The reporting of the EU in the print media and the development of Eurosceptic movements: A case study of Britain and Norway

Kristine Løfshus Solli

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Modern Languages

Cardiff University

August 2020

Abstract

Recent years have seen the development of Euroscepticism and a number of Eurosceptic parties have gained either a part in government or a hand in supporting minority governments. Growing literature on Euroscepticism deals with the concept itself, but it has also been related to political communication and the media, with the perception that framing effects in the media influence the development of Euroscepticism. This research studies to what extent the print media and grassroots campaigns contribute to the success of Eurosceptic movements. It focuses on 'No to the EU' in Norway and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK. In order to identify changes in the reporting, the research studies a longer period of time from the 1970s to 2014. It identifies key concepts and arguments in the reporting, the frequency in the reporting and changes in media attitudes towards the EU. The research demonstrates that whereas framing effects (*how* the debate is constructed in the media) do not bring any immediate political opportunities for Eurosceptic movements, priming effects (*how often* certain issues are reported on) do. Eurosceptic movements find it easier to mobilise opposition against the EU at critical junctures, when the media report more frequently on the EU. Furthermore, the research argues that mobilisation by Eurosceptic groups requires both media attention and grassroots campaigning to be successful, as grassroots activities effectively spread information and engage the public in debate on the EU.

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to my Ph.D. supervisors, Dr Andrew Dowling and Dr Nick Parsons, for their guidance and support throughout the time of my research. I appreciate their valuable comments and suggestions during the planning and development of the Ph.D. They have taught me a lot about academic writing, but they have also taught me how to deal with other challenges that comes with a Ph.D. They have inspired me to work hard and to always believe in my project. Thank you for always taking time to meet with me and for all the interesting political discussions we have had throughout these years. I have really enjoyed learning from you and could not have asked for better supervision.

Furthermore, I am grateful to Professor Roger Scully, Professor Matthew Goodwin, Professor Charlie Becket, Dr Ben Stanley, Professor Hanna Diamond and the Chief Executive of Ipsos Mori, Ben Page, for fruitful discussions on the UK media and UKIP. I am also thankful to Professor Fabio Vighi for his useful comments on discourse analysis and Professor Karin-Wahl Jørgensen for helping me make sense of the concept of content analysis.

I am deeply indebted to Professor Alan Sked, Nigel Farage, Douglas Carswell, AM Mark Reckless, MEP Nathan Gill, Alexandra Phillips, Michael Heaver, Lord Roger Liddle, MEP Dr Kay Swinburne, Trond Giske, Hallvard Bakke, Svein Roald Hansen, Stein Ørnhøi, Dag Seierstad, Kathrine Kleveland, Liv Signe Navarsete, Ulf Leirstein and Øyvind Halleraker for their contribution to this research.

Finally, I am grateful for the time spent with my fellow Ph.D. researchers. Thank you for all the interesting (and completely ridiculous) discussions and for your support throughout these years.

Thank you!

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction 10

1.1 General Outline 10

1.2 Key Concepts 14

1.3 Case Studies 15

1.4 Chapter Outlines 19

1.5 Main findings 20

1.6 Conclusion 22

2 Literature Review 23

2.1 A discussion of success 24

2.2 Euroscepticism 26

Eurosceptic movements and 'success' 29

2.3 The emergence of political parties 30

The emergence of parties 32

2.4 Organisations and social movements 36

2.5 Grassroots movements 40

What are grassroots movements? 40

The dynamics of maintaining a successful grassroots organisation 42

2.6 Political Opportunity Structure (POS) 44

Political Parties and POS 46

The media as POS 51

2.7 Media Discourses 54

Framing and priming 55

Media selection 57

2.8 Prior research in the field of Euroscepticism and the media 58

2.9 Conclusion 66

3 Methodology 68

3.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods 69

3.2 Content analysis 71

The comparative method 73

The case studies 76

Falsification 83

Selection of data 85

Data analysis 88

3.3 Interviews 90

3.4 Primary and Secondary Sources 95

3.5 Conclusion 95

4 The idea of Euroscepticism 98

4.1 Euroscepticism in the UK 98

Locating the Eurosceptic tradition 99

The Thatcher Governments 1979-90 100

Signing the Maastricht Treaty 104

The emergence of a strong Eurosceptic force 105

4.2 Euroscepticism in Norway 114

The opposition towards EEC membership in 1972 115

The opposition towards EU membership in 1994 118

The arguments against EEC/EU membership 121

Incorporation without formal membership 126

Integration by stealth? 129

4.3 Conclusion 130

5 The reporting of the integration debate in UK newspapers 131

5.1 The framing of the integration debate 133

5.2 The referendum on EEC membership in 1975 135

5.3 A change of attitudes within political parties, the media and the public 143

5.4 A change of direction 150

5.5 Towards closer union 157

5.6 Towards enlargement 159

5.7 Enlargement Eastwards 162

5.8 A noticeable change in the media framing 164

5.9 A period of reflection 170

5.10 Media coverage of UKIP in European Elections 174

5.11 Conclusion 189

6 The reporting of the integration debate in Norwegian newspapers 192

6.1 The framing of the EU/EEA 194

6.2 The 1972 referendum 196

6.3 Towards closer integration with the EC member states 205

6.4 The 1994 referendum 213

6.5 The Schengen Agreement 223

6.6 EU enlargement 226

6.7 Conclusion 230

7 Conclusion 233

7.1 Discussion and findings 236

7.2 Similar cases, but with different outcomes 245

7.3 Limitations of the research 250

7.4 Impact and implications of the work 251

7.5 Future research 254

Table of Figures

Chapter 3

Chart 3.1 The number of articles collected by publication, UK 90

Chart 3.2 The number of articles collected by publication, Norway 90

Chapter 5

Chart 5.1 Newspaper coverage of European integration from 1975-2009 134

Chart 5.2 Trends in reporting from 1975-2009 135

Chart 5.3 Public opinion on EEC membership 1977-1984 140

Chart 5.4 Voting intention 142

Chart 5.5 Public opinion on EC membership 1977-1990 149

Chart 5.6 Public opinion on EU membership 1977-1992 154

Chart 5.7 Newspaper coverage of EU integration 1975-2004 163

Chart 5.8 UKIP in media coverage of EU events, 1st data sample 173

Chart 5.9 UKIP coverage in the newspapers during European Elections 174

Chart 5.10 Eurosceptic terms in the reporting of the 2004 European Election 176

Chart 5.11 Eurosceptic terms used in 2004/2009 European Elections 178

Chart 5.12 Eurosceptic terms used in 20004/2009/2014 European Elections 183

Chart 5.13 UKIP coverage in the newspapers during European Elections 185

Chart 5.14 UKIP's vote share in European Elections 185

Chapter 6

Chart 6.1 Newspaper coverage of European integration

from 1972-2004 194
Chart 6.2 Trends in reporting from 1972-2004 195
Chart 6.3 The most significant arguments for EEC membership in the reporting in 1972 198
Chart 6.4 The most significant arguments against EEC membership in the reporting in 1972 200
Chart 6.5 Public opinion on EC membership 1989-1993 209
Chart 6.6 The most significant arguments for EU membership in the reporting in 1994 215
Chart 6.7 The most significant arguments against EU membership in the reporting in 1994 218
Chart 6.8 Public opinion on EU membership from 1989-1999 226
Chart 6.9 Public opinion on EU membership from 1989-2012 228

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 General outline

Euroscepticism, or *Eurosceptic*, which has been defined as 'a person who doubts the viability or usefulness of the EU' (Le petit Larousse 2011, 101: cited in: Condruz-Băcescu 2014, 52), has become a more frequently used term in political science and there has been a significant development of literature in the last decade on the topic of public opinion and the EU. As Buturoiu (2016, 41-42) points out, the topic is central in academic debates over both the present and the future of the EU. Euroscepticism, which Condruz-Băcescu (2014, 53) refers to as 'economic protectionism', has become a significant concern on the agenda of both politicians, analysts and the general public. However, Eurosceptics are concerned not only about the economic effects of deeper and wider integration, but also to a great extent the loss of national sovereignty. As a result, recent years have seen the development of Eurosceptic parties, such as the UK Independence Party, Alternative for Germany, Swedish Democrats, Danish People's Party and National Front. A number of Eurosceptic parties have gained either a part in government or a hand in supporting minority governments. There are also a number of cases of countries where smaller parties with Eurosceptic positions have not been included in government, but where the governing coalition has relied on their support in parliamentary votes (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2013, 19). Furthermore, Eurosceptic parties have recently gained a significant number of seats in the European Parliament.

Euroscepticism has become a great challenge for the architects of the EU and the international media have lately devoted significant space to Eurosceptic parties and movements (Condruz-Băcescu 2014, 53). Hence, the growing literature on Euroscepticism deals with the concept itself, but research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) has also been related to political communication and the media, with the perception that

the media influence public behaviour both at a national level – and within the EU community. The media are thought to have a significant impact on shaping public opinion and scholars (e.g. Johnson-Cartee, 2005; O'Keffe, 2006) argue that the media influence how the public construct realities. The media publications contribute to the shaping of political and social realities, as the content promotes political values that influence how the public construct realities. In this view, as individuals, we are all influenced, our opinion shaped, reinforced and altered by our exposure to the media.

Hawkins (2012) studied media discourses on the integration process, with a focus on the European Union Treaty Reform Process; Daddow (2012) conducted research on the framing of the integration debate in the media, identifying changes in framing over time; Schuck & de Vreese (2006) studied the framing of the integration process and its effects on public support for EU enlargement; Vliegenthart et al. (2008) conducted a more comprehensive research, looking at the framing of the integration process over time in terms of risks and opportunities, and its effects on public opinion on integration. This literature identifies changes in the reporting over time, but it focuses primarily on framing (the process by which the construction of a message affects the interpretation of the reader), without considering the effects of media priming (the agenda-setting effect on the part of the media, which by focusing more on some matters while ignoring others influences the standards by which governments, policies and candidates for public office are judged). This research therefore considers both concepts when analysing the coverage of the EU in the print media, as more than one factor could have an impact on the success of Eurosceptic parties and movements. Furthermore, while research conducted in the field of Euroscepticism and the media (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have focused on the impact that the reporting has on shaping public opinion on the EU, the approach taken in this thesis considers whether the media has an impact on the success of Eurosceptic movements, as public opinion does not necessarily translate into support for Eurosceptic parties and movements.

The research studies two case studies, Britain and Norway. Firstly, it studies the rise of the UK Independence Party. UKIP, which emerged as a small pressure group called the Anti-Federalist League in 1991, aimed to put pressure on the Conservatives to promote withdrawal from the EU. The pressure group, which a few years later developed into a political party, struggled to reach out to the public. Having changed its direction and adopting a more populist approach focusing on issues such as immigration, welfare and unemployment, the party gradually went from the fringes to the mainstream in UK politics. UKIP won 12.9 per cent of the votes in the 2015 general election (Ipsos MORI, 2015). By 2016, the party had become a salient voice and played a key role in the campaign leading up to the referendum on the EU. Secondly, the research investigates the development of the organisation 'No to the EU' in Norway. 'No to the EU' was established as a non-partisan organisation, in order to attract members from across the political spectrum and played a crucial role in the campaigns leading up to the referendums on the EU in 1972 and 1994[1]. 'No to the EU' demonstrated the effectivity of grassroots activities, as the public rejected membership in both referendums the EU, despite encouragement to join from both the Norwegian government and the mass media.

The Eurosceptic movements have, in both cases, lacked the capacity to influence through parliamentary representation at the national level ('No to the EU' has not developed into a political party and UKIP struggled to win seats in the national Parliament), though UKIP won representation in the European parliament providing it with a platform. Both UK and Norwegian movements have been successful forces in the campaigns against the EU. UKIP, without any members of Parliament, pushed the Conservative government into a referendum on the EU in 2016. 'No to the EU' decided not to seek parliamentary representation, yet convinced the Norwegian public to reject membership of the EU. In other words,

[1] In 1972, the opposition mobilised behind the forerunner of No to the EU, called 'The Movement against Norwegian membership in the EEC'.

both Eurosceptic movements have been successful forces, in the way that they both achieved their main goals; the public voted to remain outside/leave the EU.

However, in both case studies, the strength of the Eurosceptic movements has shifted over the past decades. In Britain, there has been a growth of Euroscepticism, and the country has seen the emergence and rise of UKIP. The party has performed well in elections to the European Parliament and became a central actor in the campaign leading up to the referendum on the EU in 2016. In Norway, by contrast, the public has remained opposed to the EU, but the Eurosceptic organisation has found it increasingly difficult to engage the public in the integration debate and to maintain support. Differences in the development of these Eurosceptic movements cannot be attributed to institutional arrangements per se, as both countries are integrated and bound by similar rules – Norway is a member of both the EEA and the Schengen Agreement. Until 1 January 2021, the UK is still in a transition period with the EU, while Norway is bound by EU regulations through the EEA agreement. The differences in the development of Eurosceptic movements can therefore not, in these case studies, be attributed to institutional arrangements with the EU.

Given that the Eurosceptic movements in both case studies lacked parliamentary representation, and differences cannot be attributed to institutional arrangements with the EU, other factors must have influenced these developments. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the media are thought to have great influence on the development of social movements and political parties. If the success of the Eurosceptic movements is determined by political opportunities, and the media are considered an important political opportunity variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the growth of Eurosceptic movements. Tarrow (1995, 126-7), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015, 19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public. The movements communicate to a broad public through the media, which help them gain attention and maintain support.

This research therefore studies the role of the media in this development; it studies the effects of both framing and priming, to find out whether the print media have brought opportunities for 'No to the EU' and UKIP. As will be discussed, the effects of framing are studied to find out whether the construction of the debate in the print media has brought opportunities for the Eurosceptic movements. Has the print media been supportive or critical of the EU, and has this influenced the development of the Eurosceptic movements? The effects of priming are studied to investigate whether the frequency in the reporting has influenced the development of the Eurosceptic movements. When the media report more frequently on the EU, does it become easier to mobilise opposition against the EU? Similarly, does it become more difficult for the movements to recruit members when the media report less frequently on the EU? If that is the case, that confirms Tarrow's argument (1995, 126-7) that the media contributes to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public, as the media help the movements gain attention and maintain support. Furthermore, the research studies the importance grassroots campaigns. In both countries, the Eurosceptic movements have used grassroots activities in order to spread their message to the public, and this research therefore additionally studies whether grassroots activities have contributed to the 'success' of UKIP and 'No to the EU'.

1.2 Key concepts

This research employs two key terms; the first of them is framing. The concept of framing refers to the process by which the construction of a message affects the interpretation of the receiver. By structuring media accounts around certain frames, or themes, journalists shape audience interpretations of the issue or event (Nabi & Oliver 2009, 85-6). Frames are an idea that provide meaning to a large number of events, weaving a connection among them. The frames for a given issue exist within the public discourse surrounding that issue, a discourse that is communicated to the public through the mass media. In order to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or

treatment recommendation in a communicating text, certain frames are selected and made more salient (D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010, 159).

Research within media framing investigates how the content of news *influences* the readership; because journalists and editors construct frames that reflect the cultural themes and narratives within a society, they fundamentally affect how the readership understands the events. T.E Nelson et al. (cited in Johnson-Cartee 2005, 26) argue that frames affect opinion simply by making certain considerations seem more important than others. This can be done by; firstly, adding information about an issue; secondly, making particular considerations more accessible; and thirdly, altering the weight of particular considerations (ibid, 27). In other words, the media directs the individual's thoughts toward an interpretation of a situation or object, telling its readers what to think, not just what to think about (ibid, 84).

The second term in this research is priming, which could be defined as an agenda-setting effect on the part of the media, which `by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others . . . influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged` (Lenart 1994, 15-16). Priming occurs when the media provide a context for public discussion of an issue. The amount of time and space that media devote to an issue make an audience receptive and alert to particular themes. Whereas framing effects often apply to immediate responses shaped by a message, priming effects often refer to when messages render certain schemas more accessible for activation and use in subsequent tasks.

1.3 Case Studies

This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the media and Euroscepticism. It investigates the media's role in the development of Eurosceptic movements, but additionally offers a discussion on the importance of grassroots activity. Euroscepticism has become highly relevant as firstly, the UK is currently negotiating to leave the EU; and secondly, because political parties in other member states are advocating the same. The British decision on whether to leave

or remain in the EU was made in an in/out referendum on 23 June 2016. Ahead of the referendum, opinion polls (Survation, Ipsos MORI) indicated that the majority of the public would vote to remain in the EU. However, the referendum results did not reflect the original opinion polls and represented a great shock to the political establishment: 51.9 per cent of the public voted to leave the EU, while 48.1 per cent voted to remain in the EU. When referendum the results were announced, discussions opened up about what factors contributed to the Leave vote.

When the government announced that a referendum would take place on 23 June 2016, a considerable number of movements and organisations were established to campaign against membership of the EU[2]. The Electoral Commission designated Vote Leave as the official campaign in favour of leaving the EU. The organisation had affiliations with Business for Britain, Conservatives for Britain, Labour Leave and Students for Britain. Though Vote Leave had been designated as the official campaign, the opponents were represented by *two* large campaigns; Vote Leave and Leave.EU. The latter had affiliations with The Bruges Group, The Bow Group, Campaign Against Euro-Federalism, Campaign for an Independent Britain, Democracy Movement and Global Britain. In addition, a third campaign emerged as a response to the infighting between the other campaigns; *Grassroots Out*. This campaign was established by politicians from across the political spectrum, including UKIP.

This research could have, additionally, included an analysis of all the campaigns against EU membership, but since the research aims to identify changes in framing over time, these campaigns have not been included in the analysis. It focuses merely on the rise of UKIP. Goodwin & Heath (2016) have demonstrated a connection between areas where Leave did well and past campaigns by the UK Independence Party. UKIP originally attracted voters from the political right, mostly among Conservative voters who were sceptical about the political

[2] Vote Leave, Leave.EU, Grassroots Out, Labour Leave, Left Leave, Trade Union and Socialist Coalition, Green Leaves, Liberal Leave etc.

developments of the EU. As discussed, the party later adopted a more populist approach, by linking grievances within the society to membership of the EU. This approach appealed particularly to those feeling left behind by the established parties; older, working-class, white voters who lack qualifications and skills.

Goodwin & Heath (2016) found in their research that Leave won its strongest support in the West Midlands (59%), East Midlands (59%) and North East (58%), but attracted its weakest support in Scotland (38%), London (40%) and Northern Ireland (44%). The Leave vote was much higher in areas with a considerable number of people who do not hold any qualifications, but much lower in areas with a large number of highly educated people. In fact, fifteen of the twenty 'least educated' areas voted to leave the EU, while all of the twenty 'most educated' areas voted to remain. Furthermore, there was an association between age and support for Leave. The Leave vote was much stronger in areas with an older population; of the twenty oldest local constituencies 19 voted to Leave. In addition, there was a connection between *change* in immigration and opposition towards the EU. Those living in areas with high levels of EU migration tended to be more supportive of EU membership, while those living in places which had experienced a sudden increase in migration over the last ten years tended to be more Eurosceptic. These results are consistent with prior research (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015) on support for UKIP. By and large, constituencies that were most likely to support Leave were the same voters that gave the UK Independence Party its strongest support in 2014. Though, it should be noted that these results do not explain the entire referendum result. The average support for UKIP across all constituencies in 2014 was 29 per cent, while the average support for Leave was 53 per cent. However, this evidence does suggest a connection between areas targeted by UKIP in the past and the distribution of votes in the EU referendum in 2016 (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). These findings demonstrate the importance of targeted messaging, which allows you to get a specific message out to those most likely to respond to it. This research therefore aims to find out to what extent the print media and grassroots campaigns are important in explaining the success of the UK Independence Party.

In Norway, an opposite development can be traced, with Euroscepticism becoming less visible over the past few decades. The Norwegians have twice rejected EU membership, both in the 1972 and 1994 referendums. The decision to hold the first referendum on membership has made it 'impossible' for governments to proceed with any negotiations in terms of membership without public support. The largest political parties in Norway supported EEC/EU membership in both referendums, and so did the print media (although presenting a more balanced view than UK papers, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6). EU opponents mobilised a grassroots campaign against EU membership, ahead of both referendums, which proved to be successful. The force behind this campaign was made up of a wide range of people from all social classes, and included interest groups, farmers and fishermen, academics, labour movements, environmental groups and minor parties on the political left. Similar to the UK, the campaigns for/against membership could be seen as a struggle between centre/periphery, and between the grassroots and the political elite.

Since the 1994 Norwegian referendum, the integration debate has slipped from the political agenda and the political parties, including those opposed to further commitments with the member states, have agreed not to reopen the debate. In fact, Norwegian governing coalitions have formulated a range of provisions for keeping the issue off the political agenda, so called suicide clauses; 'if a political party in a coalition brings up the membership issue, the government dissolves' (Fossum 2010, 75). The suicide clause, effective in preventing political conflicts on the membership issue within the governing parties, was in force from 2001 to 2013.

Regardless of having discarded the suicide clause, the current governing centre-right coalition[3] has made no attempt at putting the membership debate back on the agenda. The public, still contradicting the views of the political elite, have remained eminently opposed to EU membership since the 1994 referendum. In

[3] Formed by the Conservative Party, the Progress Party and the Liberal Party

2017[4], 66 per cent of the public opposed EU membership; 22 per cent supported EU membership and 14 per cent was undecided (NTB, 2017). Nevertheless, the public have remained supportive of the EEA agreement, which guarantees equal rights and obligations within the internal market for individuals and economic operators in the EEA. It provides for the inclusion of EU legislation covering the four freedoms – the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital – throughout the 31 participating EEA states. In addition, the EEA agreement includes cooperation in other significant areas, e.g. research and development, education, social policies, the environment and consumer protection (EFTA, no date). In 2017[5], 52 per cent of the public supported the EEA agreement, 27 per cent wanted to replace the EEA agreement and 21 per cent was undecided (NTB, 2017). That being the case, any attempts to re-open the membership debate would not only be meaningless, but also unprofitable, as the results are highly predictable.

As the EU membership debate has been removed from the political agenda, the print media has not made any attempts to pursue the debate; the print media has reported less frequently on the EU and it has become increasingly difficult for 'No to the EU' to reach out to the public by using the media. In addition, it has become more difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU. 'No to the EU' has decreased from 145.000 members in 1994 to 24.000 members in 2015 (Dagen, 2015). This thesis therefore examines the role of the print media, grassroots campaigning and the link between the two to explain the differences in the development of Eurosceptic groups in Norway and the UK.

1.4 Chapter Outline

Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 introduces literature that has relevance for this research and discusses central concepts that will be used in the analysis in Chapter 5 and 6. Furthermore, it discusses prior literature in the field and identifies a gap in the literature. Chapter 3 discusses the choice of methods and

[4] Conducted by Sentio in November, 2017
[5] Conducted by Sentio in November, 2017

collection of data, and how this data helps answer the research question and test hypotheses. Chapter 4 looks at the positions of the UK and Norway within the EU, and traces Euroscepticism back to the early days of the EU. The chapter presents the underlying ideas and attitudes towards the EU in Norway and the UK. In Chapter 5, an analysis of the reporting of the EU in the UK print media is presented. The chapter investigates the effects of framing (how the integration debate has been constructed in the print media) and the effects of priming (how frequently the print media report on the EU, and how often certain ideas and frames are present in the debate). It aims to find out whether the print media has contributed to the success of UKIP. Furthermore, it discusses the importance of grassroots campaigning. Similarly, Chapter 6 presents a content analysis of the reporting of the EU in the Norwegian print media. The chapter studies both framing and priming effects and aims to find out whether the print media has influenced the development of 'No to the EU'. Furthermore, it discusses the importance of grassroots campaigning. The findings from the analysis are in both chapters complemented with data collected from in-depth elite interviews, opinion polls and primary sources in the form of political manifestos collected from organisations, archives, governments and the EU. Chapter 7 compares the two case studies, by discussing the main findings. Furthermore, it briefly discusses the impact and limitations of the research.

1.5 Main findings

Firstly, the research studies the effects of framing in the print media. As will be discussed, the print media in the UK gradually became more Eurosceptic throughout the late 1980s, but the change in attitudes did not bring any immediate political opportunities for UKIP. In Norway, the print media have supported membership of the EU ever since the first referendum took place in 1972. EU supporters had the support of the media and the establishment, but the public still voted to leave the EU. In other words, the research finds that other factors than framing effects are more effective in influencing the growth and success of Eurosceptic movements.

Secondly, the research studies the effects of priming in the print media. In the UK, the analysis identifies a connection between priming effects (media attention and salience issue) and the growth of UKIP. When the print media reported more frequently on UKIP, despite not reporting favourably of the party, it performed better in the elections. In Norway, the data indicated a similar connection between framing effects in the media and mobilisation of opposition towards the EU. When the print media reports less frequently on the EU, it becomes more difficult for 'No to the EU' to engage the public in the debate and maintain support. By contrast, when the print media report more frequently on the EU, it became easier for 'No to the EU' to engage the public in the debate, and hence mobilise opposition towards the EU.

Finally, it will be argued that it is the combination of priming effects in the media and grassroots campaigning that in these case studies has influenced the development of Eurosceptic movements. Whereas the Eurosceptic movements received *attention* in the media, which contributed to the growth of the movements, they did not receive favourable coverage. Hence, symbol mobilisation has taken place elsewhere, in the form of public engagement. As discussed, UKIP struggled to get attention in the media – and when it finally did, the print media did not report favourably of UKIP. The party therefore adopted different methods to spread their message to the public, such as organising public meetings – both in larger cities, and towns and villages – knocking on doors and establishing a connection with 'ordinary people'. In Norway, in only a couple of years, 'No to the EU' established local organisations in almost all constituencies, held conferences and demonstrations in the largest cities, and printed newspapers and flyers to spread the message. What made all of this possible, was the large number of supporters volunteering for the grassroots movement. In fact, grassroots campaigning was of such importance that the Eurosceptic movement has become synonymous to 'the people's movement'. In short, it is therefore not what is being said in the media that influence the development of Eurosceptic movements, but the combination of media *attention* and grassroots campaigning. Furthermore, Eurosceptic movements find it easier to reach out to

the grassroots and mobilise opposition against the EU at critical junctures, when the media report more frequently on the EU.

1.6 Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the relevance of the research. It has identified Norway and the UK as case studies, with particular focus on 'No to the EU' and UKIP. In both case studies, the strength of the Eurosceptic movements has shifted over the past decades. As discussed, the differences in this development cannot be attributed to institutional arrangements with the EU. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the media are thought to have great influence on the development of social movements and political parties. If the success of the Eurosceptic movements is influenced by political opportunities, and the media are considered an important political opportunity variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the development of Eurosceptic movements. This research therefore investigates to what extent and how the print media influences the development of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. Additionally, it discusses the importance of grassroots activities. The chapter has discussed briefly the terms and concepts that will be used in the content analysis, such as framing and priming. In addition, the chapter has discussed the structure of the thesis, with the presentation of a brief chapter outline. Finally, the chapter has presented the main findings of the research, namely that priming effects are more effective than framing effects in bringing opportunities for Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. Priming effects, combined with grassroots activity, enables the Eurosceptic movements to reach out to the public and mobilise opposition against the EU. The following chapter will introduce relevant literature and discuss the theoretical framework. Furthermore, it identifies a gap in the field.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

As discussed in the introduction, this research studies the reporting of the integration debate in the media and aims to find out to what extent the print media and grassroots campaigns are significant in explaining the growth of Eurosceptic movements. Before introducing sources and methods used to analyse the data, a review of the literature in the field is provided. This chapter introduces literature on six different topics. Firstly, in order to investigate whether the media have influenced the success of Eurosceptic movements, a brief discussion of the term 'success' is needed. Secondly, the chapter studies the concept of Euroscepticism. As this research studies the development of Eurosceptic movements, it is crucial to understand the *concept* of Euroscepticism. Thirdly, it discusses the emergence of political parties and social movements. This research includes a case study of both a political party and a social movement, and the development of these, and it is therefore important to understand the differences between the two, and how they emerge. Fourthly, it deals with the concept of grassroots movements. In both of these case studies, the Eurosceptic movement has a bottom-up structure, where a significant part of the framing takes place through public engagement and grassroots activities. In both case studies, the Eurosceptic movements have proved to be successful forces and it is therefore necessary to discuss how grassroots movements operate. Fifthly, since the media are considered an important political opportunity variable and a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public, and this research aims to find out whether the print media has brought political opportunities for Eurosceptic movements in these case studies, this chapter discusses the concept of Political Opportunity Structures (POS). Finally, the chapter introduces central concepts in the field of media analysis, that contributes to the understanding of the content analysis conducted for this research. Furthermore, prior research within the field of framing effects and the EU is provided. The aim of this chapter is to introduce literature that contribute to the

understanding of the research findings, including discussions of definitions and concepts. In addition, the chapter identifies a gap in the literature, arguing that this research is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the role of the media in promoting Euroscepticism.

2.1 A discussion of 'success'

This research studies how the media influence the emergence, development and success of Eurosceptic movements in the UK and Norway, and it is therefore crucial to discuss the meaning of the term 'success'. As pointed out by Bettencourt et al. (1996, 175), one of the most difficult things for social scientists to do is to gauge whether social movements are successful. Different definitions of 'success' have been introduced in the field of social science, but Bettencourt et al. (1996, 176) argue that attempts to develop a standard definition of success with which to label all movements will only result in theoretical confusion. They therefore suggest that all researchers propose their own definition of success for application only to the particular movements they are studying (ibid, 176). Bettencourt et al. discuss success in terms of goal achievement, distinguishing between long-term goals and immediate goals; in order to reach their long-term goals, social movements must achieve most of their immediate goals. However, a movement can be described as successful even if it does not achieve its long-term goal, if it meets some if not many of its immediate goals (ibid).

Burnstein et al. (cited in: Jenkins J., & Klandermans B. 1995. P. 281), similarly argue that assessing a movement's success involves determining whether it has achieved its goals. In order to find out whether the movement has achieved its goals, one must identify what the goals are – any social movement has a multiplicity of participants (both individuals and organisations), each of whom may view movement goals differently. Should the goals be those of the participants, the media-reported demands of social movement leaders or the perceptions of movement targets or observers? Furthermore, goals can change over the course of a movement's activities, and if that happens – which set of goals should be considered in deciding if success has been achieved? More recent

research by Steven Epstein (2011), confirms these challenges, arguing that 'movements are not homogenous entities' and that 'often there is little agreement within a movement as to what goals must be pursued' (ibid, 258). Burnstein et al. (ibid, 282) therefore define goals as 'the formally stated objectives of political movement organisations: those goals publicly presented in speech or writing to nonmovement actors such as movement targets, the media, or bystander publics' (cited in: Jenkins J., & Klandermans B. 1995, 282). Firstly, formalised objectives are often reported in the mass media or elsewhere, making it possible to ascertain goals at specific times and to track changes over time. Secondly, although different sets of goals may exist, it is likely that only a single set of objectives will be formalised through public demands, according to Burnstein et al. (ibid, 282). In this view, a movement may be considered successful to the extent that it achieves its formally stated goals. Epstein (2011, 258), agrees with this definition, arguing that 'the question can (and to some extent must) be approached from the perspective of a movement's stated goals'. Furthermore, he argues, the real measure of a movement's success may not be whether it achieves *for itself* the benefits that it sought, but whether its actions end up benefiting some larger social group (ibid).

Rasmussen (1997, 174) argued in his research that direct results in the form of fulfilment of the movements' formulated demands – their success – can only be traced with a great measure of uncertainty, but in several cases one can assume that a considerable influence has been exerted both on the public in general and on political decisions. The movements do not necessarily succeed in their attempts to shape or change policies, but of equal importance is the fact that the movements' specific work forms and values are infiltrated into the established politics, what Rasmussen refers to as 'routine politics' (ibid). Similarly, Marco Guigni (cited in: Epstein 2011, 258) criticises scholars who assume that the results of activism should be sought in the domain of policy outcomes. Whereas the analytical emphasis on policy is understandable (the passage of legislation or the adoption of new policies are easier to observe than social and cultural effects), results that are not possible to measure in quantitative terms can have great long-

term consequences, such as the creation of new collective identities or political alliances, shifts in public opinion and changes in frameworks for understanding (ibid, 259). In light of this discussion, the term 'success' is in this thesis is determined by two different factors; the achievement of immediate – and long-term goals. Furthermore, it agrees with Epstein (2011, 258), that 'the question can (and to some extent must) be approached from the perspective of a movement's stated goals'. However, absolute success or failure in the political terrain is unlikely and we should not see success or failure in absolute binary terms, but as existing on a continuum between complete success and complete failure. Having dealt with success, it is crucial to discuss the concept of *Euroscepticism,* as this research focuses on the success of Eurosceptic movements.

2.2 Euroscepticism

The research studies the success or failure of Eurosceptic movements and it is therefore important to briefly discuss what Euroscepticism is, and what successful Eurosceptic parties and movements would achieve. Hand in hand with the process of integration has come a rise in outright opposition towards the EU. This opposition can be found in party systems across the continent and recently more parties have become relevant as opponents rather than supporters of the EU. In the article, 'Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon' by Simon Usherwood & Nick Startin (2013, 1) it is argued that opposition to the EU can be traced back to the mid-1970s. While there was some disagreement between the six nations that formed the EEC in 1957, 'Europe' did not become an issue in any significant way within the domestic sphere until the mid-1970s when debates began on the enlargement of the EU. Euroscepticism, a term used to describe this opposition towards the integration process, has become a central term in discussions about the EU. The term 'Eurosceptic' can be traced back to the mid-1980s in the post-Single European Act era in the UK, where journalists and politicians used the term to describe those Conservative MPs who were sceptical towards the EU (Leruth et al. 2018, 4). In its simplest form, Euroscepticism refers to opposition to some

aspect of European integration, but as Leruth at al. (ibid) points out, the vagueness of this definition means the term risks being 'everything and nothing'. Scholars (Tiersky, 2001; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003) have struggled to find a precise definition of the term, as opposition can differ in both strength and presence in different areas of integration. What is Euroscepticism?

Tiersky (2001, 1-2) argues that enthusiasts consider the final destination of the integration process to be the establishment of a unified federal continent, as a new economic and political structure in the world. In this view, Europe is more than just a geographical expression. However, the problem with this definition is that not all enthusiasts consider federalism the final destination of the integration process; some enthusiasts find other destinations more preferable, whereas others argue that federalism as final destination is simply not obtainable. Sceptics, he argues, are those not supportive of the integration process in general, considering the vision of integration as mistaken or impossible (ibid, 1-2). This group considers the federalist aspects of the integration process a threat to national sovereignty. In this view, the EU supresses the political-democratic vitality of national political parties and peoples without replacing them with something else. Tiersky (ibid) describes Euroscepticism as permanent doubting of the integration process, but without opposition towards *realistic* advantageous co-operation among nation states for peace and prosperity. Euroscepticism, he argues, could also include hostility towards the idea of building a continent with its own continental interests, without the inclusion of the US in political and security affairs (ibid, 3). Whereas these definitions give a general understanding of the distinction between enthusiasts and sceptics, they do not discuss how opposition or support for the integration process can differ in both strength and presence; these definitions do not recognise that both enthusiasts and sceptics can be critical or supportive of integration in one area, but not necessarily in all the different integration areas.

In the article `A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems`, Paul Taggart (ibid, 363-67) defines Euroscepticism by distinguishing between two different categories: 'Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU; Soft Euroscepticism, in contrast, is defined as involving contingent or qualified opposition to European integration` (cited in: Kopecký & Mudde 2002, 299-300). In addition, he suggests that Euroscepticism incorporates three different positions on the EU. First, a position of those who are opposed to the idea of integration and as a consequence oppose the EU. Second, a position of those that are not in principle opposed to integration but have doubts about this form of integration because it is too inclusive; this group is not in opposition to integration but would have preferred a different form of integration because the EU forces together elements that are too diverse to be compatible. Finally, a position of those that are not in principle opposed to the integration process, but are sceptical because it is too exclusive, either geographically or socially (Taggart 1998, 365-66).

In the article: `The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe`, Kopecký & Mudde (2002, 303-4) criticise Taggart`s definition for being too inclusive. First, the article argues that soft Euroscepticism is defined in such a broad manner that every disagreement with any policy decision of the European Union can be included. Second, the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism is rather blurred, as Taggart argues that `in practice hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objections to *the current form* of European integration in the EU` (cited in: Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, 300). Third, the criteria used to connect and to separate the different forms is not clear, which makes it difficult to explain why different forms of Euroscepticism appear. Finally, the categories do not do enough justice to the distinction between ideas of integration and the current form of integration in the European Union (ibid). As a result, Euroscepticism can be used to describe both those in opposition to integration and those that are supportive of integration. This might cause an

over- and underestimation of the strength of the phenomenon and illustrate that there is more or less Euroscepticism than there actually is.

Taggart accepts in a later elaboration that his first definition of 'soft scepticism' is too inclusive and that his original definition includes parties that are in essence supportive of integration. Based on this and difficulties related to the categorisation of political parties, Szczerbiak & Taggart (2003) have redefined Taggart's definition of 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism as follows: `Hard Euroscepticism might be defined as principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU. Soft Euroscepticism might be re-defined as when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU`s current or future planned trajectory based on the *further* extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make` (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2003, 12).

Eurosceptic movements and 'success'

As discussed, the concept of 'success' has in this thesis been determined by two different factors; the achievement of immediate – and long-term goals (Burnstein et al., cited in: Jenkins J., & Klandermans B. 1995, 282). As the research aims to find out whether the media have contributed to the 'success' of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK, it is necessary to briefly discuss the goals of these Eurosceptic movements. In order to know what successful Eurosceptic parties and movements would achieve, it is useful to identify the different types of Eurosceptic parties. Usherwood and Startin (2013, 5) have identified four different types of Eurosceptic parties in their article 'Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon'. Firstly, there are single-issue pro-sovereignty parties that are opposed to integration per se. These parties adopt a 'hard Eurosceptic' discourse and have not made any significant electoral impact beyond EU elections. Secondly, there are Eurosceptic radical right parties that have decided to widen their domestic appeal, beyond 'bread and butter' issues and anti-

immigration, by making the EU an increasingly important element of their political platform. Thirdly, there are left-wing Eurosceptic parties beyond the mainstream left that are opposed to the neo-liberal direction in which they see European integration progressing, regarding the EU as merely a 'capitalist club'. Finally, there are the mainstream parties which have increasingly adopted a 'soft-Eurosceptic' discourse in certain areas of integration, such as the EU budget or further enlargement. By using this definition of Eurosceptic parties, UKIP would be classified as a single-issue pro-sovereignty Eurosceptic party, opposed to integration per se. The ultimate long-term goal for UKIP would therefore be withdrawal from the EU. 'No to the EU' is not a political party, and does therefore not fit into any of these categories, but the aim of the organisation, as it emerged as a response to the Norwegian government's decision to hold referendums on the EEC/EU, would similarly be to prevent the country from become a member of the EU.

2.3 The emergence of political parties

Having discussed the concept of success and what the Eurosceptic movements in the UK and Norway want to achieve, literature on the emergence of political parties is of great significance for this research. As the research studies the development of UKIP, it is important to understand why parties emerge and how they develop. However, before discussing the emergence of political parties, it is crucial to define the *concept* of political parties. Giovanni Sartori (1976) discussed a number of definitions of political parties in his work 'Parties and party systems. A framework for analysis'. Burke (cited in: ibid, 8) defined political parties as 'a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed'. This definition does not recognise different types of political parties and Sartori (1976) distinguishes among '(i) the party that remains external to, and uninvolved with, the sphere of government, the ambassador party, so to speak; (ii) the party that operates within the ambit of government but does not govern; and, (iii) the party that actually governs, that takes on the governing or governmental function' (ibid, 19). In his

work, Sartori presents what he refers to as 'a minimal definition' of political parties: 'A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office' (Sartori 1976, 56). However, he emphasises that the minimal definition fulfils its purpose when it suffices to identify the object, but that beyond this purpose it is by no means a sufficient definition. As he put it, 'It cannot satisfy other purposes' (ibid, 57). Sartori's minimal definition is useful for explaining briefly what political parties are, but it does not sufficiently distinguish between different political parties. It is therefore useful to additionally discuss some more complex definitions of the concept.

Alan Ware (1996, 1) argues that identifying the differences between parties and other kinds of social and political institutions can be difficult and that definitions introduced by political scientists often do not cover all the different types of political parties, because not all parties fit the definitions. He therefore considered three definitions of political parties, before coming up with one single definition of the concept. The first definition describes political parties as 'institutions that bring together people for the purpose of exercising power within the state` (Ware 1996, 2). Ware both agrees and disagrees with this definition; he agrees that a political party must involve more than one person, but at the same time he recognises the possibility that parties are set up by one single person as a way of enhancing his or her own power within the state. He does not agree, on the other hand, that the purpose of political parties always is to exercise power within the state. He brings up an example from Canada, where one of the parties aimed to take the province out of the federation rather than exercising power within it. Furthermore, this definition could be challenged by the establishment of UKIP, as it emerged as a policy-seeking party without the aim of winning seats in Parliament. Sometimes, fringe and protest parties emerge simply to put pressure on the established parties, which have not succeeded in addressing the concerns of a certain group of voters. The second definition argues that the purpose of political parties is to 'seek to use legitimate means for pursuing their ends'. Ware disagrees also with this definition, because parties originally

established as civil organisations can become involved in armed conflicts with a regime because they have decided to resort to the use of force, or because the regime has chosen to repress them effectively. Though, most parties seek to use legitimate means for pursuing their ends, there can always be exceptions. The third definition argues that when parties 'can contest elections in the state, parties will seek to do so' (Ware 1996, 3). Ware contradicts this definition, as some parties choose not to nominate candidates for an election because it clashes with their long-term goals. In other situations, parties could refuse to contest a particular election in order to protest against the policies of the government. As these definitions do not succeed in capturing all the different types of political parties, Ware has introduced his own definition of the concept; `A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in the government, and (b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to aggregate interests` (Ware 1006, 2-5). Having considered different definitions of political parties, this is the preferred definition for this research. Firstly, this definition distinguishes political parties from interest groups and pressure groups; secondly, it recognises that not all political parties are office-seeking and aim to win seats in Parliament; and finally, the definition recognises that political parties *usually* (and not always) consist of more than a single interest in society, which is important considering the emergence of single-issue parties, such as UKIP[6].

The emergence of parties

A large number of political parties have emerged since the Second World War and not even countries like the United States, known for the stability of its party system, have escaped the emergence of new parties (Maisel & Cooper 1978, 31). Once a party emerges, its popularity depends on the elite and the leader of the party. A charismatic and popular leader attracts support from prospective voters, while the absence of such qualities can be a hindrance to success for the party (ibid, 36-38). Beyme (1985) also argued along these lines: 'the initiative in the

[6] UKIP before 2006*

political process lies wholly with the party leaders, who offer their programmes like suppliers on a market, and collect votes` (Beyme 1985, 277). Furthermore, a new political party's success depends on the established parties and the behaviour of the voters. If an established party fails to provide a solution for existing problems, and the voters distrust the party, there are greater chances for a new party to emerge. If, on the other hand, an established party fails to provide a solution for existing problems, but the voters still trust the party and accept the response, the development of a new party is difficult (Maisel & Cooper 1978, 36-38).

The same factors were considered by Lago & Martinez (2011, 16), arguing that 'the existence of unsatisfied political demands shared by a significant number of individuals when electoral systems or (districts) are permissive, increase the likelihood of new parties being formed` (ibid). Electoral market failures can lead to different reactions among the electorate. Firstly, voters could simply abandon the party system and decide not to participate in the election. Secondly, voters could feel attracted to non-established parties; this can be third parties in two-party systems or minor parties in multiparty systems – either way, electoral market failures make it easier for new parties to develop; these parties can be so called anti-parties, and a vote for such parties can be thought of as a voice against politics and the existing party structure (ibid).

In `Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies`, Tavits (2008, 115-33) addresses the emergence of new parties. She argues that whether or not a group decides to enter the electoral arena, depends on the cost of entry, benefits of office and chances of electoral support. Firstly, a group has to consider how easy it is to register a party. Secondly, the chances of winning a seat has to be considered before making a decision on whether or not to enter the electoral arena. Tavits' research (2008, 115-33) found that more voters are likely to support new parties in old democracies when most existing parties have already rotated through a cabinet status.

What encourages voters to look for an alternative, and what causes the emergence of new parties? Firstly, it can be connected to the emergence of new issues, such as conflicts over nuclear controversy or an increase in the immigrant population. In `Political Parties and Party Systems`, Ware (1996, 220-5) argues that when a country experiences increased migration, it is crucial for political parties to make sure that these citizens are included in the political system; if the established parties fail to do so, this group of people may look to form new parties in order to protect their interests within society. Although migration has been proved to have little impact on the party system overall (Ware 1996, 220-5), it is not possible to conclude that party systems are immune from the effects of migration. Ware introduced two possible outcomes in his research. Firstly, increased migration can transform party systems when the culture of the migrants is significantly different from that of the other citizens; and secondly, immigration sometimes facilitates conflict within societies, especially when society is experiencing high unemployment rates – one of the arguments that has been brought up during times of high unemployment is that immigrants take jobs away from the older residents; this often leads to a social division, as immigrants often are distinguishable from the others because of religion, language, skin colour etc. Situations like these can change the party systems if the political parties do not respond to the backlash against immigrants by embracing the racial politics of the older residents – new parties can emerge to develop this cleavage. In the case of the UK, migration has been an effective argument promoted by UKIP. The UK does not have high unemployment (currently 4.3 per cent (ONS, 2018)), but the party has successfully made the claim that migrants (and the EU) are to blame for social cleavages in society. Several European countries have experienced these kinds of social tension and the development of parties which respond to these changes, e.g. National Front in France, Swedish Democrats in Sweden or the Danish Folkparty in Denmark. In other words, when established parties fail to address new issues, voters may look for an alternative.

Secondly, the emergence of new parties can be connected to the effect of short-term economic performance. Recession increases the chances for new parties to

develop, as it gives the elites of the new party an opportunity to profit from policy failures of the established parties. In times of recession, established parties appear less credible and this makes it easier for new parties to mobilise voters; parties emerge not as a result of the recession itself, but because the viability of established parties has disappeared (ibid, 115-133). Tavits (2008, 119) argues that in addition to structural and institutional features, the attitudes of the voters must be considered; this is because structural and institutional features are not enough to explain the emergence of new parties. She found that `disappointment is likely to lead to an active response, i.e. to withdrawal of one`s vote from those candidates or parties that are perceived to be the source of this disappointment` (Tavits 2008, 119). Furthermore, she introduces three indicators of voter discontent. First, economic performance; as mentioned above, economic performance can be a source of discontent in democracies. Recession is usually related to high unemployment, which is a threatening issue that influences voters. In old democracies, growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation rates have been considered as motives for economic voting. Second, increased turnout in elections can be related to the emergence of parties. Parties can only mobilise voters that have left other parties, or voters that have not found existing parties appealing enough to participate in elections. This group represents potential voters for new parties and sometimes leads to increased turnout at elections, though Tavits (2008, 115-33) argues that this group of voters is insignificant, because the vote share for new parties is likely to be small. In addition, ethnic minorities can be a potential group for new parties; this group consists of voters that have not been able to mobilise behind a party, or whose parties have suffered an electoral loss. This group has been disconnected from the electoral system, but is likely to support new parties that promise to represent their interests better.

Finally, the emergence of parties could possibly be related to the credibility of the government. As discussed, dissatisfaction with the established parties makes it easier for new parties to emerge. This is also the case if an existing party system runs out of parties that have not been in government before, and there is a belief among the electorate that the established parties have failed to govern well when

serving in government (Tavits 2008, 119-122). The third factor can be linked to the emergence of the UK Independence Party. The party emerged as a response to dissatisfaction with the established parties, with the intention of bringing a new subject on to the political agenda, the EU. In the early years, the party recruited members largely from the political right, but later began to recruit members from across the political spectrum, in particular those feeling left behind in the political system, with the impression that the established parties had 'let them down'.

