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Patient safety incidents in primary care dentistry in England and Wales: mixed methods study

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1 Patient safety incidents in primary care dentistry in England and Wales: mixed methods study

2 ABSTRACT

3 **Background:** In recent decades, there has been considerable international attention aimed at
4 improving the safety of hospital care, and more recently this attention has broadened to
5 include primary medical care. In contrast, the safety profile of primary care dentistry remains
6 poorly characterized.

7 **Objectives:** We aimed to describe the types of primary care dental patient safety incidents
8 reported within a national incident reporting database and understand their contributory
9 factors and consequences.

10 **Methods:** We undertook a cross-sectional mixed-methods study, which involved analysis of a
11 weighted randomized sample of the most severe incident reports from primary care dentistry
12 submitted to England and Wales' National Reporting and Learning System. Drawing on a
13 conceptual literature-derived model of patient safety threats that we previously developed,
14 we developed coding frameworks to describe and conduct thematic analysis of free text
15 incident reports and determine the relationship between incident types, contributory factors
16 and outcomes.

17 **Results:** Out of 2,000 reports sampled, 1,456 were eligible for analysis. Sixty types of incidents
18 were identified and organized across pre-operative (40.3%; n=587), intra-operative (56.1%;
19 n=817) and post-operative (3.6%; n=52) stages. The main sources of unsafe care were *delays*
20 *in treatment* (344/1,456; 23.6%), *procedural errors (excluding wrong-tooth extraction)*
21 *(227/1,456; 15.6%), medication-related adverse incidents (161/1,456; 11.1%), equipment*
22 *failure (90/1,456; 6.2%) and x-ray related errors (87/1,1456; 6.0%).* Of all incidents that
23 resulted in a harmful outcome (n=77; 5.3%), over half were due to wrong tooth extractions
24 (37/77; 48.1%) mainly resulting from distraction of the dentist. As a result of this type of
25 incident, 34 of the 37 patients (91.9%) examined required further unnecessary procedures.

26 **Conclusions:** Flaws in administrative processes need improvement since they are the main
27 cause for patients experiencing delays in receiving treatment. Checklists and standardization
28 of clinical procedures have the potential to reduce procedural errors and avoid over-utilization
29 of services. Wrong-tooth extractions should be addressed through focused research initiatives
30 and encouraging policy development to mandate learning from serious dental errors like never
31 events.

32

33 **Keywords:** Ambulatory dentistry, community dentistry, patient safety, patient safety
34 incidents, primary dental care.

35 Introduction

36 Healthcare-associated harm is estimated to occur in between 3% and 16% of hospital admissions.¹⁻³ In
37 primary care, between two and three patient safety incidents occur per every 100 encounters;⁴ with
38 approximately 4% of these primary care incidents resulting in severe harm.⁽⁴⁾ Over the past 20 years,
39 healthcare organizations, researchers and policymakers around the world have begun to pay increasing
40 attention to patient safety. Accumulated evidence about the extent of harm and underlying causes has
41 been translated into interventions designed to improve the safety of the healthcare system,⁵ such as
42 incident reporting systems.^{6,7} The need to develop and introduce these systems was signalled within
43 the reports *To Err is Human*⁸ and *An Organisation with a Memory*.⁹ Their fundamental role is “to
44 enhance patient safety by learning from failures of the health care system”.¹⁰ The analysis of the
45 retrieved data from these systems provide valuable insights about the trends and patterns of patient
46 safety hazards at an organizational level¹¹ and can allow the identification of priorities for
47 intervention.¹² This information further bring opportunities to develop evidence-based models for safe
48 practices and support for education and learning.¹¹ Compared with other data sources,¹³ incident
49 reporting systems can provide continuous, near real-time insights about diverse patient safety
50 incidents, including near misses.

