

School of Psychology

The Paradox of Intergroup Apology

by

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Summary of Thesis

Intergroup apologies, from nations, governments, public bodies and businesses, have become commonplace in the modern era for both past and present wrongdoings. Despite the increase in these apologies, current research suggests that intergroup apologies are not effective in promoting forgiveness or progressing the reconciliation process. One prominent inconsistency is that interpersonal apologies are generally fruitful in producing forgiveness. In this thesis I attempt to answer why intergroup apologies are ineffective and whether it is possible to improve their efficacy.

In Chapter 2 I highlight some of the paradoxes that surround intergroup apologies – such as the fact that desiring such an apology does not increase the likelihood of forgiveness when that apology is delivered. In Chapter 3 I focus on the role of content in intergroup apology. There I show that specific strategies (such as future orientated promises and emotion expressions) should be kept separate to avoid one type of content undermining the other. The results reported in Chapter 4 provide a basis for optimism about the prospects for intergroup reconciliation, showing that the expression of guilt and/or shame can be an effective way of repairing an intergroup relationship, whereas the expression of pride has the opposite effect. The research reported in Chapter 5 shows that intergroup apologies can be effective when they are embedded within a broader reconciliation process.

The majority of the studies reported in this thesis show that there are important differences in how interpersonal and intergroup apologies are received. Intergroup apologies are far less likely to promote forgiveness – confirming doubts about their effectiveness. However, I conclude that there is also cause for optimism. The research reported here shows that when intergroup apologies are delivered in the right way, as part of a broad and extended reconciliation process, they can be effective in achieving forgiveness.

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Chapter 1

General Introduction

I sit on a man's back, choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him and wish to ease his lot by all possible means - except by getting off his back.

Leo Tolstoy, 1887

The above quote from Tolstoy highlights one large pitfall of apologies – If people did feel truly sorry for their actions, would they have committed them in the first place? This offers an insight into the minds of victims who choose not to accept apologies or forgive a transgressor, but of course this does not stop a transgressor offering an apology.

Prior to World War Two, public intergroup apologies were almost unheard of. They were often seen as a sign of weak leadership and a potential stick with which to beat the apologiser, because he or she was implicitly or explicitly accepting responsibility for some adverse outcome. Since World War Two, the frequency with which intergroup apologies are offered has soared. Apologies are now being offered from nations, government, public bodies and businesses for both past and present failings, to the point where one commentator has described the present era as “The Age of Apology” (Brooks, 1999). Two questions that arise from this observation are “Why are there so many intergroup apologies?” and “Are these apologies effective?”. In an attempt to answer the first of these questions, Barkan

(2000) suggested that we are living in an era in which people are more attentive to their moral responsibilities, and that this attentiveness makes us want to repair historical wrongs. Relatedly, it seems reasonable to assume that people want past wrongdoings to be both forgiven and forgotten, and that the quickest way to achieve this is to start with an apology, triggering an 'apology-forgiveness' cycle. The second question concerning the effectiveness of intergroup apologies is more complicated to answer, but one way to address this question is to start with the motivations for issuing the apology. If the motivation is to communicate regret that is genuinely felt about past wrongdoing, in the hope that future relations with the victim group can be improved, then the effectiveness can be mostly evaluated by the transgressors in terms of the extent to which they experience some alleviation of their negative feelings, as well as any potential positive impacts on the relationship between the groups. However, if the motivation for issuing an intergroup apology is simply to be forgiven and to move on, judging effectiveness becomes more complex. I will devote the remainder of this opening chapter to discussing the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, using real world examples to illustrate key issues, as well as describing findings from research that has examined intergroup apologies and their effectiveness.

Case Study 1. Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, September 2012.

In the run up to the 2010 General Election, the Liberal Democrats were seen by many as offering a genuine alternative to the two main political parties in the UK. Much of this was due to the performances of their then party leader, Nick Clegg, in the television debates that preceded the election. In the course of this

build up, Clegg, like many other Liberal Democrat MPs, signed a pledge to the National Union of Students not to raise the cap on university tuition fees; if the cap were raised, fees would rise from around £3,000 a year to £9,000 a year. After the general election finished with no single party holding a majority, Clegg opted to take his party into government via a formal coalition with the Conservative Party. After less than six months of the new coalition government, the cap on tuition fees was raised to £9,000 a year, the legislation passing through parliament with the help of several Liberal Democrat MPs. This led to an outcry and an upsurge in negativity towards Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, with terms such as “liars”, “hypocrites”, and even “Pinocchio” hitting newspaper headlines to describe this apparent betrayal of the pledge made to the country’s university students.

In an attempt to atone for this sequence of events, Clegg himself decided to issue a public video apologising on behalf of both himself and his party for not sticking to the pledge that he and his MPs previously signed. Despite newspaper articles claiming that the apology drew both “scorn and applause” (Wintour & Mulholland, 2012), even a superficial examination of opinion poll data and ‘below-the-line’ comments on newspaper websites suggests that ‘scorn’ is a better description of how Clegg’s apology was received. Below are some of the less extreme comments made about the apology (which was also satirised by turning it into a music video that went viral):

“Too damn late. You received votes on the back of this. Shameful.”

“It’s too late Nick”

“Where’s your resignation letter, Nick? We’re past apologies.”

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“Pass me the sick bucket please”

“The Lib Dem Party is largely a joke, I don’t know why anyone would vote for them in the next election”

“The Lib Dem’s are finished”

Since this episode, support for the Liberal Democrats in General Elections has collapsed – from attracting nearly 6,000,000 votes in the 2010 General Election to winning around 2,500,000 votes in the two subsequent General Elections. Many still cite the actions of the Lib Dems over tuition fees as a key reason why they would not vote for them, thereby highlighting the ineffectiveness of Clegg’s apology.

Case Study 2. The Australian Apology to the Stolen Generations

As a result of Australian Government policies concerning the ‘civilization’ of the indigenous Australian people, between the early 1900s and 1970 thousands of children were forcibly removed from their families. The children were removed and placed in girls’ and boys’ homes, foster families, and other kinds of institutions. These children were taught to reject their indigenous culture and expected to conform to “Australian values”, thereby supposedly helping them to assimilate into Australian culture. The lives of many of these children were blighted by abuse, and in many cases, they were not accepted as equals. Furthermore, a large number of those taken away from their families were never able to locate their parents. Those who were affected by these actions were subsequently named ‘The Stolen Generations’.

An official inquiry into the policies that led to this child removal was launched by the Australian Government in 1995. This report was tabled in parliament on the 26th May 1997, and from the following year onwards, this date was known in Australia as 'National Sorry Day'. In 2007, the then Prime Minister of Australia offered a formal apology in parliament, becoming the first Australian Prime Minister to publicly apologise to the Stolen Generations on behalf of the Australian government. The apology itself was reported to have been widely applauded by both indigenous Australians and non-indigenous Australians (McKenny, 2008).

Despite the apology being widely welcomed and applauded, it was not without controversy. One disputed issue concerned the fact that a promise of compensation to the Stolen Generations was missing from the apology. Compensation was something that was apparently demanded alongside an apology, but this came to nothing.

More than a decade later, it seems that genuine success in the wake of the apology was limited. The apology generated hope and optimism that inequality would be addressed, but this hope has not been fulfilled. A recent report shows that Australia is still failing on four out of seven measures that aimed to improve the lives of the indigenous people (Mao, 2018).

Case Study 3. The Canadian Apology for the Indian Residential Schools.

Much as with the assimilation attempts made by Australia in relation to the Stolen Generations, in Canada from the late 19th century to the late 20th century a system of schools was created and funded by the Canadian Government for the

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purpose of removing First Nations children from their indigenous culture and replacing it with the dominant Canadian culture. Children were rounded up and taken to these boarding schools. It is estimated that around one-third of all indigenous children were placed in one of these schools across Canada. As well as being forcibly removed from their families, these children experienced a lot of abuse at these schools.

Apologies for this school system began to be made in the 1980s and 1990s, with the apologies coming from leaders of the United Church of Canada, the Anglican Church of Canada, and the Presbyterian Church in Canada. In 1998, financial compensation was offered during a government “statement of reconciliation” to those people who were physically or sexually abused while attending residential schools, although a formal government apology would not come for another decade. It was 2008 when the then Canadian Prime Minister offered a formal apology, for both the creation of the residential schools and the abuses that occurred within them. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was also established in 2008, providing an opportunity for school survivors to share their experiences. This commission led to 94 “Calls to Action”, in the hope of promoting reconciliation.

The formal apology made by the Prime Minister was, by and large, well received by the indigenous population. It was regarded as a significant symbolic gesture and raised hopes and increased optimism that things would change (Eshet, 2015). However, once again, this appears to be an instance where such hope and optimism was not fully converted into positive developments. Of the 94 “Calls to

Action”, by 2018 10 were marked as “completed”, 15 were “in progress”, 25 had “proposed projects”, while the remaining 44 had not been acted upon (Carreiro, 2018). Research has also shown that a key reason for poor well-being in the indigenous population of Canada can still be traced to this historical trauma (Bombay, Matheson, & Anisman, 2013).

Summary

These three case studies point to the apparent ineffectiveness of large-scale, public, intergroup apologies; or at the very least, they highlight their ineffectiveness in comparison to expectations about what would follow from the apologies. However, these are just three cases, and case studies by their very nature have idiosyncrasies that may not be generalisable to the entire class of intergroup apologies. Furthermore, analysis of case studies typically (as here) depends on what is available in the public domain, in the form of newspaper reports and online commentary. I therefore now turn to more systematic research on intergroup apologies, to examine the state of the evidence concerning their effectiveness.

Research on Intergroup Apologies

Despite the large increase in the incidence of intergroup apologies, current research is inconclusive with respect to how useful they really can be. It is widely assumed that official intergroup apologies are a vital factor in attaining intergroup reconciliation (Lazare, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991) and indeed there are studies showing the positive effects that apologies can have. For example, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) showed that offering an apology would increase forgiveness,

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compared to a no apology control condition. This was done by showing participants, who were university students, a bogus article that was ostensibly written by university professors in a local newspaper. This article had professors claiming that the students were “spoiled, immature, and unintelligent,” amongst other things, and had a lack of responsibility towards their education. Participants were then given information leading them to think that the professors had either apologised or had chosen not to apologise. In the apology condition there was a greater desire to forgive the lecturers, largely mediated by a reduced desire for retribution. Although the findings of Leonard et al. suggest that intergroup apologies can be effective, the study has some limitations. First, the extent to which it is really an intergroup study is unclear, because the students and professors were all members of the same university. Second, in the control condition participants were told that the professors had chosen not to apologise, which is subtly but possibly importantly different from simply not apologising.

Another study that offers some optimism regarding the effectiveness of intergroup apologies is the one reported by Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008). These researchers conducted a study examining a ‘friendly-fire’ incident between American and Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and whether the offering of an apology would be more likely to lead to forgiveness than not offering one. The results showed that an apology was likely to inspire forgiveness, but again, the context needs to be borne in mind. As the term ‘friendly fire’ suggests, this incident was an accident that happened between two groups who were allies and were therefore already in a positive intergroup relationship. The fundamentally good relationship between these groups was not jeopardised by the incident. It also

needs to be remembered that the event was accidental, meaning that the context is one in which there was no intent. So again, although this study yielded evidence that an intergroup apology elicits forgiveness, the context of the intergroup transgression is not one in which there was real hostility or rivalry between the two groups, as there often is when intergroup apologies are called for or made.

A more common finding from research on intergroup apologies is that such apologies can improve the victim group's perceptions of the transgressor group. For example, Berndsen, Hornsey, and Wohl (2015) found that victim group members perceived transgressors as more remorseful following an intergroup apology, while more generally Blatz, Day, and Schryer (2014) showed that victim group members evaluate perpetrators more favourably after such apologies. Although such findings again provide some reason to be optimistic about the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, they do not show any increase in forgiveness, which those interested in intergroup reconciliation would generally regard as their key aim.

Thus, although there is evidence that intergroup apologies leave victim group members more satisfied, and with more positive perceptions of the transgressors, such effects typically do not translate into forgiveness and reconciliation (Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014). This is also consistent with the impression given by the three intergroup apology case studies summarised at the beginning of this chapter. Research examining the how the Canadian government apology was received and how participants responded to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the Indian Residential Schools suggests that victims were generally pessimistic about whether the apology would actually change

anything. Consistent with this is research undertaken by Chapman (2007), looking at the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Chapman found that victims and their family members were generally disinclined to forgive transgressors.

Also consistent with doubts about the effectiveness of intergroup apologies in generating forgiveness and reconciliation is research by Philpot and Hornsey (2008). These authors conducted multiple studies in a variety of contexts, each of which appeared to highlight the ineffectiveness of intergroup apologies; in none of these studies was there a significant difference in forgiveness when the transgressing group offered an apology, compared to when it did not. These studies cast doubt on the positive conclusions drawn from some of the research on this topic. The general conclusion suggested by this body of work is that although intergroup apologies are initially welcomed, and allow victims to perceive transgressors as remorseful, they do not promote forgiveness and reconciliation.

Interpersonal Apologies

Although the evidence that intergroup apologies promote forgiveness seems variable at best, and negative at worst, research on interpersonal apologies paints a much clearer and more positive picture (e.g., Exline & Baumeister, 2000). From a young age, most children are taught that an apology should always follow a wrongdoing, and that a sincerely offered apology generally results in forgiveness (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Indeed, the research evidence shows that apologies offered by one individual to another generally do lead to forgiveness. For example, McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997) found that there was a decrease in

the motivation for revenge once an apology had been given. This finding was supported by Beyens, Yu, Han, Zhang and Zhou (2015), who showed that offender apologies reduce aggressive reactions and implicit negative attitudes. Likewise, De Cremer (2010) showed that when an interpersonal apology is offered following exploitation or an unfair offer, it is an effective strategy for promoting trust. It is also described as a necessity in certain cases, where it is a stronger strategy than offering financial compensation. These findings are more consistent and offer a much more positive outlook on the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies, especially when compared to the research evidence on intergroup apologies.

Intergroup vs. Interpersonal Differences

The abovementioned research highlights a substantial difference in the way that intergroup apologies and interpersonal apologies are received. The former seems to be ineffective in promoting forgiveness or reconciliation, whereas the latter seem to be an effective way of achieving these ends. Research comparing interpersonal and intergroup interactions generally shows that intergroup scenarios tend to be more competitive than in interpersonal scenarios (Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, Wildschut, Kozar, Pinter, Finkel, Brazil, Cecil, & Montoya, 2001; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). I now turn to a consideration of the factors that may be responsible for this difference.

Identity

One factor that needs to be taken into account when considering why there is a difference between intergroup and interpersonal settings is that of personal versus social identity. Every individual has a personal identity, comprising his or her

attributes, beliefs, and other personal qualities. There are also some attributes and qualities that are shared with others, such as family members, work colleagues, fellow sports team supporters, fellow citizens of a town or country, and so on. These shared attributes make up a person's social identity. It is well established that although the degree to which individuals characteristically construe themselves in terms of personal and social attributes varies from one culture to another, with those who come from collectivistic cultures being more inclined to define themselves in terms of shared attributes (e.g., Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990), it is also the case that social identity plays an important role in social behaviour in all cultural settings, especially when one group interacts with another. Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) was developed in an attempt to account for the role played by social identity in group and intergroup settings. It proposes that individuals' sense of who they are is derived at least to some extent from the groups of which they belong. This is especially the case when people perceive themselves to be part of a group. This collective then becomes the in-group, as distinct from other individuals who belong to one or more out-groups. A key prediction that can be derived from SIT is that in intergroup settings, when one member of an in-group is harmed by one or more members of an out-group, this will be experienced by all in-group members as a threat to themselves, due to their shared identity. This means that when one or more members of a group are harmed, or targeted, for being a part of that group, all individuals who identify with that group will also feel harmed or targeted, and share (at least to some extent) the associated negative feelings. This is different from a purely interpersonal setting, where there is no shared identity with others. Here, harm or the threat of harm, to

one person is limited to that individual. Moreover, it is usually clear who the perpetrator is, making any conflict between persons a (literally) one-to-one interaction, as opposed to a many-to-many interaction. The in-group vs. out-group, us vs. them mentality that characterises intergroup relations could help to account for the difference in responses to intergroup and interpersonal apologies. This concept of identity threat is relevant to many of the studies reported in this thesis, because they typically involve instances where participants are not personally victimised by another group; instead, they will be exposed to situations in which a group (in most cases their in-group) has been treated in a way that threatens the wellbeing of the group and thereby threatens their identity.

One way in which the importance of a shared social identity becomes evident is with respect to persuasion and attitude change. Turner (1991) argued that when a social identity is salient, the ability to persuade individuals is often based on the perceived legitimacy of the information and its relation to in-group norms. Persuasion attempts coming from in-group sources are likely to be seen as more legitimate and more in keeping with in-group norms and values than are persuasion attempts coming from out-group sources. There is no shortage of evidence to support this prediction, with Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1990), for example, showing that attitude change was greater when the source of information belonged to the same in-group as the receiver. To the extent that apologies can be seen as attempts to persuade others (typically the victim) – for example, that the harm was unintentional or unforeseen or at the very least sincerely regretted – this perspective helps us to understand why interpersonal apologies are more effective than intergroup ones. If personal identity is salient,

there is no reason to regard the person offering the apology as an out-group member, and you may therefore be more inclined to accept the apology. If social identity is salient and the person offering the apology is an out-group member, you may be less inclined to regard the apology as sincere. This perspective also helps to explain the results of the few studies that have yielded some evidence that intergroup apologies are effective: As noted earlier, in those studies (Brown et al., 2008; Leonard et al., 2011) there was a degree of shared group identity between transgressors and victims, in the sense that there was a fairly salient superordinate shared group membership (members of the same university, or allies in an armed conflict). In these circumstances, the victim groups would be more likely to listen and react positively to someone who was also regarded as a fellow in-group member.

There are other pieces of research on shared social identity that also help to explain how it makes decision-making and reactions in an intergroup context differ to those in an interpersonal context. Firstly, there are studies showing that a collective social identity can and will lead individuals to evaluate situations in a way that is biased towards the in-group (e.g., Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007). Wildschut, Insko and Gaertner (2002) offer convincing evidence regarding this phenomenon. They show the impact that social support can have on intergroup competition, concluding that group members, when together, are able to provide each other with the support needed in order to pursue an action that favours the in-group. Such findings provide a reason why it is more difficult to forgive transgressions in an intergroup scenario than in an interpersonal one: in an intergroup conflict setting, the actions committed by out-group members are likely

to be judged more harshly, and the threat to the in-group is likely to be perceived as more severe, and ultimately there may be support for a position of not forgiving the out-group. In addition, it has been shown that when social group identities are made salient, people tend to behave in a more greedy, competitive manner than if individuals were reacting to each other interpersonally (Insko et al., 2001; Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efav, & Wildschut, 2005). Together, this research on identity highlights how the situations in which social identities are engaged do not create an environment that is conducive to intergroup forgiveness.

The issue of identity has already been highlighted in intergroup apology research. In the aforementioned study by Brown et al. (2008), one of the key findings was that those who identified more highly with the victim group were less forgiving of the transgression than were those who identified less strongly. This shows how potentially important the role played by identity is in intergroup apologies. It implies that having a high identification with an in-group is likely to make one less forgiving, more greedy, more competitive, and more biased towards your in-group in evaluating situations of potential or actual intergroup conflict, and be less likely to be persuaded by someone regarded as an out-group member who seeks to apologise for the out-group's actions. This helps to explain why the research evidence reveals such consistent discrepancies in the effectiveness of intergroup and interpersonal apologies.

Despite the importance of identity in intergroup apologies and reconciliation, it is worth pointing out that attempts to reduce the strength of social identity that one feels with their group would be likely to be met negatively. With

this in mind, it should be recognised that in attempting to make intergroup apologies more effective, one must attempt to address the effects that social identity can have (e.g., groups being harder to persuade in comparison to individuals), rather than the identity itself. Therefore, in the course of this thesis, although the role of social identity itself is not directly explored, factors that can have an impact on social identity, along with variables that can be influenced by social identity, will be.

Emotion

A further factor that needs to be taken into account in explaining the low effectiveness of intergroup apologies is the role of emotion in intergroup settings. Social appraisal theory (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005) proposes that our reactions to events in our lives are not only shaped by our own feelings and appraisals, but also by the feelings and appraisals of others. This offers an initial insight into how an intergroup scenario is immediately more complex than an interpersonal one. In an intergroup scenario, it is not only one's own feelings and evaluations that lead to perceptions, actions and behaviour, but also the feelings and evaluations of others. Emotions are experienced and expressed in many types of social setting, some interpersonal and some intergroup. In both types of setting, how others are seen to react to an emotional event is likely to influence an individual's own appraisal of – and therefore emotional responses to – the event, but in the case of intergroup settings group members are more likely to be influenced by the reactions of in-group members than those of out-group members.

Indeed, there is a large body of empirical research showing that people can and do experience emotions of behalf of a group to which they belong (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002). Such findings are consistent with Smith's (1993) intergroup emotion theory (IET). IET proposes that in a situation in which individuals define themselves as members of a group, this provides the foundation for group-based emotions. The rationale is that emotions are experienced when the individual perceives that an event has implications for his or her personal wellbeing. In intergroup settings, the wellbeing at stake is that of the extended or social self, the self-defined by one's social identity. Thus, the idea is that intergroup emotions are initiated by intergroup appraisals (appraisals that are group-based) and are a powerful predictor of perceptions, actions and behaviours. It has also been shown that these group-based emotions are independent of individual emotions (Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2013).

Both social appraisal theory and IET suggest that emotions in intergroup contexts are unlikely to work in the same way as they would in an interpersonal context. One way in which this is evident is in the regulation of emotions. Gross (2002) argues that certain 'strategies', like reappraisal, can be used in an attempt to upregulate or downregulate emotions to achieve a more desired state. However, this is less straightforwardly achieved in an intergroup context. For example, Kramer (1994) showed that in negotiations, members of one group often have an exaggeratively negative perception of the intentions of the opposing group, which makes it more difficult to reappraise their intentions as benign. This finding helps to explain why intergroup scenarios are often more competitive than any interpersonal counterpart.

Because of the aforementioned research, it should not be a surprise to find that intergroup emotions play prominent role in conflict and reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2007). The collective experience and shared appraisal of past conflicts powerfully influences group-based emotions, which in turn have a large sway on what happens next, whether it be reconciliation, stagnation, or retaliation. This has been argued by Cehajic-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin (2016), who propose that, as with individual emotions, negative group-based emotions need to be downregulated if reconciliation is to take place.

Research that has been undertaken on the effect that group-based emotions can have on conflict and reconciliation has revealed the influence that emotions have in either ameliorating or exacerbating intergroup conflict (e.g., Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2000). Following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, American citizens who reported higher levels of anger were much more supportive of military attacks (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). On the other side of the coin, studies examining longstanding conflicts in Bosnia (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008) and in Israel/Palestine (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014) have shown the capacity of group-based emotions to promote intergroup reconciliation.

Although the role of emotion mentioned thus far focuses on the *experience* of intergroup emotions, there is also an important role to be played by the *expression* of such emotions. If, as mentioned earlier, intergroup emotions are powerful predictors of perceptions, actions and behaviours, the expression of these emotions to a victimised group is likely have considerable implications. Although

the literature on the expression of intergroup emotions is less plentiful than that on the experience of intergroup emotions, there are studies showing that the expression of negative self-conscious emotions, such as guilt or regret, can enhance intergroup cooperation (Rychlowska et al., 2019; Shore et al., 2019). The role that emotion expression can play in reconciliation has been investigated in the context of economic games, and this will be a focus of the research reported in Chapter 4.

Identity is also closely involved in intergroup emotions, with Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007) proposing that there is a generally positive correlation between the two, such that people who identify more strongly with a social group experience stronger emotions when that group's wellbeing is affected. It has even been shown that discovering that one shares the same emotional responses to an event with other individuals strengthens the perception that one shares group membership with them, while finding out that one's emotional reactions are not shared with others weakens the sense of shared group membership (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd 2011).

A key finding in the field of intergroup emotion is that when group membership is salient, people can experience group-based emotions in relation to events even if they are not personally affected by them (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1999). This means, for example, that negative emotions can be experienced by members of a social group in relation to events in which they are not directly involved (see, for example, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). Furthermore, Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) have shown that although individuals are inclined to mimic the emotions of fellow in-group members, they are more

likely to experience contrasting emotions from those expressed by out-group members.

Prior work on social and group-based aspects of emotion helps to explain why it is difficult to achieve reconciliation between social groups. Group members are likely to look to fellow group members in responding to any event that affects the group's interests, even events that do not directly involve them, and be influenced by how other group members are seen to react. This is especially likely to be true of those who identify highly with the group in question, and there is reason to believe that shared emotional responses to an event strengthen the perception of shared group membership and thereby increase identification.

Summary

Between them, the factors of social identity and group-based emotion help to account for the differential effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup apologies. In combination, they highlight the difficulties faced by anyone seeking to promote intergroup reconciliation. Intergroup settings are characterised by greater competition and greed, and in-groups often have exaggeratedly negative perceptions of out-groups; group members are less easily persuaded by an out-group than by their in-group and are more likely to mimic emotions expressed by in-group members and contrast away from those expressed by out-group members. It is therefore more difficult to regulate intergroup emotions than individual or interpersonal emotions. As a result, intergroup apologies are less likely to be effective in generating forgiveness than their interpersonal counterparts.

An important factor that links the roles played by identity and emotion in intergroup contexts is that of trust. Voci (2006) suggests that identity, group-based emotions, and trust are three intertwined factors. A key issue with group identity in intergroup apology settings is that the victims are in effect being asked to trust to a greater extent than are the perpetrators. The apology offered can be seen as an attempt to persuade the victim group that things will be different in the future. As noted by Turner (1991), social influence is often based on perceived legitimacy of information, and this also highlights the integral factor played by trust. If one group is experiencing heightened threat-based emotions as the result of a transgression committed by another group, it is evident that a trust-restoring interaction between the groups will be needed to begin to alleviate those emotions. This it seems essential that in any effort to promote reconciliation, there will need to be a promotion of perceived trust in the apologising group.

One area of research that explores how trust can be repaired is that of economic games and trust games. There have been many studies that highlight ways in which trust can be rebuilt, such as denial of intent to be unfair (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011), offering compensation (De Cremer, 2010), and even appearing confused by how the game works (De Cremer, Van Dijk & Pilluta, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2011). However, it should be noted that the majority of research in this area focused on rebuilding trust within interpersonal economic games and, as with the variety of contexts already introduced within this chapter, intergroup economic games, in comparison to their interpersonal counterparts, are commonly characterised by greater mistrust, defection and all-around competitiveness (Kugler, Kausel & Kocher, 2012).

Theoretical Models

Having considered two factors that seem to be highly relevant to the issue of why intergroup apologies tend to be ineffective, I now turn to a discussion of theoretical models of intergroup reconciliation and apology. One of the two models I will discuss is a model of intergroup reconciliation, focusing on the needs of the two groups that are involved in a conflict. The other is ostensibly a model of intergroup apology that locates the apology in a broader process that amounts to a model of intergroup reconciliation.

The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation

One model that has been proposed to improve the efficacy of intergroup reconciliation attempts is the needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). This proposes that in order to achieve an effective reconciliation, the emotional needs of both victims and transgressors have to be addressed. It is argued that while victims are suffering an elementary threat to their identity in terms of appearing less *powerful*, transgressors feel an elementary threat to their identity in terms of appearing less *moral*.

Nadler and Shnabel's model identifies different ways in which each of these threats can be addressed. With respect to victims' need for empowerment, an obvious and perhaps instinctive way to accomplish this is through retaliation and vengeance. A more constructive route is for the transgressors to acknowledge their responsibility for the transgression, potentially in the form of an apology, which in turn gives control, and power, back to victims, who then can decide how to

progress (Minnow, 1998). It has been suggested that victims perceive matters of justice and addressing history to be of utmost importance in reconciliation (Rouhana, 2004). A further strategy for improving the probability of reconciliation from a victim perspective would include some form of appreciation on the part of the transgressors for the accomplishments and abilities of victims, thereby building the latter's self-esteem and leaving them feeling more empowered (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008).

With respect to the transgressors' needs to improve their moral image, or at the very least remove the threat to it, there appear to be two very different strategies that can be used, only one of which is likely to promote reconciliation. The first option is denial of wrongdoing. Denying the actions or transgressions, or at least refuting their potentially severe consequences, would certainly help not only in alleviating the threat to the transgressor group's moral image, but also in easing any negative emotions (such as guilt or shame) they might feel about the situation. There is some evidence that high identifiers might be more willing to deny responsibility. For example, in the study by Doosje et al. (1998), it was found that those who were categorised as 'high-identifiers' of the perpetrator group were less likely to experience high levels of collective guilt.

An alternative, more constructive option, would be to seek the victims' forgiveness. By offering an apology and making an attempt to repair or compensate for harm done, the transgressing group might evoke forgiveness, which would go a long way to alleviating the threat to the group's moral image. A potential problem with the offering of an intergroup apology is that some victims may perceive the

apology purely as a strategy on the part of the transgressors to reduce this moral threat to their identity, rather than as a sincere attempt to achieve reconciliation. It is this that has led some commentators to suggest that intergroup apologies are simply self-serving (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009). This makes it vitally important that the offered apology and reparation meet the victims' needs for empowerment.

Research has been undertaken to test hypotheses derived from this model, initially by the model's authors. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) reported four different studies that provided support for the general hypotheses of the model, initially demonstrating that transgressions make victims feel powerless and transgressors morally inadequate. They used both laboratory-based and role-playing methodologies to show this, as well as providing evidence that reconciliation is possible if social exchange between transgressors and victims addresses those needs. Shnabel et al. (2009), focusing specifically on intergroup scenarios, showed that a victim group responds more positively to a message of empowerment (one that includes an acknowledgement of responsibility) rather than one of acceptance and compassion (one that includes an acknowledgement of the suffering) from the transgressing group, whereas the reverse was true for transgressing group.

Research testing the model has also been extended to 'dual-level' conflicts, where "victims" and "transgressors" are not mutually exclusive roles but can be applied to both parties concurrently. SimonTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel (2014) investigated this using a modified dictator game, in which one party (the allocator) chooses how much of an endowed resource to allocate to another party. In their first study, the researchers manipulated participants to feel that they were a victim,

a transgressor, both (dual), or neither (control). Consistent with the needs-based model, it was shown that those in the dual condition showed a heightened need for both empowerment and acceptance. It was also shown that those in this dual condition were more like victim groups in the way they behaved (they were less generous than the other conditions). In a second study, the researchers replicated this finding at the intergroup level, using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the context for the study. Although the results of this research provide support for the needs-based model, they also pinpoint a difficulty, in that many present-day intergroup conflicts do have this dual-level character, with neither party to a conflict being exclusively 'victim' or 'perpetrator'. Unfortunately, it appears to be more challenging to meet groups' needs under these circumstances.

The needs-based model of reconciliation provides us with a way to improve the effectiveness of intergroup apologies. In order for a reconciliation attempt to be successful, any intergroup apology and offer of reparation must empower the victim group. Although this insight is valuable, it is also the case that when the roles of "victim" and "transgressor" are less clear-cut, it also becomes less clear how to promote effective reconciliation between two groups. Three studies that were inspired by the needs-based model will be reported in a later chapter of this thesis.

The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies

The second model to be discussed is one that seeks to identify the components of successful intergroup apologies. This is The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011). The purpose of this model was to situate the expression of apology in the context of a broader process. This

process begins by establishing a foundation that is based upon the acceptance of collective guilt by the transgressor group and setting straight the historical record. Thus it is acknowledged by the model that an apology in and of itself is unlikely to be sufficient to bring about reconciliation; however, if it is embedded in a broader set of reparative events and promises of a better future, it can help to increase the chances of a positive resolution. As the name of the model implies, it envisages the process of intergroup reconciliation as a staircase, with each step involving a further reparative action. As will become apparent, only one of these steps involves the offering of an intergroup apology. It is argued by the authors of the model that it is necessary to address each step before progressing further, because each step provides a foundation for the next, cumulatively building trust and creating genuine intergroup reconciliation.

The five steps are as follows: accepting collective guilt, setting straight the records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup apology, and post-apology engagement. Each step creates an incentive for bringing about reconciliation. *Accepting collective guilt* provides a moral foundation and entails the transgressor group accepting its responsibility for what has happened. *Setting straight the records of history* enables the two groups to arrive at a shared interpretation of events, and also enables victims to be heard, understood and validated. *Discussing reparations* marks the beginnings of repair and establishes a shared understanding of what resources are likely to be needed to put matters right. *Intergroup apology* is the key communicative step; it involves the expressions of regret and provides a validation for the victims. *Post-apology engagement* is designed to promote genuine reconciliation and harmony between the groups. The

idea here is that promises of reparation are not the same as actual reparation; for genuine forgiveness to occur, transgressors need to demonstrate through their actions that they have changed.

An interesting point that is evident from this account of the Staircase Model is that intergroup apology is not the first step in the reconciliation process. In many cases of intergroup apology, both in research and in real life, the intergroup apology is the first act of repair. This may be one of the reasons why intergroup apologies are sometimes dismissed as self-serving. The Staircase Model helps to eliminate this perception, because other steps have already been undertaken in the reconciliation process, meaning that the apology is more likely to appear to be genuine, sincere, and trustworthy.

The initial paper describing the Staircase Model states that the staircase metaphor should not be treated as a formal model to be tested, but rather should be seen as a framework for understanding why intergroup apologies sometimes do but more often do not have the effects that they are intended to have. The model has not yet been empirically tested. Three studies that were inspired by the model will be reported in a later chapter of this thesis.

Measuring Forgiveness and Reconciliation in this Thesis

The constructs of forgiveness, reconciliation and intergroup relationship repair could be measured or investigated in many ways. With respect to forgiveness, it is clearly important to ask victims whether they do forgive the person or group offering an apology. In this thesis, this is typically done in more than one way: first, I pose a simple question “Do you forgive [person/group]?”, with a binary

response option of “yes” or “no”. To capture variability of response, this binary measure is often supplemented by a multi-item measure of forgiveness.

How successful an intergroup apology is, however, may not simply be a question of whether it elicits forgiveness: does it also promote reconciliation? To address this, I also measure perceptions of the transgressor group and negative emotions felt by the victim group. Perceptions of the transgressor group included perceived sincerity and remorse. As noted above, many commentators (e.g., Blatz et al., 2009) have suggested that intergroup apologies are insincere and self-serving, so for reconciliation to occur it seems important that the transgressor group is seen as sincere and remorseful. However, even when transgressors are viewed in this manner, this does not necessarily translate into forgiveness and reconciliation (Berndsen et al., 2015). It is therefore important to investigate other perceptions. I also assessed trust and believability, on the grounds that both are likely to be important in promoting future reconciliation. Turning to the negative emotions felt by the victim group, the research reviewed in the present chapter shows the power of intergroup emotions in helping or hindering intergroup reconciliation. I therefore assess the strength of negative emotions such as anger and disgust in order to explore the extent to which they are reduced by intergroup apologies.

