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Citation for final published version:

Kaminer, Tahl ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0331-7869> 2014. The contradictions of participatory architecture and empire. *Architectural Research Quarterly* 18 (1), pp. 31-37. 10.1017/S135913551400027X file

Publishers page: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S135913551400027X>
<<https://doi.org/10.1017/S135913551400027X>>

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The Contradictions of Participatory Architecture and *Empire*

Tahl Kaminer

Final author's version

Abstract

The article argues that a major cause of inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies in the work of a loose group of politically committed architects is no other than Hardt and Negri's *Empire*.

The Contradictions of Participatory Architecture and *Empire*

There is nothing, no 'naked life', no external standpoint, that can be posed outside this field permeated by money, nothing escapes money. (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri)¹

In 2009, an international masterclass at the Berlage Institute studied a street market in a deprived Rotterdam neighbourhood, the Afrikaanderplein. Headed by Teddy Cruz and supported by Jeanne van Heeswijk and Miguel Robles-Duran, three socially and politically committed architects and artists, the group produced a critique of the tight control and regulation of the market by authorities. The group's proposals were, basically, to liberalise and de-regulate the market.

Whether the Afrikaanderplein market is a case which merits deregulation depends, of course, on the specific conditions the group detected in the area. More important here, however, is that the proposals appear, at least superficially, to contrast the anti-neoliberal and radical positions of the three individuals directing the group. The booklet produced at the masterclass provides the argument for the project's impetus by quoting Teddy Cruz:

There is a contradiction here: While the neo-liberalist idea of the 'free market' operating at a larger scale of the corporate has benefited de-regulation, individual freedoms and illegality, its approach to the small scale of the street market in many cities across Europe has operated as a repressive system of over-regulation and control, eroding the informal manifestations of diversity and social relations that can promote economic sustainability at the scale of the neighbourhood.²

The statement above and the proposals of the group outline state regulation as the adversary, suggesting it is 'repressive'; they mistakenly attribute the tight control of the market by authorities to neoliberalism, while, in fact, it is a legacy of the preceding era of Keynesian economics and welfare state, which produced such control mechanisms in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Rather than a contradiction, the controlled street market represents an

irreducible remainder of a previous era, a territory not yet fully integrated into the logic of free-market economy. Similar misconceptions, accompanied by emphasis on deregulation and liberalisation, hallmarks of neoliberal policies, can be found in many of the proposals and designs of a young generation of socially and politically committed architects.

This paper will study these – very real - contradictions by focusing on this ‘generational’ group of architects and its theoretical and ideological groundings. Such contradictions arise from, primarily, [1] the complexity of some of the relevant issues – for example, the fact that certain regulatory policies were implemented as a means of encouraging rather than limiting speculation;³ [2] the exposure of this group to the 1960s ultra-left critique of the Keynesian-Fordist state, i.e. a critique of a condition which has dissipated.

The loose group in question, consisting of an amalgam of small vanguard architectural practices, emerged a few years after the anti-globalisation movement consolidated in the 1999 protests in Seattle, motivated by the desire to re-establish architectural efficacy in the realm of politics. The formation of this group took place primarily via diverse international exhibitions and gatherings, such as the Camp for Oppositional Architecture (Berlin 2004; Utrecht, 2006), or the ‘Experimental Architecture’ section of the 2008 Venice Biennial, curated by Aaron Betsky and Emiliano Gandolfi. The growing number of such practices, including Estudio Teddy Cruz, Urban-Think Tank, Studio Miessen, Santiago Cirugeda, An Architektur, Stalker, CUP, Raumlabor, and BAVO, and their interest in the political dimension of architecture, has led the discipline away from the focus on signature design and formal innovation to a renewed fascination with the political and social roles of architecture.

