Semantic Attack on Disassociated Transactions

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Abstract: Publishing data about individuals is a double-edged sword; it can provide a significant benefit for a range of organisations to help understand issues concerning individuals and improve services they offer. However, it can also represent a serious threat to individuals' privacy. To deal with these threats, researchers have worked on anonymisation methods. One such method is *disassociation* which protects transaction data by dividing them into chunks to hide sensitive links between data items. However, this method does not take into consideration semantic relationships that may exist among data items, which can be exploited by attackers to expose protected data. In this paper, we propose a de-anonymisation approach to attacking transaction data anonymised by the disassociation method. Our approach attempts to re-associate disassociated transaction data by exploiting semantic relationships among data items, and our findings show that the disassociation method may not protect transaction data effectively: up to 60% of the disassociated items can be re-associated, thereby breaking the privacy of nearly 70% of protected itemsets in disassociated transactions.

1   INTRODUCTION

Transaction data consists of a set of records, each containing a set of terms or items. One example of transaction data is given in Table 1, which contains four records or transactions, each describing a set of medical diagnoses and treatments for a patient.

Table 1: An Example of Transaction Data.

TID	Items
1	vessel, blood, treatment, lung, catheterisation
2	cancer, radiotherapy, lung, treatment
3	cancer, lung, blood, tumor, biopsy
4	cancer, blood, treatment, tumor, biopsy

Transaction data can be collected from different sources, such as social networks, e-commerce websites or healthcare systems, and these data are often published to third-party research and business organisations to enable a wide range of data analyses. Although this type of data publishing can help improve service provisions by organisations and develop new solutions that are otherwise not possible, one issue must be addressed in doing so is the protection of private and confidential information contained within the datasets to be published. However, removing identifying information such as one's national insurance number from a dataset may not be sufficient to protect individuals' privacy because a combination of other information available in de-identified data can still be used to identify individuals.

Over the last two decades, much work has been carried out by the research community to understand how individuals' privacy can be protected when the data associated with them need to be published (Fung et al., 2010). A range of methods have been proposed to protect data privacy through anonymisation. These methods aim to prevent intentional or unintentional misuse of data by altering the data in such a way that individuals and the sensitive information associated with them can no longer be identified directly or indirectly (Rubinstein and Hartzog, 2016). Different anonymisation methods exist, such as generalisation, suppression and perturbation, and they can be applied to different types of data, for example, relational (El Emam and Dankar, 2008), text (Hedegaard et al., 2009), graph (Cormode et al., 2010b) and transaction (Terrovitis et al., 2008)) data.

Transaction data is difficult to protect due to its high dimensional nature. Using anonymisation methods such as generalisation or suppression to protect them is likely to result in substantial information loss (Terrovitis et al., 2012). The disassociation method achieves protection for transaction data by breaking privacy threatening associations among the items, rather than by generalising or suppressing them. It is built on the k^m-anonymity privacy model that states that if an attacker has knowledge up to m items, they cannot match their knowledge to fewer than k trans-

actions. In other words, the disassociation method ensures that each combination of m items appears at least k times in the released dataset. Using the disassociation method, items in transactions are protected by dividing them into groups such that the items in each group satisfies the k^m-anonymity requirement.

In this paper, we present a de-anonymisation approach to attacking transaction data anonymized by the disassociation method, and we do so by exploiting semantic relationships among the data items to expose hidden links between them. We use some well-established measures to score semantic relationships and we heuristically re-construct original transactions from disassociated ones. Our findings show that the disassociation method may not protect transaction data effectively: up to 60% of the disassociated items can be re-associated, thereby breaking the privacy of nearly 70% of protected itemsets in disassociated transactions.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the work related to this paper. In Section 3, we give a brief introduction to the disassociation method. In Section 4, we present our approach to semantic attack and explain the two key steps of our attacking approach. In Section 5, we illustrate how chunks in disassociated dataset can be attacked by proposing three hueristic strategies to re-construct original transactions based on semantic relationships. In Section 6, we report the experimental results. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.

2 RELATED WORKS

In recent years, privacy threats associated with releasing data concerning individuals have been extensively investigated, leading to identifying a variety of possible attacks on published data. One well-publicised potential attack is linkage attack where an attacker is assumed to be able to link a record in a dataset to the record owner by using some external knowledge. Sweeney (Sweeney, 2002) described an example of linkage attack where records in a medical dataset published by the Group Insurance Commission in Massachusetts were matched with the voters registration list for Cambridge, Massachusetts. Despite the fact that all the explicit identifiers in the medical dataset have been removed, she was able to re-identify the Governor of Massachusetts, William Weld, by linking his data in the voters registration list to that in the medical dataset.

