Devolution, Nation-Building and Development Assistance:

A Case Study of the Welsh Government's Wales for Africa Programme

Kathleen Mulready

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Geography and Planning

Cardiff University

2017

Abstract

This study explores Wales for Africa, the Welsh Government's international development programme. It particularly considers the issues of political decentralisation, and participation in development assistance, on the making of national identity in contemporary Wales. Using a case study methodology, and a conceptual framework of the sub-state *and* the citizen as development actor, it explores how notions of Welsh subjectivity are tied to iterations of national identity and civic value, constructed around the concept of sustainable development, and ideas of mutual benefit and reciprocity in international development. It focuses specifically on community-based development organisations linked with partner organisations in sub-Saharan Africa.

Although the potential benefits of citizen-led development initiatives to right-based approaches are recognised, little attention has previously been paid to the role of international development to sub-state nation-building. The study seeks to address this gap. Situated within the field of interpretive policy analysis, the thesis adopts a context sensitive approach focussed on how a political narrative around nationhood and civic value has been constructed around Wales' development activities as a symbol of an alternative nation. Beginning with political devolution, the timeframe of the study ends at October 2016. The research involved extensive documentary analysis of policy related material, participant observation at policy and international events, the analysis of semi-structured interviews with interviewees from the public and third sector, and from participants in community-based development organisations. Data from focus groups and participant observation at a development project in Uganda was also scrutinised. By approaching both the sub-state and the citizen as development actors, the study brings together the professional knowledge of policy-makers together with the experience of citizens.

The study provides a number of original contributions to knowledge. This is achieved by presenting an interpretive analysis of policy dynamics in a context where attention is largely absent in academic literature. The research also provides a broader contribution to understandings of the policy-making process by presenting an innovative explanation of how representation and interpretation may shape the design and consequences of policy.

Abstract

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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Alison Brown, whose continuous guidance and positivity has been invaluable. I would also like thank Dr. Justin Spinney for his advice and encouragement.

I would also like to thank all the research participants in both Wales and Uganda who kindly gave up their time and shared their knowledge to contribute towards this research.

This thesis was facilitated by a studentship from the Economic and Social Research Council. I thank them for their financial assistance.

Finally, a big thank you to friends and family and in particular to Tom, Christopher and my parents for their enduring support and patience.

Without you all this thesis could not have happened.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Statement of Intent

> "…the question we ought to address is not that of the real "nation" or national identity which lies behind concepts employed in political life, but that of the formation, articulation and propagation of the concepts themselves. Nationalist ideas, myths and definitions have to be deconstructed. This means that we need to treat 'Wales' as it has figured in successive, and rival discourses, and consider the question "How many Wales?" or "How many ways of being Welsh?"" (Day and Suggett 1985, p. 96).

This thesis examines recent attempts at nation-building in Wales within the context of sustainable development and, in particular, the emphasis placed on Wales' role in relation to international development. Drawing on the case of a sub-state region operating in the Western-context, it aims to assess how issues of political decentralisation and citizen participation in development assistance are used in the making of national identity, and to what effect. The author contends: efforts at defining a markedly 'Welsh' version of sustainability, alongside innovations in development, are aimed partly at fostering a national distinctiveness, used to reimagine a new, more inclusive, nation, based upon notions of partnership and reciprocity between communities.

Using a case study methodology that took the Welsh Government's international development programme - *Wales for Africa* - as its specific empirical subject, a qualitative research design was adopted, so as to better understand the configuration of identity through development policy and practice - and the tensions that arise in seeking to make connections between discourses of nationalism and sustainability. As will be explored, the programme connects Wales' development community to a representation of the nation or, as Day and Suggett put it, "ways of being Welsh" (see opening quote), to both discursive and practical effect.

To examine these effects, a conceptual framework was developed to explore the programme through the lens of both the *sub-state* and the *citizen* as development actor and expand on how policy-makers have connected the discourses of sustainable development and nationalism to reimagine the Welsh nation. The analysis examines this tying of Welsh subjectivity to iterations of national identity and civic value, constructed around ideas of mutual benefit and reciprocity in development assistance, which it is argued, has led to the development of a form of sustainability supposedly more attuned to Welsh national values and identity.

First however, this chapter provides some context and introduces key components of the thesis. The specific focus of this thesis is on Wales, which requires some justification. Wales has identity issues, and partly as a reflection of these issues, efforts have been made to recognise its distinctiveness in organisational and constitutional ways. Thus, the following section begins with political devolution in Wales and its re-territorialisation and reconstitution of identities; then, Wales for Africa and the novelty of the National Assembly for Wales' (the Assembly's) legal duty to promote sustainability is outlined. Next, some gaps in existing research are identified, followed by an explicit statement on the research questions and a brief description of the methodological approach adopted in the research to address these. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the thesis' structure.

To note, a purposefully broad interpretation of nationalist and sustainability discourses, as well as of the policy making process, is adopted, for the concern lies with discourses of nation-building as linked with those of sustainable development and, in particular, *international* sustainable development, in their broader political context. Thus, the empirical emphasis is on the interpretive context or social setting of development policy-making in Wales. This stresses the importance of social meanings, reliant upon context, and helps underscore the significance of Wales' biggest constitutional shake-up, the creation of the Assembly in 1999, to the research, which is discussed below.

An overview of the Assembly and the Welsh Government as two distinct organisations is in Annex A.[1]

See Annex B for a map of Wales.

1.2 Devolution and Identity in Wales

A referendum in 1997 gave rise to the Government of Wales Act 1998 which established the National Assembly for Wales. The referendum campaign was not couched significantly in terms of identity politics, but instead, as making government more open and accountable (see for example, WO 1997). Devolution was packaged as facilitating good governance and increased state responsiveness (Laffin and Thomas 2000), as part of wider constitutional reforms in the UK aimed at lessening a perceived democratic deficit (Royles 2007a). Much debate on citizenship at the time pointed to a Britain undergoing rapid social change. This included calls to "rethink the national story" and for the constituent regions to "reimagine themselves" (Runnymede Trust 2000). In reference to Wales' and Scotland's devolved administrations, the Parekh Report, the basis for much UK Government debate (Runnymede Trust 2000, p. 250) stated: "A community of citizens and communities has to be built from the bottom up as well as through government action". However, successive New Labour (1997-2010), Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition (2010-2015) and Conservative (2015 to date) governments have not drawn explicitly upon national identity, but instead approached devolution as an exercise in state modernisation to preserve the socio-economic and political future of the UK (Jones, Macfarlane and Orford 2015, p. 1).

Nevertheless, the interest of this thesis lies with devolution and identity; with how Wales' re-territorialisation as a result of devolved government has reconstituted identities as part of wider societal processes. The opening of this century saw a rapidly changing nation. Wales, as a nation in Europe, had an expanding capital city and ambitions for global renown, a reinvigorated economy, renewed attentiveness to the Welsh language, and a galvanised

[1] The formal separation between the executive and legislative functions of Wales' devolved institutions is outlined in Chapter Three. This thesis consistently utilises 'Welsh Government' or 'government' to refer to the devolved government of Wales.

sense of nationhood. Thus, although the rhetoric driving devolution was seldom articulated in terms of national identity, since the 1997 referendum, the relationship between identity and politics has been brought into sharp relief. Welsh identity "has acquired a different" (Davies 1999) and "far more prominent role" (Wyn Jones 2001, p. 48; see also Williams and De Lima 2006). National identity has a new salience because as Wyn Jones (2001, p. 54) articulates: "institutions matter, as do identities. The combination of a new institution and an old identity taking on new forms is a potent one". The Assembly's creation repositioned citizens in new political arenas and opened-up novel opportunities for democratic engagement (Morgan 2007). This has provided both opportunities and challenges to renegotiate the terms on which Welsh identity is discussed: "to re-imagine Wales in deliberate and conscious ways rather than as a product of drift or uncontested 'common sense'" (Williams 2015, p. 221).

The fostering of a distinctiveness through devolution brings issues of citizenship to the fore. An implication of devolution for civil society is that Welsh citizenship is now a political fact (Housley et al. 2009). The concept of identity is now exposed to devolved processes, with policy decisions now regularly taken, so that under devolution the "imagined community… has become a reality". As a consequence, definitions of identity and participation are now "matters of political scrutiny… redefined in the language of democratic engagement" (Housley et al. 2009, p. 198-199). In fostering a distinctiveness - sparked by a renewed identity politics - 'devolved citizenship', as a frame of subjectivity, is mobilised by policy makers in the construction of citizenship rights (Housley et al. 2009). Used by the government to negotiate policy aspirations, the mechanisms put in place by decentralisation are also supposed to enable Wales' citizens to play a more active role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives, with implications on how people engage with - and make demands on - Wales' institutions of government.

1.3 The Wales for Africa Programme

The Welsh Government's international development programme was officially launched with the publication of *Wales for Africa: A Framework for Government Action on International Sustainable Development* (WAG 2006b). Crucially however, international development is not a devolved competency of the

government. Responsibility instead lies with the central UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID) (PMO 2009).

Nevertheless, with DFID approval Wales for Africa has led Wales' development sector since its inception. Activities are limited to those countries in sub-Saharan Africa where Wales had existing links, with the programme lauded as a beacon for Welsh efforts to help deliver the United Nation's (UNs) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In its first year, the programme's budget was £300,000, which increased incrementally to £860,000 per annum over its first ten years of existence. Although the programme's budget remains limited it has a high profile. Supported actions have included:

- public sector international learning opportunities;
- community and health twinning links;
- teacher placements; and
- promoting Wales as a Fair Trade nation, by supporting fair trade organisations with a global reach.

Specific projects supported have included:

- Fair Trade Wales;
- the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel;
- Wales Africa Community Links (WACL); and
- Wales Africa Health Links.

These projects combined in April 2015 following government consultation, under the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration (see Chapters Six and Seven).

Wales for Africa and Sustainable Development

Although the government does not have the legal powers to undertake international development assistance, its well-being and sustainable development powers are used to justify its actions in the field. Wales is one of the few national or regional jurisdictions in the world with a legal responsibility to promote sustainable development, for the Government of Wales Act 2006 (and before it, the Government of Wales Act 1997) places a legal duty on the National Assembly to "make a scheme setting out how it proposes, in the

exercise of its functions, to promote sustainable development". The definition of sustainable development adopted was the widely accepted international description (Brundtland 1987):

> "Development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (see for example WAG 2002b).

Thus, sustainability is about the overall capacity of a society to sustain itself, both today and in the future (see for example, OECD 2011). The government conceptualises sustainable development as enhancing the environmental, economic and social well-being of people and communities, respecting the limits of the earth's resources whilst also achieving better quality of life for present and future generations in ways that respect equality of opportunity and social justice (WAG 2009). The Government of Wales Act 2006 lays down requirements for the monitoring, reporting and review of the National Assembly's policies, programmes and grant schemes to assist with supporting sustainability. Responsibilities lie mainly with the government.

The legal commitment to sustainable development has been attributed as the stimulus for the development of new governance systems in Wales. Key elements are evident at the different levels of the local, sub-state, state, European and international arenas, which include public, private and voluntary agencies in a multifaceted network of relations. Sustainable development is a central organising principle, and the legal duty is fundamental to understanding how Wales' political community was able undertake development assistance in the first place. By an imaginative interpretation of the duty, used retrospectively to validate calls for a distinct contribution to development assistance, policy makers and development practitioners in Wales have fundamentally associated sustainability with international development outcomes.

Yet despite its ambitions of being a sub-state actor in the field of development, Wales is a small nation of just over 3 million people, has limited resources and under-developed institutions, regional authority and fiscal autonomy (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2008). The Assembly had executive powers until 2007, only gaining the ability to pass primary legislation in all devolved areas in 2011.

But despite the limited resources allocated to the programme, in line with Wyn Jones and Royles (2012), this study argues that Wales for Africa illustrates the government effectively testing the boundaries of its devolved powers and competences.

As a political symbol therefore, Wales for Africa is hugely important. It validates global engagement by crafting local responsibility to a global scale in an attempt to facilitate an identifiably Welsh response to development.

Consequently, the Wales for Africa Framework (WAG 2006b) is a highly significant publication, and an astounding political achievement given the limitations of devolution. It represents the government's first substantial foray into the realm of international development, and is a significant statement of intent, as by just its second term, the Assembly was supporting government articulated policies on development assistance as a legitimate topic of concern; explained by the then First Minister, Rhodri Morgan AM, in the following terms (WAG 2006b, p. 1):

> "In all areas of Wales there are thousands of people in hundreds of groups active in support of international development – from schools twinned with a school in Africa to the big agencies raising millions to support major projects, from children asking their local shop to stock fair trade chocolate to participation in international campaigns to change world trade rules. International development is an issue that the people of Wales care passionately about."

The Welsh version of development therefore makes much of the need evident within sustainability discourses to connect the local and the global. Crucial to Wales' discourses of development assistance, actions undertaken by the government in support of the SDGs must, under the terms of the devolution settlement, also have a benefit to Wales. This principle, whilst imposing limits on the range of activities the government can support, is also marketed as a partnership of equals between communities based upon reciprocity (WAG 2006b).

Wales therefore possesses a set of nationalist discourses associated with, but not limited to, the existence of a devolved state, and also has a prominent emphasis on sustainable development as a central organising principle of Welsh political life. Much has been done by policy-makers to make connections between these discourses, and, in relation to development assistance, activities are part of the government's Sustainable Development Schemes and Action Plans (for example, NAfW 2000). The latest iteration of the sustainable development duty is enshrined in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015. The Act re-affirms sustainable development as lying at the heart of the government's work, and places additional emphasis on public bodies in Wales adhering to the same goals. A key element of the Act is developing a strategic approach to policy making based on seven long-term "well-being goals", accompanied by high level "national indicators" used to measure Wales' progress as a nation (WG 2016a). These indicators can be expressed as a value or characteristic that can be measured quantitatively or qualitatively against the well-being goals, and can be "measurable in relation to Wales or any part of Wales" (WG 2016a). The significance of development assistance to the making of national identity in Wales therefore remains pertinent, because the Act provides the overarching national vision and strategic direction for policy-making in Wales. It reinforces a legal commitment to improving social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being, whist further enabling more local interpretations of the sustainability discourse to emerge in different places (see Whitehead 2007, pp. 187-210).

Alongside these complex spatial imaginations, the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act – as its name suggests - represent an integration of temporal understandings into nationalist and sustainability discourses, in its explicit promotion of the interrelationship between the present and future generations, particularly in relation to resource use and intergenerational justice (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 54).

The emphasis within sustainable development discourses on connecting the different scales of the local and the global, and within nationalist discourses on group identity is explicitly connected within the Act in the context of development assistance under its well-being goal for "A globally responsible Wales". Local and global visions of sustainability are combined in the list of

associated indicators (WG 2016a), including in the last listed of the Act's 46 overall indicators, which specifically references Wales' development partnerships:

> "The social return on investment of Welsh partnerships within Wales and outside of the UK that are working towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals" (WG 2016a).

This inclusion of development partnerships in the well-being framework signifies a long-term political commitment to international development. In addition, whilst there has been no definitive government statement of development policy, what has been made explicit is that (WG 2013):

> "The Wales for Africa programme seeks to encourage the greatest number of people in Wales to have the biggest impact on international development and to raise awareness of international development issues in order to create a nation of global citizens."

Lending on a politics of scale therefore, for the government, it is important that as many citizens as possible participate in development activities; as within the context of sustainable development and, in particular, the emphasis placed on Wales' role in relation to international development and the UN's SDGs, nationalist discourse is being reimagined.

1.4 Identity-Making in Wales

Although Wales' re-imagined national identities within the context set by political devolution is now a focus for social science research, scholars have largely ignored the role played by Wales for Africa in nation-building and identity formation. Not many studies explore the programme. Royles (2010, 2017) and Wyn Jones and Royles (2012) are three exceptions. Both have argued that, for the government, the programme represents a way to build legitimacy and prestige and to reinvigorate a particular notion of Wales. Wales' international activities are associated with a broad political consensus on nation-building aimed at enhancing the devolved administration's governing credentials:

> "…the programme expressed a desire to project a certain vision of Welsh nationhood that stresses internationalism as a core element of the 'radical tradition', itself one of the constitutive myths of Welsh politics" (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012, p. 260).

The government's commitment to citizen participation suggest that this invigoration is more than just a global projection, but also an act of local empowerment.

Taking another angle on Wales' international development policy, Fisher (2012), in her consideration of the Fair Trade Nation as a social category for development, examined Wales' status as the world's first Fair Trade Nation. She has argued that the devolved government's involvement in fair trade networks and the localisation of development action has provided opportunities to incorporate a political community into fair trade networks, in order "to garner legitimacy for sub-state development initiatives". According to Fisher (2012, p. 262):

> "…the politics of nation-building have enabled a field of social action to unfold that incorporates state, business, and civil society actors in performative networks with a global reach".

An in-depth exploration of government development actions other than fair trade however has not been undertaken by analysts. With the exception of Fisher (2012), the literature largely ignores international development action by citizens in Wales, and there have been significant policy developments since. Royles (2017, p. 406) does however call for research to move beyond just looking at governmental structures, to better acknowledge how sub-state civil society networks helped secure a Welsh Government international development programme.

Prior to devolution, there was little evidence on the institutions, networks and relationships that made up Welsh civil society or attempts at systematically evaluating their performance (Day 2006). Within these discussions, the diversity of Wales' civil society coupled with a perception that civil society was not distinctively 'Welsh' are cited as debilitating factors.

Post-devolution, Wyn Jones and Paterson (1999), describe a shift from a civil society in Wales towards a distinctively Welsh civil society, and Rumbul (2013) describes a "re-territorialisation" in light of a developing civic identity. These analysts however also highlight the tensions evident in the process of engaging and fostering civic networks. According to Day (2006, p. 643):

> "Put bluntly, questions are posed as to whether the National Assembly for Wales is answerable to the civil society over which it presides, or whether instead Welsh civil society must answer to the Assembly".

What is certain is that the constitutional restructuring has drawn attention to the complex and contingent impacts of devolution. One impact is that Wales is now a *sub-state actor in the international arena*, and active in development assistance, a policy-field receptive to notions of autonomy and nationhood. Sub-states are government administrations that operate below the state level, moving them beyond a state-centred conceptualisation of international relations (Alexander 2014, p. 70). Much of the development of an international profile by a sub-state is about that government creating space in previously unavailable (Lecours 2002) and crowded (Criekemans 2010) arenas.

Another outcome of these changes has been the *opening up of space for citizens to participate in development assistance*. Wider societal processes at various spatial scales have shifted thinking to the diverse range of social actors and power regimes that now converge beyond the monopoly of the sovereign nation-state. In addition to the power of supra and sub-state authorities, and the increasing influence of business and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), these shifts have created novel opportunities for democratic engagement and civic action (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Gaventa 2002; Gaventa and Mayo 2009).

It is through the participation of the citizen as development actor, active within the network of the Welsh development sector, that the Wales for Africa programme is anchored. Thus, taking the Wales for Africa programme as the subject of the case, this thesis explores both *the sub-state as a development actor*, and *citizen action* itself in an effort to position and theorise the

programme and its effect on Wales' development community - both dimensions that are not widely explored in the literature (see Chapter Two).

1.5 Refining the Scope of the Study

Interpretive Policy Analysis and Wales for Africa

Employing an interpretative approach, a case study methodology was adopted to account for Wales' wider circumstance of a recently devolved nation, with limited self-governance, economically weak, and a peripheral region within Europe. International development was an unintended outcome of devolution (Fisher 2012) and unprecedented because development assistance remains undevolved (Royles 2006). This is what catalysed the study: Why did the government pursue policies on international development?

An emphasis on policy-making processes put the focus on an interpretative approach and, as outlined in Chapter Three, the study adopts the broad methodology of Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA), described by Schwarz-Shea and Yanow (2012, p. 27) to develop as follows:

> "[IPA] begins with a puzzle, a surprise or a tension, and then seeks to explicate it by identifying the conditions that would make that puzzle less perplexing and more of a 'norma;' or 'natural' event…"

IPA tends to start with a broader topic, rather than a rigid hypothesis for testing, pursued because of a perceived policy puzzle meriting further exploration, and for which existing analysis appears insufficient. Within IPA there must be a balance - an "ongoing dialogue between theory and the empirical world" (Wagenaar 2011, p.10). This commitment helped ground the research, for within literatures, defining policy-making has proved problematic: "For a term so commonly taken for granted, 'policy' is a remarkably slippery one" (IDS 2006, p. 3), with assumptions that policy-making is a rational-linear process (Hill 2009) challenged by those who instead argue that "the whole life of policy is a chaos of purposes and accidents" (Clay and Schaffer 1984, p. 192).

Defining evidence is similarly a politically loaded discussion (Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007). Yet by following an interpretive approach, policy is understood to formulate representations, IPA interprets those representations, and in doing so, is explicitly grounded in the particular contexts of policy-making. Thus, the emphasis within the author's ongoing dialogue between the empirical analysis and theory was on the assumptions and practices of policy, because interpretive approaches hold that it is through sense or meaning-making processes that representations of reality are constructed. According to Inglis and Thorpe (2012, p. 117):

> "The meaning of things is neither natural nor inevitable, but instead is socio-culturally specific. Meaning is a social product precisely because by acting in certain ways, individuals demonstrate their commitment to classifying a situation along particular lines."

Thus, meaning-making requires the researcher to involve themselves in the thoughts and learning of the everyday (Fischer 2003), for the reality constituted and addressed by a policy cannot be understood through a familiarity with 'facts' alone. Instead, as Innes (1990, p. 232) puts it: "knowledge is about whole phenomenon rather than simply about relationships among selected variables or facts in isolation from their contexts". The narrative form of the policy story is the main way of giving meaning to complex social phenomena, for it is "the device that situates the empirical data in the phenomenon as a whole" (Fischer 2003, p. 222). A focus in the research therefore was on identifying those policy relevant elements which conveying the meaning of the Wales for Africa story, what those meanings were, and how this is being communicated, whilst recognising that through her interpretations, the author is part of the meaning-making process (perhaps clearest in the participant observation phase of the research (see Chapter Three)).

In summation on meaning-making, the use of IPA was an explicit acknowledgement that the researcher is part of the interaction being studied. It reflected an awareness that the author's experiences shaped and filtered the scope and subject of this study, helping to emphasise issues of positionality, and aiding her mitigate against its effects; for example, in relation to the author's involvement in writing a positive story of Wales for Africa for the First

Minister, discussed below, and in the process of co-production that characterised elements of the research design (see Chapter Four).

Rationalising a focus on Wales' Community Links

To recap, this research explores how political narratives around nationhood and civic value have built up around Welsh Government international development activities as "a powerful symbol of an (alternative) nation" (Fisher 2012, p. 257). From the initial policy puzzle, which established Wales for Africa as the subject of analysis, the author further refined the study, to a focus on Wales' community-based development organisations linked with partner organisations in Africa. The rationale included that:

- these initiatives are citizen-led;
- tie the local to the global in a multi-layered concept of development assistance based upon reciprocal partnership;
- characterise key aspects of the development sector in Wales; and
- are promoted by policy makers as a distinctively 'Welsh approach' towards sustainable international development (for example, WG 2016b).

An Original Contribution to Knowledge

In order to address the absence of research on Wales for Africa activities, and specifically, on Wales' community links, an in-depth study is a valuable addition to the discussion. Wales for Africa celebrated its 10-year anniversary in late 2016 and there has been no in-depth evaluation on its workings. Little has been said about the contribution of community links towards Welsh development policy and practice, either theoretically or empirically, or the programme's involvement in iterations of national identity and civic value. Whilst the Wales for Africa promotes an enlargement of the public sphere within which devolved citizenship is developed and practiced, this study identified little empirical analysis on the impact of community-linking to either the *sub-state* or the *citizen as development actor*.

This thesis **addresses these gaps**. It provides an original contribution to knowledge by exploring government involvement in international development, with the aim of assessing issues of political decentralisation and citizen participation in development assistance to

the making of national identity, through the empirical subject of Wales for Africa.

The Research Questions

The study addresses three research questions, which were derived from the literature review:

1. ***The sub-state as development actor:*** How does the international development agenda converge with ambitions of nation-building?

2. ***The Wales for Africa programme:*** How has Wales for Africa built a political community of practice?

3. ***The citizen as development actor:*** Does the Wales for Africa programme support the strengthening of the citizen as development actor, through encouraging new actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both?

The rationale behind their formulation is presented in more detail in the concluding section of Chapter Two.

The Research Methods

The questions guided the methods selected to collect the data and the structure of the study. Chapter Three outlines how Wales for Africa was approached empirically as represented by discourse, shaped by particular beliefs and produced discursively within particular contexts. A combination of the following methods was used:

- documentary analysis;
- in-depth interviews;
- focus groups;
- monitoring data, and
- participant observation.

The analysis drew on data from policy documents, and from semi-structured interviews with policy-makers, NGOs, as well as on data from interviews and focus groups with individuals participating in community links.

A review of monitoring and reporting data from the first ten years of the programme was also undertaken (a detailed breakdown of the activities supported is in Annexes F, G and H).

Timeframe of the Research

In practical terms, the data collected for the empirical analysis can be time bound broadly, beginning with a textual analysis of calls for political devolution and the launch of the Assembly in 1999, and roughly ending around October 2016, which marked the 10 year anniversary of Wales for Africa; though a reflection on the programme following its restructure in January 2018 is provided in the concluding chapter.

Reflecting the dynamism of the policy-making process, the programme was impacted by two key events during the course of this thesis: 1). In April 2015 the programme was restructured when most of the major grants came to an end; and 2)., the Well-being of Future Generations Act (Wales), the significance of which was acknowledged above, became law in 2015. Because the research design was based upon an iterative process of IPA, it could accommodate these changes. By approaching both the sub-state and the citizen as development actors, the study brings together the professional knowledge of policy-makers with the experience of citizens. The author, as part of the interpretive community, was an agent in the social context.

Opportunities also arose in the study for novel research access: 1). The author participated in a development assistance project in Uganda, thus could explore in greater detail how citizen-actors in development made sense of the events around them by tracing the programme from high level objectives to on-the-ground interpretations; and 2)., the author was invited to draft *Wales for Africa: 10 Years, 2006 - 2016* (WG 2016b), published to mark the programme's ten year anniversary, and contributed towards the First Ministers speech marking the event. Both opportunities aided the interpretive analysis by providing unique opportunities for participant-observation, and were undertaken in a voluntary capacity, facilitating an in-depth knowledge of the research context instrumental to the analytic process.

To keep the focus on the context-specific interpretation of meaning, the research process was characterised by an on-going reflective negotiation between the theory outlined at the literature review and the empirical evidence gathered in the field. A kind of reflexivity, as a strategy for marking knowledge as situated, was adopted by the author during fieldwork in an attempt at gaining a comprehensive understanding of her positionality, and her role and that of others within that position, the researched and the research context. The difficulties of doing this in practice is addressed properly in Chapter Three, where the research process is made more transparent. The research scope was refined as the analysis progressed and more distinct lines of enquiry developed. This is also discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

Limitations

The study has a number of limitations. The emphasis is on garnering a more in-depth knowledge of a particular facet of Wales for Africa, thus representativeness is not a key concern. The research is temporally, socially and culturally specific in its exploration of particular development projects in a dynamic context, and at a specific time. Because the emerging development sector in Wales is complex, and is constantly evolving and varied, the research could not capture the entirety of such complexity. For academic and policy understandings to improve, more research needs to be conducted across the sector. Future research should include the perspectives of more partner organisations to inform the practices and effectiveness of the programme. The limitations, alongside suggestions for further research, are discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight.

1.6 The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis has eight chapters:

Chapter One sets the scene for the study. It introduces the context and defines the broad aim of the study and refers briefly to work already done in the area to help indicate the research gap.

Chapter Two presents the findings of the literature review.

Chapter Three sets out how Welsh identity has been expressed politically.

Chapter Four outlines the methodological approach of the research.

Chapter Five explores the sub-state state as development actor and specifically, Research Question One.

Chapter Six explores how the Wales for Africa programme has built a community of practice. It addresses Research Question Two.

Chapter Seven addresses Research Question Three. It focuses on the citizen as development actor.

Chapter Eight is the final chapter and presents the conclusions, theoretical contributions and policy recommendations of the study. It draws together the analytical arguments presented in the empirical chapters in order to draw out the findings, and to reflect on the strengths, weaknesses and lessons drawn from the research.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the potential for developing a stronger connection between the significant bodies of literature on discourses of nationalism and sustainable development is expanded upon. The aim of this research is to explore how development assistance is used in the making of national identity, and to what effect, by reference to the case of Wales. The thesis' interest in the sub-state and the citizen as development actors reflects a concern with how, post-devolution, participatory processes and social identity are being redefined in the language of democratic engagement, raising issues on how devolved citizenship and civic value is mobilised and understood. Towards this end, the overarching objective here is to focus on the conceptual connections between the constructs under investigation, and link to the empirical understandings later in the thesis.

Because the study is concerned with the sub-state's marketisation of Wales for Africa, which is promoted as enabling more transformative and effective models of sustainable practice in development assistance, this review intersects with a variety of debates in the literature on a number of topics. The previous chapter identified few studies which explicitly take Wales for Africa as a unit of analysis, summarised some gaps in our understanding, and introduced a conceptual framework based upon both the *sub-state* and the *citizen* as development actors.

This chapter extends the review further, engaging with literatures applicable to the interplay between constructing a national identity, devolved citizenship as a frame of subjectivity, and to the spaces available for citizens to participate in development assistance, to contend that: 1), nationalist discourse refers to the words and practices of a range of different people and organisations, and operates at a range of spatial and temporal imaginations; 2), sub-states have the potential to adopt transformative versions of sustainability, based on a politics of scale; and 3), encouraging citizen participation in development practice offers the potential for more inclusive and emancipatory versions of assistance to be progressed.

The tensions that arise in making these contentions, the connections across key points and the gaps identified during the review are acknowledged throughout the chapter. This helped inform the research questions, introduced in Chapter One, which arose from this review and are expanded upon in greater detail within its concluding section. In getting there, this chapter first examines concepts of *Citizenship and Community* as relevant to issues of identity formation and nationhood in post-devolved Wales. Next, the concept of *the Sub-State as Development Actor* is explored in greater detail, specifically by reference to literatures on sub-state diplomacy and the role played by non-state actors in international relations. Then, the concept of *the Citizen as Development Actor* is examined, through a focus on the small-scale initiatives set-up by citizens in the Western-context. This is followed by the chapter's conclusions.

To caveat from the outset, because of IPA's emphasis on the way meaning is given to social phenomena, Citizen Initiative literatures form a focus of this review, despite the variable quality of studies. This is because a key stakeholder interviewed during the scoping stages of this research saw synergy between Wales' community-based development organisations (linked with partner organisations in Africa) and the Citizen Initiatives body of research (interview, WCVA) (see Chapter Three for more detail).

2.2 Citizenship and Community

The significance of devolved citizenship as a frame of subjectivity to the thesis was introduced in Chapter One. Thus, this section explores in greater detail the construct of citizenship as a "momentum concept" (Lister 2007), contested in terms of meaning and political application within the literature, in part because it is about inclusion and exclusion, and membership of an imagined community, often defined in terms of membership of a political community – the nation state. The language of citizenship therefore is about governance.

Governance is an essential institution in all nations which reflects both formal structures of power, and the ability to create and reshape institutions. Traditionally used as a synonym for government, a diversification of governance systems encourages the perception that nation states are not the only

legitimate source of authority over civil society, and a redirection in its use and import (Stoker 1997; Rhodes 1996). Shifts in governance have variously been described as 'good governance' (Bang and Esmark 2009), the 'hollow state' (Milward and Provan 2000) and the 'shadow state' (Wolch 1990), amongst other things, though as a baseline, there is general agreement that governance refers to the development of governing styles in which the boundaries between and within the private and public sectors are "increasingly interdependent and blurred" (Stoker 1998, p. 17), diffusing power through society, so that creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action can be held by both governments and the governed.

Thus, governance in this sense does not presuppose a central government. Instead, action can be organised through different institutions - including governmental institutions across levels, and private, social and economic systems, giving credence to the relevance of conceptualising both the sub-state and the citizen as development actor. Globalisation, localisation and the dynamics of neo-liberalism have distorted the boundaries between the nation state, the market and the third sector, with implications on how citizen rights, responsibilities and action can be perceived. Different types of actors have entered the international arena at different times, adding ambiguity to the processes at play (Segura 2017) and further challenging the pre-eminence of the nation state.

Conceptualising Citizenship

Concurrent to the growth of governance perspectives, interest in citizenship as a focus of academic enquiry has resurged. This is attributed to the dismantling of the post-war social democratic/welfare state policy-framework under neoliberalism's ascendency, where in response, academics have drawn upon the language of citizenship, civic life and civil society as a way of resisting these changes (Barns et al. 1999). The way citizenship is defined is intrinsic to the kind of society and political community desired (Mouffe 1991); thus, the following paragraphs briefly outline some key ways in which citizenship has been understood, for conceptions are increasingly leaned-upon in discourses of citizen participation and rights, including in the shaping of Wales' policy, where they can help to (Mooney and Williams 2006, pp. 622-623):

> "…reveal particular constructions of a nation that are highly contested in a country marked for example by significant linguistic, ethnic, geographical and socio-economic division and illustrate the conundrums that face politicians seeking to establish *the* national project in post-devolution Wales."

An important aspect of the revival of citizenship is the renewed interest in T. H. Marshall's (1950) civic liberal theory, which considers citizenship as the legal status providing rights and duties to the members of a nation-state. Broadly stated, liberal constructs are based upon notions of an individual's freedom and equality. The citizen is construed as the bearer of rights against the state. Here, welfare rights are conceptualised as a minimum safety net, and citizenship is not about eliminating inequalities, but rather, about reducing the risks associated with capitalism for the poorest citizens, with rights bestowed by the state to individual citizens in conformity with the principles of formal equality (Ellison 1997, p. 669).

In T. H. Marshall's sense therefore, citizenship and the rights of nation prescribe the limits of social welfare, which in turn help to build a sense of community and social cohesion. According to liberal constructs, there is no 'common good'. Instead, an individual should be able to define their own common good (and realise it in their own way); thus, it follows, governance must be achieved through the freedom, agency and autonomy of citizens. Rawls (1971) for example, in his utilitarian liberal theory, sees the goal of a 'good society' as facilitating the greatest achievement of individual interests for the greatest number of citizens. Participation in the public arena is conceptualised as a political process whereby all citizens have a right - not an obligation - to participate (Rawls 1971, p. 227). A sharp distinction is made between citizenship as political identity, and other identities, affections and allegiances.

Equally as significant as the revival of liberal notions however is the renewal of the civic republican (and for some, communitarian) model of citizenship (Barns et al. 1999, p. 16). The revived civic republican tradition attempts to incorporate ideas on the self-interested individual evident within liberal thought into a communitarian framework of community-belonging, egalitarianism and shared

moral values, shaped around the notion of a 'common good'. According to some civic republicans, citizenship is a responsibility to be active in community affairs and public life, and much civic republicanism promotes deliberative forms of democracy (Habermas 2003).

Further, citizenship should also involve political learning, a common civic identity and a shared understanding of what the 'common good' is (Miller 1994). In addition, according to Putnam (2000) the vibrant civic life of an associational civil society is a precondition both for good governance and for a prosperous economy. According to him, citizen participation builds social capital and can have a positive political and economic benefit in the process through fostering trust and building reciprocity between members of a civil society. Similarly, Fukuyama (1995) sees trust as underpinning the economic cohesion needed for economic growth, for in his view, the more economically prosperous nations are those with a higher proportion of voluntary associations; and according to Giddens (1998), trust is a form of social capital needed for economic regeneration and civic renewal.

The desirability of new civic republican ideals of citizenship however have been questioned. Young (1989) for example criticise it as too oppressive, for notions of a common good and the associated expectation of active participation in civic life could limit the freedoms of individuals and undermine the pluralism intrinsic to contemporary societies.

Despite their fundamental differences, both civic republican and liberal conceptualisations promote citizenship as universal, individual or group identity as particular, and as operating at the level of the nation-state (Jones and Gaventa 2002, p. 14; Isin and Wood 1999, p. 14). Analysts also point to how the communitarian notion of active citizenship has been co-opted by neo-liberal regime, because it encourages citizens to assume responsibilities in public life (Barns et al. 1999). Similarly, for Rose (2000), an emphasis on the ethical as opposed to the political sensibilities of individuals is consistent with a de-politicisation of political philosophy – referred to as the 'moral turn of politics' – which is attributed to the rise of neo-liberalism and the subsequent delegation of welfare-state responsibilities to citizen actors. This co-option by neo-liberal regime problematizes active citizenship as a politically ambiguous construct:

"able to express either a communitarian ideal of social solidarity and community or a neo-liberal vision of minimalist state and a renewed ethos of voluntary self-help" (Barns et al. 1999, p. 17).

Reflecting this ambiguity, government policy has been interpreted in numerous ways within the literature: as an effort to enforce moral values using ideas around community (Brown 1999), responsibilise citizens (Ilcan and Basok 2004) and reframe responsibility for well-being away from the state (Milligan and Fyfe 2005), for instance. Different perspectives assume different relationships between their constructions of community and citizenship. Giddens' notion of the Third Way, for example, featured heavily in the central UK New Labour government's (1997-2010) policy discourse. Here, the third sector was promoted as an alternative to the state and the market, particularly on issues of civic participation and social inclusion.

A focus on the obligations of the citizen however has been heavily criticised (Levitas 2005; Rose 2000) for invoking a moral politics, because in its reconstruction of the relationship between the people and the government, it is viewed to rely heavily upon the notion of community to solve social problems. In line with these critiques, Frazer (2005) argues that T. H. Marshall (1950) and theorists who have followed him have contributed towards the de-politicising of citizenship; instead, he views citizenship as essentially a political relationship, and one which should not be conceptualised without reference to political power. Similarly, Rose (2000, p. 1395), by reference to New Labour's discourses of citizenship, criticises a "politics of conduct that seeks to reconstruct citizens as moral subjects of responsible communities" (Rose 2000, p. 1396), so that (Rose 2000, p. 1399) the:

> "…Third Way aspires to a contract between those who exercise power and those who are obliged to be its subjects. Although the former must provide the conditions of the good life, the latter must deserve to inhabit it by building strong communities and exercising active responsible citizenship."

In contrast, Staeheli (2008) sees this politics as neither intrinsically progressive nor regressive. Following her, amongst others, whilst power through community, and the concept of ethics it adopts, is often deployed in subtle ways

(Staeheli 2008; Staeheli, Mitchell and Nagel 2009), it is more helpful to think about the ways in which government and institutional actors rely on the concept of community as a moral geography (Staeheli 2008, p. 7), as opposed to couching debates in terms of neo-liberalism, or as an assumed progressive politics.

Community is a site of politics, which people either support or contest, and it is the contradictions inherent within communities which help shape citizenship. These inconsistencies operate simultaneously, so that community must be negotiated as particular constructions of citizenship are advanced (Staeheli 2008). Whilst the shared purpose of a community can develop into a political community, whereby citizenship becomes the symbol of inclusion, communities, by their definition, are also closed and bounded spaces of exclusion: to be 'in', others must be 'out', for inherent within the construct of citizenship is "the idea of inclusion [which] relentlessly produces exclusion" (Isin 2005, p. 381). Those with limited power to exert influence are often the ones excluded - as a result of social policies designed to separate those regarded as different, and by public attitudes which have reinforced such prejudices, for example (Barns 1999).

Community therefore is understood as a societal process in flux, thus the empirical analysis presented within this thesis will acknowledge and problematise the contradictions - or the 'types' of knowledge - upon which Wales' discourses of nationalism, sustainability and development are dependent. As a conceptual and practical space for participation, the activities supported by Wales for Africa are never settled and always problematic. This is because community is where questions over membership and on who 'belongs' in a political community are negotiated, through power relations and processes of citizenship formation (Staeheli 2008).

Much citizenship literature is marked by the challenge it poses to citizenship's exclusionary tendencies, and with attempts to 'make real' its inclusionary promise. Lister's (2007) response to this challenge is to link aspects of the liberal, communitarian and civic republican traditions: under the communitarian emphasis on belonging; the civic republican emphasis on deliberation and collective action; and the liberal emphasis on individual rights, equality and the rule of law – connected by reference to feminist re-workings of citizenship that

challenge the public-private dichotomy (Lister 1997). She stresses (Lister 1997, 2007; see also Mouffe 1993; Isin and Wood 1999) an individual's self-identity as citizen, through a notion of citizenship as participation which is viewed to represent an expression of human agency in the political arena, so that, "broadly defined: citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents" (Lister 1998, p. 228).

Citizenship therefore can be understood as an outcome and a process; and efforts at gaining new and shaping existing rights can be as important as the substance given to those rights (Lister 2003, p. 6).

Relational Concepts of Citizenship

Literatures also focus on the relational nature of citizenship as agency (Barns 1999; see also Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). Barns (1999), for instance, explores the significance of shared identity as a basis for collective action.

The relational nature of agency however makes the tensions between promises of universal citizenship and the recognition of difference, that is, issues of inclusion and exclusion, more obvious. Young points out how "…persons from one perspective or history can never completely understand and adopt the point of view of those with other group-based perspectives and histories" (1989, p. 258); a reality emphasised within literatures on citizenship and poverty.

Poverty is increasingly understood relationally. This is evident in the conceptualisations developed by the UN though its MDGs and SDGs for example, as well as in the Wales for Africa framework (2006b), which emphasise themes of respect and solidarity. All-inclusive notions of citizenship and social justice however can mask inherent differences of power, as those with the knowledge and resources to shape how rights are understood 'set the rules' so that those who come "into the game after it has already begun, after the rules and standards have already been set" are at a disadvantage (Young 1990, p. 164). Yet, conceptualising citizenship as universal assumes a uniformity in how a sense of identity is experienced and understood. Instead, many people struggle for recognition and a redistribution of citizens' claims for rights. Any individual's identity should be understood as made-up of a combination of subject positions, and as constructed by a variety of discourses. These discourses are not necessarily related, but are under constant

negotiation, so that identity is "temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification" (Mouffe 1993, p. 28). The attempts at fostering a distinctiveness in post-devolution Wales, which has seen policy makers mobilise notions of devolved citizenship, as a frame of subjectivity, in the construction of citizenship rights, are dependent upon the subject positions through which devolved identity is constituted in different discursive formations - including through the dialogue which exists between Wales' discourses of sustainable development and nationalism.

Mouffe (1993), by reference to the plurality of subject positions, examines how a sense of group political identity is produced through identification with others who hold similar politicised subject-positions. These positions are constantly in a process of decentring, which subverts subject-positions, preventing them from solidifying around a pre-constituted point. Despite this non-fixity however, there are series' of 'nodal points' and 'partial fixations' which help stabilise positions (Mouffe 1993). Identities nonetheless are "mutable ongoing productions" (Massey 2004, p. 5), and political culture is constantly evolving - developed through experience and practice. Citizenship therefore is enacted; thus, "there is rarely, if ever, one definitive version or story to be told" (Day 2002, p. 11). How people understand themselves as citizens, and translate this into citizen action, is likely to have a complex relationship with how they identify with particular groups and view particular institutions in terms of accountability (Jones and Gaventa 2002, p. 15).

In politics, discourses are spread across institutions (Fischer 2003), where in post-devolution Wales, the "imagined community has become subject to the gaze of emerging democratic processes" (Housley et al. 2009, p. 199). Community therefore is now under increased political scrutiny. Socio-spatial identities are narrated in the context of group identities such as nationalism (Hobsbawm 1983; Smith 1986); an issue, particularly given the relative novelty of political devolution, is the ways in which Wales' infrastructures of devolved government, as nodal points or part fixations, can mobilise a sense of national citizenship as a form of group identity. The social processes of nationhood have been described as 'invented' (Hobsbawm 1983) and 'imagined' (Anderson 1983), as through promoting a discourse of difference, nations are

institutionalised via the interlinked processes of differentiation and integration (Paasi 1996). As a result (Foster 1991, p. 238): "The very notion of a nation with a fixed "given" cultural identity is a sign of the success of a whole array of practices in naturalizing that identity".

This notion of nations being and becoming is a key tenet within studies on nationhood and national identity: Nairn (1977) describes the 'Janus face' of the nation, simultaneously looking backwards and forwards; whilst Bhabha (1990) refers to 'double time' to underscore the temporal imaginations of nationalist discourses preoccupied with national pasts, and the ways in which these can inform national presents (and futures) (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Wales' devolved spaces are based upon specific institutional developments, and upon some core assumptions on the pre-eminence of the territorially-bounded (sub-)state in the construction of citizenship rights. According to Mooney and Williams (2006, p. 623) this national project:

> "…necessarily involves the construction of the idea of Wales which includes judgements as to what sorts of elements and what sorts of relationships constitute Wales, what types of social problems it throws up and how they are best resolved (*sic*) *Welsh solutions for Welsh problems.*"

Whilst the nation-state remains a significant arena – and an imaginative field – in which different sets of concerns and forms of belonging can be projected, and continues to play a fundamental role in setting-out access to territory and citizenship rights, the drive within literatures towards more inclusive conceptions of citizenship has helped reconceptualise where citizens are found. Multi-tiered conceptions of citizenship - catalysed by the changing interdependencies amongst political actors and the globalisation of capitalism and power - have expanded the scope for analysis beyond state-centric conceptions into new spaces, within as well as beyond the nation-state (Cornwall 2002).

This chapter has already noted how much debate within recent years has focussed upon ways the state in experiencing a period of "qualitative restructuring" (Jones et al. 2005), which is also apparent in territorial and scalar contexts. Referring back to the work of Lister (2007), outlined earlier, citizenship

is understood as an identity and a practice, operating across the domains of the domestic, local, urban, regional and global, and is likely to differ across the places were people's relations play-out.

Geographers and others have used understandings of the politics of scale to argue that the 'national' no longer occupies the only, or main, position in shaping the trajectories of contemporary geographies (for example, Anderson 1996; Jessop 1997, 2002; Keating 1998; Rhodes 1994). These perspectives examine more critically how the shift from government to governance, the internationalisation of policy communities, and the de-nationalisation of the state are being reconfigured along a range of spatial levels – the translocal, sub-national, national and supranational (see Jones et al. 2005, p. 337). The national scale is now seen as one amongst many actors seeking to influence political process. Within spatial imaginations, there is a renewed focus on "the actual spaces in which citizenship is expressed" (Jones and Gaventa 2002, p. 19), so that it could be argued, following Lister, that "what is emerging is a more grounded understanding of citizenship as practice" (2007, p. 8), for citizenship can be rescaled in complex ways and experienced within specific scalar contexts.

Analysts have sought to bring an empirical focus to the rescaling of national states. Jones et al. (2005), for example, build from Jessop's (1997) description of devolution as a 'hollowing out' of the central UK state to conceptualise a process of 'filling in'. This richly evokes how, as a consequence of decentralisation, variations within the UKs component parts have been made more visible through the territorial reconfiguration of state roles and responsibilities. A focus on the hollowing-out of the nation-state can imply a top-down reading on the processes that affect the national scale. However, twinning with the concept of filling-in recognises the potential for similar processes – such as the internationalisation of policy communities and networks – to take place within sub-national territories.

As a result of the filling-in of the UKs sub-states, it is now possible to demonstrate in empirical and conceptual contexts how a concern of Wales' devolution process, in creating new structures of spatial governance, lies with

creating coherent institutions around which people can understand themselves as citizens - and translate this into citizen action.

Whilst the process of filling-in does not necessarily imply a proliferation of political activity at the regional scale, it does emphasise how processes associated with the shift from government to governance can unfold in particular spatial – and temporal (see below) - contexts (Jones et al. 2005, p. 338). The decentring of the nation-state at UK level is seeing a reterritorialization of identity at sub-state level as the constituent devolved nations assemble state-like institutions; thus, citizenships exclusionary aspects are also being restructured, for now in Wales "the imagined community has boundaries and suddenly 'who's in' and 'who's out' are pressing issues" (Housley et. al 2009, p. 199). Nationalist discourses extend well beyond the policies and practices of nationalist parties. The work of Billig (1995) illustrates how all are tied-up in the discourses of nationalism, through an ongoing and mutable process that needs to be continually reproduced to ensure a perception of being natural or unchanging.

Everyday Nationalisms

It is the ideology of nationalism permits nations to exist - though at times it might appear routine (Billig 1995). Any study of national identity therefore should look for the common-sense assumptions about nationhood.

As Billig (1995) has shown, the everyday basis of nationalism helps explain the mundane ways in which national identity is reproduced in a non-reflexive fashion. Instead of seeing nationalism as something that is the characteristic of extremists, his idea of banal nationalism shows that nationalism is something that pertains to personal and groups identities wherever, and is used to describe the everyday expressions of nationhood and the ways in which established nations are habitually reproduced. This has broadened understandings of where and how nationalism can be expressed (Davies 2006; Benwell 2014); as broadly, Billig (1995) attempted to readdress two suppositions in nationalist theory on nationalism: 1), that its "extraordinary, politically charged and emotionally driven" (Billig 1995, p. 44); and 2), is an over-heated reaction, typically the property of 'others', which enables 'us' to

forget 'our' nationalism" (Billig 1995, p. 37). Instead, the "whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices" of national identity is recreated in the everyday as part of the pervasiveness of nations. Nationalist discourses therefore can be ordinary, which also helps explain some ambiguities within the concept of identity.

Wales' sub-state status as a nation within the central UK state for instance implies the existence of both Welsh and British state identifiers within Wales. A question on national identity was included for the first time in the 2011 Census in Wales, and found that 1.8 million people identify only as Welsh (58% of the population) and 218,000 identify as Welsh and British (7% of the population) (ONS 2012). The Census also found that in overall numeric terms, the size of some of the ethnic groups listed in the 2011 Census is small in comparison to the rest of the UK, which was most distinct in many rural areas.[2]

Nationalism in Wales therefore cannot be reduced to a Welsh nationalism competing against a non-nationalist alternative, because there are potentially two or more nationalisms, with Welsh and British the most commonly cited dual nationality at the 2011 Census in Wales. The banality of nationalism helps explain British national identity in Wales because it implies that British nationalism has been and continues to be rendered everyday by assorted state and society related practices. Wales' national identity however is often founded upon different meanings: "These [British and Welsh] identities could… be fused, shared or competing, and subsequently have a variety of political consequences" (Davies 2006, p. 111).

Whilst Billig's impact has been widespread - to the extent that his ideas have become well-rehearsed, even cliched (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 56) – shortcomings with banal nationalism have also been identified (Benwell 2014; Jones and Fowler 2007; Jones and Merriman 2009). Benwell (2014) for example, points to how the everyday ways in which national identity is shaped are far more dynamic than the repetitive acts needed to sustain it would suggest. In addition, because the emblems of banal nationalism are often received differently, their consumption should be understood within everyday,

[2] Nevertheless, as Harries et al. (2014) point out, Wales does have a longstanding ethnic minority population and is becoming more ethnically diverse (see Williams et al. 2003).

localised contexts (Benwell 2014; Jones and Desforges 2003). Merriman and Jones (2009, p. 167) for instance, in an analysis of the trajectory towards Wales' now 'everyday' bilingual road signs, highlight how the symbols of the nation are interpreted differently by people: "some in banal and unconscious ways; other in a more conscious and overt manner". Thus, to avoid what Benwell (2014, p. 51) refers to as a 'banal-blatant binary', the empirical analysis presented in this thesis should acknowledge both the mundane and the more obvious articulations of nationalist discourse, because as well as through banal nationalisms, the markers of nationhood can be deliberately produced, flagged, side-lined, subverted, re-interpreted, and so on, by a range of different actors (Benwell 2014, p. 51), at a range of scales.

Localised, place-based interpretations of nationalism (Benwell 2014; Jones and Desforges 2003; Merriman and Jones 2009) show how nationalist discourse can be reproduced, complemented and/or contested in different ways and places. Thus, the politics of place can only be understood by considering the broader networks and scales of activity at play. Wales should be viewed (Jones and Fowler 2007, p. 338) "…as something that is actively produced out of its connections with the local, the regional, the international, and the global", which draws attention to the political, cultural and social dynamics associated with the continued emergence of nationalism at different scales, and with a different territorial form, at different points in time (Jones et al. 2005). Increasingly, literatures question the significance of bounded understandings of space, place and time (Massey 1994; Amin 2004); and whilst politics at the scale of the nation in Wales is embedded in the politics and territoriality of localised place, as a geographical concept, place is increasingly approached as a dynamic, open and relational entity in-formation, with different places connected by flows of people, ideas and objects (Jones and Merriman 2011).

