

## **The Mindszenty Affair and the United States Embassy in Budapest<sup>1</sup>**

On 4 November 1956, as Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, buildings were being pounded with mortar and artillery,<sup>1</sup> and jets flew overhead, tens of thousands fled the Hungarian People's Republic.<sup>2</sup> In the confusion, two dignitaries of the Hungarian Catholic Church turned up at the door of the United States Legation, *Szabadság tér* 12 in Budapest's Fifth District, about two blocks away from the Hungarian Parliament building. One of the Hungarian priests seeking refuge in the U.S. Legation, Monsignor Albert Egon Turchányi, was hardly known outside Hungary. The other supplicant was no less a personage than Cardinal Archbishop József Mindszenty, Prince Primate of Hungary and Archbishop of Esztergom, an international celebrity who, until freed three and a half days before, had been Hungary's best-known political prisoner. By the following morning, hundreds of dead littered the streets of Budapest. The fighting which János Kádár declared a 'counter-revolution', the West called a popular 'uprising', and is now remembered as the Hungarian 'revolution', was defeated. Pope Pius XII, in his third encyclical of the week as he sought to keep up with the rapid change of events, lamented the West's failure to intervene and declared 'the blood of the Hungarian nation' to be 'crying out for vengeance'.<sup>2</sup>

Cardinal Archbishop József Mindszenty, although no longer so well remembered in the West today, was at the time one of the Cold War's most famous 'victims of Communism'. His symbolic importance during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution went deep. A bishop since 1944 and prince-primate of Hungary since 1945, Mindszenty had, despite some controversy within the Vatican, been elevated to cardinal by Pius XII in 1946 because his resolute attitude towards Communism and state secularism mirrored the 'Cold Warrior' pope's own.<sup>3</sup> Mindszenty had pretensions to temporal, as well as spiritual, authority. According to the ancient Hungarian Constitution, which Mindszenty considered still valid, the Archbishop of Esztergom had the right

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<sup>1</sup> My thanks for Michael Novotny for helpful editorial suggestions.

and the duty to rule the country, as regent, at times when the throne was vacant or there was no legal civil authority. Since Mindszenty regarded the post-war Communist regime as illegitimate, this gave him the theoretical right to rule. It certainly gave him the sense that he had the right and duty to speak for the Hungarian nation.<sup>4</sup> By December 1946, Mindszenty judged himself to be ‘perhaps the only man left in Hungary’ who has ‘remained independent of political influence’ and ‘whose office entitles him to intervene in national affairs.’<sup>5</sup> Especially when dealing with determined Communists, Mindszenty maintained, ‘a hesitant, irresolute attitude could prove disastrous.’<sup>6</sup> His stated aim was to protect and defend the values and practices of traditional Hungary, an entity which predated the disastrous Treaty of Trianon of 1920.

After the Second World War, Hungary, which as a defeated Axis power was run by the Inter-Allied Control Commission, came under the control of the Soviet-backed Hungarian Communist leadership by degrees. The population of about 10 million Hungarians included some 6 million baptised Catholics, perhaps as many as 1.5 million of whom were active churchgoers.<sup>7</sup> The Catholic Church in Hungary, with its long tradition of being intertwined with the state, and which held both prestige and power, was initially protected, even championed, by the Communists. The *modus vivendi* between Church and State began to break down after the peace treaty was signed with Hungary in 1947, and power handed back to the Hungarian authorities. As the state fell steadily under Communist control, it sought with determination and effectiveness to restrict religious publications, stop the broadcasting of Church services on state radio, remove government funding for religious schools, and discredit the higher clergy, especially Mindszenty himself.<sup>8</sup> As leader of the Hungarian Catholic Church, Mindszenty sent letters to the newspapers, as well as Pastoral Letters read out in all churches, to combat encroachments on the independence of the Church. He organised protests against incursions into the Church’s historic rights and sought to discredit the state’s justifications for them. He declared 1947-1948 to be a ‘Marian Year’, to be marked by mass pilgrimages and devotions to the Blessed

Virgin throughout Hungary, including devotions to Our Lady of Fatima. This was two years before Pope Pius XII declared the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be an infallible doctrine and six years before 1954 was declared the first Marian Year for the universal Catholic Church. By 29 May 1948, faced with concerted press and media campaigns to discredit the Catholic Church, Mindszenty denounced what he identified as ‘the symptoms of the historic “Kulturkampf”’.<sup>9</sup> When Church schools were brought under state control, that summer, he arranged for ‘the bells in all the churches in the country’ to toll for a quarter of an hour in mourning as the new law went into effect.<sup>10</sup> By the time that the state campaign reached its secularist climax – with raids on convents and monasteries and the forced transportation of their inmates to prison camps, together with the establishment of the so-called Peace Priest movement as an alternative, state-controlled, Catholic Church – Cardinal Mindszenty was already behind bars.<sup>11</sup>

Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested by the Hungarian Communist state authorities on 26 December 1948, the day after Christmas. The Cardinal, who had been arrested and served time before, twice in 1919 and most recently under the 1944 Arrow Cross regime, and who had been expecting to be arrested, took the precaution of issuing the following statement: ‘I will not renounce my archiepiscopal see. I have nothing to confess, and I will sign nothing. If nevertheless I should someday do so, that will only be a consequence of the human body’s weakness, and I declare it in advance null and void.’<sup>12</sup> On 2 January 1949, in the apostolic letter *Acerrimo Moerore*, Pius XII condemned ‘the gaoling and torturing’ of Cardinal József Mindszenty as ‘a violation of human rights and dignity’ and ‘an affront against religion itself’. Not only ‘Catholics in Hungary’, the Pope declared, but ‘decent people all over the world’, were watching Hungarian developments ‘in horror’.<sup>13</sup>

Before the 1949 trial had even opened, the Hungarian state brought out *Documents on the Mindszenty Case* (known colloquially as the ‘Yellow Book’ because of its bright yellow cover), a

compendium of lurid photographs and documents cobbled together by the Hungarian security service (*Államvédelmi Hatóság* or *ÁVH*) purporting to show evidence of the Cardinal's treachery, conspiracy and criminality, including his supposed wartime 'services to the Nazis' and alleged embezzlement of funds intended for Catholic charities.<sup>14</sup> According to the Hungarian state, it was 'necessary' to issue the Yellow Book in separate French and English editions because various 'organs of the Western press' had claimed the Cardinal's arrest to be unfounded,<sup>15</sup> and were falsely presenting Mindszenty as a 'martyr' to his faith.<sup>16</sup> In Hungary, the Communist authorities continued, 'it is not considered an accident, but on the contrary, a trick of imperialist politics, that the Vatican, the London, the New York and the Salzburg radio and, in their wake the entire hostile Western press, announced on the day of the appearance of the Yellow Book that Mindszenty had been "tortured" and that his admissions were extracted with the help of "drugs"'.<sup>17</sup>

The documents in the Yellow Book presented the Cardinal as a reactionary aristocrat implacably opposed to democracy, land reform, nationalization, republicanism and all forms of progress who had 'committed treason, espionage, crimes aimed at overthrowing the republic, and foreign exchange speculation.'<sup>18</sup> According to the most far-fetched part of the indictment, Mindszenty 'stood at the head of the monarchist organization for restoring the House of Ha[b]sburg'<sup>19</sup> and 'used his station as Archbishop of Esztergom for putting the clergy and the Catholic organisations of the country into the service of his espionage'.<sup>20</sup> Mindszenty was further charged with having sought to 'stir up unrest' in Carpathian Ukraine, where steps had been taken by the Soviets to suppress the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.<sup>21</sup> The Cardinal was held to have 'completed' his 'treachery' by maintaining political contact 'with enemies of democracy' in Hungary; with aristocrats; and with reactionary 'Hungarian émigrés' living in the USA.<sup>22</sup>

Mindszenty, together with six alleged ‘accomplices’,<sup>23</sup> were condemned in a major court case held in Budapest 3-8 February 1949. The trial was publicized as widely as possible, both in Hungary and around the world. The Cardinal’s confessions, in an open court room and before a full press gallery, to having conspired to ‘overthrow the Republic and the democratic order’,<sup>24</sup> naturally led to speculation in anti-Communist circles as to what methods might have been used to break his spirit. Although it emerged much later that the Cardinal had indeed been forced to ‘confess’ to invented crimes, mainly through the torture of extreme sleep deprivation, he had not been drugged and was unmarked by bruises, cuts or other obvious signs of physical harm. This left the justice or injustice of his case open to doubt.

