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Citation for final published version:

Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2020.1785292

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Wilson, Callaghan and the management of Anglo-American relations, 1974-76

In 1946 Winston Churchill famously applied the nomenclature special relationship to Anglo-American relations and advanced a vision of the two great Anglo-Saxon powers leading a world against tyranny and injustice.\(^i\) Studies of Anglo-American functional cooperation, comparisons with other international relationships and criteria-based analyses have since produced an inconclusive spectrum of opinion about what the special relationship constitutes.\(^ii\) This ranges from denial to affirmation of its existence, from its being a natural expression of Anglo-American fraternity through to its being a British diplomatic tool to help manage relative decline, and on to arguments that once special relations have now ceased to be so.\(^iii\) What is indisputable, though, is that by the early 1970s the global positions of Britain and the US had changed markedly and their bilateral relations are seen generally to have become consequently less important and even strained.\(^iv\) The US was preoccupied with Vietnam, beset by fallout from Watergate and riven by newfound doubt following the end of the age of plenty and realisation that America’s economic fortunes especially were no longer in its own hands. Meantime Britain was engulfed in socio-economic crisis, fast liquidating its empire and under Prime Minister Heath’s stewardship heading for membership of the European Communities (EC) and potentially a more Eurocentric future.

Anglo-American relations under the leaderships of Heath and President Richard Nixon have attracted significant attention. The immediately following period, in which the Labour governments of Harold Wilson (March 1974 – April 1976) and James Callaghan (April 1976 – May 1979) sought to rebuild the special relationship with Presidents Nixon and Ford, has not. Scholarship on these Labour governments centres primarily on British domestic politics, Britain’s renegotiation of its only recently concluded membership of the EC and controversy over an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in 1976.\(^v\) Survey texts of Anglo-American relations routinely skip past the Ford administration with but fleeting general claims of business as usual in bilateral relations, albeit quantitatively reduced.\(^vi\) Detailed monographs on Anglo-American relations have similarly been drawn either side of the Ford administration to the turbulence of the Nixon years,\(^vii\) the contradictions of the Carter administration, and the romance of the Ronald Reagan – Margaret Thatcher era.\(^viii\) Within its
wider consideration of Anglo-American relations during détente, Robb’s *A Strained Partnership?* offers the only detailed analysis of the Labour governments’ relations with the Ford administration to date.\textsuperscript{ix}

This article seeks consequently to shed additional light upon how the Wilson and Callaghan governments’ managed Anglo-American relations 1974 -1976. In doing so it also differs from existing literature. First, it argues that the Labour governments had more success than hitherto acknowledged in re-invigorating Anglo-American relations.\textsuperscript{x} Second, it proposes that both Wilson and Callaghan led a subtle modernisation of the special relationship. Having established Wilson’s inheritance from the Conservative government, the article then examines how he and Callaghan sought to improve the tone of Anglo-American relations. It then analyses how they managed continuing British retrenchment whilst seeking to maintain privileged functional cooperation with the US. Subsequently the article argues that the British sought to emphasise how their soft power could contribute increasingly to US needs to reform international institutions and recover its leadership credentials in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Finally, it is argued that Wilson and Callaghan endeavoured to recast discursively the special relationship in ways more suited to the conditions of the 1970s. A once exclusive and privileged special relationship became a non-exclusive and benign relationship that, overtly at least, owed its specialness to Anglo-American historical commonalities.

**Heath, Anglo-American relations and the Labour inheritance**

A detailed analysis of Heath and UK-US relations is beyond the scope of this article but it is nevertheless important to understand how they stood when Wilson’s government came to power. Historiography on this period generally accepts that Anglo-American relations were, at least at a surface level, at a low ebb by the time Heath left office. Indeed, on 25 January 1974 NATO Secretary General, Joseph Luns, observed publicly that the special relationship had not shown its old vitality over the past year and that it might ‘disappear’ if lessened interest were not reversed.\textsuperscript{xi} What has been more keenly debated is the extent to which this situation owed to Heath’s personality, enthusiasm for the EC and replacement of the special relationship with the seemingly downgraded ‘natural relationship’.\textsuperscript{xii}
Tense Anglo-American relations in 1973 and early 1974 stood in stark contrast to President Nixon’s initial enthusiasm about Heath’s election victory and Secretary of State Kissinger’s confidence that despite ‘the fact that Britain, as a power factor, will continue to decline, our relations with the UK will undoubtedly retain a special quality of intimacy and informality; our peoples will continue to have extensive contacts and connections and our communication at all levels will be frequent, diverse and essentially frank.’ Kissinger had the advantage of co-presence and document de-classification rules to lay an early emphasis in explaining this contrast upon the failure of Nixon and Heath to establish warm personal relations. Nixon’s enthusiasm for an early meeting with Heath was not reciprocated and Kissinger describes the President’s relationship with him ‘like that of a jilted lover who has been told that friendship was still possible but remembers the rejection rather than being inspired by the prospect.’ This, together with the historical importance of President-Prime Minister relations to steer Anglo-American relations through difficult times, has encouraged a number of historians to accept broadly Kissinger’s line. However, while Kissinger described Heath as ‘the only anti-American UK Prime Minister in many years’, Nixon appears to have been less agitated and more understanding. He told the British Ambassador to the US, Lord Rowland Cromer, in January 1974 that ‘Heath has a lot of guts’ and that ‘You may have to say things in Britain and I may have to say things, but you should know that I have deep feelings that Britain must survive and come back and I will do nothing to hurt you.’

Later work, benefitting from the gradual release of original archive material, has taken a different line, arguing that Heath’s steering of Britain into the EC did not cause him necessarily to upset Anglo-American relations or indicate an anti-American disposition. The Americans had long encouraged British membership of the EC and the Heath government seemed committed to maintaining the traditional British line of complementarity between Britain’s Atlantic and European relationships. In this sense Britain being within rather than outside of the EC marked a tactical rather than necessarily substantive change in British foreign policy and revisionist scholars have demonstrated a number of occasions where Heath was evidently concerned for Anglo-American relations. For instance, Riley argues that Heath sought to smooth the impact of Anglo-American differences over the Indo-Pakistan war and Robb notes that, in the context of the 1974 Washington Energy Conference, high level Anglo-American cooperation remained possible even toward the end of the Heath government.
Cast in this light neither Heath nor British membership of the EC *per se* were necessarily problematic for UK-US relations. Some scholars have therefore focussed instead on the American side of the equation, especially the secretive Nixon-Kissinger policymaking style that concentrated power in the White House.\textsuperscript{xxiv} Certainly the British were concerned that this damaged the quality of American foreign policy and cut off traditional routes of access to policymakers and information gathering on US thinking on key issues. On 12 November 1971, for example, Lord Cromer observed that ‘No disinterested observer could possibly maintain that it [American foreign policy] is being well made and many of the Washington professionals, inside and outside the Government, think it is a mess.’\textsuperscript{xxv} The consequent situation that developed was frustrating and confusing for Anglo-American relations. The British found that Kissinger and the State Department sometimes pursued different policies and that the latter was frequently and deliberately denied key information about foreign policy developments within the White House. In addition, there was too often a lack of consultation on key issues and unwelcome surprises, including the Nixon economic shock, the opening to China and the raising of the US nuclear alert during the Yom Kippur War to DEFCON III.

