

This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional repository:<https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/110557/>

This is the author's version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.

Citation for final published version:

Cole, Alistair , Fox, Stuart , Pasquier, Romain and Stafford, Ian 2018. Political trust in France's multi-level government. *Journal of Trust Research* 8 (1) , pp. 45-67.
10.1080/21515581.2018.1457534

Publishers page: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21515581.2018.1457534>

Please note:

Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite this paper.

This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html> for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.





Political Trust in France's multi-level government

Journal:	<i>Journal of Trust Research</i>
Manuscript ID	JTR-2017-0042.R2
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	Trust, France, Institutions, Mokken Scale Analysis, Multi-level government

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Political Trust in France's multi-level government

Trust has long been identified as an essential component of social, economic and political life. Since the mid-1990s, as Newton (2007, p.342) notes, there has been an 'explosion of interest' in the concept driven by its perceived decline and reengagement with concepts of social capital (Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Seligman 1997; Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Warren 1999a; Hardin 2002, 2006; Keele, 2007; Uslaner 2002; Hetherington, 2005; Zmerli & Hooghe 2011). The wider literature on political trust has identified a range of potential factors underpinning trust, such as citizen satisfaction with policy, economic performance, the prevalence of political scandals and corruption and the influence of social capital. Parker et al. (2014, 87) sum up the underlying assumption in much of the literature that 'the public is more trusting when they are satisfied with policy outcomes, the economy is booming, citizens are pleased with incumbents and institutions, political scandals are non-existent, crime is low, a war is popular, the country is threatened, and social capital is high.'

The article acknowledges these debates, especially the general context of decline in trust in western democracies, including in France, our country case (Balme, Rosenberg & Marie, 2003; Boy & Chiche, 2010; Cautrès, 2017; CEVIPOF, 2011; CEVIPOF, 2014; CEVIPOF, 2015; Dogan, 1999; Grossman & Sauger, 2017). Cross-national studies such as the World Values

1
2
3 Survey uncover evidence that trends in political trust are similar throughout advanced Western
4 democracies and so our findings are likely to be applicable to the broader study of political trust
5 (Dalton, 2004; Dalton, 2013). While attempts to measure or evaluate levels of political trust have
6 generally been applied to the local or national level or, within the European context, the EU level
7 (Citrin & Muste 1999; Kaase 1999; van de Walle et al. 2008; Muñoz et al. 2011; van der Meer &
8 Hakhverdian 2017), however, our article breaks new ground by looking at how political trust
9 varies within a multi-level governmental system. The analysis developed within this paper
10 considers political trust within multiple layers of government at a single point and therefore
11 provides a clearer picture of how citizens engage with complex governance arrangements where
12 the primary responsibility for specific policy areas is often unclear.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30 This article reports findings from a major nationwide survey carried out from October 7-11th
31 2016. It turns around how best to understand the drivers of political trust in political institutions
32 in France in a context of multi-level government. While some descriptive data is presented and
33 discussed, the focus is primarily on the use of latent structure analysis to explore the trust data
34 itself, and regression models looking in more detail at predictors of high or low levels of trust in
35 the different institutions of France's governmental system. All of the data and coding is available
36 from the authors on request. The article is organized into four main sections. Section one
37 operates a definition of political trust. Section two presents the research design and methods.
38 Section three presents the results of latent structure analyses into the nature of measures of
39 institutional trust. Section four then analyses institutional trust and identifies key demographic,
40 regional and political traits that are associated with higher or lower levels of political trust. The
41 article concludes that types of institution and forms of party identification matter more for
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 political trust than socio-demographic or scalar explanations, supporting Parker et al's (2014)
4
5 assertion that trust is related to the performance of government and social and economic
6
7 prosperity. The main contribution is to add a territorial dimension to debates on trust and to
8
9 address the deficiency in the literature, which is dominated by studies of national or
10
11 supranational trust.
12
13

14 15 16 17 18 **DEFINING TRUST** 19 20 21 22 23

24 Trust is perhaps one of the most contested concepts within contemporary academic debates.
25
26 Levi (1998, 79 – quoted in Newton 2007, 343), for example, observes that trust ‘is not one
27
28 thing and it does not have one source; it has a variety of forms and causes.’ Therefore grasping
29
30 this concept, which is disputed both across and within multiple disciplines and operationalised
31
32 in a variety of ways, remains a significant challenge. Trust is an object of theoretical
33
34 controversy, pulled asunder by different theoretical chapels. In the rational choice tradition,
35
36 Lenard (2005, 365) emphasises ‘the strategic risk-taking elements of trust’ and draws on rational
37
38 choice theory to assume that ‘both the truster and the trusted will act, in general, to maximise
39
40 their own interests’. From a radically opposed perspective, trust is interpreted as a moral
41
42 predisposition. Uslaner (2002, 17-18) argues that moralistic trust ‘is a commandment to treat
43
44 people as if they were trustworthy’ and mostly does not depend upon personal experiences.
45
46 Fisher et al. (2010) add a third approach, deliberative trust. They argue that trust performs the
47
48 function of ‘a facilitating mechanism for collective action that occurs through deliberation,
49
50 innovation and co-operation rather than through a strategic, rational judgement of the
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 trustee's interests or a moral judgement about human nature.' Thus defined, trust has been
4
5 identified as a key factor in enabling cooperation and reducing uncertainty in complex
6
7 decision-making networks (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Cole & John, 2001; Stone, 1989).
8
9

10
11
12
13
14 'Trust' is here defined in rudimentary terms as the relationship between a subject (the one who
15
16 trusts) and an object (the individual or entity which is trusted). It is a multidimensional concept,
17
18 embracing inter-personal, social and political dimensions. A key distinction within the
19
20 literature has been the identification of these different forms of trust. Zmerli and Newton
21
22 (2011, 69) delineate three kinds of trust: 'particular social trust' which involves those that are
23
24 known to us personally, such as family, friends or work colleagues; 'general social trust'
25
26 which is that placed in 'unknown others'; and finally 'political trust' defined as 'either trust in
27
28 particular politicians or trust in the main institutions of government and public life'.
29
30
31
32 'Particular social trust' or 'thick trust' is characterised as being inter-personal, described by
33
34 Putnam (2000, 136) as 'embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent and nested in
35
36 wider networks.' However, this form of trust is inherently limited because outsiders or strangers
37
38 are likely to be distrusted. In contrast, generalised social trust or 'thin trust' is centred on
39
40 more general information about social groups and situations. This form of trust performs a
41
42 key function in modern societies, as Newton (2007, 349) notes, because 'much social
43
44 interaction is between people who neither know one another nor share a common social
45
46 background.' These two forms of inter-personal trust contrast with most characterisations of
47
48 political trust. Hooghe and Zmerli (2011, p.3) draw on Easton's (1965) idea of diffused
49
50 support to characterize political trust as a 'very thin form of trust' characterised by a 'kind
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 of general expectation that on the whole, political leaders will act according to the rules of the
4 game as they are agreed upon in a democratic regime’.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11 There has been much debate regarding how political trust can be conceptualised and
12 measured. Hardin (2002, 152) argues that notions of trust in relation to government are not
13 analogous to interpersonal trust; rather political trust is a form of ‘quasi trust’, an indirect
14 relationship between citizens and political trustees based on perceived qualities such as the
15 integrity, predictability, performance and efficiency of politicians. The key associations in the
16 rich literature have been between trust, policy performance and social capital. Hetherington
17 and Husser (2012 p. 312) define political trust ‘as the ratio of people’s evaluation of
18 government performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to
19 perform’. Keele (2007) also links trust with policy performance and proposes a long-term
20 association between levels of political trust (measured by survey-based evaluations of policy
21 performance over time) and social capital (a composite measure drawn from aggregate level
22 data). In a variety of the policy performance debate, trust has also become embedded in debates
23 on issue salience (Hetherington and Husser, 2012) and policy mood (Stimson 2004), the level of
24 trust varying over time according to broader questions of performance and policy agendas. Using
25 a mix of bespoke surveys and focus groups, Hibbing and Thiesse-Morse (2001) introduce the
26 rather different dimension of ‘process space’, to refer to the broader democratic processes that
27 encourage trust, rather than the narrower focus on policy outputs and outcomes. For their part,
28 Taber and Lodge (2006) combines surveys and media content analysis to demonstrate the
29 importance of ideological perceptions and the ever-present propensity for cognitive dissonance
30 in the filtering of information. Taken as a whole, these definitions usually subordinate
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 consideration of trust to something else: policy performance, social capital, issue-salience, policy
4 mood, ideology or process environment. In these various works, trust is understood at a level
5
6 once removed, as an intervening variable to explain variations in policy outputs, policy outcomes
7
8 and political processes.
9
10

