Integrated Distributed Authentication Protocol for Smart Grid Communications

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Abstract—In the smart grid, an integrated distributed authentication protocol is needed to not only securely manage the system but also efficiently authenticate many different entities for the smart grid communications. In addition, a lightweight authentication protocol is required to handle frequent authentications among billions of devices. Unfortunately, in the literature, there is no such integrated protocol that provides mutual authentications among various communicated entities in a distributed manner. Based on certificateless cryptography, our protocol is lightweight and efficient even if there are invalid requests contained a batch. Security and performance analysis show that the protocol provides privacy preservation, forward secrecy, semantic security, perfect key ambiguous, and protection against identity thefts while generating lower overheads in comparison with the existing protocols. Also, the protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, and denial-of-service attacks. Moreover, our protocol provides a complete resistance against the flood-based denial-of-service attacks in the smart grid.

Index Terms—Authentication, Smart grid, DoS attacks, Redirection attacks, Cloud computing.

1 INTRODUCTION

The smart grid (SG) is a critical infrastructure, whose objective is to provide more efficient, secure, stable, and reliable power to consumers, operators, and utilities. The SG system for home environment consists of various components such as smart meters (SM), home appliances (HA), energy providers (EP), gateways (GW), and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) network. It is generally assumed that home area network (HAN) is wirelessly connected with the Zigbee technology [1], whereas the building area network (BAN)/neighborhood area network (NAN) is connected by wide area network (WAN) technologies and cellular technologies, such as global system for mobile communication (GSM) and long term evolution (LTE) [2]. Smart meters can be considered to be equipped with two communication interfaces, where one interface works as a SM and the other works as a HAN-GW. Therefore, the SM is a central home controller that communicates with all the HA within a household. Further, BAN-GW/NAN-GW acts as (or deploy) an aggregator (AG) that receives data from the SM and forwards it to the respective control center (CC) via relays and concentrators with via wired/wireless connections. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the SG system.

![Fig. 1: Overall architecture of the smart grid system.](image-url)
an integrated distributed protocol can maximize the utilization of shared resources while generating low overhead. In the SG system, a fast and lightweight protocol is required as the authentication process is frequently repeated many times among billions of devices. Further, the security protocol of the SG system must provide defense against the known security attacks, including man-in-the-middle (MITM) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [5]. According to the NIST reports, one of the main security issues in the SG system is that the authentication mechanism does not sufficiently authenticate devices or exposes authentication keys. Therefore, a centralized authentication in decentralized environment is required for the centralized security management in terms of event logging/analysis and authentication [6], [7].

There are many different communication protocols used for delivering various commands and control information. These protocols were not designed initially with security in mind. Today, when Internet is connected to the SG system, various organizations, such as ETSI, IEEE, and NIST are embedding security to the existing protocols as new standards in order to prevent the system against various well known security attacks. However, they need to modify many communication standards for making them security embedded. This creates additional overheads. Furthermore, researchers have not yet focused much on an integrated protocol, rather they have proposed separate protocols for individual connections between different entities in the SG. They have not discussed the integration of these protocols for compatible communication among them. This motivates us to propose such an efficient and secure authentication protocol for the SG system. However, there are several challenges in designing an integrated distributed authentication protocol as we identified below:

- The protocol should not only be controlled by a central entity, but also by the subsystems of the SG network in a distributed manner.
- Embedding security solutions in each communication protocol of the SG network not only are highly complex but also generate huge overhead and cost. Therefore, it would be more flexible and efficient to instead design a cyber-security layer over the communication network to maintain end-to-end security [8]. This simplifies the integration at the cyber-security layer, rather than integrating different communication protocols in the SG network.
- The protocol should be able to fully utilize the available system resources.
- The generated overhead by the protocol should be as low as possible. The protocol should be fast and lightweight, as the authentication process is frequently repeated many times among billions of devices, especially, when devices receive multiple messages at once, such as when gateways/aggregators authenticate multiple smart meters and gather data from them.
- The protocol must utilize the suitable cryptosystem (with symmetric and/or asymmetric keys) as recommended by various standard organizations, such as IEEE, ETSI, and NIST. Particularly, NIST report [6] emphasizes the issues of key exchange in symmetric key cryptography and the public key infrastructure (PKI) in asymmetric key cryptography. Hence, key management issue must be considered in the design of the protocol.
- The protocol should enable consumers to have the security control over his/her home, i.e., control over all the home appliances with the smart meter.
- The protocol must support secure communication over the network with strong encryption. Moreover, the identity of each device should be protected over the network to maintain identity anonymity and untraceability.
- The protocol must be able to defeat various well-known security attacks, such as MITM attacks, redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and flood-based DoS attacks.

1.1 Research Problem

There are several challenges with the current authentication protocols in terms of efficiency, overhead, cost, delay, privacy, and etc. Also, many vulnerabilities do exist in the available authentication schemes of various communication protocols for the SG, such as weak encryption and message digest in the OSGP protocol, security issues in the DNP3 protocol (even in version 5), etc. There is not yet an integrated distributed authentication protocol that provides mutual authentications between the home environment (HA, SM, HAN-GW), energy provider, gateways (BAN-GW, NAN-GW), and AMI network (SM, aggregator/collector, CC). An integrated protocol can provide a common platform for authenticating various devices while efficiently maximizing the utilization of shared resources with low overhead in the SG system. Also, the privacy protection in the SG system is an important requirement, so the protocol must not reveal the confidential and private information related to any entity involved in the authentication process. Therefore, an end user (consumer) should have a control over his/her own home environment, such as HA, since data generated and being sent belong to a particular user. Furthermore, the protocol must be fast and efficient, and should be able to defeat known security attacks.

