A functional approach to OM-constructions

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Highlights:

• OM-constructions are not agnate with *If*-conditionals, although both may express a condition;

• OM-constructions differ from *If*-conditionals and CCs in how they are embedded in context;

• Interpersonal function is the key to differentiating potential readings of the OM-construction;

• Prototypical '*and*' is exploited in OM-constructions in both hypotactic and paratactic expansion.

Abstract

In traditional grammar, *and* is a prototypical paratactic additive conjunction, and yet when occurring in the OM-construction (the *one more* construction), this status is challenged because in these cases it represents an indeterminate or vague syntactic and semantic relation (e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). This paper discusses OM-constructions from a functional approach with the aim of resolving this indeterminacy and explaining the meaning potential they realised. Drawing on both attested examples from the BNC and the enTenTen15 corpora and examples from existing literature, we analyse a range of instances of the OM-construction, and we compare them to related constructions (e.g., pseudo-imperatives, *if*-conditionals). We draw three main conclusions: (1) the OM-construction constitutes a clause complex which construes a sequence of figures, where the nominal form of the OM-construction may be an elliptical clause; (2) the non-canonical uses of *and* evolved from the prototypical additive conjunction *and,* where interpersonal speech functions play a key role in differentiating potential readings of the OM-construction; and (3) uses of *and* in the OM-construction function not only to link a paratactic sequence but also a hypotactic one, where *and* is also used to express sequential, causal and conditional enhancement.

Keywords: OM-constructions; interdependency; conjunctions; functional; context

1. Introduction[1]

In this paper, we explore what Culicover (1972) calls OM-constructions, illustrated in example (1), where OM is a shortening of *one more* since the representative example of these constructions begins with the phrase 'one more'. The OM-construction takes

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the form: 'NP *and* S' (Culicover 1972:199).

(1) One more can of beer and I'm leaving.   (Culicover 1972:199)

OM-constructions present a challenge to existing accounts of conjunctions because they represent systematic ambiguity in terms of the syntactic and semantic relations of conjuncts combined by the conjunction *and*. Traditionally, *and, or, but* are linkers which coordinate clauses while *because*, *if* are binders used to combine clauses through subordination. When it comes to OM-constructions, however, the functions of *and* are less clear. According to Culicover (1972:209), example (1) is 'indeterminate or vague', given that it may express three different meanings as shown in example (1), a-c (from Culicover 1972:200).

(1a)   If you drink one more can of beer I'm leaving.
(1b)   After I drink one more can of beer I'm leaving.
(1c)   In spite of the fact that there is one more can of beer here, I'm leaving.

In this paper, our aim is to propose a novel account of the *and*-OM-construction[2] by examining it from a functional perspective and by describing and explaining its meaning potential. This paper highlights the multifunctionality of language and the important role that context of situation (Halliday & Hasan 1985) plays in explaining the clause combining that can be identified in OM-constructions.

In order to carry out this study, we draw on data taken mainly from existing corpora, with examples retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC) and English Web Corpus 2015 (enTenTen15), using the SketchEngine platform (Kilgarriff *et al.* 2014). These corpora were used to ensure as wide a selection as possible since both corpora are very large, 100 million words and 15 billion words respectively. With a query for the phrase 'one more' followed by 'and', we obtained 20 hits from BNC and 55 hits from EnTenten15, giving a total of 75 examples, which suggests that the construction has a very low frequency in these corpora[3]. In addition to these corpus examples, we have also complemented our discussion with relevant data from published studies where appropriate.

The next section presents an overview of the main syntactic and semantic issues and points of debate related to OM-constructions generally, where we outline the main outstanding issues and establish the key contributions we make in this paper. In section 3, we consider a functional perspective on this construction by first drawing on the framework of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) to describe the grammatical nature of the OM-construction. We examine one particular example in detail to show not only that the first part of the construction is a clause expressed by a type of nominal group but also that context and phoricity play an important role in how this construction works. We also use additional examples to complement this description and identify

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[2] While OM-constructions include a wide range of related *and/or* constructions, in this paper, we mainly discuss *and*-OM-constructions.
[3] Despite this low frequency, these expressions seem intuitively very common.

the key features of the construction. Here we show how SFL offers a framework that allows us to develop a promising approach to some of the challenges outlined in section 2. Section 4, still drawing on the SFL framework, proposes a new account of the logical semantics construed by *and* in the OM-construction. Drawing on the case built in section 3, we also argue that OM-constructions cannot be equated with *If*-conditionals, despite some obvious similarities. In terms of expansion, in addition to extending and temporal enhancing paratactic OM-constructions, we have found that conditional enhancing expansion may be either paratactic or hypotactic, depending on whether or not the clause in the protasis realizes a certain speech function. The paper ends with a brief section highlighting our conclusions and showing how our holistic account has enabled us to offer promising new insight on this perplexing construction.

2. Syntactic and semantic perspectives on OM-constructions

OM-constructions have been discussed by a variety of scholars (Jespersen 1909; Culicover 1970, 1972; Culicover & Jackendoff 1997; Quirk *et al.* 1985; Russell 2007 ; Franke, 2008; and for French, Roig & van Raemdonck, 2017[4]), most of whom focus on the conditional use of the conjunction *and*. The initial discussion of OM-constructions is attributed to Jespersen (1909), who notes that when a noun phrase conjoins with a full sentence, as in example (2a), it can express a conditional meaning as shown in (2b) since the meaning of (2a) is seen as roughly equivalent to (2b).

(2a)   One more word of your sauce, and I'll call you down and fight you.
                                                                                (Stevenson 1884: 244)
(2b)   If you give me one more word of your sauce, then I'll call you down and fight
        you.   (Keshet 2013:213)

Culicover (1972:216) explains that typical OM-sentences, as we saw in example (1), have three interpretations which are presented here in (3), each corresponding to examples (1a) to (1c) above. He claims that the ambiguity of the OM-construction arises from three different readings of the conjunction *and,* which he labels as consequential (3a), sequential (3b) and juxtapositional (3c).

(3)   *a. If...NP..., then S.*   *consequential*
       b. After...NP..., then S.   *sequential*
       c. ..{ NP } ...,   and   (surprisingly) S!   *juxtapositional*
       *   }   but*

It is worth pointing out that the juxtapositional reading has two variables: pure juxtaposition and linked juxtaposition or incongruency, illustrated in (4) and (5)

[4] See Roig & van Raemdonck 2017 for work on French in relation to this construction, e.g., "Une seule goutte de ce parfum et les hommes mourront pour toi" (ibid.: 67) [our translation: 'A single drop of this perfume and men would die for you']

respectively. For Culicover, incongruency is seen as a sub-type of juxtaposition because abnormal stress is required to indicate the exceptionality which is associated with the juxtaposition.