In a static conceptualisation of nation-states, the notion of the national territory is the archetypal example of bounded space. More nuanced reconceptualisations of territory however see spaces and places as contingent products of an on-going series of connections made between people, discourses and objects - so that places can be shaped as much by global connections as by the local qualities which characterise these places (Amin et al. 2006; Massey 2004), for example. The significance of such ways of thinking

for bounded conceptions of space, and for the individual and group identities, such as nationalism for example, associated with them, is the challenge they pose towards claims to place which are based upon exclusive - and exclusionary – notions of membership or belonging to a community.

On the social construction of nationalism, Jones and Merriman (2011, p. 938) content that research on the ways in which nations are narrated, the practices associated with forming a national identity, and the materiality of the nation, point to richer understandings of national territories as relational and networked spatial aggregations of people and objects. The plurality of the performative discourse undermines the singularity of the nation (Bhabha 1994) as national identity is shaped through an 'internal-external dialect' - involving a concurrent synthesis of internal self-definition and others ascription (Jenkins 1996, p. 20) - by institutions and the people the discourse is meant to represent (Bhabha 1990, 1994).

The empirical analysis of Jones and Merriman (2011; see also Merriman and Jones 2009), for instance, illustrates the networked character of the nation. Through an elaboration on the significance of both specific actors to the discursive construction and performance of the nation, and the ways in which symbolic and material objects are actively used in group-making projects, they point, by reference to the campaign for bilingual road signs in Wales, to how specific events can create key nodes for the definition of a national territory (Jones and Merriman 2011). Thus, whilst suggesting consensus and uniformity though nationalist discourse is "…the stuff of nation building, of national projects that seek oneness out of what indeed are very complex realities" (Mooney and Williams 2006, p. 623), conceptualising territories as on-going, contingent productions helps emphasise the potential connections that can exist between bounded and relational conceptions of space. In turn, this opens-up different ways for exploring the connections between people, discourses and objects in the making of national identity.

As part of the nationalist discourse and an exercise in boundary-making, this thesis' empirical case study - Wales for Africa - presents rich opportunities for exploring connections between territorial and relational ways of thinking about space, because its political significance depends on cultivating a sense of civic

responsibility and greater citizen involvement in the field of development assistance. The national territory is part of the group-making project associated with the nationalist discourse, yet development assistance, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is concerned with moral obligations in the international arena.

Concerned with the principles of individual moral obligations in the global arena, at its most basic, the concept of global citizenship challenges conventional understandings of citizenship as membership of a domestic political community (Cabrera 2008): Held (2004), for instance, sees global citizenship as a political and moral response to globalisation; Linklater's (1999; 2002) universalist ethical position calls for the creation of supra-state institutions within which individuals "can exercise their moral right to refuse and renegotiate offers" (1999, p. 51); whilst Falk (1994), as another example, conceptualises global citizenship as a normative undertaking for those hoping for a more peaceful global community based on social responsibility, solidarity and an ecological perspective.

Post-national concepts of citizenship also stretch the notion of temporal responsibility, to include both the legacies of privilege and advantage to which people are born and the responsibility to unborn generations. Bullen and Whitehead (2005) examined efforts at rethinking state-bound models of sustainable global citizenship in Wales. The Welsh curriculum relies upon notions of space as socially, ecologically and economically relational rather than static (Bullen and Whitehead 2005, p. 507). They argue that the principles behind the curriculum represent a hybrid form of citizenship, a "community of being which crosses time, space and substance" (2005, p. 504), which destabilises the spatial, temporal and material constraints upon which conventional forms of citizenship are based.

However, whilst this relational understanding of citizenship narrates a progressive politics, its discursive formations are being performed within the boundaries of the classroom, thus limiting attempts to create a more sustainable citizenry, and undermining the radical potential of conceptualising citizenship in truly sustainable terms.
Different kinds of individuals and institutions however are involved in narrating boundaries and territories (Paasi 1996), therefore it follows that there is

considerable scope for negotiating national identity within this process. This is explored further in the following sections, where first the scope for sub-state action, then citizen action, in the field of international development is explored, before moving on to the conclusions, which surmises the main points and sets-out the research questions derived from this review.

1.3 The Sub-State as Development Actor

This section explores literatures on sub-state diplomacy, and begins to develop a framework against which Welsh Government development action – or *the sub-state as development actor* - can be explored in the later empirical chapters.

Chapter One outlined the importance of sustainability to this thesis: the government's sustainable development duty is the basis of activities in the field of international development. Sustainability discourses emphasise the need to connect the scales of the global and the local, and are inclined to focus on the interrelationship between the present and future generations, and in this regard, are particularly powerful, because they tend to combine the well-versed definition of sustainable development provided in the Brundtland report with a degree of fluidity, enabling more local interpretations of the discourse to emerge in different places (Jones and Ross 2011, p. 54). Brundtland (1987) articulated the core principles of sustainable development adopted by most governments in the international arena. Within it are several elements critical for an understanding of the conceptual approaches evident in the wider debate (see Axelrod et al. 2011, p. 8): it attempts to bridge the interests of developed and developing nations, but applies to both; it tries to reconcile economic and environmental concerns and link these overarching priorities; is an anthropocentric concept, founded upon the notion that human needs must be met to address environmental problems; assumes environmental problems can be solved; and is deliberately vague, aimed at bringing people together to find consensus.

Since the Brundtland report and the succeeding Rio Declaration, made in 1992, local, national and regional actors have espoused principles of sustainable

development. Based upon specific empirical indicators for measuring progress (Axelrod et al. 2011; Bell and Morse 2003; Hecht 2003), in recent years, many missions have been framed or reframed to promote, first, the achievement of the UNs MDGs, then the succeeding SDGs (see Annexes C and D). However, whilst sustainable development remains on the agenda - policies continue to be developed, and laws and regulations agreed - part of the problem with it to date has been the low-level adoption of sustainable practices by individuals, organisations and institutions, which focuses attention on the need to consider the interrelated impacts of current practices at different scales, including the regional.

The international mobilisation of regions manifests in various modes, and in line with calls for greater specificity in analysing and interpreting these phenomena (Dickson 2014), this thesis approaches Wales' nationalist and sustainability discourses through the lens of the *sub-state as development actor* because it provides the potential to provide an agency-oriented explanation of autonomous, diplomatic practices, and acknowledges the political contestations that this can imply.

Sub-State Diplomacy

This section defines the sub-state by tracing its emergence and operation as a focus of analysis under the concept of paradiplomacy. Initially referring to the increasing involvement during the mid-twentieth century of federal states in international affairs, as part of wider internal processes and political tensions within these states between the forces of centralisation and decentralisation (Aguirre 1999, p. 185), paradiplomacy now describes actions developed by sub-states in parallel to state diplomacy. Originating from within consolidated democratic federal states with high levels of economic development, then widened to include unitary states in the West, such as the UK (see Segura 2017, p. 344-345), paradiplomacy explicitly challenges the nation-state's status as the pre-eminent entity of policy activity (Wimmer and Schiller 2002), helping to underscore the interdependences and the increasing involvement of non-conventional actors in international relations.

Analysis emphasises a new reality of sub-states as non-central, but nonetheless governmental actors, as increasingly they are recognised as

distinct subjects of enquiry, and part of a broader process whereby foreign policy is becoming localised, as through a network of linkages between political arenas, actors relate to each other in various ways (Hockings 1993). As a result, literatures call for more nuanced agency-oriented accounts, including to describe the impact of sub-states in the international arena.

The term 'paradiplomacy' however reinforces a distinction, rather than interdependencies, between national and sub-national governments at a systemic level, and can imply sub-state subordination to the diplomacy of nation-states. Whilst distinguishing between levels, references to paradiplomatic activity also suggest a separation of sub-state and national policies, thus tend to reinforce an image of conflict between the centre and its constituent region/s, projected onto the international arena, as well as undermining sub-state collaboration with its centre (Alexander 2014). Yet, "the factors determining the involvement of [sub-states] … are more likely to stress patterns of linkages between levels of political authority and activity" (Hocking 1993, p. 46-47).

Increasingly therefore, contemporary analysis employs the more direct 'sub-state diplomacy' to describe the activities of non-central, but nonetheless, governmental administrations, as legitimate actors operating below the state level in the international arena on many affairs (Segura 2017, p. 345). The degree of sub-state governmentality therefore, as measured by their competence to operate at an international level, is key, whereby three factors – understood in purely political terms – are used to distinguish sub-state operatives: 1), sub-states are structurally and constitutionally 'fragments of state' of a constitutionally superior central state; 2), are responsible for policy areas which are constitutionally defined and increasingly viewed to have an international dimension (see Aguirre 1999, p. 204); and 3), whilst regional and local actors are often conflated under an overarching sub-national category and a definition of subsidiarity, instead of a regional-local dichotomy, following more nuanced conceptualisation recognises the lower levels of constitutional autonomy exhibited by some weaker regions (Callan and Tatham 2014).

Whilst, sub-state governments and their sustainable development efforts are increasingly recognised in the international sphere, and their activities in the field are an area where analysis is growing - albeit with clear gaps, initially, academic focus on their contributions focussed upon activities in the United States (Rabe 2008; 2011; Burke and Ferguson 2010; Pitt 2010), and in Canada, particularly Quebec.

The emphasis was on federal political systems, or ones with high-levels of autonomy, even when specifically European cases, such as Germany, Belgium (Happaerts 2012) and the Basque regions (Galarraga et al. 2011), began to be explored. Nowadays, there is an increased focus on sub-state political entities in Western Europe (for example Happaerts 2012; Galarraga et al, 2011), which following devolution in the UK, now includes single-case analyses on Scotland (McEwen and Bomberg 2014), Wales (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Royles 2015; Royles 2017), and comparisons between the two (Royles and McEwen 2015, p. 1034). The remainder of this section focusses upon sub-state literatures emanating from the Western European context, from which, read as a whole, the launch of Wales for Africa can be contextualised as part of a wider trend of sub-states entering the international arena.

Sub-States and Sustainable Development Activities

The motivations which lead to sub-state action in the international arena can be categorised roughly as either functional, and understood broadly in economic terms, or as symbolic, and as fundamentally political by nature (Segura 2017, p. 348). Coupled with this, the sustainable development activities of sub-states in the international arena are supported within literatures, where their implementation of international commitments is increasingly acknowledged (Galarraga et al. 2011). Climate change projections collected at a regional level provide sub-states with a sound rationale for the design and implementation of adaptation and mitigation policies (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009, p. 13), where the scope of many of their competences makes them a key level of action (Corfee-Morlot et al, 2009, p. 13; Galgarra et al. 2011, p. 168), and their smaller-scale structures can be well-suited to the development of cross-cutting policies across their areas of competence, and across levels of governance (Corfee-Morlot et al, 2009, p. 43-44).

Developing explanations for how sub-states are active internationally is key to understanding their growth as unexpected global actors (Royles 2017); thus, the following paragraphs highlight some relevant themes identified within the literatures. Sub-state analysis which takes Wales as its explicit empirical case however is lacking, and there is a clear gap for exploring the nation's development activities, for literatures have tended to focus upon federal cases, and studies tend to be descriptive rather than explanatory (Royles 2017, p. 395; Cornago 2010, p. 12).

The capacity for sub-states to act shapes their behaviour within the international arena (Liefferink et al. 2009). Capacity is defined broadly (McEwen and Bomberg 2014, p. 66) to include: 1), the constitutional authority to act in a given area; and 2), the fiscal autonomy to raise direct investment and/or revenue towards policy goals. Limited constitutional, regulatory and legal frameworks all curtail the ability of sub-states to act (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009, p. 27; Lecours and Moreno 2003, p. 274), and sub-state policy-making is often limited by the decisions, resources and boundaries set at supra-national and central government levels. Ambitious policy making is easier to achieve with the constitutional and fiscal capacity in place to support innovation; but sub-states, in comparison to nation-states, are generally constitutionally weaker, with a more limited range of policy and fiscal capabilities, and usually have weaker bureaucracies and information resource strengths (Keating and McEwen 2005, p. 414-415).

As highlighted in Chapter One, Wales' policy ambitions occur in conditions of limited regional authority and fiscal autonomy, which should curtail their capacity for action. A task therefore is to expand on Wales' limited powers, and highlight those enabling factors identified within the existing evidence base which could help explain the policies of sub-states with ambitions beyond their level of governance. A comparative analysis of federalised and regionalised states in Western Europe by Swenden (2006) found the Welsh Government "bound to co-operate with the centre for any policy which it implements", so that "the level of legislative-executive interlocking is nowhere higher than in Wales" (Swenden 2006, p. 92). Constrained by its dependence upon the centre, prior to 2011 (when the Assembly gained more powers), Wales' level of autonomy was similar to 'weak' regions (see Callanan and Tatham 2014), undermining its

claims as a legitimate political resource and knowledge-base for international relations-related activity.

The distinct environment of the EU however illustrates the complex relations that can exist between factors of constitutional autonomy and the diplomatic activities of sub-states (Royles 2017), because the EU provides opportunities for regional governments to establish relations and mobilise within the international arena (McGarry and Keating 2006). The institutional factors which shape the EU help highlight the case-specific mechanisms which influence sub-state behaviours, for much of Wales' international relations-related policy is nested within EU and UK legislation in complex and multi-level divisions of power (Royles and McEwen 2015). Segura (2017, p. 350) points to three ways in which regions can make advantage out of the EU's project of regional integration: 1), the EU creates a favourable environment for interregional cooperation; 2), its processes have enabled sub-states to participate in the production of Europe in normative terms; and 3), multilevel governance is a principle of European integration, which helps normalise sub-state international action.

The multi-institution sustainable development frameworks initiated beyond the EU also validate international action by sub-state actors, because the incorporation at sub-state level of objectives set at the nation-state and at higher levels is seen as integral to sealing the policy cavities between different levels of authority (Corfee-Morlot et al, 2009, p. 8-9). This helps emphasise the role sub-states can play as collaborators, regardless of the division of competences between the different levels.

However, because sub-states tend to cooperate with the state level in external policy-making (Callan and Tatham 2014), isolating and then measuring sub-state international activity can be difficult (Royles 2017, p. 400; Kuznetsov 2015, p.12), because the apparatus of intergovernmental relations are used to embed co-ordination and iron-out tension between the sub-state and the central nation-state (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Lecours 2008).

Nevertheless, Wales' vertical integration of EU and UK level policies and embracing of multi-level governance dynamics has underpinned its claims as a

forerunner amongst sub-states on developing strategies towards sustainability (Royles 2010).

Sub-state action however is not wholly dependent upon determinants set at higher levels of governance (McEwen and Bomberg 2014, p. 67-68), for literature point to examples where they have spearheaded innovation (Liefferink and Anderson 1998), and acted as a valuable testing ground for identifying policy tools (Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 165). McEwen and Bomberg for example refer to sub-states that have developed initiatives strikingly more experimental in terms of practical policy-making - with more ambitious policy goals (relatively speaking) than set at supra-national or national level (2014, p. 64), so that the multi-level governance dynamics at play can provide room to manoeuvre.

The lack of a historical precedent for sub-states in the international arena has also been cited as an enabling factor (Royles 2017, p. 408). By reference to the Welsh case, although there has been strong variability in terms of the institutional opportunities available across the different policy domains (Royles 2017), limited constitutional capacity does not necessarily result in less autonomous policy-making, and correspondingly, a high-level of sub-state autonomy does not necessarily equate with more ambitious policy-making (Happaerts 2012, p. 12).

Unaspiring policy-making by sub-states with a high level of independence from the central state is ascribed to low political ambitions coupled with low political will (Happaerts 2012). Evidence from Wales suggests that the most autonomous activity has been in domains of no devolved powers: climate change and international development (Royles 2012b; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Fisher 2012).

Factors other than constitutional capacity therefore must drive sub-state actions. Innovation in sustainable development policy-making are often dependent upon the enthusiasm and support of policy networks (Alexander 2014; McEwen and Bomberg 2014). Exchanges within and between policy networks can encourage collaboration, compromise and consensus amongst actors. Networks are often comprised of individuals from both within and beyond government, working collectively to address policy challenges

(Peterson 2009; McEwen and Bomberg 2014), and sub-state engagement with NGOs can open-up channels of influence with international organisations (Royles 2017). Indeed, Wales for Africa illustrates how civil society networks can secure commitments, assisted in this case by political congruence between the sub-state and the centre (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Royles 2017), and highlighting the relevance of conceptualising Wales' citizens as development actors.

Regional asymmetry, either positive or negative, has also been identified as an explanatory factor for sub-state action. When there is considerable variation between regions in the distribution of economic resources and wealth creation, this is viewed to favour sub-state international relations-related activities, encouraging them to pursue more inward investment by projecting their differentiated identity outwards (Dehousse 1989; Segura 2017).

Thus, while there are no historical precedents for sub-state policy action in the field of development assistance, their emergence as players within the international arena has created opportunities for experimentation and innovation, new pathways for participation, and different ways of conceptualising development actors.

Ambitions in Nation-Building

Sub-states and have asserted their political identity and promoted themselves as important international actors over recent years, and their diplomatic activities related to symbolic motives are viewed to generate the most controversy and potential for conflict with the central state (Segura 2017, p. 348). Both compelled and constrained by the multi-level political and institutional environments in which they operate, sub-states may also have additional non-constitutional and non-material resources at their disposal, including a shared solidarity amongst its citizens, and a distinctiveness that comes from being a sub-state operating within a larger polity (McEwen and Bomberg 2014, p. 69).

One comparative study suggested that regions with a national identity distinct from the rest of the state they are a component part of are more likely to carry out international activities, in an attempt at consolidating the nationalist

sentiment within their region through international recognition (Paquin 2004). Studies have also linked a distinct language within the sub-state level to the concept of image-building, used to articulate a differentiated identity and thus a sub-national distinctiveness (Segura 2017). According to Huijgh (2012) and Alexander (2014), image-building initiatives assist in a process of "institutional self-legitimisation" (Alexander 2014, p. 71), through the international recognition they can foster, and by strengthening the internal policy areas already in place.

Territorial politics can also play a part in sub-state international relations-related policy developments, as debates about other matters are often proxies for constitutional questions about the territorial distribution of power. Policy goals and demands are often framed within sub-states and regions with a strong identity as an opportunity to maximise regional autonomy and project status, within the central state and beyond; a nationalist sentiment particularly marked in territories where calls for greater self-government are high on the political agenda (Lecours and Moreno 2003; McEwen and Bomberg 2014).

Symbolically, membership of international networks can enable sub-states to appear state-like, because they can help them build an internationally focussed profile, and enhance their profile within the territory (McEwen and Bomberg 2014; Happaerts et al. 2010, p. 130). The role of these networks therefore goes beyond multi-lateral decision making, to a collective strengthening of territorial identity, and thus a nation-building project. Symbolic motivations therefore play a role in stimulating sub-state international activities, as sub-national governments seek to carve a role distinct from the centre nation-state. Exploring the ways in which the Welsh Government has defined itself, and its relationship with others, through its sustainability discourses is a concern of this study.

2.4 The Citizen as Development Actor

The second component of this thesis' conceptual framework examines the role of *the citizen as development actor*. Arguably, development aid is a relatively new phenomenon, often linked to post-colonial agendas, and dominated by larger institutions, so that small-scale citizen-led initiatives are seldom acknowledged as players alongside the tradition channels of development

assistance. This section seeks to redress this neglect, and draws from literatures on participation in development, with a specific focus on Citizen Initiatives, to conceptualise the citizen as a distinct actor.

Citizenship and Participation in Development

Increasingly, there are calls within the literature for the language of well-being, based upon participatory processes aimed at fostering dialogue, to be used in development assistance. Development aid arguably "derives its existence from the presence of poverty (however understood)" (Nzurunziza 2007, p. 20), and poverty, as a multi-dimensional issue, has been defined in a number of ways: 1), as income poverty, or its common proxy, consumption poverty, whereby the very poor are defined to survive on less than $2.00 a day (Wratten 1995; Hulme and McKay 2005; Donnan and Burns-Murdoch, 2014); 2), as material lack or want, which includes a lack of income, little or no wealth, and an absence or low quality of other assets, and tends to include no or poor access to services (Chambers 2006); 3), as capabilities deprivation, with an emphasis on poverty of access and the dimensions of human capability, understood as what people "can or cannot do, can or cannot be" (Chambers 2006, p. 5) (Sen 1981; 1985; 1999); and 4), poverty as social exclusion, where people are excluded from full participation in society (Laderachi et al. 2003).

Yet these perceptions are imposed, abstract, and variably reductionist, because they are based upon external perceptions of what poverty is: "Our common meanings have all been constructed by us, non-poor people. They reflect our power to make definitions according to our perceptions" (Chambers 2006, p. 5).

Literatures therefore call for innovative approaches in development assistance, aimed at enabling more inclusive participation for citizens in the decisions that affect their lives (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001, p. 5; Jones and Gaventa 2002). Issues of citizenship have been mainstreamed within debates as a result, as evidenced by: an emphasis from project level towards political participation and increasing people's voice in decision-making processes (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Cornwall 2002); the perception of "a growing crisis of legitimacy" characterising the relationship between citizens and governing institutions (Gaventa 2002, p. 1) in both the global north and south; the rhetoric of 'good governance' and its calls for a decentralisation of political processes

and an increase in government responsiveness (Gaventa 2002; see also Rhodes 1996); the concept of 'citizen participation' (Jones and Gaventa 2002); the 'rights-based approach to government' and its politicisation of needs (Ferguson 1999); and parallel moves within development and human rights theory, that construct the right to participate in political decision-making as essential for making other rights claims (Ferguson 1999).

New spaces and strategies have created new interactions and institutions, "blurring old boundaries" through novel configurations of power (Cornwall 2002; see also Mansbridge 1999; Gaventa 2002), and potentially constructing forms of participation in development concerned with how citizens "'make and shape' the policies which affect their lives" (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001, p. 8).

A focus on issues of citizenship within discourses of development has opened-up ways of conceptualising the spaces for participation: towards accounting for local perceptions of poverty, and its non-material aspects, such as well-being, and an appreciation that for participation to be meaningful, a shift is needed, away from discourses of development aid beneficiaries, towards ones of citizens as legitimate claimants or recipients of assistance. Increasingly, how citizenship rights are understood and realised are recognised as context-specific, with differing effects, as the implications of right-based approaches are increasingly acknowledged within debates on inclusion, participation and accountability in development assistance. As part of this process, the emphasis upon more locally sensitive, people-centred approaches has been mainstreamed; initially, under the MDGs and their promotion of context as key, poverty descriptions as subjective, and, as fundamental to effective development assistance, the notion that people should understand and analyse their own reality.

Traditional Actors in Development

The increasing emphasis on participatory approaches towards development assistance however does undermine the development system as conventionally understood. The traditional actors of the OECD-DAC bilateral and multilateral donors remain the largest providers of development; actors maintain peer pressure amongst each other to keep-up a level of aid, and recent decades have seen attempts at rationalising an expanding, increasingly fragmented and

largely uncoordinated global development effort (see, for example, OECD 1998). The OECD-DAC for example has expanded to reflect the global rise of emerging economies - from the original twenty-two Western bilateral donors, to the include Brazil, China and India, for instance - with potential effects on South-South collaboration (Manning 2006; Kragelund 2010). All OECD-DAC donor countries have channelled part of their development budget through multilateral agencies, such as UN agencies, or other international institutions, such as the Directorate-General for Development Co-operation of the European Commission.

The different types of traditional actors involved in the provision of development aid are outlined in Figure 2.1. Together with the non-DAC bilateral and multilateral donors, these actors are labelled as distinct 'channels' (Kinsbergen 2014) or 'pillars' (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009), to describe a community of development specialists: the bilateral, multilateral and the civilateral aid channels (Kinsbergen 2014) or "the first three pillars" of development aid (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009). The first pillar / bilateral channel describes direct aid between governments; the second pillar / multilateral channel refers to aid channelled via multilateral organisations; and the third pillar / civilateral channel is associated with NGOs. The boundaries between them are fluid; organisations can move from one pillar / channel to another (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009; Kinsbergen and Schulpen 2010; Develtere 2012), or occupy more than one space at a time.

Whilst they vary widely, consisting of diverse organisations, constructed of different viewpoints, interest groups and strategic networks, and often with very different ideological approaches and areas of intervention, they do however share commonalities, so that they form "one community… with a domain specific set of values and norms, codes of conduct, and their own discourses and vocabulary" (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, p. 913). Together, they are concerned with the professional practice of development. Indeed, the professionalisation and bureaucratisation which characterises many established development NGOs could compromise their alleged comparative advantage as an alternative to the bilateral and multilateral aid channels (Banks and Hulme 2012). Thus, the traditional channels can be conceptualised as both a development arena and an aid market (Develtere 2012; Kinsbergen 2014).

Figure 2-1: Traditional and Non-Traditional Actors in Development Aid
Source: Adapted from the work of Datta et al. (2014)

Traditional	• Multilateral and bilateral donors which are part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) and multilateral development banks • International and national NGOs and Civil Society Organisations
Non-traditional	• Non-DAC donors including those from the Arab World, and Korea (although now part of the DAC) • Faith-based donors • Large private philanthropy organisations, such as the Rockefeller or the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations • Small-scale private giving and social impact investments (support to social enterprises on non-strictly market terms) • The private sector, particularly their Corporate Social Responsibility programmes • Global 'vertical funding' initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation, for example (even if most flows through these agencies are funded by DAC donors).

A De-Specialisation in Development

Increasingly however, non-professionals from the Western-context are participating in providing development assistance: "With tens of bilateral donors, hundreds of multilateral agencies and thousands of NGOs, one would expect that things cannot become more complicated still. Unfortunately, it can" (Schulpen et al. 2011, p. 325), for since the 1990s, a de-specialisation of the sector and a trend of alternative participants outside of the traditional three channel distinction has emerged, as a large number of non-traditional actors are now active in the field, with implications on how development assistance is understood. The increasing visibility of alternative participants has been termed "the rise of non-specialists" (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009), as a growing number of institutions, organisations and individuals seek opportunities for active involvement - to play a role beyond donating to charity. Thus, the development sector has evolved beyond the domain of government, multilateral institutions and established NGOs, because others are actively working towards eradicating global poverty.

The Fourth Pillar of Aid

Whilst the increasing visibility of non-traditional actors in development could be grouped alongside NGOs, in an attempt to capture how, under a myriad of explanations, celebrities, private foundations, companies and ordinary citizens are increasingly active in development, this has been challenged by analysts who argue instead that explicitly expanding the third pillar / civilateral channel to include these non-traditional actors obscures their contributions. Instead, it is suggested (Kinsbergen 2014; Develtere and De Bruyn 2009) that non-specialist actors in development assistance constitute *a fourth channel of development* in a separate classification aimed at encompassing - and differentiating between - those individuals and organisations outside of the professional development sector seeking opportunities to work towards development outcomes. There is an established separate categorisation in some regions of Europe: for instance, in the Netherlands, the term 'philanteral aid channel' is used to capture the prevalence of non-traditional actors (Kinsbergen 2013; Kinsbergen and Schulpen 2010); and in the Flemish-speaking region of Belgium, these actors are described as the 'private fourth pillar' in development aid (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009).

Three factors are identified as distinguishing a fourth channel actor or organisation: 1), they are the result of *personal relationships and collaboration* with people in developing countries. Because of this, their assistance is shaped by social experiences at, for example, school, employment, local associations, activities in local communities, and so forth, so that whilst fourth channel actors are not aid specialists as such, they become development specialists in their own context (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009; Kinsbergen 2014); 2), although some organisations classified under the third pillar / 'civilateral channel were founded in a similar fashion to those labelled fourth channel actors, organisations from the latter are differentiated because they are *non-specialist* and do not rely upon development theories (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, p. 914); and 3), the most distinctive feature of the fourth channel is that the majority of activities undertaken are on a *voluntary basis* (Schuyt et al. 2009; Kinsbergen and Schulpen 2010).

The fourth channel phenomenon is attributed to a post-modern narrative of globalisation; to the shrinking of the world due to mass media, and more accessible travel opportunities and international networking (Kinsbergen 2014, p. 42), so that citizen actors feel empowered to write a different, "idiosyncratic story", away from the "traditional script", because they want to redefine and adapt their organisation, institution, or life to the dynamics of a globalising society (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, pg. 916-914). Existing working patterns, experiences, and ambitions determine what these organisations and individuals do in development assistance, so that locally-rooted institutions might develop into (more) globally oriented, networking players, or individuals with local social and cultural capital might come to see themselves as global or world citizens (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009).

Citizen Initiatives

In conceptualising *the citizen as development actor*, this thesis refers to citizen-led development initiatives, which have been labelled as 'Citizen Initiatives', defined as "small-scale initiatives or organisations set up by (groups of) individuals, on a voluntary basis, in the global North and aimed at improving the living standards of people in the global South" (HIVA 2013)[3] by participants at the first, European, conference from the Western-context on *Global Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity*, held on the 30-31st January 2014, with the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA) in attendance as a result of the Wales Africa Community Links programme (interview, WCVA).[4]

The conference coincided with the publication of an explorative mapping exercise of citizen-led development initiatives (Pollet et al. 2014). The countries surveyed included EU members, and OECD-DAC members based upon the level of official development assistance provided. Annex F is adapted from this

[3] See: https://hiva.kuleuven.be/en/research/research-projects/european-mapping-of-citizen-initiatives-for-global-solidarity [Accessed 31st August 2017]

[4] The refinement to a focus on Citizen Initiative literatures in the thesis was as a result of the findings from early exploratory interviews (n 2) in May 2014 with key stakeholders based in the Wales for Africa Team, at the Welsh Government, and the Welsh Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA), who managed the Wales Africa Community Links project, funded by the Wales for Africa Team. Because they were exploratory, the interviews were deliberately not recorded. They were conducted before the literature review phase of the analysis. See Chapter Three for more detail.

work, and clearly illustrates, despite the disproportionate amount of research emanating from Belgium and the Netherlands, that activities are far from restricted to these two countries. All the countries mapped had established citizen initiatives, suggesting they are widespread, though the existence of initiatives was "about the only common remark that could be made" (Pollet et al. 2014, p. 9). Studies emanating from a few regions had categorised these initiatives according an adopted terminology. The established term within the Netherlands was 'private development initiatives', studies emanating from Belgium referred to the 'private fourth pillar' in the Flemish-speaking part (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009) and 'popular initiatives for international solidarity' in the French speaking part (Pollet et al. 2014); and in Norway, although far from embedded within the discourse, the term 'personalised aid' has been used (Haaland and Wallevik 2013).

Nevertheless, read as a whole, the quality of the data is mixed. For example, the figures on the number of initiatives outlined in Annex F is an extrapolation of local investigations, and put the total number of citizen initiatives in those regions mapped at anywhere between 100,000 and 200,000. Even in the Netherlands, where monitoring and reporting arrangements are more established, the number of initiatives is estimated broadly between 6,400 and 15,000 (Kinsbergen 2014, p. 58); and in Flanders, Belgium, as between 1,400 and 6,400 (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009).

However, despite the variety of activities undertaken by citizen initiatives, this is not reflected within the analyses, which generally present an impression of uniformity when discussing their prevalence; activity outcomes largely ignored, and the diversities in practice which the large numbers of initiatives reported suggests, along with the resources and policies in place to support initiatives, are rarely captured at a systemic level. This can partly be explained by the limited monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place at project and regional level (see Pollet et al. 2014), yet the existence of monitoring systems in some regions, including Wales, suggests there are analytical opportunities not yet exploited.

Though whilst the data presents an unclear picture, it does signify the emergence of initiatives in Western Europe as far-reaching, to the extent that some tentatively suggest the private funds mobilised by these networks is equivalent to the funding raised from the public by NGOs (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, p. 918). Private funding is the key source of income for citizen initiatives (Pollet et al., 2014; Kinsbergen 2014). A study by Kinsbergen and Schulpen (2011) found most initiatives had a yearly budget of under 50,000 Euros and relied on personal networks for fundraising, from family, friends, and local businesses. Formalised training and support is delivered in some regions, via funding from the traditional channels. Yet whilst some citizen actors claimed a right to a position in the development sector, others wanted no role within the officialised development discourse, so consciously avoided sanctioned support (Kinsbergen 2014).

Collaboration between initiatives and their partners often stems from a chance encounter, with no preconceived plan to start a project, which instead are founded on a concurrence of circumstances, such as an inspired meeting with an individual, local organisation or institution (Schulpen 2007; Kinsbergen 2006). Termed 'happenchance' (Kinsbergen 2014), the initial phase of the process is characterised by huge enthusiasm, because people are confronted by issues, but see possibilities for bringing about change (Schulpen 2007).

In some regions, citizen initiatives are interacting at the level of decentralised government, for example, the lander in Germany; the cantons in Switzerland; administrative regions in France; linguistically defined regions in Belgium; autonomous regions in Spain; and the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales. Activities are promoted by some governments as expressions of solidarity and global citizenship (Pollet et al. 2014; Spitz et al. 2013), yet there is limited analysis on the contribution citizen-led initiatives make in practice, including within Wales. Here, the outputs are limited to: a WCVA (2010) report, which provides a snapshot of Wales' civil society organisations who are contributing towards the MDGs; Annual Reports on Wales Africa Health Links (for example, WAHL 2013, 2015); a government commissioned mixed-methods review on the perceptions of those involved in a Welsh-based health link organisations (Thomas et al. 2011); an overview of the Wales Africa Community Links (WCVA 2014) programme, which assessed impact based upon a

mapping exercise and grants dispersed to date; and, to mark the tenth anniversary of Wales for Africa, a report was published, aimed at providing an overview of supported activities to date, whilst uncritically promoting the programme's successes (WG 2016b). All these publications, with the exception of Thomas et al. (2011), are aimed at advocating activities, and their insights have not been critically exploited further, so there are rich opportunities to problematise Wales' community of development practice.

There are high expectations within literatures on the potential impact of citizen initiatives. Develtere (2012) suggests citizen-led initiatives are more likely to innovate than NGOs, because NGO dependence on donor funding can curtail their creativity. For him, citizen-led development initiatives also better suit longer-term structural change, because many of the development projects supported by citizen initiatives do not have clearly defined timescales, or measure outputs; although Develtere and De Bruyn (2009) question what becoming established as fourth channel development actors would mean for the non-specialist identity of citizen initiatives, and whether the traditional channels would be open to sector-wide change.

Huge enthusiasm, personal ties and a 'doing' mentality is credited as their driving force; the citizen actors running initiatives are described as strongly motivated and committed, though these qualities could be to the detriment of projects (Kinsbergen 2014). This enthusiasm has been critiqued as reviving an older model of charitable giving reminiscent of donorship: "people, organisations, and institutions in the rich West have something to offer, whether it be money, knowledge, models of organisation, or know-how" (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, p. 919). Instead, the emphasis of initiatives must be on 'anthropo-logic' relations, centred on trust in the skills and dedication of people, North and South (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009).

A number of risks with initiatives have been identified within Citizen Initiative literatures, and grouped under the following themes: 1), often, initiatives do not undertake *sound context analysis* before designing or implementing a project (Chelladurai 2006; Schulpen 2007), so knowledge of and collaboration with other organisations and/or local authorities active in the same region is weak (Schulpen 2007), and projects risk being insufficiently embedded in the local

context, irrelevant and/or duplicate existing work (Chelladurai 2006), and unaware of wider structural issues (Schulpen 2007; Chelladurai 2006); 2), many initiatives originate from an informal personal relationship (Kinsbergen 2014), and as a result, partners may struggle with *managing expectations* and in developing a constructive critical attitude towards one another. Respective expectations and capacities, alongside the division of roles and responsibilities, may not be discussed, with important questions unasked (Schulpen 2007); and 3), the *monitoring and evaluation* of activities is mostly reduced to reporting an output of a project and/or a description of its execution, and can lack detail, thus hampering reflection and continuous learning process (Kinsbergen 2014).

Despite clear gaps and limitations, Citizen Initiative literatures provide useful insights into citizen-led development initiatives, on a range of issues, including the power asymmetries and processes underlying decision making in North-South partnerships (Elbers and Schulpen 2011), the sustainability of projects (Kinsbergen 2014), the fragmentation and proliferation of aid money across the four channels of development assistance (Schulpen, Loman and Kinsbergen 2011), the design or implementation of development projects (Schulpen 2007), and the relationship between the voluntary structure of initiatives and their members (Kinsbergen 2014).

The variability across citizen-led development activities however means that 'Citizen Initiatives' risks being another "of many catch-all concepts in development jargon" (Kinsbergen and Schulpen 2010, p. 8), thus, the following paragraphs explore how the concept is situated within literatures.

Citizen Initiatives, Communities and the Public Sphere

'Citizen Initiatives' are attributed to a process of 'socialisation' (Schulpen 2007; Develtere 2009; Kinsbergen 2014), described as a process of mainstreaming – when groups within society become active in a field previously viewed as the exclusive domain of those with professional expertise (Develtere 2009). Socialisation is contextualised as part of wider developments observed in the public sector where citizens are taking a more active role in areas previously taken care of by government. Described by Kinsbergen (2014, p.39) as a transformation from the social welfare state to a 'do' democracy, the concept of socialisation has become normalised within the respective Dutch and Belgian

Citizen Initiative literatures. Here, by reference to Giddens' Third Way (1994, 1998), a shift from the welfare state to the welfare society, and the appeals made by governments for citizens to assume responsibility for areas formally the concern of the state, is described as a push-factor. The pull-factor is attributed to 'do-democracy citizens', motivated by individualisation, described as the growing autonomy of the individual in relation to their direct environment (Kinsbergen 2014, p. 39-40), which is viewed to facilitate novel, informal, yet cohesive, networks, and a broadening and deepening of active citizen involvement in development (Kinsbergen 2014).

Within the studies reviewed however, the theoretical discussion is brief, and as a result, attributing the rise of citizen initiatives to a process of socialisation risks an inadequate consideration on the complexities of an increasingly diverse and multidimensional aid system, and its intersections with issues around citizenship and participation. Through either ignoring or separating the empirical analysis from normative concerns, the analysis reviewed is implicated in the marketisation of social equality. Within the work of Kinsbergen (2014), which is one of the more detailed analyses, for example, the uncritical comparisons drawn between citizen-led development initiatives and Third Way politics suggests scant engagement with wider citizenship theory and issues of inclusion and exclusion. Instead, unproblematically, Kinsbergen (2014, p. 40) concludes that governments no longer want sole responsibility for the well-being of its citizens, and citizens no longer want to be taken care of by the government (the process of individualisation). This skirts how the process of socialisation re-makes the relationship between citizens and the state.

Whilst Citizen Initiative studies point to a wider concept of public action in development, and are therefore construed as a component within wider trends towards rights-based approaches, the underdeveloped theorising fails to acknowledge then capture some key issues around claims to participate, and notions of belonging to a community.

Citizen Initiative literatures also distinguish loosely between the people as public and as citizens (Kinsbergen 2014; Pollet et al. 2014). Pollet et al. (2014, p. 16) for example conceptualise the 'public' as a monolithic group of people, passively waiting until they are called upon to give support. In contrast, for

them, the term citizen holds an active image, of people consciously taking matters in own hands. Yet such a distinction conflicts with theorists, who differentiate between the public as open and free, and communities as closed and bounded (Staeheli, Mitchel and Nagel 2009). The public is a fragmented construct, differentiated from community by its capacity to get strangers involved in a discourse (Staeheli, Mitchel and Nagel 2009, p. 634). A society does not necessarily become more democratic the more individuals and social groups gain access to and are incorporated into the public sphere, however, the affective and moral values attached to community are contrasted with the normative principles of a non-discriminatory public sphere (Staeheli 2008).

In addition, citizen-led initiatives are largely discussed alongside public support for development aid. With the exception of Develtere and De Bruyn (2009), a critique of philanthropy is neglected, risking an implicit assumption that philanthropy is good, without due consideration of the structural causes of poverty and inequality, and which assumes philanthropy and poverty as "individual successes and failures", not outcomes of a social system that facilitates both (Nickel and Eikenberry 2010, p. 276). Thus, an objective at this research is to problematise some of the assumptions underpinning citizen-led development initiatives, and given Wales' case, the extent to which government supported activities facilitate better interaction with Southern partner communities, in their complexities and contexts.

In defence of Citizen Initiative literatures however, wider academic debate on democracy and citizenship often moves between empirical and normative concerns, with no explicit acknowledgement. In line with calls from participatory approaches for a more multi-layered and nuanced understanding of links between the local and the global (Edwards and Gaventa 2001), the fourth channel of development assistance is a potential laboratory in which new forms of cooperation can be tested. New leverage for development assistance could be discovered as a result of in-depth analysis into the phenomenon (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009, p. 919).

2.5 Chapter Conclusions

Summary of the Discussion

The discussion in this chapter has refined the study's focus from the initial policy puzzle outlined in Chapter One, to the research questions listed below. Because the thesis' interest lies with the ways in which national identity and participation are being redefined under devolution, this review engaged with literatures applicable to the interplay between the group-making project of the nation, more inclusive versions of citizenship, and the practices of citizen-led development initiatives.

The review began with a discussion on the construct of citizenship as membership of an imagined community, and the significance of identity as a basis for collective action. Studies call for a better specification of the institutional contexts in which these constructs occur, for the spaces where participation happens should be understood in the context in which they, and the markers of a political identity, are created.

Multi-tiered conceptions of citizenship are reflected in the drive within literatures towards more inclusive understandings, which have also helped reconceptualise where it is that citizens are found, beyond the nation-state, into new spaces. Within spatial imaginations, more grounded understanding of citizenship as practice are emerging. Citizenship as practice helps highlight the role of both citizen action and the role of the state in facilitating this action, and aids a conceptualisation of both the citizen and the sub-state as development actor.

The review also included a consideration of future-oriented conceptions of citizenship, predicated on a care of distant others, who will suffer the consequences of unsustainable practices (Massey 2004; Bullen and Whitehead 2005). Sustainability is viewed as a discourse and a practice that operates at the scale of local communities and internationally/globally (Jones and Ross 2016). Part of the significance of sustainability is its emphasis on encouraging actors to think about the global challenges facing humanity, and the potential role of sustainable development in mitigating them. Much is made within the discourses of sustainability on connecting the scales of the local and the global

in the process. These discourses however also provide enough fluidity in interpretation to enable more regional or local interpretations to emerge in different places.

At the regional scale, the review discussed how the promotion of sustainable development is being viewed as a significant way in which sub-states can assert their presence in the international arena, with potential for reimaging the qualities of the nation in the process. How people understand themselves as citizens, and translate this into action, is likely to have a complex relationship with how they identify with particular groups and view institutions in terms of accountability. Under devolution, an idea of Wales is being constructed where the imagined community is now subject to democratic processes. This includes a concern with creating coherent institutions around which people can understand themselves as citizens and translate this into action.

Citizens are increasingly active in development under the 'fourth pillar' of development assistance, viewed to include Wales' citizen-led development initiatives. The government's support of these initiatives through Wales for Africa is one way it has responded to calls for Welsh solutions to global issues, used in defining a Welsh version of sustainable development used in the narration of the nation. Citizen initiatives therefore provide opportunities to examine more systematically the links between political decentralisation, citizen participation, policy and identity, through an examination of how development assistance is used in the making of national identity, and to what effect. From this review, a conceptual framework has been developed to explore the programme through the lens of both the *sub-state* and the *citizen* as development actor, and expand on how policy-makers have connected the discourses of sustainable development and nationalism to reimagine the Welsh nation.

The Sub-State as Development Actor

In exploring the notion of *the sub-state as development actor* several key facets arose from the literature review: 1), new sites of influence have emerged beyond the nation state which has embedded an understanding within the literature of there being a multiplicity of new actors, multiple contested meanings and varied social practices surrounding governance and civic

participation in the international realm; 2), sub-state governments have a specific role in this process as they are an arm of government, although their actions are limited by constitutional powers and financial constraints; 3), while there are no historical precedents for sub-states in development assistance, their emergence as actors in the international realm leaves opportunities for experimentation and innovation in creating new pathways for development assistance; 4), there is a clear gap in the literature, for discussion on the role of sub-states as international actors (outside of the North American context) is limited, and there is little on their role as international development actors. Wales for Africa therefore is explored in this study as part of wider changes in development that undermine established orthodoxies.

The Citizen as Development Actor

In exploring the notion of *the citizen as development actor*, in its examination of citizenship, with a view to examining the fourth pillar of development aid, a number of key points emerged from the review: 1), while debates around citizenship are fraught with tensions, discussions on the global and sustainable citizen suggest that multiple scales of citizenship can overlap, which opens up possibilities on how new concepts of citizenship can be framed; 2), there is however there is limited examples of the framing of new concepts of citizenship in the context of devolution; 3), Citizen Initiative studies point to a wider concept of public action in development, based on rights-based approaches; they fail however to assess the nature of these initiatives; 4), some have termed the increasing prevalence of citizen-led development initiatives the fourth pillar of development aid, with initiatives based on personal contact, a lack of specialist knowledge and volunteer action. However, there is limited discussion as to how these initiatives operate.

Refining the Scope to the Research Questions

The process of devolution is meant to be about bringing more direct and deliberative democratic mechanisms into play, to enable Wales' citizens to play a more active role in agenda-setting and decision-making. Under decentralisation the construct of devolved citizenship, as a form of Welsh subjectivity, can be used to imagine the nation under a new commonality. Wales for Africa is approached as a specific example of nation-building, and as a result of this review, construed as a performative resource *and* a space for

participation. This study found limited evidence on the programme as nation-building (Fisher 2012; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Royles 2017 were the exceptions, referenced in Chapter One).

Refining the scope further, this chapter looked specifically at sub-state diplomacy literatures and identified a clear gap to explore Wales' international development activities through the lens of *the sub-state as development actor*. Thus, factors impacting upon sub-state international activity were identified from previous studies, and common themes collated to inform the design of a conceptual framework to explore the Welsh Government's international development behaviours.

A focus of this review was on the symbolic motivations for sub-state international actions, essentially political in nature. The themes identified were collated under the headings of capacity for action and nation-building ambitions, used to explore Wales' development policies and address the first research question: *How does the international development agenda converge with ambitions of nation-building?*

This study found limited research which explores the iterative processes through which a political community has formed around the shared purpose of establishing a distinct Welsh programme of development assistance (Fisher's work (2012) on the Fair Trade Nation was the exception, see Chapter One). No recent studies where identified which looked in detail at the opportunities for the exercise of citizenship rights in the context set by Wales for Africa, and the contribution of its community links programme towards Welsh development policy and practice. Wales' activities were identified as a significant site for exploring what it means for citizens to participate, because they connect the notion of community to a representation of the nation. Devolution is building a political nation in Wales for the first time, and the second research question addresses how opportunity structures for participating in development have been consolidated or created, through exploring: *How has Wales for Africa built a political community of practice?*

In this review, studies on citizen participation in development, from the Western European-context, were also discussed, where a clear gap was identified on the contribution of citizen-led initiatives to development thought and practice. There are rich opportunities to engage with wider debates on whether citizen-led

initiatives represent an innovative approach to assistance. Building on a representation of poverty as a relational issue, Wales for Africa is underpinned by the notion of reciprocity in interventions, thus, could potentially facilitate an alternative discourse to more paternalistic policy prescriptions, based on fostering dialogue and shared understandings between partners. Hence, in its penultimate chapter, this thesis will address the question: *Does the Wales for Africa programme support the strengthening of the citizen as development actor, through encouraging new actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both?*

3 National Identity in Wales

3.1 Introduction

> "Wales is impossible. A country called Wales only exists because the Welsh invented it. The Welsh exist only because they invented themselves… they survived by making and remaking themselves and their Wales over and over again" (Williams 1985).

A sense of nationhood and national identity in Wales has revealed itself - or not - in many ways in modern times, including "aspirations to statehood, a unique language, cultural distinctiveness, religious affiliation, sporting achievement and, most recently, political devolution" (Jones 2006). A key aspect of any nation is its strong association with a particular territory; an emphasis which, as discussed in the previous chapter, reinforces the notion that discourses of nationalism are concerned with the spatial scale of the nation/national territory. However, discourses of scale operate in complex spatial and scalar imaginations, and Wales is no different in this regard.

To aid the empirical analysis in later chapters, this chapter places Wales for Africa in its broader historical, institutional and political context, to highlight that whilst nationalist discourses are concerned with the need to protect and enhance the national territory, the Welsh nation is a relatively new construct, and its identity has been expressed politically in various ways: as a nation divided by religion, economic performance, and the Welsh language, as well as by rural and urban divides. Thus - whilst the term *identity* literally refers to sameness - there has been a tendency for 'Welshness' to be defined in opposition (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 57-58), or described in public and political discourse as possessing links to British forms of identity (Day 2002; Johnes 2012; Jones and Ross 2016). Yet in response to Wales' changing political dynamic, national identity is now a topic of both government and academic research.

This reflects an acknowledgement of devolution's significance and an acceptance of Wales' distinctiveness. This chapter draws on data from academic outputs, policy documents and government commissioned reports, to

narrate the construction of a contemporary nationhood, broadly, along the lines of a stilted, yet sustained, movement towards political devolution.
This process is building a political nation in Wales for the first time, so that Wales' nationhood is no longer in dispute. Under devolution however, national identity is being reimagined under a unique set of constraints. The latter part of this chapter focusses upon these constraints; on constitutional capacity and change - linked to a group identity, formed around the growing legitimacy and maturing of Wales' democratic institutions.

3.2 Industry, Liberalisms and Non-conformity

Since at least the mid-twentieth century, debates have posited the relationship between religion, language and political economy as a central factor in the expression of a Welsh nationhood from the Industrial Revolution onwards (Manning 2004; Morgan 1986; Gruffudd 1995); a nationalism expressed first via Liberalism and the politicised chapel religion of Protestant non-conformity, then later through the politics of an industrialised Wales, and allegiance to a more class-based Labour Party (Morgan 1986).

The Industrial Revolution dramatically upheaved society. Prior, "Wales was a country of small towns, villages and isolated farms" (Powell 2002, p.34). By the early twentieth century, it was the world's second industrial nation after England.[5] The economic and demographic changes caused by industrialisation meant Wales could no longer be dismissed as a 'geographical expression' (see Morgan 1971, p. 153). The growth of new communities spurred the construction of chapels and cultural institutions. During the nineteenth century, religion became interwoven with a political Liberal national consciousness, as non-conformity's rise gave momentum to a Welsh nationalism.[6]

[5] Jones (2000) highlights the effects of industrialisation on population levels and distribution in Wales: from a population of just under 600, 000 in 1801, with 43% living in north Wales, by the turn of the twentieth century, "the population of Wales was over two million." Jones continues, "In the late eighteenth century, 80% of Welsh people lived in rural areas; at the beginning of the twentieth century 80% lived in industrial areas."

[6] The 1851 census of accommodation and attendance at worship (commonly referred to as the 1851 Religious Census) showed that nearly 4/5ths of those attending worship in Wales, went to a non-conformist chapel rather than to a Parish Church. Pragmatically, preaching was in Welsh "for the simple reason that that was the language of the people and the only language many of them could understand" (Morgan 1999, p. 328).

3.3 The 'New Voices' of Industrialised Wales

By the early twentieth century however, Wales' needs where increasingly seen as material, not spiritual, though the chapel and Welsh language remain key markers of a national identity (Griffiths 1995; Davies 2006); and whilst industrialisation in the south provided an alternative to migration, it exacerbated class conflict. The 'new voices' of industrialised Wales - stereotypically the colliers (see Manning 2014; Jones 1992) - represented "a very different vision of Wales' future, one associated with the political narrative of Labour rather than Liberalism, a narrative increasingly in English rather than Welsh" (Manning 2004, p. 522) as a national consciousness rapidly evolved into a class-based culture increasingly secular under socialist principles.

The socially dislocating effects of the great depression saw half a million people leave Wales to escape poverty (Jones 2006). For Labour, nationalist policy was "a luxury far removed from individual concerns of physical, intellectual and moral survival" (Jones 2006, p. 273), and by 1929 it was the largest political party in Wales (Jones 1992). Socialism was associated with progress, modernity and the English language (Manning 2004; Morgan 1999), and links between the Welsh language, religion and national identity detached.

Whilst loyalty to the left politically did signify a Welshness, these loyalties were "essentially causes to which people adhered, rather than embodying the essence of the nation" (Aughey et al. 2011, p. 24). Membership required solidarities with some communities and antagonisms against others (Jones 1992). Liberalism excluded on grounds of religion and franchise, it nevertheless could claim to have a nation-wide presence. Labour's appeal in contrast was not as geographically balanced. Labour upheld a working-class exclusivity rooted in the industrial heartlands, with Welshness constructed in terms of collectivist universal values. Class, not community, was the basis for action. Socialism was a doctrine of a centrally planned economy, with a Labour government able to plan from the UK centre posited by the majority as the solution to economic decline and social pressures (Bogdanor 1999, p. 152).