1.2 Our Contribution

In this paper, we design an integrated distributed protocol for the SG network, which meets all aforementioned challenges discussed in the previous subsection. Note that the proposed protocol may not be suitable for some parts of the SG system with very low communication latency requirements, such as for the generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) and sampled measured values (SMV) layer-2 messages within the substation. Here, messages are not encrypted due to the transmission requirements within 4 milliseconds (ms). In such scenarios, a virtual LAN (VLAN) with layer-2 capabilities can be used with signed authenticated values [16], or a simple lightweight protocol can be designed for the authentication with integrity, but without encryption. Our new SG authentication protocol has following features:
- Provides mutual authentications between the EP and the SM, between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW, between the SM and the HA, and between the NAN-GW and the CC.
- Provides a secure solution for the consumers to choose or change the energy provider of their own choice. The protocol provides more satisfaction to the consumer as he/she will have the control over its HA (secured with a password shared between the SM and all the HAs and only he/she can change it).
- Defeats various security attacks: defeats the flood-based DoS attacks targeting transmitted messages between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW; protects the SM and the EP from redirection attacks as Zip codes are verified at both ends; preserves the privacy of each message as it is encrypted before being transmitted over the network; provides resistance against ID thefts, MITM attacks, replay attacks, brute-force attacks, repudiation attacks, and impersonation attacks.
- Lightweight in terms of communication and computation overheads. The execution time of 3.96 s in Java can be considered fast, as it is for all the involved entities in the SG network and is within the requirements (few minutes) set by the standards [6].
- Uses the cloud-based trusted authorities (TA) for key management, which does not have the key exchange or PKI issues. Instead, the TA generates public and private keys, and the legitimate device generates its actual public and private keys.

1.3 Organization of the Paper

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work and Section 3 presents our SG system model. A new authentication protocol is proposed in Section 4. Security and performance analysis is presented in Section 5, including a formal proof of the protocol. Section 6 presents the conclusion of this work.

Table 1 summarizes various symbols and abbreviations used in the paper along with their descriptions and sizes. Note that the sizes of public and private keys may depend upon the algorithm used in asymmetric encryption.

## 2 Related Work

We first discuss the standardized protocols in SG along with their limitations. Then, we will present existing authentication protocols that provide authentications between various entities with lower overhead, and then those that provide protection against various security attacks and preserves the privacy in the SG.

There are some standardized protocols available in the literature for the SG, which support authentication process, such as open smart grid protocol (OSGP) for the smart meters, distributed network protocol (DNP3) between the control center and the substations, device language message specification/companion specification for energy metering (DLMS/COSEM) for the AMI network, and OpenADR for the demand response program. In addition, some standardized authentication protocols also support authentication, such as remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS) and Diameter protocols for the 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular networks [9].

The OSGP protocol, which was developed by energy service network association (ESNA) and is a standard of the European telecommunications standards institute (ETSI), was deployed for providing the authentication and confidential security to the SG applications. This protocol is expected to provide reliable and efficient delivery of command and control information between the smart meters, direct load control modules, gateways, and other SG devices. However, recently, researchers from Germany easily recovered private encryption keys of the smart meters in a system following OSGP without a significant computational effort [10]. Also, a number of attacks has been performed over the OSGP protocol [11], including one with just 13 queries to a homegrown message authentication code (OMA digest) oracle, and by which the protocol further failed to deliver authenticity guarantee and confidentiality (due to using a non-standard composition of RC4 as weak encryption algorithm) [10]. Similar security issues were found in the DNP3 protocol, which does not provide authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality. In 2012, a new version of the DNP3 protocol, named DNP3 secure authentication version 5, was announced, which provides methods to remotely change user update keys using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography [12]. However, it considers only spoofing, modification, and replay attacks over the network, and does not provide confidentiality of the message. Also version 5 of the protocol is not backwards compatible with previous versions, which may add a heavy protocol replacement cost.

Furthermore, the authentication supports provided by DLMS/COSEM, OpenADR, RADIUS, and Diameter are not sufficient and some of these are also very costly [9]. The DLMS (application layer communication protocol) and COSEM (data model), together provide an interface model for metering applications belonging to IEC 62056 standards, such as electricity [13]. Basically, there are three authentication options in DLMS/COSEM, i.e., no security, low level security authentication where server identifies client by a password, and high level security authentication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Size (bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_1()/H_2()$</td>
<td>Hash functions used in ciphering</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_3()$</td>
<td>Hash function for SK key generation</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{hashange}()$</td>
<td>Hash function for changing the password</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ht()$</td>
<td>Hash function for computing $r$</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ID$</td>
<td>Identity of the entity</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>Hash value</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Message authentication code</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK/User</td>
<td>Public key</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKR</td>
<td>Private key</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SK$</td>
<td>Shared secret key</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>Timestamp</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>Random number</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zip</td>
<td>Postal code</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S$</td>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pwd</td>
<td>Password shared between SM and HAs</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z$</td>
<td>Sum of products of $K$ and $ID$</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td>Sum of products of $PKR$ and $ID$</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$</td>
<td>Sum of products of $S$ and $ID$</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
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</table>
(mutual identification) with exchange challenges. However, the DLMS/COSEM’s security services are restricted to use symmetric key encryption. In practice, smart meters need asymmetric key to be used in secure socket layer/transport layer security (TLS/SSL), but DLMS/COSEM does not support TLS/SSL. In demand response, OpenADR, which is a standard development effort, supports authentication based on public key cryptography with exchange of certificates [14]. This standard maintains a hierarchy of certified authorities and requires a PKI to use three-tier PKI technology, which ultimately results in high development cost.