Compounding difficulties was an Anglo-American geostrategic estrangement. At least until 1973 the Nixon administration was preoccupied with Asia, especially the opening to China, the Indo-Pakistan war and negotiating a way out of Vietnam. Meantime Britain was absorbed with negotiating entry into the EC and seeing through the withdrawal from East of Suez that the previous Wilson government had announced in 1968. It is this situation that has led some scholars to argue that by the early 1970s the two nations seemed further apart than at any time since Suez.\textsuperscript{xxvi} In addition, Britain’s continuing economic instability especially limited the Heath government’s ability to gain Washington’s attention. Sharply rising public expenditure and fiscal deficits developed as the value of sterling slid and the Heath government adopted an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, described his inheritance as an economy ‘on the brink of catastrophe’ and ‘practically beyond repair…It was like the Augean Stables.’\textsuperscript{xxvii} The public sector deficit reached record peacetime levels, inflation ran at c.10%, labour relations were severely strained, Heath had imposed a three-day working week, and the economy was ill-prepared for the influx of imports that accompanied Britain’s entry to the EC in 1973.\textsuperscript{xxviii}
Finally, it needs to be recognised also that Anglo-American relations became wrapped-up in the severe transatlantic tensions of 1973. This owed in part to genuine policy differences, notably the Yom Kippur War that caused an American interruption of intelligence sharing with Britain and saw Kissinger instruct the State Department to develop a list of potential punitive measures against the UK.\textsuperscript{xxix} Arguably even more important, though, was that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic had to react to significant changes in the Cold War, transatlantic relations and domestic political pressures. With Vietnam closing down, the Nixon administration wanted to re-engage transatlantic relations, in part because of domestic pressure to have Europeans assume more of the defence burden and also out of concern for NATO, developing EC foreign policy ambitions and a perception that détente was weakening the cohesion of US-European relations. Conversely the Europeans were genuinely interested in ameliorating East-West tension, fearful of bilateral US-USSR deal-making, economically less dependent on the US, and preoccupied with the EC enlargement process and integration. The Nixon administration’s unilateral announcement of its ‘Year of Europe’ initiative consequently sparked bitterness and recrimination.\textsuperscript{xxx} Equally, coordinated EC sponsorship of a Euro-Arab dialogue in response to the Yom Kippur War ran contrary to US policy and encouraged Kissinger, especially, to suspect that France was developing the Community on an anti-American basis.\textsuperscript{xxxi} In addition, American officials found it difficult to deal with an EC that lacked clear procedures for extra-EC consultation – an irritant compounded by Nixon and Kissinger’s preference for bilateralism. As for Anglo-American relations, these were further complicated by the Heath government’s need to tread a fine line between its EC partners and the US and its strong desire to avoid being seen by France especially as a Trojan horse for American interests in the Community.\textsuperscript{xxxii}

According to Raymond Seitz, US Ambassador to Britain from 1991–1994, the Heath administration ended with relations between Prime Minister and US president slumped into mutual contempt.\textsuperscript{xxxii} This is an exaggeration; without apparent necessity Nixon sent Heath a personal and friendly message upon the latter’s election loss: ‘Dear Ted, You fought a gallant fight against great odds. I have enjoyed our association this past four years and look forward to seeing you in the future as the leader of what I know will truly be Her Majesty’s loyal opposition.’\textsuperscript{xxxiv} Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that the Labour government inherited a desperate economic situation, a special relationship that had become embroiled in the wider, strained transatlantic relationship and a situation where policymakers were struggling to make sense of rapidly changing international circumstances. Furthermore, key Anglo-
American personal relationships had, perhaps inevitably, become strained and their exchanges sometimes testy. Particularly problematic in this context was the US Secretary of State. Central to most aspects of US foreign policy, Kissinger was bitter about European reception of his ‘Year of Europe’, increasingly suspicious of European integration and recriminatory about differences over the Yom Kippur War. Indeed, on one occasion he invoked Suez in a lament upon the latter: ‘Let me be frank. It is not just a question of procedures, but one of confidence. Also, there was a totally different perception of what was at stake as between the U.S. and the Europeans. The Europeans really did to us what we did to them in 1956.’

**Improving the tone**

In September 1975, the North America Department of the FCO stated explicitly that ‘Our policy has been - and will remain – to restore the Anglo-US relationship to the level of trust and intimacy which shared values, perceptions and traditions make possible.’ When the Wilson government first came to power it was evident that this task would need to start at the highest political levels and that challenges lay ahead. At home it was necessary to retune the British foreign policy apparatus to the new Atlantic priority whilst also preparing for a promised referendum on re-negotiated terms of Britain’s membership of the EC. This would require a strong lead, Wilson recalling that the FCO was so committed to EC membership that a strategic committee of the Cabinet was set up to dilute its influence over re-negotiation. Meantime, on 15 March 1974 President Nixon spoke bluntly in Chicago of a need for ‘organic cooperation’ were American commitments to be maintained in Europe, indicating an unsettling entwining of his frustration with allies and his gathering political problems as Watergate began to unfold. In addition, Kissinger was less than complimentary about Wilson and his government, once describing the Prime Minister as ‘a sneaky, devious character’, rating his Cabinet as ‘poor’ and professing a general preference for British Conservative governments – albeit not the last one.

