

The Athenian Navy

**An investigation into the operations, politics
and ideology of the Athenian fleet between
480 and 322 BC**

Samuel Potts

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
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Abbreviations

- ATL* - Merritt B.D, Wade-Gery H.T, McGregor M.F, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 4 volumes, Cambridge and Princeton, (1939-1950). Details of individual volumes can be found in the bibliography.
- FGrHist* – Jacoby, F., *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 3 parts in 15 volumes, Berlin and Lieden (1926-1958)
- Fornara - Fornara, C.W., (ed.) *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome. Vol. 1: Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War*, 2nd edition, Cambridge, (1983)
- Harding - Harding, P. (ed.), *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome. Vol. 2: From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, Cambridge, (1985)
- HCT* - Gomme, A.W., Andrewes, A., Dover, K.J., *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 volumes, Oxford, (1945-1981). Details of individual volumes can be found in the bibliography.
- LACTOR 1* – Osborne, R (ed.), *LACTOR 1: The Athenian Empire*, 4th edition, London (2000)
- LACTOR 12* – Sabben-Clare, J.P. and Warman, M.S. (eds.), *LACTOR 12: The Culture of Athens*, London, (1991)
- ML* - Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. (eds.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Oxford, (1969)
- RO* - Rhodes, P.J., and Osborne, R. (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC*, Oxford, (2003)

Summary

This investigation focuses on the Athenian navy, by which I mean the state-owned fleet of triremes. The study covers the years between 480 and 322 BC; while Athens did possess a fleet in earlier years, it was in this period that it became an institution of the highest importance.

The work is divided into three parts. Firstly, a systematic review of the operations of the Athenian navy, along with case study of naval activity around Naupactos, which brings up general debates regarding the nature of Athenian imperialism, the scale and nature of naval activity, and the experiences of the crew. Also in this first part, the diversity amongst the crew in terms of both social and professional status will receive attention.

The second section seeks to explore the extent and nature of the link between the navy and the democracy. I shall look at the evidence for the participation of naval people in democratic politics at Athens, and the extent to which the policies and decisions of the Assembly can be viewed as favouring the trireme crews. One particularly important example of the trireme crews playing an active political role concerns the events on the island of Samos in 411 BC, when the men of the fleet constituted themselves as a democracy, independent of the oligarchy that had recently taken over in Athens.

The third part of the study concerns the ideology of the navy. The first task will be to investigate whether the crewman can be fairly described as staunch democrats, and then to tackle the wider ideology and characteristics of the navy. It is preferable to speak of intersecting ideologies within the navy, an institution manned by slaves, foreigners, citizens and mercenaries, accompanied by armed men and all led by wealthy liturgist captains.

INTRODUCTION

The Athenian navy is a subject that recommends its own importance as an area for investigation. It was one of the most significant institutions in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries BC, this itself one of the most important and best documented periods of ancient history. The navy represents a fascinating microcosm of the men of Athens as a whole, with wealthy members of the political elite living, sailing and fighting side-by-side with slaves, poor citizens, hoplites and metics. Scholarship on the nearly two-century period between the Persian wars and the overthrow of democracy by the Macedonians is an extraordinarily crowded field; but the Athenian navy, though by no means a neglected topic, has been the subject of fewer dedicated treatments than one might have expected. In the preface to his 1965 work *Athens and the Sea*, Amit was right to draw a distinction between the study of subjects such as sea-power and Athenian imperialism on the one hand, on which the scholarship is vast, and investigations into what Amit describes as “the elements which constituted the basis of Athenian sea-power” on the other, which have not been subjected to the same focus.¹

This is not to say that investigations into topics such as the Athenian Empire, Greek warfare, and Athenian democracy have not yielded important insights into the workings of the fleet; indeed it would be very difficult to imagine how one could write about such subjects without discussing the navy to some extent. But at the risk of grossly oversimplifying what is a large amount of detailed and insightful scholarship, I would agree with van Wees’ 1995 assessment that the navy’s relationship to politics and wider Athenian society was often mentioned but rarely explored, and Gabrielsen’s more recently still that “such fundamental topics, however, as the political, economic and social implications of naval warfare remain largely unexplored”.² Work focusing on the democracy tends to accept the idea of a strong connection between the presence of thetes in the navy and the radical democracy of fifth-century Athens; a theory with considerable backing from the ancient sources, but which has been recently and convincingly challenged by Ceccarelli and van Wees.³ Many discussions on Greek warfare also tend to view the navy primarily in the context of battles at sea, to the extent that the trireme has been thought of as a single purpose vessel, or even as a weapon; the versatility of the ship and the wide range of roles performed by the fleet are therefore often underestimated, despite the plentiful contrary evidence.

It would not be fair to suggest that the navy itself has not been the focus of some significant scholarly attention. Amit’s *Athens and the Sea* took perhaps the broadest approach, encompassing “the war fleet and merchant navy of Athens, the sailors, soldiers and traders who

¹ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, preface.

² Van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield: Ideology in Greek warfare’, p. 155; Gabrielsen, ‘Naval warfare’, p. 72, published in 2001. Both scholars have provided valuable exceptions to their own generalizations.

³ Ceccarelli, ‘Sans thalassocratie, pas de démocratie?’; van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield’, ‘Myth of the middle class army’ and *Greek Warfare*.

fought and travelled on board Athenian ships, the Port of Piraeus, its inhabitants, workers, merchants and others connected with its activities.”⁴ This is a lot of ground to cover in a relatively short work, and I mean no disparagement when I suggest that his treatment of the “war fleet”, which is to be my primary focus, can be built upon and expanded. More recent works dedicated to the navy have had a far tighter remit; I mention here only a few of the most important treatments. Jordan’s *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: A study of Athenian naval administration and military organization in the fifth and fourth century B.C.* is strongest in dealing with the specific areas identified in the subtitle; the various boards and officials connected with the administration of the navy ashore. There are many interesting arguments and insights throughout the work, but its overall value is undermined by several forcefully argued interpretations that are far from convincing. To name two, the evidence for multiple Athenian sacred ships, in addition to the *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, is less solid than Jordan suggests, and dismissed (perhaps a little unfairly) as “pure fantasy” by Wallinga.⁵ More tenuous still is his definition of the term *hyperesia*. In typically strident fashion he attacks the “doctrine” that the term refers to a team of specialist crewmen, and advocates instead that they were largely state-owned slave rowers.⁶ In fact the so-called “doctrine” fits the evidence far better, and if nothing else Jordan’s argument prompted a far more convincing article on the matter by Morrison.⁷ While there is still debate as to exactly which men should be considered as members of the *hyperesia*,⁸ the essential meaning of the term is beyond doubt.

Morrison’s contribution to scholarship on the navy was certainly not limited to this article. His *Greek Oared Ships*, co-authored with Williams, remains a standard for students on the Athenian navy, although once again it is a broader work, covering navies and periods beyond classical Athens. As the title suggests, technological developments in the vessels themselves are a primary focus of this work, and this has been an important strand of modern scholarship generally; Casson’s *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* deserves particular mention in this context; a wide ranging and comprehensively referenced work, particularly on the so-called “polyremes”,⁹ the increasingly large and ostentatious vessels that superseded the trireme as the ‘standard’ naval vessels. Ship-building technology no longer receives as much attention, mainly because the central issue of ancient oared galleys, the so-called ‘trireme question’, has been solved by work carried out under the auspices of Morrison, Coates and Rankov. Perhaps the most obvious, and certainly the most striking, contribution to scholarship on the Athenian navy in recent times has

⁴ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, preface

⁵ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 19, n. 18. I discuss the evidence for these ships in Part One, section C.2

⁶ Bartossa (‘The social status and ethnic origin of the rowers of Spartan triremes’) pays some credence to Jordan’s argument, admitting that in doing so he is in something of a minority.

⁷ Morrison, ‘*Hyperesia*’. Bartossa (‘The social status and ethnic origin of the rowers of Spartan triremes’) pays some credence to Jordan’s argument, admitting in doing so that he is in a tiny minority of scholars who do so.

⁸ My usage of the term includes only the 6 named specialists; the *kubernetes* (pilot or helmsman), *keleustes* (literally the ‘orderer’, best translated as boatswain or rowing-master), *auletes* (flute-player), *nauegos* (the word means shipwright, but in the context of trireme crews refers to a ship’s carpenter), *prorates* (look-out), and the *pentekontarchos* (the title literally means the ‘commander of fifty’, but the role of this man was to deal with crew-lists and financial records; the translation of purser is less literal but more accurate). In particular, I would not include any of the fighting men as *hyperesia*, nor those men amongst the crew who operated the sails.

⁹ Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, p. 96

been the project to reconstruct and sail a trireme. The resulting vessel, named *Olympias* and now part of the Greek navy, not only proved the essential viability of a seemingly unlikely set of attested design parameters (a fast and manoeuvrable ship with oar benches on three levels, the oars for which were essentially all the same length), but has provided a wealth of comparative information about the day-to-day experience of the men who crewed triremes. The second edition of *The Athenian Trireme* gives an overview of the vessel's history, collates the evidence for its structural features and gives a great deal of technical detail about the process of building the reconstruction; but for me the most stimulating and inspiring chapters concern the five sea-trials of *Olympias* in the late eighties and early nineties, which deal not only with the results of the experiment, but are also illuminating with regard to practicalities and experiences of crewing these fascinating vessels. It is the perspective of the rowers themselves that is one of the central and admirable features of Strauss' recent work on the navy, which has focussed on their experiences, their hardships and their deaths.¹⁰ His 'School of democracy' has been a particular influence on this study; and while I have some disagreements with the conclusions he has drawn, I have also tried to concentrate on the ways in which crewing the Athenian navy affected the rowers and sailors in wider social, political and ideological contexts: in short, how Athens' naval men saw and thought of themselves and how others in their community perceived them.

This concentration on the crew as a whole will pay less attention to the trierarchs, the wealthy Athenians who commanded and part financed the triremes as a public service to their city. This is partly in order to focus on the vast majority of poorer men who were involved in the navy, but also because the institution of the trierarchy has been well treated by Gabrielsen in his *Financing the Athenian Fleet*. This is a valuable work in many ways, not least as it makes extensive use of the vast and complex set of inscriptions relating to the navy from the middle of the fourth century. Amongst the extensive inventories of ship's gear contained in these lists is some more general information regarding the operation of the navy; the launching and activities of some fleets are attested only in these documents.

The other principal ancient sources for this study can be briefly summarized. Aside from Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars, the vast majority of detailed literary information about the navy comes from Thucydides' *History*. He was a man of the Athenian elite at the time of the fifth-century Empire, who served as a naval commander during the Peloponnesian war, and who wrote with perception and intelligence about his own times, people he knew and events he witnessed personally; it would be difficult indeed to imagine a better placed source. While the reverential regard for the straight-forward accuracy of his narrative has abated somewhat in favour of more nuanced appreciation of him as a literary artist of considerable subtlety and power, it is fair to say that Thucydides deserves his reputation as a reliable primary source of the first rank. The same cannot be said of his contemporary successor, Xenophon, nor of the only

¹⁰ Strauss, 'School of Democracy'; 'Perspectives on Death'; *Salamis*; 'The Dead of Arginusae'.

alternative narrative history for period after 410 BC, Diodorus. Although we do have the ability to compare and contrast two alternative traditions, at least as far as the terminal events recorded in Xenophon's *Hellenica* are concerned, neither of these sources inspires a great deal of confidence. Of the remaining literary sources, most important for the fifth century are the 11 surviving works of the comic playwright Aristophanes. In the fourth century, the speeches of the orators occasionally refer to naval activities; the most important of these is Apollodorus' speech *Against Polycles*, which gives a great deal of information regarding his (extended) time as trierarch from 362 BC. In my presentation of passages from these sources, I have generally based my translations on those most commonly available; most notably, though not exclusively, those published in the Loeb library. The main exception is with Aristophanes, where I have preferred to use the more recent Sommerstein editions throughout. I have adapted these when necessary in order to get a more accurate presentation of the Greek; most of these changes have been made in relation to semi-technical naval terms. For example, the Loeb translation of *Against Polycles* consistently renders *hyperesia* as "rowers", which I have changed to "specialists".

This investigation focuses on the Athenian navy, by which I mean the state-owned fleet of oared galleys, predominant amongst them the triremes. It is a substantial topic by itself, but as Amit's wide-ranging approach made clear, it is one that is closely related to many other areas of activity connected to the sea. The study covers the years between 480 BC and 322 BC; while Athens did possess a fleet prior to this, it was the policies of Themistocles and the repelling of the Persian invasion in 480 BC that greatly expanded the fleet and made it into an institution of the highest importance.¹¹ The fifth century receives more attention than the fourth, particularly in the detailed sections dealing with Naupactos and Samos. This is justified somewhat by the fact that the navy was more powerful and significant in the fifth century BC, though a good deal of evidence derives from fourth century sources.

The work is divided into three parts. In the first, I shall discuss the Athenian navy and the men who composed its crews. A systematic review of the operations of the Athenian navy between 480 and 322 BC, along with a case study of naval activity around Naupactos, brings to the fore many debates and discussions regarding the nature of Athenian imperialism, the scale and varied character of naval activities, and the experiences of the crew. The diversity amongst the crew in terms of both social and professional status will also be discussed. There is a tendency in modern works to oversimplify this by grouping all of these people together under the amorphous term *nautikos ochlos*, "naval mob". Indeed this term appears to be more complex and problematic than has usually been assumed; it is apparent that "naval mob" is not synonymous with "trireme crews" no more than it is with "thete-class Athenian citizens", and the term itself is used far less

¹¹ On the early history of the Athenian navy and the campaign of Salamis, see in particular the works of Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power* and *Xerxes' Greek Adventure*.

in the ancient sources than modern usage would suggest. These terms are sometimes used rather interchangeably, particularly in works concerned primarily with the democracy. Scholarship on the navy itself is more appreciative of the mixed nature of the rowers and there has been a good deal of debate as to the relative social composition of trireme crews. This knowledge is rarely applied to the prevailing Aristotelian theory that links military service with political power.

The second section seeks to explore the extent and nature of the link between the navy and the democracy. I shall look at the evidence for the participation of naval people in democratic politics at Athens. Practical issues such as long sojourns overseas and the concentration of trireme crewmen in the Piraeus would have affected the ability of these men to dominate Athenian politics. I shall also examine the extent to which the policies and decisions of the Assembly can be viewed as favouring the trireme crews, which we might expect if the “naval mob” were in control of Athens. One particular example of the trireme crews being actively political concerns the events on the island of Samos in 411 BC, where the men of the fleet formed themselves into a democracy, independent of the oligarchy that had recently taken over in Athens.

This discussion will lead into the third part of the study, which concerns the ideology of the navy. The first task will be to investigate whether the crewman can be fairly described as staunch democrats, before tackling the wider ideology and characteristics of the navy. Identifying and exploring the mindset of the predominantly low status crewmen from predominantly elite source material is challenging, but despite these difficulties some valuable information can be gleaned from careful examination of the texts. It is preferable to speak of intersecting ideologies within the navy, an institution manned by slaves, foreigners, citizens and mercenaries; by ‘professionals’, volunteers and occasionally conscripts; accompanied by armed men, many equipped with the traditional gear of the hoplite and all led by wealthy and honourably competitive liturgist captains. Attempting to unpick some of this complexity is my overall aim.

PART ONE: THE NAVY AND THE NAVAL MOB

This part of the study is intended to give an overview of the Athenian fleet and its crewmen throughout the classical period. The evidence for the operations of the Athenian navy will be approached from two different angles. The first section will examine individually all of the various activities attested for the Athenian navy. As well as elucidating the wide variety of different duties undertaken by the fleet and attempting to give a balanced picture of the relative importance of each one, this section will try and relate the individual activities to the wider goal of building and sustaining thalassocracy. As Gabrielsen has argued, “tactically and strategically...the main issue was access to and control of vital bases”,¹² and many campaigns, particularly in the fifth century, were launched with the intention of establishing or maintaining a network of such stations. Along with this naval network, the ships of the fleet became a visible symbol of Athenian authority and strength, and using triremes to project an image of power itself contributed to the maintenance of thalassocracy.

Many of these issues will be illustrated in the section B, which will give a detailed case study of fleet activity around Naupactos. This was one of the most important Athenian naval bases, and the one for which we have a comparatively detailed record of Athenian activity over the course of nearly half a century. The case study will highlight not only the operation of Athens’ naval network of bases and patrols, but also the range of missions assigned to individual fleets, and the versatility the Athenians required of their naval commanders and ships. Taken together, the review of operations and the case study will give a better understanding of the purposes and objectives that lay behind the launching of fleets, and an enhanced appreciation of the experiences of the men who crewed them.

The final section will turn to the men who manned the fleet, dealing first with the difficult and evocative term, the “naval mob”, which is much used but largely undiscussed in modern writing. By contrast the next topic, the social composition of trireme crews, has received a good deal of scholarly attention, though no consensus has been reached. For neither of these issues is there as much evidence as one would like, but some conclusions can be drawn. The evidence is also fragmentary for the two most well-known vessels in the Athenian navy, the *Salamina* and *Paralos*; I will finish this part by discussing what conclusions can, and cannot, be reached regarding these famous ships and their crews.

¹² Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 6

A: Fleet Operations, 480-322 BC: an overview

This section will discuss the wide range of evidence for Athenian fleet movements between the successful campaign against the invading Persians in 480 BC and the Lamian campaign of 423-2 BC, which ended with the final destruction of Athens as a sea power. I have compiled the ancient evidence for these operations in a Microsoft Access Database, which has enabled (relatively) easy tabulating and averaging of the relevant figures. Much of this database was itself compiled from a table of information about fleets, originally conceived to give 'at a glance' information regarding the operations, movements and scale of resources involved in the Athenian navy during the fifth and fourth centuries BC. This was inspired by Pritchett's use of such things in his *Greek State at War*, where the sources and brief details on such matters as rates of pay and casualty figures are compiled together in an admirably complete yet succinct manner. It soon became clear that the amount of information involved simply belied any attempt to view it 'at a glance', and a more sophisticated table was needed. Once I had taken the decision to 'upgrade' the printed table to a series of related tables in a database, several advantages were gained. Primarily, a database allows one to quickly rearrange the same basic set of information in a variety of ways. It is relatively quick and easy to get one's hands on (for example) any fleet that Alcibiades commanded, all the fleets active in the year 429 BC, all the fleets throughout a given period that operated in a particular area, all fleets that carried troops, or any combination of these variables; once the raw data is in the database, particular categories of information can be called up without having to go to the trouble of personally sifting the data and compiling a new table every time. The database itself is an ongoing project and is not yet in a suitable state for wider publication; however, some tables of information which have been drawn from the database and which are relevant to the discussion in this section have been gathered together in Appendix 3.

The problems of a database are equally as obvious and significant as the advantages. The operations of the Athenian navy, like any other complex series of events and activities, are simply not conducive to being placed into definite categories and affixed to specific dates. This is especially the case when the dating of events is often unreliable, unclear, imprecise or disputed. It must also be admitted that the database cannot yet claim to have caught every single fleet movement recorded in the sources, and so is currently an incomplete record of an incomplete record. It need not be stated that this has serious consequences for one wishing to base arguments on statistics derived from the database. However the database does currently contain all the fleets recorded in the major narrative sources relevant to the period (Herodotus, Xenophon, Diodorus and in particular Thucydides), as well as those from the most relevant literary sources (the comedies of Aristophanes and the speeches of the fourth-century orators in particular) and several attested only in inscriptions. I can assert with confidence that the vast majority of fleets for which there is some sort of historical record are present in the database, and

with even more confidence that few, if any, significant fleets are missing.¹³ It is my aim to complete the record of fleets at a future date, as well as make several changes to the ways some of the data is handled. Final completion of the database will add depth to the picture of Athenian naval operations, but is unlikely, at this stage, to alter the overall colour scheme. And so while indications, trends and conclusions drawn from this compilation are not to be fully depended upon, they are not so unreliable as to be unacceptable to the ancient historian, to whom incomplete and unreliable evidence is second nature, and to whom the luxury of definitive proof or absolute certainty is rare indeed.

For the 158 years covered, the database contains entries for a total of 216 fleets. The size of these fleets and length of time at sea varied greatly, but the database allows some very crude and approximate averages to be made. The average size of an Athenian fleet was 32 ships, excluding allied vessels.¹⁴ The average number of ships the Athenians had in active commission each year across the period was 58,¹⁵ and the approximate average time that each fleet spent at sea was 8.3 months.¹⁶ This coincides almost exactly with Plutarch's description of naval activity in the time of Pericles; 60 ships on station for 8 months of the year.¹⁷ Doubt has been expressed in modern times as to whether the Athenians could have afforded such a scale of operation in the fifth century;¹⁸ the suggestion from this database is that such a commitment was fully sustainable.¹⁹ Conversely, Wallinga has described a fleet of 60 ships as a "minor operation", which would seem inaccurate given these figures.²⁰ The evidence for their activities ranges from relatively full accounts (see below for a case study of the fleets operating around Naupactos), to cases where fleets are not mentioned at all, but the presence of some ships is required (for example, the inscription of treaties sworn with cities overseas imply that diplomats from Athens sailed there to conduct the negotiations).²¹ The database aims to record the movements of triremes, by far the

¹³ A slippery word, which in this context should be taken to include fleets that were large, expensive or important in terms of its political or strategic achievements, or any combination of these factors.

¹⁴ This is based on the 132 fleets for which there is some indication of their size. Inclusion of allied ships raises the average fleet size to 37 vessels. These averages are likely to be on the high side; literary sources have been known to include exaggerated numbers, and huge armadas of hundreds of ships are more likely to be noticed and reported than routine patrols of half a dozen or less.

¹⁵ The total strength of each fleet in each year has been entered in the database. Totalling these figures and dividing them by the number of years gives the approximate average. Even though these totals include allied ships sailing with the Athenian navy, it is nevertheless likely to be lower than the true figure; a not insignificant number of fleets are recorded by the sources without any indication of numbers at all.

¹⁶ It must be stressed that this figure is highly approximate, as there is often no precise evidence for how long a fleet remained in service beyond inferences from the events they participated in. Even Thucydides' narrative, from which we can assign fleets to summers and winters of particular years, gives considerable room for error. Fleets operating over a summer have been given a value of three months, unless the large range of places visited or activities undertaken suggests a longer campaign. Many fleets have no indication of length of commission, but are stated or implied to be permanent stations; for the purposes of this calculation, these 32 fleets they have been given a nominal value of 12 months duration.

¹⁷ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 11.4. The coincidence, while worth a note, is more apparent than exact. Plutarch's statement was not representing the 60 ships as Athens' total naval activity in these years, but (probably erroneously) as a single fleet amongst others, albeit one that was both substantial and long-lasting. Rawlings (*Greeks at War*, p.117) seems to accept Plutarch's single fleet as historical.

¹⁸ See Eddy, 'Peacetime navy', who argues that 60 ships per year at a drachma a day per crewman would have been unsustainable.

¹⁹ See Part One Section A.4 for differences in ships per year between the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

²⁰ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 169

²¹ For example, I have entered fleets into the database on the basis of IG II² 34/35=RO 20 and IG II² 36, treaties sworn in the 380s BC with Chios and Chalkis.

most common state-owned vessel of the classical period, and a further level of difficulty is added when the sources do not make clear exactly what type of ships were being used. For example, it is clear from our sources that diplomats and heralds were often carried to and from Athens in triremes; but this does not mean that we can take it for granted that *all* overseas ambassadors travelled in such a vessel. Even so, my policy in such cases has been to be rather more inclusive than not, and to not always require an explicit mention of triremes to infer their presence. I have worked on the assumption of some trireme involvement when we find Athenian armies, colonists and ambassadors overseas, even if there is no explicit evidence of their use in the individual case.²² While admitting the potential inaccuracies and difficulties of such an approach, I feel that it is more useful to have these fleets gathered in the database, to mark the uncertain cases as such, and include a full citation of the sources. Our extant evidence represents only a portion of Athenian naval activity anyway, and excluding too ruthlessly may create a larger distortion of the true picture than will including uncertain cases.

1: Warfare by Land and Sea

Sea Battles and Land Battles

While this study will look briefly at sea battles, it is this aspect of naval activity that receives the lion's share of attention in modern writing, to the detriment of the wider roles of the navy. Lazenby seems close to equating naval operations with sea battles; when describing the tendency of oared galleys to hug the coast, he evidences it by saying that "it is difficult to think of a single sea battle that was fought out of sight of land"²³ Morrison devoted three successive chapters to campaigns centred on set-piece sea battles; Salamis, the Gulf of Corinth, and the Hellespont.²⁴ These are followed by a single more general chapter on other naval movements, that opens with the following line:

Performance in battle was the main function of the trieres, but it was not the only one. She was the means by which Athens exerted her influence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁵

While it is not the intention of this work to suggest that sea battles were unimportant, a more balanced approach is required. It is clear from the information assembled in the database that, in terms of naval activity, it is the trireme fleet as the means of exerting Athens' influence that should receive most attention, and it was this that appears to have been the main function of the fleet, if not of the individual ships.

²² The use of triremes as troop-carriers, colony vessels and ambassadorial transports will be discussed in more detail below, Part One Section A.2 and A.3.

²³ Lazenby, 'Myths and Realities', p. 446

²⁴ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, Chapter 3: the Salamis campaign (p. 50 ff.), Chapter 4: Sybota and the Gulf of Corinth (p. 62 ff.), Chapter 5: Cynossema, Cyzicus and Arginusae (p. 80 ff.).

²⁵ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 94.

A total of 83 sea battles are recorded in the database across the period.²⁶ Only 45 out of the total 216 fleets participated in any sort of fight at sea.²⁷ This is on a similar scale to the number of land battles that the fleets indirectly participated in;²⁸ 87 land battles are recorded in the database, involving 47 different fleets. It seems significant that the Athenian navy participated in (very slightly) more land battles than it did sea battles. When one adds the occasions when troops were transported but did not fight a pitched battle, and the contribution made (also indirectly) by fleets to sieges of cities and other strongholds, it is clear that the Athenian navy had a more significant role in facilitating land actions than it did in attacking other navies and ships. This is important, given that modern scholarship occasionally describes the trireme as a one-purpose ship, or even as a weapon.²⁹ It would be more accurate, based on these figures, to describe the trireme as a troop-carrier rather than a sea-fighter. However, this would come close to falling into the trap of overly compartmentalising the navy, by presenting fighting sea battles and transporting troops as alternatives. It is misleading to imply that a fleet or individual vessel that performed one of these roles could not perform the other. It is most accurate to reflect instead upon the many uses and manifold tasks of the ships, and the varied roles performed by the crews. The trireme fleet was the means of transporting a military force as much as it was a military force in and of itself, and while they were sometimes historically important, sea battles were not a day-to-day experience for the Athenian navy.

Of course, in the fifth century between Kimon's defeat of the Persian fleet at Eurymedon and the closing stages of the Peloponnesian war, there was not a significant naval force in the Aegean to challenge the Athenians' thalassocracy. Nevertheless, several other states, including some outside of the Athenian alliance, did possess numbers of triremes, and there seems to have been very little effort taken on the part of Athens to do anything about this in terms of seeking decisive sea battles; rather, the Athenians sought to control the bases and harbours that galley fleets required. Tolmides' direct attack on the Spartan naval material at Gytheum is significant as it was the exception rather than the rule; ships were launched against cities and strongholds more than against other ships. Sea battles were not common, and large scale ones were rare indeed.

Sieges and Blockades

More common than set-piece battles by land or sea were attacks on fortresses, strongholds and cities. Direct attempts to assault and carry such places by storm have been labelled as 'sieges' in

²⁶ This acts somewhat as a check against a recent assertion by Strauss ('Agony of Seamen', p. 3) that there were "hundreds" of engagements in the classical period, and that "a battle involving about 100 ships... was perhaps the most common scenario". Even given the fact that here Strauss is referring to Athenian and non-Athenian battles, he seems to be overestimating the number of sea-battles. While the extant material of Athenian battles does seem to suggest the scale that Strauss indicates, this was probably not typical for fleet confrontations between less powerful naval states.

²⁷ In fact, this figure is likely to be a little low; due to the way the fleets are recorded, if fleet A combined with fleet B, and then the resulting fleet fights at sea, it will only register as a sea battle for fleet B. Even if these are taken into account, it would still not be more than ¼ of all fleets who fought at sea.

²⁸ The arguments concerning the possible roles of seamen in land combat will be discussed below.

²⁹ Gabrielsen, 'Naval warfare', p. 72, describes the ship as being "exclusively designed for warfare at sea". Morrison, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 25, calls the trireme "a sophisticated naval weapon developed from the simple longship to perform a specific role in warfare at sea."

the database. A total of 138 such attacks are recorded, involving 58 fleets; considerably more than both sea battles and land battles. The direct involvement of the ships in such actions would be varied; in some cases, the fleets would have just been carrying soldiers who then made the attack. Amphibious attacks from ships on cities and harbours were not unknown in the ancient world, and there are some intriguing and vague references to “machines” being used directly from ships in the context of siege attacks. In relation to an attack on Minoa by a fleet under Nicias in the summer of 427 BC, Thucydides reports that:

helôn oun apo tês Nisaias prôton duo purgô prouchonte mêchanais ek thalassês kai ton esploun es to metaxu tês nêsou eleutherôsas

Firstly, with the aid of engines from the ships, he [Nicias] captured two towers projecting into the sea on the side of Nisaea and cleared the entrance into the channel between the island and the coast.³⁰

These are usually interpreted as some sort of ship-borne siege-towers, as ballistic war machines were yet to have featured in Greek warfare.

It was sometimes the case that a blockade followed when a direct siege attack was unsuccessful.³¹ ‘Blockades’ in the database are those occasions when the fleet, usually in conjunction with a land force, circumvented a city usually with the intention of forcing it into surrender. Not included under this heading are those occasions when an Athenian fleet sought to deny access to a particular stretch of water by deploying there in numbers. Activity of this sort has been designated as ‘regional garrisons/patrols’. The line is sometimes a fine one, but most of the blockades listed are more straightforward in that they are directed against particular coastal cities or islands. Across the period, 36 fleets participated in one or more blockades. This is fewer than the number that fought at sea, but as noted above these fleets almost by definition remained in commission for extended periods of time, and a single entry in the database under the blockade heading could represent many months of naval activity. Indeed, the average commission time for fleets involved in blockades was 15.2 months, seven months greater than for the average Athenian fleet.³² In total, there were around 50 separate blockades undertaken by Athenian fleets. Some places, like Samos, were blockaded on two or more separate occasions.

The balance of power in ancient siege craft usually rested with the defender. If a city was not taken by means of a stratagem or (as was common) betrayed from within, it was the case that even relatively small fortified places could withstand direct attacks by large forces from powerful states like Athens. The Athenians enjoyed a reputation for their ability to take strongholds,³³ and the expense involved in such operations was astronomical. The best known example is the

³⁰ Thucydides, 3.51.3

³¹ Of the 138 places besieged, 35 were then blockaded.

³² Again it must be pointed out that the figures for any given fleet’s time in commission are somewhat vague, and so this comparison is only approximate.

³³ Thucydides, 1.102

blockade of Potidaea. The blockading force remained in continuous service for two and a half years, was reinforced until at its height it numbered 70 triremes, and cost the Athenian treasury 2,000 talents. While Potidaea may have been relatively rare in how long it managed to hold out, blockades of nine months were not uncommon. Not only did blockades demand a great deal of money from the city, but also a huge commitment from the crews involved; the regularity of such operations required, even presupposed, a large pool of full-time seamen.

Transporting Troops

Only 38 fleets are recorded as transporting specific numbers of soldiers, but it is clear from the number of land operations that took place that many ships must have sailed with unspecified troops on board. In addition to pitched battles, many fleet movements involved ravaging enemy territory with land forces, and attacking towns and strongholds. There appears to be no consistent pattern between fleet size and size of land force, at least for the figures we have; larger fleets often carried more troops, but we do have some small fleets apparently carrying a great number of soldiers. Dividing the number of troops on an expedition by the number of ships reveals a great deal of variation.³⁴ In many cases, the required number of troops per ship stretches credulity, given the limited amount of space on a regular trireme;³⁵ Coates estimated that the *Olympias* reconstruction could have carried, at a pinch, 30 troops in addition to the usual fighting men on board.³⁶

There are two likely solutions. Firstly, that there were other, non-trireme, ships present, and these were used to carry at least some of the troops. Secondly, many of the listed triremes were converted to troop carriers, but still listed simply as “triremes”.³⁷ Neither of these assumptions poses much difficulty, and though the second is probably preferable it is impossible on the existing evidence to be certain about these matters in any individual case. A third possibility, for which there are some examples in the texts, is that the troops rowed the triremes themselves. Thucydides points out one occasion when this happened, but it appears to have attracted his notice precisely because it was not the usual practice.³⁸ The fleet launched under Iphikrates in 389 BC, where eight ships carried 1,200 peltasts, should probably also be interpreted as self-rowing soldiers, though it is not made explicit in this case.

³⁴ The calculation for troops per ship is usually simple enough. Any cavalry listed is assumed to be carried in ships at a rate of 30 horses and men per vessel (Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 227-8). If there are unnumbered troops or ships attested, it obviously makes it impossible to obtain an accurate average, and so these have not been included in the discussions here, or in the calculation of the average.

³⁵ One fleet in the table (Fleet Number 207) seems to require 308 troops per ship, after taking the cavalry into account (see previous note) though in this instance it is most likely that the figures are wrong.

³⁶ Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 226.

³⁷ The empty ships provided in 415 BC for the Sicilian invasion were divided between 60 “fast” vessels and 40 “troop carriers” (Thucydides, 6.43. *tacheiai* and *stratiôtides*), suggesting some sort of structural difference; most likely expanded deck space or perhaps the (possibly temporary) removal of one or two levels of oar-benches in a manner similar to horse transports. Morrison, Coates, Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*, p.151 ff)

³⁸ Thucydides, 3.18

Triremes regularly carried some armed troops as part of their crew.³⁹ The numbers of *epibatai* (“marines”, armed as hoplites), and *toxotai* (archers) varied according to tactical circumstances,⁴⁰ but it appears that at least a dozen fighting men would be present aboard any given Athenian trireme. 10 *epibatai* and 4 *toxotai* are commonly attested figures, but these numbers should not be regarded as the ‘standard’. It is clear that these men would have taken part in any land fighting that occurred, but it is unclear whether these marines were counted along with a hoplite army when such a force was carried with the ships. In other words, when our sources enumerate the hoplite contingent of an expedition, do they include the *epibatai* amongst them? The most detailed account of an expedition’s composition would suggest that this was the case. In his run-down of the forces embarking for Sicily in 415 BC, Thucydides mentions the total number of hoplites, and then points out that 800 of this number were thetes serving as *epibatai*.⁴¹ Perhaps then, in expeditions for which he gives less detail, he would just give the final total, and imagine the *epibatai* already included. If an expedition is listed as enumerating 60 ships, 2,000 hoplites and a few horsemen,⁴² we can safely assume that each trireme held around a dozen armed men, a total of more than 700; but it is not made clear whether these were included with the 2,000 hoplites listed or in addition to them. Thucydides’ practice with the Sicilian fleet might suggest that 2,000 was the sum total. The alternative would be to imagine that they were not included, that the marines were considered exclusively as part of the ship’s crew and quite separate from the hoplite army. In this case, there would have been around a dozen extra armed men per ship on the expedition, and thus a considerable strengthening of the land forces available.

What is certain is that *epibatai* (and probably archers too) were present on ships even when a hoplite army was not, but were rarely mentioned explicitly. A money-collecting expedition suffered a defeat in a land battle in Lycia in 430 BC.⁴³ In 426 BC, the land force that Demosthenes lost in Aetolia contained 300 *epibatai*; no hoplites were mentioned as accompanying the fleet when it was sent out, and Thucydides is explicit that these men were from the ships.⁴⁴ It is a similar case for many of the expeditions launched throughout the *Pentekontaetia*; most of the fleets at this time are listed without details of an accompanying hoplite force, and many fought on land. Exactly who was doing the land fighting on these occasions is unclear. There are two likely alternatives; that hoplite armies accompanied the fleets but were not detailed by our sources (which are incredibly thin and sketchy for the *Pentekontaetia*), or that these land operations were undertaken by the *epibatai* and *toxotai* alone. Once again, there is often no way of choosing between these hypotheses in any given case.

³⁹ The listing of both *epibatai* and *toxotai* on IG I³ 1036, amongst the rowers, trierarchs and *hyperesia*, strongly suggests that these fighters were attached to particular vessels and considered as part of the crew.

⁴⁰ For example when large fleets found themselves in narrow waters (such as the Athenians did in the harbour of Syracuse in 413 BC) and there was little room for manoeuvre, generals would put extra fighting men on board and rely on head-on ramming, missile fire and boarding actions.

⁴¹ Thucydides, 6.60.

⁴² Thucydides, 4.53, quoted below.

⁴³ Thucydides, 2.68

⁴⁴ Thucydides, 3.95

Ship's Crew Fighting on Land?

There is also a third possibility; that the crews of the triremes also formed part of the land forces. I have suggested above that it was exceptional for soldiers to row; was it any less so for rowers to fight on land, perhaps as light-armed soldiers? It is important to note that there are some examples of trireme crews being used in land operations; the question is one of whether this was a regular and usual part of a sailor's experience. Van Wees has argued that "it appears that considerable numbers of rowers were indeed regularly employed as light troops, even if most of the time our sources ignore them".⁴⁵ He cites two examples in which light troops took part in battles, despite not having been previously listed, both from Thucydides' narrative. The first involves a campaign in the Chalcidice in 429 BC.⁴⁶

Athênaioi dischiliois hoplitais heautôn kai hippeusi diakosiois epestrateusan epi Chalkideas tous epi Thraikês...kai hoi men hoplitai tôn Chalkideôn kai epikouroi tines met'autôn nikôntai hupo tôn Athênaiôn kai anachôrousin es tèn Spartôlon, hoi de hippês tôn Chalkideôn kai psiloi nikôsi tous tôn Athênaiôn hippeas kai psilous

The Athenians, with a citizen army of 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry, campaigned against the Chalcidians in Thrace...The Chalcidian hoplites and the auxiliaries who were with them were defeated by the Athenians and retreated to Spartalos; but the Chalcidian cavalry and light troops defeated the cavalry and light troops on the Athenian side.⁴⁷

The second instance comes in four years later, in the summer of 425 BC:

Athênaioi de en tôi autôi therei hexêkonta nausi kai dischiliois hoplitais hippeusi te oligois kai tôn xummachôn Milêsiou kai allous tinas agagontes estrateusan epi Kuthêra...mia de phroura, hêper kai êmunato peri Koturtan kai Aphroditian, ton men ochlon tôn psilôn eskedasmenon ephobêsen epidromêi

In the same summer, the Athenians made an expedition against Cythera with a force of 60 ships, 2,000 hoplites, a small number of cavalry, and some allied contingents from Miletus and other places...There was one garrison which did make a stand in the neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, and when it charged it caused panic amongst the scattered crowd of light troops.⁴⁸

From these examples, van Wees suggests that "presumably these light-armed suddenly springing into action are the rowers of the warships, taking on a new role, as Thucydides expressly tells us they did in the Athenian attack on Sphacteria in 425 BC."⁴⁹ It is possible to see the light-armed in the first example as rowers, but it is hardly conclusive. The light armed contingent here could have been formed solely from the *toxotai* on board the ships. Though there is no indication in the

⁴⁵ Van Wees, 'Politics and the Battlefield', p. 163.

⁴⁶ It is worth noting that there is no evidence, other than inference from the fact that the campaign took place on the Chalcidice, that the Athenian navy was involved in this campaign at all; no ships are specifically mentioned. It is surely correct to infer that this was a naval expedition, and it demonstrates well its (often unstated) key role in facilitating land operations.

⁴⁷ Thucydides, 2.79.1-3

⁴⁸ Thucydides, 4.53.1, 4.56.1

⁴⁹ Van Wees, 'Politics and the Battlefield', p. 163.

text as to the size of the force, the ease with which the Athenian light armed were defeated and driven away is more suggestive of a small unit rather than one comprising many hundreds of sailors. The second example is also far from certain. It does imply a large number of light-armed, but again it is far from inevitable that these were rowers fighting in battles on land. It seems equally as credible to suggest that there were light armed amongst the allied troops. The specific example of Sphacteria to which van Wees refers damages rather than supports his conclusion. In this instance, Thucydides is explicit that rowers were used as light-armed:

hama de heôî gignomenêi kai ho allos stratos apebainen, ek men neôn hebdomêkonta kai oligôi pleonôn pantes plên thalamiôn, hôs hekastoî eskeuasmenoî

At dawn the rest of the army landed. This consisted of the crews of rather more than 70 ships, except for the *thalamioi* [lowest of the three banks of rowers], each having been equipped.⁵⁰

This example demonstrates that it was possible for rowers to be deployed on land. But the key point here seems to be that the rowers were not *routinely* equipped for performing such roles, and on this occasion had to scrape together weapons in order to become ‘light-armed’. A further example from earlier in this same year, involving Demosthenes’ desperate defence of his hastily-built fort at Pylos:

tas triêreis hai periêsan autôi apo tôn kataleiphtheisôn anaspasas hupo to teichisma prosestaurôse, kai tous nautas ex autôn hôplisen aspisi [te] phaulais kai oisuinais tais pollais: ou gar ên hopla en chôriôi erêmôi porisasthai, alla kai tauta ek lêistikês Messênion triakontorou kai kelêtos elabon, hoi etuchon paragenomenoi. hoplitai te tôn Messênion toutôn hôs tessarakonta egenonto, hois echrêto meta tôn allôn.

He drew up under the fortification and enclosed in a stockade the triremes remaining to him of those which had been left him,⁵¹ arming the sailors taken out of them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them.⁵²

Thucydides could not have been clearer; the desperate situation required that the crews be used to defend the fort, but it was only through serendipity that they were, even in a minor way, equipped to perform such a role. In the face of such explicit testimony from our strongest source, it is impossible to sustain an argument that sailors were routinely armed as light troops. A fourth-century example of Athenian rowers as light-armed confirms this picture:

⁵⁰ Thucydides, 4.32.2

⁵¹ Demosthenes at this time had three ships; he had been left five to “garrison” Pylos, but had sent two for help. I discuss this ‘trip-wire’ fleet further below, Part One section A.3

⁵² Thucydides, 4.9.1

Thrasullos de ta te psêphisthenta ploia labôn kai pentakischilious tôn nautôn peltastas poiêsamenos, hôs hama kai peltastais esomenois, exepleusen archomenou tou therous eis Samon

At the beginning of the summer Thrasyllus sailed from Athens to Samos with the ships that had been voted to him. He had equipped 5,000 of his sailors as peltasts so they could be used as peltasts also.⁵³

It seems to have been the same for the Peloponnesian navy:

apo tôn plêrômatôn de tôn ek tôn neôn ekêruxe boêthein hosoi eleutheroi eien: hôst' eboêthoun kai toutôn polloi, ho ti edunato hekastos hoplon echôn

He [Gorgopas] also proclaimed that all free men from his ships should join up with him, so that many of those came too, each with whatever weapon he could lay his hands on.⁵⁴

What seems clear from the specific examples is that while it was possible for crewmen of Athenian triremes to participate in fighting on land, it was in no way a usual or routine part of their duties. On those occasions when they did take on such a role, it required some effort on the part of their commanders to see that they had the necessary equipment.⁵⁵ Thucydides suggests a division between land fighters and sailors when he talks about the self-rowing soldiers depicted in Homer, implying that the conditions of his own time were different;⁵⁶ whether or not he is right about the practice in Homer's time,⁵⁷ this passage certainly attests to Thucydides' belief that rowing and land-fighting were normally separate roles in his day, and there is no good reason to doubt this. His evidence suggests that both self-rowing soldiers and sailors fighting ashore were exceptional in the classical period.

Even van Wees argues that any fighting done by crewmen was limited to "light-armed raiding at best";⁵⁸ I would differ with him merely to argue that even this minimal contribution to land warfare was the exception rather than the rule, and the examples of it are noted in the sources for their rarity as much their intrinsic interest. Even on those occasions when some arms were scraped together, the contribution to land warfare was not usually a significant one. An ad hoc round up of hastily constructed and scavenged weapons thrust into the hands of rowers would not produce a crack cadre of peltasts able to play a significant part at the forefront of land battles. On most occasions when crewmen were "armed", the majority probably had little more than stones to throw and Pritchett is doubtless correct to argue that "stone-throwers were never a major

⁵³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.2.1

⁵⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.1.11

⁵⁵ It is worth noting at this stage that the reverse was not true; light troops, or indeed hoplites, would not have faced such problems if ordered to man the oar benches, as oars in the Athenian navy were provided with the vessel itself.

⁵⁶ Thucydides, 1.10

⁵⁷ Morrison and Williams (*Greek Oared Ships*, p. 115) argue that some of Homer's fighters were not crewmen, allowing them to envision smaller vessels with fewer oars than implied by Thucydides.

⁵⁸ van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 213. But cf. pp. 62-4 and 222-3, where he seems to put a greater emphasis on the role of sailors fighting on land.

element in Greek warfare”.⁵⁹ Overall, the clear demarcation that Thucydides implies existed in his period between rowers on the one hand and land-fighters on the other seems to be justified.

Ravaging the Enemy’s Territory

The conclusion that sailors did not usually fight on land need not imply that the crewmen remained onboard their vessels for the entire duration of a campaign. While they may not have been routinely armed, nor participate in land battles and sieges, it is likely that they did not miss out on the pillaging of enemy territory. The reference in Aristophanes’ play *Frogs* to sailors who “go ashore and nick someone’s clothes”⁶⁰ seems to be a light-hearted indication of such predatory activity. Such activity is referred to in *Wasps*, although it is not certain in this case that it was a sailor doing the pillaging; the old men of the chorus represent themselves as men who used to fight on both land and sea.⁶¹

Choros: *memnêsai dêth', hot'epi stratias klepsas pote tous obeliskous hieis sauton kata tou teichous tacheôs, hote Naxos healô.*

Chorus-Leader: Do you remember, then, on campaign once, when you [Philocleon] stole those skewers and quickly threw yourself down from, the wall, at the time [c. 470 BC] when Naxos was captured.⁶²

There is a reference to similar activities with explicit naval involvement in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, concerning the depredations made by the Athenian navy to the Laconian coast between 431 and 424 BC:

Hermês: *kaita takeinôn ge kerdê tois geôrgois ên kaka: hai gar enthend' au triereis antitimôroumenai ouden aitiôn an andrôn tas kradas katêsthion.*

Hermes: And then the profit they made proved harmful to the [generalized Laconian] peasants; for the triremes kept coming from here to retaliate in their turn and devouring the fig-sprays belonging to totally innocent men.⁶³

The database records 70 instances of such activity, involving 37 different fleets. Ravaging and pillaging of enemy territory also overlaps with several other categories of activity. Destruction of the hinterland of a city was often an adjunct, and occasionally an alternative, to a more direct attack. Plundering and carrying off booty can also be considered as a very crude form of ‘money collection’, and it is certainly the case that some commanders funded their fleet through such piratical means. Perhaps the most notable, and certainly the largest-scale, examples of fleets attacking an enemy’s territory occurred in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. In 431 BC,

⁵⁹ Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, vol. 5, p. 1.

⁶⁰ ll. 1075.

⁶¹ I discuss this matter and connected issues in Part Three, section 3.

⁶² Aristophanes, *Wasps*, l. 354-6 cf. a similar occurrence, in relation to the taking of Byzantium in 478 (Thucydides, 1.131), at *Wasps* l. 236-7 cf. Sommerstein’s note on p. 171. The location of these low-level instances of ravaging in the context of blockades is again an indication of the overlap between these categories.

⁶³ Aristophanes, *Peace*, ll. 625-8

100 Athenian triremes (and 50 from the allies) under the command of three generals sailed around the Peloponnese, attacking a series of cities and ravaging territory.⁶⁴ In the next year, another fleet of 150 ships made a similar voyage.⁶⁵ These raids were no doubt lucrative for the Athenians and damaging, if only in the short term, for the Peloponnesians, but it is probable that one of the main motivations for sending out so large a raiding force was in order to give the Athenian populace the chance to strike back at the Peloponnesians, in retaliation for the damage inflicted (both to territory and to pride) by the yearly incursions of the Spartan army into Attica.

Athenian Sea Power

In the winter of 428/7 BC, Thucydides recorded another fleet, of 100 ships, that sailed along the Peloponnesian coast. While it is certain that some looting and pillaging went on when this fleet landed, its purpose, according to Thucydides, was very different. The fleet was launched shortly after the revolt of Mytilene on Lesbos, partisans in which had encouraged the Spartans to attack Athens by land and sea while she was weak.

aisthomenoi de autous hoi Athēnaioi dia katagnōsin astheneias sphōn paraskeuazomenous, dēlōsai boulomenoi hoti ouk orthōs egnōkasin all' hoiōi te eisi mē kinountes to epi Lesbōi nautikon kai to apo Peloponnēsou epion rhaidiōs amunesthai, eplērōsan naus hekaton esbantes autoi te plēn hippeōn kai pentakosiomedimnōn kai hoi metoikoi, kai para ton Isthmon anagagontes epideixin te epoiounto kai apobaseis tēs Peloponnēsou hēi dokoiē autois.

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking themselves, except the *hippeis* and *Pentekosiomedimnoi*, and the metics; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased.⁶⁶

This episode gives a good insight into the Athenian thalassocracy of the fifth century. Having listened to the appeals for aid from the Mytilenians, the Spartans had formed the impression that Athens was stretched to breaking point; with a large scale revolt overseas, a fleet heading for Naupactos round the Peloponnese and the plague in the city. Athens was indeed stretched to the limit; this recruitment of citizens and metics is usually and rightly interpreted as an example of the unusual practice of conscripting men to the oar benches.⁶⁷ Through this call-up, Athens was able to muster an impressive display of strength. The Spartans responded with despair to the appearance of this fleet, putting off their attempted (and ultimately ill-fated) intervention in Lesbos until the Athenians had returned home. It is notable that Athens' thalassocracy was maintained at this time without fighting a battle, nor did the Athenians seek a decisive

⁶⁴ Thucydides, 2.17; 2.23; 2.25, 2.30-1

⁶⁵ Thucydides, 2.56; 2.58.

⁶⁶ Thucydides, 3.16.1

⁶⁷ See for example, Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 107.

engagement with the Peloponnesian fleet, which was being hauled over the isthmus.⁶⁸ Rather, they demonstrated their sea power by projecting it upon the enemy's land, "wherever they pleased"; it is this aspect of thalassocracy, the power of the hegemonic power to more effectively deploy and supplement land forces, which deserves a greater emphasis than the relatively infrequent sea-fights. This seems to have been obvious to a fifth-century political treatise-writer who turned a rather hostile eye onto the subject: the so-called Old Oligarch, most probably writing around the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 431 BC, managed to compose a discussion of Athenian sea power, admittedly on occasions an illogical one, without referring once to fighting at sea.⁶⁹ It is conceived in terms of strategy rather than tactics; sea power meant being able to ravage the enemy's territory with impunity,⁷⁰ to project power over a wider area,⁷¹ to benefit from and control overseas trade,⁷² and to concentrate armies against their opponents individually, while preventing them from forming a united front.⁷³ There is praise for the technical skill of Athenian crewmen,⁷⁴ but neither for their role in defending the city nor for their prowess in a specifically combat context.⁷⁵

However command of the sea (thalassocracy) for Athens was never as full and absolute a thing as the Old Oligarch would have us believe; other states could and did 'defy' Athenian sea power in many ways. In the 440s BC, the Samians were able to briefly wrest control of the sea around their island from Athens; although this rebellion was crushed and few other powers could match the naval strength of the Samians, it nevertheless shows that Athens' control was, in the face of hostility, only as strong as the naval force in that area.⁷⁶ The collapsing of the Athenian empire towards the end of the Peloponnesian war demonstrated this very clearly. There are other examples, on a smaller scale, which show the limitations of thalassocracy. In c. 458 BC, the Peloponnesians were able to make a landing of troops on Aegina, despite the fact that Athens had defeated the Aeginetan fleet and were laying siege to the island. In 427 BC, Mytilene was able to import food from the Black Sea in defiance of an Athenian controls over shipping at the Hellespont,⁷⁷ and Phormio's fleet at Naupactos in 429 BC failed to prevent, or even spot, a Peloponnesian army crossing the Corinthian gulf.⁷⁸ Despite Athens being a dominant naval power, she could not and did not prevent other states from conducting naval operations, even within her sphere of control. These limitations are not so much an indication that Athens was a weaker power than has been supposed; nor do they suggest that the generals and trierarchs in these cases were incompetent; more that the nature of the ships and logistical systems available to

⁶⁸ Thucydides, 3.15

⁶⁹ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 119-2.16

⁷⁰ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 2.4

⁷¹ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 2.5

⁷² [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 2.3 cf. 2.11

⁷³ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 2.1-2.

⁷⁴ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.19-2.1

⁷⁵ Starr (*Influence of Sea Power*, p. 5) defines the requirements of thalassocracy as "naval control of sea lanes for the transport of useful supplies and also of armies...Sea power must be able to facilitate and protect a state's commerce and deny that of opposing states"

⁷⁶ Thucydides, 1.115-7

⁷⁷ *LACTOR 1*, 121=ML 65=SEG 40.7, ll. 35; cf. Thucydides, 3.2.2

⁷⁸ Thucydides, 1.108; 2.80; this fleet, and others around Naupactos, will be discussed in full below.

the Athenians allowed control of the sea to be no firmer. The limitations of the trireme to operate away from markets and harbours in particular made total control of the sea a logistical impossibility. Some of the means by which the Athenians sought to overcome these difficulties and maintain their thalassocracy will be discussed in the following sections. The Old Oligarch made some valuable observations regarding the control of the seas, but the limitations of ancient thalassocracy must also be borne in mind.

2: Conquest and Colonization

In the late fourth century, the Athenians despatched a colony to the Adriatic Sea. It is the latest colonial mission sent out by Athens in the classical period,⁷⁹ but it is a colony for which we have some of our most detailed information. The decree giving details of the colonial mission appears amongst the comprehensive lists of ships and naval equipment held by the Curators of the Dockyards.⁸⁰ It appears to list the specific vessels presumably selected for the mission in some detail, before going on to some general points about the expedition. There seems to have been a variety of vessels chosen; triremes, triacontors and quadriremes, of which we have the ship details for only the triacontors; a small and somewhat archaic type of vessel, powered by thirty oars. The main text of the decree describes the desire of the *demos* to set up a colony somewhere in the Adriatic region, and further on in the text the purposes of the mission are set down:

hopos d' an huparchei [to]i demoi eis ton hapanta [ch]ronon emporia oikeia kai [sit]opompia, kai naustathmo [oik]eiou kataskeuasthen [to]s huparchei phulake epi [Tur]renous kai Miltia[des] ho oikistes kai hoi epoi[koi ech]osin chresthai oikei[oi nau]tikoi, kai ton Hel[lenon] kai Barbaron hoi [pleonte]s ten thlattan [kai autoi e]ispleosiv ei[s to naustathm]on to Athenaion, [ploia te exon]tes kai ta all[la em bebaioi, eido]tes oti

In order that the people may for all future time have their own commerce and transport in grain, and that the establishment of their own naval station may result in a guard against the Tyrrenians, and Miltiades the founder and the settlers may be able to use their own fleet, and those Greeks and barbarians who sail the sea and themselves sailing into the Athenians' naval station will have their ships and all else secure, knowing that...⁸¹

The implication is clear; the ships mentioned in the decree were to form this naval station and from there perform these various functions, as well as carry (or possibly escort, in unmentioned ships) the settlers to their new home. Obviously there would be some movement of ships between the new naval station and Athens (to return trierarchs home after their term of service, to relay orders and information and so on), but the idea seems to have been to establish a permanent naval presence in the Adriatic region, in order to ensure Athenian interests in the area were protected.

⁷⁹ There is doubt as to whether the colony lasted very long, or was even sent, because there are no other references to the colony and a specific site has not been identified.

⁸⁰ IG II² 1629=Harding 121=RO 100

⁸¹ IG II² 1629, ll. 217-32

The link between the navy and colonization could not be clearer in this inscription, one of the most detailed examples of classical colonial activity. The inscription also shows how a naval station could be “active” (in that a permanent or long-term fleet was stationed there, and used it as a principal base of operations), or “passive” (the naval station acted as a safe harbour for any friendly ships in the region, but without necessarily having a fleet of its own to pursue operations); the colony in the Adriatic was envisioned as fulfilling both roles. The question is how far this link was foreshadowed in our less detailed examples; were other colonies set up specifically as naval stations or at least involve the use of the navy’s ships? It must be acknowledged from the outset that there is little direct evidence for the navy’s role in relation to colonies; in the account of Diodorus regarding the foundation of Thurii in 444/3 BC, ten triremes are mentioned, but this colony is somewhat exceptional in both its distance from Athens and its joint foundation, and this evidence can not be taken as wholly reliable nor necessarily representative.⁸² While colonial ventures overseas would obviously have involved the use of ships, it is unclear whether triremes of the Athenian navy would have been routinely involved. Even in those instances when there is some substantial evidence regarding the establishment of a particular colony, such details are not to be found. This is the case for the Brea decree, which gives some arrangements and regulations concerning the despatch of a colony to (probably) the Thraceward region, but does not tell us how the colonists were to get there in the first place.⁸³

Exploring the relationship between Athenian fleets and Athenian colonies is therefore problematic. Such an investigation is largely dependent on determining what purposes colonies served, and thus whether or not the Athenian fleet would have been used to fulfil that purpose. Colonies must also be examined with an eye on other Athenian naval activity; if it can be argued that the establishment of colonies was at least in part to form naval bases, how were these different from other ‘permanent’ stations of ships, such as the Guardians of the Hellespont?

Athenian settlements and the tribute lists

In many respects our evidence for colonies is extremely slim. Studies in the Athenian tribute lists and other epigraphic texts have allowed us to infer the setting up of Athenian colonies in allies’ territories even when we have no hint of them in the literary record. These inscriptions, preserved in various states of completion from the mid-fifth century until the Peloponnesian war, are among the most fundamental, and most difficult, sources for the study of Athens and her empire, and augment a period for which the literary sources, as we have seen, are far from authoritative. None are entirely intact, but patient cross-referencing has enabled many credible restorations to be made.⁸⁴ Essentially, the inscriptions list the portion of the tribute that the

⁸² Diodorus, 12.10.4

⁸³ IG I³ 46=Fornara, 100=ML 49

⁸⁴ The fundamental work done on this was completed by McGregor, Wade-Gery and Merritt and published in four volumes as *The Athenian Tribute Lists*.

Athenians set aside for Athena; one sixtieth of the total that they received. Athens set the level of tribute required from each of her 'allies', reviewing the figures in each Panathenaic year.⁸⁵ The first assessment for tribute was made following the assumption of control by Athens of the Hellenic league; a loose coalition of states formed to defend Greece from, and subsequently strike back at, Persia. This initial assessment was made by the reputedly fair and just Aristides, and few passages of Thucydides have been discussed quite to the extent as the one in which he reported that the total tribute was set at 460 talents.⁸⁶ The inscriptional record of tribute payments begins later, when the Athenians required payments to be sent to Athens and not to Delos. Incomplete though they are, and though their record begins some 20 years after Aristides' initial assessment, the tribute list inscriptions suggest a substantially lower amount of money was coming in as tribute from the allies. The patterns throughout this series of inscriptions in who was paying and how much have led to many interesting interpretations and discussions of Athenian history. In the context of the present discussion, the lists show a marked reduction in the level of tribute paid by states where an Athenian settlement was introduced.⁸⁷ The logic of this is that, with much of a state's land resources taken into Athenian hands, the rest would have been unable to afford the level of tribute that they had previously paid. It follows therefore that in other places where the level of tribute drops unexpectedly in our record we can hypothesize an Athenian presence being introduced to the area. For example, the island of Lemnos paid 9 talents in tribute in the 450s BC, but only 4.5 in 446 BC.⁸⁸ On its own, the tribute list does not make a fully convincing case for colonization taking place, but two Athenian casualty lists record the names of men from Lemnos, probably colonists, falling in battle.⁸⁹ While Lemnos had been colonized by Athens before the Persian wars, this inscriptional evidence suggests that a new phase of colonization took place sometime between 451 and 446 BC.⁹⁰ Andros is one of several examples where the literary evidence for a cleruchy can be dated by reference to the tribute lists; Plutarch records that a cleruchy was sent to the island under Pericles' auspices, and the halving of the tribute between 450 and 449 BC strongly suggests a more precise dating.⁹¹

Details of Colonial Expeditions

Even when the colonization is specifically recorded, rarely are there any details of the process itself beyond the number of settlers. For example, vague phrases such as "x number of colonists were sent out later" are not uncommon. For the purposes of dating these expeditions in my database, I have assumed that the colonization would follow on quite quickly from the conquest, as it appears to have done in the case of Mytilene in 427 BC. In this particular case we also have

⁸⁵ The Panathenaia was held once every four years.

⁸⁶ Thucydides, 1.96

⁸⁷ This is the general argument of the authors of *ATL*, and it has been subject of much debate. Their narrative section on colonization can be found in the third volume, pp. 283 ff. A cleruchy was a type of colonial settlement whereby Athenian citizens divided up the land of a state, normally a defeated ally, and rented the land to its local former owners to work on. It is this type of colony which was set up by Athens on Lesbos after the Mytilene revolt; Thucydides, 3.50

⁸⁸ Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp. 424-5.

⁸⁹ IG I² 97 and 98

⁹⁰ Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp. 424

⁹¹ Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp. 121 ff.

some detailed information regarding the division of land between the new settlers and the Gods.⁹² Especially in cases where the inhabitants of a defeated city were left alive, it would seem logical that the Athenians would quickly press their advantage by sending settlers as soon as they put down the revolt; delay might allow any of their surviving opponents to regroup and offer further resistance. While there must always be caution in appealing to logic to explain Athenian military practices, it seems a relatively safe assumption that colonization could follow as soon as possible after a campaign was won. On the other hand, it appears that the military expedition which itself made the conquest was not able or authorized to immediately settle the area in question; we have enough pieces of inscribed decrees to be sure that Athenian colonization missions required a specific debate, not to mention a lottery of candidates to become the new settlers. Such debates would have taken a fair amount of time, as would the fitting out an expedition so voted, even if the Athenians tried to move quickly; in the Brea decree, a deadline of 30 days for the expedition to be launched following the assembly vote is mandated.⁹³

As mentioned above, in many cases settlement of an area is reported as following on from a successful campaign or the crushing of a rebellion; conquest, then colonization. There are 10 clear examples of such a pattern, spread throughout the fifth century.⁹⁴ In most cases, however, colonization does not appear to have been planned from the beginning of a campaign, nor was it inevitable afterwards. Thucydides says that in the case of Lesbos in 427 BC, tribute was not imposed but the land divided instead, which suggests that either were possibilities for dealing with rebellious allies and the aftermath of successful campaigns.⁹⁵ The Samian revolt seems to have been followed by punitive damages rather than taking over of land.

This does not mean to imply that military expeditions were not ever launched with the aim of eventual colonization in mind; settling overseas could well be envisaged from the outset, without actually being planned in detail. During the planning of the Sicilian invasion, Nicias likens the campaign to a colonization mission,⁹⁶ and no doubt thoughts of parcelling out the island were in the heads of those Athenians drawing maps of Sicily in the sand and fuelled by the ambition and rhetoric of Alcibiades.⁹⁷ If the conquest of Syracuse had been successful, the Athenians already had a city-sized force on Sicily to parcel out the land and booty, but surely would have still

⁹² Thucydides, 3.50.

⁹³ IG I³ 46=Fornara 100=ML 323, l. 27.

⁹⁴ Eion and Skyros in c. 476 BC; the Chersonese in c. 464 BC and again in 448 BC; Hestiaeae on Euboea in 446 BC; Sinope, c. 435 BC; Aegina, c. 431 BC; Potidaea in c. 428 BC; Mytilene, c. 427 BC and Melos, c. 415 BC. Diodorus (11.88) records briefly three simultaneous colonisations sometime around the mid-fifth century; Pericles' in the Chersonese and Tolmides' in Euboea and Naxos. There are very few details of the campaign or campaigns that resulted in these settlements, but it is not unlikely that this is a truncated reporting of the 'conquest and colonisation' pattern.

⁹⁵ Thucydides, 3.50

⁹⁶ Thucydides, 6.23

⁹⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*, 12.1; Thucydides, 6.24

referred to the Assembly and sent out a further colonization expedition. Colonization would always require a separate debate in Assembly and another expedition.⁹⁸

There were colonization missions which seem to have been planned as such from the start, in places where there had been no recent military expedition in the area; the aim of the campaign was to establish a permanent Athenian (or Athenian friendly) presence in an area. The most obvious example is that of Amphipolis, and it is fair to call the establishment of a settlement at the site a persistent aim of fifth-century Athenian foreign policy.⁹⁹ The colony was eventually founded in 436 BC after several previous attempts, where the campaign to conquer and colonize was a one stage operation. Thurii was another example of such a settlement, where the colonial mission appears to have been sent out without a military expedition preceding it. This expedition, according to Diodorus, included ten triremes, and as mentioned above this is one of the very few colonial expeditions for which we have explicit testimony that triremes were present. In cases where local enemies had not been defeated, the case for providing warships to escort the colonists and to help deal with unfriendly inhabitants would be very powerful. In this particular case, there were ships being sent to form a colony in eastern waters; the parallels with the late fourth-century example which opened this section, and for which we also have explicit testimony for the presence of warships, are very striking. It is by no means unlikely that by founding Thurii the Athenians wanted to secure the sea lanes towards Italy, perhaps also with Sicily in mind.

Settlement Policy and Types of Settlement

The Athenian practice of sending out settlers to various regions of the Aegean was not a consistent policy followed for one common reason or purpose. Like most Athenian policy, the sending of colonies was to meet specific and immediate conditions, or to solve particular problems; as discussed above, many colonies followed from the crushing of an allied rebellion. There was thus a definite element of punishment in some of these missions, as well as ensuring the remaining population remained loyal. But colonies were not always set up to garrison rebellious areas of the Empire, or to keep watch on potential trouble in the Aegean; other possible motives included to safeguard particular sea-lanes, to monopolize certain natural resources, to bring substantial benefits to the poor, or clear Athens of idlers; there were probably as many reasons for colonization as there were colonies, and each colony had a different combination of purposes. Therefore the involvement of the navy would probably be equally varied. All that can be said with certainty at this stage is that a naval presence would have been useful, or even necessary, for many of these purposes.

⁹⁸ Tolmides' settling of Naupactos seems to be an exception to this rule, and this case will be discussed below, Part One section B.1.

⁹⁹ And the retaking of Amphipolis was a recurrent theme of fourth-century foreign policy.

The status of colonial missions in relation to each other is also a debated issue. The Athenians themselves seem to have made a technical distinction between two types of settlement, the colony and the cleruchy.¹⁰⁰ The exact differences between these two types of settlement are difficult to determine, especially as our literary sources are invariably inconsistent with the terminology. Brunt argues that the difference between the two was that cleruchies were set up alongside existing cities, whereas colonies established settlements on sites where there were no current occupiers.¹⁰¹ Scholars such as Graham follow the view that the essential difference rested on citizenship; cleruchs retained Athenian citizenship and acted as a self-funding garrison in the territory to which they were sent, whereas colonists gave up Athenian citizenship for that of their new home.¹⁰² These definitions are not mutually exclusive; cleruchs could have been Athenian citizens abroad in the territory of existing cities, while settlers who gave up their citizenship occupied new cities on empty sites. Under this argument, places such as Hestiaea and Aegina would be colonies (as they occupied land from which the original inhabitants had been removed),¹⁰³ as would Thuri and Amphipolis, Potidaea, and the first settlements to be sent to Imbros and Lemnos before the Persian wars. Cleruchies would include the settlement of Lesbos in 427 BC, and places such as Naxos, Andros, Chalchis and Eretria, as well as the later occupations of Lemnos and Imbros in c.449 BC.¹⁰⁴

Figueira argues that the cleruchies of the fifth century did not become “functionally self-standing communities”.¹⁰⁵ Like Brunt, he argues that colonists retained the citizenship rights at Athens, as

¹⁰⁰ IG I³ 237, 1.9, “*apoikiais kai klerochia[is]*”. This suggests a ‘technical’ distinction between these two categories of settlement, in the fifth century.

¹⁰¹ Brunt, *Greek History and Thought*, p. 121. He suggests that Lemnos and Imbros were cleruchies, because they were sites on which the Athenians settled alongside and existing city. (p. 121, cf. p. 123). But as he acknowledges later, and as Graham emphasizes (*Colony and Mother City*, p. 175), there seem to have been two phases of Athenian settlement in these places; the first settlement followed the expulsion of the previous Pelesagian population. The colony on Lemnos became independent of Athenian control fairly swiftly, fighting against her in the Persian wars, but later became ‘subject’ to Athens and tribute payers in the Delian league. In the mid-fifth century, a cleruchy was sent out to occupy the island. Brunt suggests that the similar later history of the two islands implies also a cleruchy was sent to Imbros at the same time (*Greek Political Thought*, p. 123)

¹⁰² Brunt dismisses the idea that Athenian colonists would have to become non-citizens as unlikely, favouring in the absence of definitive testimony the idea of these people possessing two citizenships rather than giving up one. (*Greek History and Thought*, p. 131). Graham’s view is that cleruchies were “an extension in the Athenian state overseas” (*Colony and Mother City*, p. 167), and that “the most important characteristic of a cleruch [as opposed to a settler, was], his retention of citizenship” (p. 169).

¹⁰³ Graham argues that these were cleruchies, but the way Thucydides describes the people from these settlements (“the Hestians then living in Hestiaea, being settlers”, and “the Aeginetans who then occupied Aegina”, both at 7.57) seems to argue in favour of their interpretation as citizens of the place they were from, but clearly not the original inhabitants. The evidence cited by Graham (pp. 171-3) to argue that these places were populated by Athenian citizens, including a fragmentary decree supposedly relating to the Athenian *eisphora* being levied on Hestiaea, seem inconclusive.

¹⁰⁴ Note that Thucydides 7.57, in accounting for the forces that went with the Athenians to Sicily, uses different formulas to describe the Imbrians and Lemnians when compared to the Hestians and Aeginetans which follow in the next lines. The formula for the later pair is described in the previous note. For Lemnos and Imbros, they are simply described as “Lemnians” and “Imbrians”; does this suggest (as Graham argues) that these places had different statuses, or was it simply that the colonies in Aegina and Hestiaea were more recent? While the occupiers of these two places (Lemnos and Imbros) were of Athenian origin and (as Thucydides points out) were following Athenian customs, his description of them as Lemnians and Imbrians implies a separate identity. It also implies that, if Athenian citizen cleruchs were still there, then they were not listed by Thucydides in this passage.

¹⁰⁵ Figueira, *Athens and Aegina*, p. 72

well as becoming citizens of the newly established colony.¹⁰⁶ He also argues that “cleruchies could not stand by themselves... [and]...needed the continued presence of an indigenous community onto which it might be grafted”,¹⁰⁷ but differs from Brunt’s distinction in as much that colonies could also be set up alongside an extant local population.

Cleruchies: Athenian “garrisons” overseas?

That cleruchs retained their citizenship is beyond doubt; what seems to be questioned is whether or not these men actually went out to their plots of land, or whether they were absentee landholders. Many possible pictures of these settlements can be drawn; from a tight, self-funding garrison that seems to be the natural inference from Thucydides’ description of the division of Lesbos,¹⁰⁸ to a means of punishment for rebellious states, whereby absentee Athenian landlords enjoyed income from estates they probably never saw,¹⁰⁹ or the view of Brunt, where the Athenians went out as a garrison at first, and were paid from the land they owned, but were withdrawn when it was thought safe.¹¹⁰ The question of whether such cleruchs retained their rights to the land overseas upon returning to Athens can be debated around, but not answered by, a fragmentary inscription relating to Mytilene which seems to be restoring some land to somebody.¹¹¹ Too little is known of the details of cleruchy expeditions to be certain whether they were permanent; but the absence of garrisons in opposing the revolts of Athenian allies 412 BC, and the listing of the colonists but not the cleruchy garrisons of Lemnos and Imbros in relation to the Sicilian expedition is certainly circumstantial evidence that these garrisons were withdrawn, or possibly had never existed.

Figueira argues in his discussion of these issues that “garrisons [of soldiers] would have used up significant amounts of material and human resources, and they had to be scaled very large to counter incursions”, and that “troops without attached squadrons of triremes were relatively inefficient in the projection of power.”¹¹² There is much truth in this assessment. But while a small establishment of troops may not have been able to hold down an entire city alone, it would nevertheless have been of strategic value. Such a garrison would not only have provided a visible reminder of Athenian power, but would also have been able to ensure that the harbour was open for Athenian shipping. While isolated garrisons may not have had much strategic impact

¹⁰⁶ It should be noted at this point that Figueira (*Athens and Aegina*, p. 10 ff) argues that “the Thucydidean distinction between... [cleruchies and colonies]...appears to coincide with Athenian legal terminology”, and thus he classes as colonies some settlements which most scholars consider cleruchies. His table (pp. 217 ff) makes clear his views on the status of each individual settlement. He lists, (Figueira, *Athens and Aegina*, pp. 66 ff) with full discussion, 10 arguments in favour of this interpretation. None are absolutely conclusive, and indeed hold little force if one assumes that colonists could return to Athens and regain citizenship in times of need, that citizenship wasn’t retained simply because it was convenient for a colonist to utilize it, that Athenians could own property abroad without having to belong to a colony or cleruchy, and that colonist often used the similar political groupings and organizations to the mother city.

¹⁰⁷ Figueira, *Athens and Aegina*, p. 167

¹⁰⁸ Thucydides, 3.50

¹⁰⁹ Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, p. 168-76.

¹¹⁰ Brunt, *Greek History and Thought*, p. 125 ff.

¹¹¹ IG I³ 66=Tod 63=ATL D22 Referred to by Brunt, *Greek History and Thought*, p. 126 ff

¹¹² Figueira, *Athens and Aegina*, p. 174

on their own, they provided the means for the Athenian navy to do so; a network of bases and safe harbours that was essential for a galley navy if it was to efficiently project power. In return, the navy could provide supplies and reinforcement if the troops were attacked, making up for the relatively small size of the garrison; cleruchies did not need to be large enough to cope with a full-scale incursion, because, so long as they kept the harbour open, the navy could provide the force necessary when it was needed.

Considered in this light, it seems not without significance that a large proportion of the colonisation activity (7 out of the 24 examples, 5 of them cleruchies) took place in the 4 years between 450 BC and 446 BC.¹¹³ It was around this time that Athens (probably) made peace with Persia, thus bringing to an end the original stated purpose of the alliance.¹¹⁴ The decision of the Athenians not only to maintain the alliance, but to continue to levy the tribute is the most significant stage in the development of Athenian imperialism. The spate of cleruchies established throughout the Aegean at this time was not unrelated to these developments, and would have played an instrumental role in keeping the Athenian Empire together.

This view of Athenian settlement practice in the fifth century (unlike that which supposes that cleruchs were largely absentee landlords) needs to take into account the apparent absence of these pockets of Athenian settlers and garrisons in the revolts, most particularly in 412 BC when many allies which supposedly had garrisons broke into revolt. It seems not enough simply to conclude that these garrisons were overrun and defeated, which might be considered an obvious assumption even if it is not spelled out by our sources. It could well be the case that these settlements were not as well manned as they had been when established; there is evidence of men being siphoned from the garrisons by generals to help with their campaigns,¹¹⁵ and there is no indication as to where these men went afterwards; no doubt some returned to their garrison, but if some had been taken to Sicily in 415 BC, or recalled to Athens in the wake of the defeat two years later, there could be no chance of return. Cleruchs were Athenian citizens, and many were likely to be of the *zeugite* class, and were thus liable to be called up for Athens' campaigns.¹¹⁶ It is possible that any men left in any given garrison would have chosen discretion, or possibly desertion, over valour. As mentioned above, the garrisons were not nearly numerous or strong

¹¹³ Note that this was a period in which there was reported to be ([Aristotle], 36.4) an abundance of citizens; if this was so, then some could easily have been spared to become cleruchs overseas.

¹¹⁴ The bibliography for the debate over the Peace of Kallias is extensive. Meiggs (*Athenian Empire*, pp. 487 ff) gives a summary of the sources and the historiography, describing how arguments about its authenticity have ebbed and flowed. This pattern has continued in more recent scholarship, with the pendulum currently resting in favour of the treaty's existence. Hornblower (*Commentary ad loc 1.112.2*, pp. 179 ff.) argues for authenticity, suggesting that though Thucydides does not mention the treaty during the narrative of the Fifty Years, such an agreement is assumed to exist in later sections of the work. Badian, *Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 1-72 argues that there were two peace treaties with Persians in the *Pentekontaetia*, one after Eurymedon in the 460s BC, and a renewal of the treaty in 450 BC, though no single source says so. Lewis, *Cambridge Ancient History*, volume 5, p. 121 ff. also believes in a formal peace, and argues (p. 121) that "it is the nature and completeness of his excursus [i.e. Thucydides' *Pentekontaetia*] that should be questioned rather than the fact that the Persian Wars came to an end".

¹¹⁵ For example the settlers on Lemnos and Imbros contributed to Athenian campaigns in Lesbos (Thucydides, 3.5, 427 BC), Pylos (Thucydides, 4.38, 425 BC) and Sicily (Thucydides, 7.57, from 413 BC). Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, p. 425.

¹¹⁶ Van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', pp. 60-1

enough to hold the allies alone and they relied in large part on the fact that any attack on a city could result in more forces from Athens coming to their aid. In the immediate aftermath of Sicily, this Athenian back-up could not be guaranteed, and while the Athenians may have wished emphatically to guard against revolt from the allies,¹¹⁷ they could not back this up with overwhelming force. The structures by which Athens sought to maintain a watch in the Aegean could not function without direct backing of the navy, or at least the expectation that such support could be there soon. In the aftermath of the destruction of the Sicilian fleet in 413 BC, neither the Athenians in the Aegean, nor their allies, had this expectation.¹¹⁸

Fifth-century colonies: new allied cities?

One of the arguments used to support the contention that Athenian settlers of the fifth century remained citizens is the apparent inconsistency with regard to tribute payments. Colonies founded before the Persian wars (which paid) and those established after (which did not pay) differed, it is argued, on the grounds that the former lost their citizenship and the latter did not. Cleruchs, as establishments of Athenian citizens, did not pay tribute either, but no doubt had the same obligations as other citizens in terms of taxation and military service. The comparative status of Athenian colonies and the allied states, and the effect that the establishment of a colony could have on tribute payments of local allies, has also received much discussion. In this respect the Brea decree is worth examining:

boun de kai p[anhoplion apa]gen es Panathenaia ta megal[a kai es Dionusi]a phallon. Ean de tis epistra[teuei epi ten ye]n ten ton apoikon, boethen ta[s poles hos ochsu]tata kata tas chsuggraphas

A cow and a panoply shall be brought to the Great Panathenaia, and to the Dionysia, a phallos. If anyone makes a campaign against the land of the colony, the cities are to help as quickly as possible, according to the arrangements.¹¹⁹

While no tribute payment is mentioned in the decree, it is interesting that the new settlers were obliged to send a cow and panoply to the Great Panathenaia, and a phallus to the Dionysia. The allied cities of the Empire were also obliged to do this. While this is a singular example, it is also our most detailed example of the setting up of a fifth-century colony.¹²⁰ We hear of no other regular obligations on this document; no tribute or taxation of resources. This colony, along with all the others founded after the Persian wars, fails to appear on any of the extant tribute lists. The reason for this must surely be that no such settlement was assessed for tribute; the argument from silence is quite powerful in this case. So why were colonies such as Brea not obliged to pay

¹¹⁷ Thucydides, 8.1.3

¹¹⁸ However, the fact was that in 412 BC Athens, by some human miracle, managed to put more ships in the water than at almost any other time before or since; if the garrisons did indeed fall, flee or desert, it should be argued that this overwhelming show of sea-power was too late rather than too little.

¹¹⁹ IG I³ 46, ll. 15-9=ML 49, ll. 11-15=Fornara, 100, ll. 11-15=LACTOR 1, 232

¹²⁰ As is noted in the ML 49 commentary, it is also the colony for which we know the least concerning its location and subsequent history; apart from the decree itself and a couple of late marginal notes, the colony is not mentioned in our texts, nor has a site been identified.

tribute? Perhaps instead the colonists were obliged, like some other privileged allies, to furnish manned ships when needed, and not regular monetary tribute.

This argument does not have direct support from the ancient sources, so must remain a hypothesis. But it is worthwhile to quickly examine the naval potential of the colonies, and the extent to which we see the colonists using ships. The first point is that, clearly, any coastal colony would have made some use of ships, not least for transport to Athens for legal hearings and the like. Some colonies, like Amphipolis, would certainly have had the resources to build a great many ships which could have been used in active service. The authors of *ATL* list 14 places that they believed to be ship-supplying states in 454 BC, some of which were fairly small communities. Amongst them we have such places as Andros, Eretria, Hestiaea and Potidaea, which were to have Athenian settlers sent out to them later in the fifth century.¹²¹ There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the new settlers exploiting the resources for these places would have been unable to supply themselves with ships. Clearly the contributions of these places in terms of numbers of ships would not have been great, but for the roles often envisaged for colonies, such as patrolling particular sea-lanes or watching local allies, they would not have needed to be. If a problem arose which a local fleet could not handle, then they could summon help from the Athenian alliance; the Brea decree made specific provision for this. It is possible then that some of these “garrisons” could be more accurately described as ‘trip-wires’, whose job was not so much to actively put down a revolt, but to be ready to report trouble to Athens.

The purposes of colonies and cleruchies: a network of naval stations?

The question of naval involvement in colonies and cleruchies obviously hinges on what we believe the purpose of these settlements was; some of the roles proposed would not have needed ships. A stationary hoplite garrison to control a potentially unruly population, or a division of land, held by absentee landlords, to punish and extort defeated allies, would not have needed any ships to be effective. Despite the argument of impracticality, this is an acceptable reconstruction for cleruchies, but it will not answer for other settlements. Many colonies were put in areas either where there were no local inhabitants, or where the locals had been displaced by the Athenians. Such settlements were ways in which the Athenians sought to control the resources of a region, but there may well have been a wider strategic element to them as well. The synergy of ships and regularly spaced land bases, as well as the placing of colonies on heavily frequented trade routes, strongly suggests that there was a link between the location of colonies and naval concerns. Triremes stationed at these bases protected both the harbours and the local shipping from attack.¹²² Figueira suggests that the Athenians scattering their fleet throughout the Aegean in a piecemeal fashion would not serve their strategic interests, and that wide-ranging mobile

¹²¹ *ATL* vol. 3, p. 267-8

¹²² It hardly need be stated that they could also find themselves in a position to prey on the merchants of other nations.

flotillas on a large scale would be more appropriate.¹²³ While there is some truth in this, it is the case that the Athenians did in fact employ such small and localized patrols of vessels operating from specific bases, along with wider-ranging regional patrols. Under this reconstruction, colonies would fit well into the pattern of strategic naval defence; small naval establishments in specific locations would have facilitated certain tasks such as protecting merchant convoys, countering pirates and taxing certain sea lanes, and perhaps most importantly could act as a ‘trip-wire’ to alert Athens of threats and incursions. If colonies were indeed obliged to provide some ships, then these local fleets would not have been at the cost of thinly spreading Athens’ own naval resources; the Athenians would in effect have been ‘subcontracting’ the expenses onto the new colonist communities. The allies’ provision of forces for the Athenian-led fleets seems to have been more infrequent than the yearly demanded tribute (but potentially more costly when it happened). In addition, the establishing of colonists and cleruchs in these places would not only hold down the local population (if there was one) and protect the natural resources of the region, but would help ensure that there was a wide-spread network of friendly ports and bases for the larger Athenian fleets to use; these would have been naval stations in what we might term a passive sense.¹²⁴ Trireme fleets could have worked their way between such bases, which would have provided shelter, supplies and markets.

This is a compelling picture, but one for which there is little direct testimony. Notwithstanding the presence of some shipping that can be taken for granted in any island or coastal community, there is little evidence of colonists having access to warships on the scale of triremes, or of contributing to combined fleets. This is not too surprising, even if the ships were definitely there; it is rare even in Thucydides for the total numbers of allied ships and their provenance to be disclosed, and of course even in his detailed narrative every fleet is not recorded. In 424 BC, the generals controlling a small force of ships in the north Aegean, whose mission was to raise money, came to hear of some trouble at Antandros. To counter this, they raised some forces from the allies in area; the text is unspecific as to whether this was land forces or ships, but there would be little way of carrying a great many troops unless some ships were also added.¹²⁵ Perhaps colonies set up in the Aegean, such as Skyros, Melos, Aegina, Amphipolis, Scione and Potidaea provided such a service to Athens; in these cases at least, the role of holding down a rebellious population can not be cited, as the Athenians expelled or massacred the existing inhabitants.¹²⁶

¹²³ Figueira, *Athens and Aigina*, p. 174. He considers the Guardians of the Hellespont as one such “mobile, not static, flotilla”, which seems to be an error; like the fleet attached to the toll-house at Byzantium during the Ionian war 410 BC, this fleet would probably operate from a single base over relatively a short range.

¹²⁴ And, equally importantly, denying such facilities to enemy navies.

¹²⁵ Thucydides, 4.75-6

¹²⁶ These colonies are listed by Brunt, *Greek History and Thought*, pp. 119-20.

Melos

One instructive example with regard to how the links between the navy and colonial settlement may have operated is that of Melos.¹²⁷ In this case, the inhabitants were killed or sold to slavery by the Athenians in the winter of 416/5 BC, and we are told that colonization followed later; as usual, we are left to presume that this was soon after. The next time we hear of Melos is when a sea-battle occurred there in 412 BC, in which an Athenian fleet was defeated and fled to Samos. This fleet seems to have appeared from nowhere; we do not hear of its launch, its commanders or its objectives. While it is far from unique in this respect, it is perhaps possible to conclude that this fleet was in some way connected with the new colony. Perhaps the colony at Melos was a naval station, and these ships were stationed there; the launch from Athens was not reported because in fact they were stationed at Melos, and manned by the colonists.

However, there is a big problem with this reconstruction, in that even a modest fleet of ten ships would have been beyond the man-power capabilities of the 500 man colony sent to Melos. Even if we assume that slaves and mercenaries made up a large proportion of the crews, as they did at Athens, it is inevitable to conclude that the manpower of Melos at this time was not enough to man the fleet that appears to be stationed there. Perhaps then, at least at this stage, the colony at Melos was a naval station in the passive sense; rather than providing manned ships, it simply allowed access to port facilities and markets for Athenian vessels, and (we can safely assume) some of the colonists sought employment in the fleet. In this reconstruction, the colony of Melos probably had little in the way of naval power of its own, but became part of that network of friendly ports so important to galley-based navies. No doubt Melos could have provided one or two ships if required, and it is not unlikely that there was such a requirement upon them. But it seems that for this small colony at least, any triremes that would be stationed here to patrol the allies, guard the sea lanes or combat piracy would have been from Athens, and would have been funded and commanded from there.

Melos was amongst the smaller of the colonies for which we have numbers; 1,000 colonists seems to be a usual number (although there are several examples of both smaller and larger figures)¹²⁸, and even if this refers to the number of adult males to the exclusion of slaves, women and children, and even under the assumption that most sent out to colonies would be healthy individuals in the prime of life, very few ships could be manned by so few men. If we assume firstly that the colonists themselves formed only half of the crews, with slaves and mercenaries the rest, and secondly that every colonist joined the fleet, then the colony could theoretically man

¹²⁷ Graham argues that Melos should be considered a cleruchy and not a colony, because there is inscriptional evidence of an Athenian citizen being buried on the island (*Colony and Mother City*, p. 173-4). The date of this inscription is not certainly connected with the period of Athenian settlement, and there might be any number of reasons why an Athenian was buried abroad; the idea that he was a Melian given Athenian citizenship is tempting, and alone this text does not prove that the inhabitants of the colony were Athenian citizens.

¹²⁸ As Figueira points out though, the larger examples are colonies to which the Athenians contributed only a part of the total number of settlers. The colonial expeditions sent to Amphipolis in 465 BC (which was destroyed) and 437 BC (which was successful), and that to Thurii, were all large scale operations to which the Athenians probably contributed 1,000 settlers, or 10% of the total. *Athens and Aigina*, p. 165, n.13

ten triremes. Two or three ships would seem a more reasonable and sustainable scale for the colony's naval potential. As the Adriatic colony inscription shows, we need not assume that all the ships deployed to a colony were triremes; smaller vessels which were less intensive in their man-power demands could also have had a place amongst the fleets of these colonies, even if they rarely merited one in the source material.

Regional Patrol Fleets

Of course, the Athenians did not need to send out a colony in order to establish a naval base or a 'trip-wire'; we have several clear examples of semi-permanent establishments of ships in particular regions unconnected with a new Athenian settlement in that region. We need not imagine that the fleet of three ships that watched Megara from Salamis in the 420s BC,¹²⁹ for example, were the product of a colonial expedition or permanent settlement in the area, nor that the establishment of the Hellespont Guardians in the mid-fifth century necessarily involved sending a new colony to support the fleet. One interesting and explicit example of a patrol fleet acting as a 'tripwire' occurred in 425 BC. Having hastily constructed a fortification on Pylos, an Athenian fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles continued on towards its destination, leaving Demosthenes and five ships "on guard".¹³⁰ A little time later, the Peloponnesians gathered a large force against Pylos, and Demosthenes sent out two ships to inform the main fleet of the danger.¹³¹ It is clear that time was of the essence for these messengers. Demosthenes' force was too small and inadequate to have had any chance of mounting a long-term defence or holding down the area alone;¹³² but the hastily built fortifications and poorly-armed men succeeded in repulsing several attacks before the main Athenian fleet arrived within a couple of days and inflicted heavy defeat upon the Spartans.¹³³

45 fleets were involved in regional garrisons and patrol of one sort or another. This is similar to the number of fleets that participated in sea battles. Around 40 different locations are mentioned, some quite vague (Attic coast, or the Hellespont), others relating to specific cities or places (the little fort on Salamis looking at Megara, or the toll house at Chyrstopolis). There is great variation in the size of fleets and the length of commission; some fleets were in place to ensure short-term control of a particular area, almost like a blockade. But many of these fleets were on duty for months or years, and so represent a very large commitment to the navy on the part of Athens. I have listed over a third (16) of these fleets as 'permanent', a word which of course is more an expression of the intent than reality; for very few fleets or regions is there substantial evidence of the breadth of Athenian naval activities. There are some general references to this sort of naval activity. Plutarch talks of 60 ships in regular commission in the middle of the fifth

¹²⁹ Thucydides, 2.93

¹³⁰ Thucydides, 4.5.2

¹³¹ Thucydides, 4.8.3

¹³² Thucydides 4.9 describes the short-comings of the fortifications. Cf. the discussion below regarding the equipment of the sailors at this time.

¹³³ Thucydides, 4.13-4

century, for 8 months of the year, and Stadter correctly interprets this as “a unique notice to the normal activity of the navy”.¹³⁴ A similar notice is given for the fourth century, though in this instance it is 20 ships that are mentioned.¹³⁵

After Naupactos, some of the best evidence for the substantial long-term naval presence in a region concerns the Hellespont. Following Alcibiades’ success in taking Cyzicus in 410 BC, Xenophon reports that a fleet of 30 ships was left in the area.¹³⁶ Their mission was three-fold; firstly, to levy a 10% charge on merchants going through the Hellespont, secondly to protect the recently-established custom house and fort, and thirdly to harass the enemy as and when they could.¹³⁷ It can be argued that this was a re-establishment of a toll-house set up at an earlier time; sometime after 430 BC we hear of Athenian officials called Guardians of the Hellespont charged with controlling the grain supply in the region;¹³⁸ no doubt control of this area was lost with the revolt of Byzantium and the other Hellespontine allies. Whether or not a fleet was used on a permanent basis on earlier occasions to ensure payment is not absolutely certain, but seems likely; the decree referring to the Athenian officials in the Hellespont envisions them as being able to confiscate ships passing through the region. There is no need to think that as many as 30 ships would have been used in this context; with Byzantium and Chalchadon still enemies in 408 BC, no doubt the Hellespont remained a dangerous and contested region despite the defeat and death of the Spartan admiral Mindarus, and thus a large number of ships were deployed at this time. It is not certain for how long a fleet of such size was intended to stay in this area; in the event, of course, Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian war removed her naval presence from the Hellespont until the fourth century BC.

Perhaps even more interesting is the fleet of nine ships reported in the Hellespont region one year later, in 409 BC.¹³⁹ These ships are described by Xenophon as the ships “continually on watch there”, and so should probably be distinguished from the fort and fleet recently set up near Chrysopolis. In addition, their stated purpose was the protection of Athenian merchant vessels; the Hellespont, of course, was on the crucial Black Sea grain route. Exactly what Xenophon meant by “continually” is hard to determine; Athens’ interest in the Hellespont area went back to the foundation of Sigeion in the sixth century, before her trireme fleet and empire existed. According to Garnsey, it was in the fifth century that Athens began to depend on grain from abroad, and perhaps this would have been a good context for establishing a Hellespont fleet; there is no evidence that allows greater precision. However, Xenophon’s text, our only evidence for these particular ships, offers nothing to support or undermine this, and in using “continually” he

¹³⁴ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 11.4; Stadter, *Commentary*, p. 137

¹³⁵ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 24.3 In his note on this section, Rhodes observes that there are very few examples for patrol ships using the exact words *nees phrourides* in the sources. Nevertheless, as the table makes clear, there are many examples of ships operating in particular regions, even if these exact words are not used.

¹³⁶ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.22.

¹³⁷ cf. Part Two, B.2 on the complex relations between the fleet and the city at this time.

¹³⁸ IG I³ 63=LACTOR 1, 121=ML 65, ll. 35 ff.

¹³⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.36.

probably meant nothing more than “for as long as I can remember”. While many of these Hellespont fleets purport to be permanent garrisons for the area, the sources usually report no more or less than a certain number of ships being there within a very narrow time frame.

Our sources contain enough examples of fleets operating in specific areas to lead us to conclude that they were a regular feature of Athenian foreign policy. It is likely that the true scale of these commitments was larger than the figures suggest. It is unlikely for example that a statistically significant number of battles have failed to reach the historical record, but a good number of small regional patrol fleets, particularly if they were regular and routine employments, may easily have escaped the notice of our sources.

Logistical Considerations

Patrol ships would no doubt have been crewed and paid for in the same way as any other Athenian fleet (i.e. quite sporadically and heavily reliant on the liturgical class to bear the brunt when the state could not). The naval presence in any given region then was dependent on the ability of the Athenians to maintain and finance a fleet there.

The case for the colonies may have been different. The naval presence of such a settlement may have been small and intermittent in comparison with a permanently established fleet, but it was also (from the Athenian point of view) cheaper. No doubt the newly acquired colonial land could have been exploited in order to provide pay for hired sailors,¹⁴⁰ but we should not assume that a small colonial state would necessarily fund its ships in the same way as its imperial mother-city. More than likely, manning the ships would have been a duty undertaken by all the colonists, rather than a profession after the Athenian fashion.¹⁴¹ But the point is that the Athenian state would not have had to fund these ships. The amount of money needed to maintain even a modest fleet all year round was considerable. Clearly the Athenians were willing to put a lot of resources into their navy, but the colonies can perhaps be seen as a way of maintaining their naval network and giving significant benefits to the poorest citizens,¹⁴² while at the same time saving some of the costs of manning the navy. We have seen in the case of Melos how such a settlement, even if it did not boast a permanent fleet of any significance, could have been used by later Athenian fleets as a base. This would not have been the case with some of the patrol and garrison fleets in areas such as the Hellespont and overlooking Megara; once these ships left, so did Athens’ direct power over the area.

¹⁴⁰ Osborne (*LACTOR I*, 133, note) points out that the rent paid to the cleruchs of Mytilene, 200 drachmae, would support a hoplite for most of a year (although not his servant). This is true, but this same amount of money would pay the wages for a sailor for most of a year too.

¹⁴¹ I discuss the issue of professionalism further in Part One, section C.1 and Part Three, section 2.

¹⁴² Or ridding the city of its lazy rabble-rousers, depending on one’s point of view.

The Athenian Naval Network: overseas colonies, naval stations and regional patrols

The Athenian naval network under discussion here, involving colonies, cleruchies and regional patrols of various sorts, was a largely fifth-century phenomenon. However, the only uncomplicated and explicit example of a colony as a naval station comes at the end of the fourth century, and there is evidence that regional patrol fleets were a feature of the fourth-century navy too.¹⁴³ It is likely that the Athenian politicians of the fourth century would have wanted to re-establish the Athenian naval network of the fifth century, though they would not have expressed the desire in such terms. It cannot be said that the Athenians had a consistent, or even a conscious, policy of establishing the sort of naval network that this section is attempting to reconstruct. Our sources rather frame Athenian policy aims in more general terms, such as “safeguarding the sea” or “keeping a watch over the allies”.¹⁴⁴ To meet these general aims the Athenians employed a variety of tools, depending on the political and strategic needs of the moment. What was always required for such policies was a strong navy; Athens’ power overseas was dependent on her being willing and able to deploy large numbers of ships, ships which in turn accounted for a large proportion of the resulting revenues. The navy was simultaneously the biggest expenditure and biggest earner of imperial Athens.

Of the foreign policy tools available to the Athenians, potentially the most long-lived was the colony. The establishment of new cities often occurred after the effective destruction of old and disloyal ones. These colonies were permanent settlements with close ties to their mother-city; they seemed to have become allies of Athens, and perhaps had an obligation to occasionally furnish ships, as well as the regular row and hoplite. If indeed such fleets had existed, they would have acted as a ‘trip-wire’ to alert the Athenians of potential (and indeed actual) trouble. They could also have provided ships to bolster the numbers of combined fleets,¹⁴⁵ and all this with the added bonus of not being a drain on the Athenian treasury.

Like colonies, cleruchies could have acted as safe harbours for any passing friendly fleet, as well as providing a base for operations in the local region. There is no evidence for cleruchs operating their own ships, triremes or otherwise; cleruchies were aimed more at controlling a local population and its resources and harbours, to be withdrawn when the situation was calmed.

Colonies and cleruchies appear to have been self-funding. This was not the case for Athens’ regional patrol vessels. These were kept in service for extended periods of time, and thus the expenditure was very high. Some of these fleets operated from their own forts or bases; such bases were not any type of colonial settlement, but nevertheless formed some sort of semi-permanent emplacement in a region. Ships in these places would have been funded by Athens

¹⁴³ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 24.3

¹⁴⁴ e.g. Thucydides, 1.143, 2.17, 8.1

¹⁴⁵ Note the contributions of Athenian settlements abroad in the Sicilian expedition (Thucydides, 7.57), though of course this does not prove that the settlements involved provided ships, or indeed sailors; only that men from these places were part of the invasion force in some capacity.

directly, though some like the tollhouse at Chrysopolis provided lucrative opportunities; Athenian sea power in the region lasted as long as they supported the fleet there. Fleets patrolling a region needed safe harbours, some of which were provided by colonies and cleruchies.

Conclusion

To sum up, colonization formed an essential part of Athenian imperial power in the fifth century BC. Their inclusion in the database as operations involving the Athenian navy, despite only a few concrete examples, is something of an assumption, but the relationship between established colonies and naval movements, as will be demonstrated in the case study of Naupactos, was a close one. In nearly all cases we are given very little detail about the missions themselves; mostly we hear of a successful campaign in a particular region, and a sentence to the effect “x number of colonists were sent out later”. The status of these settlements in relation to Athens as well as each other is debated; all that is reasonably certain is that there were two types of settlement, cleruchies and colonies. In the former, the settlers remained Athenians, but the latter lost their citizenship. But neither sort of settlement seems to have been obliged to pay tribute. Perhaps it is the case that new colonies were exempt from financial tribute, but were instead obliged to furnish ships like some other allies. Small-scale settlements of 1,000 or so citizens could not have furnished powerful fleets such as that of Chios. But an obligation to supply a couple of ships would explain their absence from the tribute lists, give them the somewhat privileged status that exemption implies, but still allow a mechanism for non-Athenian citizens to be obliged to serve Athens. The presence of very small naval squadrons would have made some strategic sense, and if at least some colonies are to be interpreted in the light of securing trade routes, guarding the allies and combating piracy, ships would have been absolutely necessary. The small squadrons such as these settlements could have provided would have been unable to do much against a significant enemy fleet; but they could have provided the Athenians with early warning of potential trouble, and been a visual Athenian presence to discourage such trouble in the first instance.¹⁴⁶ It is perhaps for this reason that so many colonies and cleruchies were established shortly after 450 BC, when Athens decided to maintain her dominance over the allies even after the Persian threat was neutralized. Under this reconstruction, colonies, and even cleruchies, would often have been set up as *naustathmoi*, like the example of Adriatic colony of 325/4 BC; but they would not necessarily have been furnished with permanent Athenian fleets, like the Guardians of the Hellespont.

¹⁴⁶ Compare the diplomatic missions discussed below. Technically speaking, of course, these were not Athenian triremes. But they would be under de facto Athenian control, and anyone seeing such ships would assume them to be Athenian. (see the Chians mistaken identification of Spartan ships as Athenian; Thucydides 3.32.3 cf. 8.28.2 and Aristophanes *Birds*, l. 108)

3: Other Naval Activity

Politics and Diplomacy

This section is going to examine the broad range of naval activity that had a diplomatic or political dimension. It is the category for which there is the most recorded activity; 191 instances, involving 95 out of 216 fleets. This is testament to the fact that ‘diplomatic/political activity’ is such a big area, and the wide definition covers all sorts of things that a fleet and its leaders might do; including the transportation of envoys and ambassadors, conclusion of alliances, negotiating terms of surrender and what might anachronistically be termed “gunboat” diplomacy.

At the smallest scale, it was often single ships that transported Athenian ambassadors overseas for negotiations. This small-scale activity was probably far more widespread than the individual examples indicate. Thucydides reports the Corcyraeans barring the Athenians and Spartans from their harbour “except on peaceful terms and coming in not more than one ship”,¹⁴⁷ suggesting that single ship envoys were common and generally acceptable. The Old Oligarch speaks in general terms of Athenians sailing abroad on account of overseas property and public offices, and a fourth-century student of Aristotle suggests that there were 700 such positions.¹⁴⁸ We should not envisage such political missions involving huge fleets, though the fear of the Corcyraeans about the threat posed by multiple vessels seems to have been well founded. In many cases negotiations and diplomacy were carried out by Athenian officials (often generals rather than ambassadors), with a full trireme fleet forming a somewhat ominous and intimidating backdrop. Many cities were taken by words rather than by force, as was the case with Cephallania in 456 BC and again 431 BC; many no doubt chose to concede in the face of the threat of Athenian force rather than to defy them and fight.¹⁴⁹ The position of these communities is exemplified by the case of Melos in 416 BC. Thucydides reports a unique dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians, an exchange which throws into sharp relief his view of what the Athenians meant by diplomacy in the fifth century. The following passage is characteristic:

hêmeis toinun oute autoi met' onomatôn kalôn, hês ê dikaiôs ton Mêdon katalusantes archomen ê adikoumenoi nun epexerchometha, logôn mêkos apiston parexome outh' humas axioumen...ta dunata d' ex hôn hekateroi alêthôs phronoumen diaprassesthai, epistamenous pros eidotas hoti dikaia men en tôi anthrôpeiôi logôi apo tês isês anankês krinetai, dunata de hoi prouchontes prassousi kai hoi astheneis xunchôrousin.

Athenians: We will neither use noble phrases to furnish a lengthy and unconvincing speech ourselves, about having the right to rule because we put down the Persians [at Marathon in 490 BC, at Salamis in 480 BC and at Plataea in

¹⁴⁷ Thucydides, 3.71

¹⁴⁸ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.19; [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 24.3

¹⁴⁹ To take just two examples, the city of Selymbria was betrayed to Alcibiades in 408 BC (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.3.10), and Timotheus took over the island of Corcyra with diplomacy (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.4.32). As with many similar examples of “diplomatic sieges”, it is unclear whether any fighting took place.

479 BC] or attacking now because we were wronged...understanding as well as we do that in human considerations justice is what is decided only when equal forces are opposed; and in fact the strong do what they have the power to, and the weak must acquiesce.¹⁵⁰

In the event, the Melians were not swayed by arguments of this sort, choosing to resist the Athenians rather than submit, and were consequently destroyed. This sort of thinking was present in Athenian diplomatic activity from a much earlier time. In 479 BC, the wily Athenian commander Themistocles, architect of the great naval victory at Salamis over the Persians the year before, laid siege to the island of Andros. The blockade was instigated because Themistocles' extortionate demands for money were not acquiesced to by the Andrians. While this blockade was in progress, he sent envoys in ships to nearby islands, threatening them with the same treatment if they did not pay up; unsurprisingly, many of them did.¹⁵¹ This is one of our best and most blatant example of what in a later age was called gunboat diplomacy, and no doubt this type of one-sided negotiation, based solely on disproportionate power, was at least as important as the "direct oral exchange and contact between men and constitutional organs of the various states" on which ancient diplomacy has been argued to have depended.¹⁵²

Athens did not need to use whole trireme fleets and direct threats of imminent destruction to intimidate the allies; such an effect could be brought about by smaller-scale embassies. The lead character in Aristophanes' play *Acharnians* samples a wine that represents a peace treaty, and likens this to bullying:

Dikaiopolis: *ozousi chautai presbeôn es tas poleis oxutaton hôsper diatribês tôn xummachôn.*

Dicaipolis: This one smells too-of embassies to the states of the alliance-a very acid smell, as if the allies were being ground down.¹⁵³

Such a policy is perhaps personified by the Sycophant in *Birds* that arrives in a newly-founded city of Cloudcuckooland looking for wings:

Sukophantês: *klêtêr eimi nêsiôtikos kai sukophantês...eita deomai ptera labôn kuklôi perisobeîn tas poleis kaloumenos.*

Sycophant: I am the Island Summoner and bringer of troublesome prosecutions...I want to get wings and then sweep all the way round the allied states, serving summonses.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Thucydides, 5.89

¹⁵¹ Herodotus, 8.111-2

¹⁵² Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, p. 152.

¹⁵³ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, ll. 193-4

¹⁵⁴ Aristophanes, *Birds*, ll.1422-3 and 25-6. It should be pointed out the Sycophant did not need wings in order to carry out his 'work', only to perform it more efficiently and safely (ll. 27-9).

Clearly the contexts of these examples are fantastical, and neither talks directly about triremes. But if it they at least reflect some sort of reality in as much as diplomatic missions were designed at least in part to intimidate, this helps to explain why triremes in particular were often chosen to carry Athenian diplomats and officials.

