A MIXED-METHOD EXPLORATION OF NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING REFORM IN AUSTERITY ERA ENGLAND AND WALES

BY

JACK GREIG-MIDLANE

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY

SUBMITTED FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

JANUARY 2019

Abstract

This thesis explores how socio-economic environments influence Neighbourhood Policing reform processes in the austerity era. After the fiscal crisis and the following austerity measures in England and Wales, police institutions are faced with unprecedented cuts to their central funding (Brain 2011) and other shifts in the policing field (Loader 2014; Holdaway 2017; College of Policing 2015). Significant external shocks can trigger ambitious policy agendas and the socio-economic conditions for policing reforms (Reiner 2013; Loader 2014). This can place pressure on police institutions to swing from one set of policing functions to another, especially for policing models that are resource–intensive and emphasise less coercive functions (Innes 2005; Punch 2012).

Reforming police institutions, however, is difficult due to the cultural resistance from the street-level operatives and the complexities involved in translating policy ideas and decisions into actions (Crank 2003; Skogan 2008). This thesis contends that these complex and dynamic reform processes are played out across the different levels of an institution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on cultural narratives transmitted through storytelling, as well as group interactions and negotiations involved in police work. This analysis draws upon the interactionist perspective and the work of Strauss (1978), Goffman (1983), and Fine (2012), to explore how group dynamics and culture can mediate reform and shape interactions.

Employing a mixed-methods research design, this study explores both the general trends in the neighbourhood policing team workforce and the reform processes and policing delivery in West Midlands Police. The first phase analyses secondary data from the Home Office and describes the extent and distribution of changes to the neighbourhood policing workforce in England and Wales. In the second phase, observations of police-community meetings and interviews with members of Neighbourhood Policing Teams, explore police cultural narratives and interactions and their implications for Neighbourhood Policing reform.

Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ……………………………………………………………. (candidate) Date …………………………

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD

Signed ……………………………………………………………. (candidate) Date …………………………

STATEMENT 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references.

Signed ……………………………………………………………. (candidate) Date …………………………

STATEMENT 3

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed ……………………………………………………………. (candidate) Date …………………………

Dedication and Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to Amy, who has put up with more than is reasonable in the past few years, and to Elliott and Jonah – Daddy has finished working.

Special thanks must go to my long-suffering supervisors, Professors Martin Innes and Amanda Robinson. I arrived at Cardiff University with only a fraction of an idea, and the conversations and guidance they provided has been invaluable for shaping the thesis and has transformed me as a 'thinker'. So much of my academic development is down to their support, and I am extremely grateful for this.

My research participants in the West Midlands often went out of their way during their busy schedules to assist me and provided fascinating insight into their work. Fieldwork in policing research is notorious for being challenging, and although I did experience some of these challenges myself in the early stages access, I am very grateful for the assistance I was given.

Thanks also to Jim Nixon for the extensive assistance and good conversations.

The whole process would not have been the same without my friends in the Museum Place dungeon. Will Mason-Wilkes, Grace Krause, Ellie Johnson, Ruth Doubleday, and Melissa Mendez especially. Thanks for the distractions as much as the help!

Completing a PhD thesis is as much about motivation and dedication as anything else. Thanks to Amber Fensham-Smith for being an excellent writing buddy and general source of inspiration at a crucial time.

My colleagues at the University of Bristol have been a welcome source of support. In particular I would like to thank Dr Mike McBeth and Professor Christina Pantazis for their help and understanding.

Of course, I must thank my parents for always supporting me through my life choices and always offering to provide help for me and my family. I literally would not be here without them, and I would not be the person I am without their guidance and love.

I am also incredibly grateful to my second parents, Maggie and Fred Roberts, for welcoming me into their home and family, providing shelter, and helping us out with childcare

Finally, explicit thanks to Amy for always being there for me, bringing me happiness even at the hardest of times, and for doing the heavy-lifting when I cannot.

Abbreviations

BCU	– Basic Command Unit
BWT	– Broken Windows Thesis
CAPS	– Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
CAPT	– Community Action Priority Team
CoP	– College of Policing
CP	– Community Policing
HMIC	– Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (now HMICFRS)
HMICFRS	– Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services
HO	– Home Office
KIN	– Key Individual Network
LPU	– Local Policing Unit
MMR	– Mixed Methods Research
MOPAC	– Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (London)
MPS	– Metropolitan Police Service (London)
NAO	– National Audit Office
NP	– Neighbourhood Policing
NPF	– Neighbourhood Policing Fund
NPT	– Neighbourhood Policing Team
NPP	– Neighbourhood Policing Programme
NRPP	– National Reassurance Policing Programme
PACT	- Police and Communities Together meeting
PAF	– Police Allocation Formula
PC	– Police Constable
PCC	– Police and Crime Commissioner

PCSO   – Police Community Support Officer

PEEL   – Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy

RP   – Reassurance Policing

TAP   – Targeted Area Patrol

WMP   – West Midlands Police

Table of Contents

Figures and Tables

1 Introduction: Austerity and Police Reform

1.1 Neighbourhood Policing in the Austerity Era

In December 2013, the Telegraph online newspaper published an article with the headline, 'Don't turn police into social workers, says minister' (Barrett 2013). This article was written in the aftermath of 'the Stevens report', or *Policing for a Better Britain: Report of the Independent Police Commission* (IPC 2013). In this report, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens expressed concerns that the impact of austerity would encourage police forces to retreat away from 'responsive' Neighbourhood Policing (NP) and to "a discredited model of reactive policing" (Ibid., 26). Dismissing the idea that the police can be narrowly conceived as 'crime fighters' – an idea forwarded by the then Home Secretary Theresa May to explain the direction of the government's police reforms (Home Office 2011) – Stevens' promoted the idea that the police have a broad social mission and 'civic purpose', namely, improving "safety and well-being within communities and promoting measures to prevent crime, harm and disorder" (IPC 2013, 14). The Telegraph article reported that the then Policing Minister Damian Green criticised this characterisation of a broader police role:

> "What most worried me about it was the suggestion that police need to do community work. I want the police to be out there preventing crime and catching criminals, and not acting as community workers.

> "What has happened in the past is they have sent [sic] too much time chairing liaison committees with local councils and not enough time out on the street stopping criminals." (Green; cited in Barrett 2013, no page)

The debate about the role of police in modern societies is not a new one, and the academic consensus is that law enforcement is only a small part of police work and that police have limited capabilities to prevent or reduce crime (Waddington 1999; Reiner 2000). Nevertheless, the difference in opinion between Stevens and Green illustrates the competing ideas and narratives relating to the purpose and tactics of policing. Green, for example, drew a distinction between police collaboration with communities and the local council on one hand, and preventing crime on the streets on the other. This is striking coming from a government minister in (or perhaps after) an era that has been largely dominated by the Community Policing (CP) organisational philosophy (Herbert 2000; Tilley 2003) that encourages collaboration and partnerships,

which themselves may have the goal of crime prevention (Fielding 1995, 26-31). Indeed, American CP especially was based on the promise of crime reduction in an era of rising crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Manning 1984).

The political and socio-economic context of these debates is important. The rhetoric from the Home Secretary and Policing Minister during the 2010-2015 Parliament was part of a narrative about how to reform police institutions to make them more efficient in the face of police disinvestment. The following two excerpts are examples of this rhetoric during official speeches:

> In the Home Office, I will be ruthless in cutting out waste, streamlining structures and improving efficiency. But these practical measures can only go so far, and together we have to make sure that - despite the cuts - policing must remain visible and available to the public… In scrapping the confidence target and the policing pledge, I couldn't be any clearer about your mission: it isn't a thirty-point plan; it is to cut crime. No more, and no less. (May 2010, no page)

> The government's police reforms are clearly working, helping officers do more for less; helping them speed up justice by trusting their professional discretion; helping them focus on their real purpose of crime-fighting. (Green 2013, no page)

Whatever the primary purpose of these reforms – fiscal prudence in public service provision or policing transformation – UK politicians endeavouring to redefine the 'real purpose' or 'core' mission of policing as crime-fighting in a time of austerity has a recent precedent. In the early 1990s, the police were perceived to be expensive, ineffective, and, with an increasing number of other actors involved in policing, just one agency in an increasingly plural field of security provision. This led to a similar discussion about whether core policing tasks could be separated from ancillary tasks, and whether the latter could be dropped or undertaken by other agencies (Mawby 2000).

Come the twenty-first century, the political agenda had changed substantially. The preference for policing approaches that prioritised crime management functions receded and the emerging models of policing – first Reassurance Policing (RP) and then Neighbourhood Policing (NP) – prioritised neighbourhood security functions. These new models were updated manifestations of CP, mixing both the so-called 'soft' and 'hard' aspects of policing – respectively, activities that rely on communication, negotiation,

and persuasion to achieve social control on the one hand, and activities that rely on the threat or application of coercion on the other (Innes 2005a). As a model conceived and funded by central government, NP also provided a somewhat standardised approach to hyper-local and responsive policing provision. Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs), were rolled out nationally in 2008, and were to include Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) as the main delivery agents of NP. The NP model's purpose was to trigger three delivery mechanisms - visible foot patrol, community engagement, and problem-solving activities – in order to increase confidence and reduce crime (Quinton and Morris 2008).

This thesis investigates NP delivery and reforms in the aftermath of the international financial crisis of 2007-2008. If NP still exists at all as a programme, it is widely agreed that NP delivery as envisioned during the New Labour era is threatened by the new economic conditions and the post-2010 policing reform agenda (Barker and Crawford 2013; O'Neill 2016; Higgins 2018; HMIC 2014). Indeed, CP programmes have historically been dogged by implementation problems:

> …despite successive police and government attempts to promote 'community policing', modern pressures on police have largely served to pull officers away from locally based, proactive activities into demand-led, reactive duties. Burgeoning public demand on the police has left little time for non-incident-based interaction between police officers and the communities that they serve. Organisational pressures to measure performance in the name of efficiency require the police to prioritise easily measurable activities. Consequently, public reassurance through locally tied patrols has lost out in the process. (Crawford and Lister 2004, 54)

If NP delivery is changing due to a mixture of changing external and internal conditions, as well as shifting ideas about the role and organisation of police work, what does this mean for the CP movement and the trajectory of community-focused policing models?

This chapter will first describe the challenges of the austerity era for police institutions and describe the contemporary policing reforms and changes to the policing field that are relevant to NP. Following this is a discussion of theories of institutional change, which identifies a number of concepts that are useful in analysing change at the different levels of institutions. This fits with the broader aim of this study to provide a more comprehensive overview of police change processes in the austerity era. To reveal current knowledge of how police institutions change, the next section will

review the literature on the different processes of police institutional reform. The chapter finishes by outlining the research design and the main aims of this thesis.

1.2 *The Politics of Post-Crash Policing*

1.2.1 <u>The Financial Crash and the Austerity Era</u>

Police institutions operate within their respective socio-political settings (Manning 2008), and in the years following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 the imposition of budgetary restraints on the Home Office (HO) led to gradual reductions in police funding. This culminated in a 20% real terms cut to policing across England and Wales by 2014-2015, ending decades of funding growth and favourable political conditions for police funding (Brain 2011; also see Mills et al. 2010). The central government grant represents the main source of police funding in England and Wales (Johnston and Politowski 2016) and the impact of austerity on this source of revenue has been higher than the average reduction to the budgets of other public services (Horton and Reed 2011). At the time of writing, public sector net borrowing (the deficit) has fallen by £6.3 billion in the most recent year (April 2017-March 2018) to £39.4 billion (ONS 2018) and the real terms cuts to central funding of the police persist (BBC 2018). Police funding is also distributed unevenly due to different levels of local funding through council taxation, so the impact of cuts also fall unevenly between police forces (Brain 2011).

The idea of austerity in the context of this study refers most plainly to public sector cuts, especially those that fall directly on police institutions. Understanding austerity in this narrow and formulaic sense, however, limits discussion to what austerity does to material resources and the direct impact of falling resources in the public sector on service delivery. Consequently, this omits the logic (Blyth 2013), wider processes, and rhetoric of austerity politics (Bramall et al. 2016). For the purposes of this study, these elements will be subsumed into the phrase 'the austerity era', which is broadly defined as a political and socio-economic backdrop to, and potentially influential variable in, policing reforms and change. Manning (2008, 87) dubs this domain of socio-economic influence as the 'surround', which is the 'larger political forces in a city or a nation' and encircles the Bourdieusian notion of the 'field'.

Blyth's definition of austerity usefully combines the logic, some processes, and the outcomes:

> Austerity is a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state's budget, debts and deficits. Doing so, its advocates believe, will inspire business confidence since the government will neither be crowding out the market for investment by sucking up all the available capital through the issuance of debt, nor adding to the nations already "too big debt". (Blyth 2013, 2)

Although austerity is sometimes presented as the only viable way of reducing national debt – as it has been by the UK government (Afoko and Vockins 2013) and certain media organisations (M. Berry 2016) in recent years, as well as being accepted as such by the public (Stanley 2015) – Blyth (2013) argues that this premise is both reasonable[1] and questionable for a number of reasons and dependent on context. While reducing spending is one way to escape debt, the application of austerity can become politically unsustainable due to the unequal distribution of its social and economic effects. This is partly to do with the impact on public services, as:

> '[t]hose at the bottom of the income distribution lose more than those at the top for the simple reason that those at the top rely far less on government-produced services and can afford to lose more because they have more wealth to start with' (Blyth 2013, 8).

Further implications of this are that reductions to public service budgets, including local government, may exacerbate other inequalities in the austerity era (Stuckler et al. 2017; Donald et al. 2014; Penny 2013), and that the public becomes more reliant on the most easily accessible public services, such as the police, to fill the gaps in service provision left by other receding agencies (HMIC 2017).

Since the 1970s the dominance of neoliberal economics and practices across economically developed countries has been cited as the basis for a number of market-oriented reform programmes in the public sector (Peck 2010) and beyond (C. Berry 2016), and the politics of public finances play a role in how these reforms are justified (Grimshaw and Rubery 2012; 2015; Grimshaw 2013a; 2013b). In contrast to these trajectories, the police were exempted from funding reductions and 'new public management' reforms by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration, as the

---

[1] There is evidence from the field of economics that fiscal contraction can, combined with other reforms, lead to economic recovery through increasing private consumption and aggregate output (e.g. Bergman and Hutchison 2010).

institution acquired considerable political capital through the Conservative party's adoption of 'law and order' rhetoric (Reiner 2016; Morgan and Smith 1989). However, this favourable status was temporary and eventually the Audit Commission was given access to police forces in order to increase efficiencies, culminating in extensive reform efforts in the early 1990s (Brain 2010; Savage 2007a; Mawby 2000).

While neoliberal reform agendas may be an ideological rather than pragmatic reaction to economic shocks and public sector deficits, fiscal crises can provide the political justification for these reforms and ideological agendas (Reiner 2013). For example, the current austerity era has been described as a deliberate attempt to fundamentally change the social model of the UK from 'liberal collectivism' to a 'market society' (Grimshaw and Rubery 2015; 2012; Grimshaw 2015; 2013). This change is accompanied by public sector reforms that "impose a downwards quantitative adjustment in activity, involve transferring activity to the private sector and… the ending of [some] service provision" (Grimshaw 2013, 576). This is not to reduce all policy actors to a single and coherent ideology, as the reform programmes of the Conservative-led Coalition government – such as David Cameron's 'Big Society' and Theresa May's localism – are less ideologically coherent and form an 'eclectic mix' of traditions (Lowndes and Pratchett 2011; see also Loader 2014). In contrast, Morgan (2012) maintains that the overall policy programme of the Conservatives, the more powerful partner in the coalition, used both ideas of the big society and localism to justify the same policies, which are broadly commensurate with neoliberal logic.

In light of the significant changes to the *surround*, it is important to understand how this complex environment influences policing reform and through what processes. Furthermore, what impact do these changes have on the police role in society? If such socio-economic change does have specific effects on policing delivery, this has important implications for deliberate police reforms and the extent to which they can be 'structured in'.

1.2.2   Contemporary Reforms and Issues in Policing

Additional to the financial crisis, police organisations and reformers may also react to social contexts beyond austerity politics. A fuller range of contemporary issues in policing in England and Wales include the official fall in overall crime, the changing nature of crime and police demand (College of Policing 2015; Hales and Higgins 2016), policing of and for vulnerable populations (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith, 2012; Keay and Kirby 2017), policing (de)specialisation (Innes 2014a), policing in the digital era

(Wall 2003; Wall and Williams 2007; Wessels 2007), new governance and accountability arrangements (Loader 2014; Turner 2014; Lister and Rowe 2015), and the evidence-based policing and professionalization movements (Sherman 2011; Holdaway 2017). While not all directly related to NP change, many of these recent reforms and issues relate to the role of the police and organisation of policing (Reiner 2013), and therefore have the potential to impact police institutions and policing delivery significantly enough to indirectly alter NP.

Whether the political reform programme since 2010 can be wholly separated from austerity politics is debatable. Loader (2014) suggests that the austerity era has provided political conditions for an ambitious reform agenda to a public body that has until recently avoided the enforced changes to other public services, including the 'unfinished business' of attempted police reform in the 1990s. These conditions include a lack of strong organised opposition from police bodies, a stronger government, and bad publicity from the Leveson press enquiry (Ibid.) and other public scandals (Innes 2014a). Furthermore, disinvestment in the police has been an easier political choice in an era when government can annually cite falling crime rates, as has largely been the case in England and Wales since 1996 (Innes 2014a). As numerous studies have shown, portraying the role of the police as 'crime-fighters' is empirically inaccurate and does not convey the broadness and complexity of police work (Banton 1964; Bittner 1970; Cain 1973; Clarke and Hough 1984; Bayley 1994; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Manning 1997; Waddington 1999; Flanagan 2008; Charman 2018), yet in 2011 the police's only objective was defined as crime reduction by the then Home Secretary Theresa May, which manifested itself in the removal of all other central targets for police organisations in England and Wales (Loader 2014). Redefining the (core) police role as crime reduction has meant that the government can claim that police disinvestment, resulting in reduced police resources and fewer police officers, are justified while the overall crime rate falls, while simultaneously attempting to sate the public desire for ever more 'bobbies on the beat' through claims that a higher proportion of police now work on the so-called 'front line' and that the Neighbourhood Policing workforce increased by 3,800 officers – even though these claims are potentially misleading (Millie 2014; Greig-Midlane 2015).

Additional to these more assertive moves, post-2010 policing has also seen the creation of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and the accompanying move from a tripartite to quadripartite structure (Lister and Rowe 2015). In contrast to the New Labour government's attempts to radically influence police performance and practice

through the Home Office (McLaughlin 2005; Savage 2007a; 2007b; Gilling 2008), the 2011 Policing and Social Responsibility Act diminished the HO's governance and accountability role. Although PCCs have no direct powers to influence police operations – these are still the domain of Chief Constables – they do have the powers to hold the Chief Constable to account through suspension and termination of employment and to set force priorities. This makes PCCs potential change agents of NP by virtue of these new governance arrangements and democratic processes (Lister 2013), and thus another important part of austerity-era policing in England and Wales. In particular and in light of debates around the efficacy of the PCSO role (O'Neill 2016; cf. Loveday and Smith 2015), PCCs have had to make decisions not only regarding their support of the NP model and 'bobbies on the beat', but also on the question of the provision and retention of PCSOs as part of existing or future local policing arrangements.

The question of what will happen to police visibility and in turn public confidence is particularly keen when the police workforce is falling or is likely to fall due to disinvestment (Barker and Crawford 2013), but the NP architecture is also threatened in other ways. NP is in one sense a policing specialisation, created in an era where public policing was organised into a number of specialist domains – such as response, detection, drugs enforcement, and neighbourhood – and this way of organising policing is under threat from the need for stretched police organisations to deploy resources more flexibly. This could lead to a new era of de-specialisation and the fostering of a broader range of policing skills (Innes 2014a), which represents a shift away from the 'reinvention of the constable' as a 'community leader' back to an 'omni-functional generalist' (Savage 2007c). PCSOs, on the other hand, are one manifestation of pluralisation and hybridity, where the policing division of labour is divided by a host of different agencies, actors and police roles (Johnston 2003; Crawford and Lister 2004; Manning 2014; Brodeur 2010). Reforms made in the austerity era could impact the direction of these trends, particularly if a cheaper patrolling option, public or private, can replace the PCSO without resistance (Loveday and Smith 2015; Barker and Crawford 2013).

Internal police reforms are also influenced by austerity, as organisations must make operational decisions within the constraints of changing financial environments as well as the range of contemporary political pressures. The main regulatory bodies of public policing in England and Wales – Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS – formerly HMIC) and the College of Policing (CoP) – have

had the challenge of identifying and analysing challenges for the delivery of policing in the context of disinvestment and shrinking police resources. One of these challenges is the change in demand for police services, both in terms of overall increases and the changing character of demand, which is currently seen as the increase in complex cases and sexual offences. This had led to the pronouncement of two crucial problems for police organisations: managing demand (CoP 2015) and dealing with vulnerability (HMIC 2016).

The idea of 'managing demand'– or 'reducing demand' – refers to the process of police organisations prioritising declining resources in order to cover the areas of police work that are deemed to be most important to fulfilling their mandate (Hales and Higgins 2016). In essence, the austerity era, with fewer police resources and diminished centralised governance, has catalysed urgent debates about the police role in contemporary society. This also evokes the debates from the 1990s about the idea that police organisations can retreat to 'core tasks' (Mawby 2000). In some cases, demand may be generated by high public expectations of the capacity of public services to deal with a growing range of issues (Fleming and Grabosky 2009). The New Labour reform agenda can be seen as an example of this, as the police remit was broadened through antisocial behaviour legislation (Millie 2008) and the encouragement of a customer service ethos as part of new public management reforms (Fleming and Grabosky 2009) – though this ethos likely had a limited impact on police attitudes and practice (Westmarland 2010). This idea of an excessive remit relates to one obvious method of reducing demand; redefining what demands are reasonable for police with finite resources. There is, however, an alternative (or complementary) method; understanding how to prevent crime and intervene in the lives of those who are considered to be at risk of offending/being victimised. This can be conceptualised as reducing 'failure demand', which is any demand that is caused by an earlier failure. In the case of policing, this would include not preventing crime from taking place or not dealing with other criminogenic or other demand-producing risks – currently referred to collectively as 'upstream' (Walley and Jennison-Phillips 2017).

The importance placed on vulnerability - which relates to areas such as mental health, youth, child sexual exploitation, victims of trafficking, and intimate partner and honour based violence (Asquith et al. 2017) – was evident when in 2016 the CoP conference was themed 'Vulnerability – new approaches, better outcomes' (CoP 2016), in which the then Home Secretary Amber Rudd said that vulnerability was "one of the most pressing issues facing policing today, and… one of my priorities" (Rudd 2016, no

page). Vulnerability appears to be high on the policing agenda in the austerity era as there is a concern that vulnerable people increasingly face a lack of police service provision (HMIC 2017). In keeping with the dominant reform agendas, HMIC made the following claim:

> This state of affairs strengthens the case for more efficient ways of working; by working more efficiently, forces will be able to do more to protect people, even in the face of reduced resources. (HMIC 2017, 18)

New delivery methods for policing of and with vulnerable people often revolve around spatial analysis (Williamson et al. 2007; Chainey 2008; Haining 2009). That is, to implement practical responses to vulnerability, police organisations attempt to ascertain who is vulnerable, divide populations and places into categories of risk, and guide police practitioners (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2012). The idea of vulnerability is important to NP delivery as these issues and the way police organisations deal with them can affect the prioritisation of resources across different spaces (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2015). In other words, different neighbourhoods or other geographical areas can be designated as places of higher risk, NP resources distributed accordingly, and differential policing of neighbourhoods based on vulnerability risk factors encouraged, just as with crime (Williamson et al. 2007).

These approaches fit with the recent developments that Holdaway (2017) refers to as the 're-professionalization' of policing, which involves integrating scientific principles and 'a body of authoritative knowledge' (Neyroud 2011, 44) into police practice and the creation of a new regulatory system and an independent yet accountable professional policing body, the CoP. Traditionally, the philosophy of CP had been presented as an antithesis to the professionalised, bureaucratic model of policing (Manning 1984), so there are some elements of these approaches that are in tension with some of the symbolic functions of policing that are valued by CP and its manifestations, such as social closeness and reassurance, and this new environment could present NP operatives with new challenges in delivering NP.

This section has outlined the contemporary political and socio-economic environments within which police reform must take place. These contexts, it will be argued, provide the rhetorical frameworks and stories through which new reforms are communicated. This requires a deeper understanding of institutional change processes in police organisations to understand the link between external change and reforms, as well as

how reforms are justified, resisted, and enacted by different actors and groups within the institution.

1.3   Levels of Police Institutional Change

With a topic of study so broad as reform and change in NP delivery there are numerous ways for a researcher to investigate these phenomena. Institutional change in policing occurs at multiple levels and involves numerous actors and networks (Savage 2007; Leishman et al. 1995), providing a range of units of analysis, each with an existing body of theoretical literature. Furthermore, police institutions are large and complex entities, where reform does not just occur within separate 'levels' of the organisation but must necessarily interact through a broader reform process that links the causes and effects of institutional reform. This section will briefly review these theories of police reform, exploring what is understood about when, why, and how reform and change happens. This will include a consideration of the role of exogenous shocks in reform processes to reflect this study's focus on change to NP delivery in the post-financial crash austerity era.

Reform refers to new policy directions that *attempt* to redirect, alter, or extend existing policy, and is a perpetual component of any institution (McMahon and Ericson 1984). Institutional change, on the other hand, will be referred to here as the *result* of any deliberate policy or reform and organic adaptation. The connection between the reform and change, then, is when reform leads to a desired change or indeed any meaningful change at all in institutional structure, culture, and practice. Change in policing delivery is also a separate matter, as it can take place not only because of reform, but also despite reform or independently of any top-down policy (Lipsky 1980). Therefore, a guiding question for this discussion is: *when do reforms precipitate change in policing, and which of these changes can be considered to be meaningful?* To consider how this question can be answered, it is useful to first outline some general principles of (the new) institutionalism and related theories of broad institutional change.

1.3.1   <u>Institutional Perspectives</u>

Police institutions are public bodies that are, in the current historical era, an essential part of the modern state apparatus. These bodies contain structures and formal rules that attempt to guide behaviour and produce defined outcomes, but they are also socially organised by the actions of individuals and groups. Institutionalism seeks to study and theorise the "relations between institutional characteristics and political

agency, performance, and change" (March and Olsen 2011, 160), as the structural components of institutions are intended to be translated into political action. Some other fundamental premises of institutional theory are that:

> …institutions create elements of order and predictability. They fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers of identities and roles and they are markers of a polity's character, history, and visions. (March and Olsen 2011, 160)

Accordingly, police institutions are often resistant to reform (Skogan 2008), such as those that attempt to redesign organisations in the image of a profit-making business and apply economic concepts to a public service institution (Crank 2003; Manning 2001). This is because the police are institutionalised organisations that perform 'value work', and police organisations and officers (and other staff) must embody the institutional values within the design of the organisation and the tasks they perform, respectively (Crank 2003). Crank argues that values are "foundational to the police. Organizational behavior, culture, and structure become sensible in terms of the values of members and constituencies" (2003, 187). The external and internal constituents of the police help shape the institution because public bodies seek both internal and external support for their values and goals. Bouma's (1998) view is that this normative context is the essential feature of an institution, distinguishing the broader institution from the subordinate organisation, which itself is shaped by and helps to reproduce the institution by conforming to these norms.

Firstly, this tells us that, theoretically, meaningful change in police organisations is difficult and attempts at reform are limited by institutional values. This does not mean, however, that change is impossible or does not take place (Marks 2000), but rather that there are stabilising features of public institutions in stable societies.[2] Secondly, it suggests that meaningful institutional change, rather than during technical changes to the organisation, is when the normative context of the institution is altered. This then relates to the potential for organisational change because an institutionalised organisation attempts to work within this normative context, influencing which types of reforms can be successful according to their history and social goals.

---

[2] The opposite may be true for unstable societies. Through studying police change in the transitional society of post-apartheid South Africa, Marks argues that police transformation is constant precisely because "police organisations are under constant pressure to realign themselves to changing political, social and economic environments" (2000, 146).

1.3.1.1 Institutional Change Processes

Institutional theory has in the past[3] been good at explaining institutional stability but not change, and as such there is perceived to be a 'conservative bias' in much of the institutional change literature (Baumgartner and Jones 2012; Streeck and Thelen 2005). There are two broad models that attempt to account for both change and stability in institutions: the gradualist (or incrementalist) model and the punctuated equilibrium model (PE).

In PE, the idea of institutional inertia revolves around an understanding that institutional change is often episodic, sudden and unpredictable (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2012), such as when the institution experiences an exogenous shock and an ensuing crisis. After such events institutions may face a critical juncture at which a number of different pathways may be taken, each tied to decisions about its future direction (Hogan and Doyle 2009). PE explains how institutions can dramatically and abruptly change in exceptional circumstances despite

Punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change

Figure 1 Punctuated Equilibrium model

their inherent stabilising features. Figure 1 provides a basic visual representation of how general institutional change is expected to take place under PE. It is important to note that PE does not preclude incremental change (Prindle 2012) but, according to Streeck and Thelen, tends to "conceive of this as fundamentally reactive and adaptive

---

[3] There is contention as to which perspectives present this conservative view of stability. Baumgartner and Jones (2012) suggest that the incrementalists of the 1960s had a conservative outlook and that the punctuated equilibrium model would correct this. Streeck and Thelen (2005) on the other hand suggest that it is the punctuated equilibrium theorists since the 1990s who over-emphasise stability and 'downplay' more regular change.

and serving to protect institutional continuity" (2005, 8). The main alternative to punctuated equilibrium is the gradualist model of institutional change, which suggests that institutions in advanced political economies are constantly and incrementally adapting to new conditions (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Rather than the abrupt and transformative changes theorised by PE, his perspective largely refers to the "slow and piecemeal changes [that] can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior and for shaping substantive political outcomes" (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 1). Figure 2 is a basic visual representation of this process.

Figure 2 Gradualist model

Streeck and Thelen (2005) add that many studies have shown continuity by focusing on the elements of institutions that are continuous. They further argue that change and continuity exist alongside each other in institutions, and that there may be contradiction between, for example, continuity in institutional structures and change in institutional behaviour. This points towards the importance of understanding policy at different levels of an institution (Pollitt 2001).

1.3.1.2   Connecting the Levels (1): from Ideas to Action

Whether change is considered to be gradual or punctuated can hinge on how change and transformation are conceptualised.   One answer is that fundamental change happens when a new *logic of action* is accepted by a multitude of actors within the institution (Deeg 2005; Carstensen 2017). This notion connects the ideas from those who have reform ideas and the capability to transmit those ideas to others in the institution. In a public service, new logics and ideas from policy 'visionaries' or 'entrepreneurs' (Savage 2007), politicians or managers, must therefore gain broad

acceptance for a significant shift in policy action, or street-level service delivery, to take place. This acceptance is given by individuals who make sense of new rules and environments and act accordingly (Weick 1995; Chan 2007), but this acceptance is also mediated by cultural processes (Fine 2012). The idea of accepting new ideas and logics of action implies that delivery agents are rational and can proactively change their behaviour to create new street-level policy.

While this may be a useful way to conceptualise conscious acceptance of reforms and participation in new policy action, it does not emphasise the street-level delivery that is spontaneous and culturally constituted. That is, the art and craft of policing adds layers of complexity to police action, where experience and 'ways of seeing' are drawn upon for improvisation (Shearing and Ericson 1991); improvisation being necessary for police who perform complex and unpredictable work (Bittner 1980; Klinger 1997). Furthermore, there is a danger in seeing gradualism as an evolutionary – or adaptive – process, as change does not have to go in a linear and progressive fashion but instead could be perceived as regressive, especially in states with authoritarian policy agendas (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Consequently, conceiving of rational action that is removed from political and cultural contexts can give an incomplete picture of the dynamics of institutional change. These barriers to institutional change are also evident from studies of policy transfer (Pollitt 2001; Jones and Newburn 2007; Brogden and Nijhar 2005).

Carstensen (2017) notes that gradualism has been successfully applied recently in financial institutions in the austerity era; a time when more sudden changes would be expected. However, the issue remains that gradualists have not explained the impact of exogenous shocks and times of crisis on gradual reform processes (*Ibid.*). This provides an alternative perspective to PE that still takes the impact of trigger events seriously. Instead of these events leading to sudden change, they can instead create new directions or pathways for gradual change processes. The mechanism for this is, according to Carstensen, 'institutional bricolage'. This refers to the ability of rule-makers to rearrange and redeploy institutional elements, and to *(re)frame ideas* that resonate within all levels of the institution, where policymakers attempt to "reapply the existing logic of action" (Carstensen 2017, 140). For Carstensen, this explains the slower, more gradual process of change in times of crisis and sudden shocks.

Although Carstensen uses institutional bricolage to refer to rule-making and rule-taking, it is possible to adapt this idea to account for processes of cultural change within police institutions, and indeed some police change literature has referred to

similar processes (for example, Chan 1996). Where this concept, or an adaption of it, could be useful to theories of police change, is within the bricolage analogy. This alludes to an active and pragmatic approach of taking 'whatever is at hand', suggesting that reforms do not necessarily have to be new and novel. Indeed, in order to resonate with existing logics of action/institutional cultures, it is expedient for policymakers to draw upon existing institutional elements – policies, for example, that seem familiar in their objectives and values. The (re)framing process should also include not just the decisions of policymakers, but also the way that reform is communicated within institutions – through, for example, rhetorically framed stories (Schön and Rein 1994) – and policy implementation, or how these new policies, guidelines, and stories are negotiated at the street level (Klinger 1997). All constituents of an institution are involved in policy (re)framing and negotiation. These constituents tell old and refined stories to make sense of new events and make "on-going reinterpretations of culturally sacred storylines" (Boje 1995, 106). Stories of these new events are in competition for recognition as an accepted, or dominant, narrative, and these discursive struggles can influence how reforms are enacted.

Understanding these debates in the institutional change literature is important for policing studies as it draws attention to the nature, complexity, and difficulties of change at various levels of police institutions. Certain types of policing change are demonstrably incremental (Savage 2007), but these more easily reformable features of policing exist alongside enduring and tenacious characteristics (Loftus 2009; Manning 1997; 2003; 2008; 2010; Marenin 1998). Social and political instability surrounding an institution can also affect the potential for more transformational change, in which the more stable elements of policing can be challenged and potentially changed (Marks 2000; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Finally, there must be an awareness of how exogenous shocks impacts policing reform processes as well as the more likely avenues of, and impediments to, policing change.

1.3.2 Levels of Change in Police Institutions

This section reviews the literature on processes of police reform, change and transformation and separates these into 'levels of change'. This refers to the different locations where change takes place – macro-structural, meso, cultural, interactional, and micro processes – and the studies that refer to and explain change within and between these levels. This will also build on the concepts used to describe processes of institutional change that will inform the analysis and discussion of this thesis. Of course, sites of change can also be sites of resistance, and during times of crisis and

consequent top-down reform efforts there are still a number of internal and external impediments to real change (Skogan 2008). Therefore, these 'levels of change' refer to contentious debates about how real change happens and the likely sources and catalysts of change and resistance.

1.3.2.1 Political Economy

Macro-structural perspectives of change in policing vary in the level of determinism factored into the relationship between macro-structural and policing change. The more deterministic of these is the political economy perspective, which emphasises how the police function is tied to the overall social structure and therefore is about maintaining the dominant order (Reiner 2000) or even fabricating it (Neocleous 2000). From this perspective, the police role is relatively inert in the dominant and tenacious social order produced by capitalist systems, and where changes do occur this is due to paradigm shifts in social relations and political ideology. For Reiner (2007; 2013), legislative change and reforms in the UK since the 1970s reflects the dominant political ideology changing from a welfarist to neo-liberal model, affecting policy agendas and styles of institutional management. This can be seen not only in the 'politics of law and order' and the associated policing and criminal justice policies and reforms, but also more broadly in other reform agendas and social context, which itself can impact the policing field.

Through ideational change, existing institutional arrangements can be challenged by the construction of issues, problems, and solutions (Béland 2009). Manning (2013) suggests that politicians have in recent decades devised 'rhetorical frameworks' to transform the idea of police from a public service to a marketised organisation, and this highlights how stories about policing can be devised and passed down from above the institution with variable results (Lyon 1999). However, these rhetorical shifts are not certain to lead to significant change, in part because economic terms like effectiveness and efficiency are in tension with concepts such as legitimacy and justice, which are about the public good regardless of the cost (see also White 2014).

1.3.2.2 Trigger Events

The effect of sudden shocks to police institutions have been theorised by Sherman (1978) in his study of police corruption, scandals, and reform. The main proposition is that public scandals in cases of police deviance produce processes of reform – a scandal is an 'agent of change'. The structure of a scandal, according to Sherman, is as follows: public revelation of deviant act(s); wider publication of the scandal by media; police defend themselves against accusations and labels; the facts of the case are

dramatized, usually by politicians and reformers; deviant actors are prosecuted, and; the deviant label is successfully applied by the audience. Although Sherman is interested in scandals after police corruption, this framework can be applied more broadly to other institutional scandals or crises and resultant reform, such as recent ASB scandals and their impact on the 'policy profile' of ASB victims (Donoghue 2013), political rhetoric, and policy agendas (Millie 2010). Savage (2007a) summarises these events as 'system failures', in which the trigger event or 'scandal' can be any number of things, including flawed strategies or operations. This opens up the possibility that expensive or 'inefficient' models of policing can be labelled as a system failure when (inevitable) financial crashes occur, leading to charges of organisational extravagance or profligacy that is unsustainable in times of fiscal crisis. It also alludes to how crisis is constructed and the rhetorical struggle between a number of constituents and actors to define the problem and its solution.

1.3.2.3 *Paradigm Shifts and Transformation*

Either by sudden trigger events or large macro shifts, some observe that police institutions change significantly when external conditions make previous structures or operations less desirable or impossible. Kelling and Moore (1988) present an historical account of policing in the US that resonates with the paradigm-swing thesis. They describe how police institutions would change their overarching 'organizational strategy', or values and mission, in order to adapt to new social, economic, and technological conditions and react to political pressure. These organisational strategies are relatively stable for long periods, until external conditions change so much that police values and mission need to adapt. The authors liken this to corporate strategies that evolve to meet new demands and expectations and assume that top-down programmatic changes can change police practices effectively.

The idea that macro forces lead to sudden and significant police change took shape in Bayley and Shearing's (1996) transformation thesis. They argued that in the context of a more plural provision of policing and security services and rising crime, the public police lost its monopoly on policing services and faced an identity crisis. Consequently, new strategies and organisational structures emerged that accepted the limits of the patrol function and the need for more community involvement[4]. A more recent example of the paradigm swing thesis in community policing was forwarded by Punch (2012), who, writing in the austerity era, identifies eleven macro features that shift

---

[4] Jones and Newburn (1998) contradict certain aspects of this account, arguing that the idea of a police monopoly is overstated and ahistorical.

and cause police practices and organisational rhetoric to oscillate. These features include neo-liberalism, managerialism, technology and specialisation. The cumulative effect of the eleven features, Punch argues, is to push policing towards a 'crime control' and 'high policing' (Brodeur 1983) approach, and away from the 'service-oriented' policing of CP. These ideas draw attention to the broader shifts in policing that occur due to a shifting external environment, and the space these changes create for ideational change and resulting paradigm swings in policing strategies and styles.

1.3.2.4   'Structuring in'

CP programmes are examples of top-down reform policies that aspire to change police culture, behaviour and practices and ultimately the effective delivery of policing services (Bayley 2008). Successful reorientation of policing delivery is largely measured by demonstrable change to the outcomes or performance measures that are prioritised by the institutions or politicians who produce the reforms (Fielding and Innes 2006). However, in order to be successful reform must not ignore the lessons of past implementation failures (Skogan 2008). CP programmes, therefore, must be 'structured in' correctly to effectively change police behaviour and policing delivery (Skogan and Wycoff 2004; Williams 2003). In other words, effective reform is not just the talk and decisions of policy-makers and managers, but a process that takes into account the usual avenues of resistance to change. Furthermore, some claim that in order to succeed CP must become the "operating philosophy of the entire organisation" (Williams 2003, 123) rather than an array of specialist units, but doing this successfully is not guaranteed (Maguire 1997). Furthermore, these changes may be largely rhetorical in nature, being designed to manage impressions of the legitimacy of police work rather than changing it (Manning 1997). Overall, 'Structuring in' highlights the importance of top-down reform processes that take account of resistance but does not fully describe the cultural and micro processes of mediation and negotiation that affect policy implementation.

1.3.2.5   Micro perspectives: Discretion, Sense-making, and Change Agents

Individual policing actors may be either impediments to or drivers of change. Within police institutions there are a variety of actors of different roles and ranks who have opportunities to contribute towards reform and change or attempt to block it (Skogan 2008). In top-down accounts, senior managers and policy visionaries are the most effective change agents who can change institutional rules, tactics, strategies, and values (Savage 2007a). Many other studies locate change agents lower down in the rank structure, where implementation will succeed, fail, or morph into something different

from the intended outcome (Toch et al. 1975; Toch 2008; Sklansky and Marks 2008; Skogan 2008).

Wilson (1968) was critical of the impact of the organisational management of police work through rule-making and effective supervision, arguing that organisational directives have a limited effect on police behaviour due to other constraints on individual action, such as legal and organisational constraints. For Wilson, police discretion exists due to ambiguity and situational limits to law enforcement action (such as the cooperation of the victim or community) and the lack of capability to supervise patrol officers' actions. Officers therefore make decisions to arrest based on individual, and potentially moral, judgements of a situation. This reflects the idea of police as 'streetcorner politicians' who draw upon 'moral and intellectual perspectives' as a basis for action (Muir 1977). Wilson (1968) claims that reforms that aim to change negative behaviour are met with hostility at the street level and this makes resistance more likely. Skogan (2008) observed resistance amongst police middle and top managers to reforms that diminish their ability to supervise street-level officers. Furthermore, sergeants have regular contact with and influence over street level officers and have to "interpret the operational meaning of official policies at the street level" (Skogan 2008, 25), and this makes them powerful change agents. Reform that challenges the routine practices of individuals in public institutions may not succeed because these routines are created by street-level bureaucrats precisely to cope with the pressures and dilemmas of their work (Lipsky 1980). For CP practitioners, members of the community influence how individual officers make decisions about how to perform their work (Fielding 1995).

CP programmes and strategies are often vague (Waddington 1999), broad, and ambitious, and therefore police must interpret and make sense of these reforms in order to implement them (Maguire and Katz 1997). Chan (2007) also notes that sensemaking – the processes by which practitioners make sense of the policing field – occurs in police institutions, where police "translate changes in the field into shared understandings and values that inform the occupational habitus" (323). This connects the individual processes of sensemaking to wider cultural processes and mediation in police institutions, which will be addressed more fully below.

1.3.2.6   *Cultural Perspectives*

Police culture is often portrayed in studies of police reform as an impediment to change, as features of an occupational culture endure throughout generations (Skolnick 2008). In this account, culture is constituted through experiences of the

structural realities of police work, both external and internal, that encourage a set of informal occupational norms, form identity, and inform action (Skolnick 1966; Holdaway 1983; Manning 1997; Reiner 2000; Loftus 2009; Shiner 2010; Reiner 2017). However, these traditional accounts of culture tend to emphasise negative traits, such as suspicion, that make police disinclined to implement policy that is inimical to their understanding of how police work should be done (Chan 1996). Chan (*Ibid*.) argues that instead a "theory of police culture should recognize the interpretive and active role of officers in structuring their understanding of the organization and its environment" and understand that culture is situated in the "political and social context of policing" (112). Ways of seeing the policing world and lessons about how to act in it are transmitted through stories, and this allows for improvisation, daring and the retrospective constitution of culture (Shearing and Ericson 1991; also see Shiner 2010). For Chan (1996), this means that police culture can both resist and produce change in police institutions. Institutional change comes in times of changes to the policing field – "a social space of conflict and division" (Chan 1996, 115) – and habitus – dispositions, cultural knowledge – which occur either individually or together:

> Changes in the field (e.g. in the formal rules governing policing) inevitably alter the way the game is played, since habitus interacts with the field, but the resulting practice may or may not be substantially or even discernibly changed. Once again the analogy of sports may be useful here. If the rules of a game or the physical markings on the field have been changed, an experienced player may be able to adjust quickly to the new rules and hence shows no sign of changing his/her performance. Conversely, changes to habitus (e.g. in the objectives of policing) also affect practice, but unless the field is changed in a way that reinforces the new habitus, habitus itself may revert to its old dispositions. (Chan 1996, 131)

Holdaway (1984) notes that police in his study had resisted CP because it did not reflect their occupational values, but more recent studies suggest that police cultures are shifting and diversifying away from the traditional cultural characteristics of the past, at least for some groups in the police (Charman 2018; Loftus 2009; O'Neill and McCarthy 2013). The theoretical perspectives of Chan (1996) and Shearing and Ericson (1991) reveal how these inconsistencies can exist and alterations can occur in police culture, and how what was once seen as purely an impediment to change is actually a site of mediation (see also Fine 2012).

1.3.2.7   Connecting the Levels (2): Concluding Thoughts

The previous discussion has highlighted how policing change has been theorised at a number of different levels, where complex and varied processes of change impact both structure and action. The impact of ideational and structural change should not be ignored in favour of a rich yet limited view of micro processes, but instead integrated into a wider institutional understanding of policing change; one that appreciates how rhetoric, stories, culture, and interaction are arenas of mediation, negotiation, and resistance. These arenas are embedded in the structural and are sites of both deliberate and unintentional policy implementation. For policymakers, an integrated understanding is useful to understand the potential for and limits of change, and an institutional perspective highlights the importance of institutional values, which include both internal and external constituents. However, even these categories – internal and external – potentially contain further divisions; institutions are sites of both conflict and consensus. These rhetorical and interactional struggles are part of the negotiation of social change (Lyons 1999).

1.4   Aims and Research Design

For this study, applying a wider institutional understanding to change processes in NP is enhanced by a mixed methods research design. Researching change processes that operate both within these levels and between them requires a choice of methods and analytical approach that captures and explores these processes. This allows for a more complete account of NP delivery reform and change in the austerity era, emphasising the roles of both structural change and micro processes and encompassing national and local changes. The initial quantitative phase of this study will analyse secondary data from the Home Office and other sources in order to describe the nature of the changes to the police workforce in England and Wales and the implications this has for the structure and delivery of NP. In the second stage, qualitative interviews with members of Neighbourhood Policing Teams will be used to investigate the practitioner understandings of recent and coming organisational reforms as well as the organisation of local policing work. Observations of community engagement work at police-community meetings will explore how police understandings of organisational changes and community interactions affect the delivery of neighbourhood policing. This mixed methods approach is fully explicated in chapter three.

The principal aim of the study is to explore how NP delivery is changing in the era of austerity; that is, how the shock of the fiscal crisis and resulting austerity policies impact change processes within police institutions. To understand this broad notion of

NP delivery change, the study will also consider the internal and external drivers of NP reforms, and how these reforms are understood and negotiated throughout the institution, from management to the street-level. Therefore, these three primary research questions are used as a tool to frame and shape the current study:

1. How is Neighbourhood Policing being reformed in the austerity era?
2. What is the role of cultural narratives and stories in explaining and justifying reform processes?
3. How does the socio-economic environment impact the police role?

1.5   Thesis Structure

This introductory chapter has outlined the main focus and aims of this thesis, as well as reviewing the relevant theoretical perspectives on the socio-economic change of the austerity era, the contemporary policing field, general institutional change processes, and police change processes. Contextualising what change in contemporary police institutions means requires engagement with police institutional history, and Chapter 2 continues to review the policing literature to explore the historical functions of the police and the impact this history has on contemporary community policing approaches. The developments in Anglo-American community policing in the late twentieth century are then explored to further show how and why change happens. Chapter 3 deals with the research settings and methods and describes how the empirical elements of this mixed method study were designed and performed in order to explore the main research themes. Further to this, there is a discussion of the Neighbourhood Policing Team as a unit of analysis and local group (Fine 2012). The chapter also addresses issues of ethics and access that were raised by the qualitative phase of the study.

In the next three chapters the empirical data is analysed. Chapter 4 investigates how the NP workforce is changing in the austerity era by analysing police workforce data. The main focus is on the change to the numbers, proportion, and distribution of the Police Community Support Officer workforce in England and Wales between 2004 and 2013. After analysing these trends, the chapter explores the implications for the neighbourhood security function and the delivery of NP and other local policing models. After this quantitative phase, the next two chapters represent the qualitative phase of research that focuses on NP reforms and delivery in the West Midlands. Through an analysis of the data generated through interviews with NPT operatives and other actors from West Midlands Police, Chapter 5 explores police narratives and stories about the delivery and organisation of NP as well as the impact of austerity and

internal reform programmes. Through observational fieldwork of community engagement processes at police-community meetings, Chapter 6 then looks at how NP is being performed at the street level in the context of the austerity era, internal reforms, and the police cultural reactions to these new environments. Together these empirical chapters provide a deep account of NP delivery and change across different institutional levels of the police.

Finally, in chapter 7, the research findings are discussed in relation to the concepts and theory presented in chapters 1 and 2, and how these findings contribute to the main research themes of the study and the policing literature is considered. The chapter finishes with a section on the overall conclusions of the study. This includes a consideration of the implications for policing policy and policing studies.

2 The Origins and Development of Neighbourhood Policing

2.1 Introduction

Neighbourhood Policing (NP) is the current manifestation of Community Policing (CP) in England and Wales (Innes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2009), and this chapter will explore the origins of these policing approaches – the assumptions and motivations on which CP and NP are respectively based. The concept and current theoretical underpinnings of CP emerged in the 1970s and still have influence today in many countries. Although CP has been adopted by police organisations in many states internationally, its origins are found mainly in policing and political movements in the United Kingdom and United States (Brogden 1999; Brogden and Nijhar 2005), and therefore any history of CP as the origin of NP should focus largely on these nations.

The first section of this chapter, through exploring the origins and development of CP, will illustrate the reforms that led to the creation of NP in England and Wales at the beginning of the 21st century by asking '*what has changed* and *why has it changed?*' in such a way that NP was an eventual policy response to earlier forms of policing. Although the investigation of CP will be largely based on the events and literature of the period from 1970 to 2010, taking in the beginnings of the so-called 'community policing era' (Kelling and Moore 1988) up until the early austerity era, there will be a brief discussion of the origins of modern police organisations. The purpose of studying these foundations of modern, organised state policing is to provide depth to the account of the social functions of the police and policing and to avoid an ahistorical account of CP as excessively distinct from earlier policing forms (Emsley 2007). Asking 'what happened and why?' is a prelude to the discussion of how reform happens in police organisations that follows this section.

2.2 Origins: The Functions of the Modern Police Institution

In England and Wales, "the police" broadly refers to a body of organisational entities that receive state funding and were created by the Home Office in order to formalise, professionalise, and eventually, to some extent, centralise older localised policing systems (Emsley 1991). These large and complex organisations are both bureaucratic and operational, employing a range of staff to perform tasks that contribute to achieving organisational objectives that are related to public order and security, the prevention and detection of criminal acts, and the initiation of, and contribution to, criminal justice proceedings (Emsley 1991, 1; Manning 2010, 44).

According to Manning, policing itself is a 'traditional occupation, essentially unchanged in form since the early nineteenth century' and therefore understanding this early historical context can uncover 'the assumptions by which modern policing is governed' (1997, 47). Emsley makes a similar point about the enduring police functions and tactics that form the modern-day basis of CP:

> An awareness of local communities, an understanding of their concerns and of their expectations of policing, together with negotiated relationships and policies between those communities and their police to meet those expectations are not new. (2007, 242)

In the context of British policing[5], CP is not a completely new and unique form of policing; it is rooted in previous and enduring beliefs about some desirable functions and methods of policing. Of course, British police organisations have changed in a number of ways since their formation in England, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. Nonetheless, recognising these enduring characteristics suggests that police reforms are possible only within certain parameters, and historical changes to policing have been overstated in academic, official, and lay narratives. In other words, narratives about paradigmatic change and 'golden eras' of policing are sometimes steeped in myth (Fielding 1991; Emsley 1991; 2007; Loader and Mulcahy 2003). The notion of a golden era of policing in England and Wales, a *police force of the imagination* (Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 96), is imbued with beliefs about what policing and police ought to be in comparison to other periods, past or present. This normative vision of policing arrangements does not necessarily reflect the reality of policing in any period, and neither does it reflect the internal police organisational logics that prioritise other functions and tactics than those imagined.

Recent and current manifestations of CP, then, and the development of the modern police, illuminate the contested and essential functions and philosophies of public policing as well as the nature of and possibilities for reforming policing delivery. Different perspectives on police functional priorities reveal a number of tensions between what police organisations are for, and how they should achieve their objectives. Do these organisations have broad functions that contribute to or produce order, or are they primarily concerned with the enforcement of laws and the scientifically-informed control of crime? In terms of the relationship with the public,

---

[5] Brogden and Nijhar (2005) note that even though contemporary CP can be viewed as an Anglo-American model, motivations for CP reforms and the historical context of American policing are distinct from England and Wales.

are the police a coercive, militarised force to be feared and obeyed, or a democratic organisation that achieves order through consensual service, largely unarmed? These debates perhaps deal in simple dichotomies more than the complex realities of the character of police work (Bittner 1970), but they do reveal the principles and assumptions of public policing in England and Wales that largely still hold today.

2.2.1 Reforming the Principles of Policing

The orthodox histories of the new police largely focus on reform through developments in the philosophy of policing, parliamentary legislation, and organisational policy, whereas critical or 'revisionist' histories emphasise the influence of class, power structures, and political economy on these reform processes and police actions (Brogden 1982; Reiner 2000). The nature of the principles and functions of the new police are thus contentious, due to the different perspectives on the motivations of reformers and consequences of reform. The following will present a general summary of the principles and functions relevant to the later development of CP, drawing on different perspectives to illuminate the contentions and contradictions in the functions of the police.

In the formative years of the new police, the well-known handbook instructions given to new Metropolitan Police recruits stated that the principle objective of the police is the 'prevention of crime'. Rather than reacting to crime through 'detection and punishment' alone, the new police was to further achieve the 'security of person and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all the other objects of a police establishment' (quoted in Reith 1948, 62). One implication of these guidelines is that the function of the police relates primarily to crime prevention and order maintenance, the latter suggested by the terms 'security' and 'public tranquillity'. These important functions suggest a future-oriented organisation, which attempts to both predict and change future conditions through methods such as patrol to deter crimes, deployment to protest and other social unrest to inhibit violence and political change through non-military means (e.g. Fielding 1991) and pre-emptive arrest and conviction on the basis of criminal intent (Lawrence 2017). Proactivity has arguably increased in practice since the late twentieth century amidst the adoption of more sophisticated analysis of intelligence data, models of prediction, methods of disruption (Innes and Sheptycki 2004), and the 'preventive turn' in criminal justice (Edwards and Hughes 2009), but the early police organisations and pre-1829 police were certainly involved in preventative and pre-emptive action to a larger extent than is characterised in some recent literature (Lawrence 2017).

2.2.2   The Doctrine and Drama Of Consent

In establishing a new system of policing in the face of objections from various groups, social and political, Peel realised the benefits of distinguishing the characteristics and methods of the new police from the French model of police as well as the coercive control and sometimes deadly methods of the army. Peel thus argued for a "civilian force, with minimal distinguishing uniforms and no arms, and with limited arrest powers" (Manning 1997, 77). These characteristics were the early roots of the doctrines of policing by consent and minimum force, which are intended to produce public support and cooperation through a democratically-inclined police system (Alderson 1979, 49-50), bolstered by a democratic political system in which political accountability and the police mandate are periodically 'refreshed' (Morgan 1989, 218). An important and related part of the British police doctrine from the so-called 'Peelian principles'[6] conveys the idea that the "police are the public and the public are the police" (Reith 1956, 187, cited in Reiner 2000, 21), presented by orthodox police histories to demonstrate the consensual style of British policing or the representation of the police being 'the crystalized power of the people' (Reiner 2000, 21). Whether or not this representation is accepted by the public, early efforts were certainly made to make the new police more palatable to British sceptics of the French example of a centralised and militarised police force, by focusing on 'general security' and arguing for police compatibility with the 'unwritten British constitution' (Manning 1997, 49).

The supposedly unique British style of policing came to involve police officers in local community work, such as running soup kitchens, helping to organise local sporting events (Taylor 1997, 95-96), and organising a number of other outreach activities (Critchley 1967, 263-264). Rather than these functions being a natural manifestation of officers being engaged with social activities in their beat areas, Taylor (1997) argues that police involvement in these activities, along with a drive to improve officer conduct and professionalism, were pursued by Metropolitan Police commissioners Rowan and Mayne as the keys to reducing suspicion and hostility of the public and improving relations. This runs parallel to the notion that the public perceptions of police legitimacy are central to the effective practice and even the existence and preservation of the police in a democratic society (Alderson 1979). Without the resources to deal with the majority of offences and indiscretions nor the ability to

---

[6] The "Peelian Principles" were most likely adapted from the ideas of the commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne. These ideas were summarised by Charles Reith in 1952, though with unclear citation, and in later textbooks credited to Robert Peel (Lentz and Chaires 2007).

carry out surveillance on all sections of "risky" communities – largely 'working-class districts and activities' (Taylor 1997, 95) – gaining trust and tacit support of the public became an accepted method of effective policing.

While police may rely on public cooperation and trust to carry out particular duties and achieve certain goals, some doubt the idea that these tactics amount to a general approach that relies on consent. Emsley (1999, 2007) criticised the claims of Reith[7] that the 'British model' of policing was comparable to 'kin policing' – alluding to familial and communal forms of social control, where force comes from below rather than above and is sanctioned by 'the people' – and therefore superior to the authoritarian model of continental Europe, such as France, in which force was exercised from above, non-consensually. Emsley views this English exceptionalism as exaggerated at best, due to others in European countries also viewing their own policing systems as consensual, and to the existence of multiple police organisations within each European nation, including Britain, with varying types of control, practices, functions, and accountability. Emsley (2007) also questions the Reithian claims[8] that the new police were somehow more effective since 1829 due to the 'Peelian principle' of social closeness between police and community, citing evidence that Parish constables and watchmen often worked in the areas from which they hailed. Furthermore, the new system did not end the partiality and corruption associated with this level of social closeness to the community (Emsley 2007), and other claims of immediate improvement in the effectiveness of constables due to reform was generally exaggerated (Emsley 1991).

In support of the doctrines of consensus and minimum force, some police histories have pointed to a public acceptance of police authority after a period of general opposition (Brogden 1982, 172-180). This growing consent and public support were considered to bring a 'golden age of policing' in the early to mid-twentieth century, in which there was general social consensus, 'neighbourly trust', stoicism, and safety (Alderson 1979; Fielding 1991). In these 'static' conditions the police's authority was considered to be welcomed by most and respected by all, including deviant sections of communities who feared this authority (Fielding 1991). A number of accounts presented the police during the 'golden age' as a sacred institution (Loader and Mulcahy 2003), providing

---

[7] Claims that appeared in Reith's 1952 publication, *The Blind Eye of History*.
[8] The Reithian label is applied to those historians, like Charles Reith, who viewed the new police in a Hobbesian manner as a necessary social progression to ensure social order (Brogden 1982, 174).

the 'archetypal English hero' of the Bobby (Gorer 1955, 310) and in general as a source of national identity (Reiner 2000; Loader and Mulcahy 2003).

Although this period, according to various opinion surveys and interviews, represented "the high point of police legitimation" in Britain (Reiner 2000, 58), it was not free from opposition and conflict and for some communities this 'golden age' was not experienced as such. The police often acted in violent opposition to a variety of interests, especially the economic and cultural life of some working-class communities and the troubled youth – essentially those seen as deviating from the respectable, upper-class morality (Fielding 1991, 40-46; Brogden 1982) – just as they had in the Victorian era (Neocleous 2000; Taylor 1997; Storch 1975). Although the police came to have better relations with some working-class communities, there were still pockets of intense opposition and a general 'grumbling dissent', which Brogden (1982) claims was ignored by conservative historians in their claims of a new consensus. Neither was it clear how responsible the functions and doctrines of the new police system were for the general public acceptance or effective pacification of sections of the working-class, as the changing social context of the twentieth century, such as increasing affluence and the incorporation of the working-class "as citizens of the political institutions of Britain" (Reiner 2000, 58), helped create a general reduction in class conflict and increased respect for, trust, and confidence in, social institutions. In the early twentieth century, the police were arguably increasingly viewed as one of many state services, taking responsibility for social control away from the individual (Brogden 1982, 178-179).

A more general critique of the idea of consensual policing comes from Bittner (1970, 8-9), who points out that policing is always for somebody's interests and against someone else's due to the occupational structuring that compels police officers to disregard complexity in human conflict:

> In sum, the fact that policemen are required to deal with matters involving subtle human conflicts and profound legal and moral questions, without being allowed to give the subtleties and profundities anywhere near the consideration they deserve, invests their activities with the character of crudeness. (Bittner 1970, 9)

Whose side the police take in conflicts is not only influenced by the quick decisions in exigent situations referred to by Bittner, it also reflects the social conflicts built into legislation, especially the prohibition of particular leisurely pursuits (Taylor 1997; Storch 1975). Along with the establishment of the new police, the British government

30

introduced a range of new laws in an attempt to control a range of immoral behaviours – many of these common cultural pursuits of the lower-classes – though these too were enforced with discretion and not as a matter of course by constables (Taylor 1997). The desire for new powers to be used or particular private behaviours or business practices to be controlled were shaped by concerns ranging from police capabilities to morality, and thus "the thrust of policing in a particular place and time could be fundamentally altered by the determination of people with a specific view of police priorities" (*Ibid.,* 94); concerns that continue in the current era in relation to CP's promises of democratic representation through responsive partnerships and consultation (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Sklansky 2008; Crawford 1999; Loader 1994; McLaughlin 1994; Fyfe et al. 1992).

2.2.3   Symbolic Functions

More broadly, the police in Anglo-American societies symbolises state authority through the mechanism of law enforcement. This includes "the appearance of a consensual, unitary moral order, under which all citizens stand and deserve equitable protection" (Manning 1997, 106). However, the police also represents any criminal law that is targeted against certain populations and thus reflects the dominant social order. Police officers selectively enforce laws against particular groups in society, and the law can be seen as a tool of legitimation for specific organisational decisions that lead to discretionary use of powers and force. Manning argues that these contradictions, among many others, of being under and above the law, of being for the state/dominant social order and for the people/equitable provision of security services, stem from "both the problem of police discretion and inherent tensions between the maintenance of order and individual rights" (1997, 107). Loader similarly focuses on another communicative function of the police in Britain (and especially England):

> Policing, it seems, can provide an interpretive lens through which
> people make sense of, and give order to, their world; the source of
> a set of plausible stories about the world which help people sustain
> 'ontological security'" (Loader 1997, 3)

Loader claims that this cultural arrangement provides popular police institutions with 'symbolic power' to speak about and define with authority matters of crime, crime control and order, as they communicate notions of cultural, even national, identity. This power is not actively generated by the police in the same way that police attempt to produce public consent. It is a wider cultural construction of the police, whose

31

dispositions are 're-articulated' through police iconography, such as the uniform, handcuffs and 'cop shows' (*Ibid.*, 4). For Loader, this symbolic power creates a mystique around policing that makes technocratic reform difficult where such reforms jar with historically grounded sentiments and police definitions of solutions to problems of crime and disorder. For Manning (1997) and Loader (1997), then, effective police authority is built on notions of national identity and nationhood, where public institutions have high levels of the symbolic resources that connect and reaffirm cultural sentiments. In Britain, the historic and popular ideals of policing by consent and its manifestations through the figure of the local English Bobby symbolise the sacred aspects of policing, and current policing reforms are culturally judged against these standards (Loader and Mulcahy 2003).

The history of modern police institutions in England and Wales reveals the contested nature of the police role. Culturally, the doctrine of policing by consent positions the police as an institution that should be socially close and accountable to the public and responsive to their needs. This closeness is intended to foster public trust in the police and consequentially legitimise their functions of law enforcement and maintaining order through largely coercive techniques, and also to make the police a democratic institution (Alderson 1979). Additionally, as a social institution, the police is rooted in the continuities of the social order (Fielding 1991). The social and economic development that created the conditions for the establishment of modern police institutions shaped the priorities and targets of policing, but the history and symbolism of the police impacted upon public dispositions of what policing is and should be. This attention to the importance of the establishment of modern police and its functions and cultural understandings of policing underlines the existence of socially, economically, and culturally embedded realities of policing, in which some reform efforts may be more easily enacted or even desired than others.