Previously, in the 1990s, the political dimension of architecture was framed as a critical stance based on disciplinary autonomy, a position advocated, somewhat differently, by Peter Eisenman and K. Michael Hays.⁴ According to these ideas, loosely-based on the aesthetic theories of Theodor Adorno and Clement Greenberg regarding the role of modern art,⁵ architecture is necessarily critical when practiced ‘autonomously’ – by being ‘free’ from society, it can, supposedly, be critical of society. By the end of the 1990s, however, with the widespread commissioning of precisely this type of architecture, the theory seemed divorced from reality. Autonomous architecture provided the necessary spectacle and *difference* to ‘vacuous’ urban environments, aided in branding cities as centres of ‘vitality’, ‘dynamism’, and relevance, and consequently was an instrument of globally positioning cities and attracting foreign investment.

In contrast, the young practitioners of the twenty-first century have turned to theories of participation, of everyday life, of radical democracy, of ‘anti-statism’, of ‘the right to the city’ – theories that had been central circa 1968 but were marginalised in the aftermath of the demise of the radical movement. Raumlabor have constructed pneumatic structures as community-creating temporal spaces of freedom; CUP have fostered participatory design and planning practices; Santiago Cirugeda and Atelier d’Architecture Autogérée empowered locals by organising the cultivation and appropriation of derelict urban spaces; many of the groups have proposed urban agriculture or community gardening activities as a means of altering the relationship of individuals to community, of residents to urban space, and as a way of claiming the right to the city. Emiliano Gandolfi, curator and himself involved in this loose movement, wrote that

there is an urgent necessity for a redefinition of the architect’s role, along with the formulation of strategies and instruments capable of comprehending the surrounding context, of acting on the complexities of the urban situation, of imagining an alternative. Buildings are ineffectual for the purpose of this change, and simply become part of a process in which the ultimate goal is always determined by the experience and the change in the perspective of the people involved.⁶

Masterplans, blueprints and large-scale interventions are avoided as an ideological stance against the excesses of - ‘repressive’ - governmental power.

Some of the major influences on both the contemporary protest movement and the young architects are directly tied to May ’68, such as the work of Henri Lefebvre, Jacques Rancière, or Antonio Negri.⁷ Negri, an activist in the 1960s and 70s and founder of the Italian *Autonomia* movement, has provided theoretical grounding to the emerging protest movement via his popular books *Empire*, *Multitude*, and *Commonwealth*, co-written with Michael Hardt.⁸ This paper will study the work of Hardt and Negri in order to trace some of the idiosyncrasies and incoherencies of the loose movement in question to the literature which provides its grounding.

The 1960s intellectual group of the Italian left from which Negri emerged acknowledged that postwar (Keynesian) capitalism created better living and working conditions for the working class; that capitalism itself reacted to – and therefore was determined, to some extent, by – the pressures and demands of organised labour. Its members were well-aware that some crucial aspects of Marx’s original thesis had not materialised. Figures such as Raniero Panzieri and

Mario Tronti outlined the manner in which capitalism had dismantled opposition by inclusiveness and reformism, to the extent that an ‘outside’ no longer existed.⁹

The theoretical positions of Tronti and the Workerist movement are still present in *Empire*, *Multitude*, and *Commonwealth*, though often in a somewhat modified manner. Already in *Empire*’s opening pages, the fingerprints of Tronti’s thought are visible. Hardt and Negri accept the current conditions in their generality, and argue that a radical alternative can and will emerge *within* rather than against the framework of global capitalism: ‘the only strategy available to the struggles is of a constituent counterpower that emerges from within Empire.’¹⁰

The 1960s rereading of Marx in Italy and elsewhere faced specific challenges: led by politically-involved intellectuals, it was interested in identifying a role for the political, yet it faced the emphasis of orthodox Marxism on the structural base as the agency determining all aspects of society, an emphasis which depicted politics as merely a reflection of the forces of production. Tronti, in contrast, posited ‘the autonomy of the political’, claiming that politics can themselves take part in shaping society independently of the structural base. This seemed evident enough in the postwar European condition, in which, following the implementation of *planism* and Keynesian theory, powerful governments had significant control over society and the economy. Yet another issue which emerged from the rereading of the 1960s was Marx’s conception of transformation of mode of production as a condition which is achieved *once the mode reaches a stage in which its means of production progress beyond a certain threshold*, transcending the existing mode and ushering in a new one. This argument was obscured in the interwar years, in which the Soviet Union, then pre-occupied with its five-year plan, claimed that socialism was a superior means of speeding the development of the forces of production, a claim absent in Marx’s own writings. Tronti returned to this earlier understanding, claiming that ‘the idea of searching for the salvation of the workers everywhere except in the further development of capitalism is a reactionary idea.’¹¹