51 Patient safety in primary care is a field that remains largely unexplored.^{14,15} In the United Kingdom (UK),
52 initial mixed-methods studies analyzing general practice incident reports from the National Reporting
53 and Learning System (NRLS) have shown their utility to categorize PSIs and identify patterns of
54 contributory incidents and contributory factors.¹⁶⁻²⁰ However, patient safety research in dentistry is in
55 its early development. A recent scoping review on PSIs and adverse events in dentistry shows that, over
56 the past 20 years, this field has not employed standardized patient safety terminology and used varying
57 study designs and methodologies to investigate unsafe care.²¹ As a result, the current evidence cannot
58 be generalised and provide reliable estimates of the frequency of incidents, their causes, or the
59 outcomes of these errors. To standardize patient safety research in dentistry, recent studies have
60 started to focus on the characterization of patient safety incidents,²² including adverse events.^{23,24} Only
61 two studies have explored primary dental care data from national incident reporting systems,^{22,25} from
62 which one built an initial classification.⁽²²⁾ Although these classification systems provide a starting point,
63 they should be further expanded/refined and include a clear distinction between incidents, their causes
64 as well as the outcomes affecting the patient (adverse events) and healthcare system. Therefore, we
65 aimed, firstly, to explore data from the NRLS to identify emerging themes and then develop categories
66 and subcategories of incidents, their contributory factors, outcomes and degree of harm. Secondly, we
67 aimed to describe incident patterns through identification of frequencies of the relationships between
68 incidents and contributory factors. Thirdly, we aimed to describe the more frequent and harmful
69 reported incidents.

70 Methods

71 We conducted a two-stage cross-sectional, mixed-methods study of the NRLS with a selected
72 sample of reports from primary dental care for analysis. We combined qualitative methods and
73 iterative generation of data summaries using descriptive statistical and thematic analysis
74 methods.²⁶

75

76 Data source

77 The NRLS is a national reporting system created in 2003 for the NHS in England and Wales by the former
78 National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). It is one of the most comprehensive reporting systems in the
79 world.^{27, 28} It consists of a database of incident reports submitted by National Health Service (NHS)
80 healthcare organizations, however, patients and other members of the public can also submit online
81 reports directly to the NHS. The NHS definition for the reported patient safety incidents refers to “any
82 injury or unexpected incident that could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving
83 NHS-funded healthcare.”²⁹ Although reporting was initially voluntary, it has since 2010 been mandatory
84 to report any incidents that resulted in severe patient harm or death. The reports contain categorical
85 data (e.g. age, incident location and severity of harm) and three unstructured free-text fields to
86 encourage reporters to provide a narrative description of the event, perceived causes and potential
87 preventive measures.²⁶ Incident reports describing severe harm and death outcome are reviewed by
88 healthcare staff and safety experts responsible for the NRLS to identify opportunities for the continuous
89 improvement of care.

90 Sample selection

91 The complete data set consisted of 42,729 reports over a period of 8 years (between April 2005
92 and September 2013) from general practice in England and Wales. We applied the pre-coded
93 NHS categories “Primary care setting” and “Dental surgery” to filter the dataset and obtain a
94 sample of 11,836 records (see Figure 1). From these, we read the narrative descriptions and
95 excluded the reports not related to dentistry. As a result, a revised sample of 4,247 reports
96 was obtained. From this sample, all reports with a “moderate”, “severe” and “death”
97 (combined total, n=257) outcome were included. From the remaining “no harm” and “low
98 harm” reports (n=3990), a random sample of 1,743 reports, weighted by year and the severity
99 of harm, was generated to prioritize more recent (2012-2013) and harmful reports. As a result,
100 a total of 2,000 reports were included for coding. The detailed sampling strategy is shown in
101 Appendix 1.