Published data can also be attacked by inferences. This type of attack occurs when an attacker can deduce sensitive information that they do not have access to from accessible non-sensitive information published in the dataset by using a range of techniques (Farkas and Jajodia, 2002). For example, data analysis or data mining tools can be used to discover sensitive patterns or correlations within data that violate the privacy of individuals (Turkanovic et al., 2015), (Clifton and Marks, 1996).

One advanced inference attack is the minimality attack. In this type of attack, an attacker is assumed to have knowledge of the anonymisation mechanism used and the privacy requirements set to anonymise a dataset. The attacker may obtain this knowledge by examining the published dataset and the documentation about the anonymisation algorithm, and then uses this knowledge to break anonymity (Fung et al., 2010), (Wong et al., 2007), (Cormode et al., 2010a), (Zhang et al., 2007).

All types of attack described above rely on data frequency to identify individuals and their associated sensitive information from a published dataset. They do not, however, exploit semantic relationships that may exist among data items when attacking data privacy. Shao and Ong proposed a method for attacking set-generalised transactions based on semantic relationships (Shao and Ong, 2017). To illustrate this type of attack, consider the example given in Figure 1.

The original transactions in Figure 1 (a) have been anonymised by a set-based generlisation (Loukides et al., 2011) to produce the result shown in Figure 1 (b), where an item that does not occur frequent enough is replaced by a set of items. Assuming that in this case insulin, sneezing and petechiae are sensitive items that need protection, they are generalised into a set as shown in Figure 1 (b). As such, an attacker will not know which sensitive item belongs to which transaction. However, by exploiting semantic relationships, an attacker may establish that insulin has stronger relationship with diabetes than other items in transaction (1), hence it is more likely to be the original item. This type of semantic attack can reduce the "cover" through generalisation by removing some items, as shown in Figure 1 (d), thereby violating individuals' privacy.

This type of semantic attack depends on effective assessment of the likelihood that two or more items will occur together in a given context. A number of tools in natural language processing (NLP) can be used to understand and interpret semantic relationships. For example, Sanchez et al. (Sánchez et al., 2013) measure the semantic distance between terms using point-wise mutual information (PMI) and use the World Wide Web (WWW) as a corpus to find related terms (Bouma, 2009), (Sánchez et al., 2012), (Staddon et al., 2007), (Chow et al., 2009). Chow

TID	Original transactions
1	Diabetes, Fatigue, Irritability, Insulin
2	Flu, Cough, Sneezing, Headache
3	Leukemia, Petechiae, Bruising, Tiredness

(a)

(Set-based Generalization) →

TID	Anonymization transactions
1	Diabetes, *(Insulin, Sneezing, Petechiae)*, Irritability, Fatigue
2	Flu, *(Insulin, Sneezing, Petechiae)*, Cough, Headache
3	Leukemia, *(Insulin, Sneezing, Petechiae)*, Bruising, Tiredness

(b)

Finding Semantic Relationships

Diabetes **(STRONG)** Insulin

Diabetes **(WEAK)** Sneezing

Diabetes **(WEAK)** Petechiae

(c)

TID	De-anonymization transactions
1	Diabetes, *(Insulin, Sneezing, Petechiae)*, Irritability, Fatigue

(d)

Figure 1: An example of semanitc attack.

et al. (Chow et al., 2008) use word co-occurrences on the web as a part of their inference detection model to predict what an attacker can infer and to detect undesired inferences that may be derived from text.

3 DISASSOCIATION METHOD

To understand how our proposed de-anonymisation method works, we briefly describe the Disassociation method in this section. The disassociation method is an anonymisation method that is designed to protect identities and sensitive information of individuals contained in a published transaction dataset (Terrovitis et al., 2012). Disassociation preserves the original terms, but hides the fact that two or more infrequent terms appear in the same transaction. In other words, it protects the individuals' privacy by disassociating the transaction's terms that participate in identifying combinations to prevent an attacker from using those infrequent combinations to identify individuals within a published dataset.

Let $W = \{w_1, \ldots, w_m\}$ be a finite set of words called terms. A transaction T over W is a set of terms $T = \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_k\}$, where $t_j, 1 \leq j \leq k$, is a distinct term in W. A transaction dataset $D = \{T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_v\}$ is a set of transactions over W.

Definition 1 (k^m-anonymity). *If an adversary knows up to m terms of a record, but cannot use this knowledge to identify less than k candidate records in a dataset, then the dataset is said to be k^m-anonymous. In other words, the k^m-anonymity model guarantees that each combination of m terms appears at least k times in the dataset.*

For example, if an attacker knows that a person suffers from *cancer* and *diabetes* and this person's

record is released in a 2^3-anonymous dataset, then the attacker will not be able to identify this person's record from less than 2 records.

