Cardiff, August 2011

The Effect of Anticipated Group-Based Emotions on Discrimination and Collective Action

by

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A dissertation submitted to the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Summary of Thesis

Intergroup behaviour is often regarded as selfish, unethical and immoral. In this thesis I argue against this proposition by stating that intergroup behaviour is guided by moral principles. I propose that negative anticipated group-based emotions serve the social function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour. I argue that aversive anticipated group-based emotions (such as shame) signal the harmful consequences of a future ingroup action and that the desire to avoid these aversive consequences motivates group members to inhibit immoral intergroup behaviour. The research in this thesis investigates the role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in promoting moral and inhibiting immoral intergroup behaviour.

In Chapter 2, I found that anticipated group-based shame and ingroup-directed anger (but not guilt) positively predicted collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. The research in Chapter 3 assessed the role of anticipated group-based emotions and ingroup identification on discrimination. I found that people with low and high (but not moderate) levels of self-investment reduced discrimination when they anticipated aversive group-based emotions. In Chapter 4, I found that anticipated group-based shame only moderated discrimination when the ingroup were of high-status *and* the social hierarchy was stable.

In the majority of the studies in this thesis I found that group members are motivated to avoid ingroup transgressions when they anticipate experiencing group-based shame for this action. I argue that this anticipated emotion signals that undertaking an action is likely to result in a social identity threat and that the desire to maintain a positive social identity motivates group members to avoid the transgression. I conclude by stating that this anticipated emotion serves the social function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour and protecting social identity.

Acknowledgements

I would like to start by thanking my supervisors, Professor Russell Spears and Professor Antony Manstead, for the time and effort that they have devoted to me and my research over the last 4 years. I have been incredibly lucky to work with them and am grateful for their support and encouragement. They have helped me to develop as a researcher and as a person. It has been an honour and a pleasure to work with such outstanding researchers, academics and people.

I would also like to thank past and present members of the Spears-Manstead Lab-group for enhancing my research through their comments, suggestions and support. Every member of this group has made a substantial contribution to my research. There are also members of this group that deserve an extra acknowledgement. I would like to thank Dr Andrew Livingstone and Dr Katherine Shelton for helping me with some statistical issues. I would also like to thank Dr Nicole Tausch for her useful insights into my research.

I thank the Economic and Social Research Council for their financial support over the last 4 years. I would also like to thank the support staff at Cardiff University for their assistance throughout my PhD.

I thank my family and friends for their encouragement and support. Finally, I would like to thank Charlie for her support and for not getting annoyed on the numerous occasions when I got up in the middle of the night to ‘just test one more thing’. Without the support of all these people I would not be where I am today.

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Chapter 1: General Introduction

> As individuals, men (sic) believe that they ought to love and serve each other and establish justice between each other. As racial, economic and national groups they take for themselves whatever their power can command.(Niebuhr, 1932, p. 9)

The above quote is consistent with many 'folk psychology' interpretations of intergroup relations. Individuals are depicted as moral agents, abiding by strict ethical standards. However, once these same individuals categorise themselves as group members they become immoral, undertaking any actions that might enhance their group, regardless of the ethical implications. Minimal group research showing that categorising people into an abstract, meaningless group elicits discrimination (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971)is widely believed to support this view. Indeed, Spears (2010) states that groups are 'often seen as the monster "Mr Hyde" in relation to the more personable "Dr Jekyll"' (p. 6). I disagree with the 'folk psychology' view that intergroup behaviour is inherently immoral. I argue instead that intergroup behaviour is guided by moral principles. I believe that the desire to avoid aversive, identity threatening group-based emotions (such as guilt and shame) can motivate ingroup members to act prosocially towards an outgroup. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the anticipation of these aversive group-based emotions serves a self-regulatory function of promoting prosocial and egalitarian intergroup behaviour.

At the interpersonal level, anticipated emotions are believed to serve the self-regulatory function of promoting moral *interpersonal* behaviour (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). These researchers postulate that when people anticipate aversive emotions (such as guilt and shame) they are likely to inhibit the behaviour in question in order to avoid the harmful emotional consequences of this action. In line with this, I argue that the anticipation of aversive group-basedemotions (such as guilt and shame) promotes prosocial and egalitarian

intergroup behaviour by signalling the harmful emotional consequences of a transgression. Previous research has demonstrated that group-based guilt and shame are evoked when group members commit a transgression (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005) and that they are motivated to avoid these aversive emotions and the threat they pose to social identity (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Leach et al., 2008). I believe that the desire to avoid these aversive group-based emotions motivates ingroup members to inhibit immoral intergroup behaviour. If people predict (or anticipate) that an ingroup action may result in group-based guilt and shame they should be motivated to try to inhibit the behaviour in question in order to avoid these emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity. The aim of the research reported in this thesis was to assess whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame inhibit immoral intergroup behaviour.

I first outline research on the social functions of emotions and the self-regulatory process that they serve in promoting moral interpersonal behaviour. This overview focuses specifically on the moral functions of guilt and shame. Research from the social psychology and neuroscience literature are then reviewed to create a conceptual framework describing the role of anticipated emotions in promoting moral interpersonal behaviour. I then discuss the morality of intergroup relations. Initially, this discussion focuses on ingroup members' preference for moral superiority over other comparison dimensions, such as warmth and competence. I then outline research on group-based guilt and shame, describing the role of these emotions in promoting moral intergroup behaviour. The overviews of interpersonal and intergroup moral emotions are then synthesised to create a conceptual framework outlining the role of anticipated group-

based guilt and shame in promoting moral intergroup behaviour. Finally, I summarise the aims and objectives of the succeeding chapters.

The Social Functions of Emotions

The social-functional account of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) postulates that they serve a variety of social functions at four different levels of analysis: individual, dyadic, group and cultural. At the individual level, emotions advise and prepare people for specific social situations. At the dyadic level, emotions aid communication and facilitate interactions (Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2003; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). Emotions at the group level help to define and bind the group by creating solidarity (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Livingstone, Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2011; Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). Finally, at the cultural level, emotions aid the learning of and adherence to the norms and values of a society (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Haidt, 2001).

The social function of emotions at the cultural level is elaborated in the psychological literature on morality. Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2001, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) suggest that social obedience and the adherence to cultural norms are facilitated by moral emotions. Moral emotions are defined as 'those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent' (Haidt, 2003, p. 853). When people violate a moral standard they are likely to experience moral self-conscious emotions. Moral self-conscious emotions can be defined as the emotions associated with the evaluation of the morality of the self. These emotions provide an 'emotional moral barometer,' giving agents feedback on the appropriateness of their behaviour (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Following a transgression, two moral self-conscious emotions that are

likely to be felt are shame and guilt (Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, HillBarlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006).

The Moral Affects of Guilt and Shame

The terms 'guilt' and 'shame' are often used interchangeably. However, these two emotions have distinct predictors (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010a; Tracy & Robins, 2006), are associated with different types of negative arousal (Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983), evoke different physiological responses (Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004), and can result in different behaviours (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). It is therefore useful to distinguish between these emotions before describing their role in promoting moral behaviour.

Guilt is an aversive emotional state that arises from the appraisal that one's behaviour towards another party is illegitimate (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Guilt is likely to be felt when people believe that they are responsible for a transgression (Ferguson, Brugman, White, & Eyre, 2007; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991).Guilt may be regarded as 'behaviour-focused' because agents focus on their negative action, believing that they 'did a bad thing' (Niedenthal et al., 1994). Because the agent can prevent the harmful action from being repeated in the future, the cause is likely to be appraised as internal, unstable and controllable (Tracy & Robins, 2006). According to Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), the negative affect stems from two factors: empathetic distress and social anxiety. The empathetic distress is caused by the pain of seeing another individual suffering, along with the internal attribution of causal responsibility (Hoffman, 1982). Social anxiety exists because the individual is afraid of being excluded from the social group (Jones & Kugler, 1993).

Shame is also experienced when an individual violates a moral norm (Tangney, 1991). In contrast to guilt, shame is likely to be felt when one's identity (or self-concept) is believed to be tarnished (Ferguson et al., 2007; Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A conventional account suggests that shame is likely to be experienced when a transgression is attributed to a tarnished self-concept and reflects a negative evaluation of the whole self (Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). On this account, people think that they performed the immoral action because they 'are a bad person' (Niedenthal et al., 1994). However, recent research suggests that this negative evaluation of the whole self evokes feelings of inferiority, and that shame is more likely to be felt when a specific facet of one's identity is believed to be damaged by a transgression (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011). For example, Gausel and Leach (2011) argue that after lying to a friend, people are likely to experience feelings of inferiority when they believe that they 'are a liar' and shame when they believe that they have a specific self-defect (e.g., 'I am not as honest as I should be').

As stated earlier, moral emotions are linked to the welfare of others and society as a whole. However, research has found that shame-proneness positively predicts immoral behaviours, such as substance abuse (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005), criminal activity (Tibbetts, 1997), and domestic violence (Harper, Austin, Cercone, & Arias, 2005). It is therefore questionable whether shame is in fact a moral emotion. Indeed, Tangney and Dearing (2002) conclude their chapter on moral emotions by stating that 'guilt is good; shame is bad' (p. 136). However, a distinction should be drawn between dispositional (trait-based) and situational (experienced) forms of shame (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). The latter authors suggest that the dispositional tendency to experience shame (or 'shame-proneness') promotes immoral

behaviours, but that experienced shame has the reverse effect, and that this accounts for Tangney and colleagues' findings. In keeping with this, research has found that criminal deviance is positively predicted by shame-proneness but negatively predicted by situational shame (Rebellon, Piquero, Piquero, & Tibbetts, 2010; Tibbetts, 1997). I therefore argue that *experienced* shame is a moral emotion.

Experiencing guilt and shame serves various social functions (for a review, see Haidt, 2003). Guilt promotes positive interpersonal relations and interactions (Baumeister et al., 2007; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010b) and shame serves the moral function of maintaining social order (Scheff, 1988; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010a). One route by which these outcomes occur is through the action tendencies associated with these emotions. Guilt is associated with reparations when one can make amends for actions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Lewis, 1971) and with self-punishment when this is not possible (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Reparations provide an instant benefit for the victim as the perpetrator tries to make up for the act, restoring equality and/or justice. Similarly, self-punishment may restore equality and/or justice by demoting the perpetrator to the level of the victim, thereby increasing the likelihood of the social relationship being maintained. Shame, on the other hand, is associated with prosocial action tendencies (such as reparation) and social withdrawal when this is not possible (De Hooge et al., 2008; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010). The reparations associated with shame (but not guilt) are thought to be motivated by the desire to repair the perpetrator's tarnished identity (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gausel & Leach, 2011). By making amends for a transgression, perpetrators restore their moral image and communicate that they know and respect social norms and order. Similarly, social distancing communicates to others that perpetrators know that their actions were wrong and that

they respect societal norms, thereby reinforcing social norms and order (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Haidt, 2003).

A second moral function of these aversive self-conscious emotions is to promote moral behaviour in the future (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001). People are less likely to repeat a transgression after experiencing guilt (Baumeister et al., 1995). According to the somatic-marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) and subsequent theories (Baumeister et al., 2007) aversive moral self-conscious emotions (such as guilt and shame) inform individuals that their behaviour was immoral. This emotional feedback prompts the agent to reflect on the cause of the emotion and on how to avoid the aversive state in the future. If the arousal is attributed correctly, it becomes associated with the immoral behaviour, creating a 'somatic-marker.' When the individual is in a similar situation in the future the somatic-marker associated with the immoral behaviour signals the aversive emotional consequences of this action.The desire to avoid these aversive emotional consequences motivates the individual to inhibit the immoral action. Experienced guilt and shame therefore promote moral behaviour in the future by creating aversive anticipated emotions for immoral actions.

Anticipated Emotions

Anticipated emotions can be defined as the predicted emotional experience relating to an imagined future event (Baumgartner, Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008).These latter researchers suggest that anticipated emotions are distinct from anticipatory emotions (such as fear and hope) because anticipated emotions are the *predicted* emotions arising for a future event, whereas anticipatory emotions are those that are *currently* felt with respect to a future event. Although anticipated emotions have an affective component (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), the intensity is less than that of experienced emotions. Anticipated

emotions are likely to be experienced when the interpretation of an imagined future event matches an emotional appraisal. The appraisals for actual and anticipated emotions are identical; the only difference is whether or not an event has been realised. For example, believing that an action violates an internalised moral standard may evoke guilt and shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Similarly, believing that an imagined *future* behaviour violates a moral standard may elicit anticipated guilt and shame (Manstead, 2000).

Anticipated emotions facilitate self-regulation by signalling the emotional consequences of an action or omission (Baumeister et al., 2007). For example, C. M. Brown and McConnell (2011) found that the anticipation of negative emotions motivates people to undertake actions that may prevent an undesirable end-state. This study showed that when people anticipated negative emotions for failing a test they were more likely to practice the task. Because people prefer to experience positive arousal and to avoid negative arousal, they should be motivated to undertake an action when they anticipate that it would result in positive emotions (such as pride and elation) and inhibit actions when they anticipate that it would result in negative emotions, such as guilt and shame. In line with this, economists (e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and psychologists (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) have incorporated anticipated emotions into models of behaviour and decision making. Research has found that including negative anticipated emotions into the theory of planned behaviour increases the predictive power of the model (for reviews, see Manstead, 2000; Sandberg & Conner, 2008). This has been found for various behaviours, including driving violations (Conner et al., 2007; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995), exercising (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003), helping behaviour (Lindsey, 2005; Lindsey, Yun, & Hill, 2007), and contraception use (Hynie,

MacDonald, & Marques, 2006). Research has also found that directly manipulating the prominence of anticipated emotions can increase condom use (Richard, Van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996) and consumer purchasing (Simonson, 1992). As noted earlier, the idea that anticipated emotions guide behaviour is particularly prevalent in the moral psychology literature (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003).

Moral Anticipated Emotions

Traditionally, theories of moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) have adopted a rationalist approach in suggesting that these processes are guided by logical reasoning. However, recent theories have supported Hume (1777/1960) in suggesting that emotions influence moral behaviour (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003). These researchers suggest that anticipated and experienced emotions act as a 'moral barometer' (Tangney et al., 2007), signalling the morality of an action. Experienced emotions indicate the morality of a past or present action and anticipated emotions signal the morality of a future action. Positive moral emotions signal that an action is moral and negative emotions imply that a behaviour is immoral. According to this approach, it is the valence of the moral emotion that determines whether or not an action is judged to be moral, rather than logical reasoning. Wheatley and Haidt(2005) found support for this hypothesis. In their study, participants in the experimental condition were hypnotised to experience disgust after reading neutral words. When these words were included in a moral dilemma, participants rated the action as more immoral than control participants, showing that emotions influenced moral judgments. Haidt(2001) extends this point further in suggesting that emotions have a greater influence on moral judgments than does logical reasoning. This idea has been supported by research on the *moral dumbfounding effect*(Bjorklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 2000), in

which participants were unable to provide an elaborated logical reason for a moral judgment and used their emotional state to justify their decision ('it is disgusting').

Although there is support for the idea that anticipated emotions are incorporated into moral judgments, recent research suggests that moral decision making is governed by a dual process system, with emotions guiding personal moral decisions and logical reasoning determining moral judgments in impersonal scenarios (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nvstrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Greene and colleagues (2001) argue that this helps to explain people's inconsistent responses to the 'footbridge' and 'trolley' dilemmas. In both dilemmas a runaway railway trolley is heading towards five people who are tied to the railway track. In the 'footbridge' dilemma participants are asked to imagine they are standing on a footbridge, together with a large stranger, located between the five potential victims and the runaway trolley. Participants can either do nothing, leaving the five people to be killed or push the large stranger off the footbridge onto the tracks, killing the stranger but saving the five others. In the 'trolley' dilemma, participants are asked to imagine that they are standing by a set of points that can divert the trolley onto another track. However, there is a person on this track who would be killed if the participant diverts the trolley. From a utilitarian perspective, the 'moral' solution in both cases is to kill one person rather than five. Indeed, in the trolley dilemma the majority of participants suggest that they would operate the switch to divert the trolley. However, in the footbridge dilemma, most participants suggest that they would not push the stranger onto the tracks.

Greene and colleagues (2001) suggest that because the act of pushing someone onto the tracks is emotionally salient (and personal), people use an affective pathway in making this decision. The relatively impersonal nature of the trolley dilemma means

that a cognitive pathway is used in making this judgment. In support of this, these researchers have found that brain regions associated with guilt and shame (i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex) are more active when participants process personal moral dilemmas rather than impersonal dilemmas, suggesting that anticipated emotions are incorporated into personal (but not impersonal) moral decision making. Furthermore, brain regions associated with working memory are more active when participants process impersonal dilemmas rather than personal dilemmas, implying that cognitive processes are more likely to guide impersonal than personal moral decision making.

This argument has been supported by research showing that patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are fully aware of social norms and values, but select utilitarian options in moral reasoning tasks involving personal interaction (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). Although these patients show no deficit in impersonal dilemmas, they usually have diminished guilt responses and in personal dilemmas tend to prefer solutions that involve fewer deaths over solutions that have less aversive emotional consequences (Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Tranel, Cushman, Hauser, & Damasio, 2007). This suggests that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex prevents patients from incorporating the anticipated emotional consequences into personal moral decision making. However, the fact that these patients show no deficit in impersonal moral decision making suggests that these dilemmas are processed by the cognitive system rather than the emotion pathway.

It seems reasonable to conclude that people's actions can be guided by anticipated emotions. In personal situations, participants prefer to act in ways that produce the least aversive emotional consequences, even if this would result in more casualties. Neuroimaging studies have found that brain areas associated with emotions

are active when people process personal moral dilemmas, suggesting that the anticipated emotional consequences of an action may be incorporated into this type of moral decision making. Furthermore, neuropsychological studies have found that patients with lesions to brain regions associated with guilt and shame show abnormal personal moral judgments, implying that abnormal moral decisions are made when people are unable to incorporate the emotional consequences of an action into personal decision making.

Although this neuroscientific research supports the idea that anticipated emotions guide moral interpersonal behaviour, the majority of these studies do not directly test which emotions are driving this effect. As a result it is unclear whether the effect is driven by guilt, shame, empathy, self-distress or generalised negative affect. Research outside the neuroscience domain has found direct support for the idea that anticipated guilt and shame promote moral behaviour by demonstrating that these emotions deter deviant behaviour (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Rebellon et al., 2010; Tibbetts, 1997), increase condom use (Hynie et al., 2006; Traeen & Kvalem, 2007), promote helping behaviour (Lindsey, 2005; Lindsey et al., 2007), and increase ethical decision making by consumers (Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2006).

Preliminary Summary

The overview above demonstrates that emotions guide moral decision making in personal scenarios and promote ethical behaviour. Two emotions that are particularly likely to promote moral interpersonal behaviour are guilt and shame. These emotions are experienced when the agent illegitimately harms another person. Guilt and shame promote moral behaviour in the short term by motivating agents to make amends for their actions. These emotions also promote moral behaviour in the longer term through the creation of an anticipated emotion. These anticipated emotions signal that undertaking an action will result in aversive emotional consequences. The desire to

avoid these aversive emotions motivates people to inhibit the action in question. Moreover, theorists from a variety of disciplines have suggested that anticipated guilt and shame are incorporated into decision making in personal situations.

Intergroup Morality

In the previous section I reviewed empirical support for Niebuhr's first stipulation, that individuals are moral agents. I also demonstrated that the anticipation of aversive moral emotions helps to stop people from undertaking immoral actions. I now argue against his second point, namely that groups are immoral by nature. In keeping with the interpersonal literature, I argue that groups are motivated to act morally in order to avoid aversive emotions. Just as interpersonal emotions guide an individual's moral actions, I propose that group-based emotions guide the moral actions of groups. I first outline research suggesting that groups are motivated to act morally. I then describe how group-based emotions promote moral intergroup behaviour.

The Morality of Intergroup Behaviour

Psychologists tend to focus on the dark side of intergroup relations. Researchers often investigate situations in which group members oppress, discriminate against or harm an outgroup. However, there are many situations in which ingroup members act morally towards an outgroup. For example, research has found that group members exhibit egalitarian behaviour when allocating aversive stimuli (Gardham & Brown, 2001; Mummendey & Otten, 1996; Mummendey, Otten, Berger, & Kessler, 2000), that advantaged group members are willing to help a disadvantaged outgroup(Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Sweetman, Spears, & Livingstone, 2009), and that following an ingroup transgression people are motivated to compensate the victimised outgroup(R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008;

Doosje et al., 1998, 2006). This suggests that there is a moral dimension to intergroup behaviour.

I argue that the motives driving moral intergroup behaviour are those proposed by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). According to this theory, people are motivated to maintain a positive and distinct social identity. This is achieved by making favourable comparisons with an outgroup on a specific dimension. If the ingroup is superior to an outgroup on a relevant comparison dimension, members of this group gain collective-esteem. However, unfavourable comparisons are detrimental to social identity and reduce the esteem gained from the group membership. Because of this, ingroup members are motivated to pursue favourable and to avoid unfavourable social comparisons.

Researchers have focused on three social comparison dimensions: morality, competence and warmth (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). These dimensions differ in the extent to which ingroup members view them as important. In line with the social identity tradition, researchers have often regarded competence as more important than morality and warmth (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Ellemers & Rijswijk, 1997). Indeed, morality is often thought to be an 'alternative' comparison dimension used by low-status groups to derive some collective self-esteem from their group membership. However, Leach and colleagues (2007) suggest that these studies failed to measure the importance of each comparison dimension. In their research they found that group members viewed morality as more important than other intergroup comparison dimensions, such as competence and warmth. They also found that morality was attributed more to the ingroup than the outgroup, was more closely associated with ingroup identification than competence and warmth, and increased group-based pride.

Indeed, research has shown that people prefer to work in groups that have moral norms rather than groups with competence norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008), and that in competitive circumstances ingroup members prefer to gain a positive and distinct social identity through normative (i.e., moral) routes rather than non-normative routes (Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, & Doosje, 2009).

These studies suggest that ingroup members are motivated to maintain a moral social identity and that they prefer being morally superior over other comparison dimensions, such as warmth and competence. Such research provides empirical evidence inconsistent with Niebuhr's claim that groups are immoral by nature. However, a remaining question is why groups prefer moral superiority over other comparison dimensions, such as warmth and competence. Strategically, competence should be preferred over the other comparison dimensions because this could potentially improve the ingroup's status and power in the social hierarchy. When an ingroup has greater status and power it can use its position in the social hierarchy to justify ingroup bias, creating more ingroup resources (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978). System justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Kramer, 2003) suggests that people allocate resources in accordance with the social hierarchy, resulting in high-status groups receiving resources from the low-status group. Previous research has nevertheless found that belonging to a group with high competence but low morality can result in aversive group-based emotions, such as guilt and shame (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). In line with the moral psychology literature, I argue that the desire to avoid these aversive emotions motivates group members to act morally, even if this is at the expense of the ingroup's competence.

Group-Based Emotions

Thus far, I have focused on emotion as an interpersonal phenomenon. However, emotions are not restricted to interpersonal interactions. People can also experience emotions in relation to the actions or attributes of their group, even in the absence of personal responsibility for those actions or attributes (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2003; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999; E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). For instance, people may experience pride for the success of their sports team (Cialdini et al., 1976), anger when their ingroup suffers an injustice (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003), and guilt and shame when their group is responsible for a transgression (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al., 2008; Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2005). In all of these studies, participants were not personally responsible for, or affected by the event, but reported experiencing these emotions. It is argued that the basis for these emotions is the social identity (or social self) that participants share with the person(s) who performed the action or suffered the injustice.

Intergroup emotion theory (IET; Devos et al., 2003; E. R. Smith, 1993; E. R. Smith, 1999; E. R. Smith et al., 2007) postulates that group-based emotions are experienced when people categorise themselves as ingroup members and appraise situations in ways shaped by this self-categorisation. According to IET, these processes accord with the principles outlined by self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and appraisal theory (Arnold, 1960; Frijda et al., 1989; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993).

Self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory extended the ideas proposed by social identity theory by developing the role of the social self in understanding the behaviour of group members. This theory suggests the self can be

categorised at various different levels that range from the subordinate (or individual) level to the superordinate (or human) level. Intermediate levels represent the different groups that the individual belongs to, ranging in size from dyads to national or supra-national groups. For instance, someone may categorise him/herself as an individual, a family member, a professor, a British citizen, a member of western society, a human being, etc. This theory suggests that categorisation at a specific level is dependent on the salience of contextual cues and the perceived readiness (or accessibility) of the identity. If an identity is highly accessible any contextual cues relating to the ingroup or an outgroup enhance the likelihood of self-stereotyping as a member of the corresponding group.

Self-categorization theory proposes that once this categorisation has taken place, people define themselves as members of the ingroup and act in accordance with group norms. Perceptions of ingroup homogeneity and intergroup differences are thought to increase, resulting in 'depersonalisation', whereby individuals regard themselves as exemplars of the group rather than as individuals. As a result, situations are likely to be appraised through the eyes of an ingroup member. For example, Hogg and Turner (1987) found that when gender categories were made salient, female participants were more likely to categorise as a women and to believe that they possessed characteristics that are representative of this group.

Appraisal theory. According to IET, once the self has been categorised at the most salient group level, individuals will appraise events from the perspective of group members, with the result that events that promote group goals will tend to evoke positive emotions whereas events that interfere with group goals will tend to evoke negative emotions. Smith and colleagues (2007) argue that the appraisals underlying interpersonal and intergroup emotions are identical. The only difference between

interpersonal and group-based emotions is the self to which the situation is referenced. Interpersonal emotions are likely to be elicited when the situation is relevant to the individual self, and group-based emotions are felt when a situation affects the group (or social) self. For example, people are likely to experience anger when they are illegitimately harmed by another person (Frijda et al., 1989; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Similarly, people are likely to experience anger when the ingroup is illegitimately harmed by an outgroup, even if they are not personally affected by the action (Gordijn et al., 2001; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

Moral Group-Based Emotions

In keeping with the interpersonal literature, I argue that group-based guilt and shame serve the self-regulatory function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour. These emotions may be experienced when people categorise themselves as ingroup members and appraise the actions of the ingroup as illegitimate (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). In line with recent developments in the emotion literature (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011), research has found that group-based guilt is evoked when ingroup members believe that their group was responsible for a transgression, and that group-based shame is evoked when a transgression poses a threat to group identity (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2005; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007).

The arousal entailed in group-based guilt and shame is aversive. Of possibly greater concern is the threat that these emotions pose to social identity (Branscombe et al., 1999). Social identity theory postulates that ingroup members are motivated to maintain a positive social identity. If group-based guilt or shame are experienced, group

members are likely to believe that their group was responsible for an illegitimate action, associating the ingroup with a transgression, and thereby threatening social identity. This is especially damaging because, as argued above, there is evidence that group members prefer moral superiority over other comparison dimensions, such as warmth and competence (Leach et al., 2007). Furthermore, of the two emotions, group-based shame is likely to be especially harmful because this emotion is evoked when people believe that a transgression threats their group's identity.

The desire to alleviate the aversive arousal that is group-based guilt and shame and the threat that these emotions pose to social identity is likely to promote moral behaviours that benefit the victim. Research has found that both group-based guilt and shame positively predict the desire to compensate the victim for the ingroup's illegitimate actions (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al., 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). This alleviates these aversive emotions by restoring equality between the victim and perpetrator (but see Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). Moreover, by compensating the victimised outgroup, ingroup members demonstrate that their group understands and abides by moral principles, potentially restoring the ingroup's moral identity. These action tendencies therefore serve the self-regulatory function of reducing both the aversive arousal (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006, 2007) and the social identity threat.