102

103 Methodology

104 An overview of the methodology is shown in Figure 1. For the first stage, we explored 300
105 randomly-selected reports and deductively developed initial codes to structure the free-
106 narrative descriptions of the reported incidents. This resulted in three coding frameworks to
107 describe what happened, i.e. type of incident (Appendix 2), perceived reasons the incident
108 occurred, i.e. contributory factors (Appendix 3) and incident outcomes (Appendix 4). These
109 frameworks present a hierarchical arrangement of first- and second-level codes that were
110 continuously refined throughout the study. The codes were constantly compared against
111 categories from other patient safety classification systems. These included the World Health
112 Organization’s (WHO) International Classification for Patient Safety,³⁰ the LINNEAUS Patient
113 Safety Classification for Primary Care,³¹ the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Classification
114 System¹⁸ and the results obtained from our previous scoping review.²¹ The reports were coded
115 by the first author (EEC). Moreover, a second coder (AS) was trained and provided the same
116 sample of 300 randomly-selected reports and discussed with the main author, the challenges
117 and additional improvements to the coding frameworks. For the second stage, we applied the
118 coding frameworks on our weighted randomized sample of 2,000 reports. Following the
119 method described by Rees et al.,¹⁷ we applied the nine rules of the Recursive Model of Incident

120 Analysis³² to structure the coding process (see Appendix 5). Following this approach, we
121 applied between one to four codes in chronological order to describe primary incidents,
122 contributory incidents and contributory factors. The main incident was labelled as a 'primary
123 incident', which was the closest incident to the outcome experienced by the patient. Then,
124 'contributory incidents' were defined as those incidents preceding the primary incidents. Both
125 primary incidents and contributory incidents were coded in accordance with the incident
126 coding framework (see Appendix 2). A 'contributory factor' was defined as "*a circumstance,
127 action or influence (such as poor rostering or task allocation) which is thought to have played a
128 part in the origin or development of an incident, or to increase the risk of an incident*".³³
129 Contributory factors were coded in accordance with the contributory factors coding
130 framework (see Appendix 3). Coding of the free-text narrative descriptions allowed the
131 categorization of reports by incident type, potential contributory factors, outcome and severity
132 of harm. This provided the basis for the subsequent data analysis. The severity of harm was
133 assessed using the WHO's International Classification of Patient Safety definitions (see Table
134 1).³⁰ To assess the inter-coder reliability, 20% of the reports (n=400) were double coded (EEC
135 and AS). Then, raw agreement and Cohen's K statistics³⁴ were calculated for the primary
136 incident. A kappa of >0.7 was sought between the two coders. Disagreements in coding were
137 arbitrated by a third person.

139 Data analysis

140 For the first stage, during the data coding, the reports were further thematically analyzed and
141 re-read for familiarization. If needed, new codes were created to capture additional semantic
142 (descriptive and in-depth) insights and latent (underlying or inferred) insights present in the
143 narrative descriptions and the circumstances (context) in which the incidents occurred.^{35, 36} All
144 codes were grouped into themes and sub-themes to support our understanding of data and
145 the underlying reasons for incidents that might not have been captured by the quantitative
146 data.^{35, 36} For the second stage, we undertook an exploratory, descriptive analysis³⁷ to generate
147 descriptive summaries to identify priority areas based on: (i) the most frequent incidents; and
148 (ii) the most harmful outcomes that resulted in moderate harm, severe harm or death.
149 Following the method used by Rees et al.,¹⁷ we employed pivot tables in Microsoft Excel³⁸ and
150 cross-tabulated the most frequent incidents per clinical stage with available contributory
151 incidents, contributory factor and their outcomes. We also cross-tabulated the degree of harm
152 against the primary incident types to identify potential relationships in the data. Then, we
153 identified additional patterns in the data by exploring all the frequencies of combinations of
154 incidents and contributory factors (e.g. primary incident + secondary incident + contributory
155 factor).

157 Ethics

158 Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from The University of Edinburgh's Centre
159 for Population Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee.