The participation of the Athenian navy in diplomatic activities at first glance looks unworthy of serious consideration; Athens needed to send diplomats to cities overseas, and the navy had ships to take them there. The practical realities of international negotiations demanded the employment of the navy. The case is not so simply explained, however. Diplomats could be conveyed across the sea far more cheaply than by using navy vessels if a functional and seaworthy vessel was all that was required; many merchant ships and fishing vessels plied their trade in and out of the Piraeus harbour, and thus boats would have been easily available for envoys to use. The decision to send them in naval vessels was just that; a conscious decision on the part of the Athenian Assembly, as a decree relating to the despatch of envoys makes clear.¹⁵⁵ It is impossible to say what percentage of diplomatic missions involved triremes, as often such details are not given in the sources. However, in nearly all the examples of diplomatic activity for which the type of vessel is specified, that ship was a trireme.¹⁵⁶

An explanation is required as to why the Athenians paid for triremes, and their large crews, to convey diplomats on negotiations which could stretch out for many expensive weeks and even months, especially as it was possible for diplomats to use alternative, and cheaper, transportation. Even if we concede, as Westermann has assumed, that “the dignity of sovereign states naturally demanded that the *presbeis* travel in a manner which would command the respect of the states visited”,¹⁵⁷ there were perhaps features unique to triremes that persuaded the Athenians to maintain their dignity with this particular type of ship.

In looking for justifications for the use of triremes in diplomatic missions, therefore, we must look more generally at what advantages the ships offered. Firstly, triremes were extremely fast. If a diplomatic mission was especially urgent and a speedy resolution was required, despatching the ambassadors aboard triremes made some sense. A fourth-century ship captain boasted how, because his ship was the fastest, it was chosen to carry envoys back to Athens.¹⁵⁸

One occasion where the speed of a trireme was essential to the success of the mission occurred in 427 BC. After quashing the rebellious state of Mytilene, the Athenians debated how to deal with

¹⁵⁵ IG I³ 1453. In this decree, the Assembly ordered the generals to ensure that the envoys to the allies were despatched aboard a trireme. The fact that it is specifically spelt out as part of the decree (as opposed to there being a ‘standard procedure’ for the despatch of envoys) is interesting. It shows firstly that triremes were not inevitably used in such cases and alternatives could perhaps be conceived, and yet on this occasion and on many others, the trireme option was chosen.

¹⁵⁶ Mosley (*Envoys and Diplomacy*, pp.75-6) lists some examples of such ships being assigned specifically for diplomatic duties.

¹⁵⁷ Westermann, ‘The *Ephodia* of Greek ambassadors’, p. 204

¹⁵⁸ [Demosthenes], 50.12.

the defeated populace. At first they resolved to slaughter the whole male population and enslave the women. The resolution was passed and a trireme duly despatched to relay these orders to the Athenian forces at Mytilene. This first trireme despatched had probably come to Athens from the general of the force at Mytilene in the first place, possibly carrying along with it the Mytilenian diplomats. The Athenians' decision to send the second message on such a ship was because there existed no faster way of getting the message across.

However, the very next day, perhaps following pleading from the Mytilenian ambassadors present in Athens at the time, the Athenians relented, and after another Assembly meeting, they decided to kill only the ringleaders of the rebellion, and to impose less drastic penalties on the rest of the city. Thucydides describes the results vividly:

kai triêrê euthus allên apestallon kata spoudên, hopôs mê phthasasês tês proteras heurôsi diephtharmenên tèn polin: proeiche de hêmerai kai nukti malista. paraskeuasantôn de tôn Mutilênaiôn presbeôn têi nêi oionon kai alphita kai megala huposchomenôn, ei phthaseian, egeneto spoudê tou plou toiautê hôste êsthion te hama elaunontes oinôi kai elaiôi alphita pephuramena, kai hoi men hupnon hêirounto kata meros, hoi de êlaunon. kata tuchên de pneumatos oudenos enantiôthentos ...d' husterâ autês epikatagetai kai diekôluse mê diaphtheirai

They immediately sent off another trireme in great haste, lest they find the city destroyed because the first had already arrived; it was about a day and a night ahead. With the Mytilenian envoys providing wine and barley for the ship and making great promises of rewards if they arrived in time, the degree of zeal was so high during the voyage that they ate barley kneaded with wine and oil as they rowed, and while some rowed others slept in turns, and since by luck there was no opposing wind...the ship following landed and prevented the killings.¹⁵⁹

Clearly, time was of the essence in this situation, and the second trireme was able to stop the massacre of Mytilene being carried out. But if speed was the cardinal virtue of the trireme, it was not only the rapid movement of important messages that made it so. Triremes were incredible machines, awe inspiring and impressive, and the most sophisticated vehicles of their day. The visual impact of a trireme and its speed was remarked upon in the ancient sources.

kai triêrês de toi hê sesagmenê anthrôpôn dia ti allo phoberon esti polemiois ê philois axiotheaton ê hoti tachy plei

And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly?¹⁶⁰

Many trireme captains indeed dipped into their own pockets in order to insure not only that their ship was well-crewed, but also that it looked the part. Apollodorus, a fourth-century trierarch who conveyed many diplomatic missions during his term of service, describes his own efforts in this area:

¹⁵⁹ Thucydides, 3.49.2-4

¹⁶⁰ Xenophon, *Economics*, 8.8

daneisamenos argurion prôtos eplêrôsamên tèn naun, misthôsamenos nautas hês hoion t' ên aristous, dôreas kai prodoseis dous hekastôi autôn megalas. eti de skeuesin idiois tèn naun hapasi kateskeuasa, kai tòn dêmosiôn elabon ouden, kai kosmôi hês hoion t' ên kallista kai diaprepestata tòn triêrarchôn.

I was the first [after the call to arms in 362 BC] to man my ship, hiring the best sailors possible and giving to each man large bonuses and advance payments. More than that, I furnished the ship with equipment all my own, taking nothing from the public stores, and I made everything as beautiful and magnificent as possible, outdoing all the other trierarchs.¹⁶¹

The visual effect of a trireme, and the ambivalent feelings of hope and fear it could instil in those with whom Athens wished to negotiate, could have been a reason for their regular employment to convey diplomatic missions.

The sight of an Athenian trireme would have had several interlocking effects on the viewer, alongside the impressiveness described by Xenophon. Most importantly, they were a very direct and visible symbol, almost an embodiment, of Athenian power. An Athenian character in a comic play could identify himself as coming from “the land of the fine triremes”,¹⁶² so close was the association between Athens and these vessels. In 428 BC when the inhabitants of Chios, an island allied to Athens, saw a fleet of triremes near their island, they automatically assumed that they must have been Athenian:

horôntes gar tas naus hoi anthrôpoi ouk epheugon, alla prosechôrouron mallon hês Attikais kai elpida oude tèn elachistên eichon mê pote Athênaiôn tês thalassês kratountôn naus Peloponnêsiôn es Iônian parabalein

For when these [Spartan] ships were sighted the people [of Chios] made no effort to flee; instead they came to meet the ships, under the impression that they must be Attic, since they never imagined that, with the Athenians in control of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet could come across to Ionia.¹⁶³

Clearly the inhabitants of Chios believed it would not have been possible for any other state to have warships such as triremes in the Eastern Aegean. It was a similar story for the inhabitants of Iasos in 411 BC when a Peloponnesian fleet approached:

prosbalontes têi Iasôi aiphnidioi kai ou prosdechomenôn all' ê Attikas tas naus einai hairousin: kai malista en tôi ergôi hoi Surakosioi epêinethêsan

And making a sudden attack on Iasos, without anyone expecting the ships to be other than Attic, they captured it; the Syracusans were especially commended in this action.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ [Demosthenes] 50.7. There is evidence (e.g. Thucydides, 6.31) that in the fifth century also captains sought to ornament their ships.

¹⁶² Aristophanes, *Birds*, l. 108

¹⁶³ Thucydides, 3.32.3

¹⁶⁴ Thucydides, 8.28.2

This is the same assumption made by the Chians in 428 BC, and all the more surprising given that the Athenians were far weaker after 413 BC. Indeed the sudden attack by the Peloponnesian fleet appears to have capitalised on this perception. The fact that they were wrong in these instances is not as important as the fact that they made the assumptions in the first place, and such views are indicative of a substantial overestimation of Athenian sea power.

From our modern perspective, it is easy to see the limitations of sea power in the age of the oared galley; it was literally impossible for the Athenians, or any other ancient state for that matter, to have such dominance over the sea as to prevent any others from sailing it.¹⁶⁵ Gabrielsen has argued that such modern ideas of sea power would have seemed like “wishful thinking” to ancient Greeks.¹⁶⁶ Yet the Chians seem to have believed the Athenians capable of this degree of dominance. Nor were they alone in this perception; the Old Oligarch explained how the Athenians could and did rule the Aegean through sea power:

hai men megalai dia deos archontai, hai de mikrai panu dia chreian: ou gar esti polis oudemia hêtis ou deitai eisagesthai ti ê exagesthai. tauta toimun ouk estai autêi, ean mê hupêkoos êi tôn archontôn tês thalattês.

The large states can be ruled by fear and the smaller ones by sheer necessity. For no city can do without importing and exporting, and this *will not be possible for it* unless it submits to the rulers of the sea.¹⁶⁷

How had these distorted perceptions come about? Part of the answer brings us back to Athenian diplomatic missions, and the presentation of power. The Chians could believe that only Athens could sail warships in the Aegean because they regularly saw Athenian warships in the Aegean. Bringing ambassadors to their negotiations in such vessels created the impression that where this one ship could sail 100 more could come, and persuading everyone of Athens’ inevitable rule of the waves. The Athenians were probably more aware than others of both the power and the logistical limitations of their navy, and were no doubt keen to present an image of greater power and control than in fact they possessed.¹⁶⁸ Examined from this angle then, the political and diplomatic fleet movements played a role in supplementing the naval network as a means of maintaining control over the Aegean.

Protecting Merchants and Persecuting Pirates

There are relatively few specific instances (involving seven different fleets) when the protection of merchants is referred to specifically as a goal of an individual fleet. However, this is not to suggest that merchant shipping was not of importance to Athens; indeed, one of the principal

¹⁶⁵ The limits of ancient thalassocracy have been discussed above.

¹⁶⁶ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 5. He quotes here Sir Walter Raleigh’s maxim about control of the sea resulting in control of trade and wealth, and thus the world; these sentiments seem along similar lines to those of the Old Oligarch quoted below.

¹⁶⁷ [Xenophon], 2.3. My emphasis.

¹⁶⁸ For a lengthier discussion of this argument, and how it related to the construction of impressive buildings on the Acropolis, see Potts, ‘Power Made Public’.

goals of Athenian foreign (and naval) policy was concerned with securing the grain route.¹⁶⁹ This grain route depended upon private merchantmen rather than state-owned shipping, but was no doubt protected by regional patrols and Athenian-friendly harbours throughout the Aegean, even if our sources only give a few specific notices of such outposts. Apollodorus' trierarchy in the 350s BC provides a good example of the navy operating directly to help merchants; not only protecting them in this case, but even towing them to port.¹⁷⁰

Similarly, very few fleets seem to have had missions specifically involving the quelling of piracy. This was probably something done at a regional level by Athens' local patrols, as even a relatively small squadron of triremes would have been capable of dealing with isolated bands of sea raiders. But while it was probably a comparatively safe time to send goods throughout the Aegean and to Piraeus, there seems to have been no concerted and specific effort to rid the seas of the menace of pirates. Athenian naval strength may have had the effect of quietening piracy, and there is a sense that the persecution of pirates was simply something that all thalassocracies did as a matter of course.¹⁷¹ There are reports of piratical activity during the Peloponnesian war,¹⁷² which can be used either to argue that the Athenians had not successfully quelled piracy during their years as the hegemonic naval power of the Aegean, or alternatively that pirates were at that point resurgent, and were only able to operate while the Athenians were preoccupied with the war with Sparta.¹⁷³ The evidence is too scanty to make an informed judgement on these matters. What does seem clear is that the threat of piracy, like that from the navies of other states, did not prompt a sustained and systematic campaign from the Athenians, or at least not one that has been recorded in our source material.

Money Collection and Religious Rites

As has been discussed in the section above, the extortion of money was often a matter of "gunboat diplomacy" by individual fleet commanders, as well as a more general and institutionalised policy, in the fifth century especially, through the exaction of tribute.¹⁷⁴ There has been some debate concerning three fleets described explicitly as "money-collecting vessels" by Thucydides;¹⁷⁵ were they connected with the collection or reassessment of tribute, or were these ships gathering monies over and above the annual levies? Kallet-Marx has argued convincingly that these vessels should not be connected with tribute reassessment.¹⁷⁶ She disconnects them from the tribute entirely, interpreting them as ships sent out to meet short-term

¹⁶⁹ Starr, *Influence of Sea Power*, p. 47 In discussing Athenian fourth-century naval reconstruction, Starr asks and answers the rhetorical question "why the new navy? Largely because it was useful in protecting the route of supply from south Russia."

¹⁷⁰ [Demosthenes], 50.20

¹⁷¹ In his description of two ancient thalassocracies, those of Minos of Crete (1.103) and of the Corinthians (1.13), Thucydides refers in general terms to their attempts to quell piracy.

¹⁷² For example, see Thucydides, 2.32; 2.69.

¹⁷³ Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World*, p. 110

¹⁷⁴ Allies in the Second Athenian Confederacy of the fourth century were obliged to make contributions, but the term *phoros*, "tribute", was avoided.

¹⁷⁵ Thucydides, 2.69; 3.19; 4.50 and 75.

¹⁷⁶ Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense and Naval Power*, p. 160-4

financial needs in Athens.¹⁷⁷ This is likely, though the possibility remains that such money-collecting ships were sent out regularly in order to collect arrears of tribute, and Thucydides only chose to report them when something notable occurred.¹⁷⁸

Very few fleets are recorded as being despatched for an overtly religious purpose, but this should not mislead us into thinking of the navy as wholly secular. Prayers and sacrifices would have been made at the launch of ships and fleets, as they were at the launching in 415 BC of the invasion of Sicily.¹⁷⁹ There was also a religious aspect to the aftermath of battles, with the concluding of treaties and the recovery of the dead. Ships were involved regularly in transporting *theoria*, sacred embassies, to sacrifices and festivals. Such missions were not inconsiderable in their expense; an Athenian temple account of the sanctuary at Delos dating from 377-373 BC refers to payments made to a trierarch:

eis komiden ton theoron kai ton xoro[n] Antimachoi Philonos Hermeioi trierarchoi TX

For the transport of the sacred embassies and the choruses, to the trierarch Antimachus son of Philon of Hermeios, 1 talent and 1000 drachmas.¹⁸⁰

At Athens itself, there was a quadrennial trireme race at Sounion in honour of Poseidon,¹⁸¹ and Plutarch refers to the use of a ship in the ceremonial re-enactment of Solon's conquest of Salamis:

eoike de tōi logōi toutōi kai ta drōmena marturein. naus gar tis Attikē proseplei siōpēi to prōton, eita kraugēi kai alalagmōi prosperomenōn heis anēr enoplos exallomenos meta boēs ethei pros akron to Skiradion ek gēs prosperomenois.

Now there seems to be a confirmation of this story [i.e. his version of Solon's conquest of Salamis] in certain ceremonies afterwards established. Namely, a certain Attic ship would approach the island in silence at first, then its crew would make an onset with shouts and cries, and one man in full armour would leap out with a shout of triumph and run to the promontory of Sciradium to inform those who were attacking by land.¹⁸²

Very few of these activities can be adequately recorded in the database, as there is very little evidence for specific and datable examples of these activities. Thucydides, our principal literary source for naval matters, was famously an author who did not give due prominence to the religious aspects of the events he reported, and it is somewhat inevitable that a database derived

¹⁷⁷ Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense and Naval Power*, p. 137

¹⁷⁸ Such is the cautiously expressed view of Lewis, *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 5, p. 5. Indeed something other than the collection of money occurs each time that the fleets are mentioned by Thucydides

¹⁷⁹ Thucydides, 6.32

¹⁸⁰ IG II² 1635=RO 28, l. 35.

¹⁸¹ Herodotus, 6.87, cf. Lysias, 21.5. Our testimony for this festival is too slight to pin down an individual dated occasion for this race. Assuming the festival indeed occurred every four years without any interruptions, around 40 specifically 'religious fleets' would need to be added to the database.

¹⁸² Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, 9.4

in large part from his account will suffer the same deficiency. Two triremes often described as ‘sacred ships’, the *Paralos* and the *Salamina*, will be detailed below.¹⁸³

4: Conclusions: naval activities in the fifth and fourth centuries BC

The evidence that exists for fleet movements is skewed heavily towards the fifth century BC. While the differences in source material accounts partly for this discrepancy, it no doubt also reflects the reality that fourth-century Athens participated in less naval activity than in the previous century. Of the fleets recorded in the database, 140 operated in the fifth century BC, compared to 76 only in the fourth. Perhaps an even more striking comparison is the disparity in terms of the average numbers of ships per year across the two centuries; 95 ships per year in the fifth century BC, compared to 25 in the fourth century BC.¹⁸⁴ This is a strikingly low number of reportedly active vessels when one compares it to the ship figures preserved in the naval lists. These documents provide a detailed itinerary of fourth-century BC naval organization; or indeed disorganization, as the lists attest to a great deal of ill-equipped vessels and rapacious trierarchs holding on to the city’s supplies of ship’s gear.¹⁸⁵ While the naval lists often attest to several hundred hulls in Athens’ ship sheds, there was insufficient stocks gear to fully equip all the vessels. If the figures derived from the database are a reasonable indication, a smaller proportion still of these ships were launched.¹⁸⁶ It has long been recognized, of course, that without her imperial revenues Athens was unable to subsidise her fleet to the same extent as she had previously; but even so, the huge discrepancy in volume of naval activity between the fifth and the fourth centuries BC indicated by the database is somewhat surprising. What must always be borne in mind, however, is that sustaining an average annual fleet of ‘only’ 25 triremes required the recruitment and retention of nearly 5,000 active and able-bodied crewmen, a scale of manpower beyond any but the largest Greek cities.

As well as putting far fewer ships into the water, the roles of the fleets of the fourth century BC seem to have been somewhat different. Much of the difference in activities is probably a simple matter of sources. The detailed historical account of Thucydides provides at least some of the evidence for 120 of the fleets in the database, well over half of the total. His practice of tracing fleets from year to year and place to place simply provides more information than anything written before or after. Even given this, however, there are some interesting differences in the nature of the fleet activities when comparing the fifth century with the fourth. There were substantially fewer fleets acting as regional patrols and blockades in the fourth century, implying

¹⁸³ Section One, Part C.2

¹⁸⁴ Included in this calculation are the 32 ships listed as “at sea” each year in the naval lists for 326/5 and 325/4 BC, though due to the paucity of details regarding their roles, these are not yet represented in the database

¹⁸⁵ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 146-69, “Athens suffered from a serious and chronic shortage of equipment” (p. 147). He attributes this situation to the actions of rapacious trierarchs. As an example, “Of the 283 ships possessed in 357/6, only about 89 could be fully equipped” (p. 147).

¹⁸⁶ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 146-57. He attributes this situation to the actions of rapacious trierarchs. As an example, “Of the 283 ships possessed in 357/6, only about 89 could be fully equipped” (p. 147).

that the resources to sustain such operations, which were often long-term, were difficult to find at this time. Without such a strong naval network, Athens' sea power in the fourth century BC was a shadow of its former self. Athens still had the largest navy amongst the Aegean states, at least on paper (or rather stone), but could not project this power effectively without the network of bases, allies and regional squadrons of the fifth century. This position is reflected in other entries in this table; the fourth-century fleets facilitated far fewer land battles and sieges than those of the fifth, but participated in a greater level of political and diplomatic activity. This reflects an Athens which attempted (or was obliged) to achieve foreign policy aims through negotiation rather than direct force.

After diplomacy, the biggest increase was in activity related to merchants. Perhaps the Athenians of the fourth century, in a climate where their naval network had been largely dismantled and they had fewer resources to put fleets in the water, had to be more proactive in protecting their supply lines, rather than relying on bases and their undisputed reputation for naval dominance. However, the numbers in the case of merchant-related activities in both the fourth and the fifth centuries are far too small to be certain about any such comparison.

This discussion has demonstrated the great range of activities performed by the Athenian navy in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. It shows that a primary role of the navy, especially in the fifth century, was in the moving of troops and the facilitation of land battles and sieges, and the wider projection of Athenian power overseas, and that this should make us pause before thinking of the navy only in terms of sea battles, or describing the trireme as a sort of weapon. It has also revealed many facets of the Athenian naval network, the extent and the limits of Athenian sea power, and how the use of naval vessels could cause a distorted perception of Athenian strength. What a broad activity-by-activity approach threatens to conceal is the extent to which individual Athenian fleets performed multiple roles. In addition, an overview encompassing over 150 years and over 200 fleets necessarily takes us away from the day-to-day experiences of the men crewing the navy. A case study of a single series of fleets is needed to explore these factors.

B: The Athenian Navy and Naupactos: a case study in diverse fleet operations

The activities of Athens around Naupactos present sufficient evidence for a detailed case-study of the Athenian navy, and the operations and purposes of a crucial naval station. This emplacement was established in waters close to one of the most important naval powers in Greece, Corinth. But the reported activities of the Naupactos fleets were not solely, or even mostly, concerned with the Corinthians and their fleet, and this case study is useful as a demonstration of the wide range of tasks and objectives given to individual fleets, and their commanders. It also illuminates explicitly both the extent and the limitation of Athenian fifth-century thalassocracy.

Between 450 BC and 410 BC, there is evidence of ten different fleets operating from or around Naupactos,¹⁸⁷ often for several years at a time. The evidence for these fleets is tabulated in Appendix 4. Almost all of this comes from Thucydides. Ships operating from the Naupactos base were involved in the *stasis* at Corcyra, the description of which is one of the most celebrated sections of Thucydides' work.¹⁸⁸ While the fleet was not the primary focus of the narrative, its movements are nevertheless reported fully at this time. The Naupactos fleet under Phormio took centre stage in two of Thucydides' fullest descriptions of naval battles; while these were not the biggest and most significant engagements, they provide a picture of the superiority of Athenian naval skill overcoming the larger fleets of their Peloponnesian rivals, and this detailed reporting of naval tactics should be considered an example of Thucydides' method of using one set of circumstances to stand for whole categories of events. In the closing stages of the war, the Naupactos command fell to Konon, later to be a survivor of Aigospotamoi and a notable naval general.

The study of the fleets operating at Naupactos also provides a case study of the difficulties in our source material. Thucydides is the most reliable and fullest literary source for naval movements, but even his account leaves many places where an overly demanding modern scholar might wish for more detail. As well as some difficulties in the full reconstruction of fleet movements, changes of commander, appearances of hitherto unexplained vessels and other such details, the chronology of (probably) the earliest Athenian intervention in Naupactos in the mid-fifth century BC is tied up with the thorny debate over the chronology of the *Pentekontaetia* in general.

1: The Capture and Colonization of Naupactos

The first Athenian intervention at Naupactos is a source of much debate and controversy, coming as it does at the end of the Helot revolt and subsequent war at Ithome, events whose chronology

¹⁸⁷ One of these fleets comprised two ships, *Salamina* and *Paralos*, which arrived in Naupactos and joined up with the fleet there in 427 BC. It is not therefore listed as an individual fleet in the Naupactos Details table in Appendix 4.

¹⁸⁸ Thucydides, 3.70 ff.

has been the subject of much attention. Two connected interventions at Naupactos need discussion; its capture by the Athenians, and the subsequent settling by the Athenians of Messenian ex-helots on the site. Most scholars assume that Naupactos was taken by means of a voyage around the Peloponnese, and that the capture was followed soon by the colonization, probably as part of the same campaign. These assumptions are surely correct, but many questions regarding the sequence of events remain. The starting point is Thucydides' statement regarding the settlement of Naupactos:

hoi d' en Ithômêi dekatôî etei, hôs ouketi edunanto antechein, xunebêsan pros tous Lakedaimonious eph' hôi exiasin ek Peloponnêsou hupospondoi...kai autous hoi Athênaiôi dexamenoi kat' echthos êdê to Lakedaimoniôn es Naupakton katôikisan, hên etuchon hêirêkotes neôsti Lokrôn tôn Ozolôn echontôn

In the tenth year the rebels at Ithome found they could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Lacedaimonians on condition that they should leave the Peloponnese under truce...and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the enmity to the Lacedaimonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactos, a place that had been recently occupied by the Ozolian Locrians.¹⁸⁹

This translation adopts the interpretation of Badian, and followed by Hornblower, that the “Greek should mean that the *Lokrian* seizure of the place was recent [and]...thereby palliates the aggressiveness of the subsequent Athenian seizure.”¹⁹⁰ Whatever Thucydides' motivation for not referring here to the Athenian capture of Naupactos,¹⁹¹ this passage gives us a date for the Messenians being settled there.¹⁹² Exactly what date is implied depends upon how one deals with the duration, ten years, reported in this passage, a problem for which there is abundant scholarly opinion. If the manuscripts are as accurate as they are unanimous in the transmission of the numeral, then it gives a date of around 455 BC for the end of the Helot revolt and siege of Ithome. The inescapable conclusion of this interpretation is that Thucydides narrated these events out of chronological sequence, and therefore events in the subsequent chapters *preceded* the colonization.¹⁹³ Thus many scholars prefer to amend Thucydides' text to make him say four or five years for the duration, and so preserve the sequence. In his commentary, Gomme argues that the text is corrupt and dismisses arguments suggesting that Thucydides reported the end of the revolt out of sequence.¹⁹⁴ His stance is followed by Pritchett; “If we maintain chronological order and place the Messenian settlement at Naupaktos after the affair at Thasos, scholars have observed that the numeral...must be wrong.”¹⁹⁵ He describes attempts to challenge Thucydides

¹⁸⁹ Thucydides, 1.1031-3. The passage continues by narrating the alliance between Megara and Athens, and the latter's building of Long Walls for the former.

¹⁹⁰ Hornblower ad loc 1.103, referring to Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, p. 163-9. Pritchett (*Thucydides' Pentekontaetia*, p. 73-4) disagrees with this interpretation.

¹⁹¹ Badian (*From Plataea to Potidaea* passim, esp. p. 168) casts Thucydides as a constant Athenian apologist, meliorating Athenian aggressiveness at every opportunity. In this case, it perhaps did not need stating that, in order to settle the Messenian at Naupactos, the Athenians had to be in control of it.

¹⁹² The alternative view, that Thucydides (1.103) narrates a recent Athenian capture of Naupactos after all, which is followed by the settlement of the Messenians, which is followed some years later by Tolmides' expedition (Pritchett, *Thucydides' Pentekontaetia*, p. 71 ff.) is discussed below.

¹⁹³ Notably the alliance between Megara and Athens, and the building of the former's Long Walls.

¹⁹⁴ Gomme, *HCT* vol. 1, pp. 402 ff

¹⁹⁵ Pritchett, *Thucydides' Pentekontetia* Thucydides, p. 24

in this and other matters as an “occult campaign”.¹⁹⁶ The case for emendation would be stronger, however, if there was disagreement in the ancient evidence as to the length of the Helot revolt, but it is unanimous in recording a duration of ten years.¹⁹⁷ It is of course possible that all of our sources have got the numeral wrong, but more powerful arguments for emendation than the idea of Thucydides’ strict adherence to chronological order are needed. Badian is perhaps the most strident recent author to argue for the retention of ‘ten’, referring to Gomme and others as “fundamentalists” for their adherence to the idea of Thucydides reporting all events in strict sequence.¹⁹⁸ Scholars including Hornblower¹⁹⁹ and Lewis²⁰⁰ have accepted the idea that Thucydides occasionally reported events out of their sequential place, and this indeed seems the far stronger position.

Making a choice with regard to these chronologies has consequences for the Athenian navy’s activities in Naupactos. The interpretation favoured in this work would give a date of c.455 BC for the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactos; what it does not tell us is when Naupactos was captured by the Athenians in the first place. Given the general assumptions that, firstly, the capture of Naupactos would occur only shortly before the settlement, perhaps even in the same campaign, and secondly that the capture could only be effected by a naval expedition round the Peloponnese, it is tempting to follow Diodorus in attributing the capture to the Athenian general Tolmides and his famous *periplous* of the Laconian coast.²⁰¹

Tolmides’ Command: 456/5 BC (Fleet 23)

The date of Tolmides’ expedition is fairly secure, as it is given in Diodorus and a Scholiast to Aeschines as the archonship of Kallias, 456/5 BC. However, Diodorus is the only source of the several which report the activities of Tolmides to associate him explicitly with the capture and colonization of Naupactos. His treatment is also by far the fullest. After describing at some length the preparations for the expedition, his account of events is as follows:

hôs d' autôi kai talla ta pros tèn strateian hêtoimasto, pentêkonta men triêresin anêchthê kai tetrakischiliois hoplitais, katapleusas de tês Lakônîkês eis Methônên, touto men to chôrion heile, tôn de Lakedaimoniôn boêthêsantôn anezeuxe, kai parapleusas eis to Gutheion, epineion tôn Lakedaimoniôn, cheirôsamenos de kai tautên tèn polin kai ta neôria tôn Lakedaimoniôn emprêsas, tèn chôran edêiôsen. ekeithen de anachtheis epleuse tês Kephallêniâs eis Zakunthon: tautên de cheirôsamenos kai pasas tas en têi Kephallêniâi poleis prosagagomenos, eis to peran diepleuse kai katêren eis Naupakton. homiôs de kai tautên ex ephodou

¹⁹⁶ Pritchett, *Thucydides’ Pentekontetia*, p. 163. One suspects that it is a reference primarily to Badian’s work.

¹⁹⁷ This is pointed out by Gomme (*HCT* vol. 1, p. 403), although he still concludes than emendation is required.

¹⁹⁸ Badian, *Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 78-81 especially.

¹⁹⁹ Though not necessarily in this particular instance; in his brief discussion of the numeral, Hornblower (ad loc 1.103) does not definitively state his view. He points out that retaining *deka* means abandoning the idea that Thucydides always wrote in strict sequence, and refers to a recent discussion (McNeal’s) that retains the numeral.

²⁰⁰ In a chronological note (*Cambridge Ancient History*, volume 5 (second edition) p. 500), Lewis argues that “an unnecessary belief in the strict order of Thucydides’ account has frequently led...to the emendation of the numeral”, arguing for the Helot Revolt to be dated from 465/4-456/5 BC.

²⁰¹ Diodorus, 11.84

*labôn, katôikisen eis tautên Messêniôn tous episêmous, hupospondous hupo Lakedaimoniôn aphetentas*²⁰²

When all the other preparations for his expedition had been made, he [Tolmides] set out to sea with fifty triremes and four thousand hoplites²⁰³ and putting in at Methone in Laconia, he took the place; and when the Lacedaimonians came to defend it, he withdrew, and cruising along the coast to Gytheum, which was a seaport of the Lacedaimonians, he seized it, burnt the city and also the dockyards of the Lacedaimonians, and ravaged its territory. From here he set out to sea and sailed to Zacynthus which belonged to Cephallenia; he took the island and won over all the cities on Cephallenia, and then sailed across to the opposite mainland and put in at Naupactos. This city he likewise seized at the first assault and in it he settled the prominent Messenians whom the Lacedaimonians had allowed to go free under truce.²⁰⁴

Once again, Diodorus is the only source to report the connection between Tolmides' expedition and the capture and settlement of Naupactos. Accepting this connection thus places heavy reliance on a source whose account of the fifth century is, in general, very poor; and whose detail regarding even this expedition are not to be wholly relied upon.²⁰⁵ For example, a *periplous* of the Peloponnese from Athens would arrive at Gytheum before reaching Methone, contrary to the suggestion in Diodorus' account.²⁰⁶ However, if Diodorus is prone to inaccuracy on Tolmides' expedition, at least he is in the company of most of our other material. None of our sources can be relied upon for Tolmides' itinerary, as each of them reports a different series of towns and activities; though the burning of the Spartan dockyards is common to nearly all. Confusion over geography is a common feature of most ancient writers, and does not fatally damage the credibility of Diodorus' connection of Tolmides with Naupactos. Rejecting Diodorus' account of Tolmides and Naupactos because it is not mentioned in the other sources looks at first to be a convincing argument, but becomes far less compelling when one appreciates the nature of the 'rival' accounts. Even the fact that Thucydides does not specifically tie the expedition of Tolmides (which he does report, briefly, at 1.108) with the capture and colonization of Naupactos cannot be regarded as decisive;²⁰⁷ even if this can be counted as an omission in Thucydides' account, it is hardly his only, nor the most significant, in the *Pentekontaetia*.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Diodorus 11.84.6-7

²⁰³ The original number of hoplites voted had been 1,000, but in the passage preceding this, Diodorus explains the stratagem whereby he increased the strength of his army. Lewis (*Cambridge Ancient History*, p. 117, n. 38) notes this is a very large number of hoplites compared to the number of ships.

²⁰⁴ Diodorus goes on to explain that this truce was between the Spartans and the Messenians at Ithome, following a long war, which suggests the same chronological context as that given by Thucydides.

²⁰⁵ Pritchett (*Thucydides' Pentekontaetia*, pp.163-71) puts this case most forcefully, criticizing scholars who find "golden nuggets" in Diodorus' history without recognizing how poor his work in book 11 is as a whole.

²⁰⁶ Most obviously, Aeschines (2.75) speaks of Tolmides marching by land through the Peloponnese, a glaring error corrected by the scholiast's comment on the passage.

²⁰⁷ Such a connection would only ruled out by Thucydides if it is believed that he stuck to strictly chronological reporting in the *Pentekontaetia*; for on such an interpretation, the colonization of Naupactos by the Messenians would have occurred some time (c. 5-6 years) prior to Tolmides' expedition. The case is not certain, but, as argued above, the argument that he occasionally finished off one event before reporting the start of the next seems far the stronger. Thucydides' narrative on this interpretation is thus not incompatible with the connection of Tolmides with Naupactos; he simply did not choose to clearly indicate it.

²⁰⁸ Unz ('Chronology of the *Pentekontaetia*', p. 75, n. 34) makes this point.

While this scenario might not be regarded as entirely satisfactory, it has nevertheless been accepted by modern writers such as Unz, Lewis, Hornblower and Badian,²⁰⁹ arriving at a general picture of a *periplous* involving a series of attacks and raids along the Peloponnesian coast, culminating in the capture and colonization of Naupactos in the year 456/5 BC. One reason for the accepting of this scenario is that the alternative is less satisfactory still.

The alternative, as advocated by Pritchett, requires a significant expedition round the Peloponnese prior to that of Tolmides, one which would have been the first Athenian expedition of its kind, one which succeeded in the capture of the crucially important strategic site of Naupactos and the settling there of the Messenians, and yet one for which we have no information, not even the name of the Athenian general in command. Tolmides, by contrast, receives mention by name in no less than six literary accounts in the context of his *periplous*,²¹⁰ despite (on this interpretation) having achieved nothing of long-term significance to compare with Naupactos' capture. It is of course impossible to prove that such an expedition did not happen; but while our sources on Tolmides are uniformly unsatisfactory in their details, they do testify to one key fact: that it was his *periplous* at this time that was most significant and notable.

I suggest that it was not particularly the capture of Naupactos that made Tolmides' expedition famous (after all, only one of the six accounts make the connection explicit), but rather that he was the first commander to make such a campaign around the Peloponnese. While the scholiast on Aeschines claims Tolmides won "brilliant fame" by his exploits, it is again only Diodorus who reports that it was because he was the first to attack the Spartan's coast.

epi de toutôn Tolmidês ho tetagmenos epi tês nautikês dunameôs, hamillômenos pros tèn Murônidou aretên te kai doxan, espeuden axiologon ti katergasasthai. dio kai kat' ekeinous tous kairous mêdenos proteron peporthêkotos tèn Lakônîkên, parekalese ton dêmon dêiôsai tèn tòn Spartiatôn chôran

During the year [archonship of Kallias=446/5 BC] Tolmides, who was commander of the naval forces and vied with both the valour and fame of Myronides, was eager to accomplish a memorable deed. Consequently, since in those times no one had ever yet laid waste to Laconia, he urged the Athenian people to ravage the territory of the Spartans.²¹¹

The 'signature event' of the campaign, the burning of the Spartan port of Gytheum, was notable not because of its long-term military impact on the power of Sparta, but because such a raid on

²⁰⁹ The connection of Naupactos' capture with Tolmides is argued for by Badian (*Plataea to Potidaea*, p. 163-9), and his view (if only on this specific matter) is accepted by Hornblower (*Commentary*, ad loc 1.103) and Lewis in *Cambridge Ancient History*, p. 117. Pritchett (*Thucydides' Pentekontaetia*, p. 165-7) argues that Diodorus' accuracy on the matter of Tolmides' *periplous* should be considered in the context of his woeful account of the middle of the fifth century in general, and that assuming an unmentioned *periplous* to settle the Messenians is preferable to accepting Diodorus' version.

²¹⁰ Thucydides 1.103, cf. 108; Diodorus, 11.84; Polyaeus, 3.3; Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*, 19.2; Aeschines, 2.75 with Scholiast(=Fornara 84). The sources are set out in full by Pritchett, *Thucydides' Pentekontetia*, pp. 74-6.

²¹¹ Diodorus, 11.84.2-3

Spartan territory had no precedent.²¹² The event fitted into a pattern of deteriorating relations between the two following the snubbing of Kimon's expedition to aid Sparta during the Helot revolt, and the alliances subsequently forged between Athens and Sparta's enemies, Thessaly and Argos.²¹³ The emphasis of the reports is on attacks upon the Peloponnesian coast, but as Lewis points out, the two locations mentioned in Thucydides (along with the Spartan dockyards) are in the Gulf of Corinth.²¹⁴ A date of 456/5 BC would place the expedition of Tolmides during the First Peloponnesian War, fought primarily between Athens and Corinth, and Lewis argues that "one of the main objectives [of Tolmides' campaign] was to carry the war" to the Gulf of Corinth. It is worth noting that, on Pritchett's interpretation, the seizure and colonization of Naupactos would have to have taken place *prior* to the alliance between the Megarians and Athenians, which was described by Thucydides as "the original and the main cause of the intense hatred of Athens by Corinth".²¹⁵ Given the aggressive nature of the Athenian attack on Naupactos, and the strategic significance of the site in relation to Corinthian shipping, it is hard to see how Thucydides could have justified describing the Megarian alliance as the "original" cause of hatred, if indeed it had been preceded by the Messenian colonization of Naupactos he had just mentioned.²¹⁶ Hornblower argues that "the statement that this [i.e. the Megarian alliance] *began* the hatred is emphatically put"; perhaps it was done so in order to indicate that the chronological sequence in this part of the narrative had been interrupted. Thucydides reports the Athenian settlement of Messenians at Naupactos before the account of the Athens/Megara alliance, but takes the time to remind his readers that the second event mentioned was the "original" event chronologically.²¹⁷

Advance Plans for the Capture and Colonization of Naupactos?

Badian takes the argument a stage further; not merely that the Athenians sought to move the theatre of war to the Gulf of Corinth, but that Naupactos itself was the Athenians' target from the beginning.²¹⁸ He finds support for this view in Thucydides' account of events in central Greece after the battle of Tanagra, just prior to Tolmides' expedition:

kai machêi en Oinophutois tous Boiôtous nikêsantes tês te chôras ekratêsan tês Boiôtias kai Phôkidos kai Tanagraiôn to teichos perieilon kai Lokrôn tôn Opountiôn hekatôn andras homêrous tous plousiôtatous elabon, ta te teichê heautôn ta makra apetelesan

²¹² By way of comparison, Francis Drake's naval raid on the Spanish port of Cadiz enjoys fame far out of proportion to its military significance, probably again because it was both daring and unprecedented.

²¹³ Thucydides, 1.102

²¹⁴ Lewis, *Cambridge Ancient History*, p.118

²¹⁵ Thucydides, 1.103.4

²¹⁶ Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 260-2 stresses the importance of the capture and (in his view) later colonization of Naupactos in relation to relations between Athens and Corinth, but his chronology differs from the one accepted in this study insofar as "The settlement of the helots preceded the alliance with Megara".

²¹⁷ It seems impossible to believe that the Corinthians would have been indifferent to these sudden events at Naupactos. It is equally improbable that Thucydides would, given the role it played in the Peloponnesian war, interpret the taking of Naupactos as of minimal significance. Contra Salmon; see previous note.

²¹⁸ Badian, *Plataea to Potidaea*, pp. 168-9

They [i.e. the Athenians] defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta and conquered the whole of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the fortifications of Tanagra and took as hostages a hundred of the richest people among the Opuntian Locrians.²¹⁹

Badian suggests that the forcing of the Opuntian Locrians alone to give up 100 hostages from amongst their richest citizens was a deliberate ploy to soften up Naupactos in anticipation of a take-over. With a large portion of the local elite held as hostages in the wake of Athens' victory at Oenophyta, the Athenians could have ordered the Opuntian Locrians to withdraw *their* settlers from Naupactos, thus making it easier for Tolmides to attack the town.²²⁰ Under the terms of an earlier treaty between the Opuntian Locrians and their settlers in Naupactos, they were to be guaranteed residence in their mother-city.²²¹ Whether or not this conjecture is accepted, the strategic importance of the Naupactos site in relation to Corinth was probably not lost upon the Athenians when they voted in favour of Tolmides' expedition, regardless of whether or not they wanted Tolmides to win fame. It is also true that the number of hoplites is larger than one might expect had only raiding and ravaging of the Peloponnesian coastline been envisioned.

Whether a colony of Messenians was planned at the outset of the expedition is impossible to say; probably not, given that during the planning of the expedition, the war at Ithome was ongoing, and the capture of Naupactos could not have been guaranteed.²²² Naupactos, or some similar site to threaten Corinthian shipping, may have been the target from the beginning, but the settlement of the Messenians must surely be regarded as skilful opportunism on the part of Tolmides. On the chronological reconstruction defended here, the conquest and colonization took place during the same campaigning season, which appears to be a unique occurrence. It was argued in the previous section that a conquering fleet would not have been able to establish a new colony upon a site it had taken, as the Assembly would have needed to arrange a lottery to select the Athenians who were to be settlers. Tolmides appears to have circumvented this difficulty by using non-Athenian settlers; the Messenian rebels, who were moving through the Peloponnese under a Spartan truce. It would be interesting indeed to know how far Tolmides was exceeding the bounds of his mission, and what the reaction at home was to his turning over Naupactos to the Messenians; our sources do not shed any light upon this, though no source mentions any punishment or trouble for Tolmides, and indeed Aeschines' (admittedly muddled) mention of him is in the context of exemplary Athenian military achievements which ought to be emulated:

²¹⁹ Thucydides, 1.108.3

²²⁰ Badian, *Plataea and Potidaea*, p. 168-9. In commenting on this argument, Hornblower (*Commentary*, ad loc 1.108.3) seems to misrepresent it slightly; he paraphrases Badian as saying "that the Athenians were already planning the *periplous* of Tolmides and the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactos"; in fact, Badian says that it is uncertain whether the Athenians knew at the planning stage whether or not the Messenians would have been available.

²²¹ The Ozulian/Western/Hypocnemidian Locrians. The treaty; ML 20=Fornara, 47 ll. 8-10 required the Opuntian Locrians to accept into their city those Locrian settlers in the event that they are driven out from Naupactos.

²²² Though it has to be admitted that it would have been in character for Thucydides' Athenians to make arrangements for a colony on a site they did not yet hold, given their overconfidence and expectation of victory.

egô de hapantôn men toutôn ephên dein memnêsthai...kai tèn Tolmidou zêloun stratêgian keleuôn, hos chilious echôn epilektous Athênaiôn, dia mesês Peloponnêsou polemias ousês adeôs diexêiei.

I bid you emulate... [describes other past Athenian victories, with many other inaccuracies of detail]...and the generalship of Tolmides, who marched without fear with one thousand picked troops through the centre of the Peloponnese.²²³

The Messenians were not alone in their new settlement; inscriptional evidence makes clear that the resident Naupactians had not all been killed or driven away by the Athenians.²²⁴ In the 420s BC, together with the Messenians, they made a dedicatory offering to Zeus from the spoils of war. It also seems clear that no Athenians stayed as part of the settlement. Given the alliance made between Athens and the newly settled Naupactos²²⁵ and the strategic value of Naupactos in its control of the Gulf of Corinth, it seems likely that at least some of the Athenian ships would have stayed there and used it as a naval base against the Corinthians. However, there is no direct evidence for a patrol fleet established at Naupactos at this time; for such testimony, one has to wait until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

To sum up; Naupactos was taken and colonised under the auspices of Tolmides in 456/5 BC, in the first of what was to be a pattern of raiding voyages around the Peloponnese. It followed a sharp downturn in relations between Corinth and Athens, a deterioration that had begun some years before with the alliance between Athens and Megara. Though the site clearly had strategic value, it is impossible to prove whether prior planning or shrewd opportunism was primarily responsible for the capture. Such an interpretation requires the retention of the manuscript figure of ten years for the length of the helot revolt, and the further conclusion that Thucydides related some events out of sequence.

2: Naupactos in the Archidamian War

Phormio's Command: winter 430/429-spring 428 BC (Fleets 55 and 56)

The account of the next recorded Athenian naval intervention at Naupactos is far fuller. It involved the fleet under Phormio that famously won two naval victories despite being heavily outnumbered; their interest and importance notwithstanding, these were just two events in the 'life-span' of a fleet that was in commission for about 18 months, between the winter of 430 BC and the spring of 428 BC.

²²³ Aeschines, 2.75

²²⁴ ML 74=Fornara, 135. In addition see the discussion by Lewis (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 5, p. 118) of an unpublished inscription. Both of these texts indicate the existence of previous inhabitants living alongside the Messenian settlers.

²²⁵ Following his description of the settling of Naupactos, quoted above, Thucydides (1.103) says that the Athenians entered in an alliance with the Megarians "also". The implication is that an alliance was concluded with Naupactos, and there is no difficulty in believing that the Messenians and previous inhabitants both would be quite willing to make such an agreement (not least as Tolmides had 50 ships and hundreds of hoplites at hand). See Pritchett, *Thucydides' Pentekontaetia*, p. 78-9

Such long commissions were not unusual in the Athenian navy; what is unusual is the level of detail recorded regarding this particular fleet. But while the base at Naupactos may be taken to be somewhat representative of other such emplacements throughout the Aegean, it was probably unusual in both importance and size. The largest navy of the Peloponnesian fleet belonged to Corinth, and it was against the ships, particularly merchant vessels, sailing to and from this city that the Naupactos squadron operated; according to Thucydides, this was the purpose of Phormio's fleet. This was potentially very dangerous for the Corinthians, who like the Athenians, depended on imported corn.²²⁶

tou d' epigignomenou cheimónos Athênaioi naus esteilan eikosi men peri Peloponnêson kai Phormiôna stratêgon, hos hormômenos ek Naupaktou phulakên eiche mêt' ekplein ek Korinthou kai tou Krisaiou kolpou mêdena mêt' esplein

The following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships and Phormio as general round the Peloponnese, who from Naupactos guarded against anyone sailing out of Corinth into the Gulf of Krisa or anyone sailing in.²²⁷

As we have seen, such blockades were in practice difficult to enforce except in the most narrow of waters; triremes, while being more weatherly than is often assumed, could not stand out to sea constantly and in all weathers. The effective limits of blockades with oared galleys, even under skilful and responsible commanders, are made clear in the summer of 429 BC, when the Peloponnesians were able to amass land forces, often transported by sea, at Leukas “without being noticed by Phormio, in command of the twenty ships around Naupactos.”²²⁸ It is of course impossible to determine exactly how negligent Phormio was in this instance; is Thucydides implying censure simply by recording this fact? Even if Thucydides did mean to suggest Phormio should have done better, we at least should recognize the logistical problems faced by ancient navies in blockading waterways. There is only a little evidence to suggest how such patrols were conducted. For example, the Athenian fleet at Pylos had two ships row all day round the island of Sphakteria in opposite direction, and would presumably rotate the vessels as the men tired. At night, the entire fleet of seventy ships lay at anchor around the island.²²⁹ Clearly, Phormio could not achieve such a perfect blockade with a far smaller force and a far larger area to patrol. He certainly had enough ships to perform a similar daily routine, even in several places at once; but his fleet had a much larger area to patrol than was the case at Sphakteria. In addition Phormio's fleet had a powerful and active enemy fleet in the vicinity, and splitting his forces to make an effective ‘screen’ might leave them in danger of being attacked one by one, destroying the fleet piecemeal.

There is in fact direct evidence that Phormio was reluctant to split up his fleet too much or spread his forces too thinly; following the build-up of Peloponnesian forces at Leukas and their attack on

²²⁶ Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 129-31

²²⁷ Thucydides, 2.69.1

²²⁸ Thucydides, 2.80

²²⁹ Thucydides, 4.23

Acarnania, Phormio received deputations from the Acarnanians to come to their aid. He refused, on the grounds that Naupactos could not be left undefended with an enemy fleet in the vicinity.²³⁰ Such caution may well have been sensible, but in this, he contrasts to some extent with one of his successors at Naupactos, who was willing to leave but a token fleet behind at Naupactos in order to interfere in Corcyra.²³¹ While he might have detached one or two ships from his force for particular missions, he clearly did not wish, for example, to leave half his ships behind and take half to aid the Acarnanians. Later events in this same year demonstrated that Phormio was not simply timid; rather he should be considered overtly aware of his primary objective, and the danger to Naupactos that a large Peloponnesian fleet, with many troops at hand, represented. This episode is a good illustration of the role played by Athenian generals in the field; Phormio was not able to refer to the Assembly for an immediate decision on whether or not to help the Acarnanians, and it was clearly not direct orders that prevented him from doing so.²³² While he would certainly have the Assembly's reaction to his actions in mind (most acutely if he thought it likely Naupactos could be taken), Phormio clearly had the option of aiding the Acarnanians, but refused for strategic reasons. While Phormio stuck to the patrol duties on this occasion, later in 429 BC his fleet were involved in more diverse actions.

The two battles fought in 429 BC between Phormio's fleet and far larger Peloponnesian forces have already received much detailed comment and description, not least from Thucydides himself.²³³ Sea battles were the exception rather than the rule for most Athenian fleets, and this was probably even more the case for patrol fleets. The Naupactos fleet was different, in that it was deployed expressly against the Peloponnesians' strongest naval power, and in sufficient numbers to show that this was no mere 'trip-wire' to bring reinforcements. The crews of ships sent to Naupactos would have been more expectant of facing conflict at some point in their deployment than would, for example, those sent to patrol around Euboea. Out of the eight fleets active at this most difficult of naval stations, four faced battle at sea.²³⁴

Following the first battle of 429 BC, Phormio sent news of his victory to Athens, and requested aid.²³⁵ While Thucydides does not explicitly say so (no doubt because he thought it obvious), this piece of news was borne by a trireme; if for no other reason than this was the only type of vessel Phormio is recorded as having in his fleet,²³⁶ and an overland messenger would be passing

²³⁰ Thucydides, 4.81

²³¹ See discussion below.

²³² On the subject of the amount of latitude and independence Athenian generals could exhibit, and the price they paid for this when things went badly, see Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, esp. pp. 158 ff.

²³³ In modern writing, see the detailed account, with maps, provided by Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 69 ff.

²³⁴ This is indeed a higher proportion than the average, which is nearer a quarter. (Of the 216 fleets recorded, only 45 participated in a sea battle.)

²³⁵ Fleet 56. Thucydides, 2.85

²³⁶ The possibility that Phormio (and other naval commanders) had access to smaller vessels that were unrecorded, and that these vessels could have been used for running despatches, cannot be ruled out. There is, however, enough evidence of triremes being used to report information and request aid (for example, Konon, when commander of the Naupactos fleet in 413 BC; Thucydides 7.31) to suggest that the practice was common.

through universally hostile territory. Relaying of information to Athens, and requesting reinforcements, was a regular feature of Athenian naval operations.

The response to Phormio's request was also somewhat typical of naval operations in this period; reinforcements were sent, but not directly. The fleet of 20 dispatched to aid Phormio was instructed first to sail to Crete to undertake a strong-arm diplomatic mission.²³⁷ This intervention was instigated by Athens' *proxenos*,²³⁸ a Cretan named Nicias, who suggested that the Athenians would win over the city of Cydonia. In fact, the fleet only ends up ravaging Cydonian land, and as Thucydides records, "wasting a considerable amount of time" due to contrary weather conditions before progressing to Naupactos. Missions like this, with a dual purpose, were not uncommon.²³⁹ In a similar vein, changing circumstances might have meant that a fleet intended for one purpose would find its role changed, or augmented, at the last minute.²⁴⁰ All this demonstrates the way in which fleets could be dispatched for one purpose could end up fulfilling quite another role; it attests to the flexibility of the fleets and in particular the commanders.²⁴¹

In this particular instance, the Athenian commander of the (eventual) reinforcement fleet, Fleet 56, was not named, nor described as a *strategos*.²⁴² Thucydides calls him *ho komizon*, a unique and "curious nomenclature".²⁴³ When this fleet arrived in Naupactos, it seems that all 40 ships fall under Phormio's command.²⁴⁴ There is some value in following Jordan's suggestion that this man was not one of the ten elected *strategoí*, but one of the variously named *archai* who are found in command of ships from time to time.²⁴⁵

By the time the fleet from Crete arrived in Naupactos, Phormio had already won his second brilliant victory.²⁴⁶ Perhaps emboldened by his victory and with his fleet doubled, Phormio made an expedition from Naupactos in the winter of 429/8 BC to strengthen the Athenian hold on Acarnania.²⁴⁷ Various places, including Stratus and Coronta, are mentioned as being cleared of (from the Athenian point of view) "undesirable elements"; an attack on the city of Oenidae was

²³⁷ Thucydides, 2.85

²³⁸ A *proxenos* was a citizen of a city who was responsible for looking after the interests of another city. Nicias of Gortyn was Athens' *proxenos* in Gortyn, and thus responsible for seeing to Athenian interests there. *Proxenoí* were therefore something between an ambassador and a double agent; somewhat more of the later in this case, as Nicias was encouraging the Athenians to implement a coup in a neighbouring city on Crete.

²³⁹ Cf. Thucydides 4.2 ff., for example; this fleet was sent to reinforce Athenian forces on Sicily, making a stop at Corcyra on their way, and then was diverted again to Pylos.

²⁴⁰ For example, Thucydides, 1.57 ff; a fleet for Macedonia was diverted to Potidaea. See also Thucydides, 3.4-6

²⁴¹ It also asks questions of Rosivach's interpretation of fleet manning (discussed in more detail below, Part One, section C.1). Given the uncertainty and plurality of objectives that a single fleet might have, it could be difficult for crewmen to know how long a particular fleet was going to be at sea for. While there was certainly some divide between what Rosivach calls the annual 'summer fleets' that raided the Peloponnesian coast during the Archidamian war on the one hand and long-term commissions on the other, the distinction may not have been as clear cut to contemporary oarsmen seeking a rowing berth as it is for us looking back.

²⁴² Thucydides, 2.92

²⁴³ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p.128, n. 39.

²⁴⁴ Subsequent actions of this fleet (e.g. Thucydides, 2.102) are attributed to Phormio alone.

²⁴⁵ I discuss the evidence for these commanders below in Part Two, Section A.5, cf. Appendix 1.

²⁴⁶ Thucydides, 2.90 ff. Thucydides (2.92) seems unable to help remarking that Phormio's fleet *should* have had reinforcements for the battle, but did not.

²⁴⁷ Thucydides, 2.102

contemplated, but dismissed as impossible in winter. As far as the fleet was concerned, this was essentially a troop-carrying exercise; taking the 800 troops (400 Messenian and 400 Athenian) to an unspecified point, and picked them up again after they had been around the cities. Gomme, not unreasonably, suggests that the 400 Athenian “hoplites from the ships” were *epibatai*, marines, ten from each ship.²⁴⁸ This does not necessarily mean that all 39 ships were present on this mission, however. Despite his victories over the Peloponnesian fleet, Phormio may have been as reluctant as he was previously to leave Naupactos unguarded. It is possible that, having been reinforced, he would have felt able to split his forces, perhaps leaving half of the ships behind, and loading up all the marines and the 400 Messenian hoplites on the other half. It is impossible to be certain of course; Thucydides records the number of troops used in this essentially land-based campaign, but not the number of ships that took them there. An indicative passage, in that the role of the navy is not here spelt out.

Thucydides, in the closing paragraph of his second book, records that Phormio’s fleet (presumably all 39 remaining ships)²⁴⁹ returned from Naupactos to Athens. The recording of this event, which he dates to the spring of 428 BC, is chronologically interesting, as he relates it *before* he closes his account of the year with his usual formula; “so ended the winter and the third year of this war recorded by Thucydides.” This would seem to be a clear case, minor though it is, of Thucydides finishing off the account of one series of events out of strict chronological order.²⁵⁰ The description of Phormio’s voyage itself is also not without interest:

hama êri katepleusan es tas Athênas, tous te eletherous tôn aichmalôtôn ek tôn naumachiôn agontes, hoi anêr ant' andros eluthêsan, kai tas naus has heilon

In the spring they [the Athenian fleet under Phormio] sailed back to Athens and brought with them the ships that they had captured and all the free men who had been taken prisoner in their naval actions. These were exchanged, man for man.²⁵¹

This is a brief hint at what must have been a considerable logistical problem for ancient navies; the capture and holding of prisoners. In all, the Athenians captured 18 enemy ships in their two victories, and as well as this several *nauagia*, “wrecks”, were recovered.²⁵² Exactly what types of

²⁴⁸ Gomme, *HCT*, ad loc 102.1; This was a usual, though not the ‘standard’, number of hoplites for a trireme to carry as part of its crew. As Gomme points out, losses in battle would have meant that the marine compliments were not at full strength, and so if 400 is exactly accurate, it implies that there were more than ten hoplites per ship initially. Most likely, however, Thucydides is using a rough rule of “10 per ship” to work out approximately accurate figures; if some ships had slightly different compliments of marines, or if there were some casualties, the rounded figure would still be 400.

²⁴⁹ One Athenian vessel was lost in the second battle, and not re-taken; the Peloponnesians made a dedicatory offering of it. Thucydides, 2.92.5

²⁵⁰ Perhaps surprisingly, Gomme (a defender of the argument that Thucydides recorded events in strict order throughout his work) argues this, saying (*HCT*, ad loc 2.103) “Thucydides closes the episode, the year’s events, with Phormio’s return home; which actually overlapped with the beginning of the following year. He anticipates a little” and that to suggest from this passage that somehow Thucydides counted the spring as part of the ‘previous winter as “pedantic”’.

²⁵¹ Thucydides, 2.103

²⁵² Triremes did not sink when holed, merely became waterlogged and impossible to row (Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, pp. 127-8). They could be salvaged after the battle, and either repaired, or stripped for useful timbers and ship’s gear.

ships were taken is unclear. Whether the captured ships were towed to Athens, or the Athenian trireme crews spread themselves out so as to provide at least a skeleton crew for all the vessels is also unclear; either way would have slowed the fleet considerably. It is impossible to ascertain the scale of the problem, as there is no evidence of the numbers of prisoners involved. But even assuming only 25 prisoners per ship taken, the Athenians would have had close to 500 bodies to guard and extra mouths to feed. Even if only a proportion of the total men taken were citizens and imprisoned and held for later exchange, there is perhaps a suggestion in the text that the logistical burden was hard to bear; Thucydides says that “most of the crews”²⁵³ of the 12 ships taken after the first battle are imprisoned, but after the second “some of the crews were killed, others imprisoned”.²⁵⁴ Given that ransoming prisoners could be politically beneficial and financially lucrative,²⁵⁵ this action perhaps implies that there were limits to the number of prisoners the Athenians at Naupactos felt they could handle.

It is notable that it was the free men who were reported to be imprisoned in this way, and then exchanged. What became of the slaves rowing the Peloponnesian ships is not reported, but suggestions can be made. They were possibly purchased wholesale and shipped off at once by merchants looking to profit from selling them on later at auctions. There is evidence of merchants following the Sicilian invasion fleet in order to profit in this way from the spoils of war and this was probably common practice for other fleets too.²⁵⁶ Fleet commanders, who appear to have had significant say over the division of the spoils of battle, would thus be provided with ready cash and also relieved of a logistical problem. There is no evidence of merchant ships accompanying this particular fleet however, and such quick trade may not always have been possible, or even desirable. Athenian generals would no doubt have seen the advantage in certain circumstances of keeping indentured ship’s crew to hand. Incorporating captured slaves into their fleets would enable any ships taken from the opponents’ navy, along with any “wrecks” able to be repaired, to be manned and used all the quicker. Thucydides presents the competition for naval manpower as essential to strategic thinking prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.²⁵⁷ The narratives of both Thucydides and Xenophon of the course of the conflict following the Athenian defeat at Syracuse in 413 BC show this competitive struggle to out-pay the other’s sailors. While it is free mercenaries that these writers seem to have most in mind, slave rowers should not be forgotten. As well as cases of desertion, the capture of slaves in a naval encounter would have been a very obvious way for one side to boost its naval manpower at the expense of the other. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence in this or any other case of such a thing

²⁵³ Thucydides, 2.84.4

²⁵⁴ Thucydides, 2.92.2

²⁵⁵ See Thucydides, 3.70, where 800 talents were paid to ransom some Corcyraean prisoners. The figure is suspiciously high, but Gomme’s discussion (*HCT*, ad loc 3.70) of this and other examples should leave us in no doubt as to the financial potential for ransoming captives.

²⁵⁶ Thucydides, 6.44

²⁵⁷ Thucydides, 1.121 cf. 1.143. Pericles’ pre-war speech is discussed in more detail in Part Two, section A.2

happening, not least because, despite their crucial importance to the manning of ancient navies, the sources give but scant notices of slaves as trireme crew.²⁵⁸

With Phormio's fleet returning to Athens, it would seem that the seas around Naupactos were left unguarded;²⁵⁹ perhaps the area was thought sufficiently secure after a winter without reports of any Peloponnesian fleets making another entrance into the Gulf of Corinth. Perhaps the Acarnanian cities could be relied upon, for the time being, to keep an eye on the sea. Alternatively, as Gomme suggested, there were logistical concerns; "it was not easy to keep up supplies to so distant a place".²⁶⁰ However, it is by no means clear that the Athenians did in fact send supplies to fleets and garrisons in far flung places; the usual and almost invariable practice was to supply troops and sailors with money to buy their own necessities. If the expense to the Athenian coffers of the Naupactos squadron was an issue, then it is surprising that another fleet of similar scale was sent out later in 428 BC.²⁶¹ It is perhaps better to consider the logistical difficulties in supplying Naupactos only in terms of the regular influx of wages for the crews; if there were problems with regard to this, a not uncommon occurrence,²⁶² then perhaps the impetus to return came not from Athens, but from the men of the fleet. Having been away for 18 months, with little prospect of plunder, the trireme crews themselves may well have felt that it was time to return to Athens.

Asopios' Command: summer 428 BC (Fleet 66)

The importance of Naupactos as a naval base during the Peloponnesian war was underlined when the Athenians despatched a further fleet, this time of 30 ships, to take up station there in the summer of 428 BC. The launching of this fleet was thus a matter of a few months after Phormio's return; but in that small delay it appears that the general was unavailable to return to the Gulf of Corinth. In an interesting passage, Thucydides reports a request made of the Athenian assembly at this time:

keleusantôn Akarnanôn tôn Phormiônos tina sphisi pempesai ê huion ê xungenê archonta

For the Acarnanians had asked them to send out a son or relation of Phormio as commander.²⁶³

Assuming that this is an accurate report (and there is no compelling reason for us to think it is not so), it is most interesting not that only that a foreign power sought to influence the selection

²⁵⁸ Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology*, pp. 83-101

²⁵⁹ Naupactos itself was still protected by its Messenian hoplites; without a fleet, however, they would have had no chance of disrupting Corinthian shipping, which was Phormio's original goal.

²⁶⁰ Gomme, *HCT*, vol. 2, p. 251

²⁶¹ This one is, admittedly, smaller than the 39 ships that Phormio ended up with, numbering 30; still a considerable expense, however, especially considering the higher level of naval activity (and thus expense) elsewhere in 428 BC compared to the previous year.

²⁶² *Knights*, 1364-1378, cf. 1063-5

²⁶³ Thucydides, 3.7.1 Hornblower (*Commentary*, ad loc 3.7.1) gives a good summary of the debate concerning Phormio's unavailability.

Athenian generals, or at least the assignment of generals to particular commands, but that the Athenians seem to have responded to such an appeal; the commander sent out to Naupactos was Asopios, the son of Phormio.

This fleet remained in place for at least 12 months, from the early summer of 428 BC, until the summer of 427 BC. It appears from Thucydides' reporting of the fleet's movements that this was another case of a fleet with a dual objective. In the summer of 428 BC, the fleet sailed around the Peloponnese and "various places on the coast were laid waste"²⁶⁴ before Asopios divided his fleet in two; 18 of the 30 ships were sent back to Athens, and only 12 continued on to Naupactos. This seems to have been the plan from the start; to make short-term raids with a substantial number of ships, but to pare back the fleet for the longer-term task of patrolling the region of Naupactos.

Asopios was an active commander in 428 BC, making an attempt on Oenidae and various other places. However, he was killed along with many of his troops in a land battle near Nerikus. The fleet, however, did not seem to have suffered much from the loss of these troops and their commander; at any rate, there were still 12 Athenian ships on station at Naupactos a year later in the summer of 427 BC.²⁶⁵

Salaminia, Paralos and Nicostratus' Command: 427 BC (Fleets 65 and 66)

The sequence of events and naval movements in this year are of particular interest, as they involved the Athenian sacred ships *Salaminia* and *Paralos*. It is clear that these singular vessels were not part of Asopios' original fleet, nor were they in Naupactos at the start of 427 BC. Indeed, Thucydides reports them as spotting a Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas while they were cruising off Clarus, near Notium, on the other side of the Aegean Sea.²⁶⁶ He does not report what the *Salaminia* and *Paralos* were doing in Ionian waters, nor whether they achieved their original aims; only that they immediately headed to Mytilene on Lesbos to relate the information to Paches, the Athenian general there.²⁶⁷ Paches was not slow to react:

*ho de hupo spoudês epoieito tèn diôxin: kai mechri men Patmou tês nêsou
epediôxen, hôs d' ouketi en katalêpsei ephaineto epanechôrei*

[Paches] therefore, immediately set out in pursuit and went after them [the Peloponnesian fleet] as far as the island of Patamos [100 miles south of Mytilene]. From here he turned back again, since it appeared that they had got away out of reach.²⁶⁸

Like the *Salaminia* and *Paralos*, Alcidas and his fleet were found on the far side of the Aegean later that same summer. It is likely that the sacred ships joined Paches in the pursuit to Patamos,

²⁶⁴ Thucydides, 3.7

²⁶⁵ Thucydides, 3.69

²⁶⁶ Thucydides, 3.33

²⁶⁷ Thucydides, 3.33

²⁶⁸ Thucydides, 3.33

at which point Alcidas had a substantial lead. When Paches returned to Mytilene, however, it need not be assumed that *Salaminia* and *Paralos* went with him. Indeed their later presence in Naupactos suggests that they most likely parted company with Paches at this point, and sailed west. Thucydides tells us nothing of their movements between reaching Patamos and turning up in Naupactos, but it seems most likely that they would not have gone straight from the one place to the other; they may have needed to finish the mission that had taken them into Ionian waters in the first place, and, perhaps more importantly, they may have reported back to Athens regarding the recent presence of an (admittedly timid) Peloponnesian fleet in the eastern Aegean.

Alcidas' route to the Gulf of Corinth was also not direct. Thucydides reports that the fleet:

pros tēi Krētēi cheimastheisai kai ap' autēs sporades pros tēn Peloponnēson katēnechthēsan, katalambanousin en tēi Kullēnēi treis kai deka triēreis Leukadiōn kai Amprakiōtōn kai Brasidan...eboulonto gar hoi Lakedaimonioi, hōs tēs Lesbou hēmartēkesan, pleon to nautikon poiēsantes es tēn Kerkuran pleusai stasiazousan, dôdeka men nausi monais parontōn Athēnaiōn peri Naupakton, prin de pleon ti epiboēthēsai ek tōn Athēnōn nautikon

Ran into rough weather off Crete, scattered and made their way to the Peloponnese. Arriving at Cyllene [nr. Elis, on the west coast of the Peloponnese], they found thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot trireme and also Brasidas...After their failure at Lesbos the Spartans wished to reinforce their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a revolution had broken out. The Athenians at Naupactos had a force of only twelve ships, and so the Spartan plan was to arrive at Corcyra before reinforcements could be sent out from Athens.²⁶⁹

It seems then, that despite the time-wasting delays around Crete, Alcidas managed to reach western waters prior to *Salaminia* and *Paralos*, or indeed any extra ships from Athens. The first Athenian ship to come to the region after Alcidas' arrival is mentioned in the next chapter of Thucydides: a trireme carrying diplomats was sent to negotiate with the Corcyraeans. This ship stayed in Corcyra for some little time, and acted as a refuge for the democratic faction, who fled following the murder of their leader Peithes, before it returned to Athens.²⁷⁰

According to Gomme's chronology, the return of this trireme, carrying Corcyraean exiles, sparked the sending of the *Paralos* and *Salaminia* to the Gulf of Corinth. It has been suggested that they were sent with some kind of special diplomatic mission,²⁷¹ but while this is possible, it seems difficult to reconcile with the evidence; not least the fact that they are not reported as taking any part in the diplomacy at Corcyra, and that their destination from Athens appears to have been Naupactos. The Athenian squadron was by then under a new commander, following the death of Asopios; he is introduced by Thucydides at this point, though presumably he had been in command for several months.

²⁶⁹ Thucydides, 3.69

²⁷⁰ Thucydides, 3.70

²⁷¹ Hornblower, *Commentary*, ad loc 3.77.1

têi de epigignomenêi hêmerai Nikostratos ho Dieitrephous Athênaiôn stratêgos paragignetai boêthôn ek Naupaktou dôdeka nausi kai Messêniôn pentakosiois hoplitais: xumbasin te eprasse kai peithei hôste xunchôrêsai allêlois deka men andras tous aitiôtatous krinai, hoi ouketi emeinan, tous d' allous oikein spondas pros allêlous poiêsamenous kai pros Athênaious, hôste tous autous echthrous kai philous nomizein

Nicostratus, the son of Dietrephes, came up from Naupactos with 12 ships and 500 Messenian hoplites. His aim was to arrange a settlement and he persuaded the two factions [on Corcyra] to agree among themselves to bring to trail ten men who are chiefly responsible, who presently fled, while the rest were to live in peace, the whole state was to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Athens.²⁷²

The fact that Nicostratus here has “12 ships from Naupactos”, as opposed to “*the* 12 ships from Naupactos”²⁷³ suggests that he had more than 12 ships at his disposal at this point; it is tempting to conclude that *Salaminia* and *Paralos* had reinforced him, and brought fresh orders from Athens, and possibly news that a large Athenian fleet was being prepared.²⁷⁴ Nicostratus was then able to leave two ships behind to provide at least a ‘trip-wire’ in the event of Naupactos being attacked, and proceeded to Corcyra with 12 triremes. This picture is largely conjecture, but no more so than the assumption that *Salaminia* and *Paralos* had some sort of diplomatic role to play. Given that the Corcyraean oligarchs had resolved to regard any more than one ship approaching them as an enemy,²⁷⁵ it seems that the Athenians had decided to send an armada rather than an envoy; clearly the diplomacy envisaged was decidedly “gunboat” in nature. Certainly the presence of *Salaminia* and *Paralos* in the fleet might have added some substance and weight to Nicostratus’ force and would have made it look more impressive, but it was the general himself who did the negotiating; there is no evidence of a diplomatic role played by the crews of the sacred vessels, save from being part of the fleet that backed up Nicostratus’ words.

It is perhaps not without significance that the presence of *Salaminia* and *Paralos* is not remarked upon by Thucydides until after the negotiations were completed. While Nicostratus was attempting to keep the two sides from slaughtering one another, the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas and Brasidas arrived on the scene. It is only in the context of the ensuing battle that Thucydides mentions the ships by name. The Peloponnesians split their fleet, and sent most of their ships against the Athenians’ 12 vessels, “of which two were *Salaminia* and *Paralos*”.²⁷⁶

Rather than being sent to complete some sort of diplomatic mission to the Corcyraeans, it appears then that *Salaminia* and *Paralos* were simply messengers; relaying instructions to Nicostratus to intervene in Corcyra. The decision to send these particular vessels in this instance probably had

²⁷² Thucydides, 3.75.1

²⁷³ A point made by Gomme, *HCT* ad loc 3.77.1, cf. 3.75.1

²⁷⁴ The alternative would be that the *Salaminia* and *Paralos* were already part of the 12 strong, unreinforced, fleet at Naupactos perceived by Alcidas and Brasidas at 3.69. While this is possible, (and would have interesting consequences in terms of our perceptions of these two ships) I have argued here that Alcidas arrived in western waters prior to the *Salaminia* and *Paralos*, suggesting in turn that the sacred ships did not form part of the Naupactos patrol at this time.

²⁷⁵ Thucydides, 3.71

²⁷⁶ Thucydides, 3.77

little to do with their special status, but rather because these two vessels were ready and available to sail, having recently returned from the east Aegean.²⁷⁷ Nicostratus' decision to leave no more than two ships at Naupactos, despite the fact that the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas and Brasidas was in the region, probably indicates that further reinforcements were anticipated; and indeed arrived later, in the form of Fleet 73, 60 ships under Eurymedon.²⁷⁸

The Peloponnesian battle tactics at Corcyra indicate the importance of organization, good order and situational awareness in naval battles, as well as evidencing the superior naval reputation enjoyed by the Athenians. The Corcyraeans had themselves launched 60 ships in the face of Brasidas and Alcidas' Peloponnesian fleet, but they disregarded the Athenian advice to sail out as one unit, with disastrous results:

hôs de autois pros tois polemiois êsan sporades hai nêes, duo men euthus êtomolêsan, en heterais de allêlois hoi empleontes emachonto, ên de oudeis kosmos tôn poioumenôn. idontes de hoi Peloponnêsioi tèn tarachên eikosi men nausi pros tous Kerkuraious etaxanto, tais de loipais pros tas dôdeka naus tôn Athênaiôn, hôn êsan hai duo Salaminia kai Paralos kai hoi men Kerkuraioi kakôs te kai kat' oligas prospiptontes etalaipôroun to kath' hautous

As the Corcyraeans ships approached the enemy in this disorganized way, two of them immediately deserted, in other ships the crews were fighting among themselves, and no sort of order was kept in anything. The Peloponnesians observed the confusion in which they were, set aside twenty of their ships to meet the Corcyraeans, and the rest against the 12 Athenian ships, including the two *Salaminia* and *Paralos*. The Corcyraeans, in their part of the battle, were soon in difficulties, since they were making their attacks inefficiently and in small detachments.²⁷⁹

The contrast could not be clearer; 20 Peloponnesian ships were more than a match for three times their number of disorganized Corcyraean vessels; while on the other hand 12 Athenian vessels, all with crews known to one another²⁸⁰ and using good tactics, required the attention of 33 Peloponnesian ships. Nor were the Peloponnesians on this occasion guilty of overestimating the abilities of the Athenians; indeed the Athenians got rather the better of their opponents, in the end drawing the entire Peloponnesian fleet into chasing them. As Thucydides notes, this gave “the Corcyraeans ships the fullest opportunity to escape”.²⁸¹

A little time later, the Athenian general Eurymedon arrived with Fleet 73, prompting the Peloponnesian fleet to withdraw; and it was these 60 ships alone that rode at anchor in the

²⁷⁷ It is possible that the crews for these ships were always “on call”; I discuss these vessels in Part One, C.2

²⁷⁸ Thucydides (3.80) says that Eurymedon's fleet was sent out after the Athenians learnt of the *stasis* on Corcyra and that the Peloponnesian fleet was about to leave Cyllene. This perhaps suggests that the fleet was planned after the diplomatic mission to Corcyra had returned with the exiles, and the process hastened upon further intelligence about the intentions of the Peloponnesians.

²⁷⁹ Thucydides, 3.77.2-3.78

²⁸⁰ *Salaminia* and *Paralos* probably had permanent, on-call crews, men who were used to working together (see discussion below, Part One, section C.2). The other 10 vessels had been on station at Naupactos together for plenty long enough for their crews to have become efficient.

²⁸¹ Thucydides, 3.78

Corcyraeans harbour while the *stasis* reached its bloody climax.²⁸² Nicostratus' fleet was not mentioned in this context again, and it is to be presumed that they returned to their patrols around Naupactos. There is also no direct evidence for the movements of *Salaminia* and *Paralos*; the former appears next in Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian invasion of 413 BC, when she tried to bring Alcibiades back to Athens for trial; and the latter is not referred to until the political upheavals of 411 BC, which will be discussed in full in a subsequent section.²⁸³

Demosthenes in Naupactos, summer 426 BC (Fleets 78)

It is uncertain whether Fleet 66 remained in Naupactos throughout 427 and into 426 BC; Nicostratus was not mentioned in this context again,²⁸⁴ nor was any naval activity explicitly undertaken by the Naupactos fleet at this time. However, Naupactos featured as a base for Demosthenes during his ill-fated campaign in Aetolia in the summer of 426 BC. According to Thucydides, Demosthenes launched this attack in the hope of preventing a potential threat to Naupactos, and it was the Messenians who encouraged him by saying that the Aetolians "could be quite easily subdued".²⁸⁵ There is no suggestion here of the presence of another Athenian commander at Naupactos, nor does it appear that ships from a Naupactos squadron joined Demosthenes' attack. The attack in Aetolia ended with a heavy defeat for the Athenians:

tous de nekrous hupospondous anelomenoi para tôn Aitólôn kai anachôrêsantes es Naupakton husteron es tas Athênas tais nausin ekomisthêsan. Dêmosthenês de peri Naupakton kai ta chôria tauta hupeleiphthê, tois pepragmenoïis phoboumenos tous Athênaïous.

After recovering their dead from the Aetolians under an armistice, the army returned to Naupactos, embarked on their ships and went back to Athens. Demosthenes stayed behind either at Naupactos or in the area, since he was afraid to face the Athenians after what had happened.²⁸⁶

Soon after the withdrawal of this force, Naupactos came under direct attack. Thucydides suggests that the Aetolians had wished to attack Naupactos earlier that summer, *before* Demosthenes' attack on them.²⁸⁷ If this can be accepted, it suggests a rough timeframe for the withdrawal of at least the majority of Fleet 66, as the Aetolians may have seen the lack of such a force as a golden opportunity to strike. The fact that the Messenians at Naupactos were said to be "calling in the Athenians" once again suggests that there was no patrol fleet present at this time, and it seems unlikely that the simultaneous absence of Athenian forces and formulating the idea of an attack on Naupactos were entirely co-incidental.

²⁸² Thucydides, 3.80 (Eurymedon's arrival); 3.81 (his pointed inaction during the killings on Corcyra)

²⁸³ Part Two, section B

²⁸⁴ He later served as general, along with Nicias, in Macedonia (Thucydides, 4.126, 423 BC), and again with Laches in the Peloponnese in 419 BC (Thucydides, 5.61)

²⁸⁵ Thucydides, 3.94

²⁸⁶ Thucydides, 3.98.5

²⁸⁷ Thucydides, 3.100

The appeal of the Aetolians for an attack on Naupactos was responded to by the Peloponnesians, though it was not until the beginning of autumn that the army was gathered; a mixture of Peloponnesians and Ambraciots.²⁸⁸ This force succeeded in laying waste the land around Naupactos and capturing the unwallled part of the city.²⁸⁹ It appears that no Athenian forces had arrived in Naupactos by this time, for there were not enough troops there to defend the walls; indeed, the situation was only saved by the arrival of Demosthenes, who transported 1,000 hoplites from Acarnania to relieve the besieged city and man the defences.²⁹⁰

Demosthenes is said to have transported the hoplites onboard “his ships”; it is somewhat unclear where he got these vessels, as his 30 ships, Fleet 78, had been sent home. Gomme suggests that they might not yet have left the region even if they had sailed from Naupactos, and would thus have been available for Demosthenes.²⁹¹ An alternative is that these ships were from an (unattested) Acarnanian navy, and amend the text so that it does not say that these ships were Demosthenes’.²⁹² A third proposal might be that these ships were Athenian, either a few vessels left over from Fleet 78, or some small squadron from Fleet 66 that had been in Naupactos all along. Prior to his venture into Aetolia, Demosthenes had (according to Thucydides) planned on a second attempt from Naupactos if his first was unsuccessful.²⁹³ Perhaps he had taken this small naval force from Naupactos to try and make amends for his previous failure, and it was for this reason that the base was vulnerable when the Peloponnesians attacked. It is to be presumed that he had not by this stage been relieved of his command, and nor had his time as *strategos* come to an end; ships taken from an Athenian naval base could be fairly, if loosely, described as “his”. If he had taken some of the Messenians as crew and *epibatai*, this might explain why the defences at Naupactos were so thinly manned. None of these proposals are especially convincing, and the ships of Demosthenes which brought the troops to relieve Naupactos in the summer of 426 BC must remain something of a mystery.

Demosthenes in Naupactos Again, With Aristotle and Hierophon: winter 426/5-summer 424 BC (Fleets 225 and 85)

It might be thought somewhat remiss of the Athenians to have left Naupactos unguarded for a period of (at least) several months between the summer and autumn 426 BC and to thus come within an ace of losing this most crucial of bases. This is especially the case given the high priority with which maintaining a squadron at Naupactos had been treated in the previous few years. A fleet was sent out to Naupactos eventually. In the winter 426/5 BC, Thucydides reports 20 ships, Fleet 225, operating around the Peloponnese; it is possible that these vessels were sent in response to the Messenians’ appeals for aid, and like other reinforcement fleets, had been given other tasks to undertake en route. Although there is no evidence to say how long it had

²⁸⁸ Thucydides, 3.100

²⁸⁹ Thucydides, 3.102

²⁹⁰ Thucydides, 3.102

²⁹¹ Gomme, *HCT*, ad loc 3.102.4

²⁹² Gomme, *HCT*, ad loc 3.102.4 refers to the arguments of Steup and Classen, which are along these lines.

²⁹³ Thucydides, 3.96

been in commission at the time when Thucydides first mentions it, it could be speculated that it had spent some time cruising the Peloponnesian coast, as had the fleet under Asopios before it. In the winter of 426/5 BC, these 20 ships, under the generals Aristotle and Hierophon, were appealed to by the Acarnanians to come to the aid of Amphilochean Argos, which was under attack from Eurylochus' army.²⁹⁴ Fleet 225 played a supporting role in the ensuing conflicts and negotiations; following a crushing defeat in the field, the enemy commander was forced to appeal for terms,²⁹⁵ "if he stayed there, he did not see how he could stand a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet at sea."²⁹⁶ The fleet played a further supporting role in the destruction of the reinforcing army at Idomene; having been ambushed by the Amphilochean army, which was being led by Demosthenes, the Ambraciots were routed:

kai es pasan idean chôrésantes tês phugês etraponto tines kai es tèn thalassan ou polu apechousan, kai hós eidon tas Attikas naus parapleousas hama tou ergou têi xuntuchiai, proseneusan, hêgêsamenoî en tôi autika phobôi kreisson einai sphisin hupo tôn en tais nausin, ei dei, diaphtharênai ê hupo tôn barbarôn kai echthistôn Amphilochôn.

In a frantic effort to escape, some of them actually turned to the sea, which was not far off. There they saw the Athenian ships sailing up the coast just at the same time as the action on land, and such was their panic at the moment that they swam towards them, thinking it better for them to die, if die they must, at the hands of those on board the ships than by those of the barbarous and detested Amphilocheans.²⁹⁷

These are dramatic and telling examples of the advantages of having local superiority at sea, and of the synergy between land and sea forces; without directly participating in any fighting (save, presumably, to despatch the poor wretches who swam out to their triremes), the Athenian ships had a profound impact upon their opponents, not least by severely limiting the available strategic options. The Athenian control of the sea also seems to have cut off hope; the Ambraciots become pathetically hopeless upon seeing the Athenian fleet sail up in support of the army, and the Spartan commander could see no way out of his situation given the fact that the Athenians held the strategic advantage of sea power. As we have seen even in the context of the Naupactos station, Athenian sea power was not so omnipotent that it could not be challenged or circumvented; blockades could be run, patrols evaded, trireme crews caught napping. It thus might be argued that this was another instance of Athens' opponents over-estimating Athens' power; however, in this particular and localized situation, the image of invincible thalassocracy was fairly close to the reality; the Ambraciot army probably had nothing in the way of sea power apart from a few troop-transport ships, and it is likely that they were cut off even from them.

It was shortly after these events when Thucydides reports on another logistical naval matter that rarely features in our source material.

²⁹⁴ Thucydides, 3.105.

²⁹⁵ His name was Menedaius; Eurylochus was killed in the battle.

²⁹⁶ Thucydides, 3.109

²⁹⁷ Thucydides, 3.112.7

Meta de tauta triton meros neimantes tôn skulôn tois Athênaióis ta alla kata tas poleis dieilonto. kai ta men tôn Athênaiôn pleonta healô, ta de nun anakeimena en tois Attikois hierois Dêmosthenei exêirethêsan triakosiai panopliai, kai agôn autas katepleusen: kai egeneto hama autôî meta tèn ek tês Aitôlias xumphoran apo tautês tês praxeôs adeestera hê kathodos. apêlthon de kai hoi en tais eikosi nausin Athênaiôi es Naupakton.

Afterwards they [i.e. Athens' allies the Acarnanians, who comprised the majority of the army] divided up the spoils, giving a third to the Athenians and divide the rest amongst their cities. The Athenian share was captured on the voyage home. What is now to be seen in the Attic temples is the 300 panoplies which were specially set aside for Demosthenes and which he brought back with him by sea. Incidentally, after the disaster in Aetolia, it was now, with this achievement to his credit [Demosthenes had led the victorious army], a much safer thing for him to return home. The Athenians in the twenty ships also left for Naupactos.²⁹⁸

Several points call for comment here. The first is that Thucydides would probably not have drawn attention to the fact that the spoils of war were shipped to Athens were it not for the fact that much of the booty did not make it home. As Hornblower points out in his commentary, such a loss was not unique, and it serves as a reminder of the dangers of sea travel, even for Athenian vessels.²⁹⁹ There are many queries prompted by this brief notice, not least the question of who was responsible. Pirates or Peloponnesian ships would seem the most likely alternatives, with the former most likely; Thucydides would probably have reported the incident more fully had the Spartans been responsible for the capture, but there is of course no way to tell for certain. The Athenians' share of the panoplies, even discounting those set aside for Demosthenes, would have amounted to a not inconsiderable amount of metal and would have been a tempting target.³⁰⁰ Another question would be how these panoplies were transported; it is clear they were, like Demosthenes' share, conveyed by sea, but in which ships? The twenty Athenian vessels were all said to have gone to Naupactos. Perhaps they captured some vessels from the defeated Ambraciots, and used these new acquisitions to send home the booty. Alternatively, Thucydides was inexact in his recording of fleet movements, and at least one ship from Fleet 225 returned to Athens at this point, only to be captured en route. This is perhaps unlikely; as Thucydides chose to specify the number of ships going to Naupactos, it would take more than this circumstantial case to doubt him. A third possibility is that trireme fleets were accompanied by other vessels, unmentioned in the narrative much as the non-hoplite component of infantry forces was often ignored.³⁰¹ The Sicilian invasion of 413 BC provides a good example of a trireme fleet being

²⁹⁸ Thucydides, 3.114.1-2

²⁹⁹ Hornblower, *Commentary*, ad loc 3.114

³⁰⁰ In the two battles reported in Thucydides, there were losses numbering around 1,200 men. After taking Demosthenes' 300, there would have been a maximum of 900 or so left; of these, the Athenians took a third. It is interesting that the Athenians were to have received as large a reward as the commander Demosthenes, given that there is no evidence of them committing troops to the battle. It would seem that the generosity was due either to the appreciation of the indirect contribution of the navy (as discussed above), or perhaps due to the proximity of that same force while the spoils were being divided; either interpretation emphasises the intimidating nature of a fleet of triremes.

³⁰¹ Note that the Spartan commander Brasidas (Thucydides, 4.120) had access to triremes and at least one 'light boat', *keles*; note also that such light vessels and triacontors are reported by Thucydides (4.9) as being possessed by the Messenians; perhaps such craft were commandeered for transport purposes. In this passage of Thucydides, the ships are possessed by pirates. If pirates were responsible for capturing these spoils, it seems very unlikely that they were

accompanied by privately owned merchant vessels, whose owners were looking to turn a profit from the spoils of war, and it is possible that such vessels tagged along with smaller fleets such as this one as well.³⁰² If an Athenian trireme had been involved in the loss of these panoplies, we might expect Thucydides to have mentioned it; the capture of a private merchantman would perhaps be considered less significant. Demosthenes is reported to have sailed back successfully with his 300 panoplies, and indeed the next mention of him in Thucydides finds him back at Athens, and virtually given command of a fleet despite not being a general.³⁰³ Once again, there are no details of the vessel used to transport Demosthenes and his treasures home.

The Fleet 225 remained on station at Naupactos throughout the winter of 426/5 BC, and the entire summer of 425 BC as well; at this time the Naupactos squadron contributed a small number of ships (exactly how many is unclear) towards the fleet of Eurymedon and Sophocles.³⁰⁴ These ships were summoned to aid the small beleaguered force of Demosthenes on Pylos, and were alerted to his plight by ships acting as a ‘trip-wire’.³⁰⁵

That same summer Fleet 225 was in action once more. The campaign again combined an Athenian force with an Acarnanian army, and was the last event reported by Thucydides before the end of his seventh summer. The report of this campaign is brief:

kai hoi en tēi Naupaktōi Athēnaioi kai Akarnanes hama teleutōntos tou therous strateusamenoi Anaktorion Korinthiōn polin, hē keitai epi tōi stomati tou Amprakikou kolpou, elabon prodosiai: kai ekpempantes Korinthious autoi Akarnanes oikētoras apo pantōn eschon to chōrion. kai to theros eteleuta.

At the end of the summer (425 BC) the Athenians in Naupactos supported by the Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian city that lies at the entrance of the Ambracian Gulf. They took the city by treachery, and the Acarnanians then sent out settlers themselves from all parts of their country and occupied the place. So the summer ended.³⁰⁶

As has been discussed previously, the taking of cities by treachery rather than force was far from uncommon in the ancient world. Like the base of Naupactos itself, this expedition succeeded in weakening the Peloponnesians’ strongest naval state, Corinth; triremes could not carry much in the way of supplies for their crews, nor was it usual or desirable for crews to sleep onboard, and so by denying an enemy fleet friendly ports, the Athenians considerably restricted its range and

transported in a trireme; even given that a pirates’ crew would all have had weapons and a trireme would have been crew mostly unarmed, a thirty-oared vessel would have little chance of overpowering a trireme, even if it could have caught one. Thucydides 4.9 describes a small pirate ‘fleet’ of 2 vessels, but it would probably have taken several more to stand a reasonable chance of trapping and overpowering a trireme.

³⁰² Thucydides, 6.44

³⁰³ Thucydides, 4.2. He perhaps had won election to the *strategia* and was simply waiting for his term of office to begin (Fornara, *Generals*, p. 57). Even so, it is somewhat surprising that Demosthenes is given so much lee-way.

³⁰⁴ Thucydides, 4.13. This fleet was originally intended for Sicily, but ended up taking a detour to Pylos, where after a close blockade the Athenians captured some Spartan soldiers.

³⁰⁵ Thucydides, 4.5 and 4.8.

³⁰⁶ Thucydides, 4.49

capabilities. Salmon points out that Anactorium was one of the last important Corinthian bases in the region.³⁰⁷

Once again it is unclear how long Fleet 225 remained on station at Naupactos; it is not referred to again after the end of the summer of 425 BC. In 424 BC, Demosthenes planned to take 40 ships, Fleet 85, to Naupactos, raise an Acarnanian army and so attack the city of Siphæ, which was to be given up to him by a faction within.³⁰⁸ No current squadron of ships on station at Naupactos is referred to, although of course the silence does not prove that there was no such fleet there. At the least it shows Naupactos acting as a naval station in the passive sense; a base and safe anchorage for a passing Athenian force. Demosthenes' plan came to nothing, as the Boeotians had gotten wind of it and reinforced Siphæ.³⁰⁹

3: The Naupactos fleet between 414/3 BC and 411 BC

Konon and Diphilus at Naupactos: winter 414/3 BC-summer 413 BC (Fleet 104)

After the end of summer 425 BC, Naupactos is next mentioned by Thucydides in the context of the winter 414/3 BC.

pempousi de kai peri tên Peloponnêson hoi Athênaioi eikosi naus, hopôs phulassoien mêdena apo Korinthou kai tês Peloponnêsou es tên Sikelian peraiousthai

The Athenians also sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese to guard against anyone crossing from Corinth and the Peloponnese to Sicily.³¹⁰

In the same passage, Thucydides reports the intention of the Corinthians and Peloponnesians to send troops in merchant vessels to Sicily, and then describes their naval arrangements to facilitate this:

naus te hoi Korinthioi pente kai eikosin eplêroun, hopôs naumachias te apopeirasôsi pros tên en têi Naupaktôi phulakên, kai tas holkadas autôn hêsson hoi en têi Naupaktôi Athênaioi kôluoien apairein, pros tên spheteran antitaxin tôn triêrôn tên phulakên poioumenoi.

The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships so that they might attempt a sea-battle against the ships on guard at Naupactos, and the Athenians would be less able to prevent their merchant ships from sailing because they would have to give attention to the triremes confronting them.³¹¹

The natural reading of this passage is to suppose that the fleet sent round the Peloponnese was to reinforce the ships already on guard at Naupactos, whom the Corinthians were trying to protect

³⁰⁷ Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 318

³⁰⁸ Thucydides, 4.76

³⁰⁹ Thucydides, 4.89

³¹⁰ Thucydides, 7.17.2

³¹¹ Thucydides, 7.17.4

their troop-transports against. However, the account of the subsequent events around Naupactos favours the interpretation that the “20 ships around the Peloponnese” and the “ships on guard at Naupactos” are in fact the very same ships, Fleet 104.³¹² The next passage that refers to the fleet seems to assume that only 20 ships were around Naupactos in the spring of 413 BC:

hai de pente kai eikosi nêes tôn Korinthiôn hai tou cheimônos plêrôtheisai anthôrmoun tais en têi Naupaktôi eikosin Attikais, heôsper autois houtoi hoi hoplitai tais holkasin apo tês Peloponnêsou apêran: houpper heneka kai to prôton eplêrôthêsan, hopôs mê hoi Athênaioi pros tas holkadas mallon ê pros tas triêreis ton noun echôsin.

The 25 Corinthian ships manned during the winter stayed facing the 20 Athenian ships at Naupactos up to the moment they got their hoplites in the merchant vessels clear of the Peloponnese; this was exactly why they were manned in the first place, so that the Athenians would have to give their attention to the triremes and leave the merchant vessels alone.³¹³

Given the previous experience of conflicts in the Gulf of Corinth, and the near parity of forces involved, it seems surprising that no attempt was made to engage in battle, or at least attack the merchant vessels. Unlike the previous occasions in the Gulf, however, the Athenians’ opponents had not only parity but superiority in *triremes*, as well as a larger number of vessels total. In addition, a hoplite force supported by a large naval force could have been capable of taking Naupactos itself, should the Athenian fleet have risked an engagement. Dover sees the explanation rather in terms of the deteriorating crew quality of the Athenians and the corresponding rise in ability of the Peloponnesians.³¹⁴ There may be some truth in this, and it would not have encouraged the Athenians to fight a Peloponnesian fleet with superiority in trireme numbers, as well as its tactical separateness from the sluggish troop-transports.³¹⁵ While all these factors might explain the Athenians’ caution on this occasion, it was caution nevertheless, especially given the fact that their mission, according to Thucydides, was expressly to prevent these ships delivering reinforcements to Sicily. It is also surprising given that the commander of the Naupactos squadron appears to have been Konon, who was to later enjoy a reputation for being a bold and enterprising naval commander.

³¹² It is possible to argue that there was a very small (three ship) fleet on station at Naupactos prior to the arrival of the fleet of 20 here reported. This argument is sustainable due to the natural reading of this passage, and to the sudden appearance of three not before mentioned vessels in the fleet at 7.34. What makes the argument tenuous is not only the reference to “the twenty ships” discussed below, but also the unlikelihood of the Corinthians putting 25 triremes in the water to confront a mere 3 Athenian ships; even giving the drubbings taken by Peloponnesian ships in this region, and the twice-repeated desire to ensure no losses amongst the troop-carrying merchant vessels, this seems like overkill, especially considering how, in the event, the 25 ships managed to prevent 20 Athenian vessels from coming out in battle. Of course, it could be that the Corinthians (not unreasonably) anticipated Athenian reinforcements when preparing their trireme fleet, and so we should not dismiss altogether the possibility that the Athenians had a small naval presence in Naupactos prior to 414/3 BC.

³¹³ Thucydides, 7.19.5

³¹⁴ *HCT* ad loc 7.31.4

³¹⁵ Contrast the situation in the summer of 429 BC, when Phormio’s Peloponnesian opponents seemed to have grouped the merchant vessels and triremes together in one fleet, with the result that the slow and unhandy vessels hampered the faster ones.

Konon is not mentioned by name in connection with the Naupactos fleet at this point; it is only his presence later in the summer of 413 BC from which it can be inferred that he was in command the preceding winter and spring.³¹⁶ Following the successful protection of their merchant fleet, the Corinthians pursued a more aggressive policy against the Athenian Naupactos squadron. Konon requested aid from Demosthenes, who was at Zacynthus with a reinforcement fleet for Sicily.

aphikneitai de kai Konôn par' autous, hos êrche Naupaktou, angellôn hoti hai pente kai eikosi nêes tôn Korinthiôn hai sphisin anthormousai oute kataluousi ton polemon naumachein te mellousin: pempein oun ekeleuen autous naus, hôs ouch hikanas ousas duoin deousas eikosi tas heautôn pros tas ekeinôn pente kai eikosi naumachein. tôi men oun Konôni deka naus ho Dêmosthenês kai ho Eurumedôn tas arista sphisi pleousas aph' hôn autoi eichon xumpempousi pros tas en têi Naupaktôi

Konon, the commander at Naupactos, came to them [Demosthenes and his co-general, Eurymedon] with news that the 25 Corinthian ships stationed opposite to him, far from going home without a fight, were meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged them to send him some ships, as his own 18 were not a match for the enemy's 25. Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent 10 of their best sailors with Konon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactos.³¹⁷

It is worth noting here the discussion in Wallinga as to what made ships *arista pleousai*, “best sailors”.³¹⁸ It is clearly right to suggest that this refers to speed through the water under oars, rather than a literal comment on the ship’s qualities in harnessing the wind. As part of his argument in favour of systematic undermanning in the classical Athenian navy, he argues that such “best sailors” were vessels with full (or, relative to the other ships in the fleet, fuller) crews. While full crews led to fast ships, Wallinga’s arguments are not convincing, and the description *arista pleousai* is more likely to apply to the relative quality of a ship’s rowing crew rather than its sheer numbers.³¹⁹ Fourth-century litigants often claim that their vessel was the fastest in the fleet due to their hiring of the best crews; the quality and not the quantity of the men is what is stressed.³²⁰ Polyaeus records a stratagem of Philip of Macedon which suggests that the fastest ships were those with the best structure, and the best rowers to match. In order to evade an Athenian fleet under Chares lying in wait at Neopolis, Philip provided them with some bait to chase:

³¹⁶ If Konon was an elected *strategos*, his period of command would have covered both the events reported by Thucydides at both 7.17 and 7.34

³¹⁷ Thucydides, 7.31.4-5

³¹⁸ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-Power*, p. 180-2

³¹⁹ See Appendix 2 for a fuller discussion of Wallinga’s arguments regarding undermanning, which I believe are unsustainable.

³²⁰ Wallinga argues that when an anonymous trierarch and client of the speech-writer Lysias spoke out in court (Lysias, 21.2), “he constantly harps on about his outlays, never on the discrimination in choosing his men” (Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-Power*, p. 180). This is either a gross error or wilful disingenuousness on Wallinga’s part, for it is this very trierarch, a little later in this very speech (Lysias, 21.10) who claims to have hired the best helmsman in Greece, with “a full oarcrew and other specialists” to match. He might have compared Apollodorus, ([Demosthenes], 50.7), who also boasts of the money he spent and the quality of the crew he thus obtained. In both cases, as with the trierarchs vying for the best rowers for the invasion of Sicily, the assumption was that larger expense led to better crews, and thus faster ships. Wallinga is thus too quick to dismiss the connection between better rowers and faster ships within a single state’s navy, and to conclude that differences in speed were due to differences in the numbers on board.

Philippos epilexamenos ton neon tessaras tas arista pleousas eplerosen ereton axui kai technai kai rhouei ariton, kai parayyelma edoke, proanaxthenai tou stolou pantos kai paraplein ten Nean polin ou polu tes ges apechontas

After selecting the four fastest ships [*tas arista pleousas*], Philip manned them with his best rowers in terms of age, skill and strength, and gave orders to put out to sea before the rest of the fleet and to sail past Neopolis, keeping close to the shore.³²¹

On this occasion, the Athenians took the bait; they unsuccessfully chased Philip's four best ships, allowing him to slip away with the rest of his fleet. There is also some suggestion in the Athenian evidence that the build quality of some vessels gave them an edge of speed over other ships; the naval lists refer to two ships as *taxunautousai*, "fast ships" suggesting that something in their build made them speedier than a regular trireme.³²² While this unique entry is not sufficient evidence to suggest that some triremes were vastly superior in their essential design and structure from any others, it is not unlikely that some improvements in build and performance were made during Athens' period of thalassocracy.³²³ In addition, triremes that had been damaged in battles or storms, had not had their timbers regularly dried out, had had their gear appropriated by unprincipled trierarchs, or were simply old, would not perform as well as dry, newly-built, well-equipped vessels that had yet to sustain scars; these factors seem to have been built in to the classifications mentioned in the fourth-century fleet inventories.³²⁴ Along with the strength and efficiency of the crews, these factors would have done most to distinguish the "best sailors" from the rest.

It is slightly surprising that the ten "best sailors" from Demosthenes' and Eurymedon's fleet here reinforced a Naupactos squadron numbering 18, and not 20 as might have been expected from the preceding narrative. A discrepancy of two vessels is perhaps not too difficult to explain, as it is unlikely that the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus was the only target for this request for reinforcements. It seems likely that one of these ships took such a request to Athens itself, and the response was to send a few more ships and a new commander. It is certainly the case that the Naupactos fleet's numbers are larger than expected when it is next mentioned:

³²¹ Polyaeus, *Stratagems*, 4.2.22

³²² IG II² 1623, ll. 276-285. Wallinga unconvincingly dismisses this entry; the ships are said to be sent out to "guard against pirates", and Wallinga argues that such work would require fully manned ships. Because they were fully manned, they were described as "fast". As he himself notes, however, ships could be described as "the best sailors" before they had been manned at all (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.19), suggesting some degree of physical difference between a fast ship and a standard one.

³²³ The sources do record some developments in the build of triremes over the period; for example, Plutarch (*Kimón*, 12) states that Kimon altered the design of the ships to make them "flatter", and to bridge the decks to enable them to carry more troops. Thucydides discusses the developments made to the Corinthian triremes during the Peloponnesian war to make them more effective at head-on ramming (Thucydides, 7.34)

³²⁴ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 129 ff. He argues that the Athenians "classified all hulls by rating them in accordance with their age and performance abilities." (p. 129) The evidence covers the period from the 370s and 360s BC (when ships were classed as either "old or "new") to the 330s BC (by which time four classifications were used; "first", "second", "third" and "select"). The changeover between these two methods of classification was 357/6 BC

hoi d' Athênaiōi ek tês Naupaktou triakonta nausi kai trisin êrche de autôn Diphilos epepleusan autois...kai tôn men Korinthiôn treis nêes diaphtheirontai, tôn d' Athênaiôn katedu men oudemia haplôs, hepta de tines aploi egenonto egenonto antiprôiroi emballomenai kai anarrageisai tas parexeiresias hupo tôn Korinthiôn neôn ep' auto touto pachuteras tas epôtidas echousôn. naumachêsantes de antipala men kai hôs autous hekaterous axioun nikan, homôs de tôn nauagiôn kratêsantôn tôn Athênaiôn dia te tèn tou anemou apôsin autôn es to pelagos kai dia tèn tôn Korinthiôn ouketi epanagôgên, diekrithêsan ap' allêlôn, kai diôxis oudemia egeneto, oud' andres oudeterôn healôsan

The Athenians sailed out of Naupactos to meet them [the Corinthian fleet of 25] with 33 ships commanded by Diphilus...Three of the Corinthian ships were destroyed, and none of the Athenians were sunk outright, but about 7 were put out of commission which were struck prow to prow and had their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened for this very purpose.³²⁵ After a battle indecisive enough that both sides claimed victory the sides separated, but the Athenians still got control of the wrecks because of a wind driving them further out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to meet them. There was no pursuit or prisoners taken on either side.³²⁶

The fact that the wrecks were taken from the battle, despite the apparently heavy damage sustained, testifies to the fact that triremes “had a positive buoyancy, and did not sink when flooded.”³²⁷ The extra vessels here imply that Diphilus had relieved Konon of his command,³²⁸ and brought a few extra vessels with him;³²⁹ four at least, on the assumptions that the two previously “missing” vessels both returned, and one vessel was used to carry Konon home.

Hippocles and Konon at Naupactos: 411 BC (Fleet 104)

There is an interval of a couple of years before ships in Naupactos are referred to again. After the final destruction of the two invasion fleets sent to Sicily, Thucydides reports that the Athenians looked to redirect their resources, and to form a committee of older citizens to formulate policies accordingly. The measures came into effect during the winter of 413/2 BC:

pireskeuazonto de kai Athênaiōi, hôsper dienoêthêsan, en tōi autōi cheimōni toutōi tèn te naupêgian, xula xumporisamenoi, kai Sounion teichisantes, hopôs autois asphaleia tais sitagôgois nausin eiê tou periplou, kai to te en tēi Lakônikiêi teichisma eklipontes ho enôikodomêsan parapleontes es Sikelian, kai talla, ei pou ti edokei achreion analiskesthai, xustellomenoi es euteleian, malista de ta tôn xummachôn diaskopountes hopôs mê sphôn apostêsontai

During this same winter the Athenians were busy with their preparations as they had determined, they contributed timber and pushed on their ship-building, and

³²⁵ This can be interpreted as a technological change designed to counterbalance the superiority of Athenian naval skill, though Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, p. 334, argues that on this occasion the Corinthians are likely to have been at least as accomplished as the Athenians.

³²⁶ Thucydides, 7.34.3-6.

³²⁷ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 121

³²⁸ Nothing need be read into this other than the suggestion that Diphilus was elected for 413/2 BC, and Konon's term of command had by that point expired. If there was any further political intrigue behind the appointment, it is not mentioned in the sources.

³²⁹ The alternative is that some vessels were present in Naupactos prior to the arrival of Konon's 20 ships in the winter of 414/3 BC, and only now appear in the narrative. The appearance of 33 ships here, rather than the 30 or 28 we might expect, makes it possible, though not terribly likely, that three ships had been on station at Naupactos throughout the period; see note 312.

fortified Sounion to enable their corn-ships to round it in safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia which they had built on their way to Sicily; while they also cut back in the interest of economy if there seemed to be any useless spending anywhere, and above all by watching over the allies and keeping them from revolting.³³⁰

Would the Naupactos fleet have been considered an area of “useless spending”? The station was not near any of Athens’ major tribute-paying allies, nor on the principal grain route from the Black Sea. Under Konon, the fleet had the role (though it did not perform it successfully) of preventing the Corinthians reinforcing the Syracusans, a role made obsolete by the winter 413/2 BC following Athens’ devastating defeat. It seems open to question, given the Athenians’ priorities with the allies and the grain route, whether a naval force in the Corinthian Gulf was sustainable.

