Intersection of Formal and Informal Control in Urban Neighbourhoods

Prospect of Democratic Policing in Pakistan

A thesis submitted for Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology
February 2020
Nauman Aqil

Summary

This research studies the intersection of formal and informal social control processes in two high crime and two low crime neighbourhoods in the cities of Karachi and Lahore in Pakistan. The comparative case study design explores the significance of ethnic heterogeneity, political capital, social cohesion, and spatiality in explaining the neighbourhoods' crime levels. Moreover, this study highlights the existential value of informal networks and kinship in preventing victimisation and nurturing survival in uncertain political and economic conditions. It further demonstrates that, in context of minimal state efficiency, social order is negotiated on the principles of expediency and accommodation. In particular, this study indicates that, when faced with mistrust of state institutions and selective fatalism, arising from economic vulnerability and chronic misgovernance, residents are willing to overlook some of the crimes which do not affect the harmony and stability of their neighbourhoods. By examining the ways in which social control is configured between the police and moral entrepreneurs in highly stratified neighbourhoods, this study stipulates that the optimum outcome of such an arrangement is most likely the maintenance of the status quo. Nonetheless, this study notes the limits of informal control mechanisms when these mechanisms are not buttressed by the agents of formal control or when the sheer intensity of crimes warrant self-preservation and inaction. Furthermore, this study illustrates that the legacy of colonialism lives on not only within the police forces but also within the public imagination. Consequently, the police are expected to behave in a repressive and highhanded manner, especially when dealing with offenders. Given this public conception of the police, this study discusses the grim prospects of the Western notion of democratic policing in Pakistan. Finally, this study raises questions in terms of applicability of some Western constructs and methodological tools in studying crime and policing in Pakistan.

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

To my late mom and uncle, who believed in me more than I ever have believed in myself.

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 Situating the Study

As a college or a university student in Pakistan, it is a fairly common experience to be stopped and searched by the traffic police or 'the police' when riding a motorbike or, less probably, when driving a car. The police ask you to show almost everything you need to carry under the law. More often than not, they successfully identify some document you do not have with you at the time. However, you do not need to panic if they threaten you with prosecution. You just need to consider how much money you have in your wallet and how you can get a Rs.100 note from the wallet without exposing the rest of the notes. The police official may hesitate to accept the bribe, but you need to be persistent, taking care that nobody around is watching. In a matter of seconds, he will accept the deal and you will be free to attend your lecture. When you come home, there is no harm telling your parents about the incident. They will commend you for your reaction to the situation and encourage you not to 'mess' with the police in the future. There is also a good chance that you will be reimbursed Rs. 100 by someone in your family, at least if they can afford it.

The public image of the police in Pakistan is that of a chronically corrupt institution whose members share a culture characterised by arrogance, misbehaviour, and a craving for money. This image is reproduced relentlessly in electronic and social media these days, but it existed long before the media found their way in ordinary homes. In the early 1990s, as a six or seven year old, I remember my uncle being stopped by a policeman for a traffic infraction. Sitting on the backseat of his motorbike, I almost fainted in fear. Realising that, the policeman told me, "Son, do not worry; we [he and my uncle] are just talking."

As far as I remember, none of my extended family members in Pakistan has been to a police station in their lives; 'What does any honourable person have to do with the police?', I have been told on numerous occasions. A few years ago, my father had his mobile phone stolen; despite my insistence, he did not report it to the police, but he did get his SIM card blocked so it could not be used to make calls by the perpetrators. I am confident that my family is not alone in this demeanour and that this attitude of avoidance towards the police is widespread in Pakistani society. At the family or the neighbourhood level, people tend to address their conflicts among themselves. Calling the police to resolve a conflict or to catch perpetrators is considered plain foolishness or mischief making by someone else in the neighbourhood. Given that there is order in a neighbourhood, one can assume that informal control would be high in this context. Not much is known, however, about how the social control is operationalised in urban contexts of Pakistan and what makes it less or

more effective. Even less understood is the intersection of informal control with the formal control in terms of perceptions about the police and their role in maintaining order in the neighbourhood or 'facilitating crime' in it. While my motivation to study neighbourhood crime came from a research project I did in 2014, my interest in understanding the intersection of informal and formal control was led by its findings. A review of the existing literature also showed that there is not much studied about this intersection elsewhere. Hence, I endeavoured to examine this issue for the purpose of my PhD degree.

Overview

The concepts of delinquency, crime, formal and informal social control, and community agency are central to the theoretical framework of this study. Since the research concerns crime in urban neighbourhoods, the theoretical and methodological traditions of the Chicago School are inevitably important influences. Nonetheless, the cities under investigation in the present study are quite different from Chicago neighbourhoods in terms of demography, geography, economy, politics, and culture. The urbanisation of Karachi and Lahore was largely an offshoot of the European presence in the region (Hasan and Mohib 2003; Chattha 2012). Understandably, the sociocultural evolution of these cities was not able to keep pace with the rapid urbanisation necessitated by colonial preferences. This process of 'overurbanisation' (Clinard and Abbott 1973, p. 78) alone makes it difficult to understand the growth of these cities with the theoretical and empirical frameworks used in the West. In addition, policing models exported to states with colonial histories, such as Pakistan, have generally lacked adaptation to local conditions (Robertson 2005; Pino and Wiatrowski 2016). As a result, the police in a number of these states function (as they did in colonial times) as a repressive institution (Tankebe 2008a; Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009). Thus, to take account of the informal and formal control processes in Karachi and Lahore, there is a need to critically evaluate the theoretical approaches largely inspired from cities in the UK and the USA. More importantly, this study is particularly interested in the consequences that follow from the intersection of formal and informal control mechanisms in different neighbourhoods. In particular, the interaction of agents of formal control with informal control mechanisms could provide important insights into the prospect of democratic policing in Pakistan. As these aspects are scarcely researched in postcolonial contexts, this study needs to draw from a variety of sources regarding crime, urban studies, and social control.

