The Self-Regulatory Role of Anticipated Group-Based Shame and Guilt in Inhibiting Ingroup Favoritism

Word count: 9,362

Abstract

In three studies we examined whether the anticipation of group-based guilt and shame inhibits ingroup favoritism. In Studies 1 and 2 anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted ingroup favoritism; in neither study did anticipated group-based guilt uniquely predict ingroup favoritism. In Study 3 we orthogonally manipulated anticipated group-based shame and guilt. Here we found that the shame (but not the guilt) manipulation had a significant inhibitory effect on ingroup favoritism. Anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) promotes egalitarian intergroup behavior.

Keywords: Group-based guilt, group-based shame, ingroup favoritism, anticipated emotion

The Self-Regulatory Role of Anticipated Group-Based Shame and Guilt in Inhibiting Ingroup Favoritism

Given the countless incidents of group oppression, discrimination and genocide that have taken place in human history, it would be easy to conclude that group membership promotes selfish, hostile and immoral behavior. Research with minimal groups showing that merely being categorized into abstract, meaningless groups can evoke ingroup favoritism (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) is widely regarded as supporting this conclusion. In the present paper we contribute to the small but growing body of literature suggesting that groups are motivated to act morally. We argue that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions can, under certain conditions, attenuate ingroup favoritism.

There is a growing literature on the role of emotions in regulating intergroup behavior (e.g. Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007). Researchers have found that experiencing interpersonal guilt for discriminatory behavior reduces such behaviors in the future (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993), and that group-based guilt serves a self-regulatory function (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). Moreover, recent research suggests that anticipated emotions (such as guilt and shame) regulate moral behavior (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003, 2007). These researchers suggest that when people anticipate feeling guilt or shame, they are likely to inhibit the behavior in question in order to avoid the aversive consequences of these emotions. We extend this hypothesis by applying it to group-based emotions. Previous research has demonstrated that immoral ingroup behavior elicits group-based guilt and shame (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). We argue that the desire to avoid the aversive consequences of these group-based emotions motivates ingroup members to inhibit immoral intergroup behavior. When people predict (or anticipate)

that an ingroup action would elicit aversive group-based emotions, they should be proactively motivated to inhibit the behavior in question in order to avoid the emotions and their aversive consequences. The aim of the present research was to assess the role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in inhibiting ingroup favoritism.

The Emotional Consequences of Illegitimate Ingroup Actions

Guilt and shame about the negative actions or attributes of one's group may be experienced through association with the ingroup even in the absence of personal responsibility for these actions or attributes (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). These group-based emotions are evoked when members of an advantaged group believe that their privileged ingroup status was achieved through illegitimate actions for which their group is responsible (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). The ingroup members' interpretation of an illegitimate action determines whether group-based guilt or shame is elicited. Although researchers debate whether shame stems from actions implying a global (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) or a specific lapse of one's identity and reputation (e.g., Gausel & Leach, 2011; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012), there is consensus that the focus is on one's identity, rather than the behavior (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Ferguson, Burgman, White, & Eyre, 2007). Similarly, believing that an ingroup transgression threatens the ingroup's moral identity should evoke group-based shame (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Lickel et al., 2005). In the case of guilt, people focus on the immoral action rather than the self, and feel bad because they committed a transgression ('I did a bad thing;' Niedenthal et al., 1994). Similarly, appraising the ingroup as responsible for a controllable immoral *action* should elicit group-based guilt (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004).

Group-based guilt and shame have aversive consequences for ingroup members through the threat that these emotions pose to the group's identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). For these emotions to arise people must believe that their group was responsible for an immoral action. Accepting this appraisal associates the ingroup with a transgression (Doosje et al., 1998). Group-based shame poses an additional threat to social identity because people presumably believe that the transgression tarnishes their image (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that people are motivated to maintain a positive group identity, and ingroup members will therefore try to protect their group's image by means of various 'identity management strategies' (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; van Knippenberg, 1989). These strategies serve to defend the ingroup's identity by reassigning responsibility for the negative event or legitimizing the ingroup's actions. For example, group identity might be protected by externalizing the blame (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Zebel, 2005), dehumanizing the victim (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008), or denying the credibility of the source (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006).

