Mapping the media contours of global risks

A comparison of the reporting of climate change and terrorism in the British press

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Abstract

Without techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media…risks are nothing at all." (Beck, 2006: 332)

There is considerable disparity in the media's profile, prominence and portrayal of climate change when measured against the issue's evidence base. Warming of the climate system is unequivocal (IPCC, 2013: 4) with unprecedented levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (ibid: 11), which are extremely likely to have been caused by human activities (ibid: 17). At its unchecked worst, climate change has the capacity to "*alter the sustainability of life on earth as we know it*" (Lewis, 2012: 260). In order *"[t]o manage the grave risks of climate change effectively, the world must build a zero carbon energy system by the second half of this century*" (Green & Stern, 2014: 9). Despite these warnings, climate change has failed to align with news agendas in the UK. Its visibility and presentation in the media is significantly awry with scientific, technical and socio-economic predictions. Instead, terrorism and the threat facing the West from Islamic extremists has commanded more media attention and been treated with greater urgency and less scrutiny than climate change (Lewis, 2012: 260). Whilst it is at odds with research, which indicate that terrorism is a minor, among global threats (Abbott et al, 2006: 4), Islamic-terrorism has come to calibrate the definition of 'risk' in the modern Western world.

Parallels are drawn between the differing treatment of climate change and terrorism in the media and in political responses (see for example Lewis, 2012; Sunstein, 2006; Kahan, 2013), but no research has yet empirically compared the disparity in media coverage of these risks in more detail. This research addresses that gap and presents the findings of a content analysis designed to comparatively examine reporting of climate change and terrorism over a 14-year period (from January 1999-December 2012) in five British newspapers – *The Guardian*, *The Times*, the *Daily Mirror*, *The Independent* and the *Daily Mail.*

As a result, this study finds that climate change is 'undone' by the lack of a strong, grand narrative in the British press, with the issue defined in some instances according to a newspaper's ideological position. The terrorism media narrative is concentrated around incident and response while climate change is diffuse, and the discourse of action offset by the alignment of the issue as a predominantly future based risk with financial implications. Competing and antagonistic messages between climate change and terrorism in the media present 'others' simultaneously as both victim and enemy, while climate change is also often the subject of debate. Discursive ownership of climate change, when compared to terrorism, is disparate as is the impact of the issue, which lacks a British hallmark.

This research argues that what the media says matters (Lewis, 2012: 268). Recalibrating climate change into a concentrated narrative that joins causes, impact and action may have positive implications for those at the forefront of climate communication: scientists, academics and charities/pressure groups. I suggest that comparing risks rather than addressing them individually and taking a 'politicized reading' of newspaper reporting (Carvalho, 2007: 240) may further our understanding of the representation of global risks in the media.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Climate change and terrorism are "*two of the most important sources of catastrophic risk*" (Sunstein, 2006: 1) in the modern day. They have become hallmarks of the 21st century, infusing cultural and political discourse on how we live and how we perceive others.

Bringing to life climate change and terrorism is the mass media: a central conduit in the "*'experienceability' and 'reality' of global risks*" (Beck, 2009b: 72). There is, however, disparity in their profile, prominence and portrayal in the media. In the contemporary post-9/11 world, terrorism has calibrated political and public perspective on what constitutes risk in the current day and "*redefined the priorities and strategic calculus of the world's strongest militaries*" (Glass, 2014: paragraph 1). Yet, on evidence base alone, climate change has, of the two risks, a greater potential for catastrophic change affecting not just the environment but igniting changes in social and economic stability, public health and potentially sparking conflict and mass migration in some of the world's poorest and most volatile regions (see Stern, 2006 and each of the Assessment Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)). At its unchecked worst climate change has the capacity to "*alter the sustainability of life on earth as we know it*" (Lewis, 2012: 260), transforming the physical geography of the world with implications for where and how people live (Stern, 2006: vi). Extensively documented by each IPCC Assessment Report, the risk of climate change has failed to translate to the media (Lewis, 2012). Instead, terrorism has usurped the lions' share of global risk reporting, commanding more attention, more urgency and less scrutiny than climate change (Lewis, 2012: 260). Such media supremacy is at odds with data, which indicate that terrorist attacks in the West are less frequent than at

previous times in history (see for example the Global Terrorism Database). When compared to other serious global trends, international terrorism is a minor threat (Abbott et al, 2006: 4). Human and state security is threatened not by terrorism alone, but by other global issues such as environmental degradation and extreme poverty (ibid: 5). It is among these disparities that this study finds its niche.

Although we know much about media representation of climate change and terrorism separately, the field of journalism, media and communication is yet to broach the issues comparatively, although such parallels have been drawn (see for example Lewis, 2012). Outside of this discipline, only one such study is known to currently exist, that by Sunstein (2006) who has examined the differing American regulatory responses to terrorism and climate change.

Kitzinger (1999: 56-57) suggests that "neat comparisons" of different risks are somewhat undermined by the "substantive nature" of the particular risks in question and notes that tackling 'risk journalism' as topic in its own right may provoke "*illusory connections between...diverse case studies*". This research however, argues for a holistic approach to examining media coverage of climate change and terrorism. It is founded on the assumption that the way that the media tell the story of climate change and terrorism matters (Lewis, 2012: 268). It matters because climate change and terrorism are part of a wider category of global risks in which catastrophe is anticipated (Beck, 2009b: 9) thus, their 'reality' is dependent on how they are articulated, defined and debated in the media (Beck, 2009b). I argue that continuing to explore the issues in isolation sustains a gap, which may impede a fuller understanding of the role of the media's representation of climate change and terrorism.

It also matters because for the vast majority of people in the West, terrorism and climate change are issues outside of the realm of their day-to-day experience. Lay individuals are unlikely to encounter research on climate change or terrorism first-hand, or the publications in which such studies appear (Corbett & Durfee, 2004). Similarly, they are unlikely to seek out information on political positions or debate by searching Hansard reports, for example. If climate change is the bigger of the two risks - which this research assumes - then its visibility and presentation in the media is significantly awry. As Beck (2009b: 98) posits, the political site of world risk society is not the street but the media since it is on pages and screens that people experience climate change and terrorism and where such risks 'exist', where they are debated and where they are democratically engaged with. If, however, that 'political site' misrepresents global risks then there are clear implications for policy.

The following sections of this introductory chapter will outline the case for this research in more detail, along with the aims of the study and will conclude with an overview of the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Climate change and terrorism: risks of our time

According to Beck, society is now in the grip of global risks produced by the success of the past (Beck, 2001). Such risks include climate change and terrorism - the former a product of successful industrialisation (Beck, 2009b: 8) and the latter which "*annuls the rational principles of former risk calculations*" (Beck, 2009b: 14). Although both issues have a long and established history, climate change gained traction in the media and political discourse in the 1980s when a number of events acted as catalysts to raise its profile. Towards the end of the decade, in 1988, a scientific consensus emerged around the contribution of greenhouse gases to global warming (Nerlich, 2013: paragraph 7). In that same year, British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher delivered a speech to the Royal Society. In it, she

outlined mankind's "*experiment with the planet*" and linked environmental and climatic stability to economic prosperity - "*the health of the economy and the health of the environment are totally dependent on each other*", she noted (Thatcher, 1988). In doing so, she claimed the climate change discourse for politics: 1988 is considered "*the year that climate change became political*" (Nerlich, 2013: paragraph 6). In 1990, the IPCC published its First Assessment Report noting, with certainty, that "[e]*missions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases...*" (IPCC, 1990: 52). Such an increase, they suggested may cause "*irreversible change in the climate which could be detectable by the end of this century*" (ibid: 53). Its predicted impact, even then was clear and bleak:

> "*...sea-level rise and storm surges could lead to significant movements of people. Major health impacts are possible, especially in large urban areas, owing to changes in availability of water and food and increased health problems due to heat stress spreading of infections. Changes in precipitation and temperature could radically alter the patterns of vector-borne and viral diseases by shifting them to higher latitudes, thus putting large populations at risk. As similar events have in the past, these changes could initiate large migrations of people, leading over a number of years to severe disruptions of settlement patterns and social instability in some areas.*" (ibid: 55)

Today, in 2014, a further four studies have been published by the IPCC, each cementing the scale of the problem and - as advances in science allow - sharpening predictions related to climate risk and the impact of climate change. The link between economics, science and climate policy has also become startlingly apparent with the publication of the Stern Review in 2006. This comprehensive assessment of the economic impact of climate change presented a far from disheartening picture by illustrating the benefits of a green economy, the possibilities for change and reinforcing the certainty of the science on climate change[1]. It also outlined cost of not acting which offered a far more worrying outlook.

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[1] The conclusions outlined by the 2006 Stern Review include:
- *There is still time to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, if we take strong action now.*
- *Climate change could have very serious impacts on growth and development.*
- *The costs of stabilising the climate are significant but manageable; delay would be dangerous and much more costly.*

Measured against the certainty of the science and the compelling need for action, a number of disparities exist, namely the political and individual response to climate change, media coverage of the issue and the public's perception of the risk. The UK has "*no effective politics of climate change*" (Giddens, 2008: 5) and an international political framework is similarly absent. Ironically, despite tracing the roots of political climate discourse to Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, in contemporary society, Conservative politics and scepticism of climate change are strongly linked (Corner, 2013; Poortinga et al, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Jacques et al, 2008; Antonio & Brulle, 2011). A number of ambitious initiatives exist in the UK - as in other countries - but they fall considerably short of Green & Stern's assessment of need:

> "*To manage the grave risks of climate change effectively, the world must build a zero carbon energy system by the second half of this century. In the context of a growing global economy, we must cut emissions per unit of output by a factor of 7 or 8 over the next four decades. Only a radical transformation — a new energy industrial revolution — would constitute an adequate response to climate change.*" (2014: 9)

The media has also failed to reflect the scale of the problem, climate change fitting awkwardly with news agendas (Lewis, 2012: 260). It has tracked along an inconsistent news trajectory, its contours shaped largely by politics (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2008), key climate events such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007) and "*weather events [and] charismatic megafauna*" (Boykoff, 2008: 549). Reporting has been criticised for over emphasising uncertainty (Painter, 2013: Lewis, 2012), alarmist tones (Hulme, 2009) and inconsistent, distorted scientific representation (Ladle et al, 2005). A newspaper's ideological persuasion has also been shown to shape climate

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- *Action on climate change is required across all countries, and it need not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries.*
- *A range of options exists to cut emissions; strong, deliberate policy action is required to motivate their take-up.*
- *Climate change demands an international response, based on a shared understanding of long-term goals and agreement on frameworks for action.* (Stern, 2006: vi-ix)

change news (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005: 1457; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Lockwood, 2009). Conservative newspapers such as *The Times* in Britain have challenged mainstream science (Carvalho, 2007: 237), discredited scientists and institutions such as the IPCC and cast doubt on the anthropogenic causes of the issue (ibid). Left-leaning newspapers, on the other hand, have largely emphasised the scientific consensus (ibid: 238).

Worrying variations are also evident in the public's perception of climate change. Although people recognise the issue as a problem in recent years, concern has fallen (Leiserowitz et al, 2010: Whitmarsh, 2011: Pew Research Centre, 2009). More people are expressing uncertainty about the anthropogenic causes of climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011; Pidgeon & Fischoff, 2011), a view at odds with research which finds that 97 per cent of climate science papers agree on anthropogenic warming (Cook et al, 2013).

Terrorism on the other hand has a very different media presence and an emphatically different political response in the UK and internationally. Although terrorism is woven into many nations' historical and immediate pasts (see Rapoport, 2004), the attacks on September 11th, 2001 in New York and Washington propelled the threat of international terrorism into the view of media around the world. Claiming the lives of 3,000 people, the attacks were unprecedented (ibid: 46). 9/11, as it came to be known, was held up by many in Western politics as a sign that life had changed. Then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair echoed such sentiments in a speech to the nation on the evening of September 11, 2001:

> *"...this mass terrorism is the new evil in our world. The people who perpetrate it have no regard whatever for the sanctity or value of human life and we the democracies of the world must come together to defeat it and eradicate it. This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.*" (Extract from Tony Blair's statement to the British nation, BBC News online, 2001: paragraphs 21-24)

In September 2014, the threat level facing Britain from international terrorism is classed as 'severe', one of five categories that the security agency MI5 now use to explain the risk of terrorism to the public[2]. Since first publishing these levels in 2006, the risk has not fallen below substantial (according to MI5 data on the threat level history). In the wake of 9/11, the war on terror gained currency (Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 2), becoming the defining frame for action in response to 'international terrorism' (Reese & Lewis, 2009). 'International' however, seemingly equates to Muslim or Islamic terrorism - indeed, the M15 web page listing the threat facing the UK explicitly links international terrorism with Islamic extremism[3]. Along with a leading role in the war on terror coalition, the British government introduced a raft of policies in the UK in response to the attacks with the aim of 'preventing' the same in the future. Fear became a political tool that helped diminish civil liberties, freedom, democracy and equality in search of 'lost' security (Beck, 2009b; Altheide, 2007). In 2011, the British government published the CONTEST strategy, the UK's current counter-terrorism strategy setting out the threat facing the UK and the priorities for dealing with terrorism, through to 2015.

The scale of media coverage surrounding 9/11 and beyond has been significant and sustained. 9/11 and later 7/7 engendered a surge in reporting, with continued momentum underpinned by policies, legal action and other topics. Islamic-inspired terrorism has clearly become more newsworthy than other forms of terrorism post 9/11 (Lewis, 2012: 258). In terms of public perception of the issue, a marked difference exists in relation to climate change. People in Britain and America consider the terrorist threat both legitimate and real (Altheide, 2009: 93) while the media does not treat their respective government's actions as an "arbitrary overreaction" (ibid).

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[2] The five categories listed by MI5 are: critical - an attack is expected imminently; severe - an attack is highly likely; substantial - an attack is a strong possibility; moderate - an attack is possible but not likely; low - an attack is unlikely.
[3] See https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism.html

1.3 Traversing the same path: climate change and terrorism as competing, contradictory and complementary risks

Some risks are not as newsworthy as others (Lewis, 2012: 260) but the claim that climate change is the "*most severe problem that we are facing today-more serious even than the threat of terrorism*," (King, 2004 quoted in *Global warming 'biggest threat', BBC News online*) is not reflected in media coverage.

A sweeping policy issue that spans political portfolios including home and foreign affairs, the visibility of climate change in the media is misaligned with the evidence base and far off a policy response that reflects what is at stake (Victor, 2004: x). When compared to terrorism there has been "*action in one instance and inertia in another*" (Lewis, 2012: 262), responses "*entirely in keeping with the urgency of the news coverage*" (ibid) on climate change and terrorism, and demonstrating how the news is not "*politically innocent*" (ibid: 260). Thus, America has responded 'aggressively' to terrorism but not so to climate change (Sunstein, 2006: 1) while in the UK politicians have been 'distracted' by the war on terror (Abbott et al, 2006: 18) instead of tackling climate change issues. The disparity in terms of action is a situation only to be rectified, Sunstein (2006: 1) argues, if the cost of climate change action can be shown to be 'acceptably low', or if Americans [and others in the West] are faced with a 'climate incident' (ibid).

The difference in national and global political priorities in relation to climate change and terrorism is also evidenced in the spend associated with each issue. World military expenditure in 2012 was an estimated $1756 billion[4] while global investment in climate change plateaued at USD $359 billion in 2012[5]. In Britain, according to the Treasury's Spending Round 2013, the programme and administration budget for defence in 2014/15 is

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[4] According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2013 Yearbook
[5] According to the Climate Policy Initiative's report *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2013*

£23.9bn. The combined programme and administration budget for the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for the same timeframe is £2.7bn[6].

Ironically, climate change and terrorism share common features, both physically and politically. The worst effects of climate change will fall disproportionately on the world's poorest and developing regions. It is these areas of the globe that are also most affected by terrorism. Their terrorism news, however often goes unreported, benchmarked against the Westernised view of terrorism post 9/11 (Freedman & Thussu, 2012). Therefore terrorism 'exists' in the West only according to a set of criteria that has, since 2001, changed in context and nature and dictated the focus of media reporting.

Climate change also presents a threat to security, arguably greater than that of terrorism, extending beyond the environmental agenda into international and humanitarian affairs, along with security and defence plans and policies. The issue has been described as a "*catalyst for conflict*" and a "*threat multiplier*" (Arrouas, 2014: paragraph 1) with suggestions that the impacts of climate change could fuel terrorist activities (Department of Defense, 2014), wars and extremism. Although the security angle has gained traction in public and political discourse in recent years, the suggestion of climate-related crime, displacement, civil conflict and security issues are among the impacts detailed in the very first IPCC report in 1990.

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[6] These figures relate only to the headline spending for 'defence' and the departments of Energy and Climate Change, and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, as outlined in the Treasury's 2013 Spending Review. They do not include the departmental capital budgets and neither do they include areas where terrorism or climate change spend may also be found, for example within the departments of the Home Office or Justice.

Parallels between climate change and terrorism are increasingly drawn in other socially and politically charged situations. In relation to the flooding in Britain at the end of 2013 and in early 2014, Craig Bennet of Friends of the Earth, writing in the *i* newspaper asks whether politicians would respond to a terrorist threat in the same way that they responded to the flooding in the UK:

> *"Imagine if our Government received even the tiniest shred of evidence that the UK faced a significant terrorist threat from a foreign power...Compare and contrast with how successive Governments have handled our national resilience to the threat of flooding and the worst effects of climate change. Indeed, a decade ago the then Government's Chief Scientist, Sir David King, stated that climate change was a far greater threat to the world than terrorism. Yet our political classes have, for the most part, ignored the warnings as the evidence of risk mounts."* (*UK flood crisis, i*, 12.02.14)

Friends of the Earth have their own agenda here, but the comparison between climate change and terrorism, and the use of each of these issues as signifiers in other scenarios is an emerging and interesting trend. For example, public health expert Professor David Hunter warned that obesity poses as grave a threat to Britain and the NHS as terrorism (Chapman, 2008). The risk to humanity from antibiotic resistant superbugs has also been compared to both climate change (*The Telegraph*, 22.05.14) and terrorism (*BBC News online*, 11.03.13). Clearly, communicators find value in associating such issues with climate change and terrorism. Utilising a similar discursive strategy, Stephan Richter, a journalist for the *Japan Times* pursues the topic of climate change as a form of terrorism, suggesting that "*for many poor people around the world, climate change is, in effect, terrorism conducted on them*" (Richter, 2013: paragraph 2).

1.4 The approach of this thesis

This research takes a different approach to those journalism-based studies predating it. Instead of examining climate change and terrorism as single subjects, it does so

comparatively, thus addressing the gap identified in existing research, which has previously examined climate change and terrorism as solitary issues.

This research is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will help understand more about the different discursive conditions in which climate change and terrorism are constructed. Comparing these will reveal the differences, similarities and divisions in the media's representation of these issues and if and how differences in ideology affect reporting on these issues. Examining the dominant media narratives and teasing out what they reveal, conceal and distort (Lewis, 2012: 268) will also highlight the impact of those narratives on the representation of risk and responsibility, cause and effect and the voices and groups that govern discourse. Additionally, this research will indicate what, if anything, climate communicators can learn from the representation of terrorism in the media. It will also provide data to inform and progress the current comparisons of climate change and terrorism that have been made anecdotally (not empirically) by scholars and others in the media (as noted earlier in this chapter).

Alongside such a comparison, this research will also contribute to sharpening and potentially refocusing current discussions about media coverage of climate change and terrorism by generating considerable data on each topic. It contributes to research on the role of ideology in media representations of science, an under-researched area according to Carvalho (2007: 225). More widely, it addresses global risks as a uniform category making an initial attempt to look at risks more broadly. In this vein, it is hoped that this research may prompt further comparative work, integrating scholars from across disciplines and addressing calls for interdisciplinary, policy-focused research (see for example Horizon 2020).

This study tracks reporting over a 14 year period (from 1 January 1999-31 December 2012) in five British newspapers – *The Guardian*, *The Times*, the *Daily Mirror*, *The Independent* and the *Daily Mail.*

Analysing 1013 articles, this thesis uses content analysis to explore the characteristics of UK newspapers' coverage of climate change and terrorism. The result is to shine a light on how the media have presented climate change and terrorism using the same but often competing narratives and frames; to further implicate the media at the heart of communication about global risks; and, to illuminate the potential benefit of comparing global risks such as climate change and terrorism. While it does not engage directly with public opinion on the issues but instead focuses its remit on content, it uses the research findings to make informed suggestions about the possible impact on perception and policy. The specific objectives of this work are:

- To provide the first longitudinal, comparative analysis of UK newspaper coverage of terrorism and climate change.
- To map the differences and similarities in how the British press has reported climate change and terrorism, examining the news hooks and discourses featuring in reports; the representation of action, risks, impact and uncertainty in articles; the existence of debate and the particular sources of debate; and the discursive ownership of the issues in the media.
- To assess the cumulative impact of reporting and suggest how such may affect public perception and understanding of the issues, and thus any related policies.
- To contribute to academic debate about the reporting of climate change and terrorism in the media and the impact of ideology on the construction of news.
- To explore the potential benefits of analysing media coverage of global risks holistically.

1.5 Thesis structure

Beyond this chapter, Chapter 2 introduces 'world risk society', the theory guiding this study and assesses the literature surrounding the media's reporting of climate change and terrorism. It notes the gap in existing research and sets out the research questions for this work. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach, justifying the use of content analysis and explaining the coding categories developed for this research. Chapters 4-8 cover the substantive research emerging from this study. They comparatively tackle and discuss the news hooks and narratives used to report climate change and terrorism; the representation of the causes of these issues and how each issue is portrayed as a risk; the voices discursively controlling the issues in the media; the portrayal of action; and the presence of debate within articles. Chapter 9 presents the conclusion to this work, drawing together the significant findings and reaffirming the original contribution of this study to the field of journalism research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is split into four sections. The first provides an overview of Beck's World Risk Society. Although this study does not explicitly test Beck's propositions, his work provides the backdrop for the comparative examination of climate change and terrorism as global risks rather than as separate entities. The second section examines media coverage of climate change using a thematic approach, drawing on a wide range of literature about the issue, including relevant studies in this and alternative fields (e.g. social psychology), policy documents, news articles and opinion pieces. The third section does the same for terrorism. The final section highlights the gaps arising from the previous two sections and thus, the justification and direction of travel for this study.

2.2 World Risk Society

'World risk society' is sociologist Ulrich Beck's concept of modern-day society in which society has become a risk society, preoccupied with "...*debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced*" (Beck, 2006: 332). Potentially catastrophic in nature, these risks are the unforeseen and unintended consequences of the success of modernisation (Beck, 2009b: 6) and decisions taken in pursuit of economic and technical progress (Beck & Holzer, 2007).

Risk society is not necessarily more hazardous than previously experienced (Beck, 2001), but the nature of risk has changed. Once considered external threats characterised by fate or

God (Beck, 2009b: 4), risks are now manmade, unpredictable and invisible with consequences for society globally.

The very nature of these global risks - their disregard for geographical boundaries, their incalculable consequences and their non-compensatability (Beck, 2009b: 52) - escape the national models that have previously defined, categorised and managed risk. In the face of such global risks, science, politics, business and the state are faced with the limits of their own systems and, as a result, are no longer trusted institutions but instead have become suspects (ibid: 54). Concepts such as security and control have collapsed (Beck, 2001: 2) and the key institutions of modernity are now part of the very problem they were meant to solve (Beck, 2009b: 55).

In the concept of a 'world risk society', the role of the individual has dramatically changed. State actors cannot be relied upon to manage and define risks (Beck, 2009b: 54). This failure means the individual is left to make their own decisions on risk (ibid; Beck, 2006) and responsibility becomes a citizen-centric notion, 'whitewashing' the failures of state institutions (Beck, 2006: 336). Alongside this, Beck argues that global risks have created a cosmopolitan society (Beck, 2001; 2009a; 2009b): the image of the nation has been reworked (Beck & Levy, 2013) as a 'global public' is faced with a shared fate, prompting a global consciousness to emerge (Beck, 2009b).

World risk society, Beck (2006) argues, brings with it a new historic logic. He calls for the pooling of sovereignty (2009b: 41), cosmopolitan co-operation and recognition that existing national policies are both counterproductive and ultimately destined to fail (ibid: 233). It is only by redrawing the global political map (Beck, 2001) and recognising the opportunities of

the risk society (Beck, 2001: 152) that society can end its search for certainty and security (Beck, 2009a: 18).

2.2.1 Types of global risks

Beck identifies three global dimensions of danger that typify world risk society: ecological, economic and international terrorist crises (Beck, 2001: 34-35). It is ecological/environmental risks and terrorist risks that concern this study and so will be the focus below.

Climate change, for Beck, is illustrative of the dark side of modernisation (Beck & Holzer, 2009). A product of the success of the industrial period (Beck, 2009b: 8), climate change bears all of the hallmarks of a global risk: it permeates national borders; its effects are anticipated, although recognised and estimated; it cannot be insured against. It is, largely, "*a future projected into the present*" (Beck, 2009b: 85). Consensus scientific opinion on that future has painted a bleak picture for all of the world's nations. Beyond the immediate, environmental impact, climate change is predicted to seep into other areas of life, with the potential to cause war, mass migration of people, climate refugees and widespread civil unrest (Beck, 2009b: 37; Stern, 2006; IPCC Assessment Reports).

For Beck, terrorism represents a different risk typology to ecological and economic risks (2009b). The latter are understood as 'bads' - the products of the process of modernisation (ibid: 14), but this is not true of terrorism. Instead, terrorism earns its place in the risk society on a different basis - it challenges the traditional foundation of risk calculability because of the intent behind the terrorist act: purpose replaces chance and maliciousness replaces good will (ibid: 14). Furthermore, in risk society, the concept of the enemy has been redrawn. No longer, Beck suggests, is the enemy identifiable with a particular place,

person or group. The traditional yard stick by which society understood, judged and responded to its enemies - namely their military strategy - is redundant (Beck, 2009b: 40). For Beck, as society struggles to grasp the agent, intention and potential (ibid: 40) of global international terrorism, it engenders the collapse of ontological security.

Global threats such as climate change and terrorism have the potential to affect people the world over, collectivising fate rather than individualising it (Beck, 2009b: 12). But, this fate is synonomous with the anticipation of catastrophe rather than the catastrophe itself (Beck, 2009b). There is no distinction between real and hypothetical risks anymore (Beck, 2001):

> *"Risks exist in a permanent state of virtuality and only become 'topical' to the extent that they are anticipated. Without techniques of visualisation, without symbolic forms, without mass media etc. risks are nothing at all. In other words, it is irrelevant, whether we live in a world which is in fact or in some sense 'objectively' safer than all other worlds; if destruction and disasters are anticipated, then that produces a compulsion to act."* (Beck, 2006: 332)

Global risks such as climate change and terrorism do not fit existing national political schemes (Beck, 2001: 15). Concepts such as 'before' and 'after' are extinguished along with the idea of security in the present day (Beck, 2009b: 27). There is a dichotomy between exposure to these types of risks and the "*security promises which seek to contain them*" (ibid: 28).

2.2.2 Media-realised risks

The importance of the media in world risk society lies in its ability to bring to life, anticipated risks:

> *"Risks are social constructions and definitions based upon corresponding relations of definition. Their existence takes the form of (scientific and alternative scientific) knowledge. As a result, their 'reality' can be dramatised or minimised, transformed or simply denied according to the norms which decide what is known and what is not*

known. They are products of struggles and conflicts over definitions within the context of specific relations of definitional power, hence the (in varying degrees successful) results of staging." (Beck, 2009b: 30)

Beck's concept of staging is where the media's significance in world risk society becomes strikingly apparent. As Beck posits: *"...for only by imagining and staging world risks does the future catastrophe become present - often with the goal of averting it by influencing present decisions"* (2009b: 10). By giving space to powerful social actors, the media encourage and often focus on debate and difference around risk. It is this struggle for definitional control (Beck, 2009b: 33) within the media which ultimately gives anticipated risks their existence (ibid: 30). One of the clearest examples of staging, Beck argues, is terrorism:

> "...it is not the terrorist act but the global staging of the act and the political anticipations, actions and reactions in response to the staging which are destroying the Western institutions of freedom and democracy." (2009b: 10)

In reporting the anticipation of terrorism as a global danger (Beck, 2009b), the media amplify the risk. The expectation of catastrophe becomes normalised as do the reactive routines and measures implemented in response to the threat (Beck, 2009b: 157).

Alongside the staging of risks, the media's role extends into Beck's cosmopolitan vision. For the first time, he argues, a global media allows citizens to be part of a shared present (Beck, 2009b: 12). The media enable cross-border compassion and connections (ibid: 59 & 61). It is through their portrayal of global risks, that we share global threats with others (ibid: 56).

2.2.3 Criticism of Beck's work

The theoretical limitations of Becks work and concern over certain themes within the risk society thesis itself have been the focus of criticism. The very notion of 'world risk' itself has come under fire. Scott (2000: 36) for example argues that risk is more low-key than Beck suggests, while for Hanlon (2010: 217) Beck limits his argument by positioning expertise as

objective and politically immune, which, he notes, it is not. Lash (2000: 48) suggests that Beck's approach to risk society is not modern enough and posits instead that institutional society is displaced by a risk culture.

Tulloch & Lupton (2003: 6 & 7) argue that Beck's grand theories lack empirical testing and suggest that he has failed to acknowledge the effect of class, age and other social factors on the construction of risk. Elliott (2002: 312) criticises Beck for failing to consider how risk is shaped by interpersonal, emotional and cultural factors and, in a similar vein, Pilkington (2007: 29-30) argues against Beck's ideas of individualisation for its one-dimensional approach and lack of consideration of the social narratives that shape choices related to risks. On the subject of cosmopolitanism, Martell (2009: 1) claims that Beck's ideas do not engender a new and unique perspective on global inequality, citing his failure to address inequality, conflict and power in his approach as the undermining factor. Similarly, Ormrod (2013: 727) suggests that Beck's optimism about the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere is misplaced.

In addressing particular themes within Beck's work, the role of the media has been a subject that Cottle (1998) has tackled in some depth. He argues that Beck's earlier work, *Risk Society*, lacked transparency, with ideas on the media's role found 'scattered' throughout (ibid: 6). In advancing Beck's later, more developed ideas on the importance of the media in the risk society, particularly that of the staging of global risks in the media, Cottle (2009a) finds that we should not underestimate the 'pull of the national' in news coverage. Global crises are "*reported through national news prisms and frames of reference*" (ibid: 509), a fact which presents something of a stumbling block to Beck's cosmopolitan vision (ibid). Mythen too, has argued that local experience still governs the ways in which individuals

generate and explore risks, something which cannot be ignored in favour of the global (2004: 182).

Although world risk society is the theoretical backbone of this study, this research does not test or challenge the concept. It is important, however, to note the concerns I have around world risk society, which centre primarily on the role of the media. Although Beck has taken steps to position the media centrally in world risk society, the finer points of this relationship are somewhat elusive in Beck's writings. Arguably, Beck's work fails to grasp, fully, the role of the media's framing of climate change and terrorism. A number of related issues arise. The economic, political and cultural influences that may shape such frames in the media are all but absent in Beck's work. He appears to assume an almost eternal capacity for both media interest in risk and public appetite for such and ignores the other social issues vying for coverage. Beck also does not acknowledge how media coverage of 'risks' may compare, contrast and even compete with each other, and what this may mean for public perception and policy.

Beck also appears to not fully account for the role of the media in the classification of the 'other' in the globalised world. Beck argues that such a concept is defunct in risk society and, in the truest sense of global risk, he is right. But, the way in which the 'other' has been framed in society historically and the cultural resonance of that framing, should not be underestimated. Beck also suggests that the traditional enemy has disappeared from terrorism in world risk society. Yet, as the rest of this chapter will show, since 9/11, the enemy has been consistently identified with Islam.

In the cosmopolitan society, Beck posits "*human beings must lend meaning to their lives through exhanges with others and no longer in encounters with people like themselves*"

(2009b: 15). But how far is this really true? How are those encounters mediated and framed by a media not yet attuned to reporting the global over the national or local? Can citizens perceive their role across cultures, and are they able to think beyond the local or the national and position themselves as a global citizen? Beck & Levy (2013) suggest that cosmopolitanism and nationhood are not polar opposites and that "*empowerment arises from the cosmopolitan redefinition of national interests*" (ibid: 14) but again, fail to acknowledge the consequences of a national media system and its professional norms.

Beyond this, I also disagree to an extent with the way Beck defines climate change as a global risk. Beck appears to suggest that intent is absent in the case of climate change by positioning terrorism as the only risk in which purpose replaces chance. But is intent not applicable to climate change? Climate change may have emerged innocently as a result of society's progress, but now, when science has proved the role of the human contribution to such and the potential to exacerbate the issue further, is intent still absent? Perhaps intent is the wrong word, since it encapsulates sinister connotations; or potentially, intent is masked by the veil of progress and societal advances. Either way, the knowing contribution of human emissions and lifestyle choices to climate change, and pursuit of the same in the face of scientific evidence, should not be ignored. Beck also assumes that climate change has gained prominence as a risk, citing a 2007 UK opinion poll which he uses to demonstrate that UK citizens are concerned with climate change (2009b: 34). But, research has shown that climate change, as a priority for the British public, has fluctuated. Media coverage of the issue is cyclical (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). Research has also shown that an individual's receptiveness to 'green' news varies based on their gender (see McCright & Dunlap, 2011) or political persuasion (see Corner, 2013), among other demographic variables.

Despite limitations and inconsistencies such as these, Beck's work has been an overarching theme in developing our understanding of risk. Its significance and reach are not negated by the above criticisms, however certain areas are underdeveloped. The aim of this study is not to advance or challenge Beck's ideas. Instead, his theory provides the backdrop for this comparative research, since it locates climate change and terrorism jointly as part of a wider spectrum of global risks in the modern day. World risk society therefore "*speaks to the conditions of our time and provides theoretical coordinates of potential use to mass communication researchers*" (Cottle, 1998: 5).

2.3 Climate change: meandering news

Climate change is "*the most urgent and potentially devastating of all global crises now confronting the world*" (Cottle, 2009b: viii), a "*verifiable threat facing humankind...with the potential to create death, disease and extinction on an alarming scale*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 3). Despite the comprehensive evidence-base and recommendations that only a 'green revolution' will suffice in responding to the magnitude of the risk (Green & Stern, 2014), climate change has failed to resonate with news agendas (Lewis & Boyce, 2009; Smith, 2005). Even amongst science and technology news, it loses out to stories such as avian flu, psychology and entertainment technology (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 12). As with other forms of risk news, climate change has to satisfy news values: criteria that determine the prominence and indeed presence of an issue in the news (see Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001; Brighton & Foy, 2007). Some of the conditions identified as catalysts for risk news are accidents and tragedies, groundbreaking discoveries related to a particularly critical issue, and something routine falling into crisis (Nelkin, 1991: 295). Others include debates for definitional control (Beck, 2009a; 2009b), the journalist-source relationship (Hughes et al, 2006) and the way in which a risk interacts with social processes, bureaucratic procedures and promotional strategies (Kitzinger & Reilly, 1997). Research has

shown that the media is less likely to report deaths caused by common public health risks such as smoking, focusing instead on emerging hazards such as SARS and bioterrorism (Bomlitz & Brezis, 2008), indicating the effect of news values on reporting.

Particularly in relation to climate change, the production process of news, ideological cultures (Carvalho, 2007; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005), available images, editorial decisions and celebrity or political voices (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007) have all be identified as factors that shape decisions about coverage. Different media and formats will also treat the story in various ways (see Allan, 2002 for details on television; Boykoff, 2008 for the difference between tabloid and broadsheets). Additionally, countries vary in their attention to climate change as news. The role of climate vulnerability has been demonstrated as a contributing factor, with those countries more at risk from climate impacts having more prominent media coverage of the issue (Schmidt et al, 2013). Nations with obligations under the Kyoto Protocol also demonstrated higher degrees of news coverage (ibid). The opposite is true of America, for example, whose media repeatedly covers climate news less than other countries in the West including Canada, Australia and the UK (Good, 2008; Russill & Nyssa, 2009).

Since climate change, its science and policy "infrequently satisfy" news values (Smith, 2005: 1478), coverage has largely been mapped around key events, albeit to different levels of exposure in different countries (Schmidt et al, 2013). Since the 1980s, when climate change first gained momentum in the news, coverage of the issue has increased (Bostrom et al, 1994; Boykoff & Roberts, 2007; Schmidt et al, 2013; Butler & Pidgeon, 2009) but its trajectory has been characterised by a focus on events such as the IPCC's first report in 1990 - and subsequent reports since; the Kyoto Protocol in 1997; and, in 2006, the release of the Stern Review and the film an *Inconvenient Truth* (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007; Schmidt et al,

2013). The 2009 Copenhagen summit and the 'climategate' scandal at the University of East Anglia that same year also diverted media attention towards the issue (Leiserowitz et al, 2013), although not necessarily in positive ways. Since 2009, climate change coverage has declined (ibid), dwarfed by news about the economy and jobs (ibid) as many developed nations around the world found themselves in the midst of the longest recession in history. A drop in public attention towards the issue has also been observed (ibid) since, in line with agenda setting theory, climate change news is less readily accessible in the mind of the audience (ibid).

Clearly, the frequency of climate news indicates to audiences whether the issue is important for that country (Good, 2008). Based on the information above, climate change news has trodden a meandering path, characterised by an inconsistent media presence, which signals the issue is less urgent than other risks. Beyond merely visibility and profile, the portrayal of climate change in the media has also commanded the attention of researchers. Largely, the shortcomings of reporting have been highlighted (Painter, 2013), but so too have the benefits. Indeed, raising awareness of the issue is credited to the media (Ward, 2009: 59). The next sections of this chapter will explore in more detail the media's representation of climate change as a risk.

2.3.1 Climate change: a peril for the planet or the poor?

No part of the world escapes unscathed from climate change, with the worst predictions suggesting that it may alter the sustainability of life on earth (Lewis, 2012: 260). Catastrophic effects include heat mortality and malnutrition, caused by drought-related water and food shortages (IPCC, 2014), impacts that are most likely to be experienced by those countries and people who are least responsible for emissions (Cottle, 2009b: ix). For the West, regions face effects such as economic loss caused by flooding and extreme heat

events, and water restrictions (IPCC, 2014). There is an inherent disparity in climate change causes and consequences (Cottle, 2009b: ix), a disparity that has also been emphasised in media reports. Residents of low-lying islands such as Tuvalu in the Pacific, have come to symbolise climate risk (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012), held up by Western politicians and the media as the first 'victims' or 'refugees' of climate change. Indeed, in the British press, Doulton & Brown (2009) found the most dominant discourse over a 10-year period was 'potential catastrophe' which captured the unchecked effects of climate change on the developing world (ibid: 195). Such a portrayal of victims and the developing world has however been criticised for fitting and reinforcing a Westernised view of the crisis (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012: 4; Doulton & Brown, 2009). The representation of vulnerable people and places as "poor hapless victims" (Doulton & Brown, 2009: 201), disposes them of their fate, voices, culture and history (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012: 16) and prises them into the confines of a hegemonic climate change narrative. Questions arise as to whether 'climate conflict' and 'climate refugee' are useful terms that can be applied to explain environmental unrest at the coalface of climate change or whether such a tag will be used by governments and other stakeholders to negate the long-term influences behind such issues (see Verhoeven, 2011: Hartmann, 2010). There is some symmetry here with the 'war on terror' - a term used to justify action and thus define what constitutes terrorism post-9/11 - which is discussed later in this chapter. Although some Western countries have been earmarked as climate victims, for example the residents of Newtok in Alaska were referred to as 'America's first climate refugees' (Goldenberg, 2013), these places are remote and isolated, far from cities, suburbs and centres of power. With each mile between these central locations and victims, the impact seemingly diminishes.

On the frontline of climate change are also some of the world's most iconic landmarks. The reality and observable impacts of climate change are clear in areas such as the Arctic, the

Great Barrier Reef and Mount Kilimanjaro (Adger et al, 2011: 4-5). Highly visible, they too have come to personify climate risk beyond their immediate vicinities (ibid: 5): images of melting Arctic ice and polar bears have been adopted by the media in highlighting climate change, with such images also finding resonance with audiences (see Lorenzoni et al, 2007). Ascribing climate change to such destinations demarcates the boundaries of climate change impact, situating it outside of the West and with animals, wildlife and tourist hotspots.

At a local level, weather has been one of the tools the media has used to evidence and discuss climate change (see Boykoff, 2008a; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005: 1466). Sea level rises and issues around agriculture have also featured in media and political discourse. Research is however, divided on the effectiveness of such approaches. Heal & Kriström (2002: 6) argue that focusing on such topics offers a restricted view of climate change and its human impacts, since climate change permeates every aspect of life. Outside of the field of media and communication, social psychologists have suggested that weather may actually increase climate change salience among the public (Spence et al, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). Ungar (2000: 307), on the other hand, argues that the use of weather variations or anticipated average temperature change may demean the significance of science and risks: "*Scientific predictions that the average temperature may rise two to three degrees Celsius over the course of the next 50 years do not appear overly threatening to North Americans who often experience far larger swings in temperature over the course of a single day*." Gavin et al (2011: 435) also warn of the pitfalls in linking climate change with flooding:

> "*...ascribing flooding to climate change leaves an important hostage to fortune with respect to political praxis, whoever expresses this sentiment. A line that says look-it's-flooding-and-this-is-a-direct-symptom-of-climate-change!, taken too often and too readily, is in danger of backfiring if, in the future, flooding (however temporarily) becomes less, rather than more, prevalent*."

In some cases, the media has chosen to emphasise the positives that may potentially arise from climate change for the UK. For example, an article in *The Guardian* in 2011 refers to

suggestions by Network Rail that climate change and warmer weather could lead to a rail revival in coastal areas of England and Wales (Meikle, 2011). Although such a focus appears limited in reporting, and the risks of climate change outweigh any positives that may arise for the UK, the presence of such a discourse in the media may lead citizens to question the severity of climate change in relation to their own lives, assigning instead the worst impacts to vulnerable people and places far away.

The media, it is suggested, can help make climate change risk more salient and current through the use of infographics (Painter, 2013). In a similar vein, O'Neill et al (2013: 8) conclude that "*imagery can play a role in either increasing the sense of importance of the issue of climate change (saliency), or in promoting feelings of being able to do something about climate change (efficacy)...*". Nicholson-Cole (2005) explores the potential for computer-aided visualisation and the creation of 'futurescapes' to impact positively on the public's relationship with climate change. She notes that the effectiveness of imagery is closely bound with a person's education, age, knowledge and psychological makeup (ibid: 269). Sheppard (2005) also argues for better use of visualisation to shape behaviour or at worst to increase awareness. Smith & Joffe (2009) posit that imagery is vital in conveying climate change as a current risk, arguing that visuals allow climate change to be represented at a local and national level increasing its identifiableness and salience. Absent from such suggestions however is the question of how visualisations and imagery may initially, and repeatedly, meet 'newsworthy' criteria.

The discussion above has shown that the Western media position climate change as a peril for the poor more than the planet. We know from existing research that members of the public respond not to "*the details of media content, but to its broad thrust*" (Speers & Lewis, 2004: 176), "*absorbing dominant media frames and using those to make suppositions*" (ibid:

178). If the media is repeatedly positioning climate change as an issue for the developing world and vulnerable sectors of global society, then this message is likely to resonate, in general terms with the public. They may therefore adopt a misleading view of climate change and its impacts. Such a view is further compounded by the presentation of climate change as uncertain. It is this theme that this chapter picks up next.

2.3.2 Climate change: its Achilles heel

Underpinning climate change is a vast body of robust, compelling, consensus scientific evidence that documents its anthropogenic causes and widespread negative effects on people and places. In some instances, definitive predictions are elusive with scenarios having to incorporate socioeconomic factors and take into account 'unstable' drivers such as natural climate variability, natural weather events such as El Nino (see IPCC reports) and changing anthropogenic influences (IPCC, 2014). For example, scientists know that the global surface temperature of earth is rising,[7] as are sea levels,[8] but how much they will rise in future is unclear (Grove & Lopez-Gunn, 2010). Similarly, evidence has shown how climate change will impact upon countries, but the extent of regional variations is not certain (ibid).

Although an innate characteristic of scientific research, studies examining the representation of climate science and the anthropogenic causes of climate change in the media suggest that 'uncertainty' has been afforded undue emphasis in coverage, leading to mixed messages, misconceptions and misunderstandings (Lowe, 2006). The reasons for such a focus have been explored in some depth across academic disciplines and include the ideological construction of climate change (Carvalho, 2007; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005), and the struggle for legitimacy in reporting (Ladle et al, 2005). The difficulties in translating the

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[7]According to the National Climatic Data Center
[8] Both the IPCC and NASA have documented the rise of sea levels

language of science into the media has also been examined (Corbett & Durfee, 2004). The use of "technical jargon" by scientists and a lack of specialist science reporters have also been shown to have an impact on the accuracy of climate change reporting (see Wilson, 2000). Painter (2013: 11) also notes that the public is unfamiliar with the definition and types of uncertainty as recognised by experts. The issue is further compounded since qualification of such language is usually absent in the media. Little space is available to include the context or explanation found in the journal articles from which the report derives (Ladle et al, 2005; Corbett & Durfee, 2004).

Evidence suggests that the role of balance and objectivity in the media (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2007) is a causal factor in the representation of climate science as an uncertain issue. Boykoff & Mansfield (2008) showed how UK tabloids significantly diverged from the consensus on anthropogenic climate change, a fact attributed to the journalistic norm of balance and a lack of specialist correspondents. Similar traits were found in the American prestige press (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004) with newspapers giving equal space to views on anthropogenic and natural variations in explaining the causes of climate change. In a later work however, Boykoff (2007) encountered an American newspaper industry that had not only increased its quantity of climate news, but shifted reporting from a position that promotes bias through the norm of balance, to one that closely mirrors the scientific consensus on the anthropogenic causes of climate change. Across the pond, there was no major divergence from the scientific consensus among the UK prestige press (ibid). Recent studies however, suggest that this optimism was short lived, identifying a resurgence in doubt and uncertainty about climate change in the media. In a study for the Australian Centre for Journalism, Bacon et al (2013) found that 32 per cent of articles in the Australian national press rejected or doubted climate science. This "*recalibration of contrarian views in the public arena*" (Boykoff, 2013: 797) is accompanied by a decline in public concern for

climate change (see Boykoff, 2013; Dunlap, 2013) from previously high levels (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2013).

Painter (2013: 26) notes that uncertainty has not affected other aspects of life, despite being an inherent characteristic of everyday decision-making for people and organisations alike. Interestingly, he points out that the military use risk management to make decisions about events of unknown probability but high impact, such as international terrorism (ibid: 28). Since the media is the public's primary communicator on science (Zehr, 2000), media-generated controversy and misrepresentation is an important factor in public perception of climate change (Painter, 2013: 44). Members of the public have pointed to the media as the source of their belief that climate change is the subject of contention or debate (see Butler & Pidgeon, 2009) or in expressing scepticism towards the issue (Lorenzoni et al, 2007). Notably, the media was not the subject of Butler & Pidgeon's study and it coincided with the timing of *The Great Global Warming Swindle*, a programme that received brief but considerable media coverage because of its controversial propositions. Nevertheless, their work indicates that short, sharp and significant levels of coverage may affect public perception of the issue. Indeed Lowe et al (2006), demonstrated citizens were motivated to act after exposure to the film *The Day After Tomorrow,* highlighting the ability of the media to positively change perception but noting the importance of capitalising on those moments (ibid: 454).

Beyond the science, the scale and remit of climate uncertainty has been described as "breathtaking" (Heal & Kriström, 2002: 34), permeating decisions, patterns and forecasts on economics, lifestyle choices, public health, politics, culture, migration - virtually every facet of life is affected. Each of these areas need addressing, but couching climate science and climate change impacts in terms of uncertainty may diminish the public's support for

mitigating action (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008). Focusing on uncertainty may also delay action - 'flawed' science and scientific disagreement can be used to call for more research (Zehr, 2000: 97). In America for example, Antilla (2005) demonstrates how undermining the veracity of climate science offered the government the chance to default on their responsibilities in the face of such 'bad' science. On a local level, focusing on uncertainty surrounding anthropogenic climate change, and suggesting that natural climate fluctuations may be equally responsible for climate change distances blame from individuals (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2012: 11), simultaneously devolving them of taking mitigating action.

If uncertainty is a central precept of climate change, and the issue itself an 'unknown known' (Beck, 2009b: 40) how should the media report it? One suggestion has been the injection of context into reports. In a small but landmark study involving university students, Corbett & Durfee (2004) find that the inclusion of context can help mitigate some of the issues around uncertainty and scientific controversy. However, their findings are curbed by the size of the study and the well-educated pool from which its participants were drawn. Reconciling scientific context with news values may also present something of a challenge. The responsibility to address uncertainty in media reporting has also been aligned with journalists. Among his recommendations, Painter (2013: 139-141) posits that journalists need more training and familiarity with numbers and probabilities. He identifies online news as an avenue to offer quantifiable information around uncertainty and suggests that the IPCC needs to respond to media enquiries quickly. Scientists too have been called upon to 'set the record straight' through clear, simple messages, that are repeated often and voiced by trusted sources (Maibach et al, 2014: 296).

The studies discussed above suggest that either intentionally or unintentionally (Zehr, 2000) the media has misaligned climate change with uncertainty and continued to perpetuate the

link between the two. Clearly, in some cases, sensationalism, alarmism and controversy align more with news values than their respective antonyms may. Yet the 'pseudo-controversy' (Lewis, 2012: 261) surrounding climate change also reflects the threat the issue presents to consumer capitalism and the economy (ibid). It attests to the "*vested interests stacked up against it*" (ibid: 261) and the economic and political pressures that make climate change uncertainty a valuable 'commodity'. It is this theme that this chapter addresses next.