An obvious way to measure forgiveness and reconciliation is by examining intergroup behaviour following an apology. In the studies reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis, I assess the behaviour of participants following a transgression in a trust-based game, examining the extent to which a group that has been exploited prior

to receiving an apology changes its behaviour after the apology. This offers a way of assessing behavioural responses to apologies, something that is much more difficult in the case of the 'naturally-occurring' intergroup transgressions that provide the basis of many of the other studies in this thesis. Another key advantage of using economic games is that they offer standardised ways of measuring trust, in that one player (an individual or group) is typically given a choice between a 'safe' option with a low payoff and a 'riskier' option that carries a higher potential payoff but exposes the player to the possibility of being exploited by the other player. Thus the more willing the first player is to be vulnerable to exploitation, the more this player is assumed to 'trust' the other player not to exploit this vulnerability (for a meta-analysis, see Johnson & Mislin, 2011).

Summary of the Remaining Chapters

My first aim in this thesis is to explore the paradox of intergroup apologies, investigating what it is that distinguishes them from interpersonal apologies, and why these differences lead to such a substantial variation in the effectiveness of apologies. My second aim is to examine the circumstances in which intergroup apologies can be effective, by manipulating apology content, and/or the context in which the apology is embedded.

The four studies reported in Chapter 2 investigate phenomena associated with apologies and forgiveness and how these differ between interpersonal and intergroup scenarios. In Study 1, I examine the influence of 'apology desire' on the part of victims of an intergroup transgression. Apology desire here refers to the extent to which members of the victim group want the transgressor group to

apologise. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to expect that those who express a stronger desire for an apology will be more likely to accept it when it is offered. In Study 2, I explore reactions to apologies and non-apologies made in the context of an economic game played between two groups. In Study 3, I investigate how effective it is to change the leadership of a transgressing group, and how such a change of leadership influences the effectiveness of an apology offered by the leader, in terms of perceptions of both the individual leader and the whole transgressing group. In Study 4 I examine the effects of implementing a ‘denial of responsibility’ strategy, comparing its effectiveness with that of an ‘apology’ strategy, and that of a strategy that begins with denial but ends with apology. The contexts used in these studies vary, ranging from a transgression made by one Canadian university towards members of another Canadian university and an economic game played under laboratory conditions, to the role of the local council in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire in London and the taxi firm Uber losing its licence to operate in London.

In Chapter 3, I report three studies in which I explore the role of apology content in the context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. These studies were inspired by the needs-based model of Nadler and Shnabel (2008), described earlier. In Study 1, two aspects were manipulated: first, the *content* of the apology, emphasizing one of three factors, namely structural, relational, or identity-related reparation; and second, the apology source, varying whether the apology came from a large group, a small group, or an individual. In Study 2, I build on the findings of Study 1 by focusing on the content of the apology made by a large group. I again examined the apology factors that were included in Study 1, but now they were

used in combination, and compared with a 'no apology' control condition. Another factor varied in this study was emotion, specifically remorse, such that a high-remorse condition was compared to a control condition. In Study 3, I replicated Study 2, but now I divided the emotion manipulation into a guilt condition, a shame condition, and a control condition, in order to investigate the role of more specific expressions of emotion.

In Chapter 4, I report two studies further investigating the role of emotional expression in intergroup reconciliation, but now in the context of an economic game. The game used in these studies was a modified intergroup version of 'the centipede game' (Rosenthal, 1981), an economic game that involves reciprocal cooperation between two players (in this case, between two groups). In these two studies I explored the roles of guilt, shame, and pride within the game. In Study 1, I examined what happens when two groups are allowed to play the game naturally, without any manipulation, but with the opportunity to express each of the three emotions halfway through the game, knowing that these expressions would be communicated to the other group. The idea was to examine how these emotion expressions related to the group's own behaviour and the opposing group's behaviour in the second phase of the game. In Study 2, I adopted a more controlled approach, allowing two groups to believe they were playing against each other, whereas they were in fact playing against a computer program that was scripted to behave uncooperatively in the game, but then expressing either pride or shame at the halfway stage. The idea was to examine how expressions of emotion made by a group that had acted in its own selfish interests in the first phase influenced how they were treated by the 'victim' group in the second phase.

In Chapter 5, I report three studies in which I sought to test predictions derived from the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies. In Study 1, I manipulated the experimental conditions such that in each of five conditions a successive step in the Staircase Model was introduced. The context for this study was a (real life) border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. Participants were exposed to one of the following conditions, which followed the five steps of the Staircase Model: Condition 1, accepting collective guilt; condition 2, added setting straight the historical records; condition 3, added discussing reparations; condition 4, added intergroup apology; condition 5, added post-apology engagement. There was also a control condition. In Study 2 I aimed to replicate Study 1, but this time in relation to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, with participants being recruited from mainland Britain. In Study 3, I replicated Study 2, but this time using a Northern Irish sample. A further difference from Study 2 is that each condition included an intergroup apology, but I varied where in the sequence the intergroup apology was introduced. This was intended to serve as a test of the sequential structure of the Staircase Model, examining whether the effectiveness of an intergroup apology does indeed vary as a function of the prior steps that have (or have not) been taken.

Chapter 6 begins with a summary of the findings found in the studies reported in the previous chapters and discusses how they relate to the overarching aims of the thesis. I then attempt to answer what I regard as the main research questions relating to the paradox of intergroup apology: "What makes intergroup apologies different to interpersonal apologies?", "Why are intergroup apologies ineffective?" and "Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?". I will address these questions by integrating my own findings with other research

findings in the field. I will then acknowledge the limitations of the research reported in the thesis, and how these could be addressed in future research. I will conclude by identifying some currently unanswered research questions and by considering the implications of research on intergroup apologies for understanding and resolving real-life intergroup conflicts.

Chapter 2

The Paradox of Intergroup Apology

“The Age of Apology” (Brooks, 1999) is a term that has been used to describe the era in which we live. The rationale for this description is the exponential growth in the number of official apologies that are requested or offered, and the attention paid to these apologies in the media. “Sorry” is a word that was rarely seen in use in relation to group settings before the end of World War Two, whereas today we see apologies offered quite frequently by businesses, political parties, and even nation states. This upsurge in public apologies is presumably based on an assumption that they will lead to forgiveness. However, the current state of research knowledge, limited as it is, suggests that intergroup apologies are in fact quite ineffective in promoting any form of forgiveness or intergroup reconciliation. The aim of the research reported in the present chapter is to explore the paradoxical character of intergroup apologies (the fact that they are often demanded, sometimes given, but rarely effective), and to review inconsistencies between them and their interpersonal counterparts in achieving forgiveness.

Research suggests that interpersonal apologies, from one person to another, are generally an effective strategy in repairing damaged relationships. McCullough et al. (1998) highlight the fact that an interpersonal apology is one of the key factors associated with forgiveness. Likewise, Darby and Schlenker (1998) showed how effective apologies are in children. The effectiveness of interpersonal apologies has also become salient in the world of law, with Bibas and Bierschbach

(2004) calling for apologies to be better integrated into the criminal justice procedure. Given the abundant evidence of the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies in promoting forgiveness and reconciliation, it is easy to see how it came to be assumed that apologies in intergroup settings would be similarly effective.

However, the research conducted on intergroup apologies does not support this assumption. While there are some studies that show that intergroup apologies can have positive effects for the group expressing them (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008; Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011), the majority of the evidence testifies to their ineffectiveness. In a review of the literature, Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot (2014) conclude that intergroup apologies more often than not fail to elicit the forgiveness and future reconciliation that they are intended to achieve. This is particularly evident in the work reported by Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman (2013), who investigated the potential impact of the then upcoming apology from the Canadian government for its role in the Indian Residential School system. They concluded that participants were generally neutral or pessimistic about whether an intergroup apology would actually lead to improved intergroup relations or even make a difference to the lives of the Aboriginal people.

Overview of Studies

While this difference in the effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup apology leads many to raise the question of “Why are intergroup apologies not more effective?” and/or “What can be done to make intergroup apologies more effective?”, it should also lead to the question of what other phenomena associated with apologies vary between the interpersonal and intergroup scenarios. In apology

research the context of the transgression often varies from study to study, and in the current age where public apologies are so commonplace, there are multiple opportunities to investigate the influence of different factors on intergroup apologies and how they impact forgiveness and future reconciliation in real-life contexts.

The four studies reported in this chapter aim to explore the effectiveness of intergroup apologies in a range of settings while introducing different manipulations that are known or believed to have positive impacts on the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies in achieving forgiveness and reconciliation. Study 1 investigates the effect of apology desire on intergroup apologies and how successful they are. The idea underlying this study is to examine whether those who demand an apology for an intergroup offence are more responsive to an apology and forgiving of the perpetrator group when it is forthcoming, compared to those who do not seek an apology for the same offence. Okimoto, Wenzel, and Hornsey (2015) have suggested that the general increase in apologies may be one reason for their devaluation and ineffectiveness, raising the possibility that even those who demand an apology may remain unsatisfied when it is given. In Study 2, I move from exploring whether an apology is desired to an exploration of reactions to apologies (or non-apologies) in the context of an intergroup economic game. Usually in the intergroup apology literature we find studies comparing an apology condition with a no apology condition and then investigating differences in appraisals and/or behaviour, the aim being to explore reactions to the apology condition and how these differ from those in the no apology condition. The assumption is that this helps to understand any gap in the effectiveness of

intergroup and interpersonal apologies. In Study 3 I move on to ways in which something beyond offering an apology can be done by the perpetrator group to make the attainment of forgiveness more likely. I investigate how effective a change of leadership in the group perpetrating an intergroup offence can be in shaping the effectiveness of any resulting apology. Is an apology offered by a new leader more effective than one offered by an old leader who is more closely associated with the offence? Changing leaders is often seen as a way to improve the image of the group and previous research suggests that there are benefits to such change (Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007; Flores, 2012). Finally, in Study 4 I examine instances of reactions to situations in which the perpetrator group commits an offence but then denies responsibility, thereby not seeking forgiveness. I examine whether denial of responsibility for a transgression elicits different reactions to those evoked by an apology, which usually entails an implicit or explicit admission of responsibility. Denial of responsibility is a strategy that is frequently used following a transgression, and again there is previous research showing that it can be effective (Gold & Weiner, 2000; van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). Evidence that denying responsibility is more effective than apologising would suggest that the admission of responsibility inherent in apology might be one of the reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of intergroup apologies.

The contexts in which intergroup apologies occurred in these studies included a fictitious but plausible transgression between two universities, a laboratory experimental economic game played between groups, and two real-world transgressions, one involving a civic authority's perceived responsibility for a tragic fire in which many citizens died, and another in which a commercial taxi

company was judged to be unfit to hold an operating licence due to offences committed by some of its drivers. In each context, I manipulated the way in which the offending group acted, with regard to the offering or non-offering of an apology, or how the apology was delivered. In the case of the two real-world scenarios, I varied the actual apologies or statements that were made by the perpetrating group. In one study I took the opportunity to vary whether the apology was explicitly made on behalf of an individual member (the leader) of the perpetrating group, or on behalf of the whole group. This comparison should shed light on the differences between interpersonal and intergroup apologies and has the potential to shed light on why they are differentially effective. The overarching aim of the studies reported in this chapter is that between them they illustrate ways in which interpersonal and intergroup apologies differ with respect to their capacity to elicit forgiveness, and also demonstrate how factors such as desire for an apology, acceptance of apology, changing the source of an apology, and denying responsibility for an offence influence the likelihood that an intergroup apology will result in forgiveness.

It should be noted that Study 1 was approved by the Carleton University Research and Ethics Board (#: 104675 12-120). Study 2 was approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.10.11.4598G). Studies 3 and 4 were also approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.07.12.4556).

Study 1

One major motivation for involving apologies in law and criminal justice is described in a paper by Petrucci (2002) as, simply, victims' desire for an apology. This issue of 'desire' is an interesting point to raise in connection with intergroup apologies, given use of the phrase 'The Age of Apology' to account for the sheer frequency of intergroup apologies being offered: there many demands made for intergroup apologies in the media, whether these demands are directed at criminals, businesses, political parties or governments. One paradox frequently described in this connection is that the victims of a group transgression will often demand an apology, but when it is delivered, they are no more likely to forgive than are those who did not demand an apology. This is discussed by Okimoto et al. (2015), who suggest that there may be devaluation of apologies as a result of the rising trend in public apologies. In Study 1, I aim to explore the nature of apology desire and its effectiveness in an intergroup setting in attaining forgiveness.

The context used to explore this was a fabricated transgression between two universities. Students at both the University of Ottawa and Carleton University often take classes and courses across the two universities and this provided a context for the transgression. Participants, who were all students at Carleton University, were presented with a fictitious but plausible article in which the head of the University of Ottawa announced a plan to stop this sharing of classes and courses, on the grounds that students at Carleton may be academically inferior to those at the University of Ottawa. I then manipulated whether that there was or was not said to be a collective desire for an apology on the part of Carleton

students, with the intention that this would evoke a personal desire for the apology on the part of participants. Participants were then shown an apology announcing a rescinding of the policy, and their reactions were assessed.

Although it seems intuitively plausible that the more someone wants an apology, from another person or group, the more they should be inclined to forgive when they receive that apology, I anticipated that this study would highlight one of the major paradoxes of intergroup apologies by showing that apology desire has no impact on forgiveness. This prediction was based on the previously mentioned differences in the effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup apologies, and on the findings of Okimoto et al. (2015).

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and ninety-three psychology students (46 males & 147 females; mean age of 19.73) from Carleton University completed this study for course credit. The study had a fully between-subjects design consisting of two conditions (apology desire present vs absent). Participants were randomly allocated to one of these conditions.

It should be noted that 216 participants started this study. Nineteen participants were excluded for failing an attention check placed in the dependent variables as an item stating: "This is an attention check, please select 'Strongly Disagree'". Two participants did not provide consent to use their data at the end of the study following the debrief and a further two did not finish the study.

Manipulation

Apology Desire. An article was shown to the participants stating that the University of Ottawa was going to implement a policy whereby Carleton University students could no longer attend classes at the University of Ottawa due to Carleton students being of an 'academically lower standard' to those at the University of Ottawa. Included in the concluding paragraph of the article was the reaction from Carleton University's Students' Association, in which participants read either that "an apology for the policy and the comments made is essential" or that "an apology for the policy and comments made is not going to be enough". This manipulation was also reflected in the title of the article, which was either: "CUSA Demands Apology After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from Taking their Courses" Or "'An Apology Is Not Enough' For CUSA After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from Taking their Courses". Following this, participants were informed that the policy had been rescinded and read an apology from the head of the University of Ottawa. A copy of the article is shown in Appendix 1.

Materials

Manipulation Check. After reading the article, but before reading the apology, participants responded to items asking whether collectively Carleton University wanted an apology (The students of Carleton want an apology) and whether the participant personally wanted an apology (I personally want an apology). Both responses were made on a 5-point scale, with endpoints labelled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.

Forgiveness. To measure forgiveness, participants responded to an adapted version of the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). This 18-item measure assesses forgiveness and consists of subscales measuring avoidance (e.g., [victim] should cut off any relationship with the [transgressor]), revenge (e.g., The [transgressor] should get what they deserve), and benevolence (e.g., The [victim] should release their anger so they can work on restoring the relationship) motivations. The Trim-18 was initially designed as an interpersonal forgiveness measure; for the purpose of the current research the items were therefore adapted to relate to the University of Ottawa. Responses are made on a 5-point scale, with endpoints labelled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree. The adapted measure can be found in Appendix 2.

Negative Emotions. Participants answered a four-item questionnaire asking how much they felt anger, disgust, hate, and contempt following the apology. These were rated on a 5-point scale where 1 equalled “strongly disagree” and 5 equalled “strongly agree”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .89.

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Following this, demographic measures were completed. The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: it began with the article describing the policy change and the manipulated reaction from Carleton University Students’ Association, followed by manipulation checks, the apology from the University of Ottawa, negative emotion items, and the Trim-18 (with items

within each set presented in random order). After completing these measures, participants were thanked, debriefed, and asked for consent to use their data.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Check

Independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant impact of the apology desire manipulation. Those in the 'apology desired' condition believed that the university wanted an apology ($M = 4.19$) to a significantly greater extent than did those in the 'apology is not enough' condition ($M = 3.12$), $t(184.70) = 6.75$, $p < .001$, $d = .99$. As intended, there was also a significant impact of this manipulation on participants' personal desire for an apology, $t(190) = 2.67$, $p = .008$, $d = .39$, with those in the 'apology desired' condition wanting an apology ($M = 4.22$) to a significantly greater extent than those in the 'apology is not enough' condition ($M = 3.90$).

Forgiveness

Independent samples t-tests showed that there was no significant impact of the manipulation on any of the Trim-18 subscales: avoidance, $t(191) = .13$, $p = .897$, $d = .02$; revenge, $t(191) = .20$, $p = .839$, $d = .03$; benevolence, $t(176.71) = .47$, $p = .638$, $d = .07$. The means and standard deviations for all dependent variables are shown in Table 2.1.

Regarding perceptions of a collective desire for an apology, there was no significant association between this measure and the Trim-18 subscales for avoidance, $r = .13$, $p = .083$, or benevolence, $r = -.08$, $p = .246$. There was, however,

a significant positive association between collective desire for an apology and the revenge motivation subscale, $r = .21, p = .004$, showing that the more the participant perceived a collective desire for an apology, the more vengeful they felt towards the transgressors after reading the apology.

Regarding the personal desire for an apology, there was no significant association between the personal desire for an apology and the Trim-18 subscales for avoidance, $r = .12, p = .092$, or revenge, $r = .09, p = .198$. There was, however, a significant negative association between personal desire for an apology and the benevolence motivations subscale, $r = -.15, p = .044$, reflecting the fact that the more participants personally desired an apology, the less benevolent towards the transgressors they were after reading the apology.

Negative Emotions

An independent samples t-test showed that there was no significant impact of the article read on the measure of negative emotions, $t(191) = .94, p = .349, d = .14$.

There was no significant association between the collective desire for an apology and negative emotions, $r = .10, p = .167$. There was, however, a significant positive association between the personal desire for an apology and negative emotions, $r = .14, p = .049$, reflecting the fact that the more participants desired an apology, the more they reported negative emotions after reading an apology.

Table 2.1

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables in the two apology desire conditions (Study 1).

Condition	Apology Desire	Apology Not Enough
Collective Desire for Apology	4.19 (.94)	3.12 (1.24)
Individual Desire for Apology	4.22 (.72)	3.90 (.91)
Trim-18		
<i>Avoidance</i>	2.08 (.97)	2.06 (.85)
<i>Revenge</i>	1.96 (.90)	1.93 (.88)
<i>Benevolence</i>	3.72 (.89)	3.66 (.73)
Negative Emotions	2.44 (1.06)	2.30 (1.02)

Study 1 therefore highlights one of the paradoxes of intergroup apology: desiring an apology, either collectively or individually, does not have any positive impact on how an apology is received. Reading an article highlighting a collective desire for an apology did increase both perceived collective desire for an apology and personal desire for an apology. However, it had no impact on forgiveness motivations or negative emotions felt towards the transgressor after an apology was given. Some of the observed correlations also seem counter-intuitive, with participants who perceived greater collective desire for an apology feeling more vengeful after the apology was given, and those with a stronger personal desire for an apology being less benevolent and having more negative feelings towards the transgressors after the apology was given.

Study 2

Given that it appears to be the case that desiring an intergroup apology does not result in a greater likelihood of forgiving the perpetrating group, it is worth examining reactions to an apology, versus a non-apology. One context in which repairing relationships following a transgression has been studied is that of economic games, where one player has the opportunity to act selfishly at the other player's expense, or to exploit another player's trust. Several studies have shown certain reparative acts to be useful in interpersonal economic games. For example, It has been shown that denying responsibility and intent to be unfair (van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011) and offering financial compensation (De Cremer, 2010) are strategies that can improve trust, although in both of these studies it was suggested that apology would also be a worthwhile strategy. There are also studies using economic games in which it was suggested that apology is the best avenue to relationship repair (Haesevoets, Folmer, De Cremer, & van Hiel, 2013; Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer, 2013). There are, however, plenty of studies highlighting the discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour in economic games (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Wildschut & Insko, 2007).

The Centipede Game

The centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981) is an economic game based upon repeated trust. At each decision point, players choose whether to stop the game and take the monetary allocations currently on offer, or to pass the decision on to their opponent. Every time a decision is transferred to the opponent, the total allocation to the two players increases; however, if the opponent chooses to stop

the game, the first player finishes with a lower allocation payoff than if he or she had stopped the game previously. There is a finite number of steps/nodes, with the final one allocating the largest possible pay-out to both players. This game was chosen for the present research because of its sequential structure, and because of the number of trust-based decisions made within each game. In the multiple round version of the game, if a move is made to stop the game early, meaning a low pay-out for one player, there is an opportunity to restore trust in subsequent rounds. Previous research using the Centipede Game has shown that groups stop the game significantly earlier than individuals do (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004). This provides an interesting opportunity to explore the roles of apology within an intergroup version of the game.

In Study 2, the centipede game shown in Figure 2.1 was used. All participants who completed this study were students at Cardiff University. For the purposes of the current research, the term 'centipede game' was replaced by 'intergroup cooperation game' in an effort to enhance cooperation between the groups. Each node in the game denotes a decision that has to be made by one of the two players (A or B). In this study the players were 3-person groups. The group can decide to proceed (Go) or stop. If the game reaches node 5, it is completed. Thus a game ends when one of the groups decides to stop, or when the game reaches node 5. A group's designation as "A" or "B" switches with each new game. After two rounds of the game, groups were ostensibly given an opportunity to communicate with each other, and it was during this communication that an intergroup apology (or, in the control condition, no apology) was made. Games before and after this intergroup interaction will be referred to as "Phase 1" and

“Phase 2”, respectively. The study was run using online software (veconlab.econ.virginia.edu).




Figure 2.1: The way the Centipede/Intergroup Cooperation Game was presented to participants in Study 2.

The game payout was defined as the number of lottery tickets that the groups would receive, with each payoff point translating into one lottery ticket for their group. Participants were (correctly) informed that the lottery draw would involve all groups participating in the current study.

Given that apologies are made after a transgression, it was decided that a game would be created in which the opposing group defects or steals from the experimental group at every opportunity, keeping constant the extent of the transgression. This was achieved by having the opposing group being simulated by the programme, although participants were led to believe they were playing against a real group. There were two Phase 1 rounds before the intergroup communication was delivered, and two Phase 2 rounds after the communication. The decision to restrict each phase to two rounds was motivated by the need to minimize the possibility that the experimental group would make a defecting move in Phase 1. As it was, this group was always selected (apparently at random) to make the very first

move (in which it is very rare that a group defects). This was followed by the opposing group defecting in the next move, and also defecting at the first opportunity in the second round.

After these first two rounds, groups entered a live chat room in which they appeared to interact with the opposing group. In fact, they were exposed to a pre-prepared script that offered either an apology for the behaviour or a non-reparative statement. The experimental group was able to respond to this statement. Following this interaction, the programme controlling the game allowed the next two rounds to proceed to the end of the game, to ascertain whether participants in the experimental group trusted the out-group to cooperate. Given the effectiveness of apologies in interpersonal games, it was thought that this would be a novel way of testing whether apologies are equally effective in an intergroup setting.

Method

Participants

Seventy-eight participants (20 male, 58 female; mean age = 19.58) took part in this study. They were psychology undergraduates at Cardiff University who were recruited via the Experimental Management System (EMS). They participated in exchange for course credit.

Manipulations and Reaction

Apology Manipulation. After the first two rounds, participants entered a live chatroom with what they assumed to be the opposing group, where they received one of two statements. In the apology condition, groups received the statement “We’re really sorry about what we did!”, whereas in the control condition groups received the message “We were trying to get the best outcome!”.

Communication Reaction. Reactions to the apology/control message were recorded and coded into one of two categories. Groups were categorised on the basis of whether or not they responded in a way that suggested that they had accepted the opposing group’s statement. Those whose messages mentioned “cooperation” or “going to the end” were coded as ‘accepting’, while the remainder were coded as ‘not accepting’. Two independent coders were used to determine the reliability of the response coding. Cohen’s k was run to determine the agreement and established that there was very good agreement, $k = .85$ (95% CI, .64 to 1.00), $p < .001$. Transcripts of all reactions can be found in Appendix 3.

Materials

Game Behaviours. Several game-specific variables were recorded, including number of tickets won, average node at which the in-group exited (hereafter: average node exit), number of ‘steals’ from the out-group (defined as the total number of times the group chose to exit a game), and the percentage of cooperative moves made.

Prosocial Behaviour: A composite variable was created using the average z-score for average node exit, the inverse of number of steals, and the percentage of cooperative moves made.

Procedure

On signing up to the study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire under the impression that their responses would determine their group membership. When they arrived in the lab they were left in a waiting room until all six participants had arrived. They were then separated into two groups of three and led into separate rooms where computers were ready to play the “Intergroup Cooperation Game”. Groups read the instructions for the game and had one practice game against a computer programme. Group members were then asked to ensure that they understood how the game worked before ostensibly participating in the first game with the other group. After two games in which the programme was scripted in such a way that the other group ended the game at the earliest opportunity, there was an interval in which participants participated in a ‘live chat’ room, where they received either an apology or a control statement that ostensibly came from the out-group, after which they had an opportunity to respond. Following this interaction, two further rounds of the game were played in which the programme controlling the out-group’s behaviour was scripted not to defect or to steal. Following this all participants were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

Effect of Apology Manipulation on Reactions

Reactions to the communication from the other group were classified as 'accepting' (43%) or 'not-accepting' (57%). In the apology condition, 64% of responses were classified as accepting. The corresponding number in the control condition was 28%. A chi-square analysis showed there was an association between the apology manipulation and type of reaction, $\chi^2(1) = 3.94, p = .047$, with more accepting reactions in apology condition and fewer accepting reactions in the control condition than would be expected by chance. Thus, this shows that the apology condition did lead to more 'accepting' reactions than did the control condition. However, as we shall see, this did not lead to significantly more prosocial behaviours in the game itself.

Joint Effects of Apology Manipulation and Statement Reaction on Game Variables

Mean scores on the game variables are shown in Table 2.2, broken down by apology condition and how participants reacted to the statement made by the perpetrator group. Apology condition did not have any significant effects on any of these variables: tickets, $F(1, 22) = .07, p = .799, \eta_p^2 < .01$; average node exit, $F(1, 22) = .58, p = .454, \eta_p^2 = .03$; number of steals, $F(1, 22) = 2.73, p = .112, \eta_p^2 = .11$; or percentage of cooperative moves made, $F(1, 22) = 1.05, p = .316, \eta_p^2 = .05$.

However, statement reaction did have a significant effect on number of tickets, $F(1, 22) = 7.03, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .24$, and average node exit, $F(1, 22) = 4.57, p = .043, \eta_p^2 = .17$, with those who accepted the statement scoring higher on these variables.

Statement reaction did not significantly affect number of steals, $F(1, 22) = 2.06, p =$

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.165, $\eta_p^2 = .09$, or percentage of cooperative moves made, $F(1, 22) = 3.72$, $p = .067$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$.

There were significant interaction effects between apology condition and statement reaction on average node exit, $F(1, 22) = 5.10$, $p = .034$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$, number of steals, $F(1, 22) = 8.73$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .28$, and percentage of cooperative moves, $F(1, 22) = 5.40$, $p = .030$, $\eta_p^2 = .20$. In each of these cases the interaction reflected the fact that the combination of an apology being given and accepted resulted in significantly more prosocial outcomes (i.e., later average node exit, less stealing, more cooperative moves) than did any other condition. The only exception was that there was no significant interaction effect for number of tickets, $F(1, 22) = 1.74$, $p = .201$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$.

Table 2.2
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the game variables based upon the apology manipulation and the reaction (Study 2).

Apology Reaction	Apology		Non-Apology	
	Accepting	Non-Accepting	Accepting	Non-Accepting
Tickets	17.75 (1.67)	11.20 (3.90)	16.00 (4.00)	13.80 (4.76)
Node Exit	4.81 (.37)	2.90 (.96)	3.50 (1.00)	3.55 (1.30)
Steals	.25 (.46)	1.60 (.55)	1.67 (.58)	1.20 (.92)
Cooperative Moves	.94 (.12)	.42 (.28)	.53 (.21)	.58 (.37)
Prosocial Behaviour	.87 (.39)	-.70 (.70)	-.45 (.70)	-.21 (1.05)

Joint Effects of Apology Manipulation and Statement Reaction on Prosocial Behaviour

Mean scores for the composite prosocial behaviour variable are also found in Table 2.2. Apology condition did not have a significant effects on prosocial behaviour, $F(1, 22) = 1.43, p = .24, \eta_p^2 = .06$. Statement reaction also did not have a significant effect, $F(1, 22) = 3.73, p = .067, \eta_p^2 = .15$. However, there was a significant interaction effect $F(1, 22) = 6.90, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .24$. As with the individual game variables, this interaction effect reflected the fact that the combination of an apology being given and accepted resulted in more prosocial behaviours.

A regression analysis was used to test the indirect effect of apology condition and statement reaction on prosocial behaviours. Results confirmed that the apology condition significantly predicted statement reaction, $b = .39, SE = .19, p = .049$, but not prosocial behaviour, $b = .53, SE = .37, p = .167$; statement reaction, in turn, significantly predicted prosocial behaviours, $b = .89, SE = .35, p = .018$. The indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The model for the indirect effect did not quite reach significance, $F(2,23) = 3.31, p = .054, \eta_p^2 = .15$, and the amount of the variance in prosocial behaviour accounted for by the predictors was not large ($R^2_{adj} = .16$). The coefficient for the indirect effect was not significant, $b = .22, SE = .41, 95\% \text{ bias-corrected } CI = -.64, .98$.

Thus, the key findings from Study 2 are that the offering of an intergroup apology, as opposed to a control statement, did not lead to significantly more

prosocial behaviour. However, groups who were offered an apology were more likely than those who were not offered an apology to respond to the other group's communication in an accepting way, and an accepting response to the other group's communication was associated with more prosocial game behaviours in the second phase of the game. It seems possible that groups that had a non-accepting reaction to the apology were more upset by the out-group's competitive behaviour in the first phase, and that this overrode any beneficial impact of the apology on cooperation in the second phase. This points to one of the possible reasons why intergroup apologies are not as effective as interpersonal apologies. Groups are more competitive than individuals (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). In an interpersonal scenario, it seems possible that more than 64% of participants would have been accepting of the apology. A further possibility is that in an interpersonal scenario, even those who were not accepting of the apology would not be so competitive in the second phase. The interactive effects of apology and acceptance of the apology show that once an apology has been accepted it does have a significant impact on variables related to relationship repair and prosocial behaviour (less stealing, more cooperative moves). This points to the need for further research on factors that increase the likelihood apology acceptance. Such factors will be examined in later chapters of this thesis.

Study 3

A manoeuvre that sometimes occurs following a serious transgression by a group is a change in leadership, or leadership 'turnover'. In the wake of negative events or transgressions in the political or business world, the media tend to run

stories about calls for resignation and how a certain person's position has become untenable because he or she was leading the perpetrating group and should therefore take responsibility for the consequences of its actions. Motives for calling for such a change of leadership include the argument that the affective reaction to a leader's departure has an impact on trust in the new leader and thereby the group (Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007). One reason for newfound trust is that the incoming leader is seen as representing different interests to the predecessor (Bobick & Smith, 2013). Although the majority of this research in this area treats leadership turnover as a dependent variable (e.g., Gallego & Pitchik, 2004; McGillivray & Smith, 2005), there are a few studies, such as the one by Flores (2012), showing that a change of leadership can hasten the termination of conflict. Because this is not a well investigated topic in the literature on reparation, it is worth examining this phenomenon in both an interpersonal and an intergroup setting, to establish whether the effects differ as a function of this difference in setting.

The context I used to investigate this issue was that of the Grenfell Tower fire. This occurred on 14th June 2017 at the Grenfell Tower block of public housing flats in North Kensington, West London. It is believed to have resulted in at least 80 deaths. The fire started in a fridge-freezer in one flat and its devastating spread throughout the building was hastened by the flammable nature of the building's exterior cladding. The Kensington and Chelsea council responsible for the tower block has been criticised for both its neglect of the safety of the building to begin with and its response to the fire. Following the departure of the leader of the Kensington and Chelsea Council, the newly appointed leader publicly apologised in

a newspaper (De Peyer, *Evening Standard*, 2017). I decided to use this newspaper article as the basis for the current study. Its content was manipulated (a) by ensuring that it was either obvious that the article was from a 'new' leader, or this was left ambiguous (control); and (b) by using either "I" or "we" personal pronouns in the article, to create the impression that the apology came either from the individual leader or from the entire council. I also decided to evaluate how these manipulated factors affected perceptions of both the council leader and the council. In line with the established differences in effectiveness between interpersonal and intergroup apologies, I expected to find a stronger effect of the apology on perceptions of the leader in the 'I' rather than 'we' version. I also expected to find a stronger effect of the apology on perceptions of the council leader than on the perceptions of the council in the 'new' leader version rather than the control version.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and sixty-one participants (130 males & 131 females; mean age of 47.99) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled me to recruit a sample of participants based on their residential location (London). This study had a between-subjects design consisting of four conditions resulting from the factorial combination of Leader (new vs ambiguous) and Apology Source (interpersonal vs intergroup) manipulations. Participants were randomly allocated to one of these conditions.

It should be noted that 311 participants started this study. Some were excluded because they did not provide consent ($n = 9$), failed an attention check ($n = 20$), or simply did not finish the study ($n = 21$). The attention check was embedded within a paragraph of text instructing “Skip this page and do not answer the question underneath this paragraph”. It was included to ensure that participants paid careful attention to information provided in the transcripts they were asked to read.

Manipulation

The manipulations were deployed using the same basic newspaper article in which an apology was given by the leader of the Kensington and Chelsea Council in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire. The different versions of the article are shown in Appendix 4.

New Leader vs Control. For those in the ‘new leader’ condition, the word “leader” at every point in the article was preceded by the word “new”. This adjective was absent in the control condition.

Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Apology. Throughout the article the use of the personal pronouns “I” or “We” were used consistently, depending on condition.

Materials

Manipulation Check. To ensure that those in the new leader condition perceived that the apology was given by a new leader to a greater extent than those in the control condition, at the end of the study participants were asked to respond a question about who delivered the apology, using a 1 to 5 response scale,

where 1 was “The same leader of the council at the time of the disaster” and 5 was “A new leader since the disaster”.

Forgiveness. To assess forgiveness, I used two items: “The council leader should be forgiven” and “The council should be forgiven”. Both items were answered on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 was “strongly agree”.

Positive Perceptions. Participants answered a 4-item questionnaire in which they were asked how much sincerity, remorse, trust, and believability they perceived on the basis of the apology. These items were answered on a scale 1 to 5, where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 was “strongly agree”. Participants completed these items twice, once with respect to the council leader individually (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) and another time with respect to the council collectively (Cronbach’s alpha = .90).

Negative Emotions. The negative emotion items were the same as those used in Study 1. Thus participants completed a 4-item questionnaire in which they were asked to rate how much anger, disgust, hate, and contempt they felt following the apology. Ratings were made on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 was “strongly agree”. As with the ‘positive perceptions’ questions, these items were answered twice, once in relation to the council leader (Cronbach’s alpha = .92), and once in relation to the council overall (Cronbach’s alpha = .89).

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Demographic measures were then completed. The structure of the rest of the questionnaire was as follows: First came a description of the Grenfell Tower fire and its aftermath, followed by an attention check, the manipulated article containing the apology, the negative emotion items, the positive perception items, the forgiveness item and then the manipulation check. Items within each set of measures were presented in random order. After completing these measures, participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results

To establish how the apology being delivered by a 'new leader' versus a control condition and being interpersonal or intergroup in nature affected forgiveness, positive perceptions of the leader and council, and negative emotions felt towards the leader and council, a series of 2x2 ANOVAs were conducted, where the factors were Leader (new vs control) and Apology Source (interpersonal vs intergroup). All means and standard deviations relating to this study are shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables in the new leader/control and interpersonal/intergroup conditions (Study 3).

