The regulation of private security and its challenges in contemporary society

Assessing the Security Industry Authority’s regulatory approach to door supervisors in the UK

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Abstract

Door supervisors (DS) are the largest licensable private security sector in the UK, with the SIA being the regulator responsible for administering and enforcing the regulatory regime. Previous research into the world of ‘bouncers’ has predominantly focused on their monoculture, associated with low professional standards, violence and criminality. Although these alleged qualities were the key drivers behind the introduction of regulation in 2001, the security industry is predominantly approached in previous studies as a general and homogeneous concept, resulting in a lack of in-depth research focus on how this vilified sector has developed in the post-regulation era. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to evaluate the SIA’s licensing and enforcement approach through documenting the narratives of the regulator and the DS sector (both on an individual and business level) and critically assessing the areas in which these converge or diverge with each other. The study draws upon the analysis of SIA annual reports, quantitative descriptive data, prosecution cases and interviews with SIA staff and DS, security companies and police officers across south-east Wales. Through exploring the transformation of the world of ‘bouncers’, this thesis reveals good progress in the SIA’s objective of ‘reform’; but it also highlights disparities between its strategic narrative and the occupational ‘lived realities’ in the sector. The findings also suggest that collaboration between the police and frontline operatives appeared to have improved, yet this is still essentially asymmetric, and there are specific micro dynamics that can enable or hinder cooperation. Overall, the regulatory response towards DS has been predominantly geared towards the ‘hard’ message, evident both at the point of being granted an SIA licence, as well as at translating the SIA’s enforcement-related activities into a clear-cut message that non-compliance is not tolerated. Yet, the SIA’s contribution in empowering the industry to address its contemporary challenges has not been equally dynamic when compared with its reform outputs. On the contrary, the regulatory approach towards DS companies has integrated the ‘soft’ message through supportive enforcement styles. However, this study’s findings suggest that regulatory proactivity in enforcement is restricted and therefore the SIA’s enforcement approach is largely premised on more reactive measures of limited effectiveness. The absence of regulatory oversight of security companies is identified as the key factor resulting in the lack of regulatory due diligence of corporate malpractices that affect both industry standards and public protection. Ultimately, this lopsided regulatory approach between the individual (DS) and business level is explored through the lens of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), yielding useful policy-related implications and recommendations for both the SIA and future regulatory research of the private security industry.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Private security has rapidly become a key player in the pluralised security landscape of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Button, 2008), with economic austerity continuously bringing to the forefront new avenues for delivering policing (Innes, 2011). From licensed premises and private dwellings to public buildings (e.g. major landmarks, heritage sites) and corporate security functions in various organisations, the presence of private security has increased substantially in recent years (CoESS, 2016; Gill, 2013).

Attitudes towards the value of the private sector and its contribution in the increasingly complex and fluid security landscape have been variable. Although its role in the recent crime drop has been recognised (van Dijk et al., 2012), at the same time attitudes towards private security operatives and businesses have been skewed negatively by reputational problems, mainly related to its status, legitimacy and accountability structures (Loader et al., 2014, White, 2010). The crucial question arising here refers to the possible ways, through which these diverse ‘taints’ (Thumala et al., 2011) can be accounted for. On the one hand, private security personnel and firms can operate in an unfettered marketplace, allowing the free market to either internalise and rectify these externalities (Dourado and Brito, 2012) or to further worsen them. On the other hand, these externalities can be recognised as market failures, warranting government intervention and thus the introduction of statutory regulation (Prenzler and Sarre, 2014). This in turn requires a thoughtful monitoring and evaluation of the regulatory regimes. Is current statutory regulation fit for purpose to rectify these market failures in private security sectors and what are the lessons learnt so far? The expansion of the private security industry and important questions related to how well statutory regulation works provide the key justification for why the regulation of the private security industry is a research area worthy of consideration and further exploration.

In the UK statutory regulation arrived relatively late (in 2001) compared to other European countries (Button, 2007).

‘The process of transformation of the police in this country began in 1829 and it took 40 years before the police force was in existence throughout the United Kingdom. I am sure that 2001 will be seen in a comparable light and considered the date when the private security industry began the real process of reform’ (HC Deb [2000-1], vol. 365).
With this illustrative quote Bruce George MP welcomed what has been the outcome of nearly 20 years of heated debates, competing agendas and continuous negotiations: the introduction of statutory regulation over some sectors of the private security industry in the UK (Private Security Industry Act 2001) and the creation of the organisation responsible for administering and enforcing the regulatory regime, the Security Industry Authority (SIA). The SIA is the centrepiece of the statutory regulation for some parts of the security industry in the UK and is a non-departmental public body accountable to the Home Office. Its regulatory remit refers to reducing criminality and to raising the professional standards in the regulated sectors. This twofold mandate is realised through administering a licensing regime for security operatives (individuals) and a voluntary accreditation (Approved Contractor Scheme, ACS) for businesses.

This PhD thesis is the outcome of a collaborative research project between the researcher and the SIA. Although police-academic partnerships have developed over the last decade and have demonstrated the potential to contribute significantly to police work, Bacon et al. (2020, p.1) argued that ‘they remain fragile alliances, beset with fractious occupational cultures, unreliable funding streams and unsustainable inter-institutional relationships’. Against the backdrop of these issues and the dominant police-focused ‘evidence-based policing’ movement (Greene, 2014; Loader and Sparks, 2016; Potts, 2017), this project was initiated as an opportunity for the researcher and the SIA to ‘work together on deeper questions concerning the nature of the contemporary policing landscape’ (White and Hayat, 2018, p. 92).

As such, although the overarching objective of this project is to assess the SIA’s journey in the post-regulation era, this aim is not realised through forming a series of managerialist ‘what works’ questions and then through performing an impact evaluation. Instead, influenced by the theoretical and empirical work undertaken by some of the leading figures in regulatory research (some key examples: Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Drahos, 2017; Nielsen and Parker, 2012), this thesis attempts to evaluate the SIA’s contribution through documenting the narratives of the regulator and the regulated communities and critically assessing the areas in which these converge or diverge with each other. In order to contextualise more specifically how this works in this study, first it should be noted that when referring to regulated communities (or regulatees), this term does not encompass all the parts of the security industry that are regulated by the SIA. The thesis adopts a sector-specific approach, through focusing specifically on door supervisors (DS), commonly known also as ‘bouncers’. Door supervisors (DS) are the largest licensable sector in

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1 It covers manned guarding (including security guarding, door supervision, close protection, cash and valuables in transit, and public surveillance using CCTV), key holding and vehicle immobilising.
the UK, and the one that has been associated with low professional standards, violence and criminality (Hobbs et al., 2003). These issues were a key driver that informed the introduction of regulation.

Taking this important background into consideration, this project aims to shed light on two different accounts. The first account relates to the strategic stance of the SIA. It examines how regulatory ambitions and regulatory pragmatism jostle and collide, and how the SIA’s approach to the key tenets of administering its licensing regime and securing compliance has developed in the post-regulation era. The second account involves the exploration of the same themes, but the focus in this case is shifted towards the ‘lived realities’ of regulatees both on an individual level (DS), as well as on a business level (DS companies) across a local UK context (south-east Wales). In other words, this account seeks to reveal how the role of DS as policing and order-maintenance agents in local NTEs has evolved in the post-regulation era and to assess the impact of the regulatory regime on any emerging contemporary challenges. A similar approach is followed for DS firms, but given the absence of compulsory licensing for them, emphasis is placed on investigating whether statutory oversight of businesses could be justified. Overall, through combining both accounts, this regulator-regulatees dialogue allows this project to shed light on a truly important concept, yet one that is relatively under-researched specifically in the regulation of private security: ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), with a specific focus on the balance between the enforcement strand adopted by the regulator and the support mechanisms available to regulatees. Through identifying positive change, but also gaps between the strategic set-up of the SIA’s regime and the actual experiences and understandings of the DS sector, this thesis enables a much more holistic exploration of whether both the licensing regime and the SIA’s enforcement processes are fit for purpose in contemporary society.

Before proceeding to the main body of the thesis, this last section offers a brief overview of how this study is structured. Given the collaborative and primarily empirically driven perspective of this thesis, a spectrum of different areas has influenced my understanding. As such, Chapter 2 offers a review of the literature related to the four key thematic areas that have informed and guided this research project. In short, these areas are related to the key regulatory models for the private security industry, the occupational developments in the vilified sector of ‘bouncers’, the collaboration dynamics between the police and private security operatives and the previous evaluations of the SIA’s regime. Through contextualising the supporting literature in each of these areas, the key purpose of this part of the thesis is to identify relevant research gaps. These gaps are twofold. First, they refer to several issues which have remained relatively unexplored in the literature. Prime examples are the police-DS working relationships and the specific factors
enabling or hindering cooperation, as well as the features of regulatory responsiveness in the SIA’s interventions. Second, the chapter justifies the need to re-examine, from a different perspective, areas that have attracted attention earlier. A key area refers to the contemporary trajectories and challenges of DS. The identified gaps in these areas form the basis upon which the research objectives and the contribution of this thesis are premised. As such, the chapter concludes with presenting the research objectives of the project in the form of four research questions.

These research questions are in a nutshell the research ‘compass’ of the thesis, underpinning the methodological choices, as well as the collection and analysis of the primary data. These methodological choices, namely the theoretical rationale, the design and the data collection and analysis strategies, are explored in Chapter 3. Given that the project seeks to construct a nuanced dialogue between the SIA and regulatees, the process of viewing and treating objectivity and subjectivity in these complex interactions is facilitated through a critical realist approach. This in turn informs the ‘intensive’ and ‘flexible’ design of the project: explanatory depth (‘intensive’ dimension) is married up with the reflexive coexistence of both deductive and inductive approaches (‘flexible’ dimension). Although I entered the field with a set of pre-existing theories and research questions, the most recent version of grounded theory and adaptive theory both allowed me to constantly question these leads and to remain open to the emergence of new concepts, meanings and links. Document analysis, quantitative descriptive data and interviews were the three methodological tools that allowed me to capture the SIA’s account. In terms of exploring the understandings and experiences of both regulatees (DS and businesses) and police officers across south-east Wales interviews were undertaken. Beyond justifying the various ‘technical’ methodological choices, this chapter seeks to provide a transparent reflective account. The gatekeeping arrangements, my positionality and the power dynamics between the participants and myself are highlighted as key themes across the stages of data collection and data analysis. Emerging challenges associated with each of these themes are acknowledged and their overall impact on the study is discussed.

Chapters 4 to 9 are empirical chapters, addressing the thesis’ research questions. Drawing upon the analysis of the SIA Annual Reports, the insights offered by SIA interviewees and quantitative descriptive data, Chapter 4 aims to examine the development of the SIA’s strategic stance towards its licensing regime for the DS sector. As such, the findings of this part of the thesis contribute to building up the response to the research question 1, specifically focusing on the account of the regulator. The analysis starts with a broader exploration of the development of the SIA’s strategic narrative and organisational culture in the post-regulation era (2007-2020), identifying elements
of continuity and change, which in turn affect the operationalisation of the licensing regime. Given the sector-specific focus of this thesis, the chapter proceeds to exploring how the licensing regime developed across the years for individual operatives (DS). This analysis is organised across three themes. The first one relates to the identification of three phases in licensing DS, reflecting on the dynamic shift in the regulatory narrative and approach towards the specific part of the industry. Considering the central role of the criminality criteria across these phases, the second theme concerns a critical appraisal of their role within the licensing apparatus, with particular emphasis on the implications for the SIA’s regulatory responsiveness. The third one aims to move beyond the exploration of the SIA Annual Reports and interview data, through analysing quantitative descriptive data related to the trends in the DS licensing from 2007 to 2020. Finally, the chapter considers the key developments regarding the statutory oversight of security firms. Taking into account the absence of business licensing, the SIA’s voluntary ACS is put into perspective and two key issues are addressed: the regulatory ambitions for the scheme (qualitative data) and the embeddedness of the ACS among DS companies (quantitative data).

Chapter 5 follows on from the previous one and it completes the exploration of the strategic account of the regulator. Drawing upon the analysis of the SIA Annual Reports, the insights offered by SIA interviewees and quantitative descriptive data, this chapter explores the development of the SIA’s strategic stance regarding its enforcement approach. As such, the findings of this part of the thesis contribute to building up the response to the research question 4, specifically focusing on the account of the regulator. The chapter is split into two sections. The first one aims to shed light on the intelligence gathering and analysis undertaken internally by the SIA. The ways in which intelligence is gathered from a variety of sources and the methods used to evaluate its content to either inform intelligence gaps or translate into enforceable action are two aspects with significant implications for the broader remit of enforcement. These aspects are the key themes that the analysis focuses on, so as to identify areas of best practice, but also to reveal challenges and issues that might affect the optimal operation of the regulator’s intelligence apparatus. The second section moves to consider the SIA’s enforcement toolkit, namely the sanctions that the organisation has at its disposal to secure compliance in the industry. Thus, it seeks to contextualise how the SIA has put forward its strategic perspective towards balancing these types of strategies towards the regulated communities. One of the most long-standing concerns about the SIA’s enforcement armoury appeared to be the lack of capability to impose sanctions that eliminate the financial gain from non-compliance, which was envisaged to be rectified through the introduction of POCA (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) powers in 2014. As such, the analysis of POCA cases (2014-2020) attempts to provide some early evaluation lessons from the SIA, both from an efficiency and effectiveness perspective.
In Chapter 6, the critical realist focus of this thesis shifts from the official SIA narrative to the ‘lived realities’ of door supervisors (DS) in south-east Wales. Through building upon the analysis in Chapter 4, this part of the thesis contributes to research question 1 and seeks to explore how the transformation of the world of bouncers has unfolded in the post-regulation era. Drawing upon the interviews conducted with frontline operatives working in urban and rural areas across south-east Wales, the analysis seeks to learn directly from the occupational experiences of DS. The overarching objective is to shed light into the changes in the DS occupation: to what extent have security operatives working in the NTE moved away from the pre-regulation ‘bouncer’ stereotypes and what are the key features of the DS working realities in the post-regulation era? Given the emphasis placed by the regulatory narrative on the industry’s safeguarding tasks, this analysis explores how this task is being realised and undertaken in practice by local DS. More specifically, interviews with security staff shed light into the following key aspects: who is perceived to be vulnerable in the NTE (conceptual understanding) and what sort of response is provided on the ground (actions/interventions). The emerging themes of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policing by security operatives are central in this part of the analysis, highlighting how safeguarding vulnerable individuals is a complex and multi-faceted process. Furthermore, when documenting how these operatives go about their order maintenance tasks in the local NTEs, there is a wide range of micro and macro dynamics that have shaped the contemporary DS occupation. In particular, occupational changes within the broader economic austerity context and the ways in which violence occurs on the doors are central themes of consideration. As such, this chapter aims to critically assess how each of these themes affect the implementation of the regulatory objectives of ‘cleansing’ and ‘professionalising’ the sector. In doing so, it also identifies some novel developments in the DS world and seeks to consider how these fit with the current regulatory approach towards this part of the security industry.

Chapter 7 seeks to explore to what extent the SIA’s ambition to enable private security operatives to become an integral part of the extended policing family has materialised. As such, its focus is placed on the working relationships and day-to-day dealings between DS and police officers across south-east Wales and it contributes to research question 2. Through the analysis of interview data from both DS and police participants across south-east Wales, this part of the thesis has two objectives. First, it provides a nuanced and critical exploration of both the positive and the negative dimensions associated with the collaboration dynamics between the two groups in the local context. Second, it sets out a more holistic explanatory framework, which allows these findings to be put into perspective. This framework builds upon prior research into typologies of public and private policing. In addition, through identifying specific factors that either enable or
hinder the collaboration mode in the local context, it assesses the contribution of the SIA’s regime upon the development of the working relationships between DS and the police in the post-regulation era.

Chapter 8 draws on interview data from DS, security directors/managers, police and the SIA, and it has two objectives, contributing to two research questions. First, it seeks to shed light on the key drivers of (non)compliance on the individual level (DS) across south-east Wales (research question 3). The process of exploring the motives and other factors that facilitate or hinder compliance with the SIA’s regime is undertaken through the lens of the Nielsen-Parker holistic compliance model (Nielsen and Parker, 2012; Parker and Nielsen, 2017). Second, this part of the thesis builds upon Chapter 5, which examined the development of the SIA’s strategic narrative in terms of its enforcement approach. In particular, it seeks to explore how the SIA’s enforcement approach is contextualised on the ground and its effects on regulatees. The analysis integrates two key themes; the SIA’s enforcement strategy as a deterrent factor for DS and the SIA’s enforcement styles in the day-to-day dealings with security operatives across south-east Wales. Therefore, it also corresponds to research question 4.

Chapter 9 is the last empirical chapter, and its analysis is supported by interview data, as well as data relating to prosecution cases. Following the rationale and the structure in Chapter 8, its first objective is to explore the driving mechanisms that facilitate or hinder compliance with the SIA regime on a business level (DS firms), adding to the evidence base of research question 3. Second, the discussion regarding corporate (non)compliance in the local context aims at adding the last analytical layer to the findings of Chapters 5 and 8 regarding the effect of the SIA’s enforcement approach on the DS sector (research question 4). As with Chapter 8, the analysis seeks to examine both the SIA’s enforcement strategy as a deterrent factor for DS businesses, as well as the regulator’s enforcement styles towards local firms. However, given the absence of regulatory oversight of security companies, it is of paramount importance to move the discussion one step further. Therefore, the analysis considers the impact of the inability to refuse business licensing on the SIA’s enforcement-related proactivity and responses to corporate misdemeanours. Finally, this leads to a more focussed inquiry into the broader dimensions of corporate malpractices by DS companies and their implications for the SIA’s mission.

Chapter 10 aims to act not simply as a mechanical finishing touch. Rather than an epilogue, which just seeks to provide a summary of what has come previously, this chapter has been developed across three key objectives. The first one is to offer a synthesis of the research findings. Through pulling together the key threads from Chapters 4-9, succinct responses to the research questions
that acted as the ‘research’ compass for this study are offered. These, in turn, allow the thread to move into the central overarching theme of this thesis. In particular, the SIA’s responsiveness is put into perspective: what sort of equilibrium is there between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ approach of the SIA towards this specific sector (both on individual and business level); and what sort of recommendations and policy implications can be drawn from these. Finally, through revisiting the contribution of this thesis, this last chapter offers a self-reflective account of the limitations of this study and outlines possible avenues for future research in this field.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, this PhD thesis is the outcome of a collaborative research project between the researcher and the SIA. The collaborative nature of the project has important implications for the formulation of the research objectives of this project, as well as for the specific methodological choices. The latter are explored in Chapter 3. In terms of the former, the project did not follow the conventional ‘theory-driven’ route that most PhDs in Social Sciences (and more specifically in Criminology) tend to follow. This does not mean that the project lacked the theoretical rigour of other studies. Given its primarily empirical nature, its starting point was not a single pre-identified theoretical framework, but instead a spectrum of research areas, which have influenced and guided my understanding. These research areas that shaped the theoretical formulation of the study are presented in sections 2.2-2.5, which explore the supporting literature and identify research gaps or areas that will merit further investigation. The original contribution of this thesis is then illustrated with reference to each thematic area. The chapter concludes with a summary of the project’s research objectives and introduces four research questions, which guide the methodological approaches, the analysis of the findings, and the concluding remarks.

2.2 ‘Controlling’, ‘correcting’ and ‘legitimising’ the private security industry: regulatory models across the globe

A review of the existing research literature clearly depicts a series of contemporary plural policing developments. Across the globe there has been a widespread shift from the dominant public policing model to a ‘policing web’ (Brodeur, 2010), in which a range of actors undertake policing work ‘through’, ‘beyond’ and ‘below’ government (Dupont, 2004; Jones and Lister, 2015; Loader, 2000). Among these policing arrangements, the private security industry has been the most prominent with remarkable worldwide growth. The driving forces behind the high demand for protective services delivered by private security officers has been the subject of academic scrutiny. Many explanatory frameworks have been put forward by criminology scholars,

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2 In the European Union, the presence of private security guards in almost all member states is ubiquitous, with the UK having the largest per capita private security sector (527.8 staff per 100,000) and with France, Germany and Spain having a fairly comparable ratio of private security to police officers (Button & Stiernstedt, 2017; 2018). In the US, a recent study highlights that private security officers have outnumbered public police by a ratio of 3 to 1 (Nalla & Crichlow, 2016). Similar trends are the case for Canada as well, with such a ratio being 2 to 1 (Hovbрендер, 2013). Remarkable rates of growth are also reported from Australia (Sarre & Prenzler, 2018) and New Zealand (Bradley, 2020), with the latter stating an increase of over 1000% between 1976 and 2018.
primarily focusing on how economic fluctuations in supply and demand of domestic security accelerated the growth of the market for security in the last century.

However, the rapid expansion of private security and the increased reliance on these services has been linked with what Prenzler et al. (2017, p.323) characterised as a ‘dark side’, which appears to be twofold. First, the conduct of private security companies and operatives has often been associated with poor standards, questionable performance and misconduct (Button, 2007, 2012; Prenzler and Milroy, 2012; Prenzler and Sarre, 2008, 2012). Second, the expansion of the operations undertaken by private security firms were in stark contrast with the popular expectations of the public concerning how security ought to be delivered (Loader 1997a, 1997b; Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007). Although far from the ideal Weberian-related monopoly over security provision, during the mid-20th century many political leaders across the globe attempted to reinforce the idea that security is primarily the task of the state (Garland, 1996; Shearing, 1992). As such, public expectations did not often fit well with the idea of private security providers, who ‘enjoyed little symbolic power, cultural support or legitimacy’ (White, 2012, p.94). Due to the poor standards associated with private security providers, as well as the popular socio-political norms on how domestic security ought to be delivered, by the 1990s most advanced democratic states had argued the need for intervention. Such an intervention materialised in the adoption of ‘basic’ systems of regulation (Prenzler and Sarre, 2012, p.31) with the objectives of

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3 The detailed analysis of these explanatory frameworks is beyond the purview of this chapter. Therefore, a short overview of the key arguments in understanding the contributing factors towards the privatisation of policing can be found as follows. A security vacuum has been attributed by Jones and Newburn (1998, 2002) to the decline in police budgets and the gradual discontinuation of roles involving secondary social control functions (e.g. ticket inspectors), which occurred in a period of upward trends in recorded crime. For other authors, the increase in the accumulation of various security products and services (Neocleous, 2008) leads to a self-perpetuating vicious circle; subjective feelings of insecurity are rising, patterns of crimes are changing and thus ultimately a further desire for security services is constantly stimulated (Zedner, 2003). Another argument related to the increasing demand for private security relates to the development of ‘mass private property’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1983). More specifically, the emergence of shopping malls and entertainment complexes was associated with the duty of property owners to provide for safety on their private properties, which led to the deployment of private security in order to offer tailor-made security solutions (Crawford, 2006; Kempa et al., 2004).

4 In the UK, some of the changes considered to have developed only in the closing years of the 20th century, notably privately funded policing, have a long pedigree within the English system and practice (Williams, 2008). Policing practices preceding the introduction of the New Police forces were on several occasions based on fees and this sort of profit-driven order maintenance was not easily accessible to less affluent populations (Phillips, 1977). Before the introduction of the ‘new police’ of the 19th century, policing the city was mainly undertaken by watchmen and parish constables (Emsley, 2007). A closer examination at their tasks, their interactions with owners of private property and their employment conditions reveal a series of interesting observations about the already blurred boundaries between public police and private interests (South, 1987, 1988; Rawlings, 1999; Zedner, 2006). Watchmen of the 19th century resembled much of the security guards and door supervisors of the 20th century; adhering to the traditional macho stereotype, in terms of their physical appearance, and pursuing their job mostly as a trade (Reynolds, 1998). Similarly, the ‘additional constable’ system was widely used by landlords to ensure the enforcement of urban discipline (Williams, 2008). The permeability of the public police to private interest continued to be the case during the 19th and the 20th century and even with the 1946 Police Act, the ‘additional constables’ scheme was not replaced.
professionalising the private security industry (Button, 2012) and legitimising it so as to retain the material and ideational presence of the state (Thumala et al., 2011; White, 2018, 2020).

The regulation of private security has been a challenging concept. Many academics have contributed significantly to developing propositions and models for more effective governance and regulation of private security personnel. Different schools of regulatory agendas have formed, with each of them showcasing a distinct starting point and underpinning rationale. To begin with, the empirical and conceptual work undertaken by Button, Prenzler and Sarre has underlined the necessity for regulatory models to account for instances of market failure and threats to the public interest. On a first level of analysis, this is feasible through a ‘light touch’ idea of regulation, which in practice means that regulatory regimes should remove deviant security providers from the industry or prevent them from entering in the first place (Button, 2008, 2012). For instance, Prenzler and Sarre (2008, 2014) identified fraud, incompetence, exploitation of staff, violent malpractice among a series of factors that construct a risk profile for such deviant security individuals/firms.

Further building upon the proposition of removing ‘bad apples’ from the sector, these scholars have focused on how standards of security providers can develop more broadly. Following this line of reasoning, based on the comparative analysis of regulatory regimes in European Union, Button (2008, 2012) advocates the necessity for regulatory regimes to account for width (parts of the industry regulated) and depth (i.e. rigorous licensing criteria). More recently, through enhanced integrity in the sector, these academics have underscored the potential of the industry to be involved in local crime reduction partnerships and to align their conduct with social justice and wider public interest benefits (Prenzler and Fardell, 2016; Prenzler and Wilson, 2014).

The objective of empowering cash-poor buyers by equalising access to the market for security has featured as the key conceptual and empirical proposition in the work of the ‘nodal governance’ scholars (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Drawing upon the relatively few instances of communalising regulatory ideas put into practice, the real-life cases from Toronto and Zwelethemba illustrated the potential of transferring funds to less secure communities to purchase and enhance their own security (Shearing and Froestad, 2010). Overall, the nodal governance theorists contribute to the debate surrounding regulatory practice in private security, through highlighting the significance of incorporating democratic participation and ways to address security inequality.
More recently, Loader and White (2017, p.167) argued that the previous regulatory models have not stretched the regulatory imagination beyond the ‘neoclassical economic view of the connections between the market and the public interest’. In order to fill this gap, they consider that their ‘civilising’ model maps out a regulatory architecture which views buyers and security providers not only as economic actors, but also as moral actors. ‘Inclusive deliberation’ and ‘social solidarity’ are two key principles of their model, suggesting that the regulator for private security should administrate a ‘publicly constituted space in line with these principles, the public regulator would contribute toward the important process of positioning non-contractual public values and commitments at the centre of regulatory space, both as a measure of market failure and as a motivator of human agency’ (Loader and White, 2017, p. 179). In terms of the practical application of this proposition, the process of delegation could be facilitated through MoUs (memoranda of understanding) between all relevant agencies/institutions involved in a specific regulatory response/intervention. From a theoretical perspective, the ‘civilising’ model is a fundamental addition to the burgeoning literature surrounding the rationale and objectives of regulatory regimes for the private security industry. Loader and White (2017) integrate economic imperatives, moral considerations and democratic participation in the debate on structuring regulatory responses in the current pluralised and fluid security landscape. However, in terms of its practical application, the suggested function of the MoUs, which are non-binding and thus non-enforceable contracts, could face several pitfalls, particularly when partnerships between private security officers and front-line police is considered (Stiernstedt et al., 2019).

Overall, these models are more often than not approached as standalone perspectives and at the time of the writing little scholarly effort has been made to bring these together into a more holistic framework that would encompass features from each regulatory school. A positive development towards such a synthesis comes from the latest article by Stiernstedt et al. (2019). Apart from a direct response towards the critique offered by Loader and White (2017), these authors advocate a more holistic regulatory framework, fusing the regulatory perspectives already discussed. As such, the framework builds upon three pillars: ‘regulatory’ (‘cleansing’ and professionalising the industry, Button and fellow authors), ‘distributive’ (addressing security inequality, Shearing and fellow authors), and ‘responsibility’ (aligning the industry with the public interest, Loader and White). This model is not prescriptive, but it offers a guideline and a principles-based regulatory approach and thus its inclusive, yet flexible, nature offers a valuable set of viewpoints that can be tested and refined in private security regulatory research, as is the case with this thesis.

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5 This will become more evident in section 2.4, in which we discuss the persisting trust and respect deficits between police and their commercial counterparts.
2.3 From ‘bouncers’ to ‘door supervisors’: occupational characteristics and the developments in this vilified private security sector

The night-time economy (NTE) refers to the economic activity taking place between 6pm and 6am, being primarily centred around alcohol-related entertainment in bars, restaurants and pubs (Talbot, 2006; Rowe and Bavington, 2011). Over the past decades the growth of NTEs in the UK has been substantial, filling the gaps of deindustrialisation in urban settings (Tutenges et al., 2015) and transforming post-industrial commercial and civic buildings into ‘themed’ entertainment premises, following the ‘civic boosterism’ agenda (Chatterton and Hollands, 2001; Hough and Hunter, 2008). On a first level of analysis, this expansion has been welcomed as a valuable development for revenue and job creation opportunities on a local and national level (Roberts, 2006; Roberts and Gornostaeva, 2007). However, premised upon alcohol promotion, the longer and later serving times and the tradition of binge drinking, a new culture of intoxication (Measham and Brain, 2005) appears to be a defining feature of the night-time landscape in UK cities, ‘filled with inebriated young people roaming around until the early hours of the morning’ (van Steden, 2014, p.7). Since the increasing level of alcohol consumption has been associated with an increased risk of harm within the NTE (Quigg et al., 2015b; Hughes et al., 2008), it is unsurprising that many research studies have identified anti-social behaviour, violent crime, Accident & Emergency Department admissions and substance misuse as key areas of concerns in UK ‘after dark’ settings (Bellis and Hughes 2011; Moore et al., 2013; Newton and Hirschfield, 2009; Quigg et al., 2015a; Quigg et al., 2016). There are also reports of a higher prevalence of serious violence with injury occurring in the evening, with most of violent incidents that occurred over the weekend (62%) and at night (61%) (particularly between the hours of 10pm and 6am) being alcohol-related (ONS, 2019).

Overall, as previously outlined, the contrasting dimensions of the NTE, seen as a vibrant economic driver and as filled with inebriated individuals, have attracted a UK-wide research focus. Yet, a particular city that has attracted an increased and also diverse NTE research attention in the last two decades is the Welsh capital. In the early 2000s, the TASC\(^6\) report highlighted that half of the incidents reported to the police occurred in or in close proximity to licensed premises (Maguire et al., 2003). Pre-loading\(^7\) has been also flagged as a key factor that exacerbates the

\(^6\) The Tackling Alcohol-related Street Crime (TASC) project was a police-led multi-agency scheme aimed at reducing alcohol-related crime and disorder in Cardiff and Cardiff Bay.

\(^7\) Pre-loading describes a migratory behavioural pattern, particularly common among young people, according to which individuals end up at bars and clubs located in the aforementioned hotspots late at night, after having consumed excessive amounts of alcohol either at home or at cheap alcohol outlets (Morleo et al., 2009).
cumulative impact of NTE in Cardiff (Brown, 2014), alongside with the high density of licensed premises in Cardiff city centre (City of Cardiff Council, 2016).

The situational context of the NTE in Cardiff has been explored through diverse research strands, contributing novel insights into understanding crime and violence dynamics, policing arrangements and evidence-based interventions. The first strand has involved nightlife consumers as active and knowledgeable agents in their studies. Key examples are Swann’s (2019) qualitative study that sheds lights on women’s understandings of engaging in aggressive behaviour in the NTE and Cozens’ et al (2019) exploration of crime precipitators through the lens of the end users of the Cardiff NTE. Second, the in-depth exploration of the Street Pastors initiative in Cardiff’s NTE (Johns et al., 2019; Swann et al., 2015; van Steden, 2014), as well as of the broader strategic management of the local NTE (Edwards, 2010) have shed light on the developments and challenges of plural policing in the NTE. Third, through the pioneering ‘Cardiff Model for Violence Prevention’\(^8\), novel interventions targeting alcohol-related violence in Cardiff licensed premises have been introduced and evaluated. Some interventions were associated with significant reductions in alcohol-related incidents (Moore et al., 2013), whereas others were caveated with lower level of success in decreasing police recorded violence in the NTE (Moore et al., 2014; 2017). Despite the mixed evidence of success, the key issue is that the original framework for managing Cardiff’s NTE (introduced in 2008) has switched its focus from a traditionally reactive policing response towards a more defined public health approach (Ashton et al., 2018; Shepherd, 2012), involving a wide array of co-operating agencies (i.e., police, local councils, emergency hospital departments, licensed premises)\(^9\).

Overall, across the UK policing practices in the NTE, following the broader developments in the ‘policing web’ (Brodeur, 2010) of modern urban settings, are premised upon public and private networks of social control (Chatterton and Hollands, 2002; Hadfield et al., 2009). Policing the private realm of the NTE is largely undertaken by ‘the muscular ranks of bouncers’ (Hobbs et al., 2005, p.176), known also as door supervisors (DS), who control access to night-time venues and

\(^8\) The ‘Cardiff Model’ has been developed by the Violence Research Group at Cardiff University as a groundbreaking way of violence prevention through data sharing between hospitals, police and local authorities (Crime and Security Research Institute, 2018).

\(^9\) Cardiff’s pioneering approach to multi-agency partnerships has informed many initiatives across England and Wales in terms of managing local NTEs. Some prominent examples are the following: the ‘Best Bar None’ initiative, the ‘Pub Watch’ scheme, the Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaigns of 2004 and 2005, ‘After dark’ initiatives (partnership between city centre ambassadors, street pastors, NHS Triage Service, Radio Net and CCTV operators) and the ‘Traffic Light System’ which won the Tilley Award in 2008. This strategy combines data from the police and NHS sources to categorise licensed premises in terms of their levels of violence and disorder. The approach then informs targeted interventions to tackle alcohol related crime and disorder in nightlife settings (City of Cardiff Council, 2016; Crawford & Lister, 2007; HM Government, 2007; Lister, 2009; Police Standards Unit, 2006;).
are considered to be the primary agents of social control in the NTE (Lister, 2009; Livingstone and Hart, 2003; Monaghan, 2004; Pratten, 2007). Following the routine activities theory (RAT) concepts\(^\text{10}\), DS appear to have the role of place managers (Sampson et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2010), who by using their physical and verbal assets can act as guardians and principal gatekeepers of the NTE (Lister et al., 2001). Through their position, they have the ability to limit the flow of patrons and limit access to potential troublemakers (Calvey, 2019; Cozens and Grieve, 2014; Fox and Sobol, 2000; Roberts, 2007) and they are also first respondents and spotters when a crime or a violent altercation occurs, having a broad control of the private venue, as it has become the norm for private security operatives more generally (Wakefield, 2005).

However, the mere presence of a guardian at the entrance of licensed premises is insufficient in terms of ensuring that target-hardening is immediate and effective, and that violence and disorder are deterred. Regarding guardianship in the crime triangle, place managers should be ‘capable’; otherwise they might end up being part of the problem, rather than part of the desired solution (Felson, 2002; Roberts, 2009). Capability refers to the guardian’s knowledge of what to look for, a basic understanding of what his/her role is in preventing violence and disorder and his/her ability to carry out such a duty competently and efficiently (adherence to a given set of standards) (Felson, 2006). In the case of bouncers, their capability as guardians of night-time venues was extensively questioned due to the disproportionate use of physical force and the affiliation of the ‘door trade’ with local crime networks.

In terms of the former, ethnographic research on the world of bouncers in the early 2000s highlighted how violence was a commonplace feature in policing and maintenance of social order in bars and clubs (Hobbs et al., 2002, 2003, 2005; Monaghan, 2002, 2003). The association of violence in nightlife settings with male door supervisors reflects the more generic ‘male phenomenon’ in police powers, as well as in the broader realm of private security (Erickson et al., 2000; Wakefield, 2003). Male bouncers emanate from working-class environments, where social interactions are often shaped by the negotiation of violence and thus their cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977) is largely based upon violent conduct (Winlow, 2001; Winlow and Hall, 2006). Through door supervision in corporate and commercial locations, their habitus, influenced by the traditional violent masculine practices, is transformed into economic capital (Hobbs et al., 2003, 2007). Turning next to the latter, the seminal book ‘Bouncers’ (Hobbs et al., 2003) offers an in depth and vivid illustration of how the NTE in the UK has ‘proven a bonanza for organised

\(^{10}\) The role of the guardian can be undertaken by an individual who ‘intentionally or not would deter the would-be offender from committing a crime against an available target’ (Hollis et al., 2013, p. 76).
crime’ (Waddington, 2010, p.5), either through the distribution of drugs or extortion practices. Door staff, who are regulating the entry to night-time venues, are in a central position to ‘recognise and not stop certain dealers endorsed by a certain gang affiliation’ (Calvey, 2017, p.136) and thus they can allow certain suppliers of drugs to distribute their products inside the venues in return for financial reward. In other instances, criminal groups might target establishments with weak security teams and through inflicting serious injuries to them, the owners would be inevitably ‘persuaded’ to transfer the security contract to competitors (Hobbs et al., 2003).

However, an important caveat should be considered, when the public outrage regarding the vilified practices undertaken (or believed to be undertaken) by bouncers is concerned. The beliefs/insights of the general public concerning door work were not of course guided and informed by the empirical research studies undertaken by Hobbs and his fellow authors in the British NTEs. The public perspective was largely influenced by the media-amplified image of the violent bouncer and gangster, resembling an ‘enduring folk-devil’ (Livingstone and Hart, 2003, p.165). Ignorance about the lived realities of door staff and their work has been abundant (Thompson, 2000) and, as such, exaggerated narratives and the prevalence of clichés on the door trade were not surprising. Following Calvey’s (2018, p.254) illustrative argument: ‘violence thus becomes an ambient feature of their work environment and in turn part of their occupational ‘war stories’ rather than a more saturated one, which feeds the one-dimensional view of bouncers that some commentators have successfully traded on’.

Alongside other private security scandals, which led to a widespread normative conflict across the UK (Lofstrand et al., 2016), the term ‘bouncer’ was synonymous with violence\(^\text{11}\) and thus the imperative of cleansing the sector from its criminal involvement was paramount (Thompson, 2000; Jason-Lloyd, 2009). At the same time, on a national level there was a widespread scepticism toward the security industry, which encountered cultural resistance\(^\text{12}\) towards its

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\(^\text{11}\) In the late 1990s one key incident was the assault perpetrated by a bouncer, who had a string of previous convictions including manslaughter, against a 30-year-old man, Paul Steele (BBC, 1998). The attack resulted in inflicting serious brain damage to the victim. A petition led by the victim’s family gained much public support and resulted in the issue being introduced for parliamentary debate.

\(^\text{12}\) Such a cultural resistance in the early 1990s was predicated on a twofold basis. First, both the 1989 Deal Bombing and the 1993 Group 4 prisoner escapes fuelled extensive negative press coverage and heated parliamentary debates ‘over the wisdom of contracting out important public safety operations to the private sector’ (White, 2015a, p.288). White’s (2010, p.107) analysis of the political dynamics towards the security industry during the early 1990s captures vividly the mood of many MPs in the aftermath of these events, as the following quote attributed to a Labour MP elucidates: ‘I hope that we can ensure that no more of these cheapjack firms will be hired’. Second, although in 1995 ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers, now the National Police Chiefs Council) shifted its stance in favour of the pro-regulation lobby, when referring to the private security industry they tended to reinforce the idea that commercial security providers lacked the moral, ethical, legal and public accountability mechanisms of the police.
products and services (Crawford et al., 2005; Loader et al., 2014; Thumala et al., 2011). Both driving forces contributed to a ‘hot’ temperature (Loader and Sparks, 2011, 2016) in the political discourse and the alignment of different streams (‘politics’, ‘problem’ and ‘policy’) ‘opened upon a window of opportunity’ (White, 2015a, p.284), setting the need for the government regulation in the industry at the forefront. After many years of heated debates, competing agendas and continuous negotiations, the introduction of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (PSIA 2001) and the subsequent creation of the regulatory body, the Security Industry Authority (SIA) was, according to White’s (2010, 2015b) analysis, a mixture of utilitarian and symbolic justifications. The former indicated the necessity of state oversight in eliminating the ‘cowboy’ companies whose presence was detrimental to the status of an industry that aspired to function effectively and responsibly. The latter focused on enhancing public credibility of security operatives through a provision of some visible and legally grounded connections with the state.

The creation of the SIA was the centrepiece of the PSIA 2001: a non-departmental public body, tasked with the administration of the licensing system and with raising standards in the industry and directly accountable to the Home Office and the ‘public protection’ mandate. In an attempt to re-brand and gradually legitimize the notorious world of ‘bouncers’, which was the largest licensable sector (HC 1059 [2004-5]), the SIA endorsed the title ‘door supervisor’ and introduced criminal background checks and competency requirements as part of its licensing regime. A further analysis of the finer details of the SIA’s regime, as well as existing evaluations can be found in section 2.5.

Overall, the existing literature concerning DS is associated with two key gaps. First, the vast majority of comprehensive ethnographic research into the world of bouncers is relatively outdated (Hobbs et al., 2002, 2003, 2005, Lister et al., 2001; Winlow, 2001; Winlow et al., 2001). Despite the depth of their work, the timing of their empirical studies (the early 2000s) meant that the prevailing academic-oriented capture of the DS world is one related to a monoculture, strongly linked with violence and the ‘control the doors, control the floors’ mantra (Morris, 1998, p.8). Since then, only Calvey’s (2017) covert case study of DS in the Manchester NTE attempted to revisit the sector and offers a more contemporary account of door work, highlighting the significance of collective bonds (camaraderie) among these operatives. Regarding violence, his objective was to ‘enquire into how bouncers routinely gear into and cope with it as part of their mundane reasoning’ (Calvey, 2018, p.254), and he reported that the vast majority of violent incidents occurred between intoxicated customers, while DS attempted to manage conflict and de-escalate the situation. Turning to the flow of drugs in licensed premises, many of the venues did not align with the ‘no drugs policy’, as long as drugs were not
traded overtly or instigated violent incidents. As such, ‘a very small number of bouncers received ‘kickbacks’ or monetary payments from drug dealers to allow entry and turn a ‘blind eye’ (Calvey, 2018, p.255).

Despite the contemporary nature of Calvey’s (2017, 2018) work, none of the current studies have attempted to examine how some new avenues suggested by policing/private security academics could integrate into the exploratory discourse on the DS sector. This is the second identified gap, which adds to the original contribution offered in this thesis. Considering Loader and White’s (2018, p.1402) analysis, the labour of private security operatives is a ‘signal case of incomplete commodification’, which means that security work is related not only to economic responsibilities, but also to moral obligations. Besides this, comparative ethnographic work in Sweden and in the UK (Lofstrand et al., 2016) offers an enlightening account of how private security operatives, who work in a low-prestige industry, realise, experience and deal with the ongoing reputational problems of the industry on the ground.

These two recently emerging strands in the burgeoning literature of private security have the potential to inform an updated exploration of the DS sector that seeks to learn directly from the occupational experiences of DS. Such an approach could reveal how the sector has been shaped in the pre-Covid-19 regulation era. Moreover, it could explore how changes in their occupation, together with other micro and macro dynamics, have shaped the ways that these operatives go about their order maintenance tasks in the local NTEs. Moving one step further, the question of the nature and extent to which the regulatory schema accommodated not only the ‘cleansing’ of the sector and the improvement of professional standards\(^\text{13}\), but also the process of aligning the industry more closely with the public interest (Loader and White, 2017) could also be considered.

### 2.4 Collaboration dynamics between police officers and private security operatives

The broad and multi-faceted context of policing has been captured by Newburn and Reiner (2008, p.913) who define policing as ‘an aspect of social control processes involving surveillance and sanctions intended to ensure the security of social order’. Given the developments in the policing landscape, as discussed in section 2.2, police and private security are frequently joining up their remits in the contemporary complex ‘policing webs’ (Brodeur, 2010). This leads to a questioning

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\(^\text{13}\) Following the discussion in section 2.2, these objectives are primarily associated with the ‘regulatory pillar’ (Stiernstedt et al., 2019), known also as the ‘cleansing model’ according to Loader and White (2017).
of how the on the ground working relationships between the police and their commercial counterparts developed in the last decades.

Before proceeding with the evidence available in the policing literature, it is important to note that when discussing the joined-up work between these groups, the term collaboration rather than partnership appears to be more suitable. A partnership refers to ‘a cooperative relationship between two or more organisations to achieve some common goal’ (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 172) and, therefore, it takes cooperation for granted and its emphasis is on narrow and joint goals. In contrast, collaboration is a much more flexible term, referring to formal and informal agreements as part of a broader multi-agency approach to supply a secure environment. Given that the empirical studies on this topic have yielded mixed evidence, the term collaboration arguably captures the fluid dynamics between the police and private security more accurately.

Characterising the relationship between the police and the private sector has been the subject of much academic scrutiny on a global level (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Kaklik and Wildhorn, 1972; Sklansky, 2006; South, 1988). Across these typologies, the common feature is that there are two fundamental working modes between the police and the private sector: competition and cooperation. Stenning (1989) identified six stages occurring between the police and private security, ranging from denial (first stage) progressively up to the ideal sixth stage of equal partnership. The active partnership stage (fifth stage), commonly known as the ‘junior-partner’ model (Jones and Newburn, 1998), assumes that the police have a leading role in the collaboration and security operatives are ‘helping the police do the job of real policing’ (Stenning, 1989, p.180). A series of empirical studies have identified elements of this typology, with an overall positive development in the working relationships between both ‘partners’, evidencing joined efforts and increased cooperation (Berg, 2004; Button, 2007; McManus, 1995; Nalla and Hwang, 2006; Shapland, 1999; Wakefield, 2003).

Against this backdrop, the literature reveals that the dynamics and perceptions between police officers and security operatives are not often symmetric. In particular, private security officers were often more positive towards the police and supportive of the collaboration (Hummer and Nalla, 2003; van Steden et al., 2015), whereas the police looked down on the security guards, and were reluctant to recognise or appreciate the security providers’ contribution and thus blocked

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14 Private security functions through contractual relationships and their services are funded by the buyers’ fees. On this basis, if the term partnership is used to describe the working arrangements between the police and security operatives, it might be implied that shared common goals between them are premised on financial gain. However, it should be noted that the political rhetoric often chooses the term ‘partnership’, as it sounds more positive and permanent.
appropriate channels of communication (Noaks, 2008). In an article reporting on interviews with police leaders about their perspectives towards working with the private security sector, Gill (2015) identified three distinct attitudes: the ‘sceptics’ (accepting only a secondary and marginal role for private security), the ‘pragmatists’ (acknowledging a role for the private sector as a ‘needs must’) and the ‘embracers’ (leaning towards an ‘equal partnership’). Police scepticism towards their private counterparts emerges as a belief that private security is not an essential partner; they do not act as the eyes and the ears of the police and their overall contribution in the objective of public protection was considered as minimal (Gill and Howell, 2017a). Despite the introduction of the SIA’s licensing regime and the regulatory attempt to raise the professional standards in the industry, many police officers expressed the view that ‘they are yet to be impressed by the skills and abilities and the regimes and ethos that underpins private security’s work’ (Gill and Howell, 2017b, p.28). These attitudes are rhetorical, as well as ‘real’ and it should be noted that the rhetoric of the senior police officers and the real relationships on the ground may differ, as they do on many issues.

Making sense of the mixed evidence regarding the collaboration dynamics between the police and private security can be undertaken through the following two routes. First, many scholars have demonstrated that the police across the board, as a traditionally hierarchical profession, faces significant problems in operating effective partnerships with other agencies/institutions. Barriers in accepting the equality of partnership with other bodies/institutions, a lack of clarity around each other’s responsibilities and boundaries and a shift of focus away from the grass roots implementation of the partnership are common challenges in private-public policing partnerships (Levi, 2010a; Meyer and Mazerolle, 2014; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Webster, 2015).

Second, the police often appear to have adopted a largely defensive attitude towards private security, despite the evidence that there is a blurred intermixing of market, as well as public protection rationalities that are shared by both agents on the policing spectrum. The public police have traditionally been seen to undertake their duties in accordance with the ‘public good’ mandate, whereas the private security industry is directed at preserving the security of private space for financial gain (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Against this clear-cut distinction between the police and their commercial counterparts, research evidence suggests that contemporary complex private security regime frameworks challenge the public/private security dichotomy (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Crawford and Lister, 2006; Dupont, 2014). In particular, case studies have documented how different policing styles and rationalities are intermixed among the police and private security providers. Both groups interact with business acumen, but also engage with a public duty for public protection (White, 2014; White and Gill, 2013). Against Jacobs’ (1992)
binary classification between police officers with high morals and private security officers with ‘lower’ intentions, van Steden’s et al. (2015) empirical research underscored the shared ‘security ethos’ between them.

Research on police culture has demonstrated the strong continuities in police culture over space and time (Loftus, 2010; Reiner, 2010). Police forces are not only confident of their organisational identity (White and Hayat, 2018) but even in the face of repeated controversies, they frequently draw upon their symbolic power, cultural support and legitimacy (Loader, 1997a; Loader and Walker, 2001). As such, the police ascribe a ‘wanna-be’ culture to private security occupational culture (Manzo, 2009; Noaks, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003). The boundaries between the remits of ‘security’ work (low-level end of crime/loss prevention) and ‘real’ police work (law enforcement) (Prenzler and Sarre, 1998) often appear to be deeply ingrained in the police culture, with adverse impacts upon the development of a mutually valued partnership.

Following the analysis of the literature on the working relationships between police and their commercial counterparts, two gaps can be illustrated. To begin with, in the UK context introducing regulation for some parts of the security industry has been premised on the need to ‘clean-up’ these sectors and to raise professional standards, offering them normative legitimation (Smith and White, 2014). As such, the SIA envisaged that regulation would enable private security operatives to gradually become an integral part and a trusted partner of the extended policing family in the UK (HC 1059 [2004-5]). Previous studies in the UK have examined the working relationships between the police and the security industry either as an ‘aggregate concept’ or through focusing upon security guards primarily in shopping malls (Wakefield, 2003) or in residential settings (Noaks, 2000). Although DS are the largest SIA-licensed sector and issues regarding their conduct and legitimacy status have been at the forefront of statutory regulation (section 2.3), there is a paucity of research examining the development of the working relationships between them and the police. As such, the extent to which the SIA’s regulatory regime has had any impact upon these collaboration dynamics has been unexplored. This research project aims to contribute to this area of research.

Besides this, although there is a solid research-related precedent regarding the different typologies of police-private partnerships (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Stenning, 1989; Sarre, 2011), there is

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15 Empirical studies such as the ones undertaken by Gill and fellow authors (Gill, 2015; Gill and Howell, 2017a, 2017b) offer important insights, yet they focus upon private security officers as a general and homogeneous group. Given that the regulated security industry in the UK consists of various sectors, with key differences both in terms of their roles, as well as on their legitimacy status, these studies do not capture the nuances in the collaboration dynamics between police officers and specific parts of the industry.
a paucity of empirical research, exploring the case-specific factors that either enable or hinder the collaboration mode between the police and their commercial counterparts. The ‘junior partner’ model is a useful and readily employed framework, but as illustrated by Diphoorn and Berg’s (2014, p.441) case studies in South Africa, ‘more studies are needed to analyse which factors at which particular points of time determine when and whether the ‘junior-partner’ model is adhered to and appreciated, and when it is not’. In line with this observation, a case-specific (DS sector) research project, such as this one, could explore the range of enabling and hindering factors in the collaboration dynamics between police forces and DS in local NTEs.

2.5 Evaluating the SIA’s regulatory approach through the lens of government reports and academic studies

As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the security industry has often been portrayed as a challenge to public protection and the controlling, correcting and legitimising solution was associated with the introduction of statutory regulation. In the UK context, the SIA’s statutory mandate is twofold: to reduce criminality and raise standards across seven sectors of the industry\textsuperscript{16}. The regulatory tools available that support such a statutory mandate are different on an individual and business level. Security operatives are subjected to compulsory criminal record vetting and a training requirement in order to be considered as ‘fit and proper’ individuals for undertaking the relevant security role. Regulation for companies is not compulsory but is optional through voluntary accreditation under the Approved Contractors Scheme (ACS). In other words, it is entirely up to the discretion of the security firm whether they would like to adhere to the standards of service delivery prescribed by the ACS and there is no mandatory oversight of their operations, either in law or in practice. Overall, the SIA’s regime deviated to some extent from the propositions made by George and Button in the lobbying period (George and Button, 1998). In terms of ‘width’, namely the security activities covered by licensing procedures, the SIA’s oversight did not include the following: in-house security personnel for the majority of sectors, security managers and corporate teams and some technical sectors of the industry, such as intruder alarms (Button, 2007, 2008, 2011). Security firms were not subjected to licensing, and regulation did not cover the much-anticipated sector of private investigators. Turning now to ‘depth’ (levels of training and background checks) and assessing the impact of the SIA’s regulatory regime on

\textsuperscript{16} From 2004 up to the time of writing, the SIA’s regulatory remit spans across the following parts of the private security industry: manned guarding (contract), door supervision (contract and in-house), close protection (contract), cash and valuables in transit (contract), public space surveillance (contract), the immobilisation, restriction and removal of vehicles (contract and in-house) and key holding (contract).
enhancing the performance of the security industry, government reviews and academic studies suggest a mixed view.

To begin with, in 2008 and 2009 the SIA’s regulatory activities were the subject of audit by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Better Regulation Executive (BRE). The relevant reports by both public bodies had the same impetus, which was primarily a question of ‘what works’; the technical administration of the SIA’s regime was put under the microscope. The weak enforcement policy, as well as the ‘blanket’ nature of the training standards were the main identified areas needing improvement (BRE, 2009; NAO, 2008). However, the key criterion of both reviews was the extent to which the SIA had aligned with the Hampton principles, which posited an economic interpretation of regulatory efficiency. The SIA was evaluated positively overall, given its commitment to reducing regulatory burdens. Many years later, the long-anticipated triennial review of the SIA, conducted by the Home Office, was published (Home Office, 2017). This extensive report identified good regulatory practice and once again, the focus was on the need for the regulator to further reduce burdens and develop tangible deregulatory milestones and timetables. But three interesting recommendations were urged by the review: a better sanctioning framework, regulatory oversight of security firms in light of ‘evidence of an organised crime threat in the form of shadow company directors and infiltration of legitimate operations’ (Home Office 2017, p.10) and ‘incentives that reward achievement’ (p.7), an aspect that connects with the broader responsive regulation agenda.

Post-regulation assessments undertaken by academics in practitioner-orientated reports suggest mixed evidence in terms of the impact of the SIA’s regime on fulfilling its regulatory objectives (White, 2010, 2015b). In terms of reducing criminality, reports demonstrate that some criminality has been eliminated from the security industry (Mawby and Gill, 2017; White and Smith, 2009). However, two key types of criminal practices were acknowledged as still prevailing in the regulated security sectors. According to White and Smith (2009, p.23) these are: ‘hidden’ criminality, referring to unlicensed individuals undertaking licensable security tasks and hiding from SIA investigators and ‘loophole’ criminality, when unlicensed individuals undertake licensable security tasks but ‘notionally define their terms of employment outside the remit of PSIA 2001’ (White and Smith, 2009, p.23). These were to some extent associated with weaknesses in the SIA’s investigative procedures (Mawby and Gill, 2017; White and Smith, 2009). In Humphris and Koumenta’s (2015, p.34) quantitative analysis, exploring the impact of

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17 A more detailed analysis is to follow later in this section.
18 There are two important caveats related to this study. First, the authors used the Office for National Statistics (ONS) standard occupational classification codes. On this occasion, the code 9241 is assigned to ‘security guards
occupational regulation on security guards, licensing probably had some sorting effect in that ‘it created an artificial barrier which excluded incompetent practitioners, but not on the basis of skills, but on the basis of their criminal background’. Although this finding paints a positive picture in terms of preventing individuals with prior criminal conviction(s) from entering the industry, the regulatory effect on the composition of the security workforce needs further exploration.

With reference to the objective of raising standards, licensing was demonstrated to have an insignificant impact on the employment levels and on the skills of security guards (Humphris and Koumenta, 2015). Licensing qualifications are considered to be obtained with relative ease and thus regulation may not produce meaningful barriers to entry that could contribute to the upskilling of security operatives (Fernie, 2011). The regime seems to have deterred individuals who were frequently attracted to security roles and had a criminal record, yet poor training standards was a recurring theme (Mawby and Gill, 2017; White and Smith, 2009). This is also evident in the few research studies that have so far examined the effect of the SIA’s regime specifically on the DS sector. Some DS considered that their communication and conflict managements skills have improved, but they raised concerns about the extent to which the SIA’s training requirement corresponded to the skills and confidence required in the reality of the job19 (Pratten, 2007; Jason-Lloyd, 2009). On the business level, the rationale of the voluntary ACS in steering as many companies as possible towards a set of baseline standards was not particularly welcome among many security firms, who envisaged the ACS to be functioning as a hallmark of quality (Gill et al., 2012).

Although the academic studies explored above offer some important insights into the contributions and limitations of the SIA’s regime to raise the performance of the security sectors, there are some notable gaps. First, echoing the arguments made in the previous sections, very few evaluations have directed their focus on how regulation impacted upon the transformation of the world of bouncers. Second, mirroring the scope of the government reviews by the NAO, BRE and the Home Office, most of these academic reports explored primarily ‘what works’ questions; how the SIA has performed so far in relation to its two regulatory objectives. For instance, the important conceptual contributions in terms of aligning the private security with the public

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19 Pratten’s (2007) interviews with DS indicated that the training package was lacking some fundamental requirements, such as first aid and self-defence training, which were perceived as essential to undertake their roles effectively.

and related occupations’ (ONS, 2000), a classification referring to various different types of licensed security operatives. As such, nuances regarding specific regulated sectors cannot be drawn out of this analysis. Moreover, their statistical models might not have picked up an exogenous demand side effect (e.g. the increase in demand of security since regulation was introduced).
interest have not been central concerns in evaluation studies. Against this backdrop, a notable exception has been the recent analysis by White and Hayat (2018), who revisited the first author’s earlier report (White and Smith, 2009) and explored a deeper question regarding the development of the SIA’s organisational identity. Through comparing and contrasting the regulator’s occupational culture with the stakeholder’s perceptions of the regime, they observed how the former’s adherence to a more streamlined regulatory agenda did not align well with the latter’s expectations of the SIA as leading a transformative route to reshape the industry (White and Hayat, 2018).

Third, many of the studies examined in this section outline some challenges in the SIA’s enforcement approach, yet they have not explored holistically the enforcement-related ‘regulatory craft’ (Sparrow, 2000). The starting point, which has not been addressed in these studies, is to examine the complex processes surrounding compliance, which in the words of Parker and Nielsen (2017, p.218) refers to ‘the panoply of behavioural and attitudinal responses that individuals and firms make to regulation’. The questions of why and under which conditions regulated entities comply or not with the SIA’s regime and how these driving forces of (non)compliance adapt to micro and macro influences remains unexplored.

This thesis contributes to this gap and is guided by two key frameworks: the literature on motivations behind criminal offending and the Nielsen Parker holistic compliance model. With regard to the former, some research studies attribute criminal decision making to an objective cost-benefit calculation, motivated by self-interest and a rational choice to maximise personal utility (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1987; Kagan and Scholz, 1980; Simpson, 2000). However, other studies have put forward an alternative model, recognising the imperfect or bounded rationality inherent in human decision making, and thus the impact of biases, systematic errors and strong emotions challenges the optimisation principle attached to the rational choice models (Campana, 2016b; Levi, 2008; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Simon, 1972). In the regulatory theory realm, the recognition of the interaction between different factors and various actors that can encourage or deter compliance has been captured by the Nielsen-Parker holistic compliance model. It comprises four broad categories, aimed at integrating the aforementioned schools of criminal decision-making (rational choice theory and bounded rationality): a) economic, social and normative motives, b) characteristics and capacities of

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20 The ‘civilising model’ (Loader and White, 2017) or the ‘responsibility pillar’ as referred to by Stiernsted et al (2019), following the relevant discussion in section 2.2.

21 With this term, Sparrow (2000) attempts to capture the wide range of underlying philosophies about enforcement and the practical decisions of managing enforcement-related process, that are embedded in the regulatory design.
regulatees, c) enforced compliance factors and d) deterrence factors (Nielsen and Parker, 2012; Parker and Nielsen, 2011). Yet, it is important to note that rather than a prescriptive model, this aims to ‘prompt understanding and insight into the multifarious actors and mechanisms that interact with one another to influence and create compliance’ (Parker and Nielsen, 2017, p.230).

Moreover, the studies exploring the SIA’s enforcement approach have not explored two other key aspects. First, the evolution of the ‘intelligence-led’ policing strategies and the introduction of the National Intelligence Model meant that in practice, law enforcement agencies and regulators have been directed to place significant emphasis on data and intelligence analysis (Ratcliffe, 2016). Yet, the particular ways and the associated challenges (John and Maguire, 2003; Maguire and John, 2006) in which data are gathered, analysed and ultimately guide the prioritisation of investigations and inspections for the SIA has evaded research scrutiny.

Second, previous research has focused primarily on the institution’s enforcement strategies, namely the choices made by the SIA in terms of its enforcement tools. However, none of these studies have examined the particular enforcement styles adopted by the regulatory body and their effect upon the interactions between the SIA and regulatees. Enforcement styles refer to the SIA’s day-to-day dealings with security operatives and firms, in the form of inspections or other encounters with the regulatees (May and Winter, 2011). A wide range of different enforcement styles has been identified by regulatory researchers and can be arrayed in a spectrum. On the one end, a rule-oriented/strict/coercive mode assumes that regulatees are unwilling to comply with regulations and that imposing sanctions on non-compliant individuals will compel the rest to be compliant (Gormley, 1998; Hutter, 1989; May and Burby, 1998; May and Wood, 2003). Conversely, catalytic/flexible/accommodative styles of enforcement encourage compliance through positive incentives, such as technical support and education, which aim at increasing their capacity and motivation to follow the regulations (ibid). Overall, the particular attributes attached to a regulatory enforcement style has a direct impact upon the cooperation between the regulator and regulated entities. Therefore, they constitute an important parameter that regulatory studies, such as this thesis, should incorporate when assessing the SIA’s impact.

Further building upon White and Hayat’s (2018) analysis and seeking to move beyond the ‘what works’ questions, a more holistic evaluation of the SIA’s regime could emphasise the positive incentives attached to regulation. In other words, as discussed in the previous paragraphs, the essence of the administration and the enforcement of a licensing regime goes beyond a crude representation of issuing licences and revoking them (or prosecuting), if malpractices are detected. Here, responsive regulation and focussed deterrence strategies can be two useful
models, since they allow the dynamic exchanges between a regulatory body and regulated individuals to be at the forefront of exploratory research projects. Responsive regulation, as advocated by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), has been a prominent ‘horizontal model of mutual trust’ (Hodges, 2016, p.3) between the regulator and regulatees, seeking to move beyond the traditional ‘command and control’ regulatory practice (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). The core feature of this model is the idea of an enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 2017), premised on the idea that escalation to ‘hard’ strategies (prosecution/licence revocations) should occur only after having considered ‘softer’ measures that facilitate persuasion (improvement notices, communication). Focussed deterrence strategies, also known as the ‘pulling levers’ approach (Kennedy 1997, 2008; Braga 2012) originated from Boston in order to tackle gang activity and drug trade and aimed to increase the risks by potential offenders, while at the same time communicated incentives for desistance (Braga and Weisburd, 2012). Given the intersection of the certainty of punishment and positive incentives, these strategies can be of analytic value to regulatory theory as well (Braithwaite, 2011).

2.6 Concluding remarks: contextualising the research questions

In the previous sections, the four key thematic areas that have informed and guided this research project were discussed. The process of contextualising the supporting literature and identifying relevant gaps allowed the researcher to illustrate the original contribution of this thesis. To recap from what was discussed previously in this chapter, the overall objective of this project is to evaluate the impact of the SIA’s regulatory regime upon the DS sector in the UK. The rationale here is to move beyond the purely technical ‘what works’ questions and instead focus upon a more nuanced comparison between the strategic account of the SIA and the regulatees’ experiences and understandings. In doing so, this project aims to shed light on issues which have remained relatively unexplored in the literature. Prime examples are the police-DS working relationships and the specific factors enabling or hindering cooperation, as well as the features of regulatory responsiveness in the SIA’s interventions. This thesis also seeks to re-examine, from a different perspective, areas which have attracted attention earlier. A key area refers to the contemporary trajectories and challenges of DS. Furthermore, from an enforcement-related perspective, this project seeks to showcase that a holistic examination should not focus only on the outcomes (enforcement actions). Instead, a wide range of underlying enforcement-oriented dynamics should be taken into consideration (intelligence gathering and analysis, enabling/hindering factors for compliance, enforcement styles).
The identified gaps in these areas, which are the basis upon which the research objectives and the contribution of this thesis are premised, have ultimately led to the construction of four research questions. These are approached as the research ‘compass’ of this study, underpinning the methodological choices, as well as the collection and analysis of the primary data:

1. What are the key features of the SIA’s strategic agenda on the ‘transformation of the world of bouncers’ and how do these correspond with the ‘lived realities’ of the DS community?
2. To what extent have DS become part of the extended policing family?
3. What are the key drivers behind (non)compliance with the SIA’s regime on an individual level (door supervisors) and on a business level (security companies)?
4. What are the key developments of the SIA’s enforcement approach and what is their effect on the door supervision sector?
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to outline and justify the underlying methodological logic of this research project. In doing so, it discusses the operationalising of the research objectives and the actual execution of the research plan. Following the discussion in the previous chapter, this research project aims to evaluate the regulatory regime for the private security industry in the UK, by focussing on a specific sector of the industry, namely the sector of door supervisors (DS). In this context, the key focus of this project is a critical exploration and comparison between the strategic aims of the SIA and the perceptions of the regulated entities themselves (DS and security companies offering DS services). This inquiry is premised upon the exploration of a twofold research objective\(^22\): a) the impact of the SIA’s licensing regime upon the DS sector and b) the key drivers behind regulatory (non)compliance on an individual and business level and the ways that the SIA’s enforcement approach has developed accordingly.

Following Crotty’s (1998) framework of constructing and developing the social research process, the starting point within this chapter is the description of the theoretical rationale, followed by the overarching research strategy (methodology), which in turn shapes the decisions for selecting particular methods for the data collection. Apart from the descriptive and justifying dimension, this chapter also seeks to reflect upon ethical considerations. By adopting a self-reflective tone, this chapter addresses some challenges and limitations associated with my methodological choices and their overall impact on the research study.

3.2 Theoretical rationale

The very first question that is fundamental to be posed by a social sciences researcher, before embarking upon discussing the methodological decisions is a simple, yet crucial one: ‘How do I look at the world and make sense of it?’ This simple question entails two significant dimensions that are central to these strategic research decisions; the ontological and the epistemological approach. Responses to this question in the social sciences have been traditionally divided into two distinct schools of thought, namely the positivists and the constructionists\(^23\).

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\(^{22}\) This twofold research objective has in turn shaped the research questions of this thesis, which have been already presented in greater detail in the last section of Chapter 2.

\(^{23}\) Positivists argue that by exploring empirical events and pinpointing patterns and regularities, we can end up with plausible causal relationships that illustrate an objective reality (Semmens, 2011; Miles et al., 2014). Conversely for
Adopting an either positivist or constructivist approach for the purposes of a regulatory research project could be argued to not capture an authentic and appreciative account. In order to fully capture the potential shortcomings of both perspectives to account for the ontological and epistemological foundations of this study, the researcher should initially reflect upon how regulation can be addressed as an object of inquiry. A common misconception can occur when regulation is equated with law, whereas legal rules are just one of the various forms or manifestations of a given regulatory regime (Henne, 2017). Instead of narrowly focusing on the role and the practical application of law in society, regulatory research seeks to identify and evaluate the complex mechanisms through which a regulatory regime is applied and impacts upon the regulated groups (Levi-Faur, 2011). Within a regulatory research project, the researcher seeks to account for some objective dimensions, related to structural or systemic conditions (e.g. levels of compliance among the regulated population), while exploring the subjective meanings and values that individual actors attribute to regulatory practices (Losoncz, 2017).

