To Train a Watchdog.

Media Development, Statebuilding, and Measurement in South Sudan

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Abstract

Attempts to build a free press are routinely made in countries experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof. A free press, defined as a press that holds governments accountable, is thought of as an important part of an emerging democracy. The role of media development projects is nevertheless under-researched. Most examinations of such projects are done by practitioners active in media development. This thesis contributes to the emerging academic literature on media development and its role in statebuilding. It does so by investigating media development in the new state of South Sudan. Ethnographic observations, a social survey, and unstructured interviews have been applied during a fieldwork spell in Juba, which lasted from November 2014 to August 2015. The application of three methods allowed for an in-depth investigation of the South Sudanese understanding of media, which differed significantly from the aims of western media experts implementing media development projects. Furthermore, the thesis compares the strengths and weaknesses, and the results delivered, by each utilised research method, and thus investigates how these methods perform in a country of the global South. I argue that the various understandings of media in South Sudan differ significantly from the thinking and practices of western media practitioners. In South Sudan, this resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the country's government and its international donors and led to problems for the newly trained journalists. Furthermore, my results show the limitations of using just one method in a country of the global South; and they provide an argument for *bricolage*, a research approach that combines perspectives, theories, and methods, when researching policy-relevant questions in environments where the researcher is not a cultural native.

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List of Acronyms

AMDISS	Association for Media Development in South Sudan
BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DW	Deutsche Welle (Germany's foreign broadcast)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organisation
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Development in Europe
PoC	'Protection of Civilians' site
RoSS	Republic of South Sudan
SPLA	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement
SPLM-DC	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement Democratic Change
SPLM-iO	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSP	South Sudanese Pound (currency)
SS-TV	South Sudan Television
SS-Radio	South Sudan Radio
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VoA	Voice of America (radio station)
WFP	World Food Programme

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1 – Introduction

The media is an important part in peace and statebuilding in countries experiencing the aftermath of violent conflict. The United Nations (UN) routinely establishes radio stations as part of their missions (Orme 2010), and several international nongovernmental organisations (iNGOs) are engaged in media development. While ample policy papers and project evaluations exist (Hume 2004; Kalathil 2011; Internews 2012; BMZ 2015), academic engagement with the media as part of statebuilding has just begun to emerge (Allen and Stremlau 2005; Bratic 2006; Stremlau 2014; Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015). A reason for this may be that in western thought the media's place is ideally outside the state. It is a watchdog to hold government accountable (Coronel 2010) and its ability to fulfil this role is constrained by the regime type and the market in which it operates (Norris and Odugbemi 2010, pp.4, 5). There is a firm belief that the media, when built in a country of intervention, needs to be placed as far away from 'the state' as possible. The role of the state is mainly to make sure that the media can operate in an environment, "with laws restricting media freedom narrowly defined and limited to those necessary in a democracy, and with legal provisions that ensure a level economic playing field" (UNESCO 2008, p.5). Basically, in this view, when it comes to the media the role of the state is to provide a legal framework and keep its distance. Statebuilding, on the other hand, is about building or strengthening state institutions (Fukuyama 2004; Bliesemann de Guevara 2008), which is what the media is not. In consequence, media, although understood to be an important part of a healthy democracy, has rarely been investigated as part of the statebuilding endeavour. Scholars interested in statebuilding have written about marketisation and institution-building (Paris 2004), elections (Norris 2004; 2014; 2015), security sector reform and police forces (Hensell 2012; Biecker and Schlichte 2015), legitimacy of interventions (Andersen 2012), or the role and practices of the

international community itself (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Autesserre 2014; Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 2016). When the media is investigated, practitioners engaged in media development mostly focus on people's information needs (Internews 2012; Internews 2015a) and entertain the notion of the media as a watchdog, a control on government, and a means to hold governments accountable (Orme 2010; Kalahtil 2011). Scholars, however, have pointed out that there are "serious problems when relying on media freedom to build national consensus in fragile states" (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.1). This difference in view echoes the discussion on the overall statebuilding process with its aim "to mould non-western states into modern 'governance-compatible' entities according to liberal-democratic standards set up by the West" (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012, p.3). I draw further on Berit Bliesemann de Guevara's work, in particular on the notion that statebuilding is not done by international actors alone but that national and local actors play a role in the endeavour (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010), and that statebuilding is subject to internationalisation and informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012). I argue that the media developed by international actors in a country of the global South and understood to be necessary for the functioning of a democratic state is subject to internationalisation and informalisation. International and local actors draw on their own repertoire of expectations and understandings. Furthermore, as the media is by definition a public undertaking and, in theory, accessible to everyone, there are not only clashes of international and national expectations, but these clashes are even more public and thus prominent. This may lead to problems between the national government and the international community. While the idea of statebuilding is to strengthen the state, western style media can be counterproductive.

In investigating the western-led media as part of statebuilding and providing empirical findings from South Sudan, the thesis makes an original contribution to the emerging discussion on western-led media

in countries of the global South on the one hand, and to the literature on statebuilding on the other. South Sudan was chosen as the case study because of its unique position as a new country that has been undergoing a massive statebuilding and development campaign. Despite substantial help from the international community, including a media development campaign, conflict broke out again in December 2013. These conditions make the country an appropriate environment for investigating the effects of media in an ongoing statebuilding process. The study is an important contribution as the evidence on media's effects on both state and peacebuilding is scarce (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014). It has been said that practitioners rarely examine media effects but act under the assumption that the media will contribute positively to a conflict environment (Bratic 2006); the positive effects of media are thus only asserted but not proven (Stremlau 2014). Many studies lack independence as they were published by iNGOs and other stakeholders (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014); they claim success not because of the programme's achievements but rather on the basis that programmes were executed (Rhodes 2007, p.10). The dynamics that western-led media initiate in a non-western environment are thus under-researched; in particular, how the local population understands and perceives the media barely receives consideration (Stremlau 2014). In placing the inquiry firmly on the local understanding of the media, this thesis contributes to filling this gap. Media supposedly has a positive effect on democracy and on relations between groups in a divided society and in the aftermath of a conflict. It is assumed that the free-flow of information allows the population to hold governments accountable and make informed choices in upcoming elections (Kumar 2006; UNESCO 2008; Coronel 2010, p.111; Stremlau et al. 2015, p.1510). Furthermore, by providing objective information on the 'Other' in society, the media helps to overcome mistrust and contributes to reconciliation (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256; Staub 2013, p.580). To investigate these claims, the three key concepts under investigation are 'the media' itself, 'the state', and 'groups', as the latter two are what media supposedly affects.

In the context of this thesis, 'groups' are not exclusively understood as different ethnicities but also as different social entities, namely the political elite, the international community, and regular people. I investigate, first, whether the media is differently understood by the South Sudanese. This is followed by an investigation into how 'the state' is understood in South Sudan. Together, these results allow for a conclusion on whether the media can reasonably function the way it is supposed to according to western thinking. In a third step, I examine media's contribution to group relations. This is a twofold examination. Peace radios operate under the assumption that group divisions, often of an ethnic nature, are at the heart of the conflict (Eyeradio no date; United States Institute of Peace no date) and that these can be overcome by radio broadcasts. I first explore the relations between different ethnic groups in Juba to ascertain whether the underlying idea of peace radios matches the social reality in the country. Second, I examine the relations between the South Sudanese and the international community, and the South Sudanese opinion of western-led media stations. Taken together, a comparison of the ideas on which media development operate with the results from South Sudan with reference to the key concepts of 'the media', 'the state', and 'groups' allows for conclusions about the dynamics and processes that western-led media initiates.

Furthermore, the thesis also contributes to the discussion on concepts. My results show that concepts are not fixed entities that can be operationalised and measured (Sartori 1984), but rather that they are instead substantive and flexible. For Frederic Schaffer (Schaffer 2016), the problem with the former, positivist approach is that it creates concepts that are fixed in how they view the objects or ideas they aim to describe; they are one-sided, as they only take the one view into account. The statement that, "Concepts are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon" (Goertz 2006, p.5) delivers an example of this view. In deciding what something essentially is a certain direction and worldview is

presupposed. I show that neither 'the media' nor 'the state' are conceptualised the same way in the West and in South Sudan, and these different understandings have consequences for the way media functions in a different context. This discussion on concepts and whether they can travel between contexts is important for statebuilding. In externally led statebuilding processes "purposeful attempts at establishing state institutions are 'bent' by the complex social processes they provoke and the compromise they require" (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012, p.5). The same can be said about the media as part of statebuilding. While 'the media' can certainly be understood as a mere technical entity (wires, switches, and electricity), its actual functioning is dependent on the culture and history of the country in which it operates. This adds to the argument that concepts needs to be elucidated upon (Schaffer 2016); and also supports the world view that 'reality', while measurable, is still experienced, interpreted, and constructed (Danermark et al. 2002, pp.15, 16).

Coming from a professional background in media development myself, and drawing on the experience of such work in South Sudan, I was interested in the questions: (a) if national and local agents understand 'media' differently to western ones, and (b) if this has an impact on how media development projects play out in a given environment. Doing research in South Sudan, however, it became clear relatively fast that 'research' is a concept, too; a concept with potentially different connotations and dissimilar understandings. I became interested in the question (c) if and how research, and in particular research methods, work in a specific environment, most notably one of which the researcher is not a 'cultural native'. If research methods were mere data gathering tools (Aradau and Huysmans 2014), the answers to the question regarding the effects of western-led media in a country of the global South should be roughly the same no matter which method is applied. To investigate whether research methods enact different realities or shape reality in different ways (Law 2004) I use three

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different methods – observations, a survey, and unstructured interviews – to explore the effects of media in South Sudan. Each method at first stands alone in answering the research question before they are compared with each other and then combined to provide a more complete answer in the conclusion. Based on this, I argue that methods function with reference to context; that is, to the environment, people, and circumstances. In particular, each research method focused on a specific social group in South Sudan, not because of a conscious choice but because of technicalities and social reality. Furthermore, only after experiencing the country and its ways of life did some answers gathered in interviews become meaningful; questionnaire questions needed to be elucidated upon until a shared agreement on meaning was reached, and interviews provided background for further observations. In short, the research process was disordered and confusing; answers and insights were contradictory. Every research method delivered slightly different answers, showing that methods are not mere data gathering tools but that method choice is a political intervention.

In consequence, I argue that in a complex environment, understood as a location where the researcher is not a 'cultural native' and which is marked by multifaceted social realities and composed of distinctive social groups with different values and coming from various backgrounds, , a combination of research methods offers the best chance to answer a research question. In this thesis, the approach used is this of the *bricoleur* (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, pp.2, 3), as the "Jack of all trades" (Lévi-Strauss 1966, p.17) who uses what is at hand and what is necessary. This is because this investigation is exploratory, not only because of the way the question is phrased but also because "any large social process or event will inevitably be far more complex than the schemata we can devise, prospectively or retrospectively, to map it up" (Scott 1998, p.309). With a complex question and a complex environment, bricolage allows the investigation to be pushed in different directions and to include surfacing additional questions. It is a guarantee

against perspective-induced one-sidedness and allows for context to be included and illuminated. This stands in contrast to the claim that there is one logic of inference, which is the "process of using the facts we know to learn about the facts we do not know" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, p.46) that applies theories to avoid being overwhelmed by observable facts. Focusing on one predefined theory or hypothesis and on fixed concepts bears the risk of overlooking or misunderstanding potentially important facts. The illumination of social processes and negotiation of concepts in complex environments is necessary to deliver meaningful answers.

South Sudan was chosen as the location, as it provides what has been named a critical case. These are cases that "have strategic importance in relation to the general problem" (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 229). With the general problems being the question of what effects western-led media has had in a country of the global South and if western-led media is able to contribute positively to democracy and reconciliation, the strategic importance of South Sudan can hardly be doubted. The country became independent in 2011, following a referendum in which the South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for independence. The creation of South Sudan was thought to put an end to one of the bloodiest and longest wars in Africa, and the new country was greeted with joy by its citizens. The creation of the country came with a massive development campaign, including media development, by the international community. South Sudan had favourable starting conditions, yet it plunged back into violent conflict in December 2013 and has not yet been able to overcome this. With the favourable starting conditions the country was enjoying, the media's tasks of strengthening democracy and aiding reconciliation should have been easy to fulfil if the theory that western style media can aid democracy were true. Surely, it would be far-fetched to hold media solely, or even predominantly, responsible for the success or failure of a statebuilding project. Still, with the massive approval of the young state by its citizens and the enormous help received from the international

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community, traces of media development reaching some goals should be discoverable. If it did not achieve its aims under the favourable conditions it enjoyed in South Sudan, this might suggest that the way the concept of media is translated into a different context needs to be rethought. I do not claim that the way western style media functions in South Sudan is universal. Rather, I claim that if it is not acting as expected in a country with rather favourable conditions, it shows that the theory that western-led media supports democracy independent of the context in which it acts, is not sustainable. In consequence, the way media is used in countries of the global South needs to be tailored to the specific context.

In investigating the effects of media development with three different methods, this thesis answers the question if a concept can 'travel', or whether it can function the same way and deliver similar results in a distinctive environment. More concretely, the question is whether media that is underpinned by western values is able to function in a non-western country with different traditions and culture. This breaks down into some sub-questions. First, do different research methods, applied to the same environment and at the same time, answer the same question in the same, a similar or a different way? Second, while media in western thinking has a specific task and is understood in a specific way, can this understanding be transferred to another context, here to a country experiencing violent conflict in the global South? Is media acting in such a country acting as it does in the West? In short, the questions are whether research methods are independent of context, and the effects of internationally-led media in a country of intervention. Answers to these questions are significant for scholarship and practice, and this thesis makes an important contribution to the literature on 'doing research' and on 'doing media development'. At the theoretical level, the results provide empirically based results if and how methods are acting in and with an environment. This has implications for the praxis of conducting research on complex and policy-relevant questions in countries where

the researcher is alien. Furthermore, I show that media is indeed understood differently in South Sudan and in the countries in which media development originates. In addition, the entities it 'works on' – the state and group relations – are also differently understood. This means that other ways to do media development need to be found, and that media interventions need to be tailored to the country in which they are about to take place. If the concepts are not at least fairly similar to each other and if the implementers are not able to negotiate the divide between them – something which Schaffer (2016 p.10) names the central conceptual task of many interpretivist scholars – then, in the best case, the project is useless. In the worst case, trouble is ahead. This thesis makes an important and original contribution to the way media in a statebuilding project needs to be understood and it may have implications for improvements in the praxis of media development.

1.1. Chapter overview

Following this chapter, in chapter 2 I provide an overview of the assumptions under which 'media development' is currently operating according to practitioners and the academic literature. The chapter is organised in three parts. 'Media' introduces the ideas behind media development and the underlying understanding of the media in the West. It also presents the puzzling difference in opinion and assessment of the effects of western-led media in the global South held by practitioners on the one hand, and by academics on the other. While many policy papers and project evaluations exist, the academic engagement with the subject is just starting to emerge, especially with 'media' as part of statebuilding. In treating media as an institution of a functioning state, notwithstanding its essential independence from the government of the day, I aim to contribute to this emerging literature. Consequently, in the second part of chapter I introduce the western idea of the state and the principles of statebuilding. While the first two parts focus on media and its political function, the last part, 'groups', investigates the role media supposedly

plays in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in a divided society. This part draws on the literature on social psychology, in particular social identity theory. Chapter 2 provides the point of departure for the later comparison of the concepts with the South Sudanese understanding thereof.

In chapter 3, the methodology is introduced. I define 'methods' and provide details on the two tiers of the research design. First, it is a comparison of research methods, showing (1) that concepts are not universally valid but are created depending on their environment; that (2) methods interact with the environment, because 'research' is a concept, too; and that (3) every one of the methods applied here is only able to investigate a subpart of South Sudanese social reality. This draws on the work of Christian Greiffenhagen, Michael Mair and Wes Sharrock (2015), and Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans (2014), who all see methods as performing in a particular environment instead of painting an exact picture of said environment. I argue for a combination of research methods when it comes to policy-relevant questions in complex environments. This thesis is both a comparison of methods, and a multimethod design working on one case: media development in South Sudan. Chapter 3 defends the choice of a single case study, justifies the use of mixed methods studies, and introduces the three methods employed.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are devoted to the presentation of the research findings. Each chapter starts with a detailed account of how the method in question was employed in South Sudan, what insights it provided, and what the specific problems with it have been. Following this, the findings are presented, again using the concepts introduced in chapter 2, 'media', 'state', and 'groups'. Chapter 4, ethnography, kicks off this round. It provides the insights gained while working as a part-time lecturer at Juba University, while engaging in more or less regular chess games, and during the deliberately sought-for interaction with everyday life in South

Sudan. Chapter 5 presents the quantitative section. Two social surveys were conducted and analysed using SPSS. The chapter provides insights into the process of data gathering in Juba, and then investigates possible relationships between media usage and attitudes towards the media, the state, and different groups in the society. Chapter 6 presents the insights from unstructured interviews conducted with 28 participants in Juba. As before, I investigate the process of data gathering, as well as benefits, advantages, and disadvantages of the method, before turning to the findings on media, the state, and groups. While aiming for a broad sample, most of my interviewees come from an educated middle-class background, which opens a discussion on which voices are heard and how representative interview studies done in a country of the global South can be.

Chapter 7 concludes by first delivering a summary of the findings and arguments. Following this, I compare the results from the three antecedent chapters on the question of the effects of media development. I look for coherency and congruency among the findings from the different methods and show that they act in and react with the environment. Looking at the question regarding the effects of media development in South Sudan, I then combine the results from the three methods. This shows that in South Sudan western-led media acts differently than intended by policy makers. The differences lie in distinctive understandings of the state and distinct former experience of the media. This leaves western-style media with its goal of acting as a control mechanism on the state in a problematic position and contributes to deteriorating relations between nationals and international donors. Furthermore, investigating media development's second claim that it contributes positively to peace and reconciliation, my results show that radio programmes for peace act under wrong assumptions regarding the causes of the conflict, once more underpinning the argument that media interventions need to be tailored to the environment.

2 – Assumptions about media development

Media campaigns are an important part of any foreign intervention. Hardly a peacebuilding mission comes without a media component (Hume 2004; Paris 2004 p.31, p. 39; Dobbins et al 2007, pp.202-207; Himelfarb and Chabalowski 2008; Hoeglund 2008 pp.87-89; Orme 2010). The UN and iNGOs such as Internews, Free Voice Unlimited, and Foundation Hirondelle, to name just a few, specialise in media development. This is because, "a free media has the ability to impact a number of critical areas in a given society - education, government accountability, health practices, empowerment of women and minorities, the economy, and more" (CIMA 2008, p.6). The popularity of media development initiatives is evident in the fact that access to information has been included in the United Nation's post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2015a). The importance given to media campaigns stems from its assumed ability to better a situation in a so-called weak or failed state. Its job is to hold governments accountable and strengthen citizens' participation in governance (Rozumilowicz 2002, p.13; CIMA 2008, p. 12; Coronel 2010, pp. 111, 112; Stremlau et al. 2015), hence adding to democratisation efforts. Secondly, by broadcasting information that informs in a conflict-sensitive way on the perceived 'Other' in a society, the media is assumed to contribute to peace and reconciliation. (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003, p. 7; Allen and Stremlau 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick 2007; Orme 2010, p.8). Empirically, the record of such initiatives is relatively poor (ICG 1997; Laue 2005; Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014), or, as Nicole Stremlau (2014, p.2) notes, "the 'evidence' seems to be elusive". The media's stated ability to contribute positively to democracy and peace is based mostly on assumptions (Allen and Stremlau 2005) and on the evidence that it can successfully incite hate (Bratic 2006, Somerville 2012).

To add to the emerging discussion about the media in foreign interventions, I investigate the effects western-led media has in South Sudan. In this chapter, I examine the conceptions of 'media', and of 'the state' and of 'relationships between groups', as the latter two are the areas media development supposedly has an effect on. The chapter provides the background against which the empirical findings from South Sudan are later compared.

2.1 Media

'Media assistance', in the context of a country experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath of it, is a contested concept. Its meanings range from communication for development and reconciliation attempts to developing a free press in a country of intervention. The lack of a clearly defined definition has in the past led to discussions and confusion among practitioners and donors[1]. In this thesis, 'media development' refers to the creation of a free press following the western model in a country of intervention. Such a press is seen as a cornerstone of democracy (Howard 2002, p.4; Coronel 2010; Stremlau et al., 2015). It is expected that journalists will hold governments accountable and that by providing fair and objective information citizens are enabled to make informed decisions in elections. Furthermore, a reformed media system is sought to be able to enhance economic structures to the society at large (Rozumilowicz 2002, p.11).

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[1] In a private email (see Appendix 1.2, p.4) David Hoffman, founder and President Emeritus of the iNGO Internews, remembered a huge debate at the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD), a network of more than 180 organisations working on media assistance, whether to call the endeavour 'media development' or 'media for development'. The debate, he recalled, took hours; the following discussion took a couple of years. The former, 'media development' indicates the development of the sector in a country, 'media for development' indicates the dissemination of messages to initiate behaviour change. The difference is not clear-cut and the two fields are morphing into each other. Organisations that develop the media sector itself – by training journalists, building and sustaining radio stations and transferring technology – normally also have the stations used for dissemination of humanitarian and other messages.

The literature on the subject is relatively narrow. It has been said that it is "remarkable how the role of the media has often been ignored" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.2). Ten years after this remark, nothing much has changed, as "existing scholarship is very limited, often dated and (…) presently insufficient to address the growing needs and complexity of current efforts within the field of activities" (Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015, p.4). The literature tends to center on isolated case studies of individual projects, used by "the project's organisers in funding applications" (Bratic 2013, p.2). There is a lack of evidence on the effects media has in fragile states (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014) Scholars stating that literature is scarce, however, often work to fill the gap (see Price 2002; Price et al. 2002; Allen and Stremlau 2005; Bratic 2006; Bratic 2008; Coronel 2010; Rodriguez 2011; Bratic 2013; Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015; Stremlau et al. 2015).

2.1.1 History of media development

Media's tasks in the western world are to check on government, to inform and to engage citizens in public debate. This conception of media is based on the idea of the public sphere (Habermas 1974), a space to discuss issues of social and societal importance, independent from the state and its institutions[2]. It can be located between the government and the domestic sphere (Boyd-Barrett 2001, pp.236, 237) and its role has been described as analogous to that of entrepreneurial classes in the face of royalty and aristocracy who, despite ruling at the time, were losing their power fast. The public sphere reshaped the relationship between the classes and played an important role in developing new forms of government. Of particular importance were the newspapers that informed readers on everyday issues of interest (Habermas 1974). The public sphere stresses the participation of people in politics. It is opposed

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[2] Habermas described the public sphere as emerging from the 18th century coffeehouse: a place where citizens shared information and discussed issues of the day. (Habermas, 1989, pp.32, 33, 42, 59; Cowan, 2004).

to the former idea of government by an elite that was born into their position. The public sphere provided a room and a backbone for democracy. In the 19th and 20th century, however, media changed into what today is known as mass media and this eventually destroyed the public sphere; although the idea of media as a fourth estate and a check on government is still prominent. It also underpins media development projects in the global South, where it is understood as a necessary means towards a democratic liberal government (Coronel 2010).

Media interventions in the global South gained momentum in the 'Era of Development', with modernisation theory the main theoretical framework for international development by US-American policymakers. It states that economic growth in developing countries would inevitably lead to liberal democratic capitalism and to stable polities, modelled on western examples (So 1990). When reality refused to confirm theory, lack of capital and entrepreneurial spirit in the developing countries were identified as the two main reasons for the failure. The former was healed by loans from the World Bank; the latter was thought to be solvable by an attempt to change values, attitudes, and belief systems of the citizens (Sreberny 2000). Drawing on the work of most prominently Daniel Lerner (1958), the assumption was that in order for a country to develop, its people would need to overcome traditional beliefs. Modernisation and hence development was conditioned upon a state of mind possessed by individuals and the Lerner-model understands the 'modern citizen' foremost as being able to learn and train to achieve necessary skills (Sparks 2007). For changing and eradicating traditional belief system, mass media was understood to be the perfect tool. With media, society was to be transformed and widespread social change initiated[3]. The idea to use mass media, in particular radio, to alter attitudes, change belief systems, and promote

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[3] Colin Sparks (2007, p.23) points to the formal education system as another possible means, but mass media was thought to be more effective, faster, less expensive, and hence superior.

modernity was adopted by UNESCO (Sreberny 2000). Despite critics and some changes it is still visible and prominent today. It is the rationale behind communication campaigns as well as underpinning media development initiatives in the global South (Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 1998).

Modernisation theory was criticised on different grounds. Empirical evidence showed a disappointing record of the idea to use mass media for modernisation: "After many decades of employing the modern mass media as tools for development, the records in many African countries show that very little has been achieved in such critical areas as political mobilisation, national unity, civic education, and the diffusion of new agricultural techniques and products" (Okigbo 1995, p.4). It has been argued that this disappointing empirical record is to an extent caused by the way communication interventions are evaluated[4]. Furthermore, it was noted that although people gained knowledge and shifted attitudes, this did not translate into behaviour change (Rogers 1973, pp.366-396; Sparks 2007, p.40). Communication interventions based on modernisation theory assume a linear and relatively simple cause-effect trajectory: knowledge is missing, and once this deficiency is healed the desired outcome will occur. This is an oversimplified view of human behaviour, but still prominent in some radio for peace programmes[5].

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[4] The argument has been made that social change cannot be evaluated using the rather strict framework of project cycle management, the dominant framework in M&E in international development. Project cycle management determines outcomes before the initiative and compares the expected outcome with the real results (Lennie and Tacchi 2013). Instead of this, Lennie and Tacchi (2013) argue that it would be more reasonable to use a participatory framework which allows for flexibility in the outcome. This, in their view, would suit the idea of 'social change' better, as social change happens over time and in a non-linear way. While this might be true, it seems hard to argue that a campaign with the aim to change certain behaviour – like ending FGM or increasing voter rates - should be evaluated without taking the decrease or increase of this behaviour into account.

[5] Quite on the contrary to the simple assumption of modernisation theory, Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (2010) identified three main conditions for behaviour change: behavioural beliefs, perceived beliefs, and control beliefs. In short, people form beliefs about the positive or negative consequences of a certain behaviour, secondly they form beliefs about the approval or disapproval of important others about the behaviour, and finally, they form beliefs about helping or impeding factors when carrying out the behaviour. Thus, if a conduct is seen to bring a positive outcome, if important others

Modernisation theory also comes with a distorted view of the global South, and it was criticised for its assumption that the transition to market democracy would go in an easy and self-assembling way, bringing with it stable states, operational administrations, and a general end to poverty (Packenham 1973). In line with the argument that 'development' was in general only done to permit the West to continue its dominance over the South (Thomas 2000a), the attempt to modernise societies did not always bode well for aid recipients. Lerner hat stated that "what America is… the modernising Middle East seeks to become" (Lerner 1958, p.79), assuming a general superiority of western ways. Daya Kishan Thussu (2000, p.59) criticised early modernisation theorists for their ethnocentrism and their assumption that traditional societies wanted a modern way of life, that 'modern' equalled 'western'[6], and that tradition and modernity were mutually exclusive. Some adjustments were made. It was acknowledged that the concept of modernity and the foreign experts who communicated it were alien to the targeted societies (Beltran 1976, p.108), and development came to be seen as a process (Huesca 2003, pp.184, 185). Still, the changes made did not present a huge departure from the old paradigm (Sparks 2007, p.54). Despite this new understanding, the problems of the concept being alien and the foreign experts are still present. John Postill (2006) notes both the influence of modernisation theory and the tendency of Americanisation in the Malaysian media as late as the 1990s.

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approve of it and if it can be conducted without hindering circumstances, a person's intention to behave in this way will increase, but it is still unclear to what effect; it is unclear how much weight the different entities carry. In radio programmes for peace, work under the assumption that conflict can be overcome by providing listeners with positive role models (United States Institute of Peace no date).

[6] Daya Kishan Thussu (2010, p.59, p.203) cites the example of Islam, and especially the Iran revolution of 1979. This movement was explicitly directed against former modernisation efforts driven forward by Mohammad Reza Pahlawi, the then Shah of Iran. Although backed up by the country's political elite, the modernisation attempt still failed, and the religious leaders openly directed the revolution and the masses against western values including western forms of government (see Mohammadi and Mohammadi-Sreberny 1994).

There are also critiques referring specifically to the media as a tool for modernisation and information distribution. Media is understood to be necessary in a democracy to enable citizens to participate in governance and in society. The idea that the media indeed functions in this way has been challenged. It has been said that "the formidable amount of time that people devote to receiving mass media messages leads most observers to assume that all this exposure must be having a considerable impact on the public's thoughts, feelings, and actions" (McGuire 1986, p.175). This 'considerable impact' cannot, according to McGuire, be confirmed, neither in political campaigning nor in changing lifestyles. In more recent academic literature, it has also been confirmed that evidence for the effects of media development is hard to find (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014). Furthermore, evidence has been called invalid, as is remarked with reference to media support in the Balkans: "Failure is rarely reported or framed in a 'politically correct' language. Yet the assessments (...) claim success based mainly on activities completed ('output'). The rationale is that training was provided, therefore the project was successful" (Rhodes 2007, p.10).

2.1.2 Media development contestations

There is no doubt among practitioners of the importance of a free press in countries in transition. Shantil Kalathil, writing for the World Bank, names media "a key part of governance reform" (Kalathil 2011, p.3) and the European Center for Conflict Prevention calls media "an instrument of conflict resolution, when the information it presents is reliable, respects human rights, and represents diverse views" (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003, p.21). The United Nations routinely establishes radio stations in countries of intervention and claim that "these UN-stations have helped end violent conflict and made political transition possible" (Orme 2010, p.8). The iNGO Internews describes itself as an organisation "whose mission is to empower local media worldwide, to give people the news and information they need, the

ability to connect and the means to make their voices heard" (Internews 2015b). Deutsche Welle (DW) Akademie, Germany's agency for media development, states its goal as "to enable all people to freely inform and express themselves" (DW Akademie 2015). The importance given to the task is further apparent in a policy paper from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, where freedom of expression is named a "cornerstone of democracy and economic progress" (BMZ 2015). In general, the notions of 'freedom' and 'independence' feature prominently among practitioners. Scholars, on the other hand, have warned of the dangers of an unregulated press:

> Those who have been working on the dilemmas of statebuilding tended to argue that a considerable degree of constraint over freedom of speech was usually necessary, both, to contain violence and to promote a degree of social integration. In contrast, those who have worked as journalists or have been active in supporting media organisations tended to view censorship as counterproductive, even when it is well-intentioned." (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13).

Allen and Stremlau say that "when it comes to war zones, the 'received wisdom' seems to primarily focus on arguing that the only way to counter divisive speech is to allow for more speech, rather than to impose restrictions" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30). This, they go on, might be so because "the starting point here is the benefits of the media at 'optimal performance'- i.e. in rich democracies" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.4). A media in a rich and established democracy with a rule of law, thus a media protected by secure regulations, is indeed different from a media in an environment that does not enjoy these features. Rapid press freedom has been described as counterproductive, "from the French Revolution to Rwanda, sudden liberalisations of press freedom have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism" (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, p.6).

A related question is, to what extent, if at all, the state should be a player in media reform in a crisis state (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.10). Thus far, the state is absent from media reform. This omission is attributed to "mainstream thinking in the international community regards the role of the state in transitions" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30). Also, donors are often discordant with each other as to how a media sector reform should look. This seems to stem from the different media systems in the donor countries. The USA operates media as a business and understands the business model as a guarantor of press freedom. Many countries in northern Europe understand public media to deliver the best value as it is not under financial pressure (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The underlying question thus seems to be what makes for a free and independent press and from what should a press be independent. In the West, there is a clear division between the public and the business model to finance media. The former includes ties to either social or political groups; the latter is characterised by commercial interests. Hallin and Mancini (2004) distinguish between a liberal, a democratic corporatist, and a polarised pluralist model (Figure 1). In the current neoliberal climate, and with the liberal democratic model underpinning peacebuilding, the commercial model is usually seen as the most desirable for media development initiatives. The reason for this is the assumption that a new and assumedly weak state with new institutions needs a strong watchdog, which in turn necessarily needs to be independent of the state. In addition, the bulk of media development is financed by the US, which has a strong commercial tradition, following the rationale that "a press that is licensed, franchised or regulated is subject to political pressures when it deals with issues affecting the interests of those in power" (Kelley and Donwey 1990; Curran 2000, p.121).

	Liberal	Democratic Corporatist	Polarised Pluralist
Description	Relative dominance of market mechanism and commercial media	Coexistence of commercial media and media tied to social or political groups, including a relatively active but legally limited role of the state	Integration of media into party politics, weaker role of commercial media, but strong role of the state
Locations (example)	USA, Great Britain, and Ireland	Northern continental Europe	Mediterranean countries of southern Europe

Figure 1: Media systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.11)

Further support for the commercial system comes from a study that concluded that the countries that are the most effective economically all have strong commercial media systems (Coyne and Lesson 2009), which is also seen as having the most power to hold governments accountable[7]. The conclusion that a commercial system is the best remains questionable. First, the causal connection between economic success and a commercial media system is not proven. Many of the countries in Coyne and Lesson's data set have not a purely commercial but a mixed system. The question remains also whether the connection between the two variables is causation or merely a correlation.

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[7] An example for this is the case of Peru, where the corrupt government of Alberto Fujimori was brought down through the repeated broadcast of video footage showing one of Fujimori's main advisors bribing a leader of the political opposition. The channel showing the video was a small commercial channel, the only one not having been bribed by Fujimori's advisor. Still, this is questionable. The one TV station in Peru broadcasting the evidence of corruption did not do so because it was a commercial broadcast, but because Fujimori's advisor did forget to bribe it, or decided to do so due to the station's diminutiveness. Using the counterfactual assumption that it would have been bribed, the chances are that it would have stayed silent on the issue.

The commercial system has been criticised on various grounds. First, the emergence and strengthening of the media's bonds to the economy concerns its task as a provider of neutral information. If media, in particular news, is treated as a commodity, it loses its independence (Elliot 2001, p.262). Topics that are assumed to have no market will not be covered. Minorities are excluded. There is a fundamental and probably unsolvable contradiction between the media being a provider of independent and inclusive information which shall enable the individual to exercise public rights, and the media as an economic enterprise in which the individual is seen as a producer and consumer of goods and services (Garnham 2001, pp.246, 247).

Empirical evidence underpins these problems regarding the commercial system. In Kosovo, following the war in the 1990s, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was in charge of developing the media landscape. Following a 'the more media the better for media freedom'-approach, a plethora of commercial media was licensed. As of 2005 the media sector in the country did suffer from over-licensing of radio and TV-stations, which put stations under immense pressure to generate revenue from their efforts. This resulted in cutting payments for journalists, who left the media as soon as a better-paid option was available. The high turnover of employees led to stations being mostly staffed with inexperienced people. Media acted as a mere jukebox, playing music instead of providing information (Laue 2005). In Bosnia, a similar outcome could be observed (ICG 1997). The sheer number of media projects, too many for the size of the country, led to donor rivalry, and to a run towards every possible funding source. Nationalist media did widen the ethnic divisions in the country. Long-term strategies for developing the media were mostly absent, and the development of the media sector in Bosnia was partly named a failure (ICG 1997, p.i).

Thus far, there is little substantial evidence that media assistance as it is at present contributes positively in countries in crisis. Instead, the

positive anticipation of such initiatives seems to rest on the assumption that media, a free press, and the freedom of expression all support democracy. In industrialised countries and developed societies in the West, the benefits of free media and freedom of expression are cemented beyond any doubt. This strong belief in the benefits of media is surprising. Critical literature exists stating that the concept of the public sphere, where equals could come together for rational discussions and participate in governing (Habermas 1974), was destroyed by mass media. Mass production turned newspapers and magazines from providers of information in the interest of the public good into enterprises that serve the interests of a few powerful individuals. With regards to media as part of the toolbox of international development, statebuilding, and regime change, there is a disappointing empirical record of media initiatives.

Nevertheless, the belief in media as a supporting tool for democracies in the making and countries in transition is still going strong as is evidenced by the many media assistance projects done in the global South. This might be for once simply because of intervenors' and experts' assumptions. The power of assumptions that develop from the shared culture of western experts has been described by Séverine Autesserre (2014; 2017). It has also been noted that "left to their own devices, intervening powers will tend towards replicating their own institutions, while local populations will be inclined to opt for a system with which they are familiar, even if that system has served them poorly in the past" (Dobbins et al. 2007, p xxxiv). The same can be said about peace builders or media development practitioners. Also, global media networks and nongovernmental organisations are not above self-serving motives and conflicts of interests. Media development is foremost a market (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30), and to apply successfully for grants and funding, media organisations of the industrialised world need to convince donors not only of their expertise but also of the universal validity of the western concept of media.

In summary, media development is a contested concept. Based on modernisation theory, the aim of media interventions is to strengthen democracy by implementing a media following western understanding. This is problematic as the media in the West is not only a protector of democracy but a beneficiary thereof. Furthermore, the 'free press' is a contested concept even among international donors. Still, freedom of the press is one of the most important features in media development. Academics have, however, pointed to the need of regulations in newly emerging, weak states.

2.2 The state

When media operates in a country undergoing a statebuilding project, its position becomes complicated. Western media is seen as a cornerstone of democracy and in the West it enjoys the benefits and security a stable democracy brings with it. In a state-in-the-making, it is supposed to strengthen democracy in acting as if the rule of law and democracy were already in place when in fact they are not. This makes media vulnerable. Nevertheless, media development practitioners act with the concept of a media "'at optimal performance'- i.e. in rich democracies" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.4). In other words, they act with an 'as if'-state, without considering the present state. This part of the chapter starts by defining the modern state, which provides the background for the performance of western style media; it examines how the state came into being, why it did not emerge in non-western countries, and what the ideas and problems of statebuilding are.

2.2.1 The modern state

It has been said that "scholars have generally assumed the coherence, integrity, and autonomy of the modern state (...). They have all started with the state having a fixed set of boundaries and a unified set of rules that circumscribe its realm" (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.2). This is the

state as described by Max Weber (1919), with the main feature being the monopoly of the use of physical force[8]. The people oblige because of the legitimacy of the state – a legitimacy based on rules and bureaucracy:

> (…) by virtue of the belief in the legal validity of the statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules. In this case, obedience is expected in discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern 'servant of the state' and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him.
>
> (Weber 1918/1919, in Gerth and Mills [translated] 1946, p. 79)

The legitimacy of a state is connected to its ability to function. For a state to function it needs money, and consequently state capacity was first defined as the ability to make revenue (Tilly 1985). Later the definition was extended to the state's ability to protect property, contracts, and in general the market, and to deliver public goods (Besley and Persson 2009). These skills are inextricably interlinked. Without the means to pay no health or education system, no national defence and no justice system can be sustained; no state can fulfil its tasks[9].

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[8] „Staat ist diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes – dies: das »Gebiet« gehört zum Merkmal – das *Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit* für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht. Denn das der Gegenwart Spezifische ist: daß man allen anderen Verbänden oder Einzelpersonen das Recht zur physischen Gewaltsamkeit nur so weit zuschreibt, als der *Staat* sie von ihrer Seite zuläßt: er gilt als alleinige Quelle des »Rechts« auf Gewaltsamkeit." (Weber 1919)

[9] Economists hence often measure state capacity using economic determinants, such as income level and growth rates (Savoia and Sen 2012); and in economic research on state capacity, the presence of able institutions and quality of governance is mostly assumed (Besley and Persson 2009).This might be reasonable in research focusing on the global North; however, looking at developing and conflict countries, variables like 'corruption' and 'quality of bureaucracy' cannot and have not been left out (Baeck and Hadenius 2008). The state exercises sound management of its resources through institutions; and their presence cannot be taken for guaranteed in new and unstable states emerging from a civil war in the global South. In fact, building these institutions is a core task of the statebuilding endeavour.

2.2.2 How to make revenue

States have not many possibilities to make revenue. In principle, their only source of income is taxation. Historically, European leaders started to tax their subjects in order to be able to go to war (Brautigam 2008), or:

> Rulers were – according to this history – essentially not different from Mafiosi bandits. They sold protection – having first ensured that people needed protecting. Once they had sufficient power they redefined their activities and rewrote their past. Thus these rulers could call the protection money they raised 'tax'; and they could hide their own sordid origins behind the glamourous notion of rule by divine right. (Cramer 2006, p. 180)

The same argument is made by Tilly (1985), the same behaviour can be observed in Afghan warlords (Giustozzi 2009).

While the beginnings of taxation lie in extortionate robbery, in Europe it led later to the building of modern states with stable and capable institutions. Brautigam (2008) states that taxation was at the very heart of statebuilding. It enforced a social contract between the state and society; rulers that expected payment needed to start negotiation about the money owed with their elites. Elites stressed the provision of public goods in exchange for their tax money, and they demanded a say in government. Taxation fostered representative democracy (Brautigam 2008; Moore 2008). Furthermore, collection and administering taxes promoted a need for institutions and a numerate and literate workforce, which consequently led to the creation of a public education system. This mechanism extends the theory of the public sphere (Habermas 1974), named as the point of departure for media as a fourth estate. According to this, media informs citizenry which then holds governments accountable. Here, however, the triggering mechanism is missing; the question why people should react to a government's action is not

answered. It can reasonably be assumed that as long as no own interests are hurt or injured, action will not follow. A tax-paying and informed citizenry, on the other hand, might demand delivery of public goods and held governments accountable, simply because they have paid for services.

Weber never intended for his conceptualisation of the state to be applied beyond Europe (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.3). Indeed, the trajectory from rulers' taxes to elite demands did not occur in modern day Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. One reason for this seems to be that governments had other sources of income. In the case of Latin America, states turned to borrowing instead of taxation (Centeno 2002; Thies 2005; Brautigam 2008), which resulted in the creation of notoriously weak states:

> Latin American states have regularly failed to establish their institutional autonomy; their scale and scope remain a part of daily political debate; and their legitimacy is often called into question. We consistently also find that the Latin American state has not had the required institutional capacity to perform even a limited set of tasks. While noting some significant expectations (for example, Chile and Costa Rica) authors of every report describe a generic failure to provide the basic social services associated with a modern state.
> (Centeno 2002, pp. 2, 3)

In African states, natural resources provided income; thus proving the 'resource curse': states are less democratic when they can fall back onto natural resources for income and consequently do not have to tax their citizens. The antidemocratic effects of natural resources have been described by Chaudhry (1997), and they have been explicitly linked to a rentier-effect: states with natural resources using tax rates and high spending to dampen demands for representation and democracy (Ross 2001). Notwithstanding the failure of the concept under circumstances

other than in pastime Europe, the modern western state with its technical functionality became the blueprint for statebuilding, understood as "the strengthening of state capacity through external intervention" (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.349).

2.2.3 Statebuilding

Statebuilding has become "a core concept in international discourse and western policy" (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2008, p.349). The responsibility of states is explicitly affirmed as a guiding developmental principle, in the OECD Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2007) and in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (GHD 2013/2003). The state that shall be built or whose creation is supported is "characterised by its technical, functional nature. The state is understood as a set of institutions that can be built and strengthened by external actors, or alternatively, taken over temporarily by international administration." (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.348). Statebuilding "is a crucial issue for the world community today. Weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism" (Fukuyama 2004, p.17). The lack of state capacity, understood as the lack of functioning state institutions, has been named as the main reason behind state failure:

> Countries become failed states not because of their geography or their culture, but because of the legacy of extractive institutions, which concentrate power and wealth in the hands of those controlling the state, opening the way for unrest, strife, and civil war. Extractive institutions also directly contribute to the gradual failing of the state by neglecting investment in the most basic public services, exactly what happened in Sierra Leone. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 369, 370)

A functioning state, on the other hand, is understood "through the sheer physical force at its disposal and ultimately, through the moral power that it generates (…), the state tames or mediates the unruly differences that bring members of society into conflict and threaten their individual and collective survival and well-being" (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.5). A functioning state provides security for its citizens and for the international system. Drawing on Paris (2002), Bliesemann de Guevara (2008, p.360) points out that "international interventions contribute to the reproduction of the form and idea of the modern state". This is a consequence of the underlying idea of liberal peacebuilding. A state modelled on the image of the western state fits into global governance and is a reliable partner, while a state with no clear boundaries that does not command the monopoly of force but shares it with a multitude of small groups is a potential danger.

However, the endeavour comes with problems. Statebuilding is a social engineering process, where one system of governance is replaced with another. This is a hegemonic attempt, as "the weeks immediately following the arrival of foreign troops tend to be a time of maximum possibility. The appearance of an intervening force normally produces a combination of shock and relief in the local population. Resistance is unorganised, spoilers unsure of their future. The situation is highly malleable" (Dobbins et al. 2007, p.xxiv). Written from the intervenor's point of view, this extract seems to be about possibilities. Seen from the point of view of the intervened, it is about an alien force deciding about future governance. Paris (2002, p.305) names five "core contradictions" in the statebuilding endeavour: (1) it is intrusive thus creating a legitimacy problem, (2) local ownership can only be established through international control, (3) it promotes universal values, (4) it requires a break with the past that might lead to confrontation with the national elites, and (5) short-term and long-term objectives might be in conflict with each other. Furthermore, in societies emerging from civil war, the majority of public goods – such as education and health services – are not

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delivered by the state but by international donors and iNGOs, thus weakening the state by supporting a neoliberal conception of it (Christie 2013). Legitimacy is highly problematic: by the very presence of external statebuilders, the legitimacy of the state is threatened (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn 2013, p.222). The view that legitimacy is created through the provision of public goods has, however, also been questioned with Claire McLoughlin naming this "a leap of faith" (McLoughlin 2015, p.342). She states that the creation of legitimacy is also dependent on the population's expectations as to what the state should provide, hence linking the creation of legitimacy to local culturally grounded expectations (McLoughlin 2015).

Furthermore, problems arise from the process of intervention. Local actors are not passive recipients of aid and although the intervenors claim impartiality, statebuilding takes place in political circumstances. It either in- or excludes actors (Duffield 2001, pp.7, 8; Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, p.118, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn 2013, p.220). The external statebuilders have different perceptions and understandings and are "driven by the need to reduce complexity and to set up manageable categories, [thus] the interventionists tend to establish images of local politics based on the basis of selective interpretations of local society structures and of globalised ideas about the causes of war, terrorism and economic underdevelopment" (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.352). The shared mindset of international experts has been described (Autesserre 2014). The common cultural background of international experts and their experiences 'in the field' results in interpretations of needs assessments that point in a – probably unconsciously – pre-decided direction and consequently shape projects in that way (Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 2016).

All this results in the question what the consequences of western statebuilding are. Bliesemann de Guevara (2012, p.4) points out that

statebuilding does not result in a technically adapt, mostly western state, but rather that "state institutions tend to adopt a 'western' form under the influence of the internationalised norm, but keep functioning according to other social logics." In the case of the media, this is all the more problematic as the understanding of the external media experts and the local actors, in particular the national government, are contradictory. While the western experts come with the belief in the necessity of a free media, the national government has its legitimacy and sovereignty to defend and thus aims to keep control over the media and the international actors pressuring for a free media. It might be that the media is experiencing what Snyder (2000) describes with respect to democratisation and marketisation in fragile or failed states. These attempts led to violence instead of to peace because they unleashed competition with no institutions in place to regulate it. "Democratisation produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation not only need to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development, but they also want to avoid surrendering real political authority to the average citizen" (Snyder 2000, p.33). Thus, a vicious circle would be created with elites in a partially democratised state with hybrid institutions using their control of the media to kindle nationalism, and then referring to press freedom and claiming that nothing could be done against hate speech. In this way, the very tool implemented to strengthen democracy would be used to undermine it. At the same time, the media with its watchdog-task is a device for kindling confrontations between groups in society, including the international community as a new actor in the mix (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn 2013). As such, it seems that it cannot act the way it is intended to in a non-western state.

To summarise: the modern western state is the blueprint for today's statebuilding projects that are performed in the interest of an emerging global system and out of security interests. Still, statebuilding does not result in western states or modes of governance. Instead, the mix of different interests between local actors, different international experts,

and the citizenry leads to hybrid forms of states that might look like modern states but follow their own cultural logic. For the media this is a problematic situation and it finds itself between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Tasked to hold government accountable but without the protection a stable democracy brings it simply cannot work as it is supposed to. Furthermore, it can easily be used to incite nationalist ideas.

2.3 Groups

'Groups' is the third concept in this thesis and the second thematic field which media development supposedly affects. The idea is that "without reliable news and information, people in conflict zones have to rely on rumours; and rumour invariably spreads the distrust and stereotyping which feed war" (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003, p.7). The broadcast of objective, neutral information that supports peace (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256) and the promotion of nonviolent behaviour through mass media is thought to reduce intergroup bias and help reconciliation (Staub 2013, p.580). The evidence of this is limited. First, it cannot be predicted how attitudes change[10]. In Rwanda, listeners' perceptions of social norms were changed with a media campaign but only if people listened in a group. Furthermore, their personal beliefs did not change, which gives rise to questions about the durability of these changes (Paluck 2009). In Burundi, intergroup beliefs were changed through media intervention but obedience towards leaders was not (Bilali et al. 2015). This points to the problem that the successes of such interventions are, among other things, dependent on a tailored approach. In the remainder of this chapter I unpack the idea of media as a reconciliation tool in peacebuilding, starting with the concept of 'ethnicity', which is at the heart of the idea of media interventions targeting reconciliation and unfavourable attitudes towards another

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[10] Hameiri et al. (2014) have investigated the use of paradoxical thinking as a pathway to promote peace in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Participants were exposed to a long-term paradoxical intervention campaign, which expressed extreme ideas. The study showed that participants showed more reconciliatory attitudes afterwards.

group. Following this, I present a different psychological explanation for the building of group membership in divided societies, which would call for an alteration of media interventions.

2.3.1 What about ethnicity?

The conflict in South Sudan has been described as an ethnic conflict. Many newspaper articles or radio reports explicitly mention ethnic tensions (see, for example, BBC 2011; Maru 2013; Joak 2014; The Guardian 2015). In March 2017, the Human Rights Council of the United Nations published a report in which it explicitly warned of ethnically-based violence in South Sudan. It stated that "since the outbreak of violence in 2013, civilians have been deliberately and systematically targeted on the basis of their ethnicity by armed forces and groups" (Human Rights Council 2017, p.7). In many intrastate conflicts, ethnicity seems to be at the heart of the problem. The concept of ethnic conflict gained attention among policy makers with the Yugoslav war in the 1990s. Following the massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the term 'ethnic cleansing' came into use widely and was brought to public attention, although mass murder and forced migration to 'clean' a territory was nothing new, neither in Europe (Thum 2010) nor in the rest of the world. The genocide of the Armenians at the start of the 20th century as well as the mass killings in Cambodia in 1975 all fall under the heading of 'ethnic conflict' (Hannum 1989, p.85; Midlarsky 2005). Horowitz stated in his seminal book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* that "ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon" (Horowitz 1985, p.3), and he defined ethnicity as the sense of belonging to a group based on, among other attributes, language, religion, culture, and race (Horowitz 1985, p.53). This is arguably a rather vague listing of possible dividing factors.

'Ethnic conflict' is defined as an episode of violent conflict in which national, ethnic, and religious or other communal minorities challenge a dominant group to enhance its own status in society. The main question asked in the academic literature is why ethnic conflicts occur. One

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explanation is that "the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilisations are increasing" (Huntington 1993, p.25). This is a rather problematic statement, as more groups live peacefully with each other than engage in violent conflict. In fact, civilisation differences are not an indicator for the occurrence of violent conflict (Fox 2002; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000). Most rebellions and violent crimes occur "within rather than between communities, and so group identities appear to play a less important role" (Collier 2000, p.8.40). A second hypothesis claims a connection between the availability of resources; groups fight when they feel access to resources denied by a dominant group (Humphreys 2005). This is supported by the Robbers Cave experiments and the study of intergroup conflict (Sherif et al. 1988). Drawing on the definition given above this would, however, hardly count as ethnic conflict as the aim is not to enhance status but to secure survival. Other theories exist, including the role of religion (Fox 2004), spatial effects and contagion (Gurr 1993; Hill and Rothchild 1986), and an internal security dilemma (Roe 2005).

Although hardly shared by scholars (Varshney 2009), in policy circles, ethnic conflict was mostly seen as a consequence of a supposedly 'ancient' hate between groups, which unfortunately shared a territory. This is said to have been responsible for the late and reluctant international response to the Bosnian war. Sarajevo-based newspaper editor Kemal Kurspahic wrote that:

> At a time of crucial decisions, [President Clinton] simply read the wrong book, or more precisely, drew the wrong conclusions from 'Balkan Ghosts' by Robert Kaplan, which led to the comforting thought that nothing much could be done in Bosnia 'until those folks got tired of killing each other'. (Kurspahic 1997, p.222)

Another consequence of the essentialist view was the attempt to separate the warring parties as stipulated in the Dayton agreement (Caplan 2000; Malik 2000). The way a conflict is understood and how group identity and relations are seen, has important consequences for the way it is handled by international actors. Spitka (2016, pp.38-40) shows how the way group identity is perceived by international actors determines the intervention strategy. If group identity is seen as fluid and transformable, interventions aim at promoting transformation of hostile group identities into peaceful ones. If group identity is seen as fixed, intervention strategies aim at keeping groups apart, thus creating a 'cold peace'. It is debatable whether the idea behind the Dayton agreement was to divide regular people or political leaders. For Horowitz (1985), ethnic conflict was mainly about elites. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* hardly notes the grassroots. The view on ethnic conflicts being mainly elite-driven changed with the genocide in Rwanda. Varshney names three main forms of collective violence: riots, pogroms, and civil wars. Important for the distinction is the stance taken by the state:

> Riots refer to a violent clash between two groups of civilians, often characterised as mobs. While, in riots, the neutrality of the state may be in doubt, the state does not give up the principle of neutrality. In pogroms, typically a majority community attacks an unarmed minority, and the principle of neutrality is for all practical purposes dropped by the state. The state administration either looks away, or sides with the attacking group. (Varshney 2009, p. 279)

In Rwanda, violence took the form of riots and pogroms – the genocide was widely portrayed as having been carried out by civilians and against civilians. Mass killings were executed by ordinary people whipped into a killing frenzy by hate speech on radio stations (Shabas 2000-2001; Dallaire 2003; De la Guardia 2012). With these two events, the ethnic cleansings in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic conflict is primarily understood as grounded in hate between groups

because of different ethnicities, and as conducted by civilians against civilians. On this basic understanding, iNGOs started their work on ethnic conflicts in the mid-1990s. Examples are the iNGO Radio LaBenevolencija HTF, who names the events in Bosnia, in particular Sarajevo, as a starting point for their work (LaBenevolencija HTF no date a) and the iNGO Search for Common Ground. The latter had started their work of overcoming conflicts through media interventions during the Cold War, but opened their first office in Africa in Burundi, a neighbouring state to Rwanda that was severely affected by the Rwandan genocide and wave of refugees, in 1995 (Search for Common Ground no date). Both iNGOs use media interventions in countries experiencing the aftermath of violent conflict.