2.3   *Community Policing: Remoulding or Decorating the Police Monolith?*

Before the idea of CP as a separate policing paradigm, either in terms of an organisational structure or an approach to policing mechanisms or practices, the development of the modern police in Britain led to the introduction of a mode of policing that emphasised the importance of widespread public confidence and trust in the police to fulfil their various functions, alluded to in the doctrine of consent. These themes were important foundations for the development of policing, and this section will explore the emergence of CP as a policing philosophy in the late twentieth century and the various policing approaches that were either compatible with the CP paradigm

or direct manifestations of it. CP is most associated with US and UK reform movements, and both of these are significant to the development of CP manifestations in England and Wales in the twenty-first century. Therefore, this section will explore CP's lineage in both jurisdictions.

To understand the political, organisational, and theoretical bases of NP as a programme of local policing delivery, this section will ask the following questions:

1. Why did Community Policing and its various manifestations, including NP, emerge in the late 20th and early 21st century?
2. How does policing delivery differ under CP and its manifestations compared with earlier and other parallel forms of policing?

By answering these broad questions about the development of CP and its manifestations, the establishment of NP can be appropriately situated in the broader context of police organisational changes and the socio-economic climate. Understanding the development and principles of these policing approaches also allows an exploration of the different definitions of CP and the motivations and outcomes of (attempted) reforms. As a very recent development that is more temporally and geographically limited than CP in general, NP has a smaller body of literature relevant to this thesis, and this will be explored at the end of this section in order to emphasise the more prominent and enduring questions around police reform and delivery.

2.3.1 The Development of Community Policing

The CP reform movement has had a significant impact on the rhetoric, symbolisation and organisation of policing. CP has been described as the "national mantra of the American police" (Greene 2000, 301), the "new orthodoxy for cops" in the US (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994, 3) and English-speaking countries in general (Weatheritt 1988), and the 'altar' at which police organisations must 'genuflect' if they are to maintain legitimacy (Herbert 2000, 114). This illustrates the view that, for a time, CP was the dominant philosophy of police organisation and delivery in Anglophone nations. In policing, as in many other areas of policy reform and organisational innovations, the US experiences are germane to those in England and Wales. Some of the foundations of new policing philosophies and movements were forged in the US but became influential to policing movements internationally (Brogden and Nijhar 2005), and therefore a discussion of reforms that adjust police functions and practice must refer to this jurisdiction. There are important differences between the British and American policing styles, broadly speaking, due to factors ranging from differences in legal

systems, history, politics, technology and weaponry. Nevertheless, the 'English mandate' was itself influential in the formation of police organisations in the US, making it possible to refer to Anglo-American police characteristics (Manning 1997; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Moreover, the changes that occur in the US criminal justice system are considered to be influential to criminal justice policy in England and Wales (Jones and Newburn 2002), and this may also be illustrated in the development of policing approaches in these two jurisdictions.

Police organisations in both England and Wales and the US faced similar challenges in the post-war era: crime rates and populations continued to grow (Reiner 2007, 63); the relationship between police and public and the status of the police were considered to be worsening due to police deviance, corruption, and scandal (Critchley 1967; Fogelson 1977; Reiner 2000); conflict between police and communities in multi-racial societies led to flashpoints of urban disorder (Brown 1982; Scarman 1982); new technologies were available to both the police and public (Rubinstein 1973; Goldstein 1990; Emsley 1991); and industries were changing, contributing to fluctuations in rates of unemployment (Kollmeyer and Pichler 2013). The consequent insecurities, emerging 'fluidity' and uncertainty of mid-to-late-twentieth-century life alongside falling trust in institutions (Barlow and Barlow 1999; Bauman 2000) was the background to a number of reform projects to adjust the functions, processes and organisational design of police forces to bring the police closer to the community (Kelling and Moore 1988). As symptoms of these professionalization reforms, the efficiency of motorized transport and telephone communication technologies increased the reactive capacity of police forces, however the extent of their use had consequences. The creation of free emergency-service phone-lines was burdensome on police time and resources and increased the pressure, and desire, to respond to incidents swiftly (Walker 1984). Goldstein (1990) suggests that police organisations increasingly focused on reactive tactics over time spent on patrol and the proactive activities that would better fulfil the police's preventative function.

In England and Wales, community policing reforms in the 1980s sought to not only reduce social distance between the police and public in general, but also to heal divisions between police and particular groups – multi-racial communities in particular – that had been building up in the post-war period (Reiner 1992). There were a number of urban disorders in multi-racial neighbourhoods - such as Brixton, Toxteth, St Pauls, Handsworth, and Tottenham – that were triggered by both poor relations and police overuse and abuse of powers (Scarman 1981; Savage and Wilson 1987). Although a

British vision of CP had already been devised (Alderson 1979), it took these external shocks and scandals to catalyse a series of reforms to police powers and tactics that partially coincided with CP ideals (Dixon 1999). The Scarman report (1981), for instance, advocated for more police community consultation, and this led to a statutory provision for police-community liaison in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Savage and Wilson 1987). While these reforms were welcomed by some as an effective solution to urban disorders and social distance, confidence in the reforms was shaken by further rioting in 1985 (Cumberbatch and Tadesse 1987). Cumberbatch and Tadesse (Ibid.) suggest that there may have been too much expectation on the police to reform in such a short space of time and to have such influence on complex urban problems. Reiner (1992) is more critical, suggesting that the Scarman backed reforms amounted to an 'iron fist in a velvet glove', with these reforms overlaying the more coercive and continuous aspects of urban policing.

The social and technological changes in the twentieth century also raised more technical concerns about the effectiveness of policing tactics after considerable reform efforts. Increasing reliance on motorized patrol from the late 1930s reduced the amount of officers on foot in many police departments (Walker 1984). Quite apart from failing to meet the expectations of increased crime reduction, this type of patrol was an unpopular approach with citizens due to the increased social distance between police and communities (Kelling and Coles 1996). Alongside this, early ethnographies of urban policing demonstrated that police maintain a social distance from the people they policed (or anyone who does not share their role) in part due to an occupational-cultural tendency for suspicion (Skolnick 1966; Rubinstein 1973). The public desire for a visible presence of beat officers, responsive to community concerns regarding all types of local disorder, is understood by some police researchers as symptomatic of neighbourhood insecurities, a perceived breakdown in social norms, and the new policing approaches and activities that distanced the police from communities (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Moore and Kelling 1983). These two respective critiques of reactive police work in the twentieth century – the basis of Goldstein's "Problem-Oriented Policing" (POP) and Wilson and Kelling's "Broken Windows Theory" (BWT) – gave rise to new arguments about what the functions of the police should be.

2.3.2 Organisational Adaptation

In order to emphasise the significant difference between the function of CP and other forms of policing, Rosenbaum highlights four broad police functions: crime control ("considered the highest priority under the traditional model"); "providing emergency

services"; "administering justice by means of arrest"; and "offering a wide range of non-emergency services" (1998, 8). Rosenbaum describes that in police forces that have initiated CP programmes or reforms "priorities have been rearranged to give greater attention to some functions and less to others", new functions are added and "the manner in which [all] these functions are executed is entirely different under CP" (*Ibid.*, 8). More attention is given to performing non-emergency services due to this kind of service making up the majority of public demand, the previous ineffectiveness of police in dealing with these incidents, and, most importantly, the general idea (in its various forms) that dealing with the problems associated with neighbourhood decline will indirectly lead to lower rates of crime and disorder (for example, Alderson 1979; Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 1997). Rosenbaum sums up the CP 'paradigm' as follows:

> The community policing model does not call for different policing goals (e.g., reducing crime is still a major police goal), but rather, it suggests that alternative means of achieving these goals should be given more attention (e.g. indirect strategies involving other police functions). (1998, 9; original emphasis)

To make sense of historical progress in policing from the rise of the modern police to the emergence of CP in the late-twentieth century, Kelling and Moore (1988) emphasise the role of top-down organisational structuring in reacting to social and economic changes by highlighting three 'strategic eras' of policing reform. This perspective is influenced by Miles et al.'s (1978) concept of 'organisational adaptation', which views organisations as "integrated and dynamic wholes" (*Ibid.*, 561) that can be steered by managers to successfully adapt to environmental change. For Kelling and Moore (1988) each strategic era – *political*, *reform*, and *community* – is characterised by primary strategic elements as well as the dominant values and missions of policing as a whole. The shift of interest here is the reform era to the community era. The 'reform era' of roughly the 1920s to 1970s was characterised by a crime control orientation, centralisation of command and control, professional remoteness, and a focus on motorised preventative patrol and rapid response tactics. The 'community era' emerged in the 1970s and had a number of characteristics distinct from the reform era: more community and political authorisation than professional and bureaucratic; a broad definition of the policing function, including order maintenance, conflict resolution, the provision of service through problem solving and other tactics,

and an indirect, lesser emphasis on crime control; decentralisation of operational and tactical decision making to the beat level, and a return to officer discretion.

By using the concept of 'strategic eras' to highlight the general consensus in policing at a specific time, Kelling and Moore (1988) attempt to show how the emergence of CP in the US was a deliberate and rational reaction to the changing economic and social environment of the time. They also claim that shifting policing strategies are important because each element can impact upon another. They highlight the 'perplexing' failure of early 'team policing' programmes in the 1960s and 1970s to support the claim that some programmes are better suited in particular organisational structures. In this case the failure was because team policing should have been viewed as a strategy itself rather than merely a tactic, as it contained strategic implications that were in competition with those of the reform era (*Ibid*., 23). Some findings of Sherman et al. (1973) support this interpretation, as poorly planned shifts in decision-making from middle management to patrol officers and sergeants, as well as the separation of team policing operatives from others in the same division, bred discontent and opposition to the initiative. Additionally, the occupational role of, and pressures on, radio dispatchers in large cities meant that new neighbourhood boundaries of team policing were often ignored, and team policing operatives were abstracted from their areas for emergency response.

Looking more closely at tactics, the development of CP delivery was also influenced by academic theory and empirical research. Starting with the latter, the Kansas City patrol experiment (Kelling et al. 1974) provided evidence of the failure of motorised patrol to prevent crime(?) and increase safety, feelings of safety, and awareness of police presence, whereas the Newark foot patrol experiment (Police Foundation 1981) showed that foot patrol could increase awareness of police presence and increase feelings of security among residents, if not have a significant impact upon crime rates. Some consequentially claimed that foot patrol represented a more proactive tactic than motorised patrol due to the increased level of community interaction (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Esbensen and Taylor 1984), and this came to be influential in informing Wilson and Kelling's (1982) BWT. For these authors, the efficacy of foot patrol and the specific types of interaction that it enables is connected to the notion that communities are strengthened by the police maintenance of order, and these more secure communities can deter serious criminal activity:

> Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer.
> Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with

the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what is worrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of having "done something" about the problem). You approach a person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a person in a car... The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. (Wilson and Kelling 1982, no page)

In spite of criticism of the impact of 'broken windows policing' – or, 'order maintenance policing' (Bayley and Shearing 1996) – on serious crime and thus the causal link between disorder and more serious crime (Harcourt 2002; Harcourt and Ludwig 2006), the BWT has been particularly influential for the development of later CP manifestations in both the US and England and Wales, especially in regard to its emphasis of the police role in enhancing informal social controls (Skogan 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Innes and Fielding 2002).

Before moving on, it should be noted that Goldstein's (1979; 1990) POP, which also arose in response to similar changes in policing strategies and tactics, is influential in the development of CP programmes[9]. Goldstein (1979) critiques the mode of reform proposed by those that focuses on the means (e.g. processes, administrative competence) over the ends (outcomes). He advocates systematic processes for identifying, examining, and addressing 'problems' of crime and disorder, which is what the public expect the police to prioritise and deal with in the most effective way:

It is sufficient, for our purposes here, simply to acknowledge that the police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in a community – that the end product of policing consists of dealing with these problems. ...By problems, I mean the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, residential burglaries, battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear. These and other similar problems are the essence of police work. They are the reason for having a police agency. (242)

---

[9] To be discussed below.

Although POP is distinct from CP due to its focus on the specifics of how police deal with problems in order to achieve the outcomes expected by the public, the general philosophy of analysing and solving problems, and consequentially the tactics prescribed by proponents of POP – such as the SARA[10] model – are compatible with the CP and BWT focus on 'quality of life' issues (Vitale 2005) and have been integrated within a number of CP models (e.g. Cordner 1988; Goldstein 1987; Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Attempting to effectively implement these problem-solving processes, however, brings challenges, as:

> ...the capacity for problems to be identified through formal analysis within police organizations is limited by data quality and systemic pressures associated with the volume of issues brought to police attention and the diverse nature of the issues to which the police must respond. (Innes 2005a, 190)

Innes notes that another issue with POP in practice is that police tend to define 'community problems' somewhat differently to the community, and police-recorded crime statistics "are to a significant extent an artefact of police practice and tend to reflect patterns of policing activity" (*Ibid.*, 191). This highlights how problem-solving strategies can be implemented in CP models that emphasise community engagement and involvement in police decisions, whilst acknowledging differences between police and community priorities exist.

2.3.3   Counter-narratives and the Drama of Reform

In contrast to Kelling and Moore's (1988) account of CP development and the related assumptions of the BWT, Walker (1984) claims that this historical analysis, which repeats some of the assumptions of Wilson and Kelling (1982), is flawed for a number of reasons. The analysis exaggerates the social distancing of the police from the community, the crime control orientation of the police, and the previous level of legitimacy of the police in the 'reform era', and it fails to acknowledge that the 'watchman' style of policing is also inefficient and corrupt (Walker 1984). In particular, Walker questions the notion that motorised patrol contributed to social distance, or the 'depersonalization' of policing, as broadly conceived. He argues that, instead, the technological revolution that brought patrol cars, telephones, and the two-way radio made it possible for people to summon the police and the police to respond quickly,

---

[10] Developed by Spelman and Eck (1987), SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment and describes a problem-solving process for routine use by police.

and therefore increased contact between the police and the community. What was distinct about these contacts, however, was that these technologies discouraged casual contacts with 'ordinary people' in public spaces and increased contacts with 'problem people' – those with multiple social problems – in private spaces. The implication is that the historical analysis by the proponents of the BWT employs a narrow conceptualisation of social distance, and is concerned with the experiences and views of the 'ordinary' – those who would have less problematic and more 'casual' contacts with the police – and therefore is, inequitably, for the benefit of particular social groups and to the detriment of others (see also Dixon 1999; Manning 2010).

Crank (1994) largely agrees with Walker's analysis, and adds that the myths of community and the 'watchman' style of policing propagated by the proponents of CP – both conservative (e.g. Wilson and Kelling 1982) and liberal (e.g. Skolnick and Bayley 1986) – were deployed to re-legitimise the policing mandate by evoking "powerful metaphors of democracy, small-town morality, and local autonomy" (Crank 1994, 335; see also Crank and Langworthy 1992). Many others (Weatheritt 1988; Zedner and Lacey 1995; Lynes 1996; Crawford 1999; Lyons 1999) have argued that the deployment of the term 'community' in criminal justice more generally is a conscious attempt by certain actors to evoke the idea of orderly, moral communities that are supported by criminal justice agencies with similarly desirable traits, and indeed can support these agencies to perform a more effective service. According to some, this communitarian positioning effectively downplays or ignores the plurality of values that coexist within urban geographical communities (Lynes 1996; Lyons 1999; Thacher 2001a; Thacher 2001b; Sklansky 2008).

More generally, the institutionalist view of CP reform, in which CP is fundamentally based on rhetoric and the deployment of myths for the legitimation of police organisations, is in part forwarding the view that the orthodox/conservative history of CP ignores the continuities of policing, and that these continuities are masked by the dramatic elements of CP (Walker 1984; Reiner 1992; Crank 1994; Manning 1997; Lyons 1999; Emsley 2007). Manning makes this position explicit when he argues that:

> ...community policing is a dramaturgical revision of themes found in policing over the last 75 years in the United States... Historical policing practices coexist in variable amounts with "community policing." This suggests that it is not a definitive logical entity but a collection of ideas and concepts already present to some degree in many police departments. (1997, 13)

Manning claims that because CP is ideological and in part designed to mask the realities of policing. CP reforms, which are often tactical rather than strategic, often do not deliver on the overall promises of the CP movement (1984; 1997; 2010). In terms of crime, this is consistent with the idea that the police also present themselves as an agency of crime control, but in reality have little capacity to have a significant impact on crime rates (Banton 1964; Manning 1997; Reiner 2000).

Some of these critical perspectives have been described as overly pessimistic in their evaluation of CP as an approach with capacity for improving outcomes (Thacher 2001a). Moreover, CP is not merely rhetoric, as the CP rhetoric has important ramifications for real-world practice. The distinction between the rhetoric and reality of CP

> …cannot be made. The rhetoric of community policing – rarely, the persuasive devices deployed on its behalf – has come to be an important part of its reality: Its presentational aspects and its potency as a metaphor are as important (maybe more so) as its actual program. (Weatheritt 1988, 155)

For Weatheritt, then, CP is neither simply rhetoric nor just reality. It involves a pragmatic focus on 'small-scale' tactics and an ethos that emphasises "notions of service, flexibility, consumer responsiveness, conciliation, consultation, and negotiation" (Weatheritt 1988, 154). As the professional model of policing has little symbolic currency, pursuing these tactics and ethos is popular with the public and evoking them through rhetoric, alongside focused attempts to improve police-community relations, is intended to legitimate the police institution and consequently enhance police effectiveness. Similarly, Mastrofski et al. define CP as a counter-movement to the professionalised perspective of policing functions limited to law enforcement, rather than a single, coherent policing approach:

> There is no consensus on what community policing is, but one has emerged regarding what it is not. It rejects law enforcement as the single, core function of police. (1995, 541)

In the same study, the authors showed how the values of police organisations, if internalised by officers, could lead to different decision-making processes at the street-level. Officers with positive views towards the community policing values of their institution were less likely to make arrests for most offenses and especially minor ones. The importance here is that rhetoric and ethos have the potential to mediate

action, and this has implications for how police organisations can change policing practice by instilling values through rhetoric or organisational philosophy.

The rhetoric of CP and in particular the appeals to community not only mask the realities of policing, but can also be consequential to the way police engage with communities. Lyons argues that CP uses community as a 'state-centred story' that focuses on "how police departments can use or appease communities" (1999, 16), and in the process stifles collective action capacity that can 'empower' communities. For Lyons, what is promising about CP's potential is how it can generate social capital through truly reciprocal relations between police and community:

> Reciprocity is a structural precondition for the generation of social capital. The structures and agency supported by community policing, to take community seriously, must take into account the importance of intracommunity reciprocity for the effective cooperation of effective social controls that police seek to mobilize. (Lyons 1999, 29)

In Lyons' study, however, the focus on coercive order-maintenance of the BWT approach may reduce disorder, but it does not necessarily address the absence of reciprocity and social capital in a neighbourhood that has been weakened by disorder and decay (*Ibid.*).

Thacher (2001a) describes another of CP's engagement dilemmas; to be responsive to community concerns, police must engage with the concerns of the whole community in order to provide an equitable service to all segments of the community. However, community engagement usually takes the form of public meetings, and only specific groups tend to continuously turn up to those meetings – dubbed the 'usual suspects' (Myhill 2006). This would be a significant problem if community groups could 'demand' police take action that forwards their interests over other social groups. Nevertheless, Thacher says this is not necessarily the case:

> …community partnerships are not simply vehicles for individual groups to make their interests known. Instead, they are sites of public deliberation about the common good. At their best, they generate new information about social problems and about the capabilities of government and the community to solve them, and they serve as places where citizens and officials learn about the

> proper constraints of their own roles as well as those of their partners. (2001a, 5)

For Thacher, police collaboration and community engagement can achieve 'just outcomes' when it encourages deliberation about the 'common good' and represents groups that do not actively participate. Furthermore, Jones-Brown (2000) argues that the rise in police resources encouraged by BWT approach to CP can increase tensions between police and African American males. She suggests 'service' interactions increasing familiarity between police and African American males may improve attitudes towards and respect for police, rather than a focus on positive interactions in enforcement situations. Reisig and Park (2004) found police-community collaboration increases higher aggregate quality of life assessments amongst those in areas of concentrated disadvantage, showing that the principles of social closeness can have positive effects for disadvantaged groups in general.

The organisational adaptation approach appreciates that organisations are impacted by externalities, and reform is a way to reduce the impact of these externalities on the legitimacy and performance of the organisation. The institutionalists, however, point out these adaptations are to some extent rhetorical, obscuring the reality of how the organisation really operates. This is partially due to organisational adaptation proponent's conceptualisation of an organisation as an integrated whole that can be deliberately reformed by management, rather than as a social entity that is negotiated collectively by its members (Manning 1982). Nevertheless, rhetoric and reality are difficult to separate, as the former can have an impact on the latter (Weatheritt 1988), meaning that analysis of the rhetoric of change and reform may provide a multidimensional insight into police change processes, connecting the rhetorical responses to externalities to the eventual reform of policing delivery.

2.4   Manifestations of Community Policing

To understand how a concept like CP is put into practice, it is first useful to briefly consider how it is most concisely or accurately defined in the programmatic sense. Thus far this chapter has attempted to elucidate rather than enumerate – it has not yet provided a programmatic definition, and this is because on one level the concept can lack precision required for integrating CP into a single policing delivery system (Weatheritt 1988). The broader, high-level concept of CP as a philosophy, organisational strategy, or rhetorical strategy has been elucidated above, but the way in which it is implemented as a policing programme is not so easily generalised. Due in part to the various environments in which policing activities take place, "[t]here is no

prospect of a uniform blueprint for community policing" (Fielding 1995, 33). Nevertheless, CP encourages particular tactics and delivery mechanisms, and therefore enumeration provides criteria against which programmes can be understood and judged as manifestations of the broader CP philosophy. Table 1 synthesises a number of exemplary characteristics of CP programmes from several sources. With programmatic characteristics tentatively identified, this section will review the implementation, successes, and failures of a number of programs that can be considered as manifestations of the CP philosophy and forerunners of contemporary NP.

Exemplary Characteristics of Community Policing Programmes	
Community Engagement	This is a broad category that covers all forms of police-community communication, consultation, and deliberation. Most agree that the community's participation should go beyond police communication of, for example, crime levels, police tactics, local incidents, and crime prevention advice (Bayley 1994; Skogan 2006). The community should be in some way involved in contributing to policing efforts in their neighbourhood, and the police should be prepared to be more accountable to the public (Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Lyons 1999).
Coproduction of security	The community should be encouraged to participate in the delivery of police services and the production of safety, or 'community-based crime prevention' (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). This can involve neighbourhood watch programmes and civilian street patrols with some police input, as well as the sharing of relevant information.
Decentralisation	Local police on the beat should be empowered to make decisions that are right for the particular circumstances of the community (Skolnick and Bayley 1988).
Foot Patrol	The public desires visible police on foot, and research shows that visible foot patrol can be reassuring (Bahn 1974), reducing feelings of insecurity (Kelling et al.1974). Officers on foot can also build relationships and employ discretion in order to maintain order (Wilson and Kelling 1982).
Geographical designation	To be responsive to community concerns, programmes designate resources, such as 'Community Police Officers' (Friedmann 1992), to particular areas for building stronger links (Sherman et al. 1973). This should enable police to produce familiarity and build long-term relationships for solving problems.
Information-oriented	Building community relationships and being designated to communities should allow police to gather information and

	build local knowledge through their local experience and networks (Fielding 1995).
Partnership working	Partners provide skills, powers, and knowledge to help solve local problems. There are a number of ways partners can be involved, but often regular meetings bring police and partners together. The police officer can be a mobilizer of community resources (Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Savage 2007a)
Proactivity	Policing activities should go beyond reacting to calls for service. Problem-solving, community engagement and foot patrol should be geared towards anticipating and preventing problems and crime (Alderson 1979).
Problem-oriented	Crime and non-crime problems that can damage communities should be addressed rather than a narrow focus on law enforcement. Problem Oriented-Policing methods can be used to identify and solve community problems (Cordner 1988).

Table 1 Exemplary Characteristics of Community Policing Programmes

2.4.1 Unit Beat, Team, and Sector Policing

There have been a number of policing programmes that emphasised the importance of the 'beat' – or the geographical designation of policing resources for routine police work. An early team policing programme was set up in Aberdeen in 1948, lasting until 1963, in which a team of one sergeant and five to ten constables were given responsibility for one geographical area (Sherman et al.1973). The motivations for this programme were stated to be improving the flexible and effective deployment of officers – judged at the time to be too low in number – and police working conditions and morale (The Scotsman 2012; Sherman et al. 1973). To achieve this the programme made use of foot and motorised patrol to adequately cover the areas of highest need, according to the "concentration of crimes and calls for service" (Sherman et al. 1973, xiv). The 1967 President's Crime Commission then recommended that American forces experiment with the model and a number of 'reform-minded police chiefs' installed team policing, though not all of these projects were thought to follow the central characteristics of the model (Walker 1993, 34-35). Similar to CP, the reform motivations for team policing identified in the American context was public dissatisfaction with socially distant, unresponsive policing and increasing crime (Sherman et al. 1973).

Although not consistently implemented, Sherman et al. (1973, 3), who evaluated team policing programmes in American forces, identified three basic operational elements:

'geographic stability of patrol', in which teams were permanently assigned to neighbourhoods; 'maximum interaction among team members', with an emphasis on cooperative working, information sharing, and a sense of togetherness encouraged by the team leader, and; 'maximum interaction among team members and the community', which involved regular police-community meetings. It is notable that these are enduring elements of CP programmes, and thus the failure of team policing to survive in various forces should have been an early warning to proponents of CP, though this history was rarely cited in the early CP literature (Walker 1993). Regardless of mixed and uncertain evidence for the reported benefits of team policing (Sherman et al. 1973; Gay et al. 1977; Talarico and Swanson 1980), the failure of these programmes was attributed largely to incompatibility with the wider force ethos and priorities, which themselves exacerbated the most 'direct cause' for the implementation failure; team leaders failing to organise their teams appropriately (Sherman et al. 1973).

In the UK, unit beat policing was another local policing model that was introduced in Lancashire in the 1950s and was more widely implemented from 1967. With identical reform motivations and similar programmatic elements – geographically fixed resources to sub-divisions and smaller 'home beats', local foot patrol in home beats, an emphasis on motorised patrol with two-way radio systems for efficiency, supervision, and professionalism (Holdaway 1977) – the model was effectively imposed on forces by the Home Office, who offered loans to fund new equipment (Weatheritt 1988). However, the model was judged to have failed due to its lack of regard for and inflexibility towards local circumstances, the lack of integration of police into the team structure, and the relative absence of the symbolically important and accessible foot patrolling officer (*Ibid.*), which itself was due to insufficient numbers of officers available for the programme (Brain 2010, 4). Holdaway (1977) also observed a cultural aversion to foot patrol and other specialist functions of unit beat policing, such as community liaison, which were shunned in favour of motorised patrolling, violence, hedonism, and 'easing behaviour' at the station.

Another model later introduced in England, 'sector policing', again aimed to embed small teams in geographical 'sectors', where they had geographic responsibility for crime and other problems. The model emphasised tactics associated with problem-solving and the doctrine of consent (Dixon 1999), following on from the post-Scarman era emphasis on rebuilding trust through the government-led, widespread implementation of Police Consultation Committees (Savage and Wilson 1987; Morgan

1989). To deliver 'consensual policing', the teams were expected to be visible and accessible through foot patrol, achieve the approval of communities and become more publicly accountable through the use of community consultation (Dixon 1999). The reasons for sector policing's failure to survive are again familiar; officers did not integrate into the teams and did not manage to be responsive to community concerns (Dixon and Stanko 1995). Additionally, insufficient officers again appeared to be a problem in the Metropolitan Police Service for both sector policing and its 'neighbourhood policing' replacement due to the labour intensiveness of geographical responsibility. As an 'optional element' in the 1990s 'neighbourhood policing' model

> …geographical responsibility was so labour intensive that most divisions had not implemented it. Where it had been tried it was being restricted or abandoned due to understaffing. (The same appears to have happened in recent moves to 'sector policing', or geographical responsibility. Police sources suggest it was being supported in appearance only, with prevailing, relief-based methods continuing, and a reduction by half in sectors originally designated in one area. This meant officers operating on much larger areas, effectively returning to relief mode.) (Fielding 1995, 46)

There may have been some reported benefits in these CP and local policing programmes, but the evidence of such successes was mixed and often uncertain due to the lack of systematic evaluation research undertaken. What all have in common is the failure to survive long-term due mainly to incompatibility with the broader institutional structures and priorities, management priorities, the dominant police cultural preferences, and insufficient officer numbers for resource-intensive elements. Taken together, it is clear that there are a large number of organisational obstacles that CP programmes face in modern Anglo-American policing institutions (Fielding 2000).

Another issue with CP programme research is that often there is little exploration of what CP looks like at the micro-level, or, in other words, how it is done. Fielding (1995) produced one of the few major studies investigating CP action at the street-level in an English force since the establishment of the modern CP philosophy. This work is important for understanding the implementation, success, and failure of reforms as public service delivery is mediated by street-level operatives (Lipsky 1980; Barrett and Fudge 1981). Overall, Fielding (1995) finds that CP can successfully deliver on its promises under particular conditions and can effectively facilitate some elements of

crime control, such as teamwork, planning, and acting on quality information. These elements are notable because they are realised through complex tasks and interactions that involve, for example, communication, persuasion, conciliation, negotiation, and the generation of local knowledge. For Fielding, then, quality of delivery is important too, and models that encourage valuable practices in understanding communities and controlling crime in the long term are worth preserving and persevering with.

2.4.2 Embedding Problem-solving, Chicago Style

One of the more systematically evaluated and relatively successfully implemented models of CP identified in the literature is the Chicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS). Although the senior police management were sceptical, the City Mayor ordered the strategy's implementation in 1993, generating political capital in the face of high crime, amongst other political problems (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Skogan and Hartnett (*Ibid.*, 52-57) identify six key elements of the programme:

1. Change the entire organisation: CP is not the role of one specialist department – all units would have a CP role.
2. Permanent beat assignments: Officers stay on beats long enough to build relationships with the community and generate local knowledge.
3. Commitment to training: An investment in an extensive amount of training in problem-solving skills and a general understanding of the programme and their individual roles.
4. Community role: Involve the community in solving problems through building partnerships with residents and public and private agencies.
5. Expansion of the police mandate: CP is linked to the delivery of other public services to effectively solve problems that cannot be tackled by a pure policing response.
6. Crime analysis: An emphasis on geographic crime analysis with the assistance of computer technology and crime maps

As with all CP programmes the systematic and meaningful involvement of the community is crucially important for the programme to operate, and Skogan and Hartnett described the use of regular beat meetings for solving community problems in every Chicago neighbourhood as the "most unique and visible features of Chicago's new program" (1997, 113). Although the police found the effective organisation and execution of these meetings difficult, the events were successful in some respects and experienced improvements over time in a number of ways:

> The adoption of clear procedures, model agendas, informative materials to be distributed, training for officers and beat facilitators, special training for beat sergeants, and internal inspections, has increased the quality of beat meetings and standardized their operations. In 2002 we observed noticeably fewer very poorly run meetings. (Skogan 2004, ii)

Fung (2006) is positive about the impact that CAPS had on residents, arguing that beat meetings represented 'empowered participation', as residents were able to participate in dialogue about neighbourhood problems and governance and were empowered through their collective decisions directly determining police actions. However, although the community involvement in beat meetings was generally sustained in the first ten years of the programme, the effectiveness of problem-solving was limited and, along public satisfaction, showed improvements in the early years but declined over time (Skogan 2004).

As with many other CP programmes (Fyfe et al. 2002; Somerville 2009b), one of the more difficult aspects of the beat meetings were involving all community groups and thus representing the views of specific sections of the community. Residents that attended meetings were more likely to be home-owning, older, longer-term, and more educated residents, whereas sections of the community who were suspicious of the police were less likely to participate. In particular, the Hispanic community tended to be underrepresented at beat meetings and had difficulty sustaining involvement in problem-solving activities, which was a particular concern considering they were more likely to report high levels of perceived crime in their neighbourhoods (Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Skogan 2004). However, Skogan's (2004) research shows that regardless of the attendees being unrepresentative in terms of demographic characteristics, their views about neighbourhood problems tended to be representative of the wider community (cf. Sagar and Jones 2012).

Skogan and Hartnett (1997) also explored interaction styles at beat meetings, finding these varied between districts. This refers to how police and residents perceived their roles in beat meetings, and thus how interactions were organised and responsibility distributed. The styles identified are as follows:

1. Police as leaders: The police set the agenda and residents follow it.
2. Police and residents as partners: There is a somewhat balanced and cooperative relationship between police and community.

3. Police and residents as independent operators: Police and community have clear division of functions and agendas.
4. Police and residents as adversaries: Police and community have conflicting goals and methods.

The first three styles were roughly equal in occurrence, representing around one third of all meetings each. Style four was less usual, accounting for only 6% of the meetings. Style two was the preferred mode of interaction, as it represents both the highest level of community participation and cooperation as well as the willing and functional participation of other agencies in the beat meeting and problem-solving processes. Skogan (2004) adds that participation and cooperation in meetings are also improved and sustained by social factors, such as the ways that networks of police and residents are fostered by informal talks, communication outside of the formal meeting structure, and the provision of refreshments. This highlights that the social rituals of community engagement can be functional for the goals of these beat meetings.

The CAPS project illustrates that CP programmes can be more successfully implemented and sustained, showing a number of benefits that were more elusive or at least more poorly understood in previous CP programmes. To simplify, what appears to be crucial to the success and sustained success of CP is political commitment, effective police leadership, public support, officer support, and the patience and hard work of all actors involved (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Additionally, the CAPS evaluation also revealed some difficulties and complexities of police-community cooperation, and this requires a serious and sustained programme of training and nurturing of skills.

2.5   The Development and Delivery of Neighbourhood Policing

NP was required to be implemented across all police organisations and their neighbourhoods by the New Labour government in 2008. The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, described the NP reforms as a way to 'revive the idea of community policing, but for a modern world' (cited in Innes 2005, 156). Like CP, NP can in one sense be understood as a policy response to the deficiencies of opposing policing models and other change motivations, and as such it is a product of its time. Like other previous iterations of 'neighbourhood (-oriented/team) policing' (e.g. Talarico and Swanson 1980; Oettmeier and Brown 1988; Fielding 1995), NP has programmatic elements that aspire to organise police operatives into teams with geographical responsibility, decentralise authority to street-level operatives and communities, and encourage tactics, practices and outcomes that are distinctive to the CP philosophy. Each

Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) is responsible within their assigned area for performing the delivery mechanisms of NP – visibility, problem-solving and community engagement – and achieving the politically-defined outcomes – reducing crime, anti-social behaviour and 'fear of crime' and increasing public confidence (Quinton and Morris 2008).

Some of the main programmatic elements of NP identified by ACPO (2006), as well as academic researchers (Innes 2005; 2014) the Home Office (2004) and Home Office researchers (Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and Morris 2008) are synthesised in Table 2 to illustrate the contemporary and sometimes unique features of the model. This section will address the literature on the development, organisation, and delivery of NP in order to describe the structural characteristics, social organisation, and the practices of NPTs. NP emerged from the piloting of *reassurance policing* (RP) in the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP), and so this section will begin by outlining the centrality of the concept of reassurance in recent CP manifestations in England and Wales.

2.5.1 Re-programming Community Policing: Reassurance, Neighbourhood Security, and Signal Crimes

Some earlier proponents of CP were concerned with the 'fear of crime' and its impact on communities' social control function through capable guardianship (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). This hypothetical link between the fear of crime and the conditions of neighbourhood decline that enable more serious crime to materialize was the basis of the order-maintenance approach to CP. In an era of high and rising crime rates and the consequent 'law and order politics', the 'crime management' approach "was established as the de facto political priority for policing" (Innes 2004, 155). Crime management – where the police mission is oriented to the prevention and detection of crime – was the basis of the order-maintenance/zero-tolerance and intelligence-led policing models that were dominant in England and Wales in the 1990s. However, as crime rates fell in Britain in the mid-1990s there was not a corresponding fall in the fear of crime, and many people believed that crime had risen (Innes and Fielding 2002). This situation was called the crime-fear paradox, or the 'reassurance gap', as there was a lack of a straightforward effect of crime incidence on crime-related fear and risk perceptions. The value of the crime management approach was thus limited, and there were growing calls for the police to better reassure the public through increasing visibility, familiarity, and accessibility of the police (Povey 2001). Consequentially, the objective of the NRPP was to deliver enhanced 'neighbourhood security', which Innes

51

describes as a way to reconnect policing with the traditional and broader police mission as well as address the local manifestation of a "pervasive sense of insecurity engendered by the contemporary interactional and institutional orders" (Innes 2004, 158).

Key programmatic elements of NP	
Auxiliarisation/Civilianisation	NPTs should include Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and can include Police Specials and other allied partners, such as Neighbourhood Wardens, dependent on local decision-making (ACPO 2006; also see Brain 2010).
Citizen focus	A government philosophy that connected a number of reform initiatives. Its aim was to ensure that public services are responsive to the demands of the public and improve the public's experience of policing (Home Office 2004; Innes 2005).
Delivery Mechanisms	NP should be 'evidence-based' (ACPO 2006). Three 'delivery mechanisms' were specified as key elements of effective practice on the grounds of research evidence (Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and Morris 2008): • Visibility/Reassurance • Community Engagement • Problem-solving
Geographical designation	NP provides dedicated teams and resources to all neighbourhoods. NPT operatives should be identifiable, familiar, and accessible and communities should have a named point of contact.
Information-oriented	Deployment of resources linked to National Intelligence Model (NIM). PCSOs are often referred to as 'eyes and ears' of the police in the community, as generating community intelligence remains an important part of beat policing to feed into investigations. Engagement and problem-solving activities should be undertaken within NIM processes (ACPO 2006).
Partnership working	NPTs work in partnership with communities to identify neighbourhood priorities undertake 'collaborative problem-solving'. NPTs should also form alliances with other local agencies and organisations, sometimes through multi-agency partnerships (ACPO 2006).
Signal Crimes Perspective (SCP)	The theoretical basis of RP and NP delivery. The SCP states that some events have a disproportionate impact upon people's feelings and thoughts about their security and safety and consequently their behaviour. The role of NP is to identify which events are indicators

	of concern in each neighbourhood and deal with these problems to reassure communities (Innes 2014).
Team structure	All teams should be structured to support the activities of the main delivery agents, the PCSOs (ACPO 2006). Teams generally have at least one supervisor/manager and a number of constables.

Table 2 Key programmatic elements of NP

At the same time, the New Labour Government were undertaking a 'managerialisation of policing', which included crime reduction targets (McLaughlin 2005) and the 'public confidence agenda' – a policy agenda centred around solving the problem of falling or low public confidence and trust in the police (Fleming and McLaughlin 2010). Moreover, the establishment of PCSOs by New Labour and the effective imposition of police workforce modernisation through ring-fenced funding, which Johnston (2003) notes was in response to, in part, the threat of 'balkanisation' of policing patrol provision. PCSOs were seen as vital to reassurance through their ability to provide visible patrol and a familiar and accessible presence due to the time-consuming demands of contemporary police work on warranted officers (Cooper et al. 2006). These moves signalled increased central government involvement in the reform of policing delivery across England and Wales and the further development of the police reassurance function, which meant there was sufficient political desire and funding to design and install a new CP programme.

Catalysed by the recent concern about the reassurance gap in some police organisations, the Signal Crimes perspective (SCP) was developed for the Metropolitan Police Service and Surrey Police – one of the first organisations to pilot RP – and became the theoretical basis for how RP, and later NP, should be delivered (Innes and Fielding 2002; Innes 2004; Innes 2014). The SCP updated the notion of the reassurance function of policing after the earlier work of Bahn (1974) and Kelling et al. (1974) that supported the idea of police foot patrol producing feelings of safety and security. In contrast, the SCP asserts that visible foot patrol and familiar, accessible police alone are not sufficient to increase neighbourhood security. The SCP also draws on the work of Slovic (1992), who posited that risk-related events communicate meanings that can be amplified by psychological, cultural, social and political factors, and thus each event has a particular 'signal value' that impacts upon the extent of a person's risk perceptions.

Applying this insight to policing and social control, the SCP identifies this phenomenon in social reactions to crime and disorder. For Innes and Fielding, crime and disorder events signal risk and those events with the highest signal value are "disproportionately

influential in terms of causing a person or persons to perceive themselves to be at risk in some sense" (2002, 5.2). The importance of the SCP was to extend the theoretical rationale of CP to police responsivity to locally distinctive, community priorities, and what constitutes the most salient threats to the 'ontological security' of a neighbourhood (Innes 2004). In practice, this means that on top of visible patrol and familiar, accessible police, neighbourhood security is enhanced by identifying signal crimes and disorders through community engagement and neighbourhood analysis, before these problems are targeted (Lowe and Innes 2012). This enhancement is due to both problems of crime and disorder being tackled and the related benefit of increased feelings of security that could increase the informal processes of social control in a neighbourhood (Innes 2005).

2.5.2 The Structure and Rhetoric of Neighbourhood Policing

In spite of the success of RP as identified in the NRPP pilot evaluations (Tuffin et al. 2006), the RP label did not survive and was subsequently replaced by NP. NP arguably represents a rhetorical diversion from RP. As such, Innes argues that NP should be viewed as a political construct as it is an attempt to 'give a sense of cohesiveness' (2005, 158) to a number of policing reforms through a rebranding exercise. These reforms include the 'citizen focus' philosophy and workforce modernisation represented by the introduction of PCSOs. In relation to CP, the label of 'neighbourhood' symbolically shifts the emphasis away from problematic notions of 'community' as bonds of interest to 'neighbourhood' as a bond of shared spatial experience, 'to exploit a sensibility that people who live in the same area share inter-twined fates in terms of their safety' (Innes 2005, 159). It also avoids the complex notion of reassurance that encouraged a number of separate interpretations of what RP is. In practical terms for the police, a neighbourhood is potentially much easier to define and visualise and provides zones of potential partners with whom to cooperate, facilitating 'neighbourhood management' with other local agencies (Gilling 2007, 109-110).

In terms of structure, the NPP was largely similar to the NRPP, involving the same delivery mechanisms being performed in geographically fixed teams of NP operatives (Quinton and Morris 2008). There is much variation in how NP is implemented and delivered across police organisations in England and Wales, but the NPT structure, with its mixture of PCSOs, PCs and at least one sergeant, was the most distinctive and stable feature (Longstaff et al. 2015). Evaluation is another important element of CP programmes, and when piloted, the NPP was measured against its effect on the

following categories: feelings of safety and worry about crime; public confidence; social capacity and collective efficacy (meaning intra-neighbourhood cohesion and trust); community engagement, familiarity and visibility, and; crime and Anti-social behaviour (ASB). The crime and ASB indicator was added to the NPP evaluation by the Home Office, whereas the other measures also applied to the NRPP (Quinton and Morris 2008). The NRPP evaluation found positive programme effects on many measures at the local ward level, including for crime, ASB and feelings of safety (Tuffin et al. 2006). The follow up evaluation of the NRPP sites showed that the positive results were largely sustained, but the NPP evaluation at the BCU and national level failed to identify any significant programme effects (Quinton and Morris 2008).

Although 'hard' enforcement responses are one option for dealing with neighbourhood problems, NP evokes the 'soft' functions of the police – the 'non-coercive aspects of police-led social control encompassing the provision of a visible presence of authority, persuasion, negotiation and community interaction' (Innes 2005, 157). The emphasis on responsivity appears on face value to represent a decentring or destructuring of state social control, where the 'competing stories' of the community (Lyons 1999, 7) dominate and the demands of a community are prioritised by NPTs. A potential obstacle to this is not only traditional police sub-cultural resistance to 'soft' functions (Innes 2005), but also the paradoxical effect of what Savage (2007b, 314) calls the 'bifurcation of police reform'. That is, whilst the police and community are seemingly empowered by decentralisation to influence policing delivery through, respectively, increased discretion and responsive community engagement, they are also disempowered by extended bureaucracy in the form of government targets and plans, serving to weaken operational independence and the local control of services. Another layer of decision-making and priority-setting was later added at the force-wide level by the Police and Crime Commissioner reforms in 2011 (Lister 2013).

2.5.3   Neighbourhood Policing at the Street-level

A proper understanding of NP as a distinctive CP programme must include an exploration of its street-level organisation and delivery processes. Some of the earlier academic studies of RP and NP used interview data to show how street-level operatives perceived and made sense of the reforms. Johnston (2005) found that early progress in integrating PCSOs into 'sector teams' in London was mixed overall and worsened over a nine-month period, due to the pace of change and 'unrealistic expectations' respectively. According to Johnston, successfully integrating PCSOs into the police team is helped by effective communication, organisational support, acceptance by

colleagues, and adequate supervision. More general concerns were voiced by police in Millie and Herrington's (2005) study of police views of RP, including putting RP and response policing into silos. The separation of these roles was seen as both necessary to prevent RP operatives from being abstracted away from their neighbourhood, and potentially harmful to the efforts to reassure the public if response officers did not accept the tenets of RP. Once NP was implemented, relations between PCSOs and PCs within NPTs were not completely harmonious, as O'Neill (2015) found that each role comprised separate 'performance teams' (see Goffman 1959), meaning that each role within an NPT[11] presented a different and consistent definition of given situations. This is reminiscent of Manning's observation that police work 'is characterized by cliques, cabals, informal groupings that are a reaction to" risk and uncertainty in their world, and thus occupational culture is 'revealed' through teamwork (2003, 182). O'Neill distinguishes between *complementary* and *competitive* performance teams to account for variation in levels of cooperation or conflict within NPTs, with the former arguably better for increasing morale and achieving policing goals.

The PCSO arguably became the key delivery agent of foot patrol and other community-focused activities of NP. This was in part due to their role and delimited powers making them less likely to be abstracted from their neighbourhood and also the detailed knowledge of their beats (O'Neill 2014). The principle of 'value for money' in public service provision alongside private competition for street-based security patrols was also a motivation for government and police to introduce a cheaper police auxiliary for visible patrol (Johnston 2003). Merritt (2010) argues that the PCSO role can be viewed as a continuum from a crime control-oriented 'junior enforcer' to a community-focused 'bridge builder', highlighting that the role could be constructed in different ways dependent upon the persuasion of individual PCSOs. This idea was expanded in the work of Cosgrove (2016), who explored how PCSOs engaged with the dominant occupational culture. Although based on a small sample, the study found that the majority of the PCSOs held aspirations to become police officers, which led them to associate with the dominant cultural orientation toward crime control. However, half of the PCSOs (6) in the study were characterised as 'professional PCSOs' as they recognised that "their value, effectiveness and career advancement lie in achieving a balance between the control, order maintenance and community engagement aspects of their remit" (Cosgrove 2016, 127). A quarter of the sample (3) were characterised as 'frustrated PCSOs', which meant they defined their role purely in terms of crime

---

[11] that is, PCs and PCSOs only as sergeants were not studied.

fighting, and the last quarter were 'disillusioned PCSOs', who are apathetic to the role's purpose due to the lack of authority they possess relative to officers. The tendency for NPTs to have a crime control orientation has been noted in relation to community engagement activities, where problems are filtered and defined by police rather than being truly responsive to community concerns (Bullock 2013; Cosgrove and Ramshaw 2013).

In contrast to studies that emphasised the crime-control cultural orientations of NPT operatives, McCarthy (2014) explored the delivery of 'soft' policing and found that, under NP, police have adapted to activities cynically dismissed by the dominant police culture as 'social work'. On this adaption, he argues that:

> [t]his was due to a range of factors, especially the greater emphasis on Neighbourhood Policing, which enabled both male and female officers to engage in specialised policing tasks, as opposed to purely using Neighbourhood Policing as a 'stopgap' to gain promotion. (McCarthy 2014, 138)

Some of the other factors that encouraged this orientation included stability of some officers in managerial roles in the same areas, as well as support for 'soft' policing activities from senior management. In practice, face-to-face interactions of partnership work involve interpersonal skills, such as the use of humour to reduce conflict at meetings and to discuss differences between professionals in a light-hearted way. Drawing on the work of Goffman (1959; 1967), McCarthy (2014) suggests that partnership meetings can be understood as 'interaction rituals', as the meeting contains a set of interactional rules that encourages cooperation and agreement between police and partners. However, McCarthy (*Ibid.*) also found that NP activities are gendered; any work with an emphasis on welfare or that involves supporting children and families is done mainly by women, and this is in line with previous evidence that women police take on gendered roles in CP (Miller 1999). O'Neill and McCarthy (2013) note that as part of this shifting orientation, the police cultural characteristic of pragmatism has only to be slightly adapted to fit with the 'soft' partnership activities. What is significant here is that in the bulk of CP reform literature, culture is viewed as an impediment to the implementation of CP programmes (Holdaway 1984; Chan 2003; Herbert 2005; Skogan 2008), but this work suggests that new cultural orientations can emerge and become part of the institution, regardless of the institutional tension presented by 'soft' activities.

NP is an interesting case in CP and highlights both some of the successes and some of the difficulties in implementing these kinds of programmes. It has a specific set of programmatic features that emerged due to multiple change motivations. CP programmes require political will and support, and NP was created in more favourable economic conditions and with greater central government involvement in, and funding of, police reform. The NPP was not completely resistant to the problems that have resulted in the implementation failure of previous CP programmes, but the structuring of NP appeared to have some advantages that built on previous successes of other programmes. In terms of practice, NP is notable in that the PCSO role and its level of integration into the police are unique features of the programme, and this role produces distinctive cultural dynamics in NPTs and the potential for distinctive delivery of neighbourhood security.

Modern policing in England and Wales has always employed symbolism and rhetoric in order to create ontological and tangible security. NP has its roots in policing tradition, at least rhetorically, as it emphasises the broader functions of police and encourages activities that are symbolically communicative. In NP as well as CP, this evocation of tradition is seen as a response to the bureaucratic policing models that emerged in response to social and technological changes. Although these models may have increased effectiveness and efficiency to some extent, the side effects were de-legitimation and social distance. NP is, of course, not just about tradition, but about integrating tradition into modern, bureaucratic, performance-oriented police institutions. It is evident that the NPP is a product of its time, and the reforms that forged it have made a distinctive and, to some extent, successful contribution to policing in England and Wales.

The backdrop of austerity and its broad and historic socio-economic impact in the UK (see chapter 1) represent conditions that potentially challenge the philosophy and existence of NP. Previous research has repeatedly shown that CP is dogged by implementation failure due to unfavourable political or socio-economic conditions, a lack of resources, police cultural resistance, and inflexible patterns of delivery. Eras of significant socio-economic change provide the conditions for research to reveal the processes of change in CP programmes, and investigate how police institutions attempt to preserve or reform the features of such models. This study will use the conditions of the austerity era to question how police institutions adapt to new circumstances through reform, and how police make sense of theses reforms to enact change at the

street level. Understanding what is changing and how can inform broader understandings of the historical development of contemporary CP.

3 Seeing through Multiple Lenses: A Mixed Methods Exploration of Neighbourhood Policing Reforms

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will detail and justify the overall research approach and methods used in this study. Chapters 1 and 2 explored the significance of the socio-economic context, the *surround* (Manning 2008), and the policing field (Chan 1996) on police reform processes and institutional change. With the onset of the austerity era in England and Wales and its significant implications for police funding as well as the general provision of local services, research is needed that can respond quickly to such events while investigating them deeply in order to understand the distinct impacts of the austerity era on policing.

Through utilising a mixed methods approach, this study can explore the complex processes of institutional reform through different research methods. Chapter 1 also highlighted that the culture, interactions, storytelling, and sensemaking are forces that mediate changes and contribution to the enactment of reforms. This study focuses largely at the meso-level unit of the small group to explore how the environmental and institutional pressures are experienced and mediated by NPTs before shaping the action of NP delivery. Therefore, this chapter will also describe the importance of analysing the NPT as a local group (Fine 2012).

3.2 Mixing Methods to Investigate Reform Processes

This study employs a mixed methods research (MMR) design that comprises both quantitative and qualitative research tools as part of a between-method, two-phase process. The research design has the hallmarks of what Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, 90-96) dub the 'embedded design', as the methods answer different secondary research questions with appropriate data and the overall study has a primary qualitative orientation. This section will outline the overall strategy of inquiry, including both quantitative and qualitative phases.

The overall focus of study is on NP change, but change in police organisations takes many forms, such as "structure, technologies, and culture and the forces that shape them" (Mastrofski and Willis 2010, 56). Therefore, I decided that adopting this approach would help to build a fuller picture, with both breadth and depth, of how and why NP delivery is changing in the austerity era. The qualitative phase of the study

deals with exploring the how and why of NP delivery reform at the level of the NPT, which is the arena where NP is performed and meaningful change to street-level practice can be negotiated. The quantitative phase was designed in part to enhance the qualitative findings by revealing the observable connections between funding reductions and the resources available to NP, illustrating the social forces that may shape NPT culture and NP delivery – in other words, the relationship between austerity politics and NP reform and delivery. Using Bryman's scheme of MMR's logics of triangulation, the rationales inherent in this design are as follows:

> *Completeness* – refers to the notion that the researcher can bring together a more comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in which he or she is interested if both quantitative and qualitative research are employed.

> *Process* – quantitative research provides an account of structures in social life but qualitative research provides sense of process.

> *Sampling* – refers to situations in which one approach is used to facilitate the sampling of respondents or cases.

> *Enhancement* or building upon quantitative/qualitative findings – this entails a reference to making more of or augmenting either quantitative or qualitative findings by gathering data using a qualitative or quantitative research approach. (Bryman 2006, 106-107; original emphasis)

Each of these rationales will be explained in relation to the two phases of research in the following discussion.

3.2.1   From bird's eye view to street level: mixing methods and triangulating findings

To understand change in NP in the austerity era (compared with the preceding era of higher funding) and an attempt at a harmonisation of local policing approaches, I devised a descriptive study of workforce change across all police institutions with NPTs in England and Wales. This constitutes an exploration of both the extent of the impact of funding reductions and how any impact is distributed across forces. This is important for two reasons. First, it will show how (un)evenly change is occurring across institutions, whether NP maintains former standards or becomes fragmented. Second, it provides an interpretive guide as to what is happening to NP delivery in different forces, assuming there is a relationship between the resources and structure of NPTs

and the delivery of NP (Punch 2012). This also means that the qualitative investigation of NP delivery can be contextualised against the force-level markers of change, and the *sampling* of cases can be based upon findings from the quantitative phase. For this reason, the quantitative research tool used – descriptive analysis of official data – was employed first at the start of a sequence of methods.

Figure 3 Research design sequencing

The qualitative phase of the research involves observations of police-community meetings and interviews with NPT practitioners to collect empirical data in order to provide insights into the changes in the delivery of NP and community engagement. This phase is more heavily weighted than the first in both a practical and theoretical sense. Practically, the fieldwork took a much longer time to organise and perform, and the research tools produced large amounts of rich data. Theoretically, the study is guided by the interactionist perspective (explained further in following sections of this chapter), placing emphasis on the potential for human interaction to produce social order and be influenced by structural forces (Fine 2012). Therefore, the qualitative analysis can *enhance* understanding of the broad structural changes revealed by the quantitative component, and show how these broad, contextual changes to police resources in the austerity era and institutional reforms are experienced and understood by those at the street level – providing a sense of *process* under conditions of structural change. In this case, the qualitative phase seeks to answer an extra sub-question on top of the central research questions: *How do NPTs understand and react to new social and institutional environments of the austerity era?* Taken together, the findings from each phase can produce a more comprehensive (or more *complete*) understanding of the topic of change to NP delivery in the austerity era (Jick 1979, 603-604).

3.3   Accessing the Team

This section will describe the overall approach taken to fieldwork access, including the original planned approach of the research design as well as the difficulties, setbacks, and solutions to the social process of negotiating access to institutions and participants in social research. Negotiating access to police institutions for sociological research as an 'outsider' is notoriously difficult (Innes 2003; Loftus 2009; Hallenberg et al. 2015; Jones 2015; Topping 2015), and indeed issues of access had a continuous and significant effect on the research design of this project. Before eventually finding a willing institution and recruiting individual participants, there were a number of attempts to negotiate access with different institutions that failed. These failures to gain initial institutional access will be addressed first. The section will then describe the processes of negotiating access in the final fieldwork setting.

3.3.1   <u>Negotiation processes: Formal Proposals and Gatekeepers</u>

The initial approach to accessing NPTs involved proposing the fieldwork to police organisations to gain formal permission for semi-structured interviews. Overall, contact was made with five separate forces. After the first phase of research, I identified two forces that would provide comparative fieldwork sites in which to explore two distinct emerging approaches to NP. Due to this sampling justification, my contact with and proposals to forces were to some extent chronologically staggered; some sampling arrangements were preferred and thus certain institutions were pursued more vigorously than others at the beginning of the negotiation process. Although a comparative design was initially preferred, it quickly became apparent that achieving similar or indeed any access to separate institutions within the time constraints of a PhD project was very unlikely, which underlines the potentially strong influence of practicalities on research design.

The second intention was to study a group of neighbouring forces that were creating new strategic alliances in order to reduce costs by streamlining their operations. These arrangements also involved collaborative efforts across the alliance to create a new, affordable NP model. In this case the negotiation stalled due to differences of opinion concerning the research design with the gatekeeper of initial access. This particular gatekeeper had knowledge of the policing evidence base and of the research process. However, this episode does raise the ethical consideration of such a gatekeeper's preferences for research designs and the effect this has on the institutional influence on academic research. Upon being advised by the gatekeeper to revise and resubmit

the proposal, I decided to abort the negotiation due to the specific changes asked for, as well as some concern over the potential for the institution to exert further influence on the design.

The breakthrough came after changing the research design once more. The setbacks I had already faced illustrated the challenges of gaining initial or even fruitful access in multiple institutional settings. I made the decision to focus on gaining good access in just one force. What was notable about this stage is that the eventual breakthrough in initial institutional interest was triggered by utilising my own contact – my PhD supervisor – who had knowledge of the current reform programme at the institution and laid the groundwork with a contact of his. It is not possible for me to know exactly how much my supervisor's influence affected the outcome of my proposal being accepted, but the scenario does demonstrate the benefits of good networks, if for no other reason than knowing the right institution to approach at the right time.

Access Negotiation Phase	Forces approached	Comparative Design?	Description	Result
Contrasting reforms	2	Y	Forces with opposite extreme changes to PCSO workforce change and distinct policies to deal with NP in Austerity era	One force rejected initial proposal due to perception that the research was not necessary.
Strategic alliance	2	N	Two forces entering into a strategic alliance with attempt to introduce new NP approach across both institutions.	Initial proposal rejected by contact for both forces due to issues with research design.
Single forces	5	N	Single force access more practical – lower chance of obstacles. Focus on one type workforce change and reform plan.	Initial access granted by one force. One other attempt aborted before conclusion.

Table 3 Fieldwork Access Iterations

In certain cases the more formal process of writing official proposal forms or creating proposal documents was accompanied by email discussions with potential gatekeepers. These gatekeepers were from different organisational levels, some with the capacity for formal input into the proposal process and others without such influence. The latter were most often NPT sergeants who had contacted me through finding information

about my research and expressing interest in my project or asking for research evidence for new NP models for their forces. They discovered the project through the College of Policing research map webpages, where I had uploaded the information in order to create a web presence for the project. This was not ever used as an initial access point to participants while institutional access was being sought, but it did serve two functions. Firstly, not all forces make their application processes publicly visible, and so contact with an 'insider' with an institutional email account presented an opportunity to discover the correct contact to start the application process. One gatekeeper offered to pass on my proposal to the correct contact in order to start the application process, which was convenient but did cause some confusion as the proposal was not in the expected format. Secondly, it presented opportunities for further access once the initial proposal phase was completed. One sergeant who contacted me eventually became a participant in the study. Before the project began I had considered the sergeant as a fruitful access point to NPTs due to past fieldwork experiences, and again I later found that sergeants tended to be the most significant gatekeepers of access to the NPT.

3.3.2 Recruiting the Sample

Negotiating access for qualitative fieldwork is not a single transaction but a continuous and often social process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Burgess 1984). Gaining access to teams and individual participants requires more than submitting an application form to an institution, as a researcher approaching the institutional field will experience different levels of the institution with and through different gatekeepers. Higher up in a police organisation these gatekeepers might be civilian managers and administrators or officers in positions of senior management. Lower down there are middle managers and street-level operatives. I experienced challenges within both these broad levels, though the higher level, where the initial access was negotiated, tended to present the most acute difficulties[12] to gaining access and maintaining the planned research design.

After the initial institutional acceptance of the proposal, a research administrator was assigned to arrange interviews. This process was conducted by email and was largely straightforward, as the administrator was willing to assist in recruiting my desired interview sample. However, this route limited certain aspects of access, as the

---

[12] Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, 41) note that the 'initial negotiations to enter the setting' and the 'first days in the field' often present the most difficulties with access.

administrator chose the venues for interviews. Problems at the higher level emerged after the initial interviews when I attempted to extend my field access to observations of foot patrols in neighbourhoods. I proposed this extension of access via email to my current gatekeeper, the research administrator, with a new proposal that included confirmation of university ethics approval and an additional risk management plan. The request was passed on to an Inspector with research administration duties to judge whether I could gain institutional approval, but further access was denied. This irrevocably altered the research design, as I was then committed to fieldwork in this institution and going against the wishes of the institution would have been an unethical and impractical choice.

As mentioned previously, access challenges also emerged at the 'lower levels' of the institution. The theme that connects most of these challenges is the relative lack of time that police have for either participating in research or helping a researcher organise fieldwork trips. This is to be expected, considering the constant pressures on resources in public services and the prioritisation of their core client-work over outsider interests (Lipsky 1980). In one fieldwork site, for instance, a sergeant had promised me access to his whole NPT for interviews and to community meetings for observations. For the former, we had agreed upon dates for the interviews to be held, but as these dates approached other business came up for him and his team. As for police-community meetings, these were often cancelled during my time in the field in this site and in others, with notice from police or without. Overall, this had significant potential to influence and change the research design and make fieldwork a messy process. Rather than equal access to different NPTs that I had planned, the fieldwork became a much more opportunistic endeavour, conducting interviews and attending meetings when and where openings occurred.

Additionally, turning up for a number of public meetings that had been cancelled without any public notice affected me in other ways. These wasted journeys occasionally made me doubt the value of making a long and time-consuming trip with no data to show for it. Emailing members of an NPT to enquire about these events does not always lead to a quick response, and sometimes police just did not know in advance whether community members would attend. Waiting outside of meeting venues in an unknown area in the dark was also a potential risk, and made me question the wisdom of attending meetings at night if there was a chance of cancellation. From these episodes I learned the value in checking general meeting attendance in advance and opening up better lines of communication with NPT operatives in order to reduce the

risks of attending cancelled meetings. In my experience, as there was no single way of communicating effectively, I relied on a combination of avenues ranging from arranging my attendance for each meeting through a team's sergeant to speaking to NPT operatives through police social media accounts.

3.4   *The Politics of Policing in the West Midlands*

The qualitative fieldwork was conducted in the West Midlands Police (WMP) force area. The boundary of this area was established in 1974 after the Local Government Act 1972 legislated for the creation of new county-level authorities with coterminous county councils, before the Local Government Act 1985 abolished these in favour of a number of unitary authorities. Nevertheless, WMP survived as an organisation throughout the Local Government changes in the 1980s and the proposals for further regional force mergers in 2006. As a police institution of an area that is largely urban, WMP covers the second most populous of all police force areas (2.8 million people) and has the third highest rate of officers per 100,000 head of population (245) in England and Wales. In March 2016, the institution had a total of 6,944 officers and 506 PCSOs, with 1,081 and 460 officially assigned to the Neighbourhood Policing function[13] respectively. There have been moderate reductions to the PCSO workforce but maintenance of the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce since 2010[14], making WMP fairly typical of PCSO workforce change in England.

	Full-time equivalent officers	Full- time equivalent officers available for duty	Community Support Officers
Total	6,944	6,636	506
Neighbourhoods	1,081	-	460

Table 4 - WMP officer and PCSO strength, March 2016, Source: Home Office

3.4.1   Profile of the West Midlands

WMP covers a large urban conurbation that is broken up into seven metropolitan boroughs, three of which are cities: Birmingham, Coventry, and Wolverhampton. The area does cover some rural land, such as a green belt between Birmingham's urban sprawl and Coventry, but this is a small feature of the area overall. The area had a large manufacturing sector, which has decreased significantly in recent decades, but

---

[13] The 'Neighbourhood Policing' function measure has only been used in 2015 and 2016. Before this, forces supplied data for the 'neighbourhoods' function, but the criteria for inclusion was not explicit.