A review of the literature on policing and social control across different community contexts reveals three dimensions which are relevant to this study. First, it is important to

understand how delinquency is locally defined and how social responses towards different forms of crime are triggered. This is important since several postcolonial countries still have enforced criminal justice systems which were devised to repress the democratic uprisings in those countries (Agozino 2003). In Pakistan, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1898, enacted under the British rule, is still in force. As these colonial laws were not promulgated as a result of democratic consensus, there is a distinct possibility that people's perceptions of crime and delinquency could be substantially different from what the book of law postulates. Given the dearth of academic research in urban areas of Pakistan, engaging with this issue is important in mapping the moral and non-entrepreneurs in the neighbourhoods, and in providing an opportunity to identify the groups and activities labelled as delinquents.

Second, most of the studies on social control efforts (formal or informal) can be broadly divided into three overlapping categories. These relate to the control of people (Kennelly 2011; Lopes et al. 2012; Wiley et al. 2013), the control of places (Guerette and Bowers 2009; Groff et al. 2015; Weisburd 2015) and the control of what are considered to be 'problems' (Carr 2005; Woodiwiss and Hobbs 2009; Jacques and Wright 2011). There is also the control of activities, which relates to people and places but includes cyberspace (Lyon 2003; Thomas 2005), but I have not included that in this study. As I will show later, most contemporary policing strategies and community-based mechanisms of control can loosely fit into this schema. Third, there are neighbourhood effects which influence the capacity to produce social control (Wilson 1987; Zimmerman and Messner 2011; Sampson 2012; Wright and Fagan 2013; Warner et al. 2015). These effects include the social conditions of the neighbourhood, emphasising mutual trust between neighbours and the institutional capacity to achieve commonly desired goals (Bottoms 2012).

Conducting this study, I have benefitted from the significant amount of work in the West on the operation of social control in urban neighbourhoods (Innes 2003; Silver and Miller 2004; Hawdon and Ryan 2009; Warner and Sampson 2015). However, as studies on social control kept on piling up in the criminological literature, recent studies are generally more 'specialised' in that they take specific hypotheses and deal with only some aspects of social control. Exceptions to this pattern include some excellent ethnographies which attempt to cover the entire spectrum of neighbourhood factors and their contribution to the configuration of social order (Zorbaugh 1983; Baumgartner 1989; Carr 2005; Goffman 2014). The present study is exploratory in nature since urban neighbourhoods of Karachi and Lahore are hardly studied in terms of social control processes. When I set out for the

fieldwork, I did not have preconceived notions about certain concepts and theories in terms of testing them against my empirical findings. My objective was to build a narrative that would make it possible to understand how different neighbourhood factors work in intersection with each other to produce social order. Therefore, I had to include several different concepts in the theoretical framework of this study. Below is a conceptual model of how I made sense of the social order and control in the urban neighbourhoods of Karachi and Lahore. I argue that the construction of social order in a neighbourhood is largely a product of: i) identification of delinquency and crime, ii) social control of people, places, and problems, and iii) neighbourhood effects.

Moral entrepreneurs, law, and overall context of the city are the three major factors that define crime and delinquency in a neighbourhood. The crime and delinquency problems then result in the application of formal and informal control processes which are also interlinked. These processes can be understood in terms of people, problem, and places. The intersection between these modalities of control then contribute to the social order. Neighbourhood effects, such as population heterogeneity and concentrated disadvantage, impact both crime and social control. The following figure illustrates this conceptual framework.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Research Questions

Insofar as social control is defined in its wider meaning, the distinction between formal and informal control is often problematic in real life situations. Similarly, the intersection between these modes of control can take numerous forms across space and time. This research shows that permutations of social control can be substantially different in neighbourhoods and even smaller social groups, such as families, living in similar socioeconomic circumstances. As a result, enforcement of control over members can vary decisively from one neighbourhood to the next. Hence, while this research aims to develop

an understanding of the intersection between formal and informal social control, not much could be anticipated about the configurations of social control in the neighbourhoods I studied.

The conceptual framework for this study was largely derived from my understanding of the urban social control literature which was predominantly based on cities in the Global North. After the fieldwork was completed and data analysed, some themes emerged which I had not foreseen. For instance, I included 'socio-political context of the city' in the conceptual framework, but it turned out that the socio-political context of neighbourhoods was more consequential in terms of social control. Similarly, I categorized moral entrepreneurs simply as rule creators and rule enforcers who might act as rule breakers sometimes (Becker 1963). Following the fieldwork, it appeared that both deviance and rules could be relative in a neighbourhood. A consensus or lack thereof over rules was an important factor in articulating social order. Hence, I could have considered a more nuanced description of moral entrepreneurs in terms of the rules that they create and enforce, and how interpersonal relations among moral entrepreneurs dictate the primacy of certain rules against the others.