Described as "inaugurating a new hegemony" in Wales' political landscape (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006, p. 117), following its 1945 general election victory, Labour began developing the Beveridgean welfare state. This reinforced a centralist outlook and enshrined what Williams and De Lima (2006, p. 611, following Williams 1989) refer to as an assumed 'fit' between state, nation and welfare so that, in this sense, "the *British* welfare state represented a strategy of *national*ization, a 'nation-building' project" (2006, p. 611, emphasis in the original). Labour viewed Welsh nationalism as both sociologically irrelevant and economically unsound (Bogdanor 1999). In the first Welsh Day debate in the House of Commons in 1944 for example, Aneurin Bevan MP declared: "There is no Welsh problem" (HoC 1944); and later stated (HoC 1946):

> "Is it not rather cruel to give the impression to the 50,000 unemployed men and women in Wales that their plight would be relieved and their distress removed by [devolution]? It is not socialism. It is escapism. This is exactly the way in which nation after nation has been ruined in the last 25 to 50 years, trying to pretend that deep-seated economic difficulties can be removed by constitutional changes".

3.4 The Emergence of Plaid Cymru

It was the sustained decline of Welsh which really politicised the language, long seen as a signifier of Welsh culture (Bowen 1959; Jones 2007) and a critical feature of Welsh identity. This saw the emergence of Plaid Cymru, the nationalist party of Wales, during the 1920s.

Plaid focused a sense of identity on the language, thus nationalism was perceived an issue for a Welsh-speaking middle-class minority only by many in Labour (Fevre et al 1997) – a "denial of Welshness to the English-speaking Welsh" and "a bitter self-exclusion of the English-speaking Welsh from the Welsh people and the nation" (Williams 1985, p. 293). Some in Plaid moderated their essentialist and exclusionary constructs of identity; other claimed non-Welsh speakers were not Welsh (Dafydd Iwan 1966; cited in Merriman and Jones 2009, p. 356). The links between identity, place and language tended to divide not unite (Osmond 1998, p.1).

However, though initially driven by a fear Welsh would die out within a few generations and concerned with securing its status (Thomas 1986), and reversing a sense of lost community, during the 1960s, Plaid complemented its stance with economic positions. It emerged as an electoral force in the process (Gruffudd 1994; McAllister 1998) by attracting support from outside Welsh-speaking areas (Philip 1975, p. 117-8).[7]

3.5 The 1979 Referendum

Welsh nationalism became an organised political presence again. Economic prosperity gradually returned in the 1950s; with it, a self-confidence, making it "no coincidence that creeping devolution accelerated" (Jones 2006, p. 273). A national consciousness was renewed. Cardiff was proclaimed the capital city of Wales in 1958 and the Welsh Office was established in 1964; though a slow shifting of powers from Westminster to Wales did not "reflect any overall plan of devolution" (Bogdanor 1999, p. 158), it began underscoring a political distinctiveness.

Plaid and many in Welsh Labour called for political devolution under a model of participative democracy (McAllister 1998, p. 635; Royles, 2007). Wales was seen as underrepresented in UK politics and sufficiently different to vindicate independent representation. Labour first made this case in the mid-1960s, in calls for reforming local government (Bogdanor 1999, p. 163). In response to

[7] The decline in the numbers able to converse in Welsh highlighted in the 1951 census helped stimulate the growth of Welsh nationalist sentiment. The consensus in Plaid Cymru however was that the language could be preserved in the community, rather than through political measures. There was a sense of inevitability about the demise of Welsh, and along with it, chapel culture and nonconformist values (Morgan 1992, p. 336). However, in 1962, "Saunders Lewis delivered his BBC radio lecture *Tynged yr Iaith* in 1962 ('The Fate of the Language', broadcast in Welsh) (Lewis 1962). In it, he declared the language "more important than self-government" (Lewis 1962, p. 32) and provided an ideological rationale to the development of a contemporary Welsh linguistic nationalism (see Fowler and Jones 2008; Merriman and Jones 2009). Lewis' *Tynged yr Iaith* symbolic representation of the nation encouraged a reassessment of the role of Welsh in public life leading to the Welsh Language Act of 1967. Aimed at promoting its status, it provided a framework for the language beyond its traditional strongholds (Taylor 1991; Jones and Fowler 2007 p.348; Williams 2001; Merriman and Jones 2009). During the 1960s and 1970s there was also increasing support for Welsh language provision within English-speaking areas including educational provision (Mann 2006, p. 14; Morgan 1992, p. 338-9), a higher profile for Welsh, and eventually, the launch of the Welsh language channel S4C in 1982.

the Kilbrandon Commission,[8] the Labour government (1974 – 1978) passed the Wales Act 1978, which aimed to introduce limited self-government on condition of a referendum in favour.

The debates which followed however exacerbated the anxieties of a divided nation. Labour's anti-devolutionists argued that large centralised states were progressive and small regional autonomies reactionary[9] - not a rejection of a Welsh identity as such, but of nationalism as an ideology.[10]

In the 1979 referendum, the motion in favour of a National Assembly for Wales was defeated by an overwhelming majority of four to one of the Welsh electorate, keeping devolution off the agenda until its resurrection under New Labour.

3.6 The Conservative Era

1979 ushered in eighteen years of Conservative government and an increasingly polarised political spectrum; the welfare state was scaled-back, industry was restructured, leaving Wales, historically dependent upon rigidly narrow economic bases,[11] particularly vulnerable to Thatcherite free market policies. Whilst some suggest Wales' socio-political trajectory was different to England (Jarvis 2013; Jones and Scully) - pointing to the fight against competitive individualist policies which undermined Labour's class-based values of centralised economic planning, trade unionism and the welfare state -

[8] The Kilbrandon Commission was established to examine the constitutional structures of the UK and its constituent nations, and concluded in 1973.

[9] A stance well expressed by Neil Kinnock MP (HoC 1975): "I believe that the emancipation of the class which I have come to this House to represent, unapologetically, can best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic unit, by which I mean a unit where we can have a brotherhood of all nations, and have the combined strength of working-class people throughout the whole of the United Kingdom… Their misfortunes are not the result of being British, Welsh or Scottish."

[10] For 'no' campaigners, Welsh identity was compatible with support for centralist government (Labour 'No' Assembly Campaign, 1979; in Osmond 1999, p. 4): "We do not need an Assembly to prove our nationality or our pride. That is a matter of hearts and minds, not bricks, committees and bureaucrats". 'Yes' campaigners pitched their campaign in terms of equating identity with distinct political institutions (Osmond 1985), whereby the Labour tradition was associated with the constitutional status quo (Davies 2006, p. 117).

[11] First agriculture and later predominantly coal and steel.

others caution against this (Jones 1992); instead highlighting gains made by the Conservatives in Wales over consecutive general elections.

Welsh Labour however still dominated electorally, but the de-stabilisation of its traditional basis for support under Thatcherite reforms fired calls for strengthening Welsh political identity; partly also to curb Plaid's growing support (Tanner 2000; Evans and Trystan 1999) and address perceptions of a 'democratic deficit' (Morgan and Mungham 2000, p. 86) - although another effect of Conservative government was the deepening of Wales' civic institutions.[12]

Yet the 1979 referendum had scarred Welsh Labour, revealing deep divisions that could be exacerbated if the devolution debate were publicly rekindled (Wyn Jones and Lewis 1998, 1999); thus, consultation on their proposals was limited to party membership (McAllister 1998, p. 153)[13] and fleshed-out in *Shaping the Vision* (WLP 1995) and *Preparing for a New Wales* (WLP 1996).[14]
Thus, when Labour committed to a referendum on devolution in 1996,[15] they had their own party, the other parties and a largely uninterested public to engage (McAllister 1998; Wyn Jones and Lewis 1999).[16]

[12] Welsh-medium education was expanded; the Welsh language channel S4C was created; the functions of the Welsh Office increased; and there were more 'quangos' which provided a broader framework for expressing a language-based identity (Osmond 1999, p. 7).

[13] Labour set up a policy commission to outline its devolution proposals. However, it was "difficult to see the 'consultation process' as being anything more than a cosmetic exercise" (Wyn Jones 2001, p. 41). Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats calls for a convention were rejected by Welsh Labour (Western Mail, 28 November 1995). The attitude was: "Labour does not propose to alter this [Assembly] policy to accommodate the policies of parties who represent only a minority of the Welsh people" (Wales Labour Party 1995).

[14] Significantly, the documents outlined devolution in the context of local government and constitutional reform, within calls for administrative decentralisation. Thus, devolution was subtly reintroduced by pro-devolutionists under the pretext of restructuring local government (Deacon 1996).

[15] Apparently without consulting Welsh Labour (Wyn Jones and Lewis 1999, p. 42).

[16] In a methodological overview of analyses between the 1979 and 1997 referenda, Wyn Jones and Scully (2012, p. 66) point to the limited amount of survey data on political attitudes in Wales. Qualifying Wales' inter-referenda devolution attitudes is thus problematic.

3.7 New Labour

Following New Labour's 1997 landslide general election victory, the White Paper *A Voice for Wales* (HMSO 1997) outlined how an Assembly would embody "a new, more inclusive and participatory democracy" (HMSO 1997, p. 15). Devolution was framed in terms of consensus and partnership-building (McAllister 1998, p. 154); as offering "the people of Wales a new beginning, alongside other successful economic regions of Europe" (HMSO 1997, p. 5). *A Voice for Wales* mostly ignores issues of identity. The only reference is in a "pitch made for an instinctive desire for autonomy and then only in very unionist terms" (Bradbury 1997, p. 123):

> "…securely stated within the framework of a strong United Kingdom the Assembly will give the people of Wales a real chance to express their views and set their own priorities" (HMSO 1997, p. 31).

Described as "one of the greatest moments of political theatre in recent British political history" (Wyn Jones and Lewis 1999, p. 37), the Welsh electorate voted 'yes' to a National Assembly for Wales in a referendum by a margin of 0.3%.[17]

3.8 Welsh Devolution - "A Process Not an Event"

> "In the corridors of Cardiff Bay there is much whispering about 'the project' – legal, administrative and constitutional expansion on the part of the Assembly – but with no clearly articulated destination in view" (Rawlings 2001, p. 2).

[17] By 6,271 votes out of a potential electorate of 2,218,850 (see Dewdney 1997; Wyn Jones and Lewis 1999; Broughton 1998). Despite the different results at the 1979 and 1997 referenda, recent analysis found no decisive shift in pro-devolutionary tendencies between these years. There was a 4.1 per cent increase in the percentage of Welsh national identifiers at the 1997 referendum, but no significant change in the turn-out of Welsh identifiers or demographic shifts which could explain the different results (Jones 2003; Evans and Trystan 1999; Wyn Jones and Trystan 1999). Instead, the results are attributed to an increase in pro-devolution attitudes amongst Labour voters, partly due to cues from the party, and a shift in favour of devolution amongst many Welsh identifiers (Evans and Trystan, p. 107-9, in Taylor and Thomson, eds., 1999). Turnout analysis also suggests those against an Assembly were more likely to vote in 1979 than in 1997. Had they voted, the 1997 result would be reversed (Evans and Trystan, p. 109, in Taylor and Thomson, eds., 1999).

The remaining sections of this chapter focus on constitutional change and Welsh national identity during the Assembly's opening decade, arguing that from the outset, further devolved powers were needed to govern effectively, but that the Assembly needed to entrench.

Shaped by a culture of near constant constitutional change, the disjointed devolution process was unsatisfactory. But the inadequacy of the settlement can be counterbalanced against political pragmatism. Devolution was marked at the outset by lukewarm public support. This acted as a constraint. The challenges that arose out of the limited and piecemeal powers transferred to the Assembly can be offset by the progress on democratic reforms achieved; or as Wyn Jones put it: "While all politics may well be the art of the possible, this seems particularly true of the politics of Welsh devolution" (2013, p.19).

The 1997 referendum result set in motion a process of constitutional experimentation still in progress, characterised by increasing public support for the principle of devolved government and progressively more effective government by the legislative and executive branches. Nevertheless, it has been a model of evolving devolution, with considerable confusion over Wales' powers. In making its case, this chapter condenses devolution's opening decade into three phases:

Phase One: the Assembly as a corporate entity (modelled largely on local government), launched under an executive model of devolution.

Phase Two: the passing of the Government of Wales Act (2006), which split the executive and the legislative arms of the Assembly and granted limited law-making powers.

Phase Three: the Assembly's gaining of primary law-making powers, following another referendum in 2011.

To caveat, the following sections rely heavily on smaller qualitative studies. These tend to focus on political elites, rather than on public attitudes data, using methods such as elite interviewing in retrospective analyses. Robust social attitudes data for Wales on national identity and changes over time is limited.

Whilst the British Social Attitudes Survey has included questions on political attitudes, identity and constitutional preferences since the 1990s, Wales' sample is too small to provide reliable estimates. Whilst similar questions were included in probability surveys (1999-2007) (Curtice and Seyd 2009) and repeated in subsequent ad-hoc surveys (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012; Boon et al., 2012), significant gaps in the evidence on national identity in Wales remain, including a lack of longitudinal data, Wales-wide representative studies and of high-quality qualitative data.

3.9 Phase One: The Assembly as a Corporate Entity

Following the Assembly's first elections in May 1999, the constitutional arrangements which came into action represented an "unsettled settlement" (Davies and Osmond, p. 244 in Osmond and Jones eds., 2003) characterised by uncertainty and open-endedness. The Government of Wales Act 1998 limited the Assembly to making secondary legislation only when authorised by the UK Parliament under an executive model of devolution broadly equivalent to the powers held prior by the Secretary of State for Wales.[18] The Assembly formed an entity whereby the legislature (the government) and the executive (the Assembly itself) operated as one corporate body. This structure, coupled with the complex legislative processes, stifled the institution, and the limited prescription within the Act meant the internal framework of the Assembly needed filling-in (McAllister 1999, p. 640).

Whilst devolution was described in terms of inclusiveness, cooperation and openness – as releasing a dynamic which "will boost self-confidence within Wales" (Davies 1999, p. 7), underpinning the rhetoric was a pragmatism: "…the proposals were flawed – but politics is the art of the possible, and so we just got on with what we could" (Davies 2003). There was a sense of Wales advancing into the unknown (Bogdanor 1999; Bradbury 1997, p. 116). Devolution's effectiveness could not be tested until the actors and institutions were in place (Thomas and Laffin 2000).

Yet Ron Davies inherited rather than originated the devolution proposals, as "part of a compromise I had to accept to ensure support… I realised how

[18] In contrast to the primary law-making powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament

difficult this model would be to… provide effective government" (cited in Laffin and Thomas 2000, p. 566); demonstrated by the forced resignation of the original First Minister,[19] Alun Michael, following a no confidence vote just eight months in.[20]

The forced resignation was a critical event: Assembly Members were there to govern for Wales, not just administer centrally devised policies (Thomas and Laffin 2001, p. 29). It symbolised the Assembly asserting itself as a polity as, spurred by tensions between corporate and parliamentary models of government, a new Welsh political dynamic emerged that separated its legislative and executive functions (see Annex A). Next, developing wider legitimacy across Welsh society was key (Wyn Jones and Lewis 1999); across parties, a tactical debate developed aimed at entrenching the principle of devolution (Thomas and Laffin 2001). For the Assembly's new leader, First Minister Rhodri Morgan AM (2000):

> "Let's stop talking about what we can't do and let's get on with what we can do and do it… that is how we will win support for devolution and that is how the fragile flower will grow additive free, 100% natural, no artificial ingredient – organic devolution… and if we let that happen, it will be perfectly natural for the National Assembly to grow in status and authority with the full hearted support and consent of the people of Wales."

The Assembly's early years have been characterised as ones of instability by analysts, who describe a "highly flawed process of constitution building" and resultant "governmental structures and processes that have repeatedly proven inadequate to the task in hand" (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012, p. 55). On the Assembly's internal workings, inter-party cooperation and collaborative development "in pursuit of a more workable system" (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012, p. 42) are viewed to characterise this period.

[19] Then referred to as First Secretary.

[20] The vote of no confidence centred around two different perspectives on how the National Assembly should operate: the executive model (based largely on a local government structure) favoured by Alun Michael, and on which the Assembly was established; or the parliamentary model of government, which favoured separating the executive and legislative functions of the Assembly, favoured by the majority of Assembly Members.

Early studies on devolution found a substantial growth in support for devolution since 1997, but a sense the UK Government had too much influence, and the Assembly had made little difference (Jones and Scully 2004).

The lack of any real wider public excitement generated by the Assembly (Johnes 2012, p. 417) can be counterbalanced against analysis which demonstrates "how quickly the Welsh electorate came to accept devolution as the status quo" (Johnes 1992, p. 423). Devolution was viewed to be developing a civic consciousness (Osmond 2003, p. xxix); although Thompson and Day (2000) highlight the dangers of assessing the strength of civil society against civic identification with political institutions - it risks viewing antipathy towards devolution as evidence of a weak civil society, whilst also ignoring the broader range of civic activities occurring across Wales. In the immediate post-devolution years, Wales was not engaged in a broad devolution debate; discussions were mainly held by political by political class (Osmond 2003, p. xxx).

The Assembly was however evolving: "from an institution subordinate to Westminster into a parliamentary body with the potential, and the intention, of acquiring primary legislative powers" (Osmond p. xix 2003, in Osmond and Jones eds., 2003).

3.10 Phase Two: Limited Law-Making Powers for Wales

Putting Wales First (2002), an agreement between Welsh Labour and the Welsh Liberal Democrats, was a major step forward in this transformation because it established the Richard Commission. Its brief: to investigate the Assembly's powers and electoral arrangements.
Representing Wales' first meaningful cross-party debate on the process and future of devolution, the Commission aimed to foster public debate on the significance, operation and potential of devolved government (McAllister 2005). Its final report identified several key areas of constitutional instability, and included a recommendation for new UK legislation to give the Assembly primary law-making powers (Richard 2004, p. 248-50). The Commission is credited with deepening the debate on Wales' constitutional future (Davies 2003); though its

real impact lay in its contributions towards a framework to improve public policy delivery (McAllister 2005, p. 137).

Political pragmatism and efforts at reaching workable compromises within the Labour Party in both Wales and Westminster saw calls for more devolved powers made in democratic and socialist terms rather than in nationalist terms (Bradbury and Mitchell 2005). In response to the Commission, the UK Government passed the Government of Wales Act 2006, which formally separated the Assembly's executive and legislative functions, and clarified the roles as follows (see NAfW 2017 and Annex A):

- The *Welsh Government* (the First Minister, Welsh Ministers, Deputy Ministers and the Counsel General) became responsible for making and implementing decisions, policies and subordinate legislation.

- The Welsh Government's decisions and actions are kept in check by the *National Assembly* (the body of 60 elected Members), which also makes laws and represents the interests of the people of Wales.

The 2006 Act 2006 however rejected many of the Richard Commission's cross-party recommendations; its provisions were deliberately cumbersome, and the UK Government retained its law-making powers for all matters concerning Wales.[21]

Significantly however, there was provision within the Act for the Assembly to gain primary law-making powers in devolved areas without recourse to UK Parliament approval, through a referendum vote.[22]

[21] The Assembly would gain further powers in devolved areas on a gradual basis, either through Legislative Competence Orders (see Griffiths and Evans 2013) approved by the National Assembly and both houses of the UK Parliament, or through framework powers conferred directly on the Assembly through UK Government Acts of Parliament (NAfW 2017).

[22] Still, this provision of the Act differed significantly from the proposals of the Richard Commission in that only certain defined powers fell within the Assembly's law-making remit in contrast to, as in Scotland, all matters bar those reserved to the UK Parliament.

3.11 Phase Three: Primary Law-Making Powers for Wales

When passed, the Government of Wales Act (2006) was described by then Secretary of State for Wales, Peter Hain MP, as "settling the constitutional argument in Wales for a generation or more" (Morgan and Hain 2007). A year later however, moves were in place to bring primary legislative powers to the Assembly, as following the third Assembly elections (2007), Welsh Labour and Plaid entered into formal coalition, under the *One Wales* agreement.

The agreement included within its terms the promise of a referendum. The *All Wales Convention*, established to assess the Welsh public's views on a move towards primary legislative powers, concluded winning a referendum on the issue was achievable, but not guaranteed (AWC 2009; see also Stirbu and McAllister 2011).

Held in March 2011, the referendum's result in favour of further powers saw the Assembly's competences enhanced; for the first time, Wales could pass its own Acts in all devolved areas without recourse to UK Parliament.[23] The result represented public endorsement of devolution. In a decisive affirmative vote, 21 of Wales' 22 local authorities voted for further powers.[24] Generally, anti-devolutionists either accepted or embraced the political changes (Jarvis 2013). Adaptation was assisted by a relatively vibrant economy, "once devolution proved not to be an economic disaster or the end of the UK" (Johnes 2012, p. 446). Indeed, more favourable public perceptions reflected the appropriateness of Wales having its own governance mechanisms, rather than specific policy achievements.

Analysts however cited a "growing sense of Welsh political difference" (Jarvis 2013) as an outcome of Assembly legislation; with "some 56 per cent of the Assembly's subordinate legislation is either unique to Wales or substantively different from the equivalent legislation applying to England" (IWA 2007). This divergence is viewed to reflect a distinct political identity for Wales rather than socio-cultural issues (Jarvis 2013). The extent of any Welsh "otherness" within a British context therefore "should not be exaggerated" (Johnes 2012, p. 433).

[23] Thus, a move to Part Four of the 2006 Act was legitimised, whereby under its provisions, the Assembly now legislates directly on the subjects listed in Schedule 7.

[24] The twenty second (Monmouthshire) marginally voted 'no' by just 305 votes.

Post-devolution, many still self-identified as 'British' amongst the Welsh public (Johnes 2012, p. 412) and an exclusively 'Welsh' identity was determined to be no more commonplace than it had been twenty years previously (Taylor et al. 1999). Drawing from survey data collected between 1997 and 2012 Curtice (2013) found no long-term trend of an increase in 'Welsh' identifiers as opposed to 'British' - neither since the Assembly's launch, nor since its increase in powers.

In addition, any evidence of a "widespread public radicalism" underpinning a policy agenda committed to 'Clear Red Water' between Wales and England was limited (Wyn Jones and Scully 2004, p. 1). As discussed, the aspiration to increase democratic participation in policy-making - to "nurture a civic sense of identity" (Betts et al. 2001, p. 50; Davies 1999, p. 8) - was central to the devolution process. In efforts to differentiate Welsh Labour from the social policy agenda of New Labour and its association with Third Way politics (see Chapter Two), First Minister Rhodri Morgan emphasised the 'Clear Red Water' discourse: the notion that Wales was politically more 'radical' than England, based around concepts of Wales' "smallness and "Made in Wales" policies (Moon 2012).

However, a common motif within literatures is the unreliability of traditional notions of Wales' left-wing leanings as a framing device for contemporary notions of Welsh identity (Jarvis 2013). Instead, the general consensus is that there are no commonly shared socio-cultural markers for measuring a distinctively 'Welsh' identity (Fevre and Thompson 1999), so that for Bowie (1993, p. 169):

> "…one is not left not so much with a coherent notion of Welshness as with a sense of many conflicting and interlocking definitions of identity which actively compete for symbolic space and public recognition".

A national consciousness in terms of a civic identity however was developing. Wyn Jones and Scully (2012, p. 72) demonstrated a decrease in opposition towards devolution (from 37% in 1997 to 17% in 2009), attributed to "a growing sense of the appropriateness of a Welsh institution making major political decisions for Wales". According to their analysis, constitutional concerns played

a much greater role in the 2011 referendum result than socio-cultural identity issues, because they found how people voted related most strongly to how they though Wales should be governed (Wyn Jones and Scully 2012, p. 155).

Wales was developing a civic nationhood because the processes of devolution meant national identity had a new mode of expression: "distinctive, if not necessarily independent, political institutions" (Johnes 2012). For commentators, the Assembly represented "the novel idea that Welshness could be understood and felt in civic, national and unifying terms" (Aughey et al. 2011, p. 27); a sentiment anticipated by Ron Davies a decade prior (cited in Taylor et al. 1999, p. xix):

> "Devolution is not a response to dreams of national destiny, rather it is a recognition that in a complex modern world the notion of identity is an important one for people and their communities"

This notion that Wales can be conceptualised in relation to contemporary institutional affiliations in addition to, or even instead of, the more familiar markers of Welsh identity such as language, occupation or religion, recurs within the literature, problematising any generalisable notions of identity. Instead, Welshness can be understood in different ways: in civic, ethnic or simply emotional bonds. A challenge for devolution is nurturing an inclusive identity "based on identification with institutions and places, and the values they represent, rather than ethnic markers such as place of birth and ancestry" (Wyn Jones and Trystan 1999, p. 90).

3.12 Chapter Conclusions

> "The Welsh are in the process of being defined, not in terms of shared occupational experience or common religious inheritance or the survival of an ancient European language or for contributing to the Welsh radical tradition, but rather by reference to the institutions that they inhabit, influence and react to. This new identity may lack the ethical and political imperatives that characterised Welsh life for two centuries, but it increasingly appears to be the only identity available" (Jones 1992, p. 140)

This chapter aimed to broadly outline and contextualise the contestation of national identity over the years, with a focus on establishing a context sensitive approach to the analysis presented in the later empirical chapters.

An emphasis was on how Welshness is reproduced, often upon conflicting and contradictory notions of group identity, that compete for symbolic space and public acknowledgement. As summarised over the preceding sections, a cultural-national distinctiveness articulated during the nineteenth century was replaced slowly during the twentieth century in a fragmented, yet sustained, political imperative, based upon calls for greater autonomy.

Into the twenty first century, Wales has the tools for increasingly independent policy-making under a model of legislative devolution; and the latter part of this chapter approached political ambitions of identity-making in institutional terms: the notion that the Assembly's launch symbolises recognition of a territorial distinctiveness. As discussed in Chapter Two, there is not one discourse of citizenship, but multiple discourses – and languages – of citizenship. Citizenship is about membership of an imagined community, linked to the concept of the nation-state, and Welsh national identity can now draw-upon imaginations of a civic identity embedded in the notion of devolved citizenship.

Devolution and nation-building are ongoing processes, and whilst Wales has been portrayed as a nation lacking in self-confidence, a process of greater autonomy in political decisions - alongside a growing assertiveness amongst policy makers - has run parallel with an increase in public support for the principles of decentralisation and progressively more effective policy-making (through separating the Assembly's legislative and executive functions) (though not necessarily policies).

This process of increased legislative independence from the centre has been shaped by political ambiguities, opportunism and pragmatism, so that national identity is being reimagined under a unique set of constraints. The Assembly's capacity for action is framed by its constitutional powers, and should have curtailed its ability to pursue policies in development assistance.

Yet Wales for Africa was launched the same year as the Government of Wales Act 2006. Also discussed at Chapter Two, citizenship is about inclusion and exclusion, and a key area of work is about citizenship and difference, including in attempts at constructing a nation. How Wales, and relatedly, devolved citizenship and civic value, is constructed under the programme's nationalist and sustainability discourses, and to what practical effect, is explored further in the empirical work at Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

4 The Research Methods

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the methodological framework which structured the thesis' examination of recent attempts at nation-building in Wales - a sub-state region operating in the Western-context - within the context of sustainable development and, in particular, the emphasis placed on Wales' role in relation to international development. Using a case study methodology that takes Wales for Africa as its specific empirical subject, an interpretative approach, drawing mainly from qualitative methods, in combination with an interrogation of monitoring and reporting data, was adopted to explore the configuration of national identity through development policy and practice - and the tensions that arise in seeking to make connections between discourses of nationalism and sustainability.

As outline in Chapter One, this research was catalysed by a policy puzzle: Why did the government pursue policies on international development? – for the field is undevolved and, as concluded in the previous chapter, at first glance, appears far beyond Wales' competences for action. Thus, this research is concerned with the devolution process and new structures of spatial governance, and with how, as a group making project, a preoccupation of decentralisation lies with creating coherent institutions around which people can ascribe social meanings, understand themselves as citizens, and translate this into citizen action - through participating in development assistance.

Because the research is explicitly grounded in the particular contexts of policy-making in Wales, and on the role of sense or meaning-making as a social product, mainly qualitative methods were used to collect the data and address the research question; namely: 1), documentary analysis; participant observation; 2), the analysis of monitoring and reporting data; 3), information from semi-structured interviews with government officials, funded organisations, third sector organisations and volunteers participating in development activities; and 4), informal focus groups with the recipients of development support.

In outlining the methodological framework, this chapter is structured as follows: First, the case study as methodology is discussed by reference to the Wales for Africa programme as the unit of analysis. Next, the study design and methods of data collection and analysis are described, alongside the rationale for their use. Finally, the chapter concludes by summarising ethical considerations.

4.2 The Case Study as Methodology

The Methodological Approach

The methodology, as the "plan of action, process, or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods (Crotty 1998, p. 3), guided the formulation of an investigative process, linking this choice, and the methods used, to the desired outcome of addressing the research questions. The methodology therefore provided the principles for the research strategy: the "coherent set of methods, techniques and procedures for generating and analysing the research material" (Verschuren 2003, p. 122). As already noted, a qualitative case study methodology was adopted for this research, with case studies understood as:

> "…analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case study that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates" (Thomas 2011, p. 513).

Following the definition above, case studies therefore consist of two elements: the 'object' and the 'subject'. The former refers to the analytical lens framing the case - in this thesis, nation-building; the latter, to the practical unit, or subject, of the analysis, namely: an exploration of nation-building within the context of decentralisation, sustainable development, and specifically, Wales' role in relation to international development through the Wales for Africa programme.

Wales for Africa as the Subject of the Case Study

Wales for Africa is an appropriate subject of analysis for several reasons: 1), the trajectory towards the programme runs more or less in parallel with the establishment of devolved governance in Wales. Although small-scale, as discussed in greater detail in Chapters, Five, Six and Seven, it was an ambitious programme for the government to launch; 2), Chapter One noted the programme's innovation in using the Assembly's distinctive legal duty to promote sustainable development as an entry point into international development, even though the latter remains a reserved matter with DFID (see also Chapters Five and Six); and 3), the programme sought to coordinate and strengthen the vibrant place-based Wales-Africa links that already existed. This, as identified early in the research process, offered an excellent opportunity to explore national identity in the post-devolution context, because community links have been described by policy makers as a distinctively 'Welsh approach' to development assistance (see Chapter Seven).

The process of refining the subject of analysis from Wales for Africa to a more explicit focus on community links began in earnest as a result of two exploratory meetings with key stakeholders: one with a government policy official with responsibilities for overseeing the programme; and another with the lead official at the WCVA, responsible, at the time, for overseeing Wales' community-based development links with Africa, through the Wales Africa Community Links (WACL) programme. The rationale for focussing the study on community-based links was the significance placed by these key stakeholders on these activities, in that the links were: 1), viewed as a defining feature of Wales' development sector; 2), described as a key marker of the 'Welsh approach'; and 3), referred to by the WCVA as 'Citizen Initiatives' (see Chapter Two), with synergy claimed between Wales sector and a wider, Western European, phenomenon of citizen-led development initiatives.

Methodological literatures on the case study are underpinned by two commonalities: 1), commitment to studying the complexity of real life situations; and 2), an understanding of the case as more than the methods used to collect the data (Simons 2009). Taking Simons' (2009) first commonality, case studies are appropriate when the focus is on a phenomenon within some real-life

context (Yin, 2003, p. 1), thus are used to contribute towards understandings of individual group, organisational, social, political and related phenomena (Yin 2009, p. 4). Experimental knowledge can be accessed and, in presenting contextual and experimental accounts, researchers participate in knowledge construction. The case study therefore "allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events" (Yin 2003, p. 2), but to achieve this, they "need accurate description and subjective, yet disciplined interpretation" (Stake 2005, p. 459). Single cases are often selected because they are unusually revealing and / or present opportunities for novel research (Yin 2009; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), such as with the policy puzzle raised by Wales for Africa. As explicated in the conclusions to Chapter Two, Wales for Africa, as the subject of the case, can help develop theory and make an original contribution to knowledge by illuminating and extending relationships among constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 26); specifically for the purposes of this research, between nationalism, decentralisation, identity and development assistance.

On Simons' (2009) second commonality, the case study is not a method in itself (Hartley 2004, p. 323; Titcher et al. 2000, p. 42), but instead, is defined in terms of its theoretical underpinnings (Hartley 2004, p. 324; Stake 2000, p. 435), so there is flexibility in choosing the methods by which to explore the case. Yet there is some disagreement within the literature on this; some suggest the exclusive use qualitative methods, others encourage a mixed-methods approach (Verschuren 2003; Yin 20099; Lee 1999), whilst others again advocate the use of any method that contributes towards a greater understanding of the case (Thomas 2011, p. 512). This research followed the latter's advice, for selecting the most appropriate methods for addressing the research objectives, regardless of type, was considered key.

It was crucial for Wales for Africa to be well explored by this research, so that its substance, as the phenomenon under investigation, could be revealed (Yin 2003; Stake 1995). Such a preoccupation pinned the research philosophically under a constructivist perspective. Such perspectives are based upon an appreciation of reality as socially constructed (Searle 1995), the "irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action" (Ruggie 1998, p. 856), and an understanding that (Weber 1949 p. 81, emphases in the original (cited in

Ruggie 1998, p. 856)): "We are *cultural beings*, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it *significance*". This capacity gives rise to 'social facts', which rely upon people agreeing that they exist, and usually depend upon institutions for their existence. The concept of truth therefore is subjective, and dependent upon people's perspective (Searle 1996), which lent itself to IPA, and specifically, the centrality it affords to discourse and enabling research participants to tell their stories (see Crabtree and Miller 1999), so that a focus is on what they ascribe significance to. Through the stories told about Wales for Africa, actors - the sub-state and citizens - could describe their versions of reality, thus the author could gain a better understanding of participants' actions (see Baxter and Jack 2008).

IPA is an explicitly non-linear process. It began in this case with the author's perception of a policy puzzle which needed further exploration, further refined as the author judged what material was relevant. Framing the research in this way enabled an understanding of policy communities as dynamic, not necessarily fixed around formal institutions (Wenger 1998); and supported the proposition of social meanings and practices as under constant re/configurement, evolving through the knowledge transfer between communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998). As well as aiding the study's refinement to a focus on community-based development links, thinking in this way structured the constructs under investigation by allowing for a conceptual widening of what constituted a policy community - beyond the formal institutions of devolved government, to include key stakeholders instrumental to Wales' development discourse, such as NGOs, civil society organisations and citizen actors.

Practically speaking therefore, the subject of the case provided plenty of opportunity for informed, in-depth investigation and analysis, and dialogue with key stakeholders, which included an exploration of broader shifts on ways in which devolution has shaped Wales' development sector.

Establishing the Subjects of the Case

Following the exploratory meetings, and the meanings ascribed to Citizen Initiatives by a key stakeholder, the desk-based analysis formally started with a scoping review of fourth pillar and Citizen Initiative literatures, where constructs and lines of enquiry cultivated around citizen participation in development assistance, and their relevance for rights-based approaches. This formed the beginnings of the theoretical framework, which provided coherence to the analytical frame through which the case was explored. Given the dynamism of the policy process, too tight a theoretical framework at the desk-based research phase could have undermined the study by "making the data fit the framework – or failing to see the unexpected" (Simons 2009, p. 33). In an attempt at mitigating against this, once a working draft of the literature review was completed, the subject of the case was refined further, to specific activities supported by Wales for Africa at project level. This aided more in-depth empirical analysis.

As noted in Chapter One, Wales for Africa began supporting community linking activities through a grant to the WCVA, used to solidify then strengthen the WACL programme, which ran from 2006, initially under the Gold Stars project, until 2015, when it was merged as part of the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration (see Annex G and Chapter Six). The study adapted, from an initial focus on community links under WACL, to the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration, and a focus on community-linking activities confirmed the significance of three charities to Wales' development sector, two of which pre-existed the Wales for Africa programme; namely: Dolen Cymru; the Partnerships Overseas Networking Trust (PONT); and the Cardiff-based charity, the SAFE Foundation (SAFE), awarded a 'Gold Star Partnership Link' award (see Annex G), by the government for "empowering communities to work together to facilitate participation in decision making, develop and support projects based on locally identified priorities" (WG 2014) (see Chapter Six).

Refining the Case Study to the Tororo District, Uganda

Further exploration confirmed the relevance of SAFE to a study on citizen-led development initiatives – the charity was set-up by an individual following a period of travelling, and exhibits an energetic approach to citizen engagement in development, with close ties to Wales for Africa. SAFE therefore provided an

opportunity to respond both to requests for in-depth research on citizen-led solidarity initiatives (Kinsbergen 2014), and to questions around what becoming more established within the development sector means for the identity of these organisations (Develtere and De Bruyn 2009) (see Chapter Two).

The example of SAFE also offered insight into the link between the charities Vale for Africa and the Tororo Community Initiated Development Association (TOCIDA) in Uganda. SAFE is a trustee of Vale for Africa, a community-based link in the Vale of Glamorgan, and both organisations are partnered with TOCIDA, based in the Tororo District, Uganda. A focus on the partnership between these three organisations provided opportunities for insights into collaborations between citizen-led initiatives operating in the Western-context and their overseas partners, and also, because the partnership is focussed on the Tororo District, facilitated an insight into a region identified as a key strand of activity by Wales for Africa in its programme of work (see Chapter Six). For these reasons, the investigation was extended to Tororo in Uganda, where following a period of work experience / participant observation in the SAFE office, an invite was extended to the author for her to participate in a joint initiative between SAFE and TOCIDA to plan and build clay ovens on three different sites in the Tororo District. Data on this activity was collected from focus groups with Ugandan participants, participant observation and interviews with volunteers operating from the Welsh-context, during a three-week volunteer trip to the Tororo District in summer 2015.

In summary, Wales for Africa is the subject of the analysis, explored within the context of decentralisation, sustainable development, and specifically, Wales' role in relation to international development. The study was refined to focus on its supported community links activities - first WACL, then the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration. The subject of the analysis was then further refracted, through a detailed exploration of the SAFE-TOCIDA and the Vale for Africa-TOCIDA links, which culminated in a visit to the Tororo Region, Uganda.

4.3 The Research Design

This section sets-out the framework used for the collection and analysis of data on how policy-makers have connected the discourses of sustainable development and nationalism to reimagine the Welsh nation. It builds from the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, where a conceptual framework was developed through which to explore Wales for Africa through the lens of both the *sub-state* and the *citizen* as development actor. That is: from the top-down (i.e. *the sub-state as development actor*), whereby the officialised policy discourse creates the story which determines the possibilities for action; and from the bottom-up (i.e. *the citizen as development actor*), to capture citizen participation in supported activities.

In this thesis, Wales' devolved institutions of government are conceptualised both as policy actors in their own right and as policy forums for the participation of individual actors; that is, as both policy actors and arenas (Jorgensen 2004, p. 11). The boundaries between the phenomenon under study and the context were not clearly defined (see Yin 2003, p. 13-14); thus, various data sources were used to explore multiple aspects of the case, and the subject of the case was refined as the research progressed. Case studies tend to lean towards qualitative data collection methods. In the study, data from interviews, documentary evidence, observations and focus groups was supplemented with the inclusion of quantitative monitoring and reporting data.

The research process was characterised by the linking of social theory (deduction) and empirical evidence (induction) in an evolving, dynamic process guided by abductive and retroductive inference, aimed at making explicit the links between the empirical analysis and the author's real-world experiences. In contrast to purely inductive research, which moves directly from empirical observations to theoretical inferences, abductive inference is aimed at identifying data beyond the initial theory (Meyers and Lunnay 2006) in a process of interpreting and then re-contextualising the empirical constructs under investigation within the wider conceptual framework provided by existing literatures (Danemark et al. 1997, p. 81). That is, whilst the process of retroduction is based on instinct or assumptions, and abductive reasoning moves from an incomplete observation to a best explanation for that

observation, deductive reasoning from a general rule based upon social theory to a specific conclusion, and inductive reasoning from a specific observation to a general conclusion, taken together, a research process guided by abductive and retroductive inference enabled the refining and redevelopment of the research through moving between these reasonings.

This provided flexibility to the analytical process so that a more rounded account of the empirical outcomes identified through the fieldwork phase could be explored. It also challenged the author's initial assumptions, for example, around the importance attributed by key stakeholders to Citizen Initiatives (see Chapter Seven), or the significance of the Network for Regional Governments on Sustainable Development (nrg4SD) to Wales for Africa (see Chapters Five and Seven), by encouraging both reflexivity throughout the research processes and the checking and rechecking of understandings against multiple data sources at various time points of the study. For Ragin (1994, p. 55): "Social research, in simplest terms, involves a dialogue between ideas and evidence", and the process of retroduction, described as "an instinctive mode of inference" (Meyers and Lunnay 2006), makes explicit how the "researcher moves between knowledge and observable events" because it encourages the researcher to challenge his or her 'common sense' assumptions, and recognises that 'knowledge' cannot be reduced to observable events (Meyers and Lunnay 2006).

The linking of social theory and empirical evidence in an evolving, dynamic process guided by abductive and retroductive inference not only challenges the researchers positionality but is also aimed at appreciating "how specific human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, p. 10). This approach is associated with IPA because it puts the emphasis on the role of interpretation (see Fischer 2003; Wagenaar 2011). IPA is about exploring what a policy means, rather than simply providing causal explanations for how it came about. For this study, an approach was needed that did not over-emphasise technocratic forms of policy-making, but recognised the deliberative practices of policy formation and implementation. The analysis was refined as the research *and* the policy progressed, and more distinct lines of enquiry developed.

The approach adopted provided flexibility in the analytical approach to account and adapt to the shifting parameters of the policy arena under investigation, which included: the end of the Wales Africa Community Links grant; the launch of the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration; the passing of the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act (2015); and the launch of *Prosperity for All* (WG 2017), the Welsh Government's post EU-referendum strategy for government. These developments were viewed as part of "an iterative process of researcher sense-making which cannot be fully specified *a priori* because of its unfolding, processual character" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, p. 78). Instead, the research design was re/defined by moving between the secondary and primary data, in a reflexive process of data generation and analysis, within the context set by a fast-paced policy environment.

Building flexibility into the research design was key for two reasons: 1), the dynamic nature of the policy process itself. To make explicit the link between the empirical analysis and the author's experience "…the researcher starts with what [s]he knows, as encapsulated in the original design, but [her] investigation builds on itself in a reiterative, recursive fashion" (Wagenaar 2011, p. 10). The author refined the research design as devolution progressed and Wales for Africa developed, and modified where necessary assumptions from earlier phases of the research; and 2), in primary interpretative research, it is the researcher who participates "in the locals' activities, in their setting, on their turf" (Wagenaar 2011, p. 10). The participants therefore were not viewed as research 'subjects' *per se*, but were recognised as having their own agency. During fieldwork, the process of abduction meant exploring the understandings and opinions of the *situated* actor. Thus, changes to the research setting during the process of the research were expected as the author sense-made the empirical world around her during participant observation – at times, as part of the 'formal' policy process (for example, in producing *Wales for Africa: 10 Years, 2006 - 2016* (WG 2016b); see Chapter One and this chapter), and others, as a citizen-actor in development assistance (for example, volunteering for SAFE).

4.4 Research Methods

Research methods are the "techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data" (Crotty1998, p. 3). As already noted, this study drew mainly from qualitative methods, and in keeping, was iterative and reflexive (Srivastava and Hopwood 2009). The data collected was analysed across data sets to help clarify emerging issues and meanings, and through this mixing, each method revealed its own aspects and part of the phenomenon under analysis (Cochrane 1998, p. 2130). This cross-referencing was one way in which issues of quality in the research process were addressed. The methods used are outlined below.

Theory of Change

Theory of Change-thinking helped give coherence to the analysis. The purpose of designing a theory of change is to understand the 'change' a programme is anticipated to bring about, and thus, it is an outcomes-based approach appropriate for the depiction of complex social programmes, such as Wales for Africa. The recommended starting point for developing a theory is to identify the need to be addressed, the direction of the desired change, and the desired outcome (EU 2015). In the study, this involved setting out the rationale behind the programme into a framework within which its inputs, activities or outputs, outcomes and anticipated longer-term impacts where outlined, then read together, used to depict the change anticipated by policy-makers. A logic model is a closely related method, sometimes referred to as an intervention logic or programme theory, which depicts, graphically, the logic of a policy, to describe the key components and interacting relationships of an intervention.

Increasingly used within the development sector by governmental, bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies (Retolaza Eguren 2011; Jones 2011; Jones and Hearn (2009), NGO's (Christian Aid 2007; James 2011), civil society organisations (Reeler 2007) and research programmes (Burge 2010; Batchelor 2010; Vogel 2012), Theory of Change is also used by research funders, donors and policy makers more generally, in the design and delivery of a range of public policy interventions, including, for example, those supported through EU funding programmes in Wales (see EU 2015).

Here, it is recognised that experimental models are often inappropriate for evaluating social change, but through theories of change, the links between an intervention and evidence of change can still be explored. Yet despite their increasing use in policy practice, a review commissioned by DFID (Vogel 2012) found no single definition, no set methodology, and considerable variation in terms of their implementation. This study drew from Mason and Barnes' (2007, p. 156) notion of theory construction, where Theory of Change (Mason and Barnes 2007, p. 167):

> "… should be understood less as an approach which tests the robustness of the 'theory' and its implementation, than as providing a framework within which it is possible to construct a narrative of the process of implementation and its consequences."

Drawing from the notion of narrative and theory construction (Mason and Barnes 2007), this research analysed semi-structured qualitative interview transcripts, policy documents and monitoring and reporting information, to articulate retrospectively: 1), *what* (outcomes) the Wales for Africa programme intended achieving (in the short, medium and longer term) through supporting citizen-led development initiatives; 2), *how* (action) they expected to achieve these outcomes; and 3), *why* the proposed actions were expected to deliver the intended medium and longer-term outcomes (rationale and impact). The approach provided the author with a framework within which to organise material related to the change anticipated by policy-makers. Though the approach created a top-down vision of change, speaking to government interests rather than on-the-ground realities, it did create a space for critical reflection, proving a useful tool through which to reflect on the programme's strategies and intended outcomes. By constructing a narrative, it was also possible to present a visual representation of the anticipated change through the production of a logic model which helps provide structure and coherence to the policy story (see Chapter Six). The theory constructed was an attempt at making explicit Wales' changing policy dynamics, and its impacts upon programme activities and outcomes, through an emphasis on understanding the context within which Wales for Africa operates.

The process of constructing the theory is summarised as follows: 1),first, support for the research project from key stakeholders was secured in principle from the Wales for Africa Team and the WCVA, which laid the groundwork for access to key stakeholders and data collection methods; 2), drawing from the exploratory meetings and the documentary analysis, key stakeholders were identified, to map the development of Wales for Africa and supported activities; 3), a comprehensive outline of the NGOs and civil society organisations supported by the Wales for Africa programme were identified through the monitoring and reporting data, stakeholders were recruited to the research, and a number of initiatives were explored in more detail through semi-structured interviews, participant observation and monitoring and reporting data; 4), as a result of the relationships established during the research process, the author was invited to help develop *Wales for Africa: 10 Years, 2006 - 2016* (WG 2016b), and the author gained permission to use additional, unpublished, monitoring and reporting data for this study.

To sum, from the evidence gathered, a narrative was developed that allowed the author to reflect on the programme's implementation and its consequences, as well as on its achievements, the challenges, and guiding rationale. This framework was further refined following the changing political contexts of the programme, and the findings of the participant observation.

Documentary analysis

A review of published and unpublished (available on request) government policy documents pertinent to Wales' discourses of sustainable development and international development activities was undertaken. These documents produced by the sub-state were understood to constitute the official discourse of the state, and obvious instances in which the text served a political purpose, constructing particular meanings and symbols that aim to foster nodal points or part fixations around Wales' infrastructures of devolved government, and mobilise a sense of national citizenship as a form of group identity.

Policy documents act as central points of interaction "between the politics of policy production and the politics of policy interpretation" (Gale 1999, p. 394). In this way therefore, they can produce social effects through the production and maintenance of consent (Codd 1988), and policy subjects can adjust/or and re-

write policy, so that policy texts "carry with them both possibilities and constraints, contradictions and spaces" (Bowe, Ball and Gold 1992, p15), and Wales' sustainability policies in practice depend upon the compromises and accommodations to these factors in particular settings.

Together with an analysis of published strategies, reports, speeches, and proceedings from the Assembly and the UK Parliament, media reports, peer reviewed journal articles and third sector and civil society documents, this method constituted a key means of pulling together evidence on the social meanings ascribed to Wales' role in development assistance.

Key informant interviews in Wales

Pre-arranged semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key government and non-government stakeholders. The government's international development activities are grounded in contemporary post-devolution politics and the operations of the administrative state, where responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policy lies with administrative decision-makers (Fox and Miller 1998). Policy experts, as well as elected officials, shape decisions. Thus, the first set of interviews was with government officials and officials from supported organisations, so as to gain a 'sub state' perspective to frame the initial analysis. These interviews were organised around a set of open-ended questions tailored for each interviewee. Some questions emerged from the documentary analysis, others through the participant observation work, and others from the topics which arose at interview. Probes were used so that the important points were covered. In-depth interviews were also conducted with key stakeholders from SAFE, Dolen Cymru and Vale for Africa.

In total, 12 key informant interviews were conducted between summer 2015 and autumn 2016: two with policy officials; four with officials from supported activities (Wales Africa Community Links; the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel; and Hub Cymru Africa); one with Dolen Cymru; two with Vale for Africa; and three with SAFE. A small number of interviews were conducted for three main reasons: 1), the small-scale of the development sector in Wales, aided by the small-scale nature of government, with a comparatively small number of people directly involved in the Wales for Africa programme; 2), the exploratory nature of the interviews meant the information sought could be gathered via interviews

with a small number of key informants; and 3), the participant observation as method, coupled with the novel opportunities for research access which arose during the course of the thesis, afforded plenty of occasions for less formal ad-hoc conversations.

Interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 1.5 hours – long enough to build rapport but not too long so as interviewee fatigue set in. Interviews were recorded (on two recording devices, in case one failed), so as to minimise note-taking and ensure the intricacies of the conversation were captured. Key bullets were noted during interview, and after interview, notes were made to expand on the narrative, recap the main points and capture anything that the recording device could not pick up. Recordings were transcribed in full as soon as possible to aid methodological rigour. Interviews were held in a place and time of the interviewee's request.

Interviewing was used as a less formal, opportunistic, method during participant observation through which to explore the experiences and viewpoints of different stakeholders on what aspects of the case were prominent, why they acted the way they did in the particular circumstances and what lay behind their judgements and perspectives. The participants were informed of the author's research, key details were noted in the field notes, and any points of clarification followed up either in person, via email or in a phone call.

Whilst some practical challenges associated with interviewing 'elites', such as government officials, are well documented, in this study, those interviewed were concerned with issues of social justice and the principles of democratic engagement and openness in political process. They were therefore receptive to balanced questioning from the author, open to a critique of programme, and also shared additional materials, such as, for example, monitoring and reporting information, in an effort to promote transparency.

Interviewers however are advised to be well-prepared, to provide credible questions, and meet interviewee expectations (Hertz and Imber 1995). Whether with policy-makers, practitioners or volunteers, in this study, an open-ended questioning technique was used at interviews so that interviewees could focus on what was important to them. A tailored topic guide with set probes was

developed, so the author could draw the interview back and get the relevant data, where required. The topic guide enhanced the quality of the data. It highlighted what to focus on if the time was limited, introduced an element of comparability across some transcripts, and was flexible enough so that unexpected answers could be explored in interviews. During the research design and interviewing process, the author was mindful that subjects were not obliged to try and be objective, for interviewees have a purpose in the interview too: "they have something they want to say" (Berry 2002). Those interviewed often discussed their work, justifying what they did, but because the emphasis was on the interviewee's point of view, on what and how they ascribed social meanings, this was unproblematic, and the transcripts were triangulated against other data sources.

Review of Wales for Africa monitoring data

Monitoring and reporting data on supported activities, from the launch of Wales for Africa in 2006, to its ten-year anniversary in October 2016, was also collected, then collated, interrogated and used to map the programme's resources, inputs and outputs. This included: financial reports from Wales for Africa, Wales Africa Community Links, Wales Africa Health Links and Hub Cymru Africa; press releases from Wales for Africa, Wales Africa Community Links and Hub Cymru Africa; Ministerial statements; monitoring reports from Wales Africa Health Links and Hub Cymru Africa; grant applications; audit assessments; feedback from engagement exercises; and advice and guidance for development projects.

