Coverage of the Russia–Ukraine War by Television News

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This article is a condensed presentation of an international study on the way the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was covered by broadcast news in Russia, China, Finland, the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States (on broadcast and cable

networks), Brazil, India, and South Africa. The quantitative analysis was based on the main TV news bulletins in each country on 10 days sampled between late February and mid-April 2022 by classifying the news stories according to a common code of topics and national angles. In addition, a qualitative analysis identified the key narratives in the news for each country. The results reveal significant differences between countries, especially between Russia and others but also between the Western and the BRICS countries. The article ends with proposals to follow up on this research.

Keywords: Russian invasion of Ukraine, television news, content analysis, war and peace journalism

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, was a historical milestone, bringing, for the first time since World War II, an all-out war to the very heart of Europe. News media, especially television, typically constitute the main window on the war scene and related topics. While media have proliferated in the digital era, television retains a crucial role in the process of creating and maintaining the climate of public opinion for or against the war.

This content analysis study was initiated at Tampere University, Finland, in March 2022 with the support of the Tampere-based C. V. Åkerlund Media Foundation—in response to the appalling aggression of adjacent Russia toward another neighbor, Ukraine, causing a shockwave throughout Finnish society. The study initially focused on war coverage in television news in Russia, China, and Finland from the invasion forward for two months. Soon the selection of countries was expanded by the participation of the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States (the latter by two teams) as well as Brazil, India, and South Africa, following up earlier cooperation on a study about media in the BRICS coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS Project, 2012).

The study was essentially exploratory, without a conventional literature review or theoretically sophisticated questions. However, its results provide several leads for follow-up research to test and elaborate relevant theories.

News Bulletins

In each country the main daily TV news program was identified, here referred to as "bulletin." These were typically evening news broadcasts lasting between a half and one hour on a prominent national channel.[2]

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[2] The bulletins cannot be cited as normal TV programs, as they are permanent types, like brands, without authors or producers, identified below by their local names in italics and in the References linked to their home pages. More of them in Nordenstreng (2023).

In Russia it was the main evening news, *Vremya* (2022) at 9:00 p.m. on TV channel 1, which at the start of the "special military operation" doubled the length to a full hour. In China the choice was the 30-minute *CCTV News* (2022) at 7:00 p.m. on channel 1, available worldwide.

In Finland the main daily bulletin was *YLE TV News* (2022) at 8:30 p.m. on the public service channel 1, with a duration of 25 minutes, not including a sports section. The corresponding British bulletin was *BBC News at Six* (2022), aired at 6:00 p.m. on BBC1. It is normally 30 minutes in length but was extended to 60 minutes during the first three weeks of the war. The leading Italian TV news bulletin chosen for the study was the 40-minute *TG1* (2022) at 8:00 p.m. on RAI channel 1.

The U.S. media landscape is too diverse to be represented by any one channel, and it was agreed to include the main evening news bulletins of the three national broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) and two leading cable networks (CNN, Fox). The U.S. broadcast bulletins—ABC News (2022), CBS News (2022), and NBC News (2022)—are traditionally half an hour long and broadcast at 6:30 p.m. The U.S. cable networks programs that were selected most closely followed the concept of a bulletin: the daily *CNN Newsroom* (2022), which has a duration of 50 minutes, not counting commercial breaks, and *Fox News Special Report* (2022), with a similar length.

Of the remaining BRICS countries, the Brazilian *Jornal Nacional* (2022), produced by the leading free-market media conglomerate Globo Group, has a duration of about 50 minutes at 8:30 p.m. The Indian state channel *DD India* broadcasts its half-to-one-hour main news bulletin *The News* (2022) at 7:30 a.m., as there is no formal news bulletin in the evenings, and it is also available in over 190 countries via satellite. The South African 24-hour channel *SABC News* (2022) is the most-watched news channel in the country, with a reach of over 50 countries in Africa.

Days Sampled

Days selected for the content analysis are every Thursday from the start to two months into the invasion as well as the Mondays of the first two weeks: February 24 and 28; March 3, 7, 10, 17, 24, and 31; and April 7 and 14. The TV news bulletins on those days were screened and copied from the archives in the respective countries.