2.4 Organisations and social movements

Having discussed the concept of political parties, the concept of *social movement* is of equal relevance for this study, as Eurosceptics in both case studies have mobilised behind social movements, such as the campaigns against the EU. Before discussing why social movements emerge, and the impact and political consequences of such movements, the concept needs a working definition. Amenta et al. (2010) define social movements as 'actors and organisations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilising regular citizens for sustained political act' (Amenta et al. 2010, 288). Tilly & Tarrow (2015, cited in: Kolers 2016, 581) introduced a less inclusive definition, describing social movements as a 'sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organisations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities' and specify that in social movements the *government* is involved as either a maker or target of claims. The latter has been challenged from other perspectives, on grounds on whether all the criteria are necessary conditions. Staggenborg (cited in: Kolers 2016, 581) argues that some social movements seem not to engage governments, but target social norms and cultural values, rather than policies. Furthermore, power is not located *only* in the government, but could be distributed among multiple centres (ibid). Hence, a social movement does not always advertise claims against the government. This research therefore prefers Amenta et al.'s definition, where actors in social movements seek to alter power deficits and to

effect social transformations by mobilising public support for political acts (Amenta et al. 2010, 288).

Della Porta & Diani (2006, 13) argues that social movements develop 'when a feeling of dissatisfaction spreads and insufficiently flexible institutions are unable to respond'. Similarly, Rochon (cited in: ibid) argues that social movements develop with the 'task of translating the chronic problem as described by the critical community into an acute problem that will attract media attention'. Diani (ibid, 20) characterise social movements as a social process, which consists of the mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action. Social movements are in conflict with identified opponents and are linked by informal networks which share a collective identity. Social movement actors engage in political or cultural conflicts with the aim to promote, or oppose, social change (Tilly & Touraine, cited in: Della Porta & Diani 2006, 20). By conflict, Tilly & Touraine mean 'an oppositional relationship between actors who seek control of the same stake […] and in the process make negative claims on each other' (cited in: ibid). A social movement includes both individuals and organisations, which engage in exchanges of resources in pursuit of common goals, while keeping their independence. In a social movement, no organised actor can claim to represent a movement as a whole (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 20-22). Pizzorno (cited in: Della Porta & Diani 2006, 22) emphasises that social movements are not only made up of protest events or specific campaigns, but a movement process in which collective identities develop, which go beyond specific events. Social movements connect individuals, organisations and networks to other actors in a broader collective mobilisation (ibid).

In order to distinguish social movements from organisations, networks and other forms of collective action, it is useful to establish what social movements are *not.* Melucci (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 9) argues that collective action has different forms – from voting and interest groups to football matches, but that these are not the forms of action most characteristic of social movements. He argues that movements 'characteristically mount contentious challenges through disruptive

direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes' (ibid). In 'Social Movements' (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 25-28), it is argued that the difference between social movements and other forms of collective action does not consist primarily of differences in organisational characteristics, but of the fact that social movements are not organisations. Social movements are networks which sometimes include organisations, but not always. A single organisation is therefore not a social movement, but it may be involved in a social movement process. Furthermore, social movements do not have members, but participants. De la Porta argues that if social movements are different from organisations, any organisation which is involved in a social movement may be regarded as a 'social movement organisation' (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 26). Similarly, Staggenborg (cited in: Kolers 2016, 581) points out that social movements, networks and organisations are not the same; individuals participate in social movements by formally or informally joining networks or organisations that are constituent parts of a movement.

Jones & Walsh (2017, 3) define political organisation as 'the effort to bridge the rupture of politics with the endless hard work of instituting and institutionalising this change'. To them, political organisation involves giving form to politics – instead of waiting for change to happen, groups become informed and draw political demands out of an analysis of the present. Giving form to politics involves coordinating these demands and strategising to produce change. This, they argue, does not happen without action and organisation (ibid). A *campaign* is 'a sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities' (Tilly & Tarrow cited in: Tarrow 2011, 147). In contrast to petitions, declarations or mass meetings, campaigns include more than one single event. Furthermore, campaigns contain public performances, media efforts, and educational activities and lobbying (ibid, 147-9). Tarrow argues that a campaign consists of three parties: a group of claimants, objects of claims and a public of some kind. Claims made by campaigns do not necessarily target the governments, but could target different authorities, such as owners of properties, religious functionaries or others whose actions significantly affect the welfare of the

claimed constituency. Tarrow argues that campaigns are established when weak actors challenge stronger ones, or elites or authorities. Furthermore, campaigns often emerge out of single protest events and take their shape around the initial conflict in those events (ibid, 191-192).

In this view, *No to the EU* would be characterised mainly as an organisation, as it is structured as a political party, with members and membership costs. As discussed, social movements do not have members. However, the organisation has been largely involved in a social movement against the EU. It campaigned, together with activists from other networks and organisations, against membership of the EU. The UK Independence Party, by contrast, emerged as a pressure group which later developed into a political party. However, it could be argued that also UKIP has been involved in a social movement against the EU. EU opponents in the UK mobilised through different campaigns, which together achieved a common goal. *Grassroots Out*, established by political activists from across the political spectrum, also included UKIP.

In some cases, local organisations emerge before a mass political organisation does, while other times local associations are established as the result of deliberate efforts on the part of the central organisation to expand or to create a network of associations (Eliassen & Svaasand 1975, 100). In terms of 'No to the EU', a central organisation emerged, which later established associations in almost all constituencies.

Stinchombe (cited in: Eliassen & Svaasand 1975, 105) argues that there are five factors under which organisations emerge:

- When an organisation is considered an alternative way of achieving goals that are not easily achieved within existing social arrangements
- When the benefits from establishing an organisation are considered to be higher than the costs
- When some social group with which they identify will receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing things

- When resources and legitimacy needed to build an organisation are available
- When there is a belief that the organisation can defeat, or avoid being defeated, by its competitors (ibid).

The first point could be linked to the Norwegian case study, as EU opponents in Norway found it necessary to find 'an alternative way' of achieving their goals. The largest political parties, and the government, supported membership of the EEC/EU when both referendums took place. EEC/EU opponents therefore mobilised behind a political organisation, in order to influence the public on the EEC/EU.

2.5 Grassroots movements

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, an important reason behind the success of the 'No campaigns' in both countries was rooted in public engagement and effective grassroots activities. In Norway, the members of No to EU mobilised together with EU opponents from other movements and organisations and established what later became an effective force against the EU. In the UK, members of the UK Independence Party formed an alliance with likeminded people from other political parties and organisations ahead of the referendum in 2016. In order to understand how it was possible for these movements to succeed, the concept of grassroots movements needs to be discussed. It is crucial to understand how these movements operate in order to become a successful force.

What are grassroots movements?

Whereas there has been a considerable disagreement in the field of social sciences on how to interpret the concept of grassroots movements and how far-reaching their consequences have been, researchers have come to a general agreement on some basic premises (Rasmussen 1997, 173), including the following:

1. Grassroots movements are founded in socioeconomic changes in society and when they started to emerge in the 1960s, the movements were primarily based on the emergence of new social strata, the so-called new middle layers, i.e. students and persons employed in the public sectors.
2. Movements are organised in a way that reflects and promotes specific, democratic ideals alleged to be characteristic of their social basis: anti-hierarchic, segmented, informal, network-oriented and with vague participational rules.
3. Movements represent a new channel for political influence distinct from the already existing ones, such as political parties and interest organisations – they aim to put forward demands that have not yet been dealt with by the already established channels and in addition the movements aim at changing social and cultural values. The work methods of grassroots movements are based on collective activity and often include demonstrations, protest petitions etc. It is the use of these methods that determines the categorisation as grassroots activity, according to Rasmussen (1997, 174).
4. Direct results in the form of achievements of the movements' demands can only be traced with a great measure of uncertainty, but in several cases one can assume that a considerable influence has been exerted both on the public in general and on political decisions. Of equal importance is the ability of these movements to have an impact and influence on the established politics, which Rasmussen refers to as 'routine politics' (ibid).

Margaret Post argues that 'as external actors, such alliances [grassroots coalitions] attempt to influence policy decisions through collective action: they aggregate group interests into demand-making strategies, mobilize shared resources, leverage collective organizational capacity, and garner political will for the changes they want' (cited in: Post 2015, 272). As we shall see, this type of

coalition emerged in both of these case studies in order to establish an effective force against the EU.

The dynamics of maintaining a successful grassroots organisation

In terms of whether or not a grassroots organisation is successful, one must not only consider policy success or failure, but also other forms of influence such as agenda setting, mobilisation of interests, constituent representation and voice, public credibility, and the influence of action on legislators' voting records (Post 2015, 272). Factors found to influence the strength of grassroots movements include the arrangement of interests and strategies; an ability to leverage heterogeneous relationships and resources; mutuality, trust, and respect in partnership; political capacity; and what is referred to as 'bottom-up' pathways to participation for grassroots constituencies (ibid, 271). The Eurosceptic movements studied in both of these case studies benefited from this 'bottom-up' structure, where responsibilities were shared between all of their members and volunteers played an active role in the political activities that took place, such as political events and campaigning.

Bettencourt (1996, 211) argues that coalitions between groups may facilitate the success of grassroots efforts, referring to two types of coalitions. Firstly, intergroup coalitions, which can make it easier to overcome and bridge traditional group barriers of status and power. By forming cross-category memberships, 'individuals with different backgrounds can bring to bear their distinct experiences and skills to the grassroots effort potentially' (cited in: ibid). Secondly, coalitions between separate grassroots groups that are working either on the same issue or on issues that have a shared superordinate goal (e.g., overpopulation). Such coalitions may have more potential to pool and exchange resources, as well as plan and arrange activities.

Furthermore, Bettencourt (ibid, 2012) emphasises in her research the importance of effective leadership, and the impact this has on the success of grassroots efforts – the leadership could determine whether the group is successful or not; an effective leader organises the group to achieve its goals, as well as inspires and

motivates the members of the group to continue their work. Grassroots organisations can provide volunteers with opportunities that will increase their feelings of competency, efficacy, and confidence, as well as decrease feelings of helplessness. Forsyth and Ludwick (cited in: ibid, 212), also argued along these lines, emphasising that effective leaders within grassroots organisations are those who foster sharing and inclusive atmospheres. Similarly, Bettencourt et al. (1996, 170) found that a group's structure, such as planning and leadership, and intragroup communication are important components of group coordination and morale, and the benefits of activism are key aspects of motivation within the group. Perlman (cited in: Bettencourt et al. 1996, 171) also found in his research that leadership is one of the most critical factors accounting for a group's success. However, leaders of grassroots movements should avoid oppressive leadership styles similar to those in the larger society, as grassroots movements are associated with a bottom-up structure, rather than top-down decision making.

Whereas leadership has been considered one of the important resources that grassroots movements need in order to succeed, other resources, such as funding, capacity and skills of grassroots members, are crucial for the continued operation and effectiveness of grassroots efforts. First, the movements need sufficient funding to underwrite their expenses. Second, time management and distribution of tasks are significant tools to achieve success; the most important responsibilities should be shared between the members, so that no member carries too much of the responsibility for implementing the groups' goals. Some grassroots organisations may therefore need a large number of members to achieve shared objectives. Moreover, grassroots leaders might adopt strategies for effective time use so that volunteers perceive that the time they commit 'makes a difference' (Bettencourt 1996, 212). Finally, information is an important resource for most grassroots movements. Their members need the skills necessary for uncovering information about social and political structures as well as the capacity to understand and apply expert knowledge. Bettencourt argues that having access to such information may be fundamental for making authentic changes within the social structure (ibid).

In addition to this, structural and individual variables affect the maintenance of grassroots organisations. In order to continue the work towards their goals, grassroots organisations rely on group processes including proper coordination and planning, and open acceptance and communication (Bettencourt et al. 1996, 212). It is therefore important for grassroots groups to develop relatively formal structures to set goals and guide the achievement from them. Bettencourt et al. (1996, 171) suggest that grassroots groups should arrange both long-range and short-range planning meetings, as these can serve useful purposes that include giving people a sense of participation, summarising the resources available to the group, building solidarity, making decisions, developing and choosing strategies, and listing a number of plans for achieving specified goals. Furthermore, social intragroup processes such as ingroup identification, and a sense of social connection and support, help maintain the group. These 'organisation, social and resource variables' contribute to the successes of grassroots organisations (Bettencourt 1996, 214).

2.6 Political opportunity structure (POS)

In this research, it is argued that the media functions as a political opportunity structure (POS), which brings opportunities for both political parties and social movements. However, before discussing the media as a political opportunity structure, it is necessary to briefly discuss the *concept* and different elements of political opportunity structure (POS). The first mention of political opportunity structure is found in Peter K. Eisinger`s (1973, 11-28) research, which studied why some American cities witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty during the late 1960s while others did not (Meyer 2004, 128). Eisinger defines political opportunity structure as a function of `the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system` (Eisinger 1973, 25). The research found that elements in the environment, such as governmental responsiveness, impose certain constraints on political opportunity or open avenues for it. Where the structure of government is more responsive to an electorate by providing opportunities for distinct segments of the population, or where the government is responsive to citizen needs and demands, the

structure of opportunities is relatively open. Where the structure of government is not responsive and power is concentrated, the opportunities for protest movements to succeed are limited (ibid, 11-12). Eisinger concludes that cities without visible openings for participation repressed or discouraged groups to foreclose protest.

Since 1973, an increased number of scholars (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Goldstone, 2004; McAdam et al., 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow, 1995) have conducted research on social movements and political opportunity structure. In 1977, Charles Tilly introduced a more comprehensive study on political opportunity structure based on Eisinger's work. Like Eisinger, he connects the emergence of social movements to political openness. When authorities offer meaningful avenues for access, there are smaller chances of protest groups to emerge because more direct routes to political influence are available. By contrast, authorities can prevent various groups from mobilising social movements. Tilly found that `protest occurs when there is a space of toleration by a polity and when claimants are neither sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use dramatic means to express their interests nor so completely repressed to prevent them from trying to get what they want` (cited in: Meyer 2004, 128).

In his work `Power in Movement` (1998), Sidney Tarrow identified a list of political opportunity factors:

1. Increasing access (but only for groups or countries where access has been denied – thus a curvilinear form is suggested where low or high and routine access are *not* constitutive of favourable opportunities).
2. Shifting political alignments, so that leaders need to look for new sources of support.
3. Divided elites, so that authorities do not unite to suppress protest.
4. Influential allies, so that protestors may find powerful and sympathetic supporters.

5. Limited repression and facilitation, so that the movement has room to grow and persist in its actions.
6. Low state strength – stronger and more centralised states are generally harder to "crack" and offer fewer entry points for movement contestation.
7. Ineffective and illegitimate state repression – states that engage in in-consistent or excessive repression often *increase* movement success by showing themselves to be ineffective or illegitimate. The skill and mode of state repression is, thus, important to movement outcomes.
8. International conditions and allies that support movement actors and their goals (cited in: Goldstone 2004, 347).

The third factor, *divided elites*, arguably had great importance in the Norwegian case. As Labour, and other parties, were split on the EU debate, it brought opportunities for organisations and groups, both within the party and outside the party, to emerge. However, these factors have been criticised by other scholars on various grounds. Jack A. Goldstone (2004, 247) argues that the large number of factors is difficult to deal with and raises the question on how the different factors interact. Furthermore, he recognises that these factors are useful when analysing social movement activities, but emphasises that the list could have been more specific on what elements are most important to movement emergence versus movement success. This is a valid argument, as it is not clear whether these political opportunity factors contribute to the emergence of social movements or the success of social movements.

Political parties and POS

Political opportunity structures were originally discussed in terms of social movements, but more recent publications have extensively applied the term to the emergence of political parties. In 2000, Paul Lucardie published the article `Prophets, purifiers and prolocutors – towards a theory on the emergence of new parties`. He argues that the foundation and electoral success of a political party can be attributed to three factors: `(1) its political project, which should address problems considered urgent by substantial sections of the electorate: (2) its

resources: members, money, management and mass media exposure; and (3) the political opportunity structure: positions of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions` (cited in: Lucardie 2000, 175).

The first condition founders of political parties have to meet is the articulation of a clear and convincing political project. The project should address social problems considered urgent by a significant number of voters, such as housing, environmental pollution or mass unemployment. However, these issues are not considered urgent in all societies and the perception of social problems is embedded in the ideological or cultural assumptions about society and human nature. Founders must translate social problems into political issues, with political solutions. Although some political parties find ideological solutions, most of them represent only certain interests or advocate certain issues (ibid, 176).

The second factor is mobilisation of resources; 'a party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation; without them, its project will remain a political fantasy in the head of its *auctor intellectualis*[7]' (Lucardie 2000, 178). Resources may refer to funding and material goods, but could also include publicity, personal skills and contacts. The kinds of resources that are available to actors depend on the social and political system. In systems without a consolidated party system and without an independent civil service, political parties are often founded from the top down by regional or national government leaders who use government jobs and services as the main resources to win voters. The parties could also be funded by activists in oppositional social movements. While resources are important for political parties, sufficient resources do not guarantee electoral success. Once a sufficient number of resources have been mobilised, other factors become more important, such as political opportunity structures (ibid, 178-179).

Lucardie argues that if the founders develop a convincing political project and manage to mobilise sufficient resources, the political organisation might evolve

[7] From Latin meaning 'intellectual author'

into a political party, e.g. the UK Independence Party. If not, it might become a political pressure group or think-tank outside the party system, e.g. 'No to the EU'. According to Lucardie, the choice of whether to become a political party depends on the available resources, but more important is the political opportunity structure of the political system. However, the structure of the political system did not determine whether UKIP or 'No to the EU' developed into a political party. The UK has a two-party system, which makes it more difficult for new parties to emerge. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Anti-Federalist League decided to establish a political party. Norway has a multiparty system, which makes it easier for new parties to emerge, but 'No to the EU' chose not to establish a political party in order to mobilise support from across the political spectrum. The decision on whether to establish a political party is therefore not determined simply by access to resources or the structure of the political system. Arguably, the choice of whether to establish a political party depends on additional factors.

The third condition having an impact on the foundation and electoral success of political parties is the political opportunity structure, i.e. positions of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions. Lucardie (2000, 180) argues that founders of political parties cannot succeed without some kind of structural or environmental variable; actors do not determine their own fate completely. Because it has become a broad concept, the research focuses on four aspects of political opportunity structure (introduced by Hanspeter Kriesi, 1995, cited in: ibid); formal access to the state, informal procedures and dominant strategies, interest associations, and the configuration of power in the party system (Lucardie 2000, 180). Kriesi focused on social movements in his research, but the same aspects could arguably be applied to the emergence of political parties, e.g. the UK Independence Party. Formal access to the state is often more open in federal systems like Switzerland and Germany, and more restricted in states like France or the Netherlands. Lucardie argues that federalism offers political parties more opportunities to develop a regional base before trying their luck at national elections. Political elites can facilitate, tolerate

or repress new parties and social movements by formal and informal procedures. Formal procedures include institutional barriers, such as party registration, subsidies or manipulation of the electoral system. A single-member-plurality or first-past-the-post electoral system offers fewer opportunities to political parties. This can be applied to the U.K., where in the 2015 general election the UK Independence Party won 3.8 million votes. However, the party only won 1 seat in the Parliament due to the first-past-the-post electoral system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes in each constituency gets elected. Informal procedures, on the other hand, include cultural barriers, such as political cultures, mass media and ideologies. Some political cultures are more open and tolerant to new political parties, Lucardie argues (2000, 180). As will be discussed, the mass media has great impact on the performance of political parties. It could, therefore, influence the process by either ignoring and ridiculing, or encouraging political parties that are entering the political arena. Here, social movements could have an impact on the process; large interest associations and social movements could be more or less reluctant to establish contacts with new political parties. Political culture can hinder political parties from succeeding, but can also be useful for political parties if they support historical traditions and ideologies that have been repressed by established parties in recent years (ibid).

Furthermore, Lucardie (ibid, 180-1) identifies salient cleavages in society as an important aspect of political opportunity structure. If established parties shift their position with respect to existing cleavages, because of changing interests of the party elites or external pressure, they could create political opportunities for new parties. Lucardie brings up an example from the Netherlands, when the Labour Party shifted towards the political centre and created space for the Dutch Socialist Party to enter the electoral system in 1994 (Lucardie 2000, 180-1). Established parties will do their best to prevent new parties from succeeding and from stealing planks from their platform. What Lucardie does not address in his research is when the external environment changes without any action from the established parties, which could also create political opportunities for new parties.

Arguably, the failure of the British and Norwegian governments to accommodate growing Euroscepticism contributed to the emergence of UKIP and 'No to the EU'.

The last aspect introduced in Lucardie's article is political and economic events, such as leadership crises, rising unemployment or inflation. In earlier research, conducted by Maurice Pinard (cited in: Lucardie 2000, 181), economic events are an important factor for creating opportunities for political parties. He found that economic deprivation resulting from unemployment, and the shrinking economic position of farmers in Canada contributed to the rise of the Social Credit Party in Quebec. At the same time, the established opposition party, the Conservatives, lost voters (cited in: Lucardie 2000, 181). Political leaders sometimes succeed in convincing the voters that recession or unemployment should be blamed on external factors, such as unfair competition from foreign countries. If leaders fail to do so, economic events could create opportunities for political parties entering the electoral system (ibid, 181-182).

In the article `Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success` (2006, 419), Arzheimer & Carter discuss political opportunities in terms of electoral systems, arguing that the more proportional the electoral system is, the greater the incentives for political entrepreneurs to enter the electoral race and for voters to decide to support small political parties. The less proportional the system is, the more leaders of small parties will be prevented from fielding candidates. Since the parties then have less chances of gaining representation, voters will be discouraged from voting for them. As we shall see, this theory cannot explain the rise of UKIP. Despite small chances of gaining representation, 12.6 per cent of the electorate voted for the party in 2015. The concept of decentralisation is more complex; a high degree of decentralisation could foster the development of right-wing parties because voters are more willing to support radical parties in `second order` elections, such as European elections and local elections. Decentralisation could also prevent such parties from gaining support at national level, as it sometimes provides voters with an opportunity to express

their political frustration with the mainstream parties without disturbing the political process on the national level (ibid, 423).

Furthermore, the article found that the degree of convergence between mainstream parties could have an impact on chances of success. When mainstream parties are not ideologically distinct from each other, new parties could benefit from offering an alternative to the established parties. By contrast, when mainstream parties are ideologically distinct from each other, it is more difficult for new parties to adopt this strategy (ibid, 424). Furthermore, Dennis Spies & Simon T. Franzmann (2011, 1049) found in their research on extreme right parties that if the mainstream and the extreme right party is positioned close to the potential voters of the latter, these voters will have the possibility of choosing between them. In other words, the political opportunities for an extreme right party shrinks when the mainstream right positions itself near to its extreme right competitor. In the UK, the government has been reluctant to respond to the growth of Euroscepticism, which offered a political opportunity for the UK Independence Party. Similarly, in Norway, the government has been continuously supportive of membership of the EU, which brought opportunities for 'No to the EU' to gather and represent the voice of EU opponents. While most literature on political opportunity structure focuses on social movements, scholars have also applied the concept to political parties, suggesting that it could also successfully be applied to Eurosceptic parties, e.g. the UK Independence Party.

The media as POS

In `Comparative perspectives on social movements` (McAdam et al. 1996), *the media* are considered an important political opportunity variable. According to McAdam et al. (ibid, 285), the mass media has great impact on the opportunities and constraints under which movements operate. It plays a significant role in defining for movement actors whether they are taken seriously as agents of possible change. Furthermore, the media spotlight validates the movement as an important player. This suggests that the opening and closing of media access and

attention is an important element in defining political opportunity for movements, and possibly political parties. Media have both structural and dynamic elements; ownership and consumption patterns of the media, as well as its relation to the state and political parties, are stable. At the same time, news coverage and entertainment writing are more dynamic and do sometimes have great impact on mobilisation of movements (ibid: 287-289). The media system`s openness to social movements is an important element of political opportunity; on one hand, the media have a central role in the construction of meaning – on the other hand, the media are also an arena in which symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning, including movements (ibid).

Tarrow (1995, 126) also considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements manage to reach out to the public and mobilise support. He argues that the mobilisation of symbols is important in social movements and that the mass media serve as a function of symbol mobilisation, as the movements communicate to a broad public through the mass media. When Tarrow (2011) uses the term 'symbol', he refers to frames that are symbolised by the use of 'slogans, form of dress or music, graffiti, or renaming of familiar objects with new or different symbols' (ibid, 10). Furthermore, Tarrow argues that the mass media becomes an external resource of movements during three stages. First, it becomes an important resource in terms of consensus formation. Ferree et al. (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 149) argue that the media provide a source for consensus formation that movements cannot easily achieve on their own. In this view, new information and new ways of interpreting it often appear first in the public space, only later giving rise to collective action, such as interest groups or social movements. Similarly, Gitlin (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 149) argue that once a consensus has been established, movements take advantage of it and use it to mobilise support. Second, the mass media help movements to gain attention, which is probably the most significant stage of their impact. Finally, the media attention helps established movements maintain support by communicating their views and activities to their supporters (Tarrow 1995, 127).

Similar to Gamson & Meyer (1996), Tarrow emphasises that the media are biased when communicating these views and activities; `how movements are covered by the media and perceived by the public are affected by the structure of the media industry` (Tarrow 1995, 128). As will be discussed later, discourses reproduce assumptions of society and these common perceptions and understandings are encouraged by those with access to the media, such as journalists and politicians. Some values are promoted as moral and legitimate, whereas others are discouraged as illegitimate. The media and politicians can impose meaning and explanations of social reality that protect their interests, while at the same time undermine the interests of the rest of society (Burnham et al. 2008, 251). Furthermore, the concept of framing is important; `social movements are deeply involved in the work of "naming" grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate with a population`s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others` (Tarrow 1995, 122). The Norwegian movement against the EU, for example, argued that the EU is undemocratic. In order to protect national sovereignty, the public should vote against membership of the EU. Tarrow (ibid) argues that when a social movement chooses symbols with which to frame its message, it sets a strategic course between its cultural setting, its political opponents and the public whose support it needs. However, influence of frames used by social movements varies by setting and over time. A movement can constantly use the same frames in which to spread its message to the public, but mobilisation of supporters can vary greatly over time.

Similar to Tarrow, Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) argued in their article 'The Interdependency of Mass Media and Social Movements' that social movements are dependent on the media to get their message across. In order to target their audiences, they argue, social movements need the mass media more than any other political actor. Movements essentially mobilise the public, or at least their constituents, to show to the power holders that large numbers of people do not agree and want change (or no change). Social movements need public support to do so and it is via the media that movements can reach out to both potential

protest participants and to the public (ibid, 6). Similarly, Kimberley Voss found in her research (2015, 19) that the mass media bring opportunities for social movements and describes the mass media as firstly, sites of contest (as movements must compete with other sponsors of frames), and secondly, a tool that movements must use to reach out to the public, both in terms of authorities, members and challengers.

2.7 Media discourses

As this research studies the reporting of the EU in the print media, it is crucial to discuss some of the most central concepts in media analysis, i.e., media discourses, framing, priming and media selection. Scholars (Johnson-Cartee, 2005; O'Keffe, 2006) argue that the media have great influence on how the public constructs realities and that the importance of the media in the modern world is incontrovertible. Johnson-Cartee (2005, 148) argues that for most of us, when discussing events that take place out of reach and out of sight, we use information that has been provided to us through broadcast and printed media. News content helps shape our political and social reality; the content contains political values that influence how we construct our realities. In other words, as individuals we are all influenced, our opinions shaped, reinforced and altered by our exposure to the media. For some sections of society, the media have largely replaced older institutions, such as the church, as the primary source of understanding of the world (O'Keffee 2006, 441).

Media discourse is a broad term that refers to how reality is represented in broadcast and printed media, from television to newspapers, magazines and social media. Anne O'Keeffe (2006, 441) defines media discourses as 'interactions that take place through a broadcast platform, whether spoken or written, in which the discourse is oriented to a non-present reader, listener or viewer'. Representation in the media and culture helps to construct ideas in the public mind. Stuart Hall (cited in: ibid, 14) argues that the media produce representations of the social world, images, descriptions and frames for understanding how the world is and why it works as it is said and shown to work.

Myra Macdonald (cited in: ibid) found in her research that there is `a vital interaction between the media`s role in forming the "frames for understanding" we construct in our heads about the material world, and the actuality of our behaviour and attitudes`.

When discussing discourse as the process of political communication in the public sphere, Schmidt (2008, 310-11) distinguishes between the policy sphere and the political sphere. The first sphere consists of individuals and groups at the centre of policy construction, who are involved in the creation and justification of policies and ideas. The latter, by contrast, consists of individuals and groups involved in the presentation and legitimation of political ideas to the public. Schmidt (ibid) refers to this as communicative discourse, including actors such as political leaders, the media, social activists and social movements. In addition, the public and voters to whom this communicative discourse is directed also contribute to it. The public engages through demonstrations, campaigns, social movements and interest organisations, and expresses itself in forums, polls etc. Schmidt (2008, 310-11) argues that the discursive interaction often appears to go from the top down; ideas are generated through policies, communicated to the public by political elites, who are in a position to shape public opinion by establishing the terms of the discourses and framing the policies for the media, and hence to the public. However, the process could also go from the bottom up, by discursive interactions of social activists, environmentalists etc. in the framing of 'problems' as well as solutions (ibid). As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, both case studies demonstrated a bottom-up process, where discursive interactions have been processed from the bottom up by public engagement and effective grassroots activities.

Framing and priming

The mass media provides more than facts, as it also provides frames that tell audience members how to understand particular policy controversies. *Framing* refers to the process by which the construction of a message affects the interpretation of the receiver. By structuring press accounts around certain

frames, or themes, journalists shape audience interpretations of the issue or event (Nabi & Oliver 2009, 85-86). Frames are an idea that provides meaning to a large number of events, weaving a connection among them – the frame suggests what the controversy is about. The frames for a given issue exist within the public discourse surrounding that issue, a discourse that is communicated to the public through the mass media. Robert Entman (cited in: D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010, 159) argues that `to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation`.

Media framing research investigates how the content of news *influences* the readership; because journalists construct frames that reflect the cultural themes and narratives within a society, they fundamentally affect how the readership understands the events. Such influence occurs when the media emphasise certain values, facts or other considerations, bringing greater relevance to the issue than it might appear to have under a different frame. In other words, frames influence opinions by making certain considerations seem more important than others. T.E. Nelson et al. (cited in: Johnson-Cartee 2005, 26) have identified three routes to political communication effects in the media: first, attitudes can be influenced by adding information about an issue; second, by making particular considerations more accessible; and third, by altering the weight of particular considerations. Furthermore, their research found that framing is more likely to have an impact on the readership when the readers do not have strong attitudes or beliefs towards an issue, or when the readers are confused about competing issue solutions (ibid, 27).

The concept of framing could also be applied to social movements and how movements frame specific grievances with collection action frames that dignify claims, connect them to others, and help to produce a collective identity (McAdam et al. cited in: Tarrow 2011, 144). McAdam et al. (ibid) argue that framing goes beyond how a movement's goals are strategically formed to a much

broader set of interpretive processes, which build on understandings and engage in 'framing contests' between challengers and their opponents. Samuels (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 146) argues that social movements often use both traditional and modern themes to mobilise support. Familiar themes are used to attract supporters, while modern themes are used to activate the supporters in 'creative directions' (ibid).

According to Nabi & Oliver (2009, 84), it is through the selection of particular issue attributes that news affects public opinion; politicians and journalists characterise an issue in ways that help shape its reality for an audience, creating the acceptable range of meaning. In other words, the media directs individual thoughts toward an interpretation of a situation or object, telling its readers what to think, not just what to think about (ibid). The selection of what issues to cover in the media has been referred to as priming, which could be defined as an agenda-setting effect on the part of the media, which `by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others . . . influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged` (cited in: Lenart 1994, 15-16). Whereas framing effects often apply to immediate responses shaped by a message, priming effects often refer to when messages render certain schemas more accessible for activation and use in subsequent tasks.

Both of these concepts will be applied to the content analysis conducted for this research. Framing will be used in order to study how the integration debate has been presented in the media and whether these effects have brought opportunities for Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. The concept of priming will be used to study the frequency in the reporting of certain frames, but also the frequency in the reporting of the EU. It aims to find out if the media, by reporting more or less frequently on the EU, contribute to the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK.

Media selection

Students of the media: 'The Glasgow University Media Group and the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies' (cited in: Fowler 1999,

2) found that what events are reported in the media is not a reflection of the importance of those events, but a process of selection. The media select events for reporting according to a set of criteria of newsworthiness. Then, the selected news is subject to processes of transformation as it is encoded for publication; the choice of medium and the framing of the news. In other words, news is not simply that which happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy (Fowler 1999, 3-11). Since most events are not included in news reporting, Johnson-Cartee (2005, 163) argues that the selection of news presents a partial view of the world, as the selection of news increases the significance or salience of individual elements within news reports.

The voices represented in the media are not the voices of the people, but the voices of politicians, directors, royals, managers and experts of various kinds such as doctors, architects and professors. Newspapers include a large number of statements, promises and claims which have been voiced by the group of people listed above. Fowler (1999, 20-23) argues that the media contain discourses that encode the attitudes of the elite, and that the media reproduce these discourses. Prior research (Cohen et al. 1963, cited in: Johnson-Cartee 2005, 189) has found that the frequency of interactions between the editors and their bureaucratic sources creates interpersonal relationships that affect the news process. Hence, the political elite is in a position to influence not only *what* information is reported on, but also *how* the information is presented in the news.

2.8 Prior research in the field of Euroscepticism and the media

Having discussed the central concepts that will be dealt with in Chapter 5 and 6, this section presents prior literature on media reporting and the EU. Simultaneously with the development of the integration process, there has been a growing interest among scholars in the field of media framing and media attitudes towards the EU, e.g. Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008; Ramberg, 1995 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009), Ringdal, 1996 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009), Ryghaug & Jenssen, 1999. Hawkins (2012) studied media discourses on the integration process, with a focus

on the European Union Treaty Reform Process; Daddow (2012) conducted a research on the framing of the integration debate in the media, identifying changes in framing over time; Schuck & de Vreese (2006) studied the framing of the integration process and its effects on public support for EU enlargement; Vliegenthart et al. (2008) conducted a more comprehensive research, looking at the framing of the integration process over time in terms of risks and opportunities, and its effects on public opinion towards integration; Ramberg (1995, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009), Ringdal (1996, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009) and Ryghaug & Jenssen (2009) studied the media reporting of the Norwegian referendum campaigns in 1994.

Hawkins (2012) conducted research on the integration process and discourses in the national media, with a focus on the European Union Treaty (TEU) Reform Process. He argued that the feeling of separation from the EU among the British public mirrors the representation of the integration process in the British media. Through a qualitative discourse analysis, Hawkins identified two principal frames within the Eurosceptic discourse; the EU as a foreign power and the EU as a bargaining forum (ibid, 565). The first of these frames depicts the EU as a state-like entity, rather than an international organisation. Within this frame, the EU is considered a hostile power which poses an external threat to the UK. The second frame depicts the EU as a bargaining forum in which the British interests are set against those of other member states. Furthermore, the institutions and policies are seen to work against British interests. France and Germany are seen both to govern and control the direction of the integration process; Britain, by contrast, has limited influence over decision-making processes in the EU (ibid, 566). Hawkins has successfully identified salient discourses on integration in the media through a comprehensive discourse analysis, but since the data are collected from a short period of time, changes in the reporting over time have not been identified. Furthermore, the research does not include any measurements of public support for integration and therefore does not discuss to what extent the framing in the media influences either Eurosceptic movements or public support for the EU.

Daddow (2012) has also conducted research on the framing of the integration debate in the British media, in his article 'The UK media and 'Europe': from permissive consensus to destructive dissent' (ibid, 1219). In order to identify changes in the framing over time, his research studies a longer period of time, from 1973 to 2012. Daddow argues that the media have been on a journey and has gradually become more critical towards the EU. As he puts it, the media coverage has changed from 'a permissive consensus to destructive dissent'. In 1975, he argues, 'widespread media backing surely helped sway a British public which had been antipathetic to the EEC through the 1960s and early 1970s to the Yes side' (Daddow 2012, 1223). However, the opening up of contested ground with the continuous widening and deepening of the EU has created opportunities for attacking all things European. Daddow argues that the media have played a crucial role in this development by legitimating political criticism of the EU. Furthermore, he argues, the media have worked synergistically with politicians to articulate a workable language of Euroscepticism that has 'taken hold of the popular imagination' (ibid, 1222).

Daddow observed that not only have more newspapers become critical of deeper integration, but also that those that were critical from the beginning have also changed their language when reporting on the EU. He argues that already Eurosceptic papers put withdrawal on the agenda in order to 'retain a distinctive voice' within a highly competitive marketplace (ibid, 1225). Daddow implies in his research that the image of integration constructed by the media is influenced by three factors; the process of news management by the EU institutions, the reporters' reading of the best stories and the editors' perceptions of what they believe the readers most want to consume (ibid, 1224).

Furthermore, Daddow looks at what has become known as 'the Murdoch effect' (Daddow 2012, 1227). He argues that Rupert Murdoch's business interests override his interests in ideas or politics and that he backs the parties he considers will be most amenable to his business interests. The Murdoch effect can be seen in two different ways, he argues; firstly, as politicians in the driving seat, with

Murdoch as supplicant, striving to channel the tides of political opinion in ways that suit his business interests through deals in the corridors of power; secondly, as politicians benefiting from the ideas and attitudes shaped through his media outlets (ibid, 1229-30). Anyhow, the Murdoch message has been the same: deregulated free markets are under threat from the existence of a powerful EU.

Daddow (2012) concludes that the Murdoch empire and the style of reporting is an essential explanation for the broader media drift from 'permissive consensus to destructive dissent' on the question of British relations with Europe (ibid, 1235). Furthermore, he concludes that within 15 years of Britain's joining the EEC, pro-Europeanism had gone from being the mainstream position within British politics to a sideshow. In sum, he argues, the Murdoch effect has 'altered the terms of the debate between 1973 and 2012 by convincing politicians across the political spectrum that they should fear the EU and, more importantly, the backlash from the press should they try to publicize a more constructive position on European integration' (ibid, 1236). Daddow's research is an important contribution to the field as it studies changes in framing effects over time, but whereas his research studies the concept of framing, this research aims to study the concepts of *both* framing and priming (whereas framing is the process by which the construction of a message affects the interpretation of the reader, priming is the agenda-setting effect on the part of media, which by giving more attention to some matters while ignoring others influences the standards by which policies and candidates for public office are judged) (Nabi & Oliver 2009, 85-6; Lenart 1994, 15-16). The article is mostly a discussion of the Murdoch empire and its effect on shaping Eurosceptic attitudes in other British media outlets, and among politicians and governing elites. Hence, it does not discuss the effect that this type of reporting might have on political parties or Eurosceptic movements.

In 2006, Schuck & de Vreese published the article: 'Between Risk and Opportunity. News Framing and its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement'. As indicated in the title, the article studied the news framing of the 2004 European Union

enlargement in terms of risk and opportunity, and the effect both frames had on public support for enlargement. By studying different frames, the authors have identified positive and negative elements in the framing. The 'risk' frame raises concerns and emphasises negative consequences of the enlargement process, e.g., high costs, increase of crime and instability. The 'opportunity' frame raises hope and confidence and emphasises positive consequences of the enlargement process, e.g., democracy, freedom and economic growth (ibid, 11). News articles were analysed through a multi-method research design including a content analysis and an experiment, conducted between 1 November 2002 and 31 October 2003 (ibid, 12).

Their content analysis demonstrated that both frames had an impact on public debate. Individuals were influenced by the framing in the media; when the enlargement process was presented as a risk, public support was generally lower than if it was presented as an opportunity (ibid, 21). In addition, the research found that framing effects are moderated by political knowledge; those with less political knowledge were more affected by the manipulation and more susceptible to risk framing (ibid). Prior research (Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Schneider et al., 2001, cited in: Schuck & de Vreese 2006, 22) has found that people are generally more affected by negative framing compared to positive framing. This could indicate, according to the authors, that even if opportunity and risk framing play an equally prominent role in the media, there are still important implications for public opinion formation; if risk framing is more effective, an almost equal presence of both frames could still produce a negative impact on public opinion (ibid, 22).

Having demonstrated a connection between framing in terms of risk and opportunity and public opinion, the authors argue that public opinion on the EU could shift in one or the other direction if either of the two frames receive more emphasis in the media (ibid). The research is a contribution to the field as it identifies a connection between the framing of the integration process in the media and public opinion. However, the research does not consider the impact of

priming and the data are collected from a short period of time; it does therefore not indicate whether framing in terms of risk or opportunity could be more effective at certain periods of time.

As prior research in the field (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006, cited in: Vliegenthart et al. 2008, 415) has studied whether certain frames influence individuals, Vliegenthart et al. (2008) aimed to find out whether the framing of the integration process in the media influence public opinion at an *aggregate* level. Vliegenthart et al. argue that the public depend on information from the media when forming opinions on political issues; 'much of what citizens know about the European Union (EU) stems from the mass media, and EU citizens consistently identify newspapers and television news as their most important sources of information about the EU' (cited in: ibid, 415). The research looks at the influence of news on aggregate public opinion in seven different member states[8] and over a long period of time; data were collected in the period from 1990 to 2006 (ibid, 422-423).

Vliegenthart et al. look for the presence of a *benefit frame* in the media reporting and test for its effect on public perceptions that one's country has benefited from EU membership. Complementary to the assumed effect of benefit framing, the research also considers the impact of framing the EU in terms of *disadvantages* (ibid, 419). In addition to the framing of the integration debate, the research considers possible effects of the *visibility* of the EU. Prior research (De Vreese, 2012; Peter & De Vreese, 2004; Machill, Beiler & Fischer, 2006, cited in: Vliegenthart et al. 2008, 419) has found that the EU is marginally presented during periods without key events and only moderately visible around summits or other major events (ibid, 420). To test the impact of media reporting, the research also considers additional factors, e.g., economic developments and migration patterns. EU citizens in different socio-economic circumstances experience differential costs and benefits from integration, which can cause variation in support (ibid, 417).

[8] Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (ibid, 421)

Vliegenthart et al. (2008) found that the media influence public opinion on the EU. The research demonstrated that the framing of policies in terms of risk and opportunity has an impact on shaping public opinion. Furthermore, it found that the more often integration was framed in terms of benefits, the higher the share of people who perceived EU membership as beneficial. The framing of integration in terms of disadvantages, however, did not have an impact on benefit perceptions. Vliegenthart et al. argue that in a context in which negative information is the norm, positive information is perceived as rather extraordinary and is therefore more likely to have an impact on public opinion (ibid, 433). Moreover, the research identified a decrease in support for the EU when the media framed integration in terms of conflict. As pointed out by Vliegenthart et al., prior research (De Vreese, 2012; Peter & De Vreese, 2004; Machill, Beiler & Fischer, 2006, cited in: Vliegenthart et al. 2008, 433) has demonstrated similar results on the level of the individual, but this research contributed to the field by demonstrating a connection between framing and public support over longer periods of time (ibid).

In Norway, as Ryghaug & Jenssen (2009, 21) rightly argue in their book '*Den store styrkeprøven',* a comprehensive content analysis has not yet been conducted on the media reporting of the EU. However, research has been conducted on the reporting of the referendum on the EU. Ryghaug & Jenssen (2009, 21) demonstrate through analysing a short period of time, that the media reported more frequently on the EU in the last few weeks leading up to the referendum on the EU in 1994. Furthermore, Ramberg (1995, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 1999, 22) found in his research that the voices that were represented in the reporting in Dagbladet and VG (the Norwegian newspapers with highest circulation) were dominated by the political elite. In addition, Ramberg's analysis found that both newspapers presented more arguments for EU membership than against EU membership. Ramberg's analysis demonstrated that when reporting on the different campaigns, the media did not present an equal characterisation of supporters and opponents; whereas Dagbladet reported on both supporters and

opponents from a more balanced perspective, VG held a more critical view against opponents of the EU.

Ringdal (1996, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 22) argued a similar case in his research, '*Velgernes argumenter*'. Firstly, the national newspapers reported more favourably on arguments supporting membership of the EU. Secondly, the newspapers presented *more* arguments for EU membership than against EU membership. However, Ringdal argues that this could possibly be explained by the fact that EU opponents had lower trust in the media and hence aimed to publish fewer articles. Furthermore, Ringdal (1996) identified a mismatch between the most salient arguments presented in the media, and those made by the EU opponents. For EU opponents, the most important arguments were those in terms of self-government and democracy. In the media, however, these did not rank as the most important arguments. Ringdal therefore argues that the last few weeks of reporting leading up to the referendum favoured EU supporters and hence contributed to the surge in opinion polls for EU supporters in the weeks leading up to the referendum (ibid).

In Norway, research (Ramberg 1995; Ringdal, 1996; Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009) has been conducted on the reporting of the referendum campaign in 1994. However, it has not been possible to find any research that studies the reporting of the EU over time. Furthermore, it has not been possible to find any research on the reporting of the EEA agreement or the Schengen Agreement. This research therefore contributes to the broader understanding of the Norwegian reporting of the EU. It does not only discuss every main integration event that has taken place since 1972, but it identifies changes in the reporting over time by studying both framing and priming effects. It discusses how the language changes, what arguments have been most salient in the debate and what frames are most reported on. Furthermore, this research contributes to the understanding to what extent the Norwegian print media influence the development of 'No to the EU'.

In general, scholars in this field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008; Ramberg, 1995 (cited in: Ryghaug &

Jenssen 2009); Ringdal, 1996 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009) and Ryghaug & Jenssen, 1999) have focussed mainly on the framing of the integration process in the print media. Similarly, this research investigates the framing effects in the print media (how the integration debate is reported on, what terms and arguments are present in the debate), but additionally it focuses on priming effects (how often certain frames are reported on and the frequency in the reporting on the EU). Furthermore, whereas other scholars (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006 and Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have focussed on whether framing effects have an impact on shaping public opinion on the EU, this research focuses on whether the media effects (framing and priming) influence the development of Eurosceptic movements. Changes in public opinion on the EU do not necessarily indicate a growth of support for such movements, so instead of looking at public opinion, this research studies the impact that media effects have on the growth of Eurosceptic movements (and in the case of UKIP, electoral results).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced concepts that are central to this study, which contributes to the understanding of the nature of the research and are useful when discussing the content analysis in Chapter 5 and 6. Firstly, the research investigates whether the media have contributed to the success of Eurosceptic movements in Britain and Norway, and the chapter therefore discussed the term 'success'. Secondly, it studied the concept of Euroscepticism, as the research studies the development of Eurosceptic movements. Thirdly, it discussed the emergence of political parties and social movements. The research includes a case study of both a political party and a social movement, and the development of these, and it is therefore important to understand the differences between the two, and how they emerge. Fourthly, the concept of grassroots movements has been dealt with. In both of the case studies the Eurosceptic movements have adopted a bottom-up structure, where an important part of the framing has taken place through public engagement and grassroots activities. It has therefore been necessary to briefly discuss how grassroots movements operate. Fifthly, since the media are considered an important political opportunity variable and a significant

contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public, and this research aims to find out whether the print media has brought political opportunities for Eurosceptic movements in these case studies, this chapter has discussed the concept of Political Opportunity Structures (POS) with particular focus on the media. Finally, the chapter has introduced central concepts in the field of media analysis, such as framing and priming, which contributes to the understanding of the content analysis conducted for this research.