As soon as the trial had ended, the Hungarian Ministry of Interior brought out *The Trial of József Mindszenty* (the so-called ‘Black Book’),<sup>25</sup> an edited version of the trial proceedings. According to the preface to the English-language edition, foreign journalists, including initially sceptical correspondents from *The Times*, *The Yorkshire Post* and *The Daily Express*, were persuaded of the Cardinal’s guilt after witnessing his confessions in an open courtroom.<sup>26</sup> In the Czech-language edition of the *Black Book*, American, British, Australian, Belgian, French and papal objections to the trial – said to represent ‘voices not heard since the fall of fascist Germany’ - were refuted by counter-arguments taken from a selection of Communist newspapers, including the *Daily Worker*, TASS and *L’Unità*.<sup>27</sup> The outrage which followed the Mindszenty trial verdict in the Catholic world, where it was marked by special masses, denunciations and demonstrations in Paris, London, Dublin, New York and elsewhere,<sup>28</sup> was echoed by U.S. administration and taken up as a cause célèbre by the Western alliance. U.S. President Truman, for example, denounced the Hungarian state’s ‘kangaroo court’, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson called the trial a ‘sickening sham’, and the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously backed a resolution to ask the United Nations to denounce the cardinal’s maltreatment.<sup>29</sup> As Paul Betts has found, some 80 articles on the Mindszenty case were published in the *New York Times* alone, 100

in *Le Monde* and 150 in *The Manchester Guardian*.<sup>30</sup> Mindszenty's placement on the cover of *Time* magazine on 14 February 1949, and Pope Pius XII's excommunication, on 19 February 1949, of all those who had taken part in the trial sealed the Cardinal's symbolic importance in the Cold War as a martyr, at once Christian and democratic, who was firmly placed on the Western side of the conflict.

The riposte to the publication of the Hungarian state's *Black Book* was not long in coming. In May 1949, an English-language version of the originally German-language *Authorized White Book. Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks – Published by Order of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty Prince-Primate of Hungary*, was brought out simultaneously in London, New York and Toronto. This 'White Book' presented 'the more important papers' from the Cardinal's own collection in order to show what the dustjacket described as 'four years of relentless battle against the Church in Hungary'.<sup>31</sup> The case brought the persecuted Catholic Church firmly onto the American side in the emerging Cold War. For years, the editors mused, 'we have allowed ourselves to pay scant attention to the arrest or persecution of many ministers, priests and rabbis, along with other groups of individuals who, relying on the basic principles of democracy and human freedom, have opposed the seizure of total power by the state.'<sup>32</sup> The 'recent arrest and trial of one of Europe's greatest ecclesiastical figures', it continued, 'has called attention to those methods by which the present governments behind the Iron Curtain have eliminated any opposition'.<sup>33</sup>

The judicial methods which had been observed in the Soviet Union by the (firmly anti-Communist) Overseas Press Club of America were now examined to account for the otherwise inexplicable confessions of a man with a reputation as tough as Mindszenty's during what was beginning to look like an orchestrated attack on religious leaders across the newly Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>34</sup> The Mindszenty trial of 1949 was linked specifically to other Catholic trials such as the 1946 trial of the Croat prelate Alojzije Viktor Stepanic and the

1947 trial of the Slovak clerical-fascist leader Jozef Tiso, cases which were morally complicated because of their links with collaborationist wartime regimes. The first Hollywood film about the Mindszenty trial, 'Guilty of Treason' (1950), directed by Felix Feist with a screenplay by Emmet Lavery, detailed how an American foreign correspondent sent to cover the 1949 trial in Budapest was able to uncover the lies, manipulation and secret brutality of the Hungarian state. Cardinal Mindszenty, presented in the film as the holy son of a saintly mother, was shown to be revered by freedom-loving, patriotic Hungarians as well as by simple, faithful peasants.

In 1954, the year after Stalin's death, *The Prisoner*, a subtler play by Bridget Boland (best known as the author of the 1944 psychological thriller 'Gaslight' directed by Alfred Hitchcock), was staged in London. Centred on the tense relationship between a Communist interrogator and imprisoned Catholic cardinal in an unnamed Central European country, the same cardinal who had withstood wartime imprisonment under the Nazis showed the foresight, moments before being arrested by the Communist authorities, to smuggle out a statement to warn that any confession he might make would be the result 'of human weakness'. This detail identified the cardinal in the film as Mindszenty. In the play, the cardinal is led into making false confessions through the fiendishly 'modern' technique of using sleep deprivation, solitary confinement and psychological pressure in ways calculated to break a man's will. The cardinal is eventually tripped up by his own humility and exaggerated sense of sin. The interrogator, who slowly begins to empathise with the prisoner, cracks under the ruthlessness of an inhumane Communist system and ends by taking his own life.

A film version of 'The Prisoner', directed by Peter Grenville and starring Alec Guinness as the Cardinal and Jack Hawkins as his Communist inquisitor, followed in 1955, the same year that the Pospelov Commission, a special Communist Party body, was formed in the Soviet Union to investigate what were beginning to be understood as Stalin's 'crimes'. The film version of 'The Prisoner' showed some use of drugs, but laid particular stress on the pitiless application of

‘scientific’, ‘modern’ and ‘psychological’ methods to break a person’s will – techniques which were widely coming to be known in the West as ‘brainwashing’. The film version of ‘The Prisoner’ was released in the UK on 19 April 1955 and in the USA on 11 October 1955. The film, which allowed for some human ambiguity, proved controversial. It was simultaneously banned by the Cannes and Venice film festivals for being ‘so anti-communist that it would be offensive to Communist countries’ and by the Italian Film Board and Irish Censorship Board for being ‘anti-Catholic’ and ‘subtly pro-Communist’.<sup>35</sup> It was nominated for five BAFTA awards and, in July 1956, won the Catholic Film Award. The martyred Cardinal, imprisoned for his faith by a godless Communist regime in the very heart of Christian Europe, became an enduring symbol of Western righteousness in the Cold War.

In the changed political climate in the Communist world which followed Stalin’s death in 1953 and climaxed with Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956, Cardinal Mindszenty was moved from prison to what amounted to house arrest. As the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the consecration of the Cathedral in Esztergom (1956) was approaching, Mindszenty was encouraged by the Hungarian authorities to take part in the celebrations, since this would help to dispel the stink which his show trial had produced in the Vatican, the West, and throughout the Catholic world. Mindszenty, who insisted that he wanted ‘not mercy but justice’ from the regime, refused to cooperate, remaining ‘firm’ in his resolve that ‘the cathedral would not see [him] on its festival day, not under existing conditions.’<sup>36</sup> Faced, as he later put it, ‘with the alternative of death in prison or liberty at the price of ignoble compromise’ he was adamant that he ‘would sooner choose the former’.<sup>37</sup> The few pilgrims in Esztergom, he noted with relish, ‘must have been wondering why the primate did not leave his prison, since the newspapers had stated that the government was granting him his freedom’.<sup>38</sup> Mindszenty was, in his own way, putting the Hungarian regime under pressure to go further and to grant more concessions.



The 1956 Hungarian ‘uprising’ or ‘revolution’ changed everything. On 28 October 1956, four days after the revolt began, the warden at Püspökszentlászló Castle, where Mindszenty was being kept under house arrest, told the Cardinal to get dressed and ready to move. Mindszenty refused.<sup>39</sup> ‘We are endeavouring to protect your life at the cost of our own’, his guards reasoned; ‘But if we can’t because of your opposition, we disclaim all responsibility for your safety’.<sup>40</sup> The next day, the Party steward and János Horváth, the chairman of the Bureau for Church Affairs, tried jointly to persuade him to leave. Mindszenty replied: ‘By now you must know that I am not leaving here. During the past years the government has held me in seven different places. I no longer have any desire to change this present place for still another. Besides, I am not in the slightest danger. If I leave here, it will be only to go to Budapest or Esztergom’. Furthermore, he argued, ‘a prisoner cannot enter into any binding discussions’. Only if he were liberated, Mindszenty insisted, would he be willing to ‘begin negotiating.’<sup>41</sup> On 30 October, a detachment of officers came in to announce: ‘You are free. We can set out for Budapest at once. Transportation, suitcases, trunks, everything necessary is at your disposal.’<sup>42</sup> Only now, on his own terms, did Mindszenty finally consent to leave prison.<sup>43</sup> On 31 October 1956, in Buda, the prince-primate began to hold court and to receive visitors. He made a point of refusing to see the so-called ‘peace priests’, the regime-approved, collaborationist clergy.<sup>44</sup> On 3 November, the Cardinal took to the airwaves to champion the Hungarian uprising on Radio Kossuth. Famously, he declared the Communist regime to have been ‘swept away’ by the ‘whole Hungarian people’.<sup>45</sup>

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On 4 November 1956, during the confusion and fighting of the Hungarian revolution, half the staff of the United States Legation at *Szabadság tér* 12 was lying on the floor in the telex room, with the blinds pulled down and safes shoved up against the windows to stop incoming bullets,<sup>46</sup>

when Cardinal Mindszenty and his Secretary arrived at the door. The message which he came to deliver, as a newly released political prisoner, to the U.S. Legation was that the West should support the popular Hungarian insurrection, ideally through direct military intervention by U.S. troops.