These identity management strategies are post hoc methods of avoiding aversive group-based emotions. Ingroup members employ these strategies *after* the incident has taken place. Identity management strategies may also be used to avoid these emotions in an anticipatory fashion, *before* an incident has taken place. For example, the use of propaganda to dehumanize an outgroup can alleviate the need to act morally towards this group (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989), thereby preventing group-based guilt and shame for any future transgressions. People may also use pre-emptive *pro-social* strategies to avoid these aversive group-based emotions and the threat that they pose to social identity (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013a, 2013b). One such strategy is not to commit the transgression in the first

place. Indeed, recent research has found that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions promotes collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression (Shepherd et al., 2013a) and moderates the amount of ingroup favoritism exhibited by member of high-status groups in stable hierarchies (Shepherd et al., 2013b). Therefore, when ingroup members find themselves in a situation in which they can achieve an advantage over an outgroup by illegitimate means (such as discrimination or ingroup favoritism), the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions should signal that undertaking the immoral action would result in aversive emotions that might threaten the ingroup's identity, thereby motivating group members to inhibit transgressions.

Although both group-based guilt and shame threaten social identity, shame is more damaging because it implies that the behavior is seen as a reflection of the immoral character of the ingroup rather than of a specific action. As a result, group-based shame is more closely related to the valence of the ingroup's identity or reputation than guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2009; Lickel et al., 2005, 2007). Anticipated group-based shame should therefore be a stronger signal of social identity threats than guilt. Because social identity theory suggests that the valence of the ingroup's identity is a primary concern for ingroup members, anticipated group-based shame is more likely than guilt to be a negative predictor of ingroup favoritism. In line with this, previous research has found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) promotes collective action against an impending ingroup transgression (Shepherd et al., 2013a). Moreover, anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) moderates ingroup favoritism in stable high-status groups but not unstable high-status or (stable or unstable) low-status groups (Shepherd et al., 2013b, Study 1).

Although the above research is promising, it could be argued that the inhibitory role of anticipated group-based shame and guilt has only be demonstrated in groups with superior status over an outgroup. Indeed, Shepherd et al. (2013b) found that anticipated group-based

shame only moderated ingroup favoritism in stable high status groups. Although status was not manipulated or measured in Shepherd et al. (2013a), the fact that the ingroup was able to perpetrate an aggressive transgression implies that the status and/or power of the ingroup was greater than that of the victim group. This raises the question whether a status differentiation is needed for anticipated group-based emotions to self-regulate the actions of ingroup members. The present study enhanced previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013a, 2013b) by assessing the role self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based shame and guilt on ingroup favoritism when there was not a salient status difference between the ingroup and the outgroup.

The present study also tested whether other factors could account for the self-regulatory role of anticipated group-based shame, such as social dominance orientation (SDO) or ingroup identitfication. SDO reflects people's tendency to support group hierarchies and to believe that it is legitimate for some groups to dominate others (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It has been found that SDO is positively related to the justification of immoral ingroup actions (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010) and ingroup favoritism (Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007; but see Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, Ryan, Buzumic, & Subasic, 2007). Thus people high in SDO might justify ingroup favoritism, reducing their likelihood of anticipated group-based shame and increasing their likelihood of exhibiting ingroup bias. Similarly, under certain conditions, high identifiers are more likely than low identifiers to discriminate against an outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; for an overview, see Turner, 1999) and to legitimize an ingroup transgression in order to avoid group-based shame (Johns et al., 2005). Ingroup identification may therefore negatively predict anticipated group-based shame and positively predict ingroup favoritism. It is possible that the negative relationship between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism may therefore be due to the fact that both variables are related to SDO and/or ingroup identification. The

negative relationship of SDO and/or ingroup identification and anticipated group-based shame in combination with the positive relationships of SDO and/or identification with ingroup favoritism might have given rise to the negative relationship between shame and ingroup favoritism. The present studies therefore enhanced previous research by assessing whether anticipated group-based shame predicted ingroup favoritism after controlling for SDO (Study 1) and ingroup identification (Studies 2 and 3).

Study 1

In Study 1 we assessed the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to ingroup favoritism. This study used an inter-university intergroup context. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they anticipated feeling group-based guilt and shame if their own university were to discriminate against a rival university. Participants then distributed research funding to anonymous applicants from their own and the rival university. According to university league tables the rival university was of a similar status to the ingroup university. Importantly, the league table position of the universities was not made salient to the participants at any time throughout the study. Moreover, in Study 1 we measured SDO in order to check the extent to which the predicted negative relationship between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism, if obtained, was due to this factor.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 68 undergraduate students (53 women and 15 men) participated in this study in exchange for course credit or £3.00 (approximately $4.80). The age range of respondents was 18-37 years, with a mean age of 20.18. The predictor variables were anticipated group-based guilt and shame[1]. The outcome variable was ingroup favoritism. This outcome variable was measured using the so called ‘Tajfel matrices’ (see Tajfel et al., 1971). Ingroup favoritism was measured using the pull score of FAV (maximum differentiation and

maximizing ingroup profit) against parity (P). The pull score was measured and calculated using the procedure outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994). Pull scores can range from -12 to 12. Greater positive FAV on P values indicate a stronger preference for ingroup favoritism over parity and greater negative values demonstrate stronger outgroup favoritism. Values of zero demonstrate that the participant distributed the resources equally between the ingroup and the outgroup.

