Poverty, oil and corruption; the need for a Quad-Sector Development Partnership (QSDP) in Nigeria’s Niger Delta

Adrian Gonzalez, Cardiff University.

ABSTRACT This article will start by charting the conflicting position in Nigeria’s Niger Delta between its petroleum wealth and poverty of its inhabitants before observing how governmental corruption has hampered successive development agencies from rectifying this situation. The article then moves into an examination of trans-national company (TNC) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives via a case-study of the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). This will conclude that whilst there are useful projects being established, their success is felt at a micro level that cannot supplant wider central government development. Finally the paper will set out why “Quad-Sector Development Partnerships” (QSDP), a theory which builds on CSR by establishing closer development integration between the state and TNCs will help to neutralise the national problem of corruption so that Niger-Delta socio-economic development can be improved.

Key words: Nigeria, Niger Delta, development, corporate social responsibility, Shell Petroleum Development Company

1 Introduction; the Niger Delta; resource wealth, extreme poverty and corruption

Although there was a great deal of optimism in 1960 about the development prospects of the newly independent country, forty years on Nigeria is still largely underdeveloped. (Ahunwan, 2002: 270)

A country’s reliance on nonfuel mineral exports—also tends to create atypically high poverty rates. One reason for this pattern is that resource rich governments do an unusually poor job of providing education and health care for their citizens. (Ross, 2003: 20)
In order to comprehend the necessity for a Nigerian Quad-Sector Development Partnership (QSDP), one must first understand the contradictory situation between the Niger Delta’s high resource wealth (petroleum) and the vast majority of residents who reside in extreme poverty (Nweke, 2012)\(^1\) and environmental degradation. Oil accounts for an estimated 40 percent of gross domestic product, 95 percent of exports and 83 percent of government revenue in Nigeria (Idemudia, 2009: 7). The most recent 2014 figures for crude oil production show that over 2,427 thousand barrels a day (tbd) were produced in the Niger Delta making Nigeria the world’s thirteenth highest producer (EIA, 2014) that had an export market value of US$76.925 million (OPEC, 2015: 17). In total, since the start of petroleum production in the 1960s, over $600 billion has been generated in state revenue (Amnesty and Friends of the Earth, 2011: 4) reiterating its crucial economic role for Nigeria.

Unfortunately this resource wealth has not led to constructive economic and social development for Niger Delta citizens as recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Nigerian Human Development Index (HDI) scores (UNDP, 2013: 23; UNDP, no date a; UNDP, no date b) and regional Niger Delta Human Poverty Index (HPI) (UNDP, 2006; UNDP, no date c) figures show. In addition, a wealth of academic literature attests to the extremely low standard of living and deplorable environmental situation found within the Niger Delta (Agbu, 2005; Ebegbulem et al., 2013: 280; Eweje, 2006: 27-56; Jike, 2004: 686-701; Obi, 1999). From a theoretical perspective, analysts have explored this situation through the “natural resource curse”, an intricate phenomenon that has, at the broadest level, seen natural resource abundant countries growing less economically rapidly than resource-scarce economies (Boschini et al., 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Ding and Field, 2005; Sachs and Warner, 2005).

\(^1\) Extreme poverty is described as the ‘inability to attain a minimum standard of living explains the crisis of food, clothing and shelter amongst most Nigerian’s as indicators of extreme poverty. Also associated with extreme poverty are low levels of; life expectancy, education, political participation and access to health care and increase in infant mortality. As such, a poor person is that who cannot access basic human needs required for survival and who is voiceless and powerless resulting from inability to participate or excluded from public decisions that could improve his standard of living’ (Nweke, 2012: 8).
2001; Shaxson, 2007) and which has helped caused three generalised phenomena.

The first two problems found through the natural resource curse are income volatility, particularly from commodity prices (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009) and secondly, a greater susceptibility to “Dutch disease”, an experience first coined through the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960s in which their non-tradable oil sectors declined after the exploitation of newly discovered gas deposits in the North Sea (Olusi, and Olaguni, 2005: 160; Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), a symptom that some researchers found to be present in Nigeria (Olusi and Olagunju, 2005). However, it is the resource curses third impact, its ability to hamper national governance and political institutions through increased state and societal corruption (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; Kolstad and Soreide, 2009; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robbins, 2000; Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) that has most significance in explaining the Niger Delta situation.

Academics have made a clear distinction between ‘producer friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production are complementary activities, and grabber friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production are competing activities’ (Mehlum et al., 2006: 2-3). Crucially, research has shown that in countries with poor or weak democratic institutions like Nigeria (Fukuyama, 2014: 225-226; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, no date; Ogundiya et al., 2011; Robinson et. al., 2006: 465-466; The World Bank, 2015: 4-6), resource rents like oil lead to perverse political incentives (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Robinson et. al., 2006) and an increase in corruption (Bhattacharyaa and Hodler, 2008). Evidence of the latter problem is observable in Nigeria where international data (The World Bank, 2015: 7) and academic literature (Aluko, 2002; Eker, 1981; Fagbadebo, 2007; Fukuyama, 2014: 223-224; Ogundiya, 2009; Osoba, 1996; Smith, 2007) testifies to the huge levels of governmental corruption. According to the most recent Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) data, Nigeria is ranked 136 out of 176 countries and is seen as “highly corrupt” (Transparency International, 2014), a
conclusion also shared by Human Rights Watch who noted that public officials and government institutions were ‘so pervasively marked by violence and corruption as to resemble criminal activity [rather] than democratic governance’ (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 1). The scale of this problem is evident from the chairmen of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFFC) who estimated that more than $380 billion of public funds has been stolen or wasted by successive governments since independence in 1960 (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009: 214). Similarly, Lamido Sanusi, Nigeria’s central bank governor was dismissed after noting that as much as $20 billion has gone missing from the national oil company (Fukuyama, 2014: 224) NPPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation).

