with its charm, though a lot of scholars reject Freud's well-known theory in psychoanalysis that focus on the sexual motive for the human actions and tendencies.</p> <p>And Mr. Ayed did not forget to remind us -May Allah reward him- that the Saudi researchers and the political science professors together with other intellectuals, who have access to Western philosophy and might also wrote about ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism”, do not understand ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism”; and probably even do not understand its meaning, and thus he affords us – May Allah honor him- that the origin of ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism” is derived from a Greek word “liber” means the free and that ‘allibraliah’ or “Liberalism” means freedom as we stated above.</p> <p>Thanks to Allah as he awards me and the other political science students with reading the article of Mr. Ayed, so we knew after many years we wasted in studying, researching and writing that the origin of ‘allibraliah’ is ‘liber’ and it is Greek meaning the free man and that</p>	<p>Intellectuals> liberals</p>	<p>Claim2: The argument that Saudi intellectuals do not understand what ‘allibraliah’ means is false.</p> <p>-Fallacy of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-personal deictics</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-repetition</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>'liberalism' means freedom. And perhaps Mr. Ayed would allow us to add the free woman as well, especially the western women and those who look like them of our semi-women. So we can -if the Mr. may allow- say to one woman 'ya liberh' corresponding to 'ya hurma' which we say to our decent women who have not been deceived by 'allibraliah' and its troubles. And we say to the deceived man by the west and its tricks "ya liber" corresponding to "ya walad" which some of us say to the boys when getting angry.</p> <p>And the benefits of Mr. Ayed's article does not end there, as he exploits the occasion to tell us also that the principles of freedom, brotherhood and equality are deceptive slogans that intellectual and political figures got fascinated by and fell into the trap of Freemasonry. And I swear that this discovery is greater than the previous one, as I thought before Mr. Ayed's article that the politician and the intellectual do not get easily deceived or fascinated by glamorous speech but they argue every idea before adopting it. But I figured out to the lack of my knowledge and my unawareness, as the intellectuals and the politicians, even the shrewd ones, get easily deceived, maybe easier than the fishmongers in Qatif market.</p> <p>Because I have never heard that anybody has ever succeeded in deceiving these sellers, so thanks Allah that we knew before it is too late that fishmongers are better than our intellectuals especially</p>		<p>Claim3: The argument that the principles of freedom, brotherhood and equality are deceiving slogans is a false argument.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of uselessness. -Fallacy of danger or threat. -Topos of humanitarianism -Fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah' 	<p>Involvement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -free indirect speech -personal deictics 	<p>Intensification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -adjectival phrases -adverb>'easily' -verbal -propositional phrase
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p>	<p>when it comes to the highest human values, such as the freedom, equality and brotherhood.</p> <p>And we do not have to mention ‘allibraliah’ again as Mr. Ayed has told us earlier that ‘liberalism’ means freedom, and it appears from the article that that freedom is the same freedom that the shrewd politicians and intellectuals got deceived by and because of it they fell in the traps of freemasonry and the like.</p> <p>The truth is that the benefits of Mr. Ayed’s Article are uncountable and might need volumes to explain, especially his identification of the meaning of “alliber” and “alliberalism”, then the questions he asked (which probably nobody has ever questioned before nor answered), and then his assertion that the answers will not come from ‘liberaleena’ (he wrote in the text of the article from ‘librallyona’ and he probably meant a person or a place or other people than ‘libraleena’ that we know, or maybe another thing than the Arabic plural pf the world ‘liber-liberali’ that was stated above).</p> <p>And to sum up, Mr. Ayed has scored the goal of the season in this article which I see that it should be republished and distributed to the intellectuals, professors and writers, so they understand the meaning of ‘alliber’ and ‘Liberalism’ and how freedom and equality lead to the slipping into the trap of Free Masonry.</p>		<p>-Fallacy of threat of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of uselessness (of definition).</p> <p>-Topos of uselessness</p> <p>-Fallacy of threat of ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Involvement:</p> <p>-personal deictics</p>	<p>Intensification:</p> <p>-Repetition</p> <p>-adjectival phrases>to indicate quantity (uncountable).</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-Uncertainty> the use of ‘apparently’</p>
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Is 'allibraliah' Suitable to All Societies? Al-Jazirah2009, By Abdulrahman Alhabib

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p style="text-align: center;">Is 'allibraliah' Suitable to All Societies?</p> <p>Despite the large number of seminars, debates and articles on 'allibraliah'/Liberalism, the question is still worrying in our Arab world: what is 'allibraliah'/Liberalism? and what does it want?</p>		<p>Claim 1: The general principles of 'allibraliah' are freedom, equality and participation in decision making and it specifically varies in application</p>	<p>Detachment -third person voice</p>	<p>Intensification -quantification</p>
5	<p>Well, the general principles of 'allibraliah'/Liberalism are freedom, equality and participation in the decision-making, and after that the 'allibraliah'/Liberalism trends disperse towards the right and the left, and vary a lot especially in economy.</p>		<p>-Topos of number - Topos of definition</p>	<p>-third person voice</p>	
10	<p>What is the benefit of this loose clarification as long as the majority of the modern social systems believe in these principles in their general form... so what meaning has remained for the term of 'allibraliah'? Actually, it still has a lot of meanings, because any concept is not clear from its general definition but from its descriptions, applications and the attitudes of those convinced by it.. The questions around 'allibraliah' are various, and I have discussed some of them before. Here is an attempt for the understanding through the relation of the political 'allibraliah'/Liberalism with others, I translated it from Stanford Encyclopedia of Politics (2007) with adaptation and with some illustrative additions that do not affect the content.</p>		<p>-topos of number -topos of definition</p>	<p>Involvement -personal deictic 'I'</p>	<p>-quantification</p>
15			<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p>	<p>Detachment -indirect speech</p>	<p>-evaluation 'important', 'bold'</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>Let's start with the initial question that worries all political doctrines: is the political 'allibraliah' appropriate to all political groups and countries in the world? No! John Rawls answers, one of the most important contemporary liberal thinkers, proposing his bold idea in his book (The law of people) in 1999, that there can be a rational hierarchical society that is not based on 'allibraliah' principles that states that all individuals are free and equal, and instead the individuals become responsible and collaborative within their communities, but they are not equal. The overall 'liberali' concept of justice cannot be constructed from the outside without the intellectual participation of people inside that hierarchical society, despite the fact that the main human rights apply to all human beings. However, intellectuals such as Thomas Pogge and Martha Nussbaum (2002) refuse Rawls view against the universality of 'allibraliah' principles of freedom and equality, and they see that the human principles of 'allibraliah' apply to all countries.</p> <p>The pervious question should not be mixed with another question: is 'allibraliah' a notion to a particular country or at least an ideal universal political notion for all human communities?The philosopher Kant (1795) believes that all countries should respect the dignity of their citizens as free and equal individuals, but he denies that humanity is formed in a single political style; and</p>		<p>Claim 2: the political liberalism is not suitable for all countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of definition -Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism <p>-Fallacy of suitability</p> <p>Claim 3: 'allibraliah' cannot be unified as one system shared globally</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism 	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>-indirect speech</p>	