Media programmes for peace can be divided into two categories: radio dramas that aim to provide positive role models and enable listeners to choose nonviolent behaviour and factual programmes that follow the principles of peace journalism. Peace journalism has been described as:

> ...a kind of journalism and media ethics that attempts, as well as possible, to transform conflicts from their violent channels into constructive forms by conceptualising news, empowering the voiceless, and seeking common grounds that unify rather than divide human societies. (Theranian, 2002, p.79, 80)

It is:

> ...when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report and about how to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value nonviolent responses to conflict. (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256)

In both cases, programmes are aimed at people on the ground. There seems to be the assumption that if regular people can be convinced to withstand manipulations and react non-violently, this will be a step in the direction of peace. This seems to make sense, as with no foot soldiers,

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violence and fighting cannot be executed. The aim at the grassroots is probably also part of why media initiatives are attractive for international donors. There is growing consensus that local and bottom-up resolutions and measures are crucial for overcoming violence (Autessere 2010; Anderson and Wallace 2013; MacGinty and Richmond 2013; MacGinty 2014). While attentiveness to the grassroots is in general to be welcomed, attention to the local does not mean merely to implement a project on the local level. It means paying attention to the country's circumstances, customs, and culture – which is what the above-cited scholars point out. Also, the aim of making regular people resilient to manipulation would only be reasonable if a so-called ethnic conflict is indeed based on ethnic hate and carried out by civilians. This is not necessarily the case.

2.3.2 A different explanation for ethnic violence

Drawing an identity from an association with a group is standard human behaviour. Under what conditions people get attached to a group was thoroughly researched by Tajfel et al. (1979). They formulated the minimal group paradigm after assigning schoolboys randomly to one of two group based on preference for the one or the other modern painter, and although these group memberships were completely random, once assigned to a group the participants discriminated positively against their fellow group members, and negatively against members of the outgroup (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Dovidio et al. 2005). Several further social psychology experimental studies exist that show this phenomenon; the most famous one probably being the Robbers Cave experiments[11] (Sherif et al. 1988).

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[11] In 1949, 1954, and 1961, Sherif et al. (1988) conducted these experiments in a boy scouts camp in the Robbers Cave state park in Oklahoma, USA. Well-educated, non-aggressive schoolboys from stable, middle-class background were randomly assigned to two groups in the camp. Without knowing about the existence of a second group, the boys were first engaged in group building activities within their assigned groups. Although not known to each other before, they bonded quickly with their fellow group-members; and they discriminated fiercely against the other group when competition was introduced. The research aim of Sherif et al. was reason for conflict; and based on

In treating states as groups, Mercer (1995 p.230) applied the findings of social identity theory to world politics, and he makes the point that while self-interest and group egoism are unavoidable between states, violent conflict is not. A state's interest can alter[12], and alliances and cooperation are possible. This also provides an explanation for the fact that more ethnic groups live peacefully together than engage in violence and conflict:

> There is nothing inherent about ingroup processes that tend to either ill or good. Indeed, the same underlying psychological processes can lead to both good and ill. Which of these eventuates has nothing to do with the nature of either humans or groups. Rather, it has to do with choices people make about the way they define their group. (Reicher et al. 2008, p.1326)

This points towards a different explanation for so-called ethnic conflicts. People might engage in violence against another group because they feel they have something to gain from this, because they hate each other, or because they feel obliged to do so - they might follow a leader or an order[13]. There is scarcely any doubt that authority plays a role when

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the Robbers Cave experiments Sherif formulated realistic conflict theory, which names scarce resources as a cause for groups to start hostilities.

[12] An example used by Mercer (1995) is collective security. Organisations such as NATO and, to an extent, the European Union, are based on the self-interest of member states to defend themselves, and be protected from each other – the EU was explicitly formed with the idea in mind to develop economic ties with Germany so strong, that war would simply be too costly (Herz and Jetzlsperger 2008).The formation of NATO benefited additionally from the creation of the Warsaw Pact, which was understood as a mutual adversary. Cooperation in both cases was made possible by the common goal of security in military and economic terms. In the Robbers Cave experiments, Sherif et al. (1988) had already found that the introduction of superordinate goals eased tension between groups. Groups showed a tendency to cooperate once a goal was introduced which no group could reach alone. This is congruent with the remark that "in a large number of ex-colonial states, the independence rally gave way to the ethnic riot." (Horowitz 1985, p. 5)

[13] The interest on obedience to authority sparked following World War II. In 1961 Professor Stanley Milgram of Yale University started a series of experiments that resulted in his "Behavioural Study of Obedience" (1965). Milgram's obedience experiments set out to investigate people's obedience to authority and their willingness to do unknown others harm. Participants were asked to administer what they believed were progressive electric shocks on another person. They could not see this unknown

people decide on their actions. The Nazi-Propaganda broadcast during the Third Reich in Germany, and the hate speech broadcast prior to the Rwanda genocide and during the Bosnian war were all voices of authority, either government or other political elites. On the contrary, during the Nazi occupation in Bulgaria, Jews were included in the Bulgarian national identity, the ingroup, by official voices. Bulgaria became "the only case where Jews largely survived within a country that was in the pro-German camp and where, at the end of the war, there were more Jews living than before it had started" (Reicher et al. 2006). People might choose to act in one or other way depending on how trustworthy they believe the messenger is and to what extent they are free to make a decision. This reasoning is also supported by Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned behaviour (2010). People chose to act in a certain way depending on the attitude they held towards the behaviour, the approval of authority figures and important others, and the difficulties they need to overcome when engaging or refusing to engage in the behaviour. Finally, Tajfel and Turner (1979 p. 35) point out that when people feel trapped in their group status or when they cannot change their status as individuals, they show a tendency to act with their group. This also offers an explanation for group behaviour in violent conflicts other than primordial hate towards 'the Other'.

To sum up: In this part of the chapter I have first unpacked the concept of ethnic conflict. For the question of the effects of media this is important, because media supposedly contributes positively to peace and reconciliation by providing information on an assumedly feared

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other but could hear moans, screams and pleas to stop. 65% of participants went on to administer electric shocks. Milgram interpreted this as an inclination inherent in human beings to obey authority no matter what. The results of the study, however, are contested. Instead of an experiment about obedience to authority, it was also understood as an experiment about trust (Harré 1979). Participants were repeatedly told by Milgram's assistant that they had to obey, that the administering of shocks was crucial for the success of the experiment and that everything was under control; that the other person "is suffering no tissue damage" (Harré 1979, p. 105). Participants did not obey the experimenter willingly or indifferently. Instead, they showed huge signs of distress and unwillingness.

'Other' and by providing people with alternatives to violent behaviour. This, however, assumes that hate between groups, based on ethnicity, is present in the population. In the second part, I have provided different possible explanations, especially obedience to leaders, as an explanation for so-called ethnic conflict.

2.4 Conclusions

This chapter presented the assumptions on which media development acts. In summary, media is understood to be a watchdog. It holds government accountable and provides citizens with information. Thus, citizens can make informed decisions in upcoming elections. The population is expected to demand good governance and public services because they pay taxes; taxation is the trigger to hold government accountable, and media provides the information the citizenry needs. Still, this is a western understanding of the media functioning in a western state. It cannot necessarily be applied to a non-western state. In fact, statebuilding projects tend to create hybrid states that might have a western façade but follow another social logic, in which case western-led media may not contribute positively to democracy and peace. Lastly, I have argued that academics and policy makers understand the concept of 'ethnic conflict' differently. The academic literature is concerned with what triggers conflict between groups, while policy makers see the presence of different ethnic groups as the condition for violent conflict. Radio programmes for peace building purposes thus focus on the grassroots and hope to prevent and heal conflict by providing information on the perceived 'Other'. Thus, fear can be overcome, and reconciliation and peaceful cooperation become possible. Other explanations for group behaviour, however, are obedience towards leaders and the impossibility of social change. In both cases, radio programmes would be less helpful as it would be neither fear nor hate at the roots of so-called ethnic conflicts.

The following chapter explains the research design used to investigate the South Sudanese understandings of media, the state, and groups.

3 – Methodology

The previous chapter explored the ideas behind media development. This chapter details the research design. The thesis has two aims, the first being to find out what kind of answers different methods deliver when applied to the same research question. The second is to investigate the effects of media development in a country experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof. Consequently, the research design is twofold. For part one, I compare the research process and the results delivered by three different methods. Following this, the three methods are combined to provide an answer to the question regarding the effects of western-led media in South Sudan. The three methods employed are ethnographic observations, a social survey, and unstructured, in-depth interviews. In step one, the comparison, the aim is to find out what kind of answer each method delivers and how each one is distinctive. With regards to part two, there is some discussion on whether and how methods can be combined (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Ahmed and Sil 2012; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Still, the combination of different methods is neither new nor unusual; there is a fair understanding that we should apply more than one research method to a research problem, with Eugene Webb et al. (1966, p.1) especially resolute advocates of the employment of more than one method. For them, method-induced biases and cross-validation through the use of another method is the main justification. For Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1994) the use of multiple methods adds to the rigour of a scientific study (see also Flick 1992). With reference to this study, the wide scope of an exploratory inquiry in a complex environment, as well as the insights gained through the use of different methods show the importance of the use of a mode of inquiry that is not ideologically narrowed. I will now first define 'method', and then provide details of the strategies for comparison and combination. Following this, I explore the three methods employed. The chapter closes with a justification of the choice of South Sudan as a critical case.

3.1 What is a method?

Aradau et al. (2015, p.6) say that 'method' stands "for the more lowly work of putting theory into practice". Methods are foremost tools and Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (2015, p.147) name them either data gathering or data generating tools. The distinction points to either an objectivist worldview where data is "an independent exercise, like some exotic fruit just waiting for the researcher to come and discover and pluck it" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2015, p. 147) or a worldview which sees data as generated through interaction between the researcher and the researched. Subsequently, methods are generally classified as either quantitative or qualitative, the former being concerned with quantification and numbers[14], the latter with meaning and words. Both "represent different research strategies (…) that each carries with it striking differences in terms of the role of theory, epistemological issues, and ontological concerns" (Bryman 2001b, p.21).

There is disagreement about the scope of attention methods get or should get. Andrew Sayer (1992, p. 2) laments that "it is quite extraordinary to compare the attention given in social science courses to 'methods' (…) with the blithe disregard of questions of how we conceptualise, theorise, and abstract". Two decades later, it seems that not much has changed and, "methods have increasingly been placed at the heart of theoretical and empirical research in IR and social sciences more generally" (Aradau and Huysmans 2014, p.597). Contemplating what John Law (2004, p.40) described as the disciplining function of methods, however, they go on to say that "it is perhaps therefore not surprising that critical debates in IR have shifted either towards ontology or towards epistemology" (Aradau and Huysmans 2014, p. 597). This disciplining function is connected to the "claim that their [interpretivist and qualitative researchers] scholarship is neither rigorous nor

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[14] Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2015) point out that the term 'qualitative' was mainly used as a counter-distinction to 'quantitative' methods but that increasingly the term is not capturing the full range of what they name 'interpretive' methods.

objective" (Yanow, 2015, p.98). Besides the rebuff of qualitative research, this accusation also indicates that if research is not executed in an exactly defined way of engaging its tools, then it is neither rigorous nor objective, and hence not research.

Law argues for a more open, generous methodological view that acknowledges that a complex world cannot be grasped by strict, standard social science research. He states that "methods, their rules, and even more methods practices, not only describe but also help to *produce* the reality that they understand [emphasis in original]" (Law, 2004, p. 5). The argument that methods are performative is also made by Aradau and Huysmans (2014, p.598) who say that methods:

> (...) are not simply techniques of extracting information from reality and aligning it with – or against – bodies of knowledge. Methods are instead within worlds and partake in their shaping. As performative, methods are practices through which 'truthful' worlds are enacted, both in the sense of being acted upon and coming into being.

This is the starting point of my investigation. If methods are performative and within worlds, then they should react with the environment in which they are unleashed. This should result in the creation of different 'worlds', showing distinctive answers to the research question. These worlds must not necessarily be contradictive, they can be complementary; the question is if, and if, how, they are distinctive of each other. I will now explore the two designs; one for comparing, the other for combining.

3.2 Comparing and combining

Part one of the research design (Figure 2 below) is the comparison of worlds produced by the three research methods. As will be detailed below, these three methods originate from different research traditions.

Observations are underpinned by ethnography, the survey is quantitative, and the interviews qualitative. While observations and interviews share, to an extent, ontological beliefs and epistemology, the same is not true for the survey (Bryman 2001b, p.20). For the comparison, this does not matter. The aim of the comparison is to investigate whether different methods provide distinctive answers and enact different worlds. The use of three methods underpinned by different strategies and traditions strengthens this design. Each method investigates the three concepts of 'media', 'the state', and 'groups'. 'Media' explores how media is understood in South Sudan compared to the western tradition. It looks at media's history and, where possible, examines how much of a part of everyday life media is in South Sudan. This allows conclusions about the first assumption in media development: media is a tool with the power to reach people on the ground and initiate behaviour change (Hume 2004; Bonde 2006; Orme 2010). 'The state' is shorthand for the investigation of the second assumption: through media democracy is strengthened and the government is held accountable, which increases trust in the state and its institutions (Hyden and Leslie 2003, p. 5). 'Groups', finally, stands as an umbrella term for people's interethnic attitudes, but also for the relationships between the government and the people and the government and the international community. This is to investigate the third assumption: through reliable, neutral and peace-oriented reporting fears against 'the Other' can be quelled and reconciliation becomes possible (Galtung, 1998, p.97; Bonde 2006; Himelfarb and Chabalowski 2008; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256).

The comparison of methods makes a contribution to the literature on knowledge production concerning statebuilding and conflict management or conflict resolution. It shows that methods are not innocent tools but affect the research outcome. Policy and policy-relevant research in this realm often face the problem that they need to prove a point or show that a project succeeded (Rhodes 2007;

Bliesemann de Guevara 2014). The 'grey literature' (Stremlau 2014, p.4) of project reports provides a basis for assumptions about the effects and the usefulness of policy interventions, here the media. The comparison of three methods shows that method choice is political in that a method can be chosen to produce the result preferred[15].

Phase 1:

Figure 2: Research design, part 1

Turning to the second part of the research design (Figure 3 below), I combine the three methods to determine what the effects of western-led media in South Sudan are and what they are not. There is some discussion about the combination of research methods. Besides some profound critique of social science research, Webb et al. (1966, p.1) have one fundamental criticism on the way research methods are applied: "*the principal objection is that they are used alone*" [emphasis in original]. Webb et al. might be early with this criticism but they are certainly not alone. Evan S. Lieberman (2005) proposed the combination of statistical analysis on a large-*n* with an in-depth investigation of one or more cases drawn from the large sample with the rationale that the two strategies "can inform each other to the extent that the analytic payoff is greater

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[15] See also Denzin (2009) on the politically initiated and underpinned paradigm troubles.

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than the sum of the parts. Not only is the information gleaned complementary, but also each step of the analysis provides direction for approaching the next step." (Lieberman 2005, p.436). Opposing this, Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil (2012, p.936) argue that the combination of methods can only be used to validate and triangulate results, if the methods employed share ontological beliefs. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994, p.3) focus on epistemology instead of ontological beliefs and state that "the two traditions [quantitative and qualitative methods] appear quite different; indeed, they sometimes appear to be at war. Our view is that these differences are mainly ones of style and specific technique. The same underlying logic provides the framework for each research approach." This is rejected by Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2012, p.1), who state that the two traditions "contrast across numerous areas of methodology, ranging from type of research question, to mode of data analysis, to method of inference." The same point, even further driven, is made by Norman Denzin, who shows the divide in writing about interpretive interactionism and stating that this "is based on a research philosophy that is counter to much of the traditional scientific research tradition in the social science" (Denzin 2001a, p. 1).

Nonetheless, four strategies for applying more than one method to a research question can be used. Bricolage is the fusion of disciplines, methodologies, and theories, resembling the work of the *bricoleur*, a French craftsman who uses what is at hand to fabricate an object (Lévi-Strauss 1966, p.11). The intellectual bricolage is the "combination of multiple methods, empirical materials, perspectives and observers in a single study [and is] best understood, then, as a strategy that adds rigour, breadth, and depth to any investigation" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p.2). Writing in the Sage Handbook of Qualitative Methods (1994) and lamenting the "academic and disciplinary resistance to qualitative research" (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.4), it is not entirely clear to what extent they see quantitative methods as a possible part of bricolage. Still,

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survey research is named as used by qualitative researchers (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p.3). Furthermore, the *bricoleur* uses what is 'at hand' (Lévi-Strauss 1966, p.11) and the description of bricolage as an experiment "to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely invisible" (Aradau et al. 2015, p.7) can be understood to include quantitative data. Analytic eclecticism, on the other hand, places the emphasis on the analysis. It "seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms and interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms, but that address related aspects of substantive problems" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, p.10). As such, it does not share the aims of either triangulation or multimethod research, but instead it aims at explaining policy-relevant phenomena focusing on theoretical constructs that are normally enacted in different paradigms. The aim of triangulation is to overcome method-induced bias, increase validity, and provide multiple perspectives. It is the application of multiple methodologies to study one phenomenon (Denzin 1970; Jick 1979). Finally, mixed methods "use qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis techniques in either parallel or sequential phases" (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, p.11). A main difference of the strategies is thus whether a combination of methods is used to strengthen one finding, like triangulation, or to illuminate a research problem that is understood to be more complex[16]. This is the case for bricolage or eclecticism. As my aim is to study a complex question in-depth, the approach to combining methods is that of the *bricoleur*. Bricolage illuminates the context of a question; it is by definition exploratory. It is not so much solely answering a research question but exploring a research area. In this thesis, this was most apparent when the results of observations and of the survey directly contradicted each other.

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[16] Suda Perera's (2017) account of what she calls 'Bermuda Triangulation' illustrates the functioning and usefulness of a research project informed by bricolage. Perera gained valuable and unforeseen insights into how people understand reasons of conflict in the DRC through embracing the different knowledge claims and investigating them with different perspectives.

Embracing this messiness and questioning further the reason behind this contradiction allowed valuable insights about South Sudanese social reality and doing research in South Sudan to surface. A research approach other than the bricolage would either have failed to uncover this or would have dismissed one method's result as simply false.

The problem of compatibility of research paradigms remains, most notably the question whether reality is objectively measurable or socially constructed. The answer to this question necessarily affects the epistemic practices employed. However, Charles B. Teddlie and Abbas M. Tashakkorie (2003, p.xiii) list six different positions, including a pragmatic, a-paradigmatical stance that advocates the view that in real world practice methods can be seen as independent from epistemology, a view that had been also put forward before on the basis that "questions about methodology (...) ought not to be framed in a way that installs abstract epistemology as a tyrant" (Howe 1988, p.15). Aside from the pragmatic stance and the illumination of a research area that asks for a *bricoleur* approach, my justification for the combination of methods is that a complex problem is not only offering room for answers from the qualitative and the quantitative perspective, it demands answers from both. The incompatibility of qualitative and quantitative methods is in general rejected by Berth Danermark et al. (2002, p.151). They state that "this discussion and polarisation is not only fruitless, but that it is also misleading to oppose the quantitative to qualitative method", and they name as one justifying purpose "the use of quantitative method to examine how common a certain phenomenon is" (Danermark et al. 2002, p. 154). This is the case here; by definition, mass media is thought to work on the masses. If it cannot reach them, it can hardly be effectual. An investigation into its effects or lack thereof without examining how widespread these effects are would be incomplete.

Phase 2:

Research question: What are the effects of media development campaigns in a post-conflict country of the global South?

Method 1 (Ethnography	Method 2 (Surveys)	Method 3 (Interviews)

Answer 1	Answer 2	Answer 3

Answer

Figure 3: Research design, phase 2

The next part of this chapter provides the justification for the selection of South Sudan as the case.

3.3 Case selection and settings

Case study research is described as "an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalise across a larger set of units" (Gerring 2004, p.342). Barbara Czarniawska defines a case study as "a study of the occurrence of a phenomenon – a chain of events, usually limited in time, usually studied retrospectively" (Czarniawska 2014, p.21). They have been described as "intensive analysis and descriptions of a single unit or system bounded by space and time" (Hancock and Algozzine 2017, p.9). The term "has been used in a variety of different ways, not all of them clear" (Platt 2007, p.100). One question is whether a case study is a study based on one case or the comparison of more cases. Platt names the latter rather common, but points to the need for a previously agreed research

design and coordination of the cases (Platt 2007, p.107). Following a period of blatant reproach (see Flyvbjerg 2006), case studies are today seen as more useful. It has been said that "case studies are essential for description, and are therefore, essential to social science" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, p.44). One particular strength was mentioned in that they "allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure." (George and Bennett 2005, p.19). Despite this praise, Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) still identifies "five misunderstandings", with the two main accusations being the presumed impossibility to generalise from it and to generate context-independent knowledge. With regards to generalisation, Flyvbjerg rejects the notion that it is impossible to generalise from the case study. Quite the opposite, he states that case studies are well suited to counter general claims because of the in-depth knowledge they provide: "Falsification is one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected." (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 228). Concerning the production of context-independent knowledge and the general superiority of such over context-dependent knowledge, Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba (2000, pp.31, 32) point out that human knowledge is rapidly updated and that because of these changes generalising is impossible. Lee Cronbach (1975 p.125) says that "when we give proper weight to local conditions, any generalisation is a working hypothesis not a conclusion."

The two phases of the study employ both case study strategies. I compare three different methods to establish whether research methods act with the environment or are context-independent, mere technical data collection tools, and I also investigate the effects of media in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. Thus, at first the methods are the cases. They took place over a limited time in a certain environment, and their acting and outcome were intensely studied. The three cases – observation, survey

research, and interviews – were chosen partly because of their popularity. Jaber Gubrium et al. (2012, p.1) have noted that "the interview remains unquestionable a staple of social-scientific research", and it has been estimated that as much as 90% of social sciences research employ interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, p.1). The importance of, but also the troubles with, collecting numbers in countries of the global South have been identified by Martin Bulmer (1993, pp.3-5). Unstructured interviews and survey research are not only common methods used to investigate countries of the global South and policy projects such as media development initiatives, but they also present methods from both sides of the qualitative/quantitative divide. Ethnography is becoming more and more popular in IR, and it offers again a different underpinning methodology. All three methods work through direct contact with the South Sudanese, which was important. South Sudan is a severely underdeveloped country, which ruled out text- or document analysis. While I draw on some documents - namely the constitution and some newspaper articles in the observations part – in a more oral society direct contact is superior to the analysis of the relatively few documents and written texts. Experiments have also been ruled out for this study. They are sometimes conducted in media effects research[17] (Livingstone 1996) to negotiate the causality problem: Does a research participant become interested in politics and the running of her country because she listens to the radio, or does she listen to the radio because she was interested in politics and governance in the first place? To negotiate this problem, radio programmes have been broadcast to an experimental group and a control group and attitudes have been measured with a questionnaire or focus group discussion before and following the broadcast. This has been ruled out here as it creates a highly artificial environment. More often than not, participants are

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[17] 'Media effects' in media and communication studies refers to events or consequences that occur as a result of media influence or exposure (Perse 2001; Potter 2012). The focus is on what people do or think because of something they saw or heard in media. In this thesis, I am investigating the effects a specific concept of media – the western concept - has in South Sudan.

drawn from a very small pool - the so-called listening groups, with whom the implementing organisations are regularly working. Participants then know what the 'right' answer is, and they give this 'right' answer. Transportation costs are typically paid for in these settings, and food is normally provided. In the usually shattered economies of countries in crisis, participating in research is a welcomed chance to earn, which makes a participant even more likely to provide the answer the researchers want to hear. This problem was overcome by interviewing or questioning people repeatedly and in naturally occurring settings.

South Sudan, finally, was chosen because the young country presented an exciting case study. It is what Flyvbjerg (2006) names a critical case; and it is well suited for drawing conclusions from a single case. In his defence of case study research, Flyvbjerg (2006, p.230) states that the choice of a critical, extreme, or atypical case might reveal more information on underlying causes of the phenomena. Furthermore, those cases help to identify wrong generalisations. The reasoning is that if a theory cannot be confirmed although the case offered the best possible circumstances for endorsement, it is very likely that the theory will never be valid. Media development is expected to support peace and citizens' participation in politics through fair and balanced reporting. South Sudan seceded from Sudan following a yearlong civil war and a popular vote on the secession. The referendum took place in January 2011. Over 97% of voters took part in the referendum, and of those over 98% voted for the secession (SSRC/SSRB 2011). With this overwhelming approval, it was assumed that agreement to the new state and government and unity among the groups in the new country would be a given. The UN and the international community saw South Sudan as a country in need of development, not as a country in need of conflict management. Western media development should have had a field day in the country; but instead of national unity and a relatively easy process of statebuilding, all hell broke loose with the outbreak of internal conflict in December 2013. South Sudan is hence well suited for studying the effects of media

development, or lack thereof. Furthermore, South Sudan has a plethora of media operating within its borders. The study took place in Juba. While community radio stations exist in the provinces, the majority broadcast in the capital where logistics are a lot easier to handle. Only Juba offered the possibility to investigate the effects of differently financed and managed media. Figure 4 provides an overview of the radio stations of importance in this thesis.

	Description	Aim	Financed	Premises	System
Radio Miraya	UN-radio, only nationwide programme. International expats in management, local journalists	Informing the population and enabling political participation	United Nations	UNMISS-compound, access thus restricted	Part of and subjected to directives from UNMISS' public information department
Eye-radio	Run by iNGO Internews. International expats in management positions	Informing the population with the goal to enable political participation	Internews / USAID, sells airtime	Secure compound on the outskirts of Juba	At the moment an iNGO-project, shall become commercial in the foreseeable future
Bakhita Radio	Run by the church in South Sudan. Aims are behaviour change and evangelisation. Local employees	Evangelisation, and informing and educating the population in order to promote behaviour change and participation in governance	Part of the Diocese of South Sudan. In addition selling of air time	Open compound in the city center	Affiliated with the church
SS-TV / Radio	Government-owned. South Sudanese employees	To communicate the government's opinion to the population	Government funds	Open compound in the city center	Government-owned and thus subjected to the government's directive
Voice of America	VoA is the official external broadcaster of, and funded by, the US-government,	Regime change	US-govern-ment	unknown	Has been named a propaganda tool (Uttaro, 1982)

others	Some small stations: (Dream and Classic FM, Liberty Radio)	Unclear, but mostly to make money	Selling airtime, donor money if they can get funds	Houses in the city	Commercial, media as business. Donor money if possible.

I will now provide detailed accounts of the three chosen methods and how they were applied.

3.4 Methods

Data were collected in Juba between November 2014 and August 2015. This period included a break of two months in February and March 2015; the fieldwork spell thus was eight months long. During this time I also worked as project coordinator for the Dutch NGO 'LaBenevolencija HTF' and as a part-time lecturer at Juba University. Both occupations allowed for further insight into South Sudanese everyday life[18].

The aim was not to measure a predefined effect on the listener. Instead, I look at various parts of social reality in South Sudan and conclude from there whether, and if so, what, kind of an effect media can possibly have. First, assuming that media indeed has an effect, to work its magic it would need listeners. I thus ask if it can reach an audience in everyday life on a relatively regular basis and in a fairly easy way. Second, detached from asking about a particular media station, I examine how people understand (a) government and (b) media; and I compare these understandings with what I name in short 'the watchdog concept': the tasks and activities of liberal, 'western' media. Lastly, I examine group

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[18] Although 'LaBenevolencija HTF' is utilising radio for their work, there was no conflict of interest. I was in South Sudan at the start of their programme, my work was entirely organisational, mostly consisting of opening up an office, finding national employees and organising the registration of the organisation as an iNGO in South Sudan. Insights presented in this thesis are to an extent also based on two former stays in the country. I was working in South Sudan's Upper Nile state for a French NGO in September and October 2012 and from April 2013 to August 2013 for a German organisation in Jonglei.

relations in the country in asking about people's circle of friends and their opinion about the conflict in formal interviews and in everyday life chats. The three methods I use are thus the subject of analysis, but they also are expected to provide an answer to the question of media effects, and in working with the three different methods, I add both perspective and weight to the argument. Also, in working above and across dogmatic paradigms, there is the possibility of stumbling over what Webb et al. (1966, p.2) named "measures that do not require the cooperation of a respondent and that do not themselves contaminate the response". These measures avoid the problems caused by the researcher's very presence (Webb et al. 1966; Kellehear 1993; Lee 2000). To find and understand these connections and possible measurements one needs to be familiar with the environment. Because of this, ethnography emerged as the backbone for the other methods and of this thesis. Beginning with this, I now present rationale, settings, and processes of analysis for each of the methods I applied.

3.4.1 Ethnography

The name of this subchapter is a bit of a misnomer, due to the contested character of ethnography. Martin Hammersley andPaul Atkinson (2007, p.1) say that "there is considerable overlap with other labels, such as 'qualitative inquiry', 'fieldwork', 'interpretive method', and 'case study'". Ethnography has been defined as a methodology with participant observation its preferred method (Bray 2008, p.295). Alan Bryman (2001b, p.291) states that the term ethnography refers "to both a method of research (…) and the written product of the work". Finn Stepputat and Jessica Larsen (2015, p.5) understand ethnography as "a collective term for method and methodology, that is, data collection techniques on the one hand and the consideration of epistemological and ontological issues in the research process on the other." (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, p.5). It is a holistic approach whose "value lies in the flexible process by which it takes place" (Bray 2008, p.295), its tasks have been described as "the description and interpretation of the meaning particular groups of

people (cultures) make from their interaction with the world around them: how they understand the world" (Mitchell 2007, p.61), and it has been named a fitting "approach for studying meanings and effects of policies" (Stepputat and Larsen (2015, p.5). In "the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily life for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said and/or asking questions (…) in fact gathering whatever data are available" (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p.3), they draw conclusions about the phenomena under study. The focus is on 'being there' and studying people in their natural habitat, and attempting a "comprehensive understanding" (Agar 1980, p.2) by gathering a multitude of data in a relatively unstructured way on usually small cases (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p.3).

For this thesis, the appeal of ethnography lay in its flexibility that allowed to incorporate multiple data (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Bray, 2008, pp.304, 305; Schatz 2009). Observations, to a small extent documents, informal chats, and insights gained through personal experience[19] can all be used. It has been said that "arguably, the best way to understand an activity, and the ideas or incentives that motivate it, is for the researcher to engage in it him- or herself" (Gerring 2012, p. 176). A similar point is made by John van Maanen (2011, p.1). If the importance of context is accepted and if methods perform in an environment, it follows that a researcher needs to gain an understanding of the environment. Ethnography means an immersion into the environment. It came into being carrying the promise of understanding social reality by coming into close contact with people in their everyday life. There was an objectivist worldview behind it; with researchers believing that there was one independent reality that could be described and explored. A strand of ethnographic research, however, early on supported the idea

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[19] To give just one example: The availability of electric power was such a normality for me that the experience of repeated power outages and a fuel shortage were necessary to understand that there might be a major hindrance for media to become a part of everyday life.

that people construct their social worlds (see, for example, Blumer 1969, Geertz 1984). By observing, listening and participating in a situation, important insights are gained.

Using ethnography in politics, although it originates in anthropology and is concerned with culture, is not a new endeavour. Edward Schatz says that "ethnographic approaches have long informed political science – albeit from the margins – and especially so among those comparativists who conduct field research abroad" (Schatz 2009, p.3). The reason behind this is that a political science, or an International Relations, that investigates 'the abroad' – issues important between and within countries, nation states, and the people that make these up – needs an ethnographic understanding. "If the study of justice, freedom, democracy or order is to mean anything, it must take into account individuals' lived experience and how they perceive these abstractions" (Schatz 2009, p.10). Schaffer (2016) makes a similar point when he says that concepts cannot be transferred from one context to another but need elucidation. Stepputat and Larsen (2015, p. 4) point out that "closely associated with the study of context and conceptualisation, ethnography can help to show how the encompassing, abstract and mobile templates of global policies are articulated in contingent, unstable and messy interrelationships that make up the 'lives' of policies." Ethnography makes a contribution to understanding the effects of media in a country of the global South that was important in itself but also for the conduct of the social survey and for the understanding of the unstructured interviews. With its naturalistic, holistic, and flexible approach it is a fitting approach for the question of the effects of western-led media in a non-western country.

The increasing popularity of ethnography in IR (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, p.4) is apparent in the growing literature on the 'ethnographic turn' (Vrasti 2008; Murray Li 2011; Sande Li 2013). This notwithstanding, there is also considerable criticism. Wanda Vrasti

(2008, p.279) accused IR-ethnographers that "the complexity of ethnography has been reduced to (1) an empiricist data-collection machine, (2) a writing style, or (3) a theoretical sensibility." (Vrasti 2008, p.279). She argues that ethnography has been used as a band aid, without paying attention to the criticism that has been phrased in its native discipline, anthropology, and without consideration of its underlying political principles. Being rooted in anthropology, ethnography has been connected and criticised for its colonial stance (Said 1978; Pels and Salemink 1994; Steinmetz, 2003). Although today's political ethnographers describe it as "an approach that cares" (Schatz 2009, p.5), the question to what extent ethnography is still bound to hegemonic intentions is reasonable, in particular when research is conducted on questions of peace interventions[20]. This is a value-laden question, but eventually one that is necessary for all research. Ethnography might, because of its history and origins, be more sensitive to it than other approaches, leading to greater reflexibility.

Ethnography took place in three main and some minor sites: First, at Juba University, where I was teaching a class in the Department of Mass Communication; second, in a small corner shop close to my apartment where I played chess on a regular basis with neighbours and customers[21]; and third in a local bar also in the neighbourhood. There were also hundreds of additional encounters with South Sudanese: driving to my office or the university, rummaging in local bookstores, or grocery shopping on Konyo Konyo market. Ethnography took place in

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[20] In my defence, this thesis investigates to what extent media development, which is grounded in modernisation theory and the belief of the West's superiority (see chapter 2), fulfils its surely good intentions in a country of the global South. The intention behind this was to find out if, and if, how, media development can be done in a way that suits the country where it is done.

[21] A more precise, but also more embarrassing way to describe my activity would be: Where I played and spectacularly lost at chess on a regular basis, I do not enjoy losing, but the regular chess games provided a wealth of insights into my partners' thoughts and impressions. The participation in an everyday life activity turned me from a stranger and a researcher into a partner, a neighbourhood acquaintance. My chess skills are mediocre at best, and following the chess experience in South Sudan, I have given up the idea that I ever will improve as a chess player. Notwithstanding this, the activity of playing while researching seems to be promising as a research method.

some open and some closed systems (Bell 1969, p.418). Most notably, the university was a closed system, whereas the local market, the bar, and the corner shop were all public places and thus open systems. Still, in the bar and the corner shop access had to be gained. Everyone could enter these places but in order to start my research I needed to be accepted as a neighbour, a chess player, and an acquaintance. Colin Bell's (1969) classification is thus not clear-cut. This indefiniteness was also present when thinking about my role in the field. According to Raymond Gold (1958), participant observation can be categorised as complete participation; the participant as an observer, the observer as participant, and complete observer. Herbert Gans (1968) classifies participant observers as a total participant, researcher-participant, and total researcher. The levels of detachment behind these categories oscillated between the total observer and total participant. When I was visiting the local bar, I was sometimes meeting acquaintances, giving me a status more towards the 'total participant' end of the spectrum; sometimes I was consciously just observing; and sometimes I was waiting for an opening to participate in a chat. These changes in position were also present at the university and at the shop. While I had roles there – as a lecturer and a neighbour and chess partner – at times, I was fully engaged and immersed in my role, while at others I mainly observed. Bryman (2001b, p.305) classifies field notes as mental notes, jotted notes or full field notes. While being on the scene, my focus was always on the experience, and my notes were always mental notes. I wrote full, narrated field notes when I was back in the privacy of my apartment.

My 'life as an ethnographer' was not a 24/7-affair. I engaged the relatively short time of roughly eight months with the field, and I was not constantly involved in a local setting. I lived in an apartment house for international expats; I lived an expat lifestyle in a place where foreigners "exist in cosseted bubbles, living and interacting only with those who

share their nationality or language" (Mayberry 2017)[22]. A total immersion in the South Sudanese lifestyle would have carried the danger of losing my eye for the details of South Sudanese life, as these details would have become my normality (Bryman 2001b, p.100). Ethnography has been named an "arrogant enterprise" (Agar 1980, p.41) because of the claim of understanding another's culture or practice after a relatively short period of time. Personally, I find the idea of claiming an understanding about another's everyday life without sharing it to an extent more arrogant. Furthermore, maintaining a place on the side line has its merits, as "all ethnographers have to resist the very ready temptation to try to see, hear, and participate in everything that goes on. A more selective approach will normally result in data of better quality, provided the periods of observation are complemented by periods of productive recording and reflection" (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p.37). I have found that experiencing the divide between the two lifestyles rather sharpened my eye for the contrast. Checking into one of Juba's popular expat hang-outs like James Hotel, with its constant electricity supply, whirling fans, music, and ice cubes in the drinks felt different when coming from dinner at a South Sudanese friend's place where drinks were cooled with a giant ice block we had bought, and where cooking was done on a kitchen fire.

My ethnographic experience in Juba with its three fieldwork sites connects to questions that have entered ethnography only recently. Traditionally, fieldwork was understood to take place in a relatively closed area; it was bound in time and space (Mitchell 2007, p.63).

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[22] The hardships of living conditions in South Sudan are well known to me from former fieldwork spells in Jonglei and Upper Nile state. I am certain that diving into a South Sudanese living experience 24/7 would not have helped but hindered data collection, as at least half of my time I would have been busy with the organisation of basic living needs. This would have seriously limited the time for observing and writing field notes. It made more sense to maintain an expat lifestyle and dive into South Sudanese social life on a regular basis. Besides this, due to health and safety reasons 'living native' was not an option to consider seriously, as Juba was experiencing a Cholera outbreak during my stay. Water is brought from the Nile and bought and sold in the streets, and there is no clear allocation of containers and vans to either 'water' or 'sewage'.

Increasing processes of globalisation made identifying such a 'bounded field' complicated (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, p.6). In consequence, the concept of multi-sided fieldwork was introduced with ethnography moving out "from the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meaning, objects, and identifies for itself an object of study that cannot be accounted for ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation" (Marcus 1998, p.79, 80). The effects of media can hardly be observed in a single location. It certainly can be observed how media is *produced* in the radio stations in Juba, but how people *understand* media is unobservable. My approach was thus to participate in people's everyday life and to try to understand how they interpret the rather abstract concepts of the media itself, and the two issues media is supposedly working on: the state and group relationships in the country. This rather encircling approach has become more widespread in political science and IR in the past (Kubik 2009, p.40; Weden 2009, p.84, 85).

In summary, ethnography, understood as both a methodology and a method, was chosen because of its focus on long-term observation and immersion in the everyday life of a people. With this, it produces empirical data usually lost by methods with a more short-term, on-the-spot focus, such as interviews and surveys. By focusing on everyday life and people's interpretation of the thematic fields media is supposed to improve, ethnography is a fitting approach to answer the question about media's effects in South Sudan. Furthermore, it is a contrasting approach for the comparison of methods.

3.4.2 Survey research

"Quantification is seductive. It offers concrete, numerical information that allows for easy comparison and ranking of countries, schools, job applicants, teachers, and much else" (Merry 2016, p.1). Furthermore, quantitative social research is "concerned with cause – with questions, whether some intervention works" (Turner 2007, p. 121). Surveys are

tools to produce quantitative descriptions of people's demographics, their attitudes and beliefs, and their actions and behaviour (Fowler jr. 1984; Balnaves and Caputi 2001). They are mainly categorised as public opinion polls, attitude surveys, or surveys that obtain factual information (Weisberg and Bowen, 1977). The differences, however, are not clear-cut. It has been detailed that "almost every survey seeks some factual data" (Weisberg and Bowen 1977, p. 4), and attitude surveys ask quite often for opinions. The survey I have conducted collects basic demographic information, such as age, gender, and tribal affiliation, and it asks for respondents' opinion on e.g. the media's neutrality, the government's work, and journalists' education. Finally, it inquires the attitudes people hold towards people from another tribe[23]. It thus has elements from all categories. Still, the aim is to find out about people's attitudes towards their government and people from other tribes, and whether these are correlated to a preference for the one or the other radio station. An attitude, as opposed to an opinion, is defined as "a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols" (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, p.150). This is not an unproblematic definition, as it is unclear for how long an opinion must be held to count as 'relatively enduring'. Still, surveys always gather data at a particular moment in time. The emphasis here is thus firstly on the 'organisation of beliefs' and second on the social significance (Hogg and Vaughan 2005). The questionnaire thus included not just one but a number of questions surrounding the attitudes towards government and people from other tribes, and it did not ask narrow questions. To give an example, there is no question asking 'Do you think President Kiir is doing a good job', instead the question is 'Do you think the government is working in the best interest of all South Sudanese?'

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[23] The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.1.

Media development is done with the aim to strengthen democracy and add to the legitimacy of a government, and to contribute to reconciliation. It is thus done to strengthen a positive attitude towards the state and the government and towards people from a different tribe than one's own. An attitude survey is thus a suitable method to investigate what attitudes on these two matters respondents hold. As I have stated before, one of the main problems of researching media effects is establishing the link between a preference for a radio station – or listening to radio at all – and an attitude or belief system. This is why survey research is a dominant method when it comes to media effects[24]. Measuring preferences and attitudes is easier done with a questionnaire than establishing them through interviews. Conclusions about the scope of a phenomenon in the population are possible. Even more importantly, a link between the two can be established with (for example) a simple correlation. This by no means denotes the establishment of a causal relationship, but it is at least a start even if doubts remain about the veracity of such results with regards to causality (Gunter 2000). Lastly, the quantitative approach with its focus on measurements and objectivity is still understood to be the traditional and scientific approach to research in political science (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). It comes, as Sally Engle Merry (2016, p.1) and Theodore Porter (1995) both have pointed out, with the air of objectivity and thus trustworthiness.

The above notwithstanding, there are problems. When research is conducted in developing countries, specific problems are acknowledged. Bulmer (1993) says that:

> A major issue in the use of social science methods to provide social data for Third World governments is: how can such methods produce data which those who use the data can trust? Do the procedures and techniques used give an adequate

[24] See, for example, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1994) on measurements of media effects on public opinion and Dietram Scheufele (1999) on framing. Steven Chaffee and Joan Scheuder (1986) conducted a longitudinal study on attention to media news.

picture of the state of society (or one aspect of it) at the time of the study? (p. 4)

Often, numbers collected in countries of the global South are of poor quality.[25] A major problem is correct sampling – drawing a subset from the population that resembles it on key characteristics as closely as possible (Fowler jr. 1984; Weisberg and Bowen 1977; Sapsford 1999). Drawing a probability or simple random sample is desirable for accuracy and generalisability but they require knowledge about the population to be studied (Weisberg and Bowen 1977) and in the case of countries of the global South, a census does not necessarily exist. Another problem to overcome is bias (Weisberg and Bowen 1977; Fowler 1984). Finally, "accuracy limitations" (Zarkovich 1993, p.103) need to be considered, such as misunderstandings, confusions, and errors because concepts are understood differently by researchers and respondents.

Despites all these hurdles, two main points remain. Surveys show the scope of a phenomenon, and no other method used here can do this. Also, questions regarding media preference, media consumption time, and attitudes towards the topics of interest can be asked and answered directly. This is problematic, as - especially when it comes to self-reporting on media consumption time - it is highly likely that answers are mere guesses (Slater 2004). Still, the statement of a long media consumption time indicates that a respondent understands media as important. Furthermore, with surveys it is possible to establish a link between preferences for a radio station with the attitudes one wants to investigate. Thus, valuable information and insights can be yielded by

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[25] This question is further elaborated on by Morten Jerven (2013) who shows how poor numbers have misled understanding of economic development in Africa. One of the benefits of using quantitative research designs is that it shows the scope of a problem or an issue. How widespread a phenomenon is can hardly be answered by qualitative research. However, if the data on which results are based are of poor quality this advantage vanishes into very thin air. Jerven's (2013) account gives examples why data collected in developing nations are often poor. Sometimes they are just estimates as collecting data and being in the field earns employees in national statistic offices allowances while organising and analysing the numbers does not. This leads to many fieldtrips but hardly to organisation and analysis of data.

survey research. Surveys are also the 'bread and butter' in international development practice, with donors requiring answers that are objective, scientific, transparent, and which can be held to a global standard (Merry 2016). The use of quantitative data to answer a policy-relevant question – about the effects of media development campaigns in a country of the global South – is justified.

Data were collected in December 2014 for the first survey and in July 2015 for the second survey[26]. Prior to the first data gathering, the questionnaire was run through a panel of experts – a group of three South Sudanese nationals. Following this, a small pilot of 20 questionnaires was run, and in consequence, some questions were rephrased. Despite the execution of a pilot study, there were massive problems with the data from the first survey, which led to the execution of the second survey six months later. A detailed account of this will be given in chapter 5. In brief, the problems I encountered were caused by power relations and missing knowledge about context and social rules that governed the environment. The insights needed to navigate this particular minefield were not available to me before I had heard the 'click'; and I could not have gathered this knowledge by the execution of the pilot study. A longer stay, observation, and trial and error were necessary. The execution of the first survey provided thus valuable insight into the 'acting' of methods in a certain environment, and it underpins current arguments about the disadvantages of a strict qualitative/quantitative divide in the social sciences (Teddlie & Tashakkorie 2003; Latour 2010; Gane 2012; Mair, Greiffenhagen, Sharrock 2016). While the results from the first survey are indeed not well suited to answer the question what the effects of media development are, the experience of executing it and encountering these problems are highly significant for the question of how methods act in

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[26] The questionnaire used for the second survey – whose results were analysed and are reported in this thesis – can be found in Appendix 2.1.

particular environments, and underpinned the importance of thinking about context.

For survey number one, the questionnaire was distributed by 25 students from Juba University's Department of Political Science; for survey number two, 25 students from the University's Department of Mass Communication were chosen as interviewers. In both cases, a snowball system was used – students distributed the questionnaire to friends, acquaintances, and family. This was done for the protection of the interviewers. In South Sudan, it is in general not advisable to discuss the government and the media, two highly sensitive subjects, openly with strangers, and even if my research had been on less sensitive topics, security forces would have objected to data collection on the streets. Employing students from Juba University meant that governmental procedures, in particular the question of whether my data collection would need to be approved by the government, had been cleared by the university. Nevertheless, a possible confrontation with security forces is something everyone in South Sudan tries to avoid. Distributing the questionnaire in private and to friends and acquaintances meant that the vast majority of respondents are students. Paying this price was, however, a necessity for the security of the interviewers[27]. Another problem, and also a threat for the representativeness of both samples, was calculating sample size. For both surveys I had calculated sample size with a margin error of 5%, a confidence level of 94%, and a standard derivation of .5. The population size, however, was sheer guesswork, as Juba's last census was done in 2008, before independence. The validity of this census is questionable at best, and to make matters worse it is unclear how much the population has changed since 2008. I estimated population size at 1.5 million people. Sample size was calculated (Z-score)^2 * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error) at 354 (Israel 1992). For both surveys, 500 questionnaires were distributed. Data cleaning was

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[27]Kristen Himelein et al. (2016) have described sampling problems in conflict countries.

done on the sample from survey 2 – survey 1 was unusable for my statistical analysis. It is used in chapter 5 solely as a reference point to demonstrate the importance of knowledge about the context of an environment in order to achieve meaningful results. For findings about media development campaigns, only survey two is relevant. Following data cleaning, 372 questionnaires remained for analysis, which was done using SPSS.

Descriptive statistics were used to describe peoples' attitudes towards the three categories, media, the state, and groups. I also tested if participants' attitudes are dependent on a preference for the one or the other media station. The test chosen is the Kruskal-Wallis H test, as I wanted to determine differences in the distribution of beliefs. The Kruskal-Wallis Test, developed by William Kruskal and Allen Wallis (1952), is a rank-based nonparametric test that can determine whether there are statistically significant differences between groups. It was chosen because the independent variable ('Which radio station do you listen to?') consists of more than two groups, and because the dependent variables (the different attitudes people hold towards the government and towards people from other tribes) are ordinal. Data are non-normally distributed. Thus, the data fail the assumptions for a one-way ANOVA. Beliefs and attitudes were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree', including the category 'I do not know' (Likert 1932). This is a between-subjects design, as the categories of the *IV* are independent groups.

While gender and age are relatively close to what is supposedly South Sudanese reality, having been collected by students the majority of respondents are students. This is far away from reproducing Juba's population. South Sudan is a country with a high illiteracy rate, school is not free, and sometimes fees are hefty. The majority of people in South Sudan do not have access to higher education. Still, the focus on students in the survey is not as problematic as one might think. First, the number

of illiterates is so high because it refers to the whole country. The educational situation is much worse in the rural areas of South Sudan than in Juba. What is more, in social psychology the point has been made with reference to surveys that:

> To the extent that social psychological phenomena are universal across different types of people, it makes little difference precisely with whom social psychological research is conducted – even data collected from samples that are decidedly unrepresentative of the general population can be used to draw inferences about this population. (Visser et al. 2000, p.223)

Media effects are presumed to be universal effects; if they were not media development would be useless in the first place. It is precisely its assumed ability to reach everyone and cause the same effects in attitudes and beliefs that makes media a tool for democratisation attempts. The reliance on students as respondents is thus not a huge problem. Taking into account that education in South Sudan is costly – school fees are to be paid from primary school on, and money is also due for transport, books, and stationery – it can reasonably be assumed that students come from a more affluent background than the average South Sudanese and thus are more likely to have regular access to media. Media effects thus should be more visible in this group.

In summary, surveys have been chosen as a method to investigate media effects in South Sudan, because they allow the establishment of a link between attitudes hold and media listenership. Furthermore, they allow conclusions about the scope of attitudes and their link to media preference in the population. Problems that either needed to be overcome or limited the results from this part of the study were validity, accuracy limitation, and sampling problems. Nevertheless, the survey's usefulness in both investigating media effects and allowing an

investigation in the performativity of methods far outweighed the limitations.

3.4.3 Interviews

An interview is "a conversation with a purpose" (Cannel and Kahn 1968, p.530), with the purpose being to find something out. It is a widely used method; it has been estimated that 90% of all social research comes in one or the other form with interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995), and it is named "an essential tool for making sense of political phenomena" (Mosley 2013, p.2). To an extent, all methods employed here can be said to be based on or come with an element of interviewing. Survey research employs structured interviewing, a form of interviewing where "an interviewer ask each respondent a series of pre-established questions with a limited set of response categories" (Fontana and Frey 1994, p. 362). The ethnography part relies not only on observations but also on conversations, with the main difference being that these were naturally occurring conversations. An interview, as understood here, is a specific form of conversation with the explicit aim of knowledge production (Kvale 2007). It is an arranged, not a naturally occurring conversation.

Interviews can be distinguished either by how or by with whom they are conducted. Types of interviews using the first mode of differentiation include the already mentioned structured interviews, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. Whereas structured interviews follow a strict questionnaire with almost no variation, unstructured interviews have a set purpose or themes but "the interviewer acts freely in this context, on the basis of certain research points, (re)formulating questions as required and employing neutral probing" (Sarantakos 2013, p.278). The semi-structured interview covers the middle ground between the two extremes, it "incorporate[s] both open-ended and more theoretically driven questions, eliciting data grounded in the experience of the participant as well as data guided by existing constructs" (Galetta 2013, p.45). Following this first labelling, interviews are also classified

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by with whom they are done. One main distinction would be if an interview is done with an individual or a group. The group interview "is an option that deserves consideration because it can provide another level of data gathering or a perspective on the research problem not available through individual interviews" (Fontana and Frey 1994, p.364). Besides this, interviews can be done with experts and elites, they can be biographical, inquiring, analytical, or neutral (Sarantakos 2013, p.279). All these categories are, however, rather fluid. An expert might be a professional in a certain field, but when the interview is about a person's or a group's everyday life circumstances, the category is a lot more open.

I chose to conduct unstructured, in-depth interviews. They were chosen because of the interviews' connection to the everyday. Conversations are a cornerstone of everyday life, and although interviews are not naturally occurring but arranged they have the advantage that they can be directed. It is possible to probe and zoom into an area of interest, a possibility that is not as prominent in ethnographic, informal interviews. Furthermore, I was interested in the question to what extent 'just asking' would deliver answers to my research question on media effects. Kellehear (1993) and Webb et al. (1966) both voice disagreement with the idea that truth can be uncovered by interviews. Kellehear (1993, p.1) rejects "that important 'truths' about people are best gained by talk" more in general, while Webb et al. do not object to the interview per se, but that it is used alone (Webb et al., 1966, p.1). Comparing research methods, my aim was to investigate whether interviews, the most widespread method in social science research, were able to give a relatively full answer to my research questions. I decided on unstructured, in-depth interviews because my research question is exploratory and descriptive. As has been said before, the question of the effects of western-led media in South Sudan is not one that can be answered by a direct approach; to gain a relatively grounded understanding it was necessary to break the question down into several sub-questions. These were what people thought about the media in the

country, and what they thought about the two fields media is supposedly working on, namely the state and relationships between groups. My questions were, 'What do you think of the media', 'How do you understand the conflict', and 'What do you think about the state'. In this frame, I wanted to allow interviewees room to choose where to zoom in. I was looking for a deep understanding of these questions, "the same deep level of knowledge and understanding as the members or participants" (Johnson and Rowlands 2012, p.101). With this, unstructured, in-depth interviews were a suitable method.