RADIUS is commonly used protocol to provide remote user authentication and accounting in cellular networks, and WLAN interworking and Wi-Fi offload situations [15]. It provides centralized services using a central database. However, the SG requires decentralized solutions, as a single-point-of-failure can massively affect the centralized system. RADIUS implementation supports peer authentication between communication endpoints using a pre-shared key. Hence, it brings some key management issues and is not suitable for large systems, such as the SG. Furthermore, RADIUS has poor scalability and uses the user datagram protocol (UDP), which does not provide reliable data transfer. Therefore, it is not suitable for the SG where the availability of information is extremely important. On the other hand, Diameter protocol is an authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol used in networking, which supports transmission control protocol (TCP) instead of UDP. However, its supported capabilities are sometimes more expensive. Furthermore, RADIUS and Diameter protocols do not directly protect against DoS attacks carried out by flooding the target equipment with bogus traffic.

For providing low overhead, a lightweight authentication scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) was proposed in [1]. However, it provides mutual authentication only between the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW. Sule et al. [17] made a change in [1] by using a MAC between the AMI devices and the controller nodes instead of HMAC. Although this scheme reduces the verification time, it also reduces the protocol security provided by the function. As in [1], the scheme only involves the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW communication. Further, an authentication scheme using a batch signatures verification was proposed in [18]. However, the scheme does not focus on authentication among SM, HAN, and HA, rather authenticating data aggregation. A key agreement protocol for SG is proposed in [19], which reduces the number of hash functions used and the delay caused by the security process. Recently, an identity-based scheme is proposed to provide authentication between the SM and the AS, and reduce the total number of exchanged packets, but increases the computation overhead [20].

Many researchers have proposed solutions in order to resist against different attacks in the SG system, such as replay, MITM, impersonation, and DoS. However, in the absence of authentication, an attacker can easily tamper the message and/or can send a fake message. In this direction, a mutual authentication scheme between the SM and the data concentration unit (DCU) was proposed to prevent impersonation, and MITM attacks [21]. However, this scheme neither discusses the generated overhead nor provides authentication in a home environment. Recently, an authentication scheme using a Merkle hash tree technique was proposed to prevent replay, injection and message modification attacks [22]. However, communication only between the HAN and the NAN is considered. A Diffie-Hellman-based secure aggregation scheme for collecting data was presented in [23], which generates lower computation and communication overhead, but it does not consider SM’s authentication. Metke et al. [24] stated that a strong authentication technique is required for all users and devices within the SG network. It is expected that in the near future, due to the increase in the number of devices, the current protocols may not be scalable.

In addition, the privacy of the customers in terms of power usage, billing, and other information must be preserved during the authentication. In this direction, an identity-based authentication protocol is proposed to provide source authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation services, and privacy preservation in AMI [25]. However, it does not consider overhead and efficiency. Yan et al. [26] proposed an integrated authentication and confidentiality (IAC) protocol that provides a mutual authentication between the SM and the AMI network, and enables data privacy, integrity, and confidentiality. However, it generates a huge overhead as it performs several encryption/decryption operations. Further, it does not consider EP and HA entities in their authentication system.

In summary, several standard, lightweight, and privacy-preserved protocols have been proposed by researchers. However, the existing standard protocols do not provide sufficient security and privacy preservation to the SG system. Also, many existing protocols (including privacy-preserved) are inefficient and generate huge overheads. Furthermore, the existing lightweight and privacy-preserved protocols are with limited capability of authenticating only few entities (mostly two devices) in the smart grid. In other words, these protocols do not enable authentications among all the entities with optimized resource utilization. Moreover, embedding security to the existing protocols generate huge overheads and requires integration to authenticate all the entities of the SG network, which results in inefficient and costly solution. Therefore, there is a need of an integrated lightweight authentication protocol that provides mutual authentications from end-to-end and protects the SG system from known attacks and keeping the privacy preserved. We tackle this problem in the paper.

3 System Model

Currently, in the SG system, security operations are done independently by each center. However, due to the limited processing capability, they do not support online analysis and generate high maintenance cost [27]. Further, the SG requires a powerful platform with effective integration and ubiquitous seamless access to collect and analyze huge data collected from a variety of sources such as AMI, wide area measurement system (WAMS), and HA. Recent studies [28], [29], [30], [31] show that cloud computing is very much compatible with the SG system because of its several advantages, including energy efficiency, flexibility, scalability,
agility, and cost effectiveness. Various researchers have proposed their solutions by integrating cloud computing in the SG system. Back et al. [29] designed a big data information management framework, called Smart-Frame, based on a cloud computing model. Also, Jiang et al. [32] proposed a scheme for searchable encryption on the cloud database in the SG, and Bitzer et al. [33] presented the feasibility study of monitoring renewable energy in the SG based on a cloud computing framework retaining SG security. Developing a secure cloud network is not our goal in this paper. However, we consider that our scheme uses secure cloud servers as discussed in [29], [32], and [33]. We employ the cloud computing into our SG system, particularly [29], which builds a hierarchical structure of cloud computing centers. Employing cloud computing in smart grids, not only addresses the issue of large information management, but also provides a high energy and cost saving platform. A roadmap in [34] presents a realistic example of deploying cloud computing centers in the SG system.

We propose to have a cyber-security layer on the top of communication protocols layer that takes care the security issues existing in the communication between any two entities over the network. Our SG system is divided into several regions/areas, each of which is managed by either a public or private, but secure cloud computing center [29]. As shown in Figure 2, we consider three different tiers in our SG system as follows:

- Tier-1: Central cloud computing center
- Tier-2: Distributed cloud computing centers
- Tier-3: SMs, GWs, and EPs

As shown in Fig. 2, there are $n$ distributed cloud computing centers, also called trusted authorities (TAs). Each TA manages a region that includes various SMs, GWs, and EPs. The tier-1 TA provides inter-TA communication among different entities within the system, while the tier-2 TAs are responsible for managing the public key repository, and generating partial public and private keys of devices at their ends. The main purpose of enabling cloud environment in our SG system is to provide an easy and fast access to the public key repository and to efficiently generate public and private key pairs. In addition, the SG requires a powerful computing platform to handle a large scale data analysis and to support complex real-time application services. In each TA, various cloud computing services can be deployed, such as infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) for SG information collection, processing, and storage, platform-as-a-service (PaaS) for developing and integrating cloud computing specific security-based applications for the SG environment, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) for specific services such as optimization of energy usage.