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	<p>object the idea of unifying 'allibraliah' in a universal group that share constitutions tacitly and unite as states in a confederation to ensure peace.</p>				
45	<p>With regards to the classical 'allibraliah', it is not important to distinguish between the world of the 'liberal' societies and the universal 'liberal' society, because the aim of the government in the society is ensuring the essential rights of freedom and proprietorship to its citizens, so the international borders would not become of major importance (Lomasky 2007). While modern</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of freedom for citizens</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	
50	<p>'allibraliah' insist on the principles of the distribution of wealth to achieve social justice, no matter that those principles apply within certain communities or be achieved universally. So, the disagreement between the contemporary 'allibraliah' thinkers remained considerable in terms of the necessity of the application</p>		<p>-Topos of justice</p>		
55	<p>of 'allibraliah' principles inside the 'liberal' countries or they should be applied worldwide as they are universal human gains (Rawls, Pogge, Peetz)</p>				
60	<p>And the conflict between 'allibralyeen'/Liberal Figures extends to the way to deal with the extremist communities and groups that may deny the essential rights to some of their members or practice their guardianship on them or confiscate their religious or intellectual freedom...etc. is it proper for the 'liberali' group to impede the inner control of the extremist groups?</p>		<p>Claim 4: liberal countries or groups should not interfere in the affairs of the non-liberal groups to protect 'allibraliah' principles.</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p>	

<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p>	<p>If we assume that the extremist group is a political group or a state... is it possible for the 'allibrallyeen' to interfere in the affairs of the non-'allibraliah' states? The philosopher Mill answers in a special article about that in 1859, that the civilized states and the non-civilized states should be dealt with deficiently, as there is no right for the barbarians as a nation... As long as the international ethics are mutual, then the barbarian governments cannot be accounted for and do not have equal rights with the civilized governments. This arbitrary logic was appropriate with the imperialism spirit of the colonial Britain at that time. But Mill come back to explain that he objects the interference of a state in the affairs of another state in order to protect the principles of 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>If 'allibraliah' believes in the rights of the groups in making their own decisions, are 'allibralaion' morally entitled to intervene with non-'allibraliah' groups to adapt with their human principles of freedom and equality? As 'allibralaion' believe in the freedom of individuals, they might also believe in that groups have the right to commit human mistakes to manage their own collective affairs. So the individuals who their freedom is confiscated inside particular societies, they themselves might object to intercalate 'allibraliah' principles or even get harmed by them (Margalit 1990; Tamir 1993).</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Fallacy of justice</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of rights</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of freedom</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>-indirect speech</p>	<p>Evaluation>'arbitrary'</p>
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<p>85</p> <p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p>	<p>However, Rawls believes that ‘allibrallyeen’ have to distinguish when dealing with the extremist groups between that rationality and the one outside the law, the first can be coexisted with unlike the second, as the rational societies do not tolerate the states that ignore human rights; as such states could be subject to penalty by force and foreign intervention. However, Rawls insists that the rational who object the principles of the freedom of ‘allibrallyeah’ should be encouraged and not forced on those principles. Concerning Chandran Kukathas (2003) who is a classical ‘liberal’ intellectual, he tends to a full tolerance with people who do not believe in the principles of the freedom of ‘allibrallyeah’ with the reservation that there would be an objection rights.</p> <p>And the questions of relations extend to inside ‘allibrallyeah’ states: to what extent is the right for the bigoted groups religiously, culturally, and politically to be exempted from state requirements? ‘allibrallyeah’ state has a long story in accommodating bigoted groups, but Glaston (2003) states that the biggest problem is with the bigoted groups that raise and teach children, so it cannot be looked at as pure voluntary groups that have the right to reject the requirement of ‘allibrallyeah’ states: as they practice the coercive force on children, thus the basic principles of ‘allibrallyeah’ on protecting the innocent from the</p>		<p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of law+ - Topos or fallacy of humanitarianism</p> <p>-Topos of encouragement + fallacy of compulsion -Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge -Topos or fallacy of danger of extremist -fallacy of compulsion -Topos of responsibility+ topos of consequence</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>-indirect speech</p>	
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<p>110</p> <p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p>	<p>unjust coercion will play a role here. Here, we will face a severe clash between the bigoted parental authority and the rights of children in accordance with the 'iberali' understanding. This will make the tolerance with the extremist groups that live inside 'allibraliah' states (including the right to object) seems less attractive than tolerance with them on the international level. And despite of that, some of 'allibraliah' thinkers (Lucas 2006) still believe that 'allibralyen' should ensure the quasi-sovereignty for the non-'allibraliah' local communities, allowing them to act freely in their own way.</p> <p>Another question is to what extent are extremist groups permitted to participate in decision making in 'allibraliah' state. In his book (the political 'allibraliah'), Rawls mentions that our societies are described as collectively rational, and thus cannot be forced to change with the justification based on the basis of believe in totalitarian morals or religious systems. But some of 'allibralyeen' who are close to the religious circles (ebirl 2002 and Perry 1993) pose that such an objection is a clear exclusion to the religious. And once again, 'allibralyon' diverge in their attitudes to the level a one question whether there are still what unite 'allibralyeen'?</p>		<p>-Topos of consequences of tolerance</p> <p>-Topos of rights</p> <p>Claim 5: non-liberal groups should participate in decision making in the liberal countries</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos of rationality+ fallacy of compulsion</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of exclusion</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of variance of liberal attitudes</p>	<p>-indirect speech</p> <p>-distancing voice</p> <p>'one'</p>	<p>Mitigation</p> <p>-Question instead of assertion</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the general principles of 'allibraliah' are freedom, equality and participation in the decision making - 'allibraliah' trends disperse towards the right and the left, and vary a lot especially in economy. - it still has a lot of meanings - is the political 'allibraliah' appropriate to all political groups and countries in the world? No! - states all individuals are free and equal. - apply to all countries. - the distribution of wealth to achieve social justice. - has a long history in accommodating bigoted groups