[14] See the following chapter for more details of workforce change and a typology of NP workforce change and implications.

still remains relatively high compared to the rest of the UK. There is relatively high unemployment (7.6% in 2016) and many urban localities (Lower Super Output Areas) fall within the most deprived 20%. The population is majority White/White British (70.1%) and Christian (60.5%) with a relatively large Asian/Asian British (18.9%) and Muslim (7.6%) population compared to the UK. The majority of the Asian population are Indian (6.8%) and Pakistani (7.3%), and the Pakistani and Muslim populations are most dense in the city of Birmingham.

Birmingham's unique ethnic mix is associated with a number of recent controversies and community tensions, the most high-profile of which in the UK was the so-called Trojan horse scandal, in which specific Islamic groups were accused of attempting to take control of a small number of state schools. The WMP Chief Constable of the time raised concerns over the manner of the investigation, suggesting that bringing in a counter-terrorism detective from the Metropolitan Police to investigate the matter could damage community relations (Pidd and Dodd 2014).

The city has also been highlighted or labelled as a hotbed for Islamist extremism by researchers and journalists (e.g. Stuart 2017; Bassey 2013) and was once falsely described by a commentator as a 'no-go zone' for non-Muslims (Sanchez 2015). The media commentator Katie Hopkins also shared a claim on the social media platform Twitter that police were not allowed to enter Birmingham Central Mosque, a claim that was quickly refuted by WMP via the same medium (Rodger 2017). Due to this reputation and high Muslim population of Birmingham, the far-right protest movement English Defence League has held a number of demonstrations in the city and in surrounding boroughs, fuelling tensions between communities (Treadwell and Garland 2011, 626-627). Despite the real threats along with some of the more sensational claims about extremism in Birmingham, WMP was judged to have good arrangements for meeting the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) and for preparing for any firearms attacks (HMIC 2017).

3.4.2 Crime in the West Midlands

In 2016 in the WMP force area, there were 67 crimes recorded per 1,000 of population, a rise of +6.2% compared to 2015 but a fall of -10.8% compared to 2011. The crime rate and recent one-year increase are close to the England and Wales average (68 per 1000 and +7.8% respectively), but the longer-term fall is more pronounced than the average (-3.4%). The anti-social behaviour rate is also lower than average – 21 compared to 31 per 1000 of population in 2016. However, the calls for assistance rate

is notably higher – 322 against 240 per 1000 of population – suggesting a high demand for response compared to the England and Wales average as well as the reported anti-social and crime rates (HMIC 2017). Additionally, WMP was dealing with a high level of gun crime in the year leading up to fieldwork and this continued throughout the fieldwork phase. On HMIC's PEEL (Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy) measures, WMP was judged to be 'good' on all measures apart from 'protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims', in which the force was deemed to 'require improvement' due to inconsistent completion of domestic abuse victims risk assessments. In relation to NP, HMIC found that structured problem-solving approaches in NPTs were restricted to isolated examples or that some officers and PCSOs did not understand these approaches. Therefore, WMP was advised to 'adopt a structured and consistent problem-solving process' (HMIC 2017, 19) in order to more effectively tackle crime and anti-social behaviour.

West Midlands Police descriptors, 2016	
Area Population	2.8 million
WMP operational workforce	
Officers/in NPTs	6,944/1,081
Officers per 100,000 of population	245
PCSOs/in NPTs	506/460
Crime rate per 1000 of population	67
Anti-social behaviour rate per 1000 of population	21
Calls for assistance per 1000 of population	322

Table 5 West Midlands Police descriptors, 2016

3.4.3   Reform in West Midlands Police

WMP has a history of CP reform, including the establishment of the CP-influenced civilian patrol schemes, Street Watch[15] and Faith Watch. In the years since the beginning of austerity both the former CC, Chris Sims, and the recent PCCs, the now-deceased Bob Jones and his successor David Jamieson, have expressed their support for protecting NP from the effects of funding reductions. From 2009, WMP started the first of a number of organisational reform programmes, *Programme Paragon*, which aimed to improve public confidence, enhance partnership working, and reduce overall

---

[15] See Sharp et al (2008) and Williams (2005) for research into the issues of legitimacy of the Street Watch scheme.

costs. Paragon reduced the number of policing divisions from twenty-one 'Operational Command Units' to ten 'Local Policing Units' (LPUs). These new units were coterminous with local authority boundaries, and this arrangement was expected to simplify cooperation with other agencies. Each LPU was to have a Local Command Team consisting of a Chief Superintendent along with a number of Superintendents and Chief Inspectors, who were required to ensure 'high quality local policing' in the NPTs contained within these divisions (West Midlands Police Authority and WMP 2011, 7). From 2012, WMP recruited a consultancy agency to assist in developing the Continuous Improvement programme, which aimed to reduce waste, duplication and inefficiency in the institution's systems and processes. As part of the reorganisation, greater specialisation was identified as a way to increase efficiency. NPTs would now have fewer staff who were required to be dedicated to the area and not abstracted to other teams or locations. NPT functions would now include offender management and tackling gangs and organised crime, whereas Response Teams would focus solely on responding to incidents and not investigations (West Midlands Police Authority and WMP 2012). Full remit for the patrol function was maintained after plans had been made – but subsequently rejected – to outsource some patrolling to the private security provider G4S (Warrell 2013).

In 2015 the financial situation of WMP was worsening; there appeared to be no end to the funding reductions and there was the prospect of Home Office reforms to the Police Allocation Formula (PAF) that would be particularly unfavourable to WMP. WMP was especially vulnerable to central government funding cuts as they received a high proportion of their funding from the Home Office rather than local government or other sources, and thus faced the second highest real-terms funding reduction and the seventh highest savings requirement as a percentage of gross revenue expenditure out of the main forty-three forces of England and Wales (NAO 2015). In 2015, WMP threatened legal action against the Home Office due to the disproportionate effects of the planned PAF reforms (Travis 2015a)[16].

In light of this dire financial situation, CC Chris Sims decided that another organisational change programme was required, and a new consultancy firm was brought on board to assist with planning. This reorganisation was dubbed *WMP 2020*, and NP was again a 'critical element' of the reforms. The 'WMP 2020 Blueprint' promised a new NP model that is 'not constrained by geographical boundaries', would

---

[16] At the time of writing the PAF reforms are under review with no confirmed implementation date.

focus resources in the 'areas of most need', and develop 'active citizens' – an attempt to improve methods of 'connecting and working with local people to share information' (WMP 2015). Other planned features of the programme were an increase in digital services, making greater use of new technologies to improve various tasks, and a greater focus on prevention of victimisation, harm, and reoffending.

In summary, WMP makes a fascinating setting for this project, as an institution that has been grappling with deliberate and far-reaching NP reforms motivated by the changing financial environment. The deliberate changes in large forces like WMP have the potential to inform future approaches to NP reform in other police institutions. Although WMP is unique in its funding arrangements, it has experienced workforce changes that are relatively typical of most forces in England and Wales. Additionally, the general features of the WMP2020 change programme were, to varying degrees, known to participants during fieldwork, and these proposed changes came after two other reorganisations in the space of six to seven years. This provides an interesting dimension to the thoughts, feelings, and expectations of those at the street level, having experienced big changes and awaiting further change to their roles and working environment.

3.5   The Team as a 'Tiny Public'

NP is delivered by specialist police units called Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). These units are small groups of police who work and interact together in the neighbourhood, a hyper-local geographic boundary defined by the police institution. Due to the centrality of these groups to NP delivery, this study primarily focuses on how NP is organised at the meso-realm of the NPT. The qualitative analysis in particular is informed by the interactionist paradigm, especially Goffman's (1983) principles of the 'interaction order', Strauss' 'negotiated order' (1978) and Fine's (2014; 2012; 2010, 1979) theory of small group interaction as a basis for producing social order – small local groups as a 'tiny public'. Fine and Goffman's projects are nomothetic in nature, as they catalogue general principles of behaviour that can be identified during and as a result of group interactions. This study, however, is idiographic in nature due to the focus on particular constraining contexts and exteriorities that are specific to time and place that affect the NPT action and the delivery of NP. Examples of this are the austerity environment and its effects on the resources of NPTs nationally as well as the changing nature of crime and police- or community-defined problems (two different versions of demand) in the WMP setting and specific fieldwork sites. Social

and environmental contingencies also influence the development of a group's unique *idioculture*, which is the:

> …systems of knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and customs shared by the members of the interacting group to which members refer and that they employ as the basis for further group interaction. (Fine 2012, 36)

Fine (1979, 736-737) sees one function of the idioculture as a mediator between the group's environment and action. In this sense, Fine's project is about understanding the linkages between the macro- and the micro-levels present in the meso-level, and this is as relevant to groups within institutions as to any other social group:

> If the ultimate goal is to link an understanding of the macro and micro foundations of institutions, then groups are crucial because they comprise a meso-realm through which the macro and the micro are realized in spaces of interaction. Groups are "where the action is." It is not just that groups mediate the micro and the macro; rather, this meso level has semi-autonomous properties and dynamics that shape everyday life and organizational character. (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1774)

This process of 'realising' the macro within the group setting and interaction order includes the influence of constraints, which are the 'perceived boundaries on action' (Fine 2012, 54), as well as environmental 'exteriorities' – the obdurate, stubbornly immovable contexts that cannot be resisted. Both influence the production of a group's idioculture. This study is not solely dedicated to listing every constraint and obdurate exteriority, but it must be appreciated that NPTs are subjected to a range of them, such as the weighty expectations of police action, both internally from police and externally from wider society, as a body with specific and enduring functions and presentation (Manning 1997). That many essential elements of police objectives, culture, and practice have changed so little in recent decades (Loftus 2009; Skolnick 2008; Chan 1997) is instructive in the study of attempted policing reforms and the barriers to them. According to Fine and Hallett (2014), the study of small groups in formal institutions is where we witness these linkages between macro and micro, where the adaptation to constraints and exteriorities is mediated by the idioculture before it translates to action, and where new negotiated realities produce new large-scale social forces (see also Fine 2010).

In studying the NPT as a group, it is important to pay attention to the group structure and the groupness[17] of the NPT. There are some characteristics of the NPT that are already known and fit with the sociological definition of a small group (Fine 2012, 25). They are small enough in number and localised enough for each member to have interpersonal collaboration and on-going interaction with each other member. As specialised teams in an institution, they have institutionally defined objectives that provide a basis for collective focus. Whether institutionally defined objectives align precisely with the actual communal standards of the NPT is an empirical matter, as it is within the group that these standards are shaped. Furthermore, NPTs have shared histories through which idioculture and collective identity can be formed (Fine 2010).

While the NPT may have the basic structural characteristics of a small group, there still remain questions as to its internal groupness and differentiation between NPTs, especially in light of the institutional imposition of formal goals and boundaries. The levels of affiliation and allegiance of police to the collective focus of the NPT, and therefore the aspects or even coherence of an idioculture, can also be investigated. Do PCs, for instance, share the same values and goals as PCSOs or the Sergeant within the same NPT? Some recent studies point to weak groupness. Goffman's concept of 'performance team' is one way to view how such units may not be working towards the same goals, and O'Neill (2015) observed that the PCSOs and PCs in her study inhabited distinct performance teams. Furthermore, Cosgrove (2016) identified a number of cultural orientations from a sample of 12 PCSOs across two NPTs in the same institution. The results of these studies muddy the notion of groupness within NPTs as divisions in values and performance can exist within one specialist police unit. However, it is possible for some division to exist within groups under Fine's definition, as long as enough similarities in knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and history exist. Idioculture is also not completely static and can be negotiated and resolved as part of the group's historical development (Fine 2010). It is also true that groups contain hierarchies and power relations, and these are structured in to specialist policing units by virtue of, for instance, the quasi-military rank structures within police institutions.

In summary, a primary focus on the meso-level NPT as a unit of analysis provides a way for this study to make theoretical connections between the austerity era and the reconfiguration of NP delivery. Rather than focusing on structure or action alone, the small group as an arena of interaction that constitutes social and cultural orders. The

---

[17] By 'groupness', I refer to the various measures of interrelation within a group, such as members perceptions of cohesion, allegiance/affiliation, and commitment.

mixed methods research design allows me to explore the specific structural constraints as well as the social organisation, idiocultural elements, and actions of the NPT. The quantitative phase, while not analysing the team, will explore the connections between contexts (austerity era and workforce resources) that lead to constraints and exterior influence on NP delivery as mediated by the NPT. The qualitative phase will also include an investigation into the institutional reforms in WMP and the motivations for them – another context that 'enables, constrains, and *partially* constitutes group interactions' (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1776; original emphasis). The findings will provide an illustration of specific contexts and events that the NPT must react to with the potential for new influence on the idioculture. Furthermore, the qualitative phase is enhanced by the small group perspective through the use of observations and interviews to explore the social organisation of the group as well as the idiocultural elements of the NPT that produce local practices. Finally, observations of police meetings with other neighbourhood actors will explore the interaction order of formal community engagement situations. This is again relevant to the dynamics of the NPT as these meetings represent an interaction arena of networked groups and individuals where NPTs perform their group roles and practice community engagement with civic society. The following section will describe the processes of each of these methods of enquiry.

3.6 Describing Workforce Change

The first phase of the research explored how NP had changed throughout England and Wales in the austerity era using descriptive statistics. In order to understand change as a part of the wider political context of the austerity era, the PCSO workforce was used as an indicator of material change to the staffing resources of NPTs across all police forces in England and Wales. As budgetary reductions are the primary feature of austerity politics, workforce fluctuation is the variable that captures one direct effect of austerity on NPTs. To understand how NP delivery is being reconfigured in England and Wales, analysis of national data was therefore of critical importance in understanding the types and distribution of workforce change in all police organisations in England and Wales.

Punch (2012) argues that community-oriented policing is vulnerable to organisational 'paradigm swings', in which changing contexts of policing – political, social, and organisational – encourage policing practice and organisational rhetoric to 'regress' to a limited and 'hard' notion of policing. Innes (2005) also described similar process in reverse, where the politics of policing at the time encouraged the advancement of

'neighbourhood security' functions at the expense of an extensive focus on 'crime management' functions, which is effectively synonymous with the 'soft' and 'hard' policing dichotomy, respectively. Recent concerns relating to a changing demand profile in policing in England and Wales has led to a shifting focus on the way police work in order to reduce demand and work more effectively with fewer resources (Elliott-Davies et al 2016; College of Police 2015). Some argue for a greater focus on early intervention and partnership working to prevent future demand and reduce reactive work (Boulton et al 2016).

With these new concerns and historical precedents in mind, what does the austerity era mean for the continuation of NP as a policing approach that delivers neighbourhood security through the mechanisms of visibility, community engagement and problem-solving? There is some evidence of a link between crude measures of police workforce resources and the ability to perform these delivery mechanisms. For example, Sindall and Sturgis (2013) provided some evidence that reducing police numbers leads to less visibility and thus lower public confidence, and they suggest that organisational efficiencies might not be enough to compensate for recent lost resources. Furthermore, the PCSO role, closely aligned with establishment of RP and NP programmes, is regarded as a vital resource for achieving NP objectives as the main delivery agents of visible foot patrol and community engagement (O'Neill 2014). As such, reducing PCSO numbers can change the realities of NP delivery and affect the resulting levels of security provided by this form of policing. Exploring force level workforce data can reveal which organisations are more vulnerable to such changes.

3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Official Data

Official workforce statistics were used to describe changes to the PCSO workforce before and during the austerity era and analyse the implications for NP delivery across England and Wales. These research sub-questions framed the analysis:

1. What are the trends in the numbers and proportion of Police Community Support Officers since 2004?
2. How do these trends vary by police force areas?
3. What are the implications of these workforce trends for the roles of practitioners and the delivery of neighbourhood policing?

These questions were designed for the purpose of producing a broad answer to the central question of how NP is being reformed in the austerity era.

3.6.2 <u>Sample</u>

The data sets used were the tables from the Home Office's *Police Service Strength* publications[18]. The publications provided official biannual numbers for the police workforce broken down into different categories and roles and provided for each police force area. The data from these publications were collated into a series of spreadsheets:

- Full time PCSO workforce by police force, 2004-2015
- Specials workforce by police force, 2004-2015
- Full time Police Officer workforce by police force, 2004-2015
- Police Operational workforce by police force, 2004-2015

The data in each spreadsheet were divided into three different levels: national (England and Wales); regional; and police force area. From 2004 to 2012, each year's data represents the workforce figure for March that is given to the Home Office by each police force. 2004 was used as the earliest point of analysis as eighteen forces did not employ PCSOs in 2003. Furthermore, the NRPP began in October 2003 and therefore PCSOs would start to be integrated into an approach that was the basis for NP delivery after the time of counting for the 2003 data. For 2013, biannual data covering both March and September were used to ensure the most up to date figures at the time of analysis. The data for 2014 and 2015 represents projections for workforce numbers at March of each year given to HMIC by each police force. These years were included to provide insight into the intentions of each force.

3.6.3 <u>Analysis</u>

The PCSO workforce spreadsheet shows the main trends in national, regional, and local workforce changes, and these trends are described to answer the first two research sub-questions. An analysis of the temporal significance within the trends provides an interpretation of the effects of changes to police funding on the NP workforce, and this interpretation is used as a basis for the answer to research sub-question three. There are a number of points of temporal significance that are used as the basis for analysis, including the roll out of the NP programme in 2008, the change of government and Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010, and the expiration of the Neighbourhood Policing Fund in 2013. Institutional police documents were also used to illuminate

---

[18] The most recent of these, can be accessed online via the government data website, http://data.gov.uk/dataset/police_service_strength_england_and_wales.

possible reasons for specific cases of workforce change. This allowed further interpretation of the possible motivations and contexts of workforce change, beyond centrally imposed funding environments, for particular forces or regions.

The data for police officers and police Specials were included as they provide the numbers of other staff that can be deployed in NPTs. The amalgamation of the numbers of officers, PCSOs and Specials therefore provides a figure of the *operational workforce* that is available for use in NPTs. From the operational workforce figure, the proportion of each separate role can be calculated to reveal the composition of the workforce by role. The trends in the proportions of each role are analysed to provide an answer for the final research sub-question on the premise that different operational roles are deployed in ways that have implications for the way policing is delivered. More specifically, both the numbers and proportion of PCSOs, and by extension the other operational roles, in the operational workforce have implications for the delivery of NP.

3.6.4   Issues in Using Official Data

The police workforce strength data set was used as official records provide the most accurate record of police employment divided by role. However, it is important that researchers maintain a 'healthy scepticism' over numerical data and recognise its limits (Bulmer 1980). In this case, using aggregate figures for each police role obscures intra-organisational differences in some categories, such as the specialisation of each employee. For instance, PCs are used in a variety of specialisations within organisations, such as armed response units, investigation teams, and response teams, and PCSOs can be used outside of NPTs too. Nevertheless, PCSOs are mainly used in NP and often PC roles in most other specialisations symbolise the crime management approach.

One way the administrative data sets attempt to give more clarity over the NP workforce is by allowing forces to designate 'function' labels to the workforce that in most cases appear to fit with specialised team roles. A 'neighbourhood' category exists in the dataset, the criteria for inclusion in the category is not clearly explicated – inclusion does not necessarily mean the numbers relate directly to the NPT workforce. Another problem with using this actor's category to monitor the level of staffing in NPTs is that the meaning of 'neighbourhood' is subject to change over time (especially in line with reforms to local policing operating models), and therefore is less useful for the analysis of NP change. Newly implemented local policing models that maintain

numbers according to the 'neighbourhood' category but operate over reformed boundaries and with new functions can lead to appearances that do not reflect the reality of change on the ground. This category was also cited for political purposes to show that neighbourhood resources had increased across the country, though the claims could be shown to be misleading by closer scrutiny of the data (Greig-Midlane 2015).

3.7   Interviewing the Team

The previous section dealt with how this study views structural changes as a variable in organisational change, in that fluctuations in resources can influence or constrain the choices available to police actors in NP. One function of the quantitative analysis is to set the scene of NP delivery reform by revealing NP resource changes taking place within the austerity era. The second function is to chronicle the distribution of change across forces and to consider the implications for the range of these changes. The second phase builds on the first by investigating more deeply the effects of structural change on NP delivery through qualitative research methods. This section will set out the processes of designing and conducting interviews and field observations, as well as the analysis of the data produced by these methods.

In order to understand how NP is delivered by NPTs and how this work is changing in the austerity era, I successfully conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews with eighteen street-level NPT operatives (whom I will refer to generally as 'police'), as well as three elite police actors who were involved in some capacity with high-level NP policy. The former group was formed of one inspector, six sergeants, five PCs, and six PCSOs who were currently working or had until recently worked in NPTs in WMP. The latter comprised WMP's PCC, a WMP Chief Superintendent who was the lead for local policing, and the College of Policing's lead on local policing. Each face-to-face interview was audio-recorded and lasted between approximately thirty and ninety minutes, with most lasting nearer to sixty minutes.

The elite group also included an email interview with the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) at WMP who oversaw local policing policy. A face-to-face interview was not possible with the ACC due to her own time constraints, and instead she offered to answer a set amount of questions via email. Although my preference was face-to-face encounters with the opportunity for follow-up questions and probing (Rubin and Rubin 2012), I accepted the proposal as the only practical way to receive an account of NP reforms from the highest operational rank possible.

Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most practical method to gain individual accounts of NP delivery, change, and the workings and idioculture of the NPT as a group. An interview can be used as tool to generate data on the rhetoric of policing; the normative positions on the function of NP and the motives that define actions and reform (Wright Mills 1940). It can also be used to generate data to explain the social action (Bruce and Wallis 1983) of police in NPTs. Much has been written about whether CP approaches are rhetoric or reality (Manning 1984; 1997; Mastrofski 1988; Weatheritt 1988), and I take the view that it is possible to receive both rhetorical accounts and explanations of action through interview data, as long as one casts a critical eye over what is being claimed. Hammersley and Atkinson summarise this position[19] as follows:

> For us, there are two legitimate and complementary ways in which participants' accounts can be used by ethnographers. First, they can be read for what they tell us about the phenomena to which they refer. Second, we can analyse them in terms of the perspectives they imply… such participant knowledge on the part of people in a setting is an important resource for an ethnographer – though its validity should certainly not be accepted at face value, any more than should that of information from other sources. (2007, 97-98)

As previously revealed in my account of negotiating access, I had hoped to gain greater access to NPTs through field observations of everyday NP work but ended up with limited access to only public meetings. Without this fuller access to observe the realities of how all types of NPT work is done, the interview became the most practical method to reveal the actual experiences of police in relation to, for instance, foot patrol. Of course, interviews generate a very different form of data with its own unique value to other methods, but in a multi-method study there is a case, putting aside obstacles and practicalities, for the same phenomena to be investigated using different research tools. In this case, I had to accept the interview as the best tool available for exploring explanations of action in specific areas of NPT work.

3.7.1   Designing and conducting the interview

The preparation for these meetings with respondents consisted of designing and at various points redesigning interview schedules that would elicit in-depth responses.

---

[19] Also, see Yearley (1989) for an in-depth discussion and critique of both 'actionist' and 'accountist' positions.

The advance semi-structuring of the interviews reflected both the exploratory nature of the research design as well as my previous knowledge of the topic, but the main purpose was to explore the topic in my interviewee's own words and this was reflected in the question wording. Different schedules were tailored for different roles and levels in order to better target the specific knowledge and experiences of each respondent, but the main themes were broadly the same for each level. Table 6 outlines the different roles and groupings and the broad topic areas included in the tailored interview schedules[20].

Each topic area contained a small number of main questions for discussion with additional follow-up questions attached in case of the need to probe further after initial responses (Rubin and Rubin 2012). The topics were chosen to broadly represent the themes of the research project, and each main question within was intended as a tool to encourage the respondents to openly discuss their views and experiences in the general area. In the interviews, I stuck to the wording of the main questions but follow-up questions could be omitted or altered where necessary during the conversation. I listened carefully to responses in order to probe more deeply into responses that I judged needed elaboration or clarification. I asked questions both about abstract views and tangible experiences to the 'operational officers' grouping as a matter of course and in some cases to the 'management and operational' grouping. The intention was to elicit stories from respondents that might reveal a cultural perspective of NP delivery, a 'sensibility through which action might arise' (Shearing and Ericson 1991, 481).

Role/Grouping	Topic Areas
Operational officers (PCs and PCSOs) Managerial and operational (Sergeants and Inspectors) Chief Superintendent	1. Value and values of NP 2. Changes to NP delivery 3. Community Engagement
Assistant Chief Constable	• No conversation topics, just a set number of questions for email response
PCC	1. WMP's approach to NP 2. Funding and Organisational Reform 3. Community Engagement 4. Role and Value of PCSOs
College of Policing Local Policing Lead	1. NP reform in austerity 2. Role and Value of PCSOs 3. Community Engagement

[20] See appendix 4 for full interview schedules, including all topic areas, main questions, follow-up questions, and prompts.

Table 6 Interview Schedule Types

The face-to-face interviews with police were mostly arranged to take place in private rooms (those with a door that could be closed) in police stations and offices or workplaces of individual respondents. The only interview that was conducted in a space without extensive privacy was with the College of Policing representative, as we met in an open-plan meeting space in one of the College of Policing's buildings. These were good locations for interviews as the spaces were most often very quiet, relatively private (though there were a couple of interruptions), and were very convenient for most respondents, especially when I was in the respondent's station. One issue with interviewing police in their stations while they are on duty is that there is always the chance they might run out on an urgent call for assistance with no further opportunity to reconvene and finish the conversation. This happened on just one occasion during fieldwork, and in that instance the interview only lasted for 10 minutes. To make matters more difficult, the sergeant who pulled the PC respondent out of the room to attend the call was my gatekeeper for that location, the local station of the NPT. Suddenly, I found myself alone in a police station conference room, my respondent and gatekeeper gone for an unspecified amount of time. After a few moments of recording the incident in my research diary, I decided there was no point in waiting any longer and so ventured further into the station to try and find other PCs or PCSOs who might want to be interviewed next. Luckily, I had already met some of the PCSOs through fieldwork and I was briefly introduced to other police at the beginning of the day. Had this not happened, my presence and requests to talk with other police may have been met with confusion and possibly suspicion.

Qualitative fieldwork involves building rapport with participants and respondents to allow them to open up and give greater access to their world and experiences, and as interviews are an example of human interaction the same rule is applicable to the relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Burgess 1984). As I had not previously met the majority of interviewees in other fieldwork activities, most of my rapport-building or ice-breaking opportunities came in the opening exchanges before or at the beginning of the interview. Before interviews I exchanged greetings and pleasantries where suitable, as well as giving an account of my presence and, especially if asked, my research topic. This period was also the opportunity to ensure the respondent knew about the terms of their participation – such as the anonymisation of data where possible and their right to withdraw participation – and the nature of the interview – what we would discuss, how long I expected it to last, and that I was recording the audio. I used ice-breaker questions to begin the interview, specifically

81

asking all face-to-face respondents something about themselves, their career history, and the neighbourhood they worked in, as well as why they joined WMP. I chose to do this in the belief that it would ease them into talking about the substantive topic, following the logic that it is easier to talk about oneself and one's job than any other topic. This exercise also generated some contextual information about each respondent, which is presented in Table 7. Overall, the respondents were very talkative in interviews, and most interviews lasted near to an hour with only a very small number lasting for less than forty-five minutes, and so rapport and engagement did not appear to be a problem.

3.7.2 Sampling

The overall strategy was to build a purposive sample of policing actors in WMP who were involved in NP at a number of different levels: delivery, management, and strategy. Most interviews (18) were conducted with street-level police, as these are the actors who deliver NP on a day-to-day basis and therefore have knowledge and experience of how NP is delivered and organised by NPTs in WMP. This part of the sample included:

- 5 PCs
- 6 PCSOs
- 6 Sergeants
- 1 Inspector

A smaller number of interviews (4) were carried out with 'elite' actors involved in NP through their roles in WMP (3) and in the national policing body, the College of Policing (1). Elite interviews give insights into high-level policy environments, the rules passed down from senior positions in organisations to the street-level.

The table below lists all respondents by their designated pseudonyms and provides a short profile of each. Thirteen of these respondents were chosen by the institution after I had advised my official WMP contact of my preference for police of a range of different ranks and with involvement in NPTs. I approached most other respondents via email to gauge interest in and organise participation, and one respondent (NPT2 SER) contacted me after discovering information about this project online. The NPT1 prefix relates to respondents from one NPT (referred to here as 'Middleton') who were recruited by their Sergeant after I had contacted him via email.

Middleton has a high representation in the sample as it was initially selected as one neighbourhood site that could provide comparative interview and observation data against other sites with other comparable sample sizes. Unfortunately, the level of access required to these other sites for comparisons did not materialise during the fieldwork phase, illustrating the effect of fieldwork constraints on the final sample. Middleton and Heathville are notable sites as I conducted observations of some interviewee respondents at public meetings, meaning that the interview conversations sometimes contained discussions about what I had observed in the field.

The profile table shows that the majority of respondents were male (16) and the minority female (6), with a 50% female representation in the PCSO sample and only 16% of PCs, meaning a very slight female overrepresentation in the former and male overrepresentation in the latter when compared to the England and Wales police workforce – 45% and 30% respectively. However, the sample is not intended to be statistically representative given the small numbers overall, but it is useful to note issues of representation in light of research findings on gendered policing cultures and 'soft' policing (McCarthy 2013; Martin 1999). The respondents had a variety of career backgrounds, as shown, and also a variety of other employment and personal backgrounds, which are not presented in order to ensure anonymity. Some of these backgrounds were in retail or other service sectors, and the respondents had joined WMP in order to gain more job satisfaction. A small number of the respondents told me that they joined WMP for job security, including some PCSOs.

Respondent	Area	Gender	Occupational Experience
CSO1	City, inner-city neighbourhood	F	Over 1 year as CSO, previous administration roles in WMP
CSO2	City, central neighbourhood	F	7 years, only CSO. Ex-retail worker.
CSO3	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	9 years. 1 and a half as PC, then CSO
PC1	City, central neighbourhood	F	11 years, neighbourhood and response
PC2	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	13 years, most in neighbourhoods, also response, CID
PC3	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	6 years officer, last 2 years in neighbourhoods, 4 on response
PC4	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	Long service (at least 18 years at time of interview), intelligence and beat/neighbourhood policing background.

SER1	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	24 years, previously CID
SER2	City, central neighbourhood	M	10 years, Response, neighbourhood, custody, priority teams (CAPT)
SER3	City, 4 neighbourhoods	M	13 years. Currently neighbourhood coordinator
SER4	City, inner-city neighbourhood	M	13 years, response, 'proactive team', CID
INSP1	City, oversees 4 NPTs	M	20 years' service, previous experience in response and investigations
NPT1 SER	City, mixed residential and commercial inner-city neighbourhood (Middleton)	M	15 years, 4 years as Special before,
NPT1 PC1	City, mixed residential and commercial inner-city neighbourhood (Middleton)	M	10 years. Previously CSO for 18 months
NPT1 CSO1	City, mixed residential and commercial inner-city neighbourhood (Middleton)	M	8 years as CSO
NPT1 CSO2	City, mixed residential and commercial inner-city neighbourhood (Middleton)	F	8 years as CSO
NPT1 CSO3	City, mixed residential and commercial inner-city neighbourhood (Middleton)	M	7 years as CSO
NPT2 SER	Town, inner-city neighbourhood (Heathville)	M	Over 20 years' experience, response, intelligence, firearms, drugs teams. Over 5 years as NPT Sergeant
ChSUP	West Midlands and central LPU in City	F	21 years' service, investigations, firearms, public order. Former staff officer to Chief Constable.
ACC	West Midlands	F	
PCC	West Midlands	M	N/A
CoP LPL	National	M	Officer since 1980s

Table 7 Respondent Characteristics

The elite respondents were chosen purposively according to their role. Proposals for an interview were sent via email to an administrator or personal assistant in the offices of the ACC and PCC. I contacted the PCC's office without any prior notice, but the

recruitment of Chief Superintendent, ACC and CoP representative involved some groundwork by other people in my network. Indeed, speaking with the CoP representative was not part of the initial sampling plan, but was rather the result of other contacts recommending that I speak with him. Harvey (2011, 433) recommends researchers to be very transparent with elite respondents, giving as much information as possible before commencing interviews. Although I tried to follow this rule for all my respondents regardless of their status, there were some differences with elite participants. Firstly, I made sure they understood that WMP would be named in the thesis, and this meant that because of their unique roles in the institution they would not be able to be effectively anonymised. Secondly, due to the absence of anonymity, I offered to send transcripts to elite participants for review in the event that they wanted to minimise the risk of occupational or political harm.

3.7.3 Coding and Analysis

The main objective of analysis of the interviews was to understand how NP is delivered by NPTs through a meso-level analysis of NPTs as a 'local arena where interaction is performed and institutions are inhabited' (Fine 2012, 1). As previously discussed, this involved treating the interview data as both descriptions of real action and rhetorical accounts of action. Additionally, it involved exploring the data for signs of the effects of the wider environment on the dynamics of the NPT's organisation and aspects of the idioculture and how this regulates the behaviour of the members of the NPT (Fine 2012, 51). I wanted to understand the police alignment with CP or 'soft' policing values within the NPT, exploring rhetoric to see if soft policing was a defining value of NPT idioculture, and consider how specific rhetoric might be instrumental in resisting or coming to terms with change. Additionally, the data were investigated for perceptions and experiences of real change in the modes of delivering NP, such as the shift from neighbourhood security to crime management (Punch 2012).

Analysis is a constant and iterative process that takes place throughout fieldwork and beyond (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Layder 1998; Glaser and Strauss 1967), and this section will describe the process in an orderly fashion while at the same time attempting to include some of the messy realities. My overall strategy for coding and analysis was based on both *a priori* knowledge of NP research as well as a preference for inductive exploration of new data, what Layder (1998) terms as an adaptive theory approach. In practice, this meant that I had some knowledge of what analytic categories would be created to record specific descriptions of phenomena in the data, whilst also allowing new categories to 'emerge' from the data – that is, allowing what

the respondents said to inform the coding process and direct me to unplanned theoretical explanations. This back and forth process lasted well into drafting the analysis chapters, illustrating the lengthy process of clarifying and finalising the questions and findings of a research project.

My coding plan was a six-step process. First, after interviews had taken place, all interview audio was transcribed verbatim and the resultant Word documents were exported to the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis programme, NVivo. Before commencing any coding procedures with NVivo, I chose four transcripts from across roles and ranks to read through in order to identify some preliminary themes and note down some initial ideas and questions as annotations and memos. Most of the categories I identified first were aligned to some degree with the research questions, the interview schedule topics, and the literature on change in CP and NP. During this stage, I started to categorize how participants understood the values, objectives, and processes of NPTs, as well as the effects of the wider social and political environment. Other categories emerged from the data where issues directly and indirectly linked to the research questions were raised by respondents. For example, I created categories for welfare and job satisfaction, as well as identifying different emotions expressed by respondents. Overall, this is what Layder (1998, 53) describes as 'provisional coding' – coding parts of a transcript that trigger 'some association with a particular concept, category or idea.'

I then entered my provisional codes into NVivo as 'parent nodes' and started to apply my provisional coding framework on three other transcripts. During this stage, I started the dual process of both adding more 'parent' and 'child nodes' to represent new ideas that emerged from reading more transcripts and refining existing nodes by making sure that the way I had categorised data could be applied consistently across similar excerpts. After this trial run of coding, I reviewed all the nodes I had created to see if they fit into the thesis narrative as it was emerging. The next stage was to return to NVivo and fully code every transcript with the remaining nodes – what Layder would call the 'core codes' (1998, 56). Although I envisioned the previous step as the last one in the process, the reality was quite different as planning and writing analysis chapters is itself a creative process that brings up further questions and interpretations of data. In my case, I revisited the coding process at step four to re-code some of the material into new analytic concepts, illustrating the iterative process of qualitative research and the numerous possibilities for interpreting and analysing data.

Coding Plan
1. Detailed reading of small sample of transcripts.
2. Identify themes in relation to my prior knowledge and think about other issues raised in the data. Create list of categories broadly relevant to research topic.
3. Trial run of coding on small number of other transcripts. Do the themes fit? Add more parent/child nodes where new ideas arise.
4. Take stock of parent/child nodes. Do they relate well to research questions and emerging narrative of thesis? Change or remove nodes that do not fit.
5. Full coding.
6. Plan analysis with current codes. Go back to stage 4 where necessary.

Table 8 Coding Plan

3.8   Observing the Team

The second qualitative research tool I used was observations of Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings; formal, public events involving NPT operatives, community members, and on occasion representatives from other local partner agencies. The aim of these observations was to explore the delivery of community engagement in the context of organisational reform, austerity politics, and the accounts and rhetoric of interview respondents. This involved understanding the way CE was used to deliver NP mechanisms, such as problem-solving and reassurance, and how the interaction between police and community members affected these processes and the conduct of NPT work.

Observations are sometimes characterised as being either 'non-participant' or 'participant' in methods textbooks (e.g. Bryman 2004), systematic (Reiss Jr. 1971) or unstructured, or as a spectrum of approaches between 'complete observation' to 'complete participation' (Gold 1958). To simplify the effective differences between these dichotomies, a non-participant, systematic, complete observation suggests a field researcher with detached presence in the field, having little effect on the natural setting and participant interactions within. In contrast, the unstructured, participant observation favours the integration of a researcher into the social world of the participant, investigating this world through natural interactions over an extended period of time. I will not label my approach to field observation in any such specific way, but in accordance with my mixed-method approach and combination of deductive and inductive analysis my observations included elements of a number of these broader techniques. Indeed, my approach was both in part systematic and unstructured, largely non-participant and naturalistic yet with definite moments of participation (or interaction) in the social world of the participants. The observation strategy was based on decisions relating to the collection and analysis of appropriate data as well as

situational choices relating to the field and the data generating opportunities that it represented, and this will be further elaborated in the following discussions.

3.8.1   Research Sites

The field observations were conducted in three research sites between November 2015 and April 2016. All sites were urban neighbourhoods within the setting of the WMP area. These sites are referred to by the aliases of Kingston, Middleton, Heathville, and they are profiled in Table 9. The sampling of these sites was opportunistic, in part due to the setbacks I faced in accessing other areas of NPT work. I first looked at the WMP website's local policing webpages[21] to identify which neighbourhoods had a relatively high number of PACT meetings taking place. Middleton was chosen due to a high number of PACT meetings scheduled for the first three months of my fieldwork stage advertised on the WMP website. I emailed the Inspector and Sergeant of the Middleton NPT to notify them of my research and my attendance at the meetings, and also to arrange further access to the NPT for interviews with willing respondents.

Site	Description
Kingston	Inner-city suburban neighbourhood in large city, mixture of residential and commercial. Multi-ethnic and deprived area with high crime rate. Contains Princetown microbeat – most PACT meetings took place here – with high crime rate, high deprivation and large black African-Caribbean population. High violence and anti-social behaviour. Princetown PACTs held in Islamic community centre and church, led by PC and attended by PCSO and, on one occasion, one other PC. Very large attendance at Islamic community centre.
Middleton	Inner-city suburban neighbourhood in large city. Mainly residential, but some industrial and commercial estates. Multi-ethnic and deprived area with moderate crime rate. Biggest problems at the time of fieldwork were anti-social behaviour and violence. Three locations used for PACT – community centre, sheltered housing estate, and council building. PACTs run by PCSOs. Attendance was very low for nearly all meetings.
Heathville	Largely residential suburban neighbourhood of a large town. High white British population, high deprivation, high crime rate and historically significant problems with burglary. Biggest problems at the time of fieldwork were anti-social behaviour, violence, criminal damage, and vehicle crime. PACT meeting held at community centre and led by Sergeant. Small group of older residents regularly attend and had built up familiar relationship with Sergeant.

Table 9 Fieldwork Sites

---

[21] These web pages no longer exist in the form they did during fieldwork, as the information they provided have been subsumed by the national police.uk website. A new website – 'West Midlands Now', https://www.wmnow.co.uk/ – has also now emerged, which allows registered users to "learn about community groups, events and meetings in your area."

My intention was to choose a number of sites with a number of meetings advertised for comparison, but few NPTs had advertised their meetings through the webpages the first time I checked. Heathville was chosen for the next site after discussion with the Sergeant of its NPT. He had contacted me many months before I began to attend PACT meetings to convey interest in participating in my research, and from him I discovered that three meetings were scheduled over a five-month period in Heathville, though only one was advertised. At first, PACT meetings in Kingston were not advertised either, but towards the end of the year a number of events were shown on the WMP website. I emailed the Sergeant of Kingston, who gave me advice about which meetings would be useful to attend and put me in contact with the PC running the PACT meetings in the Princetown microbeat.

3.8.2   PACT Meetings and the Process of Observation

The police running or attending PACT varied by rank, role, and number. In most meetings, PCSOs represented the NPT as chairs of the meetings, while other series of meetings were run by a PC and a Sergeant[22]. Overall, I planned to attend twelve PACT meetings across three neighbourhoods. In the end, seven PACT meetings formed the basis for the analysis, and these took place over five months across the three neighbourhoods, each lasting one hour to one hour and thirty minutes. I also went to three PACT meetings in Middleton where no residents or police attended, and one in Middleton where no residents and one PCSO attended, but only after being alerted to my presence by the manager of the residential estate in which the meeting was scheduled. One PACT meeting in Heathville was cancelled, but in this case I was given advance notice by the Sergeant of the NPT. Additionally, I attended two community meetings in the Kingston neighbourhood that were not chaired and in one case not attended by police representatives, though these became exercises in attempting to build rapport with local police and community actors and finding out more information about local issues and police relations, rather than being at the centre of any formal analysis.

At the PACT meetings with residents and police present, attendance varied considerably. One attracted over forty community members, with three police and a council representative, while at another just one resident managed to attend. The venues were meeting rooms or common areas in community centres, churches, local

---

[22] I was aware of a meeting in another neighbourhood run by an Inspector, but I did not observe any of these.

government estate, or residential estates, as well as one school gymnasium. Different meetings in different areas attracted residents with very different demographics; men, women, younger and older people, and a number of ethnicities were represented. Some meetings were more demographically diverse than others, and this was largely mediated by the location and type of venue that hosted the meeting. Community centres tended to attract their own users and volunteers, and PACTs in housing estates tended to attract their own residents and employees. The rooms tended to be arranged in one of two ways: residents sat on rows of chairs facing the chairperson or a panel of agency representatives, or; all participants sat facing each other in a circle of chairs, sometimes around a table and sometimes with space in between.

Before attending meetings I attempted to contact NPT managers to make them aware that I would be attending meetings in their neighbourhood and get advice on which meetings would go ahead. Making contact was useful because some meetings that were advertised did not take place and some that were advertised online were tasking meetings that were not actually open to the public. I also wanted to ensure that the police running the meetings expected my presence and were informed of my purpose. Some knew that I would be attending and others did not, but even those who did were not always aware of my research purposes. Informing residents of my attendance in advance was impossible because I did not know who would decide to come, but still I wanted as many people to be aware of my purposes as possible. In most cases this meant arriving early and conversing with residents before the meeting started. This was useful as I was able to speak more widely about the area and its issues, and if I spoke with the right person they would introduce me to other residents. However, most of the time I could not make everybody aware through this method. It was more effective to have the chairperson introduce me close to the start of the meeting, which was possible on some occasions but not practical on others.

At the meetings, I made sure to choose a place to sit amongst the residents where I would observe and write field notes simultaneously. I decided against sitting or standing separately in order to reduce my visibility or be more of a distraction. I reasoned that given the social situation, one in which many people were strangers and the interaction was formally structured to some extent, my presence would probably not have an excessive effect on others. At the same time I tried to choose a position where I could observe as many faces of both residents and police as possible. This approach could be characterised as Gold's (1958) 'observer-participant' or Spradley's (1980) 'passive participant', as I did not purposefully interact with participants during

the official proceedings of any meeting and neither was it ethical nor appropriate to act as a local resident, concerned about issues in the area. At the same time, I was present and visible, and I did interact with both police and residents before (as mentioned in the last paragraph) and after the meetings, asking participants about their experiences of the meetings and relationships with other actors. For example, I spoke with residents about what they hoped could be achieved by coming to the meetings and having this type of contact with police. Speaking to residents did in some cases build rapport – especially where the issues being raised at the meetings were viewed as serious and urgent – and I was asked by some community members to return to future scheduled meetings.

I made field notes of meetings during the observation in long-hand format, which was labour-intensive and challenging given the concentration involved in the combination of watching, listening, writing, and thinking. Nevertheless, long-hand notes worked as an effective memory aide when writing up after meetings and helped to construct a more accurate portrayal of what was said and done at these events, such as the specific wording of verbal exchanges and facial and bodily reactions during exchanges. In the field notes, I recorded these verbal exchanges and body language as well as information about the physical features of the meeting space, information about the venue, the feel or atmosphere of the meeting, the observable emotions, the types of issues raised, information that was observable or revealed by the central characters, the conventions of the meeting (as set by police or chairperson), and interactions I had with participants before and after the meeting. These interactions outside of the meeting were recorded opportunistically – usually when I was sitting alone waiting for meetings to start, or afterwards while sitting in my car or on the train. The field notes were written up in full at the next available opportunity in order to keep memories of the events as fresh as possible.

Observing meetings at multiple sites and each meeting more than once involved extra spatial and temporal dimensions that exposed some similarities and differences between specific PACT events as well as the approaches of different NPTs and police to community engagement. Observing the same residents and police over a number of meetings revealed a sense of how interactions at PACT developed over time and how these interactions affected the process of defining neighbourhood problems and deriving plans for action.

3.8.3 Analysing Interactions at PACT

To analyse the observation data, I use Goffman's (1982) concept of the interaction order as an analytical apparatus for exploring the police-community interactions at PACT. Viewing PACT meetings through an interactionist lens shows how the situational realities and constraints of the community engagement field shape the delivery of NP. As different groups were observed across a number of meetings at different times, the spatial and temporal context is relevant and thus the analysis of each group is presented separately to emphasise the particularities of each group. Time is also relevant to the analysis of the interaction order as continued co-presence of police and community members has the potential to progress relationships within each group. See chapter 6 for the associated concepts that were used to understand the meanings and wider implications of these interactions.

3.9 Ethical Processes and Reflections

Ethics in social research relates to broad considerations about the risks and harms posed to researchers, participants and other parties of interest by the research process and actions of the researcher. Formally, these considerations can be the list of issues raised during the institutional ethical approval process and the fieldwork procedures implemented to comply with the agreement between the researcher and institution. Guillemin and Gillam (2004) call this 'procedural ethics', and distinguish it from what they term as 'ethics in practice'. This latter category they describe as the "everyday ethical issues that arise in the doing of research" (Guillemin and Gillam 2004, 263). This latter concept not only includes the dilemmas experienced and unplanned courses of action taken by a researcher in the field, but also any decision made that could constitute an 'ethically important moment' that could have unforeseen ethical ramifications. This section will address both the procedural ethics of this study, themselves influenced by the broad principles of codified ethics in criminological research, while considering some issues of potential importance that arose in the field.

Elementary ethical procedures were followed in the categories of informed consent and reducing risks to the participants as well as myself[23]. For participants in this study, the two are closely linked as the main risks to participants is potential harm to reputation or interests. To gain informed consent, gatekeepers were asked to supply

---

[23] Some of the risks as a researcher performing observation fieldwork were presented in section 3.3. Rudimentary procedures were followed to reduce these risks, such as informing family of my whereabouts and journey times as well as carrying a mobile phone.

every interview respondent with a research information sheet and consent form (see Appendix 2) in advance. I brought extra copies of these documents to interview appointments, and this was useful as some respondents had not received them. In every case I verbally confirmed that each respondent had read the information sheet and was aware that participation was voluntary and responses were, in most cases, confidential. As previously discussed in section 3.7, I confirmed with elite participants that WMP would be named in the study and therefore they could not be fully anonymised. Naming the institution, then, also constituted a decision with ethical implications. I chose to name the setting due to the very specific reform packages that describe new approaches to NP and framed discussions in the interviews. Fortunately, none of the elite participants objected to being identifiable.

While conducting field observations, I encountered some difficulties in achieving the ethical standard of explicit and informed consent, sometimes leading to what Watts (2011) terms an 'ethical compromise' in observational fieldwork. My plan involved two stages. First, I emailed the relevant NPT managers to inform them of my research objectives and intended presence at specific meetings. As I could not always rely on an email to the NPT to receive a quick response, and because information was not always passed on to police running the meetings, the second stage of the plan consisted of arriving early at the venues for PACT and letting police and residents know who I was and why I was there. In ideal situations, I persuaded police or other chairs of the meeting to introduce me, or allow me to introduce myself, to the entire group at an early stage of the event. However, this was not always possible to arrange and opportunities for introducing myself to all attendees were sometimes limited. Where I was not introduced, I did not want to have an especially formal presence or impose myself too vigorously in order to keep the event as naturalistic as possible.

In reality, when my identity was made known my presence was usually greeted with indifference, perhaps due to PACT being open to the public and often attended by a range of neighbourhood actors with various roles and interests. This might not always be the case in such meetings. In Heathville, the sergeant recalled PACT meetings some years ago where people he described as local criminals would turn up to meetings in order to identify members of the community who were potentially 'grasses', which could have led to intimidation of attendees. It was therefore important for me to not identify any residents by their real names or descriptions in my field notes to reduce risks of harm to participants, instead using pseudonyms in the eventuality that my field notes were lost or stolen. The sight of me writing in a notebook during meetings also

led some people to question whether I was a journalist after some meetings, and this was the most hostile questioning I received during fieldwork.

Other perceptions of my presence were more positive but equally ethically troubling. In one location I was vigorously welcomed by some community members and asked to keep coming back to witness what some residents perceived as police indifference to community problems. Some police respondents also revealed preconceptions of my role that I had not knowingly encouraged, such as a sergeant who said that WMP worked with "people like [me]" to install more scientific approaches to delivering crime prevention activities. These episodes raise questions of the participants' expectations, researcher positionality, and advocacy (or even bias) in research, relating to ethical issues about the function of social research and the relationship between researcher and participating individuals and groups. Of course, it is difficult to spend time with people, hearing their grievances, trying your best to understand their actions and world without trying to help forward their interests in some way. However, there are ethical problems associated with partisanship at the expense of presenting 'value-neutral' findings in relation to research questions (Hammersley 2000), such as a deleterious effect on academic rigour or even alienating groups with other interests (Fine 1993, 270-272). In my view, my research should aim for both value neutrality in its conduct and value relevance in its implications. That is, I can hope that by studying the broad topic my research could someday become work, or influence other work, that contributes some general social progression or lessening of harm, without 'taking sides' in the process.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined, justified, and contextualised the mixed methods research design that this study employs. The mixed methods design consists of three separate methods to provide breadth and depth in the investigation of reform processes in a large and complex institution. The methods were sequenced so that the initial quantitative phase, with its broad view of structural changes to NPTs in England and Wales, could inform the sampling, and contextualise the results, of the qualitative stage, which consisted of a deeper case study approach in the West Midlands. The research design follows a number of rationales identified in Bryman's (2006) scheme of MMR's logics of triangulation – completeness, process, sampling, and enhancement – in order to make each phase complementary to the other and to highlight the interrelation between internal and external institutional contexts and the complex and dynamic reform processes within one police force. Finally, the NPT as a local group

(Fine 2012) serves as the primary unit of analysis in the study through which the complex processes of cultural mediation can be explored. Analysing NPTs as a group provides an opportunity to witness and understand the linkages between macro-structures and micro-interactions. This is crucial for a deep and nuanced understanding of how police institutions react to the socio-economic environment.

4 Changing the Beat? The Extent and Distribution of Change in the Neighbourhood Policing Workforce

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the structural context of NP in the austerity era. Through a descriptive analysis of police workforce data, it will show how NP is changing structurally throughout England and Wales and argue that the socio-economic context of policing can trigger institutional reform processes and challenge prevailing ideas of policing delivery. These structural changes are of interest because of both the political environments they reflect and the implications they have for service delivery. The localised arrangement of state policing bodies in England and Wales means that these types of changes can be distributed unevenly, though variation within this distribution is by no means inevitable.

Describing the recent changes to police workforces – encompassing the national whilst interrogating the local – lays the foundations for a deeper investigation of the reform processes within the police institution. The ability to categorise changes on a national scale allows the creation of a tentative typology that signals the relative implications of change across different localities. It also provides directions for subsequent phases of research undertaken as part of this project by revealing particular quantitative changes in potential research sites.

To understand the implications of NPT staffing structures and levels for service delivery, the outcomes, processes and the corresponding activities encompassed in the roles of NPT practitioners will be explored. The staffing levels of Police Community Support Officers is chosen as a signifier of potential reform of the NP programme's structure and the delivery of NP. The next section offers an appreciative account of the PCSO role to illustrate why they are the key delivery agents of NP.

4.1.1 Appreciating the Value of Police Community Support Officers' to Neighbourhood Policing

PCSOs are inextricably intertwined with NP; most PCSOs in England and Wales are situated within NPTs and these teams provide an appropriate structure for the kinds of activities that these unwarranted officers are expected to undertake. The role was introduced in 2002, preceding the initial reassurance policing trials by one year and the Neighbourhood Policing trials by four. The national roll out of the NP programme

came two years after the NP trials and with it the ring-fenced Neighbourhood Policing Fund. (NPF) This fund was to be used to employ a larger number of PCSOs to staff NPTs. The NP programme was founded with the intention of utilising this role as a ubiquitous deliverer of NP, and therefore the programme relies not only on the continuation of the role but with an adequate number working within NPTs, ensuring the delivery of the programmatic processes and outcomes to a greater extent than was possible before 2008.

O'Neill (2014) describes PCSOs as a 'vital component' of NP who have 'a great capacity for engagement work' (267) due to the time they can spend developing relationships and building social capital. O'Neill thus views NP as providing a natural home for the activities of PCSOs, as the programme was designed to deliver this standard of service across England and Wales. There is a mutual co-dependence between PCSOs and NP;[24] the programme needs operational staff who are not likely to be abstracted from their designated 'neighbourhood', whilst the existence of the programme provides an appropriate structure for the role and activities of PCSOs and a justification for the continuation of their employment. The size of the PCSO workforce is dependent on the continuation of the programme or a similar approach and *vice versa*. This is less true for other officers for two main reasons. The first is the proscribed activities of each role; PCs and other warranted officers are more likely to be pulled away from community-focused or visible tasks to focus on incident response and paperwork. This is due to the second interrelated reason of the legal definition of each role; PCSOs as unwarranted yet operational police staff are less suited to the uncertainties of incident response (such as an escalation from non-crime incidents to crime incidents) or other duties that require more coercive powers.

The introduction of PCSOs in 2002 can be understood as a form of workforce modernisation, with roots in debates over what constitutes 'core' police functions. Like Teaching Assistants to Teachers and Healthcare Assistants to Nurses, PCSOs are a cheaper alternative to police officers when performing tasks that do not require the same level of training or warranted status, such as those activities envisaged as the bulk of NP work. Schedule 4 of the Police Reform Act 2002 supplies them with a number of powers for use in response to anti-social behaviour[25] or low-level criminality, such as the power to seize alcoholic beverages and illegal narcotics or to issue fixed penalty

---

[24] Or rather, there is a co-dependence between PCSOs and any recent manifestation of community policing in England and Wales, such as RP.
[25] See Harradine et al (2004) for a working definition and typology

97

notices, but they do not have the power of arrest. The latter is significant as PCSOs should not be used to respond to incidents where there is a likelihood of confrontations, arrests or risk of harms to anyone present (Kirby 2007, 6-7), and therefore they should have more time to spend on visible foot patrols and engaging with individuals, organisations or community groups in their NP area. An early Home Office evaluation found that PCSOs are best utilised when their role is clearly defined to enable this division of labour between them and warranted officers (Cooper et al. 2006, 73; also see NPIA 2008 and; Cosgrove and Ramshaw 2013).

Cooper et al. (2006) also concluded that PCSOs were generally more visible and familiar than police officers, more engaged with communities than police officers, good at dealing anti-social behaviour, good at engaging with young people and more likely to be provided with information by the public due to their perceived accessibility and approachability. Clayman and Skinns (2012, 9) also found some evidence that young people felt less reluctant to confide in PCSOs compared to police officers due to the former being perceived as less authoritative than the latter, due to the 'power differential' between the roles and the relative familiarity of PCSOs. Similarly, Innes (2014, 134) suggested that the more varied demographics of PCSOs compared to PCs, such as age, could explain in some cases a tendency for PCSOs to 'possess the right kinds of soft skills and personality traits', which in turn lead to more positive interactions with younger people. These symbolic and practical differences can be utilised to build better relationships and increase access to community information, and this shows how the role is suited to the mechanisms of NP that rely more on *soft* power, rather than *hard*.

The utilisation and staffing levels of PCSOs represent one element of the NP programme. The role came into existence prior to the respective policing reforms of RP and NP and has provided a relatively affordable way of carrying out the required tasks of each. PCSO workforce change is therefore a signifier of broader programmatic reform and by extension a potential signifier of changes in policing philosophy.

4.1.2   Closed Purses and Flattened Fences: the Comprehensive Spending Review and
        the Neighbourhood Policing Fund

The NP programme ensured a standardisation of a resource-intensive way[26] of organising local policing across England and Wales, and therefore one role of central

---

[26] Boyd et al. (2011, 30) show that 'community policing' is the largest 'component of local policing' in England and Wales in terms of officer and staff allocation.

government in delivering the NP programme was to establish the Neighbourhood Policing Fund (NPF); ring-fenced funding that was to be distributed to police forces on appropriate implementation of plans for NP, including the employment of PCSOs for use in NPTs. This was initially expected to increase the operational civilian workforce (PCSOs and Neighbourhood Wardens) to 25,000. This financial incentive showcased the Labour government's strategy to roll out a standardised programme of NP through financial power, and by extension the support for the integration of the PCSO role with NP.

The NPF was thus a central element of the NP programme as an incentive to ensure greater harmony in the provision of NP delivery. This ring-fenced funding was discontinued in April 2013 (April 2011 for the Metropolitan Police) and consolidated into the Police Main Grant, with discretion over the allocation of funding for NP resourcing being handed to incumbent PCCs. This highlights the move away from centrally influenced funding decisions over NP and the heightened potential for divergent approaches to NP resource allocation across police force areas.

Before these changes came into effect, the Coalition government's 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) announced an intended real terms cut of 20% (£1.9Bn) to the central government contribution to police by 2014-2015. The yearly reductions in the contribution placed immediate pressure on police forces to find savings, some of which would inevitably come from reductions to police officers and civilian staff employment costs. Funding for police forces is complex due to a range of grants coming from different central government departments and local authorities, and locally this complexity is exacerbated by the needs-based distribution of central funds through the Police Funding Formula and the differences in local tax revenues through the police precept (Brain 2011). Police operational staff such as PCSOs can also be funded by external organisations or by match-funding, where police and external organisations both contribute a percentage of yearly staffing costs. Nevertheless, cuts to the central government contribution fall significantly on all police forces, if somewhat unevenly, affecting the capacity of forces to maintain the staff resources for NPTs. Brain (2011, 8-9) calculates that local policing was disproportionately affected by changes to police grants, losing £1.36Bn between 2010-11 and 2014-15.

These changes to the police funding regime are points of temporal significance when analysing the changes to the NP workforce. First, the NPF was announced in 2004 (Home Office 2004) and came into effect in the same year. By 2010 all police forces

had to find ways of reducing costs in order to keep up with yearly reductions to the central government contribution. In 2013 the NPF is consolidated into the Police Main Grant, ending the ring-fenced funding for PCSO staffing costs as well as the incentive to maintain nationally a harmonious approach to the delivery of local policing. These developments constitute a potential driver of NP workforce change in England and Wales. However, because changes to funding arrangements favour local discretion, the trends in workforce change are likely to vary by police force. At the same time, different forces face a range of financial fortunes, with resources being disproportionately allocated by both the Police Funding Formula and the amount raised through council tax, local grants and other contracts. Taken together this suggests that workforce trends potentially reflect both deliberate changes due to local discretion and involuntary changes due to financial pressure.

4.1.3 Trends in the number and proportion of Police Community Support Officers since 2004

In England and Wales there was an upward trend in the numbers of PCSOs in the police workforce until 2010, when the workforce begins to reduce. The two steepest jumps in the periods of 2004-2005 and 2006-2007 represent the Reassurance and Neighbourhood Policing piloting stages respectively, when police forces had access to ring-fenced Home Office funding. This ring-fenced funding had to be used to employ PCSOs as part of the Home Office's National Policing Plan in 2002 and the full roll-out of NPP by 2008 and expired in April 2013.

Number of PCSOs, 2004-2015

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
England and Wales	3,418	6,261	6,769	13,497	15,805	16,507	16,918	15,820	14,394	14,205	13,553	14,241	14,032

Figure 4 Number of Police Community Support Officers, 2004-2015

The PCSO workforce began to decrease from 2010, coinciding with the change in government and the Home Office targets to reduce central funding to police forces by 20%, but started to level off with a much smaller reduction in the period of 2012-2013. This has taken the PCSO workforce in England and Wales below the levels of 2008, the first year of NP after the piloting stage (2005-2008). The projections for the years 2014 and 2015 show only slight fluctuations in each year and an overall reduction across the whole period of 2013-2015. However, the projected figures should be used with caution as they are subject to changes – i.e. they show intentions rather than certainty. This uncertainty is illustrated by **Table 10**.

	March 2013	September 2013	March 2014 (projected)	March 2015 (projected)
PCSOs, England and Wales	14,205	13,553	14,241	14,032

Table 10 - Number of PCSOs, 2013-2015

This table shows that regardless of the previous intentions of all 43 police forces – what the projected figures portray – situations can and do change, whether because of the challenges of retaining or employing staff, or a change in strategic workforce planning. The workforce figure for September 2013 suggests that, by 2015, the number of PCSOs in England and Wales could fall well below the projected figure of 14,032. The September 2013 figure represents the lowest PCSO workforce since before 2008 – the

first year that each and every ward in England and Wales was to have its own NPT – falling close to the 2007 workforce level, with just 56 more PCSOs now than in 2007.

Operational roles as proportion of operational workforce, 2004-2015

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
Specials	9.04%	9.52%	10.05%	9.93%	9.80%	9.50%	10.12%	11.30%	12.47%	11.89%	11.80%	14.50%	15.53%
PCSOs	1.63%	3.43%	3.57%	7.39%	8.76%	8.90%	9.09%	8.92%	9.04%	9.26%	9.10%	9.26%	9.14%
Officers	89.33%	87.05%	86.39%	82.68%	81.43%	81.60%	80.79%	79.78%	78.50%	78.85%	79.11%	76.24%	75.33%

Figure 5 Operational Roles as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce

Between March 2010 and September 2013, the average reduction in PCSOs across all forces in England and Wales was 19.9%. This is very close to the 20% reduction in central funding, and seems to show that the PCSO workforce is falling in line with funding reductions – in other words, this operational, or 'frontline', role is not being shielded from the effects of fiscal reforms. However, although PCSO numbers are falling, in the operational workforce the proportion of PCSOs in England and Wales is relatively stable – 9.1% as of September 2013, representing a 0% change since 2010. This is due to changes in the other operational roles, with a loss of over 15,384 police officers and a gain of 2,563 police specials during the same period.

Whilst the figures for England and Wales show the general trend, we start to see big differences in the PCSO workforce trends by looking to the regional level. **Table 11** shows in league table format the percentage change of the PCSO workforce by region for three different periods:

102

Regions[27] league table - PCSO workforce change					
2010-2013		**2010-Sep 2013**		**2010-2015 (projected)**	
Wales	49.0%	Wales	57.2%	Wales	61.9%
East Midlands	-1.2%	East Midlands	-2.2%	East Midlands	5.3%
South West	-2.9%	South West	-5.9%	South East	-3.4%
Yorkshire and Humber	-6.9%	South East	-6.2%	Yorkshire and Humber	-3.9%
South East	-7.9%	Yorkshire and Humber	-9.2%	South West	-7.8%
North East	-10.4%	West Midlands	-17.3%	West Midlands	-14.3%
North West	-12.7%	North West	-16.1%	North West	-8.3%
West Midlands	-14.4%	East of England	-18.1%	North East	-9.1%
East of England	-15.4%	North East	-30.4%	East of England	-10.8%
London	-42.0%	London	-49.3%	London	-54.2%

Table 11 Regions league table - PCSO workforce change

Between March 2010 and September 2013, the London PCSO workforce had been reduced by 49.3%, almost 30% larger than the average change (-19.9%) for England and Wales in the same period. Occupying the opposite end of the table to London, Wales shows even more exceptional changes when compared to English regions, with a 57.2% increase registered and further growth in the PCSO workforce expected by 2015. These changes represent new directions for both London and Wales.

From 2004 to 2011, London and Wales saw similar trends in the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce, whilst London year-on-year had a higher proportion of

---

[27] 'Regions' are based on the geographical boundaries used in the Home Office data.