Method

The content analysis was conducted by first dividing the bulletins into *news items* defined as thematically consistent units of news flow with a direct or indirect focus on the war. Items were typically 1 to 5 minutes containing a mix of in-studio and on-location material. Next, each news item was attributed to one of the 13 *topics* listed in Table 1 below (for details, see Nordenstreng, 2023, Appendix 1).

Each news item was further classified according to the national perspectives or angles that were represented. An angle was defined as a dominant national perspective or a nongovernmental perspective. Five angles were identified according to the political perspective of specific stakeholders: Russia, Ukraine, the home country whose TV news is under scrutiny, another country whose perspective is outside of those

above, and a nongovernmental point of view of ordinary people, including civilians and refugees as well as military prisoners.

Topics and angles were measured in terms of their duration in minutes. The coding was performed by each country team according to shared instructions and recorded in Excel tables processed by the core team in Finland, except for the U.S. data, which were processed by their own teams (the U.S. broadcasting analysis used an extended coding scheme).

To confirm the consistency of the coding between two individual coders, the four first news bulletins in Finland were subjected to reliability testing. The coding proved to be compatible at a level of 90%. Moreover, as the coding of all countries was verified by the core researchers, the overall consistency was considered satisfactory.

The quantitative analysis was complemented by a qualitative analysis identifying specific frames, here called *narratives*, and their tones evaluated as positive, negative, or neutral. A narrative refers to a mediated account of events, including their interpretation by a journalist and/or TV anchor. To clarify, let us take the topic of *sanctions*.

In Russia, this topic consisted of seven key narratives presenting Russian activities in a favorable light and Western activities in a negative light: from state support for industry, agriculture, business, and the population to the Russian countersanctions imposed on the West—about Russia's successful resistance in the economic struggle with the West.

On the U.S. cable networks, key narratives included regular updates on U.S. and EU sanctions, which were generally neutral. Other narratives emerged with reports questioning their effectiveness, scope, and speed of implementation, which were more negative, particularly regarding EU energy purchases from Russia. There was also criticism of U.S. President Biden claiming his sanctions were not strong enough or imposed too late.

In China, six stories were broadcast on the topic of *sanctions*, focusing on three issues: what sanctions are, the negative impact of sanctions, and the views against sanctions. Five out of six narratives were reported at least partially from the Russia angle by quoting either Putin or the Russian government.

On the South African news channel, 47% of the topic of *sanctions* was reported mainly from the other-country angle, effectively from the perspective of Western institutions and countries. The topic developed along two broad narratives: the first on Western countries and institutions imposing sanctions on Russia and its people; the second pertained to President Putin's reaction to sanctions imposed by the West.

A comprehensive report of the project, including extensive accounts from the nine countries involved, is available as an open-access publication (Nordenstreng, 2023).

Overall Coverage

The overall volume of the main news bulletins in the countries included, except South Africa, is shown in Figure 1. War-related news refers to the total number of minutes of news items dealing with any topics relating to the war in the news bulletins across the 10 sample days. Other news refers to the rest of the bulletins, excluding regular weather forecasts and sports reports. The U.S. data are averages of bulletins on three broadcast networks and two cable networks. The order of countries/bulletins follows their entry into the project as noted above. South Africa is not shown here because it has no single bulletin comparable to those of the other countries but several specialized bulletins. However, South Africa is included in the subsequent analysis of war-related content.


Figure 1. Total minutes of war-related and other news, with respective percentages, in the bulletins on the 10 sample days in the countries included.

The cumulative volume of all news is greatest in Russia, followed by Brazil, the United Kingdom, Italy, and India, with the average length of the 10 daily news bulletins being over 40 minutes. On Finland and the United States broadcast networks, the average length of the bulletin is less than half an hour, and well over half of their time is devoted to war-related news, while the U.S. cable networks dedicate 80% of their time to the war; in Italy the share is 71%, and in the United Kingdom 59%. In China the bulletins are about half an hour long, but the share of war-related news there is minimal—the least among the countries included. In Brazil and India, the share of war-related news is over one-third.

The share of war-related news is highest in Russia: 99.7%, leaving practically 0% for other news. Only one out of about 627 minutes was not related to the war—a story on 44 billion rubles being allocated by the government to construct new schools. This is probably the only case in history that TV news anywhere has been so heavily and for so long a period concentrated on a single theme. It demonstrates how all-pervasive Russian attention on the "special operation" has been—not only military but also economic and not least cultural-informational.