'allibralyon'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - have to distinguish when dealing with the extremist groups between that rational one and the one outside the law - should ensure the quasi-sovereignty for the non-'allibraliah' local communities, allowing them to act freely in their own way. - diverge in their attitudes

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>'Allibralaih': Freedom or Chaos</p> <p>The deep structure of Islamic culture involves a value system of distinct quality, one of which is the value of freedom it occupies a high rank in the hierarchy of values. That value got its position from the sacred text which raised the ceiling of freedom to the extent that it prohibited all acts of coercion to convert to the supreme religion "no compulsion in religion". Is there any more freedom than that! Even the commission itself is not required from the person -in Legislation terms- if it is not available in an atmosphere of freedom that allows him to commit what he is assigned for so then the commission is lifted with the lift of the intent and choice conditions as they burden the committed with what he unable to do and therefore if the person who lost freedom utters with what could makes him infidel or even abuses any of the holy figures, then he is not sinful as what the text says "except for one who is forced while his heart is secure in faith".</p> <p>That spotless truth – represented in that freedom in the sacred text is precedent in the mental existence and thus the real existence than the freedom in 'allibraliah'- is being ignored by many writings that deal with freedom as a purely liberal product, as if it were an</p>		<p>Claim1: Freedom is a high Islamic value.</p> <p>-Topos of authority (Quran text)</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism</p> <p>Claim2: Freedom in Islam precedes the existence of freedom in 'allibraliah' and</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-rhetorical question</p> <p>-evaluation</p> <p>'spotless truth'</p>

20	<p>exclusive right! or an astonishing liberal triumph and undoubtedly this is a control that cannot be justified on the basis of knowledge; because freedom is originally a spread concept in the folds of the provisions of legislation and in the folds of the theoretical premises of our knowledge heritage and Omar's phrase "when did you enslave people when they were born free?!" is not far from us, then also the</p>		<p>thus the latter should not be adopted.</p>		
25	<p>freedom that its slogan is raised by the western liberal philosopher is not the same freedom that conforms to the components of the legislative framework that we belong to and we are obedient to and this is normal for the different manifestations of the cultural composition of each society so every human group has its standards</p>	<p>-western liberal philosophers vs. us</p>	<p>-Topos of reality</p>	<p>Involvement</p>	
30	<p>in dealing with the concept of freedom and hence we cannot reproduce a concept that was born under the circumstances that do not conform to our speciality; as freedom concept in 'allibraliah' – and I repeat 'allibraliah' in its original form- is blurred and has no standards to an extent that it becomes a chaos in one context or to become the chaos in another context.</p>	<p>Freedom in 'allibraliah' > chaos</p>	<p>-Topos or fallacy of ignorance</p>	<p>-personal deictics 'us', 'we'</p>	
35	<p>Freedom is an essential value, it is undoubtedly a human demand and an innate need, and the human being needs it as he needs food as his life cannot stand without it, but the problem here in 'allibraliah' is that due to the dominance of the unrestrained tendency, this awesome concept -freedom concept- is distorted as there is a</p>		<p>-Fallacy of exclusiveness of freedom to 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>-repetition</p>	
40	<p>tendentious employment of it and a subjective modification of its</p>		<p>-Topos of culture</p>	<p>'I repeat'</p>	
			<p>-Topos of authority</p>		
			<p>-Topos of differences</p>		
			<p>- Topos or fallacy of chaos</p>		
			<p>+implicit topos or fallacy of cultural threat</p>		
				<p>Detachment</p>	<p>-metaphors</p>
			<p>Claim3: Freedom is an essential human value</p>	<p>-third-person perspective</p>	
			<p>distorted and exploited in 'allibraliah' to mean</p>	<p>Involvement</p>	<p>-accumulation</p>
			<p>'unlimited' and</p>	<p>-local deictic</p>	<p>-evaluation:</p>
			<p>'unrestricted' freedom.</p>	<p>'here'</p>	<p>'Awesome'</p>

<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>significations that diverge from the objective factual original meaning.</p> <p>In ‘allibraliah’, there is an excessive expand on this meaning and an examination of its substance until enters its meaning what contradict its basic entity. The concept is expanded here until cultural events and contradictory manifestations to the original concept join it.</p> <p>There are many examples, take for example the economic side as the liberal freedom has no reservation in committing the crime of usury as this is a will of individual, so usury here is under the slogan of freedom, however, though the Islamic system raise the ceiling of freedom in this field but shows a great deal of reservation in this aspect of economic deals, and so on. Thus, freedom concept in liberal context is fraught with what contaminates its purity as there is a rising chaotic employment of this glamorous term, so can we imagine that such philosophies that are constituted in environments different in their principles from the ones of <i>Ummah</i> that is attributed to textually as the ideal, shall we wait from these models to coin for us concepts that conforms with the conceptual framework that our general behaviour! can we imagine that the freedom that those call for adjusts with nature of conscious that prioritize the unconditional obedience to the commands of ALLAH! The freedom of ‘allibraliah’ is based on the priority of making the human a God and the absolute interest in material and it has an agitated attitude towards spiritual</p>	<p>-Ummah vs ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>- Topos of humanitarianism+ Topos of right -Topos or fallacy of abuse of freedom concept by ‘allibraliah’ -Topos of example -Topos of difference (comparison btw Islam and allibraliah’ - Topos of definition of freedom in ‘allibraliah’ + Topos or fallacy of abuse of freedom concept + Topos or fallacy of chaos -Topos of cultural threat of ‘allibraliah’ -Topos of authority (Quran). -Topos of cultural threat of ‘allibraliah’ -Topos or fallacy of unrestricted freedom (Topos or fallacy of definition of freedom)</p>	<p>-evaluation -imperative style -local deictic ‘here’ -personal deictics ‘us’, ‘we’ -evaluation -evaluation</p>	<p>-accumulation -accumulation -evaluation: ‘excessive’ -quantification: ‘a lot’, ‘great’ -evaluation: ‘chaotic’, ‘rising’, ‘glamorous’ -rhetorical questions</p>