Ingroup members do not always implement prosocial strategies to avoid identity-threatening group-based emotions. According to social identity theory, the desire to maintain a positive group image should motivate ingroup members to avoid these emotions and their aversive consequences by implementing 'identity management strategies' (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Van Knippenberg, 1989). These strategies inhibit the aversive emotions and identity threat by legitimising the ingroup's actions or externalising the blame (for an overview, see Branscombe &Miron,

2004). For example, group members may avoid group-based guilt and shame by attributing the blame to situational factors (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Zebel, 2005) or the victimised outgroup (Staub, 1989), dehumanising the outgroup(Bar-Tal, 1990; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008), denying the credibility of the source (Doosje et al., 2006), legitimising the immoral act (Johns et al., 2005; Leach et al., 2008; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006), or by reconstruing which behaviours are considered to be moral (Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010).

To date, the literature on group-based guilt and shame has focused on post hoc strategies for avoiding these aversive emotions. Such strategies are implemented *after* the incident has taken place. However, people may also implement identity management strategies *before* an event takes place, in an anticipatory fashion. For example, the use of propaganda to dehumanise an outgroup may legitimise future transgressions (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989), thereby inhibiting group-based guilt and shame. The aim of the research reported in this thesis is to demonstrate that people may also implement *prosocial*identity management strategies in an anticipatory fashion, before an immoral ingroup transgression takes place. I argue that when people anticipate that a proposed ingroup action is likely to elicit an aversive group-based emotion (such as guilt or shame), they should be motivated to avoid the behaviour in question.

In line with IET and the anticipated emotion literature (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Manstead, 2000), I argue that anticipated group-based emotions are likely to be experienced when people categorise themselves as ingroup members and appraise future intergroup situations in a way that is consistent with this self-categorisation. As stated earlier, group-based guilt and shame are likely to be felt when people believe that their group was responsible for an illegitimate action (Branscombe et al., 2003; Lickel et al.,

2004, 2005). Similarly, people are likely to anticipate feeling group-based guilt and shame when they categorise themselves as ingroup members and appraise a potential future ingroup action as illegitimate. For example, if British people believe that it is wrong to use military force to combat Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program, they are likely to anticipate group-based guilt and shame in relation to any proposed military intervention. The desire to avoid these aversive emotions and the threat they pose to social identity should motivate British people to undertaken actions that prevent the intervention from occurring.

At the interpersonal level, researchers suggest that negative anticipated emotions signal the aversive emotional consequences of immoral *interpersonal* behaviour (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). In line with this, I argue that anticipated group-based guilt and shame inhibit immoral *intergroup* behaviour by signalling the aversive consequences of an anticipated ingroup transgression. People are motivated to avoid the aversive affect that is group-based guilt and shame, and to protect social identity. I argue that the anticipation of group-based guilt and shame for a proposed ingroup transgression signals that the group's identity would be threatened if the behaviour in question were to be undertaken. The desire to maintain a positive ingroup identity should motivate people to avoid the immoral action. This can therefore be regarded as a pre-emptive identity management strategy that serves the self-regulatory functioning of protecting the ingroup's moral image.

There is an established literature on the role of emotions in promoting moral intergroup behaviour (e.g., Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000; Maitner et al., 2007). Feeling guilty about prejudice can reduce this behaviour in the future (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Devine & Monteith, 1993). As mentioned earlier, group-based guilt and shame can promote reparation (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al.,

2008; Doosje et al., 1998). I extend these ideas by arguing that *anticipated*group-based emotions may also promote moral intergroup behaviour. In line with Baumeister and colleagues (2007), I argue that the desire to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based guilt and shame should motivate ingroup members to avoid the emotion-evoking action, thereby promoting moral intergroup behaviour.

Overview of the Current Thesis

The aim of the research reported in this thesis is to assess the effects of anticipated group-based guilt and shame on moral intergroup behaviour. Based on the above rationale, I argue that the desire to avoid the threat that these emotions pose to social identity should motivate ingroup members to inhibit immoral intergroup actions. The studies reported in Chapter 2 investigate whether anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger motivate group members to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. In Study 1 I manipulated the legitimacy of a proposed ingroup action to determine whether anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger mediated the effect of this manipulation on collective action. In Study 2replicated these results. I extended this work in Study 3 by manipulating the salience of the anticipated emotions and assessing the moderating role of ingroup identification.

In Chapter 3 I assessed the effects of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on intergroup discrimination. In three studies, I manipulated the salience of the anticipated group-based emotions to examine their effect on discrimination. I also assessed the moderating role of ingroup identification. Based on recent research (Leach et al., 2008) I measured two components of identification: self-investment and self-definition. I also examined the unique relationships between anticipated group-based guilt and shame and ingroup bias. This

was assessed in minimal groups (Study 4), university groups (Study 5), and national groups (Study 6).

Previous research has found inconsistencies regarding the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978). In Chapter 4 I investigated whether these discrepancies can be explained in terms of anticipated group-based emotions. In Study 7 I measured anticipated group-based guilt and shame to assess whether these emotions moderated the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups. I extended these results in Study 8 by manipulating anticipated group-based shame using a bogus-pipeline method.

I begin Chapter 5 by summarising the findings and the conclusions that can be drawn from the studies reported in this thesis. I then integrate these findings to provide an explanatory framework for the role of anticipated group-based emotions on moral intergroup behaviour. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of this research for existing theories of intergroup relations. I then discuss the limitations of the present research and outline ideas for future research. Finally, I consider the implications of the current work for real life intergroup conflicts and for the strategies that can be implemented in order to create more harmonious intergroup relations.

Chapter 2: 'This will Bring Shame on our Nation': The Role of Anticipated Group-Based Emotions on Collective Action[1]

In 2002, the then President of the United States (George W. Bush) and the then Prime Minister of Great Britain (Tony Blair) announced that American and British troops were going to be deployed in Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction and free the Iraqi people. This announcement led to large-scale protests in the United States and Britain. On 15th February 2003, between 750,000 (police estimate) and 2 million (organisers' estimate) protestors gathered on the streets of London to show their opposition to the war, creating the largest protest in the city's history. Similarly, on this day between 100,000 (police estimate) and 375,000 (organisers' estimate) people gathered on the streets of New York to protest against the invasion. On 19th March 2003 the invasion of Iraq began, despite the protests of American and British people. The current research addresses the question of why so many people are motivated to protest against such issues.

It has been argued that emotions promote collective action (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2003; Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). Research on solidarity-based collective action has found that advantaged group members undertake collective action on the behalf of disadvantaged group members when they experience anger (Leach et al., 2006), sympathy (Iyer & Ryan, 2009), empathy (Sweetman et al., 2009), moral outrage (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), and shame (Iyer et al., 2007). To date, this research has focused on the impact of experienced group-based emotions on collective action. Here I argue that the *anticipation* of aversive group-based emotions (such as shame and anger) for a proposed ingroup transgression can also promote collective action. The aim of protest in this case is to stop the ingroup from performing the transgression, avoiding the emotions and their aversive consequences. This helps to

[1] This chapter is based on Shepherd, Spears, and Manstead (2011c)

explain why people protested against their country’s proposed invasion of Iraq. I tested this proposition in three studies.

Group-Based Emotions and Collective Action

In order to understand what motivated so many people to protest against the invasion of Iraq it is important to understand the intergroup context. Although George W. Bush and Tony Blair stated that the purpose of the invasion was to search for weapons of mass destruction and free the Iraqi people, some reports in the media suggested that the real purpose of the invasion was to gain access to that country’s oil resources. If the war was thought to be driven by this motivation, the future actions of the ingroup would likely be appraised as illegitimate. Appraising a situation in this way is likely to elicit group-based shame, guilt and ingroup-directed anger (Leach et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2007).People may experience these emotions for the actions or attributes of their own group simply through their association with the ingroup, even in the absence of personal responsibility for these actions or attributes (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2007). The appraisal of the illegitimate action determines which emotions will be felt.

A traditional account suggests that shame is experienced when a transgression is attributed to a global self-deficit (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006), tarnishing one’s identity and leading people to believe that they ‘are a bad person’ (Niedenthal et al., 1994). However, recent research has found that attributing a transgression to a global self-deficit is likely to elicit feelings of inferiority and that shame is felt when people believe that a transgression indicates a specific self-defect (for a review, see Gausel& Leach, 2011). For example, people may experience feelings of group-based inferiority when they believe that the invasion of Iraq implies that their ‘nation is immoral’ and group-based shame when they think that

their ‘nation is not as ethical as it should be.’ Because a specific self-deficit implies that the ingroup’s image is tarnished (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel& Leach, 2011), group-based shame is associated with a damaged moral identity (Lickel et al., 2005, 2007).

Guilt is experienced when people think that they are responsible for a transgression (Tangney et al., 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), believing that they ‘did a bad thing’ (Niedenthal et al., 1994). Similarly, people are likely to experience group-based guilt when they believe that their group was responsible for an illegitimate action (Branscombe et al., 2003; Doosje et al., 1998). Guilt is regarded as a self-reflective emotion because people focus on their illegitimate act and the subsequent negative arousal(Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Leach et al., 2002). People are too concerned with wallowing in their own misery to consider the victimized party. Moreover, because guilt is associated with low levels of physical arousal and action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994) it is believed to be a passive emotion (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006).

Anger is usually believed to be felt towards others who are believed to be responsible for a transgression (Frijda et al., 1989;Gordijn et al., 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 2003; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). However, people can also feel angry at themselves (Ellsworth &Tong, 2006) or their ingroup (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). Like guilt, ingroup-directed anger is experienced when people believe that their group is responsible for harming another party (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). However, the latter researchers argue that whereas guilt is a self-reflective emotion, anger is an other-focused emotion because it is felt when people are concerned with the effect of their group’s actions (e.g., the invasion of Iraq) on the victimized outgroup (e.g., Iraqi

people). Moreover, in contrast to guilt, anger is associated with a high level of arousal and action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994).

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that ingroup members are motivated to maintain a positive social identity. All three of these group-based emotions threaten social identity by associating the ingroup with an immoral transgression (Branscombe et al., 1999). However, group-based shame poses an additional threat because it arises when people perceive that a transgression reflects an immoral facet of their group (Lickel et al., 2004, 2007). Because appraising part of the ingroup as immoral is more damaging than perceiving a single action to be illegitimate, group-based shame poses a greater threat to social identity than does anger or guilt. Group-based shame may even be regarded as one of the aversive emotional consequences of a tarnished social identity. This argument has been supported by research finding that - in contrast to guilt and anger - group-based shame is likely to be evoked when social identity is tarnished (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2005) and predicts the desire to repair the ingroup's image (Johns et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006b).

Each of these group-based emotions is associated with a different action tendency. Group-based guilt is associated with the desire to compensate the victimised outgroup(R. Brown et al., 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). However, the low action potential and self-reflective nature of this emotion is insufficient to promote active behaviours that may resolve the situation, such as collective action (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). By contrast, the high activation associated with anger motivates group members to undertake collective action in order to resolve the injustice (Livingstone et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008), even when the transgression was performed by the ingroup(Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). Group-based shame is associated with

behaviours that repair social identity (Lickel et al., 2007). This can be achieved in numerous ways. Ingroup members may implement prosocial behaviours, such as reparation (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al., 2008). Alternatively, people may repair this damage by distancing themselves from the victimised outgroup(Iyer et al., 2007), ingroup(Schmader & Lickel, 2006b), or the perpetrators (Johns et al., 2005). The latter two forms of distancing are exemplified by the 'not in my name' campaign. By distancing in this way British and American people dissociated themselves from the perpetrators of the Iraq invasion and/or the harmed ingroup, thus avoiding a negative social identity (Lickel et al., 2005). Because social identity theory postulates that the ingroup's identity is a primary concern for group members, people experiencing group-based shame are unlikely to be deterred from active behaviours that may repair their group's image, such as collective action. Therefore, group-based shame is likely to promote collective action that serves to repair social identity, as demonstrated by the 'not in my name' campaign.

It is already established that group-based shame and anger promote collective action (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that *experienced* group-based emotions may have motivated British and American people to take part in the protests on 15th February. However, these protests took place a month *before* allied forces invaded Iraq, so it seems unlikely that these emotions would have been experienced directly. At the time of the protests the ingroup had not committed any transgressions, preventing the basis for these emotions. Although it is possible that British and American people may have experienced group-based anger at the hypocrisy of their leaders, I argue that because of the future-orientated nature of the ingroup transgression other processes are more likely to promote collective action. I argue that appraising the future behaviour of the ingroup as illegitimate may have led people to

anticipate feeling group-based guilt, shame and anger if their country were to invade Iraq. The anticipation of these aversive group-based emotions may have motivated people to protest against the planned actions of their group.

Anticipated Emotions

Interpersonal

Anticipated emotions can be defined as the predicted emotional experience arising from an imagined future event (Baumgartner et al., 2008). These emotions are evoked when the interpretation of an imagined future event matches an emotional appraisal. The key difference between the appraisals for actual and anticipated emotions is whether an event has or has not (yet) been realised. For example, guilt and shame may be elicited when an action is appraised to be immoral (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Similarly, anticipated guilt and shame may be evoked when people appraise an imagined future behaviour as immoral (Manstead, 2000). These aversive anticipated emotions are believed to promote moral interpersonal behaviour (for reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). According to these theorists, negative anticipated emotions signal that a particular course of action will result in aversive emotional consequences. The desire to avoid these aversive emotional consequences motivates people to inhibit the behaviour in question.Aversive anticipated emotions should therefore deter immoral and undesirable (guilt- and shame-invoking) behaviours.

Group-based

Group-based guilt, anger and shame are aversive, as demonstrated by the numerous ‘identity management strategies’ (Ellemers et al., 1993; Van Knippenberg, 1989) that people use to avoid them (for an overview, see Branscombe & Miron, 2004): People may seek to externalise the blame (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003), dehumanise

the victimised party (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel et al., 2008), or justify the ingroup's actions (Johns et al., 2005; Leach et al., 2006; Leach et al., 2008; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Generally, the intergroup literature has focused on the implementation of these strategies *after* the event has taken place. However, people may also implement identity management strategies *before* an event takes place. For example, using propaganda to dehumanise an outgroup can reduce the experience of aversive emotions arising from future transgressions (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989). I argue that people may also implement *pro-social*identity management strategies in an anticipatory fashion. One such strategy is to stop the transgression from happening in the first place. When people predict (or anticipate) that the future actions of their group would result in them feeling aversive group-based emotions they will be motivated to try to stop the transgression from occurring. Collective action is one strategy for changing the intended behaviour of the ingroup. Thus if people (e.g., British and American citizens) appraise a proposed ingroup action as illegitimate (e.g., the invasion of Iraq) they may anticipate group-based guilt, shame and anger arising from this transgression. The anticipation of these aversive group-based emotions may motivate ingroup members to protest against their group's plans ('not in our name'). The aim of such protest would be to prevent the ingroup from committing a transgression, thereby avoiding the aversive emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity. I therefore extend the protest literature by suggesting that the mere anticipation of aversive group-based emotions is sufficient to promote collective action.

There is a well-established literature on the role of emotions in regulating intergroup behaviour (e.g., Devine et al., 2000; Maitner et al., 2007). Experiencing interpersonal guilt arising from prejudice reduces this behaviour in the future (Amodioet

al., 2007; Monteith, 1993). Similarly, group-based guilt has been found to serve a self-regulatory function (Maitner et al., 2006). I extend this literature by suggesting that *anticipated* group-based emotions also serve a self-regulatory function. In keeping with Baumeister and colleagues (2007), I suggest that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions signals the detrimental emotional and social consequences of the ingroup's future actions. I argue that the desire to avoid these aversive emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity should motivate ingroup members to undertake collective action against the proposed future transgression.

Some anticipated group-based emotions should be stronger predictors of collective action than others. Because social identity theory proposes that maintaining a positive social identity (or group image) is a primary concern for group members and because group-based shame is one of the aversive emotional consequences of a damaged group image (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007), I hypothesised that this anticipated emotion would be the strongest predictor of (preventive) collective action. The desire to avoid the damaged social identity signalled by anticipated group-based shame should motivate ingroup members to undertake collective action to prevent the proposed transgression. Therefore, in line with recent developments in the emotion literature (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010; Gausel & Leach, 2011), I argue that shame may promote prosocial behaviour. The desire to avoid the high level of agitated arousal that is anger should also promote collective action. The consequences of anticipated group-based guilt are less clear-cut. People are motivated to avoid this emotion (Doosje et al., 1998) but its low action potential may be insufficient to motivate people to undertake active behaviours, such as collective action (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). I therefore predicted that anticipated group-based guilt would predict more passive actions (such as compensation) rather than collective action.

Study 1

The aim of Study 1 was to assess whether appraising a future ingroup action as illegitimate elicits anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger, and whether these emotions promote collective action against the impending transgression. To do this I needed a situation in which the ingroup had planned illegitimate discrimination against an outgroup. At the time of the study, the United Nations (UN) was debating how best to deal with Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. The then UK Foreign Secretary (David Miliband) stated that he would not rule out the use of military force against Iran if they did not start complying with UN sanctions. I used this context because of its parallels with the invasionof Iraq.

I manipulated the illegitimacy of the ingroup's actions by altering a text that the participant's read. In the low illegitimacy condition participants were told that military force was legitimate because Britain had been forced into this position by Iran's refusal to cooperate with the UN. In the high illegitimacy condition participants were informed that it was wrong to use military force against Iran because they had recently agreed to cooperate with the UN. I hypothesised that participants would anticipate aversive group-based emotions to a greater extent in the high illegitimacy condition than the low illegitimacy condition. As a result, people should be more willing to engage in collective action under conditions of high illegitimacy. Furthermore, the effect of the illegitimacy manipulation on collective action should be mediated by anticipated group-based shame and anger. Anticipated group-based guilt was not hypothesised to mediate this effect because this emotion is typically associated with more passive behaviours.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 189 participants (140 males, 48 females, and 1 undisclosed) completed the online study. Participants were recruited through an advertisement on a social networking website. The age ranged from 18 to 64 years, with a mean age of 24.46. Three participants did not report their age. The independent variable was the illegitimacy of the ingroup’s future actions (low vs. high). This variable was manipulated by altering the text read by the participants. The dependent variables were anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger, and the participant’s willingness to engage in collective action.

Materials

Pre-manipulation opinion. Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with the following statements: ‘I oppose/am against/support (reversed)/am in favour of (reversed) the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites’ (α = .96). All four items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Illegitimacy manipulation check. Participants were asked to rate the extent of their agreement with each of the following items: ‘It would be wrong/unjust/legitimate (reversed)/morally acceptable (reversed) for the British to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities’ (α = .93). These items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Anticipated group-based emotions. Three anticipated group-based emotions were measured: guilt, shame and anger. The guilt items were ‘guilty’ and ‘remorse’ (*r* = .74). The shame items were ‘ashamed’ and ‘uncomfortable’ (*r* = .75). Anger was assessed using the following items: ‘angry’ and ‘outraged’ (*r* = .89). Participants were asked: ‘If the British were to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities to what extent would you

feel [emotion word]?' All the items were rated on a 7-point scale (0 = *not at all*, 6 = *extremely*).

Collective action intentions. The intentions to engage in collective action was assessed using three items adapted from Van Zomeren et al. (2004): 'I would like to participate in a demonstration against Britain bombing Iran's nuclear facilities,' 'I would like to participate in raising our collective voice to prevent Britain from bombing Iran's nuclear facilities,' and 'I would like to do something with other British people to show our opposition to Britain bombing Iran's nuclear facilities' ($\alpha = .96$). These items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*).

Procedure

At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that the study concerned their thoughts about the situation in Iran. Participants read a brief report summarising Iran's alleged nuclear missile program (see Appendix 1). This report outlined the allegation that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, and described the sanctions placed on Iran by the UN together with Britain's stance on this issue. The report said that the UK Foreign Secretary stated that he would not rule out the use of military force against Iran. To make this more concrete, participants were told that British forces might bomb Iran's nuclear facilities if they did not start to comply with the UN. Participants then completed the pre-manipulation opinion measure. This scale was followed by the illegitimacy manipulation. In both conditions participants read a statement from a panel of experts in international law (see Appendix 2). In the low illegitimacy condition the statements said that military force was justified because Britain had been forced into this position by Iran's refusal to co-operate with the UN. In the high illegitimacy condition the lawyers' statement said that military force would be unjustified because Iran had recently agreed to co-operate with the UN. This

information was followed by a series of comprehension questions. The illegitimacy manipulation check, anticipated group-based emotion scales, and collective action measure were then completed.

Results

Three participants were removed from the sample before data analysis because they failed to answer a substantial proportion of questions. A logarithmic transformation was performed on the pre-manipulation opinion variable prior to further analysis, to correct for a positive skew. Anticipated group-based shame and anger were highly correlated, $r(183) = .87$, $p < .001$. A tolerance value of .18 indicated that the inclusion of both constructs in a single regression model would create multicollinearity(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To overcome this problem when assessing my mediation hypothesis, I combined the anticipated group-based shame and anger variables ($\alpha = .94$).

Illegitimacy

An ANCOVA was performed on the dependent variables, with the manipulation entered as an independent variable and pre-manipulation opinion entered as a covariate (see Table 1). Pre-manipulation opinion significantly predicted all the dependent variables. Controlling for opinion, the future actions of the ingroup were believed to be more illegitimate in the high illegitimacy condition ($M = 4.94$, SD = 1.94) than the low illegitimacy condition ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 2.02$). When controlling for opinion, participants anticipated greater group-based shame/anger in the high ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 2.23$) than the low illegitimacy condition ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.98$). Although people anticipated group-based guilt to a greater extent in the high illegitimacy condition ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 2.08$) compared to the low illegitimacy condition ($M = 2.71$, $SD = 2.08$), this difference was non-significant. People were more willing to undertake collective action in the high

illegitimacy condition (M = 4.01, SD =2.42) than the low illegitimacy condition (M = 3.52, SD =2.14).

Table 1. Results of the ANCOVAs (Study 1).

	Pre-manipulation opinion	Illegitimacy manipulation
Illegitimacy manipulation check	$F(1,183) = 514.61$ $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .74$	$F(1,183) = 17.15$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$
Anticipated group-based shame/anger	$F(1,183) = 296.16$, $p<.001$,$\eta_p^2 = .62$	$F(1,183) = 6.27$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$
Anticipated group-based guilt	$F(1,183) = 104.79$, $p <.001$, $\eta_p^2 = .36$	$F(1,183) = 2.64$, $p = .106$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$
Collective action	$F(1,183) = 199.02$, $p <.001$, $\eta_p^2 = .52$	$F(1,183) = 7.18$, $p = .008$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$

Mediation

I hypothesised that appraising a proposed future transgression as illegitimate would elicit anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger, and that shame and anger would predict collective action. Anticipated group-based shame and anger were therefore expected to mediate the effect of illegitimacy on collective action. The hypotheses for anticipated group-based shame and anger were identical, so the combination of these variables did not substantially alter my hypothesised indirect effect. Pre-manipulation opinion was entered into all of the regression equations. Consistent with the ANCOVA results, illegitimacy affected anticipated group-based shame/anger ($\beta = .11$, $p = .013$) and collective action ($\beta = .14$, $p = .008$), thus fulfilling the first two criteria for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). When anticipated group-based shame/anger and illegitimacy were all entered into the same regression equation, the emotion variable was the only significant predictor of collective action ($\beta = .81$, p

<.001 for shame/anger and β = .05, p = .217 for illegitimacy)[2]. This pattern of results suggests that anticipated group-based shame/anger fully mediated the effect of illegitimacy on collective action. In keeping with Preacher and Hayes (2004), the significance of this indirect pathway was assessed using 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals with 5000 bootstrap resamples. The confidence intervals did not include zero (CI_{95} =.10, .78), showing that this indirect pathway was significant. These results are consistent with my proposition that illegitimacy affects collective action through anticipated group-based shame/anger.

I also included anticipated group-based guilt in the regression equation to determine whether it uniquely predicted collective action. In this equation anticipated group-based shame/anger significantly predicted collective action (β = .77, p < .001). Illegitimacy and anticipated group-based guilt were non-significant predictors of collective action (β = .04, p = .222 for illegitimacy and β = .05, p = .357 for guilt). These results suggest that anticipated group-based shame/anger (but not guilt) uniquely predicted the desire to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.

Discussion

The aim of Study 1 was to determine whether appraising a proposed ingroup action as illegitimate elicits anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger, and whether the latter two emotions promote collective action. Appraising the ingroup's actions as illegitimate increased anticipated group-based shame/anger and intended collective action. Furthermore, anticipated group-based shame/anger mediated the effect of illegitimacy on collective action. I also hypothesised that anticipated group-based

[2] This analysis was replicated twice with the combined emotion construct replaced with either the anticipated group-based shame or anger variable. Anticipated group-based shame *and* anger mediated the effect of illegitimacy on collective action when they were analysed separately.

guilt would not promote collective action because this emotion is associated with passive action tendencies. The results supported this hypothesis. The only hypothesis not supported in Study 1 was the effect of illegitimacy on anticipated group-based guilt, although this effect approached significance.

One issue is the multicollinearity between anticipated group-based shame and anger. The predictions for these emotions were identical, so it was possible to combine these variables. However, it is worth considering the reasons for this multicollinearity. An association between anger and shame is well documented in the emotion literature (Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney et al., 1992). Intergroup research has also found that group-based shame and anger are highly correlated (Iyer et al., 2007). In the present context, anticipated group-based shame may have led ingroup members to anticipate anger for the detrimental effects of the proposed transgression on social identity. In Study 2, I tried to avoid multicollinearityby improving how these constructs were measured. This was achieved by adding addition items to each scale.

Study 2

There were three differences between Studies 1 and 2. First, illegitimacy was measured rather than manipulated. Second, additional items were added to the anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger scales to try to avoid multicollinearity. Finally, I altered the context of the study to determine whether my hypotheses would be supported when the proposed ingroup transgression is less serious in nature. Participants were informed that the ingroup (the English) were planning to charge students from an outgroup (the Welsh) additional tuition fees for studying at an English university. In line with Study 1, I hypothesised that illegitimacy would positively predict the three

anticipated group-based emotions and that shame and anger (but not guilt) would positively predict collective action.

Method

Participants

A total of 179 undergraduate and postgraduate students (29 men and 150 women) participated in this research in exchange for course credit or 1 pound (approximately $1.60). Their ages ranged from 18 to 38 years, with a mean age of 20.15. All participants were English nationals.

Materials

Illegitimacy appraisal. Three items were used to assess illegitimacy: ‘It would be wrong for the English to charge extra tuition fees to the Welsh,’ ‘It would be immoral for the English to act in this way,’ and ‘It would be morally unacceptable for the English to treat the Welsh like this’($\alpha = .91$). These items were rated on a 7-pointLikert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Anticipated group-based emotions. An extra item was added to each of the anticipated group-based emotion measures used in Study 1. The additional guilt, shame and anger items were ‘regret,’ ‘embarrassed,’ and ‘annoyed,’ respectively. Participants were asked: ‘If the English were to charge the Welsh an extra £1,250 tuition fees for studying in England, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?’ All three scales were reliable (αs = .85 for guilt; .89 for shame, and .92 for anger). Participants responded to these items on 7-pointscales (0 = *not at all*, 6 = *extremely*).

Collective action intentions. Three items were used to assess the participant’s intentions to perform collective action: ‘I would like to participate in a demonstration against this proposal,’ ‘I would like to participate in raising our collective voice to stop this proposal,’ and ‘I would like to do something with other English people to stop this

proposal' (α = .93). Participants rated the extent to which they endorsed these items on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*).