Going from overall volumes to actual news content, Table 1 presents the percentages of 13 war-related news topics, based on their numbers of minutes on the 10 days scrutinized for each country.

Table 1. Percentages of War-Related Topics Based on Their Duration in Each Country Bulletin (in South Africa Several Bulletins on the 24-Hour News Channel) Throughout the Sample Days.

Topic	Country and Channel									
	Russia One %	China CCTV %	Finland YLE %	UK BBC %	Italy RAI %	USA broadcast %	USA cable %	Brazil Globo %	India DD India %	South Africa SABC %
Battlefield	12	21	17	16	27	32	28	15	7	2
Civilians	11	3	5	18	10	19	12	32	48	14
Disinformation	4	0	2	1	1	0.8	3	0	0	1
EU policies	>0	0	2	1	15	0	0	2	1	1
Justification	13	6	0	2	1	1.6	0	0	0	4
Nuclear hazard	1	0	0	0	0	3.3	3	0	1	3
Peace	7	23	2	6	8	0	0	6	9	12
Refugees	7	0	11	17	7	15	11	3	13	15
Sanctions	28	18	22	20	11	7	14	19	3	6
Security	1	3	29	7	3	>.01	2	4	1	18
United Nations	1	3	0	1	1	1.3	0	5	8	14
U.S. policies	13	23	1	2	3	11	9	6	7	2
Other war-related	2	0	9	9	12	9	18	8	3	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Russian bulletin, with the greatest amount of time of all, also devoted more time to various topics—over twice as much as the BBC in the United Kingdom and much more than in other countries. Except for Russia, all countries included in their bulletins at least one topic with no war-related news during each of the 10 sample days.

Closer scrutiny of the topics and their contents is provided in separate country reports. They follow a standard format of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Comparisons

The results of the country reports are summarized here regarding the topics, angles, and key narratives of the war coverage in the news bulletins analyzed on the sample days. Finally, the validity of the results will be discussed and proposals for further research presented.

First, however, we should note how the attention paid to war-related television news differed between the countries included in this study. While in Russia the coverage was focused exclusively on the war—albeit without calling it a war—Figure 1 above shows that in the Western countries, over half of the news time was devoted to the war: from 80% of U.S. cable coverage to 59% of the BBC coverage. On the other hand, the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, devoted less than half of their news time to the war—and least of all in China, just 7%.

Topics

The 13 topics were to be found in each of the 10 news bulletins as shown in Table 1. Figure 2 highlights the four main topics in each country, in addition to the rest of the war-related topics, according to the amount of time devoted to them on the 10 sample days.

Russia *Vremya*

Battlefield 12%
Justification 13%
US policies 13%
Sanctions 28%
Rest of war-related 34%

China *CCTV News*

Rest of war-related 12%
Battlefield 24%
Peace 23%
Sanctions 17%
US policies 26%

Finland *YLE News*

Rest of war-related 21%
Battlefield 17%
Refugees 11%
Sanctions 22%
Security 29%

UK *BBC News at Six*

Rest of war-related 29%
Battlefield 16%
Civilians 18%
Refugees 17%
Sanctions 20%

Italy *TG1*

Sanctions 11%
Battlefield 27%
Civilians 10%
EU policies 15%
Rest of war-related 37%

USA Broadcast Networks *ABC, CBS, NBC*

Rest of war-rel. 23%
Battlefield 32%
Civilians 19%
US policies 11%
Refugees 15%

Figure 2. Percentages of main war-related topics based on minutes in each bulletin (in South Africa in several bulletins on the news channel).

The most common topic in the bulletins analyzed was understandably *battlefield*, absent from the four main topics only in India and South Africa. Almost equally common was the topic of *sanctions*, only absent from the four main topics in the U.S. broadcast networks, India, and South Africa. Those were economic sanctions imposed against Russia by the EU and the United States—Russia itself presenting their impact mainly as an opportunity to enhance the domestic economy, while Russia's countersanctions were a retaliatory measure against those Western countries that supported the EU and U.S. sanctions. Civilians were given prominence in all countries except Russia, China, and Finland. Refugees had notable coverage in Finland, the United Kingdom, both U.S. networks, India, and South Africa. Peace was among the four main topics in Brazil, China, and India, while the UN was accorded the same status only in India and South Africa. U.S. policies as a topic was notable in Russia, China, and the U.S. broadcasts. Security had prominence only in Finland and South Africa, EU policies only in Italy.

