Conflict after conflict: music in the memorialisation of the Gallipoli Campaign

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ABSTRACT

When does war end and peace begin? Does commemoration serve indelibly to bracket conflict from post–conflict? In this article, I argue that memorial rituals serve to extend an ongoing conflict by concealing retribution in the guise of reconciliation. With specific reference to the centennial commemoration of the Gallipoli Campaign (2015), I focus on a musical performance of the iconic number entitled: Çanakkale Türküsü (lit. ‘The Dardanelles Folksong’) sponsored by the Turkish Navy, which was broadcast on Turkish television to mark the centennial celebration of the Gallipoli landings. The message of the performance is one of power, a resurgent Turkey on the high seas of world diplomacy – and also one of normality, a tacit recognition that war is every day. Significantly, the musical arrangement of the famous folksong is socially organised to emphasise consensus and inclusiveness. Further, the musical performance reinforces the theme of reconciliation between old enemies from abroad and new enemies at home. That the event was scheduled to coincide with the centennial commemoration of the Armenian deportations is no coincidence. In this way, a song of reconciliation might become a song of retribution by extending a longstanding conflict into an era that is apparently post conflict.

KEYWORDS

Commemoration; Gallipoli; Islamism; politics; post-conflict; Turkey; war

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tend to reinforce the martial agency of memorials by providing a partisan reading of history through selective memory and intentional amnesia? In this article, I examine how music is employed simultaneously to advocate concord and discord, at once being utilised to advance reconciliation between former foes and to provoke hostility between current enemies.

I focus here on music that is used in the memorialisation of the Gallipoli Campaign (1915–1916), a major defeat for the Allied forces and a decisive victory for the Central powers, especially so for the Ottoman army. After the evacuation of the Allied armies from the shores of Gallipoli, thoughts turned quickly to the construction of monuments and to the staging of rituals. As early as 1920 (at the Treaty of Sèvres), the exchange of prisoners and the preservation of graves were secured by settlement. By 1923 (at the Treaty of Lausanne) more tangible provision was agreed upon for the construction of monuments and for the consolidation of graveyards. In this Treaty, Turkey ceded sovereign territory on the Gallipoli Peninsula to the Australasian dominions as a place of pilgrimage and as a locus for commemoration. For over a century, the Allied landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula (25 April 1915), which followed their defeat in the Dardanelles Straits (18 March), have been commemorated by the Antipodean nations and celebrated by the Turkish state respectively. As the following televised vignette demonstrates, memorials have served both to separate conflict from post-conflict and to perpetuate conflict after conflict.

Mist and fog

In the outstanding war drama entitled *All the King’s Men* (1999), the character of Queen Alexandra (1844–1925) reflects upon her role in the disappearance of a company of soldiers in the Gallipoli Campaign. Recruited from the Sandringham Estate, the company is believed mysteriously to have vanished in a thick cloud while attacking Turkish lines. In the drama, this disaster causes considerable upset to the royal entourage of palace staff and estate workers. To verify the account, Queen Alexandra sends a royal minion (Reverend Charles Pierrepont Edwards, 1889–1946) to Turkey to establish the truth. The fact is worse than the fiction. The soldiers from Sandringham are buried. All the dead have apparently been executed; each dying by a single shot to the head. Rather than relating his shocking discovery to Queen Alexandra upon his return, Pierrepont Edwards allows the sole survivor of the massacre to recount and confirm the original myth. This he does much to the relief of the retinue present. In the closing scene, however, Queen Alexandra shows that she is not fooled. She concludes tersely: ‘Do you think we can safely build our memorials now, Mr Pierrepont Edwards’. He replies: ‘Yes Ma’am, I do’.

By building monuments to the fallen, Queen Alexandra suggests here that the function of commemoration is to delineate conflict from post-conflict, to separate war from peace. Through an outstanding demonstration of acting skill, Queen Alexandra (played by Dame Maggie Smith, b. 1934) portrays visually the ways in which the trauma of war can still persist after war. Her face is a picture of pain at the loss of a trusted lackey, Mr Frank Beck (1861–1915). Her face also exudes compassion for Mrs Beck who is present at the survivor’s testimonial. Additionally, she shows regret at her insistence that Mr Beck – as Captain Beck – lead the resident company of estate recruits in a
wartime escapade. Against the stern advice of her son, King George V (r. 1910–1936), Queen Alexandra expresses guilt at her stubborn interference in this matter. This heterophonic display of distinctive emotions is crowned by a momentary flicker of imperious indignation, that she as a senior member of the royal family could have been so wrong. That is, Queen Alexandra is tormented by the memory of a court favourite and calls for his sacrifice to be memorialised.

The TV drama provides a snapshot into a critical moment during the Gallipoli Campaign (see Figure 1). The Sandringham Company formed part of a larger unit, the 5th Territorial Battalion of the Royal Norfolk Regiment, which landed at Suvla Bay as part of a strategic manoeuvre to outflank Turkish positions entrenched inland. The plan was to alleviate an intractable stalemate and to ensure a decisive victory. In this way, the Peninsula could be seised and the Dardanelles would be secured, the ultimate goal being to take the Ottoman Empire out of the War. As the film shows, the soldiers were inadequately equipped and poorly commanded. On the day of the assault (12 August), the Company became detached from the main column and took refuge in a farmstead behind enemy lines. It is not clear whether the Norfolk soldiers were killed in action or whether they were executed. The role played by Pierrepont Edwards appears central to the subsequent investigation commissioned by Queen Alexandra. As chaplain of the Territorial Battalion, he was familiar with the men and the terrain. Pierrepont Edwards located the farmstead in question and interviewed the owner. Finding more than 120 dead members of the Norfolk Regiment nearby, he noted that their remains had been defiled and deposited unceremoniously in a nearby ravine.