4 Proposed Authentication Protocol

This section proposes an authentication protocol for the SG system. We first present an overview of our protocol, then present mutual authentication approaches between different SG entities. The authentications between EP-SM, SM-GW, and SM-HA are based on asymmetric key cryptography, symmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key cryptography, respectively.

4.1 Overview

Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) is considered to be a good platform for securing grid and cloud computing environments [35], [36]. However, IBC suffers from the key escrow problem [37]. Therefore, our protocol is based on a certificateless cryptosystem, which is a combination of identity-based cryptography and traditional public key cryptography [38]. Our approach not only overcomes the key escrow problem in IBC, but also does not require traditional PKI that is costly due to the private key generation (PKG) in IBC. We instead use a key generation center (KGC). The security of our scheme is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field under elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Here, we let $E$ be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field $F_p$ as $E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B; A, B \in F_p$. Let $E_1$ and $E_2$ be points in $E(F_p)$ and integer $x$ is found such that $E_1 = xE_2$. The best known algorithm to solve the ECDLP is exponential, which is not enough to break its security. We do not design a pairing based scheme under ECC, but design a certificateless-based asymmetric encryption scheme. This is because the multiplication of points under ECC is more efficient than the pairing operation. For instance, it takes 0.6 ms for point multiplication and 4.5 ms for a pairing operation under a same setting [39]. The identity (ID) of each device (EP, SM, GW, HA) in the SG network is taken from a random point on the elliptic curve over $E(F_p)$.

Each TA generates its private and public key pair, known as a master private key and a master public key, and makes the public key available to its users. Our approach is simpler than the Diffie-Hellman protocol, as it uses one-way hash functions instead of exponential functions. The KGC (at each TA) supplies an entity with a partial private key and a partial public key. We assume that the KGC securely delivers the partial keys to the intended entities. The entity then combines its partial public and private keys with secret information to generate its actual private and public keys. In this way, the entity’s private key is not known to the KGC and the anonymity of the user’s public key is also achieved. This anonymity is useful, when we consider that in order to receive the public key of a device, the requested device must be verified authentic to the TA using its partial key credentials.

First, we present generic definitions of various algorithms used in our scheme, and then explain each of these
algorithms in detail.

**Definition 1.** A generic certificateless public key encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- **Setup:** The KGC generates a common public parameter (param) and a master secret key (masterKey), and uses these keys to generate different keys.
- **PartialKeyGeneration:** TA uses param, masterKey and an identity ID (a point of an elliptic curve group) received from a user to generate a partial private key (PPR) and a partial public key (PPU) as (PPU, PPR) = PartialKeyExtract (param, masterKey, ID).
- **SecretValue:** User/device uses param and ID to generate a secret value sID = SecretValue(param, ID).
- **GenPrivateKey:** User/device uses param, PPU, and sID to generate private key PRK as PRK = GenPrivateKey(param, PPR, sID).
- **GenPublicKey:** User/device uses param, PPU, sID and ID to generate public key PUK as PUK = GenPublicKey(param, sID, ID).

The public key of each entity is available in a public repository of the corresponding tier-2 cloud computing center (TA). The private keys are kept secret and stored on the SMs, the GWs, and the EPs. Since each entity is registered to a specific TA, it knows the identity and the public key of the TA. The details of generating different keys are as follows:

- **Setup:** t ← Zq is a random integer with large prime q, and P is a generator of a large cyclic group G over E(Fq). Each TA generates its private and public key pair as (PRKTA = t, PUKTA = tP). Let us define the hash functions used in this protocol as H1 : Zq → {0, 1}*, H2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1}*, and H3 : Zv × Zv → {0, 1}*. Returns param = (q, P, PUKTA, H1, H2, H3) and masterKey = (q, P, PRKTA, H1, H2, H3).
- **PartialKeyGeneration:** TA chooses a random s ∈ Zv and computes w = sP and x = s + PRKTAH1(ID). Note that the ID is first converted from an elliptic curve point to a bit string [40] in H1(·) and then hashed. Returns (PPU, PPR) = (w, x).
- **SecretValue:** Each device computes a random z ∈ Zq, Returns sID = z.
- **GenPrivateKey:** Each device computes its private key as PRK = (sID, PPR) = (z, x). Returns PRK.
- **GenPublicKey:** Each device computes its public key as PUK = (PPU, sID, ID) = (w, v), where v = zP. Returns PUK.

**Encrypt:** Sender device computes c = H2(M∥γ), where M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a plaintext and γ ∈ {0, 1}∗. Furthermore, it computes ciphertext C = (c1, c2, c3) such that c1 = rP; c2 = rv + M∥γ; c3 = w + u; where u = PUKTAH1(ID). Returns C.

**Decrypt:** Receiver device first applies partial private key by computing Ver1 = c3 − xP. If Ver1 = 0, it proceeds further, otherwise terminates the connection.

Thereafter, it retrieves the message M∥γ as c2 − zc1 and verifies Ver2 as H2(M∥γ)P = c1. Returns M.

### 4.2 Authentication between the EP and the SM

We assume that EP knows the identity of each SM that it supplies the electricity to. Similarly, each SM also knows the identity of its EP, as it has a contract with the EP. As shown in Figure 3, the authentication between the EP and the SM/HAN-GW is carried out as follows:

**Step 1** \( EP \to SM: [E_{PUK_{SM}} \{ ID_{EP}, K_1, Zip_{EP} \}, T_1, MAC_1] \): First, the EP retrieves the public key of the SM from the repository stored at its tier-2, i.e., PUKSM. Then, it encrypts its identity IDEP, a nonce K1, and the location (Zip code) ZipEP with the public key of the SM and sends it to the SM along with a current timestamp T1 and a MAC1 (message-1), where MAC1 = \( E_{PUK_{SM}} \{ ID_{EP}, K_1, Zip_{EP} \}, T_1 \). We consider each MAC as a HMAC function, i.e., HMACSHA256, and a pre-assigned key, say K, is used in MAC.