This is a rough overall picture of the bulletins. The actual content of their war coverage requires an in-depth look at the news, which is attempted below in terms of angles and narratives.

Angles

Angles in coverage studies like the present one is a somewhat fluid concept, occasionally open to interpretation. However, double-checking between coders and teams showed that the five categories used were sufficiently consistent as indicators of general orientations. The shares of angles in each county/bulletin are presented in Figure 3.


Figure 3. Percentage of the angles in each country based on minutes of war-related news.

The Russia angle was marginal in all countries except in China and naturally in Russia. The home-country angle dominated in all countries except the United Kingdom (25%), the U.S. broadcast (17%) and cable (21%) networks and Brazil (29%). The nongovernmental angle was dominant in the United Kingdom (34%) and the U.S. broadcasts (40%). The Ukraine angle was prominent alongside the other angles in the United Kingdom (20%) and U.S. cable (28%). However, the Ukraine angle was presented at least twice as much as the Russia angle in all other countries except China, Finland, Brazil, and South Africa.

In terms of political orientation, Russia was referred to in an overwhelmingly negative tone by other countries except China and to some extent South Africa. The Chinese bulletin kept its reporting tone neutral, in line with the Chinese government's position.

Narratives

Comparing narratives between countries shows they were far from uniform. However, the first bulletin of February 24 already suggested a clear difference in the coverage between the Western countries

and the BRICS countries (apart from the special case of Russia). First, the tone of the news in the Western bulletins was quite emotive, whereas the tone on the BRICS channels was decidedly dispassionate. Second, the Western bulletins typically presented the war in terms of military activities and national politics, while the BRICS countries focused more on explanations and background information.

The key narratives show that the coverage was largely built on antagonistic grounds, depending on the country and its attitude toward the Russian invasion. Here we only summarize the narratives in the four main topics, leaving the details to the country reports.

In the *battlefield* coverage, China was the only country to adopt a balanced approach to covering the war in a tone that was neutral to the warring sides. Russia praised its own military progress at the front. The Western countries prioritized the Ukrainian view in military narratives, using a positive tone for Ukraine and a negative tone for Russia. Most of the countries sided with Ukraine against Russia, demonstrating how it was impossible to be neutral when covering military operations. Television news had become part of the information war between Russia and the rest, except for China and South Africa.

In the *sanctions* narratives, there was a clear difference between the term "sanctions" in Russia and Western countries and a different approach to the policy of sanctions in the West and the BRICS countries. In Russia, sanctions were seen as an instrument of the West's economic war against Russia. In response, Russia imposed countersanctions against the West. As Western sanctions escalated as of mid-April, this topic became the most important one on the news agenda in Russia, along with the topic of U.S. policies, indicating that Washington, not Kyiv, was perceived as Russia's real adversary. In Western countries, by contrast, sanctions were seen as a politically necessary and proportionate response to Russia's unjustified aggression, as agreed between the Western allies. The BRICS countries refrained from joining Western sanctions against Russia. Brazil and South Africa assumed the role of neutral observers in their coverage of the sanctions, China reported on the negative effects of sanctions on the economy and people's lives and called for them to be lifted, while India adopted a negative tone toward Russia in its coverage of Western sanctions.

In covering *civilians* and *refugees*, one should note the difference in the definition of civilians in Russia and other countries. In Russia, the news was about those civilians, their situation and suffering, who were oriented toward Russia and fled from the fighting to Russia. In countries except China, the news was about civilians and refugees fleeing to Western Europe from Ukraine. In India, the news paid a lot of attention to Indian students, their evacuation from Ukraine, and their repatriation. There was only one civilians and refugees story in China, covering Russia's efforts to help deal with the humanitarian crisis in Kyiv. That is, all countries took a politically selective approach to reaching civilians and refugees, distinguishing between "us" and "them." This indicates that the war spread not only territorially, informationally, and economically, but also psychologically.