Procedure

The study was completed online. After consent had been given, participants read a report stating that universities were suffering from a lack of funding, which could have serious consequences for the standard of teaching (see Appendix 3). One solution that was being considered by the UK government (in England) was to raise tuition fees for non-English students studying at English universities. However, this would mean that if non-English UK students, such as the Welsh, were to study in England they would be expected to pay more for their education than English students studying the same course. To ensure that this discrimination was perceived as illegitimate, participants were informed that the Welsh Assembly Government was *not* planning to introduce proposals to increase tuition fees paid by English students studying in Wales. This information was followed by a series of multiple-choice comprehension questions. Participants then completed the illegitimacy, anticipated group-based emotion and collective action measures.

Results

Nine participants answered more than half of the comprehension questions incorrectly. Removing these participants from the data did not alter the results in any substantive way, so their data were retained. A square root transformation was performed on the illegitimacy variable prior to further analysis to correct for moderate negative skew.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Although the correlations between the three negative anticipated emotions were high (see Table 2), the tolerance values ranged from .24 to .63, suggesting that the

dataset was not affected by multicollinearity(Cohen et al., 2003). Moreover, confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the hypothesised three-factor solution fitted the data significantly better than a single-factor or any two-factor solution (see Table 3).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the hypothesised model (Study 2).

	M (*SD*)	1	2	3	4	5
1 Illegitimacy (transformed)	1.54 (0.24)	-				
2 Anticipated group-based guilt	2.69 (1.47)	.43***	-			
3 Anticipated group-based shame	3.27 (1.65)	.54***	.80***	-		
4 Anticipated group-based anger	2.97 (1.63)	.55***	.67***	.59***	-	
5 Collective action intentions	3.03 (1.44)	.46***	.52***	.65***	.63***	-

*** = $p < .001$

Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis fit indices for the anticipated group-based emotions (Study 2).

	Fit indices							Model comparison with three-factor solution	
	χ^2	df	GFI	CFI	NFI	RMSEA	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2$	df
Three-factor model	35.43†	24	.96	.99	.97	.053	77.43		
Two-factor combined guilt and shame model	48.74**	26	.94	.98	.96	.072	86.74	13.31**	2
Two-factor combined shame and anger model	114.95***	26	.83	.92	.90	.142	152.95	79.52***	2
Two-factor combined guilt and anger model	124.81***	26	.83	.91	.90	.150	162.81	89.38***	2
Single-factor model	141.71***	27	.80	.90	.88	.159	177.71	106.28***	3

Note. df = degrees of freedom; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error approximation; AIC = Akaike's information criterion.
† = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .01$, and *** = $p < .001$

Structural Equation Modelling

Hypothesised model. Based on the above rationale, I hypothesised that appraising the situation as illegitimate would positively predict guilt, shame and anger, and that the latter two emotions would positively predict collective action. This model was assessed usingAMOS 6 software (Arbuckle, 2005). The model tests were based on the covariance matrix and maximum likelihood estimation was used. The chi-squared value was non-significant, $\chi^2(2, N = 179) = 2.07$, $p = .150$, suggesting that the fit between the data and the model was good. This was confirmed by the other fit indices: goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = 1.00, adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) = .93, comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00, normed fit index (NFI) = 1.00, and root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .078[3].

As shown in Figure 1, illegitimacy positively predicted each of the anticipated group-based emotions. Anticipated group-based shame and anger, in turn, positively predicted the intentions to perform collective action. The relationship between anticipated group-based guilt and collective action was not significant, implying that this emotion did not uniquely predict protesting. Further analysis revealed that in the fully saturated model anticipated group-based shame and anger predicted collective action, $\beta = .42$, $p < .001$ for shame and $\beta = .30$, $p < .001$ for anger, but that illegitimacy and anticipated group-based guilt were non-significant predictors, $\beta = -.05$, $p = .573$ for guilt and $\beta = .10$, $p = .149$ for illegitimacy. The fact that the bivariate relationship between illegitimacy and collective action was significant but the direct pathway in the saturated model was non-significant suggests that anticipated group-based shame and anger fully mediated the relationship between illegitimacy and collective action.

[3] The model fit was improved when the non-significant pathway between guilt and collective action was removed.



Figure 1. Model of the pathways to collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression (Study 2).
Note. Figure contains standardised parameter estimates.
*** = $p < .001$.

Alternative models. One alternative model assessed whether the anticipated group-based emotions predicted collective action via the illegitimacy appraisal. I replaced the direct pathways between the anticipated group-based emotions and collective action with an indirect pathway through illegitimacy. The fit indices suggested that this model did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(3, N = 179) = 74.55$, $p < .001$, GFI = .88, AGFI= .40, CFI = .87, NFI = .87, and RMSEA = .366. Moreover, the fit for the hypothesized model was significantly better than this alternative model, $\chi^2(2, N = 179) = 72.48$, $p < .001$. The Akaike's information criterion (AIC) was lower for the hypothesised model (30.07) than for the alternative model (98.55) suggesting that the original model was superior.

A second alternative model assessed whether generalised negative affect increased the desire to undertake collective action, rather than the discrete anticipated emotions. The anticipated emotions were treated as three observed indicators for the (latent) negative affect variable. In keeping with the hypothesised model, generalised

negative affect mediated the relationship between illegitimacy and collective action. This model did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(5, N = 179) = 16.34$, $p = .006$, GFI = .96, AGFI= .89, CFI = .98, NFI = .97, and RMSEA = .113. Moreover, the fit of the hypothesized model was significantly better than this alternative model, $\chi^2(4, N = 179) = 14.27$, $p < .006$. The AIC of the second alternative model (36.34) was also higher than that of the hypothesised model, suggesting that the latter was superior.

The final alternative model assessed whether the relationship between illegitimacy and the anticipated emotions was mediated by the intentions to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.This model did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(3, N = 179) = 36.64$, $p < .001$, GFI = .93, AGFI= .65, CFI = .94, NFI = .94, and RMSEA = .251. Moreover, the hypothesized model fitted the data significantly better than this alternative model, $\chi^2(2, N = 179) = 34.57$, $p < .001$. The AIC for this model (60.64) was lower than that of the hypothesized model, thereby suggesting that the latter was superior.

Discussion

I hypothesised that illegitimacy would positively predict anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger. The results of Study 2 supported this hypothesis. I also predicted that shame and anger (but not guilt) would predict collective action. In line with Study 1, I found that anticipated group-based shame and anger (but not guilt) positively predicted collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. The results of Study 2 extends those of Study 1 by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame and anger are separate constructs and thatthey both uniquely predict collective action.

The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the idea that anticipated group-based emotions promote collective action. A logical next step is to determine the

factors that influence anticipated group-based emotions. People's willingness to accept negative information about their group is dependent on their level of ingroup identification (Branscombe et al., 1999; Doosje et al., 1998, 2006). Researchers suggest that identification consists of two superordinate components (Leach et al., 2008; Roccas et al., 2006). Leach and colleagues (2008) call one component self-investment, and define it as the value and emotional significance attached to ingroup as well as the importance and salience of this membership. In positive circumstances, high self-investment in a group is rewarding. However, in negative circumstances greater investment in a group results in more negative affective consequences. Because of this, people with high self-investment are typically motivated to reaffirm a positive ingroup identity and are likely to legitimise negative ingroup actions in order to protect their group and avoid aversive group-based emotions (Leach et al., 2008; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006).The second component of identification is referred to as self-definition (Leach et al., 2008). This can be defined as the perception of commonality and similarity within the ingroup and between group members. Unlike self-investment, self-definition is not directly related to the desire to maintain a positive ingroup identity.

As stated earlier, the anticipation of negative group-based emotions signals that a proposed ingroup action poses a threat to social identity. People with high self-investment are likely to justify an ingroup transgression in order to protect social identity. As a result, these people should anticipate the negative group-based emotions to a lesser extent and thus be less willing to engage in collective action against the transgression. People with low self-investment, on the other hand, are not motivated to protect social identity, thereby making them less likely to justify a proposed ingroup transgression. By contrast, people withhigh self-definition are unlikely to justify the

ingroup's actions because this component of identification is not directly related to the desire to maintain a positive social identity. These hypotheses were tested in Study 3.

A possible limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that I focused on negative anticipated emotions. It may be that anticipating positive emotions for the proposed ingroup transgression would inhibit collective action. Ingroup members may experience positive emotions for derogatory actions when the superiority of their identity is threatened (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Leach et al., 2002). If people believed that a course of action would secure their advantageous positionthat is under threat, they might anticipate positive group-based emotions for this action, such as pride. For example, the allegation that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons threatened the Western world's advantageous position over Iraq; by invading Iraq Western nations could neutralise this threat, and thereby maintain their superiority over the outgroup. This may have led some people to anticipate positive group-based emotions for undertaking this status-maintaining strategy, thus making people less likely to protests against the war.

A second limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that I did not assess any action tendencies associated with anticipated group-based guilt. I argued above that group-based guilt is associated with more passive action tendencies, such as reparations. When people anticipate aversive group-based emotions they may seek to express their willingness to help the victimised party to compensate for any negative effects of their actions. This can be interpreted as a minimum effort strategy for avoiding this aversive emotion. By expressing a willingness to compensate the victimised party for any detrimental effects of their actions, ingroup members show that they are motivated to reduce the negative consequences for the victim, thereby reducing the likelihood of this emotion being experienced. It was therefore hypothesised that anticipated group-based

guilt would positively predict desire to compensate the victimised outgroup. This was assessed in Study 3.

Study 3

Study 3 differed from Study 2 in five respects. First, I reverted to the context of Iran. Second, I assessed the moderating role of ingroup identification on the anticipated emotion process. Third, I investigated the role of positive anticipated group-based emotions on collective action. Three positive emotions were measured in this study: pride, relief and feeling emboldened. The positive arousal that is feeling emboldened arises when people believe that they are superior to and have control over another party. This emotion may be more relevant in the present context than pride because it is related to the ingroup's superiority. Fourth, I investigated the action tendencies associated with anticipated group-based guilt (i.e., reparations). Finally, I manipulated the anticipated group-based emotions. This was achieved by manipulating the salience of the emotions.

Previous research has found that manipulating the salience of anticipated emotions is an effective procedure for assessing their impact on behaviour (Richard et al., 1996; Sandberg & Conner, 2008; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2011a). In the salient condition, participants rated the extent to which they would feel the anticipated group-based emotions for the proposed ingroup transgression *before* stating their willingness to engage in collective action. In the control condition, the anticipated emotions were rated *after* participants stated their willingness to engage in collective action. I also manipulated the valence of the anticipated group-based emotions. Participants rated the extent to which they anticipated *either* positive *or* negative group-based emotions for the ingroup transgression. When the anticipated group-based emotions are salient, the emotional consequences of the action are prominent and should

therefore have a greater effect on collective behaviour than in the control condition. The anticipated group-based emotion ratings can then be used to determine a) whether this effect is due to anticipated emotions and b) which emotion(s) are responsible for this effect.

I hypothesised that the effect of the manipulations would be moderated by self-investment. When negative anticipated group-based emotions are salient, people with high self-investment should be inclined to justify the ingroup transgression in order to avoid social identity threats. As a result, these people should experience less intense negative anticipated group-based emotions and therefore be less likely to engage in collective action. When the negative anticipated group-based emotions are not salient, the proposed transgression is less threatening. People with high self-investment should therefore be less likely to justify the transgression, resulting in greater levels of collective action in the control condition than the salient condition. People with low self-investment, on the other hand, are unlikely to seek to justify the proposed transgression. These people should therefore be more likely to engage in collective action when anticipated negative emotions are salient than in the control condition. Based on Studies 1 and 2, I hypothesised that this effect would be mediated by anticipated group-based shame and anger. When positive anticipated group-based emotions are salient, participants should be less willing to engage in collective action compared to the control condition, regardless of level of self-investment. Because self-definition is not related to the desire to maintain a positive social identity I hypothesised that it would not moderate the effects of the salience and valence manipulations.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 128 undergraduate students (11 males and 117 females) participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 33 years, with a mean age of 19.47. A 2 (salience: salient vs. control) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x continuous moderating variable (self-investment or self-definition, centred) between-subjects factorial design was used. In the positive valence condition participants rated the extent to which they anticipated feeling positive group-based emotions (pride, feeling emboldened, and relief) if Britain were to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. In the negative valence condition participants rated the extent to which they anticipated negative group-based emotions (guilt, shame, and anger) for this event. In the salient condition the anticipated emotion ratings were measured before collective action intentions. In the control condition the anticipated emotion rating were measured after collective action. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. The dependent variable was the participant's willingness to engage in collective action.

Materials

Ingroup identification. Identification was measured using Leach and colleagues' (2008) 14-item scale (see Appendix 4). This scale measures two superordinate components of identification: self-investment and self-definition. Self-investment is assessed using 10 items, such as 'Being British is an important part of how I see myself' and 'I am glad to be British' ($\alpha = .92$). Self-definition is assessed using 4 items (e.g. 'I am similar to the average British person' and 'British people have a lot in common with each other; $\alpha = .82$). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Anticipated group-based emotions and collective action. A new item was added to each of the negative emotion scales to increase the strength of the manipulation. The additional guilt, shame and anger items were ‘sorry,’ ‘humiliated,’ and ‘furious,’ respectively. All three scales were reliable (αs = .87 for guilt; .87 for shame, and .88 for anger). The pride items were ‘proud,’ ‘triumphant,’ ‘victorious,’ and ‘jubilant’ (α = .89). The relief items were ‘relaxed,’ ‘relieved,’ ‘reassured,’ and ‘secure’ (α = .89). Feeling emboldened was assessed with the following items: ‘bold,’ ‘superior,’ ‘fearless,’ and ‘powerful’ (α = .83). Participants were asked: ‘If the British were to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?’ These items were assessed on a 7-point scale (0 = *not at all*, 6 = *extremely intensely*). The collective action measure was identical to that used in Study 1 (α = .91).

Reparations. The desire to compensate Iranian people for any negative consequences that the bombings mightincur was assessed using the following 4 items (α = .84): ‘If Britain were to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites, resulting in civilian casualties, how willing would you be to send aid to the victims/donate money to Iranian humanitarian aid charities/sign a “book of apology”/support a government proposal to send aid to the victims?’ All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*not at all willing*) to 7 (*extremely willing*).

Procedure

After consent had been given, participants completed the identification scale. This was followed by information about Iran’s alleged nuclear missile program (see Appendix 5). This described Iran’s defiance of UN sanctions and their alleged tests of nuclear weapons. It concluded by stating that the British government has said that it would not rule out the use of military force against Iran if it did not start to comply with UN sanctions. Participants were informed that Britain *might* bomb Iran’s nuclear

facilities. A series of comprehension questions were then completed to ensure that the participant had understood this information.

In the salient conditions the anticipated group-based emotion measure was then completed. In the positive emotion salient condition the positive emotion scales were completed. In the negative emotion salient condition the negative emotion scales were completed. The collective action and reparation scales were then completed. In the control conditions these latter scales were rated before the anticipated emotion measures. When all measures had been completed participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Removing three participants who answered more than half the comprehension questions incorrectly did not substantially alter the results, so their data were retained. To correct for positive skew, a square-root, logarithmic and reciprocal transformation was performed on the relief, pride, and feeling emboldened variables, respectively, prior to further analysis. To correct for negative skew, a square-root transformation was performed on the self-investment variable before further analysis.Although the anticipated emotions were highly correlated (see Table 4), the lowest tolerance value was .33, indicating that the data was not biased my multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). The anticipated emotions were therefore assessed as difference constructs. Two 2 (salience: salient vs. control) x 2 (valence: negative vs. positive) x continuous identification measure (self-investment *or* self-definition, centred) ANCOVAs were performed on collective action, one for each identification measure. In each ANCOVA the identification measure that was not included in the analysis as a continuous moderating variable was entered as a covariate.

Table 4.Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for anticipated group-based emotions (Study 3).

	M (*SD*)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1 Anticipated group-based guilt	2.90 (1.28)	-					
2 Anticipated group-based shame	2.57 (1.33)	.74***	-				
3 Anticipated group-based anger	2.50 (1.31)	.71***	.77***	-			
4 Anticipated group-based emboldened	0.23 (0.24)	-	-	-	-		
5 Anticipated group-based relief	1.50 (0.40)	-	-	-	.71***	-	
6 Anticipated group-based pride	1.30 (0.28)	-	-	-	.79***	.70***	-

Note. Table includes post-transformation anticipated group-based pride, relief and feeling emboldened, hence the low means and standard deviations. Correlations between the positive and negative emotions are not included because these emotions were rated in difference conditions.
*** = $p < .001$

Self-Investment

Collective action. There was a significant main effect of salience, $F(1, 119) = 10.10$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. The main effect of valence was not significant, $F(1, 119) = 0.56$, $p = .457$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. Self-investment did not predict collective action, $F(1, 119) = 0.20$, $p = .658$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. The valence by self-investment interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 119) = 3.12$, $p = .080$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. These results were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between salience, valence and self-investment, $F(1, 119) = 4.64$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$[4]. A comparison of the estimated means revealed that people with low ($M - 1SD$)self-investment were less likely to support collective action

[4] The three-way interaction remained significant when self-definition was removed as a covariate.

when positive emotions were salient (M =2.65, SE = 0.34)than (1) when they were not (M =3.73, SE = 0.32), $F(1, 119) = 5.76$, $p = .018$,$\eta_p^2 = .05$, and (2) when negative emotions were salient (M =3.44, SE = 0.35), $F(1, 119) = 2.80$, $p = .097$,$\eta_p^2 = .02$ (see Figure 2). People with high (M + 1SD) self-investment, on the other hand,were less likely to support collective action when negative emotions were salient (M =2.20, SE = 0.32) than (1) when they were not (M =3.59, SE = 0.42), $F(1, 119) = 7.62$, $p = .008$,$\eta_p^2 = .06$ and (2) when positive emotions were salient (M =3.20, SE = 0.34), $F(1, 119) = 5.38$, $p = .022$,$\eta_p^2 = .04$.



Figure 2. Interaction of salience, valence and self-investment on collective action intentions (Study 3). Error bars = ±1SE.

Negative anticipated group-based emotions. Anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger were only rated in the negative valence condition. Participants in the positive valence conditions were therefore not included in these analyses and valence was not a factor. The main effect of salience on anger was not significant, $F(1, 59) = 0.18$, $p = .676$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. Self-investment significantly predicted anger, $F(1, 59) = 8.04$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, reflecting a negative relationship between these variables ($\beta = -.39$, $p = .006$). This relationship was qualified by a significant interaction between salience and self-investment, $F(1, 59) = 7.17$, $p = .010$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$. Simple effects analysis revealed that people with low ($M - 1SD$)self-investment anticipated group-based anger to a greater extent in the salientcondition ($M = 3.49$, $SE = 0.32$)than in the control condition ($M = 2.73$, $SE = 0.31$), $F(1, 59) = 3.21$, $p = .078$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$ (see Figure 3). People with high ($M + 1SD$)self-investment, on the other hand, anticipated less group-based anger in the salient condition ($M = 1.47$, $SE = 0.30$)than in the control condition ($M = 2.48$, $SE = 0.39$), $F(1, 59) = 4.84$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$.



Figure 3. Interaction of salience and self-investment on anticipated group-based anger (Study 3). Error bars = ±1*SE*.

The main effect of salience on shame was not significant, $F(1, 59) = 1.51$, $p = .223$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Self-investment significantly predicted shame, $F(1, 59) = 10.69$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$, reflecting a negative relationship between these variables ($\beta = -.45$, $p = .002$). This relationship was qualified by a near-significant salience by self-investment interaction, $F(1, 59) = 3.83$, $p = .055$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. People with high ($M + 1SD$)self-investment anticipated group-based shame to a lesser extent in the salient condition (M =1.42, SE = 0.30)than in the control condition (M =2.44, SE = 0.39), $F(1, 59) = 4.83$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$ (see Figure 4).



Figure 4. Interaction of salience and self-investment on anticipated group-based shame (Study 3). Error bars = ±1*SE*.

The main effect of salience on guilt was not significant, $F(1, 59) = 1.98$, $p = .164$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Self-investment significantly predicted guilt, $F(1, 59) = 5.78$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$, reflecting a negative relationship between these variables ($\beta = -.35$, $p = .019$). The interaction between salience and self-investment on guiltwas marginally significant, $F(1, 59) = 2.80$, $p = .100$,$\eta_p^2 = .05$. People with high ($M + 1SD$)self-investment anticipated group-based guilt to a lesser extent in the salience condition (M =1.92, SE =

0.31)than in the control condition (M =2.92, SE = 0.40), $F(1, 59) = 4.44$, $p = .039$,$\eta_p^2 = .07$.

Positive anticipated group-based emotions. Neither the main effect of self-investment nor its interaction with salience had a significant effect on any of the positive anticipated group-based emotions (*p*s> .10).

Self-Definition

The main effect of self-definition did not predict collective action, $F(1, 119) = 0.33$, $p = .566$,$\eta_p^2 < .01$. The interaction between salience and self-definition had a marginally significant effect on collective action, $F(1, 119) = 3.22$, $p = .076$,$\eta_p^2 = .03$[5]. All other interaction effects on collective action were non-significant (*p*s> .10).

Reparation

There were no significant main or interaction effects on reparation (*p*s> .10). Because positive emotions were only rated in the positive valence condition and negative emotions were only rated in the negative condition, two analyses were conducted, one regressing reparation on positive anticipated emotions and the other regressing reparation on negative anticipated emotions. Across the two analyses, the only significant predictor of reparations was anticipated group-based guilt, $\beta = .49$, $p = .008$.

Moderated Mediation

To determine whether the effect of the emotion salience manipulation on collective behaviour was mediated by anticipated group-based emotions and to identify

[5]Simple effects analysis revealed that people with high self-definition (M + 1SD)were less likely to engage in collective action when the emotions were salient (M =2.60, SE = 0.25) than in the control condition (M =3.74, SE = 0.24), $F(1, 119) = 5.38$, $p = .022$,$\eta_p^2 = .04$. I also found that the salience by self-definition interaction had a significant effect on anticipated group-based anger, $F(1, 59) = 6.16$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$. People with high self-definition anticipated anger to a lesser extent in the salient condition (M =2.30, SE = 0.28) than the control condition (M =3.02, SE = 0.31), $F(1, 59) = 3.30$, $p = .074$,$\eta_p^2 = .05$. Self-definition also had a significant main effect on guilt, $F(1, 59) = 5.01$, $p = .029$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, caused by a positive relationship between these variables ($\beta = .32$, $p = .029$).

which emotions were driving this effect, I conducted a moderated mediation analysis. The reduction in collective action exhibited by participants with high self-investment when negative emotions were salient was thought to be due to these participants justifying the ingroup's actions and thus experiencing anticipated group-based shame and anger to a lesser extent. This moderation process could only be assessed for the participants in the negative valence condition, because this is where negative emotions were measured. However, this is unproblematic because it was precisely in this condition that a reduction in collective action was observed.

For participants in the negative valence condition, the effect of the salience by self-investment interaction on collective action intentions was marginally significant, $\beta = -.21$, $p = .075$, thereby fulfilling the first criterion for moderated mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As reported above, the salience by self-investment interaction also affected the three negative anticipated group-based emotions, fulfilling the second criterion for moderated mediation. In keeping with Muller and colleagues (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005), the main effects of all negative anticipated group-based emotions and their interactions with self-investment were entered into the original regression equation[6]. The salience by self-investment interaction was a non-significant predictor of collective action intentions when the main effects of the anticipated group-based emotions and their interactions with salience were entered into the regression equation, $\beta = -.05$, $p = .715$. Anticipated group-based shame significantly predicted collective action, $\beta = .48$, $p = .019$. Anticipated group-based guilt and anger were non-significant predictors, $\beta = -.11$, $p = .524$ and $\beta = .29$, $p = .132$, respectively. The remaining the predictors were non-significant (ps$> .10$).

[6] The main effects and interactions of all the anticipated group-based emotions were entered into the regression equation to determine which emotion *uniquely* predicted collective action intentions. The salience by self-investment interaction still had a non-significant effect on collective action intentions once the anticipated group-based guilt and anger main effects and interactions were removed from the equation.

Following Preacher et al. (2007), the significance of this indirect pathway was assessed using 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals, calculated using 5000 bootstrap resamples. For people with low (M – 1SD) self-investment, the confidence intervals included zero (CI_{95} =-.17, .42), indicating that the indirect effect was non-significant. For people with high (M + 1SD) self-investment, the confidence intervals did not include zero (CI_{95} =-.64, -.07), demonstrating a significant indirect effect. These results reflect the fact that people with high (but not low) self-investment anticipated less group-based shame when the salience of the negative emotions was high, making them less willing to engage in collective action.

Discussion

The aim of Study 3 was to assess the effects of identification and anticipated group-based emotions on collective action. I hypothesised that when negative anticipated emotions were salient, participants with high self-investment would justify the action, inhibiting the anticipated emotions and collective action. The results of Study 3 supported this hypothesis. For participants with high self-investment the effect of the salience manipulation on collective action was mediated by anticipated group-based shame. Based on Studies 1 and 2, I hypothesised that this effect would also be mediated by anticipated anger, but this was not the case. However, it is worth noting that the effect of anger approached significance. I also hypothesised that people with low self-investment would exhibit greater levels of collective action when the negative emotions were salient than when they were not salient. In Study 3 this difference was non-significant. Previous research has found that low identifiers only undertake collective action when group efficacy is high (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Because the participants were not informed about group efficacy, people with low self-investment

may have been reluctant to undertake collective action when the negative emotions were salient.

In Study 3 I also investigated the effects of positive anticipated group-based emotions on collective action. I hypothesised that when positive anticipated group-based emotions were salient people would inhibit collective action, regardless of their level of self-investment. This hypothesis was supported for participants with low self-investment. Participants with high self-investment did show a (non-significant) reduction in collective action when the positive anticipated group-based emotions were highly salient compared to the control condition, providing some support for my hypothesis.

General Discussion

The aim of this research was to determine whether anticipating that an ingroup transgression would evoke aversive group-based emotions motivates group members to perform collective action to stop the transgression. I argued that anticipated group-based shame signals that a proposed future action is likely to have a detrimental effect on social identity. I hypothesised that the desire to avoid this emotion and its undesirable consequences motivates ingroup members to undertake collective action in an attempt to prevent the immoral behaviour. Similarly, the desire to avoid the agitated state of ingroup-directed anger should also motivate group members to perform collective action. These predictions were supported in Studies 1 and 2, which found that anticipated group-based shame and anger positively predicted collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.

Previous research has found that group-based guilt is associated with passive rather than active behaviours (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). On this basis I hypothesised that the low action potential of anticipated group-based guilt would be

insufficient to motivate ingroup members to undertake active emotion avoidance strategies, such as collective action. This prediction was supported in all three studies. I also hypothesised that the anticipation of group-based guilt would motivate people to undertake passive emotion avoidance strategies, such as compensation for any negative consequences of the proposed ingroup action. Study 3 supported this hypothesis.

I hypothesised that participants with high self-investment would try to justify a future ingroup transgression when negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient; the aim of this justification being to protect the ingroup's identity. In Study 3, I found that participants with high self-investment exhibited reduced collective action intentions when negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient, compared to the control condition. This effect was mediated by anticipated group-based shame. When the negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient, participants with high self-investment anticipated low levels of group-based shame. This reduction in anticipated group-based shame resulted in lower levels of collective action.

I also hypothesised that the anticipation of positive group-based emotions would reduce participants' willingness to engage in collective action. In Study 3 I found that the anticipation of positive group-based emotions reduced collective action in participants with low self-investment. For participants with high self-investment, the pattern of results supported this hypothesis, but the difference was non-significant.