Definition 2 (Disassociated transactions). *Let $D = \{T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n\}$ be a set of transactions. Disassociation takes as an input D and results in an anonymised dataset $\hat{D}$, which groups transactions into clusters $\hat{D} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_z\}$. Each cluster divides the terms of the transactions into a number of record chunks $\{C_1, \ldots, C_s\}$ and a term chunk C_T. The record chunks contain the terms in an itemset form called sub-record $\{SR_1, SR_2, \ldots, SR_v\}$ that satisfy k^m-anonymity, while the term chunk contains the rest of the terms of the transactions.*

The disassociation of transactions is achieved through three steps:

Horizontal Partitioning. Transactions are separated into groups called clusters. Horizontal partitioning uses a recursive method to perform binary partitioning of the data into groups based on the frequency of term occurrence in the dataset. The aim of the horizontal partitioning step is to minimise information loss: each cluster resulted from the partitioning will have as few transactions and as many similar terms as possible. This will lead to less disassociation among the terms in the next step and enhance data utility.

Vertical Partitioning. The purpose of vertical partitioning is to hide combinations of infrequent terms in a cluster by disassociating them into chunks. It is performed on each cluster independently. A cluster is divided vertically into two types of chunks: record and term chunks. The record chunks contain sub-records of the original transactions and these sub-records satisfy the k^m-anonymity condition. This means that each *m*-sized combination of terms needs to appear at least *k* times in a record chunk. The term chunks contain the terms that have not been placed in record

chunks. Each cluster can have a number of record chunks but only one term chunk.

Refining. The aim of the refining step is to enhance the utility of published data while preserving anonymisation. It targets term chunks and examines the possibility of reducing the number of terms in the term chunks by introducing *joint clusters* which are shared across several clusters.

The reader is referred to (Terrovitis et al., 2012) for more detailed description of the Disassociation method. The example given in Tables 2 and 3 below show the anonymised transactions produced by the Disassociation method.

Table 2: Original Transactions.

ID	Transactions
1	{vessel, blood, treatment, lung, catheterisation}
2	{cancer, radiotherapy, lung, treatment}
3	{cancer, lung, blood, tumor, biopsy}
4	{cancer, blood, treatment, tumor, biopsy}

Table 3: Disassociated Transactions.

	Record Chunks		Term Chunk
ID	C1	C2	CT
1	{blood, treatment, lung}		{vessel, catheterisation, radiotherapy}
2	{cancer, lung, treatment}	{tumor, biopsy}	
3	{cancer, lung, blood}	{tumor, biopsy}	
4	{cancer, blood, treatment}		

4 PROPOSED APPROACH

Our approach takes transactions anonymised by the Disassociation method as input, and attempts to reconstruct original transactions by exploiting semantic relationships that may exist among the data items. Our attack consists of two steps. The first step, the Scoring step, is to measure the semantic relationships among the terms in a disassociated transactions. The second step, the Selection step, uses the semantic scores obtained from the first step to determine heuristically which terms should be re-associated to reconstruct original transactions.

4.1 Scoring Step

We use two measures, Normalised Google Distance (NGD) (Cilibrasi and Vitanyi, 2007) and Word Embeddings (WE) (Pennington et al., 2014) in the Scoring step to establish the strength of semantic relationships that exist among various groups of terms. More specifically, we use the sub-records in the first record chunk as an *anchoring chunk*, and measure the semantic relationships between the terms in other

chunks and the terms in this anchoring chunk. The pseudo code for the scoring step is provided in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: Scoring Step.

Input: Disassociated transactions
Output: Semantic relationship scores

1 **for** *each cluster P* **do**
2   **for** *each record chunk RC of P* **do**
3   **for** *each sub-record SR of RC* **do**
4   Calculate the semantic score between SR and all sub-records in C_1 by NGD or WE
5             $scores_P = scores_P \cup scores$
6   **end**
7   **for** *each term t_i in C_T* **do**
8   Calculate the semantic score between t_i and all sub-records in C_1
9             $scores_P = scores_P \cup scores$
10   **end**
11   **end**
12 **end**
13 **return** $scores_P$

The algorithm is performed for each cluster P in the disassociated dataset $\hat{D}$. There are two different types of chunks in a disassociated dataset: record chunks $(C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n)$ and a term chunk (C_T), as shown in Table 3. Each record chunk contains a number of sub-records $(SR_1, SR_2, \ldots, SR_v)$ and the term chunk contains terms $(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_j)$. For each sub-record SR in record chunks from C_2 to C_n and for each term in C_T, the algorithm uses NGD or WE to calculate its semantic relationships with each sub-record ASR in C_1. All resulting scores are stored in $scores_P$. For example, for Table3, to calculate the semantic score between the first sub-record (*tumor, biopsy*) in C_2 and the first sub-record (*blood, treatment, lung*) in C_1 using WE, we obtain three scores [0.47, 0.61, 0.84]. This step will be repeated for the other three sub-records in C_1, followed by calculating the semantics scores between each term *vessel, catheterisation, radiotherapy* in C_T and the four sub-records in C_1.