Participant observation in the field

The Wales for Africa case also provided opportunities for novel research access (see Yin 2009; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) through participant observation, which occurred in four key ways: 1), as noted in Chapter One, the author worked for the government during the latter part of the study, which helped her gain access to some stakeholders classed as part of the officialised discourse, and therefore representing the sub-state as development actor, and to monitoring and reporting data. This assisted a deeper understanding of the policy-making process through her context-specific lived experiences, which also made it easier to keep abreast, and confirm the significance of, policy developments (the ethical aspects, alongside some benefits and limitations of

this involvement, are discussed in the concluding sections of this chapter); 2), the author attended Wales for Africa supported conferences and workshops, and volunteered at Fair Trade Wales and SAFE events, which aided the identification of 'gatekeepers', and facilitated access to key stakeholders. Casting the net widely in the early days and building on contacts made prior to the research helped highlight what was relevant. 3), the author also volunteered for a number of months with SAFE at their office in Cardiff. Perhaps the most valuable contribution ethnographic work can make is to engage with the world's 'messiness' (Crang and Cook, 2007) - with how 'real world research', "unlike its pristine and logical presentation in journal articles… is often confusing, messy, intensely frustrating, and fundamentally non-linear" (Marshall and Rossman 1989, p. 21). The work with SAFE facilitated a deeper understanding of the opportunities and constraints under which citizen-led initiatives are operating, and provided the author with first-hand experience of citizens' performing as development actors. 4), finally, the author was also a volunteer-participant-observer during fieldwork in the Tororo District, Uganda, on a SAFE-TOCIDA organised clay oven building project. During this process, a research diary was kept and volunteers representing SAFE and representatives from TOCIDA were informally interviewed.

The task "for *all* researchers is to recognise and come to terms with their/our partial and situated 'subjectivity'" (Crang and Cook 2007, p. 13), and this became particularly pronounced for the author during her time spent learning with other people whilst building clay ovens. Here, the author was able to participate directly without experience, as all – Welsh and Ugandan participants – learnt together. During this three week visit, the community linking and 'community' of volunteers was studied, but as a discrete time and place bound project (see Hannerz 2003). Boundaries between on the field and academic experiences often blurred for the author during participant observation, as her relationships and identity became wrapped-up in an ever-changing research process. The standard is to build empathy and rapport in ethnographic work, but in many cases, for this study, relationships pre-existed the research. This raised issues of practical ethics. There was an expectation that participants would be frank with their feelings, so the author was with hers, so that intersubjective understandings could be developed.

A research diary was kept as a key part of recording the participant observation process, to detail relevant conversations and observations. Qualitative research involves informal participant observation, and writing and sketching in the research diary complemented the more formal data records, aiding the 'mapping' of connections between stakeholders, descriptions of people and places, lines of enquiry, theoretical and conceptual musings, and self-reflections, for example. In Uganda, the diary also included sketches aimed at locating the setting and 'grounding' the scene. Indeed, keeping a written diary was particularly important for reasons of practicality also in the Tororo District. It has a tropical monsoon climate, and the electricity supply in the accommodation came from one solar panel, with the supply mostly unavailable and often knocked-out by Tororo's many thunderstorms.[25] At the end of a day working on clay ovens, diary entries were often written in candle light on the veranda, with storms sweeping past, and fellow volunteers for company. Many conversations initiated by volunteers during these periods reflected on the tensions that came with 'trying to do good' as a Westerner working towards development outcomes in a Southern-context, which were more often than not, impossible for participants to reconcile. This is expanded upon in the concluding sections of this chapter.

To sum, as a result of the initial policy puzzle, and the conclusions of the literature review, the data collection phase of the research was approached with specific questions in mind. The process of using the data collection methods was continually refined throughout the research, and the data was supplemented with learning from less formal methods, including conversations, fact-finding, sketching, web-searching, photography and reading. This produced multiple forms of transcripts, monitoring data, textual materials, and field notes. The kind of data the methods helped build, alongside the participants recruited to the research, shaped the research scope. In addition, the author did not know how research participants would assist her until fieldwork had commenced, thus unanticipated research opportunities also shaped the study (for example, drafting WG 2016b). An overview of the methods used to address each research question is in Figure 3.1.

[25] According to Tororo's Wikipedia entry, "it may be the place where thunder occurs on more days than any other place on earth". See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tororo [Accessed 31st March 2017]

Figure 3.1: The Methods Used to Collect the Data

Methods	Source
RQ.1. ***The sub-state as development actor:*** How does the international development agenda converge with ambitions of nation-building?	
➢ Documentary analysis	Documents included: a) the public policy record, e.g. strategies, reports, speeches, and proceedings from the National Assembly for Wales and the UK Parliament; b) peer reviewed journal articles; and c) third sector and government independently commissioned reports.
➢ Interviews	With Welsh Government, Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel and Hub Cymru Africa officials, Dolen Cymru
RQ.2. ***The Wales for Africa programme:*** *How has Wales for Africa built a political community of practice?*	
➢ Documentary analysis	Documents included: a) the public policy record, e.g. strategies, reports, speeches, and proceedings from the National Assembly for Wales and the UK Parliament; b) peer reviewed journal articles, and c) third sector and government independently commissioned reports.
➢ Interviews	With Welsh Government officials, and representatives from Hub Cymru Africa, Dolen Cymru, Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel, the SAFE Foundation and Vale for Africa.
➢ Monitoring data	Analysis of Wales for Africa reporting and monitoring data, including financial records, for all supported activities, from the launch in 2006 up to the end of March 2016.
➢ Observation	Attended Wales for Africa and Wales Africa Health Links conferences, networking and training events and worked in a voluntary capacity to produce a report with the Wales for Africa Team and Hub Cymru Africa, which was launched at the 10 years of Wales for Africa conference in October 2016.
RQ.3. ***The citizen as development actor:*** Does the Wales for Africa programme support the strengthening of the citizen as development actor, through encouraging new actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both?	
➢ Documentary analysis	Documents included: a) the public policy record, e.g. strategies, reports, speeches, and proceedings from the National Assembly for Wales and the UK Parliament; b) peer reviewed journal articles; and c) third sector and government independently commissioned reports.
➢ Monitoring data	Analysis of Wales for Africa reporting and monitoring data, including financial records, for all supported activities, from the launch in 2006 up to the end of March 2016.
➢ Interviews	With Welsh Government officials, and representatives from Hub Cymru Africa, the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel, Dolen Cymru, the SAFE Foundation, Vale for Africa and TOCIDA.
➢ Observation	Attended Wales for Africa and Wales Africa Health Links conferences, networking and training events. Volunteered on an ad-hoc basis with SAFE; participated in the SAFE-TOCIDA clay oven-building project, Uganda.
➢ Focus group	Conducted two focus groups with Ugandan recipients of the clay oven-building training.

4.5 Interpretive Policy Analysis

This section expands on the interpretive approach towards policy analysis adopted for this study. As already noted, IPAs defining feature is its focus on meaning-making, thus, interpretive policy analyses are situation-specific. Commonly, they focus on the language used in policy debates, and other constructs, such as people's actions, or the objects they use in those acts, which help convey policy and organisational meanings (Yanow 2007), and can therefore prove a productive means through which to explore the role of discourse in wide-ranging societal and cultural developments, such as through Wales' discourses of sustainability and nationalism.

In practice therefore, IPA helped structure the analysis, particular because, to paraphrase Yanow (2007, p. 111), it accommodated how the boundaries between the methods of research and the methods of practice are not always clear, perhaps most apparent in this case during: 1), the author's involvement in, and embedded understanding of, Wales' policy-making processes; 2), her role as a volunteer in SAFE (which built on prior contacts); and 3), her capacity as a volunteer-participant-observer in the clay oven building project.

IPA begins from the insight that "…to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, the beliefs and preferences of people involved" (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p. 1). Wagenaar (2014) cites as "all the necessary elements" of IPA: "political actions, institutions, meaning, and the reality-shaping power of meaning". For him: "Meanings are not just representations of people's beliefs and sentiments about political phenomena; they fashion these phenomena". Thus, "policies, in general, are not only instrumental-rational acts, but are also expressive of human meaning" (Yanow 2014, p. 37).

Social meanings therefore are constitutive of political actions, governing institutions, and public policies (Bevir and Rhodes 2004, p. 130), and narrative storytelling, such as that produced by adopting a theory of change-informed approach in this study, helps to frame the issues, both practical and conceptual, of policy practice (Rein 1976, p. 83; Rein and Schon 1996).

Policies represent and transmit the stories polities tell about themselves and other publics about its identity and values. As part of this process, the meanings within the stories are produced and reproduced, and an interpretive approach to policy analysis helped the author identify how this happens. For example, drawing on data from academic outputs, policy documents and interviews, Chapter Five outlines the government's development of a framework for international action as the effect of social constructions stemming from its legal duty to promote sustainable development.

In policy-making, discourses ascribe meanings from their relative positioning, emphasis or relationship with other discourses or context, so that policy discourse is described as "a double-hinged door" (Gale 1999, p. 395) because it both produces and interprets text. Because "[p]olicy texts, policy production and policy producers change within and across contexts" (Gale 1999, p. 398; see also Ball 1994), a rigid definition of policy risks separating the policy process from its context "…for values, interests and resources do not float free, waiting to link together in an ever changing array of combinations" (Davis et al. 1993, p. 4). Thus, it follows, policies cannot be neatly encapsulated within clear boundaries, and the analytical approach adopted for this research needed to adapt to the shifting governance contexts of post-devolution Wales, understood as the result of persuasive discourses that open-up new spaces.

According to Hajer (1993, p. 44): "Whether or not a situation is perceived of as a political problem depends on the narrative in which it is discussed". Government policy action in the field of development involves a conscious exercise of power by key actors in Wales, as they position themselves in broader narrative or debates. Approaching policy as discourse provided insights into this interplay, because policy questions, definitions and understandings, and the policy context, including the parameters of argumentation, language and deliberation in policy making, are framed by discursive practices, and underpinned by normative assumptions.

The spaces for political participation are ambiguous, produced for one reason, often used differently in practice (Cornwall 2002). As a result, political discourses are constantly being reconfigured, both within and across spaces for participation, and within these spaces, the practices associated with participation are informed by particular ways of thinking about society. A task at the analysis therefore was to conceptualise the government's policy-making space; to investigate how international development was thought about, by exploring how specific discourses became dominant (in this case, how international development entered Wales' political lexicon), through identifying defining positions, or nodal points, within the policy discourse. Establishing a nationalist discourse involves affirming one socio-cultural discourse over another, through "the construction of a new 'common sense' which changes the identity of the different groups" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 183). This process is a hegemonic project, defined within IPA "as a political project which constitutes a general political-strategic programme at a specific political institutional level" (Hajer 1989, p. 32). In this study: post-devolution nation-building was approached as the general political-strategic level of the government's hegemonic project; and Wales for Africa, as the core subject of the research, was the specific political institutional level explored.

4.6 The Data Analysis

This section outlines what was done at the data analysis phases of the research, following the formal fieldwork phase. The process of data analysis was approached in two stages: 1), the secondary analysis phase; and 2), the analysis of primary data. Both phases are briefly described below.

The Secondary Analysis Phase

Key policy documents were analysed in the desk-based phases of the research. In the first instance, texts were read and re-read, and pulled together into a timeline on a Word document which included key events. This document formed the basis of the overview presented in Annex G, which frames and contextualises the empirical analysis presented in Chapters Five and Six.

Following these readings, a table was developed in Word, which listed key policy documents, in date order, so that the 'journey' within the narrative, from discourses of sustainable development to international development, could be mapped. Key points and quotes were cited, the trajectory cross-referenced against other policy documents, and points of query or issues to raise at interview or participant observation noted for clarification or exploration at a later date.

Once a substantive working draft of the table had been drafted, key points were gradually pulled into a narrative of the policy story. Initial codes were developed from the documentary analysis around the broad themes of sub-state 'capacity for action' and 'nation-building ambitions' outlined at the literature review (see Chapter Two), which built on the factors outlined there as shaping sub-state diplomacy. During this phase of the analysis, the development of codes was theory-driven, but a hybrid process of inductive and deductive thematic analysis was used to work out the thematic framework, which in practice integrated theory-driven codes with some data-driven ones as the documentary analysis was supplemented and refined with analysis from the other data sources as the research progressed.

To develop theory-driven codes, key concepts outlined at the literature review were revisited, whilst developing data-driven codes required a detailed exploration of the primary data, policy documents, and the monitoring and reporting information, which was both a recursive and iterative process. An approach was developed which lent from theory of change-thinking as an outcomes-based approach. In practice, this saw the collation of monitoring and financial data, evidence from policy documents and interviews with government officials drawn into a framework aimed at depicting potential explanations or theories on intended outcomes or pathways to impact.

The Analysis of Primary Data

The interviews were analysed using the qualitative analysis software package MaxQDA to help manage the data, streamline the coding, and analyse the transcripts together in more depth. First however, after transcribing the interviews in full, so as to ensure that they retained all the information, audio recordings were listened to again, with the draft transcripts in hand, to ensure

accuracy. Transcripts were cross-referenced against the notes made at and immediately following interview, and additional information added to the end of the transcript. The transcripts were initially stored securely as Word documents. In the first instance themes were identified manually, by writing notes on the text, and using post-it notes and highlighter to indicate potential patterns or coding extracts.

The process of developing themes saw the research develop iteratively between reading, doing, ordering, interpreting and writing. After the first few transcripts had been typed-up, the documents began to be transferred over to MaxQDA, and the analysis developed further. The texts were interpreted by converting the raw data into meaningful units, and then, by thinking through concepts and theoretical associations made during previous phases of the research, by making memos alongside the data, including ideas on how to group the data units and draft thematic headings, and by making empirical and theoretical connections, then adding layers to the data as new connections were made, which then hardened as categories of analysis.

During the fieldwork phase, the observation notes, interview transcripts, photographs, monitoring and financial data, and policy documents were collated together as they were produced. A messy process was shaped into a neat product: concepts were refined as they developed coherence; materials revisited to check meanings; and ideas were cultivated, through drawing diagrams and writing memos to help refine patterns, for example (see Crang and Cook 2007, p. 143). The analysis proceeded through an interplay between the data analysed and the research questions and objectives, as ideas were refined through the coded data.

The structure for this thesis' chapters developed further from the conceptual framework of both the sub-state and the citizen as development actor, by bringing themes together with the research questions, and by connecting the themes identified from the data to the appropriate questions and sub-questions, and then by dividing them into logical sections.

4.7 Ethical considerations

Ethics in Research

Prior to fieldwork, ethical approval was secured from Cardiff University by outlining risks and mitigation strategies. This provided a framework, but there was also a wider responsibility to embed ethics within the fieldwork. Current best practice was consulted (BSA 2002; SRA 2003; BPS 2009; ESRC 2010) and a checklist adapted which outlined an approach for ethical fieldwork under the following principles: the sound application and conduct of social research methods; the appropriate dissemination and utilisation of findings; participation based on valid informed consent; the avoidance of personal and social harm; and, the non-disclosure of identity and personal information.

Because "[e]thics exist within a social context" (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011, p. 77), what was right depended on context (Crang and Cook 2007, p. 32) and a distinction was made during fieldwork between ethical codes - understood as the protocols outlined in an informed consent proposal - and ethical values. An approach to ethics based purely on codes cannot replace practical judgements and can reinforce a standard unrealistic for fieldwork (Hornsby-Smith 1993). Researchers cannot simply "achieve ethical research by following a set of pre-established procedures that will always be correct" (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 96).

The best practice is to seek to do no harm (Hay 2010, p. 38) by developing relationships of empathy, trust and respect (Peake and Trotz 1999, p. 37; DeLaine 2000). For these reasons, ethical values, understood as a moral obligation, were practiced in the field on an issue-by-issue basis. This was consistent with the view of the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice, which states how codes are "meant primarily to inform members' ethical judgements rather than to impose on them an external set of standards" (2002). Fieldwork is always "contextual, relational, embodied and politicised" (Sultana 2007), therefore great attention was paid in the field to issues of reflexivity, positionality and power relations.

For the work in Uganda, these issues proved particularly pertinent. Here, the demands of implementing ethical procedures were more challenging than in Wales, because issues such as language and literacy, and material, social and political power differences were significantly more marked. The ethical procedures were dealt with through TOCIDA, who provided consent via email prior to leaving Cardiff for fieldwork to be conducted and who communicated the study and its aims to the project participants based in Tororo before the oven building began. During fieldwork in Tororo, Uganda, the narratives of colonialism, globalisation, development and local realities were hugely significant and necessitated the careful negotiation of ethics in the field. Staeheli and Lawson (1994) and Nagar (2002) for example have debated how to undertake reflexive and politically engaged research which acknowledges power, knowledge and context, and literatures have highlighted how power relations in research are spatially constituted at multiple scales (Nagar 1997; Elwood and Martin 2000).

Ethics in Development Research

From an ethical perspective, literatures emphasise how at the global scale, there are cultural and economic assumptions which situate power between a 'first world' researcher and 'third world' interview participants. However, as the methodological and practical implications of power difference discussed above, at the sub-section on elite interviewing, emphasised, the power relations that accompany a 'first world' researcher are not necessarily resolved by conducting research in one's own country, as there are other sources of differential power that shape relationships between researchers and participants, even when similar local or national identities are shared (see Elwood and Martin 2000).

Recognising and working with multiple positionalities in the field as a researcher, sometimes volunteering and participating in development activities, and with research participant's varying from political elites to Wales for Africa's Welsh 'beneficiaries' to representatives from partnered organisation's in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa, meant thinking critically and constantly negotiating on the field ethics. Research "is an embodied activity that draws in our whole physical person, along with all its inescapable identities" (Crang and Cook 2007, p. 9). Because "research on social relations *is made out of social relations*" (Crang and Crook 2007, p. 9, emphasis in the original), the dynamics

changed with context, and the boundary between the author as researcher and volunteer-participant often got blurred, which placed extra responsibility on the integrity of the researcher.

Participant Involvement

The personal characteristics of the author - including age, gender, ethnicity, past experiences and occupation – as an individual, member of institutions and wider society – influenced the research. Researchers are always embedded in multiple contexts, and on this topic, a key strength but also a limitation was the author's employment at the Welsh Government and prior involvement with the SAFE Foundation.

Before starting the thesis, the author was an employee of the Welsh Government, first within a Ministerial private office during the Labour-Plaid coalition government of the third Assembly term, and then in a research support role, where, as a result of her role and thesis topic, she was approached by the Hub Cymru Africa and Wales for Africa teams, and subsequently volunteered to assist in the development and design of a report celebrating 10 years of Wales of Africa (WG 2016b), launched as part of a wider schedule of events at the Senedd in October 2016.

In addition, during the PhD research the author volunteered at the SAFE Foundation, helping with fundraising activities and administration and accompanying the visit to Tororo, Uganda, as volunteer and researcher. What the researcher observes, along with their professional, political and personal interests, is of consequence to the analysis Ellis and Berger 2002), and inevitably, any researcher is value-laden, with inherent bias reflected by status, resources, interests, beliefs and so on. On the subjectivities inherent in the research process more generally, Denzin and Lincoln (1994, p. ix) note how "the field of qualitative research is defined primarily by a series of essential tensions, contradictions, and hesitations", and this was no different for this thesis. These tensions and constraints helped give shape to the thesis which, because political, ethical and interpersonal spaces are by nature highly subjective, is but a partial representation of the subjects under analysis.

The close involvement with Wales for Africa and SAFE had both advantages and disadvantages. First the author could develop stronger relationships with and had excellent access to key informants, both in the Welsh civil service and grantee organisations, and in SAFE, who were interested in the potential implications of her findings for the Wales for Africa programme. The involvement also gave the author an incentive to pursue the research, as the Wales for Africa is a high-profile flagship programme. As many of the Wales for Africa supported activities rely on voluntary efforts, helping as a volunteer allowed the researcher to offer something in return (Watts 2004, p. 308). "What we bring to the research affects what we get" (Crang and Cook 2007, p. 9), and in terms of building trust with key informants and accessing policy documents, the relationships that developed on the field as a result of directly participating in the programme aided the process.

However, disadvantages may have included lack of distance from the research subject, during the visit to Uganda for example. To moderate the effects, the author took various precautions to ensure that ethical procedures were followed during this research. Prior to visiting Tororo, informed consent was received from TOCIDA. Informed consent was used to recruit SAFE volunteers to the research. All were happy to participate, and to share photographs they had taken, which are credited in the thesis. All participants referenced as part of the empirical analysis were told at the outset that they could opt-out at any time, that information would be treated confidentially, was non-attributable, and they were also given the opportunity to amend transcripts. All agreed to the inclusion of materials as presented in the final draft.

Thus, precautions were taken both to avoid harm to development actors and bias in the research process, and it is considered that the advantages of involvement described above significantly outweighed any disadvantages for this study.

5 The Sub-State as Development Actor

5.1 Introduction

Whilst principles of sustainability have been revised and reinvigorated in various regions across the world, something additional is emerging in Wales, where sustainable development is being connected to more loaded discussions relating to scalar and temporal accountabilities, cultural values, and national identities (see Jones and Ross 2006, p. 57). Wales also possesses a set of nationalist discourses, associated with, but not limited to, the existence of the sub-state, where, under devolution, national identity is being reimagined under a unique set of constraints (see Chapter Three), reflecting the ambiguities, opportunism and pragmatism inherent within its processes. This rekindled interest in identity politics has seen devolved citizenship, as a frame of Welsh subjectivity, mobilised through novel institutions of government in the construction of citizenship rights.

At one level, citizenship is about inclusion, and in this respect, Wales for Africa is an indicator of how policy-makers have approached the interests of the communities they serve. Inclusion, however, "relentlessly produces exclusion" (Isin 2005, p. 381), and a key area of work is about citizenship and difference, including in attempts at imagining the nation (see Chapter Two). An important part of the nationalist discourse is the attempts at constructing an alternative kind of nation, which relies on differentiation through identity formation; and Wales, as well as possessing a set of nationalist discourses, and a prominent set of discourses committed to sustainable development, is increasingly making the connections between them (Jones and Ross 2016), based on a conception of its rights, responsibilities and the distinctiveness of its legal duty to promote sustainability.

These connections are examined in this chapter in two specific contexts, through the conceptual lens of the sub-state as development actor, discussing how: 1), in attempts at forging its own version of sustainable development, the government has pursued development assistance as a legitimate concern of its administration, both as a way of making development more meaningful to the Welsh public and in anticipation of promoting more meaningful engagement with global issues; 2), the ways in which sustainable development is being used to create an alternative Welsh nation has been explored elsewhere within literatures (Jones and Ross 2016; Fisher 2012), and this chapter discusses how sustainability's overarching principles have been amended and augmented to include international development in the construction of a more progressive Wales, which is said to derive from a set of values associated with the nation. The discussion is brought together to address Research Question One: *How does the international development agenda converge with ambitions of nation-building?*

The chapter is divided into three parts, followed by conclusions. First, drawing from a mixture of the themes which emerged from the data, and from the themes identified in the literature review on sub-state diplomacy, Wales' capacity for international relations-related activities is discussed, in an agency-oriented explanation. The next section discusses sustainable development as an alternative discourse, and the penultimate section traces the discursive shift in Wales towards *international* sustainable development.

In addressing the first research question, an analysis of a range of different documents produced in Wales over the last fifteen years or so is drawn upon, including data from academic outputs, governmental policy statements and strategies, responses to government consultations, minutes, laws and regulations, newspaper reports and Ministerial statements. This documentary analysis is accompanied by data from qualitative interviews, understood as context-specific accounts, with key stakeholders involved in shaping the international development discourse, alongside monitoring and reporting data, and participant observation, used to explore Wales' emergence as *a sub-state development actor*.

5.2 Wales' Capacity for Action

From the very outset, Wales has emphasised is commitment to sustainable development, as a defining feature of the nation, under the Government of Wales Act 1998, where it stated it would seek to: "make a scheme setting out how it proposes, in the exercise of their functions, to promote sustainable development". Wales' devolution settlement has been characterised as "the very model of a postmodern constitution", partly because of its innovative legal duties (Rawlings 2006, p. 60; see Chaney 2004 on the equalities duty; Flynn 2003, Williams 2006 and Royles 2012 on the sustainable development duty), and the sustainable development duty's importance to development assistance cannot be overstated, because despite those limits to decentralisation referenced in Chapter Three, to fulfil its legal obligations, the principles of sustainability must be mainstreamed into the Assembly's operation, requiring wholesale compliance across the government's objectives and processes (WAG 2004b).

Accordingly, the duty applies to all devolved functions of government. Sustainable development was viewed a cross-cutting principle (Government of Wales Act 1998, section 121), and its significance to the sub-state as development actor lies with the legal requirements it imposed on the Assembly to: monitor, report and review the government's policies, programmes and grant schemes, in support of its sustainability ambitions (see Hull 2004); develop indicators and set targets for policy evaluation (see Munday and Roberts 2006); consult before making the Sustainable Development Scheme; and keep this Scheme under review, publish an annual report on its progress, and evaluate its effectiveness every four years. The duty is now at Section 79 (1) of the Government of Wales Act 2006, and until its latest iteration under the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, responsibilities for implementing the scheme and an associated action plan lay, in the main, with the government (WAG 2004b).

The duty marks a significant divergence in Wales compared to elsewhere. A "constitutional development unique in Western Europe" (Rawlings 2003, p 59) when it was passed in 1998, the duty made Wales one of only three

administrations, alongside Tasmania and Estonia (Williams 2006, p. 265), legally required to promote sustainable development in the exercise of all its functions, as a central organising principle for its public policy; a distinctiveness which has enabled Wales-specific solutions, visions and action plans to be developed. There is not however a radically different version of sustainability emerging in Wales, for the nation operates within various political, economic, scientific and technological contexts, which curtail the scope and prerogatives for experimentation. Instead, differences in approach have been attributed to divergences in emphasis rather than to profoundly different conceptions in interpretation (Jones and Ross 2016).

The sustainable development duty however is a significant case-specific mechanism, which has had far-reaching effects on Wales' sub-state behaviours. The duty is demonstrated to have: catalysed the emergence of collaborative relationships between different sectors and interests (Williams 2006; Fisher 2012); underscored Wales' unexpected positioning of itself as a sub-state actor in the international arena (Royles 2012a; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012); support nation-building ambitions (Royles 2012a; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012); inspired a rethinking of state-bound models of sustainable global citizenship in Wales (Bullen and Whitehead 2005); and been retrospectively mobilised by policy-makers in a legitimisation of Wales' pursuit of a framework for international development policy-making (see Royles 2012b), and thus is key to Wales for Africa. Evidently therefore, devolution affords sustainable development higher priority in Wales, and the opportunity-structures for it to become an exemplar region (Williams 2006; Royles 2010), including in citizen-led development assistance; and unsurprisingly, Wales' powers in relation to sustainability are complex given the multi-level context and the impact of structural factors on sub-states.

Sub-state capacity for action is a key structural factor shaping sub-state behaviours and refers to the legal competences and fiscal autonomies in place for actions (McEwen and Bomberg 2014; see Chapter Two); approached in this discussion as case-specific mechanisms for interrogating Wales' positioning as an actor on development assistance in the international arena, in line with

Royles' (2017) call for developing explanations on how sub-states are active internationally, as key to understanding their growth as unexpected global actors.

Wales' fiscal authority is limited. Central UK Government retains financial control and determines the government's overall budget. Constitutionally, Wales is unable to distribute development aid. The government had no tax-raising powers, though income tax raising powers are set to come in 2019, and its spending and revenue are determined by UK-level legislation, using the Barnett formula, whereby monies provided through a block grant provide the basis for Wales' funding, from which Wales for Africa is funded.

While the duty provides some foundation for government international action, crucially, both foreign policy and international development are the remit of the UK Government (PMO 2009). Ad-hoc in character (Bulmer et al. 2006, p. 6) and unionist in terms (Bradbury 1997), the UK Government's constitutional practices flavour dealings between the centre and the devolved regions; with Wales' inter-governmental relations largely defined by Westminster (Bulmer et al. 2006). The sustainable development duty has been implemented as part of Wales' framework of governance where, within the legislature, the systems created have associated costs as well as benefits, exacerbated by the complex and often ambiguous separation of powers between Wales and the centre, in the field of international development however, the separation is clear. The matter is undoubtedly reserved.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (ODPM 2001; OPDM 2013), structures inter-governmental relations between the centre and the devolved sub-state governments, and states: 1), international relations are the responsibility of the UK Government; but also 2), significantly, Welsh involvement in international issues is sanctioned where it affects both devolved matters and Wales' responsibilities for implementing related international obligations. A Concordat (OPDM 2013) sanctions government attendance at Council of Ministers and EU-related meetings, and its contributions to those reports relevant to obligations arising from international agreements, including

UN Conventions, related to Wales' devolved powers. There is, however, no reference made sanctioning additional involvement with international decision-making bodies, and overall, the MoU clearly outlines Wales' limits in international relations.

Despite the constraints however, the government efforts at developing its international profile have been significant (see Royles 2010, 2012, 2017; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012). Whilst capacity for action is a key structural factor shaping sub-state behaviours, and at first glance, in Wales' case, should have curtailed the pursuit of policies pertaining to development assistance, for its ambitions appear firmly outside of fiscal and legal scope, government action in the field corroborates how limited constitutional capacity does not automatically result in less autonomous policy-making (Happaerts 2012, p. 12). The government's limited powers/low capabilities have not inhibited its ability to act, and the contribution of the sustainable development duty can be predicted upon a range of different influences, including multiple discourses, embodied practices and material objects (Jones and Merriman 2012). These different elements contribute in the production of Wales, where through its governance systems, which include elements taken from different scales, such as the local, national, international and global, at each level, public, private and voluntary agencies interact in a complex web of interdependencies that in the case of sustainability, have created high expectations, as reflected in the pursuit of a framework for international development.

The contribution of these elements is explored in this chapter in the context of the low capability/high expectation conditions (Royles 2017) which predicated the launch of Wales for Africa, under conditions of no primary law-making powers, no fiscal authority, and no legal responsibilities in the field of international development. A challenge is to draw together how Wales' discourses of nationalism and sustainability, the role played by key stakeholders in shaping national territories, and material objects came together in a re/production of Wales.

Broadly, themes discussed in the literature review highlighted how territories and the nationalist discourse are dynamic entities (Paasi 1996), how their reproduction in a non-reflexive fashion is the substance of nation-building (Billig 1995), and more recent attempts at avoiding a banal/blatant binary (Benwell 2014; Jones and Desforges 2003) which acknowledge the more obvious articulations of a nationalist discourse, and emphasise how the markers of nationhood can be deliberately produced, subverted, re-interpreted, and so on, by different actors, operating at a range of scales (Benwell 2014, p. 51). Read together, these assertions demonstrate the inherent fluidity and relationality of territoriality, and the conscious and unconscious ways in which identity is flagged. The aim in the next section is to illustrate the significance of these conceptual issues to Wales for Africa. As well as providing general context for the programme, the following section focuses on the ways in which, through performance, practice and discourse, *international* sustainable development has made a symbolic and material contribution to the group-making project of producing a devolved Wales.

5.3 Sustainable Development as an Alternative Discourse

Constrained by its dependence upon the centre, Wales' level of autonomy when Wales for Africa was launched was similar to weak regions (Callanan and Tatham 2014), which should have undermined its claims as a legitimate political resource for development assistance. The campaign in favour of a development programme – supported post-devolution by organisations such as Oxfam Cymru, Friends of the Earth Cymru and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), with broad cross-party support – has its roots post-1997 referendum (see Chapter Three). Wales for Africa can be traced back to the sustainable development duty, and explicitly, to calls for the inclusion of the duty within the Government of Wales Bill during its passage through the UK Parliament. Given the central role afforded to sustainability post-devolution, an issue is how it came to be included in the Government of Wales Act (1998) in the first place, for as noted in Chapter Three, pre-devolution, Wales' governance debate was dominated by economic interests.

Calls for the inclusion of a sustainable development duty arose against the context of A Voice for Wales (WO 1997), which in its vision for Wales' future, promoted an economic agenda. Sustainability was discussed in terms of "sustainable growth" measured against a "favourable business climate" of minimising "economic costs" (WO 1997a; see also Bishop and Flynn 1999). As a social construct, the ways in which the sustainable development duty developed came from the symbols and experiences that governed the way that stakeholders thought and acted. According to Geertz (1973), political elites may look for other symbolic systems when they believe the existing culture is inadequate for new structural forms. This could be said to be the case for decentralisation in Wales, where sustainability was found to contain appropriate ideologies containing new conceptions which could refer to new kinds of futures for Wales. The inclusion of the duty in the final devolution settlement was the consequence of negotiations between the political community and environmentally-aligned networks, setting the path towards the launch of Wales for Africa.

As well as a reflection of more democratic and economic reasons, the organisational and constitutional reforms of devolution also reflect issues of national identity. Devolution is recognition of the distinctiveness of Wales. By the executive devolution of power which occurred in 1999, political assurances were secured as an alternative discourse formed around the Government of Wales Act 1998, so that as a political territory, from the very outset Wales has emphasised its commitment to the principles of sustainability.

The spatial imaginations that characterise the discourses and practices of sustainability were discussed in Chapter Two. They operate at the scale of local communities and internationally/globally, and on the significance of scale, pre-devolution, two forces helped mainstream sustainability at a regional and a more localised level. 1), prior to the Assembly, the European Commission (EC) laid down requirements for non-economic policy actors to be invited to help formulate Wales' European Regional Development Funding Scheme (ERDF) bids. The ERDF is a territorial cohesion programme aimed at addressing inequalities between EU regions by investing money from the richer regions to

the infrastructure and services of the more underdeveloped regions. Following EC requirements, initially, key environmental organisations in Wales - the Environment Agency and the Countryside Council for Wales - joined economic stakeholders in their bids for funding. As well as their subsequent involvement at much earlier stages for future rounds (Bishop and Flynn 1999), this began the process of validating an environmental perspective within Wales' economic governance discourse, which continues to this day (interview, Welsh Government). 2), there was a growing concern post-1997 referendum with the priority afforded to the economic agenda (interview, Welsh Government) during the formulation of the Government of Wales Bill, which spurred the formation of the 'Sustainable Development Charter Group', comprised of over 25 Wales-based environmental NGOs, key government agencies (Environment Agency, Countryside Council for Wales, Development Board for Rural Wales and Welsh Development Agency) and the Environmental Planning Research Unit of Cardiff University (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 96-99). The commitment to sustainability largely came as a result of lobbying from this Group. Its actors played a key role, actively positioning themselves to help shift the terms of Wales' governance debate away from its domineering economic focus.

Through the analysis of policy documents, academic outputs, third sector reports and informal interviews with government policy officials, it is possible to discern how policy discourse can be constitutive of political identities (Hajer and Versteeg 2003), and how sustainable development became relevant to the political community. Whilst initially policy-making centred on communities of economic governance, the community of practice formed by the Sustainable Development Charter Group provided the impetus for alternative actors to help shape the discourse.

As contributors to the Group, Bishop and Flynn's (1999; 2005) work provides rich insight into its discourse and how the duty was created, citing a backlash against the dominance of economic interests by those sympathetic to alternative development perspectives (Bishop and Flynn 1999, p. 66): "…the desire to do things differently from before created political spaces and opportunities for an environmental movement that had previously been

somewhat peripheral in political and policy terms". Interviewee's (Welsh Government; NGO) corroborate Bishop and Flynn's (1999) version of events, holding that the Group was the result of like-minded organisations coming together over a shared ambition of championing an alternative model of governance, with two aims: 1), debating the policy implications of the devolution process from an environmental perspective; and 2), facilitating a co-ordinated approach towards lobbying parliament during the passage of the Government of Wales Bill 1998.

The Group's effectiveness lay in its facilitator role. It successfully brought together environmental stakeholders, key government agencies and civil servants from the Welsh Office's Devolution Unit, who contributed to Whitehall's' development of the Government of Wales Bill at meetings held under 'Chatham House' rules. Despite the commitments being secured on sustainability however, in its first reading (November 1997) through Parliament, the Bill did not include a sustainable development clause (see Gay 1997). This prompted the Group to publish a Greener National Assembly for Wales (SDCG 1998), within which it was argued in discursive ways that the Assembly should: "have a principle objective of promoting sustainable development…", "an integrated approach to its activities, ensuring that the environmental and social costs of its policies are as rigorously considered as economic ones…" and "guarantee that openness and transparency are at the core of its decision-making". Sustainable development therefore was posited as lying at the heart of devolution and tied to iterations of democratic accountability in decision-making.

Following sustained lobbying, a sustainable development clause was introduced during the second passage of the Bill through parliament (Secretary of State for Wales 1997b). Its wording however did not meet the Group's calls for a central organising principle of promoting sustainable development. The phrasing "have due regard to" (Official Report for the House of Commons, 1998) sustainable development was viewed as too passive and prompted fears that in practice, sustainability would prove irrelevant to the Assembly's functions. Forceful lobbying from organisations allied to the Group, in particular, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (Bishop and Flynn 1999), saw

amendments to the Bill introduced during the Lords Committee stage which considerably strengthened the duty to the wording ultimately passed into law under Section 121 of the Government of Wales Act (1998): to "promote sustainable development". The positioning of an alternative rationality in the accession to the Groups demands was aided by the personal interests and networks of key politicians. This proved an entry-point for a representation of sustainability discourses, adding institutional legitimacy to the policy intervention, which ultimately, underscored its effectiveness (interview, NGO). A number of individuals and organisations sought to promote the need for a sustainable development duty, and their success testifies to a concerted group making project and a related belief in the political significance of a Welsh national territory with sustainability as a core thread running through its institutions. This has opened-up possibilities, to new ways of imagining the nation.

The significance of the duty should not be underestimated since it acts as a precursor to policy options. Its implications for the development of Wales for Africa lies in its delineation of the range of policy options available (see Hajer and Versteeg 2003; Liftin 1994, p. 37). An important marker for the "greening of government" (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 1998), the inclusion of the duty as a key principle of the devolved state provided the foundations for conceptualising international development as a Welsh policy issue, as well as the solutions for the issue.

There are two key points to emphasise: 1), the duty is non-delegable. There is no accountability to or monitoring of the process by the UK Government in relation to either the sustainable development scheme or its delivery; and 2), the duty's aims are hugely ambitious - to embed sustainable development as the central organising principle of Wales' devolved government. Wales therefore possesses a set of nationalist discourses associated with the devolved state, and also has a prominent set of discourses outlining its commitment to sustainable development. The duty forms a key part of the government's national project for it underpins a construction of Wales based upon sustainable development as a constituent element of what Wales *is* and

how its social issues are best addressed – that is, "*Welsh solutions for Welsh problems*" (Mooney and Williams 2006, p. 623, emphasis in the original).

5.4 Operationalising the Duty

The sustainable development duty has blurred the divided between practice, performance and discourse. The networks which drove through the duty's inclusion onto the Government of Wales Act 1998 maintained momentum on their reimaging of the nation along more sustainable lines, as they continued to influence public policy through the new spaces opened-up for democratic deliberation. Driving the analysis presented here is the intersection between: 1), the spaces to participate created by Wales' institutional structures; and 2), the influential role played by non-governmental agents in defining the policy issues. The section discusses how a politics of connectivity, centred on the political and cultural significance of sustainable development, drew together a group of people, albeit from professional positions. They pushed sustainable development up the political agenda, from policy to practice, so that the duty has significantly altered Wales' policy landscape.

From the outset, key stakeholders recognised its potential for underpinning innovation in policy-making and how reforms in governance generated new spaces for citizen engagement. Initially, the duty helped realise hopes it would encourage more collaborative styles of governance (Bishop and Flynn 1999), to the extent that during the Assembly's first term, as well as its legally binding nature, the duty's other defining feature was perceived to be the inclusive and open ways the first Sustainable Development Scheme was shaped (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 94).

The Sustainable Development Scheme is central to ways in which the meaning of the duty has been reproduced in the construction of the issues. In line with the requirements of the duty, the Assembly has consulted, prepared and adopted a Scheme and associated Action Plan, and published regular annual reports on progress and future plans. The Scheme is a key marker of how the Welsh nation has sought to forge its own version of sustainability, as a way of

both making sustainable development more meaningful and encouraging greater engagement with its principles amongst Welsh citizens, through an ongoing series of connections between people, discourses and objects (Jones and Merriman 2012), so that the duty has been negotiated to include international development as part of its policy and practice. The agency-structure dynamics these connections suggest help contextualise Wales' case-specific mechanisms and political attempts at construction a more progressive and socially-inclusive Wales, said to derive from a different set of values associated with the Welsh nation.

In response to the challenges posed by the exclusionary tendencies of citizenship, Cornwall (2002) differentiates between invited spaces and the spaces people create, with the latter consisting of individuals who come together over shared interests. In Wales, constitutional and governance reforms have given rise to entirely new structures and new democratic spaces which can be understood as conduits for negotiation, information and exchange (Cornwall and Coelho 2006). Informal interviews with stakeholders suggest the spaces occupied by the Sustainable Development Charter Group during the passage of the first Government of Wales Bill were relatively autonomous from the central UK Government.

Publicly, during its passage through parliament, organisations spoke collectively, and with support from key stakeholders within the Welsh Office and politicians in Westminster, their sustained lobbying brought about a decisive shift by helping to ensure the inclusion of the sustainable development duty in the devolution settlement. The launch of the Assembly in 1999 reconfigured the spatial dynamics of power and the entry point for participation. Keen to maintain impetus, the Group approached the Assembly offering to assist it with the development of the first Scheme, A Sustainable Wales: Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000). This offer was accepted, in part driven by the government's ideological commitment to inclusiveness and popular participation in governance processes, and in attempts at enhancing accountability and sub-state responsiveness (Day et al. 2000; Morgan 1997; Hull 2004). The political rhetoric was concerned with creating an engaged institution and fairer

governance, and the themes of partnership and collaboration underpinned much discussion.

Working together on Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000), the Sustainable Development Charter Group and policy officials became known as the Glamorgan Group after the Cardiff University building where they met (Bishop and Flynn 2005; Jones and Ross 2016). Jones and Merriman (2012, p. 942) point to the crucial role played by objects in shaping national territories. The Glamorgan Building is only 300 metres from the main government office, Cathays Park 2, and the materiality of the Glamorgan Building, its geographical closeness to the main government buildings, and the ideological commitment to making connections between the discourses of various actors, leads to the conceptual claim that the Glamorgan Group helped to create crucial nodes for the definition of a territory. It can be argued this helped anchor the sustainability discourse of the national territory, and the materiality of the Glamorgan Building, or at least its proximity to government, was also enrolled into this group-making project of the nation. These issues point to the potential connections which can exists between relational and more bounded conceptions of space (Jones and Merriman 2012, p. 950).

The degree to which national territories are significant depends on the success of the group-making projects associated with them, and the emphasis using IPA would be on the ways in which this is narrated. This is a theme which is also being developed by geographers, where analysts claim that the ways in which boundaries are narrated can enhance understandings of their processes of becoming. Different kind of individuals and organisations are involved in narrating boundaries and territories (Paasi 1996; Jones and Merriman 2012). The Glamorgan Group was the duty as an opportunity for the government to foster political interaction with civic networks, enhance public involvement and improve the quality and legitimacy of decision making through a process of narrating Wales around its new institutions.

In this way, the Sustainable Development Charter Group which lobbied for the sustainable development duty to be included on the Government of Wales Bill

evolved into what Cornwall (2002, p. 18) describes as an "institutionalised" site: a space were individuals become part of the machinery of government. Despite their autonomy, through the Glamorgan Group, organisations and individuals influenced government policy makers via an institutionalised 'invited' space. This site for policy deliberation could be described as an arena for "self-actualisation" (Cornwall 2002, p. 21) because their participation gave the space a durability based upon people's willingness to contribute over a sustained period of time.

When policies, strategies and interventions rely on expert judgments "…the latter become part of political struggle as well" (Feindt and Oels 2005, p. 162). The Glamorgan Group was described by participants as "largely informal", and "an effective means of exchanging knowledge" "in which relations of trust and respect were quickly established" which "proved essential for the meaningful exchange of ideas and entering into of commitments" (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 98). The concepts that constructed the discourse or the 'knowledge' were shaped by participants as they became intertwined with the institutional practices and capacities of the Assembly. The relationship between stakeholders had a legal basis in the duty and a material basis in drafting Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000). Though the emphasis was on transparency and collaboration, the Glamorgan Group was expert-driven, and whilst the duty opened up spaces where wider participation had an influence, there was limited citizen voice.

The Glamorgan Group's legitimisation of some practices and not others is an example of power formations (Feindt and Oels 2005, p. 162). Viewed as "a bottom-up initiative" (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 98) by participants, and as representing an alternative to the top-down approaches of the closed policy systems of the former Welsh Office (interview, Welsh Government), the network was however limited to a group of expert stakeholders, with scope for bias in their articulation of the duty. Still, the Group did open-up new avenues of interaction. Its informal working arrangements proved an effective conduit for the sharing of information and expertise and provided new opportunities for the government to foster political interactions and widen its networks (interview,

Welsh Government). Stakeholders used the opportunity structures opened up by the duty to position the debate. This saw the emergence of new collaborative arrangements between sectors and interest groups, enabling key stakeholders to build connections to government. Hence, the process of developing Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000) established partnership-ways of working, with relations between stakeholders based upon mutual respect (Bishop and Flynn 2005). The effect was to bring a legitimacy to policy, and a focus on sustainability.

5.5 Sustainable Development to *International* Sustainable Development

This section summarises Wales' transition into a sub-state actor operating in the international arena on development outcomes. In discussing this, the analysis draws from a textual analysis of a range of different documents, including government policy statements, strategies and consultation documents, laws and regulations, and speeches and media reports. This analysis has been supplemented with data from interviews and from the participant observation work, conducted in the main whilst working alongside policy officials in the Wales for Africa Team and with officials from the Hub Cymru Africa Collaboration. The earlier paragraphs of the section draw mainly from the documentary analysis and demonstrate that by the second term, despite Wales' limited constitutional capacities, and its lack of powers in international relations, discussed above, the Assembly was drawing from a socio-spatial consciousness in a narration of the Welsh national territory and a Welsh identity that delineated international sustainable development as a legal and moral obligation and a legitimate concern of the fledgling institution. As a result of this scripting of a national story, Wales for Africa was launched during the Assembly's third term. The emphasis is on how Wales' nationalist discourse has drawn from sustainable development in efforts at creating an alternative Welsh nation.

Wales' differences in approach towards sustainable development however are attributed to emphasis rather than to interpretation (Jones and Ross 2016). The government has adopted a broad definition of sustainable development that

links to the Brundtland definition, and though rarely acknowledged, Wales tends towards a weak sustainability position that assumes improvements in well-being and environmental quality can be achieved via current policy frameworks and within static linearly-conceptualised time frames (Munday and Roberts 2006, p. 536), thus implying human-made capital might substitute for environmental capital. In contrast, within a strong sustainability framework the overall carrying capacity of the environment takes precedence, discrediting the notion that environmental assets can be substituted for man-made ones and implying a direct trade-off between material well-being and environmental assets.

Sustainable development however is being connected to emotive language associated with national identities and values. From the outset it can be argued the government saw the formulation of its duty as offering a distinct approach. It became markedly more ambitious in its proposals, as reflected in the titles given to its first three schemes: Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000); Starting to Live Differently (NAfW 2004); and One Wales: One Planet (WAG 2009). Generally speaking, the vision of sustainable development that exists in Wales is broad and all-encompassing. Whilst earlier commitments emphasised working "within environmental limits" (WG 2012, p. 1), the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act is aimed at making the public bodies listed in the Act think about improving the social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being of Wales by taking a more joined-up approach to "improve all four aspects of our well-being. Each is as important as the others" (WG 2015, p. 1). The earlier Sustainable Development Scheme, One Wales: One Planet (WAG 2009), stated ambitions for Wales to become a one planet nation, whereby within a generation, Wales should be in a position in which its "ecological footprint is reduced to the global average availability of resources – 1.88 hectares per person" (WG 2012, p.8). Statements such as this help rescale the issue of sustainable development (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 57), for Wales' citizens are being asked to consider the implications of their actions in the global context, whilst these spatial imaginations are more forcefully connected to temporal ones in more contemporary contexts, through the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act.

The potential for developing stronger connections between Wales' political and public discourses of sustainability and nationalism was promoted by politicians from the Assembly's first plenary debate on sustainable development. The issues discussed define the perceived possibilities to act (Hajer and Versteeg 2003), and in this debate, the duty's potential for differentiating the nation, an important aspect of the nationalist discourse and of identity formation, included to "set Wales apart on the world scene" and mark a transparent institution, open to progressive ideas, but rooted in "strong Welsh traditions" (NAfW 1999). Because Ministers saw the duty as profile-raising, despite limits to autonomy, "seeking cost-effective ways to raise Wales' profile abroad as leading on sustainable development" (WAG 2000, p. 6) was a key objective for policy-makers. The rhetoric reflected high ambitions through iterations for global renown: "Our sustainable development duty gives us an unprecedented opportunity to develop an international model of excellence which can help set Wales apart on the world scene" (NAfW 2000a, p. 32).

In terms of its emerging international development agenda, Assembly activity can be summarised under the themes of fostering equal parity to the principles of sustainability, creating horizontal coherence across departments, and efforts at differentiating Wales through its sustainable development duty. The requirements of the duty were horizontally integrated across government soon after devolution, when responsibility was transferred to a central strategic unit, to accommodate the increasing workload, cross-cutting priorities, and need for co-ordination across policy areas, which required corporate planning (Williams 2006; Bishop and Flynn 2005). Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000b) represented the government's first statement of intent on its duty and included a focus on better decision-making and a more co-ordinated approach to policy-making. Most proposals focussed upon internal operations. An overwhelming emphasis is on becoming an exemplar institution to others *in* Wales, as evidenced by the domestic focus of the policy actions listed at the associated Action Plan (NAfW 2000b).

Even this first Scheme however included ambitions for renown in *international* sustainable development. One significant theme which arises is the contention that developing a firm commitment to sustainable development will enable Wales to raise its profile on the world stage. Whilst three of its four externally-focused goals were on collaborating at a European-regional level, the fourth, though vague, stated "seeking cost-effective ways to raise Wales' profile abroad as leading on sustainable development" as an objective (NAfW 2000b, p. 6). Early therefore, Wales was engaged in efforts at re-scaling itself to become a contributor to sustainability debates within the international arena (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 59). The Welsh nation was one "committed to fostering its unique and diverse identity… while looking confidently outwards", meaning "Wales contributing to sustainable development at a global as well as local level" (NAfW 2000b, p. 6). This kind of narrative can be seen as an example of nationalist rhetoric, used to create an impression that an inconsequential country had a meaning and presence in the international arena (Royles 2010; Jones and Ross 2016). The ambitions however were above Wales' capacity to act, thus despite the lack of detail, they are impressive in scope.

The challenge was to move from rhetoric to delivery - "to pull the levers and press the buttons of implementation" (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 110); and in the case of Wales for Africa, there is evidence to suggest that Wales commitment to sustainable development is impacting positively on its international presence. The Assembly's first term is framed in terms of learning to talk, or mainstreaming sustainability within the language and philosophy of key politicians and officials, and learning to walk, or embedding the rhetoric into the organisational culture through policy actions (Bishop and Flynn 2005, p. 100).

In line with these processes, a distinctive theme emerges in relation to Wales' take on sustainable development in the context of international development. Under Section 121(1) of the Government of Wales Act (1998) a report on the effectiveness of the Sustainable Development Scheme was needed after each Assembly election. Carwyn Jones AM, then Minister for Environment, Planning and Countryside, "wanted a warts-and-all report" to aid the delivery of tangible

changes (NAfW 2003), and three reviews were commissioned: two by the government, one internal (Davidoff 2003) and the other external (CAG consultants 2003), on perceptions of the Scheme's effectiveness; and a third commissioned by the WWF, (Flynn 2003), which examined the duty's impact on Assembly-sponsored Public Bodies, local government and NGOs. Whist acknowledging the high-standard set in the rhetoric, and the cross-party political commitment (Flynn 2003, p. 3), Learning to Live Differently (NAfW 2000b) was an ineffective agenda for action.

All three reviews called for moves from policies to delivery, "from rhetoric to action" (Flynn 2003), echoed by Friends of the Earth Cymru (James 2004) and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Williams and Thomas 2004). The emphasis was on the Assembly adopting a broader perspective, to look outside its borders and engage more fully in pioneering behaviours. Significantly, "international cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in developing countries" (CAG 2003) was identified as an area for progress. The onus was on moving the debate in Wales from a symbolic politics of sustainability to a more transformational one, and sustainable development had the potential to enable Wales to build a presence on the international stage. The reviews renewed political focus. A national conversation was launched through consultation on a revised scheme (NAfW 2003b), where as a key step, stakeholders from the development sector where invited in to help formulate an action plan, to imagine an alternative, sustainable future for the nation.

