# Developing Efficacy and Emotion Routes to Solidarity-Based and Violent Collective action

**Rim Saab**

A dissertation submitted to the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 2011

**Supervisors**
Professor Russell Spears and Dr. Nicole Tausch
School of Psychology
Cardiff University, UK

## Declaration and Statements

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed …… (candidate) Date ……

**STATEMENT 1**

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ……(insert MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)

Signed …… (candidate) Date ……

**STATEMENT 2**

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated.
Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed …… (candidate) Date ……

**STATEMENT 3**

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed …… (candidate) Date ……

**STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS**

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loans **after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Graduate Development Committee.**

Signed …… (candidate) Date ……

**Acknowledgments**

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Russell Spears and Nicole Tausch, for their wonderful guidance, support and encouragement throughout my PhD. I thank you both for your continuously helpful and constructive feedback, for being constantly available for help and advice, for giving me the space to explore my own research interests, for your continual help in my efforts to secure funding, for giving me the opportunity to work as a research assistant with you, for your patience, your inspiring ideas, your magical solutions to problems, your positive spirit, your friendship, and your modesty.

Russell, thank you for giving me the privilege to be your student, for your patience in helping me build (almost from scratch!) some sense of pragmatism and conciseness, and for your witty sense of humour. Nicole, I feel honoured to be your first PhD student. Thank you for encouraging me to move to Cardiff, for consistently creating and pointing out opportunities to improve my training, and for introducing me to vegetarianism!

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the School of Psychology for their financial support. I also sincerely thank the support staff, particularly Kevin Hotson, Dave Griffiths, Lesley Ann Strabel, Lynne Pritchard and Dave Johnson for their help and friendly attitude.

I am very grateful to the Spears-Manstead labgroup and the Social Psychology Club for their insightful feedback on my research, their help, and their great social gatherings. In particular, I thank Tony Manstead, Katherine Shelton, Andrew Livingstone, Caroline Leygue, Sole Lemus, Marcin Bukowski, Job van der Schalk, Martin Bruder, Sasha Walters, Dina Dosmukhambetova, Anja Zimmerman, Gabi Jiga-Boy, Toon Kuppens, Rose Thompson, Sian Jones, Lee Shepherd, Sindhuja Sankaran, Verbon Cheung, Dimitrios Xenias, and Joe Sweetman. I feel fortunate to have been part of a group of such interesting and inspiring researchers, and such nice and friendly people.

I am grateful to my friend Verbon for giving me the opportunity to collect data in Hong Kong, and my beloved cousins Zeina and Faysal for helping me with the material I used in Study 5. I also thank Joe for his

friendship and for many inspiring discussions on political action, social psychology, and the world.

I thank my lovely officemates, particularly Sasha, Tracey, Verbon, Gabi and Gary, for providing a friendly, supportive and fun working environment.

On a more personal note, I thank all the wonderful friends I've made during my PhD, and those from my pre-PhD years (you know who you are!). Thank you for coming into my life and making it so much better. Debbie, thank you for being like another sister to me. As promised, I dedicate the D in this PhD to you! Verbon, thank you for being such an amazing friend, colleague, housemate and officemate. Caroline, thank you for being a great source of joy, fun and laughter.

I thank my extended family including my lovely aunties, uncles, cousins and grandma for their love, great support and understanding, especially for the times I've had to miss out on family gatherings.

I thank my brother Sami for his love, understanding and great support, for his helpful tips on concise writing, amazing sense of humour, and for providing a one of a kind distraction on the phone many an evening.

I thank my sister Nour for being everything one could wish a sister to be. Her presence, her love and care, her amazing company and friendship, her unwavering support and encouragement throughout my PhD have been a vital fuel.

I am grateful beyond words to my parents Akram and Hanan for their unbounded generosity and continuous support, both financial and emotional, for their love, understanding, encouragement and constant willingness to be there for me and help me fulfil my aspirations. I dedicate this thesis to them.

## Thesis Summary

This thesis follows two independent lines of investigation on social psychological predictors of collective action, focusing on solidarity-based action among bystander groups in the first part, and violent forms of collective action in the second part.

In Studies 1-3, I examine predictors of collective action among third parties in solidarity with a disadvantaged group by extending a recent model which proposes two pathways to collective action, one emotion-based and the other efficacy-based (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). I show that moral outrage and feelings of empathy with a disadvantaged group play an important role in predicting solidarity-based collective action tendencies, while sympathy seems to be an unreliable predictor. I also provide evidence that the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of the protesting movement can influence collective action tendencies directly but also indirectly by feeding into perceptions of the action's political efficacy.

In Studies 4-7, I examine whether the pursuit of violent forms of collective action is subject to considerations regarding the efficacy of both violent and nonviolent forms of action, and the interaction between these two. I show that violence support and violent action tendencies are generally positively predicted by violence efficacy but not consistently negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, as nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy appear to interact in some contexts (Studies 4-6). Importantly, my studies reveal that people are more supportive of violent action the more efficacious it seems, even if nonviolent action is also a promising strategy. Further, when violent action seems to have low efficacy, people may still support its pursuit if they deem nonviolence to have low efficacy as well.

Overall, the findings of this thesis contribute to current scholarly efforts at identifying novel predictors of collective action as well as predictors of different forms of collective action.

# CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Collective action can be defined as any action that aims to improve the conditions, status, power or influence of an entire group rather than that of one or a few individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990b; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). It can take various forms including nonviolent actions such as signing petitions, participating in peaceful demonstrations, or violent actions such as riots, armed resistance, and terrorist attacks. A recent example of the important consequences collective action can have is the ongoing wave of popular uprisings against long-standing Arab political regimes, which started in Tunisia in December 2010 and then spread to the rest of the Arab world, with massive political repercussions across the region and beyond. Europe, meanwhile, has also seen its share of mass popular action in the last two years following the global economic crisis, with workers and students staging protests and strikes against governmental budget cuts all across the UK and Europe, with violence erupting on various occasions and signs of yet more to come. Unsurprisingly, collective action is considered one of the fundamental engines of social change given its potential to reshape social, economic and political power hierarchies, and to impact social norms, peace and security in intergroup relations. Researching when and why people participate in collective action is therefore of great theoretical and practical importance for social scientists, practitioners and policy-makers alike.

This thesis aims to expand existing work on two social psychological predictors of collective action: efficacy perceptions and emotions. In one line of investigation, I look at predictors of solidarity-

based collective action among bystander groups, exploring a range of emotions as well as different types of efficacy as predictors. In another line of investigation I delve into the efficacy of different collective action tactics and their interplay in predicting particular courses of action. In this chapter, I provide the theoretical background to my work. I begin with an overview of the traditional antecedents of collective action, after which I turn to current trends in collective action research which relate to my work, ending with an overview of the thesis.

## Classical Antecedents of Collective Action

Social psychological research has typically focused on three main antecedents of collective action, namely perceived injustice and accompanying emotions, efficacy perceptions, and identity motives. In the next sections I discuss each of these in turn.

### Perceived and Felt Injustice

Various social psychological theories view collective action as the result of individuals feeling aggrieved on a collective level about a current state of affairs. It was traditionally assumed that people take collective action to remedy *objective* inequalities with other groups, measured for example by wealth and health (e.g. Blumer, 1939; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1968). Theorists subsequently challenged this notion by noting that collective action can stem from *subjective* feelings of deprivation. For example, Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949) found that African Americans in the Southern military camps of the United States, where racial discrimination was pervasive, exhibited as favourable or more favourable responses

regarding their personal adjustment in the army compared to those in the Northern camps, who experienced less discrimination. It turned out that African American soldiers in the south perceived considerable advantages over African American civilians in that area, while the advantages over African American civilians in the north were much less notable. A series of similar unexpected findings led Stouffer and his colleagues to introduce the concept of *relative deprivation* which subsequently led to the development of Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT, e.g. Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1986; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002).

According to RDT, perceptions of personal relative deprivation, referred to as *egoistic* deprivation, result from the social comparison of one's personal conditions with the conditions of particular others who are taken as a reference point. Similarly, comparing the situation of one's social group as a whole with the situation of another social group can lead to group-based perceptions of relative deprivation, referred to as *fraternal* deprivation (Runciman, 1966). Collective action is thought to be more likely to result from feelings of fraternal deprivation than from egoistic deprivation (Runciman, 1966), given the conceptual fit between intergroup comparisons and the intergroup nature of collective action (Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999). Meta-analytic findings support this idea (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). For example, Walker and Mann (1987) found that fraternal relative deprivation among unemployed Australian workers, measured as the perceived gap between ingroup and outgroup attainment, positively predicted the workers' orientation to social protest, and did so better than egoistic relative deprivation, measured as the perceived gap

between personal expectations and attainment. The social psychological literature on fairness judgment has also subsequently emphasized the importance of viewing one's group as being unjustly treated (procedural injustice) rather than being merely unequal to another group (distributive justice) (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) as a motive for taking collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004).

Social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel; 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provides another framework for understanding collective action which also highlights the centrality of legitimacy concerns. SIT proposes that people generally seek to belong to groups that provide them with positive social identities. Social identity was originally defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his (sic) membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p.251). Given the motivation to belong to positively valued groups, membership in a low-status or disadvantaged group presents a problem. Various identity management strategies are available to low-status group members to resolve this problem, one of which is taking collective action to improve the status of their group. According to SIT, the choice of identity management strategy depends on the context, namely on three social-structural characteristics. The first is the *permeability* of intergroup boundaries, that is, whether a member of the low-status group can join the high-status group and become a member of it. Permeable boundaries allow such movement whereas impermeable boundaries prevent it. The second is the *legitimacy* of the ingroup's status, that is, whether the low status is deserved. The third is

the *stability* of the ingroup's position, that is, whether the low status is perceived as changeable (unstable) or unchangeable (stable). According to SIT, collective action arises when low-status group members perceive intergroup boundaries to be impermeable, when they view their group's disadvantaged position compared to an advantaged outgroup as being illegitimate or undeserved, and when they view the status hierarchy as unstable (Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Legitimacy concerns (and stability, which we elaborate later) thus play an important role in determining people's decisions to take collective action.

Theoretical developments building on RDT and SIT have emphasized the emotional basis of perceptions of injustice as an important player in collective action. RDT stresses that feelings of group-based deprivation such as anger and resentment, are more important in predicting collective action than mere cognitive perceptions of deprivation (e.g. Tyler & Smith, 1998), as shown in a meta-analysis by Smith and Ortiz (2002). The stress on emotional responses to perceived injustice as important drivers of group-based action can also be found in the more recent Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; E.R. Smith, 1993). This approach is based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), which view emotion as a complex syndrome composed of cognitions, subjective feelings and behavioural tendencies. IET proposes that in situations where individuals categorize themselves as members of a social group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), group-related events are viewed as more self-relevant and produce group-based emotions with specific action tendencies (Smith,

1993). For example, an outgroup appraised as suffering unfairly should generate feelings of sympathy which should lead to tendencies to help that group. A person's experience of group-level emotions can be inferred from four criteria: these emotions are different from the same person's individual-level emotions, they are a function of the person's degree of identification with the relevant group, they are socially shared within a group, and they play a role in regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour (see Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007, for empirical evidence).

According to IET, appraising an outgroup as treating the ingroup unjustly or unfairly produces feelings of group-based anger against this outgroup and a motivation to move against them in order to redress the perceived injustice. Empirical findings show that anger indeed mediates between group-based appraisals of injustice and confrontational action tendencies such as collective action (Tausch, Becker, Spears et al., 2011). For example, van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) conducted two experiments with Dutch university students who were told that their university was planning to increase tuition fees in response to recently imposed cuts by the government. The authors manipulated procedural fairness by informing students that the university would either give them or deny them any voice in the decision. They found that students were more motivated to engage in collective action to oppose the proposal when they were denied voice, and this effect was mediated by increases in group-based anger at the proposal.

## Efficacy

Approaches focusing primarily on grievances as an explanation for collective action were criticized in the seventies (e.g. see Walker & Smith, 2002, on criticism of RDT), based on the observation that grievances are pervasive in society, yet people do not always take collective action to address them. Hence, Resource Mobilization Theory argued that relative deprivation should lead to collective action only when individuals are able to mobilize sufficient resources to challenge injustice (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The theory assumes that individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of participating in social movements. Research in this tradition concentrated mainly on how social movement organisations acquire and mobilize resources (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Criticizing the *objective* presence or absence of resources as a sole focus of enquiry, Klandermans (1984) argued that individuals' *subjective* perceptions are important motives for engaging in collective action. He proposed various motives for social movement participation based on an integration of Olson's (1968) theory of collective action and expectancy-value theories of motivation (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Most relevant here is the collective motive, measured as a subjective value-expectancy product. The value component represents the extent to which people value the goals that the collective action seeks to achieve. The expectancy component represents people's expectation regarding the effectiveness of the collective action in achieving these goals (e.g. if enough people can be mobilized to achieve these goals).

The collective motive has been found to positively predict collective action participation in various contexts (Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984, 1986; Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

Various other theoretical accounts of collective action also view the perceived likelihood that collective action will succeed in achieving social change as an important explanation of participation. In SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), as previously mentioned, the perceived changeability of the social order, termed stability, is seen as an important socio-structural variable that influences members of disadvantaged groups' willingness to take collective action. According to SIT, people must view their disadvantage as part of an unstable social order rather than a stable one, in order to engage in collective action. In more recent developments of RDT, Mummendey et al. (1999) introduced the concept of group efficacy, or the belief that the group is capable of resolving their grievances through unified effort, as an important positive predictor of collective action (see also Reicher, 1996; 2001). Group efficacy draws on Bandura's (1997) concept of collective efficacy, defined as "a group's shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainments" (p. 477). Empirical findings support the idea that perceived group efficacy positively predicts collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004; see meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; but see also Tausch et al., 2011).

Instrumentality concerns have been addressed using various concepts. Wright (2001) views stability and group efficacy as two components of one factor which he terms collective control. According to

him, people engage in collective action only if they believe that the intergroup context is responsive to action (unstable) and that the group has the resources or abilities necessary to effect change (high group efficacy). Azzi (1998) posits three types of efficacy beliefs which influence individuals' readiness to endorse collective action. The first is collective efficacy, determined by a) the perceived likelihood that collective action will bring about at least some of the outcomes desired by the group, b) the perceived willingness of other group members to participate in collective action, and c) perceiving that the group possesses the resources necessary to overcome potential counterattacks by the outgroup, such as wealth, arms, resilience. The second type of efficacy beliefs is individual self-efficacy, which is the belief that one can make it on their own, exit the disadvantaged ingroup and assimilate into the advantaged group (akin to permeability in SIT). The third type is participatory self-efficacy, which is the belief that one's own participation in collective action would make a difference.

In sum, while efficacy has been operationalised in various ways and on different levels (e.g. self, group, strategy), it is consistently seen to be an important explanation of collective action.

**Identity**

Stürmer and Simon (2004) have argued that Klandermans's (1997) cost-benefit approach to collective action overlooks how individuals' decisions to participate in collective action are influenced by their group membership, that is, the extent to which they view themselves as members of a group and act in accordance with that group membership. They proposed that social identification with one's group, that is, the strength of

pre-existing identification with the group concerned with the collective struggle, constitutes an additional pathway to collective action over and above the cost-benefit pathway. Their approach draws on SIT (Tafjel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which proposes that when members of a disadvantaged group believe that the low status is illegitimate, that intergroup boundaries are impermeable, and that the low status is unstable, they are more likely to collectively challenge the status quo through collective action because they come to identify with their group more strongly (Ellemers, 1993). It has thus been argued that social identity serves to mobilize people for social change (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000; 2005).

Stürmer and Simon (2004) suggest a number of reasons why social identity should lead to collective action participation. Collective identity links group members' self-esteem to their ingroup status; it fosters a sense of collective strength and ingroup cohesion, and facilitates intergroup differentiation and social influence from ingroup members (see Brown & Gaertner, 2001 for a review). When social movements are based on pre-existing social categories (e.g. women, ethnic minorities), identification with such categories makes it easier to become part of the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997) and increases the chance that mobilization attempts by ingroup members would succeed. Further, social identification makes it more likely that the cost and benefits of collective action participation would be calculated at the group level rather than the individual level.

Importantly, collective identity is thought to be most likely to fuel collective action when it becomes politicized (Simon & Klandermans,

2001), that is, when it develops into an activist identity, which is accompanied by an internalization of the goals and standards of the social movement. Politicized identification thus influences participation by instilling an inner obligation to participate (Kelly, 1993). Consistent with this view, there is now substantial evidence that identification with a group, but more particularly identification with a social movement (politicized identification), positively predicts collective action on behalf of that group (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; see Stürmer & Simon, 2004 for a review) and that this effect is mediated by an inner obligation to participate. A recent meta-analysis also showed that identification is a positive and unique predictor of collective action over and above perceived injustice and efficacy, and that politicized identification is a better predictor of collective action than non-politicized identification (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

**Integrative Models**

Various integrative models of collective action have been proposed combining two or more of the predictors outlined in the previous section. As previously mentioned, Stürmer and Simon (2004) proposed a dual-pathway model of collective action. One pathway draws on Klandermans's (1984) collective, normative and reward motives and represents the calculation of the costs and benefits of participation. The second pathway draws on the social identity approach and represents identification processes, where participants are driven to collective action based on their internalisation of group-specific behavioural standards. The social identity model of collective action (SIMCA, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; see also van

Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press) suggests that collective action is predicted by all three classical antecedents, namely injustice and resulting emotions, efficacy and social identification, particularly politicized identification. Further, SIMCA posits that social identity forms the psychological basis for collective action and bridges the injustice and efficacy paths to action. That is, social identification predicts collective action indirectly via injustice and efficacy, as well as directly. Given that one line of investigation in this thesis focuses on efficacy and emotions, of particular interest is the dual pathway model of collective action by van Zomeren and colleagues (2004), which forms the basis of some of my studies. This is an integrative model which views emotion and efficacy as distinct but complementary pathways to collective action. The model conceptualises anger, resulting from experiences of procedural injustice and opinion support from other group members, and group efficacy, resulting from instrumental social support, as two independent predictors of collective action tendencies (see Figure 1). The emotion-based pathway is conceptualised as emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage, whereas the efficacy pathway is conceptualised as problem-focused coping (Lazarus, 1991). This model has received support in various contexts (Sweetman, Spears, & Livingstone, 2011;Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008).




*Figure 1*. A simplified version of the dual pathway model of collective action proposed by van Zomeren et al. (2004).

## Current Trends or Issues in Collective Action Research

The last decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the social psychology of collective action. Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009), and Wright (2009) have recently reviewed some of the significant research advances in this area and highlighted conceptual issues that may be important for the next generation of collective action research. Drawing on their work, in the following sections I give an overview of those issues which are relevant to my thesis to help situate my work within the current research in the field.

### Collective Action by Whom and for Whom?

In examining antecedents of collective action, social psychologists have traditionally focused on action by members of disadvantaged groups. But what about those who take collective action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups? Researchers have recently started to pay attention to collective action taken by *advantaged* group members on behalf of disadvantaged groups (e.g. Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Sweetman, Spears, & Livingstone, 2011). For example, various studies have demonstrated that group-based emotions such as self-focused anger, guilt and sympathy can promote actions to compensate or help the disadvantaged group (e.g. Iyer et al., 2007; Leach, Iyer & Pedersen,

2006). Recent theory and research have also begun to study what motivates members of *bystander* groups to sometimes take collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged group (Reicher , Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašic´, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Thomas, 2005; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). However, empirical data on members of bystander groups is still scarce compared to data on collective action by advantaged or disadvantaged group members.

Wright (2009), however, considers that actions taken on behalf of a disadvantaged outgroup, though important to examine in their own right, do not fit one of the classical definitions of collective action which stresses the importance of acting on behalf of one's *ingroup*: "a group member engages in collective action any time she or he acts as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole" (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990b, p. 995). McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, and Bongiorno (2009) contend that it is problematic to attribute collective action only to particular social categories (e.g. race, gender, ethnicity). They point out that collective action is often about relations between social categories, but that it is taken by members from various social categories and often occurs when there are intense divisions within those categories. Hence, they argue that collective action can often be attributed to *opinion-based groups*, which form around shared opinions on social or political issues. Wright (2009) concedes that action aimed at improving the conditions of a disadvantaged outgroup can be considered collective action in the classical sense to the extent that it stems from membership in an opinion-based group, given that such groups can include

members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups who advocate better conditions for the disadvantaged group.

Consistent with this, Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) argue that there is little reason to neglect advantaged groups or third parties in the study of collective action. They advocate a broader definition of collective action that can accommodate action taken in solidarity with a disadvantaged outgroup, namely as action taken in order to improve the status, power, influence of an entire group rather than a few individuals. In fact, van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) specifically call for more research in this realm given the importance of drawing other members of society to join collective action on behalf of one's group in order to increase its chances of success. My thesis fits neatly within this agenda as one of its main aims is to examine emotional and efficacy predictors of collective action by bystander group members in solidarity with a disadvantaged group (Chapter 2).

**Operationalising Collective Action**

Collective action has been operationalised in various ways in the literature, including attitudes toward collective action, intentions and action tendencies to participate in collective action, self-reported past participation and actual participation. The present thesis focuses particularly on support for collective action and collective action tendencies as dependent variables. Some view behavioural measures as the most valuable outcome variables and thus consider studies using other outcome variables as weaknesses. Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) have recently remarked, however, that the diversity of measures in the field is actually a strength. They argue that studying processes at least one step removed from actual behaviour is

valuable because these processes might influence behaviour at a later point in time. Drawing on Klandermans's (1997) four-step model of collective action participation, van Zomeren and Iyer note that studying attitudinal support for collective action helps us understand when people become part of the mobilization potential of a social movement, that is, when they become sympathetic supporters of the movement, which is the first step in Klandermans' model. Investigating intentions and action tendencies to participate in collective action help us understand the second and third steps in the model, which consist of becoming targets of mobilization attempts and developing the motivation to participate, respectively. Finally, examining actual participation helps to understand the fourth step, which is overcoming barriers to participation (e.g. time, money and other responsibilities). Hence, research on all these different steps is essential for helping us understand individuals' pathways to collective action.

**Collective Action Tactics**

Collective action encompasses a broad variety of actions, ranging from individuals acting alone to mass protest, including consciousness raising, lobbying, voting, petitioning, going on strike, participating in riots, engaging in armed resistance and even terrorist attacks (see Wright, 2009). The literature indicates various ways of classifying different forms of political action, but these classifications are not free of controversy (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991).

One common classification is that provided by Wright et al. (1990b), who distinguish between normative collective actions (i.e. actions conforming to the norms of the existing political system, such as peaceful

protest or voting) and non-normative actions (i.e. actions that violates the norms of the system, such as violent actions). Other classifications differentiate between within-system and out-of-system political actions (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991); activism versus radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), and constitutional versus extra-constitutional actions (Hayes & McAllister, 2005).

One can also distinguish between violent action, which entails physical damage to property or life, and nonviolent action, commonly defined by Sharp (2005) as "a general technique of protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence… Such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission – that is, the participants refuse to perform acts they usually perform, or are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; (b) acts of commission – that is, the participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both." (p. 547).

Sharp (2005) distinguishes between three types of nonviolent tactics. The first is nonviolent protest and persuasion, consisting of verbal, written or symbolic acts of protest challenging the status quo, or attempts to persuade others to support the movement (e.g. petitions, distributing literature, singing songs, street theatre, vigils, and creating new Web sites). The second is noncooperation, where people deny their obedience and cooperation to an opponent or opponents' pillar of support. This can include social (e.g. suspension of social activities), economic (e.g. boycott, strikes) or political (e.g. resignation, refusal to participate in government institutions

or programs) noncooperation. The third type of nonviolent tactic is nonviolent intervention which directly disrupts the opponents' ability to function, such as in acts of civil disobedience, sit-ins, or the creation of parallel institutions. Nonviolent actions have also been classified as methods of concentration (where people act in dense physical proximity to each other, such as in protests), and methods of dispersion (where people act in decentralised and diffuse ways, such as boycotts and stay-at-home strikes) (Schock, 2005).

Importantly, most social psychological research has so far examined only one specific form of collective action (e.g. protest) or included various self-reported actions in one measure. Further, most actions that are examined are typically nonviolent and little attention has been given to the study of violent actions. However, as Wright (2009) has recently noted, "it seems fairly obvious that there should be differences in the antecedents leading one to sign a petition versus burn a flag at a protest, or to attend a rally versus set a bomb." (p. 873). Accordingly, Wright calls upon collective action researchers to develop frameworks that can capture the distinctions among different forms of collective action. In line with this, one of the aims of this thesis is to examine how violent forms of collective action are predicted by their perceived efficacy and the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions, and the interaction between these two.

**Elaborating on Classical Antecedents and Expanding the Array of Antecedents**

Recent advances in collective action research consist partially of elaborating on the classical antecedents, that is, injustice and emotions,

efficacy, and identity, and exploring a wider array of antecedents (Wright, 2009).

**Emotions.** The emotions that have gained most attention in the literature on predictors of collective action are group-based anger, dissatisfaction, frustration and resentment (e.g. van Zomeren et al., 2004; see meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, expanding the array of emotions relevant to collective action is currently an important item on the collective action research agenda. Thomas and McGarty (2009), for example, have examined the role of moral outrage in international development activism. Miller, Cronin, Garcia, and Branscombe (2009) have examined fear as an inhibitor of collective action. Drury and Reicher (2009) have explored the role of positive and empowering emotions such as exhilaration that may result from participation in collective action. Tausch and colleagues (2011) have recently examined the role of contempt in predicting normative and non-normative forms of collective action. Sweetman and colleagues (2011) have investigated the role of admiration and other-praising emotions. The recent interest in collective action by advantaged or bystander group members has also led to more theorizing on the role of *prosocial emotions* in intergroup helping (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Prosocial emotions are especially relevant here given that one of the lines of investigation in this thesis focuses on collective action by members of bystander groups. In particular, my work is concerned with the roles of moral outrage, sympathy and empathy in predicting solidarity-based collective action by bystander group members.

**Other motives.** Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis and colleagues (2006) have recently critiqued traditional research on efficacy and collective action, arguing that it focuses primarily on the efficacy of collective action at influencing outgroups such as governments, but fails to take into account other equally important targets of collective action. In particular, Hornsey and colleagues point out that the efficacy of collective action can be conceptualised in terms of its potential to express certain values, build a mass movement and influence public opinion.

The expressive function of collective action has recently gained more attention in the literature. It has been linked to ideological motives, defined by some as "wanting to express one's views" (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; p. 183; see also van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2009). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) argue that the violation of personal cherished values provides an impetus for collective action; people participate in collective action not only to enforce political change, but "to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression" (p.183).

This expressive function of collective action overlaps with another proclaimed motive of collective action, which is the desire to *affirm* the collective identity of the challenging group (see Wright, 2009). Both of these motives involve the need for expression, but they seem to operate at different levels, with the expressive function referring to expression at the individual level (i.e. expressing one's personal values) and the identity affirmation function to expression at the collective level (expressing collective values). Collective action is thought to provide an opportunity to

assert the challenging group's views and their distinctiveness from the offending or oppressive outgroup. Affirming collective identity may thus constitute a motive for collective action regardless of whether action itself has a discernable impact on the group's position in the social order (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Wright, 2009).

Relatedly, Taylor and van Dyke (2004) point out that protest actions constitute a way for resisting groups to develop an oppositional consciousness and collective identity (Klandermans & de Weerd, 1999), such that collective action is not only aimed at external targets but is also aimed at movement-building (della Porta & Diani, 1999). For example, in sociological research, creating solidarity and collective identity have been identified as some of the main functions of online activism (McCaughey & Ayers, 2003). In a similar vein, Hornsey et al. (2006) argue that people can engage in collective action with the short-term goal of inspiring others to join or continue the struggle. Collective action can thus be aimed at building a movement or "rallying the troops", akin to the concept of consciousness raising by Taylor and McKirnan (1984; see Wright, 2009). Furthermore, Hornsey et al. (2006) point out that collective action can aim to influence third parties such as the general public or international community to support the movements' goals or to join the movement, in the hope that this would help tip the balance of power in favour of the movement's goals.

While these motives have begun to gain recognition in the collective action literature, empirical data surrounding them is still at its early stages, and the relations between them are rarely explored. My work attempts to

integrate these efficacy-related motives and to explore their contribution to collective action.

## The Present Research

This thesis attempts to address various gaps in the literature which were touched upon in the preceding discussion.

In Chapter 2, I present the results of three studies that look at some of the factors that might prompt members of bystander groups to take collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged group. This work builds on the dual pathway model of collective action by van Zomeren and colleagues (2004), which focuses on an emotional pathway and an efficacy pathway. I expand on this model in two ways. First, I widen the array of emotional predictors typically examined in the literature by looking at the role of moral outrage, but also at two important prosocial emotions, namely sympathy and empathy. Importantly, I compare the contributions of these two emotions, following recent theorizing on their differential roles in predicting intergroup helping (Thomas et al., 2009b). Second, I elaborate on the efficacy pathway to collective action by building on Hornsey et al.'s (2006) recent critique. In particular, I look at how collective action is predicted by its perceived efficacy at altering the social order (the traditional notion of collective action efficacy) but I also complement this by introducing an additional predictor, namely the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of a social movement. I see identity consolidation as encompassing motives such as rallying the troops, influencing third parties and expressing collective views.

In Chapter 3 I present the results of four studies looking at how the endorsement of a particular form of collective action is influenced by perceptions of the (political) efficacy of various available tactics. In particular, I examine how violent forms of action are predicted by their perceived efficacy as well as by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent tactics and, importantly, the potential interaction between these two. Here I study how members of bystander groups view violent actions of one group against the other, but also how disadvantaged group members view violent action against a powerful outgroup.

Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes the results of my research, looks at some of its limitations and implications, and points out directions for future research.

It is worth noting that both empirical chapters are based on multiple-study articles that were submitted to scientific journals. The introductions and some discussion points may show some overlap, but this is done to ensure that they can be read independently of each other. Given that this research was conducted in collaboration with others, I refer to the work as collective rather than personal (e.g. I use the pronoun “we” rather than “I”).