Indeed, Pierrepont Edwards had another reason for returning to the Gallipoli Peninsula. As a member of the Imperial War Graves Commission, he had the unenviable task of locating the corpses of the Allied dead. Although often difficult to identify, he arranged for the bodies to be reinterred in Azmak Cemetery (Suvla), with all ranks and classes being buried together with neoclassical uniformity as if to recognise the equality of each man’s sacrifice. In his official report he concluded: ‘It would appear […] that a portion of the battalion were surrounded in the farm and annihilated’. This would suggest that, as in the film, no prisoners had been taken. This seemed to be the end of the matter. As in the film, also in life: it was time to build memorials. A cross was erected in honour of the Company at Sandringham and Queen Alexandra officiated at its inauguration ceremony (October 1920). In addition, brass plaques were engraved and memorial windows were installed in various local churches. Of course, the Allied dead, including soldiers of the 5th Territorial Battalion, were also memorialised on the Gallipoli Peninsula, their names appearing on the impressive monument at Cape Helles (erected 1924).

**Conflict and post-conflict**

Do memorials signify the end of conflict and the beginning of post-conflict? In reality they rarely do. As Katzenstein (2014) contends (see above), the transition from war to peace is often messy. Even if war as conflict concludes with the cessation of hostility, violence as I mentioned earlier often persists in various forms. That is, a declaration of peace is just that, a declaration. Like a memorial, it is a symbolic gesture which disguises the continuity in a post-war world of social inequality, economic deprivation, political uncertainty and ecological catastrophe (to name just a few issues). That war is a synonym for
conflict is often assumed. However, Hozić argues (2014) that the redefinition of war as conflict has a history that dates back to the end of the Cold War (1991) when interstate wars were largely replaced by intrastate conflicts. For her, the demise of the superpower
(namely the Soviet Union) witnessed the eruption of ‘teacup wars’ in ‘failed states’, local conflicts which required the intervention of a supranational body to minimise violent contagion.

This international body was the United Nations (UN). As its Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali (s. 1992–1996) coined the term ‘post-conflict’ in his report entitled An Agenda for Peace (1992). Here, Boutros-Ghali actively promoted the processual concept of peace building in post-conflict situations through international intervention in the martial and the civil domains. In theory, the Agenda involved three pathways to peace building: democratic reform, civil society and state building. In practice, peace building encompassed the disparate tasks of military disarmament, refugee management, institutional development and educational advancement (amongst other duties). Significantly, it was Boutros-Ghali who first noted that conflict had replaced war as a more apt term to define regional conflagrations. While Hozić (2014) is critical of the liberal internationalism and neo-colonial paternalism that informs Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda and while she also details the multiple failures of the UN to implement the Agenda at critical moments of genocide (as in Rwanda, 1994) and revolution (as in Somalia, 1991), she is more disparaging of ‘western’ powers (operating under the auspices of representative military alliances), who have invoked the moral ethos of the Agenda to intervene in local conflicts for ideological advantage and material gain.

Hozić’s incisive appraisal of Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda appears as the second chapter of a ground-breaking edited volume entitled Post-Conflict Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Brown and Gagnon 2014). This volume acknowledges implicitly the growing significance of conflict studies in the academy where a diverse, interdisciplinary body of scholars includes anthropologists and sociologists and experts drawn from political science and international relations amongst others. Of importance, the volume features an activist dimension by including submissions from legislators and educators, environmentalists and peacekeepers. In their Introduction (see Gagnon, Senders, and Brown 2014), the editors (along with Stefan Senders) identify four ‘modalities’ that operate within post-conflict phases. These are: first, ‘medicalisation’, where the violence of war is translated into medical discourse after war, trauma now being the focus of therapeutic intervention. Second, ‘criminalisation’, where legitimate ‘military’ endeavours during conflict are transformed into illegitimate ‘criminal’ activities in post-conflict circumstances. Third, ‘missionisation’, where outside actors engage dialogically with inside stakeholders to bring about ideological transformation.

The fourth modality, ‘memorialisation’, is of special interest to this article. For the authors, ‘memorialisation’ is a type of ‘missionisation’ which involves selective memory by giving a particular meaning to past sacrifice. Such a memory may be highly contested if it functions to reinforce a hegemonic position. The authors identify two types of memorial. The first serves to mark a temporal distance between past and present, between conflict and post-conflict epochs. The second serves at once to acknowledge acts of violence in the past and, at the same time, to ‘simulate’ acts of violence in the present. Here, I argue that memorialisation operates in both ways as it separates the past from the present but also reveals the past in the present. In short, I argue that commemoration itself is a form of conflict after conflict, a bellicose ritual that is employed to monumentalise a specific reading of the past and to silence alternative interpretations of that past. In this way it simultaneously operates as a mode of reconciliation and retribution.
As an audible and visible display of selective memory, commemoration at once helps to remember and forget, to unite and divide.

**Memorialisation and missionisation**

It is noteworthy that in *Post-Conflict Studies* not a single chapter is devoted to memorialisation. Where the first three modalities are well-represented in the edited collection, the issue of commemoration is only mentioned in passing. For example, the leading chapter by Hozić opens with a relevant ethnographic vignette. It concerns an art installation that was created to mark the twentieth anniversary (April 2012) of the Sarajevo siege in Bosnia–Herzegovina. The Bosnian director, Haris Pašović (b. 1961), designed a theatrical set composed of more than eleven thousand red seats to symbolise the Bosnian lives lost during the four-year blockade. Called the ‘Red Line’, the artwork was exhibited in the centre of the city as a tangible reminder ‘of the loss that is still experienced as a part of everyday life in Sarajevo’ (Hozić 2014: 19–20). That is, the past is forever present. Of course, the installation attracted negative attention from friends and foes alike, the opening boycotted by representatives of the Serbian faction on the grounds of its ‘falsification of history’. Tellingly, Hozić concludes with a quote by a journalist who was present at the event saying: ‘It was better in the war’ (ibid.: 20).

Hozić shows here that post-conflict is not so different from conflict. Indeed, in the journalist’s provocative view, the post-conflict phase can be worse than the conflict itself: war in the past now being preferable to peace in the present. That the comment coincided with a commemorative event is noteworthy, since commemoration in this instance served to accentuate conflict by making the past ever present. That is, loss of life in the past continues to be experienced as every day in the life of the present. She also shows that the ‘Red Line’ represents a partisan reading of history, a contested interpretation of the past that is inimical to the Serbian interest. As a selective memory, this memorialisation of a Bosnian catastrophe serves to divide religious factions as well as to unite religious communities in that it represents a retribution against Christians and a reconciliation among Muslims. Further, the event is viewed by some as tokenistic (on the part of the international community) and opportunistic (on the part of the artist). In short, commemoration here represents a conflict after conflict, both contingent upon the cessation of hostilities yet revealing the continuation of hostilities albeit in a symbolic form.