Hollywood could scarcely have invented a happier ending than for the wronged Cardinal, so recently portrayed on film, to return to the Hungarian people as they sought to overthrow Communist tyranny. The Cardinal remembered the moment that he arrived at *Szabadság tér* 12 in just such apocalyptic terms. ‘The entrances to the parliament building,’ Mindszenty wrote in his memoirs, had ‘been sealed off by the Russians. I therefore quickly enquired which embassy was nearest. Somebody said it was the American embassy [sic]’.<sup>47</sup> Quick as a flash, Mindszenty and Turchányi concealed their cassocks under their coats and made their way ‘between rows of Russian tanks’ safely to ‘the Embassy [sic] of the United States of America’ where ‘Minister Edward Thompson [Tom] Wailes welcomed me cordially as a “symbol of liberty”’.<sup>48</sup> After long ‘years of imprisonment’, and ‘shipwrecked’ after a mere ‘three and a half days of freedom’, the Cardinal Archbishop and his secretary ‘clambered aboard the saving deck of the American Embassy to escape being carried off to the Soviet Union and to wait for the day that would once more permit me to work in [sic] behalf of my native land.’<sup>49</sup>

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Jacob Beam, on duty at the State Department in Washington, D.C. on that fateful day, later recalled how things had looked from the other side. In the small hours of the morning (Washington time), he got a call from Herbert Hoover (Acting Secretary of State while John Foster Dulles was unwell), to say that he had received a clandestine message that Cardinal Mindszenty and his secretary were on their way to seek asylum in the American legation in Budapest.<sup>50</sup> He pointed out to Hoover that although ‘in principle we opposed asylum’, it was ‘justified in this case since it involved hot pursuit endangering human life’.<sup>51</sup> Hoover checked

with President Eisenhower, after which the legation was given ‘authority to admit the two Hungarians.’<sup>52</sup> The U.S. Minister for Hungary, Tom Wailes, recalled that ‘a coded message was received by the Legation about 6 a.m. on November the 4<sup>th</sup>’ and decoded ‘just before the Cardinal appeared at the door’.<sup>53</sup> Wailes had the impression ‘that the message authorized the extension of refuge or asylum to the Cardinal’ though he also remembered being ‘somewhat surprised that Washington should have had prior knowledge of the Cardinal’s intention to seek safety in the Legation.’<sup>54</sup>

In his memoirs, Mindszenty placed the USA in the flattering role of champion of freedom and the embodiment of an anti-Communist crusade that reached its height precisely in 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis, Polish October Events and Hungarian Revolution. Behind the scenes on the U.S. side, however, much talk and telex type was taken up with mutual recriminations between the White House, State Department, and the U.S. Legation in Budapest over the extent to which CIA propaganda, broadcast via Radio Free Europe (RFE), *Voice of America* and mass leaflet drops, had given Hungarians false hope that the U.S. might intervene militarily if they stood up against their Communist ‘oppressors’ and was therefore morally responsible for the subsequent mess – including thousands of deaths - on the streets of Budapest. While the U.S. felt sickeningly responsible for the bloodshed, there was obvious political capital to be made out of the Soviet Union’s heavy-handed suppression of the Hungarian rebels. U.S. President Eisenhower and CIA Director Allen Dulles laid particular stress on the ‘ruthlessness and brutality of Soviet repression’, arguing that by responding with such a heavy hand, ‘Russia had lost a satellite and gained a conquered province’.<sup>55</sup> The U.S. State Department pointed to the political gains for NATO, arguing that the ‘Western European nations have been brought to realize that the Soviet threat is again menacing’ and noting that ‘irreparable damage has been done within the Soviet European empire’, albeit at the cost of a regrettable ‘setback to Hungary’s freedom’.<sup>56</sup> The Soviets, went this reasoning, ‘cannot tighten their rule without creating new strains

throughout the entire bloc.’<sup>57</sup> Soviet repression in Hungary, it was judged, would reduce the appeal of Communism in Western Europe and bolster the United States’ standing in the world.

United States policy towards Hungary looked rather less appealing to American diplomats posted in Central Europe, closer to the action. Minister Thompson, writing from Vienna, repeatedly urged the State Department to take more definite steps in Hungary, reminding Washington that ‘our radio and balloon operations have led to the belief that we would be prepared to do more than we have actually done if any of the subject peoples attempted [to] break free from Soviet tyranny’.<sup>58</sup> He was particularly sharp about the consequences of having chosen to send across the Iron Curtain vast numbers of leaflets by balloon. ‘I am of course aware that neither the leaflets dropped nor the nature of broadcasts were designed to incite an uprising’, he conceded, but pointed out that the ‘scope of these operations and in the case of balloons dramatic nature of method did in fact give rise in considerable measure to false expectations’.<sup>59</sup> Regardless of the underlying causes of the Hungarian uprising, he concluded, ‘our future position in this part of the world will suffer greatly if Hungarian affair ends without some action on part of US of a nature different from anything we have done, or at least made public so far.’<sup>60</sup>

By 13 November, the question of CIA responsibility for the disorders in Hungary had become so heated that the first item on the agenda of the 46<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems held in Washington consisted of a discussion, led by Jacob Beam, about ‘the allegations made in Germany and elsewhere that Radio Free Europe [*hereafter* RFE] had stirred up the Hungarians to revolt and that the U.S. had then abandoned them.’<sup>61</sup> Although the balloon campaign had been halted in Poland and Hungary, where uprisings had occurred, balloons with propaganda leaflets were still being released over Czechoslovakia and East Germany.<sup>62</sup> By 21 November, Dulles was not only speaking ‘with considerable heat’ in defence of RFE policy, but threatening to go public and embarrass the President if the criticisms that ‘seemed to accept the Communist line that RFE was responsible for the uprising and

slaughter in Hungary' were not curtailed.<sup>63</sup> On 15 December, the President was briefed on how to answer possible press questions holding RFE responsible for inciting 'the Hungarian patriots to revolt by promising outside assistance which could not be, and was not, made available'. It was suggested that such a question might be 'planted' so that he could deflect criticism. In the end, none of this proved necessary, because none of the journalists at the press conference raised the matter.<sup>64</sup>

Meanwhile, at the U.S. Legation in Budapest, a harried Minister Tom Wailes, only recently arrived as Chief of Mission, and who had yet even to present his credentials,<sup>65</sup> had other concerns. Having spent a terrifying night on the floor of the telex room, on 4 November 1956 he was busy checking food and water supplies to estimate how long his staff could hold out and how many Hungarian refugees they would be able to accept should the crisis worsen. Some thirty American journalists, who had been camping out with blankets and office equipment across the floor, were moved to a room in the Legation building.<sup>66</sup> Wailes rejected the idea of closing the Legation and leaving Hungary on the grounds that it would remove the opportunities for intelligence-gathering and influencing opinion and would be a diplomatic *faux pas*, since it would 'be interpreted by the Hungarian people as an abandonment of their cause.'<sup>67</sup> Evidently feeling the strain, and acutely conscious of the stakes, Wailes sent the following urgent message to Washington:

We strongly emphasize that in this moment the fate of Eastern Europe and the entire world depends on the action of the President; the next few critical days will determine whether we enter on a path of peace and liberation or whether we shall increase the appetite of aggression and proceed to a certain world catastrophe.<sup>68</sup>

Washington seemed unable at first to grasp how serious things were on the ground in Hungary where tens of thousands were killed or wounded within days. To Bain's suggestion that the

minister should 'present his credentials' during a lull in the fighting, Wailes responded drily: 're-presenting credentials doubt at the moment if I could find the gentleman on whom I should call even if I could navigate streets. Will therefore wait temporarily to see what present lull means'.<sup>69</sup>