In *Empire*, the necessity of the current mode of production, capitalism, is tied to the idea of immanence. The political scientist Ernesto Laclau has argued that the idea of immanence first emerged as a solution to the theological debate regarding the existence of evil in a world dominated by a God who is supposedly good and all-powerful.¹² Scotus Erigena’s solution was that there was no evil, but, rather, necessary stages on God’s route to divine perfection. Similar ideas of immanence exist also, Laclau reminds his readers, in Hegel and Marx – and, in a more explicit manner, also in *Empire*.

The idea that capitalism needs to be exacerbated in order to transform into socialism typically leads to a fatalistic view of history and to an absence of human agency, culminating in a demand for ‘quietism’: basically, the argument suggests that any battle against capitalism and victories over it simply postpone its demise, and therefore are futile, or worse, a hindrance to overcoming capitalism. In particular, it undermines the argument for *political* action and dissent. For this reason, such ‘fatalist’ theses have been opposed by figures such as Laclau.¹³

Hardt and Negri attempt to avoid fatalism by emphasising the liberatory operations within the system of global capitalism, fostered by empowered human subjects, operations which accept the basic premise of the global, neoliberal condition, and which have the potential of giving birth to an alternative reality from within the flawed existing one *by advancing its causes*:

A new sense of being is imposed on the constitution of Empire by the creative movement of the multitude, or really it is continually present in this process as an alternative paradigm. It is internal to Empire and pushes forward its constitution, not as a negative that constructs a positive or any such dialectical resolution. Rather it acts as an absolutely positive force that pushes the dominating power toward an abstract and empty unification, to which it appears as the distinct alternative.¹⁴

Hardt and Negri’s observation that ‘[i]n the constitution of Empire there is no longer an “outside” to power’ is less controversial.¹⁵ The identification of a systematic dissolution of an ‘outside’ to contemporary society is an observation made also by figures such as Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault,¹⁶ though none of these scholars propagated exacerbating current conditions as a means of overcoming them. Art critic and commentator Malcolm Bull responded to Negri by noting that

Because Hardt and Negri’s version of republican liberty is a theory of power rather than of rights it doesn’t easily translate into talk of duties. (Unlike [Quentin] Skinner, they can’t call for laws forcing us to exercise our rights.) Furthermore, their analysis of power is not one that lends itself to judgments about the way it should be exercised.¹⁷

Whereas Marx was an important influence on Negri’s early work,¹⁸ here Spinoza’s philosophy plays a central part. Spinoza’s ‘multitude’ replaces the proletariat as the protagonist of the historic transformation; the multitude already possesses the power (*potentia*), *Empire* argues, and consequently, following Spinoza’s thought regarding God, also sovereignty (*potestas*). It is in this sense that ‘freedom’ is embedded already in a state of nature – that is, a basic possession of power by every individual – and therefore power

allegedly exists prior to the social formation. Bull argues that both Hardt and Negri's focus on power rather than rights, and their avoidance of judging the execution of power are hallmarks of Spinoza's thought:

Both these difficulties are inherited from Spinoza, whose theological metaphysics dictated that, since all power is God's power, power must be co-extensive with natural right. In a state of nature everyone has as much right as they have the power to exercise, limited only by the antagonistic power of others. The formation of the commonwealth involves no transfer of natural right to the sovereign (as in social contract theory), merely an aggregation of power, and thus of right, that increases the power of the commonwealth over nature and over the individuals within it. Civil right is natural right and natural right is power.¹⁹

Negri succeeds in recovering an idea of progress and in circumventing the contemporary Left's dependence on memories of an idealised past, but at the price of a questionable alliance with free-market ideology. Bull underlines the proximity of Hardt and Negri's thought to neoliberalism, quoting from *Empire*: 'It is our turn now to cry "Big government is over!" Why should that slogan be the exclusive property of the conservatives?'²⁰

Bull identifies a fissure within the anti-globalisation movement, namely, a conflict between the demand for social justice and a demand for freedom. Negri is associated with the latter, and for this reason his work is infused with similar thoughts to the ones which prevail in neoliberal theory, itself typically legitimised via a questionable claim to 'freedom'.