PCSOs in their operational workforce than Wales until 2010. This changed in 2011 with London's first notable decrease in the proportion of PCSOs since the creation of the role: PCSOs went from making up 8.3% of the operational workforce in 2010, to 7% in 2011, and then to 4% by September 2013 (see **Figure 6**). This means that not only were PCSO numbers being considerably reduced in London, they were coming to have proportionately less of a presence within the operational workforce, making up less of the workforce than they did in 2007. In Wales from 2012, the trend was contrary, with PCSOs making up 9.6% of the workforce that year, increasing to 12.9% in September 2013.

PCSOs as proportion of operational workforce, by customised regions

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Wales	0.82%	2.98%	3.13%	6.71%	7.36%	7.64%	7.76%	7.59%	9.57%	12.47%
London	2.27%	3.90%	3.93%	6.91%	7.98%	8.31%	8.30%	7.02%	5.36%	5.66%
Other	1.78%	3.54%	3.71%	7.50%	8.93%	9.08%	9.33%	9.21%	9.24%	9.21%

Figure 6 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, by customised Regions

The other regions of England have all seen reductions so far to a lesser extent than London but with varying degrees of change between them. South West and South East regions show changes between March and September 2013 that suggest they are currently on course to meet their projected targets. The opposite is the case for all other English regions, with the North East figures receding most from its 2015 projection, showing a larger reduction than the -19.9% average and representing a decrease of 162 PCSOs[28] between March and September 2013. The only English region

---

[28] This figure may be distorted by the re-grading of PCSOs to police staff in the Northumbria region. The number of such cases is not provided by the Home Office data. Without further information on the numbers re-graded or reasons for it, this investigation will represent the effect of the re-grading as a reduction in PCSOs.

to increase the number of PCSOs in this semi-annual period was the South East, jumping from 1,689 to 1,721 PCSOs. Nevertheless, the proportions for the English regions remained largely stable (see 'Other' in **Figure 6**), especially when compared to London and Wales.

In summary, PCSO numbers notably increased at the national level after the establishment of both the RP approach and the NP programme. This is consistent with the perspective that the PCSO role is suitable for the policing activities and delivery mechanisms of each of these developments in local policing arrangements. For the steepest increase, the effect of central government policy of the time and the consequent availability of ring-fenced funding for the establishment of NPTs and recruitment of more PCSOs is clearly visible in the data. The increase in PCSO numbers lasted until 2010, the year of the CSR, at which point the year on year increases came to an end as the first ever reductions in PCSO workforces were recorded. The PCSO workforce declined at a greater pace in the years following both the CSR and the expiration of the NPF, giving credence to the interpretation that both austerity measures and the removal of targeted funding explain the change in the NP workforce across England and Wales.

The proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce has remained stable in most regions, illustrating how workforce change could be described as falling evenly across roles. However, there is not a balanced and standardised approach to workforce changes across England and Wales as evidenced by the sharp increase in the Welsh region and the sharp decrease in the London region. The next section looks deeper into the localised difference to further interrogate these regional discrepancies.

4.1.4   Variation across Police Force Areas

The data for police force areas provide the most accurate representation of PCSO workforce trends. As individual forces have ultimate control over their own staffing levels, analysing the trends at this level helps to uncover the contexts behind workforce restructuring. It also allows further interrogation of the regional data by breaking down each region into its component parts to test for divergent responses within these areas.

The data show that trends in the PCSO workforce between 2004 and 2010 are relatively consistent across the police forces in England and Wales. Centralised police reforms and access to the Neighbourhood Policing Fund coincided with the biggest increases in the PCSO workforce. Since 2010, however, there have been a number of differences in

the change in PCSO numbers and proportion across forces. The vast majority have reduced their PCSO workforce, and this is reflected in the overall trend for England and Wales, but there are three broad, distinctive trends that can be identified. These are discussed below.

4.1.4.1 Proportionate reductions

The majority of English police forces have experienced reductions in their PCSO workforces below the average change in England and Wales (-20%). As the reduction to the central police funding is also 20% in real terms and police forces have been urged to protect the 'frontline', those forces that have experienced a PCSO change between -1% and -20% can be considered to have implemented workforce changes roughly commensurate with these new financial pressures.

Table 12 shows that within the forces falling into this bracket there is considerable variance in the PCSO reductions experienced. To further illustrate these differences, in the West Midlands 155 PCSOs were lost between March 2010 and September 2013, whilst Sussex and Suffolk each only lost 6.

This group can also be said to have experienced *proportionate* reductions, as the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforces in each of these forces was not excessively altered – the changes to this measure registered between +0.8% and -0.8%.

Forces with smaller reductions (<-20%), 2010-Sep 2013			
West Midlands	-19.1%	Bedfordshire	-11.3%
Dorset	-18.8%	Surrey	-11.3%
Cleveland	-18.3%	Durham	-10.3%
Avon & Somerset	-17.6%	Humberside	-8.6%
Lancashire	-17.4%	Norfolk	-8.4%
Gloucestershire	-17.1%	Greater Manchester	-6.5%
Cheshire	-14.9%	Derbyshire	-4.7%
Kent	-14.1%	Lincolnshire	-4.5%
West Mercia	-14.1%	Suffolk	-3.6%
West Yorkshire	-12.7%	Hampshire	-3.3%
North Yorkshire	-12.2%	Thames Valley	-3.2%
Staffordshire	-11.8%	Sussex	-1.6%

Table 12 Forces with smaller PCSO reductions (<-20%), 2010-Sep 2013

Although there is variation between these forces in terms of changes in PCSO numbers, the amount of fluctuation in PCSO proportions is less defined. For example, the proportion of PCSOs in Cleveland increased by 0.4% even as they lost 35 PCSOs over the same period.

4.1.4.2   *Disproportionate Reductions*

Certain forces have reduced their PCSO workforces by more than would be expected, using the central funding reductions as a benchmark for proportional decreases to operational staff.

Starting in the capital, both police forces in the London area had large proportional decreases to their PCSO workforce between March 2010 and September 2013. City of London reduced their PCSOs by -70.5% – the largest percentage decrease in the country. The Metropolitan Police force had the largest decrease after City of London at -49.1%, or 2280 PCSOs – making it the largest reduction in the number of PCSOs. The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) outlined plans for a new approach to local policing in the Metropolitan police force area in its police and crime plan (MOPAC 2013), in which the boundaries and staffing levels of NPTs were to be changed. This is likely to be connected to the fall in PCSO numbers within this area at that time.

Exceptional approaches in the City of London Police are on the whole not surprising, as this is the smallest policing area in England and Wales and has unique characteristics. The Metropolitan Police is also an exceptional force by many measures – such as the size of its workforce, the population and population density of its policing area – but with a higher proportion of its policing area being residential, the PCSO role within NP is possibly more suited to this force area than the City of London. These differences in priorities are reflected in the amount of PCSOs as a proportion of each force's operational workforce (see **Figure 7**).

Figure 7 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, London Forces

London forces were not the only ones to see large reductions in their PCSO workforce. The other forces that saw reductions larger than 20% are detailed in **Table 13**.

Table 13 Forces with the Biggest PCSO Reductions, 2010-2013

Forces with biggest reductions (>-20%), 2010-September 2013		
Region	Mar 2010-Sep 2013	
London	London, City of	-70.5%
London	Metropolitan	-49.1%
North East	Northumbria*	-43.8%
North West	Merseyside	-31.3%
Eastern	Essex	-28.5%
North West	Cumbria	-22.8%
West Midlands	Warwickshire	-22.5%
Eastern	Hertfordshire	-21.0%
Eastern	Cambridgeshire	-21.0%
East Midlands	Northamptonshire	-20.6%

* Some of this change due to re-grading of PCSOs

Northumbria registered the next largest decrease in this period after the London forces, though as noted, this figure may obscure the real change due to the re-grading

of PCSOs in this force. Using the period of March 2010 to March 2013, the change in Northumbria was less severe, at -10.6%. The other North East forces also saw reductions using the September 2013 measure: -18.3% in Cleveland; -10.3% in Durham. The proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce has been maintained at a relatively steady level in Cleveland and Durham, but Northumbria now has a much smaller proportional presence of PCSOs – 5.8% – as compared to the previous three years. This is also the second lowest proportion in England and Wales; only City of London has a lower level at 1.9%.

All forces in the North West region have seen reductions in the 2010 to September 2013 period, but two forces have seen reductions higher than 20%; a -31.3% change in Merseyside and -22.8% in Cumbria, meaning a respective loss of 147 and 25 PCSOs for each force. Both of these reductions mean that the forces now have fewer PCSOs than expected, going by their projected figures for March 2014. Cumbria, however, has increased its PCSO workforce since March 2013, suggesting that it could be on track for its 2014 and 2015 projections.

PCSOs as proportion of operational workforce in North East forces

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
Northumbria	1.19%	0.89%	2.94%	5.61%	4.20%	5.76%	9.12%	9.07%	9.15%	8.77%	5.77%	9.10%	9.19%
Cleveland	4.14%	5.29%	5.15%	5.61%	8.26%	9.28%	8.97%	8.79%	9.07%	9.31%	9.42%	9.26%	9.41%
Durham	1.55%	3.64%	3.54%	7.23%	8.44%	9.09%	9.65%	10.04%	10.47%	10.62%	10.12%	10.28%	10.33%

Figure 8 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce in North East Forces

In the Eastern region there are three forces with reductions larger than 20%; a -28.5% change in Essex and -21% in both Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire. Essex Police had projected a loss of 83 PCSOs (-18.6%) between 2010 and 2015, but have now registered an actual loss of 127.

109

Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire have also lost more PCSOs now than projected for 2015. There is now a smaller proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce in Essex (7.9%) and Hertfordshire (8%) than the England and Wales average (9.1%), the English average (8.7%) and the Eastern region average (9.2%), and both forces have fewer PCSOs than they did before 2007 – the year before NP was fully rolled out.

Other large decreases are found in Warwickshire and Northamptonshire Police, two smaller forces that cover non-metropolitan counties. Warwickshire's PCSO workforce has decreased by 31 PCSOs (-22.5%) since 2010, but the force has projected further reductions by 2015 (73). Currently PCSOs make up 9% of the operational workforce, but by 2015 this could change to 6%, the third lowest figure for this measure. Northamptonshire now has 34 fewer PCSOs (20.6%) than in 2010, and similarly expects to further reduce the PCSO workforce to 112 by 2015. This means that PCSOs make up 7.8% of the operational workforce now, and potentially 6.1% in 2015.

4.1.4.3 Disproportionate Increases

There are a number of forces that have maintained or even increased their PCSO workforces. **Table 14** shows the forces with increases:

Forces with increases			
2010-Sep 2013		2010-2015 (projected)	
Dyfed-Powys	72.5%	Dyfed-Powys	79.4%
North Wales	70%	Gwent	72.0%
South Wales	50.9%	North Wales	66.8%
Gwent	49.3%	South Wales	51.0%
Devon & Cornwall	16.2%	Nottinghamshire	40.1%
Nottinghamshire	8.9%	Wiltshire	8.4%
Leicestershire	1.3%	Derbyshire	0.1%
Wiltshire	0.5%	Lincolnshire	0.1%
South Yorkshire	-0.1%	South Yorkshire	0.1%

Table 14 Forces with Disproportionate Increases in the PCSO Workforce

It is clear that all Welsh forces have had the largest increases, making the changes to the PCSO workforce consistent within this region. The reason behind this is easily

explained; the Welsh Labour government has funded 500 PCSO positions to be created between 2011 and 2015. In September 2013, Wales had 410 more PCSOs than it did in 2010, with the highest numerical gain in South Wales (+171) and the highest proportional gain in Dyfed-Powys (+72.5%). By 2015, Welsh forces expect to employ another 34 PCSOs.

This rise has contributed to higher proportions of PCSOs in the Welsh operational workforce between 2011 and 2013 (see **Figures 6 and 7**). The proportion in South Wales, for example, remained between 8% and 9% between 2007 and 2012, but as of September 2013 the figure stands at 14.9% - the largest operational workforce share in England and Wales. From 2008 to 2011, South Wales, North Wales and Gwent all had PCSO making up around 8% of their workforces, whilst Dyfed Powys had a proportion between 5 and 5.6% in the same period. The significant increase in PCSOs since 2011 means that the Welsh police forces now operate with very different workforce compositions.

Figure 9 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, Selected Welsh Forces (1)

PCSOs as proportion of operational workforce, selected Welsh forces (1)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
Dyfed-Powys	0.38%	1.82%	1.84%	5.28%	5.08%	5.64%	5.70%	5.65%	6.85%	9.88%	9.98%	10.28%	10.28%
North Wales	0.00%	2.49%	3.17%	7.56%	8.38%	8.38%	8.07%	8.27%	11.67%	13.92%	14.19%	13.50%	13.51%

111

Figure 10 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, Selected Welsh Forces (2)

PCSOs as proportion of operational workforce, selected Welsh forces (2)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
Gwent	2.89%	4.64%	4.52%	6.02%	7.60%	7.80%	8.29%	8.01%	10.71%	13.39%	12.69%	13.61%	13.70%
South Wales	0.00%	2.95%	3.00%	7.95%	8.37%	8.75%	8.98%	8.42%	9.05%	12.67%	14.87%	14.21%	14.21%

No other area has experienced the consistent increases across forces as seen in Wales, but there are some other notable increases. The South West region includes forces that have reduced their PCSO workforces by up to 18.8% (Dorset) since 2010, but Devon and Cornwall have added 59 more PCSOs (+16.2%) in the same period. The rise in Devon and Cornwall seems unexpected as the actual workforce trend is in opposition to the projected change between 2010 and 2015 (-0.8%). However, it appears that the trend could change again after a review of the PCSO role in Devon and Cornwall by the PCC (western Morning News 2014). Though Wiltshire police have registered a slight increase in their PCSO workforce (+0.5%), the workforce trend is moving away from the 2015 projection of an 8.4% increase.

PCSOs as proportion of operational workforce, selected South West forces

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sep-13	2014	2015
Devon & Cornwall	1.28%	1.82%	1.77%	7.22%	8.07%	8.08%	8.04%	7.99%	8.51%	10.27%	10.51%	9.31%	8.67%
Wiltshire	1.62%	2.84%	3.89%	7.99%	9.76%	9.01%	8.11%	8.72%	10.09%	9.40%	8.59%	9.14%	9.26%

Figure 11 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, Selected South West Forces

Nottinghamshire Police has increased its PCSO workforce by 24 (+8.9%) since 2010. The Nottinghamshire PCC pledged to employ 100 more PCSOs and to campaign against central funding reductions in his Police and Crime Plan, and the Home Office data shows a projected increase of 40.1% (+108) by 2015 in the force. If the force is to achieve these numbers, there is some way to go – 84 more PCSOs would be needed in the next year and a half. Regardless of the potential to fall short of the 2015 projections, Nottinghamshire has increased the share of PCSOs in its operational workforce from 9% in March 2010 to 10.5% in September 2013, currently above the England and Wales average (9.1%) and East Midlands regional average (9%).

4.1.5   Summary of findings

Overall, there has been a variety of approaches to workforce restructuring in police forces since 2010. Although the large majority of police forces have reduced PCSO numbers, there are a number of forces that have maintained or increased their PCSO workforce strength. The change in PCSO numbers at the police force level ranges from -70.5% to +72.5%.

The London and Welsh police forces have pursued markedly different approaches, occupying opposite ends of a spectrum of workforce change. The changes in London are exemplified by the Metropolitan Police purposefully reassessing their local policing structures and workforces (MOPAC 2013), whilst in Wales all forces have received a

Welsh Government grant for employing 500 additional PCSOs. Although there are differences between the remaining English forces, these are less severe; whilst PCSOs are generally being reduced, their proportions are being largely maintained.

4.2   Implications for the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing

The vast majority of police forces have reduced the number of PCSOs in their workforces, and this signals that NP has been weakened in England and Wales due to the importance of this role to its suitability to performing the tasks that support the three delivery mechanisms of NP; visibility, community engagement and problem solving. This section develops this idea by outlining a broad typology of workforce reform that explores how different approaches to workforce reform engender changes to the way policing is delivered.

Considering the recent history of police reforms is vital to understand the implications for policing and workforce change in the current climate. Most importantly, the reassurance policing approach was established to address the social distance between the police and the public that had arguably widened over the past few decades (Innes 2004). It was a response to the pitfalls of popular policing approaches in the 1990s – "zero tolerance policing" and "intelligence-led policing". These approaches were effective in reducing certain crimes but did not make people feel safe and were considered to be punitive and intrusive (Greene 1999). The approaches focused heavily on the crime management of 'crime control' functions of the police (Innes 2004) – the direct prevention and detection of crime by the police.

By contrast, RP was intended to address public insecurities and assure local people that the police were providing the service they wanted. Through this reassurance, it was hoped that communities would become stronger and cooperate more with the police to help reduce crime.[29] In this way, the approach was considered to complement the crime control functions of the police with a stronger focus on the "neighbourhood security" functions (Innes 2004) – reassurance and community engagement. These functions can and do exist alongside the crime management functions, but they are often not considered central to the police mission by many police officers (Reiner 2010; Skogan 2008). Therefore, teams and staff dedicated to these functions should help

---

[29] The connection between strong neighbourhoods the prevention of crime is a feature of many influential policing theories – e.g. Wilson and Kelling's 'Broken Windows' (1982) and Sampson et al.'s 'Collective Efficacy' (1997)

police forces to focus resources on public feelings of safety, readjusting the composition of the police role in society.

Due to the funding reductions made to the police contribution, there have been recent calls to change the way policing is delivered in order to make it more efficient (for example, Fraser et al 2014; Greenhalgh and Gibbs 2014). As NP is resource-intensive, the current approach has been earmarked for significant changes, with a greater focus on the direct preventative work of the police (Greenhalgh and Gibbs 2014). These calls for reform signal a potential adjustment to police functions, away from neighbourhood security and towards crime management.

Against this historical context, changes to the operational workforce and NPTs can be viewed as signals of a reprioritisation of police functions. A large reduction in the amount and proportion of PCSOs, whose roles are the embodiment of the NP approach, is likely to lead to a restructuring of NPTs in terms of staffing levels or even geographical boundaries – e.g. NPTs covering larger areas than before. This then has the potential to reduce the focus on the neighbourhood security functions of the given police force, and proportionally increases the resource allocation for crime management functions. The opposite can be said for forces that increase the amount and proportion of their PCSO workforces, where a strengthening of NPT resources occurs and neighbourhood security functions are given a higher prioritisation.

4.2.1   Typology of Reforms

Three types of approaches to operational workforce reform are now suggested as a way of highlighting the different consequences for local policing delivery. Due to the variation across the 43 police forces, it is difficult to envisage the likely implications of these workforce changes for the whole of England and Wales. Nevertheless, there are certain assumptions we can make, based on the aforementioned historical contexts that indicate that different approaches to workforce restructuring subsequently influence policing styles and the prioritisation of policing functions.

4.2.1.1   Weakened Neighbourhood Policing

This label describes the situation where police forces have experienced high reductions in their PCSO workforce as well as a reduction to the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce. In the forces that have experienced such changes, there tends to be a relatively low proportion of PCSOs and a high proportion of officers.

With these changes, there is likely to be a move away from the functions associated more strongly with NP – such as visibility, reassurance and community engagement – due to fewer PCSOs and potentially fewer dedicated staffing resources for each NPT. The potential weakening of NP structures indicates that more focus may be placed on crime management functions, such as incident response and investigation.

The Metropolitan Police Service is a clear example of the kind of changes that can take place under these conditions. The force's new *Local Policing Model* (LPM) constitutes a rearrangement of local policing resources and the establishment of new structures in which these resources are deployed. The previous arrangement of local policing resources in the MPS was the '1:2:3 model' – meaning one sergeant, two PCs and three PCSOs allocated and dedicated to each team and thus ward. Under the LPM, there are only two dedicated staff per ward – one Dedicated Ward Officer and one dedicated ward PCSO, representing 'a 77% reduction in ward based neighbourhood policing when compared to the 1:2:3 model.' (D'Orsi 2015, 12) Although overall resources for the model have been bolstered thanks to an additional 2579 warranted officers, the teams have been endowed with 10 additional primary functions, including 'crime investigation', 'responding to non I & S calls'[30] and 'Crime scene/Hospital guards/Custody constant watch' (D'Orsi 2015, 16). In light of fewer dedicated ward officers and PCSOs, as well as fewer PCSOs overall, the ability to undertake the tasks aligned with neighbourhood security functions to the same extent as under the previous model is uncertain.

4.2.1.2 *Proportionally maintained Neighbourhood Policing*

The forces in this category have generally experienced reductions to their PCSO workforces, but the proportion of PCSOs remains stable, changing by less than 1% in either positive or negative directions. The proportion of PCSOs in these forces tends to be mid-range, relative to forces with the highest and lowest proportions.

The consequences for this category are less clear, as the forces within it registered PCSO workforce changes between +1% and -20%. Some forces have the ability to maintain staffing levels in NPTs, whereas those at the other end of the scale may have to adapt their NPT structures, such as enlarging the boundaries of local policing areas and reducing the number of teams, or reducing staffing levels. However, as PCSOs are being maintained in proportional terms, there is an implied support for the policing

---

[30] An I graded call – 'immediate response' – should be responded to within 15 minutes, and an S graded call – 'significant priority' – should be responded to within 60 minutes.

functions associated with the NP approach, and there may not be as much change to the prioritisation of policing functions.

In those areas that have fewer resources for NPTs, both in the 'weakened' and proportionally maintained' categories, the experiences of public services as a whole will likely change. As local authorities in England also faces an average real terms cut of 28% between 2010 and 2014 (NAO 2014, 11), people's qualitative experiences of local services in many areas[31] are starting to reflect the reduced capacity of local government to deliver aspects of these services. This has led to the deterioration of 'neighbourhood environmental quality' and reduced infrastructure and staff resources for children's services, which affects feelings of security for some residents in these neighbourhoods (Hastings et al 2015, 47-63). This is problematic for the police if public demand for their services does not reduce or increases due to the reduced capacity of local government, at the same time as a reduction in their own capacity to deal with a broad range of calls for service. Additionally, the quality and extent of partnership work between police and partnering agencies could be jeopardised by funding cuts across services, and the onus may be on the police as dominant partners (McCarthy and O'Neill 2014) to maintain effective partnership working.

4.2.1.3   Strengthened Neighbourhood Policing

This label refers to forces that have increased their PCSO workforce and have experienced an increase in the proportion of PCSOs by at least 1% for each measure. These forces tend to have a higher proportion of PCSOs and a lower proportion of police officers. However, the reductions in police officer numbers are not especially high within this group.

In these forces NPTs remain well staffed, and potentially have a higher proportion of dedicated PCSOs within them. Where PCSOs are increased in both proportion and number, this signals a strengthening of NP structures and thus a prioritisation of neighbourhood policing functions. In cases where the proportion of PCSOs has risen extensively and the proportion of police officers has fallen, there is the potential for the crime management functions to be given relatively less prominence.

However, although a greater number of PCSOs may offset the reductions in police officer numbers and provide greater visibility and familiarity, they are starting to perform functions previously not associated with their role such as investigation (Trudy

---

[31] Cuts to local authority spending are unequally distributed, and 'there is a clear tendency for the percentage cuts to be greatest in the most deprived category and least in the most affluent' (Hastings et al 2015, 11).

117

Lowe, quoted in Downey 2015). This group of forces is also not immune from the potential pressures associated with reduced funding in across other local services, and this could affect the potential to maintain effective service delivery. However, if the principles and mechanisms of NP are more suited to multi-agency working, especially problem solving (McCarthy and O'Neill 2014) then a continuation of this model should be beneficial in this area.

4.3   Conclusion

This chapter has explored the effects of a significant and sudden change to the socio-economic context of policing in England and Wales. As police forces face cuts to their budgets, uneven impacts on budgetary pressures and fewer centrally dictated restrictions on the use of these funds, a range of responses are emerging to these new funding environments. The changes encompassed in these responses include fluctuations in the numbers and proportions of different operational roles, alterations to the existing functions and structural constituents of the current NP model, and the establishment of new local policing models and organisational change programmes that can serve to overhaul NP. The more deliberate approaches to the reform of territorial policing models illustrate that the austerity era has triggered processes of ideation, and the principles of NP are being challenged and dismantled in some forces.

In the years under New Labour's reform programmes, influenced by the 'new localism' agenda, "[p]ublic sensibilities increasingly govern[ed] the politics of policing" (Fleming and McLaughlin 2010, 199), and as a consequence the symbolic functions of policing were attended to with the aid of increased public spending and 'communities' were provided with new channels of engagement with state agencies. The localism agenda was still explicit in the Coalition policing policies (Loader 2014). Paradoxically, the potential degradation of neighbourhood security functions and increase in social distance between public and police would occur alongside recent policing reforms that aim to decentralise police governance by scrapping central targets, installing a system of directly elected commissioners, and reassigning a degree of force autonomy through the flattening of national ring-fenced funding. Communities across England and Wales would thus receive differentiated policing services that are shaped by local funding conditions and arrangements.

4.4   Postscript: the two halves of the austerity era

This phase of the research took place before the qualitative investigations commenced in 2015. This was an important year for police forces because, in the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks in November, the government decided to halt the planned police cuts and promised to protect real terms spending on policing (Travis 2015b). However, the total government funding to PCCs would remain relatively static for the next five years and central government would instead commit more funds to counter-terrorism. Where police forces could benefit from general funding rises would be through the council tax precept, which increased by just over £1Bn across England and Wales between 2015 and 2019 (Home Office 2019). Funding problems remained, however. Firstly, the impact of the new funding settlement would be unevenly distributed as some forces are more reliant on central government funding than others (Crawford et al. 2015). Secondly, the new settlement was not an attempt to restore the general capacities of police forces, and overall all forces experienced a 19% real terms funding cut between 2010 and 2018 (NAO 2018). Effectively, this meant that workforce reform decisions and fluctuations would continue to be affected by overall police disinvestment in the austerity era. The following update to this chapter's analysis will briefly explore the workforce trends since 2015 and reveal the continuing impact of police disinvestment on the NP workforce.

Nationally, the PCSO workforce has continued to fall. From a peak of 16,918 in 2010, by March 2019 the workforce reduced by 43.6%, representing a fall of 7,371 PCSOs in England and Wales (see figure 12). The reduction was higher in 2010-2015 (-27.1%) than in the latter period of 2015-2019 (-22.6%). The 2015-2019 reduction appears to be higher than might be expected considering the post-2015 funding settlement, suggesting that austerity era reform in England and Wales is steadily moving away from models that require a higher PCSO resource. In regions, Wales did not maintain the 2010-2015 growth in the PCSO workforce, rather experiencing a 14.3% fall between 2015-2019. However, this reduction did not undo the earlier reforms to increase PCSO numbers, and Wales enjoyed an overall rise of 17.9% between 2010-2019. The pace of PCSO reductions slowed in the London region, but this did not change London being the region with the largest reductions overall. Excluding the East of England, which is skewed by change from one particular force, the other English regions varied from overall changes of -24.7% in Yorkshire and Humber to -41.5% in the North East between 2010 and 2019, which largely maintains the rough pattern of regional changes from the first half of the decade (see table 15).

PCSO workforce, England and Wales 2004-2019

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
England and Wales	3,418	6,261	6,769	13,497	15,805	16,507	16,918	15,820	14,394	14,205	13066	12331	11043	10213	10139	9,547

Figure 12 PCSO workforce, England and Wales 2004-2019

	Percentage change 2010-2015	Percentage Change, 2015-2019	Percentage Change, 2010-2019
Wales	37.5%	-14.3%	17.9%
Yorkshire and Humber	-12.2%	-14.1%	-24.7%
East Midlands	-1.9%	-25.4%	-26.8%
South West	-10.9%	-20.0%	-28.7%
South East	-14.9%	-19.0%	-31.1%
North West	-13.7%	-20.6%	-31.5%
West Midlands	-23.3%	-15.5%	-35.2%
North East	-39.1%	-4.1%	-41.5%
East of England	-26.4%	-53.2%	-65.5%
London	-61.7%	-29.9%	-73.2%
Median	**-14.3%**	**-19.5%**	**-31.3%**
National	-22.6%	-43.6%	-27.1%

Table 15 PCSO workforce change by region

While most English regions did not experience disproportionately high decreases between 2015-2019, the East of England experienced a larger percentage change in the PCSO workforce in the second half of the decade. Accelerating reductions in Bedfordshire, Cambridge, Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, take most forces in the region into the 'weakened NP' category along with the London forces. In Norfolk, the PCSO

workforce was reduced by 78 (-28.2%) between 2010-2015, and 197 (-100%) between 2015-2019. This total decimation of the PCSO workforce came after plans in 2017 to abolish the PCSO role in the force area, with the Chief Constable citing a combination of a growth in complex crime and budget reductions (BBC News 2017). This came to fruition in 2018, with all PCSOs either being redeployed or made redundant. In order to maintain neighbourhood security functions, the force's new 'Norfolk 2020' model promises to resource NPTs with at least one 'beat manager', 14 sergeants, and 7 'Engagement Officers' (Norfolk Constabulary 2018), as well as using casually employed 'scene guards' (Dodd 2019). The new reforms to the NP model and workforce, however, have not yet been evaluated (HMICFRS 2019). Other large forces outside of this region have also openly considered drastic changes to the PCSO workforce. The Metropolitan Police and WMP suggested they would abolish or considerably reduce, respectively, their PCSO workforces, but did not go through with these plans after the announcement of the new funding settlement in 2015 (BBC News 2015a; BBC News 2015b; Beake 2015).

By 2019, the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce varied across individual forces, and most (27) forces maintained 6-9% PCSOs. A smaller range of forces had PCSO proportions between 10-11% (9) and lower proportions between 0-5% (7). The proportion remained high in the Welsh police forces, even though all Welsh forces experienced a net loss of PCSOs between 2015-2019. Yorkshire and Humber forces also maintained high proportions of PCSOs (see table 16). Forces in London and the East of England alone populated the lower proportion category (see table 17).

Region	Force	
Wales	North Wales	11.25%
West Midlands	Staffordshire	11.13%
North East	Durham	11.01%
Yorkshire and Humber	North Yorkshire	10.93%
Wales	South Wales	10.80%
Wales	Dyfed-Powys	10.56%
South West	Wiltshire	10.36%
Yorkshire and Humber	Humberside	9.85%
Yorkshire and Humber	West Yorkshire	9.73%
West Midlands	West Mercia	9.50%

Table 16 Forces with highest proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce

121

Region	Force	
East of England	Norfolk	0.00%
London	London, City of	0.71%
East of England	Essex	2.92%
East of England	Suffolk	3.02%
London	Metropolitan Police	3.74%
East of England	Bedfordshire	3.87%
East of England	Cambridgeshire	4.72%
North East	Northumbria	5.64%
South East	Surrey	5.83%
East of England	Northamptonshire	5.89%

Table 17 Forces with lowest proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce

Though the proportion of PCSOs in England and Wales fell steadily and slowly in the austerity era, the more notable change in the operational workforce was the increase in the Specials workforce in both numbers and proportion between 2010-2015 followed by a sharp fall in the specials workforce and an increase in the proportion of officers (see figure 13). While specials appeared to be used in the first half of the austerity era to plug gaps in the operational workforce left by PCSO and officer reductions, the latter half of austerity appears to show a distinct change in approaches in which officer resources were starting to be protected. The PCSO workforce continued to fall steadily and the boom in specials recruitment finished abruptly, with many specials not being retained. This perhaps reflects difficulties in the retention of volunteers and the relative importance of maintaining warranted officer numbers in times of budgetary pressures.

To conclude, reforms to the PCSO workforce continue to show general patterns nationally and in certain regions, but with much variation between forces. More deliberate changes to workforce mixes appear to represent ideation that is motivated by changes in the policing field (force resources and changing demands), some of which are catalysed by the surround (political influence through governance and austerity).

Roles as a proportion of the operational workforce, 2004-2019

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
PCSOs	1.63%	3.43%	3.57%	7.39%	8.76%	8.90%	9.09%	8.92%	9.04%	9.26%	8.67%	8.36%	8.11%	7.83%	7.84%	7.39%
Specials	9.04%	9.52%	10.05%	9.93%	9.80%	9.50%	10.12%	11.30%	12.47%	11.89%	14.64%	15.75%	11.62%	10.42%	9.35%	8.72%
Officers	89.33%	87.05%	86.39%	82.68%	81.43%	81.60%	80.79%	79.78%	78.50%	78.85%	76.69%	75.89%	80.27%	81.75%	82.80%	83.88%

Figure 13 Roles as a proportion of the operational workforce, 2004-2019

5   The Social Organisation of Neighbourhood Policing

5.1   Introduction

This chapter describes how Neighbourhood Policing (NP) is positioned between the interests and expectations of the wider police organisation (teams and objectives) and other neighbourhood actors (communities and other local organisations), and situated in local geographies with variable characteristics. It illustrates how Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs), and within them the operatives of NP – the Sergeant, PCs and PCSOs – create shared assumptions and processes to achieve organisational objectives in a way that is commensurate with their understanding of their individual roles, the role of NP, and the external environments of NP delivery. These environments include the hyper-local geography of the neighbourhood, socio-economic change, and local and national politics, which provide constraints in the form of policies and their impact on police capabilities and routines, local problems, and community expectations. On the other hand, these environments also provide resources for police story-telling and cultural standards for action (Shearing and Ericson 1991; Fine 2010). When these environments lead to change both internal and external to police institutions, street-level police make sense of how these shifts impact their work through talk and storytelling.

Using data from semi-structured interviews with NPT operatives, this chapter illustrates how neighbourhood policing is delivered in the West Midlands in light of the environmental contexts that influence and constrain these processes. The previous chapter revealed how workforce reductions and new models of local policing have created new conditions for NPTs and the delivery of NP. Police stories of the everyday work of NPTs can illustrate the effects of current social conditions on practice, the impact of police reform and socioeconomic change on police cultural understandings of their role, and the potential for reform to NP delivery. Street-level stories about NP values, functions, and practice can also point to broader shifts in police institutions through identifying police narratives about broader policing objectives and the role of NPTs in contributing to institutional goals. Additionally, as NP is a manifestation of Community Policing (CP) and the successor to Reassurance Policing (RP), approaches to policing that promote community participation and social closeness, the cultural narratives of NPTs can reveal how police in these teams relate to 'the community' both in terms of how the police-community partnership is understood and the effects of police-community interactions on NPT work.

The chapter first analyses the relationship of NP to its environments, exploring the way people, places and other organisations create the social conditions to which NPTs react. The first of these is the array of the geographical characteristics of neighbourhoods and micro-beats[32], which police interpret in order to organise their work. The second is the presence of characters and organisations with whom police interact and are expected to collaborate, and how their presence affects the everyday work of NPTs. The third is the organisational position of NP; the police organisational expectations of the role of NP in relation to the wider system of policing and the influence of these expectations.

After investigating these externalities, the internal processes of NPT organisation will be detailed. The processes are organised into themes that were created during the coding of interview data and that reflect the most commonly referred to principles and types of activity[33]. These are: *connection and interpersonal work*; *collaboration and problem-solving*; *information gathering*, and; *crime control*. The section starts by exploring the roles of different NPT operatives and how their labour is divided.

5.2   Environmental Context of NP

NPT work takes place in a number of environmental contexts. These environmental frames influence and constrain the work that NPTs do and in part influence the NP mandate. Local geographies influence police interpretations of the problems of crime and disorder, and local characters influence police understanding of their neighbourhoods through a variety of interactions, including those of a collaborative and adversarial nature. NPT work is also positioned within the wider police organisational context of street-level emergency response teams and investigation teams, as well as senior managerial strategies of controlling crime and crime analysts formulating intelligence products and tactical responses to local crime reduction. The following material will show that within the police organisation NP is understood in opposition to reactive work of response and investigation teams, but NPT operatives perceive that high volumes of response and investigation work overflows from these teams into NPTs.

---

[32] Neighbourhood here refers to the whole jurisdiction of each NPT. Micro-beats are divisions of a neighbourhood.
[33] The data mainly comes from the responses to the question, "What do you think is the most important contribution of neighbourhood policing?"

Figure 14 – The Social Organisation of Neighbourhood Policing – environmental context

5.2.1   The Neighbourhood

Knowing the neighbourhood – the physical spaces, the residents, the opportunities for and the actuality of local criminal behaviour and disorder – is of utmost importance for NPT operatives if they are to deliver NP effectively and satisfy organisational objectives. 'Local knowledge' is valued in NP as a way of interpreting the characteristics of a neighbourhood. In other words, Local knowledge is "not a jumble of unconnected facts but a scheme of interpretation" (Fielding 1995, 167). It is one component of the craft of the 'Bobby', the beat-based, uniformed agent of the police. This scheme is largely generated by police at the street-level, a contrast with other teams and departments who do not experience working in a neighbourhood, walking the beat, and attending meetings with communities and other partners.

5.2.1.1   Scheme of Interpretation

NPTs are home to the beat policing style – that of visible foot patrol in a specified geographical area by familiar police – and utilise its methods of connecting police to a neighbourhood, in part, to equip police with 'local knowledge'. The following illustrates that one tactical justification for connecting police to the community members and other partners in a neighbourhood is to build up a scheme of interpretation to aid effective problem-solving:

> **NPT1 Serg:** I think for me, it's grassroots knowledge of what goes on within an area. We work in a challenging community where not

127

everybody speaks English as their first language. So majority of our work is spent working with the likes of Birmingham city council, housing associations trying to nip anti-social behaviour in the bud by talking to landlords, council, building owners, the concierges, local shop keepers. Majority of what we do working with other agencies and partners, trying to resolve problems very, very early. Our job is one of problem solving really, not racing out to burglaries in progress. It's grassroots policing with local knowledge.

I see that with some of the PCs here. They've been here for quite a while and they know the local offenders. They know a generation of offenders because they've kept continuity. They are the local beat bobby, and their knowledge is superb.

The type of local knowledge that police refer to emphasises a deep understanding of neighbourhood *characteristics* and *characters*. Police must know their neighbourhood and its current problems to gain insight into how to alleviate neighbourhood risks, who helps or hinders this work or is in need of police assistance. In other words, police seek and cultivate knowledge of the external geographies and characters that shape their work in order to prepare for situation-specific conduct (Manning 1997, 202).

5.2.1.2 *Constructing Neighbourhood Characters*

In institutions, street-level bureaucrats tend to categorise or label external constituents in order to organise and account for their work, especially the clients or users of a public service (Manning 1997; Lipsky 1980, 69; Prottas 1979; Van Maanen 1978). Police come into contact with a variety of actors during the course of their routine work, and the data show that NPT operatives construct particular neighbourhood characters as part of their scheme of interpretation. In WMP, the context of the austerity era and the concerns over high demand appeared to colour the ways police appraised these different characters. As such, specific stories of neighbourhood characters engage with wider narratives about the role of NP and how this could change according to principles of demand reduction. The analysis identified that these types of stories categorised these characters in three broad ways. First, *allies* are those partners that collaborate productively with NPTs by passing on useful information or coproducing safety. Agencies generally fall under this category, as do particular members of the community. Second, the neighbourhood characters who interact with police through seemingly trivial requests or calls to service, or attend PACT meetings without contributing to police objectives, are seen as *time-wasters*.

These characters increase police demands that are either seen as trivial on un-actionable. A third category is the *vulnerable*, which refers to those who are considered at risk of victimisation due to various social or immutable characteristics (see Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2015). Police are more ambivalent concerning the extent to which interactions with these characters constitutes time well spent.

It is important to note that, unlike in some policing studies (Manning 1997; Van Maanen 1978), the following character types (see table 18) are not labels used by the respondents themselves, but are rather created here to refer to the characteristics of these neighbourhood characters that are relevant to the social organisation of NP.

5.2.1.3 Allies

Allies are the preferred neighbourhood partners of NPTs; they are the agencies and members of the community who productively collaborate with police or take action that contributes to achieving NPT goals. Good partners also increase efficiency, acting to reduce the amount of time police spend on issues that are perceived to be unimportant, low-status police work with, or the work that police no longer want to deal with due to falling resources.

One example of an ally is someone who is considered to be a 'key individual' as part of the 'key individual networks' (KINs) approach (ACPO 2006). The following sergeant describes how these community characters contribute the delivery of NP:

> **Serg1:** ...by having all those leaders and key members of the community you could probably get a lot more done than if you go out and try it individually. So this cul-de-sac problem I'm talking about where I've got a lot of problems, I've got one key member of the community who represents all of the community, and I went to him, or he invited me to meet him. He's far more influential around this than I would be if I had to deal with these people individually. So again it goes back to doing more with less. So if I reach out to that one person, he can reach out to 100. That's better for me than trying to reach out to 100 people, which is a lot harder.

These 'key individuals' are perceived to be useful allies relative to other members of the community due to their potential for community building and information gathering. The idea that one individual 'represents all of the community' suggests a useful shortcut in terms of police time and effort in delivering representative community engagement, and if these characters can live up to this ideal type it

129

presents a process that is much more efficient and effective at identifying local problems and building a scheme of interpretation.

The other primary allies are the partnering organisations and groups of NPTs. Police value these partners because they are potentially productive collaborators, even if they do not always live up to this potential. The following describes the mutual benefit and reciprocity between police and partners, where particular resources can be provided that police would otherwise not be able to access:

> **Serg 2**: With our partner agencies - each area of the city centre is a BID, which is a Business Improvement District, which has a salaried director and each of the businesses pay a bit from their rates towards that, to kind of make the place look nice, to improve the public's visit to that area. We work very closely with them, a lot of the time because they actually provide lots of money and problem solving for us, which is fantastic. In return they want something as well. We used to obviously have a link in, so they would know all the PCs and the sergeant who dealt with their area. So they could put us in touch with other contacts, whereas now it's anyone's guess. There's five different sergeants so everything has to go via the inspector, and someone gets nominated to deal with a certain problem, but you have lots of different teams dealing with different problems, whereas before we had that one point of contact who would put us in contact with other people as well.

Allies are important for helping police understand the local geography of their neighbourhood, but links with these allies relies on stable resources as a point of contact. Changes to NPT resources may mean that the most productive and valued relationships between police and partners deteriorate.

Furthermore, good relationships with partners may also be forged along more interpersonal lines. The following inspector considers that common experience, empathy, and camaraderie can be a basis for reciprocity and collaboration, which in turn can make NP more efficient in the austerity era.

> **Insp1**: It's all about partnership in relation to relationships, person to person. And because we've got very good relationships with the individuals, the housing officers or whatever, they haven't been altered. I would say, in fact, maybe there's a slight sense of

camaraderie in relation to, 'we know what you're going through with the cuts, we're going through them as well.' And because there's a bit of a joint venture there, we understand each other's pain to a degree. I don't think that on a personal level it has affected it. What I've yet to see though, really, is a full understanding that because we won't take primacy anymore in everything, because we're not able to, that they're going to have to pick up some extra work or figure out a creative way of dealing with it. Or in fact, of course, we've got to go with the resources that we do have and jointly. You know, the two-make-greater-than-the-whole type approach, the synergy of it, if you will. That I've yet to really see happening.

5.2.1.4   The Vulnerable and the time-wasters

While dealing with 'vulnerability' is seen as a priority in contemporary policing narratives, NPT operatives have mixed views on the extent to which the problems of vulnerable individuals and groups are a constructive use of police time. Dealing with 'vulnerability' by understanding and reducing risks has become an imperative focus of NPT work since the Pilkington scandal, and by extension this has reaffirmed the focus of NP on ASB:

> **Ch.Sup**: If you look at the journey around antisocial behaviour, it's far more now up our agenda than it probably was 10 years ago when issues such as the Pilkington case have focused minds on the importance of vulnerability. I think that's the important part of what neighbourhood teams do; addressing antisocial behaviour and looking for the longer term solutions, sustainable solutions, so the problem solving aspect, as opposed to being all about vehicle crime or burglary.

However, the vulnerable are seen as an ambiguous category because they are sympathetic characters that represent time-consuming work. Stories about the vulnerable are attempts to make sense of police obligations to vulnerable people in light of the Pilkington scandal on one hand and the demand reduction push on the other, and to consider the approaches for dealing with different vulnerable people. The distinctions made between different vulnerable groups show that this is not a stable category for organising NP work in a simple way:

NPT1 Serg: An example of that, we have got one at moment where a lady is suffering from dementia, she is calling the ambulance service daily and she is calling the police daily, and we are working with various partners to get the lady into an appropriate care home. And of course overnight the demand for all the services will cease, apart from obviously the direct service that she is involved with. To give you an idea just in terms of cost to the ambulance service, they did a breakdown of cost for us. It's about £100,000 in terms of how many resources has been allocated to that particular individual. So, on top of that the police resources, you are talking a lot of money to just deal with one individual.

Some vulnerable people are considered to be worthy of urgent police responses, while others are not due to the triviality of their demands and worries:

NPT2 Serg: For me, I feel that the level of service that we give the guy who's got low tolerance is probably not a million miles away from the service that we give the person that is in really, really great need. And I feel again - I'm not talking out of turn here, because I've raised this with my senior managers - I feel that we have to come to a point where we say to the guy or the lady that is reporting very low-level stuff, and it's just down to their real intolerance of young people being allowed to play in the streets. That we have to come to a point where if we want a reduced demand, at some point we've got to say to this individual, we're not going to come and we're not going to help you anymore, because there's got to be a cut-off point somewhere.

For me I want to be over this side of the scale where I'm helping Mrs. Miggins who is very vulnerable and is really suffering. And I want to put a robust action plan in place to tackle her issues, and tackle the offenders and to give her the best service that I would give anybody. But at the other end of the scale, that guy is reporting 20 logs a week, and he isn't really in my eyes, isn't really suffering major ASB. There has to be a point where we can't keep attending to under-tens playing football in the street.

The one label that was used by many respondents as both a term of affection (when vulnerable) and derision (when a time-waster) was 'Mrs Miggins'. This label referred to typical interactions with older women in the neighbourhood, in which the character was either a vulnerable resident in need of police help or who felt overly vulnerable or outraged and thus demanded excessive police service. The overlap between Mrs Miggins as both vulnerable and time-waster is evident in Van Maanen's explication of ideal types, and how these are "subject to situational, temporal, and individually idiosyncratic restriction" (1978, 224). To paraphrase Van Maanen (ibid., 224), Mrs Miggins in one context is not the same as Mrs Miggins in another. In the following account, for example, Mrs Miggins is viewed as a typical character in an overly service-oriented NP, in which unproductive interactions with community members replace 'gritty' tactics involved in problem-solving:

> To me, neighbourhood policing is actually a quite a gritty, in-your-face kind of policing really, because it's getting in to sort a problem that causing the community an issue. …It's not just going round and having a coffee with Mrs Miggins and just, 'oh that sounds terrible, I know', and then going away.

NP was originally formulated as a citizen-focused approach to engagement and problem-solving work (Home Office 2004), attempting to create a consumer-oriented ethos whereby police attempt to deal with community members in a way that enhances satisfaction and involvement in policing priorities (Lloyd and Foster 2009). Most police in NPTs experience some level of frustration with the public demands or expectations of them, or the issues that are raised in community engagement meetings, when the responses would be trivial or 'un-actionable' – that is, outside the boundaries of the police remit or 'real' police work. This inspector links recent reforms to police's reluctance to let down community members who make such demands:

> PCSO3: Unfortunately the police sometimes have been responsible for this more than anyone else as in we said, "we'll deal with your report. If it's dog-fouling we'll deal with it. If it's partnership we'll deal with it. If it's music we'll deal with it. So now we've become the be-all and end-all. "Any issues, call the police. Don't call the council. Call the police first of all and then we'll deal with it if we have to." We just have to get that role really – we're everything to every man, to all men, when it's not reality. That's why we now have said, "look,

133

you're housing, you deal with this side of things and we'll deal with the criminal activity or ASB, but you need to do your part of it."

Insp1: And there are things that historically, I remember twenty years ago certainly the phone call would have been, to the member of the public, "why are you phoning us? It's nothing to do with us. We're not going to get involved in that", something of that nature. And that would have been *accepted*. You try and do that now… now whether it's a societal thing again, whether it's because complaints are more easily made… but if you don't get the answer you like on the end of the phone, it is much easier to make a complaint about that. Now again, instead of the organisation just, you know, blankly saying, "Well that's quite right. It's nothing to do with us. You need to go and speak to the council", you'd do the relevant signposting, which is what we're trying to do now with force contact, because we've realised we've just taken on too much.

The solution to seemingly increasing public demands is for police to signpost complainants with un-actionable demands (or which police define as un-policeable (Roussell and Gascón 2014)) to other, appropriate agencies. During fieldwork observations and interviews, police often noted that community members raising un-actionable problems was a common feature of community engagement activities and other civilian-initiated encounters. These feeds into the general anxiety that the prevailing ethos of policing as a customer service meant that the police function had become too broad, leading to changing public expectations and increasing demand for issues that police perceive as trivial.

Grouping	Characteristics	Examples
Partners	Help inform police of neighbourhood characteristics and risks. May collaborate with police through collaborative problem solving, surveillance or liaison	Partner agencies and agents, Community Informant/Liaison (referred to collectively as 'Key Individual Networks' or KINs), business owners, shop workers
The Vulnerable	Face higher risks of harm, need assistance from police or other services to reduce risks, often	Elderly, homeless, non-English speaking immigrants, young people

	harder to reach due to social marginalisation or segregation	
Time-wasters	Interact with police often, are concerned about general neighbourhood security, ask for police assistance with trivial or 'un-actionable' matters	Older community members, 'Mrs Miggins', most PACT attendees

Table 18 - Neighbourhood Characters

5.2.2   Neighbourhood Partnerships

NP is designed to be the visible and accessible component of police organisations to external actors through community engagement and collaborative problem-solving with neighbourhood partners. Through these activities, NPT operatives come into contact with a variety of actors and organisations – the bulk of which make up the *allies* of NPTs – all with their own interests and capacity for the coproduction of neighbourhood security. The most common partners of participating NPT operatives were the agencies of local government, but housing associations, voluntary sector organisations and individual members of the community also collaborate with NPTs for the purpose of solving local problems. These activities vary from long-term projects, formal tasking groups and engagement meetings, to informal interactions with networks of individual or agency contacts.

The geography of a neighbourhood is a factor in determining which partners are available to interact with the police. City centre police have more contact with organisations who deal with problems that tend to be more acute in inner-city locations, such as visible homelessness, whereas those in residential neighbourhoods often find themselves in regular contact with housing officers and housing associations, as issues in housing estates make up a large amount of the work of such an NPT. Collaborative efforts are often problem-driven, as the existing problems of a location affect the types of partners that police have. This effect of geography is demonstrated in the following excerpts:

> **CSO2:** I currently work at the city centre, and we have quite a high population of the homeless community. … so I know that there's been a lot of work at the city centre at the moment with an operation called 'Op Engage', whereby different teams have all been tasked to obviously go out, come across anyone that's homeless, speak to and find out why they're homeless, and signpost them to various agencies

so that they get the help and support that they need, whether it's with housing or it's drug use or anything like that.

NPT1 PC1: When I say partner agents I basically mean the housing associations that obviously have properties in this area of the city. Those are basically the main partner agencies that I work with as an officer.

In residential neighbourhoods, the partners of community engagement activities include residents of the neighbourhood, whereas areas with more commercial properties, such as the city centre, business owners and workers become the focus of engagement work.

CSO2: RCO meetings, it's a Retail Operation Crime meeting basically. It's a unit that's been set up, and they publish photos and build up a literature of shoplifters for the City Centre. Then, they have this meeting with various agencies and city police will come together each month, and they'll talk about what's affecting the business, how it's affecting them and then find out what agency needs to resolve that matter.

The different 'communities' of these neighbourhoods represent different security interests that order NP. Community engagement work is tailored to specific groups in neighbourhoods and as a result resources are targeted at the type of work that is commensurate with these interests[34].

5.2.2.1   *Motivations for collaboration: reciprocity and competence*

NPTs often see the reciprocal relations involved in collaborating with partners as beneficial to achieving police goals. This reflects the emerging 'new pragmatism' in NP (O'Neill and McCarthy 2012); the belief that collaboration is a more effective method of solving local issues and helps police use their time more efficiently. The experience or promise of other partners reducing police workloads is articulated by the following Sergeant:

Serg 4: That is one of the things that has improved over time, because there's been such a push to work together collectively. That

---

[34] This reflects the common criticism of community policing it takes sides in community conflicts and prioritises certain interests above others (for example, see Crawford 1997), and the interests that are over-represented are from groups with higher social capital and better historical relations with, and more trust of, the police (for example, Skogan 1989).

is where we've made the biggest gains, because we certainly work really well with our partners, really, really well. We fail miserably without them. We are lucky in terms of when we have peaks they usually have troughs, and they'll help us out. We might be completely to capacity, running investigations, running ASB jobs and everything else, and we might have to pick the phone up and say, "Look, we've got this neighbourhood issue. We could really do with you, going to court and getting an ex parte injunction against X, Y and Z, because these are the issues." "You helped us out last week, we'll do that for you", and they'll go off and do that for us, as a short-term, medium-term, sort of problem solving issue.

Here, the collaboration is about the efficient distribution of work between agencies, where partners will pick up tasks that are within their remit and that their collaborating partner does not have sufficient time to do. Without this collaboration, the police will 'fail' to achieve objectives due to their limited capacity. Police value having direct contact with partners that have the remit and spare capacity to deal with overlapping issues of order maintenance and public safety, especially by phone.

Good communication and close, reciprocal relationships are also valued by the police as tools of persuasion in instances such as these:

NPT 1 Serg: We've just closed down a club that's had issues with noise and the license has been taken away from that club. The noise equipment has been seized by Environmental Health. This place is still operating not as a club, but there's loud music from there. So I'm now having to poke the city council and go, "I need you now to start doing your noise stuff or looking at closure orders on this premises, because you need to invoke your legislation there to do this. I will help you where I can. I will visit them and I will take camcorders and that and I will help you because it's a thorn in my side as well. But we need to work together on this. We've got a good working relationship where you just have to set your stall out a little bit, say what you can do and what I need off you and what you can do. Now we can work together." It's about building those relationships, that's why. And we need that local link.

This quotation further demonstrates how different agencies also have specific powers to complement their remits, and as 'knowledge brokers' - or "expert advisors of

137

security and security managers to other institutions" (Ericson 1994, 151) – NPTs need awareness about which agencies are most appropriate for each problem or incident in order to distribute tasks or signpost people to the correct organisation. Distributing neighbourhood security activities and the responsibility for invoking responses to neighbourhood problems is economical:

> **NPT2 Serg**: The other thing for me while we are working with partners is that when I look at the legal bill for all the injunctions and all the evictions that we've done, the housing provider picks up the tab. Hence it's a massive money-saving exercise for all the police as well. So it's really advantageous, clearly with all the spending cuts that are coming in now, it's not going to be as free and easy to get an injunction or an eviction as it has been in the past.

Ways of working that reduce police workload and other costs are increasingly being sought by NPTs to address the new socio-economic environment of policing.

5.2.2.2   Difficulties in collaboration

There are a number of difficulties associated with collaboration. Partners need to be available to each other, through convenient means of contact and the capacity, and desire, to take part in collaborative activities. Police prefer partners to be contactable by the quickest means available, but some partners do not respond quickly due to their methods of contact:

> **PC 1:** Communication can be difficult because it's all down nowadays, down to email. Everything, "E-mail me." Very rarely people answer the phone. I pick up the phone and answer it. That's due to a lack of time. More burdens on individuals. More on specific persons, officers, and other partnering agencies. It is difficult. It is purely because they've got more to do in less time. And it's because it's frustrating them. Because you're trying to get the same sort of result as you did before, say, three years ago. Say, "I just had to phone somebody and they came out and sorted this out for me." But now you have to go through these procedures, you have to… jump through these hoops and all that. It's like a policy for the policy's sake sometimes.

The practice of inter-agency communication can be an administrative burden for police who want swift responses to both calls for assistance and live issues. Increasing

reliance on E-mail in organisations lends itself to a potentially slower response to contact, as the officer above has experienced.

Partnerships do not always result in efficient, multi-agency approaches to specific problems, and sometimes instead present opportunities to exploit connections with partners for the benefit of one agency or individual. The notion of segregated remits is used by police and other partners to avoid increasing their own workload, according to this officer:

> **PC 4:** I think personally and the police are as guilty of this as much as anybody else. I've seen a lot more defensive practice coming in terms of people sort of be more willing to say, "that's not my responsibility. That's not my agency," and batting things off and trying to get another agency to take ownership of something. Rather than it being an agency defensive practice, sort of, I think it is more personal with people's workloads. They're just swamped with... People have become very defensive in terms of saying "Look, I just can't take any more work on and I think we are very much the same as police." I think some officers are carrying such a work load that they will just sort of feel as though they are at breaking point and say, "Look, I can't take any more work now."

It is the connection between agencies and the knowledge of each other's remit that provides opportunities for partners to exploit each other's capacity for dealing with specific problems. In some instances, the close relationships built up between partners are used as channels to reduce workloads by relinquishing responsibilities. This 'defensive practice' works both ways, according to the PC above, and represents divisions between partners that hinder collaborative practice.

5.2.3   The Organisational Position of Neighbourhood Policing

NP has been described as a police organisational arrangement to encourage 'soft' policing initiatives (McCarthy 2014, 261) that involve fostering connection to communities and collaborating with partners to solve neighbourhood problems. At the same time, others have observed that NP work is affected by the dominant[35], 'hard' notions and priorities of police work (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Ramshaw and Cosgrove 2013; Cosgrove 2016) and that 'hard and soft policing forms are enacted concurrently'

---

[35] Loftus (2009) argues that in police institutions the traditional, street-level police cultural characteristics are still 'dominant'.

139

(Innes 2005, 157). The distinction between the orthodox crime control and the neighbourhood security missions is understood by police through the lens of short-term versus long-term solutions to crime problems. NPT operatives sometimes use the 'sticking-plaster' metaphor to describe how the approach of Response Teams is not concerned with causes of crime and long-term solutions:

> **PC2:** …to be a good neighbourhood officer you've got to take the plaster off, because Response put a plaster on it and you've got to try and get to the root of what is actually the problem.

The distinct missions both share the core objective of crime reduction, but emphasise different methods to achieve these goals.

5.2.3.1 Situational Demands of the Neighbourhood

Although NP resources are intended to be dedicated to specific locations and the neighbourhood security mission, organisational pressures require police officers especially, who are in high demand across the organisation, to be more flexible. The crime-fighting activities that police in NPTs undertake are also influenced by the characteristics and demands of their neighbourhood:

> **Serg 3:** I think we're trying to be careful not to be obsessed by crime. That would seem strange for police officers, but it does lead towards that. If we have high burglary stats in Moseley, which we do every now and again, we'll tend to change neighbourhood policing to be target-hardening and going out and doing some of the investigation, walking some of the routes, looking for property, checking and rechecking CCTV in case investigation missed it, to try and give a premium service still to the neighbourhood around burglary. You could argue when neighbourhood policing started, that's not really what it was. It was supposed to be all about engagement. So, I think we kind of shift as and when. In a busier neighbourhood, we'll do more crime stuff and community safety stuff. In less busy areas… we'll help address mental health and some of those things that maybe we shouldn't be taking all the burden for, but we probably do.

The effect of situational variables – or neighbourhood context, such as local crime rates[36] - on policing styles illustrates that NPT work is flexible and context-specific.

---

[36] Sobol et al. (2013) found that neighbourhoods with higher crime rates predicted more police 'vigour' – the propensity to employ formal legal interventions.

Government and organisational policy demanded prioritisation of the reassurance and problem-solving functions of NP. Where NPTs deem there to be more immediate problems of crime and disorder, however, these functions can be deprioritised. The above excerpt also represents the perception of many respondents that the performance of crime-focused and community safety activities are in tension with each other; there is a perceived dichotomy between these types of work, rather than each being interrelated.

5.2.3.2   Data-driven demand

Demand is often a data-driven influence on police work, as high or rising crime statistics of particular types affect the prioritisation of police objectives, and this prioritisation of problems leads to whatever activities are judged to be an appropriate solution. Data-driven prioritisation can at times be in tension with what police in NPTs, particularly at the street-level, thought of as the core work of NP, which they often claimed was difficult to measure:

> **CSO3:** I think recently, some of the senior officers did actually come out with neighbourhood police officers and they're surprised in what we've done. You can't normally quantify it and measure it up against a response team, where you've got so many officers, you crime so many things, and being able to identify who's the offender in these things. Whereas neighbourhood policing, just by being a presence, walking past someone when they're going in with their shopping, they must feel more reassured. "Oh, there's someone there in case something happens. I know someone's not too far away."

Some respondents worried that data-driven approaches intrinsically favour the crime management mandate of NP and the traditional measures of policing success, and do not pick up the effect of, for example, the reassurance function. This appears to be perceived as something of an existential threat to NPTs, who see that the work of Response Teams will show up on performance metrics more than NPTs due to the work of the former being directly aligned with crime management activities.

Analysis of the data generated through policing activities is applied to the tactic of targeted patrol. NPTs in the West Midlands undertake Target Area Patrols (TAPs), which are fifteen-minute patrols of crime hotspots three times a day. The objective of these patrols is to prevent street crime and ASB in areas and at times with higher rates of these types of incident, based on Koper's (1995) findings that the ideal dosage of

police presence at hot spots to deter crime and disorder is ten to fifteen minutes. While TAPs are a form of visible presence of police in the neighbourhood, increasing visibility of police to the entire neighbourhood population is not the rationale, and as such they are crime control-centred.

> **PC3:** We've now inherited an area of policing called TAP patrols, which we do now, which has been proven through research. That's if we visit certain areas for several times a day, over a daily period, the crime level in that will drop drastically. And so far we've only been doing this for the last three weeks. Before it was brought in we were actually experimenting with it on our neighbourhood. We've seen a drastic drop in the crimes in these areas, so it does work.

The analysis of data to inform street-level practices reflects recent movements to embrace the science of crime control and the professionalisation and specialisation of policing practice (Holdaway 1977, 2017; Innes et al. 2006; Shearing and Ericson 1986; Willis et al. 2007). The use of TAPs illustrates that the role and work of NPTs are not sheltered from the influence of contemporary and changing scientific knowledge. Indeed, the promise of more effective methods of crime control[37] was welcomed by many of the respondents. Sergeants in particular were enthusiastic about the benefits that these new tactics bring to the performance of their teams, and a few even hoped that the changes will more broadly reform the general practices and culture of NPTs.

> **Serg 1:** I think the way forward is… being scientific with our approach, having tight timescales, deploy resources to those timescales, make sure they're disciplined and rigid so we stick to those timescales to have maximum impact. I think that's the way forward rather than just employing a load of officers who will just go around, doing what they want, walking wherever they want and not

---

[37] Innes et al. (2006) question the assumed objectivity of crime-analysis technologies, observing that:

> …charts and maps do not capture the dynamic, fluid and interactional qualities of crime. In fact, they effectively tend to 'de-contextualize' incidents, lifting them out of their settings, stripping away 'local' details and thus understanding. (52)

In this sense, effectiveness is defined by how police reduce crime problems that they themselves are involved in constructing through the use of crime analysis technologies.

> having a real approach to what we're doing and then not being able
> to measure what we're doing. So I'm for it.

This sergeant sees new developments in the science of crime control as a way to strip away the functions of neighbourhood policing that he perceives to have no value – in this case, random foot patrol – and take up practices that are more measurable and demonstrably effective to the organisation.

5.3   Processes of NPT work

In order to realise the multidimensional NP mandate that is shaped by the above environmental contexts, NPTs organise their work through the allocation of activities to each NPT operative according to their role, and the execution of these activities in a number of domains of NP delivery. These roles and tasks together equate to the *collective activity* of NP – how each NPT operative's actions "build upon and contribute to each other and something larger" (Hall 1987, 11).

5.3.1   Division of Labour

NPTs in WMP were made up of a number of different operational police actors, always including Sergeants, PCs, and PCSOs, and with Inspectors overseeing the management of more than one team. Each role is focused on delivering NP through the performance of allocated roles that contribute to the success of the team. The police organisation has a militarised rank structure for police officers, but in NPTs the inclusion of PCSOs, who are not part of this traditional structure, means that there is a mixture of formal and informal relations of command and status.

Figure 15 - Neighbourhood Policing hierarchy

PCSOs are not formally subordinate to PCs, but their organisational standing is lower as it is focused on tasks of low police-cultural status and they do not have the development opportunities open to officers (O'Neill 2014). Some PCSOs are also reported as having ambitions to become PCs (O'Neill 2014; Cosgrove 2016), and so PCs have some level of informal influence of the work of PCSOs, which can be more crime control-oriented (Cosgrove and Ramshaw 2013). Although they are in the same physical team, PCs and PCSOs may also be in different 'performance teams' (Goffman 1959; O'Neill 2015), where PCSOs attempt to create an impression of competence to an audience of PCs, but do not try to create these impressions together as 'teammates'. Together, this points to role-dependent experiences and views of the division of labour in NPTs.