Since the inception of intergroup emotion theory (Devos et al., 2003; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999) there has been a growing interest in the motivational role of group-based emotions on collective action. Initially, this research focused on the role of group-based anger in motivating disadvantaged group members to perform collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). Researchers have recently extended the collective action literature by investigating the motivational role of group-based emotions in

promoting solidarity-based collective action. This research has demonstrated that advantaged groups may undertake collective action on the behalf of a disadvantaged group when they feel angry at the ingroup(Leach et al., 2006), empathy and sympathy towards the outgroup(Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Sweetman et al., 2009), or ashamed of their own group's actions (Iyer et al., 2007). To date, this literature has focused on the effect of experienced emotions on collective action. The present study extends this research by demonstrating that the anticipation of group-based emotions predicts people's willingness to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. This research suggests that emotions do not need to be experienced directly *in situ* for them to affect the behaviour of group members. The mere prospect of an identity-harming group-based emotion is sufficient to promote collective action.

The interpersonal literature suggests that moral behaviour is guided by anticipated emotions (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). Aversive emotions are elicited when people violate a moral standard. Anticipated emotions deter immoral behaviour by highlighting these aversive consequences. I extend this theory by arguing that anticipated group-based emotions can also promote moral intergroup behaviour. Recent research has demonstrated that morality is a key aspect of ingroup identity (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011; Scheepers et al., 2009). I argue that anticipated group-based emotions help ingroup members to maintain a moral identity. Ingroup members should be motivated to prevent a proposed ingroup action when they anticipate that it will evoke group-based guilt, shame or anger. Collective action is one strategy that ingroup members can implement to alter the intended behaviour of the ingroup and thereby avoid the aversive emotions. This approach can be interpreted as a form of self-policing. The anticipation of these emotions warns ingroup members that the proposed actions of

their group are immoral, which in turn motivates collective action to prevent the transgression and thereby maintain a moral group identity.

Our results contrast with the work of Tangney and colleagues (Dearing et al., 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007) that suggests that moral behaviour is more likely to be guided by guilt than shame. However, recently research has found that shame may promote prosocial behaviour (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010), and that guilt has a 'dark side' (Bastian et al., 2011; De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). One reason why Tangney and colleagues did not find a link between shame and prosocial behaviour may be because they measured the participant's proneness to this emotion rather than the emotion itself (De Hooge et al., 2008). In keeping with this idea, Tibbetts(1997) found that shame-proneness was positively associated with deviant behaviour but that anticipated shame negatively predicted this action. Based on Tibbetts(1997) and the findings of De Hooge and colleagues, I argue that shame can promote moral behaviour. The findings of the present studies extend this work by suggesting that (group-based) shame promotes moral intergroup behaviour.

There is some debate in the literature concerning the classification of anticipated emotions. Frijda(2004) suggested that anticipated emotions are predictive cognitions rather than emotions. However, there is evidence that anticipated emotions elicit affective arousal. Imagery studies have found that imagining emotional experiences alters physical arousal (Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992). Similarly, research has found that normal participants exhibited higher skin conductance responses before undertaking a risky decision rather than a safe option (Bechara et al., 1996). The presence of this pre-empted arousal in the latter study suggests that a) anticipated emotions signal decisions that would be regretted, and b) these anticipated emotions are associated with

affective reactions. The affective nature of anticipated emotions suggests that they are (cognitively-based) emotions rather than (or as well as) cognitions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007).

It is worth considering the relationship between anticipated and experienced group-based emotions. Experienced emotions help to improve the accuracy of their anticipated counterpart (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994). People experience aversive moral emotions (such as guilt, shame and anger) when their behaviour violates a moral standard. The fact that the emotion is being experienced suggests that the anticipated emotions did not deter the immoral behaviour and that the accuracy of this system needs to be improved. These experienced emotions become associated with the immoral behaviour. The next time the person is in a situation in which they can repeat this immoral action, the negative affect signals that this will result in aversive emotions. The anticipated emotion prevents the immoral action from being repeated. I believe that this process occurs at the intergroup level. Eliciting group-based guilt, shame or anger suggests that the ingroup has done something immoral. The aversive consequences of these group-based emotions become associated with immoral action. When ingroup members are in a position to repeat the action, or engage in similar behaviour, the anticipation of these aversive group-based emotions should deter the immoral behaviour: once bitten, twice shy.

It is important to acknowledge possible limitations of the present research. It could be argued that the effects are due to the anticipation of generalised negative affect, rather than specific emotions. Anticipating that the future actions of the ingroup can evoke negative arousal may have motivated ingroup members to undertake collective action against the proposed transgression. There are two reasons for rejecting this alternative explanation. First, in Study 2 the theoretical model in which emotions

were separate constructs fitted the observed data better than the latent negative affect model did. This suggests that it was the anticipation of group-based emotions that predicted the action tendencies, rather than more generic negative affect. Second, if the results were caused by negative affect rather than the emotions, anticipated group-based shame, anger *and* guilt should predict collective action. The fact that the latter anticipated emotion failed to uniquely predict collective action in all three studies suggests that negative affect is not driving this process.

A second limitation with the present studies is that they focus on a narrow range of anticipated group-based emotions and collective behaviours. In these studies I focused on the role of anticipated group-based shame and anger in promoting collective action against an ingroup transgression. Although this is a useful starting-point, there are other anticipated emotions and collective behaviours that need to be researched. For instance, I found that the anticipation of group-based pride did not predict collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. However, the anticipation of this group-based emotion may predict other forms of collective action. In keeping with social identity theory, members of a low status group may anticipate group-based pride resulting from improving their position in the social hierarchy. Anticipating this pride may motivate ingroup members to engage in collective action to improve their position.

In conclusion, the aim of this research was to determine whether the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions motivates people to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. Anticipated group-based shame and anger (but not guilt) predicted collective action in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 3, people with high self-investment were less willing to engage in collective action when negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient than they were in the control condition. This effect was found to be mediated by anticipated group-based shame. This series of

studies extends the literature on collective action in showing that the mere anticipation of aversive group-based emotions can increase collective protest. This is important because all previous research considering group-based emotions as predictors of collective action has focused on the powerful presence of such emotions (e.g., anger) rather than their anticipated avoidance. Moreover, I extend recent developments in the interpersonal emotions literature by demonstrating that shame may also promote moral *intergroup* behaviour.

Chapter 3: The Effects of Anticipated Group-Based Emotions andIngroup Identification on Discrimination[7]

In view of the countless incidents of group oppression, discrimination and genocide that have taken place in human history it would be easy to conclude that group membership promotes selfish, hostile and immoral behaviour. Research with minimal groups showing that merely being categorised into abstract, meaningless groups can evoke ingroup bias (Tajfel et al., 1971) is widely regarded as supporting this conclusion. In the present chapter I contribute to the small but growing body of literature suggesting that groups are motivated to act morally. I argue that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions can, under certain conditions, attenuate discrimination.

The moral psychology literature suggests that ethical behaviour is guided by aversive anticipated emotions, such as guilt and shame (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003). These researchers suggest that when people anticipate feeling guilt or shame they are likely to inhibit the behaviour in question in order to avoid the aversive consequences of these emotions. I extend this hypothesis by applying it to group-based emotions. Previous research has demonstrated that immoral ingroup behaviour elicits group-based guilt and shame (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2005). I argue that the desire to avoid the aversive consequences of these group-based emotions motivates ingroup members to inhibit immoral intergroup behaviour. When people predict (or anticipate) that an ingroup action would elicit group-based guilt and shame they should be proactively motivated to inhibit the behaviour in question, in order to avoid these emotions and their aversive consequences. The aim of the present research was to assess the role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in inhibiting discrimination.

[7] This chapter is based on Shepherd, Spears, and Manstead (2011a)

The Emotional Consequences of Illegitimate Ingroup Actions

Guilt and shame about the negative actions or attributes of one's group may be experienced through association with the ingroup in the absence of personal responsibility for these actions or attributes (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). These group-based emotions are elicited when members of an advantaged group believe that their privileged ingroup status was achieved through illegitimate actions for which their group is responsible (Branscombe et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2002). The ingroup members' interpretation of an illegitimate action determines whether group-based guilt or shame is elicited. Recent research suggests that shame is elicited when people believe that a specific part of one's identity is tarnished by a transgression(Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011), whereas guilt is experienced when people believe that they are responsible for a negative action (Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Similarly, believing that a transgression poses a threat to social identity should evoke group-based shame (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007) and appraising the ingroup as responsible for a controllable immoral *action* should elicit group-based guilt (Iyer et al., 2003; Lickel et al., 2004).

Evoking group-based guilt and shame has aversive consequences for ingroup members through the threat that these emotions pose to the group's identity (Branscombe et al., 1999). For these emotions to be elicited people must believe that their group was responsible for an immoral action. Accepting this appraisal associates the ingroup with a transgression, resulting in a negative social identity (Doosje et al., 1998). Furthermore, group-based shame poses an additional threat to social identity because people must believe that the transgression tarnishes their group's identity (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that people are motivated to maintain a positive group identity

and ingroup members will therefore try to protect their group's image by means of various 'identity management strategies' (Ellemers et al., 1993; Van Knippenberg, 1989). These strategies serve to defend the ingroup's identity by reassigning responsibility for the negative event or legitimising the ingroup's actions. For example, group identity might be protected from the negative experience of shame or guilt by externalising the blame (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Zebel, 2005), dehumanising the victim (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel et al., 2008), or denying the credibility of the source (Doosje et al., 2006).

These identity management strategies are post hoc methods of avoiding aversive group-based emotions. Ingroup members employ these strategies *after* the incident has taken place. Identity management strategies may also be used to avoid these emotions, in an anticipatory fashion, *before* an incident has taken place. For example, the use of propaganda to dehumanise an outgroup can alleviate the need to act morally towards this group (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989), thus preventing group-based guilt and shame for any future transgressions. I extend this idea by arguing that people may also use pre-emptive *pro-social* strategies to avoid these aversive group-based emotions and the threat that they pose for social identity. One such strategy is not to commit the transgression in the first place. I therefore argue that when people anticipate (or predict) feeling group-based guilt and shame for an action they will be motivated to inhibit the emotion-invoking behaviour. Thus when ingroup members find themselves in a situation in which they can achieve an advantage over an outgroup through illegitimate means (such as discrimination), the anticipation of group-based guilt and shame should signal that undertaking the immoral action would result in aversive emotions that may threaten the ingroup's identity. I propose that the desire to avoid these emotions should deter discriminatory behaviour.

There is a growing literature on the role of emotions in regulating intergroup behaviour (e.g., Devine et al., 2000; Maitner et al., 2007). Research has found that experiencing interpersonal guilt for a prejudice action reduces this behaviour in the future (Amodio et al., 2007; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993). Similarly, intergroup research has found that group-based guilt serves a self-regulatory function (Maitner et al., 2006). I extend this research by suggesting that *anticipated* group-based emotions may also regulate intergroup behaviour. Baumeister and colleagues (2007) suggest that anticipated emotions regulate immoral interpersonal behaviour by signalling the aversive emotional consequences of a transgression. The desire to avoid these aversive emotional consequences causes the behaviour to become inhibited. In line with this argument, I propose that when people anticipate group-based guilt and shame the desire to avoid these aversive emotions and their social identity threat motivates ingroup members to inhibit immoral behaviour, such as discrimination.

The Moderating Role of Ingroup Identification

A group member's response to a negative group-based emotion may depend on their level of identification with the ingroup(Branscombe et al., 1999; Doosje et al., 1998; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). I argue that degree of identification will moderate the effect of the anticipated group-based emotions on the behaviour of ingroup members. More generally, degree of identification with the ingroup is an important predictor of intergroup behaviour (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). This is likely to be particularly relevant in the present context because ingroup identification is typically related to the intensity of group-based emotions (Devos et al., 2003; Doosje et al., 1998; E. R. Smith et al., 2007) and under specific conditions it can affect discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; for an overview, see Turner, 1999).

Recent research suggests that ingroup identification consists of two superordinate components: self-investment and self-definition (Leach et al., 2008). The self-investment component focuses on the value and emotional significance attached to the ingroup and the importance and salience of group membership. When the group's identity is positive, high investment results in greater reward than low investment. However, in negative circumstances stronger investment can be detrimental to group image and self. The valence of the ingroup's identity is therefore related to this component of identification (see Leach et al., 2008). People with high (but not low) self-investment are motivated to protect social identity in order to protect their investment in the group. Self-definition, on the other hand, focuses on perceptions of ingroup homogeneity and the similarity of the self to the typical ingroup member. Compared to self-investment, self-definition is not directly related to the desire to maintain a positive social identity. In keeping with this rationale, research has found that only self-investment positively predicts the use of identity management strategies (Leach et al., 2008; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006).

Our argument is that when ingroup members anticipate group-based shame and guilt they should inhibit discrimination in order to avoid these aversive emotions and protect their group's identity. Because this rationale focuses on the desire to gain or maintain a positive social identity, I hypothesised that the effect of the anticipated emotions should be moderated by self-investment, but not by self-definition. In negative circumstances, the more people are invested in their group, the more they have to lose. Social identity threats are therefore more detrimental for people with high self-investment. As a result, high identifiers are more likely to protect their group (and their investment) from social identity threats than are low identifiers (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Doosje et al., 1998, 2006). Based on Study 3, it could be argued that people with

high self-investment are likely to legitimise future ingroup transgressions in order to avoid the aversive emotions and protect social identity. However, because people are unlikely to legitimise future transgressions when the outgroup does not pose a threat to the ingroup(Shepherd et al., 2011b) and because participants are not made aware of any threats posed by theoutgroup, I hypothesised that people with high self-investment should try to avoid the aversive group-based emotions by implementingprosocial strategies. The social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based guilt and shame should therefore motivate people with high self-investment to avoid any actions, such as discrimination, that would invoke the emotions.

Anticipating group-based guilt and shame should affect the amount of discrimination exhibited by people with low self-investment less because they are less motivated to protect the ingroup's positive identity but still stand to benefit from the discrimination. Although self-definition is positively related to the intensity of group-based emotions (Leach et al., 2008), people high in self-definition should be less motivated to avoid guilt and shame. As a result, this component of identification should not moderate the effects of the anticipated group-based emotions. The present research assessed the effects of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on discrimination in minimal groups (Study 4) and in established groups (Studies 5&6).

Study 4

In Study 4 I assessed the effect of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on intergroup discrimination. I used minimal groups to ensure that any effects were not due to pre-existing characteristics of the ingroup. In minimal group studies people are categorised into one of two abstract groups (e.g., inductive vs. deductive thinkers) about which they have no prior knowledge. Participants are then

asked to distribute resources to anonymous members of the ingroup and the outgroup. Typically, ingroup bias is exhibited, despite the minimal nature of these groups (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1978), making this a suitable context in which to assess my predictions.

The effect of the anticipated group-based emotions was assessed by manipulating their *salience*. This was achieved by simply asking participants in the emotion salient condition to rate the extent to which they would feel group-based guilt or shame if their ingroup were to discriminate against the outgroup(for a similar procedure, see Richard et al., 1996; Sandberg & Conner, 2009). In the *control* condition participants did not rate any anticipated emotions. Anticipated emotions should be more prominent in the ingroup member's mind and have a greater effect on their behaviour in the emotion salient condition than in the control condition. As a result, people with high self-investment should discriminate less in the emotion salient condition. Previous research has found that the effect of this manipulation on intergroup behaviour is fully mediated by anticipated group-based emotion measures (Shepherd et al., 2011c). This suggests that any effect of the salience manipulation on discrimination is likely to be caused by anticipated group-based emotions rather than extraneous variables, such as demand characteristics or interpersonal emotions.

A group norm manipulation was also included to determine whether the effect of the anticipated emotions would be stronger when people expected ingroup bias (although ingroup bias is common and potentially expected, I could not assume that participants would necessarily expect such behaviour from the ingroup). Participants in the experimental condition were informed that previous research had established that the ingroup*usually* discriminated against the outgroup.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 88 undergraduate students (76 females and 12 males) participated in this study in exchange for course credit. The age range of respondents was 18-30 years, with a mean age of 19.7. The study had a 2 (salience: control vs. emotion salient) by 2 (group norm: present vs. absent) between participants design. The two identification subscales proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008) were used as continuous moderators. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. The dependent variable was ingroup favouritism; specifically, the pull score of FAV (MD + MIP) on maximising joint profit (MJP).

Materials

Anticipated group-based emotions. The anticipation of group-based guilt and shame was assessed using two scales adapted from Schmader and Lickel(2006a). The guilt items were: 'guilty,' 'regret,' 'sorry,' and 'remorse' ($\alpha = .84$). The shame items were 'ashamed,' 'humiliated,' 'disgraced,' and 'embarrassed' ($\alpha = .92$). Four positive (or at least non-negative) anticipated group-based emotion items were also rated: 'concerned,' 'confident,' 'relaxed,' and 'indifferent.' Participants were asked ''If Inductive Thinkers were to mistreat Deductive Thinkers in some way, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?' All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from *not at all* (0) to *extremely intensely* (6).

Ingroup identification. Identification was measured using the 14-item scale proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008). This assesses two superordinate components of identification: self-investment and self-definition. Self-investment is measured on a 10-item scale (e.g., 'I am glad to be an Inductive Thinker,' and 'I feel committed to Inductive Thinkers;' $\alpha = .93$). Self-definition is assessed on a 4-item scale (e.g., 'I am

similar to the average Inductive Thinker,' and 'Inductive Thinkers are very similar to each other;' α = .90). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Discrimination. Discrimination was assessed using so-called 'Tajfel matrices' (see Tajfel et al., 1971). These involve allocating points to anonymous members of the ingroup and the outgroup. Use of these matrices permits the calculation of 'pull scores' that reflect different strategies for allocating these points. The pull score that was of particular interest here was ingroup favouritism (MD + MIP or FAV) versus maximising joint profit (MJP)[8]. This was assessed using the matrices described by Bourhis and colleagues (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994). Positive FAV on MJP values indicate a preference for ingroup favouritism over maximising joint profit. Negative values show outgroup favouritism is preferred over maximising joint profit. Values of zero indicate that the resource was distributed equally between the two groups. Pull scores can range from -12 to 12. In the case of FAV on MJP, greater positive values indicate a stronger preference for ingroup favouritism over maximising joint profit and large negative values show a greater preference for outgroup favouritism.

Procedure

All information, scales and manipulations were presented and responded to via computer. Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to assess attributes related to different thinking styles. Respondents were told that previous research had found that people belong to one of two analytic groups: inductive or deductive thinkers. Participants were told that the first part of the study would assess their thinking style,

[8] Overall discrimination (ingroup credits minus outgroup credits) and the pull scores of MD on MIP+MJP and FAV on P were also measured and analysed in all three studies. Generally, the results of these measures supported my hypothesis. However, they are not included here in order to avoid repetition.

using a word- and number-association task, and that the second part of the study would determine the attributes associated with each type of thinking style. Once participants had understood these instructions they completed the word- and number-association task (see Appendix 6). They then received feedback that they were inductive thinkers (for a similar procedure, see Doosje et al., 1995).

The minimal group induction was strengthened by using an 'intuitive intelligence task' (cf. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Participants were informed that the researcher was interested in the intuitive intelligence of inductive and deductive thinkers. Intuitive intelligence was said to measure an individual's ability to make optimal decisions quickly and could be assessed using a simple questionnaire. This questionnaire asked participants to solve 4 ambiguous business problems (see Appendix 7). Two possible solutions were presented for each scenario. The participant was asked to pick the solution that he or she believed would yield the optimal outcome. Once these situations had been rated all participants were told that they scored 75% on the intuitive intelligence measure, and that this score was typical for inductive thinkers.

The minimal group induction was followed by the group norm manipulation. In the *norm present* condition participants were informed that previous research had found that inductive thinkers generally discriminate against deductive thinkers. In the *norm absent* condition respondents did not receive any information about previous research. This was followed by the identification scales, and then the emotion salience manipulation. In the *emotion salient* condition participants completed the anticipated group-based emotions scale. In the *control* condition no anticipated group-based emotion measures were taken. Finally, the participants completed the Tajfel matrices (see Appendix 8), after which they were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Identification. Due to the minimal nature of the groups, ingroup identification was expected to be low. This was confirmed by the means for the identification subscales. Mean levels of self-investment ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.08$) and self-definition ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.31$) were significantly lower than their scale midpoints (4), $t(87) = 9.94$, $p < .001$, and $t(87) = 3.59$, $p = .001$, respectively. Identification was measured after the norm manipulation. The manipulation did not affect either identification construct, $F(1, 86) = 0.01$, $p = .945$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$ for self-investment, and $F(1, 86) = 0.06$, $p = .808$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$ for self-definition.

Discrimination

The main dependent variable was ingroup favouritism; specifically, the pull of FAV (MD + MIP) on MJP. In the present study the pull of FAV on MJP ranged from -5 to 12, with a mean of 1.26 ($SD = 3.40$). The mean score was significantly different from zero, $t(87) = 3.48$, $p = .001$, indicating that overall participants preferred ingroup favouritism.

Two 2 (salience: control vs. emotion salient) x 2 (group norm: present vs. absent) x identification subscale (centred) ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent variable, one for the self-investment subscale and the other for the self-definition subscale. Regression analysis was also used to conduct simple slopes analyses in order to obtain beta coefficients.The main effects of group norm, salience and self-investment had a non-significant effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 80) = 0.90$, $p = .349$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ for norm, $F(1, 80) = 0.91$, $p = .343$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ for salience, and $F(1, 80) = 1.30$, $p = .257$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ for self-investment. The interaction between emotion salience and self-investment had a near-significant effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 80) = 3.85$, $p = .053$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Self-investment was *positively* related to ingroup favouritism in the

emotion salient condition, β = .36, $t(84) = 2.54$, $p = .013$. Simple effects analysis was used to determine whether the differing levels of discrimination across the two conditions were caused by people with high or low self-investment. This analysis revealed that when self-investment was low (M – 1SD), ingroup favouritism was greater in the control condition ($M = 1.96$, $SE = 0.73$) than the emotion salient condition ($M = -0.29$, $SE = 0.69$), $F(1, 84) = 5.03$, $p = .027$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. When self-investment was high (M + 1SD), on the other hand, there was no difference in ingroup favouritism between the control ($M = 1.28$, $SE = 0.72$) and emotion salient ($M = 2.15$, $SE = 0.70$) conditions, $F(1, 84) = 0.76$, $p = .386$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. This result reflects the fact that people with low (but not high) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient condition in comparison with the control condition (see Figure 5).



Figure 5.Interactionof salience and self-investment on the pull of FAV on MJP (Study 4). * = p<.05.

Self-definition had a marginally significant main effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 80) = 3.08$, $p = .083$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, caused by a positive relationship between these

variables (β = .20, p = .083). However, in contrast to the self-investment component, the emotion salience by self-definition interaction did not have a significant effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 80) = 0.32$, $p = .574$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$.

Discussion

The aim of Study 4 was to investigate the effects of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on discrimination. I hypothesised that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based guilt and shame would lower the amount of discrimination exhibited by people with high self-investment because these people are motivated to avoid the aversive consequences signalled by these emotions. However, I found that increasing the salience of the anticipated emotions led to reduced discrimination on the part of people with low (but not high) self-investment. Consistent with my rationale, the self-definition component of identification did not interact with emotion salience to predict discrimination.

I note that previous research has found that low identifiers try to leave or distance themselves from identity-threatened groups (Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). People with low self-investment are not committed to the ingroup, allowing them to leave the threatened ingroup and join a more prestigious group—or at least to distance themselves psychologically from the stigmatised group. In the current research, the ingroup is unimportant to people with low self-investment, as demonstrated by their extremely low score on this measure. As a result, these people have little commitment to the ingroup. People with low self-investment may be motivated to avoid the threat signalled by the aversive anticipated group-based emotions. Because of their low commitment these people can avoid the threat by leaving, or trying to leave, the ingroup. With their commitment reduced even

further, people with low self-investment have little reason to discriminate against an outgroup, thereby resulting in the lower ingroup-bias exhibited in Study 4.

I found that the group norm manipulation had little effect on discrimination. This is surprising considering that previous research has found that people generally exhibit group norm-consistent behaviour (Ellemers et al., 2008; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997), especially in minimal group research (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). In Study 1 participants in the norm present condition read a short paragraph stating that previous research had found that inductive thinkers usually discriminate against deductive thinkers. It would appear that the strength of this manipulation was insufficient to promote greater discrimination in the norm present condition than the norm absent condition.

The use of minimal groups in Study 4 permitted a high degree of experimental control over the intergroup environment. However, the use of this methodology has other distinctive features that can affect interpretation of results. Generally, degree of identification is lower in minimal groups than established groups (Jetten et al., 1996; Spears et al., 1997). The use of minimal groups in Study 4 meant that self-investment was therefore relatively low. Indeed, the score reflecting 'high' self-investment in this study was closer to the midpoint of the scale than to the high end. Although these individuals were high in self-investment relative to other participants in the study, their level of identification would be considered moderate in the context of established group research. The level of identification may simply have been too low to assess the effects of the anticipated group-based emotions on people with high self-investment, resulting in a non-significant difference in discrimination. I therefore used established groups in Study 5, to determine whether increasing the salience of anticipated group-based guilt

and shame would result in a reduction in discrimination exhibited by people with high self-investment.

Study 5

There were three methodological differences between Studies 4 and 5. First, established groups rather than minimal groups were used. Second, the group norm variable was dropped because this was not central to my hypothesis. Third, a legitimacy manipulation was included. In established groups people implement various strategies to legitimise immoral actions and inhibit aversive emotions (for an overview, see Branscombe & Miron, 2004). I was concerned that people might implement these strategies to legitimise discrimination, thereby attenuating the effects of the anticipated group-based emotions. The inclusion of a legitimacy manipulation ensured that participants in the illegitimate condition would view the discrimination as wrong. When discrimination is believed to be illegitimate, anticipated group-based guilt and shame should be more prominent, strengthening the inhibitory effect of these emotions on discrimination.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 136 students (110 females and 26 males) took part in this study in exchange for course credit or £3.00 (approximately $4.80). Participants were aged between 18 and 37 years, with a mean age of 20.3. A 2 (salience: control vs. emotion salient) x 3 (legitimacy: control vs. legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants design was used. The identification subscales (self-investment and self-definition) served as continuous moderators. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. The dependent variable was ingroup favouritism (the pull score of FAV on MJP, as in Study 4).

Materials

All the instructions, stimuli and responses were delivered via a computer. The identification measure and Tajfel matrices were identical to those used in Study 4, except for appropriate changes in the ingroup and outgroup names ('inductive thinkers' was replaced with 'Cardiff University students' and 'deductive thinkers' was replaced with 'students from the University of Bristol'). Both identification subscales were reliable (self-investment, $\alpha = .89$; self-definition, $\alpha = .83$). The phrasing of the anticipated group-based emotion items was altered to: 'If Cardiff University students were to discriminate against students from the University of Bristol in some way, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?' The anticipated guilt and shame words were identical to those used in Study 4 ($\alpha = .84$ for guilt, and $\alpha = .87$ for shame). The remaining anticipated group-based emotion items were 'unconcerned,' 'confident,' 'apathetic,' and 'indifferent.'

Procedure

At the beginning of the study, participants were informed that they were taking part in a survey of attitudes of students at different universities. Participants then completed the identification measure. This was followed by the salience manipulation. In the emotion salient condition respondents rated how they thought they would feel if Cardiff University students were to discriminate against students from the University of Bristol on the measures described above. In the control condition these measures were not taken.