Measure	Condition			
	New Leader		Control	
	Interpersonal	Intergroup	Interpersonal	Intergroup
Forgiveness				
<i>Council Leader</i>	3.09 (1.11)	2.75 (1.02)	2.52 (1.05)	2.12 (.91)
<i>Council</i>	2.28 (1.25)	2.34 (1.16)	2.27 (1.14)	2.05 (.96)
Positive Perceptions				
<i>Council Leader</i>	3.01 (.97)	2.79 (.69)	2.75 (.97)	2.52 (.85)
<i>Council</i>	2.65 (.96)	2.43 (.84)	2.62 (1.01)	2.40 (.94)
Negative Emotions				
<i>Council Leader</i>	3.12 (1.09)	3.31 (1.04)	3.17 (1.00)	3.33 (1.16)
<i>Council</i>	3.78 (.94)	3.31 (.90)	3.30 (.91)	3.33 (1.06)

Manipulation Check

A 2x2 ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of the Leader manipulation on perceptions of whether the apology being delivered was offered by a new leader or the previous leader, $F(1, 257) = 26.14, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$, with those in the new leader condition being more likely to identify the person delivering the apology as a new leader rather than the previous one ($M = 3.91$) than those in the control condition ($M = 3.19$). There was no significant effect of the Apology Source factor on perceptions of whether the apology being delivered was offered by a new or previous leader, $F(1, 257) = .14, p = .712, \eta_p^2 < .01$. There was also no significant interaction, $F(1, 257) = .37, p = .545, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Forgiveness

For forgiveness of the council leader, there were significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 22.49, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$, and the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 8.22, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .03$. Those in the new leader condition were significantly more forgiving ($M = 2.92$) than their counterparts in the control condition ($M = 2.32$); and those in the interpersonal condition were significantly more forgiving ($M = 2.81$) than those in the intergroup condition ($M = 2.44$). The interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 257) = .05, p = .823, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

For forgiveness of the council, there were no significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 1.22, p = .271, \eta_p^2 = .01$, or the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 257) = .34, p = .559, \eta_p^2 < .01$. The interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 257) = .95, p = .330, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Positive Perceptions¹

Regarding positive perceptions of the council leader, there were significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 256) = 6.10, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 256) = 4.33, p = .038, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Those in the new leader condition had significantly more positive perceptions of the council leader ($M = 2.90$) than did those in the control condition ($M = 2.63$); and those in the

¹ The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items (sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) for both the council leader and the council are reported in Appendix 5.

interpersonal condition had significantly more positive perceptions ($M = 2.88$) than did those in the intergroup condition ($M = 2.66$). The interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 257) = .05, p = .823, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Regarding the positive perceptions of the council, there were no significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 256) = .06, p = .805, \eta_p^2 < .01$, or the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 256) = 3.43, p = .065, \eta_p^2 = .01$. The interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 256) < .01, p = .986, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Negative Emotions

For negative emotions felt towards the council leader, there were no significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 257) = .07, p = .799, \eta_p^2 < .01$, or the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 1.78, p = .183, \eta_p^2 = .01$. The interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 257) = .01, p = .935, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

For negative emotions felt towards the council, there were main effects closely approaching significance for both the Leader manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 3.85, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and the Apology Source manipulation, $F(1, 257) = 3.63, p = .058, \eta_p^2 = .01$. These marginal main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect, $F(1, 257) = 4.38, p = .037, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Simple effects analyses showed that this interaction was driven by an effect within the new leader condition, with those in the interpersonal condition having significantly higher scores for negative emotions ($M = 3.78$) than those in the intergroup condition ($M = 3.31$). The corresponding difference within the control leader condition was not significant.

Discussion

The results of Study 3 again highlight the differential effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup apologies. Forgiveness of the council leader and positive perceptions of the leader were greater when the apology had an interpersonal (“I”) character rather than an intergroup (“we”) character. There were similar effects of the Leader manipulation, showing that a new leader who apologised was more likely to elicit forgiveness and to be perceived positively than was the case in the control condition, where it was unclear whether the apology came from a new leader or the previous one. The general reluctance to forgive a perpetrating group, rather than an individual, is also reflected in the fact that there were no corresponding effects on the measures of forgiveness of the council or positive perceptions of the council as a whole. Interestingly, there were no significant effects of the manipulations on negative emotions felt towards either the leader or the council as a whole, perhaps reflecting the widespread shock and anger that people felt in the wake of the disaster. Also interesting is the finding that negative emotions felt towards the council as a whole were significantly greater when the apology came from a new leader who delivered a personal apology, using the first person pronoun. Thus although a new leader who delivers a personal apology for a transgression committed by a group appears to be seen in a relatively positive light, this positivity appears to be at the expense of emotions felt towards the group as a whole, which are more negative than when a new leader offers a collective apology. This raises interesting questions about who should deliver intergroup apologies in the wake of a disaster for which a group can be held responsible, and how such apologies should be delivered.

Study 4

Another strategy that can be adopted by the perpetrator group following a transgression is to deny responsibility for the offence, shifting the blame onto others and trying to convey the message that “we [the ingroup] have done nothing wrong”. An important feature of the research on intergroup apologies to date is that not all studies find them to be ineffective, especially when comparing them to a no apology control (e.g., Leonard, Mackie & Smith, 2011). A point noted by Fehr and Gelfand (2010) is that much of the research on intergroup apology has a similar design, comparing an apology condition with a no apology control condition. Although Fehr and Gelfand used this point as a rationale for studying the role of apology *content*, it can also be used to raise the question of how an intergroup apology condition compares to one in which an excuse for the transgression is offered.

Gold and Weiner (2000) have shown that if it can plausibly be argued that an interpersonal transgression was caused by something uncontrollable and external to the offender, there is less concern that the transgression will be repeated and therefore more trust in the relationship. This effect has also been shown in economic games (van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011), where participants are more generous to a transgressor if the latter can convince them that there was no intent to be unfair, by arguing that it was an accident or the result of not understanding the rules of the game. Given that trust is integral to intergroup relations and relationship repair, it would be useful to examine whether offering an excuse is a more effective way of repairing a relationship than making an apology.

Of course, there are some instances in which denial of responsibility is based on a truthful account of what happened, but there are also cases in which responsibility for a negative outcome is initially denied, but later acknowledged. A particular instance of this sequence of events was used as the context for the present study.

The context was the suspension of Uber's licence to operate taxis in London, in September 2017. This suspension was enacted on the grounds that Uber was deemed to be not "fit and proper" by Transport for London (backed by the London Mayoral office), naming the company's approach to reporting serious crimes as one of the reasons for this assessment. Immediately after the suspension, Uber released a statement in which they claimed to be confused about the basis for the suspension and asserted that they had done nothing wrong, noting that they were appealing the decision. A few days later another statement was released, this time a formal and public apology for their mistake (Crerar, *Evening Standard*, 2017). The headlines and opening lines of these articles formed two of the three conditions for my study. In a third condition, participants read both articles, which were presented in their chronological order. This was done to examine whether offering of an apology as the initial response to a transgression would be more or less effective than apologising after an initial attempt to deny responsibility.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and twenty-one participants (108 males & 113 females; mean age of 47.95) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled me to recruit a sample

of participants to be chosen based on their residential location (I chose cities in mainland Britain where Uber was active). The study had a between-subjects design consisting of three conditions: denial of responsibility, apology, and denial of responsibility followed by apology. Participants were randomly allocated to one of these conditions.

It should be noted that 276 participants started this study. Some were excluded because they did not provide consent ($n = 4$), failed an attention check ($n = 24$), or simply did not finish the study ($n = 27$). The attention check used was the same as in Study 3 and was included to ensure that participants paid careful attention to the transcripts they were asked to read.

Manipulation

Denial of Responsibility, Apology, or Both. Participants read the title and the first few lines of newspaper articles following the suspension of Uber's operating licence in London. In the Denial of Responsibility condition (hereafter Denial), participants only read the initial response from Uber, which essentially stated that the company was confused as to why the licence had been suspended. In the Apology condition, participants only read the later response from Uber, apologising for the company's wrongdoings. In the Both condition, participants read the two articles, one after the other, in the correct chronological order. The articles presented were adapted from real newspaper articles but were condensed to highlight the message offered by Uber. The texts of the articles used in the three conditions are shown in Appendix 6.

Materials

Forgiveness. To assess intention to forgive Uber for wrongdoing, participants were asked to respond to a single item that read “I would be willing to forgive Uber for any wrongdoings”. Responses to this item were made on a 1 to 5 scale of, where 1 was “Strongly Disagree” and 5 was “Strongly Agree”.

Positive Perceptions and Negative Emotions. These dependent variables were the identical to those used in Study 3, such that positive perceptions were measured using 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) and negative emotions were also assessed using 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .88).

Future Intentions to use Uber. Participants were asked to respond to the item “I will definitely still be using Uber in the future”. Responses were again made on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 was “Strongly Disagree” and 5 was “Strongly Agree”.

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Demographic measures were then completed. The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: It began with a description of Uber’s operating licence in London being suspended, and then came an attention check, the manipulated article(s), the negative emotion items, the positive perception items, the future intention item, and the forgiveness item. Items within each set of measures were presented in random order. After completing these measures, participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results

One-way ANOVAs were used to establish the effects of the conditions on the dependent variables. To control for alpha level inflation, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were used to follow up any significant effects. All means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables in the three article conditions (Study 4).

Measure	Condition		
	Denial	Apology	Both
Forgiveness	3.37 (1.26)	3.31 (1.24)	2.78 (1.35)
Positive Perceptions	3.01 (.93)	2.91 (.90)	2.45 (.95)
Negative Emotions	2.31 (.92)	2.32 (.93)	2.96 (1.19)
Intention for Future Use	3.75 (1.13)	3.14 (1.17)	2.66 (1.11)

Forgiveness

There was a significant effect of Condition on forgiveness of Uber for any transgressions, $F(2, 218) = 4.67, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .04$, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing that those in the Both condition were significantly less forgiving ($M = 2.78$) than were those in either the Apology condition ($M = 3.31; p = .045$) or the Denial condition ($M = 3.37; p = .017$).

Positive Perceptions

There was a significant effect of Condition on positive perceptions of Uber, $F(2, 218) = 7.65, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing that those in the Both condition had significantly less positive perceptions ($M = 2.45$)

than those in either the Apology condition ($M = 2.91$; $p = .010$) or the Denial condition ($M = 3.01$; $p = .001$).

Negative Emotions

There was a significant effect of Condition on negative emotions felt towards Uber, $F(2, 218) = 9.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing that those in the Both condition felt significantly more negative emotion ($M = 2.96$) than those in either the Apology condition ($M = 2.32$; $p = .001$) or the Denial condition ($M = 2.31$; $p < .001$).

Intentions for Future Use

There was a significant effect of Condition on intentions to use Uber in the future, $F(2, 218) = 17.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing that those in the Both condition were significantly less likely to use Uber in the future ($M = 2.66$) than those in either the Apology condition ($M = 3.14$; $p = .036$) or the Denial condition ($M = 3.75$; $p < .001$). Those in the Denial condition were also more likely to use Uber in the future than were those in the Apology condition ($p = .004$).

Discussion

The results of Study 4 demonstrate the effectiveness of initially denying responsibility, with this response being as effective as initially offering an apology when it came to forgiveness of, perceptions of, and negative feelings towards the transgressing company. Indeed, denying responsibility was more effective than offering an apology with respect to participants' intentions to make use of the

company's service. However, the most strikingly consistent finding from this study is that an apology offered after initially denying responsibility resulted in less forgiveness of, less positive perceptions of, and more negative emotions felt towards the company, and lower intentions to use the company's service in the future. Thus the combination of an initial denial of responsibility and a subsequent apology is clearly the least effective way to respond to an accusation that one's group has committed a transgression. The conflicting messages given by these two kinds of statement, in which the accused group initially tries to deny responsibility but then acknowledges responsibility by offering an apology, make a poor impression, possibly by arousing suspicion and evoking a lack of trust. In the context of this thesis, it is noteworthy that one of the conditions in which an apology was offered by a group resulted in the least positive responses, confirming that an intergroup apology is not always well received.

General Discussion

The general objective in conducting these studies was to explore the extent of the discrepancy in reactions to interpersonal and intergroup apologies in a range of contexts, and to uncover some of the paradoxes of intergroup apologies. I investigated the impacts on a range of reconciliation measures of the following factors: desire for an apology; divergence in immediate reactions to an apology; a change in the leadership of a perpetrating group; and denial of responsibility for the transgression. Unlike interpersonal apologies, it was found that the effects of desire for apology and change of leadership had little or no influence in promoting intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation. Moreover, denial of responsibility was

found to be at least as effective as offering an apology in an intergroup scenario, paralleling findings in interpersonal settings, and there was even evidence that an apology offered after denying responsibility was the least effective way for a group to achieve reconciliation.

In Study 1 a particular paradox of intergroup apology was highlighted. It was shown that the desire for an intergroup apology, whether it be a collective desire or a personal desire, does not lead to stronger forgiveness motivations or reduce negative emotions after an apology has been delivered. This offers a somewhat pessimistic view on the prospects of intergroup apologies achieving reconciliation, because it is known that interpersonal reconciliation is enhanced when an apology is desired and then offered (Freedman, Burgoon, Ferrell, Pennebaker, & Beer, 2017). It seems that in the context of intergroup relations, wanting an apology does not increase the likelihood that an apology will be accepted. Some counter-intuitive relationships were also observed, with those participants who had a high personal desire for an apology being less forgiving and having stronger negative emotions following the apology, and those participants who perceived a high collective desire for an apology having a stronger revenge motivation. One way to explain these findings is to argue that an increased desire for an apology brings with it higher expectations, and that these higher expectations are not satisfied by the apology on its own. This is an issue that should be researched further in an effort to explain why in a group context the desire for an apology sometimes generates the reverse effect to the one it has in an individual context.

The results of Study 2 shed some light on why intergroup apologies are not always effective. There was no evidence in this study of a general tendency for intergroup apology to result in more prosocial behaviour. However, groups that had an “accepting reaction” to the transgressing group were more likely to be prosocial in subsequent interactions with the group, and offering an apology was associated with greater likelihood of an accepting reaction. By contrast, groups that did not ‘accept’ the apology were more likely to behave in a competitive manner than were those in the control condition. This points to one of the possible pitfalls of intergroup apologies, in that those who are not accepting of an apology may end up having more negative impressions of the perpetrating group than would have been the case if no apology had been offered. This again highlights a discrepancy between intergroup and interpersonal apologies, because previous interpersonal research using economic games shows that offering an apology following a transgression is an effective way of inducing future cooperation (De Cremer, 2010; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). In a broader sense, Cohen, Wildschut and Insko (2010) show how communication can increase cooperation in interpersonal scenarios, and how communication can activate interpersonal norms associated with fairness and trust. It seems to be the case that there is something about an intergroup scenario that inhibits these norms from being activated.

Study 3 highlights further differences between reactions to apologies made in the interpersonal and intergroup contexts. The main finding from this study was that reading an article of apology issued by a ‘new’ leader, as opposed to the previous one, led to an increase in forgiveness and to more positive perceptions of the leader. Likewise, an apology that was more interpersonal in nature (using “I”

instead of “we”) resulted in higher forgiveness and more positive perceptions of the leader. There was no evidence of parallel effects for the council group as a whole. The only effect that was found in terms of attitudes towards the group was that if the apology from a ‘new’ leader was delivered in an interpersonal way, rather than an intergroup one, participants felt significantly stronger negative emotions towards the council group as a whole. This may be because a ‘new’ leader making a personal apology led participants to regard the council as a whole as more blameworthy. The personal apology offered by the new leader may have served to highlight the collective failure of the previous regime, both to manage their housing safely and to offer a collective apology for this failure. In practical terms, this raises questions about who should deliver an intergroup apology under such circumstances. Although it may not be very practical for each council member to offer a personal apology, the results from Study 3 suggest that this might be the ‘least worst’ option.

The results of Study 4 did yield one finding that is consistent between interpersonal and intergroup contexts, namely that denying responsibility for a transgression is as effective in achieving reconciliation as making an apology (and indeed more effective when it came to intentions to use the company’s service in the future). However, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of the effectiveness of intergroup apologies. One finding tempering the conclusion that intergroup apologies are ineffective is that denying responsibility and then apologising later led to more negative reactions than either simply denying responsibility or simply apologising. Thus, apologising and accepting responsibility from the outset appears

to be a more effective way of promoting reconciliation than initially denying responsibility and then apologising.

These studies have their limitations. In Study 1 the 'apology is not enough' article resulted in less perception of apology desire than did the 'apology desire' article, but it did remove the perception of collective or individual desire for an apology, because mean scores for both measures were around the midpoint of the scale. To properly assess the role of apology desire it would be useful in future studies to create contexts in which members of groups that have been victims of a transgression can be separated into those who clearly desire an apology and those who clearly do not desire one. Achieving this (which would admittedly be difficult in practice) would provide greater insight into the role of apology desire and might also point to more conclusive explanations for the seemingly counter-intuitive correlations observed in this study. A limitation of Study 2 is that it focused on very short-term reactions to a transgression and a subsequent apology or non-apology. These reactions were assessed after just two rounds of an economic game. However, this was done to maintain consistency with the first phase of the game, which needed to be restricted to two rounds in order to have control over the severity of the outgroup's transgression. It could be argued that both Study 3 and Study 4 would have benefited from the inclusion of a control condition. Although much of the current research on intergroup apologies compares an apology condition with a no apology condition, in the current studies it would have been interesting to compare the manipulated conditions with to a control baseline condition in which no information was provided, to establish whether there would be significant differences from this baseline. Against these limitations, it is worth

highlighting some strengths of these studies. Although Study 1 used a fabricated story, it was one that was highly plausible to the participants. Likewise, although Study 2 made use of an artificial situation and a fabricated apology, here the participant groups were themselves the victims of the outgroup's transgressive behaviour, as opposed to making judgments about transgressions that affected other groups. Finally, Studies 3 and 4 used real-life transgressions and the manipulations were closely based on the real-life apologies that were offered by the perpetrating group. Thus, there are grounds for assuming that the studies were high in ecological validity.

To conclude, the general aim of these studies was to explore the ways in which intergroup apologies differ from their interpersonal counterparts, and to begin to examine why intergroup apologies often appear to be ineffective in bringing about intergroup reconciliation. I have shown that, in contrast to interpersonal scenarios, wanting to have an intergroup apology, and receiving an intergroup apology delivered by a 'new' leader do not increase the likelihood of forgiveness, as well as demonstrating the general ineffectiveness of intergroup apologies. Overall, the results of these studies are consistent with the assumption that intergroup apologies are ineffective, even in this so-called "Age of Apology", when apologies for transgressions committed by one group against another are routinely called for and sometimes, at least, given. In the remaining chapters of this thesis I will focus on factors that might increase the effectiveness of intergroup apologies.

Chapter 3

Improving the Effectiveness of Intergroup Apologies:

The Role of Apology Content and Moral Emotions

The use of the word “sorry” was rarely seen in exchanges relating to intergroup reconciliation before the end of World War Two. By contrast, the current era has been dubbed “the age of apology” (Brooks, 1999) due to the extraordinary growth in the number of official apologies that are offered or requested. Presumably underlying this rise in intergroup apologies is an assumption that the offering of an apology should trigger an *apology-forgiveness* cycle. Indeed, there is evidence in interpersonal contexts that apologies are effective in evoking forgiveness (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011). However, the same cannot be said for intergroup apologies (Wohl et al., 2011). The aim of the present research is to explore factors that would increase the effectiveness of intergroup apologies.

On the face of it, the offering of an intergroup apology should be beneficial. Indeed, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) showed that offering an apology, compared to not offering one, did increase forgiveness levels. There are other studies showing more specific benefits, such as reductions in the motivation for vengeance and increased future support (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008), as well as improvements in victim satisfaction and perceptions of transgressor remorse (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). However, in reviewing the literature in intergroup apologies, Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot (2014) stated that while intergroup apologies

can have positive impacts, they generally fail to elicit forgiveness. This is particularly evident in research by Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman (2013), who found that despite an increase in positive perceptions of the transgressor, individuals were generally pessimistic about the idea that intergroup relations genuinely improve as a result of apology.

This raises the question of why intergroup apologies are not effective in achieving what they are presumably intended to do, and why it is that they are less effective than interpersonal apologies. A plausible explanation for the difference in how intergroup and interpersonal apologies are received relates to trust.

Intergroup situations are characterized by more competition, higher fear, and greater mistrust (Halabi, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2012; Insko et al., 1998), all of which contribute to the perception that intergroup apologies are not to be trusted. It has also been argued that perceptions of sincerity are integral to all apologies (Wenzel et al., 2017). Given the distrustful context in which most intergroup apologies are made, it is clear why they could be perceived as insincere. This points to an apparently straightforward way to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies: Perceptions of their trustworthiness need to be enhanced.

Intergroup apologies often involve more than the perpetrator group saying “sorry.” They often take the form of a speech, or transcript, in the course of which the apology is communicated. Therefore, intergroup apologies are often described as ‘scripted performances’ (Hornsey et al., 2014). It is possible that this method of communication is one reason for these apologies being regarded as untrustworthy. Whereas intergroup apologies are generally given in the form of prepared

statements, interpersonal apologies are typically more spontaneous. Past research on intergroup apologies has tended to focus on the effects of giving versus not giving an apology. Current research is beginning to explore the components of apologies, and what it is that makes them effective (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015). Given that intergroup apologies often take the form of a script that is longer than a simple expression of regret or remorse, it is important to study what effects different aspects of apology content can have.

Nadler (2012) has argued that genuine intergroup reconciliation can only be established when there are changes to structural, relational, and identity-related factors. The structural factor refers to the status and power relations between the groups, and an apology that addresses this factor aims to promote changes that would lead to a greater equality between groups, for example through political, legal, or economic means. The relational factor refers to the trust relation between the groups, and an apology that addresses this factor would seek to promote trust between groups; doing so should lead to a greater harmony between the groups. The identity-related factor refers to identity-related threats to victims and perpetrators, and an apology that addresses this factor would aim to remove such threats, the objective being that the different group identities peacefully co-exist. Although realizing these factors would largely depend on actions taken, rather than words, they are points that can be addressed in the form of words and it should be possible to incorporate them into the content of an apology.

The present studies explore whether variations in the content of an apology designed to address these factors have an impact on how the apology is received.

By systematically examining the effects of structural, relational, and identity-related factors within a given apology, the intention is to investigate whether their inclusion helps to increase forgiveness or, at the very least, reduces the lack of trust that seems to characterize many intergroup conflicts.

Overview of Studies

The present studies explore the effects of varying apology content within the context of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, as seen by people in mainland Britain. This conflict was chosen for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is already a wealth of research on this conflict. Cairns and Hewstone (2002) suggested that in terms of forgiveness, 'The Troubles' *must* be viewed as an intergroup, rather than interpersonal, context, making it well suited to the current research objectives. They also called for future work to investigate the role that trust plays in forgiveness, citing it as a pathway towards reconciliation. Secondly, 'The Troubles' have a particular relevance to older members of the British population, from which the participants in each of the present studies were recruited. There is also an apology transcript that was issued by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in relation to their role in the deaths of civilians (*The Guardian*, 2002). This provided a basis on which to vary the content of a real-world apology and to explore the effects on perceptions and judgments.

The three studies reported below took the form of online experiments. Participants in all three studies were recruited via the research company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled the recruitment of participants based upon their age (over 35) and geographical location (living in mainland

Britain). The minimum age of 35 was chosen because it meant that participants would have been at least 18 years of age at the time of 'The Good Friday Agreement' of 1998, which brought about the end of 'The Troubles.' The mainland location was chosen because although 'The Troubles' are probably associated with strongly held attitudes in those living in mainland Britain, they are likely to evoke more polarised attitudes in Northern Irish citizens.

It should be noted that all studies reported here in this chapter were approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.15.11.10.4311).

Study 5

Although Nadler and Shnabel (2015) argue that structural, relational, and identity-related factors are interdependent and overlapping, as a first step I decided to study their independent effects. Previous studies (e.g., Leonard et al., 2011) have shown that different types of apology vary in their effectiveness. Thus, the first prediction was that emphasizing one factor rather than another in an apology would make the apology differentially effective, depending on the context.

This prediction was tested by exposing participants to apologies ostensibly coming from different sources: a large group (the IRA), a smaller republican group (the Irish National Liberation Army; INLA), or an individual (a republican soldier). The rationale for varying apology sources comes from research showing that out-group status and size can have effects on attitudes and perceptions of the group (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Liebkind, Nystrom, Honkanummi, & Lange, 2004; Schleuter & Scheepers, 2010), as well as giving me an opportunity to explore the differences between intergroup and interpersonal apologies. The text of all

apologies was identical except for the final paragraph, which was manipulated to emphasize either a structural, relational, or identity-related reconciliation process.

It was expected that apologies coming from the interpersonal apology source would be more effective in promoting forgiveness than the two group sources. It was also predicted that the interpersonal apology source would elicit more positive perceptions of the transgressor(s), and that this would enhance forgiveness. I thought that it would be interesting to explore differences between the two groups, and it was anticipated that apologies from the larger group might be less effective than equivalent apologies from the smaller group, partly as a reflection of the greater threat posed by the larger group, which might make it more difficult to change perceptions of the structural, relational, and identity-related facets of intergroup relations.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and sixty participants (127 males & 133 females) completed this study. They had a mean age of 51.70 (SD = 10.62, range = 40). The study had a fully between-subjects design comprising nine conditions, with participants randomly allocated to one of them. The stimulus material was exactly the same except for (a) the ostensible apology source (the IRA, the INLA, or an individual combatant), and (b) which feature (structural, relational, or identity related reconciliation) was emphasised in the final paragraph of the apology.

The minimum number of participants required was determined by power analysis (G*power 3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To detect a medium effect size for main effects and interactions with 80% confidence with a significance level of .05, at least 196 participants would be needed. It should be noted that 339 participants started this study, meaning that 79 participants were excluded before finishing, 22 of whom did not give consent to use their data, while the remaining 57 failed an attention check. The attention check was located early in the survey, before any manipulations, and was used because the effectiveness of the apology type manipulation depended on attentive reading of the text.

Manipulation

Apology Source. After reading a basic description of 'The Troubles,' participants were given a brief description of the perpetrator (large group, small group, or individual) that was the source of the upcoming apology. This involved a basic description of the group and event(s) for which the apology was being issued, as well as the number of people believed to have been killed as a result of the perpetrator's actions.

Apology Type. The apology itself followed the same format and had the same main body of text as the original apology that was offered by the IRA (*The Guardian*, 2002). The manipulation was implemented in the concluding paragraph. The structural conclusion emphasised the desire for equality between the groups involved in the conflict and mentioned compensation for victims; the relational conclusion emphasised the desire for trust and contact between the two groups; and the identity-related conclusion emphasised the desire for identity restoration and

the removal of threats to identity. The full transcripts of these apologies can be found in Appendix 7.

Measures

Forgiveness. This construct was measured in two ways. A single item, “After reading this, do you think (the transgressor) should be forgiven?” was responded to using ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options. This was followed by the *Intergroup Forgiveness Scale for Northern Ireland* (Hewstone et al., 2004). This 10-item scale was developed using focus groups (McLernon, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2002) and a previous study of intergroup forgiveness in Northern Ireland (Roe, Pegg, Hodges, & Trimm, 1999) to shape the item content. It was originally developed to measure forgiveness between communities in Northern Ireland, but for the purpose of the present study was adapted to measure forgiveness of the transgressor(s) by mainland British participants (which can be seen in Appendix 8). Responses to the items were made using 5-point scales (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .82.

Positive Perceptions of Perpetrator. Four items were used to assess perceptions of the *sincerity, remorsefulness, trustworthiness, and believability* of the perpetrator(s). As with the forgiveness scale, responses were made using a 5-point scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .89.

Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their religion, the extent of their knowledge of ‘The Troubles’, whether they had any Irish relations, and

whether they or their family had been affected by 'The Troubles,' either directly or indirectly.

Procedure

Participants completed an online survey that took approximately 10 minutes to complete. First, participants were given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Next, participants provided demographic information and were then taken to a page offering a brief description of 'The Troubles', which also included the attention check. Participants then read one of the nine possible apologies, which was followed by the forgiveness and positive perceptions measures. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time.

Results

None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of the dependent variables. The effect of condition on the binary forgiveness was analysed using chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the forgiveness scale and intergroup perceptions was analysed using a series of 3 (Apology Source: large group, small group, individual) x 3 (Apology Type: structural, relational, identity-related) ANOVAs. The means, standard deviations for all of the dependent measures, as well as the percentage of "yes" answers to the binary forgiveness questions are shown in Table 3.1.

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of 'yes' responses was 56.50%. A chi-square analysis showed a significant association between Apology

Source and the proportion of forgiveness, $\chi^2(2) = 36.59, p < .001$, but no significant association between Apology Type and proportion of forgiveness, $\chi^2(2) = 1.02, p = .601$. The significant association with Apology Source was driven by the much higher proportion of 'yes' responses in the individual condition (82.80%), compared to the two group conditions (large group = 43.70%, small group = 43.00%).

A logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of Apology Source, Apology Type, and their interaction on the likelihood of forgiveness. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(8) = 43.17, p < .001$. The model explained 21% (Nagelkerke R^2) of the variance in binary forgiveness and correctly classified 66% of cases. Consistent with the analyses reported above, there was a significant effect of Apology Source: the two group sources were less likely to result in forgiveness than the interpersonal condition (Large Group: $b = -1.40, SE = .57, p = .014$; Small Group: $b = -1.78, SE = .59, p = .002$). The main effect of Apology Type was not significant ($p = .557$) and the interaction was also non-significant ($p = .652$).

Turning to the forgiveness scale, there was a significant effect of Apology Source, $F(2, 251) = 18.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that forgiveness was significantly higher in the individual condition ($M = 3.56$) compared to the two group conditions (Large Group: $M = 3.03$, Small Group: $M = 3.14$). There were no significant effects of Apology Type on the forgiveness scale, $F(2, 251) = .25, p = .779, \eta_p^2 < .01$. There also was no significant interaction $F(4, 251) = .71, p = .584, \eta_p^2 = .01$.

Positive Perceptions²

There was a significant main effect of Apology Source on positive perceptions of the perpetrator(s), $F(2, 251) = 26.56, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .18$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that the individual condition ($M = 3.87$) attracted significantly higher scores than the two group conditions (Large Group: $M = 3.05$; Small Group: $M = 3.27$). There were no significant main effects of Apology Type on these perceptions, $F(2, 251) = 1.69, p = .187, \eta_p^2 = .01$. However, there was a significant interaction between Apology Source and Apology Type, $F(4, 251) = 2.78, p = .028, \eta_p^2 = .04$. Simple effects analysis showed that this was driven by effects of Apology Type within the large group condition $F(2, 251) = 7.03, p = .001$, showing that ratings of positive perceptions in the structural condition ($M = 3.36$) were significantly higher than in the relational condition ($M = 2.63$). No significant interaction effects were observed in the other intergroup perceptions.

Mediation Analysis

Regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis that the effect of Apology Source on forgiveness scale ratings would be mediated by positive perceptions of the perpetrator(s). Using the interpersonal condition as the dummy variable, it was shown that the two group conditions both resulted in both lower forgiveness ratings (Large Group: $b = -.53, SE = .09, p < .001$; Small Group: $b = -.42, SE = .09, p < .001$) and less positive perceptions (Large Group: $b = -.82, SE = .12, p < .001$; Small Group: $b = -.60, SE = .12, p < .001$). The positive perceptions, in turn,

² The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items (sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 9.

significantly predicted forgiveness ratings, $b = .53$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$. When controlling for the positive perceptions, neither group condition led to significantly lower forgiveness ratings (Large Group: $b = -.10$, $SE = .08$, $p = .184$; Small Group: $b = -.10$, $SE = .07$, $p = .164$). More than half the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the predictors ($R^2_{adj.} = .52$). The indirect omnibus effect was tested using a bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, $b = .08$, $SE = .02$, 95% bias-corrected $CI = .05, .13$.

Table 3.1

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables measured in Study 5, broken down by apology source and apology content.

	Large Group			Small Group			Individual		
	Structural	Relational	Identity	Structural	Relational	Identity	Structural	Relational	Identity
Binary Forgiveness (% 'yes' responses)	51.72%	34.48%	44.83%	44.83%	48.28%	35.71%	85.71%	86.21%	76.67%
Forgiveness Scale (1-5)	3.10 (.80)	2.95 (.58)	3.03 (.62)	3.11 (.65)	3.24 (.61)	3.07 (.61)	3.48 (.63)	3.66 (.52)	3.55 (.47)
Positive Perceptions (1-5)	3.36 (.85)	2.63 (.95)	3.16 (.74)	3.20 (.80)	3.33 (.77)	3.29 (.85)	3.87 (.66)	3.87 (.73)	3.88 (.49)

Discussion

The main aim of this study was to establish whether different types of apology could have varying effects across different contexts and sources. As expected, there was a substantial difference in the effectiveness of individual and intergroup apologies. There was less evidence that the different apology types varied in effectiveness, although one feature of the results suggests that the apology types were differentially effective.

Consistent with existing literature, apologies offered by an individual, regardless of apology type, were more effective than any intergroup apology, in promoting both forgiveness and positive perceptions of transgressors. There were no significant differences between the two intergroup conditions. This suggests that apologies offered in any intergroup setting face the same difficulty in promoting forgiveness and changing perceptions of the perpetrator group. Variations in group size and severity of transgression appear to be irrelevant. The results also show that the effect of apology source on forgiveness was fully mediated by the positive perceptions of the transgressors. This is consistent with previous research showing that intergroup apologies are hampered by mistrust, which is the primary reason why interpersonal apologies are typically more effective. This suggests that, in order to make intergroup apologies as effective as their interpersonal counterparts, steps need to be taken to ensure that groups appear sincere, remorseful and trustworthy.

Interestingly, apology type did interact significantly with apology source in shaping the positive perceptions of perpetrator(s). In the case of the large group

apology, these positive perceptions were significantly higher for the structural apology, as opposed to the relational apology. This is interesting because the central purpose of the relational dimension of an apology is to promote trust between the parties. This suggests that the extent of mistrust in the intergroup context is such that an attempt to promote trust did not reduce perceptions of untrustworthiness. It is also interesting that this only occurred in the large group context. It may be that in a larger group context, what is stated in a structural apology is seen as more realistic than when the same statement is made by a smaller group. This suggests that, in the case of a large group, an apology that seeks to promote equality and mentions potential compensation is a more effective way of enhancing trust than an apology that explicitly mentions ways in which trust could be rebuilt. This could be explained using the Needs-Based Model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015), which highlights the point that a social exchange that specifically empowers the victim group can be a successful route to identity restoration.