Peace was one of the most important topics in the BRICS countries but not at all in the Western countries. In Russia, the topic developed along with the narratives of peace negotiations and political decisions, international visits by senior officials, and reports on the restoration of a peaceful life. In China, the topic itself was a key focus of the Chinese government's declared policy; as in the coverage of *battlefield*,

this topic maintained a balance by sharing perspectives from both the Russia and the Ukraine angle and keeping a neutral tone with no recriminations against either side. The other BRICS countries, Brazil, India, and South Africa, presented their narratives mainly from the home-country perspective and kept a balance between the Ukraine and Russia angles. The Western countries—Finland, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States—paid some attention, for example, to the early ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but overall, the coverage of this was minimal. The Western countries were involved in the war politically and economically, providing military aid for Ukraine, and thus not directly furthering peace, whereas the BRICS countries were more observers and detached from the war and therefore focused on peace and negotiation.

Conclusions

A comparative analysis of the news agenda of the main national TV channels in nine countries reveals a significant difference in the structure and quality of coverage of the war—in general and between Western countries and BRICS countries in particular.

The first difference lies in the selective type of journalism of the country's television channel. The news bulletins in our study show that all countries except China have developed their respective war journalism to varying degrees since the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. Russia immediately adopted a total war approach and the countries of the West reacted promptly to this, embarking on an information war with Russia and becoming vicarious participants in the war with Russia.

Since Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge (1965), it has been clear that war journalism uses military language, and overemphasizes the visible effects of war, for instance, human casualties, bloodshed, and material damage. It favors elite sources and adopts a superficial narrative with scant context or historical assessment (see Garcia-Perdomo, Harlow, & Brown, 2022, pp. 2–3).

In contrast, China was the only country in our sample to rely on peace journalism from the very first day of the military conflict. According to Galtung and Ruge (1965), Lee and Maslog (2005), and Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2014), peace journalism promotes conflict resolution by focusing on areas of agreement that bridge political and ideological differences, use the historical context, reveal cause and effect, include ordinary people as sources, and describe the invisible consequences of the conflict. Peace was the most influential topic in the CCTV war-related news, both in terms of duration (21%) and the number of news items (24%). Its peaceful journalism also introduced other news items with balanced coverage of events presenting both sides of the conflict with a neutral approach without dramatizing the news. Importantly, peace journalism as used in this article only refers to the coverage of the war in Ukraine, and no research was conducted to identify peace journalism on other topics.

The BRICS countries Brazil, India, and South Africa took a middle way between a focus on war or peace, giving priority to peace journalism. Unlike in Western countries, peace was one of the most influential topics on their news agendas.

Another apparent difference between the Western countries and the BRICS countries was the extent to which they followed the propaganda model proposed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988). The propaganda model of journalism serves the state by using government or corporate sources of information and experts to confirm the veracity of what the official sources claim to be the indisputable truth.

Russian news was mostly produced in accordance with the propaganda model of journalism and a national government perspective—88% measured by duration. In the cases of Russia and China, the unequivocally progovernment journalism of state television channels as an integral part of government policy is clear. In the Western countries, mainstream journalism is supposed to be independent of government and a more-or-less free public service, but the war coverage was found to echo official government policies and war journalism seemed to be structurally bound to the state—a soft but nevertheless systematic progovernment orientation. Accordingly, both the Western countries and the BRICS countries could be seen to follow the propaganda model—albeit in different ways. This same pattern was also discernible in the Gulf War of the early 1990s (Kellner, 1993; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Ravi, 2005).

Among the Western countries, the national government perspective was most prominent in Finland (77%) and Italy (75%) and least prominent in the United States (17% for broadcast channels and 21% for cable channels) and the United Kingdom (25%). Of the BRICS countries, in Brazil this perspective was present in 29% of the coverage, in China it occupied 40%, in India 54%, and in South Africa 47% of news time.

Considering the impact of journalism on society, the most obvious conclusion is that it was a collective sense of fear that ensured the support of the majority for the government and its decisions at this historical moment. In Russia, sociological research recorded the rallying of 80% of the population behind the leadership. In Finland, the war coverage was no doubt a decisive factor in the overwhelming support of the population for Finland to join NATO, which suddenly rose from less than 40% to over 70%. In Italy, right-wing parties proclaimed their public support for Ukraine, backed sanctions against Russia, and approved the sending of weapons to Ukraine as well as accepting refugees from Ukraine (Biancalana, 2023).