2.3.3 A green revolution: solutions to climate change in the media

Adaptation and mitigation are the two options that exist in response to climate change although the latter is becoming increasingly unachievable the longer concerted action is evaded. At national levels, plans include renewable energy, proposals for new nuclear builds, changes to cities and transport infrastructure along with increasing taxes[9]. In the UK, the government has committed to an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2050 (Committee on Climate Change, 2008). The Climate Change Act 2008 also requires the government to set legally binding carbon budgets and the preparation of a national adaptation plan, among other measures (ibid). Yet these measures appear inconsistent with both the scale of the threat and the assessment of need (see Stern, 2006; Green & Stern, 2014; Giddens, 2008).

Action falters in real and media representational terms because of the dichotomy between climate change and progress. Traditionally, progress finds synergy with economic growth, industrialisation, material growth and consumption (Pretty, 2014). Climate change sits awkwardly with the norms of our fossil-fuelled, consumer-driven society (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 5) in which happiness equals more, bigger and better, regardless of what we may

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[9] Plans are documented by organisations such as climateaction.org.uk and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

already have or indeed actually need (Lewis, 2011). Sustainability is at odds with the cycle of

production, reproduction and renewal (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 5) that aligns 'new' with

'progress'. 'Green' lacks considerable parity with the ideology of cultural, technological and

social human advancement. In America, the Bush government rhetorically positioned

climate science as a barrier to corporate profits and achievements (Gordon et al, 2010: 174).

Indeed, the link between climate scepticism and Conservative values is well-documented

(see Dunlap et al, 2001; Jacques et al. 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Dunlap et al (2001)

showed how Republicans and Conservatives express less environmental concern than their

counterparts (ibid: 25). American citizens who use Conservative media are also less certain

that global warming is happening while the reverse has been demonstrated for those who

use non-Conservative media (Hmielowski et al, 2013: 13). Similar links between

Conservative ideology and scepticism, doubt and lack of trust have also been found (see

Leiserowitz et al, 2014b; Antilla, 2005; McCright & Dunlap, 2003).

Inertia dominates the response to climate change (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 3), implying that

green technology, green energy and green living are a detour rather than a direction of

travel. This lethargy is also evident in the media. For example, Painter's (2013: 58) research

demonstrated how few news articles emphasise the opportunities to reduce the risk of

climate change, such as the move to a low carbon economy or renewable energy.

The transition towards a green economy is tempered with reluctance and is at odds with

other policies, plans and advertising – the latter a staple income for the media. The

battleground is also larger than just the news media (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 9). As Lewis

(2011: paragraph 12) writes:

> "*If we are to prosper and develop as a species, we must begin to imagine economic
> models that appreciate the finite, and that do not rely on endless economic growth.
> We must pursue a way of working that values longevity over built-in obsolescence,*

on repairing and reusing rather than dumping and replacing. If we want to avoid high unemployment, we need to pass on productivity gains by giving people more free time rather than more money."

While consumerism and new economic models are seemingly outside of the remit of political and media narratives, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in nuclear power to meet the demands of our energy futures. Doyle (2011) suggests that the UK government's 2006 Energy Review positioned nuclear power as a viable response to climate change, arguing that a similar U-turn was evident in the media. She found that opposition to nuclear power decreased in the media and in all but one newspaper - the *Daily Mail*. With neither explicit endorsement nor challenge of nuclear in the newspapers studied, Doyle argues that the impact on policy decisions is crucial (ibid: 122). Nisbett (2009: 16-17) also outlines the reframing of nuclear as a 'solution' to climate change in America, led by the Bush administration in recent years. He outlines how nuclear is presented as a 'choice' if American citizens are to maintain their lifestyles, have access to cost-effective fuel and cut emissions at the same time.

Beyond the specifics of action, there is considerable disparity among the international community. Canada, for example, has been accused of "*foot-dragging on the difficult political choices required in order to achieve meaningful reductions*" (Young & Dugas, 2011: 2) while China's policies have been described as 'loose' with the country yet to meet its targets (Ming-Te & Tai-Ting Liu, 2011: 373). The political praxis ultimately also translates to news coverage. The glorification of climate action was evident in the Swedish press (Berglez et al, 2009: 222), a theme traced back to the political positioning of the country as EU or world-leading in reducing emissions (ibid). In the Netherlands and France, newspapers focused on the consequences and solutions to climate change (Dirikx & Gelders, 2009: 210), rarely framing the issue in terms of conflict (ibid). Other studies have found that the media

has covered international disputes on climate action. America and Europe, for example, have been seen to disagree on climate action (see Brossard et al, 2004; Olausson, 2009).

When considered against the representation of climate change as uncertain, and an issue for distant people and places, the response described above is entirely in keeping (Lewis, 2012: 262) with those characteristics. In engendering action, Jackson (2009) argues redefining prosperity may move us further along towards a sustainable economy, but overcoming traditional performance indicators and identifying alternative social, economic and political markers tied to progress is still a considerable way off. Instead, nuclear power, emission reduction and sustainable initiatives are presented as 'fixes' to climate change, leaving consumer capitalism to advance unchecked (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 14). Such 'fixes' however, are undermined by an international community that speaks with fractured voices and adopts fragmented, inconsistent responses. Although terrorism is discussed later in this chapter, it is interesting to note an ironic synergy on 'progress' between it and climate change: stripped back to its symbolic impact, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 destroyed two powerful symbols of economic and architectural progress in the Western world. The war on terror is retribution for this 'challenge' to Western progress, while climate change action requires a reassessment of such concepts of progress.

The prevailing themes surrounding climate change's presence and portrayal in the media are set within the parameters established by those who speak on and for the issue. This chapter now turns to examine who has rhetorical ownership of climate change in the news.

2.3.4 Climate change: rhetorical 'ownership' and language traits in the media

"*Who is invited to speak on and in the news says crucially important things about who counts in society and whose voices have legitimacy and status*" (Ross, 2007: 454). In constructing news, journalists and sources rely heavily on one another: sources bringing authority and credibility to news reports gaining, in exchange, publicity and the chance to advance their interests (Entman, 2007) through the mass media. It is a symbiotic relationship, described as a dance (Gans, 1980 in Strömbäck & Nord, 2006: 147) or an umbilical cord (Tuchman, 1978), that is sometimes uneasy but always necessary.

Negotiating this 'dance floor' of news (Strömbäck & Nord, 2006: 161) are central sources, parliament and the courts for example, who devote significant resources (Entman, 2007) to fulfilling their communication goals. Alongside them are other social actors, from industry, lobby groups and more, each with their own public relations strategies, vying for column and broadcast space. Research has shown that the position of a source in society is a key factor (see Ross, 2007). Government elites are most likely to be 'invited to dance' by journalists (Strömbäck & Nord, 2006) and in contrast, the public are rarely part of this process. The citizen is often the least powerful voice in the practices that shape news (Lewis, 2006: 308).

On climate change, the number of people 'authorised' to speak on the issue evolved when it moved from the coalface of science into the political arena towards the end of the 1980s (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). As a mainstream political story (Giddens, 2008), the discursive mantle belongs not only to politicians, but to celebrities (Boykoff & Goodman, 2009), businesses and pressure groups (Carvalho, 2007) and to other stakeholder social groups. Crucially, who speaks on the issue of climate change determines the policy response (Carvalho, 2010) as well as the salience of the issue more widely.

Governments have shaped climate news directly, through comment and because news is focused around their actions and rhetoric (Boykoff, 2008: 549). Politicians' skill in discursively controlling the issue of climate change is evident in existing research. In America, for example, the Conservative movement constructed the apparent 'non problemacity' of global warming (McCright & Dunlap, 2003). The resulting failure of America to engage with climate policy was a success of that movement and their skill in flooding the media with specific information (ibid). The American media, Boykoff & Boykoff (2004: 134) suggest, helped create "*a discursive and real political space for the US government to shirk responsibility and delay action regarding global warming*" through balanced reporting which failed to represent climate change and its anthropogenic causes fairly and accurately (ibid). Similarly, industry lobbies, special interest groups and PR firms manipulated the US media in order to maintain an illusion of intense controversy over climate change (Antilla, 2005: 340). In such situations, when controversy is implied or when particular facets of information are disproportionately represented, the individuals or groups that may reassure and challenge that stance are the ordinary (in the context of the issue), impartial or disinterested voices (Lewis & Speers, 2003: 917). Quite how such actors, who are likely to fail a 'newsworthiness' test, gain access to the media on such occasions is unclear (ibid).

Increasingly, scientists are being encouraged to reclaim their territory, having been marginalised as spokespersons for climate change in favour of contrarian views on the issue (Hmielowski et al, 2013). Pidgeon & Fischoff (2011) suggest a new, strategic way of working that exposes scientists to the public and communication experts to better understand how they can tailor messages on climate risk. Alongside representing science, some suggest that scientists should also have greater political visibility, mobilising support for policy actions (Alvarez, 2014: paragraph 1). Such a position carries with it the threat of undermining their credibility and authority (ibid). However, taking Pidgeon & Fischoff's suggestion further, if

scientists can vocally (and publically) link their work to climate risk, effects and related policy implications, the impact of their work may be unlocked and public trust restored. There is an alternative argument however, that it is not the failing of science or scientists in communicating climate change but instead there are 'antagonistic' meanings that culturally pollute the issue (Kahan, 2012). Kahan suggests: "[*the*] *trouble starts when this communication environment fills up with toxic partisan meanings — ones that effectively announce that 'if you are one of us, believe this; otherwise, we'll know you are one of them'*" (2012: paragraph 11). This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter's conclusion.

Absent from media discourse on climate change are citizens (Carvalho, 2010), compounding a situation in which the public's opinion is rarely sought (Lewis et al, 2004) and where they never really become involved in the deliberative public sphere (ibid: 160). In a study of discursive representation of climate change in the UK press, Doulton & Brown (2009) found that a 'disaster strikes' was the only narrative that gave a voice to people, reserving it for individuals in vulnerable countries to describe the first-hand impacts of climate change. The researchers noted that there was little discussion around the agency of poor people to address climate change (ibid: 201). Clearly, a number of issues around empowerment, control and the ability to affect change arise. Firstly, framing change as international news and one that requires an international response, simultaneously constructs citizen agency as minute (Carvalho, 2010: 8), thus restricting their involvement in discourse. Secondly, the public is situated as less knowledgeable on the subject of climate change. Zehr (2000: 85) argues that the American press used uncertainty to create rhetorical boundaries between scientists and lay individuals, implying that citizens did not have the capacity to process 'uncertainty', thus justifying the need for more research.

Beyond the voices, the language of alarm and catastrophe has been a common trait in coverage around the world, attesting to the notion that the disaster frame has a stronger pull for journalists than a positive, opportunity-led narrative (Painter, 2013: 48-49). In a study of 10 British newspapers' reporting of the IPCC's third assessment report, Hulme (2009: 1) discovered alarmist and fatalistic discourses were more prevalent in reporting than those of agency and empowerment. The language of catastrophe, fear, disaster and death is evident across newspapers (ibid: 9). Boykoff (2008: 561) too, finds that British tabloids' headlines were laden with tones of fear, misery and doom. However, fearful and threatening representations of climate change are pointed to by social psychologists as inappropriate drivers for engagement (O'Neill & Nicholson Cole, 2009). Lorenzoni et al (2005: 1394) posit that: "*a crisis narrative of climate danger may neither foster engagement nor encourage proactive responses. Rather, it may result in fatalism and withdrawal.*" A later study suggests that barriers to engagement include 'fatalism' and a 'drop in the ocean feeling' in relation to the public's engagement with climate change in the UK (Ockwell et al, 2009: 4).

Despite these findings, there are calls for more use of 'alarming' lexical choices and frames. Good (2008: 247) suggests that greater benefit may stem from terms that elaborate on the catastrophe element of climate change, such as 'climate catastrophe' or 'climate cancer'. Corbett & Durfee (2004: 144) also venture into this territory, arguing that the phrase 'global warming' lacks seriousness. However, a recent study by Yale University found that Americans cared more about climate change when it was referred to as 'global warming' (Leiserowitz et al, 2014a). Among the various American groups surveyed for the research, the term 'global warming' prompted stronger ratings of negative effects, greater certainty the phenomenon is happening and more intense worry about the issue (ibid: 27).

A move towards a point of reference that the public already grasps has also been suggested (see Nisbett, 2009), taking the climate narrative beyond uncertain economic burden (ibid) and into the realm of everyday concerns (O'Neill & Nicholson Cole, 2009). Here, one suggestion is to situate climate change in the traditional – or familiar - language of risk which Painter (2013) suggests can work as an antithesis to disaster and uncertainty narratives. He argues that using such terminology would move public debate away from not taking action to making climate change appear as something that is manageable (ibid: 142). A similar conclusion emerged from the annual Chatham House Climate Change Conference in 2013 (see Scott, 2013), when speakers argued for a change in message suggesting that articulating climate risks in terms of the effects on people and property were more personal and tangible for individuals to understand. They also point out that messages need to be more optimistic, focusing on the opportunities of climate change and the chance to positively affect our own and future generations' lives (ibid). These suggestions of utilising a traditional risk narrative do not however, attempt to cover the related effects on media uptake of the issue, and how such an approach may translate into news values.

The discussion above has indicated that while climate change is covered by the media "*its prominence is insufficient to set the political agenda*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 13). Coverage has mirrored the "*mood music*" from governments (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 10), "*veering between a rather helpless alarmism and a kind of techno-optimism*" (ibid: 13). There is, as Cottle states, a "*fundamental disconnect between the media's representations of climate change and the politics and polices needed to effect meaningful change*" (Cottle, 2009b: x). Such a disconnect is particularly alarming because in cases such as climate change, the media's importance is heightened since *"[people lack] real-world experiential conditions that could help shape opinion and understanding..."* (Corbett & Durfee, 2004: 130). The tone and characteristics of coverage are quite at odds with those found in the reporting of terrorism,

and have been used to very different effect, as the next sections of this chapter demonstrate.

2.4 Terrorism: exploding onto the front page

Terrorism in the 21st century has been redefined following the events of 11th September 2001 when four passenger planes were hijacked by al-Qaeda terrorists and flown into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Those terrorist attacks found their way into newspaper coverage around the world (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007: 68) and were covered in hours of live, rolling television broadcasts in America, Britain and internationally (see for example Bromley & Cushion, 2002 for British coverage; and Haes, 2003 for a comparison of American and German reporting of 9/11). Since 9/11, media coverage of terrorism has increased exponentially (Miller & Mills, 2009; Lewis, 2012). In the UK, the 7th July attacks in 2005 (7/7 as they became known) prompted similar live, continuous coverage of the aftermath, with the story taking the lead in the national press and television news in the days that followed (Ost et al, 2008: 7). Today, both 9/11 and 7/7 have become enduring points of reference for the media and politicians (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 131).

As with climate change, terrorism coverage is also subject to news values, but the issue easily meets a number of newsworthy criteria (Lewis, 2012: 258). Indeed, Lewis points out that it is hard to imagine a more newsworthy event than 9/11 (ibid). That single terrorist act changed the framework for the telling of the story of terrorism in the modern day (ibid). Prior to this event, the media's reporting was largely nation-specific, covering harm to citizens or threats to the nation, rather than overseas acts of terrorism (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). An unbalanced interest in other countries (Archetti, 2008) also affected coverage of international terrorism. The majority of terrorist attacks that take place

internationally have and continue to go unreported in domestic media, meaning when particular incidents do make the news, coverage is disproportionate to their social and political relevance (Picard, 1993 cited in Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006: 435). Post-9/11, the political climate engendered by the attacks led to some forms of terrorism becoming more newsworthy than others (Lewis, 2012: 258). Since that date, the terrorist threat is not perceived as a national issue, but as a global one (Beck, 2009b; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2013; 4). Its international dimension is defined primarily as a battle between the West and Arab world's (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2013: 4; Rapoport, 2004), and predominantly associated with Islam (Yusof et al, 2013; Lewis, 2012). Media coverage is also skewed towards the Western perspective on events (Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 1). There are exceptions to the global terrorist threat, with incidents occurring at a local or national level. National terrorist acts have taken place - in Oslo, Norway in 2011, for example, but these tend to be framed differently, as lone acts or troubled individuals (Powell, 2011: 91) quite different in context to the threat from Islamic terrorism.

9/11 refocused attention on what constitutes terrorism, who the enemy is and what the response should be, leading to over-inflation of the threat (Lewis, 2012: 258) and the continuity of an ever breaking story (Zalman & Clarke, 2009; Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 2). Such a narrative distorts both the scale and nature of the terrorist threat (Lewis, 2012: 268). It is at odds with figures on the frequency and source of attacks and has misrepresented terrorism, which is, in reality, "*a very rare phenomenon that does not happen in most neighbourhoods*" (Nellis & Savage, 2012: 751). The next sections of this chapter will look at the representation of terrorism post-9/11 in the media showing how political and media narratives have used fear, uncertainty and the threat of the 'other' to map the contours of terrorism and justify the response in the form of the war on terror.

2.4.1 9/11 and fear of the unknown: terrorism's Trojan horse?

9/11 was positioned as a novel breed of terrorism (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 125), inspired by fanatics and extremists with a deadly aversion to the West and its way of life. The collapse of the twin towers heralded a 'new' cultural, social and political paradigm with the attacks deprived of any historical or geopolitical context (Zalman & Clarke, 2009). Such a perspective was clear in a speech that then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair gave to the Labour Party Conference in 2004:

> *"...a wholly new phenomenon, worldwide global terrorism based on a perversion of the true, peaceful and honourable faith of Islam; that its roots are not superficial but deep, in the madrassehs of Pakistan, in the extreme forms of Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former training camps of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; in the cauldron of Chechnya; in parts of the politics of most countries of the Middle East and many in Asia; in the extremist minority that now in every European city preach hatred of the West and our way of life...*" (Tony Blair, speech to the Labour Party conference in Brighton, 28 September, 2004)

Acts of terrorism were no longer tied to crisis regions or specific nations (Volkmer, 2002): international terrorism had arrived in the West, constructing an imagined community (Anderson, 1996) facing a new and distinct threat (Lewis, 2012: 258).

At this junction, it is useful to consider, briefly, the news backdrop against which 9/11 occurred. News coverage of international affairs was increasingly neglected in the years prior to 9/11 (Zelizer & Allan, 2002; Waisbord, 2002). In the UK, according to a report by the *Media Standards Trust* (Moore, 2010), coverage of news beyond national borders has declined significantly over the last 30 years. The Trust found that international coverage had not only decreased in four of the UK's daily newspapers but that it was found beyond the first ten pages of the newspaper and often in the case of broadsheets in specialist sections. The trend is replicated in countries around the world (see for example, Randal, 1998 for a discussion of the decline of foreign news in the US media); and extends to television

coverage (see Aalberg et al, 2013). The reasons for the decline are varied. The blurring of foreign and domestic agendas is cited as one cause (Sambrook, 2010: 98). This is accompanied by issues including the changing face of the newsroom and the transition between the analogue and digital worlds (ibid, 2010: 97); the loss of specialist correspondents and the closing of foreign bureaux (ibid: 13); newspaper ownership structures (Baum & Zhukov, 2012); market-driven news agendas (Aalberg et al, 2013); and national interest and geographic proximity (ibid). Alongside these, what makes the news - the values behind news selection - are still an overarching framework. Increasingly, foreign news has fallen down the agenda unless, of course, it "*literally...blasts itself to the front page*" (Moore, 2010: 50).

With the decline of foreign news comes an incomplete and blurry picture of world affairs. When events like 9/11 or 7/7 occur, they appear to exist in a vacuum, devoid of context other than that which graces the page or screen. Indeed, when 9/11 occurred, little attention had been given to al Qaeda in the media (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 131) so sparse information about the cultural context of the attacks and Al Qaeda as an organisation 'existed'. Since 9/11, the opposite is true in terms of prominence - Al Qaeda has had almost permanent media exposure (ibid) but the cultural context - the critical perspective on foreign policy and the root causes of terrorism, are noticeably absent from media reports (Traugott & Brader, 2002: 5). Sambrook (2010: 102) argues that the media has a "*responsibility to bear witness*" and outlines a number of positive opportunities for the diversification of foreign news. Archetti (2012: 847) also notes the important role of foreign correspondents as "*sense makers*". These statements are particularly true in relation to the media reporting of terrorism (and indeed, climate change).

Returning to 9/11, the idea that the world changed as a result of this event was, Altheide (2007: 288) suggests, an 'artful' construction, connected to the fear that terrorism would also be apocalyptic (Croft & Moore, 2010: 15). The concept was no doubt helped by the searing void in international news described above. Although the attacks of 9/11 were unprecedented (Rapoport, 2004: 46), terrorism has deep cultural and historical relevance for many countries and regions around the world. The global South experiences the most terrorist attacks (Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 1) yet terrorism is a considerable priority for governments in the West (ibid). Global terrorism has been naturalised as an indigenous threat for Britain and the West in political and media discourse. The threat of terrorism as conveyed in the media, rather than real world events themselves, has directed the public's perception of the issue (Spencer, 2012: 12). As such, terrorism has been 'restored' as a threat to Britain and the West. The frontline is our towns and cities, even our nationality: as citizens of the West, the terror risk travels with us.

As outlined above, the narrative of fear has played a central role in normalising the threat of terrorism in the West. Muslims have been rhetorically positioned as a threat to Britain and 'Britishness', a narrative that wrongly implicates all Muslims, many of whom have their own identities and differentiations (Khiabany & Williamson, 2012). This narrative has "*glimpses of certain truths (some terrorists are Muslims)*" (Lewis, 2012: 268) and, potentially, the war on terror may have indeed fuelled attacks from this section of global society (Lewis, 2012). Although such a proposition is hard to measure, it is by no means implausible (ibid: 259). Quite in contrast to climate change, terrorism news has emphasised the local and national impact of the risk. A study by Ruigrok & van Atteveldt (2007) explored British, American and Dutch newspaper coverage of four different terrorist attacks, including 9/11 and 7/7, finding that initially reports skewed towards the global, but coverage soon turned inward, citing

domestic rather than international sources and seeking to give the attacks country-specific meaning (ibid: 85).

Political and media rhetoric has positioned international terrorism as an ever-present threat for the international community. A permanent state of emergency exists (Khiabany & Williamson, 2012: 147) constructed by the portrayal of a Western civilisation under threat from a shadowy, invisible enemy. The response has been the war on terror, a pre-emptive campaign that has no defined timeframe or end in sight and which has naturalised the threat of terrorism, becoming a way of life (ibid). This form of action is discussed in more detail next.

2.4.2 The War on Terror

In contrast to climate change, 'uncertainty' became a vehicle for action and a political tool in the case of terrorism. Pre-emptive strikes in the form of the war on terror sought to cushion the West from the spectre of further attacks in the future:

> *"On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars - but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war - but not at the center of a Great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks - but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day - and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack... Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." (Extract from President Bush's speech to a joint session of Congress and the American public, September 21st, 2001)*

Quite how the war on terror can be waged against neither a state nor organisation is, Freedman & Thussu (2012: 2) posit "*deeply questionable*" (ibid). Despite this, post 9/11, political rhetoric succeeded in narrowing the gap between what is and what might be in relation to terrorism (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 126-127), playing on fear which causes

citizens to be more supportive of an aggressive foreign policy (Powell, 2011: 107). In Britain and America, the outcome is that the public perceive the terrorist threat as both legitimate and objectively real (Altheide, 2009: 93), and, correspondingly, the government's actions are not seen as excessive (ibid).

Quickly, the war on terror became the prevailing organising principle of American foreign policy (Zalman & Clarke, 2009: paragraph 2), giving officials a renewed opportunity to position its 'friends' and 'enemies' around the globe - as it had via the Cold War frame previously (Norris et al, 2003: 9). Although Altheide (2003) argues that 9/11 was also encompassed within a crime-related discourse of fear, I suggest that crime does not cover the magnitude of the political response. The war on terror set the precedent for the response to terrorism in the modern world. It differed markedly to previous terrorist attacks, which were framed by the American government as criminal investigations (Ryan, 2004: 364). Similarly, in the UK, the previous terrorist threat from the IRA was addressed with diplomacy - leading to the Good Friday Agreement - sanctions, and via the criminal justice system.

Yet, 9/11 was communicated as a 'watershed moment' leading to legislation to combat the threat of terrorism in the UK, "*demonizing communities and curtailing civil liberties*" (Khiabany & Williamson, 2012: 145) in the process. Under the banner of the war on terror appeared national policies about immigration, its tentacles extending into detention, identity cards and policing (Mythen & Walklate, 2005 cited in Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 129). A 'caring', politically-rigorous response was intertwined with measures advocating control and surveillance (Altheide, 2007: 288).

The translation of the war on terror into the media has been the subject of a large swathe of research. The American media has been heavily criticised for their reporting. Coverage has been shown to have echoed the government's rhetoric (Ryan, 2004; Lewis & Reese, 2009), providing no alternative interpretations of the war on terror (Habermas, 2006: Lewis & Reese, 2009). The war on terror itself was naturalised as shorthand for policy (Lewis & Reese, 2009: 85), providing a name for widespread political change, national security debates and an institutionalised way of seeing the world (ibid). Jamail (2012: 290) argues that the American mainstream media "*blatantly abdicated its role of objective informer to the public and responsible critic of the presiding powers*", referring to the media's "*large-scale deception*"(ibid) at the "*behest of the American administrative system*"(ibid) as "*fraud*"(ibid). In a less accusatory stance, Navasky (2002) suggests that the American media confused the question of official policy with disloyalty, while Zelizer & Allan (2002) throw a lifeline to media, observing that there were in fact, no detached vantage points from which American journalists could report the attacks. In the UK, Papacharissi & Oliveira (2008) found newspaper coverage presented a range of diplomatic evaluations of the situation. Had Papacharissi & Oliveira also examined the British tabloid press in their study, they may have found different information. Their findings are also somewhat curbed by their sample size, which meant that twice as many articles from American newspapers were examined when compared to UK articles, potentially limiting opportunities for a comprehensive picture of British reporting to emerge.

According to Freedman & Thussu (2012: 14) "[*t*]*he war on terror frame is hardly convincing when significant parts of the Arab world are spilling onto the streets demanding democracy and not jihad*." Yet, the frame is given continuity by a continued media focus on the threat of extremism. Indeed, the recent extensive news coverage in the UK dedicated to the militant group ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) perpetuates the need for the war on

terror, in many cases without referring to it directly. The construction of the 'other' in the post-9/11 terrorist story has therefore been vital in helping maintain the longevity of the war on terror. It is this discursive positioning of the 'enemy' that this chapter now turns to.

2.4.3 Self and other[10]: Orientalist discourse in terrorism news

The polarisation of global society into the West/civilised world against the rest was made early after the 9/11 attacks in America (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007: 68-69). Such a positioning encompassed ideals that pitted good against evil (Mythen, 2005) and humanity against brutality. Woven throughout this narrative is the framing of Muslims and Islam. Negative in tone (Powell, 2011), it linked religion – Islam - to terrorism, an association repeatedly found in discourse, overtly and subjectively (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007; Volpp, 2002). Simultaneously, Muslims were dis-identified as citizens (Volpp, 2002: 1576), a move discursively compounded by the portrayal of the enemy as animals, prey or disease (Steuter & Wills, 2010; Steuter & Wills, 2009) - motifs which in some cases extended to entire populations (Steuter & Wills, 2009; 13). Language was also used in news reports to construct the enemy as different to 'our' Western world, places and troops. Iraqi's for example, are 'gunmen' or 'insurgents' rather than 'army' or 'soldiers' (Altheide, 2007: 290).

The resonance with Orientalism (Said, 2003) and Huntington's Clash of Civilisations is clear. The words 'Arab', 'Muslim' and 'Islam' are now discursively synonymous with terrorism (Jayyusi, 2012: 24), creating a misleading narrative (Lewis, 2012; 258) that designates these people, religion and certain regions a threat to security and civilisation (Jayyusi, 2012: 24). Indeed, according to Jayyusi, many in the Arab and Muslim world believe that transnational Islamist terrorism would not exist as a threat if American imperial intervention was absent (2012: 30).

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[10] Taken from Hutcheson et al, 2004

Longitudinal coverage of the war on terror has ensured that thematically, Muslims remain at the forefront of discourse (Powell, 2011: 108). Coverage of Muslims in the British press has significantly increased since 9/11 (Poole, 2002: 81; Moore et al, 2008), accompanied by 'scares' around Sharia Law, and most recently halal meat, which are reported as a threat to western culture and society. The war on terror further ramifies the division between the West and the rest, condensing the terrorist threat into a single, Islamic-based entity (Freedman & Thussu, 2012; Jayyusi, 2012), thus removing complexities around international terrorism and foreign policy.

Reducing terrorists to a single, homogenous group under the solitary banner of Islam divorces them from the cultural, political and social factors that mobilize their action. Such discursive positioning has the hallmarks of colonial or imperial appropriation (Jayyusi, 2012: 31). 'Terrorism' was the cause and war was the response (Entman, 2003). As Maggio (2007: 824) posits, 9/11 "... *could be seen as isolated events of madmen or as a systemic problem of the inequities of the world*", but instead the attacks prompted the war on terror and the associated 'Axis of Evil'. The latter Maggio notes, means "*one does not need to analyze the complex structures or causalities of separate nations and/or groups—they can be reduced to the signifier "the Axis of Evil." Second, it associates these regimes and groups with one of the United States' greatest enemies, the Axis Powers of World War II*" (2007: 830). It is argued, that the media have denied space to both commentators and stories relating to the 'real' causes of terrorism (Media lens, 2001). The motivation for acts of terrorism is attributed to a number of factors including: the existence of grievances among a particular group within society (Crenshaw, 1981); a lack of opportunity for political participation (ibid); ideological, for example global salafi jihad (Freeman, 2008); and state failure, war or recent regime change (LaFree, 2009). Around these areas however, there is considerable debate.

Gassebner & Luechinger (2011) found that higher levels of poverty and illiteracy were not associated with greater terrorism. High levels of terrorism could only be accurately predicted, they argue, by lack of civil liberties and high population growth. There is debate too, about whether terrorists are poor and uneducated or from more middle-class backgrounds. Research by Krueger & Malečková (2002: 29) found that participants in Hezbollah's militant wing were "*at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as they were to come from impoverished families without educational opportunities.*" Newman (2006) has pointed out the difficulties in establishing causal relationships between causes and terrorism, although did find a "*tentative correlation*" (p769) between "*the social and political conditions of the societies from which the most deadly terrorist organizations emerged and are based*" (ibid). Bjorgo (2005: 1) refers to the complexity of identifying the root causes of terrorism, a fact that he says is not helped by the elusive definition of the word terrorism itself (ibid). According to Walsh (2010: 1) most terrorist attacks do not receive attention from major media outlets in the US or the West, meaning that opportunities to cover the causes of terrorism are further limited. Clearly, such an approach fits the Western view of terrorism post-9/11, and casts a veil over motivations that may arise from "*the ugly side of Western foreign policy, with its support for and arming of various brutal regimes*" (Lewis, 2012: 264, referring to work by Lewis et al, 2009).

As with climate change, the groups and individuals with discursive control of the media agenda set the parameters for both definition of terrorism and the war on terror, along with other responses. There is considerable risk here, however, as Freedman and Thussu note:

> "[*T*]*hose who have definitional power in the West will continue to conflate many different political responses to perceived injustices - failing to distinguish, for example, between the attacks in London on 7/7 and the resistance to the occupation of Iraq - as 'terrorist' (and therefore illegitimate) and the West's attempts to pre-empt or challenge them as necessarily justified acts of 'counter-terrorism.*'" (2012: 9)

The next section of this chapter takes up this issue, examining the impact of rhetorical ownership of terrorism in the media.

2.4.4 Terrorism: rhetorical 'ownership' and language traits in the media

The reporting of 9/11 and terrorist acts since that time has been dominated by a reliance on official sources such as the government and military (Ryan, 2004; Papacharissi & Olivieria, 2008; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005). Their prominence reflects news values and, in the case of the military, may attest to the impact of the embedding of reporters with troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also reflects a climate in which terrorism rhetoric is used to generate fear (Powell, 2011) and to maintain levels of spending (Lewis, 2012). In the aftermath of 9/11, reporting in the American media focused on American sources, as opposed to foreign sources (Archetti, 2008). Political actors sought to shape the nation's discourse of foreign affairs, creating dominant hegemonic narratives that structured foreign policy debate (Krebz & Lobasz, 2007: 410), fixing the meaning of 9/11 to pave the way for an aggressive military response (ibid). The embedding of reporters in Iraq and Afghanistan has also added to the misrepresentation of the war on terrorism, allowing the coalition to "*reduce the visual impact of the war*" (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 251) and offering a sanitized version of military action (Aday et al, 2005).

Differences are found in the visibility of elite sources between countries. The American press, for example, relied more heavily on official government and military sources than the Swedish press in reporting terrorist incidents (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005). The media of Pakistan and Europe have also been shown to utilise more foreign sources in reporting 9/11, when compared to the American press, offering plural views in their reports (Archetti, 2008). Such differences in actors clearly reflect news values and national interest (ibid: 473),

and attest to the potential for such actors to dominate and shape discourse in their respective countries.

Beyond the government and military, there is a noticeable absence of academics and 'specialists' in terrorism news. Reports fail to capture the voices found in journal articles and academia that may offer an impartial, critical and contextual role (Miller & Mills, 2009) in explaining terrorism, its causes and the implications of policy actions. When representatives of this group are featured, they are disproportionately linked to corporate and to state institutions, and are "*overwhelmingly signed up to the orthodox view on terrorism*" (ibid: 431). According to Khiabany & Williamson (2012: 136) "*liberal intellectuals, with very little or no knowledge of Islam have been given space to express their views and offer their solutions to this perceived crisis and threat*". The public do lend their voices to terrorism news, but have been shown to echo government or media themes (Hutchenson et al, 2004).

Also absent are non-Western voices that may challenge official discourse. Jamail (2012: 293) notes that the 'deployment of voices' (ibid: 293) from counties such as Iraq in the American media are those that bring 'implicit support' to military operations (ibid). In his telling article, Jamail highlights the voices from the people of Iraq that tell a very different story to that of the mainstream media (see Jamail, 2012).

What the research discussed above indicates is that the reliance on official sources to interpret acts of terror such as 9/11 and to articulate the war on terror means that these actors control and shape the definition of both terrorism and the action in response. They are afforded space to engage in national identity-affirming discourse (Hutcheson et al, 2004: 35) and have been shown to discursively shape news around 'self and other' (ibid: 44) ascribing positive values to the former while simultaneously denigrating the latter (ibid).

Cumulatively, from the impact of 9/11 to the continuity of the war on terror, this section of the chapter has shown how terrorism is "*the ultimate breaking news story*" (Lewis, 2012: 268) with a narrative that "*harness[es] public anxieties and fears for political ends*" (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 138). It testifies to the "*powerful vested interests in who might benefit from the amplification of the terrorist threat*" (Lewis, 2012: 261).

2.5 The gap in the field

The studies discussed in this chapter reveal and examine the disparity evident in media coverage of climate change and terrorism. The media has signalled the importance of climate change and terrorism to society, favouring the latter more than the former, which has commanded significant coverage since 2001. Climate change has a diminished news value (Lewis, 2012: 261) arriving in the press via an emphasis on uncertainty, debate and controversy. There is procrastination around action, directly correlating to such an emphasis. Terrorism on the other hand has dominated media coverage, incorporating "*fear, violence and war*" (Lewis, 2012: 267) into its telling. Rather than weakening the threat, uncertainty about when, where or even if terrorist attacks might happen has become the impetus for political and military action. Thus, terrorism has become "*the most serious threat in our collective imagination*" (Freedman & Thussu, 2012: 2).

While news values can explain the disparities between climate change and terrorism coverage to a degree, it is clear that the saliency of news is also tied to historical and political contexts (Lewis, 2012: 261). To this end, there is a clear synergy between terrorism and climate change: "*[t]he very quality of democracy depends upon public access to a free and undistorted range of information*" (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 138). As outlined above, information in the media on climate change and terrorism has been "*expanded and shrunk*" (ibid) to fit political agendas, and has "*not led to an instructive and balanced range of*

information" (ibid). The consequences for how the public make sense of the information they are presented with, are serious (ibid). Indeed, the studies discussed above either recognise directly or attest to the role of the media in representing, reinforcing and perpetuating misinformation on both climate change and terrorism, with very different consequences for both policy and individual agency.

Beyond these similarities and differences in media coverage, I suggest that there is also a void amongst existing literature on climate change communication that arises from the solitary examination of the issue. In recommending how best the media should cover climate change, researchers have, as noted above, pointed to the inclusion of context (Corbett & Durfee, 2004) or percentages and maths in reports (Painter, 2013). Understanding more about the antagonistic messages in the climate change environment which cause confusion and ambiguity in communication has also been suggested as an avenue of research (Kahan, 2013). Yet, none of these studies have sought to situate climate change among its 'competitors' in the field of global risks. Thus, questions such as 'could the 'antagonistic messages' Kahan identifies as clouding the climate change narrative be derived from elsewhere in the media sphere?' or 'What can climate change communicators learn from the media presence of terrorism?' remain unaddressed and unanswered.

It is among these disparities, similarities and questions that this research finds its niche. While conclusions can be drawn from a review of the literature, no studies have empirically tested the claims highlighted here. Parallels have been drawn between the issues (see Lewis, 2012), but to date, there is no known comparison of media coverage of climate change and terrorism. Governed by Beck's view that positions the media as central force in risk communication: [w]*ithout techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media...risks are nothing at all* (Beck, 2006: 332), this study comparatively explores the

media's reporting of climate change and terrorism as risks. I argue that comparing these risks provides a better vantage point for understanding media representations of global risks and may thus help shape climate communications in the future.

Such a methodological approach is not without its own risks. As Kitzinger (1999) stresses, attempting to compare risks can cause problems because of the nuances associated with each topic and the fact that there is no category of 'risk journalism' in the sense that there is for crime, sport, politics, home affairs and so on. I suggest that these differences do not mean that such comparisons should not be attempted. Indeed in the case of global risks, I argue that such a comparison is timely and necessary. The central, and rather basic, research question guiding this work is:

RQ1: How have the UK press reported climate change and terrorism as risks? Specifically, how are they presented as global risks; what is the nature of that risk; who has definitional control of these global risks; how are the risks articulated in terms of action, responsibility and cause. Where are the debates over the issue and who speaks on them?

Although straightforward and general, this question is essential to address since this topic has not been covered in empirical research to date. Its simplicity will establish whether the patterns identified by the literature review exist within British media coverage, reveal any ideological differences in reporting, and test whether a comparative approach to two very different risks is feasible. This study also aims to use the data produced to answer the following sub question:

RQ2: What can be inferred from the data collected about the representation of these risks?

This chapter has outlined the theoretical compass guiding this work and discussed existing research on the topics of media coverage of climate change and terrorism. It has identified the gap emerging from that research and used that information to explain the motivation and remit of this work, including the research questions to be addressed by this study. The next chapter will explain the methodology utilised to answer those research questions.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological framework underpinning this study and describes the research design used to analyse newspaper reports. It is organised in three sections. The first sets out the factors influencing the research design and addresses the rationale behind choosing content analysis as a method. The second explains the research design in detail including the coding categories used to analyse the sample articles. The third explores the research design in practice and notes the limitations of the chosen method. The chapter concludes with summary of the main points.

3.2 Factors governing methodological choices and research design

The purpose of this research is to provide a longitudinal comparative study of five British mainstream newspapers' reporting of climate change and terrorism, examining the topics not in isolation but directly comparing the two. It is guided by a central research question:

How have the UK press reported climate change and terrorism as risks? Specifically, how are they presented as global risks; what is the nature of that risk; who has definitional control of these global risks; how are the risks articulated in terms of action, responsibility and cause. Where are the debates over the issue and who speaks on them?

It also aims to address the following sub question around the implications of reporting:

What can be inferred from the data collected about the representation of these risks?

The data should therefore enable inferences to be made not only about the similarities and differences in reporting, but also to evaluate the effect that these may have had on public understanding of climate change and terrorism. The data should also contribute to the bodies of research on media coverage of climate change and terrorism for each issue individually.

Governing the method and research design are four key considerations:

- The topics of climate change and terrorism which are distinct by nature and different in make-up but need to be compared and contrasted simultaneously.
- The number of articles to be analysed which total more than 1000 taken from across the 14 years of this study.
- The need to identify trends and patterns in sample articles and enable conclusions to be drawn about the longitudinal, comparative occurrence of these.
- To generate data that can inform suggestions about the potential effect of such patterns on public understanding of climate change and terrorism.

3.3 Content analysis

Given the aims and considerations outlined above, content analysis offered a method within which the varied elements of climate change and terrorism could be captured and compared in a manageable way. In the field of journalism, content analysis has been used to examine the impact of reporting of terrorism on policy (Weimann & Brosius, 1991); longitudinal studies of climate change (McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Boykoff, 2007); the portrayal of Muslims in the British press (Moore et al, 2008); and to identify the ways in which media coverage undermined or validated the British government's case for war in Iraq (Lewis & Brookes, 2004), among others. The method has

the functionality to work as a stand-alone technique (see Couldry & Downey, 2004; Nord & Stromback, 2006) or part of a multi-method design (see Mogensen, 2002 & 2008; Hargreaves et al, 2003; Christie, 2006).

A variety of definitions have sought to classify content analysis, particularly since the publication of Bereleson's book[11] in 1952 which provided the first orderly and integrated approach to the method (according to Krippendorff, 2004: 14). Some definitions focus on content analysis' systematic approach (Krippendorff, 2004), while others highlight the end goals of the method (Riffe et al, 2005). The definition most relevant to this research comes from Hansen et al who say content analysis is:

> "...*a method to identify and count the occurrence of specified characteristics or dimensions of texts and through this be able to say something about the messages, images, representations of such texts and their wider social significance.*" (Hansen et al, 1998: 95).

Hansen's definition offers the scope to combine both quantitative and qualitative research in a content analysis, attaching importance to the inferences originating from a study of manifest communication content. It allows for an examination of not only *what* is said, but *why* and *how* (Riffe et al, 2005), for example, which "*...actors, sources and primary definers...[are] portrayed as saying and doing what and to whom...*"(Hansen et al, 1998: 108).

Importantly, content analysis can cope with large volumes of data (Stemler, 2001; Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al, 2005) and caters for longitudinal studies. The method enables trends and patterns to emerge and the evolution of media coverage to be documented (Hansen et al, 1998; Stemler, 2001; Krippendorff, 2004). Done correctly, content analysis provides solid, replicable data characterised by reliability and validity.

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[11]*Content Analysis in Communications Research* drew on earlier work in 1948 by Berelson and Lazarsfeld

Critics of the method argue that the frequency of an item in the coding process does not mean that item is the most significant (Burgelin, 1972 cited in Krippendorff, 2004: 139; Riffe et al, 2005). However, word and thematic frequency in media reports has been shown to affect public understanding of issues. People are selective in the attention they pay to the news media and to reporting of specific issues (Holbrook et al, 2005). Hargreaves et al (2003) explain this further:

> "*Most people consume news rather inadvertently, and hence only take in certain aspects of a story... They also find it hard to follow the often truncated narratives of news – which unlike other stories, tends to start with the climax of a story before giving any history or background – and hence a great deal of information passes people by. The information that does stick, in this context, is often based on often repeated associations (Lewis, 1992; 2001).*" (Hargreaves et al, 2003: 36)

In addition, Hargreaves et al (2003) found that although repetition helped generate understanding of an issue it could also cause discrepancies and the establishment of links between details that are not necessarily connected:

> "*... Thus what is, in media coverage, merely a juxtaposition... undergoes a cognitive leap in public understanding, so that it is understood as a causal relationship.*" (Hargreaves et al, 2003: 50)

The data derived from analysing the frequency of themes in this research is of particular value as climate change and terrorism are issues that the majority of the public have no first-hand experience of (Nellis & Savage, 2012; Tulloch & Lupton, 2003). The media therefore play an essential role in communicating information about these topics. The literature review demonstrated the effect that the use of particular words had on members of the public, such as 'global warming' or 'climate change' in relation to their perception of the issue. It also illustrated how frequent themes found in the media, such as the link between climate change and its impact on the developing world, or climate science as a subject in dispute, have also translated to public observations. Understanding more about

the frequency of particular themes, news hooks, narratives, voices and issues of debate, is therefore important in establishing patterns and identifying dominant narratives, competing narratives and indeed complementary narratives and using these to make informed inferences about the potential messages the media convey to the public on these risks.

Further methodological concerns surrounding content analysis focus on objectivity and the possibility of a large number of coding categories (Krippendorff, 2004; Stemler, 2001). Categories should be clear and replicable and need a full and considerable explanation and interpretation (Hansen et al, 1998: 115). As it can analyse such large data sets, the element of confusion, or over-complication of what to search for is present. As Stemler points out, "*two fatal flaws that destroy the utility of a content analysis are faulty definitions of categories and non-mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories*" (Stemler, 2001: paragraph 29). However, these issues are problems with the research design, and are not intrinsic to the method itself, meaning that they can be overcome by accuracy and precise planning. This research used a number of pilot studies to test coding categories and as a I was the single coder for this research, there was no confusion or misinterpretation of categories.

Finally, content analysis is often criticised for the limited conclusions and inferences that can be drawn from results. Hansen et al argue for a research approach that unites qualitative and quantitative methods:

> "*… rather than emphasising its alleged incompatibility with other more qualitative approaches (such as semiotics, structuralist analysis, discourse analysis) we wish to stress … that content analysis is and should be enriched by the theoretical framework offered by other more qualitative approaches, while bringing to these a methodological rigour, prescriptions for use, and systematicity rarely found in many of the more qualitative approaches*" (Hansen et al, 1998: 91).

With these criticisms in mind, I decided to combine both quantitative and qualitative categories within the content analysis design. As well as using traditional coding categories,

such as sources, I also included discursive elements, for example news hooks, discourses and topics of debate. Additionally, the data produced by the content analysis was supplemented with a small discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis is the "*study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life*" (Taylor, 2013: 7). Studying how language is used and who speaks gives cues about how meaning is formed and how those meanings link to power relations or wider socio-cultural meaning and practices (ibid: 10). As Fairclough notes, discourse analysis can help reveal "*the non-obvious ways in which language is involved in social relations of power and domination, and in ideology*" (Fairclough, 2001: 229).

Discourse analysis and its various methods of use are criticised on a number of levels. Some argue that relationships, for example that between power and discourse, are highly complex (Wodack & Busch, 2004: 109). Others suggest that the method produces interpretations and not facts (Taylor, 2013: 82). However, discourse analysis has many positives, including its ability to deliver substantial data on the role of language and the use of texts in the "*reproduction of dominance and inequalities in society*" (Krippendorff, 2004: 65).

Within this study, the purpose of discourse analysis is to enable the evidence-based findings generated by the content analysis to be brought to life, providing colour to the empirical data. The selection of articles for this purpose is explained further in section 3.6.

3.4 Gathering the research sample

This timescale for this research is a 14-year period from 01 January 1999 – 31 December 2012. It is comprised of two separate data sets: the first examining articles from January 1999-December 2008, which was the initial scope of the work; and a second, which examined articles from January 2009-December 2012 and was added to give this research timeliness.

The original timescale was chosen because it encompassed landmark events such as 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings as well as the 2001 and 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. During this timeframe, these high-profile, significant events are also matched by periods of relative stability, which allowed the study to capture reports of major consequence as well as the more mundane, day-to-day patterns of reporting.

Five British national newspapers were selected for this study based on their availability in the database *LexisNexis.* They are:

- *Daily Mail* (and the *Mail on Sunday*)
- *The Guardian*
- *The Independent*
- *Daily Mirror* (and *Sunday Mirror*)
- *The Times*

These newspapers represent a cross-section of the British newspaper industry, spanning the political spectrum and the tabloid-broadsheet divide. Known for their agenda-setting role, broadsheet newspapers or the 'quality press' are an important source of news with a reputation for influencing both national and international policy and decision-making (Boykoff, 2008: 551). These newspapers have been the focus of much research on both climate change and terrorism reporting (see for example Carvalho (2007) for climate change

and Papacharissi and Olivieria (2008) for terrorism) because of such status. Tabloids' too

represent an influential source of news with considerably higher circulation figures than

broadsheet newspapers and a source of news that is often shared in public places (Boykoff,

2008: 551).

With circulation figures of 185,429[12], *The Guardian* is the most left-leaning of the three

broadsheet newspapers in this study. At the opposite political end of the spectrum, *The*

Times is a Conservative newspaper with average circulation figures of 396,621 - the highest

of the three broadsheets featuring in this research. While it tends to lean more towards the

political left, *The Independent* is also known to have right values too. Its average circulation

figures are 61,338.

Of all of the newspapers in this research, the *Daily Mail* has the highest circulation figure of

1,688,727. Traditionally Conservative in its values, it is a middle-market tabloid. The *Daily*

Mirror has an average circulation of 922,235 and is known for its working-class values and

largely leaning towards the left of the political spectrum.

Including these five newspapers in this study enables this research to capture data that can

be interpreted in relation to both ideology and format, thus providing a comprehensive

picture of newspaper coverage of terrorism and climate change in the UK. Although it would

have been beneficial to include *The Sun*, *The Telegraph* and *The Express* in order to examine

the eight main daily newspapers in the UK, this was not possible because the *LexisNexis*

archive did not hold content for these newspapers as far back as 1999.

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[12] Circulation figures are taken from the ABC figures for January 2015 accessed at
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/national-press-abcs-times-bucks-trend-again-32-cent-print-
circulation-boost on 22nd February 2015.

