



## How female directors help firms to attain optimal cash holdings

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### ABSTRACT

Is female board representation helpful for firms attaining optimal cash holdings? We address this question using data on 1163 US-listed firms for 2000–2017. We show that if there are more female directors on firm boards, ceteris paribus, there is no effect on excess cash holdings implying that female directors are not inclined to be particularly cautious or optimistic. However, in the presence of overly confident CEOs, having more female directors on the board counteracts the tendency of such CEOs to reduce cash holding below an optimal level. Thus, female board representation enhances corporate decision making through effective monitoring and thus, taming CEOs' biased behavior.

### 1. Introduction

Motivated by the growing pressure from regulators and societies, firms around the world are increasing their female board representation.<sup>1</sup> To assess whether gender-diverse boards are influential, the majority of studies focus on firm performance, value, and risk taking (e.g., Adams & Funk, 2012; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Liu & Mauer, 2011). Further, there is a rapidly growing body of literature which investigates whether female board representation influences firms' corporate outcomes and through which governance channels this is achieved (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Miller & Triana, 2009). The key message from these studies is that female board representation impacts several firm policies (i.e., merger and acquisitions, investment, and innovation), mainly through effective monitoring.

Our main objective in this study is to examine how female board representation affects the firms' excess cash holdings. We provide a broad picture by studying both the direct and indirect effect of female board representation on the firm's corporate policies. We see that if

there are more female directors on firm boards, ceteris paribus, there is no effect on excess cash holdings implying that female directors are not inclined to be overly cautious or optimistic. However, if we focus attention on the behavior of overconfident CEOs in the presence of female directors, we see that having female directors on the board can influence a firm's cash holding policy (i.e. excess cash) by moderating the CEO's overconfidence.

Within their overall object of improving enterprise value, determining the level of a firm's cash holding is a very important decision for directors. In the broadest terms, the amount of cash held constrains the firm's future investment opportunities and also influences the bankruptcy risk of the firm. At any given time, the cash held by a particular firm is the consequence of past firm activities such as operation, investment, and financing as the cash at time  $t$  is equal to the cash at time  $t-1$  plus the cash flows at time  $t$ . Although the level of cash in any given firm is somewhat dependent on the history of that firm, the literature on cash holdings has extensively identified the general determinants of the cash level in firms (Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999) proposing several hypotheses to justify the

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<sup>1</sup> As part of corporate governance reforms around the world to increase the number of female board representations, different types of measures are introduced from mandatory regulations (e.g., Belgium – 2006, France - 2011, Norway - 2011, and Italy – 2015) to general recommendations (UK - 2011). For more details see e.g., Isidro and Sobral (2015) and Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015).

findings.<sup>2</sup> More recently, a few studies shift their attention to examine the effect of cash in excess of the level, i.e. excess cash, on the firm's value. The emphasis on excess cash is due to firms' recent and continuous accumulation of cash reserves (Bates et al., 2009; Bates, Chang, & Chi, 2018) and the fact that excess cash is the most easily accessible form of cash for the use of managers and major shareholders (Schauten, Van Dijk, & Van Der Waal, 2013). Moreover, excess cash also has the potential to capture information about a firm's future raw and abnormal stock returns, risk, investment, and profitability (Simutin, 2010).

Studies on the relation between excess cash holding and firm value provide relatively mixed evidence. The theory of excess cash flow argues that excess cash decreases firm value because managers use it to pursue their own objectives at the shareholders' expense (Jensen, 1986). Simutin (2010) finds that firms with excess cash invest considerably more in the future but do not experience strong future profitability compared to their low-cash peers. Hence, Simutin (2010) argues that excess cash holdings proxy for risky growth opportunity. Several other studies discuss that excess cash can be regarded as a cushion for any shortfall in future cash flows (Bates et al., 2009) or it can be used to reduce the reliance on costly external financing while funding future investments (Acharya, Almeida, & Campello, 2007; Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004). Furthermore, Asem and Alam (2014) show that investors' outlook for the firm's prospect determines the relation between excess cash and firm's value. Huang and Mazouz (2018) suggest that excess cash holding indirectly affects firm value through its impact on stock liquidity. They find that excess cash increases trading activity and reduces the liquidity premium required by investors.

Despite the extensive literature on cash and excess cash holding levels, most of the suggested determinants are firm level characteristics. A recently growing literature attempts to investigate the effect of several managerial traits and behavioral biases on the level (Deshmukh, Goel, & Howe, 2018; Huang-Meier, Lambertides, & Steeley, 2016), value (Aktas, Louca, & Petmezas, 2019), and speed of adjustment (El Kalak, Goergen, & Guney, 2020) of cash holdings. Only a very limited body of work has looked at the direct impact of female directors on cash holdings. A recent study by Atif, Liu, and Huang (2019) shows that female directors play a role in affecting the firm's corporate cash holdings levels. They report a negative relationship between female directors and cash holding levels. A much more extensively researched behavioral bias related to cash holding levels is CEO overconfidence. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their firms' future cash flow<sup>3</sup> leading them to view their firms as being undervalued by the market (Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). Hence, these overconfident CEOs perceive external financing to be overly costly and rely more on internal funding to finance their investment.<sup>4</sup> Relative to rational CEOs, overconfident CEOs are found to hold more valuable cash (Aktas et al., 2019) and overinvest when abundant internal funds are available (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). They also engage in value-destroying mergers and acquisitions (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Malmendier & Tate, 2008), invest more in innovation (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012), and earn substantially lower abnormal returns post share repurchase announcements

(Andreou, Cooper, De Olalla Lopez, & Louca, 2018). More importantly, overconfident CEOs are found to hold 24% less cash, save less cash out of current cash flow, and hold less cash to fund the firm's growth opportunities relative to their rational counterparts (Deshmukh et al., 2018). Deshmukh et al., 2018 argue, building on a trade-off model, that overconfident CEOs perceive external financing to be unduly costly and expect this cost to decrease in the future as investors learn the true value of the (undervalued) firm. Therefore, these CEOs delay financing investments with external money and rely more on internal funds, leading to lower cash levels. Contrary to these findings, Huang-Meier et al. (2016) report significant differences in cash holding levels between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. They find that overconfident managers hold more cash for future growth opportunities and their precautionary demand for cash is less than that of non-overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, conditioning managerial overconfidence on gender, Zeng and Wang (2015) find that female CEOs of Chinese-listed firms are associated with higher levels of cash holdings compared to male CEOs. This indicates that female CEOs are more conservative (more concerned with the precautionary motive and less about the opportunity cost of cash) than male CEOs.

The literature on corporate governance indicates that one of the main roles of corporate boards is to monitor and help managers to make better strategic decisions (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Graham, Hazarika, & Narasimhan, 2011; Helland & Sykuta, 2004). Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) find evidence that board members are mainly characterized as active monitors of top management. In particular, a strong and independent board of directors helps overconfident CEOs in making better acquisition decisions (Kolasinski & Li, 2013) and reduces investment and risk exposure (Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, & Nanda, 2015). More recently, an emerging strand of literature focuses on the effects of female directors on males at the executive and directorship levels.<sup>5</sup> For example, building on the monitoring effect hypothesis where the increase of female directors is viewed as a better governance mechanism, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that gender-diverse boards provide better monitoring on firm's decisions. They find that firms with more female directors are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock price performance. Chen, Leung, Song, and Goergen (2019) show that increased female board representation plays a governance role through a moderating effect on the CEOs' overconfidence where this change in board structure is sufficiently strong to affect the firm's investment and M&A decisions. Banerjee, Masulis, and Upadhyay (2018) also suggest that appointing an independent female director helps to bring overconfident CEOs' capital expenditure decisions closer to their non-overconfident counterparts. Main, Gonzalez, and Sila (2018) argue that increased gender equality on the board results in positive changes in male directors' behaviors. They find that male directors, who work alongside women directors on the board within their directorship network, engage in fewer risk-taking decisions, exhibit greater personal responsibility, and deliver improved CEO accountability.

Gender diversity acts as a corporate governance tool, so that more gender-diverse boards increase the monitoring on CEOs because female directors are found to be more effective monitors than male directors leading to higher monitoring on CEOs (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In addition, the presence of female directors leads male CEOs to adjust their biased behavior, i.e., overconfidence, to what is an appropriate

<sup>2</sup> Some of these hypotheses are: (i) the transaction motive (Meltzer, 1963); (ii) the precautionary motive (Bates et al., 2009); (iii) the agency motive (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Jensen, 1986); (iv) the financial constraints motive (Almeida et al., 2004); (v) the tax motive (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007); (vi) the diversification motive (Duchin, 2010); and (vii) the product market competitiveness motive (Fresard, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Overconfidence leads to underestimation of risks or overestimation of gains. In this study, we focus on the latter definition in line with previous work in behavioral finance. For more details, see Heaton (2002), Hackbarth (2008), and Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013).

<sup>4</sup> For further details, see Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier et al. (2011), and Aktas et al. (2019).

<sup>5</sup> The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and the notion of social influence (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Latané, 1981) argue that an individual's behavior is conditioned by the subjective norms and social context in which they find themselves. This theory helps explaining whether the behavior of male CEOs, i.e. overconfidence, could be affected by the presence and the behavior of female board directors.

one, i.e., rational behavior.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, we argue that female board representation reduces the CEO's overconfidence about investment strategies and the firm's cash flow, which results in fewer aggressive growth projects and more reliance on external financing. Subsequently, the firm's excess cash level increases.

Given the literature above we develop hypotheses to test how female board representation effects excess cash holdings. Initially we assume that systematic departures from the excess cash levels held by firms with equivalent characteristics which are associated with management characteristics will be suboptimal. Given the evidence that gender-diverse boards are associated with better corporate governance we initially hypothesize that, *ceteris paribus*, there should be no significant association between female board representation and excess cash holdings. However, if overconfident CEOs hold sub-optimal levels of cash we hypothesize that female board representation should act in a way to move cash holdings to more optimal levels.<sup>7</sup> Given prior findings in the literature, we expect companies with overconfident CEOs to hold significantly less cash than held by similar companies without overconfident CEOs and the presence of greater female board representation in such companies to mitigate this issue by causing more excess cash to be held.

To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of 1163 non-financial US-listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2017. We conduct panel OLS regressions along with various other models and analyses to address potential endogeneity concerns, i.e. instrumental variable (IV) model, difference-in-difference model, OLS regressions using propensity score matching, and dynamic GMM regressions. Controlling for firm and year fixed effects, as well as, other firm, CEO, and board characteristics, our analyses provide strong evidence supporting our hypotheses. First, as expected, we find that greater female board representation, unconditional on other factors does not have a significant effect on the excess cash holdings of firms. In line with prior literature, we find that CEO overconfidence reduces the firm's excess cash holding. However, when we interact CEO overconfidence with female board representation, our results show a significantly positive association between the interaction term and excess cash holdings. This finding indicates that the presence of female directors on the board alleviates the CEO's overconfidence and leads to an increase in excess cash levels. The results are robust to alternative econometric specifications, measures of female board representation, and CEO overconfidence. Further, we attempt to identify the channels through which this increase occurs. We find that female directors in the presence of overconfident CEOs tend to increase the firm's operating profit while decreasing its capital expenditures.

In further analyses, we test whether the increase in excess cash holdings due to female directors is associated with higher benefits to shareholders. Using a modified version of [Faulkender and Wang's \(2006\)](#) model, we find that an increase in female representation significantly increases the value of a dollar of cash both economically and statistically, conditional on having an overconfident CEO. Finally, we investigate whether the presence of female directors reduces the CEOs' biased beliefs regarding the firms' excess cash holdings when cash flow increases. First, we find that more female directors on the board increase the firm's savings of excess cash holdings out of an extra dollar of cash flow, conditional on the firm being managed by the overconfident CEO. Second, we show that female board representation continues to play a

role in taming the CEO's overconfidence by altering the CEO's behavior and it increases excess cash holdings even when the firm is in a sub-optimal financial position.