4.2 Selection Step

The Selection step aims to reconstruct original transactions from disassociated ones by re-associating the sub-records in the record chunk and the terms in the term chunk based on the semantic scores obtained from the Scoring step. Algorithm 2 shows how the Selection step is performed, and we defer the discus-

sion on the three heuristic reconstruction methods we propose to the following section.

Algorithm 2: Selection Step.

Input: Disassociated transactions, Semantic relationship scores
Output: Reconstructed transactions

1 **for** *each cluster P* **do**
2   **for** *each record chunk RC* **do**
3   **for** *each sub-record SR_i in RC* **do**
4   ASR_k = Reconstruction (SR_i)
5   Update ASR_k in C_1 with RS_i
6   **end**
7   **end**
8   **for** *each Term t_i in C_T* **do**
9   ASR_k = Reconstruction (t_i)
10   Update ASR_k in C_1 with t_i
11   **end**
12   Rec_P = Reconstructed transactions of P
13 **end**
14 **return** Rec_P

The algorithm is applied to each cluster P independently. For each record chunk from C_2 to C_n in P, a reconstruction method is preformed for each sub-record RS_i in a record chunk (steps 3 and 4). This will find the best ASR_i in C_1 for RS_i, and the corresponding sub-record in C_1 will then be extended with RS_i (step 5). The reconstruction for the terms in the term chunk C_T is performed similarly (steps 8-10). After all the sub-records in record chunks and the terms in the term chunk have been processed, the transactions are deemed to be reconstructed, and the reconstructed transactions returned in step 14.

5 RECONSTRUCTION METHODS

In this section, we illustrate how record and term chunks can be attacked. We propose three heuristic strategies, averaging-based attack (ABA), most-related attack (MRA) and related-group attack (RGA), that use semantic scores to reconstruct the original transactions from the terms and sub-records in disassociated transactions.

In disassociated transactions, each sub-record ASR_i in the anchoring chunk needs to be completed by combining its terms from other chunks to reconstruct the original transaction. Hence, the terms in the sub-records in the anchoring chunk are used as a base to assemble the original transactions. In the following, we explain how the record and term chunks will be attacked.

- **Attacking Record Chunks**
  In general, to perform an attack on record chunks, the scoring step is executed first for each cluster P of the dataset, where a semantic relationship calculation is performed on the anchoring chunk C_1 and a chunk from C_2 to C_n. After that, the selection step is applied. To attack record chunks, only the ABA method is used. This is because the sub-records in record chunks usually have more than one term. Each term in one sub-record could have different levels of semantic relatedness with another sub-record. Therefore, using the MRA and RGA strategies may not capture the semantic score properly between two sub-records. As a result, the MRA and RGA strategies are not used in attacking record chunks.

- **Attacking Term Chunk**
  Unlike record chunks, the term chunk of a cluster contains single terms. These terms have support of less than k, and they are protected by placing them in the term chunk so that no terms can be linked to fewer transactions than the size of the cluster. To perform the attack on the term chunk, the scoring step is first executed for each cluster P in the disassociated dataset between each term in the term chunk and all sub-records in the anchoring chunk. After that, the selection step is applied. For term chunks that are attacked, all strategies are used.

5.1 Averaging-Based Attack (ABA)

This strategy assumes that all the terms in one transaction are about the same context, which means that they should have similar semantic relatedness. Therefore, all the terms in the sub-records from the anchoring chunk should be included in the selection step. In other words, to find the correct sub-record ASR in C_1 for a sub-record SR or term t in other chunks, the semantic scores for all terms in ASR_i are considered. That is, this strategy selects the best semantically related sub-record based on the average of the terms in ASR.

The pseudocode of the ABA strategy is provided in Algorithm 3. The algorithm is run for each input sub-record or term that needs to be re-associated. For each sub-record ASR in the anchoring chunk, the average score of all the semantic relationships scores between the terms in SR or t and all the terms in ASR is calculated (steps 1 and 2). After this, based on the averages, the sub-records in the anchoring chunk are arranged from the most to least related in N (step 4). If the input is a sub-record SR, then the algorithm calculates the count of how many sub-records there are in

a record chunk (step 6). Based on the count, the algorithm returns the number of most related sub-records *ASR* (step 8). If the input is a term *t*, then the algorithm can return $k-1$ of the most related sub-records *ASR* from the list (steps 11 to 13).

Algorithm 3: ABA.