This is not to say that a fleet at Naupactos had no strategic significance at this time; while there was no need to prevent Corinthian troops trying to reach Sicily, there was a fear in Athens of a fleet from Sicily sailing against the Piraeus.³³¹ Such a fleet did indeed appear that summer, and Athens had ships in place to try and stop them:

anekomizonto de hupo ton auton chronon touton kai hai apo tês Sikelias Peloponnêsiôn hekkaideka nêes hai meta Gulippou xundiapolemêsasai: kai peri tên Leukada apolêphtheisai kai kopeisai hupo tôn Attikôn hepta kai eikosi neôn, hôn êrchen Hippoklês Menippou phulakên echôn tôn apo tês Sikelias neôn, hai loipai plên mias diaphugousai tous Athênaious katepleusan es tên Korinthon

At about this time [Summer 412 BC] 16 Peloponnesian ships, which had served with Gylippus in Sicily throughout the war, were on their way home; and as they were off Leucadia they were intercepted and struck by the 27 Athenian ships under command of Hippocles son of Menippus, who was on guard for ships from Sicily; one was destroyed and the rest escaped the Athenians and sailed to Corinth.³³²

It seems most likely that this is Fleet 104, operating from a new station under another new commander, and with the inverse of their previous mission; preventing ships from Sicily reaching Greece.³³³ It seems that the ships rendered inoperable by the Corinthians the previous summer had not for the most part been either repaired or re-crewed; only one of the seven losses appears to have been made good, despite the Athenians capturing the wrecks. While a generous observer might regard this battle as a victory on points for the Athenians, there is something of a rebuke in Thucydides’ description. With a significant advantage in numbers and crews that could not be described as novices (this fleet had probably been in continuous service for at least 18 months), the Athenians failed to stop the enemy. It might be suggested that the fleet’s poor performance in this encounter somewhat justified Konon’s caution with the same fleet in 413 BC, when he

³³⁰ Thucydides, 8.4.

³³¹ Thucydides, 8.1

³³² Thucydides, 8.13

³³³ Such is the view of Andrewes, *HCT* ad loc 8.4. He notes that the economy drive does not involve the sacrifice of stations at either Pylos or Naupactos

refused battle with a slightly larger Corinthian fleet, and instead called for reinforcements. There is no reliable way to assess the validity of this suggestion. The evidence is simply not full enough to analyze the reasons for this poor performance, or to discover the relative blame of the commanders, the *hyperesia* or the crews as a whole. What is certain is that this fleet did not match the heroism and skill of its predecessors, and thus to some extent the series of squadrons at Naupactos chart the decline of the navy's abilities and Athenian sea power more generally. Tolmides' daring raid and capture of Naupactos gifted the Athenians a strategically crucial base, from which they were able to bottle up the most important of the Peloponnesian naval powers. Phormio's brilliant victories in the early years of the Peloponnesian war were followed by Nicostratus successfully holding off (though not defeating) of a vastly bigger Peloponnesian force. A decade and more later, with the Athenians on the brink of defeat in Sicily, Konon felt that his Naupactos squadron needed numerical superiority to fight the Peloponnesians; the ensuing battle, in which the Athenians actually had more triremes, was wryly described by Thucydides as the sort of encounter where both sides can claim victory. The final sea battle fought by a fleet (probably) from Naupactos could also be so described; the Athenians destroyed one vessel and prevented the enemy fleet from attacking the Piraeus; however, almost the entire enemy fleet escaped to a friendly port, and it had had no intention of doing anything more than return to the Peloponnese in the first place.

Such a summary, however, focuses solely on sea battles, to the detriment of the wider roles of the fleet. As has been shown previously, over the fifth and fourth centuries more Athenian fleets facilitated combat on land than fought in battles at sea. It is therefore appropriate that the final recorded act of the Athenian navy operating (probably) from Naupactos is one of transporting troops; in this case, to that most persistent of trouble-spots, Corcyra.

hoi d' oun Korkuraioi theôrountes tous dunatôtatous tôn politôn ontas pros tôi tèn polin encheirizein Lakedaimoniois, metepempsano par' Athênaiôn dunamin tèn paraphulaxousan tèn polin. Konôn d' ho stratêgos tôn Athênaiôn pleusas eis Korkuran, hexakosious men tôn ek Naupaktou Messêniôn katelipen en têi polei, autos de meta tôn neôn parepleuse, kai kathôrmisthê pros tôi tês Hêras temenei. hoi de hexakosioi meta tôn dêmotikôn hormêsantes epi tous ta Lakedaimoniôn phronountas exaiphnês agoras plêthousês hous men sunelambanon, hous d' ephoneuon, pleious de tôn chiliôn ephugadeusan: epoiêsanto de tous men doulous eleutherous, tous de xenous politas, eulaboumenoi to te plêthos kai tèn dunamin tôn phugadôn.

Accordingly the Corcyraeans, seeing that their most influential citizens were planning to hand the city over to the Lacedaimonians, sent to the Athenians for an army to protect their city. And Konon, the general of the Athenians, sailed to Corcyra and left in the city six hundred men from the Messenians in Naupactos, while he himself sailed on with his ships and cast anchor off the sacred precinct of Hera. And the six hundred, setting out unexpectedly with the partisans of the people's party at the time of full market against the supporters of the Lacedaimonians, arrested some of them, slew others, and drove more than a thousand from the state; they also set the slaves free and gave citizenship to the

foreigners living among them as a precaution against the great number and influence of the exiles.³³⁴

Diodorus, our only source for this voyage of Konon, places it in the year 410/9 BC. However, as the two events he records on either side of this are both to be dated to 411 BC, this seems to be the most likely context.³³⁵ The comparatively passive role of an Athenian naval squadron while there was killing on the streets of Corcyra puts one in mind of the 427 BC, and the inaction of Eurymedon's Fleet 73.

4: Conclusions

This case study has highlighted the various roles of the Athenian fleet, some general issues connected with study of the Athenian navy as an institution, and some of the problems, debates and gaps in the source material. The Naupactos fleets are covered by our most detailed source, the author of which was at one time a naval commander, but perhaps inevitably there are details of the Athenian navy's operation which remain shrouded in mystery. The inconsistencies in fleet numbers which hint at, but do not demonstrate, ships flitting from Athens to generals in the water with orders information and pay; the logistics of sending war booty home, and of dealing with (or possibly re-employing) captives; the use of triremes as 'trip-wires'; the categorization of triremes; the status of the *Salaminia* and the *Paralos*; all of these wider issues to do with the navy have been raised in this case study of one naval station.

The fleet operations around Naupactos have shown the diversity demanded of the navy and in particular its commanders, who were often given multiple missions in disparate theatres of war. They appear to have had a good deal of latitude within the framework of the Assembly's instructions, but failure (or even incomplete success) could bear a heavy price; Phormio was deprived of his citizenship despite his brace of victories, and Demosthenes (foreshadowing Nicias' thoughts in Sicily) feared to return to Athens on the back of a heavy defeat.³³⁶

The Naupactos fleets offer a case study of the lengths and limits of Athenian sea power and ancient thalassocracy generally. A fortified naval station close to the principal Peloponnesian naval power, and with a relatively large³³⁷ but intermittent fleet presence, Naupactos was thus variously a passive or active naval station, depending on the tactical and strategic circumstances, and was the scene for many conflicts. Athens' ability and willingness to pay for long-term fleets, and the sea battles won by these fleets, kept the navy of Corinth out of the Archidamian war almost entirely. Such fleets would have been out of reach, or at the very least unsustainable, for the vast majority of city-states in the fifth and fourth centuries; Athens by contrast nearly always

³³⁴ Diodorus, 13.48.5-7

³³⁵ Andrewes/Dover, *HCT*, ad loc 8.13; the events at Corcyra are placed between "Theramenes' voyage to Paros...of autumn 411 [Diodorus, 47.8] and his collaboration with Archelaos at Pydna...of winter 411/10 [Diodorus, 49.1]", which suggests a date late in 411 BC.

³³⁶ Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, esp. p. 118

³³⁷ Relative, that is, to other fleets that operated regional patrols and naval stations.

had other, often larger, operations going on at the same time as supporting the Naupactos fleets. The triremes sent to this station were usually away from home for many months at a time, often for a year or more;³³⁸ Fleet 104 appears to have remained for over three years.³³⁹ It has been noted above that the Naupactos fleets fought in disproportionately large numbers of battles compared to the average Athenian squadron.³⁴⁰ However, considered in relation to the length of time the fleets were in commission, and their missions, sea battles were even here a highly exceptional experience. Aggressive though the occupation of Naupactos was, the Athenian fleets stationed there do not appear to have deliberately sought to provoke a battle with the Corinthians, nor to have pursued a policy aimed at the destruction of their enemy's fleet.³⁴¹ Restriction rather than destruction, probably of merchant vessels at least as much as triremes, seems to have been the aim. The long-lasting Athenian presence in the waters close to her biggest Greek naval rival is a testament to the extent of her sea power, and deserves attention along with the victories in sea battles that resulted when Athenian control was challenged. But even the striking victories of Phormio did not ensure total domination of the region's waters, as the Peloponnesians were able to move their armies around in ships on the Corinthian Gulf. Both the extents and the limitations of sea power and naval blockades with trireme fleets are thus clear.

Thalassocracy in the ancient world was essentially limited to those areas that the hegemonic power could deploy forces in sufficient numbers at that moment. As has been discussed previously, the Athenians could not possibly provide enough ships and troops to keep down all of their allies at once. Instead they employed regional patrols and diplomatic missions to remind their subjects of Athens' domination (or, from an alternative point of view, protection) and intimidate (or reassure) them into obedience (alliance) and prompt tribute payment. In the event of an allied uprising or the presence of an enemy force, such a fleet could act as 'trip-wire', raising the alarm and enabling a larger force to be deployed. That such a strategy was a general and conscious policy on the part of the Athenians is difficult to demonstrate absolutely, but this case study has provided a couple of explicit examples of this sort of activity. The *Salamina* and *Paralos* in 427 BC, when they reported the movements of a Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenian commander in the region, acted as a 'trip-wire', although it is far from certain that this was their

³³⁸ The fleets of Phormio and his immediate successors to the Naupactos command (Asopios, Nicostratus) each remained on station for around 18 months, Aristotle and Hierophon's fleet for 9 months. It is impossible to determine exactly how long Tolmides' presence in Naupactos lasted, but given his eventful voyage, his fleet can not have spent anything less than 9 months in commission.

³³⁹ Between the winter of 414/3 BC, and the summer of 410 BC. It goes almost without saying that the patchiness of the historical record, as well as the demonstrated willingness of the Athenians to leave Naupactos without a fleet at earlier stages of the Peloponnesian war throw doubt on the continuous presence of ships in the Gulf of Corinth; the most assertive the evidence allows us to be is say that it is fully compatible with an Athenian fleet, under various commanders, being on station for 42 months, and no recorded fleet movement would suggest that all the vessels went home to be replaced at a later time (as had occurred in the spring/summer of 428 BC).

³⁴⁰ Between the eight 'proper' fleets that operated in and around Naupactos, fully half participated in a sea battle; the Athenian average across the classical period is nearer a quarter. In total, six battles are fought by these 8 fleets (75%), again higher than the proportion amongst the recorded Athenian fleets; 84 battles fought by 216 fleets (39%).

³⁴¹ We can usefully contrast the Samos fleet from 411 BC, alternately seeking and refusing battle with the Peloponnesian fleet depending on who held the advantage; this fleet will be discussed in full later on.

original purpose. A ‘trip-wire’ fleet was certainly left at Pylos under Demosthenes in 425 BC; when triggered, ships from Naupactos were amongst the fleet that responded.³⁴²

Athens was able to ensure that the faction favourable to her won out in the civil strife on Corcyra, and this was achieved in no small part through better employment of strategic sea power; in 427 BC, it was the Athenian fleet that arrived first to Corcyra, and was then reinforced in sufficient strength to hold off a challenge from the Peloponnesian fleet. This Peloponnesian fleet had been in the region in large numbers for some time, but had not acted decisively. Athens’ use of small, widely dispersed fleets and naval stations had given her strategic superiority. It was in such contexts that the speed of triremes, and the skill of the rowers who provided that speed, was most important. Faster ships with superior crews meant the swifter reception of information, more impressive and intimidating forces, the faster arrival of reinforcements, and the seizing of the strategic initiative.

As will be argued fully in the following section, such a model requires, indeed presupposes, a large pool of men willing and able to row triremes all year round, year after year. It was noted above in relation to the ships sent to Naupactos that scale of fleets and the lengthy commissions required financial and logistical resources beyond nearly all classical city-states; these ships also represented full-time work for thousands of rowers and other crewmen, who were prepared to spend months and years away at sea.

When the Peloponnesian fleet in 427 BC finally did make a move, the ensuing battle off Corcyra demonstrated the importance of sound tactical formations and organization in sea battles. Along with superb situational awareness and not a little daring, it was this ability to operate as a coordinated fleet, rather than a loose collection of ships, which also brought about Phormio’s first victory in 429 BC.³⁴³ In the second battle around Naupactos that year, the Athenians were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by exploiting the fact that the Peloponnesians had broken formation in order to pursue them.³⁴⁴ While the role of the rowers was important in the performance of a trireme in battle, manoeuvres and actions of this sort depended far more on the tactical abilities the trireme’s *hyperesia*, especially the *kubernetes*, and the fleet’s commander.

We have seen that the latter fleets to occupy Naupactos did not emulate Phormio’s victories in battle, and that the squadrons sent to Naupactos to some extent chart the decline of the Athenian navy over the course of the Peloponnesian war. Caution should be employed in the use of this argument; Athens’ naval ‘decline’ was not a linear process, nor was her prowess in battles or control of the seas absolute even at the height of her power. The ships under the generals of the Samos fleet proved capable of winning significant tactical and strategic victories after 411 BC.

³⁴² Thucydides, 4.5 and 4.8, cf. 4.13.

³⁴³ I discuss the importance of professional skill to the outcome of the ‘ideal’ sea battle in Part Three, section 3.

³⁴⁴ Thucydides, 2.91

Nor was sea power equated with victory in battles; thalassocracy depended not so much on never being defeated (as the total destruction of Athens' massive force in Egypt during the 450s BC demonstrates), but in maintaining and securing enough resources to weather such defeats.

C: Naval Personnel

1. Who Were The “Naval Mob”?

Having examined the types of fleet actions and roles played by them in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, it is time now to turn to the men who crewed them. Given the central nature of the institution of the navy, our sources are remarkably reticent on the details of crew; potential reasons and explanations for this will be discussed in due course, after a review of the testimony we do have.

This subject has been discussed in the past. The focus of the debate amongst writers on the navy has primarily been the balance between the four distinct social groups who make up the bulk of the navy crews; Athenian citizens of the thetic class, metics, foreigners (*xenoi*) and slaves. While this debate is clearly important, it misses out on a second and equally crucial approach to examining trireme crews; by their professional status. By this I mean simply an assessment of how many trireme crewmen did nothing else but crew triremes, as against those who may have pulled an oar only once or twice in their lives. It is only by examining both the social and the professional aspects of trireme crews that we will get a complete picture of the “naval mob”.

Nautikos Ochlos

It is with this highly charged and widely used term that I will begin. Widely used, that is, in modern writing; the phrase we commonly render “naval mob”, *nautikos ochlos*, occurs only three times in the contemporary source material, twice in Aristotle’s *Politics*, and once in Thucydides’ history.³⁴⁵ It is hardly the ubiquitous and well attested group that it appears to be from modern scholarship; for example, Hunt argues that “Only once does Thucydides refer to the “naval mob”, a favourite bugbear of fourth-century elitist writers”,³⁴⁶ while he is right to suggest that such writers frequently discuss sailors, he gives the perhaps misleading impression that the phrase “naval mob” was widely used and understood. It is somewhat surprising to find it so often used without explanation or discussion, as though the meaning were self-evident and obvious. Amit gives quite a broad and inclusive meaning to the phrase, deeming it to cover “sailors in the navy and merchant vessels, craftsmen working in shipbuilding and repairs, port workers”.³⁴⁷ More recently, van Wees has defined the phrase in a similarly broad manner, though in describing the “naval mob” he relates it particularly to the trireme fleet: “the tens of thousands of people—mostly poor men, foreigners and slaves—required to build, maintain and man the fleet.”³⁴⁸ Earlier in the work, however, he uses the term in a more narrow sense, “the ‘naval mob’ of rowers and

³⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1304a; 1327a; Thucydides, 8.72.

³⁴⁶ Hunt, *Slave, Warfare and Ideology*, pp. 125-6.

³⁴⁷ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 62; cf. p. 58, when he asserts that the *nautikos ochlos* “was mainly composed of sailors”.

³⁴⁸ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 200

sailors”.³⁴⁹ Even given the fact that this is a somewhat inexact phrase, such a large variation in meaning should give us pause, and lead us back to its use in the sources.

The three ancient uses of the phrase *nautikos ochlos* are obviously too few to represent any sort of generally-held ancient conception of the “naval mob”, and certainly the phrase is an evocative and emotive one, and therefore perhaps does not admit of overly tight definitions. However, the contexts in which the phrase is used do at least hint at a more exclusive definition, and give a clue as to exactly what sorts of people were envisioned as belonging to “naval mob”.

The Thucydides passage refers to the period of the oligarchic coup of 411 BC, which will be discussed in detail later.³⁵⁰ After the take-over by the oligarchs, some delegates are sent out to the fleet at Samos to explain the new arrangements. Thucydides reports:

didaxontas hōs ouk epi blabēi tēs poleōs kai tōn politōn hē oligarchia katestē, all' epi sôtēriai tōn xumpantōn pragmatōn, pentakischilioi te hoti eien kai ou tetrakosioi monon hoi prassontes... alla t' episteilantes ta preponta eipein apepempsan autous euthus meta tēn heautōn katastasin, deisantes mē, hoper egeneto, nautikos ochlos out' autos menein en tōi oligarchikōi kosmōi ethelēi

They [the ten delegates chosen] were to explain that the oligarchy had not been established to do any harm to the city or the citizens, but in order to preserve the state as a whole, and that it was not 400 but 5,000 who shared the government....They were also told the right line to take on other points, and were sent out directly after the new government was installed, since they feared (and their fears were justified by the event) that the men serving in the navy [*nautikos ochlos*] would not be willing to keep in their own place under the oligarchic system.³⁵¹

This passage is of crucial importance in discussing ideological and political matters concerned with the navy, which are topics for later sections of this work.³⁵² For the present discussion, it serves to tell us that the *nautikos ochlos*, at least in the eyes of the oligarchic leaders at Athens, comprised citizens; the nature of the appeals and fears expressed only make sense if the *nautikos ochlos* had citizen rights which could be thought under threat by the new regime. The two passages of Aristotle confirm the idea of the *nautikos ochlos* referring only to those amongst trireme crews who were citizens.

The two incidences in *Politics* appear simple at first sight, but are in fact problematic. In the first, Aristotle is expounding the now commonly held theory of the intrinsic link between military strength and political power within the constitution, giving examples from Greek history. He says:

³⁴⁹ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 78

³⁵⁰ Part Two, section B

³⁵¹ Thucydides, 8.72.1-2

³⁵² Part Three, section 1.

hoion hê en Areiôî pagôî boulê eudokimêsasa en tois Mêdikois edoxe suntonôteran poiêsai tên politeian, kai palin ho nautikos ochlos genomenos aitios tês peri Salamina nikês kai dia tautês tês hêgemonias dia tên kata thalattan dunamin tên dêmokratian ischuroteran epoiêsen

The Council of the Areopagus at Athens, for example, gained in reputation during the Persian War; and seemed for a time to be tightening the constitution. Then naval mob [*nautikos ochlos*], were responsible for the victory at Salamis, and secured for Athens an empire which depended on naval power; and the effect of this was to strengthen once more the cause of democracy.³⁵³

Here then the *nautikos ochlos* is those who manned the triremes at Salamis and in the subsequent campaigns in the Aegean; or to be more precise, *the Athenian citizens* amongst those who crewed the ships; the metics, *xenoi* and slaves are implicitly excluded from the definition by the political context.³⁵⁴ The second passage, more disparaging of the “naval mob”, appears to support this definition. Here Aristotle is discussing the virtues and dangers of sea-power in connection with the hypothetical city:

ei men gar hêgemonikon kai politikon zêsetai bion, anankaion kai tautên tên dunamin huparchein pros tas praxeis summetron. tên de poluanthrôpian tên gignomenên peri ton nautikon ochlon ouk anankaion huparchein tais polesin: outhen gar autous meros einai dei tês poleôs. to men gar epibatikon eleutheron kai tôn pezeuontôn estin, ho kurion esti kai kratei tês nautilias: plêthous de huparchontos perioikôn kai tôn tên chôran geôrgountôn, aphthonian anankaion einai kai nautôn.

If it [the city] prefers to pursue a life of leadership, and of active relations with other cities, naval power must be commensurate with the activities involved. The large population which results from a crowd of naval oarsmen [*nautikos ochlos*] is a consequence which need not follow: there is no need for such people to be part of the citizen body. The marines belong to the class of full freemen: they count as part of the infantry, and are in control and command on shipboard. But if there are masses of dwellers-around [*perioikoi*] and farm-workers ready to hand, it should always be possible to draw an abundant supply of sailors from this source.³⁵⁵

The first part of this passage seems to confirm our picture of the *nautikos ochlos*; they are citizens who ensure state power by serving in the navy. However, there is some contradiction in the second part of the passage. Aristotle claims that there is no need for a large *nautikos ochlos* in the ideally-run city, because other groups could be drafted in to pull the oars. There is also the implication that if the serfs and farm-workers rowed the ships, they would somehow be distinct from the *nautikos ochlos* who did the same thing. Part of the difference, I would suggest, is that *nautikos ochlos* specified those men who crewed the navy as their profession. To suggest that an identifiable group of Athenian citizens rowed triremes as, so to speak, a full-time job is not an uncontroversial assertion, but it does have explicit support from a further passage in the *Politics*; although it does not mention the phrase *nautikos ochlos*, it gives us a very good definition of an

³⁵³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1304a20

³⁵⁴ Arguments regarding the balance of social groups within the trireme crews are given below.

³⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b4-15

identifiable group of professional ‘naval people’. Earlier in the work, in listing various groups amongst the *demos* (“common people”) of a state, he says:

eidê gar pleiô tou te dêmou kai tôn legomenôn gnôrimôn estin, hoion dêmou men eidê hen men hoi geôrgoi, heteron de to peri tas technas, allo de to agoraion to peri ônên kai prasin diatribon, allo de to peri tèn thalattan, kai toutou to men polemikon to de chrêmatistikon to de porthmeutikon to d' halieutikon pollachou gar hekasta toutôn poluochla, hoion halieis men en Taranti kai Buzantiôï, triêrikon de Athênêsîn, emporikon de en Aiginêi kai Chiôï, porthmeutikon d' en Tenedôï

So far as the populace is concerned, one sort is engaged in farming; a second is engaged in the arts and crafts; a third is the marketing sort, which is engaged in buying and selling; a fourth is the maritime sort, which in term is partly for naval war [*polomikon*] and partly mercantile, partly employed on ferries, and partly engaged in fisheries. We may note that there are many places where one of these subdivisions forms a considerable body; as fishermen do at Tarentum and Byzantium, the trireme crews [*trierikon*] at Athens, the merchant seamen in Aegina and Cos, and the ferrymen at Tenedos.³⁵⁶

While the phrase *nautikos ochlos* does not occur in this passage, it nonetheless indicates a group amongst the Athenian citizens which crews triremes in a professional capacity, as implied in the second Aristotle passage quoted above. This concept of the “naval mob” fits in with the first Aristotle passage, although admittedly not as well; the people in the ships at Salamis, for instance, could hardly be described as career sailors, even if (as seems not unlikely) many of them stayed on in the trireme fleet and became professional in the years to follow, while securing the Empire for Athens. The Thucydides passage also features citizens who had been at sea and on campaign for an extended period. We have arrived at, therefore, a large but selectively defined group; the *nautikos ochlos* was a sub-division of the citizen body identifiable for making their living at sea, and predominantly aboard triremes.

When referring specifically to people, the term *ochlos* usually takes a more derogatory rather than descriptive tone; ‘rabble’ and ‘mob’ are appropriate translations.³⁵⁷ The work of the Old Oligarch uses the word in this context, contrasting the poor *ochlos* with the rich and good men who benefit the city. For example, in the context of warfare, *ochlos* is used to refer to a mass of people without organization or formation and is often opposed to the well-ordered and ranked hoplite phalanx. It is a highly charged term, and therefore it should not be surprising that Aristotle, in the third passage above, eschews it for something more neutral in his description of naval folk. As mentioned above, its association with the word *nautikos*, which in other forms can mean ‘fleet’ or ‘navy’, is not a common one, and the derogatory nature of the combination is clear in the three passages quoted above. *Nautikos ochlos* is a simply a more negative way to refer the professional group of seamen described neutrally in the third Aristotle passage. Gabrielsen appears to appreciate this, when he argues that “the Athenian demos was renowned

³⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1291b18-25

³⁵⁷ Hunt (*Slaves, Warfare and Ideology*, p. 126, n. 32), in discussing 8.72 quoted above, argues that Thucydides often used the term neutrally, and quotes examples. While the general argument may be valid, the context here, the perceptions and fears of the Athenian oligarchs, probably calls for a disparaging tone.

for its nautical abilities...so that Aristotle could refer to part of it as the “trieres folk” (*trieriokon*) or “naval mob” (*nautikos ochlos*).³⁵⁸ The part of the Athenian demos to which these passages refer is, I suggest, that part which earned its sole or primary living on board triremes.

In modern writing, the term is frequently used in a wider context, although of course it still includes that group of lower class Athenian citizens united by their service in the navy, and in two of these passages, seemingly characterized by their democratic instincts.³⁵⁹ While such evidence provides some justification for linking the navy crews and democratic politics, the extent and nature of this link is going to be the subject of Part Two. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature and political contexts of the passages involved, the sources clearly have only citizens in mind when they talk of the *nautikos ochlos*. While this superficially provides some justification for modern writers equating trireme crews with the thete class, we need not be bound by the same constraints and prejudices as Aristotle and Thucydides. While the elimination of other social groups from their key role in the navy in our sources is a phenomena worthy of comment, it is certainly not worthy of emulation. Any political analysis is obviously going to concentrate on citizens, but we must not forget that, if we are faithful to the (albeit limited) ancient usage of the phrase, *nautikos ochlos* no more corresponds to ‘trireme crews’ that it does to ‘thetic class’; many thetes were not trireme crewmen and many in trireme crews were non-citizen. In the next section I will investigate what portion of our trireme crews were full-time citizens, and thus how many of the thetes belonged to the *nautikos ochlos*.

Social Status Groups in Trireme Crews

There is good evidence to suggest that those who manned the fleet were not exclusively Athenian citizens, and even that citizens did not form a majority of crewmen. In an inscription dating from around the turn of the fourth century BC, which appears to be some sort of trireme crew list, the bulk of crewmen are listed under three headings;³⁶⁰ *nautai astoi* (‘sailors of the city’, referring to citizens),³⁶¹ *xenoi* (foreigners; principally from the Aegean islands though many were presumably metics resident in Athens)³⁶² and *therapontes* (slaves).³⁶³ This inscription confirms the general picture from the sum of the surviving evidence, mostly for the fifth century, which suggests a strong contribution from these social groups, but it does not indicate that any one of these groups contributed significantly more than any other. Nevertheless there has been much scholarly debate on the relative importance to the fleet of these groups.³⁶⁴ The speech of Pericles to the Athenian

³⁵⁸ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp.108-9

³⁵⁹ I discuss this issue below, Part Three, Section 1.

³⁶⁰ This unique inscription, IG I³ 1032, contains nothing to indicate the reason for its existence, being nothing more than a list of names and crew positions. The dating of the inscription to 410-390 BC relies primarily on epigraphic arguments, and although prosopographical investigation render this period very likely, there is no way to be more precise. The ‘marines’ on the stone are listed as *epibatai* and *toxotai*, and the specialist crewmen in terms of their duties onboard (for example, *kubernetes*, *protates* etc).

³⁶¹ IG I³ 1032, ll. 3, 50, 172 and 305

³⁶² IG I³ 1032, l. 71.

³⁶³ IG I³ 1032, l. 227.

³⁶⁴ Amit (*Athens and the Sea*, p. 31) gives an overview of the debate, before concluding that citizens played the dominant role; Whithead provides a very brief review of the positions adopted; *Ideology of the Athenian Metec*, p.84.

ekklesia in 431 BC makes clear that citizens and mercenaries contributed significantly to trireme crews in this period, and the Old Oligarch suggests that metics were also crucial to the operation of the fleet.³⁶⁵ The close links between the merchant shipping crews and trireme crews, which existed in both the fourth and the fifth centuries, may suggest that non-citizens, even slaves, regularly worked aboard triremes as well as merchantmen.³⁶⁶ It is the issue of slaves amongst the oarsmen that has been most contentious.³⁶⁷ In the fourth century BC, Isocrates suggested that in Athens' imperial hey-day, slaves and foreigners crewed the triremes, whereas in his time it was citizens who took the oars.³⁶⁸ While there is clearly much exaggeration in his suggestion, the Old Oligarch reports that finding slaves in the fifth century fleet was not unusual; he says that Athenian citizens and their slaves learnt seamanship through being at sea regularly, and that masters were keen to put their slaves to work on the oars so they could profit from their wages.³⁶⁹ Slaves were also present in the triremes sent to Sicily; in the letter Nicias sent back to Athens, he reported on the fate of his crews, saying that "the slaves, since we [and the Syracusans] are now on terms of equality, desert."³⁷⁰ In the face of this testimony, the suggestion that slaves were only present in the Athenian fleet for the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC seems untenable;³⁷¹ what was unusual on this occasion was that those slaves who did take part were promised freedom and citizenship.³⁷² It seems clear, therefore, that slaves rowed Athenian triremes side by side with citizens, foreigners and metics on a regular basis in the fifth century BC.³⁷³

There is far less evidence for the composition of trireme crews in the fourth century BC. As noted above, Isocrates certainly thought that citizen conscripts were compelled to row triremes in his day more so than in the past. Conscription was the exception rather than the rule in both the fourth and the fifth century, but we do hear of citizen conscripts taking oars more regularly. Apollodorus, during his trierarchy in the late 360s BC, turned away the citizens called up to serve on his ship as they were of inferior quality, and he preferred to hire crewmen privately;³⁷⁴ the episode suggests that conscription was not an especially effective means of manning the ships. Apollodorus' speech also demonstrates that there were alternatives to conscripted sailors well into the fourth century, and throughout his term of service he seems to have been able to replenish crewmen lost through injury and desertion with ease.³⁷⁵ Clearly then there was a substantial pool of skilled mercenary oarsmen in the fourth century BC, and unlike the fifth, there

³⁶⁵ Thucydides, 1.143; [Xenophon], 1.12.

³⁶⁶ Slaves were often found aboard commercial vessels, sometimes constituting the entire crew. (Casson, *Ancient Trade and Society*, p. 25). The Old Oligarch ([Xenophon], 1.20) attests to the links between the commercial fleet and trireme crews.

³⁶⁷ Sargent, 'The use of slaves' and Casson, 'Galley slaves' deny any slave presence in Athenian triremes; contra Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology*, pp. 90 ff.

³⁶⁸ Isocrates, 8.48.

³⁶⁹ [Xenophon], 1.11, cf. 1.19.

³⁷⁰ Thucydides, 7.13.2; Graham, 'Crews of Athenian triremes', p. 259.

³⁷¹ Sargent, 'The use of slaves', p. 278.

³⁷² Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.24 cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs*, l. 693.

³⁷³ As was the case in the contemporary navies of other states; for example those of Corcyra (Thucydides, 1.55.1), and Chios (Thucydides, 8.15)

³⁷⁴ [Demosthenes], 50.7

³⁷⁵ [Demosthenes], 50.12

were plentiful employment alternatives to the Athenian navy.³⁷⁶ The fact that the *Paralos* was remarkable for having an all-citizen crew in the 330s BC, and that we see a slave serving as a trireme's *auletes*, suggests that crews of mixed social backgrounds were the norm.³⁷⁷ The exact relative proportion of citizens to non-citizens in the crews is of course impossible to determine, and no doubt varied widely from fleet to fleet and year to year. IG I³ 1036 and the sum of our other evidence suggests that each group made a numerically significant contribution throughout the period, so rather than placing emphasis on testimonies that suggest that one group was more numerous than the others, it is perhaps better to suppose a relatively even contribution from the four principal social groups involved. On this interpretation, citizens did not have a dominant presence, and were outnumbered by non-citizens. Even if this conclusion is not accepted, the evidence does not allow us to argue for an overwhelming number of citizens amongst trireme crews, and the large numbers of non-citizens within the navy must surely be of great significance when considering the political influence of the trireme crews at Athens.

Professional Sailors³⁷⁸

It is equally clear that a substantial number (and the evidence permits us no more precision) of trireme crewmen made their sole or primary living as trireme crewmen. Even given the great fluctuations in the numbers of ships in commission throughout the fifth century especially, which in term required equal fluctuations in the numbers of crewmen at sea, there is plentiful evidence to suggest a large number of full-time seamen amongst the trireme crews. As we have seen already in the discussion of Athenian fleet patterns on the fifth century, Athens was regularly able to keep substantial numbers of ships in commission all year round, which surely implies a large proportion of those on board did not have other occupations.³⁷⁹ The citizens amongst these men, who spent most of their lives at sea and were identifiable as seaman as opposed to anything else, are those whom I have identified as the “naval mob”. It is to an audience of Athenian citizens that Pericles makes the point that skill in seamanship “allows one no spare time for anything else”.³⁸⁰ Just how many of the full-time crewmen were citizens as opposed to slaves, metics or *xenoi* is not apparent from our sources. Thucydides’ description suggests that in the early years of the Delian League, the Athenian citizens themselves played a leading role in the campaigns,³⁸¹ and Plutarch’s fleet of 60 ships in permanent commission is described (probably with some inaccuracy) as being manned by citizens.³⁸² Rosivach has argued that, for the early years of the Peloponnesian war, mercenaries provided most of the ‘full-time’ crewmen, while citizens (mainly farmers and farm-workers in their slow season) provided the manpower for the big summer fleets. While there may be some truth in this, it would involve us in imagining a sea-

³⁷⁶ [Demosthenes], 50.16

³⁷⁷ Arrian, *Anabasis*, 3.6, cf. Thucydides, 8.73; Demosthenes, 18.129.

³⁷⁸ I discuss this issue more fully in Part Three, section 2.

³⁷⁹ Plutarch (*Life of Pericles*, 11.4) suggests that 60 triremes were in operation for eight months of every year, and various roles which triremes performed indicates that substantial numbers of ships would be in service even in times of (relative) peace.

³⁸⁰ Thucydides, 1.142.

³⁸¹ Thucydides, 1.99

³⁸² Plutarch, *Pericles*, 11.4

change in manning patterns since the reportedly citizen-based days of the *Pentekontaetia*. In addition, Pericles' speech to the Athenians on the eve of the war suggests that there was a strong professional citizen presence in the navy at that time.³⁸³ So while we can say that a lot of Athenian citizens sailed in triremes in a professional capacity in the fifth century, any more precision in this area will be conjecture and guesswork. I have argued in favour approximately even division in numerical contribution between the four principal social groups that formed trireme crews. Given this, and assuming that Plutarch's suggestion of 60 ships in regular long-term commission during the fifth century is a reasonable estimate for the constant manpower demands of the fleet,³⁸⁴ these two suggestions together would imply a "naval mob" of around 3,000-4,000 these professional crewmen in Athens.³⁸⁵ Although it should go without saying that very little confidence can be had in this specific figure, it is probably along the right lines.

I suggested above that the term "naval mob" is somewhat unsatisfactorily used in modern writing, and I have attempted to find a definition that accords better with the limited ancient testimony. However, even having clearly set out this definition, continuing to use the most accurate translation "naval mob" inevitably carries some of the pejorative sense with which it was used in its original context. A strong argument can be made for abandoning the phrase altogether, an argument that would be conclusive if only there was alternative and equally concise way to express the definition I have defended here, "those Athenian citizens who were identifiable as crewing triremes as their sole or primary occupation". So while I shall continue to use the phrase "naval mob" in this work, I shall highlight it with quotation marks to show that by its use I mean the professional Athenian crewmen, for whom the negative connotations of the phrase should not (necessarily) be applied.

2. *Salamina* and *Paralos*: the "naval mob" personified?

When describing the *Paralos* crew, Thucydides says "each man was a free-born Athenian citizen, and all of whom had always been thoroughly opposed to the idea of an oligarchy, even when there was no question of such a thing existing."³⁸⁶ The *Paralos* crew were Athenian citizens, and clearly identifiable as trireme crewmen; at first glance they appear to be an identifiable personification of the "naval mob". However, while the *Paralos* crew share these essential characteristics of the "naval mob", they also are, in several ways, exceptional. The extent to which *Paralos* and her crew were different from the rest of the Athenian navy will be the subject

³⁸³ Thucydides, 1.140-4. I discuss this speech in more detail in Part 2, section A.2

³⁸⁴ This figure may be a reasonable estimation of the numbers of fifth-century vessels in long-term service. The figures discussed in the previous section have suggested that the average number of ships per year and the average length of commission for fleets corresponds well with Plutarch's statement. The average number of ships per year in the fifth century was 95, though this figure encompasses long and short term fleets

³⁸⁵ Each ship would have a crew of up to 200. Assuming that between a quarter and a third of the crew comprised Athenian citizens, that would give between 50 and 67 Athenians per ship. Across 60 ships, this would equal between 3000 and 4020 Athenian citizens.

³⁸⁶ Thucydides, 8.73.5

of this section, and this will make it clear whether a useful analogy can be drawn between the *Paralos* crew and the “naval mob” as a whole.

Modern views

The special status of the *Paralos* is often noted in modern writing; for example, Morrison describes her as “one of the two crack state triereis”³⁸⁷ which “went on errands for the state”.³⁸⁸ The other one of these “state” vessels, the *Salaminia*, is often mentioned in the same breath as the *Paralos* in modern writing.³⁸⁹ Casson, for example, writes “The Athenians had a famous pair, the *Paralos* and the *Salaminia*, the swiftest units in the fleet, which they constantly used to carry messages or transport important personages”.³⁹⁰ At the point of their first appearance in Thucydides, Hornblower describes them as “The Athenian sacred triremes...two fast ships used for special missions”,³⁹¹ while the footnote given by Warner at this point in the Penguin edition reads “these two ships were the elite of the Athenian navy, in service throughout the year for special missions.”³⁹² They are invariably described as having some combination of the following attributes; for being especially fast and/or elite, for being “state” vessels, for being sent on particular types of mission (“such as the despatch of news...or the transport of ambassadors”)³⁹³, for being “sacred” vessels, and for the unique nature of the crew. None of these statements are absolutely false; but some are more appropriate than others, and some are misleading. For example, Kagan’s statement that the *Paralos* was “Athens’ messenger ship”³⁹⁴ implies both that the job of sending information was the unique preserve of the *Paralos*, and also that *Paralos*’ sole role was to deliver messages. Both are misleading implications that are not borne out by the evidence.

Primary Evidence for the *Paralos* and the *Salaminia*

The evidence for the *Salaminia* and the *Paralos* is, as ever, patchy and incomplete, but it does allow a more precise description of how these ships were different from the ‘standard’ Athenian trireme, and thus why they were the best known ships in the Athenian navy. Thucydides is the first author to mention the ships, and he refers to several of their missions during the Peloponnesian war, and Xenophon’s narrative similarly mentions the vessels at relevant points in his history. The ships were well known enough in late fifth-century Athens to be referred to by name in several of Aristophanes’ plays, most notably in *Birds*. In the fourth century, a section of Demosthenes’ prosecution of Meidias refers to the latter’s allegedly dishonourable service as treasurer of the *Paralos*; a brief and one sided account, but which gives valuable evidence about

³⁸⁷ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 136

³⁸⁸ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 155, n.28

³⁸⁹ As will be discussed in more detail below, the two are mentioned together in the ancient sources too; twice in Thucydides, once in Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, and once in Aristophanes’ *Birds*.

³⁹⁰ Casson, *Ancient Mariners*, p. 92

³⁹¹ Hornblower, *Commentary on Thucydides*, ad loc 3.33

³⁹² p. 210.

³⁹³ Sommerstein, note on Aristophanes, *Birds*, l. 147

³⁹⁴ Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 170.



this vessel. Remarks in the Scholia, and later sources such as Plutarch, Pliny and Arrian, add to the somewhat fragmented picture of these ships.

One persistent problem in investigating these ships is the question of how different they were from one another. They are on several occasions mentioned as a pair in our sources. Thucydides describes them sailing out of Athens together in 427 BC,³⁹⁵ and later in that year, fighting as part of the same Athenian fleet.³⁹⁶ Xenophon mentions them together amongst ships gathered up by the general Iphikrates in composing his naval force.³⁹⁷ These occasions are records of the ships' movements and actions, rather than qualities. A character in Aristophanes' *Birds* mentions them in the same breath, pretending to mistake an envoy from the Gods for one or other of these vessels.³⁹⁸ While this is quite sufficient testimony to suggest that these ships often operated together, it is perhaps not sufficient to justify the supposition that characteristics described as belonging to one vessel or its crew (for example, the fact that all the *Paralos* crew were Athenian citizens) was necessarily shared by the other.³⁹⁹ There is enough evidence to be more exact in terms of the 'unique' characteristics attributed to these vessels in modern works. It happens that most of the information regarding these features pertains to the *Paralos*, which appears to have been the more significant of the two vessels.⁴⁰⁰

Special Missions

The oft-repeated statement that the *Paralos* and *Salaminia* were used, or even reserved, for special (often diplomatic) missions is not borne out by the literary evidence of their actions. While Plutarch records an anecdote of Critolaus that Pericles "reserved himself...like the galley *Salaminia*, for great occasions",⁴⁰¹ evidence from more reliable sources suggests that this is not invariably the case. Thucydides' first report of the two ships, in 427 BC, has them bringing news of an approaching Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenian general Paches, stationed at Mytilene.⁴⁰² However, the ships were not launched in order to bring this news; they "happened to be sailing from Athens" when they spotted the enemy fleet and altered course.⁴⁰³ The fact that *Salaminia* and *Paralos* are sailing together at this time tells against there being assigned a diplomatic mission, as such delegations were usually carried by a single vessel.⁴⁰⁴ The point at which the *Salaminia* and *Paralos* joined the Naupactos fleet is not clear. They are named at 3.77 as

³⁹⁵ Thucydides, 3.33

³⁹⁶ Thucydides, 3.77

³⁹⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.2.14

³⁹⁸ Aristophanes, *Birds*, l. 1203

³⁹⁹ As for example, Jordan does (*Athenian Navy*, p. 174) when he suggests that the group known as the *Paraloi* could be considered a *genos*, as the *Salaminioi* were one.

⁴⁰⁰ If only in terms of longevity; [Aristotle] records (61.5) that there was a treasurer elected for the *Paralos*, and one also for the *Ammonia*. The usual interpretation is that this latter vessel replaced the *Salaminia* sometime in the 4th century BC. Even if the *Salaminia* still part of the fleet in the late fourth century BC, its absence from [Aristotle]'s account would suggest that it did not have comparable status to *Paralos*.

⁴⁰¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 7

⁴⁰² Thucydides, 3.33

⁴⁰³ Thucydides, 3.33

⁴⁰⁴ The Corcyraeans' closing of their harbour to all but single Athenian or Spartan vessels (Thucydides, 3.71.1) suggests that this was the usual size for a diplomatic mission.

amongst the 12 ships that fought in the battle, but it is unclear whether they should be included in the other references to the fleet of 12 ships several chapters earlier.⁴⁰⁵ For the purposes of the present discussion it matters only a little; the undisputed presence of the *Salamina* and the *Paralos* in the line of battle should be enough to highlight the fact that they were not reserved for special missions and taking messages.

The *Paralos* crew were selected by the *stratiotai* on Samos and the Samians to relay news to Athens 411 BC.⁴⁰⁶ While the ship was certainly being used as a messenger vessel in this instance, it should not be taken as evidence that the *Paralos* exclusively filled this role. It is likely that the ship had been stationed at Samos for quite some time, and taken a full (but unrecorded) part in the various naval operations between 412 BC and the *stasis*, and again afterwards when she returned to Samos in 411 BC. Similarly, *Paralos* is reported by Xenophon as being one of the few ships that escaped from the fiasco at Aigospotamoi in 404 BC,⁴⁰⁷ and was the vessel which bore the news to Athens; certainly this is evidence of the *Paralos* as a messenger, but her earlier contribution as part of this fleet was not remarked upon.

It may be argued that the *Paralos* would not normally have been present in a war-fleet such as the one that fought at Aigospotamoi; the desperate circumstances of the fleet's launch, with citizenship being offered to anyone who pulled an oar, would surely explain the presence of a normally reserved vessel in the battle line.⁴⁰⁸ Along with the example of the battle off Corcyra mentioned above, a later reference in Xenophon's narrative shows that this was not the case. In 373 BC, Iphikrates persuaded the Athenians to add the fleet cruising around Attica, along with the *Salamina* and *Paralos*, to his own force due to sail round the Peloponnese.⁴⁰⁹ The ships presumably played a full role in Iphikrates' successful campaign though were not mentioned by name again.

Demosthenes' prosecution of his political enemy Meidias sometime around 350 BC reveals a great deal about the *Paralos*.⁴¹⁰ Demosthenes attacked Meidias' record as a public figure and performer of liturgies, pouring scorn on, amongst other things, his record as treasurer of the *Paralos*. The vessel's status as "sacred" is highlighted,⁴¹¹ and some of the duties (and, in this case, abuses) of the treasurer are briefly described. Under Meidias' leadership, Demosthenes alleges that the *Paralos* was involved in plundering and extorting the people of Cyzicus (from which activities Meidias profited substantially), and was also involved in the campaign against Euboea; in particular, the *Paralos* appears on this occasion to have been involved in the

⁴⁰⁵ I discuss the sequence of events above, Part One, section B.2

⁴⁰⁶ Thucydides, 8.74. For fuller discussion, See Part Two, Section B.2

⁴⁰⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.1.28-9

⁴⁰⁸ This offer was made before the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC (Aristophanes, *Frogs*, l. 694 with Scholia). Following that hollow victory, it appears that most of the fleet remained at sea until the disastrous 'battle' of Aigospotamoi a year later.

⁴⁰⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.2.14. It seems to be coincidence that this campaign also involves fighting around Corcyra.

⁴¹⁰ Demosthenes, 21.171-4

⁴¹¹ Demosthenes, 21.174. See discussion below

transporting of troops from Athens to Euboea, for which operation the treasurer was to have dispersed a fund of 12 talents.⁴¹² According to Demosthenes these instructions were not carried out with diligence appropriate to the office, but there is nothing that suggests the tasks were themselves unusual. Once again, therefore, the *Paralos* appears to have performed a variety of tasks and missions according to the needs of the political and military situation.

The best example of a ‘special’ diplomatic mission undertaken by the *Paralos* comes late in the fourth century, and is reported in a late source. According to Arrian, the *Paralos* was sent by the Athenians to negotiate with Alexander the Great at Tyre in 322 BC:

Entautha aphikneitai par'auton ex Atheneon he Paralos presbeis agousa Diopanton kai Achillea. Xunepresbeuon de autoiskai hoi Paraloi xumpantes. Kai houtoi ton te allon etuxon hon heneka estalesan

[When Alexander was in Tyre] the sacred vessel called the *Paralos* came to him from Athens, bringing Diophantus and Achilles as envoys to him; and indeed all the *Paraloi* were members of the deputation. Approaching Alexander, these men achieved all the objects of their mission.⁴¹³

This notice is exceptional. The history of these ships suggests that there was little unique in the types of jobs they did; at various times, they carried troops, fought in sea battles, reinforced blockading fleets, as well as acting as messengers and carrying diplomats; in other words, they performed the wide range of roles usual to triremes of this period. It seems that the “sacred” status of the vessels and the weight of cultic association added to their importance and renown, and led to their being chosen for some special diplomatic missions, such as the *Paralos*’ mission to Alexander, but the sending of important political delegations were not unique to these two ships, nor was their role confined to such things.

State ships and sacred vessels

The description of the *Salaminia* and *Paralos* as state ships seems to be somewhat misleading. While some extremely rich private individuals owned personal triremes,⁴¹⁴ nearly all the ships of the Athenian navy were state ships; it is not a feature which distinguishes the *Paralos* and the *Salaminia* from ‘regular’ triremes. Some justification for this title may be found in the presence of an elected Athenian official aboard.⁴¹⁵ These treasurers seem to have had role in the distribution of public money for naval campaigns, though it was also usual for these funds to be handled by the *stratego*.⁴¹⁶ It appears that these monies were for the campaign and not the ship itself, and furthermore that Treasurer of the *Paralos* did not command the vessel; an inscription

⁴¹² Demosthenes, 21.173-4.

⁴¹³ Arrian, *Anabasis*, 3.6.1-2

⁴¹⁴ Alcibiades’ forebear, Klienias, supplied his personally owned trireme at the battle of Salamis, but he is one of the last recorded individuals known to privately own such a vessel. Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 1-2.

⁴¹⁵ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 61.5

⁴¹⁶ Demosthenes, 21.174 Apollodorus ([Demosthenes] 50.10) refers to receiving (or rather in his case, not receiving) money from the generals.

set up in the mid-fourth century by the *Paraloi* and dedicated to their trierarch Anthippos shows this:

[*hoi*] *Paraloi* a[*po ton---on*] *hoi Paraloi apo t[on---on]*. *Anthippos etrie[rarchei]*

The *Paraloi*...The *Paraloi* from...Anthippos, trierarch.⁴¹⁷

It seems difficult to argue that the trierarch (an appointed liturgical duty relating to a single ship) and the Treasurer (a popularly-elected office with seemingly wide financial responsibilities) were one and the same post, though this has been supposed.⁴¹⁸ There is however no single source that refers to the trierarch and *tamias* as separate individuals, and so the question is beyond absolute proof. While every vessel in the fleet would have had at least one trierarch, the presence of an elected Athenian official aboard the *Paralos* probably made this ship (and by extension the *Salaminia* too) seem more of the state than regular triremes.

Some confusion can also be accounted for by the fact that Demosthenes contrasted the *Paralos* with triremes he describes as *idiotikon*, ‘private’.⁴¹⁹ It seems that the term is somewhat loosely used by Demosthenes, as a slightly earlier section of this speech suggests the provenance of these ships; they were ‘voluntarily donated’ to the navy by wealthy, patriotic and ‘philotimic’⁴²⁰ Athenians, who then often commanded them through the liturgy of the trierarchy.⁴²¹ While these vessels were clearly part of the Athenian navy, their origin could easily be made slightly ambiguous by a cunning speaker like Demosthenes. But he does not describe the *Paralos* by contrast as ‘state-owned’ or ‘public’, but as *hieran*, ‘sacred’.

It is far more meaningful, and with far better grounding in the ancient evidence, that the ships are described as ‘sacred’. Not only was *Paralos* explicitly described as such, but a passage in Aristophanes’ *Birds*, staged in 414 BC confirms that this was probably true of the *Salaminia* as well:

Iris: *para tôn theôn egôge tôn Olumpiôn.*

Peisetairos: *onoma de so. ti esti; Paralos ê Salaminia;*

Iris: *Iris tacheia.*

Peisetairos: *ploion ê kunê;*

Iris: I am from the gods, the Olympian gods.

Peisetaerus: And what’s your name? *Paralos* or *Salaminia*?

Iris: Iris the fast.

Peisetaerus: Do you mean a fast boat, or a fast bitch?⁴²²

⁴¹⁷ IG II² 2966. This fact however did not stop Demosthenes (21.174) attempting to lay the blame for the perceived failures of the ship’s maintenance at the door of her *tamias* Meidias.

⁴¹⁸ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Fleet*, p. 73 cf. p. 243, n. 12, argues this; “the commanders of the sacred ships, *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, bore the distinct title of treasurers, *tamiai*, and were elected officers”, a view which does not sit particularly comfortably with his later statement (p. 88) that the *Paraloi* “carried a permanent obligation to furnish the commander of the sacred ship”.

⁴¹⁹ Demosthenes, 21.174

⁴²⁰ *Philotimia* translates literally as “love of honour”, and refers to the spirit of competition amongst the elite in terms of conspicuous and generous performance of liturgies in exchange for recognition, respect and favours from the community.

⁴²¹ Demosthenes, 21.160

⁴²² Aristophanes, *Birds*, l.1203-4

The pairing of *Paralos* and *Salaminia* in this passage, and Peisetaerus' pretending to assume that someone from the Gods must have been one ship or the other, suggests that both vessels were sacred, and famous for being so. The question of how many other sacred vessels Athens possessed is an interesting one, but not relevant to the debate here.⁴²³ However many there were, it seems from the extent of the evidence on *Paralos* and *Salaminia* that these two vessels occupied a privileged place in Athenian consciousness. But how did sacred vessels differ from regular Athenian triremes?

The evidence suggests two principle features unique to these two 'sacred' triremes. Firstly and most obviously, these sacred vessels "served certain ceremonial and religious purposes".⁴²⁴ While these ships performed all the roles usual to triremes, they appear to have had extra duties relating to their 'sacred' status. Such tasks could have included the conveying of sacred embassies, *theoria*, that were "regularly sent to a sacrifice, and to the festivals" aboard *theoric* ships.⁴²⁵ The mission of the *Salaminia* in 414 BC, to go to Sicily and arrest Alcibiades, should perhaps be regarded in this religious context.⁴²⁶ Alcibiades was accused of serious religious wrongdoing, the breaking of the Herms statues in Athens, and profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries; it may have been the case that sacred vessels were required to bring such defendants to trial. As Lambert notes, it is possible that Alcibiades himself was a member of the Salaminioi and this possibility makes the sending of the *Salaminia* to arrest him, and his subsequent escape, even more interesting.⁴²⁷

These two 'sacred' triremes also appear to differ from the norm in terms of the selection of their crew. Thucydides' account of the political turmoil of 411 BC makes clear that the *Paraloi* were a distinct and identifiable group even when not crewing the *Paralos*, and highlights that "those who sailed on the *Paralos* being Athenians and free men one and all".⁴²⁸ It is possible to be more precise; Garland suggests that the worshippers of the hero Paralos, the son of Poseidon and the inventor of the warship,⁴²⁹ "are to be identified with the crew of the sacred trireme Paralos",⁴³⁰ and this association with the cult would perhaps explain why the whole crew were Athenian citizens. Kearns also identifies the *Paraloi* as both the trireme crewmen and those sacrificing to the hero, arguing that "the hero Paralos, for whose worship they came together, functioned as a focus of loyalty and an expression of corporate identity".⁴³¹

⁴²³ There was at least one other vessel that performed a sacred role; the *triacontor* (30-oared ship) that conveyed the sacred embassies to Delos every 4 and 6 years. [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 54.7 cf. 56.3. Jordan (*Athenian Navy*, pp. 153-81) argues that there were several more sacred vessels, but his arguments do not always persuade. If there were other sacred triremes, they would no doubt have performed similar tasks to those discussed here, but they may not have had, like *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, all-citizen crews.

⁴²⁴ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 153

⁴²⁵ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 156, referring to the Suda. Cf. Part One, section A.3.

⁴²⁶ Thucydides, 6.53 and 6.61, cf. Aristophanes, *Birds*, 147

⁴²⁷ Lambert, 'The Attic Genos Salaminioi', p. 103, n. 68, cf. p.97, n. 28

⁴²⁸ Thucydides, 8.73.5

⁴²⁹ Pliny, *Natural History*, 7.56.207

⁴³⁰ Garland, *Piraeus*, p. 131

⁴³¹ Kearns, *Heroes of Attica*, p. 42-3, cf. p. 193

The crew of the *Salaminia* were perhaps associated with a specific *genos* group called the *Salaminioi*.⁴³² Lambert suggests that the “genos of the Salaminioi might have regarded themselves as descendants of the original 6th century settlers on Salamis”, men with interests on the island and in Attica itself.⁴³³ He also accepts the thrust of Jordan’s suggestion that the men of the *genos* crewed the *Salaminia*, and if this is so he argues that “the three groups of Athenian “Salaminioi” attested in the classical period... [the *genos*, Athenians living on the island and the trireme crew]...would be nicely interconnected”.⁴³⁴ It might also suggest that the “Attic vessel” that Plutarch describes as taking part in ceremonial re-enactments of the Athenian conquest of Salamis could have been the *Salaminia* herself.⁴³⁵ Taylor is dismissive of the connection between the ship and the *genos*, suggesting that there is no evidence for anyone of the *Salaminioi* serving on the *Salaminia*, and that their presence as trierarchs on other ships suggests that they would not have been able to bear the financial burden of the upkeep of the *Salaminia* too.⁴³⁶ Given how little we know about the *Salaminioi* and its membership, neither of these objections is strong enough to disprove a connection, but the case must remain uncertain. If the *Salaminia*’s crew were provided from the *Salaminioi*, whether or not we identify the vessel with Solon’s “Attic ship”, it would suggest that she was similar to the *Paralos* not only in respect of their ‘sacred’ status, but also in their all-citizen crews.

The fastest ships with elite crews

It is often stated that the *Salaminia* and the *Paralos* were the fastest ships in the fleet. Notwithstanding the fact that all triremes were noted for their speed, the case for these vessels being faster than the rest of the Athenian navy rests on very thin grounds. In his prosecution of Meidias, Demosthenes makes mention of the ‘fact’ that, when his opponent was treasurer of the *Paralos*, the sacred vessel was overtaken by a “private” warship, and that this showed culpable negligence on Meidias’ part.⁴³⁷ The inference is, presumably, that under normal circumstances and a responsible treasurer, the *Paralos* should have been able to outstrip any ship in the fleet. As noted above, it seems likely that the blame for this alleged disgraceful conduct should rightly fall on whoever was the trierarch of the *Paralos* at that time, and not on the *tamias*. Demosthenes is not presenting an ordered and balanced account of the comparative speeds of Athenian ships; he is simply flinging accusations of misconduct at Meidias and hoping that some will stick. There is no need to believe unreservedly, based on this passage, that the sacred ships were the fastest in the fleet.

There is very little evidence on which to judge the relative speeds of the two sacred vessels and the rest of the Athenian navy. It is unlikely that the *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, or any other ship,

⁴³² Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 165-72

⁴³³ Lambert, ‘The Attic *genos* Salaminioi’, p. 99.

⁴³⁴ Lambert, ‘The Attic *genos* Salaminioi’, pp. 102-3

⁴³⁵ Lambert, ‘The Attic *genos* Salaminioi’, p. 100. If this connection is accepted, it is a good example of the kind of additional duties that ‘sacred’ triremes would have undertaken. I quote this passage in Part 1, A.3

⁴³⁶ Taylor, *Salamis and the Salaminioi*, p. 114, n. 23

⁴³⁷ Demosthenes, 21.174

would have had a greatly superior structure to any other trireme in the fleet, and certainly not to newer built vessels; if these were the fastest ships, it would have been because they had the best and strongest rowers; in other words, an elite crew. It is a not infrequent boast of litigants that, during their trierarchy, they commanded the fastest ship in the fleet.⁴³⁸ When a reason is given for their speed, it is that the trierarch was willing to spend money to secure the best crew. It would of course serve the interests of the litigants to attribute their ship's performance to their outlay, but it is also likely to have been the truth; better pay would usually secure better crew, and thus a faster ship.

It has been argued above that, in terms of social status, the crew of the *Salamina* and *Paralos* could indeed be described as comparatively elite.⁴³⁹ But were they elite in the professional sense as well? There are some references in Aristophanes to the *Salaminioi* in the context of rowing, which might suggest that they were famous and skilful in this art. These passages, however, are primarily excuses for Aristophanes to make jokes based on the fact that the verb to row was a euphemism for having sex. In the *Ecclesiazusae*, for example, one of the female plotters explains her lateness to the meeting by saying "my husband is from Salamis, you see, and all night long he was rowing me between the sheets."⁴⁴⁰ It is the association of the sailors with both ways of 'rowing', rather than the sober evaluation of the relative strength of crewmen and velocity of Athenian warships, that is Aristophanes' concern here.

The eponymous heroine of *Lysistrata* also had to deal with poor attendance at her female political gathering. In assessing the poor turnout, Lysistrata comments that "There isn't a single woman here from the Paralia, nor from Salamis"⁴⁴¹ It is clearly the two ships of similar name that Aristophanes was alluding to here; the nautical flavour of the jokes in this section are similar to the *Ecclesiazusae* passage quoted above. Sommerstein seems to consider this also a reference to great speed of *Salamina* and *Paralos*; "if these were Athens' quickest moving ships, the districts bearing their names should produce Athens' quickest moving women".⁴⁴² While we should not exclude this fairly absurd possibility, it is perhaps a better supposition to assume that the women from these places would be, like their menfolk, politically active and interested in participating; their prompt arrival was expected not because of their speed, but because of their dedication to a political cause. Thucydides provides solid evidence for the political disposition of the *Paralos* and the decisive action that resulted from it; perhaps this passage suggests that the crew of the *Salamina* were similarly forceful.

⁴³⁸ [Demosthenes] 50.12; Lysias, 21.6-7.

⁴³⁹ Comparative, that is, to the mix of metics, slaves and citizens that formed the crew of every other Athenian trireme.

⁴⁴⁰ Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, 38

⁴⁴¹ Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 58

⁴⁴² Sommerstein's note on *Lysistrata*, l. 58, p. 157. cf. "the reference is to wives of the *Paraloi*, i.e. the crew of the ship *Paralos*, who, it is implied, might be expected to arrive promptly."

There is just as little evidence concerning the pay, recruitment and conditions of the crew of the *Paralos* and *Salaminia*. It is suggested in a late lexicographical source that the crews of the *Paralos* were paid throughout the year, at the rate of four obols per day.⁴⁴³ This is a lower wage than could be gained in the open market, where a drachma a day was expected.⁴⁴⁴ It is likely that the ship did not have to be actually on duty for the crew to be paid, but that the *Paraloi* were always ‘on call’ for manning their ship. This was not the case in the Athenian navy as a whole, where wages appear to have been given per day worked, and is more comparable with the daily stipend given to officials and magistrates such as members of the *boule*, or Council.⁴⁴⁵ Given this (admittedly slim) evidence for the terms, conditions and wages of the crews of one of the ‘sacred’ ships, it is perhaps unlikely that they would often be the very fastest triremes in Athens’ navy. The *Paralos* and the *Salaminia* probably selected their crews on the basis of their belonging to certain organizations; the cult of *Paralos* and the *genos Salaminioi* respectively. While these groups would no doubt have been keen to maintain their respective ships to the highest possible standard, they would have been competing with vessels crewed by rowers drawn from all over the Greek world. The basic pay for these rowers was a little higher than that for the sacred triremes, and securing a rowing berth (not to mention bonus pay) depended on an individual’s skill and reputation. A keen and wealthy trierarch could offer big bonuses to secure a fully professional crew,⁴⁴⁶ one which would probably be capable of regularly out-rowing the sacred ships. The fact that Demosthenes, in the context of a rhetorical attack on an enemy, regarded it as disgraceful that the *Paralos* was overtaken by a private warship does not necessarily mean that such a thing was ordinarily impossible.

Conclusions

While *Salaminia* and *Paralos* performed similar roles to the other vessels in the Athenian navy, and their full time, Athenian citizen crews can in some ways be regarded as an extreme personification of the “naval mob”, there were too several fundamental differences between the sacred ships and the rest, and this makes such an identification dangerous. The Athenian citizen-only environment of the *Paralos* and *Salaminia* may have engendered different beliefs and ideologies to those found in the majority of the Athenian navy and its more cosmopolitan crew make-ups. In other ways too the *Paralos* and its crew were different from the rest of the Athenian navy, in terms of the identity and association with the cult hero for which their ship was named (in the case of the *Paralos*), or as part of the *genos* of the *Salaminioi* (in the case of the *Salaminia*). It was from these land-based associations that the crews were drawn, and which forged their collective identity. Jordan argues that the *Paralos* crew’s action in 411 BC indicated that they “were held together in an organisation with ties stronger than those which spring from common political sympathies or from loyalty to shipmates.”⁴⁴⁷ The conditions under which the

⁴⁴³ Harpokration, *Lexicon*, s.v. *Paralos*. Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 176

⁴⁴⁴ I discuss the pay rates for Athenian sailors in Part Three, section 2

⁴⁴⁵ [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athens*, 62.2

⁴⁴⁶ A client of Lysias (21.10) claimed to have hired the best helmsman in Greece, and *hyperesia* and oarcrew to match.

⁴⁴⁷ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 173.

Paralos crew worked seem to have been somewhat different than those for the navy as a whole. Not only was the crew all citizen, but they appear to have been paid throughout the year, whether actively in commission or not. It was only under exceptional circumstances that they sailed in any vessel but their own, or with any other rowers. This is significantly different than is the case for the “naval mob”, who seem to have been paid a higher wage, but only while actually on active service, and who often moved between ships as the market dictated, with little identification with an individual vessel after a given campaign. Given these factors, it would be unwise to suggest that the “naval mob” was personified by crews of the *Paralos* and *Salaminia*, despite the obvious and significant similarities.⁴⁴⁸

3: Conclusions

This discussion has shown the diversity of the crews of triremes, not only in terms of their social status, but also in what might be called their professional status. The ancient evidence highlights a group amongst the citizen population of Athens who rowed triremes as their profession, in that it was their principal means of supporting themselves and their families. I am using the term “naval mob” in this work to refer to these people specifically; a usage which is consistent with, though not mandated by, the ancient evidence. They represent only a small minority of those many thousands, citizens and non-citizens who, at some point in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, rowed on board a trireme. The crews of the *Salaminia* and *Paralos* present something of an anomaly; not only because they were crewed solely by citizens; it appears that specific organizations were responsible for supplying the crews. These men, while not amongst the fantastically rich, would be a financial cut above the usual naval volunteers; whether they were a match for them in terms of speed and endurance is a debatable issue. In the following Part, I will assess the evidence regarding the connection between democratic politics and the “naval mob” and indeed the navy as a whole.

⁴⁴⁸ I discuss the ideological ramifications of this conclusion in Part Three, section 1.

PART TWO: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND THE ATHENIAN NAVY

prôton men oun touto erô, hoti dikaiôs autothi [kai] hoi penêtes kai ho dêmos pleon echein tôn gennaiôn kai tôn plousiôn dia tode, hoti ho dêmos estin ho elaunôn tas naus kai ho tên dunamin perititheis têi polei, kai hoi kubernêtai kai hoi keleustai kai hoi pentêkontarchoi kai hoi prôiratai kai hoi naupêgoi, --houtoi eisin hoi tên dunamin peritithentes têi polei polu mallon ê hoi hoplitai kai hoi gennaioi kai hoi chrêstoi. epeidê oun tauta houtôs echei, dokei dikaion einai pasi tôn archôn meteinaï en te tôi klêrôi kai en têi cheirotoniai, kai legein exeinaï tôi boulomenôi tôn politôn.

First of all, I maintain that it is appropriate that in [fifth-century BC] Athens the poor and the common people should seem to have more power than the noble and the rich, because it is this class that provides the rowers for the fleet and on which the power of the city is based; for the steersmen, boatswains, pursers, look-out men, shipwrights- these are the men on whom the power of the city is based, far more than the hoplites, the noble and the respectable. Since this is so, it seems appropriate that they should all share in the offices of state by the process of lot and election, and that anyone of the citizens who wishes should have the right to speak before the citizens.⁴⁴⁹

This passage, taken from a political treatise, probably written in the early years of the Peloponnesian War,⁴⁵⁰ is the most explicit statement of a view that has been commonly held in both ancient and modern commentaries on classical Athenian democracy; that the thetes, Athenian citizens of the lowest property class, controlled democratic politics, and that this superiority was caused both practically and ideologically by their contribution to Athens' trireme fleet, seen as the basis of the city's security and power. Aristotle argues that, in general, those who serve the city militarily deserved the right to political power, and this view has fundamentally informed the debate on ancient Greek political life ever since. Amit argues that "Modern scholars have generally accepted the opinion of the ancients and frequently refer to the link between extreme democracy and sea power,"⁴⁵¹ and this is as true now as it was when he wrote it in 1965. Of course, there is far more to Athenian democratic politics than this simple theory can express, and the subject has seen much discussion. Amit himself saw the link as a problematic oversimplification, stating correctly that "sea power alone does not explain democracy."⁴⁵² Athenian democracy has been defined, refined and re-defined by historians and political philosophers on such a scale that listing all their contributions here would be neither practical nor useful. Nevertheless, many would still hold up classical Athens as a prime example

⁴⁴⁹ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.2.

⁴⁵⁰ There is some debate over the date of this work. All points of view are based solely on inferences from the contents of the text itself (what events the author does or doesn't write about), and therefore are not definitively provable. While Hornblower ('A fourth-century date for the Old Oligarch?', pp. 263-84) has recently argued that it may have been written in the fourth century BC, most other scholars prefer to date it to the fifth, usually a time just prior to, or during the first years of, the Peloponnesian War.

⁴⁵¹ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 59

⁴⁵² Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 60. Though he thought that the link was a strong one in the specific case of Athens.

of Aristotle's political theory in practice, and few would find fundamental fault with Hansen's view:

Athens was a radical democracy ruled by the *ekklesia* in which the majority was constituted by thetes who lived within the city walls and were called up to row the ships whenever a squadron was launched.⁴⁵³

Strauss expresses a similar view, but his formulation places more emphasis on the political power claimed and wielded by the sailors themselves, rather than the general class from which the sailors came:

The navy was the backbone of Athens' military power...it allowed the poor men who rowed its warships to leverage political power.⁴⁵⁴

However, van Wees is correct to remark that "The political implications of the rise of the fleet are often noted (though rarely explored in depth)".⁴⁵⁵ While we have several general statements in the ancient sources regarding the influence of naval folk over the democratic system, there is little to suggest how this might have operated.

Thalassocracy and Democracy

There has been much recent debate on exactly when the Athenian democracy became a democracy. In their contributions to one stimulating volume on the democracy, Raaflaub, Ober and Wallace each advocated a different decisive period; for Wallace (and indeed in the imagination of the Athenians themselves), the reforms of Solon in the early sixth century were key.⁴⁵⁶ For Ober, the reforms of Klisthenes, and more importantly the actions of the *demos* itself in restoring them in the face of Spartan occupation in 508/7 BC, defined the beginnings of democracy.⁴⁵⁷ For Raaflaub,⁴⁵⁸ recently followed by van Wees, the policies of Ephialtes and Pericles from 462 BC, and particularly the introduction of pay for political service in the 450s BC was the stage at which "recognized the right of the 'working' classes to play a role in politics beyond attending assemblies and law courts".⁴⁵⁹ It is striking how little any of these arguments fit chronologically with the advent of Athenian thalassocracy, and the development of the navy into the basis of Athenian power. The decisions of Themistocles to develop Piraeus, the trireme navy itself, and the subsequent victory of this fleet over the Persians in 480 BC are considerably later than either Ober's or Wallace's decisive moments, and more than 20 years earlier than that of Raaflaub. In the latter case it can be said that the revenues from the Empire, which were ensured by the fleet, were a key factor in providing the material conditions necessary for radical democracy; but to say that the navy (indirectly) provided the cash for radical democracy is not

⁴⁵³ Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly*, p. 11.

⁴⁵⁴ Strauss, 'The Dead of Arginusae', p. 3-4

⁴⁵⁵ Van Wees, 'Politics and the battlefield: Ideology in Greek warfare', p. 155.

⁴⁵⁶ Wallace, 'Solonian Democracy', pp. 11-28

⁴⁵⁷ Ober, 'Revolution Matters', pp. 67-83. cf. Ober, *The Athenian Revolution*, esp. pp. 32-52.

⁴⁵⁸ Raaflaub, 'Power in the Hands of the People', pp. 31-62

⁴⁵⁹ Van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', p. 62.

the same as saying that service in the navy by poorer citizens itself caused radical democracy to happen.

Nautical Thetes?

Cartledge has argued that “politically, it mattered very much where the specific gravity of Athens’ principal military fighting force was centred”, because “in wartime...practically every available free adult male, citizen and non-citizen, bore arms - or at any rate fought in some capacity”.⁴⁶⁰ Athens had, in Andrzejewski’s terminology, a high “Military Participation Ratio”, or M.P.R, and this fact, he argues, has political consequences. Cartledge’s gloss on bearing arms, (“or at any rate fought in some capacity”) is significant, as the trireme crews emphatically did not bear arms;⁴⁶¹ and as Andrzejewski argues, the significance of the M.P.R is greatly effected by whether “the warriors equip and maintain themselves, or whether they are equipped, provisioned and paid by the state...High M.P.R will exert a stronger levelling influence if the armed forces fall into the first category”.⁴⁶² Here we see quite a difference between hoplites and sailors; hoplite soldiers supplied their own weapons, and the richer hoplites contributed to wars though taxation too. Sailors appear to have been paid from an earlier date, and often at a higher rate, than hoplites.⁴⁶³ The relative significance of self-arming hoplites and professional volunteer trireme crews in terms of M.P.R. is thus less clear and more nuanced than Cartledge or Andrzejewski allow. In his discussion of Athens, Andrzejewski leans heavily on Aristotle to come to the conclusion that:

in Athens it was only when the fleet became the basis of its might that those too poor to afford the equipment of a hoplite, but whose services as oarsmen now became essential, gained equal rights. After the Persian wars, the Athenian state became a sailors’ republic.⁴⁶⁴

This is an admirable summation of the traditional view, but for all its attractive simplicity it is a view that does not really hold up; as Ceccarelli has argued, the two central facts of fifth-century Athens, thalassocracy and radical democracy, are not causally linked.⁴⁶⁵ Whatever date we choose to place the decisive stage in the development of Athenian democracy, none really fits with the establishment of Athens’ thalassocracy. The association of the democracy and the thalassocracy is an ideological construct,⁴⁶⁶ one that, as van Wees puts it, attempted to retrospectively justify the democracy by an appeal to the naval role of the poorer citizens.⁴⁶⁷ The navy was a cosmopolitan institution, and the thetes were only a part, and probably a clear minority, of the total crew of triremes. More importantly in terms of this discussion, the thetes were not defined solely by their role in the navy, and to equate them with trireme crews is

⁴⁶⁰ Cartledge, ‘*Machismo of the Athenian Empire*’, p. 61.

⁴⁶¹ I discuss armed trireme crews as a ‘practical’ matter above (Part One, section A.1) and as an ‘ideological’ matter below (Part 3, section 3)

⁴⁶² Andrzejewski, *Military Organization*, p.34-5

⁴⁶³ I discuss this issue in Part Three, section 2.

⁴⁶⁴ Andrzejewski, *Military Organization*, p.45

⁴⁶⁵ Ceccarelli, ‘sans thalassocratie, pas de démocratie?’, p. 444

⁴⁶⁶ Ceccarelli, ‘sans thalassocratie, pas de démocratie?’, p. 470

⁴⁶⁷ van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p 83

misleading; not least because many thetes were hoplites. As van Wees has argued, the contribution of the thete class to the hoplite army was significant, perhaps over half of the field army on occasions.⁴⁶⁸ In terms of Cartledge's "specific gravity" of fighters, the number of thetes who served as hoplites was probably greater than the number of professional citizen sailors. At a low point of the Athenian population, 411 BC, there were probably 9,000 hoplites in the city of Athens. Van Wees has convincingly argued that around 4,000 of these may have been of the *thete* class.⁴⁶⁹ I estimated, very approximately, that the maximum size of the "naval mob" in the fifth-century hey-day of the navy as being 3-4,000; in other words, at its lowest point, the likely number of thetic hoplites in the fifth century exceeded the highest likely peak size of the "naval mob". Even given the fact that there would have been many non-professional thetes manning the oar benches, we should not be thinking in terms of "nautical thetes" having "*de facto* military-political prepotence"⁴⁷⁰

It has long been noted that while the navy folk of Athens were said to have held power, there are many counter-examples which should caution us from accepting Aristotle's general theory; Corinth, for example, never went democratic despite its powerful navy, and democratic Argos was never a significant naval power. It is perhaps surprising that in the face of such examples the theory is still held to be true for Athens, but we still should test it against the Athenian evidence; indeed Amit argued that the theory came about in the first place because "our authorities had the example of Athens before their eyes, and their generalisations were based on the situation there."⁴⁷¹ But how well founded were such generalisations, even in the specific case of Athens?⁴⁷² Jordan argues that "it was during the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars that the *nautikos ochlos* achieved the position of political power which the Old Oligarch and the political theorists of the fourth century attacked."⁴⁷³ But aside from the broad statements in Aristotle and the Old Oligarch, where and when do we see specific examples Athens' "naval mob" dominating, or even just engaging actively, in politics? The most obvious example is the actions of the trireme crews in resisting a succession of oligarchies took control of Athens in 411 BC; but was this the quintessential example of the democratic feeling and political power of the navy crews, or can we see other motivations and factors in operation here? A study of the events at Samos in 411 BC will form the second part of this section, following a review of the evidence for the contribution made by the "naval mob" to democratic politics in Athens. The relationship between the fleet's role and the power of the Athenian state on the one hand, and the political influence of those who crewed the fleet on the other, can then be properly re-assessed, and in particular it will indicate whether or not the "naval mob" was as politically strong as some of our largely fourth-century source material sometimes suggests.

⁴⁶⁸ Van Wees, 'Myth of the middle class army'.

⁴⁶⁹ 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', pp. 57-90

⁴⁷⁰ Cartledge, 'The *Machismo* of the Athenian Empire', p. 63

⁴⁷¹ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 60

⁴⁷² Even Amit (*Athens and the Sea*, p. 60) conceded that "even in this particular case, the theory is not unquestionable"

⁴⁷³ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 220.

A: Political Institutions and the “Naval Mob”

1: The Navy and the Democracy

This section of the study will explore the link between Athenian citizens who crewed Athens’ navy and the political institutions at Athens. It will discuss various means by which the citizens of Athens’ navy might have been able to secure political power, and to see what evidence we have of them actually doing so; through which democratic institutions could they have made their influence felt? Or were they no stronger in political terms any other professional class in classical Athens?

The Old Oligarch’s view, that the poorer citizens gained power and influence through the contribution of some members of that class to the navy, is subtly but substantially different from saying that it was the men who themselves pulled the oars who controlled the democracy: this latter point of view was held by Plutarch, who states that, as a result of Themistocles’ policies with regard to the Piraeus, “control of policy now passed into the hands of sailors [*nautai*] and boatswains [*keleustes*] and steersmen [*kubernetes*].”⁴⁷⁴ The Old Oligarch is not infrequently cited, however, to substantiate the idea that democratic politics was influenced, even dominated, by the trireme crewmen themselves. A recent and telling example of this is the following statement by Maurer:

In general, the politically dominant ‘nautical crowd’ [i.e. *nautikos ochlos*] of citizen-sailors described, or presupposed, in most fifth- and fourth-century texts seems a thing so constant and so solid that to sift again all the proofs collected by M. Amit, who did his work carefully, seems otiose.⁴⁷⁵

The first source cited for this view, and described a “*locus classicus*”, is the Old Oligarch passage quoted above. The sections of Amit’s work cited in Maurer’s note indeed provide a good discussion of the main point he is looking to make here; that Athenian citizens had a place of “prime importance by their numbers”⁴⁷⁶ in terms of manning triremes. I would disagree with this particular conclusion,⁴⁷⁷ and with using the Old Oligarch to support the idea of a democracy dominated by the “naval mob”. But there is a bigger issue here; the central idea of trireme crews themselves controlling the democracy is extremely problematic. The main problem is trying to find specific examples and manifestations of this in the fourth- and fifth-century evidence. Indeed, Amit’s section⁴⁷⁸ on the matter of the political impact of the “naval mob” argues that “if we look for evidence showing direct influence of the *nautikos ochlos* on the

⁴⁷⁴ Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 19.4

⁴⁷⁵ Maurer, ‘Sailors considered Athenian’, p. 273.

⁴⁷⁶ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 48.

⁴⁷⁷ I would class myself as one of the “stubborn critics” who Maurer suggests (‘Sailors ‘considered’ Athenian’, p. 273, n.4) could dispute this interpretation, and have argued above that citizens, though their contribution to trireme crews was significant, were probably in the minority compared with the non-citizen groups.

⁴⁷⁸ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 57-71

conduct of affairs in particular cases, the result is disappointing.”⁴⁷⁹ It is the purpose of this section to look again for such evidence. Firstly, it will examine the institution of the Assembly in the light of recent work done in the relation to its composition and dynamics. The political apparatus of the Piraeus will also be explored; were the extra offices and occasional *ekklesia* meetings in this deme indicative of the political influence of the “naval mob”, or was this extra administrative machinery simply reflective of the status of the Piraeus as a principal population and commercial centre of Attica? Next, the evidence for signs that the navy and its personnel influenced policy and legislation in Athens in a more abstract and distant sense will be assessed; did the Assembly vote in ways that favoured trireme crews, even if these people were not themselves a significant portion of the Assembly’s make-up? It will also examine the Assembly in the context of electing Athens’ military and naval leaders, the *strategoï*, and briefly look at the myriad of other Athenian boards of officials for traces of the influence of the “naval mob”. Ultimately it will be shown that Amit’s somewhat negative statement, at least in what might be cautiously termed ‘normal circumstances’, is valid.

Amit and the Sea

It is worth setting out a little more fully Amit’s views on the relationship between naval people and the democracy at Athens; given his misgivings about the Aristotelian theory in general, and the lack of evidence for the “naval mob”’s influence in specific cases, his conclusions are a little surprising. He begins with the general theoretical arguments regarding the navy and democracy:

The impression given by the political and philosophical writings concerning Athenian democracy at its zenith, is that the mob dominated the Polis, and that mob was mainly composed of sailors (*nautikos ochlos*)⁴⁸⁰

After reviewing a very few specific instances where the sailors had a political impact, which will be discussed later, he concludes that:

The political regime [i.e. at Athens] was based on an alliance between a class of sailor-citizens who were the core of a permanent sea power, and the majority of the urban population who had direct or indirect sea interests.⁴⁸¹

In other words, while he conceded that there is very little evidence of their direct involvement in political activity, Amit believed in a politically significant and active “naval mob”; dominating the Assembly in an alliance with the urban population, perhaps, but dominating nevertheless. This is a difficult conclusion to accept. As will be discussed in more detail below, there are serious problems in conceiving the Assembly in terms of people voting primarily along the lines of class interest and alliance. In addition, the almost total lack of specific instances of naval people participating in politics is a grave difficulty. For example, Amit argues that the debate on the

⁴⁷⁹ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 63

⁴⁸⁰ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 58

⁴⁸¹ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 70

Sicilian expedition was “an occasion for the clash between the partisans of the expedition, the *nautikos ochlos*, and the peace-loving country folk who had no interest in a war of conquest”, which would be a great example of the political power of sailors were it not for the problem that there is no evidence at all for such a reconstruction! As Amit himself recognizes, Thucydides frames this debate as a generational clash between the young and the old.⁴⁸² To conclude that we may “presume” a significant presence of sailors on this occasion, given our evidence, is absurd.⁴⁸³ The extent to which the “naval mob” dominated, or even significantly contributed, to the politics of the Assembly must be regarded as highly questionable.

The Athenian Citizens of the Navy

It has been argued that the fleet provided a forum for the forging of political consciousness and self-confidence amongst the poorer citizens as a group, and it was this that enabled them to participate successfully in politics; Strauss’ ‘School of Democracy’ is the most detailed and lucid discussion of this phenomena. While his argument is not without problems, it is essentially correct to stress the links and group identity which may have been formed in the context of working on board a trireme. It follows that those who worked in triremes on a full-time basis would have been most likely to form into this sort of identifiable group; and we have seen in the previous section that the phrase “naval mob” indeed does seem to indicate exactly what we might expect to find; an identifiable group essentially defined as trireme crewmen who possessed citizen rights to allow them access to the political system.

My definition of the “naval mob” as professional Athenian citizen trireme crewmen obviously excludes the vast majority of those who crewed the navy of Athens. In particular, it leaves out those citizens who crewed the navy on a temporary basis, either through conscription, or the occasional volunteer.⁴⁸⁴ What is problematic for this study is the great degree of overlap between these groups. The clearest division in this is that between the conscript and the volunteer, although even here a man drafted one year could offer his services in another. In terms of analysing the political clout of naval people, therefore, we can legitimately ignore the knight or hoplite, called up to oar benches in an emergency. As van Wees argues, such people would have been unlikely to volunteer for the navy outside of these national emergencies, as they were under regular obligations to serve in the land army.⁴⁸⁵ Similarly, the thetes who volunteered occasionally for naval service, for whatever motive (pay, plunder, revenge or simply wanting to do their bit to help Athens) would not have been likely to form a particularly naval group identity; it is likely that a farm labourer who took an oar during the occupation of his land at the time of a Spartan invasion would think still think of himself as a farmer rather than a member of

⁴⁸² Thucydides, 6.12, 13, 18. Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 64

⁴⁸³ I argue later (Part Three, section 2) that many of the people who voted for, and sailed on, the Sicilian expedition formed part of a group of occasional contributors to the navy; men who would have had other professions and ways of life, but who sometimes joined a trireme crew for the sake of profit, plunder, adventure or emergency.

⁴⁸⁴ The sliding scale of professionalism with regard to contributions to the navy will be discussed in detail in Part 3, section 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Van Wees, ‘Myth of the Middle Class Army’, p. 60

the “naval mob”. The extent of the adoption of a nautical identity by the *demos* as a whole will be looked at later; in this way, a farmer, cobbler, labourer or any other poor Athenian could think of themselves as a member of the “naval mob”.⁴⁸⁶

The division between sporadic volunteers and ‘full-time’ professionals is even less clear; we can suggest a division between those who depended on rowing in the fleet for their living, and those who did not, but the idea of a ‘steady job’ seems alien to the Athenian economy. An Athenian who did only one job or had a single source of income over his entire working life was probably exceedingly rare. This was true of most professions in ancient Athens; the labour market (to use a somewhat anachronistic term) was far more loose and unfixed than is the case today. Labourers could hire themselves out in the quarries and building sites, at the docks and in the fields; farmers and landowners could engage in trade as a sideline, and sellers in the agora could own their own plot of land to grow crops. Aristotle’s definition of naval people demonstrates this fluidity; the group of naval professions consisted of several sub-divisions, and while one of these may be a large group in a particular place (as the trireme crews were at Athens) it seems that men moved fairly freely and frequently between, say, fishing and ferrying. But even within this varied picture, with a sliding scale of participation in the navy based on individual factors and circumstances, we can advocate a ‘core’ group of volunteers who, while they were free to take work in other professions when the need arose, would have nevertheless always sought employment on triremes. We have seen in the previous section that the navy’s operation provided a constantly high, though fluctuating, demand for long-term manpower. There is no difficulty in arguing that this group of professional trireme crewmen existed; the key question in this section is whether there is evidence for them participating in politics? Given the strong link between trireme crews and democracy which is often assumed but rarely detailed in modern and ancient works, it seems a valid and necessary to examine the evidential foundations of such a view. Despite the difficulties with the evidence and categories of analysis, we can legitimately ask where, when and how the supposedly dominant “naval mob” made its presence felt.

2: The Athenian *Ekklesia* and the Political Participation of Trireme Crews

The Assembly is the obvious place to begin the search. As both the most easily accessed and ‘sovereign’ body of the Athenian political system, we would expect to find any domination by an interest group or faction to occur through control of the Assembly. Although in the fourth-century the decrees of the Assembly lost some of their power and breadth of application, it was still this body that, ultimately, voted for laws and proposals, scrutinized magistrates and decided on the elective offices such as the *strategia*. Aside from general information in writers such as Aristotle, we have several other sources relevant for this discussion of the Assembly, most

⁴⁸⁶ cf. Part Three, section 4.

importantly the speeches of the orators before the *demos*. In addition, the plays of Aristophanes, in particular those such as *Knights* which most blatantly caricature politicians and debates contemporary to the drama, provide some insight to the political attitudes and activities of non-elite Athenians.⁴⁸⁷

Assembly Attendance

Analysing the presence or otherwise of a group within Athenian politics, be it farmers, *eisphora* payers, liturgists or naval crews, is very problematic. As well as the inevitable overlap between these groups, the ancient record does not allow us to precisely gauge with any degree of accuracy who contributed to the various political institutions at Athens. Ober argues that “no evidence suggests that the Assembly was grossly unrepresentative of the social composition of the Athenian citizen body as a whole”,⁴⁸⁸ though he stresses that the demographic make-up of any given meeting would vary according to the circumstances. There is very little detailed evidence to suggest how regularly people participated, and whether it was in fact possible for any single group to sufficiently fill the Assembly so as to dominate its agenda. The important role of the *boule*, “Council”, in setting the Assembly’s discussion agenda would also have a limiting effect on the issues that could be raised and decided from the floor. Xenophon’s Socrates’ list of those attending an Assembly meeting presents us with exactly what we might expect, a mixed bag:

poteron gar tous gnapheas autôn ê tous skuteas ê tous tektonas ê tous chalkeas ê tous geôrgous ê tous emporous ê tous en têi agorôi metaballomenous kai phrontizontas ho ti elattonos priamenoï pleionos apodôntai aischunei; ek gar toutôn hapantôn hê ekklêsia sunistatai.

The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying cheap and selling dear⁴⁸⁹

Plato’s Socrates’ list of those who spoke in the Assembly is also broad:

sumbouleuei autois anistamenos peri toutôn homoiôs men tektôn, homoiôs de chalkeus skutotomos, emporos, nauklêros, plousios penês, gennaios agennês, kai toutois oudeis touto epiplêttei

Anyone may get up and give advice [on matters of general policy], be he a carpenter or smith, cobbler, merchant, shipping agent, rich or poor, high or low, and no-one objects to him.⁴⁹⁰

Aside from the variety, the absence of rowers, fishermen, ferrymen and the like is the most notable feature of these lists; the “naval mob” does not seem to have been a force worth

⁴⁸⁷ While of course it would be dangerous to regard Aristophanes as ‘the voice of the people’, his standpoint and audience are both significantly less of the Athenian elite than most of our other sources. The mandate of comedy was to comment and satirize contemporary politics, politicians and ideology.

⁴⁸⁸ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, p. 137

⁴⁸⁹ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.7.6.

⁴⁹⁰ Plato, *Protagoras*, 319d

reckoning in a typical Assembly meeting. In the Assemblies parodied by Aristophanes, the normative Athenian attendee, indeed the normative Athenian, appears to have been a farmer.⁴⁹¹ This is not to say a rich farmer, although the characters tend to own at least one slave; but these servile characters may have been placed purely for comedic purposes rather than demographic accuracy. While we would not want to put too much weight on these testimonies, it is perhaps surprising that a group of such reported influence as the “naval mob” was not represented.⁴⁹²

Distance and Time

The Assembly meetings were usually held in the Pnyx, and there has been much discussion regarding the willingness of men living outside the *asty*, “city”, to travel the distance and attend. Obviously those living within the city itself would have had an advantage; both in terms of their location, and the amount of time they would have had to spend away from their professions, an Athenian living within the city could attend more regularly than his counterpart on the farm. Citizens who lived in demes such as Marathon and especially those living in cleruchies overseas would have found regular attendance in Assemblies far more burdensome than ‘local’ Athenians. Demes such as Piraeus, of especial interest in a discussion concerning the “naval mob”, were not so far from the city as to make the journey too tiresome for the politically interested Athenian; it would perhaps be more a disinclination to participate in political office, rather than the 5 mile walk, that would put off a resident from Piraeus attending the Pnyx.

Wealth also played a role in this, and probably a bigger one than simple distance; clearly the closer a man was to dependence on regular work and the wages derived from it, the less likely he was to have taken leave from his work to attend the Assembly. It would have been a similar case for the farmer operating close to subsistence; politics may have seemed a luxury he could ill afford for much of the year,⁴⁹³ though the seasonal nature of many tasks on farm would have allowed some time for participation in political, social and religious activities within the city. In the fourth century, following the reestablishment of the democracy in 403 BC, the situation was improved for the poorer man, in that a certain number of attendees to the *ekklesia* were entitled to a stipend; this started off at one obol, but was soon increased.⁴⁹⁴ But it appears this was given on a ‘first come, first served’ basis, and offered no compensation for days lost while travelling to the Assembly; even in the fourth century, therefore, it is likely that the richer slave-owning farmer, even if not a member of the ‘leisured’ class, could have taken time off for politics more frequently than the poorer one. Which is not to say that the rural poor did not regularly participate; as noted above, Aristophanes has many non-elite farmers attend the Assembly. Ober

⁴⁹¹ Not only were many of Aristophanes’ protagonists country folk (Dicaeopolis from *Acharnians*, Strepsiades in *Clouds*, and Trygaios in *Peace*), but his personification of Demos in *Knights* is described (ll.40-3) as a man from the country.

⁴⁹² The military careers of the old men in the choruses of Aristophanes’ *Wasps* are suggestive of part-time campaigners, not members of the “naval mob”; it is a fine line to draw, however. His farmers and jurors operated in their youth as both hoplites and rowers. I discuss this issue further in Part Three, section 2.

⁴⁹³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1318b10

⁴⁹⁴ [Aristotle], 41.3, cf. Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, ll. 185-9

is probably correct to argue that “there is no reason to suppose that the members of any identifiable social sub-group would systematically avoid the [Assembly] meetings”; the flip-side of this is that, given the diverse Assembly that would result, no such social sub-group could have dominated proceedings. When we relate these ideas to the “naval mob” and assess their likely level of attendance at the Assembly, we should perhaps be unsurprised that they do not figure in Socrates’ brief list. These professionals would often find themselves away from Athens for months on end, and attending the Assembly regularly enough to produce a significant impact would have been practically impossible. While trireme crewmen would have not systematically avoided the Assembly, long sojourns in foreign stations like Naupactos were not conducive to conscientious and frequent political participation. The earnings of the “naval mob” is debated, but even on the most generous interpretation of the evidence (a drachma a day as the standard rate throughout most of the period, which could have been supplemented by bonuses), work needed to have been secured for much of the year in order to support a family.⁴⁹⁵ As discussed in the previous section, a trireme crewman would often have found work within the ‘naval sector’ when not rowing warships; and once again, a voyage in a merchant’s vessel would not have facilitated regular Assembly attendance. Even if a man’s work was centred in Athens, he might not feel he had sufficient means and leisure time to journey from the Piraeus attend the Assembly.⁴⁹⁶

Addressing Groups within the Assembly

Sinclair’s study into the composition of the Assembly suggests that the audience may have contained a disproportionate number of wealthy citizens.⁴⁹⁷ This conclusion is mainly drawn from inferences in the speeches made before the Assembly; we find in the speeches appeals to particular sections of the audience, along several lines; age, for instance, but also wealth.⁴⁹⁸ He is right to reject Jones’ view that the wealthy elite would have been able to form, if not a majority, then a numerically significant minority;⁴⁹⁹ and while Ober is certainly correct to state that “many more working than leisure-class citizens would be in attendance” in the Assembly, it is probable that the wealthy comprised a higher proportion of the average Assembly meeting than they did of

⁴⁹⁵ I discuss the evidence for sailors’ pay in Part Three, section 2. Markle has argued (‘Jury pay and assembly pay’, p. 112) “a family of four could have been fed on about two-and-a-half obols per day”, and thus payments made at the rate of three obols per day to public servants were sufficient to maintain a household. His estimations seem too low, but even if they are true for a relatively inactive juryman buying only barley and that at reasonable prices, and with all other sorts of food available at prices “so cheap that they are hardly worth reckoning” (p.111-2), they can certainly not be applied to naval crews. Not only were rowers exceptionally active, but they cannot be assumed to have always had such easy access to reasonably priced food. Their basic requirements alone would have accounted for much of the 3 obols; at an absolute minimum, Demosthenes (4.28) suggested to the Athenian assembly that naval crewmen would require 2 obols per day just for their own rations. Maintaining a household on 2.5 obols a day (=c. 152 drachmas per year) seems to be a significant underestimation, and I prefer to accept Cook’s analysis (‘Timocrates’ 50 talents’, pp. 85-7) that estimates annual living expenses for a family of four to run to a minimum of 280 drachmas. This figure was first proposed by Glotz and accepted by Rosivach, (‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p.52, with discussion of previous scholars’ figures detailed in p. 64 nn. 59 and 60; none of these alternative estimations are anything like as low as Markle’s). It is worth noting the figure of Tod (*Cambridge Ancient History*, volume 5 (first edition), pp. 20-2), who posits 180 drachma per year (c. 3 obols per day) for a man and wife only, without dependent children or slaves.

⁴⁹⁶ I discuss the Piraeus below, Part 2, section A.4

⁴⁹⁷ Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation*, pp. 119 ff. By contrast, he argues that the jury courts were staffed by relatively older and poorer people (p. 124 ff.).

⁴⁹⁸ Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation*, pp. 123-4

⁴⁹⁹ Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, pp. 35-6

the Athenian population as a whole. While *eisphora* payers and other rich men of the ‘leisured’ class are often singled out, as are farmers, speakers seldom directly addressed the lower classes, and there are no examples of them directly speaking to the “naval mob”. Though Athens was still spoken of as a prominent sea power with important naval assets,⁵⁰⁰ the nearest we have is Demosthenes hypothesising about the men in the Assembly going themselves to crew the vessels. These references to manning fleets suggest attempts, usually unsuccessful, to persuade the citizen audience of the necessity of becoming rowers, rather than any sort of comments being addressed to a “naval mob”. Crewing triremes was here perceived as an irksome but necessary burden to be placed upon the citizens, and many of these references talk about, or at least hint towards, the imposition of conscription;⁵⁰¹ certainly Demosthenes would have had little luck in hiring oarsmen on the open market with offers of 2 obols ration-money only.⁵⁰²

Demosthenes gives one example where a general succeeded in making the case that his audience should become rowers; he refers to the inspiring example of Timotheus, who encouraged the men to man the ships, and inspired by his words, they trooped down to Piraeus in order to “cover the sea in triremes”.⁵⁰³ It is likely that Demosthenes somewhat exaggerated the spontaneity of this event, and the direct relationship between the Assembly listeners and the trireme crews. Even if we accept the essentials of the story, it need not imply that Timotheus’ audience contained many from the “naval mob”, and indeed it is more likely that the opposite conclusion can be drawn; many of these were non-naval citizens inspired into service by powerful oratory. In other words, Timotheus succeeded in inspiring the Athenian citizens to go on campaign in person. In general, extant speeches to the Assembly seem to have been addressed, as far as we can tell, with landowners, tax payers and hoplites in mind. In relation to the fourth century BC, we are forced to accept Amit’s negative conclusion; “we do not have the means to trace the influence of the *nautikos och los* on any particular event in the period.”⁵⁰⁴ In the context of Demosthenes’ speeches encouraging the Athenians to repel Philip in particular, we might have expected him to suggest that, along with the rich man paying his taxes and the strong man serving in the line, the sailor and oarsman should attend diligently his assigned station; he does not do this.⁵⁰⁵ The pseudo-Demosthenic speech *On Organization* contains a passage about organizing the Athenians that seems to deliberately avoid mention of the navy:

kai diexêlthon hôs an suntachtheiête, hoi th' hoplitai kai hoi hippeis kai hosoi toutôn ekstos este

⁵⁰⁰ See especially Demosthenes, 7.8, 7.14-6, 17.25

⁵⁰¹ Demosthenes’ *First Philippic* (4.16 ff) is a good example of a sustained argument in favour of citizens serving as oarsmen themselves, esp. 4.33 with its reference to binding people to the expedition. cf. 17.20 (a successful launch of a seemingly conscripted fleet), 4.43 and 3.4 (a conscripted fleet was proposed, but in the event an “unmanned” one was launched).

⁵⁰² As he suggests in 4.28; such a fleet was not voted.

⁵⁰³ Demosthenes, 8.74-5

⁵⁰⁴ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 70.

⁵⁰⁵ e.g. Demosthenes, 1.28, 4.7, 8.23.

[I] have described the method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry or in other ways.⁵⁰⁶

Several passages from other speeches that urged the Assembly to serve in person and take action that lives up to their fine words can be construed as encouraging participation on board triremes;⁵⁰⁷ if naval service *was* meant, it is striking that orators chose not to make it explicit.

A lot of our evidence comes from the fourth century, where the navy as an institution was not as strong as in the fifth; we might expect to find more references to the “naval mob” in the Assembly had more speeches from the fifth century survived. Plutarch tells an anecdote concerning Alcibiades’ first speech before the Assembly, at the conclusion of which a quail escaped from under his cloak; the bird was eventually caught by “Antiochus the pilot”, certainly a member of the “naval mob”.⁵⁰⁸ Aside from this story, there are two particular occasions from more contemporary fifth-century evidence which may indicate that there was at least some “naval mob” presence in the fifth-century Assembly. The first is Pericles’ speech, as presented by Thucydides, given before the Assembly prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, in which he discussed sea power and naval resources at length and addressed comments specifically to sailors. The second example concerns the debates following the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC, in which Xenophon seems to give evidence of members of the “naval mob” themselves speaking before the *ekklesia*.

The “Naval Mob” in the Assembly: Pericles’ speech in 431 BC

The first speech made by Pericles in Thucydides’ history contains much valuable information in relation to the Athenian navy.⁵⁰⁹ It is in this speech that Pericles discusses Athenian seamanship and sea power, and how Athenian superiority in this and other areas should shape their strategy and ensure success in the coming war. In doing this, he offers counter-arguments to likely Peloponnesian strategies, options for which were set out in a previous Thucydidean speech made by the Corinthians to the Peloponnesian League.⁵¹⁰ It is probable that there were speculations amongst the Athenians regarding the likely strategies of the Peloponnesians, and that predictions were made about the possible course of the hostilities. There could have been talk of Athenian sea power at this juncture, and it is likely too that Pericles will have had things to say on all of these matters. What is not as likely is that all of these things were put into a single speech by Pericles, and delivered as an almost telepathic counterpoint to a near-contemporary speech made by the Corinthians; this presentation is the artifice of Thucydides, who probably found it useful for himself and his readers to make a single review from the many debates and discussions he was privy to, emphasizing what he (and probably Pericles) saw as the principal pre-war issues. Therefore this pair of speeches is genuine and useful evidence for the kinds of strategic and

⁵⁰⁶ [Demosthenes], 13.9

⁵⁰⁷ Demosthenes, 4.7; 8.23; 1.28

⁵⁰⁸ Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 7.

⁵⁰⁹ Thucydides, 1.140-44

⁵¹⁰ Thucydides, 1.120-4

political thinking going on at the time of the outbreak of the war. What we cannot be certain of with this speech, as is the case with just about all speeches recorded by ancient historians, is the extent to which the words reported were ever actually said.⁵¹¹

This is an important point in relation to the present discussion, as this speech is one of the only examples in the sources when a speaker in the Assembly not only discusses naval people and issues to a unique extent, but specifically addresses trireme crewmen in the audience. Pericles in fact goes a step further; identifying the Assembly goers, and thus the Athenians generally, as sailors and rowers, professional experts in seamanship. Is Thucydides here reflecting some sort of reality, or are these things which he thought ought to have been said, should a speaker wish to discuss naval experience and sea power?⁵¹²

In this speech, Pericles talks often of the navy and sea power, using phrases in the first person which suggested ownership of a useful commodity. For example, he argues that the Peloponnesians might invade Attic territory, “but can never prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet”,⁵¹³ and that “we have acquired more experience of land fighting through our naval operations than they have of sea fighting from their operations on land.”⁵¹⁴ He goes on to make the point that the Peloponnesians would not be able to learn the skills of seamanship quickly, and emphasizes this by switching to the second person and saying:

oude gar humeis meletôntes auto euthus apo tôn Mêdikôn exeirgasthe pô

You yourselves have been studying it ever since the Persian wars, and have still not entirely mastered the subject.⁵¹⁵

This does show a degree of appreciation for the skills and experience of Athenian sailors, and the difficulty in acquiring such skill. There is perhaps a hint of the schoolmaster about this not-quite glowing tribute, as if the Athenian sailors were skilled but unruly boys, in danger of falling prey to arrogant complacency and not reaching their full potential. Even so, this is a positive comment, and the mention of sailors and rowing skill in such a direct manner is a complete contrast with the more cagey and subtle references to naval service in fourth-century speeches. If

⁵¹¹ In his commentary introducing this speech, Hornblower (*Commentary*, vol. 1, p. 226) “The speech notoriously answers and echoes, at many points, the Corinthians’ speech at [1.]120 ff. None of the particular correspondences is by itself fatal to the authenticity of either...but the general effect is disconcerting.” However, in introducing the corresponding speech (made by the Corinthians to the rest of the Peloponnesian League, Thucydides, 1.120-4), he seems to take a more forgiving line, stating that “The ‘correspondences’ are not really troubling”. The more cautious approach seems better.

⁵¹² Thucydides’ famous methodological statement regarding speeches (1.22), in which he expresses the somewhat contradictory aims of faithfully reporting what was said, but also, when he and his informants could not remember the exact words, putting down what he felt was called for, has rightly been the starting point for discussions about the validity of using the information contained in the speeches. If this speech was real, it is certain to be one that Thucydides himself heard, and could have recorded with a reasonable degree of accuracy. But the clear signs of correspondences with other speeches, combined with the foreshadowing of future events, and the Thucydidean writing style, all should give rise to caution.

⁵¹³ Thucydides, 1.142.4

⁵¹⁴ Thucydides, 1.142.5

⁵¹⁵ Thucydides, 1.142.7

these words are accurate, they imply at least that Pericles was addressing comments to a substantial number of sailors in the audience, or, perhaps more likely, he was identifying the whole Assembly, and by extension the Athenian citizens as a whole, as professional rowers; members of the “naval mob”, according to my definition. As such it is a singular notice (he might just have easily have said “our sailors have yet mastered it”) even in the context of the speech; other references to the navy and sea power, like the ones quoted above, are usually couched in the first person, and are spoken of as a possession or resource owned collectively by the Athenians. A reference in a later passage to skilled professional seamen is expressed in such terms; “we have amongst our citizens more and better *kubernetes*, and other *hyperesia*, than all the rest of Greece”,⁵¹⁶ which is rather different from saying “you are better helmsman and more skilful specialists than any others in Greece”. In a similar vein, he talks of “ourselves” only as potential trireme crew, able to take the place, along with the trusty metics, of any foreigners should they decide to defect to the other side; this is much more of a sort with the appeals made by Demosthenes to the Assemblies of the fourth century.⁵¹⁷ Despite at an earlier juncture identifying his audience as expert, full-time trireme crewmen, Pericles was well aware of the varying degrees of naval contributions made by citizens to the Athenian navy. While this example of trireme crews being referred to by a speaker before the Assembly is certainly worthy of discussion, it must also be recognized that in the same speech he identifies the audience as people who own property outside the city walls; Pericles argues that the Athenians should consider themselves islanders and abandon their land and houses, and furthermore “if I thought could persuade you, I would bid you to go and lay waste your own property.”⁵¹⁸ If these words were said (a not inconsiderable ‘if’), they might be more indicative of rhetorical flourish than demographic accuracy; presumably Pericles did not think that everyone in the audience owned land outside the walls, just as he did not imagine that all his audience were themselves naval professionals, and such comments do not give us much in the way of accurate information as to who attended Assembly meetings. It is clear that a speaker could address remarks to, or identify his audience with, whichever group of people best suited his argument at that moment, and these need not reflect accurately the demographic spread of people in the Assembly. With the exception of this passage, it is nevertheless striking that Athenian orators never seem to have thought it necessary or advantageous to address trireme crews, still less identify their audience with the “naval mob”. This must surely tell against any reconstruction which views them as having great political power.