This paper contributes to the literature on female board representation, excess cash holding and CEO overconfidence. While several studies test the direct relation between female directors on the board and corporate outcomes ([Adams & Ferreira, 2009](#); [Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011](#)), we further complement these studies by focusing on excess cash holdings and the mechanism by which female directors influence these. In doing this we introduce an additional phenomenon, i.e. CEO overconfidence, and investigate the indirect role of female board representation on the firm's top management and how this could change the corporate decisions. More precisely, our results indicate that the presence of female directors acts as an effective monitoring tool in reducing the CEO overconfidence through which it changes the decisions on the firms' excess cash holding.

Our paper, additionally, contributes to the CEO overconfidence literature by building on the findings of [Chen et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Banerjee et al. \(2018\)](#) in that overconfidence behavior can be tamed and monitored by providing a simple corrective governance mechanism, i.e., better female board representation. Both [Chen et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Banerjee et al. \(2018\)](#) find that the presence of female directors is associated with significant improvements in acquisition deals and firm performance, as well as, a reduction in aggressive investments and firm-specific risk, conditional on having an overconfident CEO. Further extending their studies, we show that the increase in female board representation is also associated with a significant increase in the relation between overconfident CEOs and the firms' excess cash holding.

Finally, our findings, in line with [Chen et al. \(2019\)](#), provide a channel explaining the firm's excess cash holdings, namely "monitoring effect by female board representation". While [Deshmukh et al. \(2018\)](#) provide evidence that firms with the overconfident CEO hold less cash compared to their rational counterparts, they did not take into consideration how the cash holding decisions of these overconfident CEOs would have changed given the presence of female directors on board. In addition, a recent study by [Atif et al. \(2019\)](#) shows that female directors play a role in affecting the firm's corporate cash holdings levels. They report a negative relationship between female directors and cash holding levels.

Our focus overlaps with their study, yet our paper differs from theirs based on the following criteria: First, they define cash holdings in nominal terms as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets rather than by reference to what can be considered an optimal level, while we use the level of excess cash holdings which can be considered to be based on an optimal level of cash calculated by reference to firms with similar characteristics. Second, we identify the main channels through which female directors influence excess cash holdings. Third, while they assume managers to be rational, we relax this assumption and test how female directors affect cash holdings in the presence of biased managerial behavior, i.e., overconfidence. Finally, we use a different sample and time period compared to theirs.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample, how we measure our variables and shows the empirical model used for hypothesis testing. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics and discusses the main results. Section 4 addresses endogeneity concerns. Section 5 reports the results of our robustness tests and further analyses. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. Data selection and empirical design

### 2.1. Data sample

The data sample of firms comes from Compustat and is based on all available data for US-listed firms on AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ. To avoid any survivorship bias in the data we include both active and inactive publicly traded firms. Financial firms and the utilities are

<sup>6</sup> In addition to the previously cited literature, see [Levi et al. \(2014\)](#) for a good discussion on the reasons why females are less overconfident than males.

<sup>7</sup> One of the main criticisms regarding the potential influence by female directors on firm policies is that the female directors are the minority on the board and it is unlikely they can have a considerable impact on a firm's decisions ([Adams & Ferreira, 2009](#); [Farrell & Hersch, 2005](#); [Kanter, 1977](#)). However, in this case we examine a possible indirect effect of female board representation on firm's excess cash through the influence on the overconfident CEO who has the power to determine firm policies.

excluded because these firms operate in different regulatory supervisions. Further, we restrict our sample to firms with headquarters in the US. We require total assets to have a greater value than capital expenditures, and both to have positive values. We drop observations where total liabilities are greater than total assets, and where the sum of long-term and short-term debt is greater than total assets. We use CRSP, IRRC/RiskMetrics, and ExecuComp databases for data on stock returns, director characteristics, managerial overconfidence and CEO characteristics, respectively. To construct the CEO overconfidence measure we use CEO option compensation variables; hence, we limit our sample to firms with available CEO option data and remove any firms without reported option data, following Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011). All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to reduce the effects of outliers. Our final data sample consists of 8017 observations across 1163 firms between 2000 and 2017.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.2. Test variables

We measure female board representation in several ways. We use the equally weighted fraction of total (outsider) female directors on the board, *FemaleRatio* (*FIndepRatio*), which is calculated as the number of total (outsider) female directors divided by the total number of (outsider) directors on the board (Gul et al., 2011; Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Also, we use the tenure weighted fraction of female directors, *TWFemaleRatio*, which is the weighted fraction of female directors with the weights being the tenure of each female director relative to the total board tenure (Chen et al., 2019; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013).

Our second key variable is the CEO overconfidence. A commonly

$$Cash_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CF_i + \beta_2 Leverage_i + \beta_3 MTB_i + \beta_4 Size_i + \beta_5 NWC_i + \beta_6 CAPEX_i + \beta_7 DIV_i + \beta_8 R\&D_i + \beta_9 IndustrySigma_i + \beta_{10} Acquisition_i + \beta_{11} Age_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

used measure for the CEO's level of confidence is the option-based measure (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). We measure the level of the CEO's confidence by using the value of his unexercised but exercisable options known as CEO option moneyness, *OptionMoneyness*. To construct this variable we follow the method by Campbell et al. (2011). First, we calculate the realizable value per option as the ratio of the total realizable value of exercisable options to the number of exercisable options. Second, we subtract the realizable value per option from the fiscal-year-end stock price to obtain an estimate of the average exercise price of options. Finally, to compute the average percentage moneyness of the options, we divide the realizable value per option by the estimated average exercise price. We use this continuous time-variant variable as a measure of CEO confidence because previous literature argue that overconfidence varies with past experience and performance (Billett & Qian, 2008; Hilary & Menzly, 2006) and we also try to capture the interaction effect of the variation between CEO overconfidence and female board representation over time.

One way to measure the effect of female directors on excess cash holdings, by mitigating the CEO's biased behavior (overconfidence), is to interact the CEO confidence measure, i.e. the option-based measure (*OptionMoneyness*), with the female board representation measure and regress the firm's excess cash variable on this interaction term. Given the differences in growth prospects and industry-wide practices (e.g., work attitudes, motivation techniques, and managerial practices) could affect

<sup>8</sup> IRRC/RiskMetrics data is available from 1996. However, our sample period starts from 2000 because of high number of missing observations for few variables in our model between 1996 and 2000.

individual behavior (Rasmussen & Rauner, 2012), it could be argued that the propensity of CEOs to hold biased beliefs could differ across industries. Therefore, we follow Chen et al., 2019 and construct an industry-based measure of the CEO overconfidence, *Overconfidence*, to capture the cross-industry differences in overconfidence. This is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the fraction of overconfident CEOs for an industry in that year (using the 2-digit SIC code) is greater than the sample median across all industries, and zero otherwise, with overconfident CEOs being those who hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money.

The choice of this variable is motivated by previous studies who find that individual's behavior could vary considerably across industries due to differences in industry-wide work practices and growth prospects (Form, 1979). Furthermore, field studies also find evidence that overconfidence behavior has a higher propensity to develop in industries where the decision-making process is non-repetitive and unclear which leads to difficulties in forming decisions based on previous actions (Simon & Houghton, 2003). Therefore, the dispersion of overconfidence among CEOs varies considerably across industries (Chen et al., 2019; Ferris, Jayaraman, & Sabherwal, 2013).

## 2.3. Dependent variable

Our goal in this paper is to examine whether and how female directors on the board affects the excess cash holdings of firms. Thus, we follow Bates et al. (2009) and estimate, for each year, the excess cash holding for firm *i* as the residual of the following cross-sectional regression:

Where *Cash* is the cash and short-term cash scaled by total assets; *CF* is earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes, but before depreciation scaled by total assets; *Leverage* is the ratio of total debt to net assets; *MTB* is the market value of assets scaled by total assets; *Size* is the natural log of total assets; *NWC* is net working capital (net of cash), scaled by total assets; *CAPEX* is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; *DIV* is a dummy variable with a value of one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise; *R&D* is the research and development expenditures scaled by total assets; *IndustrySigma* is industry cash flow risk, defined as the mean of the ratio of the standard deviations of cash flows to the total assets over 20 years for firms in the same industry (by 2-digit SIC code); *Acquisition* is the value of acquisitions; and *Age* is the natural logarithm of firm age. The residual  $\varepsilon_i$  is used as a proxy for firm *i*'s excess cash (*ExCash*) in a given year.

## 2.4. Control variables

Following the cash and corporate governance literature, we use several control variables. *LnSales* is the natural logarithm of net sales; *Debt-to-Equity* is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities scaled by the market value of equity; *ROA* is the return of assets calculated as earnings before interests and tax scaled by total assets; *ReturnVol* is the standard deviation of monthly equally weighted stock returns; *R&DDummy* is a dummy that is equal to one if a firm invests in R&D that year, and zero otherwise; *Dividend* is dividends scaled by the market



**Table 1**  
Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile
ExCash	0.035	9.158	-5.683	-0.903	4.751
Overconfidence	0.370	0.483	0.000	0.000	1.000
FemaleRatio	0.114	0.102	0.000	0.111	0.182
FIndepRatio	0.136	0.128	0.000	0.143	0.222
TWFemaleRatio	0.092	0.110	0.000	0.056	0.148
Sales (in \$ Million)	6177	14,106	629.1	1624	4803
Debt-to-Equity	0.349	0.568	0.036	0.171	0.397
ROA	0.098	0.086	0.057	0.096	0.143
ReturnVol	0.049	0.020	0.034	0.042	0.065
R&DDummy	0.534	0.499	0.000	1.000	1.000
Dividend	0.013	0.034	0.000	0.005	0.018
IndepRatio	0.722	0.163	0.625	0.750	0.857
Busy	0.484	0.245	0.300	0.500	0.667
Inactive	0.012	0.043	0.000	0.000	0.000
BoardSize	8.899	2.421	7.000	9.000	10.000
CEOTenure	8.518	7.551	3.000	6.000	11.000
CEOOwnership	0.022	0.057	0.001	0.003	0.012
Duality	0.431	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000

This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables. The time span for this study is between 2000 and 2017. There are 8017 observations across 1163 firms in this study. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *ExCash* (in %) is the residual of a cross-sectional regression of cash holdings on firm characteristics (Eq. (1)). *Overconfidence* is a dummy that equals one if the average CEO option moneyness for the industry in that year (using the 2-digit SIC code) is greater than the median average CEO option moneyness across all industries. *FemaleRatio* is the number of female directors on the board scaled by the board size. *FIndepRatio* is the number of outsider female-directors on the board scaled by the number of all outsider directors on the board. *TWFemaleRatio* is the weighted fraction of female directors with the weights being the tenure of each female director relative to the total board tenure. *LnSales* is the natural logarithm of net sales. *Debt-to-Equity* is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities scaled by the market value of equity. *ROA* is the return of assets calculated as earnings before interests and tax scaled by total assets. *ReturnVol* is the standard deviation of monthly equally weighted stock returns. *R&DDummy* is a dummy that is equal to one if a firm invests in R&D that year, and zero otherwise. *Dividend* is dividends scaled by the market value of equity. *IndepRatio* is the number of outsider directors on the board scaled by the board size. *Busy* is the number of directors on the board who also sit on the board of other firms scaled by the board size. *Inactive* is the number of directors on the board who attend less than 75% of the board meetings in that year scaled by the board size. *LnBoardSize* is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. *CEOTenure* is the number of years the CEO has been in position. *CEOOwnership* is the fraction of total shares outstanding owned by the CEO. *Duality* is a dummy that is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board.

value of equity; *IndepRatio* is the number of outsider directors on the board scaled by the board size; *Busy*<sup>9</sup> is the number of directors on the board who also sit on the board of other firms scaled by the board size; *Inactive* is the number of directors on the board who attend less than 75% of the board meetings in that year scaled by the board size; *LnBoardSize* is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board; *CEOTenure* is the number of years the CEO has been in position; *CEOOwnership* is the fraction of total shares outstanding owned by the CEO; *Duality* is a dummy that is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board.