Foreign Secretary Callaghan quickly served notice to British officials that the Labour government intended to revitalise Anglo-American relations and pursue a less ambitious approach toward European integration. For instance, in a conversation with British Ambassadors to EC countries, he reportedly called European ideas for Economic and...
Monetary Union and Political Union ‘“moonshine, just fancy words”.’ He also declared the relationship with the US to be Britain’s most important and that NATO was key to British security.\textsuperscript{xl} The US Embassy in London reported similarly that contacts in the FCO had informed that ‘one of Callaghan’s first acts as Foreign Secretary was to pass down word that the highest priority was to be given to close relations with the US.’\textsuperscript{xli}

The Labour government complemented this private rebalancing of British priorities with a series of public gestures designed to restore American confidence in British loyalty to the Atlantic connection. One of the most important of these was a set piece speech to the House of Commons on 19 March 1974, in which Callaghan made a series of points that could not fail to please Washington. The Foreign Secretary was emollient on the sore topic of the EC-Arab dialogue, expressing his desire ‘to explore the problem further with the United States to clear up any misunderstandings that may unfortunately have arisen’. He also called for an EC that accepted ‘more modest and attainable goals’ and which was more outward looking and open. Furthermore, Callaghan addressed what the British knew to be a particular source of Kissinger’s ire, namely his perception that a united Europe was being constructed in opposition to the US.\textsuperscript{xlii} Herein Callaghan cited explicitly Nixon’s warning for transatlantic relations at Chicago and asserted that ‘I must emphasise that we repudiate the view that Europe will emerge only out of a process of struggle against America. We do not agree that a Europe which excludes the fullest and most intimate co-operation with the United States is a desirable or attainable objective.’\textsuperscript{xliii} Moreover, Callaghan’s message of reassurance to the White House was reiterated one week later during a debate in the House of Lords. Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the government’s spokesperson on defence, reaffirmed NATO as ‘the framework for Atlantic defence, including Western Europe’ and defended the presence of US forces in Europe as ‘an essential part of the common effort and of vital concern to us all.’ He also defended US polaris submarines using Holy Loch and emphasised that ‘it is indisputably the case that this country looks on the United States as a firm friend, with whom relationships are extremely close and good…’.\textsuperscript{xlv}

With the new government’s positions on Anglo-American relations and Europe being established publicly and within the bureaucracy, the Labour government needed also to communicate its intent directly to the Americans. Though ill-informed and drained of influence by the secretive Nixon-Kissinger policy style,\textsuperscript{xlv} the US Embassy in London was one important vehicle for this, especially once Ambassador Walter Annenberg was succeeded
by Ambassadors Elliot Richardson and Anne Armstrong respectively.\textsuperscript{xlv} On 5 April 1974, for instance, the Embassy reported that ‘Sources close to Callaghan have made a point of telling us that he likes and respects Dr. Kissinger and expects to get on well with him.’\textsuperscript{xlvii} Similarly the British Embassy in Washington was very well connected to American political and business elites and able to disseminate the new government positions. Herein the Labour government benefitted significantly from inheriting Ambassador Ramsbotham, a recent Heath government appointment who was highly competent, not tainted by the troubles of 1973 and proved able to develop quickly a good understanding with Kissinger.\textsuperscript{xlviii} One observer went as far as to suggest that the two shared a ‘“relationship of confidence and intellectual equality”.’\textsuperscript{xliv}

Most important of all, though, were personal contacts at the highest political level and, given the concentration of power in the White House, this meant especially with Nixon and Kissinger. No time was wasted. On 3 March 1974, Wilson advised Nixon that ‘the Labour Government will attach a high priority to maintaining, and indeed improving, the close and friendly relationship we have with the Government of the United States, which I regard as an essential component of the external policy of this country in many fields.’\textsuperscript{xlv} That same day Callaghan assured Kissinger that ‘Good Anglo-American relations mean a great deal to me’ and professed his ‘delight’ that he would be ‘working closely with you on the many important issues which face in the world today.’\textsuperscript{xlvii} Whilst these messages might be regarded as expected diplomatic courtesies, they nevertheless conveyed a change of British tone that was welcomed in the US. They also carried weight insofar as what Wilson and Callaghan promised was consistent with previously established positions.

They had both demonstrated during the previous Wilson government (1964-70) commitment to Atlanticism and a global role for Britain; American frustration at Wilson’s refusal to send even a ‘platoon of bagpipers’ to Vietnam was eventually tempered by recognition of British political and covert support.\textsuperscript{li} Indeed, in January 1975 the US Embassy in London emphasised with regard to Wilson that ‘During the darkest days of the Vietnam war he stood by President Johnson at no small cost to his position within his own party.’\textsuperscript{lii} In addition, during the Heath government, Wilson and Callaghan had privately shared with American officials their doubts about European integration and their continued commitment to UK-US relations. For instance, they met with Kissinger in December 1973 and, according to the American record, assured the Secretary of State of ‘Labor’s commitment to strong Trans-
Atlantic relationships.’ They also described the EC as ‘An Emperor without clothes’ and indicated concern both that EC governments were a ‘pathetic little crew’ and that ‘the European unity movement had damaged US-Anglo relations’.

Fortunately for the Labour government, though ‘strange bedfellows’, Nixon and Wilson picked up their previously established good personal relations. Kissinger similarly developed very strong relations with Callaghan and with his successor as British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland – so much so that the latter reportedly thought Callaghan jealous. Moreover, the Nixon administration recognised that the change of British government offered opportunity to develop healthier US-UK ties and thereby strengthen also representation of American interests in Europe and the EC. Furthermore, Kissinger perceived a degree of urgency in rebuilding Anglo-American relations. In his view it was best to work with the Wilson government to establish improved cooperation whilst the Labour government was in a relatively weak position in the House of Commons. Were Wilson to go back to the people for a stronger mandate and secure it, ‘we will have more trouble. He'll have a wild left wing.’

British officials quickly detected signals of reciprocal American interest in improving the tenor of Anglo-American relations. On 14 March 1974, for instance, Hugh Overton of the North America Department concluded that ‘The Americans are evidently making a set at us. After his frank conversation on 7 March with HM Ambassador in Washington, Dr Kissinger has gone out of his way to be agreeable. When speaking forcefully to Sir P Ramsbotham about the Europe-Arab dialogue and consultations Dr Kissinger was careful to say that he had “absolutely no quarrel with the British”, and since then he has made gracious remarks about the UK’s helpful response to the US request for expanded facilities at Diego Garcia and has paid special personal attention to HM Ambassador.’ Ramsbotham noted similarly in the aftermath of Nixon’s 15 March 1974 speech that ‘There is a marked contrast between the severity of the administration’s public statements on Europe, and the evident warmth of their private dealings with and gestures towards ourselves.’