A search of *LexisNexis* was carried out for climate change and terrorism separately, using the keywords 'climate change' or 'global warming'; and 'terrorism', 'terrorist' or 'terrorists'. Articles with 'three or more' mentions of any of these keywords was set as a search term, the purpose of which was to remove passing and inconsequential references to each topic. Table 1 shows the number of articles generated by this search.

Table 1: Coverage of terrorism (keywords: 'Terrorism', 'Terrorist', 'Terrorists') and climate change (keywords: 'Climate Change', 'Global Warming') in the *Daily Mail*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Times* and the *Daily Mirror*

Year	Climate change	Terrorism
1999	219	954
2000	390	822
2001	452	4,644
2002	349	3,242
2003	274	2,756
2004	532	3,605
2005	1,170	4,004
2006	1,549	2,684
2007	2,101	2,057
2008	1,299	1,968
2009	2,044	2,698
2010	951	2,132
2011	643	1,906
2012	389	1,654
TOTAL	**12,162**	**35,126**

As the aim of this research was to compare and contrast reporting, I decided upon a sampling method that would provide similar numbers of articles for climate change and terrorism. Based on the total number of articles overall, one in every 16 articles was coded for climate change and one in every 51 for terrorism for the period 1999-2008. The first article appearing every month between 2009 and 2012 was then added to the original sample. The rationale for opting for a different sampling method for this second data set was to provide a known number of articles (12 per year) which would not cause significant distortion in figures when added to the original sample. The downside of using such a

sampling method was that it meant that for this section of the research the data generated was restricted. It also distorted the overall sample picture since there is drop in each area examined by the content analysis, directly related to the coding of only 12 articles per year between 2009 and 2012. This is taken into account when discussing the results in subsequent chapters, and I feel that the compromise here is offset by adding timeliness to this research.

Sunday newspapers were removed from the samples (*LexisNexis* did not have an option to remove these at the search stage), as were unexpected articles (e.g. one from the *Evening Standard* which was not part of the original search) and letters to the editor. This gave a total sample size of 496 articles for climate change and 517 articles for terrorism. The sample consisted of news articles, editorial and opinion pieces. The articles were exported in text files from *LexisNexis* to enable coding to take place.

3.5 Coding design

The aim of the coding design was to provide an overarching structure that would produce comparative data for climate change and terrorism, whilst simultaneously allowing each issue to retain its integrity. I was mindful not to force the issues to fit categories that would compromise their individual characteristics. As such, my content analysis design draws on and adapts several studies for influence (these are discussed below), and is also based on my own understanding of climate change and terrorism as risks.

Two separate coding sheets were developed for climate change and terrorism with the same overarching structure. Firstly background information about each article was recorded, capturing the following information:

- Newspaper

- Date
- Article length
- Position (front, first 10, other)
- Author (specialist, named, unnamed)
- Headline
- Article type (home, world, editorial, opinion, feature, NIB)
- Location (where in the world the story refers to)

Beyond this generic information, the following coding categories provided the substantive data for this research:

- News hook
- Narrative/discourse
- Sources (direct quotes as well as indirect references)
- Responsibility and action (incorporating types of action)
- Conflict and debate
- Human interest angle
- Representation of risk
- Causes

The category of 'news hook' has been successfully used by Moore et al (2008) to capture the main focus or newsworthy aspect of articles (ibid: 10) about Muslims in the media. Such an option in this study allowed climate change and terrorism to retain their identity whilst enabling data to indicate the differences or similarities in the news angles for each issue. This category is complemented by the narratives/discourse section, which takes its steer from the themes emerging from the literature review (Chapter 2). Maule (2007) showed that the public were more likely to remember and associate prominent terms such as 9/11, 7/7 and human rights with terrorism, whilst Hargreaves et al (2003) demonstrated how repeated ideas and general themes evident in the reporting of climate change were dominant in public understanding of the issue. The narrative themes selected for this research relate to climate change and terrorism individually, although in some cases there are crossovers: the narratives of 'finance' and 'no trust', for example appear on both coding sheets. Combined, news hook and narrative/discourse capture the nature of news coverage, enabling comparative assessments to be made about news angles, headlines and thematic

traits. They also provide an indication as to the effect of a newspaper's ideology on both the appearance of climate change and terrorism news and the discursive contours of reports.

The 'source' category emerged from pilot coding exercises, the findings of the literature review and my own thoughts on this field in relation to media coverage of terrorism and climate change.

The 'action and responsibility', 'conflict' and 'human interest' sections take their influence from Valkenburg et al's framing categorisation (1999). Although this study did not look at frames, these headline categories are particularly relevant to both climate change and terrorism, corresponding to key areas identified and discussed in the literature review. Using such topical categories acted as a unifying structure for climate change and terrorism news, while allowing information on these sections to relate specifically to each issue. Valkenburg et al's fourth category - economic consequences - was captured in two different ways - firstly by looking at finance/economy as a discursive theme and a secondly by including finance/investment as an action.

The categories above captured distinct elements of climate change and terrorism news, but I also decided to code for causes and risk impact/effect. The rationale for including these categories was to look at the whole picture or grand narrative of climate change and terrorism, and to be able to identify any missing links between cause, effect and response in news reporting.

Pilot coding exercises tested and refined the design of the coding categories. Each of the final, substantive overarching categories is discussed in more detail below to explain their

component parts. Since climate change and terrorism are very different in their characteristics, these categories featured areas and themes unique to each issue.

3.5.1 News hooks

A total of 19 separate news hooks were coded in climate change articles and 25 news hooks were coded in terrorism articles (see table 2). Each article was coded for one news hook, evidenced from the headline or, if the headline was abstract, the introductory paragraph/s of the article. Most news hooks are self-explanatory, but I will explain the few that I believe may raise queries in terms of exclusivity of coding categories. On climate change, I coded 'international action' and 'Kyoto protocol' as separate news hooks. The figures are combined in discussing the data, as the Kyoto protocol is a form of international action. However, I wanted to record how many times the 'official' response to climate change was used as a news hook, and to be able to compare this action with references to the 'official' responses to terrorism such as 'war', or 'counter-terrorism'. Secondly, 'environmental policy/scheme' and 'counter-terrorism policy/scheme' differ from 'international action' because the former relates to single country policies or actions, the latter to the involvement of multiple (two or more) countries in a form of action. Finally, I included 'Election' as a category because although other categories captured various facets of political action or comment, I wanted to identify how often climate change and terrorism featured in election coverage and thus to understand whether they were prominent issues at a time when public engagement with politics is heightened.

Table 2: News hooks (options) for climate change and terrorism

Climate change		Terrorism	
Weather	Natural disaster	Terrorist attack	Potential terrorist attack
Environmental policy / scheme (non-political)	Meeting or speech	Arrest or prosecution	Inquest or inquiry
IPCC	Pressure group activity	Pressure group activity	Immigration
Wildlife	Other media	Intelligence	Counter-terrorism policy or scheme
Pollution	Future events or effects	Opinion poll data	Meeting or speech
Opinion poll data	International action/global strategy	International action /global strategy	Aftermath of terrorist activity
Kyoto	Lifestyle	Military	Religion
Other research/report (non-scientific)	Election	Death	Lifestyle
Scientific evidence or research	Failure to act	War	Criminal justice issues
Environmental politics		PR by terrorist group	Anniversary of terrorist event
None		Peace process	Policing
		Election	Other media
		Report	None

3.5.2 Narrative/discourse

The narrative themes and discourses used to report climate change and terrorism are shown in table 3. They are different for both terrorism and climate change, with the exception of seven cross-over categories that can be applied to both issues. It could be argued that these narratives should have been the same for both terrorism and climate change. While such a treatment of these issues may indeed have been appropriate in a comparative study, I believe that examining the issues in this way would have potentially produced limited results. For example, 'meteorology' and 'scientific divides' do not translate to terrorism. Similarly, using a broad narrative such as 'conflict' while applicable to both

climate change and terrorism would not have captured the nuances of the conflict such as the war on terror.

Articles were coded for the presence of any of the themes in table 3, meaning that one article may have featured more than one theme. I included '9/11' and the 'war on terror' as narratives since the literature suggests that these terms have actually become defining narratives in their own right (see for example Lewis, 2012). Conversely, the Kyoto Protocol does not feature here and is instead utilised as a news hook since this form of action has not gained traction as a narrative. Instead, because the literature suggests that action on climate change is varied, inconsistent and debated, I created the category 'call for action' which captures narratives that suggest the need for urgent action on climate change.

There are crossovers between this category and news hooks in some instances. For example, 'weather' was coded as a news hook while 'meteorology' is coded as a discourse. These categories are exclusive to each section respectively and the intention was not to replicate information. However, meteorology as a discourse extends weather (and natural disaster) beyond a headline or news hook and into a defining frame for the climate change narrative. Similarly, although counter-terrorism also featured as a news hook, it is an established discourse in its own right thus is also included in this section.

Table 3: Narrative/discourse (options) for climate change and terrorism

Climate change		Terrorism	
Current risk	No trust	Current risk	Victim
Future risk	Poverty (inclusive of climate victims)	Future risk	Propaganda
Ecology	Complexity of climate change	Religious conflict	Extremism
Meteorology	Globalisation	9/11	Fear of biochemical
Call for action	Security (inclusive of energy security, national security, border security)	Fear of the unknown	Crime / underworld
Conflict or war	Religion	War on terror	Democracy
Financial	Consumerism	Counter-terrorism	Islamophobia
Eco terrorism or crime	Sustainability	Asylum	Financial
Scientific divides	Blame	Culture clash	Human rights
Myth of nature	History	Foreign policy	Globalisation
None		History	No trust
		Patriotism / identity	Evil
		None	

3.5.3 Voices

This section of the coding design aimed to examine who or what was quoted within articles in order to provide information about the dominant voices in news about climate change and terrorism. We know that news is not politically innocent (Lewis, 2012) so exploring the individuals and groups in reports indicates who defines and shapes the confines of each risk, who legitimises action and indeed, those individuals and groups who do not have such a role. 32 different types of 'source' were identified for climate change and 38 were identified for terrorism (table 4 shows these categories in full). Sources were individually recorded as, for example, Prime Minister, Opposition Minister, Opposition Government, but in interpreting the results for Chapter 6, these are counted together under the general heading of 'UK government'. Sources were coded according to their origin (police, Prime Minister, public and so on), if they were named within articles and whether they were quoted directly. Sources were counted upon their first appearance within an article.

Table 4: Source (options) for climate change and terrorism

Climate change		Terrorism	
Public	MET office	Public	Business
Foreign Government	Prime Minister	Foreign Government	Science
Academic	Public body	Academic	Ambassador/ diplomat
Celebrity	Business	Celebrity	Lobby group
UK Government	Government scientist	UK Government	Police
Local Council	Opposition leader	Local Council	Terrorist
News (other)	Opposition minister	Prime Minister	Opposition leader
Pressure group	Report	Public body	Opposition minister
Police	World group	News (other)	Charity
Scientist	Think tank	Foreign military	Report
Charity	Religion	Medical	World group
Poll	Royal	Security service	Think tank / analyst
Ambassador/diplomat	Legal	Terrorist spokesperson	Poll
Independent group	Critic	Video/media	Royal
Unnamed source	Expert	Religion	Legal
Supporter	None	Security service (international)	Expert
Medical		Independent group	Legal (international)
		Militia	Police (international)
		Military	Unnamed source
		None	

3.5.4 Responsibility and action

Responsibility and action was an overarching category which recorded information in a number of ways. First, the type of primary action was recorded. Next any specific detail relating to action was coded. For example, 'legal' refers to the primary action and 'police powers' to a specific action type. The group with responsibility for delivering action was also recorded. In some cases actions span stakeholder groups, for example the creation of new laws to tackle terrorism is threaded between both legal and political spheres. For the purpose of this study, the group assigned to bringing, or currently delivering the action and named in the article was coded, rather than those who may at a future point see it though. These groups included the UK government, foreign governments and individuals. I also

identified collective terms such as 'we', 'the world' and 'the West', which were also coded. This was to indicate how responsibility was apportioned in articles. The types of action and specific action coded in this study can be found in table 5. Table 6 shows which group in society is reported as bearing responsibility for these actions.

Table 5: Types of action and specific action (options) for climate change and terrorism

Climate Change		Terrorism	
Action category	**Specific actions**	**Action category**	**Specific actions**
Scientific	Policy	Political	Military action
Technology	Lifestyle change	Legal	Homeland policy or law
Economic	Cooperation	Psychological	Police powers
Ecological	Research	Social	Public restrictions
Political	Conserve	Financial	Cooperation
Social	Nuclear	Defence	Condemn/carry on
Legal	Aid	Intelligence	Foreign Policy (hard)
Humanitarian	Reduce emissions	Arms	Foreign Policy (soft)
Financial	Renewable energy	Humanitarian	Security increase
Technical	Consumption	Economic	Criminal
None	Manage or adapt	Diplomatic	Sanctions
	Offset	None	Citizenship
	Trade		Raise awareness
	Tax		Military (peacekeeping)
	Educate		Investigate
	Punish		Strategy
	Raise awareness		None
	None		

Table 6: Responsibility for action (options) for climate change and terrorism

Climate change		Terrorism	
UK Government	Nation (specific)	UK Government	Military
Foreign Government	'We' (generic term)	Foreign Government	Religion
Governments (named, plural)	Business	Governments (named, plural)	Policing
International efforts	Local Government	International efforts	Security
Europe	World	Europe	Community
West/Rich	Humans	West/Rich	Terrorists
Developing world	No-one named	Nation (specific)	No-one named
Independent group	Academic	Humans	Business
Pressure group	None	'We' (generic term)	Policing (international)
		Military (international)	Security (international)
		None	

3.5.5 Conflict

This section of the research sought to capture conflict in all forms. This encompassed disagreements, debate, uncertainty, contradictions, opposition, conflict, challenges, ambivalence and criticism. Overt references to debate or opposition as well as inferences to such were coded. Hesitancy and moot points were also recorded, but often these were more subtly reported. Eight areas of general debate or sources of conflict were identified for terrorism and 10 for climate change, as shown in table 7. Six of these areas are common to both climate change and terrorism. The remaining areas in the table are not relevant to both, but to each issue separately.

The issue of 'what should be done' is included in both terrorism and climate change coding. This category is not necessarily a source of uncertainty or debate. However, it does represent an alternative view, opinion or approach, and as such is important to capture here.

Table 7: Sources of uncertainty or debate in reporting (options)

Climate change	Terrorism
Current action (a definite course of action)	Current action (a definite course of action)
Future action (a definite course of action)	Future action (a definite course of action)
What should be done (speculative action or approach)	What should be done (speculative action or approach)
Level of risk	Level of risk
Causes of climate change	Causes of terrorism
Evidence of climate change risk	Evidence of terrorism risk / impending attack
Effects of climate change	What equates to terrorism
Existence of climate change	Terrorist organisation responsible
Science	None
Global warming (general)	
None	

Each article was examined for the presence of these topics in relation to uncertainty or debate. If present within an article, it was recorded once irrespective of the number of times it appeared within that article. One article may however have featured several of these areas. Additional data was also captured about the stakeholders involved in the debate. If two parties were involved and both were referenced in the newspaper report, they were coded as having opposing views, assuming that they were opposed and not in agreement: for example UK government - UK government; UK government - pressure groups. In some instances just one group voiced a concern, but it was not clear at who their grievance or difference was directed. Here, just the one group was coded.[13] In other instances, debate and difference was referred to, but it was not voiced by a particular group, in which case it was coded as 'not clear'. This resulted in identification of the main stakeholder groups involved in debates or conflict.

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[13] This also referred to opinion pieces from journalists who frequently used their column space to disagree with something, but it was not directed at any other group in particular.

3.5.6 Human interest

The subjects reported as being affected by terrorism and climate change were examined in this section of the research in order to understand how reports draw on and present human interest stories. It captured information about people and places affected by these risks, and in the case of climate change also wildlife and nature. The categories are shown in table 8.

The aim of this was to understand how the West was reported against other areas of the world such as developing countries or the Middle East. Specifically, it was to illustrate how climate change and terrorism were presented as risks with impacts for various geographical areas of the world or people and species.

Table 8: People and places affected by climate change and terrorism (options)

Climate change		Terrorism	
Person/s	Wildlife	West	World
Area or nation	West	Middle East	Developing world
Developing world	World	Area or nation (other)	Person/s
Many	Not specified	Not specified	None
None			

Once selected, each of these areas was then coded as to whether the effects were reported as definite (happening/provable/happened); hypothetical (possibility/chance of happening); or debated (uncertainty expressed about effects). The reason for this was to understand the varying degrees of certainty with which the effects of climate change and terrorism were reported for these locations, people and species.

3.5.7 Risk

This section captured data about how the risk and effects of climate change and terrorism were portrayed in newspaper reports between January 1999 and December 2012. For the purpose of this study, risks were interpreted as significant events that cause loss of life, presenting a threat to the planet and its people and can be catastrophic in scale. Effects refer to more day-to-day experiences, for example, increased rainfall or unseasonal weather, changes to public surveillance, or public access to buildings. These two categories are interchangeable and interpretation of each is subjective - some may consider effects to be risks and vice-versa. This could be problematic with multicoders but it is eliminated by me being the single coder and using the above distinction as the basis of this section of the coding.

The timescale that articles referenced when reporting climate change and terrorism effects was also captured in this section of the research, helping to build a picture of whether the effects of terrorism and climate change were contextualised in the past, present or future. The same was also done for the reporting of risk, identifying whether the risks were current or anticipated or debated. If there were borderline cases, the choice of vocabulary in reports was used as an indicator, with words such as 'will' or 'is' taken to refer to a certain effect or risk, and 'could' or 'might' referring to something that is less likely to occur, or disputed in some way. For example, in an article about new terrorism laws which referenced "...the exceptional threat to national security", the risk was coded as 'current' because of the definitiveness of the statement. These categories were the same for terrorism and climate change and are shown in table 9.

Table 9: Urgency of risk, effects and action for climate change and terrorism (options)

Risks	Current, anticipated, both or none
Effects timescale	Past, present, future, all, past/present; past/future; present/future, none
Effects impact	Positive, negative, both, debated, none
Action	Act now, act in future, now and future, no timeframe assigned to action

3.5.8 Causes

The different causes and origins reported in articles for climate change and terrorism were examined in this research. Table 10 shows the full list that was used for each issue. In both cases, the causes are different in relation to the issue itself. I included 'climate change' and 'terrorism' as generic references, in order to build a picture of whether these issues were traced back to specific causes or explained using this terminology alone.

Table 10: The causes of climate change and terrorism (options)

Climate change		Terrorism	
Human activity	Government interests	Religious differences	Asylum
Climate change (general)	Lack of interest / policy	UK/US/Other Foreign policy	Extremism
Natural	Economic	Globalisation	Underworld
Emissions	Ineffective policy	Territory	Imperialism
None		Culture clash	Middle East tension
		Freedom fighter	Depravation
		War on terror	Terrorism (general)
		Civil War	Intelligence failure
		Policy (other)	Other
		None	Other

3.6 Managing and interpreting the data produced by the content analysis

A significant amount of data was produced by the content analysis and I decided to use Microsoft Excel to input and analyse the coding data. My rationale for picking Excel to cope

with this (over and above a package such as SPSS) was based on two factors: familiarity with

Excel and; satisfaction that it could provide the functionality and level of analysis I needed.

While perhaps traditionally, SPSS is seen as a tool of choice for inputting and analysing data

derived from a content analysis, others such as Meyer & Avery (2009) argue that MS Excel is

an often overlooked option for research, highlighting two notable features:

> *"First, it can simply house information—quantitative or qualitative. This includes the ability to organize data in meaningful ways. Second, Excel's "crunching" ability is not limited to numerical calculations. Rather, its logical functions can provide significant aid in qualitative analysis."* (Meyer & Avery, 2009: 110)

Once the data was inputted, I used a series of standard excel formulas ('count', 'countif',

'sum') to analyse the text and numerical data present in spreadsheets. The results gave

insight into the frequency of news hooks, discourses and other areas examined. They also

provided a spur as to which articles to examine in more detail to provide the supplementary

discursive examples. Alongside the coding, articles were re-read and their component parts

analysed and noted in order to bring to life the findings of the content analysis and provide

insight into the social construction of climate change and terrorism. In doing so, the aim was

to identify hegemonic and dominant structures and relationships inferred from the articles,

contributing to a richer analysis of the data than provided by a traditional content analysis

alone. There is no one way of doing discourse analysis (Taylor, 2013: 87) and the approach

taken in this research is that used by Moore et al (2008) in their study of the representation

of Islam in the British media. In this study, the researchers selected stories as case studies

that "*typify[ied] the quantitative findings*" in their research (p29). In the same way and

following Moore et al's lead, this study also uses the data from the content analysis as a

guide for which articles best highlight the evidence-based research. The examples and

quotes used throughout this study to supplement the content analysis were taken from

news articles, unless otherwise stated. While all news is subject to particular news values,

agendas or ideologies that influence both the tone and content of reporting, these are likely

to be more apparent in editorial and opinion pieces. Clarifying the origin of quotes within

this research highlights where particular viewpoints are likely to be more forcefully

expressed or openly biased towards a certain worldview.

3.7 How did the method work in practice?

In practice, the content analysis was comprehensive and robust. With hindsight, the amount

of data the coding aimed to capture for both climate change and terrorism was ambitious.

Coding took up a substantial part of the timeline of this research.

In relation to the coding process itself, I was the sole coder for this work. Although this

helped eliminate multi-coder irregularities there are, over such a lengthy coding period,

margins for error. While many categories are clearly quantifiable (e.g. source), others, such

as narrative/discourse require judgements to be made about the content of the article. In

order to counteract this, I was clear about the constitution of each category. Additionally,

where confusion may have arisen (e.g. over whether to code a group/spokesperson as a

charity, independent organisation, or other body), notes were made of the coding decisions

which were then used to inform subsequent coding choices.

As this study was longitudinal, there was the potential for new themes to arise during the

course of the work. I was mindful of this, and made the decision to add such categories if

and when they occurred. In practice, this occurred predominantly in relation to the sources

category, as different groups became involved in discourse as the issues progressed over the

14 years of this work. Otherwise, the categories used within the coding sheets appeared to

encompass themes and areas that were appropriate across the time period.

3.8 What were the benefits and limitations of the methodology?

Using content analysis as the primary method for this research allowed me to analyse articles on quite different subjects in a way that meant the data could be compared and contrasted logically. The overarching, unifying structure designed for this work allowed for the effective analyses of climate change and terrorism news, while at the same time catering for the unique aspects of each issue. Additionally, it also meant that I produced data relevant to each issue separately and so giving a link to previous research in this field. There were however limitations to this study, the first being *LexisNexis*.

LexisNexis is a comprehensive method of searching for articles but is an approximate indicator of coverage (Moore et al, 2008; Norris et al, 2003). Its problems have been recognised and reported in previous studies and include keyword searches not being comprehensive leaving some articles undiscovered (Dudo et al, 2011:68). In this study, problems with *LexisNexis* became evident during the data gathering stage. Replicating the search at different times, even when using the same keywords, the same search terms and the same timeframe produced a different number of articles. For example in 2008, in a search of the five newspapers in this study using the keywords 'terrorism', 'terrorist' or 'terrorists' and limiting the criteria to three or more mentions of any of these words generated 954 articles. By way of an example, that exact same search in December 2013 generated 1164 articles. In order to deal with the inconsistencies in numbers, I decided to gather and download the articles from *LexisNexis* at specific time points: August 2009 for the sample 1999-2008, August 2012 for the sample 2009-2011, and February 2013 for the year 2012.

LexisNexis also offers the choice to ignore duplicate articles. Even when selected, this function did not remove all of the duplicate articles - there were several instances of the same article appearing twice or three times with perhaps a slightly different word count or an additional category of reference.

What these problems mean is that the same search of *LexisNexis* today will produce a different number of articles to those generated at the start of the content analysis process. It also means that the figures quoted in this study relating to the articles generated by the *LexisNexis* search are historic - they are not current. The appearance of duplicate articles will distort figures, although reassuringly, duplicate articles did not appear in significant number. Neither did these duplicate articles cause any problems with the coding as the chosen sampling method meant that there was some distance between one article and the next.

The second area to note relates to the intrinsic differences between climate change and terrorism as issues. Although the design of the content analysis allowed for these issues to be compared and contrasted simultaneously whilst remaining true to their substance, caution needs to be exercised about how much can be drawn from results based on essentially different content.

The third relates to the choice to undertake a retrospective look at newspaper coverage. The initial scope of this research was to examine articles on climate change and terrorism between 1999 and 2008. However, this research was undertaken part-time, a longer than normal time frame which meant that the data quickly became out of date once written up. The addition of a subsequent timeframe of 2009-2012 has since brought the work as up to date as possible. As mentioned earlier in this chapter however, the sampling method

chosen for this second timeframe means that from 2009 onwards, data is limited, and the overall picture with the earlier years of this study is disjointed. This difference is taken into account in later discussions.

This was, in some senses, an experimental study, that aimed not only to compare and contrast newspaper coverage of climate change and terrorism, but to understand whether such an approach was possible in the first instance. Notwithstanding the limitations outlined above, a rich and substantial body of data was produced by this study. I believe that the data and discussion that follows in the subsequent chapters illustrate that my approach was worthwhile and beneficial. The design of the content analysis provided a solid foundation for interpretation of data leading to an original perspective on how risks are communicated in the newspapers in the UK. Importantly, it also allowed for a link to past research by allowing climate change and terrorism to retain their media identities. Additionally, the content analysis, supported by discursive examples, enabled suggestions to be made about what newspaper coverage reveals, and how such coverage may have shaped audience perception of climate change and terrorism.

This chapter has outlined the reasons for choosing content analysis as the primary method in this study. It has demonstrated how content analysis enabled two very different issues to be compared and contrasted with relative ease. The method of selecting the newspapers, the sample and the coding design has been explained in detail, and details of data management have been covered. The subsequent chapters will now detail and discuss the findings of this study.

Chapter 4: Read all about it: the story of climate change and terrorism

4.1 Introduction

This chapter shows that the most common news hooks and narratives for terrorism and climate change are starkly different. In relation to climate change there appears to be evidence that news hooks and narratives are, in some cases, traceable to the ideological persuasion of individual newspapers. The data suggests that terrorism news hooks conform to an 'agreed' narrative, that moves from attacks (albeit perceived) through to reaction. They focus on a negative act and its consequence in a pattern that is socially and culturally familiar to audiences, drawing on themes of good versus bad, crime and punishment. Consequently, climate change appears to be undone by its lack of discursive simplicity.

Before presenting the findings on news hook and narrative, this chapter will first provide background information about the amount and type of coverage each issue received in the newspapers analysed.

4.2 Terrorism and climate change: setting the scene

Climate change is consistently covered less than terrorism between 1999-2012. Figure 1[14] shows the quantity of articles generated by *LexisNexis* per year, prior to the sample being taken. It is included here in order to give background information about the scale and patterns of reporting. The first noticeable increase in climate change news comes in 2005,

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[14] Figure 1 shows the total number of articles generated by *LexisNexis* using the keywords 'climate change', 'global warming'; and 'terrorism', 'terrorists', 'terrorist' in the *Daily Mail,* the *Daily Mirror, The Independent, The Times* and *The Guardian* combined. It is not the sample size. The sample was derived from these articles and was assimilated in two stages: between 1999-2008, the sample was produced from examining 1 in every 51 articles for terrorism and 1 in every 16 for climate change; between 2009-2012, the first article of each month was taken as the sample and added to the previous sample.

the year that the Kyoto Protocol came into force. Coverage peaks in 2007 coinciding with the publication of the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. In 2009, the year of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and the 'climate gate' incident at the University of East Anglia, coverage also rises to a level just short of the 2007 peak.

Figure 1: Total number of articles per year generated by LexisNexis for the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Mirror*, *The Independent*, *The Times* and *The Guardian* combined (prior to the sample being extracted)

The significant increase in coverage of terrorism in 2001 is due to the volume of reporting dedicated to the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, now more commonly known as 9/11. A second peak in 2005 reflects extensive coverage in the UK print media of the London bombings on 7 July (7/7) of that year.

Reporting of both terrorism and climate change declines from 2009 onwards, the drop in coverage appearing more noticeable for climate change. By 2012, the total number of articles about climate change falls back to a level not seen since 2000. In contrast, the frequency of articles about terrorism never reaches pre-2001 lows.

This data confirms existing research that concludes coverage of climate change is not consistent or sustained (see for example McComas & Shanahan, 1999). Largely, climate change news is event specific, hinged on topics such as the release of the IPCC reports and key international summits, echoing work by Lockwood (2009), who has shown how media attention to climate change reflects the political agenda. The prominence of climate change news can also be affected by real world events, such as flooding or natural disasters and studies have illustrated how demand for climate change news is heightened at times of extreme weather (Boykoff, 2007; McComas & Shanahan, 1999). Coverage in 2000 and 2007 (as shown in figure 1) attest to this being years of severe flooding in Britain.

Terrorism coverage also peaks around specific events (i.e. acts of terrorism), defined as episodic by Iyengar (1991), but the terrorism narrative is sustained far beyond the actual act itself. Unrest in the Middle East and the fear of further attacks in the West has helped to prolong coverage in the UK press giving it more of a thematic resonance (ibid).

4.3 Examining the sample: background details

Having looked at the overall patterns emerging from the frequency of newspaper coverage of climate change and terrorism as a whole, the rest of this chapter (and subsequent chapters) deal with the specific sample of articles that comprise this study. This sample is 496 articles for climate change and 517 for terrorism. The sampling technique used, as discussed in the methodology, was designed to give roughly equal numbers of terrorism and climate change articles to enable a detailed comparison and to ensure that patterns and trends may emerge.

The sections below compare the frequency of coverage in the *Daily Mail,* the *Daily Mirror, The Independent, The Times* and *The Guardian*, the positioning of articles within these newspapers and the types of articles reporting the issues before moving on to look at the areas of news hooks and discourse in detail.

4.3.1 Broadsheet versus tabloid

The Guardian and *The Independent* were the only two newspapers in this study to run more articles about climate change than terrorism (see figure 2)[15]. Climate change was reported more frequently by the broadsheet press than the tabloids. *The Times*, the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Mirror* each covered terrorism more than climate change. Terrorism was a consistent source of news for all. *The Guardian* reported the issue more often than the other four newspapers, but not significantly so. The *Daily Mail* ran twice as many articles about terrorism compared to climate change. The *Daily Mirror* ran quite low levels of both issues, compared to the other newspapers in this study.

Figure 2: Terrorism and climate change coverage by newspaper (1999-2012)

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
[15] As the sampling method was designed to give equal numbers of articles for terrorism and climate change, the fact that the data shows that these two broadsheets covered climate change more than terrorism within the sample does not mean that they did so overall outside of the sample.

That broadsheet newspapers dedicated more coverage to climate change than tabloids is not unexpected. Known for their higher quality of reporting, broadsheets employ specialist reporters and correspondents able to offer insight and analysis on issues such as the environment, politics and defence. In recent years, climate change coverage in tabloid newspapers has increased (Boykoff, 2008) but levels are still relatively low.

Along with the tabloid/broadsheet split, there is an early indicator that the frequency of climate change coverage may be ideologically shaped, with the left-leaning broadsheet newspapers more likely to report the issue. This corresponds with existing research, which has shown that the construction of climate change in the news is strongly influenced by ideological standpoints of broadsheet newspapers (Carvalho, 2007: 223; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). Similar levels of coverage of terrorism among the broadsheets suggests that there is an 'agreed' opinion on the newsworthiness of the issue overall among these newspapers, potentially indicating an answer to Freedman and Thussu's question of whether the war on terror (and I suggest the threat of Islamic terrorism more widely) is something of an "*ideological trope which unites policymakers and journalists*" (2012: 12).

The frequency of coverage dedicated to climate change and terrorism by broadsheet and tabloid newspapers provides signposts in assessing the impact of reports on public opinion and understanding. Tabloid newspapers have been shown to have influenced public views and policy on issues (see Boykoff, 2008: 552) while the influence of broadsheet newspapers on national and international policy is well established. Research by Hargreaves et al (2003), found that the more coverage a newspaper gave to climate change, the more concerned its readers were. As such, they found that "*83 per cent of The Guardian/The Independent readers felt that climate change 'was something we should be concerned about', compared*

90

with only 55 per cent of Sun readers" (ibid: 35). While not tested, based on the patterns of coverage found in broadsheets and tabloids in this study, audiences of each respective newspaper may also reach such a conclusion. Similarly media portrayals of terrorism, political violence, and threats to national security have been shown to provoke anxiety in individuals (Slone, 2000). The high levels of coverage of terrorism found in all of the newspapers in this study may therefore serve to reinforce the presence and immediacy of the terrorist threat among readers.

4.3.2 Hold the front page

Terrorism was more likely than climate change to be front page news (see figure 3). When climate change was front page news, headlines included political prophecies: "*I will cure the world,*" (*Daily Mirror*, 03.10.01); and apocalyptic visions of the world: "*UN's grim warning on climate change,*" (*The Guardian*, 28.11.07). Terrorism headlines included references to terrorist attacks: "*Republican bomb paralyses London,*" (*The Guardian*, 20.07.00); fear of attacks: "*Police Chief: Britain is next; America at war, apocalypse America,*" (*The Daily Mail*, 21.09.01); and counter-terrorism measures: "*Shoot-to-kill order for police on terror alert,*" (*The Times*, 24.05.03).

Figure 3: Article position in newspaper (1999-2012)

Both climate change and terrorism were reported as a 'home' news story most frequently. Figure 4 shows these breakdowns. Home news focused on the UK, its people, policies and practices.

Figure 4: Climate change and terrorism - article type (1999-2012)

Descriptive and in-depth features painting pictures of climate change and opinion pieces about the issue were common tools for reporting climate change. Features provide the opportunity to bring the human face of climate change to audiences, to discuss potential

solutions or scenarios and to offer a window to those parts of the world already affected by climate change and global warming.

World news relating to climate change was not as common in this research as it was for terrorism (see figure 4). Terrorism and terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Africa and Asia were frequent sources of news for the newspapers in this study. Hostile environments, conflict, extremism and fundamentalism are often the hallmarks of reporting about these countries. Linking these regions with terrorism evokes Orientalist ideas around 'them and us' (Said, 2003). Islam and Muslims have become synonomous with terrorism – "*ethnic identifiers*" as Martin and Phelan (2002: 264) state "*...that create a cognitive model of terrorism and, in so doing, account for the characteristics of the terrorist type (dogmatic, cowardly, superstitious, etc.) by aligning them with those of the broader culture from which the terrorists emerge.*"

Coverage of climate change and terrorism reflects certain journalistic norms and values. Brighton and Foy (2007) argue that news is selected according to its medium and its message, while Harcup and O'Neil (2001) find that editorial values, along with the factors identified by Galtung and Ruge (1965) govern whether and how a story is selected and presented. This is borne out, to some extent, by the ideological differences evident in newspaper coverage of climate change. As already highlighted, the nature of climate change does not often lend itself to satisfying news values so its frequency of coverage and the immediacy of reporting can be compromised. Maier (2002) has shown how stories using numbers dominated the front-page of newspapers, and in certain instances this was a tool evident in use in this study to elevate climate change to front page news. For example: "*£55 a year -the cost of stopping global warming,*" (*The Times*, 25.02.03); and *"Global warming floods threaten 4m in UK,"* (*The Guardian*, 22.04.04).

Terrorism more readily meets the demands of news values and newsworthiness (Lewis, 2012), so its prominence and profile in the British press is not unexpected. It is "*eye catching and sensational... appeal[ing] to base instincts and a shared sense of morality*" (Mythen & Walklate, 2006: 130). Coverage since 9/11 also plugs a vacuum left by the end of the Cold War. In addition, terrorism can easily be moulded to fit crime narratives (Altheide, 2006) or framed as a foreign policy story (Lewis, 2004), a war story (Reese & Lewis, 2009), as good versus evil (Bhatia, 2009) or as a clash of worldviews (Rojecki, 2005). Although climate change clearly has implications for foreign policy, and the link with climate-induced wars and humanitarian crises is apparent, the issue has not consistently made the narrative leap in the media into such arenas.

4.4 News hooks: results for climate change

Between 1999 and 2012, the five most frequent news hooks used by the newspapers in this study to report climate change, were, in order of prominence:

1. Environmental politics
2. Scientific evidence or research
3. Weather
4. International action (including Kyoto Protocol)
5. Other media

Three noticeable peaks among these news hooks are evident in coverage (see figure 5), in 2000, 2005 and 2007. They are explained by severe storms and flooding in the UK in 2000; the G8 summit in Scotland and Live 8 concerts in London in 2005; and the release of the IPCC's fourth report in 2007 which gave impetus to climate change news more widely. Post 2008, each of the five news hooks decline, reflecting a fall in the amount of coverage each of the five newspapers dedicated to climate change overall (see figure 1), and also the sampling method used to select the second dataset (Jan 2009-Dec 2012).

Figure 5: The five most common climate change news hooks (1999-2012)

Figure 6 shows how each of these news hooks translated to specific newspapers, indicating both the prominence and profile of climate change news among the broadsheets and tabloids.

Figure 6: Newspaper coverage of climate change by news hook (1999-2012)

4.4.1 Environmental politics

The most frequent news hook over the 14 years of this study was environmental politics. Figure 5 charts its trajectory. Encompassed within this news hook are political action, laws, initiatives and proposals. It does not capture environmental policies, projects or promises that feature in election campaigns in either the UK or the USA, or international action - both were coded separately in this study and will be covered later in this chapter.

There is a clear split between incidences of this news hook in the early years (1999-2004) when science and weather were also common news pegs, compared to 2006-2008 when environmental politics was the most frequent news hook overall. The 'environmental politics' news hook dominated coverage for six of the 14 years of this study.

The catalyst for an increase in coverage in 2005 was the G8 summit in Scotland. Although in this study, G8 meetings were categorised as 'international action', the event itself boosted the presence of environmentalism in political discourse. The Stern Review of 2006, which outlined the effects of climate change on the world economy along with the positive fiscal benefits that could emerge by acting upon climate change, and the IPCC's fourth report released in 2007 also provided fuel for politicians in the UK to bring climate change into their agenda. According to Carter (2014: 423), 2006 saw climate change rise "*rapidly up the policy agenda as for the first time British political parties started to compete with each other to be greener than their rivals on this issue*." This research corroborates that theme.

With the exception of the *Daily Mail*, all of the newspapers in this study framed their coverage of climate change primarily through politics and political action (see figure 6). *The Times* was the least likely of the three broadsheets to use this news hook. When it did, its

headlines included pointing out failings in the Labour government's policies and plans: "*A policy that pretends we can all fly on the cheap is a policy that won't fly*" (05.01.06) and "*U-turn on green homes*" (04.09.07). David Cameron's plans to tackle climate change under a Tory government on the other hand, were reported more positively: "*Cameron's green vow on power*" (30.12.07). *The Guardian* printed the most opinion and editorial pieces of the five newspapers using environmental politics as its focus, often with a debating agenda, for example: "*There is an alternative: Politicians are once more revving up the debate that only nuclear power can save the planet*" (07.09.04). *The Guardian* was also critical of America, in particular President Bush's stance on climate change using irony to convey its message in one headline: "*It's official, global warming does exist says Bush*" (04.06.02); and highlighting the outlandishness of Bush's opinion in another: "*...Bush is left isolated as America turns green*" (27.01.07). *The Independent's* headlines on environmental policies and plans include: "*Prescott unveils £60M boost for cleaner car fuel*" (21.11.00); "*Cameron calls for new taxes to save the planet*" (21.04.06) and "*Blair outlines strategy to cut global warming*" (26.05.04), conveying neutral messages about political action. In their reporting of environmental politics, the tabloids opted for a more sensationalist approach. "*Woman who was 'too tired' to save earth; fury at France's eco talks Minister*" said the *Daily Mirror* (27.11.00), while the *Daily Mail* reported "*Introducing Conan the Conservative*" (09.04.07) referring to a visit by California's governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to the Conservative Party Conference.

4.4.2 Scientific evidence or research

In the early years of this study, scientific evidence and research was one of the most common news hooks used to communicate climate change. In 1999 and 2002 it was more frequent than any of the news hooks discussed in this chapter (see figure 5). It peaked in 2007, and other than 2003 - a year with a low volume of climate change articles overall -

there is a steady growth in articles framing climate change through science from 2000 to 2007 (albeit this growth is not consistent year on year). Carvalho (2007) has shown how climate change shifted in focus towards politics in and beyond 1988. In this research, until 2005, the news hooks of scientific research and environmental politics remained relatively comparable (20-23 occurrences in total respectively). In 2005 however, environmental politics starts to outstrip the news hook of scientific evidence and research. This news hook declines beyond 2008 (as with other news hooks) and in line with the sampling method for the second data set.

Headlines using this news hook captured different facets of scientific research including applied and original studies and the complexity of research, for example: "*Scientists fear that global warming will bring climatic turbulence, with changes coming in big jumps rather than gradually*" (*The Guardian*, (feature) 30.08.06). However, scientific research was also used to suggest alarm and fear and to warn about the consequences of inaction, as these headlines demonstrate:

> "*Global warming threatens Britain with Little Ice Age*" (*The Guardian*, 07.09.01)
>
> "*Bigger carbon cut needed to avoid disaster: Leading researchers say government has misled public and call for 90% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050*" (*The Guardian*, 15.09.06)
>
> "*Goodbye cruel world: A report by top US scientists on climate change suggests that catastrophe could be imminent*" (*The Guardian* (*Comment and Analysis),* 01.03.02)

Of the five newspapers in this study, *The Guardian* most frequently framed climate change through science. This resonates with research by Carvalho (2007) who found that scientific claims were a particular focus for *The Guardian* in articulating climate change risks. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the *Daily Mirror* ran no articles based on science in this sample. When the *Daily Mail* ran articles about scientific research, they tended to be

humorous. *Bovine Backpacker*" (16.01.04) and "*Vaccine for sheep gas*" (22.06.04) are two examples of the newspaper's headlines.

These results show that scientific research was and is a consistent frame for the media's reporting of climate change. There is a divide in its treatment with the *Daily Mail* often adopting a humorous or sensational approach, in line with its tabloid agenda but one that may also actively undermine and discredit climate science. Broadsheets such as *The Guardian* and *The Independent* opted for more serious and thoughtful pieces. Science appears to be a catalyst to convey risk, fear and complexity, a trait that is evident in news hooks and headlines for both tabloids and broadsheets.

4.4.3 Weather

The use of weather as a vehicle to communicate climate change to audiences is well documented (for example see Weingart et al, 2000; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). A long-term issue, instances of extreme weather such as storms, heat waves, flooding, droughts, snowfall and temperature rises act as agents for climate change to be situated in everyday commonplace experiences (Smith, 2005; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005).

Weather was a consistent news hook in this study, recorded in all but two years and in all five newspapers (see figure 5). It peaks in 2000 as a result of coverage of severe storms in the UK and again in 2007, when coverage - prompted by the IPCC's fourth report - took on a more international focus. Six of the 11 articles using weather as a lens to report climate change during this year referred to events in other parts of the world. Headlines included:

> "*Retreating Himalayan icefields threatening drought in Bangladesh*" (*The Independent*, 29.03.07)

"*Threat to food crops as Australia prepares to turn off farmers' water*" (*The Times*, 20.04.07)

The storms in 2000 were referred to as "*the worst ...to hit Britain in 13 years,*" according to *The Independent's* editorial (01.11.00). Using the storms as its focus, the *Daily Mirror* chose its editorial space to carry the simple headline "*Global warning,*" arguing that "*[t]he British people are fantastic at rising to a challenge. We have coped with the storms and floods amazingly...The real challenge is to combat the threat of global warming. None of us has taken it seriously*" (04.11.00).

Weather-related headlines served a number of tasks for the newspapers in this study, from conveying humour: "*Phewski, what a scorcher*" referring to unseasonal temperatures in Moscow (*Daily Mail*, 13.12.06); to asking questions: "I*s Britain melting?*" (*Daily Mirror*, 09.12.99); and warning of the consequences of adverse weather: "*Warning on droughts eating up aid to Africa*" (*The Guardian*, 24.10.05). Weather was one of the *Daily Mail's* most common news hooks in this study (see figure 6) with certain headlines capturing a distinctly British discontent: "*Global warming leaves grass cutters on the verge of a strike*" (22.04.05) and "*Mighty midge; Insects to flourish in warm weather as natural attractions come under threat*" (08.01.07). Again, as with science, while the *Daily Mail* acknowledges the existence of climate change it appears to discredit it simultaneously by focusing on more quirky aspects of weather rather than intense or extreme threats. The *Daily Mirror* also concentrated much of its reporting on British weather: "*Why has Britain's weather gone so daffy?*" the newspaper asked in one feature headline (14.03.06) . The tabloids in this study were much less likely to use adverse weather in international countries as a news hook for their reporting of climate change. As the volume of climate change and global warming news increased, so too did use of this news hook. Between 2004 and 2005, the 'weather' news hook increased from one instance to seven (see figure 5) and grew annually until

2008, when it declined sharply, disappearing from the sample in 09/10 and reappearing in 2011 (again related to the volume of articles).

4.4.4 International action

This news hook refers to all action and promises of it that involved more than one country globally. It captures partnerships, summits, the work of the United Nations and includes the Kyoto Protocol.

This news hook was prominent in 2005 and 2007 (see figure 5), correlating with significant moments in world society: the IPCC's reports in 2005 and 2007; the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005 (which prompted calls for international action on issues ranging from climate change to terrorism); and the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in February 2005.

Early coverage hinged on the international action news hook focused on a UN meeting to develop an agenda for the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 (*The Independent*, 12.07.02) and a 'secret' deal - "*Britain's secret plan for new global climate pact*" (*The Times*, 09.12.04). Of the 13 articles in 2005 using international action as a news hook, six were related to the G8 summit, which was held for the first time in Scotland. Headlines included:

> "*Blair heads to US on mission to save his G8 agenda ...*" (*The Times*, 01.06.05)

> "*G8 summit: Sherpas call tune for political masters*" (*The Guardian*, 30.06.05)

Beyond G8, the Stern Review published in 2006 appeared to give impetus to the international action angle. For example one headline stated "*Britain to push for global*

climate deal by 2008" (*The Guardian*, 31.10.06) with the article going on to say that the Stern Review would be used to "*press for a new global deal to curb carbon emission*" (ibid).

The Kyoto Protocol featured in only 11 of the 47 articles on international action[16]. As a designated co-ordinated global response to climate change, the Kyoto Protocol has a notably limited presence. When compared to the primary global response to terrorism – the war on terror – there is a vast difference, as will be discussed later in this chapter. When Kyoto was used as a news hook, headlines were often critical of the initiative: "*Fiddling while the planet burns,*" (*The Guardian*, 01.11.99); and "*Kyoto is not enough to tackle climate change,*" (*The Independent* (comment), 16.02.05) are two examples. International differences over the treaty were also apparent from headlines: "*Putin refuses to say if Russia will ratify Kyoto protocol,*" (*The Independent*, 30.09.03).

The 'international action' news hook was used most often by *The Independent* (see figure 6). Carvalho (2007) found that a sense of global responsibility was absent in *The Times'* sister newspaper, *The Sunday Times* and here, it appears that *The Times* too structures less of its news around international responsibility compared to *The Independent* and *The Guardian*. The *Daily Mail* did not lead with this news hook at all in this sample, reflecting its euro-scepticism and hostility towards international news. The only time the *Daily Mirror* reported on international action was during the G8 summit when it outlined the terms of the G8 summit (*G8: What they give and what they want,* 06.07.05) and to report the start of the event '*G8 summit: it kicks off,*" (07.07.05).

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[16] Kyoto Protocol in this study, is coded as a separate action in order to compare it with the War on Terror, the co-ordinated response to terrorism. It is however, counted in the category of international action.

4.4.5 Other media

This news hook captured articles based on media and arts including films, TV programmes, concerts, articles in other newspapers and book reviews. Until 2006, 'other media' was a sparsely used news hook, recorded only four times in seven years. Although former US presidential candidate Al Gore's Oscar-winning film *An Inconvenient Truth* was released in 2006, it does not account for the rise in articles shown in figure 5. Only one article in 2006 referred to it – "*Inconvenient truth can prove lucrative*" (*The Times*, 12.09.06) which used the film for leverage to talk about the lucrative opportunities climate change gave to businesses. During the year, the BBC's '*Climate Chaos*' season received both positive and negative coverage. Criticism was also levelled at an art initiative to bring climate change to a mass audience (*Apocalypse Now and Again*, *The Independent* (feature), 26.06.06). In 2007, when this news hook peaked, coverage focused on the Live 8 concert which was linked to the G8 summit in Scotland, the controversy surrounding the *Channel 4* documentary *The Great Global Warming Swindle* which aired in March 2007, and further reports about the film an *Inconvenient Truth*.

The Guardian was the most likely newspaper to use other media sources as news hooks (see figure 6), partly because its columnists such as George Monbiot used their column space to tackle individuals and other newspapers, for example: "*Until now The Sun has denounced environmentalists as "loonies" and "eco beards". Last week it published "photographic proof that climate change is real,*" (21.09.06). It was the newspaper's joint second most common news hook of the five discussed here whereas it was the least used by *The Independent* and the *Daily Mirror*.

