The ‘Carrot’ and ‘Stick’ of Integrated Offender Management: Implications for Police Culture

Abstract

One of the many forms that modern policing takes is ‘integrated offender management’ (IOM). This involves the police working alongside staff from other agencies, including probation and prison officers and drugs workers, all in a bid to reduce offending by prolific offenders. Some of this work involves traditional policing methods of surveillance, catch and convict (the stick). The novelty for the police lies in the emphasis on drawing offenders away from crime through ‘pathway support’ such as helping them into employment and supporting them into stable housing arrangements (the carrot). In theory this changes the nature of the policing task considerably. Given the emphasis in the existing literature on how ‘cop culture’ derives from the nature of the job police officers perform, this raises interesting questions as to whether IOM officers exhibit different cultural traits from their mainstream colleagues. In this article, based on ethnographic fieldwork, I examine whether the operation of IOM, as expressed through officers’ talk and action, lives up to its rhetoric of a radical new approach to policing.

Introduction

‘Integrated offender management’ (IOM) is a multi-agency response to the crime and reoffending threats faced by local communities, under which the most persistent and problematic offenders are identified and managed jointly by the police and other criminal justice agencies working together. At the core of IOM design is the idea that each police area is afforded the autonomy to develop and implement IOM in response to local structures, needs and priorities (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014; Annison et al, 2015). The overarching objectives of IOM are simple to state but harder to achieve - reducing crime and the harm caused to victims by recidivist offenders, as well as improving the life chances of this group through support and rehabilitation (Ministry of Justice, 2010). Reminders of the ‘common purpose’ and ‘coordinated’ provision of ‘joined up services’, within the framework of IOM, have emanated from politicians and chief police officers (House of Commons, 2011). Nonetheless, alongside the appeal of multi-agency working, ideological conflicts and structural power struggles also exist (Crawford and Jones, 1995: 20). Furthermore, despite significant changes to operational policing, police culture has proven remarkably resistant to change (Loftus, 2009; Skinns, 2011). Aspects of cop culture, such as pragmatism, have been found to facilitate multi-agency working (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014), but the endurance of other core characteristics may derail the broader aims of IOM. To date, however, little empirical evidence supports this assumption.

Research on IOM, framed around a defined policy agenda1 and primarily funded by the police (e.g. Morrison, 2008; Annison et al, 2013), Ministry of Justice and Home Office (e.g. Wong and Hartworth 2009; Senior et al, 2011; Housden, 2011; Dawson et al, 2011; Williams and Ariel, 2013; Hallam Centre for Community Justice, 2013; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014), suggests that within the framework of IOM police officers are moving away from traditional cultural practices, instead adopting values and ways of working more akin to that of probation. Senior et al (2011) for example, uncovered
‘a blurring of the police role into offender management’, during their ‘process evaluation’ of five pilot IOM locations outside of London. Statistical analysis by Williams and Ariel (2012) found ‘police offender managers were acting very similarly to probation offender managers’. Annison et al., (2015) interviewed Thames Valley IOM police officers. The responses they received suggested ‘a cultural and practical shift’ had taken place among these officers ‘towards probation’ (see also, Sleath and Brown, 2017). More broadly, a joint inspection of IOM, involving interviews with providers of IOM and offenders across six parts of England and Wales, identified three common threads running through the delivery of IOM schemes: (i) good practice concerning both rehabilitative and restrictive/enforcement approaches and to intelligence sharing; (ii) integrity of staff working within the IOM approach and (iii) a positive response by those subject to IOM to the way they had been targeted and treated (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014). The implication is that closer working relationships between the police and other criminal justice agencies, within the IOM setting, has resulted in positive cultural and operational consequences.

Whilst evaluative research provides useful insights into the impact of IOM and localised patterns of police behaviour, there remains ‘no definitive body of peer reviewed critical academic research (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014: 50). My contribution aims to begin to fill the gap with findings from an independent ethnographic study of one IOM area. The research sheds light on the informal values, beliefs and practices of a set of specialist police officers – field intelligence officers – engaged in the process of rehabilitating and supporting those targeted by the scheme. What I found was an apparent disjuncture between policy statements made about the workings of IOM and how policing operations are realised on the ground. One explanation may be the continuation of traditional police dispositions and practice among IOM police officers. Many of the officers I encountered exhibited old ways of thinking and behaviour. If police culture is born out of the everyday challenges of police work, as Skolnick (1966: 42) suggests, as that work changes one might expect a cultural shift. My work, therefore, calls into question assumptions about ‘cop culture’ and its attendant socialisation processes.

The broad intention of this article is to provide fresh insights into the policing of IOM offenders by examining more closely claims made about how the scheme works in practice. Almost all of the existing work on IOM is heavily reliant on some sort of account offered by IOM practitioners themselves. This is problematic when, as in the present study, it is the veracity of IOM rhetoric which is the question being studied. Sustained participant observations enabled me to gain a firmer sense of the ‘low visibility’ activities of IOM police officers. Words can help us understand actions; it is actions, however, that really matter.

The research

This article draws on a qualitative research project, tied to a unique criminal justice setting and context – IOM. My aims were two-fold: to explore empirically what kind of policing is taking place within the framework of IOM and to theorise about what was shaping police decision-making during interactions with IOM offenders. The empirical enquiry began in September 2012 and ended over 12 months later, in October 2013. I carried out four hundred hours of observations in five research sites across an English police area. All but fifty hours were spent observing plain clothed police officers – seconded to the IOM unit since its inception in 2008 and referred to as field intelligence officers – as
they met with IOM offenders at probation offices, on the street and in their homes. For the rest of the period I observed uniformed patrol officers acting as the enforcement arm of IOM. Finally, I conducted forty-four formal in-depth interviews with police officers, IOM workers and offenders. Police officers and other IOM workers were interviewed within IOM office space, whilst some offenders were interviewed in prisons, others in cafes and in some cases I spoke with people waiting outside police/probation buildings for appointments. These conversations brought my observations, along with the views and experiences of the key actors involved in IOM, into sharp focus. Along with my field-notes, interviews recorded throughout the study and reported below, provide a foundation on which to investigate empirically whether the rhetoric surrounding IOM is mirrored in day-to-day operational practice.