On 28 March 1974 Wilson, Callaghan and Kissinger met again in London for talks that had been ‘meticulously cultivated on both sides’. In addition to the sending of reciprocal signs and signals of warming relations across the Atlantic, Kissinger had indicated strong personal interest in this meeting by first dispatching his close advisers Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor for the State Department, and Arthur Hartmann, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, to London to prepare his visit. With such careful preparation and mutual investment, the meeting evidenced clearly the new tone of exchanges being established at the highest levels of Anglo-American relations. Wilson and Callaghan affirmed themselves to be atlanticists and, whilst conceding Heath’s tactical need to appease France to facilitate British entry to the EC, expressed their view that he had nevertheless ‘leant too far towards the French Government’. Conversely, Kissinger stressed his previous good relations with Wilson, assured that the US did not view Britain as an American outpost in the EC and supported British objectives for a more outward looking Community. Ambassador Ramsbotham later credited this meeting with having helped towards the April 1974 Schloss Gymnich consensus on consultation between the EC and US, which the FCO considered Callaghan’s first major European success, and the subsequent Declaration on Atlantic Relations, agreed at Ottawa on 19 June. It is poignant, too, that Kissinger used his toast at the Lancaster House luncheon to emphasise the significance of ‘a common approach to common policy’ and to declare ‘We approach with the view that what used to be called “the special relationship” is in full force’.

**Negotiating Retrenchment**

In January 1975 the British noted with some satisfaction that ‘Anglo-American relations have been assiduously cultivated by both sides since the public recriminations between the US and Europe in 1973 and early 1974…There is also much goodwill towards Britain within the Administration and elsewhere in the United States’ However, while the Wilson government had succeeded in improving the tone of Anglo-American relations it also recognised that this alone was insufficient to preserve the special relationship. The Americans needed to be convinced of Britain’s residual value as an ally. One of the greatest challenges facing the British government in this task was to preserve American confidence whilst cutting the defence budget as part of its wider effort to restore economic stability to Britain.

From an American perspective the prospect of further British retrenchment raised several key issues. The first was a question of timing. Transatlantic relations were under significant strain and burdensharing was acutely sensitive. Congress was pushing for overseas spending cuts. The 1973 Jackson-Nunn amendment to the American Defence Appropriation Authorisation act, for example, demanded that the government reduce forces in NATO Europe to the extent
that their foreign exchange costs were not met by the European allies.\textsuperscript{lxv} Also, within Europe détente and lessening fear of the Soviet Union made defence budgets more politically vulnerable. British defence cuts could therefore precipitate a series of like measures across NATO Europe countries and in consequence further inflame Congress. This, in turn, could also jeopardise other aspects of the administration’s foreign policy. In fact, with Congress resolved upon reasserting itself vis-à-vis the Executive and inclined to use its control over the purse strings to do so, Ambassador Ramsbotham was already warning that some US programmes and commitments were genuinely uncertain. For instance, in May 1974 he cautioned that ‘there is no doubt that such unpopular causes as foreign aid, overseas commitments and free trade now tend to be more than usually vulnerable.’\textsuperscript{lxvi}

Especially when Ford succeeded Nixon, it was vital that the administration regain the confidence of Congress and of the American public, part of which meant demonstrating that others were sharing international burdens alongside the US. Herein lay the second key problem with potential British defence cuts. The US was actually very short of allies with capabilities, resources and political will to work alongside it across the world. West Germany was economically recovered and politically influential in Europe but its military was confined to defensive duties in the central European theatre. Japan was economically important and a strategically vital partner but only in a regional context. France was much reduced and, in Kissinger’s eyes at least, intent on developing an anti-American EC. As for the EC itself, the US was increasingly ambivalent about European integration in terms both of its own economic and political interests and the introverted focus that constructing Europe tended to encourage.\textsuperscript{lxvii} In November 1974 a US paper on the British Defence Review laid bare the situation: ‘We are troubled by the parochial view of the world held by many of our Allies, and we see the UK as the only European power which is capable of viewing world developments consistently from a broad perspective.’\textsuperscript{lxviii}

The Americans duly put British officials on notice. Winston Lord, Head of the Planning and Coordination Department in the State Department, advised in June 1974 that the US government was apprehensive about the Defence Review and that this constituted their main reservation in the welcome they had otherwise extended to the new tone in Anglo-American relations set by the Wilson government.\textsuperscript{lxix} Thereafter American representations escalated in seniority and robustness. President Ford was advised to impress upon Wilson in January 1975 that ‘I attach great importance to Great Britain maintaining the ability - - to the
maximum extent possible - - to provide forces for uses in areas outside of Europe. The United States should not be the only Western power capable of intervening on a worldwide scale. Similarly in June 1975, in a meeting between British Defence Secretary Roy Mason and US Defence Secretary James Schlesinger, the latter warned that were HMG ‘to make further defence cuts the US Government would have to reconsider certain of their bilateral arrangements.’ Indeed, so strong was Schlesinger in his opposition to British defence cuts, including reported suggestions that ‘we can no longer expect British to pull any weight’ and threats to cut off intelligence and Polaris cooperation, that the US Embassy in London twice called for the State Department to engage in damage limitation efforts.

The Labour government needed to manage this situation carefully. It had to reduce Britain’s overseas commitments but still aspired to a global foreign policy and, crucially, needed American help in supporting sterling and the British economy. Fortunately for the British, their hand was not empty when dealing with US officials. Their most powerful cards were the greater American need of allies at this time, the paucity of US options and the residual value of British defence assets. In addition, Wilson was regarded as a proven friend of the US and in an era of détente the British had an opportunity to emphasise the importance of quality, rather than simply quantity, of defence assets and cooperation. To this end the Wilson and Callaghan governments essentially pursued four strategies to manage Anglo-American defence relations positively whilst cutting the defence budget. The first was to demonstrate the value of Britain’s military collaboration and safeguard critical elements of privileged Anglo-American cooperation. Above all else this meant commitment to maintaining Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Perhaps fortuitously given hostility within elements of the Labour Party to the deterrent, the Wilson government was able to ratify an inherited Anglo-American agreement. In January 1974 Ambassador Cromer had informed the Nixon administration of the British government’s intention to pursue ‘Superantelope’ and secured the President’s approval of American cooperation in a programme that became known as Chevaline. This cementing of the nuclear relationship was complemented by efforts to bind the British and American armed forces closer together and to demonstrate the value of British technology and engineering. For instance, in September 1975 an Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding provided for development of greater weapons standardization and interoperability through cooperation in research, development, production and procurement.
The Labour government’s second strategy was to emphasise that amongst US allies Washington could have most confidence in the likelihood of British cooperation and, hence, the availability of their assets. In this objective the British were pushing at an open door. With an East-West balance established, détente in progress and the US needing to rebuild confidence in American leadership, American officials were already beginning to attach increased premium to reliable allies that could make key niche contributions to US objectives. Within this adjustment the State Department concluded in November 1974 that ‘it seems prudent to assume that at some time in the next 5-10 years we may want to have a British flag alongside our own for both political and military reasons.’ This assumption proved good when in June 1976 Lebanon’s civil war threatened the safety of Beirut’s international community and the American and British governments worked closely together in consequent evacuation efforts. This prompted Kissinger to tell then British Foreign Secretary Crosland how ‘immensely gratified’ he was about the joint operation and that Anglo-American cooperation had ‘helped greatly to relieve an otherwise sad and difficult period for us.’ Just as important, though, was the step-change in the extent and quality of that cooperation, running all the way through from the UK-US Embassies in Beruit to crisis coordination in Washington. As Richard Samuel at the British Embassy in Washington noted, ‘Our last experience in roughly comparable circumstances was during the October 1973 war; the effectiveness of US/UK cooperation this time, both on the ground and in Washington, was an encouraging contrast to US suspicion and virtual breakdown in communication which occurred just over 2½ years ago.