The “Naval Mob” and the Trial of the Generals

An instance for which there is more solid evidence of the political contribution of the “naval mob” relates to the series of Council and Assembly meetings held in the wake of the battle of Arginusae. In the course of these meetings, the eight victorious generals (two of whom had not

⁵¹⁶ Thucydides, 1.143.1

⁵¹⁷ Thucydides, 1.143.1

⁵¹⁸ Thucydides, 1.143.5

returned to Athens) were put on trial for neglecting their duty towards both the shipwrecked survivors of the battle, and the bodies of the dead. This infamous trial, in which the eight generals were sentenced to death on a single vote, has rightly been given much scholarly attention, highlighting the tragic consequences of the huge power of the *demos* in Athens, despite legal safeguards, arguments in favour of moderation, a far from water-tight case against the accused, and the stalling of the vote by Socrates. In the context of this study, the episode is an important one in terms of the engagement of sailors in politics at Athens, as it is the single occasion for which there is direct testimony for members of the “naval mob” speaking before the Assembly. This testimony comes from Xenophon’s account, the fuller and more detailed of the two principal sources for the trial.⁵¹⁹ The second is the brief narrative of Diodorus,⁵²⁰ which provides some credible incidental details that Xenophon’s account does not. It is also the more internally coherent of the two accounts.⁵²¹ Aside from discrepancies over the names of the generals who returned to face the trial,⁵²² the main difference lies in their depiction of Theramenes’ role. In Xenophon’s version, he zealously accused the generals and manipulated the Assembly by bribing people to turn up as mourners for the drowned.⁵²³ In Diodorus, Theramenes only turned against the generals when they tried to pin the blame on him for the failure to recover the dead and dying, and even then there is no hint that he did anything other than speak against them in the Assembly.⁵²⁴ This is however presented as being the crucial factor in the conviction, as Theramenes was a powerful speaker with a large personal following.⁵²⁵ On this matter, Diodorus’ account is probably to be preferred, but only because, if Theramenes had done anything more culpable than fight back using legitimate means against people who had accused him, it would surely have found its way into Lysias’ damning account of him.⁵²⁶

So, what role did the “naval mob” play in this affair? It should be noted that it would be unfair to describe the majority of crews in the Arginusae/Aigospotamoi fleet as members of the “naval mob”. By the time the Arginusae fleet was launched, the city would have been largely emptied of regular rowers. No doubt there would have been some experienced sailors around, who acted as the *hyperesia* of the 110 ships; but the fact that slaves were offered their freedom to row, and even members of the *hippeis*, “Knights”, class were conscripted, demonstrates the acute shortage

⁵¹⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.1-35

⁵²⁰ Diodorus, 13.101-3

⁵²¹ Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae Trial’, p. 118

⁵²² In this matter, Xenophon’s account is far preferable. He lists 6 names, where Diodorus has only 5, including one Calliades; a clear error. Diodorus’ list does not list Erasinides or Diomedon, who are notable omissions; in Xenophon’s version, these two generals advocated opposing courses of action in the post-battle conference, in which Erasinides advocated abandoning the shipwrecked to their fate. As a result of this, he is the first general to be prosecuted when the generals returned to Athens. In Diodorus’ narrative (though not in Xenophon’s) Diomedon makes a speech at Athens prior to his execution, which obviously requires him to have been one of the generals who returned despite not being listed.

⁵²³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.4 (most vigorous in his attacks on the generals), 1.7.8 (bribery).

⁵²⁴ Diodorus, 13.101.4

⁵²⁵ Diodorus, 13.101.7

⁵²⁶ Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae Trial’, pp. 120-1. Theramenes was subjected to virulent attacks in two speeches of Lysias (12 and 13), but neither mentions anything about culpable behaviour in relation to the Arginusae trial. The inference that he therefore did nothing improper at this time is probably true, but it must be recognized that this argument is only as strong as any argument from silence can be.

of naval personnel in Athens. At the time, Konon already had a substantial fleet at sea, and it was in these ships that the bulk of Athens' "naval mob" was concentrated.⁵²⁷ Xenophon specifically attests to the skills of the remaining crew after Konon consolidated his 100-strong but thinly manned fleet into 70 ships.⁵²⁸ Despite the crews' skill, he lost another 30 in battle to a far larger Peloponnesian force,⁵²⁹ and had the remainder of his fleet trapped in Mytilene. Another fleet of 12 ships under Diomedon was also at sea, but was ambushed and 10 of the triremes were captured.⁵³⁰ While the offer of citizenship for slaves no doubt encouraged many to join, and any remaining metics presumably played their part, the Arginusae fleet was disproportionately manned by Athenian citizens, including many of the wealthy. The outrage about the men left to drown and the bodies left unburied cannot be attributed to the fact that the men were sailors; more likely, the reverse was the case; the outrage was more intense precisely because it was non-sailor conscripts who suffered this appalling fate. Most likely though is that the social or professional status of the men was not the primary concern, but the fact that citizens had died in circumstances where more could possibly have been done to save them, and bodies were not recovered when more effort should have been made to do so.

The discussions of Kagan, Andrewes, Strauss and Amit all assume a large presence of sailors in Athens at the time of the trial. Kagan argues that there would have been "thousands of Athenians who knew the basic facts" regarding the unsuccessful rescue mission given to the trierarchs, taxiarchs and nauarchs. Given that the news of this failed mission had yet to be disclosed before the Assembly or Council, Kagan must here be envisioning a large number of citizen sailors from the Arginusae fleet itself, the only numerous group who would at that point have known about the rescue mission, and might have been sufficiently disappointed with the conduct of their superiors to denounce them.⁵³¹ Unlike the other two authors, he does not refer to them specifically in terms of their voting behaviour in the Assembly. Andrewes is most explicit, arguing that the generals "hoped that the many sailors from their ships would help them at their trial, but in the event...they listened rather to the accusers".⁵³² Strauss sees the Arginusae affair as Athens "nadir", and that in the trial of the generals "Athens had become an ochlocracy ["rule by the mob"]; the Athenian navy was its enabler."⁵³³ He suggests that Xenophon's account of the political debates invites a familiar contrast: "The traditional Greek elite male ideal was the orderly, virtuous hoplite. What Xenophon descried in the Athens of 406 B.C. was, instead, the disorderly, vicious, rower."⁵³⁴ Amit too assumes that there were sailors present, and sees the need to account for the conviction of the generals despite the fact that their own men were voting; he suggests that they would have been in an awkward position, and would have perhaps

⁵²⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.17

⁵²⁸ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.15

⁵²⁹ The crews escaped to land, but given the Peloponnesian blockade, it is unlikely that any of them could have made it back to Athens in time to take part in the Arginusae fleet.

⁵³⁰ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.22-3

⁵³¹ Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 364

⁵³² Andrewes, 'The Arginusae Trial', p. 117

⁵³³ Strauss, 'The Dead of Arginusae', p. 17

⁵³⁴ Strauss, 'The Dead of Arginusae', p. 12

convicted the generals so as to avoid the possibility of the blame falling on them.⁵³⁵ These arguments are not without some merit, but there is no real need for them, as the number of Arginusae sailors in Athens was probably far smaller than they all assume. Amit is correct to argue that “the Assembly changed into a mob *ochlos*...but it was not the *nautikos ochlos*”;⁵³⁶ but the reason is not anything to do with the sailors’ ambiguous views; it is simply because not many of them were there.

At first glance, there is some evidence to support the idea of a large presence of Arginusae sailors at Athens; a direct statement from Diodorus:

meta tôn pleistôn neôn katepleusan eis tas Athênas, elpizontes tous en tais nausi pollous ontas boêthous hexein en têi krisei.

[Most of the accused generals]⁵³⁷ sailed home with most of their ships, hoping they would have their sailors, who were numerous, to help them in the trial.⁵³⁸

No doubt the generals entertained such hopes of support from their crews, but there are reasonable grounds to doubt that the Pnyx was packed with men fresh off the oar-benches. The most fundamental reason is that, in both the narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, the Arginusae fleet was still on station at Samos when the authors turn their attention back to the Ionian war;⁵³⁹ the large figures given for the number of ships (173 and 180 respectively)⁵⁴⁰ mean that neither account seems compatible with the idea that a substantial number of ships had at any point returned to Athens. This would have been an extremely foolish thing to do in any case; given the inevitable desertion of a fleet returning to its home port,⁵⁴¹ and the profound difficulties that were experienced in manning these ships in the first place, Konon and the other generals would have had to have taken leave of their senses to allow the six generals to each take “most of their ships” back with them.⁵⁴² In any event, as the generals were deposed, they presumably did not have the authority to command any ships. When the charismatic and wealthy Alcibiades was deposed in the previous year, he was able to sail off with only a single trireme,⁵⁴³ and it would seem unlikely that the eight generals deposed at this time would have been able to have done better. We can perhaps assume that each of the six generals who returned to Athens sailed back in one ship. As well as these six ships, a few more were certainly in Athens. Prior to being removed from office, the generals had sent two separate dispatches to Athens. Firstly, they sent word of their victory,

⁵³⁵ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 69

⁵³⁶ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 69

⁵³⁷ For the problems with Diodorus’ list of generals, see note 522 above.

⁵³⁸ Diodorus, 13.101.5

⁵³⁹ Diodorus, 13.104; a new commander is sent out to the fleet at Samos to share command with Konon. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.1.12, cf. 2.1.16; the Athenians are still based at Samos, conducting raids on the King’s territory.

⁵⁴⁰ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.1.20; Diodorus, 13.104

⁵⁴¹ Apollodorus, a fourth-century trierarch describes this as well-known problem; [Demosthenes], 50.11

⁵⁴² It is suggested in Xenophon’s account, during the speech made to defend the generals (1.7.30) as well as in his account of the battle itself, (1.6.28) that the generals each had their own group of ships under their command. Assuming that each of the 6 generals had 12 ships and each took “most” of theirs back with him, Konon’s force would have been weakened by at least 42 vessels!

⁵⁴³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.17

and the unfortunate aftermath, to the city. As it is reported at this point that the trierarchs Thrasybulus and Theramenes had “gone off ahead to Athens”,⁵⁴⁴ it seems likely that it was they who had conveyed this first message. It would certainly have made sense for the generals to entrust their initial version of the aftermath, which blamed only the storm for their failure to rescue the survivors and recover the dead, to those men who had perhaps most to lose from revelation of the full facts.⁵⁴⁵ Later, the generals sent a second dispatch; having learned that discontent was growing in the city and perhaps fearing betrayal by their earlier messengers, the generals’ second dispatch placed the blame for the failed rescue with the captains they had assigned to the task. Assuming that the generals followed their previous, though unusual, practice of sending two messenger ships to the one destination, there would have been a maximum of 10 ships from the Arginusae fleet in Athens at the time of the generals’ trial. Assuming that fully half of all the ships’ crew were citizens, and that every single one of these citizens was able to get into the Assembly, there would have been a theoretical maximum of 1,000 Arginusae sailors in the Pnyx; a substantial minority certainly, but hardly enough to carry the day, particularly since they would not have been shouting and voting *en masse*. The crews of Thrasybulus and Theramenes at least would surely have been pushing for conviction, but many of those from the generals’ ships may have been calling for clemency. We cannot assume that there were a significant number of citizen sailors from the Arginusae fleet, and certainly not “thousands” of them, in Athens at the time of the trial. The significance of the naval contribution to the trial of the generals has nothing to do with the scale of their votes or voices in the *ekklesia*.

Expert Witnesses

Xenophon’s account of the various Assembly proceedings includes two interventions by naval people, both of which had a substantial effect of the debate. These naval contributions appear to have been quite short, and subsidiary the main rhetorical action; rather than making full speeches on their own account, it is as if they were being summoned as expert eye-witnesses to supplement the principal orators. This is most clear in the first case. The generals, when speaking before the Assembly, sought to defend themselves by blaming the severity of the storm:

toutôn de marturas pareichonto tous kubernêtas kai allous tôn sumpleontôn pollous

They produced as witness to these statements the steersmen [*kubernetai*] and many others of the ship’s company.⁵⁴⁶

This contrasts with the situation in relation to Apollodorus’ law suit against Polycles in 359 BC. In his speech before the jury courts, he called upon people who were on the expedition to bear witness to his great exertions on behalf of the city. Instead of bringing individuals forward to speak, he assumed that many of the people on the jury were on the expedition, and he urged them

⁵⁴⁴ Diodorus, 13.101.2

⁵⁴⁵ i.e. the fact that a portion of the fleet, including the ships of Theramenes and Thrasybulus, was assigned to pick up the bodies and survivors, but never managed to carry the mission out.

⁵⁴⁶ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.6

to remind their neighbours of his many and expensive good deeds.⁵⁴⁷ It is likely that Apollodorus' prosecution was initiated after Polycles, and the fleet to which both had served as trierarchs, had returned to Athens, and so while this passage can be written off as a rhetorical device, it was at least possible for there to have been men from the campaign in Athens and on the jury. Such first-hand knowledge amongst the audience was not assumed by the parties in the Arginusae trial, and lends a little weight to the idea that very few from the campaign itself were present; the audience would not have needed telling about the prevailing weather conditions after the battle if enough men who were there had returned to Athens and spread the story. This inference should not be pressed too far, however, as it would have always been advantageous in the context of a trial to call expert witnesses on specific points, however much the audience already knew. The unique appeal by Apollodorus to his audience's first hand knowledge of the campaign would be evidence suggesting the political participation of the "naval mob" in the jury courts, but for the fact that the expedition to which Apollodorus refers was, like the Arginusae campaign, largely manned through conscription.⁵⁴⁸

It is certainly fair to regard these witnesses in the trial of the generals as members of the "naval mob", called upon to give testimony in their area of professional expertise; at least the *kubernetai* must be regarded, even in the context of a conscripted fleet, as expert seamen. Xenophon reports that their statements were convincing, but that the meeting ran out of time before a vote could be held. It seems most likely that, had there been sufficient light to have held a vote that evening, the generals would have escaped execution.

The second allegedly naval intervention had precisely the opposite effect. During the debate in the next Assembly meeting, a man got up to speak before the people:

parêlthe de tis eis tèn ekklêsian phaskôn epi teuchous alphitôn sôthênai: epistellein d' autôi tous apollumenous, ean sôthêi, apangeilai tòi dêmôî hoti hoi stratêgoi ouk aneilonto tous aristous huper tês patridos genomenous.

And there came before the Assembly a man who said that he had been saved by floating upon a grain tub, and that those who were perishing charged him to report to the people, if he were saved, that the generals did not pick up the men who were most brave on behalf of their country.⁵⁴⁹

The man's fortuitous arrival, and the perfect way in which his testimony suited the accusers' case, is enough to raise serious misgivings about his authenticity. While such an escape and such a message are not beyond the bounds of possibility, his arrival in good time to make the trial seems awfully convenient, if not contrived.⁵⁵⁰ If he was indeed a stooge deployed by the

⁵⁴⁷ [Demosthenes], 50.3

⁵⁴⁸ [Demosthenes], 50.6-7. Apollodorus dismissed the conscripts as they did not meet his apparently exacting standards, but there is no reason to assume that any other trierarch acted in this way.

⁵⁴⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.11

⁵⁵⁰ Xenophon makes no comment on this sailor's testimony, but he does accuse Theramenes (*Hellenica*, 1.8.8) of bribing the main prosecution speaker, and of hiring fake mourners to pack the Assembly and encourage votes against

accusers, their plan worked very well; despite a noble speech by Euryptolomus in the generals' defence,⁵⁵¹ some voices of protest regarding the procedures, and a show of hands so close it required recounting, eight were sentenced to death on a single vote, and the six who were present were executed.

Xenophon reported that the Apaturia festival intervened between the two Assembly meetings regarding the generals,⁵⁵² and it has been argued that the mood of the people turned decidedly, and fatally, against the generals at this point. Amit and Kagan both make much of the startling and dismaying effect caused by the fact that many were mourning the loss of brothers, sons and fathers, and that families with missing members were highly visible in the context of this festival.⁵⁵³ This is of course true, but it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of the gaps in the families were simply due to the fact that the bulk of the Arginusae fleet was still at sea. Most of the missing menfolk were not pitifully drowned and abandoned to the elements, but stationed at their base in Samos, and possibly raiding and pillaging the territory of the King.⁵⁵⁴ What perhaps would not have been obvious was which men were missing for which reason. Given the relatively small number of ships that had come back to Athens, there were probably many families who did not know whether their menfolk were alive and well, dead or wounded in battle, or drowned, and would have been desperate for first-hand news. When commenting on the strengths of Thrasybulus and Theramenes in relation to the case, and the generals' tactical error in antagonizing them, Diodorus claims that their most important asset was that they had been "participating in the events around the battle".⁵⁵⁵ It seems likely then that there were very few people in Athens at this time that had been eye-witnesses to the events, and information regarding the fate of individuals was very patchy; uncertainty is likely to have been at least as prevalent as grief. Families of members of the "naval mob" were no doubt accustomed to this kind of uncertainty, though they can hardly have relished it. The families of the many conscripts, however, would not have been as familiar with their loved ones being away for extended periods of time and missing important civic festivals, particularly those that happened outside the usual summer campaigning season. The mourners may have been both numerous and conspicuous, but there surely would have been many more people who were uncertain as to whether they should be mourning or not. This uncertainty in itself could have had an effect on the mood of the city, and have contributed to the resentment and recrimination that eventually condemned the generals.

the generals. These accusations are probably false, but it is hard not to have this in mind when reading about the miraculously escaped sailor a few sentences later and this only adds to the impression that he or his message was fake.

⁵⁵¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.16-33

⁵⁵² Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.8

⁵⁵³ Amit (*Athens and the Sea*, p. 68) sees the festival as bringing in a lot of people resident outside the city, and became a "reunion of mourners"; he argues that it was these people who tipped the balance in the composition of the second Assembly. Kagan (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 368-70) argues that at the festival "the gaps caused by the recent deaths at Arginusae became painfully apparent", and the "second Assembly obviously began in the emotional atmosphere created by the Apaturia", an atmosphere characterized by "grief and anger"

⁵⁵⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.38, cf.2.1.16.

⁵⁵⁵ Diodorus, 13.101.3

The contribution of the naval crews as voters in the Assembly during this trial was probably minor. Instead, the few members of the “naval mob” who were present in the city acted in the role of expert witnesses, testifying, to an Assembly which was unfamiliar with the circumstances after Arginusae, that the generals’ version of events was correct. Xenophon reports that some combination of their testimony and the generals’ eloquence had begun to persuade the Athenians.⁵⁵⁶ A man purporting to be a sailor made a speech before the second Assembly meeting, apparently on his own initiative but fulfilling the request of his dying comrades; regardless of the genuineness of his origins or sentiments, he too was effective in making his case. The episode shows that sailors, at least as speakers rather than a voting block, could have a profound impact on the deliberations of the Assembly, and their words were listened to at least with regard to events they had witnessed and their field of expertise; it must be emphasized, however, that this is the only concrete example we have of them acting in such a capacity in the Assembly.

Assembly, Class and Interest Groups

As we have seen above, we run into several problems in trying to identify the influence of smaller within the Assembly. To assess the political clout of any given group, be it farmers, trireme crews or *eisphora* payers, is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. We must ask ourselves how would such a thing work; what would we expect to see if, say, the peasant farmers of Attica controlled the democracy? How would this be different from if the urban poor were the ones in command? Is it, in the first instance, relevant to talk of separate and conflicting class interests amongst the *demos*; should we rather look at the leading political figures, and see who supported them? But this leads to further problems; successful leaders like Pericles could call on wide support over a long period; while he was a successful general and his plan for the Peloponnesian war relied heavily on the navy, can we assume that he therefore had the backing of the “naval mob”? And if he did, was this the crucial factor that kept him at the top? Of course, even the Athenians are unlikely to have known which groups supported which measures; our sources do not allow us to assess with accuracy the composition of the various political institutions of Athens and evaluate which was strongest. Even when we can identify particular groups, it is hard to link them with particular measures; for example, ex-crewmen of triremes of all social statuses probably played a role in the restoration of democracy by “the men of the Piraeus” in 403 BC,⁵⁵⁷ but was it due to the votes of the “naval mob” shortly after that Assembly pay was introduced? We have seen that the “naval mob” was a fluid and roughly-defined group; doubtless they shared some common interests, but this does not equate to a united political force. There is no guarantee, and indeed no real likelihood, of a consistent political agenda amongst the naval people in Athens.

⁵⁵⁶ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.6

⁵⁵⁷ e.g. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.4.24

In addition to the difficulties of investigating and separating class interests, we have many problems in trying to assess how and when such interests could impact on the democracy. Even if we allow the possibility of a class interest dominating the political agenda, can we differentiate a period in which such control was maintained at the expense of other groups, or particular measures that resulted from that control?

Periods of political control and influence are described only in the broadest terms of class (the rich vs. the poor), and are centred on particular individuals. In these broadest terms, we do have some indications of class interests taking control of the Assembly; indeed, even domination for one day could have a profound effect. According to Plutarch, the reforms of Ephialtes that stripped the Areopagus of most of its power and transferred it to the Assembly could only be passed when Kimon, the champion of the aristocracy, was away from the city.⁵⁵⁸ The suggestion is that, with a big opposition leader gone, Ephialtes' supporters were able to dominate the Assembly and pass their laws. In 411 BC, an Assembly was held in which an attempt was made to exclude the poorer citizens; by holding the Assembly outside of the city walls, at a time when the Spartans occupied Decelea, those who could not afford arms and armour were discouraged from attending. At this meeting, the citizenship criteria were made more stringent, disenfranchising many of the poor and setting up an oligarchic system.⁵⁵⁹ What these stories suggest is that the Assembly could not usually be dominated even by the largest 'class' groups of rich and poor; devices had to be employed or circumstances exploited to ensure that one group could overcome the other. Even if the literal truth of these stories can be cast in some doubt, they nevertheless indicate that a normative Assembly had a balance in terms of broad 'class interests'. This lack of *stasis* between the rich and poor and the stability of Athens' direct democracy was one of its most remarkable features; Ober's detailed study into the relationship between the mass and elite concluded that "rhetorical communication...was a primary means by which the strategic ends of social stability and political order were achieved."⁵⁶⁰ While there was some class tension, much of the political competition in our sources is presented as being between individual members of the elite; conflict was based more on faction than on class.

Leaders and Factions

The analysis by Strauss of politics during and following the Peloponnesian war should lead us to be cautious about ascribing class groups to particular policies or individual politicians. While he does not deny the existence of class interests and tensions in this period,⁵⁶¹ he argues that personal factions are a more appropriate analytical tool in examining the Assembly; groups built around a specific leader, who no doubt would have appealed in general term to class interests, but where the link between the person of the leader and his faction was more important than the

⁵⁵⁸ Plutarch, *Kimon*, 15.

⁵⁵⁹ Thucydides, 8.67

⁵⁶⁰ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, p. 338

⁵⁶¹ Strauss, *After the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 26-7, cf. p. 63

leader's link to a particular programme or principle.⁵⁶² In this analysis, a trireme crewman might approach the Assembly and vote not as a member of the "naval mob", but as a follower of Kimon, or Pericles, or whichever leader he happened to favour. Plutarch presents the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles as being passed by the poor while Kimon (and the wealthier hoplites) were away, but many poor members of the "naval mob" might have been just as willing to support Kimon as they were to back the reformers. While traditionally seen as a friend of the wealthy and a 'conservative' leader, Kimon was much more of a 'naval man' than Pericles when the latter began his political career; he was also as much of an 'imperialist'. While his views on the political system at home were less 'radical' than those of his opponent, we should not on this basis shrink from ascribing to Kimon strong support from amongst the groups that would benefit most from the reforms, including the poor men of the "naval mob".⁵⁶³

The dynamic of leaders and their friends, clients and followers in Athens is a crucial one. The sources, as we have seen, focus on individual politicians and their careers and rivalries. These career politicians often had a substantial group of followers; and while Strauss argues that these factions would tend to be fairly small groups based on personal links (as opposed to mass-membership corporate groups based on shared principles like modern political parties), the role of such supporters in the Assembly would have been crucial; not only in voting the right way and persuading others to do so, but for heckling and intimidating opponents. In the context of the Arginusae trial, described above, Diodorus is probably correct to suggest that the generals made a grave mistake in antagonizing Theramenes and Thrasybulus, as both men had substantial factions on whom they could call for political support. The battle between orators and their respective factions is the crucial political struggle in the extant evidence for the democracy.⁵⁶⁴ The extent to which more 'ordinary' people took advantage of their democratic right to share in the speaking is unclear; but even if they did, they have left little for us to examine in the source material.

While no doubt many politicians did have personal links with Athens' citizen trireme crewmen, the extent and importance of this is not known. Service as a nauarch⁵⁶⁵ or a trierarch would have given aspiring members of the political elite an opportunity to establish links with trireme crews.⁵⁶⁶ Once again, this emphasizes the personal nature of Athenian politics cutting across the class interests of the "naval mob"; trierarchs, nauarchs and generals could have recruited members of the "naval mob" to their cause by personal persuasion, bribery and mutual interest, but their political rivals could have been doing the same thing on other ships within the same

⁵⁶² Strauss, *After the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 17-28

⁵⁶³ Strauss, 'Athenian naval tactics', p. 320-3, argues that Kimon's choice to take many hoplites on his Eurymedon campaign was a deliberate political act to counter the prevailing Athenian method of fighting at sea "that maximized the state's dependence on the poorest men who filled the rowing benches" (p. 317). It is an interesting argument, but one that takes for granted that the 'ideal' Athenian sea battle was representative of naval campaigns in reality (see Part One, section A.1 and Part Three, section 3). It seems more likely that the decision to take a strong force of hoplites was dictated more by the strategic and tactical requirements of the campaign rather than an attempt to boost influence of Kimon's political constituency (van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 274, n. 19).

⁵⁶⁴ Strauss, *After the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 27-8

⁵⁶⁵ I discuss these ship commanders in Part Two, section A.5 and Appendix 1.

⁵⁶⁶ Links between members of the elite and poorer citizens in the navy will be discussed in Part Three, section 4.

expedition. Therefore, if we are expectant that the “naval mob” could and did control politics, or at the very least were an important group amongst the *demos* which the orators would try to mobilize to their cause, we might not see them acting as a unified group; but we might see politicians who had extensive links or ‘careers’ in the navy being more successful than those who did not; unfortunately, looking for such details is to put pressure on our extant evidence that it cannot possibly bear. A successful general in naval actions may have been able to influence politics by virtue of that success and its appeal to Athenians generally rather than because he coveted and won the support of those on his campaign. A rich trierarch who became a politician may well have paid and treated his men well and thus have won their support, but whether this would be enough on its own to ensure success in Assembly is doubtful; other extravagance on liturgies and political ‘networking’ would probably have been crucial too. The most successful politicians, such as Themistocles, Kimon, Pericles, Kleon, Aristides (and their opponents) can all find contexts for these sorts of political activity, and beyond the general statements of Aristotle and the Old Oligarch, we have nothing to suggest that gaining support for one’s faction from members of the “naval mob” in particular would be crucial. Nor do we often see trireme crews as a specific group addressed or appealed to in the Assembly, suggesting that their presence in the Pnyx may not have been of great importance. Finally, we have not been able to discern a context for the “naval mob” to act as a group, even under the questionable assumptions that logistically and politically they could and would have acted as one; it should be pointed out, however, that any analysis of an individual class group, aside from the broad umbrella terms ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, is likely to be frustrated in this sense; the political system appears to have operated more on a factional, rather than a class, line. Any single interest group that we might identify, while some would have been more important than others, would not have been able to dominate the Assembly to any significant extent.

3. The Output of the Assembly

Decrees and Laws

In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that there is no evidence of one particular class interest literally packing the Assembly and controlling the democracy through its votes and leaders. We have also seen that the personal nature of politics and political factions intersected class interests, dividing groups such as the “naval mob” and thus diluting any collective interest that they might have had. Successful politicians like Pericles had wide appeal amongst class groups and no doubt lots of supporters in their faction, but even they, for all their influence, could not have totally controlled the Assembly. The Assembly contained enough disparate elements that even the largest and broadest class groups of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ which the faction leaders and politicians ascribed to could not dominate proceedings.

However, if the group was a powerful one outside the direct political contexts that we have been looking at, the legislation of the Assembly may still have reflected this group's concerns. The 'out-put' of democracy and decisions in the Assembly should surely reflect a class bias if there was one dominant interest (farmers, the wealthy, tax-payers) in the Assembly. The "naval mob" may not have physically packed the Pnyx, nor might leaders have dominated based on the votes of trireme crews, but nevertheless is there evidence to suggest they were of sufficient importance, presence and clout to ensure that their interests were looked after in the Assembly? Alternatively, is there any evidence to suggest that the voice of the navy was not a strong one in democratic politics, and legislation was passed which damaged their interests?

Our examination therefore turns on whether the sources can provide evidence for this sort of indirect influence, or even dominance, of the Assembly. A large number of Athenian decrees and laws survive and can be examined in this light. Quite a lot of the decrees we have are concerned with the minutiae of finance and political administration, and we would struggle to find whether such measures had any particular effect on the "naval mob" at all. Many others involve treaties with foreign powers, which have the same difficulty. The proposers of decrees, when they can be identified, are useful to see who were making the speeches and getting laws passed, but discovering whether they or their proposals were supported by the "naval mob" is impossible.

In the first instance, it should be acknowledged that the decision to build and maintain the navy, along with the vast and costly shore installations associated with it, were ones that obviously benefited those Athenians (and non-Athenians) who were to crew the vessels. But while the navy and its pay can be seen in the context of populist measures to win the support of the masses,⁵⁶⁷ the navy brought power, and wealth, to most of the citizens, and the city as whole. While Plato might have happily given up sea power, Athenians of all classes benefited from the Empire and had a vested interest in maintaining it; such maintenance required a powerful navy, and ensuring employment for the poor in triremes may not have been a significant factor in the decisions to pursue sea power, but a by-product. We do not have any obvious measures to placate or favour the trireme crews, something that for example decreed that all the naval crews should receive more pay or grants of land. By way of contrast, there is some evidence of measures passed by the Assembly which suggests that merchants had their interests looked after. Garland argues that "procedure regarding maritime lawsuits (*dikai emporikai*) was revised in c. 350 for the benefit of traders",⁵⁶⁸ and a petition from non-Athenian merchants to be given the right to buy land for a temple was granted in 333 BC.⁵⁶⁹ Aristophanes alludes to a privileged legal status enjoyed by merchants in two plays.⁵⁷⁰ Merchants, unlike trireme crewmen, appear in the list of typical

⁵⁶⁷ Plutarch (*Life of Pericles*, 11-12) sees the navy in this light.

⁵⁶⁸ Garland, *Piraeus*, p. 62 cf. 192; see also p. 108.

⁵⁶⁹ IG II² 337=RO 91=Harding 111

⁵⁷⁰ Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, 1022-7 (a man attempts to avoid the law by claiming to be an *emporos*, merchant); cf. *Wealth*, 903-4

Assembly-goers given by Xenophon's Socrates,⁵⁷¹ and so perhaps these measures were to some extent the result of direct political influence; but many merchants were non-citizen, and to Xenophon in his advice about increasing Athenian revenues, the merchants as a group were thought of as non-citizens who should be better catered for at Athens; some of his proposed reforms were put into effect.⁵⁷² In other words, merchants were an important group who had a considerable and perceptible indirect influence upon Athenian decision-making. The same cannot be said of trireme crews, although there were some legislative measures which had a particular bearing on naval folk; for example, the measures proposed by Demosthenes in 354 BC to reform the trierarchy. With one exception, there are no honorary decrees rewarding someone for naval actions.⁵⁷³ We have seen above that the dynamics of the Assembly, and the likelihood of a disproportionately rich *ekklesia*, would mean that the surviving decrees are unlikely to exhibit any obvious fingerprints of the "naval mob".

Pericles' "Citizenship Law"

Legislation proposed by Pericles in 451/0 BC is perhaps one of the most overtly 'social' laws which can support this sort of discussion. Referred to as 'The Citizenship Law' in modern works,⁵⁷⁴ this decree dates from the height of Athenian power, a time perhaps when Athenian citizenship was seen as an increasingly valuable commodity. The primary sources agree on the main thrust of the reform; limiting citizenship to the offspring of parents, both of whom had certain status. Patterson's statement that the law does no more or less than "establishes a minimum condition...for citizenship"⁵⁷⁵ is clearly true; the debate has centred on defining exactly what that minimum condition was.

All of the primary sources are collected quoted and discussed by Patterson in the opening chapter of her work on the citizenship law.⁵⁷⁶ Most are one-line remarks in lexicons and late writers; the two fullest sources are the papyrus of [Aristotle] on the *Constitution of Athens*, written in the 330s BC, and Plutarch's second century AD biography of Pericles. The different details and contexts recorded in these sources are suggestive of separate literary traditions. Plutarch records the terms of the law as part of a moral anecdote, when the proposer Pericles finds himself a victim of it; without legitimate sons and late in life, Pericles beseeched the *demos* to relax the provisions which he himself put in place, and allow the younger Pericles, his son by Aspasia, a foreign-born woman, to become an Athenian citizen:

⁵⁷¹ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.7.6

⁵⁷² Xenophon, *Revenues*, 3.3

⁵⁷³ This inscription awards a trireme crewman named Asklepiodorus for his courage in fighting the enemy sometime in the second half of the fourth century BC. This document, which flatters to deceive, is discussed in detail in Part Three, section 4. It again contrasts with the situation for merchants, who feature quite prominently in late fourth-century honorific decrees.

⁵⁷⁴ Plutarch (*Pericles*, 37) referred to it as "the law concerning bastards".

⁵⁷⁵ Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, p. 95.

⁵⁷⁶ Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, pp. 1-3

akmazôn ho Periklês en têi politeiai pro panu pollôn chronôn, kai paidas echôn, hôsper eirêtai, gnêsious, nomon egrapse monous Athênaious einai tous ek duein Athênaiôn gegonotas

When Pericles was at the height of his power, and, as I have mentioned, had legitimate children born to him, he proposed a law that only those who could claim Athenian parentage on both sides should be counted as Athenian citizens.⁵⁷⁷

The account of the law in [Aristotle] has a different context. He begins the second section of his work, pertaining to the present political system at Athens, by giving a list of requirements for citizenship, the first of which is that both parents of a citizen must be *astoi*.⁵⁷⁸ Earlier in the work (in the section tracing the history and development of Athens' political system), he records that this particular provision was initially made under the auspices of Pericles in 451/0 BC.

epi Antidotou dia to plêthos tôn politôn Perikleous eipontos egnôsan mê metechien tês poleôs, hos an mê ex amphoin astoin êi gegonôs.

Under Antidotus, because of the large number of citizens and on the proposal of Pericles, they decided that none was to share in the city who was not born of two *astoi*.⁵⁷⁹

The account of [Aristotle] is therefore to be preferred in terms of accuracy of detail to the far later and more anecdotal account of Plutarch. The inclusion of an archon date and a proposer (which would have appeared at the top of the stone when the law was inscribed) admit the possibility that the author recorded the terms of the legislation exactly as it was enacted. This possibility is strengthened (though of course far from confirmed) by the fact that the law was in active use at the time he was writing. Most modern interpretations of the law holds that there is no substantive difference between the basic terms of the law as recorded in these sources; the “two Athenians” of Plutarch a simpler way of writing the two key phrase in [Aristotle], *astoi*, and *metechien tes poleos* (“to share in the city”).⁵⁸⁰ In the political context, these two phrases are essentially synonymous, and the law requires new citizens to have two “citizen” parents; thus the testimony of our two principal sources is in agreement. The difference in terminology is explained by the fact that, despite loose wording in Plutarch and many modern works, women could not be “Athenians” or “citizens” in the political context that this law is primarily concerned with. The term *astoi* encompassed male citizens, and non-foreign women (i.e. the daughters of citizen fathers, and mothers who themselves had citizen fathers). Plutarch, perhaps not understanding the subtleties of the terminology, went for the simpler and essentially correct interpretation using technically the wrong language.

⁵⁷⁷ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 37.3

⁵⁷⁸ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 40

⁵⁷⁹ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 26.3

⁵⁸⁰ See Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, pp. 49-78, for a forcefully argued yet ultimately unsubstantiated and speculative interpretation of this legislation, which seeks to include certain metics within the category of *astoi*.

Effects of the Citizenship Law

While of course its impact would be felt amongst the whole city, the men of the “naval mob” might have been amongst those most especially affected by the decree. Citizenship was to be restricted to those whom had *astoi* parents. One of the effects of this would have been to disenfranchise the children of an Athenian and foreigner (whether they were married or not), and thus potentially make such a union less inviting. Patterson is correct to argue that “the idea that foreign marriage was generally a habit of the Few is widespread, but perhaps unjustified considering how little we know about the practices of the Many”,⁵⁸¹ but the passing of this law suggests that marriages between *xenoi* and *astoi* were far from uncommon, and that prior to 451 BC the male children of such unions could become citizens.⁵⁸² Notwithstanding the greater amount of potential contact with non-Athenians that the fifth century afforded all of the Athenian population, the “naval mob” was perhaps the most numerous group with whom relationships with foreign women could regularly arise. We are into the realms of speculation here, of course, but it seems likely that the “naval mob” would have greater contact with foreign people while working throughout the Aegean,⁵⁸³ and also back at Athens if (as seems likely) foreign visitors, metics and members of the “naval mob” all lived in the Piraeus in disproportionate numbers. Roy has recently challenged this particular assertion with regard to the metics. He bases his case on Whitehead’s discussion⁵⁸⁴ of the 366 metics whose deme registration is known, which shows that 19% of known metics lived in Piraeus, and 61% lived in the city. Therefore, Roy argues “if the free population of the *asty* was less than about three times as great as that of the Piraeus, there was a greater concentration of metics in the *asty* than in the Piraeus.”⁵⁸⁵ The case is flawed, as Roy is not comparing like with like; the *asty* here is composed of six demes, against the single deme of Piraeus. The bouletic quotas⁵⁸⁶ of the respective demes can give us some idea of the respective population; these can only be rough estimations, but the argument that the demes could have contained many citizens from other places in Attica would apply equally to the city and the Piraeus, and so does not invalidate such a comparison. The six demes of Roy’s *asty* have a total bouletic quota of 36 or 37,⁵⁸⁷ against 9 for Piraeus,⁵⁸⁸ this suggests that the population of the city was four times as great as that of the Piraeus. This would imply in turn that the Piraeus did indeed have a greater concentration of metics per head of citizen population than did the *asty*

⁵⁸¹ Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, p. 99

⁵⁸² Patterson argues that “such a law [re: Pericles’ citizenship law] is only passed when it is needed or thought to be needed.” *Pericles’ Citizenship Law*, p. 132.

⁵⁸³ Shipley, *History of Samos*, p. 124, n. 56, argues that Alcibiades may have fathered a child while the fleet was stationed at Samos. The evidence he bases this on is not the strongest (the claim of a Samian tyrant and writer Douris to have descended from Alcibiades, *FGrHist* 76 T 3 and F70). But the supposition that Alcibiades fathered a child at this time is likely enough, and he is not likely to have been the only one from the fleet in such a position.

⁵⁸⁴ Whitehead, *Demes of Attica*, p. 83-4.

⁵⁸⁵ Roy, ‘Threat from the Piraeus’, p. 196.

⁵⁸⁶ This is the number of men that each deme was entitled to have sitting on the 500-seat Council. The seats were divided as evenly possible between the tribes and *trittys*, and bore at least some relationship to the relative populations of the demes.

⁵⁸⁷ Melite; 7, Kollytos; 3, Alopeke; 10, Kydathenaion; 12 or 11, Skambonidai; 3, Keiriadai; 2.

⁵⁸⁸ These figures come from Whitehead, *Demes of Attica*, pp. 369-74. Roy’s own figure for the bouletic quota of Piraeus is 8, one lower than Whitehead’s, making the difference that little bit more vast.

as a whole,⁵⁸⁹ and, as the principal point of entry by sea, it would certainly have had a greater concentration and number of non-metic *xenoi* as well.

It seems that the Piraeus was an area with a very high density of non-Athenians, both settlers and visitors, and thus the potential for members of the “naval mob” taking foreign wives was increased. A law which, while stopping short of an outright ban,⁵⁹⁰ nevertheless had the effect of discouraging unions with foreigners can surely be interpreted as not having in mind the interests of those groups which regularly contracted such marriages. One such group was the rich elite, for whom we have most evidence, and who perhaps frequently contracted dynastic marriage with powerful families overseas.⁵⁹¹ The Citizenship Law has been interpreted in such a way, an anti-aristocratic measure,⁵⁹² perhaps even one directed against a particular politician, Kimon.⁵⁹³ Such arguments are not convincing, not least because they ignore the reason given in the ancient evidence for the law; the fact that there were “too many citizens”. Disenfranchising the children of the Athenian elite would have imperceptibly small effects on any demographic level. The “naval mob”, however, was a far more numerous group, probably in the low thousands at this time, and certainly large enough to have an impact on the number of citizens. Another large group of citizens who would have been more likely to take foreign wives were the men sent out to the various cleruchies, but all of the records of these settlements seem to have antedated the law.⁵⁹⁴ Indeed, sending out cleruchies and especially colonies would have been a more direct, obvious and traditional method of solving the problem of too many citizens in Athens, and it is probably not coincidence that a good deal of these expeditions were despatched in the years around 450 BC.

It is well worth asking how this law was intended to solve the problem of their being too many citizens. In itself, it seems not to reduce the number of citizens in 451/0 BC, but only to maintain about the present number in the future.⁵⁹⁵ As Patterson has pointed out, if the law presumes that an increasing proportion of Athenian men were marrying foreign women (and vice versa), the

⁵⁸⁹ It is worth noting that the deme Melite appears to have had a higher concentration of metics than the Piraeus, given that a greater number of attested metics were registered there (75 as against the Piraeus' 69; far and away the highest two totals for Athens), and had a lower bouletic quota; 7 as opposed to 9.

⁵⁹⁰ There is no evidence to suggest that there was a clause attached to this law that made marriage between a *xenos* and an *astos* illegal, though there was such legislation in force by the middle of the fourth century; [Demosthenes] 59.16.

⁵⁹¹ Conner ('Civic Identity', p. 36) states that “We know that marriages with foreigners were not uncommon amongst members of the Athenian elite”; similarly Boegehold ('Citizenship Law', p. 58) states that “leading citizens had for generations been contracting marriages with prominent non-Athenian families”; there is probably a good deal of truth in these statements, but Patterson (*Citizenship Law*, p. 99) is right to sound a more cautious tone, pointing out the general paucity of evidence, asking the question “can we assume...[from a very few examples]...that it was necessarily a widespread habit among the better sort at large...What marriages between foreigners and Athenians of Pericles' generation do we really know of?”

⁵⁹² It also is predicated, as Patterson notes (*Citizenship Law*, p. 99), on the assumption that “extra-Athenian marriage was a unique characteristic of the Athenian aristocracy”

⁵⁹³ Boegehold ('Citizenship Law', pp. 58-9) gives a useful and brief discussion of these and many other interpretations of the Citizenship Law, with full references.

⁵⁹⁴ I discuss colonies and cleruchies above in Part One, section A.2

⁵⁹⁵ We may not fully agree with Boegehold ('Citizenship law', p. 59) that laws are not often passed because “a far-sighted statesman looks into the future and sees a source of trouble ahead”; Pericles after all was credited widely with a high degree of foresight. But it is certainly fair to look at this law as a solution devised for an immediate and current problem in 451/0 BC.

population of new citizens would only have been slowed down if this new law did *not* significantly deter such unions, or if we assume “that if deprived of foreign wives Athenian men would choose not to marry at all”.⁵⁹⁶ Similarly, it does not seem that the law was to be retrospective, in that it did not disenfranchise those who were not born of two *astoi* but who had already been enrolled as citizens before 451/0 BC. Conner is right to say that there is no indication in the texts of the law that it could not be applied retrospectively,⁵⁹⁷ but equally there is nothing to suggest that it could; our evidence of the exact terms of the law is too scanty to be sure on this point. That some sort of large scale disenfranchisement is said to have happened several years later, and was prompted by a specific event (a gift of grain) rather than as an immediate result and consequence of this law, perhaps suggests that it was not retrospective in its effect.⁵⁹⁸ At the very least, the passing of the law in 451/0 BC did not seem to provoke a wave of legal challenges and disenfranchisements of existing citizens. It is worth noting that when the law was re-enacted, we have more detail of the exact provisions, and this one was emphatically not retrospective in its nature,⁵⁹⁹ whether this was a break from the 451/0 BC or continuing its principals is unclear.

It is perhaps best to look at this measure in relation to current *astos/non-astos* unions in 451 BC. A perceived and effective reduction in the citizen body would have been achieved if the (probably many) children born of such couples who had been registered with their demes after birth, but had not by 451/0 BC reached their full adulthood, were by this law to be excluded from becoming full citizens.⁶⁰⁰ Such young males would doubtless have been expected (and expecting) to become citizens during their childhood, and so while it is not technically a reduction of the number of citizens in 451 BC, it could easily have seemed like one, and been described as such with only a moderate degree of licence. Given that Athenian naval campaigns and a full-time fleets involving citizen rowers had begun as early as 478 BC, and that the fact of a permanent, wage-paying fleet probably accelerated the rate of migration to Athens which had begun with the refurbishment of the Piraeus under Themistocles, many naval families could have been in the position of having their children disenfranchised by this law. A man of 20 man coming to Athens to seek employment in the fleet in 478 BC, settling as a metic and marrying a local ‘Athenian’ girl when he turned thirty, having his first son in the next year, might well find that his boy would have been unable to join his deme as a citizen as planned after Pericles’ law was passed. It would have been a similar story for Athenian sailors bringing foreign wives back to the city; any sons born after 469/8 BC would not have become citizens.⁶⁰¹ There is

⁵⁹⁶ Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, p. 102

⁵⁹⁷ Conner, ‘Civic identity’, p. 43, n.25.

⁵⁹⁸ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 37. As Patterson argues (*Citizenship Law*, p. 122-3, n. 63), the passage does not need to imply a scrutiny off every single person in Attica, but only those who actually applied for a share of the grain handout.

⁵⁹⁹ Scholiast to Aeschines, 1.39; Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, p. 145.

⁶⁰⁰ Patterson, *Citizenship Law*, p. 105, suggests that there was probably a “boom’ (post-crisis) generation born in the 470’s”, contributing to the impression that there were too many citizens coming of age in the 450s.

⁶⁰¹ At least in theory; while Patterson (*Citizenship Law*, pp. 146-7) is correct to that “it cannot be shown to have been revoked or modified” between 451/0 and 403 BC, the ultimate decisions regarding citizenship would have been in the hands of the demesmen, and there were surely many who slipped through the net despite being technically unqualified

unfortunately no direct evidence for such people and circumstances; but such changes and increases in the overall population could have fed an apparent perception that there were too many Athenians to share the large but finite benefits of Empire and the far less large and infinitely more finite land resources of Attica itself.⁶⁰² It would be going too far to suggest that the law was passed specifically and consciously against the interests of the “naval mob”; even if that was the effect was damaging to them, there was not necessarily any intention to do so. But it does seem to be a law which was perhaps significantly disadvantageous to the “naval mob”, and trireme crewmen more generally, and which was passed seemingly with little obstacle or opposition. It is not what we would expect under the hypothesis that the “naval mob” had a strong voice in the Assembly, or had its interests looked after there.

Naval policy and Aristophanes' *Knights*

Of all the plays of Aristophanes, perhaps the *Knights* has most to tell us regarding the interaction of the navy, its members, and its interests with the Athenian political system as a whole. While references to the navy, rowers and famous sea-battles are not replete in Aristophanes, they are far from absent; most plays have one or two notices or jokes about naval matters in them. The *Knights* gives us information on the promotion of sailors within trireme crews and the terms under which they earned their money, but also gives us some insight as to the presence of the navy and its crew on the political stage.⁶⁰³

The central action in the play surrounds the satirical battle between the slave Paphlagon and the Sausage Seller (backed up by the titular chorus of Knights) for the favour of the old man Demos. Of course Demos, characterized as self-serving, greedy and short-sighted, represents the Athenian people as a whole. Paphlagon represents the politician Kleon, who was one of the most influential orators at the time the play was written and produced, not only due to his fiery and aggressive rhetorical tactics, but also his military success against the Spartans at Pylos.⁶⁰⁴ Aristophanes was always a foe of Kleon and his brand of ‘demagogic’ politics, and this work is the playwright’s most direct attack on him. His method of bringing Kleon low shows a high degree of cynicism in politicians and politics as a whole; as Sommerstein puts it, “the only way

to be citizens. As Conner (‘Athenian Civic Identity’, p. 40) has emphasized, “the decree itself was not the end of the story. It required interpretation and implementation.”

⁶⁰² Boegehold (‘Citizenship Law’ p. 60) argues convincingly that worries over the thin spreading of Attica’s land was a principal factor in legislation designed to narrow access to citizenship, and thus the right to own and inherit land. He further suggests that the law was little more than Pericles’ putting into decree a principle that had stemmed from decisions and arbitrations regarding land disputes in Athenian courts; that children of two *astoi* had a superior claim to those of mixed parentage. It is an attractive and persuasive speculation, but a speculation still.

⁶⁰³ The passages on pay quoted below are used by Morrison and Williams (*Greek Oared Ships*, pp. 258 ff), along with Thucydides 8.45, to suggest the policy of withholding half of a sailor’s pay until his return to port; see discussion in Part Three, section 2.

⁶⁰⁴ Aristophanes’ view (voiced through the character of Demosthenes, a slave of Demos, ll. 55) was that this success was primarily due to the far more gifted military leader Demosthenes, and Kleon cynically capitalized on the other man’s success. There is some support for this view from Thucydides 4.29-32, where it seems that Demosthenes took most of the tactical decisions.

for Cleon to be overthrown is by a man who outdoes him in those very qualities that make Cleon such a menace.”⁶⁰⁵

It is not surprising that a play produced in the centre of the Archidamian war should show concern for the military affairs of Athens and the expenses occasioned in its prosecution. Indeed, the character of Demos twice refers specifically to the importance of pay for sailors. In the first instance, the Sausage Seller is interpreting Oracles for the old man:

Allantopôlês: *houtos gar hêmôn tas puelous aphêrpassen. all' houtosi gar esti peri tou nautikou ho chrêsmos, hôi se dei prosechein ton noun panu.*

Dêmos: *prosechô: su d' anagnôske, tois nautaisi mou hopôs ho misthos prôton apodothêsetai.*

Sausage-Seller: Well, anyway, this oracle is about the fleet, and you should pay close attention to it.

Demos: I'm doing so; you read it, and first and foremost say how my sailors are going to be given their pay.⁶⁰⁶

In the final act, when the Sausage-Seller has been victorious and Demos rejuvenated, the fleet, and particularly the payment of the sailors, is the first priority;

Allantopôlês: *ta d' alla, pher' idô, pôs politeusei phrason.*

Dêmos: *prôton men hoposoi naus elaunousin makras, katagomenois ton misthon apodôsô 'ntelê*

Sausage-Seller: What policy will you follow? Tell me.

Demos: First of all, to all who row longships I will give their full pay when they come into port.⁶⁰⁷

There are several things that can be drawn from these lines. Firstly and most obviously, they give voice to the view that paying the sailors of the navy should be a high priority. Secondly, the implication (and possibly indeed the reason for the inclusion of the lines in the first place) is that the political system was failing the navy crews in this important regard. The connection between pay and the navy is made elsewhere in the play (as it is commonly in Thucydides' history); in an invocation of Poseidon, triremes are noted by the chorus for three qualities; their speed, their rams and their pay.⁶⁰⁸

While we do not have a member of the “naval mob” expressing a view on this or indeed any other issue, the Chorus Leader tells the audience of a fictional conversation between two of Athens' warships.⁶⁰⁹ An older trireme expresses concern for the ambitious plans of Hyperbolic

⁶⁰⁵ Introduction to his edition of *Knights*, p. 2.

⁶⁰⁶ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll.1063-65. He also refers to payment for triremes in line 1078; the Sausage-seller interprets an oracle's mention of fox-cubs as referring to triremes, and Demos immediately asks who is to pay for them.

⁶⁰⁷ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 1364-1378

⁶⁰⁸ ll. 554. The word used in this context is *misthophoroi*, money-bearing, and it is debated whether the expense of the ship is being referred to, or the use of triremes as revenue collection vessels (cf. l. 1070)

⁶⁰⁹ *Knights*, 1300 ff.

to send 100 ships to Carthage, and her sentiments are echoed by her younger companion, who would rather go rotten in the shipsheds than sail under the command of such a man, advocating an aggressive policy simply to win political capital. There are echoes of Pericles' policy being advocated here, stressing the dangers and folly of over-reaching. Is this just the view of Aristophanes, or is he using a rather nice device to express the views of the "naval mob"? It is difficult to be certain, and in such circumstances caution must be exercised. While sailors, and potential sailors, would certainly not want to be led by a fool on a fool's errand, most of our other evidence (including other plays of Aristophanes) suggests that they were generally quite willing to go on extended campaigns, as this would result in long-term pay and the chance for booty. An expedition likely to be successful in Carthage would have been likely to receive enthusiastic support from the "naval mob", as would the large-scale attack on Egypt in the 450s BC, and the one to Sicily in 415 BC. Of course in the circumstances Aristophanes describes in *Knights*, with the provision of pay being something of an issue, a long sojourn to Carthage may not have seemed as attractive a prospect. The effects of a long conflict were beginning to tell on Athens, and despite recent successes in Pylos and their characteristic confidence,⁶¹⁰ Athenian optimism that Carthage could be subdued might not have been high.

We should resist the temptation to ascribe such thinking to the "naval mob" on the basis of this passage of Aristophanes, just as we should not unthinkingly ascribe the views of his female characters to real Athenian women. At the very least, the play does suggest that the navy crews were not being treated in a noticeably good or preferential manner. Given the assumption of the political strength of these men, and the by no means desperate financial situation facing Athens at this time, it is somewhat surprising to find their pay lacking and their case on this matter being advocated by Aristophanes. The treatment of naval issues in *Knights* could be viewed as an attempt to get genuine concerns regarding the navy, and particularly sailors' pay, onto the political agenda. This in turn implies that such matters were not already being given their proper attention in Athens in the 420s BC, and perhaps that Kleon and his ilk were neglecting them. On the assumption that the naval crews were a powerful force in democratic politics, this would be a surprising conclusion. In fact the play as a whole is very good grounds to reject this assumption and to see the link between the navy crews and democratic politics as something of an artificial construct. Perhaps the very fact that Aristophanes was here voicing the rowers' concerns can be thought of as evidence that they could not or did not put them forward themselves.

Harming the "Great Yo-Ho"

If it was indeed the case that navy crews were treated with some degree of neglect or negligence, that is not to say that there was any deliberate persecution or political sidelining of the "naval mob"; while such sidelining certainly happened on a cultural level,⁶¹¹ Aristotle's dream of a navy

⁶¹⁰ A trait ascribed to them in Thucydides (see for example 1.70-1, where they are compared (not unproblematically) with the more cautious and less mercurial Spartans).

⁶¹¹ I discuss these issues in Part Three, section 4.

manned by disenfranchised serf/rowers never materialized, and Plato's vision of a city shorn of its connections to the sea lasted only as long as the brief and ill-fated regime of the 30 Tyrants, imposed upon Athens in 404 BC and overthrown within a year. A passage from Aristophanes' *Wasps* suggests that accusations of harm done to naval people by their leaders could be taken very seriously. The context is the comic trial of the watchdog Labes (a caricature of the Athenian general Laches), who was prosecuted by the Hound of Cydathenaeum (whom no-one in the audience could fail to perceive as Kleon, a member of that deme); the play's protagonist, the rascally old Philocleon, is given the task of judging the case, in order to cure him of his addiction to the real Athenian jury courts. The hound opens his case thus:

Kuôn: *tês men graphês êkousath' hên egrapsamên andres dikastai toutoni. deinotata gar ergôn dedrake kame kai to rhuppapai. apodras gar es tèn gônian turon polun katesikelize kaneplet' en tôi skotôi*

Hound: You have heard, members of the jury, the indictment I have entered against the defendant here. He has committed the most disgraceful crimes against me and the great yo-ho [*to ruppapai*]. He ran off into the corner and ensicilized a great amount of cheese and stuffed himself with it in the dark.⁶¹²

This is satire of the highest order; the reference is to accusations of embezzlement made against Laches in relation to his command of an expedition to Sicily, and parodies a trial that could have resulted from these rumours.⁶¹³ Aristophanes has the missing money represented as the cheese that Labes “ensicilized”, and the prosecutor Kleon-Hound incensed not so much by the theft, but from the fact that he personally did not profit from it.⁶¹⁴ The mention of *to ruppapai* is a clear reference to the crews of triremes, possibly the “naval mob”; this was their distinctive and rhythmic call made while at the oars. However, Sommerstein perhaps goes too far in suggesting that the phrase was “used to denote the poorer Athenians who manned the navy (and, in large measure, the juries) and were Cleon's strongest supporters.”⁶¹⁵ This seems to place too great a weight on the passage; while poorer Athenians did contribute both to the juries and to the fleet, equating the two like this is problematic. On the evidence of this play as much as anything else, the average juror appears to have been amongst the older citizens, his days of campaigning in any capacity behind him. There is no other evidence to suggest that Kleon had any sort of systematic support from the “naval mob”, and this passage need not suggest it. What can be said is that a successful prosecutor⁶¹⁶ could inflame the passions of a jury by suggesting that the navy (and possibly its crew) had been undermined by the actions of the accused. This could certainly suggest a concern for the welfare of naval people, at least to the extent that crimes against them should be punished; it is worth noting that the crime perpetrated against the “great yo-ho” was

⁶¹² Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 908-11

⁶¹³ See Sommerstein's brief summary of Laches' career and the allegations against him in the notes of his edition of *Wasps* pp. 171-2, ad loc l. 240

⁶¹⁴ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 915-6

⁶¹⁵ Sommerstein, pp. 211 ad loc l. 909

⁶¹⁶ For the Hound wins over the one-man jury in this case; he is denied his verdict when Bdelycleon tricks his father Philocleon into voting to acquit rather than convict.

depriving them of resources, which was a key issue for Aristophanes throughout *Knights*. It could also reflect a concern that was to resurface; that the embezzlement of unscrupulous leaders was undermining the navy itself, and therefore the safety of the city, and that such activity angered juries. It does not suggest that the “naval mob” were themselves actors in such political actions, still less that they were an integral part of the prosecutor’s following.

A Demosthenic speech hints that the Athenians were still susceptible to such arguments in the fourth century BC, and argues that such overreactions were not conducive to making rational decisions:

prin an hapant' eipô aneôixan dêpou prôên tines ton opisthodomon. oukoun hoi pariontes hapantes ton dêmon kataleluthai, tous nomous ouket' einai, toiaut' elegon...palin kôpas tis hupheileto: mastigoun, strebloun pantes hoi legontes, ton dêmon kataluesthai.

You know that a day or two ago the Opistodomus was broken into. So the speakers in the Assembly, one and all, cried that the people are overthrown, that the laws were null and void, and so on...a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the thieves torture them,” cried the speaker; “the people are overthrown.”⁶¹⁷

This is an interesting example of the link between the navy (in a very broad sense) and the safety of Athens, though one that the speaker emphatically rejects; he claims that the democracy was threatened by the *demos* itself and the failures of its political leaders.⁶¹⁸ There is no question here of crimes against the “naval mob” being the cause of the outrage and danger, as the oars were state-owned equipment; the speaker’s example involved the theft of valuables from the Parthenon treasury, and so his train of thought is concerned with state resources and not particularly about the navy or its people.

Demosthenes’ Speech *On the Symmories*

The proper organization of these material resources was one of the main subjects of Demosthenes’ first speech before the Assembly. In the context of a speech urging the Athenians to follow a cautious policy with regard to the Persian King in 354 BC, he proposed a complex and substantial reorganization of the symmories, groups of wealthy liturgists who shared the large financial burdens of the trierarchy between the members. Although the reforms were not enacted, the speech is an interesting text to consider in relation to this discussion. Even given the fact that the need for the reform stemmed from the huge financial burdens that were being placed upon the liturgical class as a whole, and in particular upon the-very-wealthy-but-not-quite-extremely-rich, the speech takes no notice of the effects of that the reform would have had on the crewmen, who themselves stood to be affected by the changes. It might be argued that the changes to the trierarchy proposed by Demosthenes, a complex set of measures designed to

⁶¹⁷ [Demosthenes], 13.14

⁶¹⁸ [Demosthenes], 13.14

spread the costs of the liturgy as fairly as possible amongst the wealthy,⁶¹⁹ would make naval finances more efficient for the liturgists, and therefore would have been welcomed by the “naval mob”; poverty stricken and ruined liturgists were not likely to make effective or generous trierarchs. This is quite so, but it is remarkable that Demosthenes did not make the point in these terms to his audience. The beneficiaries of these measures were to have been the citizens and the city as a whole, which would have been on a better war footing whatever future enemies arose.⁶²⁰ But as a strategy for winning sufficient support in the Assembly to pass the reforms, Demosthenes might have been well advised to appeal to the self-interest of the “naval mob”; if it is assumed that they were a significant political presence. Jones points out that this speech provides the one exception to the rule that speakers addressed the Assembly members as if they were themselves tax-payers; here Demosthenes speaks of “us” as those paying the taxes, and “you” (i.e. the Assembly) as voting for it. Jones uses this instance to argue that it was only in circumstances like the one of this speech (a moment of crisis) that the poor would outnumber the rich,⁶²¹ if this inference is correct and more of the poor citizens were present than was usual, could some of those have been members of the “naval mob”, and thus make it even more striking that Demosthenes makes no mention of how the reforms will effect them? However, this is a tenuous chain of reasoning, and the initial inference is not valid. While this is a notable exception to the general pattern of how the Assembly was addressed, the very next sentence resumes normal service:

alla thō boulesthe dôdekatên hêmas eisoisein, pentakosia talanta; all' out' an anaschoisthe out', ei katasheite, axia tou polemou ta chrêmata.

Suppose you want us to pay one twelfth in tax, 500 talents? But you would not submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the war.⁶²²

If this speech can be regarded as an attempt by an Athenian politician to look after the interests of the city’s sailors, it would seem that (like with the potential damage caused to them by the Citizenship Law in 451/0 BC) it was probably not thought of, and was certainly not presented, in such terms. The speech does not totally neglect the rowers themselves, however; Demosthenes does discuss new procedures for manning the ships:

plêrosin d', hê kai saphês estai kai rhaidia, meta tauta legô. phêmi tous stratêgous dein dianeimai topous deka tôn neôriôn, skepsamenous hopôs hês engutat' allêlôn kata triakont' ôsi neôsoikoi, epeidan de touto poiêsôsi, duo summorias kai triakonta triêreis toutôn hekastôi prosneimai tôn topôn, eit' epiklêrosai tas phulas: ton de taxiarchon hekaston, hon an hê phulê topon lachêi, dielein tricha kai tas naus hêsautôs, eit' epiklêrosai tas trittus, hopôs an tôn men holôn neôriôn hen hekastêi meros êi tôn phulôn, tou de merous hekastou to triton meros hê trittus echêi, eidête d', an ti deêi, prôton men tèn phulên, hopou tetaktai, meta tauta de tèn trittun, eita

⁶¹⁹ Demosthenes, 14.20-22.

⁶²⁰ Demosthenes, 14.11

⁶²¹ Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, p. 36

⁶²² Demosthenes, 14.27

triêrarchoi tines kai triêreis poia, kai triakonta men hê phulê, deka d' hê trittus hekastê triêreis echêi.

I now proceed to describe a clear and easy way of manning the ships. I suggest that the generals should divide the dockyards into ten areas, so arranging it that there may be dock-room in each for thirty ships, as close together as possible, and that when they have done this, they should apportion two boards and thirty galleys to each area, and then assign the tribes by lot to the areas. And each taxiarch must divide into three parts whatever area his tribe has taken over, and the ships in the same way, and then he must allot the thirds of his tribe in such a way that of the whole space of the dockyards each tribe may have one area and each third of a tribe a third of an area; so that you can know at once, if necessary, where each tribe and each third of a tribe is stationed, who are the trierarchs and what ships they have, and that so each tribe may have thirty ships and each third of a tribe ten.⁶²³

It is worth comparing Demosthenes' idea of a nice, systematic and ordered sorting of thousands and thousands of men with the more dynamic and realistic portrait of the launching of a fleet given in *Acharnians* around 70 years earlier:

Dikaiopulos: *pher' ei Lakedaimoniôn tis ekpleusas skaphei apedoto phênas kunidion Seriphîôn, kathêsth' an en domoisin; ê pollou ge dei: kai karta mentan eutheôs katheilkete triakosias naus, ên d' an hê polis plea thorubou stratiôtôn, peri triêrarchou boês, misthou didomenou, palladiôn chrusoumenôn, stoas stenachousês, sitiôn metroumenôn, askôn, tropôtêrôn, kadous ônoumenôn, skorodôn, elaôn, krommuôn en diktuois, stephanôn, trichidôn, aulêtridôn, hupôpiôn:*

Dikaiopolis: Supposing one of the Spartans had sailed forth in his bark and denounced and sold a puppy dog to the Seriphians, "would you within your halls sat? Far from it!" Why, on the very instant you'd have been launching 300 ships, and the city would have been full of the hubbub of soldiers, noisy crowds surrounding ships' captains, pay being handed out, Pallas emblems gilded, the colonnade groaning, rations being handed out, leathers and oarloops and people buying jars, garlic and olives and onions in nets, crowns and anchovies and flute-girls and black eyes.⁶²⁴

It is notable that the difficulties in getting men to turn up in the first place are not part of Demosthenes' speech, just how to arrange them most efficiently when they arrive.⁶²⁵ Such centralization and organization by tribe is more suggestive of citizens levied for naval service rather than the hiring of a more varied mix of men on the open market as described by Aristophanes; we should perhaps interpret this section of the speech as provisions to have been put in place in the event of a citizen call-up. This impression is strengthened by involvement of the taxiarchs in Demosthenes' organization plans. Taxiarchs were normally commanders of land forces, and are attested as being involved only in one fleet; that which fought at Arginusae, and which was manned by conscription. In any event, these provisions were not enacted.

⁶²³ Demosthenes, 14.22-3

⁶²⁴ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, ll. 542-51

⁶²⁵ This might suggest a degree of naivety and inexperience on Demosthenes' part (this is his first known speech before the Assembly, and his measures were not endorsed); certainly Apollodorus ([Demosthenes], 50.7) had considerable problems with listed sailors turning up in the first place, rather than whether they were standing in the right place on the quay.

The conclusion of this discussion is somewhat negative; we cannot detect the presence of the “naval mob” in any individual political decision of the fourth century, nor acting in any sort of collective manner on the political stage. It is also not possible to detect any particular concern for the “naval mob” in the decisions of the Assembly; while attacks on the “great yo-ho” might have been met with calls for retribution, such evidence as we have is more suggestive of an indifference towards them, to the extent that Aristophanes thought it necessary to give voice to some naval concerns in *Knights*. This discussion does not absolutely prove that the “naval mob” were *not* a significant presence or influence on decision making in the Athenian Assembly; our evidence is insufficiently detailed to be able to conclusively demonstrate a negative conclusion in these matters. But it certainly renders as problematic any vision of the Athenian political system as one in which the “naval mob” had considerable political power, still less dominance.

4. Politics in the Piraeus

Assemblies in the Piraeus

The deme of Piraeus was one of the biggest, and possibly the most important, of all of the individual demes. As well as having a large population of citizens, the Piraeus was home to larger than average numbers of metics, and no doubt many seasonal foreign visitors. The maritime activity of the Piraeus, both in terms of the merchant fleet and the trireme fleet, accounted for the fact that in the fourth century BC, compared with most demes, the harbour town boasted a great many magistracies and institutions, duplicating many of those of the Athenian state as a whole. Of particular interest at this stage is the indication in Demosthenes that the Assembly itself was sometimes held in the Piraeus. In his speech *On the Embassy*, he talks about two different Assembly meetings that were held in the Piraeus rather than the Pnyx.⁶²⁶ The first passage from this speech suggests that there was an Assembly convened for the purpose of discussing ‘things in relation to the dockyards’,⁶²⁷ though certainly it was the case that items other than the dockyards made it on to the agenda, and it was these (and the timing of the Assembly) that are the reasons for Demosthenes referring to it. Clearly the fact of the Assembly taking place in the Piraeus was intended to jog the memories of his audience and remind them of the sequence of events; it was an unusual and notable occurrence. This of course does not mean it was unique; even if Piraeus meetings were a regular if infrequent happening, it would have been worth Demosthenes making a casual reference to the location. This passage is the only one amongst the references to Assemblies in the Piraeus that comes close to suggesting that there were meetings there *for the express purpose* of discussing nautical matters. A second passage in this same speech refers to an occasion in Piraeus where the people refused to appoint Aeschines

⁶²⁶ Demosthenes, 19.60 (cf. 125), held in 347/6 BC; 19.209, held in 343 BC; discussed by Garland, *Piraeus*, pp. 81-2, cf. p. 197

⁶²⁷ Demosthenes, 19.60

as an ambassador; this is surely an *ekklesia*, although the text does not explicitly say that.⁶²⁸ There is other evidence for meetings in the Piraeus in the literary sources; the reference in Lysias' *Against Agoratus* records events that occurred "when the Assembly in the theatre of Munichia occurred."⁶²⁹ We do not know what business caused this Assembly to be convened in Piraeus. The central events of the case, concerning the 'assassin' and stooge Agoratus, involved him seeking sanctuary at an altar in Piraeus, and the serious nature of the allegations may have brought the Assembly to Munichia. Far more likely, though, is that the actions of Agoratus followed the Assembly schedule; if he was indeed keen to denounce people before the Assembly, he took steps to ensure that his refuge-place was near to the Assembly's meeting point. It is a possibility, then, that the plot of Agoratus and his choice of refuge took into account the fact that an Assembly meeting was scheduled in Piraeus. Alternatively, and perhaps most likely, it could have been a simple coincidence that these locations coincided; Agoratus fled to the nearest sanctuary when men came to arrest him, which just happened to be in the same area as the next Assembly meeting.

Again, while the pointing out of the location of this Assembly may suggest it was unusual, it does not imply it was not a regular feature of Athenian politics. In the examples discussed above, it seems that whatever this Assembly was convened for, it could carry out regular business, pass decrees and elect officials as usual. Indeed some of the decrees resulting from this Assembly were reportedly read out during the course of Lysias' speech; of course the full texts of these decrees are not given, but the speaker alludes to the substance.⁶³⁰ There is no allusion at all to any business that might be described as 'naval' being dealt with in this Assembly; if such items were on the agenda, they did not totally dominate it to the exclusion of other issues.

These represent the literary sources for the Piraeus Assembly in the classical period. Staveley suggests that "from the time of Demosthenes, it became increasingly common to hold Assemblies in the theatre, or if their principle business was to discuss naval matters, in the port of Piraeus".⁶³¹ He cites in support some of the passages above, and, without specifying, "the plentiful evidence of inscriptions." Garland is more forthcoming regarding the epigraphic texts, and it is clear from the ones he cites that the Assembly met not infrequently in the Piraeus from the third century BC and onwards.⁶³² He also adds the meeting in the Piraeus in 411 BC to organize resistance to the 400 as an example of an *ekklesia* in the Piraeus.⁶³³ It is certainly true that the Piraeus acted as a centre of dissidents at this time, as it was to do in 403 BC, when those who fought against the Thirty became known as "the men of the Piraeus" in fourth-century sources; but these can hardly

⁶²⁸ Demosthenes, 19.209

⁶²⁹ Lysias, 13.32

⁶³⁰ Lysias, 13.34-6; the decree of the Assembly required those denounced by Agoratus to be tried before a court of 2,000; in fact the Thirty took over before the trial took place, and they were tried, condemned and executed on the judgement of the *boule*.

⁶³¹ Staveley, *Elections*, pp. 79-80

⁶³² Garland, *Piraeus*, p. 82

⁶³³ Thucydides, 8.93

be described as regular Assembly meetings, and they do not shed light onto the use of the Piraeus in 'normal' circumstances during the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

The Agenda of Piraeus Assemblies

That the Athenian Assembly occasionally met in the Piraeus during the fifth and fourth centuries is beyond doubt; but the evidence for whether or not there were regular scheduled meetings in the Piraeus at this time is inconclusive. Even so, it is worth speculating as to the possible rationale for such meetings. One peculiarity of the Piraeus deme was that its demarch was elected by the whole of the Athenian people, and not just the demesmen of Piraeus (it is unsure whether the candidate for the post could be from any deme; the one named man we have testimony for was of the Piraeus deme). This bit of business would probably have been conducted at a meeting of the Assembly in Piraeus, although this election was only required once per year and would presumably have not taken the entire debating time for the day. One of the passages above implies that the rationale behind Piraeus meetings was the discussion of *peri tw̄n en tois neoriois* "dockyard business", and on the face of it, it seems a perfectly sensible measure to locate a meeting concerned with naval matters in the harbour district, and to do so regularly if such issues often arose. The Assembly dealt with, or at least scrutinized, much of the minutiae of running the state, and the navy was a particularly large, important and complex institution; in the fourth century the navy produced a large amount of epigraphic records and inventories, many of which were found in the Piraeus.⁶³⁴ This large-scale bureaucracy probably existed in the fifth century too.⁶³⁵ Such scrutiny at the level of the Assembly need not have happened frequently, even if it did so regularly; one might draw a parallel with the infrequent but regular Assembly meeting held in the theatre of Dionysius, to discuss matters arising as a result of the festival.⁶³⁶

However, we might pause to consider what naval matters actually meant in terms of an Assembly agenda. Many of the surviving speeches we have, not to mention the epigraphy, are concerned with the launching of naval campaigns. Would these foreign policy decisions, some of the most important deliberations undertaken by the Assembly, have been taken at the Piraeus? Jordan suggests this might have been the case when he refers to a meeting in the Piraeus to review a current naval expedition.⁶³⁷ If this is so, then many of Demosthenes' speeches calling for fleets to be launched would have been delivered at the Piraeus and not the Pnyx. However, the evidence that Jordan cites for this review, a decree relating to the arrangements for the Sicilian expedition, suggests only that some sort of review in Assembly should take place, and the words on the stone do not suggest that the venue for this reassessment should be the Piraeus.⁶³⁸ We

⁶³⁴ IG II² 1604-32. For a brief discussion of these texts, see Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 13-5; this work makes extensive and sensible use if these complicated documents throughout.

⁶³⁵ Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 13) notes only three such documents from the fifth century (IG I³ 498-500), but argues correctly that "Although quantitatively these are insignificant, their very existence bears testimony to a well-established naval administration in this period."

⁶³⁶ Demosthenes, 21.8-9; IG II² 223 B 5-6; Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, p. 129

⁶³⁷ IG I² 98=ML 78=IG I³ 93; Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 22.

⁶³⁸ Garland, *Piraeus*, p. 197

should be cautious about making such a restoration; the identification of the Assembly and the Pnyx⁶³⁹ must indicate that the key policy decisions, like launching fleets, were taken there. These sorts of things were not considered primarily ‘naval’. But what about the organization of the trierarchy, and decrees concerned with conscripting sailors?⁶⁴⁰ Were these ‘naval’ debates, or would such issues, dealing with liturgical and military obligations, have taken place with the other state business on the Pnyx? Demosthenes’ detailed proposals on such matters in his first Assembly oration *On the Symmories* could be considered as ‘naval’ matters, but they come in a speech that also dealt with the pressing foreign policy issues of the day. It is simple at first sight to say that ‘naval matters’ were discussed in a Piraeus Assembly, but it is unclear exactly what would be deemed as such, and, as *On the Symmories* makes clear, individual debates or even single speeches were not confined to a single category of issues. The phrase used in Demosthenes, “dockyard business”, should probably be interpreted in a fairly narrow way, and the Assembly’s role was to scrutinize the administrative work on the navy that was done by boards of magistrates and the *boule*. Perhaps one possible reason for moving the Assembly to the Piraeus was that those attending a Piraeus Assembly would be in a better position to speak about and judge the matters at hand.⁶⁴¹ It need hardly be stated that the members of the “naval mob” would have lived in disproportionate numbers within the deme of Piraeus (which is not to say that they were demesmen of Piraeus), and therefore it is not unlikely that, in a Piraeus Assembly, the “naval mob” and sea-faring folk more generally would have been a more noticeable presence than in the Pnyx. In the Arginusae trial discussed above, we saw that the “naval mob” could be relied upon to provide credible testimony on their areas of expertise. Perhaps part of the rationale for holding Assemblies in the Piraeus was to ensure a greater presence of such people.

If it is correct to suggest that the Assemblies in the Piraeus were held there in order to ensure a greater number of naval ‘experts’ in the Assembly, it has several important implications for the debate at hand. Firstly, it perhaps indicates that such people were not in regular attendance in the Pnyx, but that when their expertise was needed, it was sought. There is some debate regarding the separation of the *asty* and the Piraeus, and the extent to which its separate institutions, rules and amenities were constituted to keep the mixed population of Piraeus and its corrupting influence away from the rest of Attica.⁶⁴² It is perhaps possible to interpret the Piraeus Assembly in this light; a way of keeping the “naval mob” at a distance, away from central affairs, but still able to utilize their abilities and knowledge. The Piraeus also held many festivals,⁶⁴³ contained

⁶³⁹ For example, Aristophanes’ *Demos* (*Knights*, l. 43) has the demotic name ‘Pnyx’

⁶⁴⁰ For example, the decree of Aristophon referred to by Apollodorus at the start of *Against Polycles* ([Demosthenes], 50.6) and the sending of men and carpenters to Macedonia, IG I² 117=Fornara 161.

⁶⁴¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, 319b-d; his Socrates suggests that, in matters of technical skill the Assembly would not tolerate the advice of non-experts; ship-building is mentioned explicitly as an example. Note also the view expressed by Gorgias in conversation with Socrates (Plato, *Gorgias*, 459c) that a glib speaker could be more persuasive on technical matters than the expert, provided that the audience was ignorant of those matters.

⁶⁴² Roy (‘Threat from the Piraeus’) argues that there was much tension between the city and the Piraeus, arguing against the view of Amit (*Athens and the Sea*, p. 89) that in practical and ideological terms the two were “practically a single and continuous inhabited area”.

⁶⁴³ Garland, *Piraeus*, p. 101-38. He argues (p. 103) that the “religious year of the Piraeus was very full”

temples and sanctuaries, brothels and wine-shops,⁶⁴⁴ so that a sailor's political, social, religious and indeed base needs were catered for there. On an economic level, a man returning to Piraeus and looking for more work would have been loath to spend too much time away from the Piraeus. None of these things, nor the moderate physical distance between Pnyx and port, would stop a politically dedicated rower journeying to Athens to take part in the Assembly when he was ashore. Despite all the wonders on offer in the Piraeus, there would have been many reasons for members of the "naval mob" to travel to the city. Even if most of a sailor's friends and shipmates lived in Piraeus, a journey to the *asty* to attend a festival or sacrifice or visit family would also facilitate taking part in the Assembly, if one happened to be scheduled at that time. Our evidence allows us very little certainty on any of these issues; the regularity of Piraeus meetings and their rationale, the precise nature of the naval matters discussed there; the relative proportion of the "naval mob" attending meetings in the Pnyx and the Piraeus; the extent to which the institutions, attractions and Assemblies of the Piraeus, particularly in the fourth century, resulted in the people of the *asty* and the port living separate lives; all of these issues are matters of conjecture and speculation rather than concrete evidence.

5. Elections, Commanders and Officials

The Election of Generals

Unlike most political positions and boards of magistrates, the board of the *strategia* was directly elected in the Athenian Assembly. It is not unlikely that members of the "naval mob" would have been even more interested than most Athenian citizens in the selection of *strategoï*, "generals". Not only would they share their countrymen's concern for appointing effective military leaders, but these men would be largely responsible for their wages and welfare in any campaigns of that year. Money voted for military expeditions was generally in the hands of the *strategos*, and while sailors could (and did) petition their captains for wages and rations, it was the *strategoï* who were (or should have been) responsible for handing out the bulk of the pay of those on the expedition. At an even more basic level, it may be argued that the men of the "naval mob" could be required to fight under the orders of the *strategoï*, and so they would be interested in picking leaders who were proven and competent naval commanders and not likely to expose them to unnecessary danger. What we might expect to see if the "naval mob" held significant power in the Athenian Assembly is the election of generals with sea-faring experience, and a good military record. We might also expect to find, if the votes of the "naval mob" were significant, ambitious politicians canvassing the vote of this particular group.

This invites a wider question regarding the criteria on which generals were elected. Scholars have often assumed that the use of election in Athens, and for the generalship in particular throughout the classical period, was to ensure competent incumbents; Hanson states that:

⁶⁴⁴ Aristophanes, *Peace*, l. 164 ff; Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 84

Some of the most important ones [i.e. magistracies] were elected; the Athenians naturally had no desire to fight under a general picked out of a hat.⁶⁴⁵

The assumption here is that by the process of popular election someone more qualified would be able to be appointed, and Hansen highlights the generalship as one office where getting a qualified man would be especially important. Staveley states this even more explicitly:

By reason of the fact that the nature of their responsibilities demanded high technical qualifications, these officers [i.e. the generals] enjoyed the distinction, comparatively rare in democratic Athens, of being appointed by direct election.⁶⁴⁶

But Athens was no meritocracy, and the ability to lead an army was not the same as the ability to win an election. The division between *rhetor* (“speakers”, used to denote professional politicians particularly in the fourth century) and *strategos*, fighting men who lacked political skills and experience, must take into account the fact that the generalship was always a political role; generals were elected by the Assembly, were scrutinized by that body at the start and end of their tenure, and were accountable to it throughout their command.

An examination of the backgrounds of Athenian generals belies the conclusion that competence and military experience, “highly technical qualifications” to use Staveley’s terms, were the most important factor in the minds of the Athenian electorate. An anecdote in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* suggests this; Socrates is discussing the election of generals with a candidate who failed to get voted in. The disgruntled man, Nicomachides, ranted as follows:

kai hos, ou gar, ephê, ô Sôkrates, toioutoi eisin Athênaioi, hôste eme men ouch heilonto, hos ek katalogou strateuomenos katatetrimmai kai lochagôn kai taxiarchôn kai traumata hupo tôn polemiôn tosauta echôn--hama de kai tas oulas tôn traumatôn apogumnoumenos epedeiknuen--Antisthenê de, ephê, heilonto ton oute hoplitên pôpote strateusamenon en te tois hippeusin ouden periblepton poiêsanta epistamenon te allo ouden ê chrêmata sullegein;

“Why naturally, Socrates, the people of Athens, being what they are, have not elected me, although I am worn out with active service as an officer or a taxiarch, and have received all these wounds from the enemy”-as he spoke, he drew back his clothes and exhibited the scars-“but instead they have elected Antisthenes, who has never served in the infantry and has won no distinction in the cavalry, and knows nothing except how to manage his lands.”⁶⁴⁷

In other words, the Athenians, in their typical fashion, elected a member of the landed elite in preference to a man with good fighting credentials. Playing Devil’s Advocate as usual, Socrates proceeds to inform Nicomachides as to why such an appointment made sense, which of course gives us a lot of other qualifications for our generals; Socrates suggests that a rich man’s interest

⁶⁴⁵ Hansen, *Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, p. 160

⁶⁴⁶ Staveley, *Elections*, p. 40

⁶⁴⁷ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.4.1

in building up his estate enabled him to keep his army supplied, that his liturgical obligations to play a prominent role in the city's festivals made him used to leading men, and the competitive nature of these activities made him used to striving for victory. Qualities of an estate-manager in being successful, such as organizing their subordinates effectively and being conservative with possessions, were replicated in good generals. When it comes to the actual fighting, Nicomachides claims that the estate manager would be useless; Socrates again argues that this would not be the case, seeming to quickly persuade his interlocutor:

kai mên, ephê ho Sôkratês, oude ôidês ge ho Antisthenês oude chorôn didaskalias empeiros ôn homôs egeneto hikanos heurein tous kratistous tauta. kai en têi stratêgiai oun, ephê ho Nikomachidês, allous men heurêsei tous taxontas anth' heautou, allous de tous machoumenous

“Antisthenes has no experience of singing, or of training a chorus, but he succeeded in finding the best people for his purpose.”

“So in his capacity as general,” said Nicomachides, “he will find other people to work out the tactics and do the fighting”⁶⁴⁸

Socrates and Nicomachides are here in a discussion about the technical qualifications needed to be a general; and according to this anecdote, fighting skills and tactics were not of primary importance in the election of generals. While it was recognized that there were technical skills and practical experience that were relevant to military matters, a general did not need them if he was successful in finding others with the appropriate skills and making use of them. What background information we have from the generals suggests that this anecdote may have some grounding in truth. This fact should perhaps not be surprising; even if the historicity of the conversation and Socrates' comments can be doubted, it is more than likely the views expressed by the philosopher are those of the work's author, an Athenian and a military man himself; his discussion on what were the most necessary qualifications of military leaders at Athens should be given due consideration.

A survey of all the generalships we know about in an attempt to find out about the backgrounds of generals immediately encounters problems. The first and most major of these is the incompleteness of the evidence. In each of the 160 years between 480 and 320 BC ten generals were elected; a total of 1,600 generalships. We know at least the names of 204 generals, who between them occupied about 500 of the total generalships; in other words, less than a third. To make matters worse, if we consider the 204 generals we do know the names of, some of them are just that; a name in a literary source or on an inscription which says that someone was a general in a particular year. It is impossible to assess the backgrounds of such men. Even if we consider only those men who were important or skilled enough to be elected multiple times, our information is very incomplete.

⁶⁴⁸ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.4.4

Of the 204 generals total, we have evidence for 84 who served in that capacity more than once. 38 of these generals are known to have considerable wealth prior to their first election as a general, either made by themselves or inherited. Mostly we know this because the wealthy were obliged to use part of their fortune in the funding of liturgies, including the competing choruses which Nicomachides' opponent is said to have been so successful in. Wealth appears, statistically, to be the most important advantage. 21 generals had previous generals in the family; given the importance connected to deeds of one's father in relations to one's own standing, this could be counted as a considerable advantage in an election. Certainly in court cases, litigants cited the good deeds of their ancestors, and their fathers in particular, in the expectation of gaining advantage. 11 are attested as having some sort of previous political experience; this could have given them an advantage at the election, if they had already some experience of politics in Athens, and particularly in speaking before the Assembly. Of course, a lot of people had many or all of these advantages; personal and inherited wealth, a family with a pedigree of generalships, and political experience in Athens. 42 appear to have none of these things going for them.

While it would be nice to be able to conclude that these 42 people were elected based on their merit and military record, the evidence does not permit such an assertion. Just because they are not attested as being wealthy or politically active does not mean they weren't, and of course most of this 42 are men about whom we have no background information whatsoever. In trying to find examples of people who had nothing but their military ability to rely upon, we are thwarted from absolute certainty by the patchiness of the evidence. However, amongst this 42 there are a number of interesting examples of famous generals who we can perhaps see as similar to the embittered Nicomachides, but just finding electoral success where he failed; the fifth-century generals Phormio, Demosthenes and Laches, all of whom had good fighting reputations, are in this group.⁶⁴⁹ The general Lamachus, also among the 42, is somewhat a template for some of the others, in that we know a lot about him and his activities as a general, but almost nothing about his life before and his background. He was a general for the first time in 436 BC, and 5 times thereafter. Lamachus appears in the narrative of Thucydides as a fairly important general, and a good fighting man; the image of Lamachus as a bold, fiery and archetypical fighting general is strengthened by his portrayal in Aristophanes. In the play *Acharnians*, the warlike Lamachus is contrasted with the peace-loving hero, Dicaeopolis; in one scene, Dicaeopolis' servant brings him nice things for a feast and party, while Lamachus' servant on the other side of the stage brings him weapons and armour for going into battle.⁶⁵⁰ Concerning his background, Plutarch states he was poor,⁶⁵¹ and there are hints in Aristophanes that he pursued political and military offices for

⁶⁴⁹ The campaigning credentials of these men are referred to by Aristophanes. Phormio; *Lysistrata*, l. 804; *Peace*, l. 348. Demosthenes; *Knights*, 54-7. Laches; *Wasps*, 952-8 (this passage also implies, if not that Laches was poor, then at least that he was not rich).

⁶⁵⁰ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 1097-1141, cf. 1174-1226

⁶⁵¹ Plutarch, *Nicias*, 15.1, cf. *Alcibiades*, 21

financial gain, rather than to be of service.⁶⁵² So, Lamachus was a man with an obscure, possibly poor background and a reputation as a warlike, courageous and heroic fighter; a circumstantial case at least for suggesting that his election was based on his primarily on his fighting skills.⁶⁵³

Another of the 42 is the general Iphikrates, who was elected 17 times between 393 and 356 BC, and who appears at first sight to be our best example of a soldier ‘rising from the ranks’ to lead the armed forces of Athens. He had a reputation as being a man of limited means and a poor background; his father was said to be a cobbler.⁶⁵⁴ He also had an active military career prior to his first generalship at Athens, winning distinction first as a marine;⁶⁵⁵ He also operated, probably as a mercenary, in Thrace, commanding a band of light-armed skirmishers called ‘peltasts’. Distinguishing himself in such expeditions, he then rose to become a very successful general, both elected at Athens and as a mercenary. His military expertise is testified by the anecdotes and stratagems that are to be found in military writings,⁶⁵⁶ especially interesting in the context of this study the Iphikrates Method of training naval crews while on campaign.⁶⁵⁷ His early exploits were spotted by the Athenian general Konon, and this patronage certainly must have been a boon for him. While Iphikrates may have advanced because of his obvious merits in isolation, in his case it is perhaps a combination of military skill and reputation, and the support of a powerful friend that helped him to the top.

Local Supporters

Electing one’s fellow deme- or tribesman to the post may also have been a significant factor in elections for generals; indeed when the post was first established, the *strategos* appears to have been envisioned as a tribe’s military leader, and so one general was elected per tribe. This rule soon became obsolete; Fornara’s work on the tribal representations of generals in the fifth century BC has shown too many exceptions for us to easily contemplate the idea that the “one general per tribe” rule was still in force in the fifth century,⁶⁵⁸ the always imaginative and sometimes ingenious attempts to explain these electoral anomalies are best forgotten.⁶⁵⁹ But while there was no rule requiring every tribe to have a general on each board of *strategoí*, there nevertheless seems to have been some general desire amongst the electorate to vote for men from their own tribe. Despite the many exceptions, often caused by the repeated election of popular and powerful statesmen like Pericles, the evidence does show a reasonable spread of tribes amongst known generals, which may represent men supporting candidates from their deme, or voting along tribal lines.

⁶⁵² Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 597-617

⁶⁵³ Sources on Lamachus; Plato, *Laws*, 197c; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 20; *Nicias*, 15.1; *Alcibiades*, 18.2, 21.9; Thucydides, 6.101.6; *Peace*, 304, 473-4, 1290-4), *Thesemophoriazusae*, 841, *Frogs*, 1039.

⁶⁵⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1367b18; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 187a-b; Strauss (*After the Peloponnesian War*, p. 133) argues that, while he was by no means a wealthy man, his family was well-connected amongst the elite, and this contributed to his success in elections.

⁶⁵⁵ Plutarch, *Moralia*, 187a

⁶⁵⁶ Polyaeus, 3.9.1-63, credits him with 63 stratagems, far more than any other single commander.

⁶⁵⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.2.27-32

⁶⁵⁸ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 71

⁶⁵⁹ See for example Staveley, *Elections*, pp. 42-7

Such support for “local” politicians may also have had an effect, though it would have been less obvious, on other deliberations or debates in the Assembly; a man proposing a decree might expect more support from his tribe, and especially from his deme, than from the population as a whole. It is worth noting in this context that there were far fewer attested politicians from the deme of Piraeus than the its size and significance would lead us to expect.⁶⁶⁰ Unfortunately, there is very little weight that can be put on this circumstance, and it need not suggest anything about the political importance, or lack thereof, of the “naval mob”; as Roy has pointed out, many politicians based in the Piraeus “will have had the demotic of some other deme”; as a consequence, “it is difficult to identify politically active residents of the Piraeus”.⁶⁶¹ This was even more the case for Assembly attendees than it was for speakers. Any identities and loyalties built in demes, phratries and tribes would have been fostered and strengthened through festivals, contests, and military call-ups as well as the sharing of civic duties such as serving on the *boule*, and such support could both overlap with and go beyond a politician’s own factional support base. These occasions could also provide a bridge between richer and poorer citizens, which might have had a mitigating effect on class tensions, and once again complicates our picture of Assembly-goers and their political attitudes and voting habits.⁶⁶²

Conclusion: general elections

We can say that in all probability, and as we might expect in a democracy, some men did get elected to the generalship principally on the basis of their military ability and prowess. While a clear-cut example is hard if not impossible to definitively find given the state of our evidence, it seems that people like Lamachus in the fifth century and Iphikrates in the fourth had little to offer the electorate aside from their military reputations. Rowers may have wanted to entrust their fate to former crewmates or trierarchs who had proved themselves in previous campaigns, rather than a glib speaker from the city who had not yet been to sea. Thus we might find, if the “naval mob”’s votes were decisive in the Assembly, men with military experience, or who had at least served extensively at sea, prominent amongst those elected. Due to the political nature of the appointment, those with the means and abilities to do well in Assembly debates could get the vote ahead of those with fighting abilities. But as Socrates pointed out to Nicomachides, fighting ability not necessarily the most important thing to have in the person who was general; more important was the ability to provide and manage resources, and to be a competitive leader. If this was indeed reflective of the selection criteria used by the Athenian people, it is easy to see why so many of Athens’ social elite and traditional families supplied successful candidates for the generalship. Our evidence does not allow us to investigate in detail the previous careers of many

⁶⁶⁰ Hansen 1989b p. 74 finds only five rhetors and *stratego*i who belonged to the deme Piraeus between 403 and 322 BC, a lot lower than was the case for other large demes (pp. 32-72). Davis (1971, p. 617) also lists only five Piraeus demesmen in his catalogue of liturgical families between 600 and 300 BC, again a small number for such an important deme.

⁶⁶¹ Roy, ‘Threat from the Piraeus’, p. 195

⁶⁶² I discuss the interactions between crewmen and wealthy liturgists performing trierarchies in Part 3, section 4.

of the *strategoï*, and indeed even the names of most of those who held the office are unknown. What we can be fairly sure of is the elite origins of most of the generals in the classical period, but the extent to which men were elected on their merit as ship's captains, sailors or soldiers can not be accurately determined. A conversation of Socrates suggests that the better fighting man might have usually lost out to a good rhetorician, which in turn might suggest that the candidate the "naval mob" would have preferred was not elected. The bias towards wealthy men, rather than perhaps those with extensive campaigning experience, might reflect a bias in the Assembly composition towards rich citizens. Alternatively it might reflect the strength of the factional system, in which the well-supported aristocrat would have found himself in an advantageous electoral position compared to the professional soldier or sailor, who had little or no previous political experience. But it might also reflect the desire of poor men, including the "naval mob", to give commands, and the large funds associated with naval campaigns particularly, to men who had experience and competence for handling such sums; as far as the sailors were concerned, their pay was to come largely from these monies. We might imagine a dynamic, ambitious and competent *kubernetes* securing support for his candidature as general from those on his expedition, and amongst a decent-sized fleet of 60 ships, there might have been a potential maximum of 3,000 citizens; not an inconsiderable number if they could all have been persuaded (and indeed were able) to turn up at the Pnyx on the correct day and cast their vote for him. If there was ever such a man, our records do not bear it out. What we do have evidence for is a *kubernetes* being directly appointed to the command of a fleet by a general.

The Commanders of Ships: Nauarchs and Archons of the Fleet

This section will examine the evidence pertaining to those who, in addition to the generals, commanded Athenian fleets. The focus here will be upon the somewhat shadowy and obscure group of non-*strategoï* who are found from time to time on command of squadrons of ships. Van Wees suggests that there was little in the way of a naval command structure "above the level of the trierarch and his ship",⁶⁶³ which is true in the sense that the sources do not attest to a complex hierarchy with defined channels of command. However, there are hints in the sources of some sort of system of command and control between the trierarchs and the generals.

It is clear from [Aristotle]'s account of Athens' military officials, compiled in the 330s BC, that there was for the army and the cavalry a number of other elected officials that formed a chain of command.⁶⁶⁴ He does not list any sort of equivalent commanders for the navy,⁶⁶⁵ but our sources attest to such figures. There is clear inscriptional evidence for the existence of officials called

⁶⁶³ Van Wees, *Myths and Realities*, p. 212; he also suggests here that there were only two boards of officials of specific and direct relevance to the navy; Jordan (*Athenian Navy*, pp. 21-60) lists and discusses a far broader range of appointees with some relevance to or jurisdiction over the navy, though some of these were sub-committees of the *boule* rather than boards of magistrates in their own right.

⁶⁶⁴ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 61

⁶⁶⁵ Though he does report that the treasurers of the sacred ships *Paralos* and *Ammonias* were elected.

archontes tou voutikou, “commanders of the ships”.⁶⁶⁶ There is support in the literary texts for non-*strategos* ship commanders. In his report of the battle of Arginusae, Xenophon records the presence of three *nauarchoi*, “ship commanders”.⁶⁶⁷ Jordan is doubtless correct to identify these two groups with one another, and to distinguish them from the *strategoï*, and is followed by Develin at least this far.⁶⁶⁸ Jordan’s further arguments are typically bold. He suggests (rightly) that we cannot assume that commanders not specifically labelled as *strategoï* in the sources were each in fact one of the ten generals for that year. He thus identifies many of those men in command of ships and described by the word *archon* and its cognates as *nauarchoi*, rather than *strategoï*. Develin too believes in an official title along the lines of “commander of ships”, but reserves the right to disagree with Jordan about individual identifications; in fact nearly all the non-*strategos* commanders that Jordan infers from the literary texts are accepted as *strategoï* by Develin, except when the sources use a term such as *nauarchos* explicitly.⁶⁶⁹ I discuss the named individuals who can potentially be identified as *nauarchoi* in Appendix 1.

While I would not go so far as Develin in dismissing Jordan’s individual identifications,⁶⁷⁰ there are good reasons to cast doubts his interpretation. The principal one is that, while our texts attest clearly to “archons of the fleet” as distinct from *strategoï*, our literary sources especially are not always scrupulous to show it. Even Thucydides, as Jordan himself admits, can use *archon*-terms to describe someone who was certainly a ‘full’ *strategos*.⁶⁷¹ It is hard to distinguish between a general use of the term to describe the fact of someone’s command, and an ‘official’ use indicating a specific office or post. While Jordan is right to insist that a man described only as an *archon* was not necessarily a *strategos*, he often overstates the certainty of the contrary assumption; that those not so called were simply archons and not *strategoï*. In relation to Dietrephes’ mission to Thrace in 411 BC, for example, he argues that “As Thucydides does not call him a *strategos*, we must assume that his official title was *archon epi Thrakes*”.⁶⁷² In fact, it is often impossible to be sure one way or the other, and “must” should not come into the identification of individual cases.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁶ Bradeen, *Hesperia* 33 (SEG 21, 131), Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 124

⁶⁶⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.29 cf. 1.7.30. It is clear that these are not generals, because all the *strategoï* for that year are all listed, either as part of this same force, or elsewhere.

⁶⁶⁸ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 122, cf. Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p.6

⁶⁶⁹ Develin surprisingly accepts the assertion of Jordan that Aristotle and Hierophon, commanders of Fleet 225 around Naupactos (see Part 1, section B.2), were not generals. Jordan’s principal evidence for his identification of these two men as archons rather than *strategoï* is the parity in terminology with that used to describe the positions of Leon and Diomedon prior to the winter of 412/11 BC (see next note). Given that there are fewer testimonies for Aristotle and Hierophon, it is somewhat strange that Develin considers them as *nauarchoi*, while accepting Leon and Diomedon as *strategoï*.

⁶⁷⁰ I accept, for example, Jordan’s identification (*Athenian Navy*, pp. 126-7) of Leon and Diomedon as *nauarchoi*, up until the point that they are elected to replace Phrynichus and Skironides in the winter of 412/1 BC. While Fornara and Develin both regard the pair as *strategoï* for all of 412/11 BC, I think that the references compiled by Jordan suggest that they did indeed change their status during this year.

⁶⁷¹ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 127 “it is true he [Thucydides] uses *archien* and *arche* inconsistently; and on a few occasions he uses *archien* particularly of *strategoï*.”

⁶⁷² Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 124

⁶⁷³ In fairness, Jordan (*Athenian Navy*, p. 126) does at one point suggest a more moderate stance, arguing “In the cases of all others [i.e. those not specifically called *strategoï*] we must suspend judgement until they have been proved to be *strategoï*.”

A related problem is the inclusion by Jordan of people described as having command (*arche*) over ships in a particular place as *nauarchoi* rather than generals.⁶⁷⁴ Two of his examples relate to Naupactos, and he argues that both Konon and Diphilos were “fleet commanders”, as they were “nowhere called strategos.”⁶⁷⁵ The example of Dietrephes’ appointment in Thrace has just been mentioned. The problem with assuming that such people were not *stratego*i is that there is a concrete example of an elected general taking command of the Thracian region; Thucydides himself, in 424 BC.⁶⁷⁶ It is a similar case around Naupactos, where both Phormio and his son Asopios at the very least were full *stratego*i. That a *strategos* could exercise command in a specific region in this way seems clear. What is more debatable is whether or not non-*stratego*i could also take on such commands. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of IG I³ 375, dated to 410/9 BC.⁶⁷⁷ Line 10 of this document, which details the dispersal of funds to support Athenian commanders during the war in Ionia, records a payment made to Hermon, described as *archonti es Pulos*. Jordan argues that, as *stratego*i are referred to elsewhere in this document, “there is no possibility whatever that the term may refer to a general.”⁶⁷⁸ This is a not untypical overstatement by Jordan, although his essential point that the “commander of Pylos” was a distinct official from the generals is probably true, and accepted by Develin as such.⁶⁷⁹ The next question is whether regional commanders such as Hermon at Pylos in 410 BC should be considered analogous with the “commanders of ships”. Develin prefers to separate the *nauarchoi* from such regional officials, and places the Archon of Pylos along with the *phrounacho*i, “garrison commanders”,⁶⁸⁰ in a miscellaneous category of “military or partly military positions... [that]...show that *ad hoc* appointments could be made, perhaps by the generals, perhaps by the demos.”⁶⁸¹ In other words, looking for formal separations of powers and responsibilities is probably misguided, as the Athenians took a more pragmatic approach. A general with a fleet could be sent to take command in a specific a region; but if one was not available, another official could be sent to do essentially the same job. A regional or garrison commander may or may not find himself being a *de facto* “commander of ships”, depending on the strategic situation and the naval forces currently deployed in the area.

Many of these possible sub-general archons appear to have been appointed at Athens, though by what body or process we cannot say. [Aristotle] claims that all Athenian military posts were elected,⁶⁸² but given that such commanders are not explicitly mentioned in his account, and the fact that the trierarchs, “ship commanders”, were not elected but appointed, this general statement

⁶⁷⁴ E.g. IG I³ 304 A, ll. 9-10; *archonti es Pulos*; Thucydides, 7.31 cf. 34, *eirche Naupaktos*; Thucydides, 8.64 *es ta epi Thrakes archien*.

⁶⁷⁵ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 123

⁶⁷⁶ Thucydides, 4.104.

⁶⁷⁷ ML 84=Formara 154

⁶⁷⁸ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 125

⁶⁷⁹ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 166

⁶⁸⁰ e.g. IG I³ 15, l. 21, a fragmentary inscription relating to Athenian interference in Erythrai.

⁶⁸¹ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 6. Perhaps also to be considered part of this miscellaneous category are the “archons of the cities”, argued by the authors of *ATL* (Vol. 3, p. 145) to be found in places such as Miletus, Samos, Lesbos, Skiathos, Kos, Methone, Limnai and Agora.

⁶⁸² [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 61

cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.⁶⁸³ As well as this, there is good evidence to suggest that *strategoï* could give out appointments which seem very similar in nature to the *nauarchoi*. The best explicit evidence for such appointments comes in relation to the campaign under Timomachus in 362 BC, in which Apollodorus served as a diligent but long-suffering trierarch.⁶⁸⁴ On two occasions, the general appointed a man to Apollodorus' ship with orders to detach from the fleet in order to complete some designated task.⁶⁸⁵ Jordan argues that "the general...ordered some of the ships in the squadron to return to Athens. As commander (archon) of the force bound for home he appointed a certain Lykinos"⁶⁸⁶ Despite this description, is not clear from the speech on either occasion that any vessels other than Apollodorus' were detached. On the second occasion it seems likely that Apollodorus' was the only vessel sent, as the mission required the "best sailing ship".⁶⁸⁷ Other descriptions of naval operations are replete with fleets being split up, and one or more vessels being sent away for particular missions; it is not unlikely that on these occasions as well a general could have appointed a subordinate to command the detachment, and that Apollodorus is giving us some explicit evidence of a common practice. Whether or not such people bore the official title of *nauarchos*, this would certainly be an adequate description of their role. It might be hypothesised that a *nauarchos* elected or appointed at Athens would have, like other military officials, a set term of office, whereas those subordinates selected by generals would have command only for the duration of their designated mission; however we must bear in mind Develin's verdict above on such positions, and openly admit our ignorance of details in these cases.

There is a concrete, and indeed notorious, example of a non-general being appointed to the command of a fleet for which there is a little more detailed evidence. It is perhaps surprising that Antiochus is not listed as a potential *nauarchos* by Jordan, nor considered as such by Develin,⁶⁸⁸ but his appointment to a naval command by Alcibiades in 407/6 BC merits some discussion in this context. The story is recorded by Xenophon:

Alkibiadês de akousas Thrasuboulon exô Hellêspontou hêkonta teichizein Phôkaian diepleuse pros auton, katalipôn epi tais nausin Antiochon ton hautou kubernêtên, episteilas mê epiplein epi tas Lusandrou naus. ho de Antiochos têi te hautou nêi

⁶⁸³ The exclusion of naval officials and commanders from [Aristotle]'s discussion of military commanders is interesting in the light of discussions in Part Three, section 1, where I argue that the navy was seen as more of a job than a military duty. However, these gaps in [Aristotle] are more indicative of his weaknesses as a researcher than the relative ideological positions of the fleet and the army.

⁶⁸⁴ The enthusiastic and expensive trierarchy of Apollodorus, and his legal attempt to recoup some of the expenses incurred from his successor Polycles, is the subject of the speech usually referred to as [Demosthenes] 50. Though the situation cannot be described as 'normal' and is told from the perspective of the captain, it remains the best and most vivid case study of a year, five months and six days in the life of the Athenian navy.