11
12
13
14
15 Our preference is to engage with one of the most recent definitions – that of Grimmelikhuijsen
16 (2012, 54) - who provides a useful approach centred on three dimensions of *trustworthiness*. These
17
18 dimensions are: perceived competence, which ‘refers to whether people perceive a government
19
20 organization to be capable, effective, skilful or professional in making decisions;’
21
22 perceived benevolence, which ‘refers to whether people think that a government organization
23
24 genuinely cares about citizens’ interests’; and perceived honesty, which ‘implies that the
25
26 government organization is perceived to keep commitments and tell the truth.’ In this article, we
27
28 adapt this definition to view political trust as a contextually/institutionally contingent
29
30 phenomenon based on the perceived competence, and, to a lesser extent, benevolence and
31
32 honesty of government.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 **RESEARCH DESIGN**

43 44 45 46 47 *Case selection* 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

1
2
3 The survey forms part of a larger project on trust and transparency in multi-level governance in
4 the UK, Germany and France. Multi-level governance (MLG) is understood here across its two
5 principal dimensions: multiple levels of delivery and regulation of public services (from local to
6 European), and multiple interactions, especially beyond the State, often involving the private
7 delivery of public goods and assuming the role of lobbies and interests in policy formulation
8 (Piattoni, 2010). The focus in this article is more specifically on the first dimension, multi-level
9 government, in one of our cases, that of France. The choice of the French case captures
10 contextually specific dynamics (the dispersion of policy-making dynamics in a formal unitary
11 state), but also provides more general testable propositions in relation to other country cases,
12 namely: the role of political trust in function-specific and general purpose forms of local and
13 regional authority; the role of the State, residual or otherwise; the form of politics-policy
14 dissonance in the pattern of multi-level public administration that characterizes contemporary
15 government in general.¹ Some of these themes are equally present in the rich US-based literature
16 (e.g. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001), but they are dealt with here in a European environment
17 that is clearly distinctive from the US case.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44
45 ¹ This article examines an emblematic case, rather than engaging in a comparison, *stricto sensu*. The broader project
46 from which this article is drawn (name and title of project) is explicitly comparative, however. The project captures
47 processes of trust and transparency (in multi-level governance) by comparing national, regional and city level
48 dynamics in three current EU member states, by means of aggregate macro-level data, as well as ethnographic and
49 experimental data drawn from a comparative analysis of six territories: France (Brittany & Auvergne-Rhône-
50 Alpes), Germany (Hesse & Saxony-Anhalt) and the United Kingdom (North West England & Wales). Work is
51 ongoing. The EU context provides the core similarity between these states, whose distinct state types cover the range
52 of logical possibilities for comparison: a federal state (Germany), a predominantly unitary state modified by forms
53 of asymmetrical devolution (United Kingdom), a decentralised but still unitary state (France).
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 These questions are pertinent across state form and especially in relation to our UK and German
4 cases. They are especially germane for measuring the linkage of trust with more or less
5 transparent forms of public administration. The primary focus on perceived competence is
6 explained by the link of trust with transparency, understood in terms of policy delivery (where
7 and by whom should policies be made). Who does what is not an easy question to answer in the
8 French context. Various subnational authorities have overlapping territorial jurisdictions and
9 loosely defined spheres of competence. There are now as many as six layers of public
10 administration between the French citizen and Europe (commune, inter-communal structure,
11 department, region, national government and European Union). The post-decentralisation French
12 case provides an exemplar of what Hooghe and Marks (2001) describe as ‘type 2 multi-level
13 governance’. While the classic formulation of MLG (type 1) ‘conceives of dispersion of
14 authority to multi-task, territorially mutually exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable system
15 with limited jurisdictional levels and a limited number of units’, a second type ‘pictures
16 specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-tiered system with
17 a large number of jurisdictions’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 1). Borrowing a metaphor from the
18 federalism literature, the French model of MLG is more akin to a marble cake (random and
19 fruity), rather than a well-ordered layer cake, with neatly distributed competencies between
20 levels (Entwistle et al., 2014). Unlike in many systems of territorial administration, there is no
21 formal hierarchy between levels of local and regional authority. Since 2016, there have been 13
22 mainland regions (including Corsica), but they have lacked regulatory or law-making authority
23 or an effective means of control over the other levels (see table 1)
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 --- Table 1 around here ---
56
57

1
2
3
4
5
6 The EU dimension adds additional complexity: territorially, as there has been a gradual shift
7
8 from a territorial narrative of strategic Europeanisation (whereby cities and regions use Europe to
9
10 further their own ambitions and visions) to a practice of normative Europeanisation (whereby
11
12 local and regional authorities are forced to adapt to a harsher EU-driven convergence) (Carter
13
14 and Pasquier, 2010; Cole, et. al. 2015); politically, with the rise of eurosceptical forces and
15
16 discourses in mainstream French politics, barely occulted by Macron's election as President in
17
18 2017 and functionally, as EU integration continues to challenge some important underpinnings
19
20 of the French model of politics and policy.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31 ***Measuring Political Trust***

32
33
34
35
36

37 The dominant method for measuring trust, both in terms of social and political trust, has been
38
39 survey-based. There are a wide range of surveys that are utilised to underpin research on
40
41 trust including the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), European Social Survey (ESS),
42
43 Eurobarometer, American National Election Studies (ANES) and World Values Study (WVS).
44
45 The combination of questions and indicators used to judge trust – in both social and political
46
47 forms - varies from survey to survey. Seyd (2016) notes for example that the ANES
48
49 comprises a battery of survey questions focused on trust but many surveys, such as the ESS and
50
51 WVS, use single item survey measures.
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Typical of the single item survey response is the WVS. In the 2011 Questionnaire for the United
4 States, for example, the following single item question was asked: ‘Several groups of people are
5 listed below. For each group, please indicate whether you trust people from this group completely,
6 somewhat, not very much or not at all’ (WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014). Likewise, the ESS
7
8 (Questionnaire Round 8 2016/17) asked respondents how much they trust a list of institutions
9
10 (parliament – the legal system – the police – politicians – political parties – European parliament –
11
12 the United Nations), in a way that does not facilitate finer grained or multi-level analyses. In the
13
14 ANES, the Trust in Government Scale captures in a general sense trust in the honesty,
15
16 benevolence and competence of the government in Washington, as measured by questions on the
17
18 corruption of governmental officials, whether government is run by powerful interests and
19
20 whether government can be trusted with taxes. While the ANES is an improvement on the ESS
21
22 and WVS, the assumption is that trust is an undivided good that is not mediated by types of
23
24 political institution, or by respondents’ assessments of the policy responsibilities of those
25
26 institutions.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 The best-known example of a single question approach is that of the British Social Attitudes
40 Survey, whose measure of political trust is whether individuals trust Members of Parliament to
41
42 put the interests of the country ahead of those of their party. Implicit is the assumption that
43
44 individuals who trust a particular actor or institution in one area (such as the integrity of
45
46 Members of Parliament) also trust that actor or institution in other ways (for example in their
47
48 willingness and capacity to deliver on their commitments). It also assumes that trust in an
49
50 institution or actor in one policy area (such as economic management) is the same as that for
51
52 another policy area over which the entity’s power and/or responsibility may be considerably
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 different (such as environmental policy). Such an assumption conceptualizes political trust as
4
5 indivisible. From our perspective, it is surprising how much of the above cited scientific
6
7 production does not question the formal definitions provided of trust, and assumes an ontological
8
9 and epistemological coherence that cannot be challenged or contested. This precludes the
10
11 possibility that political trust might be more nuanced and function-specific, with individuals
12
13 having differing levels of trust in different institutions depending on their functions and
14
15 responsibilities. This paper contends that context (including institutional context) is potentially
16
17 important for understanding political trust (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen et al.
18
19 2013; Meijer 2013).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 YouGov France conducted an internet-based survey of 3003 individuals, selected according to
28
29 quotas of age, gender, region and social-professional category. As a prelude to data analysis, we
30
31 confront the tricky issue of whether the questions asked in the survey actually measure trust (or,
32
33 more specifically, the thin form of political quasi-trust, rather than the more interactive
34
35 interpersonal or generic social trust). Rather than a straight-forward question regarding trust in
36
37 government or politicians, respondents were invited to select which (if any) level of government
38
39 they trusted to deal with a range of policy issues: insecurity, employment, education,
40
41 immigration, social protection, the environment, national territory, debt, growth, housing,
42
43 transport and tax. They were requested to select 'none', the national government, the municipal
44
45 authority, the regional authority, the department, and the EU. This operationalises political trust,
46
47 therefore, in terms of respondents' faith in various government institutions to deliver their policy
48
49 objectives, and in a way that allows that trust to vary between different institutions. Such
50
51 variance not only reflects the differing levels of trust respondents' have in those institutions, but
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 also different assessments of that trust on the basis of their respective policy competences and
4 responsibilities. Though the extent to which this can be characterised as ‘trust’ has been
5 questioned (Nooteboom, 2002), it is consistent with Grimmelikhuijsen’s (2012) three dimensions
6 of trustworthiness that reflect the perceived competence of political institutions as well as their
7 benevolence and integrity. Though it might be objected that trusting the integrity of a political
8 institution and the competence of that institution are not the same thing, we accept
9 Grimmelikhuijsen’s argument that they are, on the basis that politicians promise to address policy
10 issues and social concerns, and their success or failure in doing so is perceived by voters as a
11 deliberate failure to deliver on a promise, as well as an indication of competence. Former
12 President Hollande’s failure to deliver on his repeated promise to bring down unemployment, for
13 example, was viewed by voters as indicative either of his dishonesty (making an unrealistic
14 promise) or, at least, as a sign of his unwillingness to deliver his promises, thereby diminishing
15 trust in the Socialist President.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37 **METHODS & ANALYSIS**