## 2.5. Empirical methodology

The period for the main analysis is 2000–2017. To test the main hypotheses (i.e. whether and how female representation on the board affects excess cash held by firms), we use the following panel fixed-effects (FE) OLS regression model:

$$ExCash_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} \times Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \Theta X_{i,t-1} + \eta_i + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \quad (2)$$

<sup>9</sup> We obtain virtually similar results if we use the definition by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who define a busy board if 50% of the directors on the board serve on three or more other boards.


where  $ExCash_{i,t}$  is excess cash holding of firm  $i$  in year  $t$ . *Female Representation* $_{i,t-1}$  denotes three different “female ratio” variables for firm  $i$  in year  $t-1$ : *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio*; *Overconfidence* $_{i,t-1}$  is the dummy for high overconfidence intensity in that industry where the firm operates.  $X_{i,t-1}$  is a vector of control variables (i.e., *LnSales*, *Debt-to-Equity*, *ROA*, *ReturnVol*, *R&DDummy*, *Dividend*, *IndepRatio*, *Busy*, *Inactive*, *LnBoardSize*, *CEOTenure*, *CEOOwnership*, and *Duality*);  $\eta_i$  represents firm fixed effects while  $\phi_t$  denotes year fixed effects to account for any time trends in cash holdings (Bates et al., 2018); All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

The fixed-effects approach is used in this model because we compare firms regarding the relation between female directors and firm’s excess cash, and FE controls for the omitted variables that differ between firms but are constant over time. After conducting the Hausman test, we decide to use the fixed-effects approach for the analyses.


## 3. Main results

### 3.1. Descriptive statistics

The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that, on average, 11.4% of the firms’ boards were comprised of female directors and the average tenure weighted female ratio is 9.2%. On average, 13.6% of all outsider



**Fig. 1.** Female Board Representation and Excess Cash. This figure shows the distribution of female board representation and excess cash levels across years. *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio* describe the fraction of female directors on the board. *ExCash* gives the level of excess cash holdings per year. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix.



**Fig. 2.** Excess Cash Level For Different Female Ratio Groups. This figure shows the distribution of excess cash across years for firms belonging to different *FemaleRatio* groups. A firm is in the high (low) female ratio group if the *FemaleRatio* of that firm is above (below) median value of *FemaleRatio* across all firms. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix.

directors on the board are female directors. The average female ratio in our sample (11.4%) is slightly higher than those of [Chen et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Banerjee et al. \(2018\)](#) who report averages of 10.4% and 10.3% for their female directors ratios, respectively. The ratio of CEO overconfidence (*Overconfidence*) indicates that 37% of our sample belongs to industries where CEOs are likely to suffer from overconfidence about their firm’s prospects. The mean value of our dependent variable (*ExCash*) shows that an average firm holds a positive excess cash of 0.035% which is in line with previous literature such as [Huang and Mazouz \(2018\)](#). As per firm characteristics, on average, firms have 9.8% of return on assets (ROA), 4.9% of return volatility, 1.3% of dividends, and 53.4% of firms invest in R&D. In addition, there are two mean values which should be highlighted namely Sales (in \$millions) and debt-to-equity ratio. The average firm in our sample has annual sales of \$6177 million and a debt-to-equity ratio of 34.9%. These mean values are relatively large (about the 75th percentile). One possible explanation

for this right-skewed distribution is that our sample contains several larger firms. As to the CEO and board characteristics, we find that the CEO, on average, holds 2.2% of the firm’s outstanding shares and worked in that position for 8.5 years. The average board size is approximately 9 board members, 72% of them are outsider directors. Finally, around half of the board members (48.5%) are busy directors who sit on the boards of other firms and just over 1% of the board members (1.2%) are inactive members who are found to attend less than 75% of the board meetings.

[Fig. 1](#) provides a visual summary of the cross-sectional yearly distribution of our excess cash and female board representation measures over the sample period. The solid line represents the mean values of *ExCash*. [Fig. 1](#) shows that excess cash levels are affected by major financial crisis where firms use their excess cash as a buffer against any liquidity shortfalls. There is a dramatic decline in the level of excess cash held by US firms from 2000 to 2002 which represents the technology

**Table 2**  
Effect of female board representation on excess cash through CEO overconfidence.

Variables:	ExCash		
	I	II	III
	0.049*** (0.019)		
FemaleRatio × Overconfidence	-0.004 (0.020)		
FemaleRatio		0.044*** (0.017)	
FIndepRatio × Overconfidence		-0.017 (0.015)	
FIndepRatio			0.043** (0.021)
TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence			0.022 (0.020)
TWFemaleRatio			-0.016*** (0.003)
Overconfidence	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.003)
	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)
LnSales	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Debt-to-Equity	0.152*** (0.023)	0.152*** (0.024)	0.153*** (0.024)
ROA	5.845 (11.130)	6.590 (11.030)	5.179 (11.380)
ReturnVol	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
R&DDummy	0.022 (0.023)	0.024 (0.023)	0.021 (0.023)
Dividend	0.012 (0.015)	0.013 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)
IndepRatio	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
Busy	0.021 (0.025)	0.022 (0.025)	0.021 (0.025)
Inactive	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)
LnBoardSize	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.031)
CEOTenure	0.003 (0.060)	0.004 (0.060)	0.002 (0.061)
CEOOwnership	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Duality	-0.376 (0.822)	-0.433 (0.814)	-0.329 (0.840)
Constant	(0.822)	(0.814)	(0.840)
Year and Firm Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	8017	8017	8017
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027	0.027	0.028

This table reports analysis estimates for FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, TWFemaleRatio and their interaction with Overconfidence along with LnSales, Debt-to-Equity, ROA, ReturnVol, R&DDummy, Dividend, IndepRatio, Busy, Inactive, LnBoardSize, CEOTenure, CEOOwnership, and Duality as control variables. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

bubble period with a drop from around 20% to 2.2%. Another decline is during the financial crisis of 2007 where it reached the lowest level of -8.7%. Later, it fluctuates until the year 2016 with a level of 7.9%. As per the female board representation measures, we can observe a steady increase in the ratios of female directors on boards (dotted lines) over the whole sample period with an increase from around 8.2%, 10.7%, and 6.1% in year 2000 to 18%, 20.6%, and 14% in year 2017 for FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, and TWFemaleRatio, respectively. One noticeable exception is the dramatic increase of our three main ratios between 2003

and 2004. This jump is due to the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2003 which mandates the enhancement of governance levels, among which is the increase in the female board representation.

Fig. 2 provides another perspective to our main variables of interest namely ExCash and female board representation measures.<sup>10</sup> In particular, it shows the yearly distribution of mean excess cash levels for two groups of firms with high (solid line) and low (dotted line) female board representation. An overall view provides preliminary evidence that firms with high presence of female directors hold, on average, higher levels of excess cash holdings compared to their counterpart firms with low presence of female directors, across the entire time period of our sample. Hence, Fig. 2 implies that there might be a positive association between excess cash levels and greater female board representation in firms with the overly confident CEO.

### 3.2. Main regression analysis

Table 2 presents the main analysis for the relation between female board representation and firm's excess cash.<sup>11</sup> In Column I, as hypothesized, FemaleRatio does not have any statistically significant estimates. A possible explanation is that the potential effect of female board representation cannot be observed when a rational CEO is present. As the rational CEO can take optimal decisions for the firm, the possible contribution by female directors is only marginal. Overconfidence has statistically significant and negative estimates that support our expectations and the findings in the literature (e.g., Deshmukh et al., 2018). Firms with an overconfident CEO have lower excess cash holdings (about 1.71% less). FemaleRatio × Overconfidence is the main variable of interest for our second hypothesis and denotes the female board representation in the firms with the overconfident CEO. Its positive and statistically significant estimate indicates that firms with higher female board representation have higher excess cash holdings when the CEO is overconfident. In particular, excess cash level increases by 0.49 percentage points (= 0.049 × 0.102) with a one-standard-deviation increase (about 10%) in FemaleRatio for the firms with the overconfident CEO.

This is an interesting finding because it suggests that having more female directors on the board not only stops the decline in excess cash due the overly confident CEO but also increases excess cash holdings in those firms. Consider the interpretation of the magnitude with an average firm in our sample that has nine board members, and one of them is a female director (see Table 1). Switching one of the male directors to a second female director would be associated with a 0.54 percentage points increase in excess cash (= 0.049 × (1/9)) when the firm has the overconfident CEO. Overall, the findings show the effect of female board representation on the increase in excess cash levels when an overconfident CEO is present.

Column II of Table 2 provides results with FIndepRatio. Similar to the previous result, the variable for female board representation, i.e. FIndepRatio, does not provide any statistically significant outcome. Statistically significant and negative estimate for Overconfidence indicates that an overconfident CEO decreases excess cash holdings in firms by 1.76 percentage points. Focusing on the main explanatory variable for our second hypothesis, i.e. FIndepRatio × Overconfidence, we show that

<sup>10</sup> In this figure, we use FemaleRatio as a female board representation measure. In unreported figures, we observe similar patterns when using FIndepRatio and TWFemaleRatio.

<sup>11</sup> In Table B.1 in Appendix B, Column I provides evidence that CEO overconfidence has a negative impact on excess cash levels which is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Deshmukh et al., 2018) Furthermore, Columns II, III, and IV show that female board representation on its own does not have a strong impact on excess cash levels. These findings confirm our hypothesis that the effect of female directors on excess cash is only effective (significant) when the firm deviates from its optimal cash level due to an overly confident CEO.

excess cash level in firms increases as the fraction of independent female directors on the board increases when the firm's CEO is overconfident. Specifically, a 12.8% increase in *FIndepRatio* is associated with a 0.56 percentage points ( $= 0.044 \times 0.128$ ) increase in the excess cash level when the overconfident CEO is present. In other words, adding a second female outsider director on the board of seven directors by replacing one male outsider director (see Table 1) leads to a jump of 0.63 percentage points ( $= 0.044 \times (1/7)$ ) in excess cash when the firm is managed by an overconfident CEO. These findings imply how female outsider directors can increase excess cash holdings for firms with overconfident managers.

The results for *TWFemaleRatio* are given in Column III, Table 2. As before, *TWFemaleRatio* is not significant. *Overconfidence* has a significant and negative estimate that suggests firms with an overconfident CEO have less excess cash. While the result for *TWFemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence* indicates that excess cash holdings increase by 0.47 percentage points ( $= 0.043 \times 0.110$ ) for firms with the overconfident CEO when *TWFemaleRatio* increases by one-standard-deviation (about 11%). Particularly, the increase in excess cash is about 0.39 percentage points ( $= 0.043 \times (1/11)$ ) for firms with an overly confident CEO when the board with 11 directors replaces one tenured male director with a second tenured female director (see Table 1). Overall, these findings suggest that female directors on the board tame the overconfident CEO and help the CEO to take decisions leading to higher excess cash holdings in the firm.

Previous research documents the potential effect of industry on the firm's cash holdings policies. For example, Fresard (2010) shows that the degree of competition in industry significantly affects the firm's cash holdings. Therefore, to control for time-varying industry characteristics, we include the 10-K Text-based Network Industry Concentration (TNIC) in our model, following Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Additionally, we use industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. Further, we control for growth opportunities in our main model using five different measures suggested by Goyal, Kenneth, and Stanko (2002). Lastly, we exclude observations from year 2000 due to few firms with very high cash holding and rerun our main analyses. In these untabulated analyses, we obtain qualitatively similar results to our main findings.