Materials and Procedure

Anticipated group-based emotions. After giving consent, participants were informed that this research was investigating the attitudes of students at different universities and that a similar study was being conducted at the rival university. This information was included to strengthen the participants' belief that at the end of the study the resources would be allocated between the ingroup and the outgroup. Participants were then asked to rate the extent to which they anticipated experiencing group-based guilt and shame if their own university were to discriminate against the rival university. Anticipated group-based guilt and shame were assessed using two scales adapted from Schmader and Lickel (2006). The guilt items were: 'guilty,' 'regret,' 'sorry,' and 'remorse' ($\alpha = .84$). The shame items were 'ashamed,' 'humiliated,' 'disgraced,' and 'embarrassed' ($\alpha = .87$). Four positive (or at least non-negative) anticipated group-based emotion items were also rated: 'unconcerned,' 'confident,' 'apathetic,' and 'indifferent.' Participants were asked 'If [ingroup] University students were to discriminate against students from the [outgroup] University in some way, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?' All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from *not at all* (0) to *extremely intensely* (6).

Ingroup Favoritism. Participants were then informed that the people responsible for conducting this research wanted to know how people thought research funding should be distributed between academics at the ingroup and outgroup university. Participants were told

that the grants were distributed in the form of credits. The more credits an applicant had, the more money they would receive. Participants were then asked to distribute credits between anonymous academics at the ingroup and outgroup university.

SDO. Participants also completed an SDO measure. This was adapted from the SDO6 (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and contained 8-items (e.g., 'In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups'; $\alpha = .83$). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each of these items on a 7-point scale (1= 'strongly disagree,' 7 = 'strongly agree'). When the participant had completed this scale they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Anticipated Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame were separate constructs. This analysis was conducted using AMOS 19 (Arbuckle, 2010). The model tests were based on the covariance matrix and maximum likelihood was used as the method of estimation. The two-factor hypothesized model provided an adequate fit to the data, $\chi^2(19) = 27.65$, $p = .090$. This was confirmed by the other fit indices: goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = .91, comparative fit index (CFI) = .97, normed fit index (NFI) = .91, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .082. The alternative single-factor solution did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(20) = 52.58$, $p < .001$, GFI = .83, CFI = .89, NFI = .84, and RMSEA = .156. Importantly, the two-factor solution provided a significantly better fit to the data than the single factor solution, $\chi^2(1) = 24.93$, $p < .001$. We therefore concluded that although anticipated group-based shame and guilt were strongly correlated (see Table 1), they were empirically distinct constructs.

The mean levels of anticipated group-based shame ($M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.32$) and guilt ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 1.28$) were significantly greater than zero, $t(67) = 17.44$, $p < .001$ and $t(67)$

= 18.25, $p < .001$, respectively. This shows that the intensity of these anticipated emotions was at least moderate.

Ingroup Favoritism

The pull score of FAV on P was used to measure ingroup favoritism. This score ranged from -1 to 12. The mean ($M = 1.72$, $SD = 3.33$) was significantly greater than zero, $t(67) = 4.26$, $p < .001$, indicating that, overall, participants engaged in ingroup favoritism. A regression analysis was conducted to assess the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to ingroup favoritism (for descriptive statistics and correlations, see Table 1). Anticipated group-based guilt and shame, together with SDO, were predictor variables, and ingroup favoritism was the outcome variable. Anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted ingroup favoritism ($\beta = -.33$, $p = .047$). Anticipated group-based guilt, on the other hand, did not predict ingroup favoritism ($\beta = .03$, $p = .875$). SDO also failed to predict ingroup favoritism ($\beta = .05$, $p = .704$). Importantly, the tolerance value was above .20 (.54), indicating that the results were not biased by multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These results show that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted ingroup favoritism.

Discussion

The aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationship of anticipated group-based guilt and shame to ingroup favoritism. Anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted ingroup favoritism, even when controlling for individual differences in social dominance orientation. Although Study 1 is promising, it could be argued that the relationship between anticipated-group-based shame and ingroup favoritism is an artifact of ingroup identification (see above). If this were the case, the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism should be non-significant when controlling for ingroup identification. We tested this possibility in Study 2.