38
39
40
41
42 Two core lines of enquiry organized the data analysis. First, the question of the relationship
43 between different expressions of political trust (specifically, generic and function specific trust)
44 and how they might be organized depending on the role and responsibility of the political
45 institution, and, second, the correlates of political trust. While the first question addresses the
46 blindspots of existing studies (especially those using single question survey items), the second
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 contributes the data of our survey to discussions of the social-demographic and attitudinal
4
5 underpinnings of trust.
6
7
8
9

10
11 The question regarding the relationship between different expressions of political trust is
12
13 addressed using latent structure analysis (LSA). LSA allows for the relationship between
14
15 different survey questions to be explored in terms of their representation of a common latent (i.e.,
16
17 unobserved) trait, based on the propensity of survey respondents to answer those various
18
19 questions in ways that is indicative of a common relationship. Typically, such tests have been
20
21 conducted using factor analysis in social and political science (e.g., Parry et al 1992; Campbell
22
23 2009; Pattie et al 2004; Chiche & Chanvriil, 2014), which assumes that the survey responses are
24
25 essentially a function of a number of common causes (which can be identified as latent
26
27 characteristics of interest by the analyst) and identifies the best number of ‘factors’ to represent
28
29 them. Van der Eijk and Rose (2015), however, show that factor analysis has a tendency to over-
30
31 estimate the number of latent traits identifiable within the survey data (depending on its
32
33 distribution). Moreover, factor analysis is based on the problematic assumption that individual
34
35 respondents do not vary in their expression of traits through survey questions – it is only the
36
37 questions that vary. This is hard to maintain when working with social survey data that is based
38
39 on the assumption that individuals vary in terms of their expression of the characteristics
40
41 measured, and is designed to capture as much of that variation as possible.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 Van der Eijk and Rose (2015) instead recommend Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA), a method
52
53 from the analytic family of item response theory and a probabilistic version of Guttman scaling
54
55
56
57

1
2
3 that has been used for some years in educational research (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1984;
4 Brookover et al 1964; Single et al 1974). MSA assumes that all survey variables are indicative of
5 a common trait, in which differences in response reflect the varying ability (or in our case,
6 willingness) of respondents to give a positive answer to the question (Van Schuur 2003). It then
7 tests this hypothesis, and either confirms that patterns of covariance are indeed indicative of the
8 variables representing a common trait or suggests an alternative data structure should be
9 identified (Van Schuur 2003; 2011). This method can be used to test the theory, therefore, that
10 all indicators of political trust in our survey represent a common underlying propensity to trust
11 (or not) a given political institution across all policy areas (i.e., generalised trust), or instead to
12 suggest that trust in a given institution in one policy area is not related to trusting it in others at
13 the same time (i.e., function-specific trust). The originality of this approach is that it potentially
14 allows trust to manifest itself in distinctive ways according to the context of analysis; in the
15 French case study we observe the expression of proximity trust for the lowest level of local
16 government, the commune; a form of policy-specific intermediary trust for meso-level local and
17 regional authorities and a more generic institutional trust for central government.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 The survey respondents were asked to indicate which (if any) level of government they trusted to
42 deal with the twelve policy areas identified above. This data was recoded into a series of
43 dichotomous measures relating to each institution for each policy area (e.g., identifying those
44 who trusted the national government to deal with the economy and those who did not; those who
45 trusted the department to deal with the economy and those who did not etc.), producing a total of
46 72 new variables. These were then analysed using MSA to identify patterns of covariance that
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 suggested the new variables were indicative of a common trait (such as a propensity to trust the
4 national government across all policy areas).
5
6
7
8
9

10
11 The data collected relating to socio-demographic, political and contextual traits also makes it
12 possible to examine how different expressions of trust may be related to characteristics known to
13 be associated with trust in the extant literature. Previous research has shown that political trust
14 can be shaped by one's age, gender, level of education, socio-economic status, social capital,
15 cultural capital, and experience of participating in politics (Putnam 1995; Sintomer & De
16 Maillard 2007; Southwell 2012). To address our second question – regarding the relationship
17 between different expressions of generalised or function-specific trust in political institutions and
18 socio-demographic, political and contextual characteristics – we employed a combination of
19 descriptive statistics and regression analyses, the results of which are presented below.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38 **DATA ANALYSIS**

39 *Institutional Trust & Policy Competence*

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47 The key headline finding of our survey revealed a deep mistrust in the functioning of French
48 democracy, including in the 13 regions that were the specific target of the enquiry. Though
49 barely one in two (46%) declared that they were satisfied with the functioning of democracy in
50 their region, this proportion was much higher than the corresponding figure at national level. In
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

1
2
3 the CEVIPOF's 2015 Barometer, fully 73% considered that democracy was not functioning very
4 well or not at all well. These findings are consistent with the literature that points to trends of
5 mistrust being less pronounced at the local level than at the national level (Cheurfa 2017). The
6 CEVIPOF's Trust Barometer asks the question 'do you trust the following institutions a great
7 deal, somewhat, not much, or not at all'; the survey has consistently placed municipal
8 government ahead, followed by the intermediary local and regional authorities, the national
9 government, the presidency, the National Assembly, the European Union and organisations such
10 as the G20. When the question is reframed in terms of individuals occupying institutional
11 positions, the conclusions are similar: the mayor of the commune is trusted more than any other
12 elected politician. That trust is enhanced by proximity is an intuitive finding that is backed up in
13 our survey. In relation to the question 'which level is closest to the needs and preoccupations of
14 the population?', the commune (28%) emerges as the institution that is perceived to be closest to
15 the needs and concerns of the population, ahead of the national government (16%), the region
16 (14%), the department (13%), and the European Union (4%).

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39 Table 2 shows the proportion of respondents who identified each political institution as the most
40 trustworthy to handle each policy area, as well as the proportion who identified no institution as
41 being trustworthy and those who did not know. The data shows that a substantial proportion of
42 French citizens have no faith in any institution to deal with major contemporary policy issues.
43
44
45
46
47
48 The institution that provides the most faith on average is the national government, though this is
49 still amongst a minority of the population, with around one in five respondents trusting it to deal
50 with their concerns. The municipal and regional authorities are trusted by an average of 13 and
51 14 per cent respectively, with the departments typically trusted by one in ten. The European
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Union is by far the least trusted institution, with only an average of three per cent believing it
4
5 capable and willing to address their concerns.
6
7
8
9

10
11 Table 2 about here
12
13
14
15
16

17 The average figures skew some variations in trust in each institution by policy area that are also
18 noteworthy. While the national government is typically the most trusted institution, for example,
19 fewer than one in ten trust it to address concerns relating to housing or transport, while one in
20 three trust it to protect the national territory. Almost a third trust the municipal authorities to deal
21 with housing, making them the most trusted institution in this area, while 29 per cent trust the
22 regional authorities to address transport issues. Despite its very low average levels of trust, one
23 in ten respondents trusted the EU most to address concerns relating to immigration and the
24 environment. These variations by policy area suggest respondents' faith in the capacity and
25 willingness of institutions to deal with policy concerns is conditioned by their perception of it
26 actually having the responsibility to do so; in other words, not only is political trust shaped by
27 the perceived competence of an institution to achieve a policy goal (as Grimmelikhuijsen (2012)
28 claims), but also by its perceived responsibility for achieving that goal in the first place. Trust in
29 the national government, for example, is lowest with regards to housing and transport, issues
30 over which the national government is perceived to have a limited influence. The institutions
31 with the greatest influence over these issues – the municipal and regional authorities respectively
32 – are the most trusted to deal with them. Support for the intermediary levels of sub-national
33 government (13 regions and 96 departments) is sector and place specific, but provides a very thin
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 form of legitimisation. The very low levels of trust in the EU (except in relation to immigration
4 and the environment), confirm in some respects Schmidt's (2006) dissociation between the
5 national (politics without policy) and the EU (policy without politics) levels. If the national level
6 is confronted with intense demands it cannot fulfil, the EU level ensures a key role in public
7 policy regulation and elaboration which is barely acknowledged in public opinion. Such a
8 politics-policy gap endears neither the central government, nor the EU. With echoes of Hibbing
9 and Theiss-Morse's (2001, 145) 'policy gap', trust appears undermined by the perceived lack of
10 transparency and the difficulty in understanding complex relationships and patterns of service
11 delivery.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 Table 3 reports the results of the Mokken Scale Analysis, exploring the relationship between
28 expressions of trust in institutions in relation to policy areas in more detail. The table reports the
29 'scales' identified in the analysis that were shown to represent a common latent trait, as well as
30 two Loevinger's H-coefficients. The scales are identified as clusters of variables for which
31 variance is sufficiently related that it is the result of a common cause; we deduce that these
32 variables are potentially measuring a common characteristic. The h-coefficients for each
33 individual variable show the strength of association between it and the others in that scale; the
34 higher the coefficient, the stronger the association, with a minimum threshold of 0.3 being
35 considered sufficient in the literature to conclude that the variables are measuring the same latent
36 trait (Van Schuur 2003; Van der Eijk and Rose 2015). The scale h-coefficient shows the overall
37 strength of association between all of the variables in that scale.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Table 3 around here