Therefore, following a positivist stance for a regulatory research study could assist in linking some empirical regularities with causal explanatory frameworks, but it does not address the underlying experiences and interpretations of these regularities that can be affected by the social actions of actors (Abbott, 2001; Sayer, 2000). However, a pure constructivist approach could be associated with the pitfall of overemphasising the role of cultural context and social externalities, thus bypassing the impact of structural conditions on how regulatory realities are applied, developed and enforced (Hammersley, 2008; Somers, 1998).

Since regulatory research is premised upon the exploration of the complex interplay between institutional actions and the social structures of the regulated communities, it appears that instead of a dispute between objective patterns and subjective interpretations of reality, these aspects interact in a dialectical manner (Iosifides, 2012). A viable way of moving away from this potentially sterile dichotomy is offered through the prism of a critical realist approach. Since its original conceptualisation by Bhaskar (1978), the critical realist approach accepts the existence of an objective set of knowledge about the world, but at the same time it attempts to link this with conceptualisations and interpretations by social agents and researchers.

the constructionists, reality is perceived as a set of socially constructed events that are subjected to individual perspectives, beliefs and social interactions (Hammersley, 2008). In essence, by adopting a positivist approach, the analysis is geared to a structural level, whereas constructivist rationales emphasise the role of culture and the agency of actors in revealing meanings of social action and social change.
In order to facilitate this process of viewing and treating objectivity and subjectivity in parallel, a critical realist approach is developed across three different reality dimensions, namely the empirical, the actual and the real (Danermark et al., 2002; Hartwig, 2007). The first one, the empirical dimension, entails experiences, beliefs, perceptions and concepts, which are mediated by the theoretical understandings and meanings attributed to them. In terms of this research project, such a dimension is associated with the meanings and beliefs attributed to the SIA regulation by the individuals working for the regulator, by the regulated communities (DS and security companies) and by the police (Figure 1). These subjective conceptualisations are spread across a variety of subject matters, following the twofold research objective of this study²⁴.

Moving one step further from the empirical realm, we enter the domain of the actual that is premised upon facts, events and patterns that do occur irrespective of individual knowledge, understanding and meanings (Figure 1). In the context of this project, they are associated with descriptive data on SIA licences and enforcement outputs, as well as with specific developments of the regulatory regime, such as the refinement of the criminality criteria and the acquisition of POCA powers.

Even though these two domains exist on different ontological levels, they can be interlinked via the third dimension, the real one, which relates to empirically unobservable interactions, which however produce events and phenomena that are observable, and they can be found in the actual domain (Figure 1). These interactions, which lie at the centre of a critical realist methodology, are labelled as generative causal mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1998). These are relatively stable structures that are usually triggered by the interplay of social actors or objects and ‘produce observed relationships between explanans and explanandum’ (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1996, p.281).

However, it should be noted that by depicting these mechanisms as causal structures that can trigger events, it should not be assumed that a critical realist methodological framework advocates that a correlation between some empirical observations or events can serve as a causal explanation. Rather, the proposed methodology follows an abstract research paradigm, which enables me to systematically analyse the interplay between events and experiences, so as to describe theoretically some mechanisms and structures that can hypothetically explain the

²⁴ These issues are explored in detail in the findings chapters of this thesis (Chapter 4 - Chapter 9). In short, they relate to the evolving role of DS, the perceived professionalism and accountability, the impact of the SIA regulations on the sector, the overall perception of the effectiveness of the SIA in liaising with the regulated community and enforcing the regime, and the working relationships between DS and the police.
observed regularities (Bygstad & Munkvold, 2011). The outcome attributed to these causal powers is relational and context-specific, since it is dependent on whether a specific interaction between different mechanisms will be exercised or not and on the agency of social actors, whose actions are conditional upon a series of contingent factors (Archer, 1995). Because of this inherent contingent nature, these mechanisms could provide some explanatory frameworks for the observations and phenomena of our inquiry, but they cannot predict their occurrence (Bunge, 2004).

Figure 1 Applying critical realism to a regulatory research project

![Diagram showing the relationship between empirical, actual, and real states in the context of research.

Sources: Bhaskar (1998); Danermark et al. (2002); Losoncz (2017)

3.3 Research Design – Research Methodology

Having discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the research strategy, the next step in the overall process of defining the methodological decisions is to meticulously design a concrete research framework. The basis of choosing a suitable research design is the consideration of the specific nature and characteristics of the objects in the research inquiry. By incorporating Sayer’s (1992) and Robson’s (2002) categorisations of available research designs, the two fundamental qualities attributed to this choice are the ‘intensive’ and the ‘flexible’ categories respectively.

Distinguishing between intensive and extensive research frameworks is not solely based on the question of whether a research study emphasises depth over breadth, which is commonly associated with choosing between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. This distinction has its roots in the fundamental question of how a researcher defines the research questions, objects and boundaries, which in turn informs the choice of a more specific methodology (Sayer, 2000). In this thesis, the research questions are premised on exploring actions, perceptions,
understanding of processes, changes and outcomes in a specific sector of the regulated private security industry in the UK. These accounts are explored in light of the strategic and tactical narrative of the SIA and the perspectives of local DS, security companies and police officers, so as to reveal similarities, differences and gaps between these diverse accounts. Therefore, the social actors of this study are from seemingly different groups, but in essence they relate structurally to each other and they interact with each other, since the SIA regulatory regime is the substantial common thread. In other words, the guiding principle for adopting an intensive research design is explanatory depth, which relates to the need to not overlook differences in accounts and contexts in the name of an extreme standardisation.

Regarding the ‘flexible’ research design of this thesis, my perspective aligns with the one illustrated by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p.24) that the ‘research design should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project’. As discussed in the introduction of Chapter 2, this thesis is informed by some broad ideas and issues, but these do not constitute predetermined ‘variables’. Relationships, connections and contradictions between the different actors in this regulatory project were allowed to emerge in the process of data collection and analysis. Theoretical frameworks were considered as tools to contextualise and guide the inquiry of complex phenomena.

These choices informed the next step in the methodological decisions process, namely the identification of a suitable overarching research methodology, which, following Castles’ (2012, p.16) illustrative account, can be seen as ‘our chart to navigate the social world’. The overarching question at this stage relates to how this thesis approaches the nature of the relationship between collecting data and developing theory (Bottoms, 2008). The critical realist focus of this thesis does not fit well with either the one extreme of a purely deductive approach or the other end of a purely inductive approach25.

Therefore, this study has been guided by two alternative research methodologies that align with my critical realist stance and aim to bridge the gap between hypothesis-testing and the original formulation of inductive strategies. More specifically, the most recent version of grounded

25 On the one hand, deductive approaches place emphasis on hypothesis testing, aiming at either proving or refuting pre-existing theory through the data collection. On the other hand, inductive approaches are primarily associated with the ground theory methodology, as originally developed by Glasser and Strauss in 1967, suggesting that the researcher enters the field with a tabula rasa and theory emerges from the data.
theory\textsuperscript{26} and the adaptive theory approach\textsuperscript{27} have informed my stance as follows\textsuperscript{28}. Although I entered the field with a set of pre-existing theories\textsuperscript{29} and research questions, the process of concurrent data collection and analysis pushed me beyond my received understandings. In particular, this pre-existing theoretical knowledge of concepts allowed me to work as a detective, by constantly questioning these leads and remaining open to revealing new meanings and links (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The continuous development of this strategy allowed me to link its adaptable nature with the requirements of the critical realist framework, which seeks to ‘address both the event itself and the meaning made of it. This meant I could approach data with the preconceived analytical concepts of emergence and generative mechanisms and pursue emancipatory, rather than merely descriptive, goals’ (Oliver, 2011, p.8).

Last, the flexibility of the research design in this project is evidenced through the adoption of a qualitative methodology and a thematic analysis of the SIA annual reports and interview transcripts\textsuperscript{30}. The emergence of concepts occurs naturally and, following a mixture of abductive and retroductive techniques, so that relationships and connections are explored as they manifest (Robson, 2002). By acknowledging my inevitable preconceptions\textsuperscript{31} within this study, the overall aim is to avoid the traditional divide between inductive and deductive strategies. Instead, when approaching the strategic account of the SIA, as well as the implicit and explicit meanings that the regulator and the regulated community attribute, the overall aim is twofold; on the one hand, to move beyond the superficial level of accounts into asking questions about the more transfactual conditions for these (retroduction) and, on the other hand, to theoretically re-describe connections and known phenomena in a novel way (Danermark et al., 2002).

\textsuperscript{26} Since its original conceptualisation by Glasser and Strauss in 1967, this research methodology has been modified several times. The new generation of grounded theorists deviate from the traditional mandate of either pursuing generalisable theory about an objective reality or applying a symbolic interactionist perspective, by emphasising the implications of meaning-making and social constructions (Charmaz, 2009), as well as by critically challenging dominant social structures (Gibson, 2007).

\textsuperscript{27} Closely aligning with the new more ‘moderate’ school of grounded theorists, the adaptive theory approach relates to commencing the study with some theoretical orienting concepts, which are guiding the data collection. These concepts are open to refinement, according with the findings of the research project (Layder, 1998).

\textsuperscript{28} It is important to note that I do not consider that a research methodology is a set of strategies that function as ‘gold standard’ protocol, as if it were a laboratory experiment. Instead, I sought extensively for various methodologies that could inform (rather than ‘dictate’) the further methodological decisions, without compromising on the broader critical realist framework of this thesis. As such, both the ‘new’ version of the grounded theory, as well as the adaptive theory approach, appeared to be useful means that guided the way I handled theory and data through the project.

\textsuperscript{29} These theories are informed by the literature review (Chapter 2) I conducted before entering the field (e.g. prevalence of specific types of crime and violence in the NTE, the working relationships between private and public policing, regulation theory models).

\textsuperscript{30} Examples of the coding framework used by the researcher in the thematic analysis of the qualitative data of this study can be found in Appendix E.

\textsuperscript{31} A more focussed and reflexive discussion on these preconceptions can be found in section 3.6.
3.4 Research Methods and Data Collection

The previous sections outlined the epistemological positioning and the characteristics of the research design and research methodology for this study. In this section, the focus is placed on the methods, illustratively described by Castles (2012, p.7) as ‘the tools of our trade’, which enabled me to examine the connections between the account of the SIA and the accounts of the regulatees and police in local NTEs.

3.4.1 Capturing the SIA’s account through document analysis and the SIA’s datasets

Institutional actions and ambitions are a fundamental basis upon which a regulatory body expresses its stance towards its mission, values and strategic priorities that are central in shaping regulatory agendas and frameworks. Exploring the SIA’s actions and ambitions is a multi-dimensional process, involving the description and explanation of an interplay between systemic conditions and the agency of actors involved in the institution.

The first data collection method used in the study for contextualising the official account of the SIA is document/textual analysis. More specifically, the annual reports/reviews by the SIA, covering the period from the inauguration of the SIA in 2003 up to 2020, are used not only as background literature, but also as a source of data that can be analysed. The underpinning rationale behind utilising these reports, which are produced ‘in-house’ and are publicly available through the SIA’s website, as a data collection method, lies in their potential to reveal the stated regulatory priorities, agendas and tactical responses of the body over the span of 17 years (Noaks and Wincup, 2004).

Scott’s (1990) four criteria, which refer to the baseline quality requirements of any sort of documentary evidence, are applied in this study, in order to assess the quality of these reports. More specifically, these criteria relate to the dimensions of authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. In the specific context of the SIA annual reports, the documents examined are: 1) of original nature and are produced by the regulatory body (authenticity); 2)
assumed to reflect sincere and accurate accounts\textsuperscript{32} (credibility); 3) publicly available documents through the SIA Website (representativeness) and 4) literal and interpretative\textsuperscript{33}.

These reports are the written official accounts of the SIA and through a systematic and thematic analysis of their content, a critical realist researcher can find an interesting mixture of objective and constructivist features. First, the annual reports present numerical data regarding issues and revocations of individual licences and ACS accreditation to security companies, compliance levels, licensing inspections and enforcement operations (warnings, improvement notices, prosecutions). These data sources are coupled with the analysis of quantitative descriptive data (datasets on licensing and compliance), as well as prosecution cases. Access to this data was facilitated through two different routes. The first point of access was through publicly available figures, obtained either through the SIA’s website or through its annual reports. For more sector-specific data (e.g. annual revocations of DS licences) or for those that covered a longer historical period (i.e. 2008-2020), my requests were directed to the SIA. All of the above can frame the ‘actual’ dimension of the critical realist paradigm, serving as the indicators of the substantive issues in the factual realm of the regulatory research (Henne, 2017).

Second, apart from these ‘objective’ features, the strategic priorities of the regulatory body can be explored through the lens of the associated narratives and justifications of values, missions, tactical objectives and anticipated risks. It should be noted at this point that when the researcher is approaching these topics, it is of crucial importance for the methodological rigour of the study to be able to move one step beyond the preconceived authoritative content of the institutional structures and activities (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011). Therefore, from a self-reflective point of view, although there was a temptation to treat these reports as objective sources that uncover ‘the truth’ about the regulator, I aimed at examining the narratives critically and uncovering implied and subtle meanings through a careful analysis of their modes of discourse (Garland, 2001). By approaching the SIA’s annual reports not simply as impersonal and objective records, but as textual representations of the social and political realm, within which a regulatory body applies

\textsuperscript{32} This assumption is primarily associated with the key objectives of these reports. First, the SIA seeks to communicate the actual values, missions, objectives and operations to the regulated communities, as well as to other security stakeholders. Second, the reports fulfil an accountability-related role. Being publicly available, the various reported metrics (licensing, enforcement outputs, financial statements) provide a key source of the SIA’s performance. Of course, there is the risk that if the SIA does not meet its targets, these reports could fuel criticism against the organisation. As such, by tick-boxing the credibility assumption, the content of these documents is still approached from a critical point of view in this thesis, thus being open to assessing potential controversies, gaps or irregularities.

\textsuperscript{33} In order to grasp the interpretations offered by the reports in depth, the analysis in both Chapters 4 and 5 was supported by reflections on the key developments in the domestic political sphere that impacted upon the regulatory trajectory (e.g. ‘light-touch’ regulation mandate).
its regime, the second element of the critical realist framework is illustrated; this is the constructivist dimension of the regulatory reality.

3.4.2 Capturing the SIA’s account through interviews: methodological decisions, gatekeeping arrangements and power dynamics

Turning next to the second data collection method for eliciting the SIA’s narrative on the research topics of interest, 18 semi-structured interviews with key individuals working in the regulatory body were conducted. The rationale behind undertaking these interviews lies in the methodological requirement to further build upon the constructivist dimension of the regulatory reality, as well as to adopt a strategy of methodological triangulation between the textual and oral accounts of the SIA (Denzin, 1970). More specifically, the perceptions, understandings and approaches of some of the key individuals working for the SIA were examined and interviews were approached as ‘situated talk’, rather than oral representations of reality (Hester and Francis, 1994). These interviews were then considered to be additional significant sources of eliciting the institutional objectives, ambitions and challenges in terms of regulating private security operatives and businesses.

Regarding the sampling strategies for these semi-structured interviews, a purposive non-random technique was followed, since the fundamental criterion was not the actual number of people interviewed, but their role within the SIA. As noted by Reybold et al., (2013, p.699) ‘researchers do not just collect and analyse neutral data; they decide who matters as data’. In particular, the participants were selected carefully, so as to reflect the diversity and breadth of the sample population, taking into account the different departments within the organisation and the variety of responsibilities and positions within the operation of the regulatory regime. In total, 18 interviews were undertaken within the SIA. These included staff from the following departments: a) Partnerships & Interventions, b) SIA Board members, c) Training & Standards, d) Intelligence Team, e) Policy/Research and f) Legal.34 This variety of professional backgrounds and

34 The Partnerships & Interventions team is responsible for providing compliance and enforcement across the UK. The team conducts operations and business audits to identify and tackle non-compliance, often through the collaboration with law enforcement agencies. The SIA board consists of non-executive directors and executive directors and its focus is on shaping the strategic focus of the organisation and ensuring that the regulatory body does all the work needed to implement the PSIA 2001. The Trainings & Standards department is responsible for working with all stakeholders to understand customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction points and working with awarding bodies to set the standard of the licence-linked qualifications. The Intelligence team provides a customer insight and intelligence service, through analysing and interpreting data from a variety of sources and assessing any relevant risks or issues. The Policy & Research team is focusing on enabling the SIA Board to carry out their governance role. As such, it is tasked with developing and implementing a strategic approach for the SIA. Finally, the Legal team is a full-service legal function, responsible for providing robust legal advice across the organisation.
regulation-related tasks within this sample ensured that responses elicited from the interviewees were diverse in breadth (covering all of the topics of our research inquiry with the appropriate professional expertise) and depth (including strategic, tactical and operational insights, as well as different levels of seniority).

Within this research project gaining access and establishing rapport were not single events but rather multi-dimensional and ongoing processes that involved different levels of gatekeepers and negotiations (Atkinson et al., 2001; Duke, 2002). Gatekeepers, as illustrated by Reeves (2010, p.317), ‘can help or hinder research depending upon their personal thoughts on the validity of the research and its value, as well as their approach to the welfare of the people under their charge’. In terms of gaining access to the regulatory body and obtaining the insights and perceptions of these individuals working for the SIA, this was facilitated through the pre-existing cooperation structures and gatekeeping processes between the SIA and me.

The funding arrangements for this research study, coupled with the allocation of a primary gatekeeper within the organisation, who had been my first point of contact within the SIA, allowed the gradual development of familiarity, trust and rapport between participants and me. The contribution of my internal and formal gatekeeper, who is a key individual within the SIA’s organisational hierarchy, was crucial in terms of developing the ‘personal sponsorship’ of the research study (Walford, 1994, p.224), and thus circumventing this original lack of ‘street presence’ (Hirsch, 1995, p.74).

This also highlights another interesting dimension concerning the power dynamics between the participants from the SIA and me, given that ‘the intersection of age, race, gender, academic credentials, funding and research experience help to define the researcher’s status and her/his relationship to the researched’ (Duke, 2002, p.52). Whilst I am a young female PhD student, the fact that the regulatory body is funding this research, coupled with my academic credentials, contributed significantly to bridging the gap between the ‘lone wolf’ and the ‘hired hand’ (Punch, 1994, p.85). During my interviews with SIA participants, this appeared to be an empowering aspect since it facilitated the presentation of myself as a non-threatening and bona fide researcher. Furthermore, although most of these participants worked within tight time frames, they were very generous with their time, which they were keen on adapting for the purpose of covering all the topics in my interview agenda.

However, probing beyond the official line of a regulatory body can be challenging, since in general civil servants disclose information meticulously and according to the conditions and
terms of their employment (Ball, 1994; Hennessey, 1989). Although all SIA interviewees provided thick accounts, a recurring comment made by some participants related to the representation of their arguments and perspectives as strictly personal viewpoints, underscoring the potential of deviating from other SIA participants’ views. Some of these participants appeared to be reassured that their opinions on debatable topics were known within the SIA, whereas some others expressed some subtle concerns, often accompanied by a humorous tone (‘God, I shouldn’t be saying this on the tape!’ [SIA_P15]). In a few cases, they expressed the desire to know whether their comments agreed or corresponded partly with what their colleagues, or primarily my gatekeeper within the SIA, had said. A such, I had to come up with a prompt and straightforward strategy aiming at gaining their trust, as well as fully adhering to the ethical standards of my study. First, I reassured them that all discussions are protected under the principles of anonymity and confidentiality. Second, I clearly communicated to them that whenever I got asked this question, I provided the same response to all participants, declaring that in order to protect equally all my interviewees such a question cannot be answered. Employing this honest and ethically robust strategy appeared to provide them with relief and trust in further elaborating their own personal views and being more open to share their disagreements and insights regarding the current regulatory challenges.

Prior to conducting the interviews, I had been invited by the gatekeeper to get involved in a variety of events organised by the SIA35, which significantly helped to establish my positionality within the regulatory body by gaining the insight of an insider but the neutrality of an outsider (Welch et al., 2002; Mikecz, 2012). Supportive comments regarding the scope and the value of this research by my gatekeeper, coupled with formal introductions to key individuals within the SIA and the involvement in these events were fundamental in identifying and liaising with the first stream of the participants with whom I had no prior links. Through this first stream of participants, the opportunity to supplement the purposeful sampling strategy was provided, since the former were able to direct and refer me directly to the key individuals across the SIA departments. Given that I did not have any prior contact with this second stream of participants, they were approached through interview requests36. In order to overcome the potential pitfalls of the ‘cold call’ (Useem, 1995), the message conveyed through these interview requests underlined the objective to discuss with them their views and experiences, rather than portraying the interview as a fact-finding mission.

35 Between 2016 and 2020, I have been invited to the SIA’s Violence Reduction Advisory meetings, engagement events with licence holders in South Wales and the SIA’s annual stakeholder conference.
36 These interview requests were outfitted with research-related information, the approval letter by the Ethics Committee at Cardiff University and an interview consent form. Further details can be found in section 3.5.
Most of the interviews with the SIA participants were conducted in their working environment, with the exception of two interviews that took place in my social space, a meeting room in the Postgraduate Research Office. The venue of the interview appeared to play a significant role in the development of power dynamics between myself and the participants. In particular, within the interviews undertaken at the SIA’s headquarters the participants’ power was reinforced, which was also supported by the fact that they occurred at the beginning of the fieldwork. The last two interviews occurred at a later stage of the fieldwork and in my working environment, which ultimately ‘helped to locate myself and the respondent in more physically equal and neutral positions’ (Duke, 2002, p.54).

For the purpose of obtaining rich and in-depth information pertaining to the SIA participants’ experiences and viewpoints, the interview protocol was designed using an adaptive approach, through the combination of elements from the general interview guide approach and the standardised open-ended interviews (Gall et al., 2003; Turner, 2010). In practical terms, the starting point of the interview protocol\(^{37}\) was that participants were asked questions, which were quite structured in terms of the wording, but at the same time they were open-ended, so that they could freely contribute with thick accounts regarding their viewpoints across a variety of topics.

However, adopting a reflexive stance in the field was crucial to determine whether this quite structured interview protocol could be effective in different cases. Thus, if I realised that a particular interview could benefit from a more conversational approach or from consciously letting the interviewee gain control of the discussion, then the mode of conducting the interview was shifted to allow a greater degree of freedom and flexibility, without compromising on the general areas of information collected from each interviewee. In order to retain control, I ensured that my agenda was adequately communicated to the interviewee prior to our discussion and that the interview guide, alongside the voice recorder and my notebook were made visible from the outset. This technique was particularly useful in establishing a well-balanced power dynamic between myself and the interviewees when the latter had seniority within the SIA, or they were more actively involved in the strategic dimension of the organisation.

\(^{37}\) The interview guides used by the researcher in the interviews with the stakeholders involved in this study (SIA, DS, security companies and police) can be found in Appendix D. It should be noted that these interview guides are quite structured and extensive in terms of the questions included. The researcher had a ‘master’ list of questions that she wanted to cover with each group of stakeholders, but at the same time this did not constitute a pre-fixed list of questions, as in a survey for instance. The conversational mode, as well as the power dynamics between the researcher and each participant, enabled an adaptation of the discussion on each occasion, ensuring that participants were able to bring up and elaborate their insights too.
3.4.3 Capturing the account of door supervision companies in south-east Wales: ‘going local’ and overcoming gatekeeping concerns

As outlined in the previous sections, the exploration of how regulatees experience the mechanisms underlying the regulatory responses and interventions is a crucial step in revealing connections and gaps within the web of the complex regulatory interplays. Given the requirement to obtain in-depth and thick accounts from these actors, the option of administering surveys was ruled out, since the need to ensure a numerically adequate response rate would have necessitated the inclusion of predominantly close-ended questions (Bryman, 2012). Such a methodological choice would have compromised the qualitative dimension of this project, which is fundamental for the research objectives within a critical realist framework. Thus, conducting semi-structured interviews appeared to serve proportionately this methodological mindset.

Regarding the former, as discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), Cardiff has attracted a substantial and also diverse NTE research attention in the last two decades and has informed the implementation of initiatives to mitigate NTE risks. Although this has led to the replication of these initiatives in other key areas in south-east Wales (Newport, South Wales Valleys, Caerphilly, Swansea), there has been a lack of research focus on local NTE dynamics beyond Cardiff. Even more sparse is exploratory research on how DS police the local NTEs in Cardiff and in the other neighbouring areas. From a regulatory viewpoint, understanding people’s constructions regarding regulatory regimes and interventions should be explored in light of a framework of cultures and values of the regulated community, which is dependent on times, places and groups of people (Meidinger, 1987). As such, south-east Wales appeared a promising setting to situate the exploration of the understandings and experiences of DS, security companies and police officers.

Besides this, my objective to opt in for depth-accounts from regulatees would not have been feasible if I had explored the perspectives of the regulated communities across various locations in the UK. Building up connections and trust with participants within this research context requires prolonged interaction and exchange, since I was an outsider in the DS sector. Thus, it appears that these considerations were largely shaped by the ways of negotiating and gaining access to these interviewees. More specifically, the sampling strategies regarding security companies and DS were influenced by the practical constraint, also identified in the study conducted by Mawby and Gill (2017, p.3), that the SIA does not hold a database of security companies across the UK (due to the absence of business licensing), nor ‘does the licensing authority have a usable database of officers that are licensed since they have to opt in to be
included in mailings and only a minority do so’. Although this issue might have appeared to be more problematic in case of a quantitative project, given the requirement of random sampling, it raised some concerns for this qualitative study as well. This was based primarily on the lack of a general overview of the size of the industry (companies & operatives) in the local context that affects the implementation of purposeful sampling strategies.

In order to overcome this difficulty, I liaised with the funding body of this study, the SIA, who kindly allocated the two regional SIA investigators as the gatekeepers for the fieldwork undertaken in the local Welsh context. Based on the analysis in the previous section, I gained access in the regulatory body through an internal and formal gatekeeper, a key individual within the SIA’s organisational hierarchy, who further set in motion the next phase of gatekeeping processes for the local context. These two local SIA investigators have extended working experience in South Wales and Gwent and thus they complemented my desk research in terms of identifying the security companies offering DS services across these locations. Apart from their contribution to the broader mapping of the security industry in Wales, they played a significant role in liaising with security companies, introducing my research project to them and requesting their involvement and participation in the interviews. As mentioned above, this affected the type of the sampling strategies employed for recruiting participants from security companies. More precisely, given the inherent difficulties in assessing the overall size of the industry in the local context, the identification and recruitment of directors from these companies offering DS services in the local context occurred through convenience sampling processes.

Within this research study, gatekeeping processes were neither a ‘one-off’ or a one-dimensional encounter. Gatekeeping was ongoing and evolving on different levels (Figure 2). Reflecting upon and evaluating the development of these gatekeeping practices is crucial from a methodological point of view, since they are associated with either direct or subtle impacts on the development of the fieldwork. In particular, my positionality as ‘the hired hand’ appeared to be an interesting facet, a mixture of advantageous but also hindering features. On the one hand, it contributed significantly to building up rapport and trust with the SIA investigators and the response rate by the invited participants on the local context was quite good, compared with the hypothesized rate that a ‘lone wolf’ researcher would have got in this context. On the other hand, three main

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38 This hypothesised lower rate is premised upon a personal communication with another PhD Researcher from a different university in the UK, with whom I share common research interests. During our exchange of ‘tales in the field’, he commented that all the interview requests directed to security companies in his area of interest received no response. Although we should evaluate these fieldwork-related outcomes with some caveats in mind (e.g. topic of the research project and to what extent it is perceived to be interesting by the participants, spatial and temporal particularities etc), they can be also indicative of this disadvantageous dimension of the ‘lone wolf’ researcher.
methodological concerns occurred prior to conducting these interviews in Wales. The first one related to the extent to which there was an adequate variation within the sample from the security companies and the DS\(^{39}\). Second, a critical question was whether the gatekeeping arrangements and the good working relationships between the local investigators and me would be perceived by these participants as an undercover enforcement operation by the SIA, rather than a collaborative research project. Third, the gatekeepers provided various background information about the directors, with whom I was about to diarise the upcoming interviews.

Figure 2: Gatekeeping arrangements: a model of stratified delegation

Having these caveats in mind, the fieldwork commenced in the local context, and I conducted nine interviews with either directors or managers from DS companies in south-east Wales. Some positive signs that emerged and recurred during the interviews with directors from security companies, tended to counterbalance the fine lines between my ‘hired hand’ and my ‘lone wolf’ dimension. My positionality as a young woman researcher, who did not have any sort of direct professional experience with the industry, meant I was seen by them as a ‘harmless student’\(^{40}\). Such a perception evolved into pride and appreciation that they are interviewees in a study that

\(^{39}\) Apart from the employment of convenience sampling techniques for these interviewees, it should be also noted that this concern also related to a potential mistrust by participants towards my ‘bona fide’ positionality. Put simply, from the outset of these interviews, I considered that mainly participants who respect and value their regulatory body, as well as the ones who are fully compliant, would agree to assist me.

\(^{40}\) This particular quote is attributed to one of my DS participants, when he was asked before the interview by one of his colleagues whether I was either a journalist or conducting any sort of police-related investigation. However, this quote cannot be attributed to a specific pseudonym used for participants, since it was made before the interview, so ethical considerations would not have allowed the researcher to treat this quote as ‘data’.
examines their industry, seeks to get their perspective on a wide range of topics and could serve as the basis for driving some change in their sector\footnote{Some indicative comments, made by directors of security companies in Wales towards the researcher, were the following ones: ‘If all your research is to try and make the industry a better place for all, then I am 100% on board and willing to help where I can’, ‘I am happy to be interviewed for as long as you want; no one else has asked about our views on these issues before’. Following the explanation in footnote 40, these comments cannot be attributed to specific pseudonyms used for participants, since they were made before the interview.}. Within this positive stance towards the interview requests, there was a twofold dimension that mitigated to an extent the original concerns for the quality of the sample. First, this relates to their enthusiasm to provide thick accounts for the past, the present and the future of their industry. Second, the market rationalities and the coincidence of the fieldwork with some major restructuring developments in the local DS market\footnote{Market rationalities refer to the fact that security companies operate on a highly antagonistic mode, which encourages directors to openly talk about wrongdoings and how these undermine their legitimate practice. Of course, the actual validity of these comments should be approached with caution, but since I was not on a fact-finding mission, the general content of these statements was a useful tool for framing the data analysis. Besides this, the fieldwork took place when one of the most prominent providers of DS services in Wales was under investigation for a series of suspected malpractices and thus the other companies were keen on ‘naming and shaming’, but also on talking openly about malpractices and loopholes in their sector.} worked as catalysts for the other companies to come forward, discuss malpractices and provide me with some critical viewpoints. Before conducting these interviews, during my informal conversations with the two SIA gatekeepers, they offered me some background information regarding my upcoming meetings with DS firms.

This information was a mixture of some general guidance about the size, operation and services of the company, as well as some trusted comments evaluating the operation of the company as a whole. Reflecting upon the dynamic of this background knowledge on the fieldwork, gatekeepers were depicted as ‘the institutional and social environment’ for knowledge production (Barzilai-Nahon, 2009, p.436). I appreciated the fact that this guidance allowed me not to be involved with rogue security firms\footnote{As it was mentioned before, an ideal sample, even within a qualitative research study, should account for an adequate variation between the participants and the cases selected. However, in practical terms for this project, I quickly realised that the existing plan for recruiting participants should overcome what appeared to be a ‘naïve’ belief that ‘shady’ security firms would have been willing to engage with myself. Although discussing with the directors and managers of these firms could be interesting in terms of assessing the state of the market, I was an ‘outsider’ in the industry, a young researcher with the ‘hired hand’ dimension shadowing my outreach. Therefore, by utilising to the advantage of the research what was analysed in the previous footnotes, I evaluated positively the fact that I was kept away from these security companies. Due to the suspected malpractices, coupled with their generic lack of appreciation towards the role of the SIA, it was likely that I could have been faced with suspicion and mistrust.}. However, at the same time the pitfall of entering the field with a degree of either positive or negative bias towards the participants, dependent on the content of the information provided, could not be overlooked. When entering the field, the approach adopted was that of an attempted neutral stance, although this was not always successful\footnote{This can be exemplified through an interesting example from the fieldwork. This relates to an interviewee to whom access was facilitated through my local SIA gatekeepers, who clearly indicated to me that this particular individual had his licence revoked in the past due to his involvement in a criminal incident. Although at the time of the interview he was back on track legitimately with his DS company, the SIA investigators did not praise his current status,}. Nevertheless,
through the continuous self-evaluation of the quality and the development of the fieldwork, it appeared that this background knowledge did not influence significantly the questioning mode or the overall encounter with these participants.

3.4.4 Capturing the account of door supervisors in south-east Wales: access and power dynamics

Building rapport and trust with directors was a crucial step towards facilitating the next level of the gatekeeping arrangements. In order to access DS working in the local NTEs, two methodological routes were considered; either to conduct participant observations in night-time venues across South Wales and Gwent or to conduct semi-structured interviews. The first data collection method was ruled out and the underlying rationale for this decision was not solely premised on the risks associated with studying this population through ethnographic methods, which primarily concern studies undertaken a decade ago (Monaghan, 2002; Rigakos, 2008; Winlow, et al., 2001). As Preiser (2016, p.64) illustratively points out ‘bouncers are extremely keen to remain invisible as individuals whilst executing those parts of their job that might lead to collisions with legal regulations and authorities’. Therefore, my ‘hired hand’ dimension could have served as a barrier in terms of ensuring trustworthiness and negotiating access to these night-time venues.

However, it should be noted that prior to conducting these interviews, in 2018 I shadowed an evening licensing inspection in Newport45, which was undertaken jointly by two SIA

implying that he was not a role model of an honest regulatee. On this occasion, this background information had an impact upon my stance as an interviewer with this particular participant. Although my prior knowledge assisted me to be more critical of his sayings, at the same time in parts of the interview it subconsciously forced me to act more as an investigator and less as a social science researcher. In particular, upon listening to the audio file later on that day, I realised that I did not follow the same ‘free flow’ conversation mode, as with prior interviewees. Therefore, although the interviewee was quite open to talk about his past, I devoted much time asking follow-up and prompting questions on this issue, and thus ultimately rushing through some more substantial to this research topics at the end of the interview. Based upon this self-reflection, the acknowledgment of the indirect, yet potentially significant, influence of the background info I had on some of my participants was a valuable lesson learnt. In the rest of the fieldwork in the local context of south-east Wales, prior knowledge about my interviewees contributed to my critical approach of their accounts, yet I was able to focus primarily upon my research inquiry and ‘rocking the boat’ was avoided.

45 When I was presented with this opportunity, I had to think carefully and balance any ‘trade-offs’ with respect to her upcoming interviews with local DS. A major consideration was the extent to misconceptions about my status as an ‘SIA hired hand’ could jeopardise the next steps of my fieldwork. Among the other considerations and respective strategies that I had to follow (later in the paragraph of the main text), the location was an important one. Having discussed with SIA investigators, I realised that in urban areas, the DS employed in different venues were on ‘rotation’ by the same security company across various cities in Wales, as opposed to the ones in more rural areas (more ‘permanent’ staff allocated in a specific pub). As such, when I was presented with the chance to join a licensing inspection either in a Welsh city or in a South Wales valley town, I opted in for the former. The underlying hypothesis was that due to the rotation of DS, even if suspicion could not be mitigated on my ‘bona fide’ researcher status, the chances of later interviewing the same DS who were working at the time of this inspection were relatively lower than in the case of a rural town.
investigators and local police licensing officers. The rationale behind this was threefold. My first objective was to further develop my working relationships with SIA field investigators, who were key players in my gatekeeping arrangements. Second, the prospect of networking with the local police force in the light of my upcoming interviews was important. Third, I intended to observe the exchanges and dynamics between the regulator and frontline operatives, as well as between the regulator and a law enforcement partner. My participation in this inspection did not have any adverse consequences upon securing access to the local regulated community. In other words, my ‘bona fide’ researcher status was not compromised, since my presence was quite discreet and when operatives seemed to be curious of my position, I engaged in friendly and humorous conversations, which reassured them that my affiliation was with Cardiff University, rather than with the SIA or the police.

Having said that, facilitating one-to-one discussions with DS employed by the security companies I have already liaised with, was the preferred method to obtain their insights. As an approach, this aimed to avoid potentially creating any sort of unease which might be linked to my prolonged presence in their working environment. In total, 20 interviews with DS working in the local NTEs across south-east Wales were conducted. The directors of the security companies appeared keen on gatekeeping this phase of the fieldwork and introducing me to their staff, who are working in the locations that are of interest in this study. There were three alternatives gatekeeping arrangements on these occasions: a) the director contacted some of his staff, vouched for me and explained them shortly the purpose of my interview request and then the interviews were diarised to occur at a mutually convenient date and time at the offices of the company, b) the director did the same process but the interviews took place in a quiet space at the night-time venues, where these individuals work on Friday and Saturday nights and c) the director did the same introductory bits and then it was up to the participants and me to decide when and where to meet.

Although the variety of these arrangements did not have any significant impacts upon the participants’ willingness to participate, they had some interesting effect on the power dynamics of the interview and the DS’ accounts. For instance, during some of these introductions, the

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46 Shadowing this licensing inspection offered some interesting insights in terms of the validity of the random inspection outcomes (Chapter 5), as well as the enforcement styles of the SIA investigators and their impact upon DS’ compliance with the SIA regime (Chapter 8).

47 At the time of the inspection, given that the inspection team consisted of 5 people (including myself), DS were primarily interested in ‘pleasing’ the SIA investigators. Since the two SIA investigators presented their credentials during the first minutes of entering a venue, security operatives seemed completely focused on their interactions with them and the rest of the team (police officers in civilian clothes and myself) went relatively unnoticed. On two occasions, two DS engaged with me in a short conversation and when they asked me whether I was an SIA ‘trainee’, I humorously pulled out my Cardiff University student card and commented to them that my ‘business card’ is definitely less fancy than a civil service one. As such, my non-threatening presence was re-established, being a good interaction-related ‘trial’ session before conducting my interviews in this sector of the private security industry.
challenge of my ‘hired hand’ aspect became prevalent and thus immediate strategies had to be employed to re-establish my positionality between my gatekeepers and the DS. Some of these directors, either purposefully to ‘check out’ my positionality or unwittingly through an attempt to formally frame the significance of the project, introduced me as ‘Fryni from the SIA, who would like to ask you some questions’. On one occasion, even before I had the chance to respond, one female DS approached me with hostility, as she was under the impression that I was leading an investigation on behalf of the SIA, canvassing frontline operatives for potentially useful intelligence. On these occasions I found it useful to employ a strategy of re-establishing my research identity by combining diplomacy and humour, underlining the young age, the nationality, the student status and the fact that the SIA was simply funding my project. Such a strategy appeared to be successful, based on their reactions at the time and the accounts that they provided me, although the possibility that there was a degree of bias from their side could not be ruled out.

Within this part of the fieldwork, the location of the interview appeared to be an interesting factor that had diverse impacts upon the power dynamics between myself and DS. In particular, the first round of these discussions took place in a small meeting room at the Postgraduate Research Office. Although I purposefully attempted to adjust the physical set-up of this room, so as to avoid the ‘behind-the-desk’ scenario, it was evident even from the first minutes of the informal encounter that they perceived a level of formality and overall I asserted more authority within my working space. This was further confirmed through the way that they were elaborating their responses. Without compromising on the richness of the discussion, they tended to produce more sophisticated and structured accounts during our discussion. These power dynamics shifted when the interviews took place either in the offices of the company or in their working environment (bar/pub). In both cases, given that the fieldwork occurred in what participants identified as their social space, this spatial aspect reinforced their position of the power (Housley & Smith, 2011). As a result, they appeared to be more relaxed and open during our discussion and they devoted more of the pre-agreed time for the interview, stating that ‘this is a nice break from work’.

3.4.5 Capturing the account of the police in south-east Wales: probing beyond the ‘official line’

Turning next to the participants from the local police forces, the gatekeepers from the SIA introduced me to police officers who have the oversight of the enforcement of the licensing

48 Echoing the content of footnote 40, this comment cannot be attributed to a specific pseudonym used for participants, since it was made before the interview, so ethical considerations would not have allowed the researcher to treat it as ‘data’.
requirements in the local NTEs. Since this research project examines the on the ground policing arrangements in the NTE and the working relationships between the police and security operatives, I was also targeting response police officers. Access to these respondents was granted through recommendations and snowballing processes within the police forces and 15 interviews were conducted. An interesting recurring theme concerned the official line of the police force and the respondents’ positionality during the interview. Some of them underlined from the outset that although they were interested in having a discussion with me, their accounts should be treated as expressions of their own viewpoints, and suggesting that their quotes should be attributed individually rather than it being suggested that they represent the entire force. These participants were mostly drawn from a higher rank within the force, and after having reassured them that my ‘mission’ was to hear about their own experiences and understandings, they tended to provide thick and quite elaborated accounts.

Most of the participants from the lower ranks also responded positively to my interview requests, but they appeared more reserved and cautious in terms of discussing their own perspectives and probing beyond the official line of their force. The following two examples illustrate these dynamics. The first one relates to the context of a kind declining of my interview request. Although I avoided the ‘cold call’ and personalised the interview request, by highlighting that I am not in a ‘fact-finding’ mission, the participant stated that he is aware of the fact that I have already spoken with some of his colleagues and he felt that he could not add anything to that already contributed by them. The second example concerns the refusal by a participant to be audio recorded, supporting this by the argument that I was undertaking independent research, which is not commissioned by the police, and thus the data protection regulations within the force would not allow for such a recording to happen. This was the only occasion throughout the entire fieldwork in which a participant did not agree with audio recording. After asking him kindly about the reason for this refusal, I decided to utilise the ‘hired hand’ dimension of my research status, so as to counter-argue diplomatically about the ‘independent’ nature of my project. At this stage, the participant claimed that ‘there are Burger King and McDonald’s out there, who both make burgers, but with different procedures. The same applies for the police and the SIA49’. Nevertheless, this respondent allowed me to keep notes of our discussion and despite his initial suspicions around ethics and data protection, he nonetheless provided an insightful account.

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49 Echoing the content of footnote 40, this comment cannot be attributed to a specific pseudonym used for participants, since it was made before the interview, so ethical considerations would not have allowed the researcher to treat it as ‘data’.
3.5 Ethical considerations

Overall, both the topic of this thesis, as well as the participants involved, were not associated with sensitive issues or vulnerable populations. As such, this project was from its outset shielded from major ethical issues. However, in compliance with ethical considerations and best practice standards, in this study several measures were taken to ensure informed consent from the participants, as well as the ‘sanitisation’ of data and sensible data security precautions.

First, all interview requests were furnished with: a) an explanatory note, outlining the research objectives of the study and the arrangements for data collection and data storage in accordance with the principle of confidentiality (research information sheet, Appendix B), b) the official letter by Cardiff University’s School of Social Science Research Ethics Committee, which granted ethical approval to the research project (Appendix A), and c) the interview consent form (Appendix C), so as to corroborate in practice the arrangements included in the research information sheet. The actual signing of the interview consent form occurred before the beginning of the interview, after having discussed potential questions by the interviewees. Second, audio files and interview transcripts were stored on secure password-protected servers within Cardiff University. Besides this, aligning with confidentiality requirements, participants were assigned a pseudonym\textsuperscript{50} and individuals/companies/venues mentioned in their quotes were anonymised. This anonymisation strategy has been also employed when I used some sensitive data, obtained from the SIA\textsuperscript{51}. In such a case, the ‘sanitisation’ of the data was done in the first place by me, after having liaised with my SIA gatekeepers in order to confirm that the thesis contains no identifiable personal information.

3.6 Validity and reliability

In terms of the threats to the validity and reliability of the methodological decisions of this thesis, two key issues should be discussed. The first one relates to the extent to which findings could adhere to the generalisability principle. One could argue that exploring validity through the lens of this principle is the fundamental criterion for quantitative projects, which in criminological

\textsuperscript{50} As it will become evident in the findings’ chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4-9), participants pseudonyms have been created as follows:
- SIA participants: SIA_P1- SIA_P18
- Police participants: Police_P1- Police_P15
- Security companies: Security company_P1 – Security company_P9
- DS: DS_P1- DS_P20

\textsuperscript{51} Key examples are the POCA cases in Chapter 5, as well as the case of ‘PhD Security’ in Chapter 9.
research are mostly associated with either randomised control trials or with ‘what works’ evaluations (Tilley and Laycock, 2002). Although the burden of generalisability stands at a lower level for qualitative studies, it is significant to reflect about the broader applicability of the findings. In this thesis, in terms of capturing the SIA’s strategic account, validity threats have been kept to a minimal level, since data were collected from official reports, extensive SIA datasets on licensing and enforcement and 18 interviews with SIA staff.

Turning next to the account of the regulatees and the police, as explained in detail in section 3.4, I made a conscious decision to opt for breadth, rather than depth. As such, 44 thick and in-depth accounts from these participants were collected, yet they were confined spatially to a specific locality, south-east Wales. The rich content of the interview data, as envisaged by the original research plan before commencing my fieldwork, and their implications beyond the Welsh locality mitigated the adverse effects on validity. In short, the thesis identified not only interesting variations and patterns applicable to the specific context, but also more generic characteristics related both to the transformation of the world of bouncers and corporate malpractices that could be taken forward as valuable policy lessons for the SIA’s work across England and Wales. This is further put into perspective and discussed in Chapter 10.

The second issue associated with both the validity and the reliability of the research findings concerns my positionality and the ability to reflect on my critical distance as a researcher. Following from the reflective account in this chapter, a major threat could be linked with the fact that the SIA was sponsoring this study. In terms of exploring the SIA’s narrative, it could be argued that getting access to the regulator through the funding arrangements for this research project could compromise my critical distance and autonomy. However, through the various stages of the research process, the overall engagement has been a well-balanced collaboration and a critical, yet open dialogue, which can be attributed to the following enablers. First, at the early stages of drafting my research proposal, the SIA did not assert any pre-defined conceptual and methodological constraints. Second, a significant contribution was made in the stage of the fieldwork by the gatekeeping arrangements and the steps undertaken to mitigate the gap between the ‘lone researcher’ and the ‘hired hand’, as evidenced in subsection 3.4.2. Third, during the stages of the dissemination of my research findings, the organisation appeared engaged and receptive with both the encouraging, as well as the more critical parts of this evaluation. This can be partly attributed to the SIA’s commitment to partnership with academics, aiming at moving one step forward from the purely technocratic ‘what works’ evaluations and diving into more deep-seated questions of the regulator’s organisational identity (White and Hayat, 2018). Besides this, I underlined the positive signs of the evaluation, in line with the principles of the appreciative
inquiry, which seeks to explore pockets of ‘best practice’ (Bellinger and Elliott, 2011; Liebling and Arnold, 2004; Robinson, et al., 2013). However, at the same time, I corroborated the negative sides of the story with fieldwork-related evidence and suggestions of positive action in the future.

Apart from the SIA interviewees, validity and reliability issues associated with fieldwork interactions and the critical engagement with the generated data are pertinent to other participant groups. The most notable examples are associated with my interactions with DS and security companies and these are further discussed in the rest of this section, exploring whether the oppositional construction of insiderness and outsiderness has allowed me to exercise a ‘highly disciplined subjectivity’ (Scheper-Hughes, 2001, p.318). A qualitative researcher does not enter the field as a ‘tabula rasa’ and thus the manichaeistic distinction between being ‘either objective and credible or subjective, biased, and generating questionable research outcomes’ (Savvides et al., 2014, p. 414) ignores many nuanced dynamics in the complex process of interacting with participants and then critically engaging with the generated data.

In the context of this study, my preconceptions were twofold. First, being an outsider in the DS sector, my understandings and knowledge of the topic were primarily informed by relevant research studies and the evidence that supported the SIA’s regulatory interventions in ‘cleansing-out’ the sector. Chapter 2 offers a detailed overview of how these sources have portrayed the DS sector as a monoculture, in which violence and the drug trade seemed well-embedded features, alongside with a deep-seated contestation over the incompatibility of their contractual arrangements (commercialised security) with public protection. In other words, following Preiser’s (2016, p.63) illustration: ‘the research draws attention to an archetypical bouncer: a 20-45-year-old male, hailing from various socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds, with a certain penchant towards using violence which they are given the opportunity to do through their occupation’. Second, my primary experience with NTE settings was predominantly from my country of origin, where crime and disorder in these settings is minimal and the presence of DS sparse.

Given that my methodological choices have been influenced by a blend of inductive and deductive strategies (subsection 3.3), one of the concerns before the fieldwork was the extent to which the documented DS’ monoculture would have disproportionately geared the interview structure towards this particular issue, potentially placing barriers to important emerging dimensions from the data. In order to account for this potential pitfall, a few months before commencing the data collection, I visited different NTE settings in south-east Wales, conducting
casual observations to familiarise myself with the broader context of the research. Furthermore, I started the interviews in the local context with participants from security companies to get a better sense of the industry and refine the next steps of the fieldwork process. These insightful interviews proved to be an ‘eye-opener’; a timely indication that apart from the common themes associated with the DS monoculture, there were other pressing and important issues in the sector that could open up exciting research-related avenues. As such, I adapted the interview protocol for the upcoming interviews with local DS using a more conversational approach that avoided an over-emphasis on the ‘drugs and violence’ discourse and allowed for a greater degree of freedom and flexibility in the topics discussed. Through adopting this stance, the vast majority of DS interviews ended up being illustrative and thick accounts of their ‘lived realities’ on the local NTE doors. The more ‘conventional’ topics of masculinity, violence and involvement in the drug trade were discussed, but at the same time new trajectories in their professional and occupational development were revealed.

However, the important self-reflective question arising at this point was the following: ‘Is the interpretation of this data critical enough or might have I been conned by my participants’? Defining what knowledge is produced from the fieldwork is not a sole privilege of the researcher, since participants bring their own agenda to the research situation (Karnieli-Miller et al., 2009). Adopting a critical realist approach enabled me to reflect on my critical distance as a researcher. In particular, it allowed me to shape my understanding of the complexities around key issues and thus participants’ accounts were not simply reported as objectively truthful or complete accounts. Through the provision of additional background information to the reader, I was able to evidence whether participants’ insights could be linked to ideas, themes and extant literature or they should be caveated with an appropriate counterclaim. During the fieldwork, there were a few instances, in which the interviewee over-emphasised his heroism in doing his job, possibly in a subtle effort to impress (my age and gender might have been key denominators in this effort).

Having taken this into account, I realised that some new dimensions that this thesis brings into the surface might confound general cynicism, since they partly disputed the idea of DS being a monoculture. A prime example is the theme of their morality and empathising techniques

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52 This attempt to familiarise myself with the local NTE context, as well as with the ‘lived realities’ of DS was also complemented through discussing ‘off the record’ with some security operatives in the area. Of course, given that these conversations were not part of the official fieldwork, these individuals were helpful informants, yet excluded from her interviewees list.

53 These participants were either directors or managers of local security companies offering DS services. Before taking up these positions, all of them were employed as frontline security operatives for many years and the vast majority of them still worked occasionally on the doors, alongside their staff. Having been in the industry for at least a decade, they were an excellent source of pinpointing continuity and change in the prevailing themes in the sector.

54 This information was usually provided to the reader through footnotes on specific quotes.
(Chapter 6). In such a case, I monitored the reliability of my findings through cross-referencing and triangulating them with the rest of the interview data across the participant groups and with the most recent literature on the topic\textsuperscript{55}. Furthermore, a seeming deviation from the ‘classical’ ethnographic work on bouncers (Chapter 2) is attributed to the ‘local flavouring’ of this study. As already discussed, and in light of the analysis in the upcoming chapters, the impact of a regulatory intervention is contingent upon a series of micro-dynamics in the local context of a regulated community.

3.7 Concluding remarks

This chapter explored the methodology of this study in a twofold way. First, it discussed the various ‘technical’ methodological choices, which are summarised below in Table 1. The justification of these choices illustrated how each of them attempted to serve the overarching methodological objective of this thesis: to construct a nuanced dialogue between the regulator and the regulatees.

Table 1: The study’s methodological ‘compass’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical rationale</th>
<th>Critical realism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>‘intensive’ &amp; ‘flexible’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research methodology</td>
<td>Grounded theory (most recent version) &amp; adaptive theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection</td>
<td>Documents, quantitative data, interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>Thematic analysis &amp; quantitative descriptive analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, moving beyond the purely technical methodological aspect, it sought to provide a transparent reflective account. The gatekeeping arrangements, my positionality and the power dynamics between the participants and myself were highlighted as key themes across the stages of data collection and data analysis. Emerging challenges associated with each of these themes were acknowledged and discussed, underlying how the methodological routes taken allowed this thesis to control for them. Yet, as with any other social science research project, this thesis is not flawless. In a more holistic and retrospective analysis in Chapter 10, this thesis’ methodological contribution is presented vis-à-vis its limitations to allow future studies to take forward the lessons learnt and inspire new pieces of in-depth regulatory research.

\textsuperscript{55} In the case of DS’s morality and empathising techniques, these findings were cross-referenced and corroborated with Loader and White’s (2017, 2018) argument, as it is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 8.
Chapter 4: The SIA’s Strategic Account (Part 1): Regulatory Ambitions and Regulatory Pragmatism in Licensing

4.1 Introduction

Drawing upon the analysis of the SIA Annual Reports, the insights offered by SIA interviewees and quantitative descriptive data, this chapter aims to examine the development of the SIA’s strategic stance towards its licensing regime for the DS sector. As such, the findings of this part of the thesis contribute to building up the response to the research question 1, specifically focusing on the account of the regulator.

The analysis starts with a broader exploration of the development of the SIA’s strategic narrative and organisational culture in the post-regulation era (2007-2020), identifying elements of continuity and change, which in turn affect the operationalisation of the licensing regime. Given the sector-specific focus of this thesis, the chapter proceeds to exploring how the licensing regime developed across the years for individual operatives (DS). This analysis is organised across three themes. The first one relates to the identification of three phases in licensing DS, reflecting on the dynamic shift in the regulatory narrative and approach towards the specific part of the industry. Given the central role of the criminality criteria across these phases, the second theme concerns a critical appraisal of their role within the licensing apparatus, with particular emphasis on the implications for the SIA’s regulatory responsiveness. The third one aims to move beyond the exploration of the SIA Annual Reports and interview data, through analysing quantitative descriptive data related to the trends in the DS licensing from 2007 to 2020.

Finally, the chapter considers the key developments with regard to the statutory oversight of security firms. Given the lack of a compulsory licensing regime for businesses, the qualitative data shed light on the dynamics surrounding the much debated ‘business licensing’. Through highlighting the clash between burden and public protection-related arguments, the analysis starts building upon the evidence base of a lopsided regulatory approach on an individual and business level. This will be further realised in the last chapters of the thesis. Following the absence of business licensing, the SIA’s voluntary ACS is put into perspective and two key issues are addressed: the regulatory ambitions for the scheme (qualitative data) and the embeddedness of the ACS among DS companies (quantitative data).
4.2 ‘The light-touch’ regulation model and its effect on the SIA’s narrative and organisational culture

During its early days (2003-2007), the SIA set at its forefront the transformation of the industry as the key strategic direction of the regulatory remit. The cultivation of such a transformative agenda around its statutory mandate was premised on a twofold ambition. First, the SIA aspired to eradicate criminality from the industry and, as such, to protect the public from some ‘cowboy’ security operatives. Second, regulatory ambitions chimed with an aspirational rhetoric about the economic wellbeing and the reputation of the regulated sectors. In particular, strong emphasis was placed upon the SIA’s role in assisting the regulated sectors to fulfil their potential as ‘an innovative, modernised and dynamic industry, with new markets and enhanced margins’, which at the same time should be linked with ‘reduced staff turnover, through increasing the attraction of the industry as a rewarding career’ (HC 894 [2003-4]; 1059 [2004-5]; 178 [2005-6]; 819 [2006-7]). Security firms and operatives welcomed with enthusiasm both aspects of the SIA’s transformative rhetoric, considering that the reputation of their sectors would be enhanced, and, as a result, new business opportunities would become available (White, 2010; 2012; Thumala et al., 2011). However, these transformative messages did not eventually materialise into regulatory practice and, as a result, the regulator’s strategic narrative shifted to a more baseline approach.

A variety of dynamic factors played a role in shifting the strategic message of the regulator; administrative problems within the organisation (internal factors), negative media coverage

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56 This strategic direction of the regulator was reflected in then Home Secretary Jack Straw’s statement in the SIA Annual Report 2003-2004: ‘If the private security industry is to take a greater role in our society then the public have a right to be protected from the rogues who exploit the current unenforceable system’ (HC 894 [2003-4]). Notably, among the regulated sectors, the one that attracted the vast majority of public and regulatory attention was the door supervision one. The SIA’s aspiration to remove rogue security operatives and firms from the industry is strongly associated with the ‘cleansing-out’ phase of its licensing regime, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

57 In light of the analysis of the SIA Annual reports, the strategic message towards the SIA’s stakeholders focused on the ‘aim to be a modern, efficient and collaborative regulator, continually balancing the public purpose of regulation with the commercial implications’ (HC 732 [2007-8]).

58 In terms of the administrative problems, the organisation faced some significant difficulties in processing accurately and timely the large volumes of applications that were coming through their licensing system during the first 3 years of their operation (HC 1059 [2004-5]; 178 [2005-6]). Given the requirement of the SIA to be self-financing (the total self-generated income for the SIA is the sum of the fees they charge for licence applications and the ACS), these administrative problems resulted in the deficit of the regulatory body for the respective financial years. Therefore, grant-in-aid was provided to the SIA by the Home Office, and a thorough financial analysis illustrated that the £190 licence fee was insufficient to meet the financing needs of the organisation and in 2007 this was raised to £245 (HC 819 [2006-7]). Slow processes in the licensing system, coupled with an increase in the licence fee, were two developments that were not particularly welcomed by the industry, especially by door supervisors. These operatives have been for long framed as one of the most fragmented and problematic security sectors, and the introduction of the regulatory regime figured to be a promising way to rebuild their reputation and to be perceived as trusted and professional security providers. However, the late surge in application processing often resulted in what was vividly expressed in the media by Tony Smith, a security firm owner, as follows: ‘We are short of staff at the moment and it is a nightmare. Licensees are panicking, employers are panicking and as for door supervisors it’s their livelihoods. This weekend is looking debatable because only a handful have their badges. We’re waiting and waiting…some are taking up to six months and it’s just not on’ (BBC, 2005).
towards the SIA in 2007/08\(^{59}\) and the consolidation of the Hampton Principles in 2007\(^{60}\) (centrally-imposed and thus considered as external to organisation factors).

The change of the narrative in the outward-facing SIA messages towards the industry also mirrors a significant development in the SIA’s organisational culture. The regulator was faced with a very existential, yet crucial and overarching question regarding its organisational identity: ‘What is the role of the SIA as the regulator? Does it and should it relate only to “minimum entry standards” or shall it encompass a more developed and possibly more “intrusive” approach towards the industry?’. From 2007, following the analysis of White and Hayat (2018, p.99), ‘the SIA leadership began to pursue a more “streamlined” organisational identity centred upon the efficient and effective realisation of the SIA’s statutory mandate to reduce criminality and to raise standards – nothing more, nothing less’. The data analysis in this thesis lends support to White and Hayat’s (2018) argument and at the same time highlights the significance of the ‘light-touch’ regulation mandate\(^{61}\), which echoed the broader momentum for supporting the ‘small government’ type of governance (Marsden, 2006). The ‘light-touch’ regulation model has been the cornerstone of the SIA’s regulatory identity, suggesting that ‘you can only do what your Act says, and you can look in that Act for words like “may” and “must” and you have to understand

\(^{59}\) Negative media coverage was also abundant towards the regulatory authority in light of the revelation in 2007 that 11,000 non-EU individuals, who have not been subjected to the ‘right to work’ checks, have been licensed by the SIA (The Guardian, 2007; HC Deb [2007-8], vol.469). In the introductory Joint Statement by the Chair and the Chief Executive of the 2007-8 Annual Report the regulator discussed the revelation in an attempt to rebuild the SIA’s credibility, by highlighting that the responsibility of checking the right to work falls on the employers and not the SIA and that tackling illegal working in the industry requires a shared solution. At the same time, taking into account the cumulative impact of all these technical issues and events, the strategic direction of the regulatory body echoed that ‘action will be taken to repair the damage done to our reputation’ (HC 732 [2007-8]). With the SIA becoming a target of criticism by the industry and the media between 2003 and 2007 regarding the ways in which some of the regulatory objectives were managed internally, an acknowledgment of the past mistakes and a reassuring message for the future years of their operation were inevitable. ‘I regret this, but all I can say is that our aim is to run as tight a ship as possible, to be cost effective’ was the message communicated to stakeholders by the SIA’s Chair in 2007 (HC 819 [2006-2007]), which was further supported by an increased focus in ‘redeveloping the licensing and customer services’ in the coming years (HC 732 [2007-8]; HC 79 [2008-09]; HC 233 [2009-10]).

\(^{60}\) Downsizing the ambitious regulatory agenda could be also viewed as the tangible outcome of the new directions of the Better Regulation Agenda, as these became an integral part of the Regulators’ Compliance Code in 2007. First, the Hampton recommendations highlighted the core mandate that ‘regulators should recognise that a key element of their activity is to allow, or even encourage, economic progress and only to intervene when there is a clear case for public protection’ (Hampton, 2005). Second, regulatory authorities should lead the way of simplification by deregulating, consolidating or rationalising their regulatory remit, by reflecting ‘which are the most important regulation, which we can do without and which ones can be removed from the regulatory basket’ (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005).

\(^{61}\) This concept has mainly featured in commentaries and analysis around the development of financial regulation, particularly in terms of striking a convergence between the differing logics of regulatory and economic capital (Aglietta & Sciaolm, 2010). In this realm, ‘light-touch’ regulation figured to be placed about halfway between the unfettered movement of capital and the close control over international capital flows. The consolidation of the ‘light-touch’ approach in regulatory models had been spreading quickly during the previous decades. The background rationale was incorporating models and assessments around weighing up the various costs of potential harms against the burden on business and economic growth. Abundant criticism has often been focussed on the argument that ‘financial constraints have become the underpinning factor in any decision about the things that should be in place to protect us all’ (Hope-Collins, 2017).
which they are and how you’re doing them, because you must not act ultra vires, but you must make sure you do everything you’re required to do’ (SIA_P3).

In a nutshell, the effect of the ‘light-touch’ regulation upon the SIA’s regulatory practice meant that the organisation should intervene in the market of the security services only where there is a direct and well-evidenced risk to the public and their intervention can be implemented without an adverse internal (for the SIA) and external (to the industry) burden: ‘There’s a phrase called “gold plating”, and that is not what our regulation is there to do’ (SIA_P12). However, to what extent can ‘light-touch’ regulatory approaches be equated with ‘right-touch’ regulation? The exploration of this overarching question starts from the following two sections, which explore the different mechanisms, stages and implications related to the SIA licensing regime on an individual (DS) and business (security companies) level.

4.3 The development of the SIA’s licensing regime for door supervisors

4.3.1 From the ‘cleansing-out’ to the preventative phase and from being the problem to being part of the solution

Between 2003 and 2020, the analysis of the SIA Annual Reports and the insights offered by SIA interviewees suggest that the SIA’s licensing regime for frontline DS had gone through three developmental stages.

The first phase (2003-2008), namely the ‘cleansing-out’ phase echoed the mandate of eradicating criminality from the industry, which ‘was the real focus and we’ve excluded—in the whole time since regulation began 60,000 people from working in the sector’ (SIA_P1). Not surprisingly, the sector of the industry that was mainly framed as ‘an overall fragmented and unstable industry with low public and police confidence’ (HC 894 [2003-4]), as well as ‘the most difficult and unpredictable sector to regulate’ (HC 1059 [2004-5]) was the door supervision one.

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62 ‘Right-touch’ is used in this context to be associated with the meaning of responsive and effective regulation.

63 The inherent difficulties associated with regulating door supervisors related mostly to their criminal involvement which, based on the academic evidence presented in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), could be divided into two broad categories: a) violence when dealing with their tasks, which was largely perceived as one of their occupational characteristics, signalling their macho and authoritative presence as the club (bar/pub) controllers and b) involvement with organised criminal groups and facilitation of their endeavours through their key presence in night-time venues (drug trade, racketeering etc). Apart from the research evidence on how criminality could be embedded in this sector, media articles often referred to door staff as gangsters, who were responsible for sexual assaults and for facilitating the drug trade (The Independent, 1995; The Independent, 2000; The Guardian, 1998; Vice, 2016).
The SIA utilised the prior criminal record (criminality criteria\textsuperscript{64}) of door supervisors as the tool with the potential to remove from the industry the operatives who had committed violent offences or had been involved with SOC (serious organised crime) activities. Yet, a formal record of prior criminality is not a silver-bullet. A well-known issue is attrition, referring to the gap between the commitment of a crime and the prosecution/conviction/sentencing of the offender. As Garside (2004, p.9) notes, ‘many people convicted by the courts will inevitably have committed other offences for which they will never be found guilty’. The more crimes an individual commits, the more likely is that she/he will get a criminal conviction. Yet, this is also dependent upon the types of offences that are given a higher priority. Overall, violent offending is more likely to get an individual convicted, compared to other less serious offences (Harrendorf et al., 2010), which is relevant to the context of DS’ work and the SIA’s criminality criteria.

However, the DS’ involvement with organised criminality is a far more complex area of consideration in the overall effort of ‘cleansing-out’ the industry. With the absence of business licencing and with the consideration that not all organised crime group members have prior criminal records, the extent to which individual licensing process could account effectively for this specific dimension of criminality among door staff could be contested: ‘Serious and organised crime involvement is much harder for us, obviously, because often there is no criminality; it’s often what we term “non-conviction information” and that’s intelligence from the police that this individual might be involved in criminal networks and we need to keep an eye on them, because there is no evidence for us to take away their licence, but they certainly are a risk’ (SIA_P10).

From 2008 onwards the SIA entered the ‘preventative’ phase of its licensing regime, in which ‘people would think twice about trying to enter the industry’ (SIA_P8). The overall mindset of the organisation about the role of the individual licensing regime started to prioritise the ‘exclusion element’, which aims to amplify the message towards the regulated community that ‘this is an industry where you will be checked, where criminality’s not acceptable, and this knowledge of itself improves standards’ (SIA_P3).

In 2010, after nearly a decade of operating as the regulator of private security and having gone through the stages of ‘cleansing-out’ the industry and gradually developing public and police

\textsuperscript{64} The commonly known ‘get licensed’ criteria consist of criminality criteria, identity check, training certificate from an accredited provider, mental health reports, the right to work checks and any other information that is possibly disclosed to the SIA by the police or local authorities. Among these, the criminality criteria have been the cornerstone of the licensing process and the fundamental dimension of defining who is ‘fit and proper’ to be granted a security licence and undertake security-related roles.
confidence in security operatives, the SIA has strategically positioned itself in the regulatory era, in which the industry is actually embedded as a useful ally in assisting with a variety of initiatives for public safety. In other words, from 2010 onwards the ‘preventative’ stage functions in tandem with the third phase of the licensing regime, in which security operatives are not seen as part of the problem, but ‘part of the solution, and we should be looking to equip good security to protect the public, so quite a different sort of way of looking at regulation’ (SIA_P1). The ‘reducing criminality’ dimension appeared to be communicated through the SIA Annual Reports mostly as ‘protecting the public’, which is further corroborated by the interview data, since many SIA participants tended to ‘correct’ the researcher when she referred to the first cornerstones of the regime as ‘reducing criminality’65. Violence reduction (VR), counter-terrorism and safeguarding the vulnerable have been the three key strands associated with the SIA’s public protection agenda.

These areas were depicted as ‘things that we’re being pulled to do’ (SIA_P5), reflecting the broader Home Office objectives and priorities, since ‘whatever is the political issue of the day is always high on our agenda, so, right now, protecting vulnerable people, and terrorism, is right up there’ (SIA_P6). In particular, the VR strategy started figuring as a key strand of the SIA’s focus since 2013, with the organisation clearly highlighting its strategic commitment to ‘coordinate its activity to help drive down the incidence of violence, particularly in the night-time economy’ (HC 945 [2013-14]). Given that this timeframe coincides with the phase of ‘protecting the public with the help of the private security’ the focus of the SIA’s VR strategy was twofold. The first objective was to ensure that DS can be better equipped to prevent or to respond to violent incidents happening in licensed premised in the NTE66. Second, the VR strategy placed emphasis on the contribution to the local responses against the violent incidents occurring in and around licensed premises67. In terms of the latter, one of the main regulatory aspirations that were vocally put forward in this stage related to strengthening the extended policing family by encouraging and supporting further engagement of frontline security operatives. The extent to which this strategic objective has materialised effectively in the local context will be explored in Chapter 7.