Input: C_1, *SR* or *t*, *k*
Output: Chosen ASR_i

1 **for** *each sub-record ASR_i in C_1* **do**
2   Calculate the average score of the total semantic relationships scores for *SR* or *t*
3 **end**
4 Arrange sub-records of C_1 based on the average in list *N*
5 **if** *the input is SR* **then**
6   Find the *SR* count
7   **for** $i = 1$ *to count* **do**
8   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
9   **end**
10 **end**
11 **if** *the input is t* **then**
12   **for** $i = 1$ *to $k-1$* **do**
13   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
14   **end**
15 **end**

To illustrate this type of attack, consider the example of disassociated transactions in Table 3. The example in Table 3 contains one cluster with two record chunks and a term chunk. To attack this cluster, the sub-records *SR* in the second record chunk *C2* and each term in the term chunk need to be re-associated with C_1. As a first step, the attack applies the scoring step to obtain all the semantic relationship scores between the terms in different chunks by the WE semantic measure. Table 4 is the resulting semantic scores from the scoring step for the cluster in Table 3.

Table 4: The semantic scores.

Terms in C1	Terms in C2		Terms in CT		
	tumor	biopsy	vessel	catheterisation	radiotherapy
blood	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.25	0.08
treatment	0.27	0.34	0.16	0.37	0.48
lung	0.48	0.36	0.18	0.36	0.33
cancer	0.63	0.44	0.11	0.20	0.51

The ABA method considers the terms in a transaction to be semantic related to each other, for example, the terms in a transaction describing one disease. Therefore, the ABA calculates the average of the semantic relationship scores between a term or sub-record from different chunks and all the terms of the sub-records in the anchoring chunk by applying

Equation 1.

$$ABA(ASR,SR) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{x}(SC)}{|x|}}{|n|} \quad (1)$$

where *SC* is the semantic scores between *ASR* and *SR*, *x* is the number of terms in *SR*, and *n* is the number of terms in *ASR*.

For example, to find the the average semantic score between the two sub-records *ASR* (*blood, treatment, lung*) and *SR* (*tumor, biopsy*), ABA will calculate its semantic relatedness as follows.

$$ABA(ASR,SR) = \frac{(0.27+0.61+0.84)/6}{3} = 0.316$$

The similarity scores obtained by the ABA distances for all chunks are shown in Table 6, and the reconstructed transactions are given in Table 5.

Table 5: Reconstructed transactions (ABA).

ID	Transactions
1	{blood, treatment, lung, **vessel**, **catheterisation**}
2	{cancer, lung, treatment, **tumor**, **biopsy**, **radiotherapy**}
3	{cancer, lung, blood, **tumor**, **biopsy**}
4	{cancer, blood, treatment}

As can be seen, ABA reconstructed the original transactions correctly, except for the last transaction. This means that some combinations terms, such as (vessel, catheterisation), are exposed. It is worth noting however that although ABA is effective in reconstructing transactions as shown in this example, the assumption that all terms in a single transaction are semantically connected to each other may not hold true for all transactions.

5.2 Related-Group Attack (RGA)

In some datasets, a transaction may contain more than one context. For example, a patient's medical record may describe two unrelated diseases. In such cases, considering all the terms of *ASR* from C_1 may include unrelated terms in semantic calculation, which can affect the accuracy of final score, resulting in the term *t* or sub-record *SR* being added to a wrong transaction.

The RGA strategy considers a situation where terms may come from multiple contexts in the selection step. In other words, a term *t* or sub-record *SR* from different chunks can be closely related only to some terms, but not others, in a sub-record *ASR* in the anchoring chunk. This makes it unreasonable to treat all terms equally when determining which transaction is the best for combination in the selection step.

In the RGA strategy, we assume that the terms of one sub-record *ASR* in the anchoring chunk can

Table 6: ABA results for Example 3.

	Record Chunks		Term Chunk		
ID	**C1**	**C2**	**CT**		
		tumor, biopsy	vessel	catheterisation	radiotherapy
1	blood, treatment, lung	0.316	**0.170**	**0.326**	0.296
2	cancer, lung, treatment	**0.416**	0.150	0.310	**0.440**
3	cancer, lung, blood	**0.393**	0.153	0.270	0.306
4	cancer, blood, treatment	0.353	0.146	0.273	0.356

be divided into at least two contexts. Therefore, after applying the scoring step, the RGA strategy finds the median semantic relationship score between each *t* or *SR* that needs to be associated and the sub-record *ASR* in the anchoring chunk, and uses this value as a division indicator. Based on this division indicator, the terms in each *ASR* in the anchoring chunk are divided into two groups. The first group is the *related group* which contains the terms that are semantically close to the disassociated *t* or *SR*, while the other group is the *unrelated group* which contains the rest of the terms. After that, only the semantic relationship scores for the terms in the related group will be considered when conducting the selection step.

The pseudocode for the RGA strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 4. The algorithm is executed to recombine disassociated terms or sub-records. For each sub-record *ASR* in the anchoring chunk, the division indicator between terms in *SR* or *t* and all the terms in *ASR* are calculated (steps 1 and 2). Based on the division indicator, the terms in *ASR* in the anchoring chunk are divided into two groups: related group *RG* and unrelated *NG* (line 3). Only the terms in the related group *RG* are included in the semantic calculation for *ASR*, and the average of the semantic relationship scores for terms in *RG* will be calculated (step 4). After that, based on the averages, the sub-records in the anchoring chunk are arranged from the most to least related in a list *N* (step 6). For sub-records *SR*, the algorithm returns the number of most related sub-records *ASR* (step 10). For term *t*, the algorithm can return $k-1$ most related sub-records *ASR* (steps 13 to 15).