As I show elsewhere (see O’Connell 2017), music plays a critical role in the memorialisation of conflict. Indeed, I also argue (see O’Connell 2010, 2011) that music occupies an ambiguous position in what Pettan (2010) calls the ‘war-peace continuum’, music simultaneously being employed to incite hostility and to assuage aggression. Most worrying of all is when music is manipulated to conceal conflict in the guise of conflict resolution. For example, international bodies and government authorities often invest in artistic spectacle to disguise social inequity and political dissent. By presenting music-making as a medium for reconciliation, the prevailing establishment is able to sidestep pressing accusations of violent repression (in all of its forms) with diplomatic effect and financial benefit. Simply put, artistic sponsorship is a cheap yet effective form of soft diplomacy. Commemoration also operates within in this ambivalent purview of retribution as reconciliation. Here, professions of pacific intent are usually framed by
expressions of belligerent swagger so much so that the martial character of ritual practice calls into question the conciliatory nature of such occasions. Of course, music plays a central role in the choreography of commemoration by means of the musical materials used (such as anthems and chants) and the musical practices enacted (such as marches and parades).

**Commemoration and celebration**

The memorialisation of the Gallipoli Campaign has often been undertaken with a missionising zeal. Although the first memorials were constructed with neo-classical perfection by the Imperial War Graves Commission soon after the cessation of hostilities (see above), it was the formation of the ‘ANZAC Estate’ that would ensure that commemoration of the Gallipoli Campaign would largely become an Australasian affair. The ‘ANZAC Estate’ (6 km²) was a small parcel of land above Anzac Cove (Arı Koyu) that was ceded by the Ottoman state to the British Empire following protracted negotiations that were finalised at the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Earmarked specifically as the final resting place for soldiers killed in the service of the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), the site became a focus for Antipodean pilgrims who were eager to commemorate the participation of two new dominions (Australia and New Zealand) in a global conflict (World War 1). The annual pilgrimage to the ANZAC Estate to mark the original ANZAC landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula (25 April 1915) was endorsed by the Turkish president Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] (1881–1938) who visited the site during the 1930s for diplomatic reasons.

With reference to the ANZAC fallen, Atatürk in 1934 is reputed to have stated: ‘You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country’. Claiming that there was no difference between the Ottoman (as ‘Mehmets’) and the ANZAC (as ‘Johnnies’) dead, the president addressed the mothers of the Antipodean fallen: ‘Your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well’. Significantly, the relevant memorial can still be found at Anzac Cove and is engraved exclusively in English. Atatürk’s words initiated an important and ongoing diplomatic relationship between Turkey and the ANZAC nations, especially Australia.

Meanwhile, the Turks built their own sites of commemoration. At first, these memorials were haphazard affairs built out of artillery tubes and shell cases. It was only in 1934 that an official monument was unveiled in honour of the Ottoman dead. This monument was specifically constructed to honour the ordinary Ottoman soldier (mehmetçik). Called the ‘Mehmet Çavuş Monument’ (Mehmet Çavuş Anıtı), it was built at the Nek (Cesaret Tepe) in the Anzac Estate as an important site of commemoration for both sides. Atatürk’s famous speech in honour of the ANZAC soldiers was delivered at its unveiling (1934). Critical here was the differential celebration at the time of the ANZAC and the Turkish dead. So as not to be outdone, Turkish authorities now wished to emulate their former foes in the construction of magnificent edifices. Critical also was a contemporary awareness of the value of commemorative events for political ends. There were two strands to this awareness. First, commemoration could fulfil diplomatic objectives. This was first achieved by Atatürk when he invited the Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925–1941), to tour the Gallipoli battle grounds (1934), the aim being to foster Turkish-Iranian relations. Second, commemoration could reinforce an ideological
agenda. This was especially so during periods of military dictatorship which were marked by the construction of massive monuments and the celebration of regimented ceremonies, the aim being to showcase the military might of the status quo.

Anniversaries have played an important role in the memorialisation of the Gallipoli Campaign. Each decade witnessed the gradual expansion of relevant formalities. At first, the Turks marked each anniversary with local demonstrations of patriotism, students and teachers often being co-opted as willing participants. On these occasions, poems were read and folkdances were enacted, exhibitions were held and publications were disseminated. During the 1970s the celebrations were expanded with Turkish and ANZAC representatives joining together to remember both the naval victory (on 18 March) and the Allied invasion (on 25 April). However, it was after the release of the film entitled Gallipoli (1981) that Antipodean pilgrims flocked to the Gallipoli Peninsula. Since that date the official remembrance of the Gallipoli Campaign has become largely a bellicose affair featuring military parades and cannon salutes, instrumental fanfares and martial anthems. More recently, naval flotillas and air displays (see below) have served to amplify the warlike imprint of the annual events. In this context, it is noteworthy that public expressions of peace and friendship have become a principal feature of ritual discourse, and music has served to clothe military might in the guise of peaceful purpose.

**Resolution and retribution**

The centennial commemoration (on 24 April 2015) of the Gallipoli Campaign is an excellent example of conflict clothed in the mantle of conflict resolution. Scheduled to mark the hundredth anniversary of the Gallipoli landings (25 April 1915), the event was brought forward by one day to coincide with the centenary remembrance of the Armenian deportations (which began on 24 April 1915). The change of date caused an international outcry with the presidents of France and Russia boycotting the event. As a significant ally of Turkey, Germany was not represented by its president but only by a junior minister. That being said, senior representatives from Britain and Ireland, Australia and New Zealand attended the ceremony. To counteract this public humiliation, the president of Turkey, Recep T. Erdoğan (s. 2014-), invited high-ranking delegates from seventeen Muslim nations. In this way, he was able to demonstrate his senior position amongst them and Turkey’s pivotal place in the league of Islamic nations. After all, 2015 was an election year and Erdoğan had to display his international standing to a local audience, an audience that was already ambivalent about his political ambitions and autocratic inclinations.