This was followed by the legitimacy manipulation. Initially, respondents in the legitimate and illegitimate conditions were informed that in research conducted the previous year, students from various universities across the UK thought that Cardiff and Bristol students were similar with respect to intelligence, competence, motivation to

work hard, and skill. This was included to show that students from other universities thought that students from Cardiff University and the University of Bristol had similar status. In the illegitimate condition this information was followed by a paragraph stating Bristol students thought they were similar to Cardiff students in terms of these traits. In the legitimate condition the equivalent paragraph stated that Bristol students thought they were better than Cardiff students in terms of these traits. Participants in the control condition did not receive any information about the perception of Cardiff students by students from the University of Bristol or other universities in the UK. The Tajfel matrices were completed after this manipulation. Participants were asked to distribute research funding between anonymous applicants from the ingroup (Cardiff University) and the outgroup (University of Bristol). After the matrices had been completed, participants were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Identification. The mean level of self-investment ($M = 4.98$, $SD = 1.03$) was significantly greater than the midpoint of the scale, $t(135) = 11.11$, $p < .001$, suggesting that identification was moderate to strong. The mean level of self-definition ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.16$), on the other hand, was not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, $t(135) = 1.22$, $p = .224$. A square root transformation was performed on the self-investment subscale prior to further analysis, to correct for a moderate negative skew.

Discrimination

The pull of FAV on MJP ranged from -7 to 12, with a mean of 2.14 ($SD = 3.72$). A single sample t-test found that the mean level of ingroup favouritism was significantly different from zero, $t(135) = 6.71$, $p < .001$, implying that participants showed significant ingroup favouritism.

Legitimacy had a near-significant main effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(2, 124) = 2.72$, $p = .070$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Ingroup favouritism was stronger in the control condition ($M = 3.11$, $SD = 4.79$) than in the illegitimate condition ($M = 1.52$, $SD = 2.47$), Tukey$a = 1.59$, $SE = 0.77$, $p = .100$. The amount of ingroup favouritism exhibited in the legitimate condition ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 3.40$) was not significantly different from the control or illegitimate conditions ($ps > .10$).

Ingroup favouritism was lower in the emotion salient condition ($M = 1.62$, $SD = 3.06$) than the control condition ($M = 2.66$, $SD = 4.23$), $F(1, 124) = 4.33$, $p = .039$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Self-investment had a significant main effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 124) = 9.36$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$, caused by a positive relationship between these variables ($\beta = .27$, $p = .003$). These significant results were qualified by a near-significant emotion salience by self-investment interaction on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 124) = 3.19$, $p = .076$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. A significant positive relationship was found in the control condition, $\beta = .38$, $t(132) = 3.48$, $p = .001$, but not in the emotion salient condition, $\beta = .08$, $t(132) = 0.64$, $p = .522$. Simple effects analysis revealed that peoplewith low self-investment ($M - 1SD$) did not exhibit different levels of ingroup favouritism in the control ($M = 1.29$, $SE = 0.60$) and emotion salient ($M = 1.18$, $SE = 0.65$) conditions, $F(1, 124) = 0.02$, $p = .895$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. People with high self-investment ($M + 1SD$), on the other hand, exhibited greater ingroup favouritism in the control condition ($M = 4.41$, $SE = 0.64$) than the emotion salient condition ($M = 2.00$, $SE = 0.62$), $F(1, 124) = 7.42$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This demonstrates that people with high (but not low) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient condition, as compared with the control condition (see Figure 6).



Figure 6**.** Interactionof salience and self-investment on the pull of FAV on MJP (Study 5). ** = p<.01.

Self-definition had a significant main effect on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 124) = 4.46$, $p = .037$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, caused by a positive relationship between these variables ($\beta = .19$, $p = .037$). However, in contrast to the self-investment subscale, self-definition did not interact with emotion salience to affect ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 124) = 0.04$, $p = .840$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$.

Anticipated group-based guilt and shame. As stated above, participants in the emotion salient condition rated the extent to which they would feel group-based guilt and shame if the ingroup were to discriminate against the outgroup. I was unable to determine whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame mediated the moderating effects of identification because these emotions were only measured in the emotion salient condition. However, these subscales were used to determine the unique relationship of each anticipated emotion to discrimination in this condition. The regression analysis found that anticipated group-based shame was negatively associated with ingroup favouritism, $\beta = -.33$, $t(65) = 2.11$, $p = .039$, and group-based guilt was not

a significant predictor, β = -.02, $t(65) = 0.11$, $p = .914$. The tolerance value was .54, suggesting that these results were not biased by multicollinearity(Cohen et al., 2003)[9].

I also assessed the relationships of the identification subscales to anticipated group-based guilt and shame. The correlations between self-investment and the two anticipated group-based emotions were non-significant, $r = .20$, $p = .101$ for shame and $r = .15$, $p = .220$ for guilt. Similarly, the correlations between self-definition and the two anticipated emotions were also non-significant,$r = .19$, $p = .118$ for shame and $r = .20$, $p = .109$ for guilt.

Discussion

The aim of Study 5 was to assess the effects of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on discrimination in established groups. I hypothesised that in the emotion salient condition people with high (but not low) self-investment should refrain from discrimination in order to avoid the aversive consequences signalled by anticipated group-based shame and guilt. The results of Study 5 supported this hypothesis. I also found that the emotion salience manipulation had little effect on the amount of discrimination exhibited by people with low self-investment. As predicted, self-definition did not interact with the emotion salience manipulation to affect discrimination.

The results provide further support for the idea that anticipated group-based emotions influence the behaviour of ingroup members. Anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted discrimination. Anticipated group-based guilt, on the other hand, did not predict discrimination. I argued that the desire to maintain a positive group

[9] This analysis was also conducted in Study 4. A regression analysis found that these anticipated group-based emotions did not predict FAV on MJP, β = .11, $t(41) = 0.39$, $p = .697$ for guilt and β = .09, $t(41) = 0.31$, $p = .762$ for shame. Degree of identification may have been too low for the anticipated group-based emotions to predict discrimination. We also found that the correlations between self-investment and anticipated group-based shame and guilt were significant, $r = .40$, $p = .007$ for shame and $r = .44$, $p = .003$ for guilt. The correlations between self-definition and the anticipated emotions were also significant, $r = .41$, $p = .006$ for shame and $r = .36$, $p = .016$ for guilt.

identity motivates ingroup members to inhibit behaviours that might evoke image-threatening emotions. Although group-based guilt *and* shame both threaten social identity, the latter emotion is more damaging because it implies attributing the act to an immoral facet of their group. As a result, group-based shame is more closely related to the valence of the ingroup's identity than guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). Anticipated group-based shame should therefore be a stronger signal of social identity threats than guilt. Because social identity theory suggests that the valence of the ingroup's identity is a primary concern for ingroup members, anticipated group-based shame should be a stronger predictor of the inhibitory ingroup behaviour than guilt. The fact that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted discrimination suggests that the inhibitory effect of the emotion salience manipulation was more likely to be caused by shame. In the emotion salient condition, people with strong self-investment may have reduced discrimination in order to protect their group from the identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based shame.

The findings of Studies 4 and 5 appear to be inconsistent with each other. However, if the different levels of self-investment are taken into account, the results can be seen as compatible. The use of minimal groups in Study 4 resulted in a low level of identification; the score indexing 'low' self-investment ($M - 1SD = 1.78$) was at the low end of the (7-point) scale and the score indexing 'high' self-investment ($M + 1SD = 3.94$) was near the scale midpoint. Thus Study 4 assessed the effects of the anticipated emotions in people with low and moderate self-investment. Established groups were used in Study 5, and the mean level of self-investment was high. The score indexing 'low' self-investment ($M - 1SD = 3.95$, before the transformation) was near the scale midpoint and the score indexing 'high' self-investment ($M + 1SD = 6.01$) was near the top of the scale. Thus Study 5 investigated the effects of the anticipated group-based

emotions on people with moderate and high levels of self-investment. Combining the results of these two studies, it can be seen that in Study 4, people with low (but not moderate) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient condition, as compared with the control condition; and that the null effect of the emotion salience manipulation on moderate self-investment identifiers was replicated in Study 5, where I also found that people with high self-investment exhibited less discrimination in the emotion salient condition in comparison to the control condition.

In most studies the behaviour of people with moderate levels of identification is not a focus of interest because it is assumed to fall between that of high and low identifiers. However, in the present research I found that when anticipated emotions were salient, people with a moderate level of self-investment were less likely to reduce their level of discrimination. These individuals may be attached to their group and therefore disinclined to leave it, but at the same time insufficiently identified to want to protect group identity. As a result, the emotion salience manipulation may have had little effect on the amount of discrimination exhibited by people with moderate self-investment.

If the above interpretation is correct it follows that the effect of identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on discrimination should be curvilinear. When the anticipated group-based emotions are salient, people with either weak or strong self-investment should exhibit reduced discrimination, albeit for different reasons. However, the salience of anticipated group-based emotions should have little effect on the discrimination exhibited by moderate identifiers. This hypothesised curvilinear relationship was assessed in Study 6.

Study 6

Study 6 investigated the effects of ingroup identification and anticipated group-based guilt and shame on discrimination using national groups. This context was chosen because the mean level of identification was expected to be around the midpoint of the scale, with a reasonable range on either side. The ingroup was English people and the outgroup was Germans. This outgroup was selected because its status was judged to be similar to that of the ingroup, and because of an element of historical rivalry between the national groups.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 130 undergraduates (118 females and 12 males) participated in this study, in exchange for course credit. The age range was between 18 and 25 years, with a mean age of 18.88. All participants were English nationals. The only manipulated factor was salience, with two levels: control vs. emotion salient. This was manipulated in the same way as in the two previous studies. Leach and colleagues' (2008) identification subscales were used as a continuous moderator. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions.

Materials

All the instructions, stimuli, and responses were delivered via a computer. The identification measure, negative anticipated group-based emotion scales, and Tajfel matrices were identical to those used in the previous studies, with the exception of the names of the ingroup and the outgroup ('English' for the ingroup and 'Germans' for the outgroup). Both identification subscales were reliable (self-investment, $\alpha = .93$; self-definition, $\alpha = .87$). The anticipated group-based guilt and shame scales were also

reliable (shame, α = .87; guilt, α = .81). The term 'uninterested' replaced 'confident' in the set of non-negative anticipated group-based emotions.

Procedure

After written consent had been given, participants completed Leach and colleagues' (2008) identification scale. This was followed by the emotion salience manipulation. As in the previous studies, participants in the emotion salient (but not the control) condition completed the anticipated emotion scales. The manipulation was followed by the Tajfel matrices. Participants were asked to distribute research funding between English and German academics. Once these measured had been completed participants were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Identification. Mean levels of self-investment (M = 4.64, SD = 1.01) and self-definition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.12) were significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, $t(129) = 7.17$, $p < .001$, and $t(129) = 2.15$, $p = .034$, respectively. This suggests that the level of self-investment was moderate to strong (but lower than that observed in Study 5).

Discrimination

The dependent variable in all of the analyses was ingroup favouritism, again indexed by the pull of FAV on MJP. Ingroup favouritism ranged from -6 to 12, with a mean of 1.07 (SD = 3.35). This mean was significantly different from zero, $t(129) = 3.64$, $p < .001$, indicating that people showed more ingroup favouritism than fairness.

People with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment were expected to exhibit less discrimination in the emotion salient condition, resulting in a curvilinear relationship between these variables. The self-investment and self-definition variables were squared to create their quadratic counterpart. The linear and quadratic

identification components were entered into an ANOVA to assess whether these variables interacted with the emotion salience manipulation to determine discrimination (see Aiken & West, 1991). A separate ANOVA was run for each identification subscale.

There were no significant main effects on ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 123) = 2.39$, $p = .125$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ for salience, $F(1, 123) = 0.88$, $p = .125$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ for linear self-investment, and $F(1, 123) = 0.42$, $p = .517$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$ for quadratic self-investment. However, the emotion salience by linear self-investment component interaction was significant, $F(1, 123) = 14.20$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$, as was, the emotion salience by quadratic self-investment component interaction, $F(1, 123) = 12.78$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. The significant interaction between quadratic self-investment and emotion salience shows that the prediction of ingroup favouritismby self-investment was dependent on emotion salience and the specific level of identification (Aiken & West, 1991), consistent with my curvilinear hypothesis. The linear self-investment component predicted ingroup favouritismin the control condition, $\beta = .41$, $t(124) = 3.77$, $p < .001$, but not in the emotion salient condition, $\beta = -.16$, $t(124) = 1.18$, $p = .240$. However, the quadratic self-investment function predicted ingroup favouritism in both the control and emotion salient conditions, $\beta = .29$, $t(124) = 2.86$, $p = .005$, and $\beta = -.30$, $t(124) = 1.85$, $p = .067$, respectively. The pattern of relationships found in the emotion salient condition resembles an inverted-U curve (see Figure 7).



Figure 7**.** Interactionof salience and the curvilinear self-investment component on the pull of FAV on MJP (Study 6).

Figure 7 shows that in the control condition there was little difference in the amount of discrimination exhibited by people with low and moderate self-investment, replicating the results of Study 4. However, as the level of identification increased from moderate to high, the amount of discrimination increased dramatically, replicating the findings of Study 5. The inverted U-shaped curve found in the emotion salient condition reflects the fact that participants with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment exhibited lower discrimination[10]. A comparison of the two curves shows that participants whose identification score was 1 *SD* above the mean showed much less discrimination in the emotion salient condition than in the control condition. However, increasing the salience of the anticipated emotions only attenuated discrimination among participants with low self-investment when identification was 3 *SD*s below the

[10] I reanalysed the data from Studies 4 and 5 to determine whether the curvilinear was present in these studies. In both studies the main effects of the curvilinear self-investment and self-definition components and their interactions with emotion salience were non-significant, ($p > .10$). This is unsurprising considering the polarised levels of identification in these studies.

mean (i.e. scores below 1.61). Although this level of self-investment is extremely low, it was within the range of scores in the present study (1.50 to 7.00). I could therefore use the regression model to accurately estimate the mean amount of discrimination exhibited by people with this level of self-investment.

Neither the linear nor the quadratic self-definition components predicted ingroup favouritism, $F(1, 123) = 0.57$, $p = .452$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$ and $F(1, 123) = 0.12$, $p = .729$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, respectively. However, the interactions between emotion salience and the a) linear and b) quadratic self-definition component were significant (or near-significant), $F(1, 123) = 7.74$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, and $F(1, 123) = 3.83$, $p = .053$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, respectively[11]. This unexpected interaction appeared to be due to shared variance between self-definition and self-investment. This possibility was tested by conducting a regression analysis in which the salience, self-definition and self-investment main effects and the interactions of each identification construct with salience were entered into the equation as predictors of ingroup favouritism. The interactions between emotion salience and the a) linear and b) quadratic self-definition components were non-significant, $t(120) = 0.32$, $p = .752$, and $t(120) = 0.21$, $p = .838$, respectively. The self-investment interactions, on the other hand, were significant, $t(120) = 2.06$, $p = .042$ for linear component, and $t(120) = 2.57$, $p = .011$ for quadratic component. These results show that the interaction between self-definition and emotion salience did not have a unique effect on ingroup favouritism.

Anticipated group-based guilt and shame. A regression was conducted to determine the unique relationship of each anticipated group-based emotion with ingroup favouritismfor participants in the emotion salient condition. The linear and quadratic

[11] The linear self-definition component was positively related to FAV on MJP in the control (but not emotion salient) condition, $\beta = .31$, $t(124) = 2.58$, $p = .011$; and $\beta = -.11$, $t(124) = 0.90$, $p = .369$, respectively. The quadratic self-definition component did not reliably predict FAV on MJP in either condition, $\beta = .14$, $t(124) = 1.20$, $p = .233$ for control and $\beta = -.12$, $t(124) = 0.96$, $p = .341$ for emotion salient.

self-investment variables were also entered into this regression to determine whether the predictive power of the anticipated emotions was independent of that of identification[12]. Both the anticipated group-based shame and quadratic self-investment component predicted ingroup favouritism, $\beta = -.30$, $t(59) = 1.73$, $p = .089$, and $\beta = -.26$, $t(59) = 2.17$, $p = .034$, respectively. Anticipated group-based guilt and the linear self-investment component did not predict ingroup favouritism, $\beta = -.06$, $t(59) = 0.32$, $p = .752$, and $\beta = -.16$, $t(59) = 1.31$, $p = .196$, respectively. The lowest tolerance value was .45, demonstrating that these results were not affected by multicollinearity.

I also assessed the relationships between the identification subscales and the anticipated group-based emotions. The correlations between self-investment and the two anticipated group-based emotions were non-significant, $r = -.03$, $p = .807$ for shame and $r = .09$, $p = .501$ for guilt. Similarly, the correlations between self-definition and the two anticipated group-based emotions were also non-significant, $r = -.07$, $p = .581$ for shame and $r = .05$, $p = .608$ for guilt.

Discussion

The aim of Study 6 was to determine whether increasing the salience of anticipated group-based guilt and shame would lead to less discrimination by people with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment. In the control condition, participants with high self-investment exhibited more discrimination than did low or moderate identifiers. However, in the emotion salient condition participants with either low or high self-investment discriminated less than did moderate identifiers. Furthermore, a comparison of the curves shows that participants with either low or high self-investment exhibited lower discrimination in the emotion salient condition, compared with the control condition. It should be noted that self-investment had to be 3

[12] An identification component was not included into the regression analysis in Study 5 because it did not predict discrimination in the emotion salient condition.

*SD*s below the mean for discrimination to be reduced among low identifiers. This is unsurprising given that scores that were 3 *SD*s below the mean (i.e., scores of 1.61) in the present study are close to the mean score reflecting low identification in Study 4 (1.78), where reduced discrimination was also observed. Self-definition did not interact with emotion salience to affect discrimination when controlling for the effects of self-investment.

On the basis of Study 5 I predicted that anticipated group-based shame would be a stronger (negative) predictor of discrimination than guilt because the valence of a group's identity is more closely related to shame than guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). The results support this hypothesis. These findings suggest that the inhibitory effect of the emotion salience manipulation on ingroup favouritism was more likely to be due to the increased salience of anticipated group-based shame than that of anticipated group-based guilt. In the emotion salient condition, the desire to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based shame presumably motivated ingroup members to implement pre-emptive identity management strategies.

General Discussion

The aim of these three studies was to determine whether the anticipation of group-based guilt and shame would inhibit discrimination. I predicted that self-investment would moderate this effect. People with high (but not low) self-investment should be motivated to avoid the identity threat signalled by these anticipated group-based emotions. I therefore hypothesised that when these emotions were salient people with high self-investment would reduce their discrimination in order to avoid the aversive consequences signalled by anticipated group-based shame and guilt. In Study 4, participants with low (but not moderate) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient condition, compared with the control condition.

This effect was probably caused by people with low self-investment avoiding the aversive group-based emotions by "leaving" or psychologically distancing themselves from the threatened ingroup(Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1997; Spears et al., 1997) and the reduction in commitment resulting in lower discrimination. My hypothesis was supported in Study 5, where I found that people with high (but not moderate) self-investment exhibited lower discrimination when aversive anticipated group-based emotions were salient than they did in the control condition.

The results of Studies 4 and 5 suggested that people with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment discriminate less in the emotion salient condition than the control condition, implying a curvilinear relationship. My curvilinear hypothesis was supported in Study 6. The self-definition component of identification, on the other hand, was not expected to interact with the emotion salience manipulation because this construct is not directly related to the desire to avoid the aversive emotional consequences associated with group membership (Leach et al., 2008). This hypothesis was supported in all three studies.

Researchers rarely focus on people with a moderate level of identification. In the present studies I found that these people were unique in failing to show reduced discrimination when anticipated emotions were salient. People with intermediate levels of self-investment are by definition moderately committed to the ingroup, precluding the use of the distancing strategy. At the same time, their level of self-investment is presumably insufficient to motivate them to protect their group's identity. As a result, the amount of discrimination they exhibited was not affected by the emotion salience manipulation.

In Studies 5 and 6 I found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted discrimination. I argue that the desire to avoid the social identity

threats signalled by anticipated group-based shame motivates ingroup members to reduce discrimination. The inhibitory effect of anticipated group-based shame presumably reflects the desire to maintain a positive social identity. Because social identity theory postulates that the valence of the ingroup's identity is a primary concern for ingroup members and because the valence of the ingroup's identity is more closely related to group-based shame than guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007) shame should be more likely than guilt to affect people's behaviour.

A question worth considering is whether anticipated group-based emotions are cognitions or emotions. Frijda(2004) suggested that anticipated emotions are future-orientated cognitions rather than emotions. However, there is evidence that anticipated emotions are associated with physiological arousal (e.g., Bechara et al., 1996; Sinha et al., 1992). The fact that anticipated emotions elicit affective arousal suggests that they are (cognitively-based) emotions rather than cognitions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). On this basis I argue that anticipated group-based emotions are emotions, and not just cognitions.

The present series of studies extends the intergroup literature in two ways. First, I extend intergroup emotion theory (Devos et al., 2003; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999) by showing that *anticipated* group-based emotions can influence the behaviour of ingroup members. Second, I describe a self-regulatory process for maintaining a moral social identity. A growing body of research has shown that morality is a key component of a group's identity (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007; Pagliaro et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2009). At the interpersonal level, the anticipation of aversive emotions such as guilt and shame is believed to promote moral behaviour (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). In line with this, I argue that one function of anticipated group-based emotions is to promote moral behaviour in group members.

Anticipated group-based shame should help group members to maintain a desired moral identity by deterring actions that would tarnish that image. Anticipated group-based shame can therefore be seen as acting as a 'moral barometer' (Tangney et al., 2007), promoting ethical behaviour on the part of group members.

It would nevertheless be naive to assume that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions will prevent a group from performing any immoral actions. As with interpersonal emotions, there are likely to be incidents when the anticipation of group-based emotions does not preclude illegitimate and/or immoral behaviour. As in the present research, these emotions have to be salient for an effect to occur. If anticipated group-based emotions are not salient, ingroup members will not necessarily consider the emotional consequences of their actions. Even when the emotional consequences of a group's actions are salient, other variables may influence the extent to which this affects behaviour, such as the legitimisation of the immoral action (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Although the behaviour of group members is constrained by anticipated group-based emotions, they still have the potential to act immorally when the influence of these emotions is offset by legitimising strategies.

An alternative explanation is that the effects I found may be due to the anticipation of generalised negative affect, rather than specific emotions. Increasing the salience of anticipated emotions may have led participants to associate discrimination with negative arousal, resulting in less ingroup favouritism. However, if it was the anticipation of negative affect that lowered discrimination, both anticipated group-based shame *and* anticipated group-based guilt should have predicted discrimination. The fact that it was only anticipated group-based shame that had this effect makes it likely that the results were due to specific emotions rather than negative affectin general.

The fact that I have found that shame was more likely than guilt to promote moral behaviour could be regarded as inconsistent with research by Tangney and colleagues (Dearing et al., 2005; Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney et al., 2007) who argue that guilt is the more functional of the two emotions. Indeed, Tangney and Dearing (2002) conclude their chapter on moral emotions by stating that: 'guilt is good; shame is bad' (p.136). However, recent research has found that guilt may be maladaptive (Bastian et al., 2011; De Hooge et al., 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009) and thatshame may promote prosocial behaviour (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010). Tangney and colleagues may have not found these results because they measured guilt- and shame-proneness rather than the actual emotions (De Hooge et al., 2008). In line with this, Tibbetts(1997) found that criminal behaviour was positively related to shame-proneness but negatively related to anticipated shame. Based on Tibbetts(1997), I concur with De Hooge and colleagues by arguing that shame may promote prosocial behaviour. My research also extends the emotion literature in finding that *group-based* shame promotes moral *intergroup* behaviour.

I predicted that the anticipation of group-based shame and guilt would inhibit discriminatory behaviour in ingroup members. In a series of three studies I found that increasing the salience of these anticipated group-based emotions led to less discrimination on the part of people with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment. Furthermore, the intensity of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted discrimination. This research extends intergroup emotion theory by showing that the mere anticipation of group-based emotions has the potential to alter the behaviour of group members. In line with recent developments in the interpersonal literature, I conclude that the anticipation of group-based shame serves the function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour and thereby protecting ingroup identity.

Chapter 4: The Shame of Tyranny: The Effects of Status, Stability and Anticipated Group-Based Shame on Discrimination[13]

Previous research has found inconsistent results regarding the amount of discrimination exhibited by high-status groups in stable hierarchies. Some researchers suggest that stable high-status groups use their superior position in the social hierarchy to justify discrimination, resulting in ingroup bias (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978). However, others suggest that stable high-status groups do not need to discriminate against the low-status group because they already possess a secure prestigious position in the social hierarchy, resulting in egalitarian behaviour (Doosje et al., 1995) or even outgroup bias ("noblesse oblige"; Leach et al., 2002). I argue that the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups is moderated by anticipated group-based shame, and that this can account for these inconsistent findings.

Anticipated group-based shame may be elicited when a proposed ingroup transgression is believed to be illegitimate (Shepherd et al., 2011c). People are motivated to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based shame and are therefore likely to inhibit an immoral action – such as discrimination – when they predict that it may evoke this emotion (Shepherd et al., 2011a). The amount of discrimination exhibited by ingroup members is therefore likely to be moderated by the extent to which they anticipate group-based shame. Ingroup members should exhibit egalitarian behaviour when they anticipate group-based shame and ingroup bias when they do not. In this chapter I extend this research by arguing that anticipated group-based shame is more likely to moderate discrimination in stable high-status groups than in unstable high-status groups or in low-status groups. Because their prestigious

[13] This chapter is based on Shepherd, Spears, and Manstead (2011b)

position is secure, stable high-status groups can exhibit egalitarian behaviour without aversive consequences. However, members of unstable high-status groups or of low-status groups may be reluctant to undertake egalitarian behaviour when they anticipate group-based shame because this would prevent them from obtaining a more secure prestigious position in the social hierarchy. I tested these hypotheses in two studies.

The Effects of Status and Stability on Discrimination

Discrimination is moderated by a group's position in a status hierarchy and the stability of this hierarchy (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that people are motivated to maintain a positive social identity and that they try to achieve this by obtaining a secure and prestigious position in a social hierarchy. Low-status groups are motivated to improve their position in the social hierarchy because their status inferiority threatens their social identity. When the hierarchy is unstable low-status groups may seek to strengthen the ingroup in order to improve their chances of social change (Ellemers, Van knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ellemers et al., 1993). Low-status groups are therefore likely to exhibit ingroup bias when they believe that enhanced resources would facilitate social change (Scheepers et al., 2006). Social identity theory also suggests that in stable hierarchies low-status groups cannot alter their position and are therefore likely to refrain from ingroup bias. Similarly, system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Kramer, 2003) argues that such groups may distribute resources in accordance with the social hierarchy, resulting in outgroup favouritism. However, recent research has found that stable low-status groups can also exhibit extreme forms of discrimination in an attempt to destabilise the social hierarchy (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears, Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011).

Unstable high-status groups, by contrast, have an insecure prestige position. Members of this group may want to secure this position by engaging in ingroup bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). However, use of this strategy may be counter-productive because it may elicit a status-altering retaliation from the low-status group (Van Knippenberg, 1984). In line with this, research has found that unstable high-status groups are more likely to exhibit ingroup bias than fairness, but that the level of discrimination is lower (and sometimes less antagonistic) than that observed in other groups (Scheepers et al., 2006). A moderate level of ingroup bias may help unstable high-status groups to secure their position without prompting status-altering retaliation.