Discussion

Do the results of this study really present a comprehensive picture of the war in television news of these countries? And do the results apply to the coverage of the war by the rest of the mass media? How representative is the picture given by the television news bulletins of the media coverage as a whole?

Given the limitations of the empirical sample and measurement instrument, we recognize the likelihood of criticism regarding validity and generalization. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the reason for focusing on television news was that it typically constitutes, as stated at the beginning of this article, the main window on the war scene, having a crucial role in the process of creating and maintaining the climate of public opinion for or against the war. One may ask whether the ever-growing influence of Internet-based new media, including social media, on people—and especially on young people—has superseded the role of conventional mass media and whether it is any longer feasible to concentrate solely on television news. The sources from which people derive their knowledge and beliefs have undeniably proliferated in the

contemporary world. Nevertheless, television news has retained a central place in today's media ecology, both in terms of its daily consumption and its perceived trustworthiness among the viewers.

The sampling across time in research like this is always open to discussion; it is debatable whether the number and frequency of days is enough. In this case the ten days over nearly two months proved a good compromise to reveal both changes and consistencies in the news coverage. This was confirmed by coding an extra day at the end of July in the bulletins from Russia, China, and Finland.

Likewise, the reliability of the empirical measurement in a content analysis is always somewhat problematic, especially when approaching conceptually fluid and politically sensitive materials such as television war coverage. Considerable interpretation was already involved in the identification of news items from the program flow and in coding the items to the 13 topic categories. Even more complex was the coding of items to the five angles based on national perspectives. We might have done better in cross-checking between coders in different countries, but our coding instructions appeared sufficient, avoiding major queries or disputes. As noted in the Method section, the inter-coder reliability of the Finnish sample proved to be at a satisfactory level.

The authors, having devoted innumerable hours to coding television news, assessing their contents, and writing the country reports, came up with several reflections on the project and ideas for further work. For example, the Brazilian team pointed out that such a comparative study not only serves to reveal editorial choices and news criteria but also demonstrates differences and similarities in journalistic cultures across countries. This provides invaluable material for training professional journalists, curricula of journalism schools, and mid-career extension courses. The Indian team emphasized the lessons to be learned from this kind of study for students of journalism, helping them to understand journalistic values and political affiliations regarding global perspectives and the variations in the significance of this war in Europe and countries farther away from it.

The U.S. teams in both broadcast and cable noted that the war in Ukraine was covered much as they treat most issues. In the beginning, the war dominated the news because it was the most compelling international story at the time. The drama, conflict, life-and-death struggles, the villain, and the victim attributes of the story justifiably commanded that attention. CNN was true to its reputation in war coverage by continuing to dedicate the vast majority of its news to the war throughout the research period. However, for the others, in a relatively short time, the war occupied less than half of the news time, especially in broadcast networks, which returned to their news selection calculus and covered the war when it fit that formula. Despite the war as a mega event, television news services' conventional journalistic principles and established routines guided the coverage to side with the war frame. The U.S. team of cable networks also observed that while social media have contributed to another view of the war with new voices on Facebook, Instagram, etc., the ideological positioning and media–state relations are firmly situated in legacy media and their news services.

In brief, the authors are confident that the study was well worth doing and that the results identify significant trends. Nevertheless, we do not claim to have achieved definite answers but rather a promising beginning for a continuing research program with several potential avenues for further research, including these:

        The conclusions above bring to the fore the *concept of propaganda* as a central element of the framework for digesting the empirical results. This is no random reference to one of the classics but opens promising ways to elaborate on an old concept with new perspectives of the contemporary world. This has been done, for example, by Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2020) on the discussion around Russia's meddling in U.S. elections, while revisiting the notion of propaganda was introduced by Colin Sparks (2007) and recent research on the topic was presented by Göran Bolin and Risto Kunelius (2023).

        Also, there is a tempting opportunity to follow up on earlier initiatives for systematic *monitoring of media performance* in matters of global importance (Galtung, 1999; Nordenstreng, 2004; Ramonet, 2003). A permanent system for continuous comparative study and assessment of war and peace coverage by the media around the world would be a major undertaking still waiting to be implemented, but a pilot project focusing on war and peace news on television could well be established as an extension of the present study. It could be based on the long-term voluntary collaboration of national research teams as, for example, in the Worlds of Journalism Study (2023).

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