Study 2

There were two differences between Studies 1 and 2. First, we assessed whether the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism existed when ingroup identification was taken into account. Second, we assessed this relationship in an international context, rather than the inter-university context used in Study 1. Here the ingroup was the English and the outgroup was Germans. Once again, participants first rated the extent to which they anticipated feeling group-based guilt and shame if their group were to discriminate against a rival outgroup, and then distributed research funding between the two groups. Based on Study 1, we hypothesized that anticipated group-based shame and guilt would be separate constructs and that shame (but not guilt) would negatively predict ingroup favoritism.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 64 undergraduate students (59 women and 5 men) took part in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants were aged between 18 and 25 years, with a mean age of 18.84 (*SD* = 1.13). The predictor variables were anticipated group-based guilt and shame, together with ingroup identification[2]. The outcome variable was ingroup favoritism (as indexed by FAV on P). The procedure for measuring and calculating this pull score was identical to that of Study 1.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were first informed that this study was interested in issues affecting English and German students, and that an identical study was being conducted in Germany. This information was intended to strengthen the participant's belief that Germans would also be allocating resources at the end of the study. Participants then completed the ingroup identification measure. This was adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995), and

contained 5 items (e.g., ‘The English are an important group to me’ and ‘I identify with other English people’; α = .84). All items were measured on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Participants then completed the negative anticipated group-based guilt and shame scales. These were identical to those used in Study 1, with the exception of the names of the ingroup and the outgroup (‘English’ for the ingroup and ‘Germans’ for the outgroup). Both scales were reliable (shame, α = .87; guilt, α = .81). Participants then completed a series of filler tasks to increase the amount of time between completing the anticipated emotion and ingroup favoritism measures. After completing these filler tasks, participants were informed that the funding body responsible for this research was in charge of distributing research grants to academics from across Europe, and that because of a large increase in the number of applications from English and German academics, there was a shortage of funding. As a result, this funding body was interested in how people thought that research funding should be distributed between English and German academics. Once again, participants were informed that grants were distributed in the form of credits, and that the greater the number of credits that academics have, the more funding they would receive. Participants were then presented with the Tajfel matrices and asked to distribute funding between anonymous English and German academics. When participants had completed the ingroup favoritism measure they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Identification. The mean level of ingroup identification was 5.17 (*SD* = 1.12). This was significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (4), $t(63) = 8.35$, $p < .001$, indicating that the level of ingroup identification was moderate to strong.

Anticipated Group-Based Guilt and Shame

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess whether anticipated group-based guilt and shame were separate constructs. This analysis was conducted using AMOS 19 (Arbuckle, 2010) and was based on the covariance matrix. Maximum likelihood was used as the method of estimation. Missing values were estimated using full information maximum likelihood (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). The two-factor solution fitted the data well: $\chi^2(19) = 25.14$, $p = .156$, CFI = .98, NFI = .91, and RMSEA = .072. By contrast, the single-factor solution did not fit the data well: $\chi^2(20) = 30.34$, $p = .065$, CFI = .96, NFI = .89, and RMSEA = .091. Importantly, the two-factor solution fitted the data significantly better than a single factor solution, $\chi^2(1) = 5.20$, $p = .023$. We therefore concluded that although anticipated group-based guilt and shame were strongly correlated (see Table 2), they were empirically separate constructs.

The mean levels of anticipated group-based shame ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.33$) and guilt ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.09$) were significantly different from zero, $t(63) = 21.64$, $p < .001$ and $t(63) = 26.10$, $p < .001$, respectively. This shows that the intensity of these anticipated group-based emotions was at least moderate.

Ingroup Favoritism

The pull of FAV on P represented ingroup favoritism. The pull score ranged from -5 to 12, with a mean of 0.92 ($SD = 3.27$). This mean was significantly different from zero, $t(63) = 2.26$, $p = .027$, indicating that, overall, participants engaged in ingroup favoritism. A regression analysis was conducted to assess the relationship of anticipated group-based shame and guilt to ingroup favoritism (for descriptive statistics and correlations, see Table 2). In this analysis, the anticipated emotions and ingroup identification were predictors and ingroup favoritism was the outcome variable. Anticipated group-based shame negatively predicted ingroup favoritism ($\beta = -.42$, $p = .014$). By contrast, anticipated group-based guilt did not predict ingroup favoritism ($\beta = -.09$, $p = .606$). Ingroup identification also failed to

predict ingroup favoritism ($\beta = .03$, $p = .822$). Importantly, these results were not biased by multicollineairty (tolerance = .46; Cohen et al., 2003). These results show that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) negatively predicted ingroup favoritism.