Furthermore, the chapter identified a gap in the literature, arguing that this research is a contribution to the ongoing debate on Euroscepticism and the media. Firstly, the chapter has identified a gap in the lack of analysis of priming as opposed to framing. Scholars have conducted research on how framing effects in the media influence the growth of Euroscepticism, but the effects of priming seem to have been downplayed. Secondly, research have been conducted on whether the media influence public opinion on the EU (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008; Ramberg 1995 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009); Ringdal, 1996 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009); Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009), but not to what extent the media are important in explaining the growth of Eurosceptic parties and movements. This research contributes to the field by doing so. If the success of social movements and political parties can be influenced by political opportunity structures (POS), and the media are considered an important political opportunity variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the development of Eurosceptic movements. As discussed, Tarrow (1995, 126), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015,19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public. The movements communicate to a broad public through the media, which help them gain attention and maintain support. This research therefore studies to what extent the print media (and grassroots activities) are important in explaining the growth of Eurosceptic movements.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Chapter 2 reviewed literature on Euroscepticism and the media, and identified the media as a political opportunity variable. Tarrow (1995, 126), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015,19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public. The media should therefore be in a position to influence the development of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. Prior research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have demonstrated the importance of framing effects, but based on what Tarrow (1995, 126) argued about social movements and the importance of media attention, this research equally studies the importance of priming effects. Furthermore, as the Eurosceptic movements in both case studies have used grassroots campaigning in order to more effectively spread their message, the research additionally studies the effects of grassroots campaigning. The guiding research question at the outset of the research is: 'To what extent is the print media and grassroots campaigning important in explaining the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK?'

The research tests the following hypotheses:

- H1: Mobilisation by Eurosceptic groups requires both media attention and grassroots campaigning to be successful
- H2: The volume of media attention matters more to Eurosceptic movements' success than the extent to which that attention is positive
- H3: Mobilisation against the EU is easier at critical junctures, when issue salience is higher

This chapter introduces the measures and methods used to address the research question and test the hypotheses. Firstly, it distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative methods, and explains which of these methods are preferred for this particular research. Secondly, it discusses the concept of triangulation and why this is the preferred approach for this study, including the use of both a content

analysis and elite interviews. Finally, it discusses briefly the secondary sources that will be used to complement the data collected through the primary sources.

3.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods

Before looking at the methods used for this research, the chapter discusses the differences of quantitative and qualitative methods. The first term refers to empirical research where the data are in the form of numbers; quantitative research is concerned with measurement, precisely capturing aspects of the social world that are expressed in numbers, percentages etc. (King & Horrocks 2012, 7). This type of approach is limited in the way that it focuses merely on numbers, excluding data in terms of values, meanings and experiences. Qualitative research, by contrast, is empirical research where the data are not in the form of numbers, ranging from participant observation over interviews to discourse analysis (Kvale 2007, 7). Qualitative approaches concentrate on understanding the thinking and behaviour of individuals and groups in specific situations, and direct attention to the differences and particularities in human affairs (Arksey & Knight 1999, 10). In social sciences, qualitative research is often founded upon perspectives rooted in interpretivism. This approach is generally ideographic, which means describing aspects of the social world by offering a detailed account of specific social settings, processes or relationships (King & Horrocks 2012, 11). Alfred Schütz (cited in: ibid, 11) argues that:

> All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry their interpretational inner and outer horizons.

As this research studies both framing effects (how the integration debate is presented in the print media, and whether the print media reports favourably or critically on the EU) and priming effects (how often certain frames are reported on and whether the frequency in the reporting influences the growth of

Eurosceptic movements), the preferred approach for this research is a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods.

As discussed, the data for this research are collected and analysed by the use of multiple methods, i.e. the content analysis has been complimented by in-depth elite interviews, to confirm findings. Furthermore, data have been collected from primary – and secondary sources in the form of statistical data, legal documents, political programmes and opinion polls. This approach is called *methodological triangulation* (Alasuutari et al. 2008, 222) and involves checking data collected via one method (content analysis) with data using another (in-depth interviews). Research designs relating multiple methods originated in the context of psychology (Campbell & Fiske 1959: cited in Alasuutari et al. 2008. 222) and the original conception was that triangulation would increase validity, understood as agreement in the outcomes of more than one independent measurement procedure, relative to studies employing a single procedure. In addition to the combination of methods, triangulation can involve using a number of data sources, several accounts of events, or several researchers (ibid, 556). According to McNeill & Steve (2005), triangulation usually involves combining quantitative and qualitative methods 'in order to check on the accuracy of the data gathered by each method, i.e. observation data might be verified by using follow-up interviews with those being observed to confirm the validity of the researcher's observations' (ibid, 23).

In the article 'Falsifiability, the Politics of Evidence, and the Importance of Narratives', Baron (2019, 171-177) argues that 'facts can be generated to support almost everything'. According to Caporaso (1995, 458), science proceeds not only by hypothesis and conjecture, but also by relentless attempts to reject our own theories. It is therefore important to validate the findings, which in this research are either confirmed or rejected through the conduction of in-depth interviews. The findings from the content analysis, such as changes in the reporting and access to the media, will be discussed in greater detail with the interviewees, i.e. leaders of movements and high-profile politicians. The leaders of the movements

will be able to confirm what strategies were adopted in order to reach out to the media, how easy or difficult it was to gain media attention, and whether the volume of access they had to the media was sufficient in order to mobilise opposition against the EU.

3.2 Content analysis

The main approach used by sociologists for analysing media reports has been content analysis, which emerged as a research tool which counted the frequency of particular words, images or categories of articles (McNeill & Steve 2008, 160). Moreover, it is a method of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages. It can be used to develop an understanding of the meaning of communication and to identify critical processes. It is concerned with meanings, intentions, consequences and context (Elo & Kyngäs 2007, 107-109). Content analysis allows the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data.

As this method can be used for both qualitative and quantitative research, there are different ways of conducting a content analysis. The original content analysis, as it emerged, has been used mostly in *qualitative* research, as it aims to focus on the textual and thematic analyses of media texts, i.e. the meanings, both literal and hidden, that lie behind the use of words or visual images. As a *quantitative* method, in its most simplistic form, 'the importance of a topic in a media report is measured by the number of times it is mentioned, the size of the headlines relating to the topic, the number of column inches dedicated to it and the size and nature of the photographs accompanying the article' (ibid, 161). Additionally, most researchers will operationalise the topic they are studying by breaking it further down into a number of codes or categories which are then entered onto a content frame or schedule that can be used to 'tick off' the category once it is observed (ibid). As will be discussed, this method has been used in this research in order to categorise the media articles.

Furthermore, a content analysis should take into account representativeness in terms of how media reports should be sampled, including dates and numbers of

articles. In addition, the researcher must make a decision on what media outlets to include in the content analysis. If a researcher is interested in how readership is influenced, for example, it would make sense to sample those publications with the largest audiences. Critics of this approach (McNeill & Steve 2008, 163) argue that content analysis is limited in the way that the coding method may not have high reliability, as the research is a product of personal interpretation, whether it is conducted by one or multiple researchers. The interpretation may be unconsciously influenced by the political and ideological values of the researchers. This is why the content analysis conducted for this research has been complemented with in-depth elite interviews.

What makes content analysis the preferred approach for this research is that it makes it possible to convert qualitative data into quantitative data by systematically evaluating texts. In the field of media studies, two main approaches dominate newspaper analysis; content analysis and discourse analysis (McNeill & Steve 2008, 160). By choosing discourse analysis, which merely focuses on language and the meaning behind present discourses, it would not be possible to convert the texts into quantitative data. Discourse analysis interprets the meanings of texts and situate what is written or said in the context in which it occurs, and it argues that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer (Richardson 2007, 15). However, whereas discourse analysis offers an in-depth investigation of the language, it would not enable for the investigation of the effects of priming, only of framing. Content analysis, on the other hand, allows for both, by converting qualitative data into quantitative data by systematically evaluating texts, and is therefore the preferred approach for this particular research.

For this research, a content analysis has been conducted in order to analyse newspaper articles on the EU in the print media. Whereas prior research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have studied whether framing effects have an impact on shaping public opinion on the EU, this research studies whether the reporting in the media has

an impact on the growth of Eurosceptic movements. Firstly, framing effects will be studied by conducting a qualitative content analysis, in order to identify how the integration debate has been constructed in the media, and what terms and frames have been most visible throughout the reporting. The qualitative analysis aims to find out whether the print media have purposely tried to influence the debate by criticising one of the campaigns, what arguments were presented in the reporting and whether the media have been critical or supportive of the EU. This has been done to find out whether framing effects in the print media influence the development of Eurosceptic movements.

Secondly, priming effects were studied by conducting a quantitative content analysis in order to find out how many articles have been published, and test for visibility and salience of particular terms and frames. This has been done by simply counting the number of the articles that were published in a certain period of time, and by studying the frequency of the terms and arguments used when reporting on the EU (it tests for visibility and salience of particular frames). The quantitative content analysis is conducted firstly; to test the hypothesis H2, whether the volume of media attention matters more to Eurosceptic movements' success[9] than the extent to which that attention is positive; and secondly, to test the hypothesis H3, whether mobilisation of Eurosceptic movements is easier at critical junctures (when the media report more frequently on the EU). By conducting a quantitative *and* qualitative content analysis, the frequency of the terms can be measured, while at the same time analysing the content in the reports, such as arguments, values and attitudes towards the EU.

The Comparative Method

Ragin (2013, 1) argues that virtually all empirical social research involves comparison of some sort. Researchers compare cases to each other; they use statistical methods to construct quantitative comparisons; they compare cases to

[9] As discussed in Chapter 2, the term 'success' is in this thesis is determined by two different factors; the achievement of immediate – and long-term goals. Furthermore, it agrees with Epstein (2011, 258), that 'the question can (and to some extent must) be approached from the perspective of a movement's stated goals'.

theoretically derived pure cases; and they compare cases' values on relevant variables. Comparison, according to Ragin, provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases. Lieberson (1985, cited in: ibid, 1) similarly states that 'social research in one form or another is comparative research'.

As Collier (1993, 105) stated, a 'comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis. It sharpens our power of description, and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases'. Four main approaches exist within comparative analysis (Ljiphart 1971, cited in: Collier 1993, 106). Firstly, the experimental method, which aims to eliminate rival explanations through experimental control. However, it is impossible to generate appropriate experimental data for most topics relevant to political analysis. Secondly, the statistical method, which uses statistical control, but a large set of reliable data is needed in order to do this form of analysis. Thirdly, the case-study method, which provides a framework where a scholar with a larger time frame and access to a considerable amount of resources can generate what may potentially be useful data on a particular case. However, opportunities for systematically testing hypotheses are more limited than with the other methods. Finally, the comparative method, which provides an alternative to the statistical method. When the number of cases is too low for statistical manipulation, the investigator approximates it 'though without the same degree of confidence – by systematic comparative illustration (Smelser 1976: cited in: Della Porta & Keating 2008, 201). Ljiphart (cited in: Collier 1993, 106) argued that 'given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases'.

This research uses the *comparative method*, which aims at establishing general, empirical relations between two variables and controlling them by keeping all other variables constant (Lijphart 1971, cited in: Della Porta & Keating 2008, 201). Dealing with a small number of cases, the comparative method is a preferred

approach for political and social scientists when investigating institutions or other macropolitical phenomena. As mentioned by Della Porta (ibid, 202), it has been considered to be the only choice for controlling hypotheses that apply to large units that are too few for statistical analysis. The comparative method is justified by its capacity to go beyond descriptive statistical measures, towards an in-depth understanding of historical processes, which is relevant for this research.

Furthermore, there are two different approaches within comparative studies; the variable-oriented approach, which focuses on a large number of cases, where statistical techniques based on a probabilistic logic allow for generalisations (Della Porta & Keating 2008, 204), and the case-oriented approach, which focuses upon a relatively small number of cases, analysed with attention to each case as an interpretable whole (Ragin 2000, cited in: Della Porta & Keating 2008, 204). In the case-oriented approach, an in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases provides the basis for generalisations that are temporarily limited to the cases studied.

The preferred approach for this research is the case-oriented approach, as this approach allows the researcher to understand or interpret specific cases, selected because of their relevance for a specific set of hypotheses. This method has been criticised by those who privilege large *N*, because the comparative method has been considered the weaker method (Ljiphart 1975, cited in: Della Porta & Keating 2008, 209), and it would therefore be preferable to use the statistical method in order to make sure that sufficient cases are available for investigation. Case-oriented researchers, on the other hand, oppose the suggestion that increasing the number of cases produces better-determined research designs. They stress that an increase in the number of cases normally brings about an increase in the number of third variables – that is, of variables external to the hypotheses we want to control – thus reducing the reliability of our inference or imposing a further increase in *N* (ibid, 210).

This research analyses two case studies. As pointed out by Collier (1993, 105), the decision to analyse only a few cases is strongly influenced by the types of political

phenomena under study and how they are conceptualised, or because some analysts believe that some political phenomena are best understood through the careful examination of a small number of cases. In the field of comparative and international studies, the practice of focusing on few cases has achieved greater legitimacy in recent years in conjunction with the rise of the school of 'comparative historical analysis', in which small numbers of countries are studied over long periods. By doing so, the number of case studies a scholar can study is limited (Collier 1993, 105). As this research is carried out by one single researcher, within the limited timeframe of three years, the decision was made to focus on two case studies only. The research aims to investigate changes in the media reporting over time, and the effects of it – arguably, the decision to focus on two case studies only allows for a more thorough investigation of each case study, both in terms of the time period included in the research, and the number of newspapers and articles included in the study.

The case studies

In variable-oriented research, the selection of cases is usually constrained by statistical rules, whereas in case-related research the selection of cases requires an appreciation of their relevance for a specific set of hypotheses. When selecting the cases, the researcher must identify which strategy to use. Della Porta (ibid, 214) distinguishes between two different strategies; a *most-similar systems design,* which investigates similar cases, and a *most-different systems design,* which investigates different cases. Within a most-similar system, which is the preferred design for this research, it is assumed that factors common to the countries sampled are irrelevant in explaining some observed differences, focusing instead on the variables that are different (ibid).

This research will use two case studies, Britain and Norway, to explore the hypotheses. It is not to be argued that these cases are similar on the surface, because there are pronounced dissimilarities between the two cases. Firstly, in terms of the size of their population. Whereas Britain has got a large population of 66 million people, Norway's population is just over 5 million. However, as we

shall see, both of the countries have seen a similar development of strong Eurosceptic movements, so the explanatory factor for the existence and development of these movements cannot be attributed to the size of the countries per se. Secondly, the cases differ in terms of their institutional arrangements with the EU. Britain became a member of the EU in 1973, whereas Norway is not a member of the EU, and participates through the EEA agreement – but the cases are similar with respect to parliamentary sovereignty (both are subject to EU legislation in terms of directives and regulations), which has been a central argument in the EU membership debates in both countries. Nevertheless, despite these pronounced dissimilarities, both in terms of population and their institutional arrangements with the EU, this research has adopted a *similar systems design,* arguing that even if dissimilarities exist on the surface, these cases should in fact be treated as *similar* cases. As we shall see, it could be argued that the cases are *ideologically* similar, as both countries exhibit and have exhibited strong Eurosceptic tendencies and traditions.

A significant similarity between the cases, and what makes these two countries interesting for this particular research is firstly, their long history of Euroscepticism. In both countries, Euroscepticism can be traced back to the early days of the EEC. In the 1950s, Britain was reluctant to participate in the coal and steel project, as the leaders of the other participating countries had emphasised the supranational aspects of it – when Britain was presented with an ultimatum on 1 June 1950, the government decided not to get involved. There has always been a belief that Britain is different from the rest of the European countries, both in terms of geography, the economy and their history as a global power, and in terms of the coal and steel project, it was argued that in coal and steel, Britain was more or less self-sufficient and exported very little to Europe. Furthermore, Britain's exports to its major markets, the Commonwealth and sterling bloc, were likely to suffer if Britain associated more closely with Europe. In addition, the British government had long made clear its preference for intergovernmental rather than supranational forms of integration (May 1999, 17-18). Britain, which became a member of the EEC in 1973, has kept its position has an 'awkward

partner' and has been sceptical of the development of a political union. In 2016, the public voted to leave the EU.

In Norway, the EU membership debate has been settled in two referendums, in 1972 and 1994. In both referendums, the government was supportive of membership of the EU, but the majority of the public voted against membership (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 8). Similar to the British debate, one of the most central arguments has been the protection of national sovereignty, which stood in contrast with membership of the EU. The argument about national sovereignty has dominated the debate in both countries and is one important similarity between the two cases. The Norwegian government has negotiated separate agreements with the EU, such as the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement, but the government has decided not to reopen the EU membership debate as long as the majority of the public remain opposed to the EU.

Secondly, the cases are similar in the way that strong Eurosceptic forces have emerged in both countries, and both of them have been significant contributors in the referendum campaigns against the EU. However, the Eurosceptic forces have taken different forms in the two countries. In Norway, the force behind the Eurosceptic movement has been an interest organisation, while in Britain, the driver behind the Eurosceptic force has been a political party, the UK Independence Party. Nevertheless, the Eurosceptic forces have used *similar* strategies when mobilising opposition against the EU. Firstly, both of them recognised the media as an important tool with which to effectively spread information to the public and aimed to get as much media attention as possible. Secondly, the movements adopted similar methods when campaigning against the EU. In both cases, the Eurosceptic movements periodically struggled to get their views out in the media, and grassroots activities became an important strategy in order to spread their message and inform the public on membership of the EU. UKIP has never been an office-seeking party but has attempted to influence those in government (and the general population) on the EU. As such, its behaviour is akin to that of a social movement. If the analysis indicates similar

results for the development of these Eurosceptic movements in terms of the media and success, the different forms of the movements can be eliminated as an explanatory variable, i.e. the explanation is not whether the Eurosceptic movement is a political party or an interest organisation.

In order to test the hypothesis H1: 'Mobilisation by Eurosceptic groups requires both media attention and grassroots campaigning to be successful' a brief discussion of the movements' goals is needed. As discussed, the concept of 'success' has in this research been determined by two different factors; the achievement of immediate and long-term goals. In Norway, we must distinguish between two different organisations when discussing success, as the first organisation that emerged in 1970 dissolved in 1977. 'Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemsskap i Fellesmarkedet'[10] only had one long-term goal (it could be discussed to what degree we can distinguish between immediate goals and long-term goals, as the movement emerged only a few years before the referendum took place), namely convincing the majority of the public to vote against membership of the EEC. 'Folkebevegelsen' did not dissolve straight after the referendum, but having achieved its final goal the organisation had lost its purpose – it dissolved in 1977 (Store Norske Leksikon, no date).

'Folkebevegelsen' re-emerged in 1990 as a response to the government's announcement that Norway should seek deeper integration with the member states of the EC (Seierstad 2014, 60). It emerged firstly as a committee in 1988, developing into a political organisation in 1990. The organisation, which changed its name to, 'No to the EC', had two main goals. Firstly, it aimed to prevent the signing of the EEA agreement (ibid, 1992). Secondly, if the government announced that a second referendum would take place, the organisation should, by informing the public about the consequences of EC membership, convince the majority of the public to vote against membership of the EC (ibid, 83).

In the UK, the forerunner to UKIP, the Anti-Federalist League, emerged with one immediate goal – to rally opposition to the Maastricht Treaty – and one long-term

[10] The people's movement against membership of the EEC

goal – British withdrawal from the EU (Goodwin & Ford 2014, 20-21). As the protest group emerged into a political party, it originally decided not to take up any of the seats it might win, as the purpose of establishing a political party was to simply pressure the Conservatives to adopt a more hostile approach to the EU. However, in 1997, winning seats became part of UKIPs strategy and the party decided to 'go it alone' by standing candidates across the board and appealing to all voters (ibid, 26). As the party did not do well in elections, the leadership decided to broaden its domestic appeal and focus on issues like education, trade, immigration and taxation (ibid, 70). In order to perform better in elections, the party leadership made it a priority to focus on resources in terms of media attention, messaging and money (ibid, 90). Whereas UKIP's long-term goal initially was, and has continued to be, withdrawal from the EU, the party established immediate goals to achieve their long-term goal, such as winning seats in elections and gaining access to resources in the form of media attention, financial support and messaging.

Finally, the cases are similar in the way that in both cases, the Eurosceptic movements have lacked the capacity to influence through parliamentary representation at the national level ('No to the EU' has not developed into a political party and UKIP has struggled to win seats in the national Parliament), but have been successful forces in the campaigns against the EU. UKIP, without any members of Parliament, pushed the Conservative government into a referendum on the EU in 2016. 'No to the EU' decided not to seek parliamentary representation, yet convinced the public to vote against membership of the EU. In other words, both Eurosceptic movements have been 'successful forces', as they both achieved their immediate or long-term goals; the majority of the public voted to remain outside of/leave the EU.

However, in both case studies, the strength of the Eurosceptic movements has shifted over the past decades. In Britain, there has been a growth of Euroscepticism, and the country has seen the emergence and rise of UKIP. The party has performed well in elections to the European Parliament and became a

central actor in the campaign leading up to the referendum on the EU in 2016. As things stand, UKIP has achieved its long-term goal; Britain is leaving the EU. However, it is important to note that the details of Britain's future arrangements with the EU has not yet been negotiated. In Norway, by contrast, the public has remained opposed to membership of the EU, but the Eurosceptic movement has found it increasingly difficult to engage the public in the integration debate, despite the country becoming more integrated into the EU. It could therefore be discussed whether 'No to the EU' has *completely* achieved its goals. The movement achieved one of its immediate goals, to prevent the country from becoming a member of the EU, but arguably it has not achieved its long-term goal, as the movement has not managed to prevent or reverse deeper integration of Norway into the EU. As put by Finn Gustavsen, central activist in the first referendum campaign and former representative for the Socialist People's Party; 'we won the referendum on the EC in 1972, but we lost the battle every day since' (cited in: Seierstad 2014, 48). However, differences in the development of these Eurosceptic movements cannot be attributed to institutional arrangements per se, as both countries are integrated and bound by similar rules – Norway participates in both the EEA and the Schengen Agreement. In both of the cases the argument related to the protection of national sovereignty has been present throughout the debates on EU membership, as both countries, through their arrangements with the EU, have taken part in the implementation of EU legislation. The issue of national sovereignty is therefore constant for both countries. Hence, the differences in the development of Eurosceptic movements cannot, in these case studies, be attributed to institutional arrangements with the EU.

Given that the Eurosceptic movements in both case studies lacked parliamentary representation, and differences in the development of these movements cannot be attributed to differences in population or their institutional arrangements with the EU, other factors must have influenced this development. As discussed in Chapter 2, the media are thought to have great influence on the development of social movements and political parties. Tarrow (1995, 126-7), considered the

media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public – the movements communicate to a broad public through the media, which help them gain attention and maintain support. Similarly, Kimberley Voss argues in her research (2015, 19) that the mass media bring opportunities for social movements and describes the mass media as firstly, sites of contest (as movements must compete with other sponsors of frames), and secondly, a tool that movements must use to reach out to the public, both in terms of authorities, members and challengers. If the 'success' of the Eurosceptic movements is determined by political opportunities, and the media are considered an important political opportunity variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the growth of Eurosceptic movements.

This research therefore investigates the role of the print media in this development, by studying the effects of both framing and priming, with the aim of finding out whether and how the print media have brought political opportunities for 'No to the EU' and UKIP. The most-similar research design often looks to other countries for confirmation of a hypothesis developed in a single country, which will also be done in this research. The Eurosceptic movements' existence is the independent variable in the research, whereas the success or failure of these movements in the is treated as the dependent variable. There are known dissimilarities between the cases, but these dissimilarities can be excluded as explanatory variables so both cases will follow the same research design.

As discussed, the effects of media *framing* will be studied to find out whether the construction of the debate in the print media has brought opportunities for the Eurosceptic movements. Has the print media been supportive or critical of the EU, and has this influenced the growth of the Eurosceptic movements? The effects of *priming* will be studied to investigate whether the frequency in the reporting has influenced the development of the Eurosceptic movements. When the media report more frequently on the EU, does it become easier to mobilise opposition against the EU? Similarly, does it become more difficult for the movements to recruit members when the media report less frequently on the EU? The data

collected through this part of the content analysis will be used to test hypothesis H2: 'the volume of media attention matters more to Eurosceptic movements' success than the extent to which that attention is positive'. If that is the case, it confirms Tarrow's theory (1995, 126-7) that the volume of media attention determines whether social movements are 'successful'. Similarly, Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) argued in their article 'The Interdependency of Mass Media and Social Movements' that social movements are dependent on the media to get their message across. In order to target their audiences, they argue, social movements need the mass media more than any other political actor. Movements essentially mobilise the public, or at least their constituents, to show to the power holders that large numbers of people do not agree and want change (or no change). Social movements need public support to do so and it is, amongst other means, via the mass media that movements can reach out to both potential protest participants and to the public (ibid, 6).

Furthermore, the research investigates the importance and character of grassroots activities, as much of the framing arguably has taken place outside of the media, which will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. Additionally, it is important to recognise that other variables could equally have an impact on the growth of Eurosceptic movements, such as the national economy or the popularity of the government, but similar to Schuck & Vreese (2006), Hawkins (2012) and Vliegenthart et al. (2008), this research focuses on the effects of *the media.* Vliegenthart & Esser (2017, 12) argue that most research questions are descriptive in nature and seek to describe the occurrences of certain phenomena and how these vary between cases. This study examines the framing and priming effects in the print media across two countries, that is, Britain and Norway, with respect to the development of Eurosceptic movements.

Falsification

Before discussing the research design in more detail, it is necessary to briefly touch on the concept of falsification. Popper (1963, cited in: Hyslop-Margison 2010, 821) argued that theories and hypotheses based on verification do not

produce universally true propositions, and hence universal claims are always logically false. According to him, it is easy when collecting data to find confirmations of particular hypotheses when researchers actively seek out such findings. For example, if someone wants to discover cases confirming their theory, they will undoubtedly find and report many such instances where the theory's predictions hold true. In Popper's view, the claims emerging from such observations afford little more than circumstantial evidence and do not qualify as 'scientific'. According to falsification, the test for a meaningful scientific theory is not the number of cases empirically verified, but rather a theory's ability to prohibit certain things from occurring contrary to its postulates. In other words, the more a particular theory forbids, the more scientific the theory. In this view, a theory that forbids nothing is demonstrably non-scientific. Popper's philosophy of science is that although no theory can be confirmed empirically as absolutely and universally true, a theory can be falsified if one of its hypotheses can be demonstrated as false.

Keeping this in mind, measures will be taken throughout the research to reduce the chances of subjectivity, and to ensure that my own political views and position on the EU will not influence how I handle the data. Firstly, the same research design will be applied to both cases. In terms of the content analysis, the research will apply the same set of criteria to both case studies and the techniques used when analysing the articles, such as categorisation of terms and articles, will be thoroughly developed before collecting the data in order to reduce research bias. Secondly, as discussed, the research carries out the method of triangulation, in order to increase research validity, and the observations made in the content analysis will later be checked with the data collected through in-depth elite interviews. Finally, interviewees are selected exclusively because of their positions within the party, or organisation, not based on their personal views.

Furhermore, as argued by Hyslop-Margison (2010, 822), researchers sometimes focus on instances where the predictions of theoretical claims based on certain hypotheses hold true and want to generalise from these particular observed

instances to an entire population. This practice reduces scientific claims and can cause faulty logic and circumstantial evidence. Keeping this in mind, it is important before conducting the research to recognise the possibilities of an opposite causality, that it is not the media that contributes to the growth of Eurosceptic movements, but that a development of such movements have influenced the reporting of the EU. It could be that Eurosceptic movements have influenced the language that the media use, and given them ideas on what to say, when reporting on the EU. This will be tested by examining and comparing timeframes for the reporting of the EU and the development of Eurosceptic movements.

Selection of data

The data for the content analysis are collected from print media, in form of newspapers. Whilst other forms of media would have provided interesting research, there are several reasons for focusing on newspapers here. Firstly, the print media continue to be of enormous significance both politically and within broader societal debates (Hawkins 2012, 564). Politicians are sensitive to how their policies are presented in the media, and access to the government is afforded to the media organisations by politicians who want to receive favourable coverage for their policies, e.g. EU matters. Secondly, as this research investigates the reporting of the integration debate before the internet became available, the print media is the only constant source. The research does not include any local newspapers, as these are not available to all citizens. In Britain, four newspapers have been selected; *The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph, The Times & The Sun.* This selection is based on information provided by the National Readership Survey (2015). The company has listed the most read newspapers in print form over the course of a month, and these are the seven nationally distributed papers with the highest numbers of readership[11]:

The Sun	11,869,000
Daily Mail	10,366,000

[11] Statistics from July 2014- June 2015

Daily Mirror	6,329,000
The Times	4,314,000
The Guardian	3,906,000
Daily Telegraph	3,808,000
The Independent	3,679,000

Several factors were important in this selection. First, the circulation of newspapers; the selected papers cover 59.9 per cent of the total readership, hence the papers are in a position to influence the integration debate and possibly shape public opinion. Second, the research investigates changes over time and needs constant sources; *the Independent* had not yet been launched when the first membership debate took place and is therefore not included. Third, the research investigates to what extent the print media is important in explaining the growth of Eurosceptic movements. It therefore makes sense to focus on newspapers that have adopted a hostile approach towards integration within the time period included in the research, leaving out *The Guardian & The Daily Mirror*. Whilst this may bias the selection of articles towards the right, it reflects the nature of the media in terms of both the number of titles published and the circulation.

In the Norwegian case study, the selection process was less complex, as the country only has four newspapers that are distributed on the national level; *Aftenposten, VG, Dagbladet & Dagens Næringsliv*[12]*.* As the research aims to capture the general mood in society in terms of the EU, the latter newspaper has not been included in the study – this paper focuses mainly on stocks and finances, and appeals to the upper classes in society, i.e. AB and C1. In general, the newspapers included in this case study have presented arguments from both supporters and opponents, with an overall more balanced debate than the reporting in the UK. However, *Aftenposten* is expected to be more supportive of

[12] Statistics illustrating daily circulation: *Aftenposten*: 187.694, *VG*: 138.188, *Dagbladet*: 73.647 & *Dagens Næringsliv*: 69.916 (Medienorge, 2014)

EU membership than the other publications, as it focuses on the Oslo region. The referendum results indicated higher support for EEC/EU membership in Oslo (Hellevik 1975, 37-39).

In order to observe changes over time, the total period selected for the analysis is 1970-2014. However, the time period differs slightly in the two case studies, in order to capture the most significant integration events. As the research includes a member state and a *non*-member state, the countries have taken part in different integration events, e.g. the signing of treaties and agreements. In Norway, the first referendum took place in 1972. The Norwegian analysis therefore investigates the period from 1972-2004, as the last integration event took place in 2004. In Britain, the first referendum took place in 1975. The British analysis therefore studies the period from 1975-2009, in order to include the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Furthermore, the British case study includes an additional data set in order to investigate the coverage of UKIP in European Elections, and this data set covers the period 1994-2014.

The events included in the Norwegian case study are the EEC referendum (1972), the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the EEA agreement (1992), the EU referendum (1994), the Schengen Agreement (1996/97) and the EU enlargement (2004). The events included in the first data set of the British case study are the EEC referendum (1975), the Single European Act (1986), the Delors Speech (1988), the Bruges Speech (1988), the Maastricht Treaty (1991), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), the EU enlargement (2004), the Constitutional Treaty (2005) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009). These events were selected on the grounds that they are the most significant integration events in the case studies and hence expected to have had great coverage in the media. In the second data set, the events included are the European Elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014.

The research focused on the three days leading up to each event, the day of the event and three days after the event, one week in total. The selection of dates both before and after an event allowed for the data analysis to capture the

reporting before an event took place, and the reactions after the event took place. However, the Constitutional Treaty was sampled from a different time period. This event differs from the other events, as the treaty did not get ratified by the member states, and a different time period were used in order to fully capture the debate: data for this event was collected the from the two days leading up to the signing and the five days leading up to the Dutch and French referendums on the Constitutional Treaty. Similarly, data for the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement were collected using the same method in order to fully capture the debate, as these were individual agreements with the EU. As the research focused on the days leading up to an event and reactions, covering one week in total, all articles that were published in the newspapers about the integration process during those days were included in the data collection. In the second data set, the dates included in the analysis are the 3 last days leading up to the elections, the election day, and the 3 first days after the elections, seven days in total[13]. This has been done because the first data set used the same method, as the analysis wants to capture the mood both before and after events took place.

Data analysis

Most of the data included in the content analysis were collected from online newspaper archives, but those that have not been digitalised were collected from the British Library. These were available on micro-films, which made it impossible to conduct a computer-based content analysis. As discussed, researchers using the method of content analysis often operationalise the topic they are studying by breaking it down into a number of categories and this method has been used in this research in order to categorise the articles. In order to categorise the articles, both content and language were analysed. Firstly, the arguments in the articles were analysed to find out whether the articles were supportive or critical of the EU; and secondly, the details of the language were analysed, such as terms and phrases used to describe the EU. This made it possible to identify changes in the language over time and to measure what terms have been most salient in the

[13] 8-14 June 1994, 8-14 June 1999, 9-15 June 2004, 2-8 June 2009, 20-26 May 2014

reporting. In order to decide what terms to include in the content analysis, all terms that were used to describe the EU were written down. In this way, it was possible to find out what terms were most frequently used in the reporting.

The articles were hand coded into three categories; positive articles, negative articles and informative articles. The category of positive articles included articles that supported the EU. These were articles that clearly supported deeper integration and membership of the EU. These articles were characterised by terms such as 'unified', 'family', 'partners', 'peace', 'stability', 'unity' and 'friends'. The category of negative articles included articles that did not support the EU. These were articles that clearly opposed the current form of integration, but also membership of the EU. These articles were characterised by terms such as 'federalism', 'democracy', 'superstate', 'self-government', 'distant', 'bureaucracy', 'eurocrats', 'sovereignty' and 'un-elected'. The category of informative articles included articles that simply reported on events, without revealing support either for or against the EU. These articles summarised the events and often presented the key arguments from both sides of the campaigns. However, based on prior literature (Fowler, 1999; Cohen et al. 1963, cited in: Johnson-Cartee 2005; and Doyle, 2002), it has been taken into consideration that press reports cannot be completely objective. The events reported on in the media have been interpreted by journalists and complete objectivity can therefore not be obtained. As a result, finding a precise definition of this category has been a challenge, but the decision landed on 'informative articles'.

In order to capture the full range of frames used when reporting on the integration process in the print media, a wide range of articles were included, i.e. news reports, front pages, opinion pieces, editorials and letters to the editor. As indicated in chart 3.1 and 3.2, the total number of articles included in the first data sample was 1404:

Chart 3.1: The number of articles collected by publication, UK	
Newspaper:	Number of articles examined:
The Sun	81
The Times	191
The Daily Telegraph	200
The Daily Mail	96

Chart 3.2: The number of articles collected by publication, Norway	
Newspaper:	Number of articles examined:
VG:	199
Dagbladet:	328
Aftenposten:	309

In addition, the second data sample in the UK case study included 357 articles, making it 1761 articles in total.

3.3 Interviews

Interviews are one of the major approaches in collecting data in qualitative research. Kvale (cited in: 2007, 5) defines an interview as `an interchange of views between two persons conversing about a theme of common interest`. Conversation is a basic mode of human interaction, and through conversations we get to know other people and learn about their experiences (ibid). Arksey & Knight (1999, 10-16) argue that similar to other research methods, interviews have their limitations. First, the lack of precision; interviews explore the world of beliefs and meanings rather than action. Data collected from interviews are based on what people say, rather than what they do. Even a question about yesterday's action might produce responses that differ from what observers might have noticed (ibid). Second, problems related to objectivity; in social research, it is impossible to confirm objectivity (ibid). According to Shipman (1997, 18) there is always controversy when research is about humans; if truth is socially

constructed, there will be different versions. He argues that `reality is not out there, created or waiting to be discovered, but constructed through our models in the mind. Consequently, there can be no pure and unadulterated knowledge of the world as it really is. The researcher has a particular position in society and will see the world from there` (ibid, 20). The researcher must therefore always consider whether the identity, and potential bias of the interviewer and informant could have an impact on the data. In this research, leading questions are therefore avoided. Using an identical set of questions for both case studies has not been possible due to differences in the case studies. Firstly, the research studies a member state and a *non*-member state. Both countries are integrated and bound by similar rules, but the questions needed to be framed both in terms of the EEA agreement and in terms of membership of the EU. Secondly, the research studies both an organisation and a political party. As only the political party seek to influence politics through parliamentary representation, different questions were used when asking about strategies and developments. However, *similar* set of questions was used in both case studies, which arguably reduces the chances of subjectivity. Furthermore, to reduce chances of subjectivity the data collected from the interviews will be triangulated with the other data to check if interviewees statements accord with the other observations in the analysis.

The strength of interviews is their access to information that cannot be directly observed, such as values, understandings and opinions (Arksey & Knight 1999, 32). Interviews can explore areas of broad cultural consensus and people's more personal, private and special understandings (ibid, 2-4); they can also explore motives not to be found in written documentation. In addition, interviews allow both parties to explore the meaning of the questions and the answers involved; it allows for answers to be clarified, which is not the case with self-completion questionnaires (ibid, 32). Furthermore, the application of elite interviews could open up for snowball sampling, that is `the researcher uses the initial few interviewees to recommend other potential participants who fit the inclusion criteria for the study` (cited in: King & Horrocks, 34). Snowballing is a convenient way of recruiting participants, especially in situations where potential population

to be sampled from is hard to access. However, it is worth noting that snowball sampling introduces a form of bias into the research as participants tend to recommend someone who shares their opinions and values (ibid, 34).

While surveys tend to have a precise interview schedule that the researcher has to follow, qualitative interviews are less structured (Akrsey & Knight 1999, 2-4). The degree of structure in the interview is determined by what kind of answers the interviewer seeks. Structured interviews produce simple descriptive information very quickly. To give an example, structured interviews can provide information about participation in general elections and which party a person voted for. However, this type of interview would not provide information about why the person voted for that particular party. Unstructured interviews are used when the interviewer wants to be flexible; the researcher has only decided in general terms upon the main themes and areas to be explored. Unstructured interviews provide a large amount of qualitative data and can generate deep insights into people's understandings of the social world, including hidden information not found in documents. Semi-structured interviews fall between structured and unstructured interviews, and are less formal than a structured interview. The interviewer then has a specific agenda to follow, and relevant topic areas and themes will be selected beforehand. These types of interviews contain key questions, but interviewers are able to improvise follow-up questions and to explore meanings and areas of interest that emerge (Arksey & Knight 1999, 4-7). Similar to unstructured interviews, this method gives insight into values, understandings and hidden motives.

Structured interviews would not provide the answers needed for this research; the research aims to find out to what extent the print media and grassroots campaigns influence the growth of Eurosceptic movements. Unstructured interviews would provide useful information for the research, but since the research must be completed within a limited amount of time this type of interviews is considered too comprehensive. The preferred format for this study is semi-structured interviews. This type of interview gives room for the

interviewer to improvise questions, to clarify or extend answers, and is suitable for a limited timetable. It is worth noting that also this method is time-intensive, something to take into consideration when preparing the scripts. However, the technique adopted for this study is elite interviewing, and semi-structured interviews are often the most effective way to obtain information about decision makers and decision-making processes (Burnham et al. 2008, 231). In addition, this type of interview enables the researcher to focus on common themes across two cases, while taking into account the specificities of each case.

Most research conducted by political scientists is concerned with the study of decision makers, according to Leech (cited in: Burnham et al. 2008, 231) and hence a key research technique for political scientists is elite interviewing. Leech (cited in: ibid) argues that `elite interviewing can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic in hand`. When using this type of interviews, the balance of knowledge and expertise is often in favour of the informant because of their expertise in the subject matter (ibid, 231). Elite interviews could introduce arguments in present debates and provide information not to be found in primary or secondary sources. Elite interviews are a time-intensive technique. One must consider the time involved in setting up the interview; travelling to and from it; the interview itself; preparing the transcript; and analysing the transcript (Burnham et al. 2008, 234). Berry (cited in: Burnham et al. 2008, 234) estimates that transcription takes two hours for every half-hour of interview. It is therefore important to be realistic about the number of interviews in total and the number of interviews to undertake in one day. Based on the estimated timetable for transcription of interviews, this research was limited to 20 interviews and no more than two interviews in one day. As will be discussed, the total number of interviews conducted was 17.

The interviews aimed to find out how the politicians and activists involved in the two movements attempted to frame the integration debate, and what terms have been used to encapsulate the EU. Furthermore, the interviews aimed to find out whether the politicians and activists found it easy or difficult to access the media,

and what strategies were adopted to get their message out to the public, both in terms of the media and other activities, such as campaigning or public events. The interviews included informants from political parties and organisations, and those that were central in the campaigns against the EU. Furthermore, the interviews included parties both in favour of and opposed to the EU. Interviews with informants from parties supportive of the EU were conducted to find out whether access to the media has changed over time. This was particularly interesting in the British case, as the media have become more Eurosceptic over the past few decades.

The interviewees for this research were selected based on their knowledge and expertise in the subject, in addition to their central positions within the organisations and parties. Research in the UK included six interviews with UKIP politicians, including the party founder, the former leader of the party, the former head of media, one (former) member of the Parliament, one member of the National Assembly for Wales and one member of the European Parliament. In addition, the interviews included one interviewee from the Conservative Party (MEP) and one interviewee from the Labour Party (House of Lords). Research in Norway included 4 interviews with activists in the movements against the EU. Three of these interviewees were active in the 1972 membership debate and three of them participated in the 1994 membership debate. One is the current leader of No to the EU. Furthermore, the interviews included one MP from the Labour Party, one MP from the Progress Party, one MP from the Centre Party, one MP from the Conservative Party and the former deputy leader of the Labour Party. In total, 17 interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted over the period January 2015 – June 2016.

Ethical guidelines have been taken into consideration, including the informants' rights and data protection. Participants were informed that the data provided for the research could further be used for different events, such as conferences and seminars. Furthermore, the data could be published in the form of journal articles, etc. All participants received an information sheet, explaining in detail who the

researcher was and the nature of the project. In addition, all participants were informed that their participation was on a voluntary basis and that participants could withdraw at any time. The participants were informed that the data would not be published without their approval, and anonymity would be offered.

3.4 Primary and Secondary Sources

In addition to newspaper articles, the research includes primary sources in the form of historical and legal documents, and political programmes. These were collected from organisations, archives, governments and the EU. Political programmes were included in order to identify the parties and organisations' positions on the EU. Furthermore, as discussed, the research includes surveys, voting data and opinion polls. Surveys were included in order to find out what concerns have been most important for voters at certain periods of time, and whether these have changed over time, and if the top issues for voters correlated with the topics discussed in the media, e.g. immigration or economic concerns. Opinion poll data were collected to provide information on public opinion on the EU. The opinion polls were conducted by the same polling company, as different companies use different methods, over a long period of time in order to identify changes in public opinion on the EU.

Voting data, which provide information about voting behaviour measured quantitatively, were studied in order to measure the electoral performance of the UK Independence Party. These numbers were then mapped onto the second set of quantitative content analysis, in order to identify a link between priming/media attention and electoral performance. Finally, the research includes a number of secondary sources from articles in scholarly journals – both historical and recently published articles; articles in scholarly journals introduce different opinions in the research field and give an insight into the debate from different angles.

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter has identified multiple methods, *methodological triangulation,* as the preferred approach for this research. This approach involves checking data collected via one method with data using another, i.e. content analysis and in-

depth interviews. Firstly, a *qualitative* content analysis will be conducted to study the framing effects in the media. This will be done to identify the media's attitudes towards the EU, and whether framing effects have brought opportunities and 'success' for No to the EU and UKIP. Secondly, a *quantitative* content analysis will be conducted to study the priming effects in the media. This will be done to study the frequency in the reporting, to find out whether it is easier to mobilise opposition against the EU at critical junctures, when issue salience is higher. If the Eurosceptic movements have not received attention in the media, or the media have been critical of the movements in their reporting, the framing of the movements' ideas arguably must have taken place elsewhere. The research therefore additionally studies grassroots mobilisation, as both 'No to the EU' and UKIP have used grassroots activities to mobilise opposition against the EU.

Furthermore, the chapter has discussed the choice of case studies, Britain and Norway. There are pronounced dissimilarities between the two cases on the surface, both in terms of population and their arrangements with the EU, but both countries have a long history of Euroscepticism, with the presence of strong Eurosceptic movements. This research has therefore adopted the *most-similar systems design,* arguing that even if dissimilarities exist on the surface, these cases should in fact be treated as *similar* cases. However, the development of the Eurosceptic movements differs, as UKIP has experienced a growth over the past decade and 'No to the EU' has gradually diminished. In other words, the cases are similar, but with dissimilar outcomes. Tarrow (1995, 126-7), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3), and Voss (2015, 19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements 'succeed' in reaching out to the public. If the success of the Eurosceptic movements is determined by political opportunities, and the media are considered an important political opportunity variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the growth of Eurosceptic movements. This research therefore aims to find out whether and how the reporting in the print media contributes to this development. The Eurosceptic movements' existence has been identified as the *independent* variable in the research, whereas the success of these movements has been

identified as the *dependent* variable. 'Success' here relates to the outcomes of the referendums on the EU, but also whether the movements have been successful in preventing or reversing integration of the respective countries into the EU.

Additionally, the chapter discussed the concept of interviews, and identified semi-structured interviews as the preferred structure. This type of interviews gives room for the interviewer to improvise questions, to clarify or extend answers, and is suitable for a limited timetable (Burnham et al. 2008, 231). In-depth elite interviews will be conducted to complement the content analysis and to confirm findings. Finally, the chapter discussed primary and secondary sources, and identified historical and legal documents, and political programmes as primary sources, in addition to voting data and surveys. Secondary sources included scholarly journals, both historical and recently published articles. The methods discussed in this chapter will be applied to the British case in Chapter 5 and the Norwegian case in Chapter 6.

Chapter 4

The idea of Euroscepticism

Chapter 2 introduced literature on the media and Euroscepticism, including discussions of central definitions and concepts. Chapter 3 discussed what research design will be used for this particular research, and how data is collected and analysed. The argument has been made that the case studies are ideologically similar, as both countries have a long history of Euroscepticism. Before analysing the data in Chapter 5 and 6, it is therefore useful to get an understanding of *why* these countries are Eurosceptic. This chapter discusses the most salient arguments and ideas from the EU debate in Norway and the UK, both those of political parties and the Eurosceptic movements. In order to grasp a better image of the framing of the EU in the media, it is crucial to understand the idea of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the chapter briefly discusses the emergence and development of 'No to the EU' and UKIP.

4.1 Euroscepticism in the UK

The high level of Euroscepticism in Britain has received considerable academic attention (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2013; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008; Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Usherwood, 2008) because of the UK's role as a large and influential member state. Euroscepticism in the UK can be traced back to the first application for EC membership, which contributed to the UK's position as the awkward partner within the integration process (Gifford 2006, 852). Euroscepticism before the 1980s has often been associated with the political left, which regarded European integration suspiciously, associating it with the continental political right. The Labour Party suspected that integration would serve as a Trojan horse for European capitalism to mobilise against a Labour government. Furthermore, the party argued that the federalist ambitions of integration would compromise national sovereignty, particularly in the economic sphere (Sczcerbiak & Taggart 2008, 95). From 1988, however, the party gradually shifted to an explicitly pro-European position. Important in the transformation was Jacques Delors, who wished to mobilise as many forces as possible behind the Social Charter. He emphasised workers' rights, and declared that social dialogue

and collective bargaining were essential pillars of democratic society. Furthermore, he promised an effective social dimension to the Single Market and offered British trade unions a role in it as architects (McIlroy 1995, 316-319). The European Union, which earlier had been regarded as a capitalist club opposing socialism, became a mechanism through which the political left could tame capitalism and entrench social democratic principles at the supranational level (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 115).

Margaret Thatcher came to oppose a common social policy and her response came in a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988; `We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels` (cited in: Young 1999, 347). The speech brought an enthusiastic response from sections of the British media and a growing number of Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party. This marked a turning point: The Conservatives became more hostile to integration, while the Labour Party became more pro-European.