A limitation of the present study is that there was no control group condition; nor was there a condition in which the different apology types were combined. These conditions were omitted mainly for pragmatic reasons. The absence of a control condition means that it is not possible to compare the effects of the different apologies with a no apology baseline, or at the very least a baseline apology in which none of the factors is emphasised. Despite the fact that intergroup apologies attracted low forgiveness ratings, compared to individual apologies, they may have elicited greater forgiveness than a condition in which no apology was offered or none of the factors was emphasised. With respect to a 'combined' apology condition, in his initial discussion of the three apology factors, Nadler (2012) stated that all three

factors are needed for intergroup reconciliation to occur. Strong effects of apology type on forgiveness were not observed in this study, and this may well be because the three factors need to be considered together, rather than independently. Both of these limitations were addressed in Study 6.

Study 6

In Study 6 a 'combined' apology condition was included that incorporated the structural, relational, and identity-related factors, and compared it with a control apology condition that did not include any of these factors. As in Study 5, the manipulation was implemented by adding a concluding paragraph to the real apology that was issued by an IRA spokesperson.

I also decided to focus on the large group apology source. In Study 5 evidence was found suggesting that it is a lack of trust that hampers the effectiveness of apology in an intergroup setting. Given that there were few differences between the two group conditions, I decided to concentrate on the large group (IRA) condition because this group is more familiar to British participants, and because the real-world apology that served as the basis for the research was one issued by the IRA.

In an effort to address the lack of trust in group apologies, it was also decided to vary another dimension of the apology, namely the degree of expressed remorse. Crossed with the 'combined' vs. control apology conditions, a high remorse vs. standard remorse factor was also included. Although there is relatively little empirical research investigating the effects expressed remorse in intergroup apologies, there are several suggestions that it is important to show remorse in

order to promote forgiveness and enhance perceptions that the transgression will not be repeated (e.g., de Grief, 2008; Gold & Weiner, 2000).

It was predicted that both the 'combined' apology and the apology including an explicit expression of remorse would lead to more positive perceptions of the transgressor and, in turn, greater levels of forgiveness, in comparison to the control apology condition. It also seemed intuitively plausible that the two factors would interact, such that the most effective apology would be one including the combined factors and high remorse.

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and eighty participants (90 males & 90 females) completed this study. They had a mean age of 50.86 years ($SD = 8.68$, range = 39). This study had a fully between-subjects design resulting from the factorial combination of Apology Factors (present vs. absent) and Remorse (high vs. control). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four conditions.

The minimum number of participants required was determined by a power analysis (G*power 3; Faul et al., 2007). To detect a medium effect size for main effects and interactions with 80% confidence to a with a significance level of .05, at least 158 participants were needed. Two hundred and fifty-two participants started this study, 72 of whom were excluded before finishing. Twenty-three of these did not provide consent to use their data, while the remaining 49 failed the attention check.

Manipulations

Apology Factors. In the apology factors present condition, the additional concluding paragraph included all three factors that were examined in Study 5 (structural, relational, and identity-related). This combined factor paragraph included one sentence from each of the independent concluding paragraphs from Study 5. In the control condition, the participants read the original apology without the concluding paragraph.

Remorse. In the high remorse condition, intensifying words or phrases were added throughout the statement of apology. Examples include *grievous errors* as opposed to *errors*, *sincere apologies* as opposed to *apologies*, and *deeply sorry* as opposed to *sorry*. The full transcripts of the apologies used can be found in Appendix 10.

Measures & Procedure

The measures of forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, as well as demographic questions, were the identical to those used in Study 5. The procedure was also the same as that used in Study 5.

Results

None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of the dependent variables. The effect of condition on the binary forgiveness measure was analysed using a chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the forgiveness scale and intergroup perceptions was analysed using a series of 2 (Apology Factors: present vs absent) x 2 (Remorse: high vs control) ANOVAs. The means, standard

deviations and 95% confidence intervals for all of the dependent measures, as well as the percentage of “yes” responses to the binary forgiveness question, are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables measured in Study 6, broken down by apology content and degree of expressed remorse.

	Apology Factors Included		Apology Factors Not Included	
	High Remorse	Control	High Remorse	Control
Binary Forgiveness (% ‘yes’ responses)	31.11%	45.65%	42.22%	25.00%
Forgiveness Scale (1-5)	3.04 (.65)	3.23 (.54)	3.06 (.52)	2.80 (.56)
Positive Perceptions (1-5)	3.14 (.99)	3.34 (.78)	3.25 (.74)	2.67 (.83)

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of ‘yes’ responses was 36.11%. A chi-square analysis showed that there was no significant association between the proportion of yes responses and whether or not apology factors were present, $\chi^2(1) = .44$, $p = .507$, or whether remorse was high or control, $\chi^2(1) = .02$, $p = .877$.

A follow-up logistic regression analysis was performed to ascertain the effects of the Apology Factors, the Remorse manipulation and their interaction on the likelihood of forgiveness. The logistic regression model was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 5.46$, $p = .141$. The interaction was also non-significant. The

model explained 4% (Nagelkerke R^2) of the variance in binary forgiveness and correctly classified 64% of cases.

Turning to the forgiveness scale, there was a significant main effect of Apology Factors, $F(1, 176) = 5.51, p = .020, \eta_p^2 = .03$, but no main effect of Remorse, $F(1, 176) = .16, p = .693, \eta_p^2 < .01$. When the apology factors were present forgiveness scores were significantly higher ($M = 3.13$) than they were in the control condition ($M = 2.94$). There was also a significant interaction effect, $F(1, 176) = 7.08, p = .009, \eta_p^2 = .04$. Simple effects analysis showed that this resulted from two significant simple effects. First, within the control remorse condition there was a significant simple main effect of Apology Factors, $F(1, 176) = 12.50, p = .001$, showing that inclusion of the apology factors led to a higher forgiveness score ($M = 3.23$) than did the control apology ($M = 2.80$). Second, within the control apology condition, there was a significant simple main effect of remorse, $F(1, 176) = 4.54, p = .035$, showing that the high remorse apology led to a higher forgiveness score ($M = 3.06$) than did the control remorse apology ($M = 2.80$).

Positive Perceptions³

The main effect of Apology Factors on positive perceptions of the perpetrator was significant, $F(1, 176) = 5.12, p = .025, \eta_p^2 = .043$. Scores were significantly higher when the apology factors were included ($M = 3.24$), compared to when they were not ($M = 2.96$). There was no significant main effect of Remorse, $F(1, 176) = 2.32, p = .129, \eta_p^2 = .01$, but there was a significant interaction effect,

³ The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items (sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 11.

$F(1, 176) = 9.64, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Simple effects analysis revealed the same pattern as was found for the forgiveness variable. There was a significant simple main effect of the Apology Factors manipulation within the control remorse condition, $F(1, 176) = 14.22, p < .001$, whereby the inclusion of the apology factors conclusion led to higher scores ($M = 3.34$) than did the control apology ($M = 2.67$). There was also a simple main effect of Remorse within the control Apology Factors condition, $F(1, 176) = 14.22, p = .001$, with the high remorse condition leading to higher scores ($M = 3.25$) than the control remorse condition ($M = 2.67$).

Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analyses

Regression analysis was used to test whether the effect of Apology Factors on forgiveness scale ratings was mediated by positive perceptions. Results confirmed that inclusion of the Apology Factors significantly predicted both forgiveness ratings, $b = .20, SE = .09, p = .022$, and positive perceptions, $b = .28, SE = .13, p = .030$; positive perceptions, in turn, significantly predicted forgiveness ratings, $b = .50, SE = .03, p < .001$. When controlling for positive perceptions, Apology Factors no longer significantly predicted forgiveness, $b = .06, SE = .06, p = .313$. More than half of the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the predictors ($R^2_{adj.} = .56$). The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, $b = .14, SE = .06, 95\% \text{ bias-corrected } CI = .02, .27$. An additional test was conducted to investigate the potential moderating effect of the remorse manipulation on this mediation effect. It was shown that the effect of apology factors on positive perceptions was indeed

significantly moderated by the remorse manipulation, $b = -3.11$, $SE = 1.00$, $p < .001$.

The coefficient for the indirect effect was significant in the control remorse condition, $b = .334$, $SE = .87$, 95% bias-corrected CI = 1.71, 5.14, but was not significant in the high remorse condition, $b = -.52$, $SE = .92$, 95% bias-corrected CI = -2.40, 1.23.

Discussion

The aim of Study 6 was to examine the effects of combining the three apology factors that were studied separately in Study 5, comparing this combined condition with a control apology that made no reference to these factors, and also to assess the impact of enhancing the expression of remorse in an intergroup apology. Both manipulations had a significant impact on forgiveness and on perceptions of the perpetrator group, although they did not interact in the expected manner.

First, and consistent with Nadler's (2012) argument, the presence of the 'combined' apology factors conclusion did increase levels of forgiveness. The joint presence of these apology factors also led to more positive perceptions of the out-group. However, these effects were both stronger when the apology included no further enhancement of expressed remorse. A similar mediation pattern to that observed in Study 5 was also observed: Positive perceptions of the perpetrator fully mediated the impact of the apology factors on forgiveness. This is consistent with the suggestion that in order to attain forgiveness through an intergroup apology, the perpetrating group must be perceived as at least somewhat trustworthy and sincere.

A second finding was that, in absence of the apology factors, the inclusion of an enhanced expression of remorse in an apology can be effective, enhancing both forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrator, relative to an apology with a standard expression of remorse. Unexpectedly, however, when the intergroup apology included both the apology factors and high expressions of remorse, forgiveness ratings were lower, albeit not significantly so. Contrary to the expected interaction between the Apology Factors and Remorse manipulations, the observed pattern shows that the positive effects of each manipulation were strongest in the absence of the other manipulation.

A possible explanation for this unexpected result is that combining the two factors resulted in an information overload, with the result that the impact of each factor was undermined. The results suggest that the positive effects of the 'combined' apology factors was somewhat undermined by the added remorse manipulation, as well as the positive effects of the remorse manipulation being undermined by the added 'combined' apology factors. Attempting to account for why such attenuation occurs would be key to understanding how the two factors could be combined to have a positive effect on intergroup reconciliation. A second way to account for these results is that the two manipulations may send conflicting messages. The apology factors are practical and future-oriented, whereas a strong expression of remorse focuses on past events. These mixed messages may undercut each other and thereby limit the effectiveness of each manipulation. Again, the Needs-Based Model (Nadler and Shnabel, 2015) could be useful in accounting for this result. According to this model, which argues the need for empowerment in reconciliation efforts, it could be that, individually, the apology factors and

expressions of remorse are seen as 'empowering.' Thus, the forward-looking changes included in the apology factors could be regarded as empowering, as could the sense that the transgressing group is remorseful, which elevates the moral identity of the victim group. However, interweaving the apology factors and the expression of remorse may make what is being communicated unclear. It may be that if these two components were introduced more independently, they would operate in concert.

A third possible explanation is that the high remorse manipulation as implemented here was too complex. Expressions of remorse were distributed throughout the text, rather than concentrated in a single paragraph, as the apology factors manipulation was. Moreover, expressions of high remorse can entail several moral emotions, such as guilt, shame, and regret. Each of these emotions might have a different impact on the reader or listener. Indeed, the expression of such complex emotions does not always have a positive effect. Hornsey and Wohl (2013) found that, under certain conditions, when out-groups expressed complex 'secondary' emotions in an apology, this had a more negative effect on reconciliation than if they had not offered any apology at all. Although Hornsey and Wohl argued that this might be because in-groups do not regard perpetrator out-groups as capable of experiencing such emotions, the present findings show that in the absence of the 'combined' apology factors, expressing high remorse did have a positive impact on forgiveness and on perceptions of the perpetrator group.

Study 7 was designed to explore the effects of a clearer separation of the manipulations of the remorse and apology factors. I also took the opportunity to

study the effects of implementing the high remorse condition by contrasting the moral emotion expression of guilt with that of shame. The reasoning for this change is to see whether the differences already found between these emotions (Lickel et al., 2005; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013) extend to their effects within apologies, as well as to investigate whether expressing either emotion is more effective than an apology without expression of these emotions.

Study 7

The aim of Study 7 was to gain further insight into the unexpected results of Study 6. This was achieved by having a cleaner separation between the two manipulations included in the intergroup apology. In Study 6, the 'combined' apology factors came in the concluding paragraph, whereas the high remorse expression was distributed throughout the text, including the concluding paragraph. To distinguish more clearly between the two manipulations, in the current study the apology factors manipulation was again implemented in the final paragraph of the apology, but in the high emotion expression condition, either shame or guilt was expressed only in the opening paragraph, followed by two further paragraphs of text before the concluding paragraph.

A second change introduced in this study concerns the content of what was expressed in the high emotion paragraph. In Study 6, the moral emotions of 'guilt' and 'shame' were both expressed in the high remorse condition. We know from previous research that guilt and shame are associated with different appraisals and action tendencies (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Tracy & Robins, 2006). A clearer understanding of how the expression of these emotions influences the efficacy of

intergroup apologies can be gained by separating expressions of guilt from expressions of shame. Therefore, separate shame expression and guilt expression conditions were included in Study 7, along with a no-emotion control condition.

A third change introduced in this study concerned the control condition. In Study 6, the apology factors conclusion was simply added to the text of the original IRA apology and it could therefore be argued that any positive effects resulting from its inclusion were simply due to the provision of additional information. To counter this, the control condition used in Study 7 included a concluding paragraph of similar length to the apology factors paragraph, but without any content relating to the three apology factors.

It was predicted that both the inclusion of the apology factors and the expression of emotion in the intergroup apology would result in higher forgiveness ratings and more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group. Also, due to previous research suggesting that shame is perceived as a more powerful emotion than guilt (Lickel et al., 2005; Shepherd et al., 2013), I thought it possible that the expression of shame would be more effective than an expression of guilt in eliciting higher forgiveness levels and more positive perception of the perpetrator group.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and twenty-eight participants (113 males & 115 females) completed this study. They had a mean age of 55.54 (SD = 11.08, range = 47). As in the previous studies, participants were selected based on age (> 35 years) and

location (living in mainland Britain). The study had a fully between-subjects design comprising the six conditions resulting from the factorial combination of Apology Factors (present vs absent) and Emotion (guilt or shame or no emotion control), with participants randomly allocated to one of them.

The minimum number of participants required was determined by power analysis (G*power 3; Faul et al., 2007). To detect a medium effect size for main effects and interactions with 80% confidence to a with a significance level of .05, at least 179 participants were needed.

It should be noted that 292 participants started this study. Thus 64 participants were excluded before finishing the study, 16 for not providing consent to use their data and 48 because of a failed attention check.

Manipulation

Apology Factors. This manipulation was identical to that used in Study 6, with the exception that the Apology Factors absent condition included a concluding paragraph of similar length and sentence structure to the one used in the Apology Factors present condition, but without any reference to the three apology factors.

Emotion Expression. The first paragraph of the intergroup apology included a final sentence that included expressions of either guilt or shame. This read as follows: "There is an immense feeling of guilt [shame] over the fact that we as a group were able to commit the acts that we did." There was also a no emotion control condition, in which this sentence was omitted. The full transcripts for the apologies used can be found in Appendix 12.

Measures

Manipulation Checks. To check the effectiveness of the Emotion Expressed manipulation, participants responded to single-item statements about the presence of guilt or shame in the apology. Responses were made using a 5-point scale from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree.'

Other Measures. Forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrating group, as well as demographic questions, were measured in the same way as in Studies 5 and 6.

Procedure

The procedure was the same as that used in Studies 5 and 6.

Results

None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of the dependent variables. The means, standard deviations for all dependent measures, as well as the percentage of "yes" responses to the binary forgiveness question, are shown in Table 3.3.

Manipulation Checks

Guilt. Emotion had a significant effect on perceptions of guilt, $F(2, 222) = 10.75, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that significantly more guilt was perceived in both the guilt ($M = 3.62, p < .001$) and the shame ($M = 3.26, p = .047$) conditions, compared to the no emotion condition ($M = 2.85$). The difference between the guilt and shame conditions was not significant. Interestingly, the apology factors manipulation also had a significant effect on the

perception of guilt, $F(1, 222) = 5.71, p = .018, \eta_p^2 = .03$, with those in the apology factors included condition ($M = 3.40$) perceiving more guilt in the apology than those in the condition where the apology factors were not included ($M = 3.08$).

Shame. There was a significant effect of Emotion on perceptions of shame, $F(2, 222) = 17.15, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that significantly more shame was perceived in the shame condition ($M = 3.68$), compared to both the guilt ($M = 2.88$) and no emotion ($M = 2.88$) conditions. The apology factors manipulation did not significantly affect the perception of shame, $F(1, 222) = 1.53, p = .217, \eta_p^2 = .01$.

Table 3.3

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables measured in Study 7, broken down by apology content and type of emotion expressed.

	Apology Factors Included			Apology Factors Not Included		
	Expressed Guilt	Expressed Shame	Control	Expressed Guilt	Expressed Shame	Control
Binary Forgiveness (% 'yes' responses)	62.16%	64.86%	42.11%	56.41%	63.16%	35.90%
Forgiveness Scale (1-5)	3.60 (.38)	3.65 (.48)	3.23 (.52)	3.45 (.72)	3.49 (.59)	2.96 (.50)
Positive Perceptions (1-5)	3.11 (.74)	3.22 (.64)	2.98 (.78)	2.79 (.78)	3.20 (.92)	2.58 (.84)
Perceived Guilt (1-5)	3.68 (1.16)	3.38 (1.01)	3.16 (1.08)	3.56 (1.05)	3.13 (.99)	2.54 (.88)
Perceived Shame (1-5)	2.89 (.84)	3.73 (.80)	3.05 (1.06)	2.87 (1.08)	3.63 (1.03)	2.69 (.98)

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of 'yes' responses was 54%. A chi-square analysis showed that there was no significant association between proportion of yes responses and whether or not apology factors were present, $\chi^2(1) = .47, p = .493$. However, a significant association was found between the proportion of 'yes' responses and whether guilt, shame, or no emotion was expressed, $\chi^2(2) = 10.86, p = .004$. The percentage of yes responses was lower in the no emotion condition (39%) than in the guilt (59%) and shame conditions (64%). The standardised residuals suggest that this significant effect is focused more in the control condition, with more "no" responses than expected (standardised residual = 1.9), in comparison to the residuals relating to the "no" responses for guilt (-.7) and shame (-1.3).

Turning to the forgiveness scale, there were significant main effects of Apology Factors, $F(1, 222) = 7.08, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .03$, and Emotion, $F(2, 222) = 17.89, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$, but no significant interaction, $F(2, 222) = .34, p = .713, \eta_p^2 < .01$. Forgiveness ratings were significantly higher when the apology factors were included ($M = 3.49$), compared to when they were not ($M = 3.30$). Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed that the main effect of emotion expression was due to the fact that both emotion conditions, guilt ($M = 3.52$) and shame ($M = 3.57$), resulted in significantly higher forgiveness ratings than did the no emotion condition ($M = 3.09$).

Positive Perceptions⁴

There was a significant main effect of Apology Factors on positive perceptions of the perpetrating group, $F(1, 222) = 5.62, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .03$, with significantly higher forgiveness ratings in the apology factors included condition ($M = 3.10$), compared to the condition without these factors ($M = 2.86$). There was also a significant main effect of Emotion, $F(2, 222) = 5.77, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that positive perceptions were significantly higher in the shame condition ($M = 3.21$) than in the no emotion condition ($M = 2.78, p = .003$). Positive perceptions in the guilt condition ($M = 2.95$) did not differ significantly from either the no emotion condition ($p = .528$) or the shame condition ($p = .135$).

Mediation Analysis

Regression analysis was used to investigate whether the impact of the apology factors variable had on forgiveness was mediated by the positive perception of the perpetrator group. Inclusion of apology factors significantly predicted both forgiveness, $b = .19, SE = .08, p = .014$, and positive perceptions, $b = .25, SE = .11, p = .020$. The positive perceptions variable, in turn, was a significant predictor of forgiveness, $b = .54, SE = .03, p < .001$. When positive perceptions of the transgressor were controlled for, the inclusion of apology factors was no longer a significant predictor of forgiveness, $b = .06, SE = .05, p = .275$. More than half of the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the predictors ($R^2_{adj.} = .56$). The

⁴ The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items (sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 13.

indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This indicated that the indirect coefficient was significant, $b = .13$, $SE = .06$, 95% bias-corrected $CI = .03, .26$.

Regression analysis was also used to investigate whether positive perceptions of the perpetrating group also mediated the relationship between emotion expression and forgiveness. Using the no emotion condition as the dummy variable, it was shown that the shame condition significantly predicted both positive perceptions, $b = .43$, $SE = .13$, $p = .001$, and forgiveness, $b = .48$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$. The guilt condition significantly predicted forgiveness scores, $b = .43$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$, but not positive perceptions, $b = .17$, $SE = .13$, $p = .185$. As a result, the guilt condition was not considered further. The positive perceptions measure was a significant predictor of forgiveness, $b = .51$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$. When positive perceptions of the perpetrating group were controlled for, the expression of shame remained a significant predictor of forgiveness, $b = .26$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, relative to the no emotion condition. More than two-thirds of the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the predictors ($R^2_{adj.} = .67$). The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This indicated that the coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, $b = .22$, $SE = .06$, 95% bias-corrected $CI = .10, .35$.

Discussion

One aim of this study was to test the prediction that a cleaner separation of the apology factors and moral emotion expression manipulations would result in higher forgiveness ratings and more positive evaluations of the perpetrator group,

such that the two manipulations would no longer undermine each other when presented in combination. There was a good measure of support for this prediction. Including both the apology factors and the expression of emotion led to higher forgiveness ratings, relative to their respective control conditions. The interaction between the factors was not significant; thus although their combination did not lead to significantly higher forgiveness ratings, there was no evidence, as there had been in Study 6, that one manipulation undermined the effectiveness of the other. Instead, it seems that an intergroup apology can lead to greater forgiveness by including either the future-oriented structural, relational and identity-related apology factors proposed by Nadler (2012), or the expression of moral emotions such as guilt and shame, which communicate an acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing and imply that the wrongdoing will not recur.

The positive impact of the two manipulations was also evident in the evaluations of the perpetrator group. Perceptions of the perpetrator were more positive when the apology factors were included rather than absent, and when shame was expressed than when no emotion was expressed, although the expression of guilt did not significantly impact these perceptions. In previous research, Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007) have also reported differential effects for shame and guilt, with shame predicting intentions that related to avoidance and withdrawal, whereas guilt did not independently predict any action intentions.

The greater impact of shame, compared to guilt, may reflect the fact that it is regarded as a more powerful emotion. This was also reflected in the manipulation checks. While ratings of shame were significantly higher within the

shame condition, compared to both the control and the guilt condition, ratings of guilt were not significantly higher in the guilt condition than in the shame condition, although both were significantly higher than the control condition. If shame is regarded as a stronger emotion, it may be that expressions of shame carry the implication that the person or group in question also feels guilty. Indeed, reports of shame and guilt often co-occur (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). However, shame differs from guilt on more dimensions than extremity; for example, on some theoretical accounts shame reflects a 'bad self' rather than a 'bad act' (Tangney et al., 1992), and it may be that a group that is prepared to acknowledge such a fundamental flaw in its identity is seen as one that is more committed to the reconciliation process. The positive findings resulting from shame expression add to the growing evidence that shame can have prosocial outcomes (Gausel, Vignoles, & Leach, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015).

A final point to be made in relation to this study is with respect to the mediating effect of the positive perceptions of the perpetrating group. The effect of apology factors on forgiveness levels was fully mediated by these positive perceptions, echoing the pattern observed in Studies 5 and 6. There was also evidence that the positive effect on forgiveness of expressing shame was partially mediated, though the partial nature of this mediation suggests that these beneficial effects of shame expression may also work through a different, complementary process. It is worth bearing in mind that the 'positive perceptions' measure used consisted of items assessing trust, sincerity, remorse and believability. Exploring these perceptions independently in greater detail might help to distinguish whether the mediating roles of trust and believability are different to those of sincerity and

remorse, and whether the effects of the apology factors and the expression of shame increase forgiveness through different pathways.

General Discussion

The objective of this research was to investigate whether the varying of the content of an intergroup apology would increase its effectiveness in promoting intergroup reconciliation, as indexed by willingness to forgive the perpetrator group and by evaluations of this group. Forgiveness was assessed using a binary, yes/no measure and an intergroup forgiveness scale tailored to the Northern Ireland context. The advantages of using a multi-item scale are evident from the fact that significant effects of the apology factors manipulation were found in Studies 6 and 7 for the scale, but not for the binary measure. Moreover, in Study 5 there was a substantial difference between intergroup and individual apologies on both forgiveness measures, with individual apologies eliciting higher forgiveness. Across the three studies, these effects on forgiveness of both apology content and apology source were fully or partially mediated by more positive perceptions of the sincerity, remorse, trustworthiness and believability of the perpetrator(s), consistent with the argument that a lack of perceived trust and sincerity represent major obstacles to the effectiveness of intergroup apologies.

One way in which apology content was varied was by including the structural, relational, and identity-related factors proposed by Nadler (2012), who has argued that these three factors need to be addressed in order to achieve genuine intergroup reconciliation. It was hypothesized that exposing participants to apologies incorporating these factors would increase forgiveness and enhance

evaluations of the perpetrator group. Between them, the present studies show that the three factors identified by Nadler do have a positive effect on forgiveness, as well as on positive perceptions of the transgressors. Although the results of Study 5 suggest that these apology factors are not effective when used independently of each other, the results of Studies 6 and 7 show that they are effective when used in combination. This is consistent with Nadler's (2012) claim that all three factors are needed to achieve true intergroup reconciliation. Importantly, the presence of all three factors in Studies 6 and 7 led to significant improvements in the evaluations of the perpetrating group, and these perceptions fully mediated the effect of the apology factors on forgiveness ratings.

A second way in which apology content was varied was by including expressions of moral emotions. In Study 6, expressions of remorse were distributed across the apology statement. Although the inclusion of these expressions did result in greater forgiveness and more positive evaluations of the perpetrator group, these effects were unexpectedly limited to the conditions in which the apology factors were not included. Indeed, when the statement included the apology factors and expressions of strong remorse, both forgiveness ratings and evaluations of the perpetrator group were lower than when either of these content variables was included on its own. Study 7 showed that a greater separation between these content variables, with the moral emotion expression at the start of the apology and the apology factors at the end, yielded clearer evidence of their effectiveness. Now the expression of emotion (whether this was guilt or shame) elicited greater forgiveness regardless of the presence or absence of the apology

factors, although it was only the expression of shame that influenced the positive perceptions of the perpetrating group, relative to a no emotion control condition.

There are some possible limitations to be acknowledged of the present research. First, the three studies reported here all took the form of scenario studies in which third-party observers responded to different versions of a statement of apology issued by a group, the IRA, that had perpetrated violent acts for political ends. It could be argued that the judgments made by the participants do not necessarily reflect how those who were more directly involved in 'The Troubles' would have reacted. In response to this objection, I would argue that all the participants belonged to a national group that was one of the targets of this violence and were all old enough to be able to recall some of the events for which the IRA issued its apology. Moreover, the statement that was used as the basis for the research was an official apology issued by the IRA. Furthermore, some of the participants did report that 'The Troubles' had had a direct impact on their lives, but their responses did not significantly differ from those who had not been directly affected. It would nevertheless be important for further research to study the reactions of participants in which a larger proportion of members have been directly or indirectly mistreated by another group and are then exposed to an apology issued by the perpetrator group.

In conclusion, the three studies reported here provide good support for the hypothesis that the content of an intergroup apology can influence forgiveness of and evaluations of a perpetrator group. Such evidence serves as an antidote to the view that intergroup apologies are generally ineffective in achieving intergroup

reconciliation. Intergroup apologies that explicitly address the structural, relational, and identity-related factors proposed by Nadler (2012) do result in enhanced perceptions of a perpetrator group and thereby increase forgiveness of the group's past behaviour. Furthermore, intergroup apologies that include clear expressions of shame also lead to more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and this in turn increases the likelihood that the group's actions will be forgiven.

Chapter 4

Emotion and Intergroup Cooperation: How expressions of guilt, shame and pride influence behaviour in the Centipede Game

Attempting to repair relationships that have been damaged by a transgression is relatively common in everyday life. In interpersonal relationships, there are several different routes that can be taken, all of which can have positive effects on relationships (e.g., Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; Riek & Mania, 2011). In the case of intergroup relationships, rebuilding the relationship after a transgression seems to be much more difficult. It has been argued that the reason for this discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup situations is that the latter are characterised by more competition, fear, deception, and greed (Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). An experimental context that illustrates this interpersonal/intergroup distinction is that of economic games. Findings of increased mistrust, defection and all-round competitiveness in intergroup scenarios are common in studies using the Prisoner's Dilemma, Dictator Game, and Ultimatum Game, as well as many other economic game variants (Kugler, Kausel & Kocher, 2012). In the present research we examine the capacity for intergroup reconciliation in the context of the Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981), an economic game that measures the degree to which two parties (in our case, two groups) cooperate.

Most research on relationship repair in economic games has explored this in an interpersonal setting and has yielded evidence that trust and cooperation can be restored following breaches. For example, it has been shown that denial of

responsibility or denial of intent to be unfair (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011) are effective strategies for restoring trust, as is offering financial compensation (De Cremer, 2010), although in both cases it was also suggested that apologising was the optimal strategy. There also seems to be leeway given to individuals who say that they did not fully understand the game, with studies showing that reparative acts are effective so long as the intent to be unfair was uncertain (De Cremer, Van Dijk & Pilluta, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2011). One study highlighting this was conducted by Cohen, Wildschut and Insko (2010), who showed that task-focused communication can increase interpersonal cooperation, through activating norms associated with fairness and trust. This suggests that relationship repair is possible within interpersonal economic games, and also that it is possible to achieve using communication, rather than compensation, which provides a basis for examining whether this also applies to intergroup economic games, for which research is currently limited.

One way in which relationships can be repaired via communication, or at least improved, is through the use of emotional expressions. Social appraisal theory (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) and the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) theory (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010) suggest that emotion communication has the potential to influence behaviour through inferential or affective processes. Drawing on this, we can imagine that the expression of a negative self-conscious emotion, such as guilt, shame, or regret following a transgression could have a beneficial impact on a relationship, whether it is an interpersonal or intergroup relationship. Riek (2010) has shown that feelings of guilt often mediate the relation between factors such as feelings of responsibility, anger,

severity and closeness, and the likelihood of seeking forgiveness. In theory, the communication of these negative self-conscious emotions should increase the likelihood of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Interpersonal research that has investigated the impact of expressions of self-conscious emotions does offer evidence in support of this. Apologies that were driven by guilt and/or shame motivations have been found to increase forgiveness following a transgression. Zeelenberg, van Dijk, and Manstead (1998) showed how relationships can be repaired following expressions of regret, while Vaish, Carpenter and Tomasello (2011) showed that children as young as five would prefer to interact with transgressors who are remorseful. Mock jurors have also been found to be more lenient to defendants who appear remorseful (MaLin, Downs, MaLin, & Caspers, 2009).

The majority of research investigating the role of self-conscious emotions in economic games focuses on the experience of these emotions and how this influences behaviour. For example, Ketelaar and Au (2003) show that individuals who experience guilt in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma or Ultimatum Game displayed greater cooperation or generosity in subsequent rounds. This finding was replicated by de Hooge, Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2007), although they found no equivalent effect for shame. Later research by the same authors, however, did show that shame can increase pro-social behaviour (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Despite the majority of research focusing on the experience of these emotions, there is some research that highlights the potential benefits of the expression of negative self-conscious emotions, with studies showing that

expressions of remorse and regret are more likely to be met with cooperative behaviour (De Melo, Zheng, & Gratch, 2009; van der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, & Manstead, 2015; Shore & Parkinson, 2018).

These findings suggest that negative self-conscious emotions can lead to relationship repair and future cooperation, whether it be the experience or expression of such emotions. It should be noted, however, that in the studies cited above, these benefits arose in interpersonal settings, rather than intergroup ones. There is a dearth of evidence that the expression of self-conscious emotions can boost intergroup cooperation in economic games, although the few studies there are suggest that guilt or regret expressions can enhance cooperation within intergroup economic games (Rychlowska et al., 2019; Shore et al., 2019).

The Centipede Game

The Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981) is an economic game that involves reciprocal cooperation between players. At each step of the game, one player decides whether to stop the game and accept the monetary allocations currently on offer, or to transfer the decision to the other player. Every time the decision is transferred to the other player, the total monetary allocation to the two players increases; however, if the other player chooses to stop the game, the first player will end with a lower allocation than if he or she had stopped the game earlier. There is a finite number of steps (or 'nodes'), with the final node involving the highest payout to the players. One of the most important reasons for using the Centipede Game is that trust and cooperation are key factors involved in the playing of the game (Krockow, Colman, & Pulford, 2016a). The game was chosen for

the present research because it is easy to adapt to an intergroup game and because of its sequential structure. In a multi-round version of the game, if one player decides to stop the game early, resulting in a lower payout for the other player, there will be an opportunity to restore trust in a subsequent round. This structure also allows for interventions mid-way through the game, when people can stop playing to send or receive any messages between groups and then return to what they were doing before. This enabled me to investigate the role that communication has in influencing motivations, strategies and general behaviour.

Prior research using the Centipede Game has shown that groups stop the game significantly earlier than individuals do (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004). Verbal protocol analysis has also shown that there are different motivations for cooperation depending on the temporal stage of the game, with most players who cooperate early doing so because they are experimenting with the game, while those who continue to cooperate late in the game do so for prosocial reasons (Krockow, Colman & Pulford, 2016b).

Overview of Studies

The Centipede Game shown in Figure 1 was used in both of the present studies. Each node in the game denotes a decision that has to be made by one of the two parties (A or B). In these studies the players consisted of two 3-person groups. The group can decide to proceed (Go) or stop. If the game reaches node 5, it is completed. Thus a game ends when one of the groups decides to stop, or when the game reaches node 5. A group's designation as "A" or "B" switches with each new game. In both studies, groups were given an opportunity to communicate with

each other. Games before and after this intergroup interaction are referred to as “Phase 1” and “Phase 2”, respectively. The studies were run using online software (veconlab.econ.virginia.edu).




Figure 4.1: Example Centipede/Intergroup Cooperation Game.

The payout of the game consisted of a number of lottery tickets that the groups would receive, with each payoff point translating into one lottery ticket for their group. Participants were (correctly) informed that the lottery draw would involve all groups participating in the current study. Thus group members were playing for real stakes.

The Centipede Game was renamed the “Intergroup Cooperation Game” for the purposes of these studies. This was because the term ‘centipede’ might have been aversive for some participants, and because framing it as a cooperation game should have increased the motivation to cooperate (Lieberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004), especially given the lottery ticket incentive.

The aim of these studies was to explore the role that emotion communication plays when involved in an intergroup game based on cooperation or competition. Previous research suggests that it is unusual for individuals or

groups to cooperate fully when playing this game (Krockow et al., 2016a.) I therefore anticipated that groups would be quite competitive, despite the renaming of the game. To the extent that one group behaves less cooperatively than the other group, there is a reason for members of the 'victim group' to feel aggrieved and for members of the 'perpetrator group' to feel some degree of regret or remorse, or perhaps even a little smug. Providing the groups with an opportunity to communicate made it possible for groups to express their emotions. It was predicted that this communication of emotion between the groups would have an influence on behaviour in Phase 2.