The analysis showed the measures of political trust can be linked in representing a common latent trait based around trust in a particular political institution (with one important exception considered below). The indicators are structured primarily by institution: in the language of MSA, an expression of trust in one institution to handle a particular policy area is often accompanied by an expression of trust in it to handle another policy area, indicating a commonality in the measures in representing a more general trust in that institution. The survey also uncovers evidence, however, that trust is strongly constrained by the perceived responsibilities and competencies of institutions. This observation leads us to ask the question: is trust a function of logics of appropriateness in relation to specific levels of institution? The affirmative answer to this question can be deduced from Table 2, which presented data relating to trust in institutions to handle specific policy areas and from Table 4, which presents the results of the logistic regression analysis. The data illustrates that French citizens are highly variable in terms of which institution they trust to handle their policy affairs, and that a substantial proportion have no faith in any institution to do so. Two broad logics account for the variable observed trust in institutions that we label as generic institutionalism and function-specific trust.

We label as generic institutionalism the phenomenon whereby one level of government is vested with a general purpose legitimacy, over and above instrumental considerations of policy specialisation. Thus framed, there are two ways of understanding generic institutionalism:

1
2
3 proximity (closeness of the inhabitants of a territory) and policy pertinence (appropriate action of
4
5 public authorities).
6
7
8
9

10
11 Proximity ('feeling close to') is the most visible manifestation of public authority: we label this
12
13 dimension as proximity trust. In the case of proximity, the municipal government emerges as the
14
15 reference point: proximity trust describes well the functioning of communes, as evidenced by
16
17 the high rate of re-election of sitting mayors and the high levels of trust in localized institutions
18
19 that are perceived as being close to local people. The principle of general purpose local
20
21 authorities is part of the underlying fabric of the French model of territorial administration and
22
23 explains why French local authorities are loosely bounded with overlapping responsibilities. The
24
25 general competency clause (*compétence générale d'administration*) confers the power to develop
26
27 policies on any matters in the general interest of the local authority, whether or not these
28
29 competencies are formally recognised. Since the 2015 NOTRE law, only the communes are
30
31 granted this right. The municipal government comes closest to achieving such a generic level of
32
33 proximity trust, but is less and less central in terms of policy delivery. Communes have gradually
34
35 lost competencies to 2000 or so inter-communal public corporations (EPCI) now covering
36
37 virtually all of the country. There is a gap between micro -level trust and a lack of meso-level
38
39 policy transparency, with the EPCI delivering urban public policy in the absence of direct
40
41 democratic elections, a form of politics without policy at the local government level (Desage and
42
43 Guéranger, 2016). Communes are trusted, but they represent more than ever a symbolic presence
44
45 in France's countryside and small town landscape and are far less autonomous than even a
46
47 decade ago. The new commune only marginally affects this conclusion (Pasquier, 2017).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 As far as broad-based policy pertinence is concerned, trust is vested above all in the central
4 government. In Table 2, the national government is perceived to be responsible, in some way, for
5 virtually all of the policy items proposed. It benefits from a generic credibility that is not
6 available to other, more task specific levels of government. Trusting the national government to
7 best handle immigration, the national economy and the national territory, for example, are all
8 expressions of an underlying generalized policy trust in the national government. Measures of
9 trust in the national government are not strongly associated, however, with measures of trust in
10 the other political institutions as well (as single-item survey questions would imply).
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 Generic institutionalism contrasts with a form of ‘function-specific institutional trust’, in which
26 faith in the capacity of institutions to address policy concerns is limited to the perceived
27 functions of that institution. Function-specific institutional trust in the 96 departmental councils,
28 for example, is expressed in the fields of transport, growth, immigration and the environment – a
29 more limited range of policy areas that relate to the responsibilities and capacities of the
30 departments. The departmental councils have evolved into agencies of the local welfare State,
31 with minimal formal policy autonomy (though variable capacity, according to local
32 configurations). In the case of the departments, losing the status as general purpose local
33 authorities in the 2015 local government reform (known as the NOTRe law) was a bitter blow,
34 far more so than for the regional councils, traditionally apt at framing their role in terms of
35 strategic management and planning (Frinault, 2017). Likewise, the regions are trusted mainly in
36 areas of their recognized competence, particularly that of economic development. The 2015
37 NOTRe law strengthened the regions in important respects (in their de facto role of coordination
38 of territorial planning and economic development), though our survey above all demonstrated
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 that the method retained for merging the 22 regions into 13 was widely contested by political
4
5 elites and public opinion.
6
7
8
9

10
11 The paradox is evident between the crisis of state capacity in most of the policy fields mentioned
12
13 above (abundantly commented in the academic literature), and the perception that the State
14
15 retains the core distributive, redistributive and regulatory powers. These findings are illustrative
16
17 of the continuing pertinence of the State in France and of national power as an overarching
18
19 intellectual frame within which politics is debated (Cole, 2008). Of the other levels of
20
21 government, the commune comes closest to achieving such a generic level of trust, which
22
23 extends beyond narrowly defined competencies, and reflects the practice of the general
24
25 administrative competency of French communes.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 The analysis also reveals an exception. Scale one in Table 3 consisted of indicators of having no
34
35 trust in any institution to handle the twelve policy areas, and the relationship between those
36
37 indicators was stronger than for all the other scales identified. This shows that indications of no
38
39 trust are themselves related in representing a common trait. We identify this as a generalized
40
41 tendency not to trust any political institution. This is not a direct inverse of trusting an institution
42
43 as outlined above, as it is not shaped by the perceived responsibilities of those institutions, but
44
45 instead represents a generalized rejection of the trustworthiness of any of the institutions'
46
47 capacity to be competent, benevolent or honest in their management of state affairs. This scale
48
49 represents, therefore, a generalized political mistrust; essentially a form of political alienation in
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 which respondents perceive that political institutions have neither the willingness nor capability
4 to look after their interests (Dogan, 2005; Hardin, 2004; Southwell 2012; Fox 2015).
5
6
7
8
9

10 11 *Correlates of Function-Specific Institutional trust* 12 13

14
15
16
17 Having identified manifestations of function-specific trust, our next concern is with the
18 relationship between individual characteristics typically associated with political trust in the
19 literature – such as age, gender, education, socio-economic status or political ideology – and
20 these expressions. The clusters of variables identified in the scales in Table 3 were merged into
21 composite variables representing trust in the national government, the municipal authorities,
22 regional authorities, the departments and the EU respectively. A variable was also created to
23 represent institutional mistrust. This resulted in seven new variables measuring function-specific
24 trust in each institution: trust in the national government and municipal authorities was measured
25 on a scale from 0 (meaning no trust at all) to 12 (meaning considerable trust across all policy
26 areas); trust in the departmental authorities was measured on a scale from 0 (no trust) to 6
27 (considerable trust); trust in the regional authorities was measured on a scale from 0 (no trust) to
28 10 (considerable trust), and trust in the EU was measured on a scale from 0 (no trust) to 7
29 (considerable trust). The differences in the scales reflect the differences in the range of policy
30 areas related to function-specific trust in each institution; the national government scale is
31 measured on a scale from 0 to 12 because trust was found to be represented by measures of all 12
32 policy areas in the survey; the departments, in contrast, are measured on a scale from 0 to 6
33 because trust was only represented by 6 of the policy areas covered by the survey. The
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 differences in ranges is not indicative of differences in the maximum level of trust an individual
4
5 can feel for a particular institution (in all cases, the maximum score means the highest level of
6
7 trust); the only consequences is that the larger scales allow for more variation.
8
9

10
11
12
13 Regression analyses were used to identify the key predictors of function-specific trust in each
14
15 institution. The predictors represented the influence of demography (age, gender, social class,
16
17 education and having children), party, political ideology and locality. Table 4 presents the
18
19 results of these analyses.
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 --- Table 4 around here ---
27
28
29
30
31