The main problem with interview research comes from what is also its main strength. It is a social situation, and "knowledge is produced through the interaction between an interviewer and an interviewee" (Kvale 2007, p.xvii). This means that the answers gained through interviews are shaped by the dynamics of the research situation. John Johnson and Timothy Rowlands (2012) mention the cases of Margaret Mead's (1928/1960) *Coming of Age in Samoa,* and Freeman's (1983) re-examination of Mead's interviews. Derek Freeman expected that Mead had been misled by her participants out of mistrust and for cultural reasons. Instead, he found that respondents had lied to Mead because they "told her what they thought she wanted to hear" (Johnson and Rowland 2012, p.100). This points to two, although connected, issues in interview research. One, that cultural differences might play out in a misleading way; the other that content is created in the relationship between interviewer and participant. Zoe Morris (2009) summarises participants' tendency to mould the truth under the heading 'dishonest respondents'. Still, in interview research it might be more often the case that they fall prey to biases and to what has been named 'interviewer effects':

> It is old news that the characteristics of the interviewer can contribute a substantial amount of variance to a set of findings. Interviewees respond differentially to visible cues provided by

the interviewer. Within any single study, this variance can produce a spurious difference. (Webb et al. 1966, p.21)

This holds true also the other way around. Interviewers have a self-serving bias. Johnson and Rowlands (2012, p.101) state that "they [in-depth interviewers] don't necessarily 'hear' what their informants tell them but only what their own intellectual and ethical development has prepared them to hear." Doing my interviews, I realised a tendency to believe respondents who confirmed my pre-phrased theory and to reject information that pointed into another direction. I found myself more than once giving the answers of a respondent an easy ride when they confirmed my assumptions. On the contrary, I found a lot more reasons why someone was not telling the truth (downright lying, having misunderstood something in the situation, and more) when their answer would have meant that my assumptions might be wrong. I noticed two stumbling blocks when it comes to interviews: one when the interview is conducted and the social dynamics between interviewer, interviewee and environment shape what is said, and another when the interview is transcribed and ready for interpretation, and the lone researcher on the desk starts to look for common themes and asks what it all means. This does not mean that conducting interviews is useless in social research or that the problems outweigh the advantages. It only means that one needs to be aware of these tendencies. Interviews are a way to find out what meaning people allocate to topics and issues; it is a way to uncover people's understandings of their social world (Alvesson 2011; Schaffer 2014), if the difficulties and stumbling blocks are taken into consideration.

I conducted unstructured interviews with 28 participants that had been recruited from as wide a range of South Sudanese society as possible. These were cross-cultural interviews. Although I had been living in South Sudan frequently and for durations of between two and ten months, I was a stranger in the culture. The interviews were also multi-purpose. I

wanted to gain factual knowledge and conceptual clarification, and to gather narrative information. My main interest was to understand how my participants understand their lifeworld. My approach to interviewing was hence phenomenological, following the ideas of Edmund Husserl, who states the inseparability of the world that forms the setting for everyone's subjective experience (Husserl 1964, p.15). Following this approach, I asked participants for a description of their opinion and experience of media, the state, and the conflict. While sometimes probing, I left it mainly to participants to decide where they wanted to zoom in. In order to gain insights from as many parts of South Sudanese society, participants belonged to one of four groups. Group 1, 'journalists and media professionals', contains interviews with editors-in-chief, media managers, and senior and junior journalists. Group 2 consists of politicians, both, members of the current government and members of opposition parties, and administrative employees in the ministries. Group 3 is very widely composed of what might be named civil society members, although following a rather loose definition of civil society. Interviewees were church and media activists, academic staff, and teachers. Group 4, for lack of a better word, looks at 'listeners', which here means South Sudanese who are not activists, journalists or government officials. I interviewed a driver, national NGO-staff, students, a restaurant manager, and security guards. The groups represent different forms of knowledge on the media and on society. Journalists are involved in producing broadcasts and have in-depth information on the practices of journalism in South Sudan, government and government employees possess an understanding of how journalism is seen by the leadership of the country. Civil society members represent an elite in society, often educated in the US, the UK or Australia where they have experienced media and the functioning of a society in the West and were thus thought to contribute insights on how well the concept can traverse between the spheres. Group 4, regular people, are the majority in the country; they are the audience, the people the media is thought to function on. Unexpectedly, they were also the people that were the

hardest to gain access to, pointing to another problem with interview studies.

'Regular people' in this context means people who are what in an industrialised country would count as either working or low middle class: handymen, farmers and agricultural workers who do not own land, people with no university education, but maybe an apprenticeship, blue-collar workers, salesmen, and tea ladies, who own the equipment necessary to brew tea and coffee on the sidewalks and run a small business. Figure 5 shows a tea lady serving tea outside the offices of the local government in Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. This picture mainly serves the purpose to mark the cultural difference and hence navigate indexicality, which refers "to the amount of shared background knowledge necessary to understand a message" (Agar 1980, p.5). Access to such people was hard to gain, first because of the language barrier. Although English is an official language in South Sudan, it is mostly spoken by the elite. Secondly, my requests for interviews with people like this tea lady were turned down because of perceived power relations; people who talked to me without problems at the local bar or when drinking tea were unwilling to agree to a real interview because they feared they would not understand my questions. The official interview situation has been said to come with power relations that are hard to overcome (Kvale 2006; Plesner 2011). Steinar Kvale (2005, p.90) explicitly points out that "interviews give voice to the many; the marginalised who do not ordinarily participate in public debates may in interview studies have their views and situation communicated to a larger audience", but points to the exploitative nature of the intrinsic power relations of the interview. In my case, the marginalised who do not ordinarily have their voices heard showed no interest in being heard. I asked a total of 24 regular people for interviews, and my request was turned down all but four times. A fifth interview was made possible after the intervention of a friend, who worked for the same employer than the interviewee-to-be but in a higher position. The other four interviewees

in this group are only in a generous sense 'regular people'; with being at university and working as national hires in mid-range positions they can easily count as lower-ranking 'elites'. This calls the use of the interview study as an instrument of capturing all parts of society into question, as I will detail in the conclusion. It might be that the interview study suffers from an inverted haphazard effect. In survey research, haphazard sampling is known to create a bias: In randomly picking respondents researchers try to create a random sample, but as people have a tendency to pick respondents they feel comfortable with, haphazard samples are often biased towards a middle class (Weisberg and Bowen 1977). When asking people for an interview, they choose if they want to trust me, and being a stranger they do not pick me.

Figure 5: Tea lady in Bor, Jonglei state (personal stock)

Problems with access normally are understood to refer to high-ranking ministers, leaders and people in power, but in South Sudan it was a lot harder to recruit 'non-elites'. While there were high-ranking political leaders who I did not get in front of my voice recorder – namely Dr Anne Itto, the then acting General Secretary of the SPLM – almost everyone I asked agreed to an interview. When the interview still did not take place,

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it was because of time problems. This points to an inherent bias in interview studies, with language problems, lacking confidence on side of the regular people, and an unconscious bias of the researcher to choose participants close to herself all playing a role.

Mere technical problems with interviews were failing batteries, trying to concentrate on an interview while sitting in a restaurant with a lot of background noise, getting lost on the way to a meeting point, having a total of 23 follow-up phone calls and mails to ask if an interview was possible ("Maybe. Can you call again?"), and, after a very dull interview, receiving a phone call from my interviewee telling me that he had been so close-lipped because security police had been sitting on the table next to us, and if we could repeat the interview. Interviews lasted roughly between 30 and 90 minutes. They were conducted where the interviewee proposed: I visited offices in office buildings, secured compounds and in governmental buildings, interviewed people in my car while it was parked in a yard, safe compound or a quiet street. Some interviews took place in my apartment, other in people's working places. Some were conducted in restaurants. All participants were informed about the aims of the study and their right to withdraw from it at any time. Informed consent was always asked for and always given, although signing a consent form was something, no one but three interviewees wanted to do. I thus asked for informed consent orally and recorded it at the beginning of each interview. Literally everyone I interviewed for the interview part asked for anonymity. Due to the fact that the fighting meanwhile has reached Juba and that during a direct attack on a considered safe hotel, which was frequented by South Sudanese and humanitarian aid workers, a South Sudanese had been shot point-blank, I have decided to anonymise also the very few people who have given me permission to mention their names.

In summary, unstructured, in-depth interviews were chosen because they provide insights into people's experience of the media and the

government, and how they understand the conflict. An expected problem with interviews is that knowledge is produced between interviewer and interviewee, thus raising questions about the data's validity. An unexpected problem was the recruitment of regular people, which gave rise to fears about a recruitment bias inherent in the method.

3.5 Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced the research design. As this inquiry had two aims, finding out about the performativity of methods and investigating the effects of western-led media in a country of intervention, the research design comes in two parts. I employed three different methods and compared the results they delivered as well as their strengths and weaknesses in a first step. Following this, I combined the results to deliver an answer to the question of media effects. In the course of the inquiry, it became clear that the research question was not so much a research question but rather a set of interconnected questions connected to the everyday life and hence to the question about methods' performativity. Three methods were employed: ethnography, a survey, and unstructured interviews. These three were chosen because of their different underpinnings, which makes them suitable options for the comparison. Furthermore, all three are tested methods for research in countries of the global South. However, due to its flexibility, ethnography emerged as a bridge, delivering insights that explained curious or contradictory results from the other two methods. In the course of doing research in South Sudan, it became increasingly clear that for a complex question in a complex environment, a bricolage was the research approach of choice, as it gave the best chance to make sense of messy and sometimes contradictory results. These were not 'wrong' results but provided insights into different facets of South Sudanese reality, a reality that is multifaceted, diverse and layered, and too rich for an ideologically bound inquiry.

With the following chapter 4, the core study begins. The subsequent three chapters present the empirical findings from South Sudan. Chapter 4 explores the question of media effects using ethnography; the chapter also illuminates the process of doing ethnography.

4 – Ethnography

Leaving the plane at Juba International Airport I follow the passengers to a tent where a nurse takes my temperature; after that I proceed into the arrival hall. This is new, a precautionary measure because of the Ebola epidemic that at this moment, in spring 2015, haunts West Africa. In the hall, luggage handlers unload suitcases; they are put on the ground for their owners to find. To my left, people are queuing in more or less orderly lines. Far left is the queue for foreigners with an entry permit. Two lines are for South Sudanese nationals and one is for visa holders. It does not take long before it is my turn. "How are you", asks a smiling immigration officer, stamps my passport and wishes me a nice stay. So does the police officer who draws a chalky cross on my carry-on bag as a sign that it has been checked. With another "Have a good day!" I leave Juba Airport.

While this might sound like a normal airport experience, it was rather extraordinary. By far it was the fastest and friendliest arrival I ever experienced when coming to South Sudan. In the past, I had fought my way to border control through a crowd with massive use of elbows; luggage had been thrown through an opening in the airport wall and then hand-checked by a security officer; one had to push through the crowd of fellow travellers and heave a 20kg heavy suitcase on a desk, where airport security rummaged through clothes and toiletries. The immigration officers had not been welcoming but intimidating. Only a year ago, I had entered the country after a long discussion with security that had included the threat to be sent back to Egypt immediately. The new and much-improved behaviour might be caused by training provided by the European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC). It might also be that these specific members of the security forces just had a very good day; but it is also possible that the South Sudanese perception of how a public servant should behave is finally changing. The behaviour of state employees and how they treat

citizens (and foreigners) tells a story about self-perception and about governance and government of a country. In western thinking, the state is a provider of basic services, among them security, education, and health (Weber 1919; Besley and Persson 2009). Government is legitimised by the peoples' vote, and it is accountable to the people. If the state does not provide, it loses its legitimacy and almost certainly the people's support and vote. Until my above described experience, the South Sudanese state employees had been threatening rather than supportive. The new experience led to the question whether this was changing and to what extent the western conceptualisation of the state was congruent with, or at least similar to, the South Sudanese understanding.

With this, ethnography started pretty much from the minute I arrived in the country. While I had former experiences of South Sudan and was hence able to compare new impressions with expectations, even without these former experiences of the country the significance of some observations would have been hard to miss. In the following, I present my results from ethnographic observations in South Sudan. The chapter is organised around the three concepts of the media, the state, and groups. It starts with insights into 'doing ethnography', and its strengths and weaknesses when conducted in the complex reality of South Sudan.

4.1 On doing ethnography

Ethnography is "a commitment to adopt the perspective of those studied by sharing in their day-to-day experiences" (Denzin 1970, p.185). As detailed before, my participation in everyday life took place at three fieldwork sites and only at certain times of my stay. In the literature, a major concern regarding ethnography is gaining access (Bryman 2001a, p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp.292 – 298; Feldman et al. 2003; Harrington 2003, p. 593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp.42 – 43; Sarantakos 2013, p.220). In Juba, this had not been a problem. It certainly helped that

a network of contacts was already in place and that the area of enquiry was relatively open. Researching practices of media production, to give an example, would surely have been more complicated as access to radio stations would have been needed. My interest in understandings of and opinions on media and the state, and in the relationships between groups in the country required "ongoing interaction with the human targets of study on their home ground" (van Maanen 2011, p.2). The three sites where I engaged in such interaction were Juba University, where I taught a class in the Department of Mass Communication, a corner shop, and a local bar, both in Haj Malakal, the residential area where I was living.

Researching the everyday meant that contact could be made as in every other city, town, or environment a researcher is moving to. My main distress came from the fact that I expected a more dramatic, distinctive starting point for ethnography, a 'Now I am doing ethnography' moment; whereas the immersion in the everyday meant that this was exactly what it was not. I was not a researcher behind a clipboard but part of the environment. Access to the fieldwork sites was gained over time: shopping at the corner shop, a typical shop selling soft drinks, chocolates and alcohol, toilet paper and detergent. Regulars came over in the afternoon for a chat, a tea or a beer, and a game of chess. It did not take long until I was invited to a game, and this became a regular installation. Chess is a slow game that offers ample space for drink and chat. Equally undramatic was starting my stint at Juba University. Visiting the university to enquire about an Arabic teacher, I found myself in a discussion with one of the professors who asked if I would like to teach a class. A few weeks later, I started teaching. Although I first wondered how to connect with South Sudanese everyday life, very soon I realised that there was in fact not a moment when I did not connect with it. Daily lunch breaks in a cook shop not far from one of Juba's biggest churches, doing my grocery shopping at Konyo Konyo market, visiting the local hang-out around the corner from my apartment, and soon starting to visit South Sudanese acquaintances in their homes, all provided insights.

However, how could I be sure that my experiences were not filtered and caused by my background and status and that my interpretations were correct and not a result of preconceptions? The short answer is that I could not. Having engaged in nearly constant discussions of my interpretations with South Sudanese friends, I feel confident enough to write my insights down. Still, this question is closely connected to problems of representation and the ethical dilemma of speaking for those researched. Ethnography in IR has been critiqued sharply, among other things, on the basis that it presents merely the researcher's interpretation and omits the voices of the participants (Vrasti 2008)[28]. Ethnography has been accused of ignoring reflexivity and a return to its patriarchal, positivist past (Vrasti 2008). It seems to me that reflexivity is not only important in ethnography but is a general demand in research. Similarly, in any other research it is as much the voice of the researcher that is heard. It is the researcher deciding on the questions in a questionnaire and it is also the researcher who decides which interview extracts to use. Engaging in ethnography, a researcher engages in the environment. This, together with ethnography's commitment to reflexivity and accompanying attention to positionality provides measurements against incorrect representations. Furthermore, ethnography is a slow method. This is a weakness because policy-relevant research often happens under time constraints. It is, however, also a strength as it helps to get to know the environment.

Researching in a context such as South Sudan often means that identities need to be protected. Naturally in such cases, no information on who speaks, with whom, why, and where are disclosed. This is all the more important as not everyone was aware of me as a researcher, which was a consequence of me doing my observations in everyday life and over time. While I always did mention that I am a researcher, besides my

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[28] Vrasti's critic goes much further than this. She argues that IR uses ethnography practices to maintain a scientific perspective in the discipline.

students I did not encounter everyone regularly. That reflexive thoughts on my status and standing and on power relations are not always mentioned does not mean such reflection did not take place. Where the identity of people I encountered could be disclosed through such reflection, this reflection is omitted. This lack of reflection is not a sign of unawareness - quite the opposite.

The main problem with doing ethnography was thus not gaining access, the main problem was protecting participants. Names and any features that could lead to identification were omitted with the utmost rigour. I turn know to the presentation of my research findings, starting with how the South Sudanese use and understand the media.

4.2 Media

> You students leave the schools pen can no longer liberate the Sudan But with guns, such as Kalashnikov The government of Garang will liberate the country with blood. (Dinka War song on Radio SPLA, quoted from Arop 2006, p. 92)

As detailed in chapter 2, media is an important, although not unproblematic component in countries experiencing intervention. Media's task is to provide neutral, unbiased information to enable the population to make informed choices in elections, thus holding governments accountable (Howard 2002; Hume 2006; Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010; Orme 2010) and to help people overcome mistrust and hostilities (Galtung 1998, Lynch and McGoldrick 2007). Both tasks are grounded in a western understanding of the media; it is assumed that it will act that same way in a non-western country. The idea that western institutions can be transferred to non-western contexts is prominent in statebuilding, with international experts working in the endeavour

having a 'Yes, we can' attitude that Bliesemann de Guevara (2012) amusingly compares to Bob the builder, the main character of a British children's TV show. It has been shown that the transfer and implication of western institutions to non-western environments is, however, not as simple (Koddenbrock, 2016), precisely because of different understandings and social logics of the interveners and the intervened. I argue that this is no different for western media in a non-western country.

4.2.1. Media history

Judging from a western viewpoint, media is not in a good state in South Sudan. Freedom House (2017) assesses the country as 'not free'. Reasons are security forces' attacks on journalists and media houses; these harassments mostly occur when a journalist or media outlet comes under the suspicion of siding with the SPLM-IO or another so-called rebel group[29]. While the transitional constitution guarantees media freedom[30], in reality the government has a firm grip on media. Oppression and intimidation by security forces have led non-government-owned radio stations to engage in self-censorship and exclude non-government viewpoints from their programmes. The informalisation of such radio stations is evident in this behaviour. While they are set up to strengthen democracy, they act in a fairly different way. The government-owned outlets SS-TV and SS-Radio openly act as a governmental mouthpiece. From the government's viewpoint media is a means to communicate with the citizens; but it is a one-way communication. This is not a new development. The first newspaper in the Sudan, the Sudan Gazette, was established in 1899. It was a mouthpiece of the colonial government; as

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[29] SPLM-IO is the abbreviation for 'SPLM in opposition', the name Riek Machar's splitter group gave itself. In publications, newspaper reports, and official statements the group is mostly coined 'the rebels'. This seems, however, not a helpful label for the country's situation. I hence use the group's chosen name.

[30] "All levels of government shall guarantee the freedom of the press and other media as shall be regulated by law in a democratic society" (Transitional constitution South Sudan, 2011, No 24 (2). For an extract see Appendix 1.1, p.3.

were the subsequent newspapers[31]. The first radio station in southern Sudan was Radio Juba in 1961. The SPLM/A launched their radio station shortly after founding the movement in 1983. Radio SPLA was broadcasting from Ethiopia and it was "a useful propaganda tool intended to divert Khartoum's misrepresentation of the movement as a southern movement rather than a national one" (Arop 2006, p.92). It also "filled the airwaves with politically charged commentaries, war songs and poems that depicted the heroism of the revolutionary army, the SPLA" (Arop 2006, p.103). Radio SPLA was used for recruitment campaigns, mobilisation, and political propaganda. With this history, it seems rather congruent that influential parts of the government and the SPLM/A still understand media as a governmental mouthpiece and not as a provider of independent information. It raises the issue of how the population understands today's media. Can it reasonably be expected that media can function in the western sense in the newly built state?

4.2.2 An independent media or institutional affiliations?

A plethora of media houses exists in Juba, and the overview given here is by no means exhaustive. Juba is home to several newspapers, some published in English, others in Arabic, and also to a number of radio stations. The newspapers *The Citizen, The Juba Monitor* and *The Juba Telegraph* are the biggest English dailies. The *Citizen* and the *Monitor* were both published by veteran journalists, who have been working for foreign media houses before, and both have been around since before independence. Both have also been notably outspoken. In 2014, the *Juba Telegraph* was launched[32]. It is published under the theme of 'Promoting Integrity and National Sovereignty' and has links to the government; the president's speaker Ateny Wek Ateny is the proprietor of the paper.

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[31] Throughout the 20th century, newspapers were either government-owned or under government control. In the South, vernacular newspapers were in circulation but due to a high rate of illiteracy and economic weakness they were not widespread (Wani 2014, p. 7, 8).

[32] At the time of writing, the Citizen and the Monitor have been shut down by National Security Forces. The Telegraph's editor-in-chief has been removed from his post.

'Direct links' are, however, denied by others in government (Machol 2014, Radio Tamazuij 2014). This quarrel, if the newspaper is to be understood as tied to the government, shows that the concept of 'independent press' is either not clear defined in South Sudanese understanding or it is differently defined. This is no wonder, given the already mentioned history of media in the country. The newly-established media outlets as part of media development and democratisation campaigns are not truly independent either – or they are independent if independence from the state and government is seen as the only necessary feature of a free press.

When categorising media systems one classically looks at 'Four Theories of the Press' (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1963). Media systems are classified as soviet, authoritarian, libertarian or social responsible, with the latter two roughly similar to the private/commercial and public broadcast model. In South Sudan, media is state-owned and privately owned; stations and newspapers are financed and run by the church and the United Nations, and supported by foreign governments (see table 5). Media is used to promote agendas and distribute messages. This is not alone done by the government; iNGOs and the international community use media the same way. This is clearly visible when looking at the media houses in Juba. The biggest and only nationwide broadcast, the UN-run Radio Miraya[33], states as its mission:

> Through the broadcast of fair, balanced and accurate news and information, *Radio Miraya* supports UNMISS' mandate by promoting citizen participation in the political process and giving a voice to marginalised groups. Through its variety of programming, it creates a platform for debate and dialogue

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[33] Miraya is "owned and run by the United Nation's Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)" (Radio Miraya Facebook-page, no date). See Appendix 1.3, p.6. It was started in Khartoum in 2005 as part of the United Nation Mission in Sudan; its aim then was to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the civil war in the country. With the South's independence in 2011 and the creation of UNMISS, the operation was relocated to Juba.

about the peaceful development of the world's newest nation.

(Radio Miraya Facebook page, no date)

Internally, it is understood that Miraya's broadcasting needs to be in line with the UNMISS public relations department, supporting UNMISS' view. Dependency and links to an institution, be it a government or an international organisation, are not features of an independent media. Miraya is not independent but has an institutional affiliation. The same can be said about other iNGO-run or donor-funded media. Eyeradio is run by the iNGO Internews, whose mission is "to empower local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability to connect and the means to make their voices heard" (Internews 2015b). Through Internews and USAID it is financed by the US-government. The same is true for VoA, the Voice of America in South Sudan, whose parent, the Voice of America, has blatantly been named a propaganda tool (Uttaro 1982). These connections[34] must necessarily weaken the international community's attempts to convince the South Sudanese government of the desirability of a free and independent press. They also blur the definition of an 'independent press'. The question arising from this is whether the South Sudanese understand media houses run or financed by iNGOs, foreign governments, and international institutions such as the UN differently than media run by the government of South Sudan.

4.2.3 Different understandings of media

One reaches Juba University coming from University Road. In the center of the yard is a clock tower whose hands are pointing constantly at five to nine. I park in the shade of a huge tree. Students are sitting on wooden

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[34] Another example is the fortnightly published paper *New Nation,* written by a small team of South Sudanese journalists in Juba, but supervised and overseen by a Belgian journalist and activist, who, as I was told when visiting the *New Nation's* compound, was based in Kenya. The imprint of *The New Nation* can be found in Appendix 1.3, p.7. The paper was partly financed by the Belgium government. In addition, the paper runs a guest house. In 2015, funding was running out and the staff was looking for new sources of funding.

or iron benches, chatting, watching me while I make my way to the Center for Peace and Development Studies. This is a three-storey building, and I climb irregular stairs to my classroom on the first floor. There is no glass in the windows, but a fan on the ceiling. Power is switched on at 09.00 in the morning. I have a blackboard and two pieces of chalk. The class consists of 17 students. The university moved back to Juba after independence in 2011, and the first graduation ceremony was held in April 2015. Academics in full regalia led the parade of capped and gowned students through Juba's streets (Figure 6). This first graduation was a day of national pride, with President Kiir holding the congratulatory speech.

Figure 6: Graduation ceremony in Juba, April 2015 (personal stock)

The university and its student body are struggling with problems typical for the new country. Electricity supply is limited, classrooms are scarcely furnished, and there are not enough teachers. The library is not well-equipped and printing material is costly. That a student takes six years

or more to graduate is not considered odd; it is rather normal. The students suffer from the lack of public transport; reaching the university in time for lectures is hard, especially during the rainy season when the seasonal rains convert the city's streets into impassable mud holes. Reading and learning after hours is impossible, as hardly anyone has electricity at home.

Despite – or maybe because of – these problems, students are engaging with the coursework on a high level. In my syllabus, I described the course aims:

> Media is deeply embedded in the social fabric and the politics of a society, all the more so once we turn away from looking only at the content a media outlet produces and investigate also questions of management, regulations and economy. This course thus borders on different areas of scholarship, it draws on political science, economy and sociology. Throughout the course you should formulate and justify your own ideas about why media is set up and regulated in the one or the other way in a given country.

The course consisted of student discussions, group work, and presentations. It was assessed with an essay and an exam. All these elements were used to gain an understanding of students' understanding of media and media's role in a society. Some common themes arose early in the course. Discussing classifications and features of different forms of government, all students stated that South Sudan shows the features of authoritarianism. This, students said, was evident in the existence of the government-owned media SS-TV, in the harassment of journalists and in the threats against media houses. A remarkable number of students, however, noted that this behaviour was, if not justified, understandable. The media, they said, foremost Eyeradio and Miraya, were criticising the government's actions unjustly and harshly and the government only

reacted to the media's hostility. Asked if this was a perceived or an actually present hostility, they said it was an actual hostility.

I heard the same from my chess partners. There is an understanding that "journalists fulfil an important part in helping the society prosper, but they need to do it with the government, not against it", as one student said in class. The idea of a media acting as a watchdog was mostly rejected by the students but for contradicting reasons. Some felt uncomfortable with the idea of media, especially 'foreign' media, criticising the government. Others stated that media cannot fulfil this role because, "the government is too powerful and the media is not powerful enough". When asked what a powerful media would be or how powerful the media would need to be, students specified that journalists were not sufficiently educated to criticise the government. This was the starting point for an especially heated discussion. Part of the class rejected point-blank that journalists in general lacked training and education. In their view, journalists were underpaid, and furthermore, media houses employed too many people that were not properly trained. This is of course contradictory. It seemed that these students wanted to keep blame away from individual journalists and put it instead on the media houses. The other group acknowledged the lack of trained, professional journalists; they blamed short-term trainings done by iNGOs and the lack of a long-term, accredited training, preferably done at the university. Notably, this group wished for international money but for national trainers. They did not want international trainers.

Probing deeper into the idea of 'independent media', it was confirmed that there is a different understanding in South Sudan. In the western model, media's independence from government is of prime importance because of its role as a watchdog, "the news media should serve democracy by providing a check and balance on powerful sectors of society, including leaders within the public and private domains" (Norris and Odugbemi 2010, p.16). A media that is not independent of those it is

supposed to check on cannot fulfil its role. Independence is connected to how media is funded. The USA is a strong supporter of a commercial system while the Nordic European countries, including Germany, finance media through a public fee (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The differences are not clear in South Sudan. In their exams, students stated that public broadcast is financed through public fees, taxes, or directly by the government. In discussions on the topic it was repeatedly pointed out that public fees are not a possibility in South Sudan due to the weak economy and the high number of unemployed people. During a workshop and student presentations under the heading 'Which media system for South Sudan', the United Nations, other donors, and also the South Sudanese government were repeatedly named as sources of funding. Media's independence from the government was not high in demand with my students, and they understood the government as a legitimate source of news. Only two of 17 students named 'independence from government' or 'financed through a public fee' in their exams when answering the question on what the features of the public system are. Six students mentioned 'government control' as a feature of this system.

Another topic that emerged repeatedly in discussions was the question of press freedom. In a way, this was connected to the discussions of media independence. Students seemed to understand independence to mean an unregulated press that can publish and broadcast whatever they like with no fact check or regulation in place. In my class, this was a highly unpopular idea. To investigate this further, one of the essay questions for the end-of-term-paper[35] was on press freedom. It read:

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[35] The four essay questions were:
1. How is 'press freedom' understood in the public, the commercial and the state-owned systems? In which system do you think the press enjoys the most freedom
2. Can media help a society prosper? Which system is best suited for this?
3. How does social media change the classic model of public, commercial, and state-controlled media? Is social media good for democracy?
4. Why are 'press freedom' and 'freedom of expression' important parts of a modern state? Why do governments agree to those principles?

Four of my students choose the first topic, five the second, two the third, and four wrote on the last topic. Two did not hand in.

'How is 'press freedom' understood in the public, the commercial, and the state-owned systems? In which system do you think the press enjoys the most freedom?' Four of my students wrote their essay on this topic. All phrased the fear that press freedom, if unregulated, does more harm than good, although to different extents. One called explicitly for the government to control and regulate the press, while at the same time stating that the press should also regulate itself. A need for self-regulation was also mentioned in another essay, but the point was also made that self-regulation does not necessarily work. Another student presented a list of what press freedom is not, mentioning that it is not the freedom to insult someone or to act badly against other people in the country, thus explicitly rejecting hate speech. This student also mentioned that government should not interfere with the press and limit press freedom, "unless the public interest is better served by interference". All essays on this question ask for certain control of the press. This did not come as a surprise, as it reflected opinions phrased in class discussions.

In the essays on the related question why press freedom is an important part of a modern state and why governments agree to the principle, students stated the need for a partnership with the government. All essays on this question agreed that freedom of the press and of expression is important for economic and social progress. It was said that governments need to know what people think and that "it is through media that government can correct its work for the well future of the citizens and development as a whole". One essay called for sanitisation of the media landscape and highlighted the need to control the media. It was written that sanitisation – removal of sensitive information before publication – would ensure the stability of democracy. Overall, the essays showed a distinctive and notable fear of the media's power, if unchecked. This is all the more remarkable as these were students in the Department of Mass Communication, of which quite a few had expressed the wish to work as journalists.

4.2.4 Access to media

The teaching spell at Juba University provided the possibility to investigate students' understanding of the media. However, a pressing question in the context of this thesis was how much access people have in everyday life to it. To have any effect, media needs an audience. The experience of living in the country had given rise to the suspicion that there might be less access to media than stated in surveys conducted by iNGOs. This suspicion was to an extent strengthened by the unavailing search for evidence stated in the academic literature (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau, 2014) but by observations in Juba. Every morning, I pass by a shoemaker. Sitting behind a small desk with drawers that contain soles, leftovers from old shoes, needles and yarns he waits for customers. His stall is overshadowed by a tree, and he has a radio tied to one of the legs of his desk. This I took as confirmation of the importance of radio in South Sudan. When I passed by, I heard him sometimes sing along to some song on the radio[36]. When finally I asked him what radio programme he was listening to, it turned out that he switched the radio on very rarely because of battery costs. He kept the radio tied to the stall for safekeeping; he feared it might be stolen from the small hut he was living in. When he switched it on, he searched only for music, and he changed stations when the news came on. 'I do not want to waste battery life', he said.

There is a problem with access to electricity and access to radio is thus limited. Electricity is a luxury in South Sudan. There is no city power in Juba. It is the comfortable apartments and guest houses for international expats, the luxurious mansions of members of the government, the governmental buildings and expensive hotels, serving the expats and the

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[36] One encounters music often in Juba. Hardly any taxi drives without blaring music, be it one of the 'Yellow Taxis', a company vetted by the UN and declared secure by most embassies and iNGOs, or a local car. This certainly means that music is popular, but the same does not necessarily hold true for media. In fact, I never heard news or another produced radio programme while sitting in a taxi; it was always just music. When I asked my drivers, the usual answered that it was not radio we listened to but music loaded on an USB-stick.

country's elite that possess generators and have the means to acquire fuel to have them in use. Even that is not a given: In my time in Juba electricity was limited several times to the early mornings and the evenings, due to a fuel shortage that made buying fuel not only overly expensive but at one point impossible. At the university, my class started at 08.00 in the morning. Like in most public buildings, electricity was only switched on at 09.00. The first hour of my lecture took place without electricity. As the classroom's only electric appliance was a ceiling fan that did not matter to me. The students, however, always plugged in their phones for charging the minute they entered the classroom, eagerly waiting for the moment the generators were switched on. They also complained regularly about the problems of studying, foremost because of the lack of light in their homes. They could not read or study in the evenings, and so the working day ended with sunset. Solar lamps are sometimes sold in Juba but they were dismissed as too expensive. It is not only students who have this problem. Figure 7 below shows a typical suburb of Juba at dusk and no trace of electricity can be spotted. An acquaintance of mine, who has a rather stable and relatively well-paid job as an administrative worker with an iNGO, showed me his apartment. It consisted of one room; shower, toilet and a place to cook were outside in the yard and shared among six households. The costs for the apartment were SSP750[37] without electricity. He could have rented the apartment to include three hours electricity per day, but this would have cost SSP1200, a sum too expensive for most South Sudanese, including my friend despite his good position.

There are of course high-earning South Sudanese who do own generators. Among these is another acquaintance of mine, who works for an international company as a local senior manager. He also owns land

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[37] In 2014/2015 the official exchange rate for South Sudanese Pounds to the US-Dollar was fixed at 2.96 SSP for one US-Dollar. The black market rate, however, was around 5 SSP in November 2014 and approximately 15 SSP for one US-Dollar in August 2015. In December 2015 the Sudan Tribune (2015) reported that the government gave the fixed official rate up. Following this move, KCB, the Kenyan Commercial Bank, set the exchange rate to 20:1.

and earns rent. The compound, where the family – he, his wife, and three children – lives, consists of three shanties: a combined living room and bed chamber for the couple, another contains the room for the children, and one entails the kitchen with a large fireplace for cooking, some shelves and a chests of drawers, and space for two large washing pans that are filled at a water point outside the compound.

Figure 7: Suburb of Juba (Personal stock)

The family does own a generator, and electricity is used for light and a boom box when they have guests, and, if necessary, for the freezer. The freezer, however, is rarely in use; usually a big block of ice is bought at an ice shop, and drinks are chilled with the ice in a big bowl. Sometimes the family uses electricity for entertainment purposes; during one of my visits, the wife and children were watching 'Tomb Raider', the 2001 movie starring Angelina Jolie as Lara Croft, on DVD.

It is rather striking that this relatively well-off family does own a TV set and a DVD-player, but not a radio. A common belief in iNGOs and the international community is that people listen to the radio on their mobiles. This would be possible, but it would also come with costs, as mobile batteries need to be charged on a regular basis. This can be done

in corner shops, at costs of 2SSP per battery. While this seems little enough, if done on a daily basis it would add up. Experiencing everyday life in South Sudan raises the question of what effect media can have on a population that can barely listen to it. Madut Jok (2015) made the statement that the main source of information for the South Sudanese is gossip. This statement, made by the director of a major South Sudanese think tank, is probably not or not solely pointing to a corresponding inclination of the South Sudanese but to the severe problems that hinder the dissemination of information; gossip is what remains.

4.2.5 Summary

This section has reviewed how media is understood in Juba and if there are differences to the western ideas of a media. Indeed, there are. First, the government understands media as a mouthpiece. This is evident in the behaviour and broadcasting of the government-owned outlet SS-TV/Radio, in the oppression of other media houses, and it is supported by South Sudanese history. Media stations established by the colonial powers and by the Sudan government were basically propaganda stations. The same holds true for Radio SPLA during the second civil war. In the citizenry, there seems to be confusion about the idea of press independence. This confusion is fuelled by the fact that media houses like the UN-Radio Miraya are themselves not independent but set a precedent for state-supported media. For the South Sudanese audience, however, this does not seem to present a problem. In discussions with students at Juba University three main topics emerged. Students described the harsh line the government took towards the media as to an extent understandable, as radio stations, foremost Miraya and Eyeradio, were described as being hostile towards the government. Questions of journalists' education were raised and it was said that journalists needed to work with the government, not against it. In connection to this an

explicit need to control and regulate media was stated[38]. Lastly, I examined how much access people in South Sudan really have to the media, and the answer is: maybe less than previously thought. Observations in everyday life identify the lack of electricity as the main problem.

4.3 The state

In Juba, two faces are ever present. John Garang de Mabior, deceased leader of the Sudan's People Liberation Movement (SPLM), first president of southern Sudan[39] and father of the South's independence; and today's President Salva Kiir Mayardit, vice president under Garang until the latter's death in a helicopter crash in July 2005, and then his successor. Portraits of both can be found in every office, every company, and in most shops. As a general rule, if there is a wall there are framed pictures of Garang and Kiir; Garang smiling friendly, Kiir wearing his ever present cowboy hat (Figure 8).

The omnipresence of the portraits shows not only the importance of the two leaders, it also indicates how they are perceived in society. President Salva Kiir has not just been voted into an office that he can lose on the peoples' will. Instead, the president enjoys the position of a patriarchal father figure. This status is evident in the plethora of portraits, but also in the congratulation advertisements placed by companies in newspapers.

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[38] Fear of media was also voiced by governmental officials and civil society-members in Bor, the capital of Jonglei, when I was working there in 2013 as project coordinator for the UNDP-commissioned Jonglei state radio. Stakeholders were directly referencing the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and they were phrasing the fear how the new (planned) radio could be controlled to ensure that something like this would not happen in South Sudan. This took place before the events of December 2013. The fear that media can be abused or would not report properly and thus incite mistrust and conflict between groups is strong in South Sudan.
[39] In this thesis, I refer to the country as 'Southern Sudan' before independence, and as 'South Sudan' thereafter.

Figure 8: Congratulation advertisement on Independence Day 2015, Speed Insurance

The example above (Figure 8) shows a newspaper advertisement by Speed Insurance, an insurance company active in South Sudan. It includes a picture of the president, with the cowboy hat, a distinctive mark. Few pictures of the president without it exist. The insurance company is congratulating 'His Excellence Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit' on Independence Day. Publication of such congratulation notes spikes around the 9th July[40]; but they are also placed for appointments or promotions of managers or senior army officers, and for inaugurations of new premises. Strikingly, congratulations are not, or only as an afterthought, addressed to the people of South Sudan - it is the president who is complimented, showing his importance as a patriarchal leader.

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[40] See Appendix 1.4, pp.14-17

This is a first sign of that the state, and most notably leadership, might be differently understood in South Sudan. Leaders in the stable democracies of the West are still subject to the peoples' will, and they are not above the law. In South Sudan this seems different.

4.3.1 The wish for respect and being left alone

I make most of my South Sudanese connections at a little shop around the corner from my apartment in Juba. This shop is typical for Juba. It offers bread, milk, detergents and toilet paper, beer and soft drinks, and phone-charging. A tea lady sits in the shade, ready to make tea or coffee. When fuel is scarce, young boys sell petrol in plastic bottles. Young men sit on their motorbikes in front of the shop, waiting for customers. These are Boda-Boda drivers, the South Sudanese equivalent of a taxi. Bodas are the regular transport in Juba. There are few buses and some Rikshas (Figure 9). Besides these options, one has feet. They are such a normal mode of transportation that 'footing' in South Sudan is a regular verb, meaning 'walking'. In the afternoon, men hang out at the local corner shop, drinking tea and playing chess. Every time I pass by I buy a soft drink or order a coffee. I am first treated with professional politeness, then there is a recognising friendly nod, and in time the nod comes with small talk. Eventually, I am invited to a game of chess. I last only half an hour, before I have to put my king on the board and declare defeat. This must have been a dull game for my partner, but nevertheless, revenge is offered. The games quickly become regular instalments; at least once or twice a week I stop for a tea, some chitchat, and a game.

Figure 9: Riksha in Juba (personal stock)

The wish, my South Sudanese chess partners phrased first when I asked what they expect from their leaders, is 'respect': people want the government to respect them. This does not mean special treatment, my chess partner explains, it means that one should be left alone. Most of the regulars here are employed. They pay 10% taxes on their salaries above 300SSP, and they feel that with paying taxes they have bought the right to be left alone. They do not understand the state as a provider but as a racketeer: One pays taxes in order to be left in peace. This is opposed to the idea that it is through the payment of taxes that people develop the wish to hold states accountable (Brautigam 2008, Moore 2008). Here taxes are seen as a ransom. "The government can kill and torture you", I am told, but when one pays taxes, one should be free from this threat.

The difference to the literature might be explained by the fact that South Sudan is still a young state and in the early stages of its statebuilding project. Also, it can be assumed that the men here are reacting to what

they experience from the forces of the state, notably the security forces, on a daily basis. Quite regularly traffic police stop and search cars without reason. The checks usually end with a fine for often made-up offences and of course there is no receipt. Furthermore, in traffic, the government and the population are subject to different rules. When driving to a meeting in my nondescript car a traffic-jam blocked the opposite lane, while ours was relatively free. All of a sudden an SUV with tinted windows broke free on the blocked lane. Just a few metres before us it changed sides and drove with high speed in the wrong direction, coming towards us. My driver reacted with surprising speed; without further ado he drove onto the sidewalk – which was thankfully free of pedestrians. When the SUV had passed, my driver simply drove back onto the street. He shrugged and said, "Someone from the government." If we would have hit someone on the sidewalk or would have crashed with the SUV, he said, we would have been blamed. "It is the government", he said, "of course it would have been our fault."

Smirl (2015) shows how the environment influences how humanitarian aid workers understand the situation and how this influences the perception of the field at the headquarters of an organisation. She argues that the space of humanitarian aid workers has an effect on how the beneficiaries are seen and consequently on the provision of aid. Something similar can be said about the way a government interacts with its people. The distinction between the government and the population in Juba does not only show in the behaviour of the government or of security forces in traffic and public life. Quite literally there exists a city for the population and one for the government. Most roads in Juba are not asphalted, and if they are, one has to take care of the huge holes in the asphalt. Exceptions are Ministry Road and the streets in the presidential district, which are well-maintained, as are the ministries and buildings of the government. There are generators and air condition or at least fans. A guard of honour stands in front of the president's palace. This – the guard of honour and the entrance - is as much as the normal

South Sudanese sees from this building. Compared to the average South Sudanese's housing it resembles a fairy-tale castle. The same holds true for the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, the Headquarter of the SPLM, and other government buildings. The common South Sudanese is not allowed in there. While this is the same for governmental buildings in the West, the difference of luxury and security equipment is more noticeable in South Sudan. The governmental space is a very real symbol of the distinction between the government and the people. My South Sudanese acquaintances do not think about entering these buildings – quite the opposite, one stays away. While on my way through Juba I once noticed that my driver chose a longer way. Asked why, he said he wanted to avoid the presidential buildings, as the guards had recently opened fire on a civilian car. There is a drastic and noticeable difference between the political class and the population, and encounters are more often unpleasant than not. I experienced this when I took a picture of a billboard in Ministry Road. This led to a heated discussion with armed security guards, including the threat of involving national security and a fine of SSP200. It is this behaviour of the state forces that make up the everyday life experience of the common citizen. Based on such experiences one of my chess partners shrugged. 'We fought for independence. They buy big cars'.

4.3.2 A non-providing government

In western thinking, the state is a provider of public goods, such as defence, welfare, education, and health care. This is financed through mandatory taxes, which is why citizens are thought to have an interest in holding governments accountable (Brautigam 2008, Moore 2008). While "governments as a whole or individual government agencies (...) are in a position to select the quantity and type of services they provide based mostly on their own preferences and objectives" (Bernauer and Koubi 2006, p.3), a minimum standard of provision is thought to be expected. An example would be the provision of education, which is crucial for future well-being on an individual as well as on societal level. South

Sudan is a country with a high illiteracy rate. Despite the efforts of the international community, this problem will almost certainly grow in the future. Education comes with high costs and the population is overwhelmingly poor. School fees have to be paid, with some schools charging more than others, thus implementing a selection mechanism for future education and professional success early in life. Furthermore, there are costs for transport, books, stationery, and school uniforms. In a severely poor country, these costs are too high for many South Sudanese, and many parents are consequently not sending their children to school. When told this, I point out that school should be both, mandatory and free. "But who should pay for it, then?" asks my chess partner. And after a minute of pondering silence he asks, "The government?" And his tone of voice adds that this is a very confusing idea.

Judging from this reaction, the idea that the state would provide public services is alien in South Sudan. This refusal to provide basic services has three interconnected consequences. First, the obstacles to education effectively hinder the social and economic progression of the country. South Sudan has experience with the consequences of such abandonment. Part of the reason for the underdevelopment of the South pre-independence, for the discontent of the Southerners and consequently a cause for the outbreak of civil war, was the lack of education (Johnson 2011). Second, social welfare not only keeps a population healthy and enables social progress, but it is part of a social contract and creates group feeling and sense of belonging. In South Sudan, the state is not creating this and thus a national sense of community can hardly develop. Third, the fact that most basic provisions in the country are provided by either iNGOs or UN-agencies releases the state from its core tasks. Christie (2013) named this one of the dangers of high donor and NGO involvement in developing countries. This adds to a legitimacy problem: how can the state be seen as legitimate when external agencies fulfil its tasks (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn, 2013)? This non-involvement of the state confirms the population's

belief that it is at best something distant, at worst a racketeer and predator. Where the provision of public goods is not done by the state the population will not understand the provision of public goods as a right. For media, this effectively removes the basis for the watchdog-idea. If a government is not expected to provide public services, a watchdog has no role. The idea behind the watchdog is that information about the performance of the government gives the citizens the basis to make an educated decision in the upcoming election. Non-performing governments would be voted out of offices. In South Sudan, this mechanism cannot work as the government is not expected to perform.

4.3.2 Elections

There is, furthermore, a practical problem with the idea of voting a government out of office based on non-performance. In South Sudan, the chance to do this is missing as there have been no elections. The current government was voted in in 2010, when southern Sudan was still a part of the Sudan. Following independence in 2011 and according to the transitional constitution (Government of South Sudan 2011), general elections should have taken place on 30th June 2015 (National Elections Act 2012). In 2014, President Kiir announced the delay of the 2015 general elections on grounds of the instability in the country (BBC 2014; Sudan Tribune 2014). A year later, with the date for the general elections fast approaching, Luca Biong Deng wrote in an opinion piece for the Sudan Tribune that "the Minister of Information (…) announced on 13th February that the cabinet has decided to call off the elections and extend the lifespan of the elected positions so as to give peace a chance." (Biong Deng 2015). Shortly thereafter, William Sunday D. Tor wrote in the newspaper The Citizen that, "the 270 members of parliament present voted on Tuesday to amend the country's transitional 2011 constitution to extend the presidential and parliamentary term until July, 9, 2018, with 264 members in favour and a handful opposing it" (Tor 2015)[41].

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[41] The article can be found in Appendix 1.5, p.23.

The legality of this delay is unclear. The National Elections Act (2012) makes no provision for postponement of the general election, but it does mention "Postponement of the Elections of the President and or the Governor" (ibid, §57, p.26). According to this,

> The Commission may postpone elections of the president or governor of a state by notice to that effect, if it becomes impossible to conduct the election (...) provided that the Commission shall fix a new date for elections, as soon as possible, which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the original date established for such elections. (§57 (1), p.26)

Biong Deng (2015) states that neither the president nor the cabinet has the constitutional power to delay the general election. Instead, no constitutional provision exists that explicitly forbids the president to amend provisions concerning its tenure. The elections are thus technically not postponed, rather, the tenure of the president and the parliament is extended. Given the long timespan between the president's announcement in May 2014, the Minister of Information's statement in February 2015, and the parliament's vote in March 2015, it seems unclear to what extent this delay in the disguise of extension of tenure is owed to the situation in the country. The question can be raised if a government, which was not able to improve the situation within a year, would have been confirmed in general elections. The extension of tenure might have been made more out of self-interest than for the good of the country. Comments in informal chats on the topic ranked consequently from 'A disaster' to 'A good decision'. The latter was always said on grounds of the ongoing fighting in the country and the rapidly deteriorating economy. There was the general question of whether another government could improve the situation, and there was also the fear that the current government would in the case of a defeat not go quietly. In light of this, it is questionable whether the population would remove the government given the chance. This connects to the

description of the government as patriarchal. Leadership in the context of South Sudan is neither limited to a certain period nor dependent on achievement and the idea of accountability is not very prominent in South Sudan. This seems to hold true for the leadership as well as for the population. "The leaders", I am told, "are so used to being chiefs in African societies, the idea of transparency and accountability is alien to them." The lack of transparency and accountability in the SPLM was frankly admitted at a public lecture organised by the Sudd Institute[42]. Dr Anne Itto, at this time acting secretary-general of the SPLM[43], stated that the SPLM is in the transition from a rebel movement to political party, and that there are issues the SPLM better deals with behind closed doors.

All this is reminiscent of the 'Big Men Syndrome' (Blackings 2014), a system of governance based on corruption and clientelism. The Big Men Syndrome comes with the belief that exploitation is a right of the political leader. Still, it is enabled by an undemanding population. Asked if they could vote the government out of office, my chess partner looks at me as if I am deranged. "The president is God", he says. "You cannot vote God out of office." The question alone makes him nervous (so much so, that for the first time ever I can sack his queen). "Can you criticise God? Or the president?" I ask. The answer is a very hesitant yes. One can, he says, but one cannot do so openly, open critique is a taboo. One can criticise the leader in private but not in public. The president is the boss, he needs to make things right. It is one's duty as a citizen to treat the president with respect. "And what", I ask, "would happen in case there would be an election and you would vote the government out of office?"
'"There are a lot of woulds", he says.
"True, but what if?"

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[42] The Sudd institute is South Sudan's most important think tank. More information can be found at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/

[43] Dr Anne Itto became deputy secretary general of the SPLM when Pagan Amum returned to the post of secretary general in 2015. Amum had been sacked from his position in July 2013, when President Kiir also dismissed his Vice President Riek Machar. The sackings in July 2013 led in consequence to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.

They would not accept, he finally says. They would just not leave. "Which is why it is better to give them a chance to make things right. Otherwise there would be more fighting, like in December 2013".

4.3.3 A different sense of accountability
Still, a set of rules exists in South Sudan that does bind leaders. I am told that, "The president can hardly visit the area where he is from, because everyone expects him to provide a job". In South Sudanese society, the patriarch provides for the family, but the family has a right to this provision. One of my chess partners told me repeatedly that he sent his wife to visit her sister. This always happened when his nephews came to Juba. Asked why he felt the need to send his wife away when his nephews were in town he explained that when a family member requests accommodation, one cannot refuse. My chess partner lives in a small apartment; he does not earn enough to afford the visits of his nephews. As he cannot reject his relatives his strategy is to make his place inconvenient. He achieves this by sending his wife away, which means that his nephews would need to cook and clean for themselves. Faced with this, the nephews decide to visit another relative. This system of provision works not only on the family-level. Still, there is a need for a direct link, a family, tribal or neighbourly connection.

4.3.4 Summary
Leadership in South Sudan is understood differently than in the West. The national government is not seen as a provider; it is a racketeer. However, leaders who are bound through family, tribe, or neighbourhood have an obligation to provide, but only on the small scale of kinship. A sense of public duties is not present, neither in the leadership nor in the citizenry, and this calls the idea of legitimacy created through the provision of public goods into question. This confirms McLoughlin's (2015) statement that the legitimacy of a leader is a culturally grounded and not a universal valid exercise. Thus, the idea

of media as a watchdog is stripped of its foundation. People do not vote for or against a government on the basis of delivery. Furthermore, criticism is understood as a taboo. It is believed that a vote against the government and its defeat at the ballot box would not lead to a peaceful change of power, but instead to more fighting.

4.4 Groups

One of the aims of media in a country of intervention is to improve relationships and thus contribute to peace (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Orme 2010; Staub 2010). By providing objective and neutral information, media is thought to improve transparency and accountability thus increasing trust in state institutions (Kumar 2006). In this last part of the chapter, I investigate whether media fulfils this role in South Sudan. In the previous part, I provided insights into how the South Sudanese citizens see their government; this is not a trusting relationship but a rather mistrusting one. Governments are representative of the states they are leading. In a country with no experience of bureaucratic rule and state institutions, leadership equals the 'the state'. Drawing on Rokkan's (1999 p. 261) model of plebiscitarian and corporate interests, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn (2013 p. 220) point out that in an active statebuilding process three sets of actors with different self-interests exist: the population (the plebiscitarian interests), the corporate (local elites), and the intervention actors. In understanding the government, the citizens, and the international actors as groups and employing a social psychological perspective, I now provide further insights into the relationships between state/government and citizens, into the relationship between tribal groups in the country, and, finally, in the relationship between the government and the international community.