As the research problem was not clearly defined at the outset, some of the questions addressed in this research emerged at the data collection and analysis stage. The questions included the following:

i) How are delinquencies and crimes defined in neighbourhoods and how do these definitions impact the operation of formal and informal social control?

ii) To what extent are constructs in social disorganisation theory applicable in the contexts of Karachi and Lahore?

iii) How are intersections between formal and informal social control related to the configuration of social order and crime outcomes?

iv) What are the implications of existing police-community relations on the prospect of democratic policing in Karachi and Lahore?

v) How does the negotiation of political space among moral entrepreneurs define the crime landscape in neighbourhoods?

vi) How does the presence of local institutions create conditions to facilitate or impede crime and delinquency in neighbourhoods?

vii) What are the key factors contributing to police image at the neighbourhood level?

The answers presented in this study to some of these research questions may not be comprehensive, but the answers provide an insight into more specific research questions or hypotheses that may be asked or tested in future research studies, which is what most exploratory studies aim to achieve.

Defining social control

Social control is one of those key concepts in social science whose definition is largely contested. Social control is often confused with socialization and social order. Although intimately connected with social control, blurring social control with socialization and social order deprives social control from its utility for analytical purposes. Stan Cohen defined social control as "…organized responses to crime, delinquency and allied forms of deviant and/or socially problematic behaviour…" (Cohen 1985, p. 3).

Cohen's definition of social control has served to distinguish the concept of social control from other allied concepts. However, understanding social control as 'organised responses' makes this definition less flexible in its ability to accommodate informal control enacted by individuals and the non-state actors. It also creates the problem of what can be considered as 'organised'. Donald Black's definition of social control addresses these problems by defining social control as "…the normative aspect of social life, or the definition of deviant behaviour and the response to it, such as prohibitions, accusations, punishment, and compensation." (Black 1976, pp. 1-2).

Critics of these definitions argue that new modes of social control have emerged in the past few decades so that almost everyone in society is subject to some sort of control (Garland 2001; Lyon 2001). Hence, limiting the definition of social control as responses to deviant behaviour does not cover the wide array of control strategies in the 'post-modern' world. Although this argument holds true to some extent, Cohen's and Black's definitions of social control provide a flexible yet focused conception of social control. Tentatively, I understand social control as those social responses intended to react against, or prevent, deviant behaviour, delinquency, and crime. I find social order as closely related but distinctly different from the concept of social control. Social order is a broader concept which refers to the application of those practices, rules, routines, knowledge and behaviours which to some degree constitute the social organization of the society. While maintaining social order is a manifest function of social control, social order is not wholly reliant upon social control.

Social control is traditionally understood in terms of its 'formal' and 'informal' natures. Summarily, formal control is based in the law – normally the criminal law but also including the civil and administrative/regulatory law - and is exercised by the state or formal agents of control; whereas informal control refers to activities undertaken by informal agents such as peer groups and communities (Black 1976). While the distinction between formal and informal control is applied widely in the literature, it does have some limitations. In some situations, a particular instance of social control may not be neatly categorized into a formal/informal category. For example, in Pakistan, the police sometimes engage in discussions with community elders to informally settle a local feud.

Another way of understanding social control is defined by Cohen who distinguished between controls with a 'hard edge' and those with a 'soft edge' (Cohen 1985). According to Cohen, controls with a hard edge include elements of coercion whereas controls with a soft edge do not. Social control may also be categorized into proactive and reactive social controls. Proactive social controls refer to anticipatory controls placed to prevent likely deviance. On the other hand, reactive social controls are employed to respond to crimes and delinquencies which have already taken place. In post-modern societies, the introduction of new technologies to enforce control, such as surveillance cameras and recording of online activity, has made this distinction particularly useful. There are several other ways in which social control has been categorized, all of which reflect different permutations of social control as it is practiced in routine life. Thus, although a certain categorisation of social control may be useful to describe some instances of social control, it may be less useful in others. Nonetheless, social control remains an important umbrella concept, whereas conceptual tools need to be consistently devised and updated to make sense of the evolving logics and practices of social control.

The social construction of crime and delinquency

Goffman (1963) problematized the use of the term 'deviance' by arguing that it can be applied to any person who does not comply with prevalent social norms. As this conceptualization is likely to result in a wide variety of people being categorised as deviants, the term needs refinement for a meaningful analysis. Because the assumption is that social norms are clear and legitimate, deviance becomes a matter of degree with almost everyone being deviant to some extent. Goffman (1963) argued that in small communities, there are individuals who deviate, but their deviance is 'in-group' and group members are likely to defend these individuals in case of outside threats. An example of 'in-group' deviants may be adolescents involved in 'minor' deviations. This assertion could

be particularly relevant to urban neighbourhoods in Pakistan as cultural tendencies arising out of neoliberalism have still not matured in this context. On the contrary, 'group isolates' are those deviants who are not recognized as part of the group by its members, despite being in regular interaction with them (e.g. migrants). In the context of large groups, Goffman's concept of 'social deviants' is quite relevant to the study of crime and deviance. As he puts it, "Those [deviants] who come together into a sub-community or milieu may be called *social deviants,* and their corporate life a deviant community" [italics in original] (Goffman 1963, p. 170). Although these categorizations may well cover the kind of 'deviants' I encountered in the study context, Goffman did not elaborate how and why certain infringements of norms through acts or attributes come to be defined as deviance, whereas others do not.