160 Results

161 Of the 2,000 randomized reports, 1,456 were included in the quantitative analysis. Reports
162 were excluded if they did not describe a patient safety incident (n=311), were not related to
163 dentistry (n=125), concerned patient falls (n=31), contained insufficient details (n=23), dentist
164 harmed rather than the patient (n=18), or were about general non-specific complaints (n=6).

165 Raw agreement (86.5%) and Cohen's kappa (κ) statistic for inter-rater coding reliability for
166 primary incidents was high ($\kappa=0.860$; $p<0.01$).

167

168 Incidents

169 Table 2 shows a description of the primary incidents we identified. These occurred in the pre-
170 operative (40.3%; $n=587$), intra-operative (56.1%; $n=817$) and post-operative (3.6%; $n=52$)
171 stages of dental care delivery. Main **pre-operative incidents** were delays in treatment (58.6%,
172 $n=344$), inaccurate information on medical record (10.4%, $n=61$) and breaches of
173 confidentiality (4.8%, $n=28$). In the **intra-operative stage**, these included procedural errors
174 (27.8%, $n=227$), medication-related adverse incidents (161/817; 19.7%) and equipment failure
175 (11.0%, $n=90$). The more frequent **post-operative incidents** were contraindicated medications
176 prescribed/dispensed ($n=15$; 28.8%) and errors in the process of delivering a medication ($n=12$;
177 23.1%). Regardless of the clinical stage, the main five incident types were *delays in treatment*
178 (23.6%; $n=344$), *procedural errors (excluding wrong-tooth extraction)* (15.6%; $n=227$),
179 *medication-related adverse incidents* (11.1%; $n=161$), *equipment failure* (6.2%; $n=90$) and *x-ray*
180 *related errors* (6.0%; $n=87$).

181

182 Contributory incidents and contributory factors

183 Of the 1,456 primary incidents, 34.8% ($n=506$) contained data about *contributory incidents*.
184 From these 506, main *contributory incidents* were the dentist's unavailability (20.2%),
185 equipment failure (14.6%) and mismanagement of appointments (12.6%). Data about
186 *contributory factors* were available in 42.8% ($n=623$) of the reports. From these 623, main
187 *contributory factors* included distraction (25.5%), insufficient staff members (25.5%) and
188 inadequate skills or knowledge (11.2%). All the possible combinations of primary incidents with
189 contributory incidents and contributory factors organized by clinical stage are available in
190 Appendices 6-8.

191

192 In the pre-operative period, frequent *contributory incidents* for **delays in treatment or**
193 **procedure ($n=344$)** were the dentist's unavailability (29.7%, $n=102$), mismanaging of
194 appointments (16.9%, $n=58$), and ineffective transportation of patients (7.3%, $n=25$) (Examples
195 1 to 3 in Box 1). *Contributory factors* included insufficient staff members (32.3%, $n=111$)
196 (Example 4 in Box 1) and lack of equipment maintenance (4.4%, $n=15$). Secondly, for reports
197 concerning **inaccurate information on records ($n=61$)**, main *contributory incidents* were
198 Information Technology (IT)-related errors (23.0%, $n=14$) (Example 5 in Box 1). Thirdly, for
199 reports concerning **breaches of confidentiality ($n=28$)**, frequent *contributory incidents* were the
200 inefficient transfer of information between healthcare settings and wrong medical records
201 (7.1%; $n=2$ each) (Example 6 in Box 1). Main *contributory factors* were failure to adhere to
202 procedures or regulations (50.0%, $n=14$) (Example 7 in Box 1) and distraction (14.3%, $n=4$).