The rhetoric of integrated offender management

Described as a ‘commonsense approach that intuitively feels right’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014: 4), IOM continues to represent a significant element of the government’s strategy of forging closer links between criminal justice organisations to prevent crime and reduce recidivism. To this end, IOM ties together a range of criminal justice agencies and non-criminal justice agency partners involved in the management of offenders: the Police, Prison and Probation services, Criminal Justice Intervention Teams, Community Rehabilitation Companies and in some cases voluntary organisations such as addiction recovery agencies and supported housing charities. Whereas offenders were traditionally dealt with separately by these agencies, officially, IOM is underlined by an ‘ideology of unity’, which dictates a strategy of joined up thinking and service delivery, with an increasing emphasis on partnership between the agencies (Appleton and Burnett, 2004: 35). As a senior IOM police manager explained:

We needed to work in partnership – drive out inefficiencies, duplications and so on; have live information sharing to save time, work under the same roof so that we improve [inter-agency] communication and so use our resources more efficiently; and by having faith that it would reduce crime so we could take some resources out of reactive and responsive elements of the police organisation – not just the police but probation and others – and put them into activities to prevent/reduce crime and reoffending rates.

By combining their collective knowledge, expertise and resources in this way, IOM partners are meant to ensure that once identified as a target, usually on the basis of police-led intelligence, attempts are made to change or control the person’s offending with a mix of rehabilitative and restrictive/enforcement-based interventions, depending on the level of engagement and/or offending by those subject to IOM.

IOM claims to operate as a harmonious and efficient response to prolific offending. Yet, through the medium of monitoring and surveillance, IOM also represents a further and significant extension of penal supervision and control (Sparks, 2000: 131). Take, for example, the person returning to the community following a period of custody. The prison service maintains initial responsibility for preparing individuals for release into the community. It also updates IOM partners with current intelligence about their behaviour in custody, financial position on release and proposed release settlement area prior to their actual release. Following release from custody, probation workers, guided
by the ‘offender management model’ (Home Office, 2006), a Risk-Need-Responsivity approach (Andrews et al, 2011; Annison, et al, 2015), focus on education/training, employment and housing, but also enforcement orientated strategies such as curfews, drug testing and electronic tagging (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014; Sleath and Brown, 2017). Drugs services, in the form of Criminal Justice Intervention Team workers, are also enlisted if the person has a history of substance misuse problems. The police, instead, have a threefold function: (i) to identify and monitor whether individuals currently pose a risk of reoffending; (ii) to assist them in finding a ‘pathway’ out of offending; and (iii) to explore and operationalise enforcement options when intelligence suggests they are committing further offences (IOM Police Operations Guide, 2010).

Acquisition and sharing of knowledge is a key part of policing practice within the framework of IOM. The scheme can thus be located within the broader discourse of risk regulation and penal politics (Sparks, 2000: 130), as it concerns the identification, classification and management of dangerous, deviant or threatening individuals (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 452; Pratt, 2000; Garland, 2001). The burglars, robbers and prolific thieves7 that IOM actively targets can be found within this risky group of outsiders (Becker, 1974), but actuarial justice is also a predictive and statistical understanding of justice, a reflection of market disciplines and a preference to achieve value and drive forward efficiency (O’Malley, 2004). These developments are derived from a lack of faith in the traditional apparatuses of the criminal justice system: the courts and police and the traditional ‘detect and sentence’ response to criminal behaviour. We now have a growing emphasis on the use of technologies to produce knowledge of risky populations that is useful for their administration (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 41). The police and other IOM workers are now key joint players in the risk-management of the ‘dangerous’. This has some important implications for policing, which are taken up in the next section.

**Operationalising policing within IOM**

Police officers within IOM can be divided into two groups: (plain clothed) field intelligence officers and (uniformed) patrol officers. Field intelligence officers are responsible for building an accurate picture of the activities of local IOM offenders. As a senior IOM police manager explained:

> Field intelligence officers should gather and make sense of intelligence and work in a partnership environment with other agencies on the basis of understanding what enforcement [and] tactical options are available.

But, as the Ministry of Justice (2010: 25) points out, tactical options are not always coercive:

> Many of the skills needed for good policing are also well-suited to striking the right balance between controlling [offenders] to protect communities and requiring them to take the action needed to change their criminal lifestyle and move into a law abiding and disciplined way of life.

In this view, there is an impetus for police officers to play an active role in rehabilitating offenders. Field intelligence officers are therefore also required to provide IOM offenders with ‘pathway support’ – specialist advice given to offenders, in an attempt to reduce the risk of reoffending, and the provision of action-plans to address accommodation, employment training and education, mental and physical health, drugs, alcohol, finance, benefit and debt, family relationships, attitude, thinking and behaviour.
This ‘enhanced’ form of service provision is available to IOM offenders by virtue of their participation in IOM. It is intended to offer offenders additional encouragement to participate in and comply with the scheme.\(^8\)

Coercive police action remains the domain of uniformed IOM police officers. As a uniformed police manager explained, “Our role is to disrupt the criminal activities of IOM offenders. We do this any way we can with the powers we have”. Police work has taken on a novel duality of meaning within IOM. The police organisation provides both the stick (enforcement) and, alongside probation and other agencies, the carrot (support). This represents a substantial change to policing and (officially at least) how some officers frame police work (XXXX, 2016).

**Police decision-making within IOM**

Officially both sets of IOM police officers support the IOM mandate of reducing crime, but in different ways. Nonetheless, whilst the rhetoric of IOM establishes a framework of new tasks and functions for these officers, formal rules, whether legal or organisational, rarely constrain what police officers do in practice (Loftus, 2009; McConville, 1991; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1998). Rather, much empirical evidence suggests that police objectives and the decisions that underpin them are linked to various informal cultural norms, values, beliefs and craft rules that frame police actions and thinking (Banton, 1964, Cain, 1973; Reiner, 1978; Holdaway, 1983; Punch, 1983; Foster, 1989; Young, 1991; Chan, 1997; Crank, 1998; Loftus, 2009; Marks, 2004; Skinns, 2011). These are an exaggerated sense of mission, a desire for action and excitement, the celebration of violence, an Us/Them divide of the social world, a sense of internal solidarity but also social isolation, prejudice, racism, sexism, homophobia, authoritarian conservatism, suspicion and cynicism (Reiner, 2010: 119-132; Loftus, 2009: 96-97; Dixon, 1997).\(^9\) These distinctive sets of cognitive tendencies, variously described as ‘cop culture’, are conveyed and reinforced throughout the lower echelons of the police institution through a process of socialisation and further distilled through the operation of powerful working ‘assumptions’ (Hoyle, 1998), ‘rules’ (McConville et al., 1991) and ‘frames’ (Hawkins, 2002). Classificatory devices like ‘previous’ (being known to the police), suspiciousness (being incongruent with local surroundings, uncooperative or in keeping with the wrong or prohibited company) and workload (volume and quality of tasks) structure the operation of police discretion, acting as a prism through which informal police culture is transformed into police action and behaviour. As Manning (1982: 230) puts it, organisational culture ‘acts as a grid or screen by which events are defined and also makes relevant internal rules’.