Discussion

In keeping with the results of Study 1, we found that anticipated group-based shame – but not guilt -- negatively predicted ingroup favoritism. Importantly, the results of Study 2 show that the negative relation between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism was not due to ingroup identification. Ingroup identification did not predict ingroup favoritism. A positive relationship between identification and ingroup favoritism is only likely to occur in certain conditions (Turner, 1999). Furthermore, we used generic measure of identification rather than a measure that assesses a number of subcomponents of identity (see Leach et al., 2008).

Although this research is promising, a limitation is the fact that the anticipated group-based emotions were measured rather than manipulated. We therefore cannot assume that the relationship between anticipated group-based shame and ingroup favoritism was a causal one. The aim of Study 3 was to manipulate the anticipated group-based emotions in order to determine their effects on ingroup favoritism. We felt that it was important to ensure that any effect of our anticipated group-based shame manipulation would not be due to changes in involvement in the ingroup. Previous research has found that ingroup members sometimes distance themselves from identity threatened groups in order to protect social identity (Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). It is possible that manipulating anticipated group-based shame would threaten group identity, causing group members to reduce their commitment to the ingroup. This reduced commitment could, in turn, attenuate ingroup favoritism. In Study 3 we measured self-

stereotyping as a member of the ingroup to ensure that any effects of anticipated group-based shame on ingroup favoritism were not due to people distancing themselves from the ingroup.

Study 3

There were three main differences between Study 2 and 3. First, in Study 3 the ingroup was British (rather than English) people; the outgroup was again German people. Second, we measured self-stereotyping as an ingroup member, in order to ensure that any effects of anticipated group-based shame on ingroup favoritism were not due to this variable. Finally, Study 3 assessed the effects of manipulated anticipated group-based shame and guilt on ingroup favoritism. This was done by manipulating the *salience* of these emotions. This was achieved by asking participants in the emotion salient condition to rate the extent to which they would feel group-based guilt or shame if their ingroup were to discriminate against the outgroup *before* completing the ingroup favoritism measure (for a similar procedure, see O'Carroll, Foster, McGeechan, Sandford, & Ferguson, 2011; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Sandberg & Conner, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2013). In the control condition participants rated the anticipated emotion(s) *after* the ingroup favoritism measure. Anticipated emotions are likely to be more psychologically salient and to have a greater effect on behavior in the emotion salient condition than in the control condition. As a result, people should discriminate less in the emotion salient condition than in the control condition. Previous research has found that the effect of this manipulation on intergroup behavior is fully mediated by measures of anticipated group-based emotion (Shepherd et al., 2013). This suggests that any effect of the salience manipulation on discrimination is likely to be caused by anticipated group-based emotions rather than extraneous variables, such as demand characteristics or interpersonal emotions. Moreover, by measuring the anticipated emotions in both conditions we would be able to conduct mediation analysis to assess whether any effects of the manipulation were due to anticipated emotion. We orthogonally manipulated the

salience of anticipated group-based guilt and shame in order to assess the effect of each emotion on the behavior of ingroup members. Based on Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized that manipulating the salience of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) would reduce the amount of ingroup favoritism exhibited by group members.

Another possible explanation of the hypothesized effect is that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame could result in people distancing themselves from the ingroup and that this may result in people being less likely to favor the ingroup on the resource allocation task. We measured self-stereotyping as an ingroup member to ensure that this was not the case.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 519 students and members of staff at a university in the UK participated in this study for course credit or entry into a prize draw. Two participants were not British nationals and were therefore removed from the sample. For the remaining participants (125 men, 384 women, and 8 undisclosed) the mean age was 27.83 (*SD* = 11.86). The study used a 2 (shame salient: control versus salient) by 2 (guilt salient: control versus salient) design. In the shame salient condition the anticipated group-based shame scale was completed before the ingroup favoritism (FAV on P) measure. Similarly, in the guilt salient condition, anticipated group-based guilt was measured before ingroup favoritism. In the control conditions the anticipated emotion scales were measured after ingroup favoritism. As in the two previous studies, ingroup favoritism (FAV on P) was measured using the Tajfel matrices outlined by Bourhis and colleagues (1994). We also measured self-stereotyping to ensure that the effects of the salience manipulations were not due to people distancing themselves from the ingroup.

Materials and Procedure

We first manipulated the salience of anticipated group-based guilt and/or shame. Participants in the shame salience condition completed the anticipated group-based shame scale (see below). Similarly, participants in the guilt salience condition completed the anticipated group-based guilt scale. The anticipated group-based guilt and shame emotion words were identical to those used in the previous studies. Both scales were reliable (shame, $\alpha = .90$; guilt, $\alpha = .88$). The phrasing of scales was: 'If British people were to discriminate against Germans, to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?'