203

204 In the intra-operative period, *contributory incidents* for **procedural errors ($n=227$)** included
205 equipment failure (9.3%, $n=21$) (Example 8 in Box 1) and insufficient clinical examination (2.2%,
206 $n=5$). Main *contributory factors* were distraction (31.3%, $n=71$) (Example 9 in Box 1),
207 unexpected movement from the patient (10.1%, $n=23$) (Example 10 in Box 1) and inadequate
208 skills or knowledge (8.8%, $n=20$). Then, for **medication-related adverse incidents ($n=161$)**,
209 *contributory factors* included the patient's previous health-related conditions (13.7%, $n=22$)
210 (Example 11 in Box 1) and non-compliance from the patient (5.6%, $n=9$) (Example 12 in Box 1).
211 Lastly, for incidents concerning **equipment failure ($n=90$)**, main *contributory factors* were lack

212 of equipment maintenance (44.4%, n=40) and poor equipment design (6.7%, n=6) (Example 13
213 in Box 1). In the post-operative period, *contributory incidents* for **contraindicated medications**
214 **prescribed/dispensed (n=15)** were insufficient clinical examination (20.0%, n=3) (Example 14 in
215 Box 1). *Contributory factors* included the patient's previous history on allergies (46.7%, n=7)
216 (Example 15 in Box 1) and staff distraction (20.0%, n=3) (Example 16 in Box 1). **Errors in the**
217 **process of delivering a medications (n=10)** (Example 17 in Box 1) did not include *contributory*
218 *incidents or factors*.
219

220 Outcomes

221 Table 3 shows the characterization of incident outcomes. Of the 1,456 incidents, 40.0%
222 (n=583) did not describe an outcome. The more frequent outcomes were *increased*
223 *documentation/follow-up* (12.4%; n=181), *vasovagal response* (8.2%; n=119),
224 *laceration/bleeding* (6.9%; n=100), *delays in using the dental clinic* (5.8%; n=84), *unnecessary*
225 *x-ray exposure* (5.1%; n=74) and *repeated procedures/additional treatment* (4.9%; n=72).
226 Cross-tabulations of outcomes (n=1,456) with the degree of harm showed that 97.7% resulted
227 in either no harm or low harm (n=1,379), and only 5.3% were harmful (n= 77). The main
228 harmful outcomes were unnecessary procedures (44.2%; n=34), anaphylaxis (9.1%; n=7) and
229 vasovagal responses (7.8%; n=6). Cross-tabulations of these harmful outcomes with the
230 primary incidents showed that all harmful reports that resulted in unnecessary procedures
231 (n=34) were due to *wrong-tooth extractions*. Then, harmful reports involving anaphylaxis
232 (n=7) were mainly due to medication-related adverse incidents (42.9%; n=3) and
233 contraindicated medications prescribed/dispensed (28.6%; n=2). Finally, harmful vasovagal
234 responses (n=6) were mostly due to medication-related adverse incidents (83.3%; n=5).
235

236 For the main pre-operative incidents, frequent outcomes for **delays in treatment** (n=344)
237 included increased documentation/follow-up (23.3%, n=80) and repeated procedures or
238 additional treatment (5.8%, n=20) (Examples 18 and 19 in Box 1). **Incorrect or unavailable**
239 **documentation** (n=61) mostly led to increased documentation/follow-up (14.8%, n=9) and
240 delays in using the dental clinic (8.2%, n=5) (Examples 20 and 21 in Box 1). One **breach of**
241 **confidentiality** resulted in legal implications (3.6%, 1/28;). Secondly, for the main intra-
242 operative incidents, **procedural errors** (n=227) included laceration/bleeding (41.9%, n=95),
243 chemical injuries (9.3%, n=21), repeated procedures/additional treatment (7.5%, n=17) and
244 thermal injuries (6.2%, n=14) (Examples 23 to 26 in Box 1). **Medication-related adverse**
245 **incidents** (n=161) mostly led to a vasovagal responses (64.0%, n=103) (Examples 27 and 28 in
246 Box 1). **Equipment failure** (n=90) mostly led to delays in using the dental clinic (34.4%, n=31)
247 (Example 29 in Box 1). Finally, for main post-operative incidents, **contraindicated medications**
248 **prescribed/dispensed** (n=15) led to increased documentation/follow-up and anaphylaxis
249 (20.0%, n=3 each) (Example 30 in Box 1). The majority of the reports concerning errors in the
250 process of delivering a medication did not describe harmful outcomes (75.0%, 9/12).
251