One might question, therefore, whether it is possible to make claims about the practical operation of IOM when, to date, little is known about the extent to which this way of working has disrupted traditional catch and convict police cultural practices, particularly among police officers responsible for providing offenders with support. Despite the substantively different approach to policing offered by IOM (officially), a number of informal rules, shaped largely by the dominant characteristics of police-culture, may be driving police-offender interactions. Thus, there seems good reason to explore whether police talk bears any relation to police action in the areas of IOM patrol work and field intelligence gathering. What makes such an enquiry more pressing is the danger that police culture may inhibit the full acceptance of a role founded in part on a different kind of engagement with offenders,
constructed in terms of rehabilitation and support. It should also help illuminate how far the relationship between carrot and stick is the close, constructive and integrated one suggested by IOM rhetoric.

**IOM patrol officers: the ‘stick’**

Uniformed patrol officers, working within IOM, are assigned tasks on the basis of information gleaned by field intelligence officers and inputted into the police computer system. As Ericson and Haggerty observe, ‘computerised reporting formats for the presentation of police knowledge provide classifications that fundamentally influence how the police think and act’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 58). Thus, shared intelligence influences whether a “person’s door gets knocked” (IOM patrol officer) or whether an individual gets stopped in the street and ‘encouraged’ by IOM’s uniformed police officers to re-engage with the scheme. “It’s intelligence-led policing”, one officer explained. “We’re looking for prolific offenders, executing warrants and directly trying to lock up and arrest these people”. IOM patrol officers therefore play an important part in the daily management of those subject to IOM and are regularly called upon to enforce licence conditions, curfew requirements, or simply to keep an eye on these people by “having a word” (IOM patrol officer). Each of these events, however, can be mapped upon a broader police aim, which is explored below – letting prolific offenders know the police are there.

**Communicative surveillance and social discipline**

Throughout the research people were often stopped in the street by IOM patrol officers and asked questions. At times they were searched. However, in over 50 hours of observations of uniformed officers, only one stop and search led to an arrest. For the most part, mirroring other policing studies (e.g. Allen et al, 2006; Moon et al 2011, Quinton, 2011), police officers required people to account for themselves. Often these encounters, which typically began as informal ‘chats’, were unstable and fluid (see also, Lister et al. 2008: 18):

David noticed a man, probably in his early 30s, riding a bicycle. The man seemed [to him] worthy of police attention. “He looks like shit. Let’s see what he’s doing”, David said, stopping the car next to the man. “Whoa there. Hold on a minute mate. Where are you going? And whose bike is that?” David asked. The man explained that the bike belonged to him and that he was on the way to his girlfriend’s house. This explanation did not dispel Roger and David’s suspicions. Roger had a closer look at the bike and took down a number written on its underside. He then checked in by radio to find out if it had been reported missing. The bike was ‘clean’.

However, where officers’ suspicions were aroused (or further aroused), more formal police powers such as stop and search were brought into play. To continue the preceding case study:

“Let’s have a quick look in your pockets see if you’ve got anything”, David suggested. Amongst the items turned out of the man’s pockets was a credit card, but the name on the card belonged to a female. The man said the card belonged to his girlfriend and provided a telephone number. David telephoned the man’s girlfriend who confirmed ownership of the card and that the card was in the man’s possession so that he could purchase electricity and gas for her flat. Finally, the man was ‘PNC checked’ for outstanding ‘warrants’, but cleared and subsequently sent on his way.
Stopping and questioning people in this way enables officers to subject them to a staple diet of ‘communicative surveillance’ (Lister et al., 2008) and ‘social discipline’ (Choongh, 1997). The primary concern here is the maintenance of control over individuals. But, stopping known ‘scroats’ and ‘bottom-enders’ (Shiner, 2010: 945) in the streets and requiring them to explain what they are doing, where they are going and why, is not only a way for the police to monitor people, it also communicates an authoritative message: ‘We are watching you’.

Observations further revealed the influence of classificatory devices in what amounted to the systematic and repeated targeting of IOM offenders. Decisions to stop people in the street, whether to get an account, to search, or arrest, were typically based on cues relating to a police officer’s beliefs concerning offending history (McConville et al., 1991: 26). The cues in turn led to the cultural assumption of a working rule or frame:


What might ordinarily constitute a meaningless event (a person walking down the street) was assumed by Roger to be suspicious, primarily because of the nature of what is known about Jack’s previous. Further information provided by Jack, which may have led to renegotiation and subsequent redefinition of the emerging frame, is subsequently ignored by Roger. In the meantime, the original assumption is crystallised into a working rule (those assumed to be suspicious should be interrogated) augmented by the police cultural characteristic of hyper-suspicion. This is unsurprising since, as Quinton observes, ‘the strategy of seeking out additional signals to confirm suspicion and reject alternative explanations [is] widespread’ amongst front-line police officers’ (Quinton, 2011: 362). In this instance, the frame, known offenders must be stopped and questioned, is adopted by Roger and swiftly acted upon.

Relentless suspicion on the part of the police relates to the stereotyping of individuals. The ‘them’ and ‘us’ characteristic of police culture embraces such classification, shaping the distinction between types of ‘them’ and types of ‘us’. The IOM patrol officers I observed, for example, regularly stopped individuals on the basis that they looked like “shit”, an auxiliary trait that apparently indicated ‘suspiciousness’. Moreover, time spent with the same officers uncovered an obvious distaste for IOM offenders (or for that matter any other potential suspects they came across). Terms frequently employed by IOM patrol officers to describe people included: “dirty scroats”, “shits”, “horrible cunts”, “shit-bags” and “crack-heads”. These references refer to individuals identified within orthodox policing literatures as ‘police property’ – people of low-status, powerless groups, whom the dominant majority view as distasteful (Lee, 1981: 53). The job, as these officers plainly viewed it, was to protect ‘ordinary decent people’ (‘Us’) from these ‘scum’ (‘Them’) (Reiner, 2000: 93-94). “We [should] give some [offenders] the death penalty as a deterrent to others” one IOM patrol officer suggested as a potential “solution” to the problem.