The fragmentation of the NGO community has often prevented it from presenting a united front, impeding its policy impacts (McCormick 2011, p. 106). Whilst wrong to suggest there is a homogeneous NGO community in Wales, a small number of dedicated organisations (for example, Oxfam Cymru, WWF Cymru) did spearheaded a co-ordinated effort, driven by a common goal of encouraging the Assembly to act on development and address inequalities at a global scale (see Williams 2005; Fisher 2012; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012). Politicians were aware of their work and this encouraged NGOs to be more persistent in their efforts. As the expectations for delivery increased, so too did the ambitions (interview, NGO). The NGOs Oxfam Cymru and the WWF

established offices in Cardiff (see Williams 2006; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012) and "whilst acting locally, are ideally placed to promote global linkages and perspectives" (Williams 2006, p. 259).

Read sequentially, the outputs from Assembly consultations (WAG 2004a; WAG 2004b; WAG 2004c) announce a shift in gear. Starting to Live Differently (2004b) was a real "step change" (WAG 2004c, p. 1), for it argued genuine commitment to fulfilling the sustainable development duty could not be secured without Wales considering beyond its borders (WAG 2004b, p. 22): "…decisions we make in Wales can have global repercussions".

Another distinctive theme in relation to Wales' brand of sustainability arises in the context of its emphasis on social justice, where it is viewed to have "its own account of sustainable development… embodying *our* values of fairness and social justice" (WG 2012, p. 5, emphasis added). Others have referred to the banal nationalisms taking place in such assertions (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 57), and references to the existence of a set of values allegedly Welsh in character are strewn across Wales' discourses of sustainability. In the nationalist discourse, it is irrelevant whether a different set of values does exits. Instead, it is the attempts at differentiating Wales, as explored here, through the intermeshing of sustainability and nationalist narratives and discourses, which is important to the processes of group-making and identity formation because it helps create a perception of distinctiveness. These attempts at shaping a particularly Welsh version of sustainability, connected to imagined Welsh values, have been located through and beyond the national territory within Wales' discourses of sustainable development, to include a conception of Welsh values which extend Wales' moral obligations beyond its borders (WAG 2004b, p. 22):

> "The Assembly's unique duty towards sustainable development is an opportunity to promote our work and the underlying principles with others. It is important to realise that others are facing the same challenges as us and are struggling to find solutions to the same problems. It also gives us a responsibility to work beyond our shores to promote equity and opportunity for all."

Wales' sustainability discourses therefore have been involved in the group-making project of the nation, and specifically the production of a Welsh national territory, as drawing from a politics of scale, under an interpretation of the duty, Wales' spatial relationships and obligations are broadly understood to include tackling global poverty and injustice. The attempts at re-scaling reflected a desire to act domestically and influence UK and world sustainability issues (WAG 2004c, p. 21): "…working with other regions and spheres of governance to both learn and teach".

Starting to Live Differently (2004b) notes clearly the potential role sustainable development can play in enabling Wales to play a role greater than its competences would suggest, and whilst ambitious policy making is easier to achieve with the constitutional and fiscal capacity in place (McEwen and Bomberg 2014), Wales was envisioning a future for itself as a spearhead for innovation. This was juxtaposed against the difficulties facing others adopting sustainability principles, in a process of differentiating the sub-state region by contrasting it with other, at first glance, more assertive authorities.

A frame of reference for emphasising the distinctiveness of Wales' version of sustainable development is how the Welsh nation has "committed itself to action in areas where Nation States are still struggling to find ways forward" (WAG 2004c, p. 5). Starting to Live Differently (2004b) explicitly sought to position Wales as a global contributor: "We believe places of the scale of Wales are best placed to make these connections and move forward on the international agenda" (WAG 2004c, p. 5), which has allowed Wales to re-scale itself in symbolic and political terms, by recognising "the connections between

actions at different scales" and mainstreaming good practice "at all levels, from local to nation" (2004c, p. 7).

In all this therefore, there is an effort to create a discourse of sustainable development rooted in a Welsh identity and values. In seeking to attach understandings of sustainable development to nationalist discourses, Starting to Live Differently (2004b) also stated a commitment to a distinctly Welsh approach towards international development (WAG 2004c, p. 21): "In order to deliver on our duty by furthering the sustainability of others and ourselves we will… work with NGOs in the development sector to identify a positive Welsh contribution to the Millennium Development Goals".

There is evidently an attempt however to articulate a connection between the government's aspiration of reimagining a sustainable Wales and the contribution that its citizens need to, or want to, make in reaching this goal. In the announcement that a framework for international development was being advanced for example, the policy was explained by the then First Minister (NAfW 2005a) as follows: "This will meet the perceptible need expressed by the people of Wales, and reiterated by many Assembly Members, that Wales should be playing its part". The citizenry therefore are enrolled in the group making project through a collective discourse which emphasises global contributions.

Attempts to shape a particular version of sustainable development are viewed as a way of reimagining a new and better nation. Nations are more than just discourses however, and the following section discusses the sub-state practices involved in the group-making project of the nation and, specifically, Wales' international relations-related activities.

5.6 From International Development Commitments to Actions

A legitimacy to Wales' international development ambitions has gathered pace through the government's operation in different policy arenas. Whilst the political will and ambition was clear from early on, Wales' limited competences

has made it highly dependent on the UK level. Nonetheless, because policy issues are socially constructed, certain stories gain traction, shaping how solutions to the issues at hand are perceived, including the responses available, and empowering those with the resources or skills to address them (Williams 2006, p. 255). The previous section underlined the centrality of the sustainable development duty to the government's ambitions so that international development policy-making has been defined as its natural vocation. National identity is performed by members of the nation, and within the sphere of formal performance, the level of political commitment to act on the duty has been high.

This section supplements the discussion on nation-building and identity formation through a consideration of its performative aspects, by outlining how Wales' international actions have presented profile raising opportunities and a platform to show case policies, and opportunities for the government to engage through multi-level governance structures with the UN, as has matured as an institution and its policies have progressed. Relations have also been developed with other sub-state regions so that Wales can now be located within the context of wider multi-level networks. In some respect Wales' involvement in these networks can be regarded as a symbolic form of activity aimed at asserting a post-devolved political identity and fostering a shared solidarity. In all this, the distinctiveness of the duty has been used in processes of institutional self-legitimisation as a way of enhancing domestic and international status, reinforcing territorial identity and defining Wales and its relationship with others. Notwithstanding intergovernmental relations, international activities were pursued with broad agreement from the other political parties in Wales and, in line with the rhetoric of inclusiveness, there have been genuine efforts to engage with some key stakeholders.

Wales' contributions in the international arena pre-date Wales for Africa, and there are other examples which suggest that the commitment to sustainable development is positively impacting on its international presence; such as Wales' membership of the Climate Group and the nrg4SD for example. Since 2002, the government has been a sub-state operative within a wider global network of regional governments. The First Minister's participation in the World

Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, sanctioned by the UK Government, was the government's first development engagement. Here, Welsh political leaders helped establish the nrg4SD, an international association of sub-national and regional governments, with members including Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, Brittany and later, the Mbale Region, Uganda. through the Gauteng Declaration (2002), an agreement between regional governments to commit to the MDGs. Signatories also emphasised the crucial role of regions in promoting sustainable development, based upon the principles of collaboration, responsibility and mutuality across levels of governance. The spatial dimensions of regional governments made them a crucial sphere for the policy and practice of sustainable development (GD 2002): "By reason of scale we are in many circumstances best placed to address specific sustainability issues and in other circumstances we are essential partners in solidarity with other spheres of government and civil society for integrated and coordinated policy and implementation".

Well-placed individuals within the government described Wales' involvement in nrg4SD as profile raising, and as fostering a legitimacy with policy officials from central UK Government, because it demonstrated Wales was sufficiently competent to operate semi-autonomously within the international arena. Nrg4SD represented a discernible international role for Wales in representing sub-state governments within global decision-making, both to share best practice and to lobby for more meaningful action at the international and supranational levels (Happaerts et al. 2010), though crucially, within the limits set at nation-state level. Involvement in such networks can reflect the limitations on members to influence nation-state level policy, but nonetheless permit an international profile (see McEwen and Bomberg 2014, p. 70). According to well-placed individuals, efforts to gain recognition from the UN have been "at least as important" as the work promoting sustainability.

The nrg4SD has played a lead role in promoting a place for sub-national governments in international climate change and sustainable development negotiations, and its successes include the nrg4SD gaining observer status at the UNs Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in November

2005, and accreditation and observer status at the UNs Environmental Programme Governing Council / Global Ministerial Environment Forum in 2007. Progress was also made through the UNFCC when the nrg4SD succeeded in inserting "and regional and subnational" at various points in the negotiated text. Significantly for the purposes of Wales for Africa, this is viewed as a contributing factor towards the UN referencing the contribution sub-national governments can make to the SDGs within its officialised discourse. Whilst the nrg4SD has provided a platform for Wales internationally, at the UN Climate Change Summit at Copenhagen, and to secure recognition for the Million Trees partnership with Mbale at an event with Ban Ki-moon for example (interview, Welsh Government),

in recent years its symbolic impact has been downplayed. Although Wales continues to support the nrg4SD, its institutional weakness are a factor for its current inactivity (interview, Welsh Government), and despite the enthusiasm and activity of a few core members, it has not been as successful an organisation as Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) or The Climate Group. The nrg4SD still operates on the fringes, and well-placed individuals where derisive when discussing its contemporary relevance.

At the domestic level routes to embed the international perspective have been identified, through the curriculum for Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship (2002), and the Welsh Health Circular (2006) 070 (WAG 2006c) for example, in the education and public health fields respectively. Routes to engage internationally have also been pursued. Cross-departmental workings include collaboration across government divisions, work with a number of UK Government departments and agencies, as well as with regional governments, so that Wales' activities are wide-ranging; and part of a wider networked space, for Wales' sustainability discourses emerged in parallel with many other sub-states developing their own initiatives on sustainable development (Van den Brande 2009; Happaerts et al. 2010; McEwen and Bomberg 2014).

As well as its spatial imaginations however, which has allowed Wales to rescale itself in political terms, the temporal implications of the sustainable modes of citizenship presented in Wales are a more original feature of its discourse (Bullen and Whitehead 2005). The Well-being of Future Generations Act is perhaps the government's most potent iteration on the dynamics of devolved citizenship, for it explicitly evokes notions of sustainability against a global-temporal consciousness in its commitment to considering the impact of current practice for future generations. The renaming of the Well-being of Future Generations Bill from the Sustainable Development Bill during its passage into statute was also an effort to broaden its appeal; to highlight issues of social justice and make sustainability more relevant to those public bodies listed in the Act, and meaningful for the Welsh public more generally (interview, HCA). One of the Act's seven well-being goals is for "a globally responsible Wales" (WG 2016a), viewed by key stakeholders (interviews, HCA, WG) as a long-term political commitment to international development.

It was not originally a goal however, instead introduced through the Wales We Want initiative (WG 2015), an attempt by the government to start a national conversation on the kind of future imagined for the Welsh nation. Wales We Want has been described as an attempt to develop an imagined community organised along socio-temporal and spatial, with Wales' current populace making connections to the Wales of 2050 (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 59). The vision for "a globally responsible Wales" highlights how understandings of Wales can be understood in multiple ways, including from a perspective which draws from inter-dependence and the international character of sustainability, Its inclusion was seen as a "change driven by people who are passionate about the issues" (interview, WG) and suggests a much more broadly drawn vision of community – though other contributions highlight how understandings of Welshness are often viewed through local lenses (Jones and Fowler 2008; Jones and Merriman 2012).

There is a distinct politics of scale associated with the visions of the Act. It establishes Public Service Boards (PSBs) for each local authority area in Wales, who must prepare and publish a 'Local Well-being Plan', to include an assessment of local well-being in an effort at embedding the notion of sustainable development in Wales' communities (WG 2015). The Act also purposefully connects Wales to the UN SDGs, so that locally-based imaginations of what it means to be Welsh, both now and in the future, are connected to a global network. Described as part of the journey on "how we do things differently in Wales" (Sustainable Development Commissioner, participant observation), the legislation has been designed to integrate with the UNs SDG goals, and specifically, community links, through the last listed of the Act's 46 indicators: "The social return on investment of Welsh partnerships within Wales and outside of the UK that are working towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals" (WG 2016a). This is viewed to represent a nation "absolutely embedded" in the global network and "ahead of its time" (interview, WG) as a result of its connections to SDG 17 (UN 2015): "Partnerships for the Goals. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development", and specifically indicator 17.9, nested beneath, on targeted capacity-building "through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation" (UN 2015).

The Well-being of Future Generations Act therefore is an example of the global being applied at the national, used to define a Welsh version of sustainable development which makes much of the need to connect to the scales of the local, for the Welsh Government has explicitly tied itself to the wider UN SDG conversation. At the same time, the Act is aimed at providing a degree of fluidity, which should enable more local interpretations of the discourse to emerge in different places, through the assessments of local well-being. However, whilst there is evidence that in Wales, the discourses of sustainability and nationalism are helping to reinforce themselves in complex and contingent ways (Jones and Ross 2016), the characteristics of sustainable citizenship are values and principles which do not lend themselves to nationally prescribed ways of learning and assimilation (Bullen and Whitehead 2005). A challenge for the government is defining a national culture that can act as a vehicle for

promoting its objective of increasing engagement with development assistance. In the following chapters, this thesis discusses the potential role that nationalist discourse can play in helping to increase the extent and quality of that engagement.

The Welsh NGO community is actively looking at how the principles will be put into practice (interview, SAFE; interview, HCA). According to policy, there is positive and growing momentum around the implementation of the legislation and "a sense of the spirit and intent of what it is trying to achieve" (interview, WG). According to the UN Director of Division for Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (WG 2016):

> "The Wales Future Generations Act captures the spirit and essence of two decades of United Nations work in the area of sustainable development and serves as a model for other regions and countries… We hope that what Wales is doing today the world will do tomorrow. Action, more than words, is the hope for our current and future generations."

5.7 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter addressed the first research question: *How does the international development agenda converge with ambitions of nation-building?*

In doing so, the analysis set out the scale of the challenge towards the launch of Wales for Africa. As events played out, Wales' processes of devolution gained considerable traction in a short space of time, resulting in an incremental expansion in powers from the restraints imposed on the initial devolution settlement. Nonetheless, despite limits to devolution, from the outset Wales has emphasised its commitment to sustainable development, under its distinctive duty to promote the principles of sustainability in the exercise of its functions. Through the conceptual lens of the sub-state as development actor, this chapter discussed how Wales' nationalist discourses have been associated with its prominent set of sustainable development discourses to create an alternative Wales, which now includes a programme of international development in the

reproduction of the nation. The detailed IPA-based review of policy documents, political reports and academic literature, and data from key informant interviews has enabled the careful construction of a narrative. The policy story constructed demonstrates that the international dimension of sustainable development has been seriously, and quickly, pursued by Wales' political community, as it has incorporated the original demands from environmentally-aligned networks in its attempts at fostering a legitimacy, so that later collaborations with NGOs and civic networks resulted in the development of a framework for action on the MDGs.

Taking the sustainable development duty, the political momentum generated under a limited model of devolution illustrates a dynamic response to governance. As is made clear from the analysis, the government has carved out a distinctive policy niche for itself, using its unique duty as the basis for international action, so that Wales for Africa is now used in the construction of a more progressive Wales, which is said to derive from a conception of Welsh values based on social justice and fairness; with far-reaching implications on how the government views itself and its relations with others, within its borders and in its external projection of an outward-facing, globally responsible, sustainable nation.

The government placed an early emphasis on developing a policy distinctiveness through its sustainable development duty. Although a framework for international development was not an original objective, using the duty as the justification, and aided by a cohesive policy network, the government, with a more proactive agenda in mind, quickly became more ambitious through calls for development responsibilities. Whilst the initial devolution settlement could have moderated policy behaviours, the government obtained considerable success in launching Wales for Africa. The programme is the outcome of a high-level of political commitment to act on the duty, supported by NGO collaboration on its implementation, and ultimately, any actions are sanctioned by the centre.

The government's involvement in international networks can be viewed as a symbolic contribution towards its processes of nation-building, aimed at asserting a post-devolved identity and a national distinctiveness in arenas receptive to notions of Wales' self-autonomy and nationhood, there is evidence however which suggests the commitment to sustainability, and ambitions at being an exemplar region and demonstrating leadership is positively impacting on its international presence. The material contributions of Wales for Africa are posited as an example of this and are explored in-depth in the next chapter.

By reference to the Welsh case, the analysis demonstrated the fluidity and relationality of territoriality, as through a politics of connectivity and invited spaces, sustainability has been driven up the political agenda in Wales. Policy articulations have emphasised the connections between bounded conceptions of the territorial nation and relational understandings of space and citizenship in efforts at crafting an alternative Welsh nation. The Well-being of Future Generations Act highlights the potential for developing stronger connections between Wales' discourses of nationalism and sustainability.

Two distinctive themes are strengthened under the Act in relation to Wales' take on sustainable development. One arises in the context of its emphasis on social justice, and the banal nationalisms evident in statements which assert values as Welsh in character, in efforts at differentiating Wales through the associations of sustainability and nationalist discourses. The second theme pertains to Wales' spatial imaginations which have extended the notions of fairness and social justice beyond its borders, so that its relationships and obligations are conceptualised broadly to include tackling global poverty and injustice. A more distinctive feature of Wales' sustainability discourse is the temporal implications presented within its imaginations. Notions of sustainability against a global-temporal consciousness are explicitly evoked within the more contemporary articulations of sustainability under the Act in its commitments to considering the impact of current practice for future generations.

There is also a distinct politics of scale evident, such as in the ways the Act connects Wales to the UNs SDGs in a conscious flagging of identity which

explicitly evokes a global connectivity. Whilst international development has been posited as constituent part of Wales' natural policy vocations through the sustainable development duty, Wales for Africa has been designed around the limits of devolved autonomy. The goals of the Act however are viewed by policy-makers as a long-term commitment to a Welsh framework for international development. The programme helps emphasise the nested institutional context of political communities, and the analysis highlighted how coordination and cooperation between political networks and communities of practice has seen the programme embed.

The following chapter discusses the government's objective of increasing engagement with development assistance and explores Wales for Africa in practice. It looks at some of the issues encountered when a distinctiveness approach is pursued.

6 The Wales for Africa Programme

6.1 Introduction

Wales for Africa was launched in October 2006, with the publication of Wales for Africa: A Framework for Welsh Assembly Government Action on International Sustainable Development (WAG 2006b). Its publication marked a momentous achievement, making international development a legitimate concern of the government. No further development action framework has been published since. However, the programme has grown considerably over its existence. The previous chapter examined how the government's concern with promoting sustainable development is an important part of the nationalist discourse in its attempts at constructing an alternative nation based on Welsh values, which as a complex and contingent impact, resulted in the launch of Wales for Africa. This chapter discusses Wales for Africa in practice, as an example of the doing things differently message, by exploring its rationale, delivery and anticipated outcomes. It argues that civil society groups, NGOs and the government have engaged in collective learning, aimed at doing development assistance better, by reference to Research Question Two: *How has Wales for Africa built a community of practice?*

The previous chapter outlined the uniqueness of the sustainable development duty, and how it helps capture a process of sub-state restructuring and is used in political strategy to articulate a post-devolution nation-building project. International development is an area where the government hopes significant symbolic progress against its duty can be made. Whilst literatures argue that Wales for Africa illustrates the government testing the limits of its devolved competences (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012), this thesis identified limited analysis which explores in detail how the programme has evolved, or which systematically maps the activities supported, or develops a comprehensive understanding of the rationale behind it. This chapter seeks to address these gaps by exploring how the government has associated itself with citizen-led development initiatives, acting in a leadership role by conferring political voice and resource, whilst while enhancing its international profile and contributing to the politics of nation-building.

To identify trends, themes and factors pertinent to the evolution of the programme, the analysis draws on evidence from policy documents, academic outputs, third sector publications, media archives, participant observation, and on insights from semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders from the government, Hub Cymru Africa, the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel and Dolen Cymru during the opening phase of the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration.

The arguments presented are also drawn from a detailed analysis of monitoring and reporting data from the programme and supported activities (between October 2006 and October 2016). The author's interpretation of the data was confirmed with policy officials and informed the overview of the programme provided in Wales for Africa: 10 Years (2016b). Insights from the author's experience of drafting the report inform the discussion presented here, and the engagement with the Wales for Africa Team and Hub Cymru Africa enlightened the in-depth knowledge of the research context. In generating the data, the positionality of the author is recognised, a frame considered valuable for eliciting understandings on the Wales for Africa network. An outline of programme expenditure, including a breakdown of the community links activities funded, has been amalgamated by the author. This is presented in Annex F.

In assessing Wales for Africa, it was critical to develop a thorough understanding of the theory behind the programme. As noted in the Introductory chapter, the programme's statement of intent is "to encourage the greatest number of people in Wales to have the biggest impact on international development and to raise awareness of international development issues" (WG 2013), and a goal of this chapter is to define the steps t taken to help deliver this policy, by reference to the research question. The aim was to capture the dynamism of the policy-making process, by demonstrating a thorough analysis of the context in which Wales for Africa operates, its aims and objectives, and the rationale underpinning the programme. Thus, this chapter uses Theory of Change-thinking (see Chapter Three) to set out an understanding of the programme and how it has built a community of practice.

The emphasis of the analysis was on how the programme is given specific meaning by policy-makers and participants. Thus the interpretive approach adopted was viewed to compliment Mason and Barnes' (2007, p. 155) notion of "constructing" a theory behind a programme "out of a variety of sources and resources, in a particular context that is shaped by the nature of the relationship between researchers and other stakeholders". One way in which the understanding of the change-process anticipated by policy-makers could be described was through a logic model, which is presented in Figure 6.3.

The chapter is divided into three parts, followed by conclusions: part one discusses the factors and group interests behind Wales for Africa's launch; part two examines the establishment of an identifiably Welsh development sector; and part three explores the professionalisation of the sector.

6.2 Towards a Framework for International Development Action

Key factors identified as driving the launch of the programme are discussed below, and indicate that Wales for Africa had a strong foundation from which to build a community of practice around development assistance, based upon:

- NGO support;
- a high-level of political commitment to the programme;
- the precedent set by other sub-states;
- a civil society receptive to global justice issues;
- international political developments; and
- environmental factors.

Party Political Posturing

There are tentative suggestions within the literature that competition between Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru stimulated progress on an international development framework during the early stages of devolution (Royles 2010). Statements by politicians stressed that a devolved Wales should avoid being "too parochial and inward-looking" and strive towards a National Assembly with an "outward-looking internationalist face" (John Griffiths AM, NAfW 2005b) so as to reflect a progressive Wales (see NAfW 2005a, NAfW 2005b, NAfW

2006b, NAfW 2010a, and NAfW 2010b). These were the progressive values Welsh Labour wanted to be associated with, in contrast to the more inward-looking approach of its main competitor, Plaid Cymru (Royles 2010). The Welsh Labour party's promotion of an 'outward-looking' Wales, aimed at raising Wales' international profile, received cross-party support, as evidenced in Assembly debates (NAfW 2005a; 2005b).

The Scottish Government's Malawi Development Programme

Policy developments at the Scottish Parliament also appear to have influenced Wales' politics (see Morgan 1999), including in the field of development. In 2005, the then First Minister of Scotland, Jack McConnell and President wa Mutharika of Malawi signed the Scotland-Malawi Co-operation Agreement that outlined key areas in which Scotland and Malawi would co-operate, such as governance, society, health and education, (Scottish Government 2005). The significance of Scotland's Malawi Development Programme was twofold: 1), Scotland set the path for development of international policies sanctioned by the central UK-government (Anyimadu 2011; Smith 2011); a precedent used by Wales to justify its actions (Fisher 2012; Royles 2010); and 2), an element of competition was evident – as Wyn Jones and Royles (2012, p. 260) note "a case of keeping up with the MacJoneses" between the two devolved nations on the implementation of international policies (see also Fisher 2012, p. 258); although policy officials did view Scotland as "probably our strongest link, as in government-to-government link, and we meet with them regularly" (interview, Welsh Government policy official).

Enhancing Wales' Governing Credentials

The development of international policies supports the government's nation-building ambitions which, as set out in the preceding chapter, have been undertaken with broad cross-party agreement on increasing its international presence and getting its voice heard (Royles 2010; Wyn Jones and Royles 2012; Fisher 2012).

A Growing Awareness of Africa's Development Context

Wales for Africa also took shape at a time when an awareness of Africa's development issues had increased to an unprecedented level across the UK

(Anyimadu 2011). The BBC, along with museums, galleries and other cultural venues, ran a dedicated series of cultural programmes and events (Anyimadu 2011) which coincided with Oxfam International's Make Poverty History (2005) and Make Trade Fair (2002-2005) campaigns. Oxfam Cymru had long been involved with the promotion of fair trade in Wales (Royles 2007b; Smith 2011) as part of a wider network (the Wales Fair Trade Forum, since developed into Fair Trade Wales (Cymru Masnach Deg)) associated with the church and trade justice movement. This included NGOs such as Christian Aid and businesses such as Traidcraft. The network gained traction in 2000 with support from fair trade groups, local councils and businesses across Wales (Townley 2009). For Anyimadu (2011, p. 12):

> "With central government and the general public preoccupied with Africa, it was pragmatic for the devolved governments, both of which would depend on grassroots participation for the implementation of their policies, to set the continent at the heart of their international development initiatives."

For McEwen and Bomberg: "Territorial identity is collectively constructed and reinforced within political discourses, and is also an expression of how individuals define themselves and their relationships with other" (2014, p. 69). Population with a strong and distinctive sense of shared identity can represent a less tangible but tremendous resource to a government, or a movement – take for example *Make Poverty History*, seeking to mobilise support for an ambitious policy agenda - such as the Wales for Africa programme – because of the feelings of solidarity and mutual trust such identity can generate (see Calhoun 1994; McEwen 2005).

The Commission for Africa

Another key milestone which contributed towards an increased awareness of Africa's development context was the Final Report of the Commission for Africa (2005). The Commission for Africa was set up by Tony Blair, then British Prime Minister, "to define the challenges facing Africa, and to provide clear recommendations on how to support the changes needed to reduce poverty" (2005, p. 1).

The Gleneagles Summit

The recommendations of the Final Report of the Commission for Africa (2005) laid the groundwork for commitments made at the Gleneagles Summit for the Group of Eight (G-8) heads of the powerful industrial nations in July 2005. World poverty had been top of the agenda at this Summit, which inspired protests and concerts; for example, half a million people formed a human chain to "make poverty history", Live 8 concerts took place before the G8 Summit aimed at encouraging activism and debate within the G8 member countries and increasing political pressure, and over 225,000 protestors came to Edinburgh enjoining the G8 to 'Make Poverty History' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009).

The Make Poverty History Campaign

It is against the context of the Make Poverty History campaign that sustained NGO lobbying, from the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) and Oxfam Cymru amongst others, further encouraged the Assembly to use its sustainable development duty as a basis for international development activity (Smith 2011; Royles 2010). According to the Welsh Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA), Wales for Africa was "created following extensive public pressure… for a distinctive Welsh contribution following the 2005 'Make Poverty History' campaigns" (WCVA 2010, p. 9). Make Poverty History refers to the UK branch of a global alliance of NGOs coordinated by the Global Call to Action Against Poverty to pressurise the leaders of the richest countries to achieve the MDGs they had signed up to. The global strategy to "think globally, act locally" meant that each organisation at a national level adopted themes most relevant to its own government (see Nash 2008). Agenda items prompted by Oxfam Cymru were debated by the European and External Affairs Committee of the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW 2003; NAfW 2005c), which led to debate in plenary (NAfW 2005a). Assembly Members proved a responsive audience to the lobbying of various international development NGOs, as evidenced by several plenary debates (see NAfW 2005a; NAfW 2005b; NAfW 2006b). NGOs petitioned the National Assembly for an international development framework (NAfW 2005c):

> "…because of the legal duty to promote sustainable development, because of Wales' profile in the UK and Europe, and because there is strong political support across parties for Wales to have an impact on an international stage in terms of taking a proper and rightful place in helping to overcome poverty, we think that there are key opportunities to look at how the Assembly can have an impact."

NGO Secondments to the Welsh Government

It was noted in interviews "that some NGOs made themselves heard that they wanted something Welsh, and so a secondment was brought in" (interview, Welsh Government). Lobbying saw two people, an academic specialising in fair trade governance (Fisher 2012) and an Oxfam Cymru official, seconded to the Welsh Government to help develop a Fairtrade strategy for Wales and proposals on a framework for international development: "to look at possibilities within the devolution settlement on what we could do internationally" (interview, Welsh Government policy official); thus NGOs heavily involved in the Make Poverty History campaign were instrumental in drawing up and implementing Wales for Africa (Royles 2010; Fisher 2012). Fair Trade is viewed as integral to the framework for international development, and as a way to help the government exercise its legal duty to promote sustainable development. In the words of the Head of the Wales for Africa Team: "it sees the creation of linkages between producers in developing countries and consumers in Wales as an excellent means to engage the public in the broader sustainable development agenda" (Townley 2009, p. 1027).

Calls to Support Overseas Disaster Relief Efforts

The First Minister was increasingly being asked for a recognisably Welsh response to overseas disasters (NAfW 2003b; NAfW 2006b). Assembly Members stated that constituents expected specifically Welsh relief efforts (NAfW 2005a; Anyimadu 2011, p. 12), for example in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and 2005 Kashmir earthquake (WAG 2006b).

Existing Community-based Links

Other contributing factors towards the development of an international development framework were the existing long-established links between Welsh civil society organisations and sub-Saharan Africa, which were used to rationalise a focus on the region. In particular, policy makers pointed to the community-based link between PONT, based in Pontypridd, Wales, and the Mbale district in Uganda, as well as the work of Dolen Cymru in forging long-standing links between Lesotho and Wales and in establishing the world's first country-to-country twinning between the two nations in the process. Key stakeholders played a key role in helping to commit the government to a focus on sub-Saharan Africa.

However, whilst key publications have been keen to portray a high-degree of consensus and collaboration between the government and organisations in the methods of developing Wales for Africa (for example, WAG 2006b; WCVA 2013; WG 2016b), interviewees hinted that there had been some pointed behind-the-scenes discussions amongst stakeholders:

> "…because there was this country-to-country link [Dolen Cymru], there was a feeling that it shouldn't have been Wales for Africa, it should have been Wales for Lesotho, which in my opinion was completely misguided. Because you've got all these people with links, the government aren't going to just be like 'we're not bothered about Uganda anymore, we'll just go to Lesotho'" (interview, NGO).

The Personal Commitment of Key Politicians

According to Royles (2010), the foremost push towards Wales for Africa was the commitment of Assembly Members and Ministers to international development issues. Ministerial-level commitment was consistent during the development of the Wales for Africa framework, and support for international development action was clear in Assembly debates (NAfW 2005a; NAfW 2005b; NAfW 2006b) demonstrating that the programme was driven by the Welsh Labour government with extensive cross-party and civil society support. In addition, Anyimadu (2011, p. 14) highlights "the personal links which some

AMs [Assembly Members] have to African countries (at the time of the Wales for Africa scheme's launch, two of nine ministers had been raised in Africa)". The current Cabinet Secretary for Health, Well-being and Sport, Vaughan Gething AM, with responsibilities for aspects of the Wales-Africa health links, was also born in Zambia, and stressed his commitment to the programme in his key note addresses at Wales Africa Health Conferences. Reflecting on their experiences of working with Ministers on the programme, Welsh Government officials described a high-level of engagement from the respective First Ministers and others, sustained over the years:

> "…he's [Carwyn Jones AM] always been willing and passionate about the programme; to attend events, meet people. He went to Uganda. Had an amazing jam-packed itinerary. It all fell into place when he went on that trip. All the things we put forward to him suddenly came real" (interview, Welsh Government).

> "…other Ministers, that we've had through various different strands of Wales for Africa activity, we've always had a positive experience. I've had the general feeling that they are proud of and happy to talk about Wales for Africa, and to bring it up in conversation or at events" (interview, Welsh Government)

Demand from Civil Society

For the Welsh Government policy officials interviewed, the strongest factor behind Wales for Africa's launch was demands from within civil society for a distinct contribution, coupled with a receptive government:

> "…because civil society wanted something Welsh. Because the government felt very strongly that Wales has got something to give in this area."

> "I think its civil society - that's really why we should have a role. Because people want Wales to have a role."

6.3 Space Making

Constitutional Constraints: Limitations to Wales' Capacity to Act

Outlined in Chapter Five, an international development programme could not be pursued without DFID's consent. The Welsh Government therefore is particularly subject to multi-level political and institutional constraints, and the development of the Wales for Africa programme has been dependent upon the goodwill of DFID at central UK state-level. Wales' limited scope for international development action was acknowledged at the outset by policy makers. On the announcement that a framework for development action was being pursued, for example, the First Minister noted (NAfW 2005):

> "We also have to recognise that we have no lawful power to give direct monetary aid to projects in other countries. We can only incur expenditure in connection with the exercise of our functions, and these are, in almost all cases, confined to action in relation to Wales."

Nevertheless, the government's fifth statutory report (2006, p. 3) on progress against its sustainable development duty confirms the "International Development Framework" to "enhance Wales' ability to help the MDGs". A public consultation on the proposal was held in early 2006. Over 260 responses were received. This informed the final version of the framework, within which community-linking was cited as a core feature (WAG 2006b, p. 7).

Political devolution in Wales has not been characterised by constant disputes over territorial power, although debates about other matters are often proxies for constitutional questions about the territorial distribution of power. In Wales, political elites are continuously "seeking to manipulate the evolution of devolution in each case" (Bradbury and Mitchell 2005, p. 287). However, the process leading up to Wales for Africa's launch highlights the disciplining role of the nation-state in controlling sub-state level ambitions.

The central UK government's role in formulating the Wales for Africa framework illustrates the tight constraints under which the National Assembly was operating. It represents how: "In the international realm, at least, the central

state is clearly guarding its prerogatives jealously" (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012, p. 266). Whilst initial policy statements suggest DFID was "positive and welcoming" to Welsh Assembly Government activity (NAfW 2005b), Wyn Jones and Royles (2012) point to extensive official-level behind-the-scenes discussions on the grounds for Welsh Government participation in development activities. Drawing from semi-structured, elite-level interviews with Welsh Government and DFID officials, the public and third sector, they argue that early support from DFID for the Assembly's international development aspirations was ambiguous, reflecting a 'tricky' relationship (see also Fisher 2012, p. 258).

At the crux of DFID's scrutiny was whether the Assembly's involvement in international development would bring added value to the central UK state's programme of work. Then Secretary of State for International Development, Hillary Benn MP, in principle sanctioned the devolved administration's involvement in international development, when he launched Wales for Africa with the First Minister on the 4th October 2006. At the event, Rhodri Morgan AM acknowledged that Wales' contribution would be a "drop in the ocean" and would be "valued-added" to the assistance provided by the UK government (BBC Wales 2006).

Still, Wyn Jones and Royles (2012) reference the rigorous consultations of officials from DFID on the legal basis for the Assembly's participation in the field of international development. At UK Government level, the consultation over the Welsh Government's legal interpretation of the sustainable development duty extended to detailed scrutiny over the content and wording of the Wales for Africa framework by HM Treasury lawyers, who were "substantially involved in 'wading through legislation' and advising on the basis for Welsh action to the extent that every particular action has to be checked" (Royles 2010, p. 158). Legal issues affected the operational processes of the framework even after it was agreed in principle, as they delayed of the launch of Wales for Africa's grants system (Royles 2010). Indeed, the *Sustainable Development Annual Report 2006* (WAG 2006a, p. 25) anticipated the *Wales for Africa Framework* (WAG 2006b) would be launched in June 2006, whereas the actual launch did not take place until October 2006. UK Government involvement in the formulation of the framework illustrates the tight constraints under which the

Welsh Government was operating. Wales for Africa is viewed to constitute "a very modest scheme undertaken at the initiative of a government from the same party and in pursuit of aims vigorously promulgated by the UK government"; but is said to represent how "In the international realm, at least, the central state is clearly guarding its prerogatives jealously" (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012, p. 266).

Analysis by Royles (2010) and Wyn Jones and Royles (2012) point to other factors hindering progress on the framework; grouped under the related themes of collaboration and communication issues. Initially, DFID had no designated official with responsibility for liaising with the devolved administrations. Instead, the Africa Capacity Building Initiative, established by DFID in response to the Africa Commission, was the principal forum for maintaining relations between DFID and departments in Wales and Scotland pursuing development activities in Africa. The Welsh Government's domestic focus, meant that there were no prior relations with DFID, which according to policy officials interviewed, made establishing links and maintaining an initial productive dialogue difficult (interview, Welsh Government).

The attitude of UK Government Ministers also hindered progress on the framework (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012); exacerbated by inter-governmental tensions between the central UK and the Scottish Governments (Royles 2012b; Royles 2010, p. 158), relations which Anyimadu (2011) argues only got better under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. Intergovernmental relations between DFID and the Welsh Government improved following the launch of Wales for Africa, attributed to three factors: 1), Wales' active and prominent membership of nrg4SD, and in subsequent policy discussions in Perth and Cardiff, its role as a sub-state in advocating for progress against the MDGs (WAG 2003c, p. 4-5); 2), the appointment within DFID in 2009 of an official with formal responsibilities for liaising with Welsh Government officials, resulting in regular communications (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012); and 3), DFID allocated match funding to support the UNDPs Territorial Approach to Climate Change (TACC) project in Mbale, Uganda – a three year partnership between Wales, Mbale and the UNDP (WAG 2009). This saw collaboration between individuals, civil society, private sector and

government, to provide a co-ordinated mitigation and adaptation plan against the impacts of climate change. DFID, the UNDP and the Danish Embassy provided financial assistance, whilst the government provided technical and development support, co-ordinated from Glamorgan University (WAG 2009).

6.4 The Wales for Africa Programme

A purpose of this chapter is to explain the rationale behind Wales for Africa, the models for its delivery and the outcomes it is anticipated to achieve. Thus, to produce "a framework within which it is possible to construct a narrative of the process of implementation and its consequences" (Mason and Barnes 2007, p. 167; see Chapter Three), material related to programme's change processes has been organised to provide an overview of the logic behind the activities supported. Through document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation, an understanding of the inputs, activities, outcomes and anticipated impacts of Wales for Africa is outlined, so that it is possible to reflect on the strategies adopted and what policy-makers hoped to achieve. The objective is not to test the robustness of the 'theory' behind the programme and its implementation, but to generate a framework – or 'theory of change' - to better understand the programme and explore change, whilst acknowledging the dynamic environment in which policy making occurs. Thus, some assumptions inherent in the programme's 'logic' are also considered.

Aims and objectives

Wales for Africa aims to support international activities "based on genuine partnership, with both sides gaining from the interaction" (WG 2015) to "encourage the greatest number of people in Wales to have the biggest impact on international development and to raise awareness of international development issues" (WG 2016b). Interventions should be based upon reciprocity and mutual benefit, within the context set by Wales' devolved institutional structures. The programme is designed to complement the work of DFID and was aimed at encouraging Welsh efforts to deliver the UNs MDGs (WAG 2006b, p. 2), since succeeded by the SDGs (WG 2016b). The objective is to professionalise the Welsh development sector (interview, Welsh Government):

> "…we want the Wales for Africa programme to have an impact, but it's quite a disparate programme, in that its made-up of smallish programmes working all over the place. So ideally we just want those projects to get better, more sophisticated, never do any harm, grow, develop, access funding from elsewhere. So I think it's about that and the community within Wales becoming better at what we do."

However, interviewees acknowledge the tensions inherent within the programme's ambitions to professionalise a sector which it defines as grass-roots and citizen-led. As a result, the smaller pots of funding available for projects were seen by policy-makers and supported organisations as a core feature which should continue to define the programme:

> "…we have made it very clear that we do not want to lose the smaller projects, so it's really important that whilst other groups are progressing to development support at a higher level, the lower level doesn't go… people who are interested in development should be able to learn, come along to events, attend a conference and not feel like they're not professional enough" (interview, Welsh Government).

The Legal Basis for Activities

Legal restrictions have meant that the government has had to use its sustainable development duty to pursue actions in the international arena (see Chapter Five). As a result, its international activities are part of its Sustainable Development Schemes and associated Action Plans (for example, WAG 2005 (see Chapter Five)). International activities have also been part of the Labour-Liberal Democrat (2000 – 2003) Government commitments, and the Labour-Plaid Cymru Coalition Government's (2007 – 2011) *One Wales Agreement* (Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups 2007; NAfW 2010). International development has also been part of consecutive Welsh Labour Manifestos (Labour 2011; Labour 2012; Labour 2016). The legislative basis for the sustainable development duty is currently under the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.

The *Wales for Africa Framework* (WAG 2006b) officially codified action on international development as a legitimate responsibility of the government. As the programme and the Assembly's powers have developed, a range of legal powers have been used to fund Wales for Africa projects. Following a request from the Wales for Africa team, the Legal Services Division identified the legislation which forms the basis of the programme's schemes and activities (see Figure 6.1). Activities are subject to the legal caveat that they must be exercised in relation to Wales; and each project has to identify how it gives rise to a mutual benefit. One or more power is viewed as relevant to each supported project depending on the nature and scope of the activity:

Figure 6-1: The Legal Basis for Wales for Africa Activities
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

Legal Power
Section 60 of the Government of Wales Act 2006
Section 61 of the Government of Wales Act 2006
Section 62 of the Government of Wales Act 2006
Section 70 of the Government of Wales Act 2006
Section 71 of the Government of Wales Act 2006
Section 126 Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996
Section 26 Development of Rural Wales Act 1976
Section 2 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006

Reframing the Limitations: The Principle of Mutual Benefit

Wales for Africa funded activities must be "mutually beneficial to both Wales and the country in sub-Saharan Africa" (WCVA 2015, p. 2l; see also WAG 2006b, p. 1) and respect the decisions and parameters set by DFID by representing added value to central government efforts. This model of support has been labelled a defining feature of a 'Welsh model' or 'Welsh approach' by the government (for example, WG 2016b) and some supported organisations (interview, NGO). In health linking, the principle of mutual benefit is an acknowledgement of the contribution staff recruited from overseas make to Wales (WAG 2006c, p. 3):

> "…there needed to be a policy for health links between Wales and the rest of the world to demonstrate that the relationship was not one-sided... [because the] cost of the training of healthcare staff recruited from overseas has not fallen to Wales".

In acknowledgement of this saving, efforts have focused on encouraging the NHS in Wales to expand its work in partnership with health care providers and trainers in developing countries to improve health care in their countries (WAG 2006c, p. 3). Through the recommendations of the *Welsh Health Circular (2006) 070* (WAG 2006c), Local Health Boards (LHBs) in Wales are required to demonstrate commitment to the UNs development goals by fostering health links with health providers, universities, trainers, NGO's, international health organisations or governments in sub-Saharan Africa within LHBs stated goals. Wales for Africa funded an evaluation of Wales' health links (see Annex H) and policy documents state that health linking activities benefit Wales by providing unique opportunities for Welsh health professionals to learn how to: adapt and generate ideas for health service delivery with very limited resources; provide healthcare for people from different backgrounds and cultures, with different languages and needs; and gain a renewed sense of positivity and optimism about what can be achieved in health service delivery in Wales.

Discussions with health workers at Wales Africa Health Links conferences substantiated the uniqueness of the medical, professional and personal skills that could be honed (although according to an attendee who managed a link, one hospital department was refusing to allow a group of nurses to attend a project because of staff shortages within the Welsh hospital. The benefits for Wales were framed by one Welsh Government interviewee as follows:

> "For health links, for the people that go out and, I don't know, spend a week in a hospital, they come back to their job and there's so many benefits. They see how resources and time are much more precious, and how people are treated, and all those things you couldn't really teach in a training course, it becomes part of their day-to-day lives. And we don't underestimate that" (interview, Wales for Africa).

The government's International Learning Opportunities (ILO) programme also frames the benefits in terms of participants learning resource efficiencies and gaining a more rounded perspective. For the government, the ILO programme is "…100% on the mutual benefit line, because it's about people bringing skills back to their work place" (interview, Welsh Government). The ILO programme offers individuals from the public and third sector in Wales the opportunity to spend up to eight weeks in sub-Saharan Africa on projects designed to enhance their leadership skills whilst contributing to the SDGs (WG 2013):

> "ILO is designed to stretch and challenge capabilities. The programme offers an immersive experience that involves working with African organisations, leading on specific projects. By taking you out of your comfort zone, it tasks you to work more creatively, increases levels of self-awareness and gives insight into your own personal resilience."

Key stakeholders acknowledged however that it was often difficult to articulate, let alone demonstrate, a mutual benefit for Wales with some activities; and that there was a tension within discussions on mutuality and reciprocity in development, given that any benefits for Welsh participants could be perceived very differently, and unequal, to those received by partner organisations in sub-Saharan Africa:

> "It's always difficult for partnered organisations to say 'this is what you're getting' and 'this is what you're getting', and for the benefits to be 100% equal. But actually having to think about the benefits you're going to get is better than saying 'well, were going to help them to…'. Having to qualify what that means, what you are going to do afterwards, how the project is going to help Wales - that kind of follow-up is the difference. And as the programme's gone on year-after-year, people appreciate that more and pull that out as a really good positive - as in what is different about the Welsh approach" (interview, Welsh Government).

Relatedly, policy officials acknowledged the difficulties in capturing the impact of the programme; particularly given the 'softer' skills supported by some activities. A distinction was made between holistic benefits and quantifiable outcomes:

> "…if you go out to Africa, you come back with a different outlook. And you'll carry that through your career, your personal life, bringing up kids… But then there are harder mutual benefits" (interview, Welsh Government).

> "Some project will give you hard facts and some others won't, that's where we find it difficult. Because you could look at what is a traditional community link and say the benefits to Wales are blah, blah and blah, and then you could look at an Africa diaspora link and it could be so different" (interview, Welsh Government).

Inputs

The inputs or resources dedicated to the programme are relatively modest. Responsibility for the programme falls to the Wales for Africa team, located in the European and External Affairs Division (EEAD), which in turn is headed by the Permanent Secretary's Department, under the portfolio of the First Minister. The EEAD's concerns include working on public diplomacy issues in international relations, the promotion of Wales abroad, overseas events and inward visits. Locating EEAD within the Office of the First Minister allows for greater cross-departmental working, and increased status in co-ordinating international relations-related activity across the government (Royles 2010, p. 149).

The Wales for Africa team consists of three full-time officials who are responsible for the Wales for Africa programme and other international development activities (see Chapter Five). Between its launch in October 2006 and March 2017, approximately £8,255,000.00 has been distributed to support development activities in Wales. The monitoring and reporting data amalgamated in Annex E provides a comprehensive breakdown of expenditure to date.

Crucially however, the programme's resources are portrayed by policy officials and supported organisations as more than monetary. According to Welsh Government interviewee's, the terms of the devolution settlement and the principle of mutual benefit means there are no passive recipients of

development 'aid' under the programme; and for Hub Cymru Africa, 'beneficiaries' refers to Welsh recipients of support:

> "…it's down to this benefit to Wales. We couldn't just send aid money. We wouldn't be able to from Wales. It's more about the learning from others and the mutual support and all of that" (interview, Welsh Government).

Core Activities

As identified through an analysis of policy document and interviews with policy-makers, Wales for Africa has funded a number of core activities, supported to deliver the programme's overarching objective: to professionalise the Welsh development sector. Several organisations have been involved in implementing the programme, which has funded a number of networks to work with key development groups, and these networks have provided small grants to a wide range of organisations. Activities funded have focussed on diaspora and fair trade groups, health and community links, and on professional development activities. Wales for Africa has also developed substantive programmes of work in Lesotho and in Mbale. The key strands of funded activity are summarised in Figure 6.2.

The work in Lesotho builds on the long-standing Dolen Cymru programme established in 1985, focussing on health, education and environment, and in Uganda on the PONT-Mbale link, formally established in 2006, both of which predate Wales for Africa. The government has validated the focus on sub-Saharan Africa by emphasising the number of links already between Wales and the region, including the Dolen Cymru link with Lesotho, and many other smaller links with Malawi, Uganda and elsewhere, and links with Somaliland through the Welsh Somali and Somaliland diaspora community.

Wales has a 30-year relationship with Lesotho. This is the result of the world's first country-to-country twinning between Lesotho and Wales, initiated by Dolen Cymru. There are links in areas such as education, health, governance and civil society and through the ILO programme. In December 2012 a climate change partnership was agreed between the Welsh Government and Lesotho Meteorological Services; in April 2014 an MOU was signed between the Welsh

Government and the Government of Lesotho with the stated aims of strengthening bilateral relations and further encouraging co-operation in areas of common interest:

> "We've got an MOU with the government of Lesotho and that's a government-to-government link that's about us learning from them and them learning from us" (interview, Welsh Government).

Promoting an Internationalist Outlook

Wales for Africa builds on notions of the nation as outward facing, said to reflect the people of Wales' "internationalist outlook and their desire to help those elsewhere in the world less fortunate" (Rhodri Morgan AM, WCVA 2007). Reflecting on the programme, for one interviewee:

> "…it symbolises that Wales is outward looking. The amount of links and work and people involved, and the interest, and the schools and everything - it shows that Wales is an outward nation. We tend to think of ourselves as this very small country, that's got closed borders, but that's just not demonstrated through all of the work that's being done" (interview, Welsh Government).

Development actions provide Wales with opportunities to demonstrate leadership and ambition; to show its citizens as globally engaged. *One Wales: One Planet* (WAG 2009) describes development as an "opportunity to develop Wales, as a small, smart nation" (WAG 2009, p. 5). Ambitions to "play an important role in demonstrating leadership" (WG, 2010, p. 4) have lent on discursive practices which emphasise different levels of participation to articulate innovations in policy-making viewed as considerably more significant than Wales' small size and limited competences might suggest:

> "In Wales we have the opportunity to lead amongst small nations and we plan to do so by taking prompt action to play our part…" (HoC 2008).

> "…we can provide a powerful demonstration that successful action is possible and provide an approach that other countries can consider and apply at home" (WG 2010, p. 19).

> "Wales is increasingly seen internationally as a global leader and innovator among regional and sub-national governments" (NAfW 2013).

Wales for Africa is seen as distinct because "…it represents that nation of global citizens' thing and trying to link up, for example, fair trade with community links" (interview, Welsh Government). Ministers have framed activities as a moral responsibility, with added value for both Wales and wider UK Government development efforts:

> "Devolution has made Wales more of a world citizen. We are part of the prosperous world, which gives us a moral responsibility to work to add value to the UK's international development effort. The international development framework, developments concerning fair and ethical trade and other developments constitute a big step forward in helping Wales to fulfil that very important moral responsibility to help the world's poor" (John Griffiths AM, NAfW 2006b).

> "The Welsh Assembly Government is also working to help promote trade justice. Value Wales, our procurement department, is trying to co-ordinate a major public sector fair trade banana initiative, potentially worth several hundreds of thousands of pounds. This could not only deliver cost-effective healthy bananas to our schoolchildren, but ensure a better standard of living for the people who grow them. That is another win-win situation" (Rhodri Morgan AM, NAfW 2006a).

Ministerial policy statements corroborate the notion of Wales for Africa as a symbol of status (Janet Ryder AM (NAfW 2009):

> "The resources are very small, but the aid that we give, the support that we give, and the way in which we reach out to communities is huge, vital and impressive… We have made enough mark on the

> world stage for other nations to look to Wales to see what a small nation can achieve."

Partnership Working

Government-supported activities were originally set through "work with NGOs in the development sector to identify a positive Welsh contribution" (WAG 2006b, p. 3). The programme works in collaboration with other agencies towards shared outcomes to support people in becoming more active in development by partnering with communities, the third sector, businesses and the public sector, including NHS Wales.

Helping to foster global citizenship in Wales is another objective, "in order to create a nation of global citizens" (WG 2016a), said to reflect:

> "Wales' source of duty as an international citizen and our legal duty as a government in Wales to promote sustainable development in the exercise of all our functions" (WAG 2006b, p. 1).