This issue of corruption has permeated into successive Niger Delta development agencies whose efforts at conducting widespread improvements to social, economic and environmental aspects of the region have been affected (Frynas, 2001; Aghalino, 2009). The situation under the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) established in 2000 has seen some improvement. Academics have argued that despite its limited financial budget (see Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco, 2011: 71, 74) this has not stopped it from being seen to perform better than any of its predecessors due to a high number of completed projects reported by the agency (Higgins 2009: 5; Olusakin, 2006: 19). Even so, the NDDC is not without its critics (see Imobighe, 2004: 108) who note that it has only been able to achieve a minute level of the necessary social and economic development after the chronic lack of investment from previous decades (Omotola, 2009: 43; Omotola, 2006:18). Moreover, as in previous development agencies, the NDDC has been plagued by corruption and political bureaucracy (Omotola, 2009: 43; Duruigbo, 2004-2005: 162) whilst projects and contractors remain selected.

\[2\] On the Niger Delta Development Board established in 1961 see Frynas, 2001: 36). On the 1973 Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA) and 1984 River Basin Rural Development Authorities (RBRDAS) see Aghalino, 2009: 58. On the 1992 Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) see Frynas, 2001: 37-39 and Aghalino, 2009: 59. OMPADEC’s first two Chairmen, Albert K Horsfall, who was dismissed in December 1996 and Professor Eric Opia, were both removed due to corruption charges, the latter due to his failure to account for N6.7 billion then worth about $80 million (Frynas, 2001:38).

It is important to stress that the government has responded to the widespread national corruption through the establishment of the EFCC in 2003 and this has reportedly achieved some success (Mohammed, 2013: 129-132). Nonetheless, accusations of EFCC “politicisation” through the targeting of political opponents by former President Olusegun Obasanjo and the ongoing low scores in Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International over the last nine years (2006-2014) throws into doubt how far the organisation has succeeded in stemming the high levels of corruption (Coker et al., 2012: 85; Ogundiya, 2011; Transparency International, no date).

It is plausible to conclude from this contextual overview that the Niger Delta will continue to see small degrees of developmental improvement through the NDDC but that a more consistent, thorough and therefore wide ranging approach will remain beyond its remit due to the prevalence of national corruption. Whilst such a conclusion is based on the brief study of Nigerian government development efforts, it is important to note that the state is not the only development actor in the Niger Delta; trans-national company (TNC) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are also a key cornerstone in the implementation of Niger Delta development. The next section sets out the framework for CSR before conducting a case-study analysis of the Shell Petroleum Development Company’s (SPDC).

Overall, the following section will show that whilst SPDC CSR has had a positive impact its overall effectiveness is felt at a micro rather than macro level of the Niger Delta

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3 The Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCo) is the off-shore arm of Shell’s Nigeria SPDC activities. This article will also refer to SNEPCo under the acronym SPDC. SPDC has been chosen due to the size of the oil operations in the Niger Delta as well as the scope of their CSR work. SPDC have a range of CSR standards and requirements that cover health, safety, security, environment (HSSE) and social performance (SP) which also apply to all of the contractors and companies that work with Shell under joint operational contracts (Shell Nigeria, no date a). These are part of Shell’s overarching General Business Principles in 1976 (updated most recently in 2005) which govern and relate to all of the Shell companies that make up Shell Group and see two of the six business principles incorporate Shells’ relationship with local communities and health, safety, security and the environment (Shell, 2005: 8). In order to reinforce their commitment to these principles, up to 25 percent of executive bonuses for Shell managers is measured against CSR indicators such as greenhouse gas emission, oil spills, injury and diversity (Esty and Winston, 2009: 223).
which will highlight why SDPC CSR programmes need to become more closely integrated with state led development projects. However, the paper will build on the idea of CSR and corporate involvement through the establishment of QSDP, a policy that not only seeks closer development integration between the state and business but also takes into consideration and helps to neutralise the wider national issue of corruption in order to improve the scale and completion of vital socio-economic development.

2 TNC CSR in the Niger Delta; the work of SPDC

It is important to bear in mind that successive decades of Nigerian state development failure coincided with years of TNC sub-standard practice that contributed to the poor environmental and social situation and the hostile reaction to oil extraction from oil communities living in the Niger Delta (Eweje, 2006: 34; Obi, 1997; Omoweh, 1995; Okonta and Douglas, 2012).

Despite some academics claiming that firms do not have social responsibilities (or will have difficulty implementing them) beyond a primary focus of maximising shareholder returns (see Baumol and Blackman, 1991; Henderson, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Friedman, 1962) it became clear to other researchers, businesses, international trade unions, development NGOs and human rights organisations that their practices needed to change and accept social responsibility (Broomhill 2007: 10; Husted and Salazar, 2006; Kotler and Lee, 2005; Lichtenstein et al., 2004: 16; Mullerat, 2011a). This led to the creation of various international standards organisations offering certification and benchmark processes on social and environmental issues⁴ as well as theoretical frameworks that incorporated ethical standards into their practices. These include

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⁴ For example, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provide their own G4 sustainability reporting guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, no date), Social Accountability International (SAI) utilise their SA8000 certification process surrounding human rights and based on the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights (Social Accountability International, no date), Green Globe provide a certification programme on sustainability of travel and tourism businesses (Green Globe, no date) whilst the United Nations Global Framework (UNGC) framework and mechanisms is designed to encourage businesses to adopt CSR policies (United Nations Global Compact, no date).
stakeholder theory (Freeman et al., 2010; Sternberg, 1996), total responsibility management (TRM) (Leigh and Waddock, 2006; Waddock et al., 2002) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) also known as corporate social performance (Swanson, 1999; Wood, 1991). It is this latter CSR approach that is the paper's main focus.