4.4.1 Citizens' relationship with the government

In South Sudan, the citizens have only marginal expectations towards their government. Some explanations are the behaviour of the government and the way it presents itself, apparent in the houses they reside in and the cars they drive. This bunkerization of the local elites in countries of the global South is not a new phenomenon (Fisher 2017). It is all the more likely that the population is used to understanding the state and its leadership as something remote and rather threatening. This is also apparent in the country's younger history. A prominent narrative surrounds the foundation of South Sudan: that the SPLM/A was a popular rebel movement, supported by the southern population who wanted to gain freedom from the predatory government in Khartoum. The second edition of a history book on South Sudan, primarily intended as a textbook for secondary schools and commissioned by the Ministry of Education and the Government of South Sudan, states:

> From 1983 to 1987 children, farmers and herders rushed to the SPLA's recruitment camps where they got military training. Almost no one was turned down, and the result was a large number of child soldiers. Training was rigorous. (…) Nevertheless, most of the volunteers persevered till the end of the training sessions when they were deployed. (Breidlid (ed) 2014 p. 286)

Not everyone remembers a rush of volunteers, eager to fight for freedom. A young man from a village in Central Equatoria revealed to me how he was hidden by his mother and aunts every time SPLA-soldiers came into his village:

> They did steal everything, food and water. They just took what they wanted. I was 11 years old. When they found you, they asked you to put your arm over your head. If you could touch your shoulder, they declared you old enough and took you to the

training camps. Eventually my family arranged for me to flee to Uganda.[44]

The southern population suffered especially after 1991, when the SPLM/A lost the support of the Ethiopian government. In consequence, it relied on the population for food and shelter, and this was mostly not given voluntarily. The South is a severely underdeveloped and poor country, and its population rarely had the resources to feed a hungry rebel movement. In the same year, probably the most severe split in the movement occurred. Riek Machar and Lam Akol accused John Garang of authoritarianism and human right violations and tried to overthrow him (Arop 2006; Johnson 2011). The consequence was the split into the Nasir- and the Torit-fraction, so named after the locations of their headquarters. Fighting between the two fractions led to huge loss of civilian life and to further fractionalisation of the movement[45].

The Southerners' experience with a national, centralised government prior to independence was downright devastating. The government in Khartoum was exploitative. Furthermore, the history of the SPLM/A is a history of internal splits and bitter animosities, of human right violations, killing of civilians and forced recruitment (Collins 2008; Johnson 2011; LeRiche and Arnold 2012). The government of South Sudan tries to rewrite this history by publishing textbooks like the one cited above and by exhibiting huge billboards that glorify the country's history (Figure

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[44] This measurement of age, the ability to touch the shoulder by reaching over the head, was mentioned a couple of times when I was in South Sudan. I cannot do this, and I have never met a European who can. South Sudanese, however, are usually very tall people with long limbs.

[45] The split was not healed before 2002 when Garang reconciled with Riek Machar. A year later, he settled the dispute with Lam Akol. Notwithstanding the suffering of the southern Sudanese, for which the SPLM/A did bear part responsibility, Garang was celebrated when he signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and was sworn in as vice president of the Sudan and president of southern Sudan. When he died in a helicopter crash only three weeks after having been made president of southern Sudan, he was succeeded by Salva Kiir. Kiir was confirmed in this role in the election in 2010. With the vote pro-independence in 2011, he became the first president of the new Republic of South Sudan. For a detailed account of the splits and insights into the younger history of southern/South Sudan, see Arop (2006) or Akol (2003).

10). Still, the common Southerner has good reason to mistrust government and leadership and to understand the state as something to fear. It seems questionable if such a deep mistrust can be healed by a 'western style' media.

Figure 10: Billboard in Ministry Road, Juba (personal stock)

4.4.2 Relationships between tribes

"I am proud of my Dinka", says the young man and stands up from the bench in the lecture theatre. It is question time after a public lecture that had taken place at Juba University. The young man is walking up and down the aisle, structuring his speech with the reoccurring exclamation of, "I am proud of my Dinka". Every time he says the first syllable of the word 'Dinka' he raises his fist and with the second syllable he punches his chest. It is a fierce gesture, accompanied by the chanting and many

people in the audience nod in the rhythm of the sentence. The lecture was on tribalism and how the innumerable tribes of South Sudan can be moulded into a whole. An ongoing theme during the lecture was that all South Sudanese are brothers and sisters. Tribalism and ways to fight the war are important topics in South Sudanese society, and there are many lectures and speeches on this, organised by Juba University, the church, or peace groups. With the ongoing fighting, this is undoubtedly an urgent topic. Still, it is doubtful whether people understand themselves in strong group terms.

Group attachments are strong on the one hand, weak on the other. They are strong because people identify strongly with their group, but still, one is not necessarily born a Dinka, Nuer, or Murle. It is a social identity, not a biological one. The first hint of this comes in a chat with some of my students. The rural areas of South Sudan are plagued by cattle stealing and abductions. When a child is abducted, it becomes a member of the new tribe, and this membership becomes, eventually, stronger than the association the child was initially born with. This has also been described in Edward Evans-Pritchard's (1940) famous ethnography of the life of the Nuer. The same, I am told, happens when a man marries a woman from another tribe. If a mixed couple marries, the tribal association of one of the partners will change. This is not necessarily the female partner. Men change their tribal affiliation after marriage when they are living with their wife and her tribe[46]. "You belong to the family you are living with", says one of the women I chat relatively regularly on the market with. "How should I survive without my family?" In a harsh environment like South Sudan it is important that someone has your back, thus group affiliations are strong. There is a mutual duty of care that binds kin, neighbours, and families. Still, this does not mean that there is an ethnic hatred between the groups, or that one automatically

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[46] I have no numbers showing how common this praxis is. However, it was mentioned without me asking who changes tribal membership. I assumed automatically (and wrongly) that it would be the wife living with her husband's family and tribe and thus changing her tribal affiliation.

mistrusts a member of another tribe. One of my students is a Nuer; he survived the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 by fleeing to the United Nations compound. Three years later, he still lives in one of the UN's 'Protection of Civilian' sites (PoC) established in Juba. Having experienced the murder of family members during the conflict, he would have any reason to mistrust the group understood as the Nuers' adversary, the Dinka. But he sits in class with Dinka, he participates in group work with Dinka, he takes Boda-Bodas driven by Dinka. "It was not Dinka", he says. "It was soldiers. It was militia".

South Sudanese society is not divided in the way that the different tribes are at each other's throats or that people automatically hate and distrust people from other tribes. "I don't have a problem with Dinka", said one of my chess partners, "many of my friends and neighbours are Dinka. I only have a problem because I cannot get a good job, and I cannot get a good job because you need to be Dinka, best from Bhar-el-Ghazal[47], to get a job with the government. Or another good job. They make sure that all the jobs go to themselves. It is not right. We are in Equatoria. Jobs should go to Equatorians."[48] Similar remarks were made by others. The problem is the same loyalty mentioned in the first part of this chapter. As part of a family and/or a tribe it is one's duty to support, employ, and promote members of one's family or tribe. This leads to nepotism and exclusion. To a degree this is also responsible for the perception of the SPLM being a 'Dinka movement', and the government being a 'Dinka-government'. Both accusations are aiming at the fact that members and people in power are almost always Dinka. There is clear, structurally caused favouritism in South Sudan, based on tribe membership, but also on friendship, neighbourhood, and shared experience[49].

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[47] Bhar-el-Ghazal is where President Kiir is from. The comment indicated the need to have a connection to the President in order to get a job.
[48] Notable here is that Equatoria is itself home to a plethora of tribes and that the speaker is not for appointments based on merit but advocates for discrimination based on location.
[49] An example for this is the common narrative of 'having been in the bush together'. This refers to the shared experience of fighting together in the SPLA. When working in

Figure 11: Ethnic groups in South Sudan. UNOCHA, April 2009

This might also explain the divide between the people of Equatoria and the Dinka. During chess-chats I heard regular remarks that Equatoria should be independent, that there are not enough Equatorians in the national government and that the Equatorians are the losers of independence. When looking at a map of the distribution of ethnicities (Figure 11)[50] one can see that Equatoria, the southern part of South Sudan, is indeed not a traditional Dinka homeland. For the Equatorians, the Dinka took over Equatoria; now they are in Juba, driving big cars, living in nice houses, and preventing the Equatorians from having nice houses and big cars. The former fighters and liberators of the country are seen by some as the new oppressors. The SPLM, however, although in the majority Dinka, does not understand itself as an exclusive movement[51].

South Sudan and interacting with government, be it on the local or the national level, I always heard statements like "He is a fine man. We fought together in the bush" or "I know him from when we were together in the bush". Having fought together and been 'in the bush' created an attachment stronger than tribal membership.

[50] A bigger version of this map can be found in Appendix 1.5, p.25.

[51] With reference to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, John Garang said that, "As a movement that has been fighting against the marginalisation of others, we shall not tolerate the exclusion of anybody from the process" (Garang and Khalid

There might be a self-serving bias at work, with people positively discriminating towards their kin[52].

While ethnicity, if understood as creating hate between groups, can hardly be seen as at the root of the conflict, the loyalty to one's group has an effect. By the same rule which forces people to give jobs to others from their community, people are also bound to fight for their leaders. If a militia leader or local strongman asks people to fight against another village or tribe, this constitutes an order. People have to do so, even if they do not have any problem with the other group. The violence and the fighting, I am told repeatedly, is a problem of leadership. "The violence is ethnic", said one of my interviewees, "but the conflict is not". While there might be concrete problems between groups in the rural areas and on a community level, if it comes to fighting is down to leadership. The most common reasons for tensions between villages or groups are cattle raiding and fights over water holes and grassing grounds. These are conflicts over scarce resources (Sherif et al. 1988). How such conflicts are resolved is a question of leadership. There are uncompromising leaders who understand fighting to be in their interests. What is more, when local leaders want their people to fight they do not need a reason. All they have to do is order people to fight. This makes media programmes for peace ill-suited to the task of preventing conflict. In Juba, Eyeradio, the UN-Radio Miraya and the church-financed Radio Bakhita all are broadcasting dedicated peace programmes. Eyeradio states on its website, "It explores the prospects for peace in South Sudan by looking at the role of the citizens and leaders, well-wishers, regional leaders, and the international community" (Eyeradio no date). The radio drama 'Sawa Shabab', broadcast by Radio Miraya and Radio Bakhita, presents role models and shows how they behave in certain situations including

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1992). In fact, the implementation was done by Garang's favourite intellectuals, long time companions and friends (LeRiche and Arnold 2012); it was not at all inclusive.
[52] In social psychology, the self-serving bias is a well-researched cognitive bias that leads people to attribute positive events to their abilities and skills, while negative events are seen as caused by external factors (Campbell, Sedikidis 1999; Forsyth 2008).

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interethnic strife (Free Press Unlimited 2014). This shall enable the listener to understand that they can make up their mind and work actively for peace. The idea behind these peace programmes is that if provided with reliable and neutral information and role models of behaviour, people will be able to overcome bias and prejudice. Peace programmes are thought to help listeners understanding and resisting manipulation; thus, they make peace possible (LaBenevolencija no date b). The programmes, however, assume a fear of 'the other' or a successful manipulation into hate, they do not consider a leadership order. What is more, researching Burundi Bilali et al. (2015) have shown that obedience to leadership is not changing by so-called peace programmes.

South Sudan is a highly decentralised country with a plethora of regional and local armed actors. There is a lack of communication between the upper, middle, and lower echelons of government, with President Kiir often making lone top-down decisions (LeRiche and Arnold 2012) and administrative offices, ministries, and security forces sometimes acting without an order, consultation, or agreement. This does not enhance people's trust in the state, but increases their feeling of insecurity and thus the importance of group loyalty. The conflict is a leadership and institutional problem; it is not ethnicity-based. Tribal membership becomes salient when political leaders order it so; in the absence of leaders' orders it does not make for strong bonds. Asked if he rather trusted a Dinka or a political leader of any tribal affiliation, my Nuer-student did not hesitate in saying that he would rather trust the Dinka. When I asked my Bari- and later a Dinka-Chess partner if they would rather trust a Nuer or a leader, the answer was that they would rather trust the Nuer. This calls into question the effects of peace programmes produced by media development agencies and broadcast by media houses. These programmes work on the assumption that a bottom-up approach is necessary and that hatred needs to be overcome on the grassroots level. Instead, it is a leadership problem; a top-down approach

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putting pressure on the South Sudanese leadership would be more promising.

4.4.3 Relationship between the government and the international community

In May 2015, the South Sudanese government expelled the UN's resident relief coordinator and deputy envoy Toby Lanzer[53]. The dismissal was because of Lanzer's media activities; in particular caused by an interview given in Geneva, Switzerland, in which Lanzer had critiqued the South Sudanese government harshly and described it as a failed one. Supporting reasons were his critical tweets and other statements on social media where Lanzer is said to have stated that South Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy (Atem 2015)[54]. Ateny Wek Ateny, spokesperson of the government of South Sudan (GoSS) said in an interview with the newspaper The Citizen, "These statements are irresponsible statements from the humanitarian coordinator, given the fact that they don't give hope to the people of South Sudan". The sacking of Toby Lanzer generated turmoil in the international community. International actors saw their opinion of the South Sudanese government as ruthless and authoritarian confirmed. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon condemned the decision, named Lanzer "instrumental in addressing the increasing humanitarian needs of conflict-affected communities in the country" (United Nations 2015b), and called on the GoSS to reverse the decision immediately. He further urged the government to "cooperate fully with all United Nations entities present in South Sudan" (United Nations 2015b).

Problems in the relationship between donors and governments are not uncommon. These are asymmetrical relationships between a provider and a receiver. The problem that arises is behavioural and cultural, as in

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[53] At the time, Lanzer was already at the end of his spell in South Sudan and about to take a new position as UN regional coordinator to the Sahel. His successor was already appointed.
[54] This article can be found in Appendix 1.6, pp.27, 28.

the Lanzer-incident. The South Sudanese government with its culturally-based aversion against being critiqued felt unfairly criticised and reacted accordingly. The UN Secretary-General ordered to take the decision back and to cooperate with the UN, which really meant obeying the UN. This did not bode well with a government that sees itself as an independent entity in a sovereign country and in possession of the right of self-determination. They understand the UN and the international donors and expat community as guests in the country; as such "they do have to obey the rules of South Sudan and not make their own rules. They have to follow our rules", as was explained to me by a government official in the Ministry of Information. The international community, on the other hand, understands itself as helping the country. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) operational plan states that, "our strategic objective is to help South Sudan establish stronger foundation for sustainable peace and development" (DFID 2014) and later, "the UK's long-term vision is a viable and stable South Sudan, at peace with itself and its neighbours" (DFID 2014). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) names the same objective in its South Sudan Transition Strategy paper: "The Transition Strategy further builds on USAID's previous 2006 strategy and sets forth USAID's plan to assist the government and people of South Sudan to enhance stability and advance their development aspirations" (USAID 2011). A civil servant from the European Union stated in an informal chat that "governments come and go. We assist the people of South Sudan". The same was, phrased in different ways, stated by iNGO-workers in the country. There is a disagreement between the GoSS and the international community about what relationship is formed by the provision and reception of assistance.

The international community feels that because of the amount of money they are giving they should have a say in governance and in the implementation of the projects they are financing. Most prominently, this was phrased by an acquaintance working for one of the bigger iNGOs,

who said: "We have literally paid for everything in this country. This country is functioning only because of us." The government does not see a connection between receiving donor money and a say in decisions. In informal talks, government officials said that they are happy to get advice, but that advice should be only advice; they do not feel an obligation to take it. Asked if they get the impression of having an obligation it was rather vaguely stated that, "some donors are better than others". The leadership in South Sudan often sees the Kawajas[55] as rather clueless about realities in the country. An explanation for this might be the way the donors and expat workers live and work[56]. The infamous expat bubble makes for a tangible barrier between foreigners and South Sudanese and has an effect on the perceptions of the other group (Autesserre 2014). Still, the South Sudanese elites and members of the government have the same tendency of bunkerization (Fisher 2017). In the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs it is not just the building that is protected by a fence and guards but the individual offices are secured with fingerprint scanners. These high levels of security make for divisions; between government and common South Sudanese on the one hand but also between government and foreign donors on the other. Government officials repeatedly phrased a general feeling of mistrust when we talked about their relationship with foreign donors. The development of a partnership seems to be hindered by a feeling of

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[55] South Sudanese name for a white person.

[56] Expat compounds and office buildings, especially for embassies and the European Union, are a far cry away from the houses and offices of the common South Sudanese. When my research assistant came to deliver some papers to my apartment in Juba, he was stunned by the premises and told me later that he had never seen anything like this ever before. He asked how it happens that buildings like the one I was living in are not owned by South Sudanese but by foreigners, mostly from Kenya, Ethiopia and Lebanon – a question I struggled to answer. The building I rent an apartment in is owned by a Kenyan woman. It is a four-storey building with approximately 28 two- and three-room apartments. They are comfortable, but would not be considered special in a country of the industrialised North. In South Sudan, they are luxurious because they come with security, electricity and water supply. This is made possible by generators and huge water tanks which are filled on a regular basis with water bought from a company and delivered by a tank lorry. The apartments also come with internet. While this is luxurious compared to the huts of the local population, living conditions of embassy personnel are fairy tale castles for South Sudanese, coming with elevators and private swimming pools.

exclusion, most visible in the housing and working arrangements of foreign donors. The fact that government officials do have similarly exclusive arrangements does not make a difference. There is a feeling that as guests in the country foreign donors' doors should be more open and more engaging in partnership; and there is also a feeling that they should not interfere in the inner affairs of the country. The problem was not just apparent in the expulsion of the UN's deputy envoy, but also when the Minister for Information, Michael Makuei, threatened to close the UN-Radio Miraya in February 2015 because Miraya had aired an interview with an exiled politician. The threat against the radio station was taken back by the government after an intervention of Ellen Margrethe Løj, then Head of UNMISS. This showed the same pattern as with the Toby Lanzer-incident. A member or an institution of the international community states or broadcasts something the government understands as hostile; the government reacts to this and is rebuffed by the international actor. The Miraya-incident was interpreted in two different ways. While almost any international expat I talked to understood it as an affront of the government against press freedom, freedom of expression and the UN in general, South Sudanese acquaintances were taken aback by what they described as "another UNMISS-arrogance". It was stated that no government in the West would allow a radio station to air rebel views and that the UN needed to follow the laws in the country.

This struggle over predominance between the local elites and the international intervention actors is also apparent in the GoSS' attempt to regulate iNGOs. In May 2015, the government issued a new NGO bill, which required NGOs to register with the government, a tedious and costly process but not a new requirement. Furthermore, it ordered iNGOs to ensure that no more than a fifth of their staff were foreigners[57]. This caused concern among the NGOs working in South Sudan. It was claimed

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[57] A press statement from the Ministry of Labour detailing the request can be found in Appendix 1.6, p.26.

that this regulation in combination with a shortage of skilled South Sudanese workers would result in delays of projects. The argument was dismissed by nationals. "We do not have a capacity problem", I was told, "...we have a capacity utilisation problem". Another statement was: "The international community is doing capacity building here since ten years. How can there not be enough capacity? Did they do something wrong?" The government, and many other well-educated South Sudanese, have long been complaining that iNGOs give too many jobs to foreigners and not to the local population. The NGO bill was thus seen as reasonable and necessary[58]. Finally, the struggle over predominance and mistrust is not only between the GoSS and foreign donors and iNGOs. It also takes place between iNGOs working in or on South Sudan and South Sudanese organisations. The main example for this is the AMDISS-incident which took place between the Association for Media Development in South Sudan, AMDISS, and Radio Tamazuj, supposedly a project of the Dutch NGO Free Voice Unlimited[59]. Tamazuij is a media organisation broadcasting on short wave and publishing on its website. On its Facebook page, it claims to be 'an independent and trusted source of news covering Sudan and South Sudan' (Radio Tamazuj no date), but according to The Citizen it is linked to the Dutch NGO Free Press Unlimited. A connection to the Netherlands is evident in the contact number given on Tamazuij's webpage, which is a number in the Netherlands. Tamazuij seems to be a problematic case of a foreign organisation interfering in a sovereign country. Its unaccountability and lack of transparency became especially evident when it accused the AMDISS of helping the government to track down journalists. AMDISS is headed by the editors-in-chief of The Citizen and The Juba Monitor, Nhial Bol and Alfred Taban, the latter a former BBC-correspondent in Sudan. Both rejected the accusation. Indeed, the issue in question was a

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[58] The tendency of NGOs and UN-agencies to rely on foreign experts instead of utilising local expertise has also been pointed out by Autesserre (2014). Especially in South Sudan, where many former refugees were educated in the UK, the US and Australia, capacity might indeed be less a problem than in other severely underdeveloped countries.

[59] For details on the affiliation of Radio Tamazuj, see Appendix 1.3, pp.8-13.

registration process, something not unknown in western countries. AMDISS explained its decision as a move to support media training and structure the journalistic scene in Juba – something which is understood as necessary by many media professionals. Notwithstanding appeals from AMDISS to either support or withdraw the accusation, Tamazuij did neither. When contacted via their webpage, they refused to discuss the issue[60]. This is an example of the unregulated media scene concerning South Sudan, but also of the problems between the outlet of a western backed up project like Tamazuij and the South Sudanese media.

The government accuses iNGOs of meddling in political and internal affairs. This was especially apparent when six US-based iNGOs, including Human Rights Watch, sent a letter to John Kerry, then US Secretary of State. They asked for more sanctions against South Sudan to force the warring parties to strike a peace deal. Surely this was well meant but it did not soften the GoSS' approach towards iNGOs. According to the New Nation[61] it was seen as a "blatant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation." The government said that the NGOs should rather "reflect on their current soft gloves approach towards the rebels and start to exercise more pressure on the rebels to motivate them to return to the peace talks" (Figure 12).

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[60] The e-mail exchange can be found in Appendix 1.3, pp.10-12. More information on the AMDISS-incident are in Appendix 1.7.
[61] The article can be found in Appendix 1.6, p.29.

Figure 12: NGOs must stop interfering. Newspaper article, New Nation

Lastly, the mistrust of the GoSS towards foreign donors can be explained historically. Problems with international aid can be traced back to the second civil war, when the UN and USA did not provide relief for civilians outside Khartoum's control, thus effectively taking sides. In 1986, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) were forbidden to cooperate with the SPLA. This:

> …had a direct impact on the SPLA's own attitude towards relief. They were unimpressed by assertions of neutrality by UN-agencies and NGOs, seeing their activities as directly supporting the government's [in Karthoum, kt] strategy and supplying garrison in the South. They saw that their own infractions, such as the 1986 downing of a civilian airliner in Malakal, drew far more international condemnation than the government's [in Khartoum, kt] extensive and systematic abuses. The suspicion engendered by what appeared to be UN and NGO duplicity and hypocrisy lasted well into the early years of OLS [Operation Lifeline Sudan[62]], and has never been fully dispelled. (Johnson 2011, p.147)

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[62] Operation Lifeline Sudan was established in April 1989. It was a consortium made of UN-agencies and approximately 35 NGOs with the aim to provide help and relief

This mistrust against the UN and iNGOs has not been overcome. The SPLM/A learned from early experience that humanitarian assistance can be used to take sides. As the actors in the SPLM have hardly changed it seems realistic that the GoSS today is still mistrusting towards donors - a mistrust further fed by donor's behaviour. While this thesis does not investigate the donors, it stands to reason that the two groups, interveners on the grounds and in the headquarters, and local elites in the country of intervention, develop perceptions of each other according to their own interests (see Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 2016, pp.28-34; Bliesemann de Guevara 2017).

4.4.4 Summary

This subchapter looked at the relationships between the South Sudanese population and the government, the relationships between the different tribes in the country, and the relationship between the government and the international community. Drawing on the Sudanese civil war, I provided background information concerning the predominant mistrust of the population when it comes to the government. I then investigated the relationships of the different tribes in the country and identified a group loyalty in South Sudanese society, which works to an extent along tribal lines, without being bound exclusively to the tribal association. Tribal affiliation, although strong when present, can be changed. It is not exclusively born but made. Still, in a harsh living environment such as South Sudan, one cannot survive without being part of a group, which is why people obey a leader. This means that the grassroots approach, favoured by many media development organisations, is unsatisfactory. It is the upper echelon that must be targeted by policy. Finally, the relationship between the government and the international community is also marked by a general mistrust based on an imbalance but also on past experiences. The government feels patronised by foreign donors,

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throughout war-torn and drought-affected areas in the South. OLS was different from earlier humanitarian assistance, which targeted only government-controlled areas.

and the role media plays in this is especially apparent when considering the expulsion of the UN's deputy envoy Toby Lanzer and the threat to close UN-Radio Miraya. The general mistrust of the international community might not be a new development but to an extent grounded in former experience. During the second civil war the USA and the UN only provided humanitarian aid to people under Khartoum's control. The WFP and the UNHCR were explicitly forbidden to cooperate with the SPLA.

4.5 Chapter conclusions

In this chapter, I have presented findings on the effects of media in South Sudan using ethnographic observation. Ethnography cannot answer the question of whether there is a direct, causal link from listening to a specific media programme or radio station to a mindset or attitude towards the state or people with a different ethnic affiliation. Still, it can answer the question of whether media with a western underpinning is able to fulfil its role in a non-western society. Its ability to take context into account is what makes ethnography valuable here. While a survey would rely on participants' self-proclaimed time of listening to media, using ethnography it can be observed how important media reasonably can be, which is apparent in how regular people have access to media. How they talk about leadership and the state when, figuratively speaking, they had let their hair down, was also possible to observe with ethnography. The observations revealed a more complex reality than discovered by using a questionnaire or interviews. Ethnography takes the context into consideration and hence looks deeper. This touches on the recent discussion of whether 'being there' is a necessary or at least desirable feature of ethnography (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, pp.6, 7). Coming from anthropology, ethnography had a taste not just for 'being there' but this 'there' was also usually a rather exotic place. Limited funding and increasing problems for researchers abroad have driven ethnography to places closer to home (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997). In

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IR, 'being there' is further complicated as some of the countries to do research in are increasingly dangerous. Another problem is that there might just not be a 'there', when studying phenomena that are not constrained to one location (Marcus 1995; Marcus 1998). Still, such difficulties do not mean that 'being there' is not the desirable option. Ethnography creates knowledge and context "through personal relationships bound by self-knowledge, expectation and commitment" (Greenhouse 2010, p.2). Thinking about Bliesemann de Guevara's work regarding the practices of the International Crisis Group (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014) and the increasing practice of politician's visit to military theatres (Bliesemann de Guevara 2017), it might be necessary to redefine what 'being there' means. Drawing on my experience in South Sudan, I argue that 'being there' is as much a situation as a place. Examining South Sudan requires one to dive into South Sudanese everyday life. Spending time only in an UN-house and a white land cruiser only offers a chance to study bunkerization and international peacekeepers. Understanding the situation by experiencing it on location is ethnography's major strength.

'Being there' allowed me to talk to people about the expectations they hold towards the media, the state, and the conflict and groups in the country, and having experienced driving on South Sudanese streets, water and fuel shortages, and in general South Sudanese reality over a longer period of time, I could put their remarks in context. Furthermore, in looking at the surroundings of the research question, ethnographic observation also negotiates the problem of the researcher's influence on the research environment. It becomes closer to what Webb et al. (1966) call 'unobtrusive measures'. Participating in everyday life over a longer period of time and being involved in situations that were not obviously connected to my research interest made my intervention as a researcher minimal. At the same time, there are also problems with ethnographic observation. The long duration it requires, the issues of gaining access, and establishing relationships make it rather unpractical for applied

research that requires fast answers. Furthermore, answers are country, or rather situation-specific. Still, Flyvbjerg (2006, p.228) has said that generalising from one case study is possible by using falsification. If media development is having different effects than expected in South Sudan, the theory that media can aid statebuilding and reconciliation is not generally valid.

With regards to the effects of media in South Sudan, ethnographic observations have shown that the lack of electricity in Juba probably prevents media from playing as extensive a role as claimed by its supporters. Coming to the two areas that media development is supposed to affect, namely the state and relations between groups, the ethnographic part of the study showed that South Sudanese see their government rather as a group of robber barons who they pay (in the form of taxes) and thus acquire the right to be left alone. Government's misdeeds, uncovered and broadcast by media, will hardly have an effect on the population as they know or are not surprised by them. Elections are not a way to change government but a potential source for trouble. Thus, media's attempt to inform the population has little effect on people's view of the state or on governance. The watchdog role has no basis in South Sudan. The media itself is understood as a possible source for trouble and hence a wish for tighter control of the media was repeatedly voiced. At the same time, South Sudanese see the government as a legitimate source of information. The concept of independent media is not clearly defined in South Sudan. Grounded in the country's history, media is seen and understood as a mouthpiece of the government.

A cultural rule exists in South Sudan that criticising the leaders is not to be done. This is in direct opposition to media's task as a watchdog on government. The harsh line taught to South Sudanese local journalists by western media organisations leads to danger for these journalists and to a deteriorating relationship between the government of South Sudan and the international community, as evident in the expulsion of the UN's

former special envoy Toby Lanzer. Finally, ethnic hatred is not the root cause of the conflict in South Sudan. Group attachments are on the one hand relatively weak and can be changed. On the other hand, they are strong, as people are dependent on their kin for survival. This means that when a leader orders people to fight, they have to. This does not make the conflict ethnic; instead it was repeatedly described as a power struggle between elites. This means that media as a peacebuilding tool cannot be very effective when it presupposes an ethnically grounded hate and mistrust and targets mostly the grassroots.

In looking at the context, ethnographic observation has uncovered that media development campaigns' influence in the country is rather insignificant as people have very limited access to the media. In addition, the cultural context of the country is diametrical to the assumptions under which western-led media operates.

5 – The survey

Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel state that "conversations about poverty alleviation and development are [today] much more focused on evidence than they were before" (Karlan and Appel 2016, p.2). Stremlau also noted how "international development donors have become increasingly preoccupied with how 'evidence' can ground policymaking" (Stremlau 2014, p.1). Empirical evidence is named as especially important for donor decisions (Sutcliffe and Court 2006, p.2), and numbers are popular in social research as they seem more objective than interpretive research (Merry 2016; Porter 1995). Social surveys are "a feasible and relatively economical means of collecting social data" (Bulmer 1993, p.8) and, lastly, "quantitative social research is (…) most of the time (…) concerned with cause – with questions about whether some intervention works" (Turner 2007, p.121). All these were reasons to decide on a social survey to investigate western media in a non-western country. Still, there are also well-known problems with surveys. Collecting a representative sample in countries with no census is not only a challenge, but virtually impossible. Recruitment and training of interviewers might present problems. Phrasing questionnaire questions that make sense to the population studied can be complicated, and respondents might just want to get over with the questionnaire. Surveys simplify but social reality is complex. The question has been asked, "what happens when social science tries to describe things that are complex, diffuse and messy? The answer (…) is that it tends to make a mess of it" (Law 2004, p.2). The messiness of the research process and the complexity of the research results are disregarded by academics and policy makers, although "this 'mess' and uncertainty reflects the reality of the situation in which peace builders are intervening, and should therefore be embraced by researchers studying these environments" (Perera 2017, p. 54). Suda Perera draws this conclusion from a qualitative study; but it is just as true when handling numbers and doing a survey.

I start the chapter with an account of the process of data gathering. This is followed by a description of the research aims and of the sample. I then present the results provided by survey research about people's opinion of and attitude towards the media, the state, and groups in the country.

5.1 On doing a survey

Three weeks into the fieldwork, my desk was buried under 500 questionnaires, three pages each; a total of 1500 pages. The only thing exempted from the flood of paper was my laptop. In the December heat of Juba I filled data into SPSS. I had a regular supply of tea from a restaurant around the corner and frequent visits from a young cat, whose purring mixed with the humming of the air condition to a calm background music. The peace and quiet were only disturbed by my increasing unease about my data. For reasons unknown, respondents had not stuck to the questions, and frequently multiple boxes had been ticked. Particularly problematic were the answers to the question about preference for a radio station. The multiple ticking had created 17 subcategories, most containing only one or two cases. This variable was the independent variable (*IV*). 17 subcategories meant that I had too many cases, even if this multiple ticking probably showed how people listened to radio stations in South Sudan. People seldom had one favoured radio station but instead they listen to whatever was playing. How does one research if people's attitudes were connected to a preference for a radio station, if there was no preferred station? Another issue, though more puzzling than disturbing, was that many of the respondents had scribbled notes like 'Women equality is important' in the margins. Others had included 'women programmes' as an answer where the questionnaire had asked for favourite programmes. It was unclear why that was.

The process of data gathering had started at Juba University, where student researchers were hired for the interviewing. The questionnaire had been run through a panel of experts, a group of South Sudanese who

were associated with either my apartment house or a hotel I had lived in before. It had been piloted to 20 South Sudanese, which resulted in some rephrasing of questions. At the university, I met one of the academic staff, an acquaintance of mine. His position at the university was lucky, as he clarified governmental procedures and introduced me to a class who he instructed to work as interviewers. A week later, I drove again to the university with 500 questionnaires in my car boot. My visit had been announced and the lecturer gave me time to explain my research. I felt a little rushed by interrupting him and the class, but gave an introduction to my research's design and aims, explained the questionnaire, and the way it should be completed. Then I handed over my 500 questionnaires. On the way home, I was unsure about the short amount of time I had had for explaining. I had talked to the students for roughly 90 minutes. I comforted myself with the thought that my interviewers were in their fourth year at university and that some of them had done this kind of work before. Part of a degree at Juba University involves writing a BA-dissertation, so I calmed myself with the thought that my interviewees would surely have had some research training; and, after all, I had explained the basics of my research. I also had given my telephone number so that I could be reached in case of any questions. Indeed, I was called a few days later by two of the students. I met them and talked the questionnaire through in more detail. All this was reassuring.

Still, when I had collected the questionnaires I discovered the multiple ticking and creating new categories that had happened. The directions I had given the students had been clear, at least so I had thought. Still, the returned questionnaires told a different story; obviously my instructions had not been clear enough. I decided to work on other parts of my research project for the time being. A few months later, when I met one of my former interviewers coincidentally, the puzzle was solved. I mentioned in passing that the survey would be repeated, and he asked if he could work for me again. Then he said, 'I think I was the best of your interviewers. I always asked people for what else I should tick on the

questionnaire'. Some of the respondents, he admitted, did offer multiple answers themselves but if they did not he had asked them for more than one answer. Questioned further, he said that most of the other interviewers pressed for more than one answer, too. Asked why they thought that ticking as many boxes as possible was a good thing he answered that foreigners always wanted as many answers as possible. Foreigners, he went on, also always wanted to hear about certain topics, like gender. Why, he asked, had there not been a question about female equality in the questionnaire? This, he said, had confused many interviewers and many respondents. This was why they had included these answers in the questionnaires. Asked why they had not called and asked about this he said that they did not want to bother me with something so minor that they easily could solve on their own.

The chat was revealing, and the insight gained from this was confirmed in subsequent informal interviews with my surveyors. Not only did these conversations provide an explanation for what had gone wrong, but they also underpinned the need for thinking about context when doing research in a country such as South Sudan. The country has been independent since 2011. In 2013, conflict broke out anew and led the economic situation to go from bad to worse. During my stay of roughly ten months, the South Sudanese Pound (SSP) lost value rapidly while prices for goods and food in the market skyrocketed. In November 2014, the black market rate for US-Dollars was 1:5. In August 2015, it was 1:14 or 15. For some goods, the price increased up to 40% during the same period. Making ends meet became harder and harder in the country with a lot of people being unemployed, and a lot of jobs not paying well enough to make up for price increases. Being a Kawaja, a white person, added further to the problem. Kawajas are often perceived as working for iNGOs or UN-agencies and as having the power to provide well-paid jobs for South Sudanese. Due to my skin colour, the students thought that they could gain a permanent and well-paid job, if only they did good work as interviewers for me. What was more, I had been introduced by a high-

ranking person from the university, further cementing the view that I was influential enough to initiate further projects and offer employment. This made the students eager to provide excellent data. At the same time, their idea of what 'excellent data' are was fairly different from what was needed. The question was now how this problem could be overcome. The research design and methods had been explained before the first survey, still, they surveyors came with their own set of interpretations ('the more answers, the better') and their own agenda ('trying to gain a reputation as a good interviewer').

Roughly half a year later, the survey was repeated. While again student interviewers were recruited, things were a little different. Since the first social survey, I had taught a class at the university. I had been present there every week and had had regular contact with staff and students. As before, 25 fourth-year students were recruited, the same salary was offered and everyone distributed 20 questionnaires to friends, acquaintances, and family members. Again, I collected and paid the students approximately ten days later. This time, however, the data were of an excellent quality. Every question was answered using only the possible answers, no notes in the margins, no multiple answers. The two groups of students were comparable, with each group studying in different departments. Both groups had been given the exact same amount of information on the survey. Taking a gamble, I had decided to provide the exact same amount of training to see if it was really only about my visibility and assumed status. The second set of students did not see me as a distant person, introduced by an important person and working for some unnamed international organisation. They did know me; I had been present as a member of staff in the department the past semester, I had been seen regularly on campus, running to reach my classroom in time and drinking tea with students after lectures. Two of my interviewers wrote their BA-theses under my supervision. Almost all of the students did know me from informal chats or had seen me on campus, and this time, students had no reservations to make use of my

contact data and ask additional questions. I received numerous phone calls with additional questions. When the questionnaires were collected, students were eager to talk about their experience as interviewers. I was not a person in authority this time, or, as a lecturer, I was a person with a different kind of authority. Having been known as a teacher over a longer period and having a reputation for being approachable apparently made a difference.

The first survey proved unable to answer the research question of what the effects of listening to a specific radio station were. It did, however, provide valuable information about the interplay between researcher, research environment, and lived reality in South Sudan. In drawing on ethnomethodology, Greiffenhagen, Mair and Sharrock (2015) disentangle methods from their status as entities in their own rights, describing a particular reality in a neutral way. They show how 'data trouble' provides additional information once the researcher stops looking for creative fixes and instead for deeper insight. The first survey showed that the different backgrounds the students and I were coming from created power relations that arose due to the problematic economy in South Sudan, and they led to a different way of handling the questionnaire. Methods act in a certain environment, and the troubles encountered provide information about the particular environment. In a more general sense, the experience of doing fieldwork in South Sudan made it clear that gathering quantitative data should not be done without knowing about the environment and the context. It became clear how the social reality of a country in conflict, with an accompanying and increasing level of poverty, impacted on the data collection. Data gathering is a social process and it requires awareness and reflexivity.

5.2 Research aims

Only the second survey was used for analysis. The aims were to find out whether there is a measurable difference in attitude dependent on a

preference for a radio station. If radio underpinned by western values provides neutral information and thus enables listeners to participate in governance, this effect should be observable in attitudes people held towards the state and the government. As media is thought to be able to contribute to reconciliation, listeners of western-led radios, and in particular listeners of radios that broadcast dedicated peace programmes, should also hold more favourable attitudes towards people from other tribes than listeners of other radio stations. How people thought about the media itself was also investigated, and finally, it was of interest whether listeners of 'western' radio stations hold different attitudes towards the international community, namely the UN and iNGOs, than people listening mostly to South Sudanese stations. The questionnaire[63] consisted of questions about the preference for radio stations as the independent variable (*IV*) and questions asking about attitudes towards government, UN-agencies and iNGOs, and people from different tribes constituting the dependent variable (*DV*). Answers were measured using a Likert-scale. The analysis considers differences and variations in attitudes between groups, again following the order media, the state, and groups. The category 'the state' here includes attitudes, beliefs, and opinions on iNGOs and the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as they provide essential services in the country. 'Media' looks at how media outlets are perceived by the South Sudanese, and 'groups' investigates the level of interethnic ties and the possibility of peaceful cooperation. In this part, it was examined whether there is a severe division along ethnic lines in the country and what effects the international-led media such as the UN-Radio Miraya and the iNGO-run Eyeradio and their peace programmes have on the South Sudanese population.

The hypotheses to be tested with reference to the three categories in the overall framework can be seen in Figure 13 (below). Descriptive

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[63] The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.1.

statistics are used to describe peoples' attitudes towards the three categories. I wanted to investigate what attitudes people hold towards the media, the state, and groups, and whether these attitudes are dependent on a preference for a specific radio station. The test chosen for this was the Kruskal-Wallis H test, as differences in the distribution of beliefs needed to be determined, data are non-normally distributed, and the dependent variable is ordinal. The data fail the assumptions for a one-way ANOVA. Beliefs were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree', including the category 'I do not know'. The independent variable (*IV*) here is 'media', determining which media outlet respondents had named as their primary source of information. The dependent variable (*DV*) is the attitude held. This is a between-subjects design, as the categories of the *IV* – the media stations - are independent groups (see Figure 4 in chapter 3.3)

	Hypothesis	*Null hypothesis*
State	There is a significant difference in preference for radio station and attitudes towards government. There is a significant difference in preference for radio station and attitude towards UN-agencies and iNGOs.	There is no significant difference in preference for radio station and attitudes towards government. There is no significant difference in preference for radio station and attitude towards UN-agencies and iNGOs.
Media	There is a significant relationship between preference for radio station and belief in media's objectivity. There is a significant relationship between preference for radio station and belief that journalists in South Sudan are well-educated.	There is no significant relationship between preference for radio station and belief in media's objectivity. There is no significant relationship between preference for radio station and belief that journalists in South Sudan are well-educated.
Groups	There is a significant difference in preference for radio station and attitudes towards people from different tribes.	There is no significant difference in preference for radio station and attitudes towards people from different tribes.

Figure 13: Hypotheses and null hypotheses

In some instances, listeners of the BBC were omitted from the analysis as the investigation focused solely on stations broadcasting in South Sudan. Where this was done, it is stated in the text. Otherwise stated differently, percentages reported here are valid per cent.

5.3 Sample description

Sample size was calculated with a margin error of 5%, a confidence level of 94% and a standard derivation of .5 (Israel 1992). The population size was sheer guesswork, as Juba's last census was done before independence in 2008. The validity of this census is questionable at best; already in 2008, the census result was inconclusive with numbers having been "deflated in some regions and inflated in others" (New Sudan Vision 2009). While the numbers had not been accepted in 2008, it is also unknown how much the population has changed since this time. In 2008, the population size of Juba was given as 368, 436 inhabitants (National Bureau of Statistics 2010, p.14). Following the referendum, the declaration of independence, and the outbreaks of conflict it can be reasonably assumed that this number has massively increased. I estimated population size at 1.5 million people. The sample size was then calculated (Z-score)^2 * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error) at 354. 25 fourth-year students distributed 500 questionnaires in Juba to friends and family members. Following data cleaning, 461 questionnaires remained. A further 89 BBC-listeners were later omitted on the grounds that the analysis turned to questions asking specifically for South Sudanese radio programmes. This reduced the sample to 372 cases. SPSS was used for analysis. The sample (including BBC-listeners) consists of 246 males and 215 females. The majority of the respondents are rather young, with 52.2% being between 18 and 29 years old, and 36.7% between 30 and 49. Only 2.8% are younger than 18 years, and 5.9% are between 50 and 64 years old. 2.4% are 65 years or older (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Age of respondents

47.9% of participants are Dinka. 19.1% are Nuer, and 33% are members of one of the other tribes of South Sudan (Figure 15). The sample is biased towards the Dinka; it is believed that 35.8% of the overall population are Dinka, 15.6% are Nuer, and 48.6% belong to one of the other, smaller tribes (CIA 2015). Participants of the survey came from Equatoria (27.9%), the greater Bhar e Gazal area (27.5%), Upper Nile state (22.2%), and Jonglei (21.5%). Only a small minority were originally from Warrap (.7%) or Unity (.2%). No participants came from Lakes.

What is your tribe

Legend:
- Dinka
- Nuer
- other

Unsurprisingly, given that the interviewers were students, the vast majority of respondents have been to university (61.8%) or attended secondary school (24.3%). Only 8% attended solely primary school and 5.9% never went to school. Here the sample is the most different to the overall population. 73% of men and 84% of women in South Sudan are illiterate (UNOCHA 2014). This might, however, not be such an enormous contradiction as seems at first sight. South Sudan is a vast country with massive inequality. Numbers from the whole country almost certainly display a different reality than can be found in the capital. Juba is the location of the national government; it is the base of ministries and hub of international agencies. The population of Juba is almost certainly better educated. 11.9% respondents own a business and 11.5% are day labourers. Smaller groups of 2% are refugees, 4.3% are office workers, and 19.8% are unemployed (Figure 16).

What do you do for a living

Figure 16: Professions

Given the imbalances of the sample, generalisation to the whole population is problematic, although maybe not as problematic as it seems. South Sudan is a vast country with a very diverse population with regards to language, tribe, and lifestyle. Drawing a sample which indeed reflects the whole of South Sudan was outside the scope of this research project, and it was not the aim to answer a question about all of South Sudan. The question phrased here is about media effects in Juba, and consequently the sample is drawn from the population of this city. It is Juba where radio stations are concentrated. Also, media can only have an effect on its listeners, and electricity is scarce in South Sudan. There is no city power in Juba, and those with access to electricity own a generator or have solar panels. Furthermore, education is expensive in South Sudan; schools charge fees and additional costs for books, stationery, and transport need to be paid. What is more, attending school or university means that people have less time to work and earn money. The sample is drawn from people that can reasonably be assumed to come from a

more affluent background and thus have more regular access to media than the overall population. The sample is thus drawn from the target audience of media. An argument can be made that in the provinces and the rural areas media projects often come with listener groups, and especially peace programmes are broadcast in community houses to groups of people. This, however, is not mass media but school. By definition, mass media is supposed to work on the masses and not on a selected sample of listeners. It is the media's ability to disseminate messages to many people that makes it attractive for policy makers. As the last point, the effects of media are supposedly universal and it would not be reasonable to do media development otherwise. This means that it should be possible to establish these effects regardless of which population is studied (Visser et al. 2000, p.223).

5.4 Media

Judging from this data, radio is popular in Juba and people listen to it often. Half of respondents, however, complain about journalists' level of education, a majority of respondents believe that the government uses media to influence people, and a small majority is of the opinion that government needs to and should control the media.

5.4.1 Media consumption time and its credibility

68.3% of respondents have a radio in their household, and 26.3% said that they listen to the radio on their mobile. Only 4.1% do not have a radio. 58.1% said that they listen to radio 'a few times a day' and 24.1% listen 'once a day' (Figure 17). For 69.5%, radio is the primary source of information, and 78% named the news as their favourite programme. Only 11.5% said music was their favourite, 7.8% named programmes on health and education, and radio dramas are the last popular programme: only 2.6% named them as their favourite programme.

How often do you listen to radio?

Figure 17: Media consumption time

Radio's popularity[64] is all the more interesting as it does not enjoy high credibility. Two variables measured respondents' attitudes towards media itself. The statements were 'South Sudan's journalists are not well-educated and not professional' and 'Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced, and neutral'. 58.5% do not believe that media is accurate, balanced and neutral, and they disagreed (33.6%) or strongly disagreed (24.9%) with the statement. Only a third, 29.4% of respondents, believe in the accuracy, neutrality and balance of media. Overall, a majority of South Sudanese do not think much of their media (Figure 18).

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[64] The high numbers I found are confirmed by other surveys conducted in the country, most notably by an extensive, nationwide survey the iNGO Internews executed in April 2015 (Internews 2015a). 66% of the inhabitants of Central Equatoria, the state of which Juba is the capital, said they had 'access to radio at some point in their life' (p. 56), and 51% said that radio is their prime source of information (P. 54). Further confirmation comes from a survey done on behalf of an educational media project funded by USAID (EDC 2008). Looking at six cities in what was then Southern Sudan, the survey finds a daily listenership of 86%. The numbers are not comparable as the questions were differently phrased. Internews defines levels of access by to how many different media people have access to, and the EDC-survey looks at six different cities. Still, they all show a high importance of radio in South Sudan.

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Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral

Figure 18: Perception of media

Connected to this is the question of whether people think that journalists are reliable and well-educated. Respondents are close to evenly divided on this issue. 15.9% strongly agreed and 29.6% agreed with the statement, 16.9% strongly disagreed, and 30.3% disagreed (Figure 19). 45.5%, close to half the sample, are of the opinion that journalists are not reliable and not well-educated. This number is a backlash for iNGOs doing media development, as they are engaging in journalism training[65].

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[65] To make matters worse, these data were collected by students of the Department of Mass Communication of Juba University. Having used a snowball system for data collection there might be a positive bias. The opinion about the quality of journalists might have been worse if the sample had been collected by interviewers not having a personal stake and interest in journalism.

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South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional

Figure 19: Perception of journalists' professionalism

Nevertheless, there are no reservations about media's credibility. A staggering 82.2% said that they believe what they hear on the radio, with 28.5% strongly agreeing and 53.7% agreeing with the statement. Only 10.4% disagreed and 3.3% strongly disagreed. This is startling; it contradicts the beliefs about journalists' reliability and education. In addition, 71.2% believe that the government uses media to influence people, with 28.5% strongly agreeing and 42.7% agreeing with the statement (Figure 20). This is another discrepancy: A majority of respondents believe what they hear on the radio and a majority of people believe that government uses media to influence people. Two explanations seem possible. First, it might be that respondents believe that the media and the journalists are witty enough to uncover and side-track the governmental attempts to influence listeners. As many people do not believe in the professionalism and education of South Sudanese journalists (see Figure 19 above), this explanation seems far-fetched. The more reasonable explanation is that people in South Sudan simply do not see a problem with getting information from and being influenced by the

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government. This might also explain the large number of people who stated that they believe what they hear on the radio.

The government uses media to influence people

Figure 20: Belief that the government uses media

Two more measures indicate that the South Sudanese do not see governmental involvement in the media as a problem. First, in western thought state-owned or influenced radio stations are a feature of an authoritarian regime (Siebert, Petersen, Schramm 1963). For the South Sudanese, financial dependency does not seem problematic. When asked who should pay for media, a majority of 35.9% said the government should pay, on grounds that information is necessary. 33.8% said media should make money through advertisements and selling of airtime, thus subscribing to a business model of media. 26.4% named the United Nations and the international community as donors, and only 3.9% voted for a public fee. Secondly, an (albeit very small) majority of 50.1% stated that the government is right to control the media. 46% were opposed to government control (Figure 21).

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
Figure 21: Wish that the government shall control media

The approval of government control can be explained by South Sudanese history. Media's ability to kindle conflict via hate speech is well known in the country. Historically, media has been used as a mobilisation tool (Arop 2006), and hate speech has also been broadcast in the ongoing conflict (Somerville 2014). Government control is seen as a way to prevent hate speech and its consequences. Having experienced the effects of hate speech, it seems that the South Sudanese prefer a controlled media sector to the costs of freedom of expression. When asked about media criticising the government, however, a majority gave a different impression. 20.4% of respondents agreed, and 14.8% strongly agreed that media criticises the government too much; a majority of 48.3%, however, did not concur: 27.2% disagreed and 21.1% strongly disagreed (Figure 22). This is in opposition to observations made in Juba and informal chats when people stated that open critique of a leader is a taboo (see chapter 4).

Media criticises the government unfairly and too much

Figure 22: Media critic of the government

There are two possible explanations for the variation. First, the sample consists mostly of students, and students were distributing it in a snowball system. It can be reasonably assumed that the sample is drawn from a relatively affluent and well-educated population, which may make criticising a leader or the government more accepted. Ethnographic observations were made while being with day labourers, drivers, shop owners, and newspaper agents – mostly people with no access to higher education. South Sudanese society is strictly stratified and this might be an explanation for the difference in attitude towards leadership. A second possible explanation is that while people might not criticise themselves, they may silently enjoy someone else doing it. In this explanation, media and journalists act as a surrogate for what regular people do not want to say in everyday life situations.

5.4.2 Connections between beliefs about and preference for media

In the next step, it was tested whether beliefs and opinions are differently distributed through the subcategories of the *IV* and thus if a preference for listening to a radio station comes with a particular attitude towards the media. As Radio Miraya, Eyeradio, and Voice of America are explicitly operated in a 'western' way, differences were expected. It was assumed that listeners of these radio stations believe more firmly in the information provided by the stations, that they believe media to be accurately balanced and neutral, and that their journalists are well-educated. On the other hand, listeners of these stations should disagree with the statements that most information on the radio comes from the government, that the government is right in controlling the media, and that media criticises the government unfairly and too often. For the South Sudanese stations, in particular for the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio, attitudes were likely to be opposite. Kruskal-Wallis H tests were run, and the hypothesis was that there are significant differences between groups. The null hypothesis to be tested was that there are no differences.

The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed no statistically significant differences for the statements 'Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral' and for 'South Sudanese journalists are not well-educated and not professional'. There was no difference in distribution for 'I believe what I hear on the radio', 'Most information on the radio comes from government', and 'The government uses media to influence people'. For all these statements, the null hypothesis was retained. Judging from this sample, it does not make a difference to which radio station people like to listen. Whether people listen to the UN-station, Eyeradio, or the South Sudanese radio stations does not impact on their opinion on journalists' education and media's standard, on the belief that government uses media, or on the question how accurate and reliable media is in South Sudan. Only one of the statements in the media-section showed statistically significant differences in distribution through categories. One came close and was hence also further examined. Listeners of the

state-owned SS-TV / SS-Radio are more likely to believe in the necessity of state control over the media. For the statement, 'The government is right to control the media', distribution is statistically significant among radio stations, $H(4) = 14.222$, $p =.007$. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure after visual inspection of a box plot, which showed that tests scores were not similar for all groups. A Bonferroni correction was in place for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was, due to 15 comparisons, accepted on a very low number ($p <.00333333$). I thus accepted the unaltered significance level $p <.05$. Values are mean ranks unless otherwise stated.

Treated like this, the pairwise comparison showed statistically significant differences of the statement 'Government is right to control the media' between listeners of the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio (127.79) and the two liberal radio stations, Eyeradio and Voice of America, (208.37), ($p =.004$). This was statistically significant on the unaltered significance level. The same holds true for the statistically significant difference in distribution between the audiences of SS-TV / SS-Radio and the church-run Radio Bakhita (210.25), ($p =.035$). On the altered significant level two more pairs were statistically significant: SS-TV / SS-Radio and UN-Radio Miraya (183.75), ($p = 0.07$), and SS-TV / SS-Radio and the group of small radio stations (182.87), ($p =.029$).