4.5 News hooks: climate change - least common

It is worth noting briefly what is unsaid or the news hooks that are infrequently used in reports about climate change. The least frequent in this study were:

1. Opinion polls
2. Natural disaster
3. IPCC
4. =Election
4. =Failure to act

One of the key angles relating to climate change – the work of the IPCC and its reports was rarely the news hook for articles. This news hook was used in 2001, 2007 and 2008, in line with publication of their reports with headlines declaring:

> "*Flood disaster on way say scientists*" (*Daily Mirror*, 23.01.01)

> "*UN delivers apocalyptic warning on climate: global warming increase in storms, floods, droughts, failed farms and raging pestilence will hit poor hardest, claim scientists*" (*The Independent*, 20.02.01)

> "*Global warming is not some conspiratorial hoax*" (*The Independent* (analysis), 29.01.07)

Natural disasters were rarely used as news hooks, a finding that is explained by the infrequency of their occurrence and potentially the nervousness surrounding linking such events directly to climate change. Opinion polls were also infrequent as the subject of articles in this research. Finally, elections were one of the fewest recorded news hooks for climate change. This is at odds with the high degree of environmental politics news hooks used in reporting climate change. There are a number of possible reasons for this from the infrequency of elections (in the years studied there were three general elections in the UK and four in the US) to the palatability of climate change policies during election campaigns, and the overshadowing of the issue by the economic crisis. This finding is discussed further in the conclusion to this chapter.

4.6 News hooks: results for terrorism

The five most frequent news hooks about terrorism in this study, in order were:

1. Arrest or prosecution
2. Counter-terrorism policies or initiatives
3. Potential terrorist attacks
4. War (on terror, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Civil War)
5. Aftermath of terrorist attack or activity

Figure 7 charts these news hooks over the course of the 14 years. All but one of these news hooks peaks in 2001 because of the surge in coverage as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks in America that year. The effect of these attacks on news reporting is significant and well documented (see Zelizer and Allen, 2002; Mogensen, 2008 for examples). Beyond 2001, peaks among these news hooks can be seen at various points including 2005, coinciding with terrorist attacks in the UK. It is notable that three of the news hooks are forms of response to terrorism, however it is the fear of an attack, not an attack itself that accompanies this. The aftermath of acts of terrorism is a frequent news hook, indicating the amount of coverage dedicated to the days immediately following events such as 9/11, 7/7 and the Madrid train bombings.

Figure 7: The five most common terrorism news hooks (1999-2012)

Figure 8 shows how each of these news hooks translated to specific newspapers, indicating both the prominence and profile of terrorism among the broadsheets and tabloids. *The Independent* was most likley to use the aftermath of an attack as its news hook while *The Guardian* and *The Times* used arrest/prosecution most frequently. Both of the tabloids utilised the 'potential attack' news hook most often, reflecting a more sensational approach to terrorism news.

Figure 8: Newspaper coverage of terrorism by news hook (1999-2012)

4.6.1 Arrest or prosecution

The arrest and prosecution of terrorists and suspected terrorists dominated reports in this study. 74 articles used this as their news hook and other than a decline in 2006 it remained consistently high between 2002 and 2008 (see figure 7). Together with counter-terrorism initiatives and war, both of which are discussed below, a formidable picture of the scale of the response to terrorism in the UK is evident. Beyond 2008, this news hook drops considerably in frequency. As with climate change, this is largely to do with the sampling

method chosen for the second data set in this study, although as figure 1 shows, the number of overall articles featuring terrorism dropped during these years too.

When this news hook was used it referred to different facets of arrest and prosecution including the interview and charging of suspects as well as wrongful or mistaken leads. Examples of headlines utilising this news hook are:

"*Two charged over suspected Real IRA bombs*" (*The Independent*, 22.11.01)

"*3 quizzed over killing of loyalist terrorist*" (*Daily Mirror*, 21.04.99)

"*Terrorism suspect 'framed by in-laws': France releases baggage handler arrested at airpor*t" (*The Guardian*, 11.01.03)

This news hook also embodied the theme of good, evil and justice, positioning terrorists as outcasts in civil society, as these headlines demonstrate:

"*Terror charge man 'was targeting a hero soldier'*" (*Daily Mail*, 08.12.05)

"*Bombers of Suburbia"* (*Daily Mirror*, 05.08.04)

"*Lies of '20th hijacker' caused September 11, court hears*" (*The Independent*, 07.03.06)

The Guardian and *The Times* each used arrest and prosecution as the main prism though which their articles about terrorism were framed, whereas the *Daily Mail* was the newspaper least likely to use this news hook (see figure 8).

4.6.2 Counter-terrorism

Measures to tackle terrorism including new bills, initiatives, laws and policies were captured as part of this news hook. It peaks in 2001 and 2005 in response to the terrorist attacks in America and the UK but these rises are not sustained. Counter-terrorism initiatives were not

the primary news hook for any of the newspapers in this study. When it was used, *The Guardian* was most likely to employ this news hook and *The Mirror* the least (see figure 8).

Headlines related to this news hook captured elements of 'siege chic' – symbolic and physical notions of boundaries and territory - described by Coaffee and Wood (2006: 508). For example: "*No hiding place for terror suspects*" (*Daily Mail*, 04.10.01) which refers to tough new laws to "shield" Britain from attacks. This type of headline also implies that terrorists are shadowy and unseen, further adding to the picture of the enemy evident in headlines related to the arrest and prosecution news hook. History was also utilised as an anchor among headlines, consistent with research by Winfield et al (2002). One example included drawing on World War Two associations: "*21st Century Home Guard; town halls to get terror advisers*" (*Daily Mirror*, 27.05.02).

4.6.3 Potential terrorist attacks

Terrorist acts in themselves were not common news hooks in this study however potential attacks were[17]. Directly related to 9/11, this news hook peaks in 2001, consistent with messages that attacks could happen "*anywhere and at anytime*" (Volkmer, 2002: 235). In 2004, this news hook peaks again, related to the Madrid train bombings of that year. Interestingly, this news hook was not prominent in 2005, the year of the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London. Clearly, there is an 'exportability' of terrorism and the terrorist threat (Bankoff, 2003: 418) that is reflected by the newspapers in this study.

Of the five newspapers, the tabloids most frequently adopted this news hook (see figure 8), their headlines included:

"*Sleepers ready to launch a wave of mainland carnage*" (*Daily Mail*, 17.02.00)

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[17] Actual terrorist attacks featured 26 times as news hooks in this study

> "War on terror: fear in the skies: I thought it was the end; Terrified passenger tells of bomb threat on Virgin plane" (*Daily Mirror*, 19.09.01)

> "Police chief: Britain is next; America at war, apocalypse America" (*Daily Mail*, 21.09.01)

> "Security crackdown: Take no chances; Britain is warned to be vigilant on terror after train massacre" (*Daily Mirror*, 15.03.04)

The broadsheet newspapers all utilised fear of an attack less than the tabloids in this study.

When it was used, headlines often conveyed the same sense of fear as the tabloids:

> "War on terrorism: US and Britain go on alert for possible attacks; warning" (*The Independent*, 22.09.01)

> "Warning to British travellers as Bali bombers are buried: Al-Qaida revenge attacks feared in Indonesia: Executions prompt fresh calls for compensation" (*The Guardian*, 10.11.08)

4.6.4 War

2001 can be seen as the emergence of the war news hook in this study. This hook captured not only the war on terror, but also unrest in the Middle East which was referred to under various headings including the war on terror, civil war, conflict and insurgency. Instances of this news hook in reports increased ten-fold between 2000 and 2001, with a subsequent peak in 2006 as tensions in the Middle East escalated. Of note, is the decline of this news hook beyond 2003 towards a low in 2005, which also happened to be an election year in the UK.

The Guardian utilised this news hook more often than *The Times* and *The Independent* and it was least used by the *Daily Mirror* (see figure 8). The scale of the war was one angle found in reports, with *The Independent* stating "*At the bases where America's special forces train and live...the fit, young men have disappeared from view and families are arriving to say goodbye and good luck*" (*War on Terrorism*, 27.09.01). The war on terror was seen to

'neutralise the enemy' (ibid) and 'extinguish the threat' (*Terror for all*, *The Times* (feature), 12.09.01), in retaliation against "*Manhattan murderers*" who were "*heroes to Islamist extremists*" (ibid).

While the war on terror commanded much focus, there were references to other wars. The soviet invasion of Afghanistan for example, was referred to as the instigator for the "*terrorist poison*" that has "*hatched and spread around the world*" (*The roots of Afghanistan conflict lie in Soviet war*, *The Times*, 14.11.01)

4.6.5 Aftermath

The aftermath of terrorist activity refers to the effects that terrorism had on society and individuals. As with the other news hooks in this study, this article peaked in 2001 and 2005 as newspapers reported the aftermath of terrorist events in America and London.

The Independent used this news hook most often in this study and it was least used by the *Daily Mail* (see figure 8). Headlines captured personal and moving stories: "*Bali bombing; A deserted, scarred island tries to cope with the grief*" (*The Independent*, 19.10.02) while others aimed to establish profiles of the enemy: "The *enemy may be shadowy, but this war will follow the usual battle lines...Don't underestimate the strength of military power against terrorists*" (*The Independent* (comment), 17.09.01). References to potential action in the immediate wake of an attack were included in this category, as this headline demonstrates: "*Defence spending may rise in wake of atrocities*" (*The Times*, 13.09.01). This news hook was also used to introduce questions about why and how attacks happened, for example: "*Attacks in London: Two bombing plots, many unanswered questions*" (*The Independent*, 01.08.05).

4.6.6 News hooks: terrorism - least common

The news hooks least used in this study for terrorism were:

1. Reports or studies (least frequent)
2. Poll data
3. = Anniversary of terror event
3. = Pressure group
3. = Global strategy
3. = Inquest/inquiry
3. = Lifestyle
3. = Election

Of significance here, is the lack of global strategies, other than the war on terror to respond to terrorism. Although counter-terrorism measures were presented nationally and in some cases locally, military action and war (often pre-emptive war) were favoured as strategies to counteract terrorism on the global stage. Instances in which other global initiatives were employed as news hooks often included reference to the international fight against terrorism. For example an article with the headline "*Russia and West to liaise on security*" (*The Times*, 04.10.01) went on to report:

> "*Strong Russian backing for the US-led drive against international terrorism set the tone for a new willingness in Nato and the EU to push aside reservations over such matters as Russian conduct in Chechnya and seal a new rapprochement with the old Cold War foe. Mr Putin talked of the need "to create a new European defence architecture."*

Here as with climate change, elections are not a common news hook. This may be due to a consensus among political parties on the issue or the repackaging of terrorism under, for example, the banner of controlling immigration or increasing police powers (see Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008).

4.7 Climate change narrative

The five most frequent narratives used to report climate change were, in order of prominence:

1. Action
2. Financial
3. No trust
4. Future risk
5. Meteorology

Figure 9 shows these narratives in more detail and figure 10 shows how they translated into newspaper coverage. What is particularly noticeable here is the low instances of these narratives in *The Times*. In terms of frequency, its narratives are aligned more with those of the tabloids. This indicates that the current narratives on climate change are an ill-fit with the centre-right ideologies, aligning with calls from Corner (2013: 12) for a reframing of climate change "*so that it appeals to the values held by audiences on the centre-right.*"

Figure 9: Most frequent climate change narratives (1999-2012)

Figure 10: Newspaper climate change narratives (1999-2012)

4.7.1 Action

Action was the most common narrative found in climate change articles in this study. The left-leaning newspapers were more likely to feature this narrative than their right-leaning counterparts (see figure 10), indicating the dichotomy between conservative values and measures to tackle climate change. This narrative relates to all types of action, for example government initiatives, suggestions for lifestyle changes, international deals or treaties and business plans.

The representation of action within articles took on different forms. There were calls for action aimed at specific countries or people: *"…the US has to rejoin climate talks if disaster is to be averted"* (*The global warning Bush must heed*, *The Guardian* (Comment and Analysis), 16.05.02) along with statements of intent: "*I will cure the world*" (*Daily Mirror*, 03.10.01). Calls for action captured a duality surrounding that of recognition of the problem, set against a passiveness towards addressing it: "*so far we've seen a positive attitude, but as yet no action. The government is saying the right things but there is no action*" (*Cold call;*

Sally Chatterton rings Peter Melchett, The Independent (comment), 16.01.99), and: "*we must see real action from government to tackle the problem of global climate change now*" (*Tourist spots could be too hot to handle*, *The Guardian*, 30.08.99).

Criticism towards particular courses of action was also found in reports, as this example about the Kyoto Protocol illustrates:

> "*It's a tall order to expect Western politicians to cut the rhetoric but unless they do something soon to reduce carbon emissions, the ambitious targets they set at the Kyoto climate change conference in 1997 are likely to be missed...Western governments are "fiddling while the planet burns"...[there is a]reluctance to take firmer measures to tackle global warming through higher energy prices.*" (*Fiddling while the planet burns, The Guardian,* 01.11.99)

American action (or indeed lack of it in some cases) was one subject of disapproval. "*Bush drops pledge on carbon dioxide emissions*" and "[*gives*] a *slap in the face to the world's efforts to combat climate change*" reported *The Independent* (15.03.01). Although limited in frequency, the economic benefits of taking action on climate change were also found within articles: "*taking action to combat climate change can create economic opportunities and improve living standards*" (*Warming is biggest world threat*, *The Guardian*, 09.01.04).

The action discourse also included references to suggestions about how best to mitigate and respond to climate change. Particular types of action were named as solutions including nuclear power (*Fuel Fallout*, *The Guardian* (comment), 22.02.00), reducing emissions, renewable energy and a switch away from fossil fuels (*Climate change: Blyth spirit can lead to a greener Britain*, *The Guardian*, 17.11.00). Specific areas were also identified for the government to focus on, for example: "*setting targets for reducing the pace of climate change and cutting traffic pollution and poverty should be priorities*" (*Climate change warning signals at 'red'*, *The Guardian*, 12.05.00).

4.7.2 Future risk

Climate change was most frequently associated with the future rather than the present day. As a comparison, there were 78 references to climate change as a current risk (it was the sixth most frequent narrative theme in this study). Of the broadsheets, *The Guardian* used this narrative most often and *The Times* was least likely to talk about future climate risk.

In reporting future risk, some articles reflected the vagaries inherent in scientific predictions: "... *we do know that it would only take a slight change in global temperatures to alter the mosquito breeding habits and [malaria] could re-emerge*" (*Unlucky victims of the parasite which survives despite huge odds*, *The Independent*, 28.08.00); and: "*If global warming is not checked by measures agreed at the earth summits, the Maldives could be lost*" (*Prescott goes diving to save the Maldives*, *The Independent,* 04.03.99). Other reports were more specific, offering timescales linked to specific impacts, for example: "*Britain could have a Mediterranean climate within 100 years, it was claimed yesterday.*" (*Flood disaster on way, say scientists*, *Daily Mirror*, 23.01.01) and: "*Skiing and snowboarding...could come to a muddy end this century as a lack of snow closes many of the world's top resorts...Australia could have no skiing at all by 2070*" (*On the rocks*, *The Guardian*, 03.12.03).

The limits to current knowledge were also evident in reports, for example: "*The conveyor could shut down suddenly over one or two years, leaving Britain in a climate like that of northern Canada. "We do not know if we will lose the warmth it brings completely...*"" (*Global warming threatens Britain with little ice age*, 07.09.01, *The Guardian*). This uncertainty also extended to forecasts of devastation. Although reflecting the nature of science and the known boundaries of current knowledge, words such as 'predict', 'average'

and 'estimate' are peppered throughout the climate change narrative, potentially adding further ambiguity. Examples include:

> "*[the report] predicted that by the end of this century there will be an average warming of between 2C (3.6F) and 5C, with devastating consequences*" (*Report shows scientists' real fear*, *The Times* (opinion), 31.01.06)

> "*...it is estimated that by the end of the century up to 20 per cent of its land will be under water. We are talking about millions of people being displaced by permanent flooding*" (*We are the ones who will pay for the damage*, *The Independent*, 19.02.07)

> "*Rising sea levels, desertification and shrinking freshwater supplies will create up to 50 million environmental refugees by the end of the decade, experts warn today*" (*50m environmental refugees by end of decade, UN warns*, *The Guardian,* 12.10.05)

By focusing on climate change as a future issue, its effects are displaced from the present day. In a British context, the future, as it appears in these articles, is not devastating: would it be detrimental to life if, as one report covers, the snow from Snowdon is lost? Would a climate like the Mediterranean or Canada's be so unpleasant? What if skiing disappears from Scotland? Disastrous climate change is associated with the developing world and other distant shores, and even in these cases, it is also a future, less immediate prospect tempered with words such as 'could'.

4.7.3 Financial

For finance to emerge as one of the most common narratives associated with climate change is a notable finding in itself. Climate change is associated with money in the form of investment and inevitably, taxes. At a time when the UK has faced the deepest and longest recession since the Second World War, such a narrative may actively disengage the public with climate change and potential action. This is particularly true when the cost of tackling climate change was reported as falling to the consumer, as this article demonstrates:

"*Households will have to pay £55 a year more for gas and electricity as the price of curbing global warming under government proposals announced yesterday*" (*£55 a year - the cost of*

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stopping global warming, *The Times*, 25.02.03). Conversely, there was little evidence of reports capturing the green economic benefits associated with climate change, but they were present:

> "*Three years ago BP installed an internal version of this market among its subsidiaries. It cost $20m to set up and - by encouraging energy efficiency - has saved the company $650m over a three-year period....Britain was the first country in the world to employ emissions trading, beginning in 2003...The good news is that €1.4bn has already been invested in this market, pushing the price per tonne of carbon dioxide, which began at €8, up to €23...Climate change is a global problem, and its solution could bring us hidden global benefits. Investment in new energy sources coupled with the implementation of energy-efficiency goals can be a spur to economic growth.*" (*The nuclear option isn't political expediency but scientific necessity*, *The Guardian* (comment and debate), 16.12.05)

Along with investment and taxes, the financial narrative also captured criticism over climate change spending: "*The Green Party was slammed yesterday for spending €15million on an ad campaign for climate change but only €5million on actual projects*" (*Green, but obscene*, *Daily Mirror*, 26.04.08). The *Daily Mirror* turned climate change into a game in one article reporting: "*Sir Richard Branson yesterday offered a £13million prize to anyone who can save the planet from global warming... And he wants governments to match his reward*" (*£13M reward to save the earth*, 10.02.07).

The amount that needed to be spent to respond to climate change was a trait of this discourse. "*...£12 billion pounds from oil and gas royalties to develop cleaner energy*" (*Why we should all pray that Kerry is the next American president*, *Daily Mirror* (feature)*, 18.10.04) and: "*A $400bn (£240bn) plan to provide Europe with solar power from the Sahara...*"(*Energy: Europe's green friend*, *The Guardian,* 02.11.09) are just two of the sizeable figures given in reports in this study.

Of the broadsheets, *The Times* was least likely to utilise the finance narrative. *The Independent* and *The Guardian* more readily referenced the investment needed or the sums of money to be spent. However, looked at in isolation, we can see finance was *The Times'* second most common narrative, after that of 'no trust'. Thus, the predominant messages emerging from its news narratives are criticism or doubt and cost, which when considered together may negatively portray climate change and the action and investment needed.

4.7.4 No trust

In this study, 'no trust' is the narrative that captures disillusionment, distrust, challenges and scepticism in all areas. These were expressed in relation to policies and treaties, to science and also to political decisions. *The Guardian* was most likely to utilise this narrative in its reporting while the *Daily Mirror* was the least.

Articles featuring this narrative referred to existing plans as "*not nearly ambitious enough*" (*Climate change warning signals 'at red'*, *The Guardian,* 12.05.00) while others were condemned: *"This isn't a climate policy, it's a polluters' charter. Climate change is one of the most serious issues facing our planet, but Bush and Esso have stuck two fingers up to all of us"* (*Bush and Britain worlds apart on climate control, The Independent,* 15.02.02). The Kyoto Protocol was openly criticised: "...*Too often, [international treaties] are the product of the desire to avoid a "breakdown" of a conference by reaching a deal - any deal - even if this means papering over disagreement... So it was with the Kyoto Protocol..."* (*The K Word*, *The Times* (feature), 30.03.01). In some instances, potential plans, for example around carbon trading, were doubted before even being published: *"...The leaks have not been encouraging - the Department of Trade and Industry has listened to protests from the Confederation of British Industry that too strict caps would damage competitiveness"* (*Life, the Primer*, *The Guardian*, 29.04.04).

Political decisions were also the source of misgivings, for example: "*On the G8 summit...'I believe this Administration has made a terrible mistake by ignoring this issue and future generations will pay*" (*Decisions already taken include plans to clean up Washington and the world*, *The Times*, 27.01.06), as were scientific research and predictions:

> "*The attempts by the global warming industry to use the hot weather in Europe to hype up the dangers of extreme climate change are a moral disgrace... Thus, if it is an especially hot summer, it is dire global warming, and you are unquestionably to blame, you selfish, greedy, rich Northerners, particularly if you are unfortunate enough to be American. Likewise, if it floods, it is global warming; if the land is parched and fires rage, it is global warming; if the monsoon is too wet or too weak, it is global warming; and, if winter freezes poor old robin redbreast, it is still global warming. Come rain or shine, hot or cold, it is always global warming.*" (*Claims about global warming are worse than hot air, they poison the atmosphere*, *The Times* (feature), 08.08.03)

4.7.5 Meteorology

As a narrative, meteorology captured references to weather in all its forms. This included natural phenomenon able to affect weather, such as El Niño and La Niña, but more often, meteorology was linked to seasonal temperatures and extreme weather. For example:

> "*The current year has provided the hottest January and the hottest March judged by average temperatures around the world... Very hot and dry summers of the sort that Britain experienced in 1995 will strike in one in three years by the 2050s, and the vast majority of years will be warmer than the record-breaking year of 1999.*" (*Britain goes to extremes as the world warms up*, *The Times*, 26.04.02)

Weather was sometimes expressed in positive terms, for example:

> "*... Mr Putin responded ambiguously and pointed to domestic critics of the Kyoto pact who have said that global warming would have benefits for Russia. "They often say, half-jokingly and half-seriously, that Russia is a northern country and if temperatures get warmer by two or three degrees, it's not that bad - we could spend less on warm coats and agricultural experts say that grain harvests would increase further," he said.*" (*Putin refuses to say if Russia will ratify Kyoto protocol*, *The Times, 30.09.03*)

Within reports, there was also evidence of extreme weather being used to challenge the evidence on climate change, as this example shows:

> *"Now consider this headline from the Express: "Snow chaos - and they still claim it's global warming". Yes, the recent cold snap in the UK apparently demonstrates that the notion that climate change is happening at all, let alone as the result of human activity, is one big confidence trick."* (*Comment: Mind your language...The Guardian*, 01.03.10)

As with the news hook of weather, meteorology is a useful vehicle to bring climate change into the present day, but analysing these articles shows how it is used in a number of ways, including to diminish the links with climate change and to 'expose' global warming as 'fictitious'. Among the broadsheet newspapers there were similar levels of use of this narrative. The same is also true of the tabloids.

4.8 Terrorism narratives

The five most frequent narratives (as shown in figure 10) newspapers in this study used to report terrorism were:

1. Counter-terrorism
2. 9/11
3. No trust
4. Current risk
5. War on terror

Figure 11: Most frequent terrorism narratives (1999-2012)

Figure 12 shows how these narratives featured within the five newspapers in this study.

Figure 12: Newspaper terrorism narratives (1999-2012)

Across all of the newspapers, terrorism narratives are much more prominent (in terms of frequency) when compared to climate change, adding a sense of robustness and conformity to coverage. The data indicates that there are consistent narratives for terrorism with smaller variations in use within and between newspapers.

4.8.1 Counter-terrorism

The counter-terrorism narrative extends into different areas of newspaper reporting, from arrests and prosecution to the introduction of new acts and laws. In the early years of this study (before 2001) counter-terrorism was strongly wedded to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, for example: "*Tony Blair was fighting to save the Ulster peace process early today with a dramatic pledge to Unionists that the IRA would completely disarm by next May*" (*Blair's IRA guarantee, Daily Mail,* 01.07.99), and: "*The IRA dramatically derailed Tony Blair's blueprint to resurrect the Northern Ireland peace process yesterday*" (*IRA scuppers Blair's blueprint for peace, Daily Mail*, 11.04.03).

In the wake of 9/11 (and later other acts of terrorism, such as 7/7), counter-terrorism measures found in articles became more immediate and urgent. Reports covered budget increases: "*...the counterterrorism budget has doubled from $ 6bn in 1995 to $ 12bn this year. In addition, Mr Bush intends to spend $ 8.3bn next year to begin work on his "star wars" defence programme against nuclear attack*" (*Terror in America, The Independent*, 13.09.01); and emergency action: "*Ministers are expected to rush through measures to arrest and detain suspects accused of acts associated with terrorism as an immediate reaction to yesterday's bombings*" (*Terror in London, The Independent,* 08.07.05).

Counter-terrorism measures were not without criticism within articles. They were linked to infringements of civil liberties, for example: "*Many states have rushed through restrictive anti-terrorism and security laws in response to last year's terrorist attacks, but the Blair Government is singled out for an anti-privacy "pathology" that the report claims is leading to mass surveillance of the population*" (*Britain 'leads way' in eroding privacy, The Times,* 05.09.02); and "*American officials claim that the lengthy detentions are vital to intelligence-*

gathering and that information gleaned from prisoners has led to arrests" (*Guantanamo suspects can appeal, says Rumsfeld*, *The Independent,* 14.02.04). There were examples of counter-terrorism measures with positive connotations, although such reports were in the minority. One example is: "*When the history of our time is written, Pakistan's decisions will be seen as a turning point in containing international terrorism. We are building a functioning society and economy. In the end, these sometimes unpopular steps will create a Pakistan that sucks the oxygen from the fire of terrorism*" (*We're fighting for our lives, The Guardian* (comment and debate), 01.03.10).

4.8.2 Nine Eleven (9/11)

The first instance in this study of a narrative emerging around 9/11 and what it would come to represent came in *The Independent* six days after the attacks of September 11th 2001 in America:

> "*The instinctive US response to the outrages of 11 September appear to come into the second category. Somehow those responsible must be found and hit. Countries that provide a haven will have to choose: either abandon their villainous clients or suffer the consequences.*" (*The enemy may be shadowy* (comment), 17.09.01)

Indeed, *The Independent* was most likely to use this narrative of the five newspapers. 9/11 became shorthand not only for a specific terrorist event, but for action that would follow in its wake. September 11th became a marker in time, indicating that there was a pre 9/11 and that we are now in a post-9/11 world. It was used to report ideas around attitudes towards the Middle East:

> "*... after September 11, the Bush administration refused to accept that Arab anger over Israel's treatment of the Palestinians could have been a contributing factor in the rise of the al-Qaida network.... Israel, and Israel's supporters abroad, rejected any September 11 linkage, too...*"(*Making the connection*, *The Guardian* (leader), 21.02.02)

to call for joined up action:

> "*In a strongly worded joint statement, Russia and the EU condemned the September 11 attacks on the US...saying: "...After the tragic events of September 11, the European community has a need to look again at regional security," he said.*" (*Russia and West to liaise on security*, The Times, 04.10.01)

and to evoke fear:

> "*...it came two days after George Bush's statement that US intelligence was picking up the same signals it was getting before 11 September, and expected another attack.*" (*So who's winning the terrorists' world cup? The Independent* (comment), 23.05.02)

9/11 also became a short hand for setting the scene for counter-terrorism activities. It was used, almost as justification for arrests in newspaper articles: "*Italian police have arrested more than 100 terrorist suspects since September 11, although most have now been released for lack of evidence*" (*28 held in Naples terror swoop*, The Times, 01.02.03) and to seemingly determine and justify levels of punishment: "*Government prosecutors have claimed that Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person charged over the 9/11 attacks, was a "loyal al-Qa'ida soldier" who was responsible for the deaths of almost 3,000 people and should be executed*" (*Lies of '20th hijacker' caused September 11, court hears*, The Independent, 07.03.06). The date became a marker in a different sense too, indicating 'progress' in counter-terrorism activities: "*Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi is among the most important figures to have been captured since 9/11 and his detention is a significant blow to Osama bin Laden's terrorist network*" (Top *jihadi strategist brought Iraq's insurgents into the al-Qaeda fold*, The Times, 28.04.07).

4.8.3 No trust

As with climate change, 'no trust' is the narrative that captures disillusionment, failures, challenges, distrust and scepticism. Such views were expressed in relation to policies, motives and behaviour, military action and political decisions, among others. Of the

broadsheet press, *The Times* was least likely to feature this narrative, potentially indicating that it was less critical of government actions and decisions than *The Independent* and *The Guardian*. *The Daily Mail* was considerably more likely than the *Daily Mirror* to include this narrative in its reports.

In the early years of this study, 'no trust' was found in articles about the Northern Ireland peace process, implying there was a weakness in the response to the IRA: "*If [Sinn Fein] doesn't get what it wants from the 'peace process', some of the terrorists can restart their activities... We're back where we started, except that the police and the security forces have been weakened*" (*Now it's down to the other side*, *Daily Mail*, 31.07.00). There was also criticism of governments and actions in relation to the Northern Ireland troubles: "*Like so many times before, Northern Ireland is once again in crisis...The current crisis in Ulster is not because of the IRA's failure but of Trimble's intransigence and a failure of the wider unionist leadership to reconcile themselves to a new Ireland*" (*IRA will ignore Trimble's gun plea*, *Daily Mirror* (feature)*, 06.07.01).

Following 9/11, American and coalition action became a particular focus for this narrative. Reports and comments captured public disillusion with military action, although few voices in this study came from British citizens: "*[Pakistan's] president...appeared on television to assure his 140 million citizens the American campaign would be short, sharp and aimed at terrorists, not civilians... But as he did, riot police and soldiers moved in with batons and tear gas to break up anti-U.S. and Britain protests in several cities*" (*President's power ploy as civil anger spreads*, 09.10.01). Military failures were also a thematic trait for this narrative:

> "*An Israeli victory required three elements: the crippling of Hizbollah's military capability, the elimination of its autonomous governing structures in Southern Lebanon and the arrival of a strong international force to ensure - in co-operation with the Lebanese army - that Hizbollah could not rebuild its positions. None of this has happened. Israel has failed to secure its objectives, suffering not only casualties*

but a loss of prestige, moral authority and military reputation." (*I fear that Israel has lost this war, The Independent*, 14.08.06).

There was distrust evident in articles about the motives for and around counter-terrorism proposals, exposing concerns and open criticism. For example: "*The Americans claim they are not just fighting the war on terrorism to protect the world but to preserve the highest standards of justice and civilisation. That is not what has been happening at Guantanamo. Hundreds of men - and some boys - have been held without charge or legal representation*" (*Voice of the Daily Mirror: Charge Brit 'terrorists' or let them go*, 10.03.04). The impact of particular courses of action was also raised: "*On the eve of a key vote on the second reading of the Counter-Terrorism Bill in the Commons, their open letter warns the Prime Minister that "community relations could suffer if the Muslim community appears to be ... targeted for prolonged pre-charge detention*" (*Leading cultural figures attack folly of 42-day detention limit, The Independent*, 31.03.08).

Alongside this, misgivings about procedures were expressed in reports: "*My inquiries have found all these elements of collusion. The coordination, dissemination and sharing of intelligence were poor... Crucial information was withheld from senior officers. Important evidence was neither exploited nor preserved*" (*The Stevens Report, The Guardian*, 18.04.03); along with reservations around decisions: "*The government has undervalued the continuing need to deploy significant numbers of "boots on the ground", while cuts in manpower and equipment programmes will lead to capability gaps, the Commons defence committee warns*" (*Britain cannot sustain its military deployments abroad, MPs warn, The Guardian*, 17.03.05).

4.8.4 Current risk

Terrorism was presented predominantly as a current risk by newspapers in this study, capturing the significant number of articles around acts of terrorism (such as 9/11) as well as those that referred to an impending, immediate threat. With the exception of *The Times*, 'current risk' was similarly utilised by each of the newspapers (ranging between 19-23 instances). This suggests that irrespective of political persuasion, terrorism is accepted by the majority of newspapers as a real and immediate threat.

Current threats were found in reports in a number of ways including in the form of announcements about "*active*" terror plots *"to launch attacks in Britain, France and Germany"* (*British brothers in Al Qaeda plot*, *The Daily Mail*, 01.10.10) and "...*new warnings of fresh possible attacks from the air*" (*Gunman offered £850 for terror attack on Mumbai*, *The Independent,* 05.12.08).

The arrests of individuals allegedly plotting terror attacks also served as a cue to highlight the immediacy of the threat: "*Five jihadists were caught by Egyptian police as they collected pistols, rifles and rocket-propelled grenades for a Mumbai-style assault. It is thought the slaughter of tourists in the Egyptian resort was to take place in the run-up to Christmas*" (*Terror plot to kill tourists is foiled*, *Daily Mirror*, 02.11.12). The idea that nowhere is safe from terrorism was a theme throughout articles utilising current risk as a narrative, with claims that: "*Soft targets exist all over London, Birmingham or the NEC...*" (*We're lucky we've not been bombed*, *Daily Mirror*, 20.05.03) and that terrorists were "*picking targets that are almost everyday targets, such as hotels and cafes*" (ibid).

Current incidents of terrorist activity provided a hook to stress and reinforce the present-day reality, echoing and indeed evidencing sentiments that terrorism is a sustained and real threat. This included:

> "*Fears of a renewed terror campaign swept Britain yesterday following a bomb explosion in London.*" (*Bombers are back, The Mirror*, 02.06.00)

> "*Another doctor being held was named as Iraqi Bilal Abdul Samad Abdulla, one of the men who drove a blazing Jeep into the doorway of Glasgow Airport on Saturday... The UK remains on a 'critical' state of terror alert - the highest possible - meaning another attack is believed to be imminent... Extra police patrols and vehicle searches are taking place at airports and transport hubs, including major railway stations.*" (*Doctor, Father, Husband, Bomb Suspect, Daily Mail*, 03.07.07)

Along with the threat to the UK, current risk was often associated with the Middle East and Russia capturing the unrest and volatility in those regions: "*Hizbollah fired more rockets yesterday than at any time in the 22-day war*" (*Hizbollah responds to Israeli...' The Independent*, 03.08.06); and:

> "*Two hundred children, some as young as five, are taken hostage by two dozen gunmen on the first day of the school year. In the capital, a car bomb has exploded close to a central underground station, killing 10 and injuring 30. And just one week before, two planes carrying holidaymakers fell out of the sky almost simultaneously, less than half an hour after take-off, killing all 90 people on board. This is the situation that Russia is facing, with Chechen separatists taking hostages, and their bereaved womenfolk turning themselves into human bombs.*" (*Putin's greatest political danger is to appear soft, The Independent*, 03.09.04)

4.8.5 War on terror

'War on terror' was a term coined by President Bush in 2001, which has also been known as the 'campaign against terror' and the 'global war on terror'. The first mention of a 'war on terrorism' in this study came in the days after the attacks of September 11 2001:

> "*The Senate approved by 96-0 and 98-0 measures to provide the $ 40bn of federal assistance - double the sum Mr Bush had originally asked for - and authorise force for the war the President has declared on terrorism across the world.*" (*Terror in America, The Independent*, 15.09.01)

The war on terror was linked with ideas around a war against Western or 'civil' cultures, for example: "*The war on terrorism is just that - a war. For the terrorists have declared war on us, on the civilised world, on everything that is decent*" (*Voice of the Mirror: These vile killers must not prevail, Daily Mirror,* 13.03.04). It appeared endless in timescale: "*Another day,*

another 'war against terror' scare. This time it's printer cartridges rigged up as bombs, sent

as air cargo from the Yemen to Chicago, via refuelling stops in Britain and Dubai, where the

devices were found" (*Peter McKay*, *Daily Mail* (opinion), 01.11.10). It was also seen as

confusing:

> "*Washington is at war. Washington is going to war. And Washington is starting to think about a peace to end both wars... There is some confusion here between two wars. Sometimes when Washingtonians say "the war" they mean the war against terrorism, which they are still living intensely in everyday life. Sometimes they mean the coming war with Iraq. WT and WI, as a friend tags them.*" (*Washington at war*, The Guardian (comment and analysis), 12.12.02)

The war on terror did not escape criticism. There were attacks on motives and actions

undertaken as part of the war: "*But at the fag end of the misnamed, misjudged "war on*

terror", abortion time limits are left to the conscience and detention time limits are not"

(*Law and principle are lost in the crazy politics of 42 days*, *The Guardian* (comment and

debate), 06.06.08). Its longevity was also questioned: "*Jeh Johnson suggested...that a time*

would come when the legal authority given to the White House by Congress should no longer

be used to justify waging the war that has been fought since 2001...Instead, the

responsibility for tackling al-Qaida should pass to the police and other law enforcement

agencies" (*War on al-Qaida drawing to a close, says Obama lawyer*, *The Guardian*,

01.12.12). It was also addressed with irony - although few in number - as this article about

the Edinburgh Fringe Festival illustrates: "*The light-hearted comedy Terrorist the Musical...*

ponders how terrorists might make a living once the War on Terror is over and examines

seven unemployed operatives who become entertainers" (*War on Terror goes centre stage*

at Fringe, *The Times,* 10.05.05).

Among the broadsheets, similar frequencies of this narrative were recorded, the same being

true for the tabloids. Interestingly, each newspaper was more likely to reference the

counter-terrorism narrative over the war on terror, indicating that the war on terror while a common frame for discussing action was not the predominant frame in the British press.

4.9 Discussion

The mass media "*must identify climate change as a newsworthy issue, or it is not communicated at all*" (Weingart et al, 2000: 263). The information above has shown the newsworthy angles and narrative themes that five UK newspapers have frequently used in this process.

On the subject of climate change, there is evidence that ideological standpoints are a powerful selection device (Carvalho, 2007: 223) in reporting climate change news. In contrast, the threat of terrorism post-9/11 does appear to be an ideological unifier. The data presented here suggests that there is a pre-existing, hegemonic narrative for terrorism into which newspapers 'fit' their news.

With the exception of the *Daily Mail*, this study shows that by news hook alone, climate change coverage in UK newspapers is politically dominated. Studies examining articles in more detail have also reached this conclusion (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Wu, 2009; Boykoff, 2008). The differences evident in the frequency of this news hook among the five newspapers reflects both the differing agendas of broadsheet and tabloid press as well as the impact of political persuasion on reporting.

Weather was a common vehicle for the newspapers in this research to communicate climate change, more so for the tabloid newspapers in this study. Although weather may be a familiar format for journalists to portray climate change, and existing research has

highlighted the reliance of the media on weather in reporting climate change (Boykoff, 2007; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Smith, 2005; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005), there are difficulties with using the ordinariness of weather as a news hook and narrative. It could help foster a sense of resignation or 'green fatigue' within the public – weather has the "*everyday relevance of throwaway conversation*" (Hargreaves et al, 2003: 19). The tabloids in this study in particular took a stoic or humorous approach to extreme weather, identified by Ereaut and Segnit as "*British comic nihilism,*" or "*bugger it and open another bottle*" (cited in O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009: 364). If extreme weather is seen as something that is tolerable and humorous then the full reality of climate change is unlikely to be realised. This is particularly concerning when the tabloid audiences are those that are critical to social movements to mobilise climate policy (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008). This difference between the use of the 'everyday' experience to communicate risk will be taken further in Chapter 5.

Science and scientific research is often reported in terms of human interest (Hargreaves et al, 2003; McComas & Simone, 2003). Climate science has been a staple news hook for the media's reporting of climate change because of the links that can be made between research findings, i.e. catastrophic climate change, and the threat posed to human life (Weingart et al, 2000). This research was consistent with these ideas. However, the differing treatment of science across the newspapers was evident with the right-leaning press - specifically the *Daily Mail* - rhetorically constructing climate science in seemingly inconsequential, mundane or quirky narratives.

When considered across the timeframe this research finds, contrary to to Andreadis and Smith (2007) who argue that climate change failed to gain real coverage until 2005 because of a lack of news hook, that there were three consistent news hooks relative to climate change prior to that date – weather, scientific research and environmental politics. Beyond

this point, international action and reflective comments on other forms of media also gained traction as news hooks.

Beyond the headlines, action is the most common narrative trait for climate change in this study - a positive finding, but one that is, I suggest, offset by the significant focus on finance, which seeps into different facets of the climate change story - from funding for research, to investment in new technology, taxes for business to increases in household bills. In their study, McComas and Shanahan (1999) also found that costs of resolving problems associated with climate change were emphasised as the political and international efforts become prominent. Few articles captured the reverse idea, the link between environmental protection and economic gain identified by Carvalho (2005) as ecological modernisation or the costs of failing to address climate change, as outlined in the Stern Review of 2006. Instead, the finance narrative concentrates on the negative - the amount needed to invest and what the mitigation of climate change costs. For the citizen, those costs juxtaposed with the uncertainty of the future may be irreconcilable, particularly when the benefits associated with climate economics are absent from reports. Such a perspective is likely to have heightened in recent years, with the recession of 2008 continuing to be felt across society today. There was also a split in the use of the action narrative according to the political ideology of newspapers, with right-leaning papers such as *The Times* less likely to use this narrative than left-of centre papers. Clearly, as Corner (2013: 10) points out, while science is value neutral, actions and solutions are not. The prominence afforded to action by *The Times* in comparison to *The Guardian* or *The Independent* suggests that this newspaper may indeed deflect news on this topic rather than addressing it.

In contrast to climate change, terrorism reporting is pegged on fear of an attack and responses. Of note here, is the disproportionate relationship between incidences of

terrorism and reporting – prospective attacks feature prominently, rather than actual acts of terrorism. Compared to the real risk that people face, this presents something of an imbalance since "*[m]ost of us live at peace in democracies*" (Briscoe, 2008: 81).

Arrests, prosecution and law change, were all common forms of responsive action to terrorism that UK newspapers used as news hooks and narratives, echoing findings by Papacharissi & Oliveira (2008: 71) that the UK media presented its public with broad coverage of a range of policy alternatives in response to terrorism. Such a focus on criminality may also be evidence that the media bypass the political aspects of terrorist acts locating their narrative instead in a discourse that upholds the dominance of mainstream authority (Featherstone et al, 2010; 179-180). It is significant that military action, namely war as a response to terrorism was one of the most common news pegs in this study in its own right, and which also has a presence as a narrative, separately.

There are certain similarities among the news hooks and narratives used to report climate change and terrorism. Despite the powerful political climate rhetoric in the UK in shaping climate change discourse (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005), general elections (and Presidential elections in America) were found to be a rarely used news hooks in this study. Similarly, terrorism news is also lacking in this news hook. Research has shown that individuals who consume election news are more likely to vote (Thomas et al, 2004) so, in turn, it follows that what they read in the media may also influence their vote. In relation to climate change, low carbon living is unlikely to win votes and may be 'off message' at election time. When it comes to finance, allocating taxpayers money to tackling climate change may not resonate with the public because of the lower priority they place in this area. In studies the public have identified a lack of seriousness and media presence in relation to climate change (Lorenzoni et al, 2007) with public understanding and behavioural engagement at much

lower levels (Whitmarsh et al, 2011; DEFRA 2007). Research has also shown that the UK media avoids the intricacies of climate policy (Lockwood, 2009: 187). If climate polices are therefore absent from public debate at critical times, then there are implications for public understanding of the need to reduce emissions and to take other necessary steps to mitigate the worst effects of climate change (Lorenzoni et al, 2007). The absence of elections as a news hook for terrorism could also be due to several reasons. There was a consensus among political parties as to the threat of terrorism and action needed with minor policy differences among them. Thus, the issue may have evaded focus in coverage of manifestos due to the similarities in content. It could also be explained by the government's switch away from positioning terrorism as a central parliamentary issue to exploring more widely the role of asylum and migration – without making the overt link between the two (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). Knowledgeable citizens are essential to an efficient democracy. The absence of information about climate change and terrorism during election time may therefore limit the opportunities in which government policies and practice can be discussed, debated and sanctioned - the democratic ideal is compromised.

Common to both climate change and terrorism was a narrative which expressed misgivings and challenges about particular forms of action. For terrorism, this was channelled towards the war on terror, the detention of suspects and other counter-terrorism activities, again centred on a pre-ordained narrative. Climate change on the other hand saw this narrative refer to political decisions, causes, science, action (and inaction), covering a more diverse spectrum than terrorism.

The end result of examining the news hooks and narratives determining climate change and terrorism illustrates that climate change lacks a clean and clear narrative, and is shaped by the ideological aims of individual newspapers. Considered as a whole, across the newspaper

spectrum, media narratives mix searching and challenging issues, as Liverman (2009: 279-280) points out:

> ...[climate change brings] together concerns about human relations to nature, the responsibility of rich nations to poorer, the links from local activities to global conditions, and the obligations of present to future generations..."

Such a remit means that climate change may not fit neatly into conventional or traditional storytelling conventions and themes or the news agenda. Furthermore, newspapers juxtapose these topics with political action that is reported as failing or difficult to achieve as well as seemingly inconsequential, mundane tasks that can be carried out by us all. The climate change narrative suffers from what Hamblyn calls a *"rhetorical mismatch of scale between grim apocalyptic warnings and the cheerfully mundane policy solutions proffered as useful actions: 'use less hot water'; 'check your tires'; 'plant a tree', as Al Gore suggests in his list of '10 Things to Do' which appears at the end of An Inconvenient Truth...*(2009: 234-235).

This chapter has provided an introduction to climate change and terrorism as comparative issues by focusing on the most common news hooks and narratives used by five British newspapers to report climate change and terrorism. It has identified a concentrated set of news hooks and narratives for terrorism that reinforce messages around terrorist acts, the immediacy of the threat and counter-terrorism actions. In comparison, climate change is more widely dispersed in its narratives and news hooks, suggesting that the issue lacks a discursive home and a grand narrative. This finding about the structure of the climate change story is discussed further in Chapter 9, which presents the conclusion to this work. The following chapters will develop some of the themes raised in this chapter by examining in more detail the representation of risk, cause, action and debate.

Chapter 5: Alice through the looking glass?[18] The causes and effects of climate change and terrorism risks

5.1 Introduction

This chapter shows that the topic of 'cause' is more prevalent in climate change news than terrorism. When the causes of climate change are featured in articles, they overwhelmingly refer to emissions. Extremism is the most frequently mentioned cause of terrorism, either referenced directly or inferred within the article. Coverage of the causes of climate change reflects the ideological orientation of newspapers, with the left-leaning broadsheets more likely to report and discuss this angle.

Additionally, this chapter reveals that between 1999-2012, climate change has been presented in British newspapers as a risk that is distant, future-based and hypothetical. Its effects are dispersed across the present and future, weighted marginally more in favour of the latter, and are reported within narratives centred on the mundane, and less than life-threatening issues (Cottle, 1998: 20). The true effects and risk related to climate change are associated with low-lying islands, indigenous people, wildlife and ecology. In most cases, audiences are asked to imagine a world that is beyond their own lifetime, apocalyptic and resource-depleted and to connect themselves with it. Dangerous climate change belongs to the 'other' - the other country, the other person, the other generation, the other species, with whom British audiences must empathise. Terrorism risk on the other hand is reported as a current issue for society. Reports refer to events that have happened in the past, referencing particularly 9/11 and 7/7. This historical aspect to terrorism draws on and sustains a shared event, giving gravity to reports. Such a historical anchor is missing from

[18] Taken from *Comedy to the rescue, The Guardian,* 18.10.06

climate change reporting. Additionally, the 'other', in the case of terrorism is often the source of the threat, generating fear and working to help escalate risk.

5.2 The causes of climate change

The first point to note relating to the causes of climate change is how often they feature in newspaper reports. In total, 523 references were made to the causes of climate change in the articles in this study. Some articles contained several references to causes, others concentrated on a single facet of it. In contrast, the cause or causes of terrorism were referenced 254 times in articles. This correlates with existing research which highlights the difficulties and complexities in establishing the root cause of terrorism (see Bjorgo, 2004; Newman, 2006).

Figure 13: The causes of climate change as found in newspaper articles (1999-2012)

When it came to specific causes, emissions was the topic most frequently cited as the cause of climate change (see figure 13). This was found in articles making references to human activities, the burning of fossil fuels and pollution, for example:

> *"...Pupils will also be taught to...weigh up whether they should avoid travel by air to reduce CO2 emissions and shun food produce imported from the other side of the world because of its impact on pollution."* (*All pupils to be given lessons in climate change, The Independent*, 02.02.07)

It was also referred to subtly in articles, such as this example about the creation of on and off shore wind farms:

> *"...The answer emphatically isn't unabated gas, which, whatever its cost (pretty high at the moment, subject naturally to global undulations), is incompatible with emissions targets (by 2030, we'll be scarcely able to burn any gas and meet climate targets)".* (*Power to the People?, The Guardian*, 01.12.12)

Some articles focused on the role of industry and palm oil production in emissions:

> *"...forest clearances, to make room for palm oil production, are a significant contributor to the dangerous warming of the planet. The destruction of the planet's rainforests is responsible for a fifth of global carbon dioxide emissions...Most of the measures proposed to combat climate change in the West...will prove meaningless [if] we fail to deal with this fundamental source of emissions."*(*An oil shock we cannot ignore, The Independent* (leader), 01.05.09)

Others linked emissions to failed or questionable policies, for example:

> *"...it is too late for rich countries to grow their way out of the problem and must find a new way to run their economies. Everyone including climate scientists must reduce their emissions...Why for example do we encourage the oil industry with tax breaks, when we know that to avoid runaway climate change we can only afford to burn around a fifth of the fossil fuels left in the ground..."* (*Countdown to catastrophe, The Guardian* (feature), 01.10.12)

The second most frequently used - and perhaps surprising result - is the use of climate change itself as a cause. This captured articles that referred to the effects of climate change - for example weather or species loss - without linking such back to a specific area such as emissions or human activity. Instead, 'climate change' as a phenomenon was blamed. The link between evidence and cause is absent, possibly to the detriment of the reading public since they may be unable to make the connection between emissions-climate change-human activity. The last step which takes the reader into the causal association is missing.

Such a generic term also signifies natural variations in the climate (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008: 6) and may therefore further damage public engagement with the issue.

In attributing 'climate change' as a cause, articles reported: "*Pollution, intensive agriculture, housing development and the changing climate are wiping out around 25 species every year...*" (*England is losing 25 wildlife species a year*, *Daily Mail*, 01.11.10) but for others this was debated: "*When there is a lot of rain and a lot of dampness, certain kinds of insects thrive in tea...He added that no conclusive evidence as of yet had proven that climate change caused this high rainfall or production loss*" (*How Assam's tea is beginning to feel the strain of global warming*, *The Independent*, 01.01.11).