65 Indicatively: ‘Well, “protecting the public” I think is how it’s phrased, rather than ‘reducing criminality’ (SIA_P8).
66 This side of the SIA’s VR strategy has been largely premised on: 1) the upskilling of the training available to door staff (SIA, 2015b, 2017) and the promotion of good practice through user-friendly guides targeting security operatives (e.g. increased emphasis on physical restraint) and 2) the introduction of (technological) equipment (e.g. bodycams, breathalysers) that could assist them in managing people, managing excessive drinking and deterring possible altercations (HC 1088 [2015-16]; 744 [2016-17]).
67 Acknowledging the realistic parameter that preventative measures should be complemented with a toolkit in responding to the actual occurrence of violent incidents, the SIA has incorporated intelligence-led enforcement operations, joined-up with local authorities and the police, targeting premises that have been identified as ‘hotspots’ for violence in the NTE (SIA, 2015a, 2017, 2018b)
4.3.2 The development of the criminality criteria and its implications for the SIA’s regulatory responsiveness

Across the three identified stages in the strategic development of the SIA’s licensing regime towards individuals, the criminality criteria are the cornerstone of defining who is ‘fit and proper’ to be granted a security licence and undertake security-related roles. In other words, these criteria had been the fundamental regulatory tool that the SIA had at its disposal to fulfil both the ‘cleansing’ of the door supervision sector from its problematic elements and the prevention of criminality infiltration. However, given the dynamic shift in the regulatory narrative through these three phases, the criminality criteria followed a developmental process. The exploration of this process in the following paragraphs allows us to start reflecting upon the more overarching question regarding the benefits and the limitations of strictly associating ‘fit and proper’ considerations with operatives’ prior criminal record.

To begin with, there are two noteworthy features of these criteria, which suggest a pocket of regulatory innovation for the SIA. First, unlike many of their European counterparts, these are not premised on the ‘no criminality’ standard (Button, 2007; Button and Stiernstedt, 2018). The SIA’s ‘some degree of criminality is accepted’ (SIA_P13) standard meant that in practice even during the initial ‘cleansing-out’ phase of the regime, the licensing process did not automatically exclude anyone with a formal record of prior criminality from the industry68 (Table 2). Although a few SIA interviewees supported the view that ‘in this day and age, maybe we could start to look at perhaps an enhanced DBS rather than just the basic baseline criminality check’ (SIA_P16), the current standards have been deeply embedded in the organisation as the right way forward.

The fieldwork revealed some interesting pockets of regulatory responsiveness, when considering the rationale supporting the SIA’s criminality threshold. In particular, considerations of the actual profiles of the people they give licences to and the hurdles they put up in relation to that showcased the SIA’s regulatory pragmatism: ‘If you want to employ in an industry that’s going to only pay at this rate of pay, that is only going to provide jobs that provide this level of satisfaction and intellectual engagement, then actually you’re going to have in that pool of people some people who have criminal convictions’ (SIA_P13). Besides this individual-centred

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68 The criminality matrix refers to a prescriptive list of offences, with a special focus on their relevance to the SIA’s remit of public protection, which is then added to the assessment grids that take into account two further factors. These are the type of sentence received for the offence and the time elapsed since sentence restrictions for this offence ended. The criminality matrix, as well as the respective assessment grids did not remain unchanged. The modifications on them appeared as part and parcel of the broader development in the SIA’s strategic narrative and this will be discussed in greater detail in the coming paragraphs.
approach, more stringent criminality criteria could either lead to ‘a labour shortage overnight’ (SIA_P11) with significant implications for public safety, as well as for the survival of the SIA due to the ‘question mark as to how many licence applications we might actually go and get, or actually grant’ (SIA_P13).

The second feature of the criminality criteria is also aligned with a responsive regulatory perspective. Unlike ‘other regulators who will say “We will take into account all sorts of criminal offences, and then we’ll make a decision” – so, people have to spend money in putting an application in, and they don’t know whether they’re going to get a licence’ (SIA_P10), the SIA provides all the relevant upfront information to prospective applicants, so that they see from the outset whether their application will be accepted, refused or considered with additional factors. The availability of this specific guidance, which can prevent individuals from paying the application fee just to receive a refusal by the regulator, is an indication that the SIA recognises the socioeconomic constraints of the industry and adopts an informed and supportive approach towards regulatees.

Further building upon the evidence of SIA’s responsiveness in licensing individuals, two important developments associated with the criminality matrix and assessment grids should be explored (Tables 2,3,4). The first one relates to the enhancement of the offence categories. Among the new additions to this list in 2007 is the category of proceeds to crime which reflects the SIA’s effort, in absence of business licensing, to block the entry of individuals who might have been involved in some forms of repeat or organised criminality and benefited from the proceeds of these acts. Besides this, the addition of the Licensing Act 2003 offences highlights the sensitivity of the regime towards blocking individuals from the door supervision sector, who might have in the past been involved in actions that endangered the ‘safe NTE’ commitment. Turning next to another important development, up until 2013 the previous list of offences was broken down into the categories of serious and significant offences and thus two different assessment grids were produced, reflecting a stricter approach in granting a licence for the former

69 On the stable building block of offences (SIA, 2005) (violent and abusive behaviour, espionage/terrorism, offensive weapons, firearms, dishonesty, abuse or neglect of children, sexual offences, drugs, criminal damage, offences under the PSIA 2001) the organisation added in four new categories (SIA, 2007), namely proceeds of crime, social security offences, Licensing Act 2003 offences and driving offences, which since then have constituted the full list of offences under consideration (SIA, 2018a).

70 However, the extent to which these considerations in the individual licensing process could lead to effective disruptions of serious or organised criminal groups has been approached with some degree of scepticism in the previous section. Further building upon this scepticism, Chapter 9 complements this account, offering an exploration of specific cases of SOC in the market of DS services across south-east Wales.

71 For example, by allowing disorderly conduct in licensed premises or by hindering the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals.
than for the latter. However, from 2013 onwards the SIA moved from the two assessment grids into one integrated matrix, given that the aforementioned classification of offences ceased to exist, and all the offences included in the prescriptive list of the SIA fall under the umbrella of ‘single relevant’ offences (SIA, 2013). This is further complemented by a more lenient approach in terms of the factor associated with the time elapsed since sentence restrictions ended.\(^7\)

What resembles prima facie a simple refinement of the licensing terminology, essentially depicts a much more nuanced dimension in the way that the regulator approaches the concept of prior criminality. By leaving aside the ubiquitous assumptions around harm and culpability (SCG, 2004), the SIA shifted its perspective by considering the seriousness of any of the listed offences in light of its implications to the competency requirements and responsibilities of the security role that the applicant desires to be getting entry to. Before 2013, it could be argued that the criminality ‘lens’ of the regulator ‘might rule out rehabilitated offenders, or you might rule out people with a conviction that maybe on a list of things that are inappropriate, but actually they’re probably not’ (SIA_P9). From 2013 onwards there seems to be a greater recognition by the regulator that ‘criminality is a pretty crude way of understanding how people behave in a particular circumstance in particular ways’ (SIA_P13). Therefore, such a shift towards a simplified, yet tailor-made to the roles of security operatives, assessment grid echoes a much more case and context-specific era for the SIA, when dealing with licensing decisions.

Table 2: SIA’s assessment grid of single serious offence (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time since sentence restrictions ended</th>
<th>Actual sentence/disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caution, Warning, Absolute/Conditional Discharge, Admonishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to ≤12mths</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;12 to ≤24mths</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;24mths to ≤5yrs</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5 to ≤10yrs</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10yrs</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAF= Consider Additional Factors
Source: SIA (2012)

\(^7\) First, whereas up to 2013 the time frame for this consideration spanned into sets from 0 months until 10 years, the most recent update (2013-2018) introduced a maximum time of 7 years. Second, by comparing Tables 2 and 3, it becomes evident that from 2013 onwards in a series of instances automatic refusals now fall into the ‘consider additional factors’ category.
Table 3: SIA’s assessment grid of single significant offence (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time since sentence restrictions ended</th>
<th>Actual sentence/disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caution, Warning, Absolute/Conditional Discharge, Admonishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to ≤12mths</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;12 to ≤24mths</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;24mths to ≤5yrs</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5 to ≤10yrs</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAF= Consider Additional Factors
Source: SIA (2012)

Table 4: SIA’s assessment grid of single relevant offence (2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time since sentence restrictions ended</th>
<th>Actual sentence/disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caution, Warning, Community resolution, Absolute/Conditional Discharge, Admonishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to ≤12mths</td>
<td>CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;12 to ≤24mths</td>
<td>Grant*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;24mths to ≤4yrs</td>
<td>Grant*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;4 to ≤7yrs</td>
<td>Grant*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;7yrs</td>
<td>Grant*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAF= Consider Additional Factors
* However, please note that if an Applicant or Licence Holder has ever received a conviction resulting in imprisonment of longer than 48 months, or life imprisonment, they will always fall into the CAF category.
Source: SIA (2019)

4.3.3 A quantitative overview of the trends in DS licences between 2007 and 2020

Moving one step beyond the exploration of SIA Annual Reports and interview data, this analysis incorporates some descriptive quantitative data, which provide a brief overview of the trends in DS licences (2007-2020). As such, the aim is to draw some parallels between the already discussed issues in this section and pose some further questions for exploration. Figure 3 indicates the stability of the upward trend in the valid DS licenses from 2007 until 2013, suggesting that during the ‘preventative’ phase of the licensing regime, more and more licensed DS staff were coming in the industry. However, between 2013 and 2017 a downward trend in the number of DS licences brought the licensable population in 2017 to roughly the same number as in 2011.
This trend changed in the last three years (2017-2020), with the DS licensed population increasing by 34% and reaching its peak in 2020 (n=272,478).

In order to get a more integrated understanding of these trends, the analysis seeks to identify possible drivers behind the fall and then the increase of the DS licences. To begin with the fall, the regulatory regime could have had some impact through the two statutory mechanisms of excluding ‘inappropriate’ applicants/licensees from the industry: a) refusal of applications at the licensing decisions stage (preventative mechanism) and b) revocation of an active licence (reactive mechanism). With reference to the former, the data in Figure 4 suggest that the refusals of applications for DS licences fell sharply since 2012 (86% decrease between 2012 and 2020). Furthermore, between 2013 and 2017 the number of DS-related refusals was three times lower (n=6,896) than in the preceding years (2007-2012, n=21,548). In other words, between 2013-2017 fewer applicants were excluded from the DS sector, compared to the years before, which could be seen in light of the revised and more lenient criminality matrix. Therefore, the decrease of the DS licensed population (2013-2017) could not be attributed directly to the refusal of DS applications by the regulator.

Turning next to the data in Figure 5, it can be seen that 2012 and 2013 had been the peak years in terms of revocations of active DS licences by the regulator across the examined timeframe (2007-2020). This coincides with the exhibition of the ‘regulatory teeth’ of the SIA’s compliance and enforcement activity (Chapter 5). It should be noted that one of the reasons for a licence revocation is the conviction of a licence holder for a relevant offence. Yet, there is no automation of these convictions to the SIA. The regulator is reliant upon the statutory duty of the licence holder to report such information (PSIA 2001, s.9) and relevant police disclosures. Since 2013 the number of revoked DS licences followed a marked downward trend (94% decrease from 2013 to 2020). As such, revocation-related metrics do not appear to explain the decrease of the DS licensed population between 2013 and 2017.

In terms of the impact of these statutory mechanisms on the recent increase of DS licences (2017-2020), it seems that the total number of both refusal applications (n=4,766) and revocations of DS licences (n=3124) were at their lowest levels in this period across the entire timeframe. Both figures had started to drop markedly since 2013, but there was no impact on the DS population, which in fact decreased up until 2017. A lagged effect of application refusals and revocations on

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73 In 2008, a surge in refusal of applications is visible as prior to December 2007, the SIA was not directly checking right to work in UK (RTW), but in 2008 a lot of SIA licence applications were refused by the SIA on the basis of RTW failures.
the increase of DS licences in the last three years could not be ruled out, but it does not appear to be a conclusive driver.

Moving beyond the impact of the SIA’s regime, the DS trends could be explained vis-à-vis the fluctuations in the security guarding (SG) sector. Given that a DS licence provides more flexibility for deployment than a SG one\textsuperscript{74}, SG licences began to fall since 2009. This decrease was consistent, with the notable exception of a 6\% increase between 2013 and 2015 (Figure 3), which coincides with the decrease in the DS population. The pertinent question arising here is why the DS sector was shrunk from 2013 to 2017, despite its flexibility for deployment as compared with other sectors. Thus, it appears that plausible explanations for the downward trend in the supply side of the door supervision sector should be sought considering various other socioeconomic dynamics that might exert significant influence on the size and prosperity of the DS sector. Likewise, the subsequent increase in the last three years seems to have been partly driven by SIA-related mechanisms (application refusals and revocations), but it does not appear to fully explain this trend. In order to grasp the more nuanced forces that can impact the trajectories of the DS sector, this analysis will seek to integrate some other explanatory drivers through the ‘lived realities’ on the doors (Chapter 6).

Figure 3: Valid SIA licences by sector (2006/07-2019/20)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Valid SIA licences by sector (2006/07-2019/20)}
\end{figure}

Sources: FOI Requests & data provided by the SIA to the researcher

\textsuperscript{74} A DS licence allows the operative to work across multiple areas i.e. in relation to licensed premises as well as standard security guarding in a public or private place.
Figure 4: Refused applications (2006/07-2019/20)

Sources: Data provided by the SIA to the researcher

Figure 5: Revoked DS licences (2006/07-2019/20)

Sources: FOI Requests & data provided by the SIA to the researcher
4.4 The SIA’s regulatory oversight of security companies

4.4.1 Business licensing: An unfulfilled regulatory ambition and the clash between ‘burden’ and ‘public protection’

In 2010, the prospect of abolishing the SIA, as part of the Coalition Government’s ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’, was faced with strong scepticism in heated parliamentary debates. The most vocal opposition against the planned demise of the SIA originated from the industry itself: ‘it was actually the industry that said “No, we want a regulator”. Now, I think that’s really unusual; most industries don’t really want their regulator, but, for us, it was different’ (SIA_P14). Although the organisation was ultimately removed from the relevant ‘bonfire of the Quangos’, the proposals for introducing business licensing, according to the rationale of ‘Change Blueprint’, were not. From 2010 until 2014 one of the key strategic objectives in the SIA’s Annual Reports was the ‘delivery of a phased transition to a new regulatory regime’, consisting of ongoing consultations with stakeholders and the Home Office about how the regulator should integrate the oversight of security firms into their regulatory remit. However, after 11 years of applying individual licensing in some sectors of the security industry, there seemed to be the potential for finally materialising the long and much-anticipated business licensing of these sectors. A sudden declaration in 2014 that ‘the Home Office has postponed the roll out of the new regime, although the commitment to business licensing was re-affirmed’ (HC 945 [2013-14]) was the official concluding point to this regulatory expectation.

75 For the SIA, it was recommended under the ‘Change Blueprint’ that it should be ‘no longer a non-departmental public body (NDPB)’ and that the ‘transition to a new regulatory regime’ should be geared towards the replacement of the SIA by a new governance structure outside the NDPB sector, which will place its emphasis on licensing businesses and adopting a robust enforcement policy against regulatory business-related malpractices’ (HC 1243 [2010-11]).

76 The proposed framework by the Government related to business regulation was premised upon the introduction of a public register for regulated businesses and operatives, with the clear indication that this reform should be leading to ‘some deregulation of the private security industry… at no greater aggregate cost in real terms than the current regime’ (HC 945 [2013-14]).

77 However, it should be noted that five years after the failure of consultations, debates and proposals regarding business licensing, the topic was once again brought into the political and regulatory sphere. Business licensing figured as one of the main recommendations of the triennial review of the SIA, conducted by the Home Office (2017). However, these proposals framed business licensing in a different mode, as compared with the ones that were discussed back in 2010-2013. Instead of advocating a ‘baseline’ approach (a model that will necessitate all security companies to be registered and licensed by the SIA, with proportionate licence fees according to their size), the current model is associated with a much more ‘nuanced’ version of the scheme, given the following suggested dimensions: a) business licences specifically provided to businesses that operate in critical areas of public protection, safeguarding and national security, b) security companies should first adhere to the revised ACS, which is envisaged to be working as a hallmark scheme of bronze/silver/gold, and then be granted a business licence, c) individual licensing should be progressively replaced with business licensing in light of the broader deregulatory targets recommended by the Home Office. At the time of the writing, there has not been any development in terms of considering the incorporation of any of these proposals in the regulatory armoury of the SIA. As such, the prevailing...
As a result, the SIA’s licensing regime has been developed with an important divergence between its statutory oversight of individuals and businesses. The former is subject to a compulsory licensing process, whereas for the latter the only connecting feature with the SIA is the voluntary ACS\textsuperscript{78}. What is more interesting to note is that, following the previous sections of this chapter, the two fundamental dimensions that shaped regulatory intervention for DS were the risk to public safety and the restriction of any ungrounded burden on regulated entities (Hampton Report 2005 and the broader ‘light-touch’ regulation agenda). However, the proposals around business licensing heavily focused upon the burden side of the equation, leaving the public safety argument aside. Statutory oversight of security companies would have meant in practice that the regulatory burden would have no longer fallen disproportionately on security operatives through licensing and training fees. In other words, ‘the logic was to be seen as a better regulation, putting the burden on those who are most able to afford it – it wasn’t because the perceived risk of criminality was in the business – that wasn’t why government asked us to look at it’ (SIA\_P14).

Besides this, from a logistical point of view, the SIA, as a small organisation with 200 employees ‘could manage much more effectively, because there may be 4000 companies – allegedly – in the industry, involved in supply, rather than 340,000 individuals’ (SIA\_P5). Despite these arguments, the perspective of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS until 2016) that ‘businesses should be allowed to operate as businesses in the first place, rather than putting lots of red tape around them’ (SIA\_P6), appeared to be the prevailing stance towards licensing security firms. Echoing the struggles between the different agendas of governmental departments, the following illustrative excerpt elucidates how business licensing failed in practice to be associated with benefits either related to the burden side or the public protection side of the story:

‘I hadn’t realised, and this is a criticism, but I’ll make it… how far Home Office officials had failed to engage with what was then BIS – business – it’s not BIS anymore, it’s BEIS but officials in the Industry Department, in preparing their proposals. So, we got right to 5-to-midnight for being able to make these changes, to discover that the inevitable debate between Business Departments who want as little regulation as possible, and Criminal Justice Departments who sometimes think regulation is justified on the basis of protecting the public, had not properly engaged and resolved their differences’ (SIA\_P3).

\textsuperscript{78} A more detailed discussion of the ACS follows in the next paragraphs of this section.
The critical question arising at this point is to what extent the potential of statutory oversight of security companies can be associated with the prospect of further reducing criminality and fostering public safety. First, serious and organised criminality committed on a corporate level in the industry has been identified in a series of joint operations between the SIA and law enforcement partners.\textsuperscript{79} Given the statutory powers offered to the regulator, its approach towards serious and organised crime committed by security firms, is at its best reactive and dependent upon a solid cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, rather than preventative/proactive. Among SIA interviewees, there was widespread recognition that although individual licensing accounts for immediate threats to public safety, the issues that threaten the public in a less physical and visible manner are still largely unaccounted for:

\textit{‘At the same time, the way that it was set up with individual licensing is fundamentally flawed, in my view. I think everybody recognises that – particularly now – the criminality exists in a corporate form, rather than individuals. And the SIA is unable to reach the corporate, other than through its voluntary ACS Scheme. So, it is actually unable to be as effective as it could be, against criminality’ (SIA_P5).}

\textit{‘Arguably, the failure to legislate at business level – allowing for the ACS but knowing that that’s voluntary – the failure to get to grips with that left the industry vulnerable, still, to organised crime, and in many ways to people who are exploiting the public but not in a necessarily visible way’ (SIA_P11).}

4.4.2 The SIA’s voluntary ACS: the SIA’s strategic perceptions and the relative unpopularity of the scheme among DS firms

Following the absence of business licensing, security firms are not subjected to the same regulatory scrutiny as it is the case for individual licence holders. In other words, licensing criteria in terms of whether a business is ‘fit and proper’ to operate in the industry do not exist. Anyone can set up a firm providing security-related services, but there is no statutory requirement to either inform the SIA about their corporate existence or to obtain a ‘business licence’. For those firms who seek to adhere with the development of the standards in the industry (as envisaged and communicated by the SIA), there is the opportunity to obtain a voluntary accreditation, namely

\textsuperscript{79} Indicative examples are: Project Gulf in 2010, Operation Amberhill in 2011, SIA-Merseyside Police initiative in 2013.
the ACS (Approved Contractor Scheme) status. The incentives and advantages attached to the ACS status are: a) increased business opportunities by being listed on the SIA’s Register of Approved Contractors and b) operational advantages through the deployment of a fixed percentage of individuals whose licence application is being processed (licence dispensation).

In summary, participants claimed that the voluntary ACS scheme that SIA has as its regulatory toolkit allows them to recognise that there are some very good ACS companies in the industry. However, it is interesting to note that there is a fine line between defining ‘a very good security company’ and ‘very good security services’, since ‘Our business is simply to say we think you’re an ACS company. Now, if the industry itself wants to add bells and whistles, maybe; but I’d need persuading that that was the regulator’s job, because it becomes a complex, time-consuming, expensive, almost kite-marking and there are all sorts of problems for a regulator in going down that road’ (SIA_P3). The organisation’s reluctance to provide a specific framework for defining the parameters of ‘good security’ is further framed in light of two other factors; the ‘external neutrality’ argument and the necessity not to take over the professional associations’ responsibilities. In relation to the first factor, ‘external neutrality’ refers to its status as a regulatory body, whose presence and initiatives are embellished with the state-centric expectations of the regulated communities. As one participant illustratively explained: ‘People love the fact that we’ve got “gov.uk” after our name! We’re totally apolitical, we’ve got no dog in the fight’ (SIA_P2). In addition, the process of gradually self-managing standards by the security companies themselves has been hindered, according to SIA interviewees, by the lack of a strong and dynamic presence by the professional industry associations. As a result, the SIA, are the standard-setters for the industry and ‘the more we spoon-feed the industry, there will never be a role for a professional association who can help drive standards up –we’ve got a real conundrum here’ (SIA_P14).

Focussing on the question of how the ACS has been embedded among DS companies, relevant descriptive quantitative data highlights the relative lack of popularity of this scheme in the sector.

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80 The ACS is voluntary and developed in consultation with representatives from across the industry. SIA approved contractors and organisations seeking approval must be able to demonstrate capability and effectiveness in the operation of their business and in the protection of people, property and premises. The ACS standard does not specifically require the development of a document quality management system. However, The ACS sets benchmarks for companies in the following areas: management and leadership; customer services; providing for and managing employees; and considering the society and environment in which the company operates.

81 This is also commonly referred to as a voluntary commercial advantage. It should be noted that in Scotland, it is compulsory for public services to contract security firms that have achieved the ACS status. However, this is not the case for public services across England and Wales. The alleged correlation between the ACS status and increased business opportunities is a recurring reference in the SIA’s strategic narrative. To what extent this is actually evidenced through the working practices of security companies is explored and to some extent contested in Chapter 9.
To begin with, it is estimated that at the time of writing there are more than 4,000 security firms in the UK\(^{82}\), out of which a marginal 20% holds the ACS (n=844). The most recent data from the SIA indicate that in 2020 the number of DS firms with an ACS status (n=28) represent only 3.3% of the total ACS approved companies (n=844)\(^{83}\). Zooming further into the DS approved ACS companies from 2006 onwards, Figure 6 indicates that there has not been a clear upward trend. Despite the peaks observed in three different years (2014, n=33, 2018, n=33, 2019, n=40), there were decreases and fluctuations in the in-between years. Given that the ACS approval has a duration of three years, it is helpful to explore the annual trends on the active or inactive ACS status for DS companies\(^{84}\). The data suggest that in most years between 2006 and 2020 the number of DS companies with an inactive ACS status either tallied with the active ones or in some occasions even exceeded them. Notable exceptions are the figures for 2017-2019, reflecting a change in favour of the active ACS status for DS companies. Although this could signal a promising change of the landscape regarding the uptake of the scheme by DS companies, two caveats should be considered. First, even in this period the number of DS firms who had their accreditation either withdrawn or not renewed was not marginal. Second, as mentioned above at the time of writing DS firms with an ACS status represent a tiny fraction of the total ACS firms. Interviews with SIA participants and the graphs offer some valuable insights regarding the voluntary ACS. On the one hand, the interview data revealed the strategic stance of the regulator towards the scheme, underlining and exploring the organisation’s reluctance towards developing the scheme in a way that could potentially be considered as ‘kite-marking’. On the other hand, the quantitative descriptive data illustrated that the overall uptake of the ACS scheme among DS firms has been mostly fluctuating in low levels. However, the data does not offer a full explanatory framework, since they do not capture the micro dynamics of how DS firms make

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\(^{82}\) As noted in Chapter 3, as well as earlier in this chapter, the lack of regulatory oversight of security firms means in practice that there is not an official national register. As such, a robust and conclusive figure on the actual number of security businesses operating in the UK does not exist. The estimation of around 4,000 companies comes from personal communication between the researcher and SIA staff in late 2018. The continuous growth of the industry in the last three years (2017-2020, Figure 3) indicates that the number of security firms should have increased accordingly.

\(^{83}\) This data are publicly available through the register of approved contractors in the SIA’s website (https://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-roac.aspx?all). It should be noted that for DS companies there are two emerging figures. The first one, mentioned in the main body of text, relates to security firms which are providing only DS services (n=28, 3.3% of the total ACS companies). The second one relates to security firms which provide DS among other security services (n=271, 32% of the total ACS companies). Given that this study examines firms which are primarily DS-oriented, the first figure is taken into account.

\(^{84}\) According to the explanatory notes provided to the researcher by the SIA, the ACS status of a company can become inactive due to the following reasons: voluntary withdrawal, no re-registration, company in liquidation, eligibility expired, merger/takeover, restructuring, inadequate information provided to the SIA, no assessment by the SIA, non-payment of fees, non-compliance, non-conformance. It appears that the regulator approaches the non-active ACS status as an aggregate concept and does not provide a more specific break-down of the subcategories associated with it. Therefore, the researcher could not make any further observations of whether the inactive status was attributed either to the company’s decision to withdraw or to the SIA’s revocation of the status.
sense of the accreditation and the underlying reasons behind their decision-making in working towards the ACS status. Therefore, in Chapter 9, the insights provided by security managers/directors across south-east Wales aim to complement these findings and provide a much more nuanced discussion of the embeddedness of the ACS across local DS businesses.

Figure 6: DS companies with an approved ACS status (2006/07-2019/20)

![Graph showing DS companies with an approved ACS status (2006/07-2019/20)](source: SIA)

Figure 7: ACS status (active Vs. non-active) for DS companies (2006/07-2019/20)

![Graph showing ACS status (active Vs. non-active) for DS companies (2006/07-2019/20)](source: SIA)
4.5 Concluding remarks

Overall, the analysis in this chapter highlighted that the external mandate of the ‘light-touch’ regulation and the internal debates on the ‘fit and proper’ considerations had a dynamic effect across the three identified stages of licensing DS (‘cleansing-out’, ‘preventative’ and ‘from being the problem to being part of the solution’). Through assessing the development of the criminality criteria, pockets of regulatory pragmatism and responsiveness were identified, which highlighted a case and context-specific approach for the regulator when dealing with individual operatives. As such, it is argued that the SIA has developed and refined the criminality criteria to fulfil the preventative mandate alongside with a responsive stance towards the regulated community. However, in order to fully appraise the effect of the SIA’s licensing regime particularly on the DS sector, there are three further areas that this thesis aims to consider. The first one relates to the ways in which the role of DS has changed in recent years. Second, other competencies, which might be relevant but not directly addressed through the licensing criteria, should be examined. Third, it is important to explore the extent to which the SIA’s regulatory approach has balanced the ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’ approach towards the DS sector. Given that this chapter provides a critical analysis of the SIA’s stance regarding the administration of its licensing regime, Chapters 6 and 7 will integrate the understandings and experiences of the regulatees (DS) to feedback to the regulatory considerations and identify relevant convergences and divergences.

Whereas the criteria of the compulsory individual licensing are subject to slow, yet promising development, there has been a lack of any statutory oversight of the businesses’ conduct. The only form of regulatory oversight is linked with the voluntary ACS, which, despite the SIA’s rationale and ambition, does not appear to be well embedded among DS firms. The absence of business licensing has mainly been attributed to burden-related arguments, whereas the public protection argument has been downsized. However, preliminary evidence considered in this chapter suggested that corporate malpractices can have an important association with risks to public safety. In order to further build upon the evidence base of this critical, yet under-researched and area, Chapter 9 offers findings from the local context, revealing some mechanisms on how wrongdoings on a business level can ultimately unfold into a significant threat for public protection.
Chapter 5: The SIA’s Strategic Account (Part 2): Regulatory Ambitions and Regulatory Pragmatism in Enforcement

5.1 Introduction

Following on from the previous chapter, this part of the thesis completes the exploration of the strategic account of the regulator. Drawing upon the analysis of the SIA Annual Reports, the insights offered by SIA interviewees and quantitative descriptive data, this chapter explores the development of the SIA’s strategic stance regarding its enforcement approach. As such, the findings of this part of the thesis contribute to building up the response to the research question 4, specifically focusing on the account of the regulator.

The chapter is split into two sections. The first one aims to shed light on the intelligence gathering and analysis undertaken internally by the SIA. The organisation’s enforcement approach, both on the strategic and operational level, is directly linked to, and thus influenced by, the mechanisms and the outcomes of the SIA’s intelligence cycle. The ways in which intelligence is gathered from a variety of sources and the methods used to evaluate its content to either inform intelligence gaps or translate into enforceable action are two aspects with significant implications for the broader remit of enforcement. These aspects are the key themes that the analysis focuses on to identify areas of best practice, but also to reveal challenges and issues that might affect the optimal operation of the regulator’s intelligence apparatus.

The second section moves to consider the SIA’s enforcement toolkit, namely the sanctions that the organisation has at its disposal to secure compliance in the industry. Such an objective can be undertaken through combining ‘soft’ techniques, aimed at persuading regulatees to align with the regulatory regime, or through ‘hard’ strategies, primarily associated with punishment through prosecution. Therefore, it is important to contextualise how the SIA has put forward its strategic perspective of balancing these types of strategies towards the regulated communities. This is explored through the outward-facing messages in its annual reports, as well as through the SIA participants’ insights and the quantitative trends regarding the application of different sanctions. One of the most long-standing concerns about the SIA’s enforcement armoury appeared to be the lack of capability to impose sanctions that eliminate the financial gain from non-compliance, which was envisaged to be rectified through the introduction of POCA (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) powers in 2014. As such, the analysis of POCA cases (2014-2020) attempts to provide
some early evaluation lessons from the SIA, both from an efficiency and effectiveness perspective.

5.2 The SIA’s Intelligence Cycle: Poor sources or satisficing methodology?

5.2.1 Random inspections: Redefining their compatibility within selective enforcement

Following the broader shift from reactive to proactive policing techniques, one of the most fundamental ways of cementing this approach into law enforcement agencies was the universal adoption of the National Intelligence Model (NIM)\(^85\). The SIA had not been an exception in the widespread adoption of the intelligence-led techniques. At the core of the regulator’s intelligence toolkit is the National Intelligence Model, which in the SIA Annual Reports (2004-2019) figures as the key denominator for a series of the SIA’s compliance and enforcement operations. More specifically, the rationale behind the use of the NIM by the regulator is, one the one hand, the promotion of intelligence sharing between the SIA and law enforcement agencies (most notably the police and HMRC) and, on the other hand, the development of selective enforcement techniques. Both sides of this twofold rationale have some interesting implications for the accumulation of intelligence reports within the SIA, as well as for the prioritisation of some compliance strategies.

This analysis embarks upon the association between the NIM and the prioritisation of selective enforcement. Through the thematic and content analysis of the SIA’s Annual Reports (2004-2019), the external facing message about the strategic view of the regulator in terms of the mode of enforcement operations is clear: ‘selective, consistent and proportional enforcement’. This strategic enforcement-related mandate has translated into the operational practice of the regulatory body as the promotion of intelligence-lead operations over random inspections. The underpinning logic behind favouring the former over the latter is largely influenced by the Better Regulation Agenda principle of reducing the administrative burdens imposed by regulations to businesses (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005). This influence can be illustratively captured through the following direct quote from the 2007-8 SIA’s Annual Report (HC 732 [2007-8]): ‘compliant companies should not suffer the resource burden of receiving routine audit and inspection visits’. Yet, this statement undermines the centrality of the methods by which

\(^{85}\) Apart from placing its emphasis on the use of surveillance and the preparation of target operations against crime hot-spots and prolific offenders, the NIM figured as a vehicle to promote ‘a set of business processes that plan and control the use of resources based on objective assessments of current and future crime (and other) threats’ (Maguire and John, 2006, p.82).
misconduct is detectable. In other words, it opens up a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma. How does a regulatory body know that a company is compliant without audits and inspections?

If we accept prima facie that routine/random inspections should be reduced or even eliminated in the coming years, this proposition implies that the following two conditions are valid: a) that the SIA has a solid regime for overseeing how security companies operate and flag up any misdemeanours promptly and b) that the intelligence received through partner agencies, the public and the industry is generating the best/most significant data about problems and violations.

With reference to the first condition, given that there is no statutory basis for the SIA to create and gradually develop a nationwide central register of security companies, SIA investigators are often fraught with the following scenario:

‘And recently, I’ve just been approached by HMRC to do a joint investigation with them, into a multi-million-pound tax scam and benefit fraud – and this company’s been running for 10 years and we’d never heard of them. That can’t be right – there should be something that the business has to register with us before they can operate’ (SIA_P16).

Without having a solid framework that would have otherwise allowed the regulator to develop gradually a robust picture of how many security companies operate in a given UK region, the SIA’s ability to effectively distinguish between compliant and non-compliant companies is questionable. Since the first condition is fraught with these difficulties, the organisation is inevitably led to the position in which regulatory effort focuses on the second condition (intelligence generating the most significant/best available data).

In order to evaluate to what extent the intelligence that enters the SIA effectively informs the bigger picture of non-compliance in the industry and leads to enforceable action, two further parameters should be added into the analysis. These are the methods used to collect and then analyse intelligence and the sources of intelligence. In terms of the intelligence collection methods, inspections can be intelligence-led or random. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the strategic approach of the organisation favours the former over the latter and the operational practice, as captured by the respective interviewees, reveals that random inspections are increasingly moving into the ‘dismissal’ phase:

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86 Previous intelligence classified as highly likely linked to individual/business malpractices, or significant intelligence received by partner agencies, which is therefore called ‘partner-led’.
‘Much better to do intelligence-led inspections. You might want to test, now and again, your compliance rate randomly, but it’s very resource-intensive to do that. And probably, regulators’ time is better spent reacting to intelligence. And I think that will change; I think we’ll find – in the next 3 or 4 years – that we’ll move away from random inspections, and we’ll look to targeted inspections, and they might happen in a different way’ (SIA_P17).

The underlying argument behind this development is largely premised on the small workforce size and the limited resources that the organisation can afford for these inspections. The SIA has 50 enforcement officers across England and Wales, while there are approximately 35,495 public houses and bars (Foyle, 2020). Besides this, scepticism was geared towards the effectiveness of random inspections in flagging up unlicensed operatives or other regulatory misdemeanours on the practical basis that ‘if you turn up there from the regulator and you’re looking for people without licences, the building becomes a lot emptier than it was before you arrived’ (SIA_P7). Put simply, the operational reality when it comes to these inspections, especially in the night-time economy, is that the small number of SIA investigators undertaking them, coupled with the quick circulation of the message of ‘we’re being checked’ across DS in the NTE significantly questions the validity of the random inspections’ outcomes. These fieldwork reflections appear to corroborate the argument raised by some SIA participants that:

‘The intelligence-led is the really interesting one, because we do put inspections under intelligence-led – they very rarely turn offences up. Now, our methodology is poor – and I think it always will be – because the second we’ve checked one person, the whole industry knows we’re out’ (SIA_P8).

Although the random inspections are associated with these issues in light of the modus operandi and the respective outcomes, their positive contributions could not be overlooked or fully dismissed. First, randomisation is essential not only for checking compliance rates per se, but also

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87 This number comes from the evidence that the SIA’s Acting Chief Executive Officer provided during the Manchester Arena Inquiry (OPUS 2, 2020).

88 This problem was also highlighted during the observations made by the researcher, when she shadowed an evening inspection visit to licensed premises (bars and pubs) in Newport in 2018. The operation, undertaken by two SIA investigators and police licensing officers, commenced from a local bar, which was highlighted by intelligence as likely to have breached the individual licensing requirement. Given that the visit was unexpected, the impact upon this target premise was satisfactory. In particular, the contradictory responses given by the head doorman regarding the number of door supervisors working in the bar and their licensing status, led to a further investigation of the security company itself for suspected use of counterfeit licences. From the moment that we exited this first venue, the selection basis of nearby premises was random. However, it soon became apparent that within a couple of minutes, the operation was blown across all the operatives working on the doors that night via walkie-talkies. All the door staff working in the venues visited afterwards were standing as PR hosts outside the bars, waiting for our arrival. Therefore, it came as no surprise that no further misdemeanours were either suspected or revealed until the end of this inspection.
for informing the broader intelligence picture\textsuperscript{89}. Second, random inspections have the potential to send the messages of visibility, reassurance and deterrence\textsuperscript{90}. Having said that, this analysis acknowledges that the role of the regulator should not of course adhere to the model of ‘bobbies on the beat, inspecting every door supervisor down the high street’ (SIA_P6). However, if we accept the argument raised by some SIA participants in favour of dismissing random inspections in the near future and focus entirely on intelligence-led operations, this would involve accepting the hypothesis that the latter are better than the former. The critical question arising here is to what extent the sources for the intelligence-led operations are optimal. Moreover, if they are associated with any limitations, how can they be improved?

5.2.2 The police as an intelligence source for the SIA: blurred boundaries between bureaucracy and trust deficits

To begin with, the organisation can receive intelligence not only through the random inspections, but also through disclosures by law enforcement agencies (e.g. the police, NCA), government bodies (e.g. HMRC, GLAA) and the public\textsuperscript{91}. Although a general consensus is apparent among SIA personnel regarding a robust and continuously enhancing mode of cooperation between themselves and law enforcement partners\textsuperscript{92}, intelligence-related insights from SIA participants underscore some deviations from this optimal strategic framework. Interview data suggest that these deviations can fall into the following interlinked classifications\textsuperscript{93}:

**Classification 1 (justification basis):** a) reluctance by police forces to disclose information to the SIA, b) confusion about data protection requirements.

\textsuperscript{89} Cross-reference between already existing intelligence reports, identification and classification of new areas of regulatory concern and so forth.

\textsuperscript{90} Given that these operations involve passing around various venues in the NTE, it can be argued that door staff might consider that they are likely to be subject of these checks. For the compliant ones, confidence in the operational outreach of the SIA is developed, whereas for the non-compliant ones there are two possible outcomes; either they attempt to conceal temporarily their misdemeanours or to take some steps towards aligning with the SIA’s regime. Data from the fieldwork suggest that once the message of the random inspection is blown across the night-time venues, ‘dodgy’ operatives might either a) run away and ask their colleagues to back them up, which can be easily revealed by looking at the sign-in books of the venue or b) they decide to stay and present their credentials to the inspectors. On the second occasion, the most likely outcome was to be given a warning or require further information from their employers. For some of them, this was more or less a ‘slap on the wrist’, but for some others the whole process forced them to think twice before bypassing regulatory requirements. A more detailed analysis follows in Chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{91} Either via phone to Crimestoppers who pass the information to the SIA or directly to the SIA through an online report form.

\textsuperscript{92} On a strategic level, as evidenced from the external facing messages in the Annual Reports, the SIA appears to highlight on a frequent basis that ‘partnership working’ and ‘intelligence sharing’ are the key modes of building up and developing its relationship with police forces.

\textsuperscript{93} These classifications are not exhaustive and there could be some considerable overlap between them in operational practice.
**Classification 2** (types of intelligence): a) disclosures around requested information by the SIA about individuals or companies in the security industry, b) disclosures around information, which is not requested by the SIA, but which is assumed to be significantly associated with either the PSIA 2001 regime or with some other types of malpractices committed by security operatives or companies.

These classifications provide some interesting analytical insights in terms of the timeliness, accuracy and usefulness of the intelligence (or the lack of it) transmitted from the police to the SIA. The barriers to the free flow of intelligence between these two were mainly depicted by participants to be occasional, symptomatic of a lack of knowledge around the SIA’s remit and a blurred understanding on the inter-agency application of data protection regulations. Whereas the former could be explained through the lens of the organisation’s size and outreach\(^{94}\), alongside the perception held by SIA participants that ‘it’s another one in a long list of priorities for them’ (SIA_P10), the latter could raise some questions about potential trust deficits:

> ‘I think GDPR\(^{95}\) will be a hiccup. So, we’ll have lots of “I can’t tell you that”, “I’m not going to give you that”, “You can’t ask me that” – there have been lots of that – but actually, the regulations haven’t changed that much’ (SIA_P17).

Data protection regulations, especially in light of the recent flurry of references about the impact of the GDPR on public and private sectors, have appeared to be the main legitimising basis behind the rejections of the SIA’s intelligence requests to the police. However, given that the police had an extensive and in depth involvement with data protection and privacy since 1998 (Data Protection Act) and the compulsory appointment of Data Protection Officers at every police force (Gillingwater, 2017), some rejections could be seen as a diplomatic way to avoid sharing intelligence with a government agency, which despite its compliance and enforcement regulatory toolkit, does not fit well with the traditional police perception of enforcement actors\(^{96}\). In the

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\(^{94}\) The SIA is a small non-departmental public body with a statutory remit on some sectors of the security industry and in the current era of public resources austerity, interagency working is inevitably geared towards some ‘bigger’ governmental players, such as the HMRC, Immigration Office etc. Therefore, from a realistic and operational point of view it comes as no surprise that some police officers in rural areas - with limited examples of a UK city mainstream NTE - would not be (fully) aware of the SIA’s regime and the strategic approach of partnership working with this body.

\(^{95}\) The EU General Data Protection Regulation was approved by the EU Parliament on 14 April 2016 and it was enforced across EU member states on 25 May 2018. Portrayed as the most important change in data privacy regulation in the last two decades, its overall legislative rationale is geared towards harmonising data privacy standards across member states, as well as actively empower all European Union citizens’ data privacy.

\(^{96}\) Such a theme has been highlighted in research around intelligence-led police managerialism, with potential risks evidenced around ‘the police cultural resistance and misunderstanding of the contributions of partner agencies’ (Maguire and John, 2006), as well as in intelligence sharing concerning the anti-money laundering supervisory
SIA’s case, such a reluctance by partner agencies to disclose vital intelligence to the regulator leads to the organisation facing the adverse effects, as described in the following illustrative quote:

‘We get intelligence from a wide range of sources, but perhaps not always the right ones, so from our partners we really struggle with getting intelligence from them when a person is a risk to the public. And so, we’ve had instances where we’ve picked it up in the media that someone has convictions, and no-one’s reported it to us, or shared the intelligence; however, they’re a license holder. So, we’ve found out about it through the media, through my analyst doing horizon scanning, and scanning the news, which is not ideal, especially if someone is a threat to the public’ (SIA_P4).

As a result, these discrepancies in the timely and free flow of intelligence from law enforcement to the SIA suggest the importance of developing good personal relationships on an operational level between the SIA investigators and the local police officers. Co-operation in licensing cases was the primary basis for building up rapport and trust, which then gave rise to a successful intelligence sharing approach in most jointly handled cases97.

5.2.3 Intelligence gathering through the public and the security industry: obstacles amid vindictiveness and market rationalities

Apart from the police, the SIA also relies upon disclosures made by the industry and members of the public in order to gather information related to potential industry misdemeanours. Following the thematic analysis of the SIA Annual Reports with a specific focus on the theme of intelligence gathering, in 2008 (HC 732 [2007-8]) the organisation declared that due to sponsoring the Crimestoppers website, there was an important shift in the quality of the information entering the organisation and its subsequent role in filling intelligence gaps. In order to assess the extent to which this statement aligns with the potential, as identified in the official SIA reports, of enhancing the quality of disclosures entering the organisation, quantitative and qualitative data regime (Wood et al., 2018, p.16), in which evidence points to the direction of ‘a lack of confidence by law enforcement in the ability of some PBS to protect sensitive intelligence’.

97 However, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, partnership dynamics between local SIA investigators and police officers are not static. The crucial factors affecting the trajectory of such a partnership are the following: a) the knowledge of the key features of the SIA’s identity, licensing requirements and enforcement policy and b) the levels of trust in the regulator’s proactivity in both the intelligence flow and its operational visibility. The absence of these facilitators does not only hinder the working relationships between the police and the SIA, but it also fuels arguments around the lack of accountability and regulatory oversights for the DS sector.
are examined. Regarding the former, Table 5 (Crimestoppers reports 2015-2018)\(^{98}\) indicates that only 22% of the original amount of intelligence reports (concerning all regulated sectors) stored by the SIA have been assessed to be of some value for further compliance or enforcement purposes\(^ {99}\). This low percentage is also evident when it comes to Crimestoppers reports with a specific reference to the DS sector (individual and business level). Although intelligence implicating this sector far outreaches the rest of the regulated sectors (52% of the total number of reports received), the percentage of the DS-linked reports that led to the creation of a compliance case was only 27%\(^ {100}\). All in all, from a quantitative point of view it can be seen that the partnership with Crimestoppers has increased the volume of the intelligence getting into the SIA, but few disclosures instigate a compliance case. However, the regulator argued that the majority of Crimestoppers material has been used to enrich ongoing cases, shedding light on the already existing, yet blurred, intelligence picture.\(^ {101}\)

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\(^{98}\) The original request by the researcher to the SIA was for Crimestoppers reports from 2008 onwards. Although these were available in the organisation’s database, the reports received between 2008 and 2015 were stored in a way that did not permit an easy identification of further compliance or enforcement actions taken in light of these reports. Therefore, the dataset was limited to the time frame of 01 January 2015- 31 December 2018.

\(^{99}\) It should be noted that when a Crimestoppers report is assigned with a CC (case creation) number, there are two plausible scenarios concerning its further use in setting some sort of enforcement action in motion: 1) the report could lead to the creation of a case, which is further sent to the desk-based compliance team (dealing with minor instances of non-compliance), Partnership and Interventions (P&I) or Criminal Investigations Team (CIT) (dealing with more serious instances of non-compliance) or 2) the report would not lead to the creation of a new case, but to the enrichment of ongoing cases.

\(^{100}\) Table 5 also indicates the number of reports that were assigned with a PIE (Partner Information Exchange Number), which means that these reports were either send to the SIA’s Integrity Team (for licensing review purposes) or to an external partner, so as to request further information and provide corroboratio. There is no further information by the SIA whether these reports actually materialised in any sort of further enforcement action, once they have been reviewed either internally or externally. Thus, the respective percentages are not incorporated into the analysis in this section, but they appear on Table 5, so as to provide an accurate break down of the possible routes that Crimestoppers reports can follow within the SIA’s intelligence cycle. Besides this, from a logistical point of view it can be argued that the associated percentages for the PIE-referenced reports are minimal (5% of the total number of reports stored for all sectors and 9% of the total number of reports stored for the DS sector), so their impact on the amount of reports with a CC number would have been equally minimal.

\(^{101}\) When the researcher was given with the original dataset, which formed the basis for Table 5, the organisation stated that due to time constraints it was not possible to provide a breakdown of the intelligence reports that were used as supplements to existing cases. Given the lack of these figures, this assertion is solely backed up by personal communication between the researcher and SIA personnel dealing with these reports.
Table 5: Crimestoppers reports 2015-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2015-2018</th>
<th>Crimestoppers Reports (Links with all sectors)</th>
<th>Crimestoppers Reports (Links with the DS sector)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number Received</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored and Used</td>
<td>1,645 (95% of the total number received)</td>
<td>901 (55% of the total number received)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of reports with CC</td>
<td>362 (22% of the total stored and used)</td>
<td>241 (27% of the stored and used for DS sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Case Creation) number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of reports with PIE</td>
<td>81 (5% of the total stored and used)</td>
<td>81 (9% of the stored and used for DS sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partner Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange) number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dataset provided to the researcher by the SIA.

In order to get a deeper understanding of the underlying factors, insights offered by SIA interviewees highlighted the potential for ungrounded vindictiveness by some members of the public, especially in the NTE\textsuperscript{102}. False claims in some of the reports submitted through Crimestoppers not only raise some concerns regarding the validity of the intelligence forwarded to the SIA, but they also indicate the persistence of long-standing public attitudes towards the legitimacy of DS\textsuperscript{103}.

Vindictiveness was also associated with some intelligence offered by security firms to the organisation, since ‘the industry’s desperate to see people prosecuted’ (SIA_P5). Although such a ‘desperation’ could be welcomed on a first level of analysis\textsuperscript{104}, it can be significantly distorted by the highly competitive standards among security companies, who try to direct the SIA’s attention to competitors’ businesses, by falsely claiming that they have or that they are highly likely to have breached the regime:

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\textsuperscript{102} The most common scenarios involve individuals, who might have been refused entry to a licensed premise by a door supervisor due to their vulnerable state (underage, intoxication and so forth), and due to this sudden change in their night-out plans they might file a report on Crimestoppers about this particular operative.

\textsuperscript{103} Given that the ‘bouncer’-related stereotypes appear still to be indicative of the public perceptions towards door staff, these vindictive reports are usually concerned with the use of physical violence by the ‘thugs on the doors’. This is further put into perspective in Chapter 6, highlighting some shifts in the embeddedness and occurrence of violence in the local Welsh night-time economies, particularly in light of the increasing verbal and physical violence directed towards the door staff by the public.

\textsuperscript{104} Responsive and creative enforcement strategies by local SIA investigators towards security companies often motivated security directors/managers to liaise with the regulator and forward useful pieces of intelligence regarding corporate malpractice. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
‘One company will beef about one company, the other one will beef about that company because they all want everybody’s contracts. But somewhere, in all that information that they’re giving you, is a really tidy bit of intelligence’ (SIA_P15).

5.2.4 Methods of intelligence analysis: From the classification criteria to enforceable action

Having discussed the issues related with the methods of gathering intelligence (inspections), the analysis moves into considering some grey areas in the methods underpinning the internal use of this information within the regulatory body. Once some seemingly ‘juicy’ and ‘meaningful’ bits of intelligence enter the SIA, the respective team has to create a case following a prescribed list of intelligence criteria, which are strictly related to the specific regulatory offences, as set out in the PSIA 2001\(^\text{105}\). Although a prescriptive list of criteria allows for a speedy and reliable creation of compliance cases, it also places some barriers into integrating a more nuanced categorisation of the developments of the wider criminality and offending in the ever-developing landscape of security operatives, and more specifically of the DS world:

‘That (intelligence criteria) hasn’t changed for quite a long time. It has been something we’ve wanted to change – myself and (name anonymised) – and to sit with (name anonymised) from P&I, because the industry doesn’t stop – it doesn’t always stay the same – we need to evolve with it, as it evolves itself’ (SIA_P4).

As long as the core of the PSIA 2001 is not amended, the statutory offences of unlicensed DS and directors are the building blocks of the SIA’s intelligence analysis process. Yet, this should not block a more creative and innovative approach in categorising intelligence reports. For instance, fraudulent licensing (counterfeit licences) has been considered by many SIA participants as an important current trend in non-compliance, alongside the various possible manifestations of violence in the NTE. Moving one step further, Chapter 9 discusses the prevalence and significance of corporate offences (criminal facilitation of tax evasion) among DS security companies in South Wales and the links with a broader non-compliance aptitude. From fraudulent licensing to corporate offences by security companies, all these non-compliance typologies that do not fall directly to the statutory offences are not listed among the SIA’s intelligence criteria. As a result, the creation of a compliance case related to these not centrally

\(^{105}\) Section 3(1): engaging in licensable conduct without a licence, Section 5(1): employing unlicensed persons in licensable conduct, Section 6(1): using unlicensed vehicle immobilisers, Section 9(4): Contravening licence conditions, Section 16(2): falsely claiming approved contractor status, Section 17(2): providing private security services when not approved to do so, Section 19(5): obstructing SIA officials or those with delegated authority, Section 22(1): False statements to the SIA.
listed, yet significant, criteria are dependent upon the intelligence analyst’s discretion and competence to gauge the risk of these misdemeanours.¹⁰⁶

‘My analysts do have the rein to be able to create a case when they feel they should create a case – it doesn’t have to follow that particular criteria, so if they feel that something’s really high-risk, I would expect them to escalate it without any criteria’ (SIA_P4).

So far in this section two SIA teams have been highlighted as the key players in the organisation’s intelligence cycle, the Intelligence Team and Partnerships & Interventions. Although a strong two-way relationship exists between these two teams in gathering and evaluating intelligence, some problems could be highlighted in the late stages of this cycle. More specifically, concerns were raised by SIA participants that both teams were often not fully engaged in exchanging feedback through mutually measuring their impact:

‘If we send it to P&I, they’re a massive team, and what we find a lot of the time is we’ll send a case to them and we won’t hear anything after that. So, the intelligence cycle kind of breaks down from that point. So, it’s sent to them, and they do their work – which I’m sure they do a really good job – but it never kind of gets fed back round to us about whether the intelligence that we sent to them was actually reliable intelligence, so it actually meant that a security company they went to see wasn’t compliant and because of the SIA’s investigations they are now compliant, whether it’s worthwhile intelligence’ (SIA_P4).

Although the encouragement of this type of discretion could be definitely applauded as evidence of thinking outside the ‘intelligence box’, we should not overlook the significance of updating the already existing criteria, so as to: a) reflect the developments of non-compliance patterns in the industry and b) ensure that a more holistic model in intelligence analysis is promoted, blending the centrally-defined intelligence criteria and the creativity to apply them according to the specifics of each case.

¹⁰⁶ Although the encouragement of this type of discretion could be definitely applauded as evidence of thinking outside the ‘intelligence box’, we should not overlook the significance of updating the already existing criteria, so as to: a) reflect the developments of non-compliance patterns in the industry and b) ensure that a more holistic model in intelligence analysis is promoted, blending the centrally-defined intelligence criteria and the creativity to apply them according to the specifics of each case.

¹⁰⁷ As per Figure 8, this team is responsible for evaluating intelligence, analysing intelligence and either creating a new case or enriching a pre-existing one.

¹⁰⁸ As per Figure 8, this team could be responsible for gathering intelligence through random or intelligence-led inspections and also for translating intelligence into compliance/enforcement action.
This lack of coordination between these SIA teams in the last stages of the intelligence cycle could be framed within what was described in organisational psychology literature as ‘silo mentality’ (Diamond and Allcorn, 2009; Stone, 2004; Weisbord and Janoff, 2005) referring to how departments of organisations function in a manner disconnected from the others. This concept, far from unique to business studies, has been also highlighted as one of the fundamental challenges for the implementation of the NIM at its full potential, since ‘the concern only with one’s own patch, rather than aiming to contribute to a wider system could undermine the important flow of information’ (Maguire and John, 2006, p.84). The potential of silo thinking, as evidenced in the last stages of the SIA’s intelligence cycle, could undermine attempts at evaluating the overall effectiveness of intelligence reports in informing the compliance approach of the regulator. Measurements of what works in intelligence gathering and analysis are hindered, and thus possible problems related either to intelligence sources or the methods used in every stage are not readily identified.

Figure 8: The SIA’s intelligence flow model
5.3 The SIA’s Enforcement Toolkit: Developments and challenges

5.3.1 Regulatory struggles in balancing the ‘soft’ and the ‘tough’ side of the SIA’s compliance and enforcement approach

According to the SIA Annual reports, from its early days of operation, the regulator’s strategic vision of how compliance and enforcement activity should be put forward has been largely influenced by the Macrory principles. Both the Macrory Report in 2006, as well as the refinement of regulatory sanctions in light of the RESA 2008 complemented the principles of the Better Regulation Agenda. On both occasions, the emphasis was specifically placed on fit for purpose sanctioning tools that can be used by regulators in situations of non-compliance (Macrory, 2006; 2008). On a first level of analysis, the outward-facing message of the SIA Annual Reports highlight the credibility and the proportionality of the organisation regarding the enforcement of its regime.

However, on a deeper level of analysis, an interesting variation in the SIA’s compliance and enforcement-related direction is revealed. In particular, up until 2008, the SIA’s compliance

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109 The report advocated the six penalties principles, as a generic guideline for designing and implementing enforcement regimes. The core message deriving from these principles is associated with a responsive, case-specific and proportionate sanctioning approach that aims not only to be reactive towards a regulatory offence (eliminate the financial gains/benefits or restore the harm), but also to be proactive (preventative) by influencing and changing the behaviour of the non-compliant and deterring future non-compliance (Macrory, 2006). Such a sanctioning approach requires the regulator to set up a specific enforcement policy, publicise it and refine it, according to outcome measurements, consultations with stakeholders and the government and follow-up actions, so as to enforce sanctions transparently.  

110 Macrory’s analysis (2008) identifies three strands of regulatory compliance. The two extreme strands are associated, on the one hand, with the rogue businesses who intentionally violate the regulatory requirements and, on the other hand, with legitimate traders who are engaging with the regulator and through advice or warnings they are actually doing their best to comply. Despite the prima facie simplicity of these two extremes, there appears to be ‘another species in the middle, not “criminals” who consciously avoid the law, but businesses such as those which inadvertently or through carelessness break the law’ (Macrory, 2008, p.211). For this particular category of non-compliant individuals or businesses, the Regulation, Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (RESA 2008) listed 25 regulators who could be granted an added option to their already defined enforcement toolkit, namely the power to levy financial penalties. These penalties could be either fixed (for minor regulatory requirements) or variable (more significant requirements) and, although they are civil in nature, the burden of proof adheres to the criminal standards. This power is not forced to these regulatory bodies by the RESA 2008, since the decision lies upon each regulator to consider whether they will actually take up these powers, conferred by a ministerial order.  

111 The analysis of the SIA Annual Reports revealed three key themes that figured consistently as the building blocks of the SIA’s strategic narrative regarding its enforcement approach: 1) enforcement as an important but selective tool, 2) intelligence-led operations through the use of the National Intelligence Model that assists with the prioritisation of targeted compliance activity and 3) engagement with partners (police, local authorities, HMRC, NCA, UK Border Agency etc.), so as to maximise the benefits coming from each partner and avoid duplication of effort.  

112 From a methodological perspective, this level of analysis is supported on a twofold way: a) a more in depth and critical analysis of the written outputs, produced by the SIA between 2008 and 2019 (SIA Annual Reports and newsletters) and b) the insights offered by SIA interviewees.
strategy was largely premised on ensuring that the organisation exhibits its ‘regulatory teeth’ in enforcing the regulation, since ‘it’s no good having them and not using them, because if that happens people won’t believe, and they’ll think you’re a paper tiger’ (SIA_P3). Although the regulator placed some emphasis in assisting regulatees with the technicalities of the regime, the primary focus was geared towards the objective of ‘how to make the environment hostile to non-compliance’ (HC 732 [2007-8]), underscoring that ‘nothing less than full compliance with the law is expected’ (HC 819 [2006-7]). Echoing the rationale of the ‘cleansing-out’ phase, between 2004 and 2008 the SIA relied primarily upon the ‘hard’ message to achieve compliance with the regime, as corroborated by SIA participants: ‘not long after the SIA started, the Chief Executive was quite keen to early on show some aggression, and I know that the Chief Executive and one of the Area Directors had a call, and (security company anonymised) was investigated by the SIA for having unlicensed officers’ (SIA_P5).

From 2008 onwards, the analysis identifies two distinct phases in the application of the available sanctions by the SIA. First, between 2008 and 2013, the SIA seemed to build up its dynamic enforcement presence through the application of both non-statutory disposals (i.e. warnings), as well as prosecutions. In particular, Figure 10 suggests that there has been a steep increase in the use of warnings (from 62 in 2008/09 to the peak of 749 in 2012/13). Regarding prosecutions, Figure 9 indicates that during this period the general trend was upward, with an average of 15 prosecutions annually and some modest fluctuations. If one zooms into the specifics of annual prosecutions for this period (Table 6), it can be observed that up until 2013 the SIA prosecution cases were mainly directed against frontline operatives, rather than businesses. In particular, the

113 ‘Regulatory teeth’ is a phrase that has been widely used by SIA interviewees, when enforcement-related issues were discussed. It refers to a dynamic regulatory approach in securing compliance among the regulated groups through primarily evidencing that when persuasion fails, the criminal route exists as an option in the regulator’s enforcement toolkit and the probabilities of it being followed are high.

114 This refers to assisting individuals and companies understanding their obligations arising from the regulatory regime and how to make sure that they conform to them. Providing support to the regulated groups regarding the technicalities of the regime echoes the discussion in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). During the first phase of the licensing regime (‘cleansing-out’), much of the regulatory focus was placed on making sure that security operatives and companies understood the process of how to get licenced.

115 Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.

116 The ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ message are the two integrated aspects of the ‘pulling levers’ framework (Braga et al., 2001; Braga et al., 2018), which will be discussed in great detail in the coming chapters (Chapters 8 and 9). As a brief overview, the ‘soft’ message relates to clear incentives for compliance, whereas the ‘hard’ message is associated with consequences for criminal activity or non-compliance.

117 In terms of the range of sanctions that the regulator has in its enforcement toolkit, these refer on the one hand to non-statutory disposals and on the other hand to formal investigations with a view to prosecution, in partnership with law enforcement agencies. The non-statutory disposals include verbal or written warnings, as well as improvement notices, which can be used against individual licence holders (with a view to further escalate to licence revocation or suspension) and security companies (e.g. in case of non-conformance with the ACS terms and conditions) (SIA, 2015). If compliance is not achieved through these disposals, or the SIA considers that the relevant offences pose a significant risk to public protection and that the existence of a wider criminal offending pattern endangers the integrity of the regulatory regime, then the route of prosecution is followed.
total number of prosecution cases from 2008/9 to 2012/13 against individual operatives were 27\textsuperscript{118}, whereas the ones directed against businesses were 20\textsuperscript{119}.

Yet, in the second phase (from 2013 to 2020), a different picture emerges, with the regulator reducing significantly the use of warnings and improvement notices and instead focusing entirely on the more stringent sanction-related route (prosecution). In particular, the application of SIA warnings followed a 77% decrease between 2015 and 2020 (Figure 10), whereas the average of annual prosecutions in this timeframe almost doubled (Figure 9). Furthermore, the uptick of prosecutions in this timeframe is mainly driven by prosecutions against businesses. More specifically, as opposed to the observations for 2008-2013, in this second phase the number of SIA prosecutions against security firms (\(n=95\), s.5 and s.16, Table 6) more than doubled compared with the ones directed against frontline operatives (\(n=39\), s.3, Table 6).

Also, more recently (2018-2020), SIA prosecutions started to involve offences other than PSIA-related ones. During the last two financial years, there were 11 SIA prosecution cases for offences under the Fraud Act 2006, 2 for offences under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and 2 for offences under the Identity Documents Act 2010 (Table 6). On a first level of analysis, this recent trend depicts that the regulator seeks to use its enforcement powers to broaden its outreach beyond its PSIA offences. Yet, these prosecutions were related to low volume types of fraud, since the offences have been associated so far with the use of fake licences or false documents aiming at false representation. The SIA, as a ‘delegated regulator’ (Button et al., 2018) falls into the private typology of the ‘regulatory administrative justice’ identified in the models of non-criminal justice for fraud (Button et al., 2016, p.42). Although the outcomes of prosecutions are

\textsuperscript{118} The main offence for a prosecution case against individual frontline operatives is s.3 of the PSIA 2001 (engaging in a licensable conduct without a licence). They can be also (although less frequently) prosecuted through s.9 (contravening licence conditions) or s.19 (failure to provide information required to the SIA), but these offences can be also directed against businesses. The researcher requested a full breakdown of the specifics for each prosecution case from the SIA between 2008 and 2020, so that she could see whether prosecutions on s.9 and s.19 were directed against individuals or companies. Due to time and resource constraints of the organisation, this request did not materialise. As such, the researcher attempted to obtain these through using open source tools (i.e. \url{https://archive.org}), which allows the user to get a snapshot of official websites in the past. The purpose here was to obtain the specifics of SIA prosecutions through the regulator’s website, which feeds new data every six months, but at the same time removes the older ones. However, this was not feasible since these open source toolkits had not captured the SIA’s website consistently over time, with important gaps across the years. As such, the estimation of annual SIA individual prosecutions is based on the data of Table 6. Offences associated with s.3 are in the vast majority of cases the key offence for an individual prosecution, so the non-inclusion of other offences (s.9/s.19) is unlikely to have skewed the calculation markedly.

\textsuperscript{119} The explanatory note here follows the logic associated with the previous footnote. The main offences for a prosecution case against businesses is s.5 (supply of unlicensed security operatives) and s.16 (falsely claiming to be an approved contractor). Businesses can be also (although less frequently) prosecuted through s.9 (contravening licence conditions) or s.19 (failure to provide information required to the SIA), but these offences can be also directed against individuals. Given the issues associated with accessing the specifics of historical cases (see previous footnote), the estimation of annual SIA prosecutions involving security firms is based on adding prosecution cases driven by s.5 and s.16.
published in enforcement-related newsletters on the SIA’s website, the organisation does not provide a fraudster register. In other words, the SIA has an open searchable register for licensed operatives, but ‘the search requires the user knows the identity of the person and the entry only provides information on the date of revocation, not the reason for it’ (Button et al., 2016, p.45). Given the low level of fraud offences in the SIA prosecutions and the limited publicity, the pertinent question arising here is as follows: is the prosecution of these non-PSIA offences sufficient to infer that the SIA has thought creatively outside its enforcement toolkit, so as to target other types of non-compliance that might have a significant impact on the security industry? The analysis of the annual prosecution figures paints a promising picture for the last few years, yet some preliminary caveats have been noted. The analysis in Chapter 9 builds upon the current findings, painting a more complete and critical response to this key question.

Despite these notable differences between the two identified phases, there have been some outward-facing messages communicated by the SIA to regulates consistently since 2008. The analysis of the annual reports depicts that the SIA has gradually become more active in marketing its enforcement activities, with the purpose of generating publicity and sending a reassurance message towards the industry. Furthermore, the SIA has gradually put forward the ‘soft’ message regarding its compliance approach, underscoring that ‘compliance is something that we don’t do to the industry, it’s something that we work alongside the industry to achieve’ (SIA_P18). However, this seems at odds with the sanction-related trends discussed before for 2013-2020: the ‘softer’ options (warnings) were almost underused, whereas the ‘tougher’ strand of prosecutions was on the rise. Therefore, the analysis needs to move beyond the regulatory account, as captured by the annual reports and the interview data. Through incorporating the regulatees’ experiences in Chapters 8 and 9, there is the potential to explore to what extent such a strategic shift in the balance between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ message has materialised and under which conditions.

120 Whether people actually know this, and who reads it, is another question: but it is available openly. The analysis in the next parts of the thesis (Chapters 8 and 9) puts this question into a more holistic perspective, through incorporating the insights offered by DS and security firms across south-east Wales.
Figure 9: SIA Prosecutions (2008/09-2019/20)

Table 6: Types of offences in SIA’s prosecution cases per financial year (2008/09-2019/20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PSIA 2001 Offence Engaging in licensable conduct without a licence (s.3)</th>
<th>PSIA 2001 Offence Supply of unlicensed security operatives (s.5)</th>
<th>PSIA 2001 Offence Contravening licence conditions (s.9)</th>
<th>PSIA 2001 Offence Falsely claiming approved contractor status (s.16)</th>
<th>PSIA 2001 Offence Failing to provide information required by the SIA (s.19)</th>
<th>Offences under the Fraud Act 2006</th>
<th>Offences under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981</th>
<th>Offences under the Identity Documents Act 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019/20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: FOI Requests and datasets provided to the researcher by the SIA.
Given the repeated shifts of balance between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ message of the SIA’s compliance approach, the critical question arising is to what extent the available SIA sanctions align with the (frequently referenced in SIA Annual Reports) model of a responsive, case-specific and proportionate sanctioning approach. The organisation’s reliance on either warnings/improvement notices or prosecutions has been frequently criticised as being ‘very black and white: you either “are” or you “aren’t” in breach of our legislation, there no sort of scale, as such, of a softer fine for a first-time offence, or not’ (SIA_P6). Furthermore, one of the most long-standing concerns about the SIA’s enforcement armoury related to its lack of capability to impose sanctions that eliminate the financial gain from non-compliance or to restore the harm caused.