Moral Entrepreneurs

Based on their social position, some residents of a neighbourhood are more likely to take a lead in defining the moral threats to their group than others. Howard Becker states, "Rules are the products of someone's initiative and we can think of the people who exhibit such enterprises as 'moral entrepreneurs'" (Becker 1963, p. 147). Although moral entrepreneurs are likely to be those with relatively higher socio- economic status, who exactly acts as a moral entrepreneur is largely dependent on the nature and sociocultural context of the group under study. Becker roughly categorized moral entrepreneurs into 'rule creators' and 'rule enforcers' whereas he called deviants as 'outsiders'. Becker (1963) argues that moral entrepreneurs may themselves be outsiders or rule breakers, thus implying the relativity of deviance.

Once certain individuals or groups are typified as deviants by the 'rule creators', formal and informal agents of social control ('rule enforcers') are likely to focus more on them (Becker 1995, p. 169). Cicourel (1968) states that this stereotyping may result in a self-serving bias because amplified actions against labelled individuals and groups serve to reinforce the stereotypes. This argument is central to Braithwaite's (1989) reintegrative shaming model where he opined that shaming of offenders needs to be followed by reintegration in order to reduce recidivism. In the absence of rehabilitative measures, estrangement from the mainstream compels stigmatised individuals to find sympathisers, who are likely to be those people who share the same stigma (Goffman 1963). In terms of deviance, this tendency to form group associations could also be a precursor to crime groups.

The concept of moral entrepreneurs is important for three reasons. First, it signifies that deviance is not an intrinsic property of an action or attribute, but a label assigned by society. Second, once an action or attribute is labelled as threatening to the social order, society invokes social control to counter it. Thus, the nature and extent of social control applied are at least partially dependent on the discourse surrounding the construction of deviance. Third, 'traditional authority' (Weber 1978, p. 215) is still prevalent in Pakistani society, and elderly people and those from influential families are consulted on various issues and conflicts in the neighbourhood.

Moral Panic and the construction of crime

Moral entrepreneurs can be individuals, groups or organizations, and they could hold the power to create 'moral panic'. While discussing the construction of the notion of 'organised crime', Woodiwiss and Hobbs (2009) explained how the sermons of a clergyman in nineteenth century USA transformed into an unusually powerful narrative, leading to international laws regarding organized crime. The narrative was directed against migrants and ethnic minority populations, probably because it was easier to blame marginalized sections of the community for these crimes than addressing the factors that contributed to local demands of drugs and migrant labour (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Additionally, mass media play an instrumental role in creating 'moral panics' against certain crimes and groups of people (Altheide 2009; Collins 2012). The information passed by mass media "…tends to be processed in such a form that the action or actors concerned are pictured in a highly stereotypical way."(Cohen 2011, p. 11). The deviance amplification which results in this process can generate disproportionate social reactions to crime and deviance. In a neighbourhood context, the salience of mass media generated moral panics might not be too significant as residents directly experience and live through the circumstances in their vicinity. However, the concept does highlight how people in privileged positions can manipulate the perceptions of crime and hence the responses generated against it.

In urban Pakistan, the first private news channel was launched in 2001 and the number of satellite TV licenses issued by the government have increased to 91 (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority). Electronic media has played a proactive role in shaping public perceptions about crime in Pakistan during the last fifteen years. In the wake of a war against armed insurgencies and a chronic energy crisis, there seems to be a series of moral panics in Pakistani society, similar in some ways to Britain of the 1990s (Thompson 1998). One such instance of moral panic in Pakistan resulted from the December 2014 attacks on school children by militants in Peshawar, Pakistan, which generated unusually strong public

demands for greater control towards terrorism across the social spectrum. Although the problem of terrorism had existed long before this particular incident, the state's control apparatus and privately owned media enterprises raised 'concern, hostility, and consensus' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009) to create a sustained moral panic. Substantial political, legal and administrative developments followed the event, including the establishment of the National Action Plan (for countering terrorism) and the establishment of military courts to try people accused of terrorism. Arguably, panic might have been created to garner public support after the decision to take stern measures against militants was already taken. In this study, I noted several instances where political decisions taken at the national level had profound impacts on the sense of security and configuration of social control at the neighbourhood level, even when those decisions were not intended to draw such consequences.

Although these instances of moral panic refer to macro phenomena, they provide important insights into the processes through which certain issues trigger intense reactions in terms of attitudinal and behavioural change. Rule enforcers at the community level may enact social control as a consequence of moral panic created by the rule creators (Becker 1963; Becker 1995; Altheide 2009). Thus, moral entrepreneurs may come from both within and without a community. Although the trickle-down effects of moral panics influence community level perceptions of risk, the concept of moral panics is limited in that it assumes that the problem in focus is always exaggerated, whereas this may not be the case. Second, moral panics generally follow a top down approach and they do not explain how, apart from the projections by mass media, individuals come to view certain events as a risk to social order at a community level. This limitation has implications for the current research because the object of this study is urban neighbourhoods, and in addition to the structural forces shaping people's perceptions about deviance and crime, it is important to appreciate how everyday (dis)order is constructed, negotiated and renegotiated by the residents of neighbourhoods.