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p>	<p>motives and thus it seems to lack the values that rule it, seems to be overflowing with the negatives; because it falls in the sin of generalization and unrestrictedness so it is mentioned generally and vaguely in a way that reflects a highly chaotic dimension where it appears as a term of general and unrestricted meaning. It is a freedom that its features contrast the nature of freedom in the laws of legislation and there is a vast difference between the two freedoms, so if the first speaks about the unrestricted freedom the second speaks about the absolute freedom, and what a vast difference between the two, yes there is a similarity between the two but in the origin of the concept, in the basis of meaning, in the appearance of the term, this similarity is total absoluteness and the total absoluteness as it is known does not require to match in the essence but requires to contrast according to its origin.</p> <p>In Islam, there is freedom but in its opposition, there is obedience - as Islam means submission- and that obedience will not be achieved in the most pure form except with freedom, which means by leaving all forms of dependency through absolute freedom from all obedience but to Allah only.</p> <p>Freedom in 'allibraliah' has no place for that obedience, but this obedience is a clear indication of regression of human civilisation, or it is an exclusive sign to the traditional conservative society! Freedom and obedience here are antagonist values, there is a separation</p>	<p>Freedom in Islam> (worship + loyalty)</p>	<p>-Topos of differences and similarities btw Islam and 'allibraliah' in freedom</p> <p>-claim4: Freedom in Islam is based on absolute freedom</p> <p>-Topos/fallacy of freedom</p> <p>-Topos/Fallacy of relationship between freedom and obedience.</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>-accumulation</p> <p>-evaluation</p> <p>'extreme chaos', 'vast distance'</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>-self-correction (similarities)</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-metaphor</p>
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<p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p> <p>110</p>	<p>between them so the freedom in 'allibraliah' is constituted only through a complete negation to all the forms of obedience, freedom and obedience here are like two separated islands that do not meet; whereas the Islamic system insists that they are inseparable values and hence it integrates them so it employs them in an upmost objective manner and in a way that reflects notably in the spirit of individual with purification and improvement, and the more the one rise in the scale of obedience the more the freedom is effective as an essential value in life in all its details.</p> <p>And the summary is: if freedom has a central dimension in our value system then why do we acquire it from low existential environments, is not this a redundancy?! I repeat the interrogative formulation but in a logical way: why to go for the substitution -the metaphorical dimension is present in all its intensity here- with the existence of the substituted -unless there is a reservation to it!- is not this contradictory to the rules of logic?!</p>	<p>Freedom in 'allibraliah'> substitute</p> <p>Freedom in Islam> substituted</p>	<p>Claim5: As freedom exists in our system of values i.e. (Islam), there is no need to borrow it from other systems e.g. (allibraliah).</p> <p>-Topos of advantage of freedom + Topos of culture.</p> <p>-Fallacy of the false alternative (altering 'allibraliah' with Islam)</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics 'our', 'we', 'I'</p> <p>-repetition: 'I repeat'</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'the highest'</p> <p>-rhetorical questions</p> <p>-Evaluation: 'central', 'ignoble'</p> <p>-trope</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
Freedom in Islam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It occupies a high rank in the hierarchy of values -got its position from the sacred text -is precedent in the mental existence and thus the real existence than the freedom in 'allibrahiah' -a spread concept in the folds of the provisions of legislation and in the folds of the theoretical premises of our knowledge heritage -speaks about the absolute freedom -in its opposition there is obedience - achieved by leaving all forms of dependency through absolute freedom from all obedience but to Allah only. -has a central dimension in our value system.
Freedom in 'allibrahiah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -not the same freedom that conforms to the components of the legislative framework that we belong to -is blurred and has no standards to an extent that it becomes a chaos in one context or to become the chaos in another context -is distorted as there is a tendentious employment of it and a subjective modification of its significations that diverge from the objective factual original meaning. - there is an excessive expansion on this meaning and an examination of its substance until it enters its meaning what contradicts its basic entity - has no reservation in committing the crime of usury as this is a will of individual.

<p>Freedom</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -is fraught with what contaminates its purity as there is a rising chaotic employment of this glamorous term -is based on the priority of making the human a God and the absolute interest in materia -it has an agitated attitude towards spiritual motives -it seems to lack the values that rule it -to be overflowing with the negatives -it falls in the sin of generalisation and unrestrictedness - it is mentioned generally and vaguely in a way that reflects a highly chaotic dimension -it appears as a term of general and unrestricted meaning. -it is a freedom that its features contrast the nature of freedom in the laws of legislation - speaks about the unrestricted freedom - has no place for that obedience - is constituted only through a complete negation to all the forms of obedience - a human demand and an innate need, - and the human being needs it as he needs food as his life cannot stand without it
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Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	Liberalism with Saudi character				
5	Recently, there is much talk in the Saudi society about liberalism, as it has become a subject of debate and controversy in the social, intellectual and cultural life. Debate further reached to the extent that one of the researchers and intellectuals prominent in our country, Dr. Abdullah Alghathami has written a whole book under the title of «the new ‘allibraliah’» and that one of the most famous folk series «Tash Ma Tash» has dealt in one of its episodes with ‘allibraliah’ issue in Saudi society in a revolting sarcastic and shallow language without depth and without a real understanding of the meaning of ‘allibraliah’ and its manifestations. In the book «the concept of freedom» for the Moroccan thinker Abdullah Alarawi, there are important and worthy illuminations to stop at and to reflect and understand the significance and the meaning of ‘allibraliah’ and the civil society.		<p>Claim1: There is a major debate around ‘allibraliah’ in Saudi society.</p> <p>-Topos of number</p> <p>-Topos of authority</p> <p>- Fallacy of ignorance</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition of ‘allibraliah’</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-evaluation: ‘disgusting’, ‘Important and worthy’</p>
10					
15	It is impossible to talk about ‘allibraliah’ without linking it in its particular and general context to freedom, as ‘allibraliah’ holds in its basis and foundation the issue of freedom in the comprehensive, complete and profound sense. Abdullah Alarawi says: “Perhaps the word" freedom "is the most popular in the political dictionary used		<p>Claim2: ‘allibraliah’ is mainly associated with the concept of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-direct speech</p>	<p>-evaluation: ‘essentially’, ‘whole, complete and profound’</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>by Arabs today, even the words that they compete in the field such as independence, democracy, and development are often used as synonymous with it, so that we can only find them adhered to and explained to it.</p> <p>He adds "The individual raises the slogan of freedom within his family and the woman in the face of her husband and the child against his father and the minority in the face of the majority and the nation in the fight of its enemies, and the slogan conceals different objectives, the most divergent, the individual understands freedom as dislocation of habits, and women and independence with their views. Al-Arawi details the great values that underlie the concept of freedom, which is fundamentally and profoundly connected with the concept of 'allibraliah' which illuminates in its ideas and meanings issues that overlap with the concept of state and the concept of institution, political freedom and economy, which are directly connected to the freedom of individual.