**Step 2** \( SM \to EP: [E_{PUK_{EP}} \{ ID_{SM}, K_2, Zip_{SM} \}, T_2, MAC_2] \): On receiving message-1, the SM computes MAC1 and checks if MAC1 = MAC1. If it is true, the SM decrypts the message using its private key. Then, the SM retrieves the public key of the EP (PUKEP) and verifies the identity and the location of the EP. If it is true, then the SM sends IDSM, K2, ZipSM encrypted with PUKEP to the EP along with T2 and MAC2 (message-2), where MAC2 = \( E_{PUK_{EP}} \{ ID_{SM}, K_2, Zip_{SM} \}, T_2 \).

**Step 3:** On receiving message-2, the EP computes MAC2 and checks if MAC1 = MAC2. If it is true, the EP decrypts the received message using its private key, and verifies the identity and the location of the SM. If both are correct, the EP computes a secret shared key as \( SK_1 = H_3(Zip_{EP} \oplus K_2, Zip_{SM} \oplus K_1) \) and sends message to the SM encrypted with this shared key. Here, \( H_3(·) \) is a one-way hash function. Similarly, the SM also computes the same secret SK1 key.

### 4.3 Authentication between the SM and the GW

We assume that a group of SM sends its metering data to a specific GW. The GW keeps a record of the identity of each SM associated with it. A number of SM communicates with a GW simultaneously, so the mutual authentication is executed in a batch. The authentication process and

![Fig. 3: Authentication between the EP and the SM.](image-url)
the communication scenario of the proposed authentication scheme between a group of SMs and the GW are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. As shown in Figure 4, the authentication process is carried out as follows:

**Step-1 SM→GW:** \([E_{PUK_{GW}} \{ID_{SM,i}, Z_i\}, T_3, MAC_3]\):
First, each SM_i retrieves the identity and the public key of the GW. Then, each SM_i sends its identity and \(Z_i\) encrypted with PUK_{GW} along with its current timestamp \(T_3\) and \(MAC_3\) to the GW (message-1), where \(MAC_3 = [E_{PUK_{GW}} \{ID_{SM,i}, Z_i\}, T_3\] and \(Z_i = ID_{SM,K_i}\). The \(K_i \in [1, q-1]\) are the random secret values selected by each SM_i.

**Step-2 GW→SM:** \([E_{PUK_{SM_i}} \{ID_{GW}, e\}, T_4, MAC_4]\):
On receiving message-1, the GW computes \(MAC_4\) and checks message integrity. If it is true, the GW compares its current timestamp \(t_m\) with \(T_{threshold} = T_3 + \epsilon\), where \(\epsilon\) is the maximum allowed delay to transmit the message to the GW. If \(t_m > T_{threshold}\), the request is discarded and the connection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW decrypts the message using its private key, and verifies the identity of the SM_i. If it is true, the GW checks the number of attempts by the SM_i within a specified interval. If it is more than the assigned limit, the connection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW sends its identity and a value \(e\) encrypted using the public key of the corresponding SM_i along with \(T_4\) and \(MAC_4\) (message-2) to the SM_i. Here, \(e = h(Z)\), \(h\) is a one-way hash function, \(Z = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_i\), and \(n\) is the number of SM_i communicating with the GW.

**Step-3 SM_i→GW:** \([E_{PUK_{GW}} \{ID_{SM,i}, P_{SM}, S_{SM_i}\}, T_5, MAC_5]\):
On receiving message-2, each SM_i computes MAC_5 and verifies the integrity of each message. If it is true, SM_i decrypts the messages using private keys PUK_{SM}, and verifies the received identity of the GW. If it is true, each SM_i stores \(e\), and generates a variable \(P_{SM} = PRK_{SM} \cdot ID_{SM}\), and a signature \(S_{SM_i} = (K_i + ePRK_{SM}) \mod n\). Note that the first 128 bits of \(P_{PRK_{SM}}\) are used in \(P_{SM}\), and \(S_{SM}\) for operations’ compatibility. Then, each SM_i sends \(ID_{SM}, P_{SM}, S_{SM_i}\) and \(S_{SM_i}\) encrypted using public key of the GW along with \(T_5\), and \(MAC_5 = [E_{PUK_{GW}} \{ID_{SM}, P_{SM}, S_{SM_i}\}, T_5\]\) (message-3) to the GW. On receiving message-3, the GW computes \(MAC_5\), and checks message integrity. If it is true, the GW decrypts the messages, and verifies the identity of each SM_i. In a scenario where a group of SM_i communicates with a GW, it is possible that some of them perform flood-based DoS attacks instead of sending message-3. In order to prevent these attacks, the identity of each SM_i is verified. For each unresponsive SM_i, the GW removes the corresponding \(Z_i\) and re-computes \(Z\). Then, the GW computes \(P = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_{SM}\), and \(R = \sum_{i=1}^{n} S_{SM_i}ID_{SM}, and verifies (R - eP = Z)\).

Therefore, our scheme is efficient even with the presence of invalid requests in a batch since the GW only needs to re-compute \(Z\), which is simply a summation of all \(Z_i\).