⁶⁸⁵ [Demosthenes], 50.53; 50.46ff.

⁶⁸⁶ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 125. Develin (*Athenian Officials*, p.268) describes both Lykinos and Kallippos as "Ship commanders"

⁶⁸⁷ [Demosthenes] 50.46

⁶⁸⁸ Jordan does not mention Antiochus in this context at all, and Develin (*Athenian Officials*, p. 6, cf. p. 175) lists him under "kybernates". As this was a position on board every trireme, this labelling would be misleading were it not for Develin's careful note explaining that this singular example is only included because the man in question "was given a special charge".

kai allêi ek Notiou eis ton limena tôn Ephesiôn eispleusas par' autas tas prôiras tôn Lusandrou neôn pareplei.

Alcibiades, meanwhile, had heard that Thrasybulus had sailed out from the Hellespont and was organising a blockade of Phocaea from the land. He sailed across to see him and left his own pilot [*kubernetes*] Antiochus with the ships, with orders not to bring about an engagement with Lysander's ships. But Antiochus with his own ship and one other and put out from Notium into the harbour of Ephesus, and then went sailing along right past the prows of Lysander's fleet.⁶⁸⁹

Like with the examples from Timomachus' command, we see here a *strategos* splitting up his fleet and giving an appointed subordinate command over one portion of it; in this case the subordinate Antiochus was given the largest contingent, while Alcibiades presumably took only a single, or possibly a few, vessels with him for another round of desperate diplomacy. The appointing of a member of the *nautikos ochlos* to this position is also significant,⁶⁹⁰ it suggests that other generals may have chosen to promote naval professionals to the command of detachments in this way, presuming they knew them to be reliable and dependable people.⁶⁹¹ The parallels are striking, but it is difficult indeed to convincingly extrapolate standard practice from any given action of Alcibiades. Xenophon's reporting of this incident may have been because it was unusual, but even if this is so it is not clear exactly which component (the appointment itself; the status of the man appointed; the disastrous results of the appointment; Alcibiades' leaving the main fleet; the whole sorry affair) he was drawing attention to. It is worth noting that Thucydides records Alcibiades delegating an unnamed man to what looks like a regional command of the island of Cos in 410 BC, a post that would probably have involve the command of a few ships.⁶⁹² This incident, involving Alcibiades when he was an exile from Athens and the apparent commander-in-chief of the Samos fleet, unfortunately does not help to determine whether such appointments accorded with the usual Athenian practice.

To conclude, this discussion has shown that there was a structure, probably quite *ad hoc*, of naval command below the level of generals and above the level of trierarchs. Despite quite a spread of testimony in both literature and epigraphy, there is little more than this that can be said with any degree of certainty, though it seems that both the Athenians at home and generals in the field could designate non-*strategoï* to the command of individual vessels and fleets for specific purposes. It is notable that some of the possible *nauarchoi* are known to have been elected *strategoï* at other times.

⁶⁸⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.11-12

⁶⁹⁰ The story recorded by Plutarch (see next note) shows Antiochus was a citizen, and the fact he was a *kubernetes*, probably the most important position aboard a trireme after the captain, demonstrates in itself that he was a professional; thus under the definition given above, Antiochus was a member of the "naval mob".

⁶⁹¹ Plutarch (*Alcibiades*, 10) records a story that "Antiochus the pilot" rescued an escaped quail belonging to Alcibiades during an Assembly meeting, suggesting a personal connection prior to the events at Notium.

⁶⁹² Thucydides, 8.108

Other Magistracies and Political Bodies

Athenian democracy was characterized by a bewildering variety of magistracies, or more correctly magisterial boards, which carried out the orders of the Assembly and reported any relevant matters (and their own budgets) before the people. Nearly all of these magistracies were selected under democratic, rather than oligarchic, principles; in other words, rather than holding elections to find the best man for the job, the Athenians selected their officials randomly from those who put themselves forward, the Lot paying no attention to birth, wealth, intelligence, honesty, nor any vice or virtue. The vast majority of such posts were held for one year only, and many of them (particularly the more senior archonships) could be held only once in a lifetime. Most magisterial boards were both specific in their remit and limited in their powers. With regard to the navy, the single most important administrative institution was the *boule*, or Council.⁶⁹³

Rhodes argues that the role of the *boule* was to “ensure that all the necessary equipment, both human and inanimate, was available for fighting a war.”⁶⁹⁴ Its principal duty was seeing to the construction of new ships, as decided by the Assembly. The *boule* had a direct supervisory role over the various boards of magistrates connected with the navy; some of these boards were sub-committees of the *boule* itself, their members picked from amongst the 500 councillors. Others were selected, probably by Lot, from the citizen population as a whole. The most notable of these boards were the Curators of the Dockyards,⁶⁹⁵ who were responsible for overseeing Athens’ ships and naval equipment, and their records from the middle quarters of the fourth century provide a wealth of technical and administrative detail.

For the purposes of this investigation into the extent that the “naval mob” wielded power within the democracy, there is not much evidence to be found amongst these boards. As Sinclair has argued:

A serious aspirant to the leadership of Athens would seek rather to become a *strategos* or establish a reputation as a *rhedor* in the Assembly and the law courts.⁶⁹⁶

The use of the Lot to select the *boule* and the majority of the officials, the limited tenure and remit of most boards and their collegic nature; these factors made the naval administration unlikely places to foster political power and certainly not long-term dominance of the democracy. About the most we can conjecture is that a member of the “naval mob” who wished to make a year long contribution to the administration of their city might well have put their names forward for magistracies that related to their profession. Jordan sees expert volunteers in the fact that about half of the known Curators of the Dockyards came from coastal demes; “men familiar with

⁶⁹³ [Aristotle], *Athenian Constitution*, 43-9, esp. 46; Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 24-30; Rhodes, *Athenian Boule*, p. 113-122.

⁶⁹⁴ Rhodes, *Athenian Boule*, p. 114

⁶⁹⁵ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 30-46

⁶⁹⁶ Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation*, p. 193

matters of the sea who chose to stand for specialized office”.⁶⁹⁷ This is a likely speculation, but the evidence is hardly solid.

6. Conclusions: a naval democracy?

There is very little evidence that substantiates the idea that the “naval mob” made a significant direct contribution to politics in Athens, still less that these men were politically dominant. The evidence for the “naval mob”’s indirect influence on politics is more ambiguous, suggesting that the trireme crews were not shown any favour and were even somewhat neglected; but the fact that charge of wronging the “great yo-ho” could be levelled effectively at political opponents and guaranteed to stir up the Assembly does suggest at least a minimum level of concern for the sailors. Nevertheless, the idea of political dominance, or even significant participation of the “naval mob” appears to be something of an illusion. Indeed, we have seen that the idea of any given interest group being able to control politics to any serious extent is extremely unlikely. The balance between rich and poor in the Assembly meant that even these largest of class groups could not (or at least did not) dominate the other to any significant extent; sub-groups amongst these broad classes, which is what the “naval mob” can be considered, can therefore have had little effect on Assembly decisions. The dynamics of factional politics, where a leader could rally support for his policies and proposals from a large network of contacts and clients, and call in personal obligations and friendships, cut across these class divides, splitting them up amongst competing politicians; the members of “naval mob” did not vote as a block, but in support of the leader to whom he had ties of mutual benefit. The democratic system required and encouraged active participation from a vast array of citizens; in these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that a group often away from Athens, although several thousands strong, could not dominate the Athenian Assembly. It appears that, except in the broadest terms, proposals were not passed by politicians motivating an economic class or professional group to back them, but they instead called upon on the direct support of a more disparate cross-section of citizens from a personal network, and relying on oratorical persuasion to carry the rest.

We are left with the conclusion that, if the “naval mob” did not form an active and significant group in political contexts, then perhaps it can be said that crewing triremes gave Athenian citizens political awareness and confidence on the level of the individual. And this may well have been the case; a man who served on board ship for long periods of time, perhaps rising through the ranks to become a member of the *hyperesia*, who engaged regularly with his social superiors in debates and deals regarding pay, who formed bonds with comrades on board from all across the Aegean, who wintered in foreign ports and encountered danger on the seas cannot have been unaffected by these experiences; they may well have had an impact on a man, which manifested itself politically. But then again, a man who never stepped on board a trireme in his life might

⁶⁹⁷ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 31

gain confidence in deme assemblies and the agora, competing in festivals, managing his land and the participation in local community life. On an individual level, the influence and effects of one particular experience, in this case working in Athens' navy, are indistinguishable. The somewhat frustrating conclusion is the same one that Amit drew; "if we look for evidence showing direct influence of the *nautikos ochlos* on the conduct of affairs in particular cases, the result is disappointing."⁶⁹⁸ It may be simply that our evidence is not sufficient for the task of detecting the presence of the "naval mob", but a far better conclusion is that, as a group, the "naval mob" were of very limited political significance. The greatest and most striking exception comes in 411 BC, with the political turmoil in Athens and, more importantly in terms of this study, the related events on the island of Samos.

⁶⁹⁸ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 63

B: The Samos Fleet Democracy of 411 BC

1: Political Turmoil at Samos

It seems to be the case that, in terms of the day-to-day operation of the Athenian democratic system, the input of members of the “naval mob” was of negligible importance. However, the sources are clearer on the active role of the *nautikos ochlos* during the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411/0 BC. Naval crews (most notably the men of the trireme *Paralos*) played a key role in resisting the oligarchy and in setting up their own democratic system on Samos in order to continue the war; good evidence, it seems, for the links espoused in modern writing between the “naval mob” and the democracy. A casual reading of the sources indicates naval opposition to oligarchy manifesting itself in Samos, and destroying the oligarchic counter-revolution there before pledging opposition to the 400 in Athens. The oligarchic coup of the 400 is well served by good discussions in modern scholarship. But it seems that one of the most significant events of this period, the breaking away from Athens of the fleet, is an issue which receives comparatively short shrift in much of the writing about these revolutions. Strauss calls this the most dramatic manifestation of solidarity amongst the rowers, and is right to emphasise the importance of the steps taken here.⁶⁹⁹ However, the participation of the naval crews in this manifestation of democracy may have other explanations than their attachment to this particular political system, and the nature and participants in the politics at Samos need to be examined carefully; it may be wrong to view these events simply in terms of an ideological conflict between the democratic fleet and the oligarchic city of Athens.

The scholarship on this unique and turbulent year focuses primarily on the parallel accounts of Thucydides and [Aristotle]’s *Constitution of Athens* regarding events in Athens. As this is one of the only periods for which we have a substantial and largely independent narrative which can be compared and contrasted with Thucydides’ account, such a focus is wholly understandable. However, the effects of this is to concentrate primarily on the minutiae of events in Athens itself; the establishing of the oligarchic conspiracy amid an atmosphere of fear and violence, the meeting at Kolonos where the *ekklesia* voted in the oligarchy of 400, the discussions (if reported genuinely in the *Constitution of Athens*) of the future constitutional arrangements and the composition of the 5000, and the factions within the oligarchs and the ousting of the 400 in favour of the 5000. By comparison, there is very little detailed examination of what the fleet at Samos was doing politically throughout this time, and how it was organizing its affairs. This is a significant omission, and an analysis of the naval democracy at Samos will form the bulk of this section. Firstly, I will look briefly at the origins of the oligarchic conspiracy, which began amongst the fleet before spreading to Athens, and the effect of the fleet on events in the city (and

⁶⁹⁹ Strauss, ‘School of Democracy’, p. 317

vice versa). I will then turn to the fleet democracy itself, looking at its origins and purpose, its franchise and form, and finally its actions and activities.

A very brief outline of the basic sequence of events may be helpful at this point. Having heard rumours of the abuses of the oligarchy of the 400 that took over in Athens in the summer of 411 BC, the Samos fleet constituted itself as an independent democracy. This democracy elected its own leaders and held four (recorded) assemblies, and continuing to fight the war against the Peloponnesians and engage in bitter diplomacy with the oligarchs at Athens. The fleet democracy recalled the exiled Athenian general Alcibiades, and under his leadership the war effort progressed and increasingly co-operative negotiations between the city and the fleet continued apace. In 407 BC, the fleet returned to Athens, its existence as an independent democracy over. Though the life of this fleet democracy was brief, it is not without interest and significance. Not only is it the best and most solid evidence for political activity undertaken by the “naval mob”, but the democracy that was formed at this time had a uniquely multi-national character.

Decisions at Athens

Thucydides is emphatic about where the oligarchic movement that led to the establishment of the 400 began; “The agitation began on the expedition [on Samos], and from there spread later to the city.”⁷⁰⁰ Leading men in the expedition, including the wealthy trierarchs, were sounded out about a radical proposal by Alcibiades; abandon the democracy and recall him, and so befriend the Persian satrap Tissaphernes and have him bankroll their victory. From the trierarchs and other leading men, the idea was spread to the rest of the expedition:

es te tēn Samon elthontes xunistasan te tōn anthrōpōn tous epitēdeious es xunōmosian kai es tous pollous phanerōs elegon hoti basileus sphisi philos esoito kai chrēmata parexoi Alkibiadou te katelthontos kai mē dēmokratoumenōn

Upon their return to Samos they formed their partisans into a conspiracy, and openly told the many that the King would be their friend, and would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and the democracy abolished.⁷⁰¹

It is significant that the fleet as a whole agreed to this proposal, albeit reluctantly; the decisive factor was the prospect of receiving pay from the Great King of Persia. The agreement having been made, there followed a complex series of intrigues. Phrynichus, who had spoken out unsuccessfully against Alcibiades’ plan, attempted to neutralise his opponent by alerting the Spartan admiral to Alcibiades’ movements. But by this time envoys from the conspirators had already been sent to Athens, and events leading to the oligarchy were already in motion there. What is notable in this episode is the political role of the members of the expedition; here, as in other places in Thucydides’ narrative, we see a dialogue between the leaders (usually the

⁷⁰⁰ Thucydides, 8.48

⁷⁰¹ Thucydides, 8.48.

generals) and the led.⁷⁰² But here it is taken a stage further, setting an important precedent for what followed; on this occasion the camp was consulted on policy, and its decision (to reluctantly acquiesce to the proposal) affected the subsequent political outcome. Apparently unable to count on any wide support, Phrynichus' opposition to the plan was based not on trying to rally like-minded men amongst the camp, but on intrigues with the enemy.

The contribution made to the Assemblies in Athens by naval crews at this time need not detain us long; the large number of ships launched in 412 BC, as well as the losses at Sicily, would have had the result that very few of "naval mob" would have been in the city. The conclusion that the poorer citizens in general and the "naval mob" in particular were under-represented in Athens at that the time of the oligarchic ploy seems valid. This is one of the explanations of the effectiveness of the campaign of terror and the wave of political murders in quelling potential opposition; in a more thinly populated city, it is easy to see how the perception that the coup was more widespread than it actually was could have taken hold. As well as this, the stratagem (for want of a better term) of holding the crucial meeting outside the city walls at Kolonos may well have discouraged those without arms from attending.⁷⁰³ While this could surely have decreased still further the potential representation of the unarmed "naval mob", we should not perhaps place a great deal of emphasis on this interpretation. If the Assembly included armed men in great numbers, an unarmed individual might feel that he was protected sufficiently by their presence so as not need weapons himself. Even so, it must be the case that the "naval mob" could have had no direct say in the Assembly debates concerning the negotiations with the Persians and the establishment and running of the oligarchic regimes, nor the subsequent disbanding of the oligarchy and democracy's restoration; there were simply not enough of the "naval mob" in Athens to have had any significant effect, and, as will be discussed later, the fleet on three separate occasions declined to involve itself directly in affairs at Athens during this year.

Participation in the Democracy at Samos

On the course of events at Samos, we have to rely almost solely on information from Thucydides. But here we run into the problem that his account breaks off half way through the year 411/0 BC, while the fleet was still acting independently of the city. His successors, Xenophon and Diodorus, give us few details of the political activities of the fleet, and their narratives of even the military campaigns are often patchy, conflicting, or simply inadequate.

Several questions present themselves regarding the political arrangements of the fleet. While Thucydides is quite clear in stating that the fleet organized itself democratically,⁷⁰⁴ he seems to

⁷⁰² See for example Phormio responding to the worries of his crews when outnumbered near Naupactos in 429 BC (Thucydides, 2.88), and Nicias addressing the invaders of Sicily in their peril in 413 BC (Thucydides, 7.61)

⁷⁰³ Thucydides, 8.67. *HCT* ad loc 8.67 makes reference to this interpretation, though rightly urges caution from wholeheartedly accepting it.

⁷⁰⁴ Thucydides, 8.75; refers to democracy being the rule at Samos; this must apply to the fleet, as democracy was already established amongst the Samians.

have thought his readers needed no more information than that. But who was entitled to participate in this new democracy? Would participation have extended only to those who enjoyed citizen rights in Athens? This is possible, and has indeed been the tacit assumption of modern scholars. There is some justification for the assumption; Thucydides speaks of the Argive ambassadors coming over in the *Paralos* to aid the “Athenian *demos* on Samos”,⁷⁰⁵ and it is certainly the case that the leaders whom the fleet elected were Athenians, and many of the concerns in Thucydides’ reports of the fleet’s meetings were especially pertinent to Athenians. Strauss shows this assumption in his discussion. For him, the events of 411 BC represent the Athenian sailor at his most politically assertive.⁷⁰⁶ His argument is that service in the fleet had a unifying effect on the Athenian citizen rowers and *hyperesia*, resulting in the confidence in the poorer citizens to be politically assertive; but could the solidarity and group identity he speaks of in fact belong to others as well? The principal difficulty with Strauss’ argument is the fact (which he recognizes) that the trireme crews were composed of a wide range of social groups. Strauss is forced to argue therefore that the ‘school of democracy’ that was the trireme only taught lessons to those onboard (almost certainly a minority in most fleets) who happened to be Athenian citizens, and not those slaves, metics and *xenoi* who rowed alongside them as part of the same team. In the city of Athens itself these social lines were, though permeable, perfectly visible and tangible. On campaign, however, things may well have been different. As we have seen, non-Athenians, even slaves, could be members of the *hyperesia*, giving orders to those who, at Athens, would have been considered their social superiors. Crewmen were all paid the same basic wage, and, as far as we can tell, lived and worked under the same conditions.⁷⁰⁷

Before 411 BC, Thucydides reports a number of ‘camp assemblies’ called by generals in response to pressure from the ranks. We should not believe that it was only Athenian citizens who took part in these meetings; indeed, both common sense and our most detailed example of such a meeting would suggest that they were general gatherings of the whole force. In 413 BC, when Nicias was addressing the remains of the force that invaded Sicily, he explicitly addressed Athenian citizens, their allies, and metics.⁷⁰⁸ So when in 411 BC a camp Assembly outgrew itself and became an independent democracy, could the Athenians have been willing or able to exclude those who had previously been able to attend? We are perhaps not entitled to assume, as a matter of course, that a new, revolutionary, and forcibly independent fleet would draw distinctions between its members along the same lines as the Athenian democracy had.

Of course, there is no conclusive reason to assume that the Athenians *wouldn't* stick to such tried, tested and habitual political distinctions, and the burden of proof must surely rest with those

⁷⁰⁵ Thucydides, 8.86

⁷⁰⁶ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, pp. 316-9

⁷⁰⁷ Some slaves rowed alongside their owners, and it is unlikely that these individuals would have been allowed to feel like equals.

⁷⁰⁸ Thucydides, 7.60 (“Soldiers of the Athenians and their allies”), 7.63 (“you, though not really Athenians... have been considered as Athenians”), 7.64 (“As for the Athenians amongst you”).

seeking to demonstrate that something radically different was happening on Samos at this time. Here there are problems; neither Thucydides, nor any other source, talks specifically of the enfranchisement of non-Athenians,⁷⁰⁹ though it should be pointed out that no details are given as to who exactly could and could not speak in the fleets assemblies, and who (apart from the two mentioned, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus) took over as trierarchs and generals. No source says that in 411 BC all those who rowed in the fleet and participated in the expedition, regardless of their previous status in Athens, and participated equally in a new democracy. If this had been the case, then its singular and momentous importance would surely have been noticed and noted by someone. But by whom? Thucydides' narrative, which concentrates primarily on the military and diplomatic developments at this time, does not seem much interested in the specifics of constitutional reform, either at Athens or elsewhere.⁷¹⁰ His narrative of the year 407 BC, when the fleet and its leaders were finally reconciled with the democracy at home, may well have made the arrangements clear, as might his treatment of the prosecution of the Ionian war under Alcibiades' overall leadership from 411 BC; however, his narrative abruptly breaks off leaving the oligarchy of the 5,000 in command at Athens and Alcibiades only recently voted into control of the fleet. His work, though admirable in comparison with most ancient literary evidence, is not free from significant omission.⁷¹¹ In the most unfinished section of this unfinished work, it might be expected that such discussions were to be added after the framework of events was fully in place, and their absence should not surprise.⁷¹² It is Xenophon and Diodorus who give us our narrative information after this point, and denying an event because neither of these writers manages to report it is an even more dangerous a technique with them than it is with Thucydides.⁷¹³ We have no surviving works from Aristophanes after the point when the fleet broke away from the city⁷¹⁴ until *Frogs* of 405 BC, when priorities other than the political machinations of the (then reconciled) fleet had come to the fore. More striking perhaps is the lack of mention of this dangerous and populist development in political writings of the fourth century BC by authors such as Isocrates and Plato.

⁷⁰⁹ But see discussion below on Thucydides 8.75 and the position of the Samians.

⁷¹⁰ It is in this respect that his account contrasts sharply in tone with that of the Aristotelian *Athenian Constitution*, which contains several documents supposedly written in this period, and many more details of constitutional and institutional matters than Thucydides cared to include.

⁷¹¹ The tribute reassessment in 424 BC and (more debatably) the Peace of Kallias of 450 BC and are perhaps the most documented and noteworthy of these omissions.

⁷¹² It is an oft-noted fact that Book 8 does not contain any full speeches, a feature it shares only with book 5. It is likely that the reported speech of the first Assembly, to be discussed in detail below, could have been worked up into a full speech had Thucydides completed his work. If so, it may have (like Nicias' speech on Sicily) made the status of the listeners clear.

⁷¹³ Thucydides' failure to mention important things, such as the Peace of Kallias, should not overly damage our trust in the fact that he does choose report, but nor should his silences be used to counter positive evidence.

⁷¹⁴ Two Aristophanes plays survive from the year 412/1 BC; on the most likely reconstruction (there is vast scholarship on this; see the introductions to Sommerstein's translations for succinct statements of the position and references) *Lysistrata* in the Lenaea festival early in 411 BC, and the *Thesmophoriazousae* at the City Dionysia, a couple of months later in the spring of 411. The contribution of these plays to our understanding of the events and chronology of the political turmoil in Athens is both interesting and complicated, but will not be detailed here; suffice to say that neither play illuminates the state of affairs at Samos at all, and on any chronology both were written before the uprising in the fleet.

While an argument from the silence of most of our sources should not be pressed given the fragmented state of ancient testimony, we must certainly seek positive affirmation of such a radical idea. But before turning to individual passages, the context, which is of primary importance, must be considered. Whether or not we characterise the Athenians as jealous guardians of their citizenship and its privileges, it is certainly the case that the final quarter of the 5th century saw considerable mass enfranchisement and loosening of the rules.⁷¹⁵ Famously, the younger Pericles was enrolled as a citizen, despite his father's own law that sons not born of two *astoi* parents should not be citizens.⁷¹⁶ While Pericles was of course a prominent statesman and a special case, the fact that the restored democracy of 403 BC had to specifically reinstate the law, but not apply it retrospectively, suggests that it was quite commonly ignored or circumvented before this time. During the war, Athens contemplated several mass grants of citizenship; to the slaves (and metics, if there were any?) who agreed to row in the fleet that fought at Arginusae and later at Aigospotamoi, and to the Samians after the democracy was restored. Plataeans enjoyed citizenship rights in Athens following the first 'destruction' of their city in 421 BC.⁷¹⁷ The extension of citizenship to large groups was acceptable practice in exceptional circumstances, and those of 411 BC would certainly count as 'exceptional', even by turbulent Greek standards.

There were two major groups on Samos in 411 BC, along with the Athenian "naval mob" and soldiers, who could have been considered eligible for participation in the new democracy: firstly, the Samians themselves; and secondly the non-Athenian members (*xenoi*, metics, slaves) of the naval crews, likely to have been a significant proportion of the total number. For both these groups there is some evidence, albeit slight, that they participated in the new democracy.

The Samians

The first group about whom there may be some shred of evidence to suggest their participation in the democracy at Samos is the Samians themselves. The relationship between the fleet and the Samians was incredibly close in this period. Only a little prior to the break-away of the fleet, some of the Athenians had fought with the Samians to preserve their democracy from the counter-insurgency started up by Pisander. Amongst those Athenians taking part were Thrasybulus, Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon and the crew of the *Paralos*. Following the quelling of the coup, the *Paralos* left Samos to report to Athens the developments. It is another significant setting of precedent that the decision to send the ship was taken jointly by both the "Samians and the *stratiotai*".⁷¹⁸ Not realizing that the 400 were in power in Athens by this time, some of the *Paralos* crew were arrested, and the rest sent round Euboea in a troop-transport. One

⁷¹⁵ The *duties* pertaining to citizenship (paying taxes, serving as a hoplite, performing liturgies) were given out pretty freely to appropriately rich metics.

⁷¹⁶ The citizenship law of 451 BC is discussed above, Part Two, section A.3

⁷¹⁷ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 694; Thucydides, 3.55.3. They perhaps had the rights to citizenship prior to this; see Hornblower, *Commentary*, ad loc. 3.55.3

⁷¹⁸ Thucydides, 8.74. The meaning of the term *stratiotai* will be discussed in the following section. The Loeb translation of "Athenian soldiers" is inaccurate in both its terms.

man, Chaereas, escaped and returned to Samos with exaggerated tales of oligarchic tyranny and depredation.⁷¹⁹

The fleet at Samos was on the point of returning to Athens and killing the oligarchs, but was persuaded by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus to stay in Samos and to establish itself as a democracy:

meta de touto lamprôs êdê es dêmokratian boulomenoi metastêsai ta en têi Samôi ho te Thrasuboulos ho tou Lukou kai Thrasulos houtoi gar malista proeistêkesan tês metabolês hôrkôsan pantas tous stratiôtas tous megistous horkous, kai autous tous ek tês oligarchias malista, ê mên dêmokratêsesthai te kai homonoêsein kai ton pros Peloponnêsious polemon prothumôs dioisein kai tois tetrakosiois polemioi te esesthai kai ouden epikêrukeusesthai. xunômnusan de kai Samiôn pantes ton auton horkon hoi en têi hêlikiai, kai ta pragmata panta kai ta apobêsomena ek tôn kindunôn xunekoinôsanto hoi stratiôtai tois Samiois, nomizontes oute ekeinois apostrophên sôtêrias oute sphisin einai, all', ean te hoi tetrakosioi kratêsôsîn ean te hoi ek Milêtou polemioi, diaphtharêsesthai.

After this Thrasybulus, son of Lykos and Thrasyllus, the chief activists in the revolution, made plain their desire to set up a democracy. They made everyone on the campaign, especially those connected to the oligarchy, swear the most binding and solemn oaths to maintain the democracy and live in harmony, to continue zealously the war against the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the 400 and not treat with them. All the Samians of military age swore the same oath along with them, and the campaigners made co-operated with the Samians in all affairs and were ready to share with them whatever ensued from the risks they were running.⁷²⁰

Thucydides describes Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus speaking in favour of setting up a democracy at Samos and the swearing of the oaths in one breath. It seems clear that the one was brought about by the other; that it was those willing to swear the oaths were to be the ones to participate in this new democracy. By making these oaths as solemn and as binding as possible, it seems that Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus sought to ritualize the beginning of their new democracy. As well as this, on a more mundane level, they also bound the whole fleet to their particular policy agenda; enmity to the 400 and war with the Peloponnesians. These provisions can be described, very broadly, the manifesto of the Samos democracy.

What is most interesting about this episode is that the Samians of military age swore these oaths too, on equal terms with the fleet. To which democracy were the Samians swearing fealty? Perhaps their own, just recently preserved from the oligarchic threat? But the loyalty of most of the Samians to their own democracy was surely not in question; following the successful counter-revolution and the lenient settlements provided for the oligarchs, a peaceful settlement had already been made. The oligarchic ringleaders were either killed or in exile, and the rest had been incorporated equally and successfully into the Samian democracy.⁷²¹ It seems clear that the Samians were swearing the same oaths, concerning the same democracy, as the fleet. Their

⁷¹⁹ This narrative of events derives from Thucydides, 8.73-4.

⁷²⁰ Thucydides, 8.75.2-3

⁷²¹ Thucydides (8.73) describes the settlement in positive terms, suggesting peace amongst the Samians.

position towards the fleet, and its new ‘constitution’, was the pressing concern. After stating that the Samians of military age swore these oaths equally with the members of the expedition, Thucydides places great emphasis on the ‘togetherness’ of the Samians on the one hand and the fleet on the other, their common interests and dangers. These common goals and common oaths, and the fact that the expedition “co-operated with the Samians in all affairs”,⁷²² surely attests to their direct involvement in the political events on Samos that followed.⁷²³

In 405 BC, after the fleet and Athens had been reconciled, a decree was passed in Athens granting the Samians citizenship at Athens.⁷²⁴ Several passages in the decree refer back to previous arrangements between Samos and Athens, now re-confirmed following the reconciliation. There is reference to a grant of autonomy, which was originally given to the Samians in 412 BC.⁷²⁵

tois de nomois chresthai tois spheterois auton autonomos ontas, kai talla poiēn kata tos horkos kai tas sunthekas kathaper xunkeitai Athenaiōis kai Samiōis

They shall use their own laws and be autonomous, and they shall act in all other respects in accordance with the oaths and treaties just as agreed by Athenians and Samians.⁷²⁶

The reference to previous oaths and agreements between Athenians and Samians, followed by provisions for common action in political and military matters, seems to have much in common with the arrangements and joint activities between the fleet and the Samians in 411 BC described above:

[e]an de ti anagkaiog gignetai dia ton polemon kai proteron peri tes poli[t]eias, hosper autoi legosin hoi presbes, pros ta paronta boleuomenos poiēn [he]i an dokei beltiston enai. Peri de tes erenes, eag gignetai, enai kata tauta [k]athaper Athenaiōism kai tois nun oikosiv Samon. Ean de polemen deei, parask[e]juazesthai autos hos an dunontai arista prattontas meta ton strategon. [ea]n de presbeian poi pemposin Athenaiōi, sumpempen kai to ezamo parontas, [ea]n tina bolontai, kai sunboleuen ho ti an exosin agathon.

And if any emergency arises because of the war even earlier as regards the constitution, just as the envoys say themselves, they shall deliberate in the light of present conditions and act in whatever manner it seems to them to be best. As to the peace, if it comes, the same terms shall apply for the Athenians and also for those who inhabit Samos. If it is necessary to wage war, preparations shall be made by them as best they can, acting with the generals. If the Athenians send an embassy anywhere, those present from Samos shall jointly with them send any envoy they wish, and they shall offer whatever good advice they possess.⁷²⁷

⁷²² Thucydides, 8.75

⁷²³ It is worth noting that it is the members of the expedition, *toi stratiotai*, with whom the Samians swear the oaths; “Athenians” as a group are not mentioned at all in this or the following section.

⁷²⁴ IG I³ 127=Fornara 166=ML 94.

⁷²⁵ Thucydides, 8.21

⁷²⁶ Fornara, 166, ll. 15-18

⁷²⁷ Fornara, 166, l. 18-25

Could the arrangements for the “Samians to be Athenians” be confirming the *de facto* situation of 411 BC too?⁷²⁸ Granting the Samians citizenship had not been decided in the Athenian Assembly itself before, and such a grant, even if promised previously by the fleet, would not have been a simple confirmation.⁷²⁹ If the Athenians, following the reconciliation with the fleet in 407 BC, were dragging their feet on the issue of Samian citizenship, the events of 406 BC would have thrown the question into sharp relief; at this time the Athenians granted citizenship to all who joined the Arginusae fleet, and this was still clearly a live political issue in 405 BC (as demonstrated by *Frogs*, produced in that year). This would provide a good context for the arguments regarding the citizenship of Samians to be addressed. Given the later treatment of the Samians by the restored democracy (this decree of thanksgiving and a grant of citizenship after the fleet and city of Athens were reconciled; and the extension of the franchise again to the islanders in the restored democracy of 403 BC written on the same stele)⁷³⁰, we should not shrink from the possibility that they were equals to the Athenians in 411 BC too.

The Crews of the Samos Fleet

The question as to whether the non-Athenian free men amongst the fleet in 411 BC participated in the new democracy is perhaps less certain than that of the Samians. As was argued above, it was by no means only Athenians that attended assemblies of troops and sailors on campaign, and thus we should not dismiss out of hand the idea that the non-Athenian citizens participated in the democracy of the Samos fleet. There is little in the way of direct evidence, and the question turns on who Thucydides is talking about when he uses the word *stratiotai*.

Stratiotai is most commonly rendered ‘soldiers’ in translation. This translation is appropriate in many contexts, but just as *stratego* commanded land and sea forces, this and other *strat-* terms should not be understood in the narrow context of land warfare. The case in 411 BC is instructive, as the Athenian force at Samos is described often as *to stratopedon* despite the fact that it was primarily a naval force.⁷³¹ Clearly the translation ‘army camp’ is inappropriate here; the Greek term admits of, indeed demands in this context, a broader meaning. An unsuspecting reader could assume that the democracy at Samos was a hoplite-based franchise like that which the 400 in Athens purported to be. ‘Force’ or ‘expedition’, and ‘those on the expedition/campaign’ are more accurate, though more awkward, renderings of *stratopedon* and *stratiotai*, and ones which have the benefit (like the Greek term) of including both land and sea forces, and necessarily excluding neither. As Amit says, “Thucydides uses the word *stratiotes*

⁷²⁸ It will be argued later in this chapter that the Samos fleet Assembly was not the Athenian Assembly in exile, as it has been conceived in modern writing. Even if they were on equal terms with the Samos fleet in the 411 BC Assembly, they would not thus have been Athenians. After the restoration of the fleet to the city, however, to give the Samians the equal status that they had in 412 BC would necessitate making them Athenians.

⁷²⁹ cf. [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 40.2, when a promise of enfranchisement to those who fought against the Thirty was blocked after democracy was restored.

⁷³⁰ IG II² 1=Harding 5=RO 2.

⁷³¹ e.g. Thucydides, 8.76, and 7.70 discussed below

for sailor as well as for soldier”.⁷³² What Amit, and indeed all modern scholars, have often failed to appreciate is that this word is used also to encompass non-Athenians. In this context, therefore, *oi stratiotai* could have been not simply the Athenians on Samos, but all the free men in the Samos fleet.

‘The Samos fleet’ is the name given to the large force of ships stationed on the island of Samos from 412 BC, which broke from Athens’ control in 411 BC, to be reconciled four years later in 407 BC.⁷³³ It is a modern name; the various phrases used by Thucydides to describe it will be discussed below. The Samos fleet did not spring fully formed onto that island, but was created by the pooling of half a dozen or so smaller fleets operating in the Aegean.⁷³⁴ Thus when the Samos fleet came together in 412 BC, some of the ships in it had already been on active service for long periods of time. While it was not the largest fleet in Athenian history, it was certainly big. It was also one of the longest in continuous service; it is probable that some ships and sailors were in continuous service from the spring of 413 BC to the autumn of 407 BC, six and a half years. Only the ultimately disastrous invasion of Egypt in the 450s BC involved such a big fleet being in service for so long. As there is little detailed evidence about this earlier expedition,⁷³⁵ the Samos fleet is of singular importance to any study of the Athenian navy and its crewmen. It is unfortunate, then, that we are as much in the dark about the composition of the crews in the Samos fleet as we are about most others. Most of the fleets which were eventually consolidated together at Samos were launched in the aftermath of the Sicilian defeat. In terms of manpower, this disaster was significant, but there is no indication that the Athenians resorted to conscription to launch these ships. The fall-out amongst the allies, and the increasing amount of Persian money being used to bankroll the nascent but expanding Peloponnesian fleet, would probably mean a heavier than usual reliance on Athenian citizens, metics, and their slaves. But it is very clear that there was still a market for oarsmen in operation at this time, and the scale of Athenian fleet operations (more fleets launched in 412 BC than in any other year in the classical period) surely implies that Athens was still, for the moment, willing and able to hire mercenaries; it was at this time that the Athenians broke into the 1,000 talents stashed away at the start of the war.⁷³⁶ When the Samos fleet was created in 412 BC, therefore, it probably still boasted a good number of mercenaries from the Aegean island cities, in many cases cities whose political status in relation to Athens was somewhat changeable in this turbulent period. It is likely that many of these sailors would have deserted or defected at this point, and it is probably this which accounts for the fact that the Samos fleet’s number of active vessels seems to drop, even though it

⁷³² Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 44 ff. Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 169, talks of the political decisions taken “by the Athenian democrats on Samos”, cf. p. 173 “the Athenians on Samos putting an end to the divisions among them”

⁷³³ By this point it is often referred to as the ‘Hellespont fleet’, as the main theatre of operations had by then moved northwards.

⁷³⁴ Thucydides, 8.30

⁷³⁵ Some scholars have doubted that all of the 200 ships (later reinforced by 50) remained in Egypt for the 6 years of the invasion and were thus all destroyed. Gomme, *HCT*, ad loc 1.110.1

⁷³⁶ Thucydides, 8.15, cf. 2.24.

frequently captured extra ships in battle.⁷³⁷ At its initial congregation, Thucydides reports that 114 ships were divided amongst the commanders. This number is considerably short of the total number of ships which we might expect. Thucydides' account up to that point of the various squadrons that ultimately composed the joint fleet indicates that there were around 24 more ships operating in the eastern Aegean than were divided up at Samos, as well as an unspecified number of "ships in other areas" that he mentions here for the first time.⁷³⁸ While desertion is a likely possibility, there could be various ways to account for the discrepancies in the figures, all beyond proof.

In terms of participating politically at Samos only that portion of the fleet that was stationed on the island would have been able to easily and regularly contribute. While this number varied considerably over the period with ships sent all over the eastern Aegean on various missions, it seems that at the crucial moment when the fleet broke away from Athens, there were around 80 ships, up to 16,000 crewmen, at Samos. As well as the sailors, there were some soldiers at Samos. Two of the fleets which composed the Samos fleet carried troops as well as their marines;⁷³⁹ if all of these troops remained on Samos (which is very unlikely), there would have been at the most 3,000 hoplites on the island, in addition to the Samians' own forces. But it seems that those out in the fleet in this period recognized the legitimacy of the democracy formed at Samos in 411 BC, and followed its leaders. The whole 'Samos fleet', even those parts of it not currently on Samos, seems to have split from Athens and forged its own path.

Hoi stratiotai

As stated above, the phrase *hoi stratiotai* is a common one on this section of Thucydides' narrative, and of considerable significance in the discussion of the political situation of 411 BC. Between the separating of the fleet and the city and the point where Thucydides' narrative breaks off, he gives some details of four meetings of the force at Samos.⁷⁴⁰ Though the phrase "the Athenians at Samos" is a common one throughout this section of the narrative, and the phrase *hoi en tei Samoi Athenaion stratiotai* occurs in the context of the Samos fleet,⁷⁴¹ it is significant that whenever the democratic Assembly gathered or made decisions, it is described as *hoi stratiotai*.

⁷³⁷ The fact that more ships than the initial 74 left at Samos in winter 412/11 BC could be manned the next summer (Thucydides, 8.79) is perhaps evidence of the Samians of military age joining the *stratiotai* and contributing to the manning of the ships. This should not be pushed too hard, because the explanation of Andrewes (*HCT* vol. 5, pp. 28-29) that ships detached in winter had rejoined by the summer is also credible.

⁷³⁸ Thucydides, 8.30. Andrewes (*HCT* ad loc 8.30.2) remarks that "the number is by some twenty less than we should expect from the data Thucydides has explicitly provided".

⁷³⁹ Both fleets 121 and 136 carried 1,000 hoplites, and the former carried a large number of allied hoplites too. Fleet 119 specifically carried conscripted hoplites amongst its marines, and carried out a large number of land based operations.

⁷⁴⁰ First meeting (Thucydides, 8.76-7): the fleet broke from Athens, elected new leaders, and came to terms with its actions. Second and third meetings (Thucydides, 8.81-82): after several implied but undescribed meetings, the Samos fleet in the second described meeting voted to recall Alcibiades. This led immediately to the third meeting, in which Alcibiades was also elected as general and "matters are put in his hands". Soon after this, at the fourth meeting (Thucydides, 8.86) the fleet gave a hostile reception to ambassadors from the 400; like in the third meeting, they were persuaded by Alcibiades to not attack Athens. These assemblies and the decisions taken are discussed in more detail below.

⁷⁴¹ Thucydides, 8.47

We should not, as most scholars seem to, treat these phrases as synonymous. Indeed, Thucydides gives us a very clear indication of whom he means by the phrase *hoi stratiotai* in the context of a public meeting in book 7. At the closing stages of the disastrous adventure to Sicily, Nicias noticed that the morale of *hoi stratiotai* was (understandably) flagging, and he sought to remedy the situation through persuasive oratory.⁷⁴² During his speech, he addressed explicitly not only Athenian citizens,⁷⁴³ but also the metics⁷⁴⁴ and the allied troops,⁷⁴⁵ everyone present on the campaign except for the slaves. In other words, all the free people who were to be taking part in the coming battle were considered by Nicias (or rather by Thucydides, who no doubt composed this speech as something appropriate to say to the disheartened invaders) to be *stratiotai*, and when the word is used in an unqualified way, we should interpret it widely.

Indeed, when Thucydides wishes to single out some group or other from the *stratiotai* as a whole, he can do so. When he talks about *oi...Athenaion stratiotai* at 8.47, he is singling out one particular national group, the Athenians, from the rest of the people on the campaign. It was these “Athenian campaigners on Samos” who perceived that Alcibiades was close to Tissaphernes, and thus began to plot with a view to restoring him and overthrowing the democracy.⁷⁴⁶ Other phrases used in the context of the Samos fleet, *nautikos ochlos*, *hoi en tei Samoï Athenaioi*, *ev tei Samo ton Athenaion demoï*⁷⁴⁷ are all singling out groups amongst the *stratiotai* as a whole. The very widest and most inclusive term used by Thucydides is *pantes hoi stratiotai*.⁷⁴⁸ It seems at first glance that this term is essentially synonymous with the wide interpretation of *hoi stratiotai*, and the adding of “all” is simply a matter of emphasis. This is an unsatisfactory solution, but fortunately the context of the one use of *pantes hoi stratiotai* provides a far better one. While *hoi stratiotai* is used generally of the whole fleet, and particularly in its political manifestation, the one usage of *pantes hoi stratiotai* is in connection with the oaths sworn just prior to the first fleet Assembly. While there was no ‘national’ division amongst the fleet in regard to attendance at the Assembly, it is unlikely that *all* of them could participate and decide, no more than *all* of the *demoi* could have participated in the Athenian Assembly; not through any sort of segregation, but just due to the severe logistical limits attendant upon gathering mass meetings. Not all the sailors could or would have come. Wherever it was that the Samos fleet’s meetings were held, there would surely not be room for the 10,000 or so free men stationed on the island.⁷⁴⁹ This, a minimum figure, is 4,000 more than could fit in the Pnyx at Athens, and too big a number to

⁷⁴² Thucydides, 7.60.5 Like an earlier example of such a gathering (Thucydides 2.88), Nicias holds this assembly in response to concerns expressed by his troops

⁷⁴³ Thucydides, 7.64.1, *tous te Athenaios humon*, “the Athenians amongst you”.

⁷⁴⁴ Thucydides, 7.63.3, *hoi teos Athenaioi nomizomenoi, kai me ontes*, “those of you considered Athenians without being so”, surely a reference to the metics.

⁷⁴⁵ Thucydides, 7.61.1, *Andres stratiotai Athenaion te kai ton allon xummachon*; “Men of the campaign, both Athenian and their allies”.

⁷⁴⁶ cf. 8.78, where Thucydides similarly seems to be distinguishing the Spartans from the other groups in their force.

⁷⁴⁷ Thucydides, 8.72, 8.86.4 and 8.86.8 respectively. It should be noted that while none of these are synonymous with *hoi stratiotai*, the phrases referring to the Athenians in 8.86 seem to be essentially synonymous with each other.

⁷⁴⁸ Thucydides, 8.75.2

⁷⁴⁹ This is a very approximate figure. It assumes the 16,000 trireme crew mentioned earlier, minus 8,000 (half the total) for slaves; this would surely be a smaller proportion. Added to this 2,000 troops carried on the ships and eligible to attend gives 10,000, without any allowance for the “Samians of military age”, whom I have argued above were eligible to attend as well.

easily imagine meeting for discussion. So while the Assembly *represented* all the forces, it did not *consist of* all those on the expedition. But in terms of the oaths, Thucydides seems to be emphasising that exactly this effort was made to ensure that *all* the free people present on Samos swore the appropriate oaths. There is therefore a subtle but important difference between the wide interpretation of *hoi stratiotai* on the one hand, and *pantes hoi stratiotai* on the other.

Thucydides choice of language in relation to the Samos fleet's activities is thus interesting and revealing. As we have seen, he could single out the Athenians, or even groups amongst the Athenians, when it was relevant to do so. In isolation his phrasing is not always obvious, but when considering the context it is always clear to whom he is referring.⁷⁵⁰ When referring to the ships and fleet movements, Thucydides uses, as he does through the rest of the narrative, the convenient but somewhat misleading rubric "the Athenian fleet."⁷⁵¹ Incautious readers could conclude that the people on board such vessels were all Athenian, whereas it is clear from Thucydides' narrative as much as any other source that the crews were mixed. In the context of fleet movements, though, the ships even in this period can correctly be considered "Athenian", and references to the fleet under this heading in military contexts does nothing to undermine the arguments set out above regarding political terminology. It is clear then that, if it had been just the Athenians who engaged in the fleet democracy at Samos, Thucydides could have said so. He doesn't. His language makes it clear, consistently, that it was *hoi stratiotai*, "those on campaign" taken as a whole, who were making the political decisions at Samos from 411 BC.

Citizens Only: The 'real' Athenian *demos* on Samos?

Having declared itself independent of Athenian control, the fleet constituted itself as a democracy and resolved to continue the war against the Peloponnesians in its own way.⁷⁵² Thucydides, in reported speech, records some of the ways in which the fleet came to terms with what it had done in its first Assembly. Amongst the claims the fleet made for itself was the assertion that it was the city, not the fleet, that was in fact in revolt, because the city was the minority.

hê polis autôn apestêken: tous gar elassous apo sphôn tôn pleonôn kai es panta porimôterôn methestanai

The city had revolted from them; for it was the smaller turned from them, who were the larger and better able to provide resources.⁷⁵³

⁷⁵⁰ For example, the use of the phrase *hoi en te Samo ton Athenaion* phrase in 8.63 at first glance looks to be referring to all the Athenians on Samos, as other similar phrases do in other places (cf. Thucydides 8.47, 8.86), but the context makes it clear that he is talking about only those Athenians involved in the plot; it is clearly not *all* of the Athenians on Samos, as these men pledge their private wealth to secure the oligarchy.

⁷⁵¹ Thucydides, 8.78, in the first fleet movement after the split from Athens, the Samos fleet is described as *to vauikon ton Athenion*, "the Athenian fleet". In the following section, (8.79) Thucydides uses *hoi Athenaioi* and *hoi Peloponnesioi* to differentiate the two sides. This is of course inaccurate in terms of the people on board; though the ships themselves, possibly excluding the captures, could correctly be considered "Athenian".

⁷⁵² Thucydides, 8.75

⁷⁵³ Thucydides, 8.76.3

It seems to be this claim, and the subsequent one that the fleet were following “the laws of their fathers”,⁷⁵⁴ that has led to the near-universal and normally unspoken and unquestioned assumption in modernity that the new democracy on Samos was one composed of only of Athenian citizens.⁷⁵⁵ Amit, referencing this passage of Thucydides, goes a stage further when he claims that the fleet at Samos “declared themselves [to be] the *demos* of Athens”.⁷⁵⁶ While these statements of Thucydides are indeed the strongest evidence to counter the argument I have advanced here, it seems that his report does not go as far as saying that the fleet of Samos equated itself with the Athenian *demos*.⁷⁵⁷ According to Thucydides, their legitimacy was not based on thinking of themselves as the ‘true’ Athenian *demos*, but in thinking of themselves as more numerous and better equipped. These remarks are not dealing with objective statements of fact, but rather mutual reassurance and self-justifying propaganda. Nowhere is this more clear when the Samos Assembly claimed to be (unlike the city), preserving the laws of their fathers. Obviously they were not doing this,⁷⁵⁸ but the claim to follow the “laws of their fathers” was a common slogan of revolutionary groups who made significant changes to the laws; the same phrase, and with exactly the same dubious factual accuracy, was made by the oligarchs at Athens in 411 BC.⁷⁵⁹ Similarly then, even if this section is interpreted as the Samos fleet Assembly declaring itself to be the *demos* of Athens, it does not follow that only those considered citizens of Athens attended. Such claims should not be considered too literally, and who would be considered part of the *demos* could be as flexible as what measures constituted as the “laws of their fathers”.

Amit uses the very fact of this rebellion to support his view that the crews of Athenian triremes were mostly Athenian citizens, posing the rhetorical question “is it possible that mercenaries and slaves would revolt for the sake of the democratic regime at Athens?”⁷⁶⁰ It is perhaps a little unfair to single out Amit here, as he at least raises the issue of non-Athenian contribution in the politics at Samos, even if it is only to dismiss it.⁷⁶¹ But Amit’s assumption, that the non-citizens would hardly rebel for the sake of Athens’ democracy, misses a fundamental point. It overlooks the suggestion that the mercenaries, slaves and metics in the fleet could have different and valid motives for taking part in this same action; possibilities include loyalty to their comrades, fear for their families and property (in the cases of slaves and metics living in Athens), general outrage at

⁷⁵⁴ Thucydides, 8.76.6 *tous men hēmartēkenai tous patrious nomous katalusantas, autoi de sōizein*

⁷⁵⁵ Jordan, for example, talks of “the decision of the *Athenians at Samos* to depose their generals”; *Athenian Navy*, p. 118 (my emphasis).

⁷⁵⁶ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 44.

⁷⁵⁷ Though the Argive ambassadors of 8.86, and perhaps the 400 at Athens, seem to make that assumption, or perhaps realize the importance of the Athenians amongst the cosmopolitan Assembly.

⁷⁵⁸ To name two definite examples of going against time-honoured Athenian procedure (aside from the issue of enfranchisement discussed in this chapter), the Samos fleet appears to have elected its trierarchs rather than appoint them from the rich, and extended its college of generals to allow Alcibiades to have command.

⁷⁵⁹ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 29.3 and 31.1.

⁷⁶⁰ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 44.

⁷⁶¹ Contrast, for example, Fosdyke, who claims (*Exile, Ostracism and Democracy*, p. 187) that Chareas’ reports “convinced the *Athenian sailors* on Samos to revolt from the government in Athens and, ultimately, to establish their own democracy in exile.” (my emphasis)

the crimes of the 400, and desire to fight the war (and thus hopefully receive pay) rather than accept a peace treaty.⁷⁶²

The Wide Franchise of the Samos Democracy

If the Samos fleet *was* a multi-national democracy of a new kind, many questions immediately present themselves. If it is the case that many, if not most, of the participants in the ‘Samos fleet democracy’ were non-Athenian, we may wonder at why all the leaders were Athenians, why the Argive ambassadors come to Samos to support specifically “the Athenian *demos* in Samos”,⁷⁶³ why the agenda of the reported Assembly meetings seemed so concerned with specifically Athenian issues, and, as Amit asks, why, if the new democracy “was composed of mercenaries and slaves, would the oligarchs have treated them as they did, send delegations etc.?”⁷⁶⁴ This last question at least need not detain us; the *realpolitik* of the 400’s situation in 411 BC (that the Samos fleet was militarily stronger than they were, and all knew it) would demand that they send representatives to negotiate, regardless of whether or not they found it undignified or distasteful. But in fact, it seems that, like Amit, the oligarchs at Athens *did* take a “citizen-centric” view of the fleet. When they despatched envoys to negotiate with the fleet, they instructed them to say that they were not intending to harm “the citizens”,⁷⁶⁵ and give other reassurances to do with political representation:

didaxontas hōs ouk epi blabēi tēs poleōs kai tōn politōn hē oligarchia katestē, all’epi sōtēriai tōn xumpantōn pragmatōn, pentakisχilioi te hoti eien kai ou tetrakosioi monon hoi prassontes...alla t’episteilantes ta prepona eipein apepempsan autous euthus meta tēn heautōn katastasin, deisantes mē, hoper egeneto, nautikos ochlos out’ autos menein en tōi oligarchikōi kosmōi ethelēi, sphas te mē ekeithen arxamenou tou kakou metastēsōsin

They [the ten delegates chosen] were to explain that the oligarchy had not been established to do any harm to the city or the citizens, but in order to preserve the state as a whole, and that it was not 400 but 5,000 who shared the government....They were also told the right line to take on other points, and were sent out directly after the new government was installed, since the Four Hundred feared (and their fears were justified by the event) that the naval mob [*nautikos ochlos*] would not be willing to keep in their own place under the oligarchic system.⁷⁶⁶

Of course, when the envoys themselves arrived, after some delay, at Samos, they were also obliged to answer the wider concerns of all in the fleet, particularly those resident in Athens who doubtless formed the majority of the Samos fleet’s Assembly. When they were eventually

⁷⁶² It should also be noted that these more personal motivations could also have applied to the Athenian citizen; this action on Samos, as will be argued more fully below, should not simply be seen as an ideological conflict between Athenian Oligarchs and Democrats

⁷⁶³ Thucydides, 8.86.8 *tōi en tēi Samōi tōn Athēnaiōn dēmōi*. Note the misleading translation in the Penguin and Loeb editions, “Athenian democracy in Samos”.

⁷⁶⁴ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p.45

⁷⁶⁵ *Ton politon*, 8.72. It is in this passage and this context (referring to the thoughts of the oligarchs) that Thucydides uses the phrase *nautikos ochlos* for the first and only time in his work. The context *suggests*, though not conclusively, that the phrase is meant (like Aristotle’s usage, and my own definition in this work) to refer to professional citizen sailors, and to exclude non-citizens.

⁷⁶⁶ Thucydides, 8.72.

allowed to speak, they did address some of the political representation issues that they have been charged with, but they also sought to deny the wider charges brought against the regime, some of which did not apply only to Athenian citizens:

hoi te oikeioi autôn outh'hubrizontai, hôsper Chaireas diabolôn apêngeilen, oute kakon echousin ouden, all'epi tois spheterois autôn hekastoï kata chôran menousin

[the delegates said that] their relatives had neither suffering outrage, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other ill-treatment to complain of, but were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their property just as they had left them.⁷⁶⁷

These charges were originally relayed to the fleet just prior to its split from Athens. As mentioned above, the *Paralos* was sent back to Athens after the civil strife amongst the Samians, only to find the 400 in charge and the crewmen themselves threatened with arrest. Chareas, one of the crew of the *Paralos*, escaped from the 400 and returned to Samos, bringing reports of the abuses of the oligarchs.⁷⁶⁸

angellei tois stratiôtaiis epi to meizon panta deinôsas ta ek tôn Athênôn, hôs plêgais te pantas zêmiousi kai anteipein estin ouden pros tous echontas tèn politeian, kai hoti autôn kai gunaikas kai paides hubrizontai, kai dianountai, hoposoi en Samôi strateuontai mê ontes tês spheteras gnômês, toutôn pantôn tous prosêkontas labontes eirxein, hina, ên mê hupakousôsi, tethnêkôsin: kai alla polla epikatapseudomenos elegen.

Returning to Samos, he [Chareas] drew a picture to the campaigners of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which everything was exaggerated; saying that all were punished by flogging, that no one could say a word against the constitution, that their wives and children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and shut up the relatives of as many of those who were on campaign at Samos who were not of the government's way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious inventions.⁷⁶⁹

Though Thucydides states that many of these stories were untrue, the key points are that the fleet believed them, and that the stories concerned a wider audience than citizens and wider issues than political rights. Chareas did make some accusations which were of particular relevance to the Athenian citizens; he emphasized that *all* were being subjected to the punishment of flogging, to which Athenian citizens were normally not subjected. But in making these claims, such as that their wives and children were being abused, he was addressing the *stratiotai* as a whole. Perhaps the most serious charges he made were that the families of *hoposoi en Samoi strateuontai*, “as many of those who were on campaign at Samos”, were being kept as hostages and threatened with death if they did not fall in with the new regime; the use of this broader term makes clear that the abuses of the 400 were being perpetrated against non-Athenians as well as citizens. It was the reaction amongst the assembled *stratiotai* against these wider concerns that provoked the split between the city and fleet in the first place. It was these wider charges also that the envoys

⁷⁶⁷ Thucydides, 8.86.3

⁷⁶⁸ Thucydides, 8.73-4.

⁷⁶⁹ Thucydides, 8.74.3

from the 400 attempted to deny before the Samos fleet's fourth Assembly; they did not win over their audience.

None of these questions pose significant problems to the view that all the free men in the Samos fleet participated in the assemblies. A primarily Athenian focus in the issues reported by "Thucydides the Athenian"⁷⁷⁰ should not be surprising, especially given the fact that the matters under discussed were important ones; it would be more surprising they were not discussed by the Samos fleet. As well as this, it must be remembered that we only have accounts of the assemblies that Thucydides chose to report; two of those (the first and the fourth, which are the longest accounts) were primarily concerned with the political interactions of the city and the fleet; it is likely that there were other assemblies in which other issues came to the fore,⁷⁷¹ not least the strategy to be pursued in war, and in these meetings the 'Athenian-ness' of the assemblies would have been much less evident. We should not be surprised to find a strong 'Athenian' bias in the issues discussed by the Samos fleet; even on this model of a wide franchise in the fleet's democracy, the Athenians would most likely have been the single most significant group (with the possible exception of the military-age Samians discussed above), and the most homogenous. Their significance is highlighted by Thucydides in the fourth fleet Assembly. At this time, the fleet assembly proposed various courses of action. Only one of these is specified; the policy of attacking Athens, advocated zealously by the "Athenians at Samos".⁷⁷² It was the fact that this particular group was so set on such a potentially ruinous policy that made the situation so dangerous; they influenced the rest of the crowd to such a degree that, according to Thucydides, only Alcibiades was able to restrain them.⁷⁷³ Apart from the Samians, who as noted above, jointly with the *stratigotai* sent ambassadors to Athens,⁷⁷⁴ no other national group on Samos is singled out in this way.

The disparate groups of *xenoi* would have had a significant and cohesive group identity, but that identity would be as crewmen in the Athenian navy. In addition, there were doubtless many metics in the fleet with long-term connections and roots in Athens; these people would have been just as interested in events in Attica and the fates of their families under the 400, even if they were no better or worse politically under the 400 or the democracy. The close co-operation required to efficiently run a trireme, as well as the often adverse conditions in which the men worked under, would no doubt have cemented relations between these disparate social groups, and indeed the Athenian citizens may have felt greater solidarity with their fellow rowers (part of the *demos* in their own cities, or immigrants living in Athens) than they would their fellow citizens participating in the oligarchy at Athens. In the somewhat desperate and unusual

⁷⁷⁰ This is how he introduces himself at the beginning of his work; Thucydides, 1.1.1

⁷⁷¹ This is somewhat speculative; though, as will be discussed below, it seems likely that there were other meetings at least between the first and second reported Assemblies in which Thrasybulus tried to persuade the Samos fleet to treat with Alcibiades. Thucydides, 8.81.1

⁷⁷² Thucydides, 8.86.4 *Ton en Samoi Athenaion*.

⁷⁷³ Thucydides, 8.86.5.

⁷⁷⁴ Thucydides, 8.74.1

circumstances in which the Samos fleet found itself in 411 BC, the Athenians would not have wanted to exclude their companions from joining with them against their common enemies. As the Samians demonstrated by swearing the same oaths, they perceived their fate as tied to that of the Athenians;⁷⁷⁵ this was doubtless true of the other, less numerous national groups in the fleet who also swore these oaths.

The effect of desertions and defections should also be considered at this point. The debates concerning pay for sailors, which occur both in the narratives of Xenophon and Thucydides, imply that large numbers of men served in the navy for financial reward.⁷⁷⁶ While these debates focus on the defections of *xenoi*, financial motives were as important for the Athenians and metics as they were for foreign mercenaries, and so it should not be assumed that only the later group would desert the fleet when pay was not forthcoming.⁷⁷⁷ Some of the *xenoi* would have some tricky decisions to make, and no doubt there were many desertion and defections. For those of the crewmen whose cities had ceded from Athens, their devotion to her people and her fleet must already have been challenged, even before the (crucial) consideration of pay was added to the mix; the *stratiotai* in this period were “providing for themselves” and not receiving pay.⁷⁷⁸ There would have been many who felt some sense of community with their crewmates and wished to stay on at Samos with them. Doubtless one of the purposes in getting *all* the members of the expedition to swear the oaths was to make individuals in such a dilemma nail their colours to the mast; there can be no doubt, though, that many deserted. Despite the uniting the Samos fleet by these oaths with the military-aged men of Samos, and the gradual acquiring of new vessels through capture, the Samos fleet does not appear to grow significantly in terms of the number of active vessels afloat. The subsequent drop-off in numbers on active duty throughout this period, despite the Samians joining the *stratopedon* and the new acquisitions of ships, seems to suggest that large numbers deserted or defected.⁷⁷⁹ It seems reasonable to argue that the numbers of non-Athenians deserting Samos would have been significantly higher than those of the Athenians and metics, though they should not be totally exempted from abandoning their fleet. If this was the case, it would have left the remaining *stratopedon* consequently more ‘Athenian’ in character.

It was clearly recognized in the first Assembly of the fleet democracy that maintaining the ships was the key to winning out against both the 400 and the Peloponnesians. It was because “they

⁷⁷⁵ Thucydides, 8.75.5

⁷⁷⁶ See the discussion of this issue in Part One, section c.1 and Part Three, section 2

⁷⁷⁷ This is of course the assumption that Pericles made, in his pre-war speech to the Athenian Assembly; Thucydides, 1.143.1. But at this period in history, with the Athenians Phrynichus and Alcibiades as two of the principal characters, we should be careful in ascribing absolute loyalty to the Athenians on Samos. It may be hard to believe that many would defect to the other side; but many surely deserted at this time, either because they weren't getting paid, they thought they would be defeated (a not unreasonable assumption), or they were worried about their families in Athens and wished to return.

⁷⁷⁸ Thucydides, 8.76.6 *autoi eporizonto hoi stratiôtai*

⁷⁷⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.13 reports that the “whole fleet” numbered 86 ships in 410 BC, less than the number divided between the commanders at Samos a year earlier (Thucydides, 8.30), which was less in turn than the total number of ship reported by Thucydides as active in the region of Ionia in that period.

had the whole fleet” that they would be able to exact tribute from the cities,⁷⁸⁰ and “because they had the ships” that they could secure resources.⁷⁸¹ Given the central importance of the fleet, it seems singularly unlikely that the Athenians would have been able to exclude the skilled and experienced non-Athenian citizen members of the naval crews from participating in the new democracy, even if they had wanted to. In the immediate context, where the *stratiotai* were “providing for themselves” and any future money would be dependent on a strong navy, and with the Peloponnesians looking a better prospect for winning the war and providing steady pay, any attempt at excluding non-Athenians would surely have led them to defect at once.⁷⁸²

While it is true that all the leaders we know of were Athenians, it is also the case that we only know the names of two elected at this Assembly. A third Athenian is added later, if we include the exile Alcibiades. While we may fairly regard him as an Athenian general, his citizenship status at this point was emphatically ambiguous; he was an exile from Athens who had campaigned with the Spartans and was then intriguing with the Persians. Citizenship status was not likely to have been of primary concern in the election of any of the fleet’s generals. If the *stratiotai* were looking for competent commanders and staunch democrats without the taint of collusion with the oligarchs, they could have found many amongst the Athenians. The Delian League provided a precedent for a diverse ‘multi-national’ organization with exclusively Athenian leadership. The fact that the generals we know about were Athenian does not in any way prove, or even indicate, that the people who elected them were necessarily all Athenian.

The idea of a widened franchise along the lines of the Samos fleet democracy, far from being unthinkable, was being aired in Athens just prior to these events in 411 BC. Aristophanes voiced such a view at exactly the time as the oligarchic conspiracy was plotting to narrow it. In somewhat enigmatic terms, Aristophanes has the eponymous heroine of his play *Lysistrata* advocate adding into the citizen body the metics, foreigners who were useful to Athens, and the people of Ionian cities, believed to have been colonists of Athens; using the metaphor of making wool, Lysistrata explains how women were able to handle the city’s affairs, and the policies she would pursue:

eita xainein es kalathiskon koinên eunoian, hapantas katamignuntas tous te metoikous kei tis xenos ê philos humin, kei tis opheilei tôi dêmosiôî, kai toutous enkatameixai: kai nê Dia tas ge poleis, hoposai tês gês tês d' eisin apoikoi, diagignôskein hoti tauth' hêmin hôsper ta katagmata keitai chôris hekaston: kait' apo toutôn pantôn to katagma labontas deuro xunagein kai sunathroixein eis hen, kapeita poiêsai tolupên megalên kait' ek tautês tôi dêmôi chlainan huphênai

⁷⁸⁰ Thucydides, 8.76.4 *echontôn gar sphôn to pan nautikon*

⁷⁸¹ Thucydides, 8.76.4 *sphis echontes tas naus*

⁷⁸² It is likely even that a blind eye would have been turned to “independent” slaves (by this I mean those whose masters were not present with them on Samos) who tried to attend the Assembly. If the examples of Decelea and Sicily are instructive here, though, it is probable that a lot of the slaves, even those with masters present, would have taken the opportunity to desert to the nearby Peloponnesian base.

Then card the wool into a work-basket of union and concord, mixing in everyone; and the immigrants, and any foreigner who's friendly to you, and anyone who's in debt to the treasury, they should be mixed in as well. And yes, there are also all the states that are colonies of this land: you should recognize how you now have them lying around like little flocks of wool, each one by itself; you should take the human flock of all of them, bring them together here and join them into one, and then make a great ball of wool, and from that weave a warm cloak for the people to wear.⁷⁸³

It was from the immigrants (*metics*), friendly foreigners and the Ionian 'colonies' of Athens that much of the manpower of the navy was drawn. The idea of enfranchising the naval crews specifically as a matter of general policy, including the slaves this time, was advocated by Aristophanes six years later, in the play *Frogs*.⁷⁸⁴

Conclusion

The precedent of military assemblies in which the generals addressed all their troops, and the implications of the more appropriate and wider translation of *stratiotai* in Thucydides, strongly suggests that the democracy on Samos was founded on the basis of participation of all the free people in the force. The foundation of this democracy was ritualized by the swearing of binding oaths on the part of "all the campaigners", along with the Samians of military age.⁷⁸⁵ Nothing contradicts the conclusion that the free crewmen of the triremes stationed on the island were participants in the Samos fleet democracy. The positive evidence is not conclusive, but it is certainly more likely than the prevailing assumption that the Samos fleet democracy was an Athenian-only affair. Thucydides' reporting of the fleet does suggest (as we would expect) that the Athenian presence in this multi-national mix was far the strongest. The idea of such a wider enfranchisement, far from being unthinkable, was being floated in Athens just prior to these events, and was to become active policy later in the war in relation to both the Samians and the naval crews. The principal difference between the situation of the Samos fleet of 411 BC and that of the city in 406 BC was that, in the latter's more desperate situation, the franchise was extended to slaves as well as non-citizen free men.

2: The Operation of the Samos Fleet Democracy

While broadly chronological in its approach, this section inevitably falls short of a full history of the fleet between 411 and 407 BC, and the intrinsically related subjects of the 5,000 at Athens, the restoration of democracy there, and the prosecution of the Ionian war. It is rather an attempt to highlight several issues connected with the political operation of the fleet in this period and to examine those features of the fleet's political activity which caused Thucydides to describe it as a democracy.⁷⁸⁶ Two features of the fleet's democracy can be listed at once; the use of mass

⁷⁸³ Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, ll. 579-86

⁷⁸⁴ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, ll. 702

⁷⁸⁵ Thucydides, 8.75.2-3

⁷⁸⁶ Aside from the extent of participation, discussed in the previous section.

assemblies to make decisions and the election of military leaders. In addition, this section will examine the issue of the fleet's relations with the city of Athens and its various governments.⁷⁸⁷ It almost goes without saying that the state of the evidence allows us to ask questions and make speculation, but rarely affords us concrete answers and strong conclusions.

Deposing *Stratego*

In its first Assembly, sometime in the summer of 411 BC, the Samos fleet democracy "deposed their former generals, and those of the trierarchs who were suspected, and selected other generals and trierarchs".⁷⁸⁸ This statement has not received the attention it deserves. Does it entitle us to assume that all ten Athenian generals elected for the year 412/11 BC were deposed at this time? As a practical matter, those of the generals who were not in Samos at the time were probably not deposed by the new democracy and retained their commands. But if this is so, can we presume that the Samos fleet elected ten generals? Or would it be better to assume that they elected one new general for each one deposed? Needless to say, the evidence is not full enough to permit certainty on these points, but they should still be addressed and discussed.

It is often remarked upon that Leon and Diomedon, two generals in Samos at this time and staunch democrats, lost out at this election.⁷⁸⁹ The evidence for this statement is their disappearance from the narrative at this point. It so happens that we know the names of at least eight of the generals serving in this year, and to a limited extent it is possible to trace the locations of most of them at the point the Samos fleet broke from the city.⁷⁹⁰ They nearly all disappear from the narrative after this point, and the exception, Strombichides, should caution us from the assumption that the entire college of 412 BC was deposed on the vote of the Samos Assembly. Can we be more exact about which of "their generals" were removed from command?

Three of the named generals of 412/11 BC, Leon, Diomedon and Charminos, were certainly on Samos when the fleet broke from Athens.⁷⁹¹ One was certainly *not* on Samos; Strombichides, who will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph, was in the Hellespont, based probably at Sestos. The information regarding the other seven generals of this year is less certain.⁷⁹²

⁷⁸⁷ See Andrewes' reconstruction ('Athenian generals', p. 2-9), which argues for some degree of political division between the city and the fleet, and contrast that of Kagan, (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 265 ff.) who suggests a far more harmonious relationship.

⁷⁸⁸ Thucydides, 8.76.2

⁷⁸⁹ Andrewes, *HCT*, ad loc 8.76

⁷⁹⁰ Develin (*Athenian Officials*, pp. 157-8) Fornara (*Generals*, p. 66) list the same 10 names under 412/1 BC. Not all of these men were generals in the summer of 411 BC. Jordan's argument (*Athenian Navy*, p. 127, cf. Part Two, section A.5 and Appendix 1) that Diomedon and Leon became *stratego* only upon replacing Phrynichus and Skironides, and that their command up until this point was as *nauarchoi*, is persuasive. If one does not follow this argument, then Leon and Diomedon must be considered full *stratego* for the year, and hence we know the names of all ten originally elected. In this case, two (unknown) new people were presumably elected at Athens after the deposing of Phrynichus and Skironides to make the college up to 10. For the purposes of the discussion here, though, it makes little difference, as there is no indication that these generals went to Samos.

⁷⁹¹ Thucydides, 8.74-5

⁷⁹² One uncertainty is caused by the epigraphic testimony at this time for officers called *archon t on n autikon*; commanders of fleets who appear not to be members of the 10-man strategic college. Therefore, in cases where an

Onamakiles and Euctemon, who had been besieging Chios in 412 BC, presumably fled when the siege was broken.⁷⁹³ It is likely that this Onomakles was a member of the 400, making a return to Athens prior to the fleet's defection probable, and an appearance in Samos at this time unlikely.⁷⁹⁴ There is no indication where Euctemon and the remaining eight ships went, but Samos is the most likely destination.⁷⁹⁵ Thrasykles was named sailing for Miletus in the summer of 412 BC;⁷⁹⁶ he is not named thereafter, but it is likely that he and the ships he commanded were pooled at Samos later that year along with the rest of the fleets in the region, and that he was one of the leaders on the island until 411 BC. The generalship of Eucrates, and its concern with the Thracian region, are both inferred from Aristophanes;⁷⁹⁷ it is uncertain where he was in the summer of 411 BC. Diitrephes, elected general under the 400, is reported as taking command of the Thracian region in summer 411 BC; Fornara suggests that he took up his command, under the auspices of the oligarchs, before his due time, and if this is correct it seems likely that he deposed Eucrates by doing so.⁷⁹⁸ Of the two remaining generals needed to make up the ten, it is not unlikely that one held command at Naupactos.⁷⁹⁹ Though there is no explicit evidence of an Athenian commander there at this time, there is evidence for a fleet there in 413 BC and then again in 410/9 BC, it is not unlikely that a force was based there in the interim.⁸⁰⁰ As for the final general, there is no evidence at all to suggest where he might have served, but it is likely, given the Spartan presence in Decelea, that he was stationed in Athens. Indeed, a single general in the city may be considered an absolute minimum, given the extent and proximity of the threat.⁸⁰¹ It is almost definite that there were five Athenian generals on Samos at the time that the fleet broke away from the city.⁸⁰² It is certain that these generals were deposed by the fleet, but the other half of the strategic college of 412/1 BC probably continued in their posts. Indeed the only one of these remaining generals that Thucydides mentions by name, Strombichides, seems to have remained in command.

Strombichides' Generalship in 411 BC

The case of Strombichides is interesting. He arrived, with two other generals, at Samos in the winter of 412 BC. He was therefore part of the gathering of the Samos fleet, and its division

individual is not explicitly described as a *strategos*, it is uncertain whether they should be considered as 'true' generals, or as other types of elected commander. I discuss these officers in Part Two, section A.5

⁷⁹³ Thucydides 8.63 They are both mentioned at 8.30 when they were despatched with Strombichides to attack Chios, and not named thereafter. It seems certain, though, that when Strombichides took a detachment of ships from Chios to the Hellespont, he left these two generals at Chios commanding the remainder.

⁷⁹⁴ He later became a member of the Thirty. See *HCT* ad loc 8.25.1

⁷⁹⁵ Thucydides, 8.63; given the threatening moves of the Peloponnesian fleet towards the Athenian base at Samos, it is likely that Euctemon's force fled there, to protect itself and reinforce their allies.

⁷⁹⁶ Thucydides, 8.17

⁷⁹⁷ Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, l. 103

⁷⁹⁸ Thucydides, 8.64, Fornara, *Generals*, p. 66

⁷⁹⁹ Andrewes (*HCT*, ad loc 8.13, cf. 8.54.3) suggests that Hippokles was in command of the Naupactos fleet in 412/11 BC, but points out correctly that he need not have been a *strategos*.

⁸⁰⁰ See the case study above, Part One, section B.3

⁸⁰¹ *HCT*, ad loc 8.54 states that "Athens needed three generals at home". There is no evidence to support this assertion, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the Athenians would want some *stratego*i at home in this period. Thus if we relegate any of the generals discussed above (the Naupactos commander in particular) to archons, freeing up a place on the strategic college for 412/1 BC it is reasonable to suggest that these people were likely to be in Athens, and not Samos.

⁸⁰² Leon, Diomedon, Charmios for certain; Thrasykles and Euctemon virtually certain.

anew amongst the commanders that winter. He was despatched, with around 35 ships⁸⁰³ and two colleagues, Euctemon and Onomacles, to continue the siege of Chios.⁸⁰⁴ The fleet took part in various operations before it reached Chios, during which none of the three generals are mentioned by name. The following year, in the spring of 412 BC, Strombichides alone led 24 ships to the Hellespont, took Lampsacus and then based himself at Sestos, in order to “watch and guard” the entrance to the Hellespont.⁸⁰⁵ Strombichides was still stationed there when the political turmoil enveloped Athens and the Samos fleet.

Strombichides is next mentioned in the context of the first military actions undertaken by the Samos fleet democracy. The Athenian fleet refused battle with the Peloponnesians who had sailed out from Miletus to challenge them, on the grounds that they were awaiting reinforcements from Strombichides, to whom they had sent a despatch.⁸⁰⁶ These ships, and their leader, duly arrived the next day. Strombichides reunited with the Samos fleet, and the entire force put out to challenge the Peloponnesians, who, now outnumbered, refused battle in turn. The first point to make is that Strombichides is quite clearly in command of his ships *after* the fleet Assembly’s first meeting. This suggests that Strombichides, despite being a general of the Samos fleet, was not one of “their generals” who was deposed.⁸⁰⁷

However, it is also clear that these confrontations took place very soon, a matter of days, after the elections;⁸⁰⁸ if the fleet had decided to depose Strombichides, they would not have had a chance to tell him so, and in the light of the Peloponnesian attack and the need for his aid, they would have been wise to reconsider. But there is no suggestion of this in Thucydides’ narrative. It appears that, finding themselves in trouble, the leaders of the Samos fleet sent to an Athenian general for help. The messenger (and the crew of his ship) can hardly have concealed the events at Samos and the changes in leadership there, and given this it is significant that Strombichides responded so readily. Notwithstanding the fact that the Peloponnesian fleet was a clear, present and common foe, Strombichides appears to have accepted the decision of the Samos fleet, and to work with the new leaders.⁸⁰⁹ After his return to Samos and rejoining the fleet, Strombichides disappeared from the historical record of the war.⁸¹⁰ Could this suggest that he too was deposed and replaced? Perhaps, but it seems more likely that, given the fragmentary state of even

⁸⁰³ Thucydides (8.30) says 30 ships, and then adds some troop carriers. I have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that there were about five such vessels, a reasonable number to help carry the 1,000 soldiers listed.

⁸⁰⁴ Thucydides, 8.30

⁸⁰⁵ Thucydides, 8.62

⁸⁰⁶ Thucydides, 8.79

⁸⁰⁷ Thucydides’ language at 8.76, which indicates that generals and trierarchs were deposed and *others* were chosen to replace them, seems to exclude the possibility that Strombichides was deposed, only to be re-elected straight away in his absence.

⁸⁰⁸ The Peloponnesians decide to attack because of the turmoil in Samos; having learnt this, the Athenians send to Strombichides. Thucydides, 8.79

⁸⁰⁹ An alternative reconstruction, that Strombichides was relieved of command on his return to Samos and his ships were simply added to the fleet which put out for Miletus without their former commander; it is not explicitly stated who took the fleet to Miletus, but the tone of the narrative certainly suggests co-operation on the part of Strombichides and the Samos generals.

⁸¹⁰ Strombichides is not mentioned in again until Lysias, 13.13, in which he was protesting to the Theramenes regarding the peace negotiated with Sparta in 403 BC.

Thucydides' testimony, Strombichides joined the Samos fleet democracy and his actions were simply recorded with those of the "other generals" who played second-fiddle to Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus, and later, Alcibiades.

The Samos Fleet's Generals

Having deposed these (probably) five generals, whom did the Samos fleet elect? There is no basis to assume, as Fornara does, that ten were elected,⁸¹¹ a preferable assumption is that the fleet elected one general for each that they deposed, but in fact there is little evidence to assume any particular number. Thucydides names only two, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, but it is clear that there were more.⁸¹² By 409 BC, there were at least five generals. Diodorus speaks of "Athenian generals at Sestos"⁸¹³ at a time when Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were all elsewhere;⁸¹⁴ as Alcibiades was elected only after his recall, this suggests that at least four generals were elected by the first fleet Assembly. It is very likely that Chareas of the trireme *Paralos*, whose reports from Athens sparked the split in the first place, and who was later to be found in command of troops at the battle of Cyzicus,⁸¹⁵ was elected at this time.

Aside from the 'supplementary' election of the recalled Alcibiades, there is no other election or re-election of leaders mentioned in the sources; given the continued leadership of Alcibiades, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus until their return to Athens, it seems safest to assume that there were no other 'formal' elections. The case of Alcibiades may suggest that the generals of the fleet did not have to stand for regular re-election. As has been discussed above, Alcibiades' recall to the fleet and subsequent election was based largely on his supposed closeness to the Persians, and his promise to secure an alliance with (and thus bring money from) the Great King. His capture while attempting to negotiate with Tissaphernes following the battle of Abydos, and his untroubled resumption of command following his escape, perhaps indicates that Alcibiades and the other generals did not face regular re-election and votes before an Assembly. This is not an inevitable conclusion, however. Alcibiades' ability to influence a crowd was considerable, and he could perhaps have won re-election despite this blow to his credibility. After all he could (and no doubt did) present himself as the man who 'saved the day' at the battle of Abydos, arriving in the nick of time to rescue a doomed situation. It could also have been the case that his leadership, diplomatic abilities and generalship, over and above his supposed influence in Persia, were considered by the fleet to be indispensable. Whatever can be drawn from this particular

⁸¹¹ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 67 presumes Alcibiades to be the fleet's eleventh general. That the Samos fleet claim to follow the "laws of their fathers" is not to be taken literally, and so should not be pressed to suggest that, like the city, the fleet would elect a college of ten.

⁸¹² Thucydides (8.76) says that Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were "amongst those" chosen as generals, implying obviously that at least one more man was elected.

⁸¹³ Diodorus, 13.49.2. One of these generals was surely Chareas. It is possible that Strombichides was also here. If so, and if there were only these two generals in Sestos at this time, then there need only have been three generals (Chareas, Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus) elected at the first Assembly.

⁸¹⁴ At Athens, Thrace and Lesbos respectively.

⁸¹⁵ Diodorus, 13.50

episode, there is no evidence that the fleet's Assembly held any further election of leaders after putting affairs in Alcibiades' hands in 411 BC.

If this was indeed the case, it is inevitable to assume that any named individual found in command of the Samos fleet between 411 and 407 BC was elected at this first meeting. Chareas has been mentioned already. The only other commander explicitly named who may have been elected by the fleet is Eumachos. He is first mentioned as taking command of the Hellespont tollhouse with Theramenes following the victory at Cyzicus.⁸¹⁶ However, as Theramenes was not elected by the fleet but by the city, it is possible that his colleague here too was a general of Athens.⁸¹⁷ There is of course no certainty regarding these issues, and it highlights some of the practical difficulties surrounding the deceptively simple action of the Samos fleet in deposing its generals and electing new ones.⁸¹⁸

The Fleet's Assemblies

Having elected its leaders, Thucydides reports that many in the Assembly made encouraging speeches. In indirect speech, he records the essence of these comments, some of which I have already referred to above;⁸¹⁹ the power of the fleet in relation to the city was stressed, and its ability to provide resources for itself; the relative weakness of Athens; Samos' strength and its position controlling sea routes to the Piraeus; as mentioned earlier, the appeal to the "ancestral constitution" and independence of the fleet in terms of leadership and money; the fleet's likelihood to win over Alcibiades, and thus Persia. The restoring of the democracy was referred to twice; the fleet would be better able to restrict the Athenians at home from the sea, if the constitution (*ten politeian*) was not restored; they would preserve the 'ancestral constitution' (*tous patrious nomous*), and persuade the oligarch to do so as well.⁸²⁰ The final conclusion is that, if the worst came to the worst, the fleet could sail off and find a new city and territory elsewhere.⁸²¹ This Assembly, then, can be viewed as the fleet coming to terms with the gravity of its actions. While the possibility of reconciliation is expressed, the fleet is also defiant and confident of its independent strength. The city might need the fleet, but the fleet certainly did not need the city.

⁸¹⁶ Xenophon, 1.1.22

⁸¹⁷ On the other side of the argument, if there was some degree of tension between the fleet and the city, having one general from each 'faction' to control this vital outpost might have represented a reasonable compromise. But see Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p.4 n. 13 of the slight epigraphic case for making Eumachos Theramenes' colleague.

⁸¹⁸ It should be noted that some trierarchs were removed from their posts and replaced at this time; there are no details about who was selected. The only named trierarch of this period is Thrasybulus, who was elected as a general at this time. Perhaps Charias of the *Paralos* was that ship's trierarch; it is not certain whether these men continued captaining their ships as well as their duties as *strategoí*. Given that Charias appears later commanding infantry, it is perhaps most likely that replacement trierarchs were selected.

⁸¹⁹ Thucydides, 8.76

⁸²⁰ Thucydides, 8.76.5-6

⁸²¹ cf. similar likening of cosmopolitan military expeditions to cities by Nicias on Sicily (Thucydides, 7.77), and Xenophon in relation to the Ten Thousand (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 6.5-6).

The second Assembly described by Thucydides has the Samos fleet, on Thrasybulus' motion, vote for the recall of Alcibiades.⁸²² No details are given about the arguments deployed, but we can guess that the views expressed in the first Assembly sum up the 'for' argument; against the prospect of money from the King, suspicion of Alcibiades for his collusion with Sparta, accusations of his impiety and his role in the setting up of the 400 in Athens would have been more than enough to instil doubt. Thucydides seems to suggest that in meetings prior to this one Thrasybulus had failed to win his point.⁸²³ This indicates not only an Assembly that met with some regularity, but also one which was strong, vocal and not prepared (at this stage) to sheepishly follow the views of its most prominent leader.

Shortly after, another Assembly was held, at which Alcibiades presented himself. Having made his case with some eloquence (and much exaggeration of his influence with the Persians), Alcibiades was elected as general, and "matters were put into his hands".⁸²⁴ Interpretation of the strength of this phrase varies; it may suggest that Alcibiades became formally the Commander-in-Chief of the Samos fleet, or on a moderate view, that Thucydides was commenting only on the *de facto* position of Alcibiades as a leading player in the direction of affairs.

The fourth and last reported Assembly held by the Samos fleet was convened in response to the arrival of ambassadors from the 400, which has been discussed above.⁸²⁵ It appears that on this occasion the fleet's Assembly was still very vocal and strong; first of all they shouted down the ambassadors, and even after they were persuaded to listen they were not moved, and they put forward various proposals for action. Thucydides details only one of these; the proposal, probably made by the Athenians in the Assembly, to attack Athens itself.

Insofar as we can characterize the Samos fleet and its policies from these brief accounts of its meetings, Thucydides gives the impression of a dynamic and forceful Assembly, with a large number of speakers participating in robust debates. Until Alcibiades' election, the generals seem to have played a leading, but far from dominant, role in the assemblies. With regard to policy, the Samos fleet seems to have instinctively favoured direct and violent actions. Just prior to the first Assembly, the *stratiotai* called for the immediate stoning of those responsible for the change of government in Athens, and had to be restrained.⁸²⁶ A similar call was made at the fourth Assembly. Twice the Assembly advocated sailing to Athens to attack the 400;⁸²⁷ on both occasions, Alcibiades persuaded the Assembly to reconsider. It is in relation to the second of these occasions that Thucydides praised Alcibiades lavishly:

⁸²² Thucydides, 8.81

⁸²³ Thucydides, 8.81.1 describes Thrasybulus as "finally succeeding in a meeting to persuade the majority", which implies, though does not require, previous unsuccessful meetings.

⁸²⁴ Thucydides, 8.82

⁸²⁵ Thucydides, 8.86.4-5

⁸²⁶ Thucydides, 8.75

⁸²⁷ Thucydides, 8.82 (third meeting); 8.86 (fourth meeting).

kai dokei Alkibiadês prôton tote kai oudenos elasson tèn polin ôphelêsai... kai en tôi tote allos men oud' an heis hikanos egeneto kataschein ton ochlon, ekeinos de tou t' epiplou epause

For the first time, Alcibiades did the state a service, one that was unsurpassed...And at that moment, when no other man would have had the power to hold back the mob, he put a stop to the intended expedition.⁸²⁸

Andrewes remarks that it is “odd that the second report takes no notice at all of the earlier occasion”,⁸²⁹ suggesting that the Assembly at this point was more angry and dangerous than the previous occasion. Doubtless this was the case, but is also worth noting that this is the *last* time that the idea of the fleet sailing to attack Athens is mentioned. Of course, given the fact that Thucydides’ narrative ends shortly after this point with no more assemblies reported, and neither Xenophon nor Diodorus report any, there is no obvious context for such a view to have been voiced. But Alcibiades’ speech to the delegates following this seems to have tried to take the first steps towards an eventual reconciliation, and thus what Thucydides is surely highlighting is Alcibiades ending *permanently* the wish of the fleet to attack the city, and the beginning of more harmonious relations. It is on this specific occasion, therefore, that Alcibiades deserved high praise.

It has been noted above that Xenophon’s narrative of the fleet makes no mention of assemblies. The generals, and especially Alcibiades, seem to have taken all of the major decisions themselves. This appears to contrast with the impression given by Thucydides, who reports on four specific meetings in the space of some ten chapters and perhaps suggests that there were others, portraying a frequently convened and very strong Assembly. It could be argued that this is indicative of the inferior quality of Xenophon’s reporting, focusing on the major players and crediting them with taking decisions that in fact were reached by debate and consensus. However, the impression given by Xenophon should not be dismissed outright. Even on the mildest interpretation, Thucydides’ narrative seems to suggest that Alcibiades had a predominant role from the time he was elected onwards. Having persuaded the Assembly from its disastrous course of action in the fourth Assembly, Alcibiades seems to take it upon himself to answer the ambassadors from Athens on behalf of the fleet.⁸³⁰ Shortly after this meeting, the 5,000 in Athens sent ambassadors “to the fleet and to Alcibiades”; a single delegation, but one which seems to emphasize Alcibiades’ importance.⁸³¹ This compares to a later episode in Xenophon’s narrative, where Alcibiades’ presence was required to satisfactorily conclude a treaty with the Persians, despite the fact other fleet commanders had all agreed to it beforehand.⁸³² Both episodes indicate Alcibiades’ prominence in the fleet’s leadership, and also the separateness of

⁸²⁸ Thucydides, 8.86. The exact translation, and thus extent of the praise given is debated, but the nuances matter little in to this discussion.

⁸²⁹ *HCT*, ad loc 8.86.4, p. 286-7.

⁸³⁰ Thucydides, 8.86.6, and *HCT* ad loc (p. 288) “the wording...makes this very much the personal answer of Alkibiades”

⁸³¹ Thucydides, 8.97.3 and *HCT* ad loc (p. 340) “Thucydides need not mean two separate messages, but the language comes near to treating Alcibiades as a power separate from the fleet”

⁸³² Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.3.8 cf. Diodorus, 13.66, Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades*, 31.

his status. While it is by no means unlikely that there were further meetings of the fleet's Assembly which Xenophon does not report, it is also not unlikely, nor inconsistent with Thucydides, that Alcibiades dominated proceedings to the extent that policies and actions could be fairly ascribed to him personally. One is reminded of Thucydides' verdict on Periclean Athens; it was called a democracy, but it was controlled by its first citizen.⁸³³

The City and the Fleet

The status of Alcibiades as almost a separate power from the rest of the fleet and its leaders is an important point to bear in mind when considering the extent to which the fleet operated independently and its relations with Athens.⁸³⁴ The degree and nature of the division that existed between the two is a difficult and complex issue. A good starting point for this discussion is the claim of the Samos fleet Assembly (as written by Thucydides), that a city controls a force principally by providing leadership and money.⁸³⁵ Applying these two criteria to the Samos fleet between 411 and 407 BC implies, at first glance, that it was indeed separate from the city. Most of the generals leading the fleet, particularly Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, held their commands on the authority of their election by the men of the fleet alone. Strategic decisions and military plans seem to have been made by these generals, independent of the political rulers in Athens, whether the 400, the 5000 or the restored democracy. What is more, the members of the expedition, who were "providing for themselves" in 411 BC,⁸³⁶ and appear to have received no money from Athens during their campaigns.⁸³⁷ Alcibiades' status as an exile, and his nervousness about his return to Athens in 407 BC,⁸³⁸ certainly suggest that relations before this time of reconciliation were somewhat strained. But the roles of the generals Strombichides, and particularly Theramenes and Thrasyllus, suggest a closer relationship between the city and the fleet, and there is some evidence of money flowing from places that the fleet controlled back to the city, and from the city to some of the fleet's operations.

The division between the fleet and Athens under the 400 was total. To be enemies of the 400 was amongst the solemn oaths sworn by all the *stratiotai* immediately prior to their break from the city, and the mood of the first meeting of the fleet democracy was defiant and aggressive to the oligarchy. The bitterness of the sentiment in the fleet was demonstrated by their hostile and near-violent reception of the 400's ambassadors, whom had already delayed their appearance before the fleet for fear of reprisals. But even in the first Assembly, it is clear that the fleet envisaged reconciliation with the city; by their breaking from Athens, and through superior access to resources and control of the sea routes to Piraeus, the fleet intended to compel the oligarchs to

⁸³³ Thucydides, 2.65

⁸³⁴ The essential work in this topic is Andrewes, 'The Generals in the Hellespont 410-407 BC'

⁸³⁵ Thucydides, 8.76

⁸³⁶ Thucydides, 8.76

⁸³⁷ The epigraphic testimony for the separate finances of the city and the fleet is discussed by Andrewes ('Generals in the Hellespont', pp. 5 ff.), and argues (p.6) that "they [the Hellespontine generals] were acting independently of the financial system which covered Athens, Eretria, Pylos and Samos...[they] did not send their accounts to Athens"

⁸³⁸ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.4.10

preserve the “laws of their fathers”, as they themselves claimed to be doing.⁸³⁹ The fleet’s determination to sail off and find other cities and lands is a sign of their confidence and independence, but it is advocated only as a last resort, if their other objectives fail. The division, then, was not so much between Athens and the fleet as between the oligarchy and the fleet. This is made clear by Alcibiades, in his reply to the ambassadors of the 400. Alcibiades’ words to the delegates marked the first stage in the complicated series of interactions between the fleet and the city:⁸⁴⁰

autos de apokrinamenos autois apepempen, hoti tous men pentakischiliou ou kôluoi archein, tous mentoi tetrakosious apallassein ekeleuen autous kai kathistanai tèn boulèn hôsper kai proteron, tous pentakosious: ei de es euteleian ti xuntetmêtai hôste tous strateuomenous mallon echein trophên, panu epainein. kai talla ekeleuen antechein kai mêden endidonai tois polemiois: pros men gar sphas autous sôizomenês tês poleôs pollên elpida einai kai xumbênai, ei de hapax to heteron sphalêsetai, ê to en Samôi ê ekeinoi, oud' hotôi diallagêsetai tis eti esesthai.

He [Alcibiades] dismissed them [the ambassadors] with an answer from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government of the 5,000, but insisted that the 400 should be deposed and the *boule* of 500 reinstated in power: he was entirely in favour of any measures of economy which would result in better pay for the campaigners; and in general he urged them to hold fast and make no concessions to the enemy, saying that, so long as the city was preserved, there were good hopes of some kind of agreement being reached between the two parties, whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos, or that over there [i.e. Athens], there would no longer be any one to be reconciled to.⁸⁴¹

While it was recognized that the fleet and the city were most defiantly independent of one another and any reconciliation would be for the future, the two had a common enemy. Neither would be served by the other’s destruction. It is this answer which indeed precipitated the downfall of the 400, and began the process of reconciliation between fleet and city.

After the removal of the 400, the principal issue dividing the city and the fleet, better relations between the two might have been expected. However, the 400 were not replaced by the “laws of their fathers”, but by another, albeit wider, oligarchy. Although Alcibiades had suggested acceptance of the 5,000, they could not assume this, especially as they did not restore, as Alcibiades had suggested they should, the democratic *boule*.⁸⁴² According to Thucydides, the Athenians still considered the Samos fleet “in revolt” in this period.⁸⁴³ They therefore sent diplomats to “the fleet and Alcibiades”.⁸⁴⁴ These messengers were to report the offer to recall Alcibiades and “others with him”, and to persuade them to take a hand in matters.

⁸³⁹ Thucydides, 8.76.

⁸⁴⁰ Thucydides, 8.86

⁸⁴¹ Thucydides, 8.86.6-7

⁸⁴² Thucydides, 8.86

⁸⁴³ Thucydides, 8.96.1

⁸⁴⁴ Thucydides, 8.97

Thucydides' narrative ends before the arrival of these messengers, and there is no direct indication of the reception they received from Alcibiades and the fleet. However, as will be detailed below, Xenophon seems to assume an improvement in relations between the fleet and the city. While it is true that the two were not totally reconciled, and were for example operating somewhat separate financial systems,⁸⁴⁵ Xenophon's narrative shows there was much co-operation between the forces of city and the fleet. This impression could be the result of Xenophon's oversimplification of a complex relationship; no doubt this is the case to some extent, but Thucydides' narrative provides a reasonable foundation to expect the type of co-operation we find in Xenophon.

If then, as is likely, the ambassadors from the 5,000 received a favourable response from the fleet, it is somewhat surprising that Alcibiades did not return to Athens until 407 BC, and was clearly an exile at that time. But it is likely that the democracy, which succeeded the 5,000 in summer 410 BC, would not have honoured the offer of recall made by the 5,000.⁸⁴⁶ This could well be so, but it does not explain why Alcibiades, in the nine months of the 5000's rule, appears not to have accepted their offer. This is a significant fact which argues for some degree of separation and suspicion still existing between Alcibiades and the governments of the city. Despite this, though, there is clear and consistent evidence of close co-operation between the forces of the city and those of the fleet democracy.

Thucydides' narrative describes the first stages of regular diplomatic exchanges between the two. Following the battle of Cynossema, a ship was sent to Athens to report the victory, raising morale in the city.⁸⁴⁷ Some months later, following the victory at Abydos, another messenger is sent to the city. On this occasion the envoy was the general Thrasyllus, and as well as reporting the victory, he requested reinforcements from the city, still ruled at this time by the 5,000.⁸⁴⁸ Thrasyllus, on the most likely chronology,⁸⁴⁹ remained in Athens for an extremely long time before bringing these new forces,⁸⁵⁰ but a fleet under the leadership of Theramenes was despatched from Athens soon after, and perhaps in response to, Thrasyllus' arrival.⁸⁵¹ According to Diodorus, Theramenes' mission took him to Paros, where he overthrew an oligarchy, extorted money from the oligarchs, and restored democracy. As well as being lucrative, Kagan is no doubt correct to interpret this action as an attempt to establish "his own and the Five Thousand's credentials in the eyes of the Athenian democrats both at Athens and with the fleet in the

⁸⁴⁵ Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p. 6

⁸⁴⁶ Andrewes, *HCT* ad loc 8.96

⁸⁴⁷ Thucydides, 8.106.4-5

⁸⁴⁸ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.8

⁸⁴⁹ The principal points of which are admirably summed up by Andrewes ('Generals in the Hellespont', p. 2) as follows; "The battle of Kyzikos in March or April 410, Trasyllos' expedition to Ionia in summer 409, the recovery of Byzantium and Kalchedon in 408, Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407, the battle of Notion in 407 or early 406."

⁸⁵⁰ Thrasyllus arrived back in the Hellespont in the autumn of 409 BC, around two years after the victory at Abydos, towards the end of 411 BC.

⁸⁵¹ This suggestion is made by Kagan (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 234 n. 83), but admits the point is not certain. The launching of Theramenes' fleet is recorded by Diodorus, 13.47.6-8

Hellespont”.⁸⁵² As a leading member of the oligarchic conspiracy that established the 400, against which the members of the fleet swore enmity, it is easy to see why Theramenes would have been keen to present himself as a democrat. After this, Theramenes sailed to the north Aegean, where he joined with Thrasybulus and his money-collecting fleet.⁸⁵³ A fuller account of this meeting would no doubt be revealing.⁸⁵⁴ Both generals were to lead their forces to Cyzicus, and Theramenes joined the Samos fleet until its full reconciliation and return to Athens in 407 BC. It is unsure as to what conditions this co-operation came with, if any, but it certainly seems that the city and the fleet shared the fruits of the victory. Perhaps Theramenes placed his ships at the disposal of the Samos fleet and provided some money from the city, on condition that he shared command in the Hellespont,⁸⁵⁵ that the grain-route would be held open for Athens, and some of the spoils from the Hellespont campaigns would find their way to Athens to relieve the citizens of their tax burdens. This is no more than speculation, however; our sources present nothing more or less than full co-operation between the commanders and their forces at this time. Any differences or difficulties seem to have been resolved easily.

It is perhaps significant that the Athenians sent money to the fleets in this region at this time, suggesting a good deal of co-operation between the forces here.⁸⁵⁶ As has been noted above, no money from Athens was sent to the generals in the Hellespont; perhaps Alcibiades’ assumed presence there was a factor in this, but it is also unlikely that the city was able provide funds on the scale required by the extensive campaigns in the Hellespont, even if it had wanted to.⁸⁵⁷

These two generals then rejoined the main ‘Samos’ fleet, now in the Hellespont, and participated in the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 409 BC. The descriptions of this battle in both Diodorus and Xenophon (particularly in the Diodorus’ superior account) indicated a high degree of co-operation between all the commanders involved.⁸⁵⁸ Indeed, the strategy pursued in this battle demanded the fullest possible co-operation and co-ordination between the forces and commanders on the scene. There is no indication in the sources of any hostility between the generals or fleets at this stage, such as might be expected if the rift between the fleet and the city was still large and acrimonious. It seems to have been the case also that the spoils of this joint victory were shared between the fleet and the city. The toll-house and fleet established, under

⁸⁵² Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, pp. 234-5. It is notable that this author, who argues against (p. 265 ff.) serious political divisions between the fleet and the city, nevertheless sees the two as separate and distinct political entities.

⁸⁵³ Diodorus, 13.49.1-2

⁸⁵⁴ Xenophon’s account has no record of the generals meeting at this time; Theramenes is first mentioned at *Hellenica*, 1.1.12, bringing ships from Macedon to the Hellespont, arriving at the same time as Thrasybulus from Thrace.

⁸⁵⁵ It is worth noting that it is in this context that Diodorus, 13.49 describes Thrasybulus as “Commander in Chief” of the fleet. Perhaps Theramenes was required to submit to his overall command.

⁸⁵⁶ Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 6-7. The argument is principally based on two epigraphic texts, IG I² 108 and 301. Andrewes suggests that “This evidence shows that both Thrasybulus’ squadron and Athenians from the city [presumably under Theramenes] were active in the Thraceward region in these years, but does not quite permit us to disentangle the relations of the two parties...There can be no question here of competition between the city and Thrasybulos.”

⁸⁵⁷ Alcibiades was usually in the Hellespont in this period, though at the time Thrasybulus and Theramenes were operating in the north Aegean, Alcibiades was probably either in Persian captivity, or had just escaped it to Lesbos.

⁸⁵⁸ Diodorus, 13.50, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.15-22. Kagan (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 238-246) gives a good account of both the course of the battle and the descriptions of it in the sources.

Theramenes and Eumachos,⁸⁵⁹ provided money for both the fleet and the city, and allowed grain to pass from the Black Sea safely to Athens. This was surely not because there was now enough money to fully fund the Hellespont fleet, and the surplus was sent to Athens; money-collecting missions continued to be a feature of the fleet's activities until 407 BC. Indeed, on two of these occasions Diodorus cites relieving the Athenians from the burden of paying the *eisphora* as the motive for the mission.⁸⁶⁰ Andrewes suggests that the fleet "let the corn ships through to Athens, perhaps some revenue also" as a partly political gesture, foreshadowing a future reconciliation; he is surely correct in conceiving of the fleet and the city as having individual spheres of power, and they being separate, though allied, political entities.⁸⁶¹

Theramenes' joining of the fleet coincided with Thrasyllus' continued presence in Athens; it seems almost as if the city and the fleet exchanged one general for another. Thrasyllus' stay in Athens was long, and not without incident. He was in Athens when the Spartans offered peace, and for the subsequent fall of the 5,000.⁸⁶² He was presumably elected as general at some point, possibly under the restored democracy,⁸⁶³ or alternatively under the 5,000; in any event, when the Spartan army under Agis sallied out from Decelea to the walls of Athens in the summer of 410 BC, Thrasyllus was in command of the Athenian defence.⁸⁶⁴

While these events took place in Athens, Alcibiades, Theramenes and Thrasybulus (amongst others) remained in charge of the fleet. There is some question in modern scholarship over the formal legitimacy of these generalships at Athens, and whether these were 'irregular' commands. Fornara suggests that Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus all held "irregular" commands in this period, until the fleet returned to Athens and fresh elections were held.⁸⁶⁵ Andrewes similarly suggests that Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus were not elected in Athens when the democracy was restored and (in his view) held new elections, but that no attempt was made to remove them from their commands either, and they were allowed to continue in an unofficial capacity.⁸⁶⁶ Kagan is somewhat dismissive of this, stating (correctly) that there is no evidence of a re-election in 410 BC, that nothing would have been gained by labelling the Hellespont generals irregular, and that the possible offence of this could have brought the fleet down on Athens.⁸⁶⁷ It is certainly the case that, as a matter of practicality, the city could have done very little about who was commanding the fleet, even if it had wanted to. Kagan's interpretation seems to presume, without saying so directly, that the Hellespontine generals were 'officially' elected at Athens between 409 and 407 BC, presumably while they were still absent on

⁸⁵⁹ Xenophon, 1.1.22

⁸⁶⁰ Diodorus, 13.47 (Theramenes collecting booty from the islands); 13.64 (Alcibiades plundering the territory of Persian satrap Pharnabazus)

⁸⁶¹ 'Generals in the Hellespont', p. 5

⁸⁶² Kagan's view (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 253) that it was the divisive debate over the peace offer, rather than the fleet's victory at Cyzicus, that sparked the fall of the 5,000 seems sound.

⁸⁶³ McCoy, 'Thrasyllus', pp. 275-6

⁸⁶⁴ Thrasyllus' election; Agis' attack; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.33

⁸⁶⁵ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 68-9

⁸⁶⁶ Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p. 4.

⁸⁶⁷ *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 266-8

campaign. However, Xenophon's account seems to contradict this, as it suggests Alcibiades was not elected general in Athens until his return in 407 BC; ⁸⁶⁸ he was an exile up until this point, and as Andrewes argues, "the mere fact that he [Alcibiades] found reassurance in his election to the generalship...[of 407/6 BC]...shows he was not general before."⁸⁶⁹ Until he personally returned to Athens to face his countrymen, it is unlikely that any of the various governments of this time would have elected him to the generalship. Thrasybulus, the other significant commander who did not return to Athens prior to 407 BC, was also unlikely to have been elected in his absence.⁸⁷⁰ Unlike Alcibiades, he did not have the stigma of religious sacrilege and treason hanging over him. He was, however, Alcibiades' closest ally, and the most persistent advocate, with the city and the fleet, for his recall. It seems likely, therefore, that the Athenians did not elect either of these men, nor any of the other generals of the fleet who had not come back to Athens.⁸⁷¹ These generals had all the legitimacy they needed from their endorsement by the fleet, and the high level of co-operation with the city's generals does not indicate any jealousy between the commanders. If the restored democracy (as seems certain) annually elected ten generals, it would have been unwise of them to 'use up' at least three of the places in the strategic college each year on commanders over whom they had no control whatsoever, even if those commanders were currently acting in the city's interest. The cases of Thrasyllus and Theramenes were somewhat different, as both of these men were elected to the generalship at Athens. There would have been (at least in theory) some degree of control over their actions and input into their decisions, and both, to some extent at least, depended on funding from Athens.⁸⁷² Election of these two men in their absence would have been far easier for the Athenians to countenance than it would have been for Thrasybulus or especially Alcibiades. Whatever the degree of legitimacy regarding the generalships of these men in the debates of scholars, it seems not to have been an important issue with them or the forces under their command, and it is this co-operation between groups that could so easily have become opposed and squabbling factions that is the most important feature of this period.