Wales for Africa is rationalised because international development already featured prominently in Welsh civic life. The programme is projected as reflecting "the demand within Wales for an identifiably Welsh contribution to tackling global poverty" in recognition of an "internationalist outlook" and citizens' "desire to help those elsewhere in the world less fortunate than us" (WCVA 2007). An internationalist outlook is confidently reasserted in a discourse which argues that the programme (WG 2013, p. 68):

> "…reflects our recognition that people and organisations have impacts that extend beyond the borders of Wales and our continued desire for Wales to be an outward facing nation that confidently recognises the contribution we can make to the world as active and responsible citizens."

Figure 6-2: Key Areas of Wales for Africa Activity
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

Programme	Description
Wales Africa Community Links	A network of independent voluntary organisations who worked together under the UN Gold Star framework. The network in Wales included new 'startup' links; charitable links (focused on fundraising); learning links (focused on education and exchange); partnership links (focused on volunteerism and skill sharing); and development links (focus on delivery of anti-poverty projects in Africa).
Wales Africa Health Links	Comprises a network with a broad make up of professional health experts who support health projects that link Wales and Africa.
Fair Trade Wales	The national organisation for Fair Trade education, policy, procurement, support and campaigning. The *Fair Trade Campaign* led to Wales being the first Fair Trade Nation (see Fisher 2012; Townley 2012). Fair Trade Wales now works to build on that success, through building knowledge of fair trade in schools, businesses and across Wales.
The *International Learning Opportunities programme*	Offers individuals from the public and third sector in Wales the opportunity to spend up to eight weeks in sub-Saharan Africa to work on development projects designed to enhance their leadership skills.
The Wales-Mbale Tree Planting Project	Keen to build on the momentum and relations with the Mbale region forged through the TACC project and the PONT-Mbale link, the Welsh Government established a three-year project to plant one million trees. This *Million Trees Project*, managed by the government and match funded by the environmental charity *Size of Wales*, worked towards planting one million trees. On the planting of the one millionth tree in 2014 by the First Minister in Mbale, Uganda, the project was expanded to *Ten Million Trees*. Working in partnership with *PLANT!* - a government commitment to plant a tree for every child born or adopted in Wales - a native Welsh tree is planted by Natural Resources Wales in newly created woodland in Wales and a second tree planted in Uganda in partnership with the Size of Wales.

6.5 Wales Africa Community Links

Incorporating Development Links into Government Policy

Wales Africa Community Links is said to "build on a long history of Wales' rich culture and strong communities, reaching outwards". Monitoring data (see Annex H) and interviews with policy officials confirm community linking as a core feature of the programme from its launch; it remains so under the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration.

Wales for Africa has consistently supported linking activities (see Annex H). Initially this was through the Wales Civil Society Millennium Development Goals Taskforce (WCVA managed) Gold Star Communities project (£48k, FY 2007-08), funded to develop community links between Wales and sub-Saharan Africa. Since then, the work has expanded. Financial year 2008-09 saw the launch of the Wales for Africa Grant Scheme, which helped constitute a new phase for the programme. The overall budget was increased (from £500k to £700k), with approximately £200k of funding used to establish a grant scheme, aimed at building the capacity of bodies in Wales, whose international development activities benefit Wales, to help deliver the MDGs. This included activities aimed at building effective links between communities in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa (WAG 2008). From this grant, further funding was distributed to the Gold Star Communities project (FY 2008-09 (£70k)). The Wales for Africa team worked closely with the taskforce (which was in partnership with BUILD UK) to develop the project further in supporting civil society-led partnerships to take actions in support of the MDGs in partner African communities, and promote mutual community development and learning. The Gold Star Communities project had ambitious growth plans to link up to 150 communities in Wales with up to 150 communities in Africa over the next three years (FY 2008-09 to FY 2010-11).

Other activities funded during the opening phase of Wales for Africa, targeted at stimulating exchanges between Welsh and African communities, included £75k (over FY 2008-09 and FY 2009-10) for Small and Medium Development Organisations in Wales (SMIDOS) to increase the skills, capacity and joint

working of small and medium international development organisations in Wales (see Annex H).

The Growth of a Movement

The WCVA report *Welsh Civil Society and the Millennium Development Goals* (WCVA 2010) represents the first attempt at mapping Wales' development sector. Its objectives included providing a snapshot of the breadth of activity across those Welsh civil society organisations contributing towards the MDGs. The contribution of organisations towards the MDGs was understood in the "broadest sense of each issue" (WCVA 2010, p. 7). Nine hundred and twenty-eight organisations in Wales were found to be actively engaged in international issues across 107 countries; with approximately 240 (26%) of these organisations contributing directly towards the attainment of the MDGs (WCVA 2010, p. 6). The findings of the report characterised the international sector in Wales as constituting a number of community links and small organisations, with a specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa as a result of Wales for Africa support. These links and smaller organisations sat alongside the devolved branches and supporter networks of international organisations, such as Christian Aid and Oxfam; and also included specific ties with Lesotho through the twinning work of Dolen Cymru, and the diaspora driven Wales Somaliland Link Network's ties with Somaliland (see Annex H). There was no central secretariat for the sector. Cooperation and coordination was facilitated between the WCVA and a number of lead networks, including (see WCVA 2010, p. 10):

- The Millennium Development Goals Task Force (26 national organisations (active and occasional / observer members))
- Supported projects of the Millennium Development Goals Task Force (65 local organisations funded, represented and supported via Wales Africa Community Links and / or the Size of Wales)
- SMIDOS (a network of small-medium development organisations advocating for the funding and development needs of NGOs in Wales).
- NHS Health Links (then a network of 26 institutional and professional health link organisations)
- Fairtrade Wales (a network of local groups, schools and individuals campaigning for Fairtrade)

The 928 organisations identified by the WCVA however demonstrated diversity in terms of approach and application, not reflected in the network membership sketched out above. An overview of policy documents and third sector reports indicate that many organisations were members of multiple networks; others members of none. In addition, and unsurprising, given the boost to community supported organisations as a result of Wales for Africa funding, the WCVA identified that 55% of Wales' international organisations worked in sub-Saharan Africa (WCVA 2010, p. 10). A caveat is set against over-interpreting the reported figures however, for the numbers used in mapping Wales' sector do not represent comparable programmes, in either scale or impact. The most significant mapping exercise to data of Wales' development sector was published by the WCVA (2014).

Reviewing Community Links

Wales for Africa focussed on delivering core projects and services over financial year 2014/15 to consider the programme's future direction, based on internal advice from auditors as well as wider global events. The majority of Wales for Africa's major grants were ending in March 2015, thus their operation, as well as wider aims and objectives, were open to review:

> "We were looking at everyone's grants coming to an end and we were thinking what the best thing to do was. To renew them? To change things?" (interview, Welsh Government).

The UNs MDGs were to be replaced by the SDGs, and three central strands of the programme – Wales Africa Community Links, Fair Trade Wales and the ILO programme were subject to an internal audit in 2013 (WG 2013). In relation to Wales Africa Community Links, in its final recommendations the auditors noted that future grants should be advertised through a more competitive scheme (WG 2013): "The branch should ensure that other potential recipients are invited to apply for grant funding following the completion of the current grant agreement". In addition, there was a perception amongst policy officials that work was being duplicated across the separate strands of work (interview,

Welsh Government). Thus, the Wales for Africa team focused on the delivery of core projects and services between April 2014 and March 2015 whilst they reviewed the programme and launched an engagement exercise with the Welsh development community on how best to shape its future through the grants awarded:

> "We talked to people involved in Wales for Africa and looked at what the journey had been, where we had started, where we wanted it to go, where other people wanted it to go, and it seemed to make sense that we should pull things together" (interview, Welsh Government).

In reaching its conclusions, the review drew on data from workshops, an online questionnaire, meetings with key stakeholders and written responses (interviews, Welsh Government; interview, NGO; WG 2014). A number of issues were identified, summarised below:

- *Funding:* Due to the grant arrangements in place, certain types of organisations and groups were applying for government funding – namely, place-based community links, health links and fair trade groups – excluding others, and enticing others to fit their objectives to the eligibility criteria: "…there were grants available for projects through Wales for Africa and some people felt like they had to put into a category - it had to be a community link, a health link or a fair trade group, and they tried to make themselves community links just to access funding" (interview, Welsh Government).

- *Grants:* The amount available through the grant funding streams did not necessarily meet the needs of projects. For some, the lowest level of grant funding available was too much, and for others, the highest level of grant funding available was not enough. Several respondents in the consultation found the gap between the smaller grants available through Wales Africa Community Links and Wales Africa Health Links and the much bigger grants available through UK-wide funding organisations too big. Thus, some respondents requested that medium-sized awards be made available, giving Welsh organisations hoping to scale-up projects an opportunity to show UK-

wide funders that they could manage these larger sums: "…with the community links the biggest grant they could get was £5,000, which is brilliant. You can do so much work with that. But once you go from that you take this massive leap to Big Lottery, Comic Relief grants - which can be quarter of a million pounds - and the success rates for groups in Wales was pretty low" (interview, Welsh Government).

- *Communications:* As a sector, development organisations found they were unable to communicate effectively with other supported groups, while also having difficulties gaining media coverage of their activities. A centralised and dedicated resource was posited as a solution, in order to facilitate such communications.

- *Training:* A strong theme emerged around the need for additional support on monitoring and evaluation, so as to demonstrate the impact of development activities more robustly.

- *Development Support Linked to Grants:* Respondents considered the Wales for Africa team's open-door policy (in terms of informal access to the team and supported organisations (for example, Wales Africa Community Links)) as key to the programme's successes and the increasing professionalisation of some groups. Thus, respondents felt this policy should remain a core component of any future programme management.

Policy officials also identified socio-economically disadvantaged communities in Wales as under-represented by the programme. Concerns were also raised that little support was available in the Welsh language (interview, Welsh Government). Reflections from policy officials, the results of the engagement exercise and end of year reports from funded organisations (interview, Welsh Government) informed the Wales for Africa team's proposals to the First Minister on the programme's future. The proposal aimed to capture key aspects of the themes identified through the review of the programme, and streamline core elements of the strands already in existence, by:

- Strengthening the Wales Africa Community Links movement; supporting existing links through a progression process and engaging new participants.
- Continuing to support the Welsh NHS and health groups and charities in Wales to link with counterparts in Africa. Through a restructured programme, it was anticipated that the health and community link movements would more closely align.
- Ensuring that Wales maintains its Fair Trade Nation status, with more specific targets around procurement.
- Engaging with African diasporas in Wales, viewed as complimentary to Wales for Africa objectives because of the links between many diaspora communities and their homeland.
- Providing a central hub for Wales' development sector (a role performed by the International Development Hub (see Annex H).

There is synergy between the Welsh approach and Citizen Initiative literatures emanating from other European regional contexts, which demonstrate that in many regions, there is an emphasis within development activities on partnership with civil society and place or institution-based links between partners in the global north and south. In Wales however, under the limits of decentralisation, community linking is seen as an ideal vehicle for decentralised development action.

Taking the core elements and themes listed above together, the final proposals for a restructured programme also included gender equality as a key feature of the updated programme (in line with the UK's International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 and the SDGs), treating the Welsh and English languages with parity (in line with the Welsh Language Standards), and targeting groups and individuals from socio-economically deprived areas, the aim being that the programme should benefit people and communities across Wales more proportionately (interview, Welsh Government; interview, Hub Cymru Africa).

In summer 2014, the First Minister cleared a proposal from the Wales for Africa team to advertise one grant of approximately £500,000 of the annual £850,000 Wales for Africa programme budget to undertake development activity

(interview, Welsh Government). The focus is on streamlining existing functions by encouraging the various strands of Wales for Africa funded projects to come together as one collaboration (interview, Welsh Government). There were insufficient funds for expanding the grant scheme for the foreseeable future, so during the tendering process bidders were encouraged to devise innovative ways of delivering a scheme that would address the gaps in the programme (as recognised by policy makers), and also make efficiency savings by bringing together core elements and streamlining resources. The three years of committed funding comes to an end in March 2019. Its future is currently under discussion, with the decision lying on the recommendations of the Wales for Africa team, and ultimately, the judgement of the First Minister.

6.6 Hub Cymru Africa

The tender was won by The Welsh Centre for International Affairs, the lead applicant within a consortium that also included Fair Trade Wales, the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel, the Wales for Africa Health Links Network and the WCVA (representing Wales Africa Community Links) as its other members. This consortium, also described as a collaboration, came together under the banner of Hub Cymru Africa. It was awarded funding over three years, incorporating all the major funding strands covered under the previous grant programmes whilst also reflecting the learning from the engagement exercise (interview, Welsh Government). Based at the Temple of Peace in Cardiff under a shared vision that: "People in Wales are excited and motivated to positively contribute to international development" (HCA 2016), Hub Cymru Africa officially combined the work of:

- Wales Africa Community Links;
- Wales for Africa Health Links Network;
- Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel;
- Fair Trade Wales; and
- Wales International Development Hub.

Thus, the collaboration brought together existing spaces for participation under a new arena for development practice. Hub Cymru Africa has a significant role in the delivery of development in Wales. It is responsible for the grant budget and is accountable to the government through the Wales for Africa team. For the government, Hub Cymru Africa's role is to catalyse action through awareness raising, community mobilisation, capacity building, and development support, including through small grants and advocacy on specific issues. The geographical focus is on activities in Wales and Africa, but within the broader context set by global issues, such as Fair Trade. Work on linking remains a priority for the government:

> "We still want to work with community links, 100%. They're so important. Bringing in new community links is still there… but they don't have to define themselves as a community group anymore" (interview, Welsh Government).

In this most recent phase, Hub Cymru Africa are advocating independent decision-making for grantee organisations to support the voluntary nature of the sector.

The Hub Cymru Africa Grants Scheme

Hub Cymru Africa hosts an annual small grants scheme, the Hub Cymru Africa Grants Programme, designed to enable individuals, community groups and organisations throughout Wales to apply for and access funding for small scale Wales Africa projects. A key delivery mechanism of the Wales for Africa programme, the grant scheme amalgamates funding streams previously available through Wales Africa Community Links, Fair Trade Wales and the Wales for Africa Health Links grant schemes (see Annex H for a breakdown of funded projects under the Wales Africa Community Links and Wales for Africa Health Links grant schemes). Of the £180,000 available for Wales Africa linking grants per annum, £50,000 is ring-fenced for (but not limited to) health related initiatives involving the Welsh NHS or Public Health Wales.

The grant scheme is more flexible than the previous schemes it replaces in two key ways, as it: 1), undoes definitional barriers on what constitutes an eligible project. Whilst linking work remains a key component of the programme, theoretically, grant funding is open to more applicants as the pots of funding are now arranged thematically, under the headings of 'health', 'sustainable livelihoods', 'lifelong learning', and 'climate change and environment': "…so we wanted to make Wales for Africa more about joining links between Wales and Africa, but it didn't necessarily mean that you had to fit under a certain category" (interview, Welsh Government). 2), broadens the funding scales. Applications for smaller and larger pots of money can now be submitted: grants of up to £1,000 for "small scale activity grants"; from £1,001 to £5,000 for "project grants"; and from £5,001 to £15,000 for "partnership grants".

The incorporation of citizen-led development links into the government's discourse has resulted in an increasing number of community links partnered with organisation in sub-Saharan Africa, so that it is now possible to talk of a 'Welsh approach' to development; professionalised the sector, through WACL and Hub Cymru Africa's work in supporting the progression of links, and the concurrent growth in the number of links, which has strengthened Wales' development network; and seen development activity embedded as a longer-term political commitment, through the inclusion of Welsh partnerships working towards the UNs SDGs as an indicator of government performance on its sustainability and well-being duties.

However, although performance measures across a number of indicators are currently in use as part of the grant conditions for Hub Cymru Africa-supported projects, and qualitative single-case studies have been published to try and capture the richness of the activities supported, and thus a substantial aspect of the Wales for Africa programme itself, there remains limited resource in terms of empirically interrogating the data. It is difficult therefore to assess the impact of the restructure.

That said however, the gaps in evaluation have been acknowledged, and considerable effort within the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration has focussed on building monitoring and reporting capacity within the constraints presented by time and financial considerations and a lack of dedicated research expertise. It centralises and coordinates key strands of development activity in Wales and represents a step-up in terms of monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of interventions. It has put in place frameworks aimed at capturing the impact of its supported activities, at an individual project and programme level, established as a priority by the collaboration on its inception.

This chapter also argued that the restructure under Hub Cymru Africa has opened-up possibilities within Wales' development sector. Building from the recommendations of the Wales for Africa team, the restructured grant scheme administered by the collaboration has broken down definitional barriers, widened the scope of activities supported, and provided access for projects to larger (and smaller) pots of money (thus potentially more funding streams, enabling the scaling-up of activities and more ambitious programmes of work). For some stakeholders, the effectiveness of interventions is likely to be under-reported (for example, the contribution Wales makes through health links and hospital twinning), whilst the benefits of the programme often resonate emotively in the discourse – for example, in terms of fostering solidarity.

Political commitment has enhanced the international development sector in Wales, and arguably given it a distinct identity, stimulating civic networks and action in the process. For some policy and NGO officials, the greatest success of the programme has been in facilitating greater coordination and active participation within Wales' development sector. Statements from the First Minister lend support to this finding (NAfW 2009):

> "This is a distinctive Welsh effort, and we can all be proud of the contribution that we have made through the Wales for Africa programme in stimulating this development in civil society"

Figure 6-3: A Logic Model Depicting Wales for Africa's 'Theory of Change'

Source: Welsh Government policy papers (published and available on request), interviews, third sector publications and participant observation

Situation	Input / Resources	Activity	Outputs
Aim of the programme: Increase number of people participating; raise the quality of activities; build understandings of global poverty - whilst contributing towards the SDGs and adding value to DFID. *Challenges / opportunities:* Conditions of low capability / high expectation; high-level of political commitment; NGO support; precedent set by Scotland; intergovernmental relations; existing community links; civil society support; sustainable development and well-being duties; principle of mutual benefit.	£860k per annum (FY2016-17) Team of three policy officials (the Wales for Africa team)	*What the programme does (activity funded):* International Learning Opportunities programme; Wales-Mbale Tree planting project; the Hub; Wales Africa Community Links; Wales Africa Health links (WAHL); and Fair Trade Wales; Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel – since April 2015. Key strands brought together under Hub Cymru Africa collaboration, with the Hub Cymru Africa Grants Programme a key delivery mechanism. *Who the programme reaches (participation / target group):* Wales-wide remit, with policy initiatives focusing on specific groups (e.g. fair trade work with schools, businesses; diaspora through the SSAP; health professionals through WAHL). Recent focus on engaging non-traditional participants (e.g. individuals based in areas of socio-economic deprivation).	*(As at October 2016):* 160 Welsh managers have participated in an international learning placement (working approximately 47,300 hours with Africa partners on projects) (WG 2016b)); 4.2 million trees planted; 72 health projects funded (see Annex H); 528 development projects in total funded, across 25 African nations (see Annex H); development training, advocacy, and engagement work.

Assumptions *(The premises based on theory, research, evaluation, knowledge etc. that support the relationship of the elements shown above and upon which the success of the programme rests):* Adding benefit; providing mutual benefit; engaged civil society (bottom-up, with more people left to engage); sustained level of political commitment to the programme.	**External factors** *(Variables with an effect on the outputs / outcomes but unchangeable by the programme):* support from UK government (top-down); multi-level governance frameworks open to sub-state development efforts (e.g. UN).

6.8 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter addressed Research Question 2: *How has Wales for Africa built a community of practice?* The narrative constructed thorough the thorough review of government and third sector policy documents, academic literature, media archives, participant observation, and data from key informant interviews conducted for this research illustrates that there is now a distinct Welsh development sector. The government's coordination of Wales' development sector has strengthened some citizen-actors, generating a new social category for Wales' development sector - the citizen-led initiative in development assistance. This has been labelled a core feature of a distinctly Welsh approach towards development. The detailed analysis of monitoring data illustrates that from the programme's relatively modest budget, considerable resource has been invested into community-to-community development links between partner organisations in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa. From its initial geographical focus, the definition of these links has been broken down by stakeholders, and following wider consultation, has evolved to encompass a broader definition of community-based development. Rather than simply locality based, a community link could now be defined as a community of shared interests. As a result, through the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration, Wales for Africa is better placed to support a wider range of initiatives.

Nevertheless, tensions and ambiguities on the future direction of Wales for Africa remain. Not least because the role of Hub Cymru Africa is still evolving, thus there are uncertainties over its accountabilities, the nature of its relationship with the government, and the support it can provide for the wider sector. This is compounded by the fact that the funding granted to the collaboration has been on a medium-term basis, and is currently under review; Wales for Africa's programme budget is vulnerable to appraisal, and continued Ministerial support is not guaranteed, for political priorities change with the wider social context; and Wales for Africa remains undevolved, thus the continuation of the programme depends upon the goodwill of central government.

This chapter did however identify a high-level of commitment to the programme, from its inception. The opening sections argued that demand from politicians, NGOs and civil society, out of a concern and a passion for the issues, coupled with wider global developments, translated into a specifically Welsh response towards tackling global poverty. To sum up, the original calls for a Welsh policy on development action formed the basis of a national movement, which culminated with the launch of Wales for Africa in October 2006. Key to how these demands became heard is the role played by a small number of NGOs, who became embedded in the policy discourse: first through lobbying the Assembly, where politicians proved a receptive audience, many spurred by personal motivations; then through the inward secondment of NGO officials into the government, where a limited number of individuals played a key role in designing the policy approach.

Part Two of this chapter dealt with the establishment of a Welsh development sector. It argued that the government has displayed a degree of opportunism by reference to the ad-hoc nature of how Wales for Africa developed. Underpinned by the distinctiveness of its sustainable development duty, Wales for Africa has built-upon relations stemming from multi-level governance frameworks (for example, the UNDP TACC project (see also Chapter Five)) to foster a legitimacy and a credibility for the programme, at a national (DFID / UK-wide) and international level.

Nevertheless, the programme has had to prove itself. Thus, the ad-hoc nature of the programme does not mean that it is unregulated. On the contrary, it is subject to a high degree of legal oversight, and lawyers are consulted on the legal basis of every supported activity. Indeed, this is a way in which the principle of mutual benefit could be understood – as a solution to a policy problem, or a compromise to legitimise a specifically Welsh response to tackling global poverty. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that Wales for Africa has incrementally grown in its responsibilities, so that it is now rooted in several cross-cutting strands of government activity.

Informality however has been a key feature in the programme's approach, as data from interviews and participant observations demonstrate that officials from the Wales for Africa team and supported organisations have sought to foster an open-door policy to boost engagement in development and strengthen the sector in Wales.

The programme has also drawn from pre-existing development projects to rationalise a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis shows that building the capacity of projects has helped to anchor the policy discourse. The work of PONT in Mbale, Uganda, and Dolen Cymru in Lesotho, for example, has led to a clustering of projects in these two regions. As a result, Wales for Africa now recognises Uganda and Lesotho as two distinct strands of work. Relations have been solidified through MOUs, representing a significant step in terms of Wales' independent international relations-related activities.

Despite its limited resources, the review of monitoring data, document analysis and interviews with stakeholders show that the impact of the programme has outstripped its modest budget. Designed around the limits of devolution, activities supported must complement the work of the UK Aid strategy and crucially, be of mutual benefit to Wales. This underpins the distinctiveness of Wales' approach and means that the impact of the programme can be understood as more than the sum of its parts. For, building on the notion of reciprocity in development assistance, Wales for Africa has aligned with wider Welsh Government policy initiatives (for example, on climate change mitigation, education for global citizenship and health links); encouraged the notion of a global connectivity through community-to–community linking as a geographical basis for development action; and borrowed from the existing skill-sets of Welsh beneficiaries of support in the delivery of interventions.

The principle of mutual benefit has been rationalised in terms of refining the existing expertise of participants (for example, health professionals and health links / hospital twinning; public sector professionals and the ILO programme), with an added benefit of learning to do more with less resource. In addition, the principle is articulated in terms of fostering a more proactive, progressive, globally relevant and morally aware citizenry. This chapter also highlighted the

strength of language routinely deployed by the programme in articulating the values it wishes to be associated with.

Part Three of this chapter discussed the strengthening of Wales' development sector, where Wales for Africa's greatest success has been in facilitating greater coordination and active participation.

Hub Cymru Africa has been a significant development in the consolidation of Wales' development sector. The process towards its launch saw the government consult its networks to reassess key strands of programme activity, representing its first significant programme-wide exercise of consultation and engagement. This fed into proposals on the future direction of the programme. No extra money was committed to the Wales for Africa programme; thus, the emphasis of the restructure was on streamlining resources to create efficiencies. The approach towards the launch of Hub Cymru Africa however cannot be described as a genuinely co-productive approach to policy development. The decision for the restructure, the terms of the engagement exercise, and the scope of the grant proposal put to tender lay firmly with the government.

For interviewee's, Hub Cymru Africa represents a more coordinated response to development support, by pulling together key strands of activity. In addition, the design of the restructured grant scheme (the Hub Cymru Africa Grant Scheme) was based upon the feedback of Wales' development community. The scheme perhaps represents the most significant development, by breaking down definitional barriers and widening the scope of activities supported, opening-up development support to a wider audience and further enabling the professionalisation of the sector by representing a step-up in terms of the funding and development support available.

In terms of evaluating the impact of activities at a programme-wide level however, the effectiveness of interventions is likely to be under-reported, whilst the benefits often resonate emotively in the discourse.

In addition, whilst the launch of Hub Cymru Africa is a significant development, its future is currently under review. The programme has nevertheless embedded and, as argued in this chapter, has built a community of practice so that it is now possible to refer to a distinct Welsh development sector. However, to re-emphasise, continued funding for Wales for Africa is not guaranteed.

The evidence suggests that, despite the limited scope for action, the symbolic and actual impact of Wales' development sector far outstrips the resources allocated by the Wales for Africa programme. A distinct community of practice has evolved around the programme's governance structures, albeit a community conceptualised under a number of assumptions on outcomes and impact, and where key facets remain under-articulated by policy-makers, with consequences on the claims which can be made on the programme's innovations and effectiveness.

The findings of this chapter however do suggest that community linking has proved an ideal vehicle for decentralised development action. It has provided novel opportunities for sub-state *and* citizen participation in development assistance. One critical question for the community-linking movement in Wales however is the extent to which involvement by government in citizen-led initiatives can reframe understandings of development. Thus, the following chapter explores in more detail *the citizen as development actor*.

Contribution to understanding the role devolution plays in development engagement.

7 The Citizen as Development Actor

7.1 Introduction

Supporting the growth of community-linking – community-based development organisations linked with partner organisations in Africa – has been a significant focus of Wales for Africa since its launch (see Annex H). However, although the literature review identified citizen-led development initiatives as an emerging topic of inquiry, so far, there has been little discussion about their reliance on community as a basis for action. In addition, this thesis identified limited research which has taken into account small-scale initiatives from the Welsh perspective, their coordination by the government, the extent to which Wales for Africa is professionalising citizen actors through supported activities, and the relationship between development assistance, national identity and global responsibility. Thus, the chapter's main focus will be on the under-researched area of citizen participation in development assistance, by reference to Research Question Three: *Does the Wales for Africa programme support the strengthening of the citizen as development actor, through encouraging new actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both?*

A particular focus of analysis is on the reciprocal nature of citizen initiatives funded under Wales for Africa. In addressing the question, the analysis draws on evidence from government policy documents, academic outputs and third sector publications, field notes from participant observation at development events, volunteering with SAFE, and from the work undertaken in a voluntary capacity for the Wales for Africa Team, interviews with key informants from the Wales for Africa Team and supported organisations, as well as from informal interviews and focus groups with participants during the field visit with SAFE to the Tororo Region in Uganda.

In its development of a distinctive brand of devolved Welsh citizenship, the government's Well-being of Future Generations Act explicitly connects Wales to the UNs SDGs. Indicator 46 under the Act requires Wales to measure its progress against "The social return on investment of Welsh partnerships within

Wales and outside of the UK that are working towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals" (WG 2016a), which is deliberately designed to complement SDG 17.9 on targeted capacity-building "through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation" (UN 2015). Wales' community link partnerships therefore are posited as a progressive policy solution in relation to the challenges facing Wales and the world. They have provided novel opportunities for government supported citizen participation in development assistance, and the framing of global poverty as a relational issue.

Nevertheless, there are tensions, for the brand of global citizenship promoted by the government is an exercise in territorial boundary-making, as part of a post-devolution project of nation-building concerned with reimagining Wales and Welsh values.

In presenting its arguments, the chapter explores, followed by conclusions: the symbolism behind the localisation of development action; the 'psyche' of Welsh internationalism; identity and development practice by reference to the ethically engaged sustainable citizen; and participation in community links. The concluding section draws from the discussion to reflect on what Wales for Africa means for citizen participation in development assistance.

7.2 The Localisation of Development Action

Literatures have unpacked the traditional notion that spatial scales are given, instead emphasising the politics and social constructions of scale, and the diverse situations in which different actors shape and shift scales and levels for their own objectives (Swyngedouw 1997). The literature review discussed academic texts on nationalism which have sought to bring an empirical focus to the rescaling of national territories (Jones et al. 2005; Jessop 1997). Jones et al. (2005) for example, define devolution as a form of 'filling in'. This describes the process of a territorial rescaling of Wales which broadly refers to the establishment of new state places as a spatially contingent impact of devolution that has seen the reconfiguration of state capacities to sub-state level.

Such a conceptualisation represents an alternative to top-down nation-state centric notions because it acknowledges the potential for processes such as the internationalisation of policy communities and networks to take place in territories that exist within national states (Jones et al. 2005, p. 338).

Much research into development incorporates national scales, where the focus of enquiry remains at either local or global scales of influence. However, studies are taking multi-levels of governance, such as devolution, into account. Here, this is coupled with understandings on how contradictions, ambiguities and inequalities characterise the processes of territorial rescaling, so that those living within devolved spaces are understood to identify at sub and supra national scales (Jones et al. 2004), such as local community. This section discusses ways in which the government has linked development policy to its scale of governance. As discussed in Chapter Five, international development policy-making has been defined as the government's natural vocation. It is at this governance level that responsibilities for development assistance are perceived to lie. The following paragraphs illustrate how connections have been made between discourses of nationalism and development whereby geographical levels are used in scalar imaginations that have located issues of global responsibility at a local community level.

The citizen-led development initiatives supported by Wales for Africa are viewed to identify with the programme, imbuing it with locally connected meanings and significance which may vary from the meanings of other citizen-actors in differently situated initiatives (Fisher 2012). Nation-building however is seeking oneness out of complex realities (Mooney and Williams 2006, p. 608) and sustaining a core point of reference is a political project. Actors, such as citizen and sub-state actors, can help produce scales through their activities, and scales, in turn, shape these activities through the resources they permit (Williams 1999).

Scale therefore, as discussed in Chapter Five, is a fluid, dynamic and relational process. Whilst some analysts (Morrill 1999; Lebel et al. 2004) point to the ways

in which local-level knowledge and institutions are viewed as local in scope and power, whereas the knowledge of states have bigger scope and significance, this section discusses how within the scalar imaginations of Wales' development discourses, local-level knowledge has been imbued with sub-national significance in efforts at establishing Wales' specificity through its 'smallness'.

Key to the 'Clear Red Water' rhetoric of a Welsh-specificity for example, discussed in Chapter Three, was Welsh Labour's attempts at developing "a communal 'small-nation psychology' way of working" (Morgan 2000) based upon a particular narrative of Welshness which emphasises Wales' geography. Wales was characterised by its 'smallness', articulated as characteristically 'Welsh' and used to signify the nation in political, psychological and communal terms (Moon 2012). 'Clear Red Water' also illustrates the significance of people in shaping national territories, in this case, through both performative practices and the discourses they promote (Jones and Merriman 2011); most powerfully by the then First Minister, Rhodri Morgan AM (2002):

> "The small scale of the Assembly, and of Wales itself, is surely a major advantage to us… Wales is of a size where we are well placed to work together to make things work better… We should therefore be able to take advantage of small scale to make big decisions more easily. Inside the Assembly we have done our best to maximise the advantages of being the relatively small government of a relatively small nation".

Wales' character as "a small country made up, in the main, of relatively small communities" (Morgan 2002) has been used by politicians to justify a distinct policy-making agenda. Such articulations however are viewed to promote a parochial interpretation of nationalism. Conceptualised along these ideological lines and linked to a defined set of Welsh values and attitudes, Wales' size is experienced as a mode of nationalism: "Wales is small, the logic goes, so if the justification for a policy is smallness then conterminously the justification is 'Welshness'" (Moon 2012, p. 9). Again, Welsh political identity is defined in

opposition to England and a perceived Englishness. For this speech was aimed at making the 'clear red water' between Welsh Labour's claims of social democracy and New Labour really clear.

This narrative of a specificity of smallness is reflected within Wales' development discourses. An analysis of policy texts highlight shows much has been made of connecting a politics of small-scale with the language of democratic engagement (WAG 2006b; WCVA 2013; WG 2016b).

For those people involved in its development, at its launch event, Wales for Africa was deliberately linked to wider policy objectives and fed explicitly into hopes decentralisation could represent a model for a more participatory democracy, mobilised around an active civil society.

Similarly, interviewee's framed the distinctiveness, as well as the practicalities, of Wales for Africa in terms of the nation's size: "It's distinct in that were very close to the community. Wales is such a small place, although there's a big movement and it's quite a historical international movement" (interview, WG). Such an emphasis in the discourse reinforces the notion that discourses of nationalism are ultimately concerned with the national scale and space, and with time past. The ability to rescale across levels however can be important to social movements (Williams 1999) and in this way, Wales' size was a recurring theme across the primary data collection. For one key stakeholder "…it's a small country so there's the ability to manoeuvre politically a lot more effectively" (interview, HCA). Arguably, the narrative of change driving Wales for Africa, to encourage greater participation in development, has been aided by exploiting the advantages of being a smaller country, particular in relation to stakeholder engagement and policy networks (Rabey 2015).

Within Wales' development discourse community links are seen as national in scope and relevance, and tied to the bigger scope and significance of the sub-state. From the outset, community linking was promoted by the government as a core feature of supporting citizens' participation (WAG 2006b). This is reflected in the First Minister's speeches for example (Rhodri Morgan AM

(WCVA 2007)) which launched the programme, in a narration of the Welsh territory which reflected on the peopled-nature of the group-making project:

> "I am pleased to say that this ground-breaking project is testament to our interest in the rest of the world. All over Wales, thousands of people are active in their own way to support international development. Through the 'Wales for Africa' framework, the Welsh Assembly Government is giving those people in Wales with an interest in poor continents a real chance to get involved… In linking Welsh and African communities in this way and helping to develop education and poverty reduction schemes we are bringing the global community closer and closer together."

The evidence demonstrates that the nation imagined for Wales is a local, global and sub-state one. Statements such as above clearly demonstrate that an alternative future is being imagined for the Welsh nation and its communities along globally-connected lines. As Billig (1995, p. 93) shows, through banal nationalisms members of the imagined community encounter "often unnoticed" nationalist symbols and expressions day-to-day. The use of apparently innocent terms such as nation and Welsh communities, especially when disseminated by politicians who adopt personal collective pronouns such as "we" and "our", discursively produces belonging to the nation, and exclusion from it (Billig 1995, p. 105). The effectiveness of these nationalist symbols lies in their unobtrusive repetition used to produce and reproduce a national consciousness "that embraces a complex set of themes about 'us', 'our homeland', 'nation' ('ours' and 'theirs'), the 'world', as well as the morality of national duty and honour" (Billig 1995, p. 4). There is an attempt to create a future for Wales and a shared identity as a basis for collective action in constructions of Welsh identity based on values such as social justice, solidarity and cooperation. In the articulation above, a connection is being made between the desires of the government and the contribution that the Welsh people need to make to reach this goal, through the promotion of citizens' active participation in binding communities together.

A significant theme which emerges in this context is the contention that supporting development initiatives will enable Wales as a nation to raise its

profile in the international arena, or rescale itself by becoming a global contributor to the development debate (Jones and Ross 2016, p. 59). In the political rhetoric, development assistance is rescaled in various way. At the national level for instance, the capacity of local community groups is mobilised through Wales for Africa in a representation of development assistance at the higher sub-state level. Here, the diversity in character and content of the various development groups across local areas is reproduced as a homogenous entity at the sub-state scale as part of the nationalist discourse. The heterogeneity of projects and actors, contested meanings and varied social practices that surround Wales for Africa and civic participation under the programme was evident during observation at Wales Africa Health Links, Hub Cymru Africa, Fair Trade Wales and Wales Africa Community Links events. In these events for instance, the individuals questioned included people from small businesses, church groups, midwives, teachers, burns specialists, paramedics, beekeepers, engineers, environmentalists, photographers, dancers and ceramic artists, working on a range of activities. Wales for Africa however is an attempt at presenting a unifying and coherent strategic framework. It aims "to identify a positive Welsh contribution" (WAG 2006, p. 1) "reflecting the concerns and connections of the people and communities of Wales" (WAG 2006, p. 2) by bringing together the development work Wales is involved in through an imagined oneness of the development community.

Implicit within the Wales for Africa discourse is the notion that reducing inequalities and empowering people necessitate acquiring the capacity to work across multiple scales (Swyngedouw 1997b). Its conceptualisation of development assistance challenges global-local dualisms. References to the global and local imply a particular stance on issues of geographical scale (Cox 1997), and in Wales' development discourse, the global and local are seen in relational terms. Scale therefore is socially constructed and the capacity to make use of it tends to vary greatly amongst stakeholders (Swyngedouw 1997b). Actors often have to behave strategically to take advantage of alternative scales of regulation and dependencies (Cox 1998). In Wales' case, through its sustainability discourses for instance, discussed in Chapter Five. Understanding that scalar configurations are neither entirely local nor global but

are essentially network-based has the potential to lead to the spaces of the nation as being viewed as something which is simultaneously 'deeply localised' and extensive in its reach (Swyngedouw 1997a, b). The government's commitment to citizen participation, or to the citizen as development actor, suggests that its invigorations in development assistance are more than just a global projection, but are also an act of local empowerment.

It is clear from the research that Wales for Africa has been located within the push-and-pull dialectic between national identity and cultural forms of localisation and globalisation and is interpreted as a way in which nationhood is recreated in everyday context, or in Billig's words (1995), as a manifestation of banal nationalism. The ways in which boundaries are narrated can enhance understandings of the process of becoming which affects them (Paasi 1996), and more recent literatures have focussed on the individuals and organisations involved in narrating territories and boundaries (Jones and Fowler 2007; Jones and Merriman 2009; Jones and Merriman 2012). Jones and Merriman (2012) for instance explore how the embodied practices of different actors are involved in making the nation and specifically, in reproducing a national space through performative practice or the discourses they promote, which enable nations to be imagined. Identity is formed through the symbols and experiences related to them that are familiar and recurrent to the point of banality, like road signs (Jones and Fowler 2007; Jones and Merriman 2009; Jones and Merriman 2012), or place name signs.

Objects help delineate a territory (Edsenor 2002), and road signs, as important aspects of national infrastructure, have been explored as symbolic objects which represent a visible and networked element of a nation's territory (e.g. Jones and Merriman 2012). Similarly, place name signs are viewed as significant objects within a networked Welsh territory. They were routinely used by Wales Africa Community Links, Wales Africa Health Links and Fair Trade Wales in media campaigns, advocacy work and in policy documents (e.g. FTW 2012; WACL 2010). The importance of mediated communication for national identity is widely circulated within notions of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1991). In media communications and policy reports for

example, maps of Wales, and the place names or nodes that help constitute the geographical territory, are a recurring motif, used by the government to disseminate representations of the nation, which bypass the UK nation-state, and imaginations of the populace as a tight-knit, value-sharing community.

The photographs in Figure 7.1 for example, taken on the steps of the Welsh Senedd to mark the 2012 UN Gold Star Awards, are important because they help illustrate the symbolic significance attributed to the material signs and how they are used in a social construction of scale, in an effort to promote a Welsh development programme that is rooted in relational networks of people and places. In this instance, by drawing on localised place-names to symbolise the local-global connections of Wales' community-linking movement: Crickhowell is linked with Mwanza in Tanzania; Newport with Masvingo in Zimbabwe; Wrexham with Mekele in Ethiopia, and so forth.

In the first picture for example, the then Minister for Housing, Sustainability and Planning (Jane Davidson AM), the Chief Medical Officer for Wales, the head of Wales Africa Community Links, school children, Welsh beneficiaries of Wales for Africa support, and representatives from partner organisations in Africa pose outside the main government buildings. They are holding signs with the names of communities linked in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa written together, in a subversion of a taken-for-granted everyday symbol of territoriality (Jones and Merriman 2009). In one way therefore, these events are "part discursive constructions and part political performance" (Jones and Merriman 2012, p. 945). They help demonstrate the significance of people in shaping the nation. Together, the people in the photographs are helping to frame a representation constructed within Wales' discourses of nationalism, sustainability and specifically, development assistance, in the context of political decentralisation, which help to bring Wales for Africa to life. The maps and signs materially contribute to the group-making project of reproducing a networked national territory and reinforce an understanding of Wales as relational in character.

Figure 7-1: Wales Africa Community Links, UN Gold Star Awards
Source: WCVA (2012)

On the 'Psyche' of Welsh Internationalism

Chapter Five on the sub-state as development actor demonstrated that there is a clear commitment within the political discourse to themes that are viewed to be of significance to Welsh interpretations of sustainability, such as fairness, social justice and reducing inequalities. This sub-section discusses the distinctive attempts to use community as a mechanism for enhancing a key aspect of the Welsh nation within the development discourse, namely, through a mythified culture of Welsh internationalism and solidarity. It explores some claims made in this 'narration of nation' (Bhaba 1990). The concept refers to the ways in which people negotiate relationships with the nations to which they 'belong' by constructing narratives that define the boundaries of these nations (Bhabha 1990). Its concern lies with exploring the ways in which different actors "plot the narrative of the nation" (Bhaba1990, p. 3). Many stories can be told about a nation, which can be set in many plots. The following paragraphs

explore attempts by community-linking policy-makers at constructing a national story based upon a history of internationalism rooted within the Welsh radical tradition. It discusses the compatibility of nationalist narratives of the past with more contemporary articulations.

Key policy documents help rationalise Wales for Africa in terms of it supporting a long tradition of individuals and communities in Wales playing a leading role in international solidarity movements. The programme is based on a number of core assumptions used to construct an idea of Wales which includes decisions on the values and sorts of relationships that are said to constitute Wales (Mooney and Williams 2006). These articulations frame a representation of Wales' actions in international development based on notions of community, social justice and solidarity. From its launch for example, Wales Africa Community Links has promoted this theme, which has continued, where community linking with Africa has been stated as (WCVA 2014): "…a natural progression of Wales' involvement in international solidarity movements – from the Eisteddfodau to civil rights, anti-apartheid, Live Aid, Jubilee 2000, and even the world's first 'country to country' twinning with Lesotho". Wales' development discourse has consistently referenced a tradition of Welsh international action, from building links with people and communities, to leading campaigns on human rights and justice (e.g. WAG 2005; WG 2016b). According to the host organisation of the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration, "these human bridges continue to shape Wales' identity and role in the world today" (WCIA 2015).

Popular perceptions generalise Wales as unaccustomed to cultural diversity, yet warm in its acceptance of minority ethnic groups, in attempts at presenting a common past (e.g. WCVA 2014). Wales Africa Community Links (WCVA 2013, pp. 6-7) for example produced an "outward-looking Wales" timeline, which modified nearly 2,000 years of history to present a 'mythified' internationalist history of Wales, which describes the programme as building on a "long history of Wales' rich culture and string communities reaching outwards" (WCVA 2013, p. 6). As part of the officialised discourse, it plays a role in the construction of the myths of the nation in a self-definition of a national consciousness.

These conceptualisations however are viewed to feed into a myth of Welsh tolerance (Robinson 2003, p. 160), challenged within recent analysis for downplaying the prejudices which have and do exist in Wales (Williams 2003). The "myth of tolerance" has a "perennial and almost immutable status in the national imagining" (Williams 2003, p. 220). Studies on racism however find a Wales "shot through with contradictions" (Robinson 2003, p. 176), as the nation demonstrates itself as no more, no less, tolerant in its actions than other regions in Britain. Such analyses help highlight the problematic aspects of constructions of national histories as well as the exclusionary aspects of community and citizenship.

On the 'psyche' of Welsh internationalism, a narrative therefore can be seen to have emerged out of Wales' 'radical tradition', itself described as a constitutive myth of Welsh politics (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012, p. 260), which contributes towards the construction and definition of a more contemporary culture in the reproduction of the nation. Wales Africa Community Links for instance (WCVA 2010, p. 9) has drawn from popular perceptions of Wales' socialist culture and communitarian mind-set, whereby in its attempt at reconstructing the nation, Wales is imagined against the British Empire ("fewer colonial ties"), viewed to drive the 'wrong kind' of development (WCVA, 2010, p. 9):

> "Wales has a long and proud history of internationalism, albeit one very different in psyche and profile to the wider UK… Consequently Wales has fewer colonial ties (or "guilt driven" philanthropy!) and this combined with Wales' strong cultural identity and sense of community, has nurtured an internationalism heavily rooted in social justice, solidarity, community and connectivity".

The quote is another attempt at constructing an alternative kind of nation for Wales, which is said to be a consequence of different values that are claimed as Welsh values. Even in contemporary contexts, there is tendency for Welsh identity to be differentiated in opposition to England or English identity. In the quote above, the explicit frame of reference for emphasising the distinctiveness

of the version of development promoted by the WCVA was Empire, and implicitly, England. Here therefore, there is evidence of an exclusionary politics of boundary formation, historically typical in assertions of a Welsh national identity where Welsh nationalism has often been unified in active opposition to England.

Correspondingly, a thread running through the Wales for Africa discourse, and through the wider sustainability discourse, where it has been scaled-up through indicator 46 of the Well-being of Future Generations Act, is the associations Wales seeks to make with Scotland, another devolved region within the UK, though with more devolved powers, said to be based on a stronger sense of regional identity (Royles and McEwen 2015). Under indicator 46, partnerships are viewed as measurable outcomes of governance and reduced to a quantifiable object. One highly placed individual within the government noted that indicator 46 was the last of the measures to be agreed, after sustained chasing; and during participant observation key stakeholder routinely referenced research conducted in Scotland on the Social Returns on Investment (SROI) of Scotland-Malawi links as something they wished to replicate in Wales, which suggests the inclusion of SROIs within the requirements of the Well-being of Future Generations Act was hastily-though, without wider consensus amongst internal stakeholder, or due consideration of its limitations as a method.

In addition, a report updating on progress against the well-being goals must be published by the government on an annual basis. There was no SROI information available for reporting against indicator 46 (see WG 2017), and the methods for capturing information on participation in international sustainable development projects is now under review. Chapter Five discussed a distinct politics of scale associated with the visions of the Act. For instance, PSBs for each local authority area in Wales must publish an assessment of local well-being, to include a consideration of the goal for a globally responsible Wales (WG 2015). An assessment of these reports was beyond the time frame of this study. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that in some PSBs, the organisations who were commissioned to help develop local well-being

assessments are now evaluating these same assessments for the Office of the Future Generations Commissioner. Again, this illustrates the limited number of people involved in policy production in Wales, with potential implications on the production of the political discourse.

7.3 Identity and Development Practice

Global and Sustainable Citizenship

This section presents research carried out with officials in the Welsh Government and Hub Cymru Africa, and with development organisations who are receiving support from the Wales for Africa programme, either directly or through the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration grant. The research also draws from documentary analysis and academic outputs, which form an important part of the evidence used for this thesis.

One of the prominent themes which emerged from the participant observation and interviews carried out with officials from the government was the strong connections made between the figure of the global citizen and sustainability and nationalist discourses. This theme arises across the sustainable development and international development policy texts (e.g. WAG 2006; WCVA 2013; WG 2016b). For instance, in statements such as how Wales for Africa "reflects Wales' source of duty as an international citizen" (Rhodri Morgan AM, WAG 2006, p. 1), and "Our Scheme for Sustainable Development gives Wales an opportunity to show leadership and ambition, and to learn from the past. It gives us the opportunity to show how we are playing our full role as a global citizen" (Rhodri Morgan AM, WG 2012).

Whilst at one level this global-local connection through the lens of sustainability is an example of nationalist rhetoric, data collected from interviews and during participant observation supports the assertion that Wales' development activities are genuinely concerned with fostering a brand of sustainable citizenship. Devolution was meant to "reinforce and give substantive civic meaning to the national dimension of the country's identity" (Osmond 1998, p. 1), and officials from government and Hub Cymru Africa saw what they

perceived to be a vibrant citizen-led development sector in Wales as a progeny of decentralised government. In their views, the incorporation of community links into government policy was a positive development, and their efforts at engaging civil society support the proposition of this as being central to devolution's success (Day et al. 2000; Chaney et al 2001; Paterson and Jones 1999). Interviewee's spoke of the opportunities Wales' governance structures presented to reassert a new identity and political values:

> "…it's great for a very small country, given a small budget to work on, to try and have a global impact. It's important given the world we live in today. I mean, when we look at the current issues like migration which is impacting everyone, it's important for Wales to have the approach of "you can't work in isolation any more"… it's important that we build these links with other communities, other countries, where we probably haven't in the past" (interview, Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel).

Interviewee's directly associated their efforts with attempts at fostering a devolved citizenship based on principles of sustainability. For instance, one individual described how "we continue to look for opportunities to engage with others on global debates, like climate change, fair trade… we want to get more political and talk about things like the refugee crisis. It's right that we get involved in these issues. And take a more critical view on what's happening" (interview, HCA); and according to another interviewee, "we work closely with colleagues in education on ways to get school's interested… through fair trade, encouraging children to think differently about Africa, to break down stereotypes, like what they see on Comic Relief or hear about on the news, so they can learn new things about different places and people… get a more enlightened perspective than perhaps they might otherwise" (interview, WG). Associations are being made therefore between devolution and the promotion of a global consciousness in Wales.

An interesting feature of the current reimaginations of Wales through the connections being made between its discourses of sustainability and nationalism is the ways in which they might potentially lead to variously-understood and locally-based socio-temporal modes of sustainable citizenship

(Jones and Ross 2016, p. 60-61). The visions presented under the Well-being of Future Generations Act for example open up a range of different spaces in which citizenship can be conceptualised. In particular, when contrasted against the 'smallness' rhetoric described earlier in this chapter. It is hoped for instance that the locally-based imaginations, under the local well-being assessments, will open up spaces towards multiple understandings of identity, and more imaginative solutions within policy (Jones and Ross 2016, pp. 60-61).

The incorporation of citizen-led community linking within government policy raises the issue of how to conceptualise this programme of work, and the ways in which local networks and development actions are now a focus for Wales' political community. Interviewees were clearly very passionate about the programme, as were attendees at Wales for Africa supported conferences and training events. One critical question for the community-linking movement in Wales however is the extent to which involvement by the government in citizen initiatives can foster the development of ethically engaged citizens.

It was clear that officials were conscious of the tensions. Those interviewed from the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration for instance were keen to emphasise their experiences prior to joining the government-funded collaboration, and their efforts at maintaining a partnership-based yet arms-length position from the Wales for Africa Team. According to one interviewee from Hub Cymru Africa for example, "…they're [the Wales for Africa Team] are just across the road, and it's great… but from the very start we were clear - we're a grantee organisation. We want that independence" (interview, HCA). Nonetheless, the notion of a government-funded development programme aimed at encouraging active citizen participation in itself was never challenged.

An issue however is whether the structure of the programme offers a less-restrictive space for initiatives to explore relationally conceived understandings of citizenship. Citizens who took part in development initiatives were viewed by policy officials to have widened their outlooks through the practical nature of the activities; and feedback at events, as well as from interviews with citizen-actors, supported this assessment. One volunteer for example described how "it's extended my world view... as part of a growing understanding" (interview, Vale for Africa). Reflections like this, it was felt by some interviewee's, gave

participants an appreciation of the ways in which their own actions could have a positive impact:

> "…the feedback we've had is that they've been life-changing experiences. It's made them reassess their actions, the contributions they can make, and that their knowledge and skills can make a difference… and they've learnt a lot. The experiences are often very challenging, but they build confidence, other softer skills… and people make friends, build relationships. Making that connection is often the biggest 'take home" (interview, WG).

As discussed, citizenship is developing into a multiple and multi-layered concept under decentralisation, based upon specific institutional developments and some core assumptions. Community operates as a central organising concept in the discourses of Wales for Africa, and in this context, it emphasises a devolved identity and development assistance as a means of providing a distinctive Welsh response towards development objectives. Despite its use as a category however, literatures point to the range of meanings and aspirations that can be part of the group-making project of community (e.g. Barns 1999). The focus here is on the ways in which its exclusionary aspects have been approached under Wales for Africa. Development initiatives have identified with the programme, instilling it with social meanings and significance; and by the same token, this can create exclusion, for those who cannot or do not want to participate for example.