In order to fill the enforcement gap between ‘turning a blind eye – or “NFA” it, as they say –or considering them for investigation towards a prosecution’ (SIA_P17), the RESA 2008 sanctions121 appeared as a possible option for the regulator. Given the absence of business licensing, these penalty notices were perceived as an alternative and proportionate way for the regulator to ground its oversight and demonstrate its ‘regulatory teeth’ against non-compliance:

121 RESA 2008 has been discussed in footnote 110. In terms of the RESA 2008 sanctions, these are monetary administrative penalties as an intermediate set of sanctions that will lie in between the one end of ‘cautioning and persuading’ and the other end of criminal prosecution. The significance of this piece of legislation in allowing the SIA to broaden the spectrum of its regulatory powers and account for minor transgressions of its regime was highlighted extensively by two evaluation reports (NAO, 2008; White and Smith, 2009). Following the commentary by Andy Drane (Director of Compliance & Enforcement, SIA, 2009, the new powers were evaluated as a means to bridge the regulatory gap in enforcement and to apply sanctions ‘where no action, other than informal encouragement to comply with regulation, would previously have taken place’ (Drane, 2009).
‘Our warnings mean nothing. Give them a warning, and no further action is taken – and the security operatives know that. They’d just get a slap on the wrist and told not to do it. So, I think you need to hit them where it hurts, and that’s in the pocket’ (SIA_P15).

Despite their potential to fill the gap in between the ‘soft’ (warning/notices) and the ‘tough’ (prosecution) end of the SIA’s enforcement pyramid, scepticism related to issues about their application in practice and their cost-effectiveness appeared to operate as ‘internal barriers’ in putting forward the RESA powers. First, concerns were raised about ensuring that these fines would have not ended up being either overused or underused, as this could have been detrimental to the effectiveness of the whole enforcement framework 122: ‘I’m not sure that a RESA sanction would necessarily be that successful, because if it’s set too low “Ok, fine, just tax me then”. It needs to be deployed in relation to a good prosecution strategy’ (SIA_P17). Second, another major consideration appeared regarding the resources-intensive nature of applying monetary sanctions, which resemble the costly and intensive route of prosecution and ‘the money you get back doesn’t fund the amount of work you’ve done. So, civil fines, we just don’t think it’s a good thing for us’ (SIA_P2). As such, despite the original enthusiasm and proactivity in discussing and consulting about these sanctions, the process of sizing up the practicalities of integrating them into the SIA’s enforcement toolkit ended up with rejecting this option.

5.3.2 POCA powers for the SIA: Early lessons about their efficiency & effectiveness

Since the RESA powers did not eventually materialise into an extra enforcement tool for the SIA, the organisation continued to have a lack of enforcement capability regarding eliminating the financial gain from non-compliance. However, in 2014 a significant development occurred. The institution was provided with derogated powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (HC 1088 [2015-16]), so that they can employ Accredited Financial Investigators to conduct financial investigations for a variety of purposes 123.

The addition of the POCA powers in the SIA’s armoury is indicative of the broader target culture towards asset recovery, as steadily developed in policing practices from the early 2000s onwards (Levi, 2018). Based on the thematic analysis of the SIA Annual Reports and the interviews with

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122 This obstacle related to the process of setting up a fixed fine that would have the potential to be proportionate to the given malpractices and to further disincentivise the offenders from any future non-compliance. For instance, in case of their overuse, regulated entities might develop the distorted perception that the SIA would simply stick with fines instead of prosecuting them, when there is a legitimate reason to do so.

123 These purposes are as follows: applications for restraint order, warrants of search and seizure and ultimately confiscation.
participants from the organisation, the foundations of the POCA regime in the regulator’s case are evident to be synopsised in two key policy drivers: a) the more utilitarian rationale of incapacitating directors of security companies, who benefited from illicit financial gain\textsuperscript{124} and b) the more symbolic rationale of fostering the regulated communities’ support for the rule of the SIA’s regime. With reference to the first driver, it is important to note that, prior to the POCA 2002 powers, the SIA had two pragmatic constraints to face. On the one hand, the use of a regulatory private prosecutor - as opposed to a traditional state prosecuting agency - implied that the process of enacting a confiscation order was not often straightforward (Berridge, 2015). On the other hand, the reliance upon law enforcement agencies to assist with the SIA’s inquiries about the proceeds of regulatory crime was not always feasible due to resources-related issues and different operational priorities:

‘The problem was going to a force and saying, “Will you help us?” because if it’s anything under £100,000 of initial benefit, they’re not interested. They’ve got drug dealers coming out of their ears and they don’t really need to be scrabbling around for what initially looks like a ten-grand POCA – which can then mushroom into a several hundred thousand pound POCA’ (SIA_P17).

Turning to the second policy driver, this has been premised on the necessity to clearly demonstrate to the industry that the regulator’s enforcement interventions are not only materialised into prosecutions, which usually lead to moderate fines and sparse custodial sentences\textsuperscript{125}. Instead, through the POCA regime the SIA can be said to reduce the regulatees’ anxiety about the impunity of rogue directors, since ‘if you give them a bolt, then that message goes around quite quickly, that’s what tells people running small businesses “this is a regulator with teeth”’ (SIA_P3). Thus, it has the potential to provide a restorative component, fulfilling the public’s sense of justice that criminals should not be allowed to benefit from the fruits of their illicit activities\textsuperscript{126} (Levi, 2013; Van Duyne et al., 2014).

\textsuperscript{124} Once a PSIA 2001 offence is proved by the criminal courts, then the financial investigation associated with the POCA 2002 can be activated against the defendants (security operatives/companies). According to the legal framework of sanctions in the PSIA 2001, both individual security operatives, as well as businesses can face the ultimate enforcement threat of prosecution. Following the legal precedent in the organisation through the prosecutions record from 2008 to 2020, it appears that the vast majority of prosecutions have been directed towards directors of security companies, who have supplied unlicensed operatives. Even in the significantly less frequent cases of prosecution of individual operatives, their financial gain in light of breaching the licensing regime is marginal. Thus, the POCA regime has not been applied to any of these cases, since these powers are geared towards the urgency of stripping security directors from their ill-gotten gains.

\textsuperscript{125} According to the prosecution-related outcomes for the SIA between 2008 and 2020, sentences have mostly involved fines to the defendants, ranging from £240 up to £6000 and the few custodial sentences ranged from 12 up to 18 weeks of imprisonment.

\textsuperscript{126} Asset-focused interventions targeting medium level offenders’ working capital could have a modest individual effect, since they ‘make them trade from the bottom again’ (Levi, 1997).
In terms of evaluating POCA powers as an add-on to the SIA’s enforcement toolkit, the framework used in this thesis builds upon Levi’s (2018) classification\(^{127}\). Such a classification included the consideration of the following key factors: criminal justice inputs (prosecutions and financial investigations), outputs (asset freezing, confiscations) and measurable outcomes (the effects of the outputs on different types of criminality). With reference to the last factor (measurable outcomes), two dimensions are central in further unpacking it. The first one is efficiency, which relates to the specific impact of the POCA regime in the money seized or recovered (Fazekas and Nanopoulos, 2016). The second one refers to effectiveness, which is a broader concept, incorporating not only the logistical aspect of efficiency, but also the impact upon offending behaviour, approached in light of individual incapacitation and its outcomes on individual and group deterrence (Levi, 2013), as well as the impact upon enhancing the reassurance of the regulated communities and the public that evil-doers are not benefiting from the fruits of crime. This evaluation framework would be applied as the primary tool for tracing the rationale behind the incorporation of the POCA powers in the regulator’s armoury and for providing some evaluation insights of the ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘the way forward’ during the early years of its application.

To begin with, in terms of the criminal justice inputs, the analysis commences from reflecting upon the prosecutions that had been associated with financial investigations, so as to apply the POCA regime and confiscate the illegal monies accumulated through breaches of the SIA’s regime. In a nutshell, it can be argued that since 2014 the prosecutions that culminated in the POCA processes\(^{128}\) had been targeting directors of security firms who consider the security industry as ‘quite lucrative for a one-man band, or a family business; if they can do that outside the sight of the regulator, that’s good’ (SIA_P17). These rogue security directors ‘are not serious organised criminals – they’re not part of a nominals list that our friends in high places have – they’re people who just wanted to make the maximum amount of money and close their eyes to regulation’ (SIA_P3). In particular, they have been prosecuted only for PSIA offences and no linkages have been brought forward with any other type of offending (e.g. fraud, money-laundering, drug trafficking), which would fit with the top tier of the non-compliance pyramid (organised criminality level).

\(^{127}\) One of the primary recurring themes in this thesis refers to the importance of incorporating a case-specific and more nuanced approach when linking regulatory non-compliance and enforcement options. Evaluation studies on POCA regimes should likewise avoid the trap of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. As such, when we evaluate whether the use of POCA powers as an add-on to the enforcement toolkit of either police or non-police agencies could be considered as optimal, ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1955) or poor, this analysis should include consideration of some specific and measurable factors. A comprehensive review of the existing literature on asset recovery interventions in the UK pinpointed Levi’s (2018) framework as the most suitable foundation for evaluating the POCA regime for the SIA.

\(^{128}\) According to the data in Table 8, it is evident that the most common offences are either engaging in a licensable conduct without a licence (s.3) or employing unlicensed persons in licensable conduct (s.5).
The interesting question that arises at this point is whether the POCA regime in the SIA’s case has been intentionally tailored for the ‘profit-driven and PSIA-related’ side of the industry’s malpractices or the original intention was to capture the top tier of organised criminality as well, which has not materialised yet due to some inherent difficulties. If we consider that the former is valid, then the criminal justice inputs clearly appear to fulfil the strategic objective of targeting this particular type of non-compliance (PSIA offences-business side). However, if the latter should be considered, then a discussion about the limitations of the regulatory enforcement in dealing with top tier criminality could be enlightening.

One potential limitation is associated with the lack of search and seizure powers by the organisation and its adverse effect on disrupting more serious criminality in the security industry. The PSIA 2001 does not provide search and seizure powers to the SIA. Although the PSIA 2001 has granted the power to request information of regulated individuals, the possible outcomes of this request can lead to an enforcement paradox. In particular, if such an individual decides not to respond or falsifies information in their response, this will lead to a separate criminal offence (s.19/22 of PSIA 2001), which however will often conceal more serious offences (e.g. s.5 fraud of PSIA 2001) which carry a higher criminal penalty, being indictable rather than summary offences such as s.19/22. In practical terms, if the SIA deems a search is required for the preservation of evidence, the investigators ‘have to go more or less with the police, to go into somebody’s office to search and seize other evidence, like laptops or phones, or whatever, because we can only regulate the “unlicensed” part’ (SIA_P15). Based on the analysis in the previous section, a positive outcome, which will show a broader criminality pattern behind the PSIA offences, will largely depend upon the already well-established operational relationships between the SIA and the local police officers. Operational insights from SIA participants suggest that delays in the exercising of a warrant by the police on behalf of the SIA Investigation team often hinder the process of tracing the further criminal offences associated with the seemingly low-level PSIA offences:

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129 According to evaluations of asset-focussed interventions, their success appears to be dependent on the type of the criminal targeted (Van Duyne and Soudijn, 2010; Fried, 1988; Levi and Van Duyne, 2007). For instance, one of the key findings of the empirical research study undertaken by Sittlington and Harvey (2018) is the apprehension of lower level cash-based criminals, rather than the more sophisticated organised criminals that the asset recovery legislation has been targeting at. As such, the clear objective of POCA that ‘crime should not pay’ can be undermined.

130 As a general rule, such powers are reserved for police constables (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 19), but are also provided to the Home Office Immigration Enforcement (HOIE) and other agencies such as the NCA and HMRC where legislation has deemed the power necessary in the exercising of duties.
‘Because we’re going for full POCA, then we should have more powers in terms of – for example, Search and Seizure, to get the evidence we need, to pursue more criminality, and work with the police and take people to prosecution for fraud – for fake licence fraud. And that type of thing, of being unlicensed, but working for 2 years, unlicensed, and not paying your national insurance or your tax. We should maybe have more powers to look deeper into somebody’s financial circumstances’ (SIA_P15).

Turning next to the outputs of the SIA POCA prosecution cases, the analysis will start from considering the ‘efficiency’ side, which looks into the impact on money either seized or recovered. From the earliest assessment of the upcoming asset-focussed interventions (Levi and Osofsky, 1995) to the most current evaluations of ‘what works’ in proceeds of crime mechanisms (NAO, 2016; Law Commission, 2018; Atkinson et al., 2017), the emerging theme is a persistent scepticism about the inefficiency of the confiscation of proceeds of criminal conduct, with particular emphasis on the small fractions of collected monies out of the total sum ordered to be paid under confiscation orders\textsuperscript{131}. This confiscation debt has been also raised as a key concern by the Law Commission (2018), which at the time of writing has published its consultation paper, recommending legislative changes of the confiscation regime (Law Commission, 2020).

This well-documented scepticism towards the efficiency of the confiscation regimes is also echoed through the outputs of the SIA POCA cases. More specifically, POCA powers were added to the SIA’s enforcement armoury in 2014 and over the time span of 6 years, there has been a total of 17 confiscation orders\textsuperscript{132}. According to Table 7, it is evident that the prosecution cases, in which security companies or individuals have been ordered to pay back proceeds of crime, are a small proportion out of the total sum of the prosecutions that the SIA has successfully brought into the criminal courts per year (2014-2020). There are two exceptions. The first one is 2014/15, the first year of POCA application, so the proportion of POCA cases brought to court could be a purposeful sign of the ‘regulatory teeth’ of the organisation and its messaging to the regulated community. The second one is year 2019/20 which in general was marked by a significantly increased enforcement action by the organisation (see Figure 9). Based on the outcomes associated with each one, as depicted in Table 8, within this timeframe (2014-2020) approximately half of the total sum of POCA orders have been settled (8 out of 17)\textsuperscript{133}. Looking

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{131} As of 31 March 2020, the value of outstanding confiscation orders was £2,225 million (HM Courts and Tribunals Service, 2020).
\textsuperscript{132} Looking at Table 7, the actual number of POCA cases is 13. However, the number of POCA orders is 17, since some of these cases involved confiscation orders against 2 defendants. For example, in the Capital UK Services Limited case the first order (£172,370) was settled, whereas the second one (£34,000) is still, at the time of writing, ongoing.
\textsuperscript{133} Successful settlement is indicated through the payment of the ordered amount in the confiscation order.
\end{footnotesize}
at the monies successfully recovered from these rogue security directors, it is evident that these sums have been quantitatively among the highest ones, as ordered by the court, among the 17 confiscation orders that the SIA has dealt with from 2014 until 2020. However, an important caveat within this analysis relates to the relatively new incorporation of these powers to the SIA’s enforcement toolkit, as opposed to other enforcement agencies (e.g. NCA) which used the regime almost a decade before the SIA. As such, further monitoring of these outputs in the following years is required in order to fully appraise the efficiency of the SIA’s confiscation regime.

Furthermore, the specifics of the two unsettled cases during the early days of the POCA implementation for the SIA should not be overlooked, given their valuable precedent for future SIA cases. The SecureServe case (Table 8) in 2014 reflects the problematic scenario, as outlined by the Law Commission (2018), in which the defendant does not have the money to pay back and the court has to impose the obligatory default sentence. As evidenced on this occasion, if such a scenario goes forward, then the chances of successful collection decline drastically. This outcome can be associated with some interesting observations for the specific application of the confiscation orders in regulatory non-compliance. First, it is of paramount importance for the courts to carefully consider and reach a numerically realistic confiscation order, which would hit the illegal financial gains of the defendant, but at the same time would lead to its prompt settlement. Second, although the Asset Confiscation Enforcement (ACE) team aims at monitoring the payment of the confiscation order through a risk-based approach, there are some concerns of whether such an approach is taking into account specific factors that could have a fundamental impact on the outcomes of enforcing POCA in regulatory compliance.

Turning next to the second unsettled case of 2014 (Dragon Security Solutions case), the barriers towards revealing wider and potentially more serious criminality patterns behind PSIA 2001

\[134\] In the SecureServe case, the defendant was imprisoned for 18 months for failure to pay the confiscation order of £80,000. Once released, the defendant started receiving the Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA), which could have been partly utilised as a means to deduct some amounts and account for the outstanding confiscation order (information retrieved through personal communication with SIA employees). However, this did not occur and, as a result, at the time of the writing the successful collection of the original confiscation order (£80,000 - numerically one of the highest figures across the 9 POCA cases for the regulator) is still pending.

\[135\] The proxy of ‘low risk’ in the ACE’s approach corresponds to the low probabilities of dissipating the illegally obtained assets (or cash) before the imposition of the confiscation order. Since the ACE team prioritises the cases of ‘high risk’, it is expected that one possible explanation for cases of frozen/outstanding monies would be considered as less urgent and thus delayed. For the SecureServe case, it can be argued that given the background of the case and the defendant’s inability to pay back the ordered amount, we could possibly talk about a low-risk case. However, this classification overlooks the following case and context-specific factors. First, it had been the first case for the regulatory body using its newly obtained POCA powers, so a prompt and successful settlement could have been a dynamic precedent for the upcoming cases. Second, although £80,000 might seem a trivial amount in comparison to the confiscation orders associated with the disruption of serious or organised criminality (often the minimum threshold is around £400,000), this amount, considered in light of the particular SIA offences appears to be quantitatively meaningful.
offences are once again highlighted. Despite the seriousness of the offences and the long criminal record of both rogue directors\textsuperscript{136}, the confiscation ordered by the court did not materialise, since it was considered that the available assets did not meet the threshold for criminal benefit. Nathan Salmon, SIA’s Investigation Manager underlined in a public announcement the high possibility of ‘Lindsay and Cook’s failure to provide information to the SIA may have concealed wider offending’ and welcomed ‘the opportunity to speak with anyone, customer or employee, who has been involved with the companies since October 2013’ (Professional Security Magazine Online, 2014, p.1). These PSIA offences had the potential to be seen as ‘signal’ (Innes, 2004) regulatory breaches, unravelling a domino of further underlying criminal patterns, but the limits of the SIA investigators’ powers (e.g. search and seizure powers), the problems with effectively liaising with the police (e.g. delays or lack of solid local partnerships) and the time between the first investigation and the court hearing place some notable barriers in assisting impactful confiscations on the top tier of criminals across the security industry. In addition, this case echoes the concerns raised by the Home Affairs Committee’s (2016b, p.2) report with reference to early restraint and seizure, underscoring the significance of ‘freezing assets simultaneously with the criminal becoming aware of the investigation for the first time\textsuperscript{137}.’

Following the discussion of the outputs of the POCA cases for the SIA, the analysis of the two unsettled cases in 2014 open up the last and more complex part of considering outcomes and their effectiveness. As highlighted earlier, reflections on the effectiveness of the POCA regime require us to move one step away from the raw numerical data, associated with the amounts of money successfully (or not) paid back by the respective confiscation processes. Such a step is geared towards an exploration of the impact of asset-focused interventions in the SIA’s case in a twofold way. The first one relates to the outcomes for the non-compliant end of the industry (incapacitation/deterrence on individual/business level), whereas the second one refers to the effect on the compliant end of the industry (outreach of the regulatory interventions/reassurance). As such, in order to appraise the impact of POCA powers in securing individual and general deterrence, Chapters 8 and 9 further build upon the analysis that started in this chapter. Drawing upon interview data with the SIA, DS and security directors/managers, these chapters evaluate

\textsuperscript{136} In particular, this case involved regulatory breaches by two unlicensed security directors, who given the absence of business licensing not only managed to continue the provision of security services through dissolving the first company and setting up a second ‘phoenix’ company, but also deceived customers for nine months through the supply of unlicensed security operatives.

\textsuperscript{137} This will often be at the time of arrest, although not always. Since then, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced Account Freezing Orders, yet these are reserved for specific government departments (e.g., Her Majesty’s Revenues and Customs, Financial Conduct Authority). Although the SIA is not included in this list, it can in theory work in partnership with any of the above government departments, if the circumstances arose to require those powers. At the time of writing, such a partnership has not occurred.
the enforcement outcomes in the local context (south-east Wales), the regulatees’ perceptions of the SIA’s regulatory ‘teeth’ and the perceived ratio of SIA’s enforcement to illicit firms operating in the area.

Table 7: POCA (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) cases for the SIA compared to the annual sum of prosecutions (2014/15-2019/20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total sum of SIA prosecution cases</th>
<th>Total sum of SIA prosecution cases with the application of POCA Powers</th>
<th>% of SIA prosecution cases with the application of POCA Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019/20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: a) enforcement datasets provided by the SIA to the researcher, b) data from the enforcement sections of the SIA Annual Reports and c) publicly available data through the SIA Website.

Table 8: POCA cases for the SIA (2014-2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person/Business Prosecuted</th>
<th>Type of Offence</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Application of POCA 2002 powers</th>
<th>Confiscation Lead/Referrer</th>
<th>Current position</th>
<th>Amounts of money returned to the SIA (ARIS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1</td>
<td>Falsely claiming their company to be an</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 a confiscation</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>On 02.10.14, Defendant 1 was imprisoned</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Application of POCA 2002 powers</td>
<td>Confiscation Lead/ Referrer</td>
<td>Current position</td>
<td>Amounts of money returned to the SIA (ARIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Limited</td>
<td>ACS company</td>
<td></td>
<td>order was passed ordering Defendant 1 to pay £80,000.</td>
<td>for 18 months for failure to pay the confiscation order. Confiscation remains ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1</td>
<td>Supplying unlicensed security operatives Working as an unlicensed security director</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 a £21,000 confiscation order was passed. Nominal order of £1 made against each defendant.</td>
<td>South Yorkshire Police Financial Crime Investigation Unit/SIA</td>
<td>Available assets did not meet criminal benefit. Ongoing assessment.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 2</td>
<td>Undertaking licensable activity without a licence Supplying an unlicensed security operative</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Defendant was ordered to pay £94,758 under the POCA.</td>
<td>Met RART/SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>£17,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Application of POCA 2002 powers</td>
<td>Confiscation Lead/ Referrer</td>
<td>Current position</td>
<td>Amounts of money returned to the SIA (ARIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 2 ANCO Security (UK) Ltd et al</td>
<td>security operatives.</td>
<td></td>
<td>order of £175,000. Defendant 2: confiscation order of £491,697.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defendant 2: £92,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1 Sightguard Security Limited</td>
<td>Supplying an unlicensed security operative</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Defendant 1 was ordered to pay £10,000 under the POCA.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>£3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1 MP Security Services Ltd</td>
<td>Working as an unlicensed security director</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Defendant 1 was ordered to pay £18,283 under the POCA.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>Awaiting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Application of POCA 2002 powers</td>
<td>Confiscation Lead/ Referrer</td>
<td>Current position</td>
<td>Amounts of money returned to the SIA (ARIS)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 1</strong></td>
<td>Supplying an unlicensed security operative</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £84,610.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>£30029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taghna Security Services</strong></td>
<td>Supply of unlicensed security operative</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £84,610.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>£30029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 1</strong></td>
<td>Supply of unlicensed security operatives</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £25,000.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Settled.</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 1</strong></td>
<td>Working as an unlicensed security director (2 offences)</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £291,556.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Application of POCA 2002 powers</td>
<td>Confiscation Lead/Referrer</td>
<td>Current position</td>
<td>Amounts of money returned to the SIA (ARIS)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 1</strong></td>
<td>Perverting the court of justice (witness intimidation)</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Defendant 1 was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £3608.21.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply of unlicensed security operatives</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Defendant 2 was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £1800.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 2</strong></td>
<td>Working as an unlicensed security director</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £70,800.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eventsafe Security Ltd</strong></td>
<td>Supply of unlicensed security operatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making false statements to the SIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defendant 1</strong></td>
<td>Working as an unlicensed security director</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>He was ordered to pay back proceeds of crime amounting to £30,000.</td>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cobra Security Services</strong></td>
<td>Failing to provide information relating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Application of POCA 2002 powers</td>
<td>Confiscation Lead/ Referrer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>to an investigation</td>
<td>Making false statements to the SIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: a) enforcement datasets provided by the SIA to the researcher, b) data from the enforcement sections of the SIA Annual Reports and c) publicly available data through the SIA Website.

5.4 Concluding remarks

Overall, this chapter offered some important findings in terms of the development of the strategic account of the SIA towards its enforcement strategies in the post-regulation era. Starting with the exploration of the organisation’s intelligence cycle, two key take-away messages were highlighted. First, random inspections can still be valuable for not only the information entering the SIA, but also for sending out a clear message of the SIA’s visible street presence. Second, when considering the SIA’s intelligence sources and methods, some inherent limitations and paradoxes were identified. The data analysis suggested that these can be attributed to the following factors: barriers to free intelligence flow between law enforcement agencies and the SIA, baseless vindictiveness towards security staff by both the public and the security industry and some (internal to the SIA) processing issues (intelligence criteria and ‘silo thinking’ between different departments).

Turning next to the SIA’s enforcement toolkit, the findings indicate that on a strategic level the regulator has gone through different phases in terms of balancing the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ side of its enforcement approach. Although one key concern in the organisation has been the lack of ‘medium’ sanctions between the rather ‘soft’ end of warnings/improvement notices and the ‘tough’ end of prosecution, this regulatory gap has so far not been addressed. Instead, in 2014 the introduction of POCA powers for the SIA essentially made the prosecution route even more robust, through incapacitating non-compliant security directors who have benefited from illicit
financial gain. The analysis of POCA cases (2014-2020) underscores some early evaluation lessons for the SIA. From an outputs-related perspective, the well-documented scepticism towards the efficiency of confiscation regimes holds true to some extent for the SIA too. In particular, between 2014 and 2020 POCA orders constituted a small proportion of the total annual SIA prosecutions and only half out of the total number of POCA orders have been settled. Yet, the relatively new incorporation of the POCA powers in the SIA’s armoury means that further monitoring of these outputs is necessary for a more robust appraisal of their efficiency. Turning to the effectiveness perspective, the POCA regime in the SIA’s case appeared to be well-suited for the ‘profit-driven and PSIA-related’ side of the industry’s malpractices. Yet, some barriers were identified regarding the potential of POCA powers for the SIA to disrupt more serious criminality in the industry. These findings are further developed in Chapters 8 and 9, which examine the effect of the SIA’s enforcement strategies (among these the POCA regime will be revisited) and styles in securing general and individual deterrence among DS and security firms.
Chapter 6: The impact of the SIA’s licensing regime on transforming the world of ‘bouncers’ through the ‘lived realities’ on doors in Wales

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4 the analysis of the findings commenced from critically exploring regulatory ambition and pragmatism in the development of the SIA’s strategic approach towards licensing the DS sector. In this chapter, the critical realist focus of this thesis shifts from the official SIA narrative to the ‘lived realities’ of door supervisors (DS) in south-east Wales. Through building upon the analysis in Chapter 4, this part of the thesis contributes to research question one and seeks to explore how the transformation of the world of bouncers has unfolded in the post-regulation era.

Drawing upon the interviews conducted with frontline operatives working in urban and rural areas across south-east Wales, the analysis seeks to learn directly from the occupational experiences of DS. The overarching objective is to shed light into the changes in the DS occupation: to what extent have security operatives working in the NTE moved away from the pre-regulation ‘bouncer’ stereotypes and what are the key features of the DS working realities in the post-regulation era? Given the emphasis placed by the regulatory narrative on the industry’s safeguarding tasks, this analysis explores how this task is being realised and undertaken in practice by local DS. In particular, interviews with security staff shed light into the following key aspects: who is perceived to be vulnerable in the NTE (conceptual understanding) and what sort of response is provided on the ground (actions/interventions). The emerging themes of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policing by security operatives are central in this part of the analysis, highlighting how safeguarding vulnerable individuals is a complex and multi-faceted process. Furthermore, when documenting how these operatives go about their order maintenance tasks in the local NTEs, there is a wide range of micro and macro dynamics that have shaped the contemporary DS occupation. More specifically, occupational changes within the broader economic austerity context and the ways in which violence occurs on the doors are central themes of consideration. As such, this chapter aims to critically assess how each of these themes affect the implementation of the regulatory objectives of ‘cleansing’ and ‘professionalising’ the sector. In doing so, it also identifies some novel developments in the DS world and seeks to consider how these fit with the current regulatory approach towards this part of the security industry.
6.2 Contemporary developments and challenges in doing ‘soft’ policing: order maintenance, customer services and safeguarding in a gig economy sector

This section illustrates how adopting a ‘soft’ approach to policing venues in the NTE by frontline operatives has been a key aspect of the occupational and professional development of the DS. Thus, it can be argued that the defining features of this approach are mainly related to an increasing emphasis on customer services (‘meeters and greeters’), order maintenance through deescalating violence, and harm reduction through keeping customers safe. All of these facets of the policing attitude of DS fit well with the dimensions that the existing policing literature has attributed to this approach, such as ‘persuasion and attraction’ (Innes, 2005, p.157), as well as ‘consensus, prevention and proactive operations’ (Button, 2004, p.104).

Following from Chapter 2, the broader NTE infrastructure has been very much premised on the mandate of reducing alcohol-related crime. Due to their key position within the NTE infrastructure, DS are tasked with the greater degree of responsibility in controlling and accounting for alcohol consumption within the immediate periphery of the licensed premises. Legally speaking, the duty of care and the responsible service of alcohol should be proportionately assigned to all parties involved in the management and operation of a night-time venue; DS, bar staff, designated premises supervisor (DPS)\textsuperscript{138}. The ideal scenario of an effective partnership in enforcing this principle of the Licensing Act places a shared responsibility between the DS and the bar staff to monitor intoxicated behaviour and respond appropriately\textsuperscript{139} (i.e. for bar staff not to serve the customer, as per s.141 of the Licensing Act 2003, and for the DS to ensure that intoxicated individuals are escorted safely outside the premises).

However, the reality in controlling alcohol consumption in the Welsh NTEs reveals that when drunk customers are allowed entry by DS\textsuperscript{140}, then bar staff are not very likely to enforce the rule of not serving alcohol to them. Although this could be attributed to the same reasons as the ones outlined above for DS, pressures from the management team of the venue and lack of investment in appropriate training can have a significantly adverse impact:

\textsuperscript{138} A Designated Premises Supervisor (DPS) is responsible for the sale of alcohol at licensed premises and they also act as the main point of contact for any licensing, compliance or enforcement enquiries. Normally, this person could be either the person who has day-to-day responsibility for running the premises or the premises licence holder.

\textsuperscript{139} It could be argued that the onus on bar staff to make these judgements is somewhat unfair and unrealistic. Thus, such an ideal scenario places a shared responsibility between DS and bar staff in terms of monitoring intoxicated behaviour.

\textsuperscript{140} According to the insights generated from the fieldwork of this thesis, the DS poor judgement could be attributed to one of the following: a) lack of ‘screening’ competences/training, b) lack of willingness to thoroughly apply the ‘screening’ framework and c) the sometimes unavoidable ‘human mistake’.
‘So, yeah, they do serve drunk people – and they shouldn’t serve drunk people – but they can’t, realistically, identify them in that sea of other people shouting at them. And they get pressured, by their management, to be quick on the bar. They don’t talk to people, they just go “Yep, 2 drinks”, and they hand them to them. So, unfortunately, it does happen, but… it comes down to the management, really’ (DS_P11).

Furthermore, given that DS’ role was predominantly focussed on the entry scan, this meant in practice that monitoring behaviour inside the premises was undertaken on a much more relaxed way. In other words, DS’ interventions inside the premises would have occurred only if a drunken behaviour led to an altercation, the precursor for further violence escalation.

Previous research in Liverpool, which used trained actors pretending to be drunk, found that on average, approximately 84% of ‘drunk actors’ were consistently sold alcohol (Hughes et al., 2014). Given that this provision had been one so little enforced, the pilot implementation of the ‘Say No to Drunks/Drink Less Enjoy More’ intervention was put forward. Evaluations of this national intervention have been conducted in South Wales (Quigg et al., 2015), Wrexham (Butler et al., 2018) and Cheshire and Merseyside (Quigg et al., 2016; Ross-Houle and Quigg, 2018). Although their methodological rigour can be contested, they offer some valuable complementary insights to these findings.

More specifically, although these evaluations report some improvement in raising awareness of the licensing legislation among bar staff, serving alcohol to intoxicated customers followed a more moderate improvement route, with two interesting observations. First, door staff were considered to be the primary responsible group for preventing drunkenness (Quigg et al., 2016). Second, in venues where door staff were present, bar staff were significantly more likely to serve the actor compared to venues with no door security (Butler et al., 2018). Both of these observations seem to be in line with the findings of this thesis, as discussed above. More specifically, they resonate with the greater degree of responsibility for DS to enforce the s.141 of the Licensing Act in the entry scan process. Second, they align with the often-cited lack of a joint approach (between the DS and mainly bar staff) to monitor drunken behaviour inside the premises.

141 For Liverpool evaluations: a) small pre and post test samples, b) the treatment period had been short, c) post treatment data were not collected on the same month during the next year, so temporal variations could have skewed the results, d) the methods employed were mainly (apart from the test purchases) based on self-reported data. For the Wrexham and South Wales evaluation: a) implementation issues due to funding restraints and uncertainty about the dissemination and reach of training to all key personnel working in the licensed premises, b) the methods employed (interviews, surveys and test purchases) do not allow for the consideration of some other external factors that might have contributed to the observed outcomes.
Such a judgement of who is allowed to enter the premises sits at the core of the ‘soft’ policing remit of DS, being an interesting mixture of customer service and order maintenance. Far from the stereotypical image of the ‘bully on the door’, the professionalisation objective of the SIA’s regime seems to have been translated in the field through the development of a new type of frontline security operative. This is a licensed individual (males, with the notable developing inclusion of females in the role), displaying his/her badge in a uniform, who is primarily using his/her communication skills to apply an adaptation of the National Decision Model (NDM) (College of Policing, 2013) in either prevention (refuse entry) or in response situations (escort troublemakers outside the venue/protect vulnerable individuals). Screening prospective customers in night-time venues can be seen as a fast-track application of the first two stages of the NDM: gathering information and assessing threat and risk to develop a working strategy. When the DS are asked to make this judgement, it is based on the training received through their qualification and their ‘profiling’ experience, while working on the doors, which is primarily developed through monitoring the ‘troublesome’ signs behind the customers’ behaviour and through engaging with them in ‘friendly chats’ as they approach the entrance:

‘Normally, we’ve got a queuing system, so we’ll watch them in the queue – see if we think they’re drunk – the way they behave – but me, personally, I will speak to everybody and say “Hello”, and then – if they don’t make eye contact with me – if they make eye contact with me, they either nod at me or they’ll say “Hello”, smile, and then I think they’ve got a good attitude, and maybe if they need ID, and I’ll ID them I might have a chat with them and they go in. But if they don’t give me eye contact, and then I say something to them and they’re like “What” or... you know... I’ll just say “Oh, no – try somewhere else” and they might say “Why”, and I’d say, “You’ve got a bad attitude” and it’s pretty fool-proof, actually’ (DS_P4).

To what extent this ‘vetting process on the door’ (DS_P6) is ‘fool-proof’ (DS_P4) is contested, which can have further implications on the challenges of policing effectively the doors, but also on the possibilities of some groundless exclusions of individuals from the ‘safe and vibrant NTEs’ (Welsh Government, 2016). There are two key inhibitors within this process. First, as opposed to the conventional wisdom that DS are solely responsible for deciding who is getting inside the bar/club, DS are in most cases enforcing the management’s definitions and instructions regarding who should be allowed access to the venue, which can be linked with two challenges. On the one hand, in cases when the venue’s motto is just ‘get bodies through the doors to spend money’ (Police_P2), then alcohol-related incidents are much more probable to occur. On the other hand, the management’s discretion means that such a set of rules and restrictions reflects the particular style of the venue, the desired clientele and profit pressures. This might seem to be an inevitable
consequence of defining clear boundaries between different types of ‘mass private property’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981). However, echoing Button’s (2003) empirical research of a leisure and retail complex in England, ungrounded discrimination and exclusion of specific groups cannot be ruled out in the local NTEs:

‘So, when we first start working in a venue, we’ve been given either a verbal instruction from the management, or written instruction, of what are the rules they expect to be followed. And it can be anything from the simplest of things, like dress code... you know... they can say “no shorts”’ (DS_P11).

The consequences of such a discretion can be further exacerbated in light of the absence of a measurable definition of ‘intoxication’ and ‘drunkenness’, since deciphering its meaning for practitioners is ‘down to the individual’ (Police_P14), ‘because your perception of drunk is different to mine, and the legislation talks about them, but how do you define it?’ (Police_P15). As a result, there are often circumstances in which DS have come up with their own generic set of framework of ‘drunkenness’ signs, which, although it might have been developed according to their accumulated ‘know-how’ in the NTE, often fails to be adapted appropriately on a case by case basis:

‘You can also watch how they’re walking – again, that’s not a fail-safe – we’ve obviously – or, I’ve obviously over the years, I’ve come across 2 or 3 people where I’ve thought they were too drunk, and they’ve actually had infections in their feet – a broken foot, but just didn’t have a plaster on it – they’d fractured it, but didn’t go to hospital – and one with a disability...’ (DS_P9).

In other occasions, the responsibility of being proactive in preventing altercations could lead to a distorted perception of what constitutes signals of trouble or of a violent escalation. An overestimation of their competences regarding behavioural analysis can have an adverse impact on a fair judgement, but also on the way that ‘public protection’ is served in practice:

‘And... you... don’t need a reason to refuse somebody – you can refuse anybody you want – nobody will ever question you, the police or SIA. It’s my prerogative, that’ (DS_P14).

Another interesting dimension of the ‘soft’ policing spectrum that has prevailed in the regulated DS world is the development of a ‘customer services’-oriented approach. Moving away from the traditional ‘hands-on’ approach, which was often linked with unsafe physical restraint techniques, their occupational practices have shifted towards being nice hosts; the ‘meeters and greeters’ of
the night-time establishments. This reflects the new typology of ‘servicemen’, which is placed alongside the established categories of ‘watchmen’ and ‘parapoliceman’ in the three-sided continuum of the security officers’ occupational culture (Kim et al., 2018). The fieldwork of this study illustrates that in the post-2004 era a capable and professional guardian, who can ensure the safety of the customers and the staff, as well as the integrity of the venue, is equated with an operative who ‘doesn’t go out there in tatty jeans and god-awful flip-flops’ (DS_P11) (symbolic representation of professionalisation) and who can adhere to a ‘massive customer-facing role’ (DS_P20) (utilitarian representation of professionalisation). Participants who have worked in the industry for more than a decade characterised the new type of ‘bouncer’ as a mixture of ‘stewarding, as well as just old-fashioned security’ (DS_P19), which reflects the finding of Gill’s et al study (2020, p.6) that security work ‘is as much about being an effective communicator as it is about protection’, with some participants vividly comparing themselves to ‘agonists’ (DS_P13) and ‘counsellors’ (DS_P5):

‘You know, it can literally be like Jeremy Kyle! “Oh, I’ve lost my job” and you’ve got to support them, then – you’ve got to be there. You don’t have to, but if they want to talk to you, you listen, and you try and help them. And sometimes, them talking to you for 10 minutes, they’ll go in and have a great night’ (DS_P12).

In simple terms, the core of the customer-facing role in the developing working culture of the DS is their responsibility to be the first point of contact for anybody coming into the licensed premises. Echoing the SIA’s strategic priorities142, the task of safeguarding vulnerable individuals has been increasingly acknowledged as one of the fundamental tasks of the professional security operative and thus, it is quite interesting to observe the extent to which and how it has been embraced and ultimately ingrained in the working culture of DS.

Vulnerability in the NTE can manifest in various ways, so rather than referring to it as an abstract concept, it is important to note how it is discussed by the regulator and how it emerges in the working reality of DS in the Welsh context. Both DS and police participants have adopted a risk-focused definition of vulnerability such as the one advocated by Bartkowski-Théron and Corbo Crehan (2012): impaired ability to defend himself/herself in the face of specific risks. Guided by their frontline experiences, they associated vulnerability in the local NTEs with intoxication (alcohol/drugs) and its potential outcomes, particularly for lone females. For the SIA,

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142 As illustrated in Chapter 4, in the third identified stage in licensing DS (‘from being the problem to being part of the solution’) the SIA’s strategic objectives were focused on supporting and upskilling security operatives, so that they are capable of assisting the police and local licensing authorities to protect vulnerable populations from harm.
vulnerability in the NTE was seen through the same lens, yet as discussed in Chapter 4, from 2013 onwards the regulator has placed an increasing emphasis on linking vulnerability in after-dark premises with child sexual exploitation (CSE). When prompted to discuss any links between CSE and the NTE, participants across South Wales commented that ‘there’s not much evidence to suggest that children are being exploited within the night-time economy’ (Police_P15). Interestingly, for Gwent areas, with a particular emphasis in Newport, some DS and police participants expressed strong views that CSE in the NTE has been a growing concern both for policing operations, as well as for security companies:

‘We’ve recently closed a premise – not in the town centre, but within Newport – because of our concerns about door staff and links to CSE; the type of people getting, the age of people getting into a certain premise. And we’ve got intelligence about links to other places within Newport, about CSE getting in, and – children getting in and CSE taking place – and whether that’s the kind of intentional thing by the door staff allowing them in, or are they just using fake IDs? But yeah, I think CSE definitely is quite bad in Newport’ (Police_P4).

‘Even before child exploitation came out, I’ve said to my guys just be aware of kids. So, you can tell when they’re kids and a lot of them are nervous, and… stop them, and find out who they are, and what they’re doing out’ (Security company_P1).

However, what appeared in these quotes to be a strong view of the links between the local NTE and CSE essentially demonstrates that these interviewees have been conflating under-age drinking and sexual activity with CSE. When these participants were prompted to discuss further how CSE can occur in licensed premises, they simply reiterated the previous examples, highlighting that CSE is a topic that seems to be important because of either the SIA referring to it as such or because it has been flagged in the local police assessments. Although official figures suggest that child sexual abuse (CSA) and CSE are worthy concerns143, ‘the extent to which forms of CSA are conducted in the context of, or facilitated by, elements of the night-time economy is less evident from recent court cases, media coverage or research’ (Kerr et al., 2017, p.6). Therefore, it could be argued that these participant understandings reflected how sometimes ‘hot’ topics and strategic priorities on a political level can often be ‘top-down’ priorities, skewing perceptions of what and how is actually occurring in night-time settings.

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143 According to the latest figures, the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimates that in the year ending March 2019 approximately 3.1 million adults (18-74 years) were victims of sexual abuse before the age of 16 years (ONS, 2020a). This is a proxy measure of estimating the current prevalence of child sexual abuse but given the scarcity of other available sources and their reliability, the CSEW currently stands as the best available indicator.
Following the interviewees’ insights, few of them expressed the view that although they realise the significance of the safeguarding remit, their conformance with this professional expectation was simply a box-ticking exercise in their contractual agreement. In particular, they recognised the importance of supporting the two primary categories of vulnerability in the NTE (intoxicated people/lone females), because ‘Welfare’s a big thing now – it wasn’t, back in the day... If you kick that person out, and they die, then the owners (of the venue) could be on a corporate manslaughter charge’ (DS_P5).

However, for the vast majority of participants, keeping people safe and especially looking out for signs of vulnerability were not just box-ticking exercises or some daunting tasks that had to be fulfilled to avoid legal repercussions. At the core of their occupational ethical framework, morality and pride in the security work stand out as the key ‘coping sensibilities’ (Braithwaite et al., 2007) among DS in the Welsh context. Moral reasoning is mainly seen through the self-fulfilment and satisfaction of ‘watching customers and people go home with a smile on their face’ (Security company_P7) and pride in their role derives from the desire to make a difference in the industry through ‘going above and beyond what you’re actually there to do’ (Security company_P2), thus receiving recognition for their services. Empathy can also be understood as a complementary ‘coping sensibility’, since frequently their decision to step into a violent situation144 or to act preventatively towards young inebriated individuals/lone females was guided by the ethical imperative ‘that’s someone’s child, and a lot of us are like at the age whether we are parents’ (DS_P13) or following the briefing that is provided to a team of DS in Cardiff: ‘Please remember that’s somebody’s daughter and it’s just that little 2 minutes out of your day, that could change somebody’s life completely’ (Security company_P6).

Moving from the motivational side of safeguarding to its applicability in the NTE settings, interviews with DS revealed a solid understanding around the signs of vulnerability in the Welsh context, as well as the framework of dealing with these individuals. Yet, as many participants acknowledged, both their DS training and their working realities associated vulnerability primarily with inebriated customers or lone females. Insights from DS interviewees suggest that, although there is a training section dedicated to vulnerability, this covers the basic categories of intoxicated individuals and lone females and the overall training emphasis is mostly placed on physical restraint and Criminal Law. As such, there were few examples, in which DS identified vulnerability beyond these normative groups and this was primarily driven by their ‘coping

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144 In the Welsh NTEs, both in rural and urban settings, the occurrence of violence was mostly associated with opportunistic alcohol-fuelled fights between customers.
sensibility’, rather than by being taught during their training course. One of the most illustrative examples of acknowledging a less mainstream sign of vulnerability in the NTE (mental health issues) and intervening with a ‘right-touch’ approach, which was instrumental in ensuring the ‘happy end’ was provided by a DS working in a rural South Wales area:

‘We had a lady that had come into the pub, quite obviously had mental health problems – she was talking to herself, she was pacing up and down the bar – she’d worried the bar staff because they didn’t know whether it was drugs or... whatever, and they didn’t really know how to deal with it, so they came and found me, and said “(Name anonymised – 51.28) you need to deal with this, like... can you get her to leave? But we don’t want you to be physical with her, because... we don’t know if she’s going to hurt you!”’ And I said, “Yeah, it’s no problem – I’ll go and have a chat with her”. So, I was sat up the smoking area with her, just talking to her, and just asking her what was wrong – because she was really upset about something – chatted to her for a bit, and I said, “Oh, right, ok then – what are we going to do?” Like, she lives about 40 minutes away. So, she had no money to get a taxi – I said, “Who have you come out with, tonight, then?” she said, “Oh, my Mum. She’s in... you know... the pub across the road”. I said, “Right, ok then – well, we’ll go find your Mum then”. Now this lady was in her late 20s, but... you know... was obviously quite “unstable” at that point in time, so we found Mum, reunited them, she had a cup of coffee from the Street Pastors, and she was fine. But that’s not something you’ll ever be taught to deal with in 30 hours of classroom lessons!’ (DS_P20)

Further reflecting on these prime examples of DS’ willingness and readiness to support people who are at risk in the NTE, the critical question refers to the spatial boundaries of their safeguarding responsibilities. Are they intervening only in cases pertaining to the venue, where they work, or is such an intervention also occurring beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises? For some of the participants, such a responsibility was strictly associated with the ‘safety of my customers, you know, the customers inside the venue’ (DS_P2), particularly given the tactile nature of drunk individuals and the grey lines between sexualised behaviour and sexual harassment:

‘We protect the venue, so if for instance, a girl got her bum grabbed, and she went outside, that’s not our problem anymore. I know it sounds a bit tight, but we’ve got 100 other punters to look out for inside – we can’t be messing about, it’s a bit weird. I mean, me, personally, I don’t think it’s a big deal, somebody grabbing somebody’s bum. But, if two people come over, then it’s “Right, he’s being a pest here – let’s just get him out” and that’s enough for me. He’s not causing
any more problems in there – get him out. If the girls want to go out and tell the police, then that’s between them and the police – they can deal with it’ (DS_P14).

Although such an acknowledgment seems pragmatic and in line with the rationale and functioning mechanisms of private security, it could be problematic when it leads to a rather speedy and hands-on approach to dealing with an aggressive inebriated customer. In particular, the approach used by many DS, guided by their desire to keep their venues ‘trouble-free’ was documented to have connections with the displacement of troublesome behaviour. Alcohol-fuelled aggression which has the potential to an escalation to violent conduct was moved to either other venues (‘Just get them out of the club, move them on’ [DS_P12]), which operated a more ‘tolerant’ policy (‘they’ll walk to the next club and walk straight in’ [DS_P15]), or towards altercations in public spaces.

However, as shown earlier in this section, at least some frontline operatives followed the safeguarding process\(^\text{145}\) with genuine willingness and appropriate action up until the moment that they were satisfied that an individual has been placed in a ‘safe zone’ (i.e. family, peers, police, Street Pastors). A further dimension of going above and beyond their standard duty of care within the ‘security bubble’ of a licensed premise is captured through the DS involvement in dealing with order maintenance within the broader area of their venue. Once again, the driving forces behind this involvement is very much related to the moral and empathising framework of action, coupled with a great sense of camaraderie between operatives and with the need to fill the void of police presence and response in public spaces in the NTE. Camaraderie between frontline operatives was not a mutual understanding and support mechanism reserved only for colleagues within the same security company. These findings resonate with Loader and White’s analysis (2017, 2018), who argue how security services are a contested commodity and that security operatives should be also approached as moral actors within the wider public safety discourse\(^\text{146}\).

DS participants in Cardiff, Swansea and Newport were keen on taking action to help each other when a violent incident was occurring either in the middle of the street or right outside their premises:

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\(^{145}\) When discussing the safeguarding process, its starting point was considered to be the ‘awareness’ moment. Awareness was initiated either through a disclosure made to the DS by a person in need or through an assessment of the signs by the DS that someone is at risk. This was followed by the necessary action (e.g. provide water and support to an intoxicated individual) and completion of the process was achieved, once it was ensured that the person is no longer at risk (e.g. handed over to peers/family or to other key stakeholders in the NTE, i.e. the police or the Street Pastors).

\(^{146}\) Chapter 2, section 2.3.
‘I’ve seen a little violence in the street, but it’s further up the street, just spilling out from other venues now – keep a close eye on, in case the door staff up the road, it’s a bit of a camaraderie we’ve got with the door staff; even if they’re a rival firm or anything like that, if they’re having some trouble with anyone they’ve ejected, if they can’t cope or if they seem to be struggling, we will go in and lend a helping hand’ (DS_P8).

So far in this section, the gradual development of a diverse range of responsibilities and the documented instances of going above and beyond their contractual duty highlight how ‘raising standards’ has been embedded in the DS sector during the SIA’s regulation era. However, an important paradox associated with the occupational regulation of this part of the security industry has been consistently highlighted during the fieldwork. This recurring theme relates to the extent to which a job as a frontline security operative in the NTE can be viewed as a viable career choice. The SIA’s regulatory ambition, as discussed in Chapter 4, seemed to echo the European developments on the professionalisation of security work and to aspire to the Scandinavian model which supported the role of the security officer as a viable, attractive and rewarding full-time career (Button and Stiernstedt, 2018).

However, participants’ insights underline a much more mixed picture and a partial divergence from this aspiration. In particular, DS who joined the DS world before regulation was introduced or up until approximately 2012 appeared to be much more positive in viewing the sector as one that can offer a rewarding and viable professional status. These individuals have worked as frontline staff years ago, when progression through the DS ladder was quicker and was equated with what was considered for themselves to be a satisfying wage, highlighting that ‘in 2009 I left the Prison Service for a career as a head doorman, it’s better life, better hours, better money’ (DS_P4) and ‘now, you can forge a career out of the security industry – I have, and I’m proof of that, and testament to that’ (DS_P18).

147 Traditionally, professional development for DS tends to follow a very much ‘prescribed’ route. Even before licensing came into effect, a ‘bouncer’ who would have been employed by a security company could envisage his first promotion to be Head Doorman. This promotion in the days before the SIA was mainly dependent on the ‘tough’ attitude and the physical competences to instil ‘fear and order’ amongst punters. Although in the SIA era the criterion for promotion to this role has been very much aligned with the ‘professionalisation mandate’, thus requiring an assessment of verbal competences to manage conflict and deescalate violence, the standard route for career progression has not changed. If successful in the role of Head Doorman, the highest job grade that a frontline DS could aspire to has been the role of the ‘Area Manager’. This role involves the responsibility of overseeing and managing different groups of DS across venues in a specific geographic area.

148 As a result, 10 or 15 years later after they first joined the industry, they look back at their progression and they evaluate it as a full-time career which enabled them to make the most of their potential and to make their way up the DS hierarchy (even if this is undeniably a short one!).
Yet, for local operatives who obtained their licence from 2012 onwards, the way that the sector appealed to them had been quite different. As opposed to security consultancy, investigation and cyber security that are considered by potential recruits as attractive areas of security work (Gill et al., 2020), working on the doors was not considered a full-time job with any exciting career prospects. DS roles were predominantly portrayed to fall under the contemporary gig economy recruitment paradigm and participants’ insights aligned with earlier research indicating that security is seen as a career with upper limits (Gill et al., 2008). Following the typologies identified by Manyika et al. (2016), part of them were ‘casual earners’ (‘if it was better financially remunerated, I’d probably be doing it as a full-time job. As it is, I’m not – I’m doing it as a part-time job in addition to a main job’ [DS_P7]). Some others were ‘financially strapped’ (‘It’s fine for now – it pays the bills – but it wasn’t something that I’d like me do for ever’ [DS_P3]), so DS roles seemed an option to meet immediate financial needs for participants in the age group between 25 and 35. The divergence between the ever-increasing set of responsibilities for DS and the low wages attached to the job has led many participants to consider the sector as a transient career choice, which is rarely associated with long-term development prospects. This could partly explain the downward trend in the supply side of the DS sector between 2013 and 2017, which following the discussion in Chapter 4, could not be attributed either to the revocation of DS licences or to the SIA’s refusals to DS applications.149

6.3 Doing ‘hard’ policing on the doors: ‘Vigilantism’ and short-sighted perceptions on the vulnerability spectrum

When considering how ‘hard’ policing is pursued by the police, this is mainly associated with ‘an implementation of coercive form of power’ (Innes, 2005, p.157). For private security, research evidence is limited since such an approach by security firms has been explored in a specific context, namely in cases when companies have hired private security firms to confront and react aggressively towards striking and protesting workers (Button, 2004). Insights from this thesis’ fieldwork suggest that in the context of the DS sector, and more specifically in terms of their policing activities in NTE licensed premises, the concept of ‘hard’ policing should be revisited and reconsidered in light of evidence of a zero-tolerance policy by frontline operatives towards specific ‘unwanted’ groups.

Locality is found to be a key factor in shaping the different dimensions of this ‘hard’ approach in the policing remit of DS in Wales, which is predominantly manifested in urban settings. In

149 Chapter 4 (Figures 3, 4 and 5).
Cardiff, there has been an interesting variation in the degree of ‘hardness’ pursued by security operatives. The common thread across these variations is that ‘hard’ policing techniques employed by them did not necessarily associate with the use of coercive physical power. In practice they tended to adapt their mundane order maintenance and customer-services oriented profile, so as to place barriers towards the ‘undesirable’ groups, which in Cardiff were predominantly framed to be drug gangs, homeless people and Travellers. For both drug gangs and Travellers, the zero-tolerance policy was practiced through an enhanced check during the screening process before entering the venue, which was specifically designed to deviate from the ‘soft’ version of a ‘meeter and greeter’ to pose an obstacle in getting access to the venue:

‘One of my venues I’m having sort of issues – it’s died down a bit now – but two sort of rival drug gangs are using it as a sort of a meeting point. So, we’ve had a little thing in place where we’re making life uncomfortable for them. So, when they come to my front door, I pull them to one side, and ask them to turn their pockets out onto a table; I frisk them; I’ve got a metal detector; and I just do these in front of all their friends, so it’s embarrassing for them...’ (Security company_P6).

‘In one of the places that I work in, there’s a large Traveller community and a lot of them don’t have ID – a lot of them object to being asked for ID, just on the grounds that a) they don’t have it and b) they think it’s an infringement on their idea of their own civil rights, so they tend to react very badly. And it’s a good way of weeding them out, if you have a suspicion about them’ (DS_P7).

With reference to homeless people, the underlying belief that their mere presence did not fit well with ‘the better bars and the better class of people’ (DS_P5) was widespread. When translated into the DS’ working practices, it was usually illustrated as a process of keeping the ‘underclass’ away from their venue, since ‘you’ve got people outside there smoking, now – what we don’t want is homeless people scabbing for money, making their night a bit of a misery, because they’re accosting them. We also get people trying to sell them roses and all that – we keep the street traders away from them, and make sure that their visit to our pub is the best visit they could possibly have’ (DS_P4). Such a coercive control over the presence of rough sleepers, who simply did not fit well with the image of a vibrant and economically thriving NTE, could even go one step further into a sort of ‘vigilantism’ and pride in the role of a DS as a ‘Punisher of homeless criminality’:

‘There’s a [‘large chain’ pub] just down on the right hand side; the Manager was running down on a Friday so I pulled him over, and said, “What’s the matter?” he said, “Oh, one of the
homeless people has just literally walked into the changing rooms and stolen a charity box”. So, I said, “Well, go back, get me a CCTV still of the guy”. So, he actually sent me a still of the guy – and I know all the homeless people – so, I actually paid £20 to one of the homeless people to tell me where the guy was, and we found him’ (Security company_P6).

Among all the studied locations across South Wales and Gwent, the area that demonstrated a special application of the ‘hard’ policing approach by DS was Newport. Such a uniqueness is premised on a twofold basis. The first one relates to the profoundly escalated zero-tolerance policy by DS and security companies against their ‘bully boys’ colleagues and the criminal element in the NTE. The second one refers to the aggressive and hostile reaction towards ‘troublesome’ youths, a stance which is to some extent questioning the DS’ current competence to comprehend the multiple facets of vulnerability.

Regarding the first aspect of this ‘hard’ approach in Newport, a recurring theme in participants’ accounts was the existence of the ‘thugs on the doors’ mentality across the sector, mainly exhibited through a macho attitude and an overzealous administration of physical restraint. This seemed to be at odds with the effort by some security firms and their staff to adhere to the ‘soft’ policing framework on the doors, which was considered to be the most viable way to show what the SIA has envisaged as ‘raising standards’ and ‘professionalising’ the sector. As a result, the respectable and professionally ambitious part of the industry in Newport has adopted a sui generis vigilant perspective in terms of cleaning-up the area from those who have been tarnishing the sector’s reputation in Newport:

‘There’s still “old school” people out there – there’s a lot of companies out there, they don’t give a monkey’s, they thrive off their reputation, and we call them bully-boys. We see a lot of them. And then we see people who got venues, and we’ve got venues close to our venues, and we police them well. So, we get rid of all the idiots. And if they’re across the road from us, it’s carnage sometimes’ (Security company_P1).

Such a hands-on approach by frontline operatives and their managers in Newport had not been only directed towards unprofessional operatives. Fighting against the publicly available portrayals of their hometown as a city with a high prevalence of anti-social behaviour and drug use, DS working in the area have extended their ‘cleaning-up’ remit towards any sort of ‘signal crimes’ (Innes, 2004) that had an adverse impact on public insecurities:
‘The company I worked for, there’s a venue in Newport called (name anonymised), and it’s dirty. Now, it’s really dirty\(^{150}\), so it’s rife with all sorts of stuff. And it used to be – years ago – and I’d work there on my own, and I just cleaned it up. I kicked all the crap out, and they started doing food – and it was nice – it was a nice place to go for couples, and the music downstairs. So, when we went there, we policed it – I just put my “big guns” in there – and we kept everyone at bay. So, more people come back to town – nicer people – so we’re trying to claim it back from all the crazies, if you like’ (Security company_P1).

Turning to the second dimension of the zero-tolerance policy followed by DS in this city, the group that has been considered by interviewees to be the most ‘unwanted’ are youths (12-18 years old, male) roaming around the night-time venues. Insights from participants, coupled with the researcher’s observational notes\(^{151}\) informed the categorisation of the activities pursued by this group. In practice, there were not clear boundaries between each activity; involvement in one category usually implied that this ‘child’ was already (or about to) building up its antisocial or harmful repertoire:

a) **Public order offences/anti-social behaviour:** These youths were not venue-goers; instead they would be seen roaming around the streets from 7 pm onwards, consuming alcohol (probably purchased in an off-licence store or sourced by their peers/family). As described, they ‘go around causing damage, and hassling people or occasionally fighting, or harassing women’ (DS_P7), often seen riding bikes ‘up and down the high street, popping wheelies with no care in the world-no care in the world’ (DS_P9). What was perceived by DS interviewees to be a key characteristic of these youths’ behaviour is the lack of respect towards law enforcement, mainly attributed to the reluctance of police officers to apply more coercive techniques towards them. Such a ‘soft’ approach was not particularly welcomed by frontline security operatives, who directly critiqued the willingness and the competence of local police officers to deal with these incivilities. DS considered that such a degree of leniency allowed these youths to believe that ‘the police can’t do anything to them’ (DS_P9). Instead, the DS’ practice in the NTE reflected a much more zero-tolerance attitude, promoting the perspective that ‘they should be taken off the streets’ (DS_P9), which was often on the verge of escalating into a rather reactive and aggressive stance: ‘It’s getting to the point, now, where they even think they can come and

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\(^{150}\) The use of ‘dirty’ in this excerpt is a euphemism and it was used as a catchphrase by the interviewee to underline the high levels of disorder associated with this area. The participant was referring primarily to drug use and anti-social behaviour as being the key indicators of disorder and nuisance around these night-time venues in Newport.

\(^{151}\) The researcher shadowed a licensing inspection, undertaken jointly by Gwent Police and SIA field investigators.
sit in our front gardens – we have to move them on – they’re getting in our face – it’s affronting. He (his colleague talking to local police officer) said, “If you (the police) guys aren’t willing to do anything about it, if they put their hands on us, we’re going to take the Law into our own hands!” (DS_P9).

b) Theft from the person/robbery: When inebriated individuals were leaving night-time venues (with the purpose of either continuing their pub/bar crawl or finishing off their night-out and heading home) and were roaming around the streets, they were frequently targeted by these local youths. The widespread practice of targeting these intoxicated, and thus vulnerable individuals, was primarily money-driven, and incidents of theft and robbery were commonplace in the late hours: ‘What they tend to do, as well, is, they look at very drunk people and we’re getting the ideas, now, that they’re looking to rob them because they’re too inebriated to even look after themselves. So, what they’re doing now is, they’re following them to wherever they’re going – be it down to the cashpoint – and they’re mugging them! There’s quite a few young women that will go past us, they go... in all sorts and shapes, drinking-wise – wandering past us, no shoes on, absolutely smashed – have no real awareness of what’s going on around them, or awareness of where they are – and we’ve watched kids follow them!’ (DS_P9).

c) Involvement in drug trafficking networks: A lot of these young ‘troublemakers’ were considered to be involved in selling drugs overtly around the main streets of Newport’s night-time zone. Although these youths are not venue-goers as illustrated earlier, they have gradually become an ingrained part of the local NTE, since ‘they are selling it to people who are having a “good night”, therefore they’re almost a necessity’ (DS_P10). Evidence is mixed regarding whether these youths are selling drugs on behalf of local drug dealers or whether they are exploited through the county lines drug model, which at the time of the writing has been identified as a national priority.152 The extent to which county lines is either a fundamentally new criminal and social threat or is merely (over)constructed to be seen as such when it is a sign of the adaptability of drug markets (Maher and Dixon, 1999; Hales and Hobbs, 2010) is not within the scope of this thesis.

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152 Since 2017 onwards, an ever increasing emphasis has been placed upon the law enforcement agencies’ fight against the newly coined term ‘county lines’; the expansion of the urban drug gangs’ operations to smaller towns, using dedicated mobile phone lines (‘deal lines’) and violence to drive out local dealers and exploit children and vulnerable people to sell drugs. Framing county lines as a national priority is evident through the inauguration of the National County Lines Coordination Centre (NCLCC), which is jointly run by the National Crime Agency (NCA) and National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and its role in: a) coordinating law enforcement intensification weeks (arrests, weapons and drugs seizures, engagement with victims), b) assisting in prosecution cases under the Modern Slavery Act. (NPCC, 2019).
Regarding Newport’s NTE, DS participants were reluctant to claim that these youths could possibly play the role of ‘runners’ for county lines groups, on the basis that these are just ‘local kids’, echoing a rather normative view towards the operational mechanisms of these groups. Ample evidence from both the NCA’s Annual Assessments on county lines (NCA, 2016; 2017; 2018) and academic research (Coomber and Moyle, 2017; McLean et al., 2020; Windle et al., 2020) suggests that during the last three years (2017-2020) there has been an increasing emphasis on using local marginalised youths to move the drugs on the rural/coastal areas and that the process of ‘cuckooing’ (drug dealers moving into poor people’s homes) involves a varied degree of vulnerability and victimisation for local residents.

Notwithstanding the mixed evidence on whether these youths are drug runners for local networks or for urban gangs (county-lines), the common and significant theme for consideration is twofold: how DS make sense of the profiles of these youths and how they respond to their presence around the licenced premises. To begin with, when DS interviewees were further prompted by the researcher to elaborate on the background of these youths, described them as youngsters, who were involved in a wide array of anti-social behaviours, had low educational achievement and had home-linked issues, mainly due to parental neglect, illustrating that ‘the parents are mostly to blame, because they don’t want them in the house’ (DS_P9). These key features were all linked to the lived experiences of these youths by the DS in Newport which have already been highlighted in the existing body of literature as risk factors associated with negative impacts upon their well-being (Public Health Wales, 2016), as well as with increased probabilities of exploitation and involvement in violent and gang-related practices (HM Government, 2010; Morris, 2012; Sturrock and Holmes, 2015).

Overall, DS participants seemed to recognise these adverse experiences for the young drug runners in their local town. Yet, when these youths were in the immediate vicinity of night-time venues, the response by security staff was to clamp down on their activities in a hostile way, aiming at displacing them to nearby streets. Almost all interviewees discussed their presence as a mere nuisance to the vibrant vibe of the high street and no empathy was expressed for the rough lifestyles of these kids. In the previous section of this chapter, participants on many occasions appeared to go above and beyond their prescribed work mandate (venue-customers of the venue) in order to keep people safe, thus acting with a moral and empathising framework. Yet at the same time, their judgment on who constitutes a vulnerable person was predominantly guided by a normative list (inebriated people and lone females), and there were few instances of accounting for more complex signs that warrant attention (e.g. mental health). Such a prescribed
‘vulnerability manual’ does not allow frontline operatives to consider how the list could be adapted to fit other emerging groups, such as the young drug runners in Newport. Although local DS appeared to have an appreciation of the troubled background and the current activities of these youths, standardised responses to vulnerability in the NTE simply reinforced a prejudiced assumption of who is defined as ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’. Recent comparative ethnographic research (Rowe and Søgaard, 2020) underscored how collaboration in the NTE between police officers and DS in ‘pulling levers’ towards gang members and outlaw biker groups can actually end up in enforcing a sort of ‘moral policing’, premised on ill-defined notions of troublesome groups.

Of course, frontline security operatives are not the only group within the extended policing family who might sometimes consider vulnerability with a narrow scope. Conceptualising vulnerability is a complex process, further exacerbated by the lack of an agreed definition and a shared understanding of vulnerability across police forces (College of Policing, 2018; HMIC, 2015; HMICFRS, 2018; NPCC, 2017), which is highlighted to be as key obstacle in aligning police practice with the more progressive framework of ‘vulnerability policing’ (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith, 2012; Coliandris, 2015; HMICFRS, 2020). Therefore, the broader police culture is often seen as ‘risk averse’, with a lack of reflective practice in identifying and responding to vulnerability at every stage of the policing process (Longstaff et al., 2015; Stanford, 2012).