## CHAPTER 2: Testing an extended dual-pathway model of solidarity-based collective action by third parties[1]

The international anti-apartheid movement is one of the most striking examples of the influence that collective action by bystander groups can have on the course of intergroup conflicts and struggles for social change. The processes implicated in collective action taken by bystander groups in solidarity with disadvantaged groups have, however, received limited attention in social psychology, despite the high contemporary relevance of such action (see Tarrow, 2005, for examples). Collective action researchers have traditionally concentrated their efforts on explaining what drives disadvantaged group members to fight an advantaged outgroup (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a review). Recent years, however, have witnessed increased interest in the antecedents of collective action by *advantaged* group members in solidarity with disadvantaged group members (e.g. Leach et al., 2002; see van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). In parallel, the field has begun to recognize the need to examine *bystander* groups in intergroup conflicts (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and to theorize (e.g. Subašic et al., 2008) and investigate what motivates them to take action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups. Nevertheless, empirical data on this topic are still scarce. To help address this gap, the present research examines emotional and efficacy-related predictors of collective action by bystander group members in solidarity with a disadvantaged group, which we refer to as *solidarity-based collective action*. In the following sections, we first give an overview of the role of emotions and efficacy in collective action, after which we detail the hypotheses of the present research.

[1] This chapter is based on Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung (under review).

## Predictors of Collective Action

### Perceived Injustice and Group-Based Anger

The perceived injustice or illegitimacy of the social order is viewed as an important antecedent of collective action in various social psychological theories such as Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT; e.g. Runciman, 1966; see Walker & Smith, 2002, for a review). Research also shows that emotional responses to perceived injustice, such as anger, are more proximal predictors of collective action than appraisals of injustice (see Walker & Smith, 2002; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for reviews). This is consistent with Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET, Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993), which, based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989), proposes that perceiving one's group as being unjustly treated generates group-based anger, leading to collective action tendencies aimed at confronting the offending outgroup. In line with IET, various studies have shown that anger mediates the relation between perceived injustice and action tendencies aimed at confronting those responsible for it (van Zomeren et al., 2004), particularly nonviolent collective action tendencies (Tausch et al., 2011).

### Efficacy

Another line of research views participation in collective action as the result of people believing in the efficacy of collective action at achieving the desired social change (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Efficacy has been operationalised in various ways in the collective action literature (see Hornsey et al., 2006, for a review). *Group efficacy*, or the belief that one's

group is capable of collectively solving a problem facing the group, has received increasing attention in recent years (e.g. Mummendey et al., 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2004). A recent meta-analysis showed that efficacy, operationalised as group efficacy or as the efficacy of collective action at resolving perceived grievances, is a positive and unique predictor of collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; but also see Tausch et al., 2011).

### Emotion and Efficacy as Dual Pathways to Collective Action

Van Zomeren et al. (2004) have attempted to integrate these two approaches, proposing that emotion and efficacy considerations form two separate but complementary pathways to collective action. Their model has received empirical support in a number of contexts (van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008; Tausch et al., 2011). Sweetman et al. (2011) demonstrated that the model can explain collective action tendencies among both members of disadvantaged groups as well as advantaged groups taking action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups.

## The Present Research

The present work uses the dual pathway model of collective action to explain solidarity-based collective action with disadvantaged groups struggling against another party, such as a government or a social system perceived as responsible for their disadvantage. We extend this model in two ways. First, we examine two potentially influential emotional predictors of intergroup helping, sympathy and empathy, alongside anger (which is more appropriately termed moral outrage in this context as we explain later). Recent theorizing on intergroup helping suggests that sympathy and

empathy should play different roles in promoting solidarity-based collective action (Thomas et al., 2009), but empirical data on their respective unique contributions is still lacking. Second, we build on recent work on the role of efficacy beliefs (Hornsey et al., 2006), which has highlighted the importance of examining the perceived efficacy of collective action at achieving a number of goals, such as building a movement and influencing third parties. We distinguish between two types of efficacy, namely political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy, and we examine their separate contributions to the prediction of collective action. We discuss each of these extensions in turn.

**Moral Outrage, Sympathy and Empathy as Predictors of Collective Action**

A key objective of our work is to provide an initial test of the unique predictive power of three different prosocial emotions (moral outrage, sympathy and empathy) in the context of solidarity-based collective action. Our predictions are guided by Thomas et al.'s (2009) discussion of the potential of these emotions for motivating advantaged groups to help disadvantaged groups. They distinguish two types of prosocial emotions: those that motivate actions aimed at producing social cohesion with the disadvantaged group but that ultimately preserve the status quo (Wright & Lubensky, 2008), such as top-down paternalistic assistance (Nadler & Halabi, 2006), and emotions that motivate actions aimed at addressing the source of the disadvantage to achieve genuine social change, such as collective action. Thomas et al. identify the emotions which are most likely to motivate social change strategies using criteria derived from the social

identity model of intergroup helping proposed by Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins and Levine (2006). Reicher et al. propose that bystanders are more motivated to help a disadvantaged group when they view them as part of a common ingroup rather than a separate outgroup (the category inclusion criterion), when helping them is seen as a core aspect of ingroup identity, and when they perceive that their group interests will be harmed if they do not intervene to help. Accordingly, Thomas et al. propose that, to motivate action aimed at achieving social change, it is important to induce emotions in the helper group which satisfy these three criteria. For example, the helper group must experience emotions which can be shared with the helped group in order to satisfy the category inclusion criterion.

The anger experienced by a group regarding an unjust disadvantage suffered by an outgroup, but blamed on a third party such as a government or a perceived system of inequality, is referred to as moral outrage (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas et al., 2009). We shall henceforth use this term rather than group-based anger. Thomas et al. (2009) view moral outrage as particularly likely to motivate collective action because it satisfies all three criteria of intergroup helping (e.g. it unites the advantaged and disadvantaged groups against the offending outgroup). Consistent with this view, moral outrage has been found to be a positive predictor of intentions to engage in political action on behalf of disadvantaged groups (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano and Huo, 2007; Thomas, 2005; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Sweetman et al., 2011). Hence, we expect moral outrage in response to unjust governmental policies toward

an outgroup to positively predict solidarity-based collective action (Hypothesis 1).

Distinguishing between sympathy and empathy is difficult as the two are often used interchangeably (see Thomas et al., 2009 for a review), despite clear conceptual and empirical differences between them (e.g. Wispé, 1986; Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Note that we focus here on situational sympathy and empathy rather than their dispositional counterparts. It is generally agreed that empathy is a multidimensional construct which has both cognitive and affective components (see Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011; Davis, 2004, for reviews). The present research focuses on the affective component of empathy, that is, an emotional response to a disadvantaged group's situation which entails experiencing and sharing the *same* emotions the disadvantaged group is perceived to feel (see Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000). We refer to sympathy, on the other hand, as an emotional response to the disadvantaged group's suffering which does not involve reproducing their emotions but is rather a response of compassion and concern for them (Eisenberg, 2000; Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Sympathy thus involves feeling sorry for the disadvantaged group. While sympathy is a discrete emotion, empathy can involve experiencing various emotions (Lazarus, 1991). Our distinction of sympathy and empathy at the group level mirrors that made by Gruen and Mendelsohn (1986) at the interpersonal level and by Thomas et al. (2009) at the group level.

Empirical evidence supports the distinction between sympathy and empathy. For example, Gruen and Mendelsohn (1986) showed that at the

interpersonal level, sympathy and empathy are predicted by different processes. At the group level, Finlay and Stephan (2000) found sympathy and empathy to have different effects. They found that White American participants evaluated Whites and African Americans similarly in experimental conditions where they read about discrimination against African Americans or received instructions to take the perspective of victims of discrimination, whereas they evaluated the two groups differently in the control conditions. Importantly, this effect was mediated by the experience of *parallel* emotions with the victims (feelings of empathy) rather than *reactive* emotions such as sympathy (see Davis, 2004 for a similar distinction). The authors thus stressed the importance of studying the distinct effects of sympathy and empathy in intergroup contexts.

To our knowledge, no research in the context of intergroup relations has simultaneously explored the unique effects of sympathy and empathy on intergroup helping. Research on prosocial intergroup behaviour has focused on sympathy (e.g. Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas, 2005). When empathy has been examined (e.g. Pagano & Huo, 2007), it was not distinguished from sympathy, and its unique effect could thus not be assessed.

One important characteristic of sympathy is that it is other-focused. That is, sympathy toward a disadvantaged group is thought to arise among advantaged group members when they perceive a group to be illegitimately disadvantaged and when they focus their attention on the plight of the disadvantaged rather than their own group's advantage (Leach et al., 2002; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004). Experimental

evidence supports this view (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). However, precisely because sympathy is an emotion that is other-focused and that is felt by the advantaged (or bystander) group *for* the disadvantaged, Thomas et al. (2009) argue that it maintains group boundaries and thus violates the category inclusion criterion for intergroup helping (Reicher et al., 2006). Accordingly, Thomas et al. (2009) deduce that while sympathy may motivate helping behaviour toward the disadvantaged group, the type of helping it generates may be more likely to maintain the status quo and less likely to be aimed at achieving social change. Similarly, Pagano and Huo (2007) have argued that sympathy promotes a desire to relieve the suffering of victims, and thus should be likely to motivate humanitarian assistance to a disadvantaged group, rather than prompt action against their offenders (a social change strategy).

Contrary to sympathy, however, Thomas et al. (2009) argue that empathy, by definition, involves a feeling of interchangeability with the disadvantaged group, and a potential recategorization into a common superordinate group (Turner et al., 1987; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). As such, empathy fits the category inclusion criterion of intergroup helping (Reicher et al., 2006), and should be more likely to promote genuine social change attempts (Morrison, 1999), such as collective action.

Evidence regarding the role of sympathy in prompting solidarity-based collective action is mixed. Sympathy has been shown to positively predict such action in some studies (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005) but not in others (de Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels, 2002; Schmitt, Behner,

Montada, Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000). Thomas (2005) found sympathy to be a positive but weaker predictor of volunteerism intentions in the context of international development, compared to other predictors such as guilt. In an American sample, Pagano and Huo (2007) found that sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people positively predicted support for humanitarian assistance, and for helping Iraqis reform their political system to prevent future tyranny (a social change strategy), but it was a weaker predictor of support for preventative action compared to other emotions. Importantly, however, this research did not distinguish sympathy from feelings of empathy, making it impossible to disentangle their unique contributions.

The present research thus aims to test the unique contributions of sympathy and empathy to the prediction of solidarity-based collective action. Given the inconsistent evidence regarding the role of sympathy, we refrain from making a prediction as to its contribution to solidarity-based action. In line with Thomas et al.'s (2009) argument, however, we propose that empathy should positively and uniquely predict collective action tendencies (Hypothesis 2), and that it should be a stronger predictor of collective action than sympathy (Hypothesis 3).

Further, based on appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda et al., 1989) and research on moral outrage (e.g. Leach et al., 2002) and sympathy (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2002), we expect the perceived injustice of governmental policies toward the disadvantaged group to positively predict both moral outrage (Hypothesis 4) and sympathy

(Hypothesis 5), and thereby to have a positive indirect effect on collective action tendencies.

**Political Efficacy and Identity Consolidation Efficacy as Predictors of Collective Action**

Research on the efficacy pathway in the dual pathway model of collective action (Sweetman et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008) has so far only examined perceived group efficacy, which is the general efficacy of the group at achieving social change. In line with recent research (Hornsey et al., 2006), we argue that it is important to take into account the efficacy of collective action at achieving different goals from that of altering the social order. Hornsey et al. (2006) have recently critiqued existing research on efficacy for focusing exclusively on the potential of collective action to alter the status quo by influencing outgroups responsible for perceived grievances, which we term political efficacy. The authors contended that various other audiences could be potential targets of collective action. Accordingly, they proposed three important criteria by which to judge the efficacy of collective action: (1) The efficacy to influence third parties like the general public and to recruit them to the group's cause (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Subašic et al., 2008); (2) The efficacy to build an oppositional movement, that is, strengthen solidarity within the group of collective actors, in the hope of exerting change in the long-run (Kinder, 1998; see also Klandermans, 1984); (3) The efficacy of collective action to express an individual's values (e.g. Tice, 1992). Hornsey et al. tested their ideas by surveying protesters in an anti-globalisation rally in

Australia. Importantly, the perceived political efficacy of the rally did not predict intentions to participate in similar future protests, while the three other types of efficacy did, although this was moderated by membership in an activist organisation.

Building on this work, we propose that the perceived efficacy of collective action can be usefully differentiated into two types. The first is *identity consolidation efficacy*, defined as the efficacy of collective action at expressing, asserting and strengthening the identity of a social movement, and the second is *political efficacy*, which is the efficacy of collective action at achieving social change (the classical definition of collective action efficacy). This distinction is derived from recent work by Klein, Spears and Reicher (2007), who introduced the notion of social identity performance, defined as the public expression of norms conventionally associated with a given social group's identity. Klein et al. propose that all instances of social identity performance, such as collective action, serve to fulfil an identity consolidation function or an identity mobilization function, or both. The identity consolidation function is about affirming, confirming or strengthening the identity of a group against that of other groups. On the other hand, the identity mobilisation function is about persuading ingroup or outgroup audiences to adopt specific behaviours relating to the improvement of a group's position in the social power hierarchy. Based on this theoretical framework, we derive two corresponding types of collective action efficacy:

identity consolidation efficacy, and political efficacy, which maps roughly onto identity mobilization[2].

Importantly, the typology we propose is entirely consistent with Hornsey et al. (2006). In our view, influencing public opinion, building a movement and expressing (collective) values, which form the basis of Hornsey et al.'s proposed three types of efficacy, essentially all reflect identity consolidation goals in Klein et al.'s terms. Accordingly, we operationalise identity consolidation efficacy as the efficacy of collective action at influencing public opinion, building a mass movement and expressing what the movement stands for, but also, in the context of solidarity-based action, showing support for the disadvantaged party.

Most importantly, we propose that identity consolidation efficacy can motivate collective action through two routes, an indirect one via political efficacy, and a direct one. The indirect route is based on the idea that consolidating the identity of a movement can be a means through which a movement eventually acquires the power to achieve social change. Klein et al. (2007) indeed stress that identity consolidation creates the basis for effective social action, group coordination, group organisation and group power (e.g. Haslam, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005; Turner,

[2] Note that we do not term political efficacy "identity mobilization efficacy" for two reasons, first because political efficacy is an already-established concept and second, because Klein et al. propose that identity mobilization can be targeted at the outgroup responsible for perceived grievances (e.g. to demobilize them) but it can also target the ingroup (e.g. mobilizing them for political action). Given that political efficacy refers to attempts at demobilizing outgroups, rather than mobilizing ingroups, we prefer to avoid the potentially broader term of identity mobilization efficacy. One could argue that attempting to influence third parties or mobilize ingroup members for collective action is the realm of identity mobilization rather than identity consolidation. However, increasing support for what the group stands for by influencing public opinion is a way to strengthen a movement's identity. As such, we believe it is more accurately placed under identity consolidation efficacy rather than political efficacy.

2005). Accordingly, identity consolidation efficacy should positively and indirectly predict collective action tendencies via political efficacy (Hypothesis 6).

In addition, identity consolidation may be a goal in is own right. Hornsey et al. (2006) argue that individuals may participate in collective action in order to express their opinion on a particular issue without necessarily expecting to alter the social order (see Hornsey, Majkut, Terry, & McKimmie, 2003; see also van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). This argument is based on the idea that attitudes operate as markers of group membership and can fulfil an expressive function (e.g., Katz, 1960). The expression of voice alone may even have a cathartic function in the context of a perceived injustice (Folger, 1977; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988) and serve to affirm one's identity as a movement supporter (see Simon, Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008). Following this rationale, we also expect identity consolidation efficacy to predict collective action tendencies positively and directly (Hypothesis 7), and thus independently of political efficacy.

**Overview of Studies**

We tested our hypotheses in three field surveys. In Study 1 we examined intentions to attend future protests for the Palestinian cause among international protesters in Britain demonstrating for justice in Palestine. We tested a model where moral outrage and sympathy positively predict collective action tendencies and are, in turn, positively predicted by perceived injustice. Perceived injustice was also a direct predictor of collective action tendencies in our model. In the efficacy pathway, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicts collective action tendencies both

indirectly via political efficacy as well as directly. Studies 2 and 3 surveyed different samples of Hong Kong citizens on their intentions to attend the annual June 4th vigil commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and extended Study 1 by adding empathy to the emotion-based pathway.

## Study 1

We first tested our hypotheses among a sample of protesters recruited at the National Demonstration for Palestine in London, Britain, in May 2008, which is organised annually by various British activist groups. Some of the main aims of the demonstration were to call for an end to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli siege on Gaza which had started the year before. The demonstration also opposed Britain's provision of military, economic and political support to Israel (Palestine: the Case for Justice, 2007). Our outcome variable was participants' intentions to attend future protests for justice in Palestine.

### Method

**Participants.** A team of five recruiters approached protesters during the demonstration. A total of 242 protesters filled out the survey. Fifteen participants had substantial amounts of missing data (>20%) and were therefore deleted, following recommendations by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007). The final sample consisted of 227 participants (114 women, 111 men, 2 missing; age: $M$ = 41.00 years; $SD$ = 16.61) and was quite diverse. Most participants ($N$ = 162) were British. The rest were international and included nine non-Palestinian Arabs and six Palestinians. Most participants ($N$ = 105) indicated that they had no religion, while the rest held various religious denominations, including 47 Muslims, 48 Christians, and 4 Jews.

**Measures.** Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using a six-point verbal rating scale with the labels: "not at all" (coded as 1), "slightly" (2), "somewhat" (3), "moderately" (4), "very much" (5) and "extremely" (6).

***Perceived injustice.*** Participants separately evaluated how "unjust" they thought Israel and Britain's approaches to the Palestinian issue were (Pearson's $r = .72$).

***Moral outrage.*** Participants were asked to indicate separately the extent to which they felt "angry" when thinking of Israel and Britain's approaches to the Palestinian issue in general (Pearson's $r = .57$).

***Sympathy.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "sympathy" when thinking of the Palestinians' suffering.

***Efficacy.*** Efficacy beliefs were measured using 10 items adapted from Hornsey et al. (2006). Given that the distinction between political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy had not been made before, we performed an exploratory principal factor analysis (EFA) using oblique rotation on all efficacy items (KMO = .89; Bartlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2$ (36) = 1166.92, $p < .001$; Determinant =.005). This yielded two factors with Eigen values greater than 1, which together accounted for 62.45% of the variance.

Items assessing perceptions of the demonstration's political efficacy (how effective the demonstration would be at helping to achieve justice in Palestine, helping to end the siege on Gaza, and helping to change the British as well as the Israeli governments' respective approaches to the Palestinian issue) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .62), while

items assessing identity consolidation efficacy (how effective the demonstration would be at increasing support in British public opinion for justice in Palestine, strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of justice in Palestine, helping to build a mass movement in Britain for justice in Palestine, showing resistance to the injustices committed against Palestinians and showing the Palestinians support amongst British people for their cause) loaded on the second factor (loadings > -.69). One item (the perceived efficacy of the rally in increasing support in British public opinion for justice in Palestine) cross-loaded on both factors, and was thus dropped[3]. The other items were then averaged to yield composites of the demonstration's perceived identity consolidation ($\alpha$ = .88) and political ($\alpha$ = .85) efficacies.

***Collective action tendencies.*** Participants indicated how many of the next ten protests scheduled for the support of justice in Palestine they would be willing to attend, assuming these were accessible to them. They answered using an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10.

**Results and Discussion**

**Missing value analysis and data screening.** Variables with missing values had less than 10% missing data points. Following Tabachnick and Fidell's (2007) recommendations, we imputed the missing values using the expectation maximization method (EM). None of the imputed values were out of range.

[3] This cross-loading may suggest that the British public was viewed as a third party to be recruited to the cause, but also partly categorized along with the British and Israeli governments, that is, as a group that may not be a neutral third party to the Israeli Palestinian conflict but as an accomplice.

Data screening revealed that sympathy was severely negatively skewed. To reduce the impact of non-normality on the analysis, we thus reflected and reversed this variable, which improved its distribution. Details of all variables of interest and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 1.

**Analytic strategy.** To examine our model, we conducted a path analysis with AMOS (version 7) using the raw data as input and maximum-likelihood estimation. The overall fit of our model was assessed using the chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) for which we report an estimate and a 90% confidence interval, and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). General guidelines for an adequate model fit include a non-significant chi-square test (but significant values are common and acceptable in large samples), a $\chi^2/df$ ratio < 3, a CFI ≥ .95, a RMSEA ≤ .06-.08 (*p*-close > .05-.10), and a SRMR ≤ .08 (see Hu & Bentler, 1999). To assess the significance of indirect effects, we followed the bootstrapping procedure and estimated indirect effects using bias-corrected (BC) 95% confidence intervals, based on 5000 bootstrap samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We used the same analytic strategy in all studies.

**Path analysis.** We specified a model where, in the emotional pathway, perceived injustice positively predicts collective action tendencies indirectly via moral outrage and sympathy, as well as directly, as perceived injustice may influence collective action through emotions that are beyond the focus of the present research.

Table 1
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 1)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Injustice | 1-6 | 5.38 | 1.00 | - | .20** | .25*** | .03 | -.05 | .23** |
| 2. Moral Outrage | 1-6 | 5.24 | .91 | | - | .40*** | .21** | .07 | .35*** |
| 3. Sympathy[a] | 1-6 | 5.71 | .63 | | | - | .15* | -.001 | .35*** |
| 4. Identity Consolidation Efficacy | 1-6 | 4.14 | .99 | | | | - | .53*** | .33*** |
| 5. Political Efficacy | 1-6 | 2.36 | .95 | | | | | - | .26*** |
| 6. Collective Action Tendencies | 0-10 | 6.11 | 3.11 | | | | | | - |

[a] Correlations are based on the transformed variable
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

For the efficacy pathway, we expected identity consolidation efficacy to positively predict collective action tendencies indirectly via political efficacy, as well as directly. We allowed moral outrage and sympathy to covary in line with previous research (Iyer & Ryan, 2009). We did not allow political efficacy to covary with perceived injustice, moral outrage or sympathy, because the efficacy pathway and the emotion-based pathway to collective action have been conceptualised as independent in the dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Meta-analytic evidence in line with the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) also indicates these two paths are independent. On the other hand, we allowed identity consolidation efficacy to covary with perceived injustice, moral outrage and sympathy. This is because identity-consolidation efficacy is a type of efficacy that is conceptually based in identity processes, and thus likely to be linked with antecedents of collective action such as (politicized) identification (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see also McGarty et al., 2009) or perceived social support (van Zomeren et al., 2004). These fall outside the scope of the present research but have been shown to influence or covary with perceived injustice and resulting emotions like anger (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2009).

Our model, displayed in Figure 2, showed excellent fit, $\chi^2$ (3) = 2.77, $p$ = .43, $\chi^2$/df = .92, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [.00; 0.11], $p$-close = .64, SRMR =.03. As predicted, perceived injustice positively predicted both moral outrage, $\beta$ = .20, $p$ = .002, and sympathy, $\beta$ = .25, $p$< .001. In turn, moral outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .19,

$p$ =.002, as did sympathy, $\beta$ = .21, $p$ <.001. Bootstrapping showed, as expected, that perceived injustice had a significant positive indirect effect on collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy), point estimate = .09 [.04; .17]. Perceived injustice was also positively and directly predictive of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .14, $p$ = .02.

Further, as hypothesized, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted political efficacy, $\beta$ = .52, $p$ < .001, which, in turn, positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .17, $p$ = .01. A mediation test showed that identity consolidation efficacy had a significant indirect effect on collective action tendencies via political efficacy, point estimate = .09 [.02; .16]. As expected, identity consolidation efficacy was also positively and directly predictive of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .16, $p$ = .02.

To summarize, Study 1 provided initial support for our hypotheses. Replicating previous research (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005), both moral outrage and sympathy positively predicted collective action tendencies and were, in turn, positively predicted by perceived injustice. Perceived injustice had a positive indirect effect on collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy), as well as a direct effect. Importantly, this study also provided preliminary evidence that it is possible to distinguish between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, and that this distinction has explanatory value. Identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted collective action tendencies, both indirectly via political efficacy but also directly, as we expected. Hence, perceiving the demonstration as an opportunity to express and strengthen the identity of the protest movement was associated with greater willingness to attend




*Figure 2.* Results of path analysis for Study 1. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

future protests for the same cause, partly because this meant that the demonstration was then seen as an opportunity to help redress the perceived injustice, but also, independently of that reason. That is, identity consolidation also had value in and of itself.

## Study 2

This study examined our hypotheses in a different political context, and extended the focus of our enquiry by examining the contribution of empathy to the prediction of collective action tendencies. We surveyed a sample of pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong on their willingness to attend the June 4th vigil, an annual local tribute to commemorate the victims of the Tiananmen massacre (also known as the June 4th event). This refers to the military crackdown by Chinese authorities on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, on June 4th 1989, where a number of protesters were killed, injured or arrested (Human Rights Watch News, Tiananmen's legacy, 2009). Unlike in Hong Kong, all public discussion of June 1989 in mainland China has been silenced since the massacre, and those who participated in the protests or who challenge the government's version of the events continue to be persecuted (Human Rights Watch News, Tiananmen's legacy, 2009). Importantly, commemorations of the June 4th event are only allowed in Macau and Hong Kong, as both are special administrative regions that enjoy more democratic freedom than mainland China.

We recruited our participants during an annual demonstration to commemorate the June 4th event, which takes place on May 31st and is typically attended by a few thousand highly politicized pro-democracy

activists. Both the vigil and the demonstration are organised by a large pro-democracy advocacy group, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (commonly known as "the Alliance").

We collected our data in 2009 which marked the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests. The measures we used in our study were thus informed by this context. The main slogans of the commemorations were: "remember June 4th, inherit the goals of those who came before us, pass the torch on and relay the message of democracy to those who come after us" ("Upcoming activities 2009", n.d.). Another major focus of commemoration activities that year centred around supporting the family members of the victims of the June 4th event, the Tiananmen Mothers (Human Rights in China, Solidarity with the Tiananmen Mothers, n.d.), who continue to be victimised by the Chinese government (Human Rights Watch News, Tiananmen's legacy, 2009).

**Method**

**Procedure.** The questionnaire was delivered in Chinese (translated from English by a bilingual speaker). A team of four recruiters approached protesters during the rally.

**Participants.** A total of 132 protesters (all Hong Kong residents) participated in the study. Three participants had substantial amounts of missing data (> 35%) so these cases were deleted. The final sample consisted of 129 participants (47 women, 82 men; age: *M* = 37.96 years; *SD* =15.36).

**Measures.**

***Perceived injustice.*** Participants indicated on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 7 = *strongly agree*) whether they thought the Chinese government's current position on the June 4th event was "illegitimate", and "unjust" (Pearson's $r$ = .70).

All emotion items were measured using a seven-point scale (1 = *not strongly at all*; 7 = *very strongly*).

***Moral outrage.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "angry" and "irritated" when thinking about the stance of the Chinese government on the June 4th event (Pearson's $r$ = .46).

***Sympathy.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "sympathetic" when thinking about those affected by the June 4th event.

***Empathy.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "empathic" when thinking about those affected by the June 4th event.

***Efficacy.*** Efficacy beliefs were measured using nine items adapted from Hornsey et al. (2006). All items were measured using a seven-point scale (1 = *not effective at all*; 7 = *extremely effective*). Because we used a somewhat different set of items from the one used in Study 1, and the items were delivered in a different language, we again performed an EFA to explore the structure of our measure, using oblique rotation on all efficacy items (KMO = .85; Bartlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2$ (36) = 618.69, $p$ < .001; Determinant = .007). This analysis yielded two factors with Eigen values greater than 1, which together accounted for 57.73% of the variance.

Items assessing the vigil's political efficacy (how effective the June 4th vigil would be at helping to change the Chinese government's stance on the June 4th event, helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese authorities on the Tiananmen Mothers, and helping to advance democracy in China) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .68), while items assessing the vigil's identity consolidation efficacy (how effective the June 4th vigil would be at showing opposition to the Chinese government's stance on the June 4th event, voicing public discontent with the government's stance, showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for their cause, increasing public opinion support for the "reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th" campaign, strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of that campaign, and helping to build a mass movement in support of that campaign) loaded on another factor (loadings > .58). The items were averaged to yield composites of the vigil's perceived identity consolidation ($\alpha$ = .88) and political ($\alpha$ = .79) efficacies.

***Collective action tendencies.*** Participants indicated how willing they would be to join the annual June 4th Candlelight vigil (in future years) in order to support the "reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th" campaign. They answered using a seven-point scale (1 = *very unwilling*; 7 = *very willing*).

**Results and Discussion**

**Missing value analysis and data screening.** Variables with missing values had less than 5% missing data points. We imputed the missing values using the EM method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Imputed

values which were out of range on the scales we used were adjusted to the nearest acceptable score point.

Data screening revealed that one participant was a severe outlier on the dependent variable. This participant was therefore excluded from our analyses and the final sample thus consisted of 128 participants. Details of all variables of interest and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 2.

**Path analysis.** The hypothesized model was as for Study 1, except that we included empathy as an additional predictor of collective action tendencies. This study therefore allowed us to test the hypothesis that empathy would positively predict collective action tendencies, and that it would be a stronger predictor of collective action than sympathy. We allowed empathy to covary with both sympathy and moral outrage, as emotional reactions to perceived injustice would be expected to correlate. Additionally, we allowed empathy to covary with identity consolidation efficacy, because they are likely to be linked to common antecedents of collective action such as (politicized) identification, which was, however, beyond the scope of the present research. Empathy is indeed thought to involve identification processes, namely a recategorization of the helper group with the victim group under a common superordinate category, such as an opinion-based group (Thomas et al., 2009). In the absence of previous theorizing on the causal link between perceived injustice and empathy, we treated these variables as covariates, as it is possible to imagine that perceived injustice would lead to empathy, but also that the extent to which one empathizes with a group of people would lead to a perception of greater injustice against them.