(4) My only pen and you went and lost it.   (Culicover 1970:368)

(5) Twenty-five centuries of language teaching and we have learned nothing. (ibid.)

Three constraints for *and*-OM-sentences were identified by Culicover (1972:205): (i) the first bare NP conjunct describes an event involving the NP; (2) the second full sentence conjunct also represents an event; and (c) there is a certain logical relation between the two events, e.g., temporality, cause-effect, or 'a mental relationship expressed by the incongruence reading'. Culicover (2013:16), commenting on his 1972 paper, states that the reading of the elliptical construction results from 'rules of interpretation and inference, operating over the interpretation of fragments in relation to antecedent syntactic structure and discourse structure'. For Culicover (ibid.:15):

> OM-sentences are instances of a particular construction whose interpretation
> is constrained by the form, but not fully specified by the form. It follows that
> the connectivity must be mediated by the semantics and pragmatics.

Culicover (1972) sheds light on the grammatical and semantic characteristics of the relationship between the understood role of the NP and the acceptability of the sentence. He also suggests that the thematic relations of the NPs might be helpful, however, what is not clear is how OM-sentences relate to their local environment (i.e., co-text) and to the extra-linguistic environment. While Thumm (2000) provides a useful account of the contextualization and framing of paratactic conditionals, the OM-construction is not discussed in any detail. Given the significant status of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) in the area of text linguistics broadly speaking (Butler & Gonzálvez-García 2014), it is our hope that this paper will provide an important first step in developing such an account (see section 3 below).

Turning our attention to the conjunction *and*, accounts of the relation it introduces have generally concentrated on the distinction between co-ordination and subordination. While Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) argue that the use of $_{LS}$*and* in these constructions does involve syntactic coordination, they nevertheless propose that there is a divergence between syntactic structure and conceptual representation. They conclude that *and* is best seen as conceptual subordination. It is this feature, then, that distinguishes $_{LS}$*and* from coordinating *and* (*and$_c$*), illustrated in example (6a) – (6c). This position differs from previous views on these constructions such as paratactic conditionals (Haiman 1983) or coordinate conditionals (Lakoff 1986).

(6a) Another picture of himself$_i$ appears in the newspaper $_{LS}$*and* Susan thinks John$_i$ will definitely go out and get a lawyer. $_{LS}$*and* with an IP-conjunction

(6b) Another picture of himself$_i$ in the newspaper $_{LS}$and Susan thinks John$_i$ will definitely go out and get a lawyer. $_{LS}$*and* with an OM-sentence

(6c)   If another picture of himself$_i$ appears in the newspaper, Susan thinks John$_i$ will definitely go out and get a lawyer.   *If*-construction

(Culicover & Jackendoff 1997:201)

The OM-construction is described by Culicover & Jackendoff (1997: 201) as 'a case closely related in its semantics to $_{LS}$*and*-conjoined clauses', showing the similarities among the binding uses of $_{LS}$*and* in an IP-conjunction[5] (6a), an OM-sentence (6b), and conditional *if*-construction (6c). Thus, firstly we need to delineate OM-constructions and other related phenomena. OM-constructions refer to those which take the form of [NP *and* S], which shares some features with other $_{LS}$*and*-conjoined constructions and paratactic/coordinate conditionals.

There are also two other linguistic constructions which are closely related to OM-constructions. The first is the Conditional Conjunction (CC)[6]. The CC is similar to $_{LS}$*and* but with a conditional reading as illustrated in examples (7) to (9). Quirk *et al.* (1985) include as types of CC the forms cited as (8) and (9). These are also referred to as bare VP CC in Russell (2007) and OM-constructions in Culicover (1970) respectively.

(7)   A fellow gets a few gray hairs, and they think he's ready for the ashheap.

(Bolinger 1967:340)

(8)   Give me some money and (then) I'll help you escape.   (Quirk   *et   al.* 1985:931)

(9)   One more word from you, and I phone the police.   (ibid.)

The second related account involves the pseudo-imperative, a term coined by Jespersen (1909), which reflects the (pseudo)imperative mood of the first conjunct. Russell (2007) discusses the mood forms of the first conjuncts in CCs as follows: declarative simple present sentences in (10), non-finite clauses in (11), and bare verb phrases in (12). He then summarises two types of CCs, i.e., DaD (a pseudo-declarative clause and a future modal declarative clause combined by *and*) and IaD (an imperative clause connected with a declarative clause by *and*), while he gives no comments on non-future second conjunct CCs as (13).

(10)   John drinks one more can of beer and he'll be too drunk to drive home.

(Russell 2007:131)

(11)   Everyone drink another can of beer and we'll set a record.   (Ibid)

(12)   Move a muscle and Frank will shoot you.   (Ibid:132)

(13)   Big Louis sees you and he puts a contract out on you.

(Culicover & Jackendoff 1997: 201)

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[5] IP refers to an Inflectional Phrase (IP) which is a term used in theoretical syntax to refer to a phrase or clause that expresses inflectional information such as tense or agreement; it is roughly equivalent to a finite clause in English.

[6] See Bolinger (1967) for a detailed account of these expressions

OM-constructions [7] share features with ₗₛ*and* sentences, CCs and Pseudo-imperatives since they all may present as non-canonical expressions of conditionals, and can be compared to the canonical *if*-conditional as shown in (14a). The full set is repeated here in (14a) to (14d) for illustrative purposes.