### 4.4 Authentication between the HA and the SM

Since data generated and sent by all the HA belong to a particular user, we involve the end user (owner) for authenticating the home appliances (at the initial setup) [41]. The energy consumption information can reveal personal details of the consumers, such as their daily routines (including times when they are at home or asleep), what electronic equipment they own and are being used, etc. Consumers expect that the privacy of this information is maintained. We assume that the SM and all the HA share a password selected by the user. A secret key \(SK_2 = H_3(pwd, T)\) is generated every time a HA and the SM communicates, where \(pwd\) is the shared password, \(T\) is a timestamp, and \(H_3\) is a one-way hash function. As shown in Figure 6, the authentication process between the HA and the SM is carried out as follows:

**Fig. 4:** Authentication between the SM and the BAN/NAN-GW.

**Fig. 5:** Communication scenario between a group of SMs and the GW.

**Fig. 6:** Authentication between the HA and the SM.
Step 1 HA → SM: \([TID_{HA}, T_0, MAC_0]\): First, each HA generates \(SK_2\) from a shared password and uses it to encrypt the original identity of the HA. Then, it sends a temporary identity \(TID_{HA}\), a timestamp \(T_0\), and \(MAC_0\) to the SM (message-1), where \(MAC_0 = [TID_{HA}, T_0]\) and \(SK_2 = H_3(pwd, T_0)\). The encryption can be performed by any standard symmetric key algorithm such as AES-CTR or MAES-CTR [42].

Step 2 SM → HA: \([TID_{SM}, T_7, MAC_7]\): On receiving message-1, the SM verifies \(MAC_0\) with the received \(MAC_0\). If it is true, the SM decrypts and recovers the actual identity of the HA. If the identity belongs to one of its HA, it generates a temporary identity \(TID_{SM}\) and sends its identity to the HA along with \(T_7\) and \(MAC_7\) (message-2), where \(MAC_7 = [TID_{SM}, T_7]\).

On receiving message-2, the HA computes \(MAC_7\) and compares it with \(MAC_7\), and further decrypts and recovers the actual identity of the SM. If it is correct, the HA and the SM can start communicating using messages encrypted by \(SK_2\). Moreover, the password can be automatically changed at a regular interval by calculating \(pwd_{i+1} = N \times H_{3\text{change}}(d \times pwd_i)\), where \(N\) is the number of days, \(d\) is a random secret, and \(H_{3\text{change}}\) is a hash function. For the password change, the user needs to provide \(N\) to the SM. When a new password is generated at SM, the SM encrypts it using last session key and sends it to all the HA before discarding the previous key.

4.5 Authentication between the NAN-GW and the CC
We assume that the NAN-GW aggregates the received data from various SM. The CC is assumed to be connected to the NAN-GW using wired network and is authenticated. In case, if it is wireless connected, the scenario similar to EP-SM provides mutual authentication.

5 Security and Performance Analysis
This section presents the verification proofs, defenses against various security attacks, and security and performance analysis of our protocol in comparison with the existing lightweight protocols.

5.1 Verification Proof
We present the verification proofs for the public decryption of our public encryption scheme, and the correctness of the protocol between SMs and their corresponding GW.

1. Verification of Decryption in Our Encryption Scheme:
\[Ver_1 = c_3 - xP = w + u - xP = sP + PU K_{TA}H_1(ID) - \{s + PRK_{TA}H_1(ID)\}P = sP + PRK_{TA}H_1(ID)P - sP - PRK_{TA}H_1(ID)P = 0.\]
\[Ver_2 = H_2(M|\gamma)P = c_1 = H_2(M|\gamma)P = eP = H_2(M|\gamma)P.\]

2. Correctness of the Protocol between SM and GW:
- **L.H.S.**
  \[Z = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_i = ID_{SM_1}K_1 + ID_{SM_2}K_2 + \ldots + ID_{SM_n}K_n.\]
- **R.H.S.**
  \[R = eP = (S_{SM_1}ID_{SM_1} + S_{SM_2}ID_{SM_2} + \ldots + S_{SM_n})\]
  \[-e(P_{SM_1} + P_{SM_2} + \ldots + P_{SM_n}) = (\{K_1 + e(PRK_{SM_1})\}ID_{SM_1} + (K_2 + e(PRK_{SM_2}))ID_{SM_2} + \ldots + (K_n + e(PRK_{SM_n}))ID_{SM_n}) - e(P_{SM_1} + P_{SM_2} + \ldots + P_{SM_n}) = (ID_{SM_1}K_1 + ID_{SM_2}K_2 + \ldots + ID_{SM_n}K_n) + e(\{PRK_{SM_1}ID_{SM_1} + PRK_{SM_2}ID_{SM_2} + \ldots + PRK_{SM_n}ID_{SM_n}\} - e(P_{SM_1} + P_{SM_2} + \ldots + P_{SM_n}) = ID_{SM_1}K_1 + ID_{SM_2}K_2 + \ldots + ID_{SM_n}K_n = Z.\]

5.2 Defenses Against Various Security Attacks
We assume that an adversary \(A\) has a complete knowledge about the system topology, as well as the identities and public keys of the entities. \(A\) may be an internal entity or an external entity. \(A\) may attempt to launch MITM attacks on the active connections between any two entities of the SG network. Since all messages over the network are encrypted, inherently, the MITM attacks will not be successful. The replay attacks are also prevented as every message over the network contains a unique timestamp value. As discussed in Section 4.3, the proposed protocol also defeats the flood-based DoS attacks. In addition, the impersonation attacks can be prevented, since the fake request is discarded and the connection is terminated. \(A\) does not have the actual private key/shared secret key of the valid entity and cannot decrypt the transmitted message. The key size of each shared secret key and public key/private key is chosen to be longer than 128 bits to resist against brute-force attacks. Furthermore, the Zip codes, sent by the devices, are used to overcome the redirection attacks. Table 2 shows the comparison of the security capabilities of the proposed protocol with the existing protocols. Note that [19] and [20] partially protect DoS attacks by simply limiting the key agreement sessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>[19]</th>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[20]</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MITM attacks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replay attacks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impersonation attacks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute-force attacks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redirection attacks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood-based DoS attacks</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Security Analysis