At the ceremony, Erdoğan carefully intertwined the language of peace with the symbols of war. In his extended speech to those present at the Soldier’s Memorial (Mehmetçik Anıtı), he talked about the glories of victory (on the part of the Turks) and the sorrows of defeat (on the part of the Allies). His principal theme was a ‘message of peace’, one in which freedom is advanced and Islamophobia is quashed. As Maksudyan (2019) also notes, Erdoğan was not alone in proposing a Muslim reading of reconciliation at the ceremony. The president of religious affairs, Mehmet Görmez, (s. 2010–2017), also framed the occasion with a Qur’anic recitation and a protracted prayer in honour of the fallen soldiers. He called for the recognition of self-sacrifice (fedakârlık) on the
part of combatants and the necessity for showing compassion (*merhamet*) towards adversaries. When speaking about compassion, Görmez specifically remembered recruits from Ottoman territories including Arabs, Bosnians, Caucasians and Macedonians. While speaking exclusively in Turkish, Görmez notably failed to commemorate the Allied dead. As I do elsewhere (O’Connell 2017: 1–27), Maksudyan argues for the existence of an Islamist and an Ottomanist subtext at the event.

However, perhaps Maksudyan’s criticism of religious bias at the ceremony is overstated. After all a Christian minister (Reverend David Coulter, b. 1957) and a British royal (Charles, Prince of Wales, b. 1948) offered prayers and sermons. Other non-Muslim rituals were observed elsewhere on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the centennial commemorations (such as those at Anzac Cove and Lone Pine). Given that Maksudyan (2019) is more concerned about the contemporary commemoration (or lack thereof) of the Armenian genocide in Turkey, her negative evaluation of the proceedings is understandable. However, there is some truth to her analysis. For example, the compassion proposed by Görmez in his prayer was exclusively addressed to Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, in his view a pax-Ottomana where religious rights were upheld and imperial values were revered. This is the freedom that Erdoğan extols and self-sacrifice that Görmez exalts. As Maksudyan implies, Armenians had no place in this Ottomanist consensus of subject peoples who were exclusively Muslim. Even the cemetery at the Martyrs’ Memorial (*Çanakkale Şehitleri Anıtı*) was reconfigured (2007) to include tombstones that honoured Muslim soldiers who were not Turks but who hailed from distant corners of the Ottoman Empire (see Kant 2015: 157).

At stake here was the continued existence of a secular state and the uninterrupted legacy of its founder, Atatürk. When the Ottoman Empire was finally superseded by the Turkish Republic (1923), Atatürk instituted a number of Westernising reforms that embraced educational, legal, sartorial and linguistic realms (to name a few). The secularisation of the state involved the abolition of religious law (*şeriat*) and the dissolution of mystical orders (*tarikat*). The new republic had no need for religious leaders (such as a Caliph), religious schools (*medreses*), religious endowments (*vakıfs*) or religious titles (such as *Şeyh*). These were quickly rendered obsolete. A new script was adopted (1928) and a new history was written (after 1931) to underscore the modernist and the nationalist aspirations of the new state. At the centennial commemoration, Erdoğan directly challenged the secularist and the nationalist programme of his predecessor Atatürk, by openly advocating an Islamist and an Ottomanist agenda that reorientated the Turkish state away from the ’West’ and back towards the ’East’, to the Muslim world and to the Islamic heartland.

**War and peace**

Music at the centennial commemoration seemed to resonate with the pluralistic consensus of an Ottomanist perspective. Turkish and non-Turkish genres were presented, monophonic and polyphonic styles were performed. While religious chant provided an audible register of an Islamist conformity, it was the sonic juxtaposition of the violent and the non-violent at the ceremony which underscored the ambivalent position of music in this event. On the one hand, a ’Peace Choir’ composed of children from different nations offered a suite of songs about peace. Specifically organised for the occasion, the choir
sang three numbers in three languages. The first song, in Turkish, was entitled *Zeytin Dalları* ('Olive Branches') and calls upon children around the world to raise their voices in the cause of brotherhood and to decorate their homes with the symbols of peace, olive branches. The second song was in French and the third song was in English. Entitled *Je suis un enfant de paix* and *A Song of Peace* respectively, they were as anodyne as the first. The fact that the choir had rehearsed for three months was not evident since they sang in imperfect harmony; the adoring onlookers were in any case delighted.

On the other hand, a Janissary band (*mehter takımı*) performed military music in a more professional manner. With the thunderous roar of a kös (double-headed membranophone) and the shrill grate of zurnas (double-reed aerophones), 64 band members (*mehterân*) paraded around the podium with the asymmetric gait characteristic of Janissary formations. With borus (trumpets) and zils (cymbals), nakares (kettle drums) and çevgâns (bells) adding to the deafening clatter, the ancient piece entitled the *Elçi Marşı* ('Ambassadorial March') was presented. Forming a perfect semicircle, the band concluded by playing two more marches in situ: *Sancak Marşı* ('March of the Standard') and the *Eski Ordu Marşı* ('Old Army March'). Both were sung heartily by the çevgân bell players and their words expressed devotion for the Turkish flag and the glorification of the Turkish nation. While there is some question about the militaristic function of these ensembles in the past, the Janissary band at the centennial commemoration continued to operate under the auspices of the Turkish Armed Forces, its members (as soldiers) and its repertoire (of marches) demonstrating clearly its martial function.11

Military music marked other aspects of the centennial commemoration. Where the *mehter* provided a visible memory of imperial strength, the *bando* (band) presented an audible reminder of national power, the *bando* replacing the *mehter* (1826) as a tangible symbol of the Westernising reforms that were instituted during the nineteenth century. In this transformation, polyphony displaced monophony in musical texture, and symmetry supplanted asymmetry in marching order; marches became the musical style of choice. Many of these were performed during the ceremony. They opened and closed the event. They accompanied marching parades and national anthems. In this context, a bass drum marked time and snare drums embellished with ruffles. A lone bugler played *‘Taps’ (Ti Sesi)*, an American version of the *‘Last Post’* sounded to mark the obligatory minute’s silence. The ritual ended with a rousing rendition of the Turkish national anthem, entitled *İstiklâl Marşı* ('Independence March'). What with the laying of wreaths and the saluting of soldiers, the issuing of commands and the firing of cannons, the ritual of remembrance was a potent reminder of the militaristic character of memorialisation.