### 3.3. Sources of cash

We show that female board representation, conditional on the presence of overconfident CEOs, increases the level of the firm's excess cash. Next, we attempt to identify the channels through which this increase occurs. We follow Jiang and Lie (2016) and Dessaint and Matray (2017) and examine six different ways which potentially explain the incremental effect of female board representation with overconfident CEOs on excess cash. Jiang and Lie (2016) and Dessaint and Matray (2017) argue that the increase in excess cash may come from: an increase in revenues (i.e. operating profits, sales growth) or new financing (debt or equity); or a decrease in net working capital requirements, debt requirements, investments (i.e. capital expenditures), dividends, or share repurchases.<sup>12</sup> Further, overconfident CEOs tend to rely more on internal as opposed to external financing (Malmendier et al., 2011) and engage in more capital expenditures and risky investments (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). These activities may induce them to dissipate more cash than non-overconfident CEOs. Meanwhile, female directors are found to reduce the level of aggressive investments and improve financial performance (Chen et al., 2019). Therefore, the presence of female directors may mitigate overconfident CEOs' tendency to spend excess cash through these channels. Subsequently, we examine the effect of the interaction term (female board representation measures and

overconfidence) on the changes in operating profits, capital expenditures, new financing, dividends, and share repurchases. We define *Operating Profit* as the operating income after depreciation over total revenues, *Capital Expenditures* is the firm's capital expenditures over total assets, *New Financing* is the issuance of long-term debt plus sale of new stocks scaled by equity market value, *Dividends* is the dividends paid scaled by the firm's market value of equity, *Share Repurchases* is the purchase of common and preferred stocks over last year's net income. The changes refer to the differences between the current and the next year.

Panel A of Table 3 provides the analyses regarding the changes in revenues and investments (i.e., capital expenditure). Columns I, II, and III show positive and statistically significant coefficients for the interaction terms between female board representation (*FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, or *TWFemaleRatio*) and *Overconfidence*, respectively. This indicates that female directors in the presence of overconfident CEOs tend to increase the firm's operating margin which may lead to an increase in excess cash. On average, the change in operating margin increases by 0.85 percentage points ( $= 0.083 \times 0.102$ ) with a one-standard-deviation increase (about 10%) in *FemaleRatio* for the firms with the overconfident CEO. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation in *FIndepRatio* and *TWFemaleRatio* is associated with a 0.70 percentage points ( $= 0.055 \times 0.128$ ) and 1.02 percentage points ( $= 0.093 \times 0.110$ ) increase in the change in operating margin when the overconfident CEO is present, respectively. Next, we examine whether female board representation, conditional on CEO overconfidence, increases excess cash through a decrease in capital expenditure channel. The coefficients of the interaction terms, in columns IV, V, and VI, are negative and statistically significant. Consistent with the expectations, these results suggest that the monitoring by female directors on the overconfident CEO reduces capital expenditure which can exacerbate excess cash level in the firm.

Panel B of Table 3 shows the analyses reflecting the firm's new financing decisions and payout policies. We find no evidence that, conditional on CEO overconfidence, female directors choose new investments (debt or equity) or payout policies (dividends or share repurchases) as potential channels to increase excess cash holdings.

## 4. Endogeneity analyses

Even though the results are in line with our hypotheses that female board representation does not have a conditional effect of excess cash holding levels but, for firms with overconfident CEOs, mitigates CEOs' overconfidence and lead them to increase firms' excess cash holding levels, it could be still argued that these results are biased as they are driven by the endogenous nature of board structure (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). First, one could argue that our results are driven by a reverse causality where overconfident CEOs have an influential role on the board member appointments; hence, they prefer an all-male board to avoid extra monitoring imposed by female directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). On the contrary, risk-averse female directors could self-select to serve on the board of firms led by rational CEOs with less aggressive strategies (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Second, our results could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. Some unobserved firm and CEO factors could be driving both the selection of female directors and the CEOs confidence level (Chen et al., 2019; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2018). To mitigate these endogeneity concerns, we use four approaches namely: (i) instrumental variable using 2-stage least square approach (2SLS); (ii) difference-in-difference model; (iii) propensity score matching; and (iv) dynamic GMM estimation method.

<sup>12</sup> In unreported analyses, we also explore other alternative channels, i.e. net working capital, sales growth, and debt retirement, and we do not find any statistically significant support for these channels.



**Table 3**  
Channels explaining the effect of female directors and CEO overconfidence on excess cash.

Panel A: Analyses Regarding Revenues and Investments									
	Change in Operating Margin ( $\Delta\text{OpMargin}$ )			Change in Capital Expenditures ( $\Delta\text{CapEx}$ )					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI			
FemaleRatio $\times$ Overconfidence	0.083*** (0.019)			-0.005* (0.003)					
FemaleRatio	-0.005 (0.014)			0.004 (0.003)					
FIndepRatio $\times$ Overconfidence		0.055*** (0.015)			-0.004* (0.002)				
FIndepRatio		0.011 (0.015)			0.006** (0.003)				
TWFemaleRatio $\times$ Overconfidence			0.093*** (0.036)			-0.011** (0.005)			
TWFemaleRatio			0.020* (0.012)			0.005** (0.002)			
Overconfidence	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)			
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES			
Year & Firm FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES			
Observations	7994	7994	7994	8017	8017	8017			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.201	0.201	0.202	0.055	0.049	0.061			

Panel B: Analyses Regarding New Financing, Dividends and Share Repurchases Policies									
	Change in New Financing ( $\Delta\text{NewFin}$ )			Change in Dividends ( $\Delta\text{Dividend}$ )			Change in Repurchases ( $\Delta\text{Repurchase}$ )		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
FemaleRatio $\times$ Overconfidence	0.005 (0.059)			-0.105 (0.127)			-0.625* (0.331)		
FemaleRatio	-0.058 (0.055)			0.225** (0.101)			0.297 (0.240)		
FIndepRatio $\times$ Overconfidence		0.011 (0.046)			-0.084 (0.098)			-0.457 (0.292)	
FIndepRatio		-0.091* (0.051)			0.156 (0.103)			0.230 (0.219)	
TWFemaleRatio $\times$ Overconfidence			0.027 (0.104)			-0.263 (0.229)			-0.111 (0.538)
TWFemaleRatio			-0.022 (0.042)			0.099 (0.089)			0.162 (0.181)
Overconfidence	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	0.075 (0.047)	0.065 (0.046)	0.007 (0.045)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year & Firm FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7968	7968	7968	7428	7428	7428	7891	7891	7891
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.037	0.037	0.037

This table reports estimates for *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, *TWFemaleRatio* and their interaction with *Overconfidence* along with control variables. The analyses examine which potential channels to excess cash can explain the relation between female directors, CEO overconfidence and excess cash. We use the changes in operating margin (operating income after depreciation over total revenues) and capital expenditures over total assets, in Panel A. Panel B includes changes in new financing (issuance of long-term debt plus sale of new stocks scaled by equity market value), dividends over last year's income, and repurchases (purchase of common and preferred stocks over last year's net income). The changes refer to the differences between the current and the next year. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Remaining variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. Control variables, year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

#### 4.1. Instrumental variable method

To be able to make a causal inference and address the issue that excess cash holdings and female board representation may be simultaneously determined, we follow Adams and Ferreira (2009), Levi et al. (2014), and Chen, Leung, and Goergen (2017) and use a similar instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we employ two different instrumental variables namely: (i) the female-to-male participation ratio; and (ii) the fraction of male directors linked to female directors. Our first instrumental variable, *FMRatio*, is calculated as the female participation ratio divided by the male participation ratio in the state where the firm has the headquarter. Female (male) participation ratio is measured as the percentage of the civilian non-institutional population of female (male) group in the civilian labor force. Firms in states where the female-to-male participation ratio is higher are more likely to find qualified female candidates for the board of directors due to access to larger talent pool. Hence, firms with headquarters in states where the

female-to-male participation ratio is high, are expected to have greater representation of women on the board. The data used to construct this variable is downloaded from the US Census Bureau website. Our second instrumental variable, *LinkedMRatio*, is the fraction of a firm's male directors who sit on other boards with at least one female director. The intuition behind using this instrument is that the more connected male directors are to women, the more female directors should be observed (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, the greater this fraction is, the greater the female board representation should be. Moreover, it is unlikely that *FMRatio* and *LinkedMRatio* affect excess cash holdings of firms, i.e. *ExCash*, directly. Hence, we believe that the exclusion restriction for these instruments is likely to be satisfied.

Given the main explanatory variable is the interaction between female board representation and *Overconfidence* in our analysis, we

**Table 4**  
First Instrumental Variable (IV) regression of excess cash on female board representation and CEO overconfidence.

	First Stage Regressions						Second Stage Regressions		
	FemaleRatio	FemaleRatio × Overconfidence	FIndepRatio	FIndepRatio × Overconfidence	TWFemaleRatio	TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence	ExCash	ExCash	ExCash
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
FMRatio × Overconfidence	0.048 (0.062)	0.511*** (0.053)	0.128* (0.077)	0.692*** (0.065)	0.067 (0.071)	0.538*** (0.053)			
FMRatio	0.198*** (0.038)	-0.092*** (0.010)	0.299*** (0.047)	-0.097*** (0.012)	0.211*** (0.044)	-0.094*** (0.010)			
Inst(FemaleRatio × Overconfidence)							0.177* (0.104)		
Inst(FemaleRatio)							0.113* (0.067)		
Inst(FIndepRatio × Overconfidence)								0.136* (0.081)	
Inst(FIndepRatio)								0.086 (0.054)	
Inst(TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence)									0.169* (0.101)
Inst(TWFemaleRatio)									0.294*** (0.089)
Overconfidence	-0.040 (0.050)	-0.303*** (0.043)	-0.108* (0.062)	-0.431*** (0.053)	-0.053 (0.057)	-0.350*** (0.043)	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.027*** (0.009)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year & Firm FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7616	7616	7616	7616	7616	7616	7616	7616	7616
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.267	0.505	0.227	0.480	0.230	0.402	0.641	0.641	0.642
Weak Inst. Test	151.32	142.38	152.72	161.09	79.71	138.83			
Under-Ident. Test	114.68	59.83	101.18	59.41	40.06	33.29			
Over-Ident. Test							0.619	0.567	0.810

This table reports IV regression estimates for Instrumented (FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, TWFemaleRatio), Instrumented (FemaleRatio × Overconfidence, FIndepRatio × Overconfidence, TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence), and control variables. Columns I-VI present the first-stage regressions of “female board representation” variables and their interactions with Overconfidence on FMRatio and FMRatio × Overconfidence as their instruments, respectively. FMRatio is the female participation divided by the male participation in the state where the firm has the headquarter. Columns VII-IX present the second-stage regressions of ExCash on Instrumented (FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, TWFemaleRatio) and Instrumented (FemaleRatio × Overconfidence, FIndepRatio × Overconfidence, TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence) from the first-stage regression. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Year and Firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. Test statistics for weak instruments, under- and over-identification are given. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

**Table 5**  
Second Instrumental Variable (IV) regression of excess cash on female board representation and CEO overconfidence.