Xenophon claims that in the wake of this victory over Agis the Athenians acceded to Thrasyllus' request for reinforcements for the Hellespont;⁸⁷³ whether there was a vote on the matter at this

⁸⁶⁸ *Hellenica*, 1.4.12. The speaker of Lysias 19 (*On the Property of Alcibiades*, 52) says that Alcibiades was general for four or five consecutive years, a testimony which must refer to this period and which Kagan (*Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 267) uses to suggest that there was no perception that Alcibiades' generalships were in any way irregular. Surely though this brief and inexact recollection of Alcibiades' military career should not be pressed in this way; the speaker need be indicating nothing more than the fact of Alcibiades' period of military significance. On whose mandate he held these generalships is not relevant to his point.

⁸⁶⁹ Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p.3

⁸⁷⁰ According to Diodorus, he had been the messenger who reported the victory of Cynossema, giving perhaps a context for him to be 'legitimized' as general. This is possible, and the fact that Thucydides (8.106) does not name the messenger, though he reports a trireme being sent back, cannot absolutely prove that Thrasybulus was not the messenger.

⁸⁷¹ Chareas, possibly Strombichides and Eumachos, and possibly some unknown individuals.

⁸⁷² As discussed above, Theramenes seems to have received funding until he took his ships to the Hellespont. Thrasyllus received large sums of money, which go through the books at Athens but are in fact received on campaign directly from the allies (see the discussion of the inscriptional evidence in Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p. 5-9, which "shows the Hellespontine generals standing outside the financial system operated from the city")

⁸⁷³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.34

time or not, it appears that the actual force was not ready until a year later, in the summer of 409 BC. This fleet arrived by a somewhat circuitous route, taking part in an ultimately unsuccessful campaign in Ionia. It may have been the case that there was some political motive behind this destination, and that the new democracy wanted to prove itself in the field, giving itself a victory to rival Cyzicus.⁸⁷⁴ Kagan has argued against a political interpretation, emphasizing the strategic reasons for sending a fleet to the Ionian coast.⁸⁷⁵ When Thrasyllus' force eventually joined the rest of the fleet in the Hellespont, there was tension between the two sides. While this could be a sign of political tension between the fleet democracy and the government at Athens,⁸⁷⁶ the reason for the trouble as given in the sources, that Thrasyllus' men had suffered a defeat while the fleet were only victorious, seems plausible and sufficient.⁸⁷⁷ It is certainly the case that the generals themselves, whomever they were elected by, co-operated well in the subsequent campaigns against Chalcedon and Byzantium;⁸⁷⁸ as Kagan says, "at least Alcibiades and Theramenes and probably Thrasyllus shared in the formulation and execution of these policies."⁸⁷⁹

Between the attacks on Chalcedon and Byzantium, the generals negotiated a treaty with the Persians.⁸⁸⁰ This treaty ended hostilities between Athens and Chalcedon, at the cost of Chalcedon paying her outstanding tribute. The generals also agreed not to attack the territory of the Persian Empire, and they received from Pharnabazus 20 talents and a promise to convey them to the great King for further negotiations. Who was to receive this money? Would it be sent back to Athens, or alternatively distributed there and then amongst a fleet badly in need of funds, and receiving none from the city? It seems likely that the tribute, assessed at its former level, and the arrears, would have gone to Athens; it was after all Athens to whom the tribute was originally paid and the arrears owed.⁸⁸¹ But it seems not unlikely that the twenty talents paid by Persia would have gone towards maintaining the fleet.⁸⁸² An arrangement like this, which shared spoils between Athens and the fleet, seems to suit the context of these two being separate but co-operating forces; without corroborating evidence, however, this reconstruction remains purely hypothetical.

Diodorus credits Theramenes, the city's elected general, with a leading role in the negotiations; but Xenophon's testimony that all the generals took part is more likely. Both agree, however, on the special status accorded to Alcibiades at this time. As noted above, the Persian satrap Pharnabazus required Alcibiades' presence before the treaty could be validated; at the time of the negotiations he was away plundering along the coast. Alcibiades took the opportunity to

⁸⁷⁴ McCoy, 'Thrasyllus', p. 279; Andrewes, 'Generals in the Hellespont', p. 4-5

⁸⁷⁵ Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 266-9

⁸⁷⁶ As argued by McCoy, 'Thrasyllus', p. 284.

⁸⁷⁷ Xenophon, 1.2.15

⁸⁷⁸ Chalcedon; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.3.1-8 (Chalcedon). 1.3.14-22, Diodorus, 13.66 (Byzantium)

⁸⁷⁹ Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 284

⁸⁸⁰ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.3.8-12; Diodorus, 13.66.3

⁸⁸¹ But cf. the rhetoric of the Samos fleet in its first assembly, declaring the de facto right to levy tribute. Thucydides 8.76, discussed above.

⁸⁸² At the lowest likely rate of 3 obols per day, such an amount represented the wages of 80 ship's crews for two weeks. Alcibiades' money-collecting mission at the time of the negotiations demonstrates, if demonstration were needed, the constant need for funds experienced by the fleet.

emphasize his own importance by swearing the oaths along with Phranabazus, rather than simply adding his oath to that of the other generals.⁸⁸³

The eventual return of the fleet to Athens in 407 BC marked the end of its period of independence;⁸⁸⁴ when the crews next embarked on their vessels, it was to be under leaders elected in the Pnyx and funded from the Athenian treasury.⁸⁸⁵ Xenophon's suggestion is that, while the fleet was largely reconciled long before this time, a similar reconciliation could not be assumed in the case of Alcibiades. Regardless of his privileged status within the fleet, and his ability to take the credit for the achievements of others as well as himself,⁸⁸⁶ Alcibiades was not certain of the welcome he would receive in Athens. His unforced delays and hesitancy in making his arrival demonstrate his acute awareness of this fact.⁸⁸⁷ It confirms again that Alcibiades and the fleet were to some extent separate powers.

Conclusion

Fosdyke's statement that "the sailors stationed at Samos responded to the alleged violence of the oligarchs [the 400 at Athens] by constituting themselves as an independent political community"⁸⁸⁸ is an admirably succinct summation of the events of 411 BC. While this political community was initially conceived as democratic in character and in opposition to oligarchic Athens, compromises were soon made, and the fleet's history as a (virtually) independent democracy was a brief one. Like the short-lived oligarchies at Athens, the importance of the political events here is not in their durability, but in their nature. It appears (though our sources are not conclusive on this) that in electing Alcibiades and putting matters into his hands, the fleet had voted itself a powerful leader, the most prominent among a small number of elected generals who increasingly seem to have taken the major decisions; in other words, a situation more characteristic of an oligarchy than a democracy. The narrative of Xenophon indicates Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, later Theramenes and to a lesser extent Thrasyllus as having the dominant role, and there is no hint of the previously vocal fleet Assembly. Xenophon's narrative, unlike Thucydides', seems to presuppose that, while the fleet and the city were separated from one another, relations were co-operative and cordial. Indeed, it is unlikely that a reader not already familiar with the background to the events reported by Xenophon would suppose any sort of

⁸⁸³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.3.8 cf. Diodorus, 13.66, Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades*, 31.

⁸⁸⁴ According to Diodorus (13.68), two generals, Diodorus and Manitheus were left a force to hold the Hellespont. It is uncertain whether these generals were elected by the city or came from the fleet. The former is more likely and thus this can be seen as the fleet handing the Hellespont completely back to Athens.

⁸⁸⁵ We note again the two criteria that, for Thucydides (8.76), represented the claim for cities to control fleets; provision of leadership and money.

⁸⁸⁶ The verdict of Cornelius Nepos (*Thrasybulus*, 1.3), that Alcibiades did only part of the work but "by some gift of his nature, gained the credit for everything", is made in relation to Thrasybulus, but seems to be generally applicable.

⁸⁸⁷ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.4.10-12. Alcibiades' detour is admittedly very lucrative; he brought 100 talents back from Caria.

⁸⁸⁸ Fosdyke, *Exile, Ostracism and Democracy*, p. 190. I have interpreted the phrase "sailors stationed at Samos" here differently from the way Forsdyke appears to use it. I include the metics, foreigners and allies, as I believe they took part in the political community on Samos. Fosdyke sees the democracy on Samos as comprising Athenian citizens only (p. 187 "the Athenian sailors at Samos...establish[ed] their own democracy"), and it is likely she has Athenians only in mind when she refers to the "sailors stationed at Samos".

division between the Samos fleet and the city at this time, until Alcibiades' homecoming. Both of these things (the 'general-centric' viewpoint and the ease of relations between the city and the fleet) could be indicative of Xenophon's simpler narrative, and a genuine continuation of Thucydides would have given us a more nuanced and complicated picture. However, Kagan is right to say that no source talks of a significant conflict or hostility between the city and the fleet,⁸⁸⁹ and Thucydides' narrative at least hints at Alcibiades' special position and the strengthening of relations between city and fleet. While it can be speculated that the fleet and the city were more independent of one another than Xenophon suggests, or that the men of the fleet played a more prominent role than he allows, there is little testimony on which to base such a case; it is only the (fragmentary) epigraphic record that suggests a degree of separation, in that the fleet in the Hellespont did not receive funding from Athens. It may be argued that, by Thucydides' two criteria (money and leadership) the fleet was largely free of direct Athenian control until 407 BC, but it nevertheless must be concluded that the city and the fleet (due probably to diplomatic work started by Alcibiades and continued by Thrasylus and Theramenes under the 5,000) were pulling in the same direction for most of this period. From 409 to 407 BC, the fleet was being led, apparently without significant difficulty, by two generals elected by the fleet and not the city (Alcibiades and Thrasylus; the former an exile), a general elected by both the fleet and Athens (Thrasylus), and a general elected by the oligarchs at Athens and not by the fleet at all, and who had been a participant in the regime to which the fleet swore enmity to (Theramenes). Personal friendships amongst these generals notwithstanding, it certainly seems that there was a close alliance between the city and the fleet, even if full reconciliation and direct control would not occur until 407 BC.

⁸⁸⁹ Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 266

PART 3: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NAVY

1: The Democratic Navy?

Amit's statement that the events of oligarchic conspiracy and the Samos democracy "give us a special opportunity for examining the importance of the crews of the Athenian navy in the political life of the polis"⁸⁹⁰ is also true for examining the ideology of these men. The political motivations of the *nautikos ochlos* are in the spotlight during these years in a way that they are not at any other time. However, as discussed in the previous section, the Athenian sailors of the "naval mob" were not alone in their political activity in this period. The ideological standpoint ascribed to the *stratiotai* on Samos as a whole may not be accurately indicative of that of its constituent parts. Nevertheless, as the Athenians were probably the largest and most significant group amongst the *stratiotai*, and the trireme crewmen most numerous amongst the Athenians, it would be surprising indeed if there was not a large degree of correlation in the respective ideologies of the force at Samos and the "naval mob". Several obvious pieces of evidence point to the commonly held view that the Samos fleet, and the men of the Athenian navy, were essentially democratic in their ideology; the statement of Thucydides regarding the "naval mob", the nature of the political system that the fleet set up and the oaths they took, and the clear dedication to democracy shown by the *Paralos* crew (and others) all seem to point in the direction of a "thoroughly democratic navy".⁸⁹¹ However, the evidence in fact points to a far more nuanced and complicated ideological pattern, and the picture is not simply one of ideological conflict between the oligarchic city on the one hand and the democratic navy on the other.

Oligarchic City vs. Democratic Navy?

Such polarized interpretations of this period spring largely from Thucydides' comment at the point of the Samos fleet splitting from Athens; "so they were now locked in a duel, one side attempting to force the city to accept democracy, the other to force the army to accept oligarchy."⁸⁹² Clearly this polarization had some degree of applicability for that moment in time, and even for the period of the 400's rule at Athens.⁸⁹³ Fosdyke argues, when discussing the setting up of the Samos democracy, that "Thucydides' narrative reveals...the strong democratic sentiments of the sailors at Samos"⁸⁹⁴; in fact, it is clear from Thucydides' narrative that while the navy on Samos was *at that point* democratic, and in opposition to the oligarchic city, such a clear-cut political and ideological stance was not the case either previously or subsequently. The discussion in the previous section concerned the relations between the city and the fleet

⁸⁹⁰ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 64

⁸⁹¹ Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p. 266

⁸⁹² Thucydides, 8.76

⁸⁹³ Andrewes (*HCT*, ad loc 8.76) notes that the phrasing here can apply to "the coming months as well as the present moment".

⁸⁹⁴ Fosdyke, *Exile, Ostracism and Democracy*, p.190

concluded that good co-operation between these two factions was begun under the oligarchy of the 5,000, and there was no immediate furthering of positive relations, far less full reconciliation, when democracy returned to Athens in 410 BC. In other words, the relations between the two sides were not informed primarily by ideological standpoints on forms of government; common interests and enemies, personal alliances and enmities and some degree of mutual suspicion seem to have been more significant in determining the relationship. This point has not always been fully appreciated. Kagan, for example, says “it hardly seems likely that the democrats in Athens would have been at odds with the thoroughly democratic fleet and its generals”.⁸⁹⁵ It seems that while there was co-operation between these two sides, they remained as two separate forces despite their (apparently) similar ideologies.

Prior to the break from Athens, Thucydides gives us tantalising glimpses of the thoughts and opinions of the fleet on Samos. He is clear, for example, that the oligarchic conspiracy began at Samos amongst the Athenians in the fleet in 412/11 BC.⁸⁹⁶ The supposed influence of Alcibiades in Persia was common knowledge amongst the Athenians, and was the basis for the conspiracy. However, it was not amongst all of the Athenians at Samos that the plot was initially pursued:

epeidê gar êisthonto auton ischuonta par' autôi hoi en têi Samôi Athênaiôn stratiôtai, ta men kai Alkibiadou prospempsantos logous es tous dunatôtatous autôn andras hôste mnêsthênai peri autou es tous beltistous tôn anthrôpôn hoti ep' oligarchiai bouletai kai ou ponêriai oude dêmokratiai têi auton ekbalousêi katelthôn kai paraschôn Tissaphernên philon autois xumpoliteuein, to de pleon kai apo sphôn autôn hoi en têi Samôi triêrarchoi te tôn Athênaiôn kai dunatôtatoi hôrmênto es to katalusai tèn dêmokratian.

When the Athenian campaigners on Samos realized that he [Alcibiades] had great influence with him [Tissaphernes], they took action largely of their own accord, but also because of the messages sent by Alcibiades to the leading men amongst them to tell the best men that that if there were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their friend. Thus the Athenian trierarchs and the leading men set themselves the task of overthrowing the democracy.⁸⁹⁷

The tactics used by the principal conspirators are interesting; it seems that the fleet as a whole could not be expected to be sympathetic to such a proposal, and so the influential men, and particularly the trierarchs, were sounded out first. These men then formed a conspiracy which was extended to *tôn anthrôpôn tous epitêdeious*, “the suitable men”, before putting their proposal to the fleet as a whole. How large this group of suitable people was is unclear; it was probably fairly small, but it was certainly wider than the “leading men and trierarchs” who were in on the plot from the very start.⁸⁹⁸ It indicates some level of support for the conspiracy amongst

⁸⁹⁵ Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, p.266

⁸⁹⁶ Thucydides, 8.48.

⁸⁹⁷ Thucydides, 8.47.2

⁸⁹⁸ Andrewes (*HCT* ad loc 8.48.2) suggests that this group “perhaps included the ‘other ranks’”, and rightly links them with *tous beltistous tôn anthrôpôn*, “the best men”, at 8.47.2.

the more 'ordinary' Athenians on Samos. More tangible persuasion was needed to convince the majority to support, or at least not oppose, the idea:

kai ho men ochlos, ei kai ti parautika êchtheto tois prassomenois, dia to euporon tês elpidos tou para basileôs misthou hêsuchazen

The general opinion of the crowd may have been upset for the moment, but calmed down because the prospect of pay from the [Persian Great] King seemed easy of attainment.⁸⁹⁹

This acquiescence may have been somewhat reluctant on the part of the fleet, but it appears that the prospect of money was enough to make them agree to forsake democracy in favour of oligarchy. When a similar proposal shortly thereafter was put to the Assembly at Athens, however, it took more than the thought of pay from the King to win the crowd's agreement. While the King's money is mentioned, it is done so in the context of the very survival of Athens.⁹⁰⁰ As well as this, another factor is mentioned by the leader of the conspirators, Pisander:

ho de dêmos to men prôton akouôn chalepôs ephere to peri tês oligarchias: saphôs de didaskomenos hupo tou Peisandrou mê einai allên sôtêrian, deisas kai hama epelpizôn hôs kai metabaleitai, enedôken.

The idea of oligarchy was very badly received by the people at first, but when Pisander made it perfectly clear that there was no other way out, their fears (and also the fact that they expected to be able to change the constitution later) made them give in.⁹⁰¹

For the Assembly at Athens, acquiescence at this point to the idea of an oligarchy was not dependent simply upon pay from the King,⁹⁰² the desperateness of the situation, and the necessity of securing Persian funds to win the war, were crucial in winning over the Assembly, as was the mentioning of a 'safety clause', whereby democracy could be restored. Neither of these ideas seems to have been needed to win over the fleet. If Thucydides has transmitted sufficiently accurate details, it would suggest that the actions of the Athenian assembly were informed by a greater ideological connection and loyalty to democracy than those of the fleet. Even if Thucydides' account can not be pressed into making such a comparison, the fact remains that he presents the devotion to democracy amongst the Athenians on Samos as less strong than their desire for regular and plentiful payment from a foreign monarch.

⁸⁹⁹ Thucydides, 8.48.3

⁹⁰⁰ Thucydides, 8.53

⁹⁰¹ Thucydides, 8.54.1

⁹⁰² Andrewes (*HCT*, ad loc 8.54) that on neither this occasion, nor that involving the Samos fleet at 8.48, did the audiences vote in favour of an oligarchy. However, the acceptance of the conspirator's arguments on both occasions seems to make them comparable for the purposes of the present discussion.

The next insight into the ideology of the fleet is reported by Thucydides in 411 BC, a little prior to the split from Athens, during the civil strife in Samos itself. The Samian democrats, fearing an oligarchic coup, try to rally support amongst the fleet to help them defend the democracy:

hoi de aisthomenoi tôn te stratêgôn Leonti kai Diomedonti houtoi gar ouch hekontes dia to timasthai hupo tou dêmou epheron tèn oligarchian to mellon sêmainousi kai Thrasuboulôi kai Thrasulôi, tôi men triêrarchounti, tôi de hopliteuonti, kai allois hoi edokoun aiei malista enantiousthai tois xunestôsin

They [the Samian democrats] got wind of what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the people, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, the latter a hoplite, besides certain others who had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators.⁹⁰³

They did not appeal to the fleet as a whole, but instead to individuals whom they expected to be sympathetic to their cause. As well as Leon and Diomedon (two Athenian generals), Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were mentioned by name - at this time a trierarch and a hoplite respectively - and these individuals rallied further support from the *stratiotai*, again giving particular attention to those expected to be sympathetic. The crew of the trireme *Paralos* are particularly mentioned in this context as perpetual anti-oligarchs.⁹⁰⁴ What is striking about the sequence of events here is that it closely follows that undertaken by the Athenian oligarchic conspirators outlined above; appeals are made to like-minded individuals, who themselves add to the conspiracy by word-of-mouth, rather than a mass appeal to the whole force. Perhaps it suggests that, like the oligarchs, these democrats could not expect widespread support for their cause amongst the fleet. Certainly it attests to the presence of diverse ideological viewpoints in the fleet. They ranged from the *Paralos* crew's opposition towards oligarchy on principle, to Leon and Diomedon's position as somewhat reluctant supporters of the new oligarchic arrangements in Athens, to more vocal and dedicated supporters of the oligarchic 'regime change'.

The fact that there were some enthusiastic supporters of the oligarchy still on Samos in the months following the 400 taking power is evidenced by the oaths that Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus made the fleet and the military age Samians swear. Indeed, Thucydides reports that the oaths were aimed particularly at those who were part of the oligarchic faction.⁹⁰⁵ What these oaths demonstrate is that the democratic ideology of the Samos fleet should not be taken for granted by modern scholars, any more than it was by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus. The very fact that the leaders of the Samos fleet felt that adherence to democracy needed to be solemnly sworn demonstrates that such loyalty could not be assumed. Support for their key policies, continuation of the war and opposition to the 400, was solidified in the same way. Even in this context, at its most politically active, it is hard to see the navy as "thoroughly democratic", though it seems to

⁹⁰³ Thucydides, 8.73.4

⁹⁰⁴ Thucydides, 8.73.5

⁹⁰⁵ Thucydides, 8.73.2 *kai autos tous ek tes oligarchias malista*

have taken far less persuasion to get the fleet to adhere to democracy than to acquiesce to oligarchy.

The fleet's choice to become a democracy is significant, especially given the wide political participation allowed on Samos.⁹⁰⁶ But this was democracy that soon made pragmatic compromises and choices. It is noteworthy that in the Samos fleet's first meeting, in which the speakers tried to reassure one another, the agreeable prospect of alliance with the King is a key issue again, as well as the issue of securing resources. It is likely that the issue of Alcibiades and the Persian alliance was one of the reasons for the "change of feeling against the idea of oligarchy" that Thucydides said took place on Samos. Talks between Pisander and the oligarchs on the one hand with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes on the other had broken down,⁹⁰⁷ and soon after the Peloponnesians signed the first in a series of treaties with the Persian King.⁹⁰⁸ Pisander and his fellow conspirators⁹⁰⁹ turned against Alcibiades and his recall, but pressed ahead with their plans to install an oligarchy at Athens. It is easy to see how the sailors at Samos would have turned against the oligarchy when they perceived that it was not honouring its stated commitments to recall Alcibiades, treat with the Persians, and thus secure their pay.⁹¹⁰

As noted above, the fleet went on to co-operate with the oligarchy of the 5,000 at Athens, and the fleet's democracy itself soon became effectively a narrow oligarchy of elected generals, amongst whom Alcibiades was the first amongst equals. It was Alcibiades who framed an answer to the envoys from the 400, an answer probably made before the fleet's assembly, and with that audience in mind:

autos de apokrinamenos autois apepempen, hoti tous men pentakischilious ou kôluoi archein, tous mentoi tetrakosious apallassein ekeleuen autous kai kathistanai tèn boulèn hôsper kai proteron, tous pentakosious: ei de es euteleian ti xuntetmêtai hôste tous strateuomenous mallon echein trophên, panu epainein. kai talla ekeleuen antechein kai mêden endidonai tois polemiois: pros men gar sphas autous sôizomenês tês poleôs pollên elpida einai kai xumbênai

He [Alcibiades] dismissed them [the ambassadors] with an answer from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government of the 5,000, but insisted that the 400 should be deposed and the *boule* of 500 reinstated in power: he was entirely in favour of any measures of economy which would result in better pay for the campaigners; and in general he urged them to hold fast and make no concessions to the enemy, saying that, so long as the city was preserved, there

⁹⁰⁶ I argue this in Section Two, section B.2

⁹⁰⁷ Thucydides, 8.56

⁹⁰⁸ Thucydides, 8.58.

⁹⁰⁹ Thucydides, 8.63.4. The phrase used for these people is *oi en tei Samoi ton Athenion*, "the Athenians on Samos". On its own, this phrase would imply quite a wide group, but the reference to these people contributing their private means to the cause later in this passage confirms that this group was the affluent and influential men amongst the Athenians on Samos amongst whom the conspiracy began.

⁹¹⁰ It appears that the Samos fleet did not know the full details of the conference between Pisander, Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, and the lack of real influence he had in Persia. When they formed their own government, they are still confident that the recall of Alcibiades will result in a treaty with the King (8.76, cf. 8.81). There is a similar lack of full knowledge amongst some of Pisander's oligarchic faction in Athens, who had murdered the demagogue Androcles to appease Alcibiades (8.65); as Andrewes observes (*HCT*, ad loc 8.65.2) "it was a help to the conspirators to keep the breakdown [of the negotiations with Persia] as secret as possible till they had secured their grip on the city."

were good hopes of some kind of agreement being reached between the two parties.⁹¹¹

Alcibiades suggests here that a reconciliation could occur under a wider oligarchy in Athens, provided that the war would continue and the fleet's pay would be secured. While Thucydides does not record the fleet's reaction to these proposals, Alcibiades' continued leadership would suggest their tacit agreement with his sentiments. This compares well with the occasion earlier in 411 BC, discussed above, when the fleet agreed to the idea of an oligarchy because of financial considerations. Despite breaking from Athens and operating independently and swearing the most binding of oaths to democracy, it appears that a democratic constitution at Athens was not a precondition for reconciliation between the fleet and the city; but regular pay for the fleet was. It seems then that, while the "naval mob" might prefer democracy to oligarchy, it was prepared to accept either on the reliable promise of regular wages.

There remains the question of how to interpret Thucydides' description of the "naval mob", a phrase used for the one and only time by him in the context of the events of 411 BC. Thucydides reports that the oligarchs sent ambassadors to the fleet at Samos immediately upon coming to power, and explains why the 400 considered this move to be such a priority:

deisantes mê, hoper egeneto, nautikos ochlos out' autos menein en tõi oligarchikõi kosmõi ethelêi, sphas te mê ekeithen arxamenou tou kakou metastêsôsîn.

They [the 400] feared (and their fears were justified by the event) that the naval mob would not be willing to stay under the oligarchic government, and that the trouble might start there, and end in the new government itself being thrown out.⁹¹²

While this passage could possibly be interpreted as suggesting a generalized anti-oligarchic ideology amongst the "naval mob",⁹¹³ it need mean no more that they were opposed to that *particular* oligarchy of the 400. As suggested above, even before the (possibly exaggerated) reports of abuses in Athens has reached Samos, the fleet had good reason to be suspicious of the 400, who had not recalled Alcibiades and still less secured them pay from the King. The picture is further complicated by Thucydides' authorial description the *Paralos* crew, whom he credits with being then and always opposed to oligarchy as a matter of principle.⁹¹⁴ How does this effect our interpretation of the "naval mob"'s political ideology? Was the attitude of the *Paralos* crew shared by the navy as a whole, and thus suggesting a wide interpretation of the passage quoted

⁹¹¹ Thucydides, 8.86.6-7

⁹¹² Thucydides, 8.72.2

⁹¹³ As I have argued in a previous section of this work, the sorts of issues that the 400 tell the ambassadors to discuss at Samos (that they mean no harm to the citizens and that 5,000 share the constitution) suggest that the "naval mob" they fear are those of Samos fleet who were Athenian citizens. However, I do not believe that such an interpretation of the term in this context is inevitable. While I use the term "naval mob" too include only Athenian citizens, it should not be considered certain that Thucydides used it in this way.

⁹¹⁴ The relevant passage is quoted below, in the following section.

above? Or alternatively were the *Paraloi* unusual in their opposition to any oligarchy, and the “naval mob” as a whole only opposed to such oligarchies as did them disservice?

The *Paralos* and her crew in 411 BC⁹¹⁵

In the build-up to the Samos fleet’s break from Athens, the crew of the Athenian trireme *Paralos* played a prominent role. They were amongst those democrats from the fleet who were involved in resisting the oligarchic coup on Samos in 411 BC. Upon returning to Athens with the news and finding the 400 in command, several members of the crew were arrested, before the rest were sent to Euboea in a troop-transport, on patrol duty.⁹¹⁶ Some little time later, the *Paralos* crew were ordered to convey diplomats from the 400 to Sparta, but instead they stopped at Argos, imprisoned the oligarchs, and sailed (in the *Paralos* itself) to Samos. The reason for their actions appears to be largely ideological. When describing the *Paralos* crew, Thucydides says:

tous Paralous, andras Athênaious te kai eleutherous pantas en têi nêi pleontas kai aiei dêpote oligarchiai kai mê parousêi epikeimenous

Those who sailed on the *Paralos* being Athenians and free men one and all, and had always been thoroughly opposed to the idea of an oligarchy, even when there was no question of such a thing existing.⁹¹⁷

It is unclear as to why the *Paraloi* were trusted with this mission by the 400 so soon after they had been packed off around Euboea. It must surely be considered a risky move, if not reckless one, on the part of the oligarchs, unless the democratic credentials of the *Paraloi* were established by this very episode. Such an interpretation, however, would mean disregarding Thucydides’ remark that they opposed oligarchy even before there was the possibility of one. It is also unclear how the *Paraloi* got their ship back. Perhaps they were restored to their ship for the diplomatic mission by the 400, or perhaps they recaptured it somehow: the former is perhaps most likely.

Whatever the details of this sequence of events, Thucydides’ statement of both the ideology of the *Paralos* crew and its composition is of crucial importance in this study. The *Paralos* crew were Athenian citizen trireme crewmen, the two key factors in my definition of the “naval mob”. It is thus possible that their standpoint in respect of oligarchy, clearly stated by Thucydides, is indicative of the political ideology of the “naval mob” as a whole. However, while the *Paralos* crew share the two essential characteristics of the “naval mob”, they also are, in several ways, exceptional. As concluded in Part One, section C.2, the differences between the *Paraloi* and the wider “naval mob” are as striking and significant as the similarities. As Jordan argues, they acted as they did in 411 BC because they “were held together in an organisation [i.e. the cult of

⁹¹⁵ The evidence connected with the *Paralos* generally, and with the other famous ‘sacred’ trireme the *Salamina*, has been discussed in Part One, Section C.2

⁹¹⁶ Thucydides, 8.74

⁹¹⁷ Thucydides, 8.73.5

Paralos] with ties stronger than those which spring from common political sympathies or from loyalty to shipmates.”⁹¹⁸ Given these factors, it would be unwise to suggest that the ideology of the “naval mob” was necessarily similar to that of the *Paralos* crew. It cannot be argued that that “naval mob” was, as a matter of principle, anti-oligarchic simply because the *Paraloi* were.

Conclusions: the pragmatic navy

In the course of 411 BC and in subsequent years, the men of the fleet displayed a clear preference for democracy; the system under which all of the Athenian citizens had been born, all the metics had chosen to live, and to which every (free) person on the expedition had sworn allegiance to. But is it then correct to interpret this period as an ideological contest between democrats and oligarchs? Several things count against such a view. The oligarchic movement began amongst the fleet at Samos, and was assented to by the *stratiotai* as a whole, as it would mean (so they believed) pay from the king. The immediate reasons for the anger of the members of the fleet and their determination to cede from Athens was not so much about their political disenfranchisement and the change of regime, as it was about the (perhaps exaggerated/invented by Chareas) abuses carried out by that regime. After the initial split during the rule of the 400, relations between the fleet and city started to improve under the oligarchic 5,000. After being elected to the fleet Alcibiades answered envoys from the 400 (probably before the fleet’s assembly and with this audience in mind) that a government of the 5,000 would be acceptable; he also stated that he would favour any economic measure to secure pay for the *stratiotai*, as he would be for a continuation of the war. Perhaps he was trying to associate these ideas; Athens under the 5,000, paying her sailors and soldiers to fight on. Thirdly, while relations between the fleet and the city continue to be largely co-operative when democracy was restored, there was not a full reconciliation at this time; this is troubling to a strict ideological interpretation opposing a democratic navy with the oligarchic city. While some in the fleet, particularly the leading generals Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus and the crew of the *Paralos*, were certainly staunch democrats, these people can not be taken as representative of the fleet as a whole, nor of the “naval mob”. The impression we get of the navy at this most important and singular moment of political identity and action is that while there were some staunch oligarchs, and more staunch democrats, most of the *stratiotai* were ideologically more neutral and pragmatic. They fiercely opposed the 400 not because it was a narrow oligarchy, but because *that particular* oligarchy acted against their interests. The events of 411 BC suggest that the “naval mob”, and the rest of the navy too, were more democratic than they were oligarchic, but were essentially more pragmatic than democratic.

However, it would be over simplistic to assume that any of the crews of the Athenian navy had an ideology that was consistent and durable. While the crew *Paralos*, as argued above, cannot be taken as representative of navy crews as a whole, the fact that attitudes and ideologies were not

⁹¹⁸ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 173

constant aboard this most famous of Athenian ships is probably reflective of the reality of the Athenian navy. A passage in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, produced in 405 BC, suggests that there was considerable change in the attitudes of the *Paralos* crew throughout the fifth century. In this passage Dionysus and the (dead) playwright Aeschylus nostalgically recall Athens' 'golden age':

Aischulos: *eit' au lalian epitêdeusai kai stômulian edidaxas, hê 'xekenôsen tas te palaistras kai tas pugas enetripsen tôn meirakiôn stômullomenôn, kai tous Paralous anepeisen antagoreuein tois archousin. kaitoi tote g' hênik' egô 'zôn, ouk êpistant' all' ê mazan kalesai kai 'rhuppapai' eipein.*

Dionusos: *nê ton Apollô, kai prospardein g'es to stoma tôi thalamaki, kai minthôsai ton xussiton kakbas tina lôpodutêsai: nun d' antilegei kouket' elaunôn plei deuri kauthis ekeise.*

Aeschylus: Then again, you've taught people the habit of chatter and babble, which has emptied the wrestling-schools and worn down young men's buttocks as they sit blabbering - and has encouraged the crew of the *Paralos* to talk back to their officers. Why in the old days, when I was alive, all they knew how to do was call for their grub and shout "yo-ho"

Dionysus: Yes, by Apollo-and also to fart in the face of bottom-bench Charlie, to smear a messmate with shit, and to go ashore and nick someone's clothes. Now they dispute their orders and won't row anymore; first they sail this way and then back that way.⁹¹⁹

This passage suggests, though without much precision, that the attitudes of the *Paralos* crew were subject to change over time, within their general ideological viewpoint in favour of democracy. This passage should not be pressed as authoritative evidence, but there is a suggestion here of a time in the past where the *Paraloi* were not as strong-willed or vocal as they were in 411 BC, or indeed in 405 BC, and that they became increasingly undisciplined and disobedient. But these are vague indications that allow little in the way of precision, and there is certainly not sufficient information to accurately trace developments in the ideology and activity of the *Paralos* crew. It is worth noting that, while Thucydides gives a categorical assertion of their anti-oligarchic credentials, within this the attitudes of the *Paralos* crew were imprecise and changeable; and that there is little hope of accurately assessing the mindset of the crews of the hundreds of less well-known Athenian triremes.⁹²⁰

2: Pay and Patriotism: national service, or mercenary labour market?

This section will explore further an issue raised in Part One of this work; the professional status of Athenian naval crews. It was argued there that the phrase "naval mob", as well as other passages relating to the naval crews in Thucydides and Aristotle's *Politics*, suggested that there

⁹¹⁹ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1069-77.

⁹²⁰ See discussion below, Part Three, section 4.

was a significant number of sailors who made their sole or primary living from working in the trireme fleet. In addition, although there was a great deal of variation in the numbers of triremes at sea at any given time, the manifold year-round occupations of the navy required in turn full-time rowers and specialists. I have used the phrase “naval mob” in this work to denote specifically the Athenian citizens amongst this group of professionals, a definition which has some grounding in the (very limited) ancient usage. Additional arguments in favour of the presence of significant numbers of professional trireme crewmen, citizen and non-citizen, will be set out below, and the essentially vocational nature of the classical Athenian navy will be made clear. This characterisation of the navy as a professional organisation calls into question the common perception of crewing triremes as a military service, and the appropriate ideological location of crewing triremes. It should be acknowledged at the outset that some of these points have been made before; in his study of metics, for example, Whitehead remarked that crewing a trireme was not so much a military obligation, but simply “a job of work”.⁹²¹ It is nevertheless a view worth setting out fully, not least as this argument has consequences for the commonly perceived relationship between the men of the fleet on the one hand, and Athenian democracy on the other.

Professional Sailors

There is other evidence which can be brought in to demonstrate the presence of a numerous group of professional sailors. Trundle states that “it is obvious that regular wages and professional service go hand in hand”,⁹²² to which should be added the important qualification that there was a difference, both practically and ideologically, between payments to facilitate public service and full-time earnings.⁹²³ While it should not be denied that conscripts were drafted to the oar benches in times of emergency, these were clearly exceptions to the norm; triremes were crewed largely by paid volunteers, citizen and non-citizen alike.⁹²⁴ Many of these men did so in a professional capacity, which is to say that their sole, or at least predominant, source of income was working aboard triremes. In the fourth century, some of Apollodorus’ crewmen asked their captain for extra pay for the upkeep of their households, indicating that they earned their living primarily at the oar.⁹²⁵ He says of his deserters that, being skilled

⁹²¹ Whitehead, *Athenian Metic*, p. 86.

⁹²² Trundle, *Mercenaries*, p. 19

⁹²³ Again, Trundle is elsewhere (*Mercenaries*, p. 96-7) aware of this distinction. He argues that there is a relationship between “wage-earning in the service of the state as a hoplite and service of the state as a juror”, 2-3 obols a day, and that this was different from the wages for skilled and unskilled labourers, which “demonstrate an approximation with mercenary wages”, from 3 obols to 2 drachmae per day.

⁹²⁴ Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 112 “For most of the fifth and all of the fourth century conscription was the exception rather than the rule.” See also Trundle (*Mercenaries*, p. 23), who argues that “most of the personnel in the Athenian and Spartan navies during the Peloponnesian war... were professionals, in that they were paid for their services, even the Athenian lower-status oarsmen”.

⁹²⁵ [Demosthenes] 50.12. Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 107) has argued that the use of conscription at Arginusae, and at times in the fourth century, is “a clear indication of a manpower shortage among the groups traditionally used for naval service.” The fact that (as Gabrielsen himself notes) conscription was unusual even in the fourth century indicates that it was not so much a case of there being no oarsmen available; there was rather at Athens a shortage of money to pay for crewmen, both from the state and from *trierarchoi* willing to lavish money on their ships’ crew. The ‘professional’ seamen were still there, but when there was no work at Athens, they sought employment in the navies of other states; see [Demosthenes], 50.16, cf. 50.14, where specific alternative employers are mentioned.

oarsmen, they were confident of being able to find employment in navies elsewhere; clearly they were plentiful opportunities for employment even in the fourth century BC.⁹²⁶ The *hyperesia*, undoubtedly professionals in their relative fields, were often drawn from amongst the oarcrew; this again implies a number amongst the latter who were employed full time on board triremes.⁹²⁷ Amit states that “the creation of a permanent navy offered remunerative (sic) work for the poorer citizens”,⁹²⁸ and Whitehead is doubtless correct in asserting that trireme service “never...acquired the quasi-liturgical character of hoplite service”.⁹²⁹

The levels of wages paid to hoplites and sailors is one potential indicator of this difference, but the evidence for sailors’ pay is slim and that for hoplites even slimmer. As Pritchett notes in his full account of military pay, two obols, three obols and a drachma have all been argued as the basic ‘peacetime’ daily wage of the Athenian armed forces.⁹³⁰ After a thorough review of all the source material, he concludes that three obols was the ‘standard rate’ for both hoplites and trireme crews, and that “military service, then, was financially unremunerative.”⁹³¹ This rate of pay could be supplemented if the campaign was to be a particularly long one; two examples from Thucydides, our best source on this issue, relate to the siege of Potidaea in 428 BC and the invasion of Sicily in 415 BC; in both cases, a drachma a day was paid to hoplites and trireme crews alike.⁹³² He adduces only one testimony of the pay for hoplites which was not connected with an ‘extended’ campaign; in the terms of a treaty between Athens and three other cities in 420 BC, three Aeginetan obols was the level of pay given to hoplites (and other types of soldier), and is described as *sitos*, “ration-money”.⁹³³ While these coins were slightly higher in value than the Athenian equivalents, and could thus be considered a very generous allowance for a man’s rations, this was not a sufficient level of remuneration to maintain a household. In addition, such payments were only to be given if a campaign lasted more than 30 days. That this was deemed an appropriate level of payment by the four different cities involved perhaps tentatively suggests to us a generally acceptable level of remuneration for hoplites in this period.⁹³⁴

⁹²⁶ [Demosthenes] 50.16.

⁹²⁷ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 542-4

⁹²⁸ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 61

⁹²⁹ Whitehead, *Athenian Metic*, p. 86.

⁹³⁰ Pritchett, *Greek State at War I*, p. 23.

⁹³¹ Pritchett, *Greek State at War I*, p. 24.

⁹³² Potidaea; Thucydides, 3.17. Sicily; Thucydides, 6.8.

⁹³³ Thucydides, 5.47. Three Aeginetan obols was approximately equivalent to four Attic obols. On this passage (*HCT* ad loc 5.47.6), the authors remark that “It would not be fair to compare the rates of *pay*...since this is explicitly a ration-allowance”. Terminology for wages and ration-money was not, however, remarkably consistent in fifth-century sources (primarily Thucydides). Loomis (*Wages*, pp. 41-2) interprets the *sitos* here as the total “gross pay”, rather than in the strict sense of ration-money alone. These figures do indeed represent more than a man might need for daily rations. It is perhaps the case that the level of ration-money was set at a higher rate than usual in order to discourage the signatories from calling the troops of their allies away from their homes and occupations for extended periods of time; as is remarked in the *HCT* note on this passage (cited above, cf. vol. 1, p. 10-2), this treaty implies that “a month is thought to be a reasonable length of time for a campaign”. If there was indeed this element of deterrent in the setting of this somewhat generous ration allowance, then it is significant that three Aeginetan obols per day is still an appreciably *lower* level of payment than the one Attic drachma per day given to sailors at this time.

⁹³⁴ And if not a normal level for hoplites (and indeed other infantry), then a high one; see previous note.

Pritchett argues that there was no difference between the rates of pay for hoplites and crewmen, and that both were normally paid at a level comparable to other sorts of public service; he also suggests that “if pay for army service was not instituted at the same time as dikastic misthos [i.e. jury pay], it may be expected to have followed soon thereafter”.⁹³⁵ In other words, that pay for both hoplites and juries was introduced by Pericles. There is however good evidence to suggest that sailors in the fleet were being paid long before money was routinely given for these public services in Athens, and that they were paid more generously. The sailors at Salamis were all given money, though this was a singular payment and not any sort of wage. Plutarch states, perfectly plausibly, that the tribute from the allied states was used to pay wages to oarsmen in the years between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.⁹³⁶ In his campaign against the Persian stronghold of Eion 477 BC, Kimon is said to have ransomed the captured prisoners to provide his sailors with pay.⁹³⁷ In addition, convincing arguments can be made to suggest that the usual pay for trireme crews was a drachma a day in the fifth century BC; twice as much as the usual daily rate of a hoplite or juror in that period, and well within the realms of gainful employment.⁹³⁸ In 415 BC, the Eggestans sent Athens money to cover the wage bill of a 60-ship trireme fleet for a month.⁹³⁹ The amount was 60 talents, in other words a drachma per day for each of the 200 crew. Almost two decades earlier, an inscribed account for an Athenian naval campaign strongly suggests that the same assumption regarding naval pay was being made.⁹⁴⁰ The campaign is narrated relatively fully in ten chapters by Thucydides, including a full battle report and a pair of short speeches.⁹⁴¹ In brief, a ten-ship squadron was sent to Corcyra to counter Corinthian activity in that area. A short time later, the Corinthian and Corcyraean fleets fought a sea-battle off Sybota, with the ten Athenian ships participating, though cautiously, on the side of the islanders. During the closing stages of the battle, a second Athenian fleet, 20 triremes strong, arrived on the scene. Shortly after the battle, there was a brief round of diplomacy with the now outmatched Corinthians, after which the Athenian fleet returned home. There is no explicit indication of the campaign’s duration, but the narrative suggests that the Athenian intervention in Corcyra was brief, and certainly completed within the course of a single summer. In terms of duration, all that the inscription implies is a gap of 23 days between the launching of the two fleets, or at least between the payments made to the respective commanders of these expeditions.⁹⁴²

⁹³⁵ Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, vol. 1, p. 13

⁹³⁶ Payments for the sailors at Salamis; according to [Aristotle] (*Constitution of Athens*, 23.1) each man was given 8 drachmae to support himself and his family by the Council of the Areopagus. Wages for trireme crews during the pentekontaetia; Plutarch, *Life of Kimon*, 11.2, cf. *Life of Pericles*, 11.4.

⁹³⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Kimon*, 7

⁹³⁸ It is worth noting that, even if Pritchett is correct to argue a usual rate of three obols a day for sailors, it was very common in the classical period for triremes to be in service for long periods of time; thus they would be likely to qualify for the higher rate of a drachma a day given for extended service.

⁹³⁹ Thucydides, 6.8

⁹⁴⁰ IG I³ 364=ML 61=Fornara 126

⁹⁴¹ Thucydides, 1.45-55.

⁹⁴² This is based on the virtually certain restoration of “first” in line 22, making the payments for both fleets occur in the same prytany. Gomme (*HCT*, vol. 1, pp. 196-7) admits that there are other formal possibilities, and his statement that “almost all modern scholars agree on this” remains true today; see for example Hornblower, *Commentary*, ad loc 1.50.5

Of most relevance to the present discussion on levels of sailor's pay are the figures given in the inscription for the total amounts expended on the squadrons.⁹⁴³ These monies were entrusted to the relevant *strategoï*, whose predominant expense on such a campaign would have been payment of wages to the crews.⁹⁴⁴ It is unfortunate therefore that the amounts depend on restorations; but these are relatively secure and the stone makes a useful contribution to this discussion. The first figure, on line 12, relates to the first squadron, of ten ships. There are two blank spaces for figures, which can be most minimally restored to give a figure of 26 talents.⁹⁴⁵ Assuming this to be correct, the generals would have had enough money to give each of the 2,000 crewmen manning their vessels a drachma a day for 78 days; such a time-scale accords very well with Thucydides' narrative. If however we assume that the rate of pay was only 3 obols per day, this would represent over 5 months' worth of pay for the crews, which is difficult to reconcile with Thucydides' description of the campaign. In other words, "the smallest restorations that are epigraphically possible support a minimum rate of 1 dr. p.d for the rowers."⁹⁴⁶

The second figure, in line 23, is more uncertain. There is one space on the stone for the amount, which limits the number of formal possibilities. As this sum related to a squadron of 20 ships, ten talents would seem too small an amount; as the fleet was deployed only on a short commission, 100 talents would seem to large. 50 talents is therefore is the most likely figure, and the one accepted by most scholars.⁹⁴⁷ At a drachma per day, this money could have kept the sailors paid for 75 days.⁹⁴⁸ This restoration is not entirely unproblematic, as it gives more money than this fleet probably needed; it was probably not in service for longer than two months. However, this problem is compounded if we assume anything less than a drachma per day as the rate for pay for the sailors; if the rate was only 3 obols per day, the second set of generals had funds enough for five months. It is possible that the 50 talents were envisioned as a general fund to pay the expenses for both fleets, which evidently operated together in Corcyra. In any case, the scale of payments given for these fleets make it highly unlikely that anything less than a drachma per day was given to the sailors.⁹⁴⁹

⁹⁴³ IG I³ 364, ll. 12 and 23.

⁹⁴⁴ The ship's captains are likely to have been responsible for the costs of up keeping the vessels and any bonus payments to sailors, and nothing in either the inscription or Thucydides' account (neither his description of the launching of the fleets, nor his narrative of the events) suggest that any additional troops were carried by these fleets. Virtually all of the cash given to the *strategoï*, then, was used for the basic pay the sailors.

⁹⁴⁵ 66 talents would be the next smallest possible restoration, which would seem absurdly large for this fleet.

⁹⁴⁶ Loomis, *Wages*, p. 39

⁹⁴⁷ Fornara and Meiggs both resorted 50, and it is accepted by Hornblower (*Commentary*, vol. 1, p.88, ad loc 1.45.2)

⁹⁴⁸ Again, a rate of 3 obols per day would suggest a fleet in commission for 5 months, which is not compatible with Thucydides' narrative.

⁹⁴⁹ Similar conclusions have been reached by Fornara ('Samian War', pp. 12-14) regarding the inscription IG I³ 363, a fragmentary inscription recording expenses for the siege of Samos between 441 and 439 BC, though this is not a short term fleet and so not directly relevant to the argument here. The minimum restored figures suggest payments at a rate of 1 talent per ship per month. While Loomis (*Wages*, p. 39) is correct to point out that this argument is somewhat "based on circular reasoning", the figures are nevertheless hard to reconcile with rates of pay lower than a drachma per day.

When the Persian satrap Tissaphernes reckoned up the cost of paying the wages of the Peloponnesian fleet at a drachma per head per day, he was no doubt basing his figure on the usual Athenian rate.⁹⁵⁰ However, he needed the permission of the Great King to make payments on this scale, and suggested paying three obols a day in the meantime, raising the pay to the “full drachma” upon obtaining royal consent.⁹⁵¹ Gabrielsen argues correctly that this phrase strongly suggests that a drachma per day was the level of pay expected by oarsmen at this time, in both the Athenian and the Peloponnesian navies.⁹⁵² When Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes on how much money to pay crewmen, he suggested that he would do well to follow the Athenian practice:

Athênaioi ek pleonos chronou epistêmones ontês tou nautikou triôbolon tois heautôn didoasin, ou tosouton peniai hoson hina autôn mê hoi nautai ek periousias hubrizontes hoi men ta sômata cheirô echôsi dapanôntes es toiauta aph' hôn hê astheneia xumbainei, hoi de tas naus apoleipôsin ouch hupolipontes es homêreian ton prosopheilomenon misthon

The Athenians, who had had experience in naval matters for a long time, gave only three obols to their sailors, not so much through lack of money as with the purpose of keeping their sailors insolent by reason of abundance; for some would injure their health by spending their money on things which bring sickness, while others would not desert their ships, for they would not leave behind part of their pay that was still due.⁹⁵³

As Morrison and Williams have argued, Alcibiades is here referring to the Athenian practice of giving their sailors half of their pay, three obols, while on campaign, with the balance withheld to prevent drunkenness and desertion.⁹⁵⁴ The practice of withholding pay in the Athenian navy is attested in relation to the fourth century,⁹⁵⁵ and a phrase in Aristophanes' *Knights* indicates that during the Peloponnesian war at least the balance should have been made good “when they [i.e. the sailors] come into port.”⁹⁵⁶ That this was a policy aim for the rejuvenated Demos in the play suggests that the real-life sailors were having trouble getting their dues in the 420s BC, a time when Athens' revenue was relatively secure and she still had her 1,000 talent reserve intact upon the acropolis. Though Athens' financial situation was far worse in the wake of Sicily, it is likely that the wage expected by Athenian trireme crews was still a “full drachma” per day, and there is no direct evidence to suggest that the Athenians deliberately reduced naval wages at this time.⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁵⁰ Thucydides, 8.29, cf. 8.45. The unlikely alternative, as Andrewes (*HCT*, ad loc 8.45) pointed out, is to assume that Tissaphernes immediately agreed to double sailors' wages.

⁹⁵¹ Thucydides, 8.29.1

⁹⁵² Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 112.

⁹⁵³ Thucydides, 8.45.

⁹⁵⁴ Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships*, pp. 269 ff, followed by Gabrielsen, *Athenian Navy*, p. 112.

⁹⁵⁵ Polyeanus, *Strategems*, 3.9.51

⁹⁵⁶ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 1366-7. The line also suggests that this policy is not operating efficiently at this time. *Knights* was performed in 424 BC.

⁹⁵⁷ Andrewes (*HCT*, vol. 5, p. 97 ad loc 8.45.2) regarded the passage of Xenophon discussed below as proof of an Athenian pay cut in 413 BC, but it falls far short of being so. The statement in Plutarch (*Alcibiades*, 35) that the Athenian general had trouble raising three obols for his men at a time when Lysander and the Persians were paying theirs four need refer to nothing more than the cash in hand given on campaign. In any case, Plutarch's statement is probably based on nothing more than his interpretation of this passage of Xenophon, and so it has little value as independent testimony.

If it is accepted that the Athenian navy, in theory at least, paid three obols per day to their sailors on campaign and a further three for each day when they returned to port, there remains the question of how to interpret Lysander and Cyrus' discussions, reported by Xenophon, regarding naval finances in 406 BC:

ekeleuon auton taxai tōi nautēi drachmēn Attikēn, didaskontes hoti, an houtos ho misthos genētai, hoi tōn Athēnaiōn nautai apoleipsousi tas naus, kai meîō chrēmata analōsei. ho de kalōs men ephē autous legein, ou dunaton d' einai par' ha basileus epesteilen autōi alla poiein. einai de kai tas sunthēkas houtōs echousas, triakonta mnas hekastēi nēi tou mēnos didonai, hoposas an boulōntai trephein Lakedaimonioi. ho de Lusandros tote men esiōpēse: meta de to deipnon, epei autōi propiōn ho Kuros ēreto ti an malista charizoito poiōn, eipen hoti ei pros ton misthon hekastōi nautēi obolon prostheiēs. ek de toutou tettares oboloi ēn ho misthos, proteron de triōbolon.

They [the Spartan ambassadors] urged him to make the wage of each sailor an Attic drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less money. He replied that their plan was a good one, but that it was not possible for him to act contrary to the King's instructions; besides, the original compact ran in this way, that the King should give thirty mina per month to each ship, whatever number of ships the Lacedaimonians might wish to maintain. Lysander accordingly dropped the matter for the moment; but after dinner, when Cyrus drank his health and asked him by what act he could gratify him most, Lysander replied: "By adding an obol to the pay of each sailor." And from this time forth the wage was four obols, whereas it had previously been three.⁹⁵⁸

At first glance, these discussions suggest that the Athenian rate of pay was not as much as a drachma per day; Lysander and the Peloponnesian ambassadors argued that if such a rate was offered in the Peloponnesian navy, they would have been able to poach rowers from the presumably less generous Athenians. On the view of Athenian pay advocated in this study, Cyrus' offer to raise the pay given by an obol per day would still leave the Peloponnesian sailors getting, at least in theory, a total salary of two obols per day *less* than their Athenian counterparts. This is problematic, but it is not a fatal objection. The issue for the sailors looking for the best deal would not simply be one of which navy offered the highest daily wage, but also which one was most likely to be able to make good on its offers, and which side was most likely to win the war. Cyrus and Lysander's tactic here seems to have been to outbid the Athenians with regard to the amount of pay actually given out while on campaign. No doubt this appealed to many of the crewmen in Athens' fleet. In the more challenging times following the failure of the Sicilian invasion in 413 BC, the Persian-sponsored Spartans would doubtless have seemed more able to give regular pay; this was especially the case, as Cyrus was able to settle all arrears for Peloponnesian sailors, and even give them a month's pay in advance.⁹⁵⁹ With the balance of power at sea no longer overwhelmingly in favour of the Athenians and their sources of revenue under extreme pressure, returning safely to the Piraeus to claim the remainder of one's pay would

⁹⁵⁸ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.4-7

⁹⁵⁹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.7

not have seemed such an attractive or likely scenario as it had in previous years. The greater levels of ‘cash in hand’ offered by the Peloponnesians was therefore a big incentive, particularly for those crewmen with the fewest ties to Athens. It seems that Cyrus realized that a modest level of pay that could be guaranteed and given in full was a better incentive (and cheaper for Persian coffers) than a large increase that would not necessarily be sanctioned and sustained in the future. It is worth pointing out that the underlying assumption in the discussion between Cyrus and Lysander is the same as that which underpinned the thinking of Thucydides and the agents in his work; that operating the right economic levers was the best way to influence naval recruitment. Neither author was a lover of the men who crewed the navies, but it would be unwise to dismiss their entire approach to this area as product of their bias.

The evidence we have suggests, though not quite conclusively, that trireme crews, for most of the period under discussion, expected to receive eventual payment of a drachma per day; whether Athens was always able to meet such expectations was another matter entirely. This conclusion should not be surprising, nor should this be seen as a relatively high wage. The same amount was given to building workers in last decade of the fifth century,⁹⁶⁰ and to a band of Thracian mercenaries in 413 BC.⁹⁶¹ It would be surprising to conclude that the trireme crews of Athens received less pay than these people; indeed, there is explicit evidence to suggest that the sailors would have balked at such a situation; Dicaeopolis, the hero of Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, assumes that the top-flight oarsmen would have resented getting less money than a bunch of Thracian sell-swords.⁹⁶²

The drachma a day for the hoplites at Potidaea and Sicily merely raised their wage to the standard level earned by trireme crews, to compensate them for being away from their homes and their regular work for a long period of time; Thucydides was here emphasizing the expensiveness and lavishness of these campaigns, and thus labours the point that hoplites were paid the same “full-time” wages as trireme crewmen.⁹⁶³ The navy as an institution, therefore, recruited its rowers on

⁹⁶⁰ IG I³ 475 and 476; see discussion below

⁹⁶¹ Thucydides, 7.27

⁹⁶² Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, ll. 151, quoted below. If we were to accept the conclusion that the Athenian trireme crews were paid less than such people, it would be a significant piece of evidence suggesting their lack of political muscle in Athens.

⁹⁶³ Other conclusions have been reached regarding levels of pay. Amit (*Athens and the Sea*, pp. 51-2) suggests that a rate of 3 obols was usual up until the Peloponnesian war, when it rose to a drachma, only to be reduced again in the wake of Sicily. In the fourth century, the money given was usually just for rations. He thus concludes that a man could not support a family if he worked for 8 months in the navy, and would need to find other work. As noted above, Pritchett (*Greek State at War* Vol. 1, p. 23-4) regarded 3 obols as the usual rate for both sailors and soldiers in the fifth century BC, as well as other sorts of public service, and thus that such service was “financially unremunerative”. Testimony of a drachma a day is interpreted by Pritchett as a hardship allowance for extended service. Rosivach (‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 54) generally follows Pritchett’s interpretation. Loomis (*Wages*, pp. 55-8) argues that pay for soldiers and sailors was the same; they were usually paid a drachma per day for much of the fifth century BC, up until the wake of the Sicilian disaster when it was reduced to three obols. He argues that the evidence for the fourth century BC suggests pay for soldiers of 2 obols a day for rations, often supplemented by 4 obols of actual pay, for a total wage of a drachma per day. Trundle (*Mercenaries*, p. 96-7), against Pritchett, views the wages of crews and hoplites as being nearer to the rates given to professionals and mercenaries, rather than those given to public servants; I agree in the case of sailors, but not in the case of soldiers. Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 110-8 ff) essentially follows Morrison (*Athenian Trireme*, p. 119) in viewing a drachma per day as the expected standard rate for naval crews throughout the period, a portion of which was routinely withheld; he additionally points out that the

what might loosely be termed a ‘professional’ basis, in that the sailors were given a viable living wage for their efforts, rather than compensation or expenses for performing a public duty. This contrast between the remuneration given to sailors and hoplites is made clear by two of the pieces of evidence cited above, which both deal with relatively short campaigns. The first of these is the incomplete inscription that records the expenses paid for the two squadrons sent to Corcyra in 433 BC, and for which the smallest plausible restorations strongly suggest a minimum rate of a drachma per day per sailor.⁹⁶⁴ This contrasts with the second document; the treaty quoted in Thucydides that was agreed between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis in 420 BC. Under its terms, infantry were to be provided a generous ration allowance, equivalent to just over four obols per day. This was paid by the city that called the army together, but only after 30 days; any provisioning before that was left to the individuals, or their home cities, to provide. These testimonies, though 13 years apart, seem to give a clear indication of the difference in the nature and the scale of payment between hoplites and sailors. Along with the level of remuneration, the perception of what the money was for was of importance. The money given to hoplites in this instance, as was often the case with public office-holders, was presented as “ration-money”,⁹⁶⁵ while trireme crew were usually given *misthos*, “wages”; the latter term implied a more mercenary or vocational situation. The terminology, though inconsistent, hints at a perceived difference between public service and professional work. This difference is made clearer in my view by the differing levels of remuneration given to sailors on the one hand and hoplites and office-holders on the other.

A Sliding Scale of Professionalism

The fact that the navy paid a ‘living wage’ does not mean that everyone who crewed triremes depended solely upon such work for their livelihood. In fact we can be absolutely certain that not every man in the Athenian navy was a professional, in the sense that they rowed full-time. The vast difference in the numbers of ships in service in any given year is itself sufficient testament to that, as is the indefinite length of time that any given fleet spent at sea. Amongst the Athenian naval crews, there was probably a sliding scale ranging from the career trireme crewmen through to the man who once was conscripted to pull an oar in a national emergency. The ad hoc labour market operating in the Piraeus and the high, though inconstant, demand for rowers and specialist crews must have led to a somewhat chaotic, shifting and indefinite situation.⁹⁶⁶ Even a member of the “naval mob” might have been unable to find himself a berth on a trireme in a very quiet year, whereas trierarchs might have needed to trawl fishing boats and merchant ships to find enough rowers if a big fleet was being launched and demand was high. Aristotle’s description of

crewmen often did not receive such remuneration from the state, and they increasingly looked to the private sector (i.e. the *trierarchs*) for their pay. He also emphasizes that they often had additional sources of income, principally bonus payments from their captain.

⁹⁶⁴ IG I³ 364=ML 61=Formara 126, cf. Thucydides, 1.45 and 1.51.

⁹⁶⁵ This was the case even when, as with the treaty of 420 BC, the amount of money given was larger than what was required for a man’s rations.

⁹⁶⁶ The chaos caused in Athens by the launching of a large fleet is described vividly, and probably accurately, by Aristophanes: *Acharnians*, ll. 545-55

“the maritime sort” of people seems to indicate that there was a good deal of fluidity between such areas as fishing, ferrying, crewing triremes, and the merchant marine.⁹⁶⁷

Not all ‘professional’ or frequent rowers would have been Athenian citizens. No doubt many of the non-Athenians working in the fleet also depended on trireme service for their livelihood. As had been discussed previously, the competition for such oarsmen between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War is well attested, and the opportunities for employment discussed above were available and attractive to Athenians and non-Athenians alike. Van Wees argues that many of those who came to Athens, and who subsequently settled there, did so “precisely because they hoped to find semi-permanent employment as rowers”,⁹⁶⁸ this was probably more the case in the fifth century than the fourth. Like the “naval mob”, such men could also find work in related fields when rowing in triremes was unavailable, and vice versa for those who came to Athens for opportunities in the merchant fleet and other naval industries.

There were also evidently a large number of men who rowed in triremes occasionally, returning to other occupations when their fleet returned to the Piraeus. These men had an “economic relation to their rowing that was substantially different” from the ‘professionals’ discussed above, in that their main livelihood was earned elsewhere.⁹⁶⁹ It is likely that a substantial number of this group were ‘seasonal’ rowers, who rowed only at certain times of the year. This group of seasonal rowers would have largely comprised poor farmers or farm-labourers, who took to rowing for extra income in the slow part of the agricultural calendar.⁹⁷⁰ Rosivach has put forward a convincing argument to suggest that “only farmers would appear to have been seasonally unemployed in sufficient numbers to man the large summer fleets”,⁹⁷¹ especially those farmers who had been dispossessed by the annual invasions of the Spartan army during the early years of the Peloponnesian War, and who would therefore have been available for the retaliatory strikes made by the Athenian navy. While his discussion is confined to the years 433-426 BC, his argument probably has relevance in other periods too. 431-426 BC was probably unusual in the scale of this employment of farmers and farm-labourers, but the phenomenon itself was probably not completely unique to this period. The motivation for such seasonal employees taking work in the trireme fleet is impossible to establish with certainty, but one can speculate; the desire for retaliation against Spartan incursion into Attica was probably a substantial motive for those

⁹⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1291b18-25

⁹⁶⁸ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 211

⁹⁶⁹ Rosivach, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 53.

⁹⁷⁰ Rosivach (‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 53) argues that “Greek farmers harvested their grain in mid- to late May...[and]...they picked their grapes in September”, and that the timing of large short-term summer fleets he discusses (pp. 44 ff.) fell between these times.

⁹⁷¹ Rosivach, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 54. He is probably wrong to follow Pritchett and envisage a rate of three obols per man per day for ‘summer’ fleets, and a drachma a day per man for fleets manned by professionals and in service for extended periods of time. Whilst such a distinction might have been made for hoplite armies that found themselves in service for longer than a summer, it seems that the rate of pay given to rowers in the Athenian navy by the state was always a drachma per day. In any case, as discussed in Part One of this work, it would not have always been obvious from the outset whether a naval expedition was to be a short or long term deployment, and such uncertainty must tell against any differentiation in pay between rowers in “summer” fleets and those in extended campaigns.

rowing the large “summer fleets” of the Peloponnesian war. In other times, Rosivach argues that occasional navy service was both “uniquely attractive”⁹⁷² and “economically advantageous”⁹⁷³ for poor Athenian farmers, and that supplementing their income in an otherwise idle part of the year was their principal motivation.⁹⁷⁴ Slaves were also hired out to ships by their owners for similar economic reasons.⁹⁷⁵

As well as those who rowed during the off-season of their regular work, there would have been many who rowed occasionally on long-lasting campaigns. It seems likely that the lead characters and chorus-men of some of Aristophanes’ plays, who are often presented as poor-to-averagely-wealthy farmers, could fairly be considered in this category of occasional rowers. The chorus-men of the *Wasps*, for example, seem to have been farmers rather than members of the “naval mob”,⁹⁷⁶ but they certainly claim to have done some rowing, and to have taken part, in some capacity, in several extended campaigns.⁹⁷⁷ The men who volunteered to serve for the Sicilian expedition probably fall into this category too; the scale of the invasion force, as well as simultaneous operations in other parts of the Mediterranean,⁹⁷⁸ must lead to the conclusion that the “professionals” alone would not have been able to provide all the necessary man-power, and that many joining this emphatically long-term fleet were doing so in preference to their regular occupations.⁹⁷⁹ Thucydides accounts for the keenness to participate in this expedition as follows:

*ho de polus homilos stratiôtês en te tôi paronti argurion oisein kai prosktêsesthai dunamin hothen aidion misthophoran huparxein*⁹⁸⁰

The masses in general and those on the expedition saw the prospect of getting pay for the time being⁹⁸¹ and of adding to the Empire so as to secure permanent paid employment in the future.⁹⁸²

⁹⁷² Rosivach, ‘Manning the Fleet’, p. 55

⁹⁷³ Rosivach, ‘Manning the Fleet’, p. 54

⁹⁷⁴ This picture contrasts somewhat with the argument in Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 98), related to the service of trierarchs, that “naval expeditions often coincided with the critical period of peak agricultural activity when the crops needed care or harvesting (barley and wheat become ripe between mid-May and the end of June)”

⁹⁷⁵ [Xenophon], 1.11.

⁹⁷⁶ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, p.264 ff. An alternative interpretation would be to see the old jurors as members of the “naval mob” who earned sufficient money to buy some farm land, though not enough to keep themselves in leisure in old age, and hence their dependency on the jury pay.

⁹⁷⁷ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, ll. 1096-7 (Chorus-men serving as oarsmen); ll. 354-6 and 236-7 (serving in some capacity on extended campaigns).

⁹⁷⁸ In 414 BC, for example, a fleet was sent to Naupactos (fleet 102, discussed in detail in a previous section) and remained on station for over three years, and another (fleet 108, Thucydides, 7.9) was sent to blockade Amphipolis. Such long-term commissions, particularly that to Naupactos, demanded “professional” manpower.

⁹⁷⁹ Thucydides, 6.31 remarks at its outset that the expedition was not uniquely vast in terms of the number of ships and men, but in the fact that a fleet of such size was intended to be in commission for an extended period of time.

⁹⁸⁰ Thucydides, 6.24.3

⁹⁸¹ This, of course, would be the same for any other long-term naval expedition, so perhaps should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient factor for these occasional rowers. It might have been the case that, whilst state pay was the same for this expedition as for any other, the trierarchs may have been more competitive, and thus more generous with bonuses, than was the case in other fleets.

⁹⁸² This would not be the case for most long-term expeditions, as (potential) conquest on such a scale was unusual. The “paid employment in the future” is not necessarily to be interpreted as *naval* employment; the revenue from the Empire not only provided allowances for public services, but also funded gainful employment in, for example, the manifold construction industries described by Plutarch (*Pericles*, 12).

Such occasional rowers are testament to the diverse and varied nature of economic activity amongst Athens' poorer classes; van Wees is mostly accurate when he describes the navy as a whole as being "manned by lower-class professionals",⁹⁸³ though I would prefer to reserve the word 'professionals' for the full-time trireme crew described above. As Rosivach has argued, it was important "both from an economic and a psychological point of view" for these 'seasonal' and 'occasional' rowers to not be fully dependent upon the navy for their livelihood, and that it was "something which they did in addition to (or instead of) what they normally did."⁹⁸⁴

At the farthest end of this sliding scale there were those Athenians⁹⁸⁵ who rarely acted as trireme crew, and perhaps most of these would only have rowed when compelled to do so. Conscription was the exception rather than the rule for the majority of the classical period; the incidences we know of are connected with state emergencies.⁹⁸⁶ This rarity serves to highlight the voluntary nature of crewing triremes in less desperate circumstances. Doubtless many of the richer citizens of Athens were amongst this group of very occasional crewmen, though amongst the poorer shop-keepers and smallholders too there would have been some who would never have taken an oar unless they were drafted.⁹⁸⁷ Thucydides records an instance where conscription was apparently used raise a fleet's crew, but a specific exclusion was made for the richest two classes of citizen, the *hippies* and the *pentakosiomedimnoi*.⁹⁸⁸ It is worth remembering that the heavy liturgical burden of the trierarchy fell exclusively amongst the very richest individuals, and so many of the Athenian elite, especially in the fifth century, would have been directly and regularly involved with the Athenian navy.⁹⁸⁹ It was thus the *hippeis*, or "knights", who as a group probably had the least direct involvement with the navy. Many of them were probably not rich enough to have regularly undertaken the heavy financial burden of a trierarchy, the most expensive of the liturgies;⁹⁹⁰ they were also not amongst those who crewed the vessels, even on those rare occasions when men were conscripted. It is for this reason that Xenophon makes a particular mention of their presence during the mass call-up for the Arginusae campaign of 406

⁹⁸³ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 213.

⁹⁸⁴ Rosivach, 'Manning the Athenian fleet', p. 53. To avoid possible confusion, I should point out that Rosivach makes this argument in connection with the rowers who manned the "big summer fleets" sent out by Athens between 433 and 426 BC. I am applying his idea expressed here, of men wishing to avoid the potential stigma associated with being a professional rower, to a wider and more general group of 'seasonal' and 'occasional' trireme crews than he did.

⁹⁸⁵ And indeed non-Athenians living in Athens.

⁹⁸⁶ For example, Thucydides, 3.16 (conscripts called up to fight off an imminent Peloponnesian attack in 427 BC); Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.24-5 (the battle of Arginusae, 406 BC).

⁹⁸⁷ cf. Apollodorus' reluctant and poor-quality conscripts; [Demosthenes], 50.7

⁹⁸⁸ Thucydides, 3.16

⁹⁸⁹ In the fourth century, not only were there less ships put out to sea on active duty, but reforms to the trierarchy (on which, see Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, pp. 173-217) resulted in a greater degree of the funding of the ship being shared amongst rich collectives, rather than a single wealthy paymaster/captain. The inevitable result of loosening adherence to "the principle "one man to a ship"" (Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 174) was that fewer rich men in the fourth century BC acquired extensive experience in directly commanding the vessels that they paid for than had been the case in the previous century.

⁹⁹⁰ See Davis, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth*, p.30-1 (cf. *Athenian Propertied Families*, xxvi) on the difficulties of identifying the *Pentakosiomedimnoi*, let alone the *Hippeis*, as part of the liturgical class.

BC.⁹⁹¹ It is not unlikely that they served as marines rather than sailors, as Kimon and his friends did at Salamis,⁹⁹² but it is impossible to be certain.

Professionalism and the navy: conclusion

Exactly how many people occupied each of these broad categories is impossible to determine,⁹⁹³ as is the relative balance of social statuses at each point of the sliding scale.⁹⁹⁴ What is clear is that, outside of the mass levies in times of emergency, it is only at the level of the trierarchs that serving on a trireme should be considered to be solely a patriotic duty or a “quasi-liturgical” obligation.⁹⁹⁵ While the professional rowers and the occasional rowers, as Rosivach argues, had differing economic relations to the navy, the navy itself was nevertheless a voluntary institution in which individuals were paid a living wage for their work, rather than expenses or ration-money for their period of service. As well being given a higher rate of pay, it was not uncommon for sailors (in fourth century BC at least) to be given advances prior to the expedition’s launch.⁹⁹⁶ Skilled rowers and sailors could have expected to be given additional bonus payments by their captains. In addition to this, employment as a rower in the navy led for some to promotion to a position amongst the *hyperesia*, or “specialist crew”,⁹⁹⁷ it is only a little too fanciful or anachronistic to speak in terms of a career path on board triremes. The contrast between the naval labour market on the one hand, and the arrangements for provisioning soldiers and public servants on the other, seems vivid.

3: Fighting at Sea

Aristophanes’ Old Sailors: patriotic sea fighters?

In making the contrast between paid professionals and compensated public servants, one must be careful not to draw distinctions too sharply. There is some evidence, particularly from Aristophanes, that crewing triremes was indeed seen in the similar way to hoplite service; a praiseworthy and patriotic duty in defence of one’s city. It is not surprising many such sentiments come from the plays of Aristophanes, but even these have been described, only a little too dismissively, as “a few back-handed compliments”.⁹⁹⁸ One often quoted example is the remark of Dicaeopolis in *Acharnians* describing the highest rank of oarsmen, the *thranitai*, as the “saviours of the city”.⁹⁹⁹ What needs to be emphasized more with regard to this remark is both

⁹⁹¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.24.

⁹⁹² Plutarch, *Kimon*, 5.

⁹⁹³ I suggested in a previous section that the 60 ships in regular service to which Plutarch (*Pericles*, 11) refers may be indicative the fifth-century demand for full-time crewmen, suggesting a figure of around 12,000 “professional” trireme crew in Athens at this time. I also emphasized that very little weight should be attached to this figure, though it is probably of the right order of magnitude.

⁹⁹⁴ As has been noted, Rosivach argued that foreigners would be disproportionately represented in the long-term fleets, attracted by the prospect of extended employment.

⁹⁹⁵ Whitehead, *Athenian Metic*, p. 86

⁹⁹⁶ For example, [Demosthenes], 50.7; 51.11.

⁹⁹⁷ Aristophanes, *Knights*, 542-4

⁹⁹⁸ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 200

⁹⁹⁹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, l. 162.

the context and the somewhat ironic tone; these “bulwarks of the city”¹⁰⁰⁰ are resenting some foreign mercenaries receiving decent pay, and presumably higher wages than them:

Theôros: *toutois ean tis duo drachmas misthon didô katapeltasontai tèn Boiôtian holên.*

Dikaiopolis: *toisdi duo drachmas tois apepsôlêmenois; hupostenoi mentan ho thranitês leôs ho sôsipolis.*

Theorus: These men, if you pay them two drachmas, will pelticize all Boeotia into the ground.

Dikaiopolis: Two drachmas for these foreskinless wonders? The upper-oar folk, saviours of the city, would resent that a bit, I fancy!¹⁰⁰¹

Many other passages in Aristophanes refer to past services,¹⁰⁰² including naval services, though as van Wees argues, these are generally painting a picture of an “idealised earlier generation...credited indiscriminately with naval and infantry victories over Persia”,¹⁰⁰³ which are then contrasted favourably with the youth of Aristophanes’ own day. Even in such apparently praiseworthy passages, the economic realities of the Athenian navy show through. In an exhortation to Poseidon, the chorus of *Knights* claim that he is pleased by “triremes, with their deep-blue rams, their swiftness...and their pay.”¹⁰⁰⁴ Neither the true patriotic Persian-fighting sailor of the past, nor the weak and corrupt young men and insubordinate hired rowers of the present,¹⁰⁰⁵ need be accepted as the literal truth. Despite some of Aristophanes’ rose-tinted rhetoric about the older generation, the navy and its crewmen were probably not, for the most part, motivated primarily by their desire to serve Athens; what is clear from the evidence discussed in the previous section is that the navy was most likely a wage-paying “professional” institution even at the time when the fleet’s efforts were directed primarily against the Persians. According to [Aristotle], this fact was recognized early, and it was the people who *paid* the rowers at Salamis who first gained political credit for the victory.¹⁰⁰⁶ There is much truth in the argument of van Wees; that the connection between the service of poor citizens in the navy and the growth of democracy was to a large extent a retrospective justification, rather than a primary cause.¹⁰⁰⁷

A central prop of the argument connecting naval service with political power and privileges is the opening statement of the treatise of the Old Oligarch, a work usually dated to the 420s BC, which is interpreted as suggesting that the poor exercised the greatest political influence in the city due to the value to Athens of their naval skills.¹⁰⁰⁸ Some near-contemporaneous evidence regarding

¹⁰⁰⁰ This is Sommerstein’s translation of the phrase rendered above as “saviours of the city”.

¹⁰⁰¹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 159-63

¹⁰⁰² Examples of passages extolling the glories of the past in the works of Aristophanes include *Acharnians*, l. 181 ff, 694 ff; *Knights*, 567 ff, 781 ff, 1366-8; *Wasps*, 678, 684-5, 711, and 1075-1121.

¹⁰⁰³ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 82

¹⁰⁰⁴ Aristophanes, *Knights*, 554-5

¹⁰⁰⁵ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1076

¹⁰⁰⁶ [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 23

¹⁰⁰⁷ Van Wees, ‘Myth of the Middle Class Army’, p. 83

¹⁰⁰⁸ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.1-2. See Part Two for further discussion of this passage and its implications.

the relation between naval crews and the democracy is more ambiguous. These two examples from Aristophanes plays both relate to the wider respect and political capital that was (or was not) accorded to the naval crews. The first is from *Acharnians*, produced in 425 BC.

Choros: *hoi gerontes hoi palaioi memphomestha têi polei: ou gar axiôs ekeinôn hôn enaumachêsamen gêroboskoumesth' huph' humôn, alla deina paschomen*

Chorus-leader: You do not care for us in our age in a manner worthy of the naval battles we have fought; instead you treat us disgracefully.¹⁰⁰⁹

The second comes from *Wasps*, produced three years later in 422 BC.

Choros: *touto d' est' algiston hêmin, ên tis astrateutos ôn ekrophêi ton misthon hêmôn, têsde tês chôras huper mête kôpên mête lonchên mête phluktainan labôn.*

Chorus-leader: that is very galling for us [the old men of the juries], if someone who evades military service gulps down our pay, when he's never had an oar or a spear or a blister in his hand.¹⁰¹⁰

The first of these passages suggests that past service in naval battles *should* accord respect and even political favour, but that it was not in fact forthcoming at Athens. The second also suggests that there was very little connection between military service more generally and political privileges, in this case, jury pay.¹⁰¹¹ These passages together should be weighed against the Old Oligarch, as they somewhat contradict his simplistic scheme.¹⁰¹² The testimony of the Old Oligarch, like these Aristophanes passages, cannot be treated as presenting objective factual information, and the uncritical accepting of his statement has led to much misunderstanding regarding the relationship between the navy and democracy.

The Battle of Salamis

In the rose-tinted extolling of the older generation present in the works of Aristophanes, it is the conflicts of the Persian Wars that, understandably, are especially praised. While the individual campaigns and battle are often not rigorously differentiated, it is notable that it is the hoplite battle of Marathon fought in 490 BC, rather than the naval battle of Salamis ten years later, that is more frequently singled out.¹⁰¹³ The playwright Aeschylus is thought to have fought in both battles, but mentioned only Marathon in his epitaph. The ideological battle over the significance of Salamis is an interesting story in itself. The earliest extant ancient source that describes the

¹⁰⁰⁹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 677-8

¹⁰¹⁰ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1117-9, cf. for example 678, 684 and 1121. The idea that the profits and privileges of military victories and the Empire were not being accorded to those who did the work for it is a recurrent theme in the play.

¹⁰¹¹ cf. Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae* ll. 832-9, where the chorus leader suggests that the good service of brave men ought to bring tangible recognition to their mothers in terms of seating at festivals.

¹⁰¹² cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs*, ll. 692 ff., where Aristophanes contrasts the giving of citizen rights to slaves who had served in one naval battle (*Arginusae*), while at the same time denying rights to men who had participated in many. Once again, it suggests a situation far more complex than the simple scheme proposed by the Old Oligarch.

¹⁰¹³ See the passages cited above, note 1002.

battle is Aeschylus' tragedy *Persians* produced in 472 BC. Set in the royal court just after the battle, Xerxes' mother awaits news of her son's fate from a messenger. As van Wees has pointed out, the play displays some curious attitudes in relation to the navy and the battle of Salamis.¹⁰¹⁴ While the naval action is described in full and gruesome detail, the messenger's report gave great prominence to an isolated skirmish involving hoplites on a small island, which he describes as more calamitous by far for the Persians than anything that happened at sea.¹⁰¹⁵ When the Queen enquires about the Athenians, she is told their strength lies in their army, and their supplies of silver; no word is mentioned of her navy or sailors.¹⁰¹⁶ It was noted above that the credit for the victory of Salamis was claimed by (or at least ascribed to) the Council of the Areopagus, who had paid the ships' crew, and who had increased their political power in the years following 480 BC as a result. Marincola has recently argued that Herodotus' account of the battle emphasizes the roles of the Greek leaders, with the common men, "a group that is constantly criticized for its fear and indecision in ancient historiography", as largely scared witless throughout.¹⁰¹⁷ As the comedies of Aristophanes show, the battle of Salamis could by the 420s BC be represented as a glorious victory of the Athenian people as a whole; although it was perhaps less magnificent than the more exclusively Athenian victory at Marathon.¹⁰¹⁸ By the fourth century BC, Plato could claim it was a truth universally acknowledged that the naval fighting at Salamis was the decisive moment in the freeing of Greece from the Persian invaders; he himself, however, was sure that the common knowledge was wrong, and he emphasized the importance of the hoplite battle of Plataea in 479 BC.¹⁰¹⁹ Like Herodotus, Diodorus focused his account on the leaders, with the masses as "victims of fear, dread and disorder".¹⁰²⁰ This is a good demonstration not only of the selectiveness of Greek historical memory, but also the subjectivity and diversity of views ascribed to the same series of events by different people at different times.¹⁰²¹

Ideal Sea Battles

Success in sea battles was conceived of as a matter of skill, *techne*, and experience, *epistemei*, rather than the amateur bravery characteristic of hoplite battles. These two qualities are contrasted by the pair of speeches that Thucydides claims were made by each side on the eve of the Peloponnesian war.¹⁰²² The Corinthian speaker, addressing the Peloponnesian League, claimed superiority in bravery for his audience, and while he conceded to the Athenians a greater level of naval skills, he argues that they would be easily able to buy or learn these arts and thus

¹⁰¹⁴ Van Wees, 'Politics and the battlefield', pp. 158-9, cf. Harrison, *Emptiness of Asia*, p. 97

¹⁰¹⁵ Aeschylus, *Persians*, 435-71 (cf. the different, more restrained, and probably more accurate account of the same land-fight in Herodotus, 8.76 and 95).

¹⁰¹⁶ Aeschylus, *Persians*, 234-40

¹⁰¹⁷ Marincola, 'The Persian wars', p. 119

¹⁰¹⁸ It is worth noting that Thucydides, while his speech-makers tend to make relatively little of the Persian Wars, he has an Athenian ambassador claim sole credit for Marathon, deliberately ignoring the role played by the Plataeans (1.73).

¹⁰¹⁹ Plato, *Laws*, 707 b-c

¹⁰²⁰ Marincola, 'The Persian Wars', p. 119

¹⁰²¹ This is the central argument of Van Wees in 'Politics and the Battlefield', and this article gives many other examples of this kind of reconstructing of the past by the Greeks.

¹⁰²² Thucydides, 1.120-4 and 1.140-4.

win a decisive battle over Athens.¹⁰²³ In the parallel speech made by Pericles to the Athenians, he does not deny that skill was the essential ingredient to deciding success at sea; rather, he develops the point, and suggests that the Peloponnesians would be slow to learn naval skills.¹⁰²⁴ As if to demonstrate this point, Thucydides gives two detailed account of relatively small-scale sea battles, both of which illustrated his perception of the ideal conflict at sea. These battles both took place in 429/8 BC, and involved an Athenian fleet stationed at Naupactos, under the command of Phormio.¹⁰²⁵ Despite being significantly outnumbered in both battles, Phormio's forces won two victories. In the first battle, skill and timing were everything:

kai tēn epicheirēsēsin eph' heautōi te enomizen einai, hopotan boulētai, tōn neōn ameīnon pleousōn, kai tote kallistēn gignesthai... tote dē kata ton kairon touton sēmainei, kai hoi Athēnaioi prospesontes

He [Phormio] considered that, as his ships were the better sailors, he could attack when he liked, and that the best moment for making the attack was when the wind got up...It was at this moment that he gave the signal and the Athenians attacked.¹⁰²⁶

The resulting Athenian victory left the Peloponnesian forces, though reinforced, nervous on the eve of their second battle with Phormio's fleet. In their rousing speech prior to this battle, the Peloponnesian commanders (or rather Thucydides) made an even more explicit discussion of the dynamic of courage and skill:

humōn de oud' hē apeiria tosouton leipetai hoson tolmēi prouchete ... technē de aneu alkēs ouden ōphelei

Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are ahead of him in courage ...skill without courage is no use at all.¹⁰²⁷

Once again, the speech made by Phormio to his sailors can be seen almost as a reply to this one, answering this very point. Phormio, as one might expect, refutes the idea that the Athenians lacked courage, but he did not deny the great value of skill at sea, and indeed elaborated on some of the tactics that capable fleets could use.¹⁰²⁸ He also stated that the type of courage the Peloponnesians had in relation to land battles, far from being enough to overcome their lack of proficiency, could not be transferred to the sea at all.

epeita hōi malista pisteuontes proserchontai, hōs prosēkon sphisin andreiois einai, ou di' allo ti tharsousin ē dia tēn en tōi pezōi empeirian ta pleiō katorthountes, kai oiontai sphisi kai en tōi nautikōi poiēsein to auto. to d' ek tou dikaiou hēmin mallon nun perietai, eiper kai toutois en ekeinōi, epei eupsuchiaī ge ouden propherousi, tōi de hekateroi ti einai empeiroteroi thrasuterōi esmen.

¹⁰²³ Thucydides, 1.121

¹⁰²⁴ Thucydides, 1.142

¹⁰²⁵ A detailed case study of the sequence of Athenian naval operations in Naupactos and their significance is given in Part One, section B of this work.

¹⁰²⁶ Thucydides, 2.84.2-3

¹⁰²⁷ Thucydides, 2.87.4

¹⁰²⁸ Thucydides, 2.89.3 and 8-11.

As for the manliness which they seem to think is a special attribute of theirs, and which is the reason for their confidence when they attack us, their courage only arises from the success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and they think it will be the same story by sea. But this advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but each of us are brave in our area of experience.¹⁰²⁹

Rather than contrast courage and experience, Phormio argued that the one flows from the other. The events of the second battle eventually proved him right in this instance.¹⁰³⁰ At first though, the Peloponnesian fleet started to win the day, capturing several Athenian ships and putting the rest to flight. Then a moment of individual brilliance tipped the balance:

etuche de holkas hormousa meteôros, peri hên hê Attikê naus phthasasa kai peripleusasa têi Leukadiai diôkousêi emballei mesêi kai kataduei...tois men oun Peloponnêsiois genomenou toutou aprosdokêtou te kai para logon phobos empiptei, kai hama ataktôs diôkontes dia to kratein

There happened to be a merchant ship anchored off shore, and the [final fleeing] Athenian ship, reaching it first, circled right round it, and then rammed the pursuing Leucadian boat and swamped her. It was an unexpected and unlikely action, and it caused panic among the Peloponnesians, who at this time, elated by their victory, were sailing up in pursuit in no proper formation.¹⁰³¹

The move here was not lacking in courage, but could only be pulled off by an extremely skilled crew. While everyone on board would have played their part in pulling off such a manoeuvre, most of the credit should be given to the *hyperesia*, and possibly to the captain.¹⁰³² The oarsmen, though they would have to follow their orders briskly¹⁰³³ and maintain the stroke in testing circumstances, could not for the most part see out of the ship; the performance of this audacious move could only be initiated because of the situational awareness and tactical skill of the specialist crew. The outcome of the battle was turned by this single moment, not only one of skill; but skill coupled with a particular sort of audacious bravery that came only with professional mastery.

The contrast between these two ‘ideal’ sea-fights described by Thucydides, and the idea of a set-piece pitched hoplite battle, with armies drawn up on a flat piece of ground and involving no

¹⁰²⁹ Thucydides, 2.89.2-3

¹⁰³⁰ Compare also Diodorus’ account (13.39-40) of the battle of Cynossema in 411 BC where a larger Peloponnesian fleet, superior in *arete* (“military virtue” or “bravery”) are defeated by an Athenian fleet that was superior in *technê*. Strauss, ‘Athenian naval tactics’, p.316.

¹⁰³¹ Thucydides, 2.91.3-4. Note again, as was pointed out in the Naupactos case study, the importance of maintaining a good formation to fight effectively at sea.

¹⁰³² In the fifth century BC, we are still in the age of the amateur gentleman captain. While some would no doubt have been competent seamen and able leaders, many would surely have left the actual running and manoeuvring of the ship to the professionals. We are not told who deserved the credit in this specific case; it is something of a shame that Thucydides chose not to record his name.

¹⁰³³ As Phormio exhorted them to do; Thucydides, 2.89

tactical ploys, individual initiatives or fancy signals, could not be starker.¹⁰³⁴ Thucydides does not quite give any paradigmatic description of the ‘ideal’ hoplite battle to contrast his descriptions of Phormio’s victories at sea. The closest he comes to such an account is the section concerning the battle of Delion¹⁰³⁵ in the winter of 424/3 BC, which Hornblower describes as “one of the more fully and reliably described hoplite battles of classical Greek history”.¹⁰³⁶ This battle featured a head-on clash of heavily armoured men and much up-close killing and shoving of shields,¹⁰³⁷ though the issue seems ultimately to have been decided by the Theban commander, whose redeployment of his cavalry panicked the Athenians and put their army to flight. The only other large-scale infantry engagement described in detail by Thucydides was the battle of Mantinea, fought in the summer of 418 BC. Thucydides states that “utterly outdone in the matter of skill [*epistemei*], the Spartans were that much superior in manly courage [*andreiai*]”;¹⁰³⁸ and it was the Spartans that won the battle. The contrast is made clearer when Thucydides wished to describe a conflict at sea decided *without* clever tactics and skilful manoeuvring; it is notable that he often compared such fights to a battle on land.¹⁰³⁹

There were in fact many battles at sea that were not decided by the technical naval skills of the crew or commander.¹⁰⁴⁰ The relative size of fleets, the numbers of fighting men aboard, the local “terrain” conditions could all be more crucial to the outcome than the skill of the crewmen. Fleets that did not utilize fast manoeuvres and ramming tactics could be described somewhat sneeringly as “old fashioned” or “unskilled”,¹⁰⁴¹ but even battles involving supposedly sophisticated fleets were not infrequently decided by more primitive tactics; the vicious fighting in the harbour of Syracuse in 413 BC is a good example of this,¹⁰⁴² as is the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC.¹⁰⁴³ In this latter encounter, the side with the more skilled crews was defeated by the tactics and organisation of the less skilled Athenian fleet. In a similar way, many hoplite battles were not the “single, magnificent collision of infantry...brutal killing with edged weapons on a battlefield between free men...battle where they face their enemy at arm’s reach to kill and be killed”;¹⁰⁴⁴ hoplites had a wide range combat experiences outside the phalanx, and even the pitched battles involved the use of tactics, deception and stratagems far more often than is sometimes

¹⁰³⁴ An idea which Hanson (‘Hoplite Battle’, p. 201-2) admits is “in some senses an abstraction”, but one for which there can be found in the sources “valid generalizations about the preferred and ideal form of ancient warfare”; evidence describing idealized notions of hoplite warfare includes Herodotus, 9.48-52 and Polybius, 13.3-6

¹⁰³⁵ Thucydides, 4.96-7

¹⁰³⁶ Hornblower, *Commentary*, vol. 2, p. 303

¹⁰³⁷ The debate as to exactly what this “shoving” involved (suggestions have included a mass armoured scrimmage or a series of individual shield-to-shield duals) is summarized by Hornblower, *Commentary*, ad loc 4.96.2

¹⁰³⁸ Thucydides, 5.72.2 *alla malista de kata panta tei empeiriai Lakedaimonioi elassothentes tote tei andreiai edeixan ouch hesson perigenomenoi*

¹⁰³⁹ Thucydides, 1.49, 2.89 and 7.62. See also 4.14, where Thucydides makes a double contrast; the Spartans are said to fight a sea battle from land, and the Athenians a land battle from sea.

¹⁰⁴⁰ By contrast, Rawlings (*Ancient Greeks at War*, p. 122) argues that the relative skill of the conflicting fleets was of primary importance in deciding the outcome of sea battles.

¹⁰⁴¹ Thucydides, 1.49, in reference to the sea-battle between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians in 433 BC. In discussing this battle, Thucydides again contrasts courage and skill; “spirit (*thumoi*) and strength (*rhumei*) counted for more than professional skill (*epistemei*)”

¹⁰⁴² Thucydides, 7.70-1. cf. 7.62 when the tactical circumstances are discussed.

¹⁰⁴³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.24-38

¹⁰⁴⁴ Hanson, *Western Way of War*, pp. 9 and 12.

supposed.¹⁰⁴⁵ However, what is important here is the difference between the concept of the *ideal* hoplite battle (emphasizing bravery, standing one's ground, up close fighting and killing, and collective action) and that of the *ideal* sea battle (emphasizing skill, manoeuvre, evasion, fighting with ships' rams rather than deck-to-deck, and with the potential for individual initiatives). As Thucydides had Phormio state in 429 BC, and as van Wees has argued more recently, "amateur bravery", an ideal that was held in such regard by the Greeks,¹⁰⁴⁶ had "become an irrelevance at sea."¹⁰⁴⁷

Thetes as Hoplites and Marines

While many hoplites, and certainly 'ideal' hoplites, were amateur warriors who served Athens out of a "quasi-liturgical" civic duty, many who fought for the city with shield and spear were not so overtly patriotic. Van Wees has recently argued that a large proportion, perhaps more than half, of the hoplite army came from the richer part of the thetic class.¹⁰⁴⁸ According to this argument, such men could have served as hoplites as they could afford to have provided themselves with appropriate weapons, but also that they were not obliged to do so; "they would render service to the community only for a reward."¹⁰⁴⁹ It is of particular significance to this study that the marines (*epibatai*) who served aboard Athenian vessels most likely formed a considerable proportion of these thete-class hoplites.¹⁰⁵⁰ The marines present an interesting ideological nexus. It seems clear that they were considered part of a trireme's regular crew, along with the rowers and *hyperesia*, and were undoubtedly paid at the same basic rate; a "living wage" of a drachma a day.¹⁰⁵¹ And yet there is no difficulty in believing that their activities were considered as a public service to Athens. Van Wees argues that "marines were held in the same high regard as the rest of the infantry", and cites a range of sources that support this assertion.¹⁰⁵² One of the most striking of these testimonies is that of Lysias, in his speech *Against Andocides*.

¹⁰⁴⁵ See especially Rawlings 'Alternative agonies', which describes the many ways of fighting that hoplite soldiers took part in, and Krenz, 'Deception in archaic and classical warfare', which details the use of stratagems, ambushes and other sneaky tactics in the context of hoplite battle.

¹⁰⁴⁶ In his preface (p. xi) to Hanson's *Western Way of War*, Kagan writes "that at the root of infantry battle in classical Greece lay the value of personal courage".

¹⁰⁴⁷ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 230. The argument in the section from which this quote is taken suggests that the ideal was dead by the middle of the fourth century, the period when even trierarchs did not serve personally as amateur sea captains, but were more like collectives of ship-sponsors.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', esp. pp. 53-4

¹⁰⁴⁹ Van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', pp. 60-1

¹⁰⁵⁰ Thucydides, 8.24.2 refers to "hoplites who had been called up from the regular lists and compelled to serve as marines", suggesting that it was unusual, and that *epibatai* were normally thetes. Such is the view of Andrewes (*HCT* ad loc 6.43), but his further argument that these *thetes* "would require to be armed at public expense" does not follow; as van Wees, 'Myth of the middle class army' has demonstrated, many of the richer *thetes* could afford hoplite gear.

¹⁰⁵¹ The marines are listed along with the other crewmen in the inscribed crew-list IG I³ 1036, suggesting that they were considered part of the crews of the individual ships (as opposed to, for example, part of any army carried by the vessels). As discussed in previous sections, the evidence for ship's pay seems to have worked on the assumption of a crew strength of 200 all drawing an equal wage, a number which makes most sense if one makes the assumption that around a dozen armed men (*epibatai* and archers) regularly formed part of the crews. While the number of marines on any given ship may have varied according to the particular mission and tactical circumstances, it seems a reasonable assumption that there were always some *epibatai* present on every Athenian vessel.

¹⁰⁵² Van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle Class Army', p. 60; Thucydides 3.84 (describes a group of marines lost in battle as "the best men from the city of Athens to die in this war"; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b9-11 (excludes marines from his prohibition of the "naval mob" becoming citizens in the ideal state, because they "belong to the infantry"), Plutarch, *Kimón*, 5 (Kimón and his high-priced friends serving as marines at Salamis).

In chastising his opponent for not having been of service to Athens, Lysias lists the roles in which he has failed to demonstrate his patriotism:

all' oudepôpot' ek tês poleôs estrateusato, oute hippeus oute hoplitês, oute triêrarchos out' epibatês, oute pro tês sumphoras oute meta tèn sumphoran, pleon ê tettarakonta etê gegonôs.

He has never gone on any expedition from the city, either in the cavalry or in the infantry, either as a ship's captain or as a marine, either before our disaster, or after our disaster, though he is more than forty years old.¹⁰⁵³

Given the importance of the navy to fifth-century Athens in general and the period of the Peloponnesian War in particular, it is surprising at first glance that this list does not mention Andocides' potential service as a rower, or as a member of the *hyperesia*. What seems clear from this list is that serving in the navy as a marine could be more easily conceived of as a national service and patriotic duty than could serving a sailor, on the same terms and pay, at least when discussing members of the elite.¹⁰⁵⁴ The distinction between sailors and marines is also made by Aristotle, when he considered membership of the ideal community; the “naval mob” should be excluded, but not the marines who are “free man and belong to the infantry.”¹⁰⁵⁵ While being free distinguished marines from only some of the ship's company, being part of the infantry made them distinct from all the *nautai* and *hyperesia*; I have argued above that sailors were not routinely equipped for hand-to-hand fighting, and were only in unusual circumstances called upon to take the role of light-armed troops.¹⁰⁵⁶ Belonging to the infantry entailed two important differences between the *epibatai* and the rest of their crewmates which help to explain the ideological difference between them; firstly, the type of fighting that the *epibatai* engaged in, and secondly, their use in that fighting of personally supplied weapons.¹⁰⁵⁷

Being “part of the infantry” meant that the marines had the equipment to participate in the agonal and ideal hoplite pitched battle described above; though in fact, as is made clear from a variety of

¹⁰⁵³ Lysias, 6.46

¹⁰⁵⁴ It is possible that Andocides' social class made service as a rower inappropriate; it may tell us more about ways of serving Athens amongst the elite than it does whether the navy was perceived as a civic service generally. (“Serving as a marine-though not apparently as a sailor or rower-fell within the range of what a member of the elite might conceivably do”, van Wees, ‘Myth of the Middle Class Army’, p. 60). However, if serving in the navy was seen as a way to serve Athens, we might still expect the speaker to list it here, even if it would not in fact be appropriate for a man such as Andocides to serve in that capacity. In the context of a law court speech, it would strengthen Lysias' argument to *add* as many things as possible to the list that were considered as public services, while it would weaken it to *exclude* a potential means of service, even if it was not strictly an appropriate one for the individual in question. The omission of sailors here thus seems significant. In any case, the text does show a divide in terms of status between marines and rowers.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b9-11

¹⁰⁵⁶ I have argued in Part One, Section A.1 that while it was possible for ship's crew to take to the field in land campaigns, it was exceptional for them to do so, and they were not generally equipped for any serious fighting.

¹⁰⁵⁷ This analysis, like most ancient sources, largely ignores the *toxotai*, archers, who were listed separately, and armed differently, from the *epibatai*. While they no doubt had a significant effect both in land campaigns and ship-to-ship fighting, there is very little evidence pertaining to Athens' ship-borne archers. The archer was often an ambiguous figure, and if not a despised one, in Greek military ideology, fighting in distant, cowardly manner and with the characteristic weapon of the Persian barbarians. Hanson, *Western Way of War*, p. 15, is largely right to argue that archer (and other missile troops) was a “universal object of disdain in Greek literature”.

sources, the usual combat experience of the *epibatai* on board ship was considerably different from that of fighting in the phalanx.

ethisthênai, pukna apopédontas, dromikôs eis tas naus tachy palin apochôrein, kai dokein mêden aischron poiein mê tolmôntas apothnêiskein menontas epipheromenôn polemiôn, all' eikuias autois gignesthai prophaseis kai sphodra hetoimas hopla te apollusin kai pheugousi dê tinas ouk aischras, hôs phasin, phugas. tauta gar ek nautikês hopliteias rhêmata philei sumbainein, ouk axia epainôn pollakis

[naval hoplites] are habituated to jumping ashore frequently and running back at full speed to their ships, and they think no shame of not dying boldly at their posts when the enemy attack; and excuses are readily made for them, as a matter of course, when they fling away their arms and betake themselves to what they describe as “no dishonourable flight.” These “exploits” are the usual result of employing naval hoplites, and they merit, not “infinite praise,” but precisely the opposite.¹⁰⁵⁸

Even given the tendency towards hurling missiles and hit-and-run raids, the fact that the marines were personally engaged in combat with their own weapons was a far cry from the yet more distant and less immediate combat experience of the sailors. As described above, sea-battles were conceived of as issues of professional audacity and skill, an even more explicit contrast to the amateur bravery and shield-bearing steadfastness of the hoplite.

Serving with Property

In both practical and ideological terms, fighting with one's own weapons was incredibly important. Hanson states that “this equipment was paid for by the hoplite out of his own purse, an item of family honor to be hung up over the hearth on his return.”¹⁰⁵⁹ Even given the tendency to reduce large-scale and prominent displays of weapons in favour of other forms of conspicuous consumption, van Wees argues that “many Athenian citizens had at home a full set of arms and armour...used only in war.”¹⁰⁶⁰ The providing of oneself with weapons remained a crucially important feature of military service. What did serving with property and providing weapons entail in the naval context? While the age of aristocrats personally owning and providing crew for warships was largely a thing of the past by the fifth and fourth centuries BC,¹⁰⁶¹ it was the institution of the trierarchy¹⁰⁶² that provided a mechanism for members of the elite to serve with “their bodies and their property”¹⁰⁶³ in a naval context. In a similar way, but

¹⁰⁵⁸ Plato, *Laws*, 706c. cf. Laches, 183d-184a, when he mocks a marine who gets into trouble using a custom weapon.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Hanson, *Western Way of War*, p. 63.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Van Wees, ‘Greeks Bearing Arms’, p. 333

¹⁰⁶¹ Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 1-2) is surely right to argue that Klienias, who provided his own vessel and crew for Athens' Salamis fleet in 480 BC, was the last of his breed of aristocratic warrior-captains.

¹⁰⁶² Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 220) is also correct to argue that the idea of serving in person as a trierarch became less important than the provision of money during the fourth century, and particularly after the reforms under which groups of individuals (symmories) paid for the upkeep of the vessel. However, the idea of putting one's self at risk by personal service was still a powerful one, and was used frequently in law court speeches by (allegedly) zealous former trierarchs (e.g. Lysias, 19.62; [Demosthenes], 50 59.)

¹⁰⁶³ The idea of serving the state with both property/resources and one's own person occurs in many contexts in the sources; for example, [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 29.5 and Thucydides, 8.65 (regarding the 5000), Xenophon, *Cavalry Commander*, 1.9 and [Aristotle], *Constitution of Athens*, 41.2 (regarding knights), Demosthenes, 10.28

on a less lavish scale, cavalrymen, marines and hoplites served with their property at least to the extent that they provided their own equipment.¹⁰⁶⁴ The provision of one's own equipment was not only important in terms of contributing materially to the defence of one's city, but also in the context of competition amongst one's peers. Mention has already been made of Thucydides' report that the trierarchs despatched to Sicily competed with one another to have the most splendid, as well as the most efficient, vessel; the hoplites on this great venture were similarly competitive with the lavishness of their arms and armour.¹⁰⁶⁵ The oarsmen and other trireme crewmen, though, were totally excluded from this kind of contribution and competition. The key symbol and tool of the rower's trade, the oar, was provided not by the individual, but by the state.¹⁰⁶⁶ Indeed the crewmen themselves could be seen as prizes to be won by expenditure of property in the competition between trierarchs; acquiring a good crew was part and parcel of the trierarch's property contribution, and the recruiting of skilled seamen could be boasted about in the same breath as the purchase of excellent rigging and splendid paintwork. Apollodorus, a trierarch between 362 and 360 BC, made this claim before an Athenian jury:

daneisamenos argurion prôtos eplêrôsamên tên naun, misthôsamenos nautas hôs hoion t' ên aristous, dôreas kai prodoseis dous hekastôi autôn megalas. eti de skeuesin idiois tên naun hapasi kateskeuasa, kai tôn dêmosiôn elabon ouden, kai kosmôi hôs hoion t' ên kallista kai diaprepeitata tôn triêrarchôn. hupê resian toinun hên edunamên kratistên emisthôsamên.

I was the first to man my ship, hiring the best sailors possible by giving to each man large bonuses and advanced payments. More than that, I furnished the ship with equipment wholly my own, taking nothing from the public stores, and I made everything as beautiful and magnificent as possible, outdoing all the other trierarchs. As for the specialists, I hired the best that could be had.¹⁰⁶⁷

The discussion so far should lead to the questioning of some assumptions still held regarding the navy. The idea of a link between the military service of lower class in the navy and their power in the democracy is still a widely held one, and has been built on the works of Aristotle and the Old Oligarch in particular. The simplistic nature of this conception has long been recognized. Amit has argued that "sea-power alone does not explain democracy", citing examples of oligarchic and even monarchical naval powers; he believed though that theory was true of Athens, and it was having "the example of Athens before their eyes" that gave rise to the

(services "with body and property" that it is the duty of Athenians to perform), 21.165 (liturgists who supplied ships, and also served with their bodies as ship-captains).

¹⁰⁶⁴ Richer hoplites and cavalrymen would also have been liable to pay *eisphora*, and it is the payment of these war-taxes, along with the trierarchy, that comprised the more substantial part of serving with one's property. Indeed, a line can be drawn through the middle of the hoplite class in terms of "serving with property", between those who paid war-taxes and those who did not. For this distinction, and its particular importance to the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411 BC, see van Wees, 'Myth of the Middle-class army', p. 57

¹⁰⁶⁵ Thucydides, 6.31. For this aspect of competitive display amongst hoplites, see Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, pp. 52-4.

¹⁰⁶⁶ There is direct evidence for this in the fourth century BC at least; each trireme appears to have had 200 oars, including 30 spares, as part of its "wooden gear", and was thus the preserve of the Curators of the Dockyards and trierarchs. There is no reason to suppose that the situation was significantly different in the fifth century BC.