(14a)   If you drink another can of beer, I'm leaving.   *If*-Cond
(14b)   You drink another can of beer and I'm leaving.   CC/Pseudo-*I*/ ₗₛ*and* S
(14c)   Drink another can of beer and I'm leaving.   CC/Pseudo-*I*/ₗₛ*and* S
(14d)   One more can of beer and I'm leaving.   OM/CC/ ₗₛ*and* S

(based on Culicover & Jackendoff 1997:196-197)

Different from the transformational approaches to OM-sentences (e.g., Culicover 1972; Culicover & Jackendoff 1997), Quirk *et al.* (1985) follow a Praguian approach and take both illocutionary force and speech acts into consideration. They offer a functional description of the conditional uses of *and* in the following two ways: in terms of semantics, the conditional use of *and* performs certain directive speech acts, as a promise in (8) and a threat in (9); in terms of grammar, they argue that '(i)t is not necessary ... for the first clause to be in the imperative mood, or for the second clause to contain *will* or *shall*' (Quirk *et al.* 1985 : 931), where, for example, the first conjunct can be a verbless clause as in (9). From a pragmatic perspective, there is a consensus that *and* is not 'lexically ambiguous but *and*-related pragmatic' (Ariel 2012:1693). However, it is worth recalling, as noted above, that Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) consider there to be a semantic divergence (or mismatch) in the form and function of *and*; i.e., that while ₗₛ*and* is a coordinating conjunction syntactically, it is conceptually subordinating.

Halliday also discusses some conditional uses of *and*, for example as in (15a), explaining that in this example each clause realizes a different speech function where the first clause directs a command, and the second expresses an offer (see Halliday & Hasan 1985:21). Their combination may look like the simple coordination of two clauses given the use of *and*, which could be re-expressed as (15b). However, the effect of the coordination makes (15a) resemble *if*-conditionals as in (15c), which typically expresses a hypotactic rather than paratactic relation given the use of *if*. The distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis will be returned to in more detail below.

(15a)   (Drink to me only with thine eyes   And I will pledge with mine)
         Or leave a kiss within the cup   And I'll not ask for wine
(15b)   You **do**[8] leave a kiss and I **do not** ask for wine.
(15c)   If you leave a kiss within the cup, then I'll not ask for wine.

(Halliday & Hasan 1985:20-21)

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[7] Kay and Michaelis (2012) refer to these as the 'conjunctional conditional construction', which they equate with Culicover's examples of the OM-construction.

[8] Emphasis in original

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014:439) propose that '[c]ertain mood combinations evolved particular meanings', for example, the combination of an imperative clause and a declarative clause can realize a motivated command (warning, advice) or a conditional statement. This is illustrated by their example, presented here as (16)[9].

(16) Say something against them || and you will cop a writ, || even though [[what you say]] may well be harmless or totally true,' || he said. [ACE-A]   (ibid.)

What we can glean from this brief overview of the issues related to the study of the OM-construction are four key points of debate. The first relates to the nature of the first conjunct, i.e., whether it is a clausal or nominal unit. As mentioned above, Culicover (1972) takes the first conjunct in the OM-construction as an NP representing an event, but Quirk *et al.* (1985) treat it as a verbless clause. The status of the first conjunct as a NP or a clause determines the nature of the whole OM-construction. For reasons we explain below, we argue that the first conjunct is best viewed as a clause.

The second point relates to the relationship between the OM-construction and *If*-conditionals. Culicover argues that the deep structure of *and*-OM-constructions does not involve *if-then*, but rather *and*, and that there are no deletion transformations in operation with the derivations of such sentences (Culicover 1972). In contrast, Weiser (2015) posits that the deep structure of *and*-OM-constructions does involve *if-then*, suggesting that *and*-OM-constructions and *if-then* conditionals are derived from the same source. Following Culicover, the precise nature of the relationship between them is not as clear as it might seem on the surface. Quirk *et al.* (1985: 931) believe that there is no exact paraphrase relation between CC and i*f*-conditionals. However, some scholars, namely Franke (2008) and Zhang (2005), hold that they are the same thing. While the literature is inconclusive, we will present our case below for not establishing an equivalence between OM-constructions and *if*-conditionals.

Thirdly, there remains uncertainly about the semantic determination of OM-constructions. According to Culicover (1972), the vagueness of OM-constructions stems from *and* itself, whereas Halliday & Matthiessen (2014:439) argue it is due to certain mood combinations which evolved for a particular interpersonal role, for example, the combination of an imperative clause and a declarative realizes motivated command like a warning or advice. Russell (2007) demonstrates that the same OM-sentence may have quite different understandings if considered in different context. The source of the complex meanings of these constructions is clearly debatable but we nevertheless make the case for a compromise position where this use of *and* can be said to have evolved from the prototypical additive conjunction under certain circumstances.

Finally, there is no consensus on the status of the taxis involved, i.e., whether the relationship is one of parataxis, as expected with *and* or hypotaxis, as found with *if*-conditionals. Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) attempted to resolve this issue by considering the construction to involve both syntactic co-ordination (i.e., parataxis) and conceptual subordination (i.e., hypotaxis). In an SFL perspective, we might interpret

9 The notation in this example is as follows: || indicates a clause boundary, and [[ ]] indicates an embedded clause.

this as semantic subordination. Halliday & Hasan (1985), Quirk *et al.* (1985) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) do offer some help in understanding the conditional use of *and* from a functional approach, however, there has not yet been a dedicated study of OM-constructions from an SFL approach.

3. A functional perspective on OM-constructions

Turning now to a functional perspective, we will first consider where OM-constructions can be situated within the rank of grammatical units. Our use of the term rank here refers to Halliday's rank scale (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014: 6), which captures the hierarchy of grammatical units (e.g. morpheme, word, phrase/group, clause). We then offer a multi-functional explanation to OM-constructions, combined with contextual factors.

3.1. The grammatical nature of the OM-constuction

SFL views language as a complex system of meaning potential, where paradigmatic relations are prioritised. Here meaning is considered in contrastive terms, i.e., meaning as choice where choice is central to 'the modelling of meaning as a function of context' (Author 2: 2013:2). Martin (2017: 23-24) explains that since SFL is a relational theory of meaning, paradigmatic relations should be considered in typological terms, i.e., how similarities and differences are accounted for and and organised as paradigmatic options[10]. Doing so involves describing how paradigmatic relations are formalized as system networks. The clause complex, for example, is considered a univariate unit produced through the recursion of clauses at the same rank. As shown in Figure 1, the system network for the clause complex contains three simultaneous relational subsystems (represented by a brace) which correspond to two kinds of interdependent relations, TAXIS and LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE and a system of RECURSION. Each of these represents the set of options (shown by a square bracket). The options relate to parataxis and hypotaxis in the TAXIS system and expansion and projection in the LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE system. See author 2 *et al.* (2013) for detail on system notation and a thorough discussion of the SFL concept of meaning as choice.