And there is a significant concern whether Negri has indeed overcome the fatalism implicit in the propagation of the 'necessity' of the current mode of production. The authors suggest, after all, that the masses – or 'the multitude' – are already empowered:

Don't we already possess 'arms' and 'money'? The kind of money that Machiavelli insists is necessary may in fact reside in the productivity of the multitude, the immediate actor of biopolitical production and reproduction. The kind of arms in question may be contained in the potential of the multitude to sabotage and destroy with its own productive force the parasitical order of postmodern command.²¹

The idea that the multitude is already empowered recalls Tronti's major theory. His 'strategy of refusal' was based on the argument that workers were already empowered; as capital

depended on productive labour, workers could choose to refuse to work, and therefore held, in effect, a loaded gun to the head of the bourgeoisie.²²

But when Hardt and Negri write '[t]he poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this',²³ the empowerment of the multitude becomes merely a rhetorical device which suggests that a consciousness of the innate power *already residing* in every singular person, however marginalised, is the crucial step forward, and that actions by others – the rich, the powerful, the privileged – are completely unnecessary. The conclusions could follow quite a different path than the one Negri proposes: [1] that the poor are 'undeserving' because they already have the power to change their circumstances but have not applied it; [2] that the privileged are not required to aid the poor. The subaltern class needs first and foremost to develop a consciousness of its own power.

In 2009, Negri published an article about the writings of Rem Koolhaas.²⁴ Koolhaas has served, to a limited extent, as a model for some of the architects in question,²⁵ particularly those located in North America, as Koolhaas offered an alternative to the figure of Peter Eisenman and the autonomous architecture he propagates. Yet Koolhaas's heteronomy is subjugated to the current state-of-affairs, far more so than Negri advocates. Negri did not fail to identify the resignation embedded in the Dutchman's quasi-objective distanced descriptions of the absurdities and horrors of the contemporary city: 'We are here in a Rabelaisian situation, often full of sarcasm and intense irony, but with no smile [...] The architect, demystified, continues to exist as a worldly and bitter witness, a disenchanting accuser'.²⁶ And while Negri argues that 'what is revolutionary is excess, overflow, and power',²⁷ exactly those forces with which Koolhaas is fascinated, the Italian scholar is probably unfamiliar with the larger project of Koolhaas – namely, depicting the architect as a 'surfer on the waves' rather than an agent, arguing that architecture is powerless and that critique and resistance are futile – in other words, claiming, like Negri, that an 'outside' position is impossible, but also providing justification for the architect to 'go with the flow' rather than contest 'from the inside'.

Laclau has criticised the absence of politics in *Empire*, arguing that 'within its theoretical framework, politics becomes unthinkable';²⁸ the book does not proceed beyond a general declaration of basic demands, does not envision a politics, or the manner in which the diverse – and often competing – protest movements can coalesce into a political force. Philosopher and political scientist Chantal Mouffe commented that Hardt and Negri 'think it is possible to

reach a perfect democracy in which there will no longer be any relation of power – no more conflict, no more antagonism.’²⁹

But perhaps Laclau is mistaken in treating *Empire* as an analytical study. Rather than an academic role, the book has a political purpose. Laclau himself has written of populist movements,³⁰ and about the moment of (political) articulation – the moment in which an abstract idea, an empty signifier of sorts, or a specific demand, or a name of a leader, act as unifiers of an amalgam of differentiated movements, creating a temporary coalition and mass movement. This appears to be the role of *Empire* – creating the moment of articulation, taking active part in the political formation, and precisely for this reason the book must refer to an absence, in the same manner that demands which become symbolic unifiers of a populist movement must remain abstract – ‘empty containers’ - in order to satisfy the diverse constituencies involved, as in the case of demands such as ‘freedom’. *Empire* can therefore be seen not as unfolding a political theory in full sense, but as the symbol which can enable the political articulation of the protest movement.