The third strategy was to engage the Americans in detailed and privileged discussions during the process of the Mason Defence Review and of subsequent potential cuts in defence and overseas commitments. This provided opportunity to emphasise the relative burden carried by Britain vis-à-vis other US allies and to demonstrate the utility of residual British hard power assets. It also played to longstanding American concern about lack of consultation by allies, which by 1974 was acute on account of transatlantic tensions in 1973 and the growing ambition of the EC. This strategy evidently paid dividends. A State Department telegram on 15 November 1974 emphasised that ‘Addressees should treat this information as highly privileged and not repeat not discuss UK Defence Review with foreign governments. Addressees should also note that British do not repeat not intend to discuss their thinking re Cyprus with FRG or NATO.’ Similarly, in January 1975 Kissinger advised President Ford in respect of the UK Defence Review that ‘To their credit, the British consulted fully
and frankly with us in November before submitting the results of their Review to Parliament.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv}

Finally, and closely associated with the consultation strategy, there was opportunity to identify areas of potential cuts that were particularly sensitive to the Americans and, where possible, to be seen to respond to these. Privately, of course, the Americans knew that the Labour government would have to reduce defence expenditure and resolved to ‘focus on: -- where the UK contribution will be most important over the next decade; -- where the UK contribution will be unique; -- where the UK contribution may be politically desirable to complement US capabilities over the next decade.’\textsuperscript{lxxxv} Within their general protests about pending British defence cuts, therefore, there emerged a list of American priority commitments. For example, on 28 November 1974 the US Embassy London was advised that the US Secretary Defence ‘attaches particular importance’ that Britain should reconsider planned withdrawal from Masirah under the Defence Review.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} Similarly, President Ford urged Wilson to maintain overseas intervention capability\textsuperscript{lxxxvii} and to protect British bases on Cyprus, which were important for US signals and imagery intelligence gathering in the Mediterranean.

This communicative process was important for it enabled the British to emphasise the quality of particular assets and their willingness to tailor these where possible to complement US needs. In November 1974, for instance, Wilson reassured President Ford that Diego Garcia and Cyprus would receive the attention he wanted.\textsuperscript{lxxxviii} In June 1976 Frank Cooper, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Ministry of Defence, made clear just how far ‘we have gone out of our way to be helpful to the Americans.’ Cooper listed the concessions made in response to US requests and criticism: ‘We bowed to American pressure over remaining in Cyprus, and we have undertaken a number of tasks there specifically to meet American requirements. We have allowed the Americans to expand their facilities on Diego Garcia and have kept a toe-hold in Singapore to provide the US Navy with refuelling facilities. On Masirah the problem is rather that Washington has been unable to make up its mind about whether they have any use for the place; meanwhile we have in effect already delayed our withdrawal by three months out of concern for a possible American interest.’\textsuperscript{lxxxix}

The political calculations behind these concessions was quickly evident. First, as Secretary of State for Health and Social Services Barbara Castle noted, the ‘limit of what is tolerable’ to the Ford administration was where Wilson drew the line in spending cuts within the Mason
Second, accommodating American opinion where possible encouraged goodwill at a time when Britain needed to maintain US confidence and support. For example, on 26 November 1974 Callaghan, in the context of the Cyprus bases, wrote Kissinger that ‘I hope that this outcome will give you satisfaction and the feeling that, in matters of this sort, we continue to give full weight to the views and interests of the United States wherever these can, even at some cost, be reconciled with our own.’ That Kissinger duly declared himself ‘especially grateful’ was more than a diplomatic courtesy. Britain remaining in Cyprus was a concession of significance to the US administration that the Secretary of State reminded Ford of prior to Wilson visiting Washington in January 1975.

**Britain, international institutions and soft power**

Careful coordination with the Americans during British defence cuts did not prevent sometimes heated exchanges but nevertheless proved to be a reasonably successful strategy in preserving both the newly developed positive tone of Anglo-American relations and key areas of functional cooperation. Still, though, an improved tone within relations was of limited value if the decline in British capabilities progressively removed mutual, albeit asymmetric, utility from Anglo-American relations. With Britain’s hard power resources contracting and the cost of retaining what remained rising, British officials looked to prioritise alternative forms of power and influence. Crucially, British soft power resources seemed more resilient to the retreat from empire. This owed in part to the continuation of structural power resources secured in the aftermath of WW2, such as permanent membership of the UN Security Council, which by the 1970s were of value far surpassing Britain’s objective standing. It also owed to Britain’s past technological leadership, which had enabled it to become an early official nuclear power and, consequently, a leading member of most international committees and agreements to regulate and monitor nuclear activities. Furthermore, Britain’s experience as an imperial power and global trader bequeathed an extensive international network of British economic interests and organisations.

British soft power was in some respects actually boosted by Britain’s retreat from empire. The most obvious example of this was Britain’s membership of the EC from 1973, an objective only pursued once it became clear to the Macmillan government that neither the Atlantic, the British empire nor the European Free Trade Association offered markets that
were feasible alternatives to those of the Community. In addition, though, decolonisation and the transformation of empire into Commonwealth offered revised or new forms of influence. The Commonwealth was a source of direct British influence and exercised a wider power of attraction through the political and constitutional norms and practices of its membership – many of which originated in Britain. As Callaghan told US Ambassador to Britain Elliot Richardson in May 1975, ‘the Commonwealth was still useful to influence others. It had vitality.’ xciv Furthermore, Britain’s influence within the UN was potentially augmented by its no longer being a focal point of developing world nationalist ire and its becoming an important interlocutor outside of the superpower dynamic on issues as diverse as human rights and international development.