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[10] In SFL the notion of typology is broader than the general use of the term 'typology', which generally relates to language types, since it captures a perspective on various contrastive features within a language. Within the SFL framework, it is typically viewed in contrast with topology as a complementary perspective on language (see Halliday & Matthiessen 1999 for details, especially chapter 2).

Fig. 1 The Systems of clause complexing (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014:438)

How we locate OM-constructions in the English system depends on how we view the first half of the OM-construction. There are two theoretical dimensions from SFL theory that will be useful in determining this status. The first is that of rank and the second is that of metafunction. The principle of instantiation is also relevant as we will see in section 4.

Like most theories, SFL identifies four basic grammatical ranks of unit in English: clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme, where each unit is made up of one or more of the units immediately below, for example a clause consists of one or more groups. At the same time, units of the same rank can be combined together to form a complex. However, the key feature of a complex is that it is viewed as a univariate structure which by nature involves iteration of the same functional unit. In other words, the only way to have a clause complex, is to have an iteration of clauses, i.e., two or more clauses combined to form a complex. Similarly a nominal complex would consist of two or more nominal groups. According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 434), 'clause complexing always involves assigning clause-hood to a unit related to clause through expansion or projection: this unit has the full potential of a clause, in terms of experiential, interpersonal and textual systems'. This makes it feasible for the first part of the OM-construction to be identified as a clause which is expressed by a nominal group and which is combined with a full clause to form a clause complex (cf the verbless clause discussed above in Quirk *et al.'s* (1985) example). The question we are faced with then is how a nominal group at clause rank can be differentiated from one at group rank. The answer relates to the social semiotic status realized by the unit.

> In the creation of text, we choose between augmenting a clause 'internally' by means of a circumstantial element and augmenting it 'externally' by means of another clause in a complex. The decision depends on many factors; but the basic consideration has to do with how much textual, interpersonal and experiential semiotic 'weight' is to be assigned to the unit: the more weight it has, the more likely it is to be constructed as an interdependent clause in a

clause complex rather than as a circumstantial phrase (or adverbial group) augmenting a clause.

<div align="right">(Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 434)</div>

Within SFL theory, a clause (lexicogrammar) construes a figure (semantic), which is realized by a process and one to three participants and potentially one or more circumstances. In its function of move, interpersonally, the clause enacts a proposition/proposal whereas textually it presents a message. In contrast, semantically, the nominal group typically construes a participant, and may also express the functional element of Subject interpersonally and Theme textually. OM-constructions encode relations between two figures, where the first one is represented by a nominal group (as noted by Culicover 1972). However it has the potential of being a clause as noted above. This potential is what differentiates it from the typical nominal group which does not, i.e., given that nominal groups typically construe a participant (in other words, they tend to construe objects semantically rather than events or states), they do not have the potential of expressing a figure. The nominal clause of the OM-construction then differs from typical nominal groups as we shall see below.

If we accept that the first part of the construction is a clause, then we can describe the OM-construction as a particular type of clause complex comprised of an initial clause C_1 (expressed in nominal form) and C_2 (a full clause). As we will explain below, if C_1 can be expressed by an elliptical nominal clause, then the OM-construction is treated as clause complex, i.e., an expansion of a clause. In terms of metafunction, (i.e., clause functions), C_1, as a clause, realises some kind of situation in terms of the experiential function, it enacts certain interpersonal meanings, and it also presents textual meaning, which combines with the second half to form a sequence by the logical metafunction.

In terms of experiential, interpersonal and textual systems, C_1 presents as an elliptical clause with partly implicit functional elements. Elliptical clauses are implicit full clauses contextually, i.e., in theory the elided elements are recoverable either by (i) endophoric ellipsis or ii) exophoric ellipsis. Endophoric ellipsis refers to the phenomenon where some part of the clause can be retrieved from the co-text anaphorically or cataphorically. According to (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 127), with exophoric ellipsis, 'the clause is not presupposing anything from what has gone before, but simply taking advantage of the rhetorical structure of the situation, specifically the roles of speaker and listener'. These two types of ellipsis are often exploited in OM-constructions. In what follows we examine the use of 'one more lie' as an instance of an OM-construction in order to delve deeper into the functional nature of this construction but also to develop the ideas presented so far.

3.2. *One more lie*

Example (16) below presents an OM-construction with a grammatically elliptical clause. Our position here is that in experiential terms, 'one more lie' does not construe a thing or a phenomenon as a nominal group typically does, but rather the event of

<div align="center">10</div>

telling one more lie (i.e., it construes a figure) and it is combined with another event in C₂ to construe a certain semantic sequence in logical terms. In this example both the speaker and listener know who is telling 'one more lie', in part due to the strong collocation between the 'tell' and 'lie'. From the preceding discourse in example (16), it is clear that Turner is accusing someone of lying and therefore the utterance 'one more lie' does not involve Turner but rather his addressee. The most likely recoverable form for the OM-construction given in (16) is presented here as (16a), a CC.

(16)   Turner dragged him to his feet by the hair. He had seen what they had done to Patrick and he knew the man was lying. It would make no sense to booby-trap the weapon in these circumstances. 'You're lying.' Turner showed the man his scalpel. <u>'One more lie and I'll cut your tongue out.'</u>   (BNC)

(16a)   You tell one more lie and I'll cut your tongue out.

(16b)   In any future instance where you tell one more lie, I'll cut your tongue out.

As shown in Table 1 below, the two events construed by figure 1 and figure 2 are combined as a clause complex to form a sequence through the prototypical additive conjunction *and*, which logically means that 'you do something which is unpleasant to me and accordingly I'll do something undesired to you', and it can be restated as (16b), since figure 1 (*one more lie*) has not happened and it is presupposed with the corresponding negative outcome shown in the apodasis.