At the entrance to the Chancery building, a Marine corporal, Master Sergeant and the Air Attaché were standing on the stairs when, to their astonishment, Cardinal Mindszenty and Monsignor Turchányi walked up to the door. Through the Monsignor, who acted as the Cardinal's interpreter, they requested admission to the U.S. Legation. 'The corporal looked at the Air Attaché and asked "What should I do sir?" The Air Attaché said nothing. The corporal then looked at the Master Sergeant and asked the same question. "Do your duty", the sergeant replied. The corporal, who had the keys to the building, unlocked the door, and in walked Cardinal Mindszenty.'<sup>70</sup>

The Chief of Mission, using the Legation's brand-new scrambling machine, cabled a few minutes later: 'Cardinal accompanied by his secretary, can we also take him in? Min will have answer moment. OK fine.'<sup>71</sup> Wailes, gratified both to receive the news that the Security Council was about to meet in Washington, and that he could accept the Cardinal and his Secretary into the Legation, went to get a statement. The Cardinal's statement, in the English translation which was transmitted to Washington, read: 'Under the pretence of serious negotiations the assembling Soviet troops at dawn occupied the Hungarian capital and the entire country. I protest against this aggression and I ask for forceful and speedy defense of my country from the USA and other powers'.<sup>72</sup> The Cardinal's prepared statement underlined Wailes' point that the Hungarian rebels expected the U.S. to come to their aid against the Soviets. It therefore helped him to reiterate his point about U.S. responsibility for the crisis. It should also have warned him that the Cardinal was seeking refuge, not so much as a victim of religious persecution, but rather as prince-primate, the legitimate representative and would-be saviour of the Hungarian nation.

Monsignor Egon Turchányi, Cardinal Mindszenty's secretary, remained at the Legation for just under a week, by which point the fighting had stopped. He set off for the Austrian border with Leslie Bain, one of the journalists who was camping out at the Legation, with the cover story that he was needed to take charge of an incoming shipment of anti-tetanus vaccines sent by the Catholic relief organisation Caritas.<sup>73</sup> The idea was that they would cross the border to freedom. Instead, Turchányi, 'a white-haired, elderly man', was dragged out of his car by the ÁVH (Hungarian state security service), and suffered a heart attack. Accused of trying to smuggle out messages from Cardinal Mindszenty to the Pope, the U.S. President and other world leaders (messages that Bain tells us had in fact been entrusted to him), Turchányi was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment.<sup>74</sup>

The 1956 Hungarian Uprising proved to be short-lived. Cardinal Mindszenty, however, safely installed in Minister Wailes's office, where he took over the entire top floor of the U.S. Legation, was to remain for nearly fifteen years: 5,437 days.

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Having chosen to admit Cardinal Mindszenty to the U.S. Legation in Budapest, U.S. officials had first to justify their action. Since the United States had in the past 'strongly disapproved' of the 'principle of diplomatic asylum', this was not straightforward.<sup>75</sup> The Foreign Service Regulations regarding 'Restrictions on Extending Asylum' clearly stated that 'as a rule, a diplomatic or consular officer shall not extend asylum to persons outside of his official or personal household.'<sup>76</sup> There was, however, a proviso: 'Refuge may be afforded to uninvited fugitives whose lives are an imminent danger from mob violence but only for the period during which active danger continues', which rather suggested that the Cardinal should have been released a few days or weeks after his arrival. 'Refuge shall be *refused*,' the regulation went on, 'to persons fleeing from legitimate agents of the local government. In case such persons have been admitted to the diplomatic or consular premises, they must be surrendered or dismissed

from such mission or consular office.’<sup>77</sup> ‘Since the Cardinal’s life had been in jeopardy as he was in flight from a foreign invader’, according to the Hungary Desk files in the State Department, ‘the provision of sanctuary was considered justified.’<sup>78</sup> When, later that same morning, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was informed that Cardinal Mindszenty was in the U.S. Legation in Budapest, he was assured that the Cardinal would not be handed over to the Hungarian or Soviet authorities. He was also warned that ‘Our international position is not too strong on trying to safeguard him’, but was assured that staff would ‘try to keep him quiet’.<sup>79</sup>

The man who had taken refuge in the U.S. Legation was not renowned for keeping quiet. By 1956, József Mindszenty had been arrested and imprisoned under four distinct Hungarian regimes: on 9 February 1919, by the post-Habsburg authorities; on 20 March 1919, during the short-lived Hungarian Soviet; on 27 November 1944, by the wartime fascist Hungarian Arrow Cross authorities; and, finally, on 26 December 1948, by the post-war Hungarian Communist authorities.<sup>80</sup> Mindszenty’s insistence that he was entitled to speak and act for the Hungarian nation, temporarily suppressed by Soviet troops and Hungarian Communists, put him at odds not only with the current Hungarian regime, but also with the United States. Throughout the remainder of 1956 and 1957, the two governments sought to find a way out of the impasse created by the crisis of the Hungarian Uprising and its subsequent repression. This included not mentioning the Cardinal’s continued presence in the Legation. Cardinal Mindszenty’s very existence in the building became, as Robert Illing recalled, ‘something like the emperor’s new clothes; neither the Hungarians nor the Americans chose to discuss him.’<sup>81</sup> In order to maintain the delicate *status quo*, Mr Wailes found himself repeatedly having to remind the Cardinal that ‘he could not be allowed to use the Legation as a base of operations’<sup>82</sup> or to do anything ‘which might make his position more precarious or that of the Legation more difficult’. Exasperated, he finally suggested that the Cardinal might like to transmit the occasional ‘brief oral message’ to the Vatican rather than continue to pen copious letters, often on political matters, to the Pope, the



U.S. President and others.<sup>83</sup> The Legation's position was particularly delicate since its staff in Budapest was three times the size of the Hungarian staff in Washington. This left it vulnerable to having the Hungarian authorities use the United States' 'harbouring of a convicted criminal at the Legation' as a stick with which to beat it by threatening to have the Legation substantially reduced or continually harassed.

In August 1957, the Hungarian government launched a fresh press campaign against the continued presence of the Cardinal in the Legation. The new *Chargé d'Affaires*, Garry Ackerson, suggested that the State Department might like to consider arranging for the transmission of an 'order' or 'strong intimation' from the Vatican to get Mindszenty to ask for a safe conduct.<sup>84</sup> The Vatican, however, proved quite happy to 'let sleeping dogs lie'.<sup>85</sup> The prevailing attitude towards Cardinal Mindszenty in Washington, it seemed, was simply that every chief of mission would have to 'accommodate himself' to the 'presence of this high-ranking prelate of the Roman Catholic Church'. After months and months of inaction, 'too much time had passed to leave much hope that he would ever leave. His demands for total rehabilitation and the equally stubborn refusal on the part of the Hungarian government to grant these terms, plus the lackadaisical attitude of the Vatican and [United States]'s own willingness to have him remain, appeared to exclude any possibility of a solution.'<sup>86</sup>

Things finally began to move after Péter János, the Hungarian Foreign Minister and a former Calvinist bishop, met discreetly with Paul VI, a 'modern' pope who was interested in improving East-West relations.<sup>87</sup> János offered to allow Mindszenty to leave Hungary, providing the Vatican would guarantee that he would keep silent and not meddle in Hungarian affairs. The Hungarian government, according to Monsignor Giovanni Cheli, the Vatican Desk Officer for Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, was 'itching to get Mindszenty out of Hungary', mainly because he was getting on in years and 'would be a greater problem for them dead than alive' since, were he to die in Hungary, the government of Hungary would 'be faced with the agonizing

decision of where and how to bury him.<sup>88</sup> The Vatican, however, passed the buck, arguing that since the USA was “handling the whole question of the Cardinal well” it had “no suggestions” to make.<sup>89</sup> The stalemate continued.

While the rest of the world moved on, the Cardinal remained, isolated and enclosed, at *Szabadság tér 12*, his opinions and views steadfast and unchanging. Mindszenty’s continued insistence that no accommodation was possible with Bolshevism, and that Communism represented the supreme evil, had mirrored Pius XII’s own position at the start of what came to be known as the Cold War.<sup>90</sup> By the mid-1960s, however, after destalinization in the Soviet Union and much of the Eastern bloc, together with the programme of Catholic modernization, including Christian-Marxist dialogue, put forward at the Second Vatican Council under Pius XII’s successors John XXIII and Paul VI, it was increasingly Nazism, rather than Communism, which was coming to be seen, West and East, as the touchstone of evil. Mindszenty was turning into an anachronism.