	First Stage Regressions						Second Stage Regressions			
	FemaleRatio	FemaleRatio × Overconfidence	FIndepRatio	FIndepRatio × Overconfidence	TWFemaleRatio	TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence	ExCash	ExCash	ExCash	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	
LinkedMRatio × Overconfidence	−0.004 (0.009)	0.135*** (0.007)	−0.004 (0.011)	0.147*** (0.009)	−0.019* (0.011)	0.131*** (0.007)				
LinkedMRatio	0.061*** (0.008)	−0.029*** (0.004)	0.067*** (0.010)	−0.035*** (0.004)	0.064*** (0.010)	−0.036*** (0.004)				
Inst(FemaleRatio × Overconfidence) Inst(FemaleRatio)							0.093* (0.054)			
Inst(FIndepRatio × Overconfidence) Inst(FIndepRatio)								0.107** (0.051)		
Inst(TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence) Inst(TWFemaleRatio)									0.089* (0.049)	
									0.086** (0.044)	
										0.135*** (0.051)
										0.209*** (0.069)
Overconfidence	−0.001 (0.003)	0.078*** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.004)	0.094*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.055*** (0.002)	−0.021*** (0.007)	−0.022*** (0.007)	−0.022*** (0.006)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Year & Firm FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Observations	7352	7352	7352	7352	7352	7352	7352	7352	7352	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.272	0.540	0.227	0.505	0.233	0.436	0.649	0.649	0.650	
Weak Inst. Test	160.52	350.38	135.40	272.36	81.43	303.11				
Under-Ident. Test	127.68	109.23	113.91	94.30	57.58	94.12				
Over-Ident. Test							0.273	0.256	0.133	

This table reports IV regression estimates for Instrumented (FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, TWFemaleRatio), Instrumented (FemaleRatio × Overconfidence, FIndepRatio × Overconfidence, TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence), and control variables. Columns I–VI present the first-stage regressions of “female board representation” variables and their interactions with Overconfidence on LinkedMRatio and LinkedMRatio × Overconfidence as their instruments, respectively. LinkedMRatio is the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards with at least one female director. Columns VII–IX present the second-stage regressions of ExCash on Instrumented (FemaleRatio, FIndepRatio, TWFemaleRatio) and Instrumented (FemaleRatio × Overconfidence, FIndepRatio × Overconfidence, TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence) from the first-stage regression. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Year and Firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. Test statistics for weak instruments, under- and over-identification are given. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

address the concerns raised in [Atanasov and Black \(2017\)](#) regarding the IV regression.<sup>13</sup> We estimate the following panel regressions for each instrumental variable separately. In the first stage, we regress the variable for female board representation namely *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio* or *TWFemaleRatio* on the instrument, i.e. *FMRatio* (*LinkedMRatio*), along with *Overconfidence*, *FMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence* (*LinkedMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*), and the control variables used in our main analysis. In this first stage, we also instrument the interaction between female board representation and *Overconfidence* through *FMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence* (*LinkedMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*). Hence, we also regress this interaction term on the same set of variables described above with the only difference that the instrument is *FMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence* (*LinkedMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*), instead. In the second stage, we regress the excess cash level, i.e. *ExCash*, on the instrumented variable for female board representation, the instrumented interaction between female board representation and *Overconfidence*, along with *Overconfidence* and control variables. Similar to our previous analyses, all left hand-side variables are lagged by one year, and we include year and firm fixed effects in all regressions in both stages.

[Table 4](#) reports the results using *FMRatio* as the instrumental variable. Columns I–VI present the first-stage results. In Columns I, III and V, the instrument, i.e. *FMRatio*, provides statistically significant and positive results. These findings indicate that firms operating in states with high female-to-male participation ratio have more female directors on the board. Shifting the focus to Columns II, IV and VI, we find statistically significant and positive coefficient estimates for the instrument, i.e. *FMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*. These results suggest that the positive relation between female board representation and *FMRatio* holds considering the overconfident CEO. These first-stage results are consistent with the findings in literature.

Columns VII to IX summarize the second-stage results. In all specifications, the coefficient estimates for interaction terms remain consistently positive and statistically significant. For the average firm, a one-standard-deviation (about 4.8%) increase in the fraction of female directors on the board is associated with a 0.85 percentage points ( $= 0.177 \times 0.048$ ) jump in excess cash holdings when the CEO is overly confident. Moreover, the increase in *ExCash* is 0.73 percentage points ( $= 0.136 \times 0.054$ ) and 0.83 percentage points ( $= 0.169 \times 0.049$ ) respectively, considering the instrumented interaction terms with *FIndepRatio* and *TWFemaleRatio* in Columns VIII and IX.

The results using the fraction of male directors linked to female directors, *LinkedMRatio*, as an instrumental variable are reported in [Table 5](#). Similar to [Table 4](#), columns I–VI present the first-stage results. Consistent with the rationale behind this instrument, in Columns I, III and V, the instrument, i.e. *LinkedMRatio*, provides statistically significant and positive results. This suggests that the more connected male directors are to women, the more female directors are on boards. As per Columns II, IV and VI, we find statistically significant and positive coefficient estimates for the instrument, i.e. *LinkedMRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*. These findings indicate that the positive relation between female board representation and *LinkedMRatio* holds considering the overconfident CEO.

Columns VII to IX report the results for the second-stage regressions. All three regressions confirm the significant and positive effect of the fraction of female directors on excess cash holding conditional on CEO overconfidence. For the average firm, a one-standard-deviation (about 4.8%) increase in the fraction of female directors on the board is associated with a 0.45 percentage points ( $= 0.093 \times 0.048$ ) jump in excess cash holdings when the CEO is overly confident. Moreover, the increase in *ExCash* is 0.48 percentage points ( $= 0.089 \times 0.054$ ) and 0.66

percentage points ( $= 0.135 \times 0.049$ ) respectively, considering the instrumented interaction terms, i.e. *Inst(FIndepRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*) and *Inst(TWFemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*), in Columns VIII and IX.

Both of our instruments are not subject to the issues of weak instruments, under-identification or over-identification. To address these issues, we first conduct Cragg-Donald's Wald F-test for weak instruments and find that all F statistics are above the Stock-Yogo critical F-statistic value of 19.93: Our instruments pass the weak instrument test. Second, we perform Anderson's canonical correlation Chi-square test for under-identification. The Chi-square values are statistically significant at the 1% level which suggests that canonical correlation is different from zero and under-identification is not an issue in our analyses. Finally, we obtain insignificant Hansen J statistics, which suggests that the null hypothesis that over-identification restrictions are valid cannot be rejected and that our instruments are appropriate.<sup>14</sup>

#### 4.2. Difference-in-difference method

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) instituted new requirements for public company boards, and in 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved and adopted governance-related reforms suggested by the three major US stock exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. The most prominent reform requirement is that "... A majority of the board of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors ...". Starting from 2003 all US-listed firms have to comply with the requirement of having a majority of independent directors. This change in the board structure along with others due to SEC regulations must have impacted the female board representation as well because the insider directors have been replaced with new outsider directors who might have been women. In fact, [Fig. 1](#) shows a sudden jump for all female board representation variables right after 2003 considering the firms in our sample.<sup>15</sup> Hence, this natural experiment provides an opportunity to investigate the effect of increased female board representation in firms with the overly confident CEO on the excess cash level in those firms through an exogenous shock on the board structure.

The period for this model is 2000–2007. The sample has two four-year periods around SEC announcements.<sup>16</sup> The multivariate analysis is conducted using a triple-difference analysis. Dummy variables are used for the post-2003 and firms with the overconfident CEO, along with the interactions of these variables with the variables for female board representation. We can therefore evaluate the possible influence of female directors on excess cash after the changes in the board when the overconfident CEO is present. This paper tries to demonstrate that excess cash changes occur because of the changes in fraction of female directors on the board. It examines whether, after the shock, increased female board representation has a positive effect on excess cash holdings in firms with the overly confident CEO. This claim is represented by the interaction of *FemaleRatio* (or *FIndepRatio* or *TWFemaleRatio*) with the *Post* and *Overconfidence* dummies. *FemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Post*, and *Overconfidence*  $\times$  *Post* are the interaction variables of *FemaleRatio*, *Overconfidence*, and *Post*. The model does not include the following stand-alone variables: *FemaleRatio*, *FemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*. [Table B.2](#) of [Appendix B](#) shows that these variables are highly correlated with *FemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Post* and *FemaleRatio*  $\times$  *Overconfidence*  $\times$  *Post*, 0.77 and 0.84, respectively. Moreover, these variables would cause further multicollinearity issues. In fact, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and

<sup>14</sup> See [Tables 4 and 5](#) for details of all test statistics.

<sup>15</sup> From 2003 to 2004, the total number of (independent) female directors in our sample increases drastically from 883 to 1304 (from 767 to 1092) while the total number of (independent) directors' changes from 8590 to 8519 (from 5862 to 5972). These numbers imply that firms overall fire more male directors and hire more female directors after SOX.

<sup>16</sup> In untabulated analyses, we repeat the exercise for different time periods, i.e. six years and ten years, and obtain similar robust results.

<sup>13</sup> See [Atanasov and Black \(2017\)](#) for a detailed description of these concerns.



**Table 6**  
Triple-difference analysis of excess cash on female board representation and CEO overconfidence.

Variables:	ExCash		
	I	II	III
	0.082** (0.040)		
FemaleRatio × Overconfidence × Post	-0.095*** (0.029)		
FemaleRatio × Post		0.063** (0.031)	
FindepRatio × Overconfidence × Post		-0.065*** (0.022)	
FindepRatio × Post			0.111*** (0.041)
TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence × Post			-0.079** (0.032)
TWFemaleRatio × Post	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.012* (0.007)
Overconfidence × Post	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)
Overconfidence	0.680** (0.333)	0.681** (0.331)	0.687** (0.330)
Constant	YES	YES	YES
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES
Year and Firm Fixed Effects	3353	3352	3353
Observations	0.020	0.019	0.020
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			

This table reports analysis estimates for *FemaleRatio*, *FindepRatio*, *TWFemaleRatio* and their interaction with *Overconfidence* and *Post* along with control variables. *ExCash* represents the excess cash calculated using Eq. (1). The analysis is conducted using three different measures for female board representation: *FemaleRatio*, *FindepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio*. *FemaleRatio* × *Overconfidence* × *Post*, *FindepRatio* × *Overconfidence* × *Post*, *TWFemaleRatio* × *Overconfidence* × *Post*, *FemaleRatio* × *Post*, *FindepRatio* × *Post*, *TWFemaleRatio* × *Post*, *Overconfidence* × *Post* are the interaction variables of *FemaleRatio*, *FindepRatio*, *TWFemaleRatio*, *Overconfidence* and *Post*. *Post* is a dummy that is equal to one for the years after the SEC regulations in 2003, and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. Timeline for this analysis is between 2000 and 2007. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Tolerance values of the all variables in the model improve drastically, once we drop *FemaleRatio* and *FemaleRatio* × *Overconfidence*. Hence, we have to exclude these variables. Year and firm fixed effects, along with controls (*LnSales*, *Debt-to-Equity*, *ROA*, *ReturnVol*, *R&DDummy*, *Dividend*, *IndepRatio*, *Busy*, *Inactive*, *LnBoardSize*, *CEOTenure*, *CEOOwnership*, and

Table 6 provides the results. The negative coefficient estimates for *Overconfidence* and *Overconfidence* × *Post* suggest that overconfident CEOs decrease excess cash levels in firms before and after the shock alike. This is consistent with our previous findings. More importantly, we find *FemaleRatio* × *Overconfidence* × *Post* has statistically significant and positive estimate. This result implies that more female directors on the board after the shock not only stop the decline in excess cash due the overly confident CEO but also increase excess cash holdings in those firms. In particular, the excess cash level increases by 0.85 percentage points (= 0.082 × 0.104) in firms managed by the overconfident CEO when the fraction of female directors on the board increases by one-standard-deviation (about 10.4%) due the SEC regulations. Furthermore, the increase in *ExCash* is 0.78 percentage points (= 0.063 × 0.124) and 1.20 percentage points (= 0.111 × 0.108) respectively, for the models using *FindepRatio* and *TWFemaleRatio* in Columns II and III. Overall, these results support our original findings of a positive link between female board representation and excess cash in firms with the overly confident CEO.

#### 4.3. Propensity score matching method

If firms with female directors are fundamentally different from those with no female directors, then the control variables employed in our main estimation model that capture linear relations could be inadequate. Under this assumption (unobserved heterogeneity), our results could be biased and could pick up non-linear effects of the control variables on excess cash holdings. To mitigate this concern, we create two samples that are comparable across all the control variables but differ only on whether the firm has more than two female directors on the board or have no female directors. To construct these samples, we implement a propensity score matching (PSM) process following Drucker and Puri (2005) and match firms with more than two female directors with firms exhibiting similar characteristics but have no female directors on the board.