However, across south-east Wales in the period from 2018 to 2020 some steps into aligning vulnerability policing with early intervention through a revised process-based approach appeared to be promising. As illustrated by police participants: ‘we’ve developed that kind of public health approach to harm reduction, rather than “You shall not drink too much – it’s bad for you!”, it’s more about “drink less”, it’s about considering the impact of your behaviour rather than pointing the finger at somebody and telling them not to do something’ (Police_P15). First, this indicates that policing in the local context refocused protection of groups, which were traditionally seen as problematic due to their lifestyle and interactions with law enforcement. Second, the delivery of policing is expected to be premised on proactive prevention and harm minimisation principles. Although this re-balancing of policing priorities in the NTE is a welcome step, it is still geared towards the already discussed normative lists of vulnerable people in the NTE (i.e., mainly inebriated individuals). Therefore, Coliandris’ (2015) illustration of vulnerability challenges in policing as ‘wicked’ problems (given their complex nature both conceptually and operationally) is still prevalent. He also poses a significant question: ‘if frontline police numbers are to be cut’.

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153 At the time of the writing, the most recent figures related to the police workforce in England and Wales (Home Office, 2020) suggested a small (5%) increase in the number of police officers between March 2019 and March 2020 (from 123,189 to 129,110 FTE officers). If police numbers continue to rise in the next couple of years, it can be
then what impact will this have on safeguarding and who, if anyone, across the public sector, is available to fill any gaps created by a police withdrawal or revised level of participation?” (Coliandris, 2015, p.6)

This question leads to the consideration of whether there should be any expectation for frontline security operatives to deal with these kids in a different way than the one described in the previous paragraphs. One could argue that DS, while working on a national living (or minimum) wage have already a wide range of tasks within their ‘soft’ policing remit, which should be confined within the boundaries of the venue and its clientele. Given the nature of the DS job, one should not expect that security staff should be tasked with providing a full vulnerability support package to young drug runners who might be exploited. This is arguably a responsibility that falls into the remit of the multi-agency partnerships, with key players being the police and social services; the recent introduction of the South Wales Violence Reduction Unit signals a positive development into thinking and responding holistically to adverse childhood experiences and violence prevention.

Although there is some merit and pragmatism in this proposition, the analysis in the previous section of this chapter leads to the development of a counterargument. In particular, it partially challenges the view that DS do not have much alternative when dealing with these youths, other than to push them away from the licensed premise and keep on undertaking their duties within the security bubble of the venue employing them. Frontline security staff have a unique position in the NTE infrastructure (observers of what is happening around the venues), with local knowledge on the young drug runners (family background, adverse experiences and risks). Therefore, instead of ‘cleaning’ up the streets from these unwanted youths (or even being hostile towards them), a useful starting point could be for DS to monitor their presence and to feed this back to the police (i.e., through their radio nets), so that the latter could follow-up and initiate a vulnerability policing process. For this to work effectively and move beyond purely enforcement-related objectives, a more nuanced understanding of the profile and the activities of this group is

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argued that this discourse might change. Future research projects on vulnerability could examine the association between the rising police numbers and the implementation of vulnerability policing.

The South Wales Violence Reduction Unit (VRU), which changed its name to Wales Violence Prevention Unit, was established through national funding in 2019. It seeks to bring together enforcement, public health practitioners and social services to develop proactive responses to violence through focusing on its underlying causes. Serious youth violence features as a core strategic priority for the Unit and therefore it aims to address underlying risk factors for child criminal exploitation, drug running and knife crime. Preliminary results of the process evaluations of VRUs nationally and locally (South Wales VRU) suggest that, despite some data-sharing and logistical challenges, VRUs are promising in terms of identifying vulnerability factors and implementing person-centred interventions on the local context (Craaston et al., 2020; Timpson et al., 2020).
necessary. In other words, through abandoning the faulty thinking over questions of vulnerability and risk, there is a great potential for security operatives of becoming the first point of contact, who can signpost these troubled youths to a process of supportive intervention, rather than to ungrounded aggressiveness.

6.4 ‘Fit and proper’ for the contemporary DS world: Moving from the ‘thugs on the doors’ to ‘shirt-fillers’

So far in this chapter, the prevailing ‘gig’ economy standards and low wages in the DS sector have been illustrated to stand in stark contrast with the ever-increasing responsibilities of the ‘capable guardians’ in night-time venues across south-east Wales. This narrative is further complemented through another key occupational transformation in this part of the industry, which is framed as a transition from the stereotype of the ‘thug on the door’ to the ‘shirt/jacket-filler’ model. Interview data suggest that among the different groups of participants there was a broad consensus and appreciation of the role of the SIA’s licensing regime in excluding incompetent practitioners on the basis of their criminal background. At the same time, as it is argued in this section, licensing has had some effect on changing the composition of the DS workforce; by destigmatising the occupation, individuals who may not have considered the occupation before are suggested to now be willing to enter mainly because of the ease of obtaining the DS qualifications in an era of austerity impacts on employment (see Fernie, 2011; Humphris and Koumenta, 2015). According to the participants’ insights, such a workforce composition change appeared to be highly prevalent in the sector since 2016. From a quantitative perspective, this could account as a driver of the surge in DS licences from 2017 onwards. Although this suggests that the sector is getting bigger, the analysis of the ‘shirt-filler’ model in this section indicates that this occupational transformation seems to be at odds with the regulatory ambition of raising standards in the industry.

To begin with exploring this notable dimension of transformation in the world of bouncers, the ‘thug on the door’ concept has been unpacked earlier in this section and has been associated with a disproportionate emphasis on unsafe and aggressive physical restraint and a minimal or non-existent use of communication skills to diffuse violence. Turning now next to the slang term ‘shirt-filler’, this has been coined by the DS community and is associated with negative connotations for a part of the new entrants in the industry who are lacking either motivation and interest in committing themselves to the job or who are deemed to be under-skilled and thus incapable of pursuing the challenging facets of the role. Put simply, instead of being proactive
guardians with capable vigilance over customers, they are portrayed as standing bodies who are simply filling the security logistics of night-time venues.

Concerns expressed by DS interviewees referred predominantly to the role of Jobcentres across the country in facilitating the entrance of ‘shirt-fillers’ in the sector through advocating the mantra: ‘Go on this course – you’ll get a badge, you’ll have a door job. Easy option. “You’re off the dole – go and get a door job”’ (Security company_P7). The unemployment rate in the local context of this study (south-east Wales) has been consistently higher than the national rate since 2005 (Welsh Government, 2020). Policy interventions to address unemployment, such as the Youth Obligation Support Programme\(^\text{155}\), involve job search requirements and sanctions to promote sufficient search effort (Petrongolo, 2014). DS vacancies appeared to be regularly promoted by Jobcentre staff, particularly to young job seekers, as positions that have a few baseline requirements and thus are accessible to virtually anyone who is unemployed and strives to provide some evidence of intensive job-seeking. Following the illustrative comment of an interviewee, agents from Jobcentres ‘may look like Worzel Gummidge. They haven’t got a clue about doing door work in their life, and they’re putting that person at risk because a statistic to “get them off the books” because they’re unemployed – which is wrong’ (DS_P5). Apart from portraying security work as a minimally demanding job (both in terms of competences as well as of the job workload), Jobcentres offer financial support for licensing and training expenses\(^\text{156}\) to those interested in getting SIA-badged.

One of the main areas of criticism, highlighted through discussing the skillset of ‘shirt-fillers’, was the absence of requirements regarding a basic level of physical fitness. Although overall the sector has moved away from the use of excessive and ungrounded levels of violence, the occupational reality depicts the dynamic nature of the role, in which ‘at some point, you will have to get physical with somebody, a necessary evil of the job, unfortunately’ (DS_P20). When communicative tools of conflict management fail and altercations are escalating, a good fitness level, usually developed through ‘self-defence or martial art’ (DS_P7), could be a protective factor for the DS, as well as for the customers. More often than not, such problematic situations were further exacerbated by the lack of experience from the side of these newcomers, who either got a distorted view of the remit of a DS (‘What we call “shirt fillers”, they think that the job entails bullying people and sleeping with women’ [DS_P1]) or who had ‘a clean sound character

\(^{155}\) https://www.gov.uk/guidance/support-for-18-to-21-year-olds-claiming-universal-credit
\(^{156}\) These expenses are covered by either Jobcentres or local councils, depending on the schemes available across a particular area.
on paper, but no experience in life, cannot foresee a problem or a situation that’s going to rise’ (Security company_P4).

Even more alarming are the concerns regarding their limited effectiveness in cases of ‘order maintenance’, which has some notable implications for DS camaraderie and the quality of security provided to the public. As the new generation of the fresh-faced, yet less capable DS, seems to be a key emerging dimension in the transformation of the sector, many older DS expressed their frustration with this new breed of their colleagues, who were not willing to proactively support them in cases of violence escalation in their venues:

‘I’ve worked with a few people and I’m thinking “How did you even get your badge?” Like, if something goes off, they’re like... walked off, or hiding, you know what I mean?’ (DS_P17).

‘You just get kids stood in position, don’t you, at the top of the stairs, and... just stay there, all night. And he looks like something out of Fraggle Rock!’ (DS_P5).

‘Eighteen of us. Ten downstairs, eight upstairs – in [venue anonymised] in Cardiff – the only person who helped me that day was the head doorman, who’s on the front of the door. And the 5 who were downstairs with me, in my area, 4 of them ran to the toilet. Newbies. Hadn’t got a clue. They left’ (Security company_P7).

These quotes could be read as a sort of lament from the older DS generation towards younger staff, partly reflecting a different approach of how order maintenance tasks should be undertaken. The broader theme of the pay and supply of the ‘capable’ is recurring across different professions. For instance, the older generation of police officers are often critical of young colleagues, acknowledging that young officers have a more robust educational background, yet contesting the newbies’ ability to apply the usefulness of their learning into frontline policing (Williams et al., 2019).

Moving beyond the potential lament from older/more experienced DS, these insights indicate that in practice there is often a disjointed approach between the former and the ‘shirt-fillers’. Such an approach is mainly seen to be lacking cooperation and camaraderie. Camaraderie is perceived to be a fundamental collective tool when responding to the gruesome aspects of the job, since ‘you’ve got to be confident that the people are there and they’re going to have your back, and you’re going to be ok’ (DS_P15). Therefore, a DS’ capability is framed to outweigh a sheer ‘strength in numbers’ perspective. At the same time, the lack of support between operatives in
cases of aggression is further linked with barriers in ensuring that altercations are handled proportionately, and customers’ well-being is safeguarded effectively.

Previous research has indicated that, at the entry level of security guarding, the role is rarely seen as a chosen career, with the largest proportion of operatives getting into security simply in order to become economically active (Garrett, 2016; Gill et al., 2020). The analysis in this section suggests that the young individuals entering the DS sector through Jobcentres were perceived by some participants to be lacking in a genuine interest and motivation to embrace the tasks, responsibilities and also the physically and emotionally demanding aspect of the job. Through questioning their competences and readiness to respond to various DS-related challenges, it is important to revisit the ‘fit and proper’ considerations surrounding the SIA’s licensing regime (Chapter 4). In other words, although there seemed to be a consensus and an appreciation of the effect of criminality checks on ‘cleaning-up’ the occupation, the case of ‘shirt-fillers’ indicated the industry’s concerns over the impact of occupational regulation in assisting (or perhaps more accurately, failing to assist) a highly capable and effective DS workforce.

6.5 Violence on the doors: From the ‘protecting the public’ agenda to ‘protecting the DS from the public’

Documentary analysis and interview data from SIA participants in Chapter 4 highlighted the development of the narrative supporting the regulator’s violence reduction strategy. In particular, it is purported that the strategic agenda concerning violence in the NTE has shifted from ‘protecting the public from violent DS (2003-2008)’ to ‘protecting the public alongside the re-legitimised DS’ (2008-2019). Concurrently with this key shift, another significant strand has emerged and this refers to the growing concerns of violence experienced by DS in their workplaces. The prevalence of occupational violence for frontline security operatives has been acknowledged in the literature and some research studies have explored the extent of workplace victimisation among security officers on an international level (Button and Park, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2011; Kitteringham, 2020; Leino, 2013; Talas et al., 2020). However, in the ‘Violence at Work statistics’, published annually by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the amount of workplace violence for DS is underrepresented\(^{157}\). Furthermore, little systematic academic

\(^{157}\) According to the most recent ‘Violence at Work statistics’ (HSE, 2020), protective service is the occupational group with by far the highest risk of experiencing workplace violence (11.4% - 8 times the average risk of 1.4%). The standard occupational category of protective services includes the police, fire and prison services. DS fall under the category of the ‘elementary administration service occupations’. For this category, the risk of experiencing workplace violence is 1.3%, which reflects the average risk of 1.4% identified across all occupational categories in these statistics.
attention has been given to the underlying dynamics surrounding DS’ experiences of occupational risks (Monaghan, 2004; Rigakos, 2008; Tutenges et al., 2015). This is explored in this section, drawing on the lived experiences of the DS interviewees and the local police officers, and marks the ‘protecting the DS from the public’ phase for the SIA and the possible regulatory responses.

Wearing a police lookalike uniform, being SIA accredited and a communicative ‘meeter and greeter’ who is trained in order maintenance and safeguarding could be considered to be a powerful basis for enhancing the legitimacy of the vilified world of bouncers. When it comes to public attitudes towards the sector, participants’ accounts reveal that these are still far away from this ideal scenario. First, the stereotypical images of the pre-SIA bouncers seem to be still prevailing and be taken for granted as ‘conventional wisdom’ and as a consequence, ‘things are far less violent, but the attitude of people is still the same, “You’re a steroid-head”, “You’re a meat-head”, “You’re a bully”, “There was no need for that – you’re on a power trip”, the things that are said are identical’ (Security company_P3). Second, among the most recurring themes in the interviews with local DS158 was the frequent occurrence of verbal and physical abuse by customers and other members of the public. This is vividly captured through the content of the introductory discussions between older DS and newbies, with the former cynically alerting the new DS generation: ‘Well, look; you’re going to be working as a doorman – do you know what it entails? You’re going to be hated’ (DS_P5).

The incidents experienced by DS in their workplace touch upon both the categories of public order offences (sections 4 and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986)159 and violent offences (mainly common assault or actual bodily harm, with fewer cases related to grievous bodily harm)160. Following the illustrative accounts of the interviewees, the most frequent type of workplace violence was verbal abuse in the form of ‘standing there for 25 minutes taking abuse and calling me every name under the sun-and they weren’t nice names’ (DS_P9). These verbal abuse incidents, which on average occurred between two and three times a month, were in some

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158 Interviews with frontline operatives lasted approximately between 40-70 minutes and covered a wide array of topics. When the researcher was coding the transcripts using NVivo it quickly became apparent that the issues related to the violence experienced in their workplace were raised by all of the DS participants.

159 According to the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986, section 4 refers to the cases of threatening behaviour (fear of provocation of violence), section 4a is related to disorderly behaviour with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress and section 5 covers disorderly behaviour causing or likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.

160 Common assault (section 39, Criminal Justice Act 1988) is an offence committed when some inflicts violence on another person or make him/her believe that a violent attack is imminent. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (section 47, Offences against the person act 1861) is committed when the assault has caused some physical harm to the victim. Finally, grievous bodily harm (GBH), which is also covered in the Offences against the person act 1861, has two classifications: a) either through unlawful wounding or inflicting GBH (section 20), in which an assault causes serious physical harm to the victim b) or through causing GBH with intent to do GBH (section 18), that is the most serious of the assault offences and is substantiated through the intent to cause very serious harm to the victim.
instances (approximately once a month) followed by a more escalated version of threats with ‘spitting in our faces – literally spitting in our faces – threatening to kill us, this, that and the other’ (DS_P12). Echoing the findings of a recent study of violence abuse for security operatives in the UK (Talas et al., 2020), the occasions in which verbal threats and common assault have progressively developed into the scenarios of inflicting injuries to local DS were less frequent than verbal abuse and threats. Although these occurred on average two or three times a year among interviewees, their descriptions illustrate vividly that their workplace is risky and that injuries have become a common feature of their occupational experiences:

‘I’ve been swung at-I’ve had pints thrown over me’ (DS_P13), ‘I’ve had things thrown from passing cars when I’ve been stood on a door’ (DS_P8) or even worse ‘been attacked with a steering wheel, crow bar, with a pole, I’ve been bottled and glassed a few times, broken some ribs, dislocated my knee’ (DS_P18).

Exploring how violence is situated in the DS workplace, the location appears to have a key significance in the magnitude, frequency and the types of perpetrators. In particular, the analysis of the interview data suggests that for night-time premises located in urban settings (Cardiff, Swansea, Newport) cases of harassment and assault against DS are usually standalone incidents perpetrated by ‘transient people coming in there – they’re not local – and in the city centre violence is not “oh, that’s what happens” kind of thing as in the Valleys’ (Police_P11). However, in rural towns in South Wales and Gwent the fact that these are close-knit communities could have an adverse impact on the development and duration of violence perpetrated against local DS. More specifically, aggression and threats against these operatives, whilst they are working on the doors of a venue, can be often displaced to other locations, since locals know where these DS live and socialise. As a result, abusive repercussions are not restricted to the immediate vicinity of the bar/club. Instead, fear of retaliation by aggressive ‘regulars’ in these communities is high, which is considered as a demotivating factor for local operatives to work in their hometown:

‘It’s shocking. I wouldn’t work in Pontypridd town centre anymore, because – obviously – I live in Pontypridd, and everybody knows me, and knows what I do, and… they could follow you home! So, I’d rather work out of the area that I live. I worked in Ponty for a long time, and I had my
windows smashed, because I took someone from a club – banned them, for some sort of reason – violence – again. So, this is why I prefer to work away from my town”\textsuperscript{161} (DS\_P13).

Turning next to DS’ legitimacy by the public, with the visual aid of the blue badges flashing on the jackets of security staff both in daytime and night-time premises, awareness of the existence of SIA accreditation has become widespread. Although it was recognised as a ‘symbolic’ representation of the ‘new professional era’ in the notorious world of bouncers, at the same time, for many operatives, it also signalled a period of decreasing respect towards the profession. Such a disrespect was illustrated to materialise in altercations occurring between DS and NTE patrons, during which unprovoked physical or verbal abuse towards the former was often complemented with ‘mickey-taking at you’ (DS\_P9) by the latter and with the argument that ‘You can’t put your hands on me, if you put your fucking hands on me I’ll get the police’ (Security company\_P6).

The amount of violence directed towards security operatives in the NTE has been widely acknowledged not only through their vivid illustrations, but also through the discussions with police officers. The latter category of participants, especially the younger generation of police officers\textsuperscript{162}, often highlighted an awareness of the ever-increasing amount of verbal and physical abuse endured by the DS. However, an interesting dimension here appears to be the source of such an awareness; police officers discussed violence in the workplace of the DS through the lens of their first-hand experiences, while policing the NTE on a frontline role. At the same time their ‘fieldwork observations’ did not align with the figures in the police recorded crime reports, underlining that ‘very rarely do I get door staff being assaulted, or coming in as complainants for being assaulted’ (Police\_P7). This disparity is further exacerbated, if one considers the statistical limitations of the ‘HSE Violence at Work’ statistics and the underrepresentation of the actual amount of workplace violence for the DS\textsuperscript{163} (Jones et al., 2011; Upson, 2004). As a result, this overall discrepancy between what occurs in the NTE workplaces and the official recording/representation of the amount of violence suffered from DS could be approached

\textsuperscript{161} Such a fear of retaliation by aggressive ‘regulars’ in these communities across south-east Wales can be also considered through Campana’s and Varese’s (2018) analysis on local organised crime problems. Their research study of illegal governance in Salford and Derbyshire found evidence of how locally well-known criminal gangs influenced community life through intimidation, fear of repercussions and protection rackets. In the specific excerpt of the thesis there is no direct empirical evidence to suggest that the retaliation examples against local DS were part of a parallel justice system, orchestrated and supported by local criminal gangs. However, the aggressive repercussions against DS in these close-knit communities could suggest that the local ‘hardmen’ and the well-known local patrons of pubs have created a sort of ‘quasi-political network’ influencing the working and personal life of security operatives.

\textsuperscript{162} During the fieldwork of this thesis, the researcher observed that younger police officers, who joined the force after the SIA regulations were in place, had a much more empathising and supportive stance towards the DS sector. This observation stands in sharp contrast with the mindset and the perspective of their older colleagues; the ‘bouncer’ model has been stereotypically linked with their overall perceptions about the calibre, competences and accountability of the frontline security operatives in the NTE.

\textsuperscript{163} See footnote 157.
through the lens of underreporting these incidents by the security operatives. Such an assumption was corroborated through the analysis of the interview data, suggesting that in the specific context of Welsh NTEs, the primary factors that prevent DS from recording assaults perpetrated against them are as follows:

a) The ‘culture’ of the venue has led many DS to internalise violence committed against them as a cost of doing business (Kenny, 2002). The night-time venue was often framed as a barrier towards reporting these incidents and drawing unwanted police attention to the premises, which in turn could be associated with developing a negative precedent from a licensing perspective. As one participant illustratively described in his account: ‘Now, if we’re going down that road, if you call the police, then it’s a bad mark against the venue. And the worse marks you get, the more the venue suffers, so a lot of the times, it’s pushed under the carpet’ (Security company_P2). Such a top-down direction from the management team of the licensed premises, which often places a disproportionate emphasis on maintaining a superficially impeccable image for licensing-related purposes, echoes the findings from previous research studies (Hobbs et al., 2003). Furthermore, many DS interviewees seemed to struggle with discovering the fine lines of ‘reasonable force’ and ‘self-defence’. Their vagueness has been often underlined in the wider policing literature, suggesting that the unique circumstances of each case does not allow consideration of a clear-cut set of rules that separate legally reasonable force from illegal excessive force (Alpert and Smith, 1994; Simons, 2008).

b) Eschewing involvement with the police as an active choice (Stanko, 2003) is echoed in this thesis’ findings with a more nuanced spectrum on the multi-faceted reasons underpinning this rationale. First, trust deficits with local police officers which were due in part to the police’ lopsided expectation of assistance and support for them, but not from them, discouraged many participants from reporting these incidents. Such a perspective was further fuelled by the historical masculinity-related stereotypes (Winlow et al., 2003), since depicting themselves with ‘these signs of weakness, not being able to take it on the chin when you get beaten up’ (SIA_P15) was not an appealing scenario. Second, rather than depicting scepticism towards police cooperation, many DS discussed how the reporting process could be a lengthy and bureaucratic process that would place an extra burden on the gig economy paradigm that has prevailed in the industry:

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164 These are discussed in detail in the next chapter (Chapter 7, section 2).
‘(A police officer) asked me if I was ok and that, did I want to press charges or anything, and I was like ‘No, it’s fine, like’... you know... it’s just... you get used to it. You don’t want to... if you press charges on every single person that you deal with, you’d be there all day!’ (DS_P16).

‘I’m sure they don’t report it, because they’d continually be in Court, so it’s a very difficult job they do, and I’ve got a greater appreciation of that, now, working here’ (Police_P10).

6.6 Concluding remarks

Overall, the analysis of the ‘lived realities’ of DS across south-east Wales revealed some key findings regarding the occupational developments and challenges of the sector in the contemporary era. First, an ever-increasing set of ‘soft’ policing responsibilities in the NTE has been a key aspect of the occupational and professional development of the DS. Lending support to previous research (Loader and White, 2018), the practices of security operatives highlighted how considerations other than their contractual agreements allowed them to go above and beyond into performing their safeguarding tasks. However, working on the doors was not considered a full-time job with any exciting career prospects. DS roles were predominantly portrayed to fall under the contemporary gig economy recruitment paradigm. Second, despite evidence of the prevalence of ‘soft’ policing, it is argued that ‘hard’ policing strategies by the DS should be revisited and reconsidered in light of the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy towards specific ‘unwanted’ groups. Third, with reference to the effect of licensing on changing the composition of the DS workforce, the discussion around ‘shirt-fillers’ highlighted an interesting paradox. Although the surge of new entrants in the DS sector in the last years might seem as a positive development regarding the growth of the industry, their attitude, skillset and commitment to the occupation appeared on many occasions to move in the opposite direction of professionalism and contribution to public protection.

Finally, in the contemporary era the embeddedness of violence on the doors seemed to be following a different trajectory. Although violent operatives have not been completely eradicated from the sector, physical and verbal abuse committed against them by the public was a key concern of participants. Having contextualised the prevalence of violence in the DS workplace, it is important to reflect how the implications of these findings could form the basis of integrating the theme of ‘protecting security operatives from the public’ into the SIA’s violence reduction
agenda. In light of the broader framework of the responsive regulation model\textsuperscript{165}, it is suggested
that the SIA could play a leading role in developing a supportive strategy for empowering the DS
against violent incidents. Furthermore, the other findings discussed earlier in this chapter
identified some disparities between the SIA’s strategic narrative (who is considered to be ‘fit and
proper’ for the DS role and how the objective of raising standards in the sector is developing) and
the occupational and professional transformations of the DS world in the local context. Given
their central role as first respondents in local NTEs, there is an emerging need for further
educating, trusting and empowering operatives to fulfil their safeguarding roles towards more
complex and less visible forms of vulnerability. Therefore, in Chapter 10 specific policy
recommendations are put forward, reflecting the most recent developments in this part of the
industry and allowing the accommodation of sector-specific supporting mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{165} An overview of the responsive regulation framework, supported by relevant research studies, has been provided
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 10, this framework will be put into perspective regarding the specific findings of this thesis.
Chapter 7: The impact of the SIA’s licensing regime on enabling door supervisors to become an integral part of the extended policing family

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2 the existing literature discussed the exchanges and collaboration between private and public policing as problematic and even non-existent, since mistrust and the logic of ‘us and them’ were prevalent among police and private security. For the SIA, the ambition of enabling private security operatives to gradually become an integral part of the extended policing family has been a key strand of the broader ‘raising standards’ objective. On a strategic level, the outward-facing message of the SIA Annual Reports paints a positive picture, justified in terms of the ongoing and developing joint enforcement operations with police forces across the country.

Yet, the pertinent question emerging at this point refers to the extent to which this strategic trajectory corresponds with an equally positive development on the operational level. This level concerns the working relationships and day-to-day dealings between frontline security operatives and police officers. As such, this chapter explores the collaboration dynamics between police and DS and contributes to research question 2. Through the analysis of interview data from both DS and police participants across south-east Wales, this part of the thesis has two objectives. First, it seeks to provide a nuanced and critical exploration of both the positive and the negative features of collaboration between the two groups in the local context. Second, it aims at putting forward a more holistic explanatory framework, which allows these findings to be placed into a deeper perspective. This framework builds upon prior research on the typologies of public and private policing. Besides this, through identifying specific factors that either enable or hinder local collaboration, it assesses the contribution of the SIA’s regime to the development of the working relationships between DS and the police in the regulation era.

7.2 Moving beyond the ‘us and them’ perspective: a conditional and asymmetric development

Interview data in this section suggests that during the last decade the non-existent or hostile interactions between the police and DS are the exception, rather than the norm, in the post-regulation era across south-east Wales. The improvement of the collaboration dynamics between these groups are contextualised in the following paragraphs on a twofold way. First, the police seemed to recognise that DS were proactive, being the first respondents in violent altercations and safeguarding issues in licensed premises. Second, friendly exchanges aiming at fostering a
personal touch in the co-policing of the NTE were part of the majority of interactions between the two groups. Yet, the underlying nuances in participants’ insights reveal two key caveats, which give a conditional and asymmetric dimension in the seeming improvement of their working relationships.

To begin with, in the contemporary NTEs in the Welsh context, there has been an ever-increasing recognition of the potential of DS in assisting with the broader policing mandate of ‘early intervention’\(^{166}\). This mandate, which was often referred to by police participants as the harm-reduction agenda, aims to provide a much more proactive stance towards violence, crime and vulnerability in the NTE and thus moving away from a primarily reactive response (i.e., responding to incidents that already occurred or applying a much more enforcement-focused strategy to ‘troublemakers’ in the NTE). This approach shares similarities, both in terms of the underlying rationale and the particular measures employed, with the public health approach and the focussed-deterrence strategies that have recently (from 2017 onwards) been put forward as the key frameworks for responding holistically to serious violence\(^{167}\). In the context of the local NTEs, SWP (South Wales Police) force has aligned its strategic and tactical NTE planning with the public health approach, ensuring that the policing response is based upon high-visibility reassurance police patrols, educating the public about the adverse impacts of alcohol consumption and modifying situational factors to deter violence:

‘We’ve developed that kind of public health approach to harm reduction, rather than “You shall not drink too much – it’s bad for you!”’. It’s more about “drink less”, it’s about considering the impact of your behaviour rather than pointing the finger at somebody and telling them not to do something’ (Police_P15).

Within this spectrum of early intervention in public policing and with the recognition that ‘yes, we’re the enforcement arm, but if we can get around these issues without enforcement,'
"everybody's a winner" (Police_P5), frontline security operatives appeared to have an active role to play in Welsh NTEs. Given that their responsibilities, as illustrated in Chapter 6, have been developing in a ‘soft’ policing direction, DS have been gradually identified as key ‘capable guardians’ in assisting with the early intervention policing strategies. The DS’ safeguarding strategies were considered by police officers on several occasions to be key in ensuring that individuals were not victimised and that they have been appropriately signposted to frontline police officers. Although the DS’ willingness and competence to go above and beyond their spatially defined remit (i.e. indoors and outdoors of the venue) were often praised by local police, a reliable measurement of the actual number of vulnerable people that were assisted by DS was not always possible. This is attributed to the ‘culture’ of the venue\textsuperscript{168}, which is often sceptical towards flagging up incidents of crime and insecurity that can taint their reputation\textsuperscript{169} and thus their prospective profit margins. Notwithstanding the reliability and validity issues with the venue’s feedback system to the police, proactivity by the DS as first respondents in safeguarding issues and liaising processes with the police seemed to be a key dimension of the working relationships between the two groups:

‘A young girl was approached by two Eastern European males outside the premises – who hadn’t been drinking in there – so that’s a warning flag straight away. Doesn’t look like they’ve gone to any pubs – doesn’t look like they’ve gone to any of the nightclubs – but they’re outside the premises looking for drunken females. The girl could hardly walk. As she got outside of the premises, they started talking to her – were leading her to a taxi – they’d already flagged a taxi down. The door staff ran across the road, asked them a couple of those telling questions, again, and were able to establish that she had no connection with these males whatsoever. However, they were taking her into a taxi, and they were going to take her somewhere. They intervened – the two males left – and they kept the girl safe until we arrived. So, I think that’s a good indication of how far we’ve come, you know? Previously, it would be “Out of the premises – I’ve got no responsibility for this person now.”’ (Police_P7).

Raising awareness of the negative consequences of intoxication and applying crime prevention measures have been highlighted as the fundamental components of the early intervention policing framework for the Welsh NTEs. A holistic policing model needs to include DS (and police)

\textsuperscript{168} As discussed in Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{169} In Chapter 2 (section 2.3) some key examples of multi-agency partnerships in after-dark settings were presented. In South Wales, the ‘Traffic Light System’ takes account of data from police and health service sources in order to categorise and grade pubs and clubs according to their size, location, capacity and alcohol-related crime and disorder occurred in these premises (City of Cardiff Council, 2016). As such, given that the South Wales Police Licensing Team are actively monitoring the alcohol-related incidents associated with licensed premises in the NTE, some venues’ concerns of flagging up crime and disorder might be well-founded.
enforcement against ‘troublemakers’ in alcohol-fuelled assaults, public order offences and anti-social behaviour that occurred in either public places in the NTE or in licensed premises. Frontline police officers often praised the readiness and willingness of security operatives to ‘keep people back, away from us, until more police officers arrived’ (Police_P10) and DS frequently mentioned occasions when ‘the police were in trouble – so I went over and helped them to handcuff him’ (DS_P18). As such, police benefited from security operatives’ practical involvement. For DS, such a benefit seemed to move into a more symbolic direction; being publicly praised by the police for their assistance, from a simple verbal comment ‘Your guys are good – they’re really switched on’ (Security company_P1) to a dedicated section on a police force’s website and local newspapers\(^{170}\).

With reference to responding to incidents occurring in the venues, the developing working relationships between the two types of ‘policing agents’ has been a key factor in changing the way that perpetrators are being dealt with. A decade ago, the commonplace scenario was: a troublesome patron is thrown out of the venue, then occasional physical altercation between the patron and the DS occurs and ultimately the patron walks away. As opposed to this scenario, the current practice is centred around the active involvement of DS who detain troublesome patrons through safe physical restraint. This was widely recognised by police interviewees to be a fundamental development in ensuring that the next steps of the process (i.e. arrest, witness statements, further investigation), undertaken by the police, could occur on a timely manner, ‘working hand in glove with the door staff to detain and take positive action’ (Police_P7). Willingness to fully adhere to the role of first respondent in a potential police-related enquiry is also depicted through some DS’ accounts, highlighting that particularly in terms of drugs seizures the attitude now is attuned to ‘calling the police, the drugs will be taken off the person and handed to the police’ as opposed to 10 years ago, when ‘drugs would have been flushed down the toilet, or not even taken off them because it was still very much “We don’t say anything to the police, they’ll use it against us”’ (Security company_P3)\(^{171}\).

\(^{170}\) Apart from such a moral reward, for many DS participants the assistance provided to frontline police officers also served as a symbolic confirmation of their status and of the similar challenges that both public and private policing agents face in the local NTEs. First, the recognition of the DS competences to intervene and successfully support the police in NTE-related incidents boosted their self-legitimacy; gone are the days that the general police perception towards their sector was summarised with the catchphrase ‘thugs on the doors’. Second, through offering assistance to local police officers many interviewees considered in practice how ‘the aspects of the job of the door supervisor are starting to become more and more like those of the police’ (DS_P7), often amounting to self-referencing as ‘pub police’ (DS_P19).

\(^{171}\) In light of this positive development in the attitude towards drug seizures by DS in night-time venues there are two important caveats. First, as noted in Chapter 6, the ‘culture’ of the venue is sometimes attuned to moving disorder away from venues because of the unwanted police attention and the associated repercussions for licensing. As such, flagging up drug seizures and liaising with the police was not the preferred route for such venues with known drug issues. Second, many DS and police participants discussed about the mundane and time-consuming bureaucratic processes that were part and parcel of policing disorder in the local NTEs. As such, when DS were busy and police
The collaboration dynamics between public and private policing agents in the local context are largely guided by the illustrative metaphor of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Focussed deterrence strategies, either in regulatory theory (Braithwaite, 2011) or in violence prevention (Braga et al., 2018), are premised on the simultaneous existence of both positive incentives and certainty of punishment. In this case, police officers from both the SWP and Gwent Police forces appeared to have adopted and gradually adapted this approach as an operational framework for cooperating with DS in policing local NTEs. First, the element of ‘positive incentives’ is mirrored in the friendly and supportive exchanges, which were often initiated by the police as a signal of appreciation and readiness to co-police the crowds entering the night-time settings. These were primarily embedded as symbolic gestures, in that ‘every time a police vehicle would drive past one of the venues that we’re out, they would always sort of nod, and wave, and smile and we’d kind of acknowledge each other’ (DS_P7), with the purpose of fostering a personal touch (‘If I go out to (street name anonymised) now, most of them (DS) will know me by my first name’ [Police_P7]) and a ‘community sense’ (DS_P8). At the same time, these informal chats with the purpose of ‘making ourselves know to them’ (Police_P8) often facilitated a useful early intervention mapping process for the police. In particular, the DS were perceived as a key intelligence source, given that their working experience was valued in providing frontline police officers with key information about the frequency of violence in their venues:

‘They (frontline police officers) go and identify themselves to the door staff, so we’d get an early indication if there was a large gathering in one pub, out of character for that night, at least we’d know then we’d got to be concentrating a little bit more, maybe, a presence round that premises, as opposed to somewhere that’s got 10 people in that there’s nothing happening. So, I think they’ve got that relationship as well, with the officers that attend, because that’s one of the directions is to go in there – to go and find out who’s in the premises, and is there any likelihood of disorder, from their perspective’ (Police_P9).

The ‘soft’ message communicated by the police to DS was further complemented by the provision of training sessions on vulnerability and first aid to frontline security operatives.

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presence was limited (rural areas), the mode of confiscating drugs and touch-basing with the local police officers was adapted, as the following quote elucidates: ‘if the odd one does get through, then, and they get caught then, it is dealt with and the drugs get confiscated. They get removed from the venue – they get taken away from the venue. In some cases, the police are either there, so it gets reported – sometimes the police get called in – it depends on how much... you know... if it’s just a little bit that’s left, and it’s just been unfortunate for the public to get caught with whatever it is they’ve got, [chuckles] then it just gets put into a drugs bin and then the venue deal with that’ (Security company_P5).
Second, another dimension in the police rationale of initiating interactions with DS is closely linked with monitoring the security operatives’ adherence to the licensing requirements and to the desirable behavioural conduct. A visible police presence around night-time venues is associated with the ‘stick’ side of the approach, since it aims at sending a clear deterrent message to the local DS that their adherence to the licensing requirements is actively monitored. Through incorporating support and assistance towards the DS (‘soft’ message) with the reminder of a swift monitoring of their performance (‘hard’ message), both police forces seem to follow an interesting adaptation of the focussed deterrence strategies:

‘Some of my officers will go and take the SIA licence numbers off the door staff here, and we just keep on top of them a little bit – just to let them know that yeah, we’ve got good relationships with them, but we still enforce the licensing laws’ (Police_P7).

‘But it’s important, you just plant that seed when you’re out and about, to know that we are there; You’d just put them on their toes a little bit – what’s the capacity, how are you counting people in, how many staff they had on duty that night?’ (Police_P13).

However, an important caveat should be taken into account. In this case, the target population is not high-risk offenders (e.g. gang members, drug sellers), as suggested by the original version of the focussed deterrence strategies. Multi-agency collaborations in the NTE involve a wide array of agencies (police, local councils, Street Pastors, private security). What is noteworthy is that although each body might have different agendas and approaches, each of them should technically hold the same status of accountability and respect within the multi-agency group. The police monitoring of the DS’ adherence to the SIA regime is a process that does not occur towards any other partner, but the security industry. As a result, this reveals that in practice private security in this case is largely viewed as a useful ally in managing local NTEs, but trust in their conduct is not taken for granted and is dependent upon police approval. Therefore, the extent to which private security holds the same status of accountability and respect within the broader network of policing the local NTEs is questionable.

Besides this, the analysis in this section suggests that the non-existent or hostile interactions between the police and the DS are the exception, rather than the norm, in the post-regulation era. However, on a deeper level of analysis, the positive examples do not suggest an optimal

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172 Such an approach, commonly known as the ‘pulling levers’ framework, has been put forward as a viable strategy to tackle gang and drug crime (Braga et al., 2001; Braga et al., 2018) through integrating clear incentives for compliance and consequences for criminal activity.
partnership between private and public policing agents. The interview data illustrated an improved but asymmetric collaboration mode. First, local DS were portrayed to be a useful ally, as long as they were able and willing to undertake roles that are particularly useful to the police. Second, the flow of information was one-sided. The police seemed to be eager to liaise with local DS and to receive useful intelligence regarding suspicious individuals and incidents occurring in (or around) the licensed premises. However, partly due to general issue of the limited legal gateways available for police to disclose information to non-police bodies, none of the police interviewees suggested that potentially useful information was passed to security operatives. These caveats open up a follow-up tier of analysis and a critical question, which is addressed in the following section: how far from the idealised scenario of respect, collaboration and assistance are the contemporary collaboration dynamics between the police and security staff?

7.3 ‘Plastic policemen’ vs ‘real police work’: The persistence of trust deficits between the police and DS

This section outlines the main areas of concern by both security operatives and police officers, suggesting an interesting mixture of mutual trust deficits. These deficits illustrate that in some aspects, post-regulation relationships between DS and the police remain unchanged, echoing traditional stereotypes of the pre-regulation era.

“So he (DS working under the supervision of this participant), a big, fat lad, but really lovely, has walked over – with the General Manager of [the venue] – walked over to the group of police officers and said, “Oh, can you do us a favour? Can you just move this group of guys on, please? The one of them has launched a cheeseburger and it’s all over my face!” And one of the police officers said to [him] “Well, you look like you’ve eaten enough cheeseburgers!”” (Security company_P6).

This story, apart from the negative connotations of body-shaming, is a prime example of how interactions on the ground between frontline police and DS can deviate from the idealised scenario presented of respect, collaboration and assistance. From the security operative’s perspective, despite the signals of their professionalisation (uniform and SIA badge), they considered that on some occasions they were still framed as ‘knuckle-draggers’ (DS_P9) and ‘plastic policemen’ (DS_P7). The first term is mainly associated with a well-documented and long-standing aspect of police culture: police condescension towards non-police actors (McCarthy, 2013; O’Neil and McCarthy, 2014; Reiner, 2010). Police participants in this study framed their suspicions towards the DS sector drawing upon their past negative experiences,
especially when dealing with the ‘hardest blokes in the village working on the door of pubs’ (Police_P1) and with ‘licensed premises with reputations around horrible door staff who would beat you up’ (Police_P11). The second term refers to the police perception that DS were not good enough to enter the police service and instead they ended up in the lower tier of ‘security’, which can be associated with the ‘wanna-be’ culture that is frequently ascribed to the private security occupational culture (Manzo, 2009; Noaks, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003). Some police interviewees seemed to corroborate subtly this perception, through questioning whether some security staff had basic competences of undertaking their duties, as the following quote illustrates: ‘it’s simple – it’s common sense – but these doormen sometimes aren’t the most common-sense people’ (Police_P2).

Apart from the prevalence of these ‘bouncer’-related stereotypes, the wide spectrum of the current competences and responsibilities of the contemporary security operatives was not always embedded in police perceptions. What constituted one of the most important shared concerns in this regulated sector builds upon the lop-sided expectations from the police to DS, discussed in the previous section. Following the illustrative quotes from some participants, the fact that DS are first respondents in some moments of crisis in the NTE allows the ‘police to come in at the end and clean up with everything, but don’t have to sort of “get their hands dirty”, yet they’re the guys who get all the credit’ (DS_P7), implying that in practice the police should have been more ‘thankful that there’s door men around to sort out the trouble first hand, and then they just sling them in the van and take them away’ (DS_P14).

When dealing with violent incidents, many participants discussed how police officers were often taking for granted that their ‘needs-must’ ally should lend them a hand with public order or violent offences, but often resisting in practice to be mutually supportive towards the DS: ‘we don’t really expect the police to have our backs – they expect us to have theirs, but nine times out of ten it kicks off, they’ll come looking at us, they won’t go to the customers – they come at us, because they judge us as bullies’ (DS_P9). Concerns about this lopsided expectation for assistance could be elucidated through the assumption of the police officers that the DS’ role is ‘to give the public whatever assistance they can to help them do the job of “real policing”’ (Stenning, 1989, p.180). In other words, the boundaries between the remits of ‘security’ work (low-level end of crime/loss prevention) and the ‘real’ police work (law enforcement) (Prenzler and Sarre, 1998) often appear to be deeply ingrained in the police culture with adverse impacts upon the development of a mutually valued collaboration.
Despite the gradual development of a ‘working together’ mentality, the lived realities of DS suggest that in practice there is sometimes the perception of a reverse application of the presumption of innocence\(^{173}\). In other words, in cases of violence escalation in the NTE, the primary working hypothesis for the police appeared to be that the DS have had a critical role in initiating the incident, highlighting the concern that ‘people are too quick to blame door staff without trying to find out the facts’ (DS_P5). Being portrayed by their police ‘partners’ as the ‘usual suspects’ in provoking physical altercations in their venues calls into question the assumption that the DS sector has, at least symbolically, become a valued part of the extended policing family. Moreover, this assertion appears to be linked to a belief amongst DS participants that the police will not support them; claims that are particularly concerning because of the high levels of assault many of them experience while doing their job. For example:

‘Lately, a few door staff have been assaulted, and yeah, they might arrest a guy, but they always let them go – they never press charges. Very, very rarely do they press charges. If it was a doorman, they would press charges immediately. It’s a bit sad’ (DS_P4).

‘Now, on Black Friday, we had a doorman working at a place called (anonymised). Now, the doorman got hit so bad, it cracked his eye socket, and he had a black eye, right? But the police, then, never took that on. And it frustrates the door supervisor, because they think ‘Well I’m here, I’m no scapegoat – I’m here to protect people, but who’s protecting me?’ (DS_P16).

All these concerns and trust deficits, which had the potential to place barriers upon enhancing working interrelationships between the two groups, were also echoed in police participants’ accounts. At the core of police scepticism towards the DS sector lies a twofold underpinning rationale. First, compliance with the SIA regime and the improvement of standards in this regulated part of the industry was mainly depicted as the outcome of a sustained police monitoring of their ‘fit and proper’ status, rather than the outcome of a substantial and ingrained change in the sector. In particular, compared with the pre-regulation ‘bouncer’ model, security operatives in the current era were seen as much more professional and capable guardians in NTE settings. However, adhering to the licensing rules and to the contemporary responsibility spectrum of ‘soft’ policing were not always associated with the gradual maturity of the sector. Therefore, such a shared understanding between police participants highlights that the DS sector is portrayed to need the swiftness of police monitoring and the fear of punishment as essential conditions for upholding professionalism:

\(^{173}\) The presumption of innocence is the legal principle that one is considered innocent unless proven guilty.
‘We’ll visit SIA staff (DS), we’ll check their licences – their badge – so they know ‘I’ve got to be professional here, because I’ve got the cops know who I am, they’ve got my list of who was working on the night, and they’re looking out for us’ (Police_P11).

Second, police scepticism and reluctance towards promoting an even more embedded collaboration and alliance in practice with security operatives stemmed from the criticism of the professional capabilities and accountability structures in the DS sector. What is interesting to note is that during the fieldwork, almost all police participants shared a positive and empathetic perspective when considering the development of the DS role in recent years. At this stage, emphasis was placed by police participants on the parallel trajectories of their roles and the common challenges (abuse, lack of respect) that they both had to face. However, when the researcher prompted them to reflect on the ever-increasing role of private policing in the contemporary society, a much more negative stance towards both the DS and the broader security industry was revealed. The conversation mode was shifted to a much more sceptical and sometimes hostile tone towards security operatives, with the primary focus now being switched to the unbridged gaps between their accountability and professionalism.

At the forefront of police scepticism were the negative comments regarding the breadth and depth of the competency requirement and their alleged inferior skillset was a recurring theme: ‘So, we get all that training, there’s no reason not to be professional, in every circumstance. I don’t think door supervisors get anything like that, so, to compare the two, we are poles apart’ (Police_P10). These assertions echo a symbolic mistrust towards the skillset of DS, since police awareness of the SIA training curriculum was minimal and their working experiences did not document specific evidence on how the current DS training could be insufficient on a practical level. However, criticism of the use of body-worn cameras and handcuffs by DS had a more pragmatic and utilitarian basis, since the administration and use of both are not regulated by the SIA. In terms of the former, the lack of a strong ethical framework in handling sensitive data by DS was a source of concern since ‘it could be open to abuse, where they might put it on – for any other reason – for them to have a good laugh at somebody, to have a pry into somebody’s privacy when they talk to somebody, or it could be that they might want to get identification off there for something that they want to do’ (Police_P8). Regarding the latter, the neutral stance of the SIA coupled with the lack of a compulsory training course for the DS appeared to be important barriers for the police to legitimise the use of handcuffs by security operatives. On a symbolic level, DS are just ‘members of the public and not warranted officers’ (Police_P12) and on a pragmatic level

\[174\] A more detailed analysis of this issue can be found in the next section.
because this can lead to a variety of problematic scenarios ‘from not handcuffing correctly – broken bones, sprains and all sorts of injury’ (Police_P13).

Another key dimension of the trust deficits between the two sectors is documented through the perceived accountability-related differences. Police participants unanimously portrayed themselves as the ‘only emergency service that goes and stays’ (Police_P7), with frequent references to how ‘we’re trained, professional, led by the Government with really highly-skilled people in different places to deal with all sorts of different things’ (Police_P8), as opposed to the commodified DS who are accountable only to the business or their ‘frontline gaffer’ (Police_P11). In the existing body of literature regarding the approaches on commodification of security, the three overarching perspectives are ‘scepticism’ (Reiner, 1992), ‘idealism’ (Wood and Shearing, 2007) and ‘pragmatism’ (Prenzler and Sarre, 2014). What is notable in this thesis is that the police officers’ accounts tend to subtly transcend between the ‘pragmatism’ and ‘scepticism’ terrain. More specifically, in the previous section it was highlighted how police officers expressed a partial recognition of the ‘heroism’ of DS, who often surpassed their contractual agreements in favour of their own moral agenda in cases of safeguarding intoxicated individuals (Loader and White, 2017; 2018). However, such a recognition was not a sufficient condition for maintaining ‘pragmatism’ among them, or even set in motion the movement towards the most embracing stage of ‘idealism’. Police participants in south-east Wales were often bound by a sceptical stance towards DS, showcasing an ingrained resistance to overemphasise the already apparent similarities between the two groups, as well as the ‘above and beyond’ contributions of the DS in the local NTEs. Such a resistance appeared to be rooted in the necessity to maintain the symbolic differentiation between ‘policing’ and ‘private security’. In a few instances, such an argument reached the extreme representation of the vilified term ‘private policing’ as an illegitimate enterprise associated with organised crime, following a rather Hollywood-inspired version of mafia, drug lords and their security guards. As the following quotes elucidate:

‘Door staff are better off just dealing with the boundary of their premises, and leaving that public space to others, because that’s where they become almost like a “private policing” and we

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175 A more detailed analysis of this body of literature can be found on Chapter 2.

176 It is interesting to note that, although many police participants discussed how DS police their venues, in the later stages of the interview, when the researcher used the term ‘private policing’ participants expressed immediately their reservations with the use of this term. In particular, they asserted that ‘private policing’ is only used in academic circles and has mistakenly captured the remit of policing, which is strictly reserved for public servants, as a set of services that can be pursued by private providers.
haven’t got that in this country, you know what I mean... yeah, I think they should just focus on that’ (Police_P15).

‘Has any country in the world gone away from police forces and had private security companies? No, and where they have cropped up, they tend to be kind of mafia and drugs, organised criminal gang-led private armies of people. But again, the only people who can afford their own private armies, enforcers or whatever, are the drug barons, typically, in South America – places like that’ (Police_P1).

Besides this, such a sceptical (in few instances extreme) stance towards frontline security operatives revealed how police participants were often prone to presenting an idealised version of their own professionalism. These representations not only echoed cynicism, suspicion and isolation, some of the main characteristics of police culture (Cockcroft, 2012; Reiner, 2010), but also vividly unpacked the idea of police as a ‘thin blue line’; ‘the primary force which secures, or makes possible, all the things said to be at the core of human existence’ (Wall, 2019, p.3). Certain beliefs about solidarity and the ‘blue code’ are, according to Westmarland (2003, 2005), deeply entrenched in the police occupational culture. Through over-emphasising (and in some instances exaggerating) their professional integrity, the narratives of police interviewees served the purpose of reinforcing their own status, perhaps especially in an era of austerity and cuts to public services.

Trust and respect deficits towards the DS sector were to a certain degree expected research findings that aligned not only with the existing literature on private and public policing partnerships\(^\text{177}\), but also with the viewpoint of the SIA that there is still a cultural change that needs to be achieved for those ‘police officers who just have in their heads that security officers are part of the problem, not part of the solution’ (SIA_P3). What is noteworthy however, is the extent to which the perceived divergence between the accountability of police and security operatives amounts to a cynical dismissal (or ignorance) of the statutory regulatory regime that exists for some parts of the private security. In particular, although the role of the SIA was acknowledged by the police in terms of cleansing the DS sector from criminal elements, its overall impact upon instilling a professional code of conduct and a ‘state-centric’ touch on the sector was downplayed:

\(^{177}\) As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (section 2.4).
'We are a publicly accountable service, which is held to account – as I said – by Law, Statute, Regulation, the Police and Crime Commissioner. I don’t think that regulatory framework, that transparency, the integrity you’ve got from a public police service, would be transferrable to a private sector organisation’ (Police_P12).

7.4 An explanatory framework for the dynamic relationships between police and DS: facilitators and inhibitors

The previous sections clearly depicted that the nature of the collaboration, interactions and perceptions between public and private agents of policing in the Welsh NTEs is diverse and dynamic. Although the researcher agrees with the assertion that ‘no one model of police-security relations can be entirely explanatory’ (Sarre and Prenzler, 2000, p.106), it can be argued that the targeted focus of this thesis178 allows the emergence of some situated observations regarding the key facilitators and inhibitors of the interrelationships between the two groups. More specifically, it is argued that in policing the Welsh NTEs, police officers and DS seem to operate under the ‘junior-partner’ model (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Elements of the ‘supplementary service model’ (Sarre, 2011) are central to this framework, but they are not static, since different enabling or hindering factors can make the ‘active partnership’ to move backwards to the earlier stages of ‘denigration’ and ‘competition’ (Stenning, 1989). Pragmatism features as the key driving force behind the development of this collaboration in the local context. Gill’s (2015) research on senior police officers’ perspectives on private security identified three groups: sceptics, pragmatists and embracers. As opposed to identifying distinct groups, this analysis suggests that police officers across south-east Wales are essentially pragmatists, driven by operational realities, and that being supportive or critical stance towards DS reflects adaptation to specific scenarios, rather than being a generic perspective.

To begin with unfolding the key role of pragmatism, a commonly repeated theme concerned the cuts in police resources in the current austerity era, which formed the basis of their operational considerations on the ‘need to share our workload out, and if someone can assist us – then great’ (Police_P3). Security operatives’ role in the NTE was framed by local police officers to be a necessity rather than an ideal requirement and such a ‘needs-must’ approach is echoed in the following statements: ‘(DS are) important witnesses and we need to be supportive of them, because we need them to give statements’ (Police_P11) and ‘there is a degree of like co-operation

178 The targeted focus of the thesis is twofold: a) on a specific sector of the regulated private security industry sectors in the UK, namely the DS sector and b) the location of the fieldwork with regard to the regulatees (DS and security companies), as well as the police targets the areas of South Wales and Gwent.
because it suits them to co-operate with us, and it kind of “keeps us at bay” then, to a degree’ (Police_P4). However, behind this benign pragmatism, evidence from the previous sections illustrate a defensive police perspective, which often did not do justice to the challenging aspects of the DS’s frontline role. Although on many occasions security operatives were actively undertaking many aspects of the ‘real’ frontline policing, many police interviewees appeared to underplay the DS’ contribution, suggesting that only the police deal with the ‘sharp end of public security’ (Johnston, 1992). Echoing the literature discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.4), this part of the fieldwork lends support to the argument that the police across the board do not always embrace the idea of partnership with other bodies. Their uniqueness is already under attack from general trends and thus accepting symbiosis and alliance with the private security is sometimes skewed by police’s reluctance to accept the operational realities that could jeopardise their status as the ‘special’ ones.

Therefore, the working relationships between the police and DS is not a static concept; instead it should be viewed on a spectrum, since a seemingly positive and embracing stance could often turn into scepticism and even antagonism and hostility between the two groups. The interview data and analysis in the previous sections offered a plethora of evidence from both ends of this spectrum. Moreover, they reveal that the key factors affecting the direction of the pragmatic considerations and its application in practice are the following: a) the recognition of the SIA’s role and its remit, b) the local context (urban vs rural areas), c) the specific role of police officers in the policing remit of the NTEs (frontline, strategic or licensing-related role) and d) the strategic agenda of each police force (priorities and their broader view on the role of private security).

With reference to the role of the SIA, the overarching argument is that the regulatory framework was understood as an intermediary tool for fostering the ‘needs-must’ relationship between the two groups rather than a statutory tool with the actual potential to challenge and ultimately change the dynamics between the police and the security operatives. In other words, the regulatory regime appears to have a dynamic secondary role (being either a facilitator or sometimes an inhibitor) in shaping the working interrelationships between the police and the DS, rather than a role of a static key driver. The main working hypothesis supporting this assertion is that if more respect and appreciation existed for the public body tasked with regulating the sector (on a strategic level within the police), this could be transmitted to the operational/frontline level and possibly allow the greater development of the working relationships between the DS and the police. Although there was a broader consensus in terms of the SIA’s contribution to remove criminals from the industry and equip the sector with a much more capable workforce, there is
evidence to suggest that in practice the role of the regulator was obscure, underplayed or even questioned.

First, during the fieldwork with police participants the researcher was often surprised by either the lack of baseline knowledge or the misinterpretation of the key features of the SIA’s identity, licensing requirements and enforcement policy. This could be indicative of the broader police perception that new organisations, such as the SIA, operate ‘in the shadow of a powerful and culturally resonant non-market provider—namely the police’ (Loader et al., 2014, p.475). On many occasions, police interviewees confused the status of DS as SIA licensees with ‘SIA staff/SIA members’. Lack of an accurate understanding of the SIA’s criminality criteria was also commonplace. For instance, some participants mistakenly assumed that the criminality criteria have fundamentally changed since the introduction of the SIA: ‘when it (SIA) first came in, it was like anybody was getting a licence anyway, it was just a kind of… issuing a licence, kind of thing. But as more stuff has gone on over the years – from what I’ve seen – it seems it has been an improvement’ (Police_P11).

Police participants also tended to believe that these criteria prevent anyone with a criminal record from being issued with a licence (‘if they’ve got previous convictions then you are barred from that’ (Police_P12), ‘I know they can’t have a criminal record when they’re going for an SIA licence’ [Police_P8]). Furthermore, police awareness of the training curriculum was limited, yet paradoxically, recommendations on what could be add-ons for the existing training course were abundant (‘I’d be interested to know what their training processes are, I personally would have them before they can even get their licence, they’ve got to have taken – and passed – a conflict course’ (Police_P11)). Regarding the SIA’s regulatory oversight of security companies, the fieldwork revealed a marked confusion on whether security firms are under a compulsory licensing scheme, as it is the case with individual licence-holders: ‘you’ll have some companies who are really willing to work with us and then you’ll have others – all SIA registered – who are completely not that way’ (Police_P4). Finally, few police interviewees had much awareness of

179 The researcher acknowledges that this statement might be perceived by the readers as a blunt and possibly unfair criticism towards the local police forces. However, the purview of the analysis is to provide a critical and constructive assessment of the police’s perspective towards the DS sector and the SIA. All police participants in this research project were purposefully selected and the fundamental criteria were the following: a) their operational or strategic involvement with NTE-related policing and b) sustained exchanges and interactions with DS. Therefore, before the data collection, the researcher assumed that this group of participants would have had a solid knowledge of the key features of the SIA regime (SIA licensing process, training curriculum, enforcement options). Being self-reflective and realistic, the researcher had set these expectations to a very baseline level; she did not expect all participants to be able to discuss in great detail some technicalities of the regime (e.g. POCA powers to the SIA). However, given the proclaimed partnerships between the SIA and the police, she considered that having awareness of the criminality criteria and a brief overview of the training course were common knowledge and thus fair expectations from all police officers who had dealings with the regulated sector and the SIA.
how the SIA goes about enforcing its regime, with participants stating that their ‘knowledge of the detailed regulations or statute is not good enough to make a comment’ (Police_P12).

Second, regarding their collaboration dynamics, police officers from the Licensing Departments of both forces considered that the police were ‘the eyes and the ears for the SIA’ (Police_P2). Although the joint licensing operations in the NTE were considered to run smoothly, the subtle scepticism towards the SIA was associated with the intelligence flow between both parties and SIA’s minimal operational visibility. Echoing the conception of police officers as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), police participants viewed themselves at the centre of coordinating the information exchange process with the regulator, since ‘the only time they [SIA] could be proactive is if we’ve got a real problem, or we want to do something, and we will contact them’ (Police_P2), highlighting at the same time that ‘frontline staff working in the SIA are hardly ever within our night-time economy, I can’t remember the guy’s name who works in our area’ (Police_P15). Therefore, it can be argued that a solid knowledge of the SIA’s regime and a sustained trust in the regulator’s proactivity in both the intelligence flow and its operational visibility are critical facilitators for sustaining an active and meaningful collaboration. On the contrary, their absence not only hinders the working relationships between the police and the SIA, but it also fuels arguments around the lack of accountability and regulatory oversight (section 7.3) for the DS, ultimately leading towards the side of ‘denigration’ and ‘competition’ (Stenning, 1989).

Turning now to the factor of locality, it is significant to consider how the infrastructure of urban and rural settings can have a considerable impact upon the direction of the collaboration between the police and security operatives. In the three Welsh cities (Cardiff, Newport and Swansea) the key ‘local facilitator’ is supported by the radio network across the NTE, alongside the visible police presence patrolling the high streets. Through these two important add-ons, the DS are encouraged to seek assistance in cases of violence escalation and their queries or calls for help are usually met with very good response rates by the police. As a result, these technical assets in the NTE infrastructure facilitate a more sustained collaboration on the ground, which has the potential for both groups to make them move away from the trust deficits discussed in section 7.3. As opposed to Welsh cities, rural towns across South Wales did not benefit from these and, as it is illustrated in the following quote, judgements on the quality and the efficacy of the police were negatively skewed:

‘The police are really good in Cardiff – they’ve got a lot more police down Cardiff – whereas I work in Porthcawl – the Porthcawl Police Station, it’s not manned anymore, in the nights, so if
a big incident happens, we have to wait for the nearest officers to come, or someone from Bridgend’ (DS_P13).

However, at the same time rural settings benefited from a ‘community sense’ (DS_P8), which contributed significantly to the development of supportive and friendly exchanges between them, as highlighted in section 7.2. Although in Cardiff, Newport and Swansea the NTE infrastructure appeared to play the role of the facilitator in these relationships, the lack of a personal touch in the exchanges between both groups was often portrayed to be a step backwards in the mission of bridging the gaps between the two ‘policing agents’. Through the ‘village mentality of everybody knowing everyone’ (DS_P8) and the fact that both police officers and DS, unlike their colleagues in cities, are not on a transient working mode, sustained positive interactions were made possible. Given the frequency of these interactions in close-knit towns in South Wales, both groups had the opportunity to challenge the historical stereotypes of the ‘us and them’ perspective; DS could realise that in Valleys towns they were not necessarily framed as the aggressors, whereas the police could get a more grounded sense of the difficult sides of the DS job and empathise with them:

‘Like I worked Ebbw Vale for about 6 years, and after a while I got to know the local... it was the same – every weekend, it was the same officers who were dealing with stuff, and coming to the venue, so you built up a relationship with them, which did – I’ve got to be fair – made it a lot easier’ (DS_P8).

‘We have a fantastic working relationship with the police up here. I cannot speak highly enough of them. I can’t. We’re, again, in a really fortunate position that we have the same police, probably, week in week out – unfortunately, they have to put up with us! – and I give them coffee every weekend, to keep them onside! [laughs]’ (DS_P20).

‘Worked throughout many places throughout the Valleys where it was a fantastic relationship, because the police understood, maybe, what we were dealing with as door supervisors’ (Security company_P4).

The facilitators and inhibitors associated with urban and local areas in South Wales and Gwent are further interlinked with another important factor in the broader framework discussed in this section. This factor concerns the specific role and position of the police officers (frontline/licensing/strategic) within the remit of policing the local NTEs. ‘Bobbies on the beat’ through their high-visibility patrols across the NTE are being provided with the direct opportunity
to observe the behaviour and competences of the security operatives, as well as to directly engage with them either proactively or at the stage of ‘picking up the pieces of the fights’ (DS_P7). Regardless of the frequency and the quality of the on-the-ground interactions between them, the frontline role in both groups allows them to have a much more evidence-based and nuanced appraisal of their common ground and their shared challenges. The overall perspective and the specific interactions are qualitatively different, when one is considering the exchanges between the Licensing Department (strategic planning for community safety) and security operatives. In particular, through the fieldwork of this thesis two identified scenarios are outlined:

- Scenario 1-‘The security industry is absent from Licensing/Strategic meetings on crime and disorder in the NTE’: This case was prevalent mainly in South Wales and Gwent towns, where neither security companies operating in the area nor their DS working frontline in the local night-time venues were invited to any of these meetings related to managing the licensing conditions and other risks in the NTE. It is noteworthy that when minimal communication was documented between Police Licensing and the DS, the basis for initiating a dialogue between them was the existence of a licensing-related problem caused by the security company (‘that’s the only time I’ve had to contact them – any SIA company that supply door staff – that’s the only time I’ve ever had to contact, because of the problem that happened’ [Police_P3]). As such, on a more strategic/licensing police role, the nature of the interaction with DS is predominantly geared towards monitoring the DS’ compliance with the prescribed licensing requirements.

- Scenario 2-‘The security industry is represented through some security firms in these meetings’. In Welsh cities the interview data suggested that, as opposed to the more fragmented initiatives across the rural areas, these meetings have become an embedded practice involving primarily Police Chief Inspectors, Police Licensing and the Local Authorities. The contribution of private security to managing the risks in the NTEs was often praised and police participants in these urban locations commented that ‘they’d begun to meet the biggest companies providing door staff and have regular, structured meetings with them so that we could address their concerns and they could likewise come back and let us know their difficulties’ (Police_P1). Although the overall take-away message appears to be pointing towards the direction of the ‘junior-partner’ model, the absence of business licensing has the potential of hindering such a positive development. Locally sourced intelligence appears to fill the void of a SIA centralised registration database, since the police have to elicit background information regarding the respectability and performance of the known security companies in the area. Although this seemed to be a standard practice in both police forces,
such a process appeared to raise concerns amongst police participants, highlighting that they could not always guarantee the best representation from the DS sector.

Last, a key driver for the development of the police pragmatism is associated with the strategic agenda of each police force. The strategic account of each force plays an important role in shaping not only the local crime-related priorities, but also its broader organisational identity and thus its positionality and receptivity towards the private security industry. With reference to the SWP force, there is an interesting contrast within its strategic commitments to private policing agents. On the one hand, the prospect of delivering training or awareness sessions to DS about first aid and vulnerability has been met with positive action by the force. More specifically, there was a strategic ‘drive for us (police) to train door staff to understand the signs of vulnerability’ (Police_P11), echoing the findings of the latest PEEL inspection of the SWP, which highlighted that ‘the force is good at understanding and identifying vulnerability’ (HMICFRS, 2019, p.11) and that ‘it has developed a problem profile for county lines to identify the problems of vulnerability and hidden harm associated with county lines criminality’ (HMICFRS, 2019, p.15).

However, despite the eagerness of the force to support and educate frontline security operatives, the prospect of operationalising the powers associated with the Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS) has been associated with an overwhelmingly negative stance. Participants had been quite vocal in suggesting that ‘these services could not be delivered through a private company or a private individual’ (Police_P12) and that ‘in South Wales Police, our Chief Constable doesn’t even want to give them to statutory partners, never mind give them to door staff’ (Police_P15). Such a resistance towards the particular scheme, coupled with the underpinning logic that transparency and public trust can be instilled only through the police service, sets the foundations for a collaboration which at its best can reach the level of the ‘junior-partner’ level. At the time of writing, there are no prospects for progressing to the ultimate stage of a ‘regulated equal partnership’.

A completely reverse strategic set-up exists for the Gwent Police force. Although the CSAS scheme has been moderately operationalised by the force, these training sessions did not appear

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180 This is a voluntary scheme under which chief constables can choose to accredit employed people already working in roles that contribute to maintaining and improving community safety with limited but targeted powers (Home Office, 2015).

181 According to the Freedom of Information Request 2010/14168, the organisations that employ ‘accredited persons’, who have been granted powers under the CSAS by the Chief Constable of the Gwent Police force, were: local authorities (trading standards & community safety warden schemes), University of Wales (security officers), Welsh Cycling (cycle marshals), City & Suburban Parking Ltd (traffic management) and Bradsons (traffic management).
to be part and parcel of the supportive mechanisms in place for their interactions with DS. This is also supported by the most recent inspection of the force (HMICFRS, 2018), which suggests that the force’s response to safeguarding and the way that this area is aligned within policing priorities needs improvement. There appeared to be a moderately positive stance towards the prospect of contributing to the DS’ training skillset in the future, highlighting that ‘we should have more of an involvement of actually “what we want you to be doing”’ (Police_P4). A more in depth analysis of these statements reveal a greater degree of scepticism in light of finite resources and the role of the SIA, who were portrayed as the key body for ensuring that operatives are trained appropriately and ‘do it in one, as we shouldn’t have to come behind, mopping up’ (Police_P2).