Human activity was the third most frequent cause cited in articles. This appeared either as the sole cause or in conjunction with others, in most cases emissions. In reporting the anthropogenic origins of climate change, articles in this study sometimes did so questioningly. The *Daily Mail* for example referred to 'green zealots' and reported:

> "*Fundamental to green thinking is the belief that human consumption is innately bad...the whole man made global warming theory has turned out to be just as absurd. As Britain shivers in its harshest winter for 13 years, atmospheric data shows that the earth is getting colder, not hotter, the ice caps are increasing not disappearing and the rise in sea level has slowed and is nothing out of the ordinary.*" (*Why do the green zealots think they can dictate how many children we are all allowed to have?, Daily Mail* (opinion), 02.02.09)

The Guardian made its stance clear on anthropogenic global warming by ironically reporting on a headline in *The Express:*

> "*Now, consider this headline from the Express: "Snow chaos, and they still claim its global warming". Yes, the recent cold snap in the UK apparently demonstrates that the notion that climate change is happening at all, let alone as the result of human activity, is one big confidence trick.*" (*Mind your language*, *The Guardian* (leader), 01.03.10)

The economy and natural causes were also among the top five most frequently cited causes for climate change, although to a much lesser extent, as figure 13 shows. In reporting the role of the economy, articles pointed to the importing of foodstuffs: "*Britain would be better off importing New Zealand lamb, which it claims is produced more efficiently than that of UK farms*" (*Ditch British lamb to help the planet, shops urged, Daily Mail*, 01.11.12), and the role of aviation in climate change: "*The group of 12 local authorities in and around London opposed to the third runway, planned to open in 2017, accused the Government of exaggerating the economic benefits from aviation while failing to measure its environmental impacts*" (*Thousands more homes face life in the shadow of the flight path, The Independent*, 21.08.07). That the use of natural causes was infrequent suggests that limited space was given to topics and comment that may play down the role of anthropogenic emissions in favour of natural rhythms - a positive finding in this respect. When natural causes were reported, they focused on uncertainties, for example: "*It is in fact possible that the switch in Australian weather patterns may be one of those random shifts that take place irrespective of human behaviour*" (*Drought, growth and a changing climate, The Independent* (editorial and opinion), 25.07.07); or climate change from a historical perspective:

> "*There is evidence to suggest climate change and increasing aridity may have helped to trigger the earliest civilisations of Mesopotamia, in what is now Iraq, the Harappan culture of south Asia, and ancient cities in China. Dr Brooks said that the Pacific Ocean's El Nino climate anomaly may have played a role in generating the arid conditions that were part of the reason why ancient civilisations grew out of the Peruvian mountains. "In all the 'cradles of civilisation' we find evidence of dramatic social change during a time of profound environmental change, in the form of increased regional aridity," he said.*" (*Climate change linked with the rise of the world's earliest civilisations, The Independent*, 08.09.06)

5.3 The causes of terrorism

The most common cause given for terrorism is extremism, as shown in figure 14. This was followed by religious differences and American foreign policy. As a category, extremism

suggests associations with unstable regimes or fanaticism. It puts terrorists in a narrative

category that identifies them as existing on the very fringes of society, polar in their views.

Extremism was reported in articles through direct references, for example:

> "...the only beneficiaries will be the extremists who feed off ever increasing violence and will attempt to use Israel's rash behaviour to justify even greater abominations." (*Yes, Israel has been sorely provoked*, Daily Mail, 01.01.09)

> "Terrorists do not want Pakistan to succeed...But militants underestimate us...[our] military [is] courageously battling extremists in Swat and Waziristan and succeeding..." (*We're fighting for our lives*, The Guardian (comment and debate), 01.03.10)

Associating extremism with Muslims or Islam locates the problem with the 'other' in society,

a mechanism that simultaneously shores up the cohesion of mainstream politics

(Featherstone et al, 2010: 178). It assures the superiority of the West and the hegemonic

discourse by discursively pitting 'liberal' societies against 'irrational' individuals and groups

(ibid).

Figure 14: The causes of terrorism as found in newspaper articles (1999-2012)

Religious difference was the second most frequent cause of terrorism, according to the

articles in this study. Interestingly, religion was not one of the most common narratives that

emerged around terrorism (see Chapter 4). References to this area were instead embedded within articles rather than setting the news agenda. Articles about Northern Ireland in the early years of this study featured this narrative: "*The statement said the 'beleaguered' Protestant community had endured 'a systematic or orchestrated campaign of intimidation from nationalists' and said the group's hand was being forced because of 'ethnic cleansing'.*" (*Shoot-to-kill threat puts Ulster on the brink, Daily Mail*, 21.06.00). Beyond the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this cause took on more of a focus on Islam. In an opinion article with the headline *This fanaticism we in the West will never understand,* the *Daily Mail* asked: "*Is this the Wrath of Islam against the U.S? Whoever these terrorists were, they sacrificed themselves, murdered the airline passengers and were ready to kill thousands on the ground*" (12.09.01). The connotations here are of a rational America (and Western world), victims of the anger and rage of a radical religion. *The Guardian* was more cautious in its reporting, including a statement from President Bush which seemingly reinforced the multiculturalism, inclusiveness and tolerance of the West (Featherstone et al, 2010, 178) while discursively constructing the terrorist other as extreme: "*Bush, in his carefully crafted speech on Thursday, said he had no quarrel with Islam, only with terrorists...This is what keeps me awake at night: the tragic possibilities of one of the 20th century's most lethal inheritances - the way in which the Abrahamic faiths have been pitted, one against the other*" *(A world apart* (comment and analysis), 24.09.01).

UK and US foreign policy emerged as a cause for terrorist activities, but in fewer than 20 articles in each case. This suggests that the newspapers in this study were reluctant to address the geo-political causes of terrorism, choosing instead to reinforce the particular worldview post-9/11 that symbolically constructed the enemy as the other. Existing research has also drawn such conclusions (see for example Featherstone et al, 2010).

References to US and UK foreign policy referred to the 'hard' (as opposed to soft) measures as a cause of terrorism, as these examples illustrate:

> "*As of today, US 'combat troops' have withdrawn from a country which saw 500 civilian deaths due to terrorist bombings in July and is still without a stable government...Can you wonder that the Middle East seethes with hatred for the West, mainly the US and the UK? Can you wonder that the various militants' organisations have so little difficulty in recruitment?*" (*The Andrew Alexander column*, *Daily Mail*, 01.09.10)

> "*James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence told a Senate committee Iran was now "more willing" to launch terrorist attacks in the United States "in response to real or perceived US actions that threaten the regime.*" (*Iran more willing to launch attacks on US, spy chief warns*, *The Times*, 01.02.12)

Unrest in the Middle East was also reported as one of the impetuses for terrorism, with articles covering the tension between Israel and Palestine as well as referring to certain countries as 'breeding grounds' for terrorism. Again, the discursive construction of the 'other' is evident.

> "*The Turkish prime minister...described the operation as 'state terrorism'...Israeli police cancelled leave and the army was on high alert saying it feared possible rocket attacks from Islamist militants in Gaza and southern Lebanon*" (*Gaza flotilla assault: Israel accused of state terrorism after deadly assault on flotilla*, *The Guardian*, 01.06.10)

> "*...many believe that Iran's behaviour is so outrageous, and its nuclear capability now so dangerous that a military strike is the only option left to the international community to bring the renegade nation in line...The Iranians have threatened dire consequences if such an attack took place...They are also likely to retaliate against any neighbourhood state ...They may risk attacking US forces stationed in Iraq or the nearby Gulf states...*" (*This rabid rogue state could tip the world into a new dark age*, *Daily Mail* (opinion), 01.12.11)

5.4 Newspaper portrayal of causes

In noting the causes of climate change, all of the newspapers in this study, with the exception of the *Daily Mail* referenced emissions within articles most often (see figure 15).

Figure 15*: Newspaper references to causes of climate change (1999-2012)

The *Daily Mail* used the generic term 'climate change' as a cause most frequently. Climate change as a cause divorces the issue from its real origins and discursively connotes the issue as a natural and potentially benign global phenomenon, removing the urgency for action. As the above examples show, the *Daily Mail* in some articles also questioned the role of humans in climate change, signalling the disjoint with which this tabloid reported causes and echoing research by Boykoff & Mansfield (2008) which found significant divergence among UK tabloids in reporting the scientific consensus on human contribution to climate change. There is also considerably less reference to the causes of climate change overall among the tabloids. Less visibility, particularly for anthropogenic causes, suggests considerable implications in garnering support for mitigating policy and engagement with the issue more widely from tabloid audiences.

There is also a clear divide evident among the broadsheet newspapers. Human activity, emissions and to a smaller extent the economy are referenced considerably more often in the left-leaning newspapers than *The Times*. Indeed, on these particular causes, *The*

Guardian made roughly double the amount of references when compared to *The Times*. However, as Carvalho (2007: 239) has already noted, there is a clear reluctance amongst *The Guardian* and *The Independent* to expose the real impact of business, and consumerism on climate change. This research also finds that while *The Guardian* is vocal about the causes of climate change it rarely addresses the capitalist agenda at the heart of the cause of climate change.

On terrorism, extremism was the most commonly referenced cause in all of the newspapers (see figure 16).

Figure 16*: Newspaper references to causes of terrorism (1999-2012)

The Mirror made the fewest references to the causes of terrorism, seemingly shying away from covering this area in its reports. *The Independent* and *The Guardian* were most likely to reference tension in the Middle East as a cause of terrorism, but not in significant numbers indicating an unwillingness to address the geo-political impetus for terrorism.

What is interesting is the lack of focus on the causes of terrorism when compared to climate change among, particularly among the broadsheet press. For example, *The Guardian* made

100 references to emissions in climate change reports, while extremism featured in just 17 articles on terrorism. The trend is mirrored across all broadsheets, each of which included significantly more reference to the causes of climate change than terrorism.

5.5 Results: Effects of climate change and terrorism

When climate change effects were reported, they were most likely to be referred to in a future context as anticipated (see figure 17). It was not overwhelmingly so however. A marginally smaller set of articles identified climate change effects as an issue for the current day, with a third group reporting effects as a current and future issue simultaneously. In contrast, when articles referred to the effects of terrorism, they tended to situate them in the past, by a considerable majority. This captures the significant number of articles focused on the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in America and 7/7 in Britain. It also reflects coverage of terrorism in Britain more generally. Britain's link with terrorism and politically motivated violence is well established, and the effects of the IRA's bombing campaign in mainland Britain, violence and criminal activities were reported often in the early years of this study. What this suggests is that certain terrorist attacks are focal points for reporting, providing an anchor for journalists and a shared reference point for the public. As well as this historical link, past effects are used to reminisce, for example on the anniversary of the Omagh bomb; in other cases, they are projected forward, offered as a reason for measures, policies or changes.

Figure 17: Timescale of the effects of climate change and terrorism (1999-2012)


Figure 18 shows how each of the newspapers in this study reported the timeframe of the effects of climate change. *The Guardian* and the *Daily Mirror* were the only two newspapers to situate the effects of climate change in the future more than the present (or past), however the *Daily Mirror's* coverage of effects is scarce overall. *The Times*, *The Independent* and the *Daily Mail* emphasised the current effects most often. Among the broadsheets, there are noticeably fewer articles in *The Times* that address the effects of climate change, suggesting that this is not a strong news agenda for this newspaper.

Figure 18: Timescales of the effects of climate change as reported by newspaper (1999-2012)

In reporting the effects of climate change as a future-based scenario, articles included references to holiday spots: "*By 2020, visitors to the Costa del Sol could risk contracting malaria as global warming brings more frequent heatwaves...*" (*Tourism spots could be too hot to handle*, *The Guardian*, 30.08.99). In a British context serious effects included flooding but the positive aspects of climate change were also reported, including a "*Mediterranean climate within 100 years*" in which "*citrus fruit and grapes would flourish*" (*Flood disaster on way, say scientists*, *Daily Mirror*, 23.01.01). *The Times* reported: "*A sustained increase in temperatures may also bring long-term physiological changes, such as thinner blood, which will be a positive health benefit. According to one calculation there could be two million fewer days spent in hospital by 2050 as a result*" (*Warmer winters will save 2 million days in hospital*, 02.08.02).

Primarily, the negative consequences of the future effects of climate change were emphasised in newspaper discourse. Countries were faced with forest fires, infectious disease and the destruction of coral reefs and farmland (*UN Delivers apocalyptic warning on*

climate, The Independent, 20.02.01). Future impact was also tempered with the limits of

current knowledge in some instances, as this example from *The Independent* demonstrates:

> "*Nobody, least of all the climate scientists, would say we know all there is to know about climate change... Although we can expect matters to get worse, how much worse they eventually get relies largely on what we as a global community are prepared to do now.*"(*Why flutter of butterfly's wings explains global warming (feature),*11.02.06)

In covering climate change and its impact as a contemporary and current issue in the UK,

there was evidence of reports accentuating the unusual or unexpected. The *Daily Mail*

frequently adopted this angle, reporting "*sleepless nights*" for residents in Scotland thanks

to an invasion of mosquito's (*Mosquito squadron*, 24.07.99), and "*heat-loving*" plants such

as banana and olive trees "*growing happily in Glasgow thanks to climate change*" (*Exotic*

plants are going bananas over our milder winters, 16.09.05). *The Guardian* opted for a more

environmental focus, reporting on "*the most spectacular leaf display in history*" (*Golden*

leaves spectacular colours may be due to global warming, 16.11.04).

Weather and natural disasters were also used to contextualise climate change as an issue

for 'now'. Evidence-based reporting and lexical choices (highlighted in bold in the examples

below) add to the narrative of immediacy, for example:

> "*The earth's climate **is** changing, and the last two decades **have been** the warmest in the last millennium...precipitation patterns **are** changing, with more floods and droughts; sea level **is** rising, glaciers **are** melting and ice in the Arctic **is** melting.*" (*Prescott unveils £60M for cleaner car fuel, The Independent*, 21.11.00)

> "*Climate charge **is** getting worse. Nine of the 10 warmest years on record were between 1990 and 2000. Forests **are** being destroyed at an alarming rate.*" (*Summit is in danger of becoming just idle chat, Daily Mirror*, 12.08.02)

Non-Western nations were reported as having to bear the worst of the effects of climate

change as a current issue. Droughts in Africa and the warming of the environment in the

Himalayas were some of the current effects of climate change reported. The melting of the

ice caps in the Arctic and Antarctic also featured. References to Western countries that were more hard-hitting were evident, although these were in the minority, for example:

> "...most of Australia is already suffering from a decade-long drought... agriculture has been devastated...even Perth on the west coast, are struggling to maintain supplies." (*Drought, growth and a changing climate*, *The Independent* (editorial and opinion), 25.07.07)

Wildlife, flora and fauna were common features of reports detailing the current effects of climate change, referring to the loss of habitats or the appearance of flowers earlier. Polar bear populations were reported to be "*in sharp decline, a trend that environmentalists blame on the shrinking of their sea ice habitats because of man-made global warming*" (*A black and white issue - polar bear versus oil*, *The Times*, 06.02.08).

Reporting the effects of terrorism as a past event was the most common timeframe in this study by a considerable margin. Figure 19 shows how each of the five newspapers reported the effects of terrorism.

Figure 19: Effects of terrorism as reported by newspaper (1999-2012)

There is a clear message from this data that all of the newspapers dedicated significant amounts of coverage to the effects of terrorism and terrorist acts, with *The Times* pursuing this frame most often. There is more uniformity among the newspapers when compared to climate change. Effects were coded as a past event if they had happened days, weeks, months or years prior to the date of the article (the figures for articles referring to actual terrorist attacks are shown in the risk section below). Examples include articles about the death of IRA criminals which referred to 'long careers of death and destruction' charting a trail of hijacks, armed robbery and criminal behaviour (*Blood-stained and brutal life of the 'beast'*, *Daily Mirror*, 18.03.99). The prosecution of terrorists also gave an opportunity for the re-telling of terrorist attacks, such as the trial in 2000 of the man who bombed embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, killing 24 people (*Man admits embassy bomb plots*, *The Guardian*, 21.10.00). Arrests also provided this type of coverage:

> "*Indonesian police are holding a man they believe played a key role in the terrorist attack that killed nearly 200 people at a Bali nightclub last month.*" (*Campaign against terror*, *The Independent*, 08.11.02)

> "*The US authorities claim [Abu Hamza] has links with high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaida, and that he helped militants who took 16 westerners hostage in Yemen in 1998... The US authorities also allege that Mr Hamza attempted to set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon in 1999.*" (*Abu Hamza to face charges in Britain*, *The Guardian*, 16.10.04)

The IRA and its bombing campaign was a common feature of articles. The Good Friday agreement, or major terrorist attacks such as the bombing of Omagh provided an opportunity to reflect and reiterate the wider effects of the IRA's presence and terrorist activities:

> "*Since the signing of the Agreement there have been over 30 murders carried out by mainstream IRA, countless punishment beatings and shootings and no decommissioning...*" (*I believe there's no difference between Arab and Irish terrorists*, *Daily Mirror* (opinion), 09.10.01)

In the wake of 9/11, a wealth of newspaper reports were written about the attacks, their scale and effects. Only a small portion are analysed here, but articles refer to it as a '*spectacular attack*' and '*outrage*' (*The enemy may be shadowy, but this war will follow the usual battle lines, The Independent* (comment), 17.09.01) and a '*barbarous act*' (*Russia and West to liaise on security, The Times*, 04.10.01). The connotations of these emotive words suggest widespread negative effects for society. 9/11 and later, the 7/7 attacks in London, provided a reference point for reflection, to look back on events or to pose questions about counter-terrorism, intelligence and security.

Reporting the effects of terrorism in a current context focused on issues such as transport disruption, heightened security measures, or criminal activity which brought immediacy to narratives. Restrictions on the movement of the public and other aspects of day-to-day life were evident in reports:

> "*Public access to landmark monuments, such as the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, is being limited or halted. And America's Federal Aviation Authority has ordered all commercial airliners to avoid the airspace above major sporting fixtures this weekend. According to Boston's Mayor, Thomas Menino, and other public officials, Mr Ashcroft's decision to call for heightened security was not based on any specific threat... Scotland Yard said an extra 1,500 extra officers will be on duty over the weekend as part of the anti-terrorism operation and to prevent revenge attacks against members of the Muslim community. The force is at its highest level of security in its peacetime history.*" (*War on terrorism, The Independent*, 22.09.01)

> "*Most events in the US this weekend have been called off. Most in Europe will go ahead... The US major leagues have called a halt to their schedules, with baseball deciding to extend its season so that all postponed games can be played. The US PGA and LPGA have cancelled this week's events.*" (*Attack on America, The Guardian*, 14.09.01)

In the UK, the current effects of terrorism included the introduction of laws and bills in parliament: "*Ministers are expected to rush through measures to arrest and detain suspects accused of acts associated with terrorism as an immediate reaction to yesterday's bombings...*" (*Terror in London, The Independent*, 08.07.05); and police activity: "*Even though the device did not explode, the closure of tube and mainline stations caused misery*

for hundreds of thousands of commuters, roads were gridlocked, and the build-up to the Queen Mother's centenary pageant in Whitehall was disrupted" (*Republican bomb paralyses London*, *The Guardian*, 20.07.00).

Effects such as these were not only reported in relation to terrorist attacks that had happened, but also those that were anticipated, for example:

> "*...British Airways has suspended all flights to Pakistan, a clear sign of the fear gripping foreign companies that they will be targeted by those determined to wage jihad against the West. Gunmen kidnapped the Afghan consul in Peshawar, ambushing his car, killing his driver and sending a chilling signal to Islamabad that it can no longer protect anyone outside the capital.*" (*Terrorism's curse*, *The Times* (feature), 23.09.08)

The effects of terrorist attacks on the public was also a common theme in reports. Narratives of their fears, as well as their bravery were included in reports:

> "*...the people of Moscow face a terrible uncertainty about who is behind these attacks and what their purpose is... Terrorists are on the loose targeting the most normal buildings - the ordinary homes of ordinary people.*" (*Russia: a cataclysm waiting to happen?*, *The Daily Mail*, 14.09.99)

> "*They carried on... It didn't feel like a Friday. None of the usual frenzied buzz of activity before the working week tumbles into the frivolity of the weekend. After the carnage and horror, a sombre calm descended across the city... Some admitted being nervous but all were determined they will not be beaten by the terrorists.*" (*07/07 War on Britain*, *Daily Mirror*, 09.07.05)

As well as reporting personal stories, an increase in solidarity and an identification with victims of terrorism was also evident and coded here as one of the effects of terrorism, for example:

> "*We are almost becoming used to these appalling acts, yet the sense of shock and outrage is still as sharp and as devastating... The huge numbers who gathered last night in Madrid were only a fraction of the countless millions who were with them in spirit throughout the world.*" (*Voice of the Daily Mirror*, 13.03.04)

Related to terrorism, and resonating in particular in the newspapers in this study was the impact of the IRA on British society and life. Crime and a hidden underworld featured as one of the contemporary effects of IRA-led terrorism, as this example captures:

> "And the fact is that the Belfast Agreement is in danger of collapse unless the IRA and the loyalist terror gangs stop their beatings, their torture, their rackets and their extortion on the streets of Belfast and the other Northern Irish towns and cities... Little matter that, even as we debate the fate of the peace process, young kids in Belfast will have their legs broken and their kneecaps smashed, drugs will be peddled and communities put under a cloak of fear by terrorist thugs." (This cynical move threatens a lasting peace, Daily Mail (opinion), 17.07.02)

Overwhelmingly in this study, the effects of terrorism and climate change were reported using negative terminology. Figure 20 shows how these effects were reported in this study, when they appeared.

Figure 20: Impact of the effects of climate change and terrorism (1999-2012)

There is a noticeable difference in the tabloid's treatment of climate change when compared to terrorism (see figures 21 and 22 respectively). The Daily Mail and Daily Mirror are much less likely to include details of the negative effects of climate change in their reports. However, these same newspapers reference the negative effects of terrorism in

similar frequency to the broadsheets. Between the popular and the prestige press, there appears to be a division in the visibility of climate change as a negative issue. The problem here, as Boykoff & Mansfield (2008: 7) point out is that the individuals who read tabloid newspapers are the same individuals that are crucial in moving climate policy forward. If the effects are discussed less in these newspapers, there are also fewer opportunities to focus on the negative impact of the issue, which has clear implications for the success of future action (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008). Similarly, there appears to be an ideological aspect to *The Times'* coverage of the effects of climate change, covering this angle considerably less than *The Independent* or *The Guardian*. The effect here is to divorce climate change from a narrative of immediacy and a narrative of future consequences. Corner (2013) suggests that a narrative that embraces a sense of intergenerational duty may appeal to Conservative citizens, but this research shows that *The Times* is reluctant to address the effects of climate change in its reporting, presenting an obstacle to such a discursive shift.

Figure 21: Newspaper reporting of the impact of climate change effects (1999-2012)

Figure 22: Newspaper reporting of the impact of terrorism effects (1999-2012)

6.6 Results: Portrayal of catastrophic risk

In this study, major risk in the context of climate change referred to devastating climate change that would affect specific regions, peoples or the world more widely. In relation to both issues, major risk was interpreted as a particular incident or event that may have happened (a current manifestation of this risk, such as the 9/11 attacks in America), or fear of it (a future-based threat). There were differences between climate change and terrorism in the aspects of risk reported. Terrorism risk focused only on terrorist attacks – a specific incident, whereas climate risk included references to the displacement of peoples, climate-induced wars, the extinction of species, and radical changes in temperatures that may cause loss of life.

Figure 23 shows the timeframes assigned to climate change and terrorism by the articles analysed in this study. When terrorist risks were reported, they were more likely to be reported as a current reality. This refers to attacks that happened, as well as claims that

major attacks were an everyday risk. In contrast, risks related to climate change are more

likely to be anticipated as something that will, could or may happen at a future time.

Figure 23: Timescale of the risk

With the exception of the *Daily Mirror,* each of the newspapers in this study reported

terrorism as a current or anticipated risk in similar frequency (see figure 24). Illustrating the

weight it afforded to terrorism as a current risk, the *Daily Mirror* reported this angle

considerably more than a future risk.

Figure 24: Newspaper coverage of terrorism risk (1999-2012)

These findings are in contrast to climate change news, where risk is a limited feature of reporting in the tabloid press (see figure 25). Among the broadsheet newspapers, the left-leaning press were more likely to report the issue as a current or anticipated risk, the latter by a considerably higher frequency.

Figure 25: Newspaper coverage of climate change risk (1999-2012)

The Guardian included almost double the amount of coverage of climate change as an anticipated risk compared to *The Independent* and *The Times*, a finding which is not unexpected since existing research has shown how the newspaper created an image of crisis and a sense of responsibility around climate change (see Carvalho, 2007). It is apparent that the portrayal of disastrous climate change is less of a match for the tabloids news agenda, potentially because of a lack of a UK-centric focus.

In this research, the darkest scenarios associated with climate change risk were reserved for parts of the developing world and low-lying islands around the world, for example:

> *"It estimates that a "staggering" 182 million people in sub-Saharan Africa could die of disease directly attributable to climate change by 2100. Many millions more face death and devastation from climate-induced floods, famine, drought and conflict."* (*West's failure over climate change 'will kill 182m African's'*, *The Independent*, 15.05.06)

Landmarks and tourist attractions were also utilised by newspapers to convey climate change risk, providing familiar reference points for audiences:

> *"Among the report's predictions are warnings of drought, damage from melting snow and permafrost, public health dangers caused by extreme heat and air pollution, and the disappearance of many unique ecosystems. Worst affected will be coral reefs, the alpine meadows of the Rockies and the low-lying barrier islands of the south-east coast, which may well be engulfed by the Atlantic. Forests are expected to experience "major species shifts". Improved crop productivity and better tree growth are listed as potential pluses."* (*It's official, global warming does exist says Bush*, *The Guardian*, 04.06.02)

> *"If global warming is not checked by measures agreed at the earth summits, the Maldives could be lost."* (*Prescott goes diving to save the Maldives*, *The Independent,* 04.03.99)

Notably, there is an absence of discussion in newspapers about the potentially massive refugee crisis that climate change will create. Although figures are mentioned in headlines, the scale of this crisis is at odds with its prominence, thereby shading the West's culpability and thus their responsibility in managing it.

In a UK context, the reporting of major climate change risks as anticipated events featured the loss of local and well known places: "...*By 2040 the only thing visible on Dublin's O'Connell Street could be The Spire - and the Dail would be flooded...*" (*Wave Goodbye*, *Daily Mirror,* 19.07.04) along with the potential for severe flooding and damaging sea level rises: "...*we are in for a period of much more extreme weather, resulting in more severe and more frequent floods...*" (*Low-lying homes may become uninsurable*, *The Guardian*, 14.10.00). In one of its reports, the *Daily Mail* highlighted the lack of clarity around forecasts for Britain: "*Yet more say that global warming will switch off the Gulf Stream and plunge Britain into a*

Labradorian deep freeze. In other words, the longrange forecast is clouded and confused"
(*What has happened to Autumn*, Daily Mail, 31.10.01).

In reporting climate risk as a current issue, reports drew again on weather as a hook for audiences. Permafrost disappearing from glaciers in the four main ski seasons (*On the rocks: the grim forecast for winter sports as global warming increases, Th*e Guardian, 03.12.03) and changes in temperature and rain featured in narratives:

> *"There has been a temptation to deny the need for a response to climate change because acknowledging the scale of the problem could lead to unpalatable solutions being imposed... The reality of climate change is particularly obvious. Ten of the past 14 years have been the hottest on record worldwide. The consequence of a warmer surface temperature over the world's oceans is an increased incidence of powerful hurricanes such as Frances and Ivan."* (*Yes, you can be deep blue and green at the same time*, The Times (feature), 14.09.04)

Greenhouse gases were linked to droughts in Africa (*Warning on drought eating up aids to Africa*, *The Guardian*, 24.10.05) and human action was blamed in the melting of the ice in the Arctic (*Prescott unveils £60M boost for cleaner car fuel*, *The Independent*, 21.11.00). Words in these examples such as 'is', 'are', 'now' and 'have been' lend weight to the contemporaneous nature of these effects. Other reports focused more on the nature of the problem insisting that it is a real issue that needs tackling, for example:

> *"Climate change is now such a critical problem for Britain and the world that it should be taken out of politics to make radical remedies possible, an inquiry convened by an independent group of MPs will say today."* (*Climate change should be taken out of politics to allow radical remedies*, *The Independent*, 13.07.06)

> "*Climate change is not something of tomorrow but rather of yesterday.We are immersed in unprecedented change. An increase in temperature of 0.6C by the end of the century is already inevitable*." (*Beaches gone to el*, *Daily Mirror* (feature), 12.04.07)

> "*A record amount of Arctic sea ice melted this summer, scientists said yesterday...The director of Greenpeace, John Sauven, said: 'At this rate we could see the end of summer sea ice in our lifetimes.' He described global warming as a 'planetary emergency' and called on governments to work harder to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions.*" (*Arctic ice cap melts to smallest ever size*, *Daily Mail*, 22.09.07)

Current risk, referring to terrorist attacks that had happened were reported throughout this study, and were more likely to be reported than anticipated risks - the reverse of climate change reporting of major, urgent risk. Here, risks referred to chemical and biological warfare such as anthrax outbreaks along with terrorist attacks:

> "Just as everyone was beginning to believe it safe to walk the streets at night again, along comes another terrorist atrocity to remind us of the fragility of our civilised world. The bomb blasts on three Madrid commuter trains appeared at first to be the work of the Basque terrorist movement Eta, and were seen as a localised Spanish affair, rather than as part of the wider threat posed to the West by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups." (An *air of foreboding as stock markets falter*, *The Independent*, 12.03.04)

> "By 10am it was clear something more serious was occurring and that terrorism had struck in a coordinated attack reminiscent of Madrid. Unofficial reports circulating in Gleneagles suggested 20 people had died in one of the blasts... Mr Blair may be judged to have been right to claim that a new, unrestrained terrorist threat was stalking the west in the wake of September 11." (*Blair's careful plans end in painful dilemma*, *The Guardian*, 08.07.05)

> "The massive bomb that blew up the Marriott hotel in Islamabad at the weekend not only killed and injured more than 320 people; it has blown away any hopes that the newly elected civilian President and Government would see a respite from the violence and extremism dragging Pakistan to its destruction." (*Terrorism's Curse*, *The Times,* 23.08.08)

Also evident in reports were statements that asserted major terrorist attacks were now a reality of daily life. This was emphasised by politicians, as well as by other agencies associated with counter-terrorism, for example:

> "In a speech earlier this year Prime Minister Tony Blair said people must realise the full extent of the threat from terrorism. He said there was no longer any "leafy suburb" safe from weapons of mass destruction, religious fanaticism and terrorism."" (*21st Century Home Guard*, *Daily Mirror*, 27.05.02)

Risk was also found in some articles, to have a direct association with Muslims and Islam:

> "British Airways suspended flights to Saudi Arabia yesterday after the Government received intelligence that terrorists linked to al-Qaeda were planning an attack on a British aircraft. The Department for Transport said that it had received "credible intelligence of a serious threat to UK aviation interests in Saudi Arabia". It refused to give any details, but the intelligence appeared linked to a series of arrests and shootouts with Muslim militants in Riyadh this week." (*BA halts Saudi flights after threat, The Times*, 14.08.03)

> *"For hours yesterday it seemed certain that the worst nightmare had become a reality and Dublin Airport was the target of a terrorist attack... In the immediate aftermath of the scare, independent security analyst Declan Power described the incident as a 'terrorist attack' and said the symbolism of the Koran being placed on top of the bag was unmistakable."* (*Koran sparks airport chaos*, Daily Mail, 08.07.06)

In reporting terrorism risk as an anticipated event, scenarios included the possible threat of a chemical attack: "*No one in Western Europe should sleep easily at night with the thought that terrorists more than 1,000 miles away in Russia could detonate another Chernobyl-style disaster*"(*Russia, a cataclysm waiting to happen*?, Daily Mail (opinion), 14.09.99).

Risk was also related directly to ideas around culture, society with distinct attempts to demarcate the 'other' from the 'British'. Terrorists were described as "*shadowy*", "*belligerent*" and ready to "*try again*" (T*he enemy may be shadowy but this war will follow the usual battle lines, The Independent* (comment), 17.09.01) while other articles pointed to the fracturing of society, emphasising the difference between 'them' and 'us':

> *"Last week, I sat in a room full of police and counterterrorism experts from countries all over the world, and listened to them discussing the likelihood of more terrorist attacks...Among this home-grown generation of British Muslims the sense of injustice is growing, the feeling of kinship beyond national boundaries is growing, the frustration at the West's 'slaughter' of their Muslim brothers is growing. And it takes only a tiny number of such angry young people to cause mayhem and carnage."* (*Home grown hatred is now the greatest threat facing Britain, Daily Mail*, 11.08.06)

Only once in this study did a terrorist make the claim that he was plotting further attacks, otherwise risk was something that was reported based on intelligence or assumptions.

Risk was something that was not confined to the UK but reported as a borderless threat for Western states and people, sometimes wherever they may be in the world:

> *"America ordered all nonessential workers and the families of diplomats to return to the U.S. from its missions in Pakistan last night amid fears of a terrorist attack."* (*US pulls embassy staff in Pakistan, Daily Mail*, 23.03.02)

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"The State Department warned this month of possible al-Qa'ida attacks on US targets in the kingdom." (*Attacks in Riyadh*, *The Independent*, 14.05.03)

"Six months on, Spain remains a target of Islamist extremists. Last week 17 people were arrested, accused of planning a big suicide bomb attack on the National Court...The terrorists are still planning attacks in Spain because we are serious about our fight against terrorism." (*Spain moves to weather storms over rock and war in Iraq*, *The Times,* 28.10.04)

"Commuters and holidaymakers have been warned to expect further delays on journeys today as a result of increased security. Extra police patrols and vehicle searches are taking place at airports and transport hubs, including major railway stations. In the U.S., officials said they had issued a warning that Al Qaeda was planning a 'spectacular' attack this summer after intercepting 'electronic chatter' similar to that which preceded the 9/11 suicide hijackings." (*Doctor, father, husband, bomb suspect, Daily Mail,* 03.07.07)

5.7 Discussion

By comparing how causes are reported in articles about climate change and terrorism, the data has revealed one striking fact; cause as a subject is more prevalent in climate change news than terrorism. This study found a reliance on the term 'extremism' in explaining terrorism and acts of terror, a term which connotes fear, radicalisation, instability and irrationality but at the same time, a distinct lack of causality. The real problems - poverty, economy, democracy, education, the historical impact of western foreign policy - are rarely covered. Neither are foreign policy decisions referred to in any great number. This could be because, as Chapter 6 will show, fewer academics or experts are utilised for comment in articles about terrorism, limiting the scope for these kinds of areas to be discussed. In constructing the ideas around extremism, newspapers evoke Said's orientalist principles - 'extremism' connotes messages around radical and violent individuals or groups who are outcasts to civil society. Terrorism becomes a matter of individual deviance devoid of its political origin (Featherstone et al, 2010: 182) with such individuals presenting a threat to "'taken for granted' ideas about national culture and identity" (Moore et al, 2008: 34).

Examining the causes shows how terrorism falls into a democratic west versus dark orientalist narrative in the British press.

Quite in comparison, a consumer west versus global south narrative could be employed for climate change, but it is not evident in these newspapers. Instead, the dominant framework is emissions, referenced in relation to the burning of fossil fuels, human activity and actions designed to combat or curb rising emissions. Emissions also appeared as a solitary category in some articles, divorced from its specific causes such as human activity or industry. Natural causes, as an angle, was not commonly reported - a positive finding which may point towards a limited role for sceptics in reporting climate change in the newspapers in this study. However, the historical-scientific angle to this cause that featured in reports (referencing for example, changes in the Earth's climate millions of years ago) may alienate audiences.

From the data above, one area feels somewhat underreported - the anthropogenic cause of climate change. There were more than 80 references to human activity causing climate change, so this aspect is not absent from newspapers. Indeed, this finding although comparable with existing research (see for example, Howard-Williams 2009), is at odds with the evidence base. In 2013, a survey - the most comprehensive of its kind - found that 97 per cent of peer-reviewed scientific papers taking a position on climate change said that it is man-made, with a 'vanishingly small' number rejecting anthropogenic global warming (Cook et al, 2013: 1). Unanimity on the cause of climate change is recorded by the MET office: "*It's now clear that the emission of greenhouse gases from human activities...is causing climate change*" (2009: paragraph 1); and the IPCC: "*warming of the climate system is unequivocal...most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas*

concentrations" (IPCC, 2007: 2 & 5). Other influential groups also share the same position, for example the World Health Organisation and the World Meteorological Organisation. The scientific consensus on the cause of climate change puts humans and their emissions at the centre of the issue, linking it with lifestyle, consumerism, sustainability and developing economies. Yet, such a consensus was not, I suggest, fully explicated in the news articles in this study, implying that more needs to be done by reporters and commentators to link emissions to human activity, and moreover, to link 'climate change' as a concept to its root causes. Alongside anthropogenic climate change, the lack of focus on a resource-hungry model of economic growth as a major cause of climate change is also striking. Thus, while *The Guardian* and *The Independent* are most likely to report the causes of climate change, their narratives rarely stray into the domain of consumer capitalism, reinforcing the status quo and failing to challenge "*the routines of profit-orientated consumerism, with its norms of built-in obsolescence and the commodification of the quality of life*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 13).

This chapter has shown that cause is more prevalent in articles about climate change than terrorism. In some instances, broadsheet newspapers are more than four times more likely to report the most frequent cause of climate change when compared to terrorism. 'Climate change' as a cause in its own right is frequently used, indicating that audiences may be expected to make the link between the issue and is anthropogenic causes themselves (Howard-Williams, 2009: 36). There is also a clear difference in the treatment of causes between the broadsheet press and the tabloids with the latter more reluctant to address cause more widely and specifically demonstrating a lack of focus on the anthropogenic causes. Among all of the newspapers, there are two distinct, dominant narratives around the causes of terrorism - extremism and religion. Chapter 7 will develop some of the themes outlined above by examining the way that action is reported in newspapers.

Additionally, this chapter has shown how in five British newspapers, the threat of dangerous climate change is distanced from British experience. This is achieved spatially, by imposing the worst effects of climate change on wildlife and people in developing worlds; as well as temporally - risk is anticipated and future-based. Major risk associated with climate change is contextualised for British people through narratives that focus on the loss of holiday destinations or the flooding of well-known landmarks and areas. Climate risks also vary in outcome for the UK - Britons may face a future that plunges their country into a Labradorian freeze or they may bask in the sunshine of a Mediterranean climate. The years ahead are marked by uncertainty and the future is unknown.

The effects of climate change, when reported, are concentrated in areas such as unseasonal, unusual or extreme weather. Flooding seems to be the only tangible and 'real' effect of climate change that is reported and experienced by British people. The marginal differences found in the frequency of reporting the timeframes associated with climate change effects suggests a lack of chronology to events - they embody a sense of timelessness, belonging to neither category with certainty. In contrast, the effects of terrorism are reported predominantly in the past and associated with 9/11 and 7/7. These events, along with other attacks such as those in Mumbai or Bali have narrative continuity, becoming reference points not only for reporting, but for society. They have become conduits to new policies, laws, wars and more.

Major risk - terrorist attacks themselves - were most often reported as a current risk facing society. This captures firstly, the quantity of articles that reported terrorist attacks in Britain (including the first suicide bomber on British soil in 2005), America and around the world. Second, it illustrates the emphasis placed on the anticipation of attacks as a modern day

phenomenon. Future attacks were often linked to the reporting of current attacks, with articles quoting, for example, police chiefs who said 'Britain is next' or politicians who asserted terrorists 'will try again'. Major terrorist attacks were projected forward in the articles examined in this study, becoming reasons for actions which safeguard people, their towns and cities against anticipated attacks. It is, as one report about terrorism put it, an '*Alice through the looking glass scenario*' (*Comedy to the rescue, The Guardian,* 18.10.06) which enables actions to be undertaken and reported in response to events that have yet to happen. Ironically, and in contrast to climate change, the developing world was rarely the focus of reports, despite most acts of terrorism taking place in these countries.

A number of outcomes are evident from this chapter. First, climate change risk lacks a distinct British hallmark. This has led to British newspapers sustaining narratives that associate dangerous climate change with other people, places and species. Ironically, most acts of terrorism and terrorism-related violence occur in the developing world, but this has not stopped terrorism and its risks from being characterised as a Western issue. Second, dangerous climate change is reported primarily as an event for the future; people must therefore think of a world beyond their own lives and envision an intergenerational link with family and friends they will never meet or know. Third, terrorism risk is reported as a current issue, most frequently while the effects of terrorism are attached to the past (albeit the modern past), providing a reference point for society based on a shared experience giving leverage to reporting the effects of terrorism as a real and current issue. Fourth, there are few media narratives that convey the scale of the threat of climate change in a distinctly British context. Risk is displaced. Fifth, and unsurprisingly, the effects of terrorism and climate change were both reported as being negative in outcome, although there was coverage of the positive or mixed effects of climate change. The negative tone is more prevalent when it comes to terrorism news.

What do these findings mean for understanding the public's reaction to, and interpretation of climate change and terrorism risks? What might be the end impact on policy and action? The public depend on the news media to build their knowledge about the world outside of their day-to-day experiences (Smith, 2005: 1471). In Beck's definition of world risk society, risks are:

> "*invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political positions."* (Beck, 1992 cited in Cottle, 1998: 7)

Similarly, the way in which risk and threat is constructed in the media has profound implications, on action and responsibility. Leiserowitz states:

> "*Public risk perceptions can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic and social action to address particular risks. For example, public support or opposition to climate policies (e.g., treaties, regulations, taxes, subsidies, etc.) will be greatly influenced by public perceptions of the risks and dangers of global climate change.*" (Leiserowitz, 2006: 45)

Risk and its construction has been shown to be used as a tool for governance in relation to terrorism (Aradau and van Munster, 2007) and as a point of inaction, in the case of climate change (Carvalho, 2007). In terms of the public's identification with risk, Fischoff et al (cited in Lorenzoni et al, 2005: 1388) suggest that there will be certain values upon which society will judge what is unacceptable climate change risk, and the necessary subsequent actions.

On the basis of the findings of this chapter, it appears that climate change risks linked specifically to the UK are outside of dominant media narratives. Furthermore, this narrative appears to be shaped by the ideological remit of the broadsheet press, particularly evident when *The Guardian* and *The Times* are considered together. It is also evident that there is a prestige-popular press divide. Unacceptable climate change risks are associated with other

countries, peoples and species. As Beck suggests (2009b: 37), climate risks are distributed unequally across society, and this study finds, as others have, that climate change risks are socially defined as issues primarily for developing countries, indigenous people and ways of life and certain species of wildlife. The risk is removed from the doorstep of the UK (and the West) and impressed upon global others. With no distinct and identifiable narrative, this chapter suggests that British people must adopt an altruistic perspective when it comes to climate change, making changes that will benefit others, whilst at the same time limiting their modern lifestyles. Beck suggests that although uneven in its distribution, risk is a constant in society. This research does not corroborate that idea. Catastrophic risk is certainly not uniform across the globe and importantly, it is not a constant feature of climate reporting.

Lorenzoni et al (2005) assert that public opinion matters because of its effect on policy. The premise of this thesis is that the media's role in the reporting of climate change and terrorism matters for society because these are issues that citizens are unlikely to encounter. Although this research cannot make the link between media reporting and public opinion, the polls that do exist, for example from Ipsos MORI show that on the whole, and consistently, climate change and the environment is ranked as a low threat by people in the UK (see Downing & Ballantyne, n.d). The public does not fully recognise the threat of dangerous climate change. Particularly among the tabloid press, the effects, when reported, are tolerable and as Cottle asserts, are *"mundane, low level, small-scale, local and less than life threatening"* (1998: 20). Mosquito invasions or colourful autumn leaves are the representation of climate change effects in the UK in British newspapers. The only exception here is coverage of flooding. In reporting the effects of climate change in the UK, flooding was frequently covered. In predicting the future for Britain too, the loss of landmarks and coastlines to rising sea levels also featured. Other major effects are ultimately invisible in a

British context. The ramifications for policy in this area are significant. It allows for delays, for the repositioning of responsibility, and for inaction altogether.

In a different context, terrorism has been represented as a risk that is current and provable - terrorist attacks have happened, been witnessed and been shared. 9/11 and 7/7, particularly, have become hooks upon which reporters hang their articles. The use of history in the media representation of terrorism has been shown to have an effect on bridging divides and resonating with the public (Winfield et al, 2002). Although not a daily occurrence, these risks have materialised and are evidenced. Catastrophic climate change, as reported by the press, has not and by its very nature will not for many years. That those terrorist attacks also form the majority of references to its effects indicate how much these two events in the 21st century have been relied on by the media and shaped public perception of the risk, as well as policy responses to it. It is also clear that among all of the newspapers in this study there is a consistent and similar portrayal of terrorism (in terms of frequency) as a risk and the negative effects of the issue. This visibility across all newspapers signals to audiences that the issue is both relevant and timely.

This research has referred to the discourse of 'otherness' that runs throughout British newspaper reporting of climate change and terrorism. Orientalism (Said, 2003) constructs the Orient as alien (and inferior to the West). Transplanting this idea onto terrorism, and particularly Muslim terrorists is straightforward - the other is the source of threat, with value judgements about their motivations (hatred for the West, fanaticism, Islamic extremism, for example) present in the examples shown in this chapter. In terms of climate change, the 'other' is a person affected by human (mainly in the West) actions, although this 'other' also attests to orientalist ideals. This dualism in the narrative of risk poses interesting questions around how media representation of risk affects how the public categorise

threats and may be a useful source of future research. Chapter 9 which presents the conclusion to this work picks up this theme in more detail as one of the prominent findings of this study.

There has been a noticeable split in the frequency with which *The Times* discusses the effects of climate change compared to *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. It is also evident that weather, flora and fauna are tools to convey the current and future impact of climate change to audiences. A study by Corner (2013) suggests that such a focus may alienate centre-right individuals and potentially indicates why such a focus on effects is absent in *The Times*. Corner advocates a narrative that recasts the effects of climate change as a local and less 'environmental' story in order to engage this sector of society with climate change. The data outlined in this chapter illustrates the challenges that such a reworking of the climate change narrative may face.

This chapter has shown that dangerous climate change has been presented in British newspapers as a risk assigned to others: low-lying islands, indigenous people, wildlife and ecology. A national identifier is missing since there is no 'event' or shared historical past to engender familiarity and awareness. Terrorism reports refer to events such as 9/11 and 7/7, signifiers that add gravity and realism to reports. It suggests that there is dichotomy around the representation of the other as both victim and enemy, indicating that this dual media narrative may not resonate with audiences. Additionally, this chapter further implicates media ideology as a factor in shaping the narrative of risk around climate change and terrorism. The data here suggests that for the former, risk is underemphasised particularly in the tabloids and the right of centre press and for the latter, risk is overemphasised but bolstered by a consistent approach to the negative effects of terrorism and dominant discursive timeframes that convey immediacy.

Chapter 6: Discursive ownership of climate change and terrorism

6.1 Introduction

This chapter shows that elite sources dominate climate change and terrorism media narratives, but distinct differences emerge in relation to each issue and across newspapers. Discursive control of terrorism is wielded by foreign governments (particularly America) in the broadsheet newspapers, quite in contrast to climate change where each broadsheet relies on a different source. These patterns indicate the deeper ideological structure of reporting, particularly in relation to climate change. Additionally, this chapter demonstrates how social actors have reproduced and amplified dominant ideologies around both climate change and terrorism, constraining debate in relation to the latter and enhancing it in the former.

6.2 Results – the voices of climate change and terrorism

The information generated by this section of the content analysis produced a comprehensive picture of the actors at the core and margins of climate change and terrorism communication. This chapter will examine the four most common, by frequency, for each topic, as outlined below. The rationale for this is to build a picture of the groups dominating media reports, and how they compare across climate change and terrorism. Such a focus also captured those who were on the periphery of discourse, as the next sections will show. The most frequent commentators on climate change according to this research were, in order:

- UK government   (including Prime Minister, cabinet, opposition parties, government scientists)
- Science and academics (including the MET office)

- Pressure groups and charities
- Industry and business

In relation to terrorism reporting, they were:

- UK government (including Prime Minister, cabinet, opposition parties, government scientists)
- Foreign government
- Law and the police (including foreign law enforcement)
- Public

Figure 26 shows the frequency of the sources listed above in relation to media coverage of climate change and terrorism in this study.

Figure 26: Sources used in sample articles (1999-2012)

The UK government is the most frequent commentator on terrorism. Foreign government officials come a close second with legal or judicial persons and police officers third. The UK government is also the most common source in newspaper reports about climate change, but there is a less pronounced difference between the three most common sources here with academics and scientists and pressure groups and charities also featuring often in

reports. Foreign governments are less frequently utilised in climate change reports, correlating with the Chapter 4 which showed how climate change is reported as home rather than international news. Scientists and academics are not employed in terrorism reporting often. While the former are understandably absent, to find that academics rarely feature in reports about this issue suggests that the nature of the coverage is non-analytical. Notable differences can be found in the use of members of the public, and law and order officials in reports. Members of the public were on average three times more likely to be quoted in articles about terrorism than climate change. In relation to law the difference is much larger – police and the judiciary are almost 18 times more frequent in terrorism reports in this study than they are in climate change reports.

Figure 27 shows the frequency with which each of the five newspapers in this research used the sources in figure 26 in reporting climate change. Figure 28 shows the same for terrorism.