Other instruments of war (such as bagpipes) and songs about war (such as ballads) were performed at different remembrance ceremonies on the Gallipoli Peninsula. However, only the ritual entitled *Mehter Gülbankı* was especially noteworthy. This is an unaccompanied chant to be performed by Janissary soldiers after sentry duty and before armed combat. Unlike the other numbers sung at the centennial commemoration, the *Mehter Gülbankı* involves both a military and a mystical dimension. The lyrics invoke the intercession of God in battle and the promise of victory in the Qur’an. There are mystical elements in the text: the central declamation of *‘Hu’* (‘He’) in the chant is reminiscent of the ecstatic utterance intoned by adepts during Sufi rituals. That the *Mehter Gülbankı* was a significant ritual in historic warfare, demonstrates how an Ottoman chant in a martial context might provide a sonic link between Ottomanism and Islamism.
As a central feature of the centennial commemoration, the Mehter Gülbankı showed a continuity between the Ottoman past and the republican present and in this way side-stepped symbolically the secularising ambitions of the Atatürk era.

**Red and white**

There were other juxtapositions, such as colour. This was especially evident during the air display which took place after the main ceremony, performed by seven members of the acrobatic team called the Türk Yıldızları (‘Turkish Stars’). As an aesthetic experience, the art of the display was truly spectacular. The red and white of the Turkish flag was emblazoned as paint upon the aircrafts’ fuselage and emitted as trails by the aircrafts’ engines. The two colours were visible when the planes were upright (white) or inverted (red). The two colours intersected when the planes were in a synchronised roll or in a combat formation. As a technical achievement, the craft of the demonstration was extremely impressive. One of the few teams to fly with supersonic aircraft (the NF-5 fighter bought from the Royal Netherlands Air Force), the group performed the usual moves of climbs and loops. However, the barrel roll by one plane over two planes in a synchronised inversion was extraordinary, the art and craft of the Turkish Stars justly receiving excited applause from the audience below.

The air display was also a good example of artifice. Two simulacra were juxtaposed during the show, one that was visible and one that was audible. In the first, a large screen replayed the manoeuvre. It recalled an experience for those who had missed the action. The repeat was in slow motion. In the second, an enthusiastic commentator retold the manoeuvre. He described the roll executed or the formation completed. He prepared the audience for the next event by entreating onlookers to look right or left. He commanded the onlookers: ‘hareket!’ (‘manoeuvre!’), ‘hazır!’ (‘ready!’) and ‘şimdi!’ (‘now!’). The planes roared past. They were gone before they were seen.

As Baudrillard (1981) might contend, the replaying and the retelling of the acrobatic display were not mere copies of an amazing spectacle. In sight and in sound, they recrafted the real to create the hyperreal. The visible symbols of nationalism (seen as colour on the screen) and the audible signs of militarism (heard as commands over the tannoy) reinforced the pugnacious character rather than the conciliatory tenor of this commemoration.

There was another juxtaposition, namely language. The text in Turkish did not always match the script in English. In English, the narrator extolled during the display the ‘importance of peace over the world’ especially among the ‘brotherhood of nations’. According to him, the air show operated as a metaphor for ‘spreading [the] wings of peace’ on the earth. Although somewhat farfetched, the narrative was probably aimed at representatives of NATO who were present at the centennial celebration. In Turkish, the narrator offered a different account. He admired the ‘enormous courage’ and the ‘sustained bravery’ of the pilots. After one especially dangerous fly past, he compared the pilots to Atatürk since ‘our stars retain in their hearts a love of country and nation’. As the planes approached to complete their final manoeuvre, he quoted from the famous poem by Ümit Yaşar Oğuzcan (1926–1984) entitled Mustafa Kemal’i Düşünyorum (‘I am thinking about Mustafa Kemal’). He emphasised a specific line: ‘her askeri Mustafa Kemal gibi’ (‘each soldier is like Mustafa Kemal’).
The reference to Atatürk at the commemorative event was especially contentious. Although one reference to Atatürk was made in English by the narrator, it concerned peace and not war. As a condensed expression of foreign policy by the first president of Turkey, it is today rendered using the following formula ‘yurta barış, dünaya barış’ (‘peace at home, peace in the world’). Although slightly different from the original, it positions Atatürk as a man of international diplomacy and not as a man of national hegemony. In Turkish, the narrator portrayed a different reading of Atatürk. This was the Atatürk who defeated the Allied forces. This was the Atatürk who was a model soldier and a patriotic citizen. Most importantly, this was the Atatürk who founded a secular state. However, this was not the religious state that Erdoğan envisaged. Where the narrator at the event espoused a secular nationalism, Erdoğan advocated a sacred nationalism during the ceremony, both positions being supported by military might. Indeed, Erdoğan was widely lampooned in the press for foregrounding religion in the centennial celebrations. In his understanding of this commemoration, Atatürk had no role.12

**Soldiers and sailors**

The air display was not the only demonstration of military might at the centennial commemoration. During a lull in the ceremonial proceedings, an interval act was broadcast on the national television network (TRT) which featured a staged performance of the iconic folksong that is intimately associated with the Gallipoli Campaign, the Çanakkale Türküsi (lit. ‘The Dardanelles Folksong’).13 Produced by the Turkish Navy as a way of showcasing its modern fleet, the recorded transmission was entitled Şehitlerimize Selâm Olsun (‘Salute our Martyrs’). After an extended improvisation on the bağlama sazı (folk lute) at the opening, the camera descends upon the Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial (Çanakkale Şehitleri Anıtı). There a war veteran (gazi), the retired NCO Necdet Erdinç, hand-on-heart sings the first line of the folksong as follows: ‘Çanakkale içinde vurdular beni’ (‘In Çanakkale they shot me’). The camera lingers on his badges. One reads ‘ Kıbrıs Gazi’ (‘Veteran of Cyprus’). Another reads ‘ Muharip Gazi’ (‘Veteran Warrior’). He also sports campaign medals. Above him, nine soldiers fire a volley as a mark of respect.

