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Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

Moulin, Herve, Ray, Indrajit and Gupta, Sonali 2014. Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 March 2016
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2020 11:27
URI: https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/78025

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