7.5 Concluding remarks

The overarching objective of this chapter was to explore the impact of the SIA’s licensing regime on enabling DS to become an integral part of the extended policing family. Drawing upon the analysis of the data gathered through the fieldwork across south-east Wales, this part of the thesis suggests that there has been an improvement in the working relationships between police officers and DS in the local Welsh NTEs. However, whilst collaboration is agreed to have improved, it is essentially asymmetric. In other words, there is a lop-sided expectation of assistance and flow of intelligence from the police towards the DS. Furthermore, mutual trust and respect deficits have not faded away in the SIA regulation era.

In order to make sense of these findings, it is argued that a more holistic explanatory framework should move away from the distinct classifications of police perceptions as sceptics, pragmatists and embracers. The analysis in this chapter illustrated how police participants are essentially pragmatists, yet their commonplace defensive perspective does not often allow them to give appropriate credit to the DS’ contribution and thus channels of communication are sometimes blocked. Evidence from the fieldwork suggest how the operational realities of the police are not standalone perspectives, but they are influenced by specific scenarios. These scenarios are associated with particular enabling and hindering factors that affect the direction of police pragmatism in practice: a) the recognition of the SIA’s role and its remit, b) the local context (urban vs. rural areas), c) the specific role of police officers in the policing remit of the NTEs (frontline, strategic or licensing-related role) and d) the strategic agenda of each police force (priorities and their broader view on the role of private security).
The proposition of this explanatory model pinpoints the dynamic nature of the relationships between the local police and DS. As such, this chapter highlights that the SIA’s regime appeared to have a dynamic secondary role as a facilitator or sometimes an inhibitor in shaping up the working interrelationships between the police and the DS, rather than a role of a static key driver. The development of a solid knowledge of the SIA’s regime and a sustained trust in the regulatory oversight of the security industry could be catalysts in improving the working relationships between the police and the regulator on a strategic level. Moving one step further, if these developments are transmitted to the operational/frontline level, they have the potential of facilitating a more positive collaboration mode between DS and response police officers. Yet, echoing the dichotomy between ‘street’ cops and ‘management’ cops (Reuss-Ianni, 1983), both DS and frontline police officers are more likely to be influenced by their day-to-day interactions rather than by a ‘top-down’ directive. As such, on the operational front the development of the collaboration between the two groups is still very much contingent on other key factors in this explanatory framework (i.e., the local context).
Chapter 8: Contextualising compliance and enforcement for individuals (DS) across south-east Wales: facilitators and inhibitors

8.1 Introduction

Drawing on interview data from DS, security directors/managers, police and the SIA, this chapter has two objectives and as such its analysis contributes to two research questions. First, it seeks to shed light on the key drivers of (non)compliance on the individual level (DS) across south-east Wales. Following the legal definition of compliance in the Private Security Industry Act (PSIA) 2001 for individual licence holders, a compliant DS is someone who has been granted a licence from the SIA\textsuperscript{182} for the specific security-related role and adheres to the requirement of renewing his/her licence every three years. Moving one step further from this generic and overarching legal definition, the PSIA 2001 links compliance with adherence to the professional boundaries of the security operative’s role. Escalation of violence, unsafe physical restraint techniques and failure to display the SIA badge are key examples that could be considered as contravening the licensing conditions (PSIA 2001, s.9) and can lead to either a suspension or a revocation of the DS licence.

In this chapter, the process of exploring the motives and other factors that facilitate or hinder compliance with the SIA’s regime is undertaken through the lens of the Nielsen-Parker holistic compliance model (Nielsen and Parker, 2012; Parker and Nielsen, 2017). As discussed in Chapter 2, it does not stand as a single unified explanatory model; it offers a broad and multifaceted understanding of compliance, through emphasising the interaction between different factors (spontaneous compliance factors\textsuperscript{183} and enforced compliance factors), as well as different actors and mechanisms that influence each other and create (non)compliance. Therefore, it relates to research question 3.

Second, this part of the thesis builds upon Chapter 5, which examined the development of the SIA’s strategic narrative in terms of its enforcement approach. In particular, it seeks to explore how the SIA’s enforcement approach is contextualised on the ground and its effects on regulatees.

\textsuperscript{182} As discussed in Chapter 4, in order for an individual SIA licence to be issued, two are the key requirements: a) criminality background checks and b) competency requirement.

\textsuperscript{183} Through a brief overview of what has been illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 2, Nielsen and Parker (2012) refer to spontaneous compliance factors as a set of compliance-related drivers that are related to the following subgroups: a) economic, social and normative motives (economic costs and benefits, degree of acceptance of the specific regulation, existence of non-official influence over the targeted group’s compliance) and b) characteristics and capacities of the regulated group(s) (business model, knowledge of the rules and capacity to comply). Moving from the spontaneous compliance factors to the enforced compliance ones, these are associated with the following conditions: respect for the regulator, risk of inspection, risk of detection, risk of sanction and severity of sanction.
The analysis integrates two key themes; the SIA’s enforcement strategy as a deterrent factor for DS and the SIA’s enforcement styles in the day-to-day dealings with security operatives across south-east Wales. Therefore, it also corresponds to research question 4.

8.2 Economic, social and normative motives for compliance in the DS community

In the local context there seemed to be a clear-cut recognition and acceptance of the regulatory regime among security operatives; obtaining the SIA licence and adhering to the licensing requirements was framed as a viable route for ensuring that their employment is legitimate and thus making a living (or supplementing their primary income) is guaranteed. The significant economic considerations associated with the adherence to their occupational regulations were mutually recognised by DS, as well as local police officers:

‘With regulation, it made people a bit more accountable – people think twice – if you’re relying on your badge to make sure that you’re earning a living, then you can’t afford to risk losing it by breaking the Law’ (DS_P2).

‘If we take a report of an over-zealous member of staff, then we can revoke their licence, so then they can’t work on that door. So, then, technically they’re out of employment. So, it’s in their interest to be professional at all times – it’s in their interest to do what they’re paid to do and engage with us and our fellow partners’ (Police_P14).

When DS participants were weighing up the economic costs and benefits of being non-compliant with the regulatory regime, the cost of cutting corners was associated with their licence being suspended or revoked, which in turn has severe implications for their employment and the financial strains that may follow. Regarding the benefits of working in the sector unlicensed, these were linked with the avoidance of payment of SIA-related fees: a) for the training course (between £150 and £250) and b) for the licence application fee (£190 for a three-year licence.

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184 These considerations are also known as the ‘gain goal’, following Lindenberg’s (1989; 2001) goal framing theory. Such a goal refers to the broad construct of either preserving or increasing one’s resources. In the context of this thesis with reference to the DS sector, the ‘gain goal’ equates with making a living through working on the doors in the local NTEs.

185 On a number of occasions, prospective DS have the opportunity to undertake the SIA accredited training course at no cost, since the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA), as well as Job Centres, local councils and employers of DS personnel could fund these courses, when specific requirements are met (e.g. the prospective DS has been unemployed for more than a year).
and for every subsequent renewal application\textsuperscript{186}). It is interesting to note that these fees have been frequently portrayed as a financial burden for many DS interviewees, who were quite vocal in discussing how they perceived these fees to be lacking a justification basis. This was primarily attributed to the previously discussed low wages in the sector\textsuperscript{187} and further exacerbated by drawing some parallels between the occupational similarities of their industry and other emergency services, vividly highlighting that ‘I’m paying to be able to do my job, which I can’t understand. A police officer doesn’t have to pay every 3 years for his licence to be a police officer. A fireman doesn’t have to pay every 3 years for his licence to be a fireman. I see my job; I’m protecting the public – I don’t see why I should have to pay for that privilege’ (DS_P8). Besides this, many DS interviewees demonstrated a lack of a grounded understanding on how the licence fee is used in practice by the SIA to fund its licensing and enforcement-related operations: ‘The fees, every 3 years you’re paying £220. Why are you paying £220? Because all you’re realistically getting is a DBS check which is £35? So, where does nearly £200 go, every 3 years?’ (Security company_P2). Despite such a resistance towards the licence fee, this did not seem to influence their compliance:

‘Like I said, it’s not the highest earning profession in the world, but the repercussions for having a fake licence would be too great. The reward would not warrant the risk, I don’t think. I can’t think of anyone sensible would risk it’ (DS_P6).

Portraying a regulated individual as a ‘homo economicus’ has been mostly associated with an arguably crude and cynical representation of utility maximisation (Etienne, 2010). In the case of the DS sector, the analysis of the interview data suggests a much more nuanced dimension attached to the ‘gain goal’ of DS. Although the motive of preserving their resources (and thus being able to make a living) was considered as a fundamental facilitator in ensuring that frontline DS are licensed and compliant, this was largely influenced by some other social and normative motives. ‘Acting appropriately’ and ‘doing the right thing’, following the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989), were guided by a multi-faceted moral motive. At its core we can identify the theme of moral considerations and empathising techniques in the ‘soft’ policing array of DS responsibilities. As underlined in Chapter 6, economic/contractual responsibilities and moral obligations for frontline security operatives in this local context jostled and collided. Their willingness on some occasions to exceed their strictly defined contractual agreements in favour

\textsuperscript{186}The licence fee has followed a downward trend since January 2012. Between January 2012 and October 2019 this fee has been set at £220, followed by a further reduction in the period from October 2019 up until April 2020 (£210). The most recent reduction was introduced in April 2020, setting the current licence fee at £190.

\textsuperscript{187}Chapter 6, section 6.2.
of public protection highlighted the importance of integrating the dimension of ‘moral actors’ (Loader and White, 2017, 2018) into the current discourse\(^{188}\). The connection between morality and normative motives is further enhanced from a compliance perspective. Abiding by the SIA licensing rules was often facilitated by what Nielsen and Parker (2012) describe in their model as the existence of non-official influence over the targeted group’s compliance. In particular, for DS participants this was evident through the respect and appreciation towards their employers (security firms) and the licensed premises that they work for:

‘But if you’re respected by your boss, you’ll kind of do things for their sake, because if I messed up it would look bad on (male & female names anonymised), so [he] would get in trouble through his licence. And I think if you’ve got that respect for your manager, and a good working relationship, you wouldn’t do that to them’ (DS_P3).

However, the security company’s corporate mindset and its influence over their employees did not always facilitate their compliance with the SIA regime. In most cases when a frontline DS is found to be working unlicensed or was contravening licensing requirements, the employer was complicit in this regulatory misdemeanour. According to the participants, ‘it’s the bosses at the top’ (DS_P14) who are either turning a blind eye or actively encouraging the non-compliant culture across the echelons of their business. Given the significance of the corporate culture in hindering the law-abiding stance of the DS, a more detailed analysis of the specific mechanisms underpinning this process is offered in Chapter 9.

8.3 The effect of deterrence factors in securing individual (DS) compliance: the perceived risk of inspection and enforcement action by the SIA

Economic, social and normative motives underpinning decisions of compliance do not exist in a vacuum. Compliance-related decisions are largely influenced by the following deterrence factors: their understandings on the SIA’s enforcement activities, the extent to which they consider themselves to be likely targets of an inspection, the perceived swiftness and the severity of the sanction and their broader evaluation of the SIA’s enforcement approach (Routledge, 2015). However, as it became evident in the previous section and in light of the analysis in this one, DS’ decision-making should not be seen as an objective cost-benefit calculation. Instead, their

\(^{188}\) The current discourse about the positionality of frontline security operatives in the NTE portrays them either as economic actors, who have ended up in a rather undesirable role due to the lack of further competences or simply to supplement their income and make a living or as a deviant monoculture, largely characterised by machismo, violence escalation and involvement OC (organised crime)-related activities (Chapter 2).
perceptions were based on local experience, limited information and the ‘conventional’ wisdom in the sector, ‘bound’ with their understandings of various enforcement-related factors (Simon, 1972). Therefore, their decisions relating to non-compliance can deviate from the neoclassical application of the rational choice theory model (Collins and Loughran, 2017).

To begin with the risk of detecting SIA malpractices, the analysis of the interview data suggests that for DS working in the local NTEs across south-east Wales there was a shared understanding that the likelihood of being monitored and inspected was high. Empirical deterrence studies have highlighted that frequent inspections by regulatory bodies are likely to increase regulated groups’ perceived risk that their violations will be detected (Gray and Scholz, 1993; Helland, 1998; Winter and May, 2001). Although this might suggest a strong deterrent factor for the industry, we should consider the ‘ownership of the problem’ (Levi and Maguire, 2004; Levi and Doig, 2019); who has the leading role of these enforcement operations in theory and in practice. According to the analysis on the strategic account of the regulator in Chapter 5, the organisation is portrayed through both its annual reports and the insights offered by SIA participants as having a leading role in enforcement operations\textsuperscript{189}, assisted by partner agencies.

With reference to the inspections of individual licence holders in the local context of this study, evidence from the fieldwork pinpoints the application of a reversed model. More specifically, the SIA’s operational presence was questioned by most DS participants, underscoring that the likelihood of being inspected by SIA investigators in the NTE venues was minimal. Criticism towards the infrequency of SIA inspections ranged from modest comments (‘I’ve never in the 9 years working actually met someone coming up to me and said “Hello, I’m from the SIA”’ [DS_P8]) to a more vocally expressed resentment regarding the effort that the SIA appears to be spending on enforcement\textsuperscript{190} (‘It’s a faceless brand, you see the SIA Investigators maybe once in 20 years’ (DS_P18), ‘I’ve never met anyone from the SIA in my life. Don’t know what they spend all their money on’ (DS_P4).

\textsuperscript{189} These operations, as noted in Chapter 5, cover a wide spectrum of enforcement activities; from random or intelligence-led inspections and unannounced visits to security firms to the coordination of large-scale operations against rogue security providers who are involved into various criminal activities (e.g., tax fraud, money-laundering, immigration crime). The SIA frames itself to have a leading role in operations related with enforcing its regime (non-compliance according to its statute, Private Security Industry Act 2001), whereas for operations that extend beyond the remit of the PSIA 2001 there was a recognition that the SIA complements the investigation and further actions undertaken by other law enforcement agencies.

\textsuperscript{190} The expression of such a displeasure by regulatees and the associated perceptions on the SIA’s enforcement outreach are two key areas for further consideration, particularly in light of the motivational postures of the DS sector and the respect towards the SIA. Drawing from Braithwaite’s (2003) work, motivational postures reflect the social distance that the regulated communities wish to place between themselves and the regulator. Social distance in this context indicates the extent to which individuals are supportive of the purpose of the regulatory body, as well as of the status ascribed to it. A more detailed analysis can be found in the last section of this chapter.
However, this was counterbalanced by the operational activities of local police licensing officers, who have been recognised as the key enforcement agency for monitoring the adherence with the SIA licensing requirements\(^\text{191}\). In other words, in the local context the risk of apprehension was primarily linked with the police, rather than with the SIA. Drawing upon their frontline experience in the local NTEs, DS interviewees attributed the frequency of licensing inspections to the police and local council licensing teams, who ‘are always around checking on things, if your badge isn’t on display, they do challenge you’ (DS_P1). Given the mixed evidence on the working relationships between DS and police officers (Chapter 7) in south-east Wales, licensing inspections appeared in some cases to be tainted by the police predispositions towards frontline operatives: ‘I think it’s a lack of SIA presence – I think it’s more the police. So, it comes down to the police, and some police officers are anti-door supervisor, so they would look to punish that person and just go for all that’ (DS_P15).

The central role of the police in SIA-related licensing inspections was also acknowledged by police participants with some further interesting implications for understanding the underlying dynamics in the partnership between the SIA and local police forces. In particular, through suggesting that ‘at the moment, we’re kind of quite active with checking and not the SIA’ (Police_P4), there seems to be a further corroboration of the argument presented in Chapter 7 that the police are the ‘eyes and the ears’ for the SIA. Moving one step further, monitoring SIA-related violations was facilitated in urban areas through the regular presence of police licensing officers in night-time venues. However, for rural areas\(^\text{192}\) cutting corners with the licensing regime was framed as a potentially appealing choice, given the less frequent police visits and thus the reduced risk of inspection:

‘So, it was just their… “I just won’t bother – won’t do that today – didn’t wear my badge today – it doesn’t matter, nobody comes around to check”. It just so happened that we were going around doing the checks that day, with the SIA... you know...?’ (Police_P10).

\(^{191}\) According to s.19 of the PSIA 2001 ‘a person authorised in writing for the purpose by the Authority may enter any premises owned or occupied by any person appearing to him to be a regulated person other than premises occupied exclusively for residential purposes as a private dwelling’. These powers of entry and inspection have been often delegated to police licensing officers, with the underlying rationale that this would assist the regulatory body to successfully complete inspections on a wider geographical scale and on a timely manner.

\(^{192}\) As illustrated in Chapter 7, towns and more rural areas across south-east Wales had less developed NTE infrastructure mechanisms and police presence was quite limited, when compared with the resources of the ‘After Dark’ schemes across Cardiff and Swansea.
In the process of unravelling the effect of deterrence factors on DS’ compliance with the SIA regime, the next step in the analysis is to consider how the risk of punishment and its swiftness and severity are embedded in the understandings of this regulated community. The interview data depicts a mixed picture in the local context. More specifically, two compliance-related scenarios are identified; their difference in terms of the ultimate deterrent effect is dependent upon whether the frontline operative has entered the sector legitimately or not in the first place.

In the first scenario, the DS had obtained a SIA licence and then at some point he/she breached its conditions (e.g. use of unsafe restraint techniques). On this occasion, the punishment itself could be either the suspension or the revocation of the licence and this was considered as a significant deterrent factor for two reasons. First, it was broadly considered as a fast-track process followed by the SIA between the stages of ‘finding out about the violation’ and ‘imposing the suspension/revocation’. Second, the consequences of the sanction were deemed by regulatees to be severe (exclusion from the DS sector, potential unemployment, financial hardship). A noteworthy dimension of this scenario is the shared perception that the SIA’s enforcement approach towards individuals would be tough; escalation to the ultimate sanction of revocation/suspension would be quick, often questioning whether a comprehensive appraisal of the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation is undertaken by the SIA. Following the insights offered by both security participants and local police officers:

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193 It is important to note, however, that the credible threat of punishment is mainly associated with the frequency of the licensing inspections undertaken by local police licensing officers, rather than with the SIA. Regulatees assume, based on their frontline experience, that once a licensing malpractice is spotted, then the intelligence flow between the police and the SIA would be quick and would end up in a swift revocation/suspension of their licence. In Chapter 5, issues related with the intelligence flow between the SIA and the police were discussed and some problems with disclosures between these agencies have been identified. In the local context, the information exchange between police licensing officers and SIA investigators regarding DS’ conduct (i.e. arrest for involvement in a violent incident) appeared to be swift and thus decisions on the licensing outcomes were quick too.

194 Empirical deterrence studies suggest that the certainty and the threat of punishment itself can act as a powerful deterrent and incentive for reducing reoffending, whereas the severity of the sanction is a less important factor (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Nagin, 2013; Sherman and Neyroud, 2012). Despite the methodological rigour of these research papers, it is important to note that the effect of different deterrence-related subcomponents on reducing reoffending/securing compliance is context-specific. In this section, the interview data suggest, as noted above, that both the swiftness and the severity of the SIA’s response were key deterrent factors for DS. However, the employment-related consequences and the associated financial hardship (severity of the SIA’s response) were highlighted by participants as the most significant considerations linked with their licence being suspended/revoked. Although this finding might seem prima facie as a deviation from the aforementioned propositions of the existing deterrence studies, its validity can be defended through some context-specific considerations regarding the occupational characteristics of the DS sector. More specifically, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, working as a DS was not a particularly attractive career choice, due to low wages and the lack of professional development. For those employed on a full-time basis, it was mainly driven by a lack of broader competences and a belief that this is the only viable way to climb the ‘security business ladder’. On the other hand, working part-time in the industry was portrayed as a means to make a living and supplement their main income. Given this context, in either of these cases, the prospect of losing your DS licence would have adverse implications for future employment opportunities and for ‘surviving’ financially. Therefore, contextualising deterrence through the lens of the severity of the punishment in this regulatory context is justified.
‘So, they’re almost “guilty until proven innocent” and that’s something that I don’t agree with. You know, one of my guys has been involved in a situation – he’s now been found not guilty, ok, because it was all fabricated – it was all lies – but he still had his licence revoked, to be found in the end that he was not guilty’ (Security company_P2).

‘Where door staff have been suspended from their duties by the SIA because of a criminal allegation, that’s a very big step – for all involved – and I’m not sure if their escalation process is stepped enough. It seemed to be quite cut and dried “No, we’ve had this allegation – this person needs to be suspended and that’s it”, rather than look closely at the individual type of circumstances’ (Police_P10).

The recognition that the enforcement regime on the individual level is ‘actually quite stringent and people don’t necessarily realise this’ (SIA_P8) has also been voiced by participants working in the regulatory body. Such a seemingly quick escalation of the SIA’s enforcement activities towards DS was justified by the regulatory body through the lens of the ‘public protection’ mandate. Priority setting in the SIA’s enforcement approach has been premised on what has constituted the higher risk entity at the time that the regime was introduced, namely door supervisors. Although the strategic narrative of the SIA towards the sector has shifted from ‘removing criminals from the industry’ to ‘enabling and trusting the industry to protect the public’, there were still ‘occasions where we appear to be using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, but only ever if there’s a principle’ (SIA_P2). Through a review of the prosecutions of individuals led by the SIA between 2012 and 2020, such a ‘principle’ referred to the repeated and intentional violations of the licensing regime and to occasions in which DS repeatedly ignored the warnings issued to him/her by the authority. Despite this seemingly stepped-up enforcement process, insights by SIA participants indicate a different approach. In particular, the lack of a sustained engagement with the DS sector was put forward as one of the primary reasons behind the tough enforcement route that often deviated from the ideal ‘enforcement pyramid’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992):

‘We don’t engage with the industry from a compliance perspective as much, so we give them that little bit more rope and they end up hanging themselves, so we look at it and think “Yeah, you know what? This deserves to be prosecuted”. Whereas perhaps, in the past, we would have had an earlier intervention, and we would have put it right before it got to prosecution, whereas now

195 For a more detailed analysis see Chapter 2.
– because we don’t do as much of it – they’ve perhaps gone that little bit too far over our threshold of what we think is acceptable’ (SIA_P16).

Turning next to the second scenario, in which the deterrence effect from the SIA’s enforcement response is limited, the case relates to DS who have entered the sector illegitimately in the first place; they don’t have a valid SIA licence, yet they are employed by security companies to provide their services. According to the frontline experience of participants in south-east Wales, being employed in an unlicensed DS role could be concealed in a threefold way: a) through working with a counterfeit SIA badge, b) through ‘borrowing’ someone else’s valid SIA badge and c) through being employed on a stewarding role, yet undertake a broader role which is on the verge of security and order maintenance. As noted in the end of the previous section, the key facilitating mechanism for working unlicensed in the sector was the culture and working practices of the security firm itself. Among all DS participants there seemed to be a clear-cut recognition that the SIA licensing rules were straightforward, comprehensible and that ‘the people doing the doors and doing the events know that they need an SIA licence, and the businesses that deploy them know, and the events and the pubs and clubs all know that they need SIA licences’ (DS_P15). Therefore, these individuals who could not obtain a SIA licence (rejection on the basis of criminality criteria) knew that their illegitimate status will be tolerated by some unscrupulous firms who consider that they have a deniability excuse.

From an enforcement perspective, this type of non-compliance on the individual level is exacerbated by the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Levitt and Dubner, 2005) in the sector that the ultimate punishment in prosecuting unlicensed operatives would be a fine. From a deterrence-related perspective, the effect of these criminal justice outputs was questioned by frontline operatives. First, given the significance that the DS sector attributes to the severity of the punishment, a relatively low level fine (£100-£600) is mainly read as a ‘slap on the wrist’. Second, these non-compliant DS have entered the sector illegitimately on the first place and thus the most likely scenario after they get caught and sentenced is that they will be employed by other firms, whose corporate working practices might allow the prospect of supplying unlicensed DS to venues. Following the vivid descriptions by both SIA and DS participants:

196 The review of the SIA prosecutions against individual licence holders between 2012 and 2020 reveals that on the vast majority of these cases the Magistrates’ Courts have imposed a relatively low fine (range between £100 and £600) and a victim surcharge. There were a few occasions, in which non-compliant security operatives received either a community service order or a suspended custodial sentence.
‘I know that the SIA occasionally post that “Oh, caught and in court” like “We’ve fined this person £5,000 and told them they can never have a badge again!” – well, they didn’t have a badge in the first place, so I know they will just go back to doing it again’ (DS_P20).

‘They’re going to take the money anyway, at the end of the day, and then if we find out that they’re not compliant, we’re going to prosecute; but our prosecution probably won’t be greater than the money they’ve made over the weekend, so they’ve still won! They could get fined, but then next week they’ll be on somebody else’s door, because it’s not enough. They can swallow the money – they can swallow the fine what they’re given’ (SIA_P15).

8.4 Enforcement styles and respect for the regulator: towards a more inclusive evaluation of the SIA’s enforcement strategy for the DS sector

The analytical process of exploring the effect of the SIA’s enforcement approach towards the DS sector should take into account two further important factors: the SIA’s day-to-day dealings with frontline operatives (enforcement styles) and the DS’ respect for the regulator. To begin with the former, existing research studies on regulatory compliance have pinpointed the significant role of enforcement styles upon regulatees’ awareness of rules and cooperation between themselves and the regulator197 (May and Wood, 2003; Pautz, 2009). As discussed in the previous section, DS participants had been visited and inspected by SIA investigators over the course of their frontline role. Interview data suggest that since 2012 these interactions in the local NTEs appeared to have moved away from a coercive enforcement style, which was documented in practice ‘as if they (SIA investigators) were coming to try and remove people from the doors’ (DS_P2). Coercive enforcement styles are premised on the assumption that regulatees are amoral calculators who are prone to breaking the rules and thus a punitive approach (imposing sanctions) is essential for leveraging compliance (Gormley, 1998; Hutter, 1989; May and Wood, 2003). Aligning with the change in the strategic narrative of the SIA198, the local SIA investigators in south-east Wales seemed to approach DS as regulated entities who are motivated to comply and ‘now it seems to be like they just want to get there to make sure that everything is running smoothly’ (DS_P2).

197 As highlighted in Chapter 2, an enforcement strategy refers to choices made by regulatory agencies, whereas enforcement styles concern their day-to-day dealings with regulated groups. Various models have been suggested in terms of the different types of enforcement styles followed by regulatory bodies (May and Winter, 2011). Overall, regulatory enforcement (both in terms of strategies as well as styles on daily interactions with regulatees) can be arrayed along a continuum; from punitive style to a flexible ‘tit-for-tat’ approach and ultimately to an ‘accommodative’ style.

198 Following the analysis of the SIA’s strategic account in Chapter 4, it has been argued that the narrative has shifted from the initial ‘cleanse-out’ phase of the licensing regime (protect the public from the private security industry) to the current phase of ‘enabling the private security to be a capable guardian for the public’.
Adopting a more facilitative approach and an informal and flexible style towards frontline operatives was also evident through my observational notes, when I shadowed a licensing inspection in Newport (early 2018). Overall, the stance of the SIA investigators did not follow a ‘rule-oriented’ or ‘strict’ enforcement approach (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Shover et al., 1984); rather it aligned with a ‘tit-for-tat’ style of interaction (Scholz, 1984) or what Hawkins (1984) describes as ‘adaptive, serial enforcement’. More specifically, the two key conditions that seemed to be taken into account by the investigators were the reliability of the particular regulatee (DS and the company employing him/her), as well as the seriousness of the risks at hand. When ‘suspicious’ premises were visited, a legalistic and tough approach was evident; the investigators showcased their experience and knowledge of what is going on in the local area and communicated a ‘clear’ message that given the insufficient evidence provided by the operatives follow-up enquiries will be made. Regulatees in these ‘target’ premises appeared quite alarmed, and despite their effort to conceal some of their misdemeanours in other venues, the SIA followed-up these cases after the inspection.

As opposed to the use of formalism in this case, the fieldwork in Newport revealed an accommodative and helpful stance towards DS who, despite the seeming violation of the SIA rules, were overall compliant, and their broader occupational stance did not pose a risk to the public. On this occasion, the two DS were prima facie contravening the requirement of displaying their SIA badge in a visible manner. However, through the engaging discussion with the investigators, it became clear that this incident was simply an example of a standalone recklessness, rather than a manifestation of a pre-planned malpractice. Given the absence of an

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199 This licensing inspection was undertaken jointly by two SIA investigators and two local police licensing officers. Although it was primarily intelligence-led (intelligence available for two venues with suspicions of licensing violations), the visit was not restricted in the ‘target’ venues and as a result it covered the majority of night-time venues across the two main streets of Newport’s NTE.

200 Intelligence suggested that a particular security company supplied DS in three venues, who were working unlicensed. Furthermore, this particular firm has been targeted by local police officers and the SIA before due to allegations related to contravening employment standards and paying their DS cash-in-hand. Evidence was insufficient to allow an escalation of the SIA’s enforcement actions, but warnings were issued to the security managers.

201 For one of the ‘target’ premises there was intelligence to suggest that unlicensed security operatives might work in this venue. However, apart from this particular venue, the security company employing these DS provides staff in two further venues in the area. After completing the inspection in the first ‘target’ venue and as we were walking down the road, it soon became obvious that the message about the occurrence of the operation was blown across the operatives of this firm; walkie-talkies were ‘on fire’ and DS who might attract regulatory attention were quickly removed from their post. As such, a superficial sense of compliance was restored.

202 This example could be also approached through the lens of exercising discretion, which is documented to be an unavoidable and ubiquitous feature of police work and policing more broadly (Beckett, 2016; Bittner, 1990; Goldsmith, 1990). Frontline security operatives in nightlife settings can be also depicted as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 2010); a group that includes police/security officers and other welfare state agencies who interact with the public and their decision making is based primarily on normative choices. In other words, following Buvik’s analysis (2016, p.774), ‘rules specify their duties and obligations, but discretion allows them freedom of action’. In particular, DS do not only make decisions about who is granted access to the licensed premises or who troublemakers should be dealt with. As this illustrative example from the fieldwork reveals, their ‘street-level bureaucracy’ sometimes
intention to cut corners and the company’s reputation as a law-abiding business, frequently engaged and supported by the SIA, the entire interaction was premised on a facilitative and flexible tone; the reminder of the necessity to display the SIA badge visibly was read as ‘we got told off, we had our wrists slapped for not showing their badges, but they just didn’t think – they just put their vests over the top, and so they got them out and apologised and they were asked questions – they passed with flying colours!’ (Security company_P1).

Overall, the day-to-day dealings of a regulatory body with regulated groups can be arrayed along a continuum; from punitive style to a flexible ‘tit-for-tat’ approach (adaptive, serial enforcement) and ultimately to an ‘accommodative’ or ‘conciliatory’ style (Shover et al, 1984). The analysis so far in this section has illustrated how SIA investigators in the local context of this study have moved towards the ‘tit-for-tat’ style of interaction. However, when dealing with individual licence holders (DS), evidence of moving one step further towards an ‘accommodative’ style of enforcement was limited. On this end of the aforementioned continuum, the regulatory body opens up a dialogue with the regulatees; a broader discussion about facilitators and obstacles in complying with the regulatory regime and a proactive response in advising them about the issues raised. In the case of the DS participants of this study, the interaction between both groups was premised on a supportive attitude, yet confined to the technicalities of the SIA regime (‘not a great deal, apart from the badge on your arm and when you’ve got to do your renewal’ [DS_P6]). A more ‘accommodative’ enforcement style did not appear to be ingrained into the working practices of the investigators and their dealings with the local DS population. The processes of actively opening up a dialogue with them during inspections, getting their insights on the prevalence of violence in their workplace and signposting them to the available reporting mechanisms were an exception of good practice rather than a defining feature of their day-to-day dealings with the local security operatives.

Turning next to the second factor, the extent to which regulated groups value and respect their regulator is of paramount importance. In the context of this thesis, respect for the SIA was not strictly associated with compliance per se, as advocated by Nielsen and Parker (2012). In particular, as noted earlier, participants’ insights illustrate the social distance that they place

extends to their own normative interpretations of the SIA rules. Wearing the SIA badge, according to the PSIA 2001, is mandatory and thus failure to clearly display it is a breach of the licensing conditions. However, DS adapt to their working context (‘culture’ of the venue) and to the individuals with whom they interact (venue managers, security managers/directors, other DS, public). As such, on some occasions, discretion allowed them freedom of action and the failure to display the SIA badge was rationalised as a reckless formality-related mistake amid their effort to monitor ‘law and order’ in the venue.
between themselves and the SIA. However, a partial dislike of, and resistance towards, specific actions of the SIA were not signalling disobedience.

The following quote is an illustrative synopsis of the general perception of the DS interviewees towards the SIA: ‘You don’t hear off them, or see them, until they want you to renew your licence, or if there’s a problem or an issue with compliance’ (DS_P8). Prima facie, it could be read with some positive connotations associated; the SIA follows an intelligence-led and selective enforcement process and intervenes pre-emptively in higher risk cases or it responds effectively to cases of documented non-compliance²⁰³. However, on a deeper level of analysis this perception suggests that enforcement-wise, this regulated group accepts a certain degree of regulatory ‘teeth’ by the SIA, but at the same time their respect towards the regulator is skewed due to two key issues. As a brief overview, the first one moves towards the direction of more intrusive regulation or even regulatory capture. Despite the contested applicability of these measures, there are important implications for the current state of the DS sector within the broader regulatory landscape. The second one includes administrative-related issues, showcasing the extent to which administrative burdens are still part and parcel of the interaction between the SIA and not only regulatees, but also law enforcement agencies.

With reference to the first category, in a number of occasions a commonly repeated theme among DS participants related to the lack of support mechanisms from either the security companies that employ them or the industry associations. More specifically, there appeared to be a gap in the provision of advice and support from area managers/security directors towards their frontline operatives across a wide range of significant issues (i.e. advice on how to deal with generic issues on the doors, lack of encouragement and rewards on individual cases of good practice, limited assistance with injuries incurred to DS while on duty). Similarly, an alarming finding across the insights offered by both DS and security firms in south-east Wales is associated with the limited understanding of the role of industry associations. The vast majority of interviewees did not seem to be aware of the existence of these associations and some others considered that the remit of the SIA and the trade associations for their sector was overlapping: ‘if we’ve got Union Reps, you know? You’d have one point of contact for the area. Like South Wales, Mid-Wales or West Midlands, I think areas should have at least one point of contact – an SIA representative – where I can pick up my phone and go “All right, I need to speak to Mr Jones – he’s my representative – contact point for the SIA” but we haven’t got that’ (DS_P8). As a result, in both instances the

²⁰³ Aligned with the analysis of the strategic account of the SIA regarding the significance of intelligence-led operations (Chapter 5).
DS sector seemed to have developed a misleading appreciation of the statutory responsibilities of the SIA. For instance, the SIA was framed as the agency responsible for identifying good practice among frontline operatives and reward it through the provision of upskilling/further training or as the body which should have a central role in lobbying for better working conditions for the sector:

‘The SIA should be coming round to a company, or to a door firm, or to an individual on a door, and saying, “You know what, Joe Bloggs, I’ve been watching you all night” or “I’ve been here a few weeks, I’ve done a bit of covert, and I really like what you and your team are doing. Do you know what, as a member of the SIA, what we’ll do is we’ll put you on a course, or we’ll upskill you. We’ll do something else”’ (DS_P5).

‘And the SIA keep… “Oh, we’re going to try and put the wages up” – they don’t do nothing! They keep saying things, and nothing happens – it’s broken promises with the SIA, all the time. I think it needs reforming itself more than anything – or somebody with a strong head at the Home Office to lead it, head on’ (DS_P14).

However, as depicted in Chapter 4, there are fine lines between the extent to which a regulator can intervene more ‘intrusively’ in commercial matters and not transcend to the multidimensional concept of regulatory capture (Makai and Braithwaite, 1992). Although a degree of sympathy towards the problems of the regulated community would not distort the regulator-regulatee equilibrium, anything beyond this level has the potential to render the SIA subservient to the industry’s interests. Participants’ perceptions of how the SIA could fulfil multiple roles that extend far beyond its statutory remit were a prime example of their ‘bounded rationality’ (Klaes and Sent, 2005; Simon, 1955). Their attitude was significantly influenced by the lack of support offered to them by security firms, as well as by a limited understanding of the specific responsibilities associated with their employers, trade associations and the regulator. Moreover, these findings seem to echo the analysis undertaken by White and Hayat (2018) regarding the SIA’s organisational identity. Overall, DS participants appeared to expect that the SIA should be leading a transformative route to reshape the industry, which did not match with either the regulator’s streamlined strategic agenda (White and Hayat, 2018) or with the restrictive context

204 In Chapter 4, the mandate of the ‘light-touch’ regulation has been argued to influence significantly the extent to which the SIA deemed any regulatory intervention as appropriate and proportionate. For instance, the organisation’s reluctance to develop the ACS scheme was partly attributed to the recognition that for many years they have been the standard-setters for the industry, due to the lack of a strong and dynamic presence by professional industry associations.

205 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2 (section 2.5).
in which the SIA’s policies are situated (White and Smith, 2009). In terms of the latter, Chapter 4 illustrated the effect of the ‘light-touch’ regulation upon the organisation’s regulatory practice. Yet, DS expectations in the local context continued to fall out of step with the statutory constraints of the SIA’s regime and the organisation’s baseline approach to regulatory intervention.

Turning to administrative-related issues, the interview data suggested that approximately since 2015 there has been marked improvement in the administrative side of the interaction with the SIA206 for both frontline security operatives and police officers:

‘If you’d have asked me the question 5 years ago, I would have given you a list of complaints about the SIA – I don’t think they were particularly well run, I thought that the admin side of it was very inefficient – but it seems to have sort of cleaned their act up’ (DS_P2).

‘And I know that we had difficulty getting hold of them, and I know that the door staff providing companies were often frustrated with them. But certainly, in the last couple of years, emailing them, telephoning them or even getting face-to-face meetings is a lot easier than it was’ (Police_P1).

However, some issues were raised as key obstacles in the interaction between the regulator and DS. These were particularly related to the communication channels available to the industry, the time elapsed between raising a query and getting back a response and in some instances the attitude of the SIA employees in the call centre, characterised as ‘arrogant on the phone, with attitude and what-have-you’ (DS_P12). The fact that ‘if you go onto their website, it’s all automated, and it’s all online and email’ (DS_P18) appeared to raise concerns in some instances, when participants urgently wanted to liaise with the SIA or their writing competences did not allow them to communicate via email: ‘I’m not too computer literate, and things like that, so sending emails and putting it into words in text is not my strong point’ (DS_P8).

Administrative burdens are not unique to the interaction between the SIA and security operatives (Moynihan et al., 2014). However, these issues, coupled with the limited interactions between the SIA investigators and the frontline operatives (section 8.3), often increased the social distance between the regulator and the DS; the former was sometimes portrayed as a ‘faceless brand –

206 Administrative problems have been highlighted to be one of the key areas of criticism directed towards the SIA in the past years, as illustrated in Chapter 4.
unless you’re in front of a laptop and you’re looking at a website, that’s about the only governance that you’ll get’ (DS_P18).

8.5 Concluding remarks

Overall, in terms of the drivers of (non)compliance for DS, this chapter highlighted that although the motive of preserving their resources (economic goal) was considered as a fundamental facilitator in ensuring that frontline DS are licensed and compliant, this was largely influenced by some other social and normative motives. Moral considerations appeared to facilitate compliance, whereas the corporate culture of the security firm could be seen as either enabling or hindering individual (DS) compliance. In terms of translating the SIA’s enforcement-related activities into a clear-cut message towards the DS sector that ‘non-compliance will not be tolerated’, the analysis offered mixed evidence. First, the risk of licensing inspections and thus detection of SIA violations in the local context appeared to be high. This was a key deterrent factor for security operatives, however it was not attributed to the SIA’s strategy per se, since inspections were primarily undertaken by the police and problematic cases were fed back to the regulator. Second, the swiftness of SIA’s response and the sanction imposed on DS, who had a valid licence and later breached some of its conditions, were considered to have a marked deterrent effect. Nevertheless, in the cases of DS who have entered the sector illegitimately in the first place, such a deterrent effect was limited.

Apart from deterrence factors (risk of inspection, risk of sanction and severity of sanction), the last section showcased that a more holistic exploration of the SIA’s enforcement approach should incorporate two further parameters. These are the enforcement styles of the SIA investigators and the broader respect that the DS sector has for the regulator. Although there was a marked change from a ‘rule-oriented’ to a more ‘adaptive/supportive’ style of enforcement, this was confined to the technicalities of the SIA regime, thus showcasing a lack of ‘accommodative’ enforcement.

Furthermore, communication channels between the SIA and the DS community were not always operating efficiently and regulatees seemed to express a misunderstanding of the statutory responsibilities of the SIA, which often clashed with the operational realities and the ‘light-touch’ strategic agenda of the organisation. Overall, it can be argued that the regulatory approach towards frontline operatives did not seem to be balanced between the ‘stick’ (‘hard’ message) and the ‘carrot’ (positive incentives). A more detailed discussion of the potential ways of bringing the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ side of the approach into an equilibrium follows in Chapter 10, aiming to compile the findings across the analytical chapters into specific policy recommendations.
Chapter 9: Contextualising compliance and enforcement for security companies across south-east Wales: facilitators and inhibitors

9.1 Introduction

Through the analysis of interview data, as well as prosecution cases, this last findings’ chapter of the thesis contributes to two different research questions and thus it has two analytical objectives. Following the rationale and the structure in Chapter 8, the first one is to explore the driving mechanisms that facilitate or hinder compliance with the SIA regime on a business level (DS firms), adding to the evidence base for research question 3. According to the PSIA 2001, for any security company providing services that fall into the SIA’s remit\(^{207}\), non-compliance is associated with the following offences: engaging in a licensable conduct without a licence\(^{208}\) (s.3), using unlicensed security operatives (s.5), failing to provide information required to the SIA (s.19), making false statements to the SIA (s.22), and falsely claiming an approved contractor status (s.16).

Second, the discussion regarding corporate (non)compliance in the local context aims to add the last analytical layer to the findings of Chapters 5 and 8 regarding the effect of the SIA’s enforcement approach on the DS sector (research question 4). As with the Chapter 8, the analysis seeks to examine both the SIA’s enforcement strategy as a deterrent factor for DS businesses, as well as the regulator’s enforcement styles towards local firms. However, given the absence of formal powers of regulatory oversight of security companies, it is of paramount importance to move the discussion one step further. Therefore, the analysis considers the impact of the lack of business licensing on the SIA’s enforcement-related proactivity and responses to corporate misdemeanours. Ultimately, this leads to a more focussed inquiry into the broader dimensions of corporate malpractices by DS companies and their implications for the SIA’s mission.

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\(^{207}\) SIA licensing covers manned guarding (including security guarding, door supervision, close protection, cash and valuables in transit, and public surveillance using CCTV), key holding and vehicle immobilising.

\(^{208}\) In order to operate legitimately as the director of such a security firm, individuals must be granted an individual SIA licence (e.g. a director of a DS company must have obtained a DS licence from the SIA). Directors generally in the UK are not integrity checked outside the financial services sector. As such, directors of security businesses are not scrutinised for integrity once they have been granted their DS licences.
9.2 ‘The light side of the force’: contextualising corporate compliance in DS security firms across south-east Wales

In the local context of this study, the vast majority of security-related participants (both DS and security managers/directors) were associated with either small or medium size security companies. A common thread in the working practices of these firms is their operation under ‘family business’ terms, which according to the interview data referred to the following subcomponents: involvement of family members in the administration of the company, close-knit relationships between employers and employees, and an aspiration to keep it ‘local’ and avoid expansion on the national level. Such a modus operandi was identified as one of the key drivers behind their adherence to the SIA’s regime and this can be illustrated in a twofold way. First, complying with SIA regulations and showcasing this to the local stakeholders was embedded in this part of the industry as the most viable route to gradually develop a robust local reputation. This would possibly, in turn, enable them to ‘survive’ commercially in an era of low profit margins and fierce competition between themselves and the large national-level providers of DS services. Under these circumstances, compliance with the SIA regime and being granted ACS status were seen as voluntary commercial advantages; to be recognised for the provision of excellent personalised services, given the significance of ‘personal touch’ (DS_P2) in the local context. Reputation, as a set of collective perceptions, can favour the company against its competitors (Roberts & Dowling, 2002) and thus it was perceived as a valuable tool to build up a profile that would fit with the concept of elite DS companies:

‘For example, we provide security for the (large buyer anonymised). We don’t make any money on it. But we have grown and secured other contracts off the back of it, because of association with their reputation, really. You know, that’s their brand, and for a small company trying to improve, we’re associating ourselves with that sort of brand, and that will gain you extra work’ (Security company_P4).

Second, the ‘family business’ operation style was linked with some normative and moral considerations, which further enhanced the compliant attitude of these firms. Doing everything by the SIA’s book and aligning their corporate practice with labour and tax law-related best practices were considered key conditions for being able to provide your staff (DS) with a solid supporting framework. Given the close-knit relationships between employers and employees in

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209 For a more detailed description of participants involved in this study, as well as for a discussion and justification of methodological considerations, see Chapter 3.
this part of the local industry, DS were valued as employees and adherence to the SIA regime meant that in practice the company could have in place the necessary mechanisms to account for their safety, well-being and fair treatment. For example:

‘They’re (DS) big enough to look after themselves, they’re adults, it’s their decision, we still want to make sure that their safety is paramount to us. I know we’re there to protect premises and look after people, but for us, as a business – and a family-run business – we want to ensure that they’re looked after, as well’ (Security company_P1).

Another key facilitator in securing the compliant attitude of these security firms across south-east Wales was their engagement with the SIA. More specifically, the catalytic (accommodative) enforcement style adopted by local SIA investigators played a significant role in increasing the capacity of these companies to comply. Such an enforcement style is premised on the assumption that the regulated group is motivated in the first place to adhere to the regulatory regime (Kagan et al., 2011), but they might face some difficulties due to constraints in their capacity to do so (i.e., knowledge of the rules or the ability to carry out what is necessary) (Weske et al., 2018). Therefore, the investigators act as capacity brokers, meaning that they encourage and facilitate compliance through education and technical support; inducements that align with a creative enforcement toolkit (Braithwaite et al., 1984; May and Burby, 1998). In the SIA’s case, the insights provided by managers and directors of DS firms in South Wales and Gwent suggest a good balance between the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ message communicated by the local SIA investigators towards them:

‘Let’s look at [SIA investigator] for instance, [SIA investigator] is extremely good at helping and supporting people, extremely supportive and very responsive. With that, [SIA investigator] has got a fantastic reputation in Wales. But on the flip side to it is, with the outstanding reputation, [SIA investigator] is also known as someone that you do not cross, because there’s a right way or wrong way – if there’s a right way, you’re fantastic – [SIA investigator] will bend over backwards to help you, support you. But if it’s a wrong way, you’re going to feel the pain. And that is a good message within the industry – it really is good’ (Security company_P4).

The application of such a focussed deterrence strategy (Braga et al., 2001, 2018) meant that in practice, the SIA’s enforcement style was not strictly confined to the coercive and inflexible style of an enforcement agency. Following the vivid description by one of the participants, the local investigators ‘even though they’ve got their systems, it seems to be a softer approach, not like “I’m a policeman, this is it!”’, they go out with us, have a look at our sites, introduce new people
and I like the idea of that’ (Security company_P8). However, the enforcement style was not overly informal and flexible. More specifically, maintaining some levels of formalism in this context was a key aspect of the overall engagement with the industry, as highlighted in other studies (May and Wood, 2003; Pautz, 2009). Security directors valued the SIA investigators who had a solid knowledge of the technicalities around the SIA’s regime and were willing to work with them. The supporting framework offered to companies who appeared to be willing to follow the SIA’s rules included general advice on the SIA’s regime, specific guidance on their individual working practices and targeted hints and tips about recurring problems associated with some prospective buyers of their DS services (e.g. violent incidents in licensed premises). The provision of such a framework of catalytic enforcement actions had a positive impact upon enhancing the motivation for compliance and improving the industry’s capacity in a twofold way: first to follow the baseline requirements of the licensing regime, and second to strive for more advanced levels of professionalism in their practices:

‘But it was the [SIA investigator] speaking to us that actually sort of “pushed” us forward, to do the ACS. So, there’s that, as well. There may be companies out there who are saying, “Oh, not doing the ACS – I’ve looked at the workbook online…”’ (Security company_P8).

‘Like, before I take that job on, I will phone [SIA investigator]. “What’s this place like, is it known by trouble by the police?” and [SIA investigator] will come back and go “Don’t touch it with a 10-foot barge pole” or “Yeah, that’s fine – we’ve done a check, that’s a fine place to work”. So, I know – before I send anybody anywhere – I know by [SIA investigator] who rings me, and tells me if that place is good, bad or the police are watching it. So, I know the criteria, so I know what I’m taking on before I even walk through that door’ (Security company_P7).

Building up supportive and responsive relationships with this part of the industry across south-east Wales had some further positive effects. As a gesture of appreciation towards the SIA’s responsive presence in their area, these security firms were motivated to liaise with the investigators and forward them intelligence of corporate malpractice. Given that most of DS companies directors have or are still working sometimes on a frontline security role, their insider knowledge and input of SIA-related violations can be valuable, as highlighted in the following case: ‘And this company, who’s based in (location anonymised), gave out fake badges. There’s a massive case going on’. Well, I’ve found – in the last three months, I’ve found 7 of them who

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210 The researcher has cross-referenced this statement with the SIA prosecutions in South Wales that occurred in close proximity to the time of the fieldwork and there appears to be a relevant match.
had fake badges, and I handed them all to [SIA investigator]’ (Security company_P7). However, there are two important caveats in this interesting give and take exchange between the SIA and these businesses. The first one has been already discussed in Chapter 5 and relates to the identified occasions, in which security companies try to direct the SIA’s attention to competitors’ businesses, by falsely claiming that they have breached or that they are highly likely to have breached the regime. Second, despite the use of some creative enforcement tools, the SIA is mainly portrayed as the enforcer of its licensing regime. Therefore, some firms are often reluctant to come forward and share intelligence with the regulator, mainly due to the negative connotations associated with being an informant of an enforcement agency: ‘not all decent companies will do it, because they’ll see it as “Oh, you’re grassing them up!”’ (Security company_P1).

9.3 ‘The dark side of the force’: contextualising corporate non-compliance in DS security firms across south-east Wales

9.3.1 How does corporate non-compliance manifest in the local context?

Following the introductory part in this section, defining non-compliance with the SIA regime on the business level involves the commission of specific statutory offences. In the local context of south-east Wales, two primary routes of non-compliance on the level of security firms were identified. These will be discussed in detail in the following sections, but as a brief overview they are the following. To begin with, the statutory offence of supplying unlicensed operatives (PSIA 2001, s.5) was committed on a twofold way. First, some companies allowed at least some of their DS staff, who did not have a valid licence (due to prior criminal record or suspension of original licence), to work using someone else’s licence. On such an occasion, this person was usually aware of such an unlawful use of his/her licence. Second, some DS businesses cloned genuine SIA licences and, as such, their staff were using fake badges. In this scenario, these companies obtained illegally the identities of genuine SIA licence holders, who were not complicit in the unlawful use of their badges by the bogus DS.

Furthermore, given the absence of business licensing, it is necessary to think creatively and outside the existing ‘regulatory craft’ (Sparrow, 2000), so as to identify some other proxy measures for reflecting upon business malpractices. In Chapter 5, the analysis of SIA-related figures (Table 6) revealed that since 2018 the regulator has begun to prosecute some offences, other than the PSIA-related ones. These were associated with using fake badges or false documents. Based on the analysis earlier in this chapter, counterfeit licences have been prevalent
in the local context recently, so it lends support to the SIA’s enforcement approach regarding prosecutions of these non-PSIA offences.

However, what follows in this chapter demonstrates that this should not be the end of story, when the SIA attempts to think creatively about its enforcement towards non-PSIA related violations. More specifically, the analysis is about to reveal some other types of corporate malpractices, which are not considered as instances of non-compliance with the SIA per se (i.e. tax evasion), yet they could still jeopardise the two fundamental objectives of the regulatory body, namely ‘public protection’ and ‘raising standards in the security industry’. In order to understand this seemingly odd connection between HMRC-related violations and the SIA’s objectives, two important points should be underscored and taken into account. First, the participation of companies in the shadow economy often triggered a domino effect of negative consequences; through attracting a certain calibre of DS, two scenarios that undermine the SIA’s mission are identified in section 9.3.3. Second, in most cases the outcomes of business non-compliance are visible only on the individual level (e.g. DS staff unlicensed, DS facilitating the drug trade). However, through unfolding and tracing back the ‘script’ of non-compliance, it becomes evident that the role of companies in either actively enabling or subtly allowing these to happen is fundamental.

9.3.2 Unfolding the key drivers and motives behind the ‘cutting corners’ practices by DS companies: ‘necessity’, ‘adaptation’ and the SIA’s limited deterrent effect

During the interviews with participants from local security firms, as well as with local police officers, discussions related to the current state of the industry framed the sector predominantly as ‘a dog eat dog, there’s no way, on this earth, that security companies will work with each other’ (Security company_P2). Documenting fierce competition, their accounts were also subtly echoing the prevailing ‘gain goal’ logic, yet with only one security director bluntly stating that ‘I’m driven by money – nothing else – that’s the only reason why I’m driven – I’ll do anything, to earn money’ (Security company_P4). This comment appeared to be in accordance with the sceptical stance of many local police officers against DS firms. In particular, as already discussed in Chapter 7, the defensive stance by police towards private security was positioned on the argument that the latter were exclusively guided by processes of ‘making a quick buck’

211 In this thesis the participation of security firms in the shadow economy is associated with paying their employees (DS) ‘cash in hand’, without paying income tax or national insurance. A more detailed analysis can be found in section 9.3.3.

Therefore, one could argue prima facie that on a business level, ignoring and violating the SIA regulations can be explained through the lens of a classical rational choice approach (wealth-maximisation paradigm), which postulates that non-compliance or other criminal offending is attributed to greedy yet rational calculations of how cutting corners enables them to maximise utility (Braithwaite and Geis, 1982; Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Kothari, 2010). Although complying with the SIA regime was seen by many firms as a financial burden, the analysis suggests that the utility maximisation paradigm does not offer a holistic and nuanced explanatory framework for these cases.

To begin with, most of security managers and directors in the local DS firms do not share many similar characteristics with the ‘elite’ corporate criminals, whose materialistic incentives have been put forward as the key motives for their wrongdoings (Arjoon, 2008; Schuchter and Levi, 2015). As opposed to what was discussed earlier in this chapter for compliant companies (their presence in the DS market was framed as a well-supported and conscious choice), the ones that are cutting corners are mainly driven by necessity or perceptions thereof. More specifically, for the latter category, entering the industry through setting up a DS firm was seen as the only viable way to move from the low end of the pay scale (frontline DS) to the better remunerated positions of an area manager or security director. Participating in the industry due to necessity is linked with negative consequences in terms of their corporate competences (lack of management and leadership skills), their broader business mindset (quick profit) and their perspectives towards compliance (compliance=burden). Instead of a longer-term ambition to become well-respected providers of DS services and develop economically on a gradual basis, their working practices were attuned to the objective of a speedy accumulation of profit. Therefore, regulation in these instances was perceived as an extra burden that often had to be circumvented, so that their short-term profit rationale would not be distorted:

‘The ones that cut corners are short-term trying to make as much money as they can and get away with it. They’re doing as little as possible; if you’re doing sort of like your local town, you’ve got 6 or 7 doors, and they’re sort of 8 hours a week or whatever, you’re not going to want to spend money and effort. I see it as an investment in the future, by doing everything right. We could make more money now, and cut corners, but it’s not about now, it’s about where we’re going not where we are’ (Security company_P3).
'There’s a proportion of the industry that have started a business because they were a guard – they were a doorman – and they couldn’t get enough money, and because they can’t ever earn high wages unless they start something, they start something. And they haven’t got the ability or the knowledge of how to do it properly; they feel the cash coming through. In a highly competitive industry, where the margins are small, your margin’s eroded immediately by doing it the right way. And you also have to get volume’ (Security company_P9).

Furthermore, lending support to the argument that the classical rational choice approach cannot fully capture the drivers and motives behind the non-compliance of this group can be pursued through another interesting perspective. Beyond the aforementioned analysis on necessity, and in line with the critical realist stance of this thesis, it is important to note how security firms adapt to regulation. The concept of adaptation is broader than compliance, since the existence of a regulatory regime may be a pre-requisite for compliance with it, but business practices are influenced by factors other than regulation (e.g. competitor activity, lack of perfect information) (Kitching et al., 2015). In the context of security companies across south-east Wales, the data analysis suggests that two factors exerted significant ‘non-official influence over the targeted group’s compliance’ (Nielsen and Parker, 2012) and as such led them on some occasions to adapt their business practices in a less compliant way. These were: the absence of a level playing field in the market for DS services and the buyers’ attitudes and their downward pressure on price for DS services.

With reference to the first factor, one could easily assert that the absence of a level playing field is far from unique to the companies providing DS services; free market mechanisms in the global market often deviate from the ideal scenario of perfect competition and as a result market barriers can favour companies and services that are not necessarily the best\(^{212}\) (OECD, 2019). However, in the context of this thesis, the absence of a level playing field is identified as a key mechanism that exacerbates the desperation of some firms to ‘survive’ under such a fierce and often less fair competition. On these occasions, minimising anything that can be perceived as a corporate burden is of paramount importance and, as such, non-compliance with the SIA rules seems an appealing option.

Up until 2015 the provision of DS services in night-time venues across South Wales and Gwent areas was monopolised by one DS company. Its aggressive marketing policy, coupled with its

\(^{212}\) This can be also attributed to corporate lobbying and to legal/semi-legal/allegedly illegal practices in relationships with politicians.
alleged links with OCGs (Figure 11) meant that in practice, doors in the local NTEs were ‘untouchable’ by other firms. Participants’ insights offer some illustrative depictions of how such a monopoly has gradually developed a ‘turf war on there, with who “owns” the doors, and this could get quite physical’ (Police_P8). Threats against competitors became part and parcel of the local DS market, echoing protection racketeering practices, since selling their DS services was attuned to the motto ‘Well, we’ve got all this area. If anything happens, I can get you 20 door staff to come out of wherever they are, and deal with the issue’ (Security company_P9). Such a situation was sending out a clear-cut message to all security stakeholders (companies, DS, licensed premises owners) that rocking the boat by choosing another DS firm would lead to adverse consequences:

‘We got work, and we took it off another company that was well-established. I was personally threatened on the phone – which doesn’t bother me – and that didn’t work. So, they then threatened the manager, who then withdrew and went back to them. So, they knew they couldn’t affect us, because we were unmoved by it, or whatever. They threatened the door supervisors; they “bottled it”, if you like. If you took certain doors from certain people, they would – even if they couldn’t get to you – they would get to your door staff or they would get to the owners of the establishment’ (Security company_P9).

These characteristics of the monopoly of DS services up until 2016 meant that not only was a level playing field absent, but also that many firms were technically ‘prohibited’ from entering the market. The adaptation outcomes were twofold: either to move away from this part of the industry, or to remain in the market and follow a similar logic of unscrupulousness as an ultimate and desperate effort to get even a minimal share of the DS market. In the second adaptation outcome, given the ‘inherent pressures to deliver’ (Security company_P4), adhering to the SIA regime was not a key priority. Being a compliant security supplier was neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition under these circumstances.

Once this company was dissolved in 2018, local security firms as well as national companies began a phase of fierce competition to claim as many DS contracts as possible. At this phase, the ‘survival’ strategy followed by some small and medium size local businesses was once again susceptible to cutting corners regarding the SIA regulations. However, on this occasion another key mechanism emerged, which led them to adapt their business practices in a less compliant

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213 The practices associated with this company have important implications from an enforcement perspective as well. A more detailed analysis follows in the next section.
way; the downward pressure on price for DS services. Such a pressure derives primarily from the attitudes of buyers of DS services (managers and owners of night-time venues).

More specifically, despite the analysis on Chapter 6 on how the SIA regime has had an impact upon raising standards in the DS sector, evidence from the fieldwork suggests that it is still largely considered by buyers of DS services as a ‘grudge’ purchase; ‘a tax on the bottom line, which provides little benefit’ (Button, 2012, p.206). The employment of licenced DS staff in these venues is associated with conformance to the requirements of the Licensing Act 2003. However, most buyers perceived security as a low priority, considered on the basis of money (cheapest rate possible) rather than quality (valid SIA licence and professional attitude), which has been a recurring theme in other studies exploring the market for security in the UK (Gill et al., 2012; Loader et al., 2015).

Contextualising DS services as a grudge purchase is also illustrated through the attitudes towards the voluntary ACS, which, based on the analysis of descriptive quantitative data in Chapter 4, did not appear to be a well-embedded scheme in the DS sector on a national level. Although security managers and directors may appreciate the kitemarking potential of this scheme on the actual and/or perceived quality of their DS services, their ultimate decision on whether to get through this accreditation route was often adversely influenced by the stance of the buyers. In the words of one security manager, the message often received by owners of premises was the following: ‘this is what your charge rate gets – if you don’t like it, I’ve got 20 other companies who are willing to come in at that rate’ (Security company_P6). Such a message gradually fuelled a downward pressure to security companies to compete fiercely with each other, offering really low rates that could not be always economically viable for their commercial future:

‘They don’t care about accreditations – they don’t care about certificates – they care about the money that they’re spending on getting the security in, and that’s what’s knocking the security company everywhere, because anyone can go in and do it. As long as they’ve got some six-foot big burly bouncer that’s on the door, doesn’t matter where they come from, as long as they’re paying £11 an hour instead of £14, they don’t care’ (Security company_P5).

‘The angle things should go from is educate our clients, rather than us. So, I think that would stamp out a lot of people who are sort of cutting corners to save money; “Ooh, perhaps I’ll leave that alone – perhaps I’ll do things properly”’ (Security company_P3).

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214 Figures 6 and 7 in Chapter 4.
However, these accounts might potentially ignore the financial viability or the profitability pressures of purchasers of DS services. As noted by Loader et al (2015, p.872), ‘individuals bring a range of cultural resources to bear on the question of how – and whether – to purchase security goods and services’. In the local NTEs, it seemed that contracting a DS firm to provide security services was seen by the owners of these premises as a tediously necessary investment in the conditions that enable their venue to get and retain their licence. From the side of purchasers, to the extent that they ever considered investing more on security, a general reluctance to spend could signify that they were fearful of spending too much and too proactively on DS services, which could have a detrimental impact upon the economic viability of their venues. As such, it is plausible that some security companies might accept the low payment rates offered by purchasers, based on the pragmatistic consideration that some business is better than none, even at a reduced profit.

Regarding the adaptation scenarios, these varied in the local context. First, national DS companies, due to their size, resources and the business mindset of expanding the provisions of their services across the country, were in a position to undercut small/medium size providers through offering low and thus competitive rates to buyers. Not surprisingly, this had a knock-on effect on local companies, exacerbating the already intense downward pressure on price for their services: ‘we don’t speak to the bigger companies like (company name anonymised), because they’re just out nicking anyone’s doors – as many doors as they can, and they’ll knock the rate down, so other companies can’t survive against them. But then, they push the prices down. There’re some people paying £8 an hour for door supervisors. So, that’s a big thing in the industry – they’re trying to push the price up, and there’s bigger companies chopping it down’ (Security company_P1).

As a consequence, in terms of the second adaptation scenario, some of these local companies adjusted their working practices following a money-saving strategy. Although they might have initially been motivated to comply with the SIA regime, these external influences were often important barriers to their financial capacity to comply. The significance of these structural factors in preventing compliance-related improvements has been showcased in other regulatory contexts (for example, see Winter and May, 2001). As opposed to the mindset and motives of compliant companies discussed in section 1, for some other firms the ‘short-term profit’ rationale, coupled with the lack of management competences and the aforementioned external pressures, led them to non-compliance with the SIA. This attitude towards the regulator involved taking the
risk of using unlicensed DS\textsuperscript{215} in one of the ways described in subsection 2.1. In most cases when a frontline DS is found to be working unlicensed, the employer was complicit in this regulatory misdemeanour. Following the participants’ insights, ‘it’s the bosses at the top’ (DS_P14) who are either turning a blind eye or actively encouraging the non-compliant culture across the echelons of their business.

Finally, it is important to reflect upon the effect of the SIA’s enforcement strategy in securing compliance among security companies. In the local context, deterrence factors, or in other words businesses’ perceptions of the SIA’s regulatory ‘teeth’, were not particularly strong drivers for securing compliance. The starting point of this analysis refers to an issue that has been a recurring theme within this thesis, namely the absence of business licensing. From an enforcement perspective, the vast majority of participants underscored that the lack of regulatory oversight of security companies meant in practice that ‘it’s just a piece of paper on Companies House, saying “Oh, he owns a company” – you can do what you like with the company, because the SIA doesn’t even check on you’ (Security company_P7). As a result, there was a widespread belief that following a non-compliant corporate route could easily fall under the SIA’s radar, with some participants blatantly commenting that ‘I know that I could set up a company tomorrow – start paying cash-in-hand – and never get found out. Never get caught- and that is what is happening’ (Security company_P2). The absence of regulatory due diligence on the business level meant that the implications of director disqualification were not always effective in terms of shielding proactively the industry from these rogue operators. As pointed out by Levi (2008), fraudsters can use fronts as directors, and they can continue as shadow directors. This appeared to be a long-standing issue in the local security industry, as the following excerpt elucidates:

‘You’ve got people who are practicing out there that have been putting money away for years, and years and years, simply so when something goes wrong with this company, they’ve got money to open another company. And then all the staff will switch over, all the names will switch over, and the company name will change but it will be the same people trading’ (Security company_P5).

\textsuperscript{215} In the case of the non-compliant companies, their overall strategy was strictly linked with money-saving. When employing their staff, if DS have already covered the SIA licensing expenses themselves, then offering work to individuals with a valid licence did not clash with their low profit margins. However, when prospective DS asked from the employer to cover these costs, then the preferred route was different. Especially when the pressure to deliver the security contract was imminent, encouraging unlicensed staff (either DS with a bogus badge or stewards/glass collectors with a local reputation of dealing ‘effectively’ with incidents) to take up these positions was highly likely.
Furthermore, questioning the SIA’s regulatory ‘teeth’ should be considered through the lens of the SIA’s enforcement actions locally. According to Table 9, over the course of seven years the SIA has successfully brought ten cases to court in Wales. Most of them were directed against security businesses and three cases were also linked with the application of a POCA order. One could assume that knowledge of these would have spread speedily among local security firms, sending the message that the SIA investigates unscrupulous operators and takes enforcement action often associated with severe consequences for these defendants (i.e. POCA orders, custodial sentence). The interview data suggest that this is partly correct. Although many participants commented that through the SIA newsletters, they were aware of other prosecution cases across the country, they appeared relatively untouched by the outcomes of enforcement activities in other areas. Two particular cases in the local context signalled to participants a twofold message; how the regulator’s sanctions might not be efficient and effective, and how corporate malpractices might remain undetected for many years, until a scandal leads to an investigation.

First, the SecureServe case (Table 9) in South Wales had been the first case for the SIA, in which the regulator applied the newly obtained POCA powers. Despite its potential to mark a dynamic starting point for the upcoming attempts of the SIA to recover the ill-gotten funds from rogue security firms, this did not materialise in practice. More specifically, this case highlighted the problematic scenario, in which the defendant does not have the money to pay back and the court has to impose the obligatory default sentence (Law Commission, 2018). As such, the pending outcome of this case exacerbated the perspective among local firms that ‘if they (defendants) haven’t got the money, you can’t get blood out of a stone’ (Security company_P9) and that ‘they

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216 The choice of the particular timeframe was guided by some practical limitations. More specifically, the SIA informed the researcher that the details of the prosecutions led by the SIA in Wales before 2013 were not available, due to data migration problems. As such, the SIA prosecution cases in Wales cover the period between March 2013 and March 2020.