Visual inspection of clustered bar charts after cross-tabulation showed that listeners of SS-TV / SS-Radio in the majority strongly agreed with the need for governmental control of the media (Figure 23). For clarity the table shows only agreement, disagreement, and the category 'I do not know'. The distinction of strong agreement and strong disagreement has been omitted.

Figure 23: Wish for the government to control media across audiences

It was expected that the audience of the government-owned media would see a need for more control by the government, and that habitual listeners of other radio stations would disagree with the statement. In this sense, the confirmation of these expectations adds further weight to the notion that the sample does indeed reflect reality in Juba. The clustered bar chart, however, holds a surprise. The audience of the UN-Radio Miraya also agreed in the majority with the statement, as does the audience of the small South Sudanese radio stations. The difference lies only in the amount (Figure 24).

Media outlet	Agree	Disagree
Miraya	49%	45.3%
Eyeradio, VoA	39.6%	55.6%
Radio Bakhita	42.3%	53.9%
SS-TV / SS-Radio	72.4%	20.7%
Small South Sudanese stations	52.4%	47.6%

Figure 24: Approval of government control

Coming to the statement 'Media criticises the government unfairly and too often', the result of the Kruskal-Wallis H test was close to statistical significance (p =.058). The null hypothesis that there is no difference between the audiences of different radio stations was retained. Still, the result was so close to statistical significance that posthoc analysis was nevertheless run and revealed that again the audience of SS-TV / SS-Radio is most likely to agree with the statement. Due to the non-significant test result, I could not run pairwise comparisons, hence I performed Mann-Whitney U-tests to determine if there are differences in the belief that media criticises the government unfairly across preference for a media house. Distributions were not similar as assessed by visual inspection. Statistically significant differences were found between the state-run SS-TV/SS-Radio and the UN-run Radio Miraya (U = 1998, z = -2.580, p =.010) and between SS-TV/SS-Radio and the church-run Radio station Bakhita (U = 233.5, z = -2.475, p =.013). Between SS-TV / SS-Radio and the US-financed radio stations Eyeradio and Voice of America the difference was close to statistical significance (U = 912, z = -1.819, p =.069). No other difference was statistically significant or close to it. Listeners of the state-run SS-TV/SS-Radio hold a different attitude on media criticising the government. This audience was most likely to agree strongly with the statement that 'Media criticises government unfairly and too much' (Figure 25). In the table, again, the distinction of strong agreement and disagreement has been omitted to provide more clarity.

Figure 25: Media critic across audiences

As before, it is hardly a surprise that the audience of SS-TV / SS-radio agrees with the statement, as SS-TV is the government's media station. The South Sudanese know it as a mouthpiece of the government. A second interesting point here is that no listener of Radio Bakhita, the station run by the church in South Sudan, strongly agrees with the statement, and a similar count of listeners ticked 'I do not know' and 'disagreement'. Conclusions from this are rather speculations, but this might be an indication that listeners of the church radio are rather wary of the radio station's position. Radio Bakhita broadcasts with the western idea of being a watchdog on government, but the station lacks the international backing, both morally and financially, that Miraya and Eyeradio enjoy. Bakhita has been closed down before. The answers given in the survey might point to an unwillingness to take a clear stance.

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Finally, the audiences of smaller South Sudanese stations were also more likely to disagree than to agree with the statement. The stations were a majority of listeners disagreed with the statement are the UN-Radio Miraya and the US-financed stations Eyeradio and Voice of America. Statistical significance aside it seems that there is a tendency in the audiences of international-led media such as Miraya, Eyeradio, and VoA to be not as sensitive to criticism as the audiences of the rather 'South Sudanese'-radio stations Bakhita, SS-TV/SS-Radio and the smaller outlets Capital, Liberty, Dream, and City FM. Whether this is a consequence of or a precondition for listening to them cannot be concluded from this data.

5.4.3 Summary

Radio is a popular medium in Juba, with a majority of people owning radios, listening a few times a day, and using radio as their main source of information. The news is named by a majority as a favourite programme, while radio dramas are the least popular. Radio's stated popularity is, however, startling, as people in the majority do not think that media is balanced, reliable, and neutral, and the majority also has doubts about journalists' education and reliability. This notwithstanding, people believe what they hear on the radio and they also believe that the government uses media to influence people. It seems that in South Sudan people have no trouble with the government mingling with the media. A small majority also thinks that the government should control the media. On the other hand, South Sudanese in the majority do not think that the media criticises the government too much or unfairly. Listeners of the state-owned SS-TV and SS-Radio are more likely to opt for government control of the media and they also are more likely to agree with the statement that the media is criticising the government too harshly. For all other statements, it does not make a difference to which radio station people are listening.

5.5. The state

In this section, I test for peoples' attitudes towards and beliefs about all things state. The country is currently hosting a peacebuilding mission and huge chunks of services are delivered by UN-agencies and iNGOs. I examine peoples' attitudes towards the South Sudanese government, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and iNGOs. Probably unsurprising, a majority of respondents do not believe that their government is doing good work in the interest of the whole population. More surprisingly, UNMISS also does not enjoy a high reputation.

5.5.1 People's views on their government

A first question was if people believe that their government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan. With a civil war ongoing in the country, which is named a conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer in many western newspapers and the government widely seen as a 'Dinka-government', it was expected that a majority of people would say that the government is not working in every South Sudanese's best interest. Indeed, so they did, although the difference between those who believe that the government is a government for all South Sudanese and those who do not is not as wide as expected. 52.8% of respondents rejected the statement, with 27.8% strongly disagreeing and 25% disagreeing. Opposed to this, 38.9% do believe that the government works in the interest of the whole population, with 20.4% strongly agreeing and 18.5% agreeing (Figure 26). While there is a majority not believing that the government does good work for everyone, given the situation in the country it seems surprising that 38.9% believe that it does.

The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan

Figure 26: Belief that the government works in the best interest of all South Sudanese

5.5.2 People's view on UNMISS and iNGOs

When asked the same question about UNMISS, 48% of respondents said that they believe that UNMISS works in everyone's best interest (22.1% strongly agreeing and 25.9% agreeing). 41.4% answered in the negative, with 19.5% strongly feeling that way, while 21.9% disagreed (Figure 27). This rather unfavourable opinion of UNMISS is surprising, to say the least. A possible explanation for the relatively low level of approval might be the perception of them as distant. This has been described by Beatrice Pouligny, who writes that "for the majority of the population the presence of the 'blue helmets' is often no more than big Toyota Land Cruisers and other all-terrain vehicles in white colours, with armoured cars possibly added, waving a blue flag, seen passing along the main roads, and, more rarely, stopping." (Pouligny 2006, p.43). In Juba, many people equalise the UN-mission with barricaded, inaccessible compounds, and with white land cruisers.

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The picture UNMISS presents is quite similar to the government. It is an image of distance; there is the feeling that 'the upper crust' has nothing to do with the life of ordinary South Sudanese. This was found in doing ethnography, but the numbers from the survey point in the same direction.

Figure 27: Attitude towards UNMISS

International NGOs, on the other hand, enjoy a higher level of approval. 73% of respondents agreed to the statement 'International NGOs are doing a good job'. A third (31.9%) of respondents strongly agreed with the statement. 19.5% were opposed to the statement with 11.2% disagreeing and 8.3% strongly disagreeing. From the dataset no answer can be given why iNGOs enjoy a higher level of approval than UNMISS. Still, that both of the two more inaccessible bodies, the government and UNMISS, are viewed rather unfavourable, while the more accessible iNGOs enjoy a better reputation, hints in the direction that accessibility might play a role.

Some critiques, however, goes towards iNGOs too. In the context of the discrepancies between the government and iNGOs, apparent in a new NGO-law and the government's critiques on iNGO's lobbying for more sanctions against South Sudan (see chapter 4), participants were also asked if iNGOs are cooperating enough with the government. 48.6% of respondents said that they do not. 39.1% rejected the statement (Figure 28).

Figure 28: iNGOs cooperation with government

This is an interesting result. INGOs often see governments as an adversary; as a bullying and corrupt entity which makes humanitarian work necessary in the first place and then hinders it. This may or may not be an accurate view, but on the contrary to it, in Juba the population does to an extent wish for a closer cooperation.

5.5.3 Can power change peacefully in South Sudan?

A major difference between a democratic and an authoritarian regime is if and how a government is chosen. It is one of the defining features of

democracy that power passes by the will of the people, expressed in free and fair elections. Shortly before this survey was conducted, the South Sudanese government decided to postpone the constitutionally guaranteed elections and to extend President Salva Kiir's term in office (Sudan Tribune 2014), giving rise to some concerns about South Sudan's commitment to democracy[66]. The South Sudanese population does not seem to share this concern. Asked if they think that South Sudanese leadership can change peacefully and at the peoples' will, 65.1% stated the belief that it can, while 34.9% said it could not (Figure 29).

Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people?

Figure 29: Belief in peaceful change of leadership

A majority of people think that democratic change is possible. This is quite remarkable, as the conflict which has been ongoing since December 2013 is about leadership and power. It seems significant that despite ongoing fighting respondents show a strong belief in the possibility of peaceful change.

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[66] Informal chats with members of the international community in South Sudan. Grave concerns about the leadership can, however, also be found in the press (Tisdall 2015).

5.5.4 Media's influence on these beliefs

In the next step of the analysis, it was determined whether these beliefs are dependent on a preference for a specific media house. As said before, Kruskal-Wallis H tests were performed to identify if there are differences in the distribution of the five statements:

• The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan;

• UNMISS works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan;

• INGOs are doing a good job;

• INGOs are not working enough with the government;

• Leadership in South Sudan can change peacefully and on demand of the people.

To which media house one is listening does not make a difference for the beliefs if the government works in people's best interest. This is all the more noteworthy as media development is done with the idea to contribute to statebuilding. It has already been mentioned (in chapter 4) that the UN-Radio Miraya is part of UNMISS' public information department and that broadcasting needs to be in line with the PR-departments guidelines. When UNMISS was established in 2011 (United Nations 2011) its tasks were:

> to support the Government in peace consolidation and thereby fostering longer-term statebuilding and economic development; assist the Government in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians; and help the authorities in developing capacity to provide security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the country.

With the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 UNMISS troops were increased, and in May 2014 the mission's main aim shifted to the protection of civilians (United Nations 2014). However, until then

UNMISS' main aim was assisting the government, and it is not a far stretch that Miraya was a part of this assistance – although an unsuccessful part as is clearly indicated by the fact that no difference between listeners of different radio stations exists. For people's attitudes towards the state and the government, it does not matter if one is listening to the BBC, the UN-Radio Miraya, Voice of America, or the state-run SS-TV/SS-Radio. For the opinion on iNGOs work and for the belief that iNGOs should cooperate better with the government too, no connection to preference for a radio programme exists.

Radio station preference does make a difference for the two other statements. The distribution of scores referring to the statement that UNMISS works in the best interest of people in South Sudan is statistically significant between listeners of different radio stations, $H(5) = 16.908$, $p = .005$. Tests scores were not similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was accepted at the $p < .00333333$ level. This slight number is due to 15 comparisons and unaltered significance level at $p < .05$ was then accepted. The posthoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in attitude towards UNMISS between a few radio stations. Most interestingly, the significant difference is between the BBC (273.65) and other stations. Those are: the BBC and category 2, Voice of America and Eyeradio (198.24), ($p = .000$), the BBC and Radio Bakhita (208.58), ($p = .026$), the BBC and the small South Sudanese stations (215.79), ($p = .017$), and the BBC and Radio Miraya (223.79), ($p = .003$). Apparently, listening to the BBC World Service does make a difference, but which attitude do listeners of the BBC in South Sudan have towards the work of UNMISS? Cross-tabulation was executed between the variables 'which media' and 'attitude towards UNMISS' to answer this question. A clustered bar chart (Figure 30) shows that listeners of the BBC are more likely to have an unfavourable attitude. BBC-listeners disagreed and strongly disagreed with the majority with

the statement 'UNMISS is working in the best interest of the people in South Sudan'. In other words: BBC-listeners do not have a high opinion of UNMISS.

Figure 30: Attitude towards UNMISS across media audience

The distribution of scores was also statistically significantly different between preference for media and the belief that 'leadership in South Sudan can change peacefully and on demands of the people' H (5) = 12.185, p =.032. Visual inspection of a boxplot showed that tests scores were not similar for all groups. Again a pairwise comparison was performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was, due to 15 comparisons and a tiny number (p <.00333333), accepted at the unaltered significance level p <.05. Values are mean ranks unless

otherwise stated. Again, the BBC is the 'odd' case. The posthoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in the belief that leadership can change peacefully between the BBC (203.41) and UN-Radio Miraya (232.13), (p =.04), between the BBC and the liberal radio stations Eyeradio and VoA (244.70) (p =.014), between the BBC and Radio Bakhita (271.77) (p =.005), and the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio (206.00) and Radio Bakhita (p =.026). Cross-tabulation was then executed between the variables 'which media' and 'belief in peaceful leadership change' to understand what the difference is. This revealed that, statistical significance aside, Radio Bakhita is the only radio stations whose listeners do not believe that leadership can change peacefully and on the demand of the people (Figure 31).

The only other eye-catching difference is that the audience of Eyeradio and Voice of America are significantly more likely not to believe in the possibility of peaceful change. This can be read in a positive way. The more critical stance of listeners of Eyeradio and VoA shows that those stations do reach their goal. They come with a western underpinning and the belief that media needs to act as a watchdog on government. When the audience is more critical than the audiences of other media stations, this translates to success. On the other hand, it can be argued that this critical stance weakens an already weak government, which might result in the government subscribing even more to a hard line.

Figure 31: Peaceful change of leadership across media audiences

5.5.5 Summary

This part of the chapter reviewed opinions about the state and government of South Sudan, and about the work of UNMISS and iNGOs in the country. The reason to include the latter two was that UNMISS and iNGOs provide services in the country which one would expect to be delivered by the government. The analysis revealed that a large portion of respondents do not think that the government is working with the best interest of all people in South Sudan at heart. This is not terribly surprising as a conflict is ongoing and the economic situation is deteriorating. What is surprising is that over a third of respondents do think that the government is working in the best interest of all people in South Sudan. The work of UNMISS is also not seen favourable in general. Again the sample is close to evenly divided between people thinking that

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UNMISS works in the best interest of the South Sudanese. Different to the belief about the government, however, it is an –albeit small – majority that thinks positively about UNMISS. INGOs are seen as doing a good job, but are asked to cooperate more with the government. Finally, respondents were asked if they believe in the possibility of peaceful change in South Sudan. A majority do think this is possible. Most of these beliefs are not dependent on a preference for a specific radio station, with two exceptions. BBC-listeners are more likely to see UNMISS in a negative light, and the audience of the church-run Radio station Bakhita is most likely not to believe in the possibility of a peaceful change of leadership.

5.6 Groups

This section presents the results from questions about interethnic relations in the country and the belief that people can live peacefully together despite affiliation with different tribes. South Sudan is a multi-ethnic state, with approximately 62 different tribes living in the country. International media more often than not describes the conflict as an ethnic one, with the Dinka and the Nuer being the main adversaries. On grounds of this view, some international-led media outlets are producing and broadcasting so-called peacebuilding programmes. At large, peace journalism aims to raise awareness about the possibility of nonviolent responses to conflict and thus to prevent outbreaks of violent conflict (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Staub et al 2010; Staub 2013). In South Sudan, this is especially done by the UN-Radio Miraya and the iNGO Internews' Eyeradio. An example is the radio drama 'Sawa Shabab' produced by the Dutch iNGO Free Press Unlimited (no date) and broadcast in South Sudan by the UN-Radio Miraya and the church-financed Radio Bakhita. Eyeradio broadcasts a programme named 'In search of peace' (Eyeradio no date). The assumption when looking at the survey is thus, first, that the data will show a divided country, and second that people listening to the UN-

Radio, Eyeradio, or Bakhita will have more favourable attitudes towards people from other tribes than the audiences of the South Sudanese radio stations or the government-owned media SS-TV / SS-Radio. As before, descriptive statistics will be presented and are followed by Kruskal-Wallis H tests which shall determine whether the distribution of opinion and beliefs is connected to a preference for a media house. The sample has been regrouped. As Eyeradio broadcasts a programme explicitly for peace, the station is not grouped together with Voice of America. The BBC World Service is excluded reducing the sample to 372 cases, as this part of the chapter looks explicitly at the effects of peace programmes.

5.6.1 No division along ethnic lines

The assumption that the country is divided along ethnic lines cannot be confirmed. Despite the ongoing conflict and the failing peace talks the data do not show a division between the tribes. Respondents were asked if they trust people from tribes other than their own. 63.2% of respondents are not of the opinion that only members of their own tribes are trustworthy, 29.3% strongly disagreed with the statement, 33.9% disagreed. 33.1%, answered in the affirmative with 12.5% strongly agreeing and 20.6% agreeing. Although a third of respondents state that they mistrust members of other tribes, the majority does not. The statement is, however, a bit theoretical. Trust is rather shown in everyday life than stated in a questionnaire. To add a bit flesh to the bone, respondents were asked about the composition of their social circle, the importance of living in a segregated neighbourhood, and if they have interethnic contact in everyday life. The answers to these questions show rather a mixed society than a divided one. 84.4% of respondents said they do have contact with members of other tribes in everyday life. 78.2% stated that this is 'no big deal' (Figures 32 and 33).

Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?

Figure 32: Contact across groups

How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes

Figure 33: Feelings when having contact with members of other groups

To add further to this picture, 87.4% of respondents said that they have friends with a different tribal affiliation (Figure 34).

Does your circle of friends include only members of your own tribe?

Figure 34: Friendships

Asked how important it is to live in a segregated neighbourhood, only 18.3% said that this would be important, with 8.6% feeling strongly this way. A majority, however, has no trouble with living in a mixed neighbourhood (Figure 35).

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It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe

Figure 35: Desire to live in a segregated neighbourhood

5.6.2 The belief in a peaceful coexistence

Lastly, participants were asked to respond to the statement 'I do believe that Dinka and Nuer and all other tribes in South Sudan can live together peacefully'. 56.3% stated that they believe in a peaceful coexistence, 31.8% strongly agreed with this statement, and 24.5% agreed (Figure 36). While the majority of participants believe in the possibility of peaceful coexistence, more than a third (38.1%) does not. This is a puzzling result when thinking about the prior numbers. 84.4% of respondents said that they have contact with members of other tribes in everyday life (Figure 32) and 78.2% said that it is not of particular importance (Figure 33). A majority also has a mixed social circle (Figure 34) and there is no trouble with mixed neighbourhoods (Figure 35). More people experience peaceful relations than believe in them.

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
Figure 36: Belief in peaceful coexistence

There are two possible explanations for this. First, some respondents might have made a difference because one statement asked for 'members of other tribes' while the other explicitly asked also for Dinka and Nuer. These are the two biggest groups in South Sudan and the two main adversary tribes; singling them out might have made more people doubtful about the possibility of peace. Secondly, respondents might make a difference between peaceful relations in everyday life and the possibility of a political peace deal. What shows here might be what Roger MacGinty names a "grudging coexistence": social rules that people build and use to navigate in deeply divided societies (MacGinty 2014, p.549). These social practices enable people to live in a country in civil conflict and maintain social ties to members of adversary groups.

To evaluate divisions in South Sudanese society further, I examined then if the belief in peaceful coexistence is connected to tribe membership. Interestingly, it is not the Dinka and the Nuer that do not believe in peaceful coexistence, but the members of other tribes. A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to find out if there were differences in the distribution of

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the belief that peaceful coexistence is possible across tribes. The test did show a significant difference between tribes (p =.000). As before, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. This showed statistically significant difference between all three groups; between Dinka (189.23) and Nuer (235.50) (p =.013), Dinka and a member of other tribes (287.64) (p =.000), and Nuer and members of other tribes (p =.0070). Cross-tabulation was executed between the variables, and visual inspection of a clustered bar chart showed that while Dinka in vast numbers strongly agree that peaceful coexistence is possible, Nuer do so in smaller numbers, but still with a majority. Members of other tribes, however, strongly disagree with the statement. While the groups of Dinka and Nuer are seen as the warmongers and their quarrel is understood as the primary driver of the conflict, members of these tribes believe in peaceful coexistence. Members of other tribes in South Sudan do not (Figure 37). During observations and informal chats with members of other tribes, especially Equatorians, participants often phrased mistrust towards the SPLM, which they described as a 'Dinka movement'. For the common Equatorian, the hopes of independence have been shattered. Before independence, they were suppressed by Khartoum. During the civil war, they were domineered by the SPLM/A. Today they feel suppressed by the government, which is formed by the SPLM. It is hardly startling that members of other tribes mistrust the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The sample analysed here, however, only offered 'Dinka', 'Nuer' and 'Member of another tribe'[67] as categories; it cannot be determined, which tribes among the smaller groups hold the most suspicion against the possibility of a South Sudan for all its people. This would be a question for further research.

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[67] This rather rough categorisation was chosen because the Dinka and the Nuer are the biggest tribes in South Sudan and seen to be the main adversaries in the conflict.

5.6.3 Peace programmes' influence on interethnic ties

Finally, the question whether a preference for a radio station leads to more favourable attitudes towards members of different tribes needed to be answered. As the UN-Radio Miraya, Eyeradio and Radio Bakhita are broadcasting programmes with the explicit aim of supporting peace it was expected that listeners of this media would show more favourable attitudes than listeners of other stations. Three Kruskal-Wallis H tests were run to determine if the distribution of the believes that one should only trust people from one's own tribe, that it is important to live in a segregated neighbourhood and that peaceful coexistence is possible, are differently distributed across listeners of different media. This was not the case. In all three instances the null hypotheses had to be retained. There are no statistically significant differences in the distribution of attitudes towards members of other tribes dependent on a preference

for media. Despite this, cross-tabulation was run for visual inspection to look for insights even if the distribution is not statistically significant. The distinction between 'strong' and 'simple' disagreement and agreement are in the following omitted for clarity.

Figure 38: Trust across audiences

The first cross-tabulation was executed between 'media preference' and the statement 'I do not trust members from tribes other than my own' (Figure 38 above). All audiences of media stations show a roughly similar shape. All have a majority of listeners disagreeing with the statement, indicating that they trust people from different tribes. The same holds true when looking at the bar chart for media preference and the statement 'It is important to me to live in a neighbourhood with only

members of my own tribe'. Audiences of all media stations in the majority reject this statement (Figure 39)

Figure 39: Neighbourhoods across audiences

Finally looking at the clustered bar chart for media preference and the statement 'I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all other tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan', the picture changes a bit. All audiences do in the majority either agree or strongly agree with the sentence, thus showing a belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence (Figure 40).

Figure 40: Belief in peaceful coexistence across audiences

However, when examining actual ranks of the responses (strongly agree, agree, I do not know, disagree, strongly disagree), important details become visible. The audience of the small radio stations Liberty, City, Capital and Dream show a tie between strongly agree and strongly disagree. Furthermore, within the audience of UN-Radio Miraya, nearly as many people disagreed strongly with the statement as agree with it (Figure 41). This might look like nit-picking, but the difference is important. From Figure 40 it can be concluded that Radio Miraya listeners are in the huge majority believing in the possibility of interethnic cooperation and peace. Figure 41 shows that there is, in fact, a broad group strongly disbelieving.

Figure 41: Belief in peaceful coexistence across audiences II

In general, it cannot be said that the broadcasting of, or listening to, peace programmes makes a difference to people's attitudes towards members of other tribes.

5.6.4 Summary

From this sample, it can neither be concluded that South Sudanese society is severely divided along ethnic lines nor that the presence of international-led media and the broadcasting of peace programmes makes a difference for interethnic cooperation and reconciliation. In the majority, respondents have contact with people from other tribes in everyday life, their circle of friends and acquaintances is composed of a mix of different tribes, and people do not find it important to live in segregated neighbourhoods. Strikingly, while aa majority, albeit a small one, believe in peaceful coexistence between the tribes, fewer people

believe in it than experience it. Also, the Dinkas' and the Nuers' believe in bigger numbers in peaceful cooperation than people from other tribes. However, a connection between a preference for a particular radio station and a favourable attitude towards members of other tribes or a belief in peaceful coexistence could not be found.

5.7 Chapter conclusions

In this chapter, I have investigated the effects of western-led media in South Sudan using a social survey, while also examining the process of survey research in a country of the global South. Surveys come with advantages in complex environments; they also come with disadvantages. First, surveys deliver information on how entrenched a phenomenon is in the society. Furthermore, during the process of conducting this research project in Juba, it became clear that they also allowed for greater inclusivity. When conducting the interview part of this project, regular people were wary of answering questions in a recorded one-on-one interview, and their voices were hence hardly heard[68]. Questionnaire research healed this problem. Answering questions with clear, already phrased answers asked by a South Sudanese national was apparently easier than to be interviewed by a Kawaja. The survey hence proved to be a tool to gain access to people who would otherwise not be heard. A problem was drawing a representative sample from the population. I focus on Juba but even there population numbers are unknown; the situation was made worse by the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013 when an unknown number of people fled either to or from Juba. A minimum sample size of 354 cases was sought, 500 questionnaires were distributed, resulting after data cleaning in a sample of 461 cases. From this, BBC-listeners were excluded when the question explicitly focused on South Sudan media, reducing the sample to 372. While gender, age, and tribal association are relatively close to South Sudanese reality, having been

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[68] A detailed account of this can be found in chapter 6.

collected by students the majority of respondents are students. This is far away from reproducing Juba's population. Still, the focus on students in the survey is not as problematic as one might think. No public electricity distribution system exists in South Sudan. Having power in the house – and thus access to media – is a matter of money. Students, on the other hand, can be assumed to come from relatively affluent backgrounds – they could not afford to study otherwise. This is a population which is the most likely to have access to media, thus it is a population which is of interest when assessing media development campaigns. Conducting the survey showed the importance of paying close attention to how a sample is collected. I conducted the survey twice, and this showed how interviewers seeing me had a direct impact on how they collected data and consequently how useful the data were for me. The process of data gathering revealed insights into the importance of the interplay between researcher and environment and into the process of researching as a social activity. Awareness and reflexivity about data gathering are necessary when doing quantitative research. In this sense, quantitative research needs to be ethnographically informed.

I used descriptive statistics and nonparametric tests to investigate what attitudes and beliefs South Sudanese held towards the media, the state, and groups and if these beliefs are connected to a preference for a radio station. Respondents' stance on media is rather critical. They do not see media in their country as balanced, accurate, and neutral, and they also do not have a great opinion of their journalists. The sample is evenly divided on the question of whether journalists are well-educated. This, however, does not lead to reservations towards media. A majority believes what is broadcast, although a majority also is convinced that the government uses media to influence people. This is contradictory, unless it means that respondents do not care too much about being influenced by the government. That this indeed might be the case is further supported by two other measures. A small majority thinks that the government is right to control the media, and a third of respondents said

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that government should pay for media, thus opting for state-owned media. A further third wanted a business model and a quarter wanted the UN to pay. For statements on media accuracy, journalist education, believing the media and government's influence, it does not make a difference which radio station respondents heard. For the statement, if the government needs to control media, significant differences have been found. Listeners of the state-run radio SS-TV / SS-Radio do agree in the majority with the need for government control. This is unsurprising – the audience of SS-TV / SS-Radio can be expected to be supportive of government measures. In addition, however, the clustered bar chart showed that listeners of the UN-run Radio Miraya and the audiences of the smaller South Sudanese stations Liberty, Dream, Capital and City also in the majority agree that the government should control the media.

Media development and internationally-led media have the explicit aim to inform people on current affairs, hold government accountable, and enable the population to participate in governance. It was hence expected that audiences of the UN-run Radio Miraya, the iNGO-run Eyeradio, of Voice of America in South Sudan, and of the church-run Radio Bakhita would show different attitudes than audiences of the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio and the small South Sudanese radio stations. Testing and visual inspections of graphs, however, told a different story. In the majority, respondents do not believe that the government works in the best interest of all South Sudanese and it does not matter which radio station people listen to. UNMISS does not enjoy a much better reputation among South Sudanese, with respondents close to evenly divided on the statement that UNMISS works in the best interest of all South Sudanese. The most critical listeners are the audience of the BBC World Service. INGOs enjoy a better reputation, as respondents approve of their work but wish for more cooperation with the government. As there are well-published problems between the national government

and the international community[69], this is an interesting result. Finally, a majority believes that leadership can change peacefully and on demand of the people. Here it made a difference to which radio station people listen to. The audience of Radio Bakhita was the least likely to believe in peaceful change.

The conflict in South Sudan has often been described as an ethnic one with hostile groups fighting against each other, and the Dinka and Nuer as the main adversaries. The survey does not confirm this view. A severe division along ethnic lines cannot be found. A majority of people have contact across tribal lines in everyday life, and a majority does not see this as a big deal. Furthermore, a huge majority has friends with a different tribal association, and a majority does not find it important to live in a segregated neighbourhood. The conclusion here can only be that people live interethnic cooperation despite the ongoing conflict. This underpins the notion that the conflict is not ethnic. Secondly, the data revealed that while a majority of respondents believe that Dinka, Nuer and all tribes can live peacefully together, a statistically significant difference was found. Dinka and Nuer believe in the majority in peaceful coexistence, while members of other tribes do not. Lastly, for what attitudes people held against members of other tribes than their own it does not make a difference to what media they are listening.

In general, from the survey it can be concluded that the effects of international-led media in South Sudan are not as desired. There is no evidence that people that are listening to a specific type of media have a favourable attitude towards government or towards people from other tribes. The promises of media development, to enable people to participate in governance, to strengthen democracy and to contribute to peace, cannot be seen as fulfilled.

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[69] See the article in Appendix 1.6, p.29.

6 – Interviews

It has been estimated that 90% of all social research comes in the one or the other form with interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) and it has been said that we are living in an interview society (Denzin 2001b, p.23). To an extent, all methods employed in this thesis come with an interview element. There were informal chats when doing ethnography and highly structured interviews in the survey part. This chapter examines the effects of media in South Sudan using unstructured interviews. The aim was to gain insights into people's experience (Silverman 1993, p.91), to achieve an understanding of how the South Sudanese perceive the media in their country, and how this understanding is congruent with the idea of western media. The second line of inquiry was again if media has brought results in the two areas it is supposedly acting upon, namely the state and relations between groups. While it is not possible to establish a causal link from preference for a radio station to an attitude, value or belief, it seems nevertheless reasonable to expect attitudes and values closer to the western thinking after some years of western media's work in the country. 28 people were interviewed – less than initially was hoped for. Media is supposedly working on the masses, and this provided in theory a wide pool of possible interviewees to choose from. In practice, recruiting people for interviews was harder than expected. Mostly, only members of the local elites and journalists agreed to interviews. This gives rise to a concern about whose voices are heard in interview studies – an important question due to the popularity of the method.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first provide details on the execution and the strengths and weaknesses of the method. Following this, the results from the interview study concerning the media, the state, and groups are presented. In the interest of readability, information on the interview partner is given after a full quote (>30 words). Otherwise, this information is provided in a footnote. In order to protect people's identities, only limited information is given. Grammar has been carefully

adjusted where necessary. Based on the interviews, I argue that media is differently understood in South Sudan than among the international expats engaged in media development; and the attempts to implement media based on western understanding leads to problems for the newly trained journalists in South Sudan and for the statebuilding project as it weakens the state instead of strengthening it. The interviews show that there is no mutually agreed definition on the media's role, on what 'freedom of expression' precisely means, and how far this freedom can and should go in a country experiencing internal conflict. The conflict is mostly identified as a power struggle, and not as a consequence of the multi-ethnic nature of the country. Ethnicity is seen as playing a role, but not as an initiating factor.

6.1 On doing interviews

We were sitting in the shade of a large mango tree in the garden of Juba Bridge, one of the restaurants on the banks of the Nile. The table was laden with water, coffee and tea. It was a sunny Saturday midday, too early for the influx of Juba's elites and expats to come for dinner; the garden was still relatively empty. Only a handful of people were there, two couples sitting on tables directly by the water, three men, drinking beer and telling jokes, and a lone guy, close to our table, writing in a notebook. I was sitting with a media activist who was involved with a couple of community radio stations in the provinces. It was my second meeting with him, and he had suggested the restaurant. My voice recorder was on the table but hidden under a few sheets of paper and a newspaper. We talked, he answered my questions patiently and friendly, providing insights into South Sudanese everyday life, his personal experience and thoughts, and the social situation. After some hours, we concluded the interview and paid. When we left he nodded towards the notetaking guy, acknowledging and greeting him. Outside the restaurant, he told me the guy was his 'shadow' from the security forces. He said he was always followed. When he saw my rather concerned face he laughed.

I asked if it had been wise to meet in public under these circumstances. He insisted that it was "no big deal".

I was nervous the next couple of days, wondering if he was okay. Following this, I avoided doing interviews in public, insisting on visiting people in their offices or inviting them to my office or apartment, and I toned my questions down; I did not ask as direct questions as I had before. It took some days before I calmed down, wondering if I had finally become paranoid.

6.1.1 The interview as a social situation

An interview is a social situation (Briggs 1986, p.2; Kvale, 2007, p. xvii; Johnson and Rowland 2012, p.100). It happens in the context of interviewer, participant and environment, and, as the above shows, the answers gained but also the questions asked are shaped by the dynamics of the research situation. The 'interview as a social situation' issue influences interviews in many ways. Perera notes that in conflict research, narratives are not only framed by international peacekeepers but also by local actors. Writing about her interviews in Congo with different actors, all concerning the leader of an armed group, she notes that for the Congolese respondents the stories reveal the dynamics that they feel drive the conflict. "For Claude, the NGO worker, it was Rwandan interference. For Didier, the businessman, it was western interference more generally. For Etienne, the journalist, it was exploitation, disillusioned youth and marginalisation." (Perera 2017, p.50). Her respondents do not so much reveal a truth about the leader of the armed group, but disclose what they see as a cause of the conflict. Respondents and interviewer's background, feelings, and hopes all influence the answers given.

This gives rise to the question whether participants have and are providing insights into what is 'really out there', or if they are actively constructing meaning during the interview (Alvesson 2011). In this

study, I was interested in respondents' perceptions and feelings, and the establishment of objective facts was not a primary concern of mine. Still, I analyse the interviews within a frame of a social context that exists independently and objectively from respondents' experience and meaning-making. In the context of my research question, I was interested in my interviewees' experience, what they feel, think and how they understand the situation they and the country are in. The approach chosen was phenomenological – I wanted to probe the 'lifeworld' and understand the 'lived experience' of my participants (Husserl 1964). It seems, however, doubtful that 'lived experience', 'objective facts' and 'constructed meanings' can be clearly divided. It is likely that all three are present. In this way, I see my respondents' accounts as a facet of their experience, which is ultimately connected to the social context and milieu the respondent is coming from, while the experience is caused by an objectively existing environment (Danermark et al. 2002; Crouch and McKenzie 2006).

All interviews I conducted contained a mix of questions asking for descriptions, interpretations and feelings. How much even simple questions are open to interpretation and construction becomes clear when looking at a question like: 'Can you tell me what radio stations there are in Juba?' I almost always asked this question, and it was answered in many different ways, with the UN-funded Radio Miraya sometimes being named a 'private radio station' and the government-owned SS-TV and SS-Radio labelled a 'public' station. This provided insights into how different media systems are understood in South Sudan, compared to the understanding of western media experts working in media development. Furthermore, it provided insights into how people understand this particular radio station and how this might be connected to their position in society. An important question with regards to interview studies is then maybe not only if answers describe

an objective reality or a constructed one. As said before[70], reality is constructed, but constructs are based on facts that are often measurable (Danermark et al. 2002). It seems important to figure out which interpretations reflect interviewees' realities – the essence, to stay in the phenomenological vocabulary – and which are constructed during and because of the interview situation. This might be especially important when research is done in a developing country, where the positionality of the researcher can create a clear power relationship. In my case, this showed especially in interviews with journalists. Many of them tried to sell me a western idea of the media in the hope I would report positively about their media house to wherever it was I was reporting to[71]. Twice I was directly asked about funding possibilities. Interview participants react to the interviewer, which has an impact on answers.

6.1.2 The trouble with recruitment

Access has been named a problem in ethnography (Bryman 2001a, p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp.292–298; Feldman et al. 2003; Harrington 2003, p.593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp.42–43; Sarantakos 2013, p.220). Still, in Juba it was easier to gain access for observations than to recruit people for interviews. The plan had been to interview people belonging to one of four categories: journalists and media activists, government and politicians, civil society, comprising of university teachers, NGO-workers, church members and other activists, and finally, regular people. It was this last group that was the hardest to access[72]. At first, I thought that people were scared about possible

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[70] See chapter 3.

[71] The belief that I had more influence and power than I actually had was not constantly present but came up regularly. In fact, the only person I was reporting to was my PhD-supervisor. I am not sure what he would have made of such information.

[72] With politicians, it was usually a problem to find a time that suited them, journalists were happy to talk about their difficulties and most people I approached from the wide category of civil society were also willing to share opinion and insight. Regular people, frankly, were not. People flinched when I asked for an interview. Sometimes I was offered help with drawing up a questionnaire "which people in South Sudan would be more willing to answer to". Even my class at the University fell silent when I asked if someone would be willing to do an interview with me for my PhD research.

consequences and made a point of stressing anonymity. This did not help. It took a while to understand that people were scared that they would not understand the questions, thus could not answer it and hence would lose face. Journalists, activists, academic staff, and politicians are used to engaging in discussions, to answer and ask questions, and they enjoy a level of assertiveness that regular people do not possess. The problem encountered was not confidentiality but confidence, or rather a lack thereof.

There was no solution for this problem. In the end, I managed to recruit 28 participants. Interviews were roughly between 30 and 90 minutes long. Ten interviews were done with journalists (group 1). Six interviews belong in group 2, consisting of politicians, both members of the current government and of opposition parties. Group 3 is very widely composed of what might be named civil society members, although following a rather loose definition of civil society. Interviewees were church and media activists, academic staff, and teachers. Eight interviews belong in this category. Group 4, finally, in lieu of a better word, looks at 'listeners', which here means South Sudanese who are not activists, journalists or government officials. Only four interviews belong in this group: a driver, a student, a restaurant manager, and a security guard. Everyone in this group agreed to an interview after a longer acquaintance with me, save for one person who was working for a friend of mine and was asked by this friend if an interview was possible. The journalists and media managers were approached based on their different levels of professionalism, the stages of their career and their working places. In this group there are people working for iNGO-run radios, for newspapers and for the state-owned media house SS-TV / SS-radio. The group of politicians contains staff from the Ministry for Information and Broadcast, the SPLM and SPLA and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, as well as one local politician and an opposition politician. Again, the people were approached with a request for an interview. More had been contacted, but some interviews were not possible due to time

constraints. Group three, civil society, contains eight interviews. There is a leader of a national NGO, some academics, two people engaged in local media development, a South Sudanese communications adviser, and a researcher. Interviewees were approached because of their connection to media and because of their public involvement in or public discussion of the peace negotiations that happened at the time under the auspices of the IGAD in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. The categorisation I use here is problematic as distinctions are not clear-cut. University professors are listeners, the media activist has once been a journalist, and the student I interviewed might well go on to work for the government. The distinction is mostly meant to provide information, in the widest sense, on the position of the people in the group towards media and to provide some context. Literally everyone I interviewed asked for and was guaranteed anonymity. South Sudan is a government controlled area and questions about the government and about the media are especially sensitive in the current situation[73].

6.2 Media

The situation for media is dire in South Sudan. The country is classified as 'not free' in terms of the press by Reporters sans Frontières (2016), and journalists have been talking about oppression and harassment:

> Of course, one time I did a story on the four billion dollars which were [sic] disappeared. That thing, we wrote it, it was published. When it came out, after two days, the security personnel went where I sleep, where I stay [but] (…) I was in Dubai. They thought I could not be found. (…) Then I just decided, I changed… I became a nomadic. I could sleep just everyplace.
> (Midcareer journalist, male/Interview 15)

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[73] As the situation in South Sudan is highly kinetic and volatile, I also omitted the names of people who did not ask for anonymity. This decision was made following the attack on a compound popular with Aid workers in Juba that resulted in several rapes and the death of local journalist (The Guardian 2016). The list of interviews giving rudimentary information on the interviewees can be found in Appendix 3.1.

Interviewees agree that the harsh line against the media began in the aftermath of the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013. This was when the government on the one hand, and the journalists and international community on the other hand disagreed on what role media has to fulfil in society. The emerging narrative was of a media that, while informing the population, still needed to follow government policy especially in the security-sensitive situation after December 2013. This came with the view and suspicion that the international community undermined the government's reputation and mingled in the internal affairs of the sovereign nation of South Sudan. Problems like this are not unheard of. Statebuilding projects and the implementation of western institutions in non-western states often produce tensions and problems, to the point that "despite all case-related differences, the comparison of the compiled cases suggests that there are structural similarities regarding limits to contemporary statebuilding that do not emanate from specific contexts or actors but are of a more general nature" (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, p.113). The media is not usually included as an institution in a statebuilding project, yet, as media development tries to implement western media structures in a non-western country, it is likely to encounter and create similar problems. In South Sudan, the concurring narrative to the government's reading of the situation, heard mostly from journalists, was of a ruthless government that engaged effectively in censorship. The self-perception of journalists was of special interest here. In particular, the younger journalists pleaded for an unregulated media, maybe repeating the mantra of many media development practitioners (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13, 14).

6.2.1 What role for media?

When asking what role media should fulfil in a society mainly two functions were stated. Journalists named media 'the parliament of the

people' and 'the voice of the voiceless'[74]. It fulfils this function by speaking on behalf of the people with the leaders[75], and by asking for and airing people's views, which are supposedly heard by the government and inform it on the people's will[76]. Media is understood as a communication tool, and it is a two-way communication: acts and policies from the government are broadcast to the people, people's opinions on these acts and policies are collected and broadcast, and thus the government is informed on the people's will and opinions. As an interviewee phrased it:

> We do call it as the voice of the voiceless, the parliament of the people, because we do call the local people down with the government, meaning we are the bridge between the people and the government. We get what the government says, we bring it to the people. We also track what the people say and take it to the government. (Senior staff, female/Interview 1)

In another interview the emphasis was put on asking the population for their opinion and broadcasting it to the government:

> So we have this like VoxPops[77] getting the people, yeah. They always get the views and opinions of people and we go to the market. They actually try to know what is going on and everything. (Former junior journalist, female/Interview 5)

In the groups of journalists, civil society members and listeners interviewed, media was also named 'a mouthpiece of society'[78] and a focus was on media's role to inform and educate people[79]. This is

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[74] Senior staff, female/Interview 1.
[75] Senior staff, female/Interview 1.
[76] Former journalist, female/Interview 5, academic staff, male/Interview 2, senior staff, female/Interview 1.
[77] Radio slang for 'Vox Populi', Voices of the people. A reporter asks people on the street for their opinion on an issue. Several statements are recorded and broadcast together.
[78] Academic staff, male/Interview 2.
[79] Security manager, male/Interview 3, media activist, male/Interview 6, junior journalist, male/Interview 7.

basically in line with the ideas of western media. Although, and strikingly, the idea of media as a watchdog on government is mostly absent. It was only mentioned by one journalist:

> You need independent media so that they are a watchdog for the people. To speak on behalf of the people, what the people are saying. It should be reflected. You should know it and not only that, there are certain things that go wrong especially things like corruption. Very big in this country and if the media doesn't speak out, the government we know will not take any action. It could lead to the collapse of the regime. We try to dialogue with them [the government], but is not easy. Sometimes they understand, sometimes they don't understand. (Senior journalist, male/Interview 9)

This person had a very long career as a journalist starting in Khartoum and working also as a foreign correspondent for international media. The watchdog-idea, the political function of media, is at the heart of how media is conceptualised in the West (Coronel 2010). In developing countries with media being owned privately but also by the government and also supported by international organisations, iNGOs and foreign governments, this function is present but media is also seen as an educational tool. This might be the reason why media's control function on government is not phrased prominently here. Still, the absence is surprising. Taken together with the view that government needs to build the capacity of journalists, as stated by academic staff at Juba University[80], this might be interpreted as a sign that in South Sudan media is not seen as an institution opposed to the government, but as an institution of the state and hence a supporting element of the government. Thinking about media's long history in the Sudan as a mouthpiece of government and the rebel movement during the second civil war (Arop 2006; Wani 2014) this seems reasonable. However, one interviewee said, that "one of the things that still needs to be developed

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[80] Academic staff, male/Interview 2.

in South Sudan is investigative reporting which is at its weakest point at the moment"[81]. Missing capacity to fulfil the watchdog role might explain why it has rarely been mentioned in the interviews. A third possible explanation is that the harsh line the government has on media gives people the feeling that media cannot act as a watchdog on government, even if it possibly should do this. This is also a clear indication of the informalisation process (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012) in the media. While established by international expats with international standards in mind, the actual practices bend to social realities in the country.

With regard to the idea that media is giving 'voice to the people', this seems a questionable idea at best. First, the collection of vox pops or the broadcast of call-in shows is hardly representative. Individual opinions are just individual opinions; they can hardly be seen as the will of the people. Even in a large call-in show only a tiny minority can state their view (Stremlau et al. 2015). Furthermore, for being a two-way communication, a receiver of the broadcast information is necessary: someone needs to listen. There is no evidence that the government does listen to these shows with the aim to have the will of the people inform policy. Quite opposed to the idea of a tool to communicate *with* the people, the government sees media rather as a tool to communicate *to* the people:

> We need it [the media] of course. (…) In terms of recruitment and in terms of dissemination of information to the public. It started since the SPLM/SPLA days. Back in the bush, the SPLA had a radio station and a radio broadcast. It was the only tool, means, to send instant messages to the people. The same applies to South Sudan. (Senior government official/interview 28)

In another interview, conducted in the Ministry of Information and Broadcast, this thought was put even further:

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[81] Media activist, male/Interview 6.

We believe that media is the ears and the eyes of the people. Media plays a role; even during our times of struggle, media was able to play an important role even after the CPA was signed. Even the radios and the media houses (…) like from the UN and from other places, they played a very, very important and crucial role in bringing this country together. (…) They played an important role. But. Behind [this] is always a policy that are [sic] not in line with our policy, the policy of the government, and not in line with the constitution of the country. So. The role of the media here, is to make sure that the policies of the government to bring peace, to bring harmony, development in all aspects of life, are being put out there for everybody. (Employee in the Ministry of Information, male/Interview 18)

These are contradictory views on the role of media. Journalists see it as an information tool that has the task to inform the government on the will of the people. Opposed to this, the government sees media as an information tool only for the people. The aim is to inform people of government policy. Furthermore, the government sees the international community as a troublemaker and its ideas regarding media as an attack. Judging from this, the idea that media is acting as a communication device, making government more approachable to the population and henceforth strengthening democracy can only be seen as an assumption of international development (Autesserre 2017), and a selling argument for media development organisations (Allen and Stremlau 2005).

6.2.2 Reasons for oppression

As a starting point for the deterioration of the relationship between the government and the journalists, repeatedly the events of December 2013 have been named[82]. It is clear that journalists are scared:

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[82] Security manager, male/Interview 3, junior journalist, male/Interview15, midcareer journalist, male/Interview 24, media manager, male/Interview 28.

If they [journalists] tried to report something, like to tell the, for example, if a killing happen and then they were like they want people to know that it happen, so they [government] just cover everything up or maybe they kill someone (...). That's what happened. That's why we are like kind of scared and that's the reason why I'm not working as a journalist now. (Former journalist, female/Interview 5)

Even us, our editor-in-chief, who was by then ... she came from France, she was once arrested also. She was blamed by the government that she broadcasted information from the rebel site. (Junior journalist, male/Interview 7)

In the group of interviewed journalists and media managers, everyone stated that the government oppresses the media[83], because the media interprets its job differently than the government wishes for:

They are saying that [radio station name] is a rebel because really, they have that thought that [radio station name] is only, should only broadcast gospel and pray to the people without touching what is happening to them in the conflict. (Senior staff, female/Interview 1)

Looking at all interviewees, there are different narratives as to why the government is harsh on the media. Foremost, missing professionalism of the journalists is blamed. This accusation came from the group of interviewees working for or in the government or ruling party:

There are so many of them. Journalists. But are they really qualified? If you see all of them - say, you see two. Maybe they are experienced. But if you see many of them. 80% are

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[83] Senior staff, female/Interview 1, junior journalist, female/Interview 5, junior journalist, male/Interview 7, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, midcareer journalist, male/Interview 9, senior journalist, male/Interview 10, junior journalist, male/Interview 12, junior journalist, male/Interview 15, student, male/Interview 19, midcareer journalist, male/Interview 22, junior journalist, male/Interview 24.

> youngsters. They are not really educated. They go to school and then they are taught how to do photographs, maybe. They learn a bit about broadcasting, but it's not enough. (Officer, SPLA, male/Interview 11).

The same concern was, however, phrased by people in the civil society group:

> Most of the people that are hired are masquerading now as journalists, [they] are not journalists in the real sense of the word, because there are ethics in journalism. You know that, but since these people don't even know the boundaries, they say whatever they say, and they unnecessarily tick off people. They're careless in their own way with some big shots, and so that's when they get into trouble. (Researcher, male/Interview 14)

> I call them the lazy people, because I think they... a lot of times they feed on rumours. That are readily available. Not doing enough of the in-depth research for themselves and being able to analyse and come up with you know an item that probably is well-cooked, than really just feeding on the common sense. (Consultant, male/Interview 21)

An academic from Juba University mentioned explicitly the need for the government to be involved in capacity building – training – of journalists, although he called for a bigger level of media independence:

> Of course. lot of journalists that are coming in now are young people actually. (...) They have not yet harmonised their thinking, their writings, and their reporting systems and the way they look at issues so that is important. That ideology of writings and thinking, the government should build capacities, especially in context to the media law, and the broadcasting law as well. However, I am insisting that there's that need to (...) be able to give them a lot of spacing so that they are able now to

write freely so long as they have constructive argument and criticisms again over they talk about. (Academic staff, male/Interview 2)

As much of media development is about journalism training (McCurdy and Power 2007; Rhodes 2007, p.12), these complaints about journalists' education are aimed at the international community, the iNGOs specialising in media, and the donors. National Organisations in South Sudan, like the Association for Media Development (AMDISS), see a lack of coordination between international donors and among executing agencies as part of the problem as it results in a tendency to conduct short-term training done by international experts:

> You know, DW [Deutsche Welle Akademie] came to visit us some months back they are interested in our training. Foundation Hirondelle [iNGO] came to visit us. They are also interested in giving training. However, from this study which I talked about from 2012, its one of the things that the journalists said, 'Listen, we don't want this thing, this flight by night. Somebody flies in from London, somebody comes in from New York or Frankfurt or wherever, stays two, three days, having brought all the tools for training, practice tools of training and go back. This parachute-thing, we don't want it. (Media manager, male/Interview 25)

While investments in journalism training are definitely to be welcomed, the described parachute-approach is seen as doing more harm than good. Treating journalism as a mere technical skill that does not need to be adjusted to the culture in which it is supposed to occur leads to short-term training by trainers with no experience of the local context. This can be seen as a consequence of what Bliesemann de Guevara (2012, p.11) describes with regards to statebuilding projects: the implementation of internationalised norms with no local substance. The consequence of media development is that journalists do not get a full-rounded

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education; instead they try to apply concepts learned in a short-term training to a culture alien to that concept. This, according to an employee from the Minister of Defence:

> (…) is how media is coming into conflict with the security. You know. They sometimes think: This is information, this must go out. But do they know what is there in the minds of the people? Somebody may go and chew out big information into a different construct. For those who don't have access to direct media. You know, could, and could be misused. And if it is misused we have a problem in the country. This is a contradiction. You know and that's why freedom of the press, for me I see, it is the only viable way to be regulated. (Officer, SPLA, male/Interview 11).

The same is said by a researcher from a local institution:

> That is where there is a problem. People report things that are wrong, that are not confirmed, are not checked with anyone that may be propaganda that irritates people. That one explains part of the difficulty that they already find themselves in. (Researcher, male/Interview 14)

The confusion about different concepts was found in the interviews with journalists, but also with other people. In an interview with the academic staff it was evident that the journalistic concept of 'balancing' might not be clearly understood in South Sudanese society:

> If you want to know about what is wrong with the government whatever and you go to Radio Tamazuj, you just get that quickly and you just get that story plain the way it is. Miraya will balance. Eyeradio will try to balance because they are in the country and they can be in trouble with the security. (Academic staff, male/Interview 2)

Balancing a news report in journalism refers to listening to and broadcasting of both sides of a story in order to report neutrally and unbiased. This rule is one of the backbones of objective journalism (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2016). The three radio stations named in the quote are Radio Tamazuij, a radio and website located outside South Sudan and supported by a Dutch NGO, the UN-Radio Miraya, which enjoys a rather secure position because it is a run by the United Nations, and Eyeradio, run by the iNGO Internews. These three radio stations have different layers of protection against oppression from the government. The way their approach to 'balancing' is phrased here indicates that 'balancing' is something done because of these different layers of protection, with Tamazuij, not balancing but giving the story 'plain the way it is', doing the best job. This is a problematic notion. In addition to this, another interviewee who has worked as a journalist for Eyeradio, stated when asked what the journalistic ethics are, that it included not to interview children[84]. While certainly a child should not be interviewed in the absence and without the permission of a legal guardian, it is hardly the first or most important rule in journalism.

Radio stations have been accused of being tribalist[85]. It is unclear if this is seen as having been done on purpose or as a consequence of the missing education of journalists. However cut, the media has been accused of contributing to the conflict instead of containing it.

> The media played a negative role in terms of mobilisation, because the message that was sent to the ordinary people, I remember one thing and interview with (not understandable) it was very dangerous, and it sparked the conflict into a tribal turn, because, once you were interviewing, and it was even BBC, they said that oh, the Nuer in Juba were being killed in the

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[84] Junior journalist, male/Interview 7.
[85] Security manager, male/Interview 3, junior journalist, male/Interview 12, midcareer journalist, male/Interview 22.

streets. Of course, this was not the truth, but she said it for political purposes. (Government official, male/Interview 13)

When the conflict broke out, you realise that the country was sharply divided to an extent that even some media personnel, staff, some take a side. It was no longer an objectivity of media, so some radio stations depending on whoever is running will broadcast what is going on with his or her own opinion. (Junior journalist, male/Interview 22).