Table 2
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 2)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Injustice | 1-7 | 6.57 | .65 | - | .33*** | .26** | .13 | .42*** | .18* | .36*** |
| 2. Moral outrage | 1-7 | 5.89 | 1.23 | | - | .59*** | .35*** | .42*** | .25** | .29** |
| 3. Sympathy | 1-7 | 6.47 | .85 | | | - | .50*** | .46*** | .22* | .31*** |
| 4. Empathy | 1-7 | 5.88 | 1.18 | | | | - | .27** | .24** | .30** |
| 5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy | 1-7 | 6.10 | .80 | | | | | - | .43*** | .36*** |
| 6. Political Efficacy | 1-7 | 4.97 | 1.23 | | | | | | - | .21* |
| 7. Collective Action Tendencies | 1-7 | 6.28 | 1.04 | | | | | | | - |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Our model, displayed in Figure 3, showed excellent fit, $\chi^2$ (4) = 3.52, $p$ = .47, $\chi^2$/df = .88, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [.00; 0.13], $p$-close = .62, SRMR = .03. As expected, perceived injustice positively predicted both moral outrage, $\beta$ = .40, $p$ < .001, and sympathy, $\beta$ = .26, $p$ < .01. In turn, moral outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .20, $p$ = .04. Sympathy did not, however, emerge as a significant predictor, $\beta$ = .03, $p$ = .74, *ns*. Bootstrapping showed that the indirect effect of perceived injustice on collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy) was significant, point estimate = .09 [.01; .21]. Perceived injustice, however, was also positively and directly predictive of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .18, $p$ = .003. Importantly, and as expected, empathy positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .23, $p$ = .007.

To check systematically whether empathy was a stronger predictor of collective action tendencies than sympathy, we specified a model where the paths from empathy and sympathy to collective action tendencies were constrained to be equal, and compared it to an unconstrained model. The chi-square difference test (Steiger, Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) revealed that the models were not significantly different, $\Delta \chi^2$ (1) = .96, *ns*, thus providing no evidence that empathy is a better predictor of collective action tendencies than sympathy.

As expected, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted political efficacy, $\beta$ = .44, $p$ < .001. Contrary to expectations, however, political efficacy did not predict collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = -.03, $p$ = .74, *ns*, and the indirect effect of identity consolidation efficacy on collective action tendencies via political efficacy was not significant,




*Figure 3*. Results of path analysis for Study 2. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, $^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

point estimate = -.01 [-.11; .05]. However, in line with our predictions, identity consolidation efficacy was positively predictive of collective action tendencies, $\beta = .19$, $p = .05$.

In summary, Study 2 provided mixed support for our hypotheses. With regard to the emotion-based pathway, only moral outrage and empathy emerged as significant positive predictors, whereas sympathy, unlike in Study 1, did not. This is consistent with Thomas et al.'s (2009) argument that sympathy may not be a reliable predictor of intergroup helping aimed at social change. The pattern of results is also in line with the hypothesis derived from Thomas et al. (2009), stating that empathy is a better predictor of collective action tendencies than sympathy. As expected, perceived injustice positively predicted collective action tendencies both directly as well as indirectly (via moral outrage and sympathy together).

As for the efficacy pathway, Study 2 suggested again that it is useful to distinguish between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, this time in a different political context. Interestingly, however, and contrary to our expectations, identity consolidation efficacy did not have an indirect effect on collective action tendencies via political efficacy, mainly because political efficacy did not predict collective action tendencies. This may be due to high levels of politicized identification among our participants, as previous research (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008) indicates that efficacy concerns are less crucial for motivating collective action among highly politicized participants. Importantly, however, Study 2 demonstrated again the value of examining identity consolidation efficacy, because, in line with our hypothesis, identity consolidation efficacy positively and

directly predicted collective action tendencies. Hence, in deciding whether or not to attend the June 4th vigil in the future, our sample of Hong Kong pro-democracy activists seemed to be focusing on the identity consolidation efficacy of the vigil, rather than its political efficacy.

So far, both Studies 1 and 2 have examined our model among activists in different contexts. In Study 3, we tested our hypotheses in a community sample in Hong Kong.

## Study 3

Study 3 was conducted in parallel with Study 2 and also examined predictors of tendencies to attend the June 4th vigil, but this time in a community sample of Hong Kong residents, namely internet users. To get a measure of collective action that is more proximal to actual participation, we examined tendencies to attend the upcoming June 4th vigil that year rather than in future years. Conducting our study online rather than during a protest allowed us to include a larger number of items for our measures.

### Method

**Procedure.** The study was administered as an online survey in Chinese (translated from English by a bilingual speaker) in the days preceding the June 4th vigil in 2009. We recruited participants through an advertisement via Facebook which targeted adult Hong Kong users. Respondents were given the opportunity to enter into a prize draw at the end of the survey.

**Participants.** A total of 390 respondents completed the survey (234 women, 154 men, 2 missing; age: $M$ = 29.03 years; $SD$ = 9.53).

**Measures.**

Participants first read details of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protesters. They then read that the Chinese government has not apologized for the killings, refuses to carry out a public inquiry, and interferes with the public mourning of the victims. After providing background information, they completed measures of our constructs of interest and were then debriefed.

***Perceived injustice.*** We measured perceived injustice with the same two items used in Study 2, along with two additional reverse-coded items: participants indicated on a seven-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 7 = *strongly agree*) whether they thought the Chinese government's current position on the June 4$^{th}$ event was "fair", and "moral" ($\alpha$ = .91).

All emotion items were measured using a seven-point scale (1 = *not strongly at all*; 7 = *very strongly*).

***Moral outrage.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "angry", "irritated" and "furious" when thinking about the stance of the Chinese government on the June 4$^{th}$ event. These items were combined into a composite score ($\alpha$ = .92).

***Sympathy.*** Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt "sympathetic" and "compassionate" when thinking about those affected by the June 4$^{th}$ event (Pearson's $r$ = .84).

***Empathy.*** This was measured as in Study 2.

***Efficacy.*** Efficacy was measured using 14 items adapted from Hornsey et al. (2006). All items were measured using a seven-point scale (1= *not effective at all*; 7 = *extremely effective*). Because we used a larger set

of items than in Study 2, we again performed an EFA with oblique rotation to explore the structure of our measure (KMO = .94; Bartlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2$ (105) = 8651.17, $p < .001$; Determinant = .012). This analysis yielded two factors with Eigen values greater than 1, which together accounted for 78.71% of the variance. Items assessing the vigil's political efficacy (same three items used in Study 2 in addition to how effective participants thought the June 4th vigil would be at helping to bring justice to the Tiananmen victims) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .73), while items assessing the vigil's identity consolidation efficacy (same six items used in Study 2, in addition to four items asking participants how effective they thought the June 4th vigil would be at showing sympathy for the Tiananmen mothers, raising awareness about the June 4th event especially among younger generations, influencing other people to join the "reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th" campaign, helping to build a mass movement in support of that campaign, and uniting supporters of the campaign) loaded on another factor (loadings > .66). The items were averaged to yield composites of the vigil's perceived identity consolidation ($\alpha = .88$) and political ($\alpha = .79$) efficacies.

***Collective action tendencies.*** Participants indicated how likely or unlikely they were to take part in the upcoming June 4th Candlelight vigil that year. They answered using a seven-point scale (1 = *not likely at all*; 7 = *very likely*).

**Results and Discussion**

**Missing value analysis.** Variables with missing values had less than 5% missing data points. We imputed the missing values using the EM

method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and adjusted out of range values to the nearest acceptable score point. Details of all variables of interest and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 3.

**Path analysis.** We tested the same model hypothesized in Study 2. The model, displayed in Figure 4, showed adequate fit, $\chi^2$ (4) = 13.45, $p$ = .01, $\chi^2$/df = 3.362, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .08 [.04; 0.13], $p$-close = .13, SRMR =.03. As expected, perceived injustice positively predicted both moral outrage, $\beta$ = .64, $p$ < .001, and sympathy, $\beta$ = .46, $p$<.001. In turn, moral outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .29, $p$ = .04. Again, sympathy did not emerge as a significant predictor of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .07, $p$ = .18, *ns*. Bootstrapping showed that the indirect effect of perceived injustice on collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy) was significant, point estimate = .22 [.13; .32]. Perceived injustice was, however, also directly and positively predictive of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .18, $p$ < .001. Importantly, as expected, empathy emerged again as a significant predictor of collective action tendencies, $\beta$ = .14, $p$ = .008.

To check systematically whether empathy was a stronger predictor of collective action tendencies than sympathy, we specified a model where the paths from empathy and sympathy to collective action tendencies were constrained to be equal, and compared it to an unconstrained model (Steiger et al., 1985). The chi-square difference test revealed that the models were not significantly different, $\Delta \chi^2$ (1) = .26, *ns*, again providing no evidence to suggest that empathy is a better predictor of collective action tendencies than sympathy.

Table 3
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 3)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Injustice | 1-7 | 5.74 | 1.45 | - | .64*** | .46*** | .42*** | .55*** | .36*** | .61*** |
| 2. Moral Outrage | 1-7 | 5.44 | 1.89 | | - | .65*** | .64*** | .69*** | .45*** | .77*** |
| 3. Sympathy | 1-7 | 5.63 | 1.43 | | | - | .69*** | .57*** | .42*** | .77*** |
| 4. Empathy | 1-7 | 4.74 | 1.72 | | | | - | .50*** | .43*** | .59*** |
| 5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy | 1-7 | 4.89 | 1.43 | | | | | - | .66*** | .72*** |
| 6. Political Efficacy | 1-7 | 3.99 | 1.84 | | | | | | - | .54*** |
| 7. Collective Action Tendencies | 1-7 | 5.14 | 2.10 | | | | | | | - |

*** $p < .001$




*Figure 4*. Results of path analysis for Study 3. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, $^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

As expected, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted political efficacy, $\beta = .66$, $p < .001$, which, in turn, positively predicted collective action tendencies, $\beta = .12$, $p = .008$. The indirect effect of identity consolidation efficacy on collective action tendencies via political efficacy was significant, point estimate = .08 [.02; .15]. Identity consolidation also positively and directly predicted collective action tendencies, although this link only approached conventional levels of statistical significance, $\beta = .10$, $p = .09$.

To summarize, results pertaining to the emotion-based pathway replicated those in Study 2. Again, only moral outrage and empathy emerged as significant positive predictors, while sympathy did not. Perceived injustice positively predicted collective action tendencies both directly as well as indirectly via moral outrage and sympathy together. With regard to the efficacy pathway, Study 3 provided further empirical support for the distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, this time in a community sample. Importantly, identity consolidation efficacy did have a positive indirect effect on collective action tendencies via political efficacy, in line with our predictions. Further, identity consolidation efficacy also positively and directly predicted collective action tendencies, although the direct link only approached conventional levels of significance. Hence, perceiving the June 4$^{th}$ vigil as an opportunity to express and strengthen the identity of the protest movement was associated with greater willingness to attend the annual vigil in the future, partly because this meant that the vigil was also seen as an opportunity to achieve desired political ends. However there was also some

evidence, albeit weak, suggesting that identity consolidation may have value in and of itself.

## General Discussion

The aim of this research was to extend van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model of collective action in the context of solidarity-based collective action. The model posits group-based anger in response to perceived injustice and group efficacy as independent pathways to collective action. We extended this model by examining the predictive power of two other prosocial emotions alongside anger (moral outrage), namely sympathy and empathy. Further, we distinguished between two different types of efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, and explored their relations with collective action tendencies. We now evaluate our findings and discuss some limitations and the theoretical and practical implications of our results.

### The Role of Emotions in Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action

In line with previous research (Thomas et al., 2009), we expected moral outrage and empathy, but not necessarily sympathy, to positively predict solidarity-based collective action tendencies. We also expected empathy to be a stronger predictor than sympathy.

Across three studies, we found that moral outrage positively predicts tendencies to engage in solidarity-based collective action, among pro-Palestinian activists in Britain (Study 1), among pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong (Study 2) and among a sample of Hong Kong internet users (Study 3) in the context of joining the June 4$^{th}$ vigil in solidarity with the victims of the Tiananmen massacre. Our findings extend earlier research on

the dual pathway model by showing that, consistent with Thomas et al.'s (2009) argument, third parties to a conflict seem more motivated to participate in attempts to establish social justice the angrier they feel towards the perpetrators (see also Thomas & McGarty, 2009).

Findings regarding the role of sympathy were mixed. In Study 1, sympathy for Palestinians emerged as a positive predictor of protest tendencies in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, thus replicating some previous findings (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005). Conversely, in Studies 2 and 3 which examined tendencies to join the June 4th vigil, sympathy with the victims of the Tiananmen massacre did not emerge as a significant predictor of protest tendencies. The absence of a significant link between sympathy and solidarity-based action is consistent with other findings in the literature (e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt et al., 2000) and with arguments by Thomas et al. (2009) and Pagano and Huo (2007) that sympathy may not be a reliable predictor of intergroup helping aimed at social change. Instead, sympathy may be likely to motivate actions aimed at providing humanitarian assistance. Future research should thus investigate potential moderators of the link between sympathy and solidarity-based action.

Turning to empathy, as hypothesized, we found it to be a significant positive predictor of intentions to attend the June 4th vigil in both Studies 2 and 3. This finding provides initial support for Thomas et al.'s (2009) proposition that empathy towards a disadvantaged group can motivate intergroup helping that is aimed at achieving social change. Hence, the sensation that one feels similar emotions as one perceives the disadvantaged

group to feel seems to be important for developing a motivation to take action in solidarity with that group. Thomas et al. suggest this is because empathy potentially involves a process of recategorisation with the disadvantaged group under a common superordinate ingroup identity. Future research should aim to uncover the process through which empathy impacts on solidarity-based collective action.

We hypothesized that empathy should be a stronger predictor of solidarity-based collective action than sympathy, in line with Thomas et al.'s argument (2009) that unlike empathy, sympathy maintains boundaries between the disadvantaged group and the sympathizing group. Given that empathy was a significant positive predictor in Studies 2 and 3, while sympathy was not, there is some evidence to suggest that empathy is more influential in driving solidarity-based collective action. That being said, systematic tests comparing the two separate paths did not reveal significant differences in their strengths. Hence, we cannot firmly conclude that empathy is a stronger predictor than sympathy and further evidence is needed to establish that. Nevertheless, our results provide important initial evidence suggesting the distinction between sympathy and empathy should not be overlooked as the two did have unique effects.

As hypothesized, both moral outrage and sympathy were positively predicted by perceptions of injustice. Perceived injustice was also positively and indirectly linked to solidarity-based collective action tendencies via these emotions, in line with IET (Mackie et al., 2000). Further, as expected, perceived injustice was also positively and directly predictive of solidarity-based collective action tendencies, potentially suggesting that additional

emotions may mediate the influence of perceived injustice on solidarity-based collective action tendencies.

One might argue that an alternative model, where empathy has an indirect effect on solidarity-based collective action via sympathy, is also plausible. While empathy has often been conceptualised as an antecedent of emotions such as sympathy and compassion (e.g. Batson, 1991), researchers who adopt this model typically focus on the cognitive component of empathy (e.g. perspective-taking). Previous research that has considered both feelings of empathy and sympathy tends to conceptualise these as parallel processes (e.g. Davis, 2004; Finlay & Stephan, 2000). Nevertheless, assuming such a model is plausible, its fit would actually be equivalent to the fit of our model and it can therefore not be distinguished empirically in the present research. However, sympathy did not emerge as a significant predictor of collective action in Studies 2 and 3, which rules out the possibility that it mediates the link between empathy and solidarity-based collective action in the present studies.

**Political Efficacy and Identity Consolidation Efficacy as Predictors of Collective Action**

Another key objective of the present research was to develop the efficacy pathway in the dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004). We distinguished between two types of efficacy: political efficacy, defined as the perceived potential of collective action to achieve social change, which is the classical definition of efficacy in the literature (see Hornsey et al., 2006, for a review); and identity consolidation efficacy, defined as the potential of collective action to express, assert and

strengthen the identity of a social movement. Consistently across three studies we found that these different forms of efficacy are empirically distinguishable. We further hypothesized that identity consolidation efficacy would positively predict collective action tendencies indirectly via political efficacy, as well as directly.

Consistent with this, identity consolidation efficacy positively and indirectly predicted collective action tendencies via political efficacy, among pro-Palestinian protesters in Britain asked about their tendencies to attend future pro-Palestinian protests (Study 1), as well as among a sample of internet users in Hong Kong asked about their tendencies to attend the June 4th vigil commemorating the Tiananmen massacre (Study 3). These findings suggest that collective action has greater appeal the more effective it is perceived to be at consolidating the identity of a social movement, at least partially because this leads to greater perceived potential for achieving social change. The present research thus offers evidence in support of Klein et al.'s (2007) argument that identity consolidation can provide the means for identity mobilization and gaining influence as a social movement (see also Hornsey et al., 2006; Kinder, 1998; Turner, 2005). Importantly, these results show that identity-related considerations are not entirely separate from concerns about achieving social change.

However, we found no evidence of an indirect effect of identity consolidation efficacy on collective action via political efficacy in Study 2. Political efficacy did not actually predict collective action tendencies in this study. As mentioned previously, it is possible that our sample of pro-democracy protesters were highly identified with the pro-democracy

movement such that the political efficacy of the vigil was not the determining factor in their decision to participate. Pragmatic concerns and perceiving clear gains for one's self as an individual or as a group member are believed to matter more for collective action participation among low identifiers with a social group than among high identifiers (e.g. Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Consistent with this, in two studies, Van Zomeren, Spears and Leach (2008) found that among members of a disadvantaged group, group efficacy positively predicted collective action tendencies for those who were weakly identified with their group, but not for those who were high identifiers. In light of these findings, it is interesting to observe that in Study 2, which was conducted with Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrators, no relationship was found between political efficacy and collective action. In Study 3, however, which was conducted in the same context as Study 2 but with a community sample of Hong Kong internet users, we did find a positive relationship between political efficacy and collective action which could suggest that participants in this sample had lower levels of politicized identification than those in Study 2. Future research should therefore further examine the moderating role of politicized identification in our model.

Consistent with our hypothesis, we found a direct positive link between identity consolidation efficacy and solidarity-based action tendencies across our three studies, although this link was only marginally significant in Studies 2 and 3. Hence, there is some indication that tendencies to participate in collective action are positively associated with its potential to consolidate the identity of a movement, independently of its

potential to bring about social change. The pattern of findings provides some initial support for the idea that collective action as an instance of social identity performance can serve an identity consolidation function and that this can be a goal in its own right (Klein et al., 2007). The results are consistent with Simon et al.'s (2008) argument that collective action has an identity-affirming function and with Drury and Reicher's (2009) argument that collective action can be appealing to the extent that it allows actors to realize the identity of the group. Our results suggest that expressing what a movement stands for and helping to strengthen links between its members, and to influence others to join it can be gratifying ends in themselves.

**Limitations of the Present Research**

Like most past research, we examined collective action tendencies rather than actual participation. Previous research has found that behavioural intentions are good proxy predictors of actual behaviour (e.g. de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalensko & McCauley, 2009; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Nevertheless, future research would do well to strengthen the present findings by examining actual participation in collective action. The current studies also focused on the efficacy of particular forms of collective action, namely protests and vigils. It is important that future research tests our model using a broader array of normative and non-normative forms of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 1990b) in order to test the generalisability of our results. Future work must also test the contributions of sympathy and empathy to different forms of intergroup helping (e.g. social cohesion versus social change-oriented

actions) in order to identify the specific action tendencies associated with each of these emotional experiences.

Additionally, our studies were based on cross-sectional data, which prevents us from making inferences about the causal relations between our variables, and does not rule out the potential influence of third variables. That being said, there is solid evidence for the causal role of perceived injustice and political efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies (van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) as well as evidence for the causal role of injustice in predicting emotions (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a review). Emotions and action tendencies are, however, likely to emerge simultaneously according to appraisal theories of emotions (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989), suggesting there may be little use to a strict causal order here. On the other hand, it is imperative that future work establishes the causal role of identity consolidation efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies, and the mediating role of political efficacy.

Another potential limitation of our research is that we assessed empathy in both of our studies using a single item measure. Our consultations with native Chinese speakers indicate, however, that the word "empathic" is easily understood in Chinese and captures the intended meaning, specifically: "I feel what you are feeling as if it were happening to me." This suggests that our measure does have face validity. Nevertheless, in order to increase the reliability of our findings, it would be desirable for future work to replicate our results using a more elaborate measure of felt empathy.

We should stress that the present research does not constitute a complete analysis of predictors of solidarity-based collective action. Our aim was to extend an established theoretical model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004) to examine solidarity-based action, and we therefore focused on efficacy and emotion as proximal predictors of such action. Other variables are likely to further contribute to solidarity-based action and mediate or moderate the relations examined in the present work (see Reicher et al., 2006).

**Contributions and Implications of the Present Research**

This work contributes to our understanding of solidarity-based action by third parties, which has received little empirical attention. In particular, it furthers our understanding of the prosocial emotions implicated in such action. While our findings are inconclusive with regard to the role of sympathy, they provide initial evidence for the role of felt empathy in positively predicting solidarity-based collective action, which has received little attention in the literature. Our results also provide additional evidence for the important role of moral outrage as a positive predictor of solidarity-based collective action.

The present research also helps develop our understanding of the role of efficacy considerations in predicting collective action. We provided a novel way of conceptualising the different types of efficacy proposed by Hornsey et al. (2006) by mapping them onto a recent theoretical framework by Klein et al. (2007) which suggests that collective action, as an instance of social identity performance, should fulfil two functions, namely identity consolidation and/or identity mobilization. Our focus on the role of the

perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of a social movement helps to expand research on the identity-affirmation function of collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Simon et al., 2008), which constitutes an important item on the current collective action research agenda (Wright, 2009). Importantly, our results suggest that collective action may not always be predicted solely by its perceived political efficacy, but is also sometimes independently predicted by its perceived efficacy at consolidating the identity of the movement. Equally important is that identity consolidation efficacy predicts collective action sometimes partly because it feeds into the perceived political efficacy of such action. That is, consolidating the identity of a movement and altering the social order can be related rather than totally independent goals. Our research thus sheds light on a novel predictor of political efficacy, namely identity consolidation efficacy. This is important given that political efficacy has been shown to be an important collective action antecedent (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2009). Our findings thus suggest that in order to promote solidarity-based collective action in protracted struggles (e.g. to end Israeli occupation or to bring about democracy in China), it may be useful to highlight the role of collective action at affirming, expressing and building the identity of a movement. This may help raise the perceived political efficacy of such action and thus make participation more appealing, but it may also motivate collective action independently.

**Conclusion**

The present research builds on the dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004) to examine social psychological predictors

of collective action by third parties in solidarity with a disadvantaged group. Our findings highlight the role of empathy, over and above the roles of sympathy and moral outrage. Our research also draws attention to the role of the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of a movement in predicting solidarity-based collective action, over and above its perceived political efficacy and sometimes partly via its political efficacy.

## CHAPTER 3: Violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as predictors of violent forms of collective action[4]

Recent historical events, starting with the September 11th attacks, have led to a resurgence of interest in the social-psychological predictors of political violence. If we follow a widely used definition of collective action as action that aims to improve the status, power or influence of an entire group rather than that of one or a few individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990b; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), politically motivated acts of violence clearly qualify as forms of collective action. Although there is a well-established theoretical framework for studying the antecedents of collective action in social psychology (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), it has not yet been widely applied to the investigation of politically motivated forms of violence (Wright, 2009). Indeed, the majority of social-psychological research on collective action focuses on nonviolent rather than violent forms of action. In line with current attempts to fill this gap (e.g. Tausch, Becker, Spears et al., 2011), the present research examines how efficacy, one of the well-established antecedents of nonviolent collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), predicts violent forms of collective action. Note that this chapter focuses on the *political* efficacy of violent collective action, rather than its identity consolidation efficacy. We shall henceforth refer to this simply as efficacy.

Tausch et al. (2011) have recently shown that low *group efficacy*, a sense that one's group is not capable of resolving its grievances through collective effort, plays an important role in predicting support for violent forms of collective action and violent action tendencies. However, to date there has been no

[4] This chapter is based on Saab, Spears, & Tausch (under review).

systematic empirical investigation of how violent forms of collective action are influenced by the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent forms of action. The objective of our research is therefore to examine how violent collective action is predicted by the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent collective action and, importantly, the potential interaction between the two. This interaction is critical because, as we shall see, violent and nonviolent options may be viewed as related rather than independent options.

## The Role of Efficacy in Collective Action

In the context of group-based action, efficacy refers to the perceived likelihood that collective action will achieve a desired social change for a group. Different social-psychological approaches to collective action such as Relative Deprivation Theory (Folger, 1986; Mummendey, et al., 1999; Smith & Kessler, 2004), Resource Mobilization Theory (Klandermans, 1984), and Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1979) have long stressed the influence of pragmatic considerations on the motivation to take collective action. Although not all incorporate the efficacy of collective action per se, they all use similar notions. SIT, for example, focuses on the concept of (in)stability of intergroup relations, or the perceived changeability of the ingroup's position in the existing social order (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A *stable* social system is unresponsive to attempts by group members to improve the position of their group, whereas an *unstable* social system is more responsive (see Wright, 2001, for a distinction between efficacy and stability). Classical SIT suggests that group members who view their group's position as illegitimately disadvantaged are more likely to challenge the status quo collectively if they view their disadvantage as unstable (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Other lines of research emphasize the

concept of *group efficacy* (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004), which refers to group members' belief that they can effectively resolve a problem facing their group through collective effort (Bandura, 1995, 1997; Mummendey et al., 1999).

Despite differences across these theories, all of them have traditionally stressed that, in order to be motivated to participate in collective action, members of a disadvantaged group need to believe that they can improve the conditions of their group and resolve their grievances through collective action. Consistent with this idea, research has generally found that collective action is predicted by its perceived efficacy or by the perceived efficacy of the group at achieving a desired social change through collective effort (Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; van Zomeren et al., 2004; see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for meta-analytic evidence).

However, a critical look at the quantitative evidence on the link between efficacy and collective action shows a rather exclusive focus on the prediction of *nonviolent* forms of collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), despite the obvious social and practical implications of research on violent forms of action (Wright, 2009). Importantly, recent research suggests that, unlike nonviolent collective action, violent forms of collective action may be motivated by the *low* perceived likelihood that a desired social change will be achieved. For example, Tausch et al. (2011) recently conducted three field studies examining the link between perceived group efficacy and both nonviolent and violent forms of collective action. While group efficacy was positively related to nonviolent actions in these studies, replicating previous findings in the literature (van Zomeren et al., 2008), the authors demonstrated

that violent actions were, in fact, predicted by a sense of *low* rather than high group efficacy. The authors argued that resorting to violence in a desperate situation can be highly strategic and functional, potentially influencing wider public opinion, building a movement, and winning third parties to the cause (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006), for example by provoking the opponent into extreme counter-action (see Sedgwick, 2004). Violence in a situation offering little hope for change may thus destabilize the status quo and facilitate the conditions that could lead to social change in the long run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears, Scheepers, & van Zomeren, 2011).

Tausch et al.'s (2011) results are consistent with some earlier findings suggesting that difficulty in improving a disadvantaged group position is not linked to inaction but to disruptive forms of collective action such as violence. For example, Ransford (1968) found that the willingness to engage in violence in the context of the Watts Riots was positively correlated with feelings of powerlessness and lack of control. Similarly, Wright and colleagues (1990b) found in an experiment that participants assigned to a low-status or disadvantaged group were more likely to opt for disruptive forms of collective action available to them when they were denied opportunities to move to an advantaged group. They also found that lack of hope for an improvement of their position best distinguished participants who chose disruptive forms of collective action from those who chose other forms of action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a; see also Kamans, Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2011).

More recently, a series of experimental studies by Scheepers, Spears, Doosje and Manstead (2006; see also Spears et al., 2011) found that, contrary to classical predictions of SIT, groups with *stable* low status were more likely to

support a relatively aggressive strategy of derogating the outgroup in rewards and ratings, compared to groups with *unstable* low status, even and especially when this discrimination was visible to the outgroup audience. Scheepers et al. (2006) and Spears et al. (2011) referred to this as a "nothing to lose" strategy. They proposed that this strategy stems from the belief that doing nothing is unlikely to change the situation whereas using a confrontational strategy, in comparison, has the potential to improve or at least unsettle the situation.

Importantly, researchers examining the influence of perceived (group) efficacy or stability on aggressive or violent forms of group action have thus far focused primarily on the perceived *general* possibility of achieving a desirable social change (an exception is Louis, Paasonnen, Hornsey et al., 2011). It is thus not clear how violent forms of action are predicted by perceptions of their efficacy as well as by the perceived efficacy of other nonviolent forms of collective action. Although Tausch et al. (2011) found that violent collective action is predicted by a sense of *low* group efficacy, because this index of efficacy was *general* it does not indicate which specific types of collective action need to be perceived as effective or ineffective for violent collective action to occur. Tausch et al. have stressed that in order to get a more complete understanding of how efficacy considerations predict violent (and nonviolent) forms of collective action, it is essential to distinguish between the efficacy of violent and nonviolent forms of action. The aim of the present research is therefore to address this issue.

## The Present Research

Our research examines how violent action efficacy and nonviolent action efficacy predict violent forms of collective action. Although nonviolent forms of

action are equally important, they fall outside the scope of the current paper. We now review existing research on how efficacy considerations relate specifically to violent forms of collective action and outline our predictions.

According to the expectancy-value theory of behaviour, the perceived expectancy that some behaviour will result in a valued outcome should positively predict the intention to engage in that behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In line with this idea, there is considerable empirical evidence that the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions is a positive predictor of nonviolent collective action (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). To our knowledge, however, research on efficacy and collective action has not examined the relation between the perceived efficacy of violent forms of collective action and the pursuit of violent collective action. If violent collective action is rationally motivated, people should be more likely to pursue it the more efficacious they perceive it to be for resolving their grievances.

The perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, however, is also likely to play a role in predicting violent collective action. Researchers have theorized that people are more likely to consider political violence when nonviolent alternatives are seen as ineffective at addressing grievances (Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 1990; Louis, 2009b; Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974). The rationale here is that violent collective action typically presents more risks compared to nonviolent collective action and is thus only used as a last resort, when nonviolent action is seen as ineffective or insufficient for resolving grievances. Indeed violence by definition involves physically harming people or their resources, making it morally more questionable than nonviolence, and more likely to invite punitive measures, jeopardizing safety, resources as well as social

image (e.g. see Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Wright, 2009). Based on the idea that people only use violence as a last resort, it is thought that increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of action helps to prevent people from pursuing violent action or to reduce violent action where it is already being used.