Locating the Eurosceptic tradition

In order to understand the emergence of Eurosceptic parties in the 1990s, one must start with the core elements of Eurosceptic tradition. For Oliver Daddow (2013, 210-16), the British Eurosceptic tradition is rooted in Britain`s national identity. He argues that Britain is not only geographically separated from the continent, but also psychologically distant from the European integration movement formalised in the Rome Treaty of 1957. The Eurosceptic tradition ranges over many themes and issues. Daddow focuses on three traditional themes; a realist appreciation of international affairs, a distinctive take on the uses of history, and a libertarian reading of Britain's past. First, he argues that a form of classical realism has influenced British thinking on the Europe question; it has been important to participate in strong alliances to safeguard national interests in an unpredictable world. Though Europe has been considered a significant source

for economic prosperity, it has not been considered a vital alliance to safeguard national interests. Second, he argues that Eurosceptic tradition has roots in Britain's historical image, that is `an image which extends through time, backwards into a supposedly recorded or more often mythological past and forward into an imagined future` (cited in: Daddow 2013, 215). Politicians appeal to historical images in order to sell decisions to the public, or in times of crisis. Eurosceptic tradition draws credibility from its interpretation of the national story, and it resonates with a national public literally schooled on stories of Britain's greatness. Finally, the libertarian reading of Britain's past is a present theme in Eurosceptic tradition. On one hand, this theme can be used to support a patriotic reading of the British past. On the other hand, it can be worked into a nationalist reading, claiming that Britain's individual freedom is challenged by the undemocratic European Union (ibid, 210-216). As we shall see, these traditional themes are present in the policies of the Eurosceptic parties that emerged in the 1990s. Furthermore, the parties emerged as a response to the political developments of the Community.

The Thatcher Governments 1979-90

In 1979, the Conservatives won the general election replacing Callaghan with Thatcher. The first years of Conservative leadership were characterised by a broadly positive approach to the EEC. Membership gave access to a significant market and enabled Britain to participate in the world`s largest trading bloc. Thatcher argued that Britain should participate in the development of cooperation in such fields as foreign policy and contributed to the completion of the single market. She emphasised the pragmatic benefits of trading with faster-growing neighbours and the EEC's liberal free trade rules (May 1999, 68-72). However, Thatcher later came to adopt a hostile approach towards integration, which marked the beginning of a political evolution. Arguably, these years mark the turning point when Britain went from being an awkward partner to adopting a stronger Eurosceptic attitude.

Most substantive signs of Thatcher's inclinations on Europe emerged around the Single European Act (SEA), which stood in contrast to her ideas for Europe (Fontana & Parsons 2015, 94). The Treaties of Rome set out plans for the establishment of ever closer union, but integration had proceeded in terms of economic integration. In November 1981, the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy produced a plan for `political union` and a commitment to re-launch the movement towards closer union. Thatcher`s response was clear: `I do not believe in a federal Europe . . . and I think to ever compare it with the United States of America is absolutely ridiculous` (cited in: May 1999, 73). In a trade-off for budgetary settlements and the single market agreement, Thatcher had to accept the appointment of a committee to enquire into the question of institutional reform. Negotiations resulted in the Single European Act, agreed at the Luxembourg Council in December 1985. Thatcher supported the SEA, but did not support all the elements included in the agreement. The signing of the Act tipped the argument in favour of reformed institutions, including more power to the Parliament, intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy and abandonment of the national veto on several issues. Furthermore, it included the harmonisation of indirect taxation and removal of frontier controls, which Thatcher opposed. The Single European Act marked the first moves towards political union, which had been one of the British arguments for not entering in the 1950s (May 1999, 68-74).

Thatcher adopted a hostile approach towards integration before many of her neoliberal allies, who endorsed participation in the European Community as long as the institutions prioritised free markets and respected British economic interests. European institutions could be effective technical instruments for British interests, most obviously in spreading liberalisation. For Thatcher, the institutions were unnecessary organisations that could be tolerated to win policy concessions from federalists, but national sovereignty had to be asserted against such institutions (Fontana & Parsons 2015, 93). In the mid-1980s, Thatcher's negative attitude towards integration was not obvious even for her party fellows, though

all of them knew her opinion about the reformed institutions. The Conservatives gave the impression of being supportive of integration; not only did the party accept negotiations that combined a substantive focus on liberalisation with institutional reforms, but by the end of the process the Tories reported to Parliament that the institutional reforms were functionally helpful to empower the new liberalisation agenda.

Thatcher's hostility to political integration became clear in the Bruges Speech in 1988, which was a response to Jacques Delors' comment to the Trade Union Congress meeting, that collective bargaining could happen at the European level; `The Community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept. Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation` (cited in: Tiersky 2001, 106). Furthermore, she stated that `working closely together does *not* require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy. Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, some in the Community seem to want to move in the opposite direction` (cited in: ibid, 107). The most salient theme in the speech was not an assertion of neoliberalism, but opposition to institution-building; authority beyond the nation state was considered absurd and dangerous (Fontana & Parsons 2015, 96).

The Bruges speech gave energy to Eurosceptic movements in the 1990s, and the speech brought an enthusiastic response from sections of the British media and a growing number of Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party. Holmes (cited in: Daddow 2013, 217) has argued that Euroscepticism was reborn with the Bruges speech, which transformed the issue from sideshow to centre stage – it has since become a permanent feature of the political landscape. In the late 1980s, the rebellious momentum of right-wing Eurosceptic discourse began to build and brought Euroscepticism from the margins to the centre stage in British politics.

Thatcher created discursive space for the deeper entrenchment of the Eurosceptic tradition, discussed in the beginning of the chapter, based on themes such as anti-federalism, anti-regulation, anti-protectionism and the importance of sovereign independent nation states inside the EC. Daddow (2013, 218) argues that `Thatcher gave the Eurosceptics the language they came to rely on to make their case against bureaucracy of the Commission in 'Brussels' and in the process she gouged the Eurosceptic tradition onto the public consciousness by accenting the malign nature of the European project and raising awareness of the potential horror of an overbearing superstate-in-the-making of the continent, which have since become staples of media and public discourses about the British experience of Europe` (cited in: ibid, 218). Developments in the Community undoubtedly contributed to the growth of Eurosceptic attitudes in the 1980s, but developments within the member states also had an impact on the debate, such as the reunification of Germany. The past has not been far beneath the surface of the debate on Europe and the reunification of Germany brought back memories from the wartime threat to Britain from Germany, according to Wellings (2012, 496).

An immediate response to the Bruges speech was the establishment of the Bruges Group, formed in February 1989. The group served as a Eurosceptic think tank for the Conservatives, and together with the European Foundation and the European Research Group, accounts for the growing intellectual intensity of Euroscepticism within the party. In addition, old organisations renewed themselves, such as Conservatives against the Treaty of Rome. The group re-launched itself as Conservatives against a Federal Europe (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008, 98). However, such groups did not find much support among the public, which seemed to be supportive of EC membership[14]. According to Fontana & Parsons (2015, 96), recession and de-industrialisation made Thatcher the least popular prime minister of all time, and from the Bruges speech to her resignation in November 1990 was

[14]In 1991, 57 per cent of the public viewed EC membership as `a good thing` (Fontana & Parsons 2015, 96).

a short step. What seemed to move the public in a more Eurosceptic direction was the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

Signing the Maastricht Treaty

When John Major became Prime Minister in 1990, he could not have foreseen the difficulties the government would experience during the Maastricht ratification that would lead to "the collapse of the Conservative Party as an electoral force", according to Geddes (2004, 199). The Maastricht Treaty included a number of policies in the direction of supranational organisation, e.g. extended majority voting and more power to the institutions. During the ratification process, a major rebellion emerged within the party and challenged the governing elite. Thatcher's stance on European integration gave a lead to a growing number of Conservative Eurosceptics, who were given support by the frequently xenophobic popular media (May 1999, 79-86). At this stage, there was a lack of public interest in the integration debate, which made it impossible for the opposition to stop the Maastricht Treaty. However, the rebellion continued to oppose the proposed terms (Geddes 2004, 199-201). Major faced difficult years in office, and negotiations ended with opt-outs from both the monetary union and the social chapter (May 1999, 79-86).

The rebellion opposed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty based on three main arguments; firstly, the group presented itself as representatives of the people and guardians of national sovereignty – the freedom of the people was pointed against a centralising European state. Secondly, the group argued that the governing elites could not be trusted on integration, as the leadership had forced people into a centralised state against their will. Thirdly, the rebellion emphasised the underlying instability of Europe; Maastricht continued the trend of centralising state building, which had created problems in Europe in the first place. The rebellion called for independent nation states and a free market economy – national sovereignty should be re-asserted. This echoed Thatcher's speech in Bruges, arguing that Maastricht had a federalist agenda (Gifford 2006, 862-864).

Conservative Eurosceptics argued that democracy would be an under-represented and poorly understood part of a centralising political union. Wellings (2010, 497) argues that debates taking place right before and after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty deepened the association made between the nation, the past and the defence of sovereignty.

At this stage, Euroscepticism had become a significant right-wing national movement, mobilising support both inside and outside parliament. Opposition towards deeper integration came to play a more significant role than party loyalty, and Eurosceptics organised in a number of alliances and groupings. The rebellion decided to look for support in the media, which provided substantial backing, according to Gifford (2006, 860-65). In 1993, a survey of 4,000 grassroots Conservatives indicated widespread disaffection with the Maastricht treaty. In this context, he argues, the rebellion must be seen as part of a broader national movement opposing the second wave of European integration.

The crisis over Maastricht ratification had great impact on the British political system. The immediate consequence of the Maastricht rebellion and the nature of Eurosceptic mobilisation that followed from it was to further push the government in a more hostile direction. Furthermore, it destroyed the credibility of the government and opened up divisions within the Conservative Party. The conflict consolidated a shift to the right, but Major failed to heal the divisions within the party and among grassroots supporters. In 1993, the European Foundation was established, and the movement became an important protest vehicle for Eurosceptic arguments and mobilising against the government (ibid).

The emergence of a strong Eurosceptic force

In 1991, a small pressure group called the Anti-Federalist League emerged as a response to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The group was founded by Alan Sked, a university lecturer who had been involved in the Bruges Group in 1990 (Usherwood 2008, 256). The Anti-Federalist League aimed to put pressure on the

Conservatives and to promote withdrawal from the EU. However, the group did not get much attention in the media. According to Alan Sked, the media did not take them seriously, because 'the press only takes you seriously if you've got members of parliament or you win elections' (Interview, 2015). The Anti-Federalist League lacked support, resulting in the establishment of the United Kingdom Independence Party on 3 September 1993. Sked realised that a pressure group did not have the same effect as a political party, so the idea of establishing a political party was to challenge MPs in elections (ibid). He wanted to place a hard form of Euroscepticism at the heart of British politics, meaning opposition to the very principle of European political integration based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003, 6-8).

UKIP wanted to challenge MPs in elections, but did not seek governmental power. The party was primarily a policy-seeking rather than office-seeking party and did not express much interest in elections. The UKIP board decided not to take up any of the seats it might win, as the purpose of the party was to pressure the Conservatives to adopt a more hostile approach to the EU. This changed, however, when Sked was replaced as party leader in 1997. He resigned from UKIP, due to several factors; firstly, he felt exhausted by the time of the 1997 election; 'Not only was I doing my teaching job at the LSE and doing research, but at the same time the party expected me to be holding meetings all over the country from one end to the other as party leader. It was very exhausting […] and then in 1997, I began to convey that some right-wing people were beginning to join the party and I could not prevent that. Also, James Goldsmith had started the Referendum Party and he had £40,000 to spend on the 1997 election. Neither party did well, but he did better' (Interview, 2015). In 1997, winning seats became part of UKIPs policies, in order to gather information and educate the public on the EU.

The members of the party were eager to begin a revolt against the established parties, which had started taking seats a century or more ago. In order to gain

support from the public, it became important to distance the party from the established right-wing movements that were rooted in the extremist tradition of racial nationalism. In the 1970s, Britain had seen the development of an extreme right-wing party named the National Front. The party opposed liberal democracy and immigration, and was openly racist. For a short period, it attracted significant support[15], but the party fell as quickly as it had risen. Since Thatcher had become hostile to further integration, the Conservatives attracted most of its voters. The National Front therefore split up, leading to the establishment of the British National Party (BNP) in 1982. Similar to the National Front, the party had roots in the tradition of racial nationalism and did not gain support in the media. The BNP argued that people from other ethnic groups could never be British. Furthermore, immigration was regarded a threat to the survival of the British race (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 23-7).

As mentioned above, the leadership faced competition from other pressure groups, particularly the Referendum Party. On 27 November 1994, the billionaire James Goldsmith announced his attention to launch a political party dedicated to securing a referendum on EU membership. Goldsmith argued that the public should have the right to decide whether Britain should remain a nation. In his view, the EU would eventually become a federal state, and the public should therefore get the chance to decide whether or not to be a part of this development. Similar to the UK Independence Party, the Referendum Party was a classic single-issue party with a simple message for voters. Instead of recruiting voters from one particular section of society, the party attracted voters across political parties. The leadership did not consider themselves politicians, nor did they have an interest in becoming politicians; they were different from the political elite. As written in the constitution, the leadership would resign as soon as a referendum was delivered. Goldsmith had resources

[15]The NF won over 100,000 voters at the general election in October 1974, and almost 200,000 at the general election in 1979 (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 23).

and important contacts, and the party posed a formidable threat to the UK Independence Party, which struggled to find funding for its campaign (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 23-27). As discussed in Chapter 1, a political party needs resources in terms of members, management, media exposure and money in order to succeed (Lucardie 2000, 175). The Referendum Party had more resources and thus a greater chance of winning votes in the 1997 general election.

When the Anti-Federalist League campaigned in 1992, voters did not pay much attention to European issues[16]. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty changed the climate, and by the general election in 1997, more people were concerned about the issue. Support for deeper integration and a single currency decreased, and the integration process became the third most significant issue behind health care and education. In other words, these changes offered opportunities for Eurosceptic movements and parties to mobilise support (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 30-1). The Referendum Party performed well in the 1997 election, winning 811,849 votes. Its success had great impact on UKIP's performance, which could not compete against the Referendum Party. UKIP won only 105,722 votes in the election (UK political, no date). However, the election proved that Euroscepticism could be a potent force in British politics when mobilised by a well-resourced group (Goodwin & Ford 2014, 30-31). Goldsmith became a great competitor, but within three months of the election, he died. The Referendum Party dissolved itself, giving the UK Independence Party an opportunity to become the leading Eurosceptic Party.

The first challenge seemed to be to attract voters around one single issue. UKIP did not focus on other issues dominating the general elections, while the established parties did. Some of the activists were interested in widening the message, but the board continued to focus on the EU. In 1999, the manifesto

[16]Only 14 per cent of the electorate considered Europe as one of the three most important issues in the electoral campaign (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 28).

stated; 'Not only is our country under threat but our entire legal system, our British nationality, our right to free speech and freedom of association, our policy, our armed forces, our own agricultural policy, our right to trade freely and the parliamentary system that underpins the British liberty' (cited in: Ford & Goodwin 2014, 37-38). In addition, a challenge in recruiting voters was competition from the Conservative Party. William Hague adopted a more critical approach to EU membership, promising voters that he would veto the transfer of further power from Westminster to Brussels. Furthermore, he promised not to adopt the single currency and keep the pound (which became a central theme in the 2001 General Election). While most of their members did not support withdrawal from the EU, the arguments were rather similar to those of UKIP. They promised to prevent further transfer of national sovereignty, opposing the single currency and protection of national interests. The UK Independence Party performed well in European Elections, but as soon as the elections passed, most voters lost interest in the EU (ibid).

The party continued to lack a voice in political debate and did not become a serious contender before Nigel Farage became leader of the party in 2006. He emphasised the importance of broadening the domestic appeal and focused on issues such as education, trade, immigration and taxation. By 2010, immigration had become the second most important issue for voters, behind the economy and above unemployment. Farage aimed to attract voters who were concerned about mass immigration and put the issue at the centre of the campaign. Furthermore, he linked the immigration issue to integration and emphasised that uncontrolled immigration from the European Union had to end. The manifesto offered policies that were designed to enhance domestic appeal and focused on unemployment, more police on the streets, grammar schools, referendum on EU membership, a more proportional election system and the restoration of British values. At this stage, UKIP became a right-wing party and left its past as a pressure group behind (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 70-85). However, the EU remained the most important political issue in their programme, and the party characterised the EU as

'centralised, bureaucratic, unaccountable, and corrupt, eroding our independence and imposing by diktat policies that we would never vote for in an election' (cited in: Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008, 103). According to UKIP MEP Nathan Gill, 'It has been important for UKIP to show the EU as bureaucratic, you know, to show it as aloof from the people, away from the people and not really something that people understand. The red tape, all these kinds of phrases which people understand and recognise, that's what we have tried to do and to paint to people's mind, which is a reality. We were the ones to always mention that and bring that up' (Interview, 2016).

At first, the party recruited members from the political right, mostly from the Conservative Party. These were a group of voters who had opposed the establishment of political union, opposing deeper integration in the EU. When the party decided to broaden its political message to include other policy areas, e.g. unemployment and immigration, it reached out to a different group of voters; the disadvantaged and working-class voters. This group considered the changes in society a threat to their future and were frustrated with the establishment for failing to address these issues and listen to their concerns (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 91). How did the working-class become Eurosceptic?

Ford & Goodwin (ibid, 112-125) found in their analysis of voting behaviour that firstly, middle-class professionals benefit more from integration into a global economy, and embrace the cosmopolitan and post-material values associated with it. Those feeling left behind by the established parties, tend to share a different opinion on membership, favouring different values such as nationalism, opposition to immigration and populism. Professional qualifications have become more important in society, giving blue-collar workers fewer opportunities to progress. This group therefore stands to lose most from greater economic integration, as it is most likely to be undercut by workers from other member states; migrant workers are often willing to work for lower wages, combined with higher skills. Hence, deeper integration is considered a threat to their future, both in terms of economic security and

national identity. Furthermore, there is a belief among those feeling left behind by the established parties that their concerns on immigration have been ignored by the political elite. In their view, the elite has been more sensitive to protecting migrants and ethnic minorities, than listening to their concerns. In 2012, forty per cent of blue-collar workers wanted to leave the European Union (ibid), while less than a fifth of professionals or graduates shared this opinion[17].

Secondly, opposition towards integration is more present in generations born before 1973. Those who grew up before the UK joined the EU are more likely to be critical of the EU. By contrast, those who were born after the UK became a member of the EU, find themselves more supportive of the EU. Ford & Goodwin (ibid, 157-8) identified two factors than can explain these differences. Firstly, there have been considerable changes in society since the UK became a member of the EU. The country has become more educated, middle class and multicultural. Furthermore, the UK has seen a kind of silent revolution in social values, meaning that young voters have grown up in a more diverse society and find it easier to accept different cultures. Secondly, those who were born after the UK became a member of the EU cannot imagine not being a part of it. For those who grew up before the UK became a member of the EU, by contrast, being outside of the EU is not threatening, as this is what they grew up with; this generation remembers the UK as a great power, whose foreign policies were focused on the Empire (ibid). These attitudes can be discussed in terms of the Eurosceptic tradition identified earlier in the chapter; Eurosceptic tradition has roots in the interpretation of national history, which resonates with Britain's greatness. Farage has, consciously, focused on traditional ideas of Britishness in the party's campaign literature, e.g. 'We led the way in the abolition of the slave trade. Our Industrial Revolution transformed the world. A plethora of great Britons stream through international history. Our language is the most widely spoken on the planet. Britain is a remarkable country and

[17]Survey conducted by British Social Attitudes 1993-2012 (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 119).

we are a remarkable people. We have helped shape the modern world. Britain is more than just a star on someone else's flag' (cited in: UKIP Manifesto, 2015).

Finally, those feeling left behind by the established parties have lost faith in the political system, as the establishment has failed to address their concerns, e.g. increased immigration. Ford & Goodwin (2014, 130) argue that millions of former manufacturing employees never recovered from the de-industrialisation under the Thatcher governments. As the country has become more educated, the former manufacturing employees lack both skills and experience to compete on the job market. As a result, a large group of former industrial employees and their families have remained in poverty, and lost faith in the political system. The Conservatives have made no effort to target voters in former industrial cities, as it has been considered more important to appeal to the middle-class, including graduates and ethnic minorities. Policies designed to appeal to white, working-class voters – focusing on immigration and Euroscepticism – could bring back what in literature (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 135) has been referred to as the Thatcherite 'nasty party' image and alienate other groups, such as the young, those with higher education and ethnic minorities. Similarly, the Labour Party has not succeeded in addressing the issues concerning the left behind voters. The reform of the party placed it in the political centre, more enthusiastic for capitalism and market enterprise. The leadership agreed to focus on public services, e.g. health care, education and welfare protection. The party did not want a dramatic redistribution of wealth, nor did it promote a significant nationalisation of private industries. In electoral terms, the reform of the party was a successful strategy; it delivered three terms of Labour majority government. However, in this process the party steered away from those feeling left behind in society, a group that used to be their core electorate; free market reform of state services became more important than commitments to help former industrial employers with no steady income. Furthermore, Labour agreed to the enlargement of the EU. As increased immigration has been considered a threat to left behind voters, the

party's support for wider integration further alienated this group of voters. In this view, both major political parties have failed to address the issues that are important to working-class voters (ibid, 130-35). A large group of these voters therefore decided not to participate in general elections, which made them a perfect target for the UK Independence Party. According to former MP Douglas Carswell, 'people expect responsiveness from institutions they ain't getting from political parties' (Interview, 2016). The UKIP leadership has managed to address issues that other parties have not, and part of their success can be related to the reluctance of the established parties to address these issues, according to Usherwood (2008, 258). As put by MEP Nathan Gill, 'We were the voice of the people who had no voice – genuinely, we just said the things that people were thinking that no other politician dare say. We didn't do it because we were chasing after votes, and because we kept on doing it – repeating it and repeating it – people slowly came towards us' (Interview, 2016). Klaus Beyme (1985, 277) argued that the success of new parties 'depends on the established parties and voters' behaviour. If an established party fails to provide a solution for existing problems, and the voters distrust the party, there are greater chances for a new party to emerge`. This could also be the case if a party system runs out of parties that have not been in government before and there is a belief among the electorate that the established parties have failed to govern the society when serving in government (Tavits 2008, 119-122).

In the attempt to reach out to the public, UKIP has not only used the media, but it has also organised an effective grassroots movement. As the party has deliberately framed the EU question as a battle between the elite and ordinary people, it became crucial to communicate directly with the people. According to UKIP's former Head of Media, Alexandra Phillips: 'One thing that UKIP has always done a lot since its establishment is public meetings. Even in 2013, when there was the local election campaign, I went around the country with Nigel talking to anyone who would come and listen, and that has very much always been the UKIP way. That sort of grassroots engagement, which a lot of

politicians don't do anymore – most politicians very reluctantly hold occasional meetings and it is almost as if they hold the electoral in contempt, would rather be in an office in Westminster, you know, busying themselves with only making 25 per cent of our legislation, rather than engaging with the people that they are supposed to represent'. She continued, 'And that very much fits with the UKIP approach to being overly controlled by the state, by unelected bureaucrats who don't have the interest of people at heart and hence not engaged with what the general public wants. It has always been a key part of, not so much UKIP strategy, but UKIP ideology to have that engagement with the public as much as possible' (Interview Alexandra Phillips, 2015).

4.2 Euroscepticism in Norway

The Norwegians have twice rejected EU membership, both in the 1972 and 1994 referendums. The decision to hold a referendum on membership has made it impossible for governments to proceed with membership negotiations without support from the public. When the government agreed to hold the first referendum on EEC membership, the decision was based on two different factors; firstly, there were internal splits within the political parties in the 1970s. A referendum would settle the EEC membership debate, as all members of Parliament would have to accept the referendum result; and secondly, membership of the European Community would involve the pooling of national sovereignty. This would require changes in the constitution, and parties and representatives in opposition to EEC membership argued that the public should be able to influence the decision. The government agreed to hold a referendum on the issue, but did not manage to convince the public that the country would benefit more from EEC membership (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 49-50). EEC opponents mobilised a campaign against membership, which proved to be successful. The force behind this campaign was made up of a wide range of people from all social classes (Seierstad 2014, 30), and included interest groups, farmers and fishermen, academics, labour movements, environmental groups and minor parties on the political left.

The following decades were characterised by disappointment and frustration for EEC supporters. The government decided not to debate EEC membership any further, in addition reopening the debate would break the promise of respecting the referendum results. However, the 1980s emphasised the importance of deeper integration, as reduced oil prices demonstrated Norwegian vulnerability in international developments (Claes & Tranøy 2003, 31-2). Furthermore, developments within the Community itself triggered a fourth membership application. Maastricht placed the integration debate in a new light, as integration proceeded towards political union with a common defence policy. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union had an impact on the decision to apply for EC membership. The collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe left the European Community as the most dominant feature on the landscape (Sogner & Archer 1995, 396). The government therefore opened up discussions for a more comprehensive trade agreement, including access to the single market. The idea of a trade agreement found support across the political parties and the government considered the changes in attitudes an opportunity to re-open the EU membership debate (Claes & Tranøy 2003, 31-32). Public opinion, however, had not changed remarkably and the public voted against EU membership for the second time in 1994, despite opposite recommendations from the Norwegian government, the mainstream media and influential interest groups (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 49-50). The Norwegians remained a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the politicians also decided to keep the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. Access to the single market would benefit the country economically and prevent isolation from the other member states.

The opposition towards EEC membership in 1972

On 28 August 1970, the political organisation '*Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet*'[18] emerged as a protest against membership of the European Economic Community. The organisation recruited members across the political spectrum, as it was established as a non-partisan organisation. The major

[18] The movement against Norwegian membership in the EEC

political parties in Parliament had declared support for EEC membership in advance of the EEC referendum. As a result, a large group of voters found themselves in conflict with their political parties. Folkebevegelsen was the most important driver for opposition towards EEC membership. By 1972, it had recruited more than 130.000 members from all over the country (Store Norske Leksikon, no date). In only a couple of years, Folkebevegelsen had established local groups in almost all constituencies. This was made possible by Folkebevegelsen's participation in a large and powerful grassroots movement. The grassroots movement, which consisted of different groups and interest organisations, had a large number of volunteers helping to spread their message. The grassroots movement started an intense campaign against EEC membership. Conferences and demonstrations were arranged in the largest cities, and newspapers and flyers were used to spread the message. Furthermore, the movement aimed to reach out to the public by encouraging people on the streets to mobilise and take part in the campaign, and by writing letters to editors for various media outlets (Nei til EU, 2012). Folkebevegelsen continued to campaign against deeper integration in early years after the referendum, but the purpose of the organisation had been achieved. As a result, Folkebevegelsen dissolved in 1977 (Store Norske Leksikon, no date).

Folkebevegelsen emerged as one of the most significant contributors to the mobilisation of opposition towards the EEC, but other groups also contributed to the referendum results. As discussed, there were internal splits within the Norwegian political parties on the EEC. The Labour Party made the decision to support membership of the EEC and launched a slogan ahead of the EEC referendum: 'voters who support Labour, should also support the EEC'[19]. Since a significant number of party members did not in fact support EEC membership, this caused frustration within the party. As a response, some of the party members, together with members of the labour movement, established a protest group

[19] 'En A-velger er en Ja-velger'

against EEC membership[20] – most of the members of this group remained members of the Labour Party, but used it as an opportunity to demonstrate against the party's decision to support membership of the EEC.

Similar to this group, a committee/organisation against the EEC was established, *Arbeiderkommitteen mot EEC og dyrtid (AKMED)*[21]. The organisation was established in 1970, as a response to the re-opening of the EEC membership debate. The group members worked together with activists from the Labour group against EEC membership (AKP, 2012). The organisation recruited most of its members from socialist parties and labour movements, as it focused on the rights – and protection of the lower classes in society. The aim of the group was to pressure the politicians to hold a referendum on EEC membership. The leadership of the Labour group against EEC membership did not want a referendum to be the final decision on whether the country should become a member in the future, but rather to postpone the decision and open up a debate before entering the Community. This approach mostly appealed to those in opposition towards EEC membership, but it also appealed to undecided voters.

All of these groups and organisations participated in the grassroots movement against the EEC. In order to get their message out to the public, the grassroots movement wrote letters to editors, campaigned in the streets and arranged demonstrations against membership of the EEC. Folkebevegelsen, the driver behind the grassroots movement, established its own newspaper against EEC membership, that by the end of the campaign had been distributed in more than 40.000 copies. One of the fliers 'EEC is a threat for jobs', was printed in more than 150.000 exemplars. The grassroots movement organised conferences in the largest cities, and more than two hundred committees were established across the country. In addition, the movement started a petition for holding a referendum on EEC membership. The petition was promoted and signed at 30

[20] 'The Labour Movement's information committee against Norwegian membership in the European Communities'
[21] The Labour Committee against the EEC and 'Increased Market Prices'

different conferences taking place across the country, with the total of 2500 signatures (NTNU, no date).

The most salient arguments promoted by the group were those in terms of labour rights. It was argued that salaries would be reduced and that a large number of employees would lose their jobs due to international competition. Furthermore, industries would be moved to developing countries, where costs of production and labour were cheaper. This would eventually force small businesses located in the peripheries to close down, which again would encourage centralisation – people would move out of the peripheries and into the cities. Because of this, the group appealed to those living in the peripheries, in particular fishermen and farmers. *AKMED* argued that Norwegian farmers would not be able to compete on the international market, and that sharing the fishing fleet with the other member states could cause an overexploitation of certain fish stocks. In addition, arguments in terms of independence and national sovereignty were salient in the debate. The group argued that the EEC would have great impact on laws and national regulations, and monetary policies influencing the national economy. EEC membership would also weaken democracy, as small states would not have great influence in the decision-making processes (PDF-arkivet, 2012).

The opposition towards EU membership in 1994

In 1988, Kristen Nygaard established 'The information committee on Norway and the EC'[22]. The aim of the committee was to inform the public on risks and implications of EC membership. Groups were established in most of the regions, to effectively inform the public about the EC. These groups later merged into a political organisation, '*No to the EU',* which became the most important driver for opposition to EU membership. The organisation established local groups in all regions across the country, with each region having one leader – the leaders would meet frequently to discuss strategies for the campaign (Seierstad 2014, 62-75). When the EU referendum took place, 'No to the EU' had recruited 145,000

[22] Title in Norwegian: 'Opplysningsutvalget om Norge og EF'

members, making it the largest organisation in Norway (Nei til EU, 2012). How did the organisation recruit members?

Firstly, 'No to the EU' was established as a non-partisan organisation, attracting members across the political spectrum. Similar to the 1972 referendum, the major political parties announced ahead of the referendum that they would support membership. 'No to the EU' therefore offered a party neutral campaign against the EU, appealing to those who disagreed with their political parties on the EU. In contrast to 1972, voters felt less obliged to support their political parties in the 1994 referendum, as it had become more acceptable to disagree with their parties. The Labour Party, which lost a significant number of members when the 1972 referendum took place, learned from its mistakes and opened up for diverse opinions on the EU. In this way, voters no longer felt pressured to vote in line with their political parties, and people felt more comfortable sharing their views on EU membership, even when they differed from their political parties (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 11-12).

Secondly, 'No to the EU' spent large amounts on campaign materials in order to reach out to and inform the public on the EU. The organisation received donations from the public, but the largest financial contributions came from organisations in the primary sector, i.e. fishing organisations and agricultural organisations (Interview Ørnhøi, 2015). In 1994, 'No to the EU' produced 160 printed materials in 9.1 million exemplars. Similar to Folkebevegelsen in 1972, the organisation launched its own newspaper, published in 42 issues and distributed in 11.7 million copies. People living in the peripheries was less exposed to campaign activities, and 'No to the EU' therefore made an analysis of the implications of EU membership, and had it distributed in 50,000 exemplars across the country (Seierstad 2014, 201-5). In addition to this, 'No to the EU' published a book about the negative consequences of EU membership. The book included poems and short stories written by well-known authors, and the organisation had it distributed to almost all households in the country (Interview Ørnhøi, 2015). What made all of this possible, was the large number of supporters volunteering for the

movement – more than 10,000 people helped distribute the book to the households.

Thirdly, 'No to the EU' organised a large number of meetings and demonstrations, both in urban and rural areas of Norway. The most powerful demonstration took place on 19 November 1994. EU opponents gathered in Oslo to protest against EU membership, and it has been estimated that 30,000 people participated in the demonstration. Trains and 300 buses were arranged to help commute people to the demonstration, as many of them travelled from the rural areas to the capital (Seierstad 2014, 245-6). Furthermore, smaller demonstrations were arranged in rural areas of the country, where some of them were covered in local newspapers. It was crucial to reach out to the peripheries, as most of the farmers and fishermen were opposed to membership (Interview Ørnhøi, 2015).

In addition to an intense campaign brought forth by 'No to the EU', the changed position of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) had an impact on the referendum result. In 1972, the trade unions supported membership of the EEC. In 1994, by contrast, they changed their approach, announcing that they would not support membership of the EU. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions had scheduled a conference ahead of the referendum, to discuss the implications of membership. This decision was made due to internal splits within the organisation over EU membership. 'No to the EU' seized the opportunity to influence the members of the trade unions, campaigning in various trade unions in order to convince them to vote against membership. The vote, which took place at the conference, declared that the majority of trade unions did not support membership in the EU (Seierstad 2014, 215-219).

Furthermore, environmental groups were influential drivers for opposition towards the EU. *Friends of the Earth Norway*[23] had branches established in all the regions and more than one hundred local groups were established across the country (Friends of Europe, no date). The organisation argued that the establishment of the internal market would have negative consequences for the

[23] Title in Norwegian: Naturvernforbundet

environment. The internal market included an increase of consumption and transport, which would result in more air pollution. Norway should therefore remain outside of the internal market and keep conducting environmental policies independent from the EU member states (Natur og Ungdom, no date).

The arguments against EEC/EU membership

The argumentation was similar in both referendums, and the five most salient arguments were those in terms of political values, national sovereignty, agriculture and fisheries, economic interests and the welfare state. Firstly, Norwegian political values, such as environmental protection and distribution of wealth, contradicted those adopted by the EU member states. EU opponents argued that the obsession with economic growth stood in contrast to other important objectives, e.g. protection of the environment, ensuring equal distribution of wealth inside and outside the nation state, and the promotion of peace. Furthermore, EU opponents argued in terms of future generations and the welfare state; the member states' prioritisation of economic growth was considered a barrier to progress in these areas, contributing to inequality and environmental damage. In addition, the EU prioritised economic growth over global inequalities or ecological balance. Environmental groups were active in both referendums, arguing that the EU poses a threat to the environment. In this view, opposition towards the EU became a question of morality (Skinner 2012, 432-3).

Secondly, the importance of national sovereignty runs like a red thread through the EU membership debate across the decades, rooted in a long struggle for independence (ibid, 433). Norway has never held a leading position in the world, which distinguishes it from the position of the UK. For a long time, Norway was not even independent in international affairs and this came to have an impact on debates on the EEC/EU. In 1380, the establishment of a dynastic union with Denmark incorporated Norway as a 'colonial' field under the Danish Crown. The union later deepened, replacing the Catholic Church with the Lutheran state church. In addition, the Norwegian Privy Council disappeared. The union lasted

until 1814, when Sweden acquired Norway in the Treaty of Kiel. Norway remained independent in domestic affairs, but could not conduct its own foreign policies until the union dissolved in 1905 (Gstöhl 2002, 30-34). The battle for independence has been associated with some of the arguments in the EU membership debate; arguments in terms of democratic rights and national sovereignty appealed to most people, as the question of national sovereignty does not belong to one particular social class, or specific regions. Patriotic slogans were introduced, e.g. 'the country belongs to us – vote against membership' (Furre 2007, 212). Furthermore, Eurosceptics criticised the EU's decision-making processes, emphasising the distance between the governed and those who govern; decisions are made in centralised institutions disconnected from the people. The Norwegian system, on the other hand, is characterised by local democracy, parliamentary sovereignty and transparent government. Eurosceptics emphasised the lack of democracy, arguing that the European Union is an unelected organisation that dictates decisions to its citizens (Skinner 2012, 434).

Maastricht, in particular, came to have an impact on the 1994 referendum debate, as it seemed to confirm what some Eurosceptics had been arguing in terms of the final destination of the integration process. The EC proceeded towards establishment of political union. 'No to the EU' emphasised the federalist character of the treaty, arguing that political integration could proceed towards the establishment of a federal European supranational state with a serious democratic deficit. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty triggered a complicated ratification process and several states secured opt-outs from different areas of integration. The reluctance to accept the Maastricht Treaty in member states seems to have pushed Norwegians back from supporting EU membership in 1994 (Tiersky 2001, 115-123). In particular, Danish opposition to the Maastricht Treaty came to influence the debate. The Danish rejected the treaty in a referendum and secured an opt-out from the implementation of the single currency. To Norwegian Eurosceptics, the Danish referendum symbolised the importance of mobilised opposition; the public could, as a force, influence the integration process and prevent deeper integration. As a result, the ratification process triggered

opposition towards both the EEA agreement and EU membership (Seierstad 204, 111-2).

Thirdly, the protection of agriculture and fisheries characterised the debate. Eurosceptics criticised the commitment to free market economics and open competition; the commitment to the single market posed a threat to the peripheries, primarily because it puts the settlement pattern at risk. Employment in the peripheries would be threatened by participation in the single market, as membership would force changes in agricultural and fisheries policies (Skinner 2012, 434). EU membership would entail the end of the Norwegian agricultural subsidies system, which has been important to keep rural areas populated. By 1993, as much as 77 per cent of Norwegian farmers' income came from state aid (Sogner & Archer 1995, 400). Eurosceptics argued that Norwegian agriculture would receive less subsidies from the EU; the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) favours large-scale farms over the small-scale farms most commonly found in Norway. Reduced subsidies, combined with short seasons for agriculture, would make it difficult for Norwegian farmers to compete in the single market. As a result, these industries would be replaced by industries purely driven by profit. Skinner (2012, 435) argues that the threat of membership is not to the survival of agriculture per se, but to its significant function as a rural industry. In this view, primary sectors have functions connected to identity and culture, and cannot be measured in economic terms.

Fourthly, Norwegian economic interests were seen to differ from those of the EU. Increasing petroleum industry income throughout the 1970s and 1980s permitted an independent and to some extent different economic development in Norway to that in the European Community. Norway is the most sea-oriented and the most sea-dependent nation state in Europe. The enormous sea area and territory, more or less 20,000,000 square kilometres, is almost the same size as the entire European Union before the 2004 enlargement. Since the early 1970s, Norway has become the largest oil-producing nation state in Europe and the third largest oil-exporting state in the world – its merchant fleet brings in fourteen per cent of

total export income. Largely because of this, the national economy has experienced economic growth for the past fifteen to twenty years (Tiersky 2001, 123-124). Eurosceptics therefore argued that `Norway can manage well outside the European Union` and that `economic considerations do not force us into membership` (cited in: Skinner 2012, 436). In other words, economic benefits from EU membership did not matter in 1994, because the Norwegians had been experiencing economic growth and stability since the 1970s. Economic arguments promoted by EU opponents were those in favour of protection of certain sectoral economic interests, showing solidarity with weaker economic sectors and disregarding the strong export industries (Skinner 2012, 435-436).

Finally, the welfare state came to have an impact on the EU membership debate. In the Great Depression in the 1930s, the social democrats formed a political alliance with the Agrarian party, and in 1945 all political parties agreed on a common welfare programme. The Norwegian model was the one with the strongest element of economic planning and state control of markets, as well as great efforts at regional and industrial policies (Gstöhl 2002, 539-540). Eurosceptics claimed that EEC/EU membership would lead to a reduction of the public sector and that the current welfare model would be threatened by EEC/EU harmonisation. The public sector is characterised by a protected economy, which the opposition claimed would have problems adjusting to changes in the event of EEC/EU membership. Bjørklund (2001, 145-8) found in his research that those employed in the private sector were more supportive of EEC/EU membership than those employed in public sector, as the majority of the latter were employed in positions associated with the welfare state. Local communities and municipalities have been the basis upon which the welfare system has been built; those living in the periphery have received the greatest transfers and benefitted most from the welfare state. The system has helped even out the standard of living according to class and region, and reduced the gap between centre and periphery. As a result, those living in the periphery were more Eurosceptic than those living in urban districts. The policy of reducing the standard of living gap between the centre and

the periphery and promoting egalitarianism provided a platform for the opposition against EEC/EU membership.

In fact, the differences between centre and periphery became evident in Hellevik's (1975, 37-39) analysis of voting behaviour in the 1972 referendum. The debate was a conflict between centre and periphery, with those living in the centre being more supportive of EEC membership than those in the geographical periphery (Hellevik 1975, 37-39). The periphery is made up of the middle – and northern parts of the country, while the centre is to be found in the capital city, Oslo. Stein Rokkan (1987, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 37-8) later introduced a theory to explain these tendencies, based on geographical differences in society. He found that voting behaviour can possibly be connected to both economic and social factors. The periphery was characterised by farmers and fishermen, fearing that their industries could not compete on the international market. In addition, this group of voters was made up of those sympathising with the farmers and fishermen, wanting to protect the industries from competition and international regulations.

Furthermore, social factors seemed to have an impact on voting behaviour. In 1905, the year when Norway regained its independence after the dissolution of the Union between Sweden and Norway, a national standardisation introduced a set of norms and rules with the aim to establish a new national identity. The standardisation, organised from the centre of the country, was opposed by those living in the peripheries who considered it a threat to their cultural traditions. The same idea was present in the referendum debate, arguing that membership of the EEC would pose a threat to the country's cultural traditions, similar to the standardisation that took place in 1905 (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 37-8).

This is in line with Johan Gaultung's (1964, cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 37-8) theory on voting behaviour in national elections. Galtung argued that those living in the periphery are naturally more distanced from the political system itself; the process of communication and information is more effective in the centre, and this group is therefore more positive to ideas adopted from abroad.

As a result, ideas are often adopted and developed in the centre, while the peripheries tend to be more reluctant to change, e.g. EEC/EU membership. Pettersen & Valen (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 10) also demonstrated a correlation between knowledge and voting behaviour. Participation in the 1972 referendum was higher among those with higher education. – this group often has a better understanding of political issues and the consequences of political decisions. EEC/EU opposition was made up of those in the geographical periphery, particularly farmers and fishermen, but this group did not alone win the referendums on the EEC/EU. Different protest groups and organisations played a crucial role in the EEC/EU referendum debates, with help from students, academics and environmental groups.

Incorporation without formal membership

In 1994, the Norwegian government respected the decision of the public and political parties agreed that the debate would not be reopened without a significant shift in public opinion in favour of EU membership. It could, however, be argued that Norway has achieved a kind of 'informal membership' in the EU. Given that Norway is a member of both the EEA agreement and the Schengen agreement, it is in some respects more integrated in the European Union than for instance Britain. Fossum refers to the arrangement as `tight incorporation without formal membership` (cited in: Fossum 2010, 74).

As a small nation state, Norway can neither shape the institutions and structures of Europe, nor escape them. Heavily dependent on global and European trade regimes and on overall political and strategic developments in Europe, Norway in strategic terms has no choice other than to adapt to realities created by the EU member states (Tiersky 2001, 125). Through the EEA agreement, Norwegian authorities have undertaken to implement and administer Community rules, and to respect the relevant case law of the European Court of Justice. This allows the Norwegians to reap the benefits of the internal market without being part of the political system, but the agreement includes both advantages and disadvantages. The Norwegian parliament is involved in European legislative processes in a

consultative capacity, but does not have direct influence on political decisions. The Norwegian government is not invited to take part in conferences of the parliaments, nor does it have full access to the institutions. Through art. 103 of the EEA agreement, national parliaments are given the right to veto decisions of the committee. Norway has on some occasions threatened to use the national veto, but it has never been used. First, using the veto would place Norway on a collision course with several of its important trade partners. Second, national parliaments are consulted after a decision has been made in the committee, which means that consensus has already been reached between national governments. Finally, a national veto would have the effect of blocking the decision for the whole European Economic Area (Narud & Strøm 2000, 125-135).

EU opponents campaigned against the signing of the EEA agreement in 1992, but struggled to engage the public in the debate. Supporters of the EEA agreement argued that standing outside the single market could isolate the country from the other member states. EU opponents, by contrast, argued that the Norwegian government had already signed trade agreements with several European countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In other words, reaching separate trade agreements with EU member states would not be a problem (Seierstad 2014, 107-108). Social dumping became an important argument in the debate, as trade unions feared that free movement of labour would increase the number of migrant workers and social dumping. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions participated in the negotiations, and demanded an agreement ensuring the same wages for all workers (Seierstad 2014, 113-114). The government decided not to hold a referendum on the EEA agreement, but the decision did not hold back EU opponents from campaigning against the signing of the EEA. They argued that the EEA agreement would give Norwegians less influence in political decisions, as the decision-making processes would take place in Brussels.

Since the EEA agreement includes the pooling of national sovereignty, the Norwegian government needed support from three quarters of representatives

in order to sign it (Article 115 of the Norwegian Constitution). EU opponents mobilised a protest movement against the signing of the EEA, hoping to influence the representatives. As the Norwegian government had decided not to hold a referendum on the EEA, mobilising opposition against the EEA agreement was difficult. However, 'No to the EU' organised political strikes in large factories and industries, and set out a petition against the signing of the EEA agreement. Furthermore, the group published an informative paper as part of the campaign and had it distributed in 250,000 copies. The paper focused on the negative consequences of the EEA, and emphasised the lack of independence and protection of national sovereignty. 'No to the EU' engaged people from both private and public sector, across political parties and social classes (ibid, 92-94). Despite political strikes and intensive campaigning, 'No to the EU' did not succeed in influencing the representatives of Parliament – the government signed the EEA agreement without holding a referendum in 1992.

In the aftermath of the debate, Eurosceptics criticised the signing of the EEA agreement. 'No to the EU' argued that the signing was in fact a political coup. Firstly, the public could not get the chance to influence the decision, as the government decided not to hold a referendum on the EEA agreement. Secondly, the implications of the EEA agreement contradicted the national compromise, as the public had already rejected deeper integration in 1972 (Nei til EU, 2006). The Norwegian government, by contrast, considered the signing of the EEA agreement the first step towards full membership of the EU. Signing the agreement would possibly increase the chances of the majority of the public supporting membership of the EU, as the terms of the EEA agreement were similar to those of full membership of the EU (Seierstad 2014, 97).

In 1997, the government faced the decision on whether to participate in the Schengen Agreement. Similar to the EEA agreement, the government made the decision to sign the Schengen agreement without holding a referendum. The Norwegian government argued that it would be difficult to remain on the outside of the Schengen area, if the other Nordic countries decided to participate. Nordic

participation in Schengen without Norway would mark the end of the Nordic passport union, which included the removal of passport checks at internal borders. If Norway remained outside of the Schengen area, it would become more isolated from the continent, plus it could have great implications for trade – the government therefore made the decision to sign the Schengen Agreement in 1996 (Claes & Tranøy 2003, 59-67).

Integration by stealth?