Before taking office in 1974 Wilson had already noted that whilst Britain could not compete with American power ‘there are areas of the world where we have influence or a special entrée’. xcv In the 1960s this asset made a helpful but not compelling contribution to the special relationship. However, in the 1970s the British enjoyed three strokes of good fortune when seeking to harness soft power more effectively to their foreign policy ambitions. First, the relative utility of hard power, especially military, declined in the face of Mutually Assured Destruction, the end of the Vietnam War, and the development of détente. This helped the Wilson and Callaghan governments to sell to the Americans both qualitative rather than quantitative hard power British contributions to international security and the enhanced value of British soft power resources. Second, as the US struggled with overstretch and a crisis of confidence, the Americans needed like-minded allies to help manage a proliferation of international organisations and regimes that emerged in response to deepening complex interdependence, a multilateralization of international relations, decolonisation and the emergence of new actors such as the EC. Third, the international institutions created in the aftermath of WW2, including the United Nations, Bretton Woods system and the IMF, were predominantly of Anglo-American design, which meant that American as well as British soft power flowed through and from them. In turn, this meant that when this international architecture experienced serious strain in the 1970s, the Americans had a direct interest in preserving / reforming them and, hence, a de facto interest in protecting key historical sources of British soft power too – something reflected in the creation of the G6 at the Rambouillet summit in November 1975.
The product of these developments was that British officials could promote to their American counterparts the value of Britain’s disproportionately large soft power resources. In this task they soon achieved some success. In early 1975, set against the background of Western fragility ‘before OPEC and developing countries’ demands for a New International Economic Order, Kissinger acknowledged the ‘importance we attach to British participation in cooperative efforts to deal with major international issues such as energy and the world economic system.’ Xcvii In May 1976 the State Department further demonstrated the breadth of issues upon which British support was needed when it called for continuing ‘high-level exchanges to encourage support for our multilateral goals of improving the functioning of the international monetary system, increasing the effectiveness of IEA programs, and developing a coordinated position with respect to North-South dialogue.’ Xcvii In addition, as Callaghan knew well when instructing Ivor Richard, Britain’s new UK Permanent Representative to the UN, to work as closely as possible with his US counterpart, Ambassador John Scali, Xcviii the Americans needed help in the UN. Decolonisation and non-alignment sponsored a General Assembly that was more difficult to control and that consequently weakened American public and Congressional support for the organisation. For example, Congress responded to UNESCO’s cut-off of funds for projects in Israel by suspending US funding of UNESCO ‘until it rescinds its “political” action against Israel.’ Xcix Furthermore, under the new international economic conditions of the 1970s there were some tasks that Britain was seemingly better placed to lead than the US. For instance, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S Ingersoll suggested that the British ‘may see leadership of the industrialised countries’ attempts to cope with these complex problems as a new world role for themselves - - for which they are uniquely qualified as major users of raw materials and as primus inter pares in the Commonwealth.’ xc

The most important new source of British soft power influence, though, was Britain’s membership of the EC. The Labour government certainly saw opportunities in this. Dual EC and NATO membership gave institutional form to Britain’s (self-proclaimed) role as an ‘Atlantic intermediary’ or ‘Atlantic Bridge’. Indeed, Prime Minister Callaghan was not shy in lauding Britain’s role in explaining America to Europeans and Europe to Americans. In May 1976 he told the US News and World Report that ‘When the Labour Party came into office in 1974, I found that the competitive element in Europe’s relations with the United States was becoming increasingly confrontational. It was as though European co-operation could only be achieved at the expense of the United States. Now, largely as a result of British influence, I
believe it is realised in the European Community will only develop as such by co-ordinating those policies – especially in foreign affairs – where our united voice and united strength can most effectively make themselves felt and heard.'c1

Callaghan overstated British influence and British officials worried about both US over-expectation of what Britain could deliver and EC partner suspicions of their being an American Trojan Horse.c1i Nevertheless, American officials recognised advantages of Britain’s entrance to the EC, so much so that when the Labour government re-negotiated Britain’s terms of EC membership and put the results to a referendum, they were unequivocal in their preference that Britain remain within the Community.c1ii In November 1975 a State Department paper set out a primary US concern thus: the ‘American dilemma is not only how to elicit European support for critical American policy objectives, but also how to accomplish this without so antagonising the Europeans that they accelerate the trend toward an independent, and perhaps partially unfriendly, policy.’c1v A strong friend in Europe would undoubtedly help in this task. The British were consequently viewed in Washington as a vital source of information on Community affairs. They were also able to emphasise to the Americans their agenda setting capacity in the EC, both in broad terms such as promoting international free trade and an outward looking Community and on specific issues. For example, with NATO in trouble on its Southern flank, in June 1976 Kissinger was briefed to ‘Express appreciation for British support within EC for and to Portugal’c1v and in November that year the State Department concluded it should ‘expect and welcome’ the UK presidency of the EC in the first half of 1977 to push for settlement of the Cyprus issue.c1vi

Re-tuning the special relationship

Within a few years of Churchill’s 1946 Iron Curtain speech the term special relationship began to percolate into British and American official documents and the media.c1vii Nowadays it is instantly recognisable shorthand for the depth and breadth of Anglo-American functional cooperation, cultural ties, shared histories and language, common commitment to the rule of law and democratic institutions, and so forth. What is important to appreciate in the context of the Labour governments is that by the 1970s this nomenclature already possessed a political and popular significance capable of setting expectations. Indeed, it was this that made Heath’s promotion of the ‘natural relationship’ significant in terms of indicating to EC
countries a rebalancing of British relationships and a readiness to assume a constructive role within the Community.

In October 1967 the FCO opined that ‘The phrase “special relationship” grew up in the years following the wartime partnership as a term of art to describe the Anglo-American partnership…It rested on a certain surviving but diminishing “equality” with the United States, and on certain special forms of cooperation in defence and atomic fields not shared by the Americans with other countries.’ Church, for instance, operated very much in these terms. He portrayed the special relationship as an exclusive Anglo-American affair and one that signified Britain’s privileged status in Washington and its continuing place at the top table of world powers. This was reflected in his pursuit of bilateral summit meetings with Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, his attachment to wartime forms of UK-US cooperation such as the Combined Boards and his hostility to Britain being treated as a European power.