The Signal Crimes Perspective

Not all acts of crime and delinquency affect risk perception to the same degree as the punishments coded for those acts in criminal law. Some crimes have higher 'signal' value in that they disproportionately affect perceptions of risk in society (Innes and Fielding 2002). Based on Eco's (1976) social semiotics and Goffman's (1972) Relations in Public, Martin Innes and Nigel Fielding explained the public understanding of crime embedded in symbolic construction of social space (Innes 2004). The value accorded by people to different signal

crimes depends on the subjective interpretation of the crime by the community especially by its moral entrepreneurs. For instance, in the Pakistani society where female 'modesty' is considered in high regard, 'street harassment' of women by men is likely to evoke stronger public response than a fight between youth groups which could result in serious injury.

At a community level, the signal crimes perspective offers insight into the processes through which people interpret instances of crime, and physical and social disorders as signals of victimization risks (Innes 2004). The perspective seeks to understand how certain physical or social disorders serve as 'alarm signals' for people in terms of their security, and how a range of reactions might follow from such signalling. These reactions may have an affective, cognitive, or behavioural component (Innes 2004, p. 350), and these distinctions among responses differentiate the signal crimes perspective from the 'fear of crime' construct where fear is the only response which could follow an encounter to a potential risk.

The signal crimes perspective stresses the subjective interpretation of individuals towards a potential risk (crime or disorder) and provides a framework for understanding this process of interpretation. In this way, it is different from a broken windows approach which envisages a causal relationship among disorder, fear of crime, and crime. Hipp (2013), in his analysis of American Housing Survey data (1976-1999) and crime rates, showed that perceptions of crime are disproportionately affected by certain crimes, such as robbery. The importance of differentiating perceived and actual disorder and crime is highlighted by a number of studies (Bottoms 2009; Sampson 2009). Girling et al. (2005) provided evidence that, sometimes even in the same location, residents' response towards a particular behaviour or a group of people can have significant differences. Innes (2004) has identified a range of possibilities which follow when individuals interpret a potential risk as a warning signal. For instance, individuals might cognitively converge 'weaker signals' to arrive at a strong opinion about the risks they face in a given situation. In the present study, more response categories may emerge which could develop further insights into the understanding of processes related to risk perceptions.

Given the focus of this study on the intersection of formal and informal control mechanisms, the concept of 'control signals' (Innes 2004) is also highly relevant. This concept emphasizes that formal social control actions may be perceived as 'signals' by individuals and thus they may affect risk perceptions either positively or negatively. For example, heavy police presence in a neighbourhood street could influence people either to

be more sensitive to outsiders in that street or to avoid passing through that street. Bottoms (2009) has contended that Sampson (2009)'s concern about the impact of perceived disorder and the importance of 'exogenous intervention' is closely associated with Innes (2014)'s conceptualization of control signals. Control signals signify that actions of formal agents of control may influence how people enact informal control. For instance, Bottoms and Wilson (2007) argue that control signals by formal agents of control may result in an increase in informal control actions. A number of studies have found associations between formal and informal control actions e.g. Kane and Cronin (2009) and Lynch and Sabol (2004), but the evidence in this regard is tentative. With a 'signalling approach', it is possible to delineate the social processes through which formal control actions determine or at least influence the scope of informal control practices.

Of course, the significance of symbols is one factor in defining the 'risk value' of a crime. Janet Foster's early work in London highlighted that residents of housing estates with statistically higher crime rates did not consider crime a problem for them due to the nature and frequency of the incidents, informal control, and modest expectations of residents in terms of security (Foster 1995). In any case, the interactionist, structural and interpretive processes through which people come to understand the gravity of certain crimes is consequential for social control. In the context of Pakistan, where the police and criminal justice system are considered to be repressive institutions, it is especially important to understand people's perceptions of what they consider to be crime problems in their neighbourhoods.

Summarising construction of crime and delinquency

By way of summary, we can understand the construction of crime and delinquency in urban neighbourhoods through a top down approach with moral panics and in everyday life with the signal crimes perspectives. The concept of 'mediated signals' (Innes 2004, p. 350) provides a parallel to the moral panics concept by highlighting how public perceptions of risk are shaped and steered through mass-mediated signal crimes and how the recipients of this information construct meaning by collating mass mediated signals with their own experiences of crime and disorder. The concept of mediated signals is relevant to this study because it addresses an important limitation of the moral panics concept i.e. how we should account for the events which do not create panic but are nevertheless important in (re)constructing deviance and risk perceptions.

For an exploratory study in unfamiliar context, construction of crime is a suitable starting point for understanding the interplay of social control processes. Understanding how and why some issues, but not others, are configured as suitable 'targets' and objects is important for social control interventions.