32 The analyses reveal several important findings about the drivers of trust in government
33
34 institutions. Existing accounts identify some relationship (albeit weak) between demographics
35
36 and trust; for Rouban (2016), distrust is linked to the level of education, socioeconomic status,
37
38 age, and political affiliation. The highly educated, the wealthy, the elderly, and supporters of
39
40 moderate parties are more trusting than other groups, though “trust” in politics has been
41
42 declining in all categories. Our survey also suggests that demography has a significant impact of
43
44 some sort on trust in all of the institutions, but the nature of the effect varies. Older people trust
45
46 departments and regional authorities more than those under 45, though age has no effect on trust
47
48 in the national government or city/communal authorities. On the other hand, youth is associated
49
50 with higher trust in the European Union, which corresponds to the established finding that young
51
52 people are typically associated with lower levels of Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005;
53
54
55
56
57

1
2
3 Gabel 1998; Fox and Pearce 2017). Our main finding is that some characteristics are statistically
4 significant predictors of trust in one institution, but not another. Women, for example, are
5 typically less trusting of the national government and the EU than men once all of the other
6 factors in the model have been controlled for. Gender has no effect, however, on trust in any of
7 the other institutions. Education also has a modest impact; the one significant effect from
8 education is that those with a degree are typically more trusting of the government. Social class,
9 perhaps surprisingly, has no significant effect on function-specific institutional trust.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 The key analytical point is that institutional logics matter more than demographics. This point is
24 illustrated by comparing the r-squared statistics of the regression models. These figures show the
25 proportion of variance in trust explained by the independent variables in the model. The most
26 successful model is that for trust in the national government, which shows that demography,
27 region and political ideology account for almost fifteen per cent of variance; these same traits
28 explain less than three per cent of variance in trust in the departments, however, and less than
29 two per cent in the municipal authorities. The characteristics that affect function-specific trust in
30 institutions, therefore, vary substantially. Contrary to assumptions in much existing literature, it
31 is not possible identify a particular social group as being more or less trusting than others in all
32 governmental institutions. Instead, trust needs to be examined both within the context of a
33 specific institution, and within the remit of the primary responsibilities of that institution.

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 Locality is also shown to be an influential trait, having a significant effect on political trust in the
53 national government, regional authorities, and the departments. On average, people living in

1
2
3 Paris are the most trusting of the national government, followed by those living in the South
4 East, and then the North West². Those living in the North East and South West are the least
5 trusting. The relationship is almost reversed for regional authorities: those living in Paris and the
6 South East are the least trusting. Those in the South West are rather more trusting, with no
7 significant difference between them and people living in the North East or North West. Finally,
8 those living in Paris stand out for being more trusting of central government and less trusting of
9 the local and regional authorities. As central government itself is based in Paris, this likely makes
10 Parisians more confident that the central government understands and reflects their concerns than
11 those elsewhere. It may also explain their relative lack of trust in decentralised institutions, most
12 of which are established to represent a particular local or regional interest in competition with
13 Paris for resources (Prat, 2016). However, the effect of locality on political trust varies
14 considerably by institution, and the influence of place-specific factors on political trust overall is
15 limited.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37 The one set of characteristics that consistently prove to be very influential are those relating to
38 political ideology and party identification, which suggests (perhaps unsurprisingly) that function-
39 specific institutional trust is more a function of political concerns than sociological
40 characteristics. These are significantly related to trust in every institution examined, often with
41 substantial effects. Typically, those who identify positively with political parties are more
42 trusting than those who do not – with the exception of those who identify with the Front National

50
51 ² The analysis takes You Gov's proprietary panel - which divides France into Paris and its regions, the South-East,
52 the South-West, the North East and the North West - as the basis for analyzing locality effects, though these labels
53 do not refer to the actual names of the 13 French regions. The objective is to identify broad territoriality effects.
54
55
56
57

1
2
3 and those with no party identification. The FN bases its support on hostility towards and
4
5 criticism of the political elite that dominate most political institutions, and particularly cites
6
7 failures in policy areas such as employment, immigration and European integration as evidence
8
9 of the abandoning by the political elite of many French citizens (Crépon et. al., 2015). The
10
11 logical corollary is that FN identifiers are likely to be among the least trusting of the willingness
12
13 and capability of political institutions to address their concerns.
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21 An interesting question is also raised by the fact that those with no party identification
22
23 consistently have less trust in government, and are far more likely not to trust any institution than
24
25 identifiers of any political party except for the Front National. While the causal relationship
26
27 remains unclear (does not identifying with a party make someone less trusting, or are they less
28
29 trusting because they do not identify with a political party?), this suggests that not identifying
30
31 with a political party is indicative the political alienation mentioned above in France, reflecting
32
33 the dissatisfaction of individuals with the political options available to them. The result of 2017
34
35 presidential election campaign (won by the centrist Macron who defeated the FN's Le Pen, with
36
37 neither the Socialists nor the Republicans reaching the run-of) revealed the depth of anti-party
38
39 sentiments in the French electorate, and may have been related to this finding, as people who had
40
41 lost faith in the capacity of the mainstream parties (that typically control the political institutions
42
43 studied in this survey) to address their concerns turned to the alternative presented by Macron.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52 Finally, political ideology also plays an important role in shaping political trust, independently of
53
54 the effect of identifying with a particular party. The effect is variable across institutions, and
55
56
57

1
2
3 does not suggest a consistent pattern in which right or left is associated with more or less trust in
4 particular government bodies. Typically, those who are more right wing tend to be less trusting
5 of central government than centrists or left wingers. One notable stand out group is those who
6 identify themselves as ‘very left wing’; this group is significantly less likely to trust any political
7 institution than other left-wingers, and is particularly distrustful of regional authorities. Given
8 that party affiliation has been controlled for when estimating this effect, this suggests that there is
9 a distinct effect associated with being ‘very left wing’ independent of one’s support for or
10 opposition to a particular political party that promotes a particularly distrustful view of France’s
11 political institutions. In the context of France, this finding elucidates the success of the France
12 Unbounded candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the 2017 French presidential election, surfing the
13 wave of anti-partyism and on the theme of *dégagisme*³.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 **Conclusion**

33
34
35
36
37
38 While many French citizens still trust their political institutions and government, French
39 democracy is hardly a perfect example of a satisfied citizenry. Around four in every ten citizens
40 do not feel that any of their governmental institutions can be trusted to best manage the policy
41 issues that matter to them, with trust in the departments and the European Union particularly
42 low. This was found to be barely influenced by place or demography, and more significantly
43 affected by political ideology and identification, with supporters of the Front National or of no
44 party at all the most sceptical and alienated.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55
56 ³ Melenchon polled almost 20%. Literally, *dégagisme* signifies removing existing elites and banishing them forever.
57

1
2
3
4
5
6 Further research is undoubtedly required to explore the factors which drive political trust within
7
8 different levels of governance. There appeared to be no clear structuring role for heavy socio-
9
10 demographic variables. Variation occurred more at the level of particular institutions than
11
12 according to social class, gender, age or place (though there were certainly some important
13
14 effects). Rather more evidence was found to support the proposition that party and ideology
15
16 perform an important filtering role. Parties matter; the evidence from this survey suggests that
17
18 the weakening of party identification has negative spillover effects for trust in democracy as a
19
20 whole.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 In our survey, general levels of trust were highest in the national government and municipal
29
30 authorities but notably lower for departments, regions and the EU. These mixed results suggest
31
32 that the 'closeness' of government may play some role but its relationship to political trust may
33
34 be modest or at best complex. Indeed, when individual policy areas are considered, the levels of
35
36 government with relatively low levels of general political trust, notably the EU and the
37
38 departments, receive greater levels of trust in those areas in which they have key responsibilities.
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 The most pertinent explanation would appear to be a revised institutional one: trust is accorded
46
47 to those institutions able to embody a comprehensive institutional order. The use of Mokken
48
49 Scale Analysis allowed us to demonstrate that the national government is the most generically
50
51 trusted institution: it is perceived to be responsible, in some way, for virtually all of the policy
52
53 items proposed, hence benefits from a generic trust that is not available to other, more task
54
55
56
57