Table 1 Analysis of the OM-construction in example (16)

Sequence	figure 1			Relator	figure 2				
Ideational	(Sayer	Process: verbial)	Verbiage	Conjunction	Actor	Process: Material		Goal	
Interpersonal	(S	P)	C		S	F	P	C	
clause complex	(You	tell)	one more lie	and	I	'll	cut	your tongue	out

Key: S=Subject; P=Predicator; C=Complement; F=Finite; parenthesis indicates ellipsis[11]

The interpersonal meaning expressed by the first clause in (16a) helps us to better understand the nature of the clause complex. In SFL, the interpersonal perspective views language as an exchange of commodity, which means that when the speaker uses language to do things, s/he enacts a speech role, e.g., giving or demanding information or goods & services, which accordingly expresses a speech function, i.e., statement, question, command or offer. In (16), the speaker, Turner, is not asking the man to tell one more lie, which means that figure 1 (*one more lie*) cannot be interpreted as a command. Thus, the clause is not an elliptical version of an authentic imperative clause. At the same time, figure 1 is used to refer to an irrealis event (i.e., one that has not

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[11] In SFL, the terms 'Subject, Predicator, Complement, Finite' refer to functional elements of the clause from the interpersonal metafunction, i.e., they are regarded as expressing interpersonal syntactic functions.

happened yet and may never happen or is hypothetical). We can think of this type of clause as a pseudo-declarative rather than an elliptical version of a declarative clause because its finite status is not recoverable or identifiable (i.e., the finite element has not been elided). Furthermore, as we will discuss in detail in section 4, whether or not the first clause realizes a speech function is the key to distinguishing parataxis from hypotaxis (Verstraete 2007) and therefore in understanding the logical relation between the two clauses. Based on this, here we consider the first clause in this example as dependent on the second, forming a hypotactic clause complex.

Furthermore, we might imagine that a response to an OM-construction such as the one underlined in (16) might be something like: *I won't* (e.g., *I won't tell another lie*), which indicates the preferred response to the speaker's command *Don't you lie again*, i.e., the whole OM-construction may indeed enact a command, but without the use of an imperative clause. Therefore, *One more lie and I'll cut your tongue out* may be interpreted as a type of interpersonal metaphor (cf Taverniers 2015), as it involves a kind of semantic doubling, where logically we can identify a clause complex, but interpersonally the speaker is using it to express a command. The force of the threat is much stronger than could be achieved by an *if*-clause, for example as shown in (16c) or indeed by a simple imperative. One more similar example from BNC, (17), supports this idea above and it also shows that OM-constructions tend to be more informal. For these reasons, OM-constructions must be differentiated from *if*-clause complexes.

(16c) If you tell one more lie, then I'll cut your tongue out.

(17) Charles says, with relish: 'I don't know whether a psychologist (sic) would say it was the trauma of the divorce but she had real difficulty telling the truth purely because she liked to embellish things. On the school run one day the vicar's wife stopped the car and said: 'Diana Spencer, <u>if you tell one more lie like that I am going to make you walk home</u>.' Of course I was triumphant because she had been rumbled.'   (BNC)

Combined with the textual metafunction, the elided subject, *you,* of the first clause in the OM-construction underlined in (16) is co-referential with *the man* from preceding text: *He had seen what they had done to Patrick and he knew the man was lying.* The use of *you* in the clause *You're lying* entails an anaphoric ellipsis in the OM-construction. We argue that the conditional sense of the OM-construction in (16) originates from the combination of the additive meaning of *and* with the prerequisite relation between the two events. This position suggests that the OM-construction in (16) is agnate with (16a) but not with the *If...then* construction in (16c). While they are two different grammatical forms, they are constructing closely related meanings, i.e., conditional meaning.

Consequently, the OM-construction in (16) is a hypotactic clause complex formed by two clauses combined by *and* from the perspective of logical metafunction. Interpreting the co-text, we can see that the character Turner had realized that there would be no sense in booby-trapping the weapon in these circumstances, so he would

naturally conclude that the man must be lying and we know that he showed him his scalpel when he spoke to him. The clause complex implies a conditioned command, i.e., Turner is threatening the man to tell the truth. Comparing (16) and (16a), the elliptical nominal clause, *one more lie*, produces the effect of 'making continuous information non-prominent and contrastive information prominent' (Matthiessen 1995:158), while being concise and cohesive with the antecedent clauses. Thus, this type of OM-construction can be described functionally as the structure of [Elliptical C_1 irrealis *and* full C_2 futurity], sharing similar experiential and interpersonal meanings with CCs, but serving a different textual function.

3.3 The features of the OM-construction

The detailed discussion of *one more lie* should not lead us to think that all CCs can become OM-constructions through ellipsis or that all OM-constructions have corresponding or agnate *If...then* constructions. There are two main features that capture the OM-construction: the first involves a certain logical relation[12] which is construed between a first clause, C_1, expressed by a nominal, and a second clause, C_2, expressed by a full declarative clause; the second is the fact that C_1 construes an irrealis event with reference to C_2. Some lexical items contribute to realise the irrealis construal of C_1 in OM-constructions, for example, *one more, another, any (other), again,* and so on. If we revisit Culicover's beer example originally given as (1), restated here as (18), we can consider that the nominal group *one more* indicates a future perspective on the event (i.e., the speaker hasn't had another can of beer yet). Its hypothetical status helps to explain why *one more* cannot be substituted for a definite determiner such as 'this' as in (19) because it would ground the nominal referentially to the here and now, construing an instance (i.e., an object) and not a future event.

(18)   Another can of beer and I am leaving.
(19)   *This can of beer and I am leaving.

Except for filling in the complement slot, *drink one more can of beer*, the NP in (1) C_1 may also be treated as a subject in a different context, for examples, *One more can of beer hits me and I am leaving*, or *One can of beer hits me again and I am leaving*, both indicating a future perspective on the events, too.

The OM-constructions led by *any* is another typical form shown by example (20). Here, the OM-construction entails a general conditional meaning and we can easily understand its full expression as (20a) according to the preceding text. At the same time it seems natural if the continuing clause replaces the third person singular present verb form *goes* with the future verb group *will go* as (20b). Russell (2007) believes that in the case of the conditional conjunction of two declarative clauses, or DaD (a declarative clause *and* a declarative clause), the second clause in the DaD is generally restricted

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[12] See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999:104-105) for their discussion of propositional logic as compared to the natural logic of sequences, i.e., the system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc. We only discuss conditionals in this section as other relations will be discussed in section 4.

with a 'will/would/should + V' form. However, this is not the whole picture since examples (20a) and (20c) with DaD[simple present form] are also acceptable. The whole frame construes an irrealis event and its consequent result with reference to the co-text and our common sense about a court ordered bond and its violation. In (20), the speaker describes and explains her worries and anxieties about the person and it is not hard to recognise that the OM-construction paraphrases one part of the court ordered bond as the preceding text mentioned (e.g., that she bonded him out with a court ordered bond that he should not violate laws and regulations). We argue that *Any violation and he goes back to jail* functions cohesively in this specific context and it achieves the effect of expressing the objective restatement of the bond and her unwillingness to see him return to jail by using DaD[simple present form], not DaD[modal future form] where modals such as *will* more or less indicate modal meanings. Owing to the objectiveness of simple present tense, DaD[simple present form] is quite natural to be used to express general conditionals, illustrated by examples (7), (13) and (20).