Control of problems

A contentious issue in studies relating to social control of problems is the delimitation of what constitutes a problem. In their study of signal crimes, Innes et al. (2004) asked people in 16 residential areas of England what they considered to be the key threats to their perceived safety. It was found that most of the key threats listed by the people were 'disorderly events' rather than 'criminal' activities that could be a high priority for the police. Girling et al.'s (2005) study in Macclesfield also presented similar findings where unsupervised gatherings of teenagers were considered a key threat. In order to account for this phenomenon, Sampson (2009) argued that the community context is an important determinant of individuals' subjective interpretation of problems in their area. Similarly, Foster (1995) asserted that statistical data on crime does not provide an adequate picture of people's experiences in a community, where crime is only one of the several problems they face in their daily lives. While perceived and actual disorder have not been neatly differentiated in a number of previous studies (Bottoms 2009), this distinction ought not be overlooked in any comprehensive study of neighbourhood security. This distinction is particularly important for research in non-Western contexts where an understanding of people's perceptions about crime and disorder is quite limited.

Problem identification

Neighbourhood level data on problem solving approaches by the police in Pakistan are not available; this study, however, offers an opportunity to address this gap. With regards to control of problems generally and Problem-oriented Policing (POP) in particular, an important concern is who defines what counts as a problem. Innes (2005) has contended that the capability of police to 'scan' a problem is limited by the lack of comprehensive data, their inclination towards addressing certain types of crimes, work overload, and underreporting of crimes to police. There are very few interventions in the POP literature which place emphasis on community input to identify problems. This tendency has important implications for achieving the objectives of POP because it is probable that, in terms of local problems, community perceptions may well be different from police perceptions, especially assuming that, in Pakistan, police data are a less reliable reflection

than in the West of underlying crime patterns. A number of studies have found that low level signs of disorder significantly impact the sense of security among people (Brunton-Smith 2011; Brunton-Smith and Sturgis 2011). Given this difference of perceptions, the question arises about how the police responses to their self-defined problems and the communities' attempt to address their problems intersect in the neighbourhood context.

It is not uncommon in urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan for community residents to mobilize their informal resources to settle what they consider to be a problem. For instance, a group of residents may ask other residents (typically a family) to leave the area or abandon their activities because they are perceived to pose a threat to local social order. A reason for the lack of studies discerning this tendency could be because community actions to control problems themselves are more likely to be done in places where expectations from the police are substantially low, unlike North America and Western Europe, where most such studies are conducted. In Pakistan where democratic policing strategies, especially community policing, are unfamiliar to most residents, the interactive processes required to bring consensus over problem identification are almost non-existent. Reacting to a POP assessment in San Diego, Innes (2005) argued that police officers may be more inclined to view those groups of incidents as problems which involve acts defined in criminal law. Therefore, it is possible that the priorities of the police and the public are divergent, and this discrepancy could result in contradictions for the way social order is configured.

In the case of Pakistan, a significant number of people consider the police to be a part of the problem of crime and disorder (Jackson et al. 2014), and this opinion towards formal control institutions may encourage a community to address the problems regarding their safety on their own. Low satisfaction and lack of confidence in the police have been found to be positively associated with support for vigilantism and vigilante violence (Goldstein 2003a; Adinkrah 2005; Haas et al. 2014). While vigilantism may not be related to successful control of problems, studies do show a tendency of communities to act on their own when public perceptions about the police are negative. This is not to say that the police in Pakistan have altogether failed to control crime and maintain order, but, as Tankebe (2008b) notes, police trustworthiness is not only a product of police effectiveness, but also of procedural fairness. Public legitimacy of the police has an impact on people's willingness to cooperate in policing operations. The present study documents the strategies employed by the community for problem solving and, by doing so, it examines how such activities are supplemented or thwarted by police activities. Additionally, this study explores the

processes of coordination or communication between police and community in terms of problem solving along with the implications which these processes may hold for neighbourhood security.

Problem-oriented Policing

In the policing literature, a problem is defined as "a recurring set of related harmful events in a community that members of the public expect the police to address" (Clarke and Eck 2005:14). For the purpose of this study, it is convenient, for two reasons, to consider a problem only as "a recurring set of related harmful events in a community". First, the expectations towards the police may not be uniform across the population. For instance, the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) interventions are often criticized for being undertaken at the behest of affluent sections of the society to exclude the marginalized populations from certain spaces. Second, in the context of Pakistan where public confidence in the police is very low (Jackson et al. 2014; Aqil 2015), people's hopes may be limited to fair treatment and reduced frequency and seriousness of corruption.

The central idea of POP is to encourage the police to attend to underlying problems which generate crime and disorder rather than dealing with isolated incidents on a case to case basis (Goldstein 1990). Put simply, POP aims to view similar incidents as emblematic of a problem (Goldstein 1990) and to apply a scientific approach in seeking solutions to these problems (Scott 2000). Additionally, problems may be identified from recurring incidents on the basis of their timings and victim and offender characteristics (Maguire et al. 2015).