To return to the socially and politically committed architects in question: much of what has been written here about Negri applies to the work produced by this movement as well. The anti-statism which animated the 1970s *Autonomia* movement and Negri’s early writings is still a major force in *Empire*, as it is in the contemporary protest movements; among the architects, the anti-statism is expressed as anti-planning, as a demands for participation, and as a rejection of large-scale projects led by government. Adopting theories, strategies, and tactics formed in an earlier era, the contemporary architectural dissidents are, indeed, rattling the disciplinary status quo, aided by the crippling effects of the financial crisis on architectural practice, yet often aiming their critique at phantom adversaries, or pursuing tactics which had already failed the previous generation. Often missed in the return to the theories of an earlier generation is the very different circumstance of political economy and society today, a difference which requires the adaptation and transformation of the theories in question, as well as an understanding of the reasons for a previous generation of architects and radicals abandoning them in the 1970s and 80s.

The passage to post-Fordism, to a post-industrial society and to neoliberal economics meant, among other things, also the weakening of politics via the transfer of power from national governments to the global economic forces of capitalism. Mario Tronti’s ‘autonomy of the political’, conceptualised in the era of strong, centralised ‘Keynesian’ governments, is no longer valid in a post-political period in which economy is free to pursue its own interests with only limited governmental intervention. The withering of the state as a result of

globalised capitalism stands, of course, at the centre of *Empire*; the condition recalls Engels' reading of Saint Simon, characterised as 'the subordination, indeed eventually the absorption, of politics into economics and consequently the abolition of the state in the society of the future: the "administration of things" replacing the "government of men".'³¹ Beyond the traces of Saint Simon in Marx's own writings, 1960s Fordist-Keynesian technocracy certainly posited an end to politics and 'the administration of things' as a goal – a goal that contemporary globalisation is achieving, and Negri is celebrating.

Many of the demands of the 1968 generation have, in fact, been addressed, though this took place by subverting their original meaning: the anti-state stance resulted in the post-political condition and in the empowering of markets; the demands for freedom ended up in expanded individual freedoms at the expense of collective freedoms; the demand for spontaneity and creativity has been answered by culture, by the rise of 'the creative industries', and by spectacle. The powerful '68 slogans 'beneath the paving stones, the beach' or 'power to the imagination' have been assimilated by consumerist spectacle and the 'enlightened' managerial practices of some of the current cutting edge corporations.³² Tactics such as 'micro-interventions', 'urban acupuncture', 'retro-fitting'; a preference for the ephemeral, an antipathy to *planism*, to top-down decisions, to state power, to expertise; a claim to implement democratic principles outside the official territory of politics, to empower the multitude: such practices and ideologies have, in the last four decades, in fact, been integrated and used to foster free-market neoliberalism at the expense of economic, social, and urban planning, which were specific features of 'Keynesian', Fordist society, whether in the form of the Welfare State or other. There is little evidence that the practices pursued by the vanguard architects, like the theories of Negri, are in any fundamental sense disparate from, let alone a threat to the new economy.

Many of the young 1960s protesters understood the binary opposition of communism-capitalism merely as two sides of the same technocratic coin;³³ the promise of '68 was of something radically different, yet today a similar critique can be directed at the May '68 movements and their offspring: their ideas and practices share a worldview with neoliberalism and post-Fordism. In a further contradiction, the '68 protest movement was largely organised as small vanguard political groups, in spite of the anti-vanguardist positions it propagated.³⁴ Similarly, the contemporary architects follow vanguard precedents in their own organisation and role, despite espousing participatory, direct-democracy principles which undermine the legitimacy of a vanguard – the vanguard being the role of enlightened intellectuals to 'lead the way', the type of pedagogical position assumed by Lenin and others, and criticised for its

anti-democratic aspect and its implicit presumption of a position of superiority towards the masses, an anathema to the participatory movement.