Participants were then informed that an independent funding body gives grants to various countries in order to improve their sports facilities. Because the distribution of these grants could affect a country's performance at sporting events, the researchers were interested in how people thought that these grants should be distributed between Great Britain and Germany. Participants were then asked to distribute funding for sports equipment between Great Britain and Germany. This funding was distributed in the form of credits, with more credits equating to more money, using the FAV on P Tajfel matrices (Bourhis et al., 1994). Once this measure was completed participants in the control conditions completed the anticipated group-based guilt and/or shame scales. All participants then completed a self-stereotyping measure, adapted from Spears and colleagues (1997). This scale contained three items (e.g., 'I am similar to the average British person'; $\alpha = .83$). All three items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Once this was completed participants were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Ingroup Favoritism

The dependent variable in all analyses was ingroup favoritism, as indexed by the pull of FAV on P. This score ranged from -12 to 12, with a mean of 0.81 (*SD* = 2.92). This mean

was significantly different from zero, $t(515) = 6.31$, $p < .001$, indicating that overall participants displayed ingroup favoritism.

A 2 (shame salient: control versus salient) by 2 (guilt salient: control versus salient) ANOVA was performed on ingroup favoritism. The main effect of shame salient on ingroup favoritism was significant, $F(1, 512) = 4.34$, $p = .038$, $\eta_p^2 = .01^3$. Ingroup favoritism was significantly lower in the shame salient ($M = 0.55$, $SD = 2.23$) than the control condition ($M = 1.07$, $SD = 3.45$; see Figure 1). By contrast, the main effect guilt salient on ingroup favoritism was non-significant, $F(1, 512) = 1.30$, $p = .254$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. Moreover, the interaction between shame and guilt salience did not have a significant effect on ingroup favoritism, $F(1, 512) = 0.91$, $p = .341$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. These results reflect the fact that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) reduced ingroup favoritism.

Self-Stereotyping

The mean level of self-stereotyping as an ingroup member ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.05$) was not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (4), $t(513) = 0.93$, $p = .351$, indicating a moderate level of self-stereotyping. A 2 (shame salient) by 2 (guilt salient) ANOVA was performed on the self-stereotyping variable. Neither the main effects of shame and guilt, nor their interaction had a significant effect on self-stereotyping (*p*s > .80). More importantly, the main effect of the shame salience manipulation on ingroup favoritism remained significant when self-stereotyping was entered into the analysis as a covariate, $F(1, 508) = 5.63$, $p = .018$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. The main effect of the guilt salience manipulation and its interaction with the shame salience manipulation remained non-significant predictors of ingroup favoritism (*p*s > .10).

Mediation

We conducted mediation analysis in order to assess whether the effect of the shame salience manipulation on ingroup favoritism was due to anticipated group-based shame. As

noted above, the shame salience manipulation had a significant effect on ingroup favoritism ($\beta = -.09$, $p = .043$), fulfilling the first criterion of mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Importantly, people anticipated group-based shame to a greater extent in the shame salience condition ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 1.20$) than the control condition ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.29$), $F(1, 512) = 4.11$, $p = .043$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, fulfilling the second criterion for mediation[4]. The effect of the shame salience manipulation on ingroup favoritism was only marginally significant when the measured anticipated group-based shame variable was entered into the equation ($\beta = -.07$, $p = .091$). Importantly, in this equation the measured anticipated group-based shame variable predicted ingroup favoritism ($\beta = -.19$, $p < .001$). This pattern of results did not change when the measured anticipated group-based guilt variable was also entered into the regression equation ($\beta = -.08$, $p = .087$ for shame salience manipulation, $\beta = -.17$, $p = .013$ for measured shame, and $\beta = -.02$, $p = .797$ for measured guilt). In line with Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) the significance of this indirect effect was tested using 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals, calculated using 5000 bootstrap resamples. The confidence intervals for the indirect effect of shame salience on ingroup favoritism via the measured shame variable did not include zero ($CI_{95} = -0.24, -0.01$), indicating a significant indirect effect. These results show that the shame salience manipulation had a significant effect on ingroup favoritism via anticipated group-based shame.

Discussion

The aim of Study 3 was to extend Studies 1 and 2 by determining whether manipulating anticipated group-based shame reduced ingroup favoritism. We found that increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) reduced the amount of ingroup favoritism exhibited by group members. This effect remained significant after controlling for self-stereotyping as an ingroup member. This finding is important because it suggests that the observed effect of increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame

was not due to people distancing themselves from the ingroup. Importantly, we found that anticipated group-based shame mediated the effects of the shame salience manipulation on ingroup favoritism, suggesting that this variable was likely to be responsible for such effects, rather than extraneous variables such as demand characteristics.