Surprisingly, until recently evidence in support of the hypothesized negative influence of nonviolence efficacy on violent action was based solely on qualitative studies, such as case studies of violent escalations of social and political conflicts (Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974) and interviews with militants involved in politically motivated acts of violence (Masters, 2004; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Soibelman, 2004). However, Louis et al. (2011) recently surveyed a sample of protesters in an anti-globalization rally on their perceptions of the efficacy of democratic rallies and their support for violent protest. Consistent with the idea that violence is adopted when nonviolent means are viewed as ineffective, these authors found the efficacy of nonviolence and support for violence to be negatively linked.

Thus, based on previous research and theory, we expect violent collective action to be overall positively predicted by its perceived efficacy, and negatively predicted by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action. Importantly, however, the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on violent collective action have thus far been examined only separately, without taking into account the possibility that they may interact. Previous research has neither explicitly considered nor systematically investigated this possibility. For example, do people refrain from pursuing potentially effective violent forms of collective action when they perceive nonviolent action as efficacious? Does the perceived inefficacy of nonviolence lead to the pursuit of violent action when

such action is unlikely to achieve success? The present research is aimed at examining these questions. Given that the literature has focused more on the negative link between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, we shall focus on how this link may vary as a function of the efficacy of violent action. We consider three alternative hypotheses, illustrated in Figure 5.

**Violence Efficacy as a Potential Moderator of the Link between Nonviolence Efficacy and Violence?**

The first moderation hypothesis we consider is based on the primacy of nonviolence as a guiding principle for the use of violence. We thus term it the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis (first panel, Figure 5). This interaction assumes that people pursue violence only as a last resort (e.g. Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974), that is, only when nonviolent alternatives for addressing grievances are perceived as ineffective. Hence, when nonviolent action is viewed as potentially effective, people would be reluctant to pursue violent action even if violence is also likely to be effective. Initial data showing that nonviolence efficacy is a negative predictor of support for violence is consistent with this general idea (Louis, Paasonnen, Hornsey et al., 2011). Thus, according to the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis, violence efficacy should moderate the link between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, such that the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action is *more* negatively predictive of violent action the greater the perceived efficacy of violent action is.

An alternative moderation hypothesis to consider is based on the idea that violence and nonviolence can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive strategies. We term this "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis (panel 2,

*Figure 5*. Illustration of three alternative hypotheses on how the link between the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action and violent collective action could vary as a function of the perceived efficacy of violent action.



Figure 5). This hypothesis assumes that people who believe that nonviolent action has high efficacy will pursue violent action only if they believe that violent action also has high efficacy. Crucially, this does not mean they will only pursue violent action. Instead, they may pursue both violent and nonviolent strategies in parallel if both have high efficacy, in order to maximize the chances of achieving the desired social change or to reach it more efficiently. Consistent with this, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) noted in a recent analysis of resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 that various campaigns used both violent and nonviolent methods of resistance simultaneously (see also Dudouet, 2008). A well-known example of such a strategy is the South African struggle for liberation, where the African National Congress (ANC) used violent methods, while nonviolent methods were being used in the townships (Schock, 2005). Thus, according to "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis, violence efficacy moderates the link between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, such that the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action is *less* negatively predictive of violent action the greater the perceived efficacy of violent action is. Put differently, increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action is less likely to reduce violent action when violence has high efficacy than when it has low efficacy.

While both moderation hypotheses are conceivable as they both reflect existing guiding principles concerning the use of violence, a third alternative hypothesis is that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy have independent effects on violent action. We term this the "independent effects" hypothesis (panel 3, Figure 5). That is, violence efficacy positively predicts violent action independently of the efficacy of nonviolence. Similarly, nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts violent action, independently of the efficacy of violence. Note

that this would suggest that people see less value in pursuing violence if nonviolence has high efficacy than if it has low efficacy, but they will still hold on to violence to some extent if they think it will help.

**The "Nothing to Lose" Hypothesis**

An important and related question we seek to address in the present research is whether the perceived inefficacy of nonviolence would lead to the pursuit of violent action when such violence is unlikely to achieve success. Note that this question zooms in on the *simple effect* of nonviolence efficacy on violent action when violence has low efficacy. Importantly, for reasons we will turn to shortly, we do expect violent action to be negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy when violence has low efficacy. We term this predicted simple effect the "nothing to lose" hypothesis. Note that this hypothesis is automatically implied by both "the gun and the olive branch" moderation hypothesis and the "independent effects" hypothesis, because these postulate, respectively, that nonviolence efficacy is more negatively predictive of violence when violence efficacy is low, or equally negatively predictive (see panels 2 and 3, Figure 5). We explicitly make the "nothing to lose" prediction, however, because it is not automatically implied by the "primacy of nonviolence" moderation hypothesis. The "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis indeed proposes that nonviolence efficacy should be *less* negatively predictive of violence when violence has low efficacy (see panel 1, Figure 5), which leaves open the possibility that nonviolence efficacy may not predict violence at all when violence has low efficacy. More importantly, we also explicitly make the "nothing to lose" prediction because as we shall see, finding evidence for this negative simple

effect is theoretically important, irrespective of which of our three alternative interaction hypotheses is supported.

That nonviolence efficacy should negatively predict violent action when violence has low efficacy might at first seem counterintuitive. After all, according to the expectancy-value theory of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), when people think violence is unlikely to resolve their grievances, they should be unlikely to pursue it. If nonviolent forms of action are also perceived as ineffective, there is little chance, overall, to successfully resolve grievances and the situation should be perceived as highly stable. The classical view in the literature predicts that people should have little motivation to pursue collective action in circumstances offering little scope for change (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001). Accordingly, the perceived inefficacy of nonviolent action should be unlikely to lead to violent action if violence is perceived to have low efficacy.

Importantly, however, as mentioned previously, some recent work has argued that violent action strategies may sometimes be used in order to unsettle a stable social system and bring about the conditions that would facilitate social change in the long run (Louis & Taylor, 2002; Scheepers et al., 2006; Sedgwick, 2004; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). For example, both Scheepers et al. (2006) and Spears et al. (2011) suggested that members of a disadvantaged group adopt more extreme forms of group action when the possibility of improving their conditions is low, as they have "nothing to lose". That is, there may be more to gain by using an aggressive strategy than by doing nothing.

The "nothing to lose" argument in its essence bears a close similarity to an argument made by Masters (2004). Masters suggested that when group

members face an ongoing injustice, and believe that inaction or nonviolence offer no chance of improving the status quo, while violent rebellion offers a chance, however slim, to improve the situation, they will tend to support violence even if it involves considerable risks. He based his argument on the assumption of loss aversion from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which predicts that when faced with one choice involving a guaranteed loss, and another choice involving a *likely* loss of equal or greater value, people tend to prefer the risky option, because it offers at least the possibility, however small, to escape losses altogether. Masters (2004) interviewed militants from Northern Ireland and Palestine who favoured armed struggle to advance their cause and found some qualitative evidence consistent with this argument.

Accordingly, if violent action has low efficacy, people would pursue it only if nonviolent collective action is also perceived to have low efficacy. Hence, we expect nonviolence efficacy to negatively predict violent action when violence efficacy is low, and, as mentioned above, we term this predicted simple effect the "nothing to lose" hypothesis. To clarify, the "nothing to lose" hypothesis refers strictly to the simple effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action when violence efficacy is low. Conversely, the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis, "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis, and the "independent effects" hypothesis constitute three alternative predictions regarding how the effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action when violence efficacy is high *compares* to the negative effect of nonviolence efficacy when violence efficacy is low.

## Overview of Studies

We present four studies testing our hypotheses by examining how the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent forms of collective action, and the interaction between the two, predict support for, and tendencies to engage in, violent forms of collective action.

As a starting point, Studies 4 and 5 examine the degree to which external sympathizers with the Palestinian cause in Britain support armed Palestinian resistance, as a function of the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation. In Studies 6 and 7, we move from this third-party perspective to a first-party perspective. Study 6 examines attitudinal support for violent forms of action as well as violent action tendencies among British university students in the context of the recent protests against the increase in university tuition fees. Study 7 uses an experimental scenario where we ask participants to imagine living in a country under occupation and measure their support for violent collective action and violent collective action tendencies. Importantly, Studies 6 and 7 also explore the role of attitudinal support for violent action in mediating the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on violent collective action tendencies.

## Study 4

Our first study surveyed a sample of international protesters recruited during the National demonstration for justice and freedom for Palestine, which takes place annually in London, Britain. This study investigated how protesters' support for the use of violence by Palestinians against Israel is predicted by their perceptions of the efficacy of violent and nonviolent means in that context, and the interaction between the two.

## Method

**Participants.** A total of 240 protesters participated in the study. We excluded 30 participants who had missing data on one or more of the three key variables (single item measures). The final sample thus consisted of 210 participants (108 women, 101 men, 1 unknown; age: $M$ = 40.57 years; $SD$ = 16.50). The majority of protesters ($N$ = 146) were British and the rest held various nationalities, including six Palestinians and fourteen non-Palestinian Arabs. There were no Israeli respondents in the sample. Protesters also varied in their religious affiliation and included Muslim ($N$ = 45) and Jewish ($N$ = 4) participants.

**Procedure.** Protesters were approached as they waited at the gathering point before the march started, and then later at the rally point as they listened to speeches. Participants were asked if they would like to complete an anonymous survey on their opinions about the demonstration. They were then handed the questionnaire and, upon completion were handed a debriefing sheet.

**Materials.**

Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using six-point verbal rating scales with labels ordered as such: "not at all" (coded as 1), "slightly" (2), "somewhat" (3), "moderately" (4), "very much" (5), and "extremely" (6).

***Perceived injustice***. Prior to administering the measures of interest in this paper, we measured perceived injustice to check that our participants viewed the Palestinians' situation as unjust. We thus asked them about the extent to which they viewed Israel's approach to the Palestinian issue in general as unjust, as well as Britain's approach, with two items (Pearson's $r$ = .73).

***Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action***. We measured the efficacy of each type of action using single items. Participants rated

how effective they thought Palestinians' use of peaceful means with Israel and their use of violence against Israel would be at helping Palestinians achieve their aims.

***Support for violent collective action.*** This was measured using a single item. Participants indicated their agreement with the following sentence: "In general, I support the decisions of Palestinians to use violence against Israel." Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

**Results and Discussion**

As would be expected in a sample of protesters, participants viewed the occupation as highly unjust ($M$ = 5.37; $SD$ = 1.03). A one-sample t-test indicated that participants scored significantly above the scale mid-point on perceived injustice, $t$ (209) = 26.17, $p < .001$.

We regressed support for violence on the perceived efficacy of nonviolence, the perceived efficacy of violence and their interaction, using ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression. For all multiple regression analyses reported in our four studies, continuous predictors were centred prior to our analyses, following recommendations by Aiken & West (1991). We thus always report the values of the unstandardised regression coefficients. Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables of interest in this study are displayed in Table 4.

The model explained 49.8% of the variance in support for violence (adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy emerged as a significant

Table 4
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 4)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence | 1 to 6 | 3.16 | 1.52 | - | -.01 | -.24** |
| 2. Perceived Efficacy of Violence | 1 to 6 | 2.88 | 1.54 | | - | .66*** |
| 3. Support for Violence | 1 to 7 | 4.57 | 1.90 | | | - |

** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$




*Figure 6*. Simple slopes of support for violent collective action regressed on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, at mean, low and high levels of the perceived efficacy of violent action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) (Study 4). The interaction is plotted using unstandardised coefficients.

positive predictor of support for violence, $b$ =.77, $SE$ = .06, $t$ (206) = 12.39, $p$ < .001, and nonviolence efficacy emerged as a significant negative predictor: $b$ = -.31, $SE$ = .06, $t$ (206) = -4.98, $p$ < .001. However, there was also a significant interaction between the two predictors, $b$ = .11, $SE$ = .04, $t$ (206) = 3.04, $p$ = .003, which is plotted in Figure 6.

Next, we examined simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at both high and low levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD). The analysis revealed that when violence efficacy was low, support for violence was negatively and significantly predicted by nonviolence efficacy, $b$ = -.47, $SE$ = .09, $t$ (206) = -5.4, $p$ <.001. This supports the "nothing to lose" hypothesis. When violence efficacy was high, support for violence was negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, $b$ = -.14, $SE$ = .08, $t$ (206) = -1.83, $p$ = .07, but this link only approached conventional levels of significance. The interaction was thus in line with "the gun and the olive branch"

hypothesis[5]. For the purposes of completeness, we also report the simple slopes of violence efficacy in Table 13 (p. 128-129).

To summarize, the results of Study 4 provided initial correlational evidence in support of our main effect hypotheses, but also evidence of an interaction effect. As expected, overall, the perceived efficacy of violence positively predicted support for violence. Further, overall, the perceived efficacy of nonviolence negatively predicted support for violence. Importantly, we also found a significant interaction between the perceived efficacy of violence and the perceived efficacy of nonviolence, such that nonviolence efficacy was less negatively predictive of violence support when violence efficacy was high than when it was low, in line with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. That is, the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the less the perceived efficacy of nonviolence mattered for deciding whether or not to support violence. Hence, participants who judged both violence and nonviolence to have high efficacy still supported violence to a relatively high degree, potentially suggesting that violence and nonviolence were viewed as complementary strategies to be used alongside each other. Importantly, the results also mean that the "nothing to lose" hypothesis was met, since participants who perceived violence to have low efficacy supported violence to the extent that they viewed nonviolent actions to have low efficacy as well. Thus, perceiving violent means of resistance as having little chance of success did not prevent participants from supporting violence when they perceived peaceful means of resistance to be relatively ineffective.

Our first study, however, has various limitations. Considering the different types of violent resistance used in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian

[5] An additional set of analyses which excluded Palestinian participants (first-parties) yielded very similar results.

conflict, our broad operationalisation of violence limits the interpretation of the findings, because it lacks specificity with regard to the target of violence, which could be interpreted to mean military or civilian targets, as Palestinian militants have actually engaged in attacks on both in the course of their resistance to Israeli occupation[6]. A similar critique can be made regarding our operationalisation of nonviolent means of action ("peaceful means"), which can be understood to refer to diplomatic means or popular nonviolent acts of resistance or both, considering, again, that Palestinians have used both means. Further, our findings were based on correlational data, which does not rule out alternative explanations. In Study 5 we tried to address these limitations while using the same context.

## Study 5

In this study we used an experimental procedure, focusing again on international onlookers of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but this time using a sample of university students. We manipulated the efficacy of violent and nonviolent Palestinian resistance to be either high or low and operationalised violent collective action as armed attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli military targets and nonviolent collective actions as mass demonstrations, the boycott of Israeli products, and civil disobedience. Our dependent variable, support for violence, was also operationalised as support for attacks against Israeli soldiers.

### Method

**Participants.** Cardiff University students ($N$ = 120; 84 women, 36 men; age: $M$ = 21.98 years, $SD$ = 3.79) participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit or money and were recruited from various departments across the

[6] Some participants explicitly clarified on the questionnaire sheets that they were referring to violence against military targets and not civilian targets.

university. Eighty percent were British and the rest held various nationalities. There were neither Arabs nor Israelis in our sample. Participants also varied in their religious affiliation. Only one was Muslim and three were Jewish.

**Design and procedure.** The experiment was advertised as a study on political attitudes. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions, in a 2 (efficacy of violent resistance: high or low) x 2 (efficacy of nonviolent resistance: high or low) between-participants factorial design. Upon arrival at the lab, they were led to separate cubicles and seated in front of a computer. Testing sessions never exceeded six participants.

After completing some socio-demographic questions, all participants viewed a five-minute documentary on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands (1967 onwards), providing information on the violations of international law and human rights involved. This was done to ensure participants would view the occupation as unjust and would therefore have a motive to support collective action by Palestinians. Following this, participants viewed a ten-minute documentary which contained the manipulation, focusing on the efficacy of violent and nonviolent resistance means Palestinians have been using against the occupation in recent years. Nonviolent resistance included mass demonstrations, the boycott of Israeli products and civil disobedience acts. Violent resistance consisted of guerrilla attacks on Israeli military targets. The efficacy of each type of resistance was manipulated by varying the alleged opinions of experts who argued that nonviolence (or violence) was either likely or unlikely to be effective at helping Palestinians end the Israeli occupation. The risks involved in engaging in nonviolent resistance (i.e. the predicted intensity of Israel's retaliation) were kept equal across the high and low efficacy conditions and likewise for violent

resistance. The order in which the two types of resistance were introduced was counterbalanced. The efficacy manipulation lasted for the same duration across conditions. Apart from variations pertaining to the manipulation, the script and video footage used were identical across conditions.

Following the manipulation, participants completed manipulation checks as well as measures of their perceptions of the injustice of the Israeli occupation. We then measured the perceived efficacy of Palestinians' use of both violent and nonviolent resistance, followed by support for violent resistance. We counterbalanced the order of manipulation checks and efficacy measures pertaining to violent and nonviolent resistance. At the end of the experiment, participants were thanked and debriefed.

**Materials.**

***Manipulation and control checks.*** We used a categorical manipulation check. Participants were asked to tick one of two boxes indicating whether they thought nonviolent resistance would be likely or unlikely to be effective at helping Palestinians end Israeli occupation.

***Perceived injustice.*** To check that participants viewed the occupation as unjust, we asked them about the extent to which they viewed the Israeli occupation as *morally wrong*, *illegitimate*, *fair* (reverse-coded) and *justified* (reverse-coded) on 8-point visual-analogue scales, with the end points labelled "not at all" and "extremely". The items were averaged to yield an index of perceived injustice of Israeli occupation ($\alpha = .83$).

***Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action.*** We also measured the perceived efficacy of each method of resistance separately. Participants rated how effective they thought Palestinians' use of a range of

tactics might be at ending the Israeli occupation, using a ten-point scale numbered from 0 ("not effective at all") to 9 ("extremely effective"). Three items measured the perceived efficacy of *mass demonstrations*, *the boycott of Israeli products* and *civil disobedience*. These were combined into a reliable scale of the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action (α =.86). One item measured the perceived efficacy of *armed attacks against Israeli soldiers*, which is how violent resistance was defined in the manipulation.

***Support for violent collective action.*** Following this, participants rated how strongly they supported or opposed Palestinians' use of armed attacks on Israeli soldiers, using a ten-point scale numbered from -5 ("strongly oppose") to +5 ("strongly support"). We omitted the mid-point (0) of this scale to avoid potential tendencies by participants to answer at the midpoint given their minimal involvement with the issue (Krosnick & Fabrigar, 1997).

**Results and Discussion**

**Missing value analysis.** There were some missing values (< 5% per variable) in our dataset. These were imputed using the expectation maximization method (EM) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

**Manipulation checks.** A chi-square test comparing ratings of the efficacy of nonviolent resistance across the nonviolence efficacy conditions, was significant: $\chi^2$ (1) = 53.57, $p$ < .001. Participants in the high efficacy condition were 26 times more likely than participants in the low efficacy condition to respond that nonviolent resistance was likely to be effective. Another chi-square test, performed to compare ratings of the efficacy of violent resistance across violence efficacy conditions, was also significant: $\chi^2$ (1) = 28.13, $p$ < .001. Participants in the high efficacy condition were 9.75 times more likely than

participants in the low efficacy condition to respond that violent resistance against military targets was likely to be effective. Two additional chi-square tests confirmed that ratings of nonviolence efficacy were independent of the manipulation of violence efficacy, and that ratings of the violence efficacy were independent of the manipulation of nonviolence efficacy (neither test was significant). Hence, the checks indicate that our manipulations succeeded. Note, however, that the effect sizes suggest that the manipulation of violence efficacy was less successful than the manipulation of nonviolence efficacy.

***Perceived injustice.*** Participants' scores on the perceived injustice measure indicated they viewed the occupation as quite unfair ($M$ = 6.91; $SD$ = 1.00, minimum score = 4). A one-sample t-test indicated that they scored significantly above the mid-point scale: $t$ (119) = 26.51, $p$ <.001.

**Experimental analysis.** The means and standard deviations for support for violence as a function of condition are displayed in Table 5. The 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on violence support unexpectedly revealed no significant main effect of violence efficacy, $F$ (1, 116) < 1, $p$ = .45, *ns*, nor a significant main effect of nonviolence efficacy, $F$ (1, 116) = 1.32, $p$ = .25, *ns*. The omnibus interaction was also not significant: $F$ (1, 116) = 1.80; $p$ = .18, *ns*, $\eta^2$ = .02.

We nevertheless tested the simple effects of nonviolence efficacy. Simple effect tests of nonviolence efficacy revealed that when violence efficacy was low, nonviolence efficacy did have the predicted effect on support for violence, $F$ (1, 116) = 3.11, $p$ = .08, such that participants were more supportive of violence when the efficacy of nonviolence was low than when it was high, in line with the "nothing to lose" hypothesis. Although this effect only approached conventional levels of statistical significance, it

Table 5

*Support for Violent Collective Action as a Function of Nonviolence and Violence Efficacy (Study 5).*

| | Efficacy of violence | |
|---|---|---|
| Efficacy of nonviolence | Low | High |
| Low | .20 | -.10 |
| | (2.72) | (3.16) |
| High | -1.10 | .00 |
| | (2.84) | (2.67) |

*Note*. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Support for violence is on a scale from -5 to 5.

was significant using a one-tailed test ($p$ = .04), which is justified given the directionality of our a priori hypothesis. Conversely, when violence efficacy was high, the effect of violence efficacy on violence support was not significant: $F$ (1, 116) <1, *ns*. Although the pattern of results was in line with "the gun and the olive branch hypothesis" the main effect of violence efficacy and the interaction were not significant so we cannot draw firm conclusions about this hypothesis. We report the results of the simple effect tests of violence efficacy in Table 13 (p. 128-129).

**Internal analysis.** Given the weakness of our experimental effects on support for violence, we followed up with an internal analysis. We thus performed a multiple regression analysis using support for violence as a criterion variable and using the *perceived* efficacy of nonviolence, the *perceived* efficacy of violence and their interaction as predictors. Descriptive statistics for all variables and a correlation matrix are displayed in Table 6.

The model explained 19% of the variance in support for violence. As expected, the perceived efficacy of violence emerged, overall, as a significant

Table 6
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 5)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Efficacy of nonviolence | 0 to 9 | 5.16 | 1.95 | - | .21* | -.11 |
| 2. Perceived Efficacy of violence | 0 to 9 | 4.62 | 2.16 | | - | .36*** |
| 3. Support for violence | -5 to 5 | -.25 | 2.86 | | | - |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$

positive predictor of support for violence: $b$ = .46, $SE$ = .11, $t$ (116) = 4.07, $p$ <.001. The relation between the perceived efficacy of nonviolence and violence support showed an overall trend in the expected (negative) direction: $b$ = -.21, $SE$ = .13, $t$ (116) = -1.65, $p$ =.10 (or $p$ = .05 with a one-tailed test, justified by our a priori hypothesis). These effects, however, were qualified by a significant interaction, $b$ = .15, $SE$ = .23, $t$ (116) = 2.67, $p$ = .009, which is plotted in Figure 7.




*Figure 7.* Simple slopes of support for violence collective action regressed on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at mean, low and high levels of the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) (Study 5). The interaction is plotted using unstandardised coefficients.

Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD) revealed, as expected and in line with the experimental results, that when the perceived efficacy of violence was low, support for violence was negatively and significantly predicted by the perceived efficacy of nonviolence, $b$ = -.53, $SE$ = .16, $t$ (116) = -3.41, $p$ < .001 (supporting the "nothing to lose" hypothesis). By contrast, when the perceived efficacy of

violence was high, there was no evidence of a link between the perceived efficacy of nonviolence and support for violence: $b$ = .11, $SE$ = .19, $t$ (116) = .59, $p$ = .56, *ns*. The interaction pattern thus supports "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. We also performed tests of the simple regression slopes of violence efficacy which are reported in Table 13 (p. 128-129).

To summarize, while the present study addressed some of the limitations of Study 4, it provided mixed support for our main effects hypotheses but further evidence of an interaction effect, in line with "the gun and the olive branch" moderation hypothesis. We expected that violence efficacy would overall positively predict support for violence. Surprisingly, we found no experimental support for this hypothesis in this study. This may be due to participants' deeply-held views about the (in)efficacy of violence, which may have constrained the strength of our manipulation. We also expected that nonviolence efficacy would overall negatively predict support for violence. We found no experimental support for this hypothesis either. Further, no significant interaction was found between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy. Nevertheless, simple effect tests revealed that in line with the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, nonviolence efficacy negatively predicted violence support when violence efficacy was low. Although this simple effect was only significant using a one-tailed test, this test is justified by the directionality of our a priori hypothesis. Conversely, nonviolence efficacy did not predict violence support when violence efficacy was high. The pattern of results was thus line with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis and follows that found in Study 4: the greater the efficacy of violence, the less nonviolence efficacy has an effect on support for violence.

The internal analysis sheds more light on how participants' own views of violence and nonviolence efficacy were linked with their support for violence. As predicted, the perceived efficacy of violence was, overall, a positive predictor of support for violence. The perceived efficacy of nonviolence, however, only showed a negative overall trend in predicting violence support. Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction, such that the greater the perceived efficacy of violence was, the less the perceived efficacy of nonviolence mattered in deciding whether or not to support violence. The pattern of this interaction is thus consistent with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. It also follows the pattern of findings in the experimental analysis and the interaction found in Study 4. Further, in line with the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, when participants perceived violence to have low efficacy, they supported it to the extent that they viewed nonviolence to have low efficacy as well.

One potential critique of Studies 4 and 5, however, is that they operationalise violent collective action in terms of attitudinal support for violence, rather than in terms of more behavioural measures such as violent action tendencies. Further, these studies examine violence support from the perspective of distant third-party sympathizers, rather than from the perspective of members of a disadvantaged group, who in this context would be Palestinians living under occupation. In fact, collective action has commonly been operationalised using attitudinal measures such as support for collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), which, although being somewhat removed from actual participation in collective action, are important to study as they can potentially influence behaviour at a later stage

(van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). One might question, however, whether perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy influence support for violent action similarly among disadvantaged group members and among third-party sympathizers. In fact, it has recently been argued that (support for) collective action is better conceptualized as the expression of opinion-based identities, rather than membership in social or demographic groups (McGarty et al., 2009; see also Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Montele, 2007). In that sense, Palestinians living under occupation and third-party sympathizers can be viewed as members of an opinion-based group calling for the end of Israeli occupation. Accordingly, support for violent action among disadvantaged group members and support for violent action among third-party sympathizers could be influenced by similar psychological factors, differing in degree rather than in kind (see Sweetman, Spears & Livingstone, 2011). Nevertheless, in Studies 6 and 7 we extended the focus of our enquiry by examining different forms of support for violent action and violent action tendencies, this time from a first-party perspective, among members of disadvantaged groups.

## Study 6

This study was conducted online with university students in Britain in the context of the nationwide student protest movement against increases in university tuition fees and budget cuts to higher education, proposed by the coalition government (the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats) in the fall of 2010. Students took a number of nonviolent actions to oppose the proposal, such as signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, classroom walk outs and student occupations of university campus buildings. Some students also engaged in violent actions, such as the Millbank riot on November 12th,

which involved breaking into the headquarters of the Conservative party in London and damaging property as well as entering into violent clashes with the police. The present study was conducted in early December 2010, in the days prior to the parliamentary vote session on the proposed rise in tuition fees.

Importantly, focusing on first parties allowed us to include a wider array of collective action measures. We thus examine how violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy predict not only support for violent collective action but also violent action tendencies. Further, we explore whether support for violence mediates the effects of our predictors on violent action tendencies. To our knowledge, support for violent action has not been explored as a potential mediator of the effects of efficacy perceptions on violent action tendencies. However, support for collective action is considered the first step towards participation in collective action: becoming a supporter means becoming part of the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Accordingly, we predict that the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies would be mediated by attitudinal support for violence.

**Method**

**Participants and procedure.** The study was advertised through a British rewards-based online shopping network and targeted students in British universities. It was completed by 308 students of whom 41 were excluded for completing the survey within an unreasonable amount of time. The remaining sample consisted of 267 participants (161 women, 104 men, 2 unknown; age: $M$ = 22.49 years, $SD$ = 4.25). Upon completion, respondents were offered the opportunity to enter into a prize draw.

**Measures.**

***Perceived injustice.*** Prior to administering the measures of interest in this paper, we measured perceived injustice of the proposed education cuts and increase in tuition fees, to ensure that our participants had a motive for supporting or engaging in collective action against it. Perceived injustice was measured using four items ($\alpha = .82$): "Education cuts and fees are justified" (reverse-coded); "Education cuts and fees are unfair"; "Education cuts and fees are immoral"; "Education cuts and fees are legitimate" (reverse-coded). Participants indicated their agreement with these items using 7-point scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

***Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action.*** Participants rated how effective they thought a list of four nonviolent and three violent actions would be at preventing a vote on December 9th in favour of the planned education cuts and fees, using a ten-point scale (0 = *not effective at all*, 9 = *extremely effective*). Nonviolent collective action was operationalised as signing petitions, peaceful demonstrations, classroom walkouts (strikes) and student occupations of university campus buildings. Violent collective action was operationalised as breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower), attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education cuts and fees, and throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians supporting education cuts and fees. All of these actions, except for throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians, had already occurred as part of the student protest activities at the time of the survey.

A principal components analysis using oblique rotation yielded two components with Eigenvalues greater than 1, which accounted for 82.07 % of the variance. Items on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions loaded primarily on one factor (loadings>.70) while items on the perceived efficacy of violent actions loaded on another factor (loadings>.90). The items were averaged to yield composites of the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action (α =.87) and the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (α =.95).

***Support for violent collective action.*** Participants rated the extent to which they supported or opposed the use of three violent actions (same as above) against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9th, on an 11-point scale (-5 = strongly oppose, 0 = neither support nor oppose, 5 = strongly support). The items were averaged to yield a composite score of support for violent collective action (α = .95).

***Violent collective action tendencies.*** Participants rated the likelihood that they would participate in three violent actions (same as above) against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9th, using a ten-point scale (0 = not likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). The items were averaged to yield a composite score of violent collective action tendencies (α = .98).