2.1 Corporate social responsibility

CSR originated in 1953 with the publication of Howard R. Bowen's book *Social Responsibilities of Businessmen* (Valor, 2005: 192). It was subsequently developed by S. P. Sethi into a three tier framework which was been expanded upon by A. B. Carroll into a four part pyramid definition comprising economic (foundation), legal, ethical and philanthropic/discretionary sections (Branco and Rodrigues, 2007: 10; Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1975). Whilst there is no definitive definition of CSR (see Kotler and Lee 2005: 3; World Business Council for Sustainable Development no date: 3 for examples), it can be seen as a general term for firms ‘doing good’ (Vanhamme et al., 2011: 260) through voluntary ethical behaviour in a vast array of complex often multi-dimensional social issues such as development, education, health, the environment and their relationship with stakeholders (e.g. local communities, suppliers, consumers) at various spatial levels (local through to international) (Kemp at a., 2012; Kinder, Lyndenber, Domini & Co., Inc 1999; Lichtenstein et al., 2004: 16; Lindgreen et al., 2008: 251; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001: 225-226; Smith 2003; Wood, 1991).

In recent decades, particularly from the 1990s onwards, a combination of corporate scandals in the 1990s (Broomhill, 2007: 10; Utting, 2005: 377), the expansion of NGO actors and their search for a constructive, collaborative and partner-based 'third-way approach' to solving problems (Utting, 2005: 376) and an increased awareness of issues such as sweat shops and child labour helped generate an explosion in activist and civil society group protest and engagement with corporations (Bendell, 2004). Corporations were forced to respond to the bad
publicity surrounding their activities which helped lead to an emergence of CSR discourse and programs (Broomhill, 2007: 11) as well as produce corporate acknowledgement that society had greater expectations on companies assuming public responsibilities (Bielak et al., 2007: 1). This in turn helped lead to an increase in the level of charitable (and thus CSR) business investment\(^5\) in many useful and positive social causes and issues, sometimes in areas where government support cannot occur without proven out-comes (Connolly, 2012: 1235).\(^6\)

Yet despite the increased business investment and input in different social avenues, the terms ambiguous nature (Lindgreen et al., 2008: 251-252; Mullerat, 2011b: 5; van Marrewijk, 2003), seen through its overlap with other concepts like corporate citizenship or sustainable business (Broomhill, 2007: 6) has caused academics to argue over the degree of prominence given to certain sections over another and left many businesses struggling ‘to identify, prioritise, and address social issues’ (Porter an Kramer, 2006: 83).

A neo-Keynesian school of scholars and practitioners contest that a ‘triple bottom line’ exists in which a balance should be found between economic development (shareholder returns), social justice and environmental protection within advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMaDEs) (Elkington, 1998; Willard, 2002) though such a standpoint has been refuted (see Norman and MacDonald, 2004). Through the neoliberal school, other writers have emphasised that the adoption of CSR by companies can be rational and profitable in the long-run by turning social problems into economic opportunities (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Broomhill, 2007: 7; Drucker, 1984; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Wheeler et al., 2002: 298; World Business Council for Sustainable

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\(^5\) According to Giving USA, charitable donations by for-profit business have risen from an estimated $9.6 billion in 1999 (Kotler and Lee, 2005: 4) to $17.7 billion in 2014 (Giving USA, 2015).

\(^6\) For example, Google is investing into Google Green, a project to not only power the company through 100 percent renewable energy but also invest into renewable energy projects (totalling $2 billion according to the company) (Google Green, no date). Another illustration is the food retailer Waitrose and its Community Matters scheme in which each branch donates £1,000 per month between three local causes chosen by shoppers. Since its launch in 2008, the scheme has donated £14 million to local charities throughout the UK (Waitrose, no date).
Development, no date: 3). One may also find a firm's CSR engagement reflecting a mixture of these motivations (Smith, 2003: 53) which indicates how CSR can be good for businesses (Kotler and Lee, 2005:10-11) through its ability to act as a strategic ‘shock absorber from a wide range of socio-cultural related threats’ (Gallagher, 2005: 59) and build better business image and reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) that can influence consumer purchasing (see Ko et al., 2013 for example).

These debates on the shape, scope and meaning of CSR and whether it is a cost or benefit for business (Broomhill, 2007: 14) has generated criticism on the business motivations behind their CSR engagement and application. Some of the most powerful criticism of voluntary CSR has been from development literature (Broomhill, 2007: 27). In this field, academics have explored the often underestimated importance of power in the relationship between companies and the local communities they invest into, particularly in EMaDEs and the impact this has on corporate accountability by the poor (Garvey and Newell, 2005; Newell, 2005). Others have focused on the failure by CSR to deal with the key underlying macro level and structural issues at the heart of the global economic system that are having such a hugely negative impact on EMaDEs (Utting, 2005: 386) highlighting that self-regulatory mechanisms like CSR are not enough to overcome capacity problems faced by these countries (Graham and Woods, 2006). From a different angle, scholars have also concluded that the effectiveness of CSR activities by the energy sector and other business have been increasingly questioned due to a perceived gap between the stated intentions of the business leaders and their actual impact on the ground (Frynas, 2005: 581).

Other criticisms of CSR are also visible in the literature beyond the development school. Through the CSR discourse, there is a heightened impression of general corporate engagement with voluntary initiatives that can help mask the actual reality; of the 65,000 TNCs, an estimated 4,000 produce reports dealing with their company's social and environmental performance
CSR has also been seen by some to serve as a useful marketable character (Derber, 1998: 224-229) that can help ‘manage out’ bad [company] practices and head-off potentially disastrous consumer backlashes’ (Connolly, 2012: 1234) as well as alleviate modern pressures on firms (i.e. greater media coverage of businesses, improved ICT technology and NGO campaigning) which have increased scrutiny of business practices and the risk of reputational damage (Smith 2006: 60). This has left some seeing schemes as little more than 'window-dressing' (i.e. public relations) techniques (Christian Aid, 2003; Friedman, 1970; Valor, 2005: 200) that seldom varied from the legal compliance and provision of the 'moral minimum’ (DesJardins, 2006: 211). For Valor (2005: 199-200), the self-interest claim is evident due to the often partial and selective manner in which social issues are pursued through CSR in order to increase corporate profit which reiterates the underlying duplicitousness between a company's CSR emphasis and their ongoing financial obligations to shareholders (Connolly, 2012: 1241).