252 Discussion

253 To our knowledge, this is the first mixed-methods study of incident reports from primary care
254 dentistry, identifying the main incident types, their contributory factors and outcomes (clinical
255 and non-clinical). At a conceptual level, our methodological approach aligns with the Swiss
256 Cheese Model of System Accidents proposed by Reason.³⁹ Moreover, this mixed-methods
257 approach seeks to identify the chronological sequence of events leading up to error by drawing

258 upon the Recursive Model for Incident Analysis. This approach has been used in general
259 practice^{16-18, 40, 41} and has received positive reviews.⁴² We drew on a large national database of
260 incidents and achieved very good agreement between two independent coders. Our coding
261 frameworks enabled us to understand the relationships between incident types and
262 contributory factors which highlight opportunities to improve patient safety.

263
264 However, we also acknowledge that the reports analyzed likely constitute the tip of the
265 iceberg⁴³ as these only included events that were actually reported. Although the NRLS has
266 collected over 15 million reports since 2003, less than 1% of these reports originate from
267 primary care.⁴⁴ Whilst NHS healthcare professionals might be aware of the NRLS, their fear of
268 punishment from reporting incidents, the time required to report, and the lack of belief that
269 reporting will lead to change are all recognized barriers to reporting.⁴⁴ Also, our ability to
270 extract detailed information surrounding context (e.g. demographics and disciplines involved)
271 was limited as the reports were largely unstructured. Renton and Sabbah (2016) also reported
272 this data quality issue.²⁵ In addition, the free narrative descriptions were often shorthanded
273 and contained abbreviations or other jargon to describe clinical procedures. To bring sense to
274 the data and avoid the risk of confirmation bias,⁴⁵ we assigned codes which represented what
275 was explicitly described in the reports; inferences were avoided, in particular when no explicit
276 description was available. Therefore, following the rules from the Recursive Model of Incident
277 Analysis, we coded “primary incidents” as those closest to the outcome. Then, if available, we
278 coded “contributory incidents” as those incidents that preceded the primary incident. We
279 believe this work provides a starting point to systematically characterize future incident reports
280 from primary care dentistry (Appendices 2 to 4).^{22, 23, 25, 46-50}

281 282 Incidents

283 In our study, *delays in treatment* were the main pre-operative incidents and remained as the
284 most frequent among all incident types. Although these incidents were not harmful in our
285 study, their presence reveal flaws in the provision of efficient dental care. Nevertheless, delays
286 in treatment can still contribute to diagnostic delays, which can result in the unnecessary
287 clinical deterioration or complication of the patient’s condition or disease.⁵¹ Therefore, we
288 recommend improving administrative processes by understanding the demand for dental care
289 services in the range of care contexts used for delivery. Guidance for the provision of safe,
290 reliable and effective care is available from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI),⁵²
291 including a dentistry-focused IHI Open School course in partnership with the Dental Quality
292 Alliance, established by the American Dental Association.⁵³

293
294 Our findings also revealed that *procedural errors* were the main intra-operative incidents and
295 the second most frequent among all incident types. Their frequency could be reduced by
296 determining warranted and unwarranted variations in clinical practice. This might be achieved
297 by reviewing compliance with evidence-based or best practice guidelines. However, an
298 emerging threat to patient safety is the increasing complexity of clinical cases and multi-
299 morbidities as the population gets older by living longer.⁵⁴ Therefore, as discussed by Hollnagel
300 et al.,⁵⁵ clinicians should also have flexibility to adapt their procedures in accordance with the
301 specific needs of the patient being treated. *Equipment failure* was the third most common
302 intra-operative incident and the fourth most frequent among all incident types. This type of
303 incident has been described previously by Perea-Perez et al.,⁴⁷ Hiivala et al.^{48, 50} and an issue
304 identified from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Manufacturer and User Facility