The fear that media can incite hate is why many in groups 2, 3, and 4 – government, civil society and listeners - support media regulation. Journalists, however, do not. This mirrors the views of experts working on statebuilding and experts working on media development (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13).

Finally, it has been said that the government's expectation that media has to be friendly towards them, was created by the behaviour of international media in the past:

Because when the BBC was reporting here in the South, the BBC I can say was biased towards Northern Sudan. And was projecting southern Sudanese people as people who were so oppressed, people who were suffering, people who needed to be given their rights. Majority of the SPLA-soldiers became heroes who captured towns and the BBC said, "The SPLA captured this town. The SPLA did this, the SPLA is this. The SPLA is doing blah." They have developed that concept of a child that has been spoiled. They have been baby-sat by the media for a long time, the media has been very positive about them. (Senior journalist, male/Interview 10)

The supposed lacking education of the journalists was in this regard somehow excused:

> But I think in this country even if you know some of the ethical issues at the boundaries you will still come to confrontational issues with this government, they are sensitive. They feel, you know, that you are pointing fingers at them. (Consultant, male/Interview 21)

Repeatedly, it has been said that the government lacks the understanding of what media is supposed to do in a country and that training is needed for the government and for state institutions. The notable exception to this overall opinion came from a senior politician with an opposition party, who bluntly stated that the government does not lack the capacity and does understand what the media should be in a democracy: "But it is something they don't want."[86] Coming from a man who had been among the founders of the SPLA and having worked with the current government when its leaders were still a rebel movement themselves, this voice and opinion carries weight. Furthermore, there is not really a doubt that the democratic understanding of the government of South Sudan is lacking, nor should the media alone be accused of the problems in the country and in the relationship with the government. This notwithstanding, it seems clear that media development that treats journalism as a mere technical skill makes for problems in a non-western country.

6.2.3 The trouble with cooperation

Another topic emerging clearly from the interviews with civil society members, journalists, and regular people is cooperation. There is, however, no dominant opinion on this. A wish for cooperation between the media and the government was phrased repeatedly, and such cooperation is not seen as problematic but as necessary.

> If you bring them together, the government and the security service, all the media houses, and they sit together and they

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[86] Senior opposition politician, male/Interview 22.

have a workshop training together, everybody else will see themselves. The good thing we do in the [inaudible] we want to bring all the antagonistic groups together, those who don't like them so you bring them together. Let them eat a meal and let them have themselves, greet each other, and they talk. (Academic staff, male / Interview 2)

This need to talk was also wished for by regular listeners. It was stated in an interview that government and journalists need to be trained so that they stop being hostile towards each other:

The government needs to be actually to be given capacity also together with the media, personally with the journalists, such that they should not see each other as enemies, so when I am writing I have to approach. If the minister misbehaves, I should not approach in [inaudible] way such that to get them react, seriously. There is a smart way. (Security manager, male/Interview 3)

This 'smart way' of approaching someone who has, as a member of the government, misbehaved, seems to reflect the problem that leaders should not be criticised in public but in a way that does not let them lose face. This has been mentioned before by a South Sudanese researcher who pointed out that journalists end up in trouble with the leadership and the security forces because they phrase criticism that is not well-researched and confirmed[87].

The need for the government, in particular the security forces, and the media to get to know each other and to cooperate was also stated by AMDISS. The 'Media Working Group' they are doing is chaired by UNESCO, with the participation of the Ministry of Information and several other media stakeholders:

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[87] Researcher, male/Interview 14.

There are quarterly meetings that bring together as I said earlier the media actors, media support organisations and the local media. Some of the actual points that come out of the, this kind of meetings is basically difficult to enforce. We talk about collaboration. If for example AMDISS would be working on training of journalists, we expect that other organisations who like to conduct training will have to come to AMDISS. (...) But in fact, you know you know, we say, we are coordinating this, but they'll do their own training. So in effect AMDISS is trying to coordinate and other organisations is doing training. (Media manager, male/ Interview 26)

At the same time, it was mentioned that it is problematic to get especially the foreign agencies for media development to join the table:

But somehow we find media are challenged in this area where some organisations, international organisations come directly without looking at the already existing efforts that the local organisations have done, and they go in directly (not understandable). We feel that is not appropriate, because it is double (not understandable) of efforts, and one is that... it is more appropriate when you work with a local organisation to build on what they have done, so that is moving forward, not starting again. From scratch. (Media manager, male/ Interview 26

The same was mentioned by another media activist:

One of the major challenges that I also see that the international development organisations for the media, media organisation faces is the understanding on the real local context. Because at times they would come, they'll gather a few certain indicators that seem to be visible enough, but there are certain issues that they actually don't understand, the nitty gritty. Those are the thing that make a time, causes the conflict or rather create a situation that makes it uncomfortable for the public or the other

> people, the other institutions. I have always been encouraging the international media, the Deutsche Welle, the BBC that you need to work with the local media development organisations. Because they understand the context, they understand local language, the needs of these people and when a trainer comes, you train them yes, but they would also guide you on the nitty gritty things so that when these people come they actually fit in. (Media activist, male/Interview 6)

A lack of coordination was thus stated; an unwillingness of the international media organisations to coordinate and work with the local organisation. As to why this is, is a topic of speculation. It might be that the fact that the government is included in the Media Working Group meetings sits not too well with some iNGOs, even if government involvement is not seen as problematic in South Sudan. A journalist involved in organising these meetings also named them an opportunity to enhance mutual respect between the government and the media, by keeping healthy distance:

> Respect really, not necessarily cooperate but respect each other. Understand that each one has got a role to play and they must be allowed to play their role independently. The government should not interfere with this and the media also should respect the government. (Senior journalist, male/Interview 9).

It was mentioned that the UN-agencies and the big international media development organisations want bigger NGOs as partners, that they are not keen on working with local partners:

> I know some organisations have very protective ways of doing things. That sense I have from meeting DW[88] folks, they are like: this is what we do, you know and keep it close to my chest, and

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[88] Abbreviation for 'Deutsche Welle'. Deutsche Welle Akademie is Germany's organisation for media development.

just show you one side of it. (Media manager, male/Interview 25)

That there is indeed a certain amount of protectionism has been noted: "after all, whatever the integrity of their staff, global media networks obviously have self-serving motives" (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30). Eventually, media development is a market.

It is not only that there is no mutual respect between the government forces and the media, and no cooperation between the international and local media organisations, there have also been complaints about lack of cooperation among journalists and media outlets in Juba:

> There is nothing called media fraternity because we have the church media with its own agenda. We have the UN media with its own agenda, we have the private media with its own agenda. We have the government media with its own agenda, so you will find that all these media sectors do not work collaboratively. They are suspicious of each other. Even journalists themselves, they are always suspicious of each other, so there is no media fraternity. The media itself needs to come out and work as media fraternity. That means their own reporters, their own media managers they work together to bridge the gap between government and the society by evaluating policies, pointing out where the government has gone wrong. And also appreciating what the government is doing right, yeah. (Senior journalist, male/ Interview 10)

When Radio Bakhita was closed and a number of their journalists were jailed, there was a disagreement among the media professionals on how such a situation should be handled in a country with no institutionalised way of media complaints. The Agency for Media Development, AMDISS, offered Radio Bakhita help in advocating for the release of the journalist, but this was refused:

We really found almost opposition from the Catholic Church itself. They said, oh, you people, the archbishop himself is working on this. He's going to meet the president, so he can handle this. They were really trying to say, well, just don't do anything. We will handle it ourselves. They didn't want the involvement of AMDISS, although later on they realised that AMDISS was useful, but they thought they could handle it. Because they wanted to keep it something between the two. Between the government and the Catholic Church or Bakhita, not involving other people. (Senior staff, male/Interview 9)

This policy of non-involvement points to a situation with no clear rule how to handle the situation, which indeed it is. The legal framework is missing, and in this situation, Radio Bakhita rather trusted their ability to negotiate a solution. AMDISS, on the other hand, lobbies for a rule of law and clear rules according to which every party, including the government, has to behave in such a situation. They are rather irritated by such isolationism:

Really, I think this policy, I don't know where it comes from. It's very maybe to explain why they... I talked to the secretary of the archbishop and I said, "You people you are cowards. Why do you allow your journalist to be arrested like that and you just talk in very low tones? You should come out clearly and say this is wrong and release my people immediately, but you are just keeping your voices very low. This is wrong." I quarrelled them very much. (Senior staff, male/Interview 9)

This begs the question to what extent a free press is a possibility in a country where a rule of law and legal institutions are not in place. After all, a free press is not just guarding democracy; it is as much a beneficiary of it. A situation where a free press is implemented by international actors without coordination with local actors and without the assured involvement of the state and national government will most likely lead to problems similar to those encountered in South Sudan.

6.2.4 Summary

The journalists in Juba believe that their job is not only to inform the people about government policies and events of the day but also to inform the government about what the people think. On the contrary, the government sees media solely as a one-way information channel. Journalists in Juba feel oppressed and name as the starting point for the oppression the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013. The government, but also civil society members, say that journalists are not professional and that this is a cause for the problems journalists find themselves in. The international media development agencies are seen as partly responsible for this, because of their penchant for short-term training by international, and not regional, trainers. South Sudanese media managers complain about an unwillingness of the donors to coordinate efforts; and it is said that the journalistic training provided is more often than not insufficient to the country's culture. Media has also contributed to the conflict by sharpening ethnic tensions, this being another reason why people wish for media regulation. The situation is further worsened by an absent legal framework for media.

6.3 The state

Concerning the state and the leadership in the country, all four groups saw the government as unstable and dithering. The ones most critical towards the government were – maybe unsurprisingly – the journalists. In this group, it was stated that the leaders are dictators with no democratic commitment:

> They don't want anybody if you get today to be in power, you don't want to allow anybody to be in power again. You want after your death, your son will be the second to you. (...) (Junior journalist, male/interview 22)

Others in this group said that the government had no clear direction, accused it of nepotism, and said that it had failed to unite the people:

> When we called the peace, and then the people came back from the bush, like the government as they call themselves. (...) They said, you know, like you know, you are not with us in the bush, so you don't have right to work in the government or anything. They started arresting people, people who were just disappearing. (...) It's just, they don't want people from outside to work with them. (Former journalist, female/interview 5)

In groups 2 and 3, among politicians and civil society members, a mix of harsh voices and excusing ones could be heard. The most severe accusation came from an opposition politician who said that the ruling party had failed to fulfil their promises from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005:

> So, what came afterwards, lack of service to the people, you know, and falling short on the slogans. We had another slogan during liberation that were appealing to our people and to our friends. Our friends and people were believing that we were going to deliver on what we said. That we were against the repression in Khartoum. We were against dictatorship in Khartoum. We are for democracy, we are for human rights. We are for development. All these slogans. But then when we were in power we did the opposite. (Senior opposition politician, male/interview 23)

Overall, in the group of politicians interviewed, the statements are excusing. In the group of civil society members, the government is named a failed one, and the need for a legal framework and for institutions is mentioned. There is also acknowledgement that more time is needed:

> I know it's a tall order to ask someone who has never been criticised for over 20 years now to accept criticism simply, so

> those are the challenges. We'll take time, perhaps 15 years, 20 years. (Researcher, male/interview 14)

Most forgiving were the interviewees in group 4 – regular people. It was repeatedly mentioned that media needs to be regulated and that the government needs to make sure that no broadcast threatens national security. Hate speech was mentioned explicitly. The government itself was described as inclusive:

> Here I do stand with the president because he's trying to bring people together. (…) I'm from Equitoria, but this time I don't say the president has did something bad because there's like 4 to 5 ministers from Equitoria here which is a good step of uniting people together [sic]. That's one thing I've discovered. That's one thing that can solve problem, what he did as the president, he's a Dinka, and the vice president is from Equitoria here, the speaker is from Upper Nile state. From this three regions Greater Upper Nile, Greater Equitoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal. That's already a good step, you bring the minister from Dinka and then the deputy from Equitoria here, then assembly goes to Upper Nile. That's good. (Driver, male/interview 16)

The perception people have of the government seems to depend on their position towards it. Journalists, who suffer at the hands of the government, are in the majority negative, while politicians and civil society members are rather excusing with the one or the other outlier, depending on lived history and experience. Regular people, however, view the government not too unfavourably. It was mentioned twice that South Sudan is a country in transition and that things will change when the leadership changes. Especially in the group of civil society members, among academics, activists and advisers, there is a sense that while things are not as good as they should be, there is a need to 'bide the time'. Modernising the society, including its leadership, as stated in modernisation theory (Lerner 1958), is seen here as something which

cannot be done via broadcasting and messaging. Change comes by replacing the old with the new elites, and hence with time.

6.3.1 The government and the media

Basically, every journalist interviewed said that the South Sudanese government controls the media. It was stated that "there are some topics that are too sensitive that the current government doesn't want you to discuss in the media, and they don't want the public to know about it"[89], that "in South Sudan we work in government controlled areas, so you cannot report"[90], and that "we are like kind of scared and that's the reason why I'm not working as a journalist now"[91]. These statements were all connected to the recent closures of media houses[92] and the threats against journalists. These incidents had shaken the journalistic community. Fear to discuss the government could be observed when recruiting for interviews. A few people refused to be interviewed when I said that I had questions about the government. The harsh line has led some media houses to engage in self-censorship:

> A press release is a press release of [sic] the government. You're not supposed to omit anything from that. Instead, as a media house, you can decide not to broadcast the press release (…) or you broadcast it as they give. (Senior staff, female/interview 1)

Surprisingly, it was argued that foremost the international backed media keeps the line of the government:

> These foreign-funded institutions particularly radio stations are easily intimidated by the government. They tend to toe the

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[89] Junior journalist, male/Interview 12.
[90] Junior journalist, male/Interview 24.
[91] Former junior journalist, female/Interview 5.
[92] Radio Bakhita had been closed in August 2014 (CPJ 2014) and was allowed to reopen just shortly before I started my fieldwork in South Sudan in November 2014. The memory was thus fairly fresh when I started my interviews. In February 2015, the Minister of Information, Michael Makuei threatened to close the UN-Radio Miraya (United Nations 2015c).

government line more closely than the newspapers. Of course, the newspapers are mostly commercial and they are on their own, but they have got, if you like, fearless journalists like myself. I quarrel with the government every day. (Senior journalist, male / Interview 9)

This statement from a South Sudanese journalist can be seen as self-serving bias. Still, the fact that he did indeed quarrel with the government was sadly confirmed when the newspaper he published was closed. Furthermore, he was not the only person who said that internationally backed media was too soft on government.

The media in South Sudan, mostly the electronic media, especially the radio, they play a game of, they are not confrontational in their work. If government has said this has happened in the community, sort of soft, soft news or soft sort of. There's no real hard information. It's the print media that has graduated from that. The print media is more stronger [sic] and more assertive on specific views by bringing different views together for public to make a choice. (Media activist, male/Interview 6)

Control of the media is a feature of an authoritarian or illiberal regime (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1963), while the presence of a free and independent press is seen as a sign and a safeguard for a healthy democracy[93] - which is the reason for media development (Price et al. 2002; Howard 2003; Bonde 2006). Media development is supposed to add to a government's legitimacy by keeping tabs on leadership (Coronel 2010). South Sudanese leaders, however, reject this idea, seeing media as a mouthpiece to communicate with the population[94]. With the ongoing

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[93] South Sudan can hardly be named a democracy because the country's government has never been democratically elected. The current government came into power as a transitional government following the referendum about the country's secession from Sudan. Elections were supposed to be held in July 2015, but have been postponed due to the ongoing fighting (see Appendix 1.5, pp.18-24).
[94] Senior government official/interview 28.

conflict, the government was accused of taking a harsh stance towards media houses, including shutting them down and harassing journalists. The government does not acknowledge that there are harsh policies in place. This is backed up by a local researcher:

> It [freedom of expression and access to information] is there, but it is severely challenged. The government doesn't have a policy that restricts freedom of expression or access to information. It simply has no policy, but due to the fact that the country is in a state of war right now, the sensitivity of the security organs is higher than normal. (...) The problem is not in the government organs, but particularly the security related institutions that are stifling freedom, access to information, or freedom of expression. (Researcher, male/Interview 14)

This confirms a problem that has been named repeatedly: the need for institutional reform or institutional capacity building. It seems that in South Sudan the state institutions are not clear about their tasks and duties, and the communication between the different institutions is not working well. Asked about the shutting down of media houses, the responsible authorities state that they regulate media in order to protect the state and prevent further ethnic splits:

> There is always a conflict between national security and freedoms. Civil rights and political rights. This conflict exists, irrespective of the level of development of society. It exists in Germany, it exists in America, it exists in South Sudan. For example, after nine eleven in America, the patriot act was passed, so much of, I mean a big chunk of civil liberties and political rights US-citizens had enjoyed for hundreds of years were just stripped. Just taken away. Overnight. We have not done so here in South Sudan. But if we take Rwanda as an example, radio stations played a big role in fuelling the genocide that happened in Rwanda. Every government waves between this different interests. National security and civil rights,

> political rights and freedom of expression, those things. (...) In conflict like ours then the issue of national security becomes paramount. Becomes more important than... not more important, but then there is more emphasis on national security than on freedom of expression and... so. Some people might call it censorship, but in times of warfare there is a responsibility, an obligation to make sure that people are safe. There is no incitement against... when you are in government territory than you don't need to give so much airtime to groups that want to incite hatred and... it's a responsibility to protect the state, to protect peace in the state. (Senior government official, male/Interview 28)

South Sudanese journalists say that before December 2013 reporting was easier[95], and that they were able to balance their reports and articles. It was also mentioned that media houses found themselves in troubles when they reported news related to the so-called rebels or broadcasted rebel views.[96] That this is restricted in an ongoing conflict is indeed not a particularity of South Sudan:

> Well, it does happen also in... It is not happening just here, it does happen in developed countries also. I remember when I was in Britain, you couldn't quote Gerry Adams under Margaret Thatcher. You couldn't. You could not. So, probably we are not so different there. (University professor, male/Interview 17)

In the view of the South Sudanese government, there are double standards applied when it comes to media freedom:

> I know there [in the United States] are a lot of restrictions [for the media]. But they don't want these restrictions to be applied here. They want us to open it. That everybody can do what they

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[95] Junior journalist, male/Interviews 15, junior journalist, male/Interview 24.
[96] Senior journalist, female/Interview 1, academic staff, male/Interview 2, junior journalist, male/Interview 7, government employee, male/Interview 13, and junior journalist, male/Interview 15.

want to do. (Employee in the Ministry of Information, male/Interview 18)

The view that 'everybody can do what they want to do' is indeed shared by some. One of the journalists I interviewed asked for 'absolute freedom' for the media[97]. Opposed to this, the government expects media to perform self-censorship and it sees this as necessary, especially in the current situation. Whether the shutting down of media outlets and harassment of journalists are ordered by the government or done independently by the security organs is unclear, but the acts have led to tensions with the donors and the international community. The disapproval of the international community is seen as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. As an employee in the Ministry of Information said:

> So we would want all our partners (...), we would like to coordinate our work together and make sure that Radio Miraya is saying the same thing, or that we are saying the same thing as they are saying. But not working on opposite side. Radio Miraya or other radios that are under UN-agencies or USAID we want them to continue to do their job. Because they are doing an excellent job in helping our people on so many aspects of life. But they have to work under the law, under the constitution, and not above. You are here under the invitation of South Sudan and the government of South Sudan. They are doing excellent work and we want them to continue, but they have to understand that this is a sovereign country and we all must be under the constitution, other than that it is a violation of the constitution and no country would allow its own violation of its own constitution. (Employee in the Ministry of Information, male/Interview 18)

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[97] Junior journalist, male/Interview 12.

If this gives the impression that oppression of freedom of the media is approved of, this is by no means the case. Instead, the argument is that the government understands its actions as regulation of the media, and it deems this regulation necessary because of the situation in the country, in line with its rights as a sovereign nation, and it argues that many other nations in comparable situations have done the same.

On the other hand, iNGOs giving media training in South Sudan teach a way of doing media which is not likely to provide new and inexperienced journalists with a rounded view on all journalism issues and enable them to navigate within a kinetic and volatile media field in a country experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof. The government's wish for regulation is also grounded in the fact that media has contributed to the conflict in South Sudan and played a rather bad role in broadcasting hate speech. This wish for restriction is also phrased by interview participants in group 4, regular people:

> Some of the media, they were being restricted by so putting arson to the state, okay? By doing so, then the Republic introduced the rule of regulation in which if you wanted to set up a media house, you have to get a licence from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, though you have a incorporate certificate from Ministry of Justice but you have to get it. The government said, "No, we are not restricting the media but the way you talk, you should not actually provoke the citizens on the tribal lines." You see? (Restaurant manager, male/Interview 4)

While there may be good reasons to restrict the media in order to prevent hate speech, the question remains that if the government is not ordering the security organs to shut down media houses, as it insists, then who does? The answer may be that the security organs act on their own initiative. This has been said in some of the interviews, and it might be a consequence of the fact that the ruling party was an army before it became a movement. The 'fight first, ask questions later' mentality might

still be the prevalent mindset. This points back to media development's problem: In the West, the media is not only a protector of democracy by playing the watchdog role; it is also a beneficiary of democratic structures. In a country that has yet to develop these structures, media is an outlaw, and journalists are asked to risk their necks without the safety net democracy and the rule of law provide.

6.3.2 Criticism and capacity

Regardless of who orders the shutdown of media houses, there is no doubt that the government insists on the necessity of media regulation. In particular, the government dislikes being criticised in public. This is not a particularity of the government. In the interviews, especially among civil society members, it was stated that "No South Sudanese wants to be embarrassed outside their place. But when you go to them they will listen to you. They will."[98], and that in the African and particularly the South Sudanese culture critique of a leader has to happen behind closed doors and not into a camera or a microphone.[99] The same is mentioned by a national researcher:

> If you look at organisations like my own organisation, we say a lot in terms of criticism, and (…) the way we do what we do is different from what media organisations do. I know they report news. We don't report news, we do analysis, but if we are careless, we could also (…) we could step on someone toes, but we try to avoid that. We are extremely careful, the tone that we use and how we raise issues. We make sure that we don't make them reach a personal level. That's when people begin to be uncomfortable, and anything can happen. You stay at the policy level. You don't mince your word, but you don't say things carelessly about others, because they are leaders. They deserve to be respected. (Researcher, male/Interview 14)

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[98] Consultant, male/Interview 21.
[99] Consultant, male/Interview 21.

This creates a problem for western style media training. Media in the West is established explicitly as a control mechanism on government and state institutions; media is supposed to act as a watchdog. It comes with the task to criticise in public. This is problematic in the context of the South Sudanese culture, and it leads to bad blood between the groups involved: the government, the journalists, and the donors.

Also, a lack of capacity was named, meaning that the government just does not know, or does not want to know, what role journalists fulfil in a society[100]. These statements usually vacillated between the idea that the government genuinely does not know how to handle the media in a democracy – which was mostly accompanied by the wish that the international community should build this capacity in the government – and the position that the government simply does not care. This was most bluntly stated by an opposition politician:

> They don't need to learn, they don't need to be trained, they do know. But it is something they don't want. It is not that the government doesn't know what the media is supposed to do. But. They don't want. Media to be free to broadcast what they want to, to tell people what they don't want them to. (Senior opposition politician, male/Interview 23).

Besides this, there was also a lack of technical capacity named. This refers to the missing legal framework for media work[101] and also to a lack of communication between the security organs and law enforcement and the government. It was stated that sometimes journalists had been arrested without an order and without anyone knowing about this[102]. All of this contributes to a rather insecure environment for journalists and the problematic situation of media in South Sudan.

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[100] Academic staff, male, Interview 2, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, Midcareer journalist, male/Interview 9, Government official, male/Interview 13.
[101] Media activist, male/Interview 6, senior journalist, male/Interview 10, university professor, male/Interview 17, student, male/Interview 19.
[102] Researcher, male/Interview 14.

6.3.3 Summary

The government is not perceived as stable, but rather as an unstable, dithering one. This is a consequence of the current civil war. It is journalists who describe the government in the most unforgiving terms, whereas regular people are the most forgiving. The former is not especially surprising: It is journalists that suffer from the government: Media houses have been shut down and journalists have been harassed. The watchdog line and the criticism executed by a western style media do not sit well with a government that is used to being pampered by a mouthpiece media. The government rejects that it takes a harsh line against the media, but without a doubt the media policy, whether ordered or not, is enraging the international community. This leads to a deterioration of the relationship between the government and its international donors. The government sees the outrage as interfering in sovereign affairs.

6.4 Groups

South Sudan is a multi-ethnic state. The violent conflict in the country has been coined as based on ethnicity by international media and also by some international organisations (United Nations 2016). One of the reasons for media development in countries that are emerging from violent conflict is that media is thought to be able to contribute to peacebuilding by reconciling groups (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256; Staub et al. 2010, p.278; Staub 2013, p.580). Studying this part of media development in South Sudan leads to the question whether ethnicity is really a cause for the conflict, and what is meant by the statement that a conflict is 'ethnic'.

6.4.1 Media and its contribution to peace

Three radio stations broadcast dedicated programmes for peace. The UN-Radio Miraya broadcasts the radio drama Sawa Shabab, produced by the Dutch iNGO Free Voice Unlimited in collaboration with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The aim is "to promote peace and stability by empowering youth to be confident, open-minded, and participatory citizens in a diverse society" (United States Institute of Peace no date). It focuses on gender equality, poverty, and interethnic strife and "teaches young people in South Sudan to form their own opinion through interactive programming" (Free Press Unlimited 2014). Internews' Eyeradio broadcasts the programme 'In Search for Peace', a factual programme exploring "the prospects for peace in South Sudan by looking at the role of the citizens and leaders, well-wishers, regional leaders, and the international community" (Eyeradio no date). The church-financed 'Voice for Peace', Radio Bakhita, also broadcasts Sawa Shabab, but it has additional peace programmes throughout their broadcast: "Bakhita Radio has been an effective and consistent forum to promote evangelisation, sustainable peace, behaviour change and people's participation in affairs that affect them. Bakhita nurtures Christian values with particular attention to marginalised groups and communities" (Bakhita 2012 – 2015).

In the interviews, these programmes have not been mentioned. Media's potential role in peacebuilding is, however, recognised especially in the group of civil society members. An academic employee of Juba University said with regards to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 that it would have helped if media had acted as an intermediary between the parties:

> What we thought which will have helped if the media houses were allowed to speak, and to even bring leaders from both sides because that very morning I called the editor of Bakhita Radio and I said, "Is it possible that you can talk to the... The UN

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so that Riek is given an opportunity to speak in the radio in the morning and Salva Kiir speaks in the radio again and says, 'This is not what we think. The country is in chaos and we're not thinking this way. I, Salva Kiir, I just... I'm informing all my soldiers to refrain.' 'I Riek Machar am doing this and that.'" That would have helped a lot if that thing was done but there was nothing actually. (Academic staff, male/Interview 2)

It was mentioned repeatedly that media contributed negatively. The focus here was not on media actively broadcasting hate speech in the country but on an international media house broadcasting information that was not well-researched and substantiated:

The media played a negative role in terms of mobilisation, because the message that was sent to the ordinary people, I remember one thing and interview with (not understandable) it was very dangerous, and it sparked the conflict into a tribal turn, because, once you were interviewing, and it was even BBC, they said that oh, the Nuer in Juba were being killed in the streets. Of course, this was not the truth, but she said it for political purposes. So, the Nuer were our side in the Diaspora and those who could speak English in the local areas and told the other people all the Nuer are massacred, and who said it? Oh, the BBC said it. Because they (not understandable), and then everybody took out a gun, killing the Dinka. When the killing of Dinka started in Akobo, and then Dinka went to UNMISS-camps, to kill. (Government official, male/Interview 13)

The same was mentioned in the group of civil society members:

I am going to say this whether it is recorded or not that my boss, (...) he almost, almost a hundred percent blamed the media for, you know, for the escalation of the crisis in 2013. According to him, when the BBC-lady, a journalist, I don't know from where flew in, and allegedly said that a number of Nuer people who were burned in Rum, you know in a locked room and so on, (not

understandable), and that lead, when that news went out, then the Nuer people reacted to that. And it was that particular news about the Nuer burned in a locked room. Which started all of this. At that point, he was not blaming the local, but he was blaming an international media. (Consultant, male/Interview 21)

The narrative that the BBC's reporting, at least partly, was responsible for the conflict is strong in South Sudan. As a highly respected news source it reported while local information was not at hand. However, it was not only international media that played a negative role:

> The media also contributed negatively because if you look at what happened the last attack of Bentiu when the rebels took over, there was a local media that was really calling upon the local people to kill all the Dinka when the rebels came in. That was not a good thing as well. That thing is in Nuer. It's called Nas Radio. It was taken over and it was telling everybody else to come now to Bentiu to kill everybody, whether you're a South Sudanese, whether you're what. It was horrible. That was a negative side of that media but again I understand that there was that provocation for the revenge that media has to do that (Academic staff, male/Interview 2).

It is especially troublesome that the interviewee mentions an understanding ('I understand that (…) media has to do that'), indicating that the call for murder might be understandable.

In general, media is portrayed as having played a very problematic role in the conflict of December 2013. While media should have been able to calm the situation, it is said that it worsened it. The narrative that it was the BBC's reporting that fuelled the ongoing conflict is strong in South

Sudan and it can be found in high-ranking tiers of the society[103]. Without being able to either prove or dismiss this, this narrative, whether it is true or not, explains the widespread wish for media regulation in South Sudanese society.

As group membership has been named here as the basis for the violence and the dividing factor between the people, the next part looks at how the South Sudanese see the role of ethnicity in the conflict.

6.4.2 Group membership and ethnicity
For the organisations working through media on peacebuilding, ethnicity seems to be central. Ethnicity is explicitly mentioned on the website of Free Press Unlimited, the iNGO that produces the peacebuilding radio drama Sawa Shabab. Tribal associations are named as a cause of the conflict and an open reference is made to the cast of the radio drama:

> Civil war and recurring tribal conflicts are a source of ongoing misery in South Sudan. One unique aspect of Sawa Shabab is that its cast includes people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Sawa Shahab Project Manager Hannah Rounding: "In the beginning, this new situation took some getting used to, but by now the cast members have become very close" (Free Press Unlimited 2014).

Ethnicity is named as a dividing factor in the radio show's cast and in the society. South Sudan hosts over 60 different tribes and violence broke out in December 2013 between Dinka and Nuer in the presidential guard, thus along ethnic lines. Still, people do not speak of an ethnic conflict. Interviewees through all four groups overwhelmingly rejected ethnicity as a cause for the conflict. Instead, they describe it as a "power

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[103] The 'boss' mentioned in Interview 21 is a high-ranking official. His title and position have been omitted to protect the anonymity of the interviewee.

struggle"[104], an "issue not about ethnic war"[105], and "not kind of an ethnic thing"[106]. They further say that "it's the party itself"'[107], and that "the real problem between the Nuer and the Dinka is not the Nuer and the Dinka. It is Riek Machar and Salva Kiir"[108].

There is an acknowledgement that ethnicity is used as a mobilisation tool[109]. This is said to be possible as the ties to one's tribe are quite strong:

> Only few criticised their own tribes. Only few. But they also being very different, because if you criticise your own tribe, people will think you are also in your opinion you have rebelled. Also, in their opinion you are a rebel. You see? If you criticise your own tribe, people will think you are no longer part of them, or you are less of them. (Junior journalist, male/Interview 12)

Those strong bonds let people rally behind their leader. On the other hand, the leader is supposed to provide jobs and opportunities to people from his tribe. It is this connection which brings an ethnic tone to the fighting:

> It is just because of the tribalism and the nepotism we have, if you, today, a big person, a commander, only those around you should be from that tribe because you give the power to them. But that's what had happened, because most of them in the fighting now, it is from one tribe because of the nepotism. I am supposed to give job to my cousin. But otherwise it was not an ethnic conflict. (Senior staff, female/Interview 1).

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[104] Senior government official, male/Interview 28.
[105] Academic staff, male/Interview 2.
[106] Security manager, male/Interview 3.
[107] Restaurant manager, male/Interview 4.
[108] Junior journalist, female/Interview 5.
[109] Among others, senior journalist, female/Interview 1, academic staff, male/Interview 2, restaurant manager, male/Interview 4, junior journalist, female/Interview 5, media activist, male/Interview 6, Junior journalist, male/Interview 7, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, junior journalist, male/Interview 12, junior journalist, male/Interview 15.

Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, and other leaders in the country, use ethnicity and group membership in order to rally people behind them. While ethnicity then plays a role for mobilisation, it is not a root cause of the conflict. In the literature, ethnicity is defined as the sense of belonging to a group based on descent, history, language, religion, culture, or race (Horowitz 1985, p.53). Groups are known to repress other groups in order to improve their own position in society (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Dovidio et al. 2005) and because resources are scarce (Sherif et al. 1988). Furthermore, group memberships are arbitrary (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In South Sudan, the tribes are fighting because their leader calls on them and because one follows their leader. In a harsh society based on kinship tradition and obedience, such issues are hard to overcome[110]. This was confirmed by a senior government official:

> I wouldn't say it is an ethnic conflict, because.... it started as a power struggle. Political power struggle (not understandable), and as it has happened in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, some politicians tried to, to dig into existing ethnic fault lines. It's easy for them to get manpower, to carry on [the] struggle, as we call it, or even in elections. You always go back to your constituency, if you like. And that is your ethnic group. In a country like ours, it's a guaranteed constituency. Whether it is political constituency or recruiting a stock from which you can recruit youth. What happened in 2003 [assumed a slip of the tongue: 2013] could be traced back to even 1983 and 1991 when politicians disagreed on the objective of the SPLM/SPLA, of the revolution. And those that disagreed fell back on their ethnic constituency. (Senior government official, male/Interview 28)

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[110] On the role of traditional leadership in South Sudan see Modimowabarwa H. Kanyane, James Hoth Mai and Deng Abot Kuol (2009).

People follow their leader because they hope for a position and a livelihood, as was pointed out by a female senior journalist:

> It is those on the ground we are supposed to reach. These are the people we are supposed to convince them. You are fighting. But it is only one person who is going to get the post. Are all of you going to get the president? All of you are going to get the ministers? No. You are going to remain in the bush. You are going to remain a small military. (Senior journalist, female/Interview 1)

This interviewee is working for the only radio programme broadcasting a peace programme with no involvement from western media experts, and she is not focusing on ethnicity. While broadcasting Sawa Shabab for financial reasons[111], the senior staff member here points out that people are fighting because they hope to gain a position ("but it is only one person who is going to get the post"). As not everyone will be able to secure a position ("are all of you going to get the president? (…) You are going to remain in the bush!"), the senior staff member asks the audience in the manuscript to stop killing and to give service to the people instead. The way the conflict is explained in the interviews does not see ethnicity at its root. Ethnicity is only used as a mobilisation tool, which is possible because people are supposed to follow their leader. This is contradictory to the understanding of the term 'ethnic war', where the distinguishing feature is that ethnic groups fight explicitly for their groups' position in society (Kaufman 2001, p.17). Following the ethnic cleansings in Bosnia and the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic conflict was in policy circles primarily understood as grounded in hate because of different ethnicity and as conducted by civilians against civilians. In reaction to this understanding, radio programmes for peacebuilding are designed

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[111] Senior staff at the radio station mentioned off the record that they are getting paid in order to broadcast the iNGO-produced radio drama. This is not unusual; it is a common way for South Sudanese radio stations to finance their operations.

primarily to overcome an assumed ethnic hate and they mostly target the grassroots.

While this approach may contribute to reconciliation, and while it might even work in situations where groups do hate each other on the basis of group membership, it is not a promising approach in a situation where leaders are fighting for power and where people are obliged to follow them because of cultural group boundaries. Judging from the interviews, interventions would need to focus on the elites. Targeting the masses and the people on the ground – which is what a media intervention does – is not a promising approach in a situation where ethnic hate is, at least for the time being, not present.

6.4.3 Summary

This section has reviewed media's contribution as a peacebuilding tool, and it has investigated whether the South Sudanese see the conflict in their country as based on ethnicity. Three radio stations in Juba broadcast dedicated peace programmes; two of them broadcasting an iNGO-produced radio drama with the aim to promote peace. These radio programmes have not been mentioned in the interviews. Still, media has been acknowledged in general as being able to contribute to peace. Instead of doing this, however, it has been noted as having fuelled the conflict instead, with the BBC the main accused. This understanding explains the wish for media regulation. What role does ethnicity play in South Sudan and in the conflict? Overwhelmingly, interviewees rejected the notion that it is an ethnic conflict, where 'ethnic conflict' is mainly understood as a conflict based on ethnic hate. Instead, the conflict was described as being caused by a power struggle between the elites and being based on people's obedience to leaders.

6.5 Chapter conclusions

In this chapter, I present results on the question of what the effects of western style media in South Sudan are using unstructured interviews. 28 interviews were conducted. The aim was to gain insights into how South Sudanese perceive and understand the media in their country, the state, and the relationships between groups. The question is whether these understandings are different from the understandings underpinning western-style media. Unsurprisingly, the understandings are not consistent. Perera has discussed how the desire "for verifiable, objective 'facts' obscures the extent to which drivers of conflicts are not only to be found in isolated pieces of 'hard evidence', but also in the incompatibility of multiple perceptions and narratives" (Perera 2017, p.43). In the context of my study, the question of whether journalists are under threat by the government of South Sudan was answered differently by journalists, government officials, and civil society members. These different narratives do not mean that some of the participants are lying, rather, it points to problems in the institutional architecture of the country, to a lack of communication between different institutions, and to either missing or not reliably executed media regulations. In this way, the interviews show, so to speak, the state of the state. This study looked into effects of mass media, and thus the pool of possible interviewees was rather wide. Interview participants were chosen because of their position towards the media. They are either journalists or media managers (group 1), working for or in the government (group 2), civil society members (group 3), or regular people (group 4). Despite the wide recruitment pool there were recruitment problems. In particular, regular people were wary of participating. While journalists, civil society, and government are all used to the idea of being interviewed, regular people are not. While in the end I managed to recruit four people who were neither journalists nor local elites, this was only possible after I had stayed a considerable amount of time in the country and gained the trust of South Sudanese friends. This

gives rise to the question whose voices are heard in interview studies. In South Sudan, I encountered a recruitment problem that would have led to the construction of an echo chamber, was it not for my long field work spell. The barriers erected by language problems and lack of confidence might not be a South Sudanese problem alone, but a general problem of interview studies in the global South.

With reference to the effects of western-led media in South Sudan, there are different understandings of what role media is supposed to play. The journalists see media as working for the people. Media in this view is supposed to be a two-way communication between the government and the governed. The government, on the other hand, describes media as 'the ears and eyes of society' – notably not as the 'mouth of society'. Media is a communication tool but it is a one-way communication. Furthermore, the wish to regulate the media was phrased by participants from all groups, save the journalists. Among them, the wish for 'absolute free' and unregulated media was stated. This seems to hint that the short-term trainings media development organisations conduct in South Sudan lead to confusion over what a media is and should do. Interestingly, the split in opinion echoes the distinction between academics working on statebuilding and media practitioners (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13). The short-term trainings by western experts have been named as a problem by South Sudanese organisations, and low and purely technical skills have been named repeatedly as one of the reasons why journalists and media houses find themselves in trouble with the government or security forces. The government itself is described as unstable and dithering. Other accusations towards leadership were that it has failed to unite the country and nepotism. These accusations are present in all four groups, although there are different degrees. The journalists are the harshest and the regular people are the most forgiving. The perception of the government is dependent on people's positions towards it. The journalists see themselves suffering from state organs. However, the government does not see it like this. It has been

mentioned that there is lack of communication between the government and the security organs, resulting in security organs acting on their own. Mostly, however, the government is of the opinion that it rightly limits the media and it sees regulation as necessary. There is a clear confrontation here between the view that the state needs to be protected and the wish to report unregulated. The government is aware that this enrages the international community but it sees this as a form of hypocrisy, as restrictions of freedom of expression are well known in donor countries, particularly the US. The South Sudanese government understands these enragements as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Lastly, as media development is also done under the heading of peace journalism and with the aim to reconcile groups in a divided society, questions have been asked about the media's role in peacebuilding and in the conflict. It was acknowledged that media can be a positive tool and work for peace, but none of the dedicated peace programmes broadcast in Juba – by the UN-Radio Miraya, the iNGO-funded Eyeradio and the church-run Radio Bakhita – were mentioned in the interviews. Instead, it was said that media, namely the BBC, has contributed negatively to the conflict in December 2013 by fuelling hate. Notwithstanding that the conflict has been described as ethnic in international media, interview participants reject the idea that it is an ethnic conflict. Instead, it is described as a power struggle between political leaders, who fall back on their ethnic groups as a safe constituency. This is possible because of the strong bonds that tie the individual to a group. The distinction lies in the question why people fight. In policy circles, the concept of 'ethnic conflict' seems to mean that there is a primordial hate against members of another ethnic group, which leads them to engage in violence. Instead, people are fighting to obey their leaders and to confirm their membership in a group. This makes the focus on ethnicity as a dividing feature on the one hand and of media targeting the people on the ground on the other, quite ineffective. It is not claimed here that the production and broadcast of educational radio dramas or radio programmes in countries experiencing violent

conflict is useless in general. However, if such a programme is to help overcome violent conflict, it needs to be tailored to the conditions of the environment.

7 - Conclusions

This thesis investigated western media in South Sudan. In a western understanding, the media is firmly placed outside the state; it can only fulfil its task of holding governments accountable by being independent from and firmly placed outside the state (Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010). This explicit distance together with the difficulties to find evidence for its operation (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014) are possible reasons that the media as part of a statebuilding project has received relatively little attention in academic literature. This thesis contributes to the emerging literature and to our understanding of media as part of a statebuilding process. Hardly a peace and statebuilding mission happens without a media component (Orme 2010) and even if it is not an official state institution, it is built by western actors following a western logic. Thus, it is subject to the same processes of internationalisation and informalisation as described by Bliesemann de Guevara (2012, pp.11-13) with reference to western-led state institutions implemented in a non-western state. The internationalisation is evident in the way the radio stations describe their mission. The idea of a media that acts as a watchdog and informs the population to enable it to make informed choices in elections has its foundation in western liberal democracy. At the same time, these international standards, like the notion of press freedom, are not clearly understood among the South Sudanese population, and western-led media stations are described as engaging in self-censorship. In South Sudan, western-led media has weakened the state by undermining the legitimacy of the national government, and it has contributed to a worsening relationship between the government of South Sudan and the international donors. In showing that western-led media has different effects in a non-western country this thesis also contributes to the discussion about concepts, their need for context, and some of the consequences when this need is ignored. Schaffer (2016) shows how concepts mean different things dependent on their context, and Flyvbjerg (2001, p.20) shows that context-independence is rare in the

social world. Issues are seldom fixed and cannot be isolated from their surroundings. Yet, in the social sciences, generalisable and universally valid concepts are still sought after (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Laitin 2003). Doing research in South Sudan, questions arose about the ways knowledge is produced. At the heart of this were research methods, which have often been described as technical tools for data gathering and organising[112]. Opposed to this, literature on the 'messiness' of doing fieldwork in conflict situations and how this adds insight emerged (Perera 2017).

In this thesis, I have investigated the effects of media development in South Sudan. The country was chosen for its recent history of emerging from a longstanding civil war, the enthusiasm with which the citizens greeted and welcomed independence and their new state, and the massive development campaign implemented by the international community. The restriction to one country allowed for a comparison of three different methods – namely ethnographic observations, a survey, and unstructured, in-depth interviews - with the aims to investigate whether these methods deliver distinctive answers and if so, what kind of answers. The results show that each method provided answers pointing roughly in the same direction. Still, there are also substantive differences (for an overview see Figures 43-45). What is more, every method showed blind spots. It was the combination that delivered a more rounded answer. As it was impossible to predetermine what the blind spots would be, flexibility was necessary and additional research was required. This flexibility is offered by working as a *bricoleur*. When it became clear that interview recruitment excluded a large portion of society, additional informal chats were added under the heading of 'ethnography'; when the survey and the observation results regarding

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[112] This is evident when looking at the literature. Most textbooks on methods are 'How to'-books, offering technical descriptions of how methods shall be employed (see, for example, Bryman 2001b; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Creswell 2013; Kellstedt and Whitten 2013; Sarantakos 2013). An awareness about methods' behaviour in an environment is rare.

the importance of media in everyday life pointed in the exact opposite directions, considerations of people's economic situation became prominent and flagged once more the importance of context when doing research. When an interview participant mentioned media's history in southern Sudan, it became obvious that this would be an additional area of inquiry. It is the bricolage process that allows for this illumination of context, which leads to insights that would have been overlooked by limiting an inquiry to one research tradition and one or even two methods that are grounded in the same research paradigm. Triangulation or mixed methods alone would have failed as they would have only confirmed (or contradicted) findings. In illuminating a research area, the bricolage allows answers to the question why results are as they are, thus providing deeper insight. In this sense, bricolage is indeed the new "rigour in the ruins" (Kincheloe 2001, p.682) of traditional social sciences. Still, it is unproblematic to imagine research questions that are well-served by single method research and there are certainly reasons for such research (Ahmed and Sil 2012). My argument here is that methods are not context-independent. Researching complex questions in complex environments of which the researcher is not a cultural native without acknowledging and accommodating this complexity in the research design opens the door to one-sided reductionism. This seems all the more important when 'being there' is seen as an epistemic practice (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014; Bliesemann de Guevara 2017). Understanding 'being there' as a mark of good research might lead to the necessity for a new definition of what 'being there' means. Drawing on my work in South Sudan, I argue that 'being there' cannot be understood to mean 'being on location'. One can be on location – a city, a country – and still be in very different circumstances than those that are important for the question researched. 'Being there' as a mark of good research must include 'being in the situation' (Fisher 2017; Smirl 2015). This is especially important when research is policy-relevant, firstly because it is likely that policy-relevant research takes place in complex environments. It is highly unlikely that we find

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"circumstances which can be strictly separated from daily understanding and from change" (Flyvbjerg 2001, p.20) in such situations. Second, it is important because policy-relevant research has implications for people's life.

I now provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the three methods employed and how they played out in South Sudan. This is followed by an answer to the question of the effects of media development in South Sudan based on all three methods.

7.1 Researching media in South Sudan - methods

In this thesis, I have looked at different ways to investigate a policy-relevant research question in a country of the global South. The aim was to examine if different research methods deliver distinctive answers to a research question, and thus whether methods are performative (Aradau and Huysmans 2014) or if they are mere data gathering tools "linked with the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined" (Bryman 2001b, p.4) The answer to this question – if research methods act in and with the environment or if they are only connected to a certain world view – makes an important contribution to the question of how research in countries experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof is done (Bliesemann de Guevara 2017). The disciplining function of methodology and method (Jackson 2011, pp.9, 10) has been described before; how things are done justifies a judgement of whether an inquiry is scientific or not (see Perera 2017). The proper conduct of inquiry (Jackson 2011), however, might lead to problems when the issue researched is not linear and straightforward, when it is messy (Law 2004). The comparison of different methods in South Sudan - ethnographic observation, a quantitative survey, and qualitative, in-depth interviews – showed that no method alone delivered a comprehensive understanding of the question but that a combination is

called for to provide a more complete understanding and answer to the research question regarding the effects of media in a peace and statebuilding operation. I will now explain the three methods in detail.

7.1.1 Ethnography

Ethnography is here understood as a third perspective, a bridge, so to speak, that can span the quantitative/qualitative divide. Jackson has pointed out that "the statistical methodology dominates much of the field of IR" (Jackson 2008, p.92), and he goes on to state that the use of qualitative techniques does not constitute a departure from statistical methodology and especially the search for causality. Ethnography is a descriptive approach (Jackson 2008) and as a naturalistic and holistic approach that studies phenomena in their natural settings, it can cluster qualitative and quantitative research. It is a reflexive, eclectic and political perspective that is especially useful when researching themes of policy-relevance in the global South. Ethnographic research aims "at acquiring a deep knowledge of the social community and the individual, [and] fieldwork typically entails adapting to a local area and culture (…). Knowledge is considered 'deep' when a subject is examined in the context of its complex connections" (Bray 2008, p.297). It is this deep understanding, with its attention to context, reflexivity, and political awareness that distinguishes an ethnographic approach from a qualitative approach, where the main distinguishing feature is that the qualitative approach is concerned with words instead of numbers. Vrasti (2008) criticises rightly a use of ethnography merely as a method but without its methodological and political underpinnings in International Relations. Doing ethnography means that the environment, the researcher, and her baggage are part of the fieldwork and research process. This awareness to context and open or hidden relations between the people in the social setting under investigation is what sets ethnography apart and makes it of special value when researching in an alien environment where the main concepts of the research question, and also 'research' itself, might be understood differently by the

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researcher and the participants. This is why I name it a bridge. By paying attention to the surroundings and aiming for deep understanding, ethnography provides the possibility of starting and accommodating the complex negotiation process Schaffer (2016) calls necessary to understand concepts as they are understood in the research environment. This is necessary for both quantitative and qualitative research. To give an example, it took the experience of living with a severely limited electricity supply to understand that this might play a role in the way people consume media. I had this experience when I worked as a project coordinator in Bor, Jonglei in 2013, where, despite my accommodation having been in one of the best hotels in the city, only three hours of electricity per day were provided. This made me understand that I would have to observe people's media consumption in their everyday life instead of just asking for 'time spent listening to a radio'[113]. I needed the experience of the South Sudanese reality, beyond the expat house with the normally 24/7 working generator, to understand that this needed to be an area of investigation. This leads to the question of what 'being there' actually means. Ethnography's preference for 'being there' has been criticised (Stepputat and Larsen 2015), but a definition of 'being there' is missing. Bliesemann de Guevara (2014; Bliesemann de Guevara 2017) and Fisher (2017) both have shown the limits and problems of 'being there' as an epistemic practice, when 'being there' is only understood as 'being in the location', instead of as 'being in the situation'.

It has been said that ethnography comes with a representation problem; that it only represents the world as the researcher sees and understands it while omitting the voices of the researched (see van Maanen 1995; van

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[113] It would hardly make a difference if this question is asked in a questionnaire or a qualitative interview. People seldom mention things that are normal to them; they take it for granted that the conversational partner knows about them, it is, after all, normality. As a western researcher, having an unlimited electricity supply is normal. In my normality, people can listen to a radio whenever they want. Thus, my sense of normality prevented me from questioning the assumption that media can play an important role in peace and statebuilding.

Maanen 2011). Indeed, I presented here the interpretations of what I heard, saw, and experienced. There is the danger that there are gross misinterpretations among my findings. Still, this is not a peculiarity of the ethnographic approach. In interview studies and questionnaire research it is also the researcher who asks the questions, steers in a certain direction, and choses the parts of an interview highlighted in the research paper. Interpreting is part of doing research, but ethnography with its awareness to surroundings and the long-term investment in a country or situation, might have a better chance to limit misinterpretations. With the familiarity of the territory, more chances opened up to test my interpretations in everyday life and chats with South Sudanese acquaintances. Time is a powerful remedy against misinterpretations, and ethnography takes time. At the same time, 'time' is what might count against ethnography in purely practical terms. Gaining 'deep understanding' takes time. It is much more time-costly than a qualitative or quantitative approach. A possible trade-off for urgent policy-relevant research might be to inject a bit of ethnography in a research project; by living locally for some months, research will be strengthened. In this study, ethnography has proven so valuable that I conclude that even a bit of ethnography is better than no ethnography at all.

In the literature, 'access' is named as a problem in ethnography (Bryman 2001a, p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp. 292–298; Feldman et al. 2003; Harrington 2003, p.593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp. 42–43; Sarantakos 2013, p.220). I did not experience this and access was simple enough to gain. Still, this would certainly have been different with another research topic. Access to the daily work of Radio Miraya, to give just one example, would certainly have been harder to achieve. My research area was people's everyday life, and with teaching at the university, playing chess, and hanging out at the local bar I could easily interact with South Sudanese and with South Sudanese everyday life. This, however, raises questions about ethics. While I never hid my

profession and the reason why I was in Juba, I doubt that people were constantly aware of me as a researcher. On the one hand, this was good cementing ethnography's status as a rather unobtrusive method. On the other hand, it is problematic, and it can only partially be healed by being aware and acting constantly with the participants' well-being in mind. This includes a strict policy to protect participants' identity. Another point here is that not only the participants' but also the researcher's safety is more under threat than with an interview study, which would not require an intense mingling in the everyday life of a country. South Sudan is not the safest of places, and I experienced some rather dire situations. There is a trade-off to be made with this methodological approach, and risks need to be negotiated. A last problematic point with ethnography is that its reach is rather small. The question can be asked if this is necessarily so. Quite obviously, one researcher cannot investigate a whole country ethnographically. Still, research questions can have boundaries; if a question concerns media development, perceptions of the state, or interethnic cooperation, it is possible to identify areas of importance for an ethnographic research study.