Political moves designed to encourage citizen participation in development assistance are described as having created a framework for more representative social practices for development governance in Wales (WAG 2006b; WG 2016). Wales for Africa however represents the government's visions and the ways in which it has attempted to build a development community. A theme which emerged in interviews was the challenge of fostering social inclusion in the Welsh context under the programme.

Whilst interviewee's recognised that in principle Wales for Africa aimed to support an inclusive process in which all are welcomed, overcoming social exclusion was problematic. Of particular concern were the opportunities available for those from deprived socio-economic backgrounds or from diaspora groups to occupy the space for participation within the community-linking movement. The majority of those supported by the programme came from an older or professional demographic.

> "…it's often retired people that are involved, or people with certain backgrounds… but we don't want there to be any barriers. I honestly don't know what the spread of the age group, or the demographic is, but often development is seen as this kind of thing that's for certain people, and that's probably true of our community" (interview, Welsh Government).

> "…having an inclusion agenda, you're kind of excluding because everyone should be included. There should be no line, but I think the reality is that there are specific groups that aren't included" (interview, Welsh Government).

> "…there's obviously a barrier. Is it money? We'd hope that wouldn't necessarily be the case, and if that is the case, if that's something we can address, or is it just the case, and we have to live with it?" (interview, Welsh Government).

> "…we need to be a bit more inclusive of socio-economic background… I think it would be an easy criticism to make of this programme that it's quite a white, middle class programme" (interview, Hub Cymru Africa).

> "…it's a lot of people who are retired. A lot of people who are fairly established in their careers. You know, professionals who've now got a bit of spare time. They do a project on the side. Which is great! But we're not really including yet younger people from deprived backgrounds" (interview, Hub Cymru Africa).

To expand the participatory space to include younger people experiencing social exclusion, Hub Cymru Africa has targeted activities at individuals from socio-economically deprived areas (interview, SAFE; interview, HCA). There are a number of challenges however, not least in terms of monitoring the programme to establish a basic understanding of who is participating and why. Thus, whilst Wales for Africa has a strong indication that citizen-led development initiatives are prevalent in Wales, like research emanating from other regions in Europe, the data available does not present a clear picture at programme level. This limitation is acknowledged by some stakeholders (interview, WG; interview, HCA); yet, as one interviewee noted, relatively speaking, the budget for Wales for Africa is small: "It's not going to grow. They're not going to put more money into it" (interview, Dolen Cymru).

There was a hope that the streamlining of resources under Hub Cymru Africa would lead to resource efficiencies and support a longer-term strategy by providing more room and opening up spaces "for collaboration, for avoiding duplication" (interview, HCA). What the analysis has demonstrated is that policy-makers are at least acknowledging the inclusionary and exclusionary aspects of participation, and are engaging in some capacity with the issues at stake. Nevertheless, the data illustrates a highly complex picture.

Identity Making and Global Perspectives

Housley (2006, p. 162) refers to "introspective versus international" to describe the tensions between different forms of identity-making that are concerned with the bounded nation-state but which make connections to wider global perspectives. Whilst many of the internationalist perspectives within Wales' discourses of development have the potential to inform a progressive strategy towards constructing sustainable forms of citizenship that promote spatio-temporal and relational perspectives, the spaces in which strategies of citizenship are constructed are vital to how the forms of subjectivity described are realised.

The literature review discussed Bullen and Whitehead's (2005) notion of the sustainable citizenship and ways in which contemporary understandings

articulated in Wales present the possibility for innovative and radical expression of citizenship beyond nationally conceived boundaries. Attempts at developing new brands of citizenship in Wales however have been done within bounded (e.g. classroom) institutional and discursive frameworks and instigated within the formal realms of devolved politics (Bullen and Whitehead 2005, p. 512). However, whilst the bounded spaces of the traditionally conceived nation-state, and the rigid visions of citizenship to which they refer, are inhibiting the notion of the sustainable citizen (Bullen and Whitehead 2005), spaces beyond the bureaucratic realm could support the emergence of more sustainable brands of citizenship.

In this context, Wales' discourses of sustainability and development present opportunities to negotiate the tensions between 'introspective versus international' identities. It is the symbolic dimensions of Wales for Africa which frames how people come together to incorporate ideas of nationhood within international development in a regional context (Fisher 2012). Chapter Six found: 1), the programme is an innovative approach aimed at fostering a shared solidarity through community-to-community ties based upon reciprocity; and 2), that enhancing public participation, as a key objective in post-devolution Wales, has seen a community of practice establish around a distinct Welsh development sector, with an emphasis on local-global connections between communities in Wales and communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Coupled with these factors, the programme's development practices are being conceptualised within wider institutional and discursive frameworks. Read together, this could stretch the conventional "spatial, temporal and material bounds of citizenship" (Bullen and Whitehead 2005, p. 512).

The emphasis within development initiatives therefore needs to be on the practical nature / knowledge of partnerships. There are calls however for the support from Wales for Africa to Wales' development initiatives to be more strongly branded as government-funded (policy papers, available on request). This risks a generic, prescribed approach that undermines the citizen-led locally-based interpretations of assistance currently fostered under the programme's umbrella, and could also undermine some of the qualities associated with sustainable citizenship. This 'branding' may also undermine the

programme, which at present represents both the 'sub-state as development actor', and citizen-led initiatives'. If the citizen-led element is downplayed that may stifle further innovation.

7.4 Participation in Community Links

Constructing Shared Meaning

The construct of mutual benefit is key to conceptualising the government's community linking work. Mutuality in development assistance is based on both sides participating in community partnerships gaining from relations. Effective participation needs more than just new spaces for deliberation. Also important is how people take up and make use of the spaces available (Cornwall 2000; 2008). Thus, the fieldwork in Tororo, where data was collected from focus groups, interviews and participant observation, formed an integral part of the analysis on the citizen as development actor.

An emphasis during the fieldwork in Tororo was on interactive positioning (where one places another) and reflexive positioning (where one places oneself). Towards this, two focus groups were held with the Ugandan recipients of the clay oven-building training (see Chapter Three) (6 participants at each; all recipients of the training participated, with varying levels of English language ability); one on day one, the other on the final day of the project.

The first focus group was aimed at understanding recipients' motivations for participating in the clay oven-building project, and their perceptions on whether the links in place between TOCIDA and SAFE enabled a more inclusive model of development assistance. An emphasis was on the spaces that people are given, and the spaces that people occupy as theirs; with the emphasis firmly on citizens' rights as opposed to beneficiaries needs or consumers' choices, because government claims of civic participation are rooted in the concept of mutual benefit.

In terms of why people chose to take part, in the main, responses focused on capacity-building or learning new skills that could be applied to generate income and enhance the situation of themselves, their families and a wider community:

> "I want to build my capacity. I don't have the skills, but if I get the skills then after capacity building, after being empowered with the skills, definitely it means it will raise my income, and I will be able to sustain myself, and also sustain family members, and generally the community will benefit from this project."

> "This project will help me out to improve my life, and my children and the whole community."

Calls for support from SAFE on the clay oven building project were the result of a co-productive approach facilitated by TOCIDA, aimed at pin-pointing where the SAFE-TOCIDA link could best invest its resources to support the needs identified by Ugandan project recipients. Accordingly, the focus group's participants felt part of the process of developing the project ultimately proposed. Strong themes which emerged in relation to this topic centred on collaboration and self-sufficiency:

> "…people were interested in finding out 'how do we develop ourselves?' This project [TOCIDA], the original name, the local name, is 'development through our own effort'. So those who want to learn what can they do to improve their own livelihood, we come together and share ideas."

> "It was more sharing ideas and saying 'what can we do now to improve?' Because if we can build our own capacity, whereby we can do it ourselves… that is what got people interested."

However, the focus group discussions revealed that the promotion of income-generating activities was not automatically synonymous with enhancing the livelihoods of participants. An advantage perceived by focus group participants

of community-to-community partnerships however was that from their experience, the sustainability of these links meant that Northern-partner organisations could take into account context-specific factors as part of their longer-term commitment to communities, embedded through personal relationships. In the case of TOCIDA, the organisation had links with several partners, and through these links, could develop strategies aimed at enabling recipients of support to shape their livelihoods. In the case of the clay oven-building project, the need was identified through an assessment funded by an Irish-based community link. According to the founder of TOCIDA, with this funding:

> "I visited different parts of the community, put them together, and say 'what would you like?', 'what do you think can help you to come out of the situation you are in?' - the poverty. Different people brought different ideas: 'I wish to know how I could improve agriculture', 'I wish I knew how to improve the soil'. Others said income generating. So, lots of ideas were floating around…" (focus group).

Thus, the need for clay ovens was identified by the Southern partner organisation through a process of consultation and community involvement which evolved from an existing initiative, initiated by a different community link. According to focus group respondents:

> "The reason why the clay oven building was chosen is that when we did the agriculture project, the farmers produced so much, they said 'well what we do with this?' 'What next?' They did not know how to add value to the product. So sometime they just leave it to waste. That is how we thought, maybe we need more skills. We though 'we have something, we need to turn it into something else'" (focus group).

The emphasis therefore was on building from existing assets and responding to the needs of communities, as identified by community members. A key factor behind the clay oven building project was on "adding value" to prior training and to materials [maize flour] produced as a result of existing development support:

> "…so, you [development organisations] are not just saying 'oh, grow a lot of maize'. 'Grow a lot of this'. They [recipients] ask you 'so what?' 'What do we do with it?' They sell off the grains cheaply and then they are still maybe nothing. But if they use that grain, turn it into something else..."

Recipients of the training could learn how to build the ovens, and also how to bake. Thus, the TOCIDA-SAFE project could be viewed as part of a wider network of development support, designed to promote opportunities for building assets. A degree of spontaneity was evident in the partnership between TOCIDA and SAFE, viewed as a defining feature of their relationship (interview, SAFE; interview, TOCIDA). Aside from this, revenue-making coupled with providing a community benefit was also seen as an important motivation behind the clay oven-building project by respondents from the focus group:

> "…there are so many schools around, and children don't even have, there is no school meals. But if there were things, little things they can buy for 100, 200 shillings, they would be ok for lunch…. So, they [Ugandan recipients] can first of all improve the diet of the community, but at the same time it is income generating."

Unprompted, "community" was mentioned numerous times by respondents. Its exclusionary aspect was put plainly by one focus group participant [relayed through the translation of the TOCIDA founder], Kevina, a single-mother supporting six children:

> "…the moment when she told the community that we were going to train on making a stove, making bread, some guy came and put up a bread making factory just next to her so as to block her efforts. And now she has had to move from where her home is to go to the place she is now going to make the stove. Because this fellow, this chap who put the bread making thing just opposite her knew, because we began planning this for a long time, so the community was aware. So why did he just put it there? And now make her shift to another place?"

This is a practical example of how community can be the basis for inclusion / exclusion at the micro scale and the problematic aspects of participation; for participation in the clay oven-building project had resulted in exclusion from other aspects of community-life, which also underscores the relational experiences of poverty, and the differences of power which effect recipients' claims for the right to participate. During fieldwork in Uganda, the precariousness of rights and the ambiguous nature of group identity was illustrated powerfully when the husband of Eunice, a participant in the project, died suddenly. In this situation, the eldest surviving brother of the husband automatically gained possession of the deceased possessions. Following the traditional gender norms in the region, this included Eunice and her home. Thus, her safety and provision was dependent upon the decision of her husband's brother. Reflecting on the day, the author noted in her fieldwork diary:

> "…just been talking to the rest of the group about today. We're all in shock. After such an amazing time on the build yesterday, it's really put things into perspective... when you think you're getting a handle on a place it's a reminder about how little we really know about how things work here… we've no idea really… what it's like…"

Interviews with key stakeholders in Wales suggest that for policy-makers, the unexpected events are part of the process of participating in development: "there's always complications in there" (interview, Hub Cymru Africa). The recipients of the clay oven building training were generally positive about the support provided by SAFE. A challenge identified through the initial focus group however centred on the importance of certificates so that recipients could evidence their training and new skills.

The approach facilitated by TOCIDA was viewed a departure from what was seen as the traditional model of aid distributed by the big agencies.

Themes which arose around benefits of the approach: empowerment; individual needs; long-term commitment; and the security skills afforded.

Wales for Africa is hinged on an idea of reciprocity in development. No 'aid' is distributed via the activities it supports. Instead, the emphasis has been on strengthening the development sector in Wales. Yet the notion of mutual benefit appeared to either confuse or bemuse recipients.

7.5 Chapter Conclusions

The purpose of the current chapter was to explore citizen participation in development assistance to investigate whether Wales for Africa supports the emergence of new development actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both. It began by highlighting that Wales for Africa explicitly speaks to the issue of scale, and in doing so, how community links has drawn upon a mythified history of Wales' citizens reaching outwards in solidarity with global justice movements. However, in practice, whilst overall representing a progressive alternative to the more paternalistic policy prescriptions associated with the distribution of aid, the evidence suggests that there are tensions and ambiguities over the programme's effects.

The case explored has positioned citizen-led community-to-community initiatives as a promising strategy for development assistance, whilst highlighting the context–specific dynamics of the case. It is important to note that the case explored found that community-based initiatives are not *done* to communities – that Southern-based partners are agents in defining their needs, and that Northern-based partner's work to address that need. This factor was identified as crucial to the success and sustainability of projects. Based on data from focus groups, interviews and participant observation, it was demonstrated that in this case: 1), Southern partners prescribe the activities that govern partnerships, based on an assessment of their own needs. 2), the activities prescribed however are guided by the skill-set of the Northern partner organisation. 3), there are benefits for Northern and Southern partners. However, these benefits are understood in different ways, and the decision on

who gets to participate from the Southern-partners context depends upon the individual responsible for defining the need to the Northern partner, as they apply the rules of the intervention.

8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

> "It has often been alleged that a national consciousness heavily conditioned by the needs of differentiation from a dominant neighbour is a characteristic Welsh weakness. As a result of the political and economic decline of that neighbour, a complimentary growth in our own self-confidence, and a wider change in perceptions of nationality, it is the hope of many at the beginning of the twenty first century that this essentially colonized state of mind may at last be transcended" (Lord 2000, p. 40; cited in Housley 2006)

The aim in this thesis has been to assess how issues of political decentralisation and citizen participation in development assistance are used in the making of national identity, and to what effect. Drawing on the case of Wales, a sub-state region operating in the Western-context, and from the empirical subject of Wales for Africa, the government's international development programme, the author explored the connections which can exist between nationalist and *international* sustainable development discourses. Resources are invested into connecting these political discourses in policy contexts, where through practice, performance and discursive construction, they have combined in efforts to make more meaningful a Welsh national territory. The thesis discussed how the efforts at defining a Welsh version of sustainable development, and nested within, an innovative programme of international development, are aimed partly at fostering a national distinctiveness through post-devolution nation-building. This final chapter summarises the analysis of preceding chapters to emphasise its contentions, and the study's contributions to theory and policy practice.

The chapter is structured as follows: first, the main work conducted is briefly outlined, followed by the theoretical contributions of the study, through reflecting on the relevance of the Welsh case to conceptions of sub-states and citizen development actors. Next, contributions to policy practice are considered, then, the limitations of the study, followed by suggestions for further research arising from these. The conclusion re-states the core contributions of the study.

8.2 Summary of the Thesis

That the launch of the Wales for Africa programme represents a significant achievement was recognised at the outset of this study. What was not clear however was why the government had decided to pursue policies on international development. This policy puzzle catalysed the research.

From the initial policy puzzle, which established Wales for Africa as the subject of analysis, a conceptual framework was developed in the study to explore the programme through the lens of both the *sub-state* and the *citizen* as development actor. This framed the analysis around how, as an impact of the complex and provisional effects of decentralisation, Wales is now a sub-state actor operating in the international arena, and the emphasis placed by the government on citizen-led development initiatives due to its limited competences. By approaching both the sub-state and the citizen as development actors, the study brings together the professional knowledge of policy-makers together with the experiences of NGOs and citizens.

This thesis identified few studies which took Wales for Africa as their unit of analysis; though there are some exceptions: Royles (2010, 2017) and Wyn Jones and Royles (2012) examine the programme at sub-state level, and Fisher (2012) explores the government's fair-trade activities, with a more explicit focus on citizen involvement. Even taking these studies into account however, little analysis was found on the impact of community-linking to either the *sub-state* or the *citizen as development actor*.

Out of the literature review, three core gaps in research to date were identified; namely, limited analysis on: 1), the emerging role of the sub-state as development actor; 2), new frames of citizenship in the context of devolution; and 3), citizen-led initiatives as a 'fourth pillar' of development aid. The gaps identified signified scope for exploring the programme's workings and symbolic resonance, its significance to wider conceptualisations of the development sector, and to the increasing role played by sub-states and citizens as alternative actors in development assistance.

Chapter Three expanded on some of the constructs presented in the literature review. Here, the goal was to establish a context-sensitive account of the devolution process to ground the later empirical chapters. In its broad outline of the Welsh nation as a relatively new construct, the emphasis was on how a sense of Welshness is reproduced, often upon conflicting and contradictory notions of group identity, that compete for symbolic space and public acknowledgement.

A mainly qualitative approach was adopted to collect the data, which involved extensive documentary analysis of policy related material, and the analysis of semi-structured interviews with interviewees from the public and third sector, and from participants in community-based development organisations. Data from focus groups and participant observation at a development project in the Tororo Regio, Uganda, was also scrutinised.

The empirical chapters showed how sustainable development is used as a vehicle for imagining a post-devolution Wales, under relational and temporal imaginations of a networked nation. These principles have been associated with what policy-makers promote as important Welsh values; used to reimagine a new, more inclusive nation, based upon solidarity and fairness, and in the context of Wales for Africa, upon notions of partnership and reciprocity between communities in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa.

The main findings from each of the three research questions are summarised below. Then, the core argument of the thesis is outlined.

How Does the International Development Agenda Converge with Ambitions of Nation-Building?

This question was addressed in Chapter Five, which analysed the sub-state as development actor. The chapter explored how a discourse on international development emerged in Wales, in parallel with the evolving of the Assembly's powers, a growing consensus on the appropriateness of devolution, and civic identification with Wales' new institutions of government. It argued that based upon a particular conception of its rights and responsibilities, forged around the distinctiveness of its legal duty to promote sustainable development, the

government has pursued a response to global development objectives. The promotion of sustainability is being viewed as a significant way of reimaging the Welsh nation, one which is now said to be based on important Welsh values.

The scale of the challenge towards launching Wales for Africa was outlined, and in doing so, the chapter explored how, even under a limited model of political decentralisation, sub-states can carve out distinct policy niches in the international arena. Developed on the fringes of Wales' responsibilities, Wales for Africa represents a strong example of where the government has collaborated with wider networks to develop a distinctiveness of approach in the devolved context. Its sustainable development duty has formed the basis of policy innovations in development assistance, based upon the principle of reciprocity. Activities supported by the government must have a benefit to Wales. This has opened-up new spaces for participation in development assistance and underpins how the government has framed itself and its relationship with others – as an outward-facing, globally responsible, sustainable nation.

How has Wales for Africa Built a Political Community of Practice?

This question was addressed in Chapter Six, which identified trends, themes and factors pertinent to the evolution of the programme, as it has sought to embed and consolidate Wales' development activities. It is now possible to refer to a distinct Welsh development sector, and to how a new social category has emerged in Wales – the citizen-led development initiative, labelled a core feature of Wales' approach towards development, and an example of a 'fourth pillar' initiative, identified in the literature review.

Considerable resource from a relatively modest budget has been invested into supporting community-to-community links between partnered organisations in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa. The programme has also evolved by breaking down definitional barriers, and through the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration, became better placed to support more projects. Nevertheless, tensions and ambiguities run through the programme, compounded because funding to continue supporting the sector is not guaranteed. The analysis also highlighted the limited number of people involved in the programme's formulation. The programme has developed in an ad-hoc - though highly regulated - fashion, as

Wales for Africa has built on multi-level governance frameworks to foster a legitimacy and a credibility.

The programme has grown incrementally in its responsibilities, and informality has been a key feature of the government's approach. It now plays-out across several cross-cutting strands of activity and has justified a focus on sub-Saharan Africa by building on existing good practice in the region. Significantly, development activities supported by the government must complement the work of DFID and be of mutual benefit to Wales.

As a result, the impact of the programme is understood as more than the sum of its parts, for it aligns with wider government objectives, encourages the notion of a global connectivity, and borrows from the existing skill set of Welsh beneficiaries. The principle of reciprocal benefit in development assistance has been rationalised in terms of refining the expertise of Welsh participants, and articulated in terms of fostering a progressive, global citizenship.

The professionalisation of Wales' development sector was viewed as the greatest success of the programme, in its facilitation of greater coordination and active participation across supported activities. The launch of Hub Cymru Africa is seen as significant in the consolidation of Wales' development sector because it pulls together key strands of government activity. However, although the process towards its launch saw the government consult on the future of Wales' development sector, this process was not genuinely co-productive. In addition, the future of Hub Cymru Africa is currently under review, adding a further layer of uncertainty for the sector.

Overall, the analysis suggests that the symbolic and actual impact of Wales for Africa far outstrips its modest budget. A distinct community of practice has evolved in Wales, both through raising the profile and enabling the expansion of small-scale development initiatives, and through linking citizen-led initiatives with others working in the field. The programme however is based upon a number of assumptions around its effectiveness, with consequences on the claims which can be made on its impact.

Chapter Six concluded by arguing that community linking has proved an ideal vehicle for decentralised development action. It provides novel opportunities for sub-state and citizen participation in development assistance, broadening horizons for those involved in Wales, and fostering innovations in development assistance.

Does the Wales for Africa Programme Support the Strengthening of the Citizen as Development Actor, through Encouraging New Actors, Better Interaction with Existing Structures, or Both?

This question was addressed in Chapter Seven, which explored the citizen as development actor through a focus on community linking. The chapter began by arguing that much of the political motivation behind Wales for Africa can be explained by way of efforts to project a certain vision of Welsh nationhood based on a mythified history of internationalism, and found citizen-led community-to-community initiatives to be promising strategies for development assistance, whilst highlighting the context–specific dynamics of the empirical case.

Wales' community linking activities have been infused with local-global connected meanings through the programme's localisation of development action, as it borrows from geographical scales in an iterative way. Its commitment to citizen participation however suggests that the programme, as well as an act of global projection, is also committed to local empowerment.

Wales for Africa however is based on a number of core assumptions used to construct an idea of the nation. An issue therefore is how this national story plays out. Thus, the chapter explored how the programme is given meaning in practice by exploring: 1), legislative structures aimed at supporting a brand of sustainable citizenship; and 2), the spaces available for participants to discern relationally conceived understandings of citizenship. This illustrated a complex picture, compounded by the gaps in the evidence on who is participating in Wales' development sector and why.

The larger discursive themes on the making of national identity in Wales and participation in development assistance serve as points of orientation and departure in the more concrete and everyday discourses of policy

implementation and practice, through for example, the activities of citizen-led development initiatives. Effective participation requires people to take up and make use of the opportunities available to join in, and the results from the fieldwork in the Tororo Region suggest that community-to-community partnerships can enable Northern-partner organisations to take into account context-specific factors as part of a longer-term commitment to Southern communities, embedded through personal relationships. The emphasis should be on responding to the needs of communities, as identified by community members, and where possible, building-on existing assets. The support provided through the SAFE-TOCIDA link was viewed by recipients as a departure from the traditional model of aid. Themes which arose around the benefits of their approach centred around empowerment and the sustainability of projects.

Overall, the case suggests that citizen-led initiatives are a model of development that could represent a progressive alternative to some of the more paternalistic policy prescriptions of development aid. Yet uncertainties remain over Wales for Africa's practical effects, and there are also multiple ways in which the construct of mutual benefit can be understood by Northern and Southern partner organisations, and their recipients, further problematising the principle of reciprocity in development assistance.

The Core Arguments of the Thesis

The core arguments of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 1), the emergence of sub-states as development actors is repositioning and reframing our understanding of development assistance, and encouraging innovations in policy-making, in an arena receptive to the self-autonomy and nationhood of (sub-)states; 2), the government aspires to be an exemplar sub-state region in sustainable development policy-making, and has increasingly aspired to play a role on the international stage to this effect; 3), Wales for Africa has been shaped by identity politics, sustained pressure from a small but strong NGO lobby, committed politicians, and a political commitment towards strengthening Wales' institutions of government; 4), citizen-led development initiatives should be seen as an important fourth pillar of development assistance. Arguably, government involvement in Wales' initiatives makes it more of a political and collective phenomenon, rather than citizen-led. Nevertheless, there is merit in

the government a) providing oversight and coordination, and b) in building the capacity of the sector, which the Wales for Africa programme has sought to do; 5), the principle of mutual benefit which underpins the Wales for Africa programme, as framed under Wales' duty to promote sustainable development, is providing novel ways of understanding development assistance as a two-way reciprocal process between communities and individuals.

The core arguments of this thesis were developed using IPA to explore how narratives around civic value and nationhood have formed around the Welsh Government's international development activities. The interpretive approach towards the analysis also borrowed from Theory of Change thinking to set out an understanding of Wales for Africa, and how it has built a community of practice, with an emphasis on how the programme is given specific meaning by policy-makers and participants.

The Conceptual Implications of the Thesis

The spatially contingent and complex impacts of devolution in Wales – which includes the decentring of the nation-state at UK level and a re-territorialisation of national identity at a sub-state level – run concurrent to the international growth of civil society, the emergence of new citizen actors and new forms of mobilisation. In this thesis therefore, Wales for Africa was construed as part of wider changes that undermine established orthodoxies, as there is now a multiplicity of new actors, multiple contested meanings and varied social practices surrounding governance and civic participation in the international realm.

In its examination of recent attempts at nation-building in Wales, an emphasis within the analysis was on the connections which can exist between relational and more bounded conceptions of space and place; on how, although policy-makers increasingly make links (most significantly recently, through the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act (2015)), the relationship between the discourses of sustainability and nationalism, along with the spatial and temporal dynamics they suggest, is unsurprisingly complex. These discourses can both reinforce and contradict each other through the connections and tensions that exist between them, and in post-devolution Wales, the discourses of development assistance are not immune from these antagonisms. Here, for

example, nation-building has "not been the work only of conscious nationalists. Much of it has been a response to policy problems and the search for pragmatic solutions to territorial or cultural questions" (Keating 2001, p. 263), and this is another way in which Wales for Africa should be conceptualised: as a political response to calls from within the third sector and civil society for support on development assistance, whereby a pragmatic solution, using the distinctive sustainable development duty, was found by Wales' policy-makers, who were genuinely committed to the cause.

Wales for Africa is said to be rooted in Welsh values and culture, and as nations are imagined communities, an objective of this research was to understand how these values have been imagined and mobilised under the programme. It is here where the connections between sustainability and nationalist discourses are found to be most potent. The promotion of international development is being viewed by policy-makers as a significant way of re-imagining the qualities of the Welsh nation (witnessed most clearly in the inclusion of a well-being goal for a globally responsible Wales and the associated national indicator on Welsh partnerships working towards the UNs SDGs under the Well-being of Future Generations Act), so that in many ways, the discourses of nationalism and *international* sustainable development are helping to reinforce each other in the reproduction of the Welsh nation. There is a need therefore for more reflections on the ways in which these discourses play out within Wales' policy contexts.

The Policy Implications of the Thesis

Wales for Africa also represents a genuine commitment by politicians to represent the interests of the communities they serve, by responding to calls on opportunities for citizens to actively participate in development assistance. The programme should continue, with community-linking as a key aspect, for it represents a concerted attempt at making real the inclusionary promise of citizenship in its attempts at mobilising a sense of devolved citizenship, as a form of group identity, around the values of solidarity and reciprocity, through which people can understand themselves as citizens and translate this into global action.

Brexit however could have a major impact on EU and UK development and humanitarian policies, and there are still uncertainties about the UKs new

foreign policy approach and its repercussions on aid. Wales' activities are subject to these processes. In addition, when considering Wales' majority vote to leave the EU in June 2016 despite the all the political parties, aside from UKIP (and some Conservative AMs), campaigning to remain, the influence of devolved political rhetoric on public opinion in Wales appears minimal (Pearce 2017, p. 18).

As well as challenges and significant constraints however (not least over where the competences will lie post-EU membership and the fiscal cuts the changes are predicted to bring), the uncertainties also open-up new spaces, and thus opportunities, including the potential for Wales' policy-makers to reassess and reimagine its relationship with others.

Nonetheless, whilst Wales for Africa is concerned with moral obligations in the international arena, and does have the potential to lead people to a better, more meaningful appreciation and a relational understanding of development assistance, the programme is rightfully under increasing scrutiny, not least because UKIP currently have 5 Assembly Members. The programme therefore needs to make its case better, as a valuable resource in facilitating democratic engagement, as a response to calls from Wales' citizens for the tools to play a more active role in shaping their world.

Recent developments have seen the programme restructure, so that from April 2018, the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration no longer exists, with many key functions brought in-house to the Wales for Africa Team, partly in an effort to increase recognition that the funding available is from the government (policy paper, available on request). This raises questions, such as the extent to which the programme, and by proxy, the government is, to paraphrase Day (2006, p. 642; see quote at pg. 11), answerable to civil society, or whether instead Wales' development community must answer to the government. Thus, whilst Wales for Africa has facilitated the growth of a movement so that it is now possible to refer to a distinctly Welsh development community based largely around citizen-led non-specialist development initiatives, the bringing in-house of key strands of programme activity risks their co-option by government regime, for it potentially undermines: 1), the plurality of the spaces available for citizen participation; and 2), relational ways of thinking about space and place,

because supported activities must now explicitly be associated with a sub-state bound nationalist discourse, with implications for the productive connections that can be made with the principles of sustainability.

A significant weakness identified by this study is that there has been limited evaluation on the programme's effectiveness to date, which is hugely problematic given the £8 million-plus of public money distributed so far. A key policy implication from this thesis therefore is the need for a thorough government-funded evaluation on the programme, which should include an element of both process and impact evaluation.

8.3 The Limitations of the Study

The study has a number of limitations. Although the research sought data from citizen-participants in development projects, it is by far more reflective of professional perspectives, including policy-makers, than of citizens' views. This was partly due to the nature of the study and its focus on policy-making and the official government discourse, but also due to the expertise of policy-makers in comparison to volunteers, with the professional knowledge of the former tending to produce richer data and themes on the Wales for Africa programme at a sub-state or programme level, which could be explored in more depth to address the first two research questions. The study would have benefited from a more rounded perspective on citizen-led development initiatives from a range of organisations that were identified during the analysis of monitoring and reporting data, to build on the analysis presented here. In addition, the study could have been strengthened through interviews with politicians and with individuals from government sponsored bodies, and with additional interviews from representatives of those organisations highlighted as stand-out cases by the Wales for Africa team.

Nonetheless, because the emphasis was on garnering a more in-depth knowledge of the Wales for Africa programme - an area where this study identified significant gaps in the literature - as a single-case, representativeness was not a key concern. Thus, the research is understood as temporally, socially and culturally specific, as the emerging development sector in Wales, along with the dynamics of policy-making, are constantly evolving and varied. The

research could not hope to capture the entirety of such complexity, though further research should include a wider range of perspectives.

8.4 Suggestions for Future Research

This section outlines some possible future directions for further research into Wales for Africa. The programme is characterised by considerable heterogeneity relative to its budget in terms of the activities it supports, which would impact upon any future research agenda. For empirical understandings to improve, more research is needed into Wales' development sector. In the case of Wales for Africa this should include as a key consideration the testing of the programme's effectiveness, which would involve gaining a better understanding of its perceived and actual outcomes and impacts, and the associated benefits and challenges, so as to better grasp its socio-political, cultural and economic value. Future research could also explore group identities other than the national, such as religious identity for example, to examine more thoroughly the links between development policy and identity more broadly.

Wales for Africa is a strong case through which the complexities of interactions in development assistance can be analysed, at a range of scales, spaces and places. To inform the practices and effectiveness of the programme, future research should include the perspectives of a variety of partner organisations. Perhaps the most appropriate conclusion to draw in suggesting further research is, that for a consideration of government involvement in citizen-led development initiatives, a thorough knowledge of the context-specific experiences of participants is needed, from both the Western and Southern context - which could include an element of co-production in the design and/or implementation of studies - to help inform where best to invest resource.

The concept of mutual benefit, for example, could be interrogated in greater detail, or future research could problematise more thoroughly the 'Welsh approach' towards development, such as by introducing a comparison with other devolved regions that have a recognised presence of government-supported citizen initiatives – the Scottish Government's Malawi Development Programme, for instance. Comparative analyses could also test claims on the

novelty of a Welsh approach. The examples of Estonia and Tasmania, the other regions identified as having a legal duty to promote sustainable development in the exercise of their functions, could also provide fruitful avenues for a comparative analysis on the connections being made between discourses of sustainability and nationalism.

Any assessment of the social meanings attributed to Wales for Africa should not ignore the wider political discourses, such as the uncertainties created by Brexit and its implications on the UK and Wales' relations (both internationally and within the boundaries of the nation-state), which adds a further layer of uncertainty to the devolution process. As well as emphasising the dynamic context within which an analysis of policy-making occurs, this opens-up further opportunities to explore the programme through the lens of sub-state diplomacy. Future research could explore the soft power Wales' development discourse affords for example, within the context set by multi-level governance frameworks.

In addition, whilst the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act (2015) includes an indicator on partnership-based development activities, the measurement is based upon SROI, and is thus solely concerned with quantifying the value of any social benefits deriving from these activities. There is a risk that the government's findings on the impact of the programme will be skewed towards financial understandings of value. The SROI indicator appears to be influenced by previous research on the Scottish Government's development programme (Anders 2014),[26] and is construed as a case of still "keeping up with the MacJoneses" (see Wyn Jones and Royles 2012, p. 260). Future research should aim to capture a more nuanced understanding of the programme's benefits - to include its softer, more holistic conceptions.

[26] See: https://www.scotland-malawipartnership.org/download_file/force/537/216/ [accessed 28th August 2017]

8.5 Final Conclusion

In the realm of political symbols, Wales for Africa is hugely important. Lauded as a distinctive Welsh contribution, the programme signifies and validates global engagement, by crafting local responsibility to a global scale in attempts at facilitating an identifiably Welsh response to international development, within the context of sustainability.

Despite the limited resources allocated to the programme, it is an interesting example of a devolved government testing the boundaries of its powers, in a policy field which, at first glance, appears far beyond the scope of its responsibilities. Efforts at marketing a Welsh version of sustainability, alongside innovations in development, are aimed partly at fostering a national distinctiveness, used to reimagine the nation. These ambitions, coupled with a genuine commitment to foster active participation, helped launch Wales for Africa.

Wales for Africa therefore plays a role in the production of a nationalist narrative and is thus enrolled in a nationalist group-making project, with its supported activities aimed partly at enhancing the image and status of Wales, and bolstering the government's internal legitimacy. The programme does nonetheless provide scope to imagine a different, more inclusive nation, based upon notions of partnership and reciprocity between communities. The analysis has helped challenge the dualism which can exist between relational and bounded conceptions of space, instead emphasising the connections which can exist between sustainability and nationalist discourses. Yet whilst the policy discourse is littered with the terminology of a global connectivity, what is not so readily acknowledged is the tension inherent within socio-political life, and what this means for the construction of Wales and of new Welsh identities.

Nations however are contingent products of an ongoing series of connections - including between people and discourses (Jones and Merriman 2016) - and national identity, if used constructively, could lead to more progressive policy solutions (Jones and Ross 2016). With devolution, there are opportunities for Wales to convert its reimaginings into the reality of an internationalist outlook vital to the creation of an ethically aware citizenry, not least in relation to the principles of sustainability. Wales for Africa is one way to pursue this agenda.

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Annex A: The National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government

The National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government are two distinct organisations:

- The National Assembly for Wales is the democratically elected body that represents the interests of Wales and its people, makes laws for Wales and holds the Welsh Government to account. It has 60 elected Assembly Members (AMs). It is the Welsh equivalent to the UK parliament in Westminster, which houses every MP from across the UK. The Senedd in Cardiff Bay is the home of the debating chamber for the National Assembly for Wales.

  Further information on the National Assembly is available at: http://www.assembly.wales/en/Pages/Home.aspx [Accessed 20 July 2017]

- The Welsh Government is the devolved government for Wales, and is responsible for a wide range of policy areas including:

  - education
  - health
  - local government
  - transport
  - planning
  - economic development
  - social care
  - culture
  - environment
  - agriculture and rural affairs
  - tourism

The role of the Welsh Government is to make decisions on matters regarding these policy areas, for Wales as a whole, develop policies and implement them, and propose Welsh laws. Civil Servants in the Welsh Government serve Welsh Cabinet Secretaries and Ministers working on matters devolved to Wales.

The UK government is still responsible for certain public services in Wales, for example police, prisons and the justice system. Matters such as tax and benefits, defence, national security and foreign affairs are also dealt with by the UK Government.

Further information on the Welsh Government is available at: http://wales.gov.uk [Accessed 20 July 2017]

Annex B: Map of Wales



Annex C: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

Initially, the UNs Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the focal point for work on more participatory approaches towards development, when in 2000, the UN Millennium Declaration was signed by 189 countries. This marked a watershed moment in the course of international development, as the momentum generated by the declaration was translated into eight specific MDGs for development and poverty eradication, outlined in the Figure C1 below. Across these eight goals, 21 time-bound targets and 60 associated indicators were recognised by the signatories.

Figure C1: The Millennium Development Goals
Source: United Nations (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/)

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

The MDGs broadly aimed to serve as a global framework for collective action to reduce poverty by 2015 so as to create political will, mobilise resources and bring about positive change to improve the lives of poor people, and also intended to focus effort on tangible results and the use of quality data to improve policy design (UN 2012).

Weiss et al. (2009) cite the MDGs as among the most important UN ideas that changed the world. Nevertheless, there is limited evidence as to whether the MDGs achieved their aims (World Bank 2003; Clements 2004). Although there is evidence to suggest that the goals helped to mobilise Official Development Assistance in the mid-2000s (Prizzon 2012), they were accused of being too narrow in their focus. It was also often unclear how targets should be measured (Karver et al. 2012; Gauri 2012). In addition, Datta et al. (2014) highlight how the design of the MDGs meant some development dimensions were undervalued as a result of neglecting key issues (such as employment, inequality, human rights) and through a "one-size-fits-all approach, lack of guidance and limited consultation process". There was also a perception that the MDGs were for the most part driven and 'owned' by the UN and traditional donors.

Annex D: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

2015 saw the MDGs replaced by the UN 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs build on the unfinished MDGs agenda, but with a broader scope and more ambitious targets. Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs apply to all countries and represent universal goals and targets that articulate a need and opportunity for the global community to build a sustainable future in an increasingly interconnected world. There are 17 goals in total, outlined in Figure D1 below. Across the goals, there are 169 targets covering the three dimensions of economic, social and environmental. Goal number 17 is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

Figure D1: The Sustainable Development Goals
Source: United Nations (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300)

1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Annex E: An Overview of the Aid System

The term 'aid system' is outmoded in terms of what it is now meant to describe. Nevertheless, it remains shorthand to describe the institutions, procedures and practices, and understandings about international co-operation, development, poverty and global solidarity which have typified the development system (Pollet et al. 2014).

Analysis of the aid system has traditionally been informed by the three major theoretical approaches towards international relations: realism; neo-Marxism and liberalism (Keohane 1990). Broadly understood:

- *realists* view aid as a foreign policy instrument that enables donor states to pursue their national interests;

- *neo-Marxists* see aid as a contemporary manifestation of colonialism and imperialism that contributes to the reproduction of capitalist relations between developed and developing countries; whereas

- *liberals* downplay systemic or structural determinants to focus on the relations between domestic politics and international relations, and interpret aid as a projection abroad of national values and social forces, and an instrument used by states to promote interdependence and international justice.

Therien (2002) frames the debate on development aid in terms of the oppositional forces of the right versus the left on the political spectrum. The right and left are relative concepts, and the distinction cannot be regarded as the "sole and sovereign dividing-line" in political debates. Nevertheless they "still count for a good deal in contemporary politics" (Giddens 2000, p. 38). Although crude, the distinction is used here to help briefly describe the history of development aid.

The root of the tensions between the left and the right is that the former is inclined to see development aid as something poor people are entitled to, whereas the latter tend to see it as charity. This distinction can be used to characterise the evolution of policies over the decades, which has seen the balance shift between the two perspectives, and through which, it is possible to outline the development of the aid system, albeit fragmentarily:

- The concept of development aid was derived in the 1940s under the impetus of left-wing political culture. These left-wing roots can be understood in the context of an increase in private aid in the early years of the twentieth century, the creation of the welfare state, the establishment of the United Nations, and the introduction of the Marshall Plan. For example, the establishment of the welfare state has been described as legitimising the intervention of the state to abate the damaging effects of the market and contributed to a strengthening of equality as a founding principle of democracy. Development assistance has been posited as having performed a

comparable purpose in the international arena (Lumsdaine 1993, p. 217; Noel and Therien 1995).

- The period 1950 to 1970 saw aid put into practice in a predominantly right-wing environment. It became a policy instrument subservient to the strategic interests of the major powers during the Cold War. International initiatives undertaken during this period, such as the creation of the International Development Association and the OECD's DAC, tended to concentrate decision making powers to the developed countries. The development model promoted through development aid at this time coincided with the dominant discourse, advocated by the right, which assumed economic growth would promote development in developing countries.

- The failure of this trickle-down process, which was falsely predicted by the theory of modernisation, alongside a recognition that only the elite had profited from the initial phase of development aid, resulted in a serious questioning of the aid regime during the 1970s. The work of Chenery (1974), which emphasised a need for reconciling the objectives of social equity and growth, and Streeten, which emphasised concentrating on the "nature of what is provided rather than on income" (1997, p. 50), were major contributors to this shift in thought. The critical appraisal of the period saw the introduction and promotion of the concept of basic needs and a swaying of the aid system to the left.

- The decade of the 1970s was strongly influenced by the debate on the establishment of a New International Economic Order, and witnessed a period of unprecedented dialogue, often centering on proposals associated with Marxism, between developed and developing nations. The basic needs strategy of the period however has for the most part been deemed a failure. For Stoke (1996), a contributing factor was the lack of consensus on the definition of what basic needs were. Developing countries themselves demonstrated a certain amount of apathy. This has been attributed by Johan (1997) to perception of the strategy as an effort to deviate way from a New International Economic Order. In addition, Wood (1986) notes how the policy was for the most part limited to multilateral institutions, with little change to patterns of bilateral aid allocation.

- The later years of the 1970s and the 1980s saw the forceful renaissance of the right under what Murray and Overton regard as "the orthodox phase of the neo liberal aid regime", encapsulated by free market resource allocation and the retreat of the state (2011, p. 308). The period began with the most severe recession of the postwar years. This saw the introduction by developed countries of protectionist and monetarist policies, which in turn exacerbated the debt of developing countries. The dominant discourse of neoliberalism brought with it reductions in public expenditure, an increase in structural adjustment policies, and the rolling back of state-provided services (Banks and Hulme 2012). Under the promotion of structural adjustment programmes, which became the prerequisite for obtaining development aid, poverty reduction was not an explicit concern (Murray and Overton 2011). Instead, the prevailing confidence in the trickle-down effects of economic growth

was promoted, which saw the market take precedence over the state as the provider of development policies.

- The perspective of modernisation, with its explicit goal of economic growth, and the development focus on structural adjustment policies during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s (Murray and Overton 2011, p. 308) has been posited as synonymous with secularisation (Lunn 2009).

- The hegemony of the right during this period was not total, however. The developments associated with neoliberal reform saw concurrent political changes. Significantly, with the contraction of state provided services and a weak private sector, civil society often took responsibility for the provision of basic welfare services, whether through family and community networks or constituted NGOs. Criticism from the left was for the most part articulated by NGOs, who increasingly played a role and contributed as development alternatives against what were perceived as the failures of state-led development approaches (Banks and Hulme 2012). The rise of social development in the 1980s also saw qualitative research approaches gain respectability, although the principle methods used in conventional development research still reflected the hegemony of economics.

- Looking back to the 1970s, Cornwall (2008, p. 70) identifies three distinct arguments for participation in development: efficiency and effectiveness; self-determination; and mutual learning. During the 1980s and 1990s, these three lines of argument were part of a more general push towards increasing participation in projects and programmes, so that: "Different emphases, by different actors and at different moments ebb and flow through the practices of participatory development over these decades".

- The early 1990s witnessed the decline of the neoliberal approach and its associated structural adjustment programmes. An emphasis on poverty reduction saw a leaning over to left-wing values under a new discourse supporting sustainable development, and an emerging good governance agenda under which the state regained centre stage. Debates became less concerned with why participation might be a good thing and more focused on how to put it into practice, and at scale. The mainstream aid agenda of the 1990s reintroduced the human-oriented goals of the 1970s alongside the preservation of the macro-economic emphasis of the 1980s, resulting in a continued emphasis on market-based policy reforms, but alongside a recognition that these in themselves are insufficient to effectively reduce poverty. From the 1970s to the 1990s, a general consensus emerged that people's participation in projects was the means to their success. From the mid 1990's onwards, there has also been a more explicit emphasis on poverty reduction agenda. However, the institutionalisation of participation into large donor funded programmes, and thus the technocratic mainstream, raised a number of critical issues, undermining much of the transformation that was promised.

- An emphasis on poverty reduction continued into the 2000s, with a return to a focus on broadening civil society engagement in policy and governance. The 2010s have also seen increasing recognition that NGOs are not the only one sector within broader civil society claiming a remit in development, as citizens are increasingly vying for a role. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.

- Recent years have seen participatory approaches increasingly gain traction, towards a general recognition that context is key, poverty descriptions are subjective, and a recognition that people understanding and analysing their own reality is fundamental to effective development assistance. For Chambers (2006): "Policies and actions need to be informed much less by top-down targets and much more by the diverse bottom-up realities of the powerless". An increased emphasis on more locally-sensitive, people-centred approaches has seen the concept of participation become part of the mainstream development agenda.