In the short timespan since the birth of the architectural movement in question, many of the involved practices have shifted from being highly critical and radical to a more nuanced and professional position, discarding en route not only some of the naivety and simplicity of the earlier stance and rhetoric, but also much of their radicalism. Urban-Think Tank, for example, have approached projects such as Vertical Gymnasium almost purely as an architectural design question, proposing a prototype, a solution which is generic enough to be repeated in various contexts - Caracas, Amman, New York. While highlighting density in their original proposition of a 'vertical gym' for Caracas slums, the gesture is repeated in the density-lacking Jordanian capital. It is difficult to identify their proposition as more 'social' than any other architectural design of our era, except for those aspects which are not controlled by the architects, such as the client's brief. So in what sense is the architectural design itself *social*?

Urban-Think Tank, like many of their peers, romanticise the richness and spontaneity of the everyday life of the informal cities of the Global South: 'From a theoretical standpoint, informality is a complex, nonlinear system in which patterns intersect and mutate in unexpected ways. From a design standpoint, the "informal" can serve as a laboratory for the study of adaptation and innovation.'³⁵ They seem unaware of the manner in which their object of desire, the informal city, was created and exacerbated by precisely the free-market economy the architects supposedly oppose.³⁶ At the end of the day, many of the propositions of the young generation of architects are ridiculed even by Negri, who has written that 'I almost laugh when my closest comrades talk about alternatives in terms of communes, self-managed gardens and city allotments, multifunctional squats, cultural and political ateliers, enterprises of common *Bildung*.'³⁷

So the positions evident in the projects of the 2009 Berlage workshop appear less baffling when placed in proximity to the work of Hardt and Negri. More disconcerting is the possibility that, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, many among the young architects in question have only a limited understanding of the implications of their positions. Yet, despite its shortcomings, the loose movement in question has proven to be resilient and adaptive, innovative and bold. A key aspect of this prowess is the autocritique produced by the politically and socially committed architects and their willingness to take part in an ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of architecture. It is to the credit of this debate, that in its discussions the argument that 'another world is possible' prevails.

Notes:

¹ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 32.

² Teddy Cruz, cited in Berlage Institute Report, 'Radicalizing the Local: Post Bubble Urban Strategies' (Rotterdam: unpublished Berlage Institute booklet, 2009), pp. 12-13.

³ See, for example, the introduction of the iron grid to Manhattan in 1811, which is, basically, a spatial regulatory device, yet was also a means of enhancing rather than preventing property and real-estate speculation; see Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York; London: A Harvest Book, 1989), p. 422.

⁴ Tahl Kaminer, *Architecture, Crisis, and Resuscitation: The Reproduction of Post-Fordism in Late-Twentieth-Century Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁵ Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* [1970], trans. R. Hullot-Kentor (London: The Athlone Press, 2002); Clement Greenberg, *Art and Culture: Critical Essays* [1961] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).

⁶ Emiliano Gandolfi, 'Experimental Architecture: Introduction', in Aaron Betsky, Emiliano Gandolfi (eds), *Out There: Architecture beyond Building* (New York; Venice: Rizzoli, 2008), p. 19.

⁷ The work of Negri, Lefebvre, and Rancière has been disseminated via diverse routes. Rancière's argument about the distribution of the sensible and the embedded politics of an autonomous artistic stance initially infiltrated artistic discussions following the translation and publication in English of his *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London; New York: Continuum, 2004) before being considered in architectural and urban discourses; Lefebvre's work in general has enjoyed a growing readership in Anglo-Saxon countries, his influence strengthened by the rediscovery of the situationists in the 1990s, and by the use of 'The Right to the City' as a slogan for urban contestations; Negri's work, in turn, initially became a must-read for the members of the anti-globalisation movement and an influence on the related Tute Bianche and Ya Basta! movements before being disseminated in architectural circles. The Maastricht van Eyck Academy, with its radical teachings and positions, has educated a generation of curators, theorists, architects, artists, and urbanists such as BAVO or An Architektur's Andreas Müller, and exposed them to this literature, as have similar institutions. Workshops, meetings, discussions and exhibitions such as the aforementioned Camp for Oppositional Architecture, or the conferences Rethinking the Social in Architecture (Umea, 2013) and The Paradox of Dissensus (London 2012) have spread the literature further among members of the group in question. Collaborative organisations which include activists, artists, architects and theorists, such as 16 Beaver (NYC), 66 East (Amsterdam 2004-8), City Min(e)d (Brussels) and many others have been instrumental in the dissemination of these theories.