Specifically, we run a logit model to estimate propensity scores,  $p(Y = 1/X = x)$ , based on the probability of receiving a binary treatment,  $Y$ , conditional on all the control variables,  $X$ . Based on our study, we regard having more than two female directors on the board as “treatment” and we estimate the probability of having more than two female directors on the board using a set of independent variables. The independent variables are similar to those used as control variables in Eq. (2). Then, for each firm-year with more than two female directors, we use the propensity score to find a comparable firm-year without a female director on the board based on the nearest-neighbor method. To ensure the ad-

$$ExCash_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Overconfidence_{i,t-1} \times Post_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Female Representation_{i,t-1} \times Post_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Female Representation_{i,t-1} \times Overconfidence_{i,t-1} \times Post_{i,t-1} + \Theta X_{i,t-1} + \eta_i + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \quad (3)$$

*Duality*), are added to the model. All variables are lagged by one year. The model does not have an indicator for the post-period because it is subsumed in the year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The model is specified as follows:

where  $ExCash_{i,t}$  is excess cash holding of firm  $i$  in year  $t$ . *Female Representation* $_{i,t-1}$  denotes three different “female ratio” variables for firm  $i$  in year  $t-1$ : *FemaleRatio*, *FindepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio*. *Overconfidence* $_{i,t-1}$  *Overconfidence* $_{i,t-1}$  is the dummy for high overconfidence intensity in that industry where the firm operates. *Post* $_{i,t-1}$  is a dummy that is equal to one for years after 2003, i.e., post-shock period.  $X_{i,t-1}$  is a vector of control variables.  $\eta_i$  represents firm fixed effects while  $\phi_t$  denotes year fixed effects.

equacy of the matching estimation method, we require that the absolute difference in propensity scores among pairs does not exceed 0.01. If there are more firms-years without a female director on the board that meet this criterion, we retain the firm-year with the smallest difference in the propensity scores.<sup>17</sup> We obtain 979 pairs of matched observations.

As a robustness check, we construct the “treatment” and “control” groups based on various other criteria: (i) whether the firm has more than three female directors on board or no female directors; (ii) whether

<sup>17</sup> In untabulated analyses, we perform a diagnostic test by comparing the differences for each observable firm characteristics between the treatment and control samples. The mean differences are statistically insignificant.

Table 7

Propensity score matching estimation of excess cash on female board representation and CEO overconfidence.

	ExCash								
	Matched Sample 1			Matched Sample 2			Matched Sample 3	Matched Sample 4	Matched Sample 5
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
FemaleRatio × Overconfidence	0.070*			0.112**			0.105**		
	(0.041)			(0.049)			(0.052)		
FemaleRatio	0.008			0.015			-0.024		
	(0.035)			(0.064)			(0.044)		
FIndepRatio × Overconfidence		0.055*			0.094**			0.052	
		(0.03)			(0.048)			(0.033)	
FIndepRatio		0.0042			-0.063			-0.032	
		(0.029)			(0.048)			(0.035)	
TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence			0.005			0.035			0.074***
			(0.032)			(0.051)			(0.028)
TWFemaleRatio			-0.008			0.038			0.016
			(0.031)			(0.053)			(0.037)
Overconfidence	-0.019**	-0.018**	-0.005	-0.038***	-0.036**	-0.016	-0.029**	-0.025**	-0.019***
	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.01)	(0.006)
Constant	0.07	0.07	0.078	-0.062	0.002	-0.076	0.041	-0.044	0.165*
	(0.11)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.12)	(0.115)	(0.096)
Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year and Firm FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1958	1958	1958	422	422	422	1618	1264	2754
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.047	0.043	0.094	0.095	0.090	0.054	0.101	0.036

This table reports analysis estimates for *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, *TWFemaleRatio* and their interaction with *Overconfidence* along with control variables using five matched samples. The first (second) matched sample is based on matching firms with more than two (three) female directors with firms having no female directors on board. The third, fourth, and fifth matched samples are based on matching firms which belong to the top 25th percentile of *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio* with firms belonging to the bottom 25th percentile, respectively. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. Variable definitions are given in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

the firm is in the top 25th percentile of female ratio (*FemaleRatio*) or in the bottom 25th percentile; (iii) whether the firm is in the top 25th percentile of independent female ratio (*FIndepRatio*) or in the bottom 25th percentile; (iv) whether the firm is in the top 25th percentile of tenure female ratio (*TWFemaleRatio*) or in the bottom 25th percentile. We repeat our main analysis with Eq. (2) using these five different set of paired samples and report the findings in Table 7. For each of the four constructed samples, we obtain 211, 809, 632, and 1377 pairs of matched observations, respectively.

The results reported in columns I-III of Table 7 indicate that there are significant differences in excess cash holdings for firms with the overconfident CEO when they have more than two female directors compared to when there are no female directors on the board. In particular, the coefficient estimates for interaction terms (using *FemaleRatio* and *FIndepRatio*) remain consistently positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. For the average firm, a one-standard-deviation, equals 11% (13.3%), increase in the fraction of total (independent) female directors on the board is associated with a 0.77 percentage points (=  $0.070 \times 0.11$ ) (0.73 percentage points =  $0.055 \times 0.13$ ) jump in excess cash holdings when the CEO is overly confident. Furthermore, as per columns IV-VI, these results also hold and show higher coefficient magnitudes when firms with the overconfident manager have more than three female directors compared to the firms without any female directors. The increase in *ExCash* is 1.68 percentage points (=  $0.112 \times 0.15$ ) and 1.65 percentage points (=  $0.094 \times 0.176$ ) respectively, considering the interaction terms with *FemaleRatio* and *FIndepRatio*. Finally, as per columns VII-IX, we find that the coefficient estimates for interaction terms (using *FemaleRatio* and *TWFemaleRatio*) are also significantly positive where *ExCash* values increase by 1.23 percentage points and 1.10 percentage points as *FemaleRatio* and *TWFemaleRatio* increase by one standard deviation (11.7% and 14.2%), respectively. The interaction term using *FIndepRatio* provides insignificant results. Overall, we conclude that our main results are not driven by none observable characteristics.

#### 4.4. Dynamic GMM method

Despite the use of an instrumental variable approach to mitigate the endogeneity bias resulting from reverse causality, the method has been criticized as finding a truly exogenous variable is difficult (Wintoki et al., 2012). Furthermore, the reverse causality issues in governance research tend to be of a dynamic nature (Wintoki et al., 2012). Projecting this to our paper means that female board representation and CEO overconfidence are affected by the past realization of excess cash holdings; hence, only past excess cash holding levels would be in the information set considered by overconfident CEOs and the existing board when making their decisions. Therefore, we use a dynamic panel system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The use of this method enhances the efficiency of our estimator and the power of hypothesis tests by allowing more instrumental variables to be included in the estimation (Roodman, 2009). The system GMM identification assumes that past endogenous variables in levels are not correlated with the current residual terms in first differences and those past variables in first differences are not correlated with the residual terms in levels. We include the lags of our main explanatory variables (female board representation measures and *Overconfidence*) and control variables as a part of the dynamic GMM model. Our instruments are lagged using 14 to 17 years lagging period.

The results reported in Table 8 show significant and positive coefficients for the interaction terms – for all three “female ratio” measures – indicating that female board representation reduces the CEO overconfidence leading them to increase the firm’s excess cash holdings. Excess cash levels increase by 3.53 percentage points (=  $0.346 \times 0.102$ ), 3.19 percentage points (=  $0.249 \times 0.128$ ), and 3.36 percentage points (=  $0.305 \times 0.110$ ) with a one-standard-deviation increase in *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, and *TWFemaleRatio*, respectively, for the firms with the overconfident CEO. These findings are consistent with our main hypothesis.

In addition to AR(1), we report AR(2) test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, which if present, could render the GMM estimator inconsistent, and Hansen test of over-

**Table 8**

Dynamic panel GMM analysis of excess cash on female board representation and CEO overconfidence.

Variables:	ExCash		
	I	II	III
(FemaleRatio × Overconfidence)	0.346**		
$t-1$	(0.169)		
FemaleRatio $t-1$	-0.229		
(FIndepRatio × Overconfidence)		0.249*	
$t-1$	(0.162)	(0.136)	
FIndepRatio $t-1$		-0.152	
(TWFemaleRatio × Overconfidence) $t-1$			0.305*
TWFemaleRatio $t-1$			(0.179)
Overconfidence $t-1$	-0.059*	-0.043	-0.188
Excash $t-1$	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.038)
Excash $t-2$	0.146	0.254	0.175
Constant	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.210)
Control Variables	0.039	0.034	-0.008
Year Dummies	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.159)
Observations	0.187	0.142	0.118
Lagging Period for Instruments	(0.146)	(0.163)	(0.143)
AR(1) Test (p-value)	YES	YES	YES
AR(2) Test (p-value)	YES	YES	YES
Hansen Over-Identification (p-value)	6747	6747	6747
Diff-in-Hansen Exogeneity Test (p-value)	14 to 17	14 to 17	14 to 17
	years	years	years
	0.013	0.014	0.016
	0.626	0.747	0.927
	0.867	0.609	0.928
	0.588	0.734	0.940

This table presents the estimates from dynamic GMM regressions of excess cash measured by *ExCash* on *FemaleRatio*, *FIndepRatio*, *TWFemaleRatio* and their interaction with *Overconfidence* along with control variables. All explanatory variables and controls are lagged by one year. The lags of *ExCash*, and control variables are included as a part of the dynamic GMM model. Year dummies are also included. Variable definitions are available in Table A.1, Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. AR (1) and AR(2) are the tests for the first- and second-order serial correlations in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. *p*-values of these tests are provided.

identifying restrictions. We also report the Difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of the additional differenced-instruments required for systems estimation and used in the level equations. All of our system GMM models pass all the diagnostic tests.

## 5. Robustness tests and further analyses

### 5.1. Robustness tests

We conduct several robustness tests to check the validity of our main results.<sup>18</sup> First, it is well established in the literature that CEO overconfidence affects shareholder wealth non-monotonically. While a moderate level of overconfidence maximizes firm value, high and low levels of CEO overconfidence decrease firm value (Goel & Thakor, 2008). Hence, Goel and Thakor (2008) show that board of directors acting in the shareholders' best interest will fire a CEO who is excessively overconfident. Empirically, Campbell et al. (2011) also find that

<sup>18</sup> All subsequent findings in this subsection are provided in Appendix B, tables B.3 – to B.11.

the harmful effects of CEO overconfidence are likely driven by the subset of CEOs with relatively high-overconfidence levels. Following the same spirit, we test whether female directors play a more effective “governance” role in altering the firm’s excess cash holdings in the presence of excessively overconfident CEOs. We re-estimate our main model using the group of firms with high CEO overconfidence. Following Aktas et al. (2019), we assign firms to high CEO overconfidence group if the CEOs’ *Moneyiness* belongs to the top 15th percentile during that year.<sup>19</sup> Consistent with our expectations, we find that firms with high CEO overconfidence have significantly positive and larger coefficients on the interaction term.<sup>20</sup>

Second, we re-estimate our main model using different measures to capture the CEO overconfidence level at the industry and individual CEO levels. For the first set of measures we re-calculate our main variable *Overconfidence* using a different industry classification, Fama-French 48, and define it as *Overconfidence<sub>FF48</sub>*. Then, we use the high industry overconfidence representation measure, *OverconfidenceRep<sub>FF48</sub>*. Overall, our main results hold when we replace *Overconfidence* with *Overconfidence<sub>FF48</sub>* and *OverconfidenceRep<sub>FF48</sub>*. In our second set of overconfidence measures, we use three variables at the individual CEO level in order to overcome some concerns about the option-based measure of overconfidence, *OptionMoneyiness*. We use the *UEOptionPayRatio* which is defined as the value of unexercised (vested) exercisable options scaled by the CEO total pay. We also calculate *LnUEOptionValue* which is the natural logarithm of the value of unexercised exercisable options. The use of these measures is to alleviate the concern that the CEO Option Moneyiness variable does not capture whether the unexercised options are economically important to the CEO (Banerjee et al., 2015). In addition, we use *ValueRatio* which is defined as the ratio of the intrinsic value to the exercise price of the option, where the intrinsic value is calculated as the stock price at exercise minus the exercise price (Chen et al., 2019). Then, we aggregate the *ValueRatio* for each CEO every year and divided it over the number of options exercised. Contrary to this new measure, CEO Option Moneyiness is based on the average value of all exercisable options held, part of which could be newly vested exercisable options that do not necessarily reflect the CEO’s exercise behavior. Therefore, using the *ValueRatio* we expect the presence of female directors to reduce the *ValueRatio* (less overconfident option exercise choices) leading to larger excess cash holdings. The findings are all qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.