Figure 27: Newspapers' use of commentators on climate change (1999-2012)

Figure 28: Newspapers' use of commentators on terrorism (1999-2012)

Capturing the data in this way shows that across the five newspapers, climate change had no clear defining source pattern. Broadsheet newspapers' sources have "*a reputation as primary influences on policy and decision-making at national and international levels*" (Boykoff, 2008: 551). Each broadsheet in this study relied on a different 'lead' source - science and academics, the UK government, and industry in *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times* respectively - reflecting the ideological identity of these newspapers. In reporting terrorism, these same newspapers all used foreign government officials as their main commentators, quite in contrast to climate change, which seems to struggle to garner an international news dimension. The *Daily Mail* relied on the UK Government most often in its terrorism reports and science and academics for climate change, while the *Daily Mirror* used the UK government most in its climate change articles and members of the public in terrorism. That foreign governments were less utilised by the tabloids reflects a lack of international and foreign news in these papers (Harcup & O'Neill, 2001: 203), and a focus instead on sensationalism and human interest.

These findings mean that certain worldviews are reproduced and amplified dependent on the selection of sources. Each source group is discussed in relation to both climate change and terrorism in the following sections, showing how comment was distributed across the five newspapers in this study.

6.2.1 UK government

Members of the UK government commented on terrorism and climate change more than other source groups in this study. Figure 29 shows the comparison between the two issues. Their comment on climate change peaked in 2006, corresponding with the publication of the Stern Review on the economics of climate change. Between 2005 and 2008 there was a significant increase in the appearance of this group in newspaper reports in comparison to the earlier years of this study reflecting what Carter (2014: 430) describes as a time of "*unprecedented party politicization of climate change based around a competitive consensus*." It is noticeable that the broadsheet newspapers utilise similar numbers of UK government sources in reporting of both terrorism and climate change, while the tabloids are significantly less likely to feature this group as commentators on climate change.

Figure 29: UK Government sources (1999-2012)

When members of this elite group spoke about climate change common narrative themes emerged. They presented an array of options to address climate change and took opportunities to align climate change with security and defence concerns. They also positioned climate change as a global problem but their comments on this topic were not enough to set the news agenda, as shown previously in Chapter 4.

In framing climate change as a planetary problem, UK government sources drew on issues such as a growing population, resource depletion and the modernisation of developing nations to communicate the scale of the threat. For example:

> "*An ever-increasing world population and pressure for development will place more demands on our planet and it will become increasingly vital for nations to understand environmental and climate changes.*" (Lord Sainsbury quoted in *Scientists to take world's temperature in new tests, The Independent*, 08.06.99)

In *The Guardian*, apocalyptic terminology was used by government sources to describe climate change with the issue referred to as "*the greatest long-term threat facing the planet* (Tony Blair, quoted in *Life: The Primer, The Guardian*, 29.04.04) and "*the single greatest threat to the human race*" (Michael Meacher quoted in *World deal on climate isolates US*,

The Guardian, 24.07.01). The *Daily Mirror* also emphasised the scale of the crisis with David Milliband calling it "*perhaps the biggest threat now to our future,*" (*We need a green tax*, 30.10.06). Rarely did this group discursively align climate change and its effects specifically with the United Kingdom, or other Western countries. Ministers were quoted talking about the 'real' effects of climate change already evidenced in countries such as the Maldives, but did not translate these often into a UK perspective. When the UK suffered severe weather and flooding in 2000, government voices did bring the issue into a domestic rather than global domain but an article in *The Times* quoted a MET office source criticising the government for making "*simplistic and uninformed*" claims about the relationship between global warming and weather (*Ministers 'too simplistic' on climate change*, 16.04.01).

In calling for action, this group articulated the need for international discussions, summits and agreements to tackle climate change. Examples include "[*getting*] *the agreement of the developed world to meet its world climate targets on pollution,"* (*Prescott goes diving to save the Maldives*, *The Independent*, 04.03.99) and calling for *"quicker and bolder progress"* on a European deal to halt global warming (*Blair pushes climate agenda*, *The Times*, 04.06.07). There was also criticism from British government figures towards those countries presenting obstacles in climate negotiations, with *The Independent* reporting:

> *"Britain and California are to sign a new carbon trading agreement, side-stepping opposition from President George Bush...A spokesman for the Prime Minister said: "Our differences with the US administration on this issue are well-known [but] we believe it is right to talk to other like-minded people - and we will.""* (*UK and California agree carbon deal*, *The Independent*, 01.08.06)

and:

> *"Mr [Hilary] Benn was among delegates insisting that binding emission reductions are the only answer. "We cannot say that often enough," he told reporters. "That means all of us, including the largest economy in the world - the United States."*" (Hilary Benn criticising the Bush administration for organising an alternative climate change forum to the UN's in *US criticised over climate forum*, *The Independent*, 25.09.07)

Their comment was also often synonymous with money. £60M to "*accelerate the take-up of cleaner fuels and cleaner, more fuel-efficient, vehicles*" (*Prescott unveils £60M boost for cleaner car fuel*, The Independent, 21.11.00) and a £100M investment in renewable energy in what The Independent described as a political "*cultural shift*" *(Blair plays the green card,* 07.03.01) are two examples of positive aspects of British government rhetoric in the media. Locating the issue closer to home, and its audience, the *Daily Mirror* reported: "*Families must pay higher taxes to drive, fly and run appliances which waste energy in the next 10 years, Environment Minister David Miliband said yesterday*" (*We need a green tax*, 30.10.06).

The Guardian and *The Independent* discursively constructed climate change as a far-reaching issue with widespread policy implications, with ministers quoted as saying climate change was: "*not just an environmental problem...It is a defence problem. It is a problem for those who deal with economics and development, conflict prevention, agriculture, finance, housing, transport, innovation, trade and health...*" (*When it comes to global warming, market rule poses a mortal danger, The Guardian* (comment and debate), 25.10.06) and "*we've got to better bring aid, climate change and foreign policy together*" (*Party 'must focus on green issues to see off Tories*, The Independent, 26.09.06).

When the UK government spoke about terrorism in the newspapers in this study, there was a clear difference. 9/11 was interpreted by the British government within a British context, with their comments laced with ideological views of the nation: "*At this time of challenge to our country and our values, it is vital to ensure we fight the war against terrorism on every front...*(*David Blunkett quoted in No hiding place for terror suspects, Daily Mail,* 05.10.01)*.* Terrorists and their regimes were "*evil*" (*Daily Mirror, 01.10.01*) with "*attention- seekers and extremists [abusing] our rights of free speech [stirring] up tensions in towns and cities*" (*No*

hiding place for the terror suspects, Daily Mail, 04.10.01). This is quite in contrast to climate change since British government sources did not discursively situate the West, our 'way of life' and consumerist values as problematic or a dominant cause of climate change.

This threat to the nation and its values was used as a catalyst for a range of new counter-terrorism laws and initiatives which were referred to as "*practical measures*" (*No hiding place for terror suspects, Daily Mail,* 05.10.01), or the "*toughening up*" of existing laws (ibid). These measures were accompanied by a particularly imposing and urgent discourse:

> *"Mr Blair announces that the West is ready to launch military action. He says that during a tour to shore up support for strikes he had been presented by world leaders with an "enormous" amount of evidence against Mr bin Laden and al-Qa'ida*."(*Air Strikes on Afghanistan*, *The Independent*, 08.10.01)

and:

> *"The Prime Minister said: "I have seen absolutely powerful and incontrovertible evidence of [bin Laden's] link to the events of the 11th of September...the PM said that the global coalition against terrorism, led by the US, must "eradicate" bin Laden's suspected terrorist network. Asked whether he wanted bin Laden "dead or alive", Mr Blair replied: "I think in the end the important thing is that we get him and stop him. "That is something that we'll pursue in whatever way we can.""* *(War on terror: Labour prepares, Daily Mirror,* 01.10.01)

Counter-terrorism actions were not without criticism as others within government spoke up in response to proposals. They were described as *"[smacking] of the worst aspects of the Soviet Union and other repressive states,*" (*MPs savage terror bill, The Guardian*, 20.11.01); while proposals to include glorifying terrorism were said to be "...*at best useless and at worst could cause serious problems*" (*Peers throw out planned crime of 'glorifying' terror*, *The Independent*, 18.01.06).

Of the newspapers in this study, broadsheet newspapers relied on similar levels of UK government sources in both their terrorism and climate change reports, whereas the tabloids tended to use this group considerably more often in its terrorism reports. In doing

so, the tabloids covey the message that climate change is less of a political issue than terrorism.

6.2.2 Foreign governments

The appearance of Foreign Government sources in articles about climate change peaked in this study in 2007, in line with the publication of the IPCC's fourth report. Before this point there was also a smaller rise in 2001 when foreign governments spoke about issues including the IPCC's third report, the Kyoto Protocol, and President Bush's isolation over his climate policies. Figure 30 shows how each of the five newspapers in this study featured this group in relation to climate change and terrorism.

Figure 30*: Foreign government as sources (1999-2012)*

There is an ideological split evident, with the left-leaning press more likely to utilise foreign governments than the right-leaning press as commentators on climate change. The fact that more comment is sought from this group on terrorism suggests that voices from international governments are not 'newsworthy' on climate change or indeed their rhetoric

or comment is at odds with news agendas. It also correlates with the *Daily Mail* and *The Times'* lack of global outlook, as illustrated in Chapter 4.

When foreign governments spoke about climate change in the sample articles studied it was in relation to international summits, meetings or agreements. The Kyoto Protocol was an inflammatory topic within the international community with government officials voicing concerns over its content. Loopholes and "*generous allowances*" for carbon sinks for certain countries was one such source of contention (*Genoa summit, The Guardian,* 20.07.01). The American governments' voice, particularly under the Bush administration, was commonly heard contesting international efforts to address climate change. On the Kyoto Protocol, for example, officials were quoted as "*reaffirming their country's refusal to ratify the [Kyoto] protocol*" (*Genoa summit: The Guardian,* 20.07.01) and expressing doubt over its content*:* "*This does not change our view that the Kyoto protocol is not sound policy*" (*World deal on climate isolates US*, *The Guardian*, 24.07.01). When positive comment from America was given column space, it was highlighted as being out of the ordinary and in contrast to general American consensus, for example: "*One area where we definitely need the climate to change is the national government's attitude about global warming... Let us blaze the way, for the US, for China and for the rest of the world*" (California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in *We can lead the world, says Schwarzenegger*, *The Independent*, 11.01.07).

At times, comment from foreign governments in this study presented a picture of a fragmented international community at odds with courses of action, for example:

> "*The European Union spoke with one voice. If I have been blamed it can't be as the French minister, but as a European minister because there were 15 of us and we agreed our position as 15...I regret Mr Prescott is losing his nerve.*" *(Woman who was 'too tired' to save earth; Fury at France's eco talks   Minister,   Daily   Mirror,* 27.11.00)

and:

> *"I call upon the United States to cast aside their doubts and hesitations," said Mr Chirac. "The time has come for them to join with other leading industrialised nations to work together in making a successful transition to an energy-efficient, yet no less thriving, economy."* (*Prescott unveils £60M boost for cleaner car fuel*, *The Independent*, 21.11.00)

Despite the differences expressed between international governments and countries, there were also examples of the European and worldwide community working together and positive praise for those efforts:

> "*We failed in the Hague but we felt we could not fail twice. Citizens, electorates, the public expected a result. Globalisation is getting so much a bad name, but we have shown that global decisions can be good for the environment*." (Jan Pronk, the Dutch chairman in *World deal on climate isolates US*, *The Guardian*, 24.07.01)

and:

> "*The EU summit came to an end yesterday with an air of congratulation. Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, described the agreement on climate change signed by the leaders of the 27 EU nations as "historic". The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, welcomed it as a "breakthrough.*" (*A decent deal, but hold off on the plaudits until emissions start to fall*, *The Independent* (editorial and opinion), 10.03.07)

When international voices spoke on terrorism in this study, there was not the discord present found in international comment on climate change. Neither however was there a ringing endorsement of joined-up counter-terrorism action.

The 'real' threat posed by terrorism to countries around the world was a common theme for foreign government comment, regardless of whether that threat had manifested itself in the form of a terrorist attack or not. A particular worldview purporting the threat facing the world was evident in reports. Examples include: "*The terrorist threat is present. France is targeted like all Western countries. Our country must be governed with calm and determination*" (French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in *Ricin traces found in Paris station*, *The Times*, 21.03.03); "*The Madrid attacks show how dangerous Islamic terrorism is,*

which we have to deal with in our house, too" (Federico Bricolo, Italian government, in *Italian MPs plan control of new mosques*, The Guardian, 25.03.04); "*We will intensify our national effort in fighting terrorism*" (Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono *in Bali Bombings: Suicide attacks leave 22 dead and 130 injured*, The Guardian, 03.10.05).

In this research, foreign government voices were most prevalent in 2001 and linked to the terrorist attacks of that year in America. Most comment was afforded to American government officials whose rhetoric post 9/11 focused on retaliation: "*We are going to keep after these people till they stop*" (Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defence Secretary in *Air Strikes on Afghanistan*, The Independent, 8.10.01); captured American values and society: "*... terrorists will never be allowed to kill our society and our belief in the democratic way*" (Colin Powell in *Terror for all*, The Times, 12.11.01); and prepared the world for its course of action: "*The hour is coming when we will act. Either you are with us or you are against us*" (President George Bush quoted in *Air Strikes on Afghanistan*, The Independent, 08.10.01). Others in American government also sought to construct a picture of Osama Bin Laden, the man responsible for masterminding the 9/11 attacks: "*He's very scary. He's smart, he's rich, he's ruthless, he's bold, with a very definite political agenda*" (Former American President, Bill Clinton in *Attack on Afghanistan*, The Guardian, 11.10.01).

The war on terror was not without criticism although as Chapter 8 shows, criticism within reports encompassed a range of counter-terrorism methods and was not solely directed towards the war. The governments of Middle Eastern countries and those countries that may have been subjected to closer scrutiny post-9/11 challenged the war on terror, as these examples show:

> "*America needs to tell us which groups are involved, who are involved, whether they are Malaysians or foreigners who have a base here to carry out such violent activities so that we can help them and cooperate with them to eliminate these*

terrorists." (Malaysian deputy prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, commenting on reports that America would strike against his country, in *Attack on Afghanistan*, *The Guardian* , 12.10.01)

and:

"*We will take revenge if America attacks, through different means*," *the Taliban's chief spokesman, Abdul Hai Mutamaen, said in Kabul."* (*Terror in America: After the mourning, America goes on war footing with troops call-up*, *The Independent*, 15.09.01)

Beyond the war on terror, there was also criticism of the situation in the Middle East and

the actions of Israel from international leaders:

*"World leaders pleaded for an end to violence yesterday as they watched the Middle East edge closer to a full-scale war... Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah said: "What is happening is a savage, despicable act, an inhuman and cruel act... Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called on President George Bush to stop the crisis. His Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, returning from the Arab summit on peace in the Middle East, said: "What Sharon is doing is a foolish, illegal action and a message of war against Arabs in response to a message of peace from the Arabs." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov condemned the assault as "not the way that could help find a political solution to the situation." (*Leaders call for halt to fighting*, Daily Mirror*, 30.03.02)

Of the newspapers in this study, foreign government sources were relied on most by *The*

Guardian and least by the *Daily Mail*. In each of the five newspapers, foreign government

comment was most likely to feature in reports about terrorism rather than climate change.

While climate change is clearly presented as a global problem, it lacks comment from

international governments. Such lack of visibility is likely to be associated with the news

agenda of the respective newspapers.

6.2.3 Business and industry

Business and industry in this study captured comment from across the sector – from small

local firms to multinational companies. This group was a frequently-used source of

comment and information on climate change, but less so in the case of terrorism. Figure 31

shows how the newspapers in this study utilised this group for comment.

Figure 31: Business and industry as sources (1999-2012)

On climate change, this group was particularly vocal, using comment to highlight their own

good environmental practice and initiatives, indicative of the value of green PR (Dunlap &

McCright, 2010: 246). They promised "*a revolution in green consumption" (You've checked*

the price and calorie count, now here's the carbon cost, *The Guardian*, 19.01.07); made

suggestions to tackle the issue: "*They should do what Ryanair does. Get rid of gas-guzzling*

aircraft" (Ryanair boss attacks Bishop over sermon on sins of low-fare air travel, The

Independent, 27.07.06*);* and were forthcoming about their own green credentials:

> *"The fight against climate change is the single biggest organising principle behind*
> *everything that we do in all our environmental programmes," says Auden Schendler,*
> *director of environmental affairs at the Aspen Ski Company, which sources five per*
> *cent of its energy from wind power and runs its piste-bashers on bio-diesel. "If we*
> *don't address climate change issues then we're screwed.""* (*It's all going downhill,*
> *The Independent* (feature)*,* 06.02.06)

Sources from business and industry readily commented on the British government's

performance and initiatives. One area which raised concern among this group was

suggestions relating to green taxes and investment. They were described as "*'a sin tax'* *which would not achieve the desired change in behaviour*" (*Sir John Shortridge in BP audit may shape pollution trading, The Guardian,* 26.06.99)*.*

Outspoken industry and business officials were seemingly valued within the newspapers in this study for their controversial opinions. This is exemplified by Michael O'Leary, Ryanair's chief executive who "*dismissed the climate change debate as a "middle-class mid-life crisis""* (*Record profit and green raspberry from Ryanair*, *The Guardian*, 6.11.07) and poured scorn on the attention afforded to climate change:

> *"...It's July, the press have nothing to write about. The Prime Minister's on holiday, the World Cup is over, Zidane has retired - I know, let's write about the impact of aviation on the environment." He denounced such articles as "cliched horseshit."* (*Ryanair boss attacks Bishop over sermon on sins of low-fare air travel, The Independent,* 27.07.06)

On terrorism, business and industry comment was much lower in frequency in the articles analysed. Comment peaked in 2001, directly related to the terrorist attacks of that year and focusing on topics such as job losses in aviation following 9/11, and the rise in insurance premiums. Although most comment was negative, some chose to highlight the positive effect terrorism was having in terms of increased business around travel to Syria and Libya.

The *Daily Mirror* used business and industry officials less than the other newspapers in this study largely ignoring this sector as an avenue of coverage and comment. Its use of these sources in terrorism articles was consistent with the other newspapers in this study (with the exception of *The Guardian* who utilised this group considerably more than the other newspapers). *The Times'* pro-business agenda is also evident since this group was its most-used source of comment overall. Across the timeframe of this study, individuals and organisations from this group were used more as sources of comment on climate change

than terrorism. *The Guardian* was most likely to give space in its pages to industry and economic experts on both issues.

6.2.4 Law and police

Police, solicitors, judges and others from the legal profession were one of the most-used groups in this study in relation to terrorism. In comparison, there was a near-absence of voices from this sector in relation to climate change in the articles studied. See figure 32 for the distribution of these voices across newspapers and both issues.

Figure 32: Legal sources (1999-2012)

When this group did lend their voice to the climate change discourse it was to comment on the arrest or prosecution of environmental activists. Their tone and choice of vocabulary suggested that these people were a nuisance: "*militant environmentalists*" as one article described them (*Stansted brought to standstill by 'Plane Stupid' protesters*, *The Independent*, 09.12.08), while another argued protesters prevented them from their duties in pursuing 'real' crimes:

> "*Negotiators tried last night to persuade 20 demonstrators to bring an end to the protest. Police said it had hindered their nearby search for missing schoolgirl*

Danielle Jones." (*Esso blues: 29 arrested as fuel depot is blockaded*, *The Mirror*, 26.07.01)

Comment from this group on climate change was only found in the three left of centre newspapers in this study.

When speaking about terrorism, this group had much more of an influential voice, commenting on the threat facing the country; the arrest of suspects; changes to detention laws; the outcome of prosecutions; and the work they were doing to protect Britain and the British people. Their comment formed a large part of terrorism coverage relating to attacks at home by the IRA and Al Qaida. In relation to the terrorist threat facing Britain, comment often fell to Scotland Yard or the Metropolitan Police at senior levels of command. Their remarks included:

> "*This is not hypothesis...the most worrying form of attack, and it brings back the spectre of Omagh, is a large vehicle bomb in a city centre with all the butchery that enfolds such an attack*." (David Veness, Scotland Yard's deputy assistant commissioner of specialist operations in *Mainland alert for terror bomb*, *Daily Mail*, 08.11.00)

> "*Britain's top policeman placed the nation on red alert yesterday, warning that the next Islamic terrorist attack has 'got to be here'...Who are the biggest allies of America?' he asked. 'Which is the next-biggest target? It's got to be here.' The commissioner's chilling warning came as he prepared for an 'unparalleled' weekend of security measures...*" (*Police Chief: Britain is next*, *Daily Mail*, 21.09.01)

There was evidence that this group was utilised for comment in different ways. *The Daily Mail's* hostility towards immigrants was evident via these sources: "'*Are they all facing persecution?' wonders the Home Office lawyer in a valiant attempt to stop a successful appeal. 'You have come here simply to seek a better future and you are in no danger,' she adds in a final defiant flourish on behalf of the State*" (*Asylum? No, sheer bedlam, Daily Mail*, 27.07.05). In contrast, this example shows that *The Guardian* quoted legal sources to highlight quite different flaws in the criminal justice system:

"A terrorist prosecution estimated to have cost up to £1m collapsed in disarray yesterday when a crown court judge threw out the case against six activists for human rights in Turkey. Judge Richard Haworth at Kingston crown court, west London, said: "Were this prosecution to continue, it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute amongst right-thinking people and offend this court's sense of propriety and justice."" (£1m terrorism case is thrown out by judge, The Guardian, 02.03.04)

Of the newspapers in this study, *The Guardian* was most likely to utilise legal sources in its terrorism reporting and the *Daily Mirror* the least (see figure 32). *The Independent* included the most comment from this group in its climate change articles although it was very small – just six occurrences.

6.2.5 Public

One of the most striking differences in voices between climate change and terrorism in this study was that of the public, appearing in articles about the latter issue more frequently (see figure 33).

Figure 33: Members of the public as sources (1999-2012)

Among the broadsheet press, the left-leaning *Independent* and *Guardian* were more likely to use members of the public in their climate change reporting, capturing the human aspect of the issue and correlating with research by Carvalho (2007: 239) which found that these papers tended to demonstrate equity, solidarity and empathy in their climate change reporting. *The Times* was least likely of the broadsheets to personalise climate change. The high use of the public by the tabloids in relation to terrorism reflects their human interest agenda. Interestingly, for the *Daily Mirror*, climate change has yet to make an impact in this area.

There was a stark difference in comment from members of the public on climate change and terrorism. When British people spoke about climate change, there was little sense of concern or worry:

> *"Fifty-year-old 'extreme skier' Stan Markland... says he's not worried by reports that Swiss banks are no longer lending money to resorts under 1,500m. 'Villars just had a rotten year for snow, but then again, so did Davos, which is higher up,' says the father of three from Jersey. 'There will always be snow in the Alps during my lifetime...'"* (*Hit new heights, Daily Mail,* 19.10.07)

In reporting climate change in a UK context, public comment captured a sense of triviality – they referred to minor disruptions, and interference with quirky routines:

> *"'I bought a plug-in mosquito repellent but because they have European adaptors I couldn't connect it to my wall socket. Now I apply anti-insect cream every morning which seems to be doing the trick.' She added: 'You expect to be bitten on holiday but not in your own home.'"* (*Mosquito squadron; Global warming unleashes flying plague on Scotland, Daily Mail,* 02.07.99)

> *"The cold weather has forced sisters, Margaret Shingles, 69, and Rita Hughes, 72, both widows, to abandon for the first time in 55 years their annual swim at Lowestoft in Suffolk. Mrs Shingles said: "The weather is the worst we can remember. We have got our bathing costumes with us in the hope of having a paddle but it is just too cold.""* (*Summer? It's not even lovely for ducks, The Times,* 14.07.00)

The real stories from the coalface of climate change were left to indigenous people to tell. They were few in this study however - only four of the total climate change sample featured

direct, personal testimony of this kind. When they did appear, they included personal portraits of people in despair, standing to lose their families, homes and livelihoods because of climate change:

> *...Old Jonah in Chikani, who has 24 children from three wives and is not known as the "Tongan bull" for nothing, doesn't need academics to tell him the climate is changing. "These are the worst rains ever," he says. "The pattern of rainfall is definitely changing. I remember many bad years but this is the first time the river Musaya has ever dried up. This is the first time that we have only had one place to find water." (Heat: Gathering storm: In the land where life is on hold, The Guardian* (feature)*, 30.06.05)*

There is a clear difference here between the British public's perspective and comment on climate change and that of indigenous foreigners. British voices capture a quirky and sometimes eccentric public inconvenienced by climate change, quite in contrast to those bearing the brunt of climate change impacts. There also appears to be a difference between newspapers. The Conservative newspapers *The Times* and *The Daily Mail*, in the examples above capture the eccentricities of climate change and in doing so use members of the public to potentially discredit the risks associated with climate change. *The Guardian* on the other hand, is more attuned to reporting the 'real' impacts of climate change.

In contrast when the public feature in terrorism news, they voice fears, loss, worry and talk of the atrocities they have witnessed:

> *"I really thought, this is it, we're going to explode and crash to the ground in flames...it was the scariest moment of my life."* (*War on terror: fear in the skies: I thought it was the end, Daily Mirror*, 19.09.01)

> *""There was blood, blood, blood, intestines lying on the floor," she said before being treated for shrapnel wounds in her leg. Mark Robinson, 32, of San Clemente, California, said: "I saw one woman on the steps with a piece of shrapnel in her carotid artery. She bled to death right there.""* (*Americans killed by explosions that tore church apart, The Independent,* 18.03.02)

In other articles, the public were shown to be stoic and brave through direct comment and also in the way that they were described:

"They carried on. In the hazy, warm morning sun, a steady stream of the defiant flowed down the steps into Underground stations across London... An old soldier wearing medals earned in the Second World War. His lined, world-weary face said it all: "Hold firm. Have courage. Never surrender."... Finance officer Liesl Richter who travelled in to the centre of the capital from Walthamstow, East London, said: "I am going to work and I will be using the Tube to go back home tonight and life goes on." (*07/07: War on Britain: Business as usual: Tube and passengers vow they will never beat us, Daily Mirror,* 09.07.05)

In a very definite difference (although infrequent) to climate change reporting, members of

the public reinforced and endorsed counter-terrorism action:

"*I don't think there is an American anywhere who does not support military action,"* said Spike, a salesman, aged 37. His friend, Mr Sprackman, 45, an anaesthetist, added: "I think that something has to be done. It's the first time that America has been 100 per cent in agreement ... They have f***** with Americans on American soil."* (*War on terrorism: Special forces – America's fittest young men leave for battle, The Independent,* 27.09.01)

When members of the public from different religious and cultural backgrounds spoke about

their fellow citizens in the UK their words often highlighted the divides within society

thereby contributing to the discursive creation of 'them and us':

"*I can understand it is strange for people who don't know about us...but these processions are important, as they help people to understand. Because the thing that goes through people's minds is, why? What is it that is so serious that they are doing this to themselves, beating their chests and making this action?"* (*A glad day for mourning, The Guardian* (feature)*, 28.06.03)

"*I'm not being racist or anything, but that's fine in their own country, not here," says Christine Bar-Robinson, standing in a tight huddle with two white friends while local children circle them on bicycles.* (*ibid*)

"*Muslims want to engage in political expression at university without being branded terrorists.*" (*Police anti-terror 'spy' unit at Scots university*, *Daily Mail*, 08.10.05)

The Guardian included the most comment from members of the public in its terrorism

reports, followed closely by the *Daily Mirror* (see figure 33). The *Daily Mail*, *The Independent*

and *The Times* carried a similar level of comment from members of the public. In contrast,

the *Daily Mirror* included no public voices on climate change with the other four

newspapers in this research including only a limited number of voices on this issue.

6.2.6 Pressure groups

Pressure groups and charities were rarely included in the reports on terrorism analysed in this study indicating that newspapers did not regard these social actors as relevant sources on terrorism.

In relation to climate change reporting, the picture is quite different. Pressure groups and charities have been at the interface of climate communication and crucial to its politicisation (Doyle, 2009: 103) and their high occurrence in the reports in this study reflects that. This group accounted for the third most common voice in reports across the newspapers in this research with *The Guardian* most likely to rely on them for comment, followed closely by *The Independent* and the *Daily Mail* the least (see figure 34). Corner suggests that NGOs may actually contribute to the left-leaning 'ownership' of climate change as an issue (2013: 23), thus excluding or alienating right of centre individuals (ibid). Certainly, the data here points to a discord between the Conservative press and the messages of charities and pressure groups, resulting in their lack of visibility and ownership of the discourse in these media.

Figure 34: Pressure groups as sources (1999-2012)

Comment came from a range of well-known groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the Union of Concerned Scientists and Tearfund, and in most cases was attributed to specific individuals within these organisations. Amongst their roles was to warn about the effects of climate change and the consequences of inaction:

> *"The Bush administration is continuing its 'don't worry, be happy' approach to climate change, and it's reckless."..."They're saying, 'it's true, it's happening and it's going to be bleak, but we're not going to do anything about it,'" said Susanne Moser of the union of concerned scientists."* (It's official, global warming does exist, says Bush, *The Guardian*, 04.06.02)

> *"At this rate we could see the end of summer sea ice in our lifetimes.' He described global warming as a 'planetary emergency' and called on governments to work harder to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions."* (*The director of Greenpeace, John Sauven quoted in Arctic ice cap 'melts to smallest ever size', Daily Mail*, 22.09.07)

These groups were also able to offer first-hand accounts of the effect climate change was already having in certain countries:

> "*In some parts of the world, floods, storms and poor rainfall are beginning to have catastrophic effects, threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions of people.*" (Andy Atkins, advocacy director of Tearfund in *Climate change 'will cause refugee crisis,' The Independent*, 20.10.06)

Pressure groups, charities and NGO's have been credited with getting climate change on the national agenda (McCright & Dunlap, 2003: 349) but they have a very clear political agenda and policy approach. Their comments were sought on government policies and plans which were highlighted as being contradictory: *"[t]he Government will now have to explain why it is pursuing a policy of predict and provide on aviation while promising tough action to reduce climate change emissions"* (Stop Stansted Expansion spokeswoman quoted in *Stansted expansion fails to take off*, *The Times*, 30.11.06); inadequate: "*Environmental groups and the renewables industry yesterday urged Gordon Brown to overhaul government energy policy if Britain is to have any hope of meeting its EU targets to combat climate change...*" (*Environmentalists urge Brown to overhaul Britain's energy policy to meet EU targets, The Guardian*, 14.08.07); and risky: *"This whole approach is the wrong way to tackle*

climate change because it's a set of highly risky, unproven technologies for which there is no evidence that they actually offer any practical means of taking CO_2 out of the atmosphere with any degree of certainty..." (*Special investigation: Plan to bury CO_2 under North sea*, *The Guardian*, 05.09.03).

Civil rights and privacy invasion as a result of counter-terrorism measures and new laws were the most common arenas for lobby groups, charities and think tanks to comment on in terrorism articles in this study. Groups spoke about: "*a systematic attack on the right to privacy by all levels of the British Government*," (Simon Davies, director of Privacy International, in *Britain 'leads way' in eroding privacy*, *The Times*, 05.09.02) and the 'shameless' use of ideas around protection of children and the fight against terrorism as pretexts for privacy invasion (*2020: Part three: ourselves: It's all for your own good*, *The Guardian* (feature), 25.09.04).

6.2.7 Science and academics

The group frequently associated with highlighting and communicating climate change is scientists, although their relationship with the media at times has been uneasy. Carvalho & Burgess (2005) showed how definitional control of climate change changed hands in the late 1980's from scientists to politicians, but this study finds that both of these groups, along with pressure groups and charities have significant hold over media narratives of climate change. Figure 35 shows how often the newspapers in this study referred to scientists and academics as the source of information.

Figure 35: Scientists and academics as sources (1999-2012)

Valued for their expert opinion and their ability to provide context and background information (Smith, 2005) scientists from research centres such as the Hadley Centre, the British Antarctic Survey along with academics from Higher Education institutions and across all disciplines (from psychology to geography) were a mainstay in climate change coverage. They confirmed what was already known about climate change and global warming: "*All the evidence suggests it is down to man-made emissions*" (Dr David Viner of the University of East Anglia in *Is Britain Melting?*, *Daily Mirror*, 09.12.99); and highlighted the people, places and species affected by climate change.

When speaking about their work, there were instances when this group were conservative in detailing their findings. On the topic of arctic sea ice, *The Times* quoted *Mark Serreze* of the US National Snow and Ice Data Centre as saying: "*It's still a controversial issue, and there's always going to be some uncertainty because the climate system does have a lot of natural variability, especially in the Arctic...but I think the evidence is growing very, very strong that part of what we're seeing now is the increased greenhouse effect*" (*Arctic ice cap*

'could go within 60 years, 29.09.05). There were also instances when *The Independent* too swayed towards aspects of uncertainty:

> "*Although the details both of future climatic changes and of species' responses to these changes remain uncertain, the potential magnitude of both is clear, and is such that the adaptation measures necessary to conserve European biodiversity only can be achieved through urgent international action," Professor Huntley said. Professor Green said: "Climatic change and wildlife's responses to it are difficult to forecast with any precision, but this study helps us to appreciate the magnitude and scope of possible impacts, and to identify species at most risk and those in need of urgent help and protection.*" *(The changing face of Britain's skies, The Independent,* 15.01.08)

In the case of terrorism there were fewer members of this group commentating in articles, indeed Miller & Mills (2009) note that the 'terrorism expert' is a recently new phenomenon having "*increased exponentially since 9/11*" (ibid: 431). When academics were included in comment in mainstream news reports, they provided less context and analysis than their counterparts in climate change articles but were also more likely to emphasise the scale of the threat and why particular responses were needed:

> "*Professor Wilkinson, from the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews University, said: 'We are facing a much more severe terrorist problem and that calls for more stringent measures than we have been used to in the past.*'" (*Armed guards on UK flights, Daily Mail*, 29.12.03)

> "*Their concerns were reflected yesterday by Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert and professor at Washington's Georgetown University. "The Mumbai operation was planned and premeditated and executed by terrorist teams functioning under a command and control apparatus that orchestrated their deployment and coordinated their assaults.*"" (*Front: Massacre in Mumbai, The Guardian*, 29.11.08)

The Guardian relied on this source group for its climate change news more than any of the other newspapers in this research. Such visibility is consistent with existing research which has found that the newspaper has a strong scientific news line used to discursively promote trust in science and to call for stronger political intervention (Carvalho, 2007: 238). The *Daily Mirror* included comment from scientists and academics the least, in keeping with the finding in Chapter 4 that this newspaper ran no articles using a scientific research news hook

throughout the timeframe of this study. *The Guardian* was also the newspaper to include the most comment from academics in its terrorism reports, with *The Times* as the least, although it should be noted that expert comment on terrorism accounted for a very small portion of comment across all of the newspapers.

6.3 Discussion

The UK government was the most frequently used source of comment overall across the timeframe of this study and in each of the five newspapers combined. However, when each newspaper is analysed separately, differences emerge, particularly within broadsheet reporting.

The Times' climate change news was discursively led by sources from the world of business and industry*. The Guardian's* comment on climate change was voiced mainly by science and academics while *The Independent* relied on the British government. In contrast, terrorism coverage in each of these broadsheet newspapers was dominated by foreign government sources. Terrorism is framed through a predominantly international lens by the quality press, with the discursive parameters of this issue set by foreign governments, mainly America and its allies.

The implications of this division suggest that there is a reluctance to frame climate change as an international issue. Audiences are exposed to more concentrated voices on terrorism, and an assortment in relation to climate change, dictated by a newspapers' values and ideology. Engaging different sectors and actors in comment and debate creates a dynamic picture of climate change (Bickerstaff et al, 2008: 150) and also reflects the intense competition between various groups wanting to establish their perspective and lead discourse (Anderson, 2009). It is however, argued here that by utilising different groups to

navigate climate change discourse, responsibility for and ownership of the issue is diluted and diffused – climate change lacks a discursive 'home', contributing to issues around ownership of, and for, its management.

Consistent with existing research, this study found that members of the political elite were prominent in UK news reports in terms of frequency across the years of this study but they were not the sole source of comment, sharing space with scientists and academics and charities and pressure groups. Coverage was linked to the political agenda in the UK (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005) with comment and announcements by key figures such as the Prime Minister and members of government becoming the hook for news article itself (see Chapter 4 for evidence of this). That climate change reaches into significant areas of international affairs is clear (Smith, 2005) and British government actors made this connection often. Arguably, such political rhetoric deflects responsibility for mitigation and adaption away from the UK, projecting it instead onto Europe and the international community. That same community however, is shown to be divisive and at odds with one another over climate change, potentially undermining both the extent of the climate change problem and the necessity for action.

This study does not find evidence in the UK press to support either the naturalization of European togetherness or the emerging European identity, identified by Olausson (2009) in a study of climate change reporting in Swedish newspapers. Although pockets of good international practice exist in reports and efforts are praised by British and foreign government officials, the community is seen to unite and progress under duress with agreements achieved after considerable difficulties. The 'them and us' discourse Olausson argues exists between Europe and America in climate change negotiations did have resonance in this study, although the 'us' consisted of individual national voices, rather than

a European community speaking in unity, consistently. Resonating with existing research, America's construction of climate change as a 'non-problematic' issue was evident (McCright and Dunlap, 2003: 348). It was in notable contrast to their rhetoric on terrorism which was urgent and imposing, presenting a particular Westernised view of terrorism.

Lexical choice alone from both UK and foreign government officials paints a very different picture of climate change and terrorism. Climate change is vocalised using 'agreements', 'summits', 'strategies' and 'speeches' to achieve their goals. Terrorism on the other hand is voiced using terminology such as 'support', 'strikes', 'unprecedented onslaught' and 'international fight'. Correspondingly, that action is to 'understand', 'tackle' or 'set an example' on climate change and global warming. In the case of terrorism it is to 'eradicate', 'pursue', 'disable' or 'remove'.

Along with the divide in use of foreign governments as commentators on climate change and terrorism, there are also significant differences in use of the public and legal actors in reports. The public were one of the most common groups to speak about terrorism in this study, but as Lewis (2006: 312) has found, citizens are passive, "*reacting rather than proposing, offering descriptions rather than opinions, recounting experiences rather than ideas.*" They provided the background to reports of terrorism and terrorist acts, adding drama (ibid) and providing a strong human interest angle. This was emphasised not only by British citizens, but by others worldwide. British citizens also spoke about cultural divides in the UK with their comments encapsulating a sense of 'them and us'. To an extent, this was reinforced by Middle Eastern citizens who, when they spoke in articles, painted a picture of a brutal homeland, further emphasising differences between their culture and that of the West and bolstering ideas around orientalism (Said, 2003). In contrast, divisions were evident in this research between international and British voices on climate change. In

describing their relationship with climate change, the British public reported mosquito invasions or interruption to routine - seemingly at odds with impending catastrophe and apocalyptic scenarios. They attenuate the risks to themselves (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006: 80) while at the other end of the scale, at "*ground zero*" (Bowermaster, 2011, paragraph 1) on climate change local people from the Maldives and islands in the Pacific eloquently tell of life at the coalface of climate change - the loss of their homes, livelihoods and families. These reports rarely featured in the tabloid newspapers and were in most instances confined to the feature pages of broadsheet newspapers, rather than being reported as news. Legitimising the effects of climate change is therefore left to the citizens of countries that many in the West would struggle to find on a map (Bowermaster, 2011: paragraph 2), adding to the idea that those in vulnerable countries are more likely to be affected and less likely to be able to adapt to climate change than those in the West (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006: 80). There are tensions too, in the narratives from various actors around the global community and the global citizen in relation to climate change and terrorism. In the former, the global citizen discourse suggests that for the good of the planet, all citizens and all politicians need to forge ahead, together, as one. Each faces the same threat and each is responsible for acting to mitigate the risk. In the latter, the threat is borne of the international community. Actors suggest that the international community needs to work as one, whilst simultaneously redrawing national borders. The principles of the global community and the global citizen in the case of terrorism are therefore limited.

The absence of legal sources as commentators and actors in the climate change forum is notable for two reasons. Firstly, the judiciary and related groups are not afforded space to comment or criticise on the attainment of legally binding targets or to scrutinise government or business performance, in the same way that they do regarding laws relating to terrorism. This absence is in contrast to the increasing role of the judiciary in regulating

climate change and shaping energy policy (Burns & Osofsky, 2011). Secondly, debate on attribution of responsibility, liability and climate change legal action is missing. This avoids, as Allen (2003: 892) says, "*the big question of whether current greenhouse-gas emitters could ever be held liable for the actual impacts of their emissions.*" In relation to terrorism, legal actors such as the police and the judiciary build a narrative that incorporates asylum, immigration and policing, contributing to rhetoric on security and migration (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008) without the government having to overtly sustain this connection in the public realm (ibid).

In conclusion, this chapter finds that climate change commentators appear tied to the dominant ideologies of particular newspapers resulting in a narrative dominated by several social actors in the prestige press. This contrasts sharply with actors at the centre of terrorism discourse in those same newspapers suggesting there is a 'preferred' rhetoric for terrorism news among the broadsheets. That so many voices are able to legitimately 'own' climate discourse has implications for action and ultimately responsibility. Interestingly, although this chapter showed how members of the UK government sought to internationalise climate change discourse, their comments failed to significantly influence the news agenda (see Chapter 4). There is also a contrast with their comment on terrorism since terrorism too, could be viewed as the responsibility of other governments, but it is not.

This chapter has presented and discussed the voices and sources most frequently found in newspaper reports about terrorism and climate change. It has shown that 'ownership' of climate change in the media is quite evenly split between politicians, scientists and pressure groups and charities, whereas terrorism is concentrated around government voices from the UK and internationally. It has suggested that rhetoric is shaped according to the ideological

persuasion of particular newspapers and discussed the implications of these findings in relation to the dominant discourses and dissipation of both issues.

Chapter 7: Action and ownership of action on climate change and terrorism

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will show that in British newspapers, discourse around action on climate change and terrorism is dominated by the British government. Directly, this group takes responsibility for action and indirectly it is assigned to them. The result is that certain forms of action gain traction, becoming 'popular' (in terms of frequency) while difficult issues are unaddressed. Divergent reaction to climate change and terrorism is found in the spheres of law and finance, action that is common to both issues but separate in use. Law forms an overwhelming part of the narrative of terrorism action but not of climate change, while finance is woven into climate action narratives cohesively and with considerable frequency, but is less visible in terrorism action narratives. Human responsibility is absent, much to the detriment of action on climate change.

7.2 Results

The results below show how action on climate change and terrorism has been reported in terms of responses and responsibility. When action was referred to in articles about climate change, three distinct categories dominated; technical, financial and political. Figure 36 shows these in comparison to the three most popular categories of action related to terrorism - legal, political and arms. It should be noted that 'technical' applies only to climate change, while arms was only found in relation to terrorism in this study.

Figure 36: Action categories for climate change and terrorism (1999-2012)

7.2.1 Technical measures

Technical measures refer to target-based and operational action such as cutting emissions, reducing pollution or achieving other goal-orientated initiatives. Dominating this category was targets to reduce emissions and since a reduction in emissions was also included in this section of the research as a specific action, this focus is discussed in detail later in this chapter to avoid duplication.

7.2.2 Financial action

Financially driven action formed a significant climate change narrative as a stand-alone action as well as in reference to other forms of action, such as research or new technology. References to this form of action increased from 2005 onwards peaking in 2006, coinciding with the publication of the Stern Review[19] on the Economics of Climate Change. Newspaper narratives around a financial response to climate change varied between positive

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[19] *The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change* was authored by economist Sir Nicolas Stern and published by the British Government on 30 October 2006. Prior to 2006, the highest number of references to finance or investment as a response to climate change was in 2005 when 12 references were found. In 2006, this reached 42 references, falling to 24 in 2007 and 27 in 2008.

affirmations, such as the savings that could be made and the success of green

entrepreneurs; to negative portrayals with references to increased costs to households and

seemingly mountainous sums of money needed to drive and achieve change. Investment

was linked to progress but progress was sometimes reported as constrained by

governments. Indicative of its style to use science and research to call for policy progress

(see Carvalho, 2007) *The Guardian* wrote about the hydrogen fuel cell as the "*holy grail of*

car development" quoting a General Motors source who stated the company's commitment

to fuel cells required "*statements from governments around the world helping us to get*

there" (*Reluctant Reformers*, *The Guardian*, 27.11.04).

Green entrepreneurship and the economic opportunities arising from responding to climate

change (in terms of job creation, green growth, and the competitive advantages of a green

economy) were not strong elements of this narrative. There were however examples of such

a discourse. Post-Stern Review, the first article highlighting green entrepreneurship

appeared in the sample studied:

> "*Mr Eckert, 44, who lives in Sussex with his wife and children, is one of a new breed*
> *of green entrepreneurs who are living proof of Tony Blair's claims that tackling*
> *climate change is as much an opportunity as a threat. The company he co-founded*
> *and where he is chief executive, Climate Exchange, dominates the market in carbon*
> *emissions trading, part of the green gold rush that was created by the Kyoto climate*
> *change treaty.*" (*The green gold rush that is creating multimillionaires*, *The Times*,
> 04.11.06)

The Times also reported that "*green regulation could boost the economy in straitened times*"

referring to the "*huge financial upside to shifting away from fossil fuels*" and a "*cap-and-*

trade scheme [which] could raise around $150 billion a year..." (*The time is right to change*

the climate of fear, *The Times* (feature), 07.11.08). It is interesting that these examples

comes from *The Times*, a centre-right newspaper traditionally against political intervention

and challenges to the free market. Yet, such a focus on climate entrepreneurship, green

innovation and economic gain has been highlighted by Corner (2013) as a potential new

narrative that could resonate with centre-right individuals. While not consistent in this research, the examples above show that the acorn of this discourse is evident, on occasion in *The Times*.

Negative connotations of the financial action narrative saw climate change hitting the public purse, with citizens having to pay more for sustainable transport in price rises that were called *"unjustified and unfair"* doing "*nothing to cut demand for road transport and cut carbon emissions"* (Anger as rail fares rise by up to 14.5 percent, The Independent, 01.01.08). *The Times* reported that government plans to switch to renewable energy would "*push up household electricity bills by up to 15 per cent, and gas bills by up to 5 per cent*" *(£55 a year, the cost of stopping global warming, The Times*, 25.02.03).

Quite in contrast to climate change, terrorism action narratives rarely refer to finance and the costs associated with particular avenues of action are largely absent, a notable finding given the high cost of military action. Across the spectrum of newspapers in this study, the costs of dealing with terrorism were invisible, reflective of the discursive dominance of elite individuals, as discussed in Chapter 6. Thus, on finance, "*the flavour of the coverage reflects the nature and interests of the sources used to inform it*" (Lewis & Hunt, 2011:180). This finding sits uncomfortably with the data on military and defence spending which runs into billions of pounds - significantly more than that spent on responding to climate change. Lewis and Hunt (2011: 162) found that British "*press coverage relying on business, political and military elites has played down increases in military spending, creating the misleading impression that the UK military is under-resourced.*" This research finds synergy with this statement, suggesting that British newspapers have created and perpetuated a dominant narrative in which finance and spending are obscured from view.

When finance was reported as an action in relation to terrorism there was a varied discourse, capturing financial tactics to tackle terrorists from "*freezing the assets of the retailers it suspects of aiding bin Laden*" (*Bin Laden's sting lies concealed within the honeypot, The Times*, 12.10.01) to bounties for "*anyone who can help to capture or kill [bin Laden]. The reward could exceed the $5million offered by the FBI for help in his capture...*" (ibid). In a report about 'smart intelligence' in the war on terror, *The Guardian* refers to "secret" increases in intelligence budgets in both America and Britain post-9/11 but in that same article notes "*[a]ccording to one security honcho in London, the enemy still holds most of the cards*" (*Messy war on the new masters of Armageddon* (comment and analysis), 13.06.02). The article ties intelligence to successful pre-emptive warfare. While not explicit, such rhetoric suggests that cuts to spending would potentially put the nation and the war on terror at risk. In doing so, it also implies that further increases to budgets may be necessary.

7.2.3 Political action

Discourse around political action took on different forms within articles, from challenging the government for "*sending mixed signals to the energy industry by planning to bring combined heat and power plants within the scope of its proposed climate change levy*" (*Climate change levy catches out green power, The Guardian*, 15.05.99) to urging them into action: "*The main responsibility of our own Government now is to exert intense pressure on the US to wake up to the reality of climate change*" (*A conspiracy theory that grows more implausible by the day, The Independent* (leader), 19.02.05).

This form of action also captured the movement of politicians signalling that they were at the forefront of climate change action. From the Deputy Prime Minister flying to America for climate change talks (*Ministers 'too simplistic' on climate change, The Times*, 16.04.01), to Britain taking over the presidency of the G8 with a specific focus on climate change

(*Calendar for 2005*, *The Times* (feature), 03.01.05), and David Cameron "*returning from a visit to an Arctic glacier*" to outline Conservative plans to tackle climate change (*Cameron calls for new taxes to save the planet*, *The Independent* (feature), 21.04.06), there was a sense of momentum within news narratives. It was not always so, however. Political action did concede criticism. With an ironic tone, *The Guardian* reported "*To spearhead the battle to save our threatened isle, the government have done what they do best: they have set up a committee*" (*Who needs Essex anyway?*, 12.06.03). "S*erious concerns"* were expressed over American plans on climate change which *"could be scuppered by a lack of funds..."* (*Bush 'bending science to his political needs'*, *The Guardian*, 19.02.04). Specific incidents, such as an emergency at Torness power station also provided leverage for campaigners, business and others, to encourage the government to avoid (or follow) a particular course of action:

> "*...last night environmentalists said the incident was a timely reminder of the risks of nuclear power ..."There must now be an immediate and wide-ranging inquiry into this latest incident. It highlights just another reason why nuclear should be given no second chances in Tony Blair's forthcoming energy review.""* (*Inquiry plea into new scare at N-plant*, *Daily Mail*, 24.12.05)

Coverage of international political action on climate change in this study was frequent. News angles included meetings of the European Union, G8 group and the UN. In response to a UN report about environmental refugees, *The Guardian* reported the need for an "*intergovernmental panel on environmental degradation to be established to assess the situation, feed advice to politicians and distinguish genuine environmental refugees from economic migrants*" (*50m environmental refugees by end of decade, UN warns*, 12.10.05). Other forms of international political action referenced an American "*rethink...on global warming and its rejection of the Kyoto protocol"* (*Bush aims to lose isolationist image*, *The Guardian*, 02.06.01).