*Imposition of authority and extraction of deference*
The offenders I interviewed maintained that contact with IOM uniformed police was largely coercive and hostile. Often, they seemed to be failing an informal police rule – the ‘attitude test’ (Loftus, 2009: 112-113). People that display an appropriate amount of deference, for example by apologising or quickly admitting fault, pass the test whilst those who do not face the prospect of coercive police action. David, an IOM patrol officer, explained how the attitude test impacts on police decision-making:

It’s quite simple really; if somebody’s compliant and polite they will have a positive contact with the police. If they’re obstructive, violent or abusive, they're failing that attitude test, you know. It doesn’t mean we have the power to arrest them; it just means we might look a little bit deeper, in order to find a reason.

David’s explanation of the attitude test is far from being “quite simple really”; it is a rationalisation of highly patterned and structured police behaviour, motivated by the cultural objective of imposing authority and control, rather than legal norms. Below is an example of how IOM officers use the test to make sense of a confrontational situation and how to proceed with the suspects:

Driving between one address and another, we were passed by an expensive car driven by two men. One of the men appeared to be of Caribbean descent and the other Somalian. As we passed them, David mimicked what seemed to be a ‘black American accent’, saying something on the lines of ‘iaiat, - wassup’. The man in the passenger side of the car did not respond; instead he wound his window up. Officers in another police car, Richard and James, radioed through that the car was identified as belonging to known drug dealers. David immediately put the sirens on and stopped the car containing the men.

David’s mimicking of a stereotyped black American accent is racist, but also appears to be an attempt to provoke the men. Antagonising offenders in this way is a recurring theme throughout policing studies (e.g. Loftus 2009: 113; Smith and Grey, 1983; Foster, 1989). The aim is to create an explosive situation, potentially resulting in arrest; here provocation itself is legitimising the response of the police. Framing offenders in a derogatory or racist way is likely to augment any hostility they feel towards the police. To extend the preceding case-study:

The hostility of the men towards David, Richard, Roger, and James, was thinly veiled. But it resulted in the men being handcuffed ‘for the purpose of a search’, Roger explained, and so a check could be done on the car. One of the men had a plaster cast on his arm and loudly complained as he was handcuffed. The other man started shouting and swearing, calling the officers ‘fucking pigs’ and complaining that they had already been stopped ‘by your lot’ earlier in the day.

Roger was visibly wound up by this and responded by threatening to arrest the men under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. When one of the men asked Roger why they might be arrested Roger explained: I can arrest you because your behaviour is likely to cause ‘alarm harassment or distress’ to members of the public, in this case, us. This threat and explanation appeared to placate the man and he backed down.

As the extract shows, s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 is a useful way of enforcing social discipline on the men during what appeared to be a confrontational situation. The Act provides the police with arrest powers, which are amorphous and can be adapted to suit circumstances in which offenders are being disorderly (see also, Choongh, 1997: 75 and Loftus 2009: 113). In this case, it allowed IOM uniformed
officers to impose authority – both personal authority as well as the abstract authority of law and order (McConville, *et al.*, 1991: 25). Later, in interview, David explained how the men had failed the ‘attitude test’:

If they had stopped and said, ‘Hello officers how can we help?’, instead of shouting and stuff like that to annoy us, then they would have been checked and quickly sent on their way.

Whilst David argued that the men failed the attitude test, it is difficult to conceive of how the ‘test’ might have been passed in the circumstances. The men were neither abusive nor non-compliant. The officers do not seem to have stopped the car because the suspect wound his window up but because of information received. Moreover, David and the other officers present went into the encounter with a hostile mind-set that produced a bad reaction. The officers then treated the reaction as justifying an even more aggressive response. This type of activity was later rationalised as “failing the attitude test”, but the test was rigged from the start.

Some of those frequently stopped will also enter these interactions with a hostile mind-set, but it seems they usually keep any feelings of hostility to themselves in order to avoid even worse impositions of power. However, it appeared that, for IOM offenders, public spaces represent a coercive and hostile environment, largely controlled by uniformed police officers. Formal legal regulation is limited and thus encounters between these officers and IOM offenders were tense events. With little exception the uniformed IOM police officers I observed stamped their authority in the face of any disrespect or resistance exhibited by suspects. The working assumptions officers used to make sense of these situations were based on information and knowledge about an offender’s past or superficial stereotypical indicators, whilst they adopted frames typically orientated towards communicative surveillance and social discipline. IOM patrol officers were specifically tasked with targeting IOM participants, but encounters I witnessed (e.g. between David, Roger and the man on the bike (not identified as an IOM offender)), indicate that patterns of suspicion cut across both IOM participants and other suspects – ‘known’ or otherwise – that were not part of the scheme. Despite changes to the operational landscape, some well-chronicled elements of traditional police culture continue to endure within the framework of IOM. Perhaps this is unsurprising, however, given that these IOM officers were tasked with the traditional police role of enforcement. Whether field intelligence officers think, talk and act somewhat differently (which one might expect given that supporting offenders falls within their role) is considered in the next section.

**Field intelligence officers: the ‘carrot’**

Field intelligence officers are engaged in a specialist-policing role within the IOM partnership. As Colin, a field intelligence officer, explained:

The idea is to try and get some sort of intelligence picture of what offenders are up to, who they're associating with and things like that and to see if there's anything we can do as a service to try and stop them reoffending.

Information gathered on offenders is continuously processed and updated by field intelligence officers and other IOM workers. The stream of intelligence is circulated amongst the various participating
agencies. Co-location of the partnership criminal justice agencies and the use of shared open-plan office space greatly augments this process (see also, Senior et al 2011). Integrated offender management could be re-cast as integrated information sharing, for it is this pooling of knowledge which facilitates the development of recidivism prevention strategies by the IOM unit. The practice of distributing information between agencies is a risk-management exercise wherein the information gathered is assessed and the risk, if any, of these individuals re-offending is calculated.

Field intelligence officers are given official direction on how those subject to IOM should be appropriately risk-managed according to their risk status (IOM Police Operations Guide, 2010). Individuals are colour coded according to the level of risk. ‘Red’ offenders are deemed to pose the greatest risk of re-offending, whereas ‘green’ offenders appeared to be, at least from an intelligence point of view, back on the straight and narrow. Levels (and types) of enforcement, therefore, are determined by the colour-code assigned to each offender during the selection process. For ‘red’ offenders, habitual drug users who regularly commit priority crime, the enforcement strategies can be tremendously invasive. They include daily reviews, regular, singular and multi-agency intelligence visits, CCTV surveillance, covert and overt directed surveillance, financial investigation, ASBOs, and arrests (where offenders are failing to adhere to prison licence conditions). ‘Amber’ offenders, vaguely defined as those on whom IOM has insufficient intelligence to judge the degree of priority crime offending and who are still deemed involved or at risk of being involved in such offending, are subjected to a slightly more relaxed regime of weekly reviews, arrest plans, intelligence visits and monthly case supervision. ‘Green’ offenders are former red or amber offenders, who are still monitored even though intelligence suggests that they are no longer committing priority crime. This group is managed through monthly reviews, case supervision, arrest plans and ad hoc intelligence reports.