(20)   This is so painful, I can't stop crying, I feel like rat snitch. Anyway, after 5 days I bonded him out with a court ordered bond that he be released to the custody of a drug recovery home and must complete the program. <u>Any violation and he goes back to jail.</u> I don't think he wants recovery and will more than likely bolt but when they find him he'll do a lot of time in prison and they will find him. What a nightmare.   (enTenTen15)

(20a)   He commits any violation of this bond and he goes back to jail.
(20b)   He commits any violation of this bond and he will go back to jail.
(20c)   He commits a violation of this bond and he goes back to jail.
(20d)   A violation of this bond and he goes back to jail.

At this point it will be clear that there are other features that contribute to the semantics of the construction. Words such as *a* realise an indefinite singular reference, and *any* indicates the nonassertive meaning and it has the force of conditional (Quirk *et al.* 1985), which clearly influences the meaning. The OM-constructions in (20) might be restated as (20c) and (20d), where the indefinite article *a* is substituted for *any*, but the first clause in (20c) and (20d) might also be analysed as declarative mood realizing a statement and has a causal reading with the second conjunct when construing what happens to him in other situation.

It is difficult to re-express the conditional OM-construction in (20) as (20e) below because the conditional *any* differs from superficially nonassertive *any* when it means 'it doesn't matter which/who/what' (Quirk *et al.* 1985). The examples (20f) to (20g), as with the OM-construction in (20), do express conditional meaning while they all exploit different grammatical resources to fit in different contexts. (20f) and (20g) use the conjunctions *if* and *when* respectively, whereas (20) originates the contrast of the two events connected by *and*. In other words, the conditional meaning may be realised in more than one way, which serves different functions in the text. Due to the similarity

of (20a) and (20f), the OM-construction is also considered to involve a hypotactic relation.

(20e)   No matter what violation he commits, he goes back to jail.
(20f)   If he commits any violation, he goes back to jail.
(20g)   When he commits a violation, he goes back to jail.

Building on what we have developed so far, we will now discuss one additional example, which illustrates the relationship among OM-constructions, CCs and *If...then* constructions. In short, all of these express conditionals, the choice of which one depends on the surrounding circumstances and the co-text and/or context helps us determine it.

The nominal clause *A wrong answer* in (21) does not realize an independent speech function because it does not undertake a command that the speaker demands the listener to pick an answer, nor does it provide a statement that the speaker describes an event relating to the moment of speaking. It is an elliptical version of the underscored clause in (21a), where the two clauses are combined to depict an unreal event and a consequence event (the consequence which is dependent on the hypothetical situation).

(21)   If there is no player connected, the game continues to run until a new player connects, always ready for you to join! The game loops forever and transitions between two states: a "lobby" screen that players use to join the game, and a "game" screen to hunt for the glyphs. Each glyph requires you to solve a riddle: from a list of four words, pick the odd one. <u>A wrong answer and you are back to your tent</u>! Good answer? You can get a number of points depending on the difficulty of the riddle. The purpose of the game is to run forever on a shared screen.   (enTenTen15)

(21a)   <u>You pick a wrong answer</u> and you are back to your tent!
(21b)   <u>If you pick a wrong answer</u>, then you are back to your tent!

Thus, in (21) C_1 is bound to C_2, *you are back to your tent*. C_1 and C_2 combine to form a hypotactic clause complex, similar to the *if*-conditional underscored in (21b). As was discussed above, the conditional reading of the OM-construction is not agnate with *if* clause complexes; they serve as two different forms of expressing the sequence of an unreal event and a following consequence, although both are expressed by a clause complex. The difference among the three types, i.e., the OM-construction in (21), the CC in (21a) and the *if*-conditional in (21b), can be explained by the textual function of C_1. In (21), the nominal clause, *a wrong answer,* occurs clause initially and is cohesively linked to *the odd one* in the preceding co-text, which is contrasted with *good answer* in what follows. The function of the paragraph in (21) is to explain the procedures of the game and list the two possible results after picking a word, and there is no need to make the general subject *you* to get the initial prominence. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 432) note, the clauses in a clause complex which represent a semantic sequence of temporal succession are only marked by *and* in some registers such as stories, recounts

and procedures which are organized temporally. It may be that this also holds for conditional clause complexes when they appear in dialogues, recounts, procedures as it contributes to expressing meaning efficiently in the text.

A further distinction between OM-constructions and the conditionals discussed above relates to the fact that concessive *and* OM-consctructions rely heavily on the semantic contrast between the two events expressed in C_1 and C_2. In example (22), the speaker exploits the semantic contrast between 'small error' and 'you die'. The unusual juxtaposition of these two events to express the similar meaning in (22a) highlights the speaker's emphasis on realism.

(22)   Never before is a car game designed with such emphasis on realism, in bad and in a good way. <u>Small error and you die.</u> It could be that you forgot to tighten brake linings, or that you forgot to bolt wheels properly.   (enTenTen15)

(22a)   Even if you make a small error, you die.

Based on the discussion above, we can see that in addition to the use of traditional condition conjunctions, e.g., *if* C_1, *then* C_2, there are at least three ways to express the sequence of a protasis and an apodasis using non-canonical *and*: (i) grammatically using (a) non-finite verbs in C_1 as example (11), bare VP as example (12) (see Russell 2007); (b) the combination of tenses, $DaD_{[future\ form]}$ or $DaD_{[simple\ present\ form]}$, i.e., the irrealis or unreal C_1 with simple present third singular tense being with reference to the future tense of C_2 or simple present tense; (ii) by incorporating certain cohesive lexis e.g., *more, any, another;* (iii) through semantic contrast. As illustrated by the examples discussed above, the choice of form depends on co-text and context of situation. We hold that it is not possible to predict what grammatical restrictions apply to OM-construction generally because the combination of clauses is in nature a dynamic phenomenon. The sequence of an irrealis event followed by a consequent event entails a possible conditional meaning, which needs to be scrutinized within its linguistic and non-linguistic surroundings.