The amount of discrimination exhibited by high-status groups in stable hierarchies is less clear-cut. Such groups already possess a secure prestigious position and therefore do not need to discriminate against low-status groups for either identity-based or instrumental reasons (Scheepers et al., 2006). Because of their security, stable high-status groups can treat low-status outgroups fairly (or even generously) without losing their prestigious position in the social hierarchy (Leach et al., 2002; Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009; Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010). Some researchers have therefore argued that stable high-status groups should display egalitarian behaviour (Doosje et al., 1995). However, others suggest that these groups may use their superiority to justify discrimination, resulting in ingroup bias (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978).

Jetten and colleagues (Jetten, Spears, Hogg, & Manstead, 2000) provided a way of resolving this issue by suggesting that the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups is moderated by the perceived legitimacy of this action. Such groups should display strong ingroup bias when they use their superior position to legitimise discrimination, but engage in egalitarian behaviour when this discrimination

is perceived as illegitimate. Previous research has found that perceiving a future ingroup action as illegitimate evokes anticipated group-based guilt and shame (Shepherd et al., 2011c) and that shame negatively predicts discrimination (Shepherd et al., 2011a). Extending the work of Jetten and colleagues, I propose that the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups will be moderated by the predicted emotional consequences of the perceived legitimacy appraisal, and more specifically by anticipated group-based shame.

Anticipated Emotions

Interpersonal Emotions

Anticipated emotions are predicted emotional experiences arising from an imagined future event (Baumgartner et al., 2008). People experience these emotions when their interpretation of an imagined future action matches an emotional appraisal. The key difference between appraisals relating to experienced versus anticipated emotions is whether an event has been realised. People may experience guilt and shame when they appraise their past or current actions as illegitimate (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Similarly, people may anticipate guilt and shame when they appraise an imagined future action as illegitimate (Manstead, 2000). For example, I may *anticipate* experiencing guilt and shame for cheating on my partner in the future.

Anticipated emotions serve the social function of promoting moral interpersonal behaviour (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). Two emotions that are closely associated with egalitarian behaviour are guilt and shame (De Hooge et al., 2008; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). These emotions are elicited when people believe that they have violated a moral norm, such as fairness and reciprocity (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Recent research suggests that shame is evoked when a transgression is believed to tarnish part

of one's self-image and that guilt is experienced when people focus on a controllable negative action for which they feel responsible (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011). Similarly, their anticipated counterparts are likely to be elicited when the interpretation of a future action matches these appraisals.

Baumeister and colleagues (2007) argue that negative anticipated emotions signal that undertaking a particular course of action is likely to result in aversive emotional consequences and that the desire to avoid these consequences inhibits the behaviour. In line with this, research has found that anticipated *interpersonal* guilt and shame deter illegal actions (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Rebellon et al., 2010; Tibbetts, 1997) and promote ethical consumer decision making (Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2006). Based on previous research (e.g., Shepherd et al., 2011a., 2011c), I extend this work by arguing that negative anticipated *group-based* emotions serve the self-regulatory function of deterring immoral *intergroup* behaviour. Moreover, I suggest that this inhibitory process is more likely to occur in unthreatening circumstances, such as when the ingroup's position in the social hierarchy is prestigious and stable.

Group-Based Emotions

Intergroup emotion theory (Devos et al., 2003; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999; E. R. Smith et al., 2007) proposes that emotions can be experienced through an association with the ingroup in the absence of any direct involvement in the emotion-eliciting event. These group-based emotions are felt when people categorise themselves as an ingroup member and make an appraisal-consistent interpretation of the situation. For example, research has found that group-based shame and guilt are elicited when the actions of the ingroup are appraised as illegitimate (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2004, 2005). In line with this, I argue that people anticipate group-based emotions when they categorise as an ingroup member and make an appraisal consistent interpretation of a

*future*ingroupaction. Previous research has found that perceiving the ingroup's future actions as illegitimate positively predicts anticipated group-based guilt and shame (Shepherd et al., 2011c).

In keeping with the moral psychology literature (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007) I argue that anticipated *group-based*emotions promote egalitarian *intergroup*behaviour by signalling the aversive consequences of immoral ingroup actions. Social identity theory postulates that people are motivated to maintain a positive social identity in order to gain collective self-esteem. Although group-based guilt and shame both threaten social identity by associating the ingroup with a transgression (Branscombe et al., 1999), shame is potentially more harmful because it is more determental to appraise part of the self-image as tarnished than to perceive a single action as illegitimate. Group-based shame is elicited when the ingroup's image is damaged (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2005) and is negatively related to collective self-esteem (Schmader & Lickel, 2006b). People should therefore be more motivated to avoid group-based shame than guilt. The desire to avoid these aversive emotional consequences motivates people to implement strategies to protect their group's image (Doosje et al., 1998; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2007). One such strategy that people may use when they *anticipate*feeling group-based shame for a future ingroup transgression is to inhibit the behaviour in question. I therefore argue that anticipated group-based shame deters transgressions by signaling that this action could result in a tarnished social identity. In line with this, research has found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicts discrimination (Shepherd et al., 2011a) and positively predicts collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression (Shepherd et al., 2011c).

Status, Stability and Anticipated Group-Based Shame

Research on anticipated group-based emotions has not assessed the moderating roles of status and status stability. When ingroup bias is perceived as illegitimate stable high-status groups are likely to anticipate group-based shame if group members were to discriminate against the outgroup. Because of their security, stable high-status groups can treat the outgroup fairly without losing their prestigious position (Leach et al., 2002; Nadler et al., 2009; Spears et al., 2010). These group members are therefore likely to inhibit discrimination in order to avoid anticipated group-based shame and the social identity threat it poses. When discrimination is believed to be legitimate, on the other hand, the interpretation of the future ingroup action does not match the appraisal for anticipated group-based shame, inhibiting this emotion and its effect on discrimination. Anticipated group-based shame should therefore moderate discrimination in stable high-status groups.

Low-status and unstable high-status groups, on the other hand, are threatened by their inferior or unsecure position in the social hierarchy. Members of these groups may be motivated to eliminate these threats by obtaining an improved position. The desire to change from the ingroup's current undesirable position to an advantageous secure high-status position may motivate group members to participate in behaviours that would aid this transformation, such as ingroup bias (see Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). Because this cannot be achieved through egalitarian behaviour, less prosocial strategies may be implemented to avoid group-based shame. When these group members anticipate group-based shame they may simply legitimise discrimination in order to obtain a secure prestigious position without experiencing this aversive emotion (e.g., 'we deserve to be equal with them'; or 'our high status justifies discrimination'). Anticipated group-based shame is therefore less likely to moderate discrimination in these groups.

Thus far, I have described discrimination as a generic construct. Previous research has found a distinction between subtle forms of ingroup bias – such as *absolute*ingroup bias– and more extreme forms, such as *relative*ingroup bias (Brewer, 1996; Jetten et al., 1996; Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011). Absolute ingroup bias refers to the desire to gain the maximum amount of resources for one's group (or maximising ingroup profit) and is regarded as a form of resource building. Relative ingroup bias, on the other hand, reflects the desire to allocate relatively more resources to the ingroup than the outgroup, even if this results in one's group gaining less absolute resources overall. People are willing to sacrifice some ingroup profit in order to gain relatively more resources than the rival outgroup, making this strategy more harsh. I consider both forms of discrimination in this research.

Study 7

In Study 7 I assessed whether anticipated group-based shame moderated the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups. In the high-status condition the ingroup (Great Britain) was compared to the outgroup (Germany) with respect to an Olympic sport favouring Britain (sailing). In the low-status condition these groups were compared with respect to an Olympic sport favouring Germany (equestrianism). Stability was manipulated by informing participants that experts believe that the relative position of these countries in the Olympic medals table was unlikely to change (stable condition) or could change (unstable condition) in the coming years. Anticipated group-based guilt and shame were measured continuous variables. Absolute and relative ingroup bias were assessed by a resource allocation measure.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 212 British undergraduate students (31 male, 180 female, 1 undisclosed) participated in this study in exchange for course credit or £2 (approximately $3.25). Participants were aged between 18 and 49 years (M = 20.21, SD = 3.86; two participants did not report their age). A 2 (ingroup status: high vs. low) by 2 (stability: stable vs. unstable) by continuous moderating variable (anticipated group-based guilt *or* shame) design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions formed by the two manipulated factors. The dependent variables were absolute and relative ingroup bias. Relative ingroup bias was measured using the pull score of maximum differentiation (MD) on maximum ingroup profit (MIP) and maximum joint profit (MJP), and absolute ingroup bias was assessed using the pull score of FAV (MD and MIP) on parity (P).

Materials

Anticipated group-based emotions. Participants were asked: 'If British people were to abuse Germany in the ways described above to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?' The anticipated group-based guilt items were 'guilty,' 'remorse,' and 'regret' (α = .77). The anticipated group-based shame items were 'ashamed,' 'humiliated,' and 'embarrassed' (α = .80). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (0 = *not at all,* 6 = *extremely*).

Discrimination. Participants were asked to distribute spectator passes between British and German people for the equestrian (low-status conditions) or sailing (high-status conditions) events at the 2012 Olympic Games, following a reminder that the number of spectators supporting a competitor improves the competitor's performance. Absolute (FAV on P) and relative (MD on MIP and MJP) ingroup bias were measured

using the so called 'Tajfel matrices' (see Tajfel et al., 1971) outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (1994)[14]. These matrices permit the calculation of 'pull scores.' Pull scores can range from -12 to 12. Positive FAV on P values indicate a preference for ingroup favouritism over parity and negative values demonstrate outgroup favouritism. Similarly, positive MD on MIP and MJP values demonstrate maximum differentiation in favour of the ingroup over maximum ingroup and joint profit (relative ingroup bias). Negative values reflect differentiation in favour of the outgroup. On both measures, values of zero indicate that the resources were distributed equally between the two groups.

Procedure

Participants were told that the researchers were interested in the attitudes of British and German people regarding issues surrounding the London 2012 Olympic Games. In the low-status condition participants were shown a table summarising the number of medals won by various nations in international equestrian events during the past 3 years. Germany was shown as having won the most medals and Great Britain had won the fewest (of the 5 nations presented). In the high-status condition participants were shown the total number of medals won by various nations in international sailing events during the past 3 years. The only difference between this table and that of the low-status condition was that the positions of Great Britain and Germany were reversed. The medals table was followed by a paragraph describing the stability of each country's position in the table. Participants were told that because of the number of promising junior competitors the relative position of the two countries either was unlikely to change (stable conditions) or could change (unstable conditions) in the foreseeable

[14]I also measured symbolic discrimination by asking participants to distribute passes to the medals award ceremony. The order that the participant completed the symbolic and instrumental matrices was counterbalanced.

future. These manipulations were followed by some simple comprehension questions (e.g. 'Where did Great Britain come in the medals table presented on the previous page?').

These questions were followed by the anticipated emotion scales. To increase concreteness, the anticipated emotion scales were preceded by a paragraph describing some proposed discriminatory ingroup actions (see Appendix 9). This paragraph stated that at the 2012 Olympics some British people were planning to discriminate against Germans by giving them a hostile welcome and disrupting the competitors during the events. Participants then rated the extent to which they anticipated feeling group-based guilt and shame if their group were to act in this way. These scales were followed by the discrimination measures. Once the participant had completed all of the matrices they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Seventeen participants were deleted from the dataset because they answered two or more of the comprehension questions incorrectly. To correct for negative skew, a square-root transformation was applied to the shame scale prior to further analysis. Two 2 (status: low vs. high) x 2 (stability: unstable vs. stable) x continuous moderating variable (guilt or shame, centred)[15] ANCOVAs were conducted on each of the two pull scores (FAV on P, and MD on MIP and MJP), one analysis for each anticipated emotion. The emotion variable that was not entered as a continuous moderator was entered as a covariate in order to assess the role played by 'shame-free' guilt or 'guilt-free' shame (see Tangney et al., 1992). The two pull scores were calculated using the procedure outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (1994).

[15] Continuous moderators are usually measured prior to the manipulations. However, it was legitimate to include these variables as continuous moderators because they were not affected by the main effects and interaction of the status and stability variables (*p*s> .10).

Discrimination

Absolute ingroup bias. The pull score of FAV on P represented absolute ingroup bias. Pull scores ranged from -11 to 12, with a mean of 0.76 (*SD* = 2.47). The mean score was significantly different from zero, $t(194) = 4.29$, $p < .001$, indicating that overall participants engaged in ingroup favouritism. Status and stability did not have a significant main effect on absolute ingroup bias (*p*s> .10). Similarly, anticipated group-based guilt (*M* = 3.39, *SD* = 1.42) and shame (*M* = 4.43, *SD* = 1.19 pre-transformation; *M* = 2.09, *SD* = 0.37 post-transformation) did not predict absolute ingroup bias (*p*s> .10).The interaction between status and shame had a significant effect on absolute ingroup bias, $F(1, 178) = 4.15$, $p = .043$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. This was qualified by a significant interaction between status, stability, and shame, $F(1, 178) = 5.68$, $p = .018$, $\eta^2_p = .03$[16].In contrast to shame, guilt and its interactions with status and stability did not significantly influence absolute ingroup bias (*p*s> .10).

As hypothesised, simple slopes analysis established that anticipated group-based shame predicted absolute ingroup bias in the stable high-status condition, $\beta = -.48$, $t(186) = 2.74$, $p = .007$, but not in any of the other conditions (*p*s> .10; see Figure 8). Furthermore, when group-based shame was low (*M* – 1*SD*), absolute ingroup bias was greater in the stable high-status condition (*M* = 2.12, *SE* = 0.55) than in the stable low-status condition (*M* = 0.35, *SE* = 0.61), $F(1, 178) = 4.81$, $p = .030$, $\eta^2_p = .03$, or in the unstable high-status condition (*M* = 0.74, *SE* = 0.48), $F(1, 178) = 3.82$, $p = .052$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. When anticipated group-based shame was high (*M* + 1*SD*), on the other hand, absolute ingroup bias was lower in the stable high-status condition (*M* = -0.25, *SE* =

[16] This interaction was qualified by a 4-way interaction of status, stability, counterbalancing and shame, $F(1, 178) = 3.78$, $p = .054$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. As predicted, anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted absolute ingroup bias in stable high-status groups regardless of the counterbalancing ($\beta = -.47$, $t(182) = 2.04$, $p = .042$ for instrumental first, and $\beta = -.50$, $t(182) = 2.07$, $p = .039$ for symbolic first). The significant 4-way interaction was due to a positive relationship between anticipated group-based shame and absolute ingroup bias in the stable low-status group when the symbolic matrices were completed first, $\beta = .63$, $t(182) = 2.61$, $p = .010$.

0.57) than the stable low-status condition (M = 1.26, SE = 0.45), F(1, 178) = 4.58, p = .034, η^2_p = .03. When anticipated group-based shame was high, absolute ingroup bias also tended to be lower in the stable high-status condition than in the unstable high-status condition (M = 1.00, SE = 0.58) although this difference was not significant, F(1, 178) = 2.48, p = .117, η^2_p = .01. In summary, stable high-status groups exhibited the highest level of absolute ingroup bias when anticipated group-based shame was low, but egalitarian behaviour when this anticipated emotion was high.



Figure 8. Interaction of status, stability, and anticipated group-based shame on absolute ingroup bias (FAV on P; Study 7). ** = p < .01.

Relative ingroup bias. The MD on MIP and MJP pull score represented relative ingroup bias. Pull scores ranged from -7 to 12, with a mean of 1.09 (SD = 2.97). This mean was significantly different from zero, t(193) = 5.13, p <.001, indicating that overall participants engaged in ingroup bias. The main effects and interactions of the status, stability, and shame variables did not significantly influence relative ingroup bias (ps> .10). The same was true of the main effect of anticipated group-based guilt and its interactions with the status, and stability manipulations (ps> .10).

Discussion

I hypothesised that anticipated group-based shame would moderate the amount of discrimination exhibited by high-status groups in stable hierarchies. Consistent with this prediction, anticipated group-based shame only predicted absolute ingroup bias in the stable high-status condition. When anticipated-group based shame was low, members of stable high-status groups exhibited more absolute ingroup bias than did members of stable low-status or unstable high-status groups. However, when anticipated group-based shame was high, stable high-status groups were less likely than stable low-status groups to discriminate against the outgroup. By contrast, the main effect of anticipated group-based guilt and its interactions with status and stability did not significantly influence discrimination. I argue that anticipated group-based shame was more likely to affect discrimination than guilt because shame is more closely related to social identity (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007).

There was no support for my hypothesis on the relative ingroup bias measure (MD on MIP and MJP). This may have been due to the type of resource that was allocated. Participants were asked to allocate passes to the 2012 Olympic Games after being reminded that a greater number of spectators supporting a competitor would have a beneficial effect on the competitor's performance. By displaying absolute ingroup bias participants were maximising the number of supportive spectators and thereby increasing their ingroup's chances of winning a medal. The use of relative ingroup bias would increase the chance of the ingroup winning a medal relative to the outgroup. However, because the number of spectator passes is fixed, sacrificing passes in order to gain more than the rival outgroup might result in a third party outgroup being given more passes, increasing their chances of success. In this context it might therefore be logical to engage in absolute rather than relative ingroup bias. Relative ingroup bias

might be more evident if engaging in this strategy were less likely to have the inadvertent effect of benefitting a third party outgroup. I tested this possibility in Study 8.

A potential limitation with Study 7 is that the results may have been due to the appraisals associated with anticipated group-based shame rather than the emotion itself. It could be argued that the effects may be moderated by the extent to which ingroup bias is believed to be illegitimate and/or threatening to social identity rather than anticipated group-based shame. I believe that this alternative explanation is unlikely for two reasons. First, because both anticipated group-based guilt and shame are associated with illegitimacy I indirectly controlled for this appraisal by entering the opposing anticipated group-based emotion into the ANCOVA as a covariate. Second, in Studies 1 and 2 I found that anticipated group-based shame and anger mediated the effect of illegitimacy on intergroup behaviour, implying that the anticipated emotions are more likely to predict behaviour than their appraisals. However, a stronger test of this alternative hypothesis would be to measure the illegitimacy and image threat appraisals and to assess whether anticipated group-based shame predicts ingroup favouritism when these variables have been taken into account. We therefore measured these variables in Study 8.

Study 8

Three factors were manipulated in Study 8: status, stability, and anticipated group-based shame. The status and stability manipulations were similar to those used in Study 7. Anticipated group-based shame was manipulated using a bogus-pipeline method (for a similar procedure, see Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1997). The dependent variables were again absolute (FAV on P) and relative (MD on MIP and MJP) ingroup bias. Participants were asked to allocate grants between the

ingroup(Cardiff University) and an outgroup (University of Bristol). This resource was chosen because participants were unlikely to believe that unallocated money would benefit a third party outgroup, thereby increasing the likely occurrence of relative ingroup bias.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 159 Cardiff University students (11 males and 148 females) participated in this study in exchange for course credit or £4 (approximately $6.50). Participants were aged between 18-47 years (M = 20.08, SD = 3.09). A 2 (status: high vs. low) x 2 (stability: stable vs. unstable) x 2 (anticipated group-based shame: high vs. low) between participants design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. The dependent variables were absolute and relative ingroup bias.

Materials

Anticipated Group-Based Emotions. An extra anticipated group-based shame and guilt item was added to those used in Study 7 (‘disgraced’ and ‘sorry,’respectively). These scales were completed both before and after the anticipated group-based shame manipulation (pre-manipulation guilt α = .83; post-manipulation guilt α = .92; pre-manipulation shame α = .83; post-manipulation shame α = .94). Participants were asked: ‘If Cardiff University were to discriminate against the University of Bristol in this way, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?’ All items were rated on an 11-point scale (0 = *not at all,* 10 = *extremely intensely*).

Perceived legitimacy and image threat. Two antecedents of anticipated group-based shame were measured: perceived illegitimacy and image-threat. Image threat was measured using three items: ‘If Cardiff University students were to give more resources

to themselves than the University of Bristol it would make us look bad/make us look immoral/threaten our prestigious image' (α = .89). The perceived legitimacy of ingroup bias was assessed using four items: 'It is fair/unfair (reverse coded)/legitimate/illegitimate (reverse coded) to favour Cardiff University over the University of Bristol' (α = .88). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree,* 7 = *strongly agree*).

Discrimination. Participants were asked to distribute funding for sports equipment that could potentially improve the performance of their university sports teams and thereby their performance in inter-university league tables. The matrices used to assess absolute and relative ingroup bias were identical to those used in Study 7.

Procedure

All participants read a newspaper article stating that sports clubs at Cardiff University were arranging inter-university sports competitions and that they had invited all universities in the south-west of the UK to the event with the exception of the University of Bristol (see Appendix 10). The article stated that this omission was disrespectful and that it may affect Bristol's position in sports league tables. To ensure that anticipated group-based emotions were elicited rather than experienced emotions, participants were told that the tournaments were due to take place in the following months and that there was still time to invite Bristol to these events.

After reading this article participants were told that the researchers wanted to know how they would feel if Cardiff University were to discriminate against the University of Bristol in this way. Participants were told that this could be accurately assessed using a measure that combines galvanic skin response readings with self-report items. An electrode was then attached to the participant's non-dominant hand. Participants then completed the anticipated emotions measures. After rating these

questions participants were told that, according to the skin conductance and questionnaire results, they were unlikely (low shame condition) or likely (high shame condition) to feel ashamed if students from their university were to mistreat students from the University of Bristol (see Appendix 11). As a manipulation check, participants then completed the anticipated group-based shame and guilt scales ostensibly for the purposes of a reliability check. To ensure that this did not weaken my manipulation participantswere informed that the original measures were shown to be reliable.

The status of the ingroup was then manipulated. Participants were presented with a league table displaying the aggregated number of points won at sporting events in the previous year by universities in the south-west of the UK. In the high-status condition Cardiff University was at the top of this table and the University of Bristol was last (out of ten). In the low-status condition the positions of these two teams were reversed. Participants were then told that based on their performance earlier in the year, the positions of these universities in the league table was either unlikely to change (stable condition) or that they may change (unstable condition) in the future. This manipulation was followed by the discrimination, perceived legitimacy and image-threat measures. Once these measures had been completed the participant was thanked and debriefed.

Results

Shame manipulation check. Two 2 (shame: low vs. high) ANOVAs were run on the post-manipulation anticipated group-based shame and guilt measures, one for each emotion. Post-manipulation anticipated group-based shame was greater in the high (M = 5.15, SD = 2.55) than the low shame condition (M = 4.00, SD = 2.45), $F(1, 157) = 8.39$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. There was no difference in post-manipulation anticipated group-based guilt between the high (M = 4.68, SD = 2.38) and low (M = 4.28, SD = 2.34)

shame conditions, $F(1, 157) = 1.14$, $p = .287$, $\eta^2_p < .01$[17]. I concluded that the manipulation was successful.

Discrimination

All participants answered the majority of the comprehension questions correctly. The pull scores of FAV on P and MD on MIP and MJP were calculated using the procedure outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (1994). A 2 (shame: low vs. high) x 2 (status: low vs. high) x 2 (stability: stable vs. unstable) ANCOVA was conducted on the absolute (FAV on P) and relative (MD on MIP and MJP) ingroup bias measures. Perceived legitimacy and image threat were entered as covariates.

Absolute ingroup bias. Pull scores ranged from -11 to 12, with a mean of 1.47 ($SD = 3.59$). This mean was significantly greater than zero, $t(158) = 5.15$, $p < .001$, indicating that overall participants engaged in ingroup favouritism. Absolute ingroup bias was greater in the low-status ($M = 2.22$, $SD = 3.64$) than in the high-status conditions ($M = 0.70$, $SD = 3.39$), $F(1, 149) = 8.46$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. Image threat was the only covariate to predict absolute ingroup bias, $F(1, 149) = 6.59$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2_p = .04$ for image threat and $F(1, 149) = 0.53$, $p = .469$, $\eta^2_p < .01$ for perceived legitimacy. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant ($ps > .10$).

Relative ingroup bias. Pull scores ranged from -11 to 10, with a mean of 1.04 ($SD = 3.23$). The mean score was significantly greater than zero, $t(157) = 4.04$, $p < .001$, indicating that overall participants engaged in ingroup favouritism. Relative ingroup bias was greater in the low-status ($M = 1.81$, $SD = 3.02$) than the high-status condition ($M = 0.24$, $SD = 3.27$), $F(1, 148) = 11.05$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2_p = .07$. The shame and

[17] People in the high shame condition experienced greater levels of anticipated group-based shame *prior* to the shame manipulation, $F(1, 157) = 6.39$, $p = .012$, $\eta^2_p = .04$. However, post-manipulation anticipated group-based shame was also greater in the high than the low shame condition when pre-manipulation guilt and shame were entered as covariates, $F(1, 155) = 3.71$, $p = .056$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. In this analysis, the difference in post-manipulation guilt between the high and low shame conditions remained non-significant, $F(1, 155) = 0.81$, $p = .369$, $\eta^2_p = .01$.

stability manipulations did not significantly affect relative ingroup bias, $F(1, 148) = 1.16$, $p = .284$, $\eta^2_p = .01$ for shame, and $F(1, 148) = 1.13$, $p = .289$, $\eta^2_p = .01$ for stability. Image threat was the only covariate to predict relative ingroup bias, $F(1, 148) = 3.87$, $p = .051$, $\eta^2_p = .03$ for image threat, and $F(1, 148) = 0.03$, $p = .869$, $\eta^2_p < .01$ for perceived legitimacy. The interaction between status and stability had a significant effect on relative ingroup bias, $F(1, 148) = 7.73$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. This interaction was qualified by a near-significant shame, status, and stability interaction, $F(1, 148) = 3.86$, $p = .051$, $\eta^2_p = .03$[18].

As shown in Figure 9, members of stable high-status groups engaged in a small amount of relative ingroup bias when anticipated group-based shame was low ($M = 0.14$, $SE = 0.66$). However, when anticipated group-based shame was high this group exhibited *outgroup*favouritism (or negative relative ingroup bias; $M = -1.59$, $SE = 0.71$). This difference was marginally significant, $F(1, 148) = 3.19$, $p = .076$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. Relative ingroup bias did not differ between the low and high anticipated group-based shame conditions in the unstable high-status group, or in the unstable low-status and stable low-status groups (*p*s> .10). In summary, anticipated group-based shame only moderated relative ingroup bias in the stable high-status group condition.

[18] This interaction remained near-significant when the interactions of image threat and illegitimacy with status and/or stability were also entered into the analysis, implying that the effects were more likely to be cause by anticipated group-based shame than the appraisals associated with this anticipated emotion.



Figure 9. Interaction of status, stability, and anticipated group-based shame on relative ingroup bias (MD on MIP and MJP; Study 8). Error bars = ± 1*SE*.

Further analysis revealed that when shame was high and the hierarchy was stable relative ingroup bias was greater in the low-status ($M = 2.88$, $SE = 0.67$) than in the high-status condition, $F(1, 148) = 20.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .12$. Furthermore, when shame and status were high, relative ingroup bias was greater in the unstable ($M = 0.96$, $SE = 0.70$) than in the stable condition, $F(1, 148) = 6.48$, $p = .012$, $\eta^2_p = .04$. Thus when anticipated group-based shame was high, members of stable high-status groups displayed the lowest amount of relative ingroup bias. It was also the case that when status was low and shame was high relative ingroup bias was greater in the stable than the unstable condition ($M = 0.79$, $SE = 0.68$), $F(1, 148) = 4.78$, $p = .030$, $\eta^2_p = .03$.

Discussion

As hypothesised, I found that stable high-status groups exhibited less relative ingroup bias when anticipated group-based shame was high than when it was low. Furthermore, when anticipated group-based shame was high, stable high-status groups exhibited less relative ingroup bias than any of the other conditions. Based on Study 7, I

also hypothesised that when anticipated group-based shame was low, members of stable high-status groups would exhibit the highest level of discrimination. However, I did not find this high level of discrimination in Study 8. This may reflect the fact that the mean level of anticipated group-based shame in the low shame condition (4.00) was nearer the midpoint of the scale (5.00) than the low end of the continuum, perhaps reflecting the fact that it is easier to find differences in measured shame than to manipulate it. This moderate level of anticipated group-based shame may have inhibited the stable high-status group from discriminating against the low-status group.