**Results and Discussion**

A one-sample t-test showed that participants scored significantly above the mid-point scale on the measure of perceived injustice of education cuts and fees ($M$ = 4.82, $SD$ = 1.41): $t$ (266) = 9.62, $p$ <.001. However, 25% of the sample ($N$ = 58) scored lower than the mid-point of the Likert scale (<4), indicating they did not perceive the proposed budget cuts to education and rise in tuition fees to be unfair. Thus, unlike in our two previous studies where participants all viewed

the situation as unjust to a certain extent, in this study a good portion of them did not. Given that our focus in this paper is on how collective action support and action tendencies are influenced by efficacy concerns among those who already perceive a situation as unjust and who thus form part of the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1984), we decided to exclude these 58 participants from our analyses. We reasoned that people who did not view the status quo as unjust would be unlikely to support or participate in collective action to change it, whether or not they thought it might be effective. While it is interesting to test for perceived injustice as a potential moderator of our effects, we were restricted by the relatively small proportion of students ($N$ = 58) who did not view the situation as unfair. After this exclusion, the final sample thus consisted of 209 students (127 women, 80 men, 2 unknown; age: $M$ = 22.38 years, $SD$ = 4.20). Details of all variables of interest and a correlation matrix are reported in Table 7.

**Support for violent collective action.** We regressed support for violent collective action on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, the perceived efficacy of violent collective action, and their interaction, using OLS multiple regression. The regression model explained 67% of the variance in violence support (adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor of violence support, $b$ = .92, $SE$ = .05, $t$ (205) = 17.60, $p$ < .001. Nonviolence efficacy, on the other hand, did not significantly predict violence support, $b$ = -.06, $SE$ = .07, $t$(205) = -.82, $p$ = .42, *ns*. However, again we found a significant interaction between the two predictors, $b$ = .04, $SE$ = .02, $t$ (205) = 1.99, $p$ = .048, which is plotted in Figure 8. Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD) showed, in line with the "nothing to

Table 7

*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 6)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence | 0 to 9 | 5.41 | 2.00 | - | .35*** | .24*** | .20** |
| 2. Perceived Efficacy of Violence | 0 to 9 | 3.50 | 2.82 | | - | .82*** | .71*** |
| 3. Support for Violence | -5 to 5 | -1.17 | 3.23 | | | - | .73*** |
| 4. Violent Action Tendencies | 0 to 9 | 2.40 | 2.85 | | | | - |

** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

lose" hypothesis, that when violence efficacy was low, support for violence was negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, $b$ = -.18, $SE$ = .08, $t$ (205) = -2.12, $p$ = .036. However, when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence efficacy did not significantly predict support for violence, $b$ =.06, $SE$ = .10, $t$ (205) = .61, $p$ = .55, *ns*. The interaction was thus in line with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. Tests of the simple slopes of violence efficacy are reported in Table 13 (p. 128-129).




*Figure 8*. Simple slopes of support for violent collective action regressed on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at mean, low and high levels of the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) (Study 6). The interaction is plotted using unstandardised coefficients.

**Violent collective action tendencies.** We regressed violent collective action tendencies on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, the perceived efficacy of violent collective action, and their interaction, using OLS multiple regression. The regression model explained 50.8% of the variance in violent action tendencies (adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy emerged as a significant positive predictor, $b$ = .70, $SE$ = .69, $t$ (205) = 12.46, $p$ < .001. Nonviolence efficacy, on the other hand, did not significantly predict

violent action tendencies, *b* = -.05, *SE* = .08, *t* (205) = -.68, *p* = .50, *ns*. However, we found an interaction between the two predictors approaching conventional levels of significance, *b* = .04, *SE* = .02, *t* (205) = 1.81, *p* = .07. We probed this interaction further and plotted it in Figure 9.




*Figure 9*. Simple slopes of violent collective action tendencies regressed on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at low, mean and high levels of the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) (Study 6). The interaction is plotted using unstandardised coefficients.

Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD) showed, in line with the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, that when violence efficacy was low, violent action tendencies were negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, *b* = -.17, *SE* = .09, *t* (205) = -1.87, *p* = .03 (one-tailed). Conversely, when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence efficacy did not significantly predict violent action tendencies, *b* = .06, *SE* = .11, *t* (205) = .60, *p* = .55, *ns*. The results were thus, again, in line with the "gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. Tests of the simple slopes of violence efficacy are reported in Table 13 (p. 128-129).

**Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on violent action tendencies.** We set out to investigate if violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy had indirect effects on violent action tendencies through violence support. The significant interaction between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy in predicting violence support and the significant positive correlation between violence support and violent action tendencies (see Table 7) suggested a moderated mediation model, where the interaction between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy has an indirect effect on violent action tendencies through its effect on violence support (Model 2, Preacher & Hayes, 2007). Evidence for this model emerged from the fact that the direct paths from violence efficacy and the interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy to violent action tendencies were weakened by the inclusion of violence support as a predictor (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (see Table 8).

To estimate the conditional indirect effects of our predictors, we used the bootstrapping approach recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2007) for moderated mediation and used their SPSS macro ("modmed"). This macro calculates the Sobel test for conditional indirect effects as well as bootstrap confidence intervals. We used 5000 bootstrap samples to generate 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals to estimate our conditional indirect effects (see Efron, 1987, on the advantage of bias-corrected intervals). An effect is considered significant at $p < .05$ if the values of the estimated effect sizes within the 95% confidence interval do not include zero.

The analyses revealed that the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies via violence support did not differ significantly from

Table 8

*Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Violent Action Tendencies Before and After the Inclusion of Violence Support as a Predictor (Study 6).*

| | *Step 1* | | *Step 2* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predictors | *b*(*SE*) | *t*(205) | *b*(*SE*) | *t*(204) |
| Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence | -.05 (.08) | -.68 | -.03 (.07) | -.41 |
| Perceived Efficacy of Violence | .70 (.06)*** | 12.46 | .34 (.08) | 4.12 |
| Perceived Efficacy of Violence x Efficacy of Nonviolence | .04 (.02)$^{+}$ | 1.81 | .03 (.02) | 1.16 |
| Support for Violence | | | .39 (.07)*** | 5.54 |

*Note.* All predictors except for violence support were centred.

$^{+}$ $p < .10$; *** $p < .001$

zero when violence efficacy was low, point estimate = -.07, $CI_{.95}$ = -.21, .02, nor when violence efficacy was high, point estimate = .02, $CI_{.95}$ = -.05, .14. Note, however, that these effects were still significantly different from each other, given that we had evidence of a moderated mediation model. Although inconclusive, the direction of the effects shows the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support was more negative when violence efficacy was low than when violence efficacy was high, in line with our previous findings[7].

In sum, Study 6 extended some of our findings to a first-party perspective, using a different real-life context, namely British University students' fight against increases in tuition fees and education budget cuts. As expected, the perceived efficacy of violence, overall, positively predicted both support for violent collective action and violent collective action tendencies. Contrary to expectations, however, nonviolence efficacy showed no relation, overall, with violence support nor with violent action tendencies. However, we found additional evidence of a significant interaction between the perceived efficacy of violence and the perceived efficacy of nonviolence in predicting violence support and violent action tendencies, although for the latter the interaction only approached conventional levels of statistical significance. Importantly, the pattern of this interaction was consistent with our two previous studies: the greater the perceived efficacy of violent actions was, the less the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions mattered for deciding whether or not to support violent actions

[7] The analyses also revealed that violence efficacy had a significant positive indirect effect on violent action tendencies via violence support both when nonviolence efficacy was high, point estimate= .39, $CI_{.95}$= .20, .59, and when it was low, point estimate= .33, $CI_{.95}$= .19, .49. This indirect effect was somewhat less strong, however, when nonviolence efficacy was low.

or engage in them, in line with “the gun and the olive branch” moderation hypothesis. In fact, when violence efficacy was high, we found no link between the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action and violence support or violent action tendencies. Hence, participants who perceived violent collective action to have high efficacy supported these actions and reported tendencies to engage in them irrespective of the efficacy of nonviolent actions, which is consistent with the idea that violence and nonviolence are viewed as complementary strategies. Importantly, the results also support the “nothing to lose hypothesis”, since when violence efficacy was low, the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action negatively predicted violence support and violent action tendencies. Although the link with violent action tendencies was only significant using a one-tailed test, this is justified by the directionality of our a priori hypothesis. Hence, perceiving violent actions to have low efficacy did not prevent participants from supporting them or reporting tendencies to engage in them when nonviolent actions were perceived to have low efficacy.

Study 6 also shed some light on the way violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy may impact on violent action tendencies. Indeed we found evidence of a moderated mediation model where the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support is moderated by violence efficacy. Although the simple indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy were not significantly different from zero, the pattern of findings was such that the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support tended to be more negative when violence efficacy was low than when it was high, which is consistent with the pattern of interaction emerging across our studies.

Given that our findings were based on correlational data, however, no causality can be inferred and alternative explanations cannot be ruled out. To remedy this, in Study 7 we tested our hypotheses experimentally, while still using a first-party perspective.

## Study 7

This study used a hypothetical scenario in a national liberation struggle context, where participants were instructed to imagine that they belong to a country under occupation, after which we manipulated the effectiveness of violent and nonviolent means of resistance against the occupation in a 2 x 2 design (effective or ineffective). The advantage of using a hypothetical scenario paradigm is that it allows us to avoid the resistance we are likely to encounter in attempting to manipulate experimentally the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent collective action among group members involved in an actual intergroup conflict. Members of groups in conflict are indeed likely to hold well-formed and deeply-ingrained views about the efficacy of the available means of action. Furthermore, the imaginary scenario paradigm allows us to have greater control over potential confounds involved in the use of existing conflict situations, such as the perceived availability and normativity of certain types of collective action and their perceived costs (see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006 for a discussion of the advantages of using hypothetical society paradigms). Imagined situations have been shown to influence cognition, affect and behaviour in a manner similar to real-life situations (Greenwood, 1989). Examples include the creation of a bystander apathy effect through imagining other people (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002) and improving intergroup attitudes through imagined intergroup contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009).

Importantly, as in Study 6, in this study we examined both support for violent collective action and violent action tendencies. We also extended the focus of our enquiry to assess not only attitudinal support for violence, but also financial support for violent action, operationalised as financial contributions participants would like to make to fund a violent form of collective action. Attitudinal and financial support for violent action are both important to examine, as providing a climate of acceptance and financial support or protection to groups that use violent collective action strategies helps to sustain these groups and their activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Gurr, 1998; Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, & Victoroff, 2008; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Further, Mascini (2006) found that sympathizers with violent Jihad can play an essential role as propagandists, sponsors and potential recruits. Accordingly, we predicted that attitudinal support for violence will mediate the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on both financial support for violent action and on violent collective action tendencies.

**Method**

**Participants.** The study was conducted online and was completed by 222 respondents (111 men, 111 women; age: $M$ = 36.42 years, $SD$ = 13.21). To provide an incentive for participation, we offered participants the opportunity to enter into a prize draw for Amazon vouchers when they completed the study.

**Design.** Participants read an imaginary scenario where they belonged to a fictional country under occupation. They were informed that both violent and nonviolent resistance were being used in their country to fight against the occupation. The effectiveness of each type of resistance was manipulated using a 2 (effective/ineffective nonviolence) x 2 (effective/ineffective violence) between-

subjects factorial design. The experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants were informed that nonviolent resistance against the occupation was used *alone*. Its effectiveness was manipulated such that it was either effective or ineffective. Measures of support for violence and violent action tendencies were then taken. These results, however, are not reported as they are not the focus of the present paper. Second, participants were informed that nonviolence continued to be used and that it either *remained* effective or it *remained* ineffective. Further, violence was now also being used, and it was proving to be either effective or ineffective. Measures of support for violence and violent collective action tendencies were then taken again, and the results are reported in the present paper. Hence, nonviolence effectiveness was manipulated twice and we report the results of the second manipulation, which was actually stronger, since nonviolence was proving to be effective or ineffective for the second time around. Further, participants knew that nonviolence had been tried alone at first and had yielded the same results. The reason we initially used this design was because we were attempting to mimic the manner in which conflicts typically escalate, starting with the exclusive or predominant use of nonviolent methods, and developing with the use of violence (consistent with the "primacy of nonviolence" reasoning).

**Procedure.** The study was advertised on American and British websites posting online psychological experiments, as well as through a British rewards-based online shopping network. It was also advertised through Facebook, targeting users aged 18 years or older, living in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada or Australia. The study was introduced as a social/political psychology study titled "living under occupation". When clicking

on the link, respondents were informed that they would be reading an imaginary scenario where they belonged to a country under occupation, and that we were interested in how they thought they would act under such circumstances.

After completing socio-demographic measures, participants started reading the scenario. They were asked to imagine that they belonged to an underdeveloped nation called Zed, which had come under foreign military occupation by a powerful and developed neighbouring democratic country called Alpha. Zed had not been able to fight the occupation using its army because it was militarily much weaker than Alpha. To ensure that participants had a motive to support or engage in collective action, we measured the perceived illegitimacy of the occupation.

The scenario read on that a resistance movement developed among the Zed people, whose aim was to achieve liberation by undermining public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people, as the occupation could not be sustained without such support. After completing the first part of the experiment which involved the use of nonviolent resistance alone, participants read that some time had passed by during which both violence and nonviolence had actually been used. They were informed that violence was proving to be either effective or ineffective and that nonviolence *remained* effective or *remained* ineffective. This was followed by manipulation checks. Participants subsequently read that several meetings were taking place between Zed's different resistance groups to evaluate the situation and decide on how best to continue resisting, and that we would like to get their opinion as Zed citizens on this issue. We then measured our dependent variables.

As in Study 5, nonviolent collective action was operationalised as nonviolent campaigns that included mass protests and mass civil disobedience activities, such as general strikes, resisting taxes, boycotting Alpha's products and blocking roads with sit-ins. Violent collective action was operationalised as guerrilla resistance, involving attacks against military targets, namely Alpha soldiers. The effectiveness of each type of action was manipulated by providing participants with feedback about whether nonviolent campaigns or guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers were proving to be effective or ineffective at reducing public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people, according to independent media analyses and public opinion surveys among the Alpha population

To ensure that the costs involved in the use of a particular type of resistance were the same whether it was effective or not, we provided participants with feedback about the losses incurred each time one type of resistance was used: during nonviolent campaigns some Zed people were beaten, arrested or imprisoned. Conversely, some guerrilla members were killed, others were captured, tortured, and imprisoned. We also mentioned that several Alpha soldiers were killed during Zed guerrilla operations. The costs of violent resistance were kept greater than those of nonviolent resistance in order to make the scenario more realistic.

**Measures.**

***Manipulation and control checks.*** We used a categorical manipulation check. Participants were asked to indicate whether nonviolent campaigns were proving to be effective or ineffective at reducing public opinion support for the

occupation among the Alpha people. The same manipulation check was used for guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers.

To check the perceived injustice of the occupation, we asked participants the extent to which they viewed the occupation as *unfair*, *legitimate* (reverse-coded) and *morally wrong*, using a nine-point scale numbered from 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely"). The items were averaged to yield an index of perceived injustice of the occupation ($\alpha = .51$).

***Attitudinal support for violent collective action.*** Participants rated the extent to which they supported or opposed the use of guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers in order to achieve liberation, using an eleven-point scale numbered from -5 ("completely oppose") to +5 ("completely support"), with 0 labelled "neither support nor oppose".

***Financial support for violent collective action***. Participants were asked to assume they had 100 Zed pounds to spare at the end of each month (specified as equal to 100 GBP) and that violent and nonviolent resistance operations required equal amounts of funding to be carried out. Participants were then asked to indicate the amount of money they would like to save for themselves and their families, and the amount of money they wished to contribute to help fund a) nonviolent campaigns and b) guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers. Note that although we refer to this variable as financial support, it is obviously the financial contribution participants *desire* to make to fund each type of collective action.

***Violent collective action tendencies***. Participants rated the likelihood that they would join a Zed resistance group that engaged in a Zed guerrilla group that engaged in attacks against Alpha soldiers, using nine-point scales numbered from 1 ("not likely at all") to 9 ("very likely").

**Results and Discussion**

Of the initial sample, 24 did not answer the manipulation checks correctly, and 12 participants had more than 10% of their data missing, while another two participants were outliers in terms of the duration of study completion. Their data were thus excluded from the analyses. The final sample consisted of 184 participants (89 women, 95 men; age: $M$ = 36.55 years, $SD$ = 13.04) of various nationalities. English was the native language for 81.5% of our participants. For the remaining participants, level of English was intermediate or above.

**Missing value analysis.** There were some missing values (< 5% per variable) in our dataset. These were imputed using the expectation maximization method (EM) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Any imputed values out of the scales' range were adjusted to the nearest score within the scales' range.

**Manipulation checks.** All participants retained in the final sample answered the manipulation checks correctly.

**Perceived injustice.** Participants scored significantly higher than the mid-point scale on the perceived injustice of the occupation ($M$ = 7.8, $SD$ = 1.44; minimum score = 3), as indicated by a one-sample t-test, $t$ (183) = 31.27, $p$ < .001.

**Experimental analysis.** In the following section we examine the effects of the manipulations of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on our dependent variables, namely attitudinal as well as financial support for violent collective action, and violent collective action tendencies. Means and standard deviations of attitudinal and financial support for violent action as well as violent collective action tendencies, as a function of violence and nonviolence

effectiveness are reported in Table 9. Details of these variables across groups and a correlation matrix are reported in Table 10.

***Attitudinal Violence support.*** We conducted a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on attitudinal violence support, with violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as factors. As expected, we found a significant main effect of violence efficacy, $F$ (1, 180) = 19.03; $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$, such that participants were more supportive of violence when it was effective than when it was ineffective. We also found the predicted main effect of nonviolence efficacy, $F$ (1, 180) = 4.32; $p = .04$, $\eta^2 = .02$, such that participants were more supportive of violence when nonviolence was ineffective than when it was effective. However, unlike in our previous studies and consistent with the "independent effects" hypothesis, no interaction was found between the two factors, $F$ (1, 180) < 1, *ns*.

***Financial support for violent collective action***. Data screening revealed this variable had substantial positive skewness and outliers. A square root transformation improved its distribution and successfully reduced the influence of outliers. The analyses we report refer to the transformed variable. We conducted a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on financial support for violence, with violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as factors. As expected, we found a significant main effect of violence efficacy, $F$ (1, 180) = 14.11; $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .07$, such that participants were willing to give a greater financial contribution to violent action when violence was effective than when it was ineffective. We also found the predicted main effect of nonviolence efficacy, $F$ (1, 180) = 4.55; $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .03$, such that participants were willing to give a greater financial contribution to violent action when nonviolence was ineffective than when it was not. Again, however, consistent with the "independent effects" hypothesis, no interaction was

Table 9

*Violent Collective Action Measures as a Function of Violence Efficacy and Nonviolence Efficacy (Study 7).*

| | | Low Nonviolence Efficacy | | High Nonviolence Efficacy | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DV | Scale | Low Violence Efficacy | High Violence Efficacy | Low Violence Efficacy | High Violence Efficacy |
| Attitudinal Violence Support | -5 to 5 | -.67 | 1.15 | -2.04 | .46 |
| | | (3.55) | (3.33) | (2.99) | (3.53) |
| Financial Violence Support[a] | 0 to 100 | 9.61 | 23.00 | 7.83 | 15.98 |
| | | (15.23) | (26.31) | (18.67) | (20.57) |
| Violent Action Tendencies | 1 to 9 | 2.85 | 4.11 | 2.24 | 3.93 |
| | | (2.51) | (2.99) | (2.10) | (3.12) |

*Note.* Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means.

[a] Before square root transformation

Table 10
*Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Criterion Variables (Study 7)*

| | Scale | *M* | *SD* | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Attitudinal Support for Violence | -5 to 5 | -.28 | 3.54 | - | .81*** | .78*** |
| 2. Financial Support for Violence[a] | 0 to 100 | 14.10 | 21.28 | | - | .80*** |
| 3. Violent Action Tendencies | 1 to 9 | 3.28 | 2.80 | | | - |

[a] Correlations based on transformed variable
*** $p < .001$

found between the two factors, $F$ (1, 180) < 1, *ns*.

***Violent collective action tendencies***. We conducted a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on violent action tendencies, with violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as factors. As expected, we found a significant main effect of violence efficacy on violent action tendencies, $F$ (1, 180) = 13.67; $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .07$, with participants reporting stronger violent action tendencies when violence was effective than when it was ineffective. However, we found no main effect of nonviolence efficacy: $F$ (1, 180) < 1; *ns*. Further, the interaction between the two factors was, again, not significant: $F$ (1, 180) < 1, *ns*.

Results of all main effects, and simple effect tests or simple slope tests in Studies 4-7 are summarized in Table 13 (p. 128-129).

***Mediation and indirect effects analyses*.** Next, we investigated whether attitudinal support for violence mediates the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on financial support for violence and on violent action tendencies. To estimate these indirect effects, as in Study 6, we relied on the bootstrapping approach recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008). We used their SPSS macro ("indirect") to produce 5000 random samples in order to generate 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals of the estimates of these indirect effects. For all mediation analyses, we recoded violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy using effects coding (-1 for ineffective and 1 for effective) then regressed the dependent variable of interest on the predictors of interest.

*Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on financial support for violence.* Given that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy had significant effects on attitudinal violence support, and that attitudinal violence support was positively correlated with financial violence support (see Table 10), we were able to test for mediation. Evidence for mediation emerged from the fact

that the effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on financial violence support were weakened by the inclusion of attitudinal violence support as a predictor (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (see Table 11).

We first estimated the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy, while controlling for violence efficacy and the interaction between the two predictors. The analysis revealed that nonviolence efficacy had a significant negative indirect effect on financial support for violence via attitudinal support for violence, point estimate = -.33, $CI_{.95}$ = -.63, -.02. We then estimated the indirect effect of violence efficacy on financial violence support through attitudinal violence support, while controlling for nonviolence efficacy and the interaction between nonviolence and violence efficacy. This analysis revealed that violence efficacy had a significant positive indirect effect on financial support for violence via attitudinal violence support, point estimate = .70, $CI_{.95}$ = .39, 1.03.

*Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on violent action tendencies.* Given that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy had significant effects on attitudinal violence support, and that attitudinal violence support was positively correlated with violent action tendencies (see Table 10), we were able to test for mediation and indirect effects. The effect of violence efficacy on violent action tendencies was weakened by the inclusion of attitudinal violence support as a predictor, which provided evidence of mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (see Table 12).

We first estimated the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy, while controlling for violence efficacy and the interaction between the two predictors. This analysis revealed that nonviolence efficacy had a significant indirect effect

Table 11

*Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Financial Violence Support Before and After the Inclusion of Attitudinal Violence Support as a Predictor (Study 7).*

| | *Step 1* | | *Step 2* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predictors | *b* (*SE*) | *t*(181) | *b*(*SE*) | *t*(180) |
| Effectiveness of Nonviolence | -.43 (.20)* | -2.13 | -.10 (.12) | -.78 |
| Effectiveness of Violence | .75 (.20)*** | 3.76 | .06 (.13) | .46 |
| Effectiveness of Violence x Effectiveness of Nonviolence | -.09 (.20) | -.43 | -.20 (.13) | -1.59 |
| Attitudinal Support for Violence | | | .64 (.04)*** | 17.46 |

* $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$

on violent action tendencies through attitudinal violence support, point estimate = -.32, $CI_{.95}$ = -.60, -.02. We then estimated the indirect effect of violence efficacy on violent action tendencies through attitudinal violence support, while controlling for nonviolence efficacy and the interaction between nonviolence and violence efficacy. This analysis revealed that violence efficacy had a significant positive indirect effect on violent action tendencies via attitudinal violence support, point estimate = .66, $CI_{.95}$ = .35, .97.

To summarize, Study 7 provided experimental evidence in support of our main effects hypotheses in the context of an imaginary national liberation struggle from a first-party perspective, but no evidence of an interaction effect. Violence efficacy had the predicted main effect on both attitudinal and financial support for violence, which were both greater when violence was effective than when it was ineffective. The efficacy of nonviolent collective action also had the predicted main effect on both attitudinal and financial support for violent collective action, which were greater when nonviolence was ineffective than when it was effective. However, contrary to our previous studies, we found no evidence of an interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy in predicting attitudinal or financial support for violence. The results were thus in line with the "independent effects" hypothesis.

We found mixed results for violent action tendencies. While we found the predicted main effect of violence efficacy, with participants showing greater tendencies to engage in violent action when violence was effective, there was unexpectedly no main effect of nonviolence efficacy, nor was there evidence of an interaction effect between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy.

Table 12

*Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Violent Action Tendencies Before and After the Inclusion of Attitudinal Violence Support as a Predictor (Study 7).*

| | *Step 1* | | *Step 2* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predictors | *b* (*SE*) | *t*(181) | *b*(*SE*) | *t*(180) |
| Effectiveness of Nonviolence | -.20 (.20) | -.98 | .12 (.13) | .91 |
| Effectiveness of Violence | .74 (.20)*** | 3.70 | .08 (.14) | .57 |
| Effectiveness of Violence x Effectiveness of Nonviolence | .11 (.20) | .54 | .01 (.13) | 1.16 |
| Attitudinal Support for Violence | | | .61 (.04)*** | 15.56 |

*** $p < .001$

Table 13

*Summary Table of Results (Studies 4-7)*

| | | Study 1 | Study 2 | | Study 3 | | Study 4 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Experimental Analysis | Internal Analysis | | | | | |
| | | Violence Support[a] | Violence Support | Violence Support[a] | Violence Support[a] | Violent Action Tendencies[a] | Attitudinal Violence Support | Financial Violence Support | Violent Action Tendencies |
| Main Effect: Violence Efficacy | | .77 (.06), *t*(206)=12.39, .62*** | *F* (1,116)<1 | .46 (.11), *t*(116)=4.07, .35*** | .92 (.05) *t*(205)=17.60, .80*** | .70 (.69), *t*(205)=12.46, .69*** | *F* (1,180) =19.03*** | *F* (1,180) =14.11*** | *F* (1,180) =13.67*** |
| Main effect: Nonviolence Efficacy | | -.31 (.06), *t*(206)=-4.98, -.25*** | *F* (1,116)=1.32 | -.21 (.13), *t*(116)=-1.65, -.14$^{++}$ | -.06 (.07), *t*(205)<1, -.04 | -.05 (.08), *t*(205)<1, -.04 | *F* (1,180) = 4.32* | *F* (1,180) = 4.55* | *F* (1,180) <1 |
| Interaction | | .11 (.04), *t*(206)=3.04, .13** | *F* (1,116)=1.80 | .15 (.23), *t*(116)=2.67, .22** | .04 (.02), *t*(205)=1.99, .07* | .04 (.02), *t*(205)=1.81, .08$^{+}$ | *F* (1,180) <1 | *F* (1,180) <1 | *F* (1,180) <1 |
| Simple Effects: Nonviolence Efficacy | Low Violence Efficacy | -.47 (.09), *t*(206)=-5.4, -.38*** | *F* (1,116) =3.11$^{++}$ | -.53 (.16), *t*(116)=-3.41, -.36*** | -.18 (.08), *t*(205)=-2.12, -.11* | -.17 (.09), *t*(205)=-1.87, -.12$^{+++}$ | | | |
| | High Violence Efficacy | -.14 (.08), *t*(206)=-1.83, -.11$^{+}$ | *F* (1,116)<1 | .11 (.19), *t*(116)<1, .08 | .06 (.10), *t*(205)<1, .04 | .06 (.11), *t*(205)<1, .05 | | | |

[a] For correlational analyses, we report unstandardised regression weights first, followed by standard errors in parentheses, t-values, and standardized regression weights.

$^{+}$ $p$ < .10, two-tailed; * $p$< .05, two-tailed; ** $p$< .01, two-tailed; *** $p$ < .001, two-tailed; $^{++}$ $p$ < .10, one-tailed; $^{+++}$$p$ < .05, one-tailed.

Table 13 Continued

*Summary Table of Results (Studies 4-7)*

| | | Study 1 | Study 2 | | Study 3 | | Study 4 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Experimental Analysis | Internal Analysis | | | | | |
| | | Violence Support[a] | Violence Support | Violence Support[a] | Violence Support[a] | Violent Action Tendencies[a] | Attitudinal Violence Support | Financial Violence Support | Violent Action Tendencies |
| Simple Effects: Violence Efficacy | Low Nonviolence Efficacy | .60 (.49), *t*(206)=6.65, .49*** | *F* (1,116)<1 | *.17 (.17), t(116)=1.00, .13* | .84 (.08), *t*(205)=10.73, .73*** | .62 (.08), *t*(205)=7.38, .61*** | | | |
| | High Nonviolence Efficacy | .93 (.07), *t*(206)=12.78, .76*** | *F* (1,116)=2.38 | *.76 (.14), t(116)=5.35, .57**** | 1.00 (.05), *t*(205)=18.55, .88*** | .78 (.06), *t*(205)=13.44, .78*** | | | |

[a] For correlational analyses, we report unstandardised regression weights first, followed by standard errors in parentheses, t-values, and standardized regression weights.

$^{+}p < .10$, two-tailed; * $p < .05$, two-tailed; ** $p < .01$, two-tailed; *** $p < .001$, two-tailed; $^{++}p < .10$, one-tailed; $^{+++}p < .05$, one-tailed.

Importantly, however, we found evidence of an indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through attitudinal support for violence. That is, lower efficacy of nonviolence increased support for violence which, in turn, increased violent action tendencies.

Although we found no interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy in predicting violent collective action measures in this study, the main effect of nonviolence efficacy can be generalized to the case where violence efficacy is low. Hence, as expected and consistent with the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, when violence efficacy was low, nonviolence efficacy did negatively predict attitudinal and financial support for violence and, indirectly, violent action tendencies. Importantly, nonviolence efficacy had the same effect when violence efficacy was high, in line with the idea that there is less value in using violence when nonviolence efficacy is high. Nevertheless, nonviolence efficacy did not wipe out the main effect of violence efficacy. Hence, violence efficacy still increased attitudinal and financial support for violence and violent action tendencies, when nonviolence efficacy was high, suggesting that violence and nonviolence were viewed as complementary strategies.

Study 7, like Study 6, highlighted the importance of attitudinal support for violence in mediating the process through which violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy impact more behavioural measures of violent action. Indeed, the effects of both violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on financial support for violence and on violent action tendencies were mediated by attitudinal support for violence.

## General Discussion

The aim of the present research was to examine how violent forms of collective action are predicted by their perceived efficacy, as well as by the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action, and the potential interaction between the two. We presented the results of four studies that examined these relations in different contexts using experimental and correlational designs. In the following sections we assess our findings in relation to our predictions and suggest directions for future research. We then discuss some limitations in our research, after which we turn to the theoretical contributions and practical implications of our findings.