Originating in the USA, POP is now widely implemented in the UK and across the globe (Bullock and Tilley 2003; Tilley and Scott 2012; Maguire et al. 2015). A systematic review conducted by Weisburd et al. (2010) revealed that POP has a significant impact on reducing crime and disorder. Other evaluation studies have also found a significant impact of POP on different crimes (Braga 2001; White et al. 2003; Clarke and Eck 2005; Braga and Bond 2008). Although Goldstein (1990) had not originally ruled out the possibility of using conventional law enforcement responses, POP has been also criticized for being similar to conventional policing in practice (Cordner and Biebel 2005), arguably because of the lack of capacity among law enforcement officers to address problems with a scientific approach (Knutsson 2003; Groff et al. 2015). Additional bottlenecks in the implementation of POP include contradiction between highly valued experiential knowledge of police officials and the empirical approach required in POP (Goldstein 2003b; Scott 2003), and the unavailability of extensive data (Dunworth et al. 2000).

Of the criticisms levelled against POP, the most substantive is that the effective application of each component of SARA (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment), a widely used technique in POP, requires fundamental changes in the 'technical core' of police organization (Manning 2003; Maguire and King 2004; Maguire et al. 2015). This drawback along with challenges related to analysis, response, and assessment have created a substantial gap between the prescribed POP and its practice, leading some researchers to refer to several POP interventions as 'shallow problem solving' (Cordner and Biebel 2005; Eck 2006; Braga and Bond 2008). Furthermore, some challenges such as unavailability of data, performance indicators incompatible to POP, and preoccupation with emergency response services (Tilley 2011) are germane in the context of Pakistan. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that no systematic intervention officially classified as POP has been introduced in Pakistan. However, it cannot be reasonably assumed that police organizations in Pakistan do not consider chronic and repetitive crime and disorder issues as representative of an underlying issue. The problem oriented approaches employed by police organizations in Pakistan may loosely correspond to what Braga and Weisburd noted of most POP interventions: "…weak analyses, mostly traditional responses, and limited assessments…" (Braga and Weisburd 2006, p. 149).

In the wake of armed militancy and recurrent waves of terrorism-related incidents, police organizations in Pakistan have been more inclined towards a security management function than fifteen years ago. The stress which this transformation has placed on police resources depicts that the police might be employing problem-oriented approaches in ways which could be compared with 'shallow problem solving'. For instance, the Government of Pakistan is trying to implement the National Action Plan on counterterrorism which called for registration and regulation of Madrassas (seminaries). This provision is based on the premise that a substantial amount of terrorism related violence is committed by persons who have been associated with Madrassas at some point in their lives. When trying to procure official crime data in Lahore, I came to know that the police were developing software to map crimes in the city. Hence, the extent to which problem solving has replaced punitive crime control in policing practices and its impact on informal social control is examined in this study.

Control of people

Academic research on the control of people is generally divided into different strands. These strands are united in their focus on people as the rational harbinger of criminal conduct and emphasise psychological aspects of offending at the expense of broader

structural factors. Theoretical propositions under the control theory is based on the premise that almost all people have tendencies to commit crime because it provides some utility in terms of material or emotional satisfaction (Matza 1964; Hirschi 1969). This assumption is in turn related to rational choice theory, a precursor to control of places (Clarke and Mayhew 1980; Cornish and Clarke 2003) which I will discuss in the next section. In terms of control of people, firstly, some studies focus on the effects of labelling on individuals' life chances. Second, some studies emphasize the role of neighbourhood effects in controlling people. Third, other studies highlight the differential treatment of people by formal control institutions and its consequences. Fourth, some studies document the control of people embedded in postmodern policing practices. All of these studies represent interlocking facets of how the control of people is conducted in contemporary societies. The dominant themes evident in these research studies are discussed below.

Labelling and its impact on social control

A range of studies influenced by labelling theory have focused on the measures of self-concept and individuals' assuming roles reflected through social interaction (Heimer and Matsueda 1994; Triplett and Jarjoura 1994; Adams and Evans 1996). There have been concerns to remodel labelling theory in ways through which those causal processes may be distinguished which operate between the labelling and the secondary deviance (Paternoster and Iovanni 1989; Wellford and Triplett 1993). Addressing these concerns, Sampson and Laub (1997) studied the consequences of labelling in terms of life chances which may be the causal factors leading to subsequent deviance. According to these authors, it is important to examine the 'turning points' in the life course which could determine the trajectory of crime. Sampson and Laub (2005) argued that although turning points have a structural notion, the importance of human agency should not be ignored, and individuals' desistance or offending may be understood as 'situated choice'.

Alice Goffman (2014), in her study of an urban ghetto in Philadelphia, USA, noted that a high handed policing system adversely affects social relationships of 'on the run' people, by which she meant those disadvantaged people who were caught in an array of repressive policing measures, such as surveillance and warrants. Goffman argued that this pervasive policing brings these people in cooperation with each other against the criminal justice system. Additionally, the people who had contact with the criminal justice system tended to perform 'system avoidance', which made them vulnerable to victimization (Brayne 2014; Goffman 2014). Thus, labelling of delinquents could lead to intensive social control which in turn may have an unanticipated effect of contributing to continued delinquency and crime.

The present study does not consider itself with a life course approach to understand criminal careers. Rather, the focus is on how community 'processes the label' and the impact this processing may have on the configuration of social control.