</p> <p>In recent years, 'allibraliah' has come to our country, like every intellectual, political and economic achievement, and we treat it as if it were another consumption situation that has not been dealt with as an intellectual state linked to the issue of the individual and the society. It has not been read in the social and historical context in which it appeared in the West but dealt with in a superficial vision and in a very limited understanding as the 'Hadatha' was treated not</p>		<p>-Topos of definition of 'allibraliah'</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of freedom</p> <p>Claim3: 'Allibraliah' has been dealt with superficially since it arrived in Saudi society.</p> <p>-Topos of time</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignorance.</p>	<p>-direct speech</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics 'Our country', 'we',</p>	<p>-evaluation: 'profoundly'</p> <p>-metaphor</p> <p>-evaluation: 'very limited'</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p>	<p>as a comprehensive and civilized concept, but as a small part linked to religion in a concise manner.</p> <p>One of the strangest things to find is that there are those who chew the word ‘allibraliah’ and repeat it continuously and endlessly without having to deal with it as an issue of life and behaviour. So, how can you be a liberal without living a liberal life, how to be able to adopt all the values of ‘Hadatha’, ‘allibraliah’ and freedom while you live inside your old prison and still captive to the culture of the tribe and living in the past more than living in the present and future , you cannot be ‘hadathi’ while you live an old life and you cannot be liberal and call for freedom while you stand against the freedom of others.</p> <p>Concepts are comprehension and practice, the concept of ‘allibraliah’ and the concept of freedom and ‘hadatha’ are issues of importance so that they are not dealt with lightly and superficially. If we want to be ‘hadatheen’ and ‘liberaleen’, we must be the sons of the present and the sons of the future, not the sons of the tribe and the sons of the past.</p>		<p>-Topos of example (of Hadatha)</p> <p>-Fallacy of ignorance (cherry picking fallacy)</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics ‘you’</p> <p>-personal deictics ‘we’</p>	<p>-</p> <p>Metaphor evaluation: ‘the strangest’, ‘constantly’, -Metaphor</p>
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
Allibraliah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - has become a subject of debate and controversy in the social, intellectual and cultural life. - holds in its basis and foundation the issue of freedom in the comprehensive, complete and profound sense. - illuminates in its ideas and meanings issues that overlap with the concept of state and the concept of institution, political freedom and economy, which are directly connected to the freedom of individual. - has come to our country, like every intellectual, political and economic achievement, and we treat it as if it were another consumption situation. - has not been dealt with as an intellectual state linked to the issue of the individual and the society - It has not been read in the social and historical context it appeared in the West. -dealt with in a superficial vision and a very limited understanding as the 'Hadatha' was treated. -linked to religion in a concise manner.

Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and 'allibraliah', Al-Jazirah Gazette, 2015, By Mohammad Alkana'n

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1 5 10 15	<p>Breaking the Engagement between Freedom and 'allibraliah'</p> <p>In my oral conversations with intellectuals and journalists around (allibraliah), or through my discussions with a number of twitter users around it; I noticed that they set 'allibraliah' as intertwined with freedom, and that they even transcend the closeness in the linguistic connotation to the agreement in the intellectual sense and in the real expression.</p> <p>In other words, they view 'allibraliah' as an expression of freedom in real life. So each position in which freedom is manifested is liberal, and every free practice is a form of 'allibraliah', or an application of its values. And this is an intellectual flaw in many facets; an issue that requires to break up the engagement between freedom and 'allibraliah' in the minds of those intellectuals, journalists, social media users and who see their opinion and adopt their point of view.</p> <p>The first aspect of that flaw is the word Liberalism "<i>allibraliah</i>". It is not originally stemmed from Arabic language. Rather, it is a translation of the English word 'Liberalism', which means (<i>altahroriah</i>), derived from the English word 'Liberty', which is (Alhurriah), from here the linguistic link between 'allibraliah' concept and the word 'Alhurriah' came for some, taking into account that the</p>	<p>Intellectuals and journalists and twitter users > liberals</p>	<p>Claim1: Associating 'allibraliah' with freedom is an intellectual fault.</p> <p>-Fallacy of definition (false equivalence)</p> <p>- Fallacy of definition</p> <p>- psychogenetic fallacy (argumentum ad hominem)</p> <p>-Topos of definition (etymology)</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of definition + Topos of reality+</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-personal deictics 'my'</p> <p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-Evaluation 'intellectual fault'</p> <p>-metaphor</p> <p>Intensification</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>word 'liberty' is of Latin origin which is 'liber' meaning the class of free men. So, it is this linguistic convergence that has created the cognitive problem for those who define freedom as 'allibraliah' or vice versa. And this is a methodical flaw, because this convergence must be reinforced by the historical dimension of 'allibraliah' and endorsed by its intellectual content, and the real application of its values. Does the history of 'allibraliah' confirm that it really embodies freedom? and does its intellectual content achieve this? And are the values applied today to liberal states and regimes prove that they are indeed achieving freedom? Absolutely not; since there is no liberalism that can be measured in terms of its agreement with freedom, instead there are different liberal models: English, French, American, German and others.</p> <p>The second aspect is that freedom is a human value that precedes 'allibraliah'. This value can be traced in many cultures; approved by religions and known by civilizations prior to emergence of 'allibraliah' during the European Renaissance (from the 15th to the 19th century).</p> <p>However, the difference – as quoted by Dr. Khalid al-Dakhil, professor of political sociology in an interview held with Al-Jazeera newspaper, is that the west has put freedom under a political and economic theoretical framework known as 'allibraliah'. This means that even if 'allibraliah' means freedom for the western man, this means that it is related to the cultural experience of the West during its history, and</p>		<p>-Fallacy of ignorance (fallacy of relevance)</p> <p>-Topos of history + Topos of reality+ Topos of number</p> <p>-Topos of humanitarianism + Topos of history and antecedence of freedom</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>-Topos of culture (western culture)</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-Indirect speech</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>-assertion</p> <p>'absolutely not'</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>to the degree of its view of the civilization criterion that measures with it 'allibraliah' to achieve freedom as a human value. So this is John Locke, the first philosopher of 'allibraliah' was a slave trader!!</p> <p>The third aspect is that 'allibraliah' concept is ambiguous to many researchers and intellectuals for its variety. This has led to the emergence of a problem consists of having two terms that signify the meaning of 'allibraliah' which are individualism (alfardaniah) and freedom (altahroriah). So, if the word freedom is clear that cannot bear more than one meaning or interpretation; the word individualism is the basis of the problem. So, is the intended individualism in the philosophical basis of 'allibraliah' to be the (individualism) against the (collective) or the (self) against the (other)? In the same context, Dr. Yasser Qansouh says in his book, "Liberalism is a problematic concept": "The linguistic meaning of (individualism) is the self-dependent individual act, whereas the linguistic meaning of the self (selfishness) means self-interest as the basis of moral behaviour."</p> <p>The fourth aspect is related to the historical experiences of 'allibraliah', and its real applications seen around the world. It is no secret that It is no secret that Western colonialism came to light after the emergence of 'allibraliah' in Britain with its constitutional revolution of 1688, which was the same 'allibraliah' that gave the Jews Palestine and stood behind their horrific massacres, and still</p>		<p>-Topos of example + Fallacy of definition (attribution).</p> <p>-Topos of ambiguity of 'allibraliah' + Topos of number.</p> <p>-Fallacy of Equivocation</p> <p>-Topos of authority of knowledge</p> <p>- Topos of definition of individualism</p> <p>-Topos of history of 'allibraliah'+ Topos of abuse + Topos of example</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-direct speech</p> <p>Involvement</p> <p>-evaluation</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-metaphors</p> <p>-evaluation</p> <p>'Their horrific massacres',</p>