5.3.1.1 Street-level

The Bobby is usually identified as a friendly yet authoritative PC of a bygone era (Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 69-99), but in the present day (in the West Midlands, at least) the PCSO is more likely to undertake the role and responsibilities typically associated with this idealised figure. PCSOs are considered to be more suitable than PCs for these responsibilities because their role allows them the time to be in the

144

neighbourhood and perform the gradual tasks of building connections and local knowledge:

> **NPT1 PC:** I think without community support officers, neighbourhood policing, obviously, a lot of people would talk to the community support officers a lot more then they'd talk to the police officers on the team because they're out there more. They're on foot. They have got more time than we've got because there's more of them. People will see them and talk to them. And I think if all of a sudden they're not there anymore, you lose a massive, certainly, intelligence tap for what's going on in the area. Knowledge as well. Everything really. I think if you take them away and what you've got left, I don't know if it's a neighbourhood team anymore to be honest, I don't know why. Sergeant and a couple of PCs, it's... You need more numbers and I know they're not going to replace them with police officers. There's absolutely no chance of that.

> **NPT2 Serg:** I think they're invaluable, I really do and I think they are going to be very sadly missed[38]. They are the eyes and ears. I feel that people are in the communities in my experience of neighbourhood policing are more inclined to tell a PCSO information than sometimes a constable. In terms of intelligence gathering, I think they're invaluable. People tell them so much. They've got the time and they are not abstracted in the same way the constable is. They are not going to be sent to certain jobs. Like for example, when response, on a late shift in particular, are absolutely strapped and they've got no one else to send, straight away they're going to look at either the CAP [Community Action Priority] team and, when the CAP team are completely exhausted, they're then going to look at the neighbourhood teams. And that's what we find a lot of then. When the CAP teams and the neighbourhood teams, from a PC point of view, are being utilized, your PCSOs are key to your neighbourhood policing fortune, because they're your visibility when your PCs are committed.

---

[38] At the time of interview, WMP planned to drastically reduce the number of PCSOs. However, this was eventually avoided due to news that police spending would be protected in the 2015 autumn spending review.

PCSOs are often referred to as 'the eyes and ears' of NPTs, and this emphasises the expectation that part of their role is to gain information from community members and observe the risks present in the neighbourhood. PCSOs are equipped with these abilities in part due to the organisational pressures on PCs, who may be abstracted from neighbourhood security duties by other teams in times of need, such as response or the ad hoc resource of Community Action Priority Teams (CAPT). This is such a common issue for NPTs[39] that PCSOs are viewed by many colleagues as vital to not only the delivery but the very existence of NP. L

The following respondent adds that the role of NPT PCs has, over time, moved away from being a specialised neighbourhood PC towards a flexible resource that works for the fulfilment of wider police organisational goals, performing the duties of other teams:

> **NPT1 PC1**: I came over here on the something called Continuous Improvement, which in theory was a very good idea because in departments like Response, investigation, neighbourhoods, CID, it was clearly marked out what we would all be doing. And at first, it worked really well because we were being left to do the work that we need to do within the neighbourhood. But since that time, it's all changed now. We get called out to more and more jobs that Response can't resource because they're short-staffed and it takes us away from the stuff that we need to be doing or that we should be doing. In that respect, it's changed a lot.

The PC describes how the Continuous Improvement programme effectively delineated the activities of local specialist teams, but with the onset of reductions to workforces the PC role in NPTs has shifted to cover the deficit in capacity of other teams to meet their responsibilities. This effectively limits the ability of PCs to perform the proactive, long-term activities that are intended to achieve the neighbourhood security objectives of NP.

5.3.1.2 Managerial

Sergeants, as the 'practitioner managers' of police organisations (Butterfield et al. 2005), have considerable influence on the priorities and activities of NPTs, and they can use this influence to set much of the overall tone of NP in their given area. This is

---

[39] NP has been dealing with PCSO abstractions and 'role drift' for many years (see, for example, National Policing Improvement Agency 2008)

noted most by police when their team has experienced a change in management. Sergeants each have their own policing philosophy and attitudes towards NP delivery, which, according to police, affects the type of work that is prioritised in their neighbourhood:

> **NPT1 CSO1:** What tends to happen, if I'm honest, is you get a new sergeant come in and they change things up. One sergeant will have you working this area and then a new sergeant will come in and they'll say, "No, I want to do it this way," and in my experience every single time we've had a new sergeant, they change things for whatever reason.

> **PC4:** Some team sergeants are very crime orientated and they will almost run the neighbourhood team more like a crime team. Personally, I think that's wrong. Some teams will, day after day, be going out doing drugs warrants, smashing in doors, racing around in their cars, wanting to have the lights on, racing to 999 jobs, if it's on their patch. I think some teams and supervisors have missed the concept of what we should be doing. I think most supervisors now are quite smart to say, "Well let's look at what are the issues a neighbourhood team should be dealing with."

The PC above voices the view that sergeants who focus more on crime control activities do not understand, and thus jeopardise, the NP mission – a mission that is distinct from the traditional or dominant police cultural sense of mission. In fact, many of the respondents, but not all, viewed facets of the traditional police culture and the activities that such characteristics promote as somewhat incompatible with NP 'issues' – the activities that fulfil the neighbourhood security mission of NP. Crime control-oriented sergeants prioritise, for instance, drug warrants, emergency response, and apprehending offenders instead of problem-solving projects, reassurance patrols and building relationships with community members and partners. For PCs especially, this can have a significant impact of their experience as an NPT operative, as sergeants can choose to abstract them from neighbourhood security duties. Overall, this suggests that sergeants practise street-level discretion in setting the agenda for the work of the NPT, and this is not necessarily congruent with prevailing organisational policy.

Due to the police organisational hierarchy, sergeants in NPTs face pressures of their own. NP managers are being asked to refocus the activities of NPTs in the current era,

147

and the nature of these changes means that sergeants may, depending on analysis of neighbourhood data, be expected to guide their NPT operatives away from activities with a low impact on crime data:

> **Serg 3:** I think that there's some of them that haven't changed a lot. I think some are still struggling to do neighbourhood policing that we used to 5 years ago. So there's a continuous battle for myself to say "Well, no, drop the stall down on the high street, and let's target the children's home because there's four people in there and three of them are burglars and one of them is involved in child sexual exploitation. So let's focus our time on that home, because that's where we'll make a bigger impact than speaking to people shopping."

This sergeant's view is that NP is not a static approach to policing and must change according to current organisational philosophy and objectives, installing a greater focus on more harmful crimes, such as child sexual exploitation. Sergeants are aware that, in order to manage their NPT operatives to bring about change in NP delivery, they must challenge current NP values and impinge on any police discretion to prioritise their own workloads:

> **Serg 4:** I have to be very directive to the team, in terms of, "This is what we are going to achieve and this is how we are going to achieve it," so there's less autonomy for people to go out and just say, "Right, I'm going to go out and just walk on patrol." We do ethical demand patrols, so there's two years of data that are done by departments similar to this - intelligence; they sit behind us - that will tell us where hot spot areas are, effectively. We've got six at the moment that sit across the ward and there's a piece of research that's doing evidenced-based policing that suggests if we're doing 15-minute patrol in that area, we have an impact over a period of time. So we go in and we do those ethical demand patrols to reduce demand front end. Just looking at the figures and what we've achieved and how it feels, it's been quite successful. It's something that we're pushing really hard.

The idea of demand management is being used by police management as a way of understanding how NP activities can be configured to fit current organisational objectives. The sergeant refers to the way these imperatives come from more senior

management through his evocation of the chain of command, or getting his "arse kicked":

> **Serg 4:** Each month there's a demand management meeting and from that there's a list published of the highest demand locations in your area. The expectation is, as a supervisor, I will put in place a plan, whether that be formal or informal to reduce or manage that demand at that location. I'll basically get a three-month period to resolve that before I start getting my arse kicked basically.

Just as in other middle management roles (e.g. Greer and Page 1955, 1-4), the sergeant is obligated to realise the objectives of those in senior positions through directing the efforts of street-level workers. In times of wider organisational reforms, it is their role to reconfigure the work of NPTs to fit with new organisational philosophy and meet institutional goals through the production of favourable data. Therefore, while sergeants do practise discretion in influencing the agendas and policing styles of NPTs, implementing organisational reforms is incentivised through performance measures.

5.3.2   Connection and interpersonal work

Many of the respondents considered one primary goal of NP to be the nurturing of relationships between themselves and the communities that reside in the team's designated neighbourhood. The notion is that the delivery of NP relies on the craft of creating and maintaining bonds between police and communities or individuals in those communities, much like other, past forms of community policing and beat policing in Britain (for example, Fielding 1995, 67-102; Holdaway 1977, 123). Presence, continuity, and communication skills are the tools that NPT operatives employ in the attempt to reduce 'social distance' and nurture social closeness.

5.3.2.1   Familiarity

Being familiar is intended to cultivate the connection between NPTs and their communities. In practice, this means a PC or PCSO (or sometimes a Sergeant) being recognisable by face, name, or both, to some community members. Police hope this will connect them to those that have a stake in the neighbourhood, establishing relationships that can then be nurtured and utilised. In this way, a relationship created becomes an opportunity for greater individual contacts and connections that are, according to this PCSO, often 'positive':

149

>CSO3: I think [our relationship with the public is] generally good and that's because really the familiarity with us, because we dealt with them and an issue that they had, or because they see us every other day walking around. It builds that link and a bond. And knowing the officer's name, straight away there is a relationship. Sometimes it's negative but a lot of times it's positive.

The PCSO here refers to situations where familiarity can be produced – during contacts with community members who have raised issues or when patrolling by foot. The continuous presence and visibility of police in the neighbourhood is seen as fundamental to community members knowing and recognising their local police. Being on first name terms – or at least, the community member knowing the name of the NPT operative – signifies to police a personal connection, a 'relationship', where knowing a person's name removes one layer of unfamiliarity. Removing this layer can create a positive bond, but this is not guaranteed[40].

Some respondents noted that some community members crave familiarity and a relationship with local police, and achieving this has been mutually beneficial to both parties. Respondents suggested that being a familiar presence to, and creating a heightened personal connection with, community members increases communication:

>JGM: [D]o you think that [familiarity] helps with that relationship?

>CSO1: Definitely because I think the public feel more comfortable telling you things. Do you know what I mean? A lot of people call me by first name when I walk around, and I like that because I think I'm not different to you guys. I'm just here in case you need help. That's how I see it and I can probably direct you or sort that help for you. But I'm exactly the same as you guys I'm no different.

---

[40] There is evidence to both support and cast doubt on the value of close, familiar relations between police and public. In the UK, Innes and Innes (2011) found that knowing police by name or appearance increases public confidence, but actual contact decreases confidence. More recently in the US, Lee et al. (2015) found that college students with less social distance to the police were more likely to have confidence in the police, but that negative encounters were associated with less confidence. A lack of procedural justice may play a role in negative outcomes; procedurally just behaviour - including treating people with dignity and respect - during police-citizen encounters generally increases, trust, legitimacy, and public cooperation with police (Tyler 2004). Skogan (2005) found that citizen (dis)satisfaction with police encounters in Chicago was related to the quality of police contact, the demographics of citizen interactants, and who initiated the encounter.

> **PC1:** Then you know you've got that relationship strong enough for them to feel free to pick up the phone and speak to you whenever. Even though you're working it's like an extended network of friends and family and stuff. But you still keep that boundary, you know, of what your role is.

The above are typical responses from respondents. Familiarity of local officers, being recognisable and being on first name terms with local people, was seen as a leveller – breaking down the differences in status between the public and police, and leading to a relationship where residents feel comfortable to make contact with police, improving communication. This has echoes of the mantra that 'the police are the public and the public are the police'. The imagery of friends and family illustrates the kind of relationship where each party feels free to communicate, to speak to each other 'whenever'. PC1, however, adds the qualification that this closeness has limits. Police cannot remove all barriers, even if the neighbourhood role encourages a greater level of closeness[41]. To him, difference and distance are to some extent an unavoidable and necessary part of their role.

The austerity era threatens this aspect of NP as falling NPT resources means that there is less time to nurture relationships with community members a breed familiarity, as this PCSO explains:

> **NPT1 CSO1:** I think it was a lot better. I think it was much better when, as I say, we had the numbers to focus on our areas. I would have a beat which was [microbeat] and that would be my beat. I would be able to pop in to the elderly care homes, pop in to the schools more often, and you'd know people on first name terms but now I can't actually do that as much. Obviously, you stop going into places because you can't be there, and obviously, that personal connection goes, doesn't it? Whereas before you'd pop in and you'd say, "Oh, I've seen this, I've seen this." You now go in for two weeks and people fluctuate, people move out and you walk in there's a new manager, "Oh, I don't know who you are." And then the connections are lost basically.

---

[41] See Banton (1964, 188-214) for a fuller discussion of the balance between connection and impartiality.

Connecting with members of communities, maintaining these relationships, and creating satisfaction and comfort was seen by most NPT operatives to be instrumental to the execution of other policing tasks and the fulfilment of police goals. Continuity and familiarity are components of the concept of a 'single point of contact' for a neighbourhood; an NPT operative whose name and contact details are known to community members to simplify channels of communication and encourage interactions and reporting. PC1 and PC4 explain below how the existence or absence of the single point of contact affects people's disposition:

> **PC1:** But I think the main issue is a single point of contact. People are comfortable with that. When there's no consistency, residents, especially the older generation, when there's no consistency of who you're talking to, then having to repeat themselves too much that frustrates them, that frustrates the older generation. The kids they say one thing one day, then they say another. But the older generation, when they've said something, they actually said it and they don't like repeating themselves, be that to me or to you, to somebody else.

> **PC4:** To the community, I think it is having officers who are known, who members of the public can recognise and know as one of their local community officers and having that continuity of a neighbourhood team. The community get really fed up and annoyed when we as a force keep changing our neighbourhood teams, moving particularly the supervisors and inspectors. That really pisses them off. And the positive spin off of the force is by having that continuity of neighbourhood teams, we build up that trust with the community and from that we gain information and intelligence.

The continuous presence of this recognisable figure in the neighbourhood engenders comfort, but absence of the single point of contact angers certain groups who expect this continuity. The example of older people's frustration with repeating themselves illustrates how community members dissatisfied with police organisation can become less responsive to their local police representatives, and consequently reports of local crimes and problems fall and intelligence thins out. Falling resources in NP means that this familiarity and continuity is threatened by the personnel being lost or shifted from their neighbourhoods to cover gaps elsewhere:

NPT1 CSO2: Because of losing numbers off the team, we have to keep rejigging who's got what beat, what microbeat. So I went in yesterday, and they were like, 'oh you're back'. And I said 'no, it's because someone is off sick who actually runs that microbeat.' So it's confusing for them. It's like, "oh, so you're not back then?" Because that was my original beat with the officer who left the team for [other area]. And you have to keep explaining though, "it's not my beat, so you won't be dealing with me directly. This is your officer but because they're off, then I can deal with whatever it is that you've got a problem with." Yes it's difficult because you feel like you have to keep explaining the situation.

Gaining higher levels of intelligence is also contingent on the community's trust of the police, which is itself expected to be nurtured by continuous presence of known, recognisable police. Trust of the police by the community is also seen as a condition of passing on higher levels of intelligence. The absence of this figure would therefore damage the connection between police and community and closes down opportunities for communication. Organisationally, these activities rely on *team stasis* to prevent abstractions or other uncertain geographical allocation of staff resources. In this passage, CSO2 identifies the qualities of a single point of contact that leads to open communication:

CSO2: I've been on holiday, and I've been walking around the City Centre today, and people say, "Oh, you're back. Oh, we've missed you. We've been quiet [CSO2's first name]." Isn't it great? If you spend time talking to your community and go and approach them, and take time to get to know them, and find out what affects their business or what doesn't affect their business, or just have a general chat, the community are so open arms to you. That's what they want to see. They want to see those approachable, smiling, helpful people. They don't necessarily call on us every five minutes; that's not the case at all, but they want to see us walk through the city and know and feel reassured that we're there and happy that we're there and I've clearly been missed. They miss you as well [laughs].

Building a connection with the community is not just about being present as a single point of contact, it also relies on the quality of interaction. As was clear from the observations of PACT meetings in all neighbourhoods, body language, demeanour, and

153

attitude are often used as ways to endear police to their local communities, and to encourage community members to open up productive channels of communication.

5.3.3 Collaboration and problem solving

Although working with others on neighbourhood security issues is in part another way connecting with communities, collaboration is a distinct category of NPT action due to its processes and objectives. It is not primarily about forging relationships – though good relations are considered conducive to effective processes of collaboration – but instead the practices involved in working with other neighbourhood stakeholders towards the fulfilment of shared goals (McCarthy 2014). These shared goals may be the explicit reasons for such interactions and partnerships, but police engage in collaboration as a means to achieving other policing objectives. Therefore, good partners to the police are those who have strategic utility[42].

5.3.3.1 Community Collaboration

In community engagement, with individuals representing a community or communities in one part of a neighbourhood, some police view good collaboration as including actors who provide most benefit to the police in carrying out their duties and achieving their goals.

> **Serg 1:** I think the pressures always there to have those links with the community. I think the reason they want us to engage with the community is that when something does happen, we're able to reach out to the community and defuse situations. I think that's the motivation behind it. I figure on a day-to-day basis there's no requirement for me to go out and link with the community. Yes, it's part of my day job, we should be meeting and greeting people, but it's more important for me to have links with key members of the community so that if they've got an issue in the community then they come to us, and if we've got an issue with that community then we can approach them.
>
> It's like, we had a murder yesterday in [place]. After this meeting I'm going to see the senior investigating officer in charge of the murder. She's going to speak to me about who to reach out to in the

---

[42] In the context of austerity, there are signs that police and other agencies are prioritising partnerships that 'add value' to organisational objectives (Lowndes and McCaughie 2013, 537-538).

> community to get intelligence to try and solve this murder. So it's
> that time then that it's key. You've done all the groundwork. You've
> gone in, picked up phones and spoke to the right people. That's what
> I think community engagement is for, rather than just going out there
> and speaking to just anybody.

The sergeant uses engagement to help his team defuse situations, solve issues and detect offenders. Rather than routine community engagement and informal interactions, he prioritises building bonds with a strategic contact from a community, a person who is both a conduit of information and an enabler of reciprocal relations between police and community. Together, these contacts are known as a Key Individual Network, or KIN, and they make up the civilian membership of the *allies* grouping.

The contact passes on information to the police to build intelligence about situations and incidents, and they also receive police contact or information when the police need to 'reach out' to a troubled community or in times of urgent need, such as detaining a person suspected of a serious violent crime.

The contact needs to be the 'right' person; someone who has access to useful information and is sympathetic to police objectives. Other respondents did have a broader understanding of community engagement processes than this sergeant, but the emphasis of strategic relations is applicable to other collaborative efforts undertaken by NPTs.

5.3.3.2   Multi-agency Collaboration

Police consider a good partner to have the potential or track record of easing workloads or providing information that would otherwise be hard to come by. Beyond official remits and powers, police sometimes encourage partners to act as conduits of information between the partner's work setting and the police. Shop owners, for example, are encouraged to utilise video technologies to record incidents and to pass on evidence of incrimination. Another common example is those partners that work with or inside housing estates that make up considerable amounts of police demand, . This PCSO laments the loss of an extremely useful partner in this regard – the tower block concierge:

> **NPT1 CSO1:** Actually, as I said before, covering a large area with lots
> of tower blocks and flats, there used to be the concierge based at
> the tower around [area in neighbourhood], so you'd have somebody

> based in [one] Tower it was and somebody based in [another] Tower, think it was. They basically control all the CCTV. They liaison for you, so if I wanted to know who had been in and out of the block or if I wanted to know if they'd any calls about, noise nuisance, I go straight to them. We were on friendly terms and they'd help me out with information and vice versa.

> They got took out a couple of years ago now I think it was, and there's nothing there now. If I want any information, I have to phone up the housing officer. The problem with that is the housing officer doesn't just cover those flats so they don't know as much basically.

The concierge's role and resources meant that the PCSO had access to superior surveillance and extended knowledge of the occurrences within these tower blocks. Different partners have different access to resources of information, and liaising with the housing officer does not provide the privileged access previously enjoyed by the PCSO. This suggests that the austerity era may serve to exacerbate the decline of secondary social control agents and activities (Jones and Newburn 2002, 140) in some spaces, and by extension reducing the broader security network that NPTs rely on.

As well as these covert processes, police use partners, such as housing associations, to try and open up channels of communication between NPTs and residents who have purposefully limited relations with police, as this PC explains:

> **NPT1 PC1**: A lot of people because of where they come from have got a natural distrust of police, which obviously as the neighbourhood team we're keen to show them that they can trust the police and country. But it's very, very difficult to try and breach that. A lot of the groups in the community are quite gated. They're guarded against – and that's where obviously with the housing associations that is a way into what to speak to them and show them that they can speak to us normally and that we're not there to – obviously we're there to enforce the law but we're not there as – we're approachable is what I'm trying to say at the same time.

In this way, partners can act as intermediaries and communicative links between residents and police. Police use partners that are in close proximity to these groups to establish a link with their clients. The hope is that the police can build trust with people who are disengaged form the police. Whether this is a likely outcome or not,

police messages to these groups can be given extra legitimacy if these agencies deliver the same messages, as the inspector explains:

> **Insp1**: Like I said, via safer estates, going through partners to talk to their clients, who are invariably the same as ours, so that the message can get kind of spread out, you know, it's not just coming from the police. You know, 'my housing officer also told us that.' So therefore, it kind of lends a bit more credibility. A lot of the time we say something, and it's like, 'well, you would say that', or you know, 'you're trying to protect your own', or something of that nature.

5.3.4 Information gathering

Knowledge about local communities, characters, crime, and disorder is produced by NPTs through the gathering of raw intelligence and the creation of data. Police seek to create opportunities for community members to reveal pieces of information that would otherwise be restricted.

5.3.4.1 Community intelligence mining

One tactic is to operate in the social spaces of community members, such as holding surgeries in cafes or meetings in, for example, community centres.

> **PC1:** We are really skimming the surface now. It's the lack of in depth we're able to provide. Before you were able to go to speak to two, three people or members of your community at a diner. You got so much intelligence over one cup of tea. Now as an individual officer in our neighbourhood we don't get time to do anything like that. … We had built that relationship. The relationship building is gone.

According to PC1, the presence of police in the neighbourhood allows these ventures into neutral and familiar spaces where actors engage in familiar rituals, which encourages the community members to freely pass on information, improving the depth of intelligence and local knowledge produced. The way PC1 describes this type of information-gathering exercise can be contrasted with PACT meetings; at the former the attendees are allies, perhaps because they are specifically invited to these informal events, whereas any community member can attend the latter, including time-wasters. PC1 fears that staff resource constraints directly impinge on information gathering effectiveness due to fewer opportunities for these police-initiated interactions.

157

The information passed to police can be utilised directly in their other activities, such as investigation, and/or inputted into the organisation's intelligence database. In regard to the former, gathering information is one building block of the NPT operative's 'scheme of interpretation'. That is, information gathering itself partially informs the way police understand the physical features, people, and problems of their neighbourhood. These understandings can be drawn upon to investigate incidents or solve problems:

> **PC2:** That vulnerable person who has seen your face before and has got that confidence in telling you things. ...I could be out on my bike or just popping somewhere and they'll say, "[PC's name], I've got something to tell you," and it might be that little snippet of information that puts together a job or somebody who's bringing in stolen goods because they've got that confidence in you. You lose the numbers, that's happening less and less now because they're not seeing us enough.

'Snippets of information' that are given to police by community members can be combined with existing local knowledge to piece together an understanding of a recent incident or on-going problem, also referred to as the 'jigsaw approach' to investigation based on information gathering (Fielding 1995, 168). Respondents considered that their scheme of interpretation is of, at least, equal quality to the directions provided by senior officers after neighbourhood data have been analysed:

> **NPT2 Serg:** We have a list. There's a meeting that they do with senior officers here and various inspectors and obviously the data is collected. And then I will then look at that demand list. I'm always looking at it anyways to be honest with you. So, when I get the list from the senior management team there is no real surprises for me. Because I found that when you are looking at the logs on a daily basis, you're looking at the crime at a daily basis, when you then get a hotspot address, nine times out of ten you are already working on that address already, and you're trying to combat it before it's even flagged up.

Sergeants in NPTs especially can build a broad scheme of interpretation of their neighbourhood by informally analysing incoming data, such as reports from police or

community members. In their managerial role, this knowledge can be used to direct and distribute the NPT's resources.

5.3.4.2 *Knowledge Exchange*

The flow of information is, in some cases, bidirectional. In the quest to connect and collaborate with communities, especially where there is a strategic case for doing so, police share information with specific community members:

> **PC4:** In this neighbourhood team, for example, I am the designated CT prevent officer for the area where I work as the area is deemed to be vulnerable in terms of radicalization. One of my weekly tasks is to speak to my community contacts, engage the feeling of the community in relation to worldwide events, UK foreign policy, et cetera, and that's a weekly task. I then feed in to a community impact assessment, which is done, which is at a tactical and strategic level. Yes, community teams I feel are crucially important for that flow of information. And it *is* a two-way flow as we are hearing of information, and in instants we can feed back. We have those relationships with those key members of the community and it is an open corridor of information exchange.

The 'key members of the community' are those individuals of strategic importance to the police, who are the gatekeepers of access to 'hard to reach', vulnerable communities and restricted knowledge. These strategic relations in the West Midlands are currently aimed largely at Muslim communities who are deemed at risk of radicalisation and extremist activities. Maintaining trustful relationships with these contacts, just as with partnering agencies, involves the reciprocal arrangement of bidirectional information sharing, though the PC's later example of this relates to giving advice and support to communities affected by radicalisation, rather than restricted knowledge held by the organisation. In other engagement activities, police do pass on advice to community members and share anonymised data or information about local crimes and problems.

5.3.5 Crime control

Although the majority of respondents did not associate the core duties of NPTs with a crime and incident focused style of policing, some police still valued this type of policing more highly than neighbourhood security activities. Regardless of these police sub-cultural preferences, NPTs practice crime control and law enforcement activities

159

in their own and, in times, other neighbourhoods. These activities cover a number of policing functions: prevention of crime and ASB through, for instance, targeted patrols, diversions, and offender management; enforcement of the law through responding to calls for service and apprehending suspects; investigation and detection work through, for instance, executing warrants.

5.3.5.1   Diversions

An activity that NPTs also employ in the name of prevention, but is not driven by data analysis, is the practice of diverting youth from crime or criminogenic lifestyles through community-based initiatives and programmes, or early interventions. In contrast to data-driven tactics, such as TAPs, police who undertake these interventions sometimes worry that due to the nature of the initiative the effects are not as easy to measure, and thus will not be considered to be a valuable use of police time by the wider organisation and their managers (for a similar account, see McCarthy 2014, 141):

> **NPT1 CSO3:** Myself and [other PCSO] run a football coaching thing for all the school kids where we'll go round and organise so they've got something to do in the holidays. Stop them messing about or doing whatever else they might be doing. But that's not necessarily recorded anywhere. We'd write the reports and stuff, but somebody on the response team isn't going to know about that.

> Diversion yes, and obviously it just builds more relationships with us, because we turn up in our football kit and talk about how Man United got on at the weekend, and then just when your just in between games or whatever you talk about the latest computer games. Because being a youngish lad myself, I've got a lot in common with a 14-year-old lad on the basis of I like PlayStation games and I like football and stuff like that. I like a nice pair of trainers, whatever. So you can talk about that kind of stuff rather than police stuff, and they see you as totally different. So it works on all levels. And then the lads are more likely to come up to you and go, "I'm having a bit of trouble at school" or "I'm having a bit of trouble at home." It's just a bit more—they see you as a person.

These kinds of early interventions are crime control and prevention activities that follow the logic of 'soft' policing and a community-oriented ethos, through methods of persuasion and displays of shared values and interests between police and young

people. The closeness provided by police-led initiatives provides the opportunities for police to humanise themselves in order to connect with, and feel more trusted by, young people. These kinds of projects are traditional community policing activities, focused on building relationships through interpersonal connections. This area of policing, though notionally connected to preventing crime and disorder, is closer to a social service in which the 'big stick' of policing is absent (Fielding 2002).

5.3.5.2 'Hard' interventions

On the 'harder' side of the spectrum, NPT operatives make use of coercive legal powers to investigate and prevent crime and ASB. The PCSO role and NP were established in the same era as other government policies that sought greater control over ASB and other less serious offences. The influence of those policies, such as the creation of the Antisocial Behaviour Order (ASBO), is still present in the way police deal with ASB even though the policies and powers have since been reformed. The use of one such punitive intervention, the civil injunction, was referred to by the following PC:

> **PC3:** So the neighbourhood teams have become very professional and proficient at dealing with, for example, civil interventions - what were anti-social behaviour orders and they've just changed recently. A lot of the colleagues on response and CID wouldn't have a clue if we said, "Well let's get an injunction against somebody that they can't be in the presence of any unaccompanied girl under the age of 18." A lot of colleagues might look and go, "Why would you do that?" – "Because the intel is he's a child sexual offender. We've got all this intel on him and we're going to go and get an injunction saying he can't be anywhere in England and Wales in the company of an unaccompanied girl." So those sort of things the neighbourhood teams have become really quite good at.

Although NP embraces the use of 'soft' interventions and less punitive methods, long-established coercive powers were still being used by NPTs to control crime, and NPT operatives felt capable of using these powers well.

5.3.5.3 Warrants

Sergeants talked about the operations and activities that NPTs undertook in order to control crime through investigation and detection, such as search warrants for drug operations and operations that focused on traffic and parking. To the following

sergeant, tackling a drugs problem was intuitively a good way to reduce all crime in his neighbourhood:

> **Serg 1:** Invariably I used to do one or two warrants, execute a few drugs warrants a month, pair and execute them. I used to have an officer that would just deal with warrants for me, because warrants go hand in hand with crime. So I've said got a drugs problem, so to combat that we need warrants. If we can get rid of the drugs problem, you can cut a lot of the other associated crime. That's the first thing that went so I haven't been able to do a warrant for 6 months now. Other things… operations like parking operations, speeding operations, that type of thing has gone out of the window because I haven't go the capacity to do that. In the middle I look at ASB and community cohesion, everything else around that was secondary. That stuff was coming in slowly and at least I can deliver that. At least I can respond to public calls for service.

The above also illustrates how NPT operatives saw NP changing due to the loss of warranted officer resources. In this case, the loss of officers meant that proactive targeting of specific problems of crime was less likely to be undertaken. Instead, the community-focused functions and responding to crime and ASB made up an increasing proportion of NP work. Rather than 'soft' activities being at most risk of being deprioritised, it was the proactivity and responsivity of the problem-solving approach that some respondents, especially sergeants and PCs, found more difficult to sustain.

5.4   Conclusion

This chapter explored the way NP is socially organised in urban areas of the West Midlands, highlighting a number of factors involved in influencing local policing delivery. The most significant finding in relation to this thesis is that there are competing narratives amongst NPT operatives of how NP should be delivered. In contrast to some notable studies of police culture in general (Loftus 2009; Rubenstein 1973; Van Maanen 1978) and in NP (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Ramshaw and Cosgrove 2013; Cosgrove 2016), neighbourhood security activities were more likely to be viewed by the respondents as the primary functions of NP. That is, the dominant shared assumption is of NP as a specialised arena for the delivery of 'soft' police functions (reassurance, engagement, and problem-solving) and skills (communication, persuasion, and negotiation) in the wider organisational pursuit of crime reduction. The evocation of community-focused activities and relationship building is also used

defensively, as a critique of the pressures of new organisational realities and expectations that threaten to reform their roles and practice (see Manning 1997, 133), such as the use of NPT operatives for the work of other specialised teams or management focus on short-term crime reduction as a measure of success.

In contrast with the logic of the dominant narrative, some NPT operatives regularly questioned the value of a consumer-oriented ethos in engagement activities and sought ways to reduce the amount of 'un-actionable' demands made of them by *time-wasters*, often through community engagement activities. This fits with reform narratives of demand management/reduction that promote a redefinition of the NP remit in order to reduce workloads. However, actual changes to practice observed by respondents did not move solely towards either crime control or neighbourhood security functions, but were characterised more by a loss of proactivity and longer-term problem-solving due to diminishing resources of personnel and time in both police and partner agencies. Police organisations may view more utilisation of partner capacities as a smart way to reduce demand, but some agencies face similar squeezes to their resources and as a result use the logic of demand management and segregated remits to refuse responsibilities passed on from other agencies.

The setting and situational demands of neighbourhoods were shown to influence how NPTs organised their work. NPT operatives interpret their settings – the characteristics of the neighbourhood and its inhabitants – in order to make decisions about what kind of work is necessary to deal with known problems. Geography also influences the available partners or communities who provide the most strategically useful relationships for dealing with local problems of crime and disorder. NPT work is flexible and context-specific as police react to situational realities of their neighbourhoods.

What is still not completely clear from the data, however, is the full range of reasons for the prioritisation of specific problems in neighbourhoods at the time of research. Certain communities and partners appear to have more avenues of collaboration with NPTs and therefore more sway over defining local problems. Partners are sometimes chosen due to their capacity to understand problems and coproduce solutions, and this supports the notion of the 'new' pragmatism in the NPT sub-culture (O'Neill and McCarthy 2012). Data and intelligence products from 'above' appear to define crime control problems, such as the case of TAP – an area of proactive policing that is produced from data that is collected both from the neighbourhood and by NPTs, but is analysed above the NPT level.

163

Sergeants occupy a crucial position in the NPT structure from which to internally influence change and negotiate new NPT practices, as the agenda of an NPT is influenced by sergeant's views of NP work. In this study, sergeants were influenced by the promise of new crime analysis technologies, scientifically approved/improved practices, and measurable outcomes. A more crime control oriented view of NPT work combined with their managerial discretion could lead to significant changes in NP in the future. However, a competing narrative of NPT work could also face resistance from the lower ranks and the 'new' dominant view of NP.

Changes to the socio-economic environment influence police to think in new ways about how they perform their work, and eventually this could lead to individuals within NPTs enacting change. Ideas are produced and reproduced by different actors – sometimes from higher up in the organisation, sometimes from broader discussions in the policing field and between colleagues. Ideas, rhetoric, and narratives filter through organisations with varying levels of effect. Reforms and stories of reform must be made sense of at the street-level, and in NPTs some of the new ideas about NP delivery are gaining cultural currency to an extent – especially where they resonate with narratives of professionalization and efficiency and the stripping away of particular functions that are not viewed as core police work. On the other hand, these ideas and narratives are not accepted unconditionally and are in tension with particular cultural understandings of NP, which increases the likelihood of resistance to new styles of delivery in a way that is quite distinct from the previous findings of resistance in the dominant culture.

6 The Interaction Order of Police Community Meetings

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the austerity-era delivery of community engagement by neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) at public meetings and explores the interactions between police and community members during this type of encounter. This exploration is undertaken with a view to understanding how stories of reform in the austerity era and the police-community interactions affect police delivery of community engagement. To be successful, police organisational reform relies, to some extent, on street-level practitioners understanding and accepting new policy rhetoric if it is to become policy in practice (for example, Chan 1997; Skogan 2008; Loftus 2009). The previous chapter explored how police make sense of NP work and how they understand both recent and upcoming change programmes in West Midlands Police. It noted that stories of demand management/reduction were often used to negotiate reforms that signalled a departure from the previous organisation of local policing work. How, then, do these stories and understandings play out in the arena of police-community engagement activities? How is the delivery of community engagement affected by these understandings of organisational change?

Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings bring police from NPTs, residents of the same neighbourhood, and occasionally other public officials and partners together for face-to-face encounters. These encounters are designed to provide a forum for local communities to raise any local issues of public safety and crime, oblige police and partners to prioritise community concerns, and hold local police and officials to account at regular intervals[43]. The main function of community engagement under the NP model is to ensure that the police are responsive to the community-defined problems that most impact a sense of local security (Skogan and Hartnett 1997), as well as to provide strategic interactions and collaboration with those communities that have critical security needs (Innes 2006). Community engagement through these meetings also contributes to the democratic aspirations of community policing, by providing forums for participation and deliberation that rebuild trust and social capital, even if the consultation format is somewhat flawed in practice (Bullock and Sindall 2014; Hughes and Rowe 2009; Gilling 2007).

---

[43] The Policing and Social Responsibility Act 2011 dictates that meetings between local police and residents must be held in each 'neighbourhood' at 'regular' intervals, but does not define 'regular' and allows police chiefs to define 'neighbourhood'.

The existence of events that can be used as tools by local communities to potentially influence local policing priorities raises the possibility that police organisational reform could be constrained by such a mechanism that encourages public control over police decision-making (Foster and Jones 2010), but focusing on the influence of only the community in these encounters ignores not only the police presence, role and action at the event, but also the interaction itself. The presence and role of the police actors at PACT means that communities do not always have significant influence over local police priorities when concerns raised by the community are reframed by police to suit organisational or team objectives or even rejected entirely as issues that are not 'real' police work or are 'unpoliceable' (Hunter and Fyfe 2012; Rousell and Gascón 2014). This exposes a tension between the philosophy and the practice of the community engagement mechanism in neighbourhood policing. The PACT meeting interaction itself, however, is not so easily controlled by police – that is, the way that face-to-face encounters influence the possibilities of police performances and the strategies they use to form an impression of themselves and their organisation (Manning 1997, 40). Looking beyond the outcomes of PACT, the behaviours and restraints to behaviour that form the face-to-face interactions in community engagement can, in theory, influence what types of new relationships can be forged with communities in an era of (attempted) comprehensive reforms to policing. This is where Erving Goffman's understanding of social interaction is useful.

6.1.1 The Interaction Order

The work of Goffman and his ultimate concept of the 'interaction order' provide an analytical apparatus for exploring the police-community interactions at PACT. For Goffman, whenever actors are co-present in face-to-face encounters, where one actor can sense that they are being perceived by another, pronounced behavioural changes occur that "provide evidence of our statuses and relationships" (1983, 3). These behaviours include manner, appearance, and talk, which make up our 'expressive equipment' (Goffman 1959, 32) – the tools we use to express meaning about ourselves in social situations. The fact that these encounters reveal consistent features of social organisation, Goffman argues, illustrates that the interaction order is an 'analytically viable' domain of activity (Goffman 1983, 2), distinct from other domains, such as the 'economic order'. The idea of consistency in the arrangements of this domain across time and space means that the interaction order contains an orderli*ness*:

> I mean to refer in the first instance to a domain of activity – a
> particular kind of activity, as in the phrase, "the economic order."

> No implications are intended concerning how "orderly" such activity
> ordinarily is, or the role of norms and rules in supporting such
> orderliness as does obtain. Yet it appears to me that *as* an order of
> activity, the interaction one, more than any other perhaps, is in fact
> orderly, and that this orderliness is predicated on a large base of
> shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-
> sustained restraints. (Goffman 1983, 5; original emphasis)

This doesn't mean that the order is a "product of normative consensus" as is the case in social order (Goffman 1983, 5), but rather the reasons for maintaining the interaction order are more varied, including the expectations of others' behaviour and an array of cultural assumptions we bring to an interaction – the foundations of the "cognitive relation we have with those present before us" (*Ibid*., 4). Since the interaction order is orderly, with actors tacitly supporting its arrangements to *maintain* it, the order can also be *breached* and *repaired*. Goffman's body of work is dedicated to detailing the ways that these phenomena occur.

Goffman analyses the maintenance, breaching and repair of the interaction order by viewing interaction as a set of staged performances, where actors perform roles that are commensurate with their self-conception. An actor does this because they know that other participants in an interaction – their audience – seek information pertaining to the actor's background, attitude, personal qualities, and so on. This is because:

> Information about the individual helps to define the situation,
> enabling others in advance what he will expect of them and what
> they may expect of him. Informed in these ways the others will know
> how to best act in order to call forth a desired response from him.
> (Goffman 1959, 1)

Goffman names this process, where actors are selective in what they present to others in order to influence perceptions and thus interactions, 'impression management'. Police use presentational strategies to manage public impressions and expectations of police action, capabilities and competence (Manning 1997). These impressions, as part of the interaction order, are maintained through presentational strategies but can be breached by 'expressively incompatible' events (Goffman 1959, 235-236). A more contemporary conceptual manifestation of these kinds of breaches is 'interactional vandalism', which refers to a deliberate breaching of the interaction order where a 'subordinate person breaks the tacit basis of everyday interaction of value to the more powerful" (Duneier and Molotch 1999, 1288). This illustrates the way that breaches

can give people of lower status a kind of pleasure, and simultaneously deprive people of higher status of "the ability to assume in others the practices behind the social bond" and thus a sense of ontological security (*Ibid.*, 1290). In police-community encounters, residents, I will suggest, sometimes deliberately breach the interaction order for the purpose of challenging police presentational strategies and deriving a political benefit.

What can be breached can also be repaired, and Goffman uses a number of concepts to describe different strategies of interactional repair, such as those that fall under the concept of 'face-work' (Goffman 1967). The face metaphor is central to the idea of maintenance, breaches and repairs, where face can be saved, lost or renewed. Similar to the idea of presentational strategies, a performance that attempts to maintain specific impressions is dubbed a 'line' – "a pattern of verbal and acts by which [an actor] expresses his view of the situation and through his evaluation of the participants, especially himself." (Goffman 1967, 5) The line an actor presents should, in order to maintain face, "present an image of him that is internally consistent" and is supported by others (*Ibid.*, 6). The breakdown of a line and the resulting loss of face, an interaction breached, leads to shame and embarrassment. Goffman (1967, 20-22) outlines a number of micro-actions that act as repairing strategies, such as: challenging the misconduct that threatens face and breaches order; giving the offending actor an opportunity to correct or redefine the offence, compensate for it, or castigate themselves; the acceptance of the offender's offering, and; the expression of gratitude from the forgiven offender. Police community engagement work at PACT involves the maintenance and repair of the interaction order by both police and residents, and is carried out for the sake of amiable relations and continued collaboration.

Strauss (1978) has argued that while a focus on the domain of interaction is crucial for understanding resistance to change, viewing group interactions through Goffman's framework emphasises inertia and does not adequately theorise social change:

> Goffman's social order is extremely fragile, its rules subject to disobedience or unwitting breakage, its interaction continuously subject to potential or actual disruption. Manipulation of events, of self, of other's situations, of props, and so on, is a constant feature of that interaction. At most, negotiation serves mainly to maintain that fragile order in some sort of uneasy equilibrium or to reinstate it after its disruption – certainly not to change the features of that

> order, to develop it into something new. Goffman, for the most part,
> seems relatively uninterested in social change. Neither social change
> nor negotiation is central to his thought. (Strauss 1978, 38)

Strauss' concept of 'negotiated order', on the other hand, allows for more agency in the interactions between individuals and collectives, and thus emphasises how individuals and groups "continually make adjustments to the situations in which they find themselves" (Fine 1984, 243). Both Goffman and Strauss recognise that individuals and groups are embedded in social structures – such as organisations, cultures, and history – and constantly perceive these structures within interaction (*Ibid.*). However, Strauss argues that actors constantly negotiate change to "achieve their interests and legitimate their perspectives" (Barley 2017, 348), albeit with the various structural understandings and constraints and the influence this has on the possibilities for negotiation. For police institutional change, this alludes to the potential for change and resistance through interaction, between internal constituents themselves (police-police interaction) or internal and external constituents (e.g. police-community interaction), but highlights the importance of structures and rules for influencing these processes.

6.1.2   Three Neighbourhoods

The following sections compare three different neighbourhood sites (see chapter 3 for information), describing and exploring the interaction order of police community engagement at PACT. In each site, the meetings undertaken in one PACT venue provide the data, and each of these settings has its own distinct atmosphere and recent historical relations between police and community. Two meetings from each venue provide data, and within each story these different meetings are occasionally contrasted with each other to show the effect of time on the development of relations and the consequent effects on the interaction order. Analysing neighbourhoods separately emphasises the importance of the environmental context of NP work.

6.2   *The Bastion of a Reformed Neighbourhood*

> In order to maintain the potential benefit of contacts, officers must
> invest considerable time in a series of 'community contacts' which,
> singly, can hardly be construed as police-relevant at all. (Fielding
> 1995, 92)

Maintaining confidence is a popular rhetorical strategy in the delivery of community engagement, and this was a strong theme in Heathville. The Sergeant was determined to maintain both the delivery of neighbourhood policing in Heathville and the perceptions that the residents had of the team's capabilities. The latter is compatible with the view that effective police work relies on the confidence, trust and cooperation of local communities. Encouraging confidence was a deliberate strategy of the Sergeant in order to preserve the conditions of relative safety that had been achieved in the neighbourhood in recent decades. The surrounding ward and most neighbourhoods in the ward are classified as 'most deprived' in the Index of Multiple Deprivation, both in relation to the country and the metropolitan district. The neighbourhood where I attended the community meeting is no exception. The neighbourhood, and one housing estate in particular, was infamous in the late twentieth century for its high deprivation, crime and incivilities. I was told by one resident, 'Bob', that the notoriety of the local housing estate was such that a well-known television production company sent an even more well-known television news presenter into the estate to film a secret documentary. This, he said, did not end well as the presenter was targeted by locals during his stay and was eventually "chased out of the area".

Since these troubled days, the neighbourhood has been through a positive transformation as crime and antisocial behaviour rates have plummeted. Bob was adamant that these reductions were due to the policing and community safety reforms in the era of the New Labour Government. He also mentioned that Heathville has become even safer due to the good work of the Sergeant and his team since the Sergeant took charge of the NPT five years ago, which is supported by local police recorded crime statistics. It is also a view that was shared by the other attendees of the community meeting, who were very vocal about what a good job the Sergeant has done and how much they appreciate his efforts. In this environment, it might be expected that maintaining confidence is not an onerous task, and this was the reality to some degree. However, when contrasted with the rhetorical strategy of *managing expectations*, it is notable that this strategy is actively pursued in the face of dwindling team resources – to the extent that the Sergeant suggested the quality of service will remain the same regardless of recent reductions in staffing levels and boundary enlargements.

I attended the meeting on the day that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made the announcement in the Autumn Spending Review statement that the policing budget was

to be protected. This followed some weeks of speculation about the level of the next round of cuts to policing, as departments had been asked by the Treasury to model real terms spending reductions of twenty-five and forty per cent by 2019-20 (HM Treasury 2015). The Home Office was one of the unprotected departments, but its fate in the spending review was kept secret from the press and the public and so the eventual announcement was met with surprise in the media and relief across police organisations. This was a concern for NPTs and residents as West Midlands Police had recently announced the impending loss of over four hundred PCSOs from their workforce due to financial pressures (BBC News 2015a). Even following this news, the Sergeant remained cautious, warning the residents that the plan to cut PCSOs might still go ahead so they should be prepared for Heathville to lose resources.

> The sergeant reminds attendees that PCSOs may be lost from the team in line with plans announced by the force. He draws attention again to news today of police budget protection in spending review, and links this to recent terrorist attack in Paris. He says because of this the losses planned for PCSOs are now not totally inevitable but that residents should still be prepared for the PCSO cuts to go ahead. He says that the PCSOs do a great job.
>
> Bob says this would be a shame as he thinks without the PCSOs the team will lack the "eyes and ears" they have now. He asks how many PCSOs and PCs have been lost recently. The sergeant tells him PCs have been lost but there is one more PCSO in the team compared to the recent past.
>
> Harry asks if the force could employ more specials. The sergeant says there is a force wide freeze on special recruitment. He explains that specials have too high of a turnover. Specials join and soon realise they don't want to do the job. He says this also costs the force lots of money in 'kit'.

This sharing of concern and hope for future policing resources and community safety was one sign of the strength of the bonds built in this neighbourhood between the team and these residents[44]. The developing story of the effect of the cuts on the ability of the police to meet local priorities was a common theme across nearly every meeting I

---

[44] They would learn less than a month later that the planned cuts to the PCSO workforce would not go ahead due to the protected budget. (See BBC News 2015b)

observed, and this talk often acted as a show of reciprocal solidarity between police and residents in areas where residents had congenial relations with police.

6.2.1 <u>Cooling the Residents out</u>

Although the consensus amongst the residents was that the Sergeant had been doing a good job in Heathville – a general approval, confidence and trust in his ability and actions – the most striking part of the first community meeting I attended in Heathville came when one resident, Sheena, had to be 'cooled out' by the Sergeant not long in to the meeting:

> Sheena says a neighbour's window was broken during an attempted burglary and she was involved in reporting the incident and witnessed the damage.
>
> "No one came to see me."
>
> She says the Sergeant promised her that she would be visited by him or another team member. She is calm but seems to be upset by this and has her arms folded. The Sergeant shows surprise with wide eyes and raised eyebrows.
>
> "No one came? Really?"
>
> He then apologises sincerely. He explains that one of the PCSOs was told to attend and he thought that the task had been undertaken. He says he is very annoyed that this didn't happen and will raise the issue with the PCSO the next time he sees him.

'Cooling out the mark' is a method of consoling those who are distressed after a discrepancy between expectation and reality - a loss of status leading to humiliation and damage to or destruction of the self. The 'cooler' takes on the role of consoling or pacifying the victim of the loss (Goffman 1952). There were two parts to the cooling out process in this interaction. The first was a simple and sincere apology. The Sergeant knew that this resident's confidence and trust were shaken after this promise was broken. Sheena's expectations of the local service, which had perhaps been set or strengthened by the Sergeant, were high and being visited by one of the team formed part of these expectations. The Sergeant reacted to what Sheena considered to be a serious breach of her relationship with the team with this apologetic gesture, both verbal and in concerned facial expressions, to express an understanding of her

perspective. The second reaction was a promise to follow up on the reasons for this inaction. He identified which team member had deviated from their duties by outlining the action he took after her call to report the attempted burglary, and promised further action. This signalled to his audience that he does not accept deviations from these kinds of duties in his team and that he will discipline team members who fail to take community visits seriously.

From this episode, Sheena could be the type of character that some officers caricatured as a 'Mrs. Miggins' in interviews (see chapter 5); an older lady who is demanding of police service, and who will inevitably lead to more 'rubbish' work – a combination of Manning's (1997, 203) identified caricatures of 'old dears' and 'cows'. The Sergeant's attentive treatment of her, then, is notable in its opposition to the view (whether real or implied) that Sheena's request for police service is a low-priority task for the team, or even the idea that the police should now shed any tasks that are outside the constructed boundaries of the notion of 'core police work' – the kind of tasks that are directly related to reducing crime and protecting people from harm, rather than the broader social tasks. Also absent from this discussion was any suggestion that a reduction in team resources might have contributed to the failure of the PCSO to visit. Austerity was no excuse for this Sergeant. The team were expected to continue to deliver this aspect of police service, regardless of the police organisational talk of reducing 'unnecessary' demand in a time of cuts to the service.

After the meeting and as we were driving back to the station, the Sergeant articulated to me why this episode angered him so much. He prides himself on having built a strong relationship with key members of the community that will continuously engage with his team and form part of the apparatus of co-productive social control, as this cooperation has been one factor in the reform of Heathville. The attendees at the meeting, he said, had continuously participated in PACT and were a productive source of community intelligence. This again reflects one positive perspective of the value of PACT, even at its most mundane. That is to say, maintaining a fruitful relationship with a neighbourhood or community relies on nurturing the bonds of trust between the police team and individual residents. The residents in Heathville have come to expect the level of service that the Sergeant has always promised them, and any deviation risks a rupture in trust. In the opinion of the Sergeant, any such damage to the reputation of his team and himself could result in the retreat of neighbourhood contacts from PACT or the broader network of police-community contact and

intelligence, and the perceived severity of this scenario is commensurate with the sincerity of his apologetic rhetoric and humble demeanour.

6.2.2 <u>Keeping Up Appearances</u>

The Sergeant's reaction to this situation, along with his broader perspective, alludes to a view in which the broad range of police work, including reciprocal relationships with communities and all the mundanities that this entails, is necessarily interconnected to aid the pursuit of police organisational and NPT objectives. Maintaining the confidence of local residents in the ability of NPTs to provide an expected level of service is one presentational strategy that fits with this broad notion of police work, highlighting the strategic value of a continuously amiable relationship with neighbourhood contacts. The Sergeant deployed the kind of rhetoric that assured residents of continued police capabilities in the face of reduced resources a number of times. The following exemplifies how the strategy of maintaining confidence is in tension with the narrow view of 'core police work', especially through the use of encouraging residents to make full use of available state services:

> Sheena interjects with a story about a time she and her neighbours contacted the police after one of her neighbours could not contact a resident whom they feared might have had an accident inside or worse. Eventually they asked the police to check the property. The police arrived and found that the man was fine – he had just been having a shower.
>
> The Sergeant says she and her neighbours did the right thing by taking their fears seriously and ringing the emergency services, and said even with police funding cuts residents should always feel able to call the team if they ever have any suspicions.
>
> "Even with the cuts, we're still catching criminals. Even if we can't prevent a crime, we'll still lock them up."

Whilst it is true that there is an apparent admission by the Sergeant of reduced police capacity to prevent crime, the Sergeant is emphasising continuity: the continued capacity of emergency services to respond to calls; the continued ability of the criminal justice system to detect and apprehend suspects, and follow existing procedures of justice; and the continued conditions in which residents can be 'better safe than sorry' – that is, not having to worry about excessive use of state services.

175

One could question the limits of this rhetoric being delivered in the context of PACT. Those physically present at the meeting may pay attention to such messages, but how much further does this message go? Or perhaps, who is the intended audience and what is the intended effect upon them? Looking at the delivery of this message in isolation, beyond the confines of PACT venues, family, friends, acquaintances or associates might hear the intended message through word of mouth. The extent to which this happens is not evident from my observations, but the Sergeant must accept the possibility that the transmission of this message is limited in reach – it may not be shared amongst all residents in the neighbourhood. A message as significant as the above, which reaffirms the capability of emergency services, would probably reach a bigger audience through different means – leafleting or broadcasting through other forms of publicly available media, for instance. The decision to transmit this message at a PACT meeting could be part of a broader organisational strategy, where a collaborative effort is made to shape public understanding of police capabilities with consistent rhetoric. If this is indeed the case, it again raises the possibility that such a message or its interpretation would be in conflict with one current rhetorical strategy of demand reduction. That is, reassuring the public that they should make use of emergency services no matter how unsure they are of the necessity whilst simultaneously nudging the public to make less use of police services as a dual-approach is contradictory and contains the potential to confuse receivers of these mixed messages.

Regardless of any such existence of a coherent organisational strategy of maintaining confidence in police capability, this form of impression management in the setting of a PACT meeting, with its own limited audience, bears its own symbolic value. Maintaining local confidence in the competence of the NPT and the police and emergency services in general in this setting can also be interpreted as a routine to sustain the existing network of neighbourhood contacts. The Sergeant's perspective on the reciprocal importance of community confidence and the productiveness of community intelligence is, in this sense, revealing of the utility of rhetorical strategies at the neighbourhood level. It is notable that, at this level and especially in a context where the Sergeant takes ownership of the organisation and performance of PACT, the Sergeant has considerable discretion and control over the *dosage* of any prevailing police discourse transmitted to this captive audience. The talk of limited resources and its relation to reduced capabilities was present at the meeting in numerous instances, but when the two competing discourses combine, as in the claim, "Even with the cuts, we're still catching criminals", maintaining confidence is the ultimate

message – it has a higher dosage than any rhetoric that suggests limitations to police capability.

To a researcher well versed in the characterisation of street-level work as 'an implicit tension between resource constraints and the inexorable demands for public service' (Lipsky 1980, 172), the tension between these competing rhetorical strategies is not surprising. It is, however, more noteworthy that this Sergeant, as both street-level practitioner and supervisor, chooses to give precedence to a message that has less salience in current organisational thinking and does not alleviate the burden of high demand on the street-level officers in a time of fewer resources.

The Sergeant also showed equal attention and concern for all issues raised in the meeting. Even when residents referred to incidents that did not necessarily constitute a criminal offence, the Sergeant did not ever signal that he and his team were more or less interested, or that their interest was ordered by a sense of severity:

> Before the conversations peter out completely, Winnie contributes for the first time, raising the issue of loud motorbikes driving past her house. She says that the noise has been bothering her. The sergeant gives this his full attention with his gaze directed at Winnie, and as he does the other conversations wind down and the attendees start to listen to Winnie's issue. The sergeant asks for details and notes these down on the paper in his hand.

Winnie presents this as a quality of life issue rather than one of any law-breaking or potential infringements. There is no information given that clearly demonstrates illegal behaviour. The passage above shows the two distinct ways that the Sergeant conveys his interest in the lives and concerns of the residents. Firstly, his body language signals focus and attention – a very basic way to demonstrate your interest – even as the potential for distraction remains in the form of continuing chatter of the other residents (I say 'chatter' as it was a conversation about the amount of fireworks the residents had heard this year, and did not contain any explicit requests for a police response, nor were they complaining of harm caused by fireworks). Secondly, noting down the details of this incident signals the intention to follow up on the issue – that is, the future use of NPT resources to further investigate the noisy motorbikes. Both gestures show the residents that their attendance and input are appreciated and the NPT are still attuned to all manner of public safety and quality of life issues in the neighbourhood.

Of course, it is not certain that Winnie's complaint is unrelated to criminal behaviour – further investigation could reveal uninsured drivers, for instance – but the determination to treat all issues with equal attention is in contrast with some of the other PACT meetings I attended. Rather than taking the opportunity to remind residents of the NPT's limited capacity, the Sergeant instead reinforces the impression that the residents of the neighbourhood can expect a sustained level of service. Overall, it signals the Sergeant's rigid faith in the priority-setting process of PACT – the kind of equitable responsivity that is commanded from official neighbourhood policing policy documents. This police-led, consumer-focused, playing-it-by-the-book (in the sense that it is orthodox for the era of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme) approach was apparent in the Sergeant's style throughout the meeting. The meeting opened with a presentation on recent crime figures for Heathville before residents were invited to raise new issues. Every issue raised was explored and noted down, and the Sergeant would give preliminary thoughts and advice on what could be done.

The only aspect that I had not considered to be part of an orthodox PACT format before attending was the occurrence and police allowance of unfocused discussion and multiple conversations cutting across the room: For example:

> Mary says that she has also noticed that there was less noise from fireworks during the Halloween and Guy Fawkes Day period compared to other years. Two or three of the other attendees jump in to voice their disagreement. This results in three different conversations starting up across the room on roughly the same topic. The sergeant allows this to continue until the conversations naturally wind down.

There are two observations I make about this phenomenon. Firstly, unfocused discussion was a big enough portion of the meeting to constitute one routine element of the overall ritual of PACT. It did not seem out of place and it felt appropriate in this meeting with its familiar and friendly atmosphere. Secondly, this behaviour could itself be productive in creating a convivial atmosphere that would entice residents – all of a similar age group – to come back for the pleasure of gossiping with other users of the community centre. This fits with the Sergeant's preference for preserving the bonds between residents and police in the neighbourhood, which forms the apparatus for potential community intelligence gathering and the coproduction of safety. Something that builds rapport and draws in the crowd, no matter if not strictly adhering to the primary purpose of PACT, can be beneficial to police organisational objectives (see Fielding 1995, 88-92). However, it is not productive in the orthodox sense of raising

specific issues of community safety and creating actionable priorities for the NPT. This latter point was referred to by PCSOs in Middleton. Their perspective was that the residents rarely raised any issues that were relevant to police work or were actionable as priorities, instead coming to PACT as a social event to have a cup of tea and a chat with friends and share concern about bin bags being dumped on the streets. An approach that is overly relaxed and invites apparently mundane chatter can grate against the more traditional police sense of mission, but allowed in moderation it could help to produce the conditions for fruitful community engagement.

6.3 The Agitators

> Whenever anyone makes a claim against anyone else, any kind of demand on their time and resources, the response is defended in terms of values and beliefs. In the normative debate the claims of society against its members are asserted, and accepted or denied. (Douglas 1994, 43)

6.3.1 Playing to the 'Audience'

The organisation and performance of PACT meetings are influenced not only by street level police agents but also by their biggest audience – those residents who attend the meetings, and especially those that do so of their own volition and take an active role in proceedings. The attendance and participation of residents are also shaped by other environmental factors specific to their neighbourhood, shaping relations between community and police and thus the performance of PACT. A neighbourhood with entrenched problems of crime and disorder, combined with a community affected by and sensitive to these specific forms of social problems, transforms the character of PACT performances and challenges police rhetorical strategies and impression management.

The neighbourhood analysed in this section, Kingston, is close to the city centre, and is an area with high multiple deprivation with a large proportion (over fifty per cent) of ethnic minority residents. The specific microbeat where PACT took place, Princetown, has previously attracted media interest due to the mixture of high unemployment, high welfare payments, and stubborn crime and antisocial behaviour. It also received attention for its association with a rise in gun crimes in Birmingham over the preceding year.

179

The venue for this PACT meeting is the basement of an Islamic community centre in the midst of high-rise and low-rise estates, with a public park across the road. The attendees at the meeting all appear to be of East African descent and of Islamic faith. Later on in the evening the attending PCSO, Richard, admits that, although this is a public meeting, he considers it unlikely for members of other 'communities' to make an appearance. The external and internal settings – physical spaces and their social contexts – of PACT influence the size and characteristics of an audience as well as the issues and perspectives brought by them. The social context of a neighbourhood may control the fears, concerns or hopes of its residents, whilst the existing social infrastructure bears its own capacity to filter civic participation. Community centres and other social infrastructure make convenient venues for PACT meetings, and the police teams and communities that I observed sought out venues that yield higher levels of participation (at the very least, measured in attendance) and do not carry a room booking fee.

Unlike the other community centres in this fieldwork, this venue attracted large numbers of residents from this particular community in the evening. At the first meeting, there were over thirty in attendance. Many attendees appeared to be present as part of their social and spiritual routines – socialising with peers and other families; attending evening prayers – rather than being there purely for PACT. The majority did not speak at the meeting. Children played together at the back of the room.

The large number of attendees influenced the style of the meeting. The furniture was readily arranged by members of the community centre into a conference-style set up, with chairs behind trestle tables at the head of the room for the police, which faced rows of chairs of residents. The other meetings I attended attracted fewer residents, and this allowed for a different set-up; a circle of chairs, sometimes with a table in the middle. The conference-style set up limited unstructured and spontaneous dialogue, with residents generally raising hands or waiting their turn before directing questions or rhetoric towards the police (and other officials) as chair people.

Before the meeting, in a telephone conversation, PC Ben told me that this event was a "community-run" event. This was optimistic as the community effectively resisted PC Ben's encouragement to choose a community chair for the event, regardless of their verbal acceptance of the suggestion that was made every meeting. For example, in the second meeting, this was broached immediately:

> PC Ben opens the meeting, saying that this event is not a 'police-run
> meeting or a Birmingham city council meeting' but instead is for the

> community and therefore he would like them to run the event. He
> says that the community should nominate one person to chair, but
> this won't be done today. I notice a few of the residents nod their
> heads – they seem to be on board with this suggestion generally.
>
> …
>
> PC Ben says that "it is important that the agenda is governed by the
> people in this room. We want you to become the tasking group for
> the police in this area."

It was PC Ben's belief, expressed to me after the second meeting took place, that once the community took ownership of the meetings, they would also start to take ownership of the issues that they were bringing to the events. His attempts to change the style of the meeting was thus part of his strategy to *activate* this community as co-producers of neighbourhood security.

6.3.2   False Steps in Forbidden Clothing

Different communities and cultures have different expectations for social order and etiquette – the way that things should be and the way that people should interact, in the world in general and in specific places or situations. An example of the etiquette in this centre, as mentioned above, is the removal of shoes on arrival and in the specified zones. The police that attended the first of these meetings made an instant faux pas on arrival at the centre, as they walked into the carpeted basement still wearing boots.

> [The police] are still wearing full uniforms including stab vests and
> boots. They are asked to remove their shoes as the centre users pray
> on the floor in this room. PC Ben says they will if this is necessary.
> There is a polite back and forth interaction, with some of the centre
> representatives insisting it is not completely necessary if it is a hassle
> for the officers (not all of those who made their preference for
> removing shoes known are involved in this decision), and PC Ben
> removes his shoes. PCSO Richard offers to take them off but
> eventually decides to keep them on, and PC Aliya sits down at the
> end of row A and does not remove her shoes.