The political response to terrorism in this study peaked in 2001, coinciding with the terrorist attacks of 11ᵗʰ September of that year. 33 references were made to a form of political action, compared with only five in 2000. Prior to 2001, political responses to terrorism were shaped around the IRA, the Good Friday Agreement, and occasionally, the threat to British tourists abroad. Following 9/11 there was a narrative of political impetus, with action taking the form of Government strategic trips to "*shore up support for strikes*" *(Air strikes on Afghanistan, The Independent,* 08.10.01) against Afghanistan, with Tony Blair stating he had been "*presented by world leaders with an "enormous" amount of evidence against Mr bin Laden and al-Qa'ida*" (ibid). Other reports referenced politicians seeking to win favour from moderate Arab countries to help stem sectarian violence in the region (*Moderate Arab world must see the threat Iran poses, Blair says, The Times*, 21.12.06).

9/11 has been referred to as a landmark point in British counter-terrorism policy, with new bills drafted in its wake designed to protect the UK from attacks and the threat of them. This section of political response to 9/11 does have crossovers and similarities with the legal category of action, as changes to legislation were passed in Parliament before being progressed by the police and judiciary. Coverage of these bills, as well as the issues arising from them were commonly reported in this study. While there was uniformity in the topic, ideological differences between the broadsheet newspapers did emerge in certain instances as these examples below show, with *The Times* criticising Labour plans and *The Guardian* mirroring, rather than challenging, in this particular example:

> "*Mr Blair's defeat on Wednesday was in part due to his inability to differentiate between strategy and tactics... It is perfectly possible for honest people to agree with the Prime Minister on the danger posed by al-Qaeda and yet be deeply disturbed by the notion of incarceration for a three-month period without bringing charges.*" (*For country and conscience, The Times* (feature), 11.11.05)

> "*He acknowledged the fate of Paddington Green as he told parliament that the government intends to introduce a counter-terrorism bill, allowing terror suspects to be held more than 28 days without charge, before Christmas. He also said the*

legislation would allow high court judges to authorise continued detention of terror suspects without charge by video link without the suspects being present in the court." (*New anti-terror jail to replace Paddington Green station*, *The Guardian*, 21.09.07)

As well as political responses to the 'new terrorism' of 9/11, violence in the Middle East was a story frequently returned to in newspapers. Political action here, for example, captured America's involvement in the conflict, reported in both a positive light: "*Mr Bush's intervention comes not a moment too soon. The entire region was threatening to explode with a centrifugal force which could have had - indeed, could still have - quite catastrophic consequences*"(*Enough is enough - Bush: The president's demands, The Guardian*, 05.04.02), as well as negative: "*Those intimidated by this new wave of terrorism have concluded that Pakistan's support of US policy is to blame. They say the Government has provoked the attacks by its military operations to hunt down terrorist leaders*" (*Terrorism's curse, The Times* (feature), 23.09.08).

7.2.4 Action - legal

Legal action was the most common form of response to terrorism in the newspapers in this study. This indicates that the prevailing societal discourse around the rightful response to terrorism is arrest, detention and prosecution, corroborating ideas around terrorism being treated as a crime (see Altheide, 2009). Similarly, a focus on this type of action relates to the data discussed in Chapter 4 when 'arrest and prosecution' was identified as the most common news hook in this research for terrorism news. The introduction of new laws to deal with terrorists were reported and were mixed in outlook. The first person to be convicted under new laws on religious hatred was one angle adopted by *The Times* (*Man guilty of religious hatred after Sept 11 row, The Times*, 04.10.02). Other reports criticised both the government's approach to new legislation and the level of terrorist threat facing the UK:

"The Prime Minister was equally blasé when discussing the problems presented by proposed new anti-terrorism laws back in Britain. There is a 'definition' problem here too. The Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, this week unveiled plans to make the 'glorification' of terrorism illegal. The Prime Minister casually brushed off suggestions that this could affect those sympathetic to past activities by the IRA or Palestinian militants. But this is an important issue. Poorly framed laws do far more harm than good." (*Prime Ministerial Fantasies*, *The Independent* (leader)*, 17.09.05*)

"An Algerian who was branded a terror suspect after being acquitted in the ricin plot trial, was yesterday cleared of being a threat to Britain's national security. Mr Justice Mitting, chairing the special immigration appeals commission (Siac), ruled that there were no national security grounds to deport Mouloud Sihali back to Algeria as there was no "evidence or intelligence that he has ever been a principled Islamist extremist". (*Algerian labelled terror suspect is no threat to security, judges rule*, *The Guardian*, 15.05.07)

Along with debates around this form of action, more traditional forms of crime reporting emerged, from police investigations that revealed the underbelly of terrorist activities: "*The CAB investigation is part of a Garda crackdown on criminal involvement in lapdancing*" (*EUR 2M lap in the face, Daily Mirror*, 28.07.03); to police raids: "*Heavily armed police and FBI agents swarmed a downtown hotel in Boston yesterday in what appeared to be a search following Tuesday's assault on the World Trade Centre... Elsewhere, investigators launched what was being billed as the biggest manhunt in US history*" (*Terror in America: The investigation*, The Independent, 13.09.01); and courtroom proceedings: "*A man is to appear in court this morning charged with supplying the car used by the Real IRA in the Omagh bomb. The 34-year-old was arrested by police in the border town of Newry, Co Down, on Monday*" (*Man charged over Omagh bomb, Daily Mirror*, 09.02.05).

Legal action related to climate change was reported infrequently. When it did occur, examples included reference to law suits: "*The people of Tuvalu are poised to challenge the energy companies in the international courts, while Inuit have lodged a complaint against the United States government with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) for 'destroying our habitat'. The oil industry itself is already extremely anxious about these lawsuits...*" (*The first signs of a fightback, The Independent* (comment), 29.11.05); legal bills

to be introduced by the government: "*The prime minister mentioned the climate change bill but his list of legislation for the year ahead found no room for another much-needed law...*" (*Marine bill, The Guardian* (leader), 16.07.07); as well as calls to action about the remit of climate laws: "*The UK Government must also include [shipping emissions] in the new climate change law from the start*" (*Huge rise in shipping sparks emissions alert, The Independent*, 11.12.07).

7.2.5 Action - arms

Arms as a category was found only in relation to terrorism in this study, and referred to the role of the military in responding to and preventing terrorism. This includes the war on terror as well as pre-emptive strikes in Iraq, also led by America. This category also captures hard foreign policy initiatives involving aggression or force such as threats of military occupation or invasion, as well as war. Articles in the sample included features profiling the men and women drafted in to battle from the Gurkhas to the American soldiers. There was also reference to the Bloody Sunday inquiry, when members of the Parachute Regiment opened fire at a demonstration (*On bloody Sunday tape, The Independent*, 29.09.00).

A significant portion of this form of action relates to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. As military action was also included in this study as a specific response, it is covered later in this chapter in more detail.

7.2.6 Newspaper coverage of action

Figures 37 and 38 show how each of these categories translated to newspaper coverage. Although technical action was the most frequent form of action in all newspapers, there are divides in its treatment with *The Times* referring to this form of action considerably less than

The Guardian or *The Independent*. In fact, *The Times* was least likely of the three broadsheets to cover any form of climate change action, which points to the incompatibility of climate change action with its Conservative values, and the opposition from this sector of political society to government regulation. Climate change, according to the dominant right frame, presents a challenge to the free market economy, to the use of fossil fuels and has the capacity to negatively affect businesses. By not referring to action in significant quantity *The Times* not only reinforces political stalemates and ideology, but also alleviates itself of having to negotiate action with the views of its readers. Noticeably, the tabloids refer to climate change action on very few occasions, creating a sense of invisibility in this section of the press. This is quite in contrast to terrorism, when the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Mirror* were significantly more vocal on action. In each of the five newspapers, the legal response to terrorism dominated, while the financial aspects of action on terrorism are ignored. The *Daily Mail* reported arms as a category of action in greater frequency than the *Daily Mirror*, reflecting its pro-military agenda.

Figure 37: Newspaper coverage of climate change action (1999-2012)

Figure 38: Newspaper coverage of terrorism action (1999-2012)

7.2.7 Action summary

The overall action narratives are quite different in relation to terrorism and climate change. By placing emphasis on targets and reductions, newspaper discourse connotes a weak response to climate change, particularly when considered against terrorism. By framing climate change action in terms of finance, an association is created (directly and connotatively) between taxpayers' money and the solution, quite in contrast to terrorism, where cost is infrequently reported either as a sole response or in relation to a different strategy. Terrorism action narratives rely on enforcement measures, political action and military action creating a sense of force within newspaper reports. There is also an ideological divide in the reporting of action. Aside from the narrative nuances, the fact that *The Times* reported action considerably less than its counterparts in this study, means that it helps "*legitimate the existing economic and social order*" (Carvalho, 2007: 239). In relation to terrorism, there is much more consistency among the three broadsheet newspapers in terms of the frequency with which particular forms of action appear. Such uniformity suggests that despite their ideological differences, these newspapers are complicit in

representing and advocating particular forms of action in relation to terrorism, reinforcing the thematic mainstream, dominant discourses.

The next section of this chapter examines the specific actions that were reported in addressing climate change and terrorism.

7.3 Climate change - specific actions

In reporting the types of specific action needed to address climate change, reducing emissions was overwhelmingly the most frequently referred to response, as figure 39 shows, tying in with the 'technical' overarching category discussed above. The second and third most frequent actions found within reports were policy recommendations (the introduction of or an existing policy in the UK or elsewhere in the world) and renewable sources of energy. Aside from these, other forms of action occurring in similar frequencies are greater co-operation; taxation, lifestyle change and management or adaption to climate change. Nuclear power was not found to be one of the most common forms of action in response to climate change, suggesting that this form of controversial action is infrequently commented upon and reported. It is in contrast to research by Doyle (2011) who found a resurgence of discourse around nuclear power in the press. The punishment of people, business and nations (either legally or through other measures such as fines) was rarely reported, as was aid, and educating people about climate change.

The Times was the least likely broadsheet newspaper to cover specific actions on climate change in its reporting. It referenced specific actions 119 times, quite in comparison to *The Guardian* which did so 316 times within reports. The tabloid newspapers both had less visible coverage of specific actions than the broadsheets, but similar patterns when compared to each other overall (41 in the *Daily Mail* and 46 references in the *Daily Mirror*).

Figure 39: *specific actions on climate change* (1999-2012)

7.3.1 Climate change specific actions - reduce emissions

A noticeable divide is evident among the broadsheet newspapers in suggesting that reducing emissions can combat climate change. *The Times* made just 36 references to this form of action, compared to *The Guardian* (104 references) and *The Independent* (76 references). The tabloids also featured this form of action in small numbers (16 in the *Daily Mail* and 12 in the *Daily Mirror*).

When a reduction in emissions was suggested as a specific action, articles referred to calls for the British government to adopt more ambitious targets on climate change. *The Guardian* accused the government of complacency: "*The government should set a target for much larger, longer term reductions in emissions and take vigorous measures to promote*

the necessary changes in behaviour" (*Climate change warning signals at red,* 12.05.00) and

called for bigger cuts in its reports:

> "*... At the moment, the government's estimate is that a 60% cut in emissions is needed to avoid a 2C increase in temperatures by 2050. But the authors of today's study conclude that a 90% cut in emissions is needed. Their data suggests that when aviation and shipping is factored in, UK carbon emissions have not fallen at all since 1990.*" (*Global warming: Warning: Bigger carbon cut needed to avoid disaster*, *The Guardian*, 15.09.06)

A difference in tone is evident in a *Daily Mail* article, which also called for greater cuts to

emissions but referenced an 80 percent target as "*staggering*", the task "*gargantuan*" in

scale, amounting to "*total abstinence from fossil fuels*" (Greenwash!, 24.07.08).

At odds with its agenda above, *The Guardian* also reported the effects that emission targets

would have on businesses, warning that although businesses were '*wholly supportive*' of

addressing climate change "*government targets on emissions reductions must be realistic*"

(*Minister raises stakes in debate on nuclear energy, The Guardian*, 06.10.05). The

government itself also appeared to send out mixed messages about the scale of targets

needed on climate change, as one article referred to 'flexibility' in meeting them in both the

Conservative and Labour parties plans (*Only big sticks make a difference (and they must be

accompanied by lots of juicy carrots), The Independent*, 16.10.06).

Throughout this study, a tension between allowing developing nations to grow whilst

cutting their emissions was evident. Blame appeared in some reports, directed towards the

emerging economies who were threatening the action of the West on climate change,

epitomising the 'self-righteous mitigation' discourse identified by Doulton & Brown (2009).

Their rapidly expanding economies and aims for growth were reported as at odds with the

West's targets on emissions:

> "*...For if these countries cannot control their CO2 output, the efforts of the industrialised nations will be useless, as the benefits of any reduction that the rich*

world makes in the years to come will be swamped by the colossal emissions of the emerging economies." (*Waiting in the wings*, *The Independent*, 05.07.05)

The scale of devastation that could follow if emissions targets were not reached was a common element to reports:

> "*Earth could suffer a global warming chain reaction unless greenhouse gases are dramatically cut, a report said yesterday... Yesterday's report from the Department of Environment was based on UK temperatures. It showed greenhouse gases were at their highest level. Greenpeace said: "Lives are going to be lost to global warming unless action is taken*."*" (*Global warming 'set to speed up'*, *The Mirror*, 12.02.03)

There was also the occasional humorous and ironic story about how best emissions could be cut, usually found in the tabloids as this example from the *Daily Mail* demonstrates:

> "*Scientists have developed a serum to reduce methane gas from burping sheep and cows in a bid to combat global warming... Methane is 21 times more powerful as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.*" (*Vaccine for sheep gas, Daily Mail*, 22.06.04)

7.3.2 Climate change specific actions - policy

Policy responses to climate change came in the form of White Papers, proposals and political discussions or meetings, in the UK and around the world. *The Guardian* was the most likely broadsheet newspaper to report policy action, *The Times* the least.

Policy responses to climate change included proposals to "*investigate whether... carbon sequestration, could work*" (*Plan to bury CO2 under the North Sea, The Guardian*, 05.09.03) and "*wholesale*" reviews of "*the Conservative Party's policies to draw up a new programme that gives priority to issues such as climate change and poverty in Britain and the world*" (*Eton, Oxford, Downing St?, The Independent*, 07.12.05). *The Independent* reported positively on the Labour government's Sustainable Development strategy saying that the overarching message "*is that every little helps*" (*Heading in the right direction?,* 21.03.05). The *Daily Mail* was also encouraging about Gordon Brown's "*policy of building tens of*

thousands of 'eco-homes' to help first-time buyers on to the property ladder" (*Brown has a*

rival (of sorts) in contest for the leadership, 15.05.07).

Policy differences between counties were also evident in reports, discursively constructing

boundaries between 'good' governmental practice and 'bad'. Most often America

represented the 'bad', as this example from *The Independent* illustrates:

> "*In London, a detailed blueprint demonstrated how we could cut massively the emissions of carbon dioxide from power stations and motor vehicles which are causing the world's climate to overheat; in Washington, capital of the country which produces vastly more of these emissions than any other, a plan was put forward to let them increase.*" (*Bush and Britain worlds apart on climate control*, 15.02.02)

In some instances reports signalled a prior negative policy without mentioning such, as this

example shows: *"...Mrs Boxer, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Environment and Public*

Works Committee, told reporters that in addition to pursuing a policy shift in regard to

climate change and environmental protection, she would also seek to do more on cleaning

up toxic waste" (*Democrats purge climate-change sceptics*, *The Independent*, 11.11.06).

7.3.3 Climate change specific actions - renewable energy

When renewable energy was listed as a specific action within articles, windfarms were

commonly referred to. In keeping with previous findings, *The Guardian* was the broadsheet

newspaper to cover this action most frequently (with 41 references) and *The Times* was the

least, with 19 references. There was low coverage of this type of action in both tabloid

newspapers. Solar power, hydro electric power and biomass crops were less frequent forms

of renewable energy featured within reports. There were differences evident in the

portrayal of renewable energy among newspapers, with *The Times* reporting:

> *"The drawbacks of wind farms are now becoming apparent. Like other energy sources, they carry an environmental cost. They also require back-up fossil fuel power stations and, even on optimistic projections, would merely replace nuclear power, leaving the three-quarters of electricity generated by fossil fuels virtually unchanged."* (*Britain fiddles while the world warms*, *The Times*, 21.01.05)

In another article, *The Times* took a different approach, challenging the UK Government's commitment to renewable energy, reporting: "...*ministers may be able to redeem themselves by allowing citizens interest free loans and council tax rebates for installing eco-friendly energy sources to their homes.*" It ends the article however by signing off with a dismissive comment: " *If all else fails, we can take solace from a glass of locally sourced wine. Thanks to climate change there are now nearly 400 vineyards in England and Wales*" (*U-turn on green homes*, (feature) 04.09.07).

The Independent was more positive in its outlook towards renewable energy, quoting Margaret Beckett as saying clean technology was a "*terrific opportunity*" and pointing to talks between the European Union and China to examine the potential for new technology to meet China's expanding energy needs (*Britain hosts energy summit while failing to meet its emission targets*, 01.11.05).

The Guardian emphasised the benefits of renewable energy reporting comments from Sir Nicholas Stern saying "*spending on renewable and other low-carbon industries could help stimulate the economy...[w]e're going to have to grow out of this . . . and this is an area which looks as though it could well grow strongly and with the right support could be one of the major engines of growth*" (*Banking crisis*, 07.10.08).

References to the potential for Britain to act as a pioneer in the field of renewable energy were also evident in articles. *The Times* noted that the UK had "*potential richness of resources in green energy, including wind, tidal and wave energy supplies*" but reported that

"*in 2005 Britain contributed only 0.01 per cent of its gross national product to research and development in energy. This was less than any other G7 nation*" (11.02.08[20]). Urgent calls for the West to address renewable energy as a response to climate change were similarly found within narratives: "*Roger Higman, Friends of the Earth's senior climate campaigner, said: "This catastrophe was made in the rich countries of the north. Governments in industrial countries must agree radical cuts in our use of coal, oil and gas, and big increases in the use of renewable power. If we don't act now it may be too late*" (*UN delivers apocalyptic warning on climate, The Independent*, 20.02.01).

7.4 Terrorism - specific action

Figure 40 shows the specific actions that were reported in relation to terrorism action. Criminal measures such as arrest, trial or prosecution or the suggestion that these would happen in the future were a major source of news in this study. Military action was the second most frequent response, followed by the introduction, amendment or enforcement of a particular homeland policy or law. Beyond this, co-operation with other countries or groups, and security increases were frequently mentioned within articles as responses to terrorism. As with climate change, there is a band of similarly occurring actions in news reports, such as changes to police powers, condemnation of terrorists or raising awareness of the risks of terrorism. The difference however is that with climate change the focus is on emissions and soft actions such as targets, while terrorism focuses on hard solutions such as legal or military intervention.

Of the newspapers in this study, the *Daily Mirror* least referenced specific actions on terrorism in its reports. *The Guardian* was most likely to include this content. Interestingly,

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[20] The article title is missing from the sample

The Times was the only broadsheet to refer to specific actions for terrorism more than for climate change.

Figure 40: Specific actions reported for responding to terrorism (1999-2012)

7.4.1 Terrorism specific actions - criminal

Criminal actions were most often reported in relation to terrorism as a specific type of action. The split among each of the five newspapers is very similar with 23 being the lowest recorded by the *Daily Mirror* and 37 the highest in *The Guardian*. Reporting included references to 'traditional' crime such as coverage of trials and the extradition of terror suspects:

> "*The radical Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri faces spending the rest of his life in jail after the United States sought his extradition on terrorism charges yesterday. Shortly after the 47-year-old was arrested in an armed raid on his West London home, John Ashcroft, the US Attorney-General, went on television to announce that the cleric would face 11 charges, including kidnapping and plotting to set up al-Qaeda training camps.*" (*Abu Hamza faces life in US jail*, The Times, 28.05.04)

There was also a sense of currency and relevance to this form of action, capturing day-to-day activities of the police. This *Guardian* report captures a co-ordinated police response to terrorist attacks:

> "*The day began with three unmarked police cars sealing off the M6 motorway in Cheshire and forcing a car carrying two terrorism suspects on to the hard shoulder. Minutes later, more than 40 miles away in Liverpool, a car was stopped in the Lime Street area and another man was arrested*." (*Terror attacks*, 02.07.07)

References to this type of action included the use of the death penalty in America for terrorists (*Even the Oklahoma bomber should not be executed, The Independent* (comment), 11.06.01) and the country's detention without trial of terrorist suspects in Camp X-Ray (*Campaign against terrorism, The Independent*, 12.11.01). Reports were not without criticism however. *The Times* reported that "*530 people have been arrested under the Terrorism Act. To date, just five have been convicted*" (530 people held under Terrorism Act since 9/11 (feature), 20.01.04) while according to the *Daily Mirror* "*Tony Blair faces a growing storm over his refusal to condemn America's treatment of prisoners at Camp X-Ray* (*War on terror, prisoners hell*, 21.01.02). This theme of debate around forms of action is analysed in more detail in the next chapter.

7.4.2 Terrorism specific actions - military action

When military action was referred to as a specific action, it included references to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as military build-ups and attacks. With the exception of the *Daily Mirror*, newspapers in this study carried similar numbers of references to military action within reports. The war on terrorism formed the bulk of coverage of this type of response. References to American military action sought to explain it using re-definitions of terrorism:

> "*...President Bush's West Point speech - "a doctrinal statement ... should not have been too shocking. It redefines the US position to encompass the new enemy. In place of deterrence and containment, the policies emerging are pre-emption and*

> "defensive intervention", to be deployed against states or groups bent on using WMD against the US." (*Messy war on the new masters of Armageddon* (comment and analysis), 13.06.02, *The Guardian*)

"*From atrocity to retaliation*" was *The Independent's* headline in a report that detailed the timeline of the war on terror and indicated that it was precise, targeted and direct:

> "*The US Air Force launches aerial bombardment of military installations in Afghanistan linked to Mr bin Laden*." (*Air strikes on Afghanistan: from atrocity to retaliation...US strikes back*, 08.10.01)

The Times closely reported the Labour government's military, political and reconstructive plans with the headline *'A British agenda for a safer world'* and stating "*all available pressure, including political and military*" would be used to "*defeat international terrorism*" (11.10.01). In an editorial, the *Daily Mirror* argued for the expansion of the war on terror to encompass all terrorists:

> "*The war we are waging cannot be against one man alone... It is not just bin Laden and his terror network which must be destroyed, but all those who practise terrorism... All terrorists must be fought. Those who hijack planes, destroy city centres, bomb, assassinate, spread deadly germs or simply just menace... The one thing they all have in common is that they are evil. They must be beaten if the world is ever again to live in safety*." (*Voice of The Mirror*, 13.10.01)

There was also praise for the involvement of UK special forces in the war on terror with the SAS described as "*some of the toughest, smartest troops in the world*" (Donald Rumsfeld quoted in *War in Afghanistan*, *The Guardian*, 03.12.01).

At odds with its pro-military agenda, the *Daily Mail* reported on the costs of the war on terror saying it had "*cost the British taxpayer £3.1billion. This bill is far exceeded by the burden on Americans. The Pentagon spends £6.5billion a month in Iraq and has so far lost 2,315 men. The British death toll stands at 103 while it is estimated that some 37,000 Iraqis have died so far*" (*If this is not civil war, God knows what is*, 20.03.06).

Along with the war on terror, most frequently, the conflict between Israel and Palestine featured heavily, and occasionally, tensions in Russia that led to military involvement:

> "*Russian forces were said to be massing yesterday within eight miles of Grozny... Russia has played up its fear of terrorists breaking out of Chechnya, partly to justify its tactics there. But the fear is real, especially among the Cossacks of the south, who said at the weekend that they were forming four regiments and three battalions to protect key cities from terrorist reprisals.*" (*No way out for Chechen refugees*, *The Times*, 25.10.99)

The war on terror and military action did not escape criticism however. From 'violent protests in Pakistan' in response to the action (*President's power ploy as civil anger spreads*, *Daily Mail*, 09.10.01) to questions over the direction of the war: "*The US-led War on Terror is foundering because of lack of clarity and agreement about goals. It is unclear to the public here and elsewhere -and, crucially, in the Middle East -what the aim of this global War on Terror is...*" (*The confusion that is holding us back in the War on Terror*, *The Times* (feature), 23.06.04), this course of action did not go uncontested in reports. Chapter 8 will discuss this in more detail.

7.4.3 Terrorism specific actions - homeland policy

In this study, homeland policy referred to the introduction of a new counter-terrorism initiative or the enforcement of an existing one. The *Daily Mirror* was the least likely newspaper to feature this form of action while *The Guardian* was the most likely. The peace process for example, was covered frequently in the early years of this study, as well as throughout, with references to issues such as the IRA breaking ceasefires. References to the ceasefire were also found in articles about the release of IRA prisoners.

It was 9/11 and the response to that terrorist incident which saw this form of action reported widely. From a European 'no deals' policy on terrorism (*Hostage dispute threatens*

summit, *The Times* (feature), 02.12.03) to the creation of border forces and the introduction

of ID cards, a formidable homeland response to terrorism was evident in newspaper

discourse in this research. Changes to air travel were reported with "*thousands of air*

travellers with connecting flights in the United States [requiring] an American visa even if

they do not leave the airport, under a new measure to tackle terrorism" (*Al-Qaeda in threat*

to avenge detainees as US tightens visa rules, *The Times*, 04.08.03). A new Anti-terrorism,

Crime and Security Act was introduced to "*[give] unprecedented powers to detain anyone*

whose presence is deemed "not to be conducive to the public good" (*A forgotten war that is*

bringing terror to our streets, *The Times* (feature), 18.01.03), and "*four regional counter-*

terrorism units and four regional intelligence units" were created in Britain (*Comment &*

Debate: Smugness, not substance, The Guardian (comment and debate), 20.03.08).

As with other forms of action, homeland policies attracted criticism and debate. *The Times*

accused the government of "*[using] the terrorist threat to introduce new requirements for*

personal communications data to be stored and to launch a new debate about a national

identity card" (*Britain 'leads way' in eroding privacy,* 05.09.02) while newspaper editorials

also took the opportunity to voice their concerns, such as this example from the *Daily*

Mirror: "*Why have nearly 1,000 people - mostly Muslim - been arrested under the Terrorism*

Act 2000 since 9/11 but only 27 convicted?" (*20 unanswered questions, Daily Mirror*

(feature)*,* 04.07.06). These differences of opinion and condemnation of action are discussed

further in the following chapter.


7.4.4 Specific action summary

Terrorism responses are quite different in tone and intent to those offered for climate

change. They are bound by action relating to force, legality and ideas around the protection

of the UK and its borders. Climate change actions, in response appear much lighter and are focused on targets that may or may not be met, new policies and also changes in energy production and consumption. The next section will look at the responsibility for action, as found within reports.

7.5 Responsibility for action

Figure 41 shows that when a course of action was referred to or proposed in relation to climate change, the group most likely to be associated with that action was the UK government. Around half that number of articles cited international efforts (those efforts involving one or more countries) as bearing responsibility for climate change. Specific foreign governments and business or industry were also likely to be referred to, although not quite as often. Interestingly, this study found that the use of the collective 'we' was sometimes used, but this phrase assigns responsibility for action to no-one specific, but to people as a whole. Similar ideas around responsibility anonymity can be found in references to 'Europe' or 'the West'.

Figure 41: Responsibility for action on climate change and terrorism 1999-2012

The UK government was credited with responsibility for action on terrorism, above others in this study. Individual foreign governments were afforded a high degree of responsibility in newspaper reports, capturing the weight of coverage around the war on terror, led by America. Policing was also a common group or measure referred to as having ultimate responsibility for dealing with and responding to terrorism, connecting with the profile afforded to arrest and prosecution as a form of action and the prominence of this narrative overall, as shown by previous chapters.

In both terrorism and climate change, the UK government is seen as the primary agency responsible for initiating and upholding forms of action. Beyond this there are differences on who else is regarded as the major force in action responsibility, although these differences can be accounted for by the nature of the problem. In both cases, human responsibility is reported infrequently. Although in the case of terrorism, this may be true since citizens have limited capacity to respond to terrorism, for climate change the notion that citizens' actions can affect change is crucial to tackling the problem, positioning the individual as part of a "*coherent and consistent response to climate change*" (Lorenzoni et al, 2007: 453) and involving them in the policy process (ibid: 454).

7.6 Discussion

Climate change and terrorism should be tackled by national and international governments. That is the message arising from the attribution of responsibility found in this study. Newspaper coverage of action on both issues is politicised and dominated overall by the British government. Direct claims of responsibility and inferences from others give this group control over the narrative and an opportunity to promote their views on where resources and budgets should be allocated. In a study of existing opinion polls, Lorenzoni &

Pidgeon (2006) found that people felt that they did not have personal control over climate change and the issue was best dealt with at a state or global level. Similar findings have also been reported by Lorenzoni et al (2007). The findings of this research potentially offers suggestions as to why the public may hold this opinion. Action narratives are led by government and the public (and individual) is one of the fewest referred to groups in tackling climate change. It is widely accepted that any response to climate change needs to incorporate political, social and individual forms of action (see Lorenzoni & Pigeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et al, 2007) but the latter is largely absent in relation to 'ownership' of responsibility in this study. Displacing citizens from responsibility is to the detriment of climate change as the individual is absolved of responsibility - instead it is projected onto the government. Additionally, a newspapers' agenda is influential in addressing action. In rarely reporting action, the tabloids send the message that climate change lacks seriousness. To an extent, the same conclusion can be drawn based on *The Times'* level of reporting. For terrorism, that the government controls the action discourse allows them to be the most prominent voice on the need for counterterrorism measures, as well as articulating and reinforcing the threat of terrorist attacks facing the country and its people, as Wolfendale asserts: "*fear of terrorism is as much a product of counterterrorism as terrorism itself*" (2007: 76). Thus, arrest, prosecution and military action or arms build a narrative of force, power and strength around the necessary responses to terrorism. In comparison, climate change action narratives are intention-based, they are targets or aims which connotes a weaker response.

Policing, has perhaps not been cited as a primary agency responding to terrorism in other studies, but its appearance in this research captures the number of articles that reported arrest, investigation or other form of police-led action in response to terrorism (in which the police were either referred to directly or indirectly). In reporting terrorism action in this

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way, it is placed in the realm of crime, a finding that is consistent with the work of Altheide (2003; 2006).

But what of the remedies suggested in articles? On climate change, the primary response is a technical one that is primarily target driven. By presenting targets to reduce emissions as the sole response to climate change, individuals may be overwhelmed by the scale of the reduction needed (Lorenzoni et al, 2007) and may therefore be led to believe that their role is not as significant as cohesive, global action. Alongside this, by representing emissions targets as moveable feasts an inconsistent picture emerges, one that is lacking urgency at state level. It is argued here that this will ultimately affect personal perception not only of the risk, but how measures will be achieved. Action on climate change is heavily tied to finance, but as shown in previous chapters, climate change risk is removed from the present and largely a spectre of the future. If people do not view climate change as a salient risk, they are less likely to endorse action, particularly action that is associated with a cost.

That the British press gave space to critical voices around UK involvement in the war on terror emphasises a different approach to that found in a largely complicit and 'patriotic' American media (Steuter & Wills, 2009). Positive reports around the government's response were found in opinion or comment pieces by Ministers, and utilising terminology and metaphors around an 'evil' enemy, in which the allies were portrayed as the 'hawks seeking them out'. This is particularly resonant with findings from studies into the dehumanisation of the enemy (Steuter & Wills, 2009; McChesney, 2002).

The primary form of action on terrorism is legal and arrest or prosecution. As with the responsibility for action discussed earlier, this places terrorism in criminal discourse and suggests that a legal response is the one most considered appropriate in the UK. Although

the UK media in this study did not champion or accept without question the military response to terrorism, as found by Moeller (2004) in the US media's coverage, a pluralistic range of views was somewhat limited, by frequency, to policy, arms, arrest and prosecution. Terms of discussion in the media revolve around these areas and are dominated by the British government or foreign governments, who's aim is to legitimise use of particular forms of action.

It is also noticeable in relation to climate change, the least referred to forms of action. Nuclear power is one of the fewest types of response contained in media discourse. Pidgeon et al (2008), have established that people are not ready to trade off what they perceive as one risk for another, which may explain the absence of this form of action in media narratives. Similarly, a legal response is all but absent in media discourse on climate change. This suggests that there is a reluctance from within state institutions and on a global scale to adopt legal measures, for example, for not reaching targets of emissions cuts, or to penalise businesses for failing to meet targets on supply and demand. This narrative has yet to make its way into dominant discourse, which relies more heavily on the hegemonic ideas around action.

This study finds that in these key areas of response, climate change and terrorism action are strikingly different. Ultimately, in both cases, action is pre-emptive, designed to mitigate 'what if' scenarios - catastrophic climate change and terrorist attacks. Both, to an extent are unknown quantities: scientists have predicted with certainty the effect of climate change, but not the extent of these effects; terrorist attacks by their very nature are unknown in terms of method, moment and impact. So why is inaction on climate change acceptable but not for terrorism? Here, by analysing references to action and responsibility, an indication of why this is the case starts to emerge. As set out above, reliance on the government as the

sole owner of action gives this group unprecedented command over discourse, used to their advantage. Alongside action, they articulate risk, and the two become intertwined. Troublesome issues, such as the role of nuclear power, the change needed to lifestyles and the use of legal methods, or the massively funded counter-terrorism programmes are largely unaddressed, to the detriment of public discourse and democracy. These results attest to the notion that news and its structure is not politically innocent (Lewis, 2012: 260) and the ability of these actors to lead discourse.

This chapter has shown that action on climate change and terrorism is assigned directly and indirectly to the British government. Noticeably a legal response to climate change is limited in articles, while the financial implications of counter-terrorism action are all but absent. In contrast, finance (such as investment, taxes or charges) is a common form of action for climate change while the legal response to terrorism, via arrests and prosecution is a weighty and formidable discourse.   Individual responsibility for action is absent, much to the detriment of action on climate change. The right-leaning prestige press are less likely to refer to climate change action while on terrorism, regardless of ideological persuasion, action is considerably more uniform in frequency of coverage.

Chapter 8: Reporting uncertainty, ambivalence and debate

8.1 Chapter introduction

Instances of debate, uncertainty and disagreement have been touched upon briefly in the preceding chapters. This chapter brings that theme together and shows that over the timescale of this study, and when considered as a whole, climate change reporting is infused with messages of doubt, uncertainty and ambivalence. In contrast, there is less evidence of such in newspaper reporting of terrorism. Beyond action (current action and what should be done), relatively few areas prompt debate or are reported using such narratives in news about terrorism. Extreme messages, for example outright scepticism about climate change are rarely present in articles and debates about the existence of climate change or global warming are not often reported in the UK press in this study. There is however, a continuous flow of contrary views and challenges on issues from the science of climate change to the action necessary. Over time, these messages may lead the public to believe that the science of climate change is disputed and necessary action pathways unresolved. Terrorism on the other hand is subject to fewer debates on its causes, the associated risks and effects suggesting that these are accepted and inherent in societal discourse. Such messages may also transcend public discourse, knowledge and understanding, with significant consequences for policy and practice.

8.2 Results overview: Uncertainty and debate by issue

This study found more examples of conflicting views in newspaper reports of climate change than terrorism – almost double the amount of conflict, disagreement, uncertainty and divergence is reported around climate change. There were 421 separate expressions of

uncertainty or debate recorded in articles relating to climate change (as mentioned in the methodology chapter, this does not equate to 421 unique articles – one article may have included multiple areas). Figure 42 shows the frequency of each topic between 1999 and 2012. It should be noted here, that on occasion, particular issues were reported as uncertain or in debate, but such assertions were not assigned to a particular stakeholder group. These issues were still recorded, but the groups involved were coded as 'not clear'.

Figure 42: Frequency of climate change uncertainty, by issue (1999-2012)

Issues around action (current action, what should be done and future action) were the source of uncertainty and conflicting opinions most frequently in climate change reports, with 'what should be done' featuring most often. This included suggestions for the type of action needed, such as nuclear power or carbon capture and storage, as well and the speed and severity of such measures. Typically, views on what should be done arose from criticism of action that was already underway, or was planned for the future. Debate over action was followed by debate over causes and science. The level of risk associated with climate

change; the causes of climate change; and the effects of climate change also featured although to a much smaller degree.

This research showed few overt references to scepticism of climate change, coded here as 'existence of climate change'. Only 11 incidences of debate in this area were recorded across the years of this study and were more common as climate change coverage increased in quantity. Although this may suggest that newspapers gave little column space to the sceptics, the very presence of debate and uncertainty in the articles in this study – across the majority of fields – indicates that climate change within the media is often portrayed as a battle ground. Science, policy and action face considerable scrutiny. When compared to terrorism, there is a much wider range of uncertainty covering a number of different topics.

Figure 43 shows how these debates manifested themselves across newspapers. It is evident that broadsheet newspapers were more likely to include debate or difference in their reports than the tabloids.

Figure 43: Newspaper coverage of uncertainty, ambivalence and debate on climate change (1999-2012)

Among the broadsheets, *The Guardian* and *The Independent* ran most debate, reflecting how opinion pieces and features gave space for in-depth analysis and space for competing views to be aired. Such debate is not always negative, as Boykoff and Mansfield (2007) point out. Sometimes debate is necessary to highlight and challenge shortcomings in certain forms of action. Of the three broadsheets, *The Times'* articles featured 73 instances of debate overall, compared to *The Guardian* whose reports featured 153 instances. Among the tabloids, the *Daily Mail* focused more on debate than the *Daily Mirror* and for both newspapers, current action was most often the source of that debate.

In contrast, there were fewer debates about terrorism recorded in articles in this study. There were 289 instances of conflicting views between 1999-2012 on subjects including forms of action; the level of risk; and causes (see figure 44).

Figure 44: Frequency of terrorism uncertainty, by issue (1999-2012)

Most often, current action was the foundation for difference of opinion. Indeed, the overall majority of occurrences of debate focused on this topic and 'what should be done' - two similar areas. Here, current action encompassed measures such as changes to police powers and the war on terror. Conflict around current action peaked in 2001, directly corresponding to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America, and remained a consistent topic of conflict and disagreement throughout this study. Compared to previous years, 2001, the year of the terrorist attacks in America, saw an increase in or the first mention of all but one of the issues examined here. Increases were also found in 2004 and 2005, the years of the Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London respectively.

Figure 45 shows how terrorism debate translated to newspaper coverage. Across each of the five newspapers, regardless of political orientation or audience, the topics of debate are much more concentrated than those for climate change. The only real areas of uncertainty or debate on this subject revolve around action - what is or should be done to tackle the issue. Rarely are the origins of terrorism or the evidence of risk the focal point of debate or uncertainty in the media. The net result is that the media in this study appear to help reinforce messages around the ever-present threat of terrorism by focusing on more of an 'agreed' agenda. Debate around the level of risk related to both potential terrorist attacks and the effects of climate change was marginal, with not vastly different occurrences (18 for climate change and 11 for terrorism).

Figure 45: Newspaper coverage of uncertainty, ambivalence and debate on terrorism (1999-2012)

8.3 Results overview: Uncertainty and debate by voices

Contrary opinions and uncertainty across the spectrum of issues for both terrorism and climate change were most frequently expressed by members of the British government. This included debates between politicians of the same party, across parties and between politicians and external groups or persons (pressure groups or police, for example). It also included solitary expressions of discontent or disagreement from individuals, in which case there was often not an obvious oppositional group (in these instances the second group/individual involved was coded 'not clear'). Figure 46 shows a breakdown of the stakeholder groups most frequently voicing different opinions in newspaper articles between 1999 and 2012.

Figure 46: Groups involved in debate, contention and disagreement

Following the UK government, foreign governments were the most likely source group to express ambivalence or uncertainty in relation to climate change and terrorism. As figure 46 shows, proportionally, similar numbers of both UK Government and foreign government sources comment on climate change and terrorism. Beyond these two leading commentator groups, stakeholder voices involved in debate or challenge become less frequent for terrorism. Pressure groups, the public, law and business are not utilised in reports. In contrast, the climate change media arena is occupied by further groups – scientists, pressure groups and to a lesser extent, businesses who all compete to make their voices heard in climate change debate and discussion.

Chapter 6 showed that the public were used by newspapers in this study in reporting terrorism. They gave their opinion and thoughts on acts of terrorism, bringing a human and 'real' quality to reports. In this chapter, their voices in debate or uncertainty or in questioning particular courses of action relating to terrorism are largely absent. In the case of climate change, the public is afforded even less space. The impression this leaves is that citizens are either not seen by the media as qualified to voice their opinions when

uncertainty or debate arises, or that they feel powerless to do so. The implications of this will be discussed later in this chapter.

The overview of the results detailed above shows that climate change is frequently reported using narratives and actors that highlight ambivalence, debate and difference. Risk, necessary responses, causes and science are all questioned. Taken together, the picture presented is that climate change is an issue that is disputed, queried and uncertain. Messages that actively seek to communicate the scale of the threat compete with this discursive construction of conflict and disagreement. In contrast, debate and uncertainty around terrorism is closed, focussing on a smaller array of issues and particularly, current action. Newspaper narratives provide less room for concerns about what should be done and future action to emerge. Similarly, there is less evidence that the causes of terrorism are subject to debate and scrutiny within articles. Either these issues are not contested, failing to meet news values or the ideological aims of newspapers; or, they are absent for other reasons. Discussion over the causes of terrorism, for example are more likely to have been found in reports of international news, an area that has been in decline in newspapers and the media more widely (Zelizer & Allen, 2002).

8.4 Results in focus

This section of the chapter will focus on action (5.31), causes (5.32) and risk (5.33), three areas common to both climate change and terrorism that have been covered in previous chapters and were also most often the source of conflicting opinions, uncertainty and debate.

8.4.1 'Mind boggling support'[21] and 'self-harming delusions'[22]; reporting uncertainty on action

Contrasting views on action were a common thread in both climate change and terrorism reporting. Ambivalence and outright debate on climate change was found in news reports on subjects such as the British government's carbon reduction policies, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush government's approach to climate change, as well as direct action by groups such as Plane Stupid or Greenpeace. In relation to terrorism, the IRA peace process in Britain, the introduction of identity cards in the UK and plans to detain suspects without trial for 90 days were some of the topics that generated oppositional views.

Climate change reports contained both overt criticisms of action, as well as more subtle hints of tensions, as shown in the two examples below:

> "*In a scathing report commissioned by Friends of the Earth and the Cooperative Bank, the Tyndall Centre academics lambast successive governments for misleading the public on what has been achieved and what needs to be done. The government's carbon reduction policies continue to be informed by a partial inventory which omits the two important and rapidly growing sectors of air transport and shipping . . . There is a clear void between the scale of the problem and the actual policy mechanisms proposed.*" (*Warning: Bigger carbon cut needed to avoid disaster, The Guardian*, 15.09.06)

> "*...An attempt to mend trade relations with the US will be made at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week after tension arose over suggestions that US exporters may face "carbon tariffs" from Europe...*" (*Tough European targets on cutting emissions to cost Britain £6bn a year, The Times*, 23.01.08)

The category of 'what should be done', which encompassed ideas and suggestions around different action to that which was underway or proposed, was the most common area arising in relation to climate change across all of the areas coded. It was the second most

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[21] Taken from the article *Iraq and al-Qaida are part of the same picture Straw tells envoys, The Guardian*, 06.01.03

[22] Taken from the article *We'll save the planet only if we're forced to, The Independent* , 21.02.08

frequent for terrorism, although in 2001 and 2005, the years of the terrorist attacks in America and Britain, it was the most common. Figure 47 shows a comparison of this category for climate change and terrorism.

Figure 47: *What should be done as a source of debate (1999-2012)*

Ideas around what is needed and necessary to tackle climate change were frequently related to criticism of existing or future policies. Contrarian messages arose in relation to government initiatives. Plans to build a barrage across the River Severn were reported as dividing Britain's conservationists by *The Times*:

> "*Supporters say that a barrage could meet at least 5 per cent of Britain's energy needs, vastly boost the renewable energy supply and reduce carbon emissions. Opponents say that it would wreck a crucial ecosystem, cause a build-up of silt and destroy the mud flats that support migrating birds.*" (*The rushing tide of change that divides Britain's conservationists*, 29.09.07)

Members of opposition parties challenged the scale of government measures, presenting their own agenda on climate change, for example:

> "*...if we are serious about tackling climate change, then simply making it a priority for the G8 will not be enough. A new climate change programme is needed which reduces harmful greenhouse gas emissions. Consideration of such a programme will*

require a debate about whether to support a new generation of nuclear power stations..." (*No more dogma, Election 2005, The Guardian* (comment), 07.05.05)

Different opinions on proposed international efforts to tackle climate change were also recorded. Suggestions of alternative ways to encourage and accommodate countries like America into action were opposed:

> *"...Mr Prescott - playing on ties with the Clinton government - persuaded them to drop the demand.... In return, he agreed to a modest increase in US forests - called "carbon sinks" - that could be counted towards America's reduced targets.... But when Mr Prescott took the deal back to the European group of ministers, it was rejected because of a lack of detail and fears that there could be loopholes." (Woman who was too tired to save the earth, Daily Mirror,* 27.11.00*)*

Similarly, ideas about what should be done by the international community were rejected by the British government, particularly, it would seem, if such suggestions may adversely affect the voting public:

> *"...When some in the EU suggested a levy on currently untaxed aviation fuel with the money given to Africa, Blair refused, fearful of Britain's frequent flying population..."* (*Capitulation to the nuclear lobby is a politics of despair, The Guardian* (comment and analysis), 25.05.05)

Other articles made extensive suggestions about what should be done to tackle global warming. In one of its articles, the *Daily Mail* called existing measures "*greenwash*" arguing that they "*won't make a blind bit of difference*", and calling instead for a zero-carbon economy:

> *"We cannot stop climate change by small measures...If everyone does a little, we will only achieve a little... First, we need to convert almost our entire transport system to electric power. That means trains, buses and trucks, and all our cars too, leaving only air transport to be fossil-fuel powered. Then we have to find a clean and effective way of producing all that extra electricity plus the electricity we are already using...And nuclear. A tenfold increase in nuclear capacity over current levels would achieve the required reduction in CO2 emissions - that would mean building dozens of new nuclear plants in short order."* (*GREENWASH!, Daily Mail,* 24.07.08)

While the scale of action suggested is in keeping with calls for a green revolution (See Green

and Stern, 2014), the *Daily Mail* undermines what it calls the "green lobby" (ibid) and suggests that individual efforts are futile, thus destabilising citizen engagement and action, placing responsibility instead firmly with government.

Friction was also found in reports regarding America's attitude towards reducing its emissions. The Bush government was criticised for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, and a chorus of disapproval surrounded the country's different approach to tackling climate change:

> "*Berlin wants a G8 commitment to limit global warming to a rise of 2C (3.6F) this century and to cut greenhouse gas emissions to half of 1990 levels by 2050.... The EU believes that there should be penalties for carbon emissions to promote clean energy technologies. Washington thinks public spending and incentives would be a better approach.*" (*Merkel gloomy on G8 climate deal*, *The Times*, 25.05.07)

> "*Despite Mr Bush's charm offensive, the European Union had earlier dismissed as unacceptable his promise on Monday to boost research on global warming instead of abiding by the 1997 Kyoto accords, which mandated steep greenhouse gas reductions.*" (*President opens charm offensive, The Times*, 13.06.01)

In contrast, action that was underway (current action) generated the most divergent opinions in terrorism reports. Noticeably, the *Daily Mail* featured current action as a debate in similar frequency to the broadsheets. This type of action included changes to police powers, the detention of suspected terrorists, and the war on terror. Figure 48 shows a comparison of debate and conflict arising in relation to current action in both climate change and terrorism reports.

Figure 48: Current action as a source of debate (1999-2012)

The types of action that were criticised in relation to terrorism involved changes to the law, changes to police powers, political visits, and support for international initiatives. In the early years of this study, there was also criticism of action around the early release of IRA prisoners:

> "To Labour shouts of "shame", Mr Howard welcomed the Government's condemnation of terrorism but added: "Do you have the faintest inkling how ill your words lie with the continuing release by the Government of those convicted of the most despicable terrorist offences without any progress being made on decommissioning?." (*The Independent, Anti-terror expert appointed by Cook*, 12.01.99)

Until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in America, current action was an infrequent source of controversy generating little difference of opinion. In 2001, more than ten times the amount of uncertainty or debate was recorded in this area, compared to 2000. British foreign policy and UK support for the war on terror in the wake of 9/11 was a source of disagreement. The *Daily Mirror* was open in its condemnation of the war on terror reporting "*the Government, standing shoulder to shoulder with the US, is losing the war against terror because of our appalling foreign policy - mainly in Iraq...*" (*Why we are losing the war on terror*, 11.11.06).