Third, to exclude the possibility that our main results are driven by the decisions of newly appointed CEOs, we keep firms in our sample only if their CEOs remain in the office for at least 4 years. On the contrary, it could be argued that entrenched managers refrain from holding excess cash as they do not want to draw the attention of activist shareholders. For example, Faleye (2004) show that excess cash holdings increase proxy contest which is usually followed by an increase in executive turnover. Therefore, we remove firms from the sample if their CEOs serve in the same firm with the tenure below 75th percentile of sample CEO tenure. To verify that our results do not merely reflect a mechanical change in overconfidence due to CEO replacements, we exclude years when there is a change of the CEO in the firm around female director appointments. The findings support our main results and show that the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms – for all measures of female board representation – remain positive and statistically

<sup>19</sup> We also consider different cut-offs, such as 10th and 40th percentile brackets to represent different levels of excessiveness in overconfidence and obtained robust results.

<sup>20</sup> In untabulated analyses, we also re-estimate our main model using a group of moderate CEO overconfidence only. In line with the theoretical model of Goel and Thakor (2008), we find the interaction term to be statistically insignificant for all of the three independent variables. This indicates that female directors do not find it necessary to alter the firm’s excess cash holdings when CEOs are moderately overconfident and act in the best interest of shareholders.

significant.

Fourth, throughout our analyses, we control for CEO characteristics. One potential concern, however, is that the decisions on cash holdings could be influenced by the firm's CFO and board of directors. Following Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) and Florackis and Sainani (2018), we control for potential CFO effects on cash holding decisions by including *CFOOverconfidence* which is defined as a dummy that equals one if the average CFO option moneyness for the industry in that year (using the 2-digit SIC code) is greater than the median average CFO option moneyness across all industries, *CFOAge* as the age of the CFO in years, and *CFOOwnership* as the fraction of the firm's shares owned by the CFO. Furthermore, a recently growing literature reports a significant effect of board overconfidence on firm's value (Kind & Twardawski, 2016; Schrand & Zechman, 2010). To control for board of director's overconfidence on cash holding decisions, we add board of director's overconfidence measure as an additional control variable. *Board-Overconfidence* is defined as a dummy that equals one if the average board option moneyness for the industry in that year using the 2-digit SIC code is greater than the median average board option moneyness across all industries. For board option moneyness, the executive members of the board are included. Finally, as per Adams (2016) "This is the age of the female director. Before this, it was the age of the independent director", we aim to eliminate the possible remaining effect of board independence on the relationship between female directors and excess cash. Hence we control for *IndepRatio* and CEO overconfidence interaction in our model. We obtain robust findings including all these additional controls.

In further tests, we restrict the sample to firms with only male CFOs to eliminate the potential effect of female CFOs on our results. Also, we re-run model 2 by replacing *Overconfidence* with *CFOOverconfidence* and *BoardOverconfidence*. The findings support our hypothesis as the significant and positive coefficients on the interaction terms remain robust.<sup>21</sup>

Fifth, we argue that monitoring is the main channel through which female directors tame the biased behavior of overconfident CEOs leading to higher levels of excess cash. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) show that this monitoring power can be weakened (strengthened) by the presence of co-opted (non-co-opted) directors. Co-opted directors, who were appointed after the CEO assumes office, may tend to assign their allegiance to the CEO regardless of whether they are classified as independent using traditional measures. Furthermore, Coles et al. (2014) show that there is a positive (negative) association between co-opted (non-co-opted) boards and investment level. This supports the idea that the CEOs who have captured the board to a greater extent are able to invest more than otherwise would have been the case which may affect the level of excess cash in the firm. As a robustness test, we follow Coles et al. (2014) and reconstruct our main female director variables considering that the female director should be appointed before the current CEO assumes office (Non-Co-opted female directors). The results are consistent with our main findings.

Sixth, we re-estimate our main model by excluding firm-year observations for the first three years after such a firm is declared public. The rationale behind this exclusion is that some CEOs in newly public firms obtain stock options at the issue price rather than the first-day closing price (Banerjee et al., 2015). This leads to having deep-in-the-money option which signals a false overconfidence behavior. Our main findings remain robust.

Lastly, in order to verify that the results are not driven by other unobserved characteristics that could affect our causal interpretation, we re-run our main analyses by changing the variables of female board

**Table 9**

The Effect of Female Directors and CEO Overconfidence on Value of Cash.

Dependent Variable: Female Board Representation Measure:	ExcessRet		
	FemaleRatio	FindepRatio	TWfemaleRatio
	I	II	III
FBR ×	0.723**	0.602**	0.644*
Overconfidence × ΔCashRatio	(0.316)	(0.305)	(0.370)
	-2.616	0.127	-0.201
FBR × ΔCashRatio	(4.113)	(0.164)	(0.230)
	0.014	0.022	0.005
FBR × Overconfidence	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.041)
	-0.385***	-0.246***	-0.060*
FBR	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.035)
	-0.017	-0.021	-0.002
Overconfidence × ΔCashRatio	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.058)
	6.222	5.156	7.946
Overconfidence	(6.166)	(5.598)	(7.094)
	-0.080**	-0.056*	0.006
ΔCashRatio	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.024)
	-0.169***	-0.146***	0.021
ΔEarnings	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.047)
	-0.001	-0.009	-0.075**
ΔNetAssets	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.036)
	0.006	0.060	0.017
ΔR&D	(0.324)	(0.220)	(0.271)
	0.039	0.007	-0.013
ΔInterest	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.070)
	-0.017	-0.021	-0.002
ΔDividend	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.058)
	0.004	-0.002	0.003
NetFinancing	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)
	-0.028	-0.041	-0.009
CashRatio	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.032)
	-0.681	0.635	0.299
Leverage	(1.136)	(1.166)	(1.057)
	13.320	12.171	2.424
CashRatio × ΔCashRatio	(13.861)	(12.980)	(11.490)
	14.871*	13.791	8.814
Leverage × ΔCashRatio	(8.933)	(8.756)	(9.036)
Year and Firm FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2765	2765	2765
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.775	0.748	0.808

This table presents results from OLS panel regressions with *ExcessRet* on the interaction of *FBR*, *Overconfidence*, and *ΔCashRatio* along with control variables. An intercept is included in the model, but is not reported in this table. *FBR* is female board representation measure, i.e. *FemaleRatio*, *FindepRatio*, or *TWfemaleRatio*. Following Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Aktas et al. (2019), the dependent variable *ExcessRet* is a firm's excess return between the current and the previous year, which corresponds to the difference between the firm's stock return and the return of that firm's benchmark portfolio over the same period. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), the benchmark portfolios are the Fama and French (1993) 25 value-weighted portfolios constructed by independent sorting stocks on size and book-to-market characteristics. Control variables are the followings: *ΔCashRatio* is the change in cash holdings between the current and the previous year over market value of equity at the end of previous year. *ΔEarnings* is the change in earnings before extraordinary items over market value of equity. *ΔNetAssets* is the change in net assets over market value of equity. *ΔR&D* is the change in research and development expenses over market value of equity. *ΔInterest* is the change in interest expenses over market value of equity. *ΔDividend* is the change in common dividends over market value of equity. *NetFinancing* is total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption, scaled by market value of equity. *CashRatio* is the cash holdings over market value of equity. *Leverage* is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, and market value of equity. Definitions for the remaining variables are given in Table A.1, Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firms and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<sup>21</sup> Despite the reported significant and positive coefficients on the interaction terms between female directors and CEO overconfidence, one of the main drawbacks in this analysis is that we lose large number observations due to the CFO data availability which may contribute to the weakening of the significance of the results compared to our main findings in Table 2.



representation with the following measures: *FemaleTenure*, *FOwnership*, *BEthnicity*, *BOwnership*, *IndepRatio*, *IOwnership*, *EIndex*, *CEOChange*, and *CEOPay*. For all of these variables, when interacted with the CEO overconfidence, we find the coefficient to be insignificant. This provides robust evidence for our main results that they are not driven by any unobserved factors which could be associated with *ExCash*.

### 5.2. Value of cash

In this section, we aim to test whether the increase in excess cash holdings due to female directors is associated with higher benefits to shareholders. Therefore, we implement the model of [Faulkender and Wang \(2006\)](#). This model tests whether a change in cash holdings leads to a change in firm value. Specifically, we estimate the following

equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 ExcessRet_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta CashRatio_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} \\
 & + \beta_3 Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} \times Overconfidence_{i,t-1} \\
 & + \beta_5 Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} \times \Delta CashRatio_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \Delta CashRatio_{i,t-1} \\
 & \times Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \beta_7 \Delta CashRatio_{i,t-1} \times Female\ Representation_{i,t-1} \\
 & \times Overconfidence_{i,t-1} + \Theta X_{i,t-1} + \eta_i + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \tag{4}
 \end{aligned}$$

where the dependent variable *ExcessRet*, which is defined as a firm's excess return between the current and the previous year, corresponds to the difference between the firm's stock return and the return of that firm's benchmark portfolio over the same period. Following [Daniel and Titman \(1997\)](#), the benchmark portfolios are the [Fama and French \(1993\)](#) 25 value-weighted portfolios constructed by independent sorting

**Table 10**  
The role of cash flow.

Variables:	ΔExCash		
	I	II	III
FemaleRatio × Overconfidence × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>	0.346* (0.192)		
FemaleRatio × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>	-0.246*** (0.078)		
FemaleRatio × Overconfidence	-0.02 (0.03)		
FemaleRatio	0.027 (0.016)		
FindepRatio × Overconfidence × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>		0.265* (0.155)	
FindepRatio × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>		-0.211*** (0.064)	
FindepRatio × Overconfidence		-0.005 (0.024)	
FindepRatio		0.022* (0.013)	
TWfemaleRatio × Overconfidence × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>			0.415*** (0.155)
TWfemaleRatio × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>			-0.232*** (0.071)
TWfemaleRatio × Overconfidence			-0.036 (0.026)
TWfemaleRatio			0.033** (0.014)
Overconfidence × CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>	-0.03 (0.028)	-0.025 (0.027)	-0.026** (0.011)
Overconfidence	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)
CashFlow <sub>IV</sub>	0.119*** (0.035)	0.118*** (0.035)	0.114*** (0.035)
Size <sub>IV</sub>	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)
CAPEX <sub>IV</sub>	-0.282 (0.394)	-0.240 (0.393)	-0.311 (0.4)
Growth <sub>IV</sub>	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Acquisitions <sub>IV</sub>	0.086*** (0.024)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.085*** (0.024)
ΔNWC <sub>IV</sub>	0.282*** (0.024)	0.283*** (0.024)	0.282*** (0.024)
ΔShort-Term Debt <sub>IV</sub>	0.233*** (0.023)	0.232*** (0.022)	0.234*** (0.023)
Year and Firm FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	6974	6974	6974
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.334	0.340	0.331