The proposed protocol provides mutual authentications between the EP and the SM, between the SM and the GW, and between the SM and the HA. Our protocol also provides a perfect forward secrecy, since the adversary can neither retrieve the actual key nor predict any of the future keys using any shared secret key. Furthermore, our protocol preserves the privacy of communicated entities over the network and overcomes ID thefts, since the transmitted messages are always encrypted. Table 3 shows the comparison of security requirements. Note that we have a system with $|K|=|C|=|P|$, each of 128 bits (with AES-CTR) or 256 bits (with MAES-CTR) for symmetric encryption and $|K| \geq |C|=|P|$ for asymmetric encryption. Therefore, our system has perfect secrecy as each key is used with equal probability $1/|K|$, and for every plaintext $P$ and ciphertext $C$ there is a unique key $K$ such that $E_K(P) = C$. As well, our system with at least equal size spaces $|P|=|C|=|K|$ is perfectly key ambiguous as the keys are picked uniformly, and for all $x \in P$, $y \in C$, there is a unique key $K$ such that $y = E_K(x)$.

Furthermore, $A$ cannot retrieve the partial and actual private keys of any device. Even in other scenarios where $A$ extracts any one of these parameters (i) partial private key, (ii) partial public key, and (iii) public key, or replaces the public key of the device, our public encryption scheme is able to defend such attacks, as $A$ cannot retrieve the private key and cannot decrypt the message. Let us consider two scenarios, in which $A$ tries to extract some information:

Scenario-1: $A$ does not have access to the masterKey, but may replace public keys (PUK) of the devices with any value, and also requests the public key of victim device, extracts the partial private key, and makes decryption queries. Under this scenario, $A$ has following restrictions:

- $A$ cannot extract the partial private key (PPR) of the challenge device ID at any point, as the fake ID will be discarded by the TA.
- $A$ cannot request the private key (PRK) of any identity, if the respective public key (PUK) has been replaced.
- $A$ cannot make a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext $C$ that was generated by a combination of (ID, PUK).

Scenario-2: $A$ does have access to the masterKey, but may not replace public keys (PUK) of the devices. $A$ can compute partial private key of any device, and also can request public key and make private key extraction and decryption queries. Under this scenario, $A$ has following restrictions:

- $A$ cannot replace the public key (PUK) of any device at any time, as the identity and public key repositories are stored at various trusted authorities (TA).
- $A$ cannot extract the private key (PRK) of the challenge device at any time, as it is randomly selected by each device.
- $A$ cannot successfully decrypt the challenge ciphertext $C$ on behalf of the victim device, as it may generate partial private key (PPR) of the device, but does not have the actual private key (PRK) of the device.

Definition 2. A protocol is secure against adaptive chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA secure), if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage. Therefore, our protocol is secure against IND-CPA.

Our system is secure in terms of indistinguishability as $A$ cannot identify the message choice because of a unique combination of $P$ and $K$ for each transmitted message $C$. Here, Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is equivalent to the property of semantic security. In our protocol, symmetric encryption is performed by AES-CTR, which is IND-CPA secure. Also, the asymmetric encryption, performed by our proposed scheme, is based on ECC and is indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA secure), considering the hardness of the ECDLP [43].

5.4 Performance Analysis

A mutual authentication between the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW is proposed in [1], a mutual authentication between the SM and the AS of the DCU-GW is proposed in [20]. A number of authentication scenarios between SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAM-GW, and HA are presented in [19], whereas our protocol proposes mutual authentications between EP, SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAM-GW, and HA. This subsection computes and compares communication and computation overheads among these four protocols, and evaluates total execution time of our proposed protocol.

The total communication overhead (CMO) and the total computation overhead (CPO) of the protocol for a single authentication token are calculated, respectively, as $CMO_{total} = CMO_{EP-SM} + CMO_{SM-GW} + CMO_{SM-HA}$ and $CPO_{total} = CPO_{EP-SM} + CPO_{SM-GW} + CPO_{SM-HA} + CPO_{key-gen}$. Table 4 shows the comparison of the CMO and CPO of our protocol with the existing protocols [1], [19], [20].

| Table 3: Summary of Security Requirements Fulfilled by Various Protocols |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Requirements                  | [19] | [1] | [20] | Proposed |
| Mutual authentication       | Yes   | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Forward secrecy              | Yes   | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Privacy preservation         | No    | Yes | No  | Yes |
| Prevents ID thefts           | No    | Yes | No  | Yes |

| Table 4: Performance with Single Authentication Token |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Performance Parameter                  | [19] | [1] | [20] | Proposed |
| Computation overhead                  | 8E, 3XOR, 3E, 3D, 2H, 2MUL | 13H, 3MUL, 7E, 4EMUL, 7D, 1ESUB | 25H, 4XOX, 14MUL, 1ADD |
| Communication overhead (bit)           | 3712 | 1152 | 1152 | 2752 |
of these three existing protocols, it is fair to compare our protocol with only the protocol in [19], as only this protocol includes most of the involved entities in the SG, while only two entities are involved in [1] and [20]. Although, the protocol in [19] and our protocol cover a similar range of entities, our protocol achieves much lower overhead. In detail, authentication scenario between the EP-SM generates CMO of 1024 bits and prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, and redirection attacks. The scenario between the SM-GW generates 1216 bits of CMO and prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, repudiation, and flood-based DoS attacks. In comparison with the protocol in [1], our protocol is also resistant against the flood-based DoS attacks while adding just 24 bits of CMO. Furthermore, in the authentication scenario between the SM-HA, our protocol prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, and brute-force attacks while generating 512 bits of CMO.