This critique of CSR in the literature raises an important question for this paper; where does this leave Nigeria and the reality of TNC CSR implementation on the ground? To be able to answer this question, the paper will turn its attention to an analysis of SPDC programmes in the Niger Delta. Whilst there have been numerous academic efforts to measure and evaluate business CSR (see Gallardo-Vazquez and Sanchez-Hernandez, 2014: 15) through avenues such as corporate social performance (CSP) (Avram and Avasilcai, 2014; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood 1991) the difficulties (indeed some say clear limitations (Gallardo-Vazquez and Sanchez-Hernandez, 2014: 15) of doing so lie in the incredibly broad array of CSR uses in an almost infinite number of contexts. How can any practical measurement of success be achieved in these circumstances and whose type of success is being examined? A measurement of CSR success for business (e.g. a year on year investment increase in CSR programmes or improved customer satisfaction scores due to their social programmes) is a lot different to a measurement
of a particular CSR programmes success in combating a social issue (e.g. improving the number of people given malaria and immunisation programmes in a specific area).

How then can analysis be undertaken? To do this, the paper will draw upon CSP and its first dimension of social responsibility (principles) explored by academics like Strand (1985) who focused on organisational adjustment to the social environment. The author explains that social responsibilities are determined by society and a firm’s task is to; 1. Identify and analyse societies changing demands and expectations of business (defined as organisational social responsibility), 2. Determine what process should occur when receiving information on these demands (defined as organisational social responsiveness) and 3. Implement appropriate responses to the relevant social issues (defined as organisational social response). It is the latter aspect that is most important for this research particularly surrounding two of its three research questions (1. What are (should be) the types of actions organisations take in response to social demands? (2) What are (should be) the effects of the organisational social responses? (Strand, 1985: 91).

Consequently, the following section will set out what organisational social responses have been chosen by SPDC and the good or bad outcomes (Wood, 1991: 693) these are having in relation to the range of socio-economic problems set out in the opening section of this paper. Measurement of the success of these programmes is a difficult task but will utilise the work of Singh and Agarwal (2013) and their CSR Impact Index (CSRII) theory which measures the impact of business CSR initiatives. Of the seven guidelines for CSRII, the two concerning the measurement of CSRs social and economic impacts (point IV and V) are of significance here. CSRs social impact can be measured through a social impact index that takes into account Net improvement in quality of life, and number of lives affected due to the nature of the CSR activity and based on the needs of the TB [targeted beneficiaries] (in terms of
increase in awareness in social, economic, health, environment, education, political, and other areas of life etc). (Singh and Agarwal, 2013: 6)

Similarly, CSRs economic impact can be measured through an economic impact index that examines

Net improvement in incomes, wealth, savings, and assets, and number of lives affected, due to the nature of the CSR activity, and based on the needs of the TB [targeted beneficiaries] (in terms of economic value created, income-generating assets created etc). (Singh and Agarwal, 2013: 6)

One could try and implement a numerical “score” for each of these strands but this is highly problematic given that a numerical valuation would fail to adequately capture these CSR processes completely and their “on the ground impact”. Instead, these social and economic impact parameters and Strands (1983) research help broaden the analysis of SPDC CSR to not only evaluate how successful these policies have been in combating the various Niger-Delta socio-economic problems they are invested in (the number of people helped, the relevance of CSR policies to local people’s needs) but also gauge the consequences that CSR policies have had on Niger-Delta society and wider state-led development.

Unfortunately given the critique by some academics that CSR is a corporate PR exercise, the reliance on SPDC public material presents a problem for the authenticity of this paper's findings. However, the author’s independent researcher status and lack of SPDC or wider corporate links prevents any additional data from being accessed and forces this paper to report SPDC CSR at face value as any other outsider researcher has to do. While the lack of additional information does of course prevent a more comprehensive evaluation of SPDC CSR from occurring, the information that is available will still allow this paper to show draw an important conclusion. It will highlight how SDPC and wider TNC CSR programmes in places
like the Niger Delta need to become more closely integrated with state led development projects but in a way which takes account of the wider issues in Nigeria (particularly corruption) that necessitates the establishment of a QSDP.

2.2 CSR in reality; SPDC CSR schemes in the Niger Delta

In 2006, SPDC created a Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) that is founded on agreements with groups of communities negotiated with the help of intermediaries or Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) (Hennchen, no date: 137) which formed part of their wider Sustainable Community Development (SCD) strategy (Amadi and Abdullah, 2011:275-276). The GMoU is based on the need to reduce poverty, promote economic empowerment, improve quality of life and stimulate employment for youths and women in order to fulfil global Shell “health, safety, security, environment” (HSSE) and social performance (SP) goals as well as improve the livelihoods of Niger Delta citizens (Odeleye, 2011: 531; Shell, 2013a). For the analytical purposes of this article, GMoU CSR initiatives have been split into three broad themes; Business and Agricultural development (Figure 1) (economic CSR initiatives), Educational development (Figure 2) and Health development (Figure 3) (social CSR initiatives).

The three tables of information (Figure 1, 2 and 3) on SPDC CSR policies show that many of the schemes are of great benefit to Niger Delta citizens with a particular strength found in health policies. For example, SPDCs significant investments in malaria and immunisation programmes are invaluable in the face of Nigeria’s widespread health problems (UNICEF, no date)\(^7\) while the country’s growing HIV/AIDS epidemic\(^8\) is partly being fuelled by a lack of hospitals or drugs which makes SPDC investment in 27 health facilities worthy of praise.

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\(^7\) According to UNICEF, malaria causes the deaths of an estimated 250,000 children under the age of five every year and is responsible for about 66 percent of clinic visits in the country (UNICEF, no date).

\(^8\) The World Health Organisation estimates that the adult prevalence rate is in the range of 3.6 to 8 percent (WHO, 2005: 1).
In 2009, they helped treat more than 265,000 people and deliver more than 2000 babies (Shell, no date b). The Health in Motion campaign has also played a particularly vital role in providing free medical tests to remote rural communities lacking the money to travel to urban medical centres and in this way provided 140,000 people with healthcare through the programme (Shell, no date c). Overall, these health initiatives represent the most effective application of SPDCs CSR due to the high number of people that benefit from healthcare provision that would otherwise lack access.