By 1967, U.S. relations with Hungary had improved to the point that the U.S. Legation was raised to the rank of Embassy and Martin Hillenbrand appointed its first American ambassador.<sup>91</sup> Mindszenty, outraged at the implied legitimation of the regime, threatened to walk out of the Chancery building, allowing himself to be seized by the Hungarian authorities and create an international incident.<sup>92</sup> The Vatican was persuaded to send Cardinal Koenig from Vienna urge Cardinal Mindszenty to remain in his Budapest asylum. Mindszenty, having made his point, remained, and Hillenbrand arrived as the first ambassador.<sup>93</sup> The Vatican, which similarly sought to normalise relations with Hungary, began to see that there might be ‘advantages in getting the Cardinal out of Hungary’. Both Koenig and the Vatican also came to understand, according to U.S. observers, ‘that while Mindszenty was a truly heroic figure’ he was also ‘a stubborn, unrealistic, and difficult old man.’<sup>94</sup>

In January 1969, Jozsef Prantner, the head of the State Office for Church Affairs in Hungary, held a rare press conference with Hungarian and foreign journalists. The English-language press release which followed from the Budapest Diplomatic Information Service reported that ‘discussions between the Hungarian government and the Vatican’ had taken place in Rome and in Budapest, with the ultimate aim of re-establishing diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Hungarian state.<sup>95</sup> One of the most glaring obstacles to rapprochement, the continued presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, was repeatedly mentioned. The Hungarian government ‘expressed its readiness for a solution of this question’ stressing at the same time that Mindszenty had ‘himself brought about his exclusion from Hungarian life’. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government declared itself ‘ready to discuss with the Vatican and the United States of America – at whose embassy he is staying – a solution which takes into consideration the interests of the parties concerned.’<sup>96</sup>

In the same year, 1969, Alfred Puhan, an experienced hand who had worked as a director at the Voice of America before joining the State Department, was named as Hillenbrand’s successor to the U.S. Embassy in Budapest.<sup>97</sup> His brief was to seek to normalise relations between the U.S.A. and Hungary, which had remained strained, sometimes almost to breaking-point, since the events of 1956. He was less than delighted to find that his new posting came with an inmate on the top floor of the building. Though he searched, Puhan could find ‘remarkably little’ in the official papers about Mindszenty beyond the record of his entry. It appeared that Mindszenty saw ‘no Hungarians apart from close relatives on rare occasions’ and a Hungarian priest, who heard his confession. ‘His contacts with the outside world were channelled by way of the State Department, to the Apostolic Nuncio in Washington who, if he regarded it an appropriate message, forwarded it to the Vatican’.<sup>98</sup> The official position of the United States government, it was explained to Puhan, was that ‘the cardinal in our embassy’ was

‘no concern of ours’. He was strictly the problem of the government of Hungary and the Vatican: the Americans were simply the ‘silent bystanders who had granted him asylum.’<sup>99</sup>

After taking up his post in Budapest, Ambassador Puhán replicated the pattern of his predecessors, seeing the Cardinal ‘for rather lengthy talks on the average of once a month’. During these talks, ‘lasting anywhere from one to two hours’, he found that Mindszenty ‘preferred to dwell on the past misfortunes of his native land’. It was during his ‘very first meeting with him’, Puhán drily remembered, that Mindszenty first ‘raised the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, as he was to do many times in the months and years that followed’. He dwelled with equal frequency on ‘the evils of communism’ and his ‘fear of a total takeover by the communists.’<sup>100</sup> Meanwhile, the thaw between Church and State in Hungary continued, the Hungarian press being willing to go so far as to concede, in print, ‘that the Catholic Church – after fighting off the dominance of forces hostile to the Hungarian People’s Republic – has developed her relations with the social and state order in an increasingly realistic and loyal way’ and to suggest that ‘harmony between Catholicism and the socialist social system’ might in time be possible.<sup>101</sup> The Cardinal in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest had by this point become a stumbling block to the United States government, the Hungarian state, and the Vatican alike. It was time for Mindszenty to go.

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The inevitable showdown with the cardinal came, but it did not come easily. Ambassador Alfred Puhán began his campaign to remove Mindszenty from the U.S. Embassy in earnest in 1971, pointing out to the State Department that ‘the Cardinal will be 79 in March. There is no immediate difficulty but clearly the problems of looking after an old man, seeing that he has professional medical and nursing attendance, cannot be very far away.’<sup>102</sup> One of the ‘few cards we have to play’ with Mindszenty ‘in trying to get him to budge’, John Baker considered, ‘may be his concern for his place in history’.<sup>103</sup> Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stressed that a

condition of letting Mindszenty go would be that he maintain ‘absolute silence’.<sup>104</sup> Monsignor Giovanni Cheli, the Vatican desk officer for Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, shared with the Americans some ‘strictly personal ideas’ on how Mindszenty might be ‘encouraged to abandon’ what he referred to as his ‘self-imposed exile’ in the US embassy.’<sup>105</sup> Only another Hungarian Church leader, he mused, could convince Mindszenty to leave Hungary; this would need to be ‘a ranking Hungarian churchman whom Mindszenty knows and respects’. Such a well-chosen Hungarian clergyman, Cheli suggested, could ‘delicately impress’ upon Mindszenty that ‘his day has passed, that he is no longer a symbol of Hungarian opposition to the regime’ and that ‘by perpetuating his captivity he... serves neither the Church, his country nor himself.’ As an incentive, Mindszenty should be made to realize that his treasured memoirs, in which he could set down his thoughts for posterity, had no chance of being published if he were to die in the U.S. Embassy.<sup>106</sup>

Ambassador Puhan, while welcoming Cheli’s suggestion as ‘imaginative’ and breaking ‘new ground’, was not sanguine about the possibility of finding a Hungarian Catholic leader whom Mindszenty would trust. Furthermore, it seemed to him that the Vatican was shirking its duty by ‘getting the Hungarian bishops – or anyone else – to do its own work for it’.<sup>107</sup> The Vatican, he judged, ‘presumably wants to avoid doing anything directly itself which would amount to the Pope’s requesting Mindszenty to leave’. Although understandable, Puhan’s sense was that ‘if anything’ were ‘to move the Cardinal’, it would be ‘precisely such a request from the Pope directly, not a request from the Hungarian hierarchy. I think there is a chance – I put it that way deliberately – that the Cardinal would be responsive to such a direct request from the Pope.’<sup>108</sup>

Mindszenty’s memoirs, Puhan judged, was ‘a large and as yet unexploited factor’ since, ‘if the Cardinal were brought to believe that the only way he could be sure of having his memoirs published unexpurgated was for him to leave Hungary and supervise their publication, this might

be a decisive factor, especially if coupled with a request from the Pope, to get him to leave'. While Puhán realised that the Memoirs would not necessarily show the U.S., the Vatican or the Hungarians in the best light, all three 'would all have to accept publication as a fact of life...there would be rough spots for all' but all could 'live with them.'<sup>109</sup> The regime, Puhán mused, was 'in a strange Hungarian way bothered by the possibility that the old man by staying here will [sic] he dies will in fact have remained a kind of symbol to their lack of justice and national feeling. National feeling is very important hereabouts and it takes odd shapes even under a communist regime.'<sup>110</sup> The cardinal, meanwhile, 'made a very moving plea' to Puhán regarding the significance he attached to the memoirs. He said, Puhán reported, that he had been 'maligned' and his place in history 'falsified'. He said that he 'lived only to have this falsification rectified by having his side of the story told to the world.'<sup>111</sup> Mindszenty added that he wished to speak 'in great confidence' about the Casaroli line in the Vatican. He asked Puhán not to talk about this because he said he did not wish to have problems with the Vatican. However, he said he was aware of the Vatican interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. He repeated that he was opposed to this but was aware of the interests of the Vatican.<sup>112</sup>

On 13 May 1971, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter raised the subject of Mindszenty on his own initiative. He informed Puhán that he had told the Pope that the government of Hungary was 'ready' for a 'solution to the Cardinal Mindszenty problem'. His government acknowledged that the Cardinal's presence in the Embassy was a problem for Hungary and for the Vatican, as well as for the American Embassy. He had told the Pope that there were two conditions the Hungarians would have to insist upon in arriving at a solution to this problem. The first was that the Cardinal not be used to 'disturb relations' between church and state in Hungary. The second was that the Cardinal would not be 'used for Cold War

purposes' against Hungary. Péter reported that Cheli expected a solution to the Mindszenty problem 'within two or three weeks'.<sup>113</sup>