It could be argued that the effects of our salience manipulation were due to increasing the salience of discrimination, rather than the anticipated emotions. Simply mentioning the word 'discrimination' may have resulted in a reduction in ingroup favoritism. However, if this alternative hypothesis was correct, increasing the salience of anticipated group-based shame *or* guilt should have resulted in lower ingroup favoritism, because discrimination would have been equally salient in both of these conditions. The fact that the guilt salience manipulation did not have a significant effect on ingroup favoritism suggests that this alternative hypothesis cannot account for these findings.

General Discussion

The aim of these three studies was to assess the inhibitory role of anticipated group-based guilt and shame on ingroup favoritism. In all three studies we found that the measured (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated (Study 3) anticipated group-based shame variables predicted a reduction in the amount of ingroup favoritism exhibited by ingroup members. Moreover, in none of the three studies did we find that anticipated group-based guilt predicted ingroup favoritism. In line with previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013), we argue that because shame is more closely associated to social identity than is guilt (Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2007), and because maintaining a positive social identity is a primary concern for group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), anticipated group-based shame should be more likely to reduce ingroup favoritism than guilt. Essentially, anticipated group-based shame acts as a warning signal that highlights actions that would

damage social identity. The desire to protect social identity motivates group members to inhibit this action.

Prior research has found that the anticipation of group-based shame (but not guilt) motivates group members to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression (Shepherd et al., 2013). The present studies extend this research by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) inhibits ingroup favoritism. Both lines of work demonstrate that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) motivates people to act in ways that may prevent a transgression from occurring. However, there is an apparent discrepancy between this work and research by Tangney and colleagues (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), who argue that guilt is the more functional of the two emotions. Indeed, Tangney and Dearing (2002) conclude their chapter on moral emotions by stating that: 'guilt is good; shame is bad' (p. 136). It should be noted that recent research has found that guilt can be maladaptive (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009), and that shame can promote prosocial behavior (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Gausel et al., 2012). The results of Tangney and colleagues may reflect the fact that they measured guilt- and shame-proneness, rather than the actual emotions (De Hooge et al., 2008). In line with this, Tibbetts (1997) found that criminal behavior was positively related to shame-proneness but negatively related to anticipated shame. Gausel and colleagues (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Gausel et al., 2012) argue that measures of shame-proneness may actually measure feelings of rejection and inferiority, rather than shame, and that the former emotions promote immoral behavior. Moreover, they suggest that shame is likely to promote moral behavior after controlling for inferiority and rejection. Our findings therefore support and extend the recent developments in the emotion

literature by demonstrating that anticipated *group-based* shame promotes moral *intergroup* behavior.

Previous research has suggested that the anticipation of aversive emotions (such as guilt and shame) is believed to motivate individuals to act morally (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2007). Our research extends this hypothesis by demonstrating that anticipated group-based shame motivates *group members* to act morally. A growing body of research has shown that morality is a key component of a group's identity (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2008; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, & Doosje, 2009). In line with previous research (Shepherd et al., 2013), we argue that anticipated group-based shame serves the self-regulatory function of helping group members to maintain their desired moral social identity. Anticipated group-based shame can therefore be regarded as acting as a 'moral barometer' (Tangney et al., 2007), promoting ethical behavior on the part of group members. Recently Pagliaro and colleagues (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011) have proposed that the anticipation of receiving respect from other ingroup members promotes moral intergroup behavior. Although other-praising emotions are likely to promote moral behavior, an internal system is also required; otherwise people would constantly change their behavior to suit the views of the group members that are present at a given time (Bandura, 2001). We therefore argue that our proposed self-regulatory system acts in parallel with the one proposed by Pagliaro and colleagues (2011).

It would nevertheless be naive to assume that the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions will prevent a group from performing any immoral actions. As with interpersonal emotions, there are likely to be occasions when the anticipation of group-based emotions does not preclude illegitimate and/or immoral behavior. People must anticipate these emotions in the first place in order for them to prevent a proposed transgression. Even when the emotional consequences of a group's actions are considered, other variables, such as the

legitimization of the immoral action (Branscombe & Miron, 2004), may influence the extent to which this affects behavior. For example, previous research has found that people with high self-investment in the group are likely to justify a transgression when it may be used to eliminate a threat posed by an outgroup (Shepherd et al., 2013). Similarly, anticipated group-based shame is only likely to reduce ingroup bias in non-threatening circumstances (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, in press). Although the behavior of group members is constrained by anticipated group-based emotions, they still have the potential to act immorally when the influence of these emotions is offset by legitimizing strategies.