At the operational core of IOM, field intelligence officers clearly remain central to the risk-allocation and management process (see also, Senior et al, 2010: 17). Officially, these officers must work to reduce re-offending through enforcement and support. However, the discretionary nature of policing (Dixon, 1997; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999) also enables field intelligence officers to pursue their own ideas about how the IOM mandate should be attained.

The dominance of standard police cultural practices

Our examination of the talk and actions of IOM police officers has been shaped by an overarching concern as to whether there is disjunction between IOM policy statements and how they are realised on the ground. The sharp focus has so far been concentrated on the working culture and rules exhibited by IOM uniformed patrol officers during routine interactions with IOM. These police officers act primarily as sentence enforcers, surveillance operatives and, as noted above, general disrupters of crime – all standard policing practices (Waddington, 1998). It is not surprising therefore that the occupational culture of IOM uniformed enforcement officers was found to be consistent with previous studies of frontline police work.

Nonetheless, police culture both derives and sustains its normative orders and values from police work and the challenges of that work (Loftus, 2009: 198; Loftus et al, 2016). Thus, it might be expected, that close working with agencies, which traditionally exhibit markedly different cultural orientations to
those found amongst police officers and requiring field intelligence officers to provide social support to offenders, would reduce the impact of police culture on the attitudes and behaviours of these officers. However, the widely embedded (and often articulated) police cultural practices encountered during this study suggest an alternative thesis. With few exceptions, the culture of the officers in this study bore a striking resemblance to orthodox police culture. Suspicion, cynicism, pessimism, conservatism, intolerance and prejudice were found to persist amongst both sets of IOM police officers. However, as we shall see, many of the core characteristics of cop culture have found subtle ways of filtering into the approach of field intelligence officers to the management of IOM offenders.

Knowledge sharing and distribution – the core of IOM

“They’re after information and that’s what policing is all about.” (IOM offender)

As Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 21) observe, the police are first and foremost knowledge workers. For risk-profiling IOM offenders, efficient production and distribution of knowledge is paramount. Field intelligence officers used various technologies to gather information: stop and account, computer databases, offender interviews, telephone monitoring, CCTV, and covert surveillance. The surveillance of social media was also a useful method of generating knowledge adopted by field intelligence officers. “You’d be surprised what offenders post on Facebook”. I’ve read updates about a “good score” last night and so on… which is especially interesting to us if we know a burglary was committed that fits the [modus operandi] of that particular offender”, Brian, a field intelligence officer, explained.

Working closely with IOM partners has afforded the police a new level of access to the lives of IOM offenders. Officers are now, with ease, able to keep people under surveillance in ways that might have previously been off limits or difficult to achieve. Throughout the study field intelligence officers often visited (mostly unannounced) the homes of IOM offenders and “dropped in on” routine probation appointments. The importance of these encounters was well understood by these officers:

I will endeavour to knock their doors and get to all their appointments with probation officers to obviously see whether they're testing positive/negative (for drugs), what they're wearing, who they're hanging around with, generally where they're at, how positive and how willing they are to engage with us. Obviously from a police point of view, so I can feed that intelligence back into the system, seeing whether they're toeing the line or not.

Such activities are closely linked to the expectation that officers will gather intelligence for enforcement purposes (Ministry of Justice 2010). Yet formal IOM policy dictates that field intelligence officers give equal attention to both intelligence gathering and support (Police Operations Guide, 2010). Indeed, a small minority of IOM police officers appeared to have moved beyond a pure catch and convict policing mentality, instead adopting a more welfare-orientated approach to offender management. Field intelligence officers like Gina, who advocated that “if people want to help themselves you should do your utmost to help them to get off a life of crime and get their life together”, Chris, who recognised that “a large part of the role is to engage with IOM offenders and try and offer them as much support as we can” and Martin, who spoke of his efforts to involve IOM offenders in voluntary work, education and training programmes:
I’ve tried to get a few of the people I work with into the Prince’s Trust. Nearly got there with one. Really close. Got all the way down there. Showed him all the schemes. He realised it would be good for him. Afterwards I took him for a coffee somewhere nice. I wasn’t trying to bribe him but just trying to open his eyes and show him that’s a bit more than just your mates are out there and they’re going to get you to run off and do something stupid. I was close to getting him to sign up.

What did come across clearly during the fieldwork, however, was in practice most field intelligence officers used their rehabilitative mandate to generate fresh intelligence (see also, Evans, 2015; Sleath and Brown, 2017). Working in this way provided an opportunity for officers to incorporate intelligence gathering into the provision of support whilst driving forward the crime control goals of the police organisation. As Adrian revealingly observed, “You get far more intelligence from people if you build up a rapport with them and try to support them”.

The formation of support-type relationships (with the ostensible aim of helping to rehabilitate recidivists) is an extension of what many police officers do day-to-day on the streets: cultivate reciprocal relationships, “I do something for you, you do something for me” (Field Intelligence Officer) with petty persistent criminals, prostitutes and the homeless as a way of building an informal network of informants:

Clair was attempting to locate a female IOM offender who had been having trouble with her boyfriend. Clair had been trying to get her into a refuge. We drove to various addresses, with no success. “I’ll catch up with her some other time, Clair explained. “Take her for breakfast. It’s kind of frowned upon by the bosses – buying food for offenders – but it’s worth it if they give you some information”.

Such practices are also a subtle way of imposing social discipline on an offender given that regular contact between police and IOM offenders will serve to communicate control and remind them that they are under surveillance (Choongh 1998: 227; Lister et al, 2008). Various extracts would demonstrate this, but the following field note recorded during a ride-along with Gina seems most apposite:

Having received intelligence that an IOM offender may be involved in a recent spate of burglaries, Gina decided to knock on the man’s door. “We’ll pop round – just to let him know we’re watching”, Gina explained. The door was opened by a man. Gina introduced herself, explaining that she was here to see if he needed help with anything. The man seemed puzzled about why we were at his door, stating that he had been on IOM for ages and that no one from the scheme had visited. “Do you need any help, with anything?” asked Gina. “No, everything is all good”, the man replied. “What about your benefits or housing, do you need any help?” “No “everything’s fine”, the man reiterated. Walking away, Gina explained why she lingered at the man’s door, longer than necessary, “I was trying to get a look at his trainers. What size do you think they were?”