This table provides estimates from a firm fixed-effect IV estimation of a regression model, which is estimated on the pooled data over the period 2000–2017. *CashFlow<sub>IV</sub>* equals the ratio of operating income before depreciation less interest expense less income taxes less common and preferred dividends to book value of net assets. *Growth<sub>IV</sub>* equals the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of net assets, where the market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities. *Net Assets<sub>IV</sub>* equals the difference between total assets and cash & short-term investments. *Size<sub>IV</sub>* equals the natural logarithm of the book value of net assets. *CAPEX<sub>IV</sub>* equals the ratio of capital expenditures to net assets. *Acquisitions<sub>IV</sub>* equals the ratio of acquisitions to net assets. *ΔNWC<sub>IV</sub>* equals the change in net working capital (net of cash and short-term investments) over the fiscal year divided by net assets. *ΔShort-Term Debt<sub>IV</sub>* equals the change in debt in current liabilities over the fiscal year divided by net assets. Variable definitions are given in [Table A.1](#), Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are based on the conventionally-derived variance estimator for generalized least-squares regression and given in parentheses. The \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

stocks on size and book-to-market characteristics.  $\Delta CashRatio$  is the change in cash holdings between the current and the previous year over market value of equity at the end of the previous year.  $X_{i,t-1}$  is a vector of control variables:  $\Delta Earnings$  is the change in earnings before extraordinary items over market value of equity.  $\Delta NetAssets$  is the change in net assets over market value of equity.  $\Delta R\&D$  is the change in research and development expenses over market value of equity.  $\Delta Interest$  is the change in interest expenses over market value of equity.  $\Delta Dividend$  is the change in common dividends over market value of equity.  $NetFinancing$  is total equity issuance minus repurchases, plus debt issuance minus debt redemption, scaled by market value of equity. The model also includes  $CashRatio$ , which is the cash holdings over market value of equity, and  $Leverage$ , which is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, and market value of equity. Both variables –  $CashRatio$  and  $Leverage$  – interact with  $\Delta CashRatio$ . We include year and industry fixed effects to control for time and industry trends on excess returns.

Table 9 reports the main findings. The results show positive and significant coefficients on the triple interaction terms of Female Representation variables (FemaleRatio, FindepRatio and TWfemaleRatio)  $\times$  Overconfidence  $\times$   $\Delta CashRatio$ . These results indicate that an increase in female representation significantly increases the value of a dollar of cash both economically and statistically, conditional on having an overconfident CEO. The coefficient estimate of the triple interaction term in columns I, II, and III shows that the value that investors assigns to a dollar of cash is \$0.072, \$0.060, and \$0.064 higher if FemaleRatio, FindepRatio, and TWfemaleRatio, respectively, increase by one standard deviation (about 10%) while the firm is managed by an overconfident CEO.

### 5.3. The role of cash flow

Prior literature provides evidence that cash flow (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008) and CEO overconfidence (Aktas et al., 2019; Deshmukh et al., 2018) play a role in determining the firm's cash holdings. Deshmukh et al., 2018 show a positive relation between cash flow and cash holdings. However, when CEO overconfidence is interacted with cash flow, they find a negative association between the interaction term and cash holdings. One possible explanation is that when a firm receives a windfall of cash flow from previous investments, overconfident CEOs perceive this extra cash flow as a validation of their "biased" beliefs about the firm's quality. Hence, they view current external financing as even more costly which leads them to rely more on cash balances and widen the difference of cash levels between firms managed by them and their rational counterparts, respectively (Deshmukh et al., 2018).

In this section, we further investigate whether the presence of female directors reduces the CEOs' biased beliefs regarding the firms' excess cash holdings when cash flow increases. We extend the model of Deshmukh et al., 2018 by asking the following question: does the increase in female board representation changes the overconfident CEOs' excess cash holding decision when the firms have higher cash flows? To answer this question, we follow the approach by Deshmukh et al., 2018 and further augment their model by studying a triple interactive effect of cash flow, CEO overconfidence, and female board representation ( $CashFlow \times Overconfidence \times (FemaleRatio$  or  $FindepRatio$  or  $TWFemaleRatio)$ ) on the change in excess cash holdings,  $\Delta ExCash$ .

As per Table 10, we find positive and significant cash flow coefficients which indicate that, on average, firms in the sample increase their excess cash holding levels with an extra dollar of cash flow. This is consistent with our expectations. Furthermore, the interaction terms between cash flow and CEO overconfidence are found to be negative and

insignificant for Columns I and II but significant for Column III at the 5% level. This finding suggests that firms managed by overconfident CEOs hold less excess cash for each extra dollar of cash flow compared to the firms managed by rational CEOs. This finding is also in line with that of Deshmukh et al., 2018. We also find in Columns II and III that, on average, having female directors on the board increases the amount of excess cash holdings. The coefficients on the triple interaction terms - for all three models - are found positive and statistically significant. The positive sign suggests that more female directors on the board increase the firm's savings of excess cash holdings out of an extra dollar of cash flow, conditional on the firm being managed by the overconfident CEO. This result is also consistent with our original findings in Table 2.

In further analyses, we test whether our results hold under a sub-optimal financial position, i.e., financial constraints. Following previous literature (e.g., Aktas et al., 2019; Almeida et al., 2004; Huang & Mazouz, 2018), we separate our sample into two groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms, using SA index (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), dividend payments (Almeida et al., 2004), and credit rating of the debt (Aktas et al., 2019) as proxies for financial constraints. More specifically, we define firms as financially constrained if they: (i) fall in the top tertile value of the SA index, (ii) fall in the bottom tertile of the dividend ratio, (iii) and have no credit rating information on the debt or its long-term debt is associated with a speculative grade rating. We follow the approach by Almeida et al. (2004), who study the impact of financial constraints on the relation between cash flow and the change in cash holdings. The results in Table B.12, Appendix B confirm our main findings that female board representation plays a role in taming CEO overconfidence through which excess cash increases even when those firms are financially constrained.

## 6. Conclusion

In this study, we examine how female board representation affects firms' excess cash holdings. We study both the direct and indirect effect of female board representation on firms' corporate policies. We see that if there are more female directors on firm boards, ceteris paribus, there is no effect on excess cash holdings implying that female directors are not inclined to be overly cautious or optimistic.

Previous literature confirms that overconfident CEOs perceive their firms to be undervalued by the market; therefore, they regard external financing to be overly costly. Hence, they use internal funds to finance new investments. As a result, they hold lower levels of cash compared to rational CEOs (Deshmukh et al., 2018). Based on the monitoring effect hypothesis, which predicts that female board representation provides a good layer of governance on top management, we find evidence that having more female directors on the board not only stops the decline in excess cash due to the overly confident CEO but also increases excess cash holdings in those firms. Our finding is based on a sample of 1163 US-listed firms on AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ between 2000 and 2017. We obtain robust results using various models, i.e. instrumental variables, dynamic system GMM, difference-in-difference and propensity score matching. We find supporting results with alternative CEO overconfidence measures, additional controls for the CEO, the board and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that an increase in female board representation significantly increases the value of a dollar of cash both economically and statistically, conditional on having an overconfident CEO. Also, we find that female directors in the presence of overconfident CEOs tend to increase the firm's operating profit and decrease its capital expenditures providing channels through which excess cash increases. Our results also hold in scenarios when cash flow increases and when the firm is in a sub-optimal financial position, i.e.,

financially constrained.

Our findings have an important implication on the interplay between the firm's financial decision making, i.e. excess cash holdings, and its corporate governance policies. Specifically, we believe that the appointment of female directors on boards provides a simple governance tool that helps moderate the biased decision making by overconfident CEOs concerning the level of excess cash at the firm. Furthermore, these findings have implications on investors who reward firms that increase their female board representation through assigning a higher dollar value to each dollar of cash held by the firm, when these firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Thus, the findings of this paper may

provide guidance for firms in restructuring the board to improve corporate governance and financial decision making.

#### CRedit authorship contribution statement

**Izidin El Kalak:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Software. **Onur Kemel Tosun:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Software. **Robert Hudson:** Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Writing – review & editing.

## Appendix A

**Table A.1**

Definition of variables.

Variables	Description
<i>ExCash</i>	The residual of a cross-sectional regression of cash holdings on firm characteristics using the following equation: $Cash_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CF_i + \beta_2 Leverage_i + \beta_3 MTB_i + \beta_4 Size_i + \beta_5 NWC_i + \beta_6 CAPEX_i + \beta_7 Div_i + \beta_8 R\&D_i + \beta_9 IndustrySigma_i + \beta_{10} Aquisition_i + \beta_{11} Age_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$ The dependent variable <i>Cash<sub>i</sub></i> is the cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets. The independent variables include <i>CF<sub>i</sub></i> earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization plus current liabilities less current assets less capital expenditures scaled by net sales; <i>Leverage<sub>i</sub></i> the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets; <i>MTB<sub>i</sub></i> the market value of equity plus total assets less common equity scaled by total assets; <i>Size<sub>i</sub></i> natural logarithm of total assets; <i>NWC<sub>i</sub></i> working capital less cash less marketable security adjustments scaled by total assets; <i>CAPEX<sub>i</sub></i> capital expenditures scaled by total assets; <i>Div<sub>i</sub></i> a dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividends and zero, otherwise; <i>R &amp; D<sub>i</sub></i> research and development expenses scaled by net sales; <i>IndustrySigma<sub>i</sub></i> industry cash flow risk, defined as the mean of the ratio of the standard deviations of cash flows divided by the total assets over 20 years for firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC code); <i>Aquisition<sub>i</sub></i> the value of acquisitions; and <i>Age<sub>i</sub></i> the natural logarithm of firm age.
<i>FemaleRatio</i>	The number of female directors on the board scaled by the board size.
<i>FIndepRatio</i>	The number of outsider female-directors on the board scaled by the number of all outsider directors on the board.
<i>TWFemaleRatio</i>	The weighted fraction of female directors with the weights being the tenure of each female director relative to the total board tenure.
<i>OptionMoneyiness</i>	Following <a href="#">Campbell et al. (2011)</a> , for each year, we calculate the realizable value per option as the ratio of the total realizable value of exercisable options to the number of exercisable options. Second, we subtract the realizable value per option from the fiscal-year-end stock price to obtain an estimate of the average exercise price of options. Finally, to compute the average percentage moneyiness of the options, we divide the realizable value per option by the estimated average exercise price.
<i>Overconfidence</i>	A dummy that takes the value of one if the fraction of overconfident CEOs for an industry in that year (using the 2-digit SIC code) is greater than the sample median across all industries, and zero otherwise, with overconfident CEOs being those who hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money ( <i>OptionMoneyiness</i> is greater than 67%).
<i>LnSales</i>	The natural logarithm of net sales.
<i>ROA</i>	Return on Assets is the earnings before interest and tax scaled by total assets.
<i>Debt-to-Equity</i>	Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities scaled by the market value of equity.
<i>ReturnVol</i>	The standard deviation of monthly equally weighted stock returns.
<i>R&amp;DDummy</i>	A dummy that is equal to one if a firm invests in R&D that year, and zero otherwise.
<i>Dividend</i>	Dividends scaled by the market value of equity.
<i>IndepRatio</i>	The number of outsider directors on the board scaled by the board size.
<i>Busy</i>	The number of directors on the board who also sit on the board of other firms scaled by the board size.
<i>Inactive</i>	The number of directors on the board who attend less than 75% of the board meetings in that year scaled by the board size.
<i>LnBoardSize</i>	The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board.
<i>CEOTenure</i>	The number of years the CEO has been in position.
<i>CEOOwnership</i>	The fraction of total shares outstanding owned by the CEO.
<i>Duality</i>	A dummy that is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board.

## Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102034>.

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