An alternative explanation for our findings is that the effects may be due to the anticipation of generalized negative affect, rather than specific emotions. Increasing the salience of anticipated emotions may have led participants to associate ingroup favoritism with negative arousal, resulting in less ingroup favoritism. However, if it was the anticipation of negative affect that lowered ingroup favoritism, both anticipated group-based shame *and* anticipated group-based guilt should have predicted ingroup favoritism. Similarly, in Study 3 both the shame *and* guilt salience manipulations should have had a significant effect on ingroup favoritism. The fact that only anticipated group-based shame inhibited ingroup favoritism suggests that the results were due to specific emotions rather than negative affect in general.

To conclude, in three studies we found that anticipated group-based shame (but not guilt) inhibited ingroup favoritism. This research extends the intergroup and emotion literature by showing that merely anticipating group-based emotions has the potential to regulate the behavior of group members and reduce the likelihood of ingroup favoritism. In line with recent developments in the interpersonal literature, we conclude that the anticipation of group-based shame serves the function of promoting moral intergroup behavior, helping to protect ingroup identity.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Andrew Livingstone, Nicole Tausch, Thomas Morton, Ulrich von Hecker, Richard Crisp and anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. The first author would also like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for financial support (Award Number: ES/F020074/1).

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Footnotes

[1] In this study we manipulated the salience of the anticipated emotions by asking participants in the experimental (but not the control) condition to rate the extent to which they anticipated group-based guilt *and* shame if the ingroup were to discriminate against the outgroup. The effects of this manipulation produced a complex pattern of results. In short, people with high (but not low) levels of self-investment exhibited lower ingroup favoritism in the salient than the control condition. Space considerations precluded in-depth reporting of these results in this paper. Therefore, we assessed the measured variables for the participants in the experimental condition. We excluded participants in the control condition because they did not rate any anticipated group-based emotions.

[2] Once again, in this study we manipulated the salience of the anticipated emotions using the sample procedure outlined in Study 1 (see Footnote 1). These complex results are not reported in detail in this paper due to space considerations. In short, people with high and low (but not moderate) levels of self-investment exhibited lower ingroup favoritism in the salient than in the control condition. The results presented below are the findings for participants in the experimental condition. Once again, the control condition was excluded because they did not rate any anticipated group-based emotions.

[3] Further analysis revealed that the type of recruitment strategy (prize draw versus course credits) interacted with shame salience to have a marginally significant effect on FAV on P, $F(1, 508) = 3.18$, $p = .075$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. This was due to the shame salience manipulation having a greater effect on ingroup favoritism for participants who completed the study for course credit than entry into a prize draw. The prize draw participants were recruited using an advertisement on an electronic noticeboard that appeared when they logged on to a university computer. These participants are more likely to have logged onto the computer in order to

complete another task than a psychology study. As a result, they may have paid less attention to the study, thereby reducing the strength of the salience manipulation.

[4] The guilt salience manipulation and its interaction with the shame salience manipulation did not have a significant effect on anticipated group-based shame (*p*s > .10). The main effects of shame and guilt salience, and the interaction of these variables did not have a significant effect on anticipated group-based guilt (*p*s > .10).

Tables

Table 1.Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for identification, anticipated emotion and ingroup favoritism variables for participants in the emotion salient condition (Study 1).

	M (*SD*)	1	2	3	4
1)Anticipated group-based shame	2.79 (1.32)	-			
2) Anticipated group-based guilt	2.82 (1.28)	.68***	-		
3) SDO	2.41 (0.91)	-.07	-.11	-	
4) Ingroup favoritism (FAV on P)	1.72 (3.33)	-.31**	-.20	.07	-

** = $p < .01$, and *** = $p < .001$

Table 2.Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for anticipated emotion, self-stereotyping and ingroup favoritism (FAV on P) variables (Study 2).

	M (*SD*)	1	2	3	4
1) Anticipated group-based shame	3.60 (1.33)	-			
2) Anticipated group-based guilt	3.57 (1.09)	.73***	-		
3) Ingroup identification	5.17 (1.12)	.08	.06	-	
4) Ingroup favoritism (FAV on P)	0.92 (3.27)	-.48***	-.39**	-.01	-

** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Figure

Figure 1



Figure 1. The effect of the shame and guilt salience manipulations on ingroup favoritism (pull of FAV on MJP) in Study 3. Error bars = ± 1*SE*.