As British relative power declined, successive governments re-modulated their presentation of the special relationship to maintain its credibility. Pretensions to equality of resources and power were abandoned, though preferential functional Anglo-American cooperation continued. In their stead uniqueness in Anglo-American relations became presented more in terms of commonalities. For instance, British Ambassador to the US Sir Patrick Dean argued in 1967 that these commonalities were organic rather than constructed, constituting the ‘diffuse cultural relationship between the two peoples in the broadest “human” sense of the term.’

The Wilson and Callaghan governments’ desire for privileged Anglo-American functional cooperation and special access to Washington as a ‘fidus Achates’ remained as strong as Churchill’s had been. This was evident in their concern for the tone of Anglo-American relations and in how they managed British defence cuts and sought to convince the Americans of the rising value of Britain’s numerous memberships of international organisations. Heath’s use of the ‘natural relationship’ to capture Anglo-American relations enabled the Wilson government to use its reversion to the nomenclature special relationship to send messages of caution about European integration, renewed commitment to Atlanticism and commitment to complementarity between the Atlantic and European pillars of British foreign policy. At the same time, British officials were acutely aware that to be seen to move too far towards US policies, or to claim a privileged position with Washington, would antagonise EC countries especially.
Wilson and Callaghan consequently presented the special relationship as a benign, non-exclusive partnership that nevertheless enjoyed unique characteristics and benefits arising from these. The special relationship of fact – that ‘we speak the same language and have the same cultural antecedent’ – could be used to maintain publicly a special relationship whilst ‘specialness’ in practice between the UK and US governments could be downplayed or left to inference. Wilson’s thinking in this respect was demonstrated in a speech drafted in 1971. Here he explicitly rejected the idea of the special relationship as being exclusive. This spoke to the reality of how power had shifted since WW2 within the relationship and relative to others. However, his rejection was not couched in these terms. Instead he used words that discursively modernised and democratised the special relationship: ‘In this inter-dependent world it can flourish only in a wider association…’ He also set Anglo-American relations apart from functional alliances, arguing that the special relationship was ‘based to a large extent on an identity of view and purpose over a wide area of world problems.’ Wilson thereby implied that UK-US relations maintained a special quality and resilience without laying claim to their being privileged.

Five years later Callaghan adopted a similar tactic in an interview with The Times. Asked whether the UK-US relationship was special he replied:

‘Of course, it is special. I am not claiming a relationship with the U.S. that France and Germany do not have. But to me, the special relationship is that I sit down with an American and can discuss matters from a common viewpoint. I think that is one of the reasons Henry (Kissinger) and I got on so well. He used to say to me that when he came to London he got a sort of world outlook as he did in Washington. That is bound to create a special relationship between us.’

Here Callaghan reassured key EC partners by nominally placing Britain’s relationship with the US on a par with those of France and West Germany. At the same time, however, he implied that the British relationship was qualitatively different insofar as British and American officials shared a ‘common viewpoint’. Whilst this was not couched in terms of privilege, thus tending to French face-threat especially, the anecdote that followed about Kissinger did place Britain differently to France and West Germany as a country with a ‘world outlook’. Informed followers of international relations would have likely detected here resonances of Kissinger’s controversial division of the global and regional in his speech that
launched the Year of Europe. Furthermore, it is important to recognise the significance of what Callaghan left unsaid. In sharing with the Americans a common viewpoint derived from a shared world outlook, the British had a preferential claim to the role of ‘fidus Achates’ to the US and a distinctive foundation for their Atlantic intermediary role.

**Conclusion**

Wilson and Callaghan were determined to soothe tensions in Anglo-American relations that had developed during 1973 especially and to shift the balance of Britain’s foreign policy back from the Heath government’s Eurocentric orientation to British traditional post-WW2 Atlanticism. Their management of Anglo-American relations 1974-76 in pursuit of these objectives was more successful than hitherto acknowledged and had important implications for the future of the special relationship too. This is especially the case when considered in the context of Britain’s grave economic predicament, which led ultimately to the huge IMF bailout. Wilson and Callaghan knew that British weakness had combined with the rise of other powers to mean that the US regarded Britain ‘as less important, actually and potentially, than for many years in the past.’

Somehow they had to revive Anglo-American relations whilst managing a country in retreat.

The biggest and most immediate improvement made was to the tone of Anglo-American relations. Wilson and Callaghan led by personal example the re-prioritisation of UK-US and transatlantic relations within British foreign policy. They had strong, pre-established Atlanticist reputations, rekindled and/or established close personal relations with key US officials and communicated their intent quickly to the Americans and throughout the British foreign policy bureaucracy. Results came quickly. The March 1974 Lancaster House meeting signified the new intent and in September 1974 Kissinger noted explicitly that warm relations had been ‘particularly marked since Wilson returned to power in March.’ By January 1976 President Ford was able to assure incoming Ambassador to the UK, Anne Armstrong, that ‘Our relations couldn’t be better….much better than with Heath. Heath had a sort of Gaullist attitude toward the United States. Things are much better with Wilson.’

The greatest challenge for the Labour governments was to manage the inevitable contraction of Britain’s global footprint and defence expenditure whilst convincing American officials of
Britain’s continuing value as an ally. Great care was consequently taken to keep the Americans uniquely informed of and involved in British debates about where, what and how to make essential cuts to their overseas commitments. This process avoided potentially damaging knee-jerk American reactions to announcements of cuts. It enabled the ascertaining of which British assets were considered most sensitive at this time in Washington. And it created opportunity to make politically valuable concessions to US views – such as maintaining the British presence in Cyprus. In January 1975, the FCO concluded with some satisfaction that ‘the Americans have shown a generally understanding attitude towards the cuts envisaged in the Defence Review.’

Finally, the Wilson and Callaghan governments made an important contribution to modernising the special relationship and to adjusting how American officials calculated Britain’s utility. This was done in part by their discursive repackaging of a once exclusive and preferential special relationship as one that remained special but which was now non-exclusive and not, overtly at least, oriented to seeking or being granted privilege in Washington. Emphasising this and a common cast of Anglo-American mind, together with successfully renegotiating the terms of Britain’s EC membership, bolstered British claims to be ‘fidus Achetus’ to the US and strengthened Britain’s promotion of its Atlantic and European commitments as being complementary. Still more important, though, was Wilson and Callaghan’s realisation that new opportunities to extend British influence had emerged as a result of global economic issues especially replacing the primarily ideological, political and military problems that had dominated the period 1945-70. Complex interdependence and the multilateralisation of international relations meant that British membership of international organisations especially offered influence and a means to offset within UK-US relations some of the damage wrought by defence cuts and economic weakness.