1
2
3 specific levels of government. In this adaptation of new institutionalist thinking, the type of
4 institution matters and distinct logics of institutional orders matter (Powell, 2007). In the case of
5 France, economic crisis, the distrust of politicians and a general misunderstanding of the past
6 decade of territorial reforms have increased mistrust in all political institutions. Insofar as
7 institutional trust is retained, however, a form of social protection and policy competency is
8 accorded to the national government, comforted by the proximity provided by municipal
9 administrations, leaving the intermediary authorities (the 13 regional and 96 departmental
10 councils) as the depositories of thin, more specialized legitimacies – and the EU largely ignored.
11 The French government can take some comfort from the fact that it is the main depository of the
12 citizen's residual trust. It ought to be a source of concern for the French political elite, however,
13 that more than one in three of their citizens feel that public authorities cannot be trusted, at any
14 level of government, to handle key policy areas relating to the economy and immigration.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34 The You Gov survey suggests several areas for future study. The regression analyses show that
35 political trust is highly variable depending on the institutional context; the survey suggests that it
36 is not sensible to talk of generalised political trust in all governmental institutions, but that trust
37 has to be broken down and analysed on an institution by institution basis. Are these findings
38 generalizable to other comparable democracies, in particular those responding to Hooghe and
39 Marks' multi-level governance type 1? Does state type (federal, union, unitary) determine, or at
40 least strongly influence underpinning logics of institutional trust? The line of enquiry is worthy
41 of further research. In terms of methods, the survey is a blunt tool, though it has the advantage of
42 allowing a representative sample of a whole population to be studied, in this case the French
43 electorate, and for sub-groups within that population to be compared. The project on which this
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 article is based also integrates a qualitative dimension in ongoing fieldwork, whereby the survey
4
5 is complemented by experimental and ethnographical methods. The main contribution of this
6
7 article is to add a territorial dimension to debates on trust and to address the deficiency in the
8
9 literature, which is dominated by studies of national or supranational trust; further comparative
10
11 analysis is proposed to validate fully the findings.⁴
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 TABLES

36 LIST OF REFERENCES

37
38 American National Election survey (2012) ‘ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and
39
40 Society Study’, Last consulted on 01 February 2018 at:

41
42 http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2010_2012EGSS/2010_2012EGSS.htm
43
44
45
46
47

48 Balme R., Marie J.-L. & Rosenberg O (2003) ‘Les motifs de la confiance (et de la défiance :
49
50 Intérêt, connaissance et conviction dans les formes du raisonnement politique’ *Revue*
51
52 *internationale de politique comparée* 10 (3): 433-461.
53
54

55
56 ⁴ Note detailing the future comparative analysis to be undertaken.
57

1
2
3
4
5 Boy, D. et Chiche, J. (2010), 'Confiances', in Boy, D., Cautres, B. & Sauger, N. (2010),
6
7 *Français des européens comme les autres*, Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 45-71.
8
9

10
11
12
13 Braithwaite, V. & Levi, M. (eds.) (1998) *Trust and Governance* New York: Russell Sage
14
15 Foundation.
16
17

18
19
20
21 Brookover, W.B. & Thomas, S. (1964) 'Self-Concept of Ability and School Achievement',
22
23 *Sociology of Education*, 37 (3): 271 – 278.
24
25

26
27
28
29
30 Campbell, D.E. 2009 'Civic Engagement and Education: An Empirical Test of the Sorting
31
32 Model', *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4): 771-86.
33
34

35
36
37
38 Carter, C. & Pasquier, R. (2010) 'The Europeanization of regions as "spaces for politics": a
39
40 research agenda' *Regional and Federal Studies* 20 (3): 295–314.
41
42

43
44
45
46 Cautrès B. (2017) 'Jusqu'ici tout va bien ? La démocratie de la défiance en année électorale',
47
48 *Baromètre de la confiance politique 8*, Paris : CEVIPOF.
49
50

51
52
53 CEVIPOF (2011) 'La confiance dans tous ses états'. *Les cahiers du Cevipof*, 54, Paris :
54
55 CEVIPOF.
56
57

1
2
3
4
5 CEVIPOF (2014) ‘Le baromètre de la confiance politique 5’. Consulted at :
6 <http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague5/> (Date
7
8
9 accessed: 24 July 2017)

10
11
12 CEVIPOF (2015), Le baromètre de la confiance politique 6. Consulted at:
13 [http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-](http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague5/)
14
15 [1/vague5/](http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague5/) (Date accessed 24 July 2017)

16
17
18 Cheurfa, M. (2017), ‘Les exceptions à la confiance politique’, *Baromètre de la confiance*
19
20
21 *politique* 8, Paris : CEVIPOF. Consulted at : [http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-](http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague8/)
22
23
24 [confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague8/](http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague8/) (Date accessed: 24 July 2017)

25
26
27
28 Chiche, J. & Chanvri, F. (2014), *Confiance en politique ; méthode et analyse*, 8e colloque
29
30
31 francophone sur les sondages, Dijon. Consulted at:
32
33 http://paperssondages14.sfds.asso.fr/submission_58.pdf (Date accessed 29 July, 2017)

34
35
36
37 Citrin, J. and Muste, C. (1999) ‘Trust in government’ In Robinson, J., P. Shaver and L.
38
39
40 Wrightsman (eds.) *Measures of political attitudes*, London: Academic Press, pp. 465–532.

41
42
43
44
45
46 Clarke, H.D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M.C., Whiteley, P. (2004) *Political Choice in Britain*,
47
48
49 Oxford: Oxford University Press

50
51
52
53
54 Cole, A. & John, P. (2001) *Local Governance in England and France* London: Routledge.

1
2
3
4
5
6 Cole, A. (2008) *Governing and Governance in France* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
7
8
9

10
11
12 Cole, A., Harguindéguy, J.-B. Pasquier, R., Stafford I. & de Visscher C. (2015) ‘The States of
13
14 Convergence of Territorial Governance’ *Publius: the Journal of Federalism* 45:2, 297-321.
15
16

17
18
19 Crépon, S., Dézé, A. & Mayer N. (2015) (eds.), *Les faux semblants du Front national.*
20
21 *Sociologie d’un parti politique*, Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.
22
23

24
25
26 Dalton, R.J. (2004) *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political*
27
28 *Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
29
30

31
32
33
34
35
36 Dalton, R.J. (2013) *The Apartisan American*, Thousand Oaks: CQ Press
37
38

39
40
41 Desage, F. and Guéranger, D. (2016) *La Politique confisquée: sociologie des reformes et des*
42
43 *institutions intercommunales*, Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Editions du Croquant.
44
45
46

47
48
49
50 Dogan M. (1999) “Déficit de confiance dans les démocraties avancées – une analyse
51
52 comparative”, VIème congrès de l’A.F.S.P. » Aix-en-Provence, 20 pp.
53
54
55

1
2
3 Dogan, M. (2005) (ed.) *Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians*, Boston : Brill.

4
5
6
7 Entwistle, T.W. Downe, J. Guarneros-Meza V. & S. Martin (2014) ‘The multi-level governance
8 of Wales: layer cake or marble cake?’ *The British Journal of Politics and International*
9
10
11
12 *Relations*, 16, 2, 310-325.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19 European Social Survey (2017) ‘ Questionnaire Round 8 2016/17’, Last consulted at :
20
21 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/methods/ESS8_fieldwork_questionnaire.pdf
22

23
24
25
26 Fisher, J., van Heerde, J. and Tucker, A. (2010) ‘Does on trust judgement fit? Linking theory
27 and empirics’ *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 12(2): 161- 88.

28
29
30
31
32
33 Fox, S. (2015) *Apathy, Alienation and Young People: The Political Engagement of British*
34
35
36 *Millennial*, PhD Thesis: University of Nottingham

37
38
39
40 Fox, S., Pearce, S. (2017) ‘The generational decay of Euroscepticism in the UK and the EU
41 Referendum’, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 28(1): 19-37
42
43
44
45

46
47
48
49 Frinault, T. (2017) *De la décentralisation à la réforme territoriale. Invariances et mutations des*
50
51
52 *institutions locales françaises* Grenoble : unpublished HDR thesis.
53
54
55

1
2
3 Fukuyama, F. (1995) *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* New York: Free
4 Press
5

6
7
8
9
10 Gabel, M. (1998) 'Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories',
11
12 *The Journal of Politics* 60 (2): 333-54.
13

14
15 Grimmelikhuijsen, S.G. (2012) 'Linking transparency, knowledge and citizen trust in
16 government: an experiment' *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 78(1), 50-73.
17
18

19
20
21
22
23 Grimmelikhuijsen, S., Porumbescu, G., Hong, B. and Im, T. (2013) 'The Effect of
24 Transparency on Trust in Government: A Cross-National Comparative Experiment' *Public*
25
26 *Administration Review* 73 (4), 575–586.
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34 Grossman, E. & Sauger N. (2017), *Pourquoi détestons-nous autant nos politiques ?* Paris:
35 Presses de Sciences-Po.
36
37

38
39
40
41 Hardin, R. (2002) *Trust and Trustworthiness* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
42
43

44
45
46 Hardin, R. (2004) (ed.) *Distrust* New York: Russell Foundation.
47
48

49
50
51 Hardin, R. (2006) *Trust* Cambridge: Polity Press.
52
53

1
2
3 Hetherington, M. J. (2005) *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of*
4
5 *American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
6
7

8
9 Hetherington M. J. & Husser J. A. (2012) 'How Trust Matters: The Changing Political
10
11 Relevance of Political Trust' *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2), 312-32.
12
13