305 Device Experience (MAUDE) database.⁵⁶ Based on our findings, we believe equipment-failure
306 incidents can be reduced by having all staff members familiarized with the maintenance
307 processes and assign responsibility to team members to carry out this task on a periodical basis.
308 In identifying patterns of incidents, we also identified *equipment failure* as a “contributory
309 incident” for other “primary incidents” such as *procedural errors* and *errors in obtaining or*
310 *processing x-rays*. This highlights the interaction of healthcare professionals with sophisticated
311 tools and technologies could increase risk to patient safety,⁵⁴ and manufacturers should
312 support practitioners and staff to safely use their equipment.

313
314 In our study, *wrong-tooth extractions* were the main source of harmful incidents. Although not
315 frequent (2.7%), these have been studied previously^{22, 25} and they meet the criteria of ‘never
316 events’ due to their severity and degree of preventability.^{25, 57} Prevention of these and other
317 incidents can be achieved through the use available procedural checklists⁵⁸⁻⁶¹ to reduce
318 reliance on memory and thus, limiting the impact of distraction or inattention in the
319 occurrence of incidents.⁶² A recent systematic review on patient safety interventions in
320 dentistry revealed that surgical safety checklists, which covers tooth extractions,
321 demonstrated efficacy to reduce or minimize AEs.⁶³ We also identified other less frequent
322 intra-operative incidents, which have been also reported in the literature. These include the
323 *inhalation and ingestion of foreign objects*, reported through the review of relatively small
324 samples of adverse event case reports,⁴⁹ malpractice cases,⁴⁷ and dental patient records.⁶⁴
325 Although not frequent, inhalation of foreign objects alone has recently been proposed as a
326 “never event” through international consensus.⁶⁵

327
328 Perea-Perez et al.⁴⁷ and Hiivala et al.^{48, 50} also previously reported similar post-operative
329 incidents. However, incidents related to prescription of medications, or their dispensing,
330 remain largely unreported.²¹ Therefore, the evidence base about medication errors in dentistry
331 needs further investigation. Medication errors involving antibiotics for example contribute to
332 antimicrobial resistance worldwide⁶⁶ and antimicrobial resistance is an emerging threat to
333 patient safety in the next 30 years.⁵⁴ Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched
334 the third Global Patient Safety Challenge to minimize medication related error⁶⁷ and dentistry
335 should consider its contribution to this global agenda.

336

337 Contributory incidents and contributory factors

338 The majority of medical errors are due to faulty systems and processes.⁸ Reason’s Swiss cheese
339 model of system accidents³⁹ shows that human errors are often a consequence of latent
340 organizational flaws, such as administrative or management issues. Our findings corroborate
341 this and revealed issues of accessibility to services and mismanagement of appointments,
342 insufficient staff members and lack of equipment maintenance. These issues were mainly
343 related, as a contributory incident or a contributory factor, to patients experiencing delays in
344 receiving treatment, which was the main incident reported to the NRLS. Although these
345 incidents did not lead to harmful outcomes, they reveal the underutilization of primary dental
346 care services. Underutilization of care is a prevalent issue in both high- and low-income
347 economies.⁶⁸ Factors contributing to this issue broadly include: a) inaccessible healthcare
348 services to the patient, b) the unavailability of effective services, for instance the result of a
349 lack of resources, c) the clinician’s failure to provide effective care, and d) the patients’
350 (inadequate) compliance and adherence to effective healthcare interventions.⁶⁸ As the
351 organizational structure of dental care is likely to differ between countries and clinical settings,