If the police and other agencies want to encourage mutual respect, empathy and increase participation in this community, such a faux pas could jeopardize the

181

impression of the team (Goffman 1959, 204), and hence disrupt relations and increase social distance. Some of the attendees express that they would appreciate police following the culturally defined conduct of the venue. Most of the attendees do not comment, though the room is full and many are observing the incident. However, those that do comment exude a polite and lenient disposition and there is no clear or immediate consequence to the action. They allow the faux pas to pass, and thus save the face of the police. The meeting flows much in the way one would expect for an occasion when one group are holding the other to account. If there is any effect of this scene, it is not obvious or it has only a low-level or internal impact on the attendees. In following meetings police and other council officials continue to wear shoes, but the behaviour is not questioned again by residents, at least not when I am present. It appears that after initial concern about appropriate behaviour and observance of the venue's rules, an exemption for these outsiders is tacitly accepted.

To me as a third-party observer, the scene signalled an unwillingness of officials to uphold cultural rules and respect their meanings. There are possible practical reasons for the police to both keep on and remove their shoes – for the police, they might be worried about loss or damage; they might want to be prepared to make a fast exit from the building for some reason; for the community, wearing shoes in a place of prayer is unhygienic and potential sacrilege – but it is notable that the police prioritised their own convenience over both the situational etiquette in itself and the practical basis for this etiquette, which is explicitly verbalised within the exchange. Beyond this interpretation of convenience, police dress and appearance is also communicative of authority, and police in different areas sometimes chose to remove parts of their official dress or equipment at PACT meetings. As this meeting was more formal (in tone and in room lay-out), formal and authoritative signals were more appropriate, whether intentional or otherwise. It felt somehow appropriate that this *unfocused interaction* – non-verbal, communicative gestures in face-to-face interactions – set the scene for further conflicts between police and community.

6.3.3   Blame and Negotiation

Tense relations were apparent even before proceedings began. At the first meeting, three men did most of the talking. One of these men, Imran, spoke with me before the meeting commenced:

> One resident, 'Imran', approaches me as I am sat down to have a
> chat. I ask whether he has attended many meetings with the police

before and he responds by telling me that he has but the police do very little for their community. He and the community have raised issues with them many times before but the police seem to excuse themselves from dealing with their concerns seriously. He says that they often use the phrase, "we have to prioritise our workload", which he interprets as a way to brush off their concerns. He says the community feel ignored by the local police team. He speaks strongly and articulately, with determination and what sounds to me like resentment.

This was the first sign that the relationship between police and attendees was not as harmonious as I had witnessed in other neighbourhoods. The community believed that crime and disorder in Princetown were serious enough to warrant strong police action, but that the local police had ignored them and made excuses. The phrase "we have to prioritise our workload" is a direct reference to finite resources, but the more vocal residents, at the very least, did not accept that the police lacked the capacity to deal with issues that were vital to a satisfactory level of security and quality of life.

This critical stance was a consistent theme in this meeting. Just a couple of minutes after the meeting starts, Majid, the first resident to speak, sets this tone.

Majid speaks first, telling the officers that the community have had problems recently, and that people will want to raise concerns both generally in front of the room and privately. He speaks loudly, clearly and with a level of articulacy that makes his words sound rehearsed. PC Ben responds with general comments about the recent calls they have been receiving that relate to this area, which are mostly related to the behaviour in an around the high-rise estates, such as people "hanging around on the stairwells", fighting and drug taking. He says that these are not just issues for the police and that other agencies have a responsibility to help in these areas too. He says that some understanding is needed for non-criminal behaviours as well, and they should "remember that some of them are your neighbours", suggesting that the attendees need to consider the maintenance of their relationships with the wider community. PC Ben goes on to point out that the policing team have recently, in partnership with the local premier league football club, set up some new engagement

schemes for younger people – football and boxing clubs with classes – that is aiming to divert young people from deviant public activities.

Majid speaks again and says that the issues that generally concern people are related to their safety. He says that many of them do not feel safe when people are drinking alcohol in public places. He thinks that the area is safer than it once was, and appreciates the effort of the police, but that local parents are still very worried for their families, especially about the park and the area in front of the row of shops across from the high-rise estates.

Majid took on the role of a spokesperson for the community, summarising their problems, fears, limitations and reliance on police intervention in local issues of security. He fulfilled this position competently, speaking articulately and forcefully, standing as he delivered his monologue, as if well rehearsed and addressed to the general rather than specific audience. This was the start of a prolonged rhetorical battle between the resident speakers and the PC. The former consistently demanded that the police use their position and powers to solve local issues, whilst the latter argued that the community needed to do more to help make Princetown safer.

The next passage again exemplifies this rhetorical struggle:

Majid says he was also attacked not so long ago by a big group of people. He managed to fight them off without sustaining any serious injuries. He said the police were informed but only one of the perpetrators were ever caught, and this makes him worried that the police are ineffective at tracking down offenders. PC Ben says he spoken with Majid about this incident before, and that he can't discuss the specifics of this case now but that Majid makes good points about the area. He says that if Majid wants more done he needs to think about whether he can offer any more assistance to the police, such as whether he would recognise the individuals or whether he has seen them again since the incident, and speak with the police privately.

Majid's story again criticises the police, this time for their limited capability to detect perpetrators of local offences and the consequences for the community's security. He is prepared to fight off attackers and to report the incident, but that is the limit of his capability and thus his responsibility as an individual. The implication is that there are

clear, delimited roles for both him as an individual, resident or community member and the police as agents of the state. The explication is more direct – *work harder and make us safer*.

Majid identifies the risks of his community and blames a lack of *situational protection* – related to the type of blame Douglas describes as attributing misfortune 'to *the work of individual adversaries*' (1994, 5; my emphasis). Rather than just highlighting the immorality of the perpetrators, the focus of the blame is placed on the situation that allows adversaries of the community to commit offensive acts. Part of this situation is the inaction of capable allies, and so the lack of protection provided is a normative issue. In Majid's view, the police have the capacity, knowledge and responsibility to protect them from risk. Criticism of the police is therefore warranted on an ethical level when they fail to eliminate risk.

The PC's response to this is the reverse of Majid's rhetoric of blame. Rather than the police being at fault for inaction and thus insecurity, the PC argues that, due to the inherent limitations of the police, the community are bound by a responsibility to provide greater assistance to the authorities. In this interpretation it is the community who hold the power to eliminate risk and produce public safety, and by extension the obligation to achieve this through measures such as collating and communicating information to the neighbourhood policing team. This normative logic, similar to Garland's 'responsibilization' (1996), sits comfortably with the rhetoric and economic logic of 'demand management', and so can be read as one strand within the organisation's presentational strategy.

Later in the meeting, the debate re-emerges but with more explicit reference to police capability and the impact of limited resourcing:

> Majid says that the residents want to feel that they are safe in their own area. They don't want to be in danger, but neither do they want to police the area themselves in absence of effective policing by the state. He says that the policing resources given to the area are not enough to deal with these problems, but he does believe that the team can be more present on the streets than they are currently. PC Ben says the team were patrolling the area today and moved on some people who were upsetting locals. He says this patrolling is routine, although it is not every single day. He agrees with Majid that their team is small for the area.

Again, Majid reaffirms the community's expectations of the state to create safety in light of the limited responsibility of community members to police the neighbourhood themselves. What is different this time is an offer of conciliation through empathising with the difficulties of policing a troubled area with limited resources – compromise as a tactic of negotiation. For Majid, the issue of resources was a mitigating factor for the team, but it did not negate his substantive criticism. Neither did it increase the desire of the community to take matters into their own hands, explicitly signalling that they place responsibility for controlling these problems with the police. This is where the offering ends, as Majid reasserts his belief that the police are capable of more. The PC sustains his defence with an example to contradict the specific point of criticism, but he also makes a concession with the admission that patrol is not an everyday activity and that resources for the neighbourhood are relatively low. This signals that there is common ground between the two parties on which consensus can be made and compromise reached, but still maintains the overall police perspective that the team are limited in their capabilities to control entrenched problems of crime and disorder even when performing the work that is desired by the community.

6.3.4   The Offering

The police and residents employed the same rhetorical strategies in the following meeting, but there were new developments. The most significant catalyst for these developments was a tangible offering from the police of a proposal to implement a Public Space Protection Order (PSPO) – a recently legislated power to restrict continuous activities that have a "detrimental effect on the quality of life" (Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s59(2)(a)) in a specified area. The potential use of this instrument would, according to the police, help to alleviate the community-identified problems that caused the most concern. A lot of the feelings of insecurity and anger were caused by groups of people drinking alcohol in public places, as this was perceived by some residents as a driver of other, more serious acts of violence and intimidation. This excerpt illustrates some of the intensity of feeling around the issue:

> …Imran raises an issue of people drinking alcohol on the streets. The
> area is an Alcohol Free Zone, and Imran says that although there are
> stickers up all over the area, including on shop windows, people are
> still congregating to drink, especially outside the row of shops, and
> causing trouble. He says the police have to take this seriously

because there is a breakdown in order and this is emboldening people to commit other crimes.

"This behaviour is the cause of crime. The police know about it but nothing has been done."

Imran is visibly angry and shouts these comments to front. His body language is very animated, with arms waving up and down and sometimes pointing at the officers. PC Ben remains calm. He nods slightly when listening and responds to Imran by saying that he knows this has been raised before. Before he can add anything else, Imran continues with no sign of a change in temperament. "The convenience store is the source of the issues. They are selling drink to underage people." PC Ben, remaining placid, says that the team have been dealing with this issue, adding the qualified concession, "Maybe we can do more, but we haven't had any calls about it."

"No one trusts you to do anything about it. They won't call," Imran replies.

Usman, who is much calmer, voices agreement with Imran. He asks the police what they think about this situation, because it is a continuous problem for the community. Imran does not give PC Ben time to answer. He says that the drinkers and perpetrators of the criminal behaviour are cowards and that the police just need to deliver a harder response to show the perpetrators who is in charge. He thinks the behaviour will stop if the police do this, and it will prevent more serious acts as well.

"The law is on your side. Do something about this and the people will be on your side too."

The issues of groups congregating outside the convenience store and in the park, those groups drinking alcohol in these places and the signals of insecurity sent out by these actions constituted the central and most mentioned concerns at each PACT meeting in this neighbourhood, and the above demonstrates that the relationship between this community and police is influenced by the existence of the issues as well as the perspectives on the causes of and the police responses to these problems. The community perspective – espoused in almost complete unison by residents – was that

significant blame lay with the police for using neither their analytical capabilities to understand the criminogenic influences nor their legal powers to alleviate and eliminate the deviant and criminal acts.

The negotiation hinged on a 'catch twenty-two' situation where the community perceived that the police would not respond to their concerns and so did not 'trust' them enough to call for assistance, and where the police claimed that they could not respond to these concerns due to the lack of reporting. Imran's call for the police to act first in order to get the community 'on their side' suggested a way to break this cycle that would be commensurate with the community's construction of blame, whereas PC Ben asked for more reporting from the community.

The work done on the PSPO proposal between the first and second meeting was a compromise that showed to the community the police's willingness to *do something* to contribute to a solution for the community-identified problems. The community had called in part for harsher enforcement measures and the potential implementation of the instrument was one way the police could satisfy this demand. Rather than back down fully on his own perspective of blame on the community for the lack of police action, PC Ben qualifies this new development with renewed calls for the community to take responsibility for their area, linking this to the PSPO proposal as well as other neighbourhood issues:

> [PC Ben] says that the team need to justify the need for a PSPO to be used in the area to the council, but he is concerned that the success of implementing the order could be hampered by the lack of calls to service the team get in the area. He says that the lack of calls is troubling considering that both he and the community are very aware of the kind of problems in the area. Imran says that it is not surprising because the local people do not have faith in the police and therefore don't call them when they witness incidents. PC Ben says that he accepts this, but the situation is difficult because the distribution of police resources is based on the number of reports of offences. He again addresses the room imploring them to call the police whenever they witness any incidents.
>
> "If anything happens, call the police. We will do our best to come."
>
> PC Ben reminds the audience that they have other responsibilities and issues to deal with in the area, not just those that the community

have mentioned, such as call outs to the tower blocks and work with schools. He gives an example of the kind of work they do that will positively impact those that live in the estates, where the police work with the council and tenants to remove neighbours that cause continuous problems.

If the announcement of the PSPO proposal was intended as a tactic to soften the community dissent and move the dialogue on to a new place, it was only partially successful. After the proposal was made and maps of the proposed geographic area to be covered were handed out to residents by PCSO Richard, the regular speakers Majid and Imran did refer to the plan, though these comments ranged from inquisitive yet sceptical (Majid) to explicitly critical (Imran):

> "We know that you're trying to do your best for us, but the people here do not feel safe. We don't want to be confronted in the street or our children to be in danger in their own neighbourhood. If this thing [the PSPO] happens for real, will it turn things around?" says Majid. "I can smell drugs every time I go to the shop. The CCTV still doesn't work so no one can stop them. The streetlights on [local street] aren't working, and a friend of mine was attacked there just last week."

> He says that the community want the police to give them a timeframe for when the PSPO will be established and then give them an idea of when the violence will stop. He is still polite but firm in his speech and demands.

> …

> [Imran] asks why they need a new power like this when ASBOs do the same thing. [He is not aware that ASBOs no longer exist and no one corrects him] He says that the issues won't stop and the police have to address the causes. "You need to get to the source of the issue."

> Although Imran appears visibly agitated, his speech becoming faster and louder the longer he talks, PC Ben responds very calmly. He attempts to reject the idea that the police can tackle the causes of the problem, instead saying that the police are only there to enforce

189

the law. "We're limited in what we can do unless there is an offence."

All the central actors employed repetition of the points that constitute their *line*. The continued presence of these repeated phrases and arguments illustrated that no significant compromise to the line had been made as explicit demands had not been met, and therefore the negotiations had not made progress. The maintenance or alteration of the line could in this sense function as a gauge of how far negotiations had progressed. PC Ben maintained his position that the community were still obliged to do more, in order for his offering to be validated. Majid and Imran made the police aware that their position remains the same regardless of the new development, largely because the development was hypothetical, not yet resulting in changes to their sense of security. Nevertheless, there were signs that the unified position of the residents was starting to change, or soften.

Unlike Imran's wholly critical position and intensifying anger, Majid was composed, showed interest in the proposal and wanted to know more details, signalling that he was receptive to the idea in theory. Shortly after the above interaction, Imran's anger grew further still and resulted in a heated argument with Rochelle – a Housing Manager employed by the council – in which Imran made an accusation that the present officials did not act because they did not have a personal stake in the neighbourhood:

> The Acting Housing Officer, Rochelle, suggests that she can arrange a meeting between the council housing staff to discuss the problems of crime and disorder taking place in the local park.
>
> Imran takes issues with this, saying that he has called the council before about the condition of the park and nothing was done. "It's the dirtiest it has ever been. It's filthy." He is visibly angry, shouting his comments louder now than I have witnessed before. Pointing towards the officials at the front, he makes a more personal accusation.
>
> "If you lived here and your kids played there, you'd do something about it. You would!"
>
> Rochelle says she'd like to speak with him after, but he turns his face away from her as she offers. Imran gets up from his chair and leaves the room, heading up the staircase to the ground floor.

Personal accusations are a strong expression of blame, and through this Imran maintained the position that the officials could only absolve themselves through action to solve the community-identified problems. There were two usual police (and other official) responses to hostile and angry statements. The first was to simply repeat the counterfactuals commensurate with the line, as PC Ben did in the passage before last, and the second was to offer the chance to speak after the meeting. Not only does the latter provide the opportunity for a break in or end to hostility that publicly contradicts the police perspective, but also, in practice, conversations outside of the meeting format were less heated, intense and accusatory, and more amicable. When the police spoke to Imran after this meeting, the atmosphere was in stark contrast to that in the previous interactions:

> Once the police break free and make their way to the exit, Imran is waiting at the top of the stairs. He shakes their hands and thanks them for coming, and seems almost apologetic about his conduct in the meeting, saying that he doesn't mean to get as agitated. PC Ben brushes it off, saying that it's fine and that the police are here so that the community can "hold us to account".

Rejecting the apology is in a sense *face*-saving, in that the police explicate their acceptance of Imran's performance in the meetings. In other words, they assure him that he is not violating any rules or hindering their own performance, and thus they are able to avoid an encounter that threatens Imran's *face*. This also serves the purpose of signalling that the policing team are accountable to the community and care about their concerns.

Other residents who did not participate in the first meeting went further than Majid's curiosity outlined above, praising the police and revising the dominant rhetoric of blame:

> Faheem then strikes a more conciliatory note, attempting to speak for the room as he says, "We hope that we can all work together from this point to make this place better." PC Ben agrees and starts to make another similar speech about cooperation and reciprocation – "Your future is our future…" – but as he starts the call to evening prayers is broadcasted on the loudspeakers and his words are drowned out.
>
> …

191

> In the second row, Javeed stands and says that the community really
> appreciate the police coming. He tells a story about a time when his
> son was robbed. "The police were fantastic." However, he says that
> in general the community want a lot more support.
>
> "This is a very good community with good people. What we want is
> reassurance from the police. When we had a problem with robbers,
> the police sorted it in a week. But now we need a good plan for the
> troubled youths in the area. We're not blaming you, but we want to
> know how we are going to work together."
>
> PC Ben has his thumbs up and is nodding.

These outbursts of praise were vehicles for conciliation and interactional repair, as Faheem, and less so Javeed, diverged from the line that had been maintained to this late point in the second meeting. The 'audience' performance contained collective expressions of blame, possibly rehearsed and nearly always unified, and the adherence to the team's line signalled discipline and loyalty. These rare slips in the line were an indication that the line (if rehearsed at all) had not been rehearsed well or taught widely enough, thus disrupting the performance. Regardless of the team dynamics of the community, PC Ben revealed his pleasure and approval both verbally – through subsequent statements of police-community reciprocity – and non-verbally – thumbs up and nodding, for example. This is a good sign for him regarding the negotiation, as after largely hostile responses these conciliatory remarks show that community perspective could be 'softening' – that is, converging with the police perspective.

6.4   The Indifferent Neighbourhood

Police attitudes to PACT and the delivery of community engagement through PACT are impacted upon by perceptions of productiveness, efficacy and success. Some police informally judge the value of PACT meetings through measures such as meeting attendance, as well as the quality of contact with the attending residents. The turnout and the overall interest that is signalled by turnout gives police a sense of the value of this kind of engagement activity. Time is precious and activities are prioritised in order to maximise the potential to achieve the defined objectives of the team. The definition of these objectives is formed through numerous sources: police react to calls for service; a mixture of reports, police observation, and community information influence police constructions of the neighbourhood and its security; middle-managers collate and analyse information about neighbourhoods and set tasks based on their analysis.

The neighbourhood Sergeant can choose to monitor engagement activities and make or advise changes as he or she deems appropriate.

The process of building strong and lasting relations with neighbourhood residents and communities can be an arduous and an unrewarding experience for some police. It involves skills of communication, the virtue of patience, the occasional need for creativity, and the chance of failures along the way. These failures can come in the form of lack of community interest, problems with chosen venues, interpersonal differences between police and residents and police fatigue with the processes and lack of outcomes. Notwithstanding the element of chance, different tactics and skills are employed at the discretion of the police in neighbourhood teams, but decisions about where and how to hold PACT can be moderated by the sergeant. Street-level NPT practitioners can shape the approach and style to engagement activities within the constraints of team and organisational objectives, environmental factors (the existing problems of a neighbourhood), and the interaction between police and residents.

6.4.1   Indifference

Maintaining participation in a neighbourhood with no critical or mobilising issues poses challenges for the police. Residents may not be convinced of the need for contact or an on-going relationship with the police, and vice versa. In Middleton, PACT meetings were often poorly attended or attracted no residents, and were occasionally cancelled. The following passage illustrates problems of PACT organisation and participation that may affect on-going police-community relations.

> The venue is a hall that was part of a sheltered housing estate for people over the age of sixty, which is itself nestled in the middle of low-rise housing estates and a primary school. There were no signs of life on the streets outside or on the concourse of the estate. There were no notices or signs of an imminent public meeting, and I could not see an obvious entrance to the hall. I rang the number of the estate manager, which was advertised on a permanent sign, and told her I was here for the police-community meeting.
>
> "Today? We have to have the meetings on Tuesdays now. The hall's been booked out by another person, but I'm not sure if I called the police to cancel their meeting," she explained. "The PCSO might come by soon. Can you see her out there?"

"No," I said. "But I'll wait outside to see if they turn up."

"If you wait for five minutes, I can come and show you into the hall."

As promised, the manager met me at the outer gates and walked me to the hall entrance, which was inside the boundaries of the estate. She showed me the interior of the hall and informed the man using the main room that the police might turn up for a meeting, but that they would not disturb his use of the room.

The manager explained that the meetings were not usually well attended, so the three seats in the corridor would probably be sufficient. The venue had hosted these events for about a year. The earlier meetings were attended by four to five people, and these were local residents from outside the estate. She said the residents of the estate live very sheltered lives and thus had no pressing security concerns, and this was the reason they were not interested in attending the meetings.

"The police will probably stop the meetings soon. You can wait here with a hot drink if you like. The kitchen is just there, so help yourself."

…

PCSO Ellie arrives five minutes before the start of the meeting. I ask about attendance here and she tells me she has tried to increase participation by leafleting the neighbourhood extensively to inform other residents about the meeting, but this had not yet had any effect. She says that residents no longer attend the meeting at this location but other meetings in the area are well-attended.

She adds that the team have recently lost one PCSO and this has hindered their capacity to run meetings in three different locations in the area. The manager asks if she is busy. PCSO Ellie replies that the team are 'swamped with incidents' right now.

The choice of venue has a tendency to shape participation. When residents do not perceive any critical and mobilising issues of crime and disorder, PACT attendees tend to comprise those for whom it is convenient to attend. Meetings at community centres

generally attract users of the same community centres and venues in housing association estates tend to attract internal residents. If, in the latter case, residents lead sheltered lives and rarely leave their residence, this will likely impact upon issues raised and unless the estate has its own security issues then residents may not produce 'actionable' priorities for the police. In the above case, PCSO Ellie has attempted to attract residents external to the estate to this venue for meetings through leafleting, but this had no effect to date[45]. This raises the question as to whether a choice of venue is neutral. That is to say, whilst encouraging participation from insiders, the choice of venue could discourage and effectively exclude the participation of outsiders.

The uncertainty around attendance is a concern for police in NPTs and low attendance is a frustration in light of the competing demands on their time. The NPT sergeant in Middleton told me that the team would keep PACT as long as people were attending and that he is "not certain of [PACT's] value at the moment" – a view also held by some others in the team. The police are aware of the potential each venue has for encouraging or discouraging attendance, to some extent at least. In Middleton, the conundrum seemed to be that residents were generally indifferent to community engagement activities (this was the consensus between NPT staff) and none of the venues guaranteed acceptable or consistent levels of attendance over the period that I was in the field. The inconsistency of attendance along with occasional staff absence and variations in those running each meeting meant that the running, execution and value of PACT in Middleton was unpredictable for both police and residents. This unpredictability was reflected in the eventual decision to cease PACT in one of the three venues – the community centre – due to poor attendance, even though some months before this location was considered to be the best attended and most productive in the view of the PCSOs who ran it.

In terms the value of these meetings, two PCSOs noted that when they took on the running of a new meeting, after the sergeant has assigned them to a new 'micro-beat'[46], the residents appeared to lose interest and participated less, suggesting the importance of building rapport or *familiarity* to the quality of engagements. The PCSOs suspected that residents would turn up primarily for gossip with a familiar officer or PCSO or even just for the tea and cake, fuelling the sense that PACT was more often used as a social gathering rather than a serious partnership against crime and disorder.

---

[45] Other police I spoke with in Middleton and beyond had similar experiences with leafleting.
[46] Micro-beats are divisions of neighbourhoods. If an officer is assigned a new micro-beat, they will attend and run the associated PACT meeting in their new area.

What this appears to highlight is a tension between how and why police and residents use PACT. Residents without mobilising issues form rituals around the comforting aspects of PACT – they may give the police their time, participation and allegiance if certain conditions are met and experience provided. It may not be a coincidence, then, that at one PACT I attended one of the PCSOs tasked with running the meeting forgot to attend (the other was called to an incident). Fortunately, in a show of mutual indifference no residents attended either.

Another aspect of PACT ritualisation is the limited pool of attendees – often referred to by police as 'the usual suspects'. As above, the core groups who attend PACT are sometimes perceived by officers to attend only for the comforts of social interaction, gossip and sometimes consumption of tea and cake. However, the existence of such a group of 'insiders' also has implications for the publicness of PACT meetings. The following describes the second PACT meeting in this neighbourhood, and starts to illustrate the issue of publicness:

> I arrive at 18:45, fifteen minutes before the start of the meeting. The venue is a small, single-storey council building that appears to serve a number of functions; visible from the entrance are a meeting room and laundry room. The building has one main entrance, an 'accessible' entrance that is approached via a ramp, and a tall, metal gate securing entry at the back with a spherical CCTV camera over-looking the back area. The main entrance is a thick, double-glazed door with an electronic key-pad and sensor for key fobs. I cannot see any way to attract the attention, such as a doorbell, of anyone who might be inside. The building appears to be deserted – there are no lights on apart from dim emergency lights in the main hallway – but I knock on the door's glass front anyway. Nothing happens. I wait outside until 19:15. In this time no one else approaches, no sign of any police or curious residents.
>
> …
>
> Once I am on the train, I check the website to see if this publicises the cancellation of the meeting, but the listing is unchanged.

It transpired that the meeting was cancelled as the PCSO tasked with running it was on sick leave. In this case, any usual attendees of this meeting either did not turn up through coincidence, or knew about the cancellation through forms of communication

that exclude online advertising and physical notices on the venue. To put it another way, if a core group attends then the police that run PACT are aware of who these people are, and if a meeting is cancelled then the police may only need to inform the group personally – face-to-face on the beat, by telephone or email. If no outsiders to the core group attend then there appears to be no reason to publicise a cancellation.

Attendance may also be affected by preparation and disorganisation. In the first passage, the manager had double-booked the hall, which not only illustrated a breakdown in communication between police and venue management, but also raised the possibility that residents' attendance could be affected by incorrect information emanating from those outside of the police. At the community centre, a later meeting was also advertised a day earlier by the venue's administration staff. They corrected this two days before the meeting, but, come the day of PACT, only one resident attended, thirty minutes late.

6.4.2   Chatter and Anecdote

When residents with few or no mobilising issues attend PACT and the police allow for an informal atmosphere – through, for example, room-layout, body language, meeting structure and tone of voice – there is a tendency for both residents and police to converse freely and the tell anecdotes. These activities appeared to serve different purposes: filling up time in the absence of or between issues raised; sharing knowledge of techniques and products that prevent victimisation; expressing values about public safety and behaviour; and explaining disorderly or criminal behaviour. Chatter and anecdotes were part of the PACT rituals at many meetings I attended, and in the first meeting I attended at the community centre in Middleton this was a common occurrence.

The PCSOs running this meeting were content with the event being sociable and with residents conversing with each other. The residents knew each other from attending other activities and classes at the community centre, and PCSO Ellie was also familiar with most of the residents and had built good rapport, thus the relations were good and the atmosphere convivial. This was at the beginning of the first meeting, just after the PCSOs had sat down, introduced themselves to any new attendees and asked the regular attendees how they were:

> The room is filled with talk and one of the attendees shows everybody
> a picture of the centre's members on a trip to the set of a popular
> soap opera. The PCSOs seem to know the attendees fairly well,

conversing easily with them and having good rapport. Their speech is informal and friendly. Both PCSOs have open body language, but PCSO Adam has his arms folded. Regardless of this he does not appear too cold or unfriendly.

The PCSOs did not follow a more formal structure of PACT, such as reading out crime figures or some other introductory presentation about police activities in Middleton. Instead, the meeting opened with friendly chatter and small talk. The soft, waiting-room style chairs were arranged into a square, all facing the middle of the room, and this made dialogue between any attendee easier than if the chairs were in rows, conference-style. The centre's staff laid out refreshments on a small table, including cakes and sandwiches, and just behind this table was a kitchen with facilities for making hot drinks. The PCSOs removed their hats, stab vests and jackets on arrival, making their appearance more casual and familiar as opposed to the authoritative and officious signals transmitted by a full police uniform.

The overall atmosphere and style of the meeting meant that conversation was easy and almost constant, and this sometimes resulted in unfocused chatter with different conversations cutting across each other, as the following passage illustrates:

> The attendees talk amongst themselves, with different conversations happening simultaneously. There is a relaxed atmosphere and everybody is speaking together as friends or acquaintances at a social event. The PCSOs do not stop simultaneous conversations from taking place, and do not make any attempt to bring the group into focusing on one speaker at a time.

> The residents then start to discuss a story they have heard about bystanders being hurt due to guns being used in gang-on-gang attacks as well as violence and gang culture amongst youths more generally in the UK, especially London. They draw on these stories and worry that this kind of incident might be more likely in the local area if more guns fall into their hands.

This also shows that, regardless of the apparent lack of focus in outbreaks of chatter, the talk can, and usually did, regain focus on issues of public safety. As in the above passage, these anecdotes may not be directly relatable to the future work and priorities of the NPT – they are not 'actionable' concerns – but they are effective in communicating general fears or hopes for the local area. The chatter also gave an

indication of whom or what the residents blame for rising gun crime in their city ('gang culture') and the absence of blame for others (such as the police). These rituals of storytelling do not produce specific, actionable priorities for the police, but they do communicate the community's values and anxieties. Allowing these unfocused stories to be told maintains the comfort and pleasure of the interaction at PACT.

In this and other PACT meetings, both police and residents often told anecdotes in which the moral was one of individual responsibility to prevent the risk of victimisation, conveniently congruent with the police rhetorical strategy of demand management. Giving crime prevention advice is a well-known function of NPTs and policing more broadly, and this message is well received and repeated by regulars at PACT where police-community relations are amicable. The following discussion that took place at the first meeting illustrates how anecdotes that do not communicate the messages of police rhetorical strategies, or even community values of personal responsibility, are countered or developed by others in order to convert or reinforce the 'moral of the story':

> Steve says that he has seen young people smoke drugs on the bus, and the driver and passengers are too scared to deal with them and tell them to stop or get off the bus. Other residents say this is understandable and they would also tend to not get involved to avoid confrontation. PCSO Ellie explains that drivers are discouraged by bus companies to deal with this kind of behaviour as their insurance is void if they leave the cabin. She says they can use the emergency button instead though.
>
> One resident shares a story in which a bus driver was stabbed for standing up to someone on the bus. PCSO Ellie again says that this is why bus drivers should stay in their cabins. PCSO Adam says, "You have to look after number one." He says that even PCSOs are not in a position to deal with people who represent a risk as they do not have the protective kit to be safe from injury or the powers to use necessary force.
>
> …
>
> Margaret tells them "You should have something more to protect yourself", not just their radios. PCSO Adam says that they always risk assess every situation and their sergeant never expects them to put

themselves in danger, and instead to be "risk free". He also says that they travel in pairs where possible and especially in certain areas and during more risky times or periods.

The ritualised nature of PACT in areas without mobilising issues, involving the comforts of chatter or value-laden anecdotes, appears to be comforting and appealing for residents. Whilst some police take the view that the presence of these core groups may have strategic benefits, for many police a regular crowd of attendees who come for social reasons rather than to contribute to police goals is frustrating. In the first meeting, it was clear that PCSO Adam noticed what appeared to be the residents' indifference or lack of involvement in the serious work of PACT, slipping out of character when residents overstepped what he saw as their role as good participants in the PACT process:

> In the middle of this conversation, the residents start to stand up and either walk to the kitchen or leave the meeting. Some are talking amongst themselves. As the PCSOs finish speaking to Margaret about the tall bush, PCSO Adam says, in a voice not loud enough for residents currently engaged in conversation to hear, "I guess that's it then."

Moments later, Steve verbally confirmed the police suspicion that PACT is more a social event than productive work that contributes to the police mission:

> PCSO Ellie says that they will be back next time, and that residents will be informed of the time and date by the community centre. Steve smiles and says, "It's good to have a natter, isn't it?"

6.5   Conclusions

This chapter has explored the interactions that take place at PACT meetings in the West Midlands. Three case studies were presented to highlight the impact of the neighbourhood context on the delivery of community engagement and the variation in NP work. Police come to PACT with understandings of the organisation of police work and the effect of institutional change on this work, and this feeds into the impressions they give of themselves and their teams through *rhetorical strategies* – the verbal expressions that support their *line*, the overall presentational strategy. Police at PACT make use of two rhetorical strategies that are, at times, in tension with each other.

Maintaining confidence is a strategy of promoting police competence, used to reassure communities that the police will continue to provide the level of service that the community expects, despite falling resources. To maintain this line, police must persuade residents of its veracity. If residents are not convinced, they question or refute the line by citing incidents where local police action does not live up to community expectations and, in so doing, they breach the interaction order. Once breached, repair work must be undertaken to avoid the destruction of the interaction – a point of no return, the loss of status. This repair work can take a number of forms, such as cooling out residents whose confidence has been shaken through an apology or refuting claims of deliberate inaction or ineffectiveness. If police attempt the latter, however, some concession or understanding of the residents' point of view is also face-saving – it maintains the interaction order by avoiding too strong a contradiction, and signals that the police believe residents to be sincere in their concerns and beliefs.

The rhetorical strategy for *reducing demand* was used to change public perceptions of the extent of police capabilities. This was supported by the prevailing economic, political and organisational climate, and police drew on this strategy to redefine their relationship with the communities at PACT. They did this by citing the tasks they could no longer do to the same extent as before the austerity-era, such as patrolling, and emphasising the increasing obligation of residents to take more responsibility for issues of neighbourhood security. This was in tension with the *maintaining confidence* strategy because the rhetoric is sometimes contradictory when considered through the lens of public expectations of police responsibility and capability. Whether or not the community accepted this line, when it was deployed, was dependent on the expectations and local security concerns of the residents. Those residents that challenged the line were deliberately attempting to breach the interaction – to vandalise the impression the police were trying to maintain.

The concept of interactional vandalism is useful for this particular phenomenon at PACT because it highlights the uneven relationship between police and certain communities at PACT, and how breaching is carried out for normative or political purposes. When residents shout angrily at PACT meetings – when they strongly blame the police for inaction or accuse public officials of indifference to entrenched problems of crime and disorder – they are challenging the current order and negotiating social change by disrupting the line. Strauss (1978) suggests that Goffman's view of social order does not pay sufficient attention to the ubiquity of negotiations in interaction and their impact on social change, and data presented in this chapter supports the

idea that some breaches are deliberate negotiations for new interactional arrangements. Yet the conservative effect implied by Goffman's interaction order is still present at PACT, as there is constant interactional maintenance through repetition of rhetoric, the building of rapport and convivial relations, and the rituals of gossip and anecdotes. Attempts to reconfigure the relationship between police and community in the austerity era will need to take account of both police and community expectations and the effects these have on face-to-face interactions.

Overall, the tensions in performing community engagement activities reveal the issues for maintaining the responsive approach of NP. Attending community meetings is difficult due to dwindling resources, but also difficult to neglect when faced with community expectations in face-to-face settings and the traditional presentational strategy of maintaining confidence. The normative order of an interaction is difficult to shift when police or residents are not in agreement, but actors attempt this by breaching the interaction order through a variety of means – shouting, storytelling, blaming, persuading – all things that will disrupt the rhetorical strategies and the line – seeking out repairs to this breached order that will result in a set of normative arrangements that are more beneficial or acceptable. Through maintenance, breach and repair, actors negotiate the order they want at PACT – an order they think is necessary to create impressions commensurate with their self-conceptions but also to enable arrangements that they believe enable a route to meeting collective goals.

7   Discussion and Conclusions

7.1   Introduction

This research set out to explore the reforms to NP delivery in the austerity era by utilising a mixed methods research design. The conditions created by the financial crash of 2008 led to political, economic, and fiscal changes that posed significant challenges for police institutions. Decades of increasing investment in policing ended and a new era of disinvestment begun, with overall police spending falling by 14% in real terms between 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 (Crawford et al. 2015). In recent years, overall police funding has started to rise again due to increases in some funding streams, such as money raised through the precept, but the central government grant has remained flat and with an increasing proportion directed to 'national priorities' rather than the priorities of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) (NAO 2018). As some police organisations are more reliant on central funding than others, the impact of cuts to the central government grant is unevenly distributed (Crawford et al. 2015). The recent rises to police funding also do not bring overall funding back to the levels enjoyed in 2010, with a 19% real terms fall between 2010/2011 and 2018/2019 (NAO 2018). Clearly then, the impacts of policing disinvestment are still being felt whether or not austerity measures have finished, and therefore the character of the political-economic environment of the austerity era arguably remains.

The austerity era, which includes austerity measures that directly impact police funds as well as the broader social impacts of falling investment in other services, is both a backdrop to this study of policing reform and a potential direct influence in how reforms are created, justified, and implemented. This direct influence can be observed in the macro-level restructuring and political rhetoric that accompanies it, as well as some of the stories of the NP role, reform and change that are told by police institutional actors. Structural change has an influence on the complex mechanisms and dynamics of police reform, and it is these processes that are a central focus of this thesis. The influence is not determinative but the reality of disinvestment can both constrain action and be used to justify or explain action. Of course, other changes in society can also have a similar impact on these processes and the policing field in general, and this study is not blind to other environmental factors, stable or unstable. Nevertheless, the austerity era is characterised by significant political and economic shifts and the potential for institutional transformation. As a resource-intensive policing programme that relied on a ring-fenced funding pot, the Neighbourhood

Policing Programme (NPP) was vulnerable to reforms in an era of disinvestment and therefore this study is a timely exploration of NP delivery in the post-NPP context.

The mixed methods research design I employed enabled a more comprehensive picture of the broad phenomena of NP delivery reform and change across different levels of the institution to emerge. The idea of 'levels' of the institution is a convenient way of showing empirically how change processes operate in police institutional macro-structures, culture, rhetoric, and street-level interactions. The quantitative phase revealed a fall in the NP workforce across England and Wales and analysed some of the motivations for these emerging models of NP and 'local policing'. A typology of NP workforce change was produced that interpreted the effects of these new directions and noted the implications for the future of NP delivery. This typology also facilitated the design of the qualitative phase of the study, guiding sampling choices and tailoring research methods to the particular structural changes in the West Midlands. The qualitative phase produced a deeper account of the reform processes within NPTs in WMP. The interviews focused on the impact of new institutional environments on NP delivery in WMP and the police stories of roles, reforms, and change. Observations of community engagement delivery through meetings explored how police-community interactions mediate NP delivery in the context of the austerity era. These diverse research methods all explored reform and change processes at different levels of the institution and in different domains, but it is a contention of this thesis that they are all linked by the ideas of NP delivery, reform and change that are referred to in institutional stories.

This chapter will first provide a brief summary of the findings from the different phases of the fieldwork to show these processes of change, mediation, and resistance within these separate domains. Triangulating these findings at the different levels of the institution involves theorising the connections between these change processes, and the second section of this chapter will discuss the findings in reference to the theories and concepts of institutional change and police reform.

7.2   *Summary of research findings*

7.2.1   Macro changes and new approaches

The quantitative phase of the research established that austerity measures combined with shifting policy agendas correlated with a *disproportionate decrease* in the PCSO workforce in England and Wales – that is, the PCSO workforce percentage decrease was larger than operational police officers. The disproportionate loss of PCSOs signals that

most police forces in general may be moving away from the neighbourhood security function and towards a crime management function. Across the 43 territorial police forces, a variety of approaches to workforce changes can be identified. Analysis of the data showed that forces fell into three broad categories of PCSO workforce change, each signalling different intentions and implications for NP delivery:

1. Weakened NP – where forces had high and disproportionate reductions in the PCSO workforce, signalling a move away from the NP delivery model and neighbourhood security functions.

2. Proportionally maintained NP – where forces reduced the PCSO workforce, reductions were roughly commensurate with funding reductions, but the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce remained stable. This category contains the most variation between forces, with some likely able to maintain their provision of NP delivery and others likely needing to adapt their approach due to higher reductions.

3. Strengthened NP – where forces increased the number and proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce. These changes signal a continuation of and intentional support for NP structures and delivery.

It is notable that the more autonomous devolved governance structures in London and Wales were associated with the most extreme changes to PCSO workforces at either end of the spectrum. The MPS, for example, quickly established a new model that was less reliant on PCSOs compared to their previous *Safer Neighbourhoods* model. This 'radical reorganisation' of policing delivery (MOPAC 2015, 2) was supported by MOPAC as a way to implement the priorities of the Mayor of London's Police and Crime Plan 2013-2016 – namely the priority to increase the presence of police constables in London (MOPAC 2013). In Wales, the increase in PCSO resources was a direct result of the Welsh government's support for the NP model and a new grant to fund 500 more PCSOs across Wales (Lowe et al. 2015). Although politics were not a clear influence in changes across all forces, these cases showed that political ideation did play a role in some reforms.

The reduction of the central government grant was too large for police institutions to absorb costs without reducing the operational workforce. The employment of PCSOs for NP delivery was in part funded by the NPF and this expired in 2013, effectively terminating the NPP by removing an essential programmatic element. The fragmentation of NP and other local policing approaches brings to an end the (attempted) harmonisation of NP delivery that was promoted by the NPP and is

consistent with the retreat of central government from police governance and its strategic role in NP delivery. This means that police institutions are no longer expected to follow a pre-structured NP model and are instead free to either continue with the previous model or design a new one. Due to the localist agenda that underpinned the reforms to police governance, it is now at the discretion of the PCC to financially support NP or invest in other models or priorities.

7.2.2   Police accounts of Neighbourhood Policing organisation and reform

Additional to the clear divisions in the approaches to structural reform of NP delivery, there are also competing stories of NP delivery and reform in the individual accounts of NPT operatives in WMP. Chapter 5 provided a snapshot of the organisation and delivery of NP in WMP through these accounts. Alongside organisational reform programmes were both stories that supported reform efforts and those that disputed the institutional reform narratives, including the policy decisions and the justifications and motivations for change. At the street-level, the latter was the dominant narrative of the study's participants, reflecting an emerging cultural orientation of police that undertake neighbourhood security functions in NPTs. The pro-reform stories reflected a disposition towards crime control and greater rationalisation of NP delivery, and this supports the institutional agenda of demand reduction and the broader policing agenda of professionalization.

This dominant sub-cultural narrative relates to the value of NP as a specialised arena for the delivery of neighbourhood security through utilising 'soft' policing tactics and skills. For police with these views, change is understood as inimical to the functioning of NP in delivering a good service to communities. They are somewhat critical of the emerging narratives of reform to NP delivery, which do not reflect the values they ascribe to NP, instead focusing on the efficiency of demand reduction and technology. The other narrative centres largely on professionalization and the control and reduction of demands on police time. This view broadly promotes the idea of a redefinition of NP delivery in order to realign police work to a narrower set of police functions. Although this narrative did not appear to be the dominant one in this study's sample, sergeants, who are significant and influential actors in the NPT as a social grouping, keenly took up ideas around professionalization of delivery.

Although the tension between these two narratives alludes in part to the paradigm of crime management and neighbourhood security – sometimes referred to as the 'hard' and 'soft' policing dichotomy – respondents tended to view the main impact of

austerity as a reduction in the capacity to be proactive, rather than a complete devastation of the neighbourhood security paradigm. Elements of NP delivery and rhetoric in WMP are stable. Although geographical boundaries grew and resources shrank, the NPT structure remained and police understood their teams to be performing neighbourhood security functions as a primary objective. However, performing these functions routinely had become difficult due to abstractions to other teams, especially Response Teams.

Furthermore, NP delivery is influenced by geography and situational demands of the neighbourhood and its residing communities. Police interpret their neighbourhood setting – its character, problems, and the demands and participation of communities – to make sense of and organise NP work. The community engagement function was another mechanism of NP that continued to be delivered through PACT meetings, but even where meetings were poorly attended and police were sceptical of the value of such meetings there were few signs during the fieldwork phase that NPTs would retreat from these meetings completely. This illustrates that changing routines may be challenging where this work is based on established policing tactics that are valued by some police, partners, and communities. Rather than reforms resulting in a clear direction of change, NP shows both unintended continuities and changes. Police accounts of NP delivery and the social organisation of NP in WMP represent much continuation of earlier themes in policing research, and therefore some level of police institutional continuity is apparent.

7.2.3   Community engagement in the context of austerity and narratives of change

Drawing on observational data, Chapter 6 focused on the delivery of community engagement in PACT meetings, exploring police interactions with communities and other partners in the context of the austerity era and contemporary reform agenda in WMP. The main finding was that police use rhetorical strategies in PACT meetings to manage impressions of NP delivery and the capacity of NPTs in the austerity era. The competing narratives of policing reform noted in Chapter 5 were observed in the delivery of community engagement at PACT meetings. These narratives are used as practical strategies to account for local police (in)action.

The rhetorical strategy for maintaining confidence is used to create impressions of competence, to keep residents confident in local police, and to keep communities engaged with community engagement activities. NPT operatives make claims that the NPT can continue to deliver the level of service that communities expect, regardless

of cuts to the police and reductions in NPT resources. The rhetorical strategy for reducing demand attempts to control the impressions of the extent of police capabilities to maintain expected levels of service in a neighbourhood. This is deployed as an attempt to (re)define the relationship between police and communities through police-community communication at PACT meetings.

The effectiveness of these strategies is related to communities' acceptance or refutation of the police definition of their own capacity and abilities in the austerity era. Accepting the police line maintains the interaction order of PACT, and signals a willingness of communities to participate in community engagement on police terms. PACT meetings are social events that often involve mundane chatter, gossip, and a convivial atmosphere, as these maintain the interaction order and help to form bonds between police and communities. Refuting the line, on the other hand, means that the interaction order of PACT is temporarily breached, as both police and communities seek consensus on the function of PACT. Once breached, both police and communities undertake repair work in order to create or restore genial relations and avoid lasting damage to any actor's status. The process of breaching and repairing the interaction order also has a more practical objective: to negotiate the roles and responsibilities of police and community actors. This relates to who has the power to define 'problems' and PACT can therefore also be described as a setting with a shifting, negotiated order, in which both the police and community enrol rhetoric in service to their own ends and in which differing expectations are managed.

7.3 Discussion: An institutional perspective of change in Neighbourhood Policing delivery

This section will discuss the research findings in relation to the theories of (police) institutional change and the interactionist perspectives introduced in Chapter 1, and is organised into sections that address each of this study's primary research questions. Institutional theory acknowledges that change does not happen easily, institutions have stabilising mechanisms and values which make them resistant to change, and substantial reforms are difficult to implement and can indeed lead to unexpected changes. Nevertheless, institutional change does take place in different ways: sometimes severely, episodically, and unpredictably, and at other times gradually and adaptively (Baumgartner and Jones 2012; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The normative context of an institution provides some clues as to which reforms will resonate with institutional cultures (Carstensen 2017), but this cultural resonance is not a simple model of reform in which change can be easily predicted. Studies of police change

have long noted the resistance to reform provided by occupational cultures (Holdaway 1977; Loftus 2009), and how culture is influenced by structural realities that are unchanged by internal reform processes (Skolnick 1967; Chan 1997). Furthermore, police culture is neither monolithic nor static, and police institutions and teams contain points of cultural conflict and discursive struggle. Cultural resonance may be a factor in the acceptance of reforms, but it is not the only process of mediation. Change is also negotiated through interactions, talk and sensemaking, and the meaning of change is situated within small groups and their idiocultures (Fine and Hallett 2014).

Another part of the change process that requires theorisation is the role of the exogenous shock as a trigger for punctuated (Sherman 1978) or gradual (Carstensen 2017) institutional change. This study analysed how the shock of the UK fiscal crisis and the subsequent austerity era, as a macro-structural 'surround' (Manning 2008, 87), has been influential in NP reforms and broader police institutional change. This section will also deal with these questions of how NP delivery and the police role are tied to this 'surround', and what the implications are for police institutional values and approaches to local policing delivery. There are specific claims and general claims here that will be discussed separately. First of all, the specific claims about the impacts of the austerity era of NP delivery will be discussed. This deals with the contemporary austerity era and changes in NP more directly and asks, 'what has changed and what are the implications for NP?' The next sub-section considers the issues of individual and cultural mediation from an interactionist perspective, which highlights the significance of stories, sensemaking, and group culture in negotiating change (Fine and Hallett 2014; Fine 2012; Weick 1995; Strauss 1978). Lastly, the discussion pans out to the topic of police institutional change, focusing on the general question of, 'how does change happen?' This will consider the significance of the structural mechanisms of change.

7.3.1 The Impact of Austerity on Neighbourhood Policing Delivery

In the austerity era, change in NP delivery is complex, messy, and unevenly distributed. Nevertheless, a number of the identifiable changes and challenges to NP delivery and the police role more generally are due to the reductions in the police workforce, reductions in time resources, and new reforms that are a product of the austerity era. Identifying the impact of deliberate reforms is difficult due to the impact of the socio-economic environment on the policing field. There is also the danger that due to the dilution of some aspects of NP delivery, as well as the strains that this causes to NPT operatives, there is a regression to the social distance that catalysed ideation of RP in

the early twenty-first century (see Innes 2004; Povey 2001). The delivery mechanisms of NP (Quinton and Morris 2008) and neighbourhood security functions (Innes 2004) are at risk of being deprioritised even where NP models still attempt them. This does not mean that austerity has ended these mechanisms and neighbourhood security functions – they are enduring characteristics of British policing – but it does have serious implications for how NP is understood and delivered. The following subsections discuss the impact of austerity era reforms on the structure, role and mechanisms of NP.

7.3.1.1 *Neighbourhood security and the police role in society*

Just as in WMP, there are conflicting stories about the police role in society in national conversations, and the old model of NP still receives plenty of rhetorical support from individual members of parliament (Grierson 2018), political parties (BBC News 2016), metropolitan mayors (e.g. Mayor of London 2017), PCCs (e.g. Gloucestershire OPCC 2018), police regulatory bodies (CoP 2018), and others (Independent Police Commission 2013). NP and neighbourhood security therefore appear to still be valued institutionally and politically, and this fits with the historical values, functions, and symbolism of British (and especially English) policing (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). Regardless, emphasis on aspects of the police role changes over time. Some have noted these swings or oscillations in the recent past, at least at the rhetorical and programmatic level, as seen in CP movements, POP, ILP, and ZTP (Manning 2010; Innes 2004; Innes 2005; Maguire 2000). Punch (2012) asserted that community policing is particularly vulnerable to this swing in times of austerity, with 'soft' functions being deprioritised in favour of 'hard' functions. This may apply to some aspects of NP and neighbourhood security, but is far from clear that such a comprehensive swing would happen in England and Wales given policing history and symbolism. It would also be imprecise to portray NP as only delivering neighbourhood security functions, as the 'harder' crime management functions are also an important operational aspect of any local policing model in practice (Innes 2005a). For example, in WMP crime management strategies are valued by and are part of the routines of NP operatives, and these routines include some of the hallmarks of ILP: exchange of information between partners, data-driven patrolling, and the increased specialisation of skills and functions (Maguire 2000).

Policing approaches, such as CP and ILP, can be thought of as the prevailing ideas in policing, in which certain aspects of policing are emphasised more than others in a given period (Innes 2004). The distinction between rhetoric and reality, or ideas and routine police work, highlights the different levels at which 'swing' can occur, as well as questions regarding the relationship between each level. The rhetoric of policing

approaches may not accurately describe police work at the street level (Manning 1997), perhaps because aspirations are difficult to put into practice due to the institutional pressures of policing (Ratcliffe 2002). Accordingly, while policing rhetoric and ideation may be developing to account for the new policing surround, changes to police work and specifically NP delivery are not necessarily in harmony with rhetorical swings. Indeed, rather than a deliberate and pointed reconfiguration, NP as a specialist area of policing has been diluted due to time constraints and restructuring. It is contended here that where this restructuring of the NP model has taken place – that is, resources are reduced, geographical responsibility is broadened, and the roles of NPTs diversified – this can lead to a *low-definition policing* where the function of teams are less focused and the resources are spread more thinly, whether NP resources are assigned to a team or floating between teams. Policy ideas can be the cause of this change or they can be in tension with it. Rhetoric can be a prelude to these changes, an ad hoc justification of these changes, or a reflection of aspirations for another mode of policing delivery. In the current austerity era police work and institutional rhetoric do yet not appear to be harmonious, but there are connections between the two as both are dealing with the pressures of disinvestment. Overall, this suggests that change in NP under austerity is a complex process, contingent upon a number of factors in the policing field and surround, as well as the relationships between rhetoric, deliberate reforms, and unintended changes.

7.3.1.2   *Seeing Visibility Differently*

One of the most significant dilemmas for many police institutions in the austerity era is how to maintain a visible presence on the streets with fewer NPT operatives. Visibility is a symbolically important function of NP and British policing, and has been integrated into the RP and NP programmes as a vital component (Barker and Crawford 2013). Indeed, the official evaluations of RP and NP identified visibility as a necessary delivery mechanism through its association with higher confidence when combined with problem-solving and engagement – the other two delivery mechanisms of NP. Sindall and Sturgis (2013) also found that not only is visibility associated with higher confidence in police, but higher police numbers themselves have an indirect effect on confidence through increasing visibility. It is not only NP that relies on higher officer numbers; the order maintenance approach of the New York Police Department in the

1990s, notable for its success in crime reduction[47], was bolstered by the recruitment of over nine thousand officers between 1990 to 2000 (Reaves and Hickman 2002).

Barker and Crawford (2013) highlight the importance of political ideation in times of austerity, as ideological commitments to state shrinkage and private provision of services create an inhospitable environment for resource intensive policing models. As such, official Home Office policy has been for police institutions to deal with resource reductions through efficiency savings and increasing the proportion of the frontline workforce. The claim embedded in this policy is that the police workforce was too large, and a smaller organisation could provide the same level of service with significantly fewer employees – the mantra of 'doing more with less'. Some argue that police numbers and visible foot patrol have little to no impact on crime rates (Clarke and Hough 1984; Kelling et al 1974), yet recent studies suggest that numbers and a visible presence are predictors of higher confidence in the police as well as lower crime rates (Sindall and Sturgis 2013). Although in recent years the police cuts coincided with falling aggregate crime rates as measured by the CSEW, giving an opportunity for the government to claim that the police could do 'more with less', the evidence suggests that increases in police numbers, alongside effective use of these resources, can reduce crime (Bradford 2011). If police numbers are often a prerequisite for enhanced visibility, then the link is especially important for NP as a model that relies on visibility as one vital delivery mechanism.

Internally, the necessity of visibility and visible foot patrol has been questioned. In a speech on 're-imagining' policing, Thornton (2015, no page) makes the case for hotspots policing as a valid tactic for crime reduction, but criticises the idea that visibility should be 'an end in itself'. Thornton's notion that visibility should only be applied to methods that directly reduce crime is framed by the argument that the use of visible policing in the pre-austerity era, when neighbourhood security and the reassurance function was emphasised, is unsustainable.

> When budgets were larger we could afford higher levels of visible patrol and we have increased visibility in recent years with more Special Constables and Police Community Support Officers. But is that sustainable?

---

[47] Although some claims for the impact of police on the New York crime drop are overstated (see Bratton 2005), Zimring (2011) finds it plausible that police made a contribution to the reduction in crime.

> We need an honest conversation about what policing is here to do…
> in recognition of the changing operating environment and
> significantly reduced resources resulting from the public sector
> spending cuts and austerity measures. (*Ibid.*, no page)

These new 'conversations' about what policing should become due to the constraints of austerity are indeed happening inside police institutions. Some participants in this study thought that the concept of visibility may itself need to be 're-imagined' due to the combination of shrinking NPT resources and the increasing digitalisation of social life. One suggestion was to use graphics that symbolised police presence in online spaces, echoing requests from the NPCC (2017) for police actors to consider how social media can enhance visibility. In either approach, the visibility mechanism of NP is no longer considered viable in the austerity era unless it is reconceptualised to mean effective tactics of direct crime prevention or a more efficient form of symbolising police presence in social spaces. The austerity era therefore catalyses stories about the function of police and a national downward trend of actual police visibility on the streets (ONS 2015).

7.3.1.3   From Antisocial Behaviour to Vulnerability

Neighbourhood security functions persist to some extent due to internal institutional values and external pressures. Reducing ASB is an important objective of NP through the neighbourhood security function, and in recent years the harmful impact of repeat ASB on vulnerable people has had a 'raised policy profile' (Donoghue 2013, 809). This still remains present in the high-level priorities of police organisations (HMICFRS 2018; NPCC 2016), which is consistent with the historically broad remit of beat policing (Innes and Weston 2010). The Pilkington case, for example, still had ramifications for how the NP role is understood by police in WMP at the time of fieldwork, yet HMICFRS (2018) judged that WMP's performance in keeping vulnerable people safe 'requires improvement'. NPTs are potentially well-placed to co-produce solutions to ASB with their partners, and the 'boots on the ground' and quick responses that can disrupt and reduce the harm of ASB (Innes and Weston 2010). At the time of writing, the most recent PEEL inspection (HMICFRS 2018) suggests that nationally the allocation of staff to NPTs is still falling, 'protecting vulnerable people' is improving modestly, less use is made of powers and tactics to deal with ASB, and in each of these measures there is still considerable variation between forces. Nationally, while reducing ASB as a function is still institutionally valued, the increasing focus on vulnerability and complex crimes (CoP 2015) may have encouraged a higher proportion of existing resources to

be used on specific forms of ASB. This is consistent with institutional stories of demand management that seek to rationalise the deployment of policing resources and redefine and rebalance police functions.

7.3.1.4 Community Engagement: Inertia and Stories of Reform

Delivery mechanisms of NP may also be somewhat stable in the face of external and internal pressures due to opposing institutional forces. Community consultation in the form of PACT or other police-community meetings are routine and historical aspects of police community engagement (Innes et al 2009), at least in some areas, as well as fulfilling legal obligations to communities and police promises of consultation and engagement. That is, there is institutional pressure to carry out forms of CE. Although some police do not always see it as a worthy way to spend police time, PACT satisfies these pressures, alleviating the need to introduce other methods of carrying out formal engagement, which could require innovation to create, institutional agreement to roll out, and new skills to run (*Ibid.*). A risk for CE is that, though it continues to have high-level rhetorical support and the related obligation of NPTs to perform it, it is often misunderstood in principle or practice and its delivery is patchy. Firstly, training may be inadequate or non-existent, as it was in WMP according to interview participants, and many police organisations do not share an understanding of what community engagement is or should achieve (Simmonds 2015). Secondly, the tension between community-defined and police-defined problems is a stubborn issue. CE that deals with what appear to be trivial issues can demotivate police with a particular sense of the police mission. Dealing with each community-defined issue is a time commitment so police with dwindling time resources may resent what they perceive as trivial requests made to them through engagement processes. The rhetoric of 'citizen focus' and the notion of providing a service in line with community expectations (Home Office 2004; NPIA 2008b) is being challenged by diminished resources as well as the new stories of demand management, efficiencies and the police role. These new stories do not prioritise the customer service ethos that was present in the early policy rhetoric of NP.

On the other hand, austerity has triggered stories about how community engagement practices can be reformed to make better use of digital technologies, local informant networks, and methods that foster citizen participation in the production of local security (Simmonds 2015; Fisher and Ritchie 2015; Bluelight Consultancy 2017). These stories are told largely in response to police efficiency drives and resonate with some of the original intentions of CP to increase community participation in policing, but

some of the reforms proposed in these stories also have implications for levels of participation and representation. Digital engagement methods, for example, could increase participation and representation in police consultation and engagement processes. The difficulties of organising, running, and ensuring (representative) attendance at PACTs could be bypassed, and community engagement could be transformed. However, any transformation would have to deal with the variance in the practices and rules of interaction over digital platforms. Face-to-face interactions are an inherent feature of public meetings and, as was shown in chapter 6, have a specific effect on the ordering of police-community relations and consequently co-production. We know 'remarkably little' about the consequences of new policing technologies (Byrne and Marx 2011, 17), and the same applies to new digital methods of community engagement.

One issue for the digitalisation of community engagement and co-production is the protection of community members' data and identity. This concerns both the involvement of private companies in providing platforms or potentially facilitating CE, as well as other individuals who may be motivated to know details of attendees or proceedings of these interactions. If this is not protected, then cooperation in some areas may be more difficult to forge. Of course, the opposite may also be true, that delivering such engagement processes over new secure platforms could reduce the potential for local intimidation, but this would require the presence of individuals with such intentions to be filtered out. This depends on the model of digital engagement chosen in the future (Meijer 2012).

7.3.1.5 Structural reform

The effect of structural reform on the role of NP has already been discussed above, where it was proposed that a *low-definition NP* is emerging due to these reforms. The following paragraphs will explore how this is happening in more detail.

Many police forces are reforming the boundaries of geographical responsibility for NPTs. These boundary changes may impact how NPTs treat the smaller areas that were once the units of geographical responsibility. That is, there is a tension between the idea of enlarging geographical responsibility while focusing resources on the specific neighbourhoods with the most immediate or serious problems, as bigger boundaries can merge more diverse neighbourhoods. Rubinstein (1973) suggests that police organise their knowledge at the district level – that of geographic responsibility. Changes to this responsibility causes temporary confusion to police as they have to learn about these new geographies. This could just be a teething problem for police

who remain in one NPT, but for police used as more flexible resources across different micro-beats or neighbourhoods, this threatens to detach crafted local knowledge from the problem-solving function (also see Klinger 1997, 299).

New geographical criteria for resource allocation in the austerity era may often mean that more resources will be focused on areas with higher crime rates or more serious problems. For example, the WMP 2020 reforms proposed 'mission-focused teams' that could work with the range of situational demands across different neighbourhoods, making police more responsive to the particular problems of higher-risk areas. One consequence of this type of reform, however, is that resources could be pulled away from neighbourhoods where less immediate engagement is required, potentially reducing efforts to maintain relationships and confidence in lower-risk areas. Following a protracted period of police disinvestment, the increasing focus of police analysis of the risks of harm and the severity of local problems – categorising neighbourhoods by levels of 'need', for example (Sims 2012) – could change who are the beneficiaries of engagement activities, and the extent to which particular communities receive such police services.

7.3.1.6   Diminishing Proactivity

One account of NP change that was forwarded by the participants in this study is the idea that performing proactive policing work is now more difficult. Writing about police investigation, Maguire (2008, 437) states that proactive policing gives "more weight to longer-term planning and to agendas set by the police". In Maguire's conception, knowledge of an area's problems is constructed by police and this is relevant to both the science and craft of policing neighbourhoods with a range of profiles. That is, police attempt to create a systematic understanding of the characters and problems of a neighbourhood in order to plan tactics and operations that stop on-going neighbourhood problems and prevent future offences and disorder. These functions of policing are still valued in stories of demand management as proactive work is expected to go 'upstream' and reduce future demand overall. Although the austerity era may have brought a sharper focus to these concerns around prevention and demand reduction, it may simultaneously have the contrary effect of reducing the ability of police to dedicate resources to this work. This challenges Punch's (2012) suggestion that policing oscillates between 'hard' and 'soft' functions, as, like NP in general, proactivity is not limited to one side of the 'soft'/'hard' dichotomy. With proactive work increasingly harder to perform (HMIC 2017), the austerity era may have triggered an unintended shift towards what Loader (2006) refers to as a 'narrow' policing

orientation, in which policing intervention is minimal and reactive rather than the high numbers, visibility, and proactivity of CP approaches.

Scott (1998; also see Lum et al 2012) suggests that reactive policing objectives emerge in response to efficiency drives that rely on performance culture because the more proactive functions of CP are difficult to measure. However, Scott (1998) also noted that competitive performance culture is resisted by police occupational culture. In this study police in WMP worried that a lot of the proactive work they perform is not measurable, and through reforms that promise efficiencies and rationalisation through more performance management a similar situation could arise in police forces with decreasing NPT resources. There are sources of potential resistance to competitive performance cultures in the current environment, including central government and street-level police cultures, and the use of 'hard numeric targets' in policing is thought to be falling since the Home Office abolished national performance targets in 2010 (Curtis 2015). However, localised target cultures may still emerge or persist in some forces (*Ibid*.), and the PCC role may play a part in encouraging the creation of new performance measures (BBC 2013).

In NPTs, proactive work in particular is now more difficult to do due to reduced resources. Although it is practically difficult to resist changes that are linked to the lack of resources, cultural resistance within NPTs may limit the impact of specific reforms that lead to a higher proportion of reactive demands. Dominant conceptions of NP in this study suggest that proactive work is highly valued by many, even if it is at risk, and when new environments, stories, and reforms challenge strong policing values, some form of resistance is to be expected. The effectiveness of any resistance depends on many factors, of course. Group dynamics of NPTs and the attitudes of sergeants in particular could have an effect on how reforms are mediated or resisted, but these must be understood in relation to material changes in police institutions as both practical or structural 'constraints' as well as a resource for ideation, stories, and sensemaking.