In the end, it took the concerted efforts of the Vatican, U.S. and Hungarian governments to ensure the Cardinal's departure from the U.S. Embassy and his beloved Hungary. Even after the Pope won Mindszenty's agreement in principle to leave the U.S. Embassy, on the understanding that he would 'be able to serve as an exemplar for the whole Church',<sup>114</sup> the Cardinal refused to agree to hold back in his future public statements and published memoirs out of consideration for the delicacy of relations between the Holy See and the Hungarian government. Only after U.S. President Richard Nixon turned down Mindszenty's direct appeal to be allowed to remain in the U.S. Embassy (on the grounds that his presence would offer a sliver of hope to Hungarian 'slaves' and émigrés, and after Pope Paul VI made clear that he expected to see Mindszenty in Rome at the episcopal synod scheduled for September 1971, did Mindszenty finally consent to leave his apartments in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest.<sup>115</sup> The conditions for his departure, on the Vatican's side, were that – although Mindszenty would retain the title of Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary - his work would be carried out by an apostolic administrator appointed by Rome. He would leave the country 'quietly', without issuing statements or publishing pastoral letters about his departure. After leaving Hungary, he would make no statements which might 'disturb' relations between the Hungarian government and the Holy See or which 'might be offensive to the Hungarian government or the People's Republic'. And, finally, he would leave it to the Holy See to decide when and how to publish his memoirs.<sup>116</sup> As part of the effort, Ambassador Alfred Puhán personally delivered the Cardinal's unpublished memoirs to the American Embassy in Vienna 'with strict orders to release them only to the cardinal himself or his designated representative'.<sup>117</sup>

On the morning of 28 September 1971, the Cardinal Mindszenty celebrated his last mass at *Szabadság tér* 12. After saying his farewells, at 8:28 am he crossed the threshold of the

American Embassy, whereupon he ceased to be in asylum. He and the Hungarian-born Vatican official Monsignor József Zágón got into the papal nuncio's car, while Monsignor Cheli followed in a separate car and the Hungarian government furnished 'motorized escorts fore and aft with a doctor in the rear vehicle' in case of any unexpected difficulties.<sup>118</sup> All streets leading to the square had been blocked off, so there was no risk of a popular Hungarian farewell. The photograph showing the Cardinal making the sign of the cross while Ambassador Puhan pointed to the car, and which was later published in *Paris Match*, was taken by a policeman in the little guard house in front of the Embassy. Ambassador Puhan, relieved finally to have rid himself of his ecclesiastical guest, liked to joke that 'some wicked minds' had interpreted his gesture in the photograph to mean 'Get out!'.<sup>119</sup>

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Mindszenty's story did not end there. Within a year of his departure from his diplomatic asylum of nearly 15 years, the Hungarian government was asking the Vatican to do something to silence him, since he had set up his own Mindszenty Foundation in the USA and was touring around the world's main Hungarian émigré communities, lambasting the Hungarian regime for its record on religious oppression and berating the Church in Hungary for its collaboration with the state.

On 1 November 1973, having proved unable to silence him, Paul VI finally asked Mindszenty to resign his archiepiscopal office. 'In all reverence', as Mindszenty puts it in his published memoirs, he 'informed the Holy Father that because of the present condition of the Catholic Church in Hungary', he 'could not.'<sup>120</sup> The See of Esztergom was accordingly announced vacant. Mindszenty would not have been Mindszenty if he had not then issued the following statement to the press: 'Card. Mindszenty has not abdicated his office as archbishop nor his dignity as primate of Hungary. The decision was taken by the Holy See alone.'<sup>121</sup> Next, word reached Mindszenty that the Hungarian Minister of Justice had 'pardoned' him for the crimes falsely attributed to him at his trial in 1949. Mindszenty refused to accept the pardon,



arguing that for fifteen years he had ‘made no application for any such pardon, did not accept one, and now reject[ed] it on the grounds that amends can be made for the judicial crime committed against me only by an act of rehabilitation, nothing less.’<sup>122</sup> Mindszenty had followed his path to its logical end: ‘complete and total exile’, as he put it, from his sanctuary, his country, and even from his Church.<sup>123</sup>

József Mindszenty, no longer Cardinal, Archbishop, or Prince-Primate, ended his life having frustrated every regime under which he lived and alienated even his own Pope. He had, perhaps, become so accustomed to being in opposition, exile or imprisonment, that he was unable to conceive of himself in any other way: unable, as it were, to adjust to civilian life. As Cardinal Casaroli was said once to have remarked, ‘Mindszenty is like granite, and he can be just as disagreeable as granite.’<sup>124</sup>

The Mindszenty affair began at a time of high international tension and political sensitivity – the time of the Suez Crisis and ‘October Events’ in Poland as well as the 1956 Revolution in Hungary. It persisted, unresolved, through the 1960s, *détente*, and the strains surrounding the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968. In addition to its place within the broader story of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, the Mindszenty affair also holds a particular place in the history of the Catholic Church and the Vatican’s own policies towards Communist regimes. One of the aims of Second Vatican Council - to begin normalising relations between the Vatican and the Communist regimes in the traditionally Catholic countries of East-Central Europe – was a goal for which Cardinal Mindszenty had no patience or understanding.

There was a tragi-comic side to the plight in which both the Cardinal and the U.S. Embassy staff found themselves, year after improbable year. The black humour of the situation was brought out by Woody Allen in his first Broadway play ‘Don’t drink the Water’ (1965), a comedy about an American family that seeks refuge in a U.S. Embassy in ‘a small, Iron Curtain country somewhere in Eastern Europe’ which is already housing ‘a wanted Catholic priest’.<sup>125</sup>

The enduring comic potential of the situation led to a 1969 film, starring Jackie Gleason, and a 1994 remake, starring Michael J. Fox. Mindszenty, because he never changed, brings into sharp relief the many subtle shifts that characterised Church-State relations behind the Iron Curtain from the 1950s to the 1970s. Had the climate of the 1950s gone on forever, he might well have been beatified. Instead, he ended by uniting East and West, Church and State, Democrat, Catholic and Communist, in sheer exasperation over his unwillingness to compromise or adapt.

After József Mindszenty's death in 1975, he was buried at Mariazell, a shrine and place of pilgrimage outside Vienna. In 1991, two years after the reburial of Imre Nagy and a month before the last Soviet troops were scheduled to leave Hungary, Mindszenty's body was brought over the border from Austria to Hungary so that he could be reburied in the basilica at Esztergom, together with other past primates of the Hungarian Catholic Church. Some 80,000 people turned out to witness his return to his homeland and final resting place.<sup>126</sup> The cause for Mindszenty's beatification, the first stage of sainthood, was launched in 1993. It is backed today by Hungary's ruling *Fidesz* party.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, Department of State, Central Files, 661.64/11-456, reproduced as item 162, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 375. An Aide-Mémoire from the Austrian Embassy to the Department of State dated 15 November 1956) estimated the number of refugees to have left Hungary, mostly for Austria, within the few days surrounding 4 November 1956 at 25,000. Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11-1556 reproduced as item 191, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 457.

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<sup>2</sup> J. Luxmoore and J. Babiuch, *The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul of Eastern Europe* (London and New York: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), pp. 81; 105.

<sup>3</sup> John Kent, *The Lonely War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943-1950* (Québec: McGill University Press, 2002), p. 114.

<sup>4</sup> Robert F. Illing, *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), p. 187.

<sup>5</sup> As Mindszenty explained it in his published *Memoirs*: ‘Because the right of crowning the king fell to him, the archbishop of Esztergom held the foremost place among the dignitaries of the state as well as the Church. When the king was absent from the country, the archbishop represented him. The king depended on him for advice. If the king violated the constitution, the archbishop of Esztergom was obliged to rebuke him and demand he obey the law of the land. In carrying out this duty the Archbishops of Esztergom frequently suffered sore opposition and even imprisonment. The nation expected that of its primates; both Catholics and those of other faiths took it for granted that the Archbishop of Esztergom would have frequent conflicts with the representatives of the state’. Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974), p. 63.

<sup>7</sup> The official census figures for 1949 give the total population of Hungarian Catholics as 6,240,399 or 67.8% of the total population, with the official religious minorities – Calvinist (12%), Lutheran (3%), Jewish (1%) - in descending order. Greek Catholics (Uniates) were not included as options in the census. The number of ‘atheists’, or persons with no religious affiliation, was estimated at 15%.

<sup>8</sup> George Shuster, *Religion behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 179.