We also evaluate the performance of our protocol when there are multiple authentication tokens. We assume that there are m users executing the protocol simultaneously and each user has n home appliances. The CMO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated as $CMO(m, n) = CMO(EP-SM)m + CMO(SM-GW)m + CMO(SM-HA)n = 1024m + 1216m + 512n = 2240m + 512n$. The CPO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated as $CPO(m, n) = (5m+2n)E+(5m+2n)D+(3m+n+1)H+(10m+4n)MAC+1ESUB+4mEMUL+1MUL+mADD+(2m-2)EADD + 4mXOR$. Here, E and D represent encryption and decryption, respectively; XOR is bit-wise exclusive-OR, MUL and ADD are scalar multiplication and addition over integers/binaries, respectively; EMUL, EADD, and ESUB are elliptic curve multiplication, addition, and subtraction (all three are computed as additions), respectively; and H and MAC are hash and authentication code functions, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there are r malicious users in a batch. The protocol first removes the invalid requests of the malicious users and then computes other parameters before further executing the protocol. In such case, the total recalculated CPO is as $CPO(m, n, r) = CPO(m, n) - rMUL - 2rEMUL - rESUB - 2r(1-r)EADD$. Since XOR operations are negligible in comparison with other operations, they are not included in the calculation of CPO.

Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively, show the CMO and CPO generated by the proposed protocol for different number of users ($m = 10, 50, 100$) and the number of home appliances ($n = 1, 5, 10, 20$), considering unit value for each operation. In Figure 7, $CMO(10, 1) = 2864$ and $CMO(10, 1) = 38.75$ bytes, $CMO(100, 20) = 29280$, and $CMO(100, 20) = 397.625$ bytes. In Figure 8, $CPO(100, 5, 1) = 380$ bytes, $CPO(100, 10, 50) = 348.875$ bytes, and $CPO(100, 20, 99) = 332.375$ bytes (worst case). Hence, even if there are some invalid requests r (Figure 8(b): 1, m/2, and m-1) in a batch, our protocol efficiently handles them.

5.5 Simulation Result

We simulated our protocol in Java environment with JDK1.7, 2GB RAM, and Windows7 OS. For a single authentication token, the scalar addition and multiplication operations over integer/binaries took 0.000933 milliseconds (ms) and 0.00918 ms, single addition and doubling over elliptic curve took 0.6031 ms and 0.6047 ms, hash function SHA256 took 0.9 ms, HMAC function HMACSHA256 took 271.60 ms, and [encryption, decryption] time of symmetric MAES-CTR mode with 256 bits key between EP-SM and SM-HA took (0.97, 0.78) ms. Moreover, the asymmetric encryption (i) using RSA with 2048 bits key and (ii) using certificateless public encryption scheme took (30, 16) ms and (12, 7.6) ms, respectively. The total computation time by our protocol using RSA and using proposed scheme is 4041.91 ms and 3962.71 ms, respectively. This computation time can be further reduced by using the fast multiplication, where a single addition and doubling takes approximately half of the ordinary ECC multiplication, i.e., 0.303 ms [44]. The total messages (2752 bits) transmission time on 3G and 4G networks [45] by our protocol are 0.000451 and 0.000182 ms, respectively. Hence, the total execution time by our protocol (with certificateless cipher scheme) on 3G and 4G networks of approximately 3.96 s is quite reasonable, considering that it is the total time for completing authentications for all involved entities in the SG network. Here, we presented just one case for the overall protocol execution time. However, if we encrypt the message with AES-CTR/MAES-CTR for the asymmetric encryption, and the symmetric key is encrypted by an asymmetric algorithm, the overall time can be further reduced.

5.6 Formal Proof of the Properties of the Protocol

In order to justify our analysis, we use the BAN-Logic to provide a formal proof of our scheme. The notations used in BAN-Logic can be referred from [46].

1) Message Meaning Rule:


2) Timestamp Verification Rule:


3) Jurisdiction Rule:

(1) $H_A \equiv SM \Rightarrow TID_{H_A} \Rightarrow H_A \equiv SM$
4) Protocol Goals

a. Mutual Authentication: $EP \equiv SM \land EP \rightarrow SM \equiv EP \land SM$. Thus, mutual authentication holds.
b. Session Key Agreement: Each key $SK_i$ between each $EP$ and the $SM$ provides session key agreement.
c. Freshness of messages: $SM \equiv \#(T_j) \land EP \equiv \#(T_i)$. Hence, freshness of messages between the $EP$ and the $SM$ holds.
d. Integrity and Privacy between the $EP$ and the $SM$:

\[
\begin{align*}
   & EP \equiv (EP^{TID \cdot SM}, EP \odot HMAC_{msg}) \\
   & EP \equiv (EP^{TID \cdot SM}, EP \odot E_{ID} \odot SK_L)
\end{align*}
\]

6 CONCLUSION

The proposed protocol, based on hierarchical cloud trusted authorities, provides mutual authentications between the $EP$ and the $SM$, between the $SM$/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW, between the $SM$ and the HA, and between the NANGW and the CC. Particularly, the authentications between EP-SM and GW-CC, SM-GW, and SM-HA are, respectively, based on asymmetric key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key cryptography. Processing requests in batch improves the efficiency of the system, as a large number of smart meters communicate with the gateway simultaneously for mutual authentications. The certificateless scheme in the proposed protocol maintains privacy preservation as the transmitted message is always encrypted over the network. Simulation results show that the authentication scenarios between the EP-SM, the SM-GW, and the SM-HA generate lower communication and computation overheads in comparison with existing protocols. Also the overheads generated by our protocol are manageable, even when invalid requests exist in a batch. Through security analysis, we show that our protocol is secure against various existing attacks, such as MITM attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, redirection attacks, and flood-based DoS attacks. In sum, our protocol is lightweight with low execution time and efficiently provides a centralized integrated control in a decentralized environment. Furthermore, our protocol can be readily integrated with the cloud computing-based trusted entities to utilize powerful computing services of the cloud to efficiently manage the SG system.

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