### Main Effect of Violence Efficacy on Violent Action

Based on the expectancy-value theory of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the well-established finding that nonviolent forms of collective action are positively predicted by their perceived efficacy (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), we expected that the perceived efficacy of violent actions at redressing perceived injustices would overall positively predict support for violent forms of collective action and violent action tendencies. We found both correlational and experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis. Specifically, violence efficacy positively predicted violent action in the context of third-party support for violent Palestinian resistance among international activists (Study 4), in the context of British university students' fight against planned increases in tuition fees (Study 6), and in the context of resistance against an imagined foreign occupation of one's country (Study 7). However, we found mixed support for this hypothesis in Study 5, which examined support for armed Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation among non-activist third parties

after manipulating the efficacy of violent and nonviolent resistance. The main effect of violence efficacy on support for violence was not significant in this study. This might be due to participants' own deeply-held views about the (in)efficacy of violence, which may have constrained the strength of our manipulation. An internal analysis revealed, however, that the *perceived* efficacy of violent collective action was overall positively related with support for violence, consistent with our hypothesis.

**Main Effect of Nonviolence Efficacy on Violent Action**

Based on the idea that people are more likely to resort to political violence when nonviolent forms of action fail to achieve desired group goals (e.g. Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974), and in view of initial empirical support for this idea (Louis et al., 2011), we expected the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action to be overall negatively predictive of support for violent action and violent action tendencies. We found mixed evidence for our hypothesis. A significant negative overall relation between nonviolence efficacy and support for violent action emerged in the context of third-party support for violent Palestinian resistance among international activists (Study 4). We also found a significant main effect of nonviolence efficacy on both attitudinal and financial support for violence in the context of resistance against an imagined foreign occupation, as well as a significant indirect main effect on violent action tendencies, via attitudinal support for violence (Study 7). By contrast, in Study 5, nonviolence efficacy had no main effect on support for violent Palestinian resistance among non-activist third-parties, while the internal analysis revealed a non-significant negative overall trend between the *perceived* efficacy of nonviolent action and support for violent Palestinian resistance. In Study 6, however, no overall

relationship was found between nonviolence efficacy and support for violent action or violent action tendencies in the context of British University students' fight against increased tuition fees. Hence, we did not find consistent support for a negative overall relation between nonviolence efficacy and violence. However, as will become clearer in the next section, when no overall relation was found between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, we still found an interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy.

**Violence Efficacy as a Moderator of the Link between Nonviolence Efficacy and Violence**

A key question in our research was whether the perceived efficacy of violent collective action interacts with the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action in predicting support for violence and violent action tendencies. We considered two competing moderation hypotheses. Based on the idea that violence is used as a last resort (Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974; Louis et al., 2011), one possibility was that the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the more impact the efficacy of nonviolence would have on whether or not to pursue violent action. We termed this the "primacy of nonviolence" moderation hypothesis. On the other hand, based on the idea that violent and nonviolent actions need not be mutually exclusive strategies (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), another possibility was that the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the *less* impact the efficacy of nonviolence would have on whether or not to pursue violent action. We termed this "the gun and the olive branch" moderation hypothesis. We also considered a third hypothesis, where violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy have independent effects on violent action: the "independent effects" hypothesis.

We found an interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy in predicting violence support and violent action tendencies in three studies. Consistent with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis, nonviolence efficacy negatively predicted violence support and violent action tendencies when violence efficacy was low, but when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence efficacy was not significantly related to violence support and violent action tendencies (Studies 4-6). Hence, contrary to the prevalent idea that people give primacy to nonviolent means of change, these studies suggest that if violence promises to be an effective way of achieving a desired social change goal, people would support violent actions and be willing to engage in them even when nonviolence is potentially effective. It is important to stress, however, that this does not mean that people would only pursue violent action. Instead, it is likely that people in this case regard violent and nonviolent actions as complementary strategies to be used alongside each other, as a way to maximize the chances of achieving the desired social change goal or to achieve it more efficiently.

The results in Study 7, however, were not consistent with "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis. In line with the "independent effects" hypothesis, nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy had significant main effects on violence support and on violent action tendencies (although nonviolence efficacy had only an indirect effect on the latter), but the two predictors did not interact. Hence, greater nonviolence efficacy decreased support for violent action and (indirectly) violent action tendencies, even when violence efficacy was high. At the same time, however, it should be noted that violence efficacy remained a positive predictor of support for violence and (indirectly) of violent action tendencies, even when nonviolence efficacy was high. Hence, people were

relatively still ready to pursue violent action when it had high efficacy, despite the high efficacy of nonviolent action. Importantly, no support for the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis was found in this study or the others.

The mixed support for "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis indicates that future research should determine the conditions under which violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy have independent effects on violent collective action (as in Study 7), and the conditions under which they interact in "the gun and the olive branch" pattern (Studies 4-6). This essentially entails investigating why nonviolence efficacy is sometimes equally predictive of violent action whether violence efficacy is high or low (Study 7), while at other times it is less predictive of violent action when violence efficacy is high (Studies 4-6). What distinguishes Study 7 is that participants judged a context where nonviolence had first been used alone and proved to be effective or ineffective, then it was used alongside violence, and continued to be effective or ineffective, whereas in Studies 4-6, participants judged a context where both violent and nonviolent forms of action were being pursued in parallel. The presence or absence of a history of using nonviolent collective action on its own, or the repeated success or failure of nonviolent collective action in Study 7 might have thus yielded different results. Future research should investigate this further.

The lack of support for the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis may seem intriguing, in light of the widespread norm of using violence as a last resort. It is important, however, to point out that our results do *not* necessarily indicate that in response to social or political grievances, people would *initiate* both violent and nonviolent collective action in parallel if they believe both are promising, rather than try nonviolent action first and turn to violent action at a

second stage, if nonviolence proves to be insufficient (in line with the idea of using violence as a last resort). Our findings were indeed all based on contexts where both violent and nonviolent collective action had already been initiated. Therefore participants who perceived both violent and nonviolent collective action as promising strategies had to judge whether or not they would favour the *continuation* of violent collective action. Our research thus helps explain the perpetuation of violent action. It is not clear if the same results would be obtained for the *initiation* of violence. Importantly, we found no evidence for the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis, which assumes that those who view both violent and nonviolent action as promising strategies would favour the pursuit of nonviolence alone. Instead, our results supported "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis and the "independent effects" hypothesis, indicating that where both violent and nonviolent action are in use, people are relatively reluctant to abandon violent action if it seems to be effective, even if nonviolent action seems effective as well. In order to do a more extensive evaluation of the "primacy of nonviolence" hypothesis, however, it is imperative that future research tests whether people would be willing to *initiate* both violent and nonviolent collective action in parallel if they viewed both as effective. It may well be that they would opt for the use of nonviolent action alone at first before resorting to violence. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while those who believe that nonviolence has high efficacy may not *initiate* violence even if they think it might be effective, there is a chance that others will view nonviolence as ineffective and thus initiate violence. Should violence prove to be effective, our results suggest that even those who believe that nonviolence is effective may then, in relative terms, support violent action and be willing to engage in it

(probably alongside nonviolence). In order to map the initiation and development of violent action as a function of perceptions of violence and nonviolence efficacy, however, it is essential that future research uses longitudinal designs.

**The "Nothing to Lose" Hypothesis**

Importantly, contrary to the idea that people refrain from collective action when there is a low chance of improving the status quo (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001), we predicted that at low levels of violence efficacy, violent action should be negatively predicted by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions, because when neither violent nor nonviolent actions seem promising, people may reason that they have nothing to lose through violent action or hope that violence might still help the group in some way by unsettling the status quo (e.g. Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). We termed this the "nothing to lose" hypothesis. In line with our prediction, consistently across all four studies, we found that when the perceived efficacy of violence was low, the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action negatively predicted attitudinal support for violent collective action, but also financial support for violence (Study 7). Importantly, these results extended to violent action tendencies. In Study 6, nonviolence efficacy negatively and directly predicted violence support as well as violent action tendencies (though weakly) when violence efficacy was low. Note that the weakness of this effect is not surprising or problematic. According to classic attitude-behaviour models in psychology (e.g. Ajzen, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974), intentions are more proximal predictors of action than attitudes. Attitudes are indeed considered relatively idealistic whereas intentions take more account of practical constraints.

For example, in a recent meta-analysis, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) found the relations between the classical antecedents of collective action (injustice, identification and efficacy) and nonviolent forms of collective action to be strongest for attitudinal measures of collective action and weaker for intentions to engage in collective action and behavioural measures. Study 6 also found that the effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support was moderated by violence efficacy. Although the simple indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support were not significantly different from zero, there was still a negative trend when violence efficacy was low. Furthermore, nonviolence efficacy had a significant main effect on violent action tendencies in Study 7, independently of violence efficacy, although this effect was *indirect* via attitudinal support for violence. In sum, our studies indicate that the inefficacy of nonviolence is linked with stronger violent action tendencies when violence efficacy is low, though it is not clear whether this effect is direct or indirect (via attitudinal violence support). Future research should thus examine mediators that could affect violent action tendencies in ways that cancel out the effect of attitudinal support for violence, which may explain the null direct effect of nonviolence efficacy in Study 7 (see Hayes, 2009).

The finding that nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts violent action when violence has low efficacy (the "nothing to lose" hypothesis) is important as it questions the basis of the traditional view in the literature on efficacy (and stability) that collective action would be least likely to occur when the scope for change is most restricted (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). If this view is valid,

violent collective action should be least appealing among those who believe that both violent and nonviolent strategies have low efficacy. Instead, our results show that violence support and violent action tendencies are *not* at their lowest here, but are at their lowest among those who believe violence has low efficacy and nonviolence has high efficacy. Our findings are consistent with an emerging body of research that suggests greater aggressive or violent group action in situations characterized by restricted scope for change (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears, et al., 2011; Tausch, et al., 2011). However, unlike this other research which has only considered the effects of the perceived changeability of the status quo in general, the present work is the first to consider the independent contributions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy and their interaction.

As previously mentioned, however, our results were all based on contexts where violent and nonviolent collective actions were already being pursued. One could therefore argue that they cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence that people who perceive both violent and nonviolent collective action to have low efficacy will necessarily *initiate* violent action in response to grievances. It may be the case that, in line with the traditional view in the literature, people who view both violent and nonviolent action to have low efficacy (and thus experience the situation as highly stable) would be unlikely to initiate any form of collective action. Wright (2001), for example, argues that when disadvantaged group members consider their disadvantage to be illegitimate but believe intergroup relations to be unchangeable, they are unlikely to take strategic collective action, not because they accept the situation, but because they angrily admit that it cannot be changed. In his view, the apparent inaction of disadvantaged group members results in pluralistic ignorance regarding the extent of opposition to the

status quo, which perpetuates inaction despite potentially high private support for it. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that at any one point there is likely to be variability among group members in their perceptions of the efficacy of violent and nonviolent action. Hence, members of a disadvantaged group who perceive both violent and nonviolent action to have low efficacy may not initiate any collective action, but there may be others who will view violent or nonviolent action as effective and will therefore initiate such actions. Importantly, our results suggest that if violent and nonviolent action are initiated, those who believe that both strategies have low chances of success will then show relative support for violence and some willingness to engage in violent action. In order to conduct a more extensive evaluation of the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, however, it is imperative that future research tests if those who view violent and nonviolent action to have low efficacy would initiate violent (or nonviolent) collective action. Again, a potentially fruitful direction for future research is to use longitudinal designs to map the initiation and development of support for violent action and violent action tendencies.

An important question raised by this finding is whether violent collective action in conditions offering little hope for change is strategic. Is it intended to improve the circumstance of the group on behalf of whom it is undertaken, or is it a reactive outburst to severe frustration that lacks strategic intent (Wright, 2001)? Indeed why would there be increased support for violence and violent action tendencies in response to the low efficacy of nonviolence, despite the low efficacy of violence itself and especially considering the potential costs involved in the use of violence and the harm it may do to a group's image (Scheepers et al., 2006)? Although violent action may at times seem to be reactive, it has been

argued elsewhere that it can be more strategic than it appears to be (see Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995; Wright, 2001). Building on Scheepers et al. (2006) and Spears et al.'s (2011) "nothing to lose" argument, as well as Masters' (2004) line of reasoning, we argue that violent action in conditions offering little hope for change may well be strategic (see also Tausch et al., 2011), because although it has low efficacy people may still consider it to be more promising than inaction, which would only preserve the status quo[8]. There are various reasons why people may think violent action would help, such as influencing wider public opinion, building a movement, and winning third parties for the cause (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006); perhaps by provoking an extreme counter-action by the opponent (see Sedgwick, 2004). Violent action might thus unsettle the status quo and facilitate the conditions that could lead to the desired social change in the long run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears et al., 2011). It is also possible, however, that violent action in a situation offering little hope for change is driven by alternative motives such as punishment or revenge, where it is intended to inflict harm on the perceived perpetrator of the social injustice without necessarily helping to end the ongoing perceived injustice. That being said, revenge and punishment may still be part of an attempt to impose or restore justice to the moral order, and therefore have an (indirect) social change function (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2010). In light of the growing evidence of increased tendencies for aggressive or violent group actions in situations offering little scope for change, as shown in our research and other studies (Tausch et al., 2011; Spears et al., 2011), it is important that future

[8] Note that this does not preclude the conjoint use of nonviolent action. We measured support for nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both Studies 6 and 7. Levels of nonviolence support and nonviolent action tendencies generally exceeded levels of violence support and violent action tendencies, irrespective of the efficacy of each action.

research investigate the processes underlying this phenomenon (see Spears et al., 2011, for initial evidence).

**Attitudinal Support for Violent Action as a Mediator**

Like most past research, we have focused on support for violent collective action and violent collective action tendencies as dependent measures. While it is important to assess actual participation in collective action, behavioural measures are rare in the literature given the difficulties of obtaining them (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), particularly when it comes to violent actions. Collective action intentions are, however, good predictors of actual participation in collective action (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Further, our results help shed light on the role of attitudinal support for violent action as a predictor of measures that are more proximal to actual violent behaviour, such as financial support for violence and violent action tendencies. To our knowledge, ours is the first research to explore support for violent action as a potential mediator of the effects of a classical antecedent of collective action (efficacy) on more behavioural measures of violent action. In Study 6 the link between nonviolence efficacy and violent action tendencies was mediated through attitudinal support for violence and moderated by violence efficacy. In Study 7, both violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy predicted violent action tendencies and financial support for violence through attitudinal support for violence. Our findings are thus consistent with the view that attitudinal forms of collective action are important to measure as they may influence behaviour at a later stage (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

Support for collective action is indeed considered the first step towards participation in collective action: becoming a supporter means becoming part of

the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see Mascini, 2006). Further, our results underscore the importance of examining support for violent action in its own right even if it does not lead to direct participation in violent action, because attitudinal support can translate into material support for groups that use violent collective action strategies, which can help to sustain these groups and their activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Gurr, 1998; Kruglanski et al., 2008; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Nevertheless, it is important that future studies test our hypotheses using measures of actual participation in violent collective action.

**Limitations**

Like most past research, our research has not distinguished the reasons for which collective action might be perceived as potentially effective or ineffective. Violent or nonviolent action may be perceived as ineffective because the outgroup is seen as unlikely to respond (Bandura, 2000; Wright, 2001) or likely to be oppressive towards such action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 2004) or because there is a perceived lack of resources to produce action that would get the desired response from the outgroup (e.g. lack of social support, see van Zomeren et al., 2004). The effect of efficacy perceptions on collective action might differ depending on the reasons for efficacy or inefficacy. Future research could investigate these possibilities.

Importantly, our research has also not examined the extent to which violent action is predicted by the perceived risk that violent or nonviolent action will bring the group further away from their goal. Indeed our studies have only measured or manipulated the perceived likelihood that violent or nonviolent action will *help* the group achieve their desired goal, but not the perceived

potential counter-productivity of such actions. This is particularly relevant in the case of violent collective action, which might antagonise the outgroup, reduce third-party support, or provoke violent retributions that weaken the resisting group. It is thus imperative that future research complete the picture by examining how the perceived counter-productivity of violent action fits in the picture.

It should also be noted that our research has examined only specific forms of violent action, namely guerrilla resistance in the context of a foreign occupation of a nation as well as destruction of property and aggression directed at politicians in the context of student protests. To test the generalisability of our results, future research should explore other forms of violent action in different contexts, such as violence against civilians, especially in light of the current interest in research on terrorism. Further, while the current paper has focused exclusively on violent collective action, future research should also examine how violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy influence support for and tendencies to engage in nonviolent collective action, in order to complete the picture. As established by previous research (van Zomeren, et al., 2008), support for and tendencies to engage in nonviolence should be positively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, but future research could explore the role of violence efficacy in

this equation[9].

**Contributions and Implications of the Present Research**

Despite the limitations of the present research we believe it extends the literature on efficacy and collective action in several important ways. By investigating the role of efficacy in predicting *violent* forms of collective action, our research answers recent calls to move beyond the predominant focus on predictors of nonviolent collective action (Wright, 2009). To our knowledge, the present research is the first to examine how the perceived efficacy of violent forms of collective action relates to support for such actions and tendencies to engage in them. Given that political violence is the focal outcome of much theoretical and societal interest, it does seem important to take into account its perceived efficacy as a motivating factor. The present research also contributes some rare quantitative evidence to the much hypothesized link between the perceived efficacy of nonviolence and violent action. Moreover, it goes beyond existing data (e.g. Louis et al., 2011) by testing the interaction between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy.

Based on the idea that violence is used a last resort, previous research showing a negative link between nonviolence efficacy and support for violence emphasizes the importance of increasing perceptions of the efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action in order to minimize violent action (e.g. Louis et al.,

[9] We measured support for nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both Studies 6 and 7. As expected, nonviolence efficacy positively predicted support for nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both studies. The results, however, were inconsistent with regard to the role of violence efficacy. In Study 7, we found no link between violence efficacy and attitudinal or financial support for nonviolent action or nonviolent action tendencies. In Study 6, however, we found a significant interaction between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy in predicting nonviolence support, such that violence efficacy *negatively* predicted nonviolence support when nonviolence efficacy was low, but not when it was high. Conversely, violence efficacy *positively* predicted nonviolent action tendencies. No interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy was found in predicting nonviolent action tendencies.

2011). Our research shows, however, that in contexts where both violent and nonviolent action are in use, if people believe that violent action will contribute to redressing a perceived injustice, increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolence may have little effect in reducing support for violence or tendencies to engage in it, or, at least it may not maximally reduce them. Instead, in circumstances where both violence and nonviolence are perceived to work, people seem to opt for "the gun and the olive branch" strategy, whereby violence is pursued alongside nonviolence. It is likely that conflicts where both armed and nonviolent resistance are used in parallel, such as in Burma, Chile, the Philippines and Nepal (Dudouet, 2008), reflect underlying beliefs in the efficacy of both strategies. Such beliefs also seem to underlie the "ArmaLite and ballot box" strategy used by the Irish Republican Army (see Hayes & McAllister, 2005), exemplified by Sinn Fein's organiser saying at the party's conference in 1981: "Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an ArmaLite in the other, we take power in Ireland?" (cited in English, 2003; pp 224-225).

It is important to emphasize, however, that our research does not imply that influencing perceptions of the efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action has no effect on violence where both violent and nonviolent collective action are used. Our results clearly show that as long as people do not have high hopes that nonviolent strategies can help resolve an ongoing perceived social injustice, reducing the perceived efficacy of violence will not lead to maximal reduction in support for and willingness to engage in violence. Maximal reduction of violent forms of collective action is thus most likely to be achieved

by reducing the perceived efficacy of violent actions but also by increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions.

Another important contribution of the present research is that it provides data on support for violent action from a third-party perspective. On one hand, the operationalisation of violent collective action in the first two studies as third-party sympathizers' support for violent collective action taken by a disadvantaged group might be viewed as a potential limitation. One might question the extent to which this is an adequate proxy for studying attitudinal support for violent action among disadvantaged group members themselves. However, we tested our hypotheses using both a third-party and a first-party perspective, and found relatively consistent results. This is in line with the idea that collective action can be better conceptualised as the expression of a group identity defined by a shared opinion on a particular issue, rather than identities based on objectively defined social categories (e.g. gender, national or religious categories) (McGarty et al., 2009; see also Bliuc et al., 2007). It is also consistent with recent findings that classical predictors of (nonviolent) collective action differ among advantaged group members and disadvantaged group members in degree rather than in kind (Sweetman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, our research does not directly compare predictors of third-party and first-party support for violent action, and future research would do well to test this directly. Importantly, the data we provide on third-party perspectives contributes novel and interesting insights to the burgeoning literature on the dynamics operating between groups involved in an intergroup conflict and the wider social context in which this conflict takes place (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subasic et al., 2008). Understanding how third-parties view the collective actions of other groups is particularly relevant in an era

characterized by an unprecedented level of interconnectedness among nations, where global networks of communication offer new opportunities for world opinion to influence intergroup struggles. Third-party support for violent forms of action by another group is also important to study in its own right because it can translate into behavioural support for violent action. In an analysis of global trends in international support for insurgent movements, Byman, Chalk, Hoffman et al. (2001) demonstrated the importance of various forms of material and non-material support by international non-state actors in creating and sustaining guerrilla movements and terrorist groups. Our research thus helps shed light on the predictors of such support and points out ways in which groups engaged in violent resistance can frame the efficacy of different strategies in order to shape third-party support for their actions.

## Conclusion

The present research examined the unexplored link between violent collective action and its perceived efficacy, as well as the much hypothesized link between violent action and the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent collective action, on which quantitative data is largely lacking. Importantly, it also explores how nonviolence efficacy may interact with violence efficacy in predicting violent collective action. Taken together, our results suggest that in order to exert a maximum influence on inclinations toward violent collective action, it is important to influence the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent actions.

# CHAPTER 4: General Discussion

In the present chapter I review the main findings of my thesis, starting with solidarity-based action, moving on to violent forms of collective action. For each section, I summarize my findings, discuss their implications and suggest avenues for future research. Within each section, I also point out some ways in which the two separate lines of investigation I have followed in this thesis can be connected in future research.

## Solidarity-Based Collective Action

Why do citizens around the world regularly take collective action to defend the rights of groups less fortunate than them, such as asylum seekers, immigrant workers, people involved in liberation struggles against ruthless dictatorships, or attacks from other countries? In this thesis I examined some of the predictors of tendencies to engage in solidarity-based collective action among bystander group members. My investigation aimed to expand the dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004), which looks at anger and perceived group efficacy as two distinct but complementary pathways to collective action. I reported the results of three surveys examining efficacy-based considerations and prosocial emotions as predictors of solidarity-based collective action tendencies. These looked specifically at intentions to demonstrate for the Palestinian cause among pro-Palestinian protesters in Britain (Study 1), and intentions to attend the June 4$^{th}$ vigil in Hong Kong among a sample of pro-democracy protesters (Study 2) and a sample of internet users (Study 3) in Hong Kong itself. Next I review the main findings of this research.

**Moral Outrage, Sympathy and Empathy.**

Previous research on intergroup helping has focused on the role of group-based sympathy in promoting solidarity-based action (e.g. Iyer & Ryan, 2009), rather than the role of empathy. Further, research that has explored empathy did not distinguish it from sympathy (e.g. Pagano & Huo, 2007). Recent models on prosocial emotions and intergroup helping suggest, however, that the distinction between sympathy and empathy may be important. In particular, Thomas et al. (2009) propose that empathy should be more likely than sympathy to promote intergroup helping aimed at addressing the root cause of the disadvantage and thus achieving social change. These authors argue that this should occur because empathy involves feeling *with* the disadvantaged group, and thus entails a feeling of interchangeability between the empathizing group and the disadvantaged group, and plausibly a re-categorisation into a common superordinate category. Conversely, sympathy is an other-focused emotion which involves feeling sorry *for* the disadvantaged. It rests on a salient distinction between the disadvantaged group and the sympathizing group. As such, it should be more likely to prompt efforts to provide relief for the suffering of the victim (e.g. humanitarian assistance; see Pagano & Huo, 2007) but not necessarily efforts to achieve social change.

To test these arguments, I expanded the emotion-based pathway of the dual pathway model of collective action, and tested the unique predictive powers of three prosocial emotions, namely sympathy and (felt) empathy, along with moral outrage (equivalent to anger), which has been

shown to be one of the most important predictors of intergroup helping aimed at social change (see Thomas et al., 2009, for a review).

Across Studies 1-3, moral outrage in response to the perceived injustice of governmental policies toward a disadvantaged group emerged as a positive predictor of tendencies to engage in protests/rallies in solidarity with that group. This finding confirms the important role of moral outrage in intergroup helping, which has previously been shown (see Thomas et al., 2009, for a review).

The results of Studies 1-3 were, however, inconclusive regarding the role of sympathy. While sympathy emerged as a positive predictor in Study 1, it was not a significant predictor in Studies 2 or 3. The unreliability of sympathy as an emotional predictor in the context of solidarity-based action mirrors previous findings, where sympathy was sometimes predictive (e.g. Thomas, 2005) and sometimes not (e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989). Although this thesis does not provide a data-based explanation for this inconsistency, the results add weight to the empirical basis for questioning the power of sympathy to predict intergroup helping aimed at achieving social change (Pagano & Huo, 2007; Thomas et al., 2009). Importantly, Studies 2 and 3 revealed that empathy is a unique and positive predictor of solidarity-based action tendencies, supporting Thomas et al.'s (2009) argument. Studies 2 and 3 thus provide the first piece of evidence that empathy has a unique effect on intergroup helping intentions. Overall, these findings suggest that the distinction between sympathy and empathy is important and merits further investigation.

**Efficacy-Based Considerations**

To explore the role of efficacy considerations in solidarity-based collective action, I proposed a novel organising framework for the different types of efficacy put forth by Hornsey et al. (2006), by distinguishing between perceptions of political efficacy and of identity consolidation efficacy. Political efficacy is defined as the perceived potential of collective action to achieve social change, which is the classical definition of efficacy in the literature (see Hornsey et al., 2006). Identity consolidation efficacy is defined as the potential of collective action to express, assert and strengthen the identity of a social movement (derived from work by Klein et al., 2007). It is operationalised as the efficacy of collective action at influencing public opinion, building an oppositional movement and expressing what the movement stands for. Studies 1-3 show that this distinction is empirically valid, and that these two types of efficacy are positively related.

In line with the idea that identity consolidation provides the basis for social power (e.g. Klein et al., 2007), I expected identity consolidation efficacy to predict collective action tendencies positively and indirectly via political efficacy. Studies 1 and 3 supported this hypothesis. These studies thus help identify a novel predictor of political efficacy, namely identity consolidation efficacy. This is important given that (perceived) political efficacy has been shown to be a powerful antecedent of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Considering that identity consolidation can be a goal of social identity performance in its own right (Klein et al., 2007), I also expected identity consolidation efficacy to positively and directly predict collective

action. Studies 1-3 supported this hypothesis, although this link was only marginally significant in Studies 2 and 3. Taken together, these findings, which emerged in different contexts, suggest that there is value in distinguishing political efficacy from identity consolidation efficacy as the latter can be a unique motivator of collective action.

**Implications and Future Directions**

This thesis extends a recent integrative model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and contributes to our understanding of an under-investigated area in collective action research, namely solidarity-based collective action among bystander group members. The studies reported provide clues to some of the prosocial emotions implicated in solidarity-based collective action. The exploration of feelings of sympathy and empathy answers recent calls to investigate a wider array of emotional predictors of collective action (Wright, 2009). The studies reported also shed light on the role of different types of efficacy-based considerations in collective action, thus helping to broaden the repertoire of motives traditionally explored in collective action research (Wright, 2009).

From an applied perspective, these findings may help inform attempts to promote collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged group involved in a protracted struggle, such as the fight for democracy in China and the fight for Palestinian liberation. The results confirm the importance of eliciting moral outrage in relation to the disadvantage of a group, and suggest that eliciting empathy with that group would also be useful. Moreover, the results suggest that highlighting the role of collective action at affirming, expressing and building the identity of a movement can

be helpful. This could raise the perceived political efficacy of such action and thus make participation more appealing, but it may also motivate collective action independently.

There are various potential avenues for future work to extend the present findings. Starting with the emotion-based pathway, given the inconsistent findings regarding the role of sympathy, it is imperative that future studies investigate potential moderators of the link between sympathy and solidarity-based action. One potential moderator is the *type* of solidarity-based action. Thomas et al. (2009) distinguish between actions aimed at producing social cohesion with the disadvantaged group, which, however, might ultimately preserve the status quo, and actions aimed at producing social change. Similarly, Pagano and Huo (2007) distinguish between actions aimed at providing comfort and help to relieve the suffering of the disadvantaged group, such as humanitarian assistance, and preventative actions aimed at preventing the injustice against the disadvantaged group from recurring, by targeting the offender group. Thomas et al. (2009) and Pagano and Huo (2007) argue that sympathy, with its focus on the disadvantaged group (rather than the offender group), should be more predictive of social cohesion-oriented actions or humanitarian assistance-type actions, rather than social change-oriented actions or preventative actions. Future research could thus test this idea by simultaneously examining sympathy's link to these different types of actions. Researchers could also examine empathy's link to these different actions.

It could be argued, however, that the type of solidarity-based action might not be the crucial moderator. After all, Studies 1-3 examined the link between sympathy and intentions to participate in solidarity-based actions which on the surface seem to be of the same type (rallies). Yet, no consistent link between sympathy and these actions emerged. This raises the possibility that it is participants' own *perceptions* of the type of solidarity-based action that might moderate the link between sympathy and solidarity-based action tendencies. That is, sympathy might positively predict intentions to attend a solidarity-based action among those who *perceive* that action to be aimed at producing social cohesion or providing humanitarian assistance to the disadvantaged group, but not among those who *perceive* that action to be aimed at social change. This may be the case especially for actions which can potentially be classified into more than one type, that is, as social change-oriented action or as social cohesion-oriented action. Rallies such as those that we examined (protests, vigils) could, for example, be classified into either category.