To illustrate how the RGA strategy works, we apply it to Example 3. To find the division indicator, we use Equation 2.

$$\text{Div}_i(SC) = \begin{cases} SC\left[\frac{n+1}{2}\right] & \text{if } n \text{ is odd} \\ \frac{\left(SC\left[\frac{n}{2}\right]+SC\left[\frac{n}{2}+1\right]\right)}{2} & \text{if } n \text{ is even} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where *SC* is the ordered list of semantic scores for terms of *ASR* and *n* is the number of terms in *ASR*.

For example, to find the division indicator of the semantic scores *SC* (0.08, 0.33, 0.48) for the first *ASR* *(blood, treatment, lung)* and *t (radiotherapy)*, RGA

Algorithm 4: RGA.

Input: C_1, *SR* or *t*, *k*
Output: Chosen ASR_i

1 **for** *each sub-record ASR_i in C_1* **do**
2   Calculate the division indicator for *SR* or *t*
3   Divide terms into *RG* and *NG* based on the division indicator value
4   Calculate the average semantic score for *RG*
5 **end**
6 Arrange sub-records of C_1 based on the average in list *N*
7 **if** *the input is SR* **then**
8   Find the *SR* count
9   **for** $i = 1$ *to count* **do**
10   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
11   **end**
12 **end**
13 **if** *the input is t* **then**
14   **for** $i = 1$ *to* $k-1$ **do**
15   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
16   **end**
17 **end**

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performs the calculation shown in Equation 3.

$$\text{Div}_i(SC) = SC\left[\frac{3+1}{2}\right] = 0.33 \quad (3)$$

As the division indicator for the first *SR* is *0.33*, the term *blood* is excluded from the semantic score calculation because the semantic score between *blood* and *radiotherapy* is *0.08*, which is less than the division indicator. Consequently, *blood* is placed in the unrelated group. Based on the related group, we obtain the resulting average semantic scores between chunks as shown in Table 7.

Based on the semantic scores, the reconstructed transactions are produced as shown in Table 8. As can be seen, RGA reconstructed the original transactions correctly, except for transaction 4, where separating terms into two contexts did not help. Therefore, this strategy would work better with sub-records that contain many terms which are likely to include more than one context.

Table 7: RGA results for example 3.

| ID | Record Chunks | | Term Chunk | | |
| | C1 | C2 | CT | | |
		tumor, biopsy	vessel	catheterisation	radiotherapy
1	blood, treatment, lung	0.360	**0.175**	**0.365**	0.405
2	cancer, lung, treatment	**0.475**	0.170	**0.365**	**0.495**
3	cancer, lung, blood	**0.475**	**0.175**	0.305	0.420
4	cancer, blood, treatment	0.415	0.165	0.31	0.490

Table 8: Reconstructed transactions (RGA).

ID	Transactions
1	{blood, treatment, lung, **vessel**, **catheterisation**}
2	{cancer, lung, treatment, **tumor**, **biopsy**, **radiotherapy**}
3	{cancer, lung, blood, **tumor**, **biopsy**}
4	{cancer, blood, treatment}

5.3 Most-Related Attack (MRA)

The MRA strategy focuses on the strongest semantic relationship between two sets of terms. With the RGA strategy, the terms in the related group may not have the same semantic relationship strength for a term or sub-record. This is because the terms in that transaction can describe more than one context. Hence, the MRA strategy finds the term with the strongest semantic relationship to determine which *ASR* is the most related one for combining a term *t* or sub-record *SR*. In highly sparse datasets, the semantic relationships between terms become more distinct, increasing the chance to have more distinct semantic scores. Therefore, for each term *t* or sub-record *SR*, the MRA strategy arranges the terms of *ASR* from the most related to the least in a list. Then, it will include only the most related term in each *ASR*. After that, the strategy will add *t* or *SR* that has have the best semantic score to *ASR*.

The pseudocode for the MRA strategy is provided in Algorithm 5. For each sub-record *ASR* in the anchoring chunk, the MRA finds the best score from all the semantic relationships between the terms in *SR* or *t* and all the terms in *ASR* (steps 1 and 2). After that, based on the best score in each sub-record in the anchoring chunk, the sub-records are arranged from the most to least related in a list (step 4). For sub-records *SR*, the algorithm returns the number of most related sub-records *ASR* (steps 5 to 8) based on the count of how many of this sub-record *SR* is in a record chunk. For term *t*, the algorithm can return $k-1$ most related sub-records *ASR* from the list *N* (steps 11 to 13).