Yet despite these health initiatives, the majority of other SPDC CSR programmes have only been able to support a relatively small number of the Niger Delta population. For example whilst the various educational support programmes (secondary school, undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships) provide financial assistance to 6,670 students a year in the Niger Delta, wider statistical data reveals that primary and secondary school enrolment in 2010 (when figures were last available) was over 20.6 million (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015: 46) and 5 million (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015: 48) respectively. For many, this would appear to highlight a fundamental problem with CSRs impact on the ground; its overall outreach (i.e. number of people helped) is measurable at a micro rather than macro level (ChristianAid, 2004: 24; Quak, 2008) a type of ‘incremental CSR’ (Visser, 2012: 4) that ‘simply does not produce the scale and urgency of response that is required’ (Visser, 2012: 5) in tackling the social, ethical and environmental challenges faced (Visser, 2010: 242) for a region like the Niger Delta.

At first glance, it is conceivable that this “micro impact” is attributable to a lack of significant SPDC investment into their CSR mechanisms despite global Shell’s “Constant Cost of Supplies” (CCS) earnings since 2010 (Shell, 2014a; Shell, 2012a) which have remained consistently high. Indeed, as Figure 4 details, whilst SPDCs CSR expenditure has risen year on year (2009-2014), it still represents a relatively small amount of monetary aid set aside for CSR
investment. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that increased SPDC CSR monetary investment into an expanded scheme would see greater social impact and thus higher levels of Niger Delta development. Such an assumption fails to take into account a number of major issues for Niger Delta CSR and the impact of other wider national problems that remain beyond the remit of CSR.

Scholars have argued that certain Niger-Delta based CSR schemes have often been motivated by capitalist expansionism and are only initiated in places directly linked to TNC activities (for example road building) that bring few additional benefits to the local people (Omotola, 2006: 15). Inter and intra community fragmentation and greed among local chiefs have also been reported as communities squabble over a share of CSR projects while ethnic militia competition for natural resource “ownership” may indicate how CSR projects helped to fuel the long running militant revolt in the Niger Delta (Akpan, 2006: 234-235; Asuni, 2009; Idemudia and Ite, 2006: 199-200; Watts, 2008). Academics have also raised concerns over the “top down” approach by TNCs over what they perceived the communities were lacking and the apparent “dependency culture” whereby communities see CSR projects as little more than a form of rent payment for SPDC and other TNCs to use (and in their eyes abuse) their environmental resources (Amadi and Abdullah, 2011:275; Frynas, 2005: 589-591; Ite, 2005; Ite, 2004: 7). On this basis, it is possible to conclude that an expanded TNC CSR programme in the Niger Delta would merely accentuate potential local community divisions at a wider level as more communities fight to gain a greater share of the development schemes and investment.

Indeed, apart from these potential destabilising factors, would expanded CSR schemes in the Niger Delta actually work? Wider national problems that result not only from governmental corruption but also the resource curse have an impact on the ability of certain CSR schemes to become successful. For example, one of the biggest social and economic issues
within Nigeria is the staggeringly high level of youth unemployment9 (Awogbenle and Iwuamadi, 2010: 2) which has helped fuel the militant violence and sabotage incidents at oil pipelines in the Niger Delta (Mahler, 2010:18-19). While the World Bank has attributed this to the country’s economic stagnation (Pang and van Wijnbergen, 2007) it means that many of the SPDC CSR business schemes will struggle to flourish in a climate where the majority of citizens lack access to a basic income or a secure livelihood (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012; The World Bank, 2003; Odoemene, 2011).10

Nevertheless, in many ways, the most crucial issue within Niger Delta CSR surrounds the issue of governance. Scholars argue that CSR ‘has advertently diverted attention away from the addressing the real political, economic and social problems facing the people of developing countries’ (Frynas, 2005: 596; Idemudia, 2011: 2; Kemp, 2001: 35). This paper is not suggesting that SDPC and other TNC CSR initiatives should be curtailed. Rather it acknowledges that SPDC CSR schemes cannot be expected (and indeed were not designed (Ogula, 2012: 4) to tackle the chronic lack of development in the Niger Delta or the macro non-developmental problems that affect the country (for example corruption, a stagnant economy and high unemployment), the solutions or “governance” of which remains primarily with the Nigerian federal government. ‘The millions of dollars spent on scholarships, schools and agricultural extension projects have had no impact on poverty alleviation or the socio-economic

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9 According to figures from Nigeria’s National Board of Statistics, Nigeria has a youth population of eighty million representing 60 percent of the total population of the country. Sixty four million of them are unemployed while one million six hundred thousand are underemployed. (Awogbenle and Iwuamadi, 2010: 2).

10 According to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria uses the ‘relative poverty measurement’ for its official statistics in which reference is made to the living standards of the majority in order to separate the non-poor (households with expenditure greater than two-thirds of Total Household Per Capita expenditure) from the poor. Further desegregation shows that households with less than one-third of total House Per Capita expenditure are core poor (or extreme poor) while households with income greater than one-third of total expenditure but less than two-thirds of total expenditure are moderately poor. Extreme poverty (defined ‘in terms of the minimal requirements necessary to afford minimal standards of food, clothing, healthcare and shelter’ which ‘considers both food expenditure and non-food expenditure using the per capita expenditure approach’) has seen a dramatic increase in Nigeria; from 6.2 percent in 1980, 29.3 percent in 1996 to 38.7 percent in 2010, the latter showing 112.47 million in extreme and moderate poverty. (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012: 3-4, 6). The 2003 World Bank World Development Report states that ‘36.4 percent of Niger Delta inhabitants live below poverty line [based on 1992-1993 census data] and 70.2% of this proportion earn less than $1USD per day [1997 census data] with a clear absence of the basic social amenities’ (The World Bank, 2003: 237). See also Odoemene, 2011: 128.
development of the region’ (Ogula, 2010: 4) and failed to make inroads into the sustainability crisis (Visser, 2010: 242) and their resource and energy-intensive products and services (Visser, 2010: 5). The situation is further complicated by successive Nigerian governments and development agencies which have failed to provide systematic and widespread development to the Niger Delta (Amadi and Abdullah, 2011: 274). How can these difficulties be surmounted in a way that tackles the key financial governance problems that lie at the heart of the issue in Nigeria? The answer to this situation could lie in the establishment of a Niger Delta QSDP between an international development agency (as will be shown to the UNDP), the Nigerian government, TNCs and their CSR schemes and local people in order to deliver more widespread and systematic development.