It could be argued that the two groups playing the centipede game should be described as 'winners' and 'losers', rather than 'perpetrators' and 'victims', given the natural inclination to want to gain more tickets than the opposing group. However, the broader context of the game made it clear that the tickets to be won would be shared by the two groups, such that if the groups cooperated their joint net allocation of tickets would be greater than that of groups that did not cooperate. Given that the number of tickets allocated would ostensibly increase the groups' chances of success in the lottery, it seems reasonable to think of groups that fail to cooperate as jeopardising the opposing teams' chances of winning the lottery. In this sense it seems appropriate to use the terms 'perpetrator' and 'victim', respectively, to describe groups that act competitively and cooperatively. It is also worth acknowledging that there is an opportunity for both groups to steal in this game, in which case both could be regarded as 'perpetrating groups'. However, there are many real-world conflicts in which both parties can be construed as perpetrators, which then influences the prospects for reconciliation. This is one

reason for thinking that the centipede game can offer insights into real-world intergroup behaviour.

It should be noted that all studies reported in this chapter were approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.10.11.4598G).

Study 8

The purpose of Study 8 was to examine how behaviour in the game would be influenced when groups were given the opportunity to communicate their emotions between two phases of the game, by expressing pride, guilt or shame. Groups played six games in Phase 1, and a further six games in Phase 2. The fact that there were six games in each phase meant that there was ample opportunity for groups to develop and implement a strategy for playing the game.

Between the two phases, groups were asked to report the extent to which they felt pride, guilt, and shame about the group's performance in Phase 1, in the knowledge that their answers would be shared with the opposing group. Guilt and shame were chosen because previous research has shown that guilt and shame are associated with different appraisals and actions tendencies (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; de Hooge et al., 2007). Although the differential effects of expressing guilt and shame in economic games is not a topic that has been widely researched, outside the context of economic games it has been shown that shame is generally perceived to be a more powerful emotion than guilt (Lickel et al., 2005; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013) and in intergroup scenarios the expression of shame has been shown to be more helpful and less insulting to victim groups than an expression of guilt (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2009). The current

study aims to investigate whether this difference between guilt and shame is also found in an intergroup economic game. While the abovementioned studies focus on the effects of negative self-conscious emotions, there is also some research highlighting the effects of positive self-conscious emotions. Van der Schalk, Bruder and Manstead (2012) reported effects of both regret and pride, with anticipated pride for either fair or unfair behaviour leading to increased likelihood of engaging in that behaviour in the future. Pride was therefore included in the current research with a view to exploring how the communication of this positively-valenced emotion would affect the behaviour of those to whom it is communicated.

It was expected that expressions of guilt and shame would co-occur in group expressions of emotion, reflecting a common finding in research investigating these emotions (e.g., Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). It was also expected that those who received expressions of guilt and shame would exhibit greater intergroup cooperation in Phase 2. The rationale for this prediction is that groups behaving uncooperatively in Phase 1 would be more likely to express guilt and/or shame, and that expression of these emotions would help to restore trust between the groups, which is consistent with results of studies showing the positive effects that negative self-conscious emotions can have on future cooperation (De Melo et al., 2009; van der Schalk et al., 2015). By contrast, it was predicted that when pride was expressed by groups, behaviour in Phase 2 would be dependent on the behaviour in Phase 1. If such expressions of pride were related to the high number of points won in Phase 1, the pride expression would be interpreted as pride about having behaved competitively, and this might well provoke competitive reactions in Phase 2 on the part of the group receiving this expression. However, if

the pride expressions were unrelated or even negatively related to the number of points won in Phase 1, the pride would be interpreted as pride about behaving cooperatively, and this would be likely to elicit reciprocal cooperative behaviour in Phase 2. This context-dependent prediction for pride is consistent with Verbeke, Belschak, and Bagozzi (2004), who argued that pride can be regarded as appropriate or excessive (in which case it is defined as hubris) and with Wubben, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2012), who found that 'authentic' pride elicits more prosocial behaviour than does 'hubristic' pride.

All analyses in this study are conducted at the 'group' level (i.e., using group as the unit of analysis), something that is not routinely done when investigating reconciliation in economic game studies. Although this limits statistical power, it is an appropriate reflection of the fact that group members were asked to arrive at collective decisions, rather than individual ones.

Method

Participants

Eighty-four participants (67 female, 17 male; mean age = 19.75 years) took part in this study. They were psychology undergraduates who participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants were divided into 28 three-person groups. Allocation to groups was done on a random basis, but participants were led to believe that this allocation was based on responses to a questionnaire completed online prior to the study taking place.

Given that this was not an experimental study and there was no prior literature on which to base estimates of effect size, the number of participants recruited was determined primarily by the available number of participants in the participant pool within the time period set aside for running the study.

Design

The study used a correlational design in which differences in group behaviour between Phases 1 and 2 of the game were correlated with emotions expressed by each group during the interval between the two phases.

Measures

Emotions. Groups were asked to complete single-item questions about the extent to which they felt pride, guilt, or shame about the group's performance in Phase 1. It was explained that their responses would be shared with the opposing group before commencing Phase 2 (and that they would see the opposing group's responses). Responses to these items were made on a 1-6 rating scale where 1 was labelled "not at all" and 6 was labelled "very much". In this chapter, I have chosen to focus on the effects of how the emotions expressed by the other group influence the behaviour of the group observing these expressions.

Game Behaviours. Several game-specific variables were recorded, including number of tickets won, average node at which the group exited (hereafter average node exit), number of 'steals' from the other group (defined as the total number of times the group chose to exit a game), and the percentage of cooperative moves made. These variables were recorded for both Phase 1 and Phase 2.

Procedure

On signing up to the study participants completed a questionnaire under the impression that their answers would help to determine allocation to groups that would participate in the study. This was intended to increase their identification with the group to which they were allocated. On arrival at the lab they were asked to remain in a waiting room until all six participants had arrived. Here they received an information sheet describing the game and reminding them of the lottery ticket prize. They were then divided into two groups of three and led to one of two rooms in which computers had been set up ready to play the “Intergroup Cooperation Game”. Groups first read the instructions for the game and participated in one practice game, playing against a scripted computer program in which it played one cooperative move and one steal. Participants’ understanding of how the game worked was checked before the groups played against each other in Phase 1. One group was randomly chosen to be “Player A” for the first of six games in this phase, with the other group taking the role of “Player B,” after which the groups switched roles such that each group was A for three games and B for the other three. At the end of Phase 1 there was an interval during which participants completed the emotion measures. Responses were shared with the opposing group. Then Phase 2 took place, following the same structure as Phase 1. At the end of Phase 2, there was a debrief for all participants in which the purpose of the study was explained. All participants received an equal number of lottery tickets.

Results

All data used in this study were analysed at the group level, rather than at the level of the individual.

Game Variables in Phase 1 and Phase 2

There were no significant correlations between Phase 1 and Phase 2 scores for any of the game variables. This suggests that there was no consistent strategy used across the two phases, and I interpret this difference between Phases 1 and 2 as a reflection of the impact of the emotions expressed between the two phases. To examine these differences, game variable difference scores were calculated by subtracting variables in Phase 1 from those in Phase 2. In what follows, trends in the data are illustrated with examples from the raw data (see also Appendix 14) and the relations between emotion measures and game variables, both within and between phases, will be reported using correlation and regression analyses.

Expressing Pride

A high score for pride (5 or 6, where 6 was the maximum) was expressed by at least one group in 50% of the games (see Sessions 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12, in Appendix 14). From observing these games, it can be seen that games in Phase 2 of these sessions tended to be less cooperative. Generally, groups to whom pride was expressed after Phase 1 tended to steal more in Phase 2 than they did in Phase 1. Sessions 3 and 12 (see Table 4.1) highlight this trend and are particularly interesting because they involve groups that were completely cooperative in Phase 1. Although these groups remained cooperative at the start of Phase 2, the combination of the

out-group's pride expression and being stolen from again seems to have encouraged them to steal at the end of Phase 2.

Table 4.1.

Raw game data for sessions 3 and 12 in Study 8. The table shows the actions taken by opposing groups in each game of each phase, as well as the emotions expressed in the communication interval. "S" denotes that the group stole, and the accompanying number denotes the round number on which they exited. "C" denotes a fully completed round (which by definition ended at round 5).

Phase	Game	Session 3		Session 12	
		Group 5	Group 6	Group 23	Group 24
1	1	S4	.	C5	C5
	2	S3	.	C5	C5
	3	S4	.	C5	C5
	4	C5	C5	C5	C5
	5	S4	.	.	S2
	6	C5	C5	.	S1
Expression	Pride	5	4	5	5
	Guilt	2	1	1	5
	Shame	2	1	2	2
2	7	S4	.	C5	C5
	8	C5	S5	C5	C5
	9	S4	.	.	S3
	10	S3	.	S1	.
	11	.	S1	S2	.
	12	.	S2	S1	.

These observations are confirmed by correlation analyses. The expression of pride by the out-group group was significantly associated with all measures of changes in in-group game behaviour between Phase 1 and Phase 2: total tickets ($r = -.49, p = .008$), average node exit ($r = -.54, p = .003$), number of steals ($r = .62, p < .001$), and percentage of cooperative moves made ($r = -.63, p < .001$). Thus the more that one group expressed pride, the greater the competitiveness between the groups in Phase 2, relative to Phase 1, as highlighted by the increase in the number of steals made by one group following high expression of pride by the other group.

Expressing Guilt and Shame

As anticipated, there was a strong positive correlation between the expression of guilt and the expression of shame ($r = .88, p < .001$). High scores for both variables were only observed in around 30% of the games (see Sessions 1, 7, and 13, shown in Table 4.2). Observing how these games were played suggests that the expression of these emotions had a positive effect on cooperation during Phase 2. Sessions 1, 7, and 13 were much more cooperative in Phase 2 than they had been in Phase 1. However, these sessions also reveal that expression of these emotions did not lead to stable intergroup cooperation: As can be seen in Sessions 7 and 13, despite the cooperation evident in the earlier games of Phase 2, the groups began stealing again in the final few rounds this phase.

Turning to the correlations between the expression of guilt or shame and the difference in Phase 1 and Phase 2 game behaviour, there were significant associations for all game measures: total tickets (guilt: $r = .52, p = .005$; shame: $r = .55, p = .002$), average node exit (guilt: $r = .59, p = .001$; shame: $r = .64, p < .001$), and percentage of cooperative moves (guilt: $r = .52, p = .005$; shame: $r = .71, p < .001$). Out-group expression of shame was also significantly negatively associated with the difference in number of steals ($r = -.59, p = .001$), while the corresponding correlation with out-group expression of guilt was marginally significant ($r = -.36, p = .058$). Overall, this pattern of correlations shows that expression of guilt or shame was associated with more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2 than in Phase 1.

Table 4.2.

Raw game data for sessions 1, 7 and 13 in Study 8. The table shows the actions taken by opposing groups in each game of each phase, as well as the emotions expressed in the communication interval. "S" denotes that the group stole, and the accompanying number denotes the round number on which they exited. "C" denotes a fully completed round (which by definition ended at round 5).

Phase	Game	Session 1		Session 7		Session 13	
		Group 1	Group 2	Group 13	Group 14	Group 25	Group 26
1	1	.	S3	C5	C5	C5	C5
	2	S1	.	S4	.	.	S4
	3	.	S1	S3	.	S4	.
	4	.	S2	.	S3	.	S4
	5	.	S1	S1	.	S2	.
	6	S1	.	.	S1	S1	.
Expression	Pride	3	2	3	3	2	3
	Guilt	5	5	5	5	6	4
	Shame	4	6	6	5	6	5
2	7	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5
	8	.	S4	C5	C5	C5	C5
	9	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5
	10	.	S4	C5	C5	C5	C5
	11	S2	.	C5	C5	S2	.
	12	.	S2	S4	.	S1	.

Predictive Effects of Pride, Guilt, and Shame

I computed a series of multiple linear regressions to predict the differences in game behaviour between Phase 1 and Phase 2 on the basis of the emotion measures. Due to the high correlation between the expressions of guilt and shame, it was decided that only one of these two expressions would be entered into the regression model, along with pride. Because of its stronger correlations with all of the game variables, including a significantly negative association with number of steals, expressed shame, rather than guilt, was chosen as the negative emotion predictor. Considering the extent to which the out-group's expressions of shame and pride predicted the difference in game variables between Phases 1 and 2, a

significant regression equation was found for these expressions as predictors of difference in total tickets, $F(2,27) = 10.94$, $p < .001$, $R^2_{adj.} = .42$, with shame being the only significant predictor. However, both shame and pride were significant predictors of all other game measures, for which the regression and standardized regression coefficients are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3.
B and beta values for prediction of differences in game measure scores between Phase 1 and Phase 2 by outgroup expression of shame and pride (Study 8).

	(Constant)		Shame			Pride		
	B	SE B	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Tickets	-7.49	8.62	5.51	1.47	.57**	-2.92	1.80	-.25
Node Exit	-.52	.58	.51	.10	.65**	-.31	.12	-.32*
Steals	-.86	.75	-.37	.13	-.42**	.53	.16	.49**
Coop Moves	.03	.14	.09	.02	.53**	-.09	.03	-.43**

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$

Discussion

My aim in Study 8 was to allow groups of participants to play the Centipede Game naturally, without any experimental manipulation, and to examine whether the communication of the extent to which groups reported feeling proud, guilty, or ashamed was associated with game behaviour in Phase 2. Several features of the results show that this was the case. The fact that behaviour in Phase 1 was not significantly related to behaviour in Phase 2 suggests that the communication of emotion between the two phases had an impact. The fact that there were many significant associations between the emotions expressed by the opposing group and the difference scores between Phases 1 and 2 game behaviours is consistent with the argument that expressing these emotions had an impact on how the game was played. It was predicted that the expression of pride following competitive

behaviour would be associated with more competitive behaviour in Phase 2, and that the expression of guilt and shame would be associated with more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2. Both predictions were supported by the results.

The most important finding of this study in relation to intergroup reconciliation is that the expression of both guilt and shame were associated with more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2 in comparison to Phase 1. These emotions were expressed when there had been uncooperative behaviour in Phase 1 and their expression was associated with a more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2. This is consistent with De Melo et al. (2009) and van der Schalk et al. (2015), who showed that the expression of a negative self-conscious emotion following a transgression increases cooperation in economic games. Also shown in this study was that the shame expression appears to be the stronger of the two negative self-conscious emotions in predicting cooperation: the expression of shame had a significant negative association with number of steals, which was not the case with the expression of guilt. This is not a new finding in intergroup scenarios. Giner-Sorolla et al. (2009) found that the expression of shame can be more helpful and less insulting than the expression of guilt in intergroup scenarios. The results from the present study, together with the findings of Giner-Sorolla et al. (2009), suggest that shame is a more effective emotion to express than guilt when aiming to repair relationships.

A counter-productive emotion to express, from the perspective of intergroup relationship repair, is pride. The expression of pride between the two phases was associated with a significantly less cooperation in Phase 2. This is largely

due to the fact that when one group expressed pride, the group that received that expression tended to steal more in the subsequent rounds. It may be that competitive behaviour towards groups that expressed pride is due to the pride-expressing group being untrustworthy or it could be that pride-expressing groups were being punished. If the latter is the case, it suggests that expressions of pride may have been interpreted as a form of boasting, or hubris, as mentioned by Verbeke et al. (2004) and Wubben et al., (2012), which would help to explain why the receiving group wanted to exact some form of revenge. This finding shows that emotion communication can hinder and damage relationships just as easily as it can repair them.

A limitation of this study is the small sample size. It was considered important to collect and analyse behaviour at the group level, rather than analysing individual-level data, but this methodology does limit the statistical power of the study. A further limitation of this study is that emotion expressions may have been made in relation to different behaviours. For example, pride may have been expressed in relation to having done well in the game by being competitive, but it may also have been expressed in relation to having been cooperative, which could also have resulted in doing well in the game. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the motivations underlying the emotion expressions. I attempt to address both of these limitations in Study 9.

Study 9

Although Study 8 establishes that intergroup repair is possible following group-serving behaviour in the Centipede Game, it demonstrates this in a general

way, with a variety of strategies possibly being used. In Study 9, I aimed to constrain the number of strategies. Controlling the behaviour of one group through computer simulation of the group's decisions and communications made it possible to have the group perform in a uniformly uncooperative way and then express exactly the same degree of either a positively or negatively valenced self-conscious emotion.

With regard to the self-conscious emotion expressed by the group, I decided to limit this to either pride or shame. The results of Study 8 suggested that shame expression is more strongly associated with the subsequent behaviour of the receiving group. Shame and guilt ratings were also highly correlated. I therefore dropped expressions of guilt from Study 9, and decided instead to include a no-emotion control condition in order to explore how the receiving group would behave in the absence of any expression of self-conscious emotion.

Because the results of Study 8 suggested that there was a tendency for groups to steal from groups that expressed pride, I also decided to include a measure of altruistic punishment at the end of the game. The purpose was to gain a better insight into the motivations of the groups that reacted to pride expressions by cooperating less. Previous research has shown that altruistic punishment is related to levels of anger and other negative emotions (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). After the out-group's selfish behaviour in the Phase 1 and its subsequent expression of pride, an in-group might simply mistrust the out-group, which should be reflected in uncooperative game behaviour but little tendency to engage in altruistic punishment; alternatively, the in-group might be angry about the out-group's behaviour, and therefore be willing to give up some of

its own tickets in order to punish the out-group. This also enabled me to explore whether the specific effects of pride and shame exacerbate or alleviate these feelings, relative to the control group. Although this measure of altruistic punishment could be construed as measuring 'spite', spite is generally conceptualised as involving an intention to hurt others (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). This does not necessarily involve self-sacrifice, which is the key component of any index of altruistic punishment. It is therefore reasonable to regard the measure used in the current study as a measure of altruistic punishment: punishment of another or others that is costly to the self or ingroup (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

I again predicted that the expression of shame following non-cooperation in Phase 1 would lead to more cooperation in Phase 2 than would a no emotion control condition. I also predicted that the expression of pride following non-cooperation in Phase 1 would lead to less cooperation in Phase 2 than would a no emotion control condition. Finally, I expected that the expression of pride after uncooperative behaviour in Phase 1 would give rise to greater altruistic punishment following Phase 2 than would be observed in either the shame or control conditions.

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and sixty-eight participants (141 female, 27 male; mean age = 19.58) took part in this study. They were psychology undergraduates who participated in exchange for partial course credit. The study had a fully between-

subjects design comprising three conditions, with groups randomly allocated to one of them. The materials used were the same as Study 8, except for the communicative interaction phase, where the expressed emotions were pre-determined.

The minimum number of groups required to reveal a significant difference between pride and shame expressions was determined by power analysis (G*power 3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The average value of the correlation coefficients for the associations of pride and shame with each game variable difference score in Study 8 was $r = .595$. This corresponds to a large f -effect size of .74. To detect an effect of this size in main effects with 95% confidence and with a significance level of .05, at least 35 groups would be needed. In Study 9, 56 groups were used.

Manipulation

Emotion Expression. In the interactive communication stage, the participant groups received an expression of pride or an expression of shame, or were in the control condition in which they were told that emotion ratings would not be shared between groups. Those in the pride condition received ratings reflecting a high score for pride (5 on a 1-6 scale) and a low score for shame (2 on a 1-6 scale). These ratings were reversed for groups in the shame condition (i.e., scores of 2 for pride and 5 for shame).

Measures

Game Behaviours. The same game variables were recorded as in Study 8: total tickets won, average node exit, number of steals, and percentage of cooperative moves made. These variables were recorded for the games in Phase 2. No variables were recorded in Phase 1 because all groups were exposed to the same pattern of play from the pre-programmed opponent group.

Prosocial Behaviour: A composite variable was created using the average z-score for average node exit, the inverse of number of steals, and the percentage of cooperative moves made.

Altruistic Punishment. Following Phase 2, group members were asked to respond individually to the question “If you could give up any number of your group’s tickets to remove double that amount of your opponents’ tickets, how many tickets would you give up?”. Responses were made by writing down the number of tickets participants were prepared to give up. This variable was operationalized as a percentage score of the total tickets attained by the group.

Procedure

On signing up to the study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire under the impression that their responses would determine their group membership, which was in fact allocated randomly. When they arrived in the lab they were left in a waiting room until all six participants had arrived. They were then divided into two groups of three, given the impression that the two groups would play against each other, and led into two separate rooms with computers that were ready to play the “Intergroup Cooperation Game”. Groups read the instructions for the game and played one practice game against a computer

program in which they saw the computer make both one cooperative move and one steal. Group members were then asked to ensure that they understood how the game worked before participating in the first game with the 'other group'. After two games in which the programmed opponent group ended the game at the earliest opportunity, there was an interval during which participants completed the felt emotion measures. The experimental groups then received what appeared to be the opponents' emotion ratings. Next, Phase 2 commenced, in which all groups completed two further games, but now the opponent group was programmed to cooperate at every move. This was followed by the altruistic punishment measure, before the two groups came together again to be debriefed.

Results

A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality showed that all dependent variables were non-normally distributed (all $ps < .001$). Non-parametric statistical tests were therefore used to analyse the data.

Effect of Emotion Expression on Game Variables and Prosocial Behaviour

The means and standard deviations for all group-level dependent variables are shown in Table 4.4. Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that emotion condition had significant effects on all game variables. Regarding overall tickets won, $H(2) = 15.52$, $p < .001$, Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that the shame condition differed significantly from both the pride condition ($p < .001$, $d = 1.47$) and the control condition ($p = .043$, $d = .97$). The difference between the pride and control conditions was not statistically significant ($p = .079$, $d = .55$). Thus groups in the shame condition gained significantly more tickets ($M = 17.79$) than did those in the

pride ($M = 11.68$) or control ($M = 14.11$) conditions. Although similar patterns of means were observed for average node exit, $H(2) = 15.86$, $p < .001$, number of steals, $H(2) = 8.68$, $p = .013$, percentage of moves that were cooperative, $H(2) = 15.76$, $p < .001$, and the composite prosocial behaviour measure, $H(2) = 15.41$, $p < .001$, Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc adjustments showed that the only significant pairwise differences for these variables were those between the shame and pride conditions, with the control condition not differing from either of the other two conditions. In all cases, groups in the shame condition behaved in a significantly more cooperative way than did those in the pride condition.

Effect of Emotion Expression on Altruistic Punishment

The means and standard deviations for this dependent variable are also shown in Table 4.4. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that emotion condition had a significant effect on the percentage of tickets participants were willing to use to punish the opponent group, $H(2) = 26.18$, $p < .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that all three conditions differed significantly from each other. Those in the shame condition ($M = 2.89$) punished the uncooperative group significantly less than those in the received pride condition ($M = 14.66$, $p < .001$, $d = .95$) and those in the control condition ($M = 7.56$, $p = .037$, $d = .49$). Those in the pride condition punished the other group more than those in the control condition ($p = .033$, $d = .51$).

Table 4.4.
Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Measures in Study 9, by Condition

	Control	Pride	Shame
Tickets gained	14.11 (4.09)	11.68 (4.73)	17.79 (3.46)
Average node exit	3.00 (1.14)	2.32 (1.10)	3.92 (.99)
Number of steals	1.50 (.71)	1.84 (.50)	1.21 (.79)
Percent cooperative moves	45.78 (33.06)	23.16 (29.70)	67.53 (27.67)
Prosocial Behaviour	-.01 (.92)	-.57 (.77)	.58 (.84)
Altruistic Punishment - Percentage tickets used to punish opposing group	7.56 (11.34)	14.66 (15.95)	2.89 (7.25)

Discussion

The aim of Study 9 was to explore the impact of shame and pride expressions following uncooperative behaviour in the Centipede Game. It was predicted that the expression of shame would lead to more cooperation following a transgression and that the expression of pride would lead to less cooperation. There was a good measure of support for these predictions.

The results of Study 9 show that the expression of shame led to greater cooperation. Groups in the shame condition finished with more tickets than did groups in both the pride and the control conditions. This shows that expressing

shame is not only more effective in repairing the relationship between groups than is expressing pride, but also more effective than not expressing any emotion.

Although the differences between the shame and control conditions were not consistently significant, as was also the case for the differences between the pride and control conditions, the observed pattern of means was highly consistent across measures and also consistent with our predictions.

A limitation of Study 9 is that the expression of pride and shame could be regarded as confounded with each other to some degree. A group that expresses pride about its decision making is unlikely to express shame; likewise, a group that expresses shame about its decision making is unlikely to express pride. Thus the extent to which these conditions are orthogonal can be questioned. Although there is no empirical evidence from the current study to address this issue, the ratings collected in Study 8 show that although expressions of pride were indeed negatively correlated with expressions of shame, $r = .44$, $p = .023$, this correlation is not large enough to conclude that these expressions are simply opposites. The presence of one does not necessarily mean the absence of the other.

The results of Study 9 also shed further light on why groups in the pride condition reacted by being less cooperative. Members of groups in the pride condition were more willing to engage in costly punishment of the opposing group than were groups in the shame or control conditions. This is consistent with the view that expressing pride following uncooperative behaviour was not only seen as uncooperative, giving rise to less cooperation in subsequent games, but was also potentially perceived as anti-social and therefore increased the tendency to engage

in altruistic punishment, presumably in an effort to persuade the offending group to abide by social norms.

General Discussion

The aim of this research was to investigate whether emotion expression in an intergroup economic game can lead to relationship repair following transgression. The Centipede Game was used because it is a sequential, multi-round game, in which levels of trust could fluctuate. It also provided a good opportunity to implement an interactive communication stage, which helped in establishing whether emotional communication influences motivations and behaviour in an intergroup setting. Across both Studies 8 and 9, there was support for the notion that emotion expressions impact intergroup relationships, both by showing ways in which expression of negative emotions can repair relationships, and also by showing how expression of positive emotions can hinder intergroup cooperation.

Both Studies 8 and 9 show that relationship repair via emotion expression is possible. In Study 8 I found that both guilt and shame expressions were associated with more cooperative actions when the Centipede Game was played in an unconstrained setting. In Study 9 I found that receiving an expression of shame following a transgression led to more cooperation than receiving an expression of pride or receiving no emotion information at all. These findings show that improving intergroup relationships through emotional expression is possible.

Considering guilt and shame specifically, previous research has suggested that they are distinct emotions, serving different functions (Schmader & Lickel,

2006; Tracy & Robins, 2006). However, both are negative self-conscious emotions and were associated with greater intergroup cooperation in Study 8. Previous research had shown that the experience of guilt, but not shame, leads to improved relationships in economic games. Study 8 shows that the expression of shame was more strongly associated with cooperative behaviour (the reduction of stealing moves in particular) than was the expression of guilt, and Study 9 shows that the expression of shame is effective in relationship repair in intergroup scenarios.

Although both studies point to the positive effect that shame can have, it should be noted that these are intergroup settings and that shame expression may not be as effective in interpersonal scenarios. It may also be the case that the experience of shame in interpersonal settings is less functional than is the expression of this emotion in an intergroup context.

The expression of pride had consistent effects in Studies 8 and 9. In Study 8 it was shown that the expression of pride was associated with less cooperation and a higher chance of being stolen from. Study 9 showed that pride expressions lead to something over and above less cooperation. As well as the expression of pride giving rise to uncooperative behaviour, there was also a larger chance of being punished after expressing it. This suggests that the expression of pride not only hinders relationship repair, but also motivates those who receive it to engage in altruistic punishment. It could be that the observation of pride after being uncooperative leads to anger, which would explain both being less cooperative in response but also being motivated to punish the pride-expressing group.

In both studies it is clear that past behaviour by a group is not the only factor that shapes subsequent intergroup behaviour: The emotions expressed by the group can also have a significant impact, consistent with what would be expected on the basis of theoretical models such as social appraisal (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) and Emotions as Social Information (EASI; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Members of a group that has been treated badly by an out-group do not act towards that group solely on the basis of its behaviour; they also make inferences about the appraisals and intentions of the out-group, and are readier to cooperate with the out-group if it appears to be ashamed of its actions than if it expresses pride, or in the absence of any emotional communication.

To conclude, these studies show that emotion expressions do impact behaviour in an economic game, the Centipede Game. I have demonstrated the positive impact of expressing negative self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame, as well as the negative impact of expressing the positive self-conscious emotion of pride. I started this chapter by noting that repairing relationships is a common occurrence in everyday life, but that previous research suggests that this is much more difficult to achieve in intergroup settings. The present studies show that emotional expression can play an important role in repairing intergroup relationships and in particular that expressing shame about a transgression can improve intergroup cooperation following a transgression

Chapter 5

Step by Step: Testing the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies

Civil wars that end through progressive negotiation and interaction are twice as likely to reignite, compared to wars that end through victory for one side (Toft, 2010). This stark fact suggests that reconciliation attempts between groups often fail. Despite this apparent lack of effectiveness of reconciliation, the use of intergroup apologies in an effort to achieve reconciliation is becoming more frequent. The increase in large-scale apologies being delivered by countries, political parties, businesses and corporations has led to the suggestion that we have entered an 'age of apology' (Brooks, 1999). Such apologies are offered for both current and historical transgressions in an effort to improve intergroup relations. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that these apologies do improve such relations. The present research uses a recent model of intergroup reconciliation, the Staircase Model (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011) to examine the conditions under which intergroup apologies are most likely to be effective.

An intergroup apology is one that is offered in a group-to-group context and differs from an interpersonal apology in that the latter is offered from one individual to another. Research shows that interpersonal apologies are often effective in eliciting forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Riek & Mania, 2011). The effectiveness of interpersonal apologies in promoting forgiveness has led to the assumption that intergroup apologies should have similar effects. For example, Tavuchis (1991) argued that apologies should be seen as a panacea for

repairing relationships, regardless of whether they are interpersonal or intergroup in nature.

Indeed, there is some evidence that intergroup apologies can be effective. As noted earlier in this thesis, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) found that an apology offered to university students from a group of university professors who had written an article in a local newspaper criticizing student lifestyle was more effective in gaining forgiveness than not offering an apology. There are also findings from research conducted in the context of more violent conflict to suggest that an intergroup apology can reduce motivations for revenge and avoidance (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that intergroup apologies can increase perceptions of perpetrator remorsefulness and that they usually leave the victim group feeling more satisfied (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008).

However, other findings suggest that recipients of an intergroup apology feel ambivalent and that increased perceptions of perpetrator remorsefulness often fail to translate into forgiveness (Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2015). In fact, there is surprisingly little evidence that intergroup apologies lead to true intergroup forgiveness. For example, Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman (2013) found that although intergroup apologies were regarded positively, victims were generally pessimistic about genuine improvements in intergroup relations. Thus intergroup apologies often seem to fail to achieve what they are intended to achieve.

It is therefore important to understand what it is about intergroup apologies that stops them from achieving forgiveness, in order that reconciliation attempts can be modified to take account of these factors. There have been suggestions that

intergroup apologies cannot be trusted, perhaps because intergroup situations are characterized by greater competition and fear, leading to mistrust (Halabi, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2012; Insko et al., 1988). By definition, in the case of an interpersonal apology the recipient needs to put his or her trust in another individual, whereas in the case of intergroup apology one or more persons have to trust many other individuals. This provides a relatively straightforward reason why intergroup apologies are less likely to succeed. A further point is that it is commonly thought that intergroup apologies are self-serving and insincere, and that there is no genuine concern for the victim group (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009); rather, the apology is offered to make the perpetrating group feel better about the situation. It follows that increasing the perceived trustworthiness and sincerity of an intergroup apology is likely to be pivotal to its success.

Potential reasons why intergroup apologies are problematic with respect to sincerity and trust arise not from the apology itself, but from the actions and behaviour surrounding it. Perpetrator groups may believe (or be thought to believe) that the offering of an apology can 'close the book' on the past, leaving the wrongdoing(s) forgotten (Corntassel & Holder, 2008). This creates the impression that there will be no further actions based on what is said in the apology. Such an impression would presumably lead to these apologies being regarded as untrustworthy and insincere. One way of alleviating this concern would be to make concrete promises about changes in behaviour. The effectiveness of an apology based on promised behavioural changes should be enhanced by trust-building interactions between the perpetrator or victim groups before the actual apology is delivered. This assertion is supported by Nadler (2012, p. 294) who describes the

outcome of positive intergroup reconciliation as “Trustworthy positive relations between former adversaries who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equality-based social environment.”

Previous accounts of intergroup reconciliation typically treat it as an outcome to be sought, rather than as part of a process. Treating reparative intergroup interactions as a multi-stage process, in which the apology is just one component, could help us to understand how impressions that intergroup apologies are self-serving and insincere can be avoided. Given the apparently low efficacy of intergroup apologies when taken in isolation, it makes sense to support them with other actions, both before and after the apology is delivered.

The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies

The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl et al., 2011) is a framework that seeks to identify the context in which intergroup apologies are effective. It sets out a series of steps (or ‘stairs’), starting with the perpetrating group’s acceptance of collective guilt and its willingness to set history records straight, and is structured in such a way that each successive step should bring about an improvement in intergroup relations, thereby gaining enough momentum to proceed to the next step. Wohl and colleagues claim that each step provides a foundation for subsequent steps, creating genuine intergroup communication and trust-building. The five steps are as follows: accepting collective guilt, setting straight the records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup apology, and post-apology engagement. To my knowledge, the model has not yet been tested empirically for its effectiveness in promoting reconciliation. Despite the

original article suggesting that the Staircase Model is a framework that may not need to be tested, I argue that the premise and structure of the model offer a novel and interesting way to explore a process perspective on intergroup reconciliation. The present research was designed to provide a test of the model and to investigate the effectiveness of viewing an apology as a part of a broader reconciliatory process, as opposed to as a 'stand-alone' tool to achieve an outcome.

Accepting collective guilt provides a moral foundation and entails the perpetrator group accepting its responsibility for what has happened. *Setting straight the records of history* allows the two groups to arrive at a shared interpretation of events, and also enables victims to be heard, understood and validated. *Discussing reparations* marks the beginnings of repair, and establishes a shared understanding of what resources are likely to be needed to put matters right. *Intergroup apology* is the key communicative step; it involves the expressions of regret and provides a validation for the victims. *Post-apology engagement* is designed to promote genuine reconciliation and harmony between the groups. The idea here is that promises of reparation are not the same as reparation; for genuine forgiveness, the perpetrators need to demonstrate through actions that they have changed.

Overview of the Studies

The aim of the three studies reported below was to apply the Staircase Model to examples of historical conflicts. In the first study the Staircase Model was applied to a border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that took place in 2008. Here participants acted as third-party observers, and their perceptions of the

perpetrating group were recorded. In the second study the Staircase Model was applied to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland that took place between the 1970s and 1990s and involved sustained conflict between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government and army. Here the (British) participants were persons who were adults at the time of The Troubles. They therefore had a closer involvement in the events being described. This proximity to the conflict was increased in the third study, where again the Staircase Model was applied to 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, but this time using a Northern Irish sample.

All studies used a variation of an additive procedure to introduce the different steps of the Staircase Model. In Step 1 participants learned that the perpetrating group recognized that they were to blame and accepted collective guilt. Step 2 described an agreement between the two groups about the documenting of the events, as well as members of both groups participating in the drawing up of this agreement. Step 3 provided information that the perpetrating group promised to disarm, promised compensation to those affected, and promised to ensure the safety of the victim group. Step 4 included an intergroup apology, in the form of a public statement, the structure and content of this apology being modeled on a real apology given by an IRA spokesperson (*The Guardian*, 2002). Step 5 included details of reparations, such as compensation, being delivered, and the sending of flowers and representatives to a service of remembrance. In all studies, there was also a control condition in which participants were simply told that there had been no contact between the perpetrating and victim groups.