To illustrate how MRA works, Table 10 shows the semantic scores between chunks after applying it to example 3. The MRA strategy includes just the term with the closest semantic relationship to determine the best *ASR* for combining the term *t* or sub-record *SR*. For example, when using MRA to determine term *ra-*

Algorithm 5: MRA.

Input: C_1, *SR* or *t*, *k*
Output: Chosen ASR_i
1 **for** *each sub-record ASR_i in C_1* **do**
2   Find the best score in the semantic relationships for *SR* or *t*
3 **end**
4 Arrange sub-records of C_1 based on the best scores in list *N*
5 **if** *the input is SR* **then**
6   Find the *SR* count
7   **for** $i = 1$ *to count* **do**
8   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
9   **end**
10 **end**
11 **if** *the input is t* **then**
12   **for** $i = 1$ *to $k-1$* **do**
13   **return** *The top ASR_i in N*
14   **end**
15 **end**

---

diotherapy from the term chunk, the term *treatment* in C_1 has the strongest semantic relationship with it. so the sub-records that contain *treatment* will be considered for adding *radiotherapy* to them.

The result of the MRA attack is shown in Table 9. Most of original transactions have been reconstructed correctly. This method works well when there is a clear pair of terms that can determine the semantic relationship between parts of disassociated transactions, effectively cancelling noise from other terms.

Table 9: Reconstructed transactions (MRA).

ID	Transactions
1	{blood, treatment, lung, **vessel**, **catheterisation**}
2	{cancer, lung, treatment, **tumor**, **biopsy**, **radiotherapy**}
3	{cancer, lung, blood, **tumor**, **biopsy**}
4	{cancer, blood, treatment}

Table 10: MRA results for Example 3.

	Record Chunks		Term Chunk		
ID	C1	C2	CT		
		tumor, biopsy	vessel	catheterisation	radiotherapy
1	blood, treatment, lung	0.42	**0.18**	**0.37**	0.48
2	cancer, lung, treatment	**0.53**	**0.18**	**0.37**	**0.51**
3	cancer, lung, blood	**0.53**	**0.18**	0.36	**0.51**
4	cancer, blood, treatment	**0.53**	0.17	**0.37**	**0.51**

6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

6.1 Experimental Settings

Datasets. In our experments, we use real-world datasets collected from Ezinearticles.com. This source contains hundreds of thousands of articles. To construct our datasets, we have chosen about 1000 articles in different topics with a varying number of keywords to form transactions.

Parameters. We tested the performance of our methods by varying the following parameters: *(a)* the k value from 2 to 5, *(b)* data density ranging from 0.2 to 0.7, and *(c)* the max cluster size from k^2 to k^6.

Evaluation Measures. We used two measures in our experiments. The first one measures transaction breakage and k^m-anonymity breakage. In transaction breakage, we calculate how many transactions' protection is broken by correctly re-associating at least one correct term to them. k^m-anonymity breakage calculates how many infrequent itemsets (i.e. having a support of less than k) are exposed after re-association. The second measurement assesses how much of the original transactions are correctly reconstructed from the disassociated dataset. We used accuracy and Word Mover's distance for this. The accuracy measures the proportion of correct reconstructions, and the Word Mover's Distance measures the quality of reconstruction by finding the semantic distance between the original dataset and the reconstructed dataset as a whole.

6.2 Experimental Results

In Figure 2a, we show the efficacy of our algorithms with varying k values with the max cluster size fixed at 5^2. k is used as a privacy constraint that needs to be satisfied in the disassociated dataset. Increasing k means increasing the level of protection, which usually results in pushing more terms into term chunks and sub-records in the record chunks become more indistinguishable. In terms of accuracy, the effect of increasing k makes the anonynisation more breakable. This is due to two reasons. First, because the number of transactions in a cluster is increased in order to satisfy the k^m-anonymity requirement, the number of sub-records in the anchoring chunks that have the same semantic relationship scores increase as well. This reduces the chance of choosing a wrong sub-record when associating a term. Second, when there is a large number of identical sub-records in the anchoring chunk is, any sub-record that is chosen for adding a term to it will be correct. Note that when increasing k, the difference between our methods and the random attack (which is our baseline method that re-construct the transactions randomly) becomes smaller. This is because the sub-records in the anchoring chunk become almost identical, so the difference between semantic relationships scores becomes insignificant.

In Figure 2a we can see a clear upward trend in accuracy percentage, reaching over 90% of the reconstructed sub-records and the terms being correct. The algorithm's effectiveness in re-associating sub-records and terms increases with k, even for the random attack. Also, it can be seen in Figure 2a that ABA with both NGD and WE measures has the best performance with different k values; this is because of the density level of the dataset. The density level is fixed at 0.30 in this experiment, which is relatively dense. With a dense dataset, considering all the terms from the anchoring chunk in the selection step is more effective in determining the semantic relatedness between chunks.