Hence, it is possible that sympathy positively predicted intentions to attend future protests for the Palestinian cause in Study 1 because most participants *perceived* such actions to be primarily targeted at showing support for the Palestinian population rather than ending the occupation, which classifies these protests as social cohesion-oriented actions. Conversely, it is possible that sympathy did not predict intentions to attend the June 4$^{th}$ vigil in Studies 2 and 3 because the majority of participants *perceived* the vigil to be targeted primarily at the Chinese government rather than at the victims of the Tiananmen massacre, which classifies the vigil as

a social change-oriented action. Indeed the slogans used for the vigil that year focused mostly on reversing the Chinese government's stance and democratizing China rather than showing support for the Tiananmen Mothers for example. Future work should thus assess perceptions of the type of solidarity-based action as a potential moderator of the link between sympathy and solidarity-based action. Note that empathy could relate to both social cohesion-oriented actions as well as social-change oriented actions, but researchers should test whether the perceived type of solidarity-based action moderates the link between empathy and such action.

Future work should also measure empathy more elaborately than was done in Studies 2 and 3. While I focused on the affective component of empathy, researchers could look at the cognitive component of empathy as well, that is, the extent to which participants can put themselves in the shoes of the disadvantaged group and understand their views of the situation. Experiments could manipulate perspective-taking (e.g. Batson, 1991), which is one of the cognitive components of empathy, and measure subsequent feelings of both sympathy and empathy and resulting tendencies to engage in different forms of solidarity-based action. Feelings of empathy could be measured by calculating the congruence between the emotions participants believe the disadvantaged group is experiencing in relation to their situation (e.g. anger, contempt, fear toward the perpetrator group) and participants' own experience of such emotions (see Finlay & Stephan, 2000, for a similar measurement of feelings of empathy). This could help identify which empathic emotions predict which types of solidarity-based action.

With regard to the efficacy-based pathway, future research should extend our findings by experimentally testing the causal role of identity consolidation efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies, and the mediating role of political efficacy. It is also essential that future research investigates potential moderators of the paths from political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy to collective action. Political efficacy indeed did not predict collective action in Study 2 and the direct path from identity consolidation efficacy to collective action tendencies was marginally significant in Studies 2 and 3. One obvious candidate for moderation is politicized identification (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008), which has been found to weaken the link between *group efficacy* and collective action. Researchers can thus explore a model where politicized identification facilitates identity consolidation efficacy, and moderates the link between political efficacy and collective action. Since politicized identification is one of the three important classical antecedents of collective action, alongside efficacy and felt injustice, it is imperative that future work explores the role of politicized identification in our model in order to provide a more complete account of solidarity-based action. Relatedly, future research should integrate our model with the social identity predictors which Reicher et al. (2006) argue are involved in intergroup helping, such as the degree of inclusion of the disadvantaged group within a common ingroup identity, perceptions of intergroup helping as a norm of the ingroup, and perceiving intergroup helping to serve the interests of the ingroup.

It should be noted that Studies 1-3 focused on the efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of the social movement as a

whole. Wright (2009), however, remarks that collective action may be motivated by the desire to express personal values (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009) or sacred group values (van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Similarly, Klein et al. (2007) propose that social identity performance can serve to consolidate the identity of a group against other groups, but also the identity of an individual within a group. Future research should therefore consider the efficacy of collective action at consolidating individuals' identities within the movement or in a larger social context.

Further, although the distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy is based on theoretical grounds and was empirically supported in this thesis, future research might explore a more complex factor structure, namely a hierarchical factor structure with identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy as higher order factors, and efficacy at influencing public opinion, expressing views and building a movement as lower-order factors under identity consolidation efficacy. These lower-order factors might indeed relate differently to political efficacy and to collective action.

The distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy can be used to explore the perceived efficacy of a range of nonviolent and violent collective action tactics. This can potentially help explain preferences for one tactic over another. One could, in any particular intergroup conflict, generate a profile for each collective action form in terms of its perceived political efficacy but also in terms of its perceived identity consolidation efficacy, which could be further broken down into its perceived efficacy at influencing public opinion, building a mass movement

and expressing a political or moral stance. Collective action tactics can then be compared based on these dimensions, and differences can be used to explain preferences for one tactic over another.

Finally, the distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy can also be used as an organizing framework for studying the *actual* efficacy of different forms of collective action rather than their *perceived* efficacy. Louis (2009a) has recently called on collective action researchers to examine the outcomes of collective action, not only for individual participants for also for the broader social system. Future work could thus study the *actual* political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy of different collective action tactics, by studying, for example, how effective they really are at influencing outgroups and policy-makers, as well as how effective they are at influencing public opinion, communicating particular stances and building a mass movement.

## Violent Forms of Collective Action

The second line of investigation in this thesis sought to shed light on some of the predictors of *violent* forms of collective action, which have been largely neglected in the collective action literature (Wright, 2009). Recent research (Tausch et al., 2011) has identified group efficacy as a negative predictor of violent collective action aimed at redressing perceived injustices, but has not distinguished the perceived (political) efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions. Further, research looking at the relation between the perceived efficacy of nonviolence and inclinations toward political violence has neglected the role of violence efficacy (Louis, 2011). Studies 4-7 thus tried to address this gap by examining how violent forms of collective action are predicted by their perceived

efficacy, as well as by the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action, and the potential interaction between the two. Note that efficacy here refers to political efficacy rather than identity consolidation efficacy.

In Chapter 3, I reported the results of a survey (Study 4) and an experiment (Study 5) examining third-party support for violent (or armed) Palestinian resistance, another survey examining violence support and violent action tendencies in the context of British university students' campaign against increased tuition fees (Study 6) and an experiment examining support for armed resistance and tendencies to engage in such resistance against an imaginary foreign occupation (Study 7). Both Studies 5 and 7 manipulated the efficacy of nonviolent and armed resistance. Next I review the main findings of this research.

**"The Gun and the Olive Branch" Moderation**

Overall, Studies 4-7 show that people are more inclined to pursue violent action the more effective they perceive it to be, after controlling for the perceived efficacy of nonviolence. Interestingly, however, the relationship between nonviolence efficacy and violent action is not consistently negative. Instead, in some contexts, as shown in Studies 4-6, this relationship is moderated by the perceived efficacy of violence. More specifically, perceptions of nonviolence efficacy tend to lose their tempering influence on violent action the more effective people perceive violence to be. I termed this "the gun and the olive branch" moderation, as it suggests that people are relatively reluctant to abandon violence if it seems effective, even if nonviolent action seems effective as well. Instead, they may be likely to pursue both violent and nonviolent strategies, hence the gun *and* the olive branch appellation. At other times, however, as shown in Study 7, nonviolence efficacy has a main effect on violent action that is

not moderated by violence efficacy (supporting what I termed the "independent effects" hypothesis). Nevertheless, the main effect of violence efficacy found in that context means that people were, to some degree, still more inclined to pursue violent action the more effective it was, even if nonviolence was proving to be effective as well. Hence, these studies suggest that in a context where both violent and nonviolent means of action are in use, if people perceive violence to be a promising way to fight an injustice, they would be relatively inclined toward violent action even when nonviolence is potentially effective. Note that this does not preclude the simultaneous use of nonviolence.

What is interesting and important about this finding is that it runs counter to the prevalent idea that people give primacy to nonviolent means and use violence *only* as a last resort. The results potentially suggest that where both violent and nonviolent action are effective, people may regard them as complementary strategies to be used alongside each other, probably as a way to maximize the chances of achieving the desired social change goal or to achieve it more efficiently. This may help explain why people sometimes pursue both violent and nonviolent strategies in some conflicts, such as in the South African struggle against apartheid. Naturally, further research is needed to investigate what moderates these effects. However, the results potentially imply that in contexts where both violent and nonviolent action are in use, increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolence may have little effect in reducing support for violence or tendencies to engage in it if people believe that violent action will contribute to redressing the perceived injustice.

It remains unclear, however, in what contexts the effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action is moderated by violence efficacy (Studies 4-6) and in

what contexts nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy have independent effects (Study 7). Future research should therefore seek to uncover potential moderators of this interaction. I have suggested that one possible avenue to pursue is to manipulate the presence or absence of a history of using nonviolent collective action on its own, or to change the efficacy of nonviolent collective action over time, as these seem to be the two main distinguishing factors between Study 7 on one hand and Studies 4-6 on the other.

It is worth reiterating here a disclaimer I made in Chapter 3. My findings should *not* be interpreted as signifying that people would necessarily *initiate* both violent and nonviolent collective action in parallel if they believe both are promising, instead of trying nonviolent action first and then turning to violent action at a second stage, should nonviolence be deemed unsuccessful (following the primacy of nonviolence principle). All studies examining violent action in this thesis were based on contexts where both violent and nonviolent collective actions were in use. These studies therefore indicate that participants who perceived both violent and nonviolent collective action as promising strategies show relative support for the *continuation* of violent collective action. We cannot state with confidence whether these findings extend to the *initiation* of violent action as well, or only to its continuation. It is thus important that future research investigates how perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy influence the initiation of violent collective action. This may be more easily achieved by studying a context where a disadvantage is freshly imposed and by using a longitudinal design to map out the initiation and perpetuation of violent action over time.

**The "Nothing to Lose" Effect**

Of primary importance in this thesis is the finding, across Studies 4-7, that nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts violent support when violence has low efficacy. That is, the perceived inefficacy of nonviolence leads to greater attitudinal, as well as financial support for violent action even if violence itself is seen to have low efficacy. Studies 6 and 7 also showed that nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts *violent action tendencies*, when violence has low efficacy. This effect, however, was either weak (Study 6) or indirect (Studies 6 and 7) via attitudinal support for violence. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with what I termed the "nothing to lose" hypothesis (following Scheepers et al., 2006), which posits that people resort to aggressive forms of group action when there is little chance to improve the status quo (for instance when neither violence nor nonviolence seem promising).

The significance of this finding is that it challenges the traditional view in the literature on efficacy (and stability) that people refrain from collective action when there is a low chance of improving the status quo (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, et al., 2008; Wright, 2001). If this were the case, we should have found violent collective action to be least attractive among those who believe that neither violent nor nonviolent strategies are likely to work. Instead, we find violence support and violent action tendencies to be at their lowest among those who believe violence has low efficacy and nonviolence has *high* efficacy. While there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that situations characterized by restricted scope for change lead to greater aggressive or violent group action (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears, et al., 2011; Tausch, et al., 2011), this work has so far only considered the association

between violent action and the general likelihood of achieving social change. This thesis presents the first evidence showing that violence can have relative appeal even when it has low efficacy, if nonviolence is also seen to have low efficacy.

However, the same cautionary note made earlier applies here as well: the present work ultimately looks at the perpetuation rather than the initiation of violence. Again, future research would do well to investigate evidence for the "nothing to lose" hypothesis by examining violence initiation rather than merely violence maintenance. While further research is needed to investigate moderators of the "nothing to lose" effect, the results potentially imply that in contexts where both violent and nonviolent action are in use, rendering violent action ineffective will not eliminate violence, because as long as people do not have high hopes that nonviolent strategies can help resolve an ongoing perceived social injustice, they will pursue violence if it is possible to do so.

Evidence in support of the "nothing to lose" hypothesis is important given the paucity of quantitative data on the relation between nonviolence efficacy and violent action. It has been proposed that people engage in violent acts such as terrorist attacks despite their seemingly low chance of working, because they have no other option, that is, because nonviolence has low efficacy. However, evidence in support of this hypothesis has been mostly qualitative (Masters, 2004; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Soibelman, 2004; see Louis et al., 2011 for an exception). This thesis provides the first quantitative evidence for this proposition on a micro-level analysis, that is, by examining individual perceptions of violence and nonviolence efficacy and individual tendencies to support or engage in violence. While we only examined views of armed struggle and violent protests,

it is important for future research to explore whether our effects can be replicated using other forms of violence such as acts of terrorism targeting civilians. Following the principle of proportionality, it is unlikely that people would adopt extreme forms of violent action when less extreme ones are available and have not been tried. Future research could thus explore how the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent forms of action and the perceived (in)efficacy of moderately violent forms of action influence support for and tendencies to engage in more extreme forms of political violence.

An important question left unaddressed in this thesis concerns the mechanism or reasoning underlying the "nothing to lose" effect: why do people show relative support for violent action when neither violent nor nonviolent action are likely to work? Future research should attempt to uncover the motivations for this behaviour. I have suggested that violent action in conditions offering little hope for change may well be serving strategic goals. For example, people may reason that taking action holds more promise for changing the status quo compared to doing nothing; there is thus "nothing to lose" by trying (Masters, 2004; Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). People may also pursue violent action in such desperate circumstances in the hope that it might attract attention, influence public opinion, win third parties to the cause, and as such, help consolidate the identity of the group or movement behind the struggle. Future research should therefore examine the role of the perceived *identity consolidation efficacy* of violent actions in attempting to understand the "nothing to lose" effect.

**The Importance of Attitudinal Support for Violence**

Another noteworthy finding in this thesis is that attitudinal support for violent action was found to play the role of an intervening variable between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on one hand, and more proximal measures of support for violent action and participation in violent action on the other hand, namely financial support for violence and violent action tendencies. This adds some empirical weight to the view that there is value in studying attitudinal forms of collective action because they may influence behavioural tendencies and ultimately behaviour, at a later stage (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), be it in terms of offering material support for collective action or actually participating in it. That being said, it is important that future research looks at actual violence support and actual participation in violence where possible, although this may be a challenging task due to ethical concerns and given the typically clandestine nature of violent actions.

**Third Party Support for Armed Resistance**

The findings in this thesis also help shed light on the determinants of third parties' views of violent forms of collective action (Studies 4-5). For groups involved in asymmetrical power struggles, the ability to gain and maintain support from third parties for their resistance is of paramount importance for the achievement of their goals precisely because of the severe power asymmetry inherent in such conflicts (Simon & Stürmer, 2001). Although the use of armed resistance is arguably more likely to attract third parties' attention to the plight of the disadvantaged, recent research suggests that gaining the sympathy of third parties is more difficult when a disadvantaged group uses violent resistance compared to when they use nonviolent resistance (Vandello, Michniewicz, &

Goldschmied, 2011). Assuming, however, that a disadvantaged group does decide to use violent forms of resistance, what factors might influence third-party support for such resistance? Looking at international support for armed Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, Studies 4 and 5 present evidence in support of "the gun and the olive branch" hypothesis and the "nothing to lose" hypothesis among third parties. Third party opinion is thus shaped similarly to first party attitudes and action tendencies, although more evidence based on comparative studies between third parties and first parties is needed to support this claim.

**Implications and Future Directions**

To conclude, Studies 4-7 contribute to the collective action literature by providing quantitative data on predictors of violent forms of collective action using both survey and experimental methodologies, in an area where the ratio of theorizing to data is quite high, and where generated data is drawn mostly from interviews and case studies (see Louis, 2009b). By focusing on the role of efficacy perceptions in predicting violent forms of action, this thesis puts to the test the common assumption among lay people and sometimes amongst scholars, that violence is devoid of any rational considerations and is a product of an emotional reactive backlash. Admittedly, my studies do not look at the role of emotions in predicting violent forms of action and future research should investigate emotional processes. That being said, in contemporary theoretical accounts of emotions (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Mackie et al., 2000), emotions are viewed as functional responses to individuals' social and physical environment. What my findings do show, however, is that violence is subject to considerations regarding its efficacy and the efficacy of alternative means of action. Taken

together, the findings of Studies 4-7 suggest that interventions aimed at influencing inclinations toward violent forms of collective action in contexts similar to those studied here (e.g. armed struggle in a national liberation context, students' fight against increased tuition fees) would benefit from targeting perceptions of the efficacy of both violent *and* nonviolent forms of action.

While one may be convinced by the findings in this thesis that the choice of violence is reasonable considering actors or supporters' *perceptions* of the world, they may still question the rationality of violence by arguing that perceptions regarding the efficacy of violent and nonviolent forms of action may nevertheless be distorted and may not fully map unto reality. Judging the objective efficacy of collective action at achieving intended or non-intended goals is a difficult task and one that social psychology is beginning to examine (see Louis, 2009a). However, in light of the role that efficacy perceptions seem to play with regard to violent action as shown in Studies 4-7, it seems essential that future research looks at the determinants of the perceptions of violence (in)efficacy and nonviolence (in)efficacy. Based on Studies 1-3 in this thesis, examining the perceived identity consolidation efficacy of violent and nonviolent action strategies seems to be a potentially promising way forward. It would also be useful to look at the role of perceptions of the morality of violence and nonviolence and how they influence perceptions of action efficacy or how they interact with them. Another way forward is to look at how the determinants of collective efficacy as theorized by Bandura (1997) would predict perceptions of the efficacy of violent and nonviolent strategies (e.g. past experiences, modelling of similar groups, and encouragement by other groups). In a similar vein, it would be interesting to study how perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence

efficacy relate to perceived group efficacy, which has also been shown to be implicated in violent forms of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011). Finally, future work should also examine how perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy impact on each other. I have treated these as independent factors in this thesis, but it is conceivable that they may influence each other.

## Conclusion

This thesis fills an important gap in the collective action literature by investigating social psychological predictors of solidarity-based action among bystander groups, as well as predictors of violent forms of collective action. The studies examining solidarity-based action show that moral outrage and feelings of empathy with a disadvantaged group play an important role in predicting tendencies to engage in such action. Another significant predictor appears to be the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of the protesting movement, which can influence collective action directly but also indirectly by feeding into perceptions of the action's political efficacy. The studies examining violent forms of collective action indicate that the pursuit of violent action is subject to considerations regarding the efficacy of both violent and nonviolent forms of action, and sometimes the interaction between these two. It appears that in some contexts people are more supportive of violent action the more efficacious it seems, even if nonviolent action is also a promising strategy. Further, when violent action seems to show little promise of success, people may still support its pursuit if they deem nonviolence to have low efficacy as well. These findings make a valuable contribution to current scholarly efforts at identifying novel predictors of collective action as well as predictors of different types of collective action. I hope this work will stimulate future social

psychological research on collective action and facilitate theoretical development in the field.

## REFERENCES


Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ajzen, I. (1977). Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on prediction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,* 303-314.

Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making Processes, 50,* 179–211.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude– behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and review of empirical research. *Psychological Bulletin, 84,* 888–918.

Bandura, A. (1995). Exercise of personal and collective efficacy in changing societies. In A. Bandura (Ed.), *Self-efficacy in changing societies* (pp. 1-45). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. New York: W.H. Freeman.

Baron, R., & Kenny, D. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. J*ournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*(6), 1173-1182.

Batson, C. D. (1991). *The altruism question: Towards a social psychological answer*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K., & Muntele, D. (2007). Opinion-based group membership as a predictor to commitment to political action. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 37,* 19 – 32.

Bloom, M. M. (2004). Palestinian suicide bombing: public support, market share, and outbidding. *Political Science Quarterly, 119*(1), 61-88.

Blumer, H. (1939). Collective behavior. In A. McClung Lee (Ed.), *Principles of Sociology* (pp. 219–288). New York: Barnes & Noble.

Brown, R. & Gaertner, S.L. (2001) (Eds) *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 4: Intergroup Relations* Oxford: Blackwell.

Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Brannan, D. (2001). *Trends in outside support for insurgent movement.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Crenshaw, M. (1990). The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Crenshaw, M. (1995). Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts. In M. Crenshaw (Ed.), *Terrorism in context* (pp. 3–24). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Crisp, R. J., & Turner, R. N. (2009). Can imagined interactions produce positive perceptions? Reducing prejudice through simulated social contact. *American Psychologist, 64,* 231–240.

Crosby, F. J. (1976). A model of egotistical relative deprivation. *Psychological Review, 83,* 85–113.

Davis, M. H. (2004). Empathy: Negotiating the border between self and other. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions* (pp. 19-42). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, J. (1962). Toward a theory of revolution. *American Sociological Review, 27,* 5–18.

della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (1999) *Social Movements: An Introduction*. New York: Blackwell .

De Rivera, J., Gerstmann, E., &Maisels, L. (2002). Acting righteously: The influence of attitude, moral responsibility, and emotional involvement. In M. Ross & D. T. Miller (Eds.), The justice motive in everyday life (pp. 271–288). New York: Cambridge University Press.

De Weerd, M., & Klandermans, B. (1999). Group identification and political protest: Farmers` protests in the Netherlands. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 1073-1095.

Doosje, B., Spears, R., & Ellemers, N. (2002). Social identity as both cause and effect: The development of group identification in response to anticipated and actual changes in the intergroup status hierarchy. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 41*, 57-76.

Drury, J., & Reicher, S. D. (1999). The inter-group dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 4*, 381–402.

Drury, J., & Reicher, S. D. (2000). Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of new social identities. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 39*, 579–604.

Drury, J., & Reicher, S. D. (2005). Explaining enduring empowerment: A comparative study of collective action and psychological outcomes. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 35*, 35–38.

Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2009). Collective psychological empowerment as a model of social change: Researching crowds and power. *Journal of Social Issues*, *65*, 707-725.

Duan, C., & Hill, C. E. (1996). The current state of empathy research. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 43, 261-274.

Dudouet, V. (2008). Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries. In Fischer, M., Gießmann, H., & Schmelzle, B. (Eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (pp. 1-27). Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Efron, B. (1987). Better bootstrap confidence intervals. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, *82*, 171-185.

Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51, 665–697.

Ellemers, N. (1993). The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies. *European Review of Social Psychology, 4*, 25-57.

Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). *Social identity: Context, commitment, content*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Finlay, K., & Stephan, W. G. (2000). Improving intergroup relations: The effects of empathy on racial attitudes. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*, 1720-1737.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1974). Attitudes toward objects as predictors of single and multiple behavioral criteria. *Psychological Review*, *81*, 59-74.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Flood, P. (1993). An expectancy value analysis of the willingness to attend union meetings. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, *66*, 213.

Folger, R. (1977). Distributive and procedural justice: Combined impact of "voice" and improvement on experienced inequity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35*, 108-119.

Folger, R. (1986). A referent cognitions theory of relative deprivation. In J. M. Olson, C. P. Herman & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *Relative deprivation and social comparison: the Ontario symposium* (Vol. 4, pp. 217-242). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Fox-Cardamone, L., Hinkle, S., & Hogue, M. (2000). The correlates of antinuclear activism: Attitudes, subjective norms, and efficacy. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *30*, 484-498.

Fox, D. L., & Schofield, J. W. (1989). Issue salience, perceived efficacy, and perceived risk: A study of the origins of anti-nuclear war activity. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *19*, 805-827.

Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, L. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and action tendency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 212–228.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *4*, 1-26.

Gamson, W. A. (1992). The social psychology of collective action. In A. D. Morris & C. M. Müller (Eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp. 53–76). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Moskowitz, G. B., & Darley, J. M. (2002). Crowded minds: The implicit bystander effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(4), 843-853.

Gollwitzer, M., & Denzler, M. (2010). What makes revenge so sweet: Seeing the offender suffer or delivering a message? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45*(4), 840-844.

Greenwood, I. D. (1989). *Explanation and experiment in social psychological science: Realism and the social constitution of action.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Gruen, R. J., & Mendelsohn, G. (1986). Emotional responses to affective displays in others: The distinction between empathy and sympathy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 609-614.

Gurr, T. R. (1968). A causal model of civil strife: A comparative analysis using new indices. *American Political Science Review, 62*, 1104–1124.

Gurr, T. D. (1998). Early warning of ethnopolitical rebellion. In Davies, J.L., & Gurr, T.D. (Eds). *Preventive measures* (pp. 35-47). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Harth, N. S., Kessler, T., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Advantaged group's emotional reactions to intergroup inequality: The dynamics of pride, guilt and sympathy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*, 115-129.

Haslam, S. A. (2001). *Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach*. London: Sage.

Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new millennium. *Communication Monographs*, *76*, 408-420.

Hayes, B. C., & McAllister, I. (2005). Public support for political violence and paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *17*, 599-617.

Hornsey, M., Blackwood, L., Louis, W., Fielding, K., Mavor, K., Morton, T., et al. (2006). Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36*(7), 1701-1722.

Hornsey, M., & Hogg, M. (2000a). Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of subgroup relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *4*, 143-156.

Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000b). Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*, 242-256.

Hornsey, M. J., Majkut, L., Terry, D. J., & McKimmie, B. M. (2003). On being loud and proud: Non-conformity and counter-conformity to group norms. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *42*, 319-335.

Hu, L. T.,& Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives, *Structural Equation Modeling*, *6*, 1-55.

Human Rights Watch News. (n.d.) Tiananmen's legacy, 2009. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/13/tiananmen-legacy

Human Rights in China. (n.d.). Solidarity with the Tiananmen Mothers. Retrieved from http://www.hrichina.org/content/4653

Iyer, A., Leach, C. W., & Crosby, F. J. (2003). White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*, 117-129.

Iyer, A., Leach, C. W., & Pedersen, A. (2004). Racial wrongs and restitutions: The role of guilt and other group-based emotions. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 262-283). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Iyer, A., & Ryan, M. K. (2009). Why do men and women challenge gender discrimination? The role of group status and in-group identification in predicting pathways to collective action. *Journal of Social Issues, 65*, 791-814.

Iyer, A., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2007). Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame and guilt. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 572-587.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decisions under risk. *Econometrica*, *47*, 313-327.

Kamans, E., Spears, R., Otten, S., Gordijn, E. H., & Livingstone, A.G. (2011). *Desperate measures: A 'nothing to lose'-strategy in groups with low power and status.* Manuscript submitted for publication.

Katz, D. (1960). The functional approach to the study of attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *24*, 163-204.

Kinder, D. R. (1998). Opinion and action in the realm of politics. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 778-867). New York: Oxford University Press.

Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. *American SociologicalReview, 49,* 583-600.
Klandermans, B. (1997). *The social psychology of protest*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Klandermans, P.G. & Weerd, M. de (1999). Injustice and adversarial frames in a supranational political context: Farmer's protest in the Netherlands and Spain. In D. della Porta, H. Kriesi & D. Rucht (Eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (pp. 134-147). London: Macmillan.
Kelly, C. (1993). Group identification, intergroup perceptions and collective action. *European Review of Social Psychology, 4,* 59–83.
Kelly, C., & Breinlinger, S. (1995). Attitudes, intentions, and behavior: A study of women's participation in collective action. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25*(16), 1430-1445.
Klein, O., Spears, R., & Reicher, S. (2007). Social identity performance: Extending the strategic side of the SIDE model. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11,* 28-45.
Krosnick, J. A., & Fabrigar, L. R. (1997). Designing rating scales for effective measurement in surveys. In L. Lyberg, P. Biemer, M. Collins, L. Decker, E. DeLeeuw, C. Dippo, N. Schwarz & D. Trewin (Eds.), *Survey measurement and process quality*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Kruglanski, A. W., Crenshaw, M., Post, J. M., & Victoroff, J. (2008). What should this fight be called? Metaphors of counter-terrorism and their implications. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 8,* 97–133.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Leach, C. W., Snider, N., & Iyer, A. (2002). Poisoning the consciences of the fortunate: The experience of relative advantage and support for social equality. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith (Eds.), *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration* (pp. 136-163). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lind, E. A., Kanfer, R., & Earley, P. C. (1990). Voice, control, and procedural justice: Instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59,* 952-959.
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The social psychology of procedural justice*. New York: Plenum.
Louis, W. R. (2009a). Collective action _ and then what? *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 727-748.
Louis, W. R. (2009b). Terrorism, identity, and conflict management. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3*(4), 433-446.
Louis, W. R., Paasonen, K. E., Hornsey, M., Mavor, K., White, K. M., Smith, J. R., et al. (2011). *If all else fails? Support for political violence as a function of perceptions of the ineffectiveness of democratic protest.* Manuscript submitted for publication.
Louis, W. R. & Taylor, D. M. (2002). Understanding the September 11 terrorist attack on America: The role of intergroup theories of normative influence. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2,* 87-100.

Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79*, 602-616.
Mascini, P. (2006). Can the violent jihad do without sympathizers? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29*, 343-357.
Masters, D. (2004). Support and nonsupport for nationalist rebellion: A prospect theory approach. *Political Psychology, 25*(5), 703-726.
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology, 82*, 1212–1241.
McCaughey, Martha, and Michael D. Ayers (eds.) (2003) *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
McGarty, C., Bliuc, A.-M., Thomas, E., & Bongiorno, R. (2009). Collective action as the material expression of opinion-based group membership. *Journal of Social Issues, 65*, 839-857.
Miller, D. T. (2001). On the experience of injustice. *Annual Review of Psychology, 52*, 527–553.
Miller, D.A., Cronin, T., Garcia, A.L., & Branscombe, N.R. (2009). The relative impact of anger and efficacy on collective action is affected by feelings of fear. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations,* 12, 445-462.
Mitchell, G., & Tetlock, P. E. (2006). An empirical inquiry into the relation of corrective justice to distributive justice. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 3,* 421–466.
Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. *Social Justice Research, 3*, 313-344.
Morrison, B. (1999). Interdependence, the group, and social cooperation: A new look at an old problem. In M. Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, & M. Hogg (Eds.), *Resolving social dilemmas: Dynamic, structural, and intergroup aspects* (pp. 295-308). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The distinction between activism and radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 21,* 239–260.
Mummendey, A., Kessler, T., Klink, A., & Mielke, R. (1999). Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,* 229–245.
Mummendey, A., & Wenzel, M. (1999). Social discrimination and tolerance in intergroup relations: Reactions to intergroup difference. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *3*, 158-174.
Nadler, A., & Halabi, S. (2006). Intergroup helping as status relations: Effects of status stability, identification, and type of help on receptivity to high-status group's help. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*, 97-110.
Olson, M. (1968). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pagano, S.J., & Huo, Y.J. (2007). The role of moral emotions in predicting support for political actions in post-war Iraq. *Political Psychology, 28*, 227-255.

Palestine: the case for justice. (2007). Palestine Solidarity Campaign Publication. Retrieved from http://www.palestinecampaign.org/files/caseforjustice.pdf

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda***.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. M. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 15*(1), 171-184.

Postmes, T., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Young, H. (1999). Comparative processes in personal and group judgments: Resolving the discrepancy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,* 320–338.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods, 40,* 879–891.

Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. *Multivariate Behavioral Research, 42,* 185-227.

Pruitt, D. G., & Gahagan, J. P. (1974). Campus crisis: The search for power. In J. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Perspectives on Social Power*. Chicago: Aldine.

Ransford, H. E. (1968). Isolation, powerlessness and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts Riot. *American Journal of Sociology, 73,* 581-591.

Reicher, S. D. (1996). Social identity and social change: Rethinking the context of social psychology. In P. Robinson (Ed.*), Social groups and identities: Developing the legacy of Henri Tajfel* (pp. 317–337). Oxford, England: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Reicher, S. D. (2001). Crowds and social movements. In M. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes* (pp. 182–208). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Reicher, S. D. (2004). The context of social identity: Domination, resistance and change. *Political Psychology, 25,* 921–946.