In the absence of previous empirical tests of the model, my predictions are derived directly from the structure of the model. With each additive step in the model, there should at least be a progressive increase in positive perceptions of the perpetrator group. There should also be a progressive decrease in negative emotions felt towards the perpetrator group. It is predicted that the intergroup apology, because it is not presented in isolation, but rather is part of a broader reconciliatory process, will have a significant positive effect on forgiveness. However, it is also anticipated, given that each step involves different content, that the steps may have differential effects on these outcome variables, such that some steps have a greater influence on certain outcomes than those that precede or follow them. Below all measures, manipulations and exclusions used in all three studies are reported.

All three studies followed the same format, in which there are six conditions (1 control condition and 5 conditions relating to the Staircase Model). To estimate the required sample size, I conducted a power analysis. I powered the studies to have a good chance of detecting effects that are medium-to-large in size. G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that to have an 80% chance of detecting a large effect size ($F = .40$) a sample size of 90 would be required (15 per cell), and that to have an 80% chance of detecting a medium effect size ($F = .25$) a sample size of 216 would be required (36 per cell). The cell sizes of the present studies ranged between 19 and 39, and were not increased after any data analysis took place. It should also be noted that all measures, manipulations and exclusions related to these studies are reported. All studies reported in this chapter were approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.01.12.4441).

Study 10

The context chosen for Study 10 was a border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, a real-life conflict that came about after a long dispute over ownership of the land on which the Preah Vihear Temple is located. The temple was situated within Cambodia's borders but in the summer of 2008, 50 Thai troops entered Cambodia, occupying the district surrounding the temple. This military intervention resulted in 41 deaths, several of them being Cambodian civilians. In 2013, the International Court of Justice was forced to step in, declaring that Thai troops should leave the area because the temple was located in Cambodian territory. The Staircase Model was applied to Thailand's attempts to apologize for its transgression and achieve reconciliation with Cambodia.

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and nineteen psychology students (14 males & 105 females; mean age of 19.89) participated for course credit. The study had a fully between-subjects design. There were six conditions, corresponding to the 5 steps of the Staircase Model plus a control condition. Participants were randomly allocated to one of these conditions. An attention check was used, in the form of a question asking participants "How many deaths were thought to have been caused as a result of the Thai military intervention?" All participants passed this check.

Manipulation

Staircase Model Manipulation. The control condition was labelled Step 0; here participants were given a basic description of the events of the conflict and told that there had been no contact between Cambodia and Thailand since the conflict. If assigned to Step 1, participants also read the relevant transcript. If assigned to Step 2, participants would read the transcript for Step 1, followed by the transcript for Step 2. This additive process continued to Step 5, where participants read all transcripts. Full versions of the transcripts can be found in Appendix 15.

Measures

Forgiveness. This construct was measured in two ways. A single item, “After reading this, do you think Thailand should be forgiven?” was responded to using binary ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options. This was followed by an adapted version of the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). This 18-item measure assesses forgiveness and consists of subscales measuring avoidance, revenge, and benevolence motivations. Trim-18 was originally designed as an interpersonal forgiveness measure; for the current research the items were adapted to be group related. The adapted version of the measure can be found in Appendix 2. Responses to the items were made using 5-point response scales (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The Cronbach’s alpha was high for all three subscales: Avoidance ($\alpha = .84$), Revenge ($\alpha = .74$), and Benevolence ($\alpha = .78$).

Positive Perceptions. Four single-item questions were used to assess positive perceptions of the perpetrator group. These items assessed the perceived *sincerity*, *remorsefulness*, *trustworthiness*, and *believability* of the group. As with the forgiveness measure, responses were made using a 5-point response scale from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree.' The Cronbach's alpha for this measure was .80.

Emotion Measures. Single-item questions were used to assess how participants felt towards the perpetrator group after reading the transcript. These items related to feelings of *anger*, *fear*, *sadness*, and *disgust*. Again, they were responded to using a 5-point scale from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree.'

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to endorse an on-screen consent form. Next, demographic measures were completed. The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: description of the Cambodia/Thailand conflict, attention check, Staircase Model manipulation, binary measure of forgiveness and then, in random order, the Trim-18, positive perceptions items, and emotion items (with items within each set also presented in random order). After completing these measures, participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results

There were no significant associations between the demographic variables and any of the dependent measures. To investigate the association between the Staircase Model manipulation and the binary forgiveness item, a chi-square analysis was computed. The effect of the manipulation on the Trim-18, positive perceptions, and emotion variables was analyzed using a series of one-way ANOVAs, with condition (step 0 through step 5) as the factor. To avoid alpha level inflation, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were used to follow up any significant effects.

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness (i.e., 'yes' responses) was 71.42%. Although a chi-square analysis showed that the association between the steps of the Staircase Model and responses to the binary measure of forgiveness was not significant, $\chi^2(5) = 6.86, p = .231$, there is a significant linear-by-linear association $\chi^2(1) = 5.98, p = .014$, showing that the odds of forgiveness increase with increasing steps of the model. This is borne out when inspecting the data, in that there are more 'yes' responses in all conditions, relative to the control condition, and the percentage of such responses is noticeably higher (> 80%) in the later steps (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1
Binary forgiveness rates for each step of the Staircase Model (Study 10).

Step Number	Binary Forgiveness Rate
0	55.00%
1	65.00%
2	63.16%
3	80.95%
4	80.00%
5	84.21%

However, contrary to prediction, condition did not have a significant main effect on any of the Trim-18 subscales (Avoidance, $F(5, 113) = .87, p = .507, \eta_p^2 = .04$; Revenge, $F(5, 113) = .51, p = .772, \eta_p^2 = .02$; Benevolence, $F(5, 113) = .74, p = .595, \eta_p^2 = .03$). Means and standard deviations for each step, both for the total measure and the subscales are shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales, at each step of the Staircase Model (Study 10).

Step Number	Avoidance	Revenge	Benevolence
0	2.72 (.46)	2.06 (.64)	3.68 (.41)
1	2.49 (.62)	1.99 (.72)	3.83 (.57)
2	2.33 (.60)	2.00 (.58)	3.92 (.42)
3	2.35 (.73)	2.14 (.51)	3.90 (.60)
4	2.51 (.86)	1.99 (.61)	3.89 (.51)
5	2.44 (.74)	2.22 (.48)	3.96 (.62)

Positive Perceptions

Means and standard deviations for positive perceptions of the perpetrator group at each step are shown in Table 5.3. There was a significant main effect of condition on positive perceptions, $F(5, 113) = 9.29, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .29$. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests showed that all conditions apart from step 1 resulted in significantly higher scores than Step 0, the control condition. Step 5, the final step, also led to significantly higher scores than Steps 1 ($p = .007$) and 2 ($p = .050$).

Table 5.3

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and the measured emotions each step of the Staircase Model (Study 10).

Step Number	Positive Perceptions	Anger	Fear	Sadness	Disgust
0	2.74 (.56)	4.70 (.57)	3.65 (1.27)	3.90 (1.02)	3.95 (.76)
1	3.20 (.61)	3.30 (1.42)	3.65 (1.14)	3.90 (.97)	4.05 (1.00)
2	3.30 (.54)	3.26 (.81)	3.16 (1.02)	3.47 (.96)	4.05 (.85)
3	3.60 (.52)	3.14 (.79)	2.10 (.89)	3.67 (.80)	3.67 (1.46)
4	3.63 (.59)	3.05 (1.15)	2.40 (1.19)	3.80 (.77)	2.50 (1.05)
5	3.87 (.67)	2.58 (.84)	2.11 (1.20)	3.42 (1.26)	2.58 (1.22)

Emotion Variables

Means and standard deviations for all emotion variables at each step are shown in Table 5.3. Condition had a significant effect on anger, $F(5, 113) = 10.77$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .32$, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that all steps led to significantly lower scores than did Step 0, the control condition. Thus applying the first step of the Staircase Model resulted in a significant decrease in anger levels, as can be seen in Figure 5.1.

Condition also had a significant effect on fear, $F(5, 113) = 8.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .28$, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that Steps 3, 4, and 5 all led to significantly lower scores than steps 0 and 1. This indicates that although there

was no significant decrease in fear levels after Steps 1 and 2, there was a significant decrease after Step 3, which involves the discussion of reparations, as can be seen in Figure 5.2.

There was also a significant main effect of condition on disgust, $F(5, 113) = 8.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .28$, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that Steps 4 and 5 led to significantly lower scores than did any of the other conditions. This indicates that disgust levels only decreased significantly after Step 4, the intergroup apology, as can be seen in Figure 5.3.

Condition did not have a significant effect on sadness $F(5, 113) = .90, p = .481, \eta_p^2 = .04$, as can be seen in Figure 5.4.

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


Figure 5.1. Mean anger ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each step of the Staircase Model.




Figure 5.2. Mean fear ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each step of the Staircase Model.




Figure 5.3. Mean disgust ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each step of the Staircase Model




Figure 5.4. Mean sadness ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each step of the Staircase Model.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to conduct an initial empirical test of the Staircase Model by examining how its application to an international reconciliation attempt influenced the perceptions of persons who were not directly involved in the conflict. It was predicted that proceeding through steps in the model would have positive effects on forgiveness, intergroup perceptions, and emotions. The predictions were partly supported. Being exposed to the steps of the model had positive effects on a binary measure of forgiveness, on perceptions of the perpetrating group, and on emotions. However, there was no significant effect on the multi-item subscale measuring forgiveness motivations of avoidance, revenge, or benevolence.

Focusing first on the supportive evidence, the findings show that a sequentially structured attempt to achieve intergroup reconciliation can increase positive perceptions of the perpetrator group (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008), reflecting significant increases in perceptions of sincerity, remorse, trust, and believability. This finding is important because any increase in these perceptions should be helpful in combatting the tendency to regard intergroup apologies as 'self-serving' (Blatz et al., 2009).

A possible limitation of this study is that any effects shown could have resulted purely from the increasing provision of information about the conflict and its aftermath, with the specific location of each step in the sequence not being necessary to achieve the observed benefits. However, there are aspects of the results that suggest that the sequence in which information about reconciliation attempts is provided was important. For example, a significant

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reduction in fear was only seen after step 3, when reparations were discussed, and fear remained low from this point onwards. Similarly, disgust levels only reduced at step 4, after the intergroup apology, and remained low after the next step, the post-apology engagement. These findings suggest that different steps address different needs, as predicted by the model, and at the very least that the steps in combination help to increase the success of the reconciliation attempt. Showing that the model has different effects at different steps serves to support the structure of the model.

Turning now to the results that were inconsistent with the predictions, it was surprising that the subscales of the Trim-18 were not significantly influenced by the manipulation. A possible reason for this is that the Trim-18 was originally designed to assess the motivations of individuals who are victims of an interpersonal transgression. The fact that participants in the current study were not themselves victims of the conflict may have made it harder for them to respond to items about specific motivations. Participants who do not themselves feel victimized by a conflict may not be motivated to avoid, be vengeful, or even to forgive; alternatively, they may not feel that it is their place to make such judgments. One way to test this explanation would be to apply the model to a conflict in which participants have a closer connection with the events in question, even if they do not themselves belong to the victim group. This is what I set out to do in Study 11.

Study 11

Study 11 used the context of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, and more specifically the role played by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in that conflict.

Because participants in this study were adults living in mainland Britain, IRA attacks on Britain and on British identity were emphasized in the research materials describing the 'The Troubles.' Participants in this study had to be over the age of 35, meaning that they would have been at least 18 years old when the 'Good Friday Agreement' that brought an end to the intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland was signed, in 1998. This measure was taken with the aim of ensuring that participants would have first-hand memories of at least some of the events referred to in the study. After reading a description of 'The Troubles,' participants were told that an inquiry had established that the IRA is still in existence today, although its members maintain that they are committed to peaceful protest only. This was followed by the Staircase Model manipulation, in which participants were exposed to statements made by current IRA members about the group's past.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and thirty-five participants (115 males & 120 females; mean age of 52.32) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled a sample of participants to be chosen based on age (> 35 years) and location (mainland Britain). Similar to Study 10, this study had a fully between-subjects design comprising six conditions, with participants randomly allocated to one of them.

Although 280 participants started the survey, some were excluded before finishing because they did not provide consent ($n = 8$), failed an attention check ($n = 20$), or simply did not finish the study ($n = 17$). The attention check was included to

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ensure that participants paid careful attention to information written in the transcripts they were given.

Manipulation

Staircase Model Manipulation: As in Study 10, participants were randomly allocated to conditions that corresponded to a step number in the Staircase Model. The transcripts for these different steps are available in Appendix 16.

Measures

Forgiveness. The forgiveness measures were the same as those used in Study 10. Thus, there was one binary measure with the item was, “After reading this, do you think the IRA should be forgiven?” with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options; and the multi-item Trim-18 Scale (McCullough et al., 2006). The Cronbach’s alphas for the motivation subscales were again high: Avoidance ($\alpha = .89$), Revenge ($\alpha = .86$) and Benevolence ($\alpha = .91$).

Positive Perceptions: The single-item questions and response scales assessing perceptions of the perpetrating group were the same as those used in Study 10.

Emotion Measures: The single-item questions and response scales assessing emotions felt towards the perpetrator group were asked twice: once after the description of the IRA’s actions during ‘The Troubles,’ but before the manipulation; and a second time, after the condition manipulation. The emotion items were the same as those used in Study 10.

Demographics: To control for the possible influence of confounding variables, participants were asked their religion, their knowledge of 'The Troubles' and the IRA, whether they had any Irish relatives, and whether they or their family had been affected by either The Troubles or the IRA, either directly or indirectly.

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Next, they completed demographic measures. The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: first came the description of 'The Troubles' and role of the IRA, then the attention check, followed by the Staircase Model manipulation, the discrete measure of forgiveness, and then a random ordering of the Trim-18, positive perception items, and emotion items (with items within each set also presented in a random order). Participants were then thanked and debriefed.

Results

The association between condition and responses to the binary forgiveness measure was analyzed using chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the Trim-18 measure, including its subscales, and positive perceptions was analyzed using a series of one-way ANOVAs. To protect against alpha inflation, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were used to follow up significant effects. The emotion variables were analyzed with a repeated-measures ANOVA, with the Staircase condition as the between-subjects factor and time as the within-subjects factor.

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There was a significant relationship between age and self-reported sadness (at time 2), with older respondents reporting greater sadness after the staircase manipulation ($r = .14, p = .039$). Therefore, age was controlled for when analyzing the sadness measures. There were no other significant associations with demographic variables, including the variables regarding religion, knowledge of 'the Troubles,' whether or not respondents had Irish relatives, and whether or not participants or their families had been affected by 'The Troubles' or the IRA.

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness rating (i.e., 'yes' responses) was 47.66%. The overall chi-square analysis showed that there was a significant association between step of the Staircase Model and how people responded to this measure, $\chi^2(5) = 12.35, p = .030$. Table 5.4 shows a clear trend for forgiveness rates to increase with increasing step numbers, rising from 28.21% in Step 0 to 64.10% in Step 5.

Table 5.4
Binary forgiveness rates for each step of the Staircase Model (Study 11).

Step Number	Binary Forgiveness Rate
0	28.21%
1	41.03%
2	45.00%
3	51.28%
4	56.41%
5	64.10%

The Staircase Model had a significant main effect on avoidance motivations of the Trim-18, $F(5, 229) = 5.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that Step 0 had significantly higher avoidance scores than all of the other steps. There was no significant main effect on the revenge subscale, $F(5, 229) = 1.72, p = .131, \eta_p^2 = .04$, or the benevolence subscale, $F(5, 229) = 2.12, p = .063, \eta_p^2 = .04$, although the latter effect approached significance. The means and standard deviations for the full measure and the three subscales at each step can be seen in Table 5.5.

Positive Perceptions

There was a significant main effect of the Staircase Model on positive perceptions of the perpetrator, $F(5, 229) = 4.92, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that Steps 2 ($p = .002$), 3 ($p = .010$), 4 ($p = .002$), and 5 ($p = .002$) all led to significantly more positive perceptions in comparison to Step 0. The means and standard deviations for the perpetrator perception variables can be found in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5

Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales and positive perceptions of the perpetrator group at each step of the Staircase Model (Study 11).

Step Number	Avoidance	Revenge	Benevolence	Positive Perceptions
0	3.33 (.82)	2.66 (.87)	3.15 (1.02)	2.04 (.78)
1	2.91 (.68)	2.29 (.70)	3.61 (.57)	2.51 (.83)
2	2.65 (.73)	2.30 (.90)	3.52 (.92)	2.88 (.98)
3	2.68 (.76)	2.51 (.83)	3.46 (.90)	2.79 (.99)
4	2.72 (.77)	2.25 (.85)	3.68 (.86)	2.88 (.99)
5	2.51 (.82)	2.22 (.80)	3.68 (.81)	2.90 (1.15)

Emotion Variables

A series of 2 (time of measurement; within-subjects) x 6 (condition; between-subjects) ANOVAs assessed the effects of time and condition on each emotion. Means and standard deviations for each emotion variable can be seen in Table 5.6.

Anger. There was a significant main effect of time on anger, $F(1,229) = 50.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$, with anger scores at time 2 ($M = 3.32$) being significantly lower than those at time 1 ($M = 3.68$). The main effect of Staircase condition on anger was close to significance, $F(5,229) = 2.22$, $p = .053$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. There was also a significant interaction, $F(5,229) = 12.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$. Simple effects analysis showed that

this interaction was driven by opposing patterns in the different Staircase conditions. At Step 0, anger increased at time 2, but for all other steps, anger reduced at time 2.

Fear. The main effect of time was not significant, $F(1,229) < .01$, $p = .948$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$. There was also only a marginally significant main effect of Staircase condition, $F(5,229) = 2.13$, $p = .063$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, but the interaction was significant, $F(5,229) = 12.72$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$. Simple effects analysis showed that this interaction effect was driven by step 5, where fear was significantly reduced at time 2.

Disgust. There was a significant main effect of time, $F(1,229) = 14.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, with disgust at time 2 ($M = 3.54$) being significantly lower than at time 1 ($M = 3.75$). There was also a significant main effect of Staircase condition, $F(5,229) = 2.86$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, which Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed was due to disgust at step 5 being significantly lower than after step 0. The interaction was also significant, $F(5,229) = 8.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$. Simple effects analysis showed that this was driven by steps 0, 4, and 5. At step 0 disgust scores increased at time 2, whereas at steps 4 and 5 disgust scores decreased significantly at time 2.

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Table 5.6

Mean emotion ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) at each step of the Staircase Model at Time 1 and Time 2 (Study 11).

Step Number	Anger		Fear		Sadness		Disgust	
	Time1	Time2	Time1	Time2	Time1	Time2	Time1	Time2
0	3.69 (.98)	4.15 (1.04)	2.44 (1.02)	3.38 (1.25)	3.77 (1.18)	3.62 (1.23)	3.77 (.99)	4.23 (1.09)
1	3.64 (.93)	3.36 (.78)	2.62 (1.04)	2.69 (1.03)	3.87 (.89)	3.74 (.97)	3.92 (.96)	3.79 (.95)
2	3.60 (.98)	3.08 (.94)	2.83 (1.13)	2.70 (1.11)	3.78 (1.00)	3.58 (1.22)	3.73 (1.04)	3.55 (1.09)
3	3.56 (1.21)	3.10 (.97)	2.41 (1.14)	2.21 (1.06)	3.38 (1.27)	3.41 (1.16)	3.67 (1.26)	3.49 (1.12)
4	3.82 (.85)	3.05 (.92)	2.82 (1.05)	2.56 (1.14)	3.87 (.89)	3.82 (1.00)	3.87 (.89)	3.26 (.82)
5	3.74 (1.12)	3.15 (1.18)	2.59 (1.09)	2.13 (1.08)	3.59 (1.19)	3.36 (1.27)	3.56 (1.27)	2.92 (1.18)

Sadness: There was a significant main effect of time, $F(1, 228) = 6.31, p = .013, \eta_p^2 = .03$, with sadness at time 2 ($M = 3.59$) being significantly lower than it was at time 1 ($M = 3.71$). There was no significant effect of Staircase condition, $F(5,228) = 1.09, p = .369, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and the interaction effect was also not significant, $F(5,228) = .84, p = .523, \eta_p^2 = .02$.

The greater personal relevance of the intergroup conflict in this study is evident from comparing the percentages of those who were willing to forgive the perpetrating group (71.42% in Study 10 vs 47.70% in Study 11). Independent samples *t*-tests comparing scores across the two experiments found significantly lower scores in Study 11 for positive perceptions of the perpetrator, $t(323.94) = 7.07, p < .001, d = .79$, as well as significantly lower scores on the Trim-18 benevolence subscale, $t(340.99) = 4.61, p < .001, d = .50$. There were also significantly higher scores in Study 11 on the avoidance ($t(352) = 3.81, p < .001, d = .41$) and revenge ($t(315.00) = 3.94, p < .001, d = .44$) subscales. However, there were no significant differences between the two studies on any of the emotion variables.

Discussion

The aim of Study 11 was to replicate the positive effects of applying of the Staircase Model in a context that was more directly relevant to the participants. As in Study 10, positive effects of applying the model were observed for the binary forgiveness measure, perceptions of the perpetrator, and for emotions. It was predicted that having a conflict that was more relevant to the participants would increase the personal investment to a point where motivations could be changed.

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This hypothesis was also supported, in that the Staircase Model had significant effects on the avoidance motivation subscale of the multi-item measure of forgiveness.

The key finding of this study is that applying the Staircase Model to a setting in which participants had a closer relation to the historical events meant that the model was able to have a positive impact on forgiveness rates. This provides important support for the model, given the general pessimism about the effectiveness of intergroup apologies and their ability to promote forgiveness following a conflict. As in Study 10, different variables were differentially affected at certain steps, and this can be regarded as evidence in support of the stepwise structure of the model.

While these consistent effects of particular steps on different variables found in Studies 10 and 11 support the view that proceeding through the steps of the model will have a beneficial effect on intergroup perceptions, and thereby promote reconciliation, the evidence does not unequivocally support the sequencing of the steps as proposed in the model. It could be that the steps themselves have independent effects and that presenting them in a different sequence would result in the same effect, which would call into question the 'staircase' notion that is inherent to the model. I set out to test this possibility in Study 12.

Study 12

Again, the context of 'The Troubles' and the IRA was chosen, but this time I attempted to make the involved status of the participants even more salient than

was the case in Study 11. This was achieved by recruiting participants from Northern Ireland. This should result in greater personal relevance of the transgression and the subsequent reconciliation efforts.

With regard to the Staircase Model, I chose to focus on Step 4, the intergroup apology, by varying where in the sequence of steps it was located. This was again done in a cumulative manner, with the apology appearing (a) on its own, (b) after step 1, (c) after steps 1 and 2, or (d) after steps 1, 2, and 3 – the last of these being its proper location in the Staircase Model. In addition, a control condition was included, in which no apology was offered, and I added an ‘alternative model’ condition, in which all of the information preceding the apology remained the same but was presented in a different order. The idea here was to test the importance of the sequencing of the steps within the model. If the sequence proposed by the Staircase Model is important, perceptions of the perpetrator group, emotions felt towards this group, and willingness to forgive the group should all be greater when the apology follows step 3, by comparison with the alternative, re-ordered condition.

A consistent finding in Studies 10 and 11 was that disgust felt towards the perpetrator group only reduced after the intergroup apology was offered. To explore this further, I distinguished between different facets of disgust. It has been proposed that there are different facets of disgust, one more physical in nature and associated with avoidance of physical contamination, and the other being socio-moral in nature and associated with avoidance of social or cultural contamination (Tyber, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). I aimed to investigate whether the

intergroup apology would affect measures of these different facets of disgust in different ways. I also wanted to examine whether feelings of disgust would be reduced by the intergroup apology regardless of the context in which it is given, or whether this effect depended on other steps in the model.

Method

Participants and Design

Two hundred and twenty-two participants (110 males & 112 females; mean age of 50.49) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). Participants who were resident in Northern Ireland were recruited. Similar to the previous studies, this study had a fully between-subjects design comprising six conditions, with participants randomly allocated to one of them. Although 260 participants started the study, some were excluded before finishing because they did not provide consent ($n = 12$), failed an attention check ($n = 22$), or simply did not finish the study ($n = 4$).

Manipulation

Staircase Model Manipulation. The placement of the intergroup apology in the Staircase Model was manipulated. In condition 1, participants read the intergroup apology; in condition 2 they read the first step of the Staircase Model followed by the apology; in condition 3 they read the first two steps of the model followed by the apology; in condition 4, the apology followed steps 1, 2, and 3, as in the original model. The fifth condition was a re-ordering of the model, with the intergroup apology still being the final step, but the preceding steps were 3, 2, 1

(discussing reparations, documenting history, accepting collective guilt). There was also a control condition (condition 0) in which participants were told there had not been any contact from the perpetrator group. The transcripts relating to the different conditions are available in Appendix 17.

Measures

Forgiveness. The forgiveness measures were the same as those used in the previous studies. Thus, there was one binary measure, reading “After reading this, do you think the IRA should be forgiven?” with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options; and the multi-item Trim-18 measure (McCullough et al., 2006).

Positive Perceptions. The single-item questions and response scales assessing perceptions of the perpetrating group were the same as those used in the previous studies.

Disgust Measures. To examine more closely the effect of intergroup apology on reducing disgust, observed in the previous studies, three items were used to measure physical disgust (‘I feel physically sick,’ ‘I feel my stomach turning,’ and ‘My stomach is quivering;’ $\alpha = .90$) and another three items to measure socio-moral disgust (‘The IRA are bad people,’ ‘The IRA are morally wrong,’ and ‘The IRA are evil;’ $\alpha = .91$).

Demographics. To control for the influence of possible confounding variables, participants were asked to report their religious affiliation, political views, their knowledge of ‘The Troubles’ and the IRA, and whether they or their family had been affected by either The Troubles or the IRA, either directly or indirectly.

Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Next, they completed the demographic measures. The main questionnaire began with a brief description of 'The Troubles' and role of the IRA. Then followed the attention check, the Staircase Model manipulation, the discrete measure of forgiveness, and a random ordering of the Trim-18, positive perception questions, and disgust questions (with items within each set also presented in a random order). Participants were then thanked and debriefed.

Results

Political views were strongly correlated with all the main dependent variables. As expected, the more that participants considered themselves to be 'unionists/loyalists,' the less likely they were to have positive scores on all dependent variables. Because of this, political views were controlled for in all subsequent analyses. This was done by including the political views variable as a covariate in each analysis (apart from the one involving the binary forgiveness measure, where an alternative strategy was adopted); means and standard deviations reported below are adjusted for the influence of the covariate. There were no significant associations with any other demographic variable, including variables assessing religious affiliation, knowledge of 'The Troubles,' and whether participants or their families had been directly or indirectly affected by 'The Troubles' or the IRA.

Forgiveness

For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness rating (i.e., 'yes' responses) was 44.14%. The overall chi-square analysis showed that there was an association between condition and responses to this question, $\chi^2(5) = 23.02$, $p < .001$. Table 5.7 shows a clear trend for forgiveness rates to increase as the placement of the intergroup apology moves to a successively later step in the sequence, from 22.22% in the control condition to 65.79% in condition 4, the sequence matching the staircase model, before dropping to 32.43% in the alternative sequence condition. To account for the influence of political views, subsequent analyses were conducted with the participants split, with those scoring 1-5 as broadly "Nationalist/Republican" and those scoring 6-10 as broadly "Unionist/Loyalist." The percentages of 'yes' answers for these two groups are also shown in Table 5.7. The chi-square analysis for those coded as "Nationalist/Republican" showed that there was a significant association between condition and responses to this question, $\chi^2(5) = 13.96$, $p = .016$. Here we see a much larger percentage of forgiveness score in condition 4 (80.95%), compared with both the control condition (28.57%) and the alternative sequence condition (50.00%). The chi-square analysis for those coded as "Unionist/Loyalist" showed that there the association between condition and responses to this question did not reach the conventional significance threshold, $\chi^2(5) = 10.19$, $p = .070$. Here we see a larger percentage of forgiveness score in conditions 2,3, and 4 (all 47.06%), compared with the control condition (13.33%), condition 1 (22.72%) and the alternative sequence condition (19.05%).

Table 5.7
Binary forgiveness rates for each Apology Condition and when groups are split into “Nationalist/Republican” and “Unionist/Loyalist” (Study 12).

Condition	Overall	‘Nationalist/ Republican’	‘Unionist/ Loyalist’
0. Control	22.22%	28.57%	13.33%
1. Apology only	31.58%	43.75%	22.73%
2. Step 1 then Apology	55.56%	63.16%	47.09%
3. Steps 1 and 2, then Apology	56.76%	65.00%	47.09%
4. Steps 1 to 4	65.79%	80.95%	47.09%
5. Alternative Sequence	32.43%	50.00%	19.05%

The means and standard deviations for the three Trim-18 subscales at each step are shown in Table 5.8. Condition had a significant main effect on the avoidance motivation subscale, $F(5, 215) = 5.69, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .12$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that the control condition and the condition consisting of only the intergroup apology led to significantly higher avoidance scores than all other conditions apart from the alternative sequence condition. There was also a significant main effect on the revenge subscale, $F(5, 215) = 2.25, p = .050, \eta_p^2 = .05$, although Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that none of the conditions differed significantly from each other. Finally, there was a significant main effect on the benevolence subscale, $F(5, 215) = 4.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that the control condition elicited significantly lower benevolence scores than any of the other conditions.

Table 5.8
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales and positive perceptions of the perpetrator group in each apology condition (Study 12).

Condition	Positive			
	Avoidance	Revenge	Benevolence	Perceptions
0. Control	3.91 (.86)	3.08 (.81)	2.85 (.65)	2.01 (.82)
1. Apology only	3.88 (.81)	3.07 (.94)	3.25 (.78)	2.26 (1.05)
2. Step 1, then Apology	3.29 (.99)	2.62 (.89)	3.54 (.74)	2.61 (1.12)
3. Steps 1 and 2, then Apology	3.28 (.88)	2.63 (.85)	3.39 (.74)	2.66 (1.19)
4. Steps 1 to 4	3.26 (.79)	2.61 (.88)	3.61 (.76)	2.74 (1.00)
5. Alternative Sequence	3.80 (.89)	2.89 (1.14)	3.38 (1.00)	2.01 (1.12)

Positive Perceptions

The means and standard deviations for the positive perception measures are shown in Table 5.8. There was a significant main effect of condition on the positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, $F(5, 215) = 4.22$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that the control condition led to significantly lower positive perceptions than both condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4; $p = .037$) and condition 3 (Steps 1 and 2 plus apology; $p = .050$). The difference between the control condition and condition 2 (Step 1 plus apology; $p = .060$) also approached significance. Condition 5 (alternative sequence) led to marginally lower

positive perception scores than both condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4; $p = .044$) and condition 3 (Steps 1 and 2 plus apology; $p = .059$).

Disgust

The measures of the two facets of disgust were positively and significantly correlated ($r = .47, p < .001$). Both facets were also strongly correlated with all of the other dependent variables (all $ps < .001$). Although the strength of the correlations of the two disgust measures with many of the other dependent variables is similar, the socio-moral disgust measure is much more strongly related to the revenge motivation subscale ($r = .60$) than is the physical disgust measure ($r = .34$). Means and standard deviations for the two disgust measures are shown in Table 5.9.

Socio-Moral Disgust. There was a significant main effect of condition, $F(5, 215) = 6.62, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that all conditions that included an apology led to a significantly lower score than the control condition.

Physical Disgust. There was also a significant main effect on this measure, $F(5, 215) = 6.54, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4) led to significantly lower physical disgust ($M = 1.87$) than did the control condition ($M = 2.93, p < .001$), condition 1 (apology alone; $M = 2.71, p = .001$), and condition 5 (alternative sequence; $M = 2.58, p = .008$).

Table 5.9

Mean disgust ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) for each apology condition (Study 12).

Step Number	Socio-Moral/Image Disgust	Physical Disgust
0. Control	4.34 (.66)	2.94 (1.02)
1. Apology	3.62 (1.09)	2.76 (1.06)
2. Step 1, Apology	3.53 (1.12)	2.32 (.88)
3. Steps 1 and 2, Apology	3.51 (1.12)	2.34 (1.00)
4. Full Staircase	3.56 (1.05)	1.80 (.91)
5. Alternative Model	3.59 (1.32)	2.61 (1.12)

Discussion

The aims of this study were to provide a more stringent test of the staircase model and to investigate more closely the impact of intergroup apology on forgiveness, perceptions of the perpetrator group, and disgust. It was argued that for the specific sequencing of the Staircase Model to be supported, the sequence proposed in the model should have more positive effects than the alternative sequence on measures of forgiveness, positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, and disgust. This was shown to be the case for the binary measure of forgiveness, with more than two-thirds of participants in the proposed sequence condition responding 'yes,' compared to fewer than one-third of participants in the alternative sequence condition. The proposed sequence condition also led to more

positive perceptions of the perpetrator group than did the alternative sequence condition –although here the difference fell just short of statistical significance – and to lower scores on the physical disgust measure. These findings provide good support for the sequencing of steps proposed in the Staircase Model. Also supportive of the model are the findings that the theoretically proposed sequence differed from the control condition in eliciting more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and lower physical disgust.

Turning to the specific impact of intergroup apology, particularly interesting findings from this study relate to the measures of avoidance motivation and disgust. It is striking that the offering of the apology alone did not reduce avoidance motivation, but that when the intergroup apology was set in a broader context – even if this context simply meant that the apology followed the first step of the model – it did reduce avoidance motivation, except in the alternative sequence condition. This highlights the point that simply offering an intergroup apology is unlikely to be effective in improving intergroup relations.

Distinguishing between socio-moral and physical disgust also led to some interesting findings with regard to the impact of the intergroup apology. Although it was found that all conditions that included an apology resulted in lower socio-moral disgust scores than did the control condition, it was only the theoretically proposed sequence, with the apology following three previous steps in the model, that led to reduced physical disgust, relative to the control condition, the apology-alone condition, and the alternative sequence condition. This shows that offering an intergroup apology may be sufficient to reduce socio-moral disgust felt towards the

perpetrator group, but that the apology is only effective in reducing feelings of physical disgust when it is presented at the point proposed in the Staircase Model.

General Discussion

The aim of this research was to provide an initial test of the Staircase Model by applying it to real world intergroup conflict settings. It was hypothesized that exposing participants to the steps proposed by the model, and in the sequence proposed by the model, would result in increased forgiveness, more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, and reduced negative emotions felt towards the perpetrator group. It was also predicted that these effects would vary as a function of the number of steps to which participants were exposed, and that outcome variables would be differentially affected by the different steps.

Across the three studies a good level of support for each of these hypotheses was found. There was evidence in all three studies that being exposed to all steps of the model, and in the sequence proposed by the model, led to increased forgiveness, more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, and reduced negative emotion felt towards the perpetrator group.

To assess forgiveness, I used both a binary measure and an adapted version of the Trim-18 forgiveness scale. Although scores on the three subscales of the Trim-18 were not significantly influenced by the Staircase Model in Study 10, it was argued that an intergroup conflict seen as more directly relevant by participants might be required in order for changes in motivation to become apparent. After switching the intergroup conflict to one that was more relevant to participants in Studies 11 and 12, evidence of an impact on this measure was found, with

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avoidance subscale scores being significantly reduced in both studies, and lower scores on the vengeance subscale and higher scores on the benevolence subscale also observed in Study 12, where the participants were drawn from the population most directly affected by the intergroup conflict. This suggests that changes in motivation as captured by the Trim-18 measure can be influenced by applying the Staircase Model, but only when the intergroup conflict in question is one that is relevant to participants.