14
15 Hibbing, J. R. & Theisse-Morse, E. (2001) 'Process Preferences and American Politics: What
16
17 the People want the Government to Be', *American Political Science Review*, 95 (1): 145-153.
18
19

20
21
22
23 Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. 2005. "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European
24
25 Integration" *European Union Politics* 6 (4): 419-443.
26
27

28
29
30
31 Hooghe, L., & Marks. G. (2001) 'Types of Multi-Level Governance' *European Integration*
32
33 *online Papers* 5 (11): 1-31. Consulted on July 28th, 2017, at: [http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-](http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011a.htm)
34
35 [011a.htm](http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011a.htm)
36
37

38
39
40
41 Kaase M. and Newton K. (1995) *Beliefs in Government* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
42
43
44

45
46 Kaase, M. (1999) 'Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalised political
47
48 participation in Western Europe', *West European Politics* 22 (3), 1-21.
49
50
51

1
2
3 Keele, L. (2007); 'Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government' *American Journal of*
4
5 *Political Science*, 51 (2), pp. 241-254
6
7

8
9
10 Koppenjan, J. and Klijn, E.H. (2004) *Managing Uncertainties in Networks: A Network*
11
12 *Approach to Problem Solving and Decision Making*, London: Routledge.
13
14

15
16 Meijer, E., 't Hart, P. and Worthy, B. (2015) 'Assessing Government Transparency: An
17
18 Interpretive Framework' *Administration & Society*, p.0095399715598341.
19
20

21
22
23
24 Muñoz, J., Torcal, M. and Bonet, E. (2011) 'Institutional trust and multilevel government in the
25
26 European Union: Congruence or compensation?' *European Union Politics* 12 (4), 551–574.
27
28

29
30
31
32 Newton, K. (2007) 'Social and Political Trust' in Dalton, R.J. and Klingemann, H. (eds.) *The*
33
34 *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, Oxford: OUP, 342-361.
35
36

37
38
39
40 Newton, K. and Zmerli, S. (2011) 'Three forms of trust and their association' *European*
41
42 *Political Science Review* 3 (2), 169–200.
43
44

45
46
47
48 Nooteboom, B. (2002) *Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures*
49
50
51 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
52

53
54
55
56 O'Neill, O. (2002) *A Question of Trust* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57

1
2
3 Parker, G., Parker, R. and Towner, T.L. (2014) 'Rethinking the Meaning and Measurement of
4 Political Trust' in Eder, C., Mochmann, I.C. and Quandt, M. (eds.) *Political Trust and*
5
6
7 *Disenchantment with Politics: International Perspectives*, Leiden: Brill, pp. 59–82.
8
9

10
11
12
13 Parrado, S., Van Ryzin, G. G., Bovaird, T., & Löffler, E. (2013). Correlates of co-production:
14
15 Evidence from a Five-Nation Survey of Citizens. *International Public Management Journal*, 16
16
17 (1), 85-112.
18

19
20 Parry, G., Moyser, G., Day, N. (1992) *Political participation and democracy in Britain*,
21
22
23 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24

25
26 Pasquier, R. (2017) 'Une révolution territoriale silencieuse ? Les communes nouvelles entre
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
européanisation et gouvernance territoriale', *Revue française d'administration publique* 2 :162,
239-252.

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Pattie, C., Seyd, P., Whiteley, P. (2004) *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and*
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Piatonni, S. (2010) *The Theory of Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Powell, W.W. (2007) 'The New Institutionalism'. In *The International Encyclopedia of*
Organization Studies Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, pp. 956-8.

Prat, P. (2016) 'The Greater Paris debate. The French State and its capital region', in Cole, A.,
& Payre, R. (eds.), *Cities as Political Objects* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 56-78.

Putnam, R.D. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- 1
2
3 Putnam, R.D. (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*
4
5 New York: Simon & Schuster.
6
7
8 Rouban L. (2016), 'Les seniors au centre de l'élection présidentielle 2017', *Etude n°1, L'enquête*
9
10 *électorale française : comprendre 2017*, Paris : CEVIPOF, pp 1-8. Consulted at :
11 [http://www.youscribe.com/catalogue/documents/actualite-et-debat-de-societe/politique/les-](http://www.youscribe.com/catalogue/documents/actualite-et-debat-de-societe/politique/les-seniors-au-centre-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2017-etude-n-1-2726036)
12 [seniors-au-centre-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2017-etude-n-1-2726036](http://www.youscribe.com/catalogue/documents/actualite-et-debat-de-societe/politique/les-seniors-au-centre-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2017-etude-n-1-2726036) (Date accessed: 29th
13
14
15 July 2017).
16
17
18 Schmidt, V. (2006) *Democracy in Europe* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19
20
21 Seligman, A.B. (1997) *The Problem of Trust* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
22
23
24
25 Seyd, B. (2016) 'How should we measure political trust?' Paper for PSA Annual
26
27 Conference, Brighton, 21-23.
28
29
30 Single, E., Kandel, D. & Faust, R. (1974) 'Patterns of Multiple Drug Use in High School',
31
32 *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*, 15 (4), 344 – 357.
33
34
35 Sintomer, Y., & De Maillard, J. (2007). The limits to local participation and deliberation in the
36
37 French 'politique de la ville'. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (4), 503-529.
38
39
40
41 Stimson J. (2004) *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics* New York,
42
43 Cambridge University Press.
44
45
46 Stimson J., Tiberj V. & Thiébaud C. (2010) 'Le mood, un nouvel instrument au service de
47
48 l'analyse dynamique des opinions : application aux évolutions de la xénophobie en France (1999-
49
50 2009)' *Revue française de science politique* 60 (5), 901-926.
51
52
53
54 Stone C. (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Southwell, P. (2012) 'Political Alienation: Behavioural Implications of Efficacy and Trust in the
4 2008 US Presidential Election', *Review of European Studies*, 4 (2), 71-77.

5
6
7
8 Taber, C. S. & Lodge M. (2006) 'Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political
9 Beliefs' *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (3), pp. 755-769.

10
11
12
13 Tilly, C. (2005) *Trust and Rule* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14
15
16 Uslaner, E.M. (2002) *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, Cambridge: Cambridge University
17 Press.

18
19
20
21 Van Assche, D. & Dierickx, G. (2007) 'The decentralisation of city government and the
22 restoration of political trust', *Local Government Studies*, 33 (1), 25-47.

23
24
25
26 Van de Walle, S., van Roosbroek, S. and Bouckaert, G. (2008) 'Trust in the public sector: is
27 there any evidence for a long-term decline?' *International Review of Administrative Sciences*
28 74(1), 47-64.

29
30
31
32
33
34 Van der Eijk, C. Rose, J. (2015) 'Risky Business: Factor Analysis of Survey Data - Assessing the
35 Probability of Incorrect Dimensionalisation', available at
36
37 <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0118900> [Accessed 24th May
38
39
40
41
42
43 2015]

44 Van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M.N. 2009. *Elections and Voters* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

45
46
47 Van der Meer, T. & Hakhverdian, A. (2017) 'Political Trust as the Evaluation of Process and
48 Performance: A Cross-National Study of 42 European Countries' *Political Studies* 65 (1), 81-
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 102.

1
2
3 Van Schuur, W.H. (2003) 'Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and Parametric
4 Item Response Theory', *Political Analysis*, 11 (1), 139-163.
5
6

7
8
9 Van Schuur, W.H. (2011) *Ordinal Item Response Theory: Mokken Scale Analysis* London: Sage
10 Publications.
11
12

13
14 Warren, M.E. (ed.) (1999) *Democracy and Trust* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15
16

17
18 Whiteley, R., Clarke, H.D., Sanders, D. & Stewart, M.C. (2013), *Affluence, Austerity and*
19 *Electoral Change in Britain* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20
21
22

23
24
25
26 World Values Survey (2014) ' Wave 6 2010-2014 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20150418',
27
28 *World Values Survey Association* (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN
29
30 (last consulted 01 February 2018).
31
32
33

34
35
36
37 Yamaguchi, K. & Kandel, D.B. (1984) 'Patterns of Drug Use from Adolescence to Young
38 Adulthood: II. Sequences of Progression', *American Journal of Public Health*, 74 (7) 668 – 672.
39
40
41

42
43
44
45 Zmerli, S. and Hooghe, M. (2011) 'Introduction: The Context of Political Trust' in Zmerli, S.
46 and Hooghe, M. (eds.) (2011) *Political Trust: Why Context Matters* (Colchester: ECPR), pp.1-
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review Only

Table 1 Local and Regional authorities in France

Type	Number	Functions
Communes	35,416	Varying services, including planning permission, building permits, building and maintenance of primary schools, waste disposal, some welfare services
Voluntary intercommunal syndicates*	11,378	Groups of communes with a single function (SIVU: 7,384); delivering multiple services (SIVOM: 1,085); mixed syndicates (2,794) and others (115).
Tax-raising intercommunal corporations (EPCI). Includes: métropoles (14), urban communities (15); city-wide communities (219) and communities of communes (1,018)	1,267	Permanent organisations in charge of intercommunal services such as firefighting, waste disposal, transport, economic development, some housing, structure plans
Departmental councils	101	Social affairs, some secondary education (<i>collèges</i>), road building and maintenance
Regional councils	18	Economic development, transport, infrastructure, state–region plans, some secondary education (<i>lycées</i>), training
Special statute authorities	5	The Corsican territorial authority has enhanced regulatory powers. The Lyon metropole exercises the functions of the Rhône department on its territory. Martinique and Guyane have special statutes as does the department of Mayotte.