217 Overall, the SIA prosecutions in Wales between 2012-2020 that were linked with the application of the POCA powers were three: SecureServe, MP Security and BJ Securities. Successful and timely recovery of the ill-gotten funds has so far occurred only in the MP Security case. For the SecureServe case, the time elapsed between the year of the POCA hearing and the time of the writing amounts to five years. In connection with the details related to the development of this case in the meantime (see next footnote), it is highly unlikely that a settlement will occur soon (or at all). For the BJ Securities case, the POCA hearing took place in early 2019 and as such the current ‘still pending’ status does not come as a surprise. The researcher attended this POCA hearing and discussed the particulars of this case with SIA staff, who were involved in the investigation and prosecution of this defendant. Given that these discussions are treated as personal communication and that this case is still ongoing, the researcher is bound by ethical considerations in terms of not disclosing any further details. However, overall it can be purported that at this stage the successful (full amount and in a timely manner) recovery of the ordered funds does not appear to be highly likely.

218 In the SecureServe case, the defendant was imprisoned for 18 months for failure to pay the confiscation order of £80,000. Once released, the defendant started receiving the Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA), which could have been partly utilised as a means to deduct some amounts and account for the outstanding confiscation order (information retrieved through personal communication with SIA employees). However, this did not occur and, as a result, at the time of the writing, the successful collection of the original confiscation order is still pending.
(SIA) come down hard with regard to financial payment, but it takes months, and months and months’ (Security company_P6). Overall, the impact of this asset-focused intervention was questioned on a twofold way. On the one hand, from an efficiency\(^{219}\) point of view, the confiscation process was not linked with a successful recovery of the ordered funds. On the other hand, from an effectiveness perspective, the development of this case jeopardised the message of general deterrence towards the regulated community. The SIA was not only framed as lacking proactive regulatory enforcement, but also as facing constraints in ensuring that rogue directors will not benefit from illicit financial gain (Levi, 2018; Sittlington and Harvey, 2018).

Second, probably the most prominent case which affected the perceived ratio of the SIA’s enforcement to illicit firms operating in the local region, and as such, consolidated the perception that unscrupulous DS firms do not often get their just deserts, is associated with ‘PhD security’\(^{220}\). In light of the information provided in Figure 11, it becomes evident that this local security firm, which as noted before monopolised the provision of DS services across South Wales, was also suspected of involvement in a wide array of criminal offences (SIA violations, tax evasion, money-laundering etc.). On a macro level, it can be argued that the initial investigation led by the SIA for non-compliance with its regime ‘sort of fanned out and the spider web just keeps sort of growing and growing’ (SIA_P16), which led to the successful disruption of the higher end of the alleged OCG by other partner agencies in England. This outcome pinpoints in practice how the investigation of PSIA offences can be used as a means to unfold a wider spectrum of criminality. Of course, there are two key conditions for such a potential to be effective. First, the SIA investigation should come before the police one. Second, an alignment between the SIA’s enforcement-related objectives and the police force’s disruption strategies is needed.

However, this case also exemplifies how the SIA’s enforcement activities towards the statutorily prescribed PSIA offences can be downsized in the local context. If we zoom into the micro level of this case, the ultimate punishment of the local corporate masterminds for their SIA-related malpractices was the withdrawal of their ACS status. Prosecution for the supply of unlicensed DS did not go forward and through its many phases of corporate ‘transformation’, it evaded HMRC’s attention up until 2016 (Figure 11). These outcomes highlight how falsification of

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\(^{219}\) For a detailed analysis on the specific dimensions associated with the concepts of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ in asset focussed interventions, see Chapter 5.

\(^{220}\) ‘PhD Security’ is a pseudonym attributed to this security company; a seemingly odd pseudonym, which however at the best of the researcher’s knowledge could not be associated with any existing security companies. Although this firm has been withdrawn from the ACS register, which is publicly available, part of the information provided to the researcher by the SIA is not public knowledge. Besides this, no criminal justice outcomes are available for the individuals involved with this firm on the local context of South Wales. Therefore, pseudonymisation in this case serves also as a safeguard to the identity of the individuals, who apart from their non-compliance with the SIA regime, have not been ultimately prosecuted for the rest of the offences attributed to them.
documents by rogue operators and the supply of limited evidence towards the SIA can often place some dynamic barriers into the further stages of the regulator’s enforcement activity. Following the insights of an SIA interviewee: ‘It’s such a long process in some areas, because they (rogue companies) are good at doing what they do and it’s not always around PSIA non-compliance. I’d like to see one or two of the big providers, which would perhaps send a real good shot across the bow of those middle-size companies that they might think “Ah, right, well finally something’s being done about company A”’ (SIA_P16).

However, as the interview data suggest, the relative impunity of ‘PhD Security’ did not fulfil the objective of sending a clear message across the local DS firms that non-compliance would face a swift and staggered enforcement response from the regulator. More importantly, for many participants this large unprosecuted case was a common point of reference and constituted a ‘landmark’ of what misdemeanours of a security firm means in practice. As such, when reflecting upon their own conduct, even if this might have included some minor violations, they were in a position to partly rationalise it to themselves as not really harmful (Levi, 2008, 2010b; Shover and Hochstelter, 2006).

Table 9: SIA Prosecutions in Wales (2013-2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person/BusinessProsecuted</th>
<th>Type of Offence</th>
<th>Year ofConviction</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1SecureServeFacilitiesManagement limited</td>
<td>Falsely claiming his company to be an ACS company (1 offence)</td>
<td>Sentenced in 2013. POCA hearing in 2014.</td>
<td>Fined £1,000, costs awarded of £1,000 and a Director Disqualification Order lasting 10 years. A confiscation order was passed ordering him to pay £80,000. On 2 October 2014, he was imprisoned for 18 months for failure to pay the confiscation order. Confiscation remains ongoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1MP SecurityServices Ltd</td>
<td>Working as an unlicensed security director (1 offence) Supplying an unlicensed security operative (1 offence)</td>
<td>Sentenced in 2016. POCA hearing in 2017.</td>
<td>Fined £3,000, costs awarded of £5,000. He was ordered to pay £18,283 under the POCA. Payment made and the case is settled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year of Conviction</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christopher David Price Security Operative</td>
<td>Undertaking licensable activity without a licence (1 offence) Use of a false instrument purporting to be an SIA licence (1 offence)</td>
<td>Sentenced in 2017.</td>
<td>Custodial sentence of 12 weeks, suspended for 12 months. 100 hours unpaid community work Costs awarded of £1,000 and a victim surcharge of £115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Szuchnik and Erica Lloyd Security Company Directors</td>
<td>Szuchnik: Supply of unlicensed security operative (section 5, PSIA 2001) (7 offences) Supplying Articles for use in fraud contrary to</td>
<td>Sentenced in 2019.</td>
<td>Szuchnik: 18-month custodial sentence for each count 2 years and 3 months custodial sentence (all to be served concurrently Victim surcharge of £170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Person/ Business Prosecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year of Conviction</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel Foulkes, Dylan Yorath, Ross Harris and Lewis Potter Security Operatives</td>
<td>section 7(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, Lloyd: Supply of unlicensed security operative (section 5, PSIA 2001) (7 offences), Foulkes, Yorath, Harris and Potter: Fraudulent misrepresentation contrary to section 7 of the Fraud Act 2006</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Director Disqualification Order for a period of 6 years, Lloyd: 12-month custodial sentence for each count, Community Service Order of 200 hours unpaid work, Victim Surcharge £140, Costs order of £250, Director Disqualification Order for a period of 3 years, Foulkes and Harris: 18-month Custodial Service Order; 15-day rehabilitation order, 3-month Curfew (between hours of 8pm-6am), Victim Surcharge £85, Costs order of £250, Yorath and Potter: 12-month Custodial Service Order; 140 hours unpaid work, Victim Surcharge £85, Costs order of £250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Blake Security Operative</td>
<td>Offence of unlicensed operative (section 3, PSIA 2001), Supply of unlicensed security operative (section 5, PSIA 2001)</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Blake was sentenced to pay a fine of £300 and is required to pay court costs of £500 and a victim surcharge of £30, Davies, who was the Cardiff area manager for Elite Security NW, was fined £389 and ordered to pay costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhydian Davies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person/ BusinessProsecuted</td>
<td>Type of Offence</td>
<td>Year of Conviction</td>
<td>Sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elite Security (NW) Ltd</td>
<td>Supply of unlicensed security operative (section 5, PSIA 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>of £668, plus a victim surcharge of £38. Elite Security (NW) Ltd was fined £800, with costs of £668 and a victim surcharge of £80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenna Turner Security Operative</td>
<td>Offence of unlicensed operative (section 3, PSIA 2001)</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Conditional discharge on the defendant and she was also required to pay court costs of £100 and a victim surcharge of £20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Cole Security Operative</td>
<td>Offence of unlicensed operative (section 3, PSIA 2001)</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Conditional discharge on the defendant and he was also required to pay court costs of £100 and a victim surcharge of £20.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: a) Data provided to the researcher by the SIA and b) publicly available information through the SIA’s website
The case of ‘PhD Security’ (South Wales)

This South Wales based company was established in early 2000s and it soon became one of the largest DS firms in Wales. Its expansion was attributed, according to local media, to its ‘aggressive marketing policy’, which allowed them to monopolise the provision of DS services across the entire South Wales area. Between early 2000s and 2019, the original security firm has undergone many phases of ‘transformation’; on a number of occasions it ceased to trade, went into liquidation and then either the same people or new ‘entrants’ set up a ‘phoenix’ security firm.

Non-compliance with the PSIA 2001: The SIA received intelligence in December 2015 to suggest that unlicensed DS were being used at a Christmas Fair in a city in South Wales. Checks were undertaken at the venues and stewards were found to be undertaking licensable activity. Due to lack of evidence supplied by the company, the SIA was unable to pursue the s5 PSIA offences (supply of unlicensed security operatives). However, allegations were made that the business was linked to money laundering offences with OCGs (organised crime groups) from England. Disclosures were made to relevant partners who confirmed these allegations. The SIA demanded various financial documents that were required by the business to achieve their ACS status and disclosed them to the police. During interviews by the police, the business falsified a number of these documents in order to appear that there was no criminal activity taking place. The SIA was able to use this as a reason to withdraw their ACS status (2015).

Involvement with further criminality: In 2015 the SIA received reports informing them that the directors of this company were arrested alongside some other individuals and local police licensing officers for various offences (suspicion of conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office, fraudulent evasion of income tax, suspicion to pervert the course of justice). The police officers did not face criminal proceedings and the rest of the individuals were released on bail.

On several occasions the DS employed by this firm have been involved in acts of violence against the public.

Serious tax fraud and other money laundering-related offences were investigated by the HMRC’s CIT (Criminal Investigation Team) since 2016 and the company was dissolved in 2018. Although the police and HMRC investigation continued as a way of disrupting the high level alleged OCG in England, there is no record to indicate that their associates in South Wales have been prosecuted.
9.3.3 Contextualising non-compliance outside the ‘regulatory box’: the shadow economy in the DS market and its implications for the SIA objectives

Following on from the analysis in the previous subsection regarding the adaptive strategies of some companies, for many local firms, violating the SIA rules was not the only avenue for minimising their corporate expenses. Another option, which according to the data analysis appeared to be particularly prevalent across south-east Wales, involved payroll company fraud, false self-employment or cash-in-hand payment to DS staff. Through these tax evasion routes\(^{221}\), security companies gradually develop a shadow economy in the local DS market through deliberately concealing ‘all market-based production of legal goods and services’ (Schneider and Williams, 2013, p.24). These practices enabled some firms to undercut other legitimate security providers, since the former charge lower rates (no income tax and national insurance contributions were paid for their DS), which the venues were often happy to take. Tax violations posed a significant threat to fairness and to the level playing field within the local DS market. They further exacerbated the already existing vicious circle of the fierce market rationalities between security firms and the portrayal of DS services as a grudge purchase. Moving one step further, what appears to be a simple case of tax evasion can have in practice a close association with a spectrum of important implications, which are discussed in the rest of this section.

The first set of these implications draws our attention to the DS employed by these firms, who become victims of labour abuse\(^ {222}\). Overall, through these tax-evasion corporate routes, DS are being denied their statutory employment rights; they do not qualify for national minimum wage, sick pay or holiday pay and there are no insurance policies in place for them, as depicted by the revealing message directed from security managers to frontline DS: ‘Don’t get into any trouble – and if you get hurt, “poor you”’ (DS_P7). Given the prevalence of violence perpetrated against frontline operatives (Chapter 6), such a lack of insurance, as well as health and safety policies on a corporate level is a significant risk of harm. The interview data allows us to reveal some specific dimensions and mechanisms of this issue in the local context. Some of these firms seemed to

\(^{221}\) Alternative references to these tax avoidance practices would be the term ‘HMRC-related violations/malpractices’.

\(^{222}\) However, it should be noted that some security operatives might be complicit in these tax-avoidance corporate practices. In other words, they were likely not to declare their income for tax purposes, considering that they were benefitting too, up until the moment that they faced HMRC penalties, as the following illustrative example elucidates: ‘one thing that used to be done they’d use people’s tax codes, so you’d get a payslip with somebody else’s name on. So, they would have paid your tax. So, you’d open your payslip, but the guy opposite you, it would have his name on it. It’d be your wage, but because he had “tax free”, it’d go under his name. But if he’s self-employed in the day, like one of the guys they’d done it to, he was a plumber. So, when he came to do his books at the end of the day, he’d got absolutely smashed on tax, because they had him logged down as working so many more hours than he was declaring’ (DS_P3). Regardless of whether the DS were complicit in these practices or not, the labour abuse implications remain of paramount significance.
employ deceptive practices towards the ‘new breed’ of DS\(^{223}\), offering unpaid work as part of a ‘necessary’ apprenticeship to get into the sector\(^{224}\). In other instances, they invoked fear in DS staff, who were voicing concerns about tax-related issues, that these complaints could mean the termination of their employment. Given that the DS market in the local context has been depicted as a closed sector, such a prospect was associated with adverse consequences for their future employment in a similar role:

‘I’ve had people (colleagues) having to pay double tax, because they thought they’d been paying tax – they’ve had it out of their wages – and then the HMRC contact them a year later, to say “last year you didn’t pay any tax” and because they know they won’t go in against the company that they’re working with... but if you do complain to the company you’re working with – they’re the only company that runs the doors – there’s your job gone!’ (DS_P3).

Overall, these exploitative practices reinforced the portrayal of the DS sector as an occupation in which someone ends up due to the lack of other competences and professional aspirations. The negative connotations and practical implications of being a victim of labour abuse were often overlooked. Being denied your statutory employment rights was partly rationalised following the argument that ‘there will always be people who are getting exploited, because perhaps they’re doing this job because they haven’t got the qualifications to do other jobs’ (Police_P4).

From this analysis one could claim that the implications associated with tax fraud and the shadow economy in the DS market are important, yet they are not strictly related to the SIA regulatory regime. However, through examining these malpractices on a deeper level, it can be argued that non-compliance with the HMRC rules signposts a domino effect of further implications. As the data analysis in the rest of the section suggests, these are related to the particular calibre of DS attracted by these firms and the often unexplored, yet key, role of the business in what could appear to be just a case of individual non-compliance\(^{225}\).

\(^{223}\) This term refers either to individuals who have recently obtained their SIA licence or to those who are still participating in the SIA training course with the expectation to submit their full licensing application in due course.

\(^{224}\) One illustrative example was offered by a security manager, who found out that one of his newly employed DS declared six months’ experience, whereas his licence was issued a month ago. It turned out that the operative was doing ‘trial shifts’ for six months in the previous firm, being informed by his previous managers that ‘this was the only way in, working pretty much every weekend, for 6 months, for free!’ (Security company_P6).

\(^{225}\) The analysis and the arguments made in this section do not suggest that only security companies that are operating in the shadow economy are associated with a further domino effect of non-compliance, which ultimately go against these SIA objectives (public protection and raising standards). For instance, the practices of employing ‘shirt-fillers’ or facilitating the drug trade in night-time venues can be also attributed to DS firms that operate in accordance with the HMRC rules. However, the researcher revealed an interesting recurring theme in the data analysis, which in many occasions depicted that tax evasion and cash-in-hand were highly likely to be associated with a broader spectrum of wrongdoings. As such, she made the conscious decision to focus on the specific ‘domino effect’ and ultimately
Security companies following the tax avoidance route were framed as the type of businesses that through the cash-in-hand payments and the broader labour exploitation ‘affect the quality of the staff you’re going to get’ (DS_P8). First, they often appeared to attract frontline operatives who were associated with contravening the SIA licensing requirements, as the following example depicts: ‘you could go to the club next door, and they’re getting paid cash-in-hand, people using other people’s door supervisors’ licences, so, say, their brother’s supervisors’ licence, when they don’t have one’ (DS_P15). Second, these employees were frequently linked with the stereotypical image attributed to the sector as the thugs on the doors. Practices of unsafe physical restraint and violence escalation were commonplace in these instances. Thus, the ultimate goals of keeping the public safe and legitimising the vilified world of bouncers were undermined: ‘It’s all the illegal side of it – it’s the tax evasion, they can’t just turn up, be that big burly bouncer on the door. They have rules and regulations to work by. They can’t just beat someone up around the corner, then, because they’ve been acting like a plonker outside. Because that’s what happens, and then that’s what gives the average door supervisor the bad name’ (Security company_P5). Third, being offered cash-in-hand payments seemed an appealing and flexible mode of employment for the ‘shirt-fillers’\footnote{For a more detailed analysis on the ‘shirt/jacket-filler’ model, see Chapter 6.}, the new breed of inexperienced (also sometimes incapable) DS attracted by the type of company that is ‘not paying their staff properly and employ anybody just to fill the door’ (DS_P20).

Interestingly, this association has been highlighted by SIA participants as well, underlining that compliant and professional companies ‘are happy to pay PAYE and the proper wage’, as opposed to the ones discussed in this section which ‘will pay peanuts and pay them cash and you’ll just get a load of really untrained staff – or staff that don’t have that life experience’ (SIA_P15). Under these circumstances, not only is the safety of the inexperienced DS not safeguarded appropriately by their employers (‘these unscrupulous companies, they’ll put them on doors, and they haven’t got a care in the world for them, so at the end of the day they’re just making money for them’ [Security company_P1]), but also public protection is at stake (i.e. understanding and safeguarding the multi-faceted concept of vulnerability, preventing disorder, undertaking appropriate drug searches on the door).

Going one step further, non-compliance with the HMRC regulations by DS firms sometimes signposted their involvement into a wider array of criminality. Drawing upon their experience in

\footnote{underscore the significance of the corporate culture on what often appears to be a case of individual (DS) non-compliance.}
the local market for DS security, participants from security companies shared the understanding that ‘the people who are running a cash-in-hand door tend to have a bit of a reputation – tend to be a certain type of character, who may well be involved in other things’ (Security company_P3). More specifically, in the local context of south-east Wales this was primarily evidenced through the role of DS in the drug trade within night-time venues; either through turning a blind eye to drug dealing in the licensed premises (passive acceptance) or through actively participating in such a trade (active facilitation)\textsuperscript{227}. On a first level of analysis, this evidence aligns with the body of literature discussing the monoculture of bouncers and their designation as ‘gatekeepers’ for the drug trade (Hobbs, 1995; Hobbs et al., 2003; O’Mahoney, 1997). Building upon this literature, data analysis reveals how the unscrupulous practices by security firms are a key driver behind the role of some DS as gatekeepers of the illicit drugs trade within licensed premises. Overall, three different scenarios have been identified.

First, security firms were indirectly encouraging drug dealing by some of their frontline operatives by not taking appropriate action against them. Passive acceptance or active facilitation of the drug trade in venues was an individual (DS) choice, rather than a pre-planned ‘corporate masterplan’. However, when these practices were reported to the higher echelons of the security companies, area managers or directors did not follow up the information provided and no further investigation into the alleged misdemeanours of their employees took place. An indicative example of such a response was offered by one DS participant, as follows: ‘I’ve worked with people where they were dealing drugs themselves. And I’ve reported it to management, and I’ve had to walk away because management’s done nothing. So, basically, people turn a blind eye to it, as well’ (DS_P14). Predominantly guided by the external pressures to deliver their DS services and commercially survive the fierce competition with other local providers, these firms did not seem willing or competent to have robust due diligence mechanisms in place. As a result, unprofessional attitudes from their staff either went unnoticed or were tolerated.

Second, apart from turning a blind eye to drug dealing by DS, in other cases security businesses operating in the shadow economy were actively engaged in the process of enabling the drug trade within specific premises. In these cases, drug dealing seemed to be orchestrated on a corporate level and manifested either as an ephemeral and opportunistic operation (a less organised form of criminal operation) or as a more structured operation linked with sophisticated and alleged

\textsuperscript{227} Many participants (both DS and police) commented that during the last decade the ‘pre-loading’ trend in alcohol consumption has extended to drug use as well; individuals tend to consume drugs before their night-out or they have been provided with the drugs before getting into the clubs/bars, so a lot of the ‘old-school’ type of dealing in or around premises is not as frequent as before. Yet, the perspective that ‘if you want to take illicit substances into a club, the person you need on-side is the doorman’ (DS_P8) has not faded away.
formal criminal organisations (e.g. the case of ‘PhD security’). Despite the seeming difference in manifestation, the nature of their practices and the implications for the SIA’s regime were similar in both cases. It could be also argued that these firms are making a lot of undeclared money from drugs. As such, they can afford to run the formal business at lower profit levels, further exacerbating the vicious circle of undercutting other potentially legitimate companies through offering considerably cheaper rates for the same DS contract (section 2.2).

Through their cash-in-hand payments, these firms were in a position to attract a specific calibre of DS, willing to be complicit and active facilitators of drug dealings within the venues. Employing unlicensed staff did not seem to be a particularly popular option in these occasions, since the perceived risk of inspection and thus detection of the SIA malpractices on the individual (DS) level was relatively high in the local NTEs (Chapter 8). Instead, using ‘26 members of door staff who are all SIA compliant – above board – but they’re your drug dealers – when they turn up at premises, they’re taking with them a load of drugs and palming it off, and then somebody sells them inside, so they’re never on the door staff – they’re just like the mule, where they deliver them and bring the money back at the end of the day’ (Police_P14) was considered the preferred route.

Echoing the insights from some SIA participants discussed in Chapter 4, this illustration corroborates the concerns around the effectiveness of the SIA’s criminality criteria in safeguarding the industry from the infiltration of organised criminality; the provision of illegal goods, such as drugs, by either opportunistic groups or more sophisticated criminal operators. However, it should be noted that usually not all the operatives of these companies were active facilitators of the drug trade. Some DS were mainly attracted by the superficially appealing flexibility of the shadow economy, yet they were not willing to take part in the drug trade. In cases when these operatives found out about the illegitimate activities of their bosses and their colleagues, their options were either to find the courage to face the prospect of threats (i.e. retaliation, no payment/employment) and ultimately step out of such an unscrupulous enterprise or to compromise and assist fellow colleagues with the drug trade. The following story illustrates the exploitation and the adverse realities that non-complicit DS have often to face:

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228 Less organised forms of criminal operations have been often excluded from the organised crime category. The researcher aligns with the perspective put forward by some organised crime researchers, such as Bouchard and Morselli (2014) and Campana (2016a), who have argued that the concept of organised criminality should not restrict its reference to the stereotypical structures of sophisticated criminal entrepreneurs, but should refer broadly to the provision of illegal goods and services.

229 The story refers to the working experience of a frontline security operative, just after he stopped working for this rogue security firm and sought employment opportunities from our participant.
'And I spoke to him, and everything was cash in hand – when they paid him – and he’s a good doorman. And I said, “What happened?” and he said, “I couldn’t do it” he said, “It’s drugs” he said “I spotted the drugs, and I got a hiding – I got a beating in the toilets by 2 of the other doormen, because they were the ones dealing it!”' Now, he didn’t know that, at the time, and then he was told to stay there. He said, “I worked the end of my shift – they never paid me” and he said, “I won’t go back”. I was like “What’s the name of the company?”, “I don’t know”. I was like “Well, who paid you?”, “Some guy I’d never seen before”. “How did he pay you?”, “He just gave me cash”, “Was it right – was it correct?”, “I don’t know – he just gave me money.” I said, “Well, how many hours did you work?” and he was like “Well, I worked about 18 hours, in a week”. I said, “What did they pay you?” he said, “£60” And I was like “Well didn’t you argue?” and he was like “Oh, oh no”. He was scared, you know – he was proper scared!” (Security company_P1).

In the third scenario, on some occasions the connection between corporate tax non-compliance and drug trade on the individual (DS) level became apparent through a rather indirect, yet significant mechanism. More specifically, although some local security companies might not have turned a blind eye or encouraged DS’ illicit activities per se, their corporate stance of contravening HMRC regulations and labour law provisions meant in practice that their staff were essentially low-paid workers operating in the shadow economy. In some cases, this had the adverse effect of making some DS much more prone to ‘take backhanders from drug dealers’ (DS_P7).

9.4 Concluding remarks

Overall, in this chapter a number of key findings emerged in terms of the drivers of (non)compliance for DS businesses across south-east Wales. For compliant companies two key facilitators were identified: their ‘family business’ operation style and the catalytic (accommodative) enforcement style adopted by local SIA investigators, when engaging with local firms. For non-compliant firms, it is argued that the classical rational choice approach cannot fully capture the drivers for non-compliance. The data analysis suggests that cutting corners on a business level is in most cases contextualised through the lens of ‘necessity’, ‘adaptation’ and a restricted deterrent effect associated with the SIA’s enforcement actions.

Furthermore, the chapter indicated the importance of approaching a non-compliant attitude, which seems to manifest on the individual (DS) level, through a more holistic framework. In particular, the process of tracing the ‘script’ of non-compliance from the DS to the business level
has in many cases the potential to unravel rogue corporate practices, which undermine the objectives of public protection and raising standards in the industry. This was evidenced through the domino effect of consequences linked with local DS firms operating in the shadow economy. In other words, cash-in-hand payments were not only associated with important labour abuse implications; they were often a key driver behind attracting a specific calibre of DS, who were either incompetent or were more likely to play a central role in facilitating the drug trade in licensed premises.

Currently, the SIA’s response to this issue is largely dependent upon collaborating with other law enforcement agencies, notably with HMRC. White and Hayat (2018, p.103) consider that the partnerships between the SIA and some other government agencies (e.g. Home Office Immigration Enforcement Team, National Crime Agency) are ‘helping to bring into effect elements of a transformative organisational identity’. However, regarding the collaboration between the SIA and HMRC, the operational reality reveals some key issues in terms of the power dynamics and the information exchange between the two agencies: ‘We have a reciprocal arrangement, intelligence-sharing with HMRC\textsuperscript{230}, but sometimes intelligence we pass to HMRC we never know what happens to it, so we don’t know that what we’re doing is good, or what we’re doing is correct, or what we’re doing has an impact. But HMRC have got a lot of sway, whereas we don’t have that much sway’ (SIA_P15). There are several legal limits on what HMRC can feedback to other departments (HMRC, 2016). Besides this, obstacles in substantive joined-up working between the SIA and the HMRC echoes the findings of other reports, which acknowledged the persistence of different departmental cultures and strategic priorities, as well as tight resources and funding (Doig & Levi, 2008; Grabiner, 2000). In light of the important consequences associated with the absence of business licensing and the operational issues in the SIA-HMRC partnership, there appears to be a need for the regulator and law-makers to address the lack of regulatory oversight of security firms. Recommendations and policy implications are further put into perspective in Chapter 10.

\textsuperscript{230} The SIA and the HMRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2018 with the purpose of exchanging information about businesses and individuals working in the regulated private security sectors, who are abusing employment rules and are involved in tax fraud.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

In the previous chapters of this project, the researcher explored and evaluated the impact of the SIA’s regulatory regime upon the DS sector in the UK. Having come to the end of the thesis, this chapter aims to act not simply as a mechanical finishing touch. Rather than an epilogue, which just seeks to provide a summary of what has come previously, this chapter has been developed across three key objectives. The first one is to offer a synthesis of the research findings. Through pulling together the key threads from Chapters 4-9, succinct responses to the research questions that acted as the ‘research compass’ for this study, are built up and offered in section 1. These, in turn, allow the ‘research needle’ to move into the central overarching theme of this thesis. In section 2, the SIA’s responsiveness is put into perspective: what sort of equilibrium is there between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ approach of the SIA towards this specific sector (both on individual and business level); and what sort of recommendations and policy implications can be drawn from these. Finally, through revisiting the contribution of this thesis, section 3 offers a self-reflective account of the limitations of this study and outlines possible avenues for future research in this field.

10.1 Answering the research questions

Research question 1: What are the key features of the SIA’s strategic agenda on the ‘transformation of the world of bouncers’ and how do these correspond with the ‘lived realities’ of the DS community?

Building up the response to this research question draws upon the data analysis and the findings in Chapters 4 and 6. The synthesis of these findings is guided by the ‘regulatory’ (‘cleansing’ and ‘professionalising the industry’) and the ‘responsibility’ (aligning the industry with the public interest) pillars of Stiernstedt’s et al (2019) regulatory model\(^{231}\), which have particular relevance to the transformation of the world of bouncers.

Starting from the ‘cleansing’ and ‘raising standards’ aspect of the SIA’s strategic stance towards the DS sector, the licensing regime has gone through three developmental stages. Licensing was

\(^{231}\) As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2), the most holistic regulatory framework for the private security industry comes from Stiernstedt et al (2019). More specifically, the framework builds upon three pillars: ‘regulatory’ (‘cleansing’ and ‘professionalising the industry’, Button and fellow authors), ‘distributive’ (addressing security inequality, Shearing and fellow authors), and ‘responsibility’ (aligning the industry with the public interest, Loader and White). In the specific context exploring the impact of the SIA’s licensing regime upon the DS sector, the most relevant pillars are the ‘regulatory’ and the ‘responsibility’ ones.
initially geared towards the purpose of removing violent operatives or those involved with serious organised crime (2003-2008), which in turn shifted to preventing DS with prior criminality from entering the sector (2008 onwards). In the third stage of the SIA’s licensing regime (from 2010 onwards), the regulatory focus is on trusting the new professional type of DS to contribute to public protection. The key denominator across these stages was the ‘light touch’ regulation mandate; internal (to the SIA) and external (to the industry) burdens should be kept to a minimum. The development of the SIA’s criminality criteria demonstrated different forms of regulatory responsiveness and pragmatism. Key examples were the following: the licensing process did not automatically exclude applicants with a formal record of prior criminality and the assessment grid for previous offences was revised to focus primarily on previous offences relevant to the competency requirements and responsibilities of security staff. These, alongside with the provision of ample guidance to applicants, suggest that the regulator follows a grounded appraisal of the actual profiles of the people they give licences to, while ensuring that the licensing process is not disproportionately stringent and thus creating a potential shortage of security staff.

Evidence across south-east Wales suggests that regulation had a positive impact upon the development of a new type of ‘bouncer’. The working realities of contemporary DS in the local context included a variety of responsibilities and tasks, which were mostly performed in a ‘soft’ policing way (screening at the entrance, order maintenance, staggered interventions, safeguarding of customers). However, the SIA’s regime does not achieve a complete eradication of the ‘bad apples’ from the sector; they still exist, yet they seem to be the exception rather than the norm. Regulation seemed to have a less positive impact upon two areas associated with the professionalisation objective of licensing in the DS sector. First, committing to a DS role was largely seen as a transient career choice, rarely associated with long-term development prospects. This could partly explain the downward trend in the supply side of the DS sector. Second, by de-stigmatising the occupation (‘thugs on the doors’), individuals who may not have considered the occupation before are now willing to enter, mainly because of the ease of obtaining the DS qualifications (‘shirt-fillers’) in an era of economic recession and shortage of available employment options. Evidence from the local context indicated that ‘shirt-fillers’, a part of the new entrants in the industry considered to be lacking motivation, interest, experience or the skillset to commit to the DS role, could not contribute effectively to the demands of order maintenance and public protection in night-time venues.

Moving beyond the purely ‘regulatory’ appraisal, the ways in which a large proportion of local DS perform their safeguarding tasks highlight that moral considerations and empathising techniques often allow them to go above and beyond their contractual agreements. This is a
particularly important aspect, suggesting that DS’s working realities in the post-regulation era are aligned with the public interest, as envisaged by the regulator. However, this proposition has two caveats. First, DS were largely proactive and competent in dealing with the most ‘conventional’ types of vulnerability in the NTE (drunk customers, lone females). Yet, when dealing with young drug runners or homeless individuals, DS’ approach seemed to be aligned mostly with ‘hard’ policing interventions. In other words, their judgment on who constitutes a vulnerable person was predominantly guided by a normative list (inebriated people and lone females), and there were few instances of accounting for more complex signs that warrant attention (e.g., mental health). Such a prescribed ‘vulnerability manual’ does not allow frontline operatives to consider how the list could be adapted to fit other emerging groups, such as the young drug runners in Newport. The key question arising at this stage is whether DS do have any alterative options when dealing with these youths, other than to push them away from the licensed premise and keep on undertaking their duties within the security bubble of the venue employing them. It is argued that frontline security staff have a unique position in the NTE infrastructure (observers of what is happening around the venues), with local knowledge on the young drug runners (family background, adverse experiences and risks). Therefore, instead of ‘cleaning up’ the streets from these unwanted youths (or even being hostile towards them), a useful starting point could be for DS to monitor their presence and to feed this back to the police (i.e., through their radio network), so that the latter could follow-up and initiate a vulnerability policing process.

Second, in the post-regulation era one of the key shared concerns among DS referred to their experiences of verbal and physical abuse in their workplace by customers and other members of the public. Location appeared as a key factor of the magnitude and frequency of these incidents, with DS working in towns and rural areas being exposed to recurring and escalating forms of threats, abuse and violence compared to their colleagues in urban environments. Apart from questioning the DS’ legitimacy by the public, this also suggests that the current phase of the SIA’s licensing regime (‘security operatives protecting the public’) should be complemented strategically with the theme of ‘protecting DS from the public’. It is of paramount importance that this theme should be more than regulatory rhetoric. Recommendations on how the SIA could develop a supporting strategy for empowering the DS against violent incidents are presented in section 10.2.
Research question 2: To what extent have DS become part of the extended policing family?

The findings supporting the response to this question come from Chapter 7. For the SIA, the ambition of enabling private security operatives to gradually become an integral part of the extended policing family has been a key strand of the broader ‘raising standards’ objective. On a strategic level, the outward-facing message of the SIA Annual Reports paints a positive picture, justified on the ongoing and developing joint enforcement operations with police forces across the country. Yet, the evidence from the local context of this study explored the operational level, namely the day-to-day dealings between DS and police officers, provides mixed evidence on their collaboration dynamics.

Overall, the findings suggest that in the post-regulation era, it was rare for relationships between the police and DS across south-east Wales to be hostile or non-existent. In particular, there was an apparent improvement in their working relationships, which was contextualised on a twofold way. First, the police seemed to recognise the proactive responses of DS, being the first respondents in violent altercations and safeguarding issues in licensed premises. Since early intervention is at the forefront of contemporary policing practices, DS were seen as a helpful ‘junior’ partner (Jones & Newburn, 1998) for frontline police officers. Second, as mentioned by interviewees, friendly exchanges, aimed at fostering a personal touch in the co-policing of the NTE, were part of the majority of interactions between the two groups.

However, the contemporary collaboration dynamics between the police and security staff are a long way from the idealised scenario of respect, collaboration and assistance. This proposition is corroborated through considering the nuances behind the seeming improvement reported above. Local police officers appeared to apply an interesting adaptation of a focused-deterrence strategy towards security operatives. Despite the initiation of friendly exchanges (positive message-‘carrot’ side of the approach), they were actively and vigorously monitoring the local DS’ adherence to the SIA regime (‘hard’ message-‘stick’ side of the approach), implying that security staff were mainly considered to be useful collaborators, rather than trusted partners.

Furthermore, collaboration is agreed to have improved, yet it is essentially asymmetric. In other words, there is an one-sided expectation of assistance and flow of intelligence from the police towards the DS. The qualitative analysis of data from both groups demonstrated a mixture of mutual trust deficits. DS believed that the pre-regulation ‘bouncer-related’ stereotypes (particular emphasis on the ‘aggressors’ and ‘low security work’ themes) were still to some extent ingrained in the local police culture, despite the improvement of standards in the sector. In addition, on a
number of occasions police officers took for granted that their ‘needs must’ ally should lend them a hand with public order or violent offences, but often resisted in practice to be mutually supportive towards the DS. From the side of the police, trust and respect deficits were mostly associated with the inferior skillset of DS and their accountability structures. Yet, such police scepticism was often illustrative of a largely ‘defensive’ police culture, which was not always backed up by robust examples and sometimes revealed misinterpretation of the key features of the SIA’s identity, licensing requirements and enforcement policy.

Overall, it is argued that police participants in this study are largely considered as pragmatists. Driven primarily by operational reality, their stance towards local DS was an adaptation of pragmatic considerations of specific scenarios, rather than standalone perspectives. The analysis identified four parameters, which under specific circumstances can either enable or hinder collaboration standards between the police and frontline operatives. These are: i) the recognition of the SIA’s role and its remit, ii) the local context (urban vs rural areas), iii) the specific role of police officers in the policing remit of the NTEs (frontline, strategic or licensing-related role) and iv) the strategic agenda of each police force (priorities and their broader view on the role of private security). In terms of appraising the specific contribution of the SIA’s regime, the following describes two key outcomes of this analysis. First, improvements in the working relationships between the police and security staff were mainly attributed to the good progress of the regulator in meeting its ‘cleansing’ objectives. However, the SIA’s contribution to instilling a professional code of conduct and a ‘state-centric’ touch on the sector was largely contested by the police interviewed. Second, the SIA’s regime appeared to have a dynamic secondary role (being either a facilitator or sometimes an inhibitor) in shaping the working interrelationships between the police and the DS, rather than a role of a static key driver. In other words, regulation was contextualised as an intermediary tool for fostering the ‘needs-must’ relationships between the two groups.

Research question 3: What are the key drivers behind (non) compliance with the SIA’s regime on an individual level (DS) and on a business level (DS companies)?

The first section of this research question, related to compliance on the individual level, is based on the analysis in Chapter 8. The findings from this part of the thesis identified five factors as the drivers behind compliant and non-compliant attitudes among the local DS: economic considerations, the working culture of the security company, the risk of inspection, the SIA’s swiftness and severity of sanctions and the enforcement styles of SIA’s investigators.
In terms of economic considerations, for local DS, obtaining the SIA licence and adhering to the licensing requirements was framed as a viable route for ensuring that their employment is legitimate and thus making a living (or supplementing their primary income) is guaranteed. The cost of cutting corners was associated with their licence being suspended or revoked, which in turn has severe implications for their employment and the financial strains to follow. Besides this, the respect and appreciation towards their employers (security firms) and the licensed premises that they work for were catalysts for ensuring DS’ compliance. Conversely, if the security company’s mindset turned a blind eye to or actively encouraged the non-compliant culture across the echelons of their business, then DS were more likely to follow the non-compliant route as well. Overall, the SIA’s enforcement approach had a deterrent effect on local DS. A high risk of inspections, the swiftness and severity of the SIA’s response and the supportive enforcement style by local investigators were key facilitators of individual compliance. Nevertheless, in the cases of DS who have entered the sector illegitimately in the first place, such a deterrent effect was limited since they would likely not have been authorised anyway.

Finally, it is important to note that with reference to the respect towards the SIA, communication channels between the SIA and the DS community were not always operating efficiently. Regulatees also seemed to express a misunderstanding of the statutory responsibilities of the SIA, which often clashed with the operational realities and the ‘light-touch’ strategic agenda of the organisation. Yet, such a partial dislike of and resistance towards the SIA did not appear to signal disobedience to the regulatory regime.

Turning next to the business level, findings from Chapter 9 contribute to the response to the second part of this question. For compliant DS firms in the local context, two key facilitators of compliance were identified. First, the adoption of a ‘family business’ operation style meant that in practice, compliance with the SIA regime assisted to gradually develop a robust local reputation and to be able to have in place the necessary mechanisms to account for their staff’s safety, well-being and fair treatment. Second, the catalytic enforcement style by SIA investigators often facilitated compliance through education and support to DS companies.

For non-compliant companies in the local context, the findings suggest a much more complex picture. For some of these DS companies, ignoring and violating the SIA regulations was attributed to greedy, yet rational, calculations of how cutting corners enabled them to maximise their profits. Yet, the findings postulate that this does not capture fully the key drivers of business

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232 A more detailed analysis of deterrence factors associated with the SIA’s enforcement outcomes is provided in the response to research question 4.
non-compliance in the local context. Cutting corners on a business level was in most cases contextualised through the lens of ‘necessity’, ‘adaptation’ and a restricted deterrent effect associated with the SIA’s enforcement actions. Regarding necessity, setting up a DS firm was seen as the only viable way to move from the low end of the pay scale (frontline DS) to the better remunerated positions of an area manager or security director. This was linked with negative consequences in terms of their corporate competences (lack of management and leadership skills), their broader business mindset (quick profit) and their perspectives towards compliance (compliance=burden). For some DS firms, the absence of a level playing field in the market for DS services and the buyers’ (night-time venues) downward pressure on price for DS services often led the businesses to adapt their practices in a less compliant way. Finally, in the local context, deterrence factors, or in other words businesses’ perceptions of the SIA’s regulatory ‘teeth’, were not particularly strong drivers for securing compliance.

Research question 4: What are the key developments of the SIA’s enforcement approach and what is their effect on the door supervision sector?

Developing a response to this question requires a synthesis of different aspects, which allow a more holistic examination of the SIA’s enforcement approach. These aspects are associated with the SIA’s intelligence cycle, the SIA’s enforcement strategies and the SIA’s enforcement styles. Therefore, this question draws upon the findings from Chapters 5, 8 and 9.

The ways in which intelligence is gathered from a variety of sources and the methods used to evaluate its content are two aspects with significant implications for the SIA’s enforcement approach. Intelligence-led inspections and, more broadly selective enforcement, are supported by the ‘light-touch’ mandate and the ‘cost-effectiveness’ rhetoric. These arguments propose the reduction or elimination of random inspections, assuming that two key conditions are met. First, the SIA has a robust regime for overseeing how security companies operate and flag up any misdemeanours promptly. However, the analysis suggests that the absence of business licensing places barriers upon the SIA’s proactive due diligence. Second, the intelligence received through partner agencies, the public and the industry should be generating the best/most significant data about problems and violations. Yet, the analysis of the SIA’s intelligence source and methods highlighted some inherent limitations and paradoxes. These were, in short, related to the following issues: barriers to the intelligence flow between the SIA and law enforcement agencies,

233 A more detailed analysis of the SIA’s enforcement interventions follows in the response of the research question 4.
the contested quality of intelligence pieces provided by the public or the industry to the SIA and some (internal to the SIA) processing issues. As such, it can be argued that random inspections are still valuable for not only for the information entering the SIA, but also for sending out a clear message of the SIA’s visible street presence.

Moving to the SIA’s enforcement strategies, the regulator’s strategic narrative from 2008 onwards sought to strike a balance between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ side of its compliance and enforcement approach. In terms of the ‘hard’ message, a dynamic enforcement-related presence was consolidated in a twofold way. First, prosecutions and warnings/improvement notices figures followed an upward trend between 2010 and 2015. Second, the SIA has become more active in marketing their enforcement activities, with the purpose of generating publicity and sending a reassurance message towards the industry.

Exploring how this regulatory strategy was contextualised on the individual and business level, the research findings suggest an asymmetric approach between frontline operatives and DS firms. With reference to DS, it is argued that not only there is adequate scrutiny before being granted an SIA licence, but also that a relatively robust enforcement and deterrence approach is applied. As such, emphasis in primarily placed upon the proactive and reactive ‘hard’ message of the SIA’s enforcement, with a lesser focus on the ‘soft’ approach. More specifically, the risk of licensing inspections and thus detection of SIA violations in the local context appeared to be high. These inspections were primarily undertaken by the police and problematic cases were fed back to the regulator. This was a key deterrent factor for security operatives. Furthermore, the swiftness of SIA’s response and the sanction imposed on DS, who had a valid licence and later breached some of its conditions, were considered to have a marked deterrent effect. Nevertheless, in the cases of DS who have entered the sector illegitimately in the first place, such a deterrent effect was limited since they would likely not have been authorised anyway. In terms of the interactions between SIA investigators and the local DS community, there was a change from a ‘rule-oriented’ to a more ‘adaptive/supportive’ style of enforcement. Yet, this was confined to the technicalities of the SIA regime and therefore a more ‘accommodative’ enforcement style did not appear to be ingrained into the working practices of the investigators and their dealings with the local DS population. The processes of actively opening up a dialogue with them during inspections, getting their insights on the prevalence of violence in their workplace and signposting them to the available reporting mechanisms were an exception of good practice rather than a defining feature of their day-to-day dealings with the local security operatives.
For DS firms, regulatory proactivity in enforcement was restricted and therefore the SIA’s enforcement approach was largely premised on more reactive measures of limited effectiveness. The non-existent regulatory oversight of security companies was identified as the key factor resulting in the lack of regulatory due diligence of corporate malpractices. The voluntary ACS scheme offers some form of regulatory oversight of the businesses, which opt in. Yet, data analysis suggested that the uptake of the ACS in the DS sector is limited and not particularly valued. Evidence from the fieldwork highlighted that cutting corners with the SIA’s regime on the business level can be under the regulator’s radar, until the next scandal leads to an investigation.

On a strategic level, the absence of business licensing was often attributed to burden-related arguments and the ‘light-touch’ regulatory mandate, downsizing the public protection argument. However, findings in Chapter 9 from the local context revealed how corporate malpractices can ultimately unfold into a significant threat for public protection. It is argued that the process of tracing the ‘script’ of non-compliance from the DS to the business level has in many cases the potential to unravel rogue corporate practices, which undermine the objectives of public protection and raising standards in the industry. This was evidenced through the domino effect of consequences linked with some local DS firms operating in the shadow economy. In other words, cash-in-hand payments were not only associated with important labour abuse implications; they were often a key driver behind attracting a specific calibre of DS, who were either incompetent or were more likely to play a central role in facilitating the drug trade in licensed premises.

Due to these limitations in the SIA’s enforcement-related proactivity, the regulatory approach is mainly centred around its response to already committed regulatory misdemeanours. A key development that this study explored was the addition of POCA powers in the SIA’s armoury since 2014. From an outputs-related perspective, the well-documented scepticism towards the efficiency of confiscation regimes was echoed through the analysis of SIA POCA cases. In particular, between 2014 and 2020 POCA orders constituted a small proportion of the total annual SIA prosecutions and only half of the total number of POCA orders have been settled. Furthermore, from an effectiveness point of view, this regime had some impact on the ‘profit-driven and PSIA-related’ side of the industry’s malpractices, yet it did not facilitate the disruption of more serious criminality in the industry.

General deterrence and reassurance that rogue security directors will not benefit from the ‘fruits’ of their PSIA-related offences were largely dependent upon the local SIA enforcement outcomes. The general outward-facing SIA message on enforcement (nationwide prosecutions, publicity of
enforcement actions on a national level) was not a sufficient condition for general deterrence. The analysis of the ‘PhD security’ case-study illustrated how falsification of documents by rogue operators and the supply of limited evidence towards the SIA can often place some substantial barriers into the further stages of the regulator’s enforcement activity. Besides this, the process of evaluating specific enforcement tools for security firms yields some limitations in their effectiveness. For instance, the director disqualification order did not stop at least some wrongdoers from operating in ‘phoenix’ security companies as ‘shadow’ directors, using others as fronts (‘acting’ directors). Overall, in the local context of this thesis, the broader theme related to the lack of regulatory oversight of DS firms and the specific outcomes of local cases consolidated the perception that rogue directors can benefit from illicit financial gain and that unscrupulous DS firms do not often get their ‘just deserts’.

10.2 ‘So what?’: Policy implications and recommendations

One of the overarching objectives of this thesis is to reflect on the extent to which the SIA’s ‘regulatory craft’ (Sparrow, 2000) is balanced between ‘dealing with the wrongdoing today’ and ‘nurturing consent for tomorrow’ (Braithwaite, 2003, p.35). The previous section of this chapter clearly demonstrated that there are different dynamics in the ways that the SIA’s regime has consolidated on the individual and the business level of the DS sector. Therefore, implications and recommendations associated with the SIA’s responsiveness are presented in this section separately for frontline operatives and DS companies.

To begin with the individual level, the responses to the research questions found that the regulatory response towards DS has been predominantly geared towards the ‘hard’ message. This message was evident both at the point of being granted an SIA licence, as well as translating the SIA’s enforcement-related activities into a clear-cut message that ‘non-compliance will not be tolerated’. The evidence discussed regarding the transformation of the world of ‘bouncers’ suggests that the SIA has made good progress in fulfilling the objective of ‘reform’; cleansing the DS sector from criminals and ‘fighters’, as well as professionalising the industry standards. Moving beyond the ‘regulatory’ pillar234, the SIA’s contribution in empowering the industry over its contemporary challenges (‘responsibility’ pillar as per Stiernstedt et al, 2019) has not been

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234 As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2), the most holistic regulatory framework for the private security industry comes from Stiernstedt et al (2019). More specifically, the framework builds upon three pillars: ‘regulatory’ (‘cleansing’ and professionalising the industry, Button and fellow authors), ‘distributive’ (addressing security inequality, Shearing and fellow authors), and ‘responsibility’ (aligning the industry with the public interest, Loader and White, 2017). In the specific context exploring the impact of the SIA’s licensing regime upon the DS sector, the most relevant pillars are the ‘regulatory’ and the ‘responsibility’ ones.
equally dynamic so far, compared with its reform outputs (‘regulatory’ pillar, ibid). Therefore, this thesis offers a series of propositions, which aim to signpost the direction towards a more inclusive focussed deterrence strategy (Braga et al., 2001; 2018); counterbalancing the ‘hard’ message of the SIA’s enforcement approach towards the DS sector with a ‘soft’ message of positive incentives. Drawing upon the findings across this study, these incentives could not only empower DS to align with the public interest, but they could decrease the social distance between the organisation and regulatees.

First, support structures for occupational trauma management are of paramount importance. Exposure to violence and safeguarding vulnerable individuals are key occupational characteristics of the sector. Recent research has demonstrated that suffering the effects of witnessing violence is strongly associated with developing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with varying degrees of severity (Button, 2019; Talas et al., 2020). The British Armed Forces and other agencies (including the police) have adopted the Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) programme in response to officers witnessing traumatic events. TRiM is a peer-support process that aims to support employees following trauma and encourage help-seeking. Research within military and police populations has provided preliminary support for its positive effects (Watson & Andrews, 2018).

However, such a support structure in the DS sector does not exist. The SIA on this occasion can take the lead on occupational trauma management for frontline operatives, such as DS, through a twofold way. On the one hand, the regulator can refine the existing training course syllabus through including sessions that are directly relevant to the manifestations of PTSD in the industry and to the available services for operatives in high-risk environments. On the other hand, the SIA can campaign and encourage security companies to consider the implementation of TRiM for their employees through accredited consultancy agencies (e.g. March on Stress). Such a campaign can convey the clear-cut message to DS firms that early identification and treatment of occupational trauma can be associated with important economic (keep people at work-cost effectiveness), legal (duty of care to employees) and reputational (recognised as a responsible employer) benefits. Part of the industry was associated with a wide array of non-compliance and a lack of supporting mechanisms towards their staff. For these firms, such a message is not likely to have a direct impact upon their broader corporate attitude. However, for the compliant businesses and, especially for those who are engaged with the SIA, such a message can be forwarded as part of the ‘creative’ enforcement style of local SIA investigators.
Besides this, the SIA could refine the current curriculum of the training courses for DS in two ways. First, the findings highlighted that the SIA training is disproportionately focused on a theoretical appraisal of the DS role, rather than on a more practical and grounded awareness of difficult situations in the field. Linking this observation with the ‘shirt-fillers’ discussion, it can be argued that inexperienced door staff could benefit from the following suggested modifications to the existing training courses. Guest talks by experienced DS, who will provide an ‘insider’ lived narrative and respective hints and tips, could be a useful add-on. Furthermore, for applicants with no prior experience in the industry, the training course could be complemented with an official placement under the mentorship of experienced colleagues. Second, given the operatives’ key role as first respondents towards more complex and less visible forms of vulnerability in the NTE, the vulnerability module on the SIA training course should be refined. More specifically, this module should encompass examples and training resources in order to showcase that vulnerability does not only refer to intoxicated individuals, but it is inclusive of a wider spectrum of cases, such as mental health issues. Therefore, operatives undertaking the course can be further educated and empowered through overcoming the commonplace faulty thinking over questions of vulnerability and risk.

Another important add-on to the existing training curriculum for DS refers to the administration and use of body-worn cameras. Despite their widely recognised potential in assisting DS in their often-challenging frontline role, the lack of a strong ethical framework by DS in handling sensitive data was a key concern expressed by local police officers. Therefore, the SIA could have a leading role in designing a new module about body-worn cameras on the training course that will equip DS with the essential technical and data protection-related competences. Apart from these refinements of the mandatory SIA training course for new entrants in the DS, it is important to consider the provision of supplementary refresher training sessions to operatives. These can be delivered in conjunction with police forces, following the examples of good practice identified in this study. Police officers can offer valuable guidance to DS, which can either build up on their already existing competences or can be tailored to specific issues that are prominent in the local context (e.g. county lines). The delivery of these sessions and the sustained interaction between public and private policing agents has the potential to empower the skillset of DS, thus minimising the probability of unprofessional (or even non-compliant) behaviours and also to help

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235 Across different private security roles, the use of different types of technological equipment is currently a prevalent issue. In this thesis, given its occupation-specific focus, body-worn cameras have been identified as the key technological ‘ally’ for DS working in the NTE. However, regulatory oversight should not be confined exclusively to body-worn cameras. Future research can explore how other types of technological equipment are used by the regulated parts of the industry and assess to what extent the SIA could have a more leading role in the fine details surrounding their use.
bridge the mistrust gap between the two groups. Such a gap often derives from the police’s limited awareness of the SIA’s training curriculum.

Another key policy-related issue refers to the ways in which regulatory interventions could possibly contribute to safeguarding DS from violence in their workplace. This thesis demonstrated that DS are most likely to be the first respondents of cases involving risk-taking behaviours. At the same time, the frequent occurrence of verbal and physical abuse by customers and other members of the public appeared to be part and parcel of their job on the doors. Police officers, Firefighters, prison officers and NHS staff are recognised by the law as emergency services and, as a response to the increasing number of attacks against them, a more robust legal framework has been introduced since 2018. For frontline security operatives, who are not recognised as emergency services, statutory support mechanisms do not exist.

Thus, the pertinent question is whether the SIA could work towards the recognition of this part of the industry as one of the emergency services, with the ultimate objective to provide a safeguarding structure for DS. A preliminary response to this issue showcases the difficulties associated with such a proposition. First, the classification of emergency workers, as it currently stands, involves workers in the public domain. Therefore, a potential attempt of the regulator to suggest the inclusion of private security personnel in this group is highly likely to be fraught with criticism and resistance, since it could be read as a further effort to blur the boundaries between public services and commercial security providers. Second, even if DS were classified as emergency services and thus the harsher sentence for assaulting them while on duty applied to

236 Apart from the rhetorical flourish of the ‘police under attack’ that during the last years often figures as a headline in the media, there has been a relative neglect of this issue in policing. From a quantitative descriptive point of view, the most recent figures regarding assaults with injury on a constable showed that there was a 39% increase in year ending September 2020 compared to year ending March 2018 (ONS, 2021). However, the way data is collected was changed in 2017, so it is not possible to compare current rates with what they were four years ago. From a more exploratory perspective, empirical research studies on violence perpetrated against police officers are scarce; these either approach the issue in light of gender considerations (i.e. Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007) or draw upon evidence mainly from the US (Covington, et al., 2014).

237 There is an abundance of research studies highlighting the prevalence of violence against staff in hospital emergency departments on a global scale (Gates, et al., 2006; Phillips, 2016; Pich, et al., 2010).

238 The Assault on Emergency Workers (offences) Act 2018 doubled the maximum sentence from 6 to 12 months in prison for assaulting an emergency worker and also allowed the judge to consider tougher sentences for a range of other offences (i.e., GBH and sexual assault), if the victim is an emergency worker (Ministry of Justice, 2018). At the time of writing, according to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021, currently at the Committee stage in the House of Commons, maximum sentences for low-level assaults against emergency service workers will be doubled to two years (UK Parliament, 2021).

239 In light of the response to research question 2, it is highly likely that a large proportion of such a criticism would derive from police officers. On a first level of analysis, the vast majority of them appeared to recognise the prevalence of violence towards DS in the local NTEs and empathised with the physical and verbal abuse directed to them. However, the asymmetric collaboration-related expectations, the police’s defensive culture and the broader discourse on the finite resources in public policing mean that in practice the police might oppose the recognition of DS as emergency services.
their sector, the extent to which these legal mechanisms would have prevented the occurrence of violence against them in the first place is questionable. More specifically, as evidenced in Chapter 6, most violent incidents in the local NTEs were alcohol-fuelled and, as a result, the majority of inebriated perpetrators are unlikely to be deterred through harsher sentences for assaulting a frontline operative. Besides this, underreporting of these incidents by security operatives has been highlighted as a key theme, which further casts doubt on the effective use of this legal framework.

These inherent difficulties regarding the potential of recognising DS as emergency services do not mean that in practice the SIA has no further options in its responsive regulatory toolkit. When legislative changes are not likely to happen in due course either for political reasons or due to the prioritisation of other ‘higher’ risk areas, a regulatory body can use its statutory remit on a creative way. In this case, the SIA could operate a dedicated hotline\textsuperscript{240} through its call centre, aiming to provide ad hoc legal advice and assistance for those operatives, who had been victims of violence in their workplace. The anticipated benefits of such a provision could be multi-faceted; decreasing the social distance between DS and the regulator, raising awareness of the legal responsibilities of security companies towards their employees (insurance and health and safety policies) and actively encouraging the reporting of these incidents. These objectives could be also fulfilled through extending and integrating the ‘accommodative’ enforcement of the two-month SIA ‘#SaferNightsOut’ campaign\textsuperscript{241} into the working practices of SIA investigators.

Turning next to the business level, the overarching finding demonstrates that the SIA’s response has integrated the ‘soft’ message towards DS firms, yet the ‘hard’ message suffered from some important limitations both on a proactive and on a reactive level. In other words, unlike regulatory bodies in the financial sector that can put firms out of business if they transgress, the SIA with its limited powers can be seen as merely promoting a wider social responsibility agenda without any powers beyond persuasion. Therefore, refining SIA’s responsiveness towards security companies should be aligned with some modifications to its enforcement strand. This thesis offers two propositions: an optimal and a satisficing one (Simon, 1978).

\textsuperscript{240} It is important to note that such a service should not be envisaged to operate as a substitute to the supporting mechanisms that security companies should have for their DS. The purpose of the hotline would be primarily to provide some baseline advice to security operatives about what to expect from their employers in moments of crisis and how to legally safeguard themselves after an assault (i.e. liaising with the managers of the venue and with local police officers).

\textsuperscript{241} The SIA’s #SaferNightsOut campaign ran between June and July 2019. It involved SIA regional staff visiting 22 towns and cities across the UK with the objectives of sharing information on safer restraint, listening to the concerns of security staff and encouraging them to report physical and verbal abuse against them. https://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/Pages/about-news.aspx?newsid=679
The optimal proposition relates to the proactive aspect of the SIA’s approach to security firms and recommends the need for regulatory oversight of security firms, either in the form of business licensing or in making the ACS compulsory. This research project found that the current lack of any form of statutory oversight of businesses is associated with four adverse policy implications. First, the regulator, as well as other stakeholders of the industry (government agencies, professional bodies, buyers, researchers) are not in a position to have a valid and robust appraisal of the size and the conduct of the businesses operating in the regulated sectors. This in turn, places an important barrier into the SIA’s ability to spot accurately and take appropriate and proactive action towards rogue companies. Second, operating unlawfully as a security provider has of course many facets. As this thesis demonstrated, there could be a web of malpractices (either directly related with PSIA offences or ‘hidden’ under other misdemeanours), which could often lead to undermining public protection.

Third, as Hodges (2016, p.8) points out, part of regulatory responsiveness is ‘ensuring that the responsibility is attributed to the highest relevant level of management within an organisation, rather than the foot soldier who may be a victim of wilfully blind or immoral management’. As this study demonstrated, misdemeanours on the ‘foot soldier’ level (DS) could often be a signal of much more serious non-compliance or even further criminality on a corporate level. Yet, without regulatory oversight of the business level, the process of tracing the script of non-compliance, identifying promptly the ‘masterminds’ and enforcing responsively is significantly constrained for the SIA. Finally, without this mechanism of regulatory oversight, the SIA essentially lacks ownership of the problem. In particular, its enforcement actions are often largely dependent upon the collaboration with the police and the HMRC. Although inter-agency working could be beneficial, this study showcased how these arrangements suffered from some limitations, which often pushed back the SIA’s priorities.

The crucial question regarding this optimal proposition is whether there is any realistic expectation of them materialising in the near future. According to Kingdon’s (1984) framework, the rise of a specific issue requires the favourable alignment of the politics, problem and policy streams. In the regulation of the private security industry in the UK, the ‘problem’ stream was primarily associated with private security scandals, as discussed in Chapter 2. Moving beyond these scandals that trigger normative conflict, this thesis contributed to the evidence base of the ‘problem’ stream for the topic of the regulatory oversight of security firms.
businesses. Public protection is the fundamental justification basis for the SIA and given that corporate malpractices can have adverse implications in this area, statutory licensing and enforcement of businesses’ conduct appears as a consequential policy option for this problem. However, at the time of writing, the ‘politics’ stream does not seem to have changed from the ones in 2013 which, as discussed in Chapter 4, blocked the introduction of business licensing. Regulatory oversight of security firms would necessitate the introduction of primary legislation. Given the prevalence of other current ‘hot’ issues and the broader prevailing theme of minimising the ‘red tape’ on a business level, the political context echoes slim possibilities for business licensing to materialise in the near future.

Although regulatory oversight of security firms is argued to be the optimal recommendation for improving SIA’s responsiveness on the business level, the regulator could possibly consider another proposition. This one is characterised as ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1978), since it allows the regulator to modify its reactivity towards businesses through thinking creatively outside the ‘regulatory box’. One aspect worth considering is to adopt a more flexible stance in terms of what should be investigated as a corporate misdemeanour on the first place. In particular, the remit of the functions of the PSIA 2001 is for the SIA to look after individuals and businesses who operate in the industry. As evidenced in the empirical chapters of this study, the SIA has recently begun to embrace this perspective (i.e. prosecutions for fake licences since 2018). Yet, it is important that this approach should broaden and encompass some other key types of criminal offending (e.g. training malpractice, labour abuse), which have a significant impact upon the operation of the industry. If the SIA’s enforcement strategy follows this route, SIA inquiries could come before the police ones and these types of criminal offending are more likely to align with the priorities of law enforcement. Further building upon this option, if the SIA goes for full POCA powers, this would be a useful addition for the regulator to move beyond its current obstacles and target a wider spectrum of criminality, often hidden under PSIA offences.243

The SIA should consider how the monies collected from settled cases could be reinvested, so as to contribute to crime reduction initiatives and support the regulated industry.244 Facilitating these

243 However, the Law Commission (2020) proposals on refining the confiscation regime are quite modest and do not appear to focus on non-police agencies.
244 Based on the specifications of the Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme (ARIS), the recovered funds are divided between referring agency (18.75%) and investigating agency (18.75%- the SIA is both for its own investigations), a proportion is going to fund HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) and the remaining funds are going to the Treasury. In terms of how these retrieved amounts of money should be used by the respective enforcement agencies, the Home Office guidelines have been quite vague, stating that although this is to be decided internally on an agency-specific basis, the underlying ministerial suggestions were focusing primarily upon driving up the investigative capabilities and performance of the respective agency and secondly funding local crime fighting priorities for the benefit of the community (Home Affairs Committee, 2016a; NAO, 2016).
objectives through the funds collected by POCA cases gives the regulator the potential to align its interventions with a ‘distributive’ justification (Stiernstedt, et al., 2019); funds from POCA cases could be re-invested to local crime reduction initiatives in areas that need them the most. In addition, such a re-investment could materialise through a bursary type scheme, which would allow applications made from the industry to access a funding stream from the SIA’s ARIS surplus. Such a funding stream could support training for new entrants (e.g. initiatives run by The Prince’s Trust to support young people’s entry into the security industry245 or training which is beyond and above the regulator’s licence linked qualifications (e.g. counter-terrorism training246). The evaluation of the POCA cases for the SIA247 highlighted that the outcomes of these cases did not always send the message towards compliant companies that their unscrupulous counterparts will get their ‘just deserts’. Therefore, such a re-investment could enhance the outreach of the SIA’s positive incentives towards the compliant end of DS firms.

10.3 Contribution, limitations and future avenues of regulatory research for the private security industry

Overall, this thesis evaluated the impact of the SIA’s regulatory regime upon the DS sector in the UK and in doing so, moved beyond purely technical ‘what works’ questions. Given the diverse range of sectors comprising the regulated security industry in the UK, this thesis adopted a sector-specific (focusing on DS) approach that allowed the in-depth exploration of issues which would not have been captured through a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Through constructing a ‘nuanced’ dialogue between the strategic account of the SIA and the regulatees’ experiences and understandings, it examined a number of issues, which remain relatively unexplored in the literature. For instance, this project not only explored the on-the-ground collaboration dynamics between DS and police, but also identified specific micro dynamics that can enable or hinder cooperation. It also applied regulatory responsiveness as the overarching evaluation framework in the specific industry, showcasing its usefulness into allowing the SIA to move beyond its reform and professionalisation objectives. Apart from shedding light into these areas that have not been at the forefront of the private security research, this thesis also re-examined, from a different perspective, areas which have previously attracted attention. A key area is the revisiting of the ‘vilified’ world of bouncers and offering a contemporary view into their trajectories, which revealed new challenges for both the sector itself, as well as for the regulator. Finally, from a

245 According to the latest SIA Annual report, the regulator has recently started using the ARIS funds to support such employability/training schemes for young people who are interested in joining security businesses (HC 647 [2019-20]).
246 https://www.issee.co.uk/training/counter-terrorism-training/counter-terrorism-awareness-training
247 Section 10.1, response to research question 4.
As with any other social science research project, this thesis is not flawless. The local flavouring of this study has been one of its key strengths, but at the same time it is important to recognise some potential limitations associated with this. First, this thesis showcased how micro dynamics in the local context of a regulated community can influence the effects of the SIA’s regime. With reference to the DS sector per se, it can be argued that the core findings surrounding the theme of the ‘transformation of the world of bouncers’, as well as the collaborations dynamics between police and DS, can be of relevance beyond the boundaries of the specific locality. However, it is not possible to infer conclusively that the context of other regions in the UK would yield identical trajectories and challenges associated with the particular sector. As such, future qualitative case studies should explore DS’ trajectories, developments and challenges across other regions in the UK, so as to progressively build up the evidence base for comparative analysis on a national level. The same approach can be also replicated for other regulated parts of the industry, allowing a more robust evaluative perspective to emerge, going beyond the conventional methods of surveys and document analysis.

Second, this thesis offered evidence of an asymmetric regulatory approach between the individual and business level. It demonstrated that the absence of regulatory oversight of security companies raises some important questions about the proactivity of the SIA’s enforcement approach in fulfilling the objective of public protection. This was mainly facilitated through linking the HMRC-related malpractices of some DS firms operating in the shadow economy with a further web of criminality and PSIA offences. Among social researchers, the mantra ‘correlation does not imply causation’ is well-known. Although this study is far from similar to projects utilising quasi-experimental designs, this phrase has some relevance in terms of interpreting this particular finding. In other words, we cannot infer either that all companies involved somehow in the shadow economy are bound to follow the further web of criminality and PSIA offences or that HMRC-related malpractices are the only major risk to the SIA’s objectives. Therefore, future research should further test this proposition in other UK regions and seek to explore other mechanisms through which business wrongdoings in the security industry can be associated with the much-neglected public protection argument.

Finally, at the time of writing, nations face some unprecedented challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Of course, policing is not unaffected, with emerging research in the UK exploring to
what extent the police response aligns with procedural justice (College of Policing, 2020; Crest Advisory, 2020) and how policing could avoid the pitfall of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ approach in the current outbreak (Reicher & Stott, 2020). Regarding private security, there seems to be a paucity of emerging research into its role in the security continuum during lockdown and the potential trajectories of the industry in the transition period from lockdown to as yet unknown levels of economic recovery. Given that the fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken between January-August in 2018, its primary data cannot capture the current effects of the pandemic on the DS sector. Yet, its key findings and implications highlight a number of pertinent themes that could inform a preliminary predictive thinking approach. This in turn could steer upcoming regulatory research of the private security industry into exploring these hypotheses in the near future.