¹⁰⁶⁷ [Demosthenes], 50.7, cf. Lysias, 21.10

theory.¹⁰⁶⁸ More recently, Ceccerelli and van Wees have seriously challenged such interpretations of political power and military service in to Athens itself, arguing (for example) that Athenian *thetes* served in the hoplite army prior to Athens' *thalassocracy* and were yet denied the political equality assumed to go with such service.¹⁰⁶⁹

The Old Oligarch's argument, expanded upon in Aristotle, is an attempt to bring the navy into the ideology of military service and political power. In reality, it is a poor fit, even at Athens. The evidence of the "naval mob" as professional wage-earners, and the navy as a whole as a source of both permanent and seasonal employment, further challenges such interpretations of public service and politics. The "professional" status of the institution, the cosmopolitan nature of the crews, the characteristic means of fighting at sea (itself a rarity; and for the Athenians conceived of as mainly a matter of technical skill on the part of naval professionals), and the fact that the rowers and *hyperesia* did not make any sort of contributions of "property" in the broadest sense all help to explain both the ideological inferiority of the navy as opposed to the hoplite army in particular, and the exceptions sometimes made for the marines to this negative view. The less one can see naval crews only in terms of patriotic contributors to the city's defence, the more one sees them as essentially mercenaries, or even just paid workers.

4: The Ideology of the Navy: skilled craftsmen, money-grabbing professionals or something else?

The characterisation of the navy as a professional "job of work" more than a military obligation leads naturally to a discussion of the more precise ideological location of trireme crews. If sailors were not democratic and patriotic sea-fighters, what ideological position did they occupy? This section will look at several possible comparisons; the naval crews as skilled craftsmen, the naval crew as wage-earners, and the naval crew as mercenaries. There are considerable degrees of overlap within these broad categories and several points of close comparison, but none seem to fit exactly. All of these ideas, and indeed much of the discussion so far, is really the ideology *about* the naval crews, rather than the ideology *of* the naval crews;¹⁰⁷⁰ the final sections in this part will attempt to provide, so far as possible with the available sources, a picture of the ideology of the navy crews themselves.

Naval Craftsmen and Labourers: sailors as *banausoi*

While describing the educational arrangements that it would be desirable for be put in place in order to improve cities, Aristotle gives this detailed definition of banausic occupations:

¹⁰⁶⁸ Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 60

¹⁰⁶⁹ On this specific matter, see 'Myth of Middle-class army' p. 57. On the issue of the supposed link between military service and political power, see Ceccarelli, 'Sans thalassocratie, pas de démocratie?'; van Wees, 'Politics and the battlefield' and discussion in Part Two.

¹⁰⁷⁰ An apt distinction made by Whitehead (*Athenian Metics*, p.3) in relation to his study of the ideology of metics.

banauson d' ergon einai dei touto nomizein kai technên tautên kai mathêsin, hosai pros tas chrêseis kai tas praxeis tas tês aretês achrêston apergazontai to sôma tôn eleutherôn [ê tèn psuchên] ê tèn dianoian. dio tas te toiautas technas hosai to sôma paraskeuazousi cheiron diakeisthai banausous kaloumen, kai tas mistharnikas ergasias: ascholon gar poiouasi tèn dianoian kai tapeinên. esti de kai tôn eleutheriôn epistêmôn mechri men tinos eniôn metechein ouk aneleutheon, to de prosedreuein lian pros akribesian enochon tais eirêmenais blabais. echei de pollên diaphoran kai to tinos heneken prattei tis ê manthanei: to men gar hautou charin ê philôn ê di' aretên ouk aneleutheon, ho de tauto touto Prattôn di' allous pollakis thêtikon kai doulikon doxeien an prattein.

The term *banausos* should properly be applied to any occupation, art, or instruction which is calculated to make the body, or soul, or mind of a freeman unfit for the pursuit and practice of goodness. We may accordingly apply the word *banausos* to any art or craft which adversely affects men's physical fitness, and to any employment which is pursued for the sake of gain; these preoccupy and debase the mind. It is the same for those branches of knowledge that are fit for a freeman and it is not out of keeping with a freeman's character to study these up to a certain point; but too much concentration upon them, with a view to obtaining perfection, is liable to cause the same evil effects that have just been mentioned. Much depends on the purpose for which acts are done or subjects are studied but the same act, when done repeatedly at the instance of other people, may be counted menial and servile.¹⁰⁷¹

The rest of our extant sources are in accord with this idea that depending for one's livelihood on others, either through wages given by an employer or income from customers, carried a considerable stigma.¹⁰⁷² The majority of this material is written from a very elite perspective;¹⁰⁷³ but the idea of self-sufficiency and self-reliance (*autarkeia*), particularly as a farmer, is a very strong theme not only in the philosophical sources, but also in more populist works such as the plays of Aristophanes.¹⁰⁷⁴ In a fragment from the lost play *Islands*, Aristophanes advocates the idyllic country life, a theme that is familiar from many of his extant works but is here expressed perfectly:

You've everything you need here-on your small-holding, free from the bother of the agora, with your very own pair of oxen, where you can hear the sound of bleating flocks, and of the grape-juice as it is pressed out into the vat; where you can feed on finches and thrushes.¹⁰⁷⁵

It is therefore likely that this idea had a significant place in the ideology of poorer Athenians. Indeed the aspirations of poorer Athenians seem to have gone beyond simple self-sufficiency,

¹⁰⁷¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1337b8-22

¹⁰⁷² Austin and Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History*, p. 11-12, arguing that "It remains true of the whole of classical antiquity that while the work of the artisan was admired, he was neglected or down graded as a person." See also Mossé (*Ancient World at Work*, p. 28) states that "to work for another man, in return for a wage of any kind, is degrading."

¹⁰⁷³ Loomis (*Wages*, p. 105, n.5) remarks that "those who could afford *not* to work with their hands...frequently expressed disdain for all such workers".

¹⁰⁷⁴ See for example Stepsiades' longing for the farm life in the opening of *Clouds*, ll. 44-6.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Aristophanes, *Islands*, fragment=LACTOR 12, 6.

and towards the attaining the lifestyle of the leisured elite. Fisher has written about the ambition of many poorer citizens to plug into elite activities and ideology, and the “desire among many non-elite Athenians to shine, to rise socially and to share aspects of the good life”.¹⁰⁷⁶ Cohen has argued that this elite ideology contributed to a general “disdain for salaried employment” and that “Athenian men...avoided work that required regular and repetitive service for a single employer on an ongoing basis over a continuing period”.¹⁰⁷⁷ This ideology of self-sufficiency, still less luxurious leisure, did not in many cases conform to the reality of fifth and fourth century BC Athens, as many free people, citizens and non-citizens alike, did indeed work and support themselves through such labour.¹⁰⁷⁸ Such work was often bankrolled by the state itself. One significant sector of the wage-earning economy for which we have some detailed evidence is the building industry. There is both literary and epigraphic testimony for the scale of employment and wage-earning connected with the construction of Athens’ monumental buildings, particularly those constructed under the auspices of Pericles in the mid-fifth century BC.¹⁰⁷⁹ This industry incorporated individuals with high levels of skill and expertise in specific areas (sculptors, painters, architects and so on), and a large number of less skilled (and indeed unskilled) men, working with their hands as labourers, quarrymen, scaffolders and suchlike. The same work resulted in the same pay, regardless of whether the workman was a slave, metic or citizen. Payments to these men were made in a variety of ways; daily wages, monthly salaries and piece-work are all attested.¹⁰⁸⁰ The navy was another largely state-sponsored industry, with a similar mixture of expertise, and which could also be interpreted in terms of providing employment for the poorer men of Athens.¹⁰⁸¹ There were consummate professionals on board every ship, the *hyperesia*. This group comprised at least one literate (and numerate) individual (the *pentekontarchos*), one skilled craftsman (the *naupegos*), and one musician (the *auletes*), as well as three experts (the *kubernetes*, *prorates* and *keleustes*) who were well versed in the variety of seamanship and navigational skills required on sail- and oar-driven vessels. Along with these experts there were a far greater number of men, the sailors, with diverse ability levels, skills and experience. The state paid a flat rate to all such men, regardless of skill or social status. At first glance, the comparison between the naval crews on the one hand, and craftsmen or labourers in the other, seems pretty close.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Fisher, ‘Gymnasia and democratic values of leisure’, p. 103. He argues that this desire manifested itself not only in non-elite participation in gymnastic activities, but in “a markedly greater spread of elements of ‘symptotic’ style”.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Cohen, ‘An Unprofitable Masculinity’, p. 100

¹⁰⁷⁸ As a city, Athens itself as not self-sufficient, and was dependent on imports of grain. See Keen, ‘Grain for Athens’.

¹⁰⁷⁹ IG I³ 449=Fornara, 120 records the accounts for the building of the Parthenon in 434/3 BC, listing the money given for the project and the items of expenditure. Plutarch (*Pericles*, 12) lists the variety of craftsmen needed for the building projects of the mid-fifth century BC, including “the painter, the pattern-maker, the engraver”.

¹⁰⁸⁰ IG I³ 475 and 476 record in detail a variety of individual payments that were made to workers on the Erechtheion in 409/8 and 408/7 BC respectively.

¹⁰⁸¹ Plutarch (*Pericles*, 11-2) interprets both the building programme that resulted in the Parthenon and the deployment of a large scale standing navy as essentially public work schemes, important components of Pericles’ general policy towards bringing benefits to the poor of Athens. While we might doubt that this was Pericles’ primary intention, it certainly had such an effect.

Mossé argues that there was little real difference in ancient thought between the “artisan who sells his own products and the workman who hires out his services... [because they both]...depend on others for their livelihood.”¹⁰⁸² Despite differences in expertise, craftsmen and labourers were both described as *banausoi*, people who “exploited a skill for their living”.¹⁰⁸³ Performing such tasks on a daily basis could be considered bad for one’s mental health as well as one’s social status:

kai gar hai ge banausikai kaloumenai kai epirrêtoi eisi kai eikotôs mentoi panu adoxountai pros tôn poleôn. katalumainontai gar ta sômata tôn te ergazomenôn kai tôn epimelomenôn, anankazousai kathêsthai kai skiatrapheisthai, eniai de kai pros pur hêmereuein. tôn de sômatôn thêlunomenôn kai hai psuchai polu arrôstoterai gignontai. kai ascholias de malista echousi kai philôn kai poleôs sunepimeleisthai hai banausikai kaloumenai. hôste hoi toioutoi dokousi kakoi kai philois chrêsthai kai tais patrisin alexêtêres einai

The so-called banausic occupations are always being disparaged, and, as you would expect, are very poorly regarded in our states. For they ruin the physique of those who practice and pursue them, making them spend the day sitting indoors, away from the sunlight, sometimes even by the furnace. And as the physique is softened, so is the mind also enfeebled. Such banausic occupations also mean that people have no time for attending to their friends or the state, so that those who follow them are reputed to be bad at dealing with friends and bad defenders of their country.¹⁰⁸⁴

This is a damning criticism of the effects of manual work on a man’s mental faculties, but it should be emphasized that for Xenophon, as for Aristotle, the deterioration noted results primarily from full-time employment. It was not so much the mere possession of the skills of a craftsman that was degrading in and of itself; what was degrading was to depend on these skills for a living, as to do so was to limit one’s freedom. While both craftsmen and hired workers shared this very important characteristic of dependence, there probably was some differentiation, at least at the level of the men involved in such activities, between artisans with high levels of skill (*techne*) in their fields on the one hand, and unskilled labourers on the other.¹⁰⁸⁵ Craftsmen’s products and their skills could be praised and respected.¹⁰⁸⁶ Some craftsmen were proud enough of their trade to put it on their epitaphs, though examples are rare.¹⁰⁸⁷ How closely does this relate to the ways in which the navy was perceived in classical Athens? Certainly it was recognized as an area where professional skill (*techne*) was important. The previous section discussed the importance of naval crews’ skill in determining the outcome of at least some sea battles, and certainly the ideal sea battle. More generally Thucydides’ Pericles could speak of

¹⁰⁸² Mossé, *Ancient World at Work*, p. 28

¹⁰⁸³ Burford, *Craftsmen*, p. 12. Other rough translations of this term include “people who work with their hands”, or, less clumsily, “manual workers”.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Xenophon, *Economics*, 4.2-3

¹⁰⁸⁵ Loomis, *Wages*, p. 105, n.5 “It was recognized that training and apprenticeship were required for such “skilled” work as pot-making and stone-cutting, and “skilled” workers were proud of their skills.” cf. Burford, *Craftsmen*, pp. 11-2, 82-91, 129, 156-7.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 4.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Burford, *Craftsmen*, p. 176. She describes such self-declared craftsmen as “exceptional amongst the exceptions”, as it was unusual for Athenians to record anything other than their name on epitaphs.

seamanship explicitly as a matter of skill, and one that required more than a lifetime to master.¹⁰⁸⁸ In the same speech, he described the ultimate product of this skill, “command of the seas”, as a “great thing”.¹⁰⁸⁹ Other writers were more cautious, if not hostile, to this commodity.¹⁰⁹⁰ Plato showed a good deal of worry about the threat from close proximity to the sea, and considered it a definite advantage if a city did not possess the materials for building ships and pursuing sea power.¹⁰⁹¹ Aristotle was more ambivalent. He came down in favour of a city having a “certain amount of naval power”, and saw the establishment of such power as a necessary step for the city wishing to play a role on the international stage.¹⁰⁹² He was however alive to the dangers that association with the sea and building up of a navy could bring, suggesting a cautious approach to the matter.¹⁰⁹³ In Aristotle it is most explicit that while sea-power might often be worth having, there was no need to accord respect to the sailors possessing the *techne* to bring it about; he described how there was no need to reward the men who rowed in a city’s navy with political rights, as non-citizen farmers could take the oars.¹⁰⁹⁴ Thucydides’ words extolling sea power and seamanship skills are fully compatible with the rather disdainful view he expressed towards the sailors themselves.¹⁰⁹⁵ As Strauss put it, “Thucydides loved the ships, but not the men who rowed them”.¹⁰⁹⁶ This is somewhat similar to the double standard applied with regard to craftsmen and their products, Plutarch expressing the view most clearly while discussing various types of art work; “a work may delight us with its charm, but there is no need to regard its creator with admiration.”¹⁰⁹⁷

While they were certainly dependent wage-earners and often skilled professionals, it is impossible to completely equate naval crews with ancient craftsmen. Most notably (and with the exception of the *naupagos*), the sailors did not produce physical objects; it is craftsmen in the sense of makers of, for example, ships, shoes and statues that attract the most discussion (both metaphorical and direct) in the ancient sources. Sea power can be regarded as the product of good seamanship and rowing skill only in a more indirect sense, and the crews of Athenian triremes cannot be fairly described as craftsmen, in the sense of men working raw materials into useful objects,¹⁰⁹⁸ or of poets or musicians creating an artistic performance. The other key difference between labourers and naval men is the possibility of the latter being involved in battle

¹⁰⁸⁸ Thucydides, 1.142

¹⁰⁸⁹ Thucydides, 1.143

¹⁰⁹⁰ It is worth noting that nautical metaphors involving (for example, Plato, *Laws*, 758a) soundly-constructed ships weathering storms, or skilled pilots safely and skilfully manoeuvring their ships are used not infrequently to illustrate political points. The “ship of state” is an ancient metaphor that is still familiar today.

¹⁰⁹¹ Plato, *Laws*, 704d, 705a, 706b, 707a-c.

¹⁰⁹² Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327a40 ff

¹⁰⁹³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b11 ff

¹⁰⁹⁴ It is only in the Old Oligarch ([Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.1), playing Devil’s Advocate, who advocates recognition of the “naval mob”; he concedes reluctantly that as Athens’ power was based on the navy, it was thus fair that the naval professionals should hold more sway than the rich and the respectable. As discussed in the previous section, the connection between naval people and democratic politics on a practical level is something that is often overstated.

¹⁰⁹⁵ On his slightly disparaging attitude towards sailors, see Thucydides, 8.84; 8.72.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 267

¹⁰⁹⁷ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 4.

¹⁰⁹⁸ As such, they are not mentioned in Burford’s work, *Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society*.

on Athens' behalf. This might suggest something of a patriotic turn of mind amongst the Athenian crewmen, but it must be remembered that the same dangers were faced by the metics, slaves and the Greeks from other cities who formed the largest part of the trireme crews. These factors suggest that a more telling comparison might be made with another significant group of non-craftsmen wage-earners; mercenaries.

Fighting for a Wage: naval mercenaries?

Trundle's recent work into some of the wider social, economic and political aspects of mercenaries makes a valuable contribution to the present debate. An Athenian fleet at sea, being composed of a cosmopolitan mix of professional men employed for a particular task, and thus forming a mobile community with its own status divisions, personal relationships and hierarchies, bore some obvious resemblances to a mercenary army on campaign.¹⁰⁹⁹ Trundle argues, surely correctly, that "mercenaries present interesting illustrations of identity creation beyond state boundaries".¹¹⁰⁰ The discussion above on the Samos fleet democracy provides the most striking and important case-study of this phenomenon in connection with the navy.¹¹⁰¹ At the level of the individual too, there are some similarities. Individual professional sailors looking for the navy that offered the best wages and conditions can be usefully compared to itinerant mercenaries looking for service in infantry forces. None of this was lost on Trundle, who includes many references to navies, and in particular the classical Athenian navy, within his work. Despite these similarities, he is a little ambiguous as to whether Athens' naval crews should be considered as mercenaries.

In his first chapter, he defines the term "mercenary" in such a way that the vast majority of those crewing triremes would be excluded.¹¹⁰² However, even if he does not consider them to be "true mercenaries" in his highly technical sense, Trundle views the crews as composing largely of wage-earning professionals; he argues that the sailors of the Greek navies "rowed and crewed for a daily wage...and were very unlikely to serve without the prospect of pay".¹¹⁰³ He also makes use of comparative examples from the Athenian navy in other chapters when discussing aspects of, for example, mercenary recruitment and pay. In his concluding section, he traces the increasing use of mercenaries throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, and his account begins with sailors; "naval warfare provided livelihoods for thousands of poor men in the fleets of Athens, Persian and Sparta."¹¹⁰⁴ Whether they are to be considered mercenaries or simply as professionals, Trundle argues that "even national crews had mercenary interests", and it is

¹⁰⁹⁹ And also in this sense contrast with artisans/craftsmen, who did not form any sort of class identity, or become a significant and separate category. As Vidal-Naquet and Austin (*Economic and Social history of Ancient Greece*, p. 12) argue, "there never was...any such thing as a category of artisans."

¹¹⁰⁰ Trundle, *Mercenaries*, p. 2

¹¹⁰¹ See Part Two, section B.1 and 2 and Part Three, section 1.

¹¹⁰² Trundle, *Mercenaries*, pp. 22-3. Citizens and metics of Athens could not be "proper" mercenaries, as they had some sort of stake in the community that they were employed by. Though Trundle does not refer to them specifically, slaves also could not be regarded as mercenaries, as they row under some degree of compulsion.

¹¹⁰³ Trundle, *Mercenaries*, p. 40.

¹¹⁰⁴ Trundle, *Mercenaries*, p. 165

undoubtedly the case that the idea of rowing ships as a patriotic military duty is not much to the fore in the source material.

While it may be technically correct to do so, restricting the label of “mercenary” to the non-metic *xenoi* in the fleet can perhaps be misleading; as Whitehead argues, “to talk of [non-Athenian] naval ‘mercenaries’ creates the spurious impression of a distinct category, drawing on pay where others drew on patriotism.”¹¹⁰⁵ Trundle however is keen to stress that mercenary service should not simply be conceived of solely as a matter of personal gain and greed.¹¹⁰⁶ While conceding the general paucity of evidence for the motivations of mercenaries themselves (as opposed to their leaders and hirers), Trundle elicits some examples where paid mercenaries seem to be serving for a mixture of motives,¹¹⁰⁷ in terms of an individual’s motivation to become a mercenary, pay must be considered as a necessary condition, but in some cases not a sufficient one.¹¹⁰⁸ However, none of his explicit examples concern men serving in navies, and the connection between money and naval deployments should never be underestimated. The necessity for pay is made very clear by Apollodorus, in his argument with Polycles, his would-be successor as trierarch. Polycles berates his opponent for spending far too lavishly on his vessel’s equipment and turning the crew lazy through over-payment. Apollodorus retorts with this challenge:

peri de tôn nautôn kai tôn epibatôn kai tês hupêresias, ei phês hup' emou autous diephtharthai, paralabôn tèn triêrê autos sautôi kataskeusasai kai nautas kai epibatas kai hupêresian, hoitines soi mêden labontes sumpleusontai.

As for the sailors and marines and specialists, if you say that they have been corrupted by me, take over the ship, and get sailors and marines and specialists for yourself, who will sail with you for nothing.¹¹⁰⁹

For naval crews in general the evidence that there is suggests a firm alignment between levels of wages and willingness to serve,¹¹¹⁰ but there would also have been other factors in individuals’ choices and motivations. As was the case for ‘true’ mercenaries, wages may have been necessary but not sufficient; certainly the men who were supposed to be drafted onto Apollodorus’ trireme were not keen to serve even this rich and generous trierarch, and he alleged that many did not turn up.¹¹¹¹ However, it must be conceded that our lack of direct evidence regarding the motives and attitudes of the men crewing Athens’ fleets is almost total.

¹¹⁰⁵ Whitehead, *Athenian Metic*, p. 86

¹¹⁰⁶ Trundle, (*Mercenaries*, p. 42) argues that “personal gain did not underlie all mercenary service. Complex motivations and relationships beyond *kerdos* [personal gain] worked to drive mercenary service”.

¹¹⁰⁷ Trundle (*Mercenaries*, pp. 42-3, cf. pp. 59 ff.) adduces several other motivating factors such as ritualized friendships (*xenia*) or personal relationships (*philia*) with paymasters, or diplomatic relationships and claims of kinship (*syngenes*), on both the level of the individual and the state.

¹¹⁰⁸ Trundle, *Mercenaries*, p. 42; “Personal motivation is rarely expressed in the sources... [but]...Individuals must have undertaken mercenary service with personal gain in mind.”

¹¹⁰⁹ [Demosthenes], 50.36.

¹¹¹⁰ Indeed, Trundle (*Mercenaries*, p. 42) argues that “Personal motivation for better rewards is best illustrated among Athenian naval crews, signing on for high fees and staying with commanders who paid higher rates.”

¹¹¹¹ [Demosthenes], 50.7

The Navy's Ideological Character

Without direct evidence from the sailors themselves, we are left to reconstruct the ideology and characteristics of the naval personnel from the scattered allusions in the sources, and from the mixture of elements present in the comparisons discussed above. Needless to say, any picture constructed from such material involves a good deal of conjecture, and thus one should adopt positions cautiously. Special attention will be paid to evidence drawn from the works of Aristophanes. He should not be regarded as the true voice of the common people, and certainly not the mouthpiece of the “naval mob”; indeed, their portrayal in the comedies is less fulsome and more ambiguous than might be expected.¹¹¹² However, the works of Aristophanes are significantly less of the elite than all of the other literary sources and he seemed willing to put matters of concern to the navy onto the city's agenda.¹¹¹³

The preceding discussion in this section has demonstrated the professional nature of the navy as an institution, and the primacy of money in terms of individual motives. Indeed, the problem of finding enough oarsmen to meet the huge manpower demand of a trireme fleet was nearly always a matter of finding sufficient money to dish out in pay. Strauss sees Thucydides' concentration on naval finances as opposed to naval men as evidence of his political bias against the rowers, suggesting that “when it came to the death of oarsmen or difficulty of replacing them, his [Thucydides'] silence is deafening.”¹¹¹⁴ He acknowledges that “money buys ships and, for a sea power, ships are important”,¹¹¹⁵ but this seems to miss the point that the main thing that money was needed for was to pay crewmen. Compared to the costs of running a trireme fleet, the capital costs of building one were extremely small.¹¹¹⁶ Thucydides could certainly be accused of being

¹¹¹² Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 262; “Seamen had a considerable presence in Attic drama...but were never as prominent as hoplites.” cf. van Wees, *Greek Warfare* p. 200, on the negative attitude present in some of Aristophanes' comedy. However, van Wees seems to be mistaken in seeing a significant shift in Aristophanes' attitude to the naval crews in *Frogs*, as compared to the earlier play (“no sooner had they been beaten by the Spartans in 405 BC than he let rip”). In the first place, *Frogs* was probably produced, and certainly written, before the huge defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405 BC. It is also in this play, as will be discussed below, that the marine protagonist is mocked for not showing rowing ability. Aristophanes' attitude in this play, as in his others, mixes ambiguous praise and light-hearted insult.

¹¹¹³ *Knights* in particular has the most direct examples of this, as discussed in Part Two, section A.3.

¹¹¹⁴ Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 275; Similarly, Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 108) argues that “Finding the cash needed was not so difficult as finding enough fit crews”, but this conclusion seems belied by his own arguments, and certainly by Thucydides. Conscription was rare, and while there were some occasional difficulties in finding oarsmen, they always seemed to be ready and available when there were generous and rich trierarchs around. Given the ad hoc nature of naval recruitment and the large fluctuations in demand from year to year, it is remarkable that sourcing crew was not more significant problem.

¹¹¹⁵ Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 274

¹¹¹⁶ As noted by Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology*, pp. 100-1. The highest modern estimates of the cost for building a trireme tend to suggest a cost of around 2 talents for a new and fully equipped vessel (Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 139, and p. 255 n. 34). Gabrielsen himself (p. 139-42) does not accept this or any other ‘standard’ figure, and argues (correctly) that there would be much variety in the price for a ship and that it “is impossible to come up with any particular sum representing the price of a ship in the fifth and fourth centuries” (p. 142); however, the figure of 2 talents is convenient for the purposes of this study and is undoubtedly the right order of magnitude. A trireme could potentially have a natural life exceeding 20 years (Amit, *Athens and the Sea*, p. 27, cf. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, p. 90). Rawlings rightly emphasises the large scale of costs of building the ship sheds and harbour installations, but is correct (*Ancient Greeks at War*, p. 114) to argue that “the greatest and most persistent financial expense...[in relation to the navy]...was its daily operation”. On my interpretation of naval pay, the capital cost of one ship was approximately equal to two months' wages for the crew, and only six months' worth on the absolute lowest possible figures of 2 obols a day (a minimal sum advocated by Demosthenes, 4.28, for a fleet that was never voted for). Thus the scale of expenditure on running the navy dwarfed that of building it.

rather indifferent about the deaths of oarsmen;¹¹¹⁷ but the reason that he does not explicitly discuss the difficulty of replacing rowers was because, for him, the solution was simple: Find the money to pay them.

It was not only Thucydides who thought that, in a very real sense, it was money that manned triremes. In Aristophanes' final extant play, a character asks of the personification of Wealth: "And another thing, tell me, don't you get our triremes manned?"¹¹¹⁸ While the old men of Aristophanes' choruses could have their naval exploits described in terms of patriotic service and the public good, it is likely that, even in the years immediately following the battle of Salamis in 480 BC, men rowed in Athens' fleet for their own gain. Even this idealized older generation spoke of their "lost youth...on guard duty at Byzantium, and then at night we went out for a walk and stole the bread-seller's mortar on the sly",¹¹¹⁹ and could be accused, without any real reproach, of "going ashore to nick someone's clothes".¹¹²⁰

The extent to which trireme crews held the apparently widely accepted view that disparaged wage-earners is unclear; they may have aspired to become self-sufficient landowners,¹¹²¹ and Rosivach is no doubt right to suppose that it was an important thing to those occasional and seasonal rowers that they did not depend upon their rowing wages. How comfortable the professionals of the "naval mob" were with depending upon a pay-master is impossible to say. Perhaps (like the reminiscing of Aristophanes' old rowers) the sailors preferred to focus not on the wages, but on the loot and plunder taken from the enemy. Profiting from the spoils of war could perhaps be considered a more respectable and legitimate method of acquisition and enrichment than the receiving of a wage; that the personal gain of the naval crews was a product of looting and depredation as well as wages may have had the effect of mitigating the stigma of dependence upon an employer. It is very unclear, however, the extent to which individual sailors profited from the spoils of war; it is usually the case in the classical era that the city, in the first instance represented by the fleet's *stratego*i, took charge of and used the spoils.¹¹²² Not infrequently they were used to provide the sailors with their basic pay. Generals were fairly often accused of embezzling such monies for personal profit; no doubt the same charges could have

¹¹¹⁷ As Strauss argues ('Perspectives on death', p. 274-5) there was no real obstacle to stop Thucydides finding out and recording at least the numbers of sailors lost in battles, in the same way as he routinely did for hoplite casualties, were he so inclined. That he did not do so suggests either economy of effort or indifference to this particular detail, especially as (except for in exceptional circumstances like the failed invasion of Sicily) the numbers of human losses in sea battles were probably not numerically significant (p. 268 "an Athenian ran less risk of death in battle at sea than on land...Casualties in Greek naval battles were not necessarily high.")

¹¹¹⁸ Aristophanes, *Wealth*, l. 172

¹¹¹⁹ The Chorus-Leader of Aristophanes' *Wasps*, ll. 236-8. cf. a similar incident being boasted of by the participants at ll. 354-6

¹¹²⁰ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1075. This is Dionysus talking to Aeschylus about of the crew of the *Paralos* in the days when the playwright was alive. Aeschylus fought at the battles of Marathon and Salamis, and thus can be considered the epitome of Aristophanes' 'golden generation'.

¹¹²¹ Strauss ('School of democracy', p. 322) argues that "many thetes aspired to a hoplite's prosperity and prestige".

¹¹²² Pritchett (*Greek State at War*, p. 85) argues that the "hegemon in the field could dispose of the proceeds from the sale of booty...whatever was brought back became the property of the state." Van Wees (*Greek Warfare*, p. 236-7) argues that the centralization of material resources was a key development of warfare in the classical period that differentiated it from preceding times.

been levelled at many individual sailors, but there is no explicit evidence. It is also possible that trireme crews regarded their earnings in the same way as payments for performing public service; though as I argued above, the extant source material shows a clear divide between naval pay on the one hand and remuneration for serving the city on the other.

Outspoken sailors

Whatever their general attitude to the fact of being dependent on a pay-master, the sailors on the whole were not backward in coming forward and expressing dissatisfaction when their money was not forthcoming. After concerns over their personal safety in dangerous situations,¹¹²³ often on the eve of battle, concerns over not receiving their due are the most common difficulty expressed by sailors to their commanders in the sources. As discussed above, the *Paraloi* perhaps became more outspoken across the fifth century, but even in the more disciplined ‘good old days’ they would call out for their rations.¹¹²⁴ Thucydides reports a couple of examples of sailors petitioning their commanders for funds during the Peloponnesian war.¹¹²⁵ Apollodorus’ crewmen in 362 BC took speaking up to the next level, by threatening to withdraw their service unless they were given more money.¹¹²⁶ A group of Cypriot oarsmen mutinied over pay when serving under Konon, having seen others on the campaign where treated preferentially in this respect.¹¹²⁷ Some of these examples relate to the Peloponnesian navy in 411 BC, and it is in this context that Thucydides comments that violent outspokenness was a characteristic trait of sailors.¹¹²⁸ This comment is surely not intended to be limited to sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet, but to also include men of the Athenian navy too, whom Thucydides would have had first-hand experience of when he served as a *strategos*. Indeed, it is likely that many of the individuals in the Peloponnesian fleet at this point had had previous experience rowing for the Athenians, and were acting in their usual forthright manner under their new commanders. In his letter to the Athenian people from the beleaguered campaign in Sicily, Nicias reportedly complained of the difficulty of keeping unruly sailors in line.¹¹²⁹ It is unlikely that Aristophanes would have made so much of the crewmen’s problems over pay in *Knights* had the sailors themselves kept demurely quiet about their plight.¹¹³⁰

Strauss regarded the loquacity of the Athenian trireme crews as evidence of the democratic ideology of the navy, and a product of the strong sense of collective identity built up between the crew members aboard these vessels.¹¹³¹ His argument regarding the effects on the individual of serving in the navy is valuable, but it seems a mistake to restrict the lessons of this ‘school of

¹¹²³ Xenophon argues (*Memorabilia*, 3.5.6) that sailors, unless faced with an immediate threat, were in general an unruly lot.

¹¹²⁴ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1073.

¹¹²⁵ Thucydides, 8.78 and 8.83-4

¹¹²⁶ [Demosthenes], 50.11

¹¹²⁷ Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica*, 20.1

¹¹²⁸ Thucydides, 8.84.3

¹¹²⁹ Thucydides, 7.14

¹¹³⁰ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 1063-5 and 1364-78

¹¹³¹ Strauss, ‘School of Democracy’, esp. p 316

democracy' to one particular group on board, the Athenian citizens.¹¹³² The fleet's identity could, amongst the free men aboard at least, overcome the normal dividing lines between men of different cities. The close living and working conditions, and being on campaign away from everyone's home, meant that "the individual rower might develop a sense of allegiance to the group".¹¹³³ The most obvious example of the strength of this nautical community is the events in Samos of 411 BC, described earlier. It was the equivalent "free people" of the Peloponnesian navy who were most forceful in voicing their concerns to their superiors.¹¹³⁴ Strauss points out, the reaction of the officers to the activism of their rowers was completely different in this case;¹¹³⁵ the Spartan commander tried to face down the mob and use violence with his stick, and was almost lynched for his trouble.¹¹³⁶ An Athenian commander in a similar position, as Phormio was in 429 BC, engaged with his men and tried to answer their concerns.¹¹³⁷

The Naval Career

I have argued in this thesis for the navy as a professional institution, and that most naval people most of the time were motivated by primarily economic factors.¹¹³⁸ This must be true, at least to the extent that without such financial incentives, the men for the most part would not take to the seas. But even if this conclusion is accepted, it needs to be developed. In the first instance, it must be acknowledge that there were other motivating factors; secondary to the financial aspects perhaps, but still powerful and significant.¹¹³⁹ Linked to this, there is a key further question regarding the naval profession; why would men choose to earn a drachma a day on the oar-benches, rather than in some other vocation? Compared to the building industry, for example, the navy offered working conditions that were probably more dangerous, certainly more unpleasant, took a man away from his home and family, and what is more carried the risk of battle. What advantages did a naval career offer to offset this?

¹¹³² Strauss ('School of democracy', p. 319) concedes that "some degree of fraternization among different kinds of oarsmen as...inevitable", but argues that "the tried-and-true strategy of clubbiness" would have totally undermined this. His paper gives eloquent testimony to the conduciveness of conditions on a naval campaign for forming a group identity and shaping a collective consciousness, and there is no evidence of this being undermined by "clubbiness" amongst free men from different cities. Indeed, the most important and detailed example of a naval community shows (see Part 2, Section B.1) co-operation between all the free men. It is more legitimate to exclude the slaves from this imagined community, though again we must assume some level of cooperation. In the first place, the divide between the slave and the free man was more profound than that between free men of different cities. This would be reinforced in the second place by the fact that many slaves would have been on campaign with their own masters; although they worked under the same conditions and for the same pay, they could never forget their servile status.

¹¹³³ Strauss, 'School of democracy', p. 317. His argument refers only to Athenian citizens; I have applied it to the wider group of free people who served in the navy.

¹¹³⁴ Thucydides, 8.84; "Most of the Syracusans and Thurian crews were free men, and were consequently all the more outspoken." As remarked in *HCT* (ad loc 8.84.2, p. 279), these free men were "not [exclusively] the nationals of the states that provided the ships"; i.e. they were hired men.

¹¹³⁵ Strauss, 'School of democracy', p. 319

¹¹³⁶ Thucydides, 8.83-4

¹¹³⁷ Thucydides, 2.88. It was a similar case with Nicias in Syracuse (7.76); he feels that the men of the expedition were feeling (justifiably) disheartened, and he responded with a speech.

¹¹³⁸ Whether it was to earn professional wages (the "naval mob"), exploit potentially lucrative opportunities abroad (e.g. the Sicilian invasion of 415 BC), or to earn money in the slow season of one's regular employment (e.g. the farmers disposed by the Peloponnesian army in the Archidamian war); see above for discussion of this sliding scale of professionalism.

¹¹³⁹ I discuss such motivations below.

Economic reasons can be deduced here. What seems clear in the navy, which was not so much the case for banausic professions, is that there was a direct material advantage to be gained through increased *techne*, professional skill. However strange it may seem, the Erechtheion building accounts demonstrate that there was no difference in the levels of pay given to manual labourers on the one hand, and skilled craftsmen such as carpenters on the other.¹¹⁴⁰ Even in the case of sculptors making fine statuary for the sanctuary, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that they usually earned more for their superior skill than a man paid simply to carry things.¹¹⁴¹ It was a similar case for the architects on the project, who also appear to have earned a drachma per day.¹¹⁴² In the navy, by contrast, although the basic rate of pay was the same for everybody, competition for rowers meant that skilled men could command bonus payments, and the same was true for members of the *hyperesia*. In the case of the fleet that invaded Sicily in 415 BC, in addition to bonuses paid to the specialist crews, more than a third of the oarsmen,¹¹⁴³ a total of around 6,400 rowers, received higher wages than the basic drachma per day. Given the size and splendour of the Sicilian force, extra payments on this scale were probably unusual; the concept of paying bonuses to men with higher levels of skill and experience was not.¹¹⁴⁴ Not only were rowers given greater financial rewards for greater skill and experience; but these qualities could also lead to promotion to the *hyperesia*. In what is just about the only direct passage relating to promotion in the trireme fleet, Aristophanes implies that attaining higher rank is a matter of experience and merit:

Choros: *eretên chrênai prôta genesthai prin pêdaliôis epicheirein,
kai' enteuthen proirateusai kai tous anemous diathrêsai,
kaita kubernan auton heautôi*

Chorus-Leader: Besides, one ought first to be an oarsman before trying one's hand at the helm [*pedaliôis epicheirein*]; then after that be a bow-officer [*proirateusai*] and look out for squalls; and only then steer for oneself [*kubernan*].¹¹⁴⁵

It need hardly be said that an allusion in a satirical play is not the best evidence from which to reconstruct the career path of the Athenian navy. The context of this remark is a comparison with learning the skills of comic writing. The chorus leader first mocks those comics who peaked

¹¹⁴⁰ IG I³ 475, ll. 65-71, cf. ll. 272-85. Loomis, *Wages*, pp. 105-6.

¹¹⁴¹ IG I³ 476, ll. 144-81. These men were paid per piece, rather than a day-rate, so direct comparisons are difficult to make. Loomis (*Wages*, p. 118) argues that the amount of money paid to a craftsman for any given statue was "based on how long it ought to take", and describes it as "an attractive plausibility" that the rate used in the calculation was one drachma per day.

¹¹⁴² IG I³ 476, ll. 59-62 cf. ll. 266-69. Loomis, *Wages*, p. 99, cf. p. 97. Such men seem to have been given a specified salary, rather than a daily wage. Though the actual amount of money equated to a drachma per day, the significance of this would seem to be that architects, unlike labourers and carpenters, were paid this amount regardless of the actual number of days work they put in.

¹¹⁴³ Thucydides, 6.31. The *thranitae*, who were all given bonus payments, numbered 62 men out of the trireme's maximum oarcrew of 170.

¹¹⁴⁴ While the fact of bonus payments to skilled crew is well attested, there is, frustratingly, no evidence at all to suggest how much more a professional might earn; still less indication of the extra salaries a man like Phantias, reputed to be the best helmsman in Greece (Lysias, 10.11), might command. It seems likely that there were no fixed amounts; crewmen would ask for all they could get, trierarchs would spend their money on such men at levels appropriate to their own personal and patriotism and devotion to honour (*philotimia*), and, of course, the level of resources they could raise (for an example of a trierarch going the extra mile to raise money for his crew, see [Demosthenes] 50.17).

¹¹⁴⁵ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 542-4

early and are now a shadow of their former selves; by way of contrast he explains that Aristophanes learnt his craft slowly, stage by stage, akin to climbing the ‘promotion ladder’ of a trireme. While the details remain vague, it is unlikely that such an analogy would have been made were it not correct in its essentials; the analogy would have not worked unless it was commonly recognized in Athens that skill and experience over time on the navy’s oar benches could lead to elevation. Having great *technē* seemed to pay off in the naval context far more than it did in similar banausic contexts, and this could well be one reason for the evident popularity of crewing triremes.

Secondary Motives for Joining the Navy

As with the mercenaries examined by Trundle, the fact that naval people were motivated primarily by personal gain does not rule out a range of other motives; for many, pay could have been a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Some of these factors are alluded to in the source material.

For many, the simple desire for travel and adventure, seeing new sights, experiencing exotic foreign ports and far-flung places was probably a powerful motivation. Thucydides describes the attitudes of the young men in Athens as the Sicilian invasion was being debated:

tois d' en tēi hēlikiai tēs te apousēs pothōi opseōs kai theōrias, kai euelpides ontēs sōthēsesthai

The young had the longing for the sights and experiences of distant places, and were confident that they would return safely.¹¹⁴⁶

It might have added to the attraction that many of these places that the navy visited were in the Athenian Empire, and so the “naval mob” would have had the opportunity, should they have so desired, to lord their superiority, to bully, steal from and rape their “allies”;¹¹⁴⁷ such casual predatory action was, according to Aristophanes’ descriptions, part and parcel of overseas campaigns.¹¹⁴⁸

Patriotism might be adduced as another secondary factor, at least for the “naval mob” of professional citizens; the navy was a context in which one might work for their city and its glory. Strauss has suggested that the oarsmen themselves rowed with their minds dwelling upon their “glorious contribution to the greatness of their polis.”¹¹⁴⁹ This explanation may well be true of some individuals, but we might also infer similar motives upon the men who earned their keep by constructing the Parthenon in the 440s and 430s BC, the Erechtheion in 409 BC, and the

¹¹⁴⁶ Thucydides, 6.24.3. Note the more hard-nosed attitude in this passage, quoted above, of the “masses” who were after pay.

¹¹⁴⁷ See for example Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, ll. 192-3, where trips to the allies are synonymous with “grinding them down”.

¹¹⁴⁸ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, ll. 354-6 and 236-7, cf. *Frogs*, l. 1075

¹¹⁴⁹ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p.322.

numerous other great buildings of the city. Perhaps these labourers and builders were patriots who wished to help Athens construct the visible manifestations of her grandeur and greatness; edifices that were impressive to themselves and their contemporaries and would, Thucydides suggests, fool subsequent generations into overestimating Athenian power.¹¹⁵⁰ These ‘higher’ motives are of course impossible to disprove in any absolute way, as there is simply not the evidence from the sailors (or builders) themselves to convincingly and finally rebut the suggestion that the “naval mob” were fervent patriots. The positive evidence for such a case is far from compelling.

Respect For Trireme Crewmen at Athens: a prestigious way of life?

There are some personal benefits that can come with motives of patriotism; men could have been motivated to serve in the navy because of the prestige and respect accorded to that way of life. Strauss accepts this idea, perhaps too readily,¹¹⁵¹ arguing that as “rowers in the Athenian fleet, they garnered prestige and self-confidence...It is small wonder that thetic seamen were usually volunteers rather than conscripts.”¹¹⁵² As evidence of this, he cites the “saviours of the city” passage from *Acharnians* discussed above (though not the ambiguous and slightly tongue-in-cheek context), and the fact that, again from Aristophanes, the description “the land of fine triremes” was sufficient to identify the city of an Athenian stranger.¹¹⁵³ He also argues that “the opportunity to become part of so disciplined a military team” as a trireme crew was itself a draw;¹¹⁵⁴ one can almost imagine a trierarch or a *keleustes* going around the harbour shouting about such opportunities to attract potential recruits. Certainly a man might get a reputation for skill amongst his peers in naval circles, but how strong is the evidence to suggest that sailors gained wider prestige and respect in their communities? There was certainly some credit to be had for having fought in the naval battle at Salamis, though this was not the case for other significant victories at sea, such as the battle of Eurymedon. The Old Oligarch certainly believed, though found it distasteful, that naval service more generally led to political power;¹¹⁵⁵ though not necessarily admiration. Plato argued that one of the drawbacks for the city with a navy was that they “Give honours, as rewards for their safety, to a section of their forces that is not their finest; for they owe their safety to the arts of the *kubernetes*, the *pentekontarchos* and the rower-men of all kinds and not too respectable”.¹¹⁵⁶ Aristotle claims that this intolerable situation could be avoided:

*outhen gar autous meros einai dei tês poleôs...plêthous de huparchontos perioikôn
kai tôn tèn chôran geôrgountôn, aphthonian anankaion einai kai nautôn.*

¹¹⁵⁰ Thucydides, 1.10

¹¹⁵¹ Particularly in view of some of his other statements regarding the lack of presence and prestige the trireme crews had in the city, referred to below.

¹¹⁵² Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 317

¹¹⁵³ Aristophanes, *Birds*, l. 108

¹¹⁵⁴ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 317

¹¹⁵⁵ [Xenophon], *Constitution of Athens*, 1.1-2

¹¹⁵⁶ Plato, *Laws*, 707a-b

There is no need for such people [the “naval mob”] to be part of the citizen body...if there are masses of serfs and farm-workers ready to hand, it should always be possible to draw an abundant supply of sailors from this source.¹¹⁵⁷

Against these impressions we must weigh the complaints of sailors (and former sailors) as voiced in Aristophanes, in which respect and social prestige and political rewards for their service seem to be somewhat lacking.¹¹⁵⁸ Perhaps it is unsurprising that the elite commentators felt that the sailors were accorded too much respect, and that they themselves felt undervalued. Is there any objective truth to be gleaned out of these competing points of view? Such evidence as there is tends to support the case of the sailors.

Strauss has recently called attention to “the peculiar position of the Athenian seaman in his culture.”¹¹⁵⁹ He argues that while there is much textual evidence describing Athenian fleets and sea power, it “is matched by an equally impressive set of texts indicating the invisibility of the Athenian navy and its thetic seamen.”¹¹⁶⁰ That we cannot take for granted that seamen lost while serving in the Athenian fleet were recorded on inscriptions of the war dead is significant in itself.¹¹⁶¹ Even if we conclude that the names of dead sailors were inscribed on such lists, and that the empty bier in the annual funeral procession¹¹⁶² was a nod to the sensibilities of naval families, this must be regarded only as a bare minimum of respect. Indeed these measures may well have had more to do with religious piety and scruples towards the treatment of any dead, rather than an indication of respect for naval men themselves. The city of Athens certainly did not go out of its way to heroise its sailors.

Athens’ Imagined Community and the Cultural Invisibility of the “Naval Mob”

The virtual absence of triremes and their crews from all forms of classical art, from painted pots¹¹⁶³ to the Parthenon frieze, is an eloquent testimony to the level of prestige accorded to the navy. In commenting on Pericles’ pre-war speech, Gomme states that:

it is remarkable that at Athens the navy did not enjoy greater social prestige; that though the rich were ready enough to be admirals and trierarchs, no one was especially proud of being a *kubernetes* or a subordinate officer, still less of being a rower...[and]...exaggeration of the hoplite’s value was common, even in Athens. There is more recognition of the importance of the sailor in Aristophanes than in any other writer except Thucydides.¹¹⁶⁴

¹¹⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b

¹¹⁵⁸ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1117-9; *Acharnians*, 677-8

¹¹⁵⁹ Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 262

¹¹⁶⁰ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 313

¹¹⁶¹ Strauss (‘Perspectives on death’ p. 265) summarizes the debate, before arguing that it is extremely probable that seamen’s names were recorded. Van Wees (*Greek Warfare*, p.225) argues that, even if the Athenian citizens on board were recorded on such monuments, the rest of the crew were not.

¹¹⁶² Thucydides, 2.34

¹¹⁶³ Cartledge (‘*Machismo* of the Athenian Empire’, p. 64-5) reproduces and discusses an exception to this rule, the Archenautes Stamnos; a wine-jar that has no particularly naval imagery upon it, but in which the man’s name, ‘Master Mariner’, is significant. The name is rare at Athens and the jar unique.

¹¹⁶⁴ Gomme, *HCT*, vol. 1, p. 460, ad loc 142.9

Strauss similarly argues that “Without doubt, the surviving evidence of classical Athens, with the possible exceptions of Thucydides and Aristophanes, does not give thetic seamen their due.”¹¹⁶⁵ There is some doubt even with these two authors. As Strauss himself argues, Thucydides’ attitude towards the sailors borders on indifference; it is the institution of the navy that gets its due from him, rather than its men.¹¹⁶⁶ Only Aristophanes ever seems to fight the corner of the sailors themselves, and even he is far from an uncritical advocate.¹¹⁶⁷ It is possible that some men, seeing the (sometimes grudging) respect that the fleet itself had achieved in some circles in Athens, joined in the hope that they as sailors would gain similar prestige. Surely though, there cannot have been that many who were quite so naive, and those that had joined with such expectations would be justified in feeling disappointed.¹¹⁶⁸ It may be argued that such a viewpoint comes from uncritical acceptance of source material emanating solely from the conservative Athenian elite, and so cannot be taken as indicative of the beliefs and ideals of the poorer Athenian citizens. However, Cartledge is correct to argue that “the dominance of the hoplite ideology in democratic Athens is fully confirmed by examples drawn from...the two main publicly approved democratic discourses of drama and oratory”,¹¹⁶⁹ and further points out that “If Athenian drama was importantly the city of Athens talking to itself, then it talked to itself as an ‘imagined community’ not of sailors but of hoplites.”¹¹⁷⁰ Anderson explains the ‘imagined community’ in terms of a collective consciousness of a society and its people: “the members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each of them lives the image of their communion...Communities are distinguished...by the style in which they are imagined.”¹¹⁷¹ For all that Athens’ destiny was turned to the sea by the policies of Themistocles,¹¹⁷² for all that the city was bound to the Piraeus by the Long Walls,¹¹⁷³ and in the fifth century ruled a mostly maritime Empire, for all that the reality did not match the ideology, the Athenians liked to think of themselves as community of men born from their native soil,¹¹⁷⁴ citizen-soldiers ready to defend that soil with shield and spear. In Athens, the ideal warrior, indeed the ideal man,¹¹⁷⁵ was always the hoplite, and if not

¹¹⁶⁵ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 320

¹¹⁶⁶ Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 275: “Though an expert on sea power, Thucydides seems to have been tone deaf to the sound of oars.” Given these views, it is a little strange that Strauss would also argue that prestige and respect were significant motivating factors for men joining Athenian trireme crews.

¹¹⁶⁷ Van Wees (*Greek Warfare*, p. 200) argues that Aristophanes “could barely muster a few back-handed compliments” for the sailors. While this is a perhaps a little too dismissive, it is closer to the truth than Hunt (*Slaves, Warfare and Ideology*, p. 125), who argues that “one leaves Aristophanes with the overwhelming impression of the importance of the navy and the esteem in which its crews were held”

¹¹⁶⁸ In advocating that the rowers of Athens were accorded respect, Hunt (*Slavery, Warfare and Ideology*, pp. 122-6) does not differentiate sufficiently between recognition of the navy’s power and usefulness on the one hand, and respect for the men who crewed it on the other.

¹¹⁶⁹ Cartledge, ‘The *machismo* of the Athenian Empire’, p. 62

¹¹⁷⁰ Cartledge, ‘The *machismo* of the Athenian Empire’, p. 62. The same conclusion can be drawn from analysis of the fourth-century orators; see Part Two, section A.2.

¹¹⁷¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6

¹¹⁷² Thucydides, 1.93; Aristophanes, *Knights*, l. 815

¹¹⁷³ Thucydides, 1.107

¹¹⁷⁴ As Connor (‘Athenian Civic Identity’, p. 38) has correctly pointed out, this myth is “not a description of a social reality...[but]...a reflection of the anxiety of a people who knew they were of very diverse origins”

¹¹⁷⁵ Cartledge, ‘The *machismo* of the Athenian Empire’, p. 63; “being a man in classical Athens is being a hoplite man”

then the cavalryman; never the rower.¹¹⁷⁶ Although the personification of Demos in the *Knights* was a naval man to the extent that he fought at Salamis, he was also, like Aristophanes' everyman heroes, a country-dweller.¹¹⁷⁷ The Athenians on the whole did not think of themselves as belonging to the "naval mob".¹¹⁷⁸ Rowers and sailors were not widely respected, well praised or high valued throughout Athens, even by those who saw the advantages in the possession of ships and naval power. It seems then that the trireme crews, including the "naval mob" of professional sailor-citizens, had some justification in feeling that their abilities and efforts were not sufficiently appreciated.

Wreaths and Rewards: the singular case of Asklepiodorus

Despite Plato's fears about the respect and rewards for sailors getting out of hand, van Wees is largely correct to argue that the "only naval prize attested at this time is a wreath for the captain who got his ship manned and fitted out most quickly",¹¹⁷⁹ a matter more of leadership and "serving with property" rather than of naval skill and expertise; it was certainly not one that riff-raff could hope to win, and it was the case that "credit given to the people who manned the fleet was hardly forthcoming."¹¹⁸⁰ There is one possible, and intriguing, exception to this rule, in an inscription dating from sometime in the second half of the fourth century BC.¹¹⁸¹ The document records honours given to a certain Asklepiodorus. These rewards included the granting, for himself and his descendant, the status of *isoteles*; the right of immigrants settled in Athens to pay taxes in the same way as citizens. Given that, and the fact that an *isoteles* named Philon, son of Asklepiodorus, was buried in Athens,¹¹⁸² it seems certain that the original recipient of these honours was a metic. Additionally, Asklepiodorus was crowned with leaves and dined at the Prytaneum. A rider was added to the original decree, which was likely to have contained further honours; the text of this addendum does not survive. We know nothing about him or his service, save the brief note that is on the stone:

*epeide [Ask]lepi[odoros aner] agathos eyeneto m[axo]menos p[ros tous]
polemious p[leo]n e[pi] tes trir[ous tes] Xaretos tou Aixon[eo]s*

Asklepiodorus has been a good man by fighting the enemy while sailing in the trireme of Chares of Aixione.¹¹⁸³

¹¹⁷⁶ Strauss, 'Perspectives on death', p. 262

¹¹⁷⁷ Aristophanes, *Knights*, ll. 40-44, cf. 784-5.

¹¹⁷⁸ The text which comes closest to such an identification is the rowing sequence in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, discussed below. This play was produced at a time when a large-scale fleet, unusually manned through conscription of Athenian citizens, was at sea, and this context may help account for the association of rowers and Athenians here.

¹¹⁷⁹ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 230. There is an extant Demosthenic speech, *On the Trierarch Crown* ([Demosthenes], 51), that deals with a dispute over this award.

¹¹⁸⁰ Rawlings, *Ancient Greeks at War*, p. 110. There is a little more evidence regarding rewards for individual naval captains; Herodotus (8.11, 8.17, 8.84, 8.93) reports the awarding of several prizes for various acts of valour, such as being the first to capture an enemy vessel, in the context of the Persian Wars. There is no indication that such awards continued into the fifth century.

¹¹⁸¹ IG II² 276. See Lambert, 'Athenian State Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1: III Decrees Honouring Foreigners, B: Other Awards', p. 104 with nn. 28, 29, 30 for brief discussion and references to other treatments. I thank him for letting me have an early copy of this article.

¹¹⁸² IG II² 7879

¹¹⁸³ IG II² 276, ll. 6-9

The mention of Asklepiodorus' trierarch perhaps gives a means to the date of the inscription. Chares of Aixione is attested as being part of a syntrierarchy between the years of 356 and 346/5 BC.¹¹⁸⁴ However, this does not fit in well with the argument of Tracy, accepted by Lambert, that the stone was cut by a man who was active between the years of 340 and 320 BC.¹¹⁸⁵ It could be suggested that the meritorious service was performed right at the end of Chares' syntrierarchy, but not inscribed until the very beginning of the stone-cutter's career, but this interpretation seems a little forced. It seems a preferable interpretation to assume that Chares was trierarch on more than one occasion, and to look for a context within the twenty-year span of the cutter's known career, though any such terminal dates must always be regarded as somewhat open-ended. These dates (340-320 BC) do not seem to offer much in the way of naval activity during which heroics in battle could be performed. Aside from the conflicts of the Lamian war, no sea battles are recorded for these two decades. There is of course no difficulty in believing that battles which occurred in this period have gone unnoticed in the extant sources; but the inscription's reference to "fighting against the enemy" suggests that we are here dealing with something more significant here than a minor skirmish, or a single ship having a scrape with pirates. There was probably some conflict when the Athenians lost a huge shipment of grain to the Macedonians in 340 BC, but the triremes assigned to protect the merchantmen do not appear to have put up any sort of resistance, Philip II appearing to have captured them with ease while the Athenian general Chares was absent on a diplomatic mission.¹¹⁸⁶ The context suggested by Lambert, the campaign against Philip of Macedon at Byzantium in 340-39 BC, is indeed the most likely, but again not promising from the point of view of heroism in sea battle. The fleets sent against to the Hellespont at this point succeeded in relieving the Macedonian siege of Byzantium, and subsequently chased their fleet into the Black Sea, but there is no record of any battles. Philip's fleet escaped Athenian clutches by means of a stratagem; he allowed a false message of an uprising elsewhere to fall into his enemy's hands, and slipped his fleet through the Bosphorus when the Athenian fleet sailed off in response to the disinformation.¹¹⁸⁷ Overall, it was a campaign that the Athenians would have probably been keener to forget than to commemorate; though this does not necessarily preclude an individual act of heroism being recognized and rewarded, nor does it rule out the possibility that such an award could be seen in the context of making something heroic out of what was essentially a defeat. In terms of Asklepiodorus' inscription, the precise date, like the details of his deeds or even identity of the battle in question, must remain uncertain.

Also unknown is the position that Asklepiodorus occupied onboard Chares trireme; all that can be safely inferred from the stone is that he was not the ship's captain. That this seems to be an individual reward for some personal act of bravery in battle probably suggests that he was not a

¹¹⁸⁴ IG II² 1622, l. 751

¹¹⁸⁵ Tracy, *Athenian Democracy in Transition*, p. 96-103; Lambert, 'Athenian State Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1', p. 104, n. 28

¹¹⁸⁶ Frontinius, *Stratagems*, 1.4.13 cf. Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F162; Ellis, *Philip II*, pp. 179-80

¹¹⁸⁷ Frontinius, *Stratagems*, 1.4.13; Ellis, *Philip II*, pp. 183-4

rower; as Strauss notably put it, the oar deck of a trireme was not the sort of place “to march to a different drummer”,¹¹⁸⁸ or perform actions that made one stand out in any way; indeed, keeping one’s place and staying in rhythm with the other 169 men was what praiseworthy rowing was all about. It seems most likely that Asklepiodorus was one of the armed men aboard, either an archer or an *epibatai*; an interesting conclusion in itself, given that he was certainly a metic. However, the stone falls short of giving us a definite example of a metic marine, and it is perhaps just as likely that he was member of the *hyperesia*; but it must be emphasised again that without more detailed evidence of what his singular act of bravery was, there is no way to decide this question. A rower who took up his shattered oar to defend a struck vessel from boarders might be just as noticeable as a *kubernetes* performing some brilliant manoeuvre to bamboozle the enemy. It is also worth pointing out that the words on the stone do not require us to find a battle *at sea* as the context for this award, only a fight against an enemy.¹¹⁸⁹ It is possible that Asklepiodorus was a marine belonging to Chares’ crew whose act of heroism occurred during a fight on land; possibly in relation to the relief of Byzantium in 339 BC, an action for which the Athenians as a whole received considerable praise.¹¹⁹⁰

It remains a possibility that the award was in fact made to woo a significant man (i.e. a rich potential benefactor), and the act that prompted it need not be all that significant.¹¹⁹¹ There is no evidence that this is the case however, as the honoured man is known only from this inscription, and that on the grave of his apparent son. In short, this is a tantalising inscription about which very little can be said for certain. What is certain is that such rewards for the gallantry of an individual naval crewman in battle is singular in our extant sources, and comes at a time when Athenian sea power was reaching it nadir; and thus any claims to rewards and respectability, especially from non-citizens, would logically have had less weight.¹¹⁹²

The Navy’s Self Perception

Despite the fact that they were looked down upon by society generally, the sailors of the Athenian navy may have taken pride in their work. Not just because of the professional skills (*techne*) they cultivated; there is also a sense in which the crewmen felt a kind of working-class pride in doing a hard, difficult and unpleasant job. This is made most clear in Aristophanes’ play

¹¹⁸⁸ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 318

¹¹⁸⁹ Though we should not regard Asklepiodorus as a hoplite from the regular army who had been shipped into battle by the Athenian navy; the explicit mention of the particular trireme that he “sailed in” strongly suggests that he was part of the crew, not simply a passenger.

¹¹⁹⁰ Demosthenes, 18.90-1. This speech purports to records a decree of the Byzantines, expressing of gratitude after the Athenians “extracted us from great dangers”, and granting to them many honours. The extant text of the decree is surely spurious, but the fact of the thanksgiving decree is attested by the speech, and this is in itself of importance.

¹¹⁹¹ cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 221e, where Alcibiades claims that the reward for bravery in battle that he was given properly belonged to Socrates, who had saved his life, but the generals gave it to him on account of his status. This is a slightly different matter, as the fact of the brave act is certain; the credit simply goes to the wrong man. But it does attest to the idea that someone could be given an award for something they didn’t do due to their personal status.

¹¹⁹² Van Wees (*Greek Warfare*, p. 83) makes this point in relation to the ascribing of political power to the “naval mob” by Aristotle; “these views were formulated at a time when oarsmen should, if anything, have been easier to ignore”

Frogs. It is in this play that he describes most explicitly and vividly some of the every day unpleasantness associated with crewing a trireme:

Aischulos: *ouk êpistant' all' ê mazan kalesai kai 'rhuppapai' eipein.*

Dionusos: *nê ton Apollô, kai prosperdein g'es to stoma tôi thalamaki, kai minthôsai ton xussiton kakbas tina lôpodutêsai: nun d' antilegei kouket' elaunôn plei deuri kauthis ekeise.*

Aeschylus: All they [the crew of *Paralos*] knew how to do was call for their grub and shout “yo-ho”

Dionysus: Yes, by Apollo, and to fart in the face of Bottom-Bench Charlie¹¹⁹³, to smear a messmate in shit, and go ashore to nick someone’s clothes.¹¹⁹⁴

The contrast between the lot of the rower, even one aboard one of Athens’ sacred triremes, and that of the marine is most striking:

Dionusos: *epebateuon Kleisthenei-*

Hêrakilês: *kanaumachêsas;*

Dionusos: *kai katedusamen ge naus tôn polemiôn ê dôdek' ê treis kai deka.*

Hêrakilês: *sphô;*

Dionusos: *nê ton Apollô.*

Xanthias: *kait' egôg' exêgromên.*

Dionusos: *kai dêt' epi tês neôs anagignôskonti moi tèn Andromedan pros emauton exaiphnês pothos tèn kardian epataxe pôs oiei sphodra.*

Dionysus: I was a marine on board Cleisthenes’ ship.

Heracles: And were you in battle?

Dionysus: Yes, and we sank twelve or thirteen enemy ships.

Heracles: What, just the two of you?

Xanthias: [*aside*] “And then I woke up.”

Dionysus: And, anyway, on the ship I was reading *Andromeda* to myself, and suddenly my heart was struck with a longing.¹¹⁹⁵

The surprising thing is not that there is a divide between the somewhat aspirational figure of leisure-class marine on the one hand, and the shit-covered, thieving, argumentative sailor on the other; what is surprising is that it is the marine’s situation that is ridiculed and disparaged in relation to that of the rowers. This is made clear when the marine is forced to take the oars to row to the underworld, and is humiliated by his own incompetence at the task:¹¹⁹⁶

Charôn: *kathiz' epi kôpên. ei tis eti plei, speudetô. houtos ti poieis;*

Dionusos: *ho ti poiô; ti d' allo g' ê hizô 'pi kôpên, houpper ekeleues me su;*

Charôn: *oukoun kathedei dêt' enthadi gastrôn;*

Dionusos: *idou.*

Charôn: *oukoun probalei tô cheire kakteneis;*

Dionusos: *idou.*

Charôn: *ou mê phluarêseis echôn all' antibas elais prothumôs;*

¹¹⁹³ Sommerstein’s appropriate and imaginative translation of *thalamaki*, a word denoting the lowest file of a trireme’s three files of oarsmen.

¹¹⁹⁴ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, ll. 1073-6

¹¹⁹⁵ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, ll. 48-52

¹¹⁹⁶ As Sommerstein notes (ad loc l. 197, p. 175), Dionysus’ misunderstanding of “semi-technical” language allows “anyone who had ever rowed a trireme to despise him”

Dionusos: *kaita pôs dunêsomai apeiros athalattôtos asalaminios ôn eit' elaunein;*

Charon: Sit to the oar. Anyone else who's crossing, hurry long! [*To Dionysus, who has sat down on an oar*] Here, you, what are you doing?

Dionysus: What am I doing? Sitting to the oar, of course, where you told me to.

Charon: Look, Big-Belly, sit down *here*, will you?

Dionysus: There you are.

Charon: Well, put out your hands and *stretch* will you?

Dionysus [stretching out his arms in front of him]: There you are.

Charon: Will you stop this ridiculous behaviour, thrust your feet against the stretcher¹¹⁹⁷ and row with a will.

Dionysus: And how am I supposed to be able to *row*, unexperienced, unseamanlike, unSalaminian as I am?¹¹⁹⁸

A lack of rowing *techne* is here a source of ridicule and humour, but also of superiority; any of the “naval mob” in audience, being experts in rowing and understanding all the nautical terms that Dionysus misinterprets, would be able laugh even more heartily at the inept marine, and feel smug and superior to him. Despite its depravities, or perhaps even because of them, Aristophanes seems here to be tapping into a sense of pride that rowers felt for their world and their profession; it was a hard job, and an unpleasant job, but it was *their* hard and unpleasant job.

This is quite a lot of weight to put on these passages of *Frogs*, especially as the “marine” in question is the play’s protagonist, the god Dionysus. He seems to have been a fairly standard butt of jokes and is subjected to many pratfalls throughout this play, and also in the fragments of other comedies.¹¹⁹⁹ It would perhaps be dangerous to accept him as a representation of Athenian *epibatai* generally. However, it is likely that many rowers in the audience would find the image of the lazy time this marine had, reading and daydreaming on deck, familiar from their own experience; and they would have been glad to see him get his comeuppance upon meeting Charon 150 lines later.¹²⁰⁰ This contrast between the strong working man and the idle, out-of-shape leisured individual is given a less earthy and more threatening spin by Plato.¹²⁰¹ One of the contexts in which the rich man may have seen the danger posed by the “lean, sinewy, sunburnt pauper” is when they served as shipmates. Crewing a trireme, and rowing one in particular, was physically demanding in the extreme; Aristophanes makes many other references to the physical

¹¹⁹⁷ This phrase is added by Sommerstein for the sake of clarity (ad loc l. 202, p. 175), and it is helpful for a modern reader; those in Aristophanes’ audience who were familiar with the technique of rowing would have needed no such aid, though Dionysus himself may have found it useful.

¹¹⁹⁸ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, ll. 198-206. The rowing scene continues for sometime after this, with Dionysus’ efforts ‘helped’ by a chorus of frogs calling the rhythm for him.

¹¹⁹⁹ Wilson, ‘A Eupolidean precedent for the rowing scene in Aristophanes’ *Frogs*?’ argues that there was a scene in a lost comedy in which Phormio gives Dionysus a similar hard lesson.

¹²⁰⁰ Lada-Richards, (*Initiating Dionysus*, p. 69) argues that “In the linear perspective of the play’s narrative discourse the active participation of Dionysus in rowing is to be set in contrast to his intellectual idleness as a sailor in Arginusae”. (Describing Dionysus as a sailor seems to be an error; he was certainly idle, but as a marine) She sees the scene as a more inclusive kind of fun; “amusement with the soft and sluggish way in which the god was learning to become ‘like them’ [i.e. the audience]”.

¹²⁰¹ Plato, *Republic*, 556c-e. Contrast the portrayal of the physique-ruining banausic occupations in Xenophon, *Economics*, 4.2-3, quoted above.

demands of the job.¹²⁰² The idea that the “naval mob” possessed a kind of ‘working class’ pride for being willing and able, unlike one’s social superiors, to do such a dirty and difficult job is one that can be inferred from these passages.

Characteristics of the Naval Community

This sense of being looked down upon may have helped the naval crews form their collective identity and facilitated the forming of bonds between individuals of different status levels. There is much more to be said about the character of this community, a community shaped by the institutional characteristics of the Athenian navy. Some key characteristics of this community have already been identified. The political character of the navy has been discussed in a previous section, where I argued that the “naval mob” were not the die-hard democrats that they are often made out to be. Instead their attitude to politics was far more pragmatic, and they were willing to operate under practically any constitutional arrangements that were likely to secure regular pay. In this section so far we have explored the idea of the navy as a professional body, and one in which merit led to greater pay and chances of advancement. Members of the “naval mob”, and non-citizen professionals too, were dependent wage-earners; a stigmatized ideological location. For some, their loyalty belonged to the highest bidder, but many others will have found the wages on offer a necessary but not sufficient reason to crew triremes. It is a somewhat negative conclusion, but the truth of the matter that we simply cannot know what these secondary motives were to any reasonable degree of certainty.

We have seen the sailors’ willingness to speak out as characteristic not only of the navy of democratic Athens, but also that of Sparta. Rather than connect the sailor’s willingness to Athenian sailors and the ideology of Athenian democracy, it is more correct to see it, as Thucydides does, as a characteristic of sailors in general. Given the nature of the naval labour market in the Greek world, it is likely that the same men would serve at different times in different navies, and they would take their willingness to debate, to discuss, to make demands of commanders and ultimately to riot to with them, regardless of their present employer. As Strauss correctly points out, what was different was how the commanders and captains of the individual navies and fleets dealt with their sailors.¹²⁰³

While sailors were certainly outspoken and could be violently undisciplined when angered, they were also capable of a high degree of silence and disciplined efficiency. The most succinct testimony comes from Xenophon:

kai triêrês de toi hê sesagmenê anthrôpôn dia ti allo phoberon esti polemiois ê philois axiotheaton ê hoti tachy plei; dia ti de allo alupoï allêlois eisin hoi empleontes ê dioti en taxei men kathêntai, en taxei de proneuousin, en taxei d' anapiptousin, en taxei d' embainousi kai ekbainousin;

¹²⁰² For example, see Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1118-9, *Knights*, 784-5, 1366-8.

¹²⁰³ Strauss, ‘School of democracy’, p. 319; cf. Hornblower, ‘Sticks, stones and Spartans’, p. 59

And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly? Why do the men on board not get in each other's way? Is it not because the crew sit on the benches in order, moving their bodies forward and backward in order, embark and disembark in order?¹²⁰⁴

This is not the contradiction that it seems at first sight; the idea that a naval man could be efficient and professional while on duty, and significantly less so when ashore is something that was probably familiar to all navies of all ages. Ancient sailors ashore had a reputation for drunkenness and excess, liable to ruin their bodies and render themselves unfit for service whenever they had the funds to do so.¹²⁰⁵ This general reputation for excess perhaps extended to sailors' sexual behaviour. An Athenian woman in the play *Ecclesiazusae*, when asked why she had got no sleep the night before, says "because my other half is Salaminian, you see, and all night long he was rowing me under the covers."¹²⁰⁶ The reference here to a crewman of the trireme *Salaminia*, and use of the verb *elauno*, to row, as a euphemism for sex, perhaps summed up a widely held view on the amorous character of all oarsmen. But to suggest from innuendo relating specifically to Salaminians, of one sort or another,¹²⁰⁷ that Athenian sailors in general had a reputation for lewd behaviour and sexual stamina is perhaps too much pressure on these references in Aristophanes; about the most we can say is that, if the sailors did have such a reputation, it was one they were to share with their counterparts in later ages.

What seems clear is that it was partly the imperative to work together in a co-operative fashion that helped to forge strong links between all the crewmen and to create their collective identity. The rowers and specialists were as mutually dependent on each other as the men in a close-ordered phalanx; not directly for their personal safety perhaps, but certainly to ensure a good performance from their ship. The sea trials of the reconstructed trireme *Olympias* demonstrated not only the challenge of keeping time for 170 oarsmen on three levels when only one third of them could see their strokes, but it also provided eloquent testimony for the value of a close relationship between each thranite, and the zygian and thalmian directly below him.¹²⁰⁸ For many of the crewmen on the *Olympias* project, a lasting bond was formed, despite (or perhaps because of) the shared depravities and hard work entailed.¹²⁰⁹ These friendships were forged, if not quite in adversity, then in the next best thing. It is extremely likely that similar relationships were

¹²⁰⁴ Xenophon, *Economics*, 8.8

¹²⁰⁵ Thucydides, 8.45 And hence part of the reason for the policy of withholding a portion of the sailor's wages.

¹²⁰⁶ Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae*, ll. 39-40; cf. *Lysistrata*, ll. 57-60 for similar innuendo involving Salaminians.

¹²⁰⁷ Lambert (*Attic genos Salaminioi*, p. 103) suggests that the reference is both to "an Atheno-Salaminian" and "a lusty member of the crew of the Salaminia". He rightly sounds a note of caution in "trying to infer realities from his [Aristophanes'] jokes and puns".

¹²⁰⁸ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 236, cf. 253-4.

¹²⁰⁹ Douglas Glabi, a rower on *Olympias* in 1987, writes in his Purple Motes online journal that "being on the crew of an ancient Greek warship undoubtedly included great hardships and suffering. But by 1987, that job made for a very good time." <http://purplemotes.net/2007/02/11/science-in-action-the-trireme-olympias/>

experienced on the Athenian triremes of the fifth and fourth century BC, and were perhaps in themselves reasons for men to sign on to the oar-benches year after year.¹²¹⁰

As van Wees recognized, there was a strong competitive aspect to crewing warships.¹²¹¹ It is possible that the very fact that the navy provided a forum for competition amongst and between the crews strengthened its appeal. The competition between individual trierarchs is well attested and has been discussed previously; it fits into the 'philotimic' world of liturgies and public service. However, we should not imagine however that it was just the captains who were interested in which vessel won the informal race to Aegina in 415 BC.¹²¹² The crews would also be keen for their vessel to turn in a respectable speedy performance. The fourth century BC *strategos* Iphikrates skilfully harnessed this competitiveness as a means of training up his fleet:

pollakis de kai hopêi melloi aristopoieisthai to strateuma ê deipnopoieisthai, epanêgagen an to keras apo tês gês kata tauta ta chôria: epei d' epistrepsas an kai antiprôirous katastêsas tas triêreis apo sêmeiou aphiei anthamillasthai eis tên gên

Often too, when his force was just ready to take the morning or evening meal, he would turn the line around again so the triremes were facing the land, and at a signal make them race to shore.¹²¹³

There was also some degree of competitive spirit between crewmen on an individual level. In extolling their generation, the chorus of old men in *Wasps* claim to have cared nothing for speeches or law courts; "all we cared for was who would be the best oarsman."¹²¹⁴ There is surely much exaggeration in the contrast made here, but the competitive nature of sailors need not be doubted. As described above, a superior reputation as a crewman could lead to further employment and more generous remuneration as well. The matter at issue for the crews and rowers in these contests was their relative levels of professional skill and physical stamina;¹²¹⁵ not in manly courage or the scale and lavishness of their contribution to the state. For the more hostile side of competitiveness over skill, showing contempt for those without, the passages of *Frogs* discussed above give eloquent testimony.

Public festivals at which Athenian oarsmen could display their skills and compete in formal contests are attested, but are less prominent than one might have expected.¹²¹⁶ There was a quadrennial trireme regatta off Cape Sounium, attested in Herodotus.¹²¹⁷ Tribal boat races played

¹²¹⁰ It is worth noting that many of the rowers of *Olympias* turned up for several of the series of sea trials, which resulted in successively stronger crews. Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, p. 262-4. The contacts list on the Trireme Trusts' website (<http://www.atm.ox.ac.uk/rowing/trireme/ttaddress.html>) shows that many of the rowers were veterans of multiple summers of rowing.

¹²¹¹ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 229

¹²¹² Thucydides, 6.32

¹²¹³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.2.28

¹²¹⁴ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, ll. 1097-8

¹²¹⁵ Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, p. 229

¹²¹⁶ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 153-5; Gardener, 'Boat-Races Amongst the Greeks' and 'Boat-Races at Athens'.

¹²¹⁷ Herodotus, 6.87, cf. Lysias, 21.5

a part in the Panathenaia;¹²¹⁸ although the vessels involved were probably not triremes, a team with hopes of winning would have been well advised to source some of the “naval mob” from their tribe to compete. Late inscriptions attest to boats playing a part in several festivals and in the training of *ephebes*, but it is unclear whether they did so in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.¹²¹⁹ While this presence of naval events in Athenian festivals is not without significance, there is no indication that these events eclipsed the prestige of the more traditional games and events. In addition, as was the case with dramatic choruses and trierarchies, the public recognition and credit for good performances was given mainly to the wealthy citizen who provided the funds.¹²²⁰ Once again, it is tempting to see some justification for naval men’s claims at not receiving appropriate recognition in Athens.

The Structure of the Naval Community

The navy was an institution with a complex and multilayered hierarchy, at least up to the level of ship’s captain.¹²²¹ The trierarch was at the top, and the marines, who were “in command and control onboard”, were beneath him; then the *hyperesia*; and below them the oarsmen, themselves arranged in three tiers. Such a structure could lead to the conclusion that the ships of the Athenian navy had a very formal and strict chain of command.¹²²² This complex hierarchy might also lead us to the conclusion that the navy was a very stratified society, with strong divisions between ranks and classes. Neither of these impressions are really true.

While there were certainly many different posts and layers to the trireme’s social structure, clear lines of authority there were not. Trierarchs were in charge of their vessels and responsible for them, but this was not the age of the all-powerful ship captain with supreme authority over everyone on his vessel. During Apollodorus’ trierarchy in 362 BC, a passenger on his ship tried to tell the pilot where to sail; he said he would follow instead the instructions of Apollodorus, the man who pays him his money.¹²²³ This is a timely reminder of the essential nature of naval service; Apollodorus’ authority was not based primarily on the formal and legal power of his office, but on the depth of his pockets. The reverse was also true for Apollodorus; when he was unable to secure pay for his men, some did not follow his orders and abandoned his ship.¹²²⁴

Despite Aristotle’s statement regarding the authority of the *epibatai* on board a trireme, it is unclear the extent to which they would be able (either as a matter of authority or of competence)

¹²¹⁸ An inscription from the first half of the fourth century records prizes given for a boat race (IG II² 2311, l. 78).

¹²¹⁹ Festivals; IG II² 1006, l. 29-30 and 71-2; 1011, l. 16 1028, ll. 20-1; Ephebes; IG II² 2130, l. 49. Jordan (*Athenian Navy*, p. 155) thought it likely that such events were also held in earlier times, though there is no evidence to suggest this.

¹²²⁰ A client of Lysias (21.5) claims to an Athenian court that he spent 15 mina (1,500 drachmae) on winning the Sounion race.

¹²²¹ I discuss the commanders of Athenian fleets above in Part Two, section A.5

¹²²² Van Wees, (*Greek Warfare*, p. 230-1), reacting against the picture of the egalitarian trireme as depicted by Strauss (‘School of democracy’) argues that the “sharp social distinctions” amongst the crew were reinforced by the trireme’s hierarchy and the different working conditions of the men on board.

¹²²³ [Demosthenes] 50.50

¹²²⁴ [Demosthenes] 50.11

to give orders to the rest of the crew. It is probably best to interpret these men in a similar way to the marines of Nelson's navy; their role and importance in terms of the vessel's hierarchy was not based so much on their formal authority, but on the fact that they were routinely armed men in a community of unarmed ones. It is certainly this fact about them that Aristotle highlights when he suggests that they were in command and control aboard ship.¹²²⁵ Given the number of sailors and their propensity to fall into violent passions when they did not receive their due, the marines can be viewed as enforcers and bodyguards to the trierarch, rather than figures of authority. However, this was probably not the whole story. When the Sicilian expedition sailed in 415 BC, it was the marines only who shared with the archons in the public libations before the launch.¹²²⁶

It is also unclear to what extent there was an internal hierarchy amongst the *hyperesia*. The sources are very specific on the authority of the *kubernetes*, and he should surely be regarded as senior to his five colleagues;¹²²⁷ but who, if anyone, was second to him? Did the *prorates* outrank the *keleustes*? Given that most of the *hyperesia* were specialists in distinctive roles, questions of relative authority may not be relevant or important; the *naupegos* was deferred to when repairs were needed to the ship, the *pentekontarchos* on matters of manning and supply. The *auletes* was probably junior to the *keleustes*, but for the rest there is no way to be certain. The fact that the different ranks are not listed in any consistent order on a singular inscribed crew list strongly suggests that there was no formal order of rank amongst these different posts.¹²²⁸ Perhaps relative authority, if it was an issue at all, was a matter of the reputation, skill and personal authority of the individual holding a post, rather than the post itself.

And yet for all this hierarchy, and the specifically attested authority of the pilot in particular, leadership in the Athenian navy was a consensual matter. Aristotle compares the *kubernetai* to doctors, as they are "never expected to mislead or use force in handling patients or crews".¹²²⁹ As Hornblower has remarked, discipline in the navy was not severe, at least in comparison to that of Sparta.¹²³⁰ Best practice in the Athenian navy to ensure an effective ship was to encourage and inspire the men.

hoion kai en triêrei, ephê, hotan pelagizôsi, kai deêi peran hêmèrinous plous elaunontas, hoi men tôn keleustôn dunantai toiauta legein kai poiein hôste akonan tas psuchas tôn anthrôpôn epi to ethelontas ponein, hoi de houtôs agnômones eisin hôste pleon ê en diplasiôi chronôi ton auton hanutousi ploun. kai hoi men hidrountes kai epainountes allêlous, ho te keleuôn kai hoi peithomenoi, ekbainousin, hoi de anidrôti hêkousi, misountes ton epistatên kai misoumenoi.

¹²²⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1327b9-11

¹²²⁶ Thucydides, 6.32. It is not exactly clear who these archons were; probably it is a convenient general term to encompass the trierarchs, generals, and Athenian city officials. It seems to show that *epibatai* were not authoritative enough to be called archons themselves, but of sufficient weight to be associated with them.

¹²²⁷ See for example Pollux, *Onomasticon*, 1.98 and discussion in Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p.139-41

¹²²⁸ IG I³ 1036

¹²²⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1324b

¹²³⁰ Hornblower, 'Sticks, stones and Spartans', p. 59

Consider what happens aboard triremes, for example: when the rowers are out at sea and are supposed to complete a voyage within a day, some *keleustai* can speak and act in ways designed to stimulate the crew's willingness to work, while others lack this flair to the extent that it takes them more than double the time to complete the same voyage. The crew of the first ship disembark all covered in sweat, with the *keleustes* congratulating his men and the subordinates just as pleased with him; the crew of the second ship arrive without having worked up a sweat, hating their boss and being hated in return.¹²³¹

There is some evidence indicating tension between some of the groups on board (such as the marines and *nautai*); but there is testimony too of a certain degree of equality and a lack of such divisions amongst the crew, at least in the Athenian navy. The example of the independent naval democracy on Samos in 411 BC is the most significant and grand example, but there is evidence of co-operation and good relationships on a smaller scale across the widest social divide on board; between the captain and the crew. During his trierarchy, one of Apollodorus' *hyperesia*, a *pentekontarchos* by the name of Euctamon became ill; the generous captain discharged him from duty, paid his passage home, and sent him back to Athens with his full pay.¹²³² Euctemon was later able to repay this good treatment; he accompanied one of Apollodorus' family to petition Apollodorus' nominated successor as trierarch, and by virtue of his position on board was able to confront this man, Polycles, with details of the payments made so far, to which Apollodorus felt he was entitled to have reimbursed.¹²³³ A further example of such co-operation in this speech involves one of the *nautai*, a certain Callicles, who approached Apollodorus and warned him against transporting an exile and condemned criminal on his ship as he had been instructed; to do so would leave Apollodorus himself open to prosecution.¹²³⁴ It is tempting to suggest that Callicles was prompted to come forward due to the good treatment and generous payment given out by Apollodorus; if he had been a trierarch who was negligent of his duties and stingy with his cash, Callicles may have been less likely to give his captain such a warning. An intriguing question, but one for which there is little evidence, is to what extent this close and co-operative relationship between a member of the rich elite and his poorer crewmen was typical. The institution of the trierarchy generally, like the festival and gymnastic liturgies and even the army,¹²³⁵ did allow such opportunities for the masses and the elite to interact and mix.¹²³⁶ How many took advantage of these opportunities is unknown, and would surely be depend on individual circumstances; but Apollodorus at least furnishes us with a clear example of how such a relationship could be mutually beneficial.

¹²³¹ Xenophon, *Economics*, 21.3

¹²³² [Demosthenes], 50.19

¹²³³ [Demosthenes], 50.24-6. A cynical observer might remark that it was awfully convenient that Euctemon, the man with the figures for expenses at his fingertips, just happened to be sent home sick to Athens and so be on hand to help lobby Polycles. Even if the illness was something of a conspiracy, it still attests to a good working relationship existing between the captain and a member of his crew.

¹²³⁴ [Demosthenes], 50.47-8

¹²³⁵ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.4.20; Cleocritus, the herald of the Mysteries, speaks of these things as contexts for good relations and shared experiences amongst all classes of Athenians.

¹²³⁶ Fisher, 'Gymnasia and democratic values of leisure', pp. 103-4

5: Conclusions: the nature of the naval community

The “naval mob” was part of a community of contradictions. Co-operation and friendly relationships between the crew sat side-by-side with fierce competitiveness, just as the men who in some parts of Thucydides had a reputation for rowdy outspokenness, drunkenness ashore and mob-like behaviour were also the silent, attentive and disciplined rowers portrayed by Xenophon. The hierarchical command structure of the Athenian navy hid a consensual variety of leadership, and assorted foulnesses adorned sore and blistered men who were nevertheless proud of their skills and their dirty job. It was also a diverse community, a microcosm of an extremely cosmopolitan city,¹²³⁷ but one in which the boundaries between the rich and poor, and citizen and outsider were more blurred than on land. It was a community that was driven by money; the Athenian navy as an institution accounted for a significant proportion of Athens’ public and private wealth. Despite the power and prominence of the navy in Athenian foreign policy, the naval community was to a large extent marginalized, politically and especially culturally, by the Athenians as a whole. The “naval mob”, the most important Athenian element in this wider naval community, were outspoken, pragmatic, tough, skilled, competitive and to a significant extent mercenary. When our sources report the concerns and desires of naval people, they are nearly always to do with their personal safety in dangerous times or with their hopes for booty or pay in better days. Doubtless these sources, which to a greater or lesser degree are all products of the cultural elite, fail to appreciate the full extent of rowers’ concerns and beliefs, and they do not tell the full story. But to react too strongly against this and tell another story, like the one about the patriotic, staunchly democratic sailor, rowing his heart out for the glory of his city and the prestige of his calling, is to fly in the face of the evidence, imperfect though it is, that we do have. The story of Athens’ “naval mob” was not one of military men receiving their (arguably) due political recognition for their vital role in securing Athens’ safety; this link, even for Athens, was more myth than reality, and the “naval mob” that crewed Athens’ fleet certainly did not control her Assembly. The ideological position of the hoplite as the perfect servant and defender of the city was never challenged by the rower or the *kubernetes*, not only because of our mainly elite source material, but because the central features of elite ideology (respect for personal courage and face-to-face killing, disdain for people who worked with their hands and especially those who lived “slavishly” off of a regular wage given by an employer, the importance of serving with one’s property as well as one’s body) were held by many Athenians of more modest means. Rowing in the navy itself did not lead to its sailors being disparaged; this activity could indeed be a noble public service in desperate times, and was occasionally undertaken by the great and the good. The problem was more to do with the particular features of the institution at Athens; it was ‘professional’ institution, one that offered regular employment and daily wages, one that encouraged the development technical skill, and one that offered tangible rewards for increasing expertise.

¹²³⁷ Or more correctly, the men of such a city.

CONCLUSION: A NAVAL DEMOCRACY OR A DEMOCRATIC NAVY?

The Athenian navy accounted for significant portions of Athenian revenue and was a large-scale though variable source of employment for citizens and non-citizens alike. Athens' period of time as a significant naval power coincided, though not precisely, with her existence as a democracy; it would be an error to make a causal association between the two. Cartledge argues that despite the thetes' "*de facto* naval reign...there is no gainsaying the, to us paradoxical, fact that the *nautai* were – in the Athenians' conventional, moral-political parlance – *phauloi*, 'worthless'". This is less of a paradox than it seems; even if the thetes did rule Athens, it was not a "naval reign". Any contribution of the "naval mob" to democratic politics has left very few traces in the evidence. While the Athenian citizens in 406 BC, desperate for news of the fate of their loved ones, probably hung on every word spoken by those of the "naval mob" who had returned from the Arginusae campaign, we have no other solid evidence to suggest that the trireme crews were a significant presence in the Assembly, either as speakers or as voters. This is not to say that members of the "naval mob" did not attend the Assembly, when they were in port and able to do so; it is just that their presence was not particularly important in terms of its numbers. They certainly did not dominate democratic politics, not even from a distance; the indications are that the Athenian Assembly, for all that it put considerable resources in to the navy and while it would take seriously direct attacks on the its people, did not take especial care of their rowers. If the agenda of Aristophanes' *Knights* is representative, the Athenians were sometimes lax even on the crucial issue of naval pay, and it is not unlikely that the Citizenship Law of 451/0 BC would have had disproportionate effects on the children of the "naval mob".

It is difficult to pin down the ideological relationship between the fleet and the city. While the sailors may not have been accorded respect or praise, ancient political thought and much modern analysis has posited that it was their service in the fleet that lay behind the political power of the masses. We can doubt a close connection for several reasons, not least the chronology. Poorer Athenian citizens were politically self-conscious and aware of their power long before the navy became a centrally important institution, though the tough experiences of rowing in the fleet would certainly not have dampened such sentiments. Certainly it can be argued that the imperial tribute, a source of revenue which the navy secured, was instrumental in the provision of pay for public offices, a key feature of radical democracy; but such provision continued when Athenian thalassocracy was broken, and even extended to the Assembly despite the fact that Athens had been shorn of her Empire. Whether or not this connection can be accepted on a practical level, any claims that this was *deserved* were somewhat undermined by key characteristics of the navy that ran counter to the commonly accepted hoplite ideology; the navy as a professional, voluntary, wage-paying institution; the reliance on skill and daring, rather than amateur bravery, to win naval battles; the prominence of the navy's role as a transporter of fighters; the

cosmopolitan nature of the crews; the lack of weapons or any sort of property contribution. This ideology was held not only by the small circle of the educated elite from which most of our literary evidence comes, but probably amongst the Athenians as a whole.

If the democracy was not “naval”, neither was the navy noticeably democratic. Its internal organization, while not authoritarian, was hierarchical. The events at Samos in 411 BC, so often cited as the quintessential example of the democratic ideology of the navy, in fact show a slightly different and far more interesting picture. The naval crews on Samos were more easily persuaded into abandoning democracy than was the Assembly at Athens, but were more determined and effective in their opposition when that oligarchy failed to live up to its promises and their expectations. It is interesting in this context that it was rumours of direct attacks on the families of the naval men that prompted their anger against the 400, demonstrating the danger of making an “insult against the great yo-ho”.¹²³⁸ That the naval crews in Samos responded by constituting themselves as a democracy is significant and striking, not least as the franchise appears to have been far more inclusive than was the post-451/0 BC Athenian democracy. No doubt a good many of the *nautai* were zealously democratic and were looking to put in place their preferred system of government; but there was pragmatism here too, in that it would have been practically difficult and strategically fatal to start excluding the non-Athenians in the crews, and their hosts the Samians, from political deliberations. For a brief moment, the democracy on Samos was an incarnation of Aristotelian (and modern) ideas about the interconnection between military and political roles, in that it was those free men who were taking active part in the campaign that formed the political community.¹²³⁹ Brief, not so much because the fleet was reconciled with Athens within four years, but because within a very few months the democracy began to look more like government through elected representatives (i.e. an oligarchy), with one of these representatives in particular, having “matters put in his hands”,¹²⁴⁰ seeming to call the shots. That the fleet appears to have accepted the successful leadership of Alcibiades and his colleagues without the frequent debates and assemblies that characterized their democracy prior to his return is another indication of their essential pragmatism.

A tendency towards political pragmatism was not the only detectable feature of the trireme crews. Sailors in the Athenian navy were outspoken and forthright, competitive and disciplined onboard ship, somewhat less restrained ashore. Many were professionals, and some gained widespread repute in Athens and beyond on account of their skills. All were, to a greater or lesser extent, mercenaries. The navy ran on money, and this was the main concern for most of the crewmen most of the time, whether in the form of wages or booty. But while the money may have been necessary for nearly everyone, for some at least it was not the full story. A simple

¹²³⁸ Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 908-11

¹²³⁹ Slaves, of which there were probably not insignificant numbers even after desertions, were excluded; not even the Samos fleet democracy was perfect!

¹²⁴⁰ Thucydides, 8.82.1

sense of adventure and wanderlust may have accounted for many a man's first joining the fleet, and a sense of loyalty and comradeship to his shipmates and the naval community could have made him stay. The navy paid professional wages and rewarded skilled individuals with bonuses and promotion; but this was not a way of life which accorded much respect in the wider community.

It was not so much the act of rowing a trireme in itself that was degrading, despite its many hardship and deprivations; it was the dependence upon an employer that prolonged service in the fleet entailed that was slavish and unsuitable for a free man. The parallel between rowing and 'banausic' activities is not an exact one, but towards both is the same slightly inconsistent thinking; as a sculpture could be valued without the sculptor being accorded respect, so the sea-power generated by the navy could be praised, without any glory needing to reflect on the men that maintained it.

In his discussion of the cultural invisibility of the rowers, Strauss sets up some rhetorical propositions, which provide a good summary of some modern assumptions regarding the navy, ideology and politics:

If the navy was indeed the backbone of Athens' military might, if thetes possessed considerable political power in fifth-century Athenian democracy, and if there was indeed a strong connection between thetic naval service and political strength, then it is necessary to explain the silences in the sources.¹²⁴¹

I shall take these ideas one by one. Firstly, the navy certainly was the backbone of Athens' military might and her power overseas, especially in the fifth century; but this was not universally recognized or admitted. Ideologically, in terms of defending the *polis*, the hoplite was never surpassed. Even one of the greatest naval victories, at Salamis, could be evaluated as a victory of hoplites as much as sailors, or virtually ignored in favour of the land battles of Marathon and Plataea.

Secondly, the thetes did indeed possess considerable political power through their numbers, but they are not to be identified solely as sailors; many thetes never took an oar, and many served instead as hoplites. The "naval mob" of professional citizen crewmen certainly did not possess political power; and there was not in reality such a strong connection between political strength and naval 'service' as has been assumed in modern writings. We have seen that the conception of "military service" in the fleet, outside of state emergencies and mass levies, is problematic, as is the connection between military strength and political status more generally. These factors go some way to explaining decidedly lukewarm attitude towards the navy that brought power to their city by the writers of our literary sources, the near total lack of visual representations of sailors, and the ideological worthlessness of *nautai*.

¹²⁴¹ Strauss, 'School of democracy', pp. 313-4

Appendix 1: List of named potential *nauarchoi*

426/5 BC: Aristotle and Hierophon (see Part One, section B.2)

Comparing the terms used to describe these two commanders with those used to describe Leon and Diomedon prior to winter 412 BC (see below), Jordan argues that they “can no longer be regarded as *strategoi*.”¹²⁴² Develin¹²⁴³ accepts this case, though he does not accept the supposedly parallel case of Leon and Diomedon, for whom in fact there is fuller testimony and thus a stronger argument for regarding as *nauarchoi*. Fornara is probably correct to regard these men as *strategoi*.¹²⁴⁴

414/3 BC: Konon (Thucydides 7.13)

Jordan argues that his command in Naupactos was as an archon, though he certainly served later as a *strategos*.¹²⁴⁵ Fornara¹²⁴⁶ lists him without comment as a general. Develin¹²⁴⁷ also regards him tentatively as a *strategos*, though citing Jordan admits “He could have been a nauarch”.

414/3 BC: Menandros and Euthydemos (Thucydides, 7.16, cf. 7.69)

Appointed by the Athenians “from the men present” to share command with Nicias on Sicily, until such time as elected replacements (Demosthenes and Eurymedon) should take over.¹²⁴⁸ Jordan suggests that before this step up they were likely to have been “archontes”.¹²⁴⁹ Develin argues that “they must have held some position of command to be chosen as extraordinary generals”, and seems to tentatively favour interpreting them as taxiarchs.¹²⁵⁰ In fact there is no evidence at all to suggest what post, if any, they held before their promotion. Though his earlier words implied that they would be relieved of command by the new arrivals, Fornara points out that Thucydides seems to consider Menandros and Euthydemos as *strategoi* even after Demosthenes and Eurymedon had taken up their posts.¹²⁵¹ Thucydides describes Demosthenes as persuading *Nikiav kai tous allous xunarxhontas*, “Nicias and the other *commanders*”;¹²⁵² the use of the plural here indicates that there were commanders other than Nicias, Demosthenes and Eurymedon present. Later still, Menander and Euthydemos are mentioned along with Demosthenes as *ton Athenion strategoi*, “generals of the Athenians”.¹²⁵³ Fornara suggests that

¹²⁴² Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 128-9

¹²⁴³ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 127. He does not cite any evidence other than Jordan’s argument on this matter. Though he notes that their status “cannot be regarded as totally secure”, he is sufficiently certain to list the names under the title of “Nauarchoi” without appending question marks. (Contrast, for example, the cases of Konon and Diphilus, below.) It is worth noting parenthetically that the assigning of *nauarchoi* status to Aristotle and Hierophon stops 426/5 BC being a year with a double tribal representation on the board of *strategoi*, a view with which Develin is sympathetic.

¹²⁴⁴ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 57-8.

¹²⁴⁵ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 123

¹²⁴⁶ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 65

¹²⁴⁷ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 153-4

¹²⁴⁸ Thucydides, 7.16

¹²⁴⁹ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 127-8

¹²⁵⁰ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 154

¹²⁵¹ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 65, n. 113

¹²⁵² Thucydides, 7.43.

¹²⁵³ Thucydides, 7.69

this is not a contradiction with Thucydides' earlier statement regarding Menander and Euthydemus' position, as they could have been "temporarily given that role [i.e. as *strategoï*] by the other generals." Develin accepts Fornara's argument, and lists the pair unquestioningly as *strategoï*. It is perhaps surprising the casual way that Fornara suggests (in a footnote) and Develin accepts (without significant discussion) the proposal that *strategoï* could appoint other men to be *strategoï*, this bring probably the most significant magistracy in classical Athens and one that usually required a vote of the Assembly. Such a significant proposal should surely require some discussion. An appeal to the *autokrator* status of the three 'proper' generals on Sicily, or the unusual and desperate circumstances of the latter stages of the Sicilian campaign might be cited as sufficient explanations for this,¹²⁵⁴ but there are alternatives. Firstly, that Thucydides' implication at 7.16 that Menandros and Euthydemus were to give up their commands upon the arrival of the new *strategoï* is mistaken. His words seem clear on this point however; unless there are substantial and unjustifiable alterations, his narrative is inconsistent. Alternatively, it could be proposed that Menandros and Euthydemus were appointed not as generals but as *archontes* by the *strategoï*; as we have seen in Part Two, section A.5, there is evidence for generals appointing subordinates to take control of detachments of their forces. If this interpretation is accepted, then Thucydides' naming of all these individuals as *strategoï* at 7.69 would appear to be a very loose, not to say inaccurate, usage of the term. This should serve to caution us from placing too much certainty on arguments derived from his (and other writers') use of 'official' terminology.

414/3 BC: Charikles (Thucydides, 7.2)

Despite Jordan's view that there is something "emphatic" about the way Charikles is described as an archon,¹²⁵⁵ Develin is happy to list him as a *strategos*.¹²⁵⁶ The evidence is totally inconclusive however, and believing Charikles to be a *strategos* or a nauarch comes down to little more than personal preference.

413/2 BC: Diphilus (Thucydides, 7.34)

Jordan argues that, like Konon, he was "archon ton neon, and most probably Konon's replacement" at Naupactos.¹²⁵⁷ Fornara regards him as a general.¹²⁵⁸ Develin, like with Konon, is more speculative. He includes Diphilus in the list of *strategoï* but commenting that "he could have been a nauarch" and citing Jordan's argument.¹²⁵⁹

413/2 Strobichides (Thucydides, 8.15; 8.16, 8.30, 8.62, 8.79)

Jordan argues that "he was evidently an archon at the beginning of his career", and later promoted, like Leon and Diomedon, to the generalship. Unlike Leon and Diomedon, there is not

¹²⁵⁴ Though neither Fornara or Develin in fact do this.

¹²⁵⁵ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 124

¹²⁵⁶ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 153. cf. Fornara, *Generals*, p. 65

¹²⁵⁷ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 123-4

¹²⁵⁸ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 65

¹²⁵⁹ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 155

direct evidence for this promotion. Fornara includes him on the list of strategoi for 413/2 BC and 412/1 BC.¹²⁶⁰ Develin tentatively accepts this, and is probably right to; though he cites Jordan, he does not discuss the possibility of Strombichides being a *nauarch*.¹²⁶¹

412/1 Hippokles (Thucydides, 8.13)

Missing from Jordan's list, and regarded as a general of 413/2 by Fornara,¹²⁶² and more cautiously by Develin.¹²⁶³ *HCT* argues that he was a nauarch in 412/1, a year in which there are a good many generals. While this is not unlikely, it is difficult to be certain in individual cases.¹²⁶⁴ What is clear from this year, and as was probably the case in many others, is that more than 10 leaders were needed to command all the forces operating. Even if Hippokles wasn't a nauarch, it is likely that someone was.

412/1 BC: Diomedon and Leon (see Part Two, section B.2)

Jordan makes a convincing case to suggest that these two men were *nauarchoi* until the winter of 412/1 BC, at which time they were 'promoted' to *strategoi* in order to replace Phrynichus and Skironides. The case depends entirely on Thucydides' terminology, which he admits is not always to be relied upon.¹²⁶⁵ However, the weight of the evidence in this instance, though somewhat circumstantial, favours Jordan's interpretation. Develin is not convinced, arguing that "that they [i.e. Leon and Diomedon] later replaced Phrynichus and Skironides does not show that they were not generals earlier".¹²⁶⁶ This statement is true, but it does not answer or address Jordan's case.

411 BC Dietrephes (Thucydides, 8.64)

Sent by the oligarchs at Athens to the Thracian region. Jordan believes his official title was "archon epi Thrakes", and if so Dietrephes could be regarded as holding a post comparable to that of Hermon in 410/09 BC (see below). However, the 'official' title that Jordan would like is not supported by the evidence, and Develin lists him as a general.¹²⁶⁷ Suffice to say that an appointment made under the regime of the 400 is of questionable comparative value to appointments made under the democracy. He was previously sent as *strategos* to the Thracian area in 414 BC.¹²⁶⁸

¹²⁶⁰ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 65-6.

¹²⁶¹ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 156-7

¹²⁶² Fornara, *Athenian Generals*, p. 65

¹²⁶³ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 156

¹²⁶⁴ *HCT* vol. 5, pp. 32 ff.

¹²⁶⁵ Jordan (*Athenian Navy*, p. 127) lists the testimonies: Thucydides, 8.19, 8.20, 8.23, 8.24 (referring to Leon and Diomedon prior to their replacing Phrynichus and Skironides, and not calling them *strategoi* in any instance), cf. 8.54, 8.55, 8.73, (when they have replaced the two generals, and are sometimes called *strategoi* themselves.)

¹²⁶⁶ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 157.

¹²⁶⁷ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 160

¹²⁶⁸ Thucydides, 7.29; Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p.153

410/9 BC: Hermon (IG I³ 375=ML, 84=Fornara 154)

As discussed above, Jordan¹²⁶⁹ and Develin¹²⁷⁰ both believe in the official title of ‘archon es Pylon’ as evidenced here, though Jordan associates this archon with a more general “military rank of archon which was held by officers subordinate to the strategoi”.¹²⁷¹ It seems equally valid to compare this post with the garrison commanders and “archons of the cities”.

409/8 BC, Pasiphon and Theorus (*Agora*, 17.23.107 cf. IG I³ 375=ML, 84=Fornara 154)

The first of these inscriptions is a casualty list, attesting to the post of “archon of the fleet”, naming these two individuals as holders. Develin assigns their offices to successive years, but there seems to be no compelling need to do so.¹²⁷² Pasiphon thus appears to have been a *nauarchos* having served previously as a general; as Jordan remarks, “no difficulty arises from such an assumption.”¹²⁷³

407 BC Phanosthenes (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.18, cf. 16)

Xenophon lists 10 generals for 406/5 at 1.5.16, but two sections later describes Phanosthenes (who was not named in the list) in command of 4 vessels taking over command from Konon (who was) at Andros. Jordan argues that “the case for Phanosthenes’ being an archon [in 406/5 BC, rather than a strategos] becomes extremely strong.”¹²⁷⁴ Develin, however, assigns him tentatively to the *strategia* of 407/6 BC, for which time there is evidence of Konon being in Andros.¹²⁷⁵

407/6 BC Antiochus (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.11-12)

The case of Alcibiades’ *kubernetes* is discussed in detail above, Part Two, section A.5

362 BC Lykinios and Kallippos ([Demosthenes] 50.53, 50.46 ff.)

It is clear that Lykinios was some sort of subordinate archon appointed by the general, Timomachus. Jordan suggests that he was put in command of “some of the ships in the squadron... [i.e.]...the force bound for home”.¹²⁷⁶ It is unclear from Apollodorus’ account if in fact any ships apart from his own were part of this “force”; he uses the singular in this passage, including in the line describing Lykinios’ position (“commander of the ship”). Jordan does not mention a similar appointment made by Timomachus during Apollodorus’ trierarchy. Kallippos is not described as any sort of archon, but appears to have been some sort of agent or assistant of the general, sent off on a particular mission. Develin at least found the two cases comparable,

¹²⁶⁹ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 125

¹²⁷⁰ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 166

¹²⁷¹ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 120

¹²⁷² Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 165-6, cf. p. 170

¹²⁷³ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 124

¹²⁷⁴ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 122

¹²⁷⁵ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 174

¹²⁷⁶ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 125

listing Lykinios and Kallippos as “ship commanders”.¹²⁷⁷ It does demonstrate, however, a general’s power to delegate tasks which required the use of ships to subordinate officers.

389 BC Eunomus (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 5.1.5-9)

Xenophon describes Eunomus explicitly as a *nauachos*, and Jordan argues that he makes a “clear distinction between nauarchos and strategos”,¹²⁷⁸ and Develin also is “content to leave him with the title Xenophon gives him, rather than make him a strategos”.¹²⁷⁹

346-40 BC Leodamus (Demosthenes, 18.73)

This man is recorded explicitly as a *nauarchos*, seemingly as distinct from a *strategos*; unfortunately, he is done so in one of the documents referred to by Demosthenes, and inserted by a later writer. The introduction of Loeb edition of the speech observes that the many documents quoted in the text “were forged, with very little skill, by some exceptionally ignorant editor...the reader is advised to take no notice of them”;¹²⁸⁰ this would seem to be good advice on such a technical matter.