⁸ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 2006); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2009).

⁹ Mario Tronti, *Operai e capital* (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1966).

¹⁰ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 59.

¹¹ In Pier Vittorio Aureli, *The Project of Autonomy: Politics and Architecture within and against Capitalism* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), p. 32.

¹² Ernesto Laclau, 'Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles?', Paul Passavant & Jodi Dean (eds), *Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 22-23.

¹³ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985).

¹⁴ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 62.

¹⁵ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 58.

¹⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* [1964] (London: Sphere Books, 1969); Hannah Arendt, 'Society and Culture', *Daedalus*, Vol. 89, No. 2, Mass Culture and Mass Media, Spring 1960, pp. 278-87; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

¹⁷ Malcolm Bull, 'You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 23 No. 19, 4 October 2001, pages 3-7; available at: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/print/bull01_.html> (accessed 24 August 2012).

¹⁸ See, for example, the influential 'Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State' [1972], currently available in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of State-Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 23-50, or the anthology Antonio Negri, *Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy* (London; New York: Verso, 2005).

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- ¹⁹ Bull, 'You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife': http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/print/bull01_.html (accessed 24 August 2012).
- ²⁰ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, p. 349; Bull, 'You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife', pp. 3-7.
- ²¹ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 65-66.
- ²² Mario Tronti, 'The Strategy of Refusal', in Sylvere Lotringer and Christian Marazzi (eds) *Autonomia: Post-Political Politics* [c1979] (New York; Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 28-35. See also Negri's early writings on the topic, in Antonio Negri, 'The Refusal of Work', in *Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy* (London; New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 269-74.
- ²³ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 157.
- ²⁴ Antonio Negri, 'On Rem Koolhaas', *Radical Philosophy* 154, March / April 2009, pp. 48-50.
- ²⁵ See, for example, Markus Miessen, *The Nightmare of Participation* (Berlin; New York: Sternberg Press, 2010).
- ²⁶ Negri, 'On Rem Koolhaas', p. 48.
- ²⁷ Negri, 'On Rem Koolhaas', p. 49.
- ²⁸ Laclau, 'Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles?', p. 22.
- ²⁹ Markus Miessen, *The Nightmare of Participation* (Berlin; New York: Sternberg Press, 2010), p. 111.
- ³⁰ Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005).
- ³¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism* (London: Abacus, 2011), p. 29.
- ³² Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* [1999], trans. G. Elliott (London; New York: Verso, 2005).
- ³³ This thesis is advanced by, among others, Jean Baudrillard, particularly in his *The Mirror of Production* (St. Louis: Telos, 1975).
- ³⁴ '[M]ass democratic practice – [...] shuns vanguardist manipulation', wrote Laclau and Mouffe in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, p. 58.
- ³⁵ Urban-Think Tank, <http://www.u-tt.com/researchIntro.html>, accessed 10 September 2012.
- ³⁶ See Fran Tonkiss, 'Informality and its Discontents', in Marc Angélil and Rainer Hehl (eds) *Informalize! Essays on the Political Economy of Urban Form*, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2012), pp. 55-70; Rodrigo Hidalgo, 'Socioterritorial Changes in Santiago de Chile and the New Outline for the Metropolitan Periphery', in: T. Kaminer, H. Sohn & M. Robles Duran (eds), *Urban Asymmetries: Studies and Projects on Neoliberal Urbanization* (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2011), pp. 152-69.
- ³⁷ Negri, 'On Rem Koolhaas', p. 50.