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p> <p>85</p>	<p>supplying Israel with money and weapons. Also, the American 'allibraliah', after the declaration of independence in the 18th century, took part in the extermination of the American Indians and occupied the Philippines in the middle of the 19th century. The French revolution that Western 'allibraliah' brag about, however, had gifted the world Napoleon Bonaparte with his destructive conquests and crusades against the Arab countries.</p> <p>And the real evidences of the crisis of 'allibraliah' with the value of freedom are many; of much significance is the issue of (religious freedom) for the large Muslim communities in western countries, Islamophobia has raised and extremist issues and attitudes against Islam have increased, so who forgot the repeated issue of the (offensive prophet cartoons), the rejection of hijab, the refusal of minarets, the attempts burn Quran, the rejection to build mosques and the list is increasable under the existence of the western 'allibraliah' that is basically (contradictory) in its reality, although ideal in its philosophy, So, it lacks the religious freedom and it is selective in its practices, as 'allibraliah' achieves (tolerance) and grants the practice of (hatred) at the same time and calls for the independence of individuals, the protection of their freedoms at the time it practices selectivity of the law against their religions and their lives. The simplest example of that is the position of the American 'allibraliah' that approve the law of (Anti-Semitism), and rejected to</p>		<p>-Topos of reality + Topos of number+ Fallacy of freedom + fallacy of justice</p> <p>-Topos of tolerance + Topos or Fallacy of abuse (hate) Fallacy of freedom + fallacy of justice</p> <p>-Topos of example</p> <p>- Topos or fallacy of abuse</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-evaluation</p>	<p>'Genocide', 'brag'</p> <p>Intensification</p> <p>-quantification</p> <p>-accumulation</p> <p>-evaluation</p>
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90	the enactment of a law the criminalize the abuse of religions and so on. And the position of 'allibraliah' today with the Syrian revolution proves enough how these liberal regimes have kept silent on the slaughter and destruction of the Syrian people for their regional and national interests.				
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
Intellectuals, journalists and twitter users	<p>-they set 'allibraliah' as intertwined with freedom, and that they even transcend the closeness in the linguistic connotation to the agreement in the intellectual sense and in the real expression.</p> <p>-In other words, they view 'allibraliah' as an expression of freedom in real life.</p>
'Allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the word (allibraliah) is not originally Arabic -it is a translation of the English word 'Liberalism', which means (altahroriah), derived from the English word 'Liberty', which is (Alhurriah), taking into account that the word 'liberty' is of Latin origin which is 'liber' meaning the class of free men -it is related the cultural experience of the West during its history - is ambiguous to many researchers and intellectuals for its variety. achieves (tolerance) and grants the practice of (hatred) at the same time - calls for the independence of individuals, the protection of their freedoms at the time it practices selectivity of the law against their religions and their lives
Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -is a human value that precedes 'allibraliah' -this value is existent in many cultures, approved by religions and known by civilisations before the emergence of 'allibraliah' - is clear that cannot bear more than one meaning or interpretation

Line no.	Text	Discursive Strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001)			
		Nomination	Argumentation	Perspectivisation	Intensification and mitigation
1	<p>Freedom of 'Allibraliah' and the Conventional Misunderstanding</p> <p>In the previous two articles, I attempted to clarify my vision of the liberal freedom. The words were an engagement of knowledge with the theories that occupy the minds of those interested in this vital field that is always renewed. That is the reason why the speech came into being a theorisation, referring to ideas, concepts and terms that professional readers know, while difficult to understand by others - a little or a lot.</p> <p>In this article, I will try to make the speech general / public / populist, as far as the subject can bear; as for those who read about 'allibraliah' in the "non-ideologized" scholarly literature do not need to clarify such bases that we discussed and will discuss on the limits of the freedom of 'allibraliah'. For this reason, I will try to clarify the obvious –with some examples - for those who do not read or read little, and their readings, if any, remain limited to traditional ideological</p> <p>clashing articles / summaries / leaflets / pamphlets with 'allibraliah'; so they are immersed with blatant ignorance, overt contrasts, Stupid fraud, and ideological satire loaded with misinformation and perhaps takfeer.</p>	<p>- professional readers</p> <p>-public</p>	<p>Claim1: 'allibraliah' is clear for critical readers but still misunderstood by the ideologized public whose knowledge is based on traditionalists' ideologies.</p> <p>-Topos of knowledge by critical readers</p> <p>-Topos of ignorance of the public</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse by traditionalists' ideologies</p>	<p>Involvement</p> <p>-first-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-qualification</p> <p>-evaluation</p> <p>-evaluation</p>

<p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>35</p> <p>40</p>	<p>The traditionalist preachers do not address their miserable crowds except with what emotionally agitate them; because the way to the mindless "layman" mind is only through his raging religious and social passion. The traditionalist preachers say to their masses in a deceitful superiority: it is true that 'allibraliah' in all the countries of the world do not let freedom unlimited entirely, but no liberal can deny that "absolute freedom" is the origin of the "freedom of 'allibraliah'" he calls for. Thus, according to the deceitful view of the traditionalists, all 'allibraliah' seek absolute freedom, because it is the origin of the liberal theory.</p> <p>There is no doubt that the words of the preachers here are at the first true, and at the last lie or blatant ignorance. The traditionalists exploit the truth in it; to connect it to the blatant ignorance, or the falsehood. Yes, the origin the freedom of 'allibraliah'- the origin of which is theoretically anchored - is that it is an absolute freedom without limits; because a man found - natural / in nature - free. However, this does not mean that 'allibraliah' seeks that, and this is not possible at all, because natural freedom means cruel freedom, freedom here eats freedom; this results in total natural captivity.</p> <p>To be more obvious, I would say: It is no wonder that 'allibraliah' affirms absolute freedom; as a theoretical starting point, Islam too confirms this principle rule in theory: absolute freedom. For the fundamentalists- the fundamentals of jurisprudence not the</p>	<p>-Traditionalists</p> <p>-layman >dull</p>	<p>Claim2: 'allibraliah' is not based on unrestricted freedom as the traditionalists claim. -fallacy of definition of 'allibraliah' by the traditionalists.</p> <p>-Topos or fallacy of abuse by traditionalists.</p> <p>-Topos of definition of 'allibraliah' + topos or fallacy of freedom in 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of comparison (similarity between 'allibraliah' and Islam in freedom)</p>	<p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-first-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation</p>