Source: Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales (2017) *Les Chiffres-clés des collectivités locales*, Paris: Interior Ministry, p. 1.

Table Two: Which Institution is Most Trustworthy to Handle Each Policy Issue (%)

	National		Region	Department	European		Don't Know
	Govt	Municipal			Union	None	
Employment	18	8	16	10	2	37	10
Insecurity	24	18	8	7	3	30	10
Social protection	28	9	11	12	2	27	10
Immigration	19	8	7	4	11	41	11
Debt	24	9	8	5	5	39	11
Tax	21	13	8	6	2	39	10
Environment	11	17	19	11	10	23	9
Growth	19	8	15	7	5	34	11
Education	22	13	14	11	2	28	9
Housing	8	28	15	15	2	24	9
Transport	6	20	29	19	2	17	8
National territory	34	6	12	6	4	27	13
Average	20	13	14	9	3	30	10

Source: YouGov. Data weighted using YouGov sample weight

Table Three: Mokken Scale Analysis of Trust Measures

Scale 1: No Institution			Scale 4: Region Authority		
Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef	Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef
Insecurity	0.68	0.70	Growth	0.31	0.33
Education	0.68		Employment	0.32	
Immigration	0.70		Education	0.31	
Social protection	0.68		Insecurity	0.33	
Employment	0.71		Debt	0.34	
Environment	0.70		Environment	0.34	
National territory	0.69		Tax	0.33	
Debt	0.71		Immigration	0.36	
Growth	0.70		Transport	0.33	
Housing	0.70		Housing	0.31	
Transport	0.77				
Tax	0.69				
Scale 2: National Govt			Scale 5: Department		
Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef	Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef
Insecurity	0.46	0.51	Transport	0.31	0.33
Immigration	0.49		Growth	0.32	
Transport	0.46		Immigration	0.32	
Education	0.50		Environment	0.34	
Social protection	0.52		Debt	0.34	
Housing	0.49				
Tax	0.51		Scale 6: EU (Broad)		
Employment	0.51		Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef
Debt	0.54		Transport	0.30	0.34
Growth	0.51		Environment	0.35	
National territory	0.58		Employment	0.32	
Environment	0.51		Growth	0.35	
			Tax	0.32	
Scale 3: Municipal Authority			Immigration	0.38	
Variable	H-Coef	Scale H-Coef	Insecurity	0.34	
Tax	0.38	0.43			
Insecurity	0.41				
Debt	0.43				
Immigration	0.43				
Environment	0.42				
Social protection	0.42				
Transport	0.41				
National territory	0.46				
Education	0.42				
Growth	0.43				
Housing	0.50				
Employment	0.44				

Source: YouGov. Obs = 3003. Further details of Mokken Scale Analysis available from authors on request.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review Only

Table Four (a): Regression Analysis Results

	Government		Municipal		Region	
	Coef	S Er	Coef	S Er	Coef	S Er
Age group (55+)						
45-54	-0.06	0.18	0.16	0.15	-0.18	0.11
35-44	0.06	0.21	0.16	0.19	-0.29*	0.11
25-34	0.09	0.20	-0.03	0.15	-0.32‡	0.11
18-24	0.34	0.20	0.29	0.15	-0.27*	0.12
Gender (Female)	-0.65‡	0.11	0.03	0.09	-0.03	0.07
Social class (Inactive)						
CSP-	-0.22	0.15	0.15	0.13	-0.03	0.10
CSP+	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.13	-0.14	0.09
Education (Non-bacc)						
Bacc or equivalent	0.19	0.13	-0.21	0.12	0.09	0.09
Advanced studies	0.55‡	0.14	-0.21	0.13	0.10	0.09
Children under 18	0.17	0.14	0.03	0.13	0.01	0.09
Region (North East)						
North West	0.18	0.15	-0.11	0.13	-0.10	0.11
Paris	0.50†	0.17	0.05	0.16	-0.28†	0.11
South East	0.31*	0.15	0.05	0.13	-0.33‡	0.10
South West	-0.06	0.19	0.14	0.18	-0.22	0.13
Party ID (None)						
Socialists	2.26‡	0.21	0.27	0.19	0.60‡	0.13
Republicans	1.04‡	0.21	0.42*	0.19	0.59‡	0.15
Front Nationale	0.21	0.17	0.04	0.18	-0.03	0.13
Melenchon's Left Party	1.02‡	0.27	0.08	0.25	0.54†	0.18
Ecology Party/Greens	1.09‡	0.31	0.41	0.32	0.66‡	0.21
MDM	0.98‡	0.28	-0.10	0.22	1.15‡	0.24
Ideology (Centrist)						
Very left wing	-0.31	0.32	0.09	0.32	-0.73‡	0.15
1 (left wing)	0.16	0.37	-0.05	0.32	0.08	0.25
2 (left wing)	0.53	0.28	-0.33	0.22	-0.11	0.17
3 (left wing)	0.52*	0.25	-0.50*	0.20	0.24	0.16
4 (left wing)	0.24	0.25	0.04	0.23	0.10	0.15
6 (right wing)	0.37	0.26	-0.18	0.20	0.39*	0.16
7 (right wing)	-0.44*	0.22	-0.20	0.20	0.33*	0.17
8 (right wing)	-0.18	0.23	-0.08	0.21	0.36*	0.17
9 (right wing)	-0.75†	0.28	0.09	0.24	0.46*	0.20
Very right wing	-0.64†	0.22	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.17
Constant	1.52‡	0.21	1.50‡	0.18	1.33‡	0.14
R2	0.15		0.02		0.08	

Source: YouGov, OLS regression analysis. DK and 'other' responses for party ID and ideology included in model but not reported. * - coefficient statistically significant at 95% confidence; † - 99%; ‡ - 99.9%

Table Four (b): Regression Analysis Results

	Department		EU		None	
	Coef	S Er	Coef	Std Er	Coef	Std Er
Age group (55+)						
45-54	-0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.25
35-44	-0.14†	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.13	0.28
25-34	-0.10	0.06	0.21‡	0.06	-0.67*	0.27
18-24	-0.11*	0.05	0.35‡	0.06	-1.03‡	0.26
Gender (Female)	0.02	0.03	-0.08†	0.03	0.23	0.15
Social class (Inactive)						
CSP-	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.05	0.22
CSP+	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.23	0.22
Education (Non-bacc)						
Bacc or equivalent	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.14	0.20
Advanced studies	-0.02	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.20
Children under 18	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.24	0.20
Region (North East)						
North West	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.16	0.23
Paris	-0.10*	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.23
South East	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	-0.07	0.22
South West	0.00	0.06	-0.07	0.05	0.00	0.28
Party ID (None)						
Socialists	0.16*	0.07	0.20‡	0.06	-3.33‡	0.26
Republicans	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.06	-1.92‡	0.30
Front National	0.02	0.06	-0.04	0.05	0.08	0.31
Melenchon's Left Party	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.08	-1.45‡	0.39
Ecology Party/Greens	0.15	0.09	0.25†	0.09	-2.19‡	0.43
MDM	0.09	0.08	0.24*	0.11	-2.10‡	0.38
Ideology (Centrist)						
Very left wing	-0.11	0.08	-0.18†	0.07	1.00*	0.49
1 (left wing)	0.10	0.11	-0.06	0.09	-0.53	0.42
2 (left wing)	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.08	-0.57	0.35
3 (left wing)	-0.07	0.08	0.00	0.07	-0.22	0.32
4 (left wing)	0.11	0.08	-0.01	0.08	-0.71*	0.30
6 (right wing)	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.08	-0.91†	0.32
7 (right wing)	0.04	0.07	-0.01	0.07	-0.53	0.32
8 (right wing)	0.10	0.07	-0.02	0.07	-0.33	0.32
9 (right wing)	0.31‡	0.09	-0.06	0.07	-0.24	0.41
Very right wing	0.06	0.07	-0.11	0.06	0.58	0.36
Constant	0.40‡	0.06	0.21‡	0.05	5.23‡	0.32
R2	0.03		0.06		0.13	

Source: YouGov, OLS regression analysis. DK and 'other' responses for party ID and ideology included in model but not reported. * - coefficient statistically significant at 95% confidence; † - 99%; ‡ - 99.9%