3 A Niger Delta Quad Sector Development Partnership (QSDP)

The crucial theoretical basis for QSDP is found through the idea of a “tri-sector partnership” mechanism. These are ‘a new form of strategic alliance’ that can be ‘defined as a voluntary collaboration to promote sustainable development based on the most efficient allocation of complimentary resources across corporate business, civil society and government’ (Sullivan and Warner, 2004: 17). Tri-sector partnerships seek ‘to address areas of concern by establishing agreed partnership goals, monitoring and reporting systems and collaborative activities’ which most crucially for the Niger Delta can include the ‘[i]ntegration of business strategies with regional development plans, rural poverty adjustment schemes and local education programmes’ and ‘[t]he funding of social investment projects aimed at local community development priorities’ (Warhurst, 2001: 59). Other tri-sector partnership goals can include relationship management such as the resolution of local disputes, new skills and local procurement, more effective environmental assessment and social impact, environmental management after site closure, site remediation and viable future land-use options (Warhurst, 2001: 59).
In theory, each of the actor’s core competences should enable a more effective and constructive development policy mechanism to be obtained; government authorities would deliver strategic co-ordination through local development plans, access to budgets for the provision of public services and assume the role of “capacity builder.” TNCs on the other hand have a detailed knowledge of procurement and supply chain management, the building of local infrastructure and the delivery of capital equipment, technical skills and logistics management. Equally, the involvement and mobilisation of local people via direct participation would not only provide independent monitoring over the progress of development but also offer local knowledge that would be beneficial to the implementation of development schemes (Sullivan and Warner, 2004: 19-20). Overall, it is seen as a model which will bring benefits to all the parties in the partnership and can include ‘enhancement of transparency within government, more equitable distribution of wealth, avoidance of local disputes… and reduced dependency of local communities upon companies’ (Yakovleva and Alabastar, 2004: 84).

On the surface, tri-sector partnerships seem to help alleviate some of the development issues seen in the Niger Delta situation. For example, the TNC “top-down” approach that aptly describes various SPDC CSR mechanisms is (in theory) removed as the corporations enter into voluntary arrangements with non-traditional parties and initiate dialogue with local people and the government over the implementation and placement of development projects. This in turn could help to remove concerns of CSR window dressing as firms invest in projects where they are most needed. Moreover, the creation of individual ‘partnership agreements’ either pre- or post-date each development project would offer an effective mechanism to ensure communication and relevant participation in decision making processes between all three sectors (Warhurst, 2006: 59) while also allowing CSR projects to become part of a wider national developmental framework that may help reduce localised conflict over development.

Based on these points, a tri-sector partnership scheme would appear to be advantageous
for Nigeria to adopt and would certainly go a long way to reducing some of the negative repercussions that have been discussed earlier in this paper, most notably over the relationship between CSR, the government and the local people and the type and geographical placement of projects and their impact. However, in its present form, tri-sector partnerships would only have limited effectiveness due to the ongoing influence of corruption within the state apparatus and most importantly for this paper, successive state led development agencies. If these development agencies have been so adversely affected by this problem would this not be the case for any large-scale tri development partnership model? The partnership with TNCs may help to negate this issue to some degree but not entirely given that Nigerian state individuals would still firm control over their financial revenue which leaves open the possibility (and probably likelihood) of misappropriation. In order to combat this issue, QSDP, an enhanced form of tri-sector partnership needs to be established in Nigeria.

In essence, a QSDP would see the partnership of an external international organisation with the Nigerian Federal government to jointly coordinate and control the financial revenue allocated to Niger-Delta socio-economic development and the implementation of its various projects, all in conjunction with TNC CSRs schemes and the input of Niger Delta society. The Nigerian QSDP could see the re-organisation of the NDDC into a new agency run in partnership between the Nigerian government and an international agency that would incorporate TNC CSR schemes into the development process. The international agencies direct partnership with the Nigerian government over NDDC development projects should help to act as an external check against financial mismanagement that can be strengthened through increased financial transparency (the publication of monthly or bi-monthly public reports on development revenue investment for example) which will also help to improve the degree of accountability and legitimacy that the QSDP has within Nigerian society.

In order to try and increase economic productivity, new development projects could be
awarded to local (Nigerian) construction firms that are provided investment via governmental or TNC CSR grants. Aside from the beneficial CSR health work undertaken by TNCs like SPDC, new CSR schemes could be developed which could lead to investment in training and employment for young people in a range of vocational (construction, plumbing) and technical (engineering) professions who could eventually help construct and implement development projects. Active engagement with local communities would also be paramount under the QSDP which could occur through formal community consultation meetings that would allow local people to voice ideas and raise concerns about the development priorities in the local area and maintain a partnership link between local citizens on the ground, TNCS, the Nigerian government and the international agency.

Given the important financial, development and managerial role that the international agency would play in QSDP, the UNDP, a UN body which aims to achieve sustainable development (amongst other goals\textsuperscript{11}) would be an ideal choice to jointly run a QSDP (UNDP, no date d; UNDP, no date e). UNDP are currently running over 3,100 development projects (2014) in 177 countries and territories and have worked in a number of high profile and successful (third-world) government development partnerships (UNDP, no date d). In Rwanda for example, the UNDP worked as the lead agency alongside the Government of Rwanda in the implementation of the Rwanda Integrated Development Initiative (IDP) (2011-2013) (The Ministry of Local Government and The United Nations, no date: 25; UNDP et. al., no date f). This aimed to improve the ‘existing system of rural human settlements to achieve sustainable socio-economic development, slow down population growth and accelerate progress towards MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] and EDPRS [Economic Development and Reduction Strategy] goals’ (The Ministry of Local Government and The United Nations, no date: 2). The UNDP was active in three core “result” areas (governance, environmental and sustainable

\textsuperscript{11} The other key goals are poverty reduction, achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), democratic governance and crisis prevention and recovery (UNDP, no date e: 1).
growth, and social protection) (The Ministry of Local Government and The United Nations, no date: 25)\textsuperscript{12} with their outcomes showing broad success in these three areas (UNDP et. al., no date f).