What is noticeable is that the incorporation to the EEA has unfolded amidst silence and a relative absence of organised popular protest. In fact, 'No to the EU' has diminished significantly since 1994. EU integration has not been part of electoral campaigns, as all political parties, even those in opposition to integration, have agreed not to debate it. Norwegian governing coalitions have formulated a range of provisions for keeping the issue off the political agenda, so called suicide clauses; if a political party in a coalition brings up the membership issue, the government dissolves (Fossum 2010, 75). However, political parties have together made the decision to proceed towards deeper integration and it could be argued that the Norwegian government has reached a kind of 'informal membership' with the EU. The scope of the EEA agreement expands in line with increases in the European Union's engagement in the areas that the agreement regulates, and it expands to new member states as the European Union expands (Fossum 2010, 83-84). In other words, the national compromise does not seem to hinder developments of the integration process. Instead, it has curtailed the scope for public debate on the relationship with the European Union in general. Fossum (2010, 75) argued that `Norway's political and administrative elite push EU adaption forward basically independent of what they might express in public and whatever party they might belong to`. In the UK, deeper integration has triggered a growth of Euroscepticism. In Norway, by contrast, deeper integration has not triggered any popular protest. Norway still has one active and vocal Eurosceptic organisation, 'No to the EU', which campaigns for independence in international politics, broad international collaboration, equal distribution of

wealth inside and outside the nation state, and withdrawal from the EEA agreement. Regarding trade, 'No to the EU' argues that trade agreements should include international markets as well as the European market. The organisation also promotes withdrawal from the Schengen agreement, emphasising the rights of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are not allowed to move within the Schengen area while in a procedure, and once the decision is made the seeker has to leave the European Union if rejected in one of the member states (Nei til EU, 2012). However, 'No to the EU' still aims to inform the public on the EU, but has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the history of Euroscepticism in Norway and the UK. It has presented the underlying ideas and attitudes towards the EU. In both case studies, Euroscepticism can be traced back to the early days of the Community. It emerged, not as a response to political integration, but as a response to the prospects of political integration. In both countries, EU opponents have argued in terms of national sovereignty, democracy and protection of national interests. The governments have, in both countries, committed to deeper integration with the EU, but the public has responded differently. In the UK, Eurosceptic groups have emerged as a response to these developments, and the country has seen the emergence and rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). In Norway, by contrast, the Eurosceptic organisation 'No to the EU' has diminished remarkably, as it has become increasingly difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU. As the media have been considered an important political opportunity variable (McAdam et al. 1996), Chapter 5 and 6 studies whether the media have contributed to this development.

Chapter 5

The reporting of the integration debate in UK newspapers

This chapter investigates the reporting of the integration debate in UK newspapers, to find out whether the media have influenced the development of UKIP. Before analysing the reporting in the newspapers, it is necessary to briefly discuss whether UKIP has been successful. In this research, 'success' has been determined by two different factors introduced by Bettencourt et al. (1996, 176), namely the achievement of the party's immediate and long-term goals. UKIP has therefore in this research been considered successful, as the party achieved its long-term goal, that is withdrawal from the EU. UKIP has campaigned to leave the EU ever since it emerged as a pressure group and even when the party gradually expanded its party programme to other policy areas, membership of the EU remained the focus of the party. However, it can be discussed to what *degree* UKIP has been successful (as discussed, the concept of success should not be discussed in absolute binary terms, as a party could be considered successful even if some of its short-term goals or its long-term goal are not achieved). In brief, the party has achieved its long-term goal, as the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, but the negotiations with the other member states are not finalised and it is currently uncertain what the final terms will look like. It is therefore not guaranteed that the party has achieved long-term success. Moreover, the party has failed to achieve electoral success on the national level, and it is therefore important not to over-estimate UKIP's success. Nevertheless, the EEA agreement has already been ruled out from the negotiations and the UK is likely to end up with a trade deal, leaving the UK less integrated than Norway. It could therefore be argued that the party has indeed achieved short-term success, with the possibility of long-term success.

As discussed in Chapter 2, media are thought to have great impact on the success of social movements and political parties (Tarrow (1995, 126-7), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3), and Voss (2015, 19)). If success is influenced by political opportunities, and the media are considered an important political opportunity

variable, the print media should arguably have an impact on the growth of the UK Independence Party. As discussed, Tarrow (ibid) considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public. The movements communicate to a broad public through the media, which help them gain attention and maintain support. This chapter therefore investigates the framing effects in the media by conducting a qualitative content analysis. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the effects of priming (an agenda-setting effect on the part of the media, which calls attention to some matters, while ignoring others) and media attention by conducting a quantitative content analysis, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Firstly, the chapter investigates the effects of media framing and aims to find out to what extent the print media are important in explaining the growth of the UK Independence Party. It studies the terms and arguments used by the media when reporting on the EU. As will be discussed, the chapter identifies a change in the reporting over the past few decades, as the media have adopted a more critical approach towards the EU. Secondly, the chapter investigates the concept of priming, to find out what frames are used most frequently in the reporting and whether these have changed over time; arguably, some frames have higher salience in the media and therefore have greater impact. As discussed in Chapter 3, the chapter studies change in the reporting over time and in order to compare contemporary constructions of integration to those of earlier debates, the chapter chronologically studies the most significant integration events since the 1975 referendum[24]. Thirdly, through the data collected via in-depth interviews with politicians and political activists, the chapter discusses the importance of grassroots campaigns. As we shall see, grassroots activity helps Eurosceptic movements reach out and spread information to the public when the movements struggle to get their views out in the media. Finally, the chapter studies the reporting of the UK Independence Party. As noted in Chapter 2, a party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation, including funding and

[24] See Chapter 3 for details

material goods, but also personal skills, contacts and publicity (Lucardie 2000, 178). Graber et al. (1998, 1-2) argue that political messages are expressed through the media, which serve as a kind of communication between the public and the government. Newspapers, radio and television all serve that role, as they are accessible to a large number of people and carry messages rapidly. Government officials, party spokespersons as well as interest group leaders use this form of communication, but journalists and editors are those who determine which political messages will be published through their channels and how they will be framed, according to Graber at al. (ibid). The chapter therefore investigates the reporting of UKIP, to find out whether the party's access to the media has changed over time and whether the media have functioned as a platform for the party to spread ideas to and mobilise the public.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the content analysis includes a limited selection of newspapers, focusing on those with high circulation figures that are in a position to influence the public[25]. Data have been collected in the form of print media, as the research investigates the framing of the integration debate before the internet became available – social media, blogs and online news are therefore not constant sources. In addition, print media and online versions provide similar ideas and it is therefore not crucial to include both forms in the content analysis. The newspapers included in this data sample are The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Sun and The Daily Mail.

5.1 The framing of the integration debate

As discussed, the research studies the media coverage of the integration process from 1975-2009. It studies a long period of time to find out whether the framing has changed over time, and what terms and arguments have been most salient in the reporting. Before looking at the reporting in more detail, graphs with data collected from the content analysis are provided as an overview of the coverage in the media from 1975-2009. Chart 5.1 presents the total number of publications

[25] See Chapter 3 for details on readership and data selection

and indicates which periods the reporting has been supportive or critical of integration[26, 27]. As we can see, the newspapers reported most frequently on the EU when the 1975 referendum took place. At the time, the media supported membership of the EEC. The media did not report much on the Single European Act (SEA), the Delors' speech and the Bruges speech in 1988, but began to report more frequently on the EC again in 1991. In the 1980s, a shift in the reporting is identified, and as Chart 5.1 indicates, the media gradually become more critical towards the EU. Since Maastricht, the media have published a high number of articles on the integration process and remained critical towards the EU.



Chart 5.1

* The Delors Speech 8 September 1988, ** The Bruges Speech 20 September 1988

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Chart 5.2 indicates how trends in reporting have changed over time, focusing on the four themes that have been most salient in this data sample. These include 'bureaucracy', 'federalism', 'sovereignty' and 'superstate'. As indicated in the chart, the media language gradually became more Eurosceptic after 1988, and Eurosceptic terms were most frequently used in the coverage of Maastricht, Nice,

[26] Individual data for each newspaper to be found in the appendix*
[27] See Chapter 3 for definitions of categories of newspapers/coding

the Treaty on European Union, and the Lisbon Treaty. What is interesting to note is that 'federalism', which was a central theme in the reporting of Maastricht, gradually vanished from the debate and has been replaced by the term 'superstate'. Furthermore, 'sovereignty' has become increasingly salient in the reporting after 2004. The analysis will now look in more detail at changes in the reporting over time, starting with 1975.



Chart 5.2

* The Delors Speech 8 September 1988, ** The Bruges Speech 20 September 1988

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

5.2 The referendum on EEC membership in 1975

As discussed in Chapter 4, Euroscepticism in the UK can be traced back to the first application for EEC membership in 1963, which contributed to the UK's position as the awkward partner within the integration process (Gifford 2006, 852). Euroscepticism before the 1980s has often been associated with the political left, which regarded European integration suspiciously, associating it with the continental political right. The Labour Party suspected that integration would serve as a Trojan horse for European capitalism to mobilise against a Labour government. Furthermore, the party argued that the federalist ambitions of integration would compromise national sovereignty, particularly in the economic

sphere (Sczcerbiak & Taggart 2008, 95). The political right supported the EEC, as integration had primarily proceeded in terms of market integration and economic growth.

The UK became a member of the EEC in January 1973, when Edward Heath finalised the negotiations (May 1999, 52-61). Labour, which won the general election in 1974, was deeply divided on the EEC. Harold Wilson criticised the negotiated terms arguing that the terms were 'intolerable', and played on public perceptions of the EEC as run by an out-of-touch bureaucracy. This is interesting to note, as this would a few decades later be one of the central arguments used by UKIP. During the 1970 election campaign, Heath had promised that British entry into the European Community would only take place with the full-hearted consent of Parliament and people. However, the idea of a referendum was first put forward by opponents of the EEC. Wilson had picked up on it and promised a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry, followed by a consultation with the public in the form of a referendum. In office, he considered this an opportunity to settle the referendum question once and for all (ibid). From the moment it was announced, opinion polls indicated a two-to-one lead for the supporters of the EEC. The referendum, which took place on 5 June 1975, resulted in support for the EEC with a division in percentage terms of 67.2 to 32.8 per cent (George 1994, 95). 'Fourteen years of national argument are over', Wilson declared (cited in: May 1999, 63). As we shall see, the media supported membership of the EEC.

In this sample, 46 articles supported EEC membership, 13 articles opposed EEC membership and 99 informative articles were published. 156 articles were published in total[28]. The prospects of political union were touched on in a small number of news articles and the general understanding of the project in the press seemed to be linked to the idea of a trade market only, e.g. `Political union will not come unless and until we – and the French and the Germans – are ready for it. And we're nowhere near ready for it now, and a lot of us probably won't live to

[28] Dates included in the data sample: 2-8 June 1975

see it` (Daily Mail, 4 June 1975, p. 6). The coverage included a wide range of articles, e.g. leading articles, editorials, small notices, letters to editor, advertisements, leading headlines and front pages. All four newspapers included in the analysis were in general supportive of EEC membership[29,30].

The reporting of the debate favoured those supportive of the EEC. The newspapers presented more voices for membership than against membership, and published more arguments for membership than against membership. In other words, the reporting of the referendum debate was partisan. This finding goes in line with Tarrow's (1995) argument that the media are not neutral when communicating views and activities to their readers. The content analysis identified the most central arguments in the reporting. Firstly, the newspapers argued in terms of economic advantages and trade. EEC membership would ensure access to the Common Market and the economic disadvantages of leaving were considered more significant than the economic advantages of remaining inside the Community. Secondly, the newspapers argued in terms of business and investment opportunities, and thirdly, they emphasised the importance of preventing conflicts and war on the continent. The term 'continent' was in fact used by both opponents and supporters of integration. Supporters simply used it as a reference to the other member states, with no underlying meaning. Opponents, by contrast, used the term to distance themselves from the other member states, e.g. `. . . bound by the authoritarian and dead hand of the past imposed by some rigid bureaucratic formula devised by continental constitutionists` (The Times, 4 June 1975, p. 15). In this article, 'the continent' is a loaded term representing something remote and different from the UK. It represents geographical distance, but also differences in ideas and ambitions, such as views on the final destination of the integration process, by referring to the other member states as 'constitutionists'.

[29] For details on each newspaper, see appendix
[30] For details on coding and analysis, see Chapter 3

The opponents of the EEC were concerned that the Common Market would proceed towards political union and eventually become a federal state, e.g. `the United Kingdom is no longer a State but has become a province` (Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1975, p. 10). However, this was not a shared view in the newspapers and such constructions did not have high salience in the media when the EEC referendum debate took place. As indicated in Chart 5.2, the concept of 'federalism' appeared in only 4 articles. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind that EEC opponents used these constructions ahead of the EEC referendum, as such matters would obtain high salience in the media in decades to come.

A common theme in the reporting was the sense of commitment, responsibilities and unity. The media used the emotional appeal of unity in an attempt to shape public opinion, referring to the other member states as 'friends', 'family' and 'partners', e.g. `Vote Yes – and we shall at least have prospects: the prospects of friends and partners` (Daily Mail, 4 June 1975, p. 6). Furthermore, there was a strong sense of *togetherness* in the news articles and 10 articles emphasised that we should all stand united, e.g. `We are all Europeans now. Let us make sure that we are good Europeans` (The Sun, 7 June 1975, p. 2). Other articles referred to the pros and cons of EEC membership, encouraging supporters and opponents to work together to make the most of European membership. With this togetherness came responsibilities to other member states, `nations who belong to the same European family as the four nations of the United Kingdom` (The Times, 5 June 1975, p. 15). The terms describing withdrawal were those linked to isolation, division, and being alone on the outside, e.g. `If we leave now, every other nation in Europe will think twice about accepting our word again . . . we shall be disregarded and dishonoured (Daily Mail, 4 June 1975, p. 6).

It should be noted that the Commonwealth did not have a central role in the debate, as historical discourses would become more central in the 2016 referendum debate. In fact, it did not appear in any of the articles opposing the EEC. The Commonwealth appeared in only 2 articles, and those were articles supporting the EEC, e.g. `One after another our Commonwealth partners have

said they want us to stay in Europe, because it is in *their* interest that we do so` (Daily Telegraph, 4 June 1975, p. 16). Furthermore, `the growth and prosperity of British industry was built up by trading with the countries of the Commonwealth and Empire. But times have changed and they have found new trading partners to support their own growing industries. So we too must react to changing conditions by finding new partners. . . `(Daily Telegraph, 4 June 1975).

In the following years, the Labour government signed agreements that allowed for deeper integration in different policy areas. In 1978, the other member states pressed forward, with an agreement to start an Exchange Rate Mechanism, a European Monetary System. Britain joined the EMS, but declined to join the ERM. Furthermore, direct elections to the European Parliament were introduced in 1979. However, the British public did not seem to share the enthusiastic view of the government, as eighteen polls taken over the period 1974-82 found that only 33 per cent of British respondents supported EEC membership. 23 per cent did not have an opinion about it and 37 per cent opposed membership (May 1999, 64). The media, by contrast, remained supportive of the EEC, so what made the public question their decision to remain a member only a few years after the referendum? Opinion poll data are provided in Chart 5.3 to find out which year the public started to change attitudes towards EEC membership[31]:

[31] Numbers from Ipsos MORI. Q If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?



Chart 5.3

Surveys provided by Ipsos MORI (Ipsos MORI, 2016)

Chart 5.3 indicates that the public gradually became more sceptical of EEC membership in 1977. The change in attitudes continued to grow and the public have never been more opposed to EEC membership than in 1980, with 65 per cent of the public opposing it; 26 per cent supported membership and 8 per cent undecided. This analysis found that the rise of Euroscepticism in the aftermath of the EEC referendum could possibly be rooted in 'the budget question', also known as the 'Bloody British Question'. The problem arose from the malfunctioning of the 1975 rebate mechanism and the escalating costs of the CAP. 'The budget question' came to dominate Britain's relations with the other member states[32] and an agreement was not reached until the member states met in Fontainebleau in June 1984 (May 1999, 69-70).

In order to find out whether 'the budget question' influenced public opinion on EEC membership, different factors were considered in this analysis: the media

[32] The report from the Luxembourg Council on 27 and 28 April 1980 states that: `despite the efforts by its President, Mr Cossiga, and by the representatives of the Member States and by the Commission, the European Council in Luxembourg on 27 and 28 April broke up without finding solutions to the basic problem on its agenda: the British contribution to the Community budget` (European Council 1980).

coverage of the budget negotiations[33], opinion polls and electoral data. 'The budget question' was debated in all the four newspapers, including a wide range of articles, e.g. front pages, leading headlines and long articles. High salience in the media suggests that 'the budget question' received attention both among political elites and among voters. What could have influenced public opinion on EEC membership was the link made between 'the budget question' and welfare cuts at home, e.g. `the British people are furious at ploughing huge sums into Brussels when housing, education and social services are being slashed at home` (The Sun, 30 November 1979, p. 2). At the Dublin Castle Summit, Mrs Thatcher stated that `I must leave you in no doubt about the great political problem at home caused by this Budget question` (Daily Mail, 30 November 1979, pg. 2). It is worth noting that the media suggested a connection between grievances in society and membership of the EEC, as this strategy a few decades later would prove very effective for the UK Independence Party.

Furthermore, an argument in the debate was that national inflation caused social conflict in society and economic issues were at the forefront of political debate, according to the BSA (British Social Attitudes, 1979-83). As the economy moved steadily into the worst recession since the war, economic issues were very much in people's mind. Polls taken in early 1983 confirmed this; the rate of unemployment and the total numbers of unemployed were both, as far as the post-war period was concerned, at record levels (Jowell & Airey 1984, 47-49). When asked whether unemployment *or* inflation caused the highest level of concerns for the respondents and their families, 51.6% ranked inflation as the issue of highest concern in 1984. 44.4% of the respondents said unemployment was of highest concern for themselves and their families (BSA Information System, 2016).

Electoral data were studied to find out whether the public changed voting behaviour in light of these events and which social classes were most influenced

[33] The events included in the analysis are the Dublin Castle Summit on 29-30 November 1979 and the Luxembourg European Council on 17-18 April 1980.

by economic concerns. Voting intention polls found that 55 per cent supported the Conservatives in January 1979. When the same polls were conducted a year later, only 39 per cent supported the Conservatives (MORI, 1987). Furthermore, a survey conducted in May 1979 indicated that changes in electoral behaviour were most visible among the social classes C2 and DE, as indicated in chart 5.4[34] (cited in: New Statesman, 1980):

	ABC1	**C2**	**DE**
	%	%	%
VOTING INTENTION			
Con	56	32	24
Lab	26	53	62
Lib	16	13	12
Con lead	30	-21	-38
Con lead May '79	35	0	15

Chart 5.4

Source: (New Statesman, 1980)

There were no polls indicating which social classes supported EEC membership in 1980. However, the change in voting intentions suggests that the working classes were more likely to have been influenced by economic concerns. Furthermore, a report from 1984 found that support for EEC membership was stronger among Conservative voters. 67 per cent of Conservative voters supported EEC membership, while 58 per cent of Labour voters supported EEC membership (Jowell & Airey 1984, 36). This indicates that the social classes C2 and DE were more likely to be opposed to EEC membership than ABC1.

However, this is not to imply that economic concerns were the only factor contributing to the change in opinion polls. It could be that other factors, such as the popularity of the PM, had an impact on shaping public opinion on the EEC.

[34] Numbers from MORI Jan Feb-March 1980

The public gradually became more opposed to the EEC during 1979. Simultaneously, the public became less satisfied with Margaret Thatcher. In April, just before she was elected Prime Minister, 47 per cent of the public were satisfied with her job as the leader of the opposition. 38 per cent was dissatisfied. In august 1979, 45 per cent was satisfied with her as Prime Minister, while 43 per cent was dissatisfied. In January 1980, the polls had shifted dramatically and only 39 per cent were satisfied with her as PM, while 50 per cent was dissatisfied (Ipsos MORI, 1988). The changes in the opinion polls on EU membership could therefore also be rooted in public satisfaction with the PM. As she supported membership of the EEC in 1979, it could be that an anti-government feeling among the public actually fostered critical attitudes towards the EEC.

5.3 A change of attitudes within political parties, the media and the public

The divisions within the Labour Party on EC membership continued, and May (1999, 64) argues that 'public opinion may explain why Britain was a reluctant partner in the Community; that it was an awkward partner was largely the work of the government' (ibid). The French had been given a foretaste of this in January 1975 when the British government abruptly cancelled a Channel Tunnel Project. In July 1975, the attempt to build a common environmental policy was almost hindered when the British government insisted on exceptions from emission limits designed to curb the pollution of rivers. Furthermore, two integration projects in particular emerged: direct elections to the European Parliament and the establishment of a monetary union. Direct elections were considered a demand of the European federalists and the UK reluctantly agreed to the principle in September 1976. In terms of a monetary union, it was argued that the EMS would only serve German interests and that currency stabilisation could most effectively be achieved through the IMF. Furthermore, the reluctance to establish a monetary union was rooted in the grounds of national sovereignty. The UK joined the EMS, but declined to join the ERM (ibid, 64-65).

The Conservatives won the general election in 1979, replacing Callaghan with Margaret Thatcher. At the time, the Conservatives were known as 'the party of

Europe'. Thatcher's anti-Europeanism became clear in the last years of her premiership, but the earlier years were characterised by a positive approach (May 1999, 67). Throughout the 1980s, a change in attitudes is noticeable within both the political parties, the media and the public. Arguably, events taking place around this time marked the beginning of a political evolution, mostly due to changes within the EC itself. The Treaties of Rome (1957) set out plans for the establishment of an 'ever closer union', but in practice integration proceeded in terms of economic collaboration.

In November 1981, the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy produced a plan for `political union` and a commitment to re-launch the movement towards closer union. Negotiations resulted in the Single European Act (SEA), agreed at the Luxembourg Council in December 1985. Margaret Thatcher supported the agreement itself, but did not support all elements of it, as they stood in contrast to her ideas for Europe (Fontana & Parsons 2015, 94). The signing of the Act tipped the argument in favour of reformed institutions, including more power to the European institutions, intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy and abandonment of the national veto on several issues. Furthermore, it included the harmonisation of indirect taxation and removal of frontier controls, which Thatcher opposed. The Single European Act marked the first moves towards political union, which had been one of the British arguments for not entering in the 1950s (May 1999, 68-74).

As indicated in Chart 5.1, a change in the reporting is noticeable between 1975 and 1986. In this sample, only 5 articles were published in total[35]. 1 article opposed the SEA, 1 article supported it and 3 articles simply informed about the SEA. The reporting of the event did not include any front pages, leading articles or editorials. The signing of the SEA did not trigger a debate in the media, and the low number of articles arguably indicates that the media did not consider the event *newsworthy*. As argued by Fowler (1999, 2-11), what events are reported in

[35] Dates included in the data sample: 14-20 February 1986

the media is not a reflection of the importance of those events, but a process of selection. In other words, news is not simply that which happens but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy. Furthermore, it could suggest that the media did not have strong reactions to the first steps towards closer union or simply misread the reforms. What did catch the attention of the media, on the other hand, was the changing attitudes within the political parties a few years later. Thatcher came to regret signing the Single European Act, although she always believed that the problem was not so much with the Act itself as with its implementation (May 1999, 74). The media onwards became more critical of the EC. Data included in this analysis suggest that two events possibly contributed to the change in media attitudes: the call for common social policies by Jacques Delors and the PMs response to the proposal. Firstly, the events seem to have caught the attention of the media, as they began to report more frequently on the EC. Secondly, the analysis indicates a shift in the media language, as Eurosceptic terms were more frequently used after the Delors' speech in 1988.

In September 1988, Delors made a controversial speech at the Trade Union Congress (TUC), asserting that it was impossible to conceive of a single market without common social policies. He had earlier stated that `in ten years, 80 per cent of economic legislation – and perhaps tax and social legislation – will be directed from the Community` (ibid). These statements were only predictions, but it could be argued that the media helped shape a construction of integration by disseminating his predictions. As discussed in Chapter 2, the mass media provide more than facts; they also provide frames that tell the audience members how to understand specific policy controversies (Nabi & Oliver 2009, 83).

However, the Delors speech did not trigger a debate, as only 6 articles reported on it: 2 articles were critical of the speech, none of the articles supported the speech and 4 articles simply informed about it[36]. A change is noticeable in the language though, as the media became more Eurosceptic when reporting on EEC

[36] Dates included in the data sample: 8-14 September 1988

membership. Firstly, federalism appeared in the reporting for the first time in 2 articles, e.g. `. . . efforts to make greater economic co-operation inseparable from a gradual shift towards federalism` (The Times, 15 September 1988). Despite not being a common theme in the reporting, it is interesting to note that the term made an appearance and gradually became a feature of the language used in the media. Secondly, diversity emerged as a feature of the reporting, e.g. `Europe is composed of states, many of which are ancient political entities, distinct from one another not only in point of language, but also of cultural traditions and ways of attending to political issues` (The Times, 15 September 1988). This stands in contrast with the emotional appeal of *unity* present in the 1975 referendum debate, referring to the other member states as 'friends', 'family' and 'partners'. Similarly, Brussels emerged as something remote, impersonal and distant, e.g. `the remote, impersonal, soulless bureaus of Brussels` (ibid). Though this description of Brussels appeared in only one article, it is worth noting that the sense of *togetherness* no longer was present in the reporting. This type of language can be referred to as *othering*; a process that identifies those that are thought to be different from oneself or the mainstream – by pointing out their weaknesses it makes ourselves look stronger and better. Finally, the media emphasised that common social policies stood in contrast with the Government`s vision of Europe in terms of the internal market [37], e.g. `M Delors brought himself into immediate conflict with the Government`s view of 1992 when he warned the conference that it was impossible to rebuild Europe on deregulation` (The Times, 9 September 1988). Similarly, 'M Delors insists that 1992 must carry with it a "social dimension" with rights for workers as well as freedom for capital; this has encouraged the unions to see Brussels a life-line which they know the British Government will not provide'. It continues 'The unions are deluding themselves if they think Europe is going to deliver them easily from the crises and divisions on view in Bournemouth last week' (Daily Telegraph, 11 September 1988, p. 5). It was also emphasised that the speech provoked the Prime Minister, arguing that

[37] Thatcher believed in free market principles, involving privatising the nationalised industries, diminishing the power of trade unions, cutting taxes and removing obstacles to free enterprise (May 1999, 66).

Delors 'prompted an angry reply from the Prime Minister when he announced recently that the UK will have to accept that 80 per cent of economic and industrial legislation will be formulated in Brussels after 1992' (Daily Mail, 9 September 1988, p. 17). A reaction in the media to the proposed common social policies came when the PM responded to the proposal a few weeks later. Arguably, this suggests that the media did not shape ideas on integration at this stage, but rather *reflected* ideas introduced elsewhere.

The PMs response came in a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 September 1988: `We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels` (cited in: Young 1999, 347). This marks a turning point in British attitudes towards EC membership. Labour gradually became supportive of EC membership due to promises of social benefits, while backbenchers within the Conservatives gradually became more critical of EC membership. Moreover, it marks a turning point in the media reporting of the EC.

As indicated in Chart 5.1, 26 articles were published in total: 15 articles were opposed to deeper integration, 4 articles were supportive of deeper integration and 7 articles informed about the Bruges speech. The Bruges Speech is of significant impact because it triggered a shift in media attitudes; the media gradually became more critical of the EEC, and the language changed and became more Eurosceptic than in previous reporting of the EC[38]. As indicated in Chart 5.2, terms as 'bureaucracy' or 'bureaucratic', 'centralisation' and 'federalism' appeared more frequently in the reporting, contributing to a negative portrayal of the EC.

A noticeable change in the reporting is the increased focus on 'centralisation' and 'bureaucracy', as indicated in Chart 5.2. EC opponents argued that further integration must be based on less regulation and centralisation, e.g. `The Delors vision of a single Europe is therefore now out of the bag. It is corporatist, socialist

[38] Dates included in the data sample: 20-28 September 1988

and centralist` (Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1988). In addition, it was argued that ` Those Brussels bureaucrats and European leaders […] would turn the Common Market into a federal republic by the turn of a century. . . ` (Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1988). Similarly, Eurocrats were introduced as a reference to Brussels commissioners; `With 1992 and Europe's single market looming larger, Brussels has lost no time in preparing to centralise economic policy in the Eurocrats` hands` (Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1988). EU opponents have used the argument since, emphasising that elected politicians are side-lined by unelected commissioners.

In further contrast to the 1975 referendum debate, the sense of *unity* remained a negative loaded concept in the reporting, as opponents to deeper integration feared that the integration process would go too far e.g. `She [Thatcher] pointed out that the last person who tried to unite Europe was Adolf Hitler` (Daily Mail, 21 September 1988, pg. 2). A few articles still referred to the other member states as 'partners', but terms like 'family' and 'friends' were no longer present in the reporting; `They have no desire whatsoever to become politically involved with foreigners with whom they have nothing in common` (The Sun, 22 September 1988, pg. 6). 'Friends' were replaced with 'foreigners', and `together` was replaced with `nothing in common`. This type of language creates a distance between 'us' and 'them', a concept that has previously been referred to as othering.

Furthermore, ideas in terms of political integration and 'socialism' were reintroduced to the reporting, and 7 articles discussed the socialist aspects of the Delors' speech, e.g: 'She bluntly told EEC bureaucrats: "Hands off Britain," and warned that the move would lead to a Soviet-style system, with all member states looking the same (The Sun 21 September 1988, 2). Furthermore, the final destination of the integration process became a crucial element in the debate, e.g. 'Again and again, her instincts have been those of the British people, her views their views. Now she speaks out against the absurd notion of a United States of Europe' (The Sun 22 September 1988, p. 6). Similarly, 'Mrs Thatcher has set a

determined tone for her trip, with a vigorous rejection of attempts to force Britain down the road to political federalism or economic union in the form of a central bank for the Community or a common currency' (Daily Telegraph, 20 September 1988, p. 11). Furthermore, 'Her argument that a more united Europe should mean less regulation and less centralisation, is unimpeachable' (The Times, 21 September 1988). Arguably, the Bruges Speech influenced the construction of the integration debate both in terms of language and ideas promoted in the reporting, and brought fourth an enthusiastic response from sections of the media and a growing number of Eurosceptics (May 1999, 75).

Despite the critical attitude towards EC membership in the newspapers, the public remained eminently supportive of EC membership until 1991; 62 per cent supported membership, while only 28 per cent wanted to withdraw from the EC; 9 per cent were undecided. Despite the media becoming more critical of EU integration, withdrawal from the EU was not on the political agenda at this stage – a Eurosceptic party promoting withdrawal (i.e. hard Euroscepticism) had not yet been established.



Chart 5.5

Surveys provided by Ipsos MORI (Ipsos MORI, 2016)

5.4 A change of direction

When John Major became Prime Minister in 1990, he could not have foreseen the difficulties the Government would experience during the Maastricht ratification in December 1991. During the process, a major rebellion emerged within the party and challenged the governing elite; the Bruges speech had given lead to a growing number of Eurosceptics, especially on the political right (May 1999, 83-85). The public had never been more supportive, but the newspapers gradually became more critical of the EC. As indicated in Chart 5.1, Maastricht is one of the events that received the most attention in the media in this data sample. 84 articles were published in total; 53 articles reported on Maastricht from a critical point of view, 5 articles reported favourably on Maastricht, while 27 informative articles were published[39]. The coverage of the Maastricht summit differed from previous reporting in two ways. Firstly, the language in the media became more Eurosceptic, with more reference to 'federalism', 'power' and 'bureaucracy', as indicated in Chart 5.2. Secondly, EC membership had higher salience in the media as indicated in Chart 5.1, including long articles, editorials, leading headlines, letters to editor and front pages.

'Federalism', which previously has appeared in the reporting as a concept, emerged as a common *theme* in 1991. It replaced 'socialism' and 'centralisation' as the most salient themes. Firstly, federalism appeared in articles that called for a removal of the term from the final draft of the Maastricht Treaty. It appeared in critical articles, e.g. 'The wording of the Treaty that comes out of Maastricht could determine whether Europe remains a community of nation states, working together in ever closer union, or whether it embarks on an evolution towards a single country, with sovereignty eventually invested in supra-national institutions' (Daily Telegraph, 6 December 1991). Additionally, the term appeared in informative articles, e.g. `Mr Major […] appeared confident that Britain had won the argument for a removal of the reference to a "federal goal" from the treaties` (Daily Telegraph, 5 December 1991, p. 8). Secondly, 'federalism' appeared in

[39] Dates included in the data sample: 9-15 December 1991

articles where concerns were raised about the final destination of the integration process, e.g. `the conveyor belt to federalism may have been slowed, but it has not been stopped` (The Times, 12 December 1991).

Furthermore, 'bureaucracy' remained a salient theme in the reporting, as indicated in Chart 5.3. The EC commissioners were referred to as bureaucrats, e.g. `the Prime Minister is justified in resisting the ambition of the Commission`s bureaucrats to throw an officious spanner into every aspect of our way of life` (Daily Mail, 12 December 1991, p. 6). Here, the concept of *othering* is revisited. This first emerged in the media when Thatcher delivered her controversial speech in Bruges in 1988. As discussed, the concept of *othering* aims to distance 'us' from 'them', the unelected bureaucrats who change our way of life. 'Eurocrats' were sometimes used as a synonym for 'bureaucrats', but the term was not used as frequently as 'bureaucrats'. So far, the content analysis has demonstrated that both the linking of grievances in society to membership of the EC and the concept of *othering* emerged in the media before these ideas were adopted by Eurosceptic groups. This could suggest that the media have in fact provided the groups with ideas and a language to use to promote Euroscepticism.

In addition, 'socialism' remained a common theme in the reporting. Firstly, the term was used describe the controversial social chapter included as a protocol in the final draft, e.g. `the socialist-inspired social chapter was battered out of the Maastricht treaty ` (Daily Mail, 11 December 1991, p. 1). Secondly, 'socialism' was associated with trade unions and socialist member states, e.g. `socialist France demanded new EC laws to put union bosses back in the driving seat in British industry` (The Sun, 11 December 1991, p. 2). 'Socialism' had become a negative loaded term with the Delors Speech in 1988 and remained a negative loaded term. 'Socialism' did not appear in any articles supporting the EC.

Furthermore, 'sovereignty' remained a theme in the reporting. As the Maastricht summit set out the plans for the establishment of political union, including more pooling of national sovereignty, it would be expected that 'sovereignty' appeared more frequently than other Eurosceptic terms. The content analysis indicated,

however, that ‘sovereignty’ only appeared in 10 articles. Nonetheless, there were raised concerns in the media about the political development of the EC, e.g. `If Britain actually wants to take part in a United States of Europe, then British leaders should be trying to negotiate a new constitution that would eventually make the super-state democratic, unbureaucratic and conducive to national diversity` (The Times, 9 December 1991).

All four themes discussed here (federalism, socialism, bureaucracy and more power to EC institutions) somehow challenged British traditions; the concept of federalism challenged national independence; socialism challenged the Conservative tradition; bureaucracy challenged democracy; and more power to EC institutions challenged British sovereignty. In other words, the EC stood in sharp contrast with British traditions. Arguably, this image helped create a negative portrayal of Europe. The media did not, at this stage, promote withdrawal from the EC. Hence, the media were not in opposition to integration *per se*, but it could be argued that the media engaged critically with political developments of the EC. In terms of Eurosceptic definitions, this approach to EC membership would fall in under soft Euroscepticism, which by Szczerbiak & Taggart (2003, 12) has been defined as ‘ when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU`s current or future planned trajectory based on the *further* extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make’.

When the final draft was presented, all four newspapers supported the negotiated terms and argued along the lines of this article: 'John Major has proved himself to be an effective champion of our country's interests in shaping an ever closer European Union' (Daily Mail, 12 December 1991, p. 6). However, it could be discussed what motives were behind the support. As the papers were critical of political integration, the enthusiasm could possibly be rooted in Major’s refusal to sign the social chapter and take part in the establishment of a monetary union.

In this view, the media's support for the negotiated terms could be considered opposition towards political integration.

Prior research (Copeland & Copsey 2017, 724) has found that there is no tipping point for the growth of Euroscepticism in the UK. Copeland and Copsey (2017) argue that since 1974-5 there has been a decline in positive reporting about the EU in the media and an increase in the number of articles taking a more negative position, but that this cannot be traced to one particular event in the relationship between the UK and the EU. Daddow (2012, 1233), by contrast, argues in his research that `If anything, it was the Maastricht ratification process rather than the Bruges speech that gave the Murdoch-Thatcher consensus on Europe the sustained period it needed to flourish and take hold of the British national psyche`.

This research has identified the late 1980s as a tipping point for the growth of Euroscepticism. Not only did the media begin to report more frequently on the EC again, but the language gradually changed after the speech made by Delors in 1988. Furthermore, this research confirms that the Maastricht ratification process did in fact have an impact on the media. As discussed, the language changed significantly in 1991, with a more negatively loaded language and references to Eurosceptic terms, such as 'federalism', 'power' and 'bureaucracy'. In addition to changes in the language, articles supporting deeper integration diminished remarkably. As indicated in chart 5.1, 53 out of 84 articles included in this sample were critical of deeper integration in 1991. The public, by contrast, remained eminently supportive of EC membership according to opinion polls conducted by Ipsos MORI (2016), although the gap is starting to close from 1991[40]:

[40] The Question asked in the Survey: `If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?` (Ipsos MORI, 2016).



Chart 5.6

* 1991 polls conducted on 21 June and 4-5 December
** 1992 polls conducted on 5-6 June and 10-13 June
Surveys provided by Ipsos MORI (Ipsos MORI, 2016)

As indicated in Chart 5.6, the public gradually became more supportive of EC membership after 1980. In order to explain the increased support for EC membership, three factors have been considered in this analysis; satisfaction with the government, economic concerns and changes in the international scene. Firstly, the electorate was dissatisfied with the government and its premiership from the mid-1980s (Ipsos MORI, 2013). As indicated in Chart 5.6, this is when the opinion polls started to change and the public became more supportive of the EC. Mrs. Thatcher's hostile attitude towards EC membership did not match public opinion in 1990. Nor did her attitude towards EEC membership match public opinion in 1980, when she supported EEC membership and the majority of the public was against it. In fact, the majority of the public disagreed with her on an overall basis. In 1984, 54 per cent of the public said they did not like her policies[41], while 50 per cent said they did not like her in general. In 1990, 71 per cent said they did not like her policies, while 60 per cent said they did not like her in general.

[41] Poll from Ipsos MORI. Base: c. 1,000 British adults each month

The average of all opinion polls from 1979-90 found that 54 per cent of the public were dissatisfied with her, 40 per cent were satisfied and 6 per cent did not have an opinion (Ipsos MORI, 2013). These results indicate that the Prime Minister did not have high popularity among the public and that possibly she influenced the public negatively, similar to the late 1970s. It could simply be that the public went in an opposite direction as a 'protest' against the PM.

Secondly, economic concerns have been taken into consideration, as it has been demonstrated that 'the budget question' and recession possibly contributed to the growth of scepticism towards EEC membership in 1980. In general, the public was positive about the economy from 1987 to 1992[42]. In 1991, 49.8 per cent of the public said that closer links with the EC made the British economy stronger. 35.8 per cent said it made no difference and only 14.5 per cent said it made the economy weaker (BSA Information System, 2016). Similarly, as indicated in Chart 5.6, the public was positive about membership of the EU from 1987 to 1992. These numbers could indicate that the public found EC membership profitable for the national economy, and hence found EC membership beneficial for the country, which possibly contributed to the change in public opinion on the EC from 1990-1991.

Thirdly, the international dynamics had changed, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. May (1999, 77) argued that the reunification of Germany underlined the necessity of tying Germany most firmly into European institutions. Furthermore, he argues that changes in the international scene convinced many moderate Conservatives that a more constructive approach was needed, which stood in contrast with Mrs Thatcher's hostile approach to EC membership. Her attitudes towards EC membership resulted in her resignation on 22 November 1990, in addition to other factors such as loss of popularity, economic factors and the poll tax. However, among many of her colleagues, EC membership was considered the major reason for the resignation (ibid).

[42] Attitudes changed with Black Wednesday in 1992. As a result, the public ranked the national economy as the fourth most important issue facing Britain in 1994 (Ipsos MORI).

However, though support for EC membership has never been higher than in 1991, it had already dropped to 52 per cent in 1992. As indicated in Chart 5.6, public support dropped even further from 1992 to 1993. Having found that economic concerns had an impact on shaping public opinion on EEC/EC membership in both 1980 and 1991, this could also have been the case in 1992. On 16 September, the British Conservative government made the decision to withdraw the British currency form the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and it has been estimated that the government spent £8 billion in an attempt to maintain the pound's value. The event fuelled Euroscepticism on the political right and diminished the already small possibility that Britain would take part in a monetary union (May 1999, 82). In May 1992, the economy ranked as the third most important issue facing British voters. In September 1992, the economy became the second most important issue. Furthermore, EC membership became a top issue for British voters in September 1992 (Ipsos MORI, 2014). The above could possibly suggest a connection between the economic situation in the country and attitudes towards EC membership, similar to the situation in 1980.

In addition, and probably of greater impact, the change in attitudes could be rooted in the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty, which was approved by the heads of government of the states of the European Community in December 1991, was not officially signed until 1992 and entered into force in 1993. It could therefore be that the shift in opinion polls from 1991-1993 had to do with the ratification process of Maastricht. The treaty draft was not made available to the British public before 1992, after pressure from the Danish public. The Anti-Federalist League, the forerunner of the UK Independence Party, translated the document into English and had it published in 1992 (Interview with Alan Sked, 2016). If the public was not fully aware of the political implications of Maastricht in 1991, AFL's publication of the translated document in the media might have contributed to the change in EC attitudes in 1992.

5.5 Towards closer union

In 1997, Labour, which changed its stance towards the EU in the late 1980s, remained supportive of deeper integration. Labour claimed that the previous Government had left the country on the side-lines. Britain should be taking on a leading role in Europe. However, it can be argued to what extent the change in the Government's tone on integration indicated full commitment to the EU, e.g. Blair declared already in January 1996 that `the British people are not yet ready to accept a single European currency` (May 1999, 88). In September 1997, Gordon Brown announced that a Labour government would not be recommending joining within the lifetime of the 1997 parliament.

On 19 June 1997, the member states agreed to the Amsterdam Treaty. Firstly, the treaty included the incorporation of the social protocol, although a British veto was still retained on matters relating to employment law. Secondly, the treaty strengthened the machinery for a common foreign and security policy, although again the British veto was retained. Thirdly, the European Parliament was given a greater legislative role. Finally, the treaty incorporated the Schengen Agreement, covering border controls, immigration and asylum policies. Britain secured an opt-out from the agreement and frontier controls came to dominate the media coverage during the negotiations (May 1999, 87-89).

In the media, the Amsterdam Treaty did not get as much attention as the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. The total number of articles decreased and only 35 articles were published in total in this data sample[43]: 17 of the articles were critical of the Amsterdam Treaty, none of the articles reported on the Amsterdam Treaty in favourable terms, and 18 articles simply informed about the event[44]. This could indicate that the media were either less concerned by integration, or that they found the Amsterdam Treaty less newsworthy than the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the media remained critical of the EU when the Amsterdam Summit took place, but the reporting included less Eurosceptic terms than in the reporting

[43] Dates included in the data sample: 16-22 June 1997
[44] See Chapter 3 for definition of newspaper categories/coding

of Maastricht in 1991. ‘Federalism’, which was the most common theme in the reporting of Maastricht, appeared in only 6 articles. ‘Socialism’ appeared in 5 articles, which is interesting considering the implementation of the Social Chapter, while ‘independence’ appeared in only one article. ‘Bureaucracy’ was in fact not mentioned at all, which is a remarkable change from the Maastricht coverage, where ‘bureaucracy’ was one of the common themes in the media. However, this is not to suggest that the media did not critically engage with the EU.

The arguments promoted in the reporting changed from the reporting of Maastricht. Whereas previous reporting emphasised that integration might proceed towards the establishment of a ‘federal state’, the media focused more on the actual details of the treaty when reporting on Amsterdam, such as border controls and fishing quotas, e.g. 'the British position is that because of our island status, our history, and the patterns of immigration, we must maintain our frontiers' (Daily Mail, 16 June 1997, p. 2). Furthermore, the distance to the other member states remained a feature of the language, as shown in this quote, and some of the terms used to emphasise differences were ‘island status’, ‘history’, and ‘separation’: 'Britain’s border controls are, and always have been, an effective means of regulating immigration as well as combating terrorism, drug trafficking and other serious crime. In contrast, Europe’s frontiers are land borders: many are thousands of miles long and have often been determined not by geography but by accident of history and warfare . . . Our historical and geographical separation from the Continent has led to a further difference in policing traditions between Britain and most other EU states` (The Times, 19 June 1997). Firstly, this article emphasises the geographical differences with the other member states on the continent – again, ‘the continent’ became a negatively loaded term used to symbolise distance and separation from the other member states. Secondly, the article stressed historical differences, using historical discourses by emphasising that *our* history is different from *their* history. Arguably, the media have contributed to the public discourses by constructing differences between the member states and the EU. Moreover, immigration appeared for the first time as

an argument in the debate, but contradictory to the present debate on the EU, immigration was not linked to either costs, social benefits or religion. Instead, it was discussed in terms of crime. The term 'immigration' appeared in a total of 16 articles out of 35, making it the most important argument in terms of frequency.

What is interesting to note, is that the articles that supported the finalised negotiations presented them as a victory, instead of an agreement between the member states, e.g. `Tony Blair notched up his first big victory in Europe last night` (Daily Mail, 17 June 1997, p. 2). In fact, 9 articles, from all the four newspapers, presented the final document in line with this report from The Daily Mail. Similarly, the negotiations were portrayed as a battle between the UK and the other member states, e.g. `Blair wins battles where Major lost` (The Times, 19 June 1997). By presenting the final document as a victory over the other member states rather than an agreement, the media indirectly implied that the other member states were something that needed to be fought. In other words, the other member states were antagonists, which again could be considered a process of 'othering'.

As discussed, the media held a similar position on the EU. The newspapers included in this data sample remained Eurosceptic. However, the Eurosceptic attitudes in the media appear not to have brought any opportunities for the AFL (which had mutated into the UK Independence Party in 1993), which remained on the fringes and struggled to mobilise support. In the 1997 election, the Referendum Party performed well winning 811,849 votes. Its success had great impact on UKIP's performance, which could not compete against the Referendum Party. UKIP won only 105,722 votes in the election and remained on the fringes of British politics (UK political, no date).

5.6 Towards enlargement

The 2001 Nice Treaty restricted itself to setting out the principles and methods for changing the institutional system; it reformed the institutional structure in order to prepare the union for eastward expansion. The number of seats in the European Parliament allocated to the member states were reduced and all

member states had to reduce their number of MEPs, with the exception of Germany and Luxembourg (European Commission, 2003). In the British media, a change in the reporting is noticeable. Firstly, the media began to report more frequently on the EU again. As indicated in Chart 5.1, 63 articles were published in total[45] on the Nice Treaty. 25 articles reported on integration from a critical point of view, 6 articles reported on it in favourable terms and 28 informative articles were published. However, since the 1980s, the media have not, in any of the events, published more favourable articles than critical articles. Secondly, the analysis identified a shift in the language, as 'federalism', 'sovereignty' and 'bureaucracy' were reintroduced as the most common themes, as indicated in Chart 5.2. In addition, the term 'superstate' became a feature in the reporting, for the first time. Furthermore, the final destination of the integration process was reinforced as a central discussion in the debate, e.g. 'They want it to simplify the EU's treaties, a process that would put the EU's core principles into a separate document, but one that is seen by British Eurosceptics as a backdoor route to a European constitution' (The Times, 8 December 2000, p. unknown). As discussed, these themes had not been salient in this data sample since Maastricht, as they vanished from the debate in 1997.

The argumentation in the media changed since 1997. Firstly, 'sovereignty' was reintroduced as a common theme in the reporting, with concerns that deeper political integration would include too much pooling of national sovereignty, e.g. `He [Blair] was forced to threaten use of the veto to block moves to strip Britain of its sovereignty over tax and social security policies (Daily Telegraph, 10 December 2000, p. 1). Secondly, 'bureaucracy' reappeared as a trend in the reporting, as it had vanished from the reporting in 1997. This marks a shift in the reporting, as Eurosceptic terms were more frequently reported on again. In fact, the arguments were rather similar to those of Maastricht, with bureaucrats making decisions over the head of the people, e.g. '`Tony Blair last night put on a brave face after signing up to more bureaucracy, greater secrecy and dodgier

[45] Dates included in the data sample: 7-13 December 2000

decision-making in Brussels (The Sun, 12 December 2000). Furthermore, `no matter how much the bureaucrats try to paper over the cracks, there is something fundamentally wrong with the EU (The Sun, 11 December 2000).