Drawing on some of the ideas developed by Robert Sampson and colleagues, Lopes et al. (2012) documented the impact of labelling, operationalised as early police intervention, on adverse outcomes including criminal behaviour and drug use over the life course. The study found indirect effects of labelling on unemployment and welfare receipt, which may explain the relationship between labelling and criminal outcomes. However, the measure of labelling used in the study did not account for the community reactions to the officially labelled individuals and its intersection with the individuals' socioeconomic background. This limitation is particularly significant since the study used arrests as the measure for labelling, and there is evidence that individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely than those from advantaged backgrounds to face formal police interventions for otherwise similar behaviours (Bowling and Phillips 2007; Wiley et al. 2013). Additionally, the study did not account for the crimes for which the arrests were made. In the context of urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan, public confidence in the police is low (Jackson et al. 2014; Aqil 2015) and people tend not to contact the police to report 'trivial' offences. Nonetheless, the police in Pakistan are recognised as playing an important 'gate keeping function' for the criminal justice system. Their strategic and tactical decisions are a significant influence upon which individuals and social groups become the focus of police activity and thus more likely to have a deviant label applied to them. However, the consequences of such labelling are experienced at an informal level, so it is important to examine the community reactions towards deviants and the resultant processes through which communities attempt to control people.

Neighbourhood factors and control of people

Maimon and Browning (2010) set out to examine the influence of 'unstructured socializing' on violent behaviour in the urban neighbourhood context. Their study represents a different strand of research about the control of people than most studies deriving from the labelling perspective, as it emphasizes the importance of neighbourhood factors in controlling violent behaviour among adolescents. Drawing from the routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) and social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997), the authors found that unstructured socializing has a significant positive association with violence. Consistent with these findings, Osgood and Anderson (2004) also found that high levels of parental

supervision may decrease the chances of adolescents engaging in unstructured socializing. Similarly, the level of social interaction has been also shown to have a negative effect on crime outcomes (Bellair 1997; Palmer et al. 2005). Of course, social networks, level of interaction, parental supervision and socialisation of adolescents are all facets of informal social control which are important to assess in the present study.

Disproportionate control of the socially disadvantaged

Social control efforts are not directed evenly against all segments of society. Certain segments of society, such as the sick, the poor, and the young, may experience stringent social control and are more likely to be labelled as deviant (Chriss 2013). A number of studies have documented the differential treatment of people by formal agents of control, especially the police (Bowling and Phillips 2003). In their seminal work, Policing the Crisis, Hall et al. (1978) documented the stereotypes against black people which led to repressive policing against them. Similarly, Gordon (2009) noted that the police view young people of colour through a lens which considers them trouble-makers rather than individuals capable of rectification. As risk-oriented approaches to social control have gained prominence (Rose 1999; Innes 2003; Tilley 2011), for the police, youth as 'citizens in waiting' (Kennelly 2011) represents a potential threat to social order.

While the selectivity of criminal justice was highlighted as early as the 1970s (Young 1999) and even before (for example, Sutherland 1940), mass media are rife with recent news of racially motivated police shootings, particularly in the USA (Embrick 2015). In the UK, although the representation of black and Asian communities in the criminal justice system has increased, stereotypes of these communities are still persistent within and across the police forces (Bowling et al. 2011). The control apparatus in developed countries appears to be informed by the construct of 'dangerous classes' where disadvantaged segments of society are dealt with via repressive as opposed to rehabilitative and reconciliatory measures which are extended to mainstream segments (Gordon 1994; Bowling and Phillips 2003; Terrill and Reisig 2003; Hough 2013). The reverse could be also true where labelling of people by the community instigates the police to exert more control on these people. In urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan, this disproportionate control could be exercised against religious minorities and ethnicities. The mere stereotyping of certain communities within a neighbourhood could impact social solidarity and undermine social control efforts.

In addition, Choongh's (1997) criticism of the idea of policing as the gatekeeper of criminal justice process is particularly relevant for Pakistan . Given the perceived ineffectiveness of

the criminal justice system in Pakistan, the police overtly perform the function of 'social disciplining' by using the political space accorded to them on the streets and by keeping people in custody to discipline them (Choongh 1997). These people are humiliated or tortured before they are released by the police who do not necessarily frame charges against them. In most cases, these people are from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. This function of the police is so entrenched in Pakistani society that it is considered an essential attribute of policing. These aspects of 'labelling' and 'disciplining' are the express foci of this study to the extent that they impact the operation and effectiveness of social control processes in neighbourhoods.

Although there is very limited data (especially valid data) available on the spatial distribution of crime in urban metropolises of Pakistan, there are significant variations in neighbourhood dynamics and crime in different areas of the cities. Hence, the strategies employed by formal social control institutions in these areas also vary, albeit in a less formalized way. In Pakistan, where the reputation of the police is that of a chronically corrupt institution and an instrument of political victimization, it becomes imperative to understand how differential treatment by the police works and how it affects the lives of groups and individuals in a community context. On the other hand, the practice of differential treatment also affects the public image of the police and raises the question of how the police can influence perceptions that are established and ingrained in the collective consciousness of Pakistani society. These matters are dealt with in this study when examining those police interventions which have had positive impacts on the public image of the police.

Control of people embedded in postmodern policing practices

The control of people by formal policing traditionally included reactive policing strategies associated with the criminal justice system, such as incarceration. However, in the late-