<sup>9</sup> L. Gussoni and A. Brunello, eds., *The Silent Church: Facts and Documents concerning Religious Persecution behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Veritas Publishers, 1954), p. 170.

<sup>10</sup> L. Gussoni and A. Brunello, eds., *The Silent Church: Facts and Documents concerning Religious Persecution behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Veritas Publishers, 1954), p. 175.

<sup>11</sup> Contemporary, or near-contemporary, surveys, in English, of the escalation of anti-Catholic measures in Hungary can be found in e.g. Lino Gussoni and Aristede Brunello, eds., *The Silent Church: Facts and Documents concerning Religious Persecution behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Veritas Publishers, 1954), pp. 149-178; Vladimir Gsovski, ed., *Church and State behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955); Kurt Hutten, *Iron Curtain Christians* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Publishing House, 1967 [original German edn. 1962], pp. 180-5.

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<sup>12</sup> According to Stephen K. Swift, who was attending a conference held in Washington, D.C. on 16 November 1948, the cardinal's 'elimination' by the Hungarian authorities was expected within 'weeks, perhaps days'. Stephen Swift, *The Cardinal's Story: The Life and Work of Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty Archbishop of Esztergom Primate of Hungary* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. vii. Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 127.

<sup>13</sup> The letter can be consulted at [http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/la/letters/documents/hf\\_p-xii\\_lett\\_19490102\\_acerrimo-moerore.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/la/letters/documents/hf_p-xii_lett_19490102_acerrimo-moerore.html).

<sup>14</sup> János Kovács, ed., *Documents on the Mindszenty Case* (Budapest, January 1949), p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949), p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949), p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949), p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Anon., *Documents on the Mindszenty Case*, ed. János Kovács (Budapest, January 1949), p. 88.

<sup>19</sup> Anon., *Documents on the Mindszenty Case*, ed. János Kovács (Budapest, January 1949), p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> Anon., *Documents on the Mindszenty Case*, ed. János Kovács (Budapest, January 1949), p. 60.

<sup>21</sup> The Greek Catholic Church, although Orthodox in religious practice, came under the authority of the Vatican and was thus aligned with the USA rather than the USSR in the rapidly developing Cold War.

<sup>22</sup> Anon., *Documents on the Mindszenty Case*, ed. János Kovács (Budapest, January 1949), pp. 77-78.

<sup>23</sup> The 'accomplices', as presented in the trial proceedings, were: Dr Jusztin Baranyai; Dr. András Zakar; Dr. Pál Eszterházy; Miklós Nagy; Dr Béla Ispánky; Dr. László Tóth.

<sup>24</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949), p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949).

<sup>26</sup> Anon., *The Trial of József Mindszenty*, ed. Gorszky Tivadar (Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1949), *passim*.

<sup>27</sup> Ministerstvo Informací a osvěty, *O kardinálovi (Černá kniha)* (Prague: Orbis, 1949), pp. 6; 8-10.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, 'Rebellion to Tyrants is Obedience to God', a sermon delivered by Francis, Cardinal Spellman in St Patrick's Cathedral, New York on 6 February 1949, a date declared 'Cardinal Mindszenty Day – a day of

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prayer and of protest'. Stephen Swift, *The Cardinal's Story: The Life and Work of Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty Archbishop of Esztergom Primate of Hungary* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. xiii-xiv.

<sup>29</sup> Stephen Swift, *The Cardinal's Story: The Life and Work of Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty Archbishop of Esztergom Primate of Hungary* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 287; Paul Betts, 'Religion, Science and Cold War Anti-Communism: The 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty Show Trial' in P. Betts and S.A. Smith, eds., *Science, Religion and Communism in Cold War Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 286.

<sup>30</sup> Paul Betts, 'Religion, Science and Cold War Anti-Communism: The 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty Show Trial' in P. Betts and S.A. Smith, eds., *Science, Religion and Communism in Cold War Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 286.

<sup>31</sup> Anon., *Authorized White Book. Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks – Published by Order of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty Prince-Primate of Hungary* (New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), dustjacket.

<sup>32</sup> Anon., *Authorized White Book. Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks – Published by Order of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty Prince-Primate of Hungary* (New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), dustjacket.

<sup>33</sup> Anon., *Authorized White Book. Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks – Published by Order of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty Prince-Primate of Hungary* (New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), dustjacket.

<sup>34</sup> Overseas Press Club of America, *As We See Russia* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1948).

<sup>35</sup> As cited in Paul Betts, 'Religion, Science and Cold War Anti-Communism: The 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty Show Trial' in P. Betts and S.A. Smith, eds., *Science, Religion and Communism in Cold War Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 288.

<sup>36</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), pp. 191-2.

<sup>37</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 193.

<sup>38</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 193.

<sup>39</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 194.

<sup>40</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 195.

<sup>41</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 196.

<sup>42</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), pp. 197-8.

<sup>43</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), pp. 197-8.

<sup>44</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), p. 209.

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<sup>45</sup> Mindszenty's speech can be heard at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IX-pCkLeoW0> or viewed at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IX-pCkLeoW0>. His own account of giving this speech can be found in his published *Memoirs* (1974), p. 211.

<sup>46</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, published as item 162 in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 380,

<sup>47</sup> József Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. And C. Winston (New York, 1974), p. 212. Jacob Beam repeats an anecdote, which he attributes to the Austrian diplomat, later President, Rudolf Kirchschläger, that the cardinal had been heading towards the Austrian legation in Budapest 'but could not get across the river because of the fighting, otherwise the Austrians, instead of ourselves, might have had him as their guest for almost fifteen years'. Jacob Beam, *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues* (New York, 1978), p. 72.

<sup>48</sup> József Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. And C. Winston (New York, 1974), p. 212.

<sup>49</sup> József Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. And C. Winston (New York, 1974), p. 212.

<sup>50</sup> Jacob Beam, *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues* (New York, 1978), p. 71.

<sup>51</sup> Jacob Beam, *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues* (New York, 1978), p. 71.

<sup>52</sup> Jacob Beam, *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues* (New York, 1978), p. 72.

<sup>53</sup> US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), Editorial note, no. 163, p. 386.

<sup>54</sup> Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty – 1956-7, as cited in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, editorial note, no. 163 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 386.

<sup>55</sup> Meeting at the White House (7 November 1956), as cited in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), note 177, p. 423.

<sup>56</sup> Meeting at the White House (7 November 1956), as cited in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), note 177, p. 423.

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<sup>57</sup> US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), note 177, pp. 423-4.

<sup>58</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State (Department of State Central Files, 764.00/11-1156. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Belgrade and Munich) as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 181, p. 430.

<sup>59</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State (Department of State Central Files, 764.00/11-1156. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Belgrade and Munich) as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 181, p. 430.

<sup>60</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State (Department of State Central Files, 764.00/11-1156. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Belgrade and Munich) as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 181, p. 430.

<sup>61</sup> Telegram 1828 from Bonn, November 10, reported Bundestag speeches and Free Democratic Party press releases critical of RFE's role in the Hungarian revolt (Department of State, Central Files, 940.40/11-1056), as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 185, p. 436, note 2.

<sup>62</sup> Notes on the 46<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, November 13, 1956 (source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4-OCB/11-1356. Top Secret. Drafted by [Warren A.] Kelsey [Assistant OCB Staff Representative]), as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 185, p. 438.

<sup>63</sup> Memorandum for the Record by Counsellor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Washington, 21 November 1956, item 2. Radio Free Europe, as reproduced in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168 (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 201, pp. 479-480.

<sup>64</sup> Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), Subject: Suggested Reply to Question to be Raised at Presidential Press Conference on RFE Broadcasts, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168 (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 213, pp. 518-19.

<sup>65</sup> Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Secretary of State (12 November 1956), (from Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11-1256. Secret. Also sent to the Acting Secretary through Murphy), as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 182 p. 433. As late as 11 December 1956, the State Department still

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considered it 'inadvisable' for Wailes to present his credentials to the Hungarian government. US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168 (Washington, D.C., 1990), 'Notes on the 56<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, December 11, 1956, no. 207, p. 503.

<sup>66</sup> Leslie Bain, *The Reluctant Satellites: An Eyewitness Report on East Europe and the Hungarian Revolution* (New York, 1960), p. 165.

<sup>67</sup> Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Secretary of State (12 November 1956), (from Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11-1256. Secret. Also sent to the Acting Secretary through Murphy), as reproduced in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* xxv (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 182 p. 433.

<sup>68</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, Department of State, Central Files, 661.64/11-456, reproduced as item 162, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 168, p. 379.