352 we believe quality improvement strategies should be developed and implemented locally.
353 *Distraction and unexpected movement from the patient* were the most frequent “contributory
354 factors” for procedural incidents and wrong-tooth extractions. This highlights any unexpected
355 distraction can create conditions for unsafe care. Other reported contributory factors in the
356 literature for wrong-extractions include: i) inadequate checks, ii) incorrect radiographs, and iii)
357 wrong diagnoses have also been reported as causes for wrong-tooth extraction.²⁵
358

359 Outcomes

360 Vasovagal responses and lacerations/bleeding were the most commonly described adverse
361 outcomes. However, the majority of outcomes resulted in either no harm or low harm (94.7%;
362 n=1,379) which frequently resulted in increased documentation/follow-up, delays in using the
363 dental clinic, unnecessary x-ray exposure and repeated procedures/additional treatment. The
364 identification of these outcomes showed the presence of flaws in the provision of efficient and
365 effective primary dental care, which in addition to patient safety highlight two further
366 compromised aims of quality improvement, as proposed by the former IOM.⁵¹ Moreover, the
367 over-utilization of healthcare services can: a) contribute to future unnecessary harm; b) result
368 in additional financial demands for the patient; and c) cause waste of resources within the
369 healthcare system.⁶⁹
370

371 Our findings have helped to identify priority issues for improvement and are a starting point
372 for setting patient safety research priorities in dentistry.⁷⁰ Patient safety in dentistry is still an
373 emerging discipline which needs to be further developed in parallel with the quality of care.
374 Health services researchers designing patient-safety-oriented interventions⁵¹ should consider
375 the more frequent and most harmful incidents reported in this study. Policy makers could take
376 note of these emerging priorities and allocate resources accordingly. We believe this approach
377 will contribute to reduce unintended harm and support appropriate utilization of primary
378 dental care services. Our proposed priority issues can be pursued within research strategies
379 that embrace robust primary research designs and methods with agreed working definitions.³⁰
380 Examples of these research designs include mixed methods studies of a mix of complimentary
381 secondary data (e.g. medical records, malpractice cases). In doing so, priority areas and
382 knowledge gaps should be corroborated in local contexts,⁷¹ as well as furthering advances
383 already made for data collection methods and taxonomies for patient safety in dentistry.⁷²
384 Natural Language Processing (NLP) could support the pace of progress and in terms of
385 analysing large volumes of data about unsafe dentistry offers a set of informatics tools capable
386 of transforming text into a structured format that can be used for research.⁷³ For example,
387 data extraction systems based on NLP have been developed in the medical domain.⁷⁴ However,
388 this innovation has yet to be explored in dentistry. Incident reporting systems, such as the NRLS
389 in England and Wales, have generated many lessons to improve patient safety. The Council of
390 European Dentists’ has already recommended the development of reporting systems in
391 dentistry,⁷⁵ and these should now be either developed exclusively for the profession or
392 integrated into existing reporting systems, such as the NRLS, now the Patient Safety
393 Information Management System led by NHS Improvement. Also, any further dentistry-
394 focused initiative needs to be supported by clear regulations and policies that allow private
395 and healthcare-funded dental practices to report incidents, preferably to a single system.
396 Where multiple regulators have complimentary functions in countries, clear processes about
397 incident reporting are needed for the dental profession to follow.⁷⁶
398

399 **Conclusions**

400 Our study represents an important step forward into the characterization patient safety
401 incidents and their contributory factors in primary care dentistry. Initiatives to improve quality,
402 including patient safety, in dentistry should focus on improving the main sources of unsafe care
403 identified in this work. However, our findings also reveal that over-utilization of dental care
404 services is an issue that can be easily overlooked by researchers, policy makers and members
405 of the dental profession. As more patient safety focused evidence continues to emerge, this
406 needs to be integrated into evidence-based guidelines and compliance with these guidelines
407 needs to be encouraged through fostering a patient safety culture. Patient safety is an
408 emerging field in dentistry that offers a wide spectrum of opportunities for both research and
409 improvement.

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411 References

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