The increased forgiveness scores were accompanied by more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, including more positive ratings on items measuring trust and sincerity. If intergroup apologies fail because they are seen as insincere, and the groups offering them are regarded as untrustworthy, here is evidence that proceeding through the steps of the Staircase Model can reduce perceptions of insincerity and untrustworthiness.

Exposing participants to the steps in the Staircase Model also had consistent effects on participants' self-reported emotions. In Studies 10 and 11, anger was reduced at each step of the model, with all steps resulting in significantly lower scores than the control condition. This is consistent with previous evidence that intergroup apologies reduce anger (Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). Fear decreased significantly after step 3 in Study 10, but not until step 5 in Study 11. Step 3 entails discussion of proposed reparations for the victim group. When the conflict is more personally relevant to participants, it appears that reducing fear felt towards the perpetrator group depends on steps beyond proposed reparations. Step 5 entails concrete behaviours undertaken by the

perpetrator group. Disgust was the only emotion that was reduced significantly after the intergroup apology, step 4 of the model. This was the case both in Study 10, where I focused on differences in emotion between conditions, and in Study 11, where the focus was on interactions between condition and time of measurement, reflecting changes in emotion as a result of the steps taken.

The results from Study 12 shed further light on the effect of intergroup apology on feelings of disgust. Consistent with the findings of Studies 10 and 11, offering an intergroup apology in isolation led to lower socio-moral disgust. However, when the apology was embedded in the broader context of the model, it also reduced physical disgust. This suggests that the function of an apology in intergroup contexts differs from its function in interpersonal contexts. In the latter case, it is generally assumed that expressions of apology trigger forgiveness because the apology recipient accepts that the harm done was unintentional and/or that it will not recur. In an intergroup context, feelings of disgust towards another group are known to be related to a tendency to engage in dehumanization, and intergroup disgust predicts prejudice and discrimination (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). There is also evidence that brain areas associated with disgust reactions are activated when individuals view targets who are considered to be 'less than human' (Harris & Fiske, 2006). This suggests that reducing disgust felt towards another group should diminish any tendency to dehumanize its members. If intergroup apologies are effective in specifically reducing disgust, whether socio-moral or physical, this suggests that they can play a key role in achieving intergroup reconciliation. This also highlights the value of the Staircase Model: by decomposing the reconciliation process into different steps, it helps to identify the specific effects

of each step in that process. The fact that both disgust and fear were only reduced after certain steps suggests that particular kinds of information have specific effects on the reconciliation process.

Some limitations of the present research should be acknowledged. All three studies were scenario studies in which participants responded to information about historical transgressions. It could be argued that their responses may not reflect how those who were more directly involved in the conflicts in question would have reacted. Although it is clearly important for future research to address this issue by studying the perceptions and emotions of members of groups who have been directly mistreated by another group and who are then exposed to a reconciliation attempt made by the perpetrating group, it is worth remembering that many intergroup apologies are demanded and offered years or even decades after the original conflict or transgression, and that the parties involved in the giving and receiving of such apologies are not those who were directly involved. It is also worth pointing out that there were some participants in Studies 11 and 12 who reported that they had been directly affected by the conflict, and that although this was not a large subgroup, their judgments did not differ significantly from those of other participants.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of the current research suggest that current views of the limited effectiveness of intergroup apologies (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2015) may be unduly pessimistic. In all three studies, it was found that disgust felt towards the perpetrator group only reduced after an intergroup apology was offered, and in Studies 11 and 12 this reduction in disgust was coupled

with increases in positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and an increase in readiness to forgive the group for its actions. It therefore seems that when an intergroup apology is offered in a context established by the preceding steps of the model, it can pave the way to reconciliation by reducing feelings of disgust, enhancing perceptions of the outgroup, and making forgiveness more likely.

To conclude, the three studies reported here provide good support for the key assumptions of the Staircase Model of intergroup apology. The results show that applying the model has the potential to increase forgiveness, improve intergroup perceptions, and reduce negative emotions. There is also evidence that the different steps of the model have differential effects on these outcome measures. At the outset of this chapter I alluded to evidence that civil wars that are ended through negotiation are more likely to recommence than are those that are ended by a military victory. The present findings offer a more optimistic perspective on the prospects for peaceful reconciliation following intergroup conflict, provided the reconciliation effort is structured in the way proposed by the Staircase Model.

Chapter 6

General Discussion

When apologising for a wrongdoing, does one expect to be forgiven? Should one expect to be forgiven? It would seem that the answer to these questions is clear in the case of interpersonal apologies, where the evidence suggests that the answer is 'yes'. However, things are much less clear-cut in the case of intergroup apologies. In this thesis I have explored the key differences between intergroup and interpersonal apologies; I have investigated whether changing the content of an intergroup apology makes it more effective; I have examined the role that emotion expression can play in promoting reconciliation; and I have empirically tested the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies, which led to a consideration of the role that intergroup apologies play in the intergroup reconciliation process.

In this final chapter, I summarise the findings of the 12 studies reported in the four empirical chapters of this thesis. I then identify the consistencies that in these findings and use these consistencies to answer the three theoretical questions set out in Chapter 1: "What makes intergroup apologies so different to interpersonal apologies?", "Why are intergroup apologies ineffective?", and "Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?". I go on to discuss possible limitations of my research, and I end this concluding chapter by discussing the practical implications of this thesis, including the prospects for continuing this line of research to a point where intergroup apologies can genuinely be regarded as functional and powerful tools for achieving intergroup reconciliation.

Summary of the empirical findings

In Chapter 2 I set out to explore the effectiveness of intergroup apologies in difference scenarios, introducing a series of manipulations that have a positive influence on the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies with a view to seeing how these affected intergroup apologies. The intention was to show that there are paradoxes in intergroup apologies and to pinpoint the ways in which they differ from their interpersonal counterparts. In Study 1, I explored the influence of how much the victim of a transgression desires an apology from the perpetrator, something that is an integral factor in achieving forgiveness, especially within the justice system (Petrucci, 2002). Using a fictitious intergroup transgression between two Canadian universities, I was able to manipulate whether participants who were members of the 'victim' group felt both a personal and a collective desire to receive an apology from the transgressor group. Following the delivery of an apology, I was able to show that the apology itself had no positive impacts, irrespective of whether or not participants had desired an apology. The results of this study highlight that desiring an apology in an intergroup setting appears to have different consequences than it does in an interpersonal setting. The results also point to the first paradox of intergroup apology: despite members of a victim group wanting an apology from the perpetrating group, they are no more likely to forgive the perpetrating group if an apology is forthcoming. This hints at the lack of trust that seems to characterise intergroup relations: the victim group wants the perpetrating group to apologise but is unwilling to accept the apology when it is given.

In Study 2 I explored the difference in reactions to collective apologies versus collective non-apologies using the Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981), an economic game of trust and cooperation. Groups of three persons took part under the impression that they were playing against another 3-person group. In reality groups played against a computer program that was consistently unfair towards their group in the first phase of the game. All groups then entered what appeared to be an online chatroom in which the groups could communicate with each other. Now the ostensibly unfair group either did or did not apologise for its behaviour in phase 1. I found that the offering of an intergroup apology did lead to a higher chance of receiving an “accepting” or “positive” response in the chatroom. However, an intergroup apology did not lead to more cooperative behaviour on the part of the ‘exploited’ group in the second phase of the game. This study again highlights something that is often shown in the literature on real-life intergroup apologies, namely that although the initial reaction to such apologies can be positive, the ensuing behaviour is no more positive than if the apology had not been given. This is a second paradox of intergroup apologies: Even when they are well received in the first instance, they tend not to result in more positive relations between the two groups at a behavioural level.

Two separate factors were manipulated in Study 3: whether the apology following a real life transgression was interpersonal, in the sense of being offered by an individual, or intergroup, in the sense of being offered on behalf of the group that was ostensibly at least partly responsible for the transgression; and whether the leader of the transgressing group who offered the apology was the person in charge of the group at the time of the transgression or a new leader. Change of

leadership was studied because research shows that a new leader can lead to greater levels of trust and to a speedier resolution of the conflict (Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007; Flores, 2012). The context of the Grenfell Tower fire was used to investigate these issues, using an apology given by the leader of the Kensington and Chelsea council (De Peyer, *Evening Standard*, 2017), who apologised for the neglect of the safety of the building, as well as for the council's poor response to the fire. The wording of the apology was manipulated such that it read either as an interpersonal or intergroup apology. Also varied was the identity of the council leader issuing the apology, who was said to be either the 'old' or a 'new' leader. This study again revealed clear differences in the way that participants responded to interpersonal and intergroup apologies, with positive effects arising from an interpersonal apology, but not from an intergroup one. Furthermore, a 'new' leader' elicited more forgiveness for the council leader but did not influence forgiveness of the council. These findings illustrate a further paradox of intergroup apologies: Although almost exactly the same words can be used by individuals and by groups when apologising for the self-same transgression, the interpersonal version is more effective than the intergroup one.

In Study 4 I investigated two issues: first, the effectiveness of denying the group's responsibility for a negative event, in comparison to offering an intergroup apology; and second, what happens if an intergroup apology is given after an initial attempt to deny the group's responsibility. The context in which these issues were studied was the revoking of the taxi firm Uber's licence to operate in London, as a result of negative events allegedly perpetrated by Uber drivers. Participants were allocated to one of three conditions. In one condition they read an article in which

Uber denied responsibility for the negative events; in another, they read an article in which Uber apologised for these negative events; and in a third condition they read an article in which Uber initially denied responsibility for the negative events but then went on to apologise for them. I found that denying responsibility was more effective than issuing an apology in terms of maintaining participants' intentions to use the company; and at least as effective as an apology in terms of eliciting forgiveness, increasing positive perceptions of the company, and reducing negative feelings about the company. One ray of hope from this study concerning intergroup apologies is that the strongest effect was that there was a backlash in the condition where the company first attempted to deny responsibility and then issued an apology: Participants in this condition were less forgiving, had less positive perceptions, possessed stronger negative emotions and were less likely to use the company in the future. Although in one sense the results of this study show the ineffectiveness of intergroup apology, they also show that participants prefer the perpetrating group to be honest about its role in a transgression, rather than seeking to deny responsibility. This suggests that accepting responsibility for an intergroup transgression is an important step in the reconciliation process.

It was concluded that the studies reported in Chapter 2 were effective in illustrating the severity of the discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup apologies in a variety of contexts, as well as in demonstrating some of the paradoxes that surround intergroup apologies. While many of the findings reported in this chapter cast doubt on the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, there was also some evidence that an intergroup apology can elicit an initially positive reaction, and that it is better for a group to apologise for wrongdoing than to seek

to deny responsibility for a negative outcome but then have to 'come clean'. My aim in the subsequent chapters was to explore the conditions under which intergroup apologies are effective.

In Chapter 3, I investigated the role played by apology content in shaping reactions to intergroup apologies. My main aim in the studies reported in this chapter was to examine the importance of communicating structural, relational, and identity-related messages in the intergroup apology. A secondary aim was to explore the role of moral emotions, both generically (in the sense of expressing remorse) and more specifically (in the sense of expressing guilt and shame). In all three studies reported in this chapter, I investigated the effects of varying the content of apologies, using the context of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland (based on the apology transcript issued by the Irish Republican Army; *The Guardian*, 2002). The participants in all studies were British, living in mainland Britain. In Study 5, I investigated the independent effects of communicating structural, relational, and identity-related messages embedded within an apology by asking participants to read an apology in which the concluding paragraph was varied to highlight one of these three factors. I also manipulated who gave the apology. In one condition it came from a large group, in another condition it came from a smaller group, and in a third condition it came from an individual. The clearest finding from this study was that the interpersonal apology was much more effective than either of the intergroup apologies, regardless of the manipulated content. Although the effect of apology content was not significant, there was some evidence that an apology emphasising structural factors was more effective when it came from a large group,

perhaps because a large group was seen as having the capacity to bring about the structural changes mentioned in the apology.

In Study 6, I examined the effect of combining the three apology content factors within the final paragraph of an intergroup apology, comparing this with a condition in which this final paragraph was omitted, and focusing only on the 'large group' as the source of the apology. I also took the opportunity to vary another aspect of apology content, namely how much remorse was expressed in the apology. The results revealed that the intergroup apology including structural, relational and identity factors was more effective than the one that did not. However, there was an unexpected interaction reflecting the fact that the intergroup apology expressing high remorse was only more effective than the one that did not in the condition in which the other apology factors were not included. Thus, adding high remorse to an apology that included structural, relational and identity factors did not make the intergroup apology more effective. It seems that the expression of remorse somehow undercut the impact of the final paragraph emphasising structural, relational and identity factors.

An attempt was made in Study 7 to account for the counter-intuitive results of Study 6. First, I separated the manipulation of emotion from the manipulation of other aspects of apology content, by having the expression of emotion appear early in the apology and the other content aspects at the end. Second, I was more specific about the emotions being expressed, using one condition to express guilt, another to express shame, with the third condition being a no emotion control. Now there were significant main effects of both manipulations. Inclusion of the

combined apology factors in the final paragraph and the expression of emotion led to higher forgiveness ratings, relative to their respective control conditions.

Although the interaction between the two manipulations was not significant, there was no evidence, as there was in Study 6, that one manipulation undermined the effectiveness of the other. Instead, it seems that intergroup apologies are more effective when they include either the future-orientated structural, relational and identity-related apology factors proposed by Nadler (2012), or the expression of emotions such as guilt and shame, which communicate an acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing and imply that the offense will not recur. Support for this separation of strategies (one more future-oriented, focused on solutions; the other more past-oriented, focused on acceptance of blame for wrongdoing but carrying the implication that the wrongdoing will not recur) also comes from the mediation analyses conducted in the studies reported in Chapter 3. In all studies, having positive perceptions of the transgressor group seems key to attaining forgiveness. In Study 5, it fully mediated the effect of apology source on forgiveness, and in Studies 6 and 7, it fully mediated the effect of the combined apology factors on forgiveness. This mediation was only partial, however, when considering the effect of shame expression on forgiveness, suggesting that the beneficial effects of shame (and of emotion expression more generally) may work through a separate process.

Given the evidence from the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3, in the research reported in Chapter 4 I decided to shift away from a focus on intergroup apologies and towards the study of intergroup reconciliation, concentrating on the way in which expression of emotion influences behaviour following an intergroup

transgression. The studies reported in this chapter used the Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981) to explore the role of guilt, shame, and pride in competitive intergroup settings. In Study 8, I used an intergroup version of the game to examine what would happen if groups were given an opportunity to communicate the three aforementioned emotions after six rounds of the game. Comparing group behaviour in the game before and after this emotional communication revealed no significant relations, suggesting that the emotional communication did have an effect on behaviour. Moreover, the changes between the first and second phases of the game were in the expected direction, in that expressing guilt and/or shame was associated with more cooperative behaviour in the second phase, whereas the expression of pride was associated with more competitive behaviour.

In Study 9, I decided to focus on the effects of emotional expression by a group after it has behaved in an uncooperative manner. To ensure that one group behaved equally uncooperatively throughout the study, members of all participating groups were led to believe that they would be playing the game against another co-present group but in fact both groups were playing against a pre-programmed group that behaved consistently uncooperatively in the first two games and then expressed either shame or pride (there was also a 'no emotion' control condition). The expression of shame consistently led to more cooperative behaviour in the second phase of the game, whereas the expression of pride consistently led to more competitive behaviour. Furthermore, it was also shown that an expression of pride led to an increased tendency for the 'victim' group to engage in altruistic punishment.

The findings from the two studies reported in Chapter 4 do offer some cause for optimism about intergroup apologies, in that they show that the expression of negative moral emotions, like guilt and shame, promote intergroup reconciliation. This finding is consistent with the evidence from Studies 6 and 7 reported in Chapter 3, where it was found that expressing remorse or shame increased the likelihood of forgiveness. The beneficial effect of emotion is something that could readily be applied to intergroup apologies (whether the expression forms part of the apology or is made separately, preferably – given the results of Study 6 – before the apology). Such emotion expression should increase the likelihood of cooperation and forgiveness. However, the negative role that emotional expression can play is also evident in this chapter. Expressing pride after behaving uncooperatively resulted in greater competitiveness on the part of the victim group, showing that pride expressions should be actively avoided in any intergroup conflict scenario.

In Chapter 5 the focus returned to intergroup apologies, but now on their role in a broader intergroup reconciliation process, as opposed to their stand-alone effectiveness. This was undertaken by exploring the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011), a framework that sets out a series of steps towards intergroup reconciliation, in which making an intergroup apology is just one step. The steps in this model are: accepting collective guilt, setting straight the records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup apology, and post-apology engagement. In Study 10, I applied the model to a border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, and participants acted as third-party observers. Participants in different conditions read accounts of the conflict that cumulatively

included the different steps of the model. It was shown that being exposed to the steps of the model did have positive effects in terms of having improved perceptions of the perpetrating group, as well as less negative emotion felt toward it, and that these effects increased as the number of steps increased. However, it was also shown that the model did not have a strong effect on forgiveness, although it was suggested that the fact that the participants were third-party observers might help to account for this.

In Study 11, I explored the model in a similar way, but now in the more directly relevant (to my participants) context of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland. Mainland British participants were exposed to different conditions in which they learned about actions and statements of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The different conditions were designed to include different steps of the model in a cumulative fashion. The results of Study 10 were almost fully replicated, with exposure to the steps of the model leading to an improved perception of the transgressor as well as a reduction in negative emotion felt toward the perpetrator group. It was shown that levels of anger and fear reduced significantly following early steps of the model but, interestingly, disgust only reduced significantly after the intergroup apology had been offered.

In an attempt to bring the transgression 'closer to home', in Study 12 I again used the context of 'The Troubles' and the IRA, but now I recruited a Northern Irish sample, for whom the events would presumably be more salient. A further change I made in this study concerned the manipulation. Here I investigated whether presenting the elements of the model in or out of the theoretically proposed

General Discussion

sequence would affect its influence. This generated several interesting findings. First, it was shown that presenting the elements of the proposed Staircase Model in the 'correct' sequence was more effective than an alternative model in which the steps were completely switched. Second, presenting the intergroup apology alone was not effective in reducing the avoidance motivation component of forgiveness, but when it was preceded by other steps it became more effective. There were also some interesting results regarding how placement of the intergroup apology in the sequential steps influenced different aspects of disgust. Socio-moral disgust was lower when an apology was given, regardless of the sequence, but physical disgust was only lower when the intergroup apology was presented in the location proposed by the Staircase Model.

It is argued that the research reported in Chapter 5 offers some grounds for thinking that intergroup apologies *can* be effective and that it provides useful insights into how they work. Intergroup apologies are most likely to be effective when they are embedded within a broader reconciliation process and the way in which they work seems to be by reducing levels of disgust felt towards the perpetrating group.

General Summary

We live in an "Age of Apology" (Brooks, 1999) but the majority of research on intergroup apologies suggests that they fail to evoke forgiveness (Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014), a reaction that is vital if intergroup reconciliation is to occur. In this thesis I have explored intergroup apologies in a range of contexts, using varying methods. A key theme of the work on apology, and one that is echoed

in some of the findings reported in the thesis, is the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup apologies. Research generally suggests that interpersonal apologies are effective (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal, 1997) and that intergroup apologies are not (Chapman, 2007; Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008), and this differential effectiveness is also evident in this thesis. The results of Studies 3 and 5 highlight the fact that an interpersonal apology is more likely to result in forgiveness than is an intergroup one. Some paradoxes associated with intergroup apologies are also evident, ones that are not evident in their interpersonal counterparts. In Study 1 it was shown that wanting an intergroup apology does not increase the likelihood of forgiveness when such an apology is delivered, while in Study 2 it was shown that even if an apology is 'accepted', those who were on the wrong end of an intergroup transgression do not necessarily go on to behave in a more cooperative manner with the perpetrator group.

A second key theme that emerges from the research reported in this thesis is the role of intergroup apology content. This was evident in Study 3, where simply replacing "we" by "I" and including the adjective "new" before "leader" resulted in positive changes in evaluations of those who were apologising. Intergroup apologies are often regarded as self-serving (Blatz, Day, and Schryer, 2014), so for such an apology to be effective it needs to deliver clear messages about how the situation of the victim group is to be improved and how the intergroup relationship is to be changed for the better. These are the key points underlying the structural, relational and identity-related factors that were included in apologies in Studies 6

and 7. The results of both studies show that including these messages within an intergroup apology does make the apology more effective.

Staying with the theme of apology content, it is also evident from the research in this thesis that there is important role to be played by the expression of emotions when intergroup apologies are made. Evidence of the importance of emotion expression in intergroup relationship repair is evident in the results of Studies 8 and 9. There it was shown that the expression of guilt and/or shame can be very effective in repairing a relationship following an intergroup transgression. However, as was shown in Studies 6 and 7, it vitally important to ensure that the emotional component of an intergroup apology is separated from the more 'future-oriented' components referred to in the previous paragraph. In Study 6, it was found that repeated expressions of remorse in an apology can undercut the effectiveness of messages about structural, relationship and identity-related issues. I interpret this as reflecting the fact that frequent expressions of remorse remind the audience of the past wrongdoing for which the group is admitting responsibility, and thereby encourage the audience to focus on the wrongdoing, rather than the group's willingness to put things right. It is indeed important for the perpetrating group to acknowledge its responsibility and to express emotions such as guilt and shame, but this should be separated from (and probably precede, as in Study 7) the message components that focus on practical steps for achieving reconciliation.

The mediation analyses reported in Chapter 3 suggest that there are at two types of apology content that have the capacity to improve the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, one relating to the three apology-related structural,

relational, and identity-related factors, the other relating to the expression of negative emotions, such as guilt and shame, that are felt regarding the transgression. If one seeks to use both of these routes, the studies inspired by the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl et al., 2011), reported in Chapter 5, provide a framework for doing so. I suggest that it is through my exploration of the Staircase Model in the three studies reported in Chapter 5 that this thesis provides us with the most positive conclusions about the potential impact of intergroup apologies. It seems that an effective way to overcome the perception that intergroup apologies are insincere and self-serving is by embedding them in a context in which other messages or events take place. These are the steps of the Staircase Model, where the apology is simply one component of the reconciliation process. Thus, forgiveness and reconciliation are not exclusively dependent on the apology itself. In Studies 10, 11 and 12, it was evident that adopting this broader perspective is effective in enhancing the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation. It also became clearer what the specific impact of intergroup apology is in this process: making an apology seems to reduce levels of disgust felt towards the transgressor.

Theoretical Implications

Intergroup apology and its role in achieving reconciliation is not a topic that has been widely researched, but it one that is attracting increasing research attention. There are some studies (e.g., Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008; Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011) that show the positive effects on intergroup relations that intergroup apologies can have, but there are also many studies showing their

ineffectiveness in eliciting forgiveness (e.g., Chapman, 2007; Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). I believe that the studies reported in this thesis extend our understanding of intergroup apologies and intergroup reconciliation. I now return to the three questions raised in Chapter 1, to see how they can be answered on the basis of the current research: “What makes intergroup apologies so different to interpersonal apologies?”, “Why are intergroup apologies ineffective?”, and “Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?”

The first of these questions, “*What makes intergroup apologies so different to interpersonal apologies*”, was answered in part in the course of the literature review in Chapter 1, where I argued that identity and emotion are two key factors that differ between interpersonal and intergroup scenarios. With respect to identity, it seems reasonable to suggest that if personal identity is salient, as it typically would be in an interpersonal setting, the recipient of an apology is much less likely to regard the person offering the apology as an out-group member; by contrast, if social identity is salient, the person making the apology is likely to be seen as out-group member, and given what we know about ingroup bias and outgroup hostility, this in itself is likely to lead the apology recipient to view the apology as insincere or untrustworthy. This point is highlighted by the interpersonal-intergroup discontinuity research conducted by Wildschut and Insko (2007), who evaluate two explanations for this discrepancy, finding compelling evidence for the explanation that intergroup relations are characterised by greater fear and greed. One component of this perspective is the identifiability explanation, suggesting that there is a lack of ability to assign responsibility for transgressions in

intergroup settings, compared to their interpersonal counterparts. Because it is relatively easy to assign responsibility for interpersonal transgressions, it should also be easier to establish whether you trust the transgressor's apology.

With respect to group-based emotions, it is clear that when social identities are salient, group members are more likely to appraise events that affect the wellbeing of their group in the same way, regardless of whether or not their personal wellbeing is affected (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Therefore, group members are more likely to experience the same emotional responses as other in-group members. It also may be the case that, to the extent that such emotions are shared with other in-group members, any negative emotions are likely to be more intense and longer-lasting. This possibility is mentioned by van Zomeren, Spears and Leach (2008), who suggest that group members can "psych up" other in-group members by expressing emotions such as anger. It is also possible to influence in-group members indirectly, by expressing emotions within media reports (Pescosolido, 2002). The ability for in-group members' emotions to corroborate, blend and potentially intensify in intergroup conflict situations is in turn likely to make it more difficult to reduce or regulate negative perceptions of and feelings towards transgressor groups. The fact that a change in emotion will also affect appraisals (Tiedens & Linton, 2001) may also mean that where negative perceptions or evaluations of transgressing groups were not initially held, they might develop due to emotional influence from other in-group members.

The effects of the aforementioned distinctions can be seen within Study 5, where a mediation analysis showed that the effect of the apology source (the

interpersonal condition vs. the two intergroup conditions) was fully mediated by perceptions or appraisals (sincerity, remorsefulness and trustworthiness) of the transgressor(s). Thus, the fact that the intergroup apology was less likely to elicit forgiveness than its interpersonal counterpart was fully explained by the fact that participants were more likely to rate the perpetrators as lacking in sincerity, remorse, and trustworthiness. To the extent that participants viewed the transgressing group as an out-group, and considered themselves as part of the in-group, this mediation by appraisals could have been influenced by emotions felt on behalf of the victim group.

It is worth pointing out that the studies reported in Chapter 2 suggest that it is not just that intergroup apologies themselves are less effective than their interpersonal counterparts, but that it is also the case that other factors that should in principle lead to a greater reconciliation are also less effective in intergroup contexts. For example, in Study 1 it was found that wanting an apology – something known to make it more likely that the perpetrator will be forgiven if s/he does apologise in interpersonal scenarios (Petrucci, 2002) – did not play a similar role in an intergroup scenario. Another example came in Study 2, where it was found acceptance of an intergroup apology (as reflected in an immediate verbal response), another factor associated with reconciliation in interpersonal settings, did not necessarily mean that the victim group's behaviour towards the perpetrator group was any more cooperative. Thus, it seems that the differences between interpersonal and intergroup wrongdoing scenarios extend beyond the differential effectiveness of apologies in these two settings. The lesser effectiveness of intergroup apologies appears to be part of a broader set of differences that reflect

the greater difficulty of achieving reconciliation between groups than between individuals. Greater greed and competition (Wildschut and Insko, 2007), intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) are just three examples of the obstacles that need to be overcome if intergroup apologies are to result in reconciliation.

In seeking to answer the second question, “*Why are intergroup apologies ineffective?*”, it is instructive to consider examples of when intergroup apologies or intergroup reconciliation attempts were unsuccessful in the studies reported in this thesis. The mediation analyses in Chapter 3 highlight the need for transgressor groups to be seen more positively (or at least, less negatively) in order to achieve forgiveness and reconciliation. It is these perceptions of sincerity, remorsefulness, and trustworthiness that distinguish the effective interpersonal apology and the ineffective intergroup apologies in Study 5. So one answer to the question of why intergroup apologies are (often) ineffective is that the persons making them are regarded as *insincere*, in the sense of not really meaning what they are saying, perhaps because the apology has been made under duress (e.g., political pressure) rather than spontaneously, and/or long after the transgression in question, as opposed to immediately afterwards; as *unremorseful*, perhaps because often they are apologising for what other ingroup members have done, rather than what they themselves have done, which may constrain the extent to which they can be seen as genuinely remorseful; and as *untrustworthy*, in the sense that the promise that things will be different in the future – inherent in interpersonal apologies – is regarded with suspicion in the case of intergroup apologies (Blatz, Schumann & Ross, 2009; Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). A telling real-world example of how an

intergroup apology can be seen as sincere and remorseful is when Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany spontaneously dropped to his knees in front of the Memorial to Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw, in 1970 (see <https://www.dhm.de/blog/2016/12/07/392/>). Although Brandt himself had not been involved in Nazi war crimes, as Chancellor of the perpetrating nation he was faced with the seemingly impossible task of apologising for one of the worst atrocities ever committed by one group to another. The fact that the gesture was obviously spontaneous and heartfelt helped to make it more effective than mere words could have been.

Another way of answering the same question emerges from the combined results of Studies 6 and 7. Between them, these two studies show that the structure and content of intergroup apologies matter. Although it might seem intuitively attractive to crank up expressions of remorse in intergroup apologies, and to combine such expressions with attempts to address key concerns of the victim group, such as ways to empower them and to recognise their identity as a group, it is possible for such remorse to undercut the influence of messages about empowerment and identity, as was the case in the results of Study 6. I interpreted these results as reflecting the fact that remorse focuses attention on the wrongdoing for which the apologiser is remorseful, and thereby deflects attention away from undertakings about the future relationship between the two groups. The results of Study 7 are consistent with this interpretation, in the sense that when the expression of group-based emotion (here, guilt or shame) came early in the apology and the apology factors came late, there was no longer an interaction between remorsefulness and the apology factors such that forgiveness was lower in the high

remorse/apology factors present condition than in the low remorse/apology factors present condition. The implication is that intergroup apologies may fail if they try to achieve too many things at once, especially if achieving those outcomes requires slightly different mindsets on the part of the audience.

A third way of answering the question about why intergroup apologies are often ineffective emerges from the results of the two studies reported in Chapter 4. Here it was found that any expression of pride on the part of one group – even a group that has behaved cooperatively in the past – seems to be damaging the prospects for future intergroup cooperation. When a perpetrator group seeks to apologise for its actions towards another group, it is therefore very important to avoid any form of words that could be construed (or misconstrued) as an attempt to defend or justify the perpetrator group's behaviour. Apologies that fall short of being completely unreserved are likely to be dismissed as insincere and self-serving (Blatz et al., 2009).

A fourth and final way of answering this question on the basis of my thesis research comes from Study 12. There I showed that when an intergroup apology was offered in isolation, it was not effective in promoting forgiveness. Instead – and this is a point that will be elaborated below – an intergroup apology should be part of a broader process in which the perpetrator group addresses concerns beyond its responsibility for the wrongdoing or harm that was done. Thus, a standalone apology runs the risk of being dismissed as meaningless if it is not accompanied by other messages that recognise the concerns of the victim group and by actions that address those concerns. Once again, the perception that an apology is insincere if it

is not accompanied by additional measures seems to be the most parsimonious way to explain this: When harm has been done by a perpetrator group to a victim group, simply saying 'sorry' will usually be insufficient to elicit forgiveness.

This brings me to the third of the questions that I raised in the opening chapter: "*Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?*". I argue that the research reported in this thesis has helped to identify several ways in which apologies can be made more effective. In Studies 6 and 7 I showed that combining structural, relational and identity-related messages within an apology increases the likelihood of forgiveness, as well as improving the perceptions of the transgressor. A further strategy for improving the efficacy of intergroup apologies revolves around emotion expression. It was shown in Studies 6, 7, 8 and 9 that the expression of negative moral emotions, such as remorse, guilt and shame, improves the effectiveness of apologies and increases the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation. These studies were all concerned with manipulating the content of an apology in order to promote forgiveness, but probably the most important evidence in this thesis regarding ways of making intergroup apologies more effective comes from the studies reported in Chapter 5, where I examined the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies. My evaluation of the Staircase Model shows that locating an intergroup apology within a broader, structured reconciliation process increases the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation.

Thus, there are two ways in which the efficacy of intergroup apologies can be enhanced. First, the content of the apology needs to be carefully considered, such that it (a) acknowledges responsibility for the wrongdoing, (b) expresses

profound remorse, guilt, and/or shame about the wrongdoing, and (c) makes credible statements about how the status of the victim group will be improved, how the future relationship between the groups will be made more equal, and how the identity of the victim group will be respected and protected in the future. A second, complementary approach is to embed the apology in an extended set of messages and actions, such that it is preceded by an acceptance of the perpetrator group's collective guilt, an effort to agree on the facts of the transgression, and a discussion of what reparations will be made; and followed by serious engagement between the two groups. In effect, then, the Staircase Model decomposes some of the intergroup apology components (such as the expression of negative moral emotion and the making of reparations in order to redress the structural imbalance between the two groups) into separate steps, extended over time. Which of these two approaches is preferable in a given situation is likely to depend on how much time is available, and to some extent on the gravity of the intergroup transgression. If the transgression is serious but does not completely undermine the intergroup relationship, and especially if time is in short supply, an intergroup apology that follows the first approach will have a reasonable chance of success. However, the graver the transgression, and the deeper the threat to the intergroup relationship, the longer is likely to be the reconciliation process that is needed, and the less likely it is that a one-off intergroup apology – even one containing all the elements of the first approach – will be sufficient, and the more appropriate it will be to adopt the extended approach of the Staircase Model.

A further question has emerged in the course of conducting this research: “Should forgiveness be considered the primary outcome of intergroup apologies, or

do they serve a different purpose?”. The evidence from the final study reported in this thesis is that the primary function of intergroup apologies is to reduce victim group members’ feelings of disgust towards the perpetrator group. Although the key function of interpersonal apologies is to garner forgiveness, it may well be that intergroup apologies serve a different function, given the greater complexity of the relationship between perpetrator and victim. When the perpetrator is a group, rather than an individual, there is scope for intergroup processes such as prejudice and discrimination to occur. Feelings of disgust in an intergroup context are known to promote prejudice, discrimination, and dehumanization (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). Thus, the finding that intergroup apologies reduce feelings of disgust should be regarded as pivotal for achieving reconciliation. For this reason, I would argue that even if intergroup apologies alone are not hugely effective in eliciting forgiveness, they nevertheless have the potential to play a key role in attaining genuine intergroup reconciliation.

Limitations

It needs to be acknowledged that the research reported in this thesis, like any research endeavour, has some limitations. One limitation is that the majority of the studies were conducted in the form of online surveys in which participants were asked to make judgments about historical events. Thus, it could be argued that although the historical events were real enough, they did not happen ‘to’ the participants, and the participants’ responses therefore do not represent how ‘real’ victim groups would respond to apologies for what happened. Although I concede that research participants responding to an apology they read on a computer

screen in the context of a study is undoubtedly different from members of a victim group responding to an apology made by a perpetrator group, either face-to-face or through the media, there are some good reasons for believing that the results of my research would generalise to real-life settings. First, not only were the historical events I used real ones, but it was also the case that the apology that served as the basis for much of the research was a real one, issued by the IRA. Second, although the participants were not themselves direct victims of the intergroup transgression, in several studies they did belong, broadly speaking, to the victim group, in the sense that one of the targets of the IRA was Britain (and therefore the British people). Third, although the transgressions were historical ones, in real life intergroup apologies are often made years, decades or even centuries after the original transgression took place (e.g., the Australian apology to the Stolen Generations came in 2007, while the transgressions occurred between the early 1900s to the 1970s; or the Indian Residential Schools that were active from the late 19th century to the late 20th century in Canada, which were only apologised for in 2008). So what matters in such cases is not the response of the direct victims of the transgression, but rather how representatives of the victim group respond to apologies made by representatives of the perpetrator group, which is close to the circumstances modelled in several of my studies.