Annex F: Mapping Citizen Initiatives

Figure F1: The presence of citizen initiatives
Source: Adapted from Pollet et al. 2014

Country	Concept - terminology	Data and features of citizen initiatives	Governmental involvement	Civil Society Organisation involvement	Main funding sources
Austria	Development initiatives at personal basis	Diaspora and returned expat initiatives; DEAR activities	ADA micro projects programme	Globale Verantwortung; NGDO Sol and the 1zu1 platform (database 80 CIs)	Provincial grant schemes; private
Belgium	Private 4th Pillar Initiatives (Flanders); Popular initiatives of international solidarity (French speaking part)	Popular (1,5000 to 6,500 CIs in Flanders – estimate); returned expats, solidarity groups, former mission projects	Regional governments (monitoring); provincial and local governments (funding)	Focal points with data bases (2x600 CIs) embedded in CSO umbrella organisations 11.11.11 and CASIW	Provincial and municipal grant schemes; private
Czech Republic	Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations	Few CIs with South component	Professionalisation of NGDOs	FoRS (NGDO umbrella); representation and support	Private funding
Denmark	Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations	Diversified; youth groups	Sub-granting through CSO umbrella organisations; direct funds to Southern CSOs	CISU (280 members), DMCDD, DUF (umbrella organisations	Grant schemes through umbrella organisations
Finland	Volunteer and small citizen organisations	Diaspora groups; youth groups	Rights Based Approach (not suited for CIs); direct support to South CSOs	KEPA (NGDO umbrella organisation); representation and support	Foundations, church and private
France	Micro projects and small associations	Diversified; up to 40,000 CIs (estimate)	AFD programme for micro projects (sub-granting)	GER serving volunteer organisations and FORIM for diaspora organisations; regional networks	Regional grant schemes; grant schemes through GER and FORIM

Figure continued…

Germany	Small projects and associations (Verreine)	Church-related groups; DEAR activities; 32,000 Verreine (CIs) including 8,000 Verreine under AGL	BMZ – Engagement Global (focal point)	AGL Landesnetwerke (CI umbrella organisation); VENRO-BBE (NGDO-umbrella organisations)	Regional grant schemes (Lander) and municipalities; church-related and other large private foundations
Hungary	Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations	Few CIs with South component	Occasional calls for NGDO tendering by national government	HAND (NGDO umbrella organisation)	Private funding
Ireland	Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations; small charities	Few CIs with South component	Irish Aid small projects funding scheme (terminated)	DOCHAS (NGDO umbrella organisation);	Private funding
Italy	Small solidarity initiatives	3,500 organisations in international solidarity	Regional governments; National: Third Sector Agency (terminated)	ARCS (CSO umbrella support)' Forum Terzo Settore (representation)	Private funding (church); regional, provincial and municipal small grants schemes
Netherlands	Private initiatives (particuliere initiatieven)	Diversified; 6000 – 15,000 CIs (estimation)	CIs as policy instrument for strengthening public support for aid; NCDO (public support agency); sub-granting through NGDOs	Partin (representation); MyWorld (online platform); the NGDOs Cordaid, ICCO, Edukans, Kerk in Actie (through Impulsis) and Wilde Ganzen (brokering and support)	Local fundraising, Impulsis programme; Cordaid Particulier Initiatief Fonds; Wild Geese Foundation; foundations
Norway	Personalised aid	Diversified, diaspora groups	Close cooperation between NORAD and Norwegian CSOs; specified grant programmes via sub-granting	Fivilliget (volunteering groups umbrella) support; Bistandstorget (NGDO umbrella organisation) support	NORAD; local fundraising
Poland	Civil Society Organisation initiative	Few CIs with South component	Occasional calls for NGDO tendering by Polish Aid	Grupa Zagranica (representation and support)	Local fundraising

Figure continued…

Spain	Iniziativa ciudana	Activist groups	Regional and local level	Regional NGDO umbrella organisations	Local fundraising; private foundations
Sweden	Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations	Diversified	Close cooperation SIDA with Swedish CSOs; framework agreements; sub-granting; rights-based approach	Forum Syd (support and sub-granting)	Forum Syd; foundations; municipalities (incidental)
Switzerland	Private initiatives or charitable associations	Popular and spread over cantons; few CIs engaged in DEAR activities	Canton and municipalities	Federeseau (umbrella for canton federations); Canton Federations: Fribourg-Solidaire, FGC, FICD, Latitude 21, FOSIT, Valais Solidaire and FEDEVACO	Sub-granting through Canton Federations; foundations; local private donors; municipalities
United Kingdom	Small charities; Small Non-Governmental Development Organisations; Individual projects	16.500 voluntary UK-based CSOs with an international component	DfID: International Service programme; Common Ground Initiatives (DfID – Comic Relief)	Comic Relief (grants); WCVA (Wales representation); NIDOS (Scotland – support); BOND (England – NGDO umbrella organisation)	Big charitable foundations; Common Ground grants scheme for small and diaspora organisations

Figure F1a: list of acronyms

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AFD	French Agency for Development
AGL	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Eine Welt-Landesnetzwerke
ARCS	Arci Cultura e Sviluppi
BBE	Bundesnetzwerk Burgerschaftliches Engagement
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CASIW	Support Unit for International Solidarity Wallonia
CISU	Civil Society in Development Denmark
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DEAR	Development Education and Awareness Raising

DFID	Department for International Development
DMCDD	Danish Mission Council Development Department
DOCHAS	Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organisations
DUF	Danish Youth Council
GER	Guild Europeenne du Raid
HAND	Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid
FORIM	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland
FoRS	Czech Forum for Development Cooperation
KEPA	Umbrella organisation for Finnish Civil Society Organisations
NCDO	Dutch expertise and advisory centre for citizenship and international cooperation
NGDO	Non-Governmental Development Organisation
NIDOS	Network International Development Organisations Scotland
VENRO	German Umbrella of Non-Governmental Development Organisations
WCVA	Wales Council for Voluntary Action

Annex G: Wales for Africa Timeline

Year	Milestones
2006	• In October 2006, the First Minister officially launched Wales' international development programme with the publication of *Wales for Africa: A Framework for Welsh Assembly Government Action on International Sustainable Development* (2006). This framework provided the opportunity for Wales to make a unique contribution towards the Millennium Development Goals. A crucial factor in motivating a Welsh contribution to international development was Oxfam International's Make Poverty History (2005) campaign. In the words of then First Minister for Wales, Rhodri Morgan AM, the programme reflects the people of Wales' "internationalist outlook and their desire to help those elsewhere in the world less fortunate than us".
	• The publication of the Welsh Health Circular (2006) 070 'NHS Wales Health Links with sub-Saharan Africa and other Developing Health Systems' signals the Welsh Government's firm commitment to supporting and the fostering of health links with health providers, universities, trainers, NGOs, international health organisations or governments in sub-Saharan Africa.
2007	• The Gold Star Project is launched at the Senedd to mark UN World Poverty Day on October 17th 2007 by then First Minister for Wales Rhodri Morgan AM and BAWSO Chair Mutale Nyoni. The project supported the development of Welsh organisations, enabling them to build quality and mutually beneficial links with African partners to support the delivery of the MDGs. The first five community links signed up were: o Abergavenny in Monmouthshire and Yirgacheffe in Ethiopia o Brecon in Powys and Molo in Kenya o Crymych in Pembrokeshire and Hlotse in Lesotho o Hay in Powys and Timbuktu in Mali o Pontypridd in Rhondda Cynon Taff and Mbale in Uganda The Gold Star Project developed into Wales for Africa's first flagship programme - Wales Africa Community Links – funded via a grant to the Wales Council for Voluntary Action and aimed at linking communities in a meaningful and impactful way.
	• The first *Wales for Africa* sponsored international conference takes place in Brecon Castle.
	• Wales for Africa funds the Somali Progressive Association to support the Somali community and others in Wales to both contribute towards the MDGs and build their own skills and development.
	• Wales for Africa's International Learning Opportunities programme is launched, which places leaders and managers in public and third sector organisations on 8-week professional assignments in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2007, the programme has delivered over 150 challenging placements, with the focus on enhancing the skills of participants whilst contributing to the SDGs.
	• Monmouthshire Comprehensive becomes Wales' first Fair Trade school.
2008	• The shared learning through collaborative working of the *Wales for Africa* supported community

	links network is refined into the UN Gold Star Framework. The UN recognises this model as "leading the world by example", and announced its support for framework at the UN Hub for Innovative Partnerships, in Geneva, in early 2008. By the first UN Gold Star awards event, the network had grown to 20 community links. UN Gold Star awarded links make a difference. Judged by an independent awards panel, they demonstrate a great contribution to charity, learning, partnership and development, and mutual benefits to the enrichment of both communities in Africa and Wales in one or more of the themes of livelihoods, health, youth, environment and equality.
	• Wales becomes the world's first Fair Trade Nation.
	• The Wales for Africa Grant Scheme is launched.
2009	• Size of Wales / Million Trees project, to collectively conserve an area of tropical forests 'the Size of Wales'. which aimed to plan an area of tropical rainforest the size of Wales
	• In 2009 and 2010, the Farmers Union Wales and the National Farmers Union Cymru sign up to a joint policy to support local and Fair Trade.
	• Wales co-chairs the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD) during the UN Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen. The nrg4SD is an international network of sub-national and regional governments, including Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, Brittany and Mbale. Its main focus is to gain recognition for regional governments at the UN and promote sustainable development on an international level. It is the only global association of regions.
2010	• Stemming from the strong community link between Pontypridd in Wales and the Mbale region in Uganda, the Mbale Territorial Approach to Climate Change (TACC) project is implemented by the UNs Development Programme (UNDP) aimed at adapting to and mitigating the impacts of climate change in Mbale. Technical and development support and expertise for the project is provided by the Welsh Government and the UNDP to help Mbale deliver a climate change action plan, alongside financial support from the Danish Embassy, DfID, and the Global Environment Facility.
	• The Big Food Debate takes place at Abergavenny Food Festival – a platform funded by Wales for Africa which enabled cutting edge global debate on Fair Trade, sustainable food sourcing and climate change issues. Taking part were Welsh Farming Unions, Fair Trade farmers from Africa, Asia and Latin America, representatives from the supermarket industry, public sector procurement and academics – helping to put Wales at the forefront of global debate on Fair Trade and sustainable food issues.
2011	• The Wales-Mbale Million Trees project – developed in conjunction with the Size of Wales programme - is chosen by the UN as one of its 'Lighthouse Projects' at the launch of Momentum for Change at the UNs Climate Change Conference in Durban. Momentum for Change is an initiative spearheaded by the UN Climate Change secretariat to shine a light on the enormous groundswell of activities underway across the globe that are

	moving the world toward a highly resilient, low-carbon future.
	• Laugharne VC Primary School is declared the 500th Fair Trade School in the UK.
	• The Wales International Development Hub is launched.
	• 2011 - Hay-Timbuktu 'Two Towns One World' – Wales' first EU grant for global education work.
2012	• Wales for Africa Health Links is launched. The network harnesses the expertise which exists within the NHS in Wales and partners in disadvantaged communities in Africa.
	• The visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in October 2012 was a fantastic celebration and opportunity for him to see first-hand the work of linking groups in Wales and recognise the work Wales for Africa supports. His visit coincided with the 5th birthday of Wales Africa Community Links. The programme worked across 25 African countries and was the most used online resource on community linking globally. Its legacy continues, and goes from strength to strength under the Hub Cymru Africa collaboration.
	• Wales' relationship with Lesotho – with links in areas such as education, health, governance and civil society – is enriched further through the Lesotho Climate Change Partnership.
2013	• Building from the foundation of the TACC programme, the Welsh Government launches Ten Million Trees, a major carbon offset project which supports farmers in Mbale to plant and preserve trees.
	• The International Learning Opportunities (ILO) programme is streamlined to focus specifically on sending people on work placements to Mbale in Uganda and Lesotho. The Wales for Africa funded ILO programme offers public and voluntary sector workers the opportunity to work for 8 weeks on projects that support Mbale and Lesotho and stretch their personal and professional skills.
2014	• Cardiff University launch the Phoenix Project. Designed to complement the work of Wales for Africa, Cardiff University are working in partnership with the University of Namibia to promote the higher goals of better health and less poverty. The partnership is embedding quality education in focused projects, with all activities based on the needs identified by the University of Namibia. The collaboration is focused on building capacity in Africa and providing opportunities for shared learning and development through training, sharing educational resources, supporting staff, making student exchanges and providing information technology support. The partnership is based on the principle that "educating people to help themselves is the only way to ensure sustainable change" and "helping each other, we learn and grow together".
	• Cathays High School in Cardiff switch their school uniform to Fairtrade cotton after a year-long campaign by students.
	• The First Minister visits Uganda and sees first-hand the work of many Welsh groups working in the Mbale region of Uganda and the mutually beneficial nature of the programme. This included

	a visit to the Fairtrade and Organic certified Gumutindo Coffee Co-operative to see for himself the benefits that Fair Trade brings and planting the 1 millionth tree of the Size of Wales project.
	• The fourth Wales International Development Summit is held in March 2014.
	• Whilst in Uganda, the First Minister launches the extension of Plant! From April 2014, a tree is planted in Wales and Uganda for every child born or adopted in Wales.
	• Following the huge success of the Size of Wales project, a new target of Ten Million Trees is set by our tree planting partners in Uganda to encourage the regeneration of heavily deforested areas of Mbale.
	• The UK International Development Gender Equality Act is passed, which imposes a duty on DfID to consider the gender implications in all of its spending. Wales for Africa is designed to complement the UK development effort, and now all supported projects clearly consider gender issues in their work.
2015	• Hub Cymru Africa is launched in April 2015. It brings together the work of Wales Africa Community Links, the Wales for Africa Health Links Network, the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel, Fair Trade Wales and the Wales International Development Hub. Hub Cymru Africa is a three-year partnership project funded by *Wales for Africa* which supports mutually beneficial links between Wales and Africa, and Fair Trade activities to strengthen, consolidate and raise the profile of international development in Wales.
	• 'Fair Trade is My Business' is launched – a three-year project which recognises the vital role businesses play in using, supporting and promoting Fair Trade.
	• The Well-being of Future Generations Act (Wales) 2015 is passed. Aimed at improving the social, economic and cultural well-being of Wales, it encourages public bodies to think about the long-term and work better with people and communities, and each other, to create a Wales we all want to live in, now and in the future.
	• In 2015 the Millennium Development Goals came to the end of their term, and a post 2015-agenda, comprising 17 Sustainable Development Goals takes their place.
2016	• The world's first country to country twinning – the Dolen–Cymru Wales Lesotho flagship link - celebrates its 30-year anniversary. Wales for Africa funding helps to support a range of Dolen's activities, which include delivering Welsh health professional placements in Lesotho, awareness raising of development issues, capacity building, and International Learning Opportunities.
	• PONT – a community link between Rhondda Cynon Taff and Mbale in Uganda - celebrates 10 years. Over this period, PONT has overseen projects over all MDG areas, and continues to work towards meeting the SDGs.
	• The High Commissioners of Kenya and Tanzania visit Cardiff in March 2016 to discuss Wales' relationship with the East African region, including international development, education and trade links. During their visit, they met with a range of organisations and institutions, including Hub Cymru Africa and the Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel. The visit was viewed to highlight the key role Welsh-African diaspora communities play in Wales' international development sector. According to the Head of Partnership at Hub Cymru Africa: "From within these communities, groups and individuals often play an important role in giving

	back to their local communities in Wales as well as in their country of origin.
•	Wales for Africa celebrates its 10-year anniversary.

Annex H: Wales for Africa Expenditure

Introduction

1. This Annex outlines the Wales for Africa programme's expenditure, from its launch in October 2006 to October 2016, which marked ten years of the programme. The aim is to collate the information, to provide an overview of Wales for Africa's funded activities, forming the basis of discussions on the programme's inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes in Chapters Six and Seven. The objective is to draw together the budget information, so as map out how the programme has developed and where its resources have been focussed. The Annex is structured as follows:

   - the overall programme budget is outlined;
   - projects funded by the programme by financial year are listed alongside an overview of funded activity per annum.

2. Read as a whole, the Annex provides an outline narrative of project activity funded over the first ten years of the programme; forming the basis for the analysis in Chapter Six on **Research Question 3**: *How has Wales for Africa built a political community of practice?* The government's coordination of the small-scale initiatives, as this Annex illustrates, characterises Wales' development sector and what is referred to as a 'Welsh approach' to development assistance. Thus, this Annex also provides contextual information for the analysis in Chapter Six, on **Research Question 4**: *Does the Wales for Africa programme support the strengthening of the citizen as development actor, through encouraging new actors, better interaction with existing structures, or both?*

3. The information in this Annex draws from unpublished Welsh Government monitoring and reporting information (available on request), grant advice, annual reports (WCVA 2013; WG 2015) and web updates. The author was granted access to the government data through her work producing the ten-year report of Wales for Africa (WG 2016b); an advocacy document aimed at celebrating the successes of the programme, launched at a Ministerial event in the Senedd fronted by the First Minister, Carwyn Jones AM.

4. Access to the data on Wales Africa Community Links and Hub Cymru Africa was granted by Hub Cymru Africa, who were keen to promote transparency in process and encourage research on supported activities.

Expenditure: October 2006 to March 2008

5. Figure H-1 sets out the annual programme budget of Wales for Africa from its launch in October 2006 up to financial year (FY) 2016/17 (a financial year covers the period from April to the end of March). The programme was originally implemented with a modest but dedicated funding stream of £500,000, increased incrementally to £860,000 by FY15/16. Up to March 2017, the programme has received £8,225,000 in funding.

Figure H-1: Wales for Africa Programme Budget (FY 2006/07 – FY 2016/17)
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

Financial Year	Budget (£)
October 2006 to March 2007	300,000
April 2007 to March 2008	500,000
April 2008 to March 2009	700,000
April 2009 to March 2010	755,000
April 2010 to March 2011	850,000
April 2011 to March 2012	850,000
April 2012 to March 2013	850,000
April 2013 to March 2014	850,000
April 2014 to March 2015	850,000
April 2015 to March 2016	860,000
April 2016 to March 2017	860,000
Total:	**8,225,000**

6. Since its inception, Wales for Africa has funded a variety of projects. Those listed in Figure H-2 were funded over FY 2007/08 (the budget for FY 2007/08 was £500k plus £300k carried over from FY 2006/07), aimed at attending to the main areas of work outlined at the Wales for Africa Framework (WAG 2006b).

7. The International Learning Opportunities scheme (see Figure H-2, row 4) was established in partnership with Voluntary Service Overseas and managed by Academi Wales (see Chapter Six). The scheme sent public and private sector leaders / managers form Wales on 8-week work placements to public service organisations in sub-Saharan Africa. Anticipated outcomes for participants included that they would expand their skills in leadership, project management, by working in challenging and resource poor environments. There were delays to the scheme, caused largely by the reluctance of managers to release staff. However, the first volunteers left for either Zambia or Cameroon in February 2008.

8. The Gold Star Communities Project (Figure H-2, row 1), the Civil Society Millennium Development Goals Taskforce, managed by the WCVA, was funded to develop community links between Wales and sub-Saharan Africa. To begin with, the WCVA worked with five main community links:

    - Pontypridd / Rhondda Cynon Taf and Mbale, Uganda;
    - Bryn-y-Cwm (Abergavenny) and Yirgacheffe, Ethiopia
    - Brecon and Molo, Kenya
    - Hay-on-Wye and Timbuktu, Mali
    - Crymych (Pembrokeshire) and Hlotse, Lesotho

    As well as these five links however, by January 2008, the WCVA reported that over 30 associate community links were being supported across Wales. The UN Development Programme had also given the project official recognition, which saw a UN representative attend the first 'UN Gold Star Awards' in August 2008.

Figure H-2: Wales for Africa Programme Budget – FY 2007/08
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

Budget £500,000 plus £300,000 (carried over from FY 2006/07)

	Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	WCVA (Civil Society Millennium Development Goals Taskforce)	Gold Star Communities Project	48,000
2	Wales Fair Trade Forum	Fair Trade Country Campaign and Conference	212,073
3	Wales Fair Trade Forum	Fair Trade business support via the Wales Co-Operative Centre	39,000
4	PSMW	International Learning Opportunities (VSO)	217,375
5		Disaster and Emergencies Booklet	
6	Somali Progressive Association		37,450
7	Dolen Cymru	Wales Lesotho Link	38,500
8		Health Links / Hospital Twinning	17,000
9	Welsh International Development Sector Network	Civil Society Organisations – mapping exercise	28,000
10	Welsh International Development Sector Network	Civil Society Organisations – networking and training	10,575
11	St John Cymru Wales	St Johns (Wales and Zambia)	10,130
12	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief / International Health Exchange / Engineers Without Borders	Humanitarian assistance training courses	20,000
13	Welsh Network of Development Researchers	Series of 5 seminars with academics, NGOs and interest groups / individuals	9,900
14	Regeneration Skills Collective Wales	Assessment of level of activity, experience and interest amongst members of institutions in helping to deliver the MDGs in sub-Saharan Africa	21,714
15	Grassroots Theatre Company	Using theatre to assist community development in disadvantaged communities in Wales.	10,000
16	Mencap Cymru / Dolen Cymru	Scoping exercise in support of volunteer placement project.	10,000
17	Engineers for Overseas Development (EFOD) / Saltpeter Trust	10 EFOD student members to assist in building medical centre in Soroti, Uganda.	10,200
18	WAG staff costs		50,000
19	Meeting / events / communications		10,000
	Total funds offered		**799,917**

9. In FY 2007/08 funding was also provided to the Somali Progressive Association (Figure H-2, row 6) to employ a development officer to build links between the Somali community in Wales and communities in Somaliland. The aim was to link the Somali community in Wales with programmes such as the Gold Star Communities Project, health / hospital links and the DFID global school linking scheme. In December 2007, representatives from the Somali Progressive Association travelled to Somaliland to help establish links, receiving a high-profile welcome from the political establishment and the media there (including being met at the airport by the President and his cabinet). Given the diplomatic sensitivities of working in Somaliland, a self-declared state internationally recognised as an autonomous region of Somalia, Wales for Africa officials sought to engage with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the programme developed.

10. Dolen Cymru were also provided with funding in FY 2007/08 (Figure H-2, row 7), partly to support their diversification and create extra capacity to promote their linking activities, particularly in education. Wales for Africa also contributed funds to the health department's work on health links and hospital twinning between Wales and sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure H-2, row 8).

Expenditure: Financial Year 2008/09

11. The three financial years from 2008/09 to 2010/11constituted a new phase of the programme. This saw an increase in the overall budget, from which a grant scheme was established to distribute approximately £200k per year for up to the next three years. Open to any interested parties, and advertised on the Welsh Government's website and across the international development and disaster relief sector in Wales, it was aimed at building the capacity of bodies in Wales, whose international development activities benefit Wales, to help deliver the MDGs. In its first year, the grant scheme sought to support activities that would (policy paper dated 31st January 2008, information available on request):

- encourage international disaster preparedness in Wales and enable and support appropriate volunteering at times of disaster;
- support diaspora communities in Wales in their efforts to respond to international disasters in their homeland;
- build the capacity of small Welsh development NGO's and aid the co-ordination of the sector as a whole in order to strengthen Wales' impact on MDG delivery; and
- build effective links between communities in Wales and sub-Saharan Africa.

12. Launched at the end of 2007, fifty-eight grant applications were received for the scheme, requesting a total of £3.1m from the grant fund. Funding of around £240k (from the budget of £700k) was awarded to the projects listed in Figure H-3. This included the continued funding of the Gold Star Communities Project (Figure H-3, row 1) to develop community links between Wales and sub-Saharan Africa. Wales for Africa worked closely with the Wales Civil Society Millennium Development Goals Taskforce (managed by the WCVA) in partnership with BUILD UK, to develop this project, which supported civil society-led partnerships to take actions in support of the MDGs in partner African communities, and promote mutual community development and learning. It had ambitious growth plans to link up to 150 communities in Wales with up to 150 communities in Africa over the next three years. The First Minister presented the first Gold Star awards to successful communities at the National Eisteddfod on the 4th August 2008.

13. The WCVA also received funding for the 'Going for Gold' scheme (Figure H-3, row 2) which provided small grants for communities signed up to the Gold Star Communities Project. The small grants helped facilitate the training and development of community coordinators, aimed at mobilising the involvement of the wider community and stimulating exchanges between Welsh and African communities.

14. In addition, Small and Medium Development Organisations in Wales (SMIDOS) received funding to increase the skills, capacity and joint working of small and medium international development organisations in Wales. Aimed at encouraging these organisations to network with each other and with larger international development organisations, the funding also assisted with helping these organisations to share information and link to other development initiatives in

Wales. Activities were also targeted at developing capabilities in income generation and at encouraging more, and more effective, activity in Wales contributing towards the delivery of the MDGs.

Figure H-3: Wales for Africa Grant Scheme - FY 2008/09
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project		Amount (£)
1	WCVA	Gold Star Communities Project		69,743
2	WCVA	Gold Star – 'Going for Gold' Grant Scheme		40,000
3	Small and Medium International Development Organisations in Wales (SMIDOS)	Capacity Building Project	(FY 08/09)	39,709
			(FY 09/10)	34,528
4	Somali Progressive Association	Capacity building to support fledgling links.		26,000
5	Bees for Development Trust	Beekeeping Information Portal		24,200
6	Hope for Grace Kodindo	Making Birth Safer		10,000
7	Mencap Cymru	Lesotho Volunteer Project		10,000
8	Development Studies Association	Wales for Africa Seminars		7,000
9	British International Search and Rescue Dogs	Chainsaw and rope rescue training		6,766
10	Dolen Cymru	Publicity / awareness Raising Campaign		2,000
11	Cynnal Cymru – Sustain Wales	Booklet and interactive webpages.		7,809
	Total funds offered:			**243,277**

15. The grant scheme did not include projects focussed primarily on fair trade, which were funded separately. Funding was committed to the campaign to make Wales the world's first Fair Trade Country, coordinated by the Wales Fair Trade Forum. A conference aimed at putting Wales at the centre of international debate on fair trade and celebrating Wales' Fair Trade Country status was held in June 2008. In addition, a secondee (see Chapter Six) worked with Value Wales (the government's procurement division) to ensure the advice on procuring fair trade goods to the public sector accounted for best practice in the area. Funding was also provided to the Wales Co-operative Centre to employ a development specialist to work with employers in Wales to encourage them to switch to fair trade and provide advice to ethical and fair trade businesses.

Expenditure: Financial Year 2009/10

16. The second round of awards under the Wales for Africa Grant Scheme were granted in FY 2009/10. In total, 56 grant applications were received requesting a total of £1.9m from a grant fund of £280k from the overall Wales for Africa budget of £755k. Approximately £270k was awarded to 13 projects in FY 2009/10 (see Figure H-5).

17. This included a third year of funding for the Somali Progressive Association to develop links between Wales and Somaliland. The grant was aimed at strengthening the organisational arrangements, including drawing together a partnership committee from across the Somali community and relevant organisations. The funds were also designed to help the Association develop volunteering opportunities for Somali community members in Somaliland and Wales, whilst encouraging Somalis and non-Somalis in Wales to contribute towards the delivery of the MDGs in Somaliland, and help build the skills of the Somali community in Wales.

18. Funding was also provided for the activities of Fair Trade Wales. This included work to support and increase the numbers of Fairtrade Schools in Wales, and to help sustain the awareness and growth of the Fair Trade movement amongst communities and other organisations. Funding was also awarded aimed at increasing the numbers of businesses using Fair Trade products and applying Fair Trade policies to ultimately benefit the greatest number of Fair Trade producers /

farmers. In addition, a grant (Figure H-4, row 13) supported a Fairtrade debate during the Hay Festival in Wales.

19. Funding was also provided to support monitoring and evaluation activities. A grant was awarded to the Wales for Zambia Consortium (Figure H-4, row 7) aimed at establishing a common framework / protocol for the monitoring and reporting of activities for four Welsh organisations working on development projects in Zambia. The objective was to enable these organisations to better guide and assess the effectiveness of their work, whilst also assisting them to build links with each other and with other development organisations in Wales. A grant was also provided to the Southern Ethiopia Gwent Healthcare Link (Figure H-4, row 9.) aimed at evaluating the effect of healthcare workers from Wales of working in Ethiopia and the subsequent contribution they make to Wales in light of their experiences.

Figure H-4: Wales for Africa Grant Scheme - FY 2009/10)
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	Somali Progressive Association	Wales – Somaliland Link Partnership	60,000
2	Fair Trade Wales	Fair Trade Wales Activities	56,500
3	Wales Co-operative Centre	Fair Trade for Business	40,000
4	Bees for Development	Africa – Wales Honey and Beeswax Trade Project	33,000
5	General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) Wales	Engineering Training – Mbale Workshop Project	20,000
6		Hope for Zimbabwe	15,000
7	Wales for Zambia Consortium	Monitoring and Evaluation Project – Zambia	10,000
8	Engineers for Overseas Development	Soroti Orphanage Construction Project	10,000
9	Southern Ethiopia Gwent Healthcare Link	Health Workers Partnership	8,000
10		Fairtrade Coffee Co-operative Business Support and Producer / Consumer Links	7,000
11	Love Zimbabwe	Wales World Trade Fair event	5,000
12	RedR	Disaster Relief Training courses and International Development Conference	3,000
13		Fairtrade Debate – Hay Festival	1,000
	Total funds offered:		**268,500**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2010/11

20. Eight grants were awarded under the Wales for Africa Grant Scheme in FY 2010/11 (see Figure H-5). This included continued funding for SMIDOS and for Fair Trade Wales activities. Funding for The Big Food Debate enabled an international summit to be held alongside the Abergavenny Food Festival as a platform for debate on Fair Trade, sustainable food sourcing and climate change issues.

21. In addition to those activities funded via the grant scheme, funding was again provided to the WCVA for the Wales Africa Communities Links project (Figure H-7). This project was developed in partnership between the Wales Civil Society MDG Task Force and Building Understanding through International Development (BUILD) and was continuing to grow. By FY 2010/11 over 160 development projects aimed at helping to deliver the MDGs in Africa and promoting mutual development and learning had been supported. The projects focused on 5 main topics (or 'gold stars'). Namely: health; livelihoods; the environment; children / youth; and social harmony. The Wales Africa Communities Links project provided advice, networking and one-to-one support for community links, and a small grant scheme to help facilitate exchanges and project activities.

22. Funding continued for the International Learning Opportunities programme (Figure H-6, row 2). Placements were provided in one of four countries: Cameroon; Lesotho; Uganda; or Zambia.

23. Seventy-five thousand pounds was allocated to the Territorial Approach to Climate Change Project: Wales-Mbale, Uganda (Figure H-6, row 3). This was delivered in association with the UNDP, DFID and the Danish International Development Agency. The project was aimed at using Welsh expertise to help Mbale develop a climate change action plan to help Mbale identify what actions were necessary for them to access international funding streams for this work in the future. The funding was allocated to support the engagement of Welsh experts in the programme and increase their skills and expertise in climate change issues.

24. Funding was also provided to the Wales for Africa Health Links group to support an annual conference for Wales – Africa Health Links and the production of an annual report highlighting their achievements (Figure H-6, row 10). It also facilitated a research exercise to evaluate the benefits of Wales-Africa health links (Figure H-6, row 10).

Figure H-5: Wales for Africa Grant Scheme - FY 2010/11
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Funded Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1		The Big Food Debate – Fair Trade, Sustainable Food and Climate Change	50,000
2	Small and Medium International Development Organisations in Wales (SMIDOS)	Advice, training and one-to-one support to mall-medium international development groups in Wales	40,000
3	Fair Trade Wales	Fair Trade Wales Activities	36,000
4	Tools for Self-Reliance Cymru	Fair Trade Tools	10,000
5		Hay Festival – Kenya Education Link	10,000
6	Engineers for Overseas Development	Young engineers to take part in building projects in Uganda.	10,000
7		Fairtrade Coffee Co-operative Business Support and Producer-Consumer Links, Uganda	8,700
8	Engineers Without Borders	Humanitarian/disaster relief training courses	7,000
	Total funds offered:		**171,700**

Figure H-6: Other Expenditure under Wales for Africa - FY 2010/11
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Funded Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	WCVA	Wales Africa Community Links	173,500
2		International Learning Opportunities	148,586
3		Territorial Approach to Climate Change	75,000
4	Somali Progressive Association	Wales - Somaliland Communities Link Partnership	60,000
5		Dolen Cymru - Wales Lesotho Link	55,000
6		Fair Trade Wales National Coordinator	50,000
7		Fair Trade for Business	30,000
8		UNIDO - Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs	25,000
9		Meetings / events / communications	26,214
10		Wales for Africa Health Links support	18,000
11		Africa-Wales Honey and Beeswax Trade Project	17,000
	Total:		**678,300**

Wales Africa Health Links Grant 2010-11

25. A separate grant fund (£50k) (see Figure H-8) was available from the Welsh Government's Department for Public Health and Health Professionals to increase the number and impact of hospital / health linking work between Wales and Africa.

26. As outlined in the *Welsh Health Circular (2006) 070* (WAG 2006b), Local Health Boards in Wales are required to demonstrate commitment to the MDGs by fostering health links with health providers, universities, trainers, NGO's, international health organisations or governments in sub-Saharan Africa within their stated goals (WAG 2006c, p. 3). NHS professional development policies were amended "to allow visits, secondments, exchanges and the management of projects to be recognised as one of the [professional development] options allowed to NHS employees". The mutual benefit aspect of health linking was framed in part as an acknowledgement of the

contribution staff recruited from overseas make to Wales. In acknowledgement of this saving, the initiative is aimed at encouraging the NHS in Wales to expand its work in partnership with health care providers and trainers in developing countries to improve health care in their countries (WAG 2006c, p. 3); and the Wales for Africa Framework includes a recommendation that the public sector should be supported to create links with their counterparts in African developing countries (WAG 2006b).

27. The grant funding for the Wales Africa Health Links Grant Scheme required demonstration of addressing one or more of these MDGs:

- MDG 4 Reduce child mortality by two-thirds for children under five;
- MDG 5 Improve maternal health; and
- MDG 6 combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

Figure H-7: Wales for Africa Health Links Grant Scheme – FY 2010/11
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Health Link	Amount (£)
1	Ethiopia Links Project	3,226
2	Medics4Timbuktu	3,000
3	Upgrading of Mbale Regional Referral Hospital Casualty Department	6,000
4	Emergency Response Ambulance Service (Mbale, Uganda)	5,000
5	Reproductive Health Link (Sierra Leone)	4,400
6	Professional Nurse Development Programme	6,400
7	Zimbabwe Health Training Support Network	5,000
	Southern Ethiopia Health Link	4,500
8	HM Stanley Link Project	5,000
9	Hope for Grace Kodino	4,000
	Total:	**46,526**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2011/12

28. In FY 2011-12 the grant was increased from £50,000 to £100,000. Eleven different projects were supported by the programme (see Figure H-8).

Figure H-8: Wales for Africa Grant Scheme - FY 2011/12
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Funded Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	Fair Do's	Interactive learning sessions with schools	4,930
2	PONT	Appointment of project manager for PONT	15,800
3	Tools for Self-Reliance Cymru	Fair Trade Tools programme	7,000
4	Two Towns One World	Community link between Hay and Timbuktu - appointment of a full-time co-ordinator	16,270
5	Safer Birth in Chad Foundation	Funding for French speaking volunteer to interpret for British midwives in Chad	6,108
6	TWIN	Volunteer placement to provide advice to Gumutindo Coffee Cooperative in Mbale, Uganda	5,800
7	Money for Madagascar	Update website to encourage further participation in the charity	3,700
8	Jump4Timbaktu	Scrutinising activities	13,800
9	Fair Trade Wales	Funding pool for mini grants of between £200 to £500 for Fair Trade groups around Wales	21,000
10	Fair Trade Wales	Increase visibility of Fair Trade and promote Wales as a Fair Trade nation	40,000
11	Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel	Work with diaspora groups in Wales	4,900
	Total funds offered:		**103,308**

29. Funding of £50,000 was agreed from the health budget for 2011-12 to foster health links between the health service in Wales and their counterparts in sub-Saharan

Africa. This funding was matched by the Wales for Africa programme, and eleven grants were awarded. These are listed in Figure H-9.

Figure H-9: Wales for Africa Health Links Grant Scheme – FY 2011/12
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Health Link	Amount (£)
1	Wrexham Maelor Hospital Yirga Alem Link (Ethiopia)	5,000
2	Wales Somaliland Communities Link	9,800
3	Quithing Ysbytu Gwynedd Health Link (Lesotho)	8,870
4	University of Sierra Leone / Cardiff University Partnership and Life for African Mothers	9,320
5	Ethiopia Link (BCUHB)	5,550
6	Cardiff-Makerere Malaria Project (Uganda)	13,355
7	Powys-Molo Health Partnership (Kenya)	13600
8	Healthy School and Communities (Pembrokeshire / Zanzibar)	10,000
9	Cwm Taf Mbale Hospital Link (Uganda)	5,330
10	Southern Ethiopia Gwent Healthcare Link	5,000
11	PONT Cwm Taf – Mbale Primary Health Care Link (Uganda)	14,225
	Total:	**100,000**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2012/13

Figure H-10: Wales for Africa Expenditure – FY 2012/13
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	WCVA	Wales for Africa Community Links	268,000
2	Fair Trade Wales	Fair Trade Nation	140,800
3		International Learning Opportunities	152,399
4		TACC - University of Glamorgan	50,500
5		TACC - Participants	21,700
6		Lesotho and Uganda	33,600
7	Bees for Development		16,009
8	EFOD		10,000
9		Health Links Grants	46,500
10		Health Links Network	10,900
11	WCIA	International Development Hub	79,000
12	ELRHA	Funding for Wales humanitarian training	16,000
13		Hay on Wye	16,300
	Total:		**861,708**

Wales Africa Health Links Grant 2012-13

30. In November 2011, Ministerial approval was granted to continue the Wales Africa Health Links grant scheme over the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. Funding of £50,000 for each of these years was agreed from the health budget, which was match funded by the Wales for Africa programme, thereby giving a total allocation of £100,000. Whilst grants were previously awarded for one year only, to assist in planning, a proportion of the funding was offered for a three-year period. In FY 2012/13 (see Figure H-11):

- approximately £25,000 was allocated for three-year projects; and
- approximately £75,000 for one-year projects.

31. Legal services provided advice on the relevant powers, found in section 1 of the National Health Service Act (Wales) Act 2006 together with section 70 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (GOWA 2006):

- Section 1 requires the Welsh Ministers to continue the promotion in Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical

and mental health of the people of Wales and in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness.

- Section 70 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 provides that Welsh Ministers may give financial assistance (including a grant) to any person engaged in any activity which the Welsh Minsters consider will secure or help secure the attainment of any objective which they aim to attain in the exercise of any of their functions. These are powers of the Welsh Ministers

Figure H-11: Wales for Africa Health Links Grant Scheme - FY 2012/13
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Health Link	Amount (£)
1	Zambia Wales Health Collaboration *(funding year 1 of 3)*	6,000
2	Ethiopia Link *(funding year 1 of 3)*	5,000
3	PONT Cwm Taf – Mbale CAP Health Link *(funding year 1 of 2)*	12,000
4	Hay2Timbuktu *(funding year 1 of 3)*	7,980
5	Yirga Alem – H M Stanley VISION 2020 Eye Link	6,000
6	Advocacy for Mothers of Africa	6,000
7	Midwives Ethiopia	15,000
8	Zimbabwe Health Training Support	10,000
9	Sierra Leone to Velindre Cancer Centre	10,000
10	The Swansea Gambia Link Clinical Skills Training Initiative	10,000
11	PONT	5,000
	Total:	**92,980**

Note: Allocated funding split between Health budget and Wales for Africa programme budget.

Figure H-12: Wales Africa Community Links - FY 2012/13
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project Title	Amount (£)
1	Foundation for Refugee Education (FREd) Ltd	Anlo Afiadenyigba - Newport ICT and School-linking Project	1,953

2	Itala Foundation	Science Teaching Development, Early Years School Provision	2,550
3	African Mothers Foundation International	International Exchange Visits Grant	2,000
4	Treeflights	Bore - 100 Families Alternative Livelihoods Programme	2,837
5	The Daily Hope Foundation	Global Health Initiative Ghana (Kwahu) 2012	1,600
6	Theatre versus Oppression	Applied Theatre In Action - New Hope Theatre	2,000
7	Help a Rwandan Person	Exchange visit – Rwandan counterpart to visit Swansea	1,500
8	Love Zimbabwe	Chinamhora Community Centre Development & Producer Training	2,000
9	Hayaat Women Trust	Women Empowerment Link	2,000
10	Wales Millennium Centre	Migration Project	2,000
11	Valley and Vale Community Arts Ltd	Gemini Sussed	4,600
12	Wales Liberia Connect	Building Partnership	1,850
13	Bigger Heart	Education Improvement	1,910
14	Hands Up For Uganda	Kisaabwa Project	1,985
15	Diverse Cymru	DWA Seven Project Network	5,000
16	RCMA Social Enterprise	Roots and Shoots	1,875
17	Dolen Llanbrynmair	Enhancing Technical Education	1,000
18	Safer Wales	Riverside Al Fat'h Community Link up	3,991
19	Caerleon Comprehensive School	School - NGO Link Project	1,997
20	Treeflights	Bore alternative Livelihoods	2,837
21	Africa Greater Life Mission	Extending The Link	1,000
22	TFSR Cymru	Improved Tools Link	3,600
23	Derek Turnbull	Computer School Project	1,455
24	Cardiff-Freetown Rugby League Community Partnership	the Cardiff Freetown Rugby League Bridge	2,000
25	Dolen Ffermio	Ngora Photo Project	2,000
26	Hazina	IT and School Project	2,000
27	Dolen Cymru (Wales - Lesotho Link)	New Partnership	1,925
28	Hands Up For Uganda	Kisaabwa solar	10,000

29	Love Zimbabwe	Solar	4,000
30	Green Links Community Interest Company	Skills Exchange	1,700
31	Treeflights	Bore Women's Forest Project	10,000
32	Help a Rwandan Person	Vocational Training Project	2,500
33	PONT	Busimba Primary School HEP Project	9,985
34	Women 4 Resources Zimbabwe link	Listening to Chomzangari	1,400
35	Positive Women	Tools 4 Life: Building Better Futures	2,000
36	Sazani Associates	CASA Rural Solar Hubs	10,000
37	Labata Fantalle Cymru	Solar Water Generation	1,860
38	Gobaith I Ethiopia - Hope for Ethiopia	Youth Training Workshop	1,805
39	Labata Fantalle Cymru	Community Forestry Grant	2,947
40	Discovery - Student Volunteering Swansea	Sharing Skills Project	4,000
41	Mothers Of Africa	Health Through Art	1,990
42	Red Cafe (a project of Linden Church Trust)	Exchange visit	2,000
43	Wrexham Community Choir	One Voice project	2,000
	Total:		**131,648**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2013/14

32. The budget for FY 2013/14 was a baseline of £850k (see Figure H-13). The funding was aimed at developing the Wales for Africa programme by focusing the financial support on networks and projects that complemented existing programmes of work. In addition, the funding of activities continued to move towards an emphasis on two geographical areas – Eastern Uganda and Lesotho where possible – whilst continuing to support civil society activity elsewhere through the networks. There

was also a greater focus on the monitoring and evaluation of the programme in an effort to draw out data on outcomes and impact.

Figure H-13: Wales for Africa Programme Expenditure – FY 2013/14
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	Size of Wales	Size of Wales Project	37,500
2	Size of Wales	10 Million Trees Project	50,000
3		Wales for Africa Health Links	70,000
4		Bees for Development	20,000
5		Lesotho	55,000
6		Wales for Africa Health Links Grants	50,000
7	Bridges and Links to Leadership (consortium bid from Dolen Cymru and Lesotho)	International Learning Opportunities	130,000
8	WCVA	Wales for Africa Community Links	208,000
9	Fair Trade Wales		130,400
	Total:		**750,900**

33. New funding for FY 2013/14 included activities coordinated by the Size of Wales project (Figure H-13, rows 1 and 2). Here, the funding was split by the Wales for Africa programme to fulfil two functions:

1) *The Size of Wales Project*: The Waterloo Foundation funded Size of Wales project raised £2m between 2010 and 2013 to protect 2m hectares of tropical rainforest. This included funding for the Mbale Million Trees project, along with eight others. The Waterloo Foundation decided to focus their funding on land rights issues, and approached the Welsh Government, with the support of the Sustainable Futures Commissioner, for the government to take over the administration of the Wales element of the project which raises the funds and engages the Welsh public in behavioural change activity through work with schools and on social media. This strand of the work was joint funded between

Wales for Africa and the Sustainable Behaviour Change Team in the then Department of environment and Sustainable Development.

2) *The 10 Million Trees Project*: The Size of Wales Million Trees Project was significantly scaled up to the 10 Million Trees Project, which aims to plant 10m trees in Mbale. The £50k of Wales for Africa funding directly contributed to the employment of the core support team for the project, so that monies raised through Size of Wales fundraising could be spent directly on planting trees. The anticipated benefits for Wales were framed in terms of: volunteering opportunities for people from Wales to engage in the project by visiting and engaging in the work and by hosting visitors to Wales from the project; and the communications from the project through the social media channels of Twitter, Facebook and blogs being used to change behaviour.

34. Funding was also provided to projects in Lesotho, allocated to help progress the climate change partnership agreed between Wales and Lesotho in 2012, build additional government to government links and engage with NGOs in Wales and Lesotho (Figure H-13, rows 5 and 7).

35. There was a decrease in funding for the International Learning Opportunities programme, as elements were brought in house. A new contract for the programme was awarded in FY 2013/14 to Bridges and Links to Leadership, a consortium bid between Dolen Cymru and PONT (Figure H-13, row 7).

36. Funding for Wales Africa Health Links remained at £100,000 in FY 2013/14. This included £25,000 which had already been allocated to three-year projects in FY 2012/13 (ie. projects now in year 2 of 3), leaving a total of £75,000 additional funds to be allocated in 2013/14. The extra money was designed to make the network a more strategic operation, learning from the example set by the development of Wales Africa Community Links, whilst they worked to obtain charitable status. It was decided to split the total into £25,000 for two-year projects and £50,000 for one-year projects.

Figure H-14: Wales Africa Health Links Grant Scheme - FY 2013/14
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Health Link	Amount (£)
1	Zambia Wales Health Collaboration *(funding year 2 of 3)*	6,000
2	Ethiopia Link *(funding year 2 of 3)*	5,000
3	PONT Cwm Taf – Mbale CAP Health Link *(funding year 2 of 2)*	6,000
4	Hay2Timbuktu *(funding year 2 of 3)*	8,495
5	Gambia-Swansea Vision 2020 link *(1 year of funding)*	11,670
6	Midwives@Ethiopia *(1 year of funding)*	15,000
7	Yirga Alem/ Stanley Eye Unit Vision 2020 Link *(funding year 1 of 2)*	6,248
8	Powys Molo Health Link (Birth Attendants) *(funding year 1 of 2)*	10,000
	Total:	**92,980**

Figure H-15: Wales Africa Community Links – FY 2013/14
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project Title	Amount (£)
1	EFOD	Kachumbala Widows	1,500
2	ABESU	Mid Project Review	2,000
3	Gift of Grace Project	Education Project	2,000
4	RCMA Social Enterprise	Growing Together	3,820

5	Volunteer to Change	Solo Forest Conservation Project	1,085
6	Global Love Youth Trust	Solar Youth	1,970
7	St Davids Matsieng Link Group	Exchange Visit	2,000
8	Friends of Monze	Partnership Visit	2,000
9	Zimele UK	Developing Swayimane Link	2,000
10	Africa Greater Life Mission	Bulabakulu Children's Village 2014 Progression - Broadening the link	1,482
11	Hands Up For Uganda	Broadening involvement in the Kisaabwa Project	2,000
12	Hayaat Women Trust	Diaspora skills exchange promoting Health Education among women & delivering First Aid maternal heal	3,770
13	Zimbabwe Newport Volunteering Association	Mufakose Community Games: Inspiring Community Youth cohesion through sports linking	2,000
14	Valley and Vale Community Arts Ltd	"Girl Talk" - Gender Equality Project	1,975
15	Brecon Molo Community Partnership	Knowledge exchange developing health services for disabled children to promote education and inclusion	4,000
16	TFSR Cymru	Extending Welsh training and Tools Exchanges to rural Tanzanian villages	2,000
17	Anza	Kauli's women's livelihoods programme and Cardiff Baccalaureate learning	2,500
18	Midwives@Ethiopia	Link development and sharing midwifery skills teaching for Health Extension workers	2,000
19	RCT Young People First	A Better World for All – no one left behind	2,000
20	Acacia Partnership Trust	Kawtal - Llanederyn/Gorom-Gorom Partnership	1,999
21	RCMA Social Enterprise	Cultivating Enterprise	3,850
22	South East Wales Racial Equality Council	Thrive Gambia - Wales	1,815
23	Safer Wales	Riverside Al Fat'h Community Link Up	2,000
24	Bigger Heart	School Library Project Kizimkazi, Zanzibar	1,600
25	Hazina	Human Impact of Climate Change in Africa	3,500

26	Friends of Bedwas High School Association - Kenya	Kikambala School and Community Project	1,800
27	Disability in Wales and Africa	Disability Networking in Kenya	5,000
28	Zimbabwe Newport Volunteering Association	Community regeneration through Sports Links	3,000
	Total:		**66,666**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2014/15

Figure H-16: Wales for Africa Programme Expenditure – FY 2014/15
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project	Amount (£)
1	WCVA	Wales Africa Community Links	202,186
2	Fair Trade Wales		130,400
3		International Development Hub	75,000
4		Size of Wales	137,476
5		Health Links Network	55,500
		Health Links Grant	50,000

7	Mbale Technical Assistance	23,346
8	International Learning Opportunities	113,144
	Bees for Development	16,198
9	Projects in Lesotho	8,503
	Welsh Centre for International Affairs (Wales Africa Partnership)	14,500
	Promotional activity, learning and development	5,917
10	Sub-Saharan Advisory Panel	19,875
Total:		**852,045**

Figure H-17: Wales for Africa Health Links Grant Scheme - FY 2014/15
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Health Link	Amount (£)
1	Zambia Wales Health Collaboration	6,000
2	Glan Clwyd – Hossanna Link	5,000
3	Yirga Alem / Stanley Eye Unit Vision 2020 link	6,718
4	Powys Molo Health Link	10,000
5	Hay2Timbuktu	8,525
6	PONT	5,200
7	Care for Uganda	15,000
8	Uganda Wales Health Protection Partnership	5,500
9	Quithing Health Link	11,790
10	National Health Training Centre – Bangor University	2,500

11	Velindre Sierra Leone Cancer Care	12,500
12	Interburns Training Centre (ITC) Africa	6,267
13	Midwives@Ethiopia	5,000
	Total:	**100,000**

Figure H-18: Wales Africa Community Links - FY 2014/15
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation	Project Title	Amount (£)
1	Sazani Associates	Rural Solar Hubs for Inclusion	5,000
2	Theatre versus Oppression	Applied theatre project - exchange of skills and performance	3,000
3	Brynycwm Yirgacheffe Community Link	Two Towns Trading Community Coffee Link	2,615
4	Swansea University	Engineering Student Expedition to Zambia 2014	-
5	L'Arche Brecon	Outward Bound	2,000

6	Rising Star Orphans	Rising Star Orphanage in Kitale, Kenya	1,500
7	ABESU	Next Steps to Sustainability	2,000
8	Dolen Ffermio	Ngora Community Solar Power project	8,000
9	Seeds for the Future (Lesotho)	Support for Community Development	2,000
10	Zimele UK	Abergavenny Cultural and Craft Exchange	3,071
11	Treeflights	Rooting for Change - Trees for Schools Programme	500
12	South People's Project SoPPro	Objective 2015 Caravan	-
13	Global Love Youth Trust	Key to Growth	2,000
14	Brecon Molo Community Partnership	Improving Health and Participation Through APT	4,000
15	Hazina	Light at Bangalala Secondary School	7,150
16	African Innovation Prize	Venture Exchange	2,000
17	Hayaat Women Trust	Mental Health Training	2,750
18	Love Zimbabwe	Chinamhora Tree for Life project	4,000
19	Anza	Feminine Health Programme	3,885
20	Hands Up For Uganda	Capacity Building & Skills Development in Kisaabwa	2,000
21	Valley and Vale Community Arts Ltd	Cultural Connections Project	3,350
22	Hazina	Access to Education	2,039
23	University of Wales Bangor	Exchange Visit	2,000
24	South East Wales Racial Equality Council	Tanka Tanka Psychiatric Hospital Visitor Centre	2,000
25	Positive Women	Tools for Life	2,000
	Total:		**68,860**

Expenditure: Financial Year 2015/16

Figure H-19: Wales for Africa Programme Expenditure – FY 2015/16
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

Organisation	Project	Amount

			(£)
1	WCIA Wales Africa Partnership	Hub Cymru Africa	565,000
2		Size of Wales	88,500
3		ILO programme	110,000
4		PLANT!	25,000
5		Projects in Lesotho	15,000
	Total:		**803,500**

37. Hub Cymru Africa was established on April 1st 2015 and brings together the work of Wales Africa Community Links, the Wales for Africa Health Links Network, the Sub Saharan Advisory Panel, Fair Trade Wales and the Wales International Development Hub.

38. In 2015 nine health links were funded. These grants involved health professionals from 5 Health Boards in Wales reaching 8 countries in Africa.

39. There are currently 24 active health links registered with the Wales for Africa Health Links Network involving hundreds of health professionals across Wales. These links comprise of Welsh Health Boards, hospitals and charities that are committed to supporting health care improvements in their link African countries. They also contribute a significant amount of voluntary time and personal fundraising efforts to support their work. The Welsh Government grants have often acted as a catalyst for health links to acquiring further grants from other donors. The activities of these links benefit Wales by providing unique opportunities for Welsh health professionals to:

- build their confidence and leadership skills in a highly engaging and practical way;
- practice their teaching and training skills;
- learn how to adapt and generate ideas for health service delivery with very limited resources;
- learn how to provide healthcare for people from different backgrounds and cultures, with different languages and needs;

- gain direct experience of global diseases and health problems that may also threaten Wales/ the UK; and,
- gain a renewed sense of positivity and optimism about what can be achieved in health service delivery in Wales.

40. The previous Minister for Health and Social Services agreed (SF/FM/2484/14 refers) to allocate £50,000 to the Wales for Africa Health Links Grant Scheme in each of 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18 financial years from the health and social services budget. This funding was agreed as a part of the Wales for Africa programme and is ring-fenced for support to NHS Wales – Africa health link projects.

41. The First Minister also agreed, for the same financial years, that £50,000 would be allocated and ring-fenced from the Wales for Africa budget for health-related projects. This gives a total allocation of £100k for health-related projects. The Wales for Africa Grant, which includes the health scheme component, is administered by Hub Cymru Africa.

Figure H-20: FY 15/16: Hub Cymru Africa grants
Source: Welsh Government policy papers, available on request

	Organisation Name	Project Title	Amount Awarded (£)
1	Abergele Fairtrade Committee	Fairtrade Big Breakfast	100
2	Acacia Partnership	Kawtal Market Gardening Research	1,000
3	Ammanford Fair Trade	Unfair Funfair	1,000

	Group		
4	Anglesey Fairtrade Partnership	Masnach Deg Ynys Moin	180
5	Anza Entrepreneurs	Be the Change	4,900
6	Bangor University	Supporting the development of Sustainability work-stream at MUK	12,300
7	Barry Town Council	Fairtrade Promotion	700
8	Bees for Development	Money from honey in Mbale, Uganda	14,712
9	Carmarthenshire County Council	Fair enough? Digon teg?	1,000
10	Clynfyw Community Interest Company	Wheelie Good Idea	1,000
11	Community Carbon Link	Half a Million Trees for Kenyan Schools (HMT)	15,000
12	Crymych-Hlotse Lesotho Community Link Committee	Revival of Community Link, forged in 2008 through UN Gold Star Community Links Programme	1,000
13	Disability in Wales and Africa	Disabled Volunteers in Wales Africa	2,000
14	Dolen Ffermio	Ngora Community solar power project phase 2	14,778
15	Fair Do's / Siopa Teg	Every Time a Person in Wales buys Fair Trade a producer benefits	1,000
16	Fair Trade Cardiff	From sweatshop to Fairtrade	940
17	Fair Trade In Football Campaign	Fair trade in Football Campaign	1,000
18	Fairtrade Hay	The True Cost of Fashion	400
19	Faith in Families Clase Family Centre	Information Sharing Event	550
20	Georgetown Boys and Girls Club	Georgetown Upcycle Fashion Show	250
21	Georgetown Boys and Girls Club	Christmas Carol	250
22	Giakonda IT Ltd	Equipping schools with computers	5,000
23	Global Love Youth Trust	Keyhole to clean communities	4,052
24	Hay2Timbuktu	Student2Student Hay2Timbuktu	3,000
25	Hijinx	Able to Act: Lesotho	4,700
26	Niokolo Network	Capacity building for the production and distribution of	1,000

		official-language training films for conversation and international development	
27	Phoebe Davies Household	Bafazi Khulumane	1,000
28	PONT	A North-South partnership for empowerment through income generating small groups	14,941
29	Size of Wales	Attending COP21	1,000
30	Stop Climate Chaos Cymru	Save the planet, it's the only one with chocolate	1,000
31	SUSSED Wales	Raise awareness of Fairtrade and social justice	939
32	The Nature Foundation	Ocean Motion	3,000
33	The SAFE Foundation	Map the gap - gender equality in education	113
34	Tools for Self Reliance Cymru	"Supporting Village Clusters"	15,000
35	Valley & Vale Community Arts	Make it Happen 2	14,809
36	Wales Deaf Rugby Union		1,000
37	Weedon Household	World Heritage Orphans & Vulnerable Children's Project (WHOVC)	1,000
38	Ysgol Esgob Morgan		1,000
39	Zimele UK		15,000
	Funded health projects		
40	Care for Uganda	VHT training in Luwero District	15,000
41	Dolen Cymru	Delivering Mental Health Training in Lesotho using WHO mhGAP	910
42	Ethiopia Link Glan Clwyd - Hossan Link	The three pronged project	5,000
43	Glasbey Household	Foundation in Audit and Research Skills Course	1,000
44	Hayaat Women Trust	Scaling up care intervention for mental health disorders in Somaliland	13,300
45	Hazina	Health Worker for Children with Disabilities in Bangalata Village- Phase 1 - Preparatory Work	2,500
46	Hywel Dda University Health Board		1,000
47	Interburns	Improving national burn care	15,000

		and prevention in Ghana	
48	Midwives@Ethiopia	Strengthening Training of Health Extension Workers (HEWs and Midwives in SNNPR, Ethiopia.	15,000
49	SaddleAid	SaddleAid/SMMMS scoping visit(s)	5,000
50	Shine Cymru	Saving lives and improving futures!	3,880
51	Velindre NHS Trust	South Wales - Sierra Leona Cancer Care Link	15,000
	Total:		**254,204**