The next lines of the folksong are sung by sailors on a Turkish naval vessel TCG Nusret; a vintage minelayer used to repulse the assault by Allied ships in the Dardanelles Campaign (February–March 1915). The ship’s captain, named in the video clip as Burak Kenden, sings on the bridge: ‘Ölmeden mezara koydular beni’ (‘They buried me alive in a grave’). In response, his unnamed crew on deck lament: ‘Of gençliğim eyvah’ (‘O! Alas [such was] my youth’). The next four verses are choreographed in a similar fashion. The antiphonal texture allows the film to introduce officers and sailors in sequence, soloists being accorded the full accolades of rank and name. Women as well as men are foregrounded. Cadets as well as seamen are included. During the instrumental interludes that punctuate each verse, a warship (TCG Oruçreis) plies the Atlantic Ocean and a corvette (TCG Büyük Ada) sails the Marmara Sea. A submarine (TCG Perveze) plunges into the Aegean and a helicopter hovers above the Mediterranean. There are shots of ships on manoeuvre and aircraft in formation.

Flags, red and white, fly gloriously over stunning seascapes, all honouring the Turkish nation. Riffs on an electric guitar elevate the anticipated audience to a state of patriotic
fervour. Even soldiers of an amphibious unit and workers at a naval dockyard have their chance to sing a line of the song. Each strophe of the folksong is characterised by a different style of Turkish music. There is a brass band playing ‘western’ music (alafranga) that accompanies marines on parade. There is a ‘classical’ ensemble (ince saz takımı) playing Turkish music (alaturka) that frames warships in action. A clarinet solo reminiscent of commercial music (piyasa müziği) is employed to introduce the final verse. It is sung by the Eurovisionista Candan Erçetin (b. 1963). After a brief excursion to the old Naval Academy (Deniz Harp Okulu) on Heybeliada, Erçetin intones the last lines of the folksong at the Maritime Museum (Deniz Müzesi) which overlooks the Bosphorus. Predictably, the film returns to the Martrys’ Memorial where it began. There, the war veteran Erdinç salutes the fallen when a guard of honour commands: ‘dikkat’ (‘attention’), ‘selâm’ (‘present’), ‘dur’ (‘arms’).

In the televised entr’acte music presents an unwavering pathway for delivering a seamless narrative. The narrative is not just about the acceptability of war; it is also about the inevitability of change. The video portrays a resurgent Turkey on the high seas, a Turkish nation at ease with its militaristic past and its imperial tradition. The video clip shows that the past is forever present, the musical texture revealing that the hybrid styles of the Ottoman past are once again to be heard in the cinematic displays of the republican present. The musical setting allows Turkish listeners to engage comfortably with a once fragmented history, a history that is no longer divided into an Ottoman epoch and a republican era, when sultans were replaced by presidents and when the sacred was displaced by the secular. Indeed, the musical arrangement of Çanakkale Türküsü embraces the heterogeneous character of the Turkish nation, a neo-Ottomanism where diversity is possible under the unifying crescent of Islamism. Here, it is noteworthy that an Islamic warrior (gazi) frames a video clip that is dedicated ‘to our [Islamic] martyrs’ (‘şehitlerimize’).15

Land and sea

The video clip conjoins harmoniously the traditional (in the form of a folksong rendered) and the modern (in the form of a navy displayed). It renders believable the threat of war in the semblance of peace. Here, music provides an unquestionable medium for clothing conflict in the mantle of conflict resolution. It proclaims that war is every day and that war is acceptable. The musical texture allows for the performers to display a unity of purpose, the antiphony conveying group consensus, the harmony displaying group solidarity. Even the eclectic arrangement of musical styles serves to address the diverse tastes of a national audience. However, the musical performance is not perfect (even at times unprofessional), the choirs are not always in unison and the singers are not always in tune. Paradoxically, this enables further to humanise the inhuman character of war. Whereas the musical performers are not of equal talent, they are also not of the same rank. Some are officers, some are sailors. Some are combatants, some are non-combatants. The broadcast helps to portray naval recruits simply as ordinary Turks, Turks who happily sing a song about death.

This happiness is perhaps misplaced. First, the Çanakkale Türküsü is a lament about the tragedy of war and it is not a song about the triumph of victory. In this recorded version of the piece, the song talks of death in terms of ‘rows of willows’ where ‘brave
lions lie beneath’. The fact that the principal protagonist is buried alive is certainly distressing. A further reference to a cypress tree (selvi) evokes a similar image of ‘those of you who are engaged and those of you who are married’ (‘kiminiz nişanlı, kiminiz evli’) being buried in a mass grave. Second, Çanakkale Türküsü is a strange choice to celebrate the nautical might of the Turkish navy; it is a song about a land war on the Gallipoli Peninsula and not about a naval encounter in the Dardanelles Straits. However, Turks celebrate the naval victory in the Dardanelles Campaign over the Allied fleet (18 March 1915) and they do not usually commemorate the Allied landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula (25 April 1915).

In this televised rendition of the Çanakkale Türküsü, two versions of the folksong are combined. Four verses draw upon a song that was collected (c. 1952) by the music folklorist and radio presenter Muzaaffer Sarısozen (1899–1963). It was originally performed by the ‘musical poet’ (‘saz şairi’) İhsan Ozanoğlu (1907–1981) and features seven verses. However, noticeably missing from the video clip are the strophes that describe how ‘my lungs were rotting [and I was] vomiting blood’ and ‘the waters that are flowing with blood’ (so much so that they cannot be imbibed). One verse draws upon a different version of the Çanakkale Türküsü, entitled the Çanakkale Kahramanları Hattırası (‘[In] Memory of the Dardanelles Heroes’), which was written as a march by the female composer ‘Kemanî’ Kevser Hanım (1887–1963). Although the reference to mass graves in terms of willows (söğüts) in the first or cypresses (selvis) in the second is shared but slightly different, the allusion to husbands and fiancés appears only in the composition by Kevser.

The televised adaptation of the Çanakkale Türküsü calls into question the singular connection between a song and a war. It suggests that there are a number of versions of the famous folksong that have been transmitted orally. As Çakır (2003) shows, these variants reveal that two numbers, which are now called the Çanakkale Türküsü, existed at the time of the Gallipoli Campaign; one by Kevser (published in 1915) and one by ‘Destançı’ Mustafa (published in 1915). As Çakır (ibid.: 20–21) also shows, there are important connections between the two pieces, especially in the repetition of certain phrases (such as ‘[their] hope forsaken’ [‘ümidi kesti’]) and stereotypical formulae (such as ‘In Çanakkale’ [‘Çanakkale içinde’]). It is this overlap that demonstrates another point: the Çanakkale Türküsü reiterates certain motifs that can be found earlier in the vocal repertoire associated with the Ottoman-Greek war (1897) and the Ottoman-Balkan wars (1912–1913). After the War, the Çanakkale Türküsü was recorded by non-Turkish artists and in non-Turkish languages: indeed the first recording (c. 1923) of the Çanakkale Türküsü, then called ‘Chanakale Canto’, was recorded in America for Columbia Records (No. E5283) by Greek singer Marika Papagika (1890–1943).