The Guardian questioned the logic and remit of the war, saying "*the harbourers of terrorists, the axis of evil, are also in the frame. Against them the pre-emption doctrine needs to be predictable, if it's to have any deterrent effect. There must be rules that everyone understands. Will we be attacking Russia because Putin is helping Iran become a nuclear power? Or China because it threatens Taiwan? If we pre-empt against allegedly terrorist-backing Iraq, how do we stop other countries using the same criteria to sort out their own backyards? India in Pakistan, for example*" (*Messy war on the new masters of Armageddon, The Guardian* (comment and analysis), 13.06.02). There was also condemnation from influential individuals on the world stage:

> *"The Nobel peace prizewinner, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, criticised Mr Blair for his "mind-boggling" support of the US. Many, many of us are deeply saddened to see the United States aided and abetted extraordinarily by Britain," he said."* (*Iraq and al-Qaida are part of the same picture Straw tells envoys, The Guardian*, 06.01.03)

Other forms of current action related to the war on terror and counterterrorism in the post-9/11 climate were criticised. *The Independent* reported that "*none of the 660 alleged al-Qa'ida and Taliban terrorists who are being held at the maximum-security prison at the American naval base in Cuba have been charged... Human rights groups have criticised the treatment of the detainees and the lack of trials or access to lawyers*" (*Guantanamo suspects can appeal says Rumsfeld*, 14.02.04). The *Daily Mail* accused David Blunkett of "*usher[ing] in identity cards 'by the back door'* " quoting the then Home Secretary as saying *"he had 'no sympathy at all' with the civil liberties argument. Unveiling his plans in the Commons, he said ID cards were vital to tackle benefit abuse, illegal immigration and terrorism*" (*The hi-tech ID card built into a passport*, 12.11.03).

In certain instances, criticism or debate was not explicit but the rhetoric used in reports indicated tension. For example, *The Independent* reported "*Gordon Brown won a hollow victory for his new 42-day anti-terrorism powers last night when he was forced to rely on the votes of nine Democratic Unionist Party MPs during a day of backroom deals and*

concessions" (*Brown triumphs on terror - but then he is stopped in his tracks*, 12.06.08)

amplifying messages that parliament was divided on the necessity and relevance of policies.

Beyond the war on terror, attention focused on the Middle East. British and American

foreign policy in this region was openly criticised, their intervention seen as detrimental to

the region: "*I have huge criticisms of [Yassir Arafat], but when Bush and Ariel Sharon say*

they want to change Arafat, I become head of his re-election committee. So he will never

stand against him? "When Bush and Sharon leave us alone we will deal with it the way we

think right. We may stand against him, we may not. We may fight him, we may not. But they

have to leave us alone"" (*After Arafat*, *The Times* (feature), 02.07.02). A visit to Iran by Jack

Straw and an accompanying article in the Iranian press was reported by *The Independent* as

'*lighting a fuse*' between the UK and Israel:

> "*Ra'anan Gissin, a government spokesman, said the Foreign Secretary's comments*
> *"bordered on anti-Semitism", were "despicable" and "ignorant". There was a similar*
> *diatribe from a cabinet minister, Ephraim Sneh, who said the article was "an*
> *obscenity" and a "stab in the back", which "turns Israel from the victims of terrorism*
> *into the accused.*" (*'Despicable' article adds to Israel's concern over British foreign*
> *policy*, *The Independent*, 25.09.01)

8.4.2 'Wilful blindness'[23] and global warming swindles[24]: uncertainty on the causes of climate change and terrorism

In 1990, the IPCC stated categorically that "*emissions resulting from human activities are*

substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases" (IPCC,

1990: xi). Other prominent and respected groups have since endorsed this view. Despite this

compelling scientific consensus there was continued debate around the causes of climate

change stretching the length of this study. In 1999, *The Independent* reported: "S*cientists*

disagree over whether climatic changes in the Arctic are the result of natural changes,

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[23] Taken from the article *Making the connection*, *The Guardian*, 21.02.02
[24] Taken from the title of the programme *The Great Global Warming Swindle*, Channel4

human activity triggering global warming or a combination of those factors" (*Arctic Ice has thinned by 40 percent in 20 years*, *The Times*, 18.11.99). Ten years later, this uncertainty was still present in reports. Constructing the evidence-base as uncertain and the issue as one in dispute, the *Daily Mail* reported "*[l]ess than a month ago, on December 13, dozens of eminent scientists signed a letter beseeching the United Nations to reconsider the global warming hypothesis, pointing out that the science of climate change is not 'settled' and that there has been no net global warming at all since 1998"* (*Cold Comfort,* 05.01.08). This newspaper also undermined scientific authority, as this example shows:

> *"A United Nations report earlier this year said humans are very likely to be to blame for global warming and there is ' virtually no doubt' it is linked to man's use of fossil fuels. But other climate experts say there is little scientific evidence to support the theory." (Greenhouse effect is a myth, say scientists, Daily Mail,* 05.03.07)

Here, choice of words such as 'hypothesis', a standard term in scientific research may imply to audiences that climate science is based on premises or guesswork, whilst 'very likely' allows room for elements of doubt to emerge and alludes to uncertainty around the science of climate change causes. In a report about the controversy surrounding the television programme *The Great Global Warming Swindle*, the *Daily Mail* reported that the broadcaster was "*cleared of misleading audiences*" about "*global warming 'lies'*", using the article to recap on the content of the programme: *"...On it, scientists, politicians and economists claimed the idea of man-made global warming was a lie. It questioned the link between carbon dioxide pollution and climate change and warned that the obsession with climate change could harm the world's poorest people"* (*C4 is cleared of misleading over film on global warming 'lies', Daily Mail*, 22.07.08). In 2008, coverage of this programme accounted for three of the five articles which highlighted debate in this area.

While not overtly sceptical of the anthropogenic causes of climate change, on occasion *The Independent's* reports and sources did raise questions about this aspect of the evidence base, for example:

> *"Evidence from previous missions suggested these ice caps were melting. If we find the ice is continuing to retreat, this may be evidence of global warming on Mars...The consensus is that global warming on earth is due to human activity, but if it is happening on Mars as well, we may have to re-think." (Open eye: Mars mission succeeds in picturing a planet, The Independent,* 03.02.04)

Denial about the causes of climate change was also couched in more subtle terms with articles referring to past statements or thoughts. The example below shows how uncertainty around the causes of climate change was prolonged in reports:

> *"...She also softened her tone on global warming, denying saying previously that human activity has no role in climate change..."* (*Palin softens on global warming and melts the hearts of the right*, The Independent, 13.09.08)

Figure 49 shows a comparison of the frequency of debate or conflicting opinions on the causes of terrorism and climate change in reports.

Figure 49: Causes as a source of debate (1999-2012)

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
The causes of climate change and the extent to which a particular area, industry or practice contributed to such was also the focus of debate and differing opinions. The example below comes from industry representatives given a right to reply in *The Guardian* in response to an earlier article:

> "...Monbiot fails to mention that the intergovernmental panel on climate change's central estimate for aviation's share of greenhouse gases is only 5% by 2050. With that in mind, it seems premature to call for the closure of runways, and utterly ludicrous to equate flying with drought in Africa - he would be better off arguing that we should all demolish our houses and live in caves, since buildings account for 40% of greenhouse gas emissions in the UK." (*Response: Stop this war on tourism*, *The Guardian* (leader), 03.03.06)

Elements of doubt, debate and uncertainty around the causes of climate change in newspaper reports peaked in 2007, matching an increase in coverage of climate change that year overall.

Terrorism causes as a theme for debate had no major peaks and was found sporadically thought this study. When it did emerge, issues around poverty, lack of education, Middle East tensions, foreign policy, religion and cultural differences were some of the areas identified, discussed and contested as the root causes of terrorism. Unlike climate change, terrorism lacks an accepted definition. Veiled references to any number of the above points can be found in, for example, counter-terrorism proposals from the United Nations or counter-terrorism documents from individual governments. Indeed, Krueger & Malečková (2002: 27) point out that "*[t]o make any headway investigating the determinants of terrorism one must have a working definition of terrorism. This is a notoriously difficult task.*"

Although rarely reported, conflicting views on the causes of terrorism were featured in broadsheet newspapers more readily than tabloids (see figure 49). Indeed, there was a split

across newspaper type with *The Independent* and *The Guardian* debating the causes of terrorism more than *The Times*, and the *Daily Mirror* more than the *Daily Mail*. It is evident that the ideological goals of newspapers are likely to affect the prevalence of certain topics of debate. They tended to be found in opinion pieces from academics or in in-depth features rather than generic news articles. This area first emerged as a source of contrary views in this study in 2001 and was directly related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11:

> *"...The upsurge of radical Islam is a protest against westernisation, American cultural hegemony, capitalism, and the State of Israel that only exists thanks to US backing. Terrorism will end when America ceases to impose its values on the world, helps to end poverty in poor countries, and compels Israel to give the Palestinian people what they want. This pre-conceived storyline bears little relation to actuality." (A dangerous whiff of anti-semitism can be smelt amid the cordite, The Independent* (comment), 19.10.01)

This was the single reference to debate on the causes of 9/11, and international terrorism more widely that year. A year later, in 2002, two articles expressed different opinions on the causes of terrorism with one highlighting long-standing foreign policy as a key driver in international terrorism:

> *"...Israeli and American governments have long denied a direct connection between the Palestinian conflict and other basic problems in the Middle East such as anti-western terrorism and the rise of "rogue states" such as Iraq. This wilful blindness now threatens to prolong and exacerbate the daily carnage in both the occupied territories and Israel and to delay the resumption of a meaningful dialogue. It is time for a more honest approach. US-Iranian antagonism, for example, dating back to the Carter presidency, has always played out against this backdrop of denial..." (Making the connection, The Guardian* (leader), 21.02.02)

In 2008, a similar message was reported in coverage of a speech by the then head of the security services, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller:

> *""...The Government needs to address the root cause, the underlying issue that is making some young British Muslims join radical groups. That issue is our foreign policy." Dame Eliza admitted in her speech that our foreign policy is part of the problem." (Why we are losing war on terror, Daily Mirror*, 11.11.06)

These results show that climate change is more likely to have its causes queried, with opposing views and opinions presented on the subject. The language of science and science itself, including natural climate change variations lend themselves readily to deliberation and discussion. Tied in with this is uncertainty over the extent of human and industry contributions to climate change. There are fewer examples of debate or difference over the causes of terrorism in this study. This suggests that if articles contain details about the causes of terrorism, they are presented as facts, rather than moot points; or are not presented at all. Among each of the newspapers, there appears to be a split in focusing on causes as a debate. Chapter 5 showed how *The Independent* and *The Guardian* were more likely to feature a wider range of causes more prevalently. Here, we see that these two newspapers also feature most debate on the causes of climate change, suggesting that these broadsheets dedicate more space to this area.

8.4.3 Climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious even than the threat of terrorism[25]: uncertainty on the risks related to climate change and terrorism

The risks associated with climate change relating to human health, human rights, global security and economic crisis are documented extensively. The five IPCC reports, dating back to 1990 have outlined these. The Stern Review of 2006 also referred in detail to the widespread economic and social disruption arising from climate change. Despite this, there were examples in this study that climate risk is reported as 'new', or something that was previously in dispute. For example:

> *"...According to Tony Blair, [climate change] is now the greatest long-term threat facing the planet..."* (*Life, the primer*, *The Guardian*, 29.04.04)

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[25] Taken from the article *The stark message from Blair's Science Chief*, *The Independent*, 09.01.04

Here, it is implied that climate change is one of a number of issues facing the world that could in turn, become a threat to the planet. It suggests that climate change could be relegated, should a more urgent issue arise.

Questions around the nature and extent of the threat associated with climate change were reported, both as a tool for procrastinating on action, for example: *"Conservative supporters are, however, more sceptical than those of other parties about measures to tackle climate change. Some senior Tories question the extent of the threat"* (*Voters do care, but they prefer the carrot to the stick, The Times*, 13.03.07), as well as a reason as to why action is needed: "*Today we have a threat. Still we have to convince many people that the threat is urgent and real and there is no superhero*" *(£13M reward to save the world, Daily Mirror*, 10.02.07).

The natural variations in climate change that scientists have reported historically were also used as a factor to mitigate the risks associated with climate change, as shown by the two examples below:

> *"...The global warming debate remains controversial. It may be the greatest environmental threat to human life, as many eminent scientists insist, or insignificant relative to natural forces that vary climate and create or destroy lands and people..."* (*Britain fiddles while the world warms, The Times*, 21.01.05)

> *"...The conference motion says the scientific evidence for climate change is "overwhelming" and that "if decisive action is not taken in the next decade, any prospect of a stable climate may be lost". But delegate John Allen criticised the policy, saying: "Climate change has always happened and always will."*(*Car ban by 2040, Daily Mirror*, 18.09.07)

In this study, uncertainty about the level of risk related to terrorism was not vastly different to climate change (18 for climate change and 11 for terrorism). Figure 50 shows the occurrences of debate over the level of risk in climate and terrorism articles. Notably, the level of risks related to terrorism rises in 2004, having been absent for the preceding two

years. This rise is not associated with any terrorist attack in the UK but 2004 is the year that

the Madrid train bombings took place.

Figure 50: Debates on the risk of climate change and terrorism (1999-2012)

When the risks associated with terrorist attacks were reported as a source of contention in

newspapers, they tended to be played down, rather than the reverse, as shown in the

example below:

> *"Mr Blunkett has given London's top police officer a private dressing down for his*
> *dire warning that the capital may be the next major terrorist target... But last week*
> *Mr Blunkett sought to reassure the public that threats to British cities are not*
> *imminent and urged the nation to continue as normal a direct contradiction of the*
> *commissioner's previous warning."* (*No hiding place for terror suspects, Daily Mail,*
> 04.10.01)

Newspaper editorial also dismissed political comment related to the risk and threat of

terrorism:

> *"...Never have we faced such a dangerous enemy as Al Qaeda, opines John*
> *Reid...While no one could possibly underestimate the dangers of Al Qaeda terrorism*
> *least of all the people of London after July 7 the Defence Secretary's comments are*
> *preposterous."* (*Odious comparison, Daily Mail*, 21.02.06)

The Times reported in full a verdict by the House of Lords into the threat associated with a particular detained suspect, relating it to the implied threat to the nation:

> "*His Lordship referred to the appellants' submission that there neither had been nor was a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" within the meaning of article 15; that such an emergency had to be actual or imminent, to be temporary, and that no detailed information had been shown to that effect.*" (*Detention of foreign suspects is incompatible*, *The Times* (feature), 17.12.04)

That debate or difference about the level of risk posed by climate change and terrorism was small in both cases suggests that any subsequent concern about risks related to these issues are likely to have been generated from other areas. As shown above, climate change has more avenues of uncertainty or debate than terrorism in the media domain, which may all have contributed to the dilution of the level of risk. The affect this may have had on public understanding will be considered below in more detail.

8.5 Discussion

Findings that climate change is frequently presented and couched in uncertain and ambivalent terms in this study, are consistent with existing research in this area. Carvalho (2007: 223) has discussed how "*media depictions often suggest that the scientific community is divided in the middle [with] many aspects of climate change politics heavily contested.*" Boykoff & Boykoff (2007) have pinpointed the language of science as a vehicle that underpins uncertainty, while Ladle et al (2005) have shown how science terminology is difficult to translate into the sound bites of news. In a review of climate change reporting, Anderson (2009: 166) has highlighted that disagreement extends from the nature of the effects of climate change to how best to tackle the problem, and who needs to be involved. Correspondingly, a similar breadth of disagreement and ambivalence was recorded in this study, with science, causes, current action and what should be done emerging as key areas

of and for debate, controversy and challenge. Beyond this, other issues such as the causes of climate change, the risks related to it and the likely effects appear, but to a much smaller degree.

In contrast, uncertainty and ambivalence towards and about terrorism is more focused, located in two areas both of which are related to action (current action and what should be done). Beyond these areas, other issues appear infrequently as a source of debate or contrasting opinions. The picture that emerges, particularly when considered longitudinally, is that debate or divisions over climate change occur more frequently and across more areas, when compared to terrorism. Reporting of terrorism highlights fewer issues as being uncertain or debated. What this suggests is that these are either not reported as a point of debate (and instead accepted as fact), or are in fact, not reported at all.

The types of action at the source of climate change and terrorism debate are different for each issue. Ideas about what should be done to mitigate or adapt to climate change are frequently presented, more so than in relation to terrorism. This implies that there is disagreement about the types of action already underway and planned, but also that there are several competing ideas on the best way to tackle the issue. There were fewer suggestions about what should be done in response to terrorism in this study. Instead, current action and counter-terrorism proposals which incorporate the war on terrorism (and British support for such), and opting out of the European Convention on Human Rights, attracted opposition and uncertainty. As such, this study does not find, as Mythen and Walklate (2006: 392) have suggested that "*those in any way opposed to the violent reprisals in Afghanistan and Iraq are dismissed as unpatriotic altermondistes, in need of direction back to the trump card of 9/11*". Instead, there was significant debate in the UK press newspapers in this study around responses to terrorism post-9/11. Unlike their American

counterparts, the British newspapers did not "naturalise" the war on terror (Reese & Lewis, 2009: 792), creating a "*favourable news discourse for military action...*" (ibid). Instead, action was challenged but differences appear to be related to strategy, rather than the need for the war itself.

When compared to reporting of climate change, there are fewer debates about the causes of terrorism. This trend may reflect the decline and neglect of reporting of international affairs in the media (Zelizer & Allen, 2002), or it may indicate that the causes of terrorism are inferred by association with Islam and Muslim extremism, the latter seeming more plausible. In this study, there was also little emphasis on reporting different opinions or scepticism towards climate change (coded here as uncertainty around the existence of climate change). This differs to research by, for example, Antillia (2005) who found that use of certain climate sceptics in American newspapers between 2003 and 2004 had skewed the issue. There are also contradictions with existing research which showed that sceptical voices are more likely to be found in the right-leaning media than the left (see Corner, 2013), since *The Times* was least likely to feature debate when compared to *The Guardian* or *The Independent*.

From the outset, this research has aligned with the position that there is a connection between media coverage of climate change and terrorism, and public perceptions (and misconceptions) of these issues. Both issues are outside of an individual's direct day-to-day experiences and as such, the media play a central role in communicating information to the public at large. Allouche & Lind (2010) point out that although the risk of a terrorist attack is low, polls reveal that a significant number of people think they will be a victim of terrorism. In contrast, research has shown that while awareness of climate change is high amongst the public, the issue continues to be a low priority for people (Whitmarsh, 2011). In Britain, the

threat of international terrorism has consistently ranked above environmental concerns in monthly polls carried out by Ipsos MORI.[26] In this study however, the level of risk is not an issue that generates significant opposing views. Questions over the validity of evidence related to the risk rarely, if at all, arise. This implies that the public's view on the level of risk related to climate change is potentially influenced by other areas of debate. For example, constructing and representing climate science as a source of uncertainty may in turn lead to a perception of climate change as a low-level risk. What this research suggests, is that it is both the frequency and diversity of ambivalence, uncertainty and debate that have constructed a long-term discourse around climate change that attests to the issue's 'non-problemacity' (McCright & Dunlap, 2003: 348). By focusing on these uncertainties, the newspapers in this study have helped develop controversy around climate change where none had existed or sustained it beyond its time (Zehr, 2000: 86). Terrorism on the other hand has no such broadness to its sources of uncertainty or debate. Conflict appears less in reports in this research, suggesting that risks are known and accepted, and current and immediate action is needed in response. Even if this action is debated or uncertain, as shown here, the lack of reporting of uncertainty or difference in other areas eliminates messages that the risk of terrorism is doubted.

Additionally, this chapter demonstrates that on certain issues, the left-leaning media have more debate on climate change than the right. While this is possibly at odds with the centre-right's alignment with scepticism, it may be that debate in *The Guardian* and *The Independent* is actually both challenging and necessary in highlighting the shortcomings of action and responsibility (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008). It also suggest that an absence of debate in *The Times* means that there is little challenging of the status quo, except on issues that align with its ideology such as business taxes or curbing use of fossil fuels. In contrast,

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[26] Ipsos MORI have polled people (records date back to 1974) on the 'most important issues facing Britain today'

the compass of debate on terrorism is fixed to two specific co-ordinates, both on action. The lack of involvement from the tabloids on debate around terrorism exposes audiences to fewer opportunities to discuss the threat from and response to terrorism.

As well as debate across a spectrum of issues a range of voices were also involved in climate change debate, seeking, as Ladle et al (2005: 231) state, to convince the public of the legitimacy of their views. These views ranged from expressing opinions on action, causes and responsibility as well as uncertainty, doubt and indifference. When uncertainty is reported or debated, it is used as a weapon and shield, depending on the issue at stake. Oreskes (2004: 1689) suggests that uncertainty around climate change science and causes is used as an argument against adopting considerable measures to reduce emissions. Carvalho (2007: 238) has similarly found that scientific uncertainty has been the basis for debate around action, some highlighting it as a need for action, others using the same as a reason for inaction. Here there was evidence that some within government used uncertainty as an excuse for inaction, while those in other fields, aviation for example, used doubts about the extent of their industry's contribution to climate change as a tool to question statements and courses of action. In relation to terrorism, there were fewer groups lending their voices to question or debate, and in fewer areas. In the newspapers in this study, the UK government, foreign governments and legal sources are most likely to be involved in debate or to express uncertainty.

Consistent with existing research, this section of the research also found that the public are a little used source in reporting on areas of contention or debate. As previous chapters have shown, the public is used to make threats tangible (Cottle, quoted in Smith, 2005: 1475), express their fears, hopes, to give their thoughts and complaints but never their views (Lewis et al, 2004). The public do not appear in this study to question policy decisions

suggest courses of action, offer views on the causes of climate change or terrorism, or speak about the issues more widely. As Lewis et al (2004) write:

> *"Citizens are, on the whole, shown as passive observers of the world. While they are seen to have fears, impressions and desires, they do not, apparently, have much to say about what should be done about healthcare, education, the environment, crime, terrorism, economic policy, taxes and public spending, war, peace or any other subject in the public sphere."* (ibid: 11)

The consequences of this are significant. Whitmarsh et al (2011) discuss how the public have disassociated themselves with the causes, impact and responsibility for climate change, while research by Evans et al (2012) in the field of psychology has shown the value of altruistic messages on the public - people are more likely to engage in environmentally friendly behaviour for moral gain rather than financial. It is suggested here that excluding citizens from the public-policy interface has helped absolve them of responsibility for both causes and action in relation to climate change. Responsibility is seen to be placed at the doorstep of others and although the anthropogenic causes of climate change are present in reports, they are articulated and debated by others (in government or science) remaining, to a degree, distanced from the public at large. In a similar vein, the public are excluded from expressing their views and opinions on terrorism, its causes, the associated risks and necessary responses. As Chapter 6 showed, they are often used in reports to articulate their fears and concerns, but their opinion beyond this is lost.

This chapter has shown that climate change is more likely than terrorism to be reported using narratives that depict the issue as uncertain in the newspapers in this study. Importantly, it suggests that the debate has moved on to 'what should be done' (see Howard-Williams, 2009) rather than concentrating on the science of existence of the issue, although these sources of debate are still present. Debate, conflict and contest in the media in relation to terrorism is limited and related to current action, reflecting the divergence of opinion surrounding the war on terror and other counter-terrorism measures.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

> *"To survive in the world we have transformed, we must learn to think in a new way. As never before, the future of each depends on the good of all."* (Nobel Laureates, 2001)[27]

This research has been based upon two assumptions. First, that "a*nthropogenic climate change is the most significant verifiable threat facing humankind in the twenty-first century, with the potential to create death, disease and extinction on an alarming scale*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 3) but media coverage has failed to reflect the scale of the risk. Secondly, that media coverage of terrorism since 9/11 is disproportionate to the scale of the risk it poses. That does not mean that terrorism should not be considered seriously, as a risk (Lewis, 2012: 260), but that the evidence base suggests that people are now safer than they have been at previous times. Additionally, the threat of terrorist attacks of Muslim or Islamic origin is misplaced (Lewis, 2012).

This research has examined the disparity in media coverage of terrorism and climate change in more detail, answering the question: "*How has the UK press reported climate change and terrorism as risks?*". Its original contribution to the field of journalism research is to compare and contrast how *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Independent*, the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Mirror* have reported climate change and terrorism over a 14-year timeframe. In doing so, it has addressed a gap within existing research in this area since to date climate change and terrorism have been examined as solitary issues in relation to media coverage.

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[27] This is an extract from a letter drafted by 100 Nobel Laureates and published in 2001, the 100th anniversary of the Nobel Prize.

The advantage of this approach has been to unite the issues and consider them holistically, within the context of global risks. It has also shed light on if and how the discursive context in which news is created, namely the ideological orientation of newspapers, affects reporting. Methodologically, each issue has retained its individuality, thus their respective characteristics are not compromised nor forced to fit this research agenda. Instead, an overarching framework has provided for a parallel examination of the news angles and narratives, sources, representation of risk, debate and action to emerge. As a result, this study has identified discernible differences in the way that the British press has reported climate change and terrorism.

This chapter summarises the main findings of this research and discusses their implications. It considers the limitations of this work and makes suggestions for future research, which both test the findings of this study and look to build on it in future.

9.2 Summary of the findings

In terms of volume alone, British newspaper coverage of terrorism suggests that it is a bigger threat than climate change. Clearly, the political environment has also provided the space for the sustained coverage of the terrorist threat (Lewis, 2012) with various stakeholders including governments and terrorists themselves, able to gain from the amplification of the threat (ibid: 261). The mismatch does not end there, however. Beyond the message that the sheer quantity of coverage conveys, the angle and content of reports communicates messages about climate change that I suggest confuse and weaken the issue while the coverage of terrorism encourages a much harder, more urgent response.

A longitudinal comparison of 1013 newspaper reports of climate change and terrorism shows that the news hooks and narratives used to report climate change and terrorism

differ significantly in their tone and connotation (Chapter 4). Climate change lacks a strong, overarching discursive narrative that joins up cause, effect and resolution. 'Action' is the most common of the 20 narratives coded at 13% overall[28], but arguably, this is offset by the prominence of the narratives of finance (12%), future risk (11%) and meteorology (9%). Terrorism news is heavily concentrated around events (9/11 and 7/7) and the response (war on terror/counter-terrorism). Fear of terrorism is ever-present, and the issue is represented in British newspapers primarily as a current-day risk (in 8% of articles). The overall picture pits the immediacy and urgency of terrorism against a lack-lustre, laid back approach to climate change (Lewis, 2012).

There is difference too, in the representation of the risks and impacts associated with climate change and terrorism (Chapter 5). Climate change lacks a distinctive British hallmark (hallmark here, is taken to mean a shared reference point, identity or symbol). Dangerous climate change is displaced from the UK and the West more widely, reported as an issue for other species, other people, other places and/or a risk that is future-based. 71% of articles referring to climate change risk reported it as anticipated, compared to 13% reporting it as a current risk. In contrast, terrorism is represented as a current issue or risk in 52% of articles mentioning risk, with 41% of articles referring to the issue as an anticipated risk. References from the past such as 9/11 and 7/7, are drawn upon to reinforce the spectre of further potential attacks.

The primary cause of climate change was reported as emissions, with 51% of articles referencing a cause citing this factor (Chapter 5). Noticeably, 'climate change' itself emerged as a cause in 20% of articles, the repeated use of this term rhetorically dissociating the issue

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[28] This percentage is gained from comparing action to all of the narratives featuring in the content analysis. Other percentages given in this chapter also relate to the full sets of data examined for each respective area.

from its socio-economic causes. In a similar vein the term 'extremism' dominated articles citing a cause of terrorism, referenced 39% of the time and perpetuating a disconnect between acts of terrorism and their geo-political impetus. 27% of articles which included a cause referred to religious causes, creating a powerful discursive message that religion (specifically Islam) and extremism are root causes of terrorism, a narrative veil that obscures the real issues at the heart of acts of terrorism.

The groups and individuals commanding attention in the media tend to be the British government, for both climate change and terrorism (Chapter 6). In the case of climate change however, 'ownership' of climate discourse is shared between this group (collectively members of the UK Government were quoted or referenced in 17% of reports), scientists and academics (16%), pressure groups or charities (13%) and businesses (12%) dissipating the issue and potentially confusing the authority of voices. Noticeably, analytical voices from researchers and academics are largely absent in terrorism news (just 2% of articles about terrorism including a source referenced these individuals), meaning that critical appraisals of, and alternative perspectives on action, events and causes are missing. 39% of terrorism articles featured either British or Foreign government sources compared to 25% for climate change.

Arrest, prosecution and military action or arms build a narrative of force, power and strength around the necessary responses to terrorism, as revealed in Chapter 7. Climate change action narratives are intention-based, offered as targets or aims which I suggest connotes a weaker response. 31% of articles mentioning action references reducing emissions, 11% covered renewable energy and 12% policy. The variety of responses and myriad of possible actions may also mean that salinity is lost in the climate change story. Finance is a common theme associated with climate change action; money is rarely referred

to in reports about counterterrorism action, despite the high cost of military action. Human agency and individual responsibility for action is also underreported, suggesting that the balance of action lies with the government, rather than at a personal or local level. Criminal or legal action featured in 25% of terrorism articles, with military action and homeland policies featuring in 16% of articles each.

Chapter 8 showed how climate change is more likely to be reported using uncertain narratives than terrorism. Climate change was referenced in the context of debate or contention 84.8% of the time[29]. The content of debates was also noticeably different, with most conflict or contrasting views around current action such as the war on terror and changes to the regulations around the detention of suspects - in relation to terrorism; and most debate arising in relation to 'what should be done' in climate change news. Recently, there have been calls from Sir Mark Walport, the Government's chief scientist for climate change to move from debates around the science into what should be done to tackle the issue (Sample, 2014). This research shows that 'what should be done' is already a prominent source of debate within the British press, resonating with Howard-Williams' claim that debate in the media has moved on to how climate change can be solved (2009: 39). However, such a move needs to coincide with a reduced media focus on uncertainty and less displacement of the risk in the climate change narrative more widely. On both climate change and terrorism, the public is absent from debate, reinforcing existing studies that have found that the public do not comment on issues (see Lewis et al, 2004).

What is also clear from this research is that climate change reporting is influenced by the ideological aims of individual newspapers, considerably more so than terrorism news. From news hooks through to the portrayal of the issue, a newspaper's agenda governs the

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[29] This percentage relates to the total number of instances of debate or contention - one article could have included several areas of debate.

prominence and profile of climate change whereas there appears to be an 'agreed' narrative on terrorism around which reporting is structured. Clearly the ideological persuasion of the newspapers in question emerges through the tone and content of reports but terrorism news 'benefits' from a consensus around newsworthiness, action, causes and impact, and social actors. What is apparent however is that this hegemonic narrative excludes significant voices, belying the real causes of terrorism (Allen, 2001), fitting instead a westernised view of terrorism. Terrorism news conforms to an established and overarching agenda, rather than allowing 'real' news to dictate that agenda (ibid: 5), thus voices and news angles reinforce and legitimise the political consensus, diverting attention away from real issues by marginalising the scope of debate and the people involved in determining coverage.

In Chapter 2, this research claimed that it was not the aim of this work to test Beck's World Risk Society theory. However, during the course of the work, a number of important findings emerged that both corroborate and challenge this theory, which should not be ignored and so are noted next.

Beck suggests that risks are distributed unequally in society (2009: 163-164) and this research finds that largely, that inequality is evident in the media with climate risks defined as issues for the developing world, species and fauna. There is an imbalance between climate risks for the West and the rest of the world. Interestingly, while acts of terrorism are also, statistically, an issue for similar regions of the world, there is an exaggeration of the threat facing the West, which obscures the reality. Thus, it appears from this research that the unequal distribution of risk in world risk society is subject to, if not constructed by, particular Western worldviews. In his criticism of Beck's work, Scott (2000) suggests that risk is not always catastrophic. This research also finds that catastrophic climate risk is not a common feature of reporting in this study. When considered against terrorism on both

media presence and overall tone, there is casualness to reporting climate change that belies the issue's real risk. There is a preoccupation in relation to terrorism news in British newspapers in this research, indicating the inequity inherent in particular risks and their perceived catastrophic qualities.

Global risks in world risk society disregard national boundaries (Beck, 2009: 52). Yet, in the British newspapers in this study, national boundaries are clearly demarcated with climate change categorised largely as a problem for 'them' rather than 'us'. Similar use of national borders are found in the reporting of terrorism, but to different effect, and instead serving to realise and reinforce the threat for the UK and the Western civilised world more widely. Such a restricted, closed narrative serves as a direct counterbalance to Beck's ideas around cosmopolitanism and the opportunities of the risk society by emphasising the national outlook over the global. The cosmopolitan doctrine is further challenged, this study shows, by narratives around action and responsibility that emphasise the national over the international.

Beck suggests that the political site of world risk society is no longer the street but the media (2009: 98), a theme lent considerable weight by this research and particularly apparent in the authority articles afforded to politicians (both home and foreign) and government agendas within their narratives, news hooks and comment. The visibility of such state actors is also seemingly at odds with Beck's claim that in world risk society, the public distrust these individuals and groups (2009: 54). Their prominence in the news suggests that these individuals are still regarded as the managers of risk (ibid) and their apparatus still considered to have purchase (ibid) and power in decision making, definition and control (ibid) of these issues. It also challenges the notion that domestic and foreign

policy overlap in world risk society (Beck, 2009: 95) since the former is currently afforded more credence and emphasis than the latter in the newspapers in this research.

Interestingly, while Beck notes that it is the anticipation of catastrophe that is a hallmark of the risk society (2009: 9), this research shows that in the case of terrorism it is the past that drives coverage and action, a past that albeit becomes projected into the future. There is also a Westernised view of 'the other' evident from this research. It is through a Western media lens that we encounter the terrorist 'other' as a threat and the climate change 'other' as a victim, meaning that true cosmopolitanism, according to Beck's vision, is absent. Fate certainly is not collectivised in the sense that Beck would envisage.

Beck says that without the media, risks are nothing at all (2006: 332). This research has showed how five British newspapers have helped to generate, endorse and sustain the risk of terrorism while marginalising the risk of climate change. This chapter will now look at the findings in more detail, paying particular attention to what I consider to be the three significant findings emerging from this research, to explain this disparity further.

9.2.1 A 'narrative nomad'

I suggest that the most notable finding to emerge from this research is the structure of the climate change story in the news. Longitudinally, climate change appears to lack an overarching, logical narrative. There has been a failure, discursively, in cohesively linking the issue with its causes, impacts and policy solutions. Instead, climate change is refracted in different directions as a story, each newsworthy, but resulting in a confused meta-narrative. That refraction is dictated largely, certainly among the prestige press, by the ideological compass of each newspaper.

While such a finding is not necessarily new, it becomes more salient when compared to longitudinal coverage of terrorism. Messages in articles about terrorism revolve around a clear, linear structure that incorporates incident, effect and resolution. In other words, a beginning, middle and end. It is a normative framework, familiar to us - structurally and socially - and encompasses ideals such as good and bad, right and wrong, cause and effect. While the news does not necessarily follow a chronological pattern as it moves between these topics, such a restricted focus concentrates the story, distilling it into identifiable and manageable segments: it is easily compartmentalised. Interestingly, the tough actions taken to combat terrorism do not appear to have had a significant impact on the level of perceived risk. Climate change, in contrast, is something of a narrative nomad, moving between stories, but without a real discursive home. While action is a common theme in climate discourse, its presence is challenged by narratives around the cost of action (in the form of research investment, the cost of new energy builds or taxes and additional costs facing business or householders). Action is also weakened by the displacement of the immediacy of climate impact and risk for the UK, and the common representation of the issue through weather, which may serve to undermine the seriousness of the risk.

Intertwined with this, I suggest is the construction of the narrative around the 'enemy' in the media. The global terrorist threat is easier to tell (and sell) because the enemy is positioned as a social and cultural outsider. There is, as Lewis writes, *"...an identifiable parade of villains"* (2012: 261) in the terrorism news narrative. Such a positioning of the enemy as polar to the educated, civil and cultured West ultimately helps sanction the war on terror and other actions under the banner of homeland and national security. Such a positioning of the terrorist enemy as Islamic and extreme may also be self-fulfilling: some Muslims are terrorists (Lewis, 2012) and military action by the West may have inspired

retaliation among Arab and Muslim groups, although this is clearly difficult to measure (Lewis, 2012: 259). When it comes to climate change the enemy is closer to home, but has no real ill-intent (Lewis, 2012: 261). Instead, the 'enemy' is part of a society hinged upon a definition of progress that encompasses ideals around 'new' and 'growth': "*The idea that economic growth may be finite - that prosperous sections of society may actually have enough objects, and might even be better off seeking "ego-satisfaction" outside material accumulation - is still regarded as unthinkable within the political mainstream*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 7). The fact remains, however, that anthropogenic cause is the 'enemy' in the story of climate change, yet Chapter 5 showed that 'climate change' features prominently within articles as a self-referential cause. While anthropogenic causes are also referenced within articles, they are less frequent. Within the climate change grand narrative, there is a disjoint in identifying 'emissions' and 'climate change' with anthropogenic factors. I question, therefore, whether media coverage makes the link between people, their habits, and emissions forcefully enough, or whether that jump is left to the public to make (Howard-Williams, 2009). Citizens and social progress are not positioned as the 'enemy'; and indeed, whether such a status would engender action or even meet the requirements of news values in the first instance, is unclear. However, this lack of continuity in the climate change media narrative is important to understand and clearly requires examination in more depth.

9.2.2 West is best

Comparing media coverage of climate change and terrorism has demonstrated that the 'other' has competing and contradictory meanings. Orientalism defines the West, its strength and identity by ideologically representing the Orient (Said, 2003: 1-3). The theory identifies 'us' against 'them' and elevates Western society to a superior foothold in relation to non-European peoples and cultures (ibid: 7). When comparing media coverage of climate

change and terrorism, I have shown that a 'West is best' discourse runs throughout media narratives in two key areas. The first relates to the contradiction between the enemy and victim and the second revolves around Western cultural and economic values.

Beyond the West, a complex and contradictory pattern emerges of 'others' as both victim and enemy. The dominant discourse is negative and is associated with Islam and terrorism as the enemy. If climate victims are also displaced and identified with similar locations (directly and indirectly) antagonistic messages emerge. Potentially, the incompatibility of the 'others' as expressed in the media may have disengaged us from an altruistic response to climate change. If 'others' are simultaneously both victim and enemy, confusing connotations arise. By way of an example (and a potential direction for future research) I question how an image of a Middle-Eastern individual would be perceived by the public: as an enemy (terrorist) or victim (climate change)?

Secondly, a West is best discourse is present in relation to both climate change and terrorism. In relation to the former, the dominant frame encapsulates ideas around progress, growth, standards of living and consumerism. In the latter the West's cultural and social values are seen to be under threat. The West is therefore reinforced as an economically and culturally advanced 'better' society, potentially at risk from climate action which may indeed (and necessarily) curb or alter lifestyle and personal and professional measures of 'progress', as well as being at risk from terrorists who are represented as resenting such societal advances. The West versus the Global South and the notion of the West as a driver of social instability in this area is noticeably absent as a media discourse in climate change reporting, illustrating a reluctance on behalf of all of the newspapers in this study to adopt such a narrative.

9.2.3 A British hallmark

Another important finding from this study is that climate change lacks a distinctive British hallmark. It affects people and places distant to us both spatially and culturally. Ironically, most acts of terrorism also occur in regions of the world that are not the West, but this focus has not transcended to media coverage in the UK. The threat from Islamic terrorists is and has been constructed in the British press as a current and real problem for British society. On the other hand, climate change is represented as a threat for the rest of the world and one which is largely tied to the future.

Terrorism is entrenched in British history. The IRA's bombing of mainland Britain and the first British suicide bomber on British soil are just two examples of the shared reference points society has. Even if citizens weren't directly affected by either of these events, they are a common shared experience - part of what Anderson (1996) refers to as the imagined community. Although the IRA's activities were found in reports in this study, post-9/11, focus quickly turned to the threat of Islamic-based extremism facing the UK.

In comparison, climate change does not have a shared social historical dimension. Despite the UK experiencing extreme flooding in recent years that has been linked to climate change, that experience has not transcended boundaries in the same way that terrorism has. British society is not seen to be threatened by climate change in the same was as it is in relation to terrorism.

9.3 Implications of the findings

The type of coverage climate change receives in the media is a crucial factor in averting the worst effects (Howard-Williams, 2009: 40). News influences public opinion, particularly on

issues where public understanding is limited (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 13). Research to date has shown that there is a void between an individual's perception that they will be personally affected by terrorism and the actual risk of such an incident (Allouche & Lind, 2010). On climate change there is a gap between people's understanding, perception and awareness of the risk compared to the scientific evidence about such (Etkin & Ho, 2007). Opinion polls too, have shown that the public is largely disengaged with climate change as an issue. A survey by the Pew Centre (2014) found that Americans ranked climate change second to last as a priority for the nation, with the table topped by the economy, jobs and terrorism. Interestingly, terrorism has retained its prominence as an issue for members of the public, even at a time of austerity. They also found a partisan gap between views on climate change. Similar findings are also published by Gallup (2014) although terrorism ranked lower in this survey than in Pew's. In the UK, a YouGov survey in 2013 found that 79 percent of the public thought that the world's climate was changing but 39 percent thought that scientists had exaggerated their concerns.

These findings are however, at odds with official information. According to the most recent Global Terrorism Index 2012[30] Iraq is the country most likely to suffer from acts of terrorism; America is one of the least likely. The authors of the study also conclude that those countries with the highest number of terrorist incidents (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Yemen) are those which have seen foreign military intervention as a policy response (ibid). According to that same Index, in 2011, 7473 people globally died from terrorist attacks. Figures relating to deaths from climate change vary, but include references to 300,000 people a year (Global Humanitarian Forum)[31] and 150,000 a year (World Health Organisation). Whichever figure is used, climate change-related deaths are significantly more than those caused by terrorism.

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[30] The most recent was published on 4 December 2012
[31] Cited in Vidal (2009), *Global Warming causes 300,000 deaths a year, says Kofi Annan think tank*

While this research has not directly engaged with the link between media reporting and public opinion, in relation to the agenda setting and framing effect of the media, it assumes that such a link exists. It has advocated the view that what the media says on climate change and terrorism matters (Lewis, 2012: 268). It matters because the political site of world risk society is no longer the street, but the media (Beck, 2009b). It is through the media that people engage with these risks, otherwise largely imperceptible to their lives.

Shuckburgh et al (2012) suggest the public has a finite pool of worry in relation to risks. If this is true, then based on the key findings outlined above, climate change – against an issue such as terrorism – is likely to fail to cause even a ripple in that pool. Similarly, if Kahan's work (2012) implores that the failing of climate communication is attributed to cultural pollution, and antagonistic messages, I suggest that those messages may equally derive from the terrorism narrative.

A number of suggestions have been made regarding climate change communication and increasing its resonance with audiences. Moser & Dilling (2011: 165) argue that neither 'alarmism nor Pollyannaism' hold the key to mobilising engagement with climate change and suggest that linking climate change to issues that resonate with the public – their health, that of their children may prove beneficial. Nisbett (2009: 22) places a responsibility on journalists suggesting they have the opportunity to produce "*novel, accessible and relevant narratives.*" Williams (2012) suggests the use of social groups to reinforce social norms, coupled with a marketing campaign. A UK ESRC paper (by Poortinga et al, 2011) has highlighted the opportunity for climate communicators to bridge the gap in understanding between scientists, the media, and public - helping people make sense of the wide variety of

information they receive on climate change. This suggestion has also been made by others (see Pidgeon & Fischoff, 2011).

Alongside such possibilities, this research has highlighted the potential importance of more concise structuring of the climate change narrative in the media. As such, there may be opportunities for those at the forefront of climate change communication – scientists, the IPCC, charities and pressure groups - to build their agendas around such a structure. Importantly, on climate communication, the findings of this research suggest that there is much to learn from the terrorism narrative. Structuring the climate story clearly around incident or impact and action may help carry the message that "*just as we caused [climate change], we also have the capacity to control it*" (Lewis & Boyce, 2009:3).

9.4 Limitations of this research

There are limitations on what can be concluded from this study. Comparing climate change and terrorism has provided an insight into the benefits of this approach but tackling such complex and vast issues in unison means that this work has provided an overview rather than in depth analysis. Clearly, there is more that can be done with the data, particularly linking across and within the chapters to explore further correlations and disparities. Focusing on such a sizeable number of articles and different areas while providing substantial data has restricted drilling down into the data for a more refined analysis of each topic.

Methodologically, this research relied on content analysis as its primary tool, which was supplemented with a qualitative dimension aimed at bringing to life the quantitative data. This aimed to reveal the presence of discourses and themes and act as a starting point for

comparative research. There is criticism of the use of content analysis as a sole method, which I accept may have limited the conclusions of this study. It would have therefore been useful to additionally include a fuller discourse or framing analysis, or to supplement the study with a secondary methodology. Thus, future research might build on this study and usefully benefit from utilising framing categories, such as those suggested by Valkenburg et al (1999), to further compare climate change and terrorism and understand more about action, human interest, conflict and economic consequences. Taking some of the chapters as separate issues and examining them closely may also produce further in-depth insight. Painter's (2013) frames around uncertainty may be particularly useful in seeking to understand more about the representation of climate change and terrorism uncertainty.

While the content analysis and discursive examination has enabled inferences to be made about the possible effect of coverage on members of the public, the agenda setting and framing effects of media coverage on climate change and terrorism have not been tested. This work has not examined whether there is any correlation or overlap between the findings and public opinion, either in the form of tracking coverage against opinion polls or via focus groups. Therefore, I am limited in the conclusions that I can draw about the impact of reporting on public understanding and opinion.

Using two separate data sets for the content analysis also limits the inferences that can be made from this research, as a complete picture. Taking just the first article appearing each month for the years January 2009-December 2012 means that there is disjoint in the data with the earlier set (January 1999-December 2008) since this first sample was based on the total number of articles overall. Unfortunately, this was the compromise in adding in a second sample to bring this work up to date and having to balance the additional coding with writing up and working full time.

This research has also relied on Beck's 'world risk society' theory in order to position the media as central conduits in the political site of society. Yet, it has not sought to test or challenge Beck's theory. There are a number of issues with Beck's theory, as outlined in the literature review, which could be empirically tested in future research.

9.5 Future directions

In some respects, this research has raised more questions than it has answered. Indeed, the primary question it set out to address was straightforward in order to reflect the approach of this work and the infancy of a comparative approach, and to accommodate comparing media coverage of climate change and terrorism which are two vast and complex issues. Emerging from this work are broad questions such as:

- How does media coverage of climate change and terrorism compare in and between other countries?
- What is the impact of the findings of this research on members of the public and their perception of climate change and terrorism?
- Would this approach extend to media coverage of other global risks or 'general' risks?
- How do social and digital media represent climate change and terrorism, and is this an outlet for public engagement with the issues?
- Is there a role for citizen journalists in contextualising climate change and terrorism risks?

There are also more specific questions related to each chapter such as:

- How is the debate around 'what to do' on climate change structured; how does it compare with debates around 'what to do' given the current situation in Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Middle East more widely?

- Can the security narrative associated with terrorism effectively translate to climate change?

- How does the representation of the victim compare between climate change and terrorism? Is the victim discourse also evident in other global risks - economic risk, for example?

- Does an Orientalist approach to climate victims suffer at the hands of such an approach to terrorism?

Since this is the first study to have compared reporting of climate change and terrorism, it would be useful for further research to explore the subject and build on or challenge the findings. Testing the findings of this research among members of the public is also critical, in order to understand whether they resonate with citizens. Here, merit can be gained by uniting journalism with social psychology in order to understand more about how the public interacts with media messages and how they respond to competing narratives. A mapping of findings with opinion polls may also provide useful information, something not attempted in this study.

Carvalho (2007: 240) proposes a "politicized reading" of science in the press. This research suggests that terrorism news too, should be subject to such an approach. While this data adds to the body of work around the impact of ideology on reporting clearly, there is much more scope to examine the issues raised in subsequent chapters through this lens. Thus, further content analysis and discourse analysis could reveal more about the relationship between ideology and the representation of climate change and terrorism.

Future research could also usefully benchmark media coverage of climate change and terrorism in the West and rest of the world. Additionally, it would also be useful to map international media coverage with global public opinion, in the manner described above, to understand more about the framing and agenda setting effects of media coverage of these issues in countries, and to provide wider details about the impact of ideology of reporting terrorism and climate change worldwide.

Beyond these suggestions, research may usefully turn to examining the impact of online news and social media in order to understand the messages, interaction and potential effect on the public's perception of risk. Big data trends can help inform our understanding of the media landscape around climate change and terrorism as social issues.

9.6 Conclusion

This research was ambitious in its remit and scale. Notwithstanding the limitations outlined above, it has I hope, provided an alternative perspective on British newspaper reporting of climate change and terrorism. Tackling the issues simultaneously has allowed for renewed focus on two saturated bodies of work and offered a vantage point from which to better understand climate change and terrorism. It has contributed to debate on the role of ideology not only as a selection tool (Carvalho, 2007) but in determining which messages about terrorism and climate change are amplified or minimised. This comparative approach has also shed light on discussions of media coverage of climate change and terrorism separately, and provided significant data which brings those discussions into sharper relief. More so, by comparing climate change with terrorism, it has offered a potentially new narrative direction for climate change communication: by replicating the roundness of the terrorism news narrative, climate change may benefit from a more complete grand story.

Clearly, this will not solve all of the problems around climate communication, since the battleground is larger than just the media (Lewis & Boyce, 2009: 9).

I am hopeful that this work will encourage further comparative studies, not just between terrorism and climate change, but across risks more broadly. It has made an initial attempt to map the media contours of the global risks of climate change and terrorism and in doing so, has illuminated these issues anew.

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