The most significant arguments in the reporting were those linked to the final destination of the integration process. Similar to 1991, there seems to have been concerns that the integration process would proceed towards 'total integration'. This type of reporting characterised both the coverage of Bruges and Maastricht. In the media's view, the other member states had introduced so-called federalising measures, in order to achieve total integration, e.g. common defence policies. In light of these concerns, as discussed, the term 'superstate' re-emerged as a theme in the reporting, e.g. `The Eurocrats will be back like the tide: still wanting their unified tax system, still wanting a superstate, still putting Brussels before Britain` (The Sun, 11 December 2000). An interesting change in the language is that 'federalism' seem to have been replaced by 'superstate'. Arguably, the terms represent the same ideas, with the establishment of a political state as the final stage of the integration process. However, 'federalism' appeared in only 10 articles in 2000. This is a remarkable change from 1991, when the term appeared in 42 articles altogether in this sample.

Furthermore, deeper integration was framed as a threat to national cultures in four articles, arguing that deeper integration leads to an erosion of cultural identities; national culture and heritage are undermined and the great tradition of parliamentary democracy is dismantled piece by piece (The Times, 9 December 2000). As discussed in Chapter 4, British Eurosceptic tradition is rooted in Britain`s national identity (Daddow 2013, 210-16). Daddow argues that Eurosceptic tradition draws credibility from its interpretation of the national story and it resonates with a national public literally schooled on stories of Britain's greatness. The libertarian reading of Britain's past has been present in the British Eurosceptic tradition, and can be worked into a nationalist reading, claiming that Britain's individual freedom is challenged by the undemocratic European Union (ibid, 210-216).

Immigration received less attention in the media coverage of the Nice Treaty and was mentioned in only 5 articles, which is interesting considering the aim of the summit was to prepare the EU for eastward expansion. However, this could possibly be rooted in public attitudes towards immigration. In 2000, immigration did not rank as a top issue of concern for voters, as health care ranked as the issue of most concern, followed by education, the EU, unemployment and crime (Ipsos MORI, 2006). Hence, it might simply have been considered less newsworthy in 2000. However, immigration would later become the most important argument in terms of integration, but the issue was not yet at central argument in discussions on the EU. As will be discussed, the UK Independence Party did not actively use immigration in its political campaigns before 2009.

5.7 Enlargement Eastwards

On 1 May 2004, ten nation states with a combined population of almost 75 million joined the European Union. With 25 member states, the European Union now formed a political and economic area with 450 million citizens (EUR-Lex, 2007). In general, the newspapers presented a rather equal reporting of EU enlargement[46]. However, it could be argued whether the more positive attitude towards EU enlargement suggested that the media had become less critical of political integration, as EU enlargement would prevent the more enthusiastic member states from proceeding towards deeper political integration. A larger number of EU member states in the parliament would make it more difficult to come to agreement and move closer towards political union.

As indicated in Chart 5.2, the language used in the reporting was less Eurosceptic than in previous events, such as the Maastricht Summit and the Nice Summit. Eurosceptic terms diminished from the reporting and the term 'superstate', which four years back emerged as a common trend in the reporting, appeared in only 1 article. 22 articles reported on the event from a critical point of view, 16 articles

[46] Dates included in the data sample: 28 April - 4 May 2004

reported on enlargement favourably, and 18 informative articles were published in this data sample. As indicated in Chart 5.7, 66 articles were published in total:



Chart 5.7

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Analysis demonstrated that EU enlargement found support among both supporters and opponents of the EU. For the first time since the EEC referendum, the concept of *togetherness* was revisited; the nation states were reunited again, and enlargement ensured peace and stability on the continent e.g. 'Europeans are no longer kept apart by artificial ideological barriers' (The Times, 1 May 2004, p. 21). Enlargement was referred to in terms of 'unity', 'celebration', 'triumph', 'opportunities' and 'enthusiasm'. In addition, the member states were referred to as 'friends', 'partners' and 'family'. This type of language was highly present in the media coverage of the EEC referendum in 1975, but vanished with the establishment of the European Union in 1991.

An argument present in the reporting was that EU enlargement would prevent deeper integration and ensure that no member states were in charge of the integration process, e.g. 'the creation of an expanded Europe that buries any idea

of a federal superstate' (Daily Telegraph, 1 May 2004, p. 8). Those critical of EU enlargement emphasised 'turbulence', 'disharmony', 'doubt', 'difficulties' and 'complexity'. However, as indicated in Chart 5.1, only 3 articles reported on the EU from a critical point of view. Firstly, arguments from the sceptics were linked to social dumping. In one of the articles, it was claimed that cheap labour from the Eastern member states could undermine unskilled jobs in richer countries, but such beliefs were not common ground in the debate (Daily Mail, 1 May 2004, p. 5). However, it is interesting to note that such arguments were introduced to the debate, as the challenges of cheap labour would later become a central and effective argument in the Leave campaign in 2016. Secondly, increased migration westward was introduced as an argument, as increased migration could cause social strains within society. Similar to the concept of cheap labour, social strains would later become a central argument used by opponents of the EU. However, in 2004, this was not a shared view in the debate and only 1 article reported on it (Daily Mail, 1 May 2004, p. 79).

In an article published a few weeks after the expansion, concerns were raised about growing Euroscepticism in the member states (The Times, 14 May 2004, p. 15). European parties hostile to integration across the member states, were expected to make sweeping gains in the forthcoming European election. The article claimed that it could be difficult to reach agreement if a large number of MEPs were opposed to the European Union. As will be discussed, the UK Independence Party performed well in the 2004 European Election. In fact, the party was mentioned in the article for the second time in this data sample: `The UK Independence Party, which wants to pull Britain out of the EU, has just signed up the high-profile former TV presenter Robert Kilroy` (ibid). However, the party did not get sympathetic treatment; indeed, there were concerns raised about the growth of Eurosceptic parties.

5.8 A noticeable change in the media framing

A few weeks after EU enlargement, the framing in the media changed. The media remained critical of the EU, but the language became more Eurosceptic. In May

2004, the media used a positive loaded language when reporting on the EU, such as 'unity' and 'friends', but it could be discussed whether the media actually supported the EU. As mentioned, a widening of the EU would prevent a deepening of the EU. However, a few weeks later the language became negatively loaded again. What triggered a change in media attitudes was the proposed Constitutional Treaty. The controversial treaty aimed to create a consolidated constitution for the European Union. It would have replaced the existing treaties with a single text, expanding qualified majority voting and giving legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The constitution, which was signed on 29 October 2004, was rejected in the French and Dutch referendums in May and June 2005 (Europa.EU, no date). As we shall see, the negotiations of the treaty and the ratification process caused a heated debate in the media. It marked a significant change in the reporting, both in terms of language, the frequency of the reporting and the arguments in the debate. Furthermore, Eurosceptic movements received more attention in the media, and 'immigration' was reinforced as a central argument. What has previously have been referred to as 'critical engagement', should at this stage be defined as hostility towards the EU. Similar to the attitudes in the media, the proposal did not find strong support among the British public; a survey conducted on 1 June 2005 indicated that only 22 per cent of the public supported the treaty. 56 per cent would have voted against it, and 22 per cent would have abstained from voting. When undecided voters were included, the result illustrated a no vote by a margin of 72 per cent to 28 per cent[47] (Ipsos MORI, 2005). However, no vote was held due to the French and Dutch referendum results.

Firstly, in terms of the frequency in the reporting, the media undoubtedly found the Constitution more newsworthy than EU enlargement, as the number of publications increased. As indicated in Chart 5.1, 58 articles were published in total in this data sample[48]. No articles reported on the Constitution in favourable

[47] Mori interviewed a representative quota sample of 515 adults aged 18+ by telephone on 1 June 2005.
[48] Dates included in the data sample: 29-30 October 2004 and 29 May-3 June 2005

terms, which is worth noting considering the total number of articles was 58. Furthermore, 40 articles reported on it from a critical point of view and 18 articles simply informed about the Constitution, without either supporting or opposing it.

Secondly, in terms of language all the four newspapers went from using a positive language with a sense of *togetherness* when the EU enlargement took place, to the use of a negative and Eurosceptic language when plans for the Constitution were set out. The concept of *togetherness* vanished completely from the debate again and hostility replaced the idea of the other member states as 'friends' and 'partners'. The media focused on the distance not only between the UK and the member states, but also on the distance between the public and the decision makers, e.g. 'the fanatical and corrupt elite that drives the EU onwards will not give up' (Daily Mail, 30 May 2005, p. 12). The public could not relate to the political elite, nor trust them, e.g. 'it adds up to "trust the people", you might say. At the least, it adds up to not trusting the political elite' (Daily Mail, 3 June 2005, p. 16).

Similarly, descriptions of Brussels were negative, e.g. `this week we have witnessed a Europe that is arrogant, intolerant, remote and utterly indifferent to the needs of ordinary people` (Daily Mail, 30 October 2004, p. 20). Furthermore, 'Yesterday's expensive nonsense in Rome was a perfect example of why the British people dislike the EU. It exists for the glory of its politicians and bureaucrats. It puts its people second' (The Sun, 30 October 2004). The EU institutions were described as something distant from and meaningless to most people, run by unelected officials who were 'immune to public opinion'; the political elite pushed on with further integration regardless (Daily Telegraph, 30 May 2005, p. 19). The analysis identified similar tendencies in the reporting of Bruges in 1988, when Eurosceptic articles emphasised that elected politicians are side-lined by unelected commissioners. It is worth noting that attacks on the elite were present in the media before Eurosceptic groups capitalised on them. This feature of the language would later become central in the Brexit debate, which additionally could be considered a battle between 'ordinary people' and the

establishment. Moreover, populist attacks on the elite have been a very successful strategy adopted by UKIP.

Furthermore, the concept of 'superstate' was reinforced as a trend in the reporting, arguing that the establishment of an EU constitution would be a great step towards a 'superstate' e.g., ''Tony Blair signed up to a European superstate yesterday' (The Sun, 30 October 2004). It continues 'The PM put his name to the controversial EU constitution at a Pounds 9 million ceremony in Rome – taking just seven minutes to sign away 1,000 years of British history' (ibid). The Government should therefore not sign up for it without holding a referendum, e.g. `the Prime Minster put his name to the new EU constitution, the biggest single step towards a superstate. . . and he did so before the British people have had any chance to express a view on the new treaty` (Daily Mail, 30 October 2004, p. 4). Moreover, the terms 'democracy', 'bureaucracy' and 'sovereignty' were reinforced as common themes in the reporting. To begin with, there was a shared view in all the four newspapers that the EU is undemocratic, e.g. 'the project was never meant to be democratic. From the first, the EU`s founding fathers understood that it needed to be immune to public opinion' (Daily Telegraph, 30 May 2005, p. 19). Furthermore, the concept of 'bureaucracy' played a central role in the construction of integration in the media and as discussed, Brussels was referred to as bureaucratic, e.g. `the sclerotic and sleazy bureaucracy of Brussels only offers only more regulation instead of desperately-needed reform` (Daily Mail, 31 May 2005, p. 14). Additionally, there was a shared view in all four newspapers that the establishment of a constitution would include too much pooling of sovereignty, e.g. `Tony Blair paid a whistle-stop visit to Rome yesterday to sign away British sovereignty` (Daily Mail, 30 October 2004, p. 4). Similarly, 'This Government is busy signing away major constitutional issues that will remove Britain's authority over our judicial system, asylum and immigration among other things' (The Sun, 29 October 2004).

Thirdly, right-wing populist movements received more attention, as the referendums in France and The Netherlands triggered a debate in the media on

whether the UK should hold a similar referendum. 4 articles were published on The Front National – though the party did not get sympathetic treatment, it is interesting to note that Eurosceptic parties were starting to get more attention in the media[49]. Jean-Marie Le Pen was quoted in the articles, e.g. `the French people are a great people. This is a revolution staged by the people` (The Times, 30 May 2005, p. 1). The UK Independence Party was mentioned in only 1 article[50] arguing that traditional parties had lied to the electorate leaving the public with only one option; the UK Independence Party. The article suggested leaving the EU, but withdrawal was not a shared view at the time and the discussion in the media focused mainly on whether or not to sign the Constitution (The Times, 29 October 2004, p. 16). It is worth noting that the article did not in fact criticise UKIP. Nevertheless, the party continued to lack support and in the 2005 general election it won only 2.2 per cent of the total vote share (Electoral Commission, 2005).

Finally, immigration and migration became more salient, with 18 articles reporting on it[51]. In general, the language used when reporting on immigration was not negatively loaded and there was no reference to `mass immigration` at the time. The EU constitution aimed at incorporating asylum and immigration policies, which were criticised in the articles, e.g. `The Constitution undermines what remains our right to run a national asylum policy` (Daily Mail, 29 October 2004, p. 16). Nevertheless, some changes from previous reporting on immigration were noticeable; previously, immigration had been discussed only in terms of terrorism and crime. At this time, 2 articles discussed immigration in terms of religion and culture, e.g. `Across Europe […] there are widespread fears about global competition and immigration, their impact on national cultures, as well as on wages, pensions and jobs` (The Times, 2 June 2005, p. 20). However, we should keep in mind that the international context had changed. The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 contributed to a surge in hostility towards Islam. In addition, the free movement of people within the EU/EEA and increased immigration had

[49] The Times
[50] The Times
[51] 3 in The Times, 4 in The Sun, 6 in Daily Telegraph and 5 in Daily Mail

opened up a more multi-cultural Europe, where differences between cultures became more visual. Furthermore, 2 articles discussed immigration in terms of jobs and unemployment, e.g. `In France voters were angry about the perceived threat from "the Polish plumber", with widespread fears that jobs were being lost to competition from the eight poorer Eastern European countries that joined the EU last year` (The Times, 1 June 2005, p. 8). Similar to the reporting of 'the budget question' in 1979, this type of approach aims to connect grievances in society to membership of the EU. It plays on the fear that increased migration will have an impact on both wages, social security and unemployment in the UK. In 2005, immigration became a top issue for British voters (Ipsos MORI, 2006)[52]. Crime was ranked the most important issue, followed by health care and immigration. Surveys (Ipsos MORI, 2004) found that the socio-economic grade C2 was more concerned about immigration than the other social grades, followed by DE. These are the social classes that were most affected by concerns of social dumping and immigration, which would later be most likely to support UKIP. Furthermore, those ranking immigration as the most important issue were most likely to read The Daily Express, Daily Mail and The Sun. As the media reported on concerns of immigration before it became a top concern for British voters, it could suggest that the media, by calling more attention to immigration, have contributed to the change in the opinion polls in terms of immigration. This leads back to the argument about priming, that shaping of public opinion is not necessarily about the presentation of the argument in the media, but the fact that the media call attention to certain frames and make them more available to the public. As discussed in Chapter 2, priming could be defined as an agenda-setting effect of the party of the media, which by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others influences the standards by which governments, policies or candidates for public office are judged (Lenart 1994, 15-16).

[52] Numbers from Ipsos MORI. Survey conducted in 2005

5.9 A period of reflection

As discussed, the controversial EU Constitution was rejected in the French and Dutch referendums in 2005. As a result, it could not enter into force and the European leaders needed a period of reflection. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was introduced to replace the EU Constitution. The treaty brought new law-making powers to the European Parliament. Furthermore, it included the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in at least 45 policy areas in the Council of Ministers. Additionally, the treaty for the first time provides for a formal procedure to be followed by member states wishing to withdraw from the EU, namely Article 50[53] (European Parliament, 2017). The British public, which seemed to be under the impression that the reformed treaty was identical to the Constitution, did not support the reformed treaty. An ICM Poll[54] in 2007 found that 82 per cent of British voters wanted a referendum on Lisbon (House of Commons, 2009). The Government argued that there were significant constitutional differences between the treaties, which made a referendum unnecessary. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009.

The Lisbon Treaty had high salience in the media, even higher than the Constitutional Treaty: in total, 73 articles reported on the Lisbon Treaty in this data sample[55]. 42 articles opposed the reforms, 9 articles supported the reforms and 22 articles informed about the reforms, as indicated in Chart 5.1. The terms used to encapsulate the EU were similar to those used to describe the Constitution in 2004. The language did not change remarkably, as it remained highly Eurosceptic. However, the themes changed slightly, as 'superstate' vanished from the reporting and 'sovereignty' was reinforced as a common theme in the media reporting (both themes could be understood as reluctance to the pooling of national sovereignty, but to various degrees: whereas the first term would include a total loss of sovereignty with the establishment of a constitutional state, the second term could simply include the loss of sovereignty in one or

[53] This Article was invoked by the UK on 29 March 2016
[54] Conducted mid-August 2007
[55] Dates included in the data sample: 18-24 October 2007

several areas of integration, for example Common Agricultural Policies). In general, the media argued that the reformed treaty would transfer too much power to Brussels, e.g. `once signed, it will mark the moment when the balance of power shifts forever from an elected Westminster to an unelected Brussels` (The Sun, 19 October 2007). The argument of 'unelected commissioners' became more central again, first introduced in Bruges, 1988. There was a shared belief in the media that the EU elite disappeared into darkened rooms and made decisions over the heads of the public. Furthermore, it was argued that no more sovereignty should be surrendered to EU institutions, e.g. ` the surrender of sovereignty the treaty promises, not least on such sensitive matters as criminal justice and foreign policy, is unacceptable to many Britons` (Daily Telegraph, 18 October 2007, p. 1). Similar to the reporting of the Constitution, there was a shared concern in the media that reforms would establish a political union. It is therefore worth emphasising that the term 'superstate', which had been salient in the reporting of the Constitutional Treaty, vanished from the debate, as indicated in Chart 5.2.

In general, the media remained Eurosceptic, but the idea of withdrawal had not yet become a feature in the reporting of the EU. As discussed in Chapter 2, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003) defined Euroscepticism within the categories of 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism: `Hard Euroscepticism might be defined as principled opposition to the project of European integration, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU. Soft Euroscepticism might be re-defined as when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU`s current or future planned trajectory based on the *further* extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make` (ibid, 6-8). In this view, the UK newspapers would fall in under the category 'soft Euroscepticism', as they did not seem to oppose integration *per se*, but to further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make. As the media have not at this stage promoted the idea of

withdrawal from the EU, it could imply that the media both *shape* and *reflect* public opinion, as the media later came to oppose membership of the EU.

To sum up, this chapter has analysed the reporting of the most significant UK integration events since the EEC referendum, with particular focus on the 1990s and beyond. The analysis indicates that framing effects in the media did not bring immediate electoral opportunities for UKIP. Firstly, the party had its first electoral breakthrough almost 20 years after the media became critical of the EU. The actual framing effects could therefore not, as the only factor, have contributed to the rise of UKIP. Secondly, as discussed, a party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation, including funding and material goods, but also personal skills, contacts and publicity (Lucardie 2000, 178). As indicated in Chart 5.8, UKIP did not get their message out to the public around the events included in the first data sample, as the party only appeared in 5 articles between 1991 and 2009 in this data sample. Nevertheless, it gradually went from being a small fringe party to becoming a serious contender in British politics. In the 2015 General Election, UKIP won 12.6 per cent of the votes and became the third largest party in the U.K. This indicates that factors other than framing effects have contributed to the development of UKIP.



Chart 5.8

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

UKIP's electoral performance in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European Elections suggests that the party could have received high levels of publicity in the media around European elections. Furthermore, according to theories about framing, it would have received high levels of favourable publicity. As argued by Arzheimer & Carter (2006, 423), voters are generally more willing to support radical parties in 'second order' elections, such as EU elections. This is because this type of elections sometimes provides voters with an opportunity to express their political frustration with the mainstream parties without disturbing the political process on the national level. According to MEP Nathan Gill, media access changed remarkably in the times of European Elections: 'Certainly, because the EU elections were about.. well, about Europe and obviously they [the media] had to include us all in the debates, they had to include us in everything on the equal basis'. He continued 'We all had plenty of opportunities during that campaign' (Interview, 2016). A second data set will therefore be included in the analysis to find out whether there is a connection between *media attention* and the rise of UKIP.

5.10 Media coverage of UKIP in European Elections

This section of the chapter analyses the media reporting around EU elections to find out whether there is a connection between *media attention* and the rise of UKIP. As discussed in Chapter 3, the dates included in the analysis are the 3 last days leading up to the elections, the election day, and the 3 first days after the elections, seven days in total[56]. This has been done to capture the mood both before and after events take place. Before investigating the reporting in more detail, Chart 5.9 provides an overview of the reporting of UKIP in the EU elections:



Chart 5.9

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

When the first European Elections after UKIP`s establishment took place in 1994 and 1999, the party received little attention in the media, as indicated in Chart 5.9. UKIP struggled to get its views out to the public, even in times of EU elections. In 1994, the party was mentioned in only 4 articles. However, 2 of the reports revealed support for UKIP, e.g. `The UKIP is the only one to recognise that we are not going to beat the inexorable drift towards federalism by playing the game as all the present parties are playing it` (Daily Mail 1994, 9 June). Some Eurosceptic

[56] 8-14 June 1994, 8-14 June 1999, 9-15 June 2004, 2-8 June 2009, 20-26 May 2014

terms were used in the reporting, such as 'federalism', 'socialism', 'independence' and 'superstate'. It is interesting to note that 'superstate' appeared in the reporting already here, as it did not become a salient theme before 2004 in the articles previously looked at. In 1999, UKIP received more attention than in the previous election, with 9 articles in total. 6 articles reported on the party from an informative perspective, by simply discussing the results of the election. 3 reports revealed support for the party, in the form of letters to editors, e.g. `Our last and only hope is that sufficient UKIP candidates win seats, to save the ending of our 10 centuries of self-governance and our 71 years of universal franchise and democracy` (Daily Telegraph 1999, 10 June p. 27). This indicates that UKIP started getting its message across in the reporting of the EU elections. In terms of language, 'democracy' and 'United States of Europe' appeared in one of the reports, but none of the other articles used a Eurosceptic language when discussing the party and its political platform. In 1994, UKIP won 155.487 votes and did not get enough votes to secure a seat in the European Parliament. In 1999, the party did slightly better and won 696.057 votes, giving it 3 seats in the European Parliament.

In 2004, a remarkable change in the reporting has been identified. As indicated in Chart 5.10, 134 articles reported on UKIP in total[57]. This is a surprising change for a party that previously did not get attention in the media and was struggling to get its political platform out to the public. However, the party did not get favourable treatment in the media and only 8 articles revealed support for its policies. By contrast, 26 articles criticised the party; 100 articles simply informed about the party and its policies without revealing support either for or against it. In addition, the reporting adopted a more Eurosceptic language than used in previous EU elections, as indicated in Chart 5.10:

[57] The Sun: 27, The Times: 65, Daily Mail: 34, Daily Telegraph: 52



Chart 5.10

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

As discussed, there were concerns raised about growing Euroscepticism in the member states in 2004. Eurosceptic parties were expected to make sweeping gains in the EU election in 2004. UKIP made its first electoral breakthrough that year and gained more votes than expected. In 2004, Robert Kilroy-Silk announced that he was going to stand for the party. Despite never being an official party member, he became a popular candidate and was parachuted into the top slot on UKIP's list of candidates in the East Midlands – a region where UKIP had struggled to gain support. Ford & Goodwin (2014, 44-46) found that Kilroy dominated the media coverage[58] and started to broaden the party's appeal by moving it in a more populist direction and criticising the established parties. Furthermore, he linked EU membership to long hospital waiting lists, overcrowded schools and pensioners living in poverty. He argued, according to Ford & Goodwin (2014, 44-46), that EU enlargement would make the situation worse, though these arguments did not appear in this data sample. In other words, the party made a connection between challenges in society and EU membership by holding the EU responsible. As noted in Chapter 2, `social movements are deeply involved in

[58] Different data sample, the same results were not found in the data sample used in this analysis

“naming” grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others (cited in: Tarrow 1995, 122). As UKIP has used similar strategies in an attempt to appeal to the public, this theory can also arguably be applied to political parties. However, UKIP did not *originally* come up with the idea to connect challenges in society with the EU. This chapter demonstrated that similar argumentation was present in the reporting even before the establishment of UKIP. It first appeared in the first data sample in the reporting of ‘the budget question’ in 1979, and was additionally reinforced as a feature of the reporting on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004/5.

Kilroy’s celebrity status had a positive impact on UKIP, which almost tripled its membership from 8,500 in 2001 to 26,000 in 2004. When all votes were counted, the party obtained the best set of results since its establishment; it attracted 2.6 million voters. Nationally, its share of the vote more than doubled to 16 per cent, enabling the party to quadruple its representation in the European Parliament from three to twelve seats (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 48). Nevertheless, it should be noted that EU membership was not a top issue for British voters in 2004. Defence was ranked the top issue, followed by health care and immigration. The latter would later be strongly associated with membership of the EU. Furthermore, public support for EU membership increased in 2003-2007 from 49 per cent to 51 per cent (Ipsos MORI, 2016). This suggests that other factors than the EU were driving support for UKIP, e.g. the failure of established parties to deal with the concerns of ‘ordinary people’.

In 2009, the reporting of UKIP changed again, with less attention in the newspapers. As indicated in Chart 5.13, only 51 articles reported on the party, which is a noticeable change from the previous EU election when it appeared in 134 articles. The party did still not get favourable treatment in the media, but it was not particularly critical either; 3 articles revealed support for the party, 9 articles criticised it, while 39 articles reported on it from an informative

perspective. In addition, the newspapers adopted a less Eurosceptic language in 2009. Chart 5.11 illustrates the differences in use of Eurosceptic terms in the reporting between 2004 and 2009:



Chart 5.11

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

As discussed earlier, the first data sample indicated that UKIP did not have a salient voice in the media in 2009. When reporting on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the party did not have a voice in the debate and did therefore not get its views out to the public when the event took place. Furthermore, UKIP received less attention when the EU election took place in 2009, compared to 2004. Similarly, immigration did not play an important role in the reporting, compared to 2004. The total vote share dropped slightly from the previous EU elections, but the party continued to do well. What factors contributed to this result?

In 2009, commentators again predicted a surge in support for parties promoting EU withdrawal. By December 2008, the economy had become the top issue for British voters due to the economic crisis, followed by crime and immigration (Ipsos MORI, 2014). However, the UK Independence Party had an average of only

7 per cent in the polls. What seemed to have changed the situation was a scandal that happened less than one month before polling day. The Daily Telegraph published details of parliamentary expenses claimed by members of the Labour Cabinet. In the following days, MPs from all three main parties were linked to widespread abuse of the expenses system. Ford & Goodwin (2014, 75-76) found that the scandal, which received high media attention, triggered a protest vote in the 2009 EU election. It turned the elections into an immediate outlet for public anger. A snapshot of public opinion conducted only days before the polling day found that 84 per cent of voters wanted those involved in the scandal to be expelled from Parliament. Furthermore, 50 per cent of the voters agreed that most MPs were `personally corrupt` (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 75-76). UKIP used the scandal to its advantage and criticised the corrupt elite. In the week after the scandal broke, three different companies published four opinion polls and all of them indicated a surge in support for UKIP. In addition to populist attacks on the established parties, the party campaigned on border controls, uncontrolled immigration, national identity and EU membership costs (ibid, 76). In other words, the party capitalised on the growth of an anti-elite sentiment. When the results were announced, the UK Independence Party had won 13 seats in the European Parliament (House of Commons, 2009). The Conservatives won the popular vote across Britain, polling 4.2 million votes. UKIP were second with 2.5 million votes, Labour third with 2.4 million and the Liberal Democrats fourth with 2.1 million. The Green Party won 1.3 million votes and the BNP nearly 950,000 (ibid).

Furthermore, Parsons (2012, 4-5) made a link between the European Election and the series of wildcat strikes that affected the energy industry in 2009. A £200 million construction contract to build a hydro desulphurisation plant was given to an Italian company, which shipped in a hundred of its permanent workers instead of giving the job to British workers. This led to a wildcat strike by hundreds of workers joined by local unemployed construction workers and engineers, claiming that the British workers had not been given the chance to apply for the jobs. On 4 February, 22 other sites in Britain were affected with an estimated 6000 workers taking part in sympathy strike action. In May, another strike broke out in Wales as

workers claimed that the subcontractor had broken an agreement to offer jobs to British workers by bringing in Polish workers. 200 workers participated in the strike, which was supported by another 2,750 workers from other refineries in Britain (ibid). The UK Independence Party benefited from the strikes, arguing that `the only way we can run our economy, run our country, the way we want to, is by leaving the European Union and being free and independent again. British jobs for British workers will only happen when Britain is run by and for Britons` (cited in: ibid, 7). A significant surge in support for the UK Independence Party could be seen in areas where the strikes took place. In Yorkshire and Humber constituency in which Lindsey oil refinery is located, UKIP did better than the national average with 17.4 per cent of the total vote share. This is an increase of 2.9 per cent from the 2004 Elections. Furthermore, the UKIP vote rose from 17.4 per cent to 21.4 per cent in North Lincolnshire. In the area around the Lindsey refinery, nearly one in three voters supported parties that promoted EU withdrawal (ibid, 13). This implies that the wildcat strikes taking place in 2009 had an impact on the European election results.

In 2014, immigration came to play a more significant role, which was reflected in the reporting of the EU election. In total, 65 articles mentioned immigration[59]. This could arguably be a response to an anti-immigration campaign that was launched by UKIP in 2010. The campaign linked EU membership and 'mass immigration' together. The reason for the launch of the campaign was evidence indicating that immigration had become a top issue for voters. In a survey, the economy was ranked the most important issue with 42 per cent, immigration was ranked the second most important issue with 17 per cent, and government debt was ranked the third most important issue with 11 per cent (BES, 2013). In 2008-2009, immigration dropped down the agenda for all social groups, as the financial crisis gripped the nation and pushed all other issues to one side. As the urgency of the economic crisis diminished, immigration returned to the top of the issues. As a response to these changes, the party launched a campaign against `the

[59] 20-26 May 2014

effects of continuing unlimited mass immigration` (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 79). The party leadership demanded a ban on the burka and niqab in public, and continued to fuse Euroscepticism with anti-immigration and populist attacks against the established political class. As noted in Chapter 2, the foundation and electoral success of political parties can be attributed to three factors: '(1) its political project, which should address problems considered urgent by substantial sections of the electorate: (2) its resources: members, money, management and mass media exposure; and (3) the political opportunity structure: positions of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions` (cited in: Lucardie 2000, 175). By 2010, a large group of voters considered immigration a problem, which was addressed by UKIP in order to gain public support. UKIP linked immigration to grievances in society, such as overcrowded schools or long hospital waiting lists. Furthermore, in terms of political opponents, the party had the chance of debating something that the established parties were not interested in discussing, despite a change in public attitudes towards immigration. According to UKIP's former Head of Media, Alexandra Phillips, 'the left and the right have come closer and closer and closer together, more and more centrist. The closer those parties get together, the more people feel disengaged, because there is no one that represents them in this huge effort to push critical debate into the taboo section of politics, such as immigration or membership of the EU'. She continued, 'UKIP really brought those issues to the front and got them discussed and debated in politics, and because it has been such a long period of time that people weren't talking about those issues, I think that has really helped to give UKIP a solid, permanent platform and actually changed the nature of the debate in this country altogether' (Interview with Philips, 2016). This distinguished the party from the established parties and the remote political elite. As discussed, attempts to distance the establishment from 'the ordinary people' can be traced back to the media coverage of Maastricht Treaty in 1991.

The campaign to ban the burka and niqab in public received little attention in the newspapers at the time[60]. 6 articles reported on the campaign in less biased terms, 4 articles criticised the campaign and 1 article supported it. 11 articles were published in total[61], which is almost nothing considering the search included 12 months of reporting. It is interesting to note that the voice most represented in the articles was the voice of the former (and future) leader Nigel Farage, rather than its then current leader Lord Pearson, e.g. `announcing the policy, Mr Farage said that Britain faced a "ghettoization" that was a threat to society` (The Times, 18 January 2010, p. 13). Farage's image has undoubtedly been important for the party, which for a long time operated as a 'one-man-band'. According to Alexandra Phillips: 'He is very much synonymous with UKIP and people can't imagine a UKIP without him' (Interview, 2016). When asked whether his image and the setting of interviews have been part of a media strategy, she constantly replied 'It is not a strategy – it is him! There is this idea that "you should wear this shirt today and go to a country pub and drink a pint of beer and smoke a cigarette", but you couldn't tell Nigel to do those things. Have I ever tried to change him, yes, but it did not work'. She continued, 'He is a one hundred percent genuine character and you know, when he started to gain success, a lot of people were like "oh yeah, we can all go to the pub and have a pint and a fag and pretend to be the man of the people", but this really isn't a media strategy' (ibid). Anyhow, despite not getting a sympathetic view for the anti-immigration campaign in the newspapers, the reporting allowed UKIP to get its ideas out to the public, e.g. `its manifesto will specify policy measures. UKIP said that it would increase Britain's military budget by 40 per cent and bring back grammar schools. The party also believes that fewer school leavers should go to university, and that less academic teenagers should be encouraged to learn a trade` (The Times, 16 January 2010, p. 18).

UKIP had established itself as a serious contender in EU elections by 2014. Arguably, EU elections brought opportunities for protest votes, which benefited

[60] Article search from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010
[61] Articles were found in The Sun (1), The Times (8) and The Daily Telegraph (2).

the party. UKIP, which previously struggled to get its party policies out to the electorate, received great attention in the media when the 2014 election took place. As indicated in Chart 5.9, 208 articles reported on the party, which is a remarkable change from 2009. 15 articles supported the party`s policies, 35 articles criticised it and 159 articles reported on the party from an informative perspective. Additionally, as we shall see, the party performed better in this EU election than in previous ones. The language became more Eurosceptic again, with more reference to 'sovereignty', 'democracy' and 'immigration', as indicated Chart 5.12. Of particular interest is the increased use of the term *immigration*, which became a rather significant part of the debate. Immigration did not have high significance in the coverage of previous EU elections, but came to play a more central role in the debate after immigration became a top issue for voters. It was ranked the second most important issue, after the economy and before government debt (BES, 2013). This could suggest that the media at times *reflect* public opinion, rather than *shape* public opinion. According to Former MP Douglas Carswell, 'The elite often like to blame Euroscepticism on the media. […] the press media reflects public opinion, it doesn't shape it. It is an entirely bottom up process' (Interview, 2016).



Chart 5.12

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Furthermore, immigration did *not* characterise the reporting of the EU events included in the first data sample. Hence, the media deliberately reported more on immigration around EU elections. As discussed, this type of reporting has been defined as priming, an agenda-setting effect which takes place when the media call attention to some matters, while ignoring others. Arguably, by making some issues more accessible to the public, such as immigration, the media gave UKIP the platform it needed to spread its views to the public. According to Alexandra Phillips: 'UKIP has always believed that the immigration debate will play a key part in people's sentiments, because it really is a huge area of policy that the UK government can't control and we know that it is not on the table, and that we can't negotiate it. UKIP recognised this a long time ago, whereas other parties have avoided those issues because of the taboo that has been built around them. UKIP always uniquely got to make that argument'. She continued, 'Of course it is controversial and you know, people have been sort of conditioned to not want to talk about it, but with the rise of migration coming into… you know, the economic migrants, the asylum seekers, it is becoming a more and more critical issue'. She continued: 'Nigel was very clever to recognise the connection between open borders and the EU and has really made that the centre-piece of his media strategy' (Interview, 2016).

As discussed, UKIP went from the fringes to becoming a serious contender in EU elections. In 2014, the party won 26.6 per cent[62] of the popular vote and almost doubled its seats in the European Parliament, from 13 to 23 seats (House of Commons, 2019). Arguably, EU elections offer a simple way of casting a protest vote against Westminster politicians, as there is no government formation at stake. In order to find out whether there is a connection between media attention and electoral performance, the analysis mapped the reporting of UKIP onto UKIP's vote share in European Elections:

[62] 4.376.635 votes



Chart 5.13

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3



Chart 5.14

Source: House of Commons (2019)

The data presented in Chart 5.13 and 5.14 clearly indicate a correlation between media attention and electoral performance. UKIP did not perform well in the first EU election in 1994 and struggled to get its views out to the electorate. In 1999, the party gained more media attention and performed slightly better in the EU

election. As the party received more publicity, it performed better in EU elections, which clearly indicates a connection between media attention and electoral performance. Looking at opinion polls from 2014, the astonishing result in the European Election cannot be explained by public opinion on the EU, as the majority of the public did in fact support the EU in May 2014; 54 per cent supported membership of EU, 37 per cent opposed membership of the EU and 10 per cent was undecided (Ipsos MORI, 2016). This could further indicate that additional factors, such as immigration or unemployment, motivated people to vote for UKIP. Nevertheless, the analysis confirms that a political party needs publicity, good or bad, in order to mobilise support and achieve electoral success. This brings back what Lucardie (2000, 178) argued about the success of new parties: 'a party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation, including funding and material goods, but also personal skills, contacts and *publicity*'. As put by Graber et al. (1998, 1-2), political messages are expressed through the media, which serve as a kind of communication between the public and the government.

As discussed in Chapter 2, having a convincing and charismatic leader is important. Once a party emerges, its popularity partly depends on the leader of the party, as a charismatic and popular leader attracts support from prospective voters, while the absence of such qualities can be a hindrance to success for the party (Maisel & Cooper 1978, 36-38). Max Weber (1864-1920) introduced the concept 'Charismatic authority' arguing that society's attempts to bring rationality into the area of human emotions and social arrangements would eventually endanger individual creativity and freedom. He believed that 'charisma is fated to decline as permanent institutional structures increasingly develop' (cited in: Conger 1993, 278). Weber argued that charismatic authority resides in the personal qualities of an individual leader. Whereas traditional leaders are elected or appointed under existing rules and traditions, charismatic leaders are chosen by followers out of a belief that the leader is gifted. In his view, traditional leaders derive their power from positions, expertise and traditions, whereas charismatic's bases of power are personal (ibid, 279). This can be linked to UKIP, which before

getting attention in the media recognised the importance of having a prepared, popular and charismatic leader. When asked what strategies were used by UKIP to gain the attention from the media, Nathan Gill said: 'Well, initially the strategy was.. the media ignored us, so we had no media attention whatsoever. So we had to do things through Facebook, through that kind of media. But after Rotherham, the media woke up to us. And actually.. well, they knew we were there, but they didn't want to give us any oxygen. You know, you can put a fire up, but we didn't have any oxygen. That's what they thought they were doing. And they would have done it if it wasn't for Youtube and Facebook and that kind of stuff.. Twitter! We then started to get more and more media attention and started a snowball. Nigel had spent years developing his speech and his ability to interact with the public. His thought processes. He developed it all already, so by the time we hit the media, he knew exactly what he was doing and that is how he was able to rise above quickly' (Interview Gill, 2016).

Moreover, Gill confirmed the importance of media attention, rather than framing effects: 'You know, if you have got a wonderful message, if people can't hear it, you will get nowhere – and our message, we think, was a wonderful message, but also we had to get that message to as many people as possible. Maybe by the fact that Nigel was hated, as well as loved, but that in a way helped as well because everybody knew who he was and everybody had an opinion – and the media propagated that opinion to a lot of people, the negative opinion. But the British people vote fair and eventually we always see through it all'. He continued, 'Eventually. It only took us 23 years' (Interview Gill, 2016).

Although the media did not report favourably on UKIP, the publicity appears to have helped the party to spread its message out to the public. Nigel Farage recalls in an interview (2016): 'I think there was a time a couple of years ago when the UKIP view was demonised as being fringe, on the edge of civilised society, and everything we fought for and campaigned for over those years is now part of the mainstream debate in this country'. He continued; 'The media access changed in the Eastleigh by-election. That's when it really changed. When suddenly we won

almost 30 per cent of the vote in that by-election and that was in early 2013. And that has been the case ever since. It is very interesting, you know, I was out this morning campaigning and there was *one* person in the whole street who was really abusive, just one. But other people, even those who don't support us, they are not abusive anymore. Absolutely not' (Interview Farage, 2016). The media, by giving publicity to the party and hence making it possible for them to distribute their views to the public, have undoubtedly contributed to the success of UKIP.

Furthermore, the importance of public engagement has been confirmed through elite interviews conducted for this study. Extensive campaigning and other grassroots activities have undoubtedly contributed to the success of UKIP. In the UK, members of the UK Independence Party formed an alliance with likeminded people from other political parties and organisations ahead of the referendum in 2016, *Grassroot Out*. However, ever since its establishment, UKIP has aimed to be a 'party of the people'. It has been important for the party to connect with 'ordinary people', and this has been achieved through grassroots activities, i.e. the party has organised a considerable number of public meetings around the country – both in larger cities, and in towns and villages. As demonstrated in this chapter, the party found it difficult to get attention in the media – it therefore adopted other methods to get its message out to the public. As discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of grassroots activities is to put forward demands that have not yet been dealt with by the already established channels (Rasmussen 1997, 174). This ties back to UKIP's argument that the establishment has failed to deal with the concerns of 'ordinary people' and that UKIP represents the voice of the 'left behind' voters. The work methods of the grassroots movements are based on collective activity and often includes demonstrations, protest petitions, etc. It is the use of these methods that determines the categorisation as grassroots activity, according to Rasmussen (1997, 174).

According to Professor Alan Sked, the first leader of UKIP, the party's strategy in order to recruit members and reach out to the public was to hold public meetings: 'we did a little bit of advertising, put leaflets through doors and hoped, and waited

for people to write in. We had an office on Regent St. and could work from there, and then held meetings in various constituencies – and when people turned up, we could organise local constituency branches' (Interview Sked, 2016). Sked resigned as party leader in 1997, but public engagement remained a central part of UKIP's strategy in order to spread its message to the public, due to its lack of media attention. Farage recalls (interview Farage, 2016): 'We do what I do. You get out of London, you travel around the country, you do public meetings, public engagement and crucially; going to the pubs – and that is where you meet everybody'.

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the reporting of the integration debate in UK media since 1975, with particular focus on the 1990s and beyond. Firstly, the analysis indicates when the media started to change their attitude towards the EU; from supporting integration when the 1975 referendum took place, to becoming more neutral around the signing of the SEA. Throughout the late 1980s, the media adopted a more critical approach and when the last treaties were negotiated in 2000, 2004 and 2007 the reporting was sorely negative. Secondly, the analysis demonstrates how the language changed over time; when the 1975 referendum took place, the sense of 'togetherness' was a salient theme – with this togetherness came responsibilities to other member states, our 'friends' and 'neighbours'. A decade later, 'togetherness' was no longer a present theme and 'unity' became a negative loaded word – the language began to change, with more reference to 'socialism', 'bureaucracy', 'federalism' and 'political union'. In the following decades, 'togetherness' was replaced by the concept of 'otherness'; the other member states were different from 'us'.

The analysis aimed to find out to what extent the print media and grassroots campaigning are important in explaining the success of the UK Independence Party. This chapter has demonstrated that framing effects have not, as the only factor, brought any immediate electoral opportunities for the UK Independence Party. Firstly, the party had its first electoral breakthrough almost 20 years after

the media became critical of the EU. The actual framing effects could therefore not, as the only factor, have contributed to the rise of UKIP. Secondly, as discussed, a party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation, including funding and material goods, but also personal skills, contacts and *publicity* (Lucardie 2000, 178). UKIP did not get publicity around the events included in the first data sample. Nevertheless, it gradually went from being a small fringe party to becoming a serious contender in British politics. In the 2015 General Election, UKIP won 12.6 per cent of the votes and became the third largest party in the U.K. This indicates that other factors than media framing have contributed to the success of UKIP.

UKIP's electoral performance in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European Elections suggested that the party could have received high levels of publicity in the media around European elections. As expected, a second data set indicated a correlation between party publicity and electoral opportunities for UKIP. In the 1994 and 1999 European Elections, the party was not frequently reported on in the media and hence struggled to mobilise support. This changed in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, when the party was more frequently reported on. As indicated in Chart 5.14, UKIP performed better in these elections, identifying a connection between media attention and electoral performance – although the media did not report favourably of UKIP, the publicity helped the party to spread its message out to the public. Referring back to Chapter 1, this confirms what Tarrow (1995, 126), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015,19) argued about political parties and the media; the success of political parties and social movements can be determined by political opportunities, and media are considered an important political opportunity variable. These scholars all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements and political parties succeed in reaching out to the public. Moreover, this finding challenges the importance of framing effects, because if framing effects in the media contributed to UKIP's success in EU elections, the media should have reported favourably of UKIP.

Moreover, the media early on adopted a Eurosceptic attitude and reported on issues that were important for UKIP. This brings back what Ferree at al. (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 149) said about consensus formation: the media provide a source for consensus formation that movements cannot easily achieve on their own. In this view, new ideas and ways of interpreting it often appear first in public space, only later giving rise to collective action, such as interest groups or political parties. Keeping this in mind, it could be argued that in terms of media effects, it is the *combination* of the priming effects (how often certain frames are reported on in the media) and party publicity (media attention) that has contributed to the success of UKIP.

Furthermore, analysis found that the media have both *shaped* and *reflected* ideas on the EU, e.g. the public ranked immigration a top issue *before* the media became critical of immigration and started using it. In the first data sample, immigration did not have a significant role in the reporting of the integration debate. In 2010, the public ranked immigration a top issue and put it on the agenda. UKIP launched an anti-immigration campaign the same year and *mass immigration* became a part of the integration debate. In 2014, immigration came to play a significant role in the reporting of the EU election. This suggests that the media have *reflected* ideas originally presented elsewhere, rather than shaping ideas. Similarly, the UK Independence Party has capitalised on grievances in society, by connecting them to membership of the EU. This chapter has demonstrated that similar argumentation was present in the reporting even before the establishment of UKIP. It first appeared in this data sample in the reporting of 'the budget question' in 1979, e.g. `the British people are furious at ploughing huge sums into Brussels when housing, education and social services are being slashed at home` (The Sun, 30 November 1979, pg. 2). It was additionally reinforced as a feature of the reporting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004/5, e.g. `Across Europe […] there are widespread fears about global competition and immigration, their impact on national cultures, as well as on wages, pensions and jobs` (The Times, 2 June 2005, p. 20). This suggests that the media, additionally, have *shaped* ideas that later brought opportunities for UKIP.

Chapter 6

The reporting of the integration debate in Norwegian newspapers

In Norway, a strong Eurosceptic movement played a significant role in the 1972 and 1994 referendums on the EU. The organisation behind the movement, 'No to the EU'[63], emerged as a response to the Norwegian government's announcement that Norway should apply for membership of the EU. The initial aim of the organisation was therefore to prevent membership of the EU, which it successfully achieved when the public rejected membership in both of the referendums on the EU. By 1994, the organisation had recruited 140,000 members. Having won both of the referendums on the EU, it could not be argued that 'No to the EU' has not been successful to some degree as an organisation. However, 'No to the EU' has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU outside of the referendums and by 2017, the number of members decreased to 27,000. The organisation has not been successful in preventing deeper integration, as Norway has signed both the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement. As discussed in Chapter 5, the concept of success should not be discussed in absolute binary terms, as a movement could be considered successful even if some of its short-term goals or its long-term goal are not achieved. It could therefore be argued that the Eurosceptic movement in Norway has been successful to some degree, as it achieved short-term success in the referendums on the EU. However, the movement has *not* been successful in achieving long-term success, namely, to prevent deeper integration into the EU.

As noted in Chapter 2, the 'success' of social movements and political parties is sometimes determined by political opportunities. Eisinger (1973, 25) defines political opportunity structure as a function of `the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system`. As discussed, McAdam et al. (1996, 285) considered the media an important political opportunity variable, as the media are in a position to decide *what* events

[63] EEC opponents mobilised under a different name in 1972: '*Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet*'

are reported on and *how* the events are reported on. The media help movements and political parties to gain attention, but crucially they help established parties and movements *maintain* support by communicating their views and activities to the public. Tarrow (1995, 126), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015,19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements succeed in reaching out to the public. As 'No to the EU' has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU outside of the referendums, this chapter investigates whether the media have influenced this development.