7.1.2 Survey

The quantitative approach with its focus on measurement, objectivity, and generalisability is described as the scientific approach to research in political science (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). Numbers, as Merry (2016) and Porter (1995) both point out, come with objectivity and thus trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the need for context and understanding of the environment showed very clearly during data gathering. Two surveys were conducted, one in December 2014, the other in July 2015. The first survey pointed to the importance of understanding the asymmetrical relationship between researcher and nationally recruited interviewers. For both surveys, I employed students as interviewers, and in both cases I spent roughly 90 minutes in class to explain my research and the questionnaire. For the first survey, however, conducted at the beginning of my fieldwork in Juba, I was introduced to the students by a

high-ranking member of the faculty. Recruitment for the second survey started after I had taught a class and most students knew me already from my presence on campus. Student researchers from the first survey were of the belief that I was an employee of the UN or an iNGO, and they hoped that I might be able to get them one of the coveted jobs with one of these bodies. They were under the impression that the more answers were ticked on the questionnaire the better, and their wish to please me made them press respondents for as many answers as possible. Furthermore, they did not want to bother me with questions but give the image of independent and good interviewers. The result of this wish to make a good impression was multiple ticking of boxes, which created several subcategories on the questionnaire; 17 alone for the independent variable. This rendered the survey unusable and resulted in the need to conduct a second survey. The experience with the first survey illuminates a problem with the data gathering process. My surveyors were subject to interviewer perceptions of the situation bias (Balnaves and Caputi 2001, p. 87), which was because of the way they saw me. The first survey showed clearly that using hired interviewers one has little control over the process (Bowling 2005). It has been named one of the strengths of questionnaire research that questions are standardised, as this means that the research is easily repeatable and can be checked for reliability. The multiple ticking and scribbling in the margins showed that answers were negotiated between the surveyor and the participant. Judging from the questionnaires, there must have been quite a bit of discussion, calling the repeatability into question. Extensive training periods for surveyors of up to three weeks have been advised (Nichols 1991, p.28). This would have been outside the scope of my means, and it would also weaken one of the strengths of questionnaire research: that data can be obtained relatively quickly and economically. Lastly, the second set of surveyors came from the same background and had the same training as the first one – the difference in data quality changed remarkably with my position towards the surveyors.

The positive points about surveys are that they give an idea about the scope of a phenomenon and that they provide sound evidence – or claim to do so. When it comes to statebuilding operations in countries of the global South, sound evidence is increasingly asked for. Decisions on projects and programmes need to be based on sound evidence, which can be understood and acknowledged despite cultural differences (Sutcliffe and Court 2006; Stremlau 2014; Merry 2016). Surveys deliver such evidence. Furthermore, surveys allow for the relatively fast collection of huge amounts of data and, much more so than ethnography or interviews, surveys can be conducted and analysed with a certain amount of speed. While these are clear advantages of surveys, therein lies also a catch. Surveys are prone to one-sidedness. They come with a tendency to define concepts in line with western researchers' perspectives, ignoring the lived normality of the subect being researched. This is where a combination of ethnography and surveys is particularly fruitful, as each heals the others weakness, a point already made by Lieberman (2005). Ethnography can provide context to a survey study, whereas a survey shows the scope of a phenomenon. Still, using ethnographic inquiries in a survey compromises the survey's strengths of delivering results relatively fast. Ethnography takes time. Still, this trade-off seems worth it.

To summarise, surveys are widely understood as being 'scientific' and providing clear and objective evidence. How data gathering did take place is, however, important knowledge that should not be omitted from research studies, as it allows for evaluation of data quality. My two surveys showed the importance of the researcher's position towards the national hired interviewers, which had a serious effect on data quality.

7.1.3 Interviews

The main problem I encountered with interviews was recruiting participants. This is an acknowledged but also underreported problem with interview studies (AHRQ no date; Potter and Hepburn 2012, p.557).

Recruitment was not problematic with journalists, politicians, university professors, or NGO-leaders. All these groups were relatively easy to cover with people being in general open to share thoughts and insights. Of course, there was the one or the other national leader who did not find time for an interview, but no one I asked refused point-blank. The problem was the response rate of regular people - South Sudanese who lacked higher education, were unemployed, or in blue-collar jobs or working as day labourers. These people, who are the majority of the population, were wary to answer questions and to be recorded. Initially, I thought that this was due to the sensitive nature of my research, and I made efforts to assure people of confidentiality and anonymity. In fact, this was not the concern. Interviewing someone means putting them in the spotlight and this was a position with which regular people were unfamiliar. People were scared to answer questions because they thought they could not answer them; they feared they would not understand the question and lack the knowledge to answer 'correctly'. The problem I encountered was not confidentiality but confidence. In medical research problems with mistrust and resulting problems with recruitment are documented (Corbie-Smith et al. 2002; Fuqua et al. 2005). In the social sciences, however, the literature focuses mostly on best practices once recruitment is done (Bryman 2001b; Knapik 2006). Interviewing by proxy has been named as a strategy to overcome the problem with interview recruitment (Cammett 2013), but following the experience with the survey I was not convinced that this would be sufficient. This means that my interview study focuses mainly on elites, if 'elites' are understood as relatively well-educated people. The masses, which are the main audience of mass media, were despite my best efforts mostly excluded. This raises doubts about the representativeness and usefulness of interview studies, and about whose voices are heard in such studies. I achieved interesting results from the interviews and getting insights into how government officials, elites in society and, last not least, the journalists themselves understand the media is important and a valid area of inquiry. Still, the actual target audience of media

development as a democracy strengthening and peacebuilding tool was severely underrepresented in the interview study.

It is, of course possible that this problem is unique to South Sudan, yet it is doubtful. Developing countries of the global South come with enormous social stratification. It seems doubtful that this stratification should result in a rather shy population regarding interviews only in South Sudan. Despite my participation in South Sudanese everyday life, participants for the interview part were mostly educated, middle-class professionals who worked with foreigners and were, in their positions as academics, consultants, journalists, and politicians used to giving answers. This means that interview studies come with a certain level of exclusion. Furthermore, they also come with the question to what extent interviewees might tell what the researcher supposedly wants to hear – an effect and a danger of interview studies that has been described before (Morris 2009; Johnson and Rowlands 2012). While the government officials I interviewed usually had the interest to show their country in a good light, journalists often hoped for funding. I was repeatedly asked for either advice or for direct help for a project whose funding was about to run out. In order to present themselves as worthy of funding, journalists presented themselves as protecting assumedly western values. And it is, of course, not only interviewees who might have an agenda, it is the researcher too. I repeatedly caught myself believing someone who said something that was congruent with my ideas and theories. I was a lot more mistrusting when people's answers contradicted my theories. On the contrary to ethnography, in interviews questions are targeted. This is an advantage as it allows zooming in on particular parts of the puzzle. It is also a disadvantage as the researcher is an active participant in the research situation (Kvale 2007); the researcher helps create the situation and this tendency is a lot more forceful in the one-on-one situation of an interview than in the observatory participation of everyday life situations.

Finally, interviews are time-intensive when it comes to data preparation and analysis. Transcribing interviews takes a lot of time and effort. Engaging a professional transcription service, which I did for part of my interviews, led to what I name the 'Lost in Transcription'-problem. South Sudanese speak English with a relatively harsh accent. This led to my professional transcribers misunderstanding some utterances and sentences. I was quite surprised when in one of my interviews the topic of discussion was "boarder-raiders' - I could not remember ever having discussed something like this in South Sudan. When I checked the recording, the puzzle was solved. We had been talking about 'boda-riders', young men with motorbikes who provide transportation in Juba.

In summary, then, there are two main problems with interview studies. First, they are rather exclusive in focusing on a middle-class or elite as participants. This can be healed by combining interviews with surveys or ethnographic observations and informal interviews. Second, as a social situation the researcher is actively engaged in the conversation which might be part of the construction of meaning specific to this situation. On the other hand, more targeted questions are possible in interview studies, steering the interview towards the area of interest, and also covering past and future. This is not possible with ethnographic observations, which are, however, better in providing context that is less touched by the researcher and the interview situation. As with ethnography, interview studies cannot deliver knowledge on how widespread a phenomenon is in the population; this is the survey's domain.

7.1.4 Summary

In general, the three methods investigated different portions of South Sudanese society. Ethnography captured older South Sudanese, but also students. The survey targeted mostly students and younger people, and the interviews were mostly done with elites or skilled professionals, and with journalists themselves. This was not planned, but emerged while

doing research as a consequence of employing a snowball system for data collection for the survey and recruitment problems for the interviews. It had outcomes for the research results, to give an example, doing only interviews would have meant that the degree to which people in South Sudan are dissatisfied with journalists' education would have escaped me. On the other hand, if I had done only a survey, it is likely that I would not have thought about asking a question on journalists' education – after all, this is the primary business of western media development organisations. It is rather likely that, having worked in journalism myself, I would have assumed that good training is done and that people are satisfied with journalists' professionalism. The interviews revealed a blind spot, coming from my professional background. On the other hand, while the set of cultural rules with regards to criticising government and leadership emerged from the observations and informal chats and the interviews, the dimension would have eluded me had I decided on doing interviews alone. It was the experience of living in South Sudan and the informal chats in everyday life situations (plus my own, sometimes unpleasant, encounters with the representatives of the government) that shone a clear spotlight on the strengths of this feeling and the importance of it. Interviewing did not highlight the magnitude.

This shows that when doing research in a country with a complex social reality of which the researcher is not a cultural native, relying on one method alone might lead to distorted results. In particular, it shows ethnography emerging as a possible bridge between quantitative and qualitative approaches to research in developing countries or countries in violent conflict. Such research, for better or worse, is often done by researchers who are not native to the country in question. At the same time, the social reality in such a country is complex, to an extent because of the experience of violent conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment. Portions of reality are hidden while others are overly salient. Every method employed here was only able to shine a light on a part of the

compound mechanism at work in social life (table 42). A more rounded understanding and the correction of assumptions based on the researcher's background was only achieved by looking at the results delivered by all three methods. The thesis offers an account of the practices – understood as the day-to-day actions and processes - of doing research in a country of the global South.

Method	Strengths	Weaknesses
Ethnographic observations	Bridges qualitative and quantitative approaches by providing context	Representation and interpretation problem
	Reflexive, understands the researcher as part of the research environment	Safety concerns, because the researcher is required to live locally
	Helps to overcome blind spot bias	Time-intensive
	Unobtrusive method	Rather small scale
Surveys	Delivers comparability	Loss of control
	Provides information on how widespread a phenomenon is	Can be rather expensive
	Quick delivery of answers	Danger to accept definitions of key concepts without checking if they fit
Interviews	Allows targeted questions	High amount of time necessary for data preparation and analysis
	Can cover past, present and future	"Lost in transcription"-problem
	High level of control with regards to participants	Participant recruitment, tendency to focus on elites

Figure 42: Methods: Strengths and weaknesses

The case study is media development in South Sudan, an exciting and fitting case as 'media development' and 'research' share a feature: they

both come from a conceptual background alien to the environment in which they are unleashed. The thesis shows that for such a transplant of concepts adjustment is necessary. It cannot be expected that concepts from the West act the same way and deliver the same results in the global South.

In showing this and in offering an alternative approach to social knowledge production and inquiry, this thesis makes a significant contribution to both scholarship and praxis. Firstly, it shows that research limited to one perspective and method might be misleading in an environment more complex than the method can grasp. This is important as it widens our understanding how research is done and it shows that the choice of perspective and method(s) needs to take the research environment into account. Furthermore, it adds to the discussion concerning the qualitative/quantitative divide. I do not make an argument that the one or the other research tradition is superior. Quite the opposite, my account shows that under the circumstances described here, no method alone would have sufficed. This is also not an argument for the general superiority of mixed methods research. Rather, I show that there are circumstances when mixed approaches are called for, and there are others. In arguing that the context of the environment shapes research results, I add to the argument brought forward by Sil and Katzenstein (2010, p.2), that "scholarly discourse risks becoming dominated by self-referential academic debates at the expense of addressing the complexities and messiness of everyday problems".

7.2 Researching media in South Sudan - results

In this section, I detail the answers the three methods delivered on the question of the effects of media development in South Sudan. I first provide a brief overview of the results delivered by the three methods. Following this, I compare the results of each method applied to the three

elements used in the empirical chapters - media, the state, and groups. This shows that concepts are not good travellers and that a transfer from a western to a non-western country is problematic. If media development were only about the technicalities – the means of mass communication – without ideological underpinnings there might not be a problem. Still, media development is not value-free and technical, but comes with a strong connotation. It brings the idea that it holds governments accountable and strengthens democracy (Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010, Orme 2010; Kalathil 2011). Furthermore, it is thought that it can help end conflict and reconcile groups (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Orme 2010; Staub et al. 2010; Staub 2013). In South Sudan, however, 'media' is on the one hand understood as a mouthpiece of government. On the other hand, it is, if uncontrolled, seen as a danger. Media in South Sudan is subject to internationalisation and informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012), which leads to problems for the newly trained journalists in South Sudan and to the deterioration of the relations between the national government and international donors.

7.2.1 Comparison I: The media

The justification for media development and the money spent on it is that it strengthens democracy as was explored in chapter 2. Historically, radio was the instrument of choice to 'modernise' people's mindset (Lerner 1958). It was seen as easier to access, cheaper, and faster than, for example, school education (Sparks 2007). A crucial condition for radio to work its magic, however, would be that people have access to it on a regular basis and in everyday life. Drawing on ethnography, it cannot be confirmed that media plays a particularly big role in South Sudan society. While people like to listen to music, they are not especially keen on listening to the news. More important, however, than people's preferences or like or dislike of media in general, is that the ability to listen to media is severely limited. There is no power distribution; in order to have electricity one needs to have a generator and fuel, and only

the affluent part of South Sudanese society can afford this. Most South Sudanese live without electricity. Listening to media on a mobile would be a possibility, but batteries need to be charged, which comes with costs. Another line of argument brought forward by iNGOs is that people listen in groups in community houses or as part of iNGOs listener groups[114]. While this might be so, it is not mass media but rather resembles school education. Mass media is supposed to work on the masses. There is no evidence that electronic media plays a big role in the average South Sudanese's everyday life (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014). One does see many people reading newspapers, which can be shared and put to use in a household after reading. While one of the doctrines of media development experts is that radio is the medium of choice to reach people (see Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 2002), it might be that in South Sudan newspapers would be a better option.

Opposed to this, the survey – like other surveys (EDC 2008; Internews 2015a) – confirmed media's importance for the South Sudanese. 68.3% of respondents said that they have a radio in their household, and 26.3% stated that they listen to the radio on their mobile. Only 4.1% reported that they do not own a radio. Accordingly, 58.1% said that they listen to radio 'a few times a day'. 24.1% stated that they listen 'once a day'. These are impressive numbers, which show that money spent on such projects is well worth it. This notwithstanding, observations in the country tell a different tale. There is a clear difference between statements from surveys and observations made in Juba. Informal chats revealed three reasons why people overstate their media consumption. First, they do so because they understand media as important and would listen more often if they could. The statements in surveys thus seem to reflect a desired and not an actually existing reality. Secondly, with a lot of iNGOs and UN-agencies working in South Sudan people know that baseline surveys are done before a new project is started. Projects come with

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[114] Informal chats with iNGO-workers. Field notes 26 January 2015.

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employment possibilities and offer chances to create income. The positive statements are an exaggeration because iNGO-activities are welcomed as a possible source of income. By stating that a project would be important, participants want to pave the way and make sure that the project actually starts. A similar effect of statements given as a favour or a courtesy has been described in the literature (Johnson and Rowlands 2012). Third, iNGOs offering media activities often have regular listener groups to evaluate people's reactions to their radio dramas and messages. These listener groups come with provisions of food and drinks, sometimes also with money for transportation and other fringe benefits. The presence of these listener groups is well known in South Sudan, and participants in surveys want to show that they would be good members of a listener group. This resembles the students I hired as interviewers for my first survey, who wanted to show that they are good interviewers and hence interpreted my guidelines how to fill out the questionnaire rather freely. This is a reminder that with surveys a researcher does not really control how data are collected. Here this led to respondents stating a considerable amount of media consumption because they see this as a step towards becoming a regular in a listener group. Besides this, the question "How often are you listening to radio" is in general rather vague and invites respondents to guesswork. What do we mean by "listening to radio"? Have it on in the background while doing the dishes or rather listening like I would in a supervisory meeting? Questionnaires hardly ask for such distinctions, and even if they did, it seems questionable that the answers would be something other than speculation. After all, people rarely keep a detailed account of media consumption.

The comparison of quantitative and ethnographic data clearly showed that numerical data cannot be taken at face value. It is important to know the environment from which the data is taken; how data are collected and by whom; and if there are hidden (or open) intentions to answer the one or the other way are all important information to evaluate data

quality. Knowing South Sudan and its severe electricity limitations heightened awareness to the contradiction of the two data sets produced by two different methods and allowed for taking respondents' answers not literally but with a pinch of salt. It also led to an investigation into possible explanations for the contradiction. My results here add to the emerging body of literature on the need for context. Merry (2016) points towards the limitations of artificially created indicators for quantitative research, which makes results comparable on a global scale, but loses the nuances which would make them meaningful to the people whose experiences are supposedly captured. Schaffer (2016) points in this very same direction with his criticism of positivist concepts that are just data containers, or, in the words of Satori: "It can be said that we have a concept of A (or of A-ness) when we are able to distinguish A from whatever is not-A" (Sartori 1984, p.74). Schaffer (2016) makes the case that such an understanding of concepts omits the (possibly) distinctive conceptualisations of people from a different cultural background. He uses the example of the *gol,* the structure in the Nuer's social organisation closest to what we understand as *family,* but which is still something different. One could say that the data-container *family* is too small for the *gol*. Similiarly, 'media' is understood in the West differently from how it is understood in South Sudan.

Could this context have been delivered by any qualitative method, namely also by the third method employed in this research, the in-depth interviews? It seems questionable. It would, of course, have been possible to ask respondents about their media consumption habits. However, if, as has been indicated in informal chats, the reason for the exaggeration was either a wrong perception of one's media consumption time or to recommend oneself for further research participation, it seems unlikely that more meaningful answers would have been given in an interview. As it was, in this research I did not ask about media consumption time in the interviews. As said in chapter 6, one of the problems when it came to interviewing, was recruitment. Due to the

nature of my research and the situation in the country, regular people were very wary to be interviewed and mostly refused. The majority of individuals willing to participate in this part of the study were elites and skilled professionals, and journalists themselves. It thus made sense to investigate another set of questions, mainly about the role media should have in the society and how media is done. This revealed other insights, for example an ambiguous understanding of 'press freedom'. Unsurprisingly, most journalists interviewed advocated for a rather broad interpretation of press freedom. Most other interviewees, working for the government, the university, or in some other high-skilled jobs, asked for some control over the media. These results, the considerable confusion about the meaning of 'press freedom', and the wish for the government to control the media, were confirmed by doing ethnography. My students' essays showed a surprising variance of definitions, with a portion of them advocating for the government controlling the media. The need for this was also confirmed in the survey. It was here where all three methods confirmed each other. Another field of surprisingly great method conformance was the question of journalists' education. Both in the interviews and in the survey, respondents stated that journalists are not well-educated, which was named as one reason why they find themselves in trouble with the government. This notion was rejected only by the journalists themselves. In terms of ethnography, it would have been most fruitful to observe how journalistic education is done in South Sudan. As it is, this was not possible. I have from former professional stays in South Sudan some knowledge of the subject, but there is a clear question of how objective and neutral I can be in retrospect. Still, the experience of what I named the AMDISS-incident, when Radio Tamazuij, a media outlet operating with funding from the Netherlands, attacked the AMDISS, points to at the very least questionable journalistic standards and behaviour. Whether this is because of bad education and missing knowledge or whether there is a political agenda behind it cannot be answered with the data at hand. Still, all three methods confirmed each other and added additional insights.

Interviewees stated that journalists do not have good skills and are not well-educated, which was confirmed in the survey, thus by another portion of society as the survey captured more regular people. With ethnography, it was possible to see that there is indeed some questionable journalistic behaviour.

Figure 43 shows an overview of the findings, with contradictory results in red and confirming results in blue.

	Ethnographic observations	Survey	Interviews
Media	Media does not play a big role in South Sudanese everyday life	Radio is very important in South Sudanese everyday life	
	Journalistic standards are not always kept, there is some questionable journalistic behaviour	A considerable part of society does believe that journalists are not well-educated	Criticism of journalists' skills
	There is confusion about the meaning of 'press freedom'		There is criticism of the way the international community does media trainings
			There is not enough cooperation between the internationals and with people in the country

Figure 43: Results 'media'

7.2.2 Comparison II: The state

With regards to the understanding of the state and the government, the three methods mostly confirmed each other. They all showed a

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considerable difference to the western understanding, calling the western-led media's ability to provide the expected outcomes and function like 'at home' into question.

Ethnographic observations showed a country with a different set of rules concerning government than in the established democracies of the western world. People in South Sudan do not understand the state as an institution that needs to provide. The government is understood to be more a kind of robber baron, with the citizens paying taxes to be left alone. There is no expectation that the government has the responsibility to provide public goods and consequently, they are not seen as being accountable. This is in opposition to the literature, where taxes are described as the triggering mechanism for people demanding goods and representation (Brautigam 2008; Moore 2008; Besley and Persson 2009). People phrased the fear that if voted out of office, the leaders would not go quietly and more fighting would be the consequence. Furthermore, a cultural rule forbids criticising the leaders openly. All this is problematic with regards to a media underpinned by western values; as these western values are quite contrary to the understanding of leadership in South Sudan.

Probably due to it being anonymous, the survey showed a society close to evenly divided on the question whether the government works in the best interest of the South Sudanese. Puzzling here was not so much how many respondents disapproved, but how many approved of the government. When the survey had been conducted, fighting and violent conflict had increased – although, at this time Juba was still peaceful – and the economic situation was well on its way from bad to very bad, with worse clearly to come. The surprisingly high number of people approving of the government might be explained by the set of rules found in observations and informal chats, while the close to an equally large number of individuals stating disapproval might be explained by the anonymous nature of the survey. In this sense, the results do not

necessarily contradict the findings from the ethnographic observations. The survey did contradict ethnography with regards to the question whether peaceful leadership is possible in South Sudan. In the survey most respondents stated that they did believe this to be possible. In informal interviews, conducted under the heading ethnography, people phrased the fear that the government would not go quietly if voted out of office. The difference of the results cannot be explained with the data at hand. It might be that the difference is due to distinctive cohorts as participants. My chess partners and people I met in everyday life were mostly older and not too well-educated[115], whereas the majority of respondents to the survey are fairly young and students. It seems possible that the younger cohort that answered the questionnaire are simply more optimistic than the older South Sudanese, who had experienced years of war.

The interview study did confirm the strict hold the South Sudanese government has on the country, and it also confirmed the control the government exercises over the media. Besides the members of government I was talking to, close to everyone confirmed that there is a firm government control that has tightened with the outbreak of conflict. The interviews also showed different understandings of press freedom, with the journalists wanting to have the least control exercised. The government justifies the control with the situation the country is in and makes the point that every country exercises some control over the media. This statement was also given by some of the people in the group of civil society members. Members of both groups of government and civil society said that journalists lack education, which has forced the government's hand to control them more tightly. The interviews thus showed a significant difference in content or discontent about how the government acted towards the media. As this topic emerged relatively early and quite clearly in the process of doing interviews, I included a

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[115] Ethnography also took place at Juba University, but this particular question about peaceful leadership change was never discussed in this environment.

question on 'journalists' education and professionalism' in the survey to gather the opinion of a wider audience. Close to half the sample, 45.5% of respondents, said that journalists in South Sudan are not well-educated.

Figure 44 shows an overview of the findings, again with contradictory results in red and confirming results in blue.

	Ethnographic observations	Surveys	Interviews
The state	Leaders are not expected to provide, consequently there is no accountability	Half of the respondents are not satisfied with the work of the government	Dissatisfaction with government's work, government controls the country tightly
	Leaders are not to be criticised		Leaders are not to be criticised
	People fear that change of leadership would not be peaceful	A majority expects leadership to change peacefully	

Figure 44: Results 'the state'

7.2.3 Comparison III: Groups

Part of the reason for media development is that it is thought to better the relationships in a country and between groups in a divided society (Theranian 2002; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Staub et al. 2010; Staub 2013). Objective information provided by a trusted source shall improve relations between groups. In South Sudan, radio stations play dedicated peace programmes – radio dramas that should enable the citizens to solve confrontational situations peacefully (Bakhita 2012-2015; Eyeradio no date; United States Institute of Peace no date). South Sudan is a severely divided country with over 60 different tribes. Ethnicity has been named as the cause of South Sudan's internal war. When fighting

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broke out in December 2013, it did so between soldiers of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka, and his on-and-off Vice President Dr Riek Machar, a Nuer. Instead of pointing towards ethnicity as a driver of conflict, scholars and analysts (Johnson 2011; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; de Vries and Justin 2014; de Waal and Mohamad 2014) have pointed to rivalry in the army and the elites as the root cause of the conflict. The question here was how are group relations 'on the ground'? Is South Sudan plagued by hatred between people in everyday life?

Observations and informal chats pointed in a different direction. My students, my chess partners, and acquaintances from a local bar detailed that the conflict is not a tribal or ethnic one. Instead, they named it a power struggle of the elite class, in particular of the president and the vice president, going back to the Nasir declaration and the split in the SPLA in 1991 (Akol 2003). Ethnicity does play a role to the extent that it is a safe constituency in South Sudan. This is connected to the set of cultural rules mentioned above. People are culturally bound to their leader. The leader provides and for this provision, people follow. If necessary, they fight. One cannot afford to lose the tribal affiliation, and this would happen should one refuse followership. The war is fought by soldiers – war professionals – and followers who are bound in a cultural way to a leader who orders. Ethnic hate was not mentioned. The survey confirmed this, as did the interviews. 'Intergroup relations' and 'cross-group friendships' have been named as indicators for positive behaviour and attitudes towards other groups in conflict- and post-conflict societies (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2002; Kenworthy et al. 2016). Thus, in the survey, I asked for the desire to live in a segregated neighbourhood, the composition of the circle of friends and acquaintances, and contact in everyday life. Another question referred to the belief in a possibility of peaceful coexistence. As laid out in chapter 5, respondents showed no sign of ethnic or tribal hate; the majority had positive relations with members of other tribes in everyday life, and only a small percentage mentioned a need or desire to live in a segregated

neighbourhood. Roughly two-thirds of the sample said that they believe in the possibility of peaceful coexistence of all tribes. This is of especial interest as more people experience friendly relations (84.9%) than believe in peaceful coexistence (59.7%). This might be what MacGinty (2014) named a 'grudging coexistence': social rules that people build to navigate deeply divided societies. People might follow social practices enabling them to navigate life in a country in violent conflict but might not believe in the possibility of a political deal and thus lasting peace. This would confirm the 'conflict as political struggle' thesis. In the interviews the ethnic struggle-thesis was also rejected. Literally everyone named the conflict a power struggle with roots in the country's past and fought not by neighbours but by war professionals on the one hand, and because people cannot turn against their tribe but have to follow their leaders, on the other hand. Thus, the interviews also confirmed the 'set of rules' that binds people to their tribes and superiors. However, some of the journalists argued for the importance of peace programmes and media as a tool to improve relationships in the country. This line of argument came even if it was mentioned before that it is not ethnic hate that makes people fight but obedience to leaders. Mostly, the importance of peace programmes was stated by journalists and media professionals dependent on international funding for their programmes.

All three methods confirm each other regarding the question of group relations between the ethnic tribes in South Sudan. This is quite a clear answer: ethnicity is not a root cause of the conflict in South Sudan. The conflict is not yet caused by an ancient hate between the groups or by mistrust between the groups. At the moment war professionals fight their leaders' battles, and the leaders fall back on their ethnic constituency. There is still no ethnic hate in the citizenry, among the people on the ground. This makes peace programmes working on the people on the ground an insufficient policy. Instead of people on the ground, leaders should be the target audience group to overcome the

conflict. There is, however, no guarantee that things will stay like this. Should the fighting go on, people on the ground might start mistrusting, and eventually hating each other on the basis of group membership.

Group relations are not only about the ethnic groups. Group associations are arbitrary, multiple, fluid, and can be made salient (Tajfel et al. 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1982). Reviewing the political economy of states and statebuilding, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn (2013) have argued that three sets of interests exist in countries under intervention and statebuilding: the masses, the elites, and the intervenors. I investigated the relationship between the government and the international donors, also because there were hints that western style media has a negative impact on this relationship. Ethnographic observations showed that media policies rather impaired these liaisons. This was most apparent in the expulsion of the United Nation's special envoy Toby Lanzer and the events surrounding the threat to close down the UN-Radio Miraya. Both events caused an outcry in the international community and confirmed the perception of the South Sudanese leadership as ruthless and authoritarian. In Juba, however, the accompanying behaviour of the UN and the international community were described as 'arrogant' and it was stated that the UN had to follow the rules in South Sudan. This was confirmed in the interviews. In the survey, close to half the sample had a rather unfavourable view of UNMISS and a majority stated that iNGOs do not cooperate sufficiently with the government. It seems that there is a conflict concerning the understanding of the sovereignty of a nation on the ground, with the question being if the provision of humanitarian aid and other help gives the UN a right to govern, and if so, to what extent.

I again give an overview over the findings on groups below (Figure 45). Blue cells confirm each other, while red cells show a contradiction.

	Ethnographic observations	Survey	Interviews
Groups	No ethnic divide has been found, the conflict has been named a power struggle fought by militia, not on basis of ethnicity	No ethnic divide could be found	The conflict has been named a power struggle with ethnicity being used by leaders
	International community is criticised for their behaviour	Rather unfavourable view of UNMISS, and iNGOs are not working enough with the government	The international community has been named 'arrogant' because of their behaviour regarding Toby Lanzer and UN-Radio Miraya

Figure 45: Results 'groups'

7.3 Closing thoughts

In this study, I have investigated media development in South Sudan and the process of knowledge production in a country of the global South. Although considered an important part of peace and statebuilding (Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010; Orme 2010), evidence for the effects of media development is elusive (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014). Furthermore, media is hardly understood as a part of statebuilding. In western thought the media is firmly situated outside the state as a fourth estate (Coronel 2010). I argue that western-led media in a non-western country is undergoing processes of internationalisation and informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010; 2012). It is internationalised as is evident in the western journalist education by media development organisations that try to implement the watchdog

concept of media. In South Sudan, this led to confusion about the meaning of press freedom among the journalists, it lacks substance in the population who phrase a need for regulation of the media, and it weakens the legitimacy of the government, whose authority on the question of press regulation is undermined by the international community. In consequence, it causes the relationship between the government and the international donors to deteriorate. This is not to approve of censorship and undemocratic behaviour. Instead, I have shown that the media on the one hand, and the state and relationships between groups as the two entities media supposedly affects on the other hand, are so different that the implementation of media as a mere technical endeavour leads to intense problems. These problems have been described in the statebuilding literature (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012) with reference to state institutions. The media is no such institution, but media development is subject to the same processes and problems.

Overall, media plays a less significant role in everyday life than expected. This is mostly due to the lack of electricity. This result from observations is controversial to statements made in the survey, where respondents overwhelmingly claimed that they listen to radio daily or several times a day. Observations showed that this is an exaggeration at best, as regular people simply lack the electricity to listen to the radio that often. Some NGOs believe that people use their phones for listening, but charging batteries, which needs to be done at corner shops, is costly. Evidence for this praxis being widespread could not be obtained. As detailed in chapter 4, this discrepancy between observed and stated behaviour is probably due to the research environment itself, underpinning my conclusion that the environment must be taken into account when doing research.

Media development is done because it is assumed that a pluralist media, providing neutral and objective information, will enable citizens to hold governments accountable and participate in governance, thus

strengthening democracy (Orme 2010; Kalathil 2011; Stremlau et al. 2015). Furthermore, the provision of neutral information by a trusted source is thought to help overcome and heal tensions in an ethnically divided society (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Staub 2013). Ethnographic observations, however, pointed to the existence of a set of cultural rules, which oblige people to obedience towards their rulers. Furthermore, there exists a 'Do not criticise the leader'-taboo, which is contrary to western-led media's task of acting as a watchdog and holding government accountable. In interviews, many government workers and skilled professionals mentioned this. Similarly, my students at Juba University confirmed this, and in the survey a high percentage of respondents indicated a reluctance to the media's open critique of the government. This obedience to the leader also seems to be an enabling mechanism for the conflict. All three methods confirmed that ethnicity is not a cause of the conflict, even if it is used as a mobilisation tool. Ethnicity can be utilised for fighting as people have a duty to oblige. Ethnic hate is no part of this, and an effective conflict management tool would thus work either directly on the leaders or against the people's sense of obedience.

This means that media cannot hold a government truly accountable – it is relatively questionable that people would vote against their leader. Government and leadership simply follow other rules in South Sudan, and on the contrary to western thought, a government's legitimacy is not connected to the provision of public goods (McLoughlin 2015). Also, while the broadcasting of peace programmes to help people make peaceful decisions in times of conflict surely does not do harm, it also does not seem to do much good. People do not fight because they hate each other based on tribal association; they fight because they are ordered to, either as war professionals or because they are obliged to a leader. At the very least, it is questionable whether media is even a trusted source of information. The survey and the interviews showed that journalists are seen as not well-educated and not professional. At

the same time, the survey revealed that a relatively high percentage of respondents believe and have no problem with the government using media to do their bidding. The government is seen by a relatively high percentage of respondents as a reliable source of information.

Media in South Sudan comes from a different cultural background, and people experience it differently. Especially journalists that are educated by western NGOs construe 'press freedom' quite extensively. This creates problems with the government and the security organs, which increased when fighting broke out again in December 2013. The governmental action against the media, including the closure of media houses, outraged the international community. In turn, this angered the government which felt threatened in their sovereignty. In this way, western-underpinned media has not contributed to democracy but instead weakened the legitimacy of the government and caused a deteriorating relationship between the GoSS and the international community. The problem seems to be mostly that binding and enforceable rules with regards to the media in South Sudan have not been discussed between the stakeholders, meaning here the donors and the government, nor have such rules been implemented. This has led to a clash of the different understandings of what the media is, can, and should do.

It has been said that the methods employed here have delivered some contradictory results, in particular the discrepancy between the survey and ethnography concerning media's role in everyday life. Such competing knowledge claims are, however, in themselves valuable hints of an underlying social reality (see Perera 2017). Here, they hint at the peculiarities of the environment and of the importance of knowing how survey data have been collected to assess such discrepancies. In South Sudan with its bad economy, participating in a survey regarding media flags it up to participants that a project is about to be done. This provides jobs and possibilities to earn, and in consequence, participants overstate their media consumption time. In this way, the environment has an

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impact on research findings, methods are performative (Aradau and Huysmans 2014).

The research outcome of the three different methods on the question "What are the effects of western-underpinned media in South Sudan?" showed that no method alone would have delivered a reasonably full picture. Every method shone a spotlight on some portions of social life in South Sudan and the media's role in it but left other parts in the dark. This does not mean that a mixed method research design is necessary for every research problem. For some, however, it is, and it seems that for policy-relevant research in a country of the global South a more detailed research process such as the one I have done in South Sudan is indeed necessary (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

Doing media and doing research are both not merely technical undertakings, and they should not be treated as such in a country of the global South: Context matters.

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Appendices

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Appendix 1: Ethnography

1.1 Press freedom

Freedom of Expression and Media

24. (1) Every citizen shall have the right to the freedom of expression, reception and dissemination of information, publication, and access to the press without prejudice to public order, safety or morals as prescribed by law.

(2) All levels of government shall guarantee the freedom of the press and other media as shall be regulated by law in a democratic society.

(3) All media shall abide by professional ethics.

Freedom of Assembly and Association

25. (1) The right to peaceful assembly is recognized and guaranteed; every person shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form or join political parties, associations and trade or professional unions for the protection of his or her interests

Figure 46: Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, extract

Extract from the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (Government of Southern Sudan 2011, p.8) detailing freedom of expression and media.

1.2 Media development and development for communication

Mail from David Hoffman, founder of the media development iNGO Internews. Hofman details his personal view on the difference between 'media development' and 'media for development/communication for development' and shares his experience of the discussion about definitions in the practitioner community. E-mail addresses and additional names have been omitted for privacy reasons.

Re: advise an literature / media development

DH   David Hoffman (DHoffman
Sun 05/01/2014, 03:48
Kerstin Tomiak

Kerstin,

Thanks for this letter. I am copying   who probably knows more about radio for conflict resolution than anyone I know. Because he is usually so busy, I would suggest you try and arrange a time when you two could talk, rather than just email each other. Her may possibly know of some Internews publications on the subject of media and conflict resolution.

As for the difference between 'communication for development' and 'media development', I don't know the academic literature at all. But I can briefly share with you my own experience. When I was organizing the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) there was a big debate whether to call it "media development" or "media for development." We chose the former and made a clear distinction with media for development, which frankly, most of us believed to be comparatively less effective. The debate took up hours of time. Warren Feek, who heads up the Communication Initiative, was livid. The fight over GFMD went on for a couple years. In the end, it was more or less acknowledged that the media for development field had morphed more into media development and vice versa. It's a long and complex history, but I would say that overall the much larger field of media for development substantially recognized the value of developing the media sector per se, as an industry with its own needs and not, as a medium to deliver messages. As you can tell, I am very critical of any of these social marketing strategies which seem to me to be neocolonialist.

I hope this is helpful. Check out the Internews website for job openings. I suspect that if anyone in the organization is interested in someone with your academic interests, it would also be Mark, who has gathered a remarkable team around him. So, I hope that you and Mark are able to connect. Good luck.

Warm regards,

David Hoffman

Author "Citizens Rising: Independent Journalism and the Future of Democracy" (CUNY Journalism Press)

Watch/learn more Get the book

David

1.3 Media affiliations

This section contains several imprints of media in South Sudan, showing the affiliations these media houses have.

The Niles is "is a bi-lingual website offering independent, balanced coverage of Sudanese and South Sudanese current and cultural affairs as well as a platform for the coaching and professional development of journalists in Sudan and South Sudan." (The Niles website no date). It is a publication of MICT, a small iNGO working in the area of media development, and financed by the German Federal Foreign Office.

Figure 48: The Niles imprint

The Radio Miraya Facebook page (Radio Miraya no date):

Imprint of the New Nation:

New Nation

Published every fortnight by
Sudan Advocacy for Development
(NGO).

Chief Editor: Els De Temmerman

Training Editor: Kenneth Oluka

Designer: Okeno Adem

Journalists Juba:
Oscas Gama
Jok Petero
Peter Moi
Jok Solomon (Photographer)

Correspondents:
John Actually (Jonglei)
Rita Kasana (Western Equatoria)
Dimo Silva (Western Bahr el
Ghazal)
Abraham Agoth (Northern Bahr el
Ghazal)
Vincent Buruga (Eastern
Equatoria)
Michael Makuac Thok (Lakes)

**The New Nation welcomes
comments, reactions and
opinions.**
Letters can be sent to:
editor@newnationsouthsudan.com
Or tel. +211 955944385

For Advertising contact:
+211 977 429 070

For Distribution contact:
+211 920 433 261

Figure 50: New Nation imprint

Facebook page Radio Tamazuj (Radio Tamazuj no date a):

Figure 51: Radio Tamazuj Facebook page

Radio Tamazuj is very secretive about their affiliation and editors, as can be seen in the mail below written to the author. In Juba, it is said that they belong to the Dutch NGO Free Press Unlimited. Their Facebook page gives a telephone number in The Netherlands as contact (see above). The number given seems indeed to be an extension number of Free Press Unlimited, as shown by OneSite Europe, a European contact database for policy and development organisations, supported by the OECD (OneSite no date) On the screenshot below from OneSite, Free Press Unlimited's telephone number is given as +31 35 625 0110. The telephone number given on the Facebook page of Tamazuj is +31 35 625 4340. It seems clear that there is an association. Why this is not made transparent is unclear.

Re: Interview

Radio Tamazuj <radiotamazuj@gmail.com>

Mon 27/07/2015 15:42

To: Kerstin Tomiak <TomiakKI@cardiff.ac.uk>;

Kerstin - see below our answer in blue.

On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 8:53 AM, Kerstin Tomiak <TomiakKI@cardiff.ac.uk> wrote:

> Dear editors,
>
>
> thanks a lot for your reply, and please find my letter of introduction from Cardiff University attached. You can also check my profile on my university's website (http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/politics-international-relations/profile/kerstin-tomiak/) and/or on LinkedIn UK (https://www.linkedin.com/pub/kerstin-tomiak/51/602/a31)
>
>
> I understand your security concerns; and mailing you questions is fine with me - thanks a lot for agreeing to look at them!
>
>
> I would be interested in the following:
>
>
> 1.) Could you describe the mission and values of Radio Tamazuij? What do you think media should do and be in a country like South Sudan?

Our mission is to provide reliable and independent news and information from both Sudan and South Sudan to diverse audiences who come from different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Historically since our founding in 2011 we have focused on covering news in areas and communities where there may not be other media penetration, originally the relatively neglected (in information terms) borderlands such as Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Western Bahr al Ghazal and Abyei, but now also including other unreached areas of South Sudan. This is why we use shortwave radio which has a long range.

At the heart of our vision is the free flow of information and ideas across borders and cultures, which is why we are called Radio 'Tamazuj', which means 'intermingling' or 'blending'. When we originally founded Radio Tamazuj we adopted this term primarily in reference to the "manatiq at-tamaz" (which means the border areas, literally, the 'touching' or 'mixing' areas) between Sudan and South Sudan, besides also the cultural mixing between Arabs and South Sudanese, and between religions. Now, however, we have expanded our coverage to all of South Sudan and we hope that this concept promoting interaction and mutual understanding will also be embraced by audiences in the South, which have their own diversities and intermingling, e.g. Dinka-Nuer, traditional-modern, etc.

We would like to note that we do not have any overt humanitarian, developmental or political agenda unlike some other media. We try to be service-oriented. We also want listening to Radio Tamazuj to be an

experience enjoyed by listeners in spite of the sometimes heavy news content, which is why we have included also social and sports programs, besides sometimes drama or music.

2.) I understand Radio Tamazuij to be a project financed by the Dutch NGO Free Press Unlimited. Does this have any influence on your work? Do you have contact with them, and/or do you have international expats working with you in the editorial process?

Radio Tamazuj has had various supporters over the years, none of whom have interfered in our editorial processes or affected our editorial independence. Donor support has been necessary because of the high start-up and training costs for such a project, operational costs, bad press freedom environment and the weak or collapsed economy. Eventually we want and need to be financially independent.

As to the latter part of your question regarding expats, we would rather not comment on the ethnic background or nationalities of our staff. We are all one team regardless of ethnicity and nationality. As we mentioned we are promoting the free flow of news across borders and cultures, including both Sudan and South Sudan. We do not want our listeners or audiences or our peers in the media to judge us by our tribes or nationalities but rather by the quality of information that we provide.

3.) In general, is it mostly South Sudanese working for Tamazuij?

See our comment above.

4.) I did a lot of interviews with journalists in South Sudan, most of them were mentioning problems with security forces / the government. How is your work affected by the rather harsh stance the government has towards the media?

Our work has suffered serious negative consequences because of attacks on the press and we would be much more effective and much better able to serve our audiences were it not for these conditions. But because we broadcast on shortwave radio from outside of South Sudan, we cannot be censored or silenced. We are prepared to operate in a highly repressive environment but we want freedom.

5.) How do you think the working relationship between the media in general and the government in South Sudan can be bettered?

As Radio Tamazuj, we have not participated in 'dialogues' with the government's National Security Service or Ministry of Information. We are not interested in a "working relationship" as they have no legal authority or competencies to interfere in our work. Instead, we interact with other government officials not on the institutional level but from our newsroom, interviewing local, state and national officials. We value our interactions with these officials for audio interviews and source information. Sometimes these officials have important information to share about their constituences, institutions and activities. We think that they usually appreciate the opportunity to speak on Radio Tamazuj.

6.) Do you work together with other media in South Sudan?

We had a formal training and cooperation initiative with state-run radio stations in Unity, Warrap and Northern Bahr al Ghazal in 2012. Previously also, Radio Tamazuj was aired on Internews-run stations when we were still at the pilot stage of production, in the format of a radio magazine. They no longer rebroadcast our programmes. We are always open to dialogue and discussions with our fellow journalists and we have previously encouraged newspapers also to republish our written reports.

7.) How do you see the media in South Sudan - media like Miraya and Eye radio which are very much backed up by the UN and Internews/USAID, and media like Bakhita or other radio stations without such strong stakeholders? Are they doing a good job in your point of view?

Radio Tamazuj often benefits from the work of these media houses because of their reporting, and we also hope that our reports are of interest and assistance to them as they host their own programmes and make

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their own news. We recognize in particular the immensely important audience reach of Radio Miraya, the long-standing community stature of Radio Bakhita and the increasing potential of the Eye Radio network. However, we are concerned about the atmosphere of fear in which they are working, which limits reporting on human rights, politics, corruption, healing, trauma, reconciliation and other critically important issues. For example, we published a series of special investigative reports about corruption but none of the other media houses followed up on these reports or republished/rebroadcast about them. We are also concerned that media have not been interviewing widows of soldiers since the beginning of the conflict, nor the war-disabled, nor reporting on the plight of orphans, the war-traumatized and the victims or survivors of massacres.

8.) Do you have contact with your audience? How do you know what interests your audience?

We have a call-in line with our audience which used to be operated by volunteers but mostly now this just goes to voice mail. Sometimes we call back callers for news tips or vox pops. We have done some research with our audience. We think listeners' groups and focus groups with audience members in different locations would help us but this is difficult for us to organize in the current security context because of the deliberate targeting of the free press and efforts to disrupt or control operations of the free press.

I hope this is not too much. 🙂

Thanks a lot for your work and your time!

Kerstin

***
Kerstin Tomiak, BA (OU), MSc (LSE)
PhD-candidate
Cardiff University

Figure 52: Mail exchange Radio Tamazuj

Mail exchange between Radio Tamazuj and the author.

Extract OneSite Europe (One Site no date)

1.4 Congratulation messages

Selection of congratulatory messages, published by different companies and institutions to mark the anniversary of Independence Day on 09 July 2015. Published in The Citizen, The Juba Monitor and The Juba Telegraph.

Figure 54: Independence Day message, Central Bank

Upper Nile University
Vice Chancellor's Office
Malakal/Juba

جـــامعة أعـــالي النيـــل
مكتب المــدير
ملكال/جـــوبا

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

The Senior Management Team, on behalf of Upper Nile University (UNU), would like to convey their sincere congratulatory message to Cde Salva Kiir Mayardit, UNU Chancellor and President of the Republic and his Vice President Cde Wani Igga and members of the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly and the entire people of South Sudan upon the 4th Anniversary of Independence of South Sudan on 9th July 2015. Happy Independence!

The Senior Management Team of Upper Nile University and the Minister of Education, Science and Technology Hon. Dr. John Gai acknowledge the achievements of President Cde – Salva Kiir Mayardit for implementation process of SPLM Unification Agreement signed early this year in Arusha, Tanzania, for the sake of peace and prosperity in our country. Hon Dr. John Gai, the Minister of Education, Science and Technology ,and Senior Management Team of Upper Nile University congratulate Cde Salva Kirr Mayardit for reinstating Cde Pagam Amum Okiech as SPLM Secretary General for the sake of rebuilding a peaceful coexistence and unification of SPLM and the entire nation of South Sudan.

Peace, Unity, Justice, Liberty, Inclusiveness and Prosperity are South Sudan's ultimate goals.

Long live the people of South Sudan!

Long live SPLM!

Long live President of Republic of South Sudan!

Long live Upper Nile University!

Office of Vice Chancellor
Upper Nile University

Figure 55: Independence Day message, Upper Nile University

Figure 56: Independence Day message, three companies

Nile Petroleum Corporation

CONGRALUATORY MESSAGE

The **Chairman of Board of Directors**, the **Management**, and the entire staff of the **Nile Petroleum Corporation (NILEPET)**, congratulate **H.E. the President** of the **Republic of South Sudan (RSS)**.

General Salva Kiir Mayardit,

the **Government** and the **people of South Sudan** for the 4th anniversary,

Happy the 4th anniversary the Republic of South Sudan.

07 JUL 2015

The National Oil & Gas Corporation of South Sudan
P.O Box 390, Tel: +211 (0) 912 111 405 . Plot #96 - Block no. 3b, opp. Arkel Restaurant
Off Airport Road - Ministries Road, Thong Ping Area, Juba - South Sudan. www.nilepet.com

Figure 57: Independence Day message, Nile Petroleum Cooperation

1.5 Postponed elections

President Salva Kiir Mayardit had been elected President of the Government of Southern Sudan before independence. In agreement with the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, he was sworn in as president of the new country:

CHAPTER II

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

The President

97. (1) There shall be a President for the Republic of South Sudan.

(2) The President of the Republic of South Sudan is the head of State and Government, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Supreme Commander of all the other regular forces. He or she represents the will of the people, and shall exercise the powers vested in the office of the President by this Constitution.

(3) The incumbent elected President of the Government of Southern Sudan shall be the President of the Republic of South Sudan.

Eligibility for the Office of the President

98. A candidate for the office of the President shall:

Figure 58: Transitional constitution of South Sudan, extract II

Regarding the President's tenure the constitution states:

Oath of the President

99.   The President of the Republic of South Sudan shall, before assuming office, take the following oath before the public:

" I………………….., do hereby swear by the Almighty God/ solemnly affirm, that as the President of the Republic of South Sudan, I shall be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Republic of South Sudan and shall diligently and honestly discharge my duties and responsibilities in a consultative manner to foster the development and welfare of the people of South Sudan; that I shall obey, preserve and defend the Constitution and abide by the law; and that I shall protect and promote the unity of the people of South Sudan and consolidate the democratic decentralized system of government and preserve the integrity and dignity of the people of South Sudan; so help me God."

Tenure of the Office of the President

100.   The tenure of the office of the President of the Republic of South Sudan shall be four years, commencing from July 9, 2011.

Functions of the President

101.   The President shall perform the following functions:

Figure 59: Transitional constitution of South Sudan, extract III

On 6 January 2015, The Citizen published an article based on an interview with Professor Abednego Akok Katchuol, the Chairperson of the National Electoral Commission (Arou 2015). In it, the international community is asked to contribute to the budget for the election.

Electoral Commission demands In
Community to contribute 30% El

The Chairperson of the National Electoral Commission Prof. Abednego Akok Kachuol

racy is supposed to sponsor the election by paying 30 percent of the budget.

"From this point, I really want to appea and seek that they should reconsider thei position and support general elections fo South Sudan in June," The Chairperson o the National Electoral Commission Prof Abednego Akok Kachuol told The Citizen yesterday in an interview.

South Sudan National Election Commis sion last week declared 30th June as the polling date. The election will be the firs general election held in the country afte South Sudan seceded from Sudan in July 9th 2011. The government allocated 1.5 billion SSp for its facilitation.

In addition, the chairperson accused the international community of failure in pro moting and building of democracy in South Sudan.

"They do not want to support their democ racy, I do not know why, but why are they here, they are here to build democratic in stitution," he said.

Prof. Akok urged the government to create a peaceful and conducive atmosphere for the success of the upcoming elections.

He said the people who are living in the rebels controlled areas will not exercise their democratic rights by voting in the

Juba, Arou David

The National Electoral Commission yesterday appealed to international community to pay 30 per cent in cash as part of their contribution to the general elections

schedule for June 30th t this year.
The commission said the 1.5 billion SSP that will be provided for by the government will not be enough to facilitate all election processes, and besides the international community as an agent of democ-

for three years

Juba, Ayuen Akuot Atem

Members of Parliament yesterday extended the lifespan of President Salva Kiir's government as well as its own up to July 2018.

227 members of the National Legislative Assembly voted in favor while six voted against.

37 members of the higher house, the Council of States unanimously voted in favor of the extension also.

"The amendment for the extension was based on the democratic will of parliamentarians to extend the lifespan of the president's office and legislature for three years," the speaker of the National Legislative Assembly, Manasseh Magok Rundial in his ruling said.

During deliberation, MP Charles Majak representing Twic Constituency in Warrap state noted that the legislature was "exercising the will of the people by amending the constitution."

"The democratic government can extend its lifespan when the government legitimacy elapses without possibilities of holding elections, it's not only in South Sudan parliament but worldwide," Majak said. For her part, MP Betty Achan Ogwero, representing Magwi county, stressed that parliament cannot remain silent and allow the government legitimacy to elapse without amending the constitution. The minority leader in Parliament, Andigo Onyoti Nyikwac was however not convinced of the extension.

Figure 61: Extension of term, The Citizen II

Two days later, The Citizen reported reactions to the move, with many opposition politicians naming it 'self-serving'. The same was reported, also on the 27 March 2015, in the newspaper Juba Monitor under the headline 'Extending President's term illegal says opposition' (Butty and Wudu 2015).

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JUBA

South Sudanese opposition officials and civil society activists have condemned as self-serving and unconstitutional a move by parliament to extend the terms of the country's elected officials, including themselves and President Salva Kiir.

"It is actually illegal for this parliament to extend the term of the president for three years," former political detainee Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, who is now deputy foreign affairs secretary in Riek Machar's rebel movement, said.

"It is a violation of the constitution of the Republic of South Sudan and we are calling on the people of South Sudan to reject it and call the government to focus on negotiating in good faith and bring peace," he said.

The government cannot change that mandate without going back to the people, the source of power.

Parliamentary Opposition Leader Onyoti Adigo

South Sudanese lawmakers voted Tuesday to delay elections, which were due to be held at the end of June, and extend the terms of all elected officials by three years from July 9, the fourth anniversary of in-

depencence and the day after Kiir's term is set to end.

Thomas Wani Kundu, the chairman of the National Assembly's Information Committee, said more than 270 members of parliament from both houses voted in an extraordinary session of parliament in favor of the extensions.

People must vote

But Onyoti Adigo, the minority leader in parliament, chided his fellow lawmakers for changing the tenures of elected officials without putting the motion to a popular vote.

"The government cannot change that mandate without going back to the people, the source of power," he said during the extraordinary session at which the the motion was passed.

Opposition leader Lam Akol said parliament's decision to extend the mandates of all elected officials - including lawmakers themselves - was driven by self-interest.

"It proves the concern of the people that, all along, this government has never cared about the people. It looted the coffers of the country and after they did that they plunged the country into a devastating civil war... They want that war to contin-

ue," he said.

The government should come with a clear plan on what they are to achieve in the next three years so that we don't go to the end of the third year and say, 'Oops! We need another extension.'

South Sudan civil society activist Lorna James

Peace initiative

Kundu told South Sudan in Focus on Tuesday that the motions to delay elections and extend officials' mandates were initiatives of President Kiir. He said the changes were designed to help restore peace in South Sudan.