A different kind of response to this limitation is to point to the laboratory studies that formed part of my research. Here, participants in these studies did think that they had been unfairly treated by another group, and they then interacted with this out-group both verbally and behaviourally, and I was able to show that at least some of the processes that I studied in the online research were

also applicable to this 'in situ' intergroup setting, where groups interacted with each other in real time (or believed that they were doing so). However, there is a limit to what can practically and ethically be studied in a laboratory, with groups allocated to different conditions, which is why the majority of my studies used scenarios based on real-life events.

A key advantage of the scenario approach is that it enables the researcher to study a wide variety of contexts. In this thesis, intergroup apologies and/or intergroup reconciliation were investigated using historical transgressions in Studies 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12; real-life current event transgressions, including a real-life apology, were examined in Study 3 (Grenfell Tower) and Study 4 (Uber licence); and a fabricated transgression in the context of a real-life university rivalry was examined in Study 1. Alongside this variation in contexts, there was also a variation in the degree to which participants were victims. Although participants were simply third-party observers in Study 10, in every other study they had some connection with the transgression, as noted above. In Study 1 participants were led to believe the transgression was against their own university. In Study 3 participants were all based in London, where the tragedy of the Grenfell Tower Fire occurred, while in Study 4 I recruited participants in cities where Uber was actively operating. In Studies 2, 8, and 9, participants were the victims of selfishly uncooperative behaviour, but also had opportunities to engage in uncooperative behaviour themselves. In Studies 5, 6, 7, and 11, participants were from mainland Britain, and would have been adults at the time of 'The Troubles', meaning that there was a possibility of them being at least indirectly affected by the IRA's activities. Finally,

in Study 12, participants were recruited from the population of Northern Ireland, those whose lives would have been most impacted by 'The Troubles'.

So although it is not unreasonable to argue that some of the research reported here involved "hypothetical transgressions", "hypothetical apologies" and "hypothetical reconciliation", my counter-argument is that this limitation is offset by the considerable variation in the contexts studied, by the fact that in many studies the apologies were closely based on real apologies, and by the fact that in several studies participants did have a relationship, direct or indirect, with the victim group.

Practical Implications

A final question worth addressing concerns the practical implications of the present research. How can policy makers and practitioners benefit from the results of these studies? As should be clear from the preceding sections of this chapter, much of the research reported in this thesis suggests that intergroup apologies serve an important function in repairing intergroup relations following transgressions. As noted above, there are practical implications for the design of apology content and also practical implications for treating intergroup apologies as part of an extended process. We now have a better idea of what intergroup apologies should consist of, and also of how they can be integrated into a more general strategy for achieving intergroup reconciliation.

Intergroup relations are often fraught and conflictual, making it likely that one group will act in a way that leads to adverse consequences for another group. Every intergroup conflict in human history ends at a certain point, and once it is

over relations between the two parties to the conflict need to be repaired if future conflicts are to be avoided. Despite the rather pessimistic tone of much research on intergroup apologies, they have an important role to play in repairing the intergroup relationship. Undoubtedly, intergroup apologies are less straightforwardly effective than their interpersonal counterparts. The tendency for there to be greater degree of suspicion and competition between groups than between individuals means that intergroup apologies are rarely taken at face value and are often seen as insincere and self-serving. However, the current research shows that there are steps that can be taken to reduce these problems and that if such steps are taken, intergroup apologies can be effective in changing perceptions of the perpetrator group, reducing disgust felt towards that group, and thereby eliciting forgiveness.

Conclusion

Intergroup apologies are becoming increasingly common in contemporary society, whether they are made by countries, governments, political parties, businesses, universities, or smaller, social groups. Despite this prevalence, published research prior to the work reported in this thesis had generally led researchers and commentators to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of such apologies. In the course of this thesis, I have shown that there are indeed some important differences in how interpersonal and intergroup apologies are received, with intergroup apologies being much less likely to give rise to forgiveness. This appears to confirm the pessimistic view of intergroup apologies. Nevertheless, I also show that intergroup apologies can be effective, provided they have the right

content, are delivered in the right way, and are seen as part of an extended effort to achieve intergroup reconciliation. I would therefore argue that the view that intergroup apologies are ineffective is unduly pessimistic. They are not a panacea and in the case of serious intergroup conflicts they are unlikely to be effective unless they form part of a broader reconciliation attempt. However, I have shown that they can be effective and therefore argue that my thesis contributes to our understanding of intergroup apologies.

I began this thesis by quoting from Tolstoy, who noted that one pitfall of apologies that it is easy to apologise and to wish the alleviation of pain and suffering that you may have caused, but not so easy to actively do anything about it. My hope is that this thesis will help to engender a more positive outlook on intergroup apologies and thereby to offer a way in which the pain and suffering that frequently accompanies intergroup conflict can be eased.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Study 1 Manipulation

Apology Desire

CUSA DIALOGUE

CUSA DIALOGUE

The Official CUSA
Newsletter

Issue 46, Summer 2017

Why Has UOttawa Forsaken Us? CUSA Demands Apology After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from Taking their Courses.

Want to know how to insult an entire university? Ask the University of Ottawa. Last week, the President of the University, Jacques Frémont, announced that Carleton University students would no longer be able to take courses at The University of Ottawa.

Frémont announced at a board meeting in August that, "The University of Ottawa feels this move will help the University to progress. For a long time, we have prided ourselves on the caliber of students taking our courses and we feel that the move to halt Carleton University help maintain this high level."

The statement was posted on the University of Ottawa Facebook page and post quickly received over a thousand 'likes' and approving comments, many from University of Ottawa students, staff, faculty and alumni.

New President of Carleton University, Dr. Alastair Summerlee, initially called the policy "both unfortunate and disrespectful" and suggested that he would do all that he could to reverse the decision. Echoing Dr. Summerlee, the Carleton University Students Association (CUSA) said in a prepared statement: "University rivalry is one thing, but throwing our school's academic reputation under the bus is another."

Following this announcement students at Carleton understandably reacted in uproar, at both the policy and the suggestion that they were less-able than their University of Ottawa counterparts. Protests and petitions were widely supported.

A joint statement was issued by Carleton administration and CUSA demanding an apology for the policy. It read: "Relationship between our two universities will remain damaged until a sincere apology has been offered."

In this issue:

-  Important Dates and Deadlines 2
-  CUSA Health, Dental and Accident Insurance Plan 2
- Clubs & Societies**
-  CUSA Statement on Events at Oliver's Pub Comedy Night 3
-  Carleton GRAD info session 4

Apology Not Enough

CUSA DIALOGUE

CUSA DIALOGUE

The Official CUSA Newsletter

Issue 46, Summer 2017

Why Has UOttawa Forsaken Us? "An Apology Is Not Enough" For CUSA After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from Taking their Courses

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Following this announcement students at Carleton understandably reacted in uproar, at both the policy and the suggestion that they were less-able than their University of Ottawa counterparts. Protests and petitions were widely supported.

A joint statement was issued by Carleton administration and CUSA rejecting the notion of an apology for the policy. It read: "An apology would not be enough to repair the damage between our two universities."

In this issue:



Important Dates and Deadlines

2



CUSA Health, Dental and Accident Insurance Plan

2

Clubs & Societies



CUSA Statement on Events at Oliver's Pub Comedy Night

3



Carleton GRAD info session

4

Appendix 2

Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). Used in Studies 1, 10, 11, 12.

(A) = Victim Group

(B) = Transgressing Group

All to be marked on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

1. (A) should make (B) pay
2. (A) should keep as much distance from (B) as possible
3. Even though the actions of (B) have hurt, the (A) people should have goodwill for them
4. (A) should wish something bad would happen to (B)
5. (A) is best living as if (B) doesn't or didn't exist
6. The hatchet should be buried and (A) should move forward
7. (A) shouldn't trust (B)
8. Despite what happened, (A) should have a positive relationship with (B)
9. (B) should get what they deserve
10. (A) should find it difficult to act warmly towards (B)
11. (A) should avoid (B)
12. (A) should put any hurt aside so their relationship can resume
13. (A) will get even one day
14. (A) should give up its hurt and resentment
15. (A) should cut off any relationship with (B)
16. The (A) people should release their anger so they can work on restoring the relationship
17. (A) should want to see (B) hurt and miserable
18. (A) should withdraw contact with (B)

Scoring Instructions:

Avoidance Motivations: 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 15, and 18.

Revenge Motivations: 1, 4, 9, 13, and 17.

Benevolence Motivations: 3, 6, 8, 12, 14, and 16.

For a sum of the Trim-18 Forgiveness Scale, answers to all avoidance and revenge motivations questions were reverse coded and added to the answers of the benevolence motivations.

Appendix 3

Study 2 Statement Reactions.

Condition: "We're really sorry about what we did!"

"Okay, let's go to the end"

"You're mean"

"Thanks, lets go to the end"

"Stop Stealing!"

"You've mugged us off, lets just cooperate"

"No worries"

"Okay, let's go to the end"

"Let's work together"

"Why are you stopping?"

"Thanks"

"Better go to the end next round, bitches!"

"Can we trust you"

"That's okay, can we just cooperate now?"

Condition: "We're trying to get the best outcome!"

"Waiting for an apology..."

"Well if we go to the end we both do better."

"Bit harsh"

"Do you understand the game?"

"Stop being so greedy, this is no fun, you're mean!"

"It's fairly even anyway"

"We feel pretty much the same"

"We want to cooperate"

"No chocolate biscuit for any of you"

"It's only a game."

"Please can we cooperate."

"Why are you choosing to stop?"

"That's crap, we're both doing badly now"

Appendix 4

Study 3 Kensington and Chelsea Council Manipulation (Manipulations shown in Red)

News › London

**‘[I/We] are truly sorry’:
[New/(blank)] Kensington and
Chelsea leader makes humble
apology as probe into Grenfell
Tower disaster widened**



In the first public statement since the fire, the [new/(blank)] council leader was said to feel "truly sorry" and pledged to "heal the wounds" in the community.

"The first thing [I/we] want to do is apologise, this is our community and we have failed it when people needed us the most. So, no buts, no ifs, no excuses – [I am/We are] truly sorry."

The leader continued: "As the [new/(blank)] leader, I can say that things are going to change."

Appendix 5

Study 3. Exploratory analyses of individual 'positive perceptions' items, including means and SDs (in parentheses).

Measure	Condition			
	New Leader		Control	
	Interpersonal	Intergroup	Interpersonal	Intergroup
<i>Sincerity</i>				
Council Leader	3.02 (1.06)	2.85 (.91)	2.70 (1.15)	2.60 (1.04)
Council	2.53 (1.04)	2.40 (.93)	2.63 (1.11)	2.37 (1.02)
<i>Remorse</i>				
Council Leader	3.08 (1.10)	2.95 (.89)	2.98 (1.11)	2.82 (.98)
Council	2.67 (1.09)	2.59 (1.00)	2.73 (1.09)	2.65 (1.08)
<i>Trust</i>				
Council Leader	2.99 (1.06)	2.66 (.80)	2.63 (1.03)	2.34 (.89)
Council	2.64 (1.06)	2.37 (.96)	2.56 (1.13)	2.23 (.97)
<i>Believability</i>				
Council Leader	2.97 (1.11)	2.71 (.84)	2.69 (1.08)	2.31 (.93)
Council	2.76 (1.04)	2.39 (.88)	2.56 (1.08)	2.37 (1.07)

Sincerity: Council Leader. Significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = 4.66, p = .032, \eta_p^2 = .02$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 1.11, p = .294, \eta_p^2 < .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .07, p = .799, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Sincerity: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = .06, p = .802, \eta_p^2 < .01$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 2.30, p = .131, \eta_p^2 = .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .24, p = .623, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Remorse: Council Leader. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = .82, p = .366, \eta_p^2 < .01$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 1.31, p = .253, \eta_p^2 = .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .03, p = .853, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Remorse: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = .24, p = .625, \eta_p^2 < .01$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = .42, p = .519, \eta_p^2 < .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .01, p = .981, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Trust: Council Leader. Significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = 8.40, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .03$; Significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 6.69, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .03$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .02, p = .876, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Appendices

Trust: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = .69, p = .407, \eta_p^2 < .01$; significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 5.49, p = .020, \eta_p^2 = .02$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .06, p = .801, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Believability: Council Leader. Significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = 7.59, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .03$; significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 6.72, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .03$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .23, p = .635, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Believability: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, $F(1,256) = .69, p = .406, \eta_p^2 < .01$; significant effect of apology type, $F(1,256) = 5.01, p = .026, \eta_p^2 = .02$; non-significant interaction, $F(1, 256) = .50, p = .478, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Appendix 6

Study 4 UBER manipulation

Denial of Responsibility

Following the decision on by London's transport authority to not renew Uber's license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published a letter in the *Evening Standard* stating the company's confusion as to why this course of action has been taken, finishing with:

"This ruling shows that London is closed to innovative companies".

Apology

Following the decision on by London's transport authority to not renew Uber's license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published a letter in the *Evening Standard* apologizing for the company's myriad of mistakes, finishing with:

"On behalf of everyone at Uber globally, I apologise for the mistakes we've made."

Both

Following the decision on by London's transport authority to not renew Uber's license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published a letter in the *Evening Standard* stating the company's confusion as to why this course of action has been taken, finishing with:

"This ruling shows that London is closed to innovative companies".

A few days later, Khosrowshahi has published a second letter in the *Evening Standard*, accepting the ruling and apologizing for the company's myriad of mistakes, finishing with:

"On behalf of everyone at Uber globally, I apologise for the mistakes we've made."

Appendix 7

Study 5 Manipulation (Source vs. Type)

Main Body [unmanipulated but edited accordingly whether the source was the IRA (large group), the INLA (small group), or an individual soldier (interpersonal)]:

The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives, and we recognise their grief and pain.

The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of others.

We are endeavouring to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in Ireland. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the acceptance of our own past mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused to others.

Structural Conclusion:

To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are deeply sorry. We understand that people have lost the most basic of human rights, the right to life, because of our actions. Therefore, we would like to restore and compensate the communities and families that have been left disadvantaged as a result of our actions. We will seek to promote any initiatives that increase equality between everyone.

Relational Conclusion:

To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are deeply sorry. We will endeavour to promote contact with between us and any of the victims of our actions. We would like to help the communities that have been affected. We will seek to promote any initiatives that would help build trust between members of all communities in the future.

Identity Conclusion:

To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are deeply sorry. We would like all to know that the IRA acknowledges that it owes a moral debt and that it is willing to take action to remove all threats (real or imagined) to anyone's identity. As part of this process we will seek to endorse the rights of all those living within these islands.

Appendix 8

Adapted Intergroup Forgiveness Scale for Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2004)

Used in Studies 5, 6 and 7.

Where (A) is the transgressor.

1. The political violence should never be retaliated against.
2. It is important that the wrongs done to us are never forgotten.
3. (A) must be forgiven, in order to be free of political violence.
4. (A) should never be forgiven.
5. The apology has made me want to forgive (A) more.
6. Britain would be weaker if these wrongdoings were forgiven and forgotten.
7. (A) are completely at fault for 'The Troubles'.
8. It is important that the atrocities are avenged.
9. Britain and Northern Ireland will never move on until the events are forgotten.
10. Britain and Northern Ireland will never move on until the events are forgiven.

Questions 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 need to be reverse coded

Appendix 9

Study 5. Exploratory analyses of ‘positive perceptions’ items, including means and SDs (in parentheses).

	Large Group			Small Group			Individual		
	Structural	Relational	Identity	Structural	Relational	Identity	Structural	Relational	Identity
Sincerity	3.41 (.87)	2.62 (1.12)	3.07 (.75)	3.17 (1.00)	3.52 (.87)	3.50 (.84)	4.00 (.90)	4.10 (.77)	4.03 (.62)
Remorse	3.59 (.87)	2.79 (1.08)	3.41 (1.05)	3.38 (.82)	3.48 (1.02)	3.64 (1.03)	4.04 (.58)	4.03 (.78)	4.00 (.64)
Trust	3.24 (1.09)	2.34 (1.05)	3.00 (.80)	3.10 (.94)	3.10 (.77)	2.93 (1.18)	3.82 (.86)	3.83 (1.00)	3.80 (.61)
Believability	3.21 (1.01)	2.76 (.87)	3.17 (.76)	3.14 (.79)	3.21 (.77)	3.07 (.94)	3.61 (.88)	3.52 (.83)	3.70 (.65)

Sincerity: Significant effect of apology source, $F(2,251) = 30.18, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .19$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(2, 251) = .53, p = .589, \eta_p^2 < .01$; significant interaction, $F(4, 251) = 3.54, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .05$ [driven by Large Group condition, where structural apology differs significantly from relational]

Remorse: Significant effect of apology source, $F(2,251) = 16.51, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .12$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(2, 251) = 2.10, p = .124, \eta_p^2 = .02$; significant interaction, $F(4, 251) = 2.46, p = .046, \eta_p^2 = .04$ [driven by Large Group condition, where relational apology differs significantly from structural and identity apologies]

Trust: Significant effect of apology source, $F(2,251) = 25.41, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(2, 251) = 2.17, p = .116, \eta_p^2 = .02$; significant interaction, $F(4, 251) = 2.63, p = .035, \eta_p^2 = .04$ [driven by Large Group condition, where structural apology differs significantly from relational]

Believability: Significant effect of apology source, $F(2,251) = 11.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$; non-significant effect of apology type, $F(2, 251) = .99, p = .373, \eta_p^2 = .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(4, 251) = 1.05, p = .383, \eta_p^2 = .02$

Appendix 10

Study 6 Manipulation (Combined vs. Remorse)

Control Main Body:

The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives, and we recognise their grief and pain.

Despite our regrets, the future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of others.

We are endeavouring to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in Ireland. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the acceptance of our own past mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused to others.

High Remorse Main Body:

The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We are deeply ashamed about the suffering that our actions have caused.

Despite our immense feelings of guilt and regret, the future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of others.

We are endeavouring to fulfil this serious responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in Ireland. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the acceptance of our own past mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused to others.

Control Conclusion:

To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. We feel remorse about the fact that people have lost the most basic of human rights, the right to life, because of our actions. Because of this we will endeavour to promote contact between us and any of the victims of our actions. We would therefore like to help the affected communities, through restoration and compensation. We acknowledge our debt and we will also take action to remove all threats to anyone's identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that increase equality and trust between members of all communities in the future and as a part of this process we endorse the rights of all those living within these islands.

High Remorse Conclusion:

To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are deeply sorry. We feel sincere remorse about the fact that people have lost the most basic of human rights, the right to life, because of our actions. Because of this we will endeavour to promote contact between us and any of the victims of our actions. We would therefore like to help the affected communities, through restoration and compensation. We acknowledge our moral debt and we will also take action to remove all threats to anyone's identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that increase equality and trust between members of all communities in the future and as a part of this process we endorse the rights of all those living within these islands.

Appendix 11

Study 6. Exploratory analyses of 'positive perceptions' items, including means and SDs (in parentheses).

	Apology Factors Included		Apology Factors Not Included	
	High Remorse	Control	High Remorse	Control
Sincerity	3.16 (1.09)	3.41 (.83)	3.29 (.87)	2.61 (.99)
Remorse	3.36 (1.09)	3.46 (.89)	3.40 (.89)	2.80 (1.05)
Trust	3.00 (1.15)	3.26 (.98)	3.11 (.91)	2.55 (.90)
Believability	3.07 (.99)	3.24 (.90)	3.20 (.69)	2.73 (.76)

Sincerity: Significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,176) = 5.32, p = .020, \eta_p^2 = .03$; non-significant effect of remorse, $F(1, 176) = 2.18, p = .142, \eta_p^2 = .01$; significant interaction, $F(1, 176) = 10.85, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$ [driven by the apology factors not included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high remorse].

Remorse: Significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,176) = 4.44, p = .037, \eta_p^2 = .03$; non-significant effect of remorse, $F(1, 176) = 2.96, p = .087, \eta_p^2 = .02$; significant interaction, $F(1, 176) = 5.81, p = .017, \eta_p^2 = .03$ [driven by the apology factors not included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high remorse].

Trust: Significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,176) = 4.20, p = .042, \eta_p^2 = .02$; non-significant effect of remorse, $F(1, 176) = 1.07, p = .303, \eta_p^2 = .01$; significant interaction, $F(1, 176) = 7.85, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .04$ [driven by the apology factors not included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high remorse].

Believability: Non-significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,176) = 2.27, p = .134, \eta_p^2 = .01$; non-significant effect of remorse, $F(1, 176) = 1.43, p = .234, \eta_p^2 = .01$; significant interaction, $F(1, 176) = 6.59, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .04$ [driven by the apology factors not included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high remorse].

Appendix 12

Study 7 Manipulation (Combined vs. Emotion)

Control Main Body:

The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We regret the suffering that our actions caused.

The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved.

Guilt Main Body:

The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We regret the suffering that our actions caused. There is an immense feeling of guilt over the fact that we as a group were able to commit the acts that we did

The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved.

Shame Main Body:

The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We regret the suffering that our actions caused. There is an immense feeling of shame over the fact that we as a group were able to commit the acts that we did

The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved.

Control Conclusion:

To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those that have been hurt, directly or indirectly. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in Ireland. We remain committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes both the honest recognition of our own past mistakes, as well as the acceptance of the mistakes caused by others. All deaths during the troubles are regretted and should not have happened, and we underline the now important need to implement agreement in full to ensure that there are no future deaths from violence in Northern Ireland.

Apology Factors Conclusion:

To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. We regret the fact that people lost the most basic of human rights, the right to life, because of our actions during the conflict. Because of this we will endeavour to promote contact between us and any of the victims. We would like therefore like to help the affected communities, through restoration and compensation. We acknowledge our moral debt and we will also take action to remove all threats to anyone's identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that increase equality and trust between members of all communities in the future and as a part of this process we endorse the rights of all those living within these islands.

Appendix 13

Study 7. Exploratory analyses of ‘positive perceptions’ items, including means and SDs (in parentheses).

	Apology Factors Included			Apology Factors Not Included		
	Expressed Guilt	Expressed Shame	Control	Expressed Guilt	Expressed Shame	Control
Sincerity	3.16 (.87)	3.16 (.69)	2.97 (.89)	2.87 (.95)	3.29 (1.06)	2.56 (.91)
Remorse	3.35 (.82)	3.54 (.84)	2.97 (.89)	2.92 (.98)	3.37 (1.08)	2.59 (.94)
Trust	2.92 (.92)	3.03 (.83)	3.03 (.89)	2.67 (.90)	2.95 (.96)	2.59 (.91)
Believability	3.00 (.94)	3.16 (.69)	2.95 (.87)	2.72 (.86)	3.18 (1.01)	2.56 (.94)

Sincerity: Non-significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,222) = 2.55, p = .112, \eta_p^2 = .01$; significant effect of emotion, $F(2, 222) = 4.89, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .04$, [shame significantly larger than control]; non-significant interaction, $F(2, 222) = 1.50, p = .160, \eta_p^2 = .02$.

Remorse: Significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,222) = 7.11, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .03$, [factors included significantly larger than not included]; significant effect of emotion, $F(2, 222) = 9.98, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$, [shame and guilt significantly larger than control]; non-significant interaction, $F(2, 222) = .41, p = .665, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

Trust: Significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,222) = 4.59, p = .033, \eta_p^2 = .02$, [factors included significantly larger than not included]; non-significant effect of emotion, $F(2, 222) = 1.08, p = .340, \eta_p^2 = .01$; non-significant interaction, $F(2, 222) = .74, p = .477, \eta_p^2 = .01$.

Believability: Non-significant effect of apology factors, $F(1,222) = 3.30, p = .071, \eta_p^2 = .02$; significant effect of emotion, $F(2, 222) = 4.51, p = .012, \eta_p^2 = .04$, [shame significantly larger than control]; non-significant interaction, $F(2, 222) = 1.06, p = .348, \eta_p^2 = .01$.

Appendix 14

Study 8 Game Behaviour Raw Data.

“S” denotes that the group stole, and the accompanying number denotes the round number on which they exited. “C” denotes a fully completed round.

Session 1						Session 2					
Phase	Game		Group 1	Group 2		Phase	Game		Group 3	Group 4	
1	1	b		S3	a	1	1	b	C5	C5	a
	2	a	S1		b		2	a		S4	b
	3	b		S1	a		3	b		S1	a
	4	a		S2	b		4	a		S2	b
	5	b		S1	a		5	b		S1	a
	6	a	S1		b		6	a		S2	b
Expression	Pride		3	2		Expression	Pride		2	4	
	Guilt		5	5			Guilt		1	6	
	Shame		4	6			Shame		1	5	
2	7	b	C5	C5	a	2	7	b	C5	C5	a
	8	a		S4	b		8	a		S4	b
	9	b	C5	C5	a		9	b		S3	a
	10	a		S4	b		10	a		S4	b
	11	b	S2		a		11	a		S2	b
	12	a		S2	b		12	b		S1	a

Session 3						Session 4					
Phase	Game		Group 5	Group 6		Phase	Game		Group 7	Group 8	
1	1	b	S4		a	1	1	a	S3		b
	2	a	S3		b		2	b	C5	C5	a
	3	b	S4		a		3	a		S4	b
	4	a	C5	C5	b		4	b	C5	C5	a
	5	b	S4		a		5	a		S4	b
	6	a	C5	C5	b		6	b	C5	C5	a
Expression	Pride		5	4		Expression	Pride		4	5	
	Guilt		2	1			Guilt		2	1	
	Shame		2	1			Shame		2	1	
2	7	b	S4		a	2	7	b	S2		a
	8	a	C5	C5	b		8	a		S2	b
	9	b	S4		a		9	b	S2		a
	10	a	S3		b		10	a	S1		b
	11	b		S1	a		11	b	S2		a
	12	a		S2	b		12	a	S1		b

Appendices

Session 5						Session 6					
Phase	Game		Group 9	Group 10		Phase	Game		Group 11	Group 12	
1	1	b		S3	a	1	1	b	C5	C5	a
	2	a	S3		b		2	a	S3		b
	3	b		S3	a		3	b	C5	C5	a
	4	a	S3		b		4	a		S2	b
	5	b		S3	a		5	b		S1	a
	6	a	S1		b		6	a	S1		b
Expression	Pride		4	1		Expression	Pride		4	5	
	Guilt		1	1			Guilt		1	2	
	Shame		1	1			Shame		1	2	
2	7	b	S4		a	2	7	a		S4	b
	8	a	S3		b		8	b	S2		a
	9	b		S1	a		9	a		S2	b
	10	a		S2	b		10	b		S1	a
	11	b	S2		a		11	a	S1		b
	12	a		S2	b		12	b		S1	a

Session 7						Session 8					
Phase	Game		Group 13	Group 14		Phase	Game		Group 15	Group 16	
1	1	a	C5	C5	b	1	1	a		S4	b
	2	b	S4		a		2	b	C5	C5	a
	3	a	S3		b		3	a		S4	b
	4	b		S3	a		4	b	C5	C5	a
	5	a	S1		b		5	a		S4	b
	6	b		S1	a		6	b	S2		a
Expression	Pride		3	3		Expression	Pride		5	6	
	Guilt		5	5			Guilt		2	1	
	Shame		6	5			Shame		1	1	
2	7	a	C5	C5	b	2	7	a	S1		b
	8	b	C5	C5	a		8	b		S1	a
	9	a	C5	C5	b		9	a	S3		b
	10	b	C5	C5	a		10	b		S1	a
	11	a	C5	C5	b		11	a	S1		b
	12	b	S4		a		12	b		S1	a

Session 9						Session 10					
Phase	Game		Group 17	Group 18		Phase	Game		Group 19	Group 20	
1	1	b	S2		a	1	1	b	S2		a
	2	a	S1		b		2	a	C5	C5	b
	3	b		S1	a		3	b	S4		a
	4	a	S1		b		4	a	S3		b
	5	b		S1	a		5	b	C5	C5	a
	6	a	S1		b		6	a		S2	b
Expression	Pride		4	2		Expression	Pride		6	3	
	Guilt		4	2			Guilt		2	4	
	Shame		3	2			Shame		1	3	
2	7	b		S1	a	2	7	b	S2		a
	8	a	S1		b		8	a		S4	b
	9	b	S2		a		9	b	S2		a
	10	a		S2	b		10	a		S4	b
	11	b	S2		a		11	b		S1	a
	12	a		S2	b		12	a		S2	b

Session 11						Session 12					
Phase	Game		Group 21	Group 22		Phase	Game		Group 23	Group 24	
1	1	a	C5	C5	b	1	1	a	C5	C5	b
	2	b	C5	C5	a		2	b	C5	C5	a
	3	a	C5	C5	b		3	a	C5	C5	b
	4	b	S4		a		4	b	C5	C5	a
	5	a	C5	C5	b		5	a		S2	b
	6	b	S4		a		6	b		S1	a
Expression	Pride		5	1		Expression	Pride		5	5	
	Guilt		3	1			Guilt		1	5	
	Shame		1	1			Shame		2	2	
2	7	a	C5	C5	b	2	7	b	C5	C5	a
	8	b	S4		a		8	a	C5	C5	b
	9	a	C5	C5	b		9	b		S3	a
	10	b	S4		a		10	a	S1		b
	11	a	C5	C5	b		11	b	S2		a
	12	b		S1	a		12	a	S1		b

Session 13						Session 14					
Phase	Game		Group 25	Group 26		Phase	Game		Group 27	Group 28	
1	1	b	C5	C5	a	1	1	a		S4	b
	2	a		S4	b		2	b	S2		a
	3	b	S4		a		3	a		S2	b
	4	a		S4	b		4	b	S2		a
	5	b	S2		a		5	a		S2	b
	6	a	S1		b		6	b	S2		a
Expression	Pride		2	3		Expression	Pride				
	Guilt		6	4			Guilt				
	Shame		6	5			Shame				
2	7	b	C5	C5	a	2	7	b		S1	a
	8	a	C5	C5	b		8	a	S1		b
	9	b	C5	C5	a		9	b	S2		a
	10	a	C5	C5	b		10	a	S1		b
	11	b	S2		a		11	b		S1	a
	12	a	S1		b		12	a	S1		b

Appendix 15

Study 10 Staircase Model Manipulation

Step 0: Control Condition

To present day, there has been no contact between the Thai and Cambodian Governments concerning the events at Preah Vihear.

Step 1: Accepting Collective Guilt

In early 2014, Thailand made contact with Cambodia and admitted their fault for crossing into the district whilst armed. The Thai government issued a statement in which they recognised their wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt for the dispute. Specifically, they disclosed that the blame for the conflict “lay with them” and that the deaths of soldiers and civilians from both countries was both “regrettable and a direct consequence of Thai actions”

Step 2: Settings History Records Straight

In addition to accepting guilt, Thai officials signed a copy of the ICJ’s official document stating the events that occurred at Preah Vihear and that they recognised that the Temple belonged to Cambodia and that they would make no further claim on it. Representatives of both the Thai and Cambodian worked together to ensure what was drawn up in the ICJ’s document was factual and accurate.

Step 3: Discussing Reparations

In May 2014, the Thai government offered to pay for all reparations needed for the Preah Vihear Temple by a way of reconciliation, and to offer a significant amount of money to each Cambodian family who had lost a family member in the conflict. In addition to this, they stated that they will soon remove any military camps that were located near the Cambodian border, ensuring the safety of the Cambodian people.

Step 4: Intergroup Apology

The Prime Minister of Thailand used the following public statement to apologise to Cambodia for the conflict:

“I, as well as the rest of the Thai Government acknowledge that there have been faults and grievous errors in the effort to seize land. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We are ashamed about the suffering that our actions have caused.

We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The Thai Government is committed unequivocally to rebuilding our relationship with Cambodia. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of our own past mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.”

Step 5: Post-Apology Engagement

A year after Thailand’s offer of reparations, all families that had lost a family member in the conflict that sought financial compensation had received it as promised. Later that year, the Preah Vihear Temple had been given World Heritage status, with Thailand paying when any repairs were necessary. As a form of acknowledgement of their role, the Thai Government send flowers and representatives to attend any memorial services regarding those who had died as a result of the events at Preah Vihear, so that the relationship between them and Cambodia could become harmonious and avoid any further conflict.

Appendix 16

Study 11 Staircase Model Manipulation

Step 0: Control Condition

To present day, there has been no contact between the remaining IRA group and the British government or people.

Step 1: Accepting Collective Guilt

In late 2005, the IRA made contact with the British Government and admitted their fault for the atrocities they caused in Britain. The IRA issued a statement in which they recognised their wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt for the actions. Specifically, they disclosed that the blame for the acts that occurred in Britain “lay with them” and that the deaths were “regrettable and a direct consequence of IRA actions”.

Step 2: Settings History Records Straight

In addition to accepting guilt, IRA officials signed a copy of Britain’s official document stating that they recognised that they were at fault for the attacks and bombings that they conducted. Representatives of both the IRA and the British government worked together to ensure what was drawn up in the document was factual and accurate.

Step 3: Discussing Reparations

In early 2006, the IRA offered to pay for all reparations for their attacks in Britain by a way of reconciliation, and to offer a significant amount of money to each British family who had lost a family member in the conflict. In addition to this, they stated that they will soon complete the disarmament of all of their weapons, ensuring the safety of the British people and their identity.

Step 4: Intergroup Apology

An IRA spokesperson used the following public statement to apologise to the British people for the conflict:

“The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in the prosecution of war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We are ashamed about the suffering that our actions have caused.

We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice, and peace. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of our own past mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.”

Step 5: Post-Apology Engagement

A year after the IRA’s offer of reparations, all families that had lost a family member in the conflict that sought financial compensation had received it as promised. Later that year, the international weapons inspectors confirmed the groups ‘full disarmament’ status. As a form of acknowledgment of their role, the remaining IRA group send flowers and representatives to attend any remembrance services of the British people who had died as a result of their actions, so that the relationship between them and the British could become harmonious and avoid any further conflict.

Appendix 17

Study 12 Staircase Model Manipulation

Apology

An IRA spokesperson used the following public statement to apologise to all of the victims of conflict:

“The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in the prosecution of war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We are ashamed about the suffering that our actions have caused.

We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice, and peace. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of our own past mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.”

Accepting Guilt

In late 2005, the IRA made contact with the British Government and admitted their fault the atrocities that they caused. Following this, both the IRA and the British Government issued statements in which they recognised their wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt for particular actions during ‘The Troubles’. Specifically, both disclosed that the blame for particular acts “lay with them” and that the deaths were “regrettable and a direct consequence of our actions”.

Setting History Records

In addition to accepting guilt, officials of both the IRA and the British government met to discuss the official documentation of events during ‘The Troubles’. The representatives worked together to ensure that what was drawn up into the document was factual and accurate. After these discussions, both parties signed a copy of the official document.

Discussing Reparations

In early 2006, representatives of the IRA and the British Government again met, this time to discuss reparations. The negotiations allowed both parties to suggest what was needed of one another to continue the reconciliation process. These discussions ended in a positive manner, with certain promises made, the British Government offering a more devolved government in Northern Ireland, and the IRA offering a complete disarmament to ensure the safety of civilians in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain.

Control

Following 'The Good Friday Agreement (1998)' to present day, there has been little public contact from the remaining IRA group.

Conditions

Condition 0: Control.

Condition 1: Apology.

Condition 2: Accepting Guilt, Apology.

Condition 3: Accepting Guilt, Setting History Records, Apology.

Condition 4: Accepting Guilt, Setting History Records, Discussing Reparations, Apology.

Condition 5: Discussing Reparations, Setting History Records, Accepting Guilt, Apology.