Figure 2b illustrates the reconstruction extent in terms of reconstructing the entire transactions correctly from original dataset. In general, the semantic distance between the reconstructed and the original transaction is increased with an increasing k value for the random attack, while it is slightly decreased for other semantic attack methods when $k \leq 4$. The number of terms in the anchoring chunk can affect the WMD measure: larger numbers mean less terms in different chunks that need to be re-associated and that less semantic distance is needed between the terms in both the original and reconstructed transactions.

(a) Accuracy

(b) WMD

(c) Transaction breakage

(d) k^m-anonymity breakage

Figure 2: The effect of k on attacking methods.

Therefore, when k is increased, the number of terms in the anchoring chunk decreased and the semantic distance started to increase. However, semantic attack methods maintained a low WMD with increasing k compared with the random attack attack.

In Figure 2c we can see the effectiveness of our algorithms in terms of transaction breakage. Overall, the breakage rate is around 25% for all k values. However, an increasing value of k has a different effect on attacking record chunks and term chunks. Attacks on record and term chunks have opposite trends for transaction breakage when k increases. This explains the fluctuating trend of the overall transaction breakage with different k values.

Figure 2d shows the impact of increasing k values on attacking the protected infrequent itemsets in the disassociated dataset. It can be seen that the breakage percentage increases with k. In general, a higher k means that more infrequent itemsets would have been protected. However, because we associate terms based on the semantic relationships in our semantic attack methods, the increase in the number of protected itemsets means a greater chance of finding more infrequent itemsets.

The result in Figure 3a compares the accuracy of our algorithms when applied to datasets with different density levels: a dataset with a higher density will have less distinct terms in it. In general, the accu-

racy greatly increases as the density level decreases for most attacking methods. This is because decreasing density would increase sparsity for a dataset, i.e. there will be more distinct terms and more varied semantic relationships in a dataset. Note also that NGD uses the WWW as a corpus to find the semantic relationships. Therefore, the NGD measure can find the semantic score for any term in a dataset. On the contrary, the WE measure will be limited by the trained corpus. This shows that when increasing the sparsity level, the methods using NGD as a semantic measure perform better than the same methods that using the WE measure in Figure 3a.

Figure 3b describes the reconstruction of correct transactions. For our semantic attack methods, the density level does not have a strong effect on the full reconstruction, and the results fluctuated between 2.5 and 3.

The results of transaction breakage are presented in Figure 3c. The breakage level for all attacking methods improves when the sparsity level increases until 0.5, at which point it starts to decrease. This is because after 0.5, the number of sub-records or terms that have a frequency greater than k drops. In other words, the number of terms inside the record chunks decreased.

Figure 3d shows the overall k^m-anonymity breakage for the attacking methods with different data den-

(a) Accuracy

(b) WMD

(c) Transaction breakage

(d) k^m-anonymity breakage

Figure 3: The effect of data density on attacking methods.

sity levels. In general, the difference between the performances of attacking methods becomes clearer when the density is lower. This is because sparse datasets will have more diversity of semantic relationships, hence it helps to determine which terms need to be included from anchoring chunks, and which has an effect on the total semantic scores, thereby affecting the reconstruction.

Figure 4a compares the accuracy of our algorithms with various max cluster sizes. In general, larger sizes allow for more transactions in a cluster, and this negatively affects the accuracy of all attacking methods. This is because the chance to associate terms with wrong sub-records increases.

The extent of reconstruction in terms of proportion of reconstruction for the original transactions is illustrated in Figure 4b. With an increase in cluster size, the reconstructed transactions become semantically less similar to the original transactions. In larger clusters, the number of transactions is large, increasing the possibility of incorrectly combining terms into sub-records.

In Figure 4c, we evaluate the effectiveness of our attacking methods on transaction breakage. Note that increasing clusters size has different impacts on attacking record chunks and term chunks.

Figure 4d illustrates the overall k^m-anonymity breakage of the attacking methods with different max

cluster sizes. As mentioned earlier, larger sizes allow for more transactions in a cluster, hence affecting the performance of all methods, and we observe that the breakage percentage decreases slightly as the cluster size increases.

7 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have studied the effectiveness of the Disassocation method when used to protect transaction data. We have proposed a de-anonymisation approach that aims to expose the hidden links between items in a disassociated dataset. In our attack approach, we have exploited semantic relationships between items in a anonymised transaction dataset and have used such semantic information to reconstruct the original transactions. Our semantic attack approach can reconstruct different chunks with around 60% accuracy and can break over 70% of protected itemsets. This illustrates that the disassociation method may not be safe enough to protect transaction data if semantic relationships among the terms are considered.

(a) Accuracy

(b) WMD

(c) Transaction breakage

(d) k^m-anonymity breakage

Figure 4: The effect of max cluster size on attacking methods.

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