**Friend and foe**

Music is often a common currency for friend and foe alike. This is especially so for subject peoples who survived the terrible upheavals that attended the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As Aksoy (2005) reminds us, Papagika recorded her Çanakkale Türküsü soon after the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) to suit the musical tastes of an Ottoman diaspora in the United States that included Albanians, Armenians, Greeks and even Turks (to name a few). Importantly, Papagika, along with her husband,
opened the first ‘café aman’ in New York called ‘Marika’s’ where she performed a multi-lingual repertoire to satisfy her multi-ethnic clientele. In this sense, her rendition of Çanakkale Türküsü is not extraordinary. The folksong represented an example of her wide knowledge of regional styles to be found along the Aegean littoral. That Çanakkale Türküsü had by then become intimately associated with the Turkish victory in the Gallipoli Campaign would not have fazed Papagika since she was probably aware that an earlier version of the piece had been used for recruitment, the Greek version like the Turkish variant being adapted where necessary to facilitate universal conscription (after 1909).

Music might even present a medium for nurturing atonement between friend and foe. In this matter, the march entitled Çanakkale Marşı (‘the Dardanelles March’) is especially remarkable. Written by the Armenian composer Bimen Dergazaryan [Şen] (1873–1943), the lyrics of the march celebrate the Ottoman victory in the Gallipoli Campaign. Bearing in mind that the Gallipoli landings coincided with the start of the Armenian deportations, the composition demonstrates a surprising amnesia on the part of the composer with respect to the contemporary horrors of ethnic cleansing. Unlike other marches of that name, this particular Çanakkale Marşı was recorded by Orfeon Records apparently after the declaration of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1923). Although this is difficult to date precisely,20 verse 6 makes explicit reference to a ‘republic’ (‘cumhuriyet’) and to a ‘warrior’ (‘gazi’). That is, the lyrics make a direct allusion respectively to the Turkish Republic and to the Turkish president, Atatürk, who, at the time, was known as ‘Gazi’. Although very different compositions, it is noteworthy that the Çanakkale Marşı by the Armenian Şen is contemporaneous with the Çanakkale Türküsü by the Greek Papagika.

In Çanakkale Marşı by Şen, the lyrics are especially revealing. Written in the style of folk poetry (türkü), Şen openly announces his preference for an Ottoman victory. He declares in verse 1 as an Armenian that ‘[we] are all allies [now], [we] should know this’ (‘müttefikler hepiniz, bunu böyle biliniz’). Alluding to a contemporary evolutionist theory that concerned the origin of all peoples from a Turkic hearth (see, for example, Zürcher 1994: 199), he declares in the refrain that ‘[we] are [all] the grandchildren of the ancient Turks’ (‘eski Türk ahfadiyız’). He talks as a Christian about ‘martyrdom’ (‘şehit[lik]’) in verse 4 and ‘jihad’ (‘cihat’) in verse 2, two descriptors usually reserved for Muslims. He describes in verse 3 (somewhat incorrectly) how ‘enemy ships’ (‘zehirler’) and foreign ‘armies’ (‘ordular’) were both turned back from the [Dardanelles] Straits. In verse 5, he rightly confirms though that ‘all the eyes of the enemy’ (‘duşmannın hep gözü’) were pointed in the direction of Istanbul. As ‘sons of the motherland’ (‘vatammın evlatları’) ‘we understood this situation’ (‘anladığız bu sözü’).

It is interesting that the Greek artist and the Armenian composer frame a folksong in an urban style, the former by recourse to rebetiko and the latter by way of alaturka. Papagika sings her Çanakkale Türküsü in a melismatic style more characteristic of a classical vocalist than a folk singer. She is accompanied by an ensemble (gk. kompania) consisting of a violin and cello. The instrumental makeup also includes a cimbalom (gk. santouri), a hammered dulcimer which was probably played here by her husband (Graziosi 2018: 154). The piece ends with a concise improvisation (gk. taximi) on the violin as would be expected in the Smyrnaic style of that musical tradition. By contrast, Şen sets his Çanakkale Marşı in a classical mode (Rast makamı) and metre (muhammes usülü), the syllabic rendering of the text (7 syllables per line) being tailored cleverly to the asymmetric configuration of the metre
(arranged $3 + 2 + 3$ per cycle). Intriguingly, both musicians set a folksong associated with national partisanship in a classical manner indicative of an imperial pluralism. That is, *rebetiko* and *alaturka* represented musically an Ottomanist consensus between friend and foe alike, be they Armenians or Greeks, Albanians or Turks.

**Conflict after conflict**

But is this the Ottomanist consensus imagined by Erdoğan? If it were, the Turkish president would have advocated freedom for non-Muslim minorities and compassion for non-Turkish adversaries. However, he chose to highlight Islamophobia exclusively in his ‘message of peace’. The fact that only Muslim martyrs of the Ottoman Empire were mentioned by the principal imam, Görmez, is especially revealing since the centennial commemoration of the Gallipoli landings was rescheduled to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of the Armenian deportations. Where Muslims were remembered, Christians were forgotten; Turks were acclaimed but Armenians were disavowed. The centenary occasion also marked a reconciliation with a religious past but a retribution against an areligious present. This view of a Turkish transformation did not go unchallenged. During the air display, it was the secular vision of Atatürk rather the sacral ambition of Erdoğan that was celebrated. While seemingly opposed, in both apperitions of a Turkish future the armed forces have a central role to play. This was made clear during the broadcast entr’acte in which ordinary Turks as naval recruits joyfully acknowledge that conflict is every day, the Turkish people now comfortable to envision ‘teacup wars’ in Anatolia and ‘failed states’ in Syria.