Firstly, the chapter studies the effects of media framing to find out whether the Norwegian media have supported or opposed membership of the EU. Through a qualitative content analysis[64] of newspaper articles, the chapter identifies the attitudes in the reporting, by studying the different terms and arguments used when reporting on the EU. As we shall see, the Norwegian media have continuously been supportive of the EU. Secondly, through a quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles the chapter studies the effects of media priming. It aims to identify the frequency in the reporting on the EU, by studying the number of articles that were published at each event. It could be that the media, by periodically reporting less frequently on the EU, have made it more difficult for the Eurosceptic movement to mobilise opposition against the EU. Finally, through the data collected via in-depth interviews with politicians and political activists, the chapter discusses the importance of grassroots campaigns. As we shall see, grassroots activity helps Eurosceptic movements reach out and spread their message to the public.

In order to investigate changes in the reporting over time and to compare present arguments to those of earlier debates, the chapter chronologically studies the most important integration events in Norway from 1972-2004. This includes the 1972 referendum, the signing of the EEA agreement, the Maastricht referendum in Denmark, the 1994 referendum, the signing of the Schengen Agreement, and

[64] For details on coding/categories, see Chapter 3

the 2004 enlargement. As discussed in Chapter 3, the newspapers included in this data sample are 'VG', 'Dagbladet' and 'Aftenposten'.

6.1 The framing of the EU/EEA

Before looking at the reporting in more detail, graphs with data collected from the content analysis are provided as an overview of the coverage in the media from 1972-2004. Chart 6.1 presents the total number of publications and indicates which periods the reporting has been supportive or critical of integration[65]. As we can see, the event most frequently reported on is the 1994 referendum, with 421 articles in this sample. The second most frequently event reported on is the 1972 referendum, with 262 articles in this sample. Furthermore, as indicated in Chart 6.1 the media supported EU membership in both referendums and have remained supportive of the EU:



Chart 6.1

* Data selection includes 19-20.12 1996 and 7-11.06.1997
** 1992: The signing of the EEA agreement
*** 1992: Maastricht Referendum in DK
Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Chart 6.2 indicates how trends in reporting have changed over time, focusing on the five themes that have been most salient in this data sample ('self-governing',

[65] Individual data for each newspaper to be found in the appendix

‘democracy’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘centralisation’). As we can see, Eurosceptic terms were most frequently reported on when the 1972 and 1994 referendums took place, which makes sense as a large number of articles were published around these events. In 1972, the Eurosceptic term most frequently reported on was ‘self-governing’, followed by ‘democracy’ and ‘national sovereignty’. In 1994, similar to 1972, the Eurosceptic term most frequently used was ‘national sovereignty’, followed by ‘self-governing’ and ‘democracy’. It is interesting to note that after the 1994 referendum, Eurosceptic terms have almost vanished from the reporting of the EU in the newspapers. The Norwegian government has signed agreements committing the country to deeper integration with the member states of the EU, but Eurosceptic terms have not been present in the reporting after 1994:



Chart 6.2

* Data selection includes 19-20.12 1996 and 7-11.06.1997
** A Norwegian term used by the opposition meaning ‘self-governing’
* 1992: Signing of the EEA agreement
** 1992: Maastricht Referendum in DK

Source: Author’s own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

6.2 The 1972 referendum

The first demonstration against EEC membership took place on 5 March 1962, when thousands of people gathered in front of the Parliament to protest against the government`s plans to join the EEC (Seierstad 2014, 15-19). EEC opponents argued in terms of independence and claimed that the current free trade arrangements with the member states were sufficient. EEC membership included common policies in areas such as agriculture and fisheries, which would later become a central argument in the debate against membership of the EEC. The purpose of the demonstration was to convince the Government that the decision on whether to join the EEC should be made by the public. However, EEC opponents decided not to establish a social movement against EEC membership in 1962. The British applications to join the EEC in both 1961 and 1967 were vetoed by the French, which encouraged a withdrawal of the Norwegian applications, i.e. EEC opponents did not find it necessary to establish a social movement at the time. In 1969, the situation changed; Charles de Gaulle resigned as President and his successor, Georges Pompidou, announced that he would take on a different approach and support enlargement of the EEC.

Britain sent its third EEC application in 1970, which encouraged other EFTA states to follow, including Norway. Britain decided not to hold a referendum on EEC membership, but the Norwegian government announced that an EEC referendum would take place on 24/25 September 1972. As a response, EEC opponents organised and established a movement against EEC membership in 1970[66]. The movement against EEC membership mobilised quickly and when the EEC referendum took place on 24/25 September 1972, the organisation had recruited 130,000 members (Seierstad 2014, 27-28). When all the votes were counted, the 'No Campaign' had won the referendum with 53.5 per cent of the votes. 46.6 per cent voted for EEC membership. As we shall see, the EEC referendum result contradicted the views of the national media.

[66] Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i EEC (Seierstad 2014, 27).

Similar to the UK in 1975, the reporting of the referendum debate in Norwegian newspapers favoured those supportive of the EEC. As indicated in Chart 6.1, in this sample 85 articles supported the EEC[67], 36 articles opposed the EEC, and 119 informative articles were published on the EEC referendum[68]. 262 articles were published in total in this sample. The newspapers presented slightly more voices for membership than against membership and published more arguments for EEC membership than against EEC membership. However, it could be argued that although the newspapers published a higher number of articles reporting favourably on the EEC, the Norwegian media have in general been less partisan than UK newspapers. Both campaigns were reported on in the media and voices from both campaigns were present in the reporting, e.g. the media did feature interviews with leaders from both campaigns, equally introducing the leaders to the public without revealing support for either of the campaigns. Important to note is that one of the newspapers – Dagbladet, which would later support membership in the 1994 referendum – was in fact against EEC membership in 1972. 3 articles in Dagbladet supported membership, 25 articles opposed membership and 67 articles informed about the EEC referendum; 95 articles were published in total[69].

The most central arguments in the debate presented by EEC supporters were those in terms of trade, industries and the national economy. Economic arguments were used in 24 articles, industrial arguments were reported on in 19 articles and trade arguments were reported on in 12 articles. EEC supporters argued that Norway would prosper from EEC membership and emphasised the importance of trade with the other member states, e.g. `EEC membership, in contrast to a free trade agreement, ensures economic growth so that we can create more jobs` (Aftenposten 23 September 1972, p. 1). Furthermore, 'peace' and 'security' were central arguments in the referendum debate and the terms appeared in 20 articles altogether, as there was a shared belief in the media that

[67] Dates included in the data sample: 21-27 September 1972
[68] See Chapter 3 for definitions of categories/coding
[69] Chart 6.12 in the appendix

the EEC had brought peace and stability to the continent. As discussed, arguments in terms of peace and stability were also central in the UK referendum debate in 1975.

In addition, EEC supporters argued in terms of 'democracy', emphasising that voting against the EEC would leave the country on the outside of the decision-making processes in the EEC, e.g. `The government has, after careful consideration, come to the decision that EEC membership benefits Norway as a free nation, but at the same time gives us the chance to influence EEC decisions. A free trade agreement would not give us the same influence in the decision-making processes` (Aftenposten 22 September 1972, p. 3). It was argued that on the outside, Norway would not be given a vote when important decisions were made, and hence could end up being isolated from the rest of the continent if both Denmark and Britain were to become members of the EEC. As indicated in Chart 6.3, this type of argumentation appeared in 11 articles:



Chart 6.3

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

By contrast, some of the most important arguments from EEC opponents presented in the newspapers were those linked to the fisheries, agriculture and the petroleum industry. As indicated in Chart 6.4, 22 articles reported on the

fishing industry, 12 articles reported on the petroleum industry, and 6 articles reported on possible implications for the Norwegian farming industry. There were strong beliefs among EEC opponents that these resources should remain under national control. Norwegian farmers are subsidised by the state and EEC opponents argued that Norwegian farmers would get less from the EEC. Moreover, it was argued that Norwegian agriculture would not be able to compete against the other EEC member states, mostly due to its very short season. Similarly, EEC opponents argued that Norwegian fisheries should remain under national control. If Norway became a member of the EEC, the fishing quota would be shared with the other EEC member states. Additionally, allowing other EEC member states to fish in Norwegian waters could possibly lead to overfishing of threatened fish stocks. In 1972, the primary sector employed about 13 per cent of the total population (SSB, 2013).

As indicated in Chart 6.4, economic arguments in terms of fisheries and the petroleum industry were the most central arguments made by EEC opponents. It is interesting to note that both campaigns promoted economic arguments, but in different terms. Whereas EEC supporters discussed economic advantages of EEC membership in broader terms, EEC opponents targeted more specific groups, e.g. farmers and those working in the fishing industry. Chart 6.4 presents the most significant arguments made by the EEC opponents:



Chart 6.4

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Furthermore, as indicated in chart 6.2, the most frequently used Eurosceptic terms in the media reporting were 'self-governing', 'democracy', 'national sovereignty' and 'centralisation'. This differs slightly from the reporting in UK newspapers, where 'federalism' and the prospects of a 'political state' were important terms in the reporting. Similar argumentation did appear in Norwegian newspapers, but were not common in the debate. EEC opponents claimed that EEC membership would include the pooling of national sovereignty, with the implication that more decisions would be made in Brussels, e.g. `EEC membership would have an impact on the development of our society. Power would be centralised and important decisions would be made in EEC institutions instead of our democratic institutions. The integrated society promoted by the EEC includes centralisation, bureaucracy and standardisation` (Dagbladet 22 September 1972, p. 16). Arguably, this terminology reflects the arguments made about the fishing industries and the petroleum industry, wanting to keep the resources under national control. Furthermore, it reflects arguments in terms of agriculture, as EEC opponents wanted to protect Norwegian farmers from the standardisation of the framing industries. As discussed, EEC supporters engaged with these arguments

by claiming that it would be less democratic to remain on the outside, as Norway would not be able to take part in the decision-making processes.

According to Stein Ørnhøi[70], former leader of 'No to the EU', EEC opponents instantaneously made the decision to use national symbols in the debate (Ørnhøi, 2016). National symbols would undoubtedly have an emotional appeal on voters, as nationalism can inspire strong feelings of loyalty and devotion to a political cause, idea or movement, often through the use of symbols and slogans. As discussed, Tarrow (1995, 126) believed that the mobilisation of symbols (frames that are symbolised in terms of slogans, form of dress or music, or graffiti etc.) is important in social movements when communicating their views to the public. In Norway, the use of national symbols, such as the national flag, became a symbol of both *independence* and *national sovereignty*. As discussed in Chapter 4, both themes run like a red thread through the membership debate across decades, rooted in the country's long struggle for independence. Patriotic slogans were introduced, e.g. 'the country belongs to us – vote against membership' (Furre 2007, 212). Furthermore, EEC opponents printed a logo in which the national flag was depicted in one half, and the other half presented the slogan `No to EEC membership`.

The No campaign started using national symbols early in the debate to prevent EEC supporters from using them. Once EEC opponents started using them, the idea lost its originality and EEC supporters went in an opposite direction, promoting trade and internationalism. In addition, EEC supporters were reluctant to use national symbols, due to historical events (Ørnhøi, 2016). By and large, EEC supporters came from right-wing political parties. As the radical right had used national symbols during the Second World War, EEC supporters on the political right were cautious about using national symbols in the debate. Although the campaign was made up of people from both the left and right wing, EEC support has often been associated with the parties on the political right. This differs from the UK, where Euroscepticism has generally been associated with the political

[70] Politician and activist who campaigned in both the 1972 and 1994 referendum

right. However, before the 1980s, Eurosceptic attitudes in the UK were more closely associated with the political left, considering the EU a 'capitalist club'.

The analysis of the EEC referendum found that firstly, the media's views contradicted the referendum results. The media announced their stance on EEC membership during the last days leading up to the EEC referendum. Hence, the media arguably aimed to influence public opinion on the EEC. However, when the referendum results were announced, the majority of the public[71] had voted *against* membership of the EEC. In other words, other factors must have been more effective in driving support for Eurosceptic movements than framing effects in the print media. Secondly, analysis found that although the print media published more articles for EEC membership than against EEC membership, the reporting was more balanced than in UK newspapers. Arguably, a more balanced reporting brought opportunities for the 'No campaign' to spread its views to the public by the use of the media. As discussed in Chapter 2, social movements communicate with the public through the media, which help movements to gain attention and maintain support (Tarrow (1995, 126), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3) and Voss (2015,19)). As the media have great impact on opportunities and constraints under which movements operate, they are considered an important political opportunity variable (McAdam et al. 1996, 285). This could suggest that although the reporting in the print media was slightly partisan, it brought opportunities for the movement against the EEC. Finally, the media published a significant number of articles on the EEC referendum. Hence, information about the EEC was made *available* to the public, which arguably encouraged people to engage in the debate and join the movements both for and against the EU. This brings back the argument about priming effects, making it easier for political parties and organisations to recruit members when certain frames are reported on more frequently, and thus made available to the public.

Furthermore, what made it possible for the Eurosceptic movement to win the EEC referendum was the effective and successful grassroots movement that had

[71] 53.5 per cent opposed EEC membership; 46.6 per cent supported EEC membership

developed ahead of the referendum on the EEC. As discussed in Chapter 4, the force behind this campaign was made up of a wide range of people from different social classes (Seierstad 2014, 30), and included interest groups, farmers and fishermen, academics, labour movements and environmental groups. In only a couple of years, the grassroots movement established local organisations in almost all national regions. The movement started an intense campaign against EEC membership; conferences and demonstrations were arranged in the largest cities, and newspapers and flyers were used to spread the message. Furthermore, the movement engaged the public by talking to people on the streets and encouraging them to take part in the campaign. In addition, letters to editors were written for various media outlets (Nei til EU, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 4, the Eurosceptic movement even established its own newspaper, that by the end of the campaign had been distributed in more than 40.000 copies. The group organised conferences in the largest cities, and more than two hundred committees had been established across the country. In addition, the group started a petition for holding a referendum on EEC membership. The petition was promoted and signed at 30 different conferences taking place across the country, with the total of 2500 signatures (NTNU, no date).

The EEC referendum results indicated a significant difference in voting behaviour between centre/periphery. In Oslo, which is the largest city, 66.5 per cent supported EEC membership in 1972. In Finnmark by contrast, located in the rural part of the country, only 29.6 per cent supported membership of the EEC (SSB, no date). The grassroots movement targeted mainly the peripheries, as these were made up of farmers and fishermen, and people who sympathised with these groups. In order to reach out to the voters in the peripheries, the grassroots movement established offices in almost all of the constituencies and communicated with the public by organising public events, handing out information pamphlets and holding demonstrations in both rural places and the largest cities. Arguably, the targeting of specific groups allowed for the grassroots to more effectively spread its message to those most likely to oppose membership of the EEC. As discussed in Chapter 4, the distinction between centre and

periphery also had roots in arguments about the welfare state in 1972. Eurosceptics claimed that EEC membership would lead to a reduction of the public sector and that the current welfare model was threatened by EEC harmonisation (Gstöhl 2002, 539-540). Analysis of voting behaviour (Bjørklund 2001, 145-8) found that those employed in private sector were more supportive of EEC membership than those employed in public sector, as the majority were employed in positions associated with the welfare state. Local communities and municipalities have been the basis upon which the welfare system has been built; those living in the periphery have received the greatest transfers and benefitted most from the welfare state. The system has helped even out the standard of living according to class and region, and reduced the gap between centre and periphery. As a result, those living in the periphery were more Eurosceptic than those living in urban districts (ibid). Arguably, the policy of reducing the standard of living gap between the centre and the periphery, and promoting egalitarianism provided a platform for the opposition against EEC membership.

This brings out similarities between the Norwegian referendum debate in 1972 and the British referendum debate in 2016. In the UK, the referendum debate could additionally be considered a protest against the establishment, as voting data indicated a significant distinction between 'ordinary people' and 'higher social classes'. In fact, 59 per cent of the social class AB voted remain, while 41 per cent voted to leave. By contrast, 36 per cent of the social class DE voted remain, while 54 per cent voted to leave. Similarly, among those with no qualifications, 30 per cent voted remain, while 70 per cent voted to leave. By contrast, among those holding a degree, or higher, 68 per cent voted remain and only 32 per cent voted to leave (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Though the 'No Campaign' in Norway in 1972 did not initially consider the EEC referendum a protest against the establishment, it could still be considered a struggle between 'ordinary people' and the political elite, as the supporters had the backing from the largest political parties and the national media. Whereas EEC supporters were highly represented by people in higher positions, EEC opponents found most of their support in rural

areas among farmers and fishermen, and people sympathising with those employed in the primary sector.

In the EEC referendum, 79.2 per cent participated, which is lower than the 1969 General Election, with 83.8 per cent turnout. Lazarsfeld et al. (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen, 2009) demonstrated in their research a connection between party loyalty and what was considered to be a low turnout. Labour, which was split on EEC membership, eventually made the decision to campaign for EEC membership, as a vote demonstrated that the majority of the party supported EEC membership. Labour promoted arguments for EEC membership and slogans were introduced to effectively influence both party members and the public. The leader of Labour, Trygve Bratteli, put pressure on the party members, as he announced ahead of the EEC referendum that he would resign as PM if the public voted against EEC membership. Arguably, this made it difficult for loyal party members who did not want to go against their own party. As a result, a considerable number of party members abstained from participating in the EEC referendum. Bratteli resigned as PM, as promised, on 18 October 1972.

6.3 Towards closer integration with the EC member states

When the public voted against EEC membership in 1972, the Labour government decided not to debate EEC membership further. Firstly, the EEC referendum put strains on the party, which was split on the EEC. Secondly, once the Government had settled the EEC debate in a referendum, proceeding with another application without the support of the public would be 'impossible'. As the public had made the decision to remain on the outside, there was no point of debating a prospective membership of the EEC. The issue was not debated at any party conferences between 1973-1986. Norway would not become a member of the EEC, but would trade with the other member states through the EFTA agreement (Seierstad 2014, 56).

In 1987, however, Labour announced that Norway should proceed towards deeper integration with the other member states in the EC. The announcement did not set out in greater detail what the implications of deeper integration would

be, but the EC debate had been brought back onto the political agenda (Seierstad 2014, 56-60). In 1989, PM Gro Harlem Brundtland promised that the process of deeper integration would *not* result in membership of the EC. She encouraged EC opponents to support a prospective trade agreement with the EC member states, as an agreement with the other member states would supposedly prevent full membership of the EC (ibid, 61). In 1989, a white paper from the Labour Government confirmed that negotiations would eventually result in a trade agreement with the EC member states, i.e. the EEA agreement. EC opponents feared that the EEA agreement would be the first step towards full membership of the EC.

The EEA agreement was signed on 2 May 1992 and ratified by the Norwegian Government on 18 October 1992. The European Economic Area (EEA) would include all the EC member states and three of the EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The EEA agreement would guarantee equal rights and obligations within the internal market for individuals and economic operators in the EEA. Furthermore, the agreement provided for the inclusion of EC legislation in all policy areas in the Single Market. This included the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital, as well as competition and state aid rules, but also horizontal policies, e.g. consumer protection, company law, environmental and social policy (EFTA, no date).

The EEA agreement was based on the primary legislation of the EC at the time of the EEA agreement's entry into force and on secondary legislation. Hence, a large part of the EEA agreement was identical to the relevant parts governing the four freedoms as laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EC. A central feature of the EEA agreement was its dynamic aspect; the common rules of the EEA agreement would be updated continuously with new EU legislation (EFTA, no date). However, the EEA agreement would not grant the EEA states formal access to the decision-making process within the EC.

The movement against the EEC, which dissolved after the EEC referendum in 1977, re-emerged as a response to the Government's announcement on 25

September 1990. The members of the organisation, which predicted another EC membership debate, prepared to campaign against membership of the EC, again, and decided to name the organisation 'No to the EC' (Seierstad 2014, 63). In order to spread its message to rural areas, local organisations were re-established in most of the constituencies, which proved to be an effective strategy in the EEC membership campaign in 1972. EC opponents aimed to inform the public on the implications of membership of the EC. Furthermore, they campaigned against the signing of the EEA agreement and launched an 'information campaign' on 1 February 1992. The movement adopted similar strategies to those used in 1972, with the aim to reach out to as many as possible. Leaflets and information sheets, with the purpose to inform the public on the implications of the EEA agreement, were printed and distributed to both rural and urban areas of the country. In addition, the movement started a petition against the signing of the EEA agreement (Seierstad 2014, 92). 175,000 signed the petition, which was handed over to the Ministry of Foreign affairs (ibid, 118).

The signing and ratification of the EEA agreement was reported on in the media, but fewer articles were published than on the EEC referendum in 1972. As indicated in Chart 6.1, the media in this sample published 69 articles in total. 39 articles supported the EEA agreement, 33 articles opposed the EEA agreement, and 113 articles simply informed about the EEA[72]. Naturally, a referendum on EEC membership is considered more newsworthy than the signing of the EEA agreement, but considering the implications of the agreement, it is worth noting that the media did not give more attention to it. As discussed in Chapter 2, prior research (The Glasgow University Media Group and the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, cited in: Fowler 1999, 2) has found that what events are reported on in the media is not a reflection of the importance of those events, but a 'process of selection'. The media select events for reporting according to a set of criteria of *newsworthiness.* Then, the selected news is subject to processes of transformation, as it is encoded for publication; choice of medium

[72] Dates included in the data sample: 2-3 May 1992 (EEA agreement signed on 2 May), 14-18 October 1992 (EEA agreement ratified in Norwegian Government on 18 October)

and the framing of the news. In this view, news is not simply that which happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy (ibid, 3-11).

A change in the reporting is noticeable from 1972, as the media reporting became more balanced. Firstly, arguments were presented both for and against the EEA agreement. Voices were represented from both campaigns and most of the articles 'informatively' reported on the EEA. Secondly, Eurosceptic terms were no longer present in the media, which is a remarkable change from the reporting of the EEC referendum in 1972. As indicated in Chart 6.2, 'bureaucracy' and 'self-governing' vanished from the reporting. 'Democracy' and 'centralisation' appeared only once, and 'national sovereignty' appeared in two articles. As discussed, the EEA agreement provided for the inclusion of EC legislation in all policy areas in the Single Market, and the EEA member states would not be granted formal access to the decision-making processes within the EC. It is therefore worth noting that terms like 'centralisation' and 'sovereignty' vanished from the debate, as these were central arguments in the EEC debate in 1972. This could imply that either EC opponents did not aim to publish articles in the media due to the decline in public engagement, or that the media deliberately excluded Eurosceptic articles from the reporting.

The most central arguments made by the supporters of the EEA agreement were arguments in terms of market access, industrial competitiveness and participation in the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. EC supporters considered the EEA agreement a step towards full membership of the EC. Once the EEA agreement entered into force, the public would presumably be more supportive of membership of the EC. However, if the public made the decision not to support EC membership in a second referendum, the EEA agreement would at the very least ensure market access. By contrast, the most central arguments made by the opponents of the EEA agreement were arguments in terms of unemployment, social dumping and protection of national resources, e.g. the petroleum industry. There was a shared concern among EEA opponents that

through the EEA agreement, the oil/gas resources would be shared equally with the EC member states.

So, analysis of the EEA agreement found that the media became more balanced in their reporting in 1992: the number of articles opposing the EEA almost outweighed the number of articles supporting the EEA. This is a remarkable change from the coverage of the EEC referendum, when 85 articles supported the EEC, while only 36 articles opposed the EEC. As Indicated in Chart 6.5, the public became increasingly opposed to the EC after 1991. It is worth noting that the change in opinion polls happened *before* the signing and ratification of the EEA agreement. Hence, something else must have triggered a shift in public opinion on the EC. Arguably, if framing effects in the media bring opportunities for movements and political parties, a more balanced reporting and the change in the opinion polls should have brought opportunities for the movement against the EC:



Chart 6.5

(Some of) the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on "NSDs meningsmålingsarkiv". The data are provided by Respons Analyse AS and Opinion , and prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither Respons Analyse AS, Opinion nor NSD are responsible for the analysis/interpretation of the data presented here.

* 1990 polls conducted in February and December
* 1991 polls conducted in January and December

* 1993 polls conducted in May and December
Surveys provided by NSD (NSD, no date)

According to Ørnhøi (2016), this has not been the case. He campaigned against EC membership both in 1972 and 1994, and had a central role in the 1994 campaign as deputy leader of No to the EC. 'We struggled to engage the public in the EEA debate', he said. 'By and large, the debate on the EEA agreement engaged those with a particular interest in EC matters, and not so much 'ordinary people'', he continued. He found that a problem with the debate on the EEA agreement was that the EEA has never been understood by ordinary people as a part of the EC. Hence, the use of national symbols, which effectively appealed to the voters in 1972, has not been as effective in the debate on the EEA agreement (Interview, 2016).

An explanation for the difficulties in mobilising opposition against the EEA could be that people did not feel *informed* about the EEA. This feeling has been captured in a research conducted by NSD in 1990. In an opinion poll, 47.9 per cent of the public did in fact support the EEA agreement, while only 8.7 per cent opposed the EEA. 43.5 per cent did not have an opinion about the EEA (NSD, no date). What is particularly interesting about the poll is not that 47.9 per cent supported the EEA agreement, but that 43.5 per cent did not have an *opinion* about it. Arguably, this could indicate that the public did not feel informed about the EEA, which could be a consequence of the decrease in media articles published on the EC. In fact, the feeling of not being well informed on the matter has been confirmed in a later opinion poll conducted by the NSD in 1991, which found that only 5.5 per cent of the public felt well informed about the EEA negotiations, while 36.9 per cent felt informed about the EEA. 40.2 per cent did *not* feel well informed about the EEA, while 12.7 per cent did not feel informed at all. 4.8 per cent did not respond (NSD, no date). When the public feel less informed on a political matter, such as the EC, it seems to discourage participation in debates on the EC. This, again, could make it difficult for Eurosceptic movements to recruit members and remain relevant in the debate on the EU.

As discussed, the Norwegian public became increasingly opposed to the EC after 1991. As the change in opinion polls happened *before* the signing and ratification of the EEA agreement, something else must have triggered a shift in public opinion on the EC. As demonstrated in the UK case, Maastricht appears to have influenced the debate, as the British public became more opposed to membership of the EC after 1991. To capture the Norwegian media's *reactions* to Maastricht, the analysis studied the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish referendum has been included in this study due to two factors. Firstly, due to the shift in public opinion after Maastricht. Secondly, because the positions of the neighbouring countries, Denmark and Sweden, had an impact on the EEC debate in 1972. The Danish attitude towards Maastricht could therefore similarly have influenced the debate in 1992.

The Danish referendum, which was held on 2 June 1992, indicated that 50.7 per cent of the public did in fact *not* support Maastricht. The results were initially considered a hindrance to the process of European integration, but as the Danish Government secured opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and the 'Citizenship of the European Union', the Danish public accepted Maastricht in a second referendum in 1993 (Seierstad 2014, 159). Arguably, the reluctance to accept the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark was bound to have an impact on the Norwegian debate.

The debate in the Norwegian media became more partisan again in the reporting of Maastricht. Similar to 1972, the media published more articles supporting deeper integration, than opposing deeper integration. In general, the media did not criticise the establishment of political union. As indicated in Chart 6.1, in this sample 66 articles reported on the Maastricht referendum in Denmark[73]. 12 articles supported Maastricht, 1 article opposed Maastricht, and 52 articles simply informed about the Maastricht referendum in Denmark.

[73] Dates included in this data sample: 30 May- 5 June 1992

Similar to the reporting of the EEA, the language used in the articles did not include Eurosceptic terms. 'Democracy' and 'self-government' appeared in 2 articles each, and 'bureaucracy' appeared in only 1 article. As only one article opposed Maastricht, arguments against the EC were not reported on in the media. However, the only article opposing the establishment of a 'political union' argued that when the member states proceeded towards deeper political integration, it would become more difficult for them to manage separate agreements with neighbouring countries, such as Norway.

As most of the articles published by the media supported Maastricht, the most central arguments and terms in the reporting were those promoted by EC supporters. The most frequently used term in the reporting was 'crisis', which appeared in 8 articles and was used to describe the devastating results of the Danish referendum. Furthermore, EC supporters portrayed the Danish results as 'dramatic', 'an earthquake', 'a nightmare' and 'a great shock' for the EC. The most central argument presented by EC supporters in the media stated that Maastricht would ensure peace and stability in Europe, and prevent nationalism from re-emerging in the nation states. Furthermore, EC supporters argued that a rejection of Maastricht in Denmark could possibly have an impact on the Norwegian application for membership of the EC, as all applications could be put on hold until all member states successfully ratified Maastricht. EC opponents, by contrast, argued in terms of 'isolation', claiming that the other member states would proceed towards deeper integration with or without Denmark. As the Scandinavian countries would not succeed on their own, isolated from the EC member states, the Scandinavian countries should aim to proceed at the same speed as the other member states in the EC.

Taken into consideration that the media reported on Maastricht, and hence found it *newsworthy*, the establishment of a political union arguably must have influenced the Norwegian debate on the EC. Data collected in the form of interviews confirmed this presumption. Despite not being a member of the EU, Maastricht *did* have an impact on the Norwegian debate. According to Ørnhøi

(2016), 'Maastricht became a central argument in the debate against membership of the EU. We [No to the EC] linked the establishment of a political union to national sovereignty and democracy. We *consistently* argued in terms of self-government and democracy'. As indicated in Chart 6.5, the public gradually became more opposed to the EC from 1991 to 1993. This suggests that Maastricht influenced public opinion on the EC.

6.4 The 1994 referendum

In 1988, the Labour Government brought the EC membership debate back onto the agenda. As discussed, PM Gro Harlem Brundtland ensured EC opponents that a trade agreement with access to the single market would supposedly prevent full membership of the EC. However, the 1989 Labour party programme stated that: 'Norway should aim to integrate with the EC on the terms that best secure our national interests' (Seierstad 2014, 97). In 1988, Labour had started an investigation of benefits and risks of membership of the EC. The investigation included 10-12.000 participants, based on a sample of the population. In 1992, the completed investigation confirmed that the majority of the participants *recommended* EU membership. The Parliament approved the application for EU membership after a vote in Parliament on 19 November 1992 (ibid, 154). As the previous application had been withdrawn after the public rejected EEC membership in 1972, the Government felt pressured to hold a second referendum. The rule had become `what the people have decided, only the people can dissolve` (Tiersky 2001, 114). The EU referendum, which took place on 28 November 1994, once again rejected membership of the EU. The results were almost identical to the results in the 1972 referendum: 52.2 per cent voted against EU membership, while 47.8 per cent supported membership of the EU. Similar to 1972, EU supporters had the support from the largest political parties and *the media.*

As indicated in Chart 6.1, the total number of articles in the data sample almost doubled from the 1972 referendum. In total, 421 articles were published on the

EU referendum[74], which is the highest number of articles published at any of the events included in this data sample. 94 articles supported membership of the EU, 40 articles opposed membership of the EU, and 287 articles simply informed about the referendum on the EU. A remarkable change in the reporting has been identified as, firstly, the integration debate became more salient again, not only in terms of the frequency in the reporting, but also in stylistic terms, e.g. the reporting included both leading articles, headlines and front pages. Not only did the Government put the EU debate back on the political agenda, but so did the Norwegian media.

Secondly, the language changed significantly and included more Eurosceptic terms, as indicated in Chart 6.2. However, this could possibly be explained by the fact that the reporting included articles opposed to the EU. In 1992, articles against deeper integration vanished from the reporting, which caused a decline the frequency of Eurosceptic terms.

Finally, the media once again promoted membership of the EU. As discussed, during the signing and ratification of the EEA, the media adopted a less partisan attitude when reporting on the EU. In 1994, the media reporting dramatically changed and the media once again became eminently supportive of the EU. In fact, Dagbladet – which had been a Eurosceptic newspaper in 1972 – became supportive of the EU in 1994. These findings are in line with Ramberg's analysis from 1995 (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen 1999, 22), which similarly indicated that the print media presented more arguments for EU membership than against EU membership in 1994. Anyhow, similar to 1972, the media did not ignore the voices of the Eurosceptic movements and both campaigns had access to the media, but to various degrees. According to Stein Ørnhøi (2016), 'the newspapers adopted the ideology that media coverage on the EU referendum should be completely neutral and that both campaigns should be represented in the reporting of the EU. However, this ideology was built on the naive perception that a letter to the editor is just as informative as a front page. That is not how it works and the 'yes

[74] Dates included in this data sample: 25 November- 1 December 1994

campaign' dominated the front pages. In fact, they dominated the media coverage in general'.

If framing shapes people's views and behaviour, the Yes campaign should have won the referendum on the EU. However, if the argument that priming effects bring more opportunities for social movements than framing effects is plausible, 'No to the EU' should benefit from the frequency in the reporting, despite a more pro-EU attitude in the media. Despite the fact that the Government had signed and ratified the EEA agreement before the EU referendum took place, the arguments were fairly similar to the argumentation in 1972. Though, as we shall see, some differences have been identified in the reporting.

The *terms* most frequently used to promote the EU, were 'democracy' which appeared in 34 articles, 'isolation' which appeared in 31 articles, 'peace' which appeared in 20 articles and 'welfare' which appeared 10 articles. These were the terms associated with the benefits of membership of the EU. Furthermore, as indicated in Chart 6.6, the most central *arguments* introduced by EU supporters in the media were arguments in terms of the decision-making processes and possible isolation from the EU member states.



Chart 6.6

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

Firstly, EU supporters emphasised that voting against EU membership would isolate the nation from the rest of the Continent. Denmark had already become a member of the EEC in 1973, and Finland and Sweden had applied for EU membership. Hence, Norway would find itself in a difficult position if the other neighbouring countries were to become members of the EU, e.g. `In 1972, when Norway held its first EEC referendum, a Nordic arrangement was an alternative to EEC membership. This time around, an arrangement like that is not an option, as Iceland is the only country to remain on the outside` (Aftenposten 25 November 1994, p. 13). The term 'isolation' had been introduced already in the 1972 referendum debate, but as indicated in Chart 6.6, 'isolation' did not rank as one of the most frequently used terms in 1972. This is a noticeable change, as 'isolation' ranked as a top argument in the media in 1994.

Secondly, EU supporters emphasised the democratic deficit with the EEA agreement. As discussed, the EEA agreement provided for the inclusion of EU legislation in all policy areas in the Single Market, and the EEA member states are not granted formal access to the decision-making processes within the EU. In order to take part in these processes, which directly have an impact on the country, Norway must become a member of the EU. In 1972, the democratic deficit ranked as the fourth most salient argument in the media. In 1994, by contrast, the democratic deficit became more central in the debate and ranked as the top argument in the media made by EC supporters.

Thirdly, EU supporters argued that Norway would prosper economically from membership of the EU. Standing 'alone' on the outside could have great implications on the national economy, while EU membership would prevent stagnation or turbulence in the economy. Similarly, standing alone on the outside could have a damaging impact on industries, in different areas. If the public voted against membership of the EU, large industries could be forced to move their production to EU member states. If so, jobs would be put at risk, which could possibly result in higher unemployment. Overall, economic arguments had less significance than in 1972, arguably because the country already had been given

full access to the Single Market. In 1972, economic arguments ranked as the most important issue in the media made by EC supporters, while in 1994 they ranked as the third most important issue.

Finally, 'peace' and 'security' were central arguments used by the supporters in the reporting of the EU. There was a shared belief among EU supporters that the establishment of the EU had brought peace to the Continent. It would therefore be 'ridiculous' not to take part in the EU. As indicated in Chart 6.6, arguments in terms of 'peace' and 'security' became more salient in 1994 than in 1972. By contrast, arguments in terms of 'trade' became less important in the debate, as access to the single market had already been secured through the EEA agreement. In 1972, 'trade' ranked as the fourth most important argument, while in 1994 it had dropped to the tenth most salient argument.

As indicated in Chart 6.2, the most frequently used Eurosceptic *term* in the coverage of the 1994 referendum was 'national sovereignty', which appeared in 26 articles. 'Self-government' appeared in 23 articles and 'democracy' appeared in 18 articles. 'Bureaucracy' and 'centralisation' were present terms in the reporting, but these were reported on less frequently, as 'bureaucracy' appeared in only 5 articles and 'centralisation' appeared in 4 articles.



Chart 6.7

Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3

As indicated in Chart 6.7, the most frequently used *arguments* in the media made by EU opponents were arguments in terms of 'self-governing'. In 1972, 'self-governing' ranked as the fourth most important issue in the media made by EU opponents, while in 1994 it became the top issue. 'Self-governing' had been a significant argument when the 1972 referendum took place, but the significance of 'self-governing' increased remarkably after Maastricht. EU opponents emphasised that economic integration had proceeded towards *political* integration. Hence, EU membership would include even more pooling of national sovereignty. As discussed, Maastricht triggered a complicated ratification process in some of the member states and during the 1990s, several member states secured national opt-outs from certain areas of integration, e.g. social policies and the single currency. The reluctance to accept the Maastricht Treaty in other member states arguably had an impact on the EU referendum in 1994. The establishment of a political union seemed to have pushed people back from voting for EU membership. According to Dag Seierstad, a politician with a central role in the debate in both 1972 and 1994, `the ratification process had a special impact on the EU debate` (Seierstad, 2016). He argued that opinion polls conducted before the EU referendum found that EU supporters were in majority before

Maastricht. However, once the ratification process started in Denmark, support for EU membership dropped and the polls indicated a split electorate (ibid). Opinion polls provided by the NSD (no date) confirm a change in attitudes after Maastricht: in 1991, 37.5 per cent supported EC membership, while 32.3 per cent opposed EC membership. 34.3 per cent did not have an opinion. In 1993, 26 per cent supported EU membership. 55.6 per cent opposed EU membership. 18.4 per cent did not have an opinion.

Similarly, arguments in terms of 'democracy' were central in the debate. It is worth noting that such arguments were used by both supporters and opponents of the EU. EU opponents emphasised that membership would move the decision-making process even further away from the people, in a centralised-decision making process in Brussels. In addition, smaller nation states would not be given a great voice on important matters. According to Ørnhøi (2016), EU opponents focused on the distance between 'ordinary people' and those who make political decisions: 'We did talk about national sovereignty, but we strategically focused on *the distance* to Brussels'. As discussed in Chapter 5, the distance between the people and those who make the decisions have similarly been a frequently used argument by UKIP. In both of these case studies, Euroscepticism seeks to mobilise against 'elites', arguing that the political elite is somehow different to 'ordinary people'.

Furthermore, central arguments used by EU opponents were arguments in terms of agriculture and the fishing industries. As discussed, these arguments came to play a significant role in 1972. The argumentation in 1994 was similar to the argumentation in 1972, with focus on the sharing of fishing quotas and the process of standardisation within the farming industries. Similar to 1972, there was a concern among EU opponents that smaller farms would be diversified, which could lead to a 'centralising process', forcing people to move from rural areas in to more urban areas, due to increased unemployment. A difference in the reporting is noticeable, as the fishing industries were less frequently reported on than in 1972. In 1972, arguments in terms of fishing industries ranked as the top

issue, while in 1994 it dropped to the third most important issue. To EU opponents (Ørnhøi, Interview 2016), arguments on fishing industries had the same significance in both referendums, suggesting a mismatch between arguments made by EU opponents and the most frequent arguments in the media against the EU.

Research conducted by Kristen Ringdal (cited in: Ryghaug & Jenssen, 2009) found that the most important arguments for the voters supporting EU membership were:

1. Political influence and to take part in decision-making processes
2. Security and safety
3. Access to the single market
4. Isolation
5. Economic growth
6. Environment
7. Free movement
8. Peace

The most important arguments for the voters opposing EU membership were:

1. Self-government and democracy, to make decisions close to the people
2. Jobs and unemployment
3. Agriculture
4. Maastricht (political union)
5. Culture
6. Economic growth and against capitalism
7. Fisheries
8. Crime, immigration and national borders

The data confirm that the arguments ranked as top issues among voters, were reported on in the media. The analysis found that 'decision-making', 'peace' and 'security', and 'isolation' ranked among the top issues for EU supporters, which correlates with the data presented here. Furthermore, the analysis found that

‘self-governing’, ‘democracy’ and ‘agriculture’ ranked among the top issues for EU opponents, which also correlates with the data.

Similar to 1972, the 1994 referendum results indicated a significant difference in voting behaviour between centre/periphery. The grassroots movement adopted the same strategies as in 1972, with particular focus on the rural areas of the country. Stein Ørnhøi recalls in an interview (2016) ‘to win again in 1994, the referendum had to get a higher turnout than in 1972. It was really important to get a higher turnout in those areas most likely to vote against membership of the EU’. As mentioned, the grassroots re-established offices in almost all of the constituencies and communicated with the public by organising public events, handing out information pamphlets and holding demonstrations in both rural places and in the largest cities, as discussed in Chapter 3. Similar to 1972, demographic factors had an impact on voting behaviour in 1994: in less populated areas, such as Finnmark, 74.5 per cent of the population voted against the EU. In more urban areas, such as Oslo, 33.4 per cent voted against the EU. This is almost identical to the results of 1972, when 70.4 per cent voted against the EEC in Finnmark, and 33.5 per cent voted against the EEC in Oslo (SSB, 1995). Hence, similar to 1972, the targeting of specific groups arguably allowed for the grassroots to more effectively spread its message to those most likely to oppose the EU.

Furthermore, Labour adopted a different strategy in 1994, which arguably contributed to the victory for the ‘No Campaign’. As discussed, Labour announced ahead of the 1972 referendum that it would support membership of the EEC. The PM made a promise to resign if the public voted against the EEC, which put off party members from participating in the EEC referendum. In 1994, by contrast, Labour kept its positive stance towards the EU, but opened up for diverse opinions and emphasised that all party members should make up their own minds on the EU. This seemed to have encouraged the party members, and the public in general, to participate in the EU referendum, as the turnout increased by almost

10 per cent: 88.6 per cent voted in the referendum in 1994 (Ryghaug & Jenssen 2009, 11).

The analysis of the EU referendum demonstrated that despite a favourable coverage of the EU in the media, EU opponents won the referendum in 1994 against the entire political establishment. The EU referendum results do not correlate with the attitudes promoted in the media: in both 1972 and 1994, the Norwegian print media supported membership of the EEC/EU. The public, by contrast, voted against membership of the EEC/EU. These findings contribute further to the argument that priming effects and media attention are more effective in bringing opportunities for the Norwegian Eurosceptic movement than the effects of framing in the print media. If the effects of framing were more forceful than the effects of priming, the pro-EU reporting should not have brought political opportunities for 'No to the EU' in 1972 and 1994.

Furthermore, the 1994 referendum results confirm the effectivity of grassroots movements and targeted messaging, as demonstrated in 1972. Without the support from either the print media or the largest political parties, the Norwegian grassroots movement managed to mobilise enough support to win the referendums in both 1972 and 1994. Similar to 1972, the Eurosceptic movement spent large amounts on campaign materials in order to reach out to – and inform the public on the EU. The movement received a significant number of donations from the public, but the largest financial contributions came from organisations in the primary sector, i.e. fishing organisations and agricultural organisations (Ørnhøi, 2016). In 1994, the movement produced 160 printed materials in 9.1 million exemplars. Similar to the Eurosceptic movement in 1972, a Eurosceptic newspaper was launched, published in 42 issues and distributed in 11.7 million copies. As discussed, the reason for this was to reach out to those living in the peripheries, as these were less exposed to campaign activities taking place in the urban places around the country. Furthermore, the Eurosceptic movement did an analysis of the implications of membership in the EU and had it distributed in 50,000 exemplars across the country. What made all of this possible, was the large

number of supporters volunteering for the grassroots movement – more than 10,000 volunteers helped distribute materials out to the households (Seierstad 2014, 201-5). Stein Ørnhøi (2016) recalls; 'I travelled around for two years to attend meetings all around the country in order to spread our message to the public. We did it the traditional way and this engaged people in the debate – we would talk to someone who knew someone who had not yet made up their minds, and the people we met helped us spread the message out to the undecided. That is how it is done'. As discussed in Chapter 5, this strategy of connecting with 'ordinary people' through grassroots activities is similar to the strategy adopted by UKIP. In both cases, the Eurosceptic movements seem to have benefitted from priming effects in the media (despite not always receiving favourable attention in the media) and grassroots campaigning, which allowed for the Eurosceptic groups to effectively mobilise by targeting certain areas of the country.

6.5 The Schengen Agreement

When the EEA negotiations took place in 1992, EU opponents had emphasised the risk of deeper political integration in additional areas if a 'trade agreement' came into place. As predicted, the Government signed an agreement committing Norway to closer integration with the EU member states on 19 December 1996, i.e. the Schengen Agreement. The Government signed the agreement after a vote in Parliament, where the majority of the representatives supported integration in the area of border controls (Seierstad 2014, 276-77). According to Hallvard Bakke, a political activist with a central role in both the 1972 and 1994 referendum, 'Some Labour members opposed the Schengen Agreement, but most of us supported it. The other Scandinavian countries would, as member states, participate in the Schengen Agreement, which put us in a difficult position: our neighbours would be on the inside of the Schengen Area' (Interview, 2016). Arguably, this put pressure on the Government to sign the Schengen Agreement.

The Schengen Agreement enhances the freedom of movement by enabling citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks. The border-free area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens,

as well as to many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on EU territory. The Schengen Agreement includes a harmonisation of the conditions of entry, enhanced police co-operation, stronger judicial co-operation, and the establishment and development of the Schengen Information System (SIS), (Europa.EU, 2018).

As indicated in Chart 6.1, the signing of the Schengen Agreement did not cause a debate in the media similar to the referendum debate in 1994. As expected, the total number of articles decreased and Norway's relationship to the EU received less attention in the media. 37 articles in this data sample reported on the Schengen Agreement in total[75]; 6 articles supported the Agreement, 10 articles opposed the Agreement, while 21 articles simply informed about the Agreement. Simultaneously with the shift in media attention, a change in the language is noticeable, as Eurosceptic terms were no longer present in the reporting. As discussed in the reporting of the EEA, this probably has to do with the fact that fewer articles were published. As indicated in graph 6.2, the only Eurosceptic terms that appeared in the reporting were 'democracy', which appeared once, 'self-governing', which appeared in 3 articles and 'sovereignty', which appeared in 4 articles.

The most central arguments presented by EU supporters were arguments in terms of 'common borders', which allowed for free movement through the abolition of border controls. Furthermore, EU supporters emphasised police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. EU opponents, by contrast, emphasised the loss of 'national sovereignty', as participating states would not be able to control their national borders inside the Schengen Area. In addition, EU opponents claimed that the signing of the Schengen Agreement contradicted the EU referendum in 1994: the public had already voted against deeper political integration by rejecting full membership of the EU. In this view, the Government had – without the support from the public – proceeded towards deeper political integration,

[75] Dates included in the data sample: 19-20 December 1996 (Schengen Agreement signed on 19 December), 7-11 June 1997 (Schengen Agreement ratified in Norwegian Government on 9 June).

despite being given the opposite recommendation by the public in 1994. Though such concerns did not get much attention in the media, it is worth noting that it was reported on, and that such views have been present in the reporting, e.g. `I can understand that people have had enough of the EU debate. However, the Government takes advantage of this; step by step, the Government signs agreements that commit us to deeper integration, despite the fact that the public voted against EU membership (VG, 20 December 1996, p. 45). The article continued: `The journalists and the media do not seem to pay any attention to the Agreement, which probably has to do with the fact that they want the public to believe that the Agreement is already a done deal` (ibid).