In January 1975 Kissinger told Ford that ‘the UK still maintains an influence in international affairs disproportionate to its size and military and economic strength’. In August 1975 British planners were confident that ‘we still enjoy a privileged position in the United States which our economic and military weight does not really merit.’ Such conclusions indicate some British success in convincing the Ford administration of Britain’s continuing relevance. More than this, though, they had encouraged calculations of mutual utility within Anglo-American relations to extend beyond a traditional hard power calculus. The Labour
governments had, in soft power, begun to tap a key enabler of Britain going forwards as a medium-sized power ‘punching above its weight’ in international affairs.

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ii For a useful overview of these debates see Dobson and Marsh eds, *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, Introduction. See also Baylis, 'The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory', 368-379; Danchev, *On Specialness*; Dumbrell and Schafer eds, *America's 'Special Relationships'*.


iv For instance, Robb emphasises strain and US coercion within UK-US relations and Reynolds argues that by the early 1970s Britain had ‘lost much of its special importance for the United States’ and that ‘During this period Britain had often seemed importunate rather than important.’ Dimbleby and Reynolds argue likewise that “Britain no longer mattered … as a world power or as a political example”. Thomas Robb, *A Strained Partnership*; David


Robb, *A Strained Partnership?*

Robb, for instance, acknowledges that the Labour government had some success in improving the tone of UK-US relations but is less sanguine than about the gains made and the renewed quality of UK-US relations, presenting these as being more strained and marked by American coercion. Robb, *A Strained Partnership?*; Robb and Hughes, ‘Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage’, 861-905.
xi Annenberg to Secretary of State, 29 January 1974, 
https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=3045&dt=2474&dl=1345

xii See, for example, Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 73; Dickie, “Special” No More, 144-45; Bartlett, “The Special Relationship” – A Political History of Anglo–American Relations, 129–130.

xiii Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 602.

xiv NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Security Council Files, President’s Trip Files, Visit of Richard Nixon, President of the United States: Detailed Schedule United Kingdom, Henry Kissinger, ‘Memorandum for the President’.

xv Kissinger, The Years of Upheaval, 141.

xvi Cf Dumbrell, ‘Personal Diplomacy’, 82-104.


xix Ibid.


xxi UKNA, FCO 82/64, FCO paper entitled ‘Relations with the United States’ prepared for Alec Douglas-Home in preparation for a meeting with the Prime Minister 9 November 1971. Some scholars still hedge on this question. For instance, David Gowland argues that Heath was a ‘possible exception’ to the standard British line of not separating Europe from the global dimensions of foreign policy. Gowland, Britain and the European Union, 279.
George, *Britain and European Integration*, 45-6.


Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 266.


UKNA, PREM 16 / 419, Henderson to FCO, 8 March 1974.


xxxv GFL, National Security Advisor, Kissinger – Scowcroft West Wing Files 1969-76, Box 26, United Kingdom (12) 11/1/73 – 12/30/73, Memo of private conversation following Quadripartite Dinner, 9 December 1973.

xxxvi UKNA, FCO 82/576, Thomas to Rycroft, 19 September 1975.

xxxvii Wilson, Final Term, 54.


xiii For instance, British Ambassador to the US Peter Ramsbotham reported that his first meeting with Kissinger was dominated by European/Arab dialogue. UKNA, PREM 16/419, Ramsbotham to FCO, 7 March 1974.

The British press viewed Annenberg as ‘no more than a figurehead’ whose primary preoccupation appeared to be cultivating high society and refurbishing the Embassy Residence in Regents Park. British officials were likewise critical, Sir John Killick calling Annenberg’s leadership ‘complacent’ and Ramsbotham labelling it ‘lamentable’ that the activities of the US Embassy withered away to the extent they did on his watch. Library of Congress, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Box 272, Appointment as Ambassador, press coverage, pre-arrival, William Lowther, ‘It’s Mr Powerful’, *Daily Mail*, 12 February 1975. Library of Congress, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Box 272, Appointment as Ambassador, press coverage, interviews arrival, cited in Marilyn Berger, ‘Richardson: Envoy post important’, *Washington Post*, 10 January 1975; UKNA, FCO 82/627, Killick to Permanent Under-Secretary, 8 April 1975; UKNA, FCO 82/627, Ramsbotham to Killick, 1 May 1975. For more on Annenberg see Ogden, *Legacy*; Fonzi, *Ambassador Extraordinary*; Cameron, ‘Walter H Annenberg’, 171-189.


UKNA, PREM 16 / 419, Memo by HTA Overton with Steering Brief attachment, 14 March 1974; UKNA, FCO 82/422, Draft letter Killick to Ramsbotham, ud.


Seitz, *Over Here*, 316.


conversation Kissinger and Ramsbotham, October 13, 1976; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 977.

lix Benn, *Against the Tide*, 576.

lx GFL, National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 14 August 1974,

lxii UKNA, PREM 16/419, Memo by HTA Overton with Steering Brief attachment, 14 March
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lxiii UKNA, PREM 16/419, Ramsbotham to FCO, ud.

lxiv UKNA, PREM 16/419, Record of conversation between the Prime Minister and Secretary
of State Kissinger, 28 March 1974.

lxv UKNA, PREM 16 / 419, Record of conversation between the Prime Minister and
Secretary of State Kissinger, March 28,1974.

lxvi UKNA, FCO 30/3015, JE Cable to McNally, 30 July 1975.

lxvii UKNA, FCO 82/536, Ramsbotham to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

lxviii GFL, National Security Advisor, Kissinger – Scowcroft West Wing Files 1969-76, Box

lxix UKNA, T 354/407, FCO Steering Brief for Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, 29-31
January 1975.

Kissinger, for instance, later noted that his Year of Europe initiative ran up against ‘the reality that, in the early 1970s, our European allies were far more preoccupied with European integration than with Atlantic cohesion.’ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 600.


UKNA, FCO 82/579, Defence Department Brief, 9 July 1975.


lxxv GFL, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, Country File United Kingdom, Folder (3), memo from James G Lowenstein and Thomas Stern to the Secretary, 8 November 1974.


lxxvii Bodleian Library, MS Wilson, 1591, Ford to Wilson, nd


lxxix UKNA, FCO 82/660, Frank Cooper (Ministry of Defence) to Michael Palliser (FCO), 1 June 1976.


xciv UKNA, FC0 82/627, minutes of meeting Callaghan and Elliot Richardson, 19 May 1975.

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cviii UKNA FCO 7 / 771, FCO to certain missions and dependent territories, 12 October 1967.

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cxxiii Marsh, ‘Foreign Policy’, 83.