But Gatkuoth said, "You don't need to extend your term to reach a peace deal. What you need to do is negotiate in good faith."

And the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Donald Booth, told reporters in Juba Wednesday, "The best way to extend the constitutional legitimacy beyond July 9th is through a peace agreement that would establish a transitional government of national unity."

Regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), has been trying since January last year to broker a deal

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Very outspoken was William D. Tor, a regular columnist of The Citizen. On 01 May 2015 he published under the heading 'New Government in the extended Term' (Tor 2015):

The Power of Word

By William Sunday D Tor
williamtor@ymail.com
www.thepowerofword.blogspot.com

New government in the Extended Term

Part (1-3)

In last March the National Legislative assembly has extended the tem of the current elected President that supposed to last in June this year and itself to three years for to give chance for peace and avoid power vacuum. According to Reuter's report of Mar 24, 2015 by Denis Dumo, South Sudan's parliament voted to extend President Salva Kiir's term in office by three years, after elections due to be held in June were called off and negotiations to end more than a year of internal conflict broke up without agreement.

Speaker Manasseh Magok Rundial said parliament overwhelmingly approved Kiir's extension, as well as similar three-year prolongation of parliament's own term.

The 270 members of parliament present voted on Tuesday to amend the country's transitional 2011 constitution to extend the presidential and parliamentary term until July 9, 2018, with 264 members in favor and a handful opposing it. In February, government spokesman

Michael Makuei said that the proposal to extend Kiir and parliament's terms was aimed at avoiding any power vacuum in the event that the government fails to reach a permanent deal with rebels.

The lawmakers however rejected extension of the life-term of state governors, saying the Transitional Constitution did not refer to them.

"Our constitution only talks of parliament and presidency, so it is up to the President either let them continue or not in the coming transitional period," said Onyoti Adigo, parliamentary minority leader.

South Sudan's parliament has a total of 302 members, with six members belonging to opposition Sudan People Liberation Movement-Democratic Change Party and the rest belonging to the ruling Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM). Last year, 21 lawmakers defected from SPLM to the join Machar's rebel movement, prompting parliament to annul their membership.

In addition, after the extension, the new government shall be formed for the term mentioned above. Therefore the question that is disturbing one mind, will the new cabinet be based on quality of those who are appointed or the SPLM leadership may continue appointing inexperience person on favoritism and nepotism basis?

Figure 63: Extension of term, The Citizen III

The National Election Act (2012) states in §57:

57.   Postponement of the Elections of the President and or the Governor

1)   The Commission may postpone election of the President or Governor of a State by notice to that effect, if it becomes impossible to conduct the election by reason of proven occurrence of an imminent danger that may threaten the entire country or a State, or any part thereof, or in the event of declaration of a state of emergency according to Article 189 of the Constitution in all the country, or a state or in any part thereof; provided that the Commission shall fix a new date for elections, as soon as possible, which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the original date established for such elections.

2)   Pending holding of the postponed elections as provided for under sub-section (1) of this section, the incumbent holder of the office shall continue in his or her office as caretaker and his or her tenure shall automatically be extended until the elected President or Governor takes the oath of office.

Figure 64: National Election Act, extract

1.5 Groups in South Sudan

Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan

Ethnic boundaries shown on this map
exact representation of the situation in

The administrative units and their names shown on this map do not imply acceptance or recognition by the Government of Southern Sudan. This map aims only to support the work of the Humanitarian Community.

Sudan

Southern Darfur

Southern Kordofan

White Nile

Rank

Shilluk Berta

Manyo

Berta

Manyo Melut

Mahan

Shilluk

Fashoda

Dinka (Abiliang)

Abyei

Pariang

Upper Nile

Malakal

Dinka (Ruweng)

Abiemnhom

Pultoana Guit

Nuer (Jikany)

Dinka (Twic WS) Nuer (Bul)

Mayom

Dinka (Padeng)

Nuer (Lek)

Aweil North

Twic

Aweil East

Sobat

Langach

Dinka (Malual)

Aweil West

Panyikang

Unity

Pariang

Nuer (Jikany)

Northern Bahr el Ghazal

Aweil

Gogrial East

Koch

Luakpiny/Nasir

Aweil South

Nuer (Jegai)

Nuer (Gawaar)

Raga

Gogrial West

Warrap

Leer

Ayod

Nyirol

Ulang

Fertit

Kwajok

Tonj North

Nuer (Adok)

Nuer (Lou)

Chad

Dinka (Rek)

Mayendit

Akobo

Jur Chol

Tonj East

Uror

Jonglei

Wau

Dinka (Gok)

Rumbek North

Nuer (Nyong)

Dinka (Hol)

Western Bahr el Ghazal

Jur River

Panthou

Duk

Balanda Bagari

Tonj South

Nuer (Ador)

Dinka (Nyarweng)

Twic East

Dinka (Twic JS)

Yihu

Jur Chol

Rumbek Centre

Murle

Balanda Bor

Cueibet

Dinka (Agar)

Pochalla

Nagero

Dinka (Ciec)

Yirol East

Lakes

Rumbek East

Dinka (Atwot)

Bor South

Dinka (Bor)

Tambura

Wulu

Jur Bel

Yirol West

Dinka (Allab)

Bor

Awerial

Bongo

Mvolo

Mundari

Moru

Terekeka

Azande

Mundri West

Nyanwara

Lopa

Pori

Kapoeta North

Eze

Yambio

Ibba

Meridi

Mundri East

Central Equatoria

Lopit

Boya

Western Equatoria

Baka

Avokaya

Juba

Lokoya

Makaraka

Juba

Bari

Yambio

Mundu

Pajulu

Yei

Latiya

Lolubo

Latuka

Torit

Dind

Kakwa

Kuku

Madi

Acholi

Lango

Mugabo

Kajo-Kaji

Magwi

Lubwara

Uganda

Legend / Inset

N W E S

Sudan

Egypt

Libya

Chad

Red Sea

Eritrea

Central African Republic

Sudan

Ethiopia

Southern Sudan

Central African Republic

Democratic Republic of Congo

Uganda Kenya

Central African Republic

Democratic Republic of Congo

Kilometers

0   50   100   200   300   400

Code: SS-0132
Date: 24/12/09
IMU OCHA SS

Subject: Press Statement on Circular No 007/2014: Ministerial Circular Prohibiting and Regulating the Service and Employment of Aliens in Certain Positions in the Private Sector.

It was reported in the media citing that authorities in Juba announced on Tuesday a ban on foreigners including aid workers in order to give their positions to the nationals.

1. In reference to the circular, we are not talking about technical or professional positions such as Nurses, Head of Missions, Country Directors, and Financial Controllers of any institutions including banking, insurance, hotels and Non Governmental organizations.

2. The circular excludes all United Nations (UN) agencies, diplomatic corporations *missions* and organizations that signed bilateral/mutual agreement with the Republic of South Sudan such as IGAD, USAID etc.

3. We are targeting low—level positions existing in the various organizations, financial institutions, hotels etc. whose composition will not reach 40% of the total staffing structure. Pursuant to the directives in the circular, I must clarify that:

   a) By Executive Directors, we mean Executive Secretaries and Secretaries
   b) Personnel Managers, we mean Human Resource Managers
   c) Public Relations: we mean front desks officers, receptionists and protocol officers
   d) Other categories includes procurement officers and logisticians

4. All positions listed under the provision of the circular issued on September 12, 2014 will be advertised and fill by only qualified South Sudanese. All listed positions will be recruited in conjunction with the policy of Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development.

Ngor Kolong Ngor
Minister
Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Management
RSS/Juba

(Official stamp: Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of Labor, Public Service & Human Resource Development — Ngor Kolong Ngor, Minister)

Figure 66: Ministry of Labour, press statement

UN aid chief expelled as western countries voice concern

zer's home-among other western countries.

The decision taken by the government of South Sudan is "deep-

ly regrettable," the UK Minister for Africa James Duddrige said in a statement yesterday.

"Such a move is particularly

concerning, given the desperate humanitarian situation facing the country," Duddridge said.

Lanzer

Juba, Ayuen Akuot Atem
The government said it has ex-

coordinator Toby Lanzer, a move that has raised concern

Sudan likely to have armed S. Sudan rebels by air: report

Nairobi (AFP)

Sudan is likely to have supplied weapons by air to rebels battling the government in neighbouring South Sudan, a report released Tuesday said, despite Khartoum's denials of

The study from the London-based small arms research organisation, Conflict Armament Research, documented a cache of weapons and ammunition captured by South Sudanese government troops from the rebels in Jonglei

"The composition of the documented materiel, and a precedent for airdropping identical materiel to rebel forces in South Sudan in 2012, prior to the current conflict, suggests direct supply from Sudan to SPLM-iO

27

UN aid chief expelled as western countries voice concern

...From page 1

In an exclusive interview with the Citizen Newspaper, presidential Spokesperson Ateny Wek Ateny revealed that the former United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarians affairs was expelled in a decision reached on Monday by the Council of Ministers.

Ateny said Lanzer was expelled for remarks he made against the government of South Sudan while in Geneva, Switzerland, describing the leadership as a failed one.

He also said earlier remarks that the country was on the brink of bankruptcy and resorting to printing of its currency, made by Lanzer also contributed to the government's decision.

"These statements are irresponsible statements from the humanitarian coordina-

tor, given the fact that the remarks don't give hope to the people of South Sudan," Ateny explained.

The Heads of Mission of western countries echoed the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon in condemning the decision of the government of South Sudan.

"Mr Lanzer has spared no effort on behalf of the millions of victims of the man-made crisis in South Sudan, they said in a joint statement.

"He has echoed the views of many members of the international community who believe it is time that the leaders of South Sudan pay heed to the suffering of their people, and make the decisions and compromises that their people and the deepening humanitarian tragedy demand, the envoys' statement added.

They called for Lanzer to be reinstated and be allowed to serve out the term of

his appointment.

Ateny said the work of the United Nations is to support the government and the people of South Sudan other than criticism. Duddrige urged the government of South Sudan to reverse the decision and "allow Lanzer to finish his tour as planned next month."

"I also impress upon them the importance of achieving peace, and the need to face up to the numerous and deep humanitarian challenges that the country faces, he added.

Ateny said the prerogative to reverse the decision rests with President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

Special Notice

The Citizen Management has organized a show under the name The Open Mic which will feature on important issues of public interest. It will begin with focus on the South Sudanese writers and their works. During the occasion the focus will be on:

-Why South Sudanese writers write more political books other than novels or plays.

The show will be held in The Citizen premises opposite Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on Airport Road every Saturday from 3.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. and will be broadcast live by CTV. This week's event will be staged on Saturday 6th June, 2015 starting at 3.00 p.m. and is open to the public.

Figure 67: Expulsion of UN special envoy

Newspaper article on the expulsion of UN Special Envoy Toby Lanzer in The Citizen. (Atem 2015b)

S. Sudan calls on NGOs to stop interfering

NEW NATION TEAM

JUBA

The Government has called on six US-based NGOs to stop their campaign calling for an arms embargo and sanctions against South Sudan, calling it a "blatant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation".

It said the NGOs should instead put pressure on the rebels to return to the talks and sign a peace agreement.

"NGOs should reflect on their current soft gloves approach towards the rebels and start to exercise more pressure on the rebels to motivate them to return to the peace talks," a statement from South Sudan's embassy in the US said.

"Unless this is done, the rebels will maintain their unreasonable de-

mands, the Government will continue to resist, and innocent people will continue to suffer."

The Government was reacting to a letter by Human Rights Watch, The Enough Project and four other NGOs, addressed to US secretary of state John Kerry and national security adviser Susan Rice.

In the letter, the NGOs urged the Obama administration to take the lead in slapping additional sanctions against those responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan.

They also called on the US government to push for sanctions by other countries and by the UN Security Council, including an arms embargo "to prevent weapons and ammunition being used by the warring parties to further more abuses".

The sanctions, they said, would force the parties to strike a peace deal

Ambassador Garang Diing

and provide a form of accountability for "widespread and horrific violations". But the Government called the campaign unjustified, noting that it has accommodated many of the rebels' demands. "The Government deserves to be treated fairly as there is no equivalence between an armed rebellion, vent on rustling political power through the barrel of a gun, and an elected government," the statement said.

It warned that threats of sanctions and an arms embargo would only serve as a disincentive for peace.

"The current campaign, based on negative feelings of frustration, will only complicate matters and harden positions," the statement said.

"South Sudan needs encouragement and support towards peace, not punishment and exclusion."

The Government said it deplored the "unnecessary suffering of civilians due to rebel actions" and reiterated its commitment to achieve peace, support the humanitarian effort and bring to book those responsible for human rights violations.

"The Government pledges to work closely with members of the international community to ensure that perpetrators of heinous crimes against civilians and humanitarian actors will be brought to account for their actions."

Figure 68: Interference of NGOs, newspaper article

Article in the New Nation on the government complaining about NGOs (New Nation Team 2015).

1.7 The AMDISS-incident

Figure 69: Radio Tamazuj on AMDISS (Radio Tamazuj 2015)

Alfred Taban
22 June 2015 · Juba, South Sudan

Dear all,

22/6/2015

It is with shock and dismay that I read the Radio Tamazuj report printed on an AMDISS letterhead accusing AMDISS of helping the security service to track Journalists. AMDISS has never done that. What ADMISS did was to implement resolutions passed during two securtiy/media dialogues.
During these dialogues media houses complained of obstructions by the securtity in some of their coverages.
Thus in the last security/media dialogue implementation meeting which was attended by UJOSS , the National Editors Forum besides AMDISS, it was decided that the various media houses should avail the names of some of its reporters to the ministry of Information for accreditation so that these reporters can be able to attend certain occasions such as Independence day (July 9th) and enter some ministries such as the Defence ministry without hindrance.
This accreditation does not demand detailed information about journalists as said in the article, but a sort of facilitation. AMDISS then wrote to the various media houses to present a list of their journalists who are going to get this accreditation from the ministry. Radio Tamazuj completely misrepresented AMDISS which has since been helping to ensure that no Journalist is hindered in his or her work. I hereby call on Radio Tamazuj to apologize to AMDISS for this harmful misrepresentation of the organisation.
Thank you

Alfred Taban
Chairman
AMDISS

👍 Like   💬 Comment

Figure 70: AMDISS reaction on Facebook

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Straight Talk

By Nhial Bol Aken

Radio Tamazuj, Free Voice must apologize

It is almost a week now since the Association of Media Development for South Sudan, AMDISS demanded a formal apology for misinterpretation to accreditation of journalists in South Sudan as part of implementation of Security and Media dialogue. The aim of this dialogue was aimed to help the safety and protection of journalists in the country and there is no way for Free Voice or Radio Tamazuj to oppose this process.

As a secretary of AMDISS, I standby the resolution supported by National Editors' Forum NEF and Union of Journalists of South Sudan UJOSS which urged Radio Tamauzj to apology formally and I am again and again calling on them to effect the apology within the next five working days or failure to do so AMDISS will call for a meeting of its executive body for the next step which may include distancing AMDISS from the two media institutions. Another step may include legal action because Radio Tamazuj already concluded that AMDISS is cooperating with security. We want the law to take its course because the report on us have tarnished our good image for wrong reasons.

We made it clear in our press release that this accreditation does not have detailed information about journalists as misin-

terpreted in the report but a kind of facilitation in the absence of Media Authority. This is our view and it has been accepted by the government so what makes us not to cooperate with the government since the process provides security to our journalists.

We have indicated this in our press release that media and security dialogue will continue for the safety and protection and this is our home made process which deserves respect by foreign media operating in South Sudan.

The benefits of accreditation process is that it distances journalists who are doing professional work in this country from those who are doing underground activ-

ities in the name of media. As leaders in this sector, we will translate this sector into responsibilities because leaders exercise responsibilities and we were elected for the task of advocating for the welfare of our journalists and media houses. The foreign mafias such as Hilde Brand of Netherlands should not intimidate us, we are for the welfare of our journalists and interest of our country. For the last 10 years since this government took power, we said in our reporting that the government has failed, the opposition is dead, the civil society is weak and the Church is been compromised, if all these things are happening then why are we in this country?

I want the media to promote dialogue for change that will make the government accountable for its brutality. Since the members of AMDISS are united, foreign mafias will never succeed because we are strong for them.

Figure 71: AMDISS reaction in The Citizen (Bol 2015)

From: Radio Tamazuj <radiotamazuj@gmail.com>
Sent: 16 July 2015 12:31
To: Kerstin Tomiak
Subject: Re: Interview

Dear Kerstin Tomiak

We thank you for your interest in the media in South Sudan including our work as Radio Tamazuj. We may be able to consider how to accommodate your request for information or insights into the media sector but we have concerns about the security of such meetings in Juba and therefore may not be willing to meet personally. Please would you send your letter of introduction from Cardiff, and if you have some questions specifically you want answered we could see whether we can prepare a response over email. On the matter of AMDISS we have no comment about any of their accusations, we refer you only to the report that we earlier published about the issue of accreditation, which we have never retracted or corrected.

Again, thanks for your email.

Best regards,
Editors

Figure 72: Tamazuj mail to the author

Appendix 2: Survey

This appendix contains the output of all tests run in SPSS and the associated questionnaire used for the second survey. It starts with a remark for the surveyor that this questionnaire needs to be filled out by a male Dinka. These notes were included to model the population of South Sudan as much as was possible.

2.1 Questionnaire, 2nd survey

Researcher: This questionnaire needs to be filled out by a male Dinka

What is your gender?
☐ Male ☐ Female

How old are you?
☐ Younger than 18 ☐ 18-29 ☐ 30-49 ☐ 50-64 ☐ 65 and above

Where are you from?
☐ Equatoria ☐ Jonglei ☐ Upper Nile state ☐ Bhar e Gazal

What is your tribe?
☐ Dinka ☐ Nuer ☐ something else (please state: _____)

What is your level of education?
☐ Never went to school ☐ Secondary school
☐ Primary school ☐ University / college

What do you do for a living?
☐ I am a student / pupil ☐ I am a day labourer
☐ I own a business ☐ I am a refugee
☐ I am unemployed ☐ Something other (please state: _____)

Is there a radio in your household? (Please tick just <u>one</u> box)
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ I listen to radio at work ☐ I listen to radio on my mobile

How often do you listen to radio? (Please tick just <u>one</u> box)
☐ A few times a day ☐ Once a week
☐ Once a day ☐ It might play in the background but I do not pay attention
☐ A few times a week ☐ I do not know

Which radio station are you listening to the most? (Please tick just <u>one </u>box!)

☐ Radio Miraya ☐ Eye Radio

☐ Voice of America ☐ Radio Bakitha

☐ Dream Radio ☐ Liberty Radio

☐ BBC Radio ☐ Radio Tamazuj

☐ SS-TV ☐ City FM

☐ Capital FM ☐ I do not care

What do you like most listening to on the radio? (Please tick just<u> one </u>box!)

☐ News and Information ☐ Radio Drama

☐ Music ☐ Health and education programmes

What is your main source of information? (Please tick only <u>one </u>box!)

☐ Radio ☐ Teachers ☐ Family

☐ Newspaper ☐ Church / Mosque ☐ Friends and colleagues

Who do should pay for radio and journalists? (Please tick <u>only one </u>box!)

☐ The government – informing citizens is important

☐ They should sell advertisements and make their own money

☐ The public – a small fee should be paid by everyone

☐ Donors and organisations like the UN

State how much you agree or disagree with the below statements. Tick only ONE box per statement!

	Strongly agree	agree	Don't know	disagree	Strongly disagree
I believe what I hear on the radio					
I trust what I hear in the media when it comes from an official source.					
Most information on the radio comes from the government					
Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral					
The government is using media to influence people					
The government is working in the best interest of all people in South Sudan					

UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan					
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all other tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan.					
I do not trust members from other tribes than my own					
South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional.					
The government is right in controlling the media.					
It is important to me to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my own tribe.					
Media criticises the government unfairly and too much					

Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes than your own?

☐ Yes ☐ No

How do you feel when you have contact with members from other tribes?

☐ It is no big deal.

☐ I feel scared

☐ I try to avoid contact with members from other tribes

Does your circle of friends and acquaintances include:

Dinka: Yes ☐ No ☐

Nuer: Yes ☐ No ☐

Shilluk: Yes ☐ No ☐

Member of other tribes than your own: Yes ☐ No ☐

Only members of your tribe: Yes ☐ No ☐

Would you advise your children only to marry someone from your own tribe?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people of South Sudan?

☐ Yes ☐ No

For the researcher: Please do not forget to thank the interviewee for participation!

2.2 Output SPSS

GET
 FILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20151221_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav'.

Warning # 5281. Command name: GET FILE
SPSS Statistics is running in Unicode encoding mode. This file is encoded in
a locale-specific (code page) encoding. The defined width of any string
variables are automatically tripled in order to avoid possible data loss. You
can use ALTER TYPE to set the width of string variables to the width of the
longest observed value for each string variable.
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT.
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender Age Location Tribe Education Employment
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 14:45:08
Comments		
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	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
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[DataSet1] H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20151221_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav

Statistics

		gender	age	Where are you from	What is your tribe	level of education
N	Valid	461	458	451	461	461
	Missing	0	3	10	0	0

Statistics

		What do you do for a living
N	Valid	460
	Missing	1

Frequency Table

gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	male	246	53.4	53.4	53.4
	female	215	46.6	46.6	100.0
	Total	461	100.0	100.0	

age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	younger than 18	13	2.8	2.8	2.8
	18 - 29	239	51.8	52.2	55.0
	30 - 49	168	36.4	36.7	91.7
	50 - 64	27	5.9	5.9	97.6
	65 and above	11	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	458	99.3	100.0	
Missing	99	3	.7		
Total		461	100.0		

Where are you from

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Equatoria	126	27.3	27.9	27.9
	Jonglei	97	21.0	21.5	49.4
	Upper Nile state	100	21.7	22.2	71.6
	Bhar e Gazal	124	26.9	27.5	99.1
	Warrap	3	.7	.7	99.8

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Unity	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	451	97.8	100.0	
Missing	99	10	2.2		
Total		461	100.0		

What is your tribe

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Dinka	221	47.9	47.9	47.9
	Nuer	88	19.1	19.1	67.0
	other	152	33.0	33.0	100.0
	Total	461	100.0	100.0	

level of education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never went to school	27	5.9	5.9	5.9
	Primary school	37	8.0	8.0	13.9
	Secondary school	112	24.3	24.3	38.2
	University / college	285	61.8	61.8	100.0
	Total	461	100.0	100.0	

What do you do for a living

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Student	223	48.4	48.5	48.5
	Business owner	55	11.9	12.0	60.4
	Unemployed	91	19.7	19.8	80.2
	Day labourer	53	11.5	11.5	91.7
	Refugee	9	2.0	2.0	93.7
	Something other	9	2.0	2.0	95.7
	Office worker	20	4.3	4.3	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=gov_best_interest
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

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Statistics

The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan

N	Valid	460
	Missing	1

The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	94	20.4	20.4	20.4
	Agree	85	18.4	18.5	38.9
	I don't know	38	8.2	8.3	47.2
	Disagree	115	24.9	25.0	72.2
	Strongly disagree	128	27.8	27.8	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

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 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

Frequencies

Notes

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Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=UNMISS_best_int /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
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Statistics

UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan

N	Valid	456
	Missing	5

UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	101	21.9	22.1	22.1
	Agree	118	25.6	25.9	48.0
	I don't know	48	10.4	10.5	58.6
	Disagree	100	21.7	21.9	80.5

	Strongly disagree	89	19.3	19.5	100.0
	Total	456	98.9	100.0	
Missing	99	5	1.1		
Total		461	100.0		

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FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=NGOs_good_job NGOs_gov
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Frequencies

Notes

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Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=NGOs_good_job NGOs_gov /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:01.01
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.39

Statistics

		International NGOs are doing a good job	International NGOs are not working enough with the government
N	Valid	457	456
	Missing	4	5

41

Frequency Table

International NGOs are doing a good job

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	146	31.7	31.9	31.9
	Agree	188	40.8	41.1	73.1
	I don't know	34	7.4	7.4	80.5
	Disagree	51	11.1	11.2	91.7
	Strongly disagree	38	8.2	8.3	100.0
	Total	457	99.1	100.0	
Missing	99	4	.9		
Total		461	100.0		

International NGOs are not working enough with the government

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	85	18.4	18.6	18.6
	Agree	137	29.7	30.0	48.7
	I don't know	56	12.1	12.3	61.0
	Disagree	127	27.5	27.9	88.8
	Strongly disagree	51	11.1	11.2	100.0
	Total	456	98.9	100.0	
Missing	99	5	1.1		
Total		461	100.0		

Frequencies

Notes

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	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.	
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Statistics

Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people?

N	Valid	456
	Missing	5

Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	297	64.4	65.1	65.1
	No	159	34.5	34.9	100.0
	Total	456	98.9	100.0	
Missing	99	5	1.1		
Total		461	100.0		

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/MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
/CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.

Nonparametric Tests

Notes

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Comments	

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	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Syntax		NPTESTS /INDEPENDENT TEST (gov_best_interest UNMISS_best_int NGOs_good_job NGOs_gov Lead_change) GROUP (Station_regroup_II) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIR WISE) /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.72
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.53

[DataSet1] H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.117	Retain the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.005	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of International NGOs are doing a good job is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.432	Retain the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of International NGOs are not working enough with the government is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.534	Retain the null hypothesis.
5	The distribution of Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people? is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.032	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 15:43:51
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.

Syntax		FREQUENCIES
		VARIABLES=UNMISS_II
		/BARCHART PERCENT
		/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.37
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.36

MEANS TABLES=UNMISS_best_int BY Station_regroup_II
/CELLS=COUNT MEDIAN.

Means

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 15:54:52
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	\<none>
	Weight	\<none>
	Split File	\<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	For each dependent variable in a table, user-defined missing values for the dependent and all grouping variables are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Cases used for each table have no missing values in any independent variable, and not all dependent variables have missing values.
Syntax		MEANS TABLES=UNMISS_best_int BY Station_regroup_II /CELLS=COUNT MEDIAN.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.00

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent

UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan * Which station regrouped with BBC	456	98.9%	5	1.1%	461	100.0%

Report

UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan

Which station regrouped with BBC	N	Median
UN-Radio Miraya	192	2.50
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	81	2.00
RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	25	2.00
State media SS-TV	29	3.00
small SS radios	42	3.00
BBC	87	4.00
Total	456	3.00

```
CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY UNMISS_II
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.
```

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 15:59:53
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.

Syntax	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY UNMISS_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.30
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.20
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which station regrouped with BBC * UNMISS_II	456	98.9%	5	1.1%	461	100.0%

Which station regrouped with BBC * UNMISS_II Crosstabulation

Count

		UNMISS_II	
		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	96	22
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	49	7
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	15	1
	State media SS-TV	11	5
	small SS radios	20	5
	BBC	28	8
Total		219	48

Which station regrouped with BBC * UNMISS_II Crosstabulation

Count

	UNMISS_II	Total

		Strongly diagree/Disagree	
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	74	192
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	25	81
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	9	25
	State media SS-TV	13	29
	small SS radios	17	42
	BBC	51	87
Total		189	456

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:17:27
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:01.64
	Elapsed Time	00:00:01.40

Statistics

		Is there a radio in your household	How often do you listen to radio?	What is your main source of information	What do like listen to the most	Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral
N	Valid	460	461	459	461	453
	Missing	1	0	2	0	8

Statistics

		South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional	I believe what i hear on radio	The government uses media to influence people	Who should pay for radio and journalists	The government is right to control the media
N	Valid	459	460	459	459	461
	Missing	2	1	2	2	0

Statistics

		Media criticises the government unfairly and too much
N	Valid	460
	Missing	1

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.

SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav'
 /COMPRESSED.
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:20:53
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1

	Filter	<none>	
	Weight	<none>	
	Split File	<none>	
	N of Rows in Working Data File		461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.	
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.	
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	
Resources	Processor Time		00:00:01.44
	Elapsed Time		00:00:01.35

Statistics

		Is there a radio in your household	How often do you listen to radio?	What is your main source of information	What do like listen to the most	Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral
N	Valid	460	461	459	460	453
	Missing	1	0	2	1	8

Statistics

		South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional	I believe what i hear on radio	The government uses media to influence people	Who should pay for radio and journalists	The government is right to control the media
N	Valid	459	460	459	459	461
	Missing	2	1	2	2	0

Statistics

		Media criticises the government unfairly and too much
N	Valid	460
	Missing	1

Frequency Table

Is there a radio in your household

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	314	68.1	68.3	68.3
	No	19	4.1	4.1	72.4
	I listen to radio at work	6	1.3	1.3	73.7
	I listen to radio on my mobile	121	26.2	26.3	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

How often do you listen to radio?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A few times a day	268	58.1	58.1	58.1
	Once a day	111	24.1	24.1	82.2
	A few times a week	41	8.9	8.9	91.1
	Once a week	30	6.5	6.5	97.6
	It might play in the background, but I do not pay attention	11	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	461	100.0	100.0	

What is your main source of information

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Radio	319	69.2	69.5	69.5
	Newspaper	82	17.8	17.9	87.4
	Teachers	10	2.2	2.2	89.5
	Church/Mosque	18	3.9	3.9	93.5
	Family	3	.7	.7	94.1
	Friends and colleagues	27	5.9	5.9	100.0
	Total	459	99.6	100.0	
Missing	99	2	.4		
Total		461	100.0		

What do like listen to the most

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	News and information	359	77.9	78.0	78.0

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Music	53	11.5	11.5	89.6
	Radio drama	12	2.6	2.6	92.2
	Health and education	36	7.8	7.8	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	34	7.4	7.5	7.5
	Agree	99	21.5	21.9	29.4
	I don't know	55	11.9	12.1	41.5
	Disagree	152	33.0	33.6	75.1
	Strongly disagree	113	24.5	24.9	100.0
	Total	453	98.3	100.0	
Missing	99	8	1.7		
Total		461	100.0		

South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	73	15.8	15.9	15.9
	Agree	136	29.5	29.6	45.5
	I don't know	36	7.8	7.8	53.4
	Disagree	139	30.2	30.3	83.7
	Strongly disagree	75	16.3	16.3	100.0
	Total	459	99.6	100.0	
Missing	99	2	.4		
Total		461	100.0		

I believe what i hear on radio

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	131	28.4	28.5	28.5
	Agree	247	53.6	53.7	82.2
	I don't know	19	4.1	4.1	86.3
	Disagree	48	10.4	10.4	96.7
	Strongly disagree	15	3.3	3.3	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	

| Missing | 99 | 1 | .2 | | |
| Total | | 461 | 100.0 | | |

The government uses media to influence people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	131	28.4	28.5	28.5
	Agree	196	42.5	42.7	71.2
	I don't know	47	10.2	10.2	81.5
	Disagree	66	14.3	14.4	95.9
	Strongly disagree	19	4.1	4.1	100.0
	Total	459	99.6	100.0	
Missing	99	2	.4		
Total		461	100.0		

Who should pay for radio and journalists

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The government - informing citizens is important	165	35.8	35.9	35.9
	They should sell advertisements and make their own money	155	33.6	33.8	69.7
	The public - a small feeshould be paid by everyone	18	3.9	3.9	73.6
	Donors and organisations like the UN	121	26.2	26.4	100.0
	Total	459	99.6	100.0	
Missing	99	2	.4		
Total		461	100.0		

The government is right to control the media

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	117	25.4	25.4	25.4
	Agree	114	24.7	24.7	50.1
	I don't know	18	3.9	3.9	54.0
	Disagree	100	21.7	21.7	75.7
	Strongly disagree	112	24.3	24.3	100.0
	Total	461	100.0	100.0	

Media criticises the government unfairly and too much

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	68	14.8	14.8	14.8
	Agree	94	20.4	20.4	35.2
	I don't know	76	16.5	16.5	51.7
	Disagree	125	27.1	27.2	78.9
	Strongly disagree	97	21.0	21.1	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples.
NPTESTS
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (SS_media_neutral gov_influence Believe Info_from_gov
Journ_edu gov_controll Media_critics) GROUP (Station_regroup_II)
KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.

Nonparametric Tests

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:28:57
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461

Syntax		NPTESTS /INDEPENDENT TEST (SS_media_neutral gov_influence Believe Info_from_gov Journ_edu gov_controll Media_critics) GROUP (Station_regroup_II) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIR WISE) /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.39
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.20

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.676	Retain the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of The government uses media to influence people is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.967	Retain the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of I believe what i hear on radio is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.168	Retain the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Most of the information on radio comes from government is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.606	Retain the null hypothesis.
5	The distribution of South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.149	Retain the null hypothesis.
6	The distribution of The government is right to control the media is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.009	Reject the null hypothesis.
7	The distribution of Media criticises the government unfairly and too much is the same across categories of Which station regrouped with BBC.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.096	Retain the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY gov_cont_II
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL
/BARCHART.

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:33:32
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY gov_cont_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.17
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which station regrouped with BBC * gov_cont_II	461	100.0%	0	0.0%	461	100.0%

Which station regrouped with BBC * gov_cont_II Crosstabulation

Count

		gov_cont_II	
		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	95	11
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	32	4
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	11	1
	State media SS-TV	21	2
	small SS radios	22	0
	BBC	50	0
Total		231	18

Which station regrouped with BBC * gov_cont_II Crosstabulation

Count

		gov_cont_II	
		Strongly disagree/Disagree	Total
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	88	194
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	45	81
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	14	26
	State media SS-TV	6	29
	small SS radios	20	42
	BBC	39	89
Total		212	461

```
CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.
```

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:38:07
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1

	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.19
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.17
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which station regrouped with BBC * Media_Critics_II	460	99.8%	1	0.2%	461	100.0%

Which station regrouped with BBC * Media_Critics_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Media_Critics_II			
		1.00	2.00	3.00	Total
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	63	28	103	194
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	29	16	36	81
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	6	7	13	26
	State media SS-TV	14	6	9	29
	small SS radios	16	8	17	41
	BBC	34	11	44	89

Total		162	76	222	460

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.

SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav'
 /COMPRESSED.
CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:39:22
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.16
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

60

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which station regrouped with BBC * Media_Critics_II	460	99.8%	1	0.2%	461	100.0%

Which station regrouped with BBC * Media_Critics_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Media_Critics_II	
		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	63	28
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	29	16
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	6	7
	State media SS-TV	14	6
	small SS radios	16	8
	BBC	34	11
Total		162	76

Which station regrouped with BBC * Media_Critics_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Media_Critics_II	
		Strongly diagree/Disagree	Total
Which station regrouped with BBC	UN-Radio Miraya	103	194
	Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA)	36	81
	RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita)	13	26
	State media SS-TV	9	29
	small SS radios	17	41
	BBC	44	89
Total		222	460

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact
Friends_other_tribes
 Lead_change
 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

Descriptives

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:47:52
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	All non-missing data are used.
Syntax		DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact Friends_other_tribes Lead_change /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.00

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact
Friends_other_tribes
 Lead_change
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:49:07
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.

		Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax			FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact Friends_other_tribes Lead_change /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources		Processor Time	00:00:00.62
		Elapsed Time	00:00:00.61

Statistics

		I do not trust members from other tribes than my own	Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?	How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes	Does your circle of friends include members of other tribes than your own?	Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on demand of the people?
N	Valid	459	456	456	435	456
	Missing	2	5	5	26	5

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:50:02
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.

Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact Friends_other_tribes Tribes_live_peace /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.75
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.67

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact
Friends_other_tribes
 Tribes_live_peace
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 16:55:42
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact Friends_other_tribes Tribes_live_peace /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.64
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.62

Statistics

		I do not trust members from other tribes than my own	Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?	How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes	Does your circle of friends include members of other tribes than your own?	I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan
N	Valid	458	454	455	435	460
	Missing	3	7	6	26	1

Frequency Table

I do not trust members from other tribes than my own

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	50	10.8	10.9	10.9
	Agree	93	20.2	20.3	31.2
	I don't know	17	3.7	3.7	34.9
	Disagree	156	33.8	34.1	69.0
	Strongly disagree	142	30.8	31.0	100.0
	Total	458	99.3	100.0	
Missing	99	3	.7		
Total		461	100.0		

Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	386	83.7	85.0	85.0
	No	68	14.8	15.0	100.0
	Total	454	98.5	100.0	
Missing	99	7	1.5		
Total		461	100.0		

How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	It is no big deal	366	79.4	80.4	80.4
	I feel scared	56	12.1	12.3	92.7
	I try to avoid contact with members from other tribes	33	7.2	7.3	100.0
	Total	455	98.7	100.0	

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Missing	99	6	1.3		
Total		461	100.0		

Does your circle of friends include members of other tribes than your own?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	362	78.5	83.2	83.2
	No	73	15.8	16.8	100.0
	Total	435	94.4	100.0	
Missing	99	26	5.6		
Total		461	100.0		

I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	158	34.3	34.3	34.3
	Agree	117	25.4	25.4	59.8
	I don't know	22	4.8	4.8	64.6
	Disagree	63	13.7	13.7	78.3
	Strongly disagree	100	21.7	21.7	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=mix_neighbourhood
/BARCHART PERCENT
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:03:56
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461

	Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
		Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax			FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=mix_neighbourhood /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources		Processor Time	00:00:00.14
		Elapsed Time	00:00:00.13

Statistics

It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe

N	Valid	460
	Missing	1

It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	35	7.6	7.6	7.6
	Agree	41	8.9	8.9	16.5
	I don't know	11	2.4	2.4	18.9
	Disagree	174	37.7	37.8	56.7
	Strongly disagree	199	43.2	43.3	100.0
	Total	460	99.8	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.2		
Total		461	100.0		

*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples.
NPTESTS
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace) GROUP (Tribe)
KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.

Nonparametric Tests

Notes

Output Created	03-DEC-2016 17:05:35
Comments	

67

Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Syntax		NPTESTS /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace) GROUP (Tribe) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.17
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.13

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan is the same across categories of What is your tribe.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

```
CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY Tribe
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.
```

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:07:34
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY Tribe /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.27
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.19
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent

Tribes_Live_Peace_II * What is your tribe	460	99.8%	1	0.2%	461	100.0%

Tribes_Live_Peace_II * What is your tribe Crosstabulation

Count

		What is your tribe			Total
		Dinka	Nuer	other	
Tribes_Live_Peace_II	1.00	167	49	59	275
	2.00	11	5	6	22
	3.00	43	33	87	163
Total		221	87	152	460

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:08:47
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY Tribe /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.16
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:09:39
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	461
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Tribe BY Tribes_Live_Peace_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.14
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.14
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
What is your tribe * Tribes_Live_Peace_II	460	99.8%	1	0.2%	461	100.0%

What is your tribe * Tribes_Live_Peace_II Crosstabulation

Count

	Tribes_Live_Peace_II	Total

		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know	Strongly disagree/Disagree	
What is your tribe	Dinka	167	11	43	221
	Nuer	49	5	33	87
	other	59	6	87	152
Total		275	22	163	460

SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav'
 /COMPRESSED.
RECODE Which_station (1=1) (2=2) (5=3) (7=4) (8=5) (3=6) (6=6) (9=6) (11=6) INTO
Which_Stat_II.
VARIABLE LABELS Which_Stat_II 'Which_Stat_II'.
EXECUTE.
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Which_Stat_II
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:18:55
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Which_Stat_II /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.15

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.

SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav'
 /COMPRESSED.

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Which_Stat_II
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

Frequencies

Notes		
Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:20:43
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Which_Stat_II /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.14

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood everyday_life_contact
Feel_contact
 Friends_from_own_tribe Tribes_live_peace
 /BARCHART PERCENT
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

Frequencies

Notes		
Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:34:03
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>

	N of Rows in Working Data File		372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.	
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.	
Syntax		FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood everyday_life_contact Feel_contact Friends_from_own_tribe Tribes_live_peace /BARCHART PERCENT /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	
Resources	Processor Time		00:00:00.73
	Elapsed Time		00:00:00.73

Statistics

		I do not trust members from other tribes than my own	It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe	Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?	How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes	Does your circle of friends include only members of your own tribe?
N	Valid	369	371	366	367	341
	Missing	3	1	6	5	31

Statistics

		I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan
N	Valid	371
	Missing	1

Frequency Table

I do not trust members from other tribes than my own

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	46	12.4	12.5	12.5
	Agree	76	20.4	20.6	33.1
	I don't know	14	3.8	3.8	36.9
	Disagree	125	33.6	33.9	70.7

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly disagree	108	29.0	29.3	100.0
	Total	369	99.2	100.0	
Missing	99	3	.8		
Total		372	100.0		

It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	32	8.6	8.6	8.6
	Agree	36	9.7	9.7	18.3
	I don't know	9	2.4	2.4	20.8
	Disagree	134	36.0	36.1	56.9
	Strongly disagree	160	43.0	43.1	100.0
	Total	371	99.7	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.3		
Total		372	100.0		

Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	309	83.1	84.4	84.4
	No	57	15.3	15.6	100.0
	Total	366	98.4	100.0	
Missing	99	6	1.6		
Total		372	100.0		

How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	It is no big deal	287	77.2	78.2	78.2
	I feel scared	50	13.4	13.6	91.8
	I try to avoid contact with members from other tribes	30	8.1	8.2	100.0
	Total	367	98.7	100.0	
Missing	99	5	1.3		
Total		372	100.0		

Does your circle of friends include only members of your own tribe?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	43	11.6	12.6	12.6

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	No	298	80.1	87.4	100.0
	Total	341	91.7	100.0	
Missing	99	31	8.3		
Total		372	100.0		

I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	118	31.7	31.8	31.8
	Agree	91	24.5	24.5	56.3
	I don't know	21	5.6	5.7	62.0
	Disagree	54	14.5	14.6	76.5
	Strongly disagree	87	23.4	23.5	100.0
	Total	371	99.7	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.3		
Total		372	100.0		

CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Tribe BY Tribes_Live_Peace_II
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 17:49:57
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.

Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Tribe BY Tribes_Live_Peace_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.	
Resources	Processor Time		00:00:00.19
	Elapsed Time		00:00:00.19
	Dimensions Requested		2
	Cells Available		349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
What is your tribe * Tribes_Live_Peace_II	371	99.7%	1	0.3%	372	100.0%

What is your tribe * Tribes_Live_Peace_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Tribes_Live_Peace_II			
		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know	Strongly disagree/Disagr ee	Total
What is your tribe	Dinka	123	10	35	168
	Nuer	38	5	31	74
	other	48	6	75	129
Total		209	21	141	371

*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples.
NPTESTS
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood) GROUP
(Which_station) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.

Nonparametric Tests

Notes

Output Created	03-DEC-2016 17:52:21
Comments	

Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Syntax		NPTESTS /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood) GROUP (Which_station) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.19
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.13

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan is the same across categories of Which station are you listening to the most.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.217	Retain the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of I do not trust members from other tribes than my own is the same across categories of Which station are you listening to the most.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.708	Retain the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe is the same across categories of Which station are you listening to the most.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.698	Retain the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 18:01:44
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_Live_Peace_II mix_neighbourhood_II Trust_Tribes_II /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.41
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.40
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which_Stat_II * Tribes_Live_Peace_II	371	99.7%	1	0.3%	372	100.0%
Which_Stat_II * mix_neighbourhood_II	371	99.7%	1	0.3%	372	100.0%
Which_Stat_II * Trust_Tribes_II	369	99.2%	3	0.8%	372	100.0%

Which_Stat_II * Tribes_Live_Peace_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Tribes_Live_Peace_II			
		Strongly agree/Agree	I do not know	Strongly disagree/Disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	107	13	73	193
	Voice of America	14	0	5	19
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	19	1	9	29
	Eyeradio	35	2	25	62
	Bakhita	13	1	12	26
	Small stations	21	4	17	42
Total		209	21	141	371

Which_Stat_II * mix_neighbourhood_II Crosstabulation

Count

		mix_neighbourhood_II			
		Strongly agree/agree	I do not know	Strongly disagree/disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	33	2	158	193
	Voice of America	6	0	13	19
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	7	1	21	29
	Eyeradio	11	2	49	62
	Bakhita	5	0	21	26
	Small stations	6	4	32	42
Total		68	9	294	371

Which_Stat_II * Trust_Tribes_II Crosstabulation

Count

		Trust_Tribes_II			
		Strongly agree/agree	I do not know	Strongly disagree/disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	72	5	115	192
	Voice of America	6	1	12	19
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	8	2	19	29
	Eyeradio	19	2	41	62
	Bakhita	8	1	17	26
	Small stations	9	3	29	41
Total		122	14	233	369

CROSSTABS

```
/TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/CELLS=COUNT
/COUNT ROUND CELL
/BARCHART.
```

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 18:09:36
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.15
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan		371	99.7%	1	0.3%	372	100.0%

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan Crosstabulation

Count

		I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan			
		Strongly agree	Agree	I don't know	Disagree
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	60	47	13	28
	Voice of America	7	7	0	3
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	15	4	1	0
	Eyeradio	19	16	2	11
	Bakhita	5	8	1	7
	Small stations	12	9	4	5
Total		118	91	21	54

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan Crosstabulation

Count

		I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	
		Strongly disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	45	193
	Voice of America	2	19
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	9	29
	Eyeradio	14	62
	Bakhita	5	26
	Small stations	12	42
Total		87	371

```
CROSSTABS
 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
 /CELLS=COUNT ROW COLUMN TOTAL
 /COUNT ROUND CELL
 /BARCHART.
```

Crosstabs

Notes

Output Created		03-DEC-2016 18:11:39
Comments		
Input	Data	H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	372
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES /CELLS=COUNT ROW COLUMN TOTAL /COUNT ROUND CELL /BARCHART.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.16
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.17
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	349496

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	371	99.7%	1	0.3%	372	100.0%

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan

Crosstabulation

	I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan

			Strongly agree	Agree	I don't know	Disagree
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	Count	60	47	13	28
		% within Which_Stat_II	31.1%	24.4%	6.7%	14.5%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	50.8%	51.6%	61.9%	51.9%
		% of Total	16.2%	12.7%	3.5%	7.5%
	Voice of America	Count	7	7	0	3
		% within Which_Stat_II	36.8%	36.8%	0.0%	15.8%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	5.9%	7.7%	0.0%	5.6%
		% of Total	1.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.8%
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	Count	15	4	1	0
		% within Which_Stat_II	51.7%	13.8%	3.4%	0.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	12.7%	4.4%	4.8%	0.0%
		% of Total	4.0%	1.1%	0.3%	0.0%
	Eyeradio	Count	19	16	2	11
		% within Which_Stat_II	30.6%	25.8%	3.2%	17.7%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	16.1%	17.6%	9.5%	20.4%
		% of Total	5.1%	4.3%	0.5%	3.0%
	Bakhita	Count	5	8	1	7
		% within Which_Stat_II	19.2%	30.8%	3.8%	26.9%

			4.2%	8.8%	4.8%	13.0%
	% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan					
	% of Total		1.3%	2.2%	0.3%	1.9%
Small stations	Count		12	9	4	5

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan Crosstabulation

			I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	
			Strongly disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Miraya	Count	45	193
		% within Which_Stat_II	23.3%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	51.7%	52.0%
		% of Total	12.1%	52.0%
	Voice of America	Count	2	19
		% within Which_Stat_II	10.5%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	2.3%	5.1%
		% of Total	0.5%	5.1%
	SS-TV/SS-Radio	Count	9	29
		% within Which_Stat_II	31.0%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	10.3%	7.8%
		% of Total	2.4%	7.8%
	Eyeradio	Count	14	62
		% within Which_Stat_II	22.6%	100.0%

				16.1%	16.7%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan		16.1%	16.7%
		% of Total		3.8%	16.7%
	Bakhita	Count		5	26
		% within Which_Stat_II		19.2%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan		5.7%	7.0%
		% of Total		1.3%	7.0%
	Small stations	Count		12	42

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan Crosstabulation

			I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan			
			Strongly agree	Agree	I don't know	Disagree
Which_Stat_II	Small stations	% within Which_Stat_II	28.6%	21.4%	9.5%	11.9%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	10.2%	9.9%	19.0%	9.3%
		% of Total	3.2%	2.4%	1.1%	1.3%
Total		Count	118	91	21	54
		% within Which_Stat_II	31.8%	24.5%	5.7%	14.6%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	31.8%	24.5%	5.7%	14.6%

Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan Crosstabulation

			I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	
			Strongly disagree	Total
Which_Stat_II	Small stations	% within Which_Stat_II	28.6%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	13.8%	11.3%
		% of Total	3.2%	11.3%
Total		Count	87	371
		% within Which_Stat_II	23.5%	100.0%
		% within I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	23.5%	100.0%

Appendix 3: Interviews

This appendix contains additional information on the interviewees. The majority of interviewees asked for anonymity. As the security situation has deteriorated in the country since all personal data have been omitted.

3.1 List of interviewees

<u>Group 1 – Journalists</u>

Interview 1: Senior staff at a South Sudanese radio station, financed through advertisement, selling of airtime and by the Catholic Church in South Sudan. I met her through my NGO-work in South Sudan. Interview conducted on 01 December 2014.

Interview 5: Former journalist, female, rather junior. She belongs to a group of young South Sudanese females hanging out in one of the bars frequented by expats, which was how I met her. Works at times for a security organisation, doing translations and operates as fixer. Interview conducted 14 December 2014

Interview 7: Male journalist, has been working for the government as well as for iNGO-financed radio. Junior positions. I met him through word of mouth. In the following, he became my research assistant and fixed a couple of governmental interviews for me. Interview conducted 07 January 2015.

Interview 8: Senior journalist and editor, male. Works in and with AMDISS. Past position as correspondent for a European media house. Interview conducted 25 March 2015. I contacted him because of his important position in South Sudanese media.

Interview 9: Midcareer journalist, male. Postgraduate degree from a European institution. Leading position in a newspaper. Contacted him because of his position. Interview conducted on 25 March 2015.

Interview 10: Senior journalist and editor. Major media player in South Sudan. Contacted because of his position. Interview conducted on 25 March 2015.

Interview 12: Junior journalist. Male. Worked for newspaper and radio. Contact made by research assistant. Interview conducted 04 April 2015.

Interview 15: Junior journalist, mostly working for newspaper. Freelancing. Contact made by research assistant. Interview conducted 18 June 2015.

Interview 22: Midcareer journalist, male, working at the government-owned station. Having a fairly secure and good position there. Interview conducted 27 July 2015.

Interview 24: junior journalist, male, freelancer and student. Working for an iNGO-newspaper project which, at the time of interview, was about to lose funding. Interview conducted 04 August 2015.

Group 2 – Government

Interview 11: SPLA officer. Contact made through a South Sudanese acquaintance. Interview conducted 18 April 2015

Interview 13: Government official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Contact made by a South Sudanese acquaintance. Interview conducted 16 April 2015

Interview 18: Official from the Ministry of Information and Broadcast. Directly contacted because of his position. Interview conducted 30 June 2015

Interview 20: Minister in the local government. Contact made with a cold-call e-mail. Interview conducted 03 July 2015.

Interview 23: Senior opposition politician. Cofounder of the SPLM, responsible figure in the Nasir-split (1991). Contact made through a South Sudanese acquaintance. Interview conducted 27 July 2015.

Interview 28: High-ranking official in the SPLM and the government. Contact made via e-mail. Interview conducted 14 August 2015.

Group 3 – Civil society

Interview 2: Academic staff, Juba University. Postgraduate degree from a European institution, contact made before the research stay in Europe, through mutual friends. Interview conducted 28 November 2014.

Interview 6: Media activist and lobbyist. Consultant on some projects. Contacted through a South Sudanese acquaintance. Initial interview conducted 20 December 2014, an unrecorded follow-up interview conducted on 24 May 2015.

Interview 14: Researcher from a South Sudanese institution, male. Contacted him through their website. Interview conducted 18 April 2015

Interview 17: Professor from Juba University. Met and contacted through my work at the University. Interview conducted 29 June 2015.

Interview 21: Media consultant. Met through a public lecture organised by the UN. Initial interview conducted 20 June 2015, unrecorded follow-up on 12 August 2015.

Interview 25: Consultant from the MDI, Media Development Institute. Met him when waiting for another interview. Interview conducted 09 August 2015

Interview 26: Employee at AMDISS/MDI. Contact made through a cold-call visit. Interview conducted 09 August 2015

Interview 27: National worker, project manager, midcareer, at an iNGO. Met him through work. Interview conducted 13 August 2015

Group 4 – regular listeners

Interview 3: Security manager, male. Acquaintance made through mutual acquaintances. Interview conducted 03 December 2014.

Interview 4: Restaurant manager, working at the restaurant in a hotel I have been living in at one of my professional stays in South Sudan before the fieldwork. Interview conducted 08 December 2014.

Interview 16: Driver. Contact made through a friend of mine who is working as an expat for the same organisation the interviewee works for. Interview conducted 28 June 2015.

Interview 19: Student. One of my students from Juba University. Interview conducted 02 July 2015.

3.2 Interviews - Coding Scheme

Area of Interest 1: Media

Open Codes	Properties
Media task	What should media do?
Media general	What media is there in RoSS?
Shutdown on Media	How do media people see crackdown of media houses?
Government Media Relationship	How do the people think the government sees the media?
International community	What they need / should do
Treatment	How is the government treating the media?
Journalist media	How do the journalist see the media?
Media people view	How do people see the media?
Practical media	Work in a media house
Relationship	Relationship between media and government

Area of Interest 2: Government

Open Codes	Properties
President	What is the President doing and how successful is he? What do people think about the President?
Government view on media	How does the government see the media?
People view	How do people see the government?
Behaviour	How does government behave towards people?
System change	Can politics/government change?

Area of Interest 3: Groups

Open Codes	Properties
Power struggle	Leaders are fighting / why are leaders fighting
Ethnicity	Ethnicities, role in the conflict
Overcoming the conflict	How can the conflict be ended?

Conflict reasons	Power struggle, leaders, nepotism
Groups	Working together, ingroup/outgroup dynamic
Donors/iNGOs	Working with/for foreigners, opinions about foreigners, opinions on foreign radio stations
Trust	Trusting government, trusting media
Trust II	Trust in other people / different tribes. Problems with people from other tribes?

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