'No to the EU' opposed the signing of the Schengen Agreement and organised a protest on 28 November 1996. EU opponents demonstrated against the Agreement on the Swedish border, together with EU opponents from Sweden. However, the Eurosceptic oranisation found it difficult to mobilise opposition against the Schengen Agreement. Similar to the signing of the EEA agreement, the public did not seem to engage in the debate. Naturally, public engagement diminished after the EU referendum in 1994. Firstly, the EU referendum made it possible for 'ordinary people' to take part in the decision-making process on whether or not to become a full member of the EU. Arguably, this encouraged the public to engage in the debate. The Schengen Agreement, by contrast, was decided upon and signed by the Government, without consulting with the public first. As the public was not consulted, it arguably reduced the opportunity for public engagement in the debate. Secondly, as the Government did not encourage public debate on Schengen, the public did not have the same access to information about the agreement, as they had to the referendum on the EU. As discussed, the analysis of the reporting of the EEA agreement indicated that when the public does not feel well informed, fewer people engage in the EU debate – as a result, it becomes more difficult for the Eurosceptic movement to maintain its relevance and hence continue to mobilise opposition against the EU. Finally, as the print media did not report as frequently on the Schengen Agreement, the reporting provided a smaller platform to which EU opponents could spread their

views to the public outside of grassroots activities. This suggests that grassroots mobilisation on its own is not enough for an organisation of this type to be successful, 'No to the EU' needed the combination of media attention and grassroots campaigning to mobilise the public. When the signing of the EEA agreement and the Schengen agreement took place, the organisation used the same strategies as they did in the referendums in 1972 and 1994. However, mobilisation against the EU has not been possible outside of the context of referendums on the EU. Nevertheless, the public remained opposed to membership of the EU, as indicated in Chart 6.8:



Chart 6.8

* 1990 polls conducted in February and December
* 1991 polls conducted in January and December
* 1993 polls conducted in May and December
* 1994 polls conducted in January and December
* 2002 polls conducted in January and December
* 2003 polls conducted in January and December
Surveys provided by NSD (NSD, no date)

6.6 EU enlargement

On 1 May 2004, ten nation states with a combined population of almost 75 million joined the European Union. The historic enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states was the culmination of a long accession process leading to the

reunification of a Europe that had been divided for half a century by the Iron Curtain and the Cold War. With 25 member states, the European Union in 2004 formed a political and economic area with 450 million citizens (EUR-Lex, 2007). Firstly, EU enlargement would have an impact on member states that were subject to free movement through EU membership. Secondly, it would have an impact on nation states that were subject to free movement through bilateral agreements, i.e. the EEA agreement.

As indicated in Chart 6.1, in this sample a total amount of 47 articles was published on the enlargement of the EU[76]. 6 articles opposed EU enlargement, 5 articles supported EU enlargement and 36 articles simply informed about the EU enlargement. The reporting did not change remarkably from the reporting of the Schengen Agreement. Firstly, a similar amount of articles were published on both events, which as discussed, could either be an attempt to avoid public debate on the matter, or simply an indicator that the media did not find the events *newsworthy*. Secondly, the language used in the reporting was similar during both events. Eurosceptic terms were not present in the reporting on Schengen and the Enlargement of the EU. In fact, Eurosceptic terms have not been present in the reporting since the EU referendum in 1994. As indicated in Chart 6.2, the only Eurosceptic term present in the reporting of the EU enlargement was 'self-governing', which appeared in only 2 articles.

In articles supporting EU enlargement, the reporting emphasised the reunification of the East and the West. EU enlargement marked the beginning of a unified Europe, making future conflicts between the nation states less likely to happen, e.g.: `EU enlargement strengthens the feeling of not participating in the EU, but the enlargement has greater significance than the EU membership debate; what started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has now been completed with the reunification of the East and the West` (Aftenposten, 2 May 2004, p. 4). As discussed in Chapter 5, this type of reporting symbolises a strong sense of *togetherness*, which appeals to similarities between 'us' and 'them'. A similar type

[76] Dates included in the data sample: 28 April - 4 May 2004

of reporting was identified in the UK case, especially in the reporting of the EEC referendum in 1972 and the EU enlargement, when the other member states were referred to as 'friends', 'partners' and 'family'.

Eurosceptics who criticised or opposed the enlargement of the EU emphasised that the event would also bring challenges for society, e.g. the concept of 'social dumping'. As discussed in Aftenposten, `the police do not have the resources to control the contracts of all the EU migrants. With increased EU migration, the police do not have enough resources to control social dumping` (Aftenposten, 29 April 2004, p. 1). However, a limited number of arguments were presented in the articles, as most of the articles simply informed about the event without arguing either for or against the enlargement of the EU. Again, it is possible to draw parallels to the reporting in the UK, where social dumping was one of the most present arguments promoted by EU opponents.

Simultaneously with the rise of Euroscepticism in opinion polls on the EU, the Norwegian Eurosceptic movement has diminished and it has become increasingly difficult for 'No to the EU' and open up a debate on the EU:



Chart 6.9

(Some of) the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on "NSDs meningsmålingsarkiv". The data are provided by Respons Analyse AS and Opinion, and prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither Respons

Analyse AS, Opinion nor NSD are responsible for the analysis/interpretation of the data presented here.

* 1990 polls conducted in February and December
* 1991 polls conducted in January and December
* 1993 polls conducted in May and December
* 1994 polls conducted in January and December
* 2002 polls conducted in January and December
* 2003 polls conducted in January and December

Surveys provided by NSD (NSD, no date)

Arguably, three different factors appear to have contributed to this result. Firstly, it could be argued that 'No to the EU' lost its purpose when the public, for the second time, voted against membership of the EU. The 1994 referendum made it almost 'impossible' for a political party to bring the EU membership debate back on the political agenda. 'No to the EU' therefore had to find a different purpose, namely the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement. However, the public has remained eminently supportive of the EEA agreement, which has made it difficult for 'No to the EU' to capitalise on the democratic deficit, which is one of their most significant arguments against the EEA agreement. Furthermore, it could be argued that a referendum in binary terms is easier to understand, which possibly encourage people to engage in the debate, whereas a more nuanced relationship like the EEA agreement requires greater expertise to comprehend.

Secondly, 'No to the EU' emerged as a 'party neutral' organisation in order to recruit members from across the political spectrum and most of its members additionally held memberships in the established parties. Once the 1994 referendum was over, a significant number of supporters therefore ended their membership in the organisation out of loyalty to their political parties. As all Norwegian political parties accept divergent opinions on the EU, and EU membership remains completely off the table, party members seem not to find it necessary to keep mobilising behind a movement against the EU.

Finally, the media have gradually reported less frequently on the EU, making it more difficult for 'No to the EU' to spread its message and continue to mobilise opposition against the EU. As discussed in Chapter 2, the media contribute to the salience of political issues by reporting on them and sharing ideas, either

constructed by the media or adopted from somewhere else. 'No to the EU' has therefore not been successful in mobilising opposition against the EU outside of the context of EU referendums in 1972 and 1994. This is not only confirmed by the membership number of 'No to the EU', but also confirmed through the elite interviews that were conducted for this research. As Kathrine Kleveland, current leader of 'No to the EU' stated in an interview, 'media attention has decreased since the 1994 referendum, which is understandable' (Interview Kleveland, 2016). She continues 'it has been particularly difficult to open up a debate on the EEA agreement'.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the reporting of the most significant EU events in the Norwegian print media since 1972, with particular focus on the 1990s and beyond, and the decline in support for 'No to the EU'. The data in the content analysis indicated that, firstly, the reporting of the EU in the Norwegian print media has been slightly partisan, as the print media supported EU membership in both 1972 and 1994. In both membership debates, the print media advised the public to vote in favour of membership of the EU. If framing effects are more effective than priming effects, the media should not have brought political opportunities for 'No to the EU'. If anything, EU supporters, with the support from both the print media and the establishment, should have won both referendums on the EU. In both of these case studies, framing effects appear not to bring any immediate opportunities for Eurosceptic movements.

By contrast, a connection between priming effects in the media and the success of Eurosceptic movements has been established. Similarly to the case of UKIP, when the print media reported more frequently on the EU, despite reporting favourably of the EU, 'No to the EU' found it easier to maintain support and mobilise opposition against the EU. Correspondingly, when the print media reported less frequently on the EU, 'No to the EU' found it increasingly difficult to remain relevant and mobilise opposition against the EU. As discussed in Chapter 2, the influence of frames used by social movements varies by setting and over

time. A movement can constantly use the same frames in which to argue its case, but mobilisation of support can vary greatly over time. Whereas the framing of the EU in the print media, as the only factor, appears not to bring 'success' for Eurosceptic movements, priming effects do. At critical junctures, when the print media report more frequently on certain frames on the EU, these are made available to the public. This encourages the public to engage more in the debate on the EU, which again makes it easier for Eurosceptic movements to mobilise opposition against the EU.

Finally, the chapter has discussed the importance of grassroots campaigning, arguing that it is the combination of media attention and grassroots activities that made it possible for 'No to the EU' to win the referendums in 1972 and 1994. In Norway, the grassroots movement was of such importance that the Eurosceptic movement has become synonymous to 'the people's movement'. As discussed, both in 1972 and 1994 'No to the EU' established offices in almost all constituencies and communicated with the public by organising public events, handing out information pamphlets and holding demonstrations in both rural areas and in the largest cities, with particular focus on the rural areas of the country. Prior research (SSB, 1995) has demonstrated that demographic differences had an impact on the referendum results. In less populated areas, such as Finnmark, 74.5 per cent of the population voted against the EU in 1994. In more urban areas, such as Oslo, 33.4 per cent voted against the EU. 'No to the EU' strategically targeted peripheral areas, which allowed for the Eurosceptic movement to more effectively spread its message to those most likely to oppose membership of the EU. Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that grassroots activities, as the only factor, is not sufficient to achieve 'success'. 'No to the EU' has continued to use similar strategies, but has only been successful in 1972 and 1994. As it has been difficult for 'No to the EU' to mobilise opposition against the EU outside of the referendums, it has been argued that it is the combination of grassroots campaigning and priming effects in the media that contributes to the success of Eurosceptic movements. 'No to the EU' has not been

able to mobilise opposition against the EU because priming effects in the media are needed to stimulate grassroots activity.

Chapter 7

Conclusion: Comparing the UK and Norwegian Cases

This research has investigated to what extent the print media and grassroots activity is important in explaining the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. The guiding research question at the outset of the research was: 'To what extent is the print media and grassroots campaigning important in explaining the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK?' The research tested the following hypotheses:

- H1: Mobilisation by Eurosceptic groups requires both media attention and grassroots campaigning to be successful
- H2: The volume of media attention matters more to Eurosceptic movements' success than the extent to which that attention is positive
- H3: Mobilisation against the EU is easier at critical junctures, when issue salience is higher

As discussed in Chapter 2, the media is thought to have a significant impact on shaping public opinion and scholars (Johnson-Cartee, 2005; O'Keffe, 2006) have argued that the media influence how the public construct realities. When discussing events that take place out of reach, the public use information provided by the broadcast and printed media. Hence, the media publications contribute to the shaping of political and social realities, as the content promotes political values that influence how the public construct realities. In this view, as individuals we are all influenced, our opinion shaped, reinforced and altered by our exposure to the media (Johnson-Cartee 2005, 148). Furthermore, the media are thought to have significant influence on the development of social movements and political parties. As we have noted in Chapter 2, Tarrow (1995, 126-7), Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012, 3), and Voss (2015, 19) all considered the media a significant contributor to whether social movements 'succeed' in reaching out to the public. Political parties and movements communicate to a broad public through the media, which help them gain attention and maintain support. Whereas prior

research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have focused on the impact that media has on shaping *public opinion* on the EU, this research studied whether the reporting in the media has an impact on the growth of *Eurosceptic movements*. Public opinion does not necessarily translate into support for Eurosceptic parties and movements. In the UK, opinion polls (Ipsos MORI, 2016) have indicated that the public, at certain periods of time, have been Eurosceptic without bringing political opportunities for UKIP. Similarly, in Norway, the public have remained Eurosceptic, while the two largest political parties have in fact been supportive of the EU. Furthermore, whereas prior studies have focused mainly on the effects of framing, this research has additionally considered the effects of priming, arguing that priming effects are in fact more effective in bringing opportunities for Eurosceptic movements.

This research has studied two case studies, Britain and Norway. As discussed in Chapter 3, despite pronounced dissimilarities between the case studies, such as population and the difference between a political party and interest organisation, the case studies have been treated as similar cases. It has been argued that the cases are *ideologically* similar, as both countries have a long history of Euroscepticism. In both countries, strong Eurosceptic movements have emerged and have been important contributors in the referendum campaigns on the EU. However, the Eurosceptic movements have taken on different forms in the two case studies. In Norway, the force behind the Eurosceptic movement is an interest organisation, 'No to the EU', whereas in the UK, the early driver behind the Eurosceptic movement is a political party, UKIP.

In both cases, the Eurosceptics have lacked the capacity to influence through parliamentary representation at the national level ('No to the EU' has purposefully not developed into a political party and UKIP has struggled to win seats in the national Parliament) but have been successful forces in the referendum campaigns on the EU. As discussed in Chapter 2, a party or movement is considered 'successful' when its goal has been achieved (Burnstein et al., cited in: Jenkins J., & Klandermans B. 1995. P. 281). UKIP, without any members of

Parliament, pushed the Conservative government into a referendum on the EU in 2016. 'No to the EU' decided not to seek parliamentary representation yet convinced the public to reject membership of the EU.

However, in both case studies, the strength of the Eurosceptic movements has shifted over the past decades. In Britain, there has been a growth of Euroscepticism, and the country has seen the emergence and rise of UKIP. The party has performed well in elections to the European Parliament (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 48, 75-76, 97) and became a central actor in the campaign leading up to the referendum on the EU in 2016 (though the position within the Conservative Party has been fundamental). In Norway, by contrast, the public has remained opposed to the EU, but 'No to the EU' has found it increasingly difficult to engage the public in debates on the EU. Differences in the development of these Eurosceptic movements cannot be attributed to institutional arrangements per se, as both countries are integrated and bound by similar rules – Norway is a member of both the EEA and the Schengen Agreement (Fossum 2010, 74). The differences in the development of Eurosceptic movements could therefore not, in these case studies, be attributed to institutional arrangements with the EU. In other words, other factors must have influenced this development.

This research therefore investigated what the media's role has been in this development. If the 'success' of the Eurosceptic movements is determined by political opportunities, and the media are considered a significant political opportunity variable (McAdam et al. 1996, 285), we should, according to the theory, be able to measure a correlation between the reporting in the media and the development of Eurosceptic movements. This research therefore studied to what extent the print media are important in explaining the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. Furthermore, it studied the extent to which grassroots activity is important in the development of Eurosceptic movements. Whereas the Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK have been identified as the independent variable, the 'success' or 'failure' of these movements have been treated as the dependent variable. The intervening variables, studied in

order to explain the different development in Norway and the UK, are the media and grassroots mobilisation.

7.1 Discussion and findings

Firstly, the research investigated the effects of *framing* to find out how the integration debate has been constructed in the print media. In both case studies, the reporting of the EU in the print media has been tendentious. However, the research found that despite a slightly tendentious reporting of the EU, Norwegian newspapers have been more balanced in the reporting than newspapers in the UK. Though Norwegian newspapers supported EEC/EU membership in both 1972 and 1994, both campaigns had access to the media – despite having adopted a positive stance towards EEC/EU membership, the newspapers did not ignore, nor completely exclude, Eurosceptic voices from the reporting.

In Britain, the content analysis indicated that the British print media have gradually changed its stance towards the EU and become more Eurosceptic over the years. When the referendum on EEC membership took place on 5 June 1972, the British print media[77] supported membership of the EEC. The other member states were referred to as 'partners' and 'family', and the media emphasised the importance of a 'unified' and 'peaceful' continent. A discourse of `togetherness` characterised the reporting, which would in later decades be replaced with `otherness`. In the late 1980s, a change is noticeable, and the print media started referring to the other member states as something remote and different from the UK. The other member states were no longer referred to as 'friends' and 'family', and the newspapers emphasised the divergence between the member states, both politically, geographically and culturally. This research has therefore identified the late 1980s as a tipping point for the growth of Euroscepticism in the British print media.

Furthermore, this analysis found that the Maastricht ratification process had an impact on the reporting in the British print media. As discussed, the language

[77] The Times, The Sun, The Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph

changed significantly in 1991, with a more negatively loaded language and references to Eurosceptic terms, such as 'federalism', 'power' and 'bureaucracy'. Eurosceptic language became a feature in the reporting and remained present in the reporting in decades to come. However, the change in the reporting and an introduction of Eurosceptic terms in the print media do not seem to have brought any immediate political opportunities for UKIP. The party continuously struggled to win seats in the elections and did not have its first electoral breakthrough until 2004 (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 48).

If framing effects, as the only factor, brought political opportunities for UKIP, the party should have benefitted from the Eurosceptic attitudes adopted by the print media. UKIP emerged as a response to the developments of the EU and strongly opposed Maastricht. However, the party struggled to recruit members, and attract investors, and found it difficult to become a serious contender in British politics in the 1990s (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 23-27). Furthermore, the party did not gain any attention in the media; in this analysis, UKIP did not get attention in the newspapers during the negotiations of Maastricht, nor did it get media attention around *any* other EU events. However, the party gradually went from being a small fringe party to becoming a serious contender in British politics, suggesting that other factors than framing effects in the print media influenced the success of UKIP.

In Norway, by contrast, the print media have supported membership of the EU ever since the first referendum took place in 1972. In the reporting of the membership debate in 1972, the print media backed the establishment and favoured those supportive of the EEC. The newspapers presented slightly more voices for EEC membership than against EEC membership and published more arguments for EEC membership than against EEC membership. 'Peace', 'security' and 'democracy' were arguments frequently used by EEC supporters. Similarly, the print media supported membership of the EU when the second referendum took place in 1994. 'Industry', 'economy' and 'peace' were the most frequently used arguments by EU supporters. However, the analysis of the EU referendum

demonstrated that despite a favourable coverage of the EU in the media, EU opponents won the referendum in 1994 against the entire political establishment. In both 1972 and 1994, the Norwegian print media supported membership of the EEC/EU. The public, by contrast, rejected membership of the EEC/EU. If framing effects are the most important factor in influencing the success of Eurosceptic movements, the print media, with the backing from the largest political parties, should have brought opportunities for the 'Yes Campaign' in both 1972 and 1994. In neither of the case studies do framing effects in the media, as the only factor, explain the success of Eurosceptic movements.

Secondly, the research investigated the effects of *priming* to study the frequency in the reporting. In the UK, as discussed, the Eurosceptic attitudes in the print media did not bring any immediate political opportunities for UKIP. In national elections, the party did not win any seats, and struggled to gain attention and open a debate on membership of the EU (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 23-27). In European elections, however, the party gradually began to perform better and win seats. This research therefore analysed a second data set on EU elections, in order to find out whether there is a correlation between the reporting of these events and the growth of UKIP. When UKIP first stood in EU elections in 1994 and 1999, the party struggled to compete with the established parties. UKIP failed to reach out to the public and get its message across, and additionally lacked a clear and convincing political project. At this point, the party was a single-issue party, with one simple agenda; to take the country out of the EU. By 2004, the party started to broaden its appeal by moving it in a more populist direction and criticising the established parties. Furthermore, it linked EU membership to grievances in society, e.g. long hospital waiting lists, overcrowded schools and pensioners living in poverty (Goodwin & Ford 2014, 44-46). This coincided with the recent expansion on the EU and a rise in net immigration to the EU. The populist direction adopted by UKIP caused great controversy and caught the attention of the media, and as the party received more media attention it performed better in EU elections.

In 2004, the party had its first electoral breakthrough, with 2.6 million votes (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 48). The second data set suggested that a change in the reporting contributed to this development. The media started reporting more frequently on UKIP, but the party did not receive favourable treatment. Despite being criticised in the media, the party received media attention, which helped the party reach out and spread its message to potential voters. A similar observation was made on the reporting of the EU election in 2009. UKIP received less attention in the media, which arguably contributed to a lower vote share than in 2004. UKIP came second in the election, with 2.5 million votes (House of Commons, 2009). In 2014, UKIP had its greatest electoral breakthrough in EU elections. As indicated in Chart 5.9, the media reported more frequently on the party, as 208 articles reported on UKIP. The party won 26.6 per cent[78] of the popular vote and almost doubled its seats in the European Parliament, from 12 to 23 seats (House of Commons, 2019). The analysis indicated that when UKIP received more attention in the media, it performed better in EU elections. Arguably, if UKIP's success in EU elections was driven by framing effects in the media (what is being said), the media should have reported favourably of UKIP. Instead, the media largely reported negatively on UKIP, but the priming effects (media attention) in the reporting brought political opportunities for UKIP. This confirms what Lucardie (2000, 178) argued in terms of political parties and resources. A party needs resources in order to develop a political organisation, including funding and material goods, but also personal skills, contacts and *publicity*.

Furthermore, the UK newspaper analysis found that the print media have both *shaped* and *reflected* ideas on the EU. In the first UK data sample, immigration did not have a significant role in the reporting of the EU. In 2010, the public ranked immigration a top issue and put it on the agenda. This caught the attention of both UKIP and the print media. As a response to the public ranking immigration a top issue, UKIP launched an anti-immigration campaign the same year. By 2010,

[78] 4.376.635 votes

mass immigration became a significant part of the debate on the EU. This suggests that the UK print media have reflected ideas originally presented elsewhere, rather than shaping ideas. Similarly, UKIP has capitalised on grievances in society, by connecting them to membership of the EU. Chapter 5 demonstrated that similar argumentation was present in the reporting long before the establishment of UKIP. This type of argumentation first appeared in the UK data sample in the reporting of 'The Budget Question' in 1979, e.g. `the British people are furious at ploughing huge sums into Brussels when housing, education and social services are being slashed at home` (The Sun, 30 November 1979, pg. 2). Furthermore, it was reinforced as a feature in the reporting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004/5, e.g. `Across Europe […] there are widespread fears about global competition and immigration, their impact on national cultures, as well as on wages, pensions and jobs` (The Times, 2 June 2005, p. 20). In other words, the media have both reflected and shaped ideas that later brought success for UKIP. It must therefore be argued that although priming effects undoubtedly were more effective in bringing political opportunities for UKIP, it is important to recognise that framing effects additionally to some extent have contributed to the success of UKIP.

In terms of priming effects, similar results were found in the Norwegian case study, as the research identified a connection between priming effects and the development of 'No to the EU'. As discussed, the Norwegian media have continuously been supportive of membership of the EU. Despite not having the support from either the media or the Norwegian government, 'No to the EU' convinced the public, both in 1972 and 1994, to reject membership of the EU. The content analysis found that when both referendums took place in 1972 and 1994, the media reported frequently on the EU. As a result, the public engaged in the debate, as information could easily be accessed. It was therefore not difficult for 'No to the EU' to reach out and to mobilise opposition against the EU.

However, when the signing of the EEA agreement and the Schengen agreement took place, 'No to the EU' found it increasingly difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU. As discussed in Chapter 6, when these events took place, the

Norwegian media reported less frequently on the EU. 'No to the EU' did therefore not succeed in engaging the public in the debate on the EU. The former leader of the organisation recalls: 'We [No to the EU] struggled to engage the public in the EEA debate. By and large, the debate on the EEA agreement engaged those with a particular interest in EC matters, and not so much 'ordinary people' (Ørnhøi, 2016). As Kathrine Kleveland, the current leader of No to the EU, states in an interview: 'media attention has decreased since the 1994 referendum, which is understandable' (Kleveland, 2016). She continues 'it has been particularly difficult to open up a debate on the EEA agreement'.

As discussed in Chapter 6, when the media report less frequently on the EU, less information is made available to the public, which seems to discourage public engagement. This brings back what Vliegenthart et al. (2008, 415) argued: `Much of what citizens know about the European Union (EU) stems from the mass media, and EU citizens consistently identify newspapers and television news as their most important sources of information about the EU`. In both of the case studies, the effects of priming have brought political opportunities for the Eurosceptic movements. In the UK, the reporting of UKIP in the media around EU elections brought political opportunities for the party, which contributed to its electoral success. In Norway, priming effects can explain the short-term success of 'No to the EU' around the referendums on the EU. Equally, it can explain what has previously been defined as 'long-term failure', as the organisation has not succeeded in mobilising opposition against the EU outside of the context of referendums on the EU.

Finally, the research has discussed the importance of grassroots activity. It has been argued that it is the combination of priming effects in the media and grassroot activity that in these case studies has influenced the growth of Eurosceptic movements. As we noted, Tarrow (1995, 126) argued that the media is a significant contributor to whether social movements manage to reach out to the public and mobilise support. Furthermore, he argued that the mobilisation of symbols is important for social movements and that the mass media serve as a

function of symbol mobilisation, as the movements communicate to a broad public through the mass media. However, in these case studies, whereas the Eurosceptic movements have received *attention* in the media, which have contributed to the development of the movements, they have not always received favourable coverage in the print media. The symbol mobilisation has therefore taken place elsewhere, in the form of public engagement and grassroots activities. In addition to getting their message across by using the print media (when possible), the Eurosceptic movements in both case studies have used alternative forms of political communication, such as grassroots campaigning and public events.

In the UK, the importance of public engagement was confirmed through elite interviews (Sked, 2016; Farage, 2016; Phillips, 2016) conducted for this study. Extensive campaigning and other grassroots activities have undoubtedly contributed to the success of UKIP. In the UK, members of the UK Independence Party formed an alliance, *Grassroots Out,* with likeminded people from other political parties and organisations ahead of the referendum in 2016. However, ever since its establishment, UKIP has aimed to be a 'party of the people'. It has been important for the party to connect with 'ordinary people', and this has been achieved through grassroots activities, i.e. the party has organised a considerable number of public meetings around the country – both in larger cities, and in towns and villages, and been out campaigning on the streets and knocking on doors. As discussed, the party found it difficult to get attention in the media – it therefore adopted other methods to get its message out to the public. As discussed in the Chapter 2, the aim of grassroots activities is to put forward demands that have not yet been dealt with by the already established channels (Rasmussen 1997, 174). This ties back to UKIP's argument that the establishment has failed to deal with the concerns of 'ordinary people' and that UKIP represents the voice of the 'left behind' voters. The distance between the elite and the ordinary people has been present in the debate over the past few decades. EU institutions have been described as something distant from and meaningless to most people, run by unelected officials who are immune to public opinion, e.g. 'the fanatical and

corrupt elite that drives the EU onwards will not give up' (Daily Mail, 30 May 2005, p. 12). Furthermore, in order to win votes, UKIP has targeted specific areas (e.g. South Thanet, Rochester and Strood, Thurrock, Castle Point, and Boston and Skegness).

According to Professor Alan Sked, the first leader of UKIP, the strategy adopted to recruit members and reach out to the public was to arrange public meetings: 'we did a little bit of advertising, put leaflets through doors and hoped, and waited for people to write in. We had an office on Regent St. and could work from there, and then held meetings in various constituencies – and when people turned up, we could organise local constituency branches' (Interview, 2016). Sked resigned as party leader in 1997, but public engagement remained a central part of UKIP's strategy in order to spread its message to the public, due to its lack of media attention. Nigel Farage (2016) confirms the importance of public engagement in an in-depth interview: 'We do what I do. You get out of London, you travel around the country, you do public meetings, public engagement and crucially; going to the pubs – and that is where you meet everybody'.

Similarly, what made it possible for the Eurosceptic movement in Norway to win the 1972 and 1994 referendums was the effective grassroots activities that developed ahead of the referendums on the EU. As discussed in Chapter 4, the force behind the Eurosceptic campaign was made up of a wide range of people from different social classes (Seierstad 2014, 30), including interest groups, farmers and fishermen, academics, labour movements and environmental groups. In only a couple of years, the Eurosceptic movement established local organisations in almost all national regions. 'No to the EU' started an intense campaign against membership of the EU. Conferences and demonstrations were arranged in the largest cities, and newspapers and flyers were used to spread the message (Nei til EU, 2012). Furthermore, the movement engaged the public by talking to people on the streets and encouraging them to take part in the campaign.

‘No to the EU’ even established its own newspaper, that by the end of the campaign had been distributed in more than 40.000 copies. The organisation held conferences in the largest cities, and more than two hundred committees had been established across the country (NTNU, no date). In addition, the group started a petition for holding a referendum on the EU. The petition was promoted and signed at 30 different conferences taking place across the country, with the total of 2500 signatures (NTNU, no date). The grassroots movement targeted mainly the peripheries, as these were made up of farmers and fishermen, and people who sympathised with these groups. The targeting of specific groups arguably allowed for the grassroots to more effectively spread its message to those most likely to oppose the EU.

The importance of grassroots activity was confirmed in an in-depth interview with Stein Ørnhøi (2016): ‘I travelled around for two years to attend meetings all around the country in order to spread our message to the public. We did it the traditional way and this engaged people in the debate – we would talk to someone who knew someone who had not yet made up their minds, and the people we met helped us spread the message out to the undecided. That is how it is done’. What made all of this possible, was the large number of supporters volunteering for the grassroots movement – more than 10,000 volunteers helped distribute materials out to the households (Seierstad 2014, 201-5). In Norway, the grassroots movement was of such importance that the Eurosceptic movement has become synonymous to ‘the people’s movement’.

Nevertheless, this research has demonstrated that grassroots activities, as the only factor, is not sufficient to achieve ‘success’. ‘No to the EU’ has continued to use similar strategies, but has only been successful when the referendums took place in 1972 and 1994. It has been difficult for ‘No to the EU’ to mobilise opposition against the EU outside of the context of EU referendums when the media did not report on the EU. Similarly, UKIP could only mobilise effectively once they were discussed in the British media. It has therefore been argued that

it is the combination of grassroots campaigning and priming effects in the media that in these case studies contributes to the 'success' of Eurosceptic movements.

7.2 Similar cases, but with different outcomes

It can be argued that the case studies are similar, but with different outcomes. In the UK, there has been a growth of Eurosceptic movements and this research has focused on the growth of UKIP. The Eurosceptic party, which emerged merely as a protest group, gradually developed into a political party and went from the fringes of British politics to become a serious contender. It also played a major role increasing the salience of the European issue within the Conservative Party, which came to be increasingly concerned at the growth of UKIP. It could be argued that UKIP has indeed been successful. As discussed in Chapter 2, a party or movement is considered 'successful' when its goal has been achieved (Burnstein et al., cited in: Jenkins J., & Klandermans B. 1995. P. 281). The aim of UKIP has been to promote withdrawal from the EU. This goal was achieved in the 2016 referendum, when the public voted to leave the EU. It remains to be seen to what *degree* the party has been successful, as the negotiations between the UK and the EU are not finalised, but 'success' has certainly been achieved, as the UK stopped being a member of the EU on 31 January 2020.

In Norway, by contrast, the development has been different. The Eurosceptic organisation 'No to the EU', which successfully campaigned against membership of the EU in both 1972 and 1994, have struggled to mobilise opposition against the EU after the referendum in 1994. It has become more difficult for the organisation to engage the public in the debate and, particularly, to open up a discussion on the EEA agreement. In the Norwegian case study, it is necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term 'success'. In terms of short-term goals, the aim of 'No to the EU' was to prevent membership of the EU. The organisation must be considered successful in this area, as the public, in both referendums, rejected membership of the EU. In terms of the organisation's long term-goals, to prevent deeper integration, the organisation has *not* been successful. Norway has not become a member of the EU, but the country

continues to participate in the integration process through the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement. 'No to the EU', which wants to withdraw from the EEA agreement, has not succeeded in reopening the debate or influencing public opinion on the EEA agreement.

This research found that the media have contributed to the different outcomes in the case studies, by studying the effects of both framing and priming. The analysis demonstrated in both cases that firstly, framing effects have not, as the only factor, contributed to the success of Eurosceptic movements in the UK and Norway. In the UK, the media became Eurosceptic longer than a decade before UKIP had its electoral break-through. If framing effects in the media, as the only factor, contributes to the success of Eurosceptic movements, UKIP should have performed better in elections when the media started to become more Eurosceptic. In Norway, the reporting has arguably been more balanced than in the UK, but the media overall supported membership of the EU. It can therefore not, in these case studies, be argued that the growth of Eurosceptic movements can be explained solely by framing effects in the media.

Secondly, the analysis found that priming effects have an impact on the development of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. As discussed in Chapter 5, when the British media reported more frequently on UKIP, the party performed better in EU elections. What is particularly interesting to note is that very few articles were in fact supportive of UKIP, but the party kept performing better when they received more media attention. Hence, in the UK case study, priming effects have been more effective than framing effects. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 6, 'No to the EU' found it easier to mobilise opposition against the EU when the Norwegian media reported more frequently on the EU. A significant difference between the two cases is that UKIP had the advantage of receiving attention in the media when EU elections took place, which is every fifth year. 'No to the EU', by contrast, relied on oxygen from the media when the EU referendums took place in 1972 and 1994, so when the media in the aftermath of the referendums reported less frequently on the EU, mobilisation against the EU

was not possible to maintain. 'No to the EU' used similar methods over time when campaigning against the EU, but the campaigning has only been successful in 1972 and 1994. When the signing of the EEA agreement and Schengen agreement took place, the organisation lacked the oxygen it was previously given by the media, and mobilisation against the EU proved to be more difficult. The development of the Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK is different, but the effects of the media are similar. In both cases, the Eurosceptic movements could not have succeeded without priming effects in the media.

Thirdly, as both UKIP and 'No to the EU' lacked access to the media over longer periods of times, both Eurosceptic movements found it necessary to adopt a different strategy to reach out to the public and get their message across, namely grassroots activities. However, the research demonstrated that this strategy is only successful when combined with priming effects in the media. Grassroots activities is not sufficient, as the only factor, in bringing success for Eurosceptic movements. In these case studies, mobilisation by Eurosceptic groups requires both priming effects in the media and grassroots campaigning to be successful. Furthermore, grassroots activity is only effective in the presence of priming effects in the media.

Finally, the Eurosceptic movements in the case studies have taken on different forms, a political party and an interest organisation. In the light of these findings, this seems to be of importance as winning seats in the European Parliament offered UKIP a new platform to be heard. As Arzeimer & Carter (2006, 423) argued in their research, a high degree of decentralisation could foster the development of right-wing parties because voters are more willing to support radical parties in 'second order' elections, such as European elections. 'No to the EU' did not have a platform from which to spread its message and it has therefore been difficult to mobilise opposition outside of the referendums on the EU. EU elections have arguably contributed to the growth of UKIP, by giving the party a platform to be heard, but as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the media have undoubtedly played an important role in the development of UKIP.

The findings suggest that although prior research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have investigated and demonstrated the effect of framing, the effects of priming, which seems to be more effective in bringing success for Eurosceptic movements, have been overlooked. This research contributes to the field of Euroscepticism and the media by studying both framing and priming, and demonstrating that in these case studies, priming effects are in fact more effective in bringing success for Eurosceptic movements than the effects of framing. However, this research recognises that other intervening variables could additionally have brought opportunities for UKIP and 'No to the EU', e.g. the national economy, anti-political leadership sentiment or international developments, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, this research has examined the relationship between the media and grassroots activity, and the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. It has been argued that framing effects is not the main explanation for the different developments of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. By contrast, it has been argued that priming effects in the media influence the 'success' of Eurosceptic movements. It could be an idea for further research, however, to build on this research in order to investigate to what degree other intervening variables are important in explaining the development of Eurosceptic movements.

Moreover, it is important to discuss the possibilities of an opposite causality, that it is not the media that have contributed to the growth of Eurosceptic movements, but that a development of such movements have influenced the reporting of the EU. In some cases, political parties or social movements undoubtedly are in a position to influence the language that is being used in the media and bring to the media ideas of what to say when reporting on a certain issue. However, this has not been the case in this research. An opposite causality has been controlled for by examining and comparing the timeframes for the reporting of the EU and the development of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. In the UK, a shift towards a more Eurosceptic reporting was identified already in the 1980s, a few years before the Anti-Federalist Group (the forerunner to UKIP) emerged. The

media could therefore not have become Eurosceptic as a response to the emergence of the Anti-Federalist Group. Moreover, when the protest group developed into a political party, it did not have a silent voice in British politics, nor did it receive any attention in the media, as discussed in Chapter 5. By studying the timeframe of the reporting in the UK, an opposite causality can therefore be controlled for.

In Norway, 'No to the EU' received attention when the media reported on the EU. Rightly enough, the organisations emerged only a few years before the 1972 and 1994 referendums took place, which could arguably have triggered a debate in the media. But to answer the question on whether Eurosceptic movements have influenced the reporting of the EU, it is necessary to study a longer period of time. The media have remained continuously supportive of the EU. It would therefore be problematic to argue that the Eurosceptic movement in Norway has influenced the reporting and the language used when reporting on the EU. The media favoured EU supporters in both referendums and 'No to the EU' has found it increasingly difficult to get their message out in the media after the last referendum took place in 1994. If Eurosceptic movements influenced the reporting of the EU, either in terms of the language used in the reporting or what issues to report on, 'No to the EU' should be able to trigger a debate on the EU, not only when the referendums took place, but also outside of the referendums on the EU, and particularly when the EEA and Schengen were being implemented.

Hyslop-Margison (2009, 822) argued that researchers sometimes focus on instances where the predictions of theoretical claims based on certain hypotheses hold true and want to generalise from these particular observed instances to an entire population. As discussed in Chapter 3, this research has used a case-oriented approach, which focuses upon a relatively small number of cases, analysed with attention to each case as an interpretable whole (Ragin 2000, cited in: Della Porta & Keating 2008, 204). In the case-oriented approach, an in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases provides the basis for generalisations that are temporarily limited to the cases studied. It is therefore important to recognise

that the findings from this research cannot be generalised outside of this study or be applied to other case studies, as the research has focused exclusively on the development of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK. However, since both case studies used the same research design, and the same findings have been identified in both case studies, it allows for future research to apply the same methods to different case studies, which could then allow for further generalisation.

7.3 Limitations of the research

Firstly, the data for this research have been collected in the form of print media, as the research investigates the reporting of the integration debate before the internet became available – social media, blogs and online news are therefore not constant sources. Hence, it has not been possible in this research to find out whether the effects of the print media are more effective than the effects of the digital media. However, print media and the online versions provide similar ideas and it has therefore not been crucial to include both forms in the analysis. Furthermore, the research has not included local newspapers, as these are not available to all citizens. Local newspapers could be particularly interesting for future research, as the Norwegian referendum results indicated a divergence between rural and urban districts.

Secondly, this research includes only a small sample of media output. The articles selected for the study include seven days of publications on each of the selected events. As this research has studied the reporting in the media on a cross-national basis, the number of articles included for each case study is limited. Furthermore, as a large number of articles included in the research could be accessed on microfilms only, it has not been possible to do a computer-assisted content analysis. The data for this content analysis has therefore been hand coded, making it impossible to include a larger sample of articles due to limits in both time and resources. It has been taken into consideration that looking at different dates or events possibly could have an impact on the findings. However, the

selection of dates includes the most important integration events and gives a general impression of the change in media attitudes towards the EU over time.

Finally, whereas this research has focused on the role of the media, other factors could additionally have an impact on the success (or failure) of Eurosceptic movements. Of particular interest is the difference between political parties and interest organisations. This research found that UKIP received attention around EU elections, which offered the party a new platform to be heard, whereas 'No to the EU' did not have a platform from which to spread its views outside of the media, making it more difficult to mobilise opposition against the EU. However, future research is needed to corroborate or not this observation that the institutional framework matters because elections give political parties greater exposure at regular intervals, which makes it easier for the parties to spread their message and mobilise opposition against the EU.

7.4 Impact and implications of the work

As discussed in Chapter 1, over the past decade there has been a rise in Euroscepticism. More parties have become opposed to membership of the EU rather than supportive of membership of the EU. In fact, a similar development has taken place in Norway during the course of this research, as Norwegian political parties and MPs have become more Eurosceptic. In opinion polls conducted in 2017[79], 43.2 per cent of MPs were opposed to EU membership; 22.5 per cent supported EU membership and 34.3 per cent were undecided or did not want to participate. When a similar poll was conducted in 2013[80], the numbers indicated support for the EU: 46.7 per cent supported EU membership; 41.4 per cent opposed EU membership and 12.2 per cent were undecided or did not want to participate in the opinion poll (Vermes, T, 2017).

Furthermore, Norwegian political parties have recently changed their stance on membership of the EU. The Labour Party, which supported membership in both 1972 and 1994, has previously stated in its party programme that membership of

[79] Conducted by No to EU in 2017
[80] Conducted by No to EU in 2013

the EU would be 'beneficial for the country'. In 2017, however, the Labour Party withdrew this statement from the party programme, arguing that EU membership is not currently on the political agenda. However, it caught the attention of the media, as the Labour Party has always supported membership of the EU.

Moreover, the Norwegian Progress Party (right-wing party) has recently changed its opinion on membership of the EU. The party, which as previously chosen not to have an opinion on the matter, announced its decision to oppose membership of the EU in September 2016. This is a noteworthy change, as the Progress Party is the first political party to oppose membership of the EU on the political right. The party argues that it has previously not been clear on EU membership, but that recent events have made the party reconsider its position and make a decision on whether or not to support the EU. The EU, with the original purpose to secure peace and stability on the continent, has instead become a source of conflicts between the member states, according to the Progress Party (NTB, 2016). However, this does not mean that EU membership is back on the political agenda; the parties do not intend to either re-open the debate or use Euroscepticism in political campaigns. Nevertheless, recent events in the UK do seem to have an impact to some degree, as the largest parties in Norway have recently found it useful to re-think their positions on the EU.

Similarly, during the course of this research, the UK has not only become more Eurosceptic, but the country has decided to withdraw from the EU altogether, as discussed in Chapter 1. The decision on whether to leave or remain in the EU was made in an in/out referendum on 23 June 2016. As opinion polls (Ipsos MORI, Survation) indicated that the public would vote to remain in the EU, the referendum results represented a great shock to the political establishment: 51.9 per cent of the public voted to leave the EU, while 48.1 per cent voted to remain in the EU. Negotiations with the member states are currently taking place and should be completed by the end of 2020.

What is interesting, is that simultaneously as the negotiations are carried out between the UK and the other members states, UKIP has seen a complete collapse

in public support. UKIP, which in the 2015 General Election won 12.6 per cent of the total vote share, dropped to 1.8 per cent in the 2017 General Election. The party has not only lost a lot of its funding[81] and its most high-profile politicians (Nigel Farage, Douglas Carswell, Paul Nuttall, Steven Woolfe and Diane James), but arguably it has also lost its purpose, as it emerged with the aim to take the country out of the EU. As discussed in Chapter 2, political parties need a clear and convincing political project in order to gain attention and maintain support (Lucardie 2000, 175-6). The project should address social problems considered urgent by a significant number of voters, such as housing, environmental pollution or mass unemployment. The party leadership must then translate social problems into political issues, with political solutions. UKIP successfully adopted this strategy, by linking grievances in society to membership of the EU. However, since the UK decided to leave the EU, the party has lost its convincing political project. As a result, the party has lost its support and returned to the fringes of British politics.

Simultaneously with the fall of UKIP, the UK has seen the rise and fall of the Brexit Party. The party emerged in 2018, recruiting mainly former members from UKIP. When the early negotiations between the UK and the EU took place, the Conservative Government discussed whether to adopt Soft – or Hard Brexit. The Brexit Party, founded by Catherine Blaiklock and Nigel Farage, emerged with the aim to push the Conservative Government towards Hard Brexit. Only four months after its foundation, the Brexit Party won the largest share of national vote in the 2019 European Parliament election in the UK. The party won 29 seats (BBC, 2019). UKIP collapsed as a party, but the foundation of the Brexit Party offered Eurosceptics a new party to mobilise behind. Arguably, the Brexit Party influenced the Conservative Government's decision to adopt Hard Brexit.

With Euroscepticism on the rise, and the UK leaving the EU, this research contributes to the ongoing discussion on Euroscepticism and the role of the

[81] UKIP struggles financially after Arron Banks, the party's major donor, got suspended in 2017. In addition, the party has lost access to a significant source of EU campaign funding.

media. Prior research in the field (Hawkins, 2012; Daddow, 2012; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008) have argued that the print media shape public opinion on the EU. As discussed, public opinion does not necessarily translate into support for Eurosceptic movements and the research that have been conducted in this field do therefore not answer the question on whether the media influence the development of Eurosceptic movements. This research does that, by studying the reporting in the media and the effects the media have on the development of Eurosceptic movements. Moreover, as this research has studied different forms of Eurosceptic movements, a political party and an interest organisation, the findings can be applied to different forms of Eurosceptic groups.

Furthermore, whereas prior research has focused primarily on the effects of framing, without considering other media effects, it has not been investigated what effects are most effective in driving support for Eurosceptic movements. This research does that, by investigating the effects of both framing and priming, arguing that priming effects are in fact more effective than framing effects. This research therefore contributes to the field and it challenges the conception that the Eurosceptic media, by reporting negatively on the EU, has created opportunities for Eurosceptic movements, by demonstrating that it is not *what* is being said in the media that brings opportunities for Eurosceptic movements, but that the issue is being reported on in the media. The results from this research could possibly bring a useful insight to interest organisations or political parties forming strategies on how to get their message out to the public.

7.5 Future research

The research has demonstrated that the print media have a significant impact on the success of Eurosceptic movements in Norway and the UK, but there are still questions to be answered. As discussed, the Eurosceptic movements in this research have taken on different forms, a political party and an interest organisation. This research focused merely on the role of the media and has therefore not investigated whether one of these forms of mobilisation is more

effective than the other. Furthermore, the research has not investigated the role of the digital media and whether digital media are more effective than the print media. It is therefore possible for future research to build on this study, encouraging further integration in these areas.

More specifically, this research demonstrated that the print media, in both case studies, deliberately have framed the debate with the aim to influence public opinion on the EU. An idea for future research could therefore be to investigate whether the media promote or debilitate democracy. Anderson Jr. (1998, 481) argues that democracy requires deliberation and that deliberation leads to wiser choices if those who deliberate are well informed. The public obtain information about society and political matters from the media. Hence, if the media present serious discussions of political matters, the media would foster deliberation. However, if the media fail to inform the public, deliberation is impoverished and democracy is weakened (ibid).

This is particularly relevant with the recent rise of *fake news*, which has been considered a threat to democracy. The concept of fake news has turned into a political weapon, with supporters of a political party spreading falsehoods about their competitors in order to gain support. Additionally, it allows supporters to denounce, dismiss or deride journalism which they regard as flawed, biased or invented. McNair (2017) argues that the concept of fake news has worked for politicians, such as Donald Trump, in persuading his voting base to dismiss media criticism of him – that success has given the term a quality which anyone can tap into, regardless of status or ideological affiliation, according to McNair. It could therefore be interesting to study the impact of media exposure on public perceptions. Has the print media reflected or shaped public opinion? Does the print media debilitate or impoverish democracy?

Furthermore, with the decline of print newspapers, it could also be interesting to compare the media and other forms of political communication, such as the social media, to find out whether the role of social media could be undermining the role of the print media. In Chapter 5, it was discussed briefly that UKIP used social

media as a strategy to reach out to potential voters (Gill, 2016), as they for a long period of time did not get attention in the British print media. As Bennett (cited in: Tarrow 2011, 137) argues in his research, the digital media are changing the nature of activism in significant ways. The digital media extend the range of social networks transnationally, diminish the importance of local and national 'off-line' organisations as bases for activism, increase the advantages of resource-poor organisations within broader movements, and make it easier to target certain areas and reach out to faraway places in ongoing campaigns (ibid). As social media has made it easier to spread an access information, the question on whether the media promote or debilitate democracy has become increasingly relevant and would make an interesting case for further research in the field of media studies.

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Appendix



Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3



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

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

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

Chart 6.13

* Data selection includes 19-20.12 1996 and 7-11.06.1997
Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3



Chart 6.14

* Data selection includes 19-20.12 1996 and 7-11.06.1997
Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3



Chart 6.15

* Data selection includes 19-20.12 1996 and 7-11.06.1997
Source: Author's own data collection. For details, see Chapter 3