Reicher, S., Cassidy, C., Wolpert, I., Hopkins, N., & Levine, M. (2006). Saving Bulgaria's Jews: An analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social solidarity. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 36,* 49-72.

Reicher, S., Haslam, S. A., & Hopkins, N. (2005). Social identity and the dynamics of leadership: Leaders and followers as collaborative agents in the transformation of social reality. *The Leadership Quarterly, 16,* 547-568.

Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (1996). Seeking influence through characterizing self-categories: An analysis of anti-abortionist rhetoric. *British Journal of Social Psychology,* 35, 297-311.

Reniers, R.L.E.P., Corcoran, R., Drake, R., Shryane, N.M., & Völlm, B.A. (2011). The QCAE: A questionnaire of cognitive and affective empathy. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 93,* 84-95.

Runciman, W. G. (1966). *Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Saab, R., Spears, R., & Tausch. N. *Violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as predictors of violent forms of collective action.* Manuscript under review.

Saab, R., Tausch, N., Spears, R., & Cheung, W. *Acting in solidarity: Testing an extended dual-pathway model of collective action by third parties.* Manuscript under review.

Sabucedo, J. M., & Arce, C. (1991). Types of political participation: A multi-dimensional analysis. *European Journal of Political Research, 20,* 93–102.

Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Diversity in in-group bias: Structural factors, situational features, and social functions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90,* 944–960.

Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Manstead, A. S. R., & Doosje, B. (2009). The influence of discrimination and fairness on collective self-esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35*(4), 506-515.

Schmitt, M., Behner, R., Montada, L., Müller, L., & Müller-Fohrbrodt, G. (2000). Gender, ethnicity, and education as privileges: Exploring the generalizability of the existential guilt reaction. *Social Justice Research, 13,* 313-337.

Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Schofield, J. W., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1989). Fallout from The Day After: The impact of a TV film on attitudes related to nuclear war. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19,* 433-448.

Sedgwick, M. (2004). Al-Qaeda and the nature of religious terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 16,* 795-814.

Sharp, G. (2005). *Waging nonviolent struggle: 20th Century practice and 21st century potential.* Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers.

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods, 7,* 422–445.

Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist, 56,* 319–331.

Simon, B., Loewy, M., Stürmer, S., Weber, U., Freytag, P., & Habig, C., et al. (1998). Collective identification and social movement participation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 74, 646-658.

Simon, B., Trötschel, R., & Dähne, D. (2008). Identity affirmation and social movement support. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 38,* 935-946.

Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualisations of prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition and stereotyping* (pp. 297-315). San Diego: Academic Press.

Smith, E.R., Seger, C.R., & Mackie, D.M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,* 431-446.

Smith, H. J., Cronin, T., & Kessler, T. (2008). Anger, fear or sadness: Faculty members' emotional reactions to collective pay disadvantage. *Political Psychology, 29*(2), 221-246.

Smith, H. J., & Kessler, T. (2004). Group based emotions and intergroup behavior: The case of relative deprivation. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, H. J., & Ortiz, D. J. (2002). Is it just me? The different consequences of personal and group relative deprivation. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith (Eds.), *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration* (pp. 91–115). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Soibelman, M. (2004). Palestinian suicide bombers. *Journal of investigative psychology and offender profiling, 1*(3), 175-190.

Spears, R., Scheepers, D., & van Zomeren, M. (2011). *Nothing to lose: A provocative strategy in groups with stable low status*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Steiger, J. H., Shapiro, A., & Browne, M. W. (1985). On the multivariate asymptotic distribution of sequential chi-square statistics. *Psychometrika, 50,* 253–263.

Stephan, M., & Chenoweth, E. (2008). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. *International Security, 33,* 7-44.

Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M. (1949). *The American soldier: Vol. 1. Adjustment during army life.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stürmer, S., & Simon, B. (2004). Collective action: Towards a dual pathway model. *European Review of Social Psychology, 15,* 59–99.

Stürmer, S., & Simon, B. (2009). Pathways to collective protest: Calculation, identification, or emotion? A critical analysis of the role of group-based anger in social movement participation. *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 681-705.

Subašic´, E., Reynolds, K. J., & Turner, J. C. (2008). The political solidarity model of social change: Dynamics of self-categorization in intergroup power relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12,* 330-352.

Sweetman, J., Spears, R., & Livingstone, A. (2011). *Other-praising emotions regulate social hierarchy*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). *Using multivariate statistics* (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Tajfel, H. (1978). The achievement of inter-group differentiation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups* (pp. 77–100). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-47). CA: Brooks-Cole.

Tarrow, S. G. (2005). *The New transnational activism*. Cambridge University Press.

Tausch, N., Becker, J., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Sing, P. & Siddiqui, R.N. (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 101, 129-148.

Taylor, D. M., & McKirnan, D. J. (1984). A five stage model of intergroup relations. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 23,* 291 – 300.

Thomas, E. F. (2005). The role of social identity in creating positive beliefs and emotions to motivate volunteerism. *Australian Journal on Volunteering*, *10*, 45-52.

Thomas, E. F., & McGarty, C. (2009). The role of efficacy and moral outrage norms in creating the potential for international development activism through group-based interaction. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *48*, 115-134.

Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., & Mavor, I. (2009). Transforming "apathy into movement": The role of prosocial emotions in motivating action for social change. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13,* 310-333.

Tice, D. M. (1992). Self-concept change and self-presentation: The looking glass self is also a magnifying glass. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*, 435-451.

Turner, J. C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *35*, 1-22.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). *Social justice in a diverse society.* Oxford, England: Westview Press.

Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1998). Social justice and social movements. In D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 595–629). New York: McGraw-Hill.

"Upcoming activities 2009". (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.alliance.org.hk /64/64 20/?page_id=521

Vandello, J.A., Michniewicz, K.S., & Goldschmied, N.G. (2011). Moral judgments of the powerless and powerful in violent intergroup conflicts. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47,* 1173-1178.

Van Stekelenburg, J. van & Klandermans, P.G. (2007). Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention. In P.G. Klandermans & C.M. Roggeband (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines* (pp. 157-204). New York: Springer.

Van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B., & van Dijk, W. (2011). Context Matters: Explaining How and Why Mobilizing Context Influences Motivational Dynamics. *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 815-838.

Van Zomeren, M. & Iyer, A. (2009). Toward an integrative understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action. *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 645 – 660.

Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research

synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin, 134,* 504–535.
Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (in press). On conviction's collective consequences: Integrating moral conviction with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action. *British Journal of Social Psychology.*
Van Zomeren, M. & Spears, R. (2009). Metaphors of protest: A classification of motivations for collective action. *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 661 – 679.
Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W. (2004). Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,* 649-664.
Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Exploring psychological mechanisms of collective action: Does relevance of group identity influence how people cope with collective disadvantage? *British Journal of Social Psychology, 47,* 353 – 372.
Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches, *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49* (1), 3-42.Walker, I., & Mann, L. (1987). Unemployment, relative deprivation, and social protest. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13,* 275–283.
Walker, I., & Smith, H. J. (Eds.). (2002). *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. *Psychological Bulletin, 132,* 249 –268.
Weiss, H. M., Suckow, K., & Cropananzo, R. (1999). Effects of justice conditions on discrete emotions. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 84,* 786–794.
Wispé, L. (1986). The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a concept, a word is needed. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50,* 314-321.
Wright, S. C. (2001). Strategic collective action: Social psychology and social change. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 409-430). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press.
Wright, S. C. (2009). The next generation of collective action research. *Journal of Social Issues, 65,* 859-879.
Wright, S. C., & Lubensky, M. E. (2008). The struggle for social equality: Collective action versus prejudice reduction. In S. Demoulin, J. Leyens, & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), *Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities* (pp. 291-310). New York: Psychology Press.
Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990a). The relationship of perceptions and emotions to behavior in the face of collective inequality. *Social Justice Research, 4,* 229-250.
Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990b). Responding to membership in a disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58,* 994-1003.

## APPENDIX

## STUDY 1

**The following questions concern your views on the roles some parties play in the Palestinian issue:**

• To what extent do you think the following parties' approach to the Palestinian issue is unjust?
- Israel's approach to the Palestinian issue in general
- Britain's approach to the Palestinian issue in general

☐ *not at all unjust* ☐ *slightly unjust* ☐ *somewhat unjust* ☐ *moderately unjust* ☐ *very unjust* ☐ *extremely unjust*

**The following questions concern the different emotions you experience when thinking of the Palestinian issue:**

• When you think of Israel's approach to the Palestinian issue in general, to what extent do you feel the following way?
- Angry

• When you think of Britain's approach to the Palestinian issue in general, to what extent do you feel the following way?
- Angry

☐ *not at all* ☐ *slightly* ☐ *somewhat* ☐ *moderately* ☐ *very much* ☐ *extremely*

• When you think of the Palestinians' suffering, to what extent do you feel the following way?
- Sympathetic

☐ *not at all* ☐ *slightly* ☐ *somewhat* ☐ *moderately* ☐ *very much* ☐ *extremely*

**Following is a list of objectives related to this demonstration. Please rate how effective you think today's demonstration will be in achieving these objectives:**
- helping to change the British government's approach to the Palestinian issue
- helping to change the Israeli government's approach to the Palestinian issue
- helping to achieve justice in Palestine
- helping to end the siege on Gaza
- increasing support in British public opinion for justice in Palestine
- strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of justice in Palestine
- helping to build a mass movement in Britain for justice in Palestine
- showing resistance to the injustices committed against Palestinians
- showing the Palestinians support amongst British people for their cause

☐ *Not effective at all* ☐ *slightly effective* ☐ *somewhat effective* ☐ *moderately effective* ☐ *very effective* ☐ *extremely effective*

- Of the next ten protests scheduled in support of justice in Palestine and accessible to you, how many would you be willing to attend?

*0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10*

**STUDY 2**

**I think the Chinese government's current position on the June 4th event is…:**

- Illegitimate
- Unjust

*1= Strongly disagree; 7 Strongly agree*

**When thinking about the stance of the Chinese Government on the June Fourth event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions?**

-Angry
-Irritated

*1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly*

**When thinking about those affected by the June 4th event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions?**

-Sympathetic
-Empathic

*1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly*

**Below is a list of objectives related to the June Fourth Protest. Please rate how effective you think the annual June Fourth Candlelight vigil will be in achieving these objectives:**

-showing opposition to the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-voicing public discontent with the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for their cause.
-increasing public opinion support for the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-helping to build a mass movement in support of the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-helping to change the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese authorities on the Tiananmen Mothers.
-helping to advance democracy in China

*1= Not effective at all; 7= Extremely effective*

**Using the scale provided, please tell us how willing you would be to engage in the following actions in order to support the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign:**
- Join the annual June 4th Candlelight vigil in the future
*1= very unwilling; 7 = very willing*

**STUDY 3**

**I think the Chinese government's current position on the June 4th event is…:**
- Illegitimate
- Unjust
- Fair (-)
- Moral (-)
*1= Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree*

**When thinking about the stance of the Chinese Government on the June Fourth event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions?**
-Angry
-Irritated
-Furious
*1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly*

**When thinking about those affected by the June 4th event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions?**
-Sympathetic
-Compassionate
-Empathic
*1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly*

**Below is a list of objectives related to the June Fourth Protest. Please rate how effective you think the annual June Fourth Candlelight vigil will be in achieving these objectives:**
-showing opposition to the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-voicing public discontent with the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for their cause.
-showing sympathy for the Tiananmen Mothers.
-raising public awareness about the June Fourth event, especially among younger generations..
-increasing public opinion support for the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-influencing other people to join the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-helping to build a mass movement in support of the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.

-uniting supporters of the "reverse the Chinese government stance on june 4th" campaign.
-helping to change the Chinese government's stance on the June Fourth event.
-helping to bring justice to the Tiananmen victims and their families.
-helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese authorities on the Tiananmen Mothers.
-helping to advance democracy in China
*1= Not effective at all; 7= Extremely effective*

**Please rate how likely or unlikely it is that you will take part in the upcoming June Fourth vigil:**
*1= Not likely at all; 7= Very likely*

**STUDY 4**

**The following questions concern your views on the roles some parties play in the Palestinian issue:**
• To what extent do you think the following parties' approach to the Palestinian issue is unjust?
- Israel's approach to the Palestinian issue in general
- Britain's approach to the Palestinian issue in general

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ☐ *not at all unjust* | ☐ *slightly unjust* | ☐ *somewhat unjust* | ☐ *moderately unjust* | ☐ *very unjust* | ☐ *extremely unjust* |

**The following questions concern your views on the effectiveness of the different means available to Palestinians to deal with their situation:**
- To what extent do you think Palestinians' use of peaceful means with Israel will be effective at helping them achieve their aims?
- To what extent do you think Palestinians' use of violence against Israel will be effective at helping them achieve their aims?

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ☐ *not at all* | ☐ *slightly* | ☐ *somewhat* | ☐ *moderately* | ☐ *very much* | ☐ *extremely* |

**Please think about the reasons that some Palestinians have resorted to the use of violence in their struggle with Israel. Could you now please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:**
- In general, I support the decisions of Palestinians to use violence against Israel.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ☐ *strongly disagree* | ☐ *mostly disagree* | ☐ *somewhat disagree* | ☐ *neither agree nor disagree* | ☐ *somewhat agree* | ☐ *mostly agree* | ☐ *strongly agree* |

## STUDY 5

*Text in bold refers to parts that differed across the conditions.*

Fake documentary voice over

Since the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands began in 1967, Palestinians have been united in their opposition to the occupation and its accompanying policies.

The last two decades witnessed several negotiation rounds between Israelis and Palestinians in an attempt to bring peace to the region. Israeli proposals for resolving the conflict, however, have repeatedly failed to offer Palestinians a fully sovereign, independent and viable state of their own on the currently occupied territories, in accordance with international law and key UN resolutions. The collapse of peace talks in 2000 eventually led to a revival of Palestinian resistance in recent years.

Resistance to any occupation or oppression by one people over another can take various forms. It can be violent or nonviolent; or a combination of both violence and nonviolence. There is currently no agreement among Palestinians on which of these resistance strategies should be adopted in order to end Israeli occupation. In fact, Palestinians have been developing resistance tactics in both violent and nonviolent directions. But what really are the prospects of violent resistance in ending Israeli occupation and what, on the other hand, are the prospects of nonviolent resistance in achieving the same goal?

In recent years, several non-violent resistance groups have sprung up independently in many Palestinian towns and villages. These groups have been training people on the use of nonviolent resistance methods against Israeli occupation, such as engaging in mass demonstrations, boycotting all Israeli products, and using civil disobedience actions. Civil disobedience actions involve, for example, gathering large groups of people to physically block the demolition of homes or the construction of settlements. Non-violent resistance in the Occupied Territories has been spreading and it is getting more organized. This has brought to the forefront questions about the potential effectiveness of a non-violent resistance strategy at helping Palestinians liberate their lands from Israeli occupation.

Professor Gene Sharp, the world's leading expert on the use of nonviolent strategies in international conflicts, has recently been interviewed regarding the prospects of success of nonviolent resistance in the Palestinian case. Professor Sharp heads the International Centre for NonViolent Conflict based at the University of Massachusetts in Dartmouth. Along with his academic colleagues, he has conducted large-scale research projects investigating the determinants of success of non-violent resistance campaigns worldwide.

Nonviolent resistance high efficacy condition

"In our research um we have examined all non-violent resistance campaigns that were waged worldwide in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. And uuuuh our research reliably shows that **non-violent resistance is particularly likely to succeed** against regimes with powerful militaries. Now this may seem counterintuitive at first, but there is a reasonable uuh explanation behind it. The fact is, that regimes with

powerful militaries typically respond to wide-scale nonviolent resistance using their military might, so using violence. And there is no reason to believe that Israel will be any different, especially if we look at Israel's historical record, they are very likely to resort to military repression against a nonviolent Palestinian uprising. **But this is exactly where things turn in Palestinians' favour. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict already gets uuum huge attention and media coverage at the international level. The violent repression of people engaged in peaceful resistance is bound to elicit huge popular outrage and sympathy for Palestinians all over the globe. And this would inevitably lead the international community to exert an unprecedented level of pressure on Israel. Now Israel, with its political, economic and social configuration, is not a country that can sustain such high levels of international pressure for too long. Eventually, Israel will have to yield.** It is exactly these kinds of dynamics that uh have allowed several oppressed populations all over the world to **successfully gain their rights using nonviolent resistance**. So what we know from research on conflicts similar to the Israeli-Palestinian one, leads us to believe that a **non-violent resistance strategy is likely to be effective** at helping Palestinians drive Israeli occupation to an end."

Nonviolent resistance low efficacy condition

"In our research um we have examined all non-violent resistance campaigns that were waged worldwide in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. And uuuuh our research reliably shows that **non-violent resistance is particularly unlikely to succeed** against regimes with powerful militaries. And the reason behind this is actually uuh quite straightforward. The fact is, that regimes with powerful militaries typically respond to wide-scale nonviolent resistance using their military might, so using violence. And there is no reason to believe that Israel will be any different, especially if we look at Israel's historical record, they are very likely to resort to military repression against a nonviolent Palestinian uprising. **They will do everything they can in order to crush it, and that includes resorting to violent repression against people engaged in peaceful resistance. And what can we expect a nonviolent movement to achieve under such circumstances? Realistically, very little. Because nonviolence functions best against a regime that can exercise a certain degree of restraint and proportionality in their response to acts that challenge their authority. But nonviolence is simply not sustainable against ruthless opponents, against regimes that typically adopt extreme responses. And this is what the Israeli regime is like.** It is exactly these kinds of responses, uh, these extreme repressive measures that have made **nonviolent resistance an ineffective tool** in the hands of several oppressed populations seeking self-determination across the globe. So what we know from research on conflicts similar to the Israeli-Palestinian one, leads us to believe that a **non-violent resistance strategy is unlikely to be effective** at helping Palestinians drive Israeli occupation to an end."

Voice over continues

Armed Palestinian militants have recently been developing new guerrilla resistance tactics against Israeli occupation. This has posed new

questions about the potential effectiveness of pursuing a violent resistance strategy in the Palestinian case.

In conflicts pitting opponents with drastic differences in military power, groups that choose armed resistance against their more powerful opponent typically resort to the use of guerrilla tactics, rather than conventional warfare. Guerrilla tactics involve armed resistance groups that conduct clandestine and surprise attacks on the adversary. The aim is to raise the costs of occupation to a degree that the opponent is no longer willing to sustain. As such, it can sometimes take several years for this type of resistance to achieve its aims. Guerrilla operations in the Palestinian case can include armed attacks on any Israeli military targets, as well as armed attacks on Israeli settlers, that is, Israelis living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Armed attacks against military targets can, for example, involve killing Israeli soldiers through suicide bombing attacks. Such operations could sometimes lead to Israeli civilian casualties. As for armed attacks on Israeli settlers, they can involve firing rockets on the settlement areas, for example, or conducting armed attacks inside the settlements themselves.

But could the use of violent resistance be effective in the Palestinian struggle for liberation?

We are now joined by Eric Margolis, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which is based in London. Thanks for joining us Professor Margolis. The IISS is one of the world's leading authorities on political-military conflict, and has recently issued a report on armed Palestinian militant groups, showing that they are increasingly becoming paramilitary guerrilla organizations; and that there has been an impressive improvement in the last two years in their fighting capabilities in terms of discipline, organisation, weapons and equipment. Professor Margolis, could you perhaps tell us what this recent development means in terms of the chances of success of an armed Palestinian resistance strategy?

<u>Armed resistance high efficacy condition:</u>

"Well um actually the improvement in Palestinian guerrilla tactics **is likely** to make a significant difference on the ground, because Israel is having **lots of difficulties** developing successful counter-guerrilla strategies. For example uh, in the Israeli war on Gaza last December, Israel was **not able to defeat Hamas**, which is the main armed resistance group in the Gaza Strip. And our assessment of Israel's military arsenal and training shows that **Israel is extremely well-equipped to engage in conventional warfare, but not guerrilla warfare.**

Now of course we also know that in order to fight Palestinian resistance groups, Israel will most likely resort to violent military repression against any Palestinian civilians who provide assistance to Palestinian militants. But even then, Palestinian guerrilla groups will constitute **a great challenge** for the Israeli military. And one of the main reasons for this is actually the geography of Palestinian lands: **as you know, a large portion of the Palestinian terrain in rural areas is not flat, it is hilly and mountainous, which is greatly advantageous** for Palestinian guerrilla groups because **it helps them** conduct the surprise and clandestine operations typically required in guerrilla warfare. But even in urban areas

uh, Palestinian guerrilla groups **would have little trouble** conducting operations against Israeli soldiers, because in an urban setting both sides have to fight each other within close proximity. In a context like that, Israelis **cannot make use** of their long-range high-tech weapons, which essentially means that **the Israeli military will lose much of their technological advantages over Palestinian militants**. So to answer your question, um, **yes,** the current development in Palestinian guerrilla groups gives us good reason to believe that the use of armed struggle, **the use of a violent resistance strategy, is likely to be an effective way for Palestinians to end the Israeli occupation of their lands."**

Armed resistance low efficacy condition:

"Well um actually the improvement in Palestinian guerrilla tactics **is unlikely** to make a significant difference on the ground, because Israel is having **no difficulties** developing successful counter-guerrilla strategies. For example, in the Israeli war on Gaza last December, Israel **dealt a serious blow to Hamas**, which is the main armed resistance group in the Gaza Strip. And our assessment of Israel's military arsenal and training shows that **Israel is extremely well-equipped to engage not only in conventional warfare, but also in guerrilla warfare**. Of course we also know that in order to fight Palestinian resistance groups, Israel will most likely resort to violent military repression against any Palestinian civilians who provide assistance to Palestinian militants. So Palestinian guerrilla groups will really **not constitute much of a challenge** for the Israeli military.

Another reason why guerrilla resistance **would not be effective** is actually the geography of Palestinian lands: **as you know, a large portion of the Palestinian terrain in rural areas is neither hilly nor mountainous, but flat, which does not help** Palestinian guerrilla groups at all to conduct the surprise and clandestine operations typically required in guerrilla warfare. Even in urban areas uh, Palestinian guerrilla groups would have **great trouble** conducting operations against Israeli soldiers, because in an urban setting both sides have to fight each other within close proximity. In a context like that, **Israelis can really make use** of their short-range high-tech weapons, which essentially means that **the Israeli military will have many technological advantages over Palestinian militants**. So to answer your question, um, **no,** despite the current development in Palestinian guerrilla groups, we have good reason to believe that the use of armed struggle**, the use of a violent resistance strategy, is unlikely to be an effective way for Palestinians to end the Israeli occupation of their lands."**

**• Please rate how you view the Israeli occupation using the following dimensions. Circle the line that is closest to your views. Here's an example for you:**

**I THINK THE ISARELI OCCUPATION IS…:**
-Morally wrong
-Illegitimate
-Fair (-)

-Justified (-)




**• In your opinion, <u>how effective</u> might the following actions be at helping Palestinians end the Israeli occupation of their lands?**
-Mass demonstrations:
-Boycott of Israeli products:
-Civil disobedience actions:
-Armed attacks on Israeli soldiers:
*0 = Not effective at all; 9 = Extremely effective*

**• How strongly would you <u>support or oppose</u> Palestinians using the following actions as means of resistance against Israeli occupation?**
- Armed attacks on Israeli soldiers:
*-5 = Strongly oppose; 5 = Strongly support*

**STUDY 6**

**The following questions concern your views on the planned education cuts and rise in tuition fees:**
-Education cuts and fees are justified. (-)
-Education cuts and fees are unfair.
-Education cuts and fees are immoral.
-Education cuts and fees are legitimate. (-)

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongy Disagree | Disagree | Slightly Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Slighty Agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |

**How EFFECTIVE do you think the following actions will be at preventing a vote on December 9th in favour of the planned education cuts and fees?**
-Signing petitions
-Peaceful demonstrations
-Classroom walkouts (strikes)
-Student occupations of university campus buildings
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower)
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education cuts and fees
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians supporting education cuts and fees

*0= Not effective at all; 9=Extremely effective.*

**To what extent do you support or oppose the use of the following actions against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9th?**
-Signing petitions
-Peaceful demonstrations
-Classroom walkouts (strikes)
-Student occupations of university campus buildings
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower)
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education cuts and fees
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruits at politicians supporting education cuts and fees

*-5 = Strongly oppose; 0 = Neither support nor oppose; 5= Strongly oppose*

**How likely is it that you will participate in the following actions against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9th?**
-Signing petitions
-Peaceful demonstrations
-Classroom walkouts (strikes)
-Student occupations of university campus buildings
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower)
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education cuts and fees
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruits at politicians supporting education cuts and fees
*0 = Not likely at all; 9 = Extremely likely*

## STUDY 7

Throughout this study, we ask you to imagine that you live in a nation called ZED which is under occupation. There will be a description of the political situation of Zed and how it is developing with time. Please read the text very carefully. At various stages, we will stop to ask you questions regarding your thoughts, feelings and opinions on the situation. As you read through, please try to picture yourself in the described situation as vividly as you can.

**Imagine that...**

...You belong to a small and underdeveloped nation called Zed. Zed's neighbouring nation, Alpha, is a powerful and developed country that has managed to occupy and control all of Zed's territory and is exploiting its resources and people. Alpha is a democracy and there is a great deal of support among the Alpha population for the occupation. Zed is militarily much weaker than Alpha and has thus not been able to prevent and fight the occupation using its army. As a citizen of Zed, you now live under foreign occupation. Your territory is full of Alpha soldiers.

**As a citizen of Zed, please indicate what you think of Alpha occupying your country:**
-This occupation is unfair
-This occupation is legitimate (-)
-This occupation is morally wrong
*0 = Not at all; 9 = Extremely*

A resistance movement has developed among the Zed people. They know that the occupation cannot be sustained without public opinion support for the occupation among Alpha's own population. Hence, to achieve liberation they must undermine public support for the occupation among Alpha's own people. The movement has decided to launch nonviolent resistance campaigns involving mass protests and mass civil disobedience activities such as general strikes, resisting taxes, boycotting Alpha's products and blocking roads with sit-ins and so on.

Nonviolent resistance efficacy manipulation Time 1:
*The low efficacy condition is marked in bold gray and the high efficacy condition is marked in bold black.*

**...Some time later...**

Numerous nonviolent campaigns have already taken place. Nonviolent resistance has now been going on for a while. Many Zed people have been beaten, arrested or imprisoned by Alpha authorities for engaging in nonviolent resistance.

The effectiveness of resistance campaigns against Alpha's occupation can be judged by their effect on public opinion support for the occupation among Alpha's own population. Independent media analyses and public opinion surveys have been conducted on the Alpha people since the start of nonviolent resistance campaigns. They indicate that nonviolent campaigns **are having *no* effect / are reducing** public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people. The nonviolent resistance campaigns that have been pursued so far are thus **not helping / helping** the Zed people in their fight for liberation.

….At this point some members of Zed's resistance movement suggest that using guerrilla resistance operations may increase Zed people's chances of achieving liberation. Guerrilla resistance would involve armed resistance groups that operate secretively and conduct clandestine and surprise attacks against military targets only, namely Alpha soldiers. There are now discussions among members of Zed's resistance movement on how best to continue resisting, whether or not to continue using nonviolent resistance, and whether or not to start using guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers...

What do you think? In the next section, we would like to get your opinion as a Zed citizen on this issue.

*Time 1 dependent variables (not reported in this thesis)*

Nonviolent and armed resistance efficacy manipulations Time 2:
*The low efficacy conditions are marked in bold gray and the high efficacy conditions are marked in bold black*

**...Some time later...**

Some more time has passed, during which both nonviolent campaigns as well as guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers have been used in the fight against Alpha occupation.
During nonviolent campaigns, again some Zed people have been beaten, arrested or imprisoned by Alpha authorities for engaging in these campaigns.

As for Zed people engaged in guerrilla resistance, some guerrilla members have been killed during counter-guerrilla attacks by Alpha soldiers, others have been captured, tortured, and imprisoned, while other members continue to operate. Several Alpha soldiers have also been killed during Zed guerrilla operations.

As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of resistance campaigns against Alpha's occupation can be judged by their effect on public opinion support for the occupation among Alpha's own population. Since nonviolent campaigns and guerrilla operations have both started to be used, there have been new independent media analyses and public opinion surveys of Alpha's population. These indicate that nonviolent resistance campaigns **are still having no effect on / are still reducing** public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people. By contrast / Furthermore, guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers **are having *no* effect on / are reducing** public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people. Thus, nonviolent resistance campaigns are not helping / helping the Zed people in their fight for liberation, whereas guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers are **not helping/ helping** them.

...Several meetings are now taking place between members of Zed's different resistance groups to evaluate the current situation and to see how best to continue resisting Alpha's occupation... What do you think? In the next section, we would like to get your opinion as a Zed citizen on this issue.

**This section is about your position on the use of nonviolent campaigns and the use of guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers in view of the present situation:**
**In the present circumstances, to what extent would you support or oppose the use of the following activities in order to achieve liberation?**
-Nonviolent campaigns
-Guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers

*-5 = Completely oppose; 0 = Neither support nor oppose; 5 = Completely support.*

**In the fight against Alpha's occupation, nonviolent campaigns and guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers still require equal amounts of funding to be carried out. As a Zed citizen living under Alpha's occupation, suppose you have 100 Zed pounds (equivalent to 100 GBP) to spare at the end of each month. You can spend this money as you wish: you can save some or all of it for yourself and your family, or you can donate some or all of it to help fund nonviolent campaigns, or donate some or all of it to help fund guerrilla operations.**
**Please indicate how you would spend these 100 pounds each month by entering the desired number of pounds you wish to allocate to each category. Remember the total must be 100 Zed pounds:**

-For yourself and your family:
-For nonviolent campaigns:
-For guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers:

**In the present circumstances, how likely is it that you would join (or remain part of a Zed resistance group that engages in <u>nonviolent campaigns</u>?**

*1 = Not likely at all; 9 = Very likely*

**In the present circumstances, how likely is it that you would join (or remain part of a Zed guerrilla group that engages in <u>attacks against Alpha soldiers</u>?**

*1 = Not likely at all; 9 = Very likely*