Field intelligence officers have “found their own way” (IOM Police Manager) of achieving policing objectives. In the main, these officers seemed unyielding in their professional orientation, with the excesses of cop culture still evident within their approach to the management of IOM offenders. Rather than ‘being alongside the offender and committed to his welfare’ (Nash, 2008: 304), the vast majority of field intelligence officers I encountered were sceptical about the likelihood of IOM offender change. “Most have been offending like it’s going out of fashion. I don’t see any reason why they’re suddenly
going to change now”, one officer complained. IOM offenders were routinely referred to by these officers as “vile smack-heads”, “walking abortion cases”, “dirty scroats” and “wastes of space”, reflecting the types of pejorative language used by enforcement officers (quoted above). One field intelligence officer went so far as to suggest that, “Putting them all down …would save us all a lot of money and do society a favour”. A commonality exists between field intelligence officer talk and that of uniformed officers, at least in relation to how IOM offenders are viewed. Like their uniformed counterparts, field intelligence officers were also found to retain a deeply cynical view of the social world and those in it. The following field note, which I recorded during a ride-along with Mark, illustrates this:

Mark and I were on the way to ‘knock an offender’s door’, as Mark described the activity. The aim was to ask a man, recently released from prison, what IOM could do for him. We passed a man walking down the street. He was barefooted and bare chested. Looking the man up and down with a stern frown, Mark turned to me and said: “Look at what we’re faced with – evolution clearly hasn’t moved on round here. It’s like society has lost its moral compass.”.

Mark’s exaggerated perception of the silent erosion of social morality, can be located within what core policing literature describes as police ‘pessimism/cynicism’. As Reiner explains, ‘Officers often develop a hard skin of bitterness seeing all social trends in apocalyptic terms, with the police as a beleaguered minority about to be overrun by the forces of barbarism’ (Reiner, 2000: 93-94). Scepticism further embeds the crime control-orientated approach of field intelligence officers to offender management. As a result, officers largely adopt the approach of attempting to keep under surveillance, catch, re-convict and ‘bang up’ these individuals (preferably at the earliest opportunity), but these methods also can be further connected to the police officer’s desire for action and excitement.

Getting a buzz: re-defining action within the context of IOM

Unpredictable and confrontational physical interactions with citizens, witnessed during time spent with uniformed IOM police, did not form the majority of the day-to-day work of field intelligence officers. Instead, I observed that the vast majority of field intelligence officers’ time is spent in front of computer screens, entering intelligence reports into the local police database. This is not to say that officers did not harbour a desire for the thrill of the search, chase and arrest (Waddington, 1998: 99). In fact, officers were resistant to the idea that their role was one that encompassed a less action-orientated dimension. Rather, action was redefined so as to fit with the field intelligence officer role:

Depends what you mean by action. Joe Bloggs’ view of your average copper is in uniform racing around and doing what they do. Well, we don't do any of that now. From my point of view action now is meeting these people and getting some nice information from them, building up a bit of a rapport with them; not being fluffy but building up a rapport with them so that they trust you, so that then they can tell you stuff without even realizing they're telling you and you put a nice intelligence report in. It's a bit dry; it's a bit dry, but it's a different way of looking at things. As much as I'd like to roll around on the floor with some of them sometimes, clearly we're not doing that, but yeah. I get a buzz. I like meeting people anyway and I get a buzz from going to someone's house and talking to them and being able to have a look around without being there having just kicked the door in.
The response here was typical amongst IOM field intelligence officers, but the “buzz” as Colin describes it, comes from using inter-personal skills to out-smart offenders, gaining their trust but at the same time acting against their interests. Police officers take a similar approach during interrogations (Ofshe and Leo, 1998). Rather than being viewed as mundane or routine, this sort of police work is more akin to the intelligence gathering done by the ‘Criminal Investigation Department’. Whilst this sort of work is not as action-orientated as ‘rolling around with offenders’, the police desire for action/excitement is sated by the exciting combination of out-smarting and spying on IOM offenders. Yet for some field intelligence officers valorising action in the form of the skillful detection (Young, 2016: 30) was insufficient; instead these officers continued to seek out what obviously they viewed as more thrilling police work:

Recalling events of the previous day, Barry and Kim (field intelligence officers) mentioned that one of “their IOM offenders”, known to be disqualified from driving, had been seen sitting in the driving seat of a car. Whilst the sighting had taken place during ‘down-time’ (in this case whilst driving to and from appointments) the officers described, with some enthusiasm, how they had parked up around the corner, but within viewing distance, and had waited for the person to drive off. When the offender did, Barry and Kim pursued the car but lost sight of it, then spotted the car again but this time unoccupied. A short time later when they caught up with the man who was out of the car and walking, Barry and Kim challenged him about driving the motor vehicle.

The man apparently mocked the field intelligence officers saying, “I’m not that stupid to let you catch me driving like that”, which Barry and Kim took to mean that the offender had indeed been driving the car. Catching the offender in the act of driving whilst disqualified would have enabled the officers to put pressure on the probation service to return the offender to prison for the rest of his prison sentence. The ‘mocking’ was also viewed by Barry and Kim as ‘bad behaviour’ (and most likely a challenge to their ‘authority’) and alongside the alleged driving offence was considered by the field intelligence officers as enough for the offender to be recalled to prison.

Barry and Kim seem to go beyond the typical field intelligence officer remit, enthusiastically taking up the opportunity to participate in police work offering the promise of excitement. These officers had the rare opportunity of gaining direct evidence of what they suspected was offending behaviour. The design of IOM suggests that parking up and observing the offender in order to gather useful intelligence falls within the field intelligence officer mandate, but confronting the suspect constitutes the type of enforcement activity ordinarily carried out by the enforcement arm of IOM. Nonetheless, both officers clearly viewed this event (attempting to catch a misbehaving IOM offender ‘red-handed’) as ‘real police work’ (Loftus, 2009: 91). As Kim later explained:

We’re police officers, it’s what we’re supposed to be doing really. If they’re not behaving themselves then they don’t deserve to be out in the community and it’s our job to make sure they get locked up again quickly.