<sup>69</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, Department of State, Central Files, 661.64/11-456, reproduced as item 162, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 168, p. 376.

<sup>70</sup> Anon., 'Personal Reminiscences about 1956 and Cardinal Mindszenty', Embassy of the United States Budapest, Hungary website, last accessed 19 April 2016, <http://hungary.usembassy.gov/reminiscence.html>.

<sup>71</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, Department of State, Central Files, 661.64/11-456, reproduced as item 162, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 168, p. 379.

<sup>72</sup> Transcript of a Teletype Conversation between the Legation in Hungary and the Department of State, November 3-4, 1956, Department of State, Central files, 661.64/11-456, reproduced as item 162, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, (Washington, D.C., 1990), no. 168, pp. 379-380.

<sup>73</sup> Leslie Bain, *The Reluctant Satellites: An Eyewitness Report on East Europe and the Hungarian Revolution* (New York, 1960), pp. 172-3.



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<sup>74</sup> Leslie Bain, *The Reluctant Satellites: An Eyewitness Report on East Europe and the Hungarian Revolution* (New York, 1960), pp. 172-180.

<sup>75</sup> US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, editorial note, no. 163 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 387.

<sup>76</sup> US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, editorial note, no. 163 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 387, citing Section 225.2 of the Foreign Service Regulations ('Restrictions on Extending Asylum). The matter remains complicated. See, for example, G.Noll, G., "Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law?", *17 International Journal of Refugee Law* (2005) 542–573; René Värk, 'Diplomatic Asylum: Theory, Practice and the Case of Julian Assange' in *Sisekaitseakadeemia Toimetised* (2012).

<sup>77</sup> US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, editorial note, no. 163 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 387, citing Section 225.2 of the Foreign Service Regulations ('Restrictions on Extending Asylum).

<sup>78</sup> Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty – 1956-7, as cited in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, editorial note, no. 163 (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 387.

<sup>79</sup> 'Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, November 5, 1956, 10:20 a.m.', United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168, p. 394. Accessed 7 June 2016 <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=tur>

<sup>80</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, tr. R. and C. Winston (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1974), pp. 4-7; pp. 17-23; pp. 18-24; xii.

<sup>81</sup> Robert F. Illing, *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), p. 188.

<sup>82</sup> Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), from Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty. Confidential. Drafted by Sutterlin and concurred in by WE and L, as reproduced in *US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168, p. 555.

<sup>83</sup> Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), from Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45,

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Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty. Confidential. Drafted by Sutterlin and concurred in by WE and L, as reproduced in *US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168, p. 556.

<sup>84</sup> Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), 'Problems concerning Cardinal Mindszenty', Source: Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty, 1956-57. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin, as reproduced in *US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Eastern Europe* vol. xxv, no. 168, p. 657.

<sup>85</sup> Letter from the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs in Washington, D.C. (Leverich) to the Chargé in Hungary (Ackerson), 1 October 1957, from Department of State, Budapest Mission Files (Lot 75 D 163, Mindszenty, 1956-57. Secret; Official-Informal, as reproduced in *US State Department Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-7. Eastern Europe*, vol. xxv, p. 663.

<sup>86</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), pp. 186-7.

<sup>87</sup> Peter Hebblethwaite, *Paul VI: The First Modern Pope* (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 1993).

<sup>88</sup> Robert F. Illing to Alfred Puhan (23 April 1971), as reproduced in '*His Eminence Files*' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 48.

<sup>89</sup> Letter from the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Leverich) to the Chargé in Hungary (Ackerson), 1 October 1957, Department of State, Budapest, Mission Files: Lot 75 D 163, Mindszenty 1956-57. Secret; Official-Informal, as reproduced in *US State Department Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-7. Eastern Europe*, vol. xxv, p. 663.

<sup>90</sup> See John Kent, *The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943-1950*, *passim*.

<sup>91</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), pp. 186-7.

<sup>92</sup> Robert Illing, *American and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), p. 188. See also Chris Sibilla, 'A Moment in U.S. Diplomatic History: The Cardinal who Lived in the Embassy'. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (online).

<sup>93</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), p. 187.

<sup>94</sup> Robert F. Illing, *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), p. 189.

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- <sup>95</sup> Anon., 'Prantner's Press Conference, *Diplomatic Information Service* (Budapest, 25 January 1969), as reproduced in Radio Free Europe Research, unpublished 'Hungarian Press Survey' no. 1984 (11 February 1969), f. 6.
- <sup>96</sup> Anon., 'Prantner's Press Conference, *Diplomatic Information Service* (Budapest, 25 January 1969), as reproduced in *Radio Free Europe Research*, unpublished 'Hungarian Press Survey' no. 1984 (11 February 1969), f. 7.
- <sup>97</sup> G. Lewis Schmidt, 'Interview with Ambassador Alfred Puhán' (22 January 1990), *The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series* (Washington, D.C., 2009), unpaginated.
- <sup>98</sup> Alfred Puhán, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), p. 186.
- <sup>99</sup> Alfred Puhán, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), p. 186.
- <sup>100</sup> Alfred Puhán, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York, 1990), p. 188.
- <sup>101</sup> Anon., 'Modern Catholicism', *Világosság* (January 1970), as translated and reproduced in Radio Free Europe Research, unpublished 'Hungarian Press Survey' no. 2076 (27 May 1970), f. 2.
- <sup>102</sup> Alfred Puhán, 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 21.
- <sup>103</sup> John A. Baker to [US State Department] (20 April 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 42.
- <sup>104</sup> Anon., 'Secret Rome 2482 Subject: Janos Peter visits Vatican Ref: Rome 2278', as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 45.
- <sup>105</sup> Illing to Lodge (23 April 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 48.
- <sup>106</sup> Illing to Lodge (23 April 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 48. See also his published account in Robert F. Illing, *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), pp. 190-1.
- <sup>107</sup> Puhán to Illing (4 May 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 54.
- <sup>108</sup> Puhán to Illing (4 May 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 54.
- <sup>109</sup> Puhán to Illing (4 May 1971), as reproduced in 'His Eminence Files' *American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 55.

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<sup>110</sup> Puhan to Illing (4 May 1971), as reproduced in ‘*His Eminence Files’ American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 55.

<sup>111</sup> Alfred Puhan, ‘Cardinal Mindszenty’ (11 May 1971, as reproduced in ‘*His Eminence Files’ American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 59.

<sup>112</sup> Alfred Puhan, ‘Cardinal Mindszenty’ (11 May 1971), as reproduced in ‘*His Eminence Files’ American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 61.

<sup>113</sup> ([Alfred Puhan], ‘Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty’, (13 May 1971), as reproduced in ‘*His Eminence Files’ American Embassy Budapest, from Embassy Archives 15 (1971)* (Budapest, 2012), p. 66.

<sup>114</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, p. 232.

<sup>115</sup> Robert F. Illing, *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (Palisades, N.Y.: History Publishing Company, 2011), p. 193.

<sup>116</sup> Peter Hebblethwaite, *Paul VI: The First Modern Pope* (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 581.

<sup>117</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York and Los Angeles, 1990), p. 212.

<sup>118</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York and Los Angeles, 1990), p. 213; J. Luxmoore and J. Babiuch, *The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul of Eastern Europe* (London and New York: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), pp. 167-8.

<sup>119</sup> Alfred Puhan, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections* (New York and Los Angeles, 1990), p. 214.

<sup>120</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, p. 245.

<sup>121</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, p. 246.

<sup>122</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>123</sup> Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, p. 247.

<sup>124</sup> As cited in Owen Chadwick, *The Christian Church in the Cold War* (London, 1992, 1993), p. 71.

<sup>125</sup> The priest, Fr Drobney, presents himself in the play with the following gag: ‘This is the United States Embassy of this country. Six yeaes ago I ran in here seeking asylum from the Communist police. Outside these walls were four million Communists determined to kill me! My choice was simple. I could remain here in the safety of your embassy, or I could go outside and attempt the biggest mass conversion in history. I decided to stay and I’ve been hiding upstairs ever since.’ Woody Allen, *Don’t Drink the Water: A Comedy in Two Acts* (New York, London and Toronto: Samuel French, (1965; 1995), p. 7.

<sup>126</sup>Celestine Bohlen, ‘Hungarian Cardinal Is Reburied in Homeland as ‘Red Star’ Is Extinguished’, *The New York Times* (5 May 1991).

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<sup>127</sup> <https://www.mindszentalapitvany.hu/en/szente-avatas/mindszenty-jozsef/>