In Study 7 I found my hypothesised effects on the *absolute*ingroup bias measure, whereas in Study 8 I found these effects on the *relative*ingroup bias measure. This discrepancy is likely due to the different allocation objects used to assess ingroup bias. In Study 7 participants allocated passes to Olympic events under the impression that supportive spectators would improve the competitors' performance. Engaging in absolute ingroup bias would give the ingroup better representation among the spectators and thereby enhance the ingroup competitors' chance of success. Engaging in relative ingroup bias would also give the ingroup relatively greater representation than the outgroup, but now at the expense of forfeiting some passes for ingroup spectators (bearing in mind that this strategy is structured to conflict with absolute ingroup gain). Because Olympic arenas need to be filled, the 'sacrificed' tickets would be allocated to a third party outgroup, increasing their representation in the crowd and thereby reducing the ingroup competitor's chance of success. Engaging in relative ingroup bias might therefore be detrimental to the ingroup. In Study 8, however, it could not be assumed that unallocated grants would be given to a third party outgroup. In this context relative ingroup bias is less likely to have a detrimental effect on the ingroup, making this

strategy more appropriate to use in Study 8 if the objective is to increase the ingroup's resources.

General Discussion

In two studies I found that anticipated group-based shame moderated discrimination on the part of stable high-status groups. In Study 7 I found that stable high-status groups exhibited high levels of discrimination when anticipated group-based shame was low. I argued that this is because discrimination is free of consequences in such circumstances. In both studies I found that when anticipated group-based shame was high, members of stable high-status groups exhibited the lowest levels of discrimination. In Study 8 members of this group even displayed outgroup favouritism. In these circumstances the desire to avoid group-based shame motivates stable high-status groups to inhibit discrimination. In both Studies 7 and 8 I found that anticipated group-based shame only moderated discrimination in stable high-status groups. In line with other researchers (Leach et al., 2002; Nadler et al., 2009; Spears et al., 2010), I argue that because of their security, stable high-status groups are able to engage in egalitarian behaviour (and even outgroup favouritism) without the risk of losing their prestigious position. Their low-status and unstable high-status counterparts, on the other hand, are motivated to obtain a better or more secure position in the social hierarchy and this cannot be achieved through egalitarian behaviour. These groups are therefore likely to legitimise discrimination by inhibiting anticipated group-based shame and its effect on ingroup bias.

Previous research has found inconsistent results regarding the amount of discrimination undertaken by members of high-status groups in stable hierarchies. Jetten and colleagues (2000)suggested the extent of ingroup bias exhibited by stable high-status groups depends on the perceived legitimacy of this action. I extended this

argument by proposing that the emotional consequence of perceived illegitimacy moderates this effect, and support for this proposal was found in two experiments.

Recent research has established that group members are motivated to possess and maintain a moral social identity (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 2009). Previous work has argued and shown that anticipated *group-based* emotions promote moral *intergroup* behaviour and that this self-regulatory system helps to maintain the ingroup's moral identity (Shepherd et al., 2011a, 2011c). The present research extends this line of work by showing that this system only deters non-egalitarian behaviour in stable high-status groups. When faced with a threat to their group, people are likely to be more concerned with defending their group. The desire to protect the ingroup may result in them legitimising actions such as discrimination that deal with this threat. In keeping with recent developments in the moral psychology literature (e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011), I argue that the perceived morality of an action is context dependent. In secure circumstances ingroup members may regard non-egalitarian behaviour as immoral. However, when the ingroup is threatened, people are likely to be more concerned about moral issues relating to group unity (or loyalty), resulting in the legitimisation of non-egalitarian intergroup behaviour. The self-regulatory system promoting moral intergroup behaviour should therefore be most effective in non-threatening situations.

In the current research and previous work (Shepherd et al., 2011a, 2011c) I have found that anticipated group-based shame is more likely to promote moral behaviour than guilt. This can be seen as inconsistent with the work of Tangney and colleagues (Dearing et al., 2005; Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007), which suggests that guilt is a more prototypical moral emotion than shame. However, it is worth noting that Tangney and colleagues' research focused on shame-

and guilt-proneness, rather than on experienced or anticipated shame and guilt. Furthermore, recent research has found that guilt has a dark side (Bastian et al., 2011; De Hooge et al., 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009) and that shame promotes prosocial behaviour (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010). Interestingly, Tibbetts(1997) found that criminal activity was positively related to shame-proneness but negatively related to anticipated shame. I join De Hooge and colleagues (2008, 2010) in suggesting that shame can have a prosocial effect on behaviour. My research adds to this argument by showing that anticipated group-based shame promotes moral intergroup behaviour but that this effect is less likely to be observed in threatening situations.

It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of this research. It could be argued that the observed effects were caused by anticipated *interpersonal,* rather than group-based, emotions. I do not regard this as plausible because in both studies the anticipated emotions were felt towards an event that the participants were not personally responsible for creating. The participants did not personally plan to discriminate against Germans at the 2012 Olympic Games in London (Study 7) or to exclude Bristol from the sports tournaments (Study 8). Because these events were relevant to social identity, rather than personal identity, it seems reasonable to suppose that anticipated group-based emotions were elicited.

In conclusion, in two studies I found that anticipated group-based shame moderated the amount of discrimination exhibited by members of high-status groups when the social hierarchy was stable. Members of such groups exhibited high levels of ingroup bias when anticipated group-based shame was low but egalitarian behaviour when shame was high. The moderating role of group-based shame helps to account for the discrepancies in previous research on the amount of discrimination shown by stable high-status groups. When members of a stable high-status group do not anticipate

group-based shame, their discrimination is consequence-free and therefore more likely. When members of this group anticipated group-based shame, on the other hand, the desire to maintain a positive social identity seemed to motivate them to inhibit the shame-evoking behaviour. In low-status and unstable high-status groups the desire to gain a better or more secure status position leads group members to focus on enhancing ingroup resources; as a consequence there is less concern with the lot of other groups, and anticipated group-based shame is too weak to constrain ingroup bias.

Chapter 5: General Discussion

In his 1932 book *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Reinhold Niebuhr suggested that people are guided by moral principles. However, when these same individuals are part of a group, their actions become selfish, unethical and immoral. In this thesis I have argued against this interpretation by suggesting that anticipated group-based emotions promote moral intergroup behaviour. At the interpersonal level, harmful anticipated emotions deter transgressions by signalling the aversive emotional consequences of this action (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). In line with this, I argue that the anticipation of harmful group-based emotions promote moral intergroup behaviour by signalling the aversive emotional consequences of illegitimate and immoral actions. Group-based guilt and shame threaten social identity by associating the ingroup with a transgression (Branscombe et al., 1999; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). Their anticipated counterparts therefore signal that undertaking a particular course of action may pose a threat to social identity. The desire to avoid these aversive emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity motivates ingroup members to inhibit the behaviour in question or undertake actions that reduce the likelihood of the transgression being undertaken. This system therefore serves the self-regulatory function of helping ingroup members to maintain a positive and moral social identity.

I start this concluding chapter by summarising the results of the eight studies in the previous chapters. These studies are then compared and contrasted to assess their commonalities and to discuss their differences. I then use this research to create a theoretical model of the role of anticipated group-based emotions in promoting moral intergroup behaviour and the effect of group threats on this process. After this, I assess the impact that this research may have on the emotion and intergroup literature. I then discuss the limitations of these studies and possible future research. Finally, I discuss

the practical implications of this research, such as how it can be used to create harmonious intergroup relations.

Summary

In *Chapter 2*, I assessed whether anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger promote collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. I argued that the desire to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based shame and the high level of agitated arousal signalled by anticipated group-based anger should motivate ingroup members to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. Although people are motivated to avoid group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 1998), its low action potential may be insufficient to motivate active behaviours, such as collective action (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). I therefore argued that anticipated group-based guilt was more likely to predict passive behaviours (such as reparations) rather than active behaviours. In Study 1 I manipulated the illegitimacy of a proposed ingroup action and found that people were more willing to protest against this action when it was believed to be illegitimate than when it was legitimate. I also found that people anticipated group-based shame/anger to a greater extent in the illegitimate condition than the legitimate condition. Moreover, anticipated group-based shame/anger (but not guilt) fully mediated the effect of illegitimacy on collective action. People anticipated group-based shame/anger to a greater extent in the illegitimate condition than the legitimate condition, making them more willing to protest against the proposed ingroup transgression. In Study 2 I extended the results of Study 1 by demonstrating that the three anticipated group-based emotions were distinct constructs and that shame and anger (but not guilt) positively predicted collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.

In Study 3 I extended the previous studies by investigating the effects of both positive and negative anticipated group-based emotions on collective action and the role of ingroup identification in moderating this process. I manipulated the salience of the anticipated emotions by asking participants in the salient (but not the control) condition to rate the extent to which they anticipated either positive (pride, relief and feeling emboldened) or negative (shame, guilt and anger) group-based emotions for a proposed ingroup action before they completed a collective action measure. I found that anticipated group-based guilt uniquely predicted passive action tendencies, such as reparations. I also found that people with low self-investment were less willing to engage in collective action when positive anticipated group-based emotions were salient than they were in the control condition. The corresponding pattern of results for people with high self-investment was non-significant. Furthermore, people with high self-investment were less willing to engage in collective action when negative emotions were salient than they were in the control condition. I also found that people with high self-investment anticipated group-based shame to a lesser extent when negative emotions were salient, compared to the control condition. Moderated mediation analysis revealed that people with high self-investment were less willing to engage in collective action when negative emotions were salient because they anticipated low levels of group-based shame. I argue that because it was easy to justify the use of military force against Iran, people with high self-investment could avoid the aversive anticipated group-based emotions by legitimising the ingroup's actions, thereby reducing their willingness to engage in collective action.

I concluded that anticipated group-based shame and anger promote collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression and that guilt predicts passive action tendencies, such as reparations. Positive anticipated group-based emotions inhibit

collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. When ingroup members are able to justify their group's actions, people with high self-investment are likely to inhibit anticipated group-based shame and anger by legitimising the ingroup's actions, making people less willing to engage in collective action against the anticipated transgression. This research extends the collective action literature by demonstrating that the mere anticipation of an aversive group-based emotion is sufficient to promote collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.

In *Chapter 3* I assessed the effect of anticipated group-based shame and guilt on discrimination. I argued that the effect of these emotions would be moderated by ingroup identification. Based on Shepherd and colleagues (2011b) I assumed that people with high self-investment would not avoid these aversive emotions by legitimising discrimination, because it is difficult to justify this behaviour when the ingroup is not threatened by the outgroup. I therefore argued that because people with high self-investment are highly motivated to avoid the threat that anticipated group-based guilt and shame pose to social identity, they are more likely to inhibit discrimination in order to prevent these emotions from being evoked than people with low self-investment. In Study 4 (minimal groups) I found that people with low (but not high) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination when the aversive group-based emotions were salient than in the control condition. At first sight this appears to conflict with my predictions. Previous research has found that low identifiers try to leave or distance themselves from identity-threatened groups (Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1997; Spears et al., 1997). The threat of the aversive anticipated group-based emotions may have motivated people with low self-investment to leave the ingroup, resulting in a reduction in commitment and thus lower ingroup-bias.

In Study 5 (established groups) I found that people with high (but not low) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient than the control condition, as originally predicted. In keeping with my hypothesis, I argued that people with high self-investment reduced discrimination in order to avoid the social identity threat posed by the anticipated group-based emotions. Furthermore, anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted discrimination. Because group-based shame is more closely associated with social identity than is guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007), and because a primary goal of ingroup members is to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), I argued that anticipated group-based shame should be a stronger (negative) predictor of immoral intergroup behaviour, by comparison with guilt.

The use of minimal groups in Study 4 resulted in low levels of identification, with the score representing 'low' self-investment at the low end of the scale and the score indexing 'high' self-investment at the midpoint of the scale. This study therefore assessed the effects of anticipated emotions on people with low and moderate self-investment, respectively. In Study 5 I used established groups and found that the mean level of self-investment was high. The score indexing 'low' self-investment was near the midpoint of the scale and the score representing 'high' self-investment was near the top of the scale. Study 5 therefore assessed the effects of anticipated group-based emotions on people with moderate and high levels of self-investment, respectively. Combining these results, it can be seen that in Study 4 people with low (but not moderate) self-investment exhibited lower levels of discrimination in the emotion salient than in the control condition; and that the null effect of this manipulation on people with moderate self-investment was replicated in Study 5, where I also found that people with high self-investment displayed less discrimination in the emotion salient

than in the control condition. These results suggest a curvilinear relationship between self-investment and discrimination in the emotion salient condition. People with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment should reduce discrimination when the anticipated group-based emotions are salient. This curvilinear hypothesis was supported in Study 6. This study also found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted discrimination, thereby supporting the findings of Study 5.

I concluded that people with low and high (but not moderate) self-investment reduce discrimination when they anticipate aversive group-based emotions, albeit for different reasons. Because of their low commitment to the ingroup, people with low self-investment are likely to distance themselves or leave the group in order to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based shame. This reduced commitment is likely to decrease ingroup-bias. People with high self-investment, on the other hand, are likely to inhibit discrimination when they anticipated group-based shame in order to avoid social identity threat. In the case of people with moderate self-investment, they have some commitment to the ingroup and therefore cannot implement a distancing strategy to avoid the identity-threatening emotions. At the same time, they may be insufficiently identified to want to protect the ingroup's identity. As a result, people with moderate self-investment were unlikely to reduce discrimination when they anticipated group-based shame.

In *Chapter 4* I assessed whether anticipated group-based emotions may explain inconsistencies found in previous research regarding the amount of discrimination exhibited by members of high-status groups in stable hierarchies. Some researchers suggest that stable high-status groups may use their position in the social hierarchy to justify discrimination, resulting in high levels of ingroup-bias (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978), while others suggest that because members of this

group already enjoy a secure, prestigious position in the social hierarchy they do not need to discriminate against the low-status group, resulting in egalitarian behaviour (Doosje et al., 1995). I argue that the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups is likely to be moderated by anticipated group-based shame. When members of this group use their superior position to justify discrimination, the interpretation of the future ingroup action is inconsistent with the anticipated group-base shame appraisal, inhibiting this emotion and its prosocial effects on intergroup behaviour. However, stable high-status groups are likely to anticipate group-based shame when they view discrimination as illegitimate. In such circumstances, this group is likely to display egalitarian behaviour in order to avoid the social identity threat signalled by shame. Furthermore, I suggest that because low-status and unstable high-status groups are motivated to exhibit discrimination in order to try to obtain a secure prestigious position in the social hierarchy, they are likely to legitimise this action when they anticipate group-based shame, inhibiting this emotion and its prosocial effect on behaviour. Anticipated group-based shame is therefore less likely to moderate discrimination in low-status and unstable high-status groups.

In Study 7 I found that anticipated group-based shame only moderated the amount of discrimination exhibited by stable high-status groups. When anticipated group-based shame was low, members of this group exhibited greater discrimination than did stable low-status and unstable high-status groups. When anticipated group-based shame was high, on the other hand, stable high-status groups exhibited the lowest levels of discrimination. In Study 8 I manipulated anticipated group-based shame using a bogus pipeline method, and found that this anticipated emotion moderated discrimination in stable high-status groups but did not do so in low-status or unstable high-status groups. Moreover, when anticipated group-based shame was high, stable

high-status groups exhibited less discrimination than did stable low-status and unstable high-status groups.

I concluded that anticipated group-based shame moderates discrimination in stable high-status groups. Because of their secure position, this group can treat the outgroup fairly (or even favourably) without losing their prestige in the social hierarchy. Low-status groups and unstable high-status groups, on the other hand, are motivated to resolve and secure their threatened position in the social hierarchy first. Because this cannot be achieved through egalitarian behaviour, members of these groups are likely to legitimise discrimination when they anticipate group-based shame in order to use this action to try to obtain a secure prestigious position in the social hierarchy without damaging social identity. Anticipated group-based shame is therefore unlikely to predict discrimination in threatening circumstances.

General Summary

The anticipation of harmful emotions such as guilt and shame promotes moral interpersonal behaviour by signalling the aversive emotional consequences of non-normative actions (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001). In this thesis I extended this research by arguing that the anticipation of aversive *group-based* emotions (such as guilt and shame) promotes moral intergroup behaviour. I argue that the desire to avoid the social identity threat signalled by anticipated group-based guilt and shame motivates ingroup members to inhibit immoral (emotion-evoking) behaviours. In all eight studies I found that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions deters immoral intergroup behaviour. Studies 1 to 3 demonstrated that anticipated group-based shame and anger motivate ingroup members to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression and Studies 4 to 8 found that anticipated group-based shame deters intergroup discrimination. My results therefore

provide strong support for the argument that anticipated group-based emotions promote moral intergroup behaviour.

In all three chapters, I found that anticipated group-based shame is more likely to deter immoral intergroup behaviour than guilt. I argue that this is due to the (differential) association of these emotions with social identity. Although group-based guilt and shame both threaten social identity by associating the ingroup with a transgression (Branscombe et al., 1999), shame is more aversive because it is more closely associated with social identity than group-based guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). Since ingroup members are highly motivated to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), ingroup members should be more motivated to avoid shame than guilt.

Although there is a large degree of consensus across the three series of studies, there are some discrepancies that need to be addressed. The first concerns the effect of self-investment on these processes. In Study 3 I found that when negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient, people with high self-investment were unlikely to inhibit immoral actions. However, in Studies 5 and 6 I found that these people were most likely to inhibit immoral actions. Anticipated emotions should be most effective at reducing immoral behaviour when people cannot justify their group's actions. Indeed, research has found that high identifiers are less likely to justify a transgression when it is believed to be unquestionably negative (Doosje et al., 1998; Johns et al., 2005). In Study 3 I assessed the extent to which British people anticipated aversive group-based emotions for bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. In this context people with high self-investment could use Iran's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations to justify the ingroup's actions, inhibiting anticipated group-based shame and its effect on immoral actions. It may have been more difficult to legitimise discrimination in the studies

reported in Chapter 3 because the outgroup had not threatened the ingroup or committed any immoral actions. As a result, people with high self-investment were more likely to avoid the aversive anticipated group-based emotions by inhibiting rather than legitimising the immoral actions.

Studies 5 and 6 found that anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted discrimination when the status of the ingroup and the outgroup was equal. However, the studies reported in Chapter 4 found that anticipated group-based shame only moderated discrimination in stable high-status groups. In Chapter 4 I argued that anticipated group-based shame is unlikely to predict discrimination in low-status and unstable high status groups because they are motivated to use this action to resolve their threatening position in the social hierarchy. In Studies 5 and 6 people were not aware of any threats that the outgroup may pose to the ingroup. The only salient social identity threat was the harm signalled by anticipated group-based shame. People were therefore likely to exhibit egalitarian behaviour in order to avoid this social identity threat.

From the studies reported in this thesis I can draw a clear picture of the effect of anticipated group-based emotions on moral intergroup behaviour. These studies suggest that people are motivated to maintain a positive and moral social identity. The anticipation of group-based shame signals that a particular course of action may have a detrimental effect on the group's image. In unthreatening circumstances, the desire to maintain a positive social identity motivates ingroup members to inhibit the immoral (emotion-invoking) behaviour. However, in threatening circumstances group members may legitimise the proposed ingroup transgression in order to use this action to alleviate the potential harm and reduce or prevent the identity threat. For example, in Study 3 I argued that people with high self-investment were likely to legitimise the use of military force against Iran in order to deal with the threat of that country's alleged nuclear

weapons program. Similarly, the studies reported in Chapter 4 found that members of low-status and unstable high-status groups were likely to legitimise discrimination in order to use this action to try to obtain a secure prestigious position in the social hierarchy. Anticipated group-based shame is therefore most effective at inhibiting immoral intergroup behaviour in non-threatening circumstances.

Theoretical Implications

Over the last 20 years there has been a growing interest in the effect of group-based emotions on the behaviour of ingroup members. Researchers have found that group-based anger evokes collective action (Livingstone et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008), guilt and shame elicit reparation (R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al., 2008; Doosje et al., 1998), angst promotes behaviours that strengthen the ingroup(Wohl & Branscombe, 2009; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010; Wohl, Giguere, Branscombe, & McVicar, 2011), and sympathy and empathy promote helping behaviour (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Sweetman et al., 2009). The present research extends the intergroup emotion literature by showing that the mere anticipation of an aversive group-based emotion can motivate ingroup members to inhibit an immoral action. It also extends intergroup emotion theory by showing that these emotions are felt when people categorise as an ingroup member and make an appraisal-consistent interpretation of a future ingroup action.

A growing body of research has suggested that groups are motivated to obtain and maintain a moral social identity (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007; Pagliaro et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2009). In line with the morality literature (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007), I argue that aversive anticipated group-based emotions such as shame serve the self-regulatory function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour and that this system helps ingroup members to maintain a moral

social identity. I extend this literature by suggesting that anticipated group-based shame signals that the behaviour in question poses a threat to social identity and that the desire to avoid this threat motivates ingroup members to inhibit the immoral action, thereby protecting social identity.

It would be naïve to suggest, however, that anticipated group-based emotions can prevent all instances of immoral intergroup behaviour. A brief glimpse at the evening news will confirm that this is not the case. As with interpersonal moral emotions, there are instances where anticipated group-based emotions do not inhibit immoral behaviour. Just as moral interpersonal emotions may not prevent a married person from committing adultery, moral group-based emotions do not always prevent group members from committing an immoral action. For example, in Studies 7 and 8 I found that anticipated group-based shame only moderates discrimination in stable high-status groups. Similarly, in various studies reported in this thesis I have demonstrated that anticipated group-based emotions have to be salient in order for them to deter immoral actions. If these emotions are not salient group members will not necessarily consider the emotional consequences of their actions. Even when these emotions are salient, other variables may influence the extent to which they inhibit immoral actions. For example, group members may legitimise a transgression in order to use this action to eradicate a threat to the ingroup, thereby inhibiting anticipated group-based shame and its prosocial effect on intergroup behaviour. Legitimisation strategies may therefore break the restraints of morality, allowing group members to act how they please.

Many psychologists believe that it is self-evident that emotions have a direct effect on behaviour (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Frijda et al., 1989). Emotions are believed to signal a discrepancy between an actual and desired state of affairs that needs to be addressed and to elicit an action tendency that would resolve this discrepancy.

However, Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, DeWall, Vohs, & Alquist, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2007) suggested that the relationship between experienced emotions and action tendencies is mediated by anticipated emotions. According to these theorists, the desire to alleviate the negative arousal that is guilt and shame motivates people to undertake actions that may repair their mood. Therefore, when experiencing guilt and shame, people are likely to undertake an action when they anticipate that it will result in positive emotions. From this perspective, it is the *anticipation* of positive emotions, rather than guilt and shame, that motivates people to compensate the victimised party. Moreover, Baumeister and colleagues suggest that the main function of experienced emotions is to improve the accuracy of the anticipatory emotion system. In line with this, C. M. Brown and McConnell (2011) found that anticipated emotions mediate the relationship between experienced emotions and self-regulatory behaviour. Similarly, in an unpublished meta-analysis DeWall and colleagues (DeWall, Baumeister, & Bushman, 2008, cited in Baumeister et al., 2010) found that anticipated emotions were more likely to mediate behaviour than were experienced emotions. In the present thesis I found that anticipated *group-based* emotions affect the behaviour of ingroup members and have therefore taken the initial steps in extending Baumeister and colleagues' (2007) theory to intergroup research. Future research should determine whether anticipated group-based emotions mediate the relationship between group-based emotions, action tendencies, and actions.

In the majority of the studies reported in this thesis I found that anticipated group-based shame, but not guilt, promoted egalitarian and ethical behaviour. This can be seen as inconsistent with research by Tangney and colleagues (Dearing et al., 2005; Stuewig et al., 2010), in which it was found that guilt was more likely than shame to promote prosocial behaviour. However, recent research has found that shame may also

promote moral behaviour (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010; Rebellon et al., 2010), and that guilt may be maladaptive (Bastian et al., 2011; De Hooge et al., 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). It is possible that Tangney and colleagues failed to find any prosocial effects of shame or maladaptive effects of guilt because they measured shame- and guilt- proneness, rather than the emotions themselves (De Hooge et al., 2008). This is consistent with Tibbetts' (1997) finding that criminal behaviour was positively related to shame-proneness but negatively related to anticipated shame. I therefore concur with De Hooge and colleagues in arguing that situational forms of shame can promote moral behaviour.

Guilt and shame are highly correlated emotions that are evoked in similar situations (Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1992). In all of the studies reported in this thesis I measured both anticipated group-based guilt *and* shame to assess the unique predictive power of each emotion. However, this is not standard practice in intergroup research. Although some researchers have measured both group-based guilt and shame (e.g., R. Brown & Cehajic, 2008; R. Brown et al., 2008; Johns et al., 2005; Leach et al., 2008; Lickel et al., 2005), the majority of researchers investigate group-based guilt without measuring shame. This may lead to invalid results. For example, in Study 2 I found that the zero-order correlation between anticipated group-based guilt and collective action was significant but that it was non-significant when controlling for shame. Had I only measured anticipated group-based guilt in this study, I could have drawn the unwarranted conclusion that this emotion predicts collective action. This is not meant to imply that all previously observed impacts of group-based guilt on intergroup behaviour are in fact due to group-based shame. Rather, I propose that researchers should measure both guilt and shame in order to assess which effects on behaviour are unique to each emotion.

The affective forecasting literature suggests that people overestimate the intensity and duration of future emotional episodes (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). This suggests that group members are likely to overestimate the intensity and duration of aversive group-based emotions (such as guilt and shame) relating a proposed ingroup transgression. Such overestimation may serve the social function of promoting moral intergroup behaviour. Overestimating the duration and intensity of aversive group-based emotions creates a greater deterrent for the immoral action. People should therefore be less likely to undertake the immoral action. It could be argued that people are also likely to overestimate the intensity and duration of positive group-based emotions for undertaking an action that may be regarded as immoral (such as discrimination) and that this may cancel out the prosocial functions of this overestimation. However, the fact that negative information is weighed more heavily than positive information (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) suggests that people are more likely to act in accordance with negative anticipated group-based emotions and are therefore more likely to inhibit immoral actions.

Limitations and Future Research

In this thesis I used a variety of methods to assess the effects of anticipated group-based emotions on intergroup behaviour. I measured these emotions in the course of the research reported in all three empirical chapters. Although these results indicated that anticipated group-based emotions predict intergroup behaviour, I could not establish a causal relationship using these correlational methods. I therefore extended this work by manipulating anticipated group-based emotions. Initially, I manipulated anticipated group-based emotions by varying the salience of this factor. In Study 8, I manipulated anticipated group-based shame using a bogus-pipeline procedure. These experimental studies supported my original hypothesis and allowed me to draw causal

conclusions regarding the effects of anticipated group-based emotion on intergroup behaviour. Furthermore, across all of these studies I consistently found that anticipated group-based emotions reduced immoral intergroup behaviour. The fact that the findings were consistent across different methodologies reduces the chances that they resulted from a procedural artefact.