In terms of the NTE-related dynamics, the analysis in this study was predicated on the steady growth of the NTE and on the increasing security (DS) demand for licensed venues. In the lockdown period, the supply and demand equilibrium for security appears to have changed markedly. In particular, the requirements for security guarding in critical roles are following an upward trend, as opposed to the demand for DS services that has plummeted since all night-time venues shut down. In light of the ‘shirt-filler’ theme of this thesis and the broader limited career prospects in the DS sector, it seems plausible that the current demand and supply circumstances might have some further adverse effects on turnover and the quality of personnel.

Even when lockdown restrictions are eased for the NTE, it seems that a new complex reality might affect this part of the industry. The switch over from lockdown to economic recovery is likely to retain key residual restrictions, such as social distancing in licensed premises. Considering the central role of security staff in the NTE in upholding these regulations, it is expected that DS should be required to follow a similar tactic as the current guidance for police officers with the 4E approach: engaging, explaining, encouraging and only enforcing as a last resort (NPCC and College of Policing, 2020). In theory, the optimal application of this approach requires: a ‘2 metre (or revised 1 metre) conversation’, a clarity on the Covid-19 legislation and possibly a ‘hands on’ in the event of non-compliance. Putting this into practice in alcohol-fuelled environments is a much more complex issue, which has the potential to shift the current equilibrium for DS between ‘soft’ policing and physical escalation. An over-reliance on the identified subcomponents of ‘soft’ policing could lead to a restricted upholding of the health and

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248 On 23 March 2020 the SIA confirmed that the current definition of key worker includes regulated security professionals, essential to national infrastructure, operating in critical roles. According to the SIA, this definition covers, amongst other areas, security provision in hospitals; social care; courts; government estate; supermarkets and the food supply chain; the transport network; national infrastructure and utilities.
safety regulations, whereas an overzealous commitment to the Covid-19 legislation might generate some new forms of ‘hard’ policing among DS.

Beyond the implications for frontline staff, the consequences for security firms are of paramount importance too. First, with specific reference to DS companies, the security requirements for the NTE were largely considered by buyers as a ‘grudge’ purchase. The economic viability of night-time venues is expected to be adversely affected by having lost a significant revenue over the last three quarters of 2020\textsuperscript{249}. As such, the pre-lockdown themes of approaching DS security requirements as a ‘grudge’ purchase and exerting downward pressure on price for DS services could strengthen in the post-lockdown period. Given the links between non-compliance of some companies and their adaptation to these external influences, the volatile dynamics in the near future could lead more firms to such an adaptation route.

Furthermore, this project demonstrated how some businesses take advantage of the lack of statutory oversight of their conduct and do not comply with health and safety, as well as labour-related regulations for their DS. At the time of writing, the most recent figures of the Covid-19 related deaths by occupation in England and Wales suggest that security guards had the highest rate, with 74 deaths per 100,000 males, equivalent to 104 deaths (ONS, 2020b). The ONS analysis cannot prove conclusively that occupational exposure is a causal factor for Covid-19 related deaths\textsuperscript{250}. However, a recent report suggests that while ‘no one risk factor seems to fully explain why deaths from Covid-19 are so high for security officers’ (Goldstraw-White et al., 2020, p. 27), gender, ethnicity and the nature of the job seem to be key contributing factors for contracting Covid-19, and these are all characteristics of security staff. This thesis’ findings can flag a preliminary hypothesis that the treatment and the occupational hazards of security staff could be exacerbated in the current crisis, at least when the licit NTE re-emerges. As the SIA stated in its most recent FAQs guideline to the industry, ‘the ACS standard already provides for the proper treatment and welfare of staff’ (SIA, 2021, p.8). In other words, for the largest part of the industry (non-ACS companies), the proper treatment and welfare of staff relies upon the goodwill of the firm.

\textsuperscript{249}The value of UK economic output in November 2020 has decreased by 9\% compared to the February 2020 level. The economic consequences of the tiered local restrictions in autumn 2020 have been particularly stark for the accommodation and food sector: its economic output fell by 64\% in November 2020 (compared to February 2020) and 47\% of eligible jobs in these sectors were furloughed as of December 2020 (Francis-Devine et al., 2021; Harari and Keep, 2021). Further evidence from recent surveys undertaken by trade bodies representing pubs and restaurants in the UK suggest that around ‘72\% of their members are expected to operate at a loss and to be unable to survive next year because of the collapse in trade’ (The Guardian, 2020, p.1).

\textsuperscript{250}This is methodologically attributed to the fact that in the analysis they adjusted for age, but not for other factors such as ethnic group, place of residence, deprivation and the occupations of others in the same household.
The SIA’s journey so far has brought some important positive developments into cleaning and reforming parts of the private security industry. Aligning private policing with the public interest can be further enhanced through empowering frontline operatives with support structures and positive incentives, while refining regulatory proactivity over security firms. The overarching principle upon which this thesis has been developed is that scholarship resembles a conversation; hopefully somebody will pick up where you have left off and continue the dialogue. The new challenges emerging in and after the Covid-19 era for policing provide a significant opportunity for regulatory research and policy to continue such a dialogue, thinking creatively about the transformation of the private security industry and its role and contribution in the security continuum.
Appendix A: Ethical Approval Application Form and Ethics Approval Letter

SREC Ref No:

STAFF, MPhil/PhD & PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE RESEARCH PROJECTS

Ethical Approval Application Form

*Must be submitted by the due deadline to: The SOCSI Research Office*

*Email: socsi-ethics@cardiff.ac.uk*

**SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please tick relevant project type:</th>
<th>Staff Project</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>PhD Project</th>
<th>Yes ☒</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Title of Project:**
Regulation of the Security Industry and its Challenges in Contemporary Society

**Project Start Date:**
10/2016

**Project End Date:**
10/2020

**Project Funder:**
ESRC Collaborative Doctoral Award (Co-Operating Body: Security Industry Authority)

**Name of Researcher(s) / Student:**
Fryni Kostara

**Signature of Lead Researcher / Student:**

**Student Number:**
1654509

**Student’s Email Address:**
KostaraF@cardiff.ac.uk

**Supervisors:**
1. Professor Michael Levi
2. Dr. Rachel Swann

**Supervisors’ Signatures:**
1
2 (signature on the physical copy of this form)

**Before completing, please now read the Application Guidance Notes at the end of this form**

**SECTION B: PROJECT SUMMARY**
Urban regeneration, founded on massive corporate investment and illustrated by large entertainment districts, has during the last decades underlined the prominence of the night-time economy. Unsurprisingly, a large amount of studies, as well as policy papers, have underlined a connection between alcohol consumption in the NTE and various criminal incidents, such as violent crimes and anti-social behaviour. Policing practices in the night-time economy are grounded, following the overall trend in policing arrangements in contemporary urban settings, on the interface between public (police officers, community support officers) and private agents of surveillance (door supervisors), plus the informal controls exercised by drinkers and companions.

Before the official arrival of the regulation of the private security industry in the UK (which came in effect with the Private Security Industry Act 2001 and the subsequent creation of the Security Industry Authority), one of the main arguments in the pro-regulation agenda referred to the urgent need of combating criminal practices (such as the supply of drugs and the infiltration of organised criminal groups) and the use of excessive amounts of violence and physical force by door supervisors. The SIA has set two primary regulatory goals; to reduce criminality and to raise standards within the security industry via (a) the competency requirement, which is integrated into every SIA licence and (b) the Approved Contractor Scheme, designed to raise company standards.

In this context, our first research objective relates to the legal, commercial and normative legitimacy of bouncers (linked with changes in occupational culture through security regulation) and an evaluation of police-door supervisor collaboration in policing the NTE. Secondly, it aims to explore and compare the perceptions of regulators (SIA) with the perceptions of regulatees (security companies offering door supervision services, as well as door supervisors), coupled with views from the public. (Public perceptions in this realm have not been previously integrated in any of the existing studies).
2. What are the research questions?

Based upon the aforementioned research objectives, this project seeks to address the following research questions:

- What are the main premises, upon which door supervisors' legal, commercial and normative accountability are based, and what has been the contribution of the regulatory regime so far?
- Does the regulatory regime work as a solid foundation for multi-agency partnership (police, community and private sector) in combating criminal issues appearing in the sphere of the NTE?
- How has the role of the regulator (SIA) developed and shaped since its introduction back in 2001 and what sort of balance has been achieved between public protection and raising standards within the industry?
- Is SIA’s enforcement policy premised upon a variety of sanctions (starting from persuasion and ending up in licence revocation or even criminal prosecution) and what are the effects of this policy on both regulatory goals?

3. Who are the participants?

For the qualitative part of this research project, the participants will be the following:

- SIA Personnel / SIA Board Members
- Security companies providing door supervision services across the UK
- Security operatives (door supervisors working in the night-time economy)
- Buyers of security services (door supervision)
- Licensing Council Officers
- Police forces (indicative examples are the police forces in Nottingham, Kent and Scotland)
- Public Protection Unit of the Home Office, which oversees the SIA’s work.

For the quantitative part of this research project, the participants will be the following:

- Respondents of the online survey from the general public, who are over the age of the 18 and UK residents of any nationality.
4. How will the participants be recruited?

For the qualitative part of this research project:

Participants will be recruited through purposive, non-random sampling, as the semi-structured interviews, as well as the participant observation, focus on participants with specific characteristics (key stakeholders in regulation of the private security industry, with emphasis on door supervision). Initial contacts are established through the network of the SIA (researcher’s funding body), and further contacts will be acquired through snowball sampling.

For the quantitative part of this research project:

For the online survey, the targeting characteristics for our participants will be the following; they should be over the age of the 18 and they should also be UK residents of any nationality. They will be recruited through SurveyMonkey, following a random sampling technique, which is further elaborated, as follows. SurveyMonkey has gradually developed a database of participants (SurveyMonkey Audience), which consists of a diverse and broad population sample of more than 45 million individuals. These participants are known as SurveyMonkey Contribute members and they are recruited after having filled a SurveyMonkey survey. Any of the aforementioned Contribute members has to complete a profile, which contains a series of demographic details, as well as more specific characteristics that are related to the particular content of a given survey. With reference to the incentivizing aspect of this recruitment, it should be mentioned that once a Contribute member participates in a survey, SurveyMonkey donates a small amount of money to a charity chosen by the participant.

5. What sort of data will be collected and what methods will you use to do this?

For the qualitative part of this research project:

- A series of exploratory semi-structured interviews.
- Participant observation of the SIA Strategic Forum.

For the quantitative part of this research project:

- Administration of a UK-wide online survey.
6. How and where (venue) are you undertaking your research? What is the reason(s) for using this particular location?

For the semi-structured interviews:

Participants’ own work environment will be the preferred venue for undertaking the semi-structured interviews (e.g. SIA’s office in London, offices of security companies providing door supervision across the UK etc). Taking into account the exploratory nature of the interviews, as well as the busy working days for participants involved in this research project, it is expected that they will feel more comfortable at their own work environment and minimal disruption of their working schedule will be ensured. However, if any of the participants wish for any reason to have the interview outside the organisation, the choice will be offered to them and a quiet setting with little distraction will be selected, so as to suit both the researcher and the participant. This is particularly prominent in the case of interviewing door supervisors, since some of them are likely to work in-house, which means that nightlife settings (e.g. bars, clubs) will not be the preferred venues to undertake these interviews, in accordance with the reasoning outlined in the section 24 (ways to minimise potential risks/harm from the research project).

For the participant observation:

SIA Strategic Forums are taking place every 3 months in specific locations in London, where the researcher will be granted access as an observer.

7. (a) Will you be analysing secondary data (that is, data collected by others for research purposes)?

If YES, does approval already exist for its use in further projects such as yours?

- SIA statistics (2003-2017) on door supervision licensing (issue & revocation), Approved Contractor Scheme on security companies providing door supervision services (issue & revocation)
- SIA’s strategic plans (annual reviews) from 2003 until now
- Prosecution cases of unlicensed door supervisors/security companies not adhering to the standard regulatory requirements.

Approval of access to all the aforementioned secondary data is granted through the SIA (Co-Operating body with the researcher and Cardiff University).

(b) Will you be using administrative data (that is, data collected by others for registration, transaction or recordkeeping purposes)?

If YES, how will you be using these data (e.g. sifting for suitable research participants or analysing the data)?

**SECTION C: RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES**
| 8. | (a) Does your project involve children or young people under the age of 18? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
|    | If No, go to 10 || |
|    | (b) If so, have you consulted the University’s guidance on child protection procedures, and do you know how to respond if you have concerns? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 9. | (a) Does your project involve one-to-one or other unsupervised research with children and young people under the age of 18? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
|    | If No, go to 9(b) || |
|    | If Yes, go to 9(c) || |
|    | (b) If your project involves only supervised contact with children and young people under the age of 18, have you consulted the head of the institution where you are undertaking your research to establish if you need a Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Check? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
|    | If Yes, and you do need a DBS check, then go to 9(c); if you do not need a DBS check, then go to Question 10. || |
|    | (c) Do you have an up-to-date Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Check? (Please give details below if you have a pending application) || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 10. | Does your project include people with learning or communication difficulties? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 11. | Does your project include people in custody? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 12. | Is your project likely to include people involved in illegal activities? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 13. | Does your project involve people belonging to a vulnerable group, other than those listed above? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |
| 14. | Does your project include people who are, or are likely to become your clients or clients of the department in which you work? || Yes ☐ No ☒ |

**SECTION D: CONSENT PROCEDURES**

| 15. | Will you obtain written consent for participation? || Yes ☒ No ☐ |
16. What procedures will you use to obtain informed consent from participants?

Participants will be provided prior to the beginning of the interview/observation with the following documents:

1) **Research Information Sheet**, which includes:
   - Study title
   - Purpose of the study (brief overview of the background, aim and overall design)
   - Who is conducting the study and who is funding the study
   - Explanation of data collection methods
   - Participation (why the participant was chosen/entirely voluntary)
   - Potential benefits of participation (e.g., furthering understanding of the topic both for the researcher and the key stakeholders involved in the regulation of the private security industry)
   - Potential disadvantages and risks of taking part (this study is not associated with any anticipated risks)
   - Explanation of how confidentiality, privacy and anonymity will be ensured
   - Use of results
   - Contact details for further information

2) **Informed Consent Form**, which concisely covers the core statements to which the participants are being asked to agree or disagree (through initialing each statement). The content of these statements are related to the aforementioned issues (participation, handling & storage of data in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 etc). The participants are asked to sign, print their name and date the form. Space is also provided on the consent form for the researcher taking the consent to sign, print her name and date the form.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their consent to being observed?</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Yes ☐</th>
<th>No ☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?</td>
<td>Yes ☐</td>
<td>No ☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at any time and/or for any reasons?</td>
<td>Yes ☐</td>
<td>No ☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Will you give potential participants appropriate time to consider participation?</td>
<td>Yes ☐</td>
<td>No ☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Does your project provide for people for whom English/Welsh is not their first language?</td>
<td>Yes ☐</td>
<td>No ☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION E: POTENTIAL HARMS ARISING FROM THE PROJECT**

|   | Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing either physical or psychological distress or discomfort? | Yes ☐ | No ☐ |
| 22. | Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing a detriment to their interests as a result of participation? | Yes ☐ | No ☐ |
| 23. | Below, please identify any potential for harm (to yourself or participants) that might arise from the way the research is conducted | Please do not leave box blank | |
This research project is not anticipated to cause physical harm to either the participants or the researcher. As outlined in section 6, the semi-structured interviews, as well as the participant observation (SIA Strategic Forum) will take place in controlled research settings (e.g. SIA offices in London, offices of security companies providing door supervision services across the UK), where no violence or other risks of physical harm is likely. It should be noted that gathering primary (qualitative) data with security operatives, who provide door supervision services in the night-time economy, could be associated with some potential risk for the researcher’s own safety. Having taken this ethical consideration into account, the researcher has decided not to undertake any overt participant observation of door supervisors in nightlife settings (primary reasons: potential physical harm & the tricky dimension of negotiating invisibility, trust and cooperation in these settings). Instead, semi-structured interviews with door supervisors will be conducted, adopting the following choices of research settings: a) in the case of those door supervisors, who work in contract with a security company, the interviews are expected to take place in the offices of the security company and b) in the case of those door supervisors, who work in-house, the interviews are expected to take place in quiet, neutral and peaceful settings agreed by both parties.

Although the researcher has meticulously accounted for selecting research settings and procedures that do not present risk of violence or any other potential source of physical harm, a minimal risk of psychological harm cannot be ruled out as a possibility. Overall, the evaluation of an existing regulatory regime is not exactly a sensitive matter; it is though a complex interplay between strategic, structural and system conditions and actors. For instance, interviews with SIA personnel/SIA Board members/Home Office Protection Unit will explore their views on how regulation of door supervision in the UK has worked so far (achievements, problems, enforcement tactics etc). It is thus possible for them to experience short-lived feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, annoyance or other emotions, as they might not want to become critical of the ways ‘things are being done’ in their working environment. Similar emotions might be experienced by the participants in the SIA Strategic Forum, in which the researcher plans to conduct observations, so as to explore the views and power dynamics within this roundtable discussion that includes representatives from a wide range of interests in the private security industry. Potential distress cannot be also ruled out in the case of interviewing door supervisors, who might consider that by expressing critical personal opinions on various pertinent issues (e.g. their working conditions, accountability, partnerships with the police and evaluation of the effectiveness on regulation in their field), they might be at risk of career/financial detriments. However, these mild anxieties are likely no more than would be generated by any external contact.

25. Below, please set out the measures you will put in place to control possible harms to yourself or participants. PLEASE DO NOT LEAVE BOX BLANK
As discussed in the previous section, due to the carefully selected research settings, this study presents minimal risk for the researcher’s and the participants’ own safety. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on how potential sources of psychological harm for the participants can be kept to a minimal level too.

Allowing participants to make an informed decision about whether or not to take part in this research project is seen as the most fundamental measure that can lead to two important outcomes; to effectively control the aforementioned harms, as well as to gain participants’ trust and build rapport with them. In order to facilitate such an informed decision, the following steps should be followed:

- A detailed Research Information Sheet will be provided to each participant before the interviews/participant observation, accompanied by an Informed Consent Form. The administration of these documents to participants will ensure that participants are fully aware of the key issues associated with the context of the study, the data collection and data analysis methods and the data security (see also section 16).
- Besides the aforementioned written forms, the researcher is willing to give extensive oral explanations to participants, so that queries regarding confidentiality and anonymity will be fully addressed. Both oral and written explanations to participants will explicitly stress the voluntary nature of participation, so as to minimise risk of any kind of perceived coercion or obligation to participate in this study.
- Finally, participants for the semi-structured interviews will be provided with the choice of selecting their preferred location. This can be either their working environment, or any external setting, as long as it is a ‘neutral’ and quiet setting.

**SECTION F: THE ‘PREVENT DUTY’**

This question is in response to HEFCW operating a monitoring framework, which is intended to satisfy the UK government that ‘relevant higher education bodies’ in Wales are fulfilling their duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism (the ‘Prevent duty’).

26. Has due regard be given to the ‘Prevent duty’, in particular to prevent anyone being drawn intoterrorism?  
   
   For further guidance, see:  
   and  
   http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/public-information/policies-and-procedures/freedom-of-speech  

   Yes ☑  No ☐

**SECTION G: RESEARCH SAFETY**

Before completing this section, you should consult the document ‘ Guidance for Applicants’ – and the information in this under ‘Managing the risks associated with SOCSI research’.

27. Are there any realistic safety risks associated with your fieldwork?  

   Yes ☑  No ☐

28. Have you taken into account the Cardiff University guidance on safety in fieldwork /for lone workers?  

   Yes ☑  No ☐
### SECTION H: DATA COLLECTION

The SREC appreciates that these questions will not in general relate to research undertaken in SOCSI. However, for further University guidance and information please see the links below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>29.</th>
<th>Does the study involve the collection or use of human tissue (including, but not limited to, blood, saliva and bodily waste fluids)?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes ☐ No ☑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Yes, a copy of the submitted application form and any supporting documentation must be emailed to the Human Tissue Act Compliance Team ([https://intranet.cardiff.ac.uk/staff/research-support/integrity-and-governance/human-tissue-research](https://intranet.cardiff.ac.uk/staff/research-support/integrity-and-governance/human-tissue-research)). A decision will only be made once these documents have been received.

For guidance on the Human Tissue Act: [http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/govrn/cocom/humantissueact/index.html](http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/govrn/cocom/humantissueact/index.html)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30.</th>
<th>Does the study include the use of a drug?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes ☐ No ☑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Yes, you will need to contact Research Governance before submission ([resgov@cardiff.ac.uk](mailto:resgov@cardiff.ac.uk))

### SECTION I: DATA PROTECTION

31.  

#### (a) Are you collecting sensitive data? [Defined as: the racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs (or similar), trade union membership, physical or mental health, sexual life, the commission or alleged commission any offence, or any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.]

|     | Yes ☐ No ☑                                                                                      |

If Yes, how will you employ a more rigorous consent procedure?

#### (b) Are you collecting identifiable data? [Please note, this includes recordings of interviews/focus groups etc.]

|     | Yes ☑ No ☐                                                                                      |

If Yes, how will you anonymise this data?

This process refers only to the collection of qualitative data, since in the case of the online survey, participants will not be identified (the option of ‘Anonymous Responses’ will be turned on before starting collecting responses).

As far as the qualitative data are concerned, the planning of anonymization will be conducted at the time of transcription. Direct or indirect identifiers will not be crudely removed or aggregated, since our objective is to achieve a reasonable level of anonymization, whilst maintaining maximum content. Therefore:

- Pseudonyms, replacement terms or vaguer descriptors will be used consistently throughout the study
- ‘Search and replace’ techniques will be carefully used, so that unintended changes are not made, and misspelled words are not missed.
- Replacements will be identified in text clearly (with {brackets})
- An anonymization log of all replacements, aggregations or removals made will be created and stored separately from the anonymised data files.
(c) Will any non-anonymised and/or personalised data be retained?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes ☑</th>
<th>No ☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If No, what are the reasons for this?

(d) Data (i.e. actual interview recordings, not just transcripts) should be retained for no less than 5 years or at least 2 years post-publication and then destroyed in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Have you noted and included this information in your Information Sheet(s)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes ☑</th>
<th>No ☐</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

32. Below, please detail how you will deal with data security. Please note, personal laptops (even password protected) stored in personal accommodation are not acceptable. Storage on University network, or use of encrypted laptops required.

Interviews will be recorded using a Digital Voice Reorder (DVR). My storage strategy to ensure data security involves two different forms of storage for the resulting audio files: on the University network and in password protected files at an external hard drive which will be kept locked in my personal locker in the postgraduate office. The transfer from the DVR to the University network will be done as soon as possible in order to minimise risk of data being stolen. File names will be coded so as to ensure participant anonymity (no real names or personal information in the stored file name). All transcribed data will be anonymised as well to avoid identification of any participant by their answers. The data integrity will be checked periodically. Comprehensive and accurate documentation will be kept for informed and accurate use (and re-use) of data at any time in the future (e.g. digital versions of paper documentation in PDF/A format for long-term security).

In terms of the field notes gathered after the participant observation in SIA Strategic Forums, these will be physically separated from the consent forms on the first place. Besides this, the field notes will be transferred to the researcher’s personal locker in the postgraduate office, as soon as possible after their collection.

Lastly, the quantitative data, gathered through the online survey, do not fall into the category of identifiable data, as outlined in section 31b (the option of ‘Anonymous Responses’ will be turned on before starting collecting responses). However, the data set will be stored on the University network and in password protected files at an external hard drive which will be kept locked in my personal locker at the postgraduate office.

If there are any other potential ethical issues that you think the Committee should consider please explain them on a separate sheet. It is your obligation to bring to the attention of the Committee any ethical issues not covered on this form.
Application Guidance Notes

Making an application to the School Research Ethics Committee if you are a member of staff or an MPhil / PhD /Professional Doctorate student

Please Note: the SOCSI SREC web page links highlighted below are currently unavailable – please instead refer to the SOCSI Shared Drive Folder: S:\ SREC proformas and resources

There are five stages in preparing an application to the Research Ethics Committee. These are:

1. Consider the guidance provided in the SOCSI Shared Drive Folder: S:\ SREC proformas and resources.

2. Discuss any ethical issues you have about the conduct of your research with your co-investigators or supervisor(s).

3. Complete this Staff/MPhil/PhD/Professional Doctorate Student application form.

4. Sign and date the form, and if applicable ask your supervisor(s) also to sign.

5. Submit one copy of your application to the secretary of the School Research Ethics Committee – see contact details on Page 1.

PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING BEFORE COMPLETING YOUR APPLICATION:

1. Illegible handwritten applications will not be processed so please type.

2. Some NHS-related projects will need NHS REC approval. The SREC reviews NHS-related projects that do not require NHS REC approval. See guidance provided in the SOCSI Shared Drive Folder: S:\ SREC proformas and resources.

3. You should not submit an application to the SREC if your research involves adults who do not have capacity to consent. Such projects have to be submitted to the NRES system.

4. Staff undertaking minor projects as part of a course of study (e.g. PCUTL) do not need SREC approval unless the project involves sensitive issues. This exemption does not apply to Masters dissertations and Doctoral research.

5. Research with children and young people under the age of 18.
   i) One-to one research or other unsupervised research with this age group requires an up-to-date Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Check (formerly called Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) Check).

   ii) If your research is in an institution or setting such as a school or Youth Club and all contact with the children and young people is supervised you will still need to check with the person in charge about whether you need a DBS check; many such organisations do require DBS checks for all those carrying out research on their premises, whether this includes unsupervised contact or not.

   iii) You will need to have an awareness of how to respond if you have concerns about a child/young person in order that the child/young person is safeguarded.

   iv) You will also need:

      a) permission from the relevant institution

      b) consent from the parent or guardian for children under 16
c) consent from the child/young person, after being provided with age-appropriate information.

See guidance provided in the SOCSI Shared Drive Folder: S:\ SREC pro formas and resources.

6. Information on data management, collecting personal data: data protection act requirements, can be accessed via: https://intranet.cardiff.ac.uk/staff/research-support/integrity-and-governance

7. Information on Research Ethics (including Ethical Issues in Research – informed consent etc.) can be accessed: https://intranet.cardiff.ac.uk/staff/research-support/integrity-and-governance

8. The collection or use of human tissue (including, but not limited to, blood, saliva and bodily waste fluids): The Committee appreciates that the question relating to this in this application form will not in general relate to research undertaken in SOCSI. However, for further University guidance and information on the Human Tissue Act, please see: https://intranet.cardiff.ac.uk/staff/research-support/integrity-and-governance

9. For interesting examples of information sheets and consent forms, please see the SOCSI Shared Drive Folder: S:\ SREC pro formas and resources.
APPROVAL LETTER

13 November 2017

Our ref: SREC/2411

Fryni Kostara
PhD Programme
SOCSI

Dear Fryni,

Your project entitled ‘Regulation of the Security Industry and its Challenges in Contemporary Society’ ins now been approved by the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee of Cardiff University and you can now commence the project.

If you make any substantial changes with ethical implications to the project as it progresses you need to inform the SREC about the nature of these changes. Such changes could be: 1) changes in the type of participants recruited (e.g. inclusion of a group of potentially vulnerable participants), 2) changes to questionnaires, interview guides etc. (e.g. including new questions on sensitive issues), 3) changes to the way data are handled (e.g. sharing of non-anonymised data with other researchers).

In addition, if anything occurs in your project from which you think the SREC might usefully learn, then please do share this information with us.

All ongoing projects will be monitored and you will be obliged periodically to complete and return a SREC monitoring form.

Please inform the SREC when the project has ended.

Please use the SREC’s project reference number above in any future correspondence.

Yours sincerely

Professor Emma Reynold
Chair of School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

cc: Corinna Perkins
Appendix B: Research Information Sheet

Research Information Sheet

Researcher: Fryni Kostara

This document, sent in conjunction with the interview consent form, provides a summary of the ‘Regulation of the Security Industry and its Challenges in Contemporary Society’ research project.

About the Project (Research Objectives & Data Collection)

This research project seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing regulatory mechanisms in the private security industry (PSI) in the UK.

Our fundamental starting point is that such an evaluation should not be premised upon the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Put simply, the private security industry in the UK consists of a variety of sectors, with different responsibilities and needs, across the UK, where local context plays an important role in shaping the working reality of security operatives.

Therefore, this project focuses upon private security operatives working in the night-time economy (NTE), commonly known as door supervisors or bouncers, across 6 different cities and towns in Wales. Firstly, it examines the role of door supervisors in the NTE; how they manage crime, violence and anti-social behaviour in local NTEs, as well as how they work along the police, third sector organisations and local authorities under the umbrella of ‘multi-agency partnerships’ in the NTE. Secondly, it examines how the official and strategic set-up of the regulatory mechanisms and objectives by the regulator of the PSI in the UK, namely the Security Industry Authority, is valued and operationalised in practice by the door supervision sector.

For these research purposes, in order to capture the strategic dimension of the regulation for the private security industry, an in-depth qualitative analysis on the official documents, disseminated by the SIA, will be conducted. In addition, semi-structured interviews with key personnel from the SIA will add a more nuanced dimension regarding the objectives and the assessment of how these rules have worked so far. Examining the ‘on the ground’ impact of regulation across the local NTEs in Wales will be facilitated by semi-structured interviews with door supervisors, security companies and police officers.

Who is responsible for the data collected in this research project?

The sole researcher of this research project is Fryni Kostara, a PhD Researcher at Cardiff University within the School of Social Sciences and her research project is funded by the ESRC Collaborative Doctoral Award (Co-Operating Body: Security Industry Authority).
supervisors of this research project are Professor Michael Levi and Dr. Rachel Swann.

Fryni Kostara holds a Bachelor of Laws (LLB, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, with merit), a Master of Science (MSc) in ‘Criminology and Criminal Justice’ (LSE, with merit) and a Master of Science (MSc) in ‘Crime Science’ (UCL, with distinction). Her academic interests include: policing, crime prevention, regulatory theory, urban governance.

Subsequently, the individual responsible for the data collection and analysis for this research project is Fryni Kostara. The role of both supervisors is to monitor the progress of the research project, therefore interview data may be accessed by the supervisors for this purpose.

How is the interview being conducted, and the data stored?

Interview data will be collected and recorded using a Digital Voice Recorder (DVR, commonly known as a Dictaphone) during either a face-to-face, telephone, or video link interview which will last approximately one hour. Face-to-face interviews will be held at the desired location of the interviewee(s). The recordings of the interview will then be transcribed electronically by the researcher. The interviewee(s) may request a copy of this transcription, and are given the opportunity to correct any factual errors.

My storage strategy to ensure data security involves two different forms of storage for the resulting audio files: on the University network and in password protected files at an external hard drive which will be kept locked in my personal locker in the postgraduate office. The transfer from the DVR to the University network will be done as soon as possible in order to minimise risk of data being stolen. File names will be coded so as to ensure participant anonymity (no real names or personal information in the stored file name). All transcribed data will be anonymised as well to avoid identification of any participant by their answers.

None of the data collected for this research project will be shared or distributed to any other organisation. The voice recordings of all interviews will be kept until eight months after the completion of the research project, after this point they will be permanently deleted.
What is involved in participating in this research project?

As stated beforehand, the interview will take approximately one hour, the researcher will not exceed this assigned timeframe. If a shorter or longer interview timeframe is necessary this can be discussed and mutually agreed between the researcher and interviewee(s). The interview will consist of a series of semi-structured questions relating to the topics outlined in the first section ('About the project').

The dates of interviews for each participant will be wide-ranging, this is to fit in with the schedules of the researcher and interviewee(s). The date and time of the interview will be mutually agreed well in advance of the chosen date. Once the interview has been conducted no further participation is required unless the interviewee(s) requests a transcription of the interview, to check and suggest the amendment of any factual errors. The researcher will contact the interviewee(s) if clarification is required for any part of the interview during the transcription phase.

What are the risks involved in this research project?

There are no potential risks involved with the participation of this research project. Interviewee(s) will be fully anonymised within the research publication(s).

What are the benefits for taking part in this research project?

Essentially, this research project provides participants with the chance to express their views on one of the most pressing and significant issues in contemporary urban settings; crime and risks in the local NTEs. In addition, participants will also be given the opportunity to discuss about the existing regulations on private security and reflect upon its value so far and raise potential concerns. Their perceptions and insights will guide an in-depth analysis of these prominent issues, which will eventually translate into mapping 'the way forward', meaning specific policy recommendations and areas of improvement for all the interested parties. Therefore, participating in this research project could be a beneficial experience for not only communicating insights and perspectives, but also for actively contributing in shaping policy and practices in the security industry.

What are your rights as a participant?

Taking part in this research project is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or subsequently cease participation at any time.

Will I receive any payment or monetary benefits?

You will receive no payment for your participation. The data will not be used by the researcher for commercial purposes. Therefore, you should not expect any royalties or payments from the research project in the future.

Additional Information

This research has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Cardiff University. If you have any further questions or concerns about this research project, please contact Fryni Kostara (KostaraF@cardiff.ac.uk) via email.
Appendix C: Consent Form

Researcher: Fryni Kostara.


Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of the ‘Regulation of the Private Security Industry and its Challenges in Contemporary Society’ research project.

The proposed interview is expected to last for approximately one hour.

This consent form is necessary for the researcher to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. Therefore, could you please sign this form to declare that you approve and comprehend the following statements (please initial the boxes below):
I agree that all or part of the content of my interview may be used within academic publications, informative articles and other media such as spoken presentations.

I have read and understood the accompanying Participant Information Sheet.

I agree to take part in this project voluntarily and I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.

I do not expect to receive any benefit or payment from my participation.

I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have had them answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I am free to contact the researcher with any questions that I may have in the future.

I agree that the interview will be recorded with a Dictaphone to ensure that the transcription of the interview is accurate.

I understand that I can request a copy of the interview transcript and be given the opportunity to correct any factual errors or make any amendments I feel necessary to ensure the effectiveness of any agreement made about confidentiality.

The voice recordings of interviews will be kept securely for eight (8) months after the completion of the research project, and after this period they will be permanently deleted.

I agree to be quoted directly.

I agree that all or part of the content of the interview might be used within academic publication(s) or other academic outlets.

I understand that any summary interview content, or direct quotations from the interview that are made available through academic publication, informative articles and other media (e.g. spoken presentations) will be fully anonymised. My personal details, or any other potential source of personal identification, will not be circulated in any publication(s), in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
The ‘Regulation of the Private Security Industry and its Challenges in Contemporary Society’ research project has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Cardiff University.

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Appendix D: Interview Guides

*Interview guide for the SIA (example interview guide for SIA participants working in intelligence and enforcement-related posts)*

- **Introductory questions/ icebreakers**
  - Thanking the interviewee for his/her voluntary participation in the research study.
  - Based on the consent form & the information sheet, ask the interviewee whether they have any questions before starting the interview. Also, reiterate that all data gathered from interviews will be treated with confidentiality (anonymity, access to data restricted only for the researcher and the supervisors, secure storage of data).
  - Ask the interviewee to briefly state their position within the SIA (job title, department, main responsibilities, working experience within the SIA).

- **Questions on the objectives of the SIA’s regulatory regime**
  - Starting our discussion by reflecting on the SIA’s mission and objectives, I would be interested in getting your insights in terms of how these have been contextualised for the DS sector. In terms of the frontline security operatives working in the NTEs (DS/ individual level):
    - In the early 2000s the ‘bouncers’ world was associated with many reputational issues (excessive use of force, violence, links with broader types of criminality). 17 years later and whilst being on the post-regulation era, to what extent and in what sort of ways do you think that the sector has got rid of these issues?
    - Reducing criminality has been one of the key regulatory objectives. What do you think are the key contributions of the licensing regime towards this goal? Are there any challenges/gaps?
    - In terms of the objective of raising standards in the DS sector, how well do you think both the criminality criteria and the competency requirement (training) have enabled DS to become more professional? Are there any challenges/gaps?
o From your experience in the organisation, what key competences and skills do you think that a ‘fit for purpose’ DS should have today? How far do you think that the regulatory regime has contributed to these? Are there any gaps and why?

o How well do you think the licensing scheme has enabled DS to perform tasks that have the goal of protecting the public? Any gaps/challenges with this and why?

o From your experience in the SIA, how prevalent do you think is violence experienced by security operatives in their workplace? What do you think about the support structures available to them by their employers? What is the SIA’s stance towards this issue?

- Considering the SIA’s regulatory regime for security companies (DS/business level):

  o What sort of barriers do you think the absence of regulatory oversight of security companies creates for the organisation in terms of meeting its objectives?

  o Back in 2013, when the option of giving the SIA the much anticipated business licensing scheme was rejected by the government, the rationale, as communicated by your annual reports, was that business licensing was seen as an unnecessary burden to be imposed to companies. Could you give me a brief overview, from your experience, how does the SIA view the option of business licensing? To what extent is this position aligned with the government’s perspective, as well as with the industry’s understanding and expectations of your regime?

  o To what extent do you think that the absence of business licensing has been counterbalanced by the availability of the voluntary ACS scheme?

  o From your experience, what has worked well regarding the ACS scheme for security companies (prompt the interviewee to discuss its uptake in general and in the DS sector, advantages to the businesses, impact on the SIA’s approach)?

  o Have you identified any challenges/gaps associated with the ACS scheme? Why and how do you think that the organisation and the industry could mitigate against these?
- **Questions on the processes related to the SIA’s intelligence gathering and analysis**

  - Thinking about the ways that intelligence gets to the SIA, your annual reports highlight that your key sources are disclosures made by police/law enforcement partners, the industry, the public and also information collected through your inspections:
    - Which of these sources would you say generate the greatest amount of intelligence for you? Why?
    - Which of these sources would you say generate the most actionable pieces of intelligence for you? Why?
    - Thinking specifically about police-related disclosures, how speedy is the process of liaising with these partners on the back of the intelligence received? From your experience, have you faced any sort of challenges and if so why this might be the case?

  - Considering the inspections that you undertake; the SIA Annual reports indicate that these can be random or intelligence-led. Another interesting indication found in these reports is that there seems to be a prioritisation of intelligence-led inspections over the random ones, justified by the argument that ‘the burden of inspections should not fall on compliant companies and operatives’:
    - Does this reflect the position of the regulator in terms of how it makes sense of the impact of random inspections?
    - From your experience, what do you think about the overall value of the random inspections? What can these bring to the SIA and also what sort, if any, challenges do they bring? (Prompt the interviewee to discuss the impact of random inspections on testing compliance, sending a deterrence-related message and generating/enriching the intelligence picture for the organisation)
    - From your experience, what do you think about the overall value of the intelligence-led inspections? What can these bring to the SIA and also what sort, if any, challenges do they bring? (prompt the interviewee to discuss the impact of random inspections on testing compliance, sending a deterrence-related message and generating/enriching the intelligence picture for the organisation)
- What do you think that the industry considers about your inspections? From your experience, do you think that they perceive these as happening frequently? In other words, do you think that the industry believes that they are under the SIA’s radar and that they are a likely target of an inspection?

- Thinking about the methods that you use for analysing the intelligence that you receive:
  - Could you walk me through the analytical process that you follow?
  - Could you give me an overview of the types of intelligence-related criteria that you employ? Do these relate only with the PSIA 2001 offences?
  - From your experience, what do you think works well within this analytical process? Why?
  - Also, have you considered that there are any gaps/challenges within this analytical process? Why?

- From your experience, do most of the intelligence received and analysed create a new case for your consideration or does it enrich an already existing one?

- Once a new case is created or an already existing one is enriched based on the intelligence that you assessed, what happens next?
  - Which are the key teams that you liaise internally to forward these?
  - What works well in this internal process? Why?
  - Are there any key gaps/challenges? Why?

**Questions on the SIA’s enforcement approach**

- Considering compliance to the SIA’s regime by the industry, the figures across your annual reports suggest that compliance levels have been consistently high.
  - For security operatives (DS), what do you think are the key drivers behind their adherence to the SIA’s regime?
  - For those DS who cut corners with the regulation, what do you believe are the key reasons for this?
  - When it comes to the security companies, what do you think is driving their compliant attitude and adversely what can lead them sometimes to break the rules?
Considering how the SIA goes about ensuring that regulatees are compliant with the regulation, the annual reports seem to reflect a mixed message across the years; the early years message appears to echo that the SIA’s mission is to make the environment hostile to non-compliance, whereas since 2008 it seems that the SIA reflects itself as more into supporting the industry to reach the desired compliance levels.

- What do you think about this mixed message and from your experience in the organisation how do you think that the organisation goes about its compliance approach?
- From your experience, could you give me some examples/an overview of how this process works in practice both for frontline operatives but also for security companies?

Considering the enforcement tools that the SIA has at its disposal and the use of these:

- Regarding warnings/improvement notices, your figures suggest that its use has declined significantly since 2012/13. Why do you think this has been the case?
- On the contrary prosecutions have been on the rise, particularly since 2012/13. Why do you think this has been the case?
- Further on prosecutions, since 2012/13 most of these seem to be directed against businesses rather than against individuals, as it has been the case before 2012. Do you have any reflections on why this might have happened? Is there any connection between this trend and the broader enforcement approach of the organisation?
- In 2008 there was some indication that the SIA considered to introduce monetary administrative penalties under the RESA 2008 framework, but ultimately this didn’t happen. What’s your opinion on what these sanctions could have meant for your enforcement approach and why the organisation did not actually integrate these into your enforcement actions?
- Instead of these sanctions, the SIA got POCA powers in 2014. From your experience what were the key driving forces and the rationale behind this? Being now four years since POCA powers were introduced for the SIA, have they fulfilled part of the reasoning behind their introduction? What has worked well? Are there any key gaps/challenges? Why?
Overall considering all the enforcement tools that we discussed, what sort of impact do you have in the industry (both for those who broke the rules but also for those who are compliant)?

- Considering the dealings between SIA investigators and regulatees:
  - From your experience do you consider that you have regular dealings with regulatees?
  - On what occasions do these dealings mostly occur? Do they primarily involve security operatives, security companies or both?
  - Thinking about your dealings with the DS sector (individual and businesses), what has worked well in your interactions? Are there any challenges and how do you go about these?

**Concluding questions/ Wrap-up**

- Overall, what would you say are the key contributions of the regulatory regime in the DS sector?
- On the other hand, what are the key current challenges and gaps that the regulatory regime might face and how can the SIA address these?
- Overall, do you think that the industry respects you and treats you as a regulator that does a good job?
- How do you see the near future of the regulated parts of the industry (and any specific considerations for the DS sector)?
- Are there any further thoughts or comments that you’d like to discuss/add to our conversation today that might not have been captured in the time we spent together reflecting on any of the above issues?
**Interview guide for door supervisors in south-east Wales**

- **Introductory questions/icebreakers**
  - Thanking the interviewee for his/her voluntary participation in the research study.
  - Based on the consent form & the information sheet, ask the interviewee whether they have any questions before starting the interview. Also, reiterate that all data gathered from interviews will be treated with confidentiality (anonymity, access to data restricted only for the researcher and the supervisors, secure storage of data).

- **Questions on occupational characteristics of DS**
  - How long have you been working as a door supervisor?
    - Prompt the participant to discuss whether this is a full-time or part-time role and how does their overall work experience background so far look like.
  - Have you worked as a door supervisor only in this area or have you worked in the same role in any other area across Wales?
  - What made you consider working in the door supervision sector? Have you ever worked in any other security-related position beforehand?
  - Are there any aspects of your job that you particularly enjoy or find particularly rewarding?
  - On the other hand, are there any issues that have made you frustrated or annoyed working as a door supervisor? Can you give me some examples of these?
  - How long do you think you will continue to work as a door supervisor? Have you thought about other jobs that you might like to do?
  - For those who have worked in the sector pre-regulation or in the early days of regulation: Ask the interviewee to reflect on how the occupation looks like now compared to the pre-regulation/early days of regulation and if any differences are brought up, prompt to contextualise what drove these.
Questions on the local NTEs and the role of door supervisors

- How does this town/city look after dark? What about the street that your club/pub is located?
- Before starting to work as a door supervisor, what did you think about crime, violence or anti-social behaviour in the NTE of this town/city? Can you give me some specific examples (who are more likely to be involved in these incidents, either by causing these incidents or by being affected by these incidents?)
- Did this perception change or remained the same when you started working as a door supervisor? How do you think people (locals & the media) who don’t work in the NTE see crime and violence in your area after dark?
- From your experience in the sector so far, what would you say are your main tasks & goals working as a door supervisor?
  - Could you walk me through the process that you go whilst on the doors to check who is allowed entry to the pub/bar/club and who is not? How is such a decision made? How do you deal with customers that might not agree with your call?
  - How do you get along with the bar staff and the owners of the pub/bar/club that you are working? Can you give me any examples of how do you work together?
- From your working experience, who would you say is considered to be a vulnerable individual in the local NTEs? Have you ever had to intervene to do something about such a person? If so, can you walk me through an example of what you did and whether you had some help from anyone else in dealing with this issue?
- How do you get along with local police? On what sort of occasions did you have the chance to liaise/work with them and how did it go?
  - What sort of similarities and differences can you see between your role and the role of police in the NTE?
  - How do you think the local police officers that you’ve dealt with so far perceive you and your colleagues?
  - For those who have worked in multiple locations across south-east Wales: Are there any differences in the way that you’ve worked/liaised with police across the different areas that you’ve worked so far?
- Have you experienced violence by customers/the public/anyone else whilst doing your job?
  o What type of violence have you experienced? How often does this occur?
  o Have you reported any of those instances to the police?
  o Has your employer supported you after these occasions? If so, what type of support did you receive?

- Have you ever used bodycams/headcams in your job? What sort of good and bad sides can you see from your experience in terms of using this equipment whilst on the doors?
- For those who have worked in the sector pre-regulation or in the early days of regulation: Ask the participant to reflect comparatively as per the previous set of questions.

• Questions on the regulation of the sector and perceptions of the SIA

- As you might be aware, in the early 2000s the reputation of your sector was full of talk about ‘bouncers’ being violent or trading drugs in the NTE. To what extent do you think that this is still the case in the last decade or so? Why? Feel free to give me any examples from your working experience or from discussions that you might have had with your colleagues.
- To what extent do you think the SIA had any sort of effect in the concerns on your sector that we discussed before?
- What do you think about the training course that you had to complete to get your licence?
  o Was it adequate and good to make you competent do the job?
  o What did you like the most/the least about it?
  o From your experience, is there anything that you’d like to see being added in the training course that isn’t part of it at the moment?
- Overall, do you think that regulation is a good thing for your sector? Is there anything that you think regulation hasn’t addressed properly so far?
- What do you think about the fact that the companies who employ you don’t have to get through the process of licensing?
- What do you think about the SIA? Do you think that they are doing a good job? Why?
- From your personal point of view, what makes you to comply with the rules that the SIA has in place for you in order to be licenced?
- What do you think makes some of your colleagues to possibly cut corners with these?
- Have you ever been met any of the SIA investigators? What was the occasion and how did this go?
  
  o If the response is yes, prompt the interviewee to discuss how often they had dealings with the SIA investigators and how did they find their interaction with them.
  
  o If the response is no, prompt the interviewee to discuss why this might have been the case (i.e. does he/she think that the SIA investigators do not in general turn up in their workplace or he/she thinks that it just hasn’t occurred to them yet).
- What do you think will happen to a DS if she/he is found to be working unlicensed? How quickly do you expect the SIA to find out about it and do something?

- **Concluding questions/ Wrap-up**

- Overall, how do you see your sector in the near future (i.e., next 5 years or so)?
- What sort of changes would you like to see in your sector in the near future and where do you see the SIA fit within these?
- Are there any further thoughts or comments that you’d like to discuss/add to our conversation today that might not have been captured in the time we spent together reflecting on any of the above issues?
Interview guide for security companies (door supervision services) in south-east Wales

- **Introductory questions/ icebreakers**

  - Thanking the interviewee for his/her voluntary participation in the research study.
  - Based on the consent form & the information sheet, ask the interviewee whether they have any questions before starting the interview. Also, reiterate that all data gathered from interviews will be treated with confidentiality (anonymity, access to data restricted only for the researcher and the supervisors, secure storage of data).
  - Ask the interviewee to briefly state their position within the security company (job title & main responsibilities) and also provide some background information regarding the security company (number of employees, security services provided, since when it has been established, areas of service coverage).

- **Questions on the DS (individual level): occupational characteristics and the SIA’s regulation**

  - Thinking about the DS staff employed by your company, what are the key characteristics that you are looking from prospective employees?
  - What are the key responsibilities and tasks that you expect your DS staff to perform whilst on the job?
  - Has any of your DS done something whilst doing his job that you might have considered it to be ‘above and beyond’ his/her role? If so, what was it about and what was your reaction as his/her employer?
  - What are the key competences that you expect your DS staff to have in order to be able to perform their tasks? In other words, who do you consider to be ‘fit for purpose’ as a DS?
  - Evidence from other interviewees in this research project, but also from the broader literature suggests that security operatives experience different forms of violence in their workplace.
    - From your experience in the company, has this come to your attention regarding your own staff? If so, how did you find out about these incidents?
o What type of violence have they experienced? How often would you say that these incidents occur?

- Are you aware of whether your staff who have experienced any type of violence in their workplace have reported this to the police?

- What did you do from your side when these incidents came to your attention?

- As you might be aware, in the early 2000s the reputation of the DS sector was full of talk about ‘bouncers’ being violent or trading drugs in the NTE. To what extent do you think that this is still the case in the last decade or so? Why? Feel free to give me any examples from your working experience or from discussions that you might have had with your colleagues.

- To what extent do you think the SIA had any sort of effect in the concerns on DS that we discussed before?

- What do you think about the training course that your staff had to complete to get their licence?
  
  - Was it adequate and good to make them competent do the job?
  
  - From your experience, is there anything that you’d like to see being added in the training course that isn’t part of it at the moment?

- From your experience and your discussions with your staff, how do your DS view the SIA? Do they think that the regulator is doing a good job for the industry? Why?

- If you happen to find out that a DS employed by you has cut some corners with the SIA’s regime, what would you do? From your experience in the industry, would you say that your way of dealing with such a DS would have been the standard route for most security companies? Why?

- For those who have worked in the sector pre-regulation or in the early days of regulation: Ask the interviewee to reflect on how the DS occupation looks like now compared to the pre-regulation/early days of regulation and if any differences are brought up, prompt to contextualise what drove these.
- **Questions on the DS security companies (business level): the market of DS services and the SIA’s regulation**

  - How does the local market for DS service provision look like? Thinking about the time you started working in the sector, do you think that there have been any sort of changes/developments? Why?
  
  - What would you say are your key business goals as a security company? Have you been able to follow these objectives? If not, why?

  - Thinking about a prospective contract with the owner of a pub/bar/club regarding the provision of DS services:
    - From your experience so far how speedy is this process?
    - From your experience how well would you say that your offer meets the requirement of the clients?
    - Have you faced any particular obstacles with securing contracts and if so what do you think were the key reasons behind this?

  - Unlike the DS who have to go through the licensing process, security companies do not have an equivalent requirement set by the SIA. Do you think that business licensing should have been in place as well? Why?
    - If business licence existed, what would have been different for the sector?

  - If the interviewee’s company has ACS status:
    - Thinking about your ACS status, what were the key reasons behind your decision to apply for this voluntary accreditation?
    - How did you find the process of applying for ACS, meeting its requirements, and going through the relevant assessments?
    - Did you have to liaise with the SIA to get some support/technical advice in terms of getting ready for your application? How did this go?
    - What sort of advantages, if any, has the ACS scheme brought to your company?
    - Have you identified any challenges or gaps with the scheme?
    - At the moment, what are your thoughts in terms of renewing your ACS status when this is due?

  - If the interviewee’s company doesn’t have ACS status:
    - Have you thought about going through the process of getting an ACS status?
Could you give me an overview of the key reasons behind your rationale/decision?

Overall, what do you think about what the ACS can bring to a company? What is this dependent upon?

- From your experience working in this particular security company but also from your broader experience in the sector, what would you say makes you to follow the SIA’s rules?
  
  - Have you ever had any issues/problems that might have made adhering to the SIA’s regulation a bit tricky and if so, what did you do on such an occasion?
  
- From your experience in the sector, in what ways do you think that some security companies might cut corners with the SIA’s regime?

- Thinking further about these companies, what do you think makes them to cut some corners?

- If we assume that one security company cut corners with the SIA’s regime. In this scenario:
  
  - How quickly do you think that the SIA might found out about this?
  - Once the SIA finds out about this, what do you think will be the consequences for this particular company?
  - Has this scenario we just discussed happened here in the local market of DS services and if so, could you walk me through of what happened and what sort of impact did it have?

- In terms of communicating or liaising with the SIA more broadly:
  
  - Have you ever had any sort of contact or dealing with the SIA? If so, on what occasion and how did this interaction go?
  - Have you ever had been inspected or met any of the SIA local investigators? If so, on what occasion and how did this interaction go?
  - From your point of view and your experience, to what extent do you think that the SIA tries to liaise with security companies and what is most of their communication about?

- Further on the communication lines with the SIA, do you get the sense that you have an active role in shaping the future of the regulatory regime? In other words,
to what extent do you believe that your voices as part of the regulated industry are heard and taken into account?

- Overall, reflecting on what we discussed so far, to what extent do you think the SIA does a good job? Why?

- Thinking about trade unions/professional associations:
  - During your experience so far in the sector, have you ever liaised with any of these? On what occasion?
  - What do you think is their role for your industry and what sort of impact had they have so far?

• **Concluding questions/ Wrap-up**

- Overall, how do you see your sector in the near future (i.e., next 5 years or so)?
- What sort of changes would you like to see in your sector in the near future and where do you see the SIA fit within these?
- Are there any further thoughts or comments that you’d like to discuss/add to our conversation today that might not have been captured in the time we spent together reflecting on any of the above issues?
Interview guide for the Police (South Wales & Gwent Police involved in night-time economy policing activities & partnerships)

• **Introductory questions/ icebreakers**

  - Thanking the interviewee for his/her voluntary participation in the research study.
  - Based on the consent form & the information sheet, ask the interviewee whether they have any questions before starting the interview. Also, reiterate that all data gathered from interviews will be treated with confidentiality (anonymity, access to data restricted only for the researcher and the supervisors, secure storage of data).
  - Ask the interviewee to briefly talk about their position within the given law enforcement agency (South Wales Police or Gwent Police): job title, work background/experience and main responsibilities with a particular focus on their experience in policing the local NTEs and/or their involvement with licensing-related issues, as well as on the specific cities/towns that they have worked on.

• **Questions on policing the NTE (police focus)/ multi-agency partnerships**

  - If we go back in the early days of your involvement with policing/licensing activities in the night-time economy of …. (any of the cities/towns identified in the introductory part of the discussion), how did (this place) look after dark? How could you describe the main features of its night-time economy on a Friday or Saturday night, say from 7pm until 5am?
  - Were there any particular crime, violence or anti-social-related concerns during specific hours of the night? Who are most likely to be involved in these ‘troublesome’ situations?
  - Do you consider that the same issues are still prevalent in the local NTE or can you identify any sort of change?
    - If the interviewee confirms such a change, ask him/her what sort of reasons may account for it.
    - If the interviewee considers that these issues have remained approximately the same, prompt him/her to reflect why this might be the case.
Based on your overall working experience in the Gwent/South Wales Police force, have you spotted any interesting differences in terms of the incidents that appear in the NTE across different towns? Could you provide me with some examples and some reflections on these local differences?

Apart from your insights from the field, are there any strategic or tactical reports within your police force that discuss these issues in the NTE and how you can respond to them as police officers? How would you describe the value of these reports in terms of identifying policing priorities in the NTE and proposing relevant policing responses?

Now that we’ve contextualised the NTE and the particular crime, violence and anti-social behaviour-related incidents in the area of …., I will be interested in discussing with you how policing the NTE is actually being accomplished in practice.

Could you give me an overview of how do you go about in terms of both preventing the incidents we discussed before from happening in the first place, as well as responding to them after they occurred?

Have you been involved in any multi-agency partnerships to manage these problems in the NTE? If so, can you give me an overview of who is involved in these partnerships and how do these work in practice (frequency, objectives, follow-up actions, review etc)?

From your experience, how well do you think cooperation and coordination with other partners have worked so far in terms of both setting an agenda and objectives but also agreeing and following-up with specific actions?

Are there any key areas of best practice that have come out of these partnerships? What about any potential challenges and gaps (prompt: both in the strategic set-up, but also in the operational side of the partnership)?
Questions on policing the NTE with DS (working relationships)/ Understanding and perceptions of the SIA’s regulation

- What do you think are the duties and responsibilities of door supervisors, commonly referred to as ‘bouncers’, in the NTE?
- How similar do you think your roles are? What are the key differences between you and DS?
- On which occasions have you liaised with DS? How did it go?
  o On these occasions that you discussed, what were the key reasons behind having to liaise with the DS?
  o Prompt the interviewee to reflect, if possible, if his/her feedback on the occasions mentioned was positive or whether there were some key concerns and contextualise why.
  o Also, if the interviewee has mentioned that he/she had been involved in policing/licensing the local NTEs across different cities/towns, prompt a discussion to reflect whether the process and the outcomes of liaising with DS might have been different across these areas.
- In the old ‘bouncers’ days (pre-regulation), the working relationships between police and bouncers appeared to have been challenging. From your experience and based on what we discussed previously, how would you describe your relationships with them? Prompt him/her about discussing any key positive aspects of the collaboration, but also any challenges as well. What are these and why do you think they are the case?
- How do you think local DS see the way that they liaise/work with you? Prompt the interviewee to reflect, if helpful, to the specific occasions he/she has liaised with DS so far and, if relevant, reflections across different cities/towns.
- Before the SIA, ‘bouncers’ were associated with reputational issues (low professional standards, use of excessive force, violence, involvement in broader criminality). From your experience, do you think that the DS that you have worked/liaised so far are anywhere near of the pre-SIA profile? Have you seen any change/development in the sector and to what extent?
- Based on the previous question, what do you think has driven any of the changes/developments you mentioned in the DS sector? Is it because of the regulatory regime or do you consider that there are any other contributing factors other than these?

- In terms of the licensing regime of the SIA for security operatives, are you aware of the licensing criteria (criminality criteria and training requirement)? If so, to what extent do you think that these are adequate/robust for deciding who is being granted a licence to work as a DS?

- On what grounds have you worked/liaised with the SIA? How did your cooperation with the regulator go? Prompt for best practice Vs key challenges/gaps and contextualise why.

- Have you been involved in exchanging information/intelligence with the SIA? On these occasions, did you or the SIA ask for the information in the first place? How did it go? (prompt reflections on timeliness and accuracy of information exchange and any positive and negative feedback).

- Have you worked or liaised with any of the local SIA investigators? If so, on what occasion(s) and how did it go?

- In terms of ensuring that the local DS are properly licenced to undertake their duties, have you been involved in checking the licences in the NTE? How does this check process work in practice?

- From your experience of liaising and checking the licences of local DS, do you think that unlicensed operatives might be an issue in any of the areas that you’ve worked?

- From your experience, how easy do you think it is for an unlicensed operative to hide his/her lack of a valid licence?

- From your experience on such an occasion, if he/she is found out to be unlicensed, what exactly and how quickly do you think that the SIA will do about this?

- Overall, from your experience with dealing and working with local DS, have you got a sense of what they think about the SIA as their regulatory body? Have there been any sort of instances when they expressed either positive or negative comments and, if so, what’s your personal take on these?
- What role do you think the local context plays in the way that door supervisors perform their tasks and subsequently to the ways that they might be associated with excessive use of violence or any other illicit activity?

- In order to tackle some of the aforementioned concerns, which were also raised for other sectors of the private security industry, the regulator for the PSI, the SIA, introduced in 2003 the statutory licensing requirements and the competency requirement for private security operatives. The goal was twofold; to protect the public and to raise the professional standards within the industry. To what extent do you think that these regulatory provisions have contributed to tackling the concerns we discussed about door supervisors?

- When you are called to liaise with door supervisors at a particular location, do you feel confident about your cooperation? On what grounds? Could you briefly mention some cases that could highlight either good or bad levels of cooperation and explain your views on why this might have been the case.

- Based on the insights that you provided for the previous question, if we try and approach this issue from the side of door supervisors, how do you think that door supervisors view police officers? Could you mention some specific examples, either from your working experience or from discussions that you might have had with your colleagues on this issue.

- **Concluding questions/ Wrap-up**

  - Overall, what do you think about the growth and the roles of private security and other forms of policing in contemporary society? From your experience in your role, do you envisage that these are likely to become more prominent in the near future? Are there any implications that you’d like to discuss in terms of what does this mean about the police and how do you go about dealing and cooperating with private types of policing?

  - Are there any further thoughts or comments that you’d like to discuss/add to our conversation today that might not have been captured in the time we spent together reflecting on any of the above issues?
Appendix E: Example Coding Framework

As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology), the researcher applied thematic analysis as the method of analysis for the qualitative data of this research project (SIA annual reports and interview transcripts). NVivo, a qualitative data analysis computer software package, has been used to code and analyse both types of qualitative data. The following tables provide two examples of the coding framework that the researcher applied for the analysis stage in this thesis.

Regarding these examples, two key observations should be noted. To begin with, each table corresponds to the coding framework used by the researcher to guide her analytical approach towards a specific research question. As highlighted in the concluding remarks of Chapter 2 (Literature Review), this thesis explores four research questions. Out of these, research questions 1 and 4 (as also shown in the corresponding findings chapters) are more complex, given that they have been drawing upon all the different data used in this thesis. Research questions 2 and 3 reflect on a more defined set of qualitative data (i.e., question 2: interview transcripts with DS, police, SIA). Given these differences in the analytical complexity among the research questions, the researcher offers an example of her coding framework for each type of these; from the more ‘straightforward’ ones, this refers to the table below for question 2 and from the more ‘complex’ ones, the coding framework for question 4 is presented.

Furthermore, both tables are organised in two key columns. The first column refers to the open codes (adult nodes in NVivo), which have been based on the main themes for each research question, while the second column (properties/child nodes) breaks each open code down into smaller parts. With reference to the child nodes, given the flexibility of the research design of this thesis alongside the use of both deductive and inductive approaches, these have been created in two ways. Some child nodes have been created from existing literature on areas such as relationships between police and private policing/security operatives (research question 2) and the Nielsen-Parker holistic compliance model (research question 4). Other child nodes have been added either after initial familiarisation with the whole dataset was established (e.g. the codes around ‘inspections’ in question 4, as their prominence within the adult node and the question itself emerged through coding and analysis of the SIA annual reports and transcripts) or through adapting some of the original sub-propositions within the project. A key example of the second method is elucidated considering the child node ‘DS as moral’ actors in question
4. At the initial stage of interview analysis, the adult code was mainly centred around the child node ‘Preserving employment’/ ‘DS fulfilling contract requirements’, which following the analysis of further data and recent literature in the field (Loader and White, 2018) was adapted and the current code ‘DS as moral actors’ emerged and was added to the framework.

**Coding framework for research question 2 (‘To what extent have DS become part of the extended policing family?’)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open codes/ adult nodes</th>
<th>Properties/ child nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SIA’s regulatory ambition | - Strategic collaboration with law enforcement agencies  
- Joint enforcement operations |
| Similarities between DS and police | - Order maintenance  
- Safeguarding the vulnerable  
- Prevention  
- Incident response  
- De-escalation  
- Experiencing violence |
| Differences between DS and police | - Real policing  
- Loss prevention  
- Training  
- Accountability  
- Legitimacy  
- Ethos |
| Positive signs/Improvement | - Friendly chats  
- Joint early intervention  
- Joint safeguarding  
- Police praising DS’ conduct  
- Police empathising with DS  
- DS calling police for help  
- DS confiscating drugs |
| Negative signs/ Deficits | - Monitoring DS’ conduct  
- One way intelligence flow  
- One way assistance |
| Dynamic relationship | - Police’s knowledge of SIA’s regime  
- Police’s lack of understanding of SIA’s regime  
- Police doing the SIA’s job  
- Police collaborating with SIA investigators  
- Police not knowing SIA investigators  
- Police visible in cities  
- NTE infrastructure in cities  
- Lack of police in towns  
- Personal touch in towns  
- Frontline police exposed to DS’ world  
- Police confusion of business licensing  
- DS companies in licensing meetings  
- DS companies absent from licensing meetings  
- SWP training to DS  
- SWP use of CSAS  
- Gwent police training to DS  
- Gwent police use of CSAS |

**Coding framework for research question 4** (‘What are the key developments of the SIA’s enforcement approach and what is their effect on the door supervision sector?’)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open codes/ adult nodes</th>
<th>Properties/ child nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Intelligence gathering by the SIA: Strategic foundations** | - National Intelligence Model  
- Focus on intelligence-led inspections  
- Intelligence-led inspections as minimum burden |
| **Intelligence gathering by the SIA: Random inspections** | - Testing compliance  
- Resources |
| SIA: Police disclosures to the SIA | - Deterrence  
- Validity  
- Type of information  
- Facilitators  
- Inhibitors |
|---|---|
| SIA: Public disclosures to the SIA | - Validity  
- Vindictiveness |
| Intelligence gathering by the SIA: Industry disclosures to the SIA | - Validity  
- Competition |
| Intelligence analysis by the SIA | - PSIA 2001 intelligence criteria  
- Flexible intelligence criteria  
- Horizon scanning  
- Creating a case  
- Enriching an existing case  
- From intelligence to action: follow-up  
- From intelligence to action: lack of follow-up  
- Internal silos |
| SIA’s strategic narrative to compliance and enforcement | - Better Regulation Agenda  
- Macrory Principles  
- Cleansing the industry  
- Eliminating non-compliance with PSIA 2001  
- Supporting the industry to be PSIA 2001 compliant |
| SIA’s enforcement tools: Warnings & Improvement Notices | - Rationale  
- Frequency |
| SIA’s enforcement tools: Prosecutions | - Staggered application  
- Quick escalation  
- Strict PSIA 2001 focus  
- Broadened focus |
| SIA’s enforcement tools: RESA 2008 powers | - Potential advantages  
- Concerns |
| SIA’s enforcement tools: POCA 2002 powers | - Incapacitation rationale  
| - Deterrence rationale  
| - Reassurance rationale  
| - Limitations in search and seizure  
| - Police dependency  
| - PSIA 2001 focus  
| - Wider criminality  
| - Money seized  
| - Reinvesting the money seized  
| - General deterrence  
| - Individual deterrence  
| Compliance on the individual level (DS) | - Preserving employment  
| - Financial needs  
| - DS as moral actors  
| - Employer actively facilitating PSIA non-compliance  
| - Employer actively facilitating drug trade  
| - Employer turning a blind eye to PSIA non-compliance  
| - Employer turning a blind eye to drug trade  
| - High risk of being inspected by police in cities  
| - Low risk of being inspected by police in towns  
| - Low risk of being inspected by the SIA in cities  
| - Speedy sanctioning by the SIA  
| - Quick escalation by the SIA  
| - Local individual prosecutions  
| - Local enforcement outputs  
| - Lack of support from employers  
| - Victims of labour abuse  
| - Rule-oriented enforcement style by SIA investigators  
| - Technical support by SIA investigators  
| - Understanding individual concerns by SIA investigators  
| - Understanding industry associations’ remit  
| - Liaising with industry associations  


| Compliance on the business level (DS companies) | - Expectation for the SIA to reward best practice  
- Expectation for the SIA to lobby for the industry  
- Improvement in communication with the SIA  
- Persisting challenges in communication with the SIA  
- Commercial advantages  
- Surviving competition  
- Business seen as family  
- Support by the SIA to comply  
- Cutting corners for money  
- Lack of corporate skills  
- Quick profit as a business mindset  
- Monopoly barrier in the local market  
- Buyers of security focusing on price  
- Buyers of security not caring about quality  
- Undervaluing ACS  
- Absence of business licencing  
- ‘Phoenix’ companies  
- Knowledge of national enforcement outputs  
- Knowledge of local enforcement outputs  
- Limited individual deterrence  
- Limited group deterrence  
- Tax evasion  
- Paying DS cash in hand  
- Exploiting DS  
- Employing violent DS  
- Employing inexperienced DS  
- Employing incompetent DS |
References


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