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<p>45</p> <p>50</p> <p>55</p> <p>60</p>	<p>fundamentalist movements-, we find the fundamental rule that the legalists repeat consistently, that the origin of everything is permissibility, asserting that the "permissible" does not require evidence, because it is the origin, while the "forbidden" is what needs an evidence because it gets out of the original: general permissibility. Here, is it permissible for anyone to say that Islamic law permits everything, because its origin is permissibility? Of course, no one would say this, everyone knows that the emphasis on the origin of permissibility is a theoretical principle only; to control the assets of the exceptional prohibition.</p> <p>Here, the preachers go back a little - they claim, the freedom of 'allibraliah' is indeed restricted, but it is restricted only to the detriment of others, that is, a person is free to do whatever he pleases; as far as he does not harm others. This is also true in principle. However, the most important question remains, the problematic question: What are the limits of harming others? We are all aware that they are not just the limits of direct aggression, physical or moral, but are much wider.</p> <p>The limits of harm to others are not defined at all times and places, but they are issues in terms of their relative and circumstantial nature, because they are cultural boundaries, i.e., the culture, including religion, creates its features and horizons. If they are based on a collective basis in a fixed religion, they remained fixed albeit</p>		<p>Claim3: freedom in 'allibraliah' is relative based on cultural factors but not based on not harming others as traditionalists claim.</p> <p>- fallacy of definition of freedom.</p> <p>-topos of relativity of freedom in 'allibraliah' + Topos of culture</p>	<p>-free indirect speech</p>	<p>mitigation</p> <p>-agreement with the antagonist</p>
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<p>65</p> <p>70</p> <p>75</p> <p>80</p> <p>85</p>	<p>controversial, or in a renewed religion; they keep transforming according to the requirements of the situation, the humanitarian situation and the real situation.</p> <p>I think this is clear. Nevertheless, although it is clear, I will try to clarify and simplify the examples, and even with naive images sometimes; for the layman to recognize the simple general features of the image. Traditionalists say that liberals do not impose a restriction on freedom except on the limits of harming others. Indeed, it is a culture that creates our vision of the concept of harm. For example, I would choose from the examples what constitutes the traditional human obsession. If a man chose to walk naked on the streets of London, Paris or New York, would he be permitted to do so, if this man stood completely naked at the airport or boarded the plane, etc.? Will he be allowed to do so, although in the traditional principle he practices his personal freedom that does not harm others? Of course, we all know that liberal societies do not allow this, and they see in this behaviour a blatant attack on the public space, which is the right of all. Thus, this behaviour / nakedness in public space is an explicit, but indirect, aggression against all, an aggression that is punishable by law, for violating the public morals emanating from the cultural practices that everyone has accepted -they are cultural practices formed by many factors, including the religion of Christianity-. This</p>		<p>- fallacy of definition of freedom in 'allibraliah' by the traditionalists.</p> <p>-topos of culture.</p> <p>-topos of example (in the west).</p>	<p>-second-person perspective</p>	
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<p>90</p> <p>95</p> <p>100</p> <p>105</p>	<p>means that such behaviour is not an individual choice, although it is not a "direct aggression" from a person to another.</p> <p>If we come to the Muslim community, we find that Islam is strongly present in shaping the cultural vision. For example, in a Muslim community, it cannot be possible to issue a law that allows for adultery and makes it legitimate. But -here come the cultural legal details- there is a difference between the criminalization of adultery, and the imposition of laws of discretionary control alleging guardianship of public behaviours that are - in terms of origin - permissible; Under the pretext of blocking excuses. The systems that try to control gender mixing, or adjust the limits and circumstances of this mixing ... etc., are all based on judgments, in the sense that they are not fundamental assets, as is the absolute basis for the prohibition of adultery. Thus, such judgmental systems are subject to constant conflict between those with a liberal vision, a vision that grants the individual a responsible freedom, and those who maintain a conservative vision that sees details of individual actions must remain under the strict control that forms the identity of the tutelary society.</p> <p>Also, traditionalists argue about 'allibraliah' by claiming that freedom exists in all sects, or in most sects, and, more importantly, it exists in Islam so why does 'allibraliah' claim an exclusive possession of theorizing of freedom, and why does 'allibraliah' claim that freedom</p>		<p>-Topos of example (local Islamic)</p> <p>Claim4: individual freedom is central in 'allibraliah' but subsidiary in other concepts.</p>	<p>-free indirect speech</p> <p>-second-person perspective</p>	
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<p>110</p> <p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p> <p>130</p>	<p>is what distinguishes it from others? . In fact, each doctrine or trend has a compass of a central interest, distinguishing it from others. Individual freedom is the compass of liberal interest. However, this does not mean it do not exist in others'. It exists - to an extent - in every intellectual trend, but in 'allibraliah' it is a priority, and in others it is one of the elements of discourse.</p> <p>The centrality of 'allibraliah' idea around the "individual freedom" is what distinguishes it, as "social justice" is what distinguishes socialism, for example. In socialism, we find a will to liberate, embracing - in the end, as theoretically claiming - individual freedom, but it admits that this individual freedom is not the centre of interest. Hence, socialism was characterized by a focus on something, not the same focus of 'allibraliah', and vice versa, hence, they are distinguished.</p> <p>To be more obvious, we say, the emphasis on individual freedom exists in most sects, trends and religions, but 'allibraliah' makes this individual freedom its focus, and even its identity that distinguishes it. If all this suggests that "the freedom of allibraliah" is relative, circumstantial, and transient, it means that the limits of liberal freedom are not predetermined. Here, the traditional preacher will come out with us denouncing and arguing that the inability to define the limits means that 'allibraliah' is nothing more than an illusion, or</p>		<p>-fallacy of comparison btw 'allibraliah' and other concepts.</p> <p>-Topos of difference (of 'allibraliah' from other concepts) + Topos of advantage of freedom in 'allibraliah'.</p> <p>-Topos of example</p> <p>-Topos of existence of freedom in most concepts + Topos of centrality of freedom in 'allibraliah'</p>	<p>-second-person perspective</p>	