What is the role of music in this paradoxical iteration of conflict? Does music help unsettle the pacific claims of commemoration? Yes, I would argue. Music can be analysed to highlight the belligerent character of ritual practice, be it in the musical materials employed or the musical practices enacted. Here, the march of the Janissary provided an audible and a visible reminder of the centrality of conflict at the centennial commemoration. So too in different ways, did the air display and the televised entr’acte. That is, there is no end to conflict and there is little distinction between conflict and post-conflict. Commemorative events serve to reinforce this truth. Returning to the TV drama entitled: *All the King’s Men*, the loss of The Sandringham Company in a thick cloud provides a useful metaphor for understanding the distinction between conflict and post-conflict. The Sandringham Company vanished in the ‘fog of war’. But, the Sandringham recruits did not emerge from the ‘fog of peace’. Although memorials were erected in their honour, for Queen Alexandra the War did not end there. For her, it continued to endure in the guise of pain and compassion, doubt and indignation.

**Notes**

1. This article forms part of my wider study of music and commemoration as it relates to the Gallipoli Campaign (see O’Connell 2017). In it, I adopt a number of conventions. Since the representation of Turkish names is problematic before 1934, I first supply the contemporary name with the surname in parenthesis. For example, I represent the first president of the Turkish Republic as follows: Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], referring to him simply as Atatürk after the first mention. Where relevant, Ottoman texts are rendered in modern Turkish. Ottoman dates are represented using their Gregorian equivalents. When talking
about musical styles such as ‘classical’ and ‘folk’, I refer explicitly to what is now called ‘Turkish classical music’ and ‘Turkish folk music’ respectively. To avoid confusion, I reference the Gallipoli Campaign by its English name, well aware that other names for the Campaign exist in French, German and Turkish sources. I allude to the First World War simply as the War.

2. *All the King’s Men* was produced (1999) as a TV drama for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Based upon a historical study by Nigel McCrery entitled *The Vanished Battalion* (1992), the story was adapted for television by screenwriter Amanda Cullen.

3. See Scates (2006: 36–38) for similar accounts of grave desecration on the Gallipoli Peninsula. However, Reid, McGibbon and Midford (2016: 209) suggest that these accounts may have been exaggerated with some graveyards being cleaned up in anticipation of an inspection by a Papal envoy (1917).

4. Cited in McCrery (1992: 106). According to Storey (2020: 183), the official report by Pierrepont Edwards was dated September 23, 1919. Importantly, it was headed with a note ‘Not for Publication’. Storey states that a copy of the report was sent to Sandringham. It is not clear if this copy was sanitised for royal inspection. As McCrery (1992: 104–105) notes, different versions of the report appeared in contemporary newspapers.

5. In Britain, institutions offering programmes in post-conflict studies include the Universities of Aberdeen, Bradford and Nottingham. The Universities of Amsterdam, Oslo and Upsala to name a few offer equivalent programmes in Europe. In Turkey, Sabancı University is noteworthy for offering postgraduate degrees in conflict and conflict resolution. It has also published relevant scholarly outputs. This institution has hosted scholars who are specialists in post-conflict issues that have emerged in Turkey’s ‘tea cup’ wars, for example in Cyprus and Syria.

6. See Reid, McGibbon and Midford (2016) for an in-depth study of the history of commemoration on the Gallipoli Peninsula from the ANZAC perspective. See, also, Atabay, Körpe and Erat (2016) for an equivalent history from the Turkish perspective.

7. I was in Turkey on 24 April 2015 when the centennial commemoration of the Gallipoli landings was held. Not having an official pass to visit the Peninsula, I watched the complete ceremony on the national television channel, TRT 1. Although I recorded the whole event, a version of the ceremony was made available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqcqp6zappk (accessed 26 April 2015). Unfortunately, this video is no longer available.

8. For an overview of centenary commemorations in Turkey see Maksudyan (2019).

9. The whole speech by Mehmet Görmez can be found on the official website of the Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı at the following web address: www.diyanet.gov.tr (accessed 24 October 2015).

10. Ottomanism (*Osmanlık)* and Islamism (*İslâmcılık*) were two terms employed during the late-Ottoman period to represent two distinct ideological positions, the former being pluralistic with respect to religious observance and the latter being partisan with respect to religious affiliation. Along with the nationalist position called ‘Turkism’ (*Türkçülük*), the two terms were famously defined in a newspaper article (1904) by Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) entitled: ‘Three Types of Politics’ (‘Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset’). Noteworthy here is the way in which Erdoğan has conflated Ottomanism with Islamism in his search for a unified imperial and religious identity by way of the contentious term ‘neo-Ottomanism’ (*neo-Osmanlık*). See O’Connell (2017: 127–155) for an extended discussion of these terms.

11. As I show elsewhere (see O’Connell 2017: 11–12), the Janissary band in the past was not simply concerned with military conquest and religious observance. From contemporary illustrations by the artist Levnî (d. 1732), the ensemble accompanied outdoor festivities such as sports events and hunting parties (see, also, Atıl [2000]). The band performed at guild parades and for dancing boys. The troupe sometimes featured tambourine players (*dairezrens*), musicians who probably also performed as vocalists. While some scholars have distinguished between an official (*resmi*) and an unofficial (*gayri resmi*) ensemble (see, for example, Sanlıkol [2011]), it is clear that the Janissary band had a wider remit in the past than in the present.
12. See Kant (2015) for a consideration of contested memories as they relate to the centennial commemoration of the Gallipoli Campaign. Like me, she shows how the ceremony, which celebrates the beginning of a national modernity (in the guise of Atatürk), is being replaced by a ritual that commemorates the end of an imperial tradition (in the guise of Erdoğan). She also highlights the issues surrounding the date of the centennial commemoration, it being held on 24 April (2015) instead of 25 April (2015).

13. The videoclip entitled ‘Şehitlerimize Selâm Olsun’ is available online at the following web address: www.dailymotion.com/video/x2tdv8j (accessed 4 July 2020). Because my analysis of the televised entr’acte is recent, I use the present tense; this despite the original broadcast taking place on 24 April 2015.

14. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Gemisi (‘Turkish Republic Ship’).


17. çiğerlerim çürüdü kan kusa kusa.
18. al kan olmuş suları.


20. Çanakkale Marşı has a catalogue number (13385). As I calculate with reference to contemporary recordings by Orfeon Records (see O’Connell 2017: 60 n. 16), this would indicate that the piece was recorded after the foundation of the Turkish Republic (1923).

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