Director networks and takeovers

Renneboog, Luc and Zhao, Yang ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5018-6953 2014. Director networks and takeovers. Journal of Corporate Finance 28 , pp. 218-234. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.012

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Mergers and acquisitions; Director networks; Centrality; Connections
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0929-1199
Date of Acceptance:	18 November 2013
Last Modified:	25 Oct 2022 09:09
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/57447

Citation Data

Cited 67 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item