This type of thinking resonates deeply with the police preoccupation with crime fighting and action, long identified as central to police culture (Reiner, 2000: 89; Loftus, 2009: 90). Pursuit of the offender is also consistent with police officers’ exaggerated sense of moral (and cultural) commitment to the separation of social order from chaos. Endeavouring to get this criminal locked up provided, Barry and Kim, with an opportunity to engage in a challenging and exciting game of wits and skill. From a cultural perspective it was ‘business as usual’ for these officers.
Transference of interests and values between IOM workers

There was also evidence that aspects of police talk and action had penetrated the cultures of other partner agencies. The transference was most palpable among probation officers, some of whom exhibited shared systems of values, interests and language with the police. For example, a minority of probation officers described offenders in equally negative terms as their field intelligence officer colleagues. Officers that initially claimed to be “shocked” at the disparaging language used by the police were overheard referring to IOM offenders as “liars” and “wasters” and people that were “incapable of change”. The shift also manifested at a practical level, as some probation officers advanced a more hard-line approach to offender management:

Jane (probation officer) mentioned to Mike (field intelligence officer) that she was no longer able to recommend custody where the offender could not be said to pose a high risk of harm to society. “What’s it all coming to?”, Mike questioned. Jane, however, offered a ‘solution’, “I should be able to word the report in a way that gets round this if [despite other evaluations] we think the offender is risky”.

Drug workers had also detected the cultural change, complaining that some probation officers had become “wannabe cops”. One interviewee provided the following example:

One of the probation officers at the police station was pumped up. She said to me, ‘We’ve just nicked […]’. I was like, so what? She was trying to high-five me. I thought to myself, that’s not something to high-five me about. High-five me when we get someone into rehab for 6 months then I’ll celebrate, not because you’ve just nicked someone. She got the hump afterwards, probably because I didn’t share her viewpoint.

Mike Nash’s notion (1998: 366) of the ‘polibation’ officer – a portmanteau of the roles of police officer and probation officer – captures the phenomenon of probation workers becoming increasingly focused on control and surveillance, perhaps to the detriment of their traditionally welfare-oriented aims/objectives. It was thought that close and cooperative relationships between police and the probation service, within the setting of intensive supervision schemes, would result in probation ‘going the way of the police’ (Nash, 2008; Annison et al, 2015 Kemshall and Maguire, 2001; Mawby and Worrall, 2013). The convergence between the talk and actions of IOM probation officers, like Jane and Andrea and their police colleagues, ratifies these concerns, but also provides firmer evidence of the dominance of police culture and goals within this IOM unit.

Rhetoric revisited

The findings presented above appear to be at odds with many of the claims made about the operation of IOM. Despite close proximity with other agencies and attempts to broaden the police mandate to encompass a focus on pathway support, field intelligence officers continued to adopt standard police cultural assumptions, frames and rules when dealing with IOM offenders. The informal mandate is simple: relentlessly pursue known prolific offenders by creating and grasping intelligence-gathering opportunities and implementing a form of social control rather than assisting in the rehabilitative process of IOM offenders. Thus, whilst field intelligence officers appeared, overtly at least, to be
providing support (largely in the form of logistics, advice and attending drug/housing/employment appointments) to those targeted by the scheme, simultaneously and more covertly they remained committed to the containment and/or incapacitation of IOM offenders.

*Old habits die hard*

Given what we know about the conveyance, reinforcement and variation of police cultural constituents, resulting from professional training and socialisation, the continuance of cop culture throughout the ranks of field intelligence officers begs the question of why the change in the nature of the policing role has not caused the culture to shift. After all, as Skolnick (1966) first argued, police cultural attributes derive from the unique demands of the job. In answer, we might turn to the work of Loftus, which points out that ‘notwithstanding the reordering of the policing landscape, the underlying worldview of officers, displays considerable continuity with older patterns’ (Loftus, 2009: 198). Field intelligence officers are drawn from the ranks of uniformed officers and whilst a transfer to IOM requires a move away from the duties of the archetypal police officer one cannot assume these officers will abandon the shared working culture of the police. These officers therefore would be expected to exhibit police occupational thinking, albeit in a modified form shaped by the uniquely altered policing landscape of IOM. This helps explain the preference among field intelligence officers for enforcement-focused management of IOM offenders, for it reflects the link between coercive policing methods and police culture (Terrill et al., 2003). Whilst the emphasis on social support creates cultural tensions, field intelligence officers appeared to relish out-witting offenders and returning them to prison. The social support mandate provides a convenient cover for what appears to be a continuation of old patterns of policing. Far from mundane and routine, the focus on intelligence gathering fits nicely with the police officers’ desire for crime control orientated action. In their consciousness, field intelligence officers remain firmly part of the thin blue line, protecting society from the ever-threatening forces of evil, chaos and disorder. Senior IOM police managers had expected police officers to modify their working practices and outlook to fit a novel organisational reality:

> We’re looking to step outside our normal professional and cultural boundaries. [Field intelligence officers] should have high levels of policing skills, but exhibit high levels of compassion and understanding and an open-minded view about what leads people to commit crime and what we can do to help them not commit crime.

Yet whilst the scheme (operative for five years) was well-established, with time enough for police attitudes to evolve, this message had failed to penetrate the framing of most field intelligence officers observed during the study. Rather than adapting the role of the police officer to fit IOM rhetoric, these officers reworked the role of field intelligence officer to fit the reality of policing as they saw it: penetrate, survey and control a ‘dangerous’ community of known prolific offenders. This is a departure from the stated aims of IOM, which seeks to break the cycle of offending via welfare-orientated policing (albeit carried out against the backdrop of law enforcement), but it does conform to police culture.
Implications for IOM

The hegemony of police culture and the failure by field intelligence officers to adopt a rehabilitative frame, as reported above, may present challenges for the possible trajectory of IOM and rehabilitation of offenders. The police preoccupation with intelligence gathering, for example, may reduce offender chances of accessing and engaging with support if officers fail to focus on rehabilitation for those who are willing to accept help. Just as concerning was the apparent ‘policification’ of probation (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001). Good relationships between probation officers and offenders are important to the chances of promoting desistance among recidivists (Farrall, 2004). A drift among probation workers towards the police, both in outlook and practice, could precipitate relational breakdowns between IOM offenders and probation workers viewed as “getting too close to the coppers”.

Nonetheless, presented above is an in-depth empirical case study of a one IOM scheme, spanning a single English police area. One must not assume, therefore, that the data discussed above advances a conclusive snapshot of a broader pattern of IOM practice nationwide, but it does raise a further question: how is the empirical evidence here – with its pessimistic conclusions for reformed practice – to be reconciled with previous research on IOM? These studies have found evidence of cultural change (of a more positive nature) and a shift to a more supportive role among field intelligence officers. There are two possibilities. Other studies may have focussed more on the accounts given in policy papers and interviews with officers, whereas my study is firmly based on observation of police officers on the ground over a considerable time period. Accordingly, there is the possibility that rhetoric and practice point in different directions.