Haidt and colleagues (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007) suggest that there are five psychological systems that are the foundations of morality: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. In the present thesis I focused mainly on the role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in promoting egalitarian behaviour (Chapters 3 and 4) and deterring harmful ingroup actions (Chapter 2). This work may therefore be criticised for focusing on the role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in promoting moral behaviour relevant to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions. However, I argue that these anticipated emotions are more relevant to fairness and care than to the other three dimensions. Group loyalty is an intra-group process and is therefore unlikely to be affected by anticipated *group-based* guilt and shame. Similarly, although there may be an element of anticipated group-based guilt and shame that promotes purity/sanctity, disgust is more characteristic in this domain (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999). In Studies 7 and 8 I found that anticipated group-based guilt and shame did not affect the low-status group's discrimination against the high-status group, suggesting that these emotions are unlikely to promote moral behaviour in the authority/hierarchy domain. On the other hand, the fact that shame down-regulates discrimination among those who already have high status suggests that it can foster more equal social relations.

A second limitation of this thesis is that it focused on a narrow range of anticipated group-based emotions. Although other anticipated group-based emotions were assessed, I focused predominantly on anticipated group-based guilt and shame. Other anticipated group-based emotions are likely to affect the behaviour of ingroup members. For example, Haidt and Joseph (2007) argue that pride is likely to promote ingroup loyalty, and that disgust increases purity. The anticipation of group-based pride may motivate people to associate themselves with the ingroup and to undertake group-enhancing behaviours, such as social competition and collective action. Similarly, the anticipation of group-based disgust may inhibit impure intergroup actions. Future research should therefore assess the moral functions served by other anticipated group-based emotions.

In the research reported here I focused on the role of anticipated group-based emotions on discrimination and collective action. Although this range of behaviours is a good starting-point, further research is needed to examine the effects of group-based guilt and shame on other intergroup actions. An interesting extension to this work would be to investigate whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame increase helping behaviour towards disadvantaged groups. For example, research could investigate whether anticipating the group-based guilt and shame that would be experienced as a result of not helping Syrian rebel fighters increases British and French people's willingness to engage in collective action in favour of a UN-backed military intervention.

Future research should assess the relationship between experienced and anticipated group-based emotions; specifically, the role of experienced emotions in creating and adjusting the anticipated emotion system. Baumeister and colleagues (2007) suggest that the primary function of experienced emotions is to improve the

accuracy of their anticipated counterpart. In line with the somatic-marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), Baumeister and colleagues suggest that the presence of an aversive emotion signals that the anticipatory emotion system failed to prevent the transgression and needs to be improved. The aversive arousal motivates the agent to determine which behaviour caused the emotion. If attributed correctly, the aversive emotion becomes associated with the transgression. When the agent is in a situation in which s/he can repeat the transgression, the aversive emotion associated with the behaviour signals the harmful consequences of the action. The desire to avoid these aversive emotional consequences motivates the agent to inhibit the behaviour in question. This theory has been supported by recent research showing that experienced interpersonal emotions influence future behaviour through anticipated emotions (C. M. Brown & McConnell, 2011). Future research should determine whether experiencing group-based guilt and shame for a past transgression deters similar behaviours in the future and whether this effect is mediated by anticipated group-based guilt and shame.

Many researchers view action tendencies as the end-point of emotional episodes. However, I suggest that these researchers are missing a vital link in the chain. They are failing to assess how the elicitation of the emotion affects actions in the future. In keeping with the interpersonal literature (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994), I argue that the elicitation of aversive moral emotions increases the accuracy of the anticipated emotion system. As a result, people should be less likely to undertake similar illegitimate actions in the future. In this situation the emotion not only elicits the action tendency, but also influences future situations by increasing the accuracy of the anticipatory emotion system. Therefore, the elicitation of an action tendency is not the ultimate function of the emotion episode. However, many interpersonal and intergroup researchers do not investigate the effect of the emotion beyond the immediate action

tendency (for an exception, see C. M. Brown & McConnell, 2011). I argue that it is vital for researchers to do this in order to arrive at a complete understanding of the social functions served by moral emotions.

Practical Implications

Thus far, I have discussed the role of anticipated group-based shame in promoting moral intergroup behaviour and instances when this emotion may be ineffective. It is worth considering how this anticipated emotion system can be reinstated after intergroup conflict. Following intergroup conflicts, both victim and perpetrator groups may experience social identity threats (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008). Victim groups are threatened by feelings of powerlessness and the morality of the perpetrator group is called into question (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). If these threats are not alleviated they can result in a cycle of hostility (Branscombe & Cronin, 2010). For example, powerless victimised groups may believe that they have 'nothing to lose' and as a result be more willing to engage in violent non-normative forms of collective action (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011), especially if they feel contempt towards the perpetrators (Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, &Siddiqui, 2011). The use of violence by Palestinians against Israel can be regarded as a real-life example of this process. This violence is likely to result in the perpetrator group adopting victim status. Members of the perpetrator group may believe that the outgroup is immoral for performing such a non-normative action, resulting in infra-humanisation or dehumanisation (Gaunt, 2009;Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, &Demoulin, 2001; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Because there is no need to apply moral standards to an outgroup that is viewed as 'sub-human' (Bar-Tal, 1990), the perpetrating group can oppress, discriminate against or even try to eradicate the rival outgroup without experiencing any

aversive emotional consequences (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel et al., 2008). The perpetrator group can therefore use harmful methods to retaliate against the outgroup's non-normative action. Israel's barricade of Gaza can be regarded as an example of retaliation against non-normative collective action[19]. This is likely to result in more extreme violence by the victimised group, and so the cycle continues.

In Studies 7 and 8 I found that anticipated group-based shame was unlikely to deter immoral intergroup behaviour when the ingroup was under threat. Therefore, the key to preventing this cycle of hostility and promoting moral intergroup behaviour is to eliminate the threats faced by the victimised and perpetrator groups (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Nadler & Liviatan, 2004). One way to remove these threats would be to replace the cycle of hostility with an apology–forgiveness cycle (Branscombe & Cronin, 2010; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). The latter researchers suggest that an apology made by the perpetrating group empowers the victimised group by giving it the choice of whether to grant or withhold forgiveness, thereby alleviating feelings of powerlessness. If the victimised group grants forgiveness, the perpetrators are able to rejoin the moral community, eradicating the threatto their social identity. The removal of these social identity threats increases the likelihood of anticipated group-based shame promoting moral intergroup behaviour. However, this process is dependent on the victimised group perceiving the perpetrating group as trustworthy and the apology as genuine. When perceivers view the adversary as untrustworthy, an apology may have adverse effects on intergroup relations (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Moreover, people are unlikely to anticipate aversive group-based emotions for transgressions performed

[19] This is not to justify Israel's actions; rather it is an attempt to explain the psychological processes underlying the cycle of violence.

towards untrustworthy groups, increasing the likelihood of immoral intergroup behaviour.

During intergroup conflict, people may dehumanise the adversary in an attempt to explain this group's harmful actions and to justify any transgressions performed by the ingroup(Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). This dehumanisation is likely to create a distrust between the rival groups that needs to be removed before an apology–forgiveness cycle can be initiated. One of the most successful strategies for increasing positive attitudes towards an outgroup is positive intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Positive contact can increase positive attitudes towards the outgroup(Powers & Ellison, 1995) and reduce intergroup tension (R. J. Brown & Hewstone, 2005). One way in which it can be achieved is through empathy (Pettigrew, 1998). People are more likely to view another as human when they empathise with them (Fiske, 2009). Positive intergroup contact can increase a person's ability to view members of another group as human (Reich & Purbhoo, 1975). Contact therefore 'rehumanises' the outgroup and reinstates the requirement to apply moral standards to this group. With the outgrouprehumanised, ingroup members are likely to believe the outgroup is trustworthy and anticipate aversive group-based emotions for illegitimate actions, thus promoting moral intergroup behaviour. However, it should be noted that contact can have detrimental effects for low-status groups because it can reinforce their perceptions of social inequality and thereby diminish support for social change (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). Although positive intergroup contact can rehumanise victimised groups, it is not a panacea for dealing with hostile intergroup relations.

Conclusion

Intergroup behaviour is often regarded as immoral, unethical and selfish. In the present thesis I dispel this myth by showing that members of social groups are

motivated to act morally towards other groups. In keeping with the interpersonal literature, I argue that intergroup behaviour is bound by moral group-based emotions. Anticipated group-based shame signals that a particular course of action poses a threat to social identity. The desire to avoid this aversive group-based emotion and the threat that it poses to social identity motivates ingroup members to act morally towards outgroups. Moreover, people are likely to legitimise immoral group actions when the outgroup threatens the ingroup. Once their actions have been legitimised, ingroup members are less likely to anticipate aversive group-based emotions, thereby creating the potential for consequence-free intergroup transgressions. Anticipated group-based emotions are therefore most effective in deterring immoral intergroup behaviour in non-threatening situations. Immoral group behaviour may therefore be regarded as a defensive reaction to an ingroup threat rather than an inevitable consequence of intergroup relations.

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Appendix 1

Study 1 Iran Information

Three years ago, President Ahmadinejad of Iran announced that his country had joined the world's nuclear powers by successfully enriching uranium to an industrial level. This announcement led to concern on the part of the international community regarding Iran's intentions. While Tehran insists that the uranium is being used to make nuclear power, many suspect that this material is being used to create nuclear weapons.

In March 2006, this issue was discussed at the UN Security Council, which called for a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to establish Iran's compliance with the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The treaty allows for the use of nuclear technology for peaceful energy purposes, as long as countries can demonstrate that their programme is not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. In July 2006, the Security Council said it was "seriously concerned" that the IAEA was unable to provide assurances about Iran's undeclared nuclear material. It demanded that Iran "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development", giving it one month to do so. Failing that, it would face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions.

The deadline for Iranian compliance with the Security Council's demands passed without being heeded. In December 2006, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737 (2006). This called on states to block Iran's import and export of "sensitive nuclear material and equipment" and to freeze the financial assets of those involved in Iran's nuclear activities. The Council decided that all countries should prevent the supply or sale of equipment and technology that would aid Iran's nuclear programme in any way.

In March 2007, with Iran's nuclear programme continuing, the Security Council voted to toughen sanctions. It banned all Iran's arms exports. It also froze the assets and restricted the travel of people it deemed to be involved in the nuclear programme. Further restrictions imposed in March 2008 encouraged scrutiny of dealings of Iranian banks. It also called upon countries to inspect cargo planes and ships entering or leaving Iran if there were "reasonable grounds" to believe they contained goods prohibited by previous resolutions. Despite these sanctions, Iran announced that it intended to build another 10 uranium enrichment plants, with or without the support of the UN.

International leaders have said that they would be willing to implement tougher action if Iran does not start to comply with the UN sanctions. Both Barack Obama and David Miliband (UK Foreign Secretary) have said that they will not rule out the use of military action to counter Iran's nuclear ambitions. Government documents have stated that British and American forces would bomb Iran's nuclear sites if they do not start to cooperate with the UN. Intelligence suggests that these nuclear sites are in rural areas, minimising the risk of civilian casualties if Britain were to undertake this action.

Appendix 2

Study 1 Illegitimacy Manipulation Information

We often find that people are overwhelmed by political issues. Therefore, to help you understand the situation we have included a statement from the International Justice Council (IJC). The IJC consists of a panel of experts in international law who discuss the legal implications of international issues. This panel has been involved in various international hearings, ranging from the Bosnian genocide trials to the Iraq inquiry.

Earlier this year the IJC discussed the legality of bombing Iran's nuclear sites. After several meetings on this issue the chair of the IJC, Matthew Schander, released the Iran Intervention Report. The quote below is taken from this report.

Low illegitimacy Condition

"Britain and the US have tried to use diplomatic strategies to deal with this issue. For the past three years they have dealt with the issue through the UN. Iran has hindered peaceful negotiations by consistently defying UN sanctions. This action suggests that Iran is not willing to cooperate with the UN. In light of this, bombing the nuclear facilities may be a legitimate strategy for dealing with this situation. According to international law, Britain would be within its rights if it were to neutralise the threat of Iran to the western world using whatever means necessary." (International Justice Council, Jan 2010)

High illegitimacy Condition

"Britain and the US have tried to use diplomatic strategies to deal with this issue. For the past three years they have dealt with the issue through the UN. Although Iran has been uncooperative in the past, there are signs that diplomacy is beginning to work. Iran has agreed to let the IAEA inspect its nuclear facilities. This action suggests that Iran is beginning to cooperate with the UN. In light of this, bombing the nuclear facilities would be an illegitimate strategy for dealing with this situation. According to international law, Britain would not be within its rights if it were to neutralise the threat of Iran to the western world through the use of military force." (International Justice Council, Jan 2010)

Appendix 3

Study 2 Top-Up Fee Information

The ‘credit crunch’ has hit various sectors, from small businesses to international firms and banks. However, the credit crunch has claimed a new victim: universities. Recently there has been growing concern over the funding available to universities in the UK. A spokesperson from the Russell Group, which represents the top 20 Universities in the UK, said:

“There is a growing consensus that without increased investment, there is a real danger that the success of our world-leading universities will not be sustained. Recent research for the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) showed that universities need an additional 15 -20% funding for current teaching standards to be sustained. It concluded that without further investment the ‘quality of the student experience and the reputation and contribution of English higher education will suffer.’

"The Russell Group has therefore been investigating a range of options to solve the funding crisis and to ensure that financial burden is spread fairly. The state, employers and graduates benefit hugely from research-intensive universities, but at the moment the taxpayer still foots the lion's share of the bill.”

One solution, which has received serious consideration from the UK government in Westminster, is to raise the tuition fees of non-national students studying in England. Under this legislation, non-English students studying at an English university would be expected to pay an extra £1,250 in tuition fees a year, raising their annual tuition fees to £4,475. However, this proposal has sparked a heated debate between politicians in the UK. The implementation of the proposal would mean Welsh students studying in England would be required to pay the extra tuition fee. An NUS spokesman said:

“This ‘non-English top-up fee’ is an illegitimate tax on non-English UK students. Why should a Welsh student have to pay more than an English student to gain the same qualification? Charging Welsh students extra because of their nationality is discrimination, plain and simple. Afterall, we are all British.”

As expected, a recent survey found that the overwhelming majority of Welsh students were opposed to the new proposal. These students suggested this proposal was a form of discrimination by the English universities. One Welsh student said the plans made her feel like a ‘foreigner in my own land.’

The proposal has also attracted criticism from the International Student Council (ISC); a discussion panel comprising of student union representatives from some of the top universities around the world. The head of the ISC condemned the proposal, suggesting the instigation of this plan would ‘violate the rights of Welsh people.’

Some proponents of the 'non-English top-up fee' have tried to legitimise the plans by suggesting this proposal is similar to a grant previously given to Welsh students studying in Wales. However, there is a clear distinction between the 'non-English top-up fees' and the grant for Welsh students. In the Welsh context, the tuition fees for English and Welsh students were identical. The only difference was the Welsh Assembly

Government partly subsidised Welsh students' tuition fees, while the UK government did not do this for English students. In the 'non-English top-up fee' context Welsh students would be actively discriminated against as they would be expected to pay more than English students because of their nationality. However, the Welsh Assembly Government are no subsidising Welsh students studying in Wales in this way, thus eradicating any previous advantages of Welsh students over English students.

If this proposal were to go ahead Welsh students studying in an English university would be disadvantaged in comparison to their English counterparts. Welsh students' overall grades may suffer as they might have to supplement their study with paid work to help fund their course. Welsh students would have to work, on average, an additional 5 hours a week just to cover the cost of the extra tuition fee. The introduction of this proposal would also mean a Welsh student with the same expenditure as an English student would leave university with an extra £3,750 of debt. Welsh students from less affluent backgrounds may also be restricted to studying in Wales.

As yet, the Welsh Assembly Government have not discussed or planned any similar proposals for English students studying in Wales.

Later this year the UK government will be meeting to decide on the rise in tuition fees. The 'non-English top-up fee' is one issue that will be discussed. The present survey gathers opinions related to this issue. As an English student studying in Wales, we are interested in your thoughts and feelings regarding this issue.

Appendix 4

Study 3 Leach et al.'s (2008) Identification Measure

Self-investment(1 = *strongly disagree,* 7 = *strongly agree*)

1) I feel a bond withBritish people
2) I feel solidarity withBritish people
3) I feel committed toBritish people
4) I am glad to be British
5) I think that the British have a lot to be proud of
6) It is pleasant to be British
7) Being British gives me a good feeling
8) I often think about the fact that I am British
9) The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity
10) Being British is an important part of how I see myself

Self-definition(1 = *strongly disagree,* 7 = *strongly agree*)

1) I have a lot in common with the average British person
2) I am similar to the average British person
3) British people have a lot in common with each other
4) British people are very similar to each other

Appendix 5

Study 3 Iran Information

Four years ago, President Ahmadinejad of Iran announced that his country had joined the world's nuclear powers by successfully enriching uranium to an industrial level. This announcement led to concern on the part of the international community regarding Iran's intentions. While Tehran insists that the uranium is being used to make nuclear power, many suspect that this material is being used to create nuclear weapons.

In March 2006, this issue was discussed at the UN Security Council, which called for a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to establish Iran's compliance with the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The treaty allows for the use of nuclear technology for peaceful energy purposes, as long as countries can demonstrate that their programme is not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. In July 2006, the Security Council said it was "seriously concerned" that the IAEA was unable to provide assurances about Iran's undeclared nuclear material. It demanded that Iran "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development", giving it one month to do so. Failing that, it would face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions.

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In March 2007, with Iran's nuclear programme continuing, the Security Council voted to toughen sanctions. It banned all Iran's arms exports. It also froze the assets and restricted the travel of people it deemed to be involved in the nuclear programme. Further restrictions imposed in March 2008 encouraged scrutiny of dealings of Iranian banks. It also called upon countries to inspect cargo planes and ships entering or leaving Iran if there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that they contained goods prohibited by previous resolutions. Despite these sanctions, Iran announced that it intended to build another 10 uranium enrichment plants, with or without the support of the UN.

International leaders have said that they would be willing to implement tougher action if Iran does not start to comply with the UN sanctions. Members of the UK coalition government have said that they will not rule out the use of military action to counter Iran's nuclear ambitions. The current UK Secretary of State for Defence (Liam Fox) has stated that military action 'absolutely has to be on the table' if Iran does not start to comply with the UN sanctions. Similarly, David Cameron has previously said that he would not rule out a military attack on Iran if they did not start to cooperate with the UN.

One strategy for dealing with this situation that has received serious consideration is to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. British forces may bomb Iran's nuclear sites if peaceful negotiations do not improve in the near future. Reports have said that this action could delay any nuclear development by 4 to 5 years. Intelligence suggests that these nuclear

sites are in rural areas, minimising the risk of civilian casualties if Britain were to undertake this action.

Appendix 6

Study 4 Number- and Word-Association Tasks

Word-Association Task

1) Which word do you most closely associate with cow?
   a. Horse b. Farmer c. Grass d. Milk

2) Which word do you most closely associate with house?
   a. Number b. Street c. Flat d. Room

3) Which word do you most closely associate with book?
   a. Letter b. Library c. Paper d. Couch

4) Which word do you most closely associate with tree?
   a. Leaf b. Forest c. Roots d. Fire

5) Which word do you most closely associate with computer?
   a. Software b. Monitor c. Office d. Hard-disk

6) Which word do you most closely associate with spoon?
   a. Metal b. Soup c. Fork d. Dinner

7) Which word do you most closely associate with bird?
   a. Garden b. Feather c. Song d. Eagle

8) Which word do you most closely associate with ring?
   a. Diamond b. Finger c. Goldsmith d. Wedding

9) Which word do you most closely associate with music?
   a. Orchestra b. Note c. Dance d. Violin

10) Which word do you most closely associate with car?
    a. Road b. Wheel c. Holiday d. Bus

11) Which word do you most closely associate with sea?
    a. Water b. Fish c. Ship d. River

12) Which word do you most closely associate with flour?
    a. Grain b. Mill c. Bread d. Bakery

Number-Association Task

1) Which number do you most closely associate with 12?
   a. 11 b. 6 c. 13 d. 24

2) Which number do you most closely associate with 1?
   a. 0 b. 11 c. 2 d. -1

3) Which number do you most closely associate with 33?
   a. 30 b. 66 c. 3 d. 35

4) Which number do you most closely associate with 7?
   a. 14 b. 6 c. 5 d. 49

5) Which number do you most closely associate with 301?
   a. 302 b. 31 c. 299 d. 602

6) Which number do you most closely associate with 54?
   a. 55 b. 27 c. 50 d. 108

7) Which number do you most closely associate with 16?
   a. 32 b. 4 c. 256 d. 8

8) Which number do you most closely associate with 1000?
   a. 100 b. 101 c. 999 d. 2000

9) Which number do you most closely associate with 5?
   a. 25 b. 10 c. 6 d. 4

10) Which number do you most closely associate with 36?
   a. 6 b. 72 c. 18 d. 37

11) Which number do you most closely associate with 450?
   a. 51 b. 400 c. 45 d. 900

12) Which number do you most closely associate with 98?
   a. 99 b. 100 c. 97 d. 49

Appendix 7

Study 4 Intuitive Intelligence Task

1)A flower shop is not doing well. It seems that, due to recession, flowers are the first thing that people economise on. It is only possible to ensure the future of the company if the costs of personnel are reduced. This can be achieved in two ways: a) by discharging a small number of employees, or b) by reducing the working hours of all employees.

What would you choose a) or b)?

2) A UK company is manufacturing in South Korea. About a year ago, margins from the Korean operations came under pressure because of increasing Thai and Vietnamese competition.The company flew in well experienced UK managers to determine why the Korean managers were not getting the job done. On the basis of a continuous improvement programme Korean managers were put under pressure to improve.The Korean managers were told that they must work harder to become a profit generating company and that this would be rewarded by significant monetary bonuses. After six months of demands and very disappointing results, a second UK manager was flown in, but his similar words made no difference.

What would you do in this situation: a) reinforce the previous manager's positions. However, not only reward them by measures of output but by promotion, or b) identify those Korean managers who were most respected by the others, and work with that group to support their efforts to improve the operations.

What would you choose a) or b)?

3) Your company has entered into a 7-year contract with a major supplier. The contract has 3 years remaining on its term but the supplier has now asked you to renegotiate the price because their labour and fuel costs have risen more than expected.If you agree to a price increase, it will have a substantial negative impact on your profitability. However, the company has been an excellent business partner and if it were to go bust replacement suppliers will not offer such a reliable and good value service. What would you do in this situation: a) renegotiate the contract, or b) enforce the contract through legal means if necessary.

What would you choose a) or b)?

4) A marketing firm is not doing well. It seems that, due to recession, consumers are less likely to increase their spending as a result of advertising and marketing projects. This means that client businesses are not seeing the same kind of returns on their marketing budgets.

Given that the marketing and advertising market has low levels of competition and technological development, it is only possible to ensure the future of the marketing firm if they can increase market share.This can be achieved in two ways: a) by reducing the price of their marketing services to undercut their competition, or b) by investing in new marketing technologies.

What would you choose a) or b)?

Appendix 8

Study 4 Tajfel Matrices

Please choose the box that contains the number of credits you would like to allocate to members of the two groups:

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
Credits to inductive thinker no. 7	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7
Credits to deductive thinker no. 5	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21	23	25

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
Credits to inductive thinker no. 17	25	23	21	19	17	15	13	11	9	7	5	3	1
Credits to deductive thinker no. 13	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19

Appendix 9

Study 7 Future Transgression Information

We will return to thoughts about this discipline later in the study. Now, we would like to know your thoughts about another issue that may affect the 2012 Olympic Games. You are probably aware that these games will be taking place in London. In the past, there has been tension between Great Britain and Germany. This tension has been apparent at recent football matches. Because of this, the Metropolitan police are concerned about the behaviour of British spectators at the 2012 Olympic Games. Police intelligence has suggested that British fans may give the German athletes a hostile reception when they arrive for the games and at the opening and closing ceremonies. Similarly, British fans may try to put the German competitors off during the events. There has been an indication that some British fans may even try to cause a disturbance outside the German's accommodation in the Olympic Village late at night to disrupt the athletes. We have been asked, by various sources, to determine British people's thoughts about these plans.

Appendix 10

Study 8 Future Transgression Information

Cardiff University fail to invite the University of Bristol to charity sports tournaments.

In the past there has been some competition between Cardiff University and its nearest red-brick rival, the University of Bristol. However, there is some concern that this rivalry threatens to get out of hand. Various sports clubs at Cardiff University are arranging inter-university tournaments to raise money for charity. Because Cardiff University is running the tournaments they can choose which universities to invite. Competitors from Swansea University, the University of Exeter, UWIC, the University of Glamorgan, the University of the West of England, the University of Plymouth, the University of Bath, and Bath Spa University have been invited. However, students from the University of Bristol have not been invited.

The organisers of the tournaments have failed to give a reason why Bristol was not invited. A spokesman said: 'I cannot disclose why we did not invite Bristol. This is a confidentialmatter. All I can say is that we have our reasons.' There have been a number of speculations for this omission. For example, some people have suggested that Bristol has not been invited because they may beat Cardiff in some events.

People at the University of Bristol have expressed their disappointment at being excluded. The head of Bristol'sAthletic Union has said: 'I cannot understand why we have been excluded. Every other university in the southwest of the United Kingdom has been invited except Bristol. This omission is disrespectful.'

These tournaments have been recognised by the British Universities and Colleges Sport Association as officialinter-university competitions. As a result, the universities competing in these events can gain points towardstheir national rankings. The exclusion of Bristol by Cardiff will therefore reduce the number of chances that theyhave to gain points that will improve their national rankings.

Some members of Cardiff's Athletic Union have also raised concerns about not inviting Bristol. One member ofthe union said: 'Students from Cardiff and Bristol have always had a friendly rivalry. However, by not invitingBristol we may going too far.'

Some of the competitors from Cardiff have expressed their dissatisfaction at Bristol not being invited. Thecaptain of the Rugby team said: 'I always enjoy playing against Bristol. They give 110%. The tournaments willnot be the same without them.'

These tournaments are due to take place in April. Therefore, there is still time to invite competitors from Bristol.Some Cardiff students have started a Facebook group to show their opposition to the exclusion of Bristol.Various prestigious members of Cardiff University, such as the head of the Athletic Union, have joined thisgroup. However, only the organisers of the tournaments can make the decision of whether to invite Bristol. Theorganisers are due to meet in the coming weeks to discuss this issue. As a result of these rejections there issome doubt that the proposal to exclude Bristol will go ahead.

Appendix 11

Study 8 Shame Manipulation

To give you insight into your own emotion reading we will give you some feedback from the preliminary data. The combination of your galvanic skin response and the questionnaire measure provides insight into which emotion you are experiencing and how strongly. From the physiological and questionnaire measures we calculate an emotion intensity index (EIi). This is a score that ranges from 1 to 100. EIi scores that are below 30 indicate that the intensity of a specific emotion is low. EIi scores above 70 demonstrate that the intensity of the emotion is high.

Low Shame Condition

Your emotion intensity index (EIi) was 23 out of 100. This score indicates that you are likely to experience low levels of shame if Cardiff students were to discriminate against students from the University of Bristol. In other words, you are unlikely to feel ashamed.Based on this score, you are likely to think that:

- this action would not threaten the reputation of your university
- this action does not reflect badly on Cardiff University students
- people from other universities will not make judgements about the type of person you are based on this action
- people from other universities would not think less of your university if this action were to go ahead

High Shame Condition

Your emotion intensity index (EIi) was 72 out of 100. This score indicates that you are likely to experience high levels of shame if Cardiff students were to discriminate against students from the University of Bristol. In other words, you are likely to feel ashamed.Based on this score, you are likely to think that:

- this action would threaten the reputation of your university
- this action reflects badly on Cardiff University students
- people from other universities would make judgements about the type of person you are based on this action
- people from other universities would think less of your university if this action were to go ahead