Another example can be seen in the case of Nicaragua where the Government partnered with the UNDP in order to combat the lack of electricity in rural areas of the country through the introduction of renewable hydropower (Mordt et al., 2013: 49). The UNDP project has provided electricity to over 48,000 people in rural communities, introduced greater electrical capacity and a larger electrical network and established micro enterprises as local community members, including women, are trained with the management and maintenance of the micro-hydro plants (Mordt et al., 2013: 50). Indeed, from a global perspective, about ten million people, mainly rural poor have gained access to modern energy services through UNDP-supported projects over the past decade so the agency has the experience, staff and financial leverage necessary to help administer a Niger Delta QSDP (UNDP, no date g).\textsuperscript{13}

Still it is important to note that not all partnerships between governments and international development agencies have been successful. A clear example of this can be seen in the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline project, a venture developed by the oil consortium (ExxonMobil, Petronas and ChevronTexaco) and the governments of Chad and Cameroon alongside assistance from the World Bank and other lenders from 1993 to 1999 (Pegg, 2005: 7; The World Bank, 2010). Its cost of $3.7 billion makes it the largest single private-sector investment project in Sub-Saharan Africa with only a small financial element

\textsuperscript{12} Within the governance field, the UNDP provided technical support for the establishment of a rural settlement strategy, for the sustainable management of eco-friendly systems and for the Umurenge saccos (a government initiative aimed at increasing the accessibility of financial services to Rwandan citizens). In the environment field, UNDP developed a strategy and action plan for environment management and supported local districts to effectively manage and implement environmental policies and strengthen the ownership and the capacity of communities for a sustainable management. Finally, UNDP contributed to the sustainable growth and social protection by providing technical and financial support to carry out a participatory feasibility study and support the construction of a multipurpose hall (The Ministry of Local Government and The United Nations, no date: 25).

\textsuperscript{13} The 2014 budget for the UNDP is US$3.981.90 million with US$746.52 million for environment and sustainable development goals (UNDP, no date d).
provided by the World Bank (Pegg, 2005: 7-8).\textsuperscript{14}

Despite this relatively small investment, the significance of the World Bank’s role was seen in three main areas; political risk mitigation, credit mobilisation and crucially for this paper, resource curse mitigation (Guyer, 2002: 112-113; Pegg, 2005: 8). In relation to the first two points, it became evident that the private sector would not participate unless the World Bank delivered their ‘seal of approval’ thus providing a degree of political risk mitigation and securing additional lending from commercial banks and government agencies (Pegg, 2005: 8) such as US Export-Import Bank (Mitchell, 2010: 15).\textsuperscript{15} The final major role was their efforts at combating the resource curse by turning the pipeline into a poverty reduction scheme through three technical assistance projects; The Petroleum Capacity Enhancement Project in Cameroon, the Management of the Petroleum Economy Project and the Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project in Chad (Pegg, 2007: 8).

Scholars have noted that aspects of the project proved successful including increased macroeconomic investment in Chad (which exceeded World Bank estimates) and improved financial transparency (Mitchell, 2010: 14-15; Pegg, 2005: 9-10). However, the attempt by the World Bank to ameliorate the resource curse issues, reduce poverty and promote good governance were fairly ineffective (Pegg, 2005). For example, the Petroleum Revenue Management Program (PRMP) a vehicle for positive development and a reduction in state corruption\textsuperscript{16} was implemented through Chad’s 1999 Law on Revenue Management (LRM). Unfortunately, the LRM proved to have a number of initial problems that limited its scope in

\textsuperscript{14} These were $93 million in loans from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to finance each government’s project, $100 million direct loans from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to the oil consortium and the IFCs mobilisation of $300 in financing from private banks) (Pegg, 2005: 8).

\textsuperscript{15} However, the idea that the project would not have gone ahead without World Bank approval has been refuted by James Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank. See Mitchell, 2010: 16.

\textsuperscript{16} The PRMP earmarked portions of direct oil revenues from royalties and dividends for priority poverty reduction activities over long-term timeframes. This included ten percent of revenue going into the Fund for Future Generations (FGF), a fund to ensure that some of the oil revenue money would remain after production ended (Mitchell, 2010: 18; Pegg, 2005: 11; The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2000: 95-100).
achieving these aims\(^{17}\), a situation accentuated when the Chad government weakened the PRMP in 2006 (Smis and Kingah, 2007) that ultimately led to the World Bank suspending their cooperation in the scheme in 2008 (Mitchell, 2010: 20).

Where does this leave the idea of QSDP in Nigeria? The evidence presented above has shown that UNDP led development projects in EMaDEs have succeeded before and there is no reason why this would not be the case for Nigeria. However, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project highlights that a Nigerian QSDP, a project of similar size and undertaking would need to have a focused set of development aims, and objectives rather than attempt a broad-based approach that combined developmental, environmental and/or structural state transformative agendas. Consequently, QSDP should establish which development spheres are crucial for the Niger Delta (e.g. health, education, employment and job creation), develop a time-framed road-map for each one (over a ten, twenty year and thirty year period and what would be expected to be accomplished at each stage) and then focus project implementation on one aspect, rotating every five or seven years to a different sphere. This would help coordinate the various QSDP actors’ projects into one avenue, keep them all “on the same page” and allow greater strides to be made in improving that development sphere rather than seeing such a patchy and potential less coordinated process.