***Nauarchoi* and the *autos* formula in Thucydides**

Jordan suggests that the indisputable evidence of the existence of sub-*strategos* naval commanders can be brought into several problematic passages in Thucydides where a command is described with what Jordan terms “the enigmatic *autos* formulae”.¹²⁸¹ Such a formula usually has a named commander along with “*x* others”. Jordan argues that it cannot be assumed in these others were *all strategoi*, but could have been archons instead. He says that on only two occasions¹²⁸² is it clear that all the commanders were in fact *strategoi*, and that in many of the other incidences, supposing that the “others” were archons is a preferable interpretation. Indeed in some cases Jordan’s proposition is attractive, as it is often a way to avoid amending the numerals in the text; attractive, but certainly not proven. His central contention, that some of these other commanders may not have been *strategoi*, is certainly worthy of consideration. As we have seen from the discussion of possible *nauarchoi* above, and despite Jordan’s sometimes strident prose, it is usually impossible to be certain of any identifications; the same is true here. Fornara, in pursuance of a different argument, cites the uses of the *autos* formula with regard to generals, and it is from his work that the following list derives.¹²⁸³

¹²⁷⁷ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 268.

¹²⁷⁸ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 122

¹²⁷⁹ Develin, *Athenian Officials*, p. 216

¹²⁸⁰ Vince and Vince, *Demosthenes* vol. 2, p. 17.

¹²⁸¹ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 129

¹²⁸² His footnote (*Athenian Navy*, p. 129 n.44) on this matter in fact cites three passages (2.79, 3.2, and 4.3). the second seems to be a mistake for 3.3. The third does not seem to have anything to do with the argument about the *autos* formula.

¹²⁸³ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 28-9 Two of the examples of the *autos* formula cited by Fornara (Thucydides 1.46 and 8.35) concern foreign cities (Corinth and Rhodes respectively); even if they could be shown to demonstrate Jordan’s case (which they can’t) they can not be used to reflect on the specific Athenian situation

433/2 BC: Archestratos and “ten others” (Thucydides, 1.57).

As our evidence for *strategoí* points to a college of ten, there is clearly either an error or misinterpretation here. Jordan’s view is that these others are archons and not generals, an interpretation that has the virtue of preserving the text. Given the number of named generals already accounted for in this year, this is some difficulty in assuming that four other *strategoí* (the only plausible emendation) would have been available for this mission, as the discussion on this passage in Gomme’s *Historical Commentary* makes clear. Jordan’s proposal in this case has something to recommend it.

432/1 BC: Kallias. (Thucydides, 1.61 cf. 1.62).

In the first of these passages, Kallias is described by the phrase *pempton auton strategon*. Jordan’s translation is odd. He proposes “the fifth (of a group of five commanders), as strategos”, attempting to extract the meaning that Kallias was the only one of the group to be a ‘full’ general. The second reference describes Kallias “the general of the Athenians and those sharing command with him”.¹²⁸⁴ This is just about compatible with Jordan’s reading, but the argument in this case seems rather forced. Fornara argues that the phrase *sunarchontes* does not suggest a difference in status between the named individual and the colleagues so described, and Jordan’s proposal here seems far from sound.¹²⁸⁵

c. 440 and 431 BC: Pericles (Thucydides, 2.13 cf. 1.116)

On two separate occasions Thucydides describes Pericles as “one of the ten generals”. Fornara discusses the alternative interpretive nuances that this phrase might have, from emphasizing that he was only one amongst a college of generals, to suggesting that he had formal power over his fellow *strategoí*.¹²⁸⁶ Fornara’s conclusion is that Pericles, and other *strategoí* named amongst sundry “others”, were mentioned not because they had any more formal power, but because “they were the more significant men, the natural leaders.”¹²⁸⁷

430/29 Xenophon (Thucydides 2.79, cf. 2.70)

One of the occasions where the autos formula was used explicitly of a group of *strategoí*.

428 BC Cleippides (Thucydides, 3.3)

When Jordan cites Thucydides 3.2 as an example of the autos formula being used of *strategoí*, it is presumably this passage he means. As with Xenophon above, Cleippides is described *tritos autos estrategei*.

¹²⁸⁴ *ton Athenaion strategos kai oi xunarchontes*.

¹²⁸⁵ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 31. Fornara’s argument, however, assumes that “the others” so described are all *strategoí*, and was aimed at demonstrating that such phrases did not indicate a hierarchy amongst the generals.

¹²⁸⁶ Fornara, *Generals*, pp. 34-5

¹²⁸⁷ Fornara, *Generals*, p. 35

428 BC Lysikles (Thucydides 3.19)

Jordan argues that his interpretation of the *autos* formula has especially good results with this passage, presumably because five generals might seem rather a lot for a money-collecting operation involving only 12 ships.¹²⁸⁸ There is some superficial appeal to this idea, though it has to be balanced with the clear testimony of large numbers of generals in other relatively small operations. One example, attested by both Thucydides' narrative and the epigraphic record, concerned Corcyra in 433 BC.¹²⁸⁹ The first fleet sent to the island comprised only ten ships, but was commanded by three generals. When reinforcements arrive, there were six generals in command of a total of 30 ships. The ship per general ratios are not quite as low as for Lysikles' money-collection mission, but are perhaps enough to instil some doubt in Jordan's assertion. It is worth noting that this money-collecting mission took part in an ultimately disastrous land campaign in Caria at this time; though no troops are explicitly recorded as being attached to this fleet,¹²⁹⁰ the high number of generals can perhaps be connected with this aspect of the operation.

425 BC Nicias (Thucydides, 4.42)

Nicias is described in exactly the same terms to Xenophon at 2.79; *estrategi de Xenophon ho Euripidou/Nikias ho Nikeratou tritos autos*. It is strange therefore that Jordan does not cite this as a further example of the *autos* formula being used explicitly of other generals.

Fornara also collected the Thucydidean references to the *sunarchontes* formula, meaning something like "colleagues in command". He argues that the meaning is equivalent to the "autos" formula, and therefore could be of relevance to the discussion here.¹²⁹¹ The two most illuminating instances of this usage have been incorporated into the discussion above. Thucydides, 1.57.6 would have us believe in more than ten generals, which no scholar seems prepared to countenance; either Jordan's suggestion must be accepted in this instance, or Thucydides' text altered. Neither is an especially welcome proposal, and the most likely amendment to the text would still leave a very dubious-sounding quantity of *strategoï* on this occasion. Thucydides, the only contemporary author with a narrative detailed enough to make such discussions, appears (from 7.43 cf. 7.69 especially) to have been lax in his terminology describing *strategoï* and other commanders, but as far as we can tell, the *autos* and *sunarchontas* formulae usually, but perhaps not invariably, referred to generals.

¹²⁸⁸ Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, p. 129

¹²⁸⁹ IG I³ 364=Fornara 126=ML 61 cf. Thucydides, 1.45 cf. 1.51. Fornara, *Generals*, p. 51 for a persuasive explanation as to why the names given in Thucydides for the second fleet do not correspond with that given on the inscription.

¹²⁹⁰ As was discussed above (Part One, Section A.1), it was not unusual for fleets to take part in land campaigns in this way without specifically described troops.

¹²⁹¹ The references are: Thucydides, 1.62 (Kallias; see discussion above), 2.58 (Hagnon and Cleopompus described as *xustrategoï*, "co-generals", with Pericles. Fornara (*Generals*, p. 29) treats this as a variant of *sunarchontes*); 4.54 (Used of three *strategoï* who were listed individually in the preceding passage); 7.31 (Demosthenes and Eurymedon, replacing Alcibiades and Lamachus in Sicily); 7.43 (Sicily again; Demosthenes, Nicias, and "other co-commanders")

Appendix 2: Wallinga on the Crew Levels of Athenian Triremes

In an appendix to his work on archaic sea-power, Wallinga sets out an argument advocating the hypothesis that triremes were not usually manned with the full complement of 200 men. The result, perhaps the purpose, of this argument is to validate the figures that Herodotus gave for the Persian navy during the invasion of 480 BC; multiplying the figures in Herodotus by the maximum complement of 200 results in unfeasibly large numbers of able-bodied men. If the number of men per ship is reduced, a more reasonable total can be extracted. Wallinga, quoting an argument of Grundy, believes that “there are no solid grounds for doubting”¹²⁹² Herodotus’ ship numbers, and that all doubt is removed by the hypothesis that “these fleets were far undermanned, because a large number of the ships came as reserves”.¹²⁹³

While specific argument with regard to the Phoenician cities of the Persian Empire is not strictly relevant to our purpose here, Wallinga describes it as “reason enough to inspect closely the evidence that leads to the equating the oar crew of every trireme with 170 men”.¹²⁹⁴ His starting point is to refer to the “disbelief” provoked in modern scholars by the implications of Herodotus’ figures for the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC; 204,000 oarsmen would have been required for the benches of the 1,200 triremes that Herodotus lists. He cites the specific example of the Phoenician contribution of 300 triremes to Xerxes’ fleet. He shows that the population of Sidon and Tyre at the end of the fourth century BC would have been insufficient to man the 300 ships attested for the beginning of the fifth century, and therefore that Herodotus’ calculation “is fundamentally wrong”. Wallinga admits that there is no information regarding the Phoenician population in the early fifth century, but argues “it seems reasonable to assume that it was comparable to that of the fourth century”.¹²⁹⁵

Where Wallinga’s arguments become directly relevant to this investigation is in his use of classical Athenian examples to support his hypothesis.¹²⁹⁶ I shall discuss the evidence in the order that Wallinga does, with the intention of disproving his hypothesis, at least with regard to Athens; before this, however, a few general remarks need to be made.

¹²⁹² Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 185, referring to Grundy, *The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries*, London, 1901

¹²⁹³ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 185

¹²⁹⁴ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 170

¹²⁹⁵ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 170

¹²⁹⁶ In his work on the finances of the classical Athenian navy, Gabrielsen (*Financing the Athenian Fleet*, p. 109, cf. p. 249 n. 11) offers a brief rebuttal of Wallinga’s view, saying that “his contention...is at best circumstantial.” While I agree with Gabrielsen’s view on the essential weakness of the case, it does need a fuller rebuttal, especially as Wallinga has carried this argument forward into his 2005 work on the Persian wars. Such a rebuttal also raises some issues that make it worthy of fuller discussion.

The first point to make is that Wallinga is right to an extent when he describes 200 men per ship as a “paper figure”. It goes almost without saying that factors such as desertion, illness and injury, casualties in battle, and availability of crewmen would have resulted in some variation from ship to ship and fleet to fleet. Admitting to such variations, probably quite small in most circumstances, does not require belief in the idea that the vessels of the Athenian navy were routinely and deliberately undermanned. The second is that I am in agreement to some extent with Wallinga’s central argument, that multiplying the fleet totals given by the maximum crew of 200 is an inaccurate way of gauging the manpower of a fleet. As argued above, troop-transport ships were often described simply as triremes, and it is likely that in the case of fleets described as having soldiers with them, some at least of the ships were troop-carriers. While no vessel was routinely undermanned, troop-transports by their nature probably had a less numerous oarcrew than that of the “standard” trireme. Wallinga makes clear, however, that he believes undermanning to have been routine in the case of the “standard” triremes, and so his specific arguments need to be confronted. His argument begins with setting out the scale of the difficulties:

Since each of them pulled his own oar, they all had to be trained men. For that reason the commission of a minor fleet of sixty fully manned triremes would have been a major operation, entailing the mobilization of some 12,000 trained men, a larger number than that of the Athenian army at Marathon.¹²⁹⁷

A new and revealing perspective on the level of training needed by the oarsmen of trireme crews was given by the trials of the reconstructed vessel *Olympias*. It demonstrated that the complicated oar system could be utilized effectively by novices; even those who had little previous experience of rowing picked up the technique relatively quickly.¹²⁹⁸ *Olympias* produced reasonably good performances, though short of those attested in some of the ancient sources, with mixed crews of some experienced rowers, some with a little rowing experience, and many who had hardly handled an oar at all.¹²⁹⁹ In a 1993 revision of an 1982 paper, Wallinga cannot fairly be criticized for not taking this evidence into account, but the fact that not all a trireme’s crew needed to be trained men is hinted at in the ancient evidence; Nicias, in his despatch to Athens, suggests it was a minority of the sailors who can effectively keep a ship going.¹³⁰⁰

Less forgivable is the discussion of the manpower needs of a sixty ship fleet; while these were indeed considerable, it seems very unfair to describe such a fleet as “minor”. Such an undertaking would be beyond almost every individual Greek city. Even in relation to Athens, the strongest naval power in the Aegean for much of the classical period, the description is unfair; as has been discussed in Part One, the average size of an Athenian fleet was around 32. A fleet

¹²⁹⁷ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 169

¹²⁹⁸ And at first at least, none of the modern rowers had had any experience of trireme rowing at all.

¹²⁹⁹ Morrison, Coates, Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, Chapter 13, esp. pp. 253 and 274. The sea-trials of *Olympias* demonstrated both that triremes could be moved adequately even by inexperienced rowers, but also that stronger and more experienced crews resulted in far better performances.

¹³⁰⁰ Thucydides, 7.14

numbering around double the amount that was usual for a thalassocratic state can hardly be described as a “minor”.

Wallinga argues that the evidence of the Naval Dockyard Accounts, which shows that triremes carried 200 oars, 30 of which were spares, attests only to the maximum possible rowing compliment.¹³⁰¹ While this is true, it is difficult to see a rationale for vessels that were routinely undermanned to always carry a considerable number of spare oars. He then cites literary evidence relating to the providing of pay for crews that assumes 200 men per vessel, dismissing such testimony as “computed for a certain period *in the future*...at best testifies to the intention of negotiating parties and politicians to make the crews as full as possible...these are paper figures.”¹³⁰² Once again, there is some truth in this discussion, but some of the examples need greater examination. While the figure of 200 may have been merely an intention, it was a solid enough one for the Egestans in 415 BC to not only to have made calculations, but to have given 60 talents of silver to Athens, on that basis. Demosthenes too in his *First Philippic* calculates the city’s expense for a potential expedition at the rate of 200 men per ship.¹³⁰³ Demosthenes in this section seems to be keen to show that a viable expedition can be maintained with a minimum of expenditure, suggesting that the soldiers and sailors need no more than ration money. If undermanning was usual practice in the Athenian navy, and the Athenians need only have employed (say) 80 oarsmen per vessel, it would surely have helped Demosthenes’ case to have mentioned it here; that he assumes that the crews would be full, as the Egestans did in 415 BC, suggests that such an assumption was a reasonable one. While the cases Wallinga cites do refer to future manning needs, they are not so far removed in time as to be totally abstract estimations. At the best, such testimonies are compatible with Wallinga’s view; but it is at least as easy to interpret them as suggesting that fully crewed vessels was the normal and expected practice in both the fifth and the fourth centuries BC.

Herodotus reports that the Athenian Klienias, an ancestor of Alcibiades, supplied his trireme and its 200-man crew for the war effort against Persia,¹³⁰⁴ and Wallinga suggests that this was mentioned because “the strength of the crew...was altogether exceptional”, and that “it would be rash to consider Klienias’ crew as typical”.¹³⁰⁵ While it is impossible to absolutely dismiss this suggestion outright, there is a more obvious and surely a far preferable interpretation; that what is being emphasised is the wealth and patriotic effort of a powerful individual in supplying not only a vessel but its entire large crew.¹³⁰⁶ To suggest that what was unusual in this case was the fact that the ship’s crew numbered 200, rather than the fact that it was one man paying for that crew, seems unconvincing.

¹³⁰¹ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 170

¹³⁰² Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 170-1

¹³⁰³ Demosthenes, 4.28

¹³⁰⁴ Herodotus, 8.17

¹³⁰⁵ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 171

¹³⁰⁶ Gabrielsen, *Athenian Fleet*, p. 6

Wallinga next discusses the manning implications of the so-called Decree of Themistocles that purports to relate to the call-up before the battle of Salamis. His interpretation of this document is that “100 oarsmen were all the Athenians could muster in 480” BC, and thus that the navy at Salamis was quite severely undermanned.¹³⁰⁷ What the stone and Wallinga both ignore is the contribution of slaves to the war effort in 480 BC. The 100 rowers per vessel attested by the Themistocles Decree are drawn from two groups; the Athenian citizens and the metics. A third group mentioned earlier in the decree, the foreigners “willing to share the danger” may also have been included in this group.¹³⁰⁸ I have argued above that slaves regularly contributed to the Athenian fleet, and follow the argument of Garlan that many slaves would have joined their Athenian masters on the oar benches during the desperate time of the Persian invasion, as they were to do in subsequent decades.¹³⁰⁹ There is no way of gauging the level of contribution from slaves, but even if only half of the 100 men brought a single slave with them, the triremes in this navy would have had 150 out of 170 oars manned, as well as the marines, archers and *hyperesia*. Given that some individuals would have been able to contribute many slaves, this should be regarded as the minimum oar strength of the Athenian triremes at this time. In short, the Themistocles Decree is not solid evidence for Wallinga’s hypothesis of regular undermanning, at least not to the extent of only 100 rowers per vessel.

Wallinga concedes that any undermanning at this early and exceptional time in Athenian naval history may not be representative, but goes on to give two later examples of the phenomena. The first of these does indeed seem to attest to under-strength crews:

Konôn d' epei eis tēn Samon aphiketo kai to nautikon katelaben athumôs echon, sumplērôsas triêreis hebdomêkonta anti tōn proterôn, ousôn pleon ê hekaton

When Konon arrived at Samos he found that the fleet was in a poor state of morale. He fully manned seventy triremes instead of the number (more than 100) that had been in service before then.¹³¹⁰

Wallinga argues “even the Athenian navy in its prime furnishes some examples” of significant undermanning, of which this is one. I would suggest instead that Xenophon is presenting an unusual situation here; the fleet had just been defeated in a battle in which some men were surely injured or killed, and some were definitely (according to Xenophon) imprisoned;¹³¹¹ as a result of this morale was low, and therefore the rate of desertion was probably high. It was in such a context that only 70 ships could be fully manned from the crews of over 100. This does not therefore attest to Athenian ships being *regularly* undermanned, rather to the irregularity of finding crews in such a depleted state. His second example is even less convincing. He refers to

¹³⁰⁷ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 173

¹³⁰⁸ If not, of course, their numbers would be in addition to the 100 rowers per ship.

¹³⁰⁹ Garlan, *Slavery in Ancient Greece*, pp. 165-6

¹³¹⁰ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.20, discussed by Wallinga, *Ships and Seapower*, p. 173

¹³¹¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.5.14

the three commanders at Sicily in 415 BC agreeing to Alcibiades' plan for political engagement with the peoples of Sicily, and thus "they fully manned" (*xumplerosantes*) 60 ships for a spot of gunboat diplomacy. Wallinga's assertion that this episode shows that "The 80 fast ships of this fleet appear not to have been fully manned: we must assume that the crews were concentrated as in Konon's fleet just mentioned"¹³¹² is not a necessary, or even a particularly likely, inference from the text.

Wallinga includes a lengthy discussion of the naval battle between Corcyra and Corinth at Sybota.¹³¹³ He argues that the tactics employed at the battle did not require full oar crews, and therefore they did not have them; "His [i.e. Thucydides'] description definitely proves that not all fighting at sea was done according to *diekplous* tactics [i.e. battle manoeuvres that would require speed and agility], and that triremes for that reason were not invariably required to be fully manned."¹³¹⁴ What Wallinga's argument fails to demonstrate, because there is in fact no evidence to substantiate such a demonstration, is that the vessels fighting in this way actually *were* undermanned. He argues that the static nature of the battle was due to the ships being undermanned, but Thucydides' narrative suggests an alternative explanation; that ships locked together once one vessel had rammed the other.¹³¹⁵ It is clear that even in this most primitive and un-tactical of naval battles, ramming took place. Wallinga fails to appreciate that the ramming power of a vessel would have been in direct proportion to the strength of its oar crew. Whether or not the rowers, and especially the *hyperesia*, were sufficiently skilled to be able to choose where they struck, and perhaps disengage afterwards and strike again, the description of this battle does not indicate or even imply that the oarcrews were significantly under strength. Wallinga also suggests that the size of the fleets in the battle, and the populations of the cities involved, requires there to have been less than 200 crewmen per vessel. Given that Thucydides is explicit that the naval manpower for Corinth, who had the larger of the two fleets, was not provided by that city alone,¹³¹⁶ that he remarked upon the huge and unprecedented scale of the fleets,¹³¹⁷ and given also how little we know for certain about ancient population levels, caution should be exercised in accepting such conclusions.

Wallinga argues, both in general and in relation to Sybota, that fleets brought along undermanned ships as reserves and then consolidated the man-power of the vessels when they came to battle.¹³¹⁸ He cites Thucydides' description of the Sicilian expedition as evidence: "they had 60 fast ships and 40 troop-transports".¹³¹⁹ Wallinga's assertion that "the only difference between

¹³¹² Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 174

¹³¹³ Thucydides, 1.47-51

¹³¹⁴ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 172

¹³¹⁵ Thucydides, 1.49 Morrison's translation (*Athenian Trireme*, p. 65) has "when the ships rammed each other they did not easily separate", whereas Wallinga's (*Ships and Sea-power*, p. 172) is somewhat less explicit, describing the forces as "coming to blows". Morrison's version is superior.

¹³¹⁶ Thucydides, 1.31, cf. 1.35

¹³¹⁷ Thucydides, 1.50

¹³¹⁸ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, pp. 174-5, and p. 178

¹³¹⁹ Thucydides, 6.43

them was the size of their (oar) crews”¹³²⁰ ignores the earlier reference to the ships, where the distinction is made between empty vessels;¹³²¹ this suggests some sort of structural difference between the two types of trireme.¹³²² A troop-transport would have by its nature a smaller oar crew than a “fast” trireme, but the difference between the two was not simply a matter of how many men the vessel had aboard it at that moment. The examples Wallinga cites to support this idea are not convincing. He reports on the example of the *Paralos* crew, put into a troop-transport vessel by the oligarchs at Athens, and sent to patrol Euboea in that vessel. He argues that the troop transport “became a *naus taxeia* when its small crew (if any) was reinforced by the addition of the *Paraloi*”. This seems unlikely. It is probable that the reason for putting the *Paralos* crew in the troop-transport was to give them a less powerful as well as a less glorious vessel than their own ship. It seems unlikely that the oligarchs would have bothered putting them in a troop-transport if the only difference in the performance of these vessels was their relative ages, rather than the number of oar-ports available to work. His next two examples are even less convincing.¹³²³ Firstly, he report Xenophon describing vessels as “more transport than fast”,¹³²⁴ which Wallinga interprets as meaning “rather undermanned”. Secondly, he refers to Thucydides describing some troop-transports,¹³²⁵ and quotes Morrison’s remark on the passage that “the words suggest that some of the ships might have been *stratitides* without actually carrying troops.” All these examples testify to two facts; firstly that there was an apparent structural difference between transports and “fast” triremes, and secondly that transports could be pressed into more general service when the need arose. They do not indicate that “troop-transports” was the term used to describe undermanned triremes.

Wallinga argues also that the description of a trireme as “fast” or “best sailing” was mostly matter of having either a more numerous or a more skilled crew. His own analysis favours the former, suggesting that “the quality of rowers was not a determining factor”,¹³²⁶ but the evidence he cites does not support that conclusion. Wallinga cites a passage of Xenophon’s *Economics* which he says testifies that “speed is clearly the result of a full complement of rowers.” This is a true statement in itself, but in fact the emphasis in Xenophon is rather different:

kai triêrês de toi hê sesagmenê anthrôpôn dia ti allo phoberon esti polemiois ê philois axiotheaton ê hoti tachu plei; dia ti de allo alupoî allêlois eisin hoi empleontes ê dioti en taxeî men kathêntai, en taxeî de proneuousin, en taxeî d' anapitousin, en taxeî d' embainousi kai ekbainousin;

And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly? Why do the men on board not get in each other’s way? Is it not because the crew sit on the

¹³²⁰ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 175

¹³²¹ Thucydides, 6.31

¹³²² Probably the removal of one or both of the bottom two tiers of oars, a modification that probably could be reversed with a little time and effort.

¹³²³ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 175

¹³²⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.36

¹³²⁵ Thucydides, 8.62

¹³²⁶ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 180

benches in order, moving their bodies forward and backward in order, embark and disembark in order?¹³²⁷

What is emphasized in this entire section, of which the trireme metaphor is one of an almost tediously long list of examples, is the value of order to ensure efficient situation. The point is not that “a full trireme is a fast trireme”, as Wallinga seems to suppose; in such a case, the men could have got in one another’s way. The point is rather that “a full trireme is a fast trireme *when the crew work together and are well coordinated*”. If they are simply numerous and not ordered, then they will obstruct each other and not be fast. Wallinga wants this passage to emphasize the idea that full crews resulted in speed, but it is as much a testament to the idea that it was the skill of the crews that was decisive.

He suggests that “when distinction is made within one navy... [he cites several examples]... the assumption that the faster ships had the better rowers, rather than they had more, seems improbable.”¹³²⁸ This is surely not the case. The testimony of Apollodorus makes clear that his ship was fastest because he had paid for the best rowers he could find.¹³²⁹ Comparable with this Wallinga quotes another trierarch, the speaker of Lysias 21 discussing his liturgy, and he suggests that “he constantly harps on about his outlays, never on his discrimination in choosing his men”.¹³³⁰ This is simply wrong, as the following excerpt from the speech makes clear:

*eichon gar chrêmasi peisas kubernêtên Phantian hapanta ton chronon,
hos edokei tôn Hellênôn aristos einai, pareskeuasamên de kai to plêrôma
pros ekeinon kai tèn allên hupêresian akolouthon*

I secured as my *kubernetes* for the whole time Phantias, who was esteemed the best in Greece, and a full oar crew [*pleroma*] and specialists [*hyperesian*] to match his abilities.¹³³¹

This man professes his discrimination in the clearest possible terms, and indeed this is one of the most eloquent testimonies in the ancient literature regarding skilled trireme crewmen. For both of these trierarchs as well as for Xenophon, a fast ship was one with a full crew and a skilled crew. The reason why Apollodorus’ ship was the fastest of all was because it had a better crew, not that it had more rowers.

A possibility for accounting for differences in ship speed, that Wallinga takes the time to reject, is differences in the structure of the vessel. Wallinga argues that such a distinction “ought to come out in the Naval Accounts, which it does not”.¹³³² The lists seem to classify vessels with regard to their age, however, and this in itself could affect performance. In their persuasive discussion

¹³²⁷ Xenophon, *Economics*, 8.8

¹³²⁸ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 180

¹³²⁹ [Demosthenes] 50.7 and 50.15 as examples of claiming to hire the best rowers, and 50.12 on having the fastest ship.

¹³³⁰ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-Power*, p. 180

¹³³¹ Lysias, 21.10

¹³³² Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 176, n. 14.

on the classification of triremes as “fast”,¹³³³ Morrison, Coates and Rankov suggest that the extent to which a trireme became waterlogged and befouled would have had considerable effects on its speed and turning. An old vessel would naturally be more susceptible to this sort of effect than a newer one, though it is likely (and indeed borne out by their analysis)¹³³⁴ that the relative quality of oarcrews accounted principally for the differences between faster and slower ships and fleets.

Wallinga’s reconstruction of fleet operations posits that “All larger fleets, therefore, will have been undermanned at the moment of mobilization” in order for their to have been vessels in reserve; and then the crews would have been packed into fewer, fully manned and faster, vessels for battle. This seems unlikely, and indeed the evidence we have tells against such regular and large-scale movement between vessels. The Themistocles decree seems specifically, almost pedantically, to assign marines, trierarchs, *hyperesia* and sailors to particular vessels by lot; there would be little point in such fastidiousness if the crews were to be intermingled for the imminent conflict. Apollodorus’ *pentekontarchos*, and all such officers, would have had an impossible job of keeping an accurate record of all the sailors his captain had hired for his vessel if they were always hopping from one ship to another in the way Wallinga envisions,¹³³⁵ and there is some suggestion in the speech *Against Polycles* that the men were indeed responsible to a particular trierarch, and assigned to his vessel.¹³³⁶ The impression of specific crews for specific vessels is lent some weight by IG I³ 1036, which lists separately the crews for (probably) eight different vessels. The fact that there are two trierarchs attested for some of these vessels, when only one such officer would command at a time, suggests that the list was intended to cover the whole period of their syntrierarchy; it thus implies that the names of the crew were relatively static for that period, which tells against Wallinga’s interpretation. It appears that the example of Konon consolidating the crews of over 100 ships into 70 cited above was the exception, and not the rule.

I conclude that Wallinga’s hypothesis is unconvincing and unlikely in itself, and that the evidence he adduces to support it is capable of alternative and superior interpretations. I have not addressed every single one of his individual citations and interpretations, but I hope that I have done enough to show that Wallinga’s conclusion that “even in the Athenian navy undermanning was habitual”¹³³⁷ is not borne out by the sources, and should be dismissed.

¹³³³ Morrison, Coates and Rankov, *Athenian Trireme*, pp.276-9

¹³³⁴ A poorly trained or tired crew could reduce speed by up to 32%, while the effects of a waterlogged and befouled hull could reduce speed by up to 14%.

¹³³⁵ [Demosthenes] 50.24-5

¹³³⁶ [Demosthenes] 50.16 Apollodorus raging against deserters from his ship, and talking about the other trierarchs whose sailors were assigned to them from the lists.

¹³³⁷ Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-power*, p. 174

Appendix 3: Fleet Tables

Sea Battles

Date	Location	Athenian Losses	Athenian Captured	Enemy Losses	Enemy captured	Primary References	Total ships (Athenian and allies)	Fleet number
480	Artemisium				15	Herodotus, 7.194	224	2
480	Artemisium				30	Herodotus, 8.6-11	224	2
480	Artemisium	"heavy losses"	5			Herodotus, 8.15-19	278	2
480	Salamis	40		200	5	Diodorus, 11.18; Herodotus, 8.40; 8.56-64; 8.74-97	378	2
480	Skiathos	3				Herodotus, 7.179-182	3	2
467	Caria and Lycia					Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12.		11
466	Hydrus?? (Cyprus? Syedra?)			70	10	Plutarch, Kimon, 13		12
466	Eurymedon			100	100	Thucydides, 1.100; Diodorus, 11.60-1; Plutarch, Kimon, 12-13.	250	12
465	Chersonese				13	Plutarch, Kimon, 14		15
465	Sigeion				13	Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928		15
465	Thasos				33	Thucydides, 1.100-1		13
459	Memphis					Thucydides, 1.109	200	18
459	Ceryphalia					Thucydides, 1.105		20
458	Aegina				70	Thucydides, 1.105; Diodorus, 11.78		21
458	Memphis					Thucydides, 1.109	200	18
457	Memphis					Thucydides, 1.109	200	18
456	Memphis					Thucydides, 1.109	200	18
454	Egypt	45				Thucydides, 1.110	50	19
449	Cypriot Salamis		100			Thucydides, 1.112, cf. Diodorus, 12.3	140	25
440	Tragia					Thucydides, 1.116	44	36
440	Samos					Thucydides, 1.117	29	36
439	Samos					Thucydides, 1.117	155	36
433	Sybota			30		Thucydides, 1.47-50, 54.	110	43
433	Sybota					Thucydides, 1.50-1	20	44
429	Budorum		3			Thucydides, 2.93-4	3	58
429	Patrae				12	Thucydides, 2.83 ff	20	55
429	Rhium				6	Thucydides, 2.90 ff	20	55
428	Mytilene					Thucydides, 3.3-4	40	60
427	Corcyrea			1		Thucydides, 3.78 ff	12	66
425	Messina/Rhegium	1				Thucydides, 4.25	22	74
425	Messina/Rhegium	1				Thucydides, 4.25	21	74
425	Messina/Rhegium			1		Thucydides, 4.25	20	74
425	Prote				5	Thucydides, 4.13-15	50	75

Sea Battles

Date	Location	Athenian Losses	Athenian Captured	Enemy Losses	Enemy captured	Primary References	Total ships (Athenian and allies)	Fleet number
413	Pheia			1		Thucydides, 7.31	65	106
413	Syracuse	3		11		Thucydides, 7.22-3	60	100
413	Megara				1	Thucydides, 7.25	20	100
413	Syracuse					Thucydides, 7.25	1	100
413	Syracuse	2				Thucydides, 7.37-8	75	100
413	Syracuse	7		2	1	Thucydides, 7.40-2	75	100
413	Syracuse	The ships with Eurymedon	18			Thucydides, 7.52	86	100
413	Naupactos	7 disabled.		3		Thucydides, 7.34	33	104
413	Syracuse	60 in battle, and the rest of the fleet afterwards		24		Diodorus, 13.19 cf. 17; Thucydides, 7.60, 7.70-71	110	100
412	Melos	3				Thucydides, 8.39	10	128
412	Spiraeum			1		Thucydides, 8.10	37	114
412	Spiraeum		4			Thucydides, 8.20	20	114
412	Avaia				4	Thucydides, 8.19	16	119
412	Lesbos				1	Thucydides, 8.23	25	119
412	Syme, Chakce, Rhodes, Lycia	6		3		Thucydides, 8.41	20	118
412	Tropium				6	Thucydides, 8.35		118
412	Laucadia			1		Thucydides, 8.13	27	104
411	Chios		6			Thucydides, 8.63	8	118
411	Abydus				10	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.5-8; Diodorus, 13.45-46	74	118
411	Rhoeteum					Xenophon, 1.1.2-3	20	118
411	Eretria		22			Thucydides, 8.95	36	131
411	Elaeus				2	Thucydides, 8.103	67	118
411	Elaeus	1 (abandoned and burnt)	3, 1 with crew			Thucydides, 8.102-3	18	118
411	Byzantium					Thucydides, 8.80	8	118
411	Chios					Thucydides, 8.61	32	118
411	Cynossema	15			21	Thucydides, 8.104-6	76	118
410	Cyzicus				47	Diodorus, 13.49 ff, Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.16-22	85	118
410	Hellespont			3		Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36	9	135
409	Methymna, Lesbos				4	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.12-13	50	136
407	Andros					Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.18-19	4	139

Sea Battles

Date	Location	Athenian Losses	Athenian Captured	Enemy Losses	Enemy captured	Primary References	Total ships (Athenian and allies)	Fleet number
407	Notium, Ephesus		22 (15 according to Xenophon)			Xenophon, 1.5.11-14; Diodorus, 13.71	75	138
406	'Open sea'					Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.19-21	1	138
406	Arginusae	25		77		Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24-38; Diodorus, 13.97-104	152	140
406	Mytilene	10				Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.22-23	12	141
405	Aegospotam ai		171			Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.23-30; Diodorus, 13.105-7	180	140
390	Near Telos?		10			Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.24	10	149
389	Aegina					Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.2		153
389	Aegina					Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5		155
388	Aegina					Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.7	13	156
388	Cape Zoster					Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.9	13	156
387	Abydos		8			Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.27	8	159
376	Naxos	18		24	8	Diodorus, 15.34	83	166
375	Leucas					Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.65; Diodorus, 15.36.6	60	175
373	Korkyra				9	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.33-36	70	177
363	Chalchidike					Aeschines, 2.30-1		185
361	Stryme					[Demosthenes], 50.21-23		189
357	Chios					Didodrus, 16.7	60	200
322	Abydos					Diodorus, 18.15, IG I(2) 298 and 493	170	218
322	Lichades islands					Diodorus, 18.15		218
322	Amorgos					Plutarch, Demitrius, 11.3		218

Land Battles

Date	Location	Primary References	Troop-transport?	Fleet number
479	Mykale	Herodotus, 9.101-106; Diodorus, 11.35-6.	No	4
466	Eurymedon	Thucydides, 1.100; Diodorus, 11.60-1; Plutarch, Kimon, 12-13.	No	12
465	Kardia	Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928	No	15
465	Paion	Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928	No	15
465	Sigeion	Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928	No	15
460	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.104; Diodorus, 1.75	No	18
459	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	Yes	18
459	Halieis	Thucydides, 1.105; 11.78	No	20
458	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	No	18
457	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	No	18
456	Sikyon	Thucydides, 1.108	Yes	23
456	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	No	18
455	Sikyon	Thucydides, 1.111	Yes	24
454	Prosopitis	Thucydides, 1.9-10	No	18
454	Egypt	Thucydides, 1.110	No	19
449	Cypriot Salamis	Thucydides, 1.112, cf. Diodorus, 12.3	No	25
440	Samos	Thucydides, 1.116; Plutarch, Pericles, 26.	No	36
432	Potidaea	Thucydides, 1.61-2.	No	45
431	Alope	Thucydides, 2.26	No	50
431	Aegina	Thucydides, 2.27	No	52
431	Pheia	Thucydides, 2.25	No	49
430	Carian and Lycian coast	Thucydides, 2.69	No	57
429	Spartalos	Thucydides, 2.70	No	229
428	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.6	No	60
428	Myos	Thucydides, 3.19	No	64
428	Nerikos	Thucydides, 3.7	No	66
426	Mylae	Thucydides, 3.90	No	74
426	Oeneon	Thucydides, 3.95	Yes	78
426	Caicinus	Thucydides, 3.103	No	74
426	Ellomenus	Thucydides, 3.94	No	78
426	Locri	Thucydides, 3.99	No	74
426	River Halex	Thucydides, 3.115	No	74
426	Idomene	Thucydides, 3.112	No	225
426	Argos	Thucydides, 1.107	Yes	225
426	Inessa	Thucydides, 3.103	No	74
425	Solygia	Thucydides, 4.42	Yes	82
425	Eion	Thucydides, 4.7	No	81
425	Corcyrea	Thucydides, 4.46	No	75
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.28-38	No	75
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.9	No	75
425	Messina/Rhegium	Thucydides, 4.25	No	74
425	Messina	Thucydides, 4.25	No	74
424	Antandros	Thucydides, 4.76	No	79
424	Sicyon	Thucydides, 4.101	No	85
424	Cythera	Thucydides, 4.54	No	83
424	Niscea	Thucydides, 4.72	No	84
424	Cotyrra and Aphrodisia	Thucydides, 4.56	No	83
423	Scione	Thucydides, 4.131-2	No	87
422	Amphipolis	Thucydides, 8; 10-11	No	90

Land Battles

Date	Location	Primary References	Troop-transport?	Fleet number
415	Syracuse	Thucydides, 6.65-6	No	100
414	River Terias	Thucydides, 6.94	No	100
414	Thaparus	Thucydides, 6.3	No	100
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.52	No	100
413	Mycalessus	Thucydides, 7.29	No	111
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.40-2	No	100
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.25	No	100
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.25	No	100
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.22-3	No	100
412	Miletus	Thucydides, 8.24	No	116
412	Lesbos	Thucydides, 8.23	No	119
412	Bolisso	Thucydides, 8.24	No	119
412	Phanae	Thucydides, 8.24	No	119
412	Leuconium	Thucydides, 8.24	No	119
412	Miletus	Thucydides, 8.25	No	121
412	Rhodes	Thucydides, 8.55	No	118
412	Spiraeum	Thucydides, 8.10	No	114
411	Lampsacus	Thucydides, 8.62	No	118
411	Corcyrea	Diodorus, 13.48	Yes	104
411	Harpagium and Priapus	Thucydides, 8.107	No	118
411	Rhoeteum	Xenophon, 1.1.2-3	No	118
410	Cyzicus	Diodorus, 13.49 ff, Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.16-22	No	118
409	Pygela	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3	Yes	136
409	Ephesus	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.7-10; Oxyrhynchus Historian, (Cario fragments), Diodorus, 13.64.	Yes	136
409	Abydos	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.15-17	No	118
408	Calchedon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.5-7; Diodorus, 13.66	No	118
407	Cyme	Diodorus, 13.73	No	138
407	Andros, Gaureum	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodorus, 13.69	No	138
407	Thasos	Diodorus, 13.72	No	118
390	Mytilene	Xenophon, 4.8.29	No	150
389	Aegina	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5	No	155
389	Abydos	Xenophon, 4.8.37	No	152
388	Aegina	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.10-13	No	157
373	Acarmania	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.37	No	177
368	Pherae	Diodorus, 15.71	No	181
357	Chios	Diodorus, 16.7	No	200
355	Persia	Diodorus, 16.22	No	200
323	Thessaly	Diodorus, 18.12	Yes	218

Siegues

Date	Primary References	Location	Blockade?	Fleet number
480	Herodotus, 8.108-11	Andros	Yes	2
480	Herodotus, 8.121	Karystos	No	2
479	Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodorus, 11.37.5; Thucydides, 1.89.	Sestos	Yes	4
478	Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 1.44.2	Cyprus	Yes	5
478	Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; Plutarch, Aristides, 23.	Byzantium	Yes	5
477	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 7; Diodorus, 11.60; Herodotus, 7.107. Fornara, 61B	Eion	Yes	5
476	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus, 11.60.	Skyros	No	8
475	Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105	Karystos	Yes	9
468	Thucydides, 1.99; Aristophanes, Wasps, 1.355.	Naxos	Yes	10
467	Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12.	Caria and Lycia	Yes	11
466	Plutarch, Kimon, 12; Fornara 68.	Phaselis	No	12
465	Thucydides, 1.100-1	Thasos	Yes	13
460	Thucydides, 1.104; Diodorus, 1.75	Memphis	Yes	18
460	Thucydides, 1.104	Cyprus	No	18
459	Thucydides, 1.109	Memphis	Yes	18
459	Thucydides, 1.105; 11.78	Halicis	No	20
458	Thucydides, 1.105; Diodorus, 11.78	Aegina	Yes	21
458	Thucydides, 1.109	Memphis	Yes	18
457	Thucydides, 1.105; 1.108; Diodorus, 11.78	Aegina	Yes	21
457	Thucydides, 1.109	Memphis	Yes	18
456	Thucydides, 1.108	Chalkis	No	23
456	Thucydides, 1.109	Memphis	Yes	18
456	Diodorus, 11.84	Methone	No	23
456	Diodorus, 11.84	Zakynthos	No	23
456	Fornara, 84	Kythera	No	23
456	Fornara, 84	Boiai	No	23
456	Thucydides, 1.108; Fornara, 84; Diodorus, 11.84	Gytheum	No	23
456	Diodorus, 11.84; Thucydides, 1.103	Naupactos	No	23
455	Thucydides, 1.111; Diodorus, 11.85.	Oeniadae	No	24
454	Thucydides, 1.9-10	Prosopitis	No	18
450	Diodorus, 12.3	Marium	No	25
450	Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 18-19; Diodorus, 12.3	Citium	Yes	25
449	Diodorus, 12.4	Cypriot Salamis	Yes	25
446	Thucydides, 1.114; Diodorus, 12.7; Plutarch, Pericles, 23.	Euboea	No	31
440	Thucydides, 1.115; Diodorus, 12.27	Samos	No	35
440	Thucydides, 1.116; Plutarch, Pericles, 26.	Samos	Yes	36
440	Thucydides, 1.117; Diodorus, 12.28	Samos	Yes	36
437	Thucydides, 2.68	Argos	No	67
432	Thucydides, 1.61	Therme	No	45
432	Thucydides, 1.61	Pydna	Yes	45
432	Thucydides, 1.61	Pydna	Yes	45
432	Thucydides, 1.61	Strepsa	No	45
431	Thucydides, 2.30	Sollium	No	49
431	Thucydides, 2.30	Astacus	No	49
431	Thucydides, 2.25	Methone	No	49
431	Thucydides, 2.25	Pheia	No	49
431	Thucydides, 2.26	Thronium	No	50
431	Thucydides, 2.27	Aegina	No	52
430	Thucydides, 2.56	Epidauros	No	54
430	Thucydides, 2.56	Prasie	No	54

Siegues

Date	Primary References	Location	Blockade?	Fleet number
430	Thucydides, 2.58	Potidaea	No	54
430	Thucydides, 2.58	Potidaea	Yes	45
427	Thucydides, 3.28	Antissa	No	60
427	Thucydides, 3.34	Notium	No	60
427	Thucydides, 3.35	Pyrra	No	60
427	Thucydides, 3.35	Eresus	No	60
427	Thucydides, 3.51	Minoa	No	72
426	Thucydides, 3.90	Messina	No	74
426	Thucydides, 3.99	River Halex	No	74
426	Thucydides, 3.103	Inessa	No	74
426	Thucydides, 3.115	River Halex	No	74
426	Thucydides, 3.90	Mylae	No	74
426	Thucydides, 3.94	Leucas	No	78
425	Thucydides, 4.28-38	Pylos	No	75
425	Thucydides, 4.46	Corcyrea	No	75
425	Thucydides, 4.49	Anactorium	No	225
424	Thucydides, 4.76	Antandros	No	79
424	Thucydides, 4.54	Cythera	No	83
424	Thucydides, 4.57	Thyrea	No	83
424	Thucydides, 4.54	Scandea	No	83
424	Thucydides, 4.68-9	Megara	No	84
424	Thucydides, 4.69	Niscea	Yes	84
423	Thucydides, 4.130	Scione	No	87
423	Thucydides, 4.130	Mende	No	87
423	Thucydides, 5.1	Delos	No	89
422	Thucydides, 5.2-3	Torone	No	90
422	Thucydides, 5.6	Galepsus	No	90
422	Thucydides, 5.6	Stagirus	No	90
416	Thucydides, 5.114	Melos	Yes	95
416	Thucydides, 5.116.	Melos	Yes	95
416	Thucydides, 6.7	Ornaea	No	97
415	Thucydides, 6.51	Catana	No	100
415	Thucydides, 6.62	Hycara	No	100
414	Thucydides, 6.94	Centoripa	No	100
414	Thucydides, 6.94	Megara	No	100
414	Thucydides, 7.9	Himeraeum	Yes	108
413	Thucydides, 7.29	Mycalessus	No	111
412	Thucydides, 8.23	Polichna	No	119
412	Thucydides, 8.20	Erae	No	119
412	Thucydides, 8.23	Lesbos	No	119
412	Thucydides, 8.35	Cnidus	No	118
411	Thucydides, 8.62	Abydos	No	118
411	Thucydides, 8.62	Lampsacus	No	118
411	Diodorus, 13.47	Euboea	No	134
411	Diodorus, 13.49	Pydna	No	134
411	Thucydides, 8.100	Eresus	No	118
411	Thucydides, 8.107	Cyzicus	No	118
410	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.119-20	Cyzicus	No	118
410	Diodorus, 13.49	Pydna	No	134
409	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3	Pygela	No	136
409	Diodorus, 13.64	Chalcedon, Byzantium	Yes	118
408	Diodorus, 13.68	Hellespont cities	No	118
408	Xenophon, 1.3.2	Calchedon	Yes	118
408	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.10	Selymbria	No	118
408	Xenophon, 1.3.14	Byzantium	Yes	118
407	Xenophon, 1.5.11	Phocaea	Yes	118

Sieges

Date	Primary References	Location	Blockade?	Fleet number
407	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.9; Diodorus, 13.69	Thrace, Thasos	No	118
407	Diodorus, 13.68	Hellespont cities	No	118
407	Diodorus, 13.69	Andros	Yes	138
407	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodorus, 13.69	Andros, Gaureum	Yes	138
390	Demosthenes, 20.59 ff.	Thasos	No	150
390	Diodorus, 14.99	Rhodes	No	150
377	Diodorus, 15.30	Hestiaea	No	166
376	Diodorus, 15.34	Naxos	No	166
375	Xenophon, 6.2.3, Diodorus, 15.45	Zacynthos	No	175
375	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.62	Kerkyra	No	175
373	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	Peloponnesian territory	No	177
373	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.33	Kephallonia	No	177
372	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	Peloponnesian Coast	No	177
371	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	Peloponnesian Coast	No	177
366	Isokrates, 15.111-2	Samos	Yes	186
365	Diodorus, 15.81; Isokrates, 15.108, Polyainus, 3.10	Torone	No	186
365	Polyainus, 3.10	Olynthus	No	186
365	Demosthenes, 23.150;	Amphipolis	No	186
364	Nepos, Timotheus, 1.3; Diodorus, 15.81	Kyzicus	No	186
364	Isokrates, 15.112	Crithote	No	186
364	Isokrates, 15.112-3;	Sestos	No	186
363	Isokrates, 15.112-3	Poteidaia	No	186
363	RO 38	Macedonian coast	No	184
363	Isokrates, 15.112-3	Chalchidike	No	186
361	[Demosthenes], 50.21-23	Stryme	No	189
361	Diodorus, 15.95	Panormos	No	190
360	Demosthenes, 23.160, 168	Alopeconnesus	No	202
359	Demosthenes, 23.167	Alopeconnesus	No	202
357	Diodorus, 16.7	Chios	Yes	200
353	Diodorus, 13.34	Sestos	No	203

Blockades

Start Year	Location	Primary References	Months in commission	Max ships	Fleet number
480	Andros	Herodotus, 8.108-11	4		2
479	Sestos	Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodorus, 11.37.5; Thucydides, 1.89.	9? (a garrison left in place for longer, according to Diodorus)		4
478	Cyprus	Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 1.44.2	20?	80	5
478	Byzantium	Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; Plutarch, Aristides, 23.	20?	80	5
477	Eion	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 7; Diodorus, 11.60; Herodotus, 7.107. Fornara, 61B	20?	60	5
475	Karystos	Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105	9?		9
468	Naxos	Thucydides, 1.99; Aristophanes, Wasps, 1.355.	9?		10
467	Caria and Lycia	Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12.	12?		11
465	Thasos	Thucydides, 1.100-1	24		13
460	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.104, 109; Diodorus, 1.75	42	200	18
458	Aegina	Thucydides, 1.105, 1.108; Diodorus, 11.78	9		21
456	Prosopitis	Thucydides, 1.09	42	200	18
450	Citium	Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 18-19; Diodorus, 12.3	12	140	25
449	Cypriot Salamis	Diodorus, 12.4	12	140	25
440	Samos	Thucydides, 1.116; Diodorus, 12.28; Plutarch, Pericles, 26.	18	155	36
432	Pydna	Thucydides, 1.61	30	70	45
432	Potidaea	Thucydides, 2.70	30	70	45
431	Potidaea	Thucydides, 1.64; 2.58	25		47
428	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.6	15	40	60
427	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.27-8	15	40	60
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.23	18	73	75
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.23	18	53	75
424	Niscea	Thucydides, 4.69	2		84
423	Scione	Thucydides, 4.131-3, 5.2, 5.32	24	50	87
419	Epidaurus	Thucydides, 5.56, 5.75, 5.80	12		92
418	Macedonia	Thucydides, 5.83			93
416	Melos	Thucydides, 5.114-6	6	38	95
414	Thaparus	Thucydides, 6.97, 6.103	24	139	100
414	Thaparus	Thucydides, 6.3	24	139	100
414	Naupactos	Thucydides, 7.19, cf.7.17	42	20	104
414	Himeraeum	Thucydides, 7.9			108
412	Spiraeum	Thucydides, 8.10-18.15	2	37	114
412	Lade	Thucydides, 8.19	3	19	116
412	Chios	Thucydides, 8.24	2	25	119
412	Miletus	Thucydides, 8.25	2	48	121
412	Chios, Delphinium	Thucydides, 8.38	60	32	118
412	Chios	Thucydides, 8.56	60	32	118
409	Chalcedon, Byzantium	Diodorus, 13.64	60	50	118
408	Chalcedon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.2, 1.3.5-7; Diodorus, 13.66	60		118
408	Byzantium	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.14-22; Diodorus, 13.66-7	60		118
407	Thasos	Diodorus, 13.72	60	15	118

Blockades

Start Year	Location	Primary References	Months in commission	Max ships	Fleet number
407	Phocaea	Xenophon, 1.5.11	60	30	118
407	Andros, Gaureum	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodorus, 13.69	21	100	138
407	Andros	Diodorus, 13.69	21	20	138
389	Aegina	Xenophon, 5.1.2	2		153
388	Abydos	Xenophon, 5.1.7	24	32	152
366	Samos	Isokrates, 15.111-2	35	30	186
357	Chios	Diodorus, 16.7, 16.21	36	60	200
334	Miletus	Arrian, 1.19	6		216
323	Lamia	Diodorus, 18.13, 18.15	10	240	218

Transporting Troops (when troop numbers are specified)

Date	Primary references	Ships	Athenian hoplites	Allied hoplites	Light troops	Cavalry	Location	Totals and notes on troops	Troops per ship	Fleet number
458	Diodorus, 11.80 (cf. Thucydides, 1.108)	50	0	1000	0	0	Mt. Geraneia	14,000 total troops, of which only 1,000 Argives are specifically referred to (Thucydides, 1.108). Diodorus mentions a Thessalian contingent (11.80), but gives nothing but a total figure.		22
456	Thucydides, 1.108; Scholist on Aeschines, 2.75=Fornara, 84; Diodorus, 11.84; Plutarch, Perikles, 19.2; Pausanias, 1.27; Polyaeus, 3.3	50	4000	0	0	0	Naupactos	According to Diodorus, Tolmides managed through a ruse to attract a further 3000 troops, from the 1000 voted. This would seem an unfeasably large number to carry on 50 ships.	80	23
455	Thucydides, 1.111; Diodorus, 11.85; Plutarch, Perikles, 19.	50	1000	0	0	0	Peloponnesian Coast	Embarked at Pegae, according to Thucydides.	20	24
446	Thucydides, 1.114; Plutarch, Pericles, 22-3; Diodorus, 12.7; Fornara 101 and 103; IG I(3).39 and 41.		5000	0	0	0	Euboea			31
432	Thucydides, 1.61	40	2000	0	0	600	Potidaea	The cavalry was Macedonian. An undisclosed number of allied troops also accompanied the ships.	100	46
432	Thucydides, 1.64, 2.58		1600	0	0	0	Potidaea			47
432	Thucydides, 1.57-65; 2.70; Diodorus, 12.34; Plutarch, Pericles, 29.	30	1000	0	0	0	Potidaea		33	45
431	Thucydides, 2.17; 2.23; 2.25; 2.30; 2.31.	100	1000	0	400	0	Peloponnesian Coast	The light troops were archers.	14	49
430	Thucydides, 2.56; 2.58.	150	4000	0	0	300	Peloponnesian Coast, Chalkidike		26	54
430	Thucydides, 2.69; 2.80-1; 2.83-92; 2.102-3.	40	400	400	0	0	Naupactos	Unusually, the Athenian hoplites are explicitly described as "from the fleet"; marines no doubt. The 400 Messenians are presumably hoplites, but this is not definite. The troops are mentioned in connection with the winter operations around Astacus in 429 BC only.	20	55

Transporting Troops (when troop numbers are specified)

Date	Primary references	Ships	Athenian hoplites	Allied hoplites	Light troops	Cavalry	Location	Totals and notes on troops	Troops per ship	Fleet number
428	Thucydides, 3.18		1000	0	0	0	Mytilene	These troops rowed themselves to Mytilene		61
428	Thucydides, 3.7; 3.69; 3.75; 3.77;		0	500	0	0	Corcyrea	Messenian hoplites		66
425	Thucydides, 4.42-45	80	2000	0	0	200	Corinth	Cavalry taken on horse-transport. Allied troops from Miletus, Andros and Carystus take part.		82
425	Thucydides, 4.27-39	80	0	0	400	0	Pylos	The 400 are archers; in addition, Cleon additionally brought Lemians, Imbrians and peltasts.		77
424	Thucydides, 4.67-74.		600	0	0	0	Megara			84
424	Thucydides, 4.76-7; 4.89; 4.101	40	400	0	0	0	Boeotia	Also some Acarnanians and Agraeans troops in this force.		85
424	Thucydides, 4.53-4; 4.56-7. Cf. 2.27 for Aeginetan presence in Thyrea. See also Herodotus, 1.82.	60	2000	0	0	0	Cythera	A small number of cavalry, and allied contingents from Miletus and other places. The Miletans number at least 2000.		83
423	Thucydides, 4.122-3; 4.129-33; 5.2, 5.32	50	1000	0	600	0	Scione	The light troops are archers, and there are also 1000 Thracian mercenaries	52	87
422	Thucydides, 5.2-3; 5.6-7; 5.10-11.	30	1200	0	0	300	Scione	Took a "still larger" force of allies, and added to this by taking troops from the seige of Scione		90
416	Thucydides, 5.84; 5.114-6.	38	1200	1500	300	20	Melos	The cavalry are mounted archers	81	95
416	Thucydides, 6.7	30	600	0	0	0	Orneae		20	98
415	Thucydides, 6.8; 6.25; 6.30-2; 6.42-4; 6.46; 6.50-2; 6.62-71; 6.74-5; 6.94-103; 7.3-8; 7.20-5; 7.37-45; 7.50-6; 7.69-72	134	2200	2900	1300	30	Sicily	500 of the allied hoplites are from Argos and 250 from Mantinea. The hoplites explicitly include the marines. Of the light troops, 400 are archers, 80 are Cretan archers, 700 Rhodian slingers and 120 Megarian exiles as peltasts.	48	100
414	Thucydides, 7.17, 7.19, 7.31, 8.13; Didorus, 13.48	20	0	600	0	0	Naupactos	These are part of the Messenian garrison at Naupactos	30	104
414	Thucydides, 6.94		0	0	0	280	Sicily	These men were sent to Sicily as cavalry (30 as horse-archers), but without horses.		103
413	Thucydides, 7.20; 7.26; 7.31; 7.33; 7.35; 7.42	73	1200	3800	0	0	Sicily	A great many light troops as well were on board.		106

Transporting Troops (when troop numbers are specified)

Date	Primary references	Ships	Athenian hoplites	Allied hoplites	Light troops	Cavalry	Location	Totals and notes on troops	Troops per ship	Fleet number
413	Thucydides, 7.29-31		0	0	1300	0	Thrace	These are Thracian mercenaries.		111
412	Thucydides, 8.25; 8.27; 8.30	48	1000	2500	0	0	Samos	1500 of the allied hoplies came from Argos, and 500 of these were light troops who were given hoplite weapons.	73	121
409	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.6-13 cf. 1.1.34; Diodorus, 13.64	50	1000	0	0	100	Ionia	Ship's crew are additionally armed as peltasts.	22	136
407	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.21-3; 1.5.11-14; 1.5.18-22; 1.6.15-23; 1.6.38; Diodorus, 13.69; 13.71; 13.76-79.	100	1500	0	0	150	Andros		16	138
389	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.34, 5.1.7; 5.1.35	8	0	0	1200	0	Chersonese	Iphikrates' veteran peltasts	150	152
388	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.10, cf. Isocrates 4.140?, Demosthenes, 20.76.78.82.83	10	0	0	800	0	Cyprus		8	157
368	Diodorus, 15.71, Demosthenes, 23.120	30	1000	0	0	0	Euboea		33	181
360	Diodorus, 16.2		3000	0	0	0	Macedonia			197
349	Philochorus, FGrH 328, F49	30	0	0	2000	0	Olynthus	2000 peltasts	67	205
349	Harding, 80	18	0	0	4000	150	Olynthus	4000 peltasts	307	207
348	Harding 80		2000	0	0	300	Olynthus			208
323	Diodorus, 17.111 cf. 18.8, 15; Plutarch, Demosthenes, 27, Phocion, 23-6; Hypereides, Funeral Oration, 10-20	240	5000	2000	0	500	Lamia	The 2000 are mercenaries.	31	218

Ravaging Enemy Territory

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
480	Karystos	Herodotus, 8.121	2
466	Phaselis	Plutach, Kimon, 12; Fornara 68.	12
459	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	18
458	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	18
457	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	18
456	Gytheum	Thucydides, 1.108; Fornara, 84, Diodorus, 11.84	23
456	Memphis	Thucydides, 1.109	18
455	Peloponnese	Diodorus, 11.85	24
432	Pallene	Thucydides, 1.64	47
431	Potidaea	Thucydides, 1.64; 2.58	47
431	Peleponnese	Thucydides, 2.25	49
431	Pheia	Thucydides, 2.25	49
431	Peleponnese	Thucydides, 2.25	49
431	Euboea	Thucydides, 2.26	50
431	Megara	Thucydides, 2.32	49
430	Epidaurus	Thucydides, 2.56	54
430	Troezen	Thucydides, 2.56	54
430	Haliae	Thucydides, 2.56	54
430	Hermione	Thucydides, 2.56	54
430	Prasie	Thucydides, 2.56	54
429	Spartalos	Thucydides, 2.70	229
429	Cynodia	Thucydides, 2.85	56
428	Peloponnese	Thucydides, 3.16	63
428	Peloponnesian coast	Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 3.16	66
428	Oiniadai	Thucydides, 3.7	66
426	Leucas	Thucydides, 3.94	78
426	Caicinus	Thucydides, 3.103	74
426	Peloponnesian Coast	Thucydides, 3.105	225
425	Crommyon	Thucydides, 4.45	82
424	Asine	Thucydides, 4.54	83
424	Helus	Thucydides, 4.54	83
424	Cotyrtia ad Aphrodisia	Thucydides, 4.56	83
424	Epidaurus Limera	Thucydides, 4.56	83
423	Scione	Thucydides, 4.130	87
416	Argos	Thucydides, 5.84	94
415	Syracuse	Thucydides, 6.52	100
414	Megara	Thucydides, 6.94	100
414	River Terias	Thucydides, 6.94	100
414	Inessa	Thucydides, 6.94	100
414	Hybala	Thucydides, 6.94	100
414	Epidaurus Limera	Thucydides, 6.105	109
413	Syracuse	Thucydides, 7.25	100
413	River Anapus	Thucydides, 7.42	100
413	Epidaurus Limera	Thucydides, 7.26	106
413	Laconian coast	Thucydides, 7.26	106
413	Tanagra	Thucydides, 7.29	111
412	Miletus	Thucydides, 8.24	116
412	Cardamyle	Thucydides, 8.24	119
412	Bolisso	Thucydides, 8.24	119
412	Chios	Thucydides, 8.24	119
412	Cnidus	Thucydides, 8.35	118
411	Various cities	Didodorus, 13.47	134
409	Pygela	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3	136
409	Lydia	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4-5	136
409	Persian territory	Diodorus, 13.64; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.17	118
408	Calchedon	Xenophon, 1.3.2	118
407	Cos	Diodorus, 13.69	138

Ravaging Enemy Territory

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
407	Rhodes	Diodorus, 13.69	138
407	Cyme	Diodorus, 13.73	138
407	Various cities	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20	138
406	Enemy territory	Diodorus, 13.100	140
405	Persian territory	Xenophon, Helleica, 2.1.16	140
390	Mytilene	Xenophon, 4.8.30	150
390	Aspendus	Diodorus, 14.99	150
389	Chersonese	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.35	152
377	Hestiaea	Diodorus, 15.30	166
373	Peloponnesian territoy	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	177
372	Peloponnesian Coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	177
371	Peloponnesian Coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	177
349	Boetiaia	Harding 80	207

Colonization

Year	Fleet Name	General references	Total ships	Fleet number
476	Skyros	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus, 11.60.		8
476	Eion Colony	Plutarch, Kimon, 7-3; Scholia to Aeschines, 2.32(=Fornara 62).		7
465	Ennoi Hodoi colony	Thucydides, 1.100, cf. 4.102; Scholia to Aeschines, 2.32(=Fornara 62); Diodorus, 11.70, cf. 12.68.		14
464	Chersonese colonies?	Plutarch, Kimon, 13		142
456	Periplous of Tolmides	Thucydides, 1.108; Scholist on Aeschines, 2.75=Fornara, 84; Diodorus, 11.84; Plutarch, Perikles, 19.2; Pausanias, 1.27; Polyaeus, 3.3	50	23
450	Cleruchy on Andros	Plutarch, Pericles, 11		230
449	Cleruchy to Imbros	Thucydides, 7.57		227
449	Cleruchy to Lemnos			226
448	Cleruchies on Euboea	Diodorus, 11.88		28
448	Cleruchies on Naxos	Diodorus, 11.88		28
448	Colonization of Chersonese	Diodorus, 11.88 (cf. Plutarch, Perikles, 19)		29
446	Colonization of Hestaea	Thucydides, 1.114; Plutarch, Pericles, 23; Diodorus 12.22 cf. 7; IG 1(3).41; Scholia on Aristophanes, Clouds, 213.		32
445	Colonization of Brea	Fornara 100		26
443	Foundation of Thurrii	Diodorus, 12.9-11; Fornara 108	10	33
437	Colonization of Amphipolis	Diodorus, 12.32; Fornara, 62		42
435	Colonization of Sinope	Plutarch, Pericles, 20		41
431	Colonization of Aegina	Thucydides, 2.27		53
429	Colonization of Potidaea	Thucydides, 2.70; Diodorus 12.46; Fornara 129		48
426	Notium	Thucydides, 3.34		62
426	Colonization of Lesbos	Thucydides, 3.50; IG (3) 67		70
415	Melos colonization	Thucydides, 5.116		143
361	Cleruchy on Samos	Diodorus, 18.18; Diodorus, 15.93, Aeneas Tacticus, 11.13-14		191
351	Colonization of the Chersonese	Diodorus, 16.34		204
325	Colony on the Adriatic	Rhodes, Osborne 100	More than 9	233

Garrisons and Regional Patrols

Date	Location	Primary References	Ships	Months in commission	Fleet number
480	Artemisium	Herodotus, 7.177, 7.194, 8.6-11, 8.15-19	224	4	2
480	Skiathos	Herodotus, 7.179-182	224	4	2
480	Chalkis	Herodotus, 7.183	224	4	2
480	Salamis	Diodorus, 11.18; Herodotus, 8.40; 8.56-64; 8.74-97	224	4	2
479	Sestos	Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodorus, 11.37.5; Thucydides, 1.89.	110	9? + permanent establishment of ships at Sestos?	4
456	Naupactos	Diodorus, 11.84, Thucydides, 1.103	50	9	23
450	Hellespont	ML 58 A, 1.7		Permanent	234
447	Chersonese	Plutarch, Pericles, 19; Diodorus, 11.88		Permanent	29
440	Samos	Thucydides, 1.115; Diodorus, 12.27	40	3	35
440	Samos	Thucydides, 1.117	60	18	36
440	Caria, Chios and Lesbos	Thucydides, 1.116	60	18	36
436	Black Sea	Plutarch, Pericles, 20.		3 (12 for Lamachus?)	40
436	Sinope	Plutarch, Pericles, 20		3 (12 for Lamachus?)	40
432	Thrace	Thucydides, 1.59	30	30	45
431	Atalanta	Thucydides, 2.32		Permanent	51
431	Euboea	Thucydides, 2.26	30	Permanent?	50
430	Budorum	Thucydides, 2.93-4	3	Permanent	58
430	Naupactos	Thucydides, 2.69, 2.80, 2.103	20	18	55
429	Rhium	Thucydides, 2.90 ff	20	18	55
429	Patrae	Thucydides, 2.83 ff	20	18	55
428	Naupactos	Thucydides, 3.7, 3.69, 3.102	30	18	66
427	Rhegium	Thucydides, 3.88	20	27	74
427	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.35	40	15	60
427	Antissa	Thucydides, 3.28	40	15	60
427	Salamis	Thucydides, 3.51		Permanent	71
427	Minoa	Thucydides, 3.51, 4.67,		Permanent	72
427	Naupactos	Thucydides, 3.77	2	1	65
427	Clarus	Thucydides, 3.33	2	1	65
426	Naupactos	Thucydides, 3.105, 3.114	20	9	225
426	Hellespont	ML 65		Permanent	235
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.2-3, 4.5, 4.9	40	18	75
424	Eion	Thucydides, 4.106-7	7	Permanent	86
424	Amphipolis	Thucydides, 4.104	7	Permanent	86
424	Cythera	Thucydides, 4.54	60	3	83
424	Thracian Coast	Thucydides, 1.104	7	Permanent	86
422	Torone	Thucydides, 5.2-3	30		90
418	Epidaurus	Thucydides, 5.75, 5.80		12 (Permanent?)	92
415	Syracuse	Thucydides, 6.65-6	134	24	100
414	Thapasus	Thucydides, 6.97, 6.103	133	24	100
414	Peloponnese	Thucydides, 7.17	20	42	104
413	Laconian coast	Thucydides, 7.26	73	3	106
413	Megara	Thucydides, 7.25	148	24	100
413	Naupactos	Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 7.19 and 7.17, Diodorus, 13.48	20	42	104
413	Laconian Coast	Thucydides, 7.26	30	2	107

Garrisons and Regional Patrols

Date	Location	Primary References	Ships	Months in commission	Fleet number
412	Spiraeum	Thucydides, 8.11, 8.15	37	2	114
412	Chalce, Cos	Thucydides, 8.44	74	60	118
412	Melos	Thucydides, 8.39	10	Permanent	128
412	Peloponnese	Thucydides, 8.15	37	2	114
412	Laucaidia	Thucydides, 8.13	27	42	104
412	Samos	Thucydides, 8.43-4, 8.51; 8.54; 8.56	74	60	118
412	Syme, Chakce, Rhodes, Lycia	Thucydides, 8.41	74	60	118
412	Chios	Thucydides, 8.56	35	60	118
412	Chios, Delphinium	Thucydides, 8.38	35	60	118
412	Lesbos	Thucydides, 8.34	35	60	118
412	Chalce	Thucydides, 8.55	74	60	118
411	Piraeus	Thucydides, 8.97	20		133
411	Euboea	Thucydides, 8.74		Permanent	132
411	Euboea	Thucydides, 8.74	1	1	127
411	Cos	Thucydides, 8.108	82	60	118
411	Byzantium	Thucydides, 8.80	82	60	118
411	Chios	Thucydides, 8.63	32	60	118
411	Sestos	Thucydides, 8.62, 8.80, 8.102	32	60	118
411	Thrace	Thucydides, 8.64		Permanent	129
410	Chrysopolis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, Diodorus, 13.64; cf. ML 58, Hellenica, 4.8.27	30	60	118
410	Hellespont		161	60	118
410	Hellespont	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36	9	Permanent	135
409	Lampsacus	Xenophon, 1.2.15	238	60	118
394	Oeniadae	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.6.14		Permanent	160
388	Aegina	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5	13	2	156
386	Thrace	Harding, 29			168
377	Euboea	Diodorus, 15.30		24	166
377	Metropolis	Diodorus, 15.30		24	166
375	Zacynthos	Xenophon, 6.2.3, Diodorus, 15.45	60	4	175
373	Attic coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.14	10	Permanent	179
361	Sestos	Demosthenes, 50.52-3, Hyper. 4.1		24	189
340	Hellespont	Demosthenes, 18.88, Frontinius, 1.4.13	80		212

Diplomatic and Political missions

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
480	Carystus and Paros	Herodotus, 8.108-11		Andros was attacked, prompting Carystus and Paros to pay money to the fleet	2
480	Isthmus	Herodotus, 8.123		The awarding of prizes to the Greek commanders.	2
479	Aegina	Herodotus, 8.132, Diodorus, 11.34	110	The Ionians appeal to the mainland Greeks to aid them in becoming free of Persian rule. According to Diodorus, the meeting took place on Delos	4
479	Samos	Herodotus, 9.106; Diodorus, 11.37		The idea of removing the Greeks from Ionia and re-settling them elsewhere is discussed. The Athenians gain support amongst the islanders for opposing this idea, forming a confederacy with the Samians, Chians, Lesbians and other islanders	4
478	Byzantium	Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; Plutarch, Aristides, 23.	80	Pausanius is removed from command after the capture of Byzantium, his replacement Dokis is not accepted by the allies, and the Athenians take over.	5
478	Byzantium, Delos?	Thucydides, 1.95-6; Diodorus, 11.46.5; [Aristotle], Constitution of Athens, 23.5; Plutarch, Aristides, 25;	60	We don't know where the agreements and oaths between the league members were sworn, or where the iron ingots were cast into the sea; Byzantium and Delos seem to be the most likely options, if these things occurred collectively (rather than city by city)	5
467	Caria and Lycia	Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12.		Diodorus hints at prolonged campaigning in the area prior to the 'showdown' at Eurymedon, involving force and diplomacy with the Persians and Ionian Greeks	11
466	Phaselis	Plutarch, Kimon, 12; Fornara 68.	200	Kimon attacks this city after it refuses to allow his fleet entry. After appeals from the Karian allies, Kimon resolves the dispute diplomatically; the Phaselians agree to pay 10 talents and join the expedition.	12
464	Chelidonian islands	Plutarch, Kimon, 13		A 'flag-showing' exercise into Persian waters in the aftermath of Eurymedon; no opposition encountered.	16
463	Chelidonian islands	Plutarch, Kimon, 13.		A 'flag-showing' exercise into Persian waters in the aftermath of Eurymedon; no opposition encountered.	17
456	Kephallania	Diodorus, 11.84	50	Kephallania is 'won over', implying strong-arm diplomacy rather than fighting.	23
455	Oeniadae	Thucydides, 1.111; Diodorus, 11.85.	50	The attack on the town is unsuccessful, but according to Diodorus, all of the rest of the region is won over.	24
450	Egypt	Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 19; Diodorus, 12.3	60	This force was sent to aid the revolt of Amyrtaeus while the rest of the fleet went to Citium.	25
449	Egypt	Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 19; Diodorus, 12.3	60	This detachment rejoins the rest of the fleet to return home.	25
449	Cypriot Salamis	Diodorus, 12.4	140	Diodorus records a siege of Salamis which forces the Persian king to make terms with Athens; it is likely that these events are confused with the account of Eurymedon.	25

Diplomatic and Political missions

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
449	Asia Minor, Islands	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	5	A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, arguably mostly connected to the tribute following the Peace of Kallias	30
449	Hellespont, Thrace	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	5	A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, arguably mostly connected to the tribute following the Peace of Kallias	30
449	Euboea, Thessaly	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	5	A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, arguably mostly connected to the tribute following the Peace of Kallias	30
440	Samos	Thucydides, 1.115; Diodorus, 12.27	40	Regime change; Athens imposed democracy and took hostages, and left a garrison behind. Diodorus claims that 80 talents were taken.	35
439	Samos	Thucydides, 1.117	155	The Samians capitulate after 9 months, and the Byzantines give up at the same time.	36
437	Argos	Thucydides, 2.68		Taken by storm in conjunction with the Akarnanians, with whom an alliance was made.	67
436	Black Sea	Plutarch, Pericles, 20.		The diplomacy here was principally gunboat; a show of strength in the region.	40
436	Sinope	Plutarch, Pericles, 20	13	Lamachus' squadron may have remained behind until the arrival of the colonists, probably in the next year.	40
433	Corcyrea	Thucydides, 1.45	10	Sent to help the Corcyreans, but without breaking the treaty; a tough assignment!	43
433	Sybota	Thucydides, 1.52, 55.	30	After the Corinthians refuse battle and some exchanges of words, both the Corinthians and the Athenians sail home.	43
432	Thrace	Thucydides, 1.59	30	Having found Potidaea in revolt and too strong, the commanders ally with Philip and make war on Perdiccas of Macedon, their original target.	45
432	Pydna	Thucydides, 1.61	70	Negotiates a solution with Perdiccas before moving on; siege fails to capture Pydna.	45
431	Cephalonia	Thucydides, 2.30	150	Took the island's four cities (Palea, Crania, Samaea and Pronaea) by diplomacy.	49
430	Potidaea	Thucydides, 2.70	70	Lenient terms given to the people of Potidaea to end the siege.	45
430	Crete	Thucydides, 2.85	20	Sent to Crete after being persuaded to try to win over the city of Cynodia by a proxenos, Nicias	56
429	Astacus	Thucydides, 2.102	40	Land forces expelled unfriendly people from Stratus, Coronta and other places.	55
429	Spartalos	Thucydides, 2.70		Thucydides reports destruction of the crops, and also hopes of effecting a revolt from within	229
429	Potidaea	Thucydides, 2.70		The Athenians retreat to Potidaea, and from there ask for a truce in order to collect the dead.	229
428	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.3-4	40	Some desperate diplomacy ensues after the arrival of the Athenian fleet, staving off prolonged hostilities for a short while	60

Diplomatic and Political missions

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
427	Mytilene	Thucydides, 3.27-8	40	After an ill-fated attempt in arming their citizenry, the Mytilenians surrender to Athens, and terms are negotiated	60
427	Notium	Thucydides, 3.34		After using a ruse, Paches takes the city by storm; it was later colonized.	60
427	Corcyrea	Thucydides, 3.75	12	Ships from Naupactos	66
427	Corcyrea	Thucydides, 3.70	1	This 1 ship diplomatic mission renews the alliance with Corcyrea, but the island wished to maintain good relations with the Peloponnese too (a Corinthian delegation was there too)	223
426	Messina	Thucydides, 3.90	30	Settlement and hostages from the defeated Messinians, on Sicily.	74
426	Sollium	Thucydides, 3.95	30	Negotiates with his allies here.	78
426	Acarnania	Thucydides, 3.102		According to Fornara, Demosthenes' generalship has expired at this time, and he has no official command. Demosthenes, despite snubbing them over the siege of Leucas, persuades the Acarnanians to give him some troops to prevent an attack on Naupactos.	66
426	Peloponnesian Coast	Thucydides, 3.105	20	In Winter, the Acarnanians request the help of this fleet, and Demosthenes, in an attack on Aetolia.	225
426	Argos	Thucydides, 1.107	20	The Athenians are trying to relieve the siege of Argos. 400 Messinian hoplites and 60 Athenian archers are used. The land battle is a victory for Athens and her allies, followed by some 'secret' negotiations	225
425	Pylos	Thucydides, 4.16, cf. 4.23	53	Armistice between the Athenians and Spartans at Pylos.	75
425	Athens	Thucydides, 4.16	1	By the terms of the armistice, the Spartans were to be taken to Athens and back in a trireme for negotiations.	75
425	Corcyrea	Thucydides, 4.46	40	Watches the ending of the Corcyrean civil war before moving on to Sicily	75
425	Anactorium	Thucydides, 4.49		The city was taken by treachery, and the allied Acarnanians later colonized it.	66
425	Rhegium	Thucydides, 4.65	20	Fleet 75 and its commanders must have arrived at some point around the Sicilian peace negotiations. This round of diplomacy amongst Sicilian states and the Athenians leads to the latter's return home.	74
425	Eion	Thucydides, 4.7		Eion is captured by treachery by the Athenians, but re-captured by force shortly after by the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans.	81
425	Islands off the Corinthian coast	Thucydides, 4.44	80	Nicias asks for two bodies left behind of the Athenian dead, thereby conceding victory	82

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
425	Anactorium	Thucydides, 4.49		The city was taken by treachery, and the allied Acarnanians later colonized it.	225
424	Ephesus	Thucydides, 4.50	1	Learning of Ataxerxes' death (and possibly of the succession troubles talked of by Diodorus (12.71) and Ktesius (45), this mission returns home.	80
424	Cythera	Thucydides, 4.54	60	The settlement was quite favourable to Cythera, as apparently Nicias had been undergoing negotiations beforehand. The island was garrisoned.	83
424	Naupactos	Thucydides, 4.76	40	Demosthenes raises troops in the region, and generally assess the complicated alliances and factions in the area.	85
423	Scione	Thucydides, 4.122	1	A trireme (presumably Athenian, as the Peloponnesians agreed not to travel by sea in warships) arrives at Scione and tells Brasidas of the armistice; just one of no doubt many such diplomatic missions, many of which undoubtedly involved ships.	88
423	Scione	Thucydides, 4.131-2	50	An alliance with Perdikkas of Macedonia.	87
422	Thrace	Thucydides, 5.6		Diplomatic mission sent to Polles, king of the Odomantians	90
422	Macedonia	Thucydides, 5.6		Diplomatic mission sent to Perdikkas of Macedon	90
422	Italy	Thucydides, 5.5	2	Negotiated with Italian cities on his way to Sicily	91
422	Camarina	Thucydides, 5.4	2	Successful diplomacy	91
422	Agrigentum	Thucydides, 5.4	2	Successful diplomacy	91
422	Gela	Thucydides, 5.4	2	Unsuccessful diplomacy	91
422	Bricciniae	Thucydides, 5.4	2	Encouraged the garrison	91
422	Catana	Thucydides, 5.4	2		91
422	Italy	Thucydides, 5.5	2	Negotiated with Italian cities on his way from Sicily	91
422	Locris	Thucydides, 5.5	2	Phaex's agreement with Locris is recorded in the context of meeting a band of Locrian settlers en route to Athens.	91
418	Egesta	Fornara 81+C99		Alliance recorded with Egesta on Sicily, which surely must involve at least one trireme sent there at this time.	34
416	Melos	Thucydides, 5.84	38	Diplomacy begins before hostilities break out; the so-called Melian Dialogue.	95
416	Egesta	Thucydides, 6.6		Sent to ascertain whether Egestan promises of lavish resources for a Sicilian campaign were true. Return with 60 talents and envoys	97
415	Sicilian/Italian cities	Thucydides, 6.42, 46	3	Sent ahead to see which cities would receive the Athenian fleet.	100
415	Egesta	Thucydides, 6.44	3	Sent to find out if the money promised by the Egestans was really there; returns to Rhegium with the news that it wasn't, prompting a strategic debate.	100

Diplomatic and Political missions

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
415	Messina	Thucydides, 6.50	1	Alcibiades makes a brief trip to Messina, but fails to win the city over and returns to Rhegium	100
415	Syracuse	Thucydides, 6.50	60	Ten ships go on ahead to proclaim the restoration of Leontini, and to scout the city and harbours. The rest remain back, ready for battle.	100
415	Catana	Thucydides, 6.51	60	While the generals negotiated with Catana, soldiers break in and the place comes over to Athens.	100
415	Camarina	Thucydides, 6.52	134	Despite the intellegance they received, Camarina was not ready to join Athens; they would not receive more than one Athenian ship.	100
415	Catana	Thucydides, 6.61	1	<i>Salaminia</i> . Ordered to bring back, but not arrest, Alcibiades. He and other accused people join this fleet in Alcibiades' ship.	102
415	Egesta	Thucydides, 6.62	133	Managed to get 30 talents out of the Egestans.	100
415	Sicilian Allies	Thucydides, 6.62	133	Try to raise an army among the Sicels.	100
415	Messina	Thucydides, 6.74		Once again, 'diplomatic' means of getting Messina on-side fail.	100
415	Camarina	Thucydides, 6.75	1	The debate at Camarina between the Athenians and Syracusans is given in Thucydides	100
415	Carthage	Thucydides, 6.88	1	Goodwill mission	100
415	Sicels	Thucydides, 6.88		Sicels were encouraged to send horses, and to join the alliance of they hadn't done so already.	100
415	Egesta	Thucydides, 6.88		Requested to send horses	100
413	Argos	Thucydides, 7.20	30	Went to Argos to pick up troops provided under the treaty. Joined fleet 106	107
413	Thurii	Thucydides, 7.33	73	Stop at Thurii to review the forces, and try and conclude an alliance with the city, which was undergoing stasi at the time; they eventually add yet more troops to the relief force.	106
412+ A93	Chios	Thucydides, 8.9		Confronts the Chians with evidence of their betrayal, but they claim no knowledge and agree to send ships as a measure of good faith.	113
412	Teos	Thucydides, 8.16	9	Warns Teos against hostility to Athens, but flees on seeing a large Peloponnesian fleet approach.	116
412	Teos	Thucydides, 8.20	10	Makes a treaty with Teos to have them receive Athenian ships	119
412	Samos	Thucydides, 8.21	3	The revolution at Samos is supported by these three ships; it is unclear how the Samians came to be ruled by the oligarchy which seems to be in power in 412.	119

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
412	Clazomenae	Thucydides, 8.23	25	Carried the Clazomenaens back to their own city, and win it over to Athens; no conflict is implied.	119
412	Athens	Thucydides, 8.49, 8.53	1	Proposal concerning winning the king on to the side of Athens at the cost of removing the democracy; opposed by Phrynichus, leaving him in an invidious position.	118
412	Persia	Thucydides, 8.54; 8.56	5	Sent to arrange matters with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, with a view to bringing the Persians over to the Athenian side.	125
411	Athens	Thucydides, 8.64		On the way to Athens, these ships were to put in at various cities along the way and make oligarchies there.	125
411	Other cities	Thucydides, 8.64		Sent to initiate changes to oligarchies in other (unspecified) imperial cities.	125
411	Thasos	Thucydides, 8.64		Ditrephe forced an end to democracy at Thasos	129
411	Samos	Thucydides, 8.63	5	Negotiates with the forces at Samos, with a view to making Samos oligarchic once more.	125
411	Samos	Thucydides, 8.73		Leon and Diomedon assign an indefinite number of ships, including the Paralos, to watch out for democratic interests in Samos.	118
411	Persia	Thucydides, 8.82	1	Alcibiades sails on a diplomatic mission to Tissaphernes having been elected general at Samos.	118
411	Samos	Thucydides, 8.85	1	Returned to Samos at the same time as the diplomats from the 400 at Athens (Fleet 126) arrive for negotiations, and shortly before the Paralos crew (fleet 127)	118
411	Argos	Thucydides, 8.86	1	On a diplomatic mission to Sparta, the Paralos crew handed over their charges to the Argives and set out for Samos rather than Athens.	127
411	Samos	Thucydides, 8.86	1	The Paralians brought Argive diplomats and themselves to Samos in "their own trireme"	127
411	Samos	Thucydides, 8.86		Unsuccessful negotiations made with the fleet at Samos	126
411	Aspendus	Thucydides, 8.88	13	More diplomacy with Tissaphernes	118
411	Cos	Thucydides, 8.108	21	Alcibiades appointed a governor and fortifies the place.	118
411	Sardis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.9	1	Alcibiades tried to negotiate with Tissaphernes, but was arrested. He escaped after a month.	118
411	Corcyra	Diodorus, 13.48		On request from the Corcyrean demagogs, Konon brought troops over to prevent the city being handed over to Sparta. There is much fighting before the situation is calmed.	104
411	Various cities	Diodorus, 13.47	30	A broad range of missions here; collecting money from inhabitants of allied cities who were trying to revolt and plundering the land of enemies.	134

Diplomatic and Political missions

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
411	Paros	Diodorus, 13.47	30	Democracy restored to Paros and exacts a lot of money for the privilege.	134
409	Colophon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4		The town was won over peacefully	136
408	Bithynian Thracians	Xenophon, 1.3.3-4		Xenophon records this mission of Alcibiades, winning over the Thracians with whom the Calchedians had deposited their valuables.	118
408	Calchedon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.8-11		The siege of Calchedon is concluded by diplomatic means, and negotiations with the Persians start; the satrap Pharnabazus required Alcibiades' oath to seal the deal.	118
408	Selymbria	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.10		Diodorus claims that Selymbria was betrayed to Alcibiades.	118
408	Calchedon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.11-12		Alcibiades exchanged oaths with Pharnabazus	118
408	Cyzicus	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.13		Negotiations with the Persians	118
408	Byzantium	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.14-22; Diodorus, 13.66-7		A long siege is implied by Diodorus before Byzantium is finally betrayed to the Athenians; his account is more detailed than that of Xenophon.	118
408	Hellespont cities	Diodorus, 13.68		According to Diodorus, after Byzantium fell the Athenians took every city in the Hellespont, except the Spartan base Abydos. We can imagine a combination of diplomacy and combat, but no city was likely to resist too much after Byzantium's fall.	118
407	Hellespont cities	Diodorus, 13.68		The Hellespont campaign described by Diodorus as commencing after the capture of Byzantium would probably have continued into 407, at which time the region was secure enough for the entire fleet (excluding the 30 ships at the toll-house, presumably) to return to Athens	118
407	Abdera	Diodorus, 13.72	15	Diodorus implies a diplomatic return of this city to the Athenian side	118
407	Cyme	Diodorus, 13.73	73	After presenting false charges, Alcibiades has an excuse to plunder Cyme. The Cymians put up a fight, and drive the Athenians away.	138
404	Samos	Lysias, 12.71; Diodorus, 14.3		According to both Lysias and Diodorus, Lysander is sent for from Samos and imposes the Thirty. Xenophon (Hellenica, 1.3.13) mentions only a mission sent by the Thirty to get a garrison, which Diodorus also mentions (14.4).	144
397	Persia	Oxyrhynchus Historian, 7.1		Envoys to Persian, captured en route to by a Spartan nauarch and executed.	145
397	Cyprus	Oxyrhynchus Historian, 7.1		The purpose of these missions was to bring supplies and hyperesia to Konon and his fleet, which was probably stationed in Cyprus.	147
396	Cyprus (?)	Oxyrhynchus Historian, 6.1 ff	1	it is assumed that Konon is in Cyprus at this point. According to the Oxyrhynchus Historian, the Athenians sent other missions to Konon with supplies and crew for ships, but disavowed this one.	146

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
393	Persia	FGrH 328 F 149	1	The details of this diplomatic mission are obscure, but Epikrates' stance as a friend of the King, and as a 'professional' diplomat, is well attested.	148
390	Near Telos?	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.24	10	This fleet was intended to aid the tyrant of Cyprus Euagoras against the Persians despite (as Xenophon points out) good relations between Athens and Persia at the time.	149
390	Hellespont	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodorus, 14.94	40	Thrasyboulos resolved the dispute between two Thracian kings, Amedoctus and Seuthes, and allied them both to Athens	150
390	Thasos	Demosthenes, 20.59 ff.	40	Thrasyboulos was admitted to Thasos by a faction there led by Ekphantos. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus record this action. The Loeb translation of this speech dates the taking of Thasos to 408-7 BC (under fleet 118), where our sources only record money-collection.	150
390	Byzantium	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodorus, 14.94, Lysias, 28.5	40	Diodorus simply says he collected money; Xenophon has Thrasyboulos farming out taxation contracts for the shipping and installing a democracy here.	150
390	Hellespontine and Ionian cities	Xenophon, 4.8.26-7; Diodorus, 14.94	40	Xenophon talks in general terms of securing good realtions with Greek cities in the region; Diodorus talks of collecting money from the allies and visiting Ionia.	150
390	Chalchedon	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.28	40	Xenophon records that the Chalcedonians were made friends of Athens.	150
390	Mytilene	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.30	17	The Athenians allied with some cities, and make raids to get booty around Lesbos, gathering resources to attack Rhodes.	150
388	Cyprus	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.7	10	Fleet sent to help Euagoras on Cyprus.	157
387	Persia	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.30, 32		The ambassadors heard the terms dictated by the king, and returned to their cities.	161
384	Chios	IG II2 34/35 (Rhodes Osbourne, 20)	1	Alliance treaty	167
383	Chalkis	IG II2 36	1	Alliance treaty	169
378	Byzantium	Didodorus, 15.28, IG II2 41	1	Alliance treaty	165
378	Rhodes	Diodorus, 15.28	1	Alliance treaty	171
378	Mytilene	Diodorus, 15.28	1	Alliance treaty	170
378	Chios	Diodorus, 15.28	1	Alliance treaty	172
377	Cyclades	Diodorus, 15.30		Chabrias wons over several island to the Confederacy	166
377	Peperethos	Didodrus, 15.30		Chabrias won over this island	166
377	Sciathos	Diodorus, 15.30		Chabrias won over this island	166
377	Perinthos	IG II2 43		This city allied with Athens at this point.	166

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
377	Maroneia	IG II2 43		This city allied itself with Athens at this point	166
377	Methymna	Harding 37	1	The decree called for another expedition to ratify the treaty and make oaths	173
377	Dion	IG II2 43		This small island joins after the garrison at Histiaia is defeated by the Thebans	166
375	Olynthus			According to Buckler, the alliance was renewed at this time. On the events of 375, see Buckler p.250-1, based on the Chabrias Monument	166
375	Abdera	Aenius Tacticus, 15.8-10; Diodorus, 15.36		Chabrias rescues, and allies with, the Abderians from the attack of the famine-hit Triballians. On the events of 375, see Buckler p.250-1, based on the Chabrias Monument. Diodorus erroneously reports Chabrias' death at this point.	166
375	Hellespont	Chabrias Monument		Other cities (Dikaia, Ainos and Samothrace) join the league at this point, but it is unsure whether Chabrias' fleet visits them. On the events of 375, see Buckler p.250-1, based on the Chabrias Monument	166
375	Kerkyra	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.62	60	Xenophon reports that the island was taken over and a generous peace settlement made; if there was fighting, it appears to have been an easy victory for Athens.	175
375	Acarmania and Kephallonia	Tod II, 126; Diodorus, 15.36	60	An inscription recording the fact that Kerkyra, Kephallonia and Arcarnania joined the Confederacy at this time should surely be attributed to diplomatic activity undertaken by Timotheus.	175
375	Molossia	Diodorus, 15.36	60	Diodorus reports Timotheus as winning over the Molossian king Alectus and other cities in the region prior to the battle with the Spartan fleet.	175
375	Sparta	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.1; Diodorus, 15.38	1	On the terms of this peace, see Nepos, Timotheus, 2.2 and Philochorus F 151.	176
373	Thrace	Diodorus, 15.46; Harding, 43	60	According to Diodorus, Timotheus' activities in Thrace brought Athens many alliances and thirty extra ships. The ships are unlikely, but treaties agreed with the King of Macedon in this period (Harding, 43) may be associated with this fleet.	177
373	Peloponnesian territory	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	90	Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given as to how successful this was.	177
372	Peloponnesian Coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	70	Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given as to how successful this was.	177

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
371	Peloponnesian Coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38	90	Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given as to how successful this was.	177
371	Athens	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.3	90	Callistratus returns to Athens in 371 to take part in negotiations for the next King's Peace, promising Iphikrates he will either bring money or peace. It implies that Iphikrates' force has been in commission continually from spring 373 BC to summer 371	177
371	Peloponnesian coast	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.4.1	89	After peace is concluded in summer 471 BC, Iphikates is instructed to return all the territory gained.	177
371	Sparta	Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.2	1	Diplomats to negotiate the King's Peace.	180
368	Amphipolis	Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28		Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Northern Aegean and the Chalkidike, without getting close to restoring Amphipolis.	187
367	Persia	Xenophon, 7.1.36-7	1	Leon has his fellow envoy prosecuted and executed when he returned to Athens, as well as telling the King Athens would do well to find other friends.	182
367	Amphipolis	Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28		Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Northern Aegean and the Chalkidike, without getting close to restoring Amphipolis.	187
366	Amphipolis	Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28		Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Northern Aegean and the Chalkidike, without getting close to restoring Amphipolis.	187
365	Amphipolis	Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28		Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Northern Aegean and the Chalkidike, without getting close to restoring Amphipolis. Timotheus replaces Iphikrates in the area after the Athenians lose patience.	187
363	Macedonia	Aeschines, 2.30-1		This treaty was not well received in Athens, and as a result Kallistratus was put to death.	185
363	Macedonian coast	Rhodes-Osbourne 38		This inscription attests to the presence of generals other than Timotheus in the region of Macedonia in 363, presumably also participating in the war vs. Amphipolis and the Chalkidike.	184
362	Chersonese	Demosthenes, 23.104, 50.4 cf. 50.12		Autocles failed to impress the demos, and was replaced 8 months into his tenure. Hamel (North Aegean Wars, p. 144) argues that his mission was to aid a rebel without angering the king he was rebelling from, so it seems unlikely that he could have ever impressed t	189

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
361	Athens	[Demosthenes], 50.12	1	Apollodorus brings ambassadors, possibly from the Thracian rebel Miltocythes, back to Athens	189
361	Maronea	[Demosthenes], 50.21		The fleet tows merchant vessels to Maronea, and negotiates with the city.	189
361	Thasos	Demosthenes, 23.115; 50.23		Diplomacy with Cotys probably took place on Thasos	189
360	Macedonia	Diodorus, 16.2		An attempt to put Argaeus rather than Philip on the throne of Macedon; Philip comes to the throne on 359	197
359	Chabrias	Demosthenes, 23.171		Chabrias negotiates with Thracians in the Chersonnese, but without any force cannot get good terms.	195
359	Chersonnese	Demosthenes, 23.172	1	Following Chabrias' unsuccessful negotiations, 10 ambassadors elected; they don't go, and so Chares is sent instead.	196
359	Alopeconnesus	Demosthenes, 23.167	359	Truce negotiated	202
353	Chersonese	Diodorus, 16.34		The Chersonese, apart from the city of Cardia, is seded to the Athenians by the sucesor of Cotys, Cersobletos, as both have a common enemy in the form of Philip of Macedon	203
349	Olynthus		18	Having arrived in Olynthus, Chardemos' troops behave badly, causing more harm than good.	207
348	Pella		1		209
348	Greek Cities	Diodorus, 16.54		This mission fails to ignite any anti-Philip feelings amongst the Greeks.	210
344	Cyprus	Diodorus, 16.42		Phokion, along with the former Cypriot king Evagoras, is sent to take command of a Persian force. No Athenian ships are part of the fleet	211
343	Eretria	Demosthenes, 9.63		The embassy fails; the faction advoctaing allience with Philip, rather than the Athenians, wins out.	217
340	Hieron	Frontininus, 1.4.13; Philochorus, FGrH 328 F162.	40	While Chares goes off to engage in dipomacy with the Persians, Philip takes the oppourtunity to take most of the 230-strong grain fleet that he was meant to be protecting. This part ofthe fleet too presumably leaves the Hellespont as a result of Philip's action.	212
339	Greek cities and islands	Aeschines, 3.145, 3.151; Demosthenes, 18.178		These various diplomatic missions get a favourable response from the Corithians, Euboians, Achaians, Megarians, Leukadians, Kerkyrians, Argolid Akatians and Akarnanians.	214

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Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet Size	Further Notes	Fleet number
331	Tyre	Arrian	1	The entire crew of the Paralos took part in these negotiations with Alexander while he was besieging Tyre.	215
323	Alexander in Persia (Susa?)	Diodorus, 17.11.3		The Athenians are not listed specifically, but their presence can surely be assumed.	219
323	Various cities	Diodorus, 18.11		It is not known exactly which cities the Athenians visited, but Diodorus (18.11) gives a comprehensive list of those places that eventually joined the alliance.	220
323	Taenarum	Diodorus, 18.9		Advice is sent to Leosthenes to be secretive; he was building up an army from Alexander's disbanded mercenaries.	221
323	Taenarum	Diodorus, 18.9		Later, when Alexander dies, Leosthenes is given more open and tangible (money and weapons) support from Athens.	221
323	Thessaly	Diodorus, 18.12	240	The Athenians win over the Thessalians, and are victorious in a land battle against Antipater.	218

Protecting Merchants and Persecuting Pirates

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
430	Carian and Lycian coast	Thucydides, 2.69	57
410	Hellespont	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36	135
410	Chrysopolis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, Diodorus, 13.64; cf. ML 58, Hellenica, 4.8.27	118
409	Chysopolis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22	118
388		Lysias, 19.50	154
376	Athens	Diodorus, 15.34	163
376	Paros? Naxos?	Diodorus, 15.34	163
362	Chersonese	Demosthenes, 23.104, 50.4 cf. 50.12	189
361	Maronea	[Demosthenes], 50.21	189
361	Hieron	[Demosthenes], 50.19	189
340	Hieron	Frontinus, 1.4.13; Philochorus, FGrH 328 F162.	212
340	Hellespont	Demosthenes, 18.88	212

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
476	Skyros	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus, 11.60.	8
431	Atalanta	Thucydides, 2.32	51
430	Carian and Lycian coast	Thucydides, 2.69	57
388	Aegina	Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5	156
361	Chersonese	[Demosthenes], 50.12	189
333	?	IG II(2) 1623, ll. 276 ff.	238
325	Adriatic sea naval station	RO 100	233

Money Collection and Religious Rites

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
480	Andros	Herodotus, 8.108-11	2
480	Karystos	Herodotus, 8.121	2
475	Karystos	Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105	9
430	Carian and Lycian coast	Thucydides, 2.69	57
428	Caria	Thucydides, 3.19	64
425	Eion (Strymon)	Thucydides, 4.50	79
424	Pontus	Thucydides, 4.75	79
424	Hellespont	Thucydides, 4.75	79
424	River Calex	Thucydides, 4.76	79
411	Cyzicus	Thucydides, 8.107	118
411	Halicarnassus	Thucydides, 8.108	118
411	Various cities	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.8	118
411	Various cities	Diodorus, 13.47	134
411	Paros	Diodorus, 13.47	134
410	Thrace	Diodorus, 13.49; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.12	118
410	Thasos	Diodorus, 13.49; Xenophon, 1.1.11	118
410	Cyzicus	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.119-20	118
410	Chrysopolis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, Diodorus, 13.64; cf. ML 58, Hellenica, 4.8.27	118
410	Hellespont		118
409	Chysopolis	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22	118
409	Lydia	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4-5	136
409	Persian territory	Diodorus, 13.64; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.17	118
408	Bithynian Thracians	Xenophon, 1.3.3-4	118
408	Chersonese, Hellespont	Xenophon, 1.3.8; Diodorus, 13.66	118
407	Caria	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.9	118
407	Cos	Diodorus, 13.69	138
407	Rhodes	Diodorus, 13.69	138
407	Cyme	Diodorus, 13.73	138
407	Various cities	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20	138
390	Byzantium	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodorus, 14.94, Lysias, 28.5	150
390	Mytilene	Xenophon, 4.8.30	150
390	Klazomenai	IG II2 28 (Rhodes-Osbourne 18)	150
390	Aspendus	Diodorus, 14.99	150
389	Chersonese	Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.35	152
375	Athens	Xenophon, 5.4.66	175
373	Kephallonia	Xenophon, 6.2.38	177

Date	Location	Primary References	Fleet number
476	Skyros	Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus, 11.60.	8
449	Asia Minor, Islands	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	30
449	Hellespont, Thrace	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	30
449	Euboea, Thessaly	Plutarch, Perikles, 17	30
423	Delos	Thucydides, 5.1	89
409	Notium	Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.11	136
377	Delos	RO 28	239
375	Alyzia	Xenophon, 5.4.66	175

Figures for Naval Activity in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC

Activity	Recorded instances (from 903 entries)	%	Recorded instances for 5th century fleets (from 692 entries)	%	Recorded instances for 4th century fleets (from 211 entries)	%	% difference, between 5th and 4th centuries
Sea battle	83	9%	68	10%	15	7%	-3
Land Battles	87	10%	78	11%	9	4%	-7
Siege	136	15%	110	16%	26	12%	-4
Blockade	86	10%	76	11%	10	5%	-6
Troop transport	64	7%	53	8%	11	5%	-3
Ravaging	70	8%	62	9%	8	4%	-5
Colonisation	24	3%	21	3%	3	1%	-2
Garrison/Patrol	106	12%	97	14%	9	4%	-10
Diplomacy/Politics	189	21%	120	17%	69	33%	16
Merchants	12	1%	4	1%	8	4%	3
Pirates	7	1%	3	0.5%	4	2%	1.5
Money Collection	36	4%	29	4%	7	3%	-1
Religious Activity	7	1%	6	1%	1	0.5%	-0.5

Appendix 4: Naupactos Tables

Naupactos Fleets

Fleet number	Date	Commander	Total ships	Principal Primary References	Notes
23	456	Tolmides	50	Thucydides, 1.103 and 108; Fornara, 84; Diodorus, 11.84	Captured Naupactos, and settled it with Messenians who had survived Ithome and the war with Sparta.
55	430	Phormio	20	Thucydides, 2.69	Arrived in Winter, 430/29 BC
	429	Phormio	20	Thucydides, 2.80-1; 2.83-92	Won two sea battles against larger fleets
	428	Phormio	40	Thucydides, 2.102-3	Left Naupactos in Spring 428 BC
56	429		20	Thucydides, 2.92	Joined fleet 55 after the two battles in 429 BC
66	428	Asopios	30	Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 69	18 ships in this fleet were sent home before reaching Naupactos. Despite the loss of the general and many men in battle in 428, it seems that 12 ships returned to Naupactos; at any rate, they were there the next summer.
	427	Nikostratus	12	Thucydides, 3.69, 3.75, 3.77	The fleet joined in the intrigues around Corcyra, and fought a battle there.
	426	Demosthenes	?	Thucydides, 3.102	Demosthenes uses 1,000 hoplites carried in "his ships" to repel an attack on Naupactos, the vessels likely to have been a few left behind from this fleet, and/or Fleet 78
65	427		2	Thucydides, 3.77	<i>Salaminia</i> and <i>Paralos</i> . Joined fleet 66
78	426	Demosthenes	30	Thucydides, 3.94, cf. 98	After disastrous attack on Aetolia, Demosthenes returned to Naupactos, though without this fleet; see Fleet 66.
225	426	Aristotle, Hierophon	20	Thucydides, 3.105; 3.107 3.112; 3.114	Arrived in Winter, 426/5 BC
	425	Aristotle, Hierophon	20?	Thucydides, 4.13, 4.49	Sent ships to help the seige at Pylos
85	424	Demosthenes	40	Thucydides, 4.76-77	Demosthenes based this fleet briefly at Naupactos
104	414	Konon	20	Thucydides, 7.17, 7.19	Arrived in Naupactos in Winter 414/3 BC
	413	Konon	18	Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 7.19 and 7.17	Asked for help from Fleet 106
	413	Diphilus	33	Thucydides, 7.34	Fought an undecive battle against a Corinthian fleet
	412	Hippocles	27	Thucydides, 8.13	Posted to intercept ships from Sicily.
	411	Konon	0	Diodorus, 13.48	Carried troops to Corcyra
	410	Konon	0	Diodorus, 13.48	Konon probably remained stationed at Naupactos during these turbulent times.
106	413	Demosthenes and Eurymedon	10	Thucydides, 7.31	Sent to Fleet 104 and joined before Diphilus took command.

Naupactos Details

Primary References	Sea battle?	Land Battle?	Diplomacy?	Siege?	Ravaging?	Garrison/patrol?	Blockade?	Colonization?	Troop-transport?	Fleet number
Thucydides, 1.108; Fornara, 84, Diodorus, 11.84	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	23
Diodorus, 11.84	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Diodorus, 11.84	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Thucydides, 1.108	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Fornara, 84	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Fornara, 84	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Diodorus, 11.84, Thucydides, 1.103	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	23
Thucydides, 1.108	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Diodorus, 11.84	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	23
Thucydides, 2.83 ff	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	55
Thucydides, 2.103	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	55
Thucydides, 2.102	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	55
Thucydides, 2.90 ff	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	55
Thucydides, 2.80	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	55
Thucydides, 2.69	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	55
Thucydides, 3.69	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.102	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 4.49	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.78 ff	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.75	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 69	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.7	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.7	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.7	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.102	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	66
Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 3.16	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	66
Thucydides, 3.94	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	78
Thucydides, 3.94	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	78
Thucydides, 3.95	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	78
Thucydides, 3.95	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	78

Naupactos Details

Primary References	Sea battle?	Land Battle?	Diplomacy?	Siege?	Ravaging?	Garrison/patrol?	Blockade?	Colonization?	Troop-transport?	Fleet number
Thucydides, 3.98	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	78
Thucydides, 4.101	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	85
Thucydides, 4.76	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	85
Thucydides, 7.34	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	104
Thucydides, 7.17	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Thucydides, 7.19, cf.7.17	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	104
Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 7.19 and 7.17	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Diodorus, 13.48	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Diodorus, 13.48	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	104
Diodorus, 13.48	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Diodorus, 13.48	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Thucydides, 8.13	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	104
Thucydides, 7.33	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 7.33	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 7.33	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	106
Thucydides, 7.26	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	106
Thucydides, 7.42	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 7.26	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 7.26	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	106
Thucydides, 7.31	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	106
Thucydides, 7.31	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 7.31	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	106
Thucydides, 3.105	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	225
Thucydides, 1.107	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	225
Thucydides, 3.112	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	225
Thucydides, 3.114	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	225
Thucydides, 4.49	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	225
Thucydides, 3.15	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	225
TOTALS	6	8	12	10	7	19	1	1	21	8 fleets

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