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<p>135</p> <p>140</p> <p>145</p> <p>150</p>	<p>that it is an idea with no identity, so that its proponents do not know what they want at all.</p> <p>To understand 'allibraliah', we must recognize that it is a "general trend", a "circumstance", a "freeing tendency," and therefore it is necessarily relative. For example, it is said in the West: the Christian liberal trend, which refers to the trend that conforms to Christian values, but in a spirit of liberation that raises the value of the individual. Also, in the Muslim world, liberal Islam, or the liberal Islamic trend, is also a distinction from extremist Islam, or the Islam of the totalitarians, on the one hand, and its distinction from an entirely odd 'libraliah', that try to break with its reality and starting from the zero as it claims, which is impossible.</p> <p>If 'allibraliah' is a "circumstantial", "relative", "state", it means that it exists - in some way - in all societies, although it does not explicitly express itself, and may not be aware of it. In Iran, for example, we find that political and social dominance is for the clergy. Mohammad Khatami, the former president, wears the religious turban, which means he is a clergyman. But Khatami is described - in Iran and abroad - as a liberal, does this mean that he adopts the vision of the most liberal trends in the West, just because he possesses this feature: liberal? Of course not. Hence, Khatami described as a liberal, a relative description, that is deserved because he represents an open liberal trend within a closed tutelary system. If Khatami had</p>		<p>Claim5: relativity of freedom in 'allibraliah' does not mean that 'allibraliah' is a myth as the traditionalists claim.</p> <p>-Topos of definition of 'allibraliah'+ Topos of relativity.</p> <p>-Topos of example</p> <p>-Topos of existence of 'allibraliah' in all societies + Topos of ignorance of this existence.</p> <p>-Topos of example.</p>	<p>Detachment</p> <p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>Intensification</p> <p>-evaluation</p>
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155	<p>moved to one of the capitals of the West with the same thought and details of the vision without change, he would have been a conservative right.</p>				
160	<p>Mindful liberal does not penetrate the entire socio-cultural practices. He works his vision through them. For example, if a committee of ten persons is formed, to look at the age at which a person may travel abroad without the permission of a guardian. Globally, an individual becomes independent at about 18 years old. If the Committee had the following options: Freedom of travel is at 18/19/20/22, we will find the members of the Committee will differ according to the nature of the cultural reference that determines their vision of things.</p>		-Topos of culture.	-third-person perspective	
165	<p>The liberal, in asserting responsible individual freedom, will choose the age of 18, and affirms that the individual as soon as he is of legal age assumes full responsibility for himself. While emphasizing this option, he does not miss the dangers, but believes that freedom is more important and has priority, and that the negatives resulting from it are dealt with from other entrances, which do not go beyond the limits of those negatives.</p>				
170	<p>This would be the liberal choice. On the other hand, a conservative man will choose age 22, if there is a higher age to choose, he would chose it; because he believes in the need to control the behaviour of individuals, and believes that the freedom available to them will necessarily spoil them. This is why we have seen in many of the</p>		-Topos of example.	-third-person perspective	
175					

<p>180</p> <p>185</p> <p>190</p> <p>195</p> <p>200</p>	<p>totalitarian countries- mostly communist / socialist-oriented countries - that make no travel, and travel is an exception. Therefore, those who want to travel from their citizens abroad, even at the age of 30 or 40, have to take a special complex permit, which is available only to few.</p> <p>Another example: If a committee is set up to supervise the Book Fair. Here, you will find that the member of the Liberal Committee does not prevent books except very little, and perhaps does not prevent anything at all. On the other hand, you will find the conservative tutelary wants to make the ban is the origin, and that each book in the exhibition holds a special permit. Of course, between this and that, for the relativity of the liberal trend, you will find the conservative liberal, and you will find the liberal conservative in the middle. It is obvious that the liberal, when he emphasizes the need to allow all books except few, does not mean that he agrees with the contents of everything presented in the exhibition. It merely means that he grants individuals responsible freedom so that they decide themselves what is harmful and useful, and also they have the right to take the experience with all its dangers so they are ultimately responsible by their choices.</p> <p>In the above examples, you can note that ‘allibraliah’ did not raise a contradiction to a religious principle that is agreed upon by all Islamic scholars. No one will discuss the origin of the obligation to pay zakat,</p>	<p>Liberal vs. conservative</p> <p>Liberal conservative - conservative liberal</p>	<p>-Topos of example</p> <p>Claim6: ‘allibraliah’ does not contradict the main principles of Islam but assess</p>	<p>-third-person perspective</p>	<p>-evaluation</p>
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<p>205</p> <p>210</p>	<p>for example, but there will be a discussion about the way it is performed and the details of the steps to be complied with; If the obligation is determined. What is intended is that the members of the imagined committees present their views within the possible religious, cultural and social context, which is relatively circumstantial. As it is related to the general cultural context, it is ordinary that some jurisprudential views are present and it is natural for a liberal to choose the closest to individual freedom; even if it is the view of some jurists as opposed to the opinion of the majority of jurists, the existence of the dispute necessarily means that the matter is not a fundamental origin, and it has a space of interpretation that makes the exclusive possession - whatever justified - a kind of radical exclusion.</p>		<p>the relative application of these principles on the basis of the cultural factors that support the freedom of individuals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Topos of culture. -Topos of relativity of Islamic law. -Fallacy of exclusion. 		
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Predication strategies	
Main social actors and practices	Predications
'allibraliah'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the origin the freedom of 'allibraliah'- the origin of which is theoretically anchored - is that it is an absolute freedom without limits; because a man found - natural / in nature - free. However, this does not mean that 'allibraliah' seeks that, and this is not possible at all, because natural freedom means cruel freedom, freedom here eats freedom; this results in total natural captivity. - Individual freedom is the compass of liberal interest - "individual freedom" is what distinguishes it - but 'allibraliah' makes this individual freedom its focus, and even its identity that distinguishes it - it is a "general trend", a "circumstance", a "freeing tendency," and therefore it is necessarily relative. -it exists - in some way - in all societies, although it does not explicitly express itself, and may not be aware of it. – - did not raise a contradiction to a religious principle that is agreed upon by all Islamic scholars.
'allibraliah' in traditionalists' view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - argue about 'allibraliah' by claiming that freedom exists in all sects, or in most sects, and, more importantly, it exists in Islam so why does 'allibraliah' claim an exclusive possession of theorizing of freedom? - 'allibraliah' in all the countries of the world do not let freedom unlimited entirely, but no liberal can deny that "absolute freedom" is the origin of the "freedom of 'allibraliah'" he calls for. - all 'allibraliah' seek absolute freedom, because it is the origin of the liberal theory. - the freedom of 'allibraliah' is indeed restricted, but it is restricted only to the detriment of others, that is, a person is free to do whatever he pleases; as far as he does not harm others - Traditionalists say that liberals do not impose a restriction on freedom except on the limits of harming others. - argue that the inability to define the limits means that 'allibraliah' is nothing more than an illusion, or that it is an idea with no identity.