3.4 An exchange-oriented perspective

Within SFL, language is considered as social semiotic and in this sense language is viewed as dialogic exchange, i.e., people use language to do things, for example, to exchange information with other people, 'to influence their behaviour, to express our own viewpoint on things in the world, and to elicit or change theirs' (Thompson 2014: 28). What we can draw from this for our current purposes is that the stance the speaker takes generally influences the reading of the OM-construction. Recontextualisation can help to clarify the ambiguities. We repeat our example (1) from Culicover here as example (23) so that we can use different contexts to illustrate the influence this has on the construal of the construction.   In what follows, we propose four exchange roles of the OM-construction: Prediction, Bargain, Threat and Promise.

(23)   One more can of beer and I'm leaving.

Prediction, sequential statements

If the aim of the speaker is purely to predict his or her next activities, s/he shows no preference towards the two events. In this case, both clauses in example (23) involve the speaker as actor (or agent), and the natural logic relation between the two events is with reference of time in the physical world, which contributes to the sequential reading of the OM-construction, as ***First** I'll drink one more can of beer, and **then** I'm leaving*. The relation between the two clauses is paratactic because they are independent of each other, i.e., each can function without the other.

Bargain, a request followed by a statement

A conditional reading of example (23) may be realized in a different situation, where the speaker is supposed to benefit from event one and the listener the beneficent from event two. For example, the speaker may use it to bargain for another can of beer when he is asked to leave, which would convey the following: *Give me one more can of beer and then I'm leaving*. C_1 is regarded as the imperative structure conjoined with indicative C_2 by the linker *and*, especially when the speaker says *Give me one more can of beer* accompanied with a gesture of one palm to ask the listener for another beer, which indicates s/he directly orders the listener to give him/her goods by pinning the request with the situation of context. Since the listener giving one more can of beer to the speaker is the prerequisite for the speaker to leave, it also triggers this coordinate structure a conditional sense. Here, the clause complex realises a conditional sequence of a request and a statement respectively, constructing a paratactic clause complex.

Threat or warning, a conditioned command

We might imagine another situation where a conditional meaning is implied. For example, perhaps John has already drunk too many cans of beer and he is going to open another can, but his friend Bob, who thinks that John has had too much to drink, wants to stop him from drinking any more. Similar to example (16) above, in this scenario, we also find two layers of meaning. There should be co-text or situational context contributing to the conditional reading, for example, a preceding clause such as *You have already had ten cans of beer*, or some mention of a large number of empty beer cans. If Bob utters example (23) then he is threatening to leave John if John drinks one more beer. Here the clause complex is treated as a hypotactic clause complex because the first clause does not enact a speech function and cannot realise a proposition or proposal of its own.

Promise, a conditioned offer

Inversely to Threat, it is possible for a speaker to use the OM-construction to make a promise to the addressee to do something the speaker would prefer to avoid. We were unable to find an attested example in the corpus but we could imagine a scenario where two people are at a party which the speaker is enjoying but the addressee is not. In this scenario, the party is becoming quite rowdy and someone has thrown a beer can which has landed near the addressee. We can imagine that the speaker, who knows the

addressee would prefer to leave, turns to the addressee and offers a conditional promise as given in (24). In this invented example, the irrealis C_1 relates to a potential future event which is unpleasant for the addressee, and C_2 presents the consequence, which the speaker is hoping to avoid. The clause complex is hypotactic since 'one more flying beer can' does not realize a speech function. This feature differentiates Promise from Bargain. Since the offer has a condition attached to it, we refer to it as a conditioned offer.

(24) One more flying beer can and we're leaving

The context of situation together with the register features of tenor play a role in influencing the semantics of the OM-construction. Taking an interpersonally-oriented perspective has allowed us to illustrate four discourse functions of OM-constructions, which are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Four functions of OM-constructions

sequence / Exchange	C_1, (irrealis event)	C_2 (consequent event)
Prediction	Preference not mentioned	Preference not mentioned
Bargain	Desirable to the speaker	Desirable to the addressee
Threat or warning	Undesirable to the speaker	Undesirable to the addressee
Promise	Undesirable to the addressee	Undesirable to the speaker

The conclusion we must draw, therefore, is that it is not only the conjunction *and* but also the logico-semantic meaning together with context which provide the construal of the OM-construction.

4. The logical semantics construed by *and*

Having discussed the conditional readings of OM-constructions, CCs and *If-then* constructions in the previous section, we now discuss other logical relations between the two component parts of the OM-construction, i.e., C_1 and C_2.

Within SFL, there are two types of interdependency relations which are involved with OM-constructions as indeed there are for all clause complexes. These concern taxis (parataxis vs hypotaxis) and logico-semantics (projection vs expansion). These two systems are viewed as simultaneous, or in parallel, which means that for every clause complex, one feature from each must be selected (and from their sub-systems, e.g., expansion is a sub-system with three features as shown in Fig. 1). However, within each system, only one option can be selected; in other words, the taxis relation in a clause complex cannot express both parataxis and hypotaxis. This view is quite

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different from the traditional description of clause combinations, where clause combinations are simply divided into coordination, which involves linking conjunctions such as *and*, and subordination, which involves binding conjunctions such as *if*. As discussed in section 2, OM-constructions pose a challenge to traditional descriptions because the presence of *and* suggests a paratactic (co-ordinating) relation.

While there has been considerable research on bare VP conditional conjunctions as a pseudo-imperative, e.g., *Say one more word and I'll scream!* (Franke 2008: 261), little attention has been given to the interdependency relations of OM-constructions. We hold that extending OM-constructions involve a paratactic relation, while enhancing ones may be either paratactic or hypotactic depending on the context of use.

In SFL the clause complex is viewed as expansion, i.e., one clause serves as an expansion of another clause. There are three types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). For Halliday, *and* is a prototypical marker of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 471) and has an additive function (e.g., *He'd been a medieval history student in college <u>and</u> I was interested in medieval literature, too* p. 472). When *and* appears in other than the additive function, it is typically combined with other conjuncts or adjuncts. For example, temporal (*and meanwhile*), spatial (*and there*), manner (*and in that way*), cause-conditional (*and still*) enhancement, where *and* is often optional (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014 for details).

According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 480), 'a sequence of paratactic clauses which have to be interpreted as being in some circumstantial relation to each other, especially a temporal sequence, is marked simply by *and*, without any further conjunctive expression'. This statement would then hold for the enhancing interpretation of *and*. The data we collected from the corpora (see above) confirm this tendency. As we will now discuss, our data shows evidence of *and* in extending and enhancing clause expansion.