7.3.2   Stories and sensemaking in Neighbourhood Policing Teams

Stories are a ubiquitous tool of change and resistance across different levels of the police institution (internal) and across constituents of the institution (internal and external). The accounts of change given by participants within this study reflect wider contemporary and traditional stories about policing. The different perspectives about what policing is and should be, as well as how it should react to the shifting socio-

economic environment, reveal discursive conflicts around policing delivery and the role of the police. In institutions, stories also reveal how change is understood and enacted and, in the case of NP in particular, give an insight into how groups attempt to maintain or negotiate a local culture (Fine 1987; 2012; Fine and Hallett 2014). The understanding of local group culture in policing, it will be contended here, is a vital avenue of policing research. How police are grouped in new forms of neighbourhood or local policing will likely affect how individuals understand and enact reforms as well as meet individual and collective objectives. It is within these groups that talk and stories help to understand and enact change as well as negotiate order (Fine 1984; 1987; 2010; 2012; Fine and Hallett 2014; Strauss 1978).

7.3.2.1   Understanding the team

Studies of NP and other team policing approaches in general have lacked theorisation of how requiring officers to work together in a small group – a group that officially has pre-defined policing delivery mechanisms and objectives – impacts the social organisation of policing. Interactionist perspectives of policing have in the past considered how police work (Manning 1997) and NP work (O'Neill 2017) is affected by the formation of performance teams. This Goffmanian concept of teamwork describes how during group interactions particular actors will work together to convey a specific impression to their audience through a unified performance. For O'Neill (2017), this concept is useful for showing the interactional divisions between PCSOs and PCs within NPTs, and considering whether NPTs contain *complementary* or *competitive* teams within the grouping, where relationships between PCSOs and PCs are either good or bad respectively. O'Neill uses these concepts for judging the quality of interactions within NPTs and thus the quality of policing delivery. While the idea of an NPT as a group and unit of analysis is touched on in O'Neill's study, this is not the focus of theorisation. The conceptual distinction between Goffman's performance team and Fine's local group is outlined here:

> Despite a shared concern with interaction ritual, Goffman's *dramatism*, focusing on free-floating, untethered interaction, contrasts with *localism*, emphasizing that action is shaped by and responsive to the embedded meaning of the group to its participants. As a result, *practices*, actions routinized in light of local cultures and a bounded interactional domain, are central. Every ongoing group is a local outpost of society. Although actions may extend beyond the

218

> interacting group, group boundaries establish the legitimacy of group
> action. (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1777)

What this suggests is that the NPT as a local group is influential in the social organisation and delivery of NP as regular intra-group face-to-face interactions build a local group culture – the idioculture – and set 'standards for action' (Fine 2010, 356). Of course, roles within these groups remain important for performances and the interaction order, but group culture and standards for action are negotiated over time with regards to the group's local and historical context.

For NP, the question is to what extent the NPT is a small group that regularly interacts and creates its own standards for action. If NPT members do not interact with each other and are teams in name only, then they are closer to Manning's (2008, 104) description of the 'notional team', in which members rarely meet face-to-face and interaction is largely through telecommunication. The teams in WMP appeared have some level of groupness: teams, at the time of fieldwork, had the station as their base where briefings took place; sergeants were of course involved in briefing all police and justifying tactics; sergeants, constables, and PCSOs worked together to varying degrees on the engagement/problem-solving process. For Fine, it is important for team members to interact together enough to create an understanding between members. This depends on the extent and nature of the interactions. Stations provide one space where police can collectively and continuously make sense of their roles in NPTs. Although there are other spaces where this interaction can take place – when performing tasks like engagement or patrol together – reforms that seek to remove police from communal spaces, such as the reduction of stations and investing in new portable digital technologies, could reduce the time for intra-team face-to-face interaction and consequently diminish groupness.

Groups as units of analysis are not only useful for understanding a unifying idioculture, but also for exploring the conflicts and negotiations that occur during times of external pressures and change:

> Interaction orders are not always peaceful or filled with consensus.
> They may be fraught with turmoil and appear chaotic, but they are
> socially organized nonetheless (Hallett, 2009). The same analytic
> perspective applies for understanding instances of conflict as it does
> for cohesion. Shared memory, performance, and differentiation still
> apply, although there is often contention as to the proper form that

these logics should take in and across groups. (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1788)

Conflicts in teams, especially in times of reform, are important signifiers of sensemaking processes, resistance, and struggles in the definition of standards for action, and the status and roles of group members, as well as the divisions within groups, is another factor in how standards for action are negotiated. In NPT hierarchies, sergeants appear to be significant players in setting the tone for their teams, reflecting the importance of police ranks in general (Manning 1997; Holdaway 1988) and the sergeant role in particular for the reform of NP delivery.

7.3.2.2 The role of talk and stories in Neighbourhood Policing

Police tell stories in a number of settings. In this study these included: formal research interview scenarios, where there is the potential for quiet reflection and representative anecdotes with an academic audience; public meetings, where anecdotes or aphorisms are offered within the action of police work, and; more informal conversations between police and the researcher before and after public meetings, in which 'show and tell' commentaries are sometimes offered (Shearing and Ericson 1991, 489). Stories within NPTs can generate both police occupational culture and idioculture, but they are not the only relevant stories to NP. NPT operatives and other street-level police may hear stories about policing told by other internal and external constituents of policing. Stories about NP are told by interested parties in police senior management, politics, local communities and various forms of media. Indeed, stories are *joint actions* (Plummer 1995; Blumer 1969) in both institutions and local groups that serve to make sense of change, negotiate order, and create structure (Strauss 1978; Boje 1991; Fine 1979; 1984; 2010).

Fine makes the distinction and link between the worlds of *action* and *talk* in his study of preadolescent baseball teams:

> Through this talk, the boy's self and his knowledge of how to present this self to others are being developed: What is the range of appropriate behaviours and roles available, and how can one manipulate them in a variety of situations? (Fine 1987, 59)

For Fine, it is talk within groups that organises their cultural outlook and distinguishes the group from broader moral and cultural concerns. In general, stories are both representations of group culture and tools for making sense of both action and structural influence on action. In NPTs, therefore, sensemaking involves talk and

storytelling to come to a collective understanding of the NP role and delivery as well as reforms and socio-economic change. NP is also ordered by negotiations between actors in NPTs and external groups. In public meetings, such as PACT, new stories of NP roles and delivery are either accepted or challenged by communities who themselves have their own cultural expectations regarding the police role in the management of local crime and disorder. Other agencies that participate in these meetings and partnership work with police may have particular expectations of the police role in collaborative work, as well as their own institutional pressures and stories. It is important to recognise the connections between the institution as a whole and the talk and action of the group, and how these processes can mediate change in the role and delivery of NP. The role and status of each storyteller, whether in the local group or the broader institution, also affects how stories are received and meaning generated within the group. This perspective of communication in groups and organisations as a negotiation of order is described in the following excerpt:

> The negotiated order perspective reminds us that organizational structure is not fixed but rather is continuously being constructed. People learn what they are expected to do in organizations through their communication with others and then find these expectations modified through additional interactions. Organizational life is not directed by an organizational chart but by the meanings of the social relations of the persons who inhabit roles in that formal hierarchy. (Fine 1984, 256)

If the group culture is important for guiding action, this again highlights the potential influence of higher status members of the group. Stories from community groups, for instance, may be more influential in certain settings and for certain parts of police work than others. Stories from senior management may be imbued with a formal institutional status but less culturally influential than those from within the group. Sergeants, on the other hand, are likely influential both in terms of formal hierarchy and group status.

Apart from the dynamics of groups and institutions, the success of reform may also be aided by the use of stories that resonate with occupational and group cultures. Senior management in institutions may attempt to change occupational identities through narratives that legitimate existing orders or reforms, but these can be resisted by occupational narratives (Humphreys and Brown 2002). This is a complex process due to intra-institutional conflicts; stories may be rejected if they do not reflect particular

values, but they may be accepted by others. In this study, different stories about NP and reform draw upon understandings of police institutional values to either support change or express apprehension and condemnation of incoming reforms. Furthermore, some stories may be culturally dominant in institutions or in groups. The existence of dominant stories, if opposing change, may restrict sensemaking and lead to institutional inertia (Näslund and Pemer 2011; Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009). In NPTs, the dominant stories appeared to be those that support the new cultural dispositions of NP, but this is complicated by the existence of stories that may have more institutional dominance due to the support of higher status individuals – i.e. senior and middle managers, especially sergeants – and the traditional occupational culture (Skolnick 1966; Reiner 2010; Loftus 2009).

The plurality of stories within policing could mean that policing is currently more open to sensemaking processes and the potential change that these bring. While the new cultural stories of NP are influenced by current NP structures and recent policing history, stories about demand reduction and retreating to the 'core' functions of crime reduction are likely triggered by the fiscal environment and supported by central government and the police regulatory bodies. According to Holdaway (2017), the new loosely coupled structure of police regulation supports the re-professionalisation of policing, and through the CoP this includes the establishment of a 'corpus of knowledge about what works in policing' (Ibid., 597) and standards for effective and ethical police action. The role of the CoP in particular represents a vehicle for knowledge production, ideation, and storytelling in policing, and it is likely that this plays a part in informing stories and sensemaking in NPTs, especially regarding reforms and change. In the face of these changes in an already complex world, nostalgia for the past is an act of resistance (Reissner 2011).

While these stories tend to be influenced by role, rank, and existing subcultural dispositions within NPTs, these links are not definitively causal and one individual is capable of expressing seemingly contradictory stories about policing. Understanding individual police attitudes is useful for investigating cultural divisions (Cosgrove 2016; Muir 1977), yet stories can themselves be a separate unit of analysis. Stories are connected to the experiences and attitudes of story-tellers, but this connection does not have to be fixed as attitudes and experiences are not necessarily consistent over time and context, especially when individuals are in the process of sensemaking in a time of reform (Reissner 2011).

7.3.3 How police institutions change

There is debate in policing studies regarding how sudden or gradual, unintended or deliberate police institutional change is (Manning 1997; 2001; cf. Marks 2000; Savage 2007a). Much of this debate hinges on how change is operationalized and measured, as well the differences in police institutional change between states with distinct socio-economic contexts. Although some measures, such as workforce characteristics, tactics, and performance, may show some form of evolution over time and a more direct link to policy decisions, institutional perspectives of policing emphasise that there exists a largely stable core of values, functions and culture. This core may be influenced by changes to the peripheral measures, but it remains largely inert.

This section will discuss how socio-economic factors and exogenous shocks impact the police reform environment more than most policing change studies account for. It will tentatively suggest that *socio-economic environments constrain and influence police reform decisions and stories about policing*, and specifically that *austerity can both exert pressure and provide contemporary resources for the accounts of police reform*. These structural environments and shifts are vital for understanding the opportunities and restrictions in processes of mediation, negotiation and sensemaking in police institutions. The interplay between different levels of police institutional change takes into account the impact of trigger events (Sherman 1978), the socio-economic environment (Manning 2008; Chan 1997; Reiner 2007), ideation (Béland 2009), story-telling (Shearing and Ericson 1991), sensemaking (Weick 1995; Maguire and Katz 2002), and negotiation (Strauss 1978). Police institutional change occurs across different levels and these processes interact to both generate and stifle reforms, and therefore the influences at each level deserve analysis and theorisation in studies of police institutional change.

7.3.3.1 *Trigger events and policing reform*
Faced with significant exogenous shocks in the socio-economic realm, external and internal constituents may prompt institutions to enact reforms to address prevailing ideas about the how the institution should act in relation to its new environment (Sherman 1978; Manning 2001). The manner of these prompts vary; pressure to reform can come from legislation, government financial incentives, media narratives, representations of public opinion, and other changes in the policing field. The link between trigger events and their impact on police change processes requires attention in policing studies. Whether the impact of the shock is on ideas or more tangibly on the policing field, police institutions and their constituents react to these new contexts

223

through ascribing meaning to socio-economic changes, forwarding reforms, and sensemaking.

Fiscal contraction in general and police disinvestment in particular is a deliberate economic policy, and the latter is a direct intervention in the reform of policing due to the unavoidable impacts this has on internal police budgeting and associated structural and operational reforms (Holdaway 2017, 593). The management of resources is experienced at the operational level as a series of top down reform initiatives that alter, for example, geographical boundaries, the resourcing and functions of the NPT, and some routine aspects of police work. However, the post 2010 policy programme was not just economic. New systems of governance and regulation of policing have changed police reform decision processes, and these are based on eclectic ideological positions, such as localism and strains of conservatism (Holdaway 2017; Lowndes and Pratchett 2011; Loader 2014). The extent to which such policy programmes were influenced by the financial crisis and resulting fiscal environment is debatable, but the austerity era can serve as a justification for any policy that professes to do more with fewer resources, or for new arrangements where securing efficiency is considered to be a core function (for example, see UK Government 2016).

Chapter 3 showed that police workforce reform in England and Wales was suddenly impacted by departmental spending reductions. However, though a particular trajectory of change was triggered nationally, the relatively decentralised territorial model of policing in England and Wales, alongside the relative retreat of the Home Office from operational policing policy and accountability from 2010, allowed for an uneven distribution of workforce change. The reactions varied from proportionate workforce changes without stated changes to the NP model to workforce reforms that were intended to complement new or existing models, which appear to be dependent on local ideation. This more complex picture of stasis and change is further complicated by variation in NP delivery within police forces (Higgins 2018), illustrated in this thesis by the variety of approaches to community engagement between NPTs. This also highlights the importance of studies that respond to events that trigger socio-economic change to develop additional evidence and insights for knowledge of police institutional change. Idiographic studies can capture the importance of periods when the socio-economic environment is in flux and compare the police institutional reactions to this environment with times of relative stability.

Analysis of police institutional change after trigger events must pay attention to cultural and individual mediation in order to understand the impact of the shock on

policing delivery, or the causal mechanism of a trigger event on policy action. Exogenous shocks can act as a trigger for policy decisions, but these new policy decisions may amount to re-ordering existing institutional ideas and policies in order to resonate with institutional values and standards for action (Carstensen 2017). However, conflict in institutions means that particular values and standards will most likely be emphasised over others. In this scenario, cultural conflict means that there will be more occupational resistance and perhaps more protracted processes of sensemaking taking place before meaningful change can happen.

7.3.3.2 Socio-economic environment of policing

A distinction was made in chapter 1 between the trigger event of the global financial crisis, austerity as a government policy programme, and the austerity era as a consequential socio-economic condition. The trigger event is of course important for understanding the political reactions and the socio-economic impacts that emerge due in part to the altered political environment. At such times the surround and the field of policing are susceptible to change, bringing new political and tangible pressures on police institutions. According to Reiner (2000), the police role is relatively inert as it is tied to the overall social structure, but when the social structure changes considerably the police role and other institutional elements are more likely to change to reflect this new dominant order. Writing in the context of a society in greater flux, Marks also notes that "police organisations are under constant pressure to realign themselves to changing political, social and economic environments" (2000, 146). In England and Wales, and other countries with localised policing arrangements, local political cultures also contribute to the socio-economic environment (Lyons 1999; Manning 2008).

Marks (2000, 144) argues that mechanical behaviour and structure can be changed, but this is "generally not accompanied by more fundamental changes in the basic assumptions that police hold about their work and their environment". This cultural adaption is necessary for fundamental reform, yet in the context of the complex socio-economic environment of advanced capitalist societies the pressures on institutions to change are unpredictable (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Furthermore, cultural change has occurred to some extent in Anglophone police institutions in recent decades (McCarthy and O'Neill 2014; Chan 2003; Loftus 2009; Charman 2017), but whether this can be considered to represent or enable fundamental change in policing (in England and Wales) is questionable. Instead, cultural divisions emerge that reflect both changes and continuities in the policing field (Chan 1996; 2003; Loftus 2009) and are influenced

by the work of specialist teams (O'Neill and McCarthy 2014) and the neighbourhood characteristics (Cain 1973; Rubinstein 1973). This study supported the idea that these divisions exist, and that during socio-economic shifts particular cultural understandings of police work can be challenged or supported through stories and sensemaking.

The findings of this thesis support the idea of socio-economic forces influencing both change and inertia in NP in the austerity era. Some of the programmatic elements of NP may have been diluted or removed in WMP and other police forces, but the social organisation of police work appears to be relatively stable. For all the structural changes, reform efforts, and difficulties associated with squeezed resources that may be linked to an attempted change in the UK social model (Grimshaw and Rubery 2015), there are enduring features of policing that form the basis of NP delivery and organisation and will likely continue in new models of local policing delivery. Stability in police functions, social organisation, and routines are in line with punctuated equilibrium/order model of police institutional change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Manning 2001), even if some institutional elements shift more gradually, such as the integration of new digital technologies in police work. Although technologies are referred to in stories of efficiency and demand management as solutions to the limitations of contemporary policing in the austerity era, their integration in NP is still limited to a small number of initiatives.

7.4   Final Conclusions

7.4.1   Reforming Neighbourhood Policing in the Austerity Era

This thesis provides a snapshot of policing reform in a time of police disinvestment and changing socio-economic conditions during a government programme of austerity measures. The financial crisis and the austerity era has been a significant concern for public services and has arguably led to a shift in the social model of the United Kingdom (Grimshaw and Rubery 2015; 2012; Grimshaw 2015; 2013). Police institutions have faced notable changes in the policing field, such as technological developments, the digitalisation of social life, the rise in complex crimes, and new understandings of vulnerability (CoP 2015; NPCC 2016), as well as a host of reforms to governance and accountability structures (Lister and Rowe 2015) and the police regulatory environment (Holdaway 2017). In light of these changing environments, this study used the following research questions as a basis for investigating reform processes in NP in the austerity era:

1. How is Neighbourhood Policing being reformed in the austerity era?

2. What is the role of cultural narratives and stories in the explaining and justifying reform processes?
3. How does the socio-economic environment impact the police role?

To provide specific and broad answers with supporting evidence, this chapter first summarised the main findings from each of the empirical chapters. The next section then discussed these findings in relation to the policing and institutional change literature and offered contentions that relate to the themes of the research questions. This section will offer some general conclusions on these research themes and the implications of this thesis for policing studies and policy, before considering future directions for research on local policing approaches and police institutional change.

The changes to Neighbourhood Policing are complex because it is being reformed in a number of different ways across the 43 territorial police forces. The structure of policing in England and Wales combined with the lack of a national programme or strategy means that new reforms to policing delivery are numerous and diverse, and there is evidence that differences in NP delivery exist within forces too. Nevertheless, NP delivery workforces across the country have changed, with a large reduction in the number of PCSOs in England and Wales. Forces that have high PCSO reductions alongside general workforce reductions are likely to face challenges in delivering NP as was envisaged by the Home Office (2004). That is, some of the programmatic features of the NPP have ceased, while the continuation of other features is locally contingent on resources, policing policy ideation, and reform decisions. At a national level, not only do these changes mean that the policy rhetoric and principles of local policing delivery are shifting, but the theoretical underpinnings and evidence base of the NRPP and NPP (Innes and Fielding 2002; Innes 2014; Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and Morris 2008) are no longer programmatically supported by central government nor the structures that once provided a natural home.

For English police forces, the new approaches to deal with typical workforce reductions in the austerity era is likely leading to a dilution of the neighbourhood security function and the emergence of a more reactive style of policing, and therefore the idea of temporal oscillations in police functions has merit (Innes 2004; Punch 2012). Delivering NP as it was initially conceived is becoming more challenging due to the increased time pressures in policing as well as the emphasis placed on crime reduction as the core role of policing by the Home Office and a reform agenda that deprioritised neighbourhood security functions (Loader 2014). This is in part due to the unintended consequences of tangible changes to police budgets and resources, but also the

reactions to the shifts in the police surround and field – the social, economic, technological, and political changes that police policy actors and street-level operatives must make sense of and react to.

New stories of policing delivery and the police role are told to create and account for reforms, as well as to give voice to the acceptance or resistance to these new ideas. NP itself carried its own stories of police professionalisation (ACPO 2006) that accounted for the centrally mandated emphasis of community involvement, problem solving, and visible beat policing. These stories were situated in the politics and socio-economic situation of the first decade of the twenty-first century, but in response to the fiscal crisis and the shifting surround and field, new stories are emerging that challenge these accounts of policing and professionalisation. For example, professionalisation narratives now have to contend with the immediate concerns that police forces have of doing 'more with less' or maintaining expected levels of service with fewer resources. In other words, to stay relevant in the contemporary austerity era proponents of evidence-based policing and the evidence-base must factor in socio-economic and political developments, and therefore 'professionalisation' is not a static concept in policing. In this context, resource-intensive policing approaches have to contend with the new dominant narratives of policing with heightened concerns for efficient or economical practices.

Dominant narratives in policing can be resisted by NPT operatives. Where reform decisions relate to street-level practices this resistance could manifest itself through discretion, but resistance is common in rhetoric and stories about the role and routines of NP. This has given rise to a 'discursive struggle' in policing in England and Wales, in which NP delivery mechanisms and the 'soft' skills that are emblematic of community and beat policing are contrasted with new approaches to local policing that emphasise the reduction of demand through efficient practices, use of new technologies, and redefining the relationship between the police and the public.

Overall, an institutional approach is vital for understanding police reform to emphasise the impact of the socio-economic environment on reform processes and reveal the complexities of policing change. Change is also mediated through institutional interactions and negotiations, and through internal cultures. These cultural and institutional contexts have enduring features but also shift through time, meaning that change in police institutions is often piecemeal but rarely transformative (Skinns et al. 2017). This makes deliberate reform difficult and uncertain, as the complexity of social and institutional change means that mediation processes are either difficult or

impossible to predict. The institutional approach in the analysis of change in public services must take local and national politics seriously to provide a deep portrayal of social reactions to trigger events.

7.4.2   Implications for Policy

There are a number of policy implications raised by this study for the future of NP and police reform. This section will consider the key implications and potential policy responses for policing bodies.

7.4.2.1   Structuring NP

There are a number of reasons to carefully consider how the structures of existing and new local policing models impact policing delivery. The NPP was an example of an attempt by central government to transform policing delivery through 'structuring in' change, most significantly through the assignment of hyper-local geographical responsibility to specialist teams that were required to deploy PCSOs as part of the NPT workforce mix. Reducing NP workforces and enlarging boundaries means that resources for NP or local policing delivery are spread more thinly, diluting local knowledge, reducing time for proactivity and risking a more reactive style of policing delivery. With policing organisations now concerned about managing demand, reducing this demand by targeting the 'upstream' problems and causes is a difficult task when NPTs perceive that their time resources are too limited to undertake proactive tasks. The dilemma that the austerity era poses is that achieving the expected efficiency in prevention and demand reduction is challenging if resources are stretched and NPTs are covering more policing functions and operatives are being abstracted to response. The ability of NPTs or other local teams to perform the kind of proactive work that can target problems and reduce demand (see Boulton et al. 2017, 72-73; Maguire and John 1995) could be encouraged and monitored by forces. Evidence-based tactics for prevention and early intervention can be communicated by the College of Policing, but there also needs to be an understanding of the models, structures, and resources that best support these proactive tactics.

Another important aspect of team structures in local policing models is the role of group interaction. There is a distinction to be made between a 'notional team', in which face-to-face interaction between team members is fleeting (Manning 2008), and a local group, in which members interact for sufficient time to negotiate local standards for action (Fine 1984; 2012). Given the opportunities for face-to-face interactions within policing teams, members can build a group identity that potentially

229

leads to a more unified approach to policing delivery. The sergeant role in the team is significant here, as they have potential for a high status role within teams to provide leadership and support (Butterfield et al. 2005). Sergeants have strong opinions on how policing should be delivered in their neighbourhood, and as such can be powerful enablers or obstacles to reform. Nurturing the relationship and opportunities for interaction between sergeants and team members, as well as persuading sergeants of the benefits of reforms, can therefore be productive.

7.4.2.2   Storytelling as reform

Related to the group dynamics of the team is the role of storytelling in police reform. In policing, stories represent accounts of action, justifications for reform, and communicate police values. Stories that resonate with occupational cultures are shared and repeated, and this suggests that how reforms are communicated can impact the process of translating policy decisions into action. However, the mediation process is complicated by conflicting stories within police institutions broadly (the 'system') and policing groups specifically ('subsystems'). The process of sensemaking involves individuals coming to a collective understanding about events and changes in organisations (Weick et al 2005), yet the process is necessarily influenced by competing ideas in a discursive struggle in times of external and internal change (Thurlow and Helms Mills 2009). Importantly, the dominant stories in this struggle are more likely to restrict sensemaking and limit the potential for reform (Naslund and Pemer 2011). In police institutions, the dominant stories are likely different between specialist teams or different areas of the organisation due to the impact of organisational position on culture. This points to two interrelated lessons: the type of communication between police reformers and the street-level is important for persuading street level operatives to accept new reforms and; groups and individuals mediate reforms, and this process is influenced by occupational cultures. Therefore, telling a culturally resonant story to accompany reforms may be more persuasive for street level operatives when they are making sense of reforms.

7.4.2.3   Nurturing Neighbourhood Security

This study identified that NP delivery and the neighbourhood security function has been weakened due to both internal and external impacts of austerity. Despite the economic challenges of maintaining resource-intensive styles of policing, the College of Policing (2018) has recently produced guidelines to restate the benefits and best practice of NP. This is a useful resource for police forces that are able to or desire to reboot or maintain the NP model and sustain the neighbourhood security function, but

the impact of such guidelines may be limited in the face of increasing demand, constraints on resources, and the other effects of socio-economic change since 2010. The forces of decentralisation in police governance also potentially limit or constrain the local application of NP models, as without the more prominent role played by central government there is more scope for policy variation across forces.

The signal crimes perspective was the early theoretical basis behind the neighbourhood security orientation of RP and NP, and the community engagement mechanism was vital for the identification of community problems and signal crimes and disorder. However, the delivery of community engagement is patchy and sometimes confused. In part, this is because of well understood facets of police occupational culture that mean police do not value the often slow pace of maintaining relations with community partners that appear to offer little tangible benefit to police in achieving institutional and group objectives. This is not true for all police, as there are cultural divisions even within NPTs that impact the value placed on engagement activities by individual police. Identifying police with constructive attitudes and appropriate skills for interacting, communicating, and negotiating with communities would be beneficial for the execution of the community engagement mechanism. These community engagement 'specialists' would have an appreciation for how interactions and negotiations work at PACT and the differences between communities and their influence on the range of styles of PACT meetings. In WMP, police reported an absence of formal training in community engagement. This is something that could be addressed at an institutional level in order to give elementary lessons about the functions and practice of running community engagement. Community engagement specialists could also take the lead in mentoring other NPT operatives, by buddying up or supervising others.

PACT and other meetings should be appreciated for their potential for maintaining police-community relations, giving community groups a collective voice, and providing a forum for collective efforts in problem-solving. However, meetings can easily become routine, unproductive, and badly attended, and when they do the imperatives for police to maintain relations and sustain a forum for participation and consultation mean that it is neither desirable nor easy for police to retreat from delivering these events. In terms of problem-solving, these meetings are unlikely to be consistently productive across all neighbourhoods, so it would be desirable for police to utilise other, more methodologically rigorous techniques for identifying community problems and gaining community intelligence (Lowe and Innes 2012; Innes and Roberts 2008).

This is not to say that meetings have no value. The underlying agenda of NP and one of the most important tenets of CP is to reduce police social distance and provide avenues of participation and co-production, and the face-to-face interactions in these public events can foster community involvement and may contribute to community building.

7.4.3   Implications for Policing Studies

This study highlighted the influence of trigger events and socio-economic change on police reform at various levels of analysis and in a broader interactionist approach. The main contribution of this thesis is to situate the influence of socio-economic factors in the culture, stories, and street-level interactions of NPTs. The institutional perspectives on policing (Manning 1997; Crank and Langworthy 1992; Crank 2003) complements this approach through the recognition that the historical functions and values of the modern public police organisations are stabilising features. To deal with the complexities of police institutional change, this study combined concepts and theory from political science, police sociology, and interactionist perspectives to explore reform agendas, policing delivery, and processes of change. A mixed methods research design was employed to investigate NP reform at different levels of the police institution and this provided a broader picture of change, encompassing analysis of both structures and action.

McMahon and Ericson (1984) argue that from a police reformer's point of view, there is always something wrong with the past or present that requires necessary changes for the improvement of the institution, but these reforms themselves are likely to be challenged in the future in a perpetual cycle of change. This, they consider, is the pitfall of reform that is not based in 'careful research and analysis' (*Ibid.*, 1). I suggest that careful research and analysis of police reform and change would avoid ahistorical understandings of police institutions and engage with broad theories of institutional change. Debate in the institutional literature relates to whether change is broadly episodic, sudden, and unpredictable, or slow, incremental, and adaptive. It is important to acknowledge how change occurs and how far police institutions can reform themselves or be reformed in the face of institutional or street-level resistance. Jones and Baumgartner's (2012) model of punctuated equilibrium suggests that significant changes to institutions are episodic yet allows for gradual changes too. This is a useful perspective for understanding police change, as while generally reform appears to tinker often but rarely transform, exogenous shocks have the potential to trigger shifts in socio-economic conditions that influence ideation, policy, stories, and

sensemaking. Work on the impact of trigger events, socio-economic conditions, and police reform should build on earlier studies that emphasise these influences (Sherman 1978; Manning 2008; Chan 1997; Reiner 2007).

Another useful insight from the institutional perspective is that police institutions have a largely stable core of values and functions, which is an influential factor in police occupational cultures and action. This study supported the idea that while police culture and action is not static, there are notable continuities in routine police work and culture. Occupational culture reacts to the police institutional values and functions (Skolnick 1966) as well as the policing field, with new cultural attitudes and behaviours emerging in response to changing routines and environments of police work (Chan 1996; Loftus 2009; O'Neill and McCarthy 2014). Culture should be understood as a process of collective sensemaking and enactment with 'ideational, behavioural, material, social structural, and emergent elements' (Crank 2004, 15), as this appreciates the connections between the macro, meso, and micro processes and goes beyond depictions of culture as merely words or negative traits to be reformed (Waddington 1999). Furthermore, policing studies should extend the study of police cultures to the idiocultures of local groups (Fine 1987; 2012), as the group unit has had little theoretical nor analytical attention to date. This would build on work that identifies the divisions in police cultures that are influenced by rank and roles (Reuss-Ianni 1982; Cosgrove 2016).

7.4.4   Future Directions for Research

In approaching the third decade of the twentieth century, over a decade after the financial crash, the contemporary landscape of NP and other local policing models across the territorial police forces of England and Wales provides an array of opportunities for future research on the implementation of new approaches. There are many police forces that are already remodelling neighbourhood/local policing (Higgins 2018), and sites with such deliberate reforms would make fascinating case studies or comparison sites for research that aims to understand how local policing reforms are being configured. Such research could explore how the structures of models impact routine police work and policing delivery, to what extent neighbourhood security functions are emphasised by reformers, and how street level police understand their roles. An in depth qualitative research design could reveal how these reforms are framed by policing organisations as well as sensemaking at the street level. Additionally, models with well-defined objectives and delivery mechanisms would be suited to systematic evaluations to appraise modelling and implementation.

233

Furthermore, research into these models that can react to significant events or socio-economic shifts could explore similar themes of reform and change as this thesis did, as timing is an important element of institutional change research.

This thesis has discussed the potential importance of the team as an interacting 'group' that can produce an idioculture, and the 'groupness' and dynamics of NPTs and other policing teams could be ethnographically investigated through this lens. For these groups to interact sufficiently to build an idioculture, the structures of the model would have to allow for occasional-regular face-to-face interactions between team members. Sustained ethnographic investigation could reveal whether these teams do represent Fine's (1987; 2012) local group and uncover the influence exerted by the highest status members. In this study, NPT operatives considered sergeants to be influential in setting the style of policing and standards of action in the team, even if this went against the dominant understanding of NP in NPTs. The structures of the model, group dynamics, storytelling, negotiations, and sensemaking should be investigated to broaden knowledge of the social organisation of policing teams and its impact on policing delivery.

8 References

Afoko, C. and Vockins, D. 2013. *Framing the Economy: The Austerity Story*, London: New Economics Foundation, available online at https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/a12416779f2dd4153c_2hm6ixryj.pdf (accessed 29/01/2019).

Alderson, J. 1979. *Policing Freedom: A Commentary on the Dilemmas of Policing in Western Democracies*, Plymouth: Macdonald and Evans.

Asquith, N.L., Bartkowiak-Théron, I. and Roberts, K.A. 2017. *Policing Encounters with Vulnerability*, London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Association of Chief Police Officers and Centrex. 2006. *Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing*, Wyboston: National Centre for Policing Excellence, available at http://library.college.police.uk/docs/acpo/Professionalising-NeighbourhoodPolicing.pdf (accessed on 27/03/2018).

Bacon, M. 2014. 'Police culture and the new policing context', In J.M. Brown (Ed) *The Future of Policing*, London: Routledge, pp. 103–119.

Bahn, C. 1974. 'The Reassurance Factor in Police Patrol', *Criminology*, 12(3), pp. 338-345.

Banton, M. 1964. *The Policeman in the Community*, London: Tavistock.

Barker, A. and Crawford, A. 2013. 'Policing urban insecurities through visible patrols: Managing public expectations in times of fiscal restraint', in Lippert, R. and Walby, L. Eds. *Policing Cities: Urban Securitization and Regulation in a 21st Century World*. London: Routledge, pp. 11–28.

Barley, S. 2008. 'Coalface Institutionalism', in R. Greenwood, C. Oliver and T.B. Lawrence. Eds. *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism,* 2nd Edition, London: Sage, pp. 338-364.

Barlow, D.E. and Barlow, M.H. 1999. 'A Political Economy of Community Policing', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 22(4), pp. 646-674.

Barrett, D. 2013. 'Don't turn police into social workers, says minister', *The Telegraph*, December 3rd, available online at

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10491532/Dont-turn-police-into-social-workers-says-minister.html (accessed 27/01/2019).

Bartkowiak-Théron, I. and Asquith, N.L. 2012. 'The Extraordinary Intricacies of Policing Vulnerability', *Australian Journal of Policing: a Journal of Professional Practice and Research*, **4**(2), pp. 43–49.

Bartkowiak-Théron, I. and Asquith, N.L. 2015. 'Policing Diversity and Vulnerability in the Post-Macpherson Era: Unintended Consequences and Missed Opportunities', *Policing*, 9(1), pp. 89-100.

Bassey, A. 2013. 'Birmingham "has become a byword for Islamic extremist terror"', *Birmingham Mail*, May 4th, available online at http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/local-news/birmingham-has-become-byword-islamic-3408471 (accessed 31/07/18).

Bauman, Z. 2000. *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bayley, D.H. 1994. *Future for the Police*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BBC News. 2015a. *Plans to Cut PCSO Numbers by 78% in West Midlands Announced*, November 10th, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34778430 (accessed 25/02/16).

BBC News. 2015b. *West Midlands PCSOs in Jobs Reprieve*, 18th December, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-35134909 (accessed 25/02/16).

BBC News. 2016. *Police forces 'sleepwalking' away from communities*, 18th February, available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35599312 (accessed 30/01/2019).

BBC News. 2017. *Norfolk Police: Abolition of PCSOs plan going ahead*, 29th March, available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-norfolk-43573049 (accessed 19/08/19).

BBC. 2018. 'Reality Check: Is Police Funding Falling?', *BBC News*, 11th April, available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43699623 (accessed 31/07/18).

Beake, N. 2015. 'Met Police considers scrapping 1,000 neighbourhood PCSOs', BBC News, 9th September, available online at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-34200384 (accessed 19/08/19).

Béland, D. 2009. 'Ideas, institutions, and policy change', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(5), pp. 701-718.

Bergman, U.M. and Hutchison, M.M. 2010. 'Expansionary Fiscal Contractions: Re-evaluating the Danish Case', *International Economic Journal*, 24(1), pp. 71-93.

Berry, C. 2016. *Austerity Politics and UK Economic Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Berry, M. 2016. 'No alternative to austerity: how BBC broadcast news reported the deficit debate', *Media, Culture and Society,* 38(6), pp. 844-863.

Bittner, E. 1970. *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*, Chevy Chase, MD: U.S. National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency.

Bluelight Consultancy. 2017. 'Tick Box Engagement – Time to Reconnect?', *Bluelight Consultancy blog*, available online at https://www.bluelightconsultancy.com/2017/06/23/tick-box-community-engagement-time-to-reconnect/ (accessed 31/07/18).

Blumer, H. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Blyth, M. 2013. *Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boje D. 1991. 'The storytelling organization: a study of story performances in an office-supply firm'. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 36(1), pp. 106–126.

Boulton, L., McManus, M., Metcalfe, L. and Brian, D. 2016. 'Calls for Police Service: Understanding the Demand Profile and the UK Police Response', *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 90(1), pp. 70-85.

Bouma, G. 1998. 'Distinguishing institutions and organisations in social change', *Journal of Sociology*, 34(3), pp. 232–245.

Bradford, B. 2011. *Police Numbers and Crime Rates – A Rapid Evidence Review*, London: HMIC.

Brain, T. 2010. *A History of Policing in England and Wales from 1974: A Turbulent Journey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brain, T. 2011. *Police Funding (England and Wales) 2011-2012: Police Briefing Paper No. 1*, Cardiff: Universities' Police Science Institute.

Bramall, R., Gilbert, J. and Meadway, J. 2016. 'What is Austerity?', *New Formations*, 87, pp. 119-140.

Bratton, W. 2005. 'Crime is down in New York City: Blame the Police', in Newburn, T. ed. *Policing: Key Readings*, Cullompton: Willan.

Brodeur, J.P. 2010. *The Policing Web,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brogden, M. 1982. *The Police: Autonomy and Consent*, London: Academic Press.

Brogden, M. and Nijhar, P. 2005. *Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches*, Cullompton: Willan.

Brown, J. 1982. *Policing by Multi-Racial Consent: The Handsworth Experience*, London: Bedford Square Press.

Bryman, A. 2004. *Social Research Methods*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bryman, A. 2006. 'Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it done?', 6(1), *Qualitative Research*, pp. 97-113.

Bullock, K. 2013. 'Community, Intelligence-led Policing and Crime Control', *Policing and Society*. 23(2), pp. 125-144.

Bullock, K. and Leeney, D. 2013. 'Participation, 'responsivity' and accountability in neighbourhood policing', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 13(2), pp. 199-214.

Bulmer, M. 1980. 'Why Don't Sociologists Make More Use of Official Statistics?', *Sociology*, 14(4), pp. 505-523.

Butterfield, R., Edwards, C. and Woodall, J. 2005. 'The New Public Management and Managerial Roles: the Case of the Police Sergeant', *British Journal of Management*, 16, pp. 329-341.

Byrne, J. and Marx, G. 2011, 'Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact', *Journal of Police Studies*, 3(20), pp. 17-40.

Cain, M. 1973. *Society and the Policeman's Role*, London: Routledge.

Carstensen, M. 2017. 'Institutional Bricolage in Times of Crisis', *European Political Science Review*, 9(1), pp. 139-160.

Chan, J. 1996. 'Changing Police Culture', *British Journal of Criminology*, 36(1), pp. 109-134.

Chan, J. 1997. *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multiracial Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chan, J. 2007. 'Making Sense of Police Reforms', *Theoretical Criminology*, 11(3), pp. 323-345.

Charman, S. 2018. *Police Socialisation, Identity and Culture*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Clarke, R.V. and Hough, M. 1984. *Crime and Police Effectiveness*, Home Office Research Study 79, London: Home Office.

College of Policing. 2018. *Neighbourhood policing guidelines*, https://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Support/Guidelines/Neighbourhood-Policing/Documents/Neighbourhood_policing_guidelines.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

Cooper, C., Anscombe, J., Avenell, J., McLean, F. and Morris, J. 2006. *A National Evaluation of Community Support Officers*, Home Office Research Study 297, London: Home Office.

Cordner, G.W. 1988. 'A Problem-Oriented Approach to Community Oriented Policing', in J. Greene and S.D. Mastrofski. Eds. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, London: Praeger.

Cosgrove, F. 2016. 'I wannabe a copper: The engagement of Police Community Support Officers with the dominant police occupational culture', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 16(1), pp. 119-138.

Cosgrove, F. and Ramshaw, P. 2015. 'It is what you do as well as the way you do it: The value and deployment of PCSOs in achieving public engagement', *Policing and Society*, 25(1), pp. 77–96.

Crank, J.P. 1994. 'Watchman and Community: Myth and Institutionalization in Policing', *Law and Society Review*, 28(2), pp. 325-352.

Crank, J.P. 2003. 'Institutional theory of police: a review of the state of the art', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 26(2,) 186–207.

Crank, J.P. and Langworthy, R. 1992. 'An Institutional Perspective of Policing', *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 83(2), pp. 338-363.

Crawford, A. 1998. *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Crawford, A. and Lister, S. 2004. "The patchwork shape of reassurance policing in England and Wales: Integrated local security quilts or frayed, fragmented and fragile tangled webs?", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 27(3), pp. 413-430.

Crawford, R., Disney, R. and Innes, D. 2015. *Funding the English & Welsh police service: from boom to bust?*, IFS Briefing Note BN179, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, available online at https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN179.pdf (accessed 6/11/2018).

Critchley, T.A. 1967. *A History of Police in England and Wales, 1900-1966*, London: Constable.

Cumberbatch, G. and Tadesse, M. 1987. 'Community Policing in Crisis', in J.W. Shaw, Nordlie, P.G. and Shapiro, R.M. Eds. *Strategies for Improving Race Relations*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 46-70.

Curtis, I. 2015. *The Use of Targets in Policing*, http://www.policesupers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Review_Targets_2015.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

D'Orsi, L. 2015. *Neighbourhood Policing Review 2014 – Phase 1*, London: Metropolitan Police Service, available online at http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/neighbourhood_policing_review_2014.pdf (accessed 25/05/2015).

Dixon, B. 1999. *Popular policing? Sector policing and the reinvention of police accountability*, PhD Thesis, available at http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4828 (accessed 17/08/2017).

Dixon, B. and Stanko, B. 1995. 'Sector policing and public accountability', *Policing and Society*, 5(3), pp. 171-183.

240

Dodd, V. 2019. 'Police force that axed PCSOs takes on zero-hours 'scene guards'', *The* Guardian, 7th February, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/07/police-force-that-axed-pcsos-takes-on-zero-hours-scene-guards (accessed 19/08/19).

Donald, B., Glasmeier, A., Gray, M. and Lobao, L. 2014. 'Austerity in the City: Economic Crisis and Urban Service Decline?', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 7(1), pp. 3-15.

Donoghue, J. 2013. 'Reflections on risk, anti-social behaviour and vulnerable/repeat victims', *British Journal of Criminology*, 53(5), pp. 805-823.

Douglas, M. 1994. *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*, Paperback Edition, New York: Routledge.

Downey, S. 2015. 'Role of PCSOs changing in the face of cuts', *Police Oracle*, 16th June, available online at http://www.policeoracle.com/news/local_and_neighbourhood_policing/2015/Jun/12/role-of-pcsos-changing-in-face-of-cuts-_88558.html (accessed 16/06/15).

Duneier, M. and Molotch, H. 1999. 'Talking City Trouble: Interactional Vandalism, Social Inequality and the "Urban Interaction Problem"', *American Journal of Sociology*, 104(5), pp. 1263-1295.

Eck, J.E. and Rosenbaum, D.P. 1994. 'The new police order: Effectiveness, equity, and efficiency in community policing', In D.P. Rosenbaum. Ed. *The challenge of community policing: Testing the promises,* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Eck, J.E. and Spelman, W. 1987. *Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News*, Washington, DC: Department of Justice.

Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. 2009. 'The Preventive Turn and the Promotion of Safer Communities in England and Wales', in A. Crawford. Ed. *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*, Cullompton: Willan, pp. 62-85.

Elliott-Davies, M., Donnelly, J., Boag-Munroe, F. and Van Mechelen, D. 2016. 'Getting a battering': The perceived impact of demand and capacity imbalance within the Police Service of England and Wales: A qualitative review', *The Police Journal*, 89(2), pp. 93-116.

Emsley, C. 1991. *The English Police: A Political and Social History*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Emsley, C. 1999. 'A typology of nineteenth-century police', *Crime, History and Societies*, 3(1), pp. 29-44.

Emsley, C. 2007. 'Community Policing/Policing and Communities: Some Historical Perspectives', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 1(2), pp. 235-245.

Ericson, R. 1994. 'The Division of Expert Knowledge in Policing and Security', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 45(2), pp. 149-175.

Ericson, R. and Shearing, C. 1986. 'The Scientification of Police Work' in G. Bohme and N. Stehr. Eds. *The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations*, Dordrecht: D. Riedel.

Esbensen, F-A. and Taylor, C.R. 1984. 'Foot Patrol and Crime Rates', *Southern Journal of Criminal Justice*, 8(Spring), pp. 184-194.

Fielding, N. 1991. *The Police and Social Conflict: Rhetoric and Reality*, London: Athlone Press.

Fielding, N. 1995. *Community Policing*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fielding, N. 2000. 'Community policing: Fighting crime or fighting colleagues?', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, 3(4), pp. 289-302.

Fielding, N. and Innes, M. 2006. 'Reassurance Policing, Community Policing and Measuring Police Performance', Policing and Society, 16(2), pp. 127-145.

Fine, G.A. 1979. 'Small Groups and Culture Creation: The Idioculture of Little League Baseball Teams', *American Sociological Review*, 44(5), pp. 733-745.

Fine, G.A. 1993. 'Ten Lies of Ethnography: Moral Dilemmas of Field Research', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 22(3), pp. 267-294.

Fine, G.A. 2010. 'The Sociology of Local Action and Its Publics', *Sociological Theory*, 28(4), pp. 355-376.

Fine, G.A. 2012. *Tiny Publics: A Theory of Group Action and Culture*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Fine, G.A. and Hallett, T. 2014. 'Group Cultures and the Everyday Life of Organizations: Interaction Orders and Meso-Analysis', *Organization Studies*, 35(12), pp. 1773-1792.

Fisher, A. and Ritchie, S. 2015. 'A Functional Shift: Building a New Model of Engagement', *Policing*, 9(1), pp. 101–114.

Flanagan, R. 2008. *The Review of Policing: Final Report*, London: Home Office.

Fleming, J. and Grabosky, P. 2009. 'Managing the Demand for Police Services, or How to Control an Insatiable Appetite', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 3(3), pp. 281–291.

Fleming, J. and McLaughlin, E. 2010. ''The Public Gets What the Public Wants?' Interrogating the Public Confidence Agenda', *Policing*, 4(3), pp. 199-202.

Fleming, J. and McLaughlin, E. 2012. 'Through a different lens: researching the rise and fall of New Labour's 'public confidence agenda'', *Policing and Society*, 22(3), pp. 280-294.

Fogelson, R. 1977. *Big City Police*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Foster, J. and Jones, C. 2010. ''*Nice to do' and essential: improving neighbourhood policing in an English police force',* Policing: a Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(4), pp. 395-402.

Fraser, C., Hagelund, C., Sawyer, K. and Stacey, M. 2014. *The Expert Citizen*, London: Reform, available online at http://www.reform.co.uk/content/34685/research/criminal_justice/the_expert_citizen (accessed 20/07/2014).

Friedmann, R.R. 1992. *Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Fung, A. 2006. *Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fyfe, N.R. 1992. 'Towards locally sensitive policing: politics, participation and power in community/police consultation', in D. Evans, N. Fyfe and D. Herbert. Eds. *Crime, Policing and Place: Essays in Environmental Criminology,* London: Routledge, pp. 305-326.

Garland, D. 1996. 'The Limits of the Sovereign State', *British Journal of Criminology*, 36(4): pp. 445-471.

Gay W.G., Woodward, J.P. and Talmadge Day, H. 1977. *Neighborhood Team Policing: Phase I Report*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Geiger, D. and Antonacopoulou, E. 2009. 'Narratives and Organizational Dynamics: Exploring Blind Spots and Organizational Inertia,' *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 45(3), pp. 411–36.

Gilling, D. 2007. *Crime Reduction and Community Safety: Labour and the Politics of Local Crime Control*, Cullompton: Willan.

Gilling, D. 2008. "Celebrating a decade of the Crime and Disorder Act? A personal view", *Safer Communities*, 7(3), pp. 39-45.

Gloucestershire's Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner. 2018. *Neighbourhood Policing is very much a priority in Gloucestershire for PCC* https://www.gloucestershire-pcc.gov.uk/latest-news-media-martins-blog/neighbourhood-policing-is-very-much-a-priority-in-gloucestershire-for-pcc/ (accessed 30/01/2019).

Goffman, E. 1952. 'On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaption to Failure', *Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations*, 15(4), pp. 451–63.

Goffman, E. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Goffman, E. 1963. *Behaviour in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings*, New York: The Free Press.

Goffman, E. 1967. 'On Face-Work: an Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction', in *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour*, New York: Anchor Books, pp. 5-45.

Goffman, E. 1983. 'The Interaction Order - American Sociological Association, 1982 Presidential Address', *American Sociological Review*, 48(1), pp. 1-17.

Gold, R.L. 1958. 'Roles in Sociological Field Observations', *Social Forces*, pp. 217-223.

Goldstein, H. 1979. 'Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach', *Crime and Delinquency*, 25(2), pp. 236-258.

Goldstein, H. 1987. 'Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold Questions', *Crime and Delinquency,* 33(1), pp. 6-30.

Goldstein, H. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gorer, G. 1955. *Exploring English Character*, London: Cresset Press.

Green, D. 2013. *Damian Green Speech on Police Reform,* July 8th, available online at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/damian-green-speech-on-police-reform (accessed 27/01/2019).

Greene, J.A. 1999. 'Zero Tolerance: a Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City', *Crime and Delinquency*, 45(2), pp. 171-187.

Greene, J.R. 2000. 'Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and Function of the Police', *Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System*, Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice.

Greenhalgh, S. and Gibbs, B. 2014. *The Police Mission in the Twenty-First Century: Rebalancing the Role of the First Public Service*, London: Reform, available online at http://www.reform.co.uk/content/32744/research/criminal_justice/the_police_mission (accessed 07/07/2014).

Greer, S.A. and Page, C.H. 1955. *Social Organization: Studies in Sociology*, New York: Random House.

Greig-Midlane, J. 2014. *Changing the Beat? The Impact of Austerity on the Neighbourhood Policing Workforce*, Cardiff: Universities' Police Science Institute, available online at http://upsi.org.uk/news/2014/11/11/new-report-on-the-impact-of-austerity-on-the-neighbourhood-policing-workforce (accessed 31/07/2017).

Greig-Midlane, J. 2015. '"A five-fold increase in neighbourhood officers. Really, Prime Minister?", *Policing Insight*, Available online at https://policinginsight.com/analysis/4934/ (accessed 17/08/2018).

Grierson, J. 2018. 'Cuts have left policing at risk of becoming irrelevant, MPs warn', *The Guardian*, 25th October, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/25/cuts-have-left-policing-at-risk-of-becoming-irrelevant-mps-warn (accessed 30/01/2019).

245

Grimshaw, D. 2013. 'Austerity, privatisation and levelling down: Public sector reforms in the United Kingdom', in D. Vaughan-Whitehead. Ed. Public Sector Shock: The Impact of Policy Retrenchment in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar and Geneva: ILO.

Grimshaw, D. 2015. 'Britain's social model: Rapid descent from 'liberal collectivism' to a 'market society'', in D. Vaughan-Whitehead. Ed. *The European Social Model in Times of Economic Crisis and Austerity*. Cheltenham and Geneva: Edward Elgar and ILO, pp. 419-462.

Grimshaw, D. and Rubery, J. 2012. 'The end of the UK's liberal collectivist social model? The implications of the coalition government's policy during the austerity crisis', *Cambridge Journal of Economics,* 36(1), pp. 105-126.

Grimshaw, D. and Rubery, J. 2015. 'Neoliberalism 2.0: Crisis and austerity in the UK', in S. Lehndorff. Ed. *Divisive Integration: the Triumph of Failed Ideas in Europe*, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.

Guillemin, M. and Gillam, L. 2004. 'Ethics, Reflexivity, and "Ethically Important Moments" in Research', *Qualitative Inquiry*, 10(2), pp. 261-280.

Hales, G. and Higgins, A. 2016. *Prioritisation in a Changing World: Seven Challenges for Policing*, London: Police Foundation.

Hall, P.M. 1987. 'Interactionism and the Study of Social Organization', *Sociological Quarterly,* 28(1), pp. 1-22.

Hallenberg, K., O'Neill, M. and Tong, S. 2015. 'Watching the Detectives: Researching Investigative Practice' in Brunger, M., Tong, S. and Martin, D. Eds. *Introduction to Policing Research: Taking Lessons from Practice,* London: Routledge, pp. 101-118.

Hammersley, M. 2000. *Taking Sides in Social Research*: *Essays on Partisanship and Bias*, London: Routledge.

Harcourt, B.E. 2002. *Illusion of Order*: *The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harcourt, B.E. and Ludwig, J. 2006. 'Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment', *The University of Chicago Law Review,* 73(1), pp. 271-320.

Harradine, S., Kodz, J., Lernetti, F. and Jones, B. 2004. *Defining and Measuring Anti-Social Behaviour*, Home Office Development and Practice Report No. 26. London: Home Office.

Hastings, A., Bailey, N., Bramley, G., Gannon, M. and Watkins, D. 2015. *The Cost of the Cuts: the Impact on Local Government and Poorer Communities*, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). 2018. *PEEL: Police effectiveness 2017. A national overview*, https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-1.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). 2019. *PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19. An inspection of Norfolk Constabulary*, available online at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-norfolk.pdf (accessed 19/08/19).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). 2017. *PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2016: An Inspection of West Midlands Police*, London: HMIC, available online at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2016-west-midlands.pdf (accessed 29/01/2019).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. 2012. *Policing in Austerity: One Year On*, London: HMIC, available online at http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/policing-in-austerity-one-year-on.pdf (accessed 28/04/2015)

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. 2014. *Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge*, available online at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf (accessed 29/01/2019).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. 2017. *State of Policing, 2016*, London: HMIC, available online at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/state-of-policing-2016.pdf (accessed 31/07/18).

Her Majesty's Treasury. 2015. *A Country that Lives within Its Means: Spending Review 2015*, London: HM Treasury, available online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att

achment_data/file/447101/a_country_that_lives_within_its_means.pdf (accessed 25/01/2019).

Herbert, S. 2000. 'Reassessing Police and Police Studies', *Theoretical Criminology*, 4(1), pp. 113-119.

Higgins, A. 2018. *The Future of Neighbourhood Policing*, London: Police Foundation.

Holdaway, S. 1977. 'Changes in Urban Policing' *British Journal of Sociology*, 28(2), pp. 119-137.

Holdaway, S. 1988. 'Blue Jokes: Humour in Police Work', in C. Powell and G.E.C. Paton. Eds. *Humour in Society: Resistance and Control*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 106-122.

Holdaway, S. 2017. 'The Re-Professionalisation of the Police in England and Wales', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, Online Access, pp. 1-17, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1748895817690214.

Holdaway, S. 2017. 'The Re-Professionalisation of the Police in England and Wales', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, Online Access, pp. 1-17, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1748895817690214.

Home Office. 2004a. *Building Communities, Beating Crime*, London: Home Office

Home Office. 2004b. *The National Policing Plan 2005-2008: Safer, Stronger Communities*, London: Home Office.

Home Office. 2019. *Police Funding for England and Wales, 2015-2020*, London: Home Office.

Horton, T. and Reed, H. 2011. 'The Distributional Consequences of the 2010 Spending Review', *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, 19(1), pp. 63-66.

Humphreys, M. and Brown, A.D. 2002. 'Narratives of organizational identity and identification: a case study of hegemony and resistance', *Organization Studies* 23(3), pp. 421-447.

Hunter, J. and Fyfe, N. 2012. *Police Officer and Community Perceptions of the Operation and Impact of the Community Engagement Model in Fife*, Dundee: Scottish Institute for Policing Research, online at http://www.sipr.ac.uk/downloads/FifeCEM.pdf (accessed 16/06/16).

Independent Police Commission. 2013. *Policing for a Better Britain, Report of the Independent Police Commission,* Essex: Anton Group, available online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/Researchcentresandgroups/mannheim/pdf/policingforabetterbritain.pdf (accessed 27/01/2019).

Innes, M. 2003. *Investigating Murder*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Innes, M. 2004. 'Reinventing Tradition?: Reassurance, Neighbourhood Security and Policing', *Criminal Justice*, 4(2), pp. 151-171.

Innes, M. 2005a. 'Why "Soft" Policing is Hard: On the Curious Development of Reassurance Policing, How it Became Neighbourhood Policing and What This Signifies about the Politics of Police Reform', Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 15(3), pp. 156-169.

Innes, M. 2005b. 'What's Your Problem? Signal Crimes and Citizen-Focused Problem Solving', *Criminology and Public Policy,* 4(2), pp. 187–200.

Innes, M. 2014a. 'Reinventing the Office of Constable: Progressive Policing in Austerity', in J. Brown. Ed. *The Future of Policing*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 64-78.

Innes, M. 2014b. *Signal Crimes: Social Reactions to Crime, Disorder, and Control*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Innes, M. and Fielding, N. 2002. 'From Community to Communicative Policing: Signal Crimes and the Problem of Public Reassurance', *Sociological Research Online,* 7(2), Accessed at http://www.socresonline.org.uk/7/2/innes.

Innes, M. and Sheptycki, J. 2004. 'From Detection to Disruption', *International Criminal Justice Review*, 14(1), pp. 1-24.

Innes, M. and Weston, N. 2010. *Rethinking the Policing of Anti-Social Behaviour*, London: HMIC.

Innes, M., Abbott, L., Lowe, T. and Roberts, C. (2009) 'Seeing like a citizen: field experiments in 'community intelligence-led policing', P*olice Practice and Research*, 10(2), pp. 99-114.

Innes, M., Fielding, N. and Cope, N. 2005. 'The Appliance of Science: The Theory and Practice of Crime Intelligence Analysis', *British Journal of Criminolog*y, 45(1), pp. 39-57.

249

Jick, T.D. 1979. 'Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24(4), pp. 602-611.

Johnston, L. 2003. 'From "pluralisation" to the "police extended family": Discourses on the governance of community policing in Britain'. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 31(3), pp. 185–204.

Johnston, L. 2005. 'From 'community' to 'neighbourhood' policing: police community support officers and the 'police extended family' in London', *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 15(3), pp. 241–254.

Johnston, L. 2007. ''Keeping the Family Together'. Police Community Support Officers and the 'Police Extended Family' in London', *Policing and Society,* 17(2), pp. 119-140.

Johnston, N. and Politowski, B. 2016. *Police Funding,* Briefing Paper 7279, House of Commons Library, available online at http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7279/CBP-7279.pdf (accessed 31/07/18).

Jones-Brown, D.D. 2000. 'Debunking the Myth of Officer Friendly: How African American Males Experience Community Policing', *Journal of contemporary Criminal Justice*, 16(2), pp. 209-229.

Jones, D.J. and Baumgartner, F.R. 2012. 'From There to Here: Punctuated Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information Processing', *Policy Studies Journal*, 40(1), pp. 1-19.

Jones, M. 2015. 'Researching Sexuality and Policing: Reflections from the Field', in Brunger, M., Tong, S. and Martin, D. Eds. *Introduction to Policing Research: Taking Lessons from Practice,* London: Routledge, pp. 203-216.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. 2002. 'Policy Convergence and Crime Control in the USA and the UK', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 2(2), pp. 173-203.

Keay, S. and Kirby, S. 2017. 'Defining Vulnerability: From the Conceptual to the Operational', *Policing*, 12(4), pp. 428-438.

Kelling, G.L. and Coles, C. 1996. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in our Cities*, New York: Free Press.

Kelling, G.L. and Moore, M.H. 1988. 'From Political to Reform to Community: the Evolving Strategy of Police', in J. Greene and S.D. Mastrofski. Eds. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, London: Praeger.

Kelling, G.L. Pate, A., Dieckman D. and Brown C. 1974. *The Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment*, Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Kirby, J. 2007. *ACPO Guidance on Police Community Support Officers*, available online at http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/LPpartnerships/2007/200709LPPGonPCSO.pdf (accessed 01/03/2015)

Klinger, D. 1997. 'Negotiating order in patrol work: an ecological theory of police response to deviance', *Criminology*, 35(2), pp. 277–306.

Kollmeyer, C. and Pichler, F. 2013. 'Is Deindustrialization Causing High Unemployment in Affluent Countries? Evidence from 16 OECD Countries, 1970-2003', *Social Forces*, 91(3), pp. 785-812.

Koper, C. 1995. 'Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hotspots'. *Justice Quarterly*, 12(4), pp. 649-672.

Lawrence, P. 2017. 'The Vagrancy Act (1824) and the Persistence of Pre-emptive Policing in England since 1750', *British Journal of Criminology*, 57(3), pp. 513-531.

Layder, D. 1998. *Sociological Practice: Linking Theory and Social Research*, London: Sage.

Lipsky, M. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lister, S. 2013. 'The New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commissioners and the 'Operational Independence' of the police', *Policing*, 7(3), pp. 239-47.

Lister, S. and Rowe, M. 2015. 'Electing police and crime commissioners in England and Wales: prospecting for the democratisation of policing', *Policing and Society*, 25(4), pp. 358-377.

Lister, S., Adams, B. & Phillips, S. 2015. *Evaluation of Police-Community Engagement Practices*, An Exploratory Knowledge Platform for Policing: Exploiting Knowledge Assets, Utilising Data and Piloting Research Co-production, University of

Leeds. Available online: http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/research/projects/an-exploratory-knowledge-platform-for-policing/.

Lloyd, K. and Foster, J. 2009. *Citizen Focus and Community Engagement: A Review of the Literature*, London: The Police Foundation.

Loader, I. 1997. 'Policing and the Social: Questions of Symbolic Power', *British Journal of Sociology*, 48(1), pp. 1-18.

Loader, I. 2006. 'Policing, Recognition, and Belonging', *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 605(1), pp. 201-221.

Loader, I. 2014. 'Why Do the Police Matter? The Myth of Crime-Fighting', in J. Brown. Ed. *The Future of Policing*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 40-51.

Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A. 2003. *Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Loftus, B. 2009. *Police culture in a changing world*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Longstaff, A., Willer, J., Chapman, J., Czarnomski, S. and Graham, J. 2015. *Neighbourhood Policing: Past, Present and Future. A Review of the Literature*, London: Police Foundation.

Loveday, B. and Smith, R. 2015. 'A critical evaluation of current and future roles of police community support officers and neighbourhood wardens within the Metropolitan Police Service and London boroughs: Utilising 'low-cost high-value' support services in a period of financial austerity', *International Journal of Police Science & Management,* 17(2), pp. 74–80.

Lowe, T. and Innes, M. 2012. 'Can We Speak in Confidence?: Community Intelligence and Neighbourhood Policing v2.0', *Policing and Society,* 22(3), pp. 295-316.

Lowe, T., Innes, H., Innes, M. and Grinnell, D. 2015. *The work of Welsh Government funded Community Support Officers*, Welsh Government Social Research, available online at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51b06364e4b02de2f57fd72e/t/58d125eecd0f68e7f3624bee/1490101758159/wg-funded-community-support-officers-en.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. 2011. 'Local Governance under the Coalition Government: Austerity, Localism and the 'Big Society'', *Local Government Studies*, 38(1), pp. 21-40.

252

Lum, C., Telep, C., Koper, C. and Grieco, J. 2012. 'Receptivity to research in policing'. *Justice Research and Policy,* 14(1), pp. 61–95.

Lynes, D.A. 1996. 'Cultural diversity and social order: Rethinking the role of community policing', *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 24(6), pp. 491-502.

Lyons, W. 1999. *The Politics of Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Maguire, E.R. and Katz, C.M. 2002. 'Community policing, loose coupling, and sensemaking in American police agencies', *Justice Quarterly*, 19(3), pp. 503-536.

Maguire, M. 2000. 'Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence-led crime control', *Policing and Society: An International Journal*, 9(4), pp. 315-336.

Maguire, M. 2008. 'Criminal Investigation and Crime Control', in T. Newburn. Ed. *Handbook of Policing*, Second Edition, Devon: Willan, pp. 430-464.

Mahoney, J, and Thelen, K. 2009. 'A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change', in J. Mahoney and K. Thelen. Eds. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-37.

Manning, P.K. 1984. 'Community Policing', *American Journal of Police*, 3(2), pp. 205-227.

Manning, P.K. 1997. *Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing*, Second Edition, Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Manning, P.K. 2001. 'Theorizing Policing: The drama and myth of crime control in the NYPD', *Theoretical Criminology*, 5(3), pp. 315-344.

Manning, P.K. 2003. *Policing Contingencies*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Manning, P.K. 2008. 'Goffman on Organisations', *Organization Studies*, 29(5), pp. 677-699.