The second possibility is that differences, between the insights into IOM offered here and those provided by other research, may be better explained by distinct organisational practices across IOM sites. I emphasised above the considerable autonomy local areas have in implementing IOM. This, for example, enables IOM units to apply the approach to groups other than prolific (mainly acquisitive) offenders – in particular, violent offenders, domestic violence perpetrators and organised criminals (Home Office, 2015).12 These individuals may not attract the same degree of contempt or such frequent street stops, simply for ‘looking like shit’. In other words, the specific context in which IOM participants encounter IOM police officers may influence the type of talk and action directing at them. Structural independence would also allow for differences in how leadership of IOM is negotiated, and power is distributed (or redistributed), among agencies. IOM schemes might, for instance, choose to locate IOM staff in probation offices (instead of police buildings), where a senior probation manager (rather than a senior, police manager) is the IOM lead. Such arrangements may significantly affect the culture of staff. Differences in recruitment policies may also provide an explanation for the divergent attitudes and practices of police officers across IOM areas, with some forces enlisting in ways more likely to encourage the socialisation of IOM police officers into different cultural patterns. Field (2007: 318), during work on youth justice practice cultures, encountered police officers that had volunteered for secondment to youth offending teams having previously worked with young people in a variety of settings inside and outside of the criminal justice system.13 A number of the police forces encountered during other IOM studies may be recruiting IOM police officers particularly attracted to support roles; whilst other forces (including that which formed the focus of my work) simply appoint officers regardless of their personal preferences.
Concluding remarks

This article focused on unpicking the cultural and attitudinal traits that underpin the activities of IOM police officers at one IOM site. It presents a significant challenge to much of the existing literature on IOM by demonstrating that field intelligence officers retain many of the worst aspects of ‘police culture’, rather than embracing the ‘welfare’ aims emphasised in the official rhetoric. Meaningful rehabilitative activity, undertaken by these officers (e.g. developing working relationships, providing logistical support, and encouraging offenders to engage with services), not only failed to soften orthodox police cultural attitudes, it also acted as a cover for the pursuit of core policing goals. The work has changed, but the traditional control culture continues to dominate, inhibiting the mixing of probation and police cultures (or control and support cultures) within IOM approaches. If true nationwide, then the prospects for an IOM that works the way the official rhetoric suggests appear bleak. Yet there is some cause to be optimistic. Earlier research offers a different account of the culture and operational practice of IOM police. These studies paint a positive picture of IOM schemes, where many of the police officers are engaged in what Nash (2008) would describe as ‘traditional’ probation work. In this view, reality more closely matches rhetoric. This suggests that the traditional nature of the field intelligence officer culture I encountered may be contingent on particular aspects of the police force I examined (e.g. recruitment methods and leadership structures). To date, however, there remains limited work specifically on whether such differences exist and, if so, what generates variations in the culture and practice of IOM police officers, across IOM sites. This article closes therefore with the suggestion that a comparative empirical study addressing these important questions would be timely.

1 Localised policing of prolific offending (see, for example, Ministry of Justice, 2010 and Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014).
2 This work was supported by Economic and Social Research Council (EF/H011382/1).
3 Interviewees included nine field intelligence officers, two patrol officers, one police inspector, one field intelligence officer supervisor of the rank of sergeant, six probation officers, two probation managers, two criminal justice intervention workers and one criminal justice intervention team manager. Other available senior representatives from the major stakeholders in the scheme were also interviewed. These interviewees included one Assistant Chief Constable, one Probation Chief Executive Officer and one Senior Prison Officer. Twenty offenders (ten in custody and ten undergoing community supervision) were also interviewed. Police, probation and prison records were used to gather the names of current IOM offenders; names of individuals were then selected completely at random from the list. Most offenders were introduced to me either by probation staff, prison officers or the police themselves; some were selected through snowball sampling (Davis, 2000). In the case of community-based offenders, my belief was that police interview rooms or probation office consultation suites were unlikely to create the environment required to capture free and frank offender perceptions of the scheme. I decided, therefore, that in order to overcome the problem of neutrality, it was necessary, as far as possible, to meet offenders on their own turf. Some offenders, for example, were approached after routine IOM appointments and subsequently taken to a coffee shop, to conduct the interview away from the formal trappings of the probation office or police station.
4 Police operated premises.
5 For a more detailed personal/autobiographical account of my fieldwork and the various challenges I encountered, see XXXX 2016)
6 Under the ‘transforming rehabilitation’ strategy (Ministry of Justice, 2013), Probation Trusts were dissolved and replaced (from February 2015) by a National Probation Service. Following this reorganisation, probation trusts became responsible for high risk offenders, whilst the majority of offenders on community sentences or release from prison (including IOM participants) became the responsibility of ‘community rehabilitation companies’. Fieldwork for this study was conducted between 2012 and 2013, prior to the implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation strategy.
Thus, the impact of the ensuing ‘split’ in probation services (and it is recognised has likely had a substantial operational impact on IOM) was not the focus of the research.

7 Prolific, acquisitive criminals formed the focus of the IOM unit examined in the present study. Nonetheless, the IOM approach now covers a much wider range of offenders, including: Violent Offenders, Priority Youth Offending Team cases, High Risk Serious Harm Offenders, High Risk Domestic Violence Offenders and 18-24s’ Gangs and Serious Youth Violence (Home Office, 2015).

8 There was little evidence, however, to suggest that being a part of IOM afforded offenders improved access to services, otherwise available to non-IOM participants.

9 While there is some evidence of shifts in police culture, as more graduates, women and ethnic minorities enter the force, the main themes continue to be identified in empirical work (see for example, Loftus, 2010).

10 ‘Having a word’ with an IOM offender typically means conducting a ‘low-level’ stop, which may or may not lead to a search and/or arrest of an offender. Police officers retain the power to stop people for a variety of reasons, ostensibly based on ‘reasonable suspicion’, by virtue of s.1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s.23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and can also stop vehicles under s.163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (s.163 does not require reasonable suspicion). The powers are further glossed by the PACE Code of Practice A (most recently revised in 2015) which provides practical guidance for police officers exercising stop and search powers.

11 Referred to by some field intelligence officers as the ‘gold’ or ‘premium’ service.

12 See also note 6, above.

13 Examples included: mediation, counselling, social work, child protection, running youth clubs and prior postings in family support units (Field, 2007: 318).

References