4.1 Extension

With extension, one clause adds something new which extends the meaning of another clause, such as an addition, a replacement, or an alternative. *And* is a prototypical paratactic marker of additive extension, as exemplified in the underscored sentence in (25).

(25)   But I know there were more than three crashes here. I can think of at least one more crash. I can also remember a guy died here last year. Right here. He crashed his motorcycle. He layed it down and skid into a truck. <u>No helmet and he was pretty drunk.</u> He would have been a senior with me this year.
       ((enTenTen15)

Furthermore, as we can see in an example such as (26), *and* can also be used to relate adversative extension clauses, where it takes a reading similar to *but*. Here, the speaker uses it to link two clauses to express her compliment on Helm's first docking attempt

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when compared to her own. The adversative use of *and* in OM-constructions, with preference in spoken English language, usually has the effect of showing the speaker's feelings and attitudes, such as surprise, anger, or criticism, as shown in (26), (27) and (28), where examples are underscored.

(26) "Well done, Helm! <u>First time and you didn't shear off an antenna or anything,</u> I'm impressed! " Rishov laughed, "You should have seen my first docking attempt.   (enTenTen15)

(27) <u>My only pen and you went and lost it</u>.   (Culicover 1970:368)

(28) <u>Twenty-five centuries of language teaching and what have we learned</u>.   (ibid.)

4.2 Enhancement

As was mentioned above, *and* is a prototypical paratactic marker of addition extension, which can also be used to relate enhancement clauses including sequence, causal, conditional, when combined with conjunctive expressions, such as *(and) then*, *(and) so*, *(and) yet* shown above; the brackets here indicate that *and* is optional. The reason why Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) interpret these nexus as paratactic enhancing ones lies in the fact that firstly they have a corresponding hypotactic version which involves an enhancing dependent clause and secondly *and* is optional. However, simple *and*, i.e., without any further conjunctive expression, is frequently used to link paratactic clauses being in circumstantial relation, especially a temporal sequence (Halliday & Matthiessen: 2014:480). These examples of OM-constructions demonstrate not only sequential nexus but causal and conditional relations as well.

Sequential OM-constructions are sequential in terms of the time reference to the conjoined events and have corresponding agnate major clauses which share equal status. For this reason, they are analyzed as paratactic expansion. For example, in (29) the OM-construction can be considered agnate with *There is only one more weekend to go and the security screen could be lifted*. In (30) the OM-construction may be alternatively expressed as *We had a firm handshake and he wastes no time getting down to business*, and in (31) the OM-construction agnates with *He takes another sip and he's looking back up at the man-offering on stage*. These OM-constructions allow *and* to be substituted with *and then* to make the sequential sense explicit.

(29) He was relieved from duty by the end of the week. <u>One more weekend and the security screen could be lifted</u>. Two men had been arrested in Liverpool and their informer in Belfast named them as the assassins. Once this was established, Neil Fraser and the other two targets would be low risks as usual.   （BNC）

(30) At 1.30 in the night, Abhi (as we love to call him) arrives in his booked room at the Rennaisance Powai Hotel where I am waiting for him along with his personal PR, Shalmana, who's giving me company since 10pm. <u>A firm handshake and he wastes no time getting down to business.</u> Abhi has just returned after finishing his first shot for the film Game he is filming along with actress Kangna Ranaut in   the   hotel. (enTenTen15)

(31) He offers a friendly wave to Perdy and smiles to Sammy. A curious look is sent Elisha's way. But, he doesn't pursue it. <u>Another sip and he's looking back up at the man-offering on stage.</u> Poor bastard, his look suggests. (enTenTen15)

OM-constructions may also construe a cause-and-effect link in the sequence of the events as shown in (32). The clausal relation in this case is paratactic in status.

(32) The person responsible sent me an email and was extremely apologetic. Since he just bought his car this summer, he wanted to make a side deal. <u>No insurance involvement and he would pay me directly.</u> I said I was open to that since the car is 10 years old and it would be easy to for me to fix it. I found the parts online and gave him a rough estimate. (enTenTen15)

As concerns its use in OM-constructions, *and* has a tendency to occur on its own and we find it used for most types of expansion, including sequential, causal and conditional sequences. Outside of OM-constructions, with the exception of additive extension, *and* is an optional conjunction in formal style and where it is used, it co-occurs with other conjunctive expressions, e.g., 'and yet' in adversative extension (see Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). As discussed above, Culicover (2013) treats differences in uses of *and* as semantic ambiguities of the OM-construction. We suggest here that by considering the interpersonal functions of the clauses involved, we can delineate one reading from other possible readings of the OM-construction.

5. Concluding remarks

This study has re-examined OM-constructions from a functional perspective. The paper set out to shed some light on this construction by locating OM-constructions in the English system as clause complexes in which the first clause may be elliptical, arguing that OM-constructions cannot be equated with *If*-conds, although both constructions may be used to realize very similar meanings, i.e., conditionals. We further showed that non-canonical *and* evolved from the prototypical additive conjunction *and* under certain circumstances. In general, extensive and temporal enhancing OM-constructions are paratactic while conditional enhancing ones may be paratactic or hypotactic, which depends on whether the clause in the protasis realizes a specific speech function or not. Thirdly, with the combination of a lexicogrammatical and a contextual analysis, we have been able to show that it was not only the conjunction *and* but also the logico-semantic meaning together with context which enabled us to account for the construal of the OM-construction. The multi-functional and multi-stratal framework of SFL has shown how promising the framework is for dealing with challenging constructions. As Butler & Gonzálvez-García (2014:488) have concluded, one the strengths of SFL is accounting for the structure and properties of extended stretches of discourse. The combination of lexicogrammar with text properties can provide a convincing description than either discourse analysis or syntactic analysis alone.

Our examination of OM-constructions in English has provided a plausible account of the nature of these expressions which can be situated within a functional framework. Importantly, we have identified key areas for future work. The role of aspectual semantics, both lexical and grammatical, was shown to be significant and the exact nature of this role should be explored in detail, for example how items such as *again* and *more* contribute to the OM-construction. Future work in this area will no doubt be fruitful as it will lead to a much better understanding of the pragmatic inferences involved in these constructions. Finally, it is clear that register factors contribute to the interpretation of the OM-construction but this has yet to be fully explored. This is understandable in part because of the difficulty in building a suitable corpus for this type of research. However, what we have shown here is that it can be done and that this approach does lead to greater insights into the nature of the construction.

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