Another key problem raised by the Chad-Cameroon pipeline example is the need for long-term Nigerian political support for QSDP. It is hoped that the overarching socio-economic development goal would resonate with Nigeria’s politicians in a way that would suppress ideological or party political differences but needless to say, gaining the support of Nigeria’s politicians would be no easy task, especially from those individuals who have a financial

\(^{17}\) For example, ‘the law applied only to certain modes of oil-related revenues, leaving substantial revenue streams outside the revenue management system. Second, the law only applied to oil obtained from three fields - Kome, Miandoum, and Bolobo - in the Doba region, despite significant exploration and development activities outside of that area. Third, some observers argued that the law does not earmark enough revenue to the oil producing region for compensatory purposes. Fourth, the priority sectors were defined too vaguely, leaving excessive room for political manipulation that could undermine the spirit of the PRMP’ (Mitchell, 2010: 18)
incentive to maintain the current non-transparent financial system. Political difficulties would also arise through the efforts at legally securing QSDP over the medium to long-term as either a new law or as a statute on the Nigerian constitution, neither of which would be an easy task. However, it is reasonable to believe that the policy would have some initial Nigerian political support and the possible backing of certain state mechanisms like the EFCC who would welcome the opportunity to reinforce their work on combating national corruption and fraud.

Therefore, a careful path must also be trod on the degree of preliminary transparency between the Nigerian government and the public over this policy as it represents a real financial threat to certain individuals and could therefore lead to a toxic and divisive campaign from pro and anti-opposition QSDP groups. The destabilising impact on the Niger Delta could be profound and potentially lead to deep divisions and hostility between members of Nigeria’s society that would hinder any possible future local QSDP initiatives. With this in mind, preliminary negotiations between the international agency and Nigerian government must be held in secret and remain strictly confidential until, it is hoped, an agreement is reached. From that point, a PR strategy could be drawn up which would enable the policy to be distributed to Nigerian society in a way that nullifies any significant societal grievance by reiterating its core aim of providing development to the people of the Niger Delta. Future efforts could be made to widen the QSDP to other areas of Nigeria but again the initial core focus must remain on the Niger Delta.

4 Conclusion

It is no exaggeration to say that the scale of the development task in the Niger Delta is monumental and will take decades of planning, consultation, commitment and labour to achieve a level of genuine widespread development. This paper has presented the innovative idea of a QSDP, a scheme which integrates the work of various state and business development practices into one mechanism but in a way which seeks to negate the impact of state corruption, an issue
that lies at the heart of the problems in Nigeria and successive development agencies. QSDP will allow often micro level impact CSR projects to become part of a much larger regional or indeed national development focus whilst at the same time integrating local community development input into the mechanism.

Through QSDP it is also plausible to speculate that it could lead to an alleviation of some of the social grievances and criminal sabotage on oilfield facilities in the Niger Delta though this issue would by no means completely disappear. Aside from the developmental impact, Niger Delta QSDP would provide successive political leaders with the experience to formulate and implement national development agenda frameworks for the country that may eventually see an end to QSDP and UNDP involvement but this is by no means guaranteed. Whilst corruption remains deeply entrenched in Nigeria’s state apparatus, QSDP offers a radical but by no means improbable mechanism through which to achieve widespread socio-economic development in the Niger Delta.
### Tables

**Table 1: Business and Agricultural CSR:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of project</th>
<th>Date initiated</th>
<th>Date terminated</th>
<th>Number of people supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LiveWIRE Nigeria (provides finance and training for young entrepreneurs (18-30) in the Niger Delta) (Shell, no date d; Shell, 2012b: 1)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3,208 Niger Delta youths (2012 figures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDDC/Shell Women Empowerment Programme (Offers skill development to rural women) (Niger Delta Development Comission, no date)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>1620 women (2012 figures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro credit (help establish small business and expand existing ones) (Shell, no date e)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>30,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC, USAID Nigeria and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture cassava farming Project (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2005: 25)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Estimated 300,000 farmers will benefit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Educational CSR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of project</th>
<th>Date initiated</th>
<th>Date terminated</th>
<th>Number of people supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cradle-to-Career programme (financially supports secondary school children through to university) (Shell, no date f)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>60 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Scholarship Scheme (Shell, no date g)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2,600 students per scholarship year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Scholarship Scheme (Shell, no date h)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>4000 students per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC Niger Delta Postgraduate scholarship scheme (Shell, no date i)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ten students per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Health CSR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of project</th>
<th>Date initiated</th>
<th>Date terminated</th>
<th>Number of people supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health in Motion programme (remote access medial aid (Shell, no date b))</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>30,000 people treated in 2010, 87,000 people in 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Niger Delta AIDS Response (NiDAR) project (Shell, no date i)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14,000 individuals in 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care facilities (Shell, no date j)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Treated 265,000 people in 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: SPDC CSR investment (2009-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPDC taxes and royalties (US$)</td>
<td>$3 billion (2005-2009) (Shell, 2010a: 1)</td>
<td>$3.5 billion (Shell, 2010b: 18)</td>
<td>$6 billion (Shell, 2011: 18)</td>
<td>$5.2 billion (Shell, no date k)</td>
<td>$4 billion (Shell, 2013c: 23)</td>
<td>$3 billion (Shell, 2014c: 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC NDDC investment (US$)</td>
<td>$156.5 million (Shell, 2010a: 2)</td>
<td>$161.1 million (Shell, 2010b: 18)</td>
<td>$164.1 million (Shell, 2011: 18)</td>
<td>$178.3 million (Shell, 2013b: 1)</td>
<td>$180 million (Shell, 2014b: 2)</td>
<td>$202 million (Shell, 2014c: 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC CSR investment (US$)</td>
<td>$57.7 million (Shell, 2010a: 2)</td>
<td>$71.4 million (Shell, 2010b: 18)</td>
<td>$76.3 million (Shell, 2011: 18)</td>
<td>$103.2 million (Shell, 2013b: 1)</td>
<td>$104 million (Shell, 2014b: 2)</td>
<td>$112 million (Shell, 2014c: 37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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