Manning, P.K. 2010. *Democratic Policing in a Changing World*, London: Paradigm.

Manning, P.K. 2014. 'Policing: Privatising and Changes to the Policing Web', in J. Brown. Ed. *The Future of Policing*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 23-39.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. 2011. 'Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"', in R.E. Goodin. Ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, pp. 159-175.

253

Marks, M. 2000. 'Transforming robocops? A case study of police organisational change', *Society in Transition*, 31(2), pp. 144-162.

Mastrofski, S.D., Worden, R.E and Snipes, J.B. 1995. 'Law Enforcement in a Time of Community Policing', *Criminology*, 33(4), pp. 539-564.

Mawby, R.I. 2000. 'Core Policing: the Seductive Myth', in F. Leishman, B. Loveday and S. Savage. Eds. *Core Issues in Policing*, 2nd Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education, pp.107-123.

May, T. 2010. *Police reform: Theresa May's speech to the National Policing Conference*, Speech to the Association of Chief Police Officers and Association of Police Authorities National Conference on 29 June 2010 Manchester, text available online at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/police-reform-theresa-mays-speech-to-the-national-policing-conference (accessed 29/01/2019).

May, T. 2015. *Home Secretary's Police Federation 2015 Speech*, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-police-federation-2015-speech (Accessed 26/10/16).

Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. 2013. *Police and Crime Plan, 2013-2016*, MOPAC: London, available online at http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/PoliceCrimePlan%202013-16.pdf (accessed 22/06/14).

Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. 2015. *Review of the Transition to the Local Policing Model*, MOPAC: London.

McCarthy, D. 2014. *Soft Policing: The Collaborative Control of Anti-Social Behaviour*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

McCarthy, D. and O'Neill, M. 2014. 'The Police and Partnership Working: Reflections on Recent Research', *Policing*, 8(3), pp. 243-253.

McCarthy, D.J. 2013. 'Gendering 'Soft' Policing: Multi-Agency Working, Female Cops, and the Fluidities of Police Culture/s', *Policing and Society*, 23(2), pp. 261-278.

Mclaughlin, E. 1994. Community, Policing and Accountability: The Politics of Policing in Manchester in the 1980s, Aldershot: Avery.

McLaughlin, E. 2005. 'Forcing the Issue: New Labour, New Localism and the Democratic Renewal of Police Accountability', *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 44(5), pp. 473-489.

Meijer, A.V. 2012. 'Co-production in an Information Age: Individual and Community Engagement Supported by New Media', *Voluntas*, 23(4), pp. 1156-1172.

Merritt, J. and Dingwall, G. 2010. 'Does Plural Suit Rural? Reflections on Quasi-Policing in the Countryside', *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 12(3), pp. 388-400.

Millie, A. 2008. *Antisocial Behaviour*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Millie, A. 2014. 'What are the Police for? Rethinking Policing Post-austerity', in J. Brown. Ed. *The Future of Policing*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 52-63.

Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. 2010. *Police Expenditure, 1999-2009*, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, available at https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/Police%20expenditure%201999-2009.pdf (Accessed 31/07/18).

Moore, M.H. and Kelling, G.L. 1983. 'To Serve and Protect - Learning from Police History', *Public Interest*, 70(winter), pp. 46-69.

Morgan, R. 1989. 'Policing by consent: legitimating the doctrine', in R. Morgan and D.J. Smith. Eds. *Coming to Terms with Policing: Perspectives on Policy*, London: Routledge.

Morgan, R. 2012. 'Crime and Justice in the 'Big Society', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 12(5), pp. 463-481.

Morgan, R. and Smith, D.J. 1989. 'Introduction: Opening the Debate', in R. Morgan and D.J. Smith. Eds. *Coming to Terms with Policing: Perspectives on Policy*, London: Routledge, pp.1-10.

Muir, W.K., Jr. 1977. *Police: Streetcorner Politicians*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Näslund, L. and Pemer, F. 2012. 'The appropriated language: Dominant stories as a source of organizational inertia', *Human Relations*, 65(1), pp. 89–110.

National Police Chief's Council (NPCC). 2016. *Policing Vision 2025*, https://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/Policing%20Vision.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

National Audit Office 2014. *The Impact of Funding Reductions on Local Authorities*, London: National Audit Office.

255

National Audit Office. 2018. *Financial Sustainability of Police Forces in England and Wales 2018*, available online https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces-in-England-and-Wales-2018.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

National Police Improvement Agency. 2008. *Neighbourhood Policing Programme: PCSO Review*. London: NPIA.

National Police Improvement Agency. 2008b. *Citizen Focus Policing Hallmarks*. London: NPIA.

Neocleous, M. 2000. *The Fabrication of Order*, London: Pluto Press.

Norfolk Constabulary. 2018. *Norfolk 2020 – One Year on,* 26th October, available online at https://www.norfolk.police.uk/news/latest-news/26-10-2018/norfolk-2020-one-year (19/08/19).

O'Neill, M. 2014. 'Ripe for the Chop or the Public Face of Policing? PCSOs and Neighbourhood Policing in Austerity', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 8(3), pp. 265-273.

O'Neill, M. 2014. *PCSOs as the Paraprofessionals of Policing: findings and recommendations from a research project*, Dundee: University of Dundee, Available online at http://www.sipr.ac.uk/downloads/PCSO_project_report.pdf (accessed 14/03/17).

O'Neill, M. 2017. 'Police community support officers in England: a dramaturgical analysis', *Policing and Society*, 27(1), pp. 21-39.

O'Neill, M. and McCarthy, D. 2012. '(Re)negotiating police culture through partnership working: Trust, compromise and the 'new' pragmatism', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 14(2), pp. 143-159.

Oettmeier, T.N. and Brown, L.P. 1988. 'Developing a Neighbourhood-Oriented Policing Style', in J. Greene and S.D. Mastrofski. Eds. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, London: Praeger, pp. 121-134.

Office for National Statistics (ONS). 2015. *Crime Statistics, Focus on Public Perceptions of Crime and the Police, and the Personal Well-being of Victims: 2013 to 2014*, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compe

ndium/crimestatisticsfocusonpublicperceptionsofcrimeandthepoliceandthepersonal wellbeingofvictims/2015-03-26 (accessed 30/01/2019).

Office for National Statistics. 2018. *Public sector finances, UK: June 2018*, available online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/727393/PSF_bulletin_June_2018_-_HMT.pdf (accessed 31/07/18).

Peck, J. 2010. *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Penny, J. 2013. *Public services and (in)equality in an age of austerity*, British Council, available at https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/dk_d160_book_4_public_servic es_joe_penny.pdf (accessed on 31/07/18).

Pidd, H. and Dodd, V. (2014) 'Police chief condemns appointment of terror officer over 'Islamic schools plot'', The Guardian, 15th April, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/15/police-chief-counter-terror-officer-islamic-schools-plot-birmingham (accessed 30/01/2019).

Plummer, K. 1995. Telling Sexual Stories. Power, Change and Social Worlds, London: Routledge.

Police Foundation. 1981. *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment*, Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Pollitt, C. 2001. 'Convergence: The Useful Myth?', *Public Administration*, 79(4), pp. 933-947.

Povey, K. 2001. *Open All Hours – A Thematic Inspection Report on the Role of Police Visibility and Accessibility in Public Reassurance*, London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

Prottas, J. M. 1979. P*eople-processing: The street-level bureaucrat in public service bureaucracies*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.

Punch, M. 2012. 'COP's vulnerability to paradigm swing', *European Journal of Policing Studies,* 1(0), pp. 23-38.

Quinton, P. and Morris, J. 2008. *Neighbourhood Policing: The Impact of Piloting and Early National Implementation,* Home Office Online Report 01/08, available online

at   http://openeyecommunications.typepad.com/Uploads/NHPImpactReport.pdf
(accessed 30/01/13).

Ratcliffe, J. 2002. 'Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice', *Policing and Society*, 12(1), pp. 53-66.

Reaves, B. and Hickman, M. 2002. *Police departments in large cities, 1990-2000*, Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Reiner, R. 1992. 'Policing a Postmodern Society', *Modern Law Review*, 55(6), pp. 761-781.

Reiner, R. 2000. *The Politics of the Police,* 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R. 2007. *Law and Order: An Honest Citizen's Guide to Crime and Control*, Cambridge: Polity.

Reiner, R. 2010. *The Politics of the Police*, 4th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R. 2013. 'Who governs? Democracy, plutocracy, science and prophecy in policing', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 13(2), pp. 161-180.

Reiner, R. 2016. 'Conservatives and the Constabulary in Great Britain: cross-dressing conundrums', in M. Deflem. Ed. *The Politics of Policing: Between Force and Legitimacy*, (Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Volume 21) Bingley: Emerald Publishing, pp. 79-96.

Reissner, S.C. 2011. 'Patterns of stories of organisational change', *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, 24 (5), pp. 593-609.

Reith, C. 1948. *A Short History of the British Police*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rodger, J. 2017. 'Birmingham police call out Katie Hopkins after 'no-go' zones claim', *Birmingham   Mail*,   7th   June,   available   online   at http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/birmingham-police-call-out-katie-13150958 (accessed 30/01/2019).

Rosenbaum, D. 1998. 'The Changing Role of the Police: Assessing the Current Transition to Community Policing', in J-P. Brodeur. Ed. *How to Recognize Good Policing: Problems and Issues*, Thousand Oaks: Sage and Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 3-29.

Rousell, A. and Gascón, L.D. 2014. 'Defining "Policeability": Cooperation, Control, and Resistance in South Los Angeles Community-Police Meetings', *Social Problems*, 61(2), pp. 237-258.

Rubinstein, J. 1973. *City Police*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Rudd, A. (2016). *Home Secretary's College of Policing speech on vulnerability*, 30th November, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-college-of-policing-speech-on-vulnerability.

Sagar, T. and Jones, D. 2012. 'Priorities for the minority? Street-based sex work and Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT)', *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 13(4), pp. 431-445.

Sampson, R.J., Raudenbush, S.W. and Earls, F. 1997. 'Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy', *Science*, 277, pp. 918-924.

Sanchez, R. 2015. 'Fox News 'terror expert' says everyone in Birmingham is a Muslim', *Telegraph*, 12th January, available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11338985/Fox-News-terror-expert-says-everyone-in-Birmingham-is-a-Muslim.html (accessed 30/01/2019).

Savage, S. 2007a. *Police Reform: Forces for Change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Savage, S. 2007b. 'Give and Take: the Bifurcation of Police Reform in Britain', *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 40(3), pp. 313-334.

Savage, S. 2007c. 'Neighbourhood Policing and the Reinvention of the Constable', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 1(2), pp. 203-213.

Savage, S.P. and Wilson, C. 1987. '"Ask a Policeman": Community Consultation in Practice', *Social Policy and Administration*, 21(3), pp. 252-263.

Scarman, Lord J. 1981. *The Brixton Disorders, 10th-12th April*, London: HMSO.

Scotsman, The. 2012. 'From the archive: Scottish police 13 July, 1950', *The Scotsman*, 13th July, online at https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/from-the-archive-scottish-police-13-july-1950-1-2409675/amp (last accessed 26/03/18).

Scott, J. 1998. 'Performance culture': The return of reactive policing', *Policing and Society: An International Journal*, 8(3), pp. 269-288.

Selznick, P. 1948. 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization', *American Sociological Review*, 13(1), pp. 25-35.

Shaw, D. 2015. 'Police Forces All Face Major Budget Cuts', *BBC News Website*, March 7th, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31771456 (accessed 28/04/15).

Shearing, C. D., and Ericson, R. V. 1991. 'Culture as figurative action', *British Journal of Sociology*, 42(4), pp. 481-506.

Sherman, L. (2011). Professional Policing and Liberal Democracy. *The 2011 Benjamin Franklin Medal Lecture*, November 1st, London: Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce.

Sherman, L. 1978. *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption*, London: University of California Press.

Sherman, L., Milton, C.H. and Kelly, T.V. 1973. *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies*, Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Simmonds, D. 2015. *Why Is the Clutch Slipping? Developing Clarity, Capacity and Culture for Citizen and Community Engagement*. London: College of Policing.

Sims, C. 2012. *Neighbourhood Policing: Report of the Chief Constable*, Birmingham: West Midlands Police Authority.

Sindall, K. and Sturgis, P. 2013. 'Austerity policing: Is visibility more important than absolute numbers in determining public confidence in the police?', *European Journal of Criminology*, 10(2), pp. 137-153.

Sklansky, D. 2008. *Democracy and the Police*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Skogan, W. 2008. 'Why Reforms Fail', *Policing and Society*, 18(1), pp. 23-34.

Skogan, W.G. 1989. 'Communities, Crime, and Neighborhood Organization', *Crime and Delinquency,* 35(3), pp. 437-457.

Skogan, W.G. 1990. Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighbourhoods, New York: Free Press.

Skogan, W.G. 2004. *CAPS at Ten: Community Policing in Chicago*, Chicago, IL: Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, available online at

http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/papers/urban-policy-and-community-development/docs/caps/Yr10-CAPSeval.pdf (accessed 28/03/18)

Skogan, W.G. and Hartnett, S.M. 1997. *Community Policing, Chicago Style*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skolnick, J.H. 1966. *Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Skolnick, J.H. 2008. 'Enduring issues of police culture and demographics', *Policing and Society*, 18(1), pp. 35-45.

Skolnick, J.H. and Bayley, D.H. 1986. *The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities*, New York: Free Press.

Skolnick, J.H. and Bayley, D.H. 1988. 'Theme and Variation in Community Policing', *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, 10, pp. 1-37.

Slovic, P. 1992. 'Perception of risk: Reflections on the psychometric paradigm', In S. Krimsky and D. Golding. Eds. *Social Theories of Risk,* New York: Praeger, pp. 117-152.

Stanley, L. 2015. *What Six Public Opinion Graphs Tell Us about Austerity,* available online at http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2015/07/09/public-opinion-graphs-austerity/ (accessed 26/07/18)

Storch, R.D. 1975. 'The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England, 1840-57', *International Review of Social History*, 20(1), pp.61-90.

Strauss, A. 1978. *Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes and Social Order*, London: Jossey-Bass.

Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. 2005. 'Introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies', in W. Streeck and K. Thelen. Eds. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-39.

Stuart, H. 2017. *Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015)*, available online at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Islamist-Terrorism-preview-1.pdf (accessed 30/01/2019).

Stuckler, D., Reeves, A., Loopstra, R., Karanikolos, M. and McKee, M. 2017. 'Austerity and health: the impact in the UK and Europe', *European Journal of Public Health*, 27(4), pp. 18-21.

Talarico, S.M. and Swanson C.R. Jr. 1980. 'The Limits of Team Policing?', *Police Studies: International Review of Police Development*, 3(2), pp. 21-29.

Taylor, D. 1997. T*he New Police in Nineteenth-Century England: Crime, Conflict and Control*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Thacher, D. 2001a. 'Equity and Community Policing: a New View of Community Partnerships', *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 20(1), pp. 3-16.

Thacher, D. 2001b. 'Conflicting Values in Community Policing', *Law and society Review*, 35(4), pp. 765-798.

Thornton, S. 2015. *NPCC Chair Sara Thornton: We must "re-imagine" policing in the UK*, https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/npcc-chair-sara-thornton-we-must-re-imagine-policing-in-the-uk (accessed 30/01/2019).

Topping, J. 2015. 'Policing in Northern Ireland: research, meaning, and lessons from a contested landscape', in Brunger, M., Tong, S. and Martin, D. Eds. *Introduction to Policing Research: Taking Lessons from Practice,* London: Routledge, pp. 71-86.

Travis, A. 2015a. 'Police force threatens to sue Theresa May over funding plans', *The Guardian*, 4th September, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/04/exclusive-police-force-west-midlands-threatens-sue-theresa-may-secret-funding-plans (accessed 30/01/2019).

Travis, A. 2015b. 'Paris attacks lead to surprise ring-fencing of UK police funding', *The Guardian*, 25th November, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/25/paris-attacks-lead-to-surprise-ring-fencing-of-uk-police-funding (accessed 16/08/2019).

Treadwell, J. and Garland, J. 2011. 'Masculinity, Marginalization And Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League', *British Journal of Criminolog*y, 51(4), pp. 621-634.

Tuffin, R., Morris, J. and Poole, A. 2006. *An Evaluation of the Impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme*, Research Study 296, London: Home Office, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115825/hors296.pdf.

262

UK Government. 2016. *Police and Crime Commissioners: here to stay: Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2015-16*, available online at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/822/82204.htm (accessed 11/01/19).

Van Maanen, J. 1978. 'The Asshole', in Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen. Eds. *Policing: A View From the Street*, New York: Random House.

Vitale, A. 2005. 'Innovation and Institutionalization: Factors in the Development of "Quality of Life" Policing in New York City', *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 15(2), pp. 99-124.

Waddington, P.A.J. 1999. *Policing Citizens,* London: UCL Press.

Walker, S. 1984. 'Broken Windows and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis', *Justice Quarterly*, 1(1), pp.75-90.

Walker, S. 1993. 'Does Anyone Remember Team Policing? Lessons of The Team Policing Experience for Community Policing', *American Journal of Police*, 7(1), pp. 33-55.

Wall, D.S. 2003. *Crime and the Internet: Cybercrimes and Cyberfears*, London: Routledge.

Walley, P. and Jennison-Phillips, A. 2018. 'A Study of Non-Urgent Demand to Identify Opportunities for Demand Reduction. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice'*, available online at https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pay034.

Warrell, H. 2013. 'Police forces veto G4S outsourcing deal', *Financial Times*, January 30th, available online at https://www.ft.com/content/6aef1640-6a65-11e2-a3db-00144feab49a (accessed 23/01/2019).

Weatheritt, M. 1988. 'Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality?', in J. Greene and S.D. Mastrofski. Eds. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, London: Praeger.

Weick, K.E.1995. *Sensemaking in Organizations*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Wessels, B. 2011. *Inside the Digital Revolution: Policing and Changing Communication with the Public*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

West Midlands Police Authority and West Midlands Police. 2011. *Strategic Policing Plan 2011-2015*, *Birmingham*: West Midlands Police Authority.

263

West Midlands Police Authority and West Midlands Police. 2012. *Strategic Policing Plan 2012-2015, Birmingham*: West Midlands Police Authority.

West Midlands Police. 2015. *2020 Vision Blueprint*. Birmingham: West Midlands Police Authority.

Westmarland, L. 2010. Dodgy Customers? Can the Police Ever Trust the Public? *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 4(3), 291–297.

Willis, J.J., Mastrofski, S.D. and Weisburd, D. 2007. 'Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments', *Law and Society Review*, 41(1), pp. 147-188.

Willliams, E. J. 2003. 'Structuring in Community Policing: Institutionalizing Innovative Change', *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 4(2), pp. 119-129.

Wilson, J.Q. and Kelling, G.L. 1982. 'The Police and Neighbourhood Safety: Broken Windows', *The Atlantic*, 127, March, pp. 29-38.

Wooff, A. 2016. ''Soft' Policing in Rural Scotland', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, advance access, pp. 1-9.

Yearley, S. 1988. 'Settling Accounts: Action, Accounts and Sociological Explanation', *British Journal of Sociology*, 39(4) pp. 578-599.

Zimring, F.E. 2011. *The City that Became Safe: New York's Lessons for Urban Crime and Its Control*, Oxford: OUP.

9 Appendix 1 - Participant Information Sheet

<u>Project Title</u>: Neighbourhood Policing in a new era: changes in Neighbourhood Policing Teams and community engagement

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you accept or decline it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

The research is being undertaken as part of a PhD thesis at Cardiff University, and is due to be completed by October 2016. This project has been approved by Cardiff University School of Social Sciences' Research Ethics Committee. The supervisors for the project are Professor Martin Innes and Doctor Amanda Robinson, and the project is funded by the Dawes Trust.

<u>Project Aim</u>:

The project is exploring how and why Neighbourhood Policing delivery has changed in recent years, in order to gain a better understanding of the current provision and potential future directions of local policing in England and Wales.

<u>Participants</u>

There will be a number of participants from one police force area. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you should keep this information sheet for your reference. You will then be asked to confirm that you are willing, but even after doing this you can still withdraw from the study at any reasonable time – before the writing up stage, which starts in January 2016 – and there is no obligation for you to give a reason.

Participants will be granted anonymity where it is possible for them to remain anonymous. Some participants with very specific roles could be identified in the final document through information provided about his/her role and police force area.

<u>Methods of Research</u>

The research will be conducted through **an interview** with each participant that should last approximately **one hour**.

- The interview will be largely conversational, so please be prepared for in-depth discussions about the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing.
- The location of the interview is subject to negotiation between you and the researcher.
- The **audio of the interview shall be recorded and later transcribed**. The audio recording is to be used only for analysis by the researcher and will not be published or passed on to any other individual or organisation.
- At any stage of the interview you may ask questions if you are uncertain about something, and you do not have to answer a question if you feel uncomfortable in doing so. If you wish, you may discontinue your participation at any time.

Results

If you wish to see the transcriptions of the interviews or results of the study, you can contact the researcher to request these. Contact details can be found at the bottom of this page.

Complaints

If you feel at any point during the research that you have been treated unfairly or are seriously dissatisfied in any way, you are free to contact the researcher's supervisor to make a formal complaint. Contact details are provided below.

Contact	Telephone	Email	Address
Jack Greig-Midlane, Researcher	07427 502 168	Greig-midlanej@cardiff.ac.uk	PhD Office 1-3 Museum Place CF10 3BD
Martin Innes, Project Supervisor	02920 875 307	innesm@cardiff.ac.uk	1-3 Museum Place CF10 3BD

Thank you for taking the time to read this information and considering taking part in this research. Please do not hesitate to contact the researcher if you have any other questions.

25 Appendix 2 - Consent Form

Project Title: Neighbourhood Policing in a new era: changes to
                       Neighbourhood Policing Teams and community
                       engagement

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have
    had the opportunity to ask questions.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time
    before the writing-up stage, without giving reason.

3. I understand that my responses are confidential, my name will not be linked with the research
    materials, and I will not be identified in the report or reports that result from the research,
    unless I request otherwise.

4. I agree to take part in the study.

5. I agree to the interview being audio recorded

Name of Participant	Date	Signature

Name of Researcher	Date	Signature

Please return this form to the researcher by email or post:

Jack Greig-Midlane
PhD office
Cardiff University
1-3 Museum Place
Cardiff
CF10 3BD

greig-midlanej@cardiff.ac.uk

26 Appendix 3 – Field notes

Kingston – PACT, 15/1/16

Venue –Islamic community centre

Attendees:

2 PCs, 1 male 1 female

1 PCSO

Around 30 attendees

Room layout: rectangular, conference style – trestle table at front of 3 rows of chairs, some chairs at back, all chairs are hard plastic with no arm rests – table with tea making facilities – bags, paper cups, flask of hot water behind main chair layout

Codes:

Front row = Row A

Second row = Row B, etc

A4 = "Majid"

C1 = "Imran"

C4 = "Usman"

Attendees, from left to right per row = A1, A2, etc; B1, B2, etc

Standing attendees and those seated at back of room not coded due to movement throughout meeting.

Other features:

Strip lighting – room is well lit

It is noticeably cold, especially before most of the attendees arrive, and some people are still wearing their coats, but it is not too uncomfortable to be without coat and shoes

There are exposed plastic and copper pipes on some of the walls, coming from the ceiling. Occasionally, the sound of running water or pressurised movement can be heard coming from different directions.

Floor is carpeted. The carpet is grey and, like the rest of the room, looks quite old. It is not very tatty or dirty though, probably due to the no shoes policy in the centre.

External   area:

The area is very close to the city centre (about 30 minutes' walk from New Street Station) with a mixture of low- and high-rise estates. I park my car in front of a row of small shops that is overlooked by the tower blocks. There is a park behind the towers. At just before six in the evening the area is busy with people using the shops and school students in uniforms. There is lots of chatter and people shouting to each other, not in an unfriendly way, and this makes for a bustling atmosphere at this time in the evening.

The attendees all seem to be of Islamic faith or culture, which is appropriate given the venue, but it means that other groups are not represented at the public meeting. It takes some time for the all attendees to arrive, and when the meeting starts the number is closer to 15 people at most.

When I enter the building I remove my shoes and wait on the ground level room, sat on decorative carpeted floor. Various people greet me and tell me the basement venue will be ready in a few minutes.

Once I enter the venue and take a seat in the second row (row B), one person seems to introduce me to the others who are already sat down in a different language. One or two say hello and the others look over but say nothing. One attendee (C1) approaches me as I am sat down and tells me that the police do very little for their community. He and the community have raised issues with them many times before but the police seem to excuse themselves of dealing with their concerns seriously. He says that they often use the phrase, "we have to prioritise our workload", which he interprets as a rhetorical way to brush off their concerns. He says the community feel ignored by the local police team. He speaks strongly and articulately, seemingly with determination and resentment.

271

The police arrive shortly after this. They are still wearing full uniforms including stab vests and boots. They are asked to remove their shoes as the centre users pray on the floor in this room. PC1 says they will if this is necessary. There is a polite back and forth interaction, with some of the centre representatives insisting it is not completely necessary if it is a hassle for the officers (not all who made their preference for no shoes known are involved in this decision), and PC1 removes his shoes. The PCSO offers to take them off but eventually decides to keep them on, and PC2 sits down at the end of row A and does not remove her shoes. PC1 and PCSO stand in front of the chairing table facing the rows of chairs.

As the room settles, but still with chatter and people coming into the room, PC1 starts the meeting by saying that they are "here to find out the issues you have" and then says that the meeting should be "community-led". In this context, where the police are in the chairing position, the PC appears to be defining this style as one where the meeting starts not with a police presentation of recent crimes or issues in the area, but with the attendees opening the discussion with their current concerns. There is no reference to any previous community priorities or any recent police action to deal with community-raised issues.

A4 speaks first, telling the officers that the community have had problems recently, and that people will want to raise concerns both generally in front of the room and privately. He speaks loudly, clearly and with a level of articulacy that makes his words sound rehearsed. PC1 responds with general comments about the recent calls they have been receiving that relate to this area, which are mostly related to the behaviour in an around the high-rise estates, such as people "hanging around on the stairwells", fighting and drug taking. He says that these are not just issues for the police and that other agencies have a responsibility to help in these areas too. He says that some understanding is needed for non-criminal behaviours as well, and they should "remember that some of them are your neighbours", suggesting that the attendees need to consider the maintenance of their relationships with the wider community.

PC1 goes on to point out that the policing team have recently, in partnership with the local premier league football club, set up some new engagement schemes for younger people – football and boxing clubs with classes – that is aiming to divert young people from deviant public activities. I think that these comments could have been used as the 'police-led' introduction that the PC announced that he would not make at the start of the meeting. Effectively there was little difference between doing this at the start and doing so after the first comment. However, the approach of reading out local crime statistics has been avoided, and PC1 might have been referring to this more so than the reference to local projects that he thinks address the community's general concerns.

A4 speaks again and says that the issues that generally concern people are related to their safety. He says that many of them do not feel safe when people are drinking alcohol

in public places. He thinks that the area is safer than it once was, and appreciates the effort of the police, but that local parents are still very worried for their families, especially about the park and the area in front of the row of shops across from the high-rise estates. He says that attacks are common and that he knows someone who was attacked yesterday close by in a neighbouring area. PC1 turns to PCSO and asks if he know about this specific incident. PCSO says he doesn't know anything about it. PC1 turns back to the room and says the incident was probably on a beat of a separate, neighbouring police team. The border of this other beat is a main road that is only a few minutes away from where we are now. As the attack is very recent they have not yet been made aware of this by the other team, so they do not know the details.

PC1 and PCSO have relatively closed body language, sometimes crossing their arms or putting their hands into their stab vests just underneath their shoulders (presumably for comfort – taking the weight off of their shoulders or keeping their hands snug).

A4 says he was also attacked not so long ago but a big group of people. He managed to fight them off without sustaining any serious injuries. He said the police were informed but only one of the perpetrators were ever caught, and this makes him worried that the police are ineffective at tracking down offenders. PC1 says he spoken with A4 about this incident before, and that he can't discuss the specifics of this case now but that A4 makes good points about the area. He says that if A4 wants more done he needs to think about whether he can offer any more assistance to the police, such as whether he would recognise the individuals or whether he has seen them again since the incident, and speak with the police privately.

PC1 then addresses the room and says that the police are currently working with the council to tackle the local drug use. He say the police team have the capability to remove alcohol and search for drugs, but they have not been receiving many calls about these kinds of behaviours. B5 says that it's not just drug use, but dealing in public places too. PC1 repeats that they are not getting any calls about this. B3 asks if there is a number to call for the local police team. He says if they had a single number to contact the local team it would be better than calling a general number. PC1 explains that they can call 101 or email the team. Some people in the room are confused about the 101 number, but PC1 reassures them that this number does take them through to the local team.

A4 speaks up again. He says that the residents want to feel that they are safe in their own area. They don't want to be in danger, but neither do they want to police the area themselves in absence of effective policing by the state. He says that the policing resources given to the area are not enough to deal with these problems, but he does believe that the team can be more present on the streets than they are currently. PC1 says the team were patrolling the area today and moved on some people who were upsetting locals. He says this patrolling is routine, although it is not every single day. He agrees with A4 that their team is small for the area.

273

PC1 asks if most of the problem behaviours are taking place in the early evening. Some of the attendees nod and agree and B3 adds that there are problems all day on weekends too. PC1 says, "call us and we'll put resources in the right places." The room has been quite noisy with conversation and noises from the exposed pipes for the last few minutes.

A2 then leans over to A4 and speaks to him in another language. A4 relays her message to PC1, saying that school kids have damaged her home and perhaps tried to break in. The noise from the pipes has now stopped, making it easier to hear the speakers more clearly. PC1 says they have moved school kids on and will continue to do so but it is difficult to do so often, especially as many school kids are using the area to visit the local shops.

C4 starts to speak, telling the police first that he is an Imam and that it was his daughter that was the victim of the attack yesterday mentioned by A4 earlier. He speaks articulately and loudly but never reached the point of shouting, which differs from A4. He says that this community has many needs and the police have in the past made a good effort to meet these, but people still feel unsafe so the police have more to do. "Our needs have not yet been met." He continues, stating that the police use too many cautions as an alternative to tougher treatment, and this encourages people to commit worse offences. He tells the police that he understands local problems well, as he works with the council to tackle youth problems and extremism in the area, and this role has led him to work with the police at times too. He adds there have been a lot of stabbings and other physical assaults close by to this venue. He knows that officers do attend after these incidents but the perpetrators are rarely caught.

PC1 enquires about C4's daughter, asking how she is after the attack, showing concern with his body language – raised and pinched eyebrows. C4 says the attackers used a knife but luckily missed any vulnerable areas on her body. She is in hospital but not in a serious condition. PC1 says he wishes her a speedy recovery and that he will speak to C4 individually after the meeting.

PC1's responses are not immediate after C1 speaks, perhaps giving others a chance to add to the conversation, but this could also be interpreted by attendees that police don't know how to answer concerns or don't want to.

PC1 tells the room that these issues raised so far are very important, and that it is the responsibility of the senior officers to deal with most serious issues across the city. However, he says of the neighbourhood team's responsibility, "We're here for your

274

protection. Everything else is secondary." This line is delivered more decisively and emotively than in his previous speech. Referring back to the attack on C4's daughter, he says this incident was not officially in the team's area, but as it close by he understands that it could affect people here. He then promises that he will update them when he has more information.

PC1 goes on to show his appreciation for the high turnout at the meeting, saying that it is good that so many people have come tonight. Partnerships with agencies and the community is the key to improving public safety in the area. "Collective action is really important. We have to tackle these problems together." He goes on to say that it is possible to achieve this even in the current period of austerity:

"There are less of us and it's difficult, but it's not just about numbers. It's about working in different ways."

He says what is really concerning him is that recent attacks have involved the use of weapons. He says that some people here might recognise or know more about some of the perpetrators, and the police need 'community intelligence' so they can be most effective at preventing more incidents like these.

This is the longest and most impassioned speech from the police representatives so far. The attendees who were there from the start, and a few more standing at the back, listened to this intently but without showing any signs of agreement, such as nodding. They are focused and still.

A few moments after PC1's speech, C1 raises an issue of people drinking alcohol on the streets. The area is an Alcohol Free Zone, and C1 says that although there are stickers up all over the area, including on shop windows, people are still congregating to drink, especially outside the row of shops, and causing trouble. He says the police have to take this seriously because there is a breakdown in order and this is emboldening people to commit other crimes.

"This behaviour is the cause of crime. The police know about it but nothing has been done."

C1 is visibly angry and shouts these comments to front. His arms are very animated, waving up and down and sometimes pointing at the officers. PC1 remains calm. He nods slightly when listening and responds to C1 by saying that he knows this has been raised before. Before he can add anything else, C1 continues with no sign of a change in temperament. "The convenience store is the source of the issues. They are selling drink

275

to underage people." PC1, remaining placid, says that the team have been dealing with this issue, adding the qualified concession, "Maybe we can do more, but we haven't had any calls about it."

C1 tells him, "No one trusts you to do anything about it. They won't call."

C4 joins this conversation, and says that he agrees with C1 (C4 is a lot more calm than C1). He asks the police what they think about this situation, because it is a continuous problem for the community. C1 does not give PC1 time to answer. He says that the drinkers and perpetrators of the criminal behaviour are cowards and that the police just need to deliver a harder response to show the perpetrators who is in charge. He thinks the behaviour will stop if the police do this, and it will prevent more serious acts as well.

C1: "The law is on your side. Do something about this and the people will be on your side too."

After a moment of silence, PC1, remaining placid, says it is difficult because the area has a small neighbourhood team, but concedes that they could be doing more and they will keep trying. He tells C1 that he will speak to him afterwards about this to see what they can do. C1 does not appear to be content with the suggestions that involve more community involvement in policing. He states that the problem is easy to solve for the police and they know this.

"Just think about the shop. That's where the problem starts. You don't need my help to do that. The police have the training to deal with these issues and we don't."

He says that this issue is the most important one for the community as it affects everybody's lives. "Children are scared. Their parents and other people here are scared. We're not even at war!"

The conversation ends with a few moments of silence as PC1 does not respond to the last points, except with a slight nod. He looks around the room to see if any others want to add to this. When they don't he askes if there are any other issues. A5 says he was attacked on the street a few days ago. C4 says some of the people sitting in the back row witnessed the attack. During this exchange, the call to prayer comes on over the loud speakers that are attached high on the walls. I cannot hear the rest of the exchange, but PC1 responds to A5 briefly. This conversation is conducted calmly. I am not sure how they can hear each other clearly over the noise.

Some of the attendees start to go upstairs. The call to prayer comes to an end and PC1 acknowledges that the attendees will want to go upstairs to pray, so he says they will finish there. He tells them he will be back next month for the meeting and that he wants the meetings to be chaired by a member of the community rather than the police. He explains this will involve the chair taking responsibility for some organisation and making an agenda in advance, and the team will try to ensure that the council and local housing associations send representatives. He says that he doesn't want the meetings to be police-led anymore. He asks what everyone thinks. A4 says that meetings should be called after immediate problems on top of the current schedule and PC1 says he thinks that is fine if a resident takes charge of organising this.

The meeting comes to an end and most attendees go upstairs. PC1, PC2 and PCSO talk to individual attendees, including those who raised issues during the meeting. A couple of children are playing in the emptied room – jumping off stairwells and using the desk to role-play some kind of business encounter.

I speak to A4 and C4. They tell me they think the police do a good job generally but it's not enough for this area. They say the police can't solve some of the community's most pressing issues because of a lack of police resources.

I then speak with PCSO. He says he's been in the area for 2 years now but these meetings are relatively new, with only three having taken place so far. I ask him if he has received any training for delivering these types of meeting and he says that he has not, and that he just turns up and reacts accordingly. He says that the meetings only attract Muslims because of the space, and no other community members have attended so far. They have used another building in the area but as there is a hire fee for the room they tend to not use it. He also tells me that a lot of what they have to do at these meetings is 'managing expectations' of the community as there is a lot that the team cannot do.

I leave with C1, who is very calm now and not visibly angry in any way. He repeats his sentiments and says he knows the police try but that they aren't doing enough. He leads me out and thanks me for coming, shaking my hand.

277

27 Appendix 4 – Interview schedule

Interview Guide – PCs/PCSOs

- How long have you worked for ___[Police Force]___?
- What made you choose a career in the police?

NP

- Can you describe a situation you have experienced in which the work of your NPT has been successful, and illustrates the benefits of neighbourhood policing?
    - What do you think is the most important contribution of neighbourhood policing?

- How do you think Neighbourhood policing is perceived by others in the police who don't work in NPTs?

Change

- How do you think neighbourhood policing has changed, if at all, since you joined?
    - Is there anything about the way you work that has changed?
        - [prompts: boundaries, tasks, staffing levels]

- Are there any examples you can think of that illustrate how the financial crisis and funding cuts are impacting upon the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing?
    - Are there any problems that you have to deal with more frequently now than in the past?

- Have you experienced or heard about ways the funding cuts have impacted upon your partner agencies?
        - Are there any instances where your NPTs working relationship with these agencies has been affected due to recent changes?

- What would you change about how Neighbourhood Policing is delivered?
    - Or… [Do you think NP has a future?]

Public

- How would you describe the relationship between the public and your NPT?
    - What do you think the public expect of your NPT?

- Can you describe any situation you have experienced that illustrates why community engagement is important, to either or both the police and the public?

- In what ways does your NPT attempt to engage with the community?
    - Are there any groups that are harder to reach in your area?
        - Why do you think this is?

- Looking back over your time in an NPT, are there any ways the team engaged with the public that were problematic or could be improved?

28 Appendix 5 – Interview transcript

Me – How long have you worked for West Midlands?

Insp-1 – 20 years

Me – Can you describe the areas that you oversee.

I-1 – I am responsible for an area of approximately 25,000 residents of Birmingham. I'm responsible for the policing of [neighbourhood policing areas, 4 of them]. Part of this LPU [Local Policing Unit] is broken down into different neighbourhoods. I'm the constituency manager, sector inspector under old money. That's the area I'm responsible for.

…

Me – So you've got 4 [inspectors] in the local policing unit?

I-1 – That's right.

ME – What do you think are the most important contributions of neighbourhood policing in West Midlands?

I-1 – I would say that… one of the biggest areas is getting to truly know the area that you're working, and not just geography, but the people. The police in general have gone through many, many changes over the years and there's always been an element of, when I first joined there was a PBO, a permanent beat officer who was effectively allowed, if you will, by the organisation to stay in an area. And that single officer would often know all of the local criminals, all of the local kids, all the local issues. And that person could then feed into the organisation, about intelligence basically, about community intelligence. With the onset of neighbourhood policing in the main when we could actually throw some teams at it, so as opposed to one person there were multiple officers and PCSOs, the main aim's always been to reduce demand. So understand the demand to start with – what is it, where is it? – and then look at longer term problem solving to effectively either target harden an area, deal with offenders on an offender management kind of perspective, and then work with partners to… kind of share resources to deal with a local issue. Because, as you'd appreciate, not all of it is just a policing issue. Sometimes it's environmental health, council, [unclear word] landlord… and then with the onset really over the last… I'd say few years, but it's been with us for longer than that, but certainly more focused after the Pilkington incident[48]

in relation to ASB, is neighbourhood teams that have already been able to impact on that. So for me the focus is getting to know the area and the people – intimately in some places. Understanding where the demand is, and then trying to reduce that demand. IT's a very long term plan. And as with everything from a government perspective, and you could argue the fast pace of life, we almost have a need to have an instantaneous result. Some of these issues takes months or indeed years to actually deal with. There has to be a political appetite to allow that to take time. In the absence of that, you're basically hand to mouth existence all the time. So neighbourhood policing is definitely long term and, going on pure statistics, you could argue that the crime figures would show that we have been able to reduce crime. I know there'll be lots of discussion over lies, damned lies and statistics but in the main it'd be true to say no matter which survey you look at, there has been a downward trend. And I would genuinely put that in no small part to the way that neighbourhood policing has impacted. Because response don't have that time – they are the sticking plaster – they don't have the time to, you know, reduce the demand to keep coming back to a certain address or what have you, whereas neighbourhood [teams] pick that up – look at the problem to the background of that. Rather than just the domestic violence incident, for the sake of argument, that's happening right here and now, we would then look at, okay whether there's some kind of abuse – as in domestic, alcohol abuse, substance abuse, referrals, help, signposting… all that kind of stuff. And then when it comes to enforcement you would look at more to do with enforcing tenancy, you know to have that as a lever to almost force the person in to some form of help. And it's that kind of work I would say's been the main contribution to policing.

ME – So in terms of… you mentioned the crime rate falling. Specific crimes – you've already mentioned domestic violence and antisocial behaviour, but other ones which fall in to that where you think you'd actually achieve…

I-1 – Yeah definitely, I mean robbery, burglary and vehicle have been reducing. We aare showing an unfortunate little rise now in public place violence… whether that be a little bit of a delay to the austerity measures – I mean that as in a societal austerity, people struggling with finding work or what have you – it's just a… There's an argument saying that there's a density issue in certain parts of the country, and a lot of on-street living, and the fact of the matter is, if you put human beings in close proximity to each other, they will rub along to a degree then there'll be a flare up. And to me, when I look at the density of the population in the parts where I police, I attribute it to that

really. There's just so many people in one area trying to get along, a lot of them do in fairness, but you know, there's a number that don't want to or just can't.

Me – How about people who don't work as part of the neighbourhood policing structure – what do you think their perceptions are? Have they changed since neighbourhood policing has been bedded in?

I-1 – I would say, having worked many different aspects of policing – whether it be response or neighbourhoods or an investigative role – I would say that anecdotally, you could argue I think that people who've never worked in neighbourhoods see it as a fluffy... cousin to mainstream policing. Because it's not always... well, frankly those who haven't worked it don't understand that there is an enforcement element to neighbourhood policing. It's not all going down the school fete and face-painting. In fact, we don't have time to do that, and even more so now. I would say generally speaking, not everybody, but generally you just don't know what it's like – 24/7 response. For those of us who've done it, do know to start with. I think personally it genuinely it makes you a more rounded officer, and I'll say that for this reason; if you're always going around putting a sticking plaster on things, and you never fully understand how everything links in in the background. When you do neighbourhood, you understand how all the agencies and partners come together, how it all works, and why it's important to have certain information from response officers. Simple one being ASB – not getting names of the kids causing the problem. Neighbourhood will then struggle to pick that up and take it anywhere further. Response will then moan about all the demand they have, but if they give us a fighting chance to nip it in the bud with those kids, then they'd understand that actually we're helping *them*, or trying to... and of course the public. So those who've always done response, it's an extremely challenging job – there's no two ways about that – but they don't fully understand all the links in the chain. That'd be my take on it. And then because of that it's, "well, neighbourhood have got it easy. You've got loads of officers." I don't know where that comes from because we haven't. But those officers who've done both roles, they're usually, I find, more rounded. More understanding of the system as a whole.

Me – In neighbourhood policing teams, one of the things which is quite distinctive is the police community support officer role. How important do you consider them as part of the team? Their role, really.

I-1 – I was working in a different LPU when PCSOs first came on board... probably about ten years ago I think. Maybe a little bit longer. I was probably the same as everybody else. I was suspicious. I saw it as possibly a cheap form of policing, etcetera, etcetera.

Certainly my view's changed over the years. PCSOs are critical to neighbourhood policing. No two ways about it. Their initial deployment principles have been stretched and bent out of all shape. If you tried to apply the initial principles, you would genuinely struggle. They do… either they do it because they naturally do much more than they're actually supposed to … observe, report and all that. They actually get far more involved. Or there have been… at times I suppose the organisation is at fault, because we've perhaps deployed them into a situation or to an incident they shouldn't probably have been deployed into. But they manage very well. A lot of my PCSOs, if not all of them, can actually outshine PCs. Not sure why that is in all honesty. Maybe they're not as indoctrinated perhaps into the way that police do things, so they're more open to looking at it differently. But they're critical. I really make very little distinction between my PCs and my PCSOs. The only time I do look at it is, as I say, for enforcement – as in actual powers of a constable. So such as doing a warrant. We've just got to make sure we've got enough cops going through the door. Things like that. Other than that, from a neighbourhood… because we do lots of warrants… again, going back to your previous question, response don't actually realise how many warrants that we actually do… how many doors we put in. In relation to that, there's very little distinction in my book. Some of the PCSOs would make great cops, and some of mine have gone and recently applied to join the job as a regular, and they've got in and they're probably going to be very good.

Me – Is that at all problematic in a sense? Going back to some of your initial expectations of them. Maybe what they become is too similar to a PC?

I-1 – Yeah, you do have to remind yourself sometimes of the limitations of powers to start with, and also really their capability, as in they don't carry certain equipment that we would. It doesn't stop everything from happening, but of course it gives you that fighting chance to protect yourself. Personally, I wouldn't be surprised over the years if PCSOs stay under the current government, with funding, etcetera. It wouldn't surprise me if their powers broadened slightly. I mean there is obviously more potential within the legislation, which the current chief and the one before hasn't used. There are times when, yes, it would be nice if they had a bit more power, but that purely comes down to boots on the ground. If I have a team of three PCs and four PCSOs, if a certain type of situation comes up it would be great to put all seven to it equally, but you can't. And with the current situation, with the threat assessment, it means that PCSOs have to be double-crewed. Obviously when I say crewed, they're on foot or bikes at least. That again is problematic for deployment, because there's so few of

283

us. I always to them every single one of you – staff, officers, irrelevant – you are so important. We don't have the numbers now where we can just throw people at a job, a problem. Everyone is so critical. As soon as we're not there on the day for tour of duty, you feel it. They can do without me for a few days, maybe even a few weeks for some of them. A striped sergeant, you can maybe get away with a day or so if you've got a good team. But you start losing actual bobbies and PCSOs you feel it instantly. That's why they're so important. That's why we try and make them understand. Of everybody here, this is irrelevant, you know. IT's people who are actually going out there and doing the job. They're the ones who matter.

Me – We've touched on the numbers of staff available to you, but are there any other changes with neighbourhood policing or the structure of the teams which you've observed during your career?

I-1 – I would say, in policing generally, but certainly within neighbourhood policing we've taken on things that historically weren't a policing matter. Now whether we've taken them on… we like to see ourselves as a doing organisation. You know, you give us a problem and we'll crack on with it. Now that's not to diminish the work done by any partners but there is a level of frustration that statutory *and* voluntary, they just don't have that level of operational tempo that we do. You know, they don't really grip a problem and drive it, and really kind of, you know, "let's get this resolved and move on to the next thing." But there still seems to be a lag, and we tend to be pulling people along, or pushing them – whichever way you want to look at it – and because of that, we've almost created our own demand. And there are things that historically, I remember twenty years ago certainly the phone call would have been, to the member of the public, "why are you phoning us? IT's nothing to do with us. We're not going to get involved in that", something of that nature. And that would have been *accepted*. You try and do that now… now whether it's a societal thing again, whether it's because complaints are more easily made… but if you don't get the answer you like on the end of the phone, it is much easier to make a complaint about that. Now again, instead of the organisation just, you know, blankly saying, "well that's quite right. IT's nothing to do with us. You need to go and speak to the council." You'd do the relevant signposting, which is what we're trying to do now with force contact, because we've realised we've just taken on too much. But communities have become used to us taking it on, so all of a sudden when you start saying no, there's a disappointment to the service that they're receiving, whereas some years ago we were never doing it. As long as legislation said we have to do it… we didn't used to do it. Somehow though we've

just eaten into other parts of work and taken it on board. And now we're finding, you know what, we can't service that anymore. So now all of a sudden we've got an expectation that we've raised and we're struggling now to meet that expectation. So the perception of the public is, 'the police are rubbish. They don't do this that and the other.' But actually we've never gone out and said, 'well, a) we never used to do it, b) we don't have to do that', or what have you. We've just done it. And now that's becoming very difficult. Some difficult conversations.

Me: So you said you're creating demand, and at the same time... now as you're...

I-1 – We're trying to reduce demand. Yes exactly. It's a bit of a dichotomy that, isn't it. Yeah, we've created it in as much as, almost we've created the expectation that we will go out to almost everything that you phone up about. You know, where there's kids playing football on a grassy area where there's a sign that says, 'No ball games'. How are we really going to resolve it? We haven't put the sign up. Is there a bye-law? It might've just been a local council that's put that up. We would've, back in the day, probably just said, 'it's not a police matter. Take it up with the council.' Whereas no we have a tendency, although as I say now we're trying to stop doing it, we have a tendency to just say, 'alright. We'll make our local neighbourhood team aware.' So now they've made me aware or they've made my sergeants aware, what's the expectation. Well if they say they'll make us aware, we feel as if we have to make some kind of contact now, whether it be a phone call or a visit or a walk down. Do we then generate an ASB non-crime number because we recognise the fact that someone is suffering from ASB or their interpretation of ASB. So you know, before we know it we've got non-crime numbers generated, we're going to do a visit. But when you backtrack it all away, it's some kids playing football on grass and the only reason it's apparently not allowed is because someone, god knows when, put a sign up saying no ball games. So it's that kind of... if we had gone in right from the beginning and said, 'sorry to hear that, but you're going to have to contact the council because it's council land', or something of that nature. We've cut it dead. And then the ASB figures will play out in the national stats, and then all of a sudden the ASB figures go through the roof. Kids have always played football on grassy areas where a sign says no ball games, and they always *will*. Just because now we're non-crime-ing it or whatever, and doesn't actually mean there's an increase in the problem or demand. But certainly, internally we've created our own demand. Do you know what I mean? And again it comes back to, how do you want to record, how do you want to deal with things.

Me – Just wanted to talk about some of things that are happening in West Midlands at the moment. I don't know how much it's filtered through down to the LPU…

I-1 – Are you talking about Accenture?

Me – Yes, the 'Blueprint'. I just wondered how those new policies are affecting things, or perhaps some of the challenges that those changes are bringing.

I-1 – I think there's a hell of a lot of expectation. More so than I've seen from any other initiative or project, you know, or what have you that've changed the way we do our work. I think really there's a genuine expectation that things are really going to change. IT's not just going to be all talk and blue sky thinking and lots of nice documents, but just essentially continue doing the same thing. I think from the chief down it's been really marketed… not marketed. That makes it sound like it's been manipulated. But the message has been quite clear that, you know, we will not look the way we do now within the next 5 years – the way that we do work etcetera. The challenge that comes from that though, unfortunately, is people being people, there's sometimes a thing of, 'well should I bother working on this project or shall I start investing time and effort in doing this piece of work when, it sounds like, within 5 years I might not be doing this role?' Or… well neighbourhood policing will still be about in 5 years. It won't look anything like it does now… but because of that expectation, I think some people have just taken their foot off the gas, because they're just thinking, 'well, do I really want to invest in that?', because, you know, when the plan gets released in the next month or whatever, that might not be on the agenda. I think that's one of the shifting sands of agendas, and what's the political push at the moment, what am I expected to do or concentrate or focus on? And when you've got so much change programme going on, that then becomes difficult to keep people focused. And the simple message from me is this: 'just keep doing the job that you're doing. You do it well , 9 times out of 10. Keep doing that. And you know, when we get told what we're going to do tomorrow, so to speak, you do that job and you do that as best as you can.' At the end of the day I keep it really simple, you join the job to protect and look after people and stop the bad guys from doing what they do. That will ostensibly not change. The framework might change, but really when you walk out the door that's really what you're there to do. Reassure, help the good guys, stop the bad guys. It doesn't really get more complicated than that.

Me – Are there specific ways you're expecting it to change? The structure of neighbourhood policing teams or the areas, the boundaries?

I-1 – Again, it hasn't yet come out to us. I think the expectation is that boundaries have never meant much to the public to start with, and certainly don't mean much to criminals. We're the only ones who deal with boundaries and lines on maps. I think there's becoming a stronger understanding either that those lines will reduce, diminish, or in fact fade away, and it will literally be… You're working in generally a rough area, but you'll go much further afield to service demand wherever it might be. So the lines on the map will become irrelevant. You're just a resource nearest to the job, so therefore you're gonna go to it. So that's one thing that I think is almost accepted to a degree. Although that again brings, 'well, where am I going to work from?' Well, there'll be stations, you've still got to work from somewhere, but the manner in which you go out – the area which you're responsible for – will change. The other one would be, specific to neighbourhood policing with what the chief came out with fairly recently, is that a lot of people will read what they want to read. They see a whole paragraph, pick out one line and they hang their hat on it, and say, 'neighbourhood policing's going'. Well, it's not, but it won't be – I don't think in my humble opinion – it will not be teams as we have them. We won't have as many sergeants or inspectors. I think if we're lucky, in certain areas that demand demonstrates we need it, we'll go back to a little bit like having a PBO, the same as 20 years ago. They'll still be that point of contact. And then you'll have a team that'll move around – it'll be non-geographical – and it'll just move to wherever the problem is. Problem-solve it for a set period of time. A bit like Safer Travel do. Safer travel go onto the networks. If there's a peak demand somewhere, they'll throw some resources at it, do whatever it is that they need to do to try and either reduce the demand, target harden, what have you, and then they'll move on somewhere else. But they're on the network of the force. You could argue BTP operate a bit like that. So really neighbourhood policing could be like a Safer Travel team – a safer neighbourhood team – they get parachuted into an area, intensely deal with it if they can hopefully, and then when the job's done they come out and go somewhere else. I wouldn't be surprised if it was something along those lines, personally.

Me – what do you think that means for community intelligence, or really knowing the area and the people. I mean, you've said you expect there to be a least one person to deal with that…

I-1 – Possibly. I mean, there'll be certain areas that when you do your demand, if you're going to do a RAG status – you know, red-amber-green – in a green area, shall we say, where there's very little demand and/or a very low crime rate, I don't think you'll get

that. I think in the amber, certainly in the red, that's where I think you'll need some kind of beat officer – whatever terminology they end up with describing it, but essentially that kind of role – and you're right, I think part of the problem is, and I have raised this with senior management, is because of… neighbourhood policing is not fully understood. There's a lot of things that we do that don't appear on corporate systems. It's not captured anywhere. Things that come in directly to me, they won't go to anybody else, I won't tell anybody else – there'll be a request, a demand, whatever you want to term it as – and I will deal with that. I'll either deal immediately by bouncing it back on the email saying, 'well, we're not going to do x, y, z.' OR it'll go to the sergeant and say, 'have a look. Assure me that there isn't something for us, and then signpost the relevant agency.' That won't go to anyone else in the force, but it is demand that we're dealing with. So one of the points I've raised is that because we do a reasonable amount of stuff that isn't known effectively by the force, that when we start pulling that back from the community I think the community impact is going to be greater than anticipated in certain areas, and as you point out the community intelligence, certainly there'll be a dip. We might recover it over time, but with any change programme you'll always see performance will drop off first and then it'll start to recover. I think we will… and every time we've done a reorganisation… I started on the sub divisions, then to OCU [??], now LPU. Community Intelligence has always been something that seemed to, you know, we're not getting anything [indecipherable – 'in it'?]. It's like, you know, the people who used to work there now no longer work there and the new lot don't know who to talk to. Being human, they're still settling in and frankly couldn't really care about what's going on out there because they're trying to sort out their own lives and, you know, all this kind of stuff. So we will suffer from an intelligence drought, initially anyway.

Me: How about partner agencies, just to keep on that theme of change. Have you noticed the impact of the funding cuts on your other partnership agencies?.

I-1: Yes. Bluntly, yes. I chair the Safer Estates group, or the Safer Communities group depending on who you talk to. And that is a multi-agency, around-the-table discuss a problem and try and sort it. I think there's much more that Safer Estates Communities group can do, and under the ASB legislation there is some potential for that on the cards in relation to what the expectations are. I think that monthly meeting could be used more widely. We've got everyone around the table. We've got all the stakeholders, all the decision makers, effectively all the practitioners right there, right now. Why do we really need another meeting, you know, to discuss anything else?

We've got everybody there, let's bring them to the table and let's deal with it. What I've decided to start doing now is via those partners, so effectively trying to communicate it further afield, is explain to them the situation we've found ourselves in and the fact that certain things they might've expected us to do, not only the general public but partners, trying to give them a rationale as to why we won't be doing that anymore. So that's the first stage is to kind of explain that to them. The second bit is, in that discussion, that conversation, it's become quite clear to me that they are going through exactly the same. One of the strongest proponents I saw of that argument was at a ward committee meeting. A councillor, [Name] I think is her name, she's become mayor of Birmingham, and she was extremely straight with the public at the ward meeting. They were talking about rubbish, in essence, and she was just basically telling them, 'you will not get the service that maybe you've been used to, and certainly what you asking, which is for an enhanced service in this area, you aren't gonna get it.' And it was one of the most straight talking times I've ever seen some talking to the public. Just laying it on the line, just saying, 'whether you like it, whether you don't like it, whether you can live with it, is almost irrelevant. This is a cold hard fact; that service is gone or going.' You know, that kind of approach. We haven't – I certainly haven't seen it anyway. We're kind of getting there. The chief's one [speech or meeting?] a few months ago was the closest I've seen so far. But we haven't really, I don't think, been that brutally honest. We've tried to do it in a soften-the-blow kind of way. If I was going to be cynical, I would say that I'd say that's kind of being left to myself, my colleagues and my sergeants to almost be the ones to deliver that message at the front end. Is that the right place for it? Maybe some of it, yeah, but... The expectations are really high, that's the problem. So I think maybe if more top management, command team-wise, were maybe just a bit more blunt, then maybe when we made the call it's not totally unexpected. But that's not easy, and I appreciate that.

ME: How about the working relationship between yourself or the neighbourhood policing teams with the agencies? Are there any tensions at the moment?

I-1: No. I have to say. I always say that organisations don't work very well together, but people do. IT's all about partnership in relation to relationships, person to person. And because we've got very good relationships with the individuals, the housing officers or whatever, they haven't been altered. I would say, in fact, maybe there's a slight sense of camaraderie in relation to, 'we know what you're going through with the cuts, we're going through them as well.' And because there's a bit of a joint

venture there, we understand each other's pain to a degree. I don't think that on a personal level it has affected it. What I've yet to see though, really, is a full understanding that because we won't take primacy anymore in everything, because we're not able to, that they're going to have to pick up some extra work or figure out a creative way of dealing with it. Or in fact, of course, we've got to go with the resources that we do have and jointly. You know, the two-make-greater-than-the-whole type approach, the synergy of it, if you will. That I've yet to really see happening. I think there's an understanding that it's coming, but I haven't really seen it put into practice yet. I think everyone's almost still trying to operate in the same way, and it's just becoming very difficult. WE have to do something different, it's as simple as that.

Me: What about the public – what do you think about, generally the relationship between your NPTs and the public at the moment? Is that developing in any way?

I-1: Well, because the public are made up of a huge range of people, you'll always get a huge range of reactions. You'll get those that people who perhaps because they worked in the public sector themselves anyway, or still do, you have an understanding and know it isn't through a particular choice that we have to work in different ways. All the way through to the other end of the spectrum where people, no matter really what you do or how you do it, if it doesn't come out quite the way they want it, they'll never be happy. So that's the starting point from which we're looking at. In relation to all the changes that are going on, rather than it going to a big bang – you know, one day we're all there, the next day we're not – I've told my sergeants to start already… not pulling back, that's too harsh a term, but certain things that would be nice to do, you know, as opposed to the must dos, I've said with my backing just to start explaining, not just a straightforward 'we're not doing that', but try and put it in some kind of context. My sergeants are very good at doing that. We've got got the other demands, the vulnerability demands of child sexual exploitation, ASB, domestic violence – that agenda – that is very important. It's all about threat and harm risk. If we have to choose between, for example, attending the fete and doing some face-painting, which would be nice to do – there's a community feel to it – or we do our visits in relation to our CSE locations, or something of that nature, well guess which one's going to win. It's not going to be the fete. Some would say that that is, or their understanding was, 'that's why neighbourhood policing was invented, wasn't it?' That nice fluffy, come along and get to know your local bobby type thing. And that comes back to that point I made at the beginning that we've maybe taken on at times a bit

too much of that. To me, neighbourhood policing is actually a quite a gritty, in-your-face kind of policing really, because it's getting in to sort a problem that causing the community an issue. If you're living next to the neighbour from hell, then that really, day in day out, is a quality of life problem that, you know, is really going to affect you. And to actually get that sorted sometimes, is really robust policing. It's not just going round and having a coffee with Miggins and just, 'oh that sounds terrible, I know', and then going away. It is getting into their tenancy agreements, giving them ABC contracts, threatening them with legislation, doing warrants to disrupt. It really is, you know… it can be, depending on what legislation you use, quite draconian. You know, really getting into people's lives with [indecipherable]. The new ASB act can close private residences down. That was unheard of before. So I think that the public… our relationship with the public, we're trying to mangage, but I still think that when push comes shove there will be a finite period where it will be really noticeable. And I just think that a lot of people will really lament the loss of what they used to have, so much that they'll trouble to accept it. And I think that's where we'll get our.. you know, we'll have a dip in popularity. Our confidence; it will dip. But it's nothing to do with actually doing… we do things differently. We're still there to protect you. If you still call us, we'll still get there, but it's the manner in which we're doing it, and because people don't like change as a general rule of thumb, they'll see that as, we've pulled up the drawbridge and we're no longer contactable, and we don't know who does this and who does that. When you actually call us though, we'll still get to you, it just might not be the face you're used to who's gonna get there. But yeah, that is going to be a difficult one to manage. We will a knock trust and confidence-wise.

Me: How about your engagement methods? What kind of methods are you using at the moment to find out problems, priorities?

I-1: Well, through the local delivery groups, the LDGs, and resident[?] associations, we start doing it through those on an ad-hoc.. we get a request coming in, 'can you do x, y, z?' And then maybe the neighbourhood sergeant says, 'we can't do x anymore, I'm afraid. We'll try and do y, and we'll still do z.' And with a rationale as to why. I've steered away from social media because I think it can be massively misinterpreted. A message that you put out on a few – I don't do a lot of social media – but a certain amount of characters isn't enough to convey a complex message. So we steer away from that. So it's more to do with face-to-face engagement, so really the NTGs, the Neighbourhood Tasking Groups, and resident associations. Like I said, via safer estates, going through partners to talk to their clients, who are invariably the same as ours, so

that the message can get kind of spread out, you know, it's not just coming from the police. You know, 'my housing officer also told us that.' So therefore, it kind of lends a bit more credibility. A lot of the time we say something, and it's like, 'well, you would say that', or you know, 'you're trying to protect your own', or something of that nature. But definitely more to do with face-to-face if we can, and then it's dealt with on an ad-hoc. Email can be quite a good way of doing it. If we get it via and email, if we don't know who the person is then a decent email response back. If we know who it is then it's a phone call to try and, you know... because we want to try and keep people on side as best you can because you've still got to work with them. In the intervening five years, whilst we're trying to sell this message, we've still got to work with everybody. And again, some officers and PCSOs are saying understandably, again, 'I'm investing all this time and effort into this, which I know or is highly likely within 5 years, you know, I'm going to be here to be doing it anyway.' So yeah, it's a fine balance.

Me: When you say face-to-face engagement, are we still talking about meetings like PACT in other areas...

I-1: Yeah it's the same thing. For example where I work we've got a little conference room. They will come into the nick, the meeting will take place, their neighbourhood sergeant will be there. You know it's those kinds of messages. So yeah, face-to-face would be lovely, but you can't always.

Me: Are you quite active in trying to engage particular groups, or is it more letting people come to you?

I-1: I haven't been hugely proactive. Yeah, so it's more to do with when something is raised. I think it's more to do with trying not to set hares running too early. We've only known about this ourselves for a relatively short period of time, and because I think we fully understand it because we physically haven't seen any plans, if I jump too far ahead of it I'm going to make a lot of phone calls happen to senior management, and again I say, you know, give someone a paragraph and they'll pick out the line that interests them out of context and that'll be the nature of the phone call to the commander or something like that. One of my jobs is community cohesion and keeping people, not in the dark so that they're feeling safe, but you know trust and confidence is one of my roles, part of my remit, and fear of crime, or trying to limit the fear of crime is part of my remit. Reducing crime and demand is part of my remit. So I think if I go too quickly and go proactive, there'll be a lot of Chinese whispers, everyone will be thinking something different and I can't control that. So at the minute it's as it

comes in to us, we're trying to manage it slowly back out. There will come a point when we understand it more, that we'll probably start proactively calling neighbourhood meetings and saying, 'right, okay, we now have a clearer picture of where we think it's going to go – the journey.' I want to give people correct information as soon as possible, at the minute though, I wouldn't know how to describe to you, because I don't know. In fact I don't know if anyone does. I'm sure someone does somewhere, but it hasn't yet been cascaded to us. So in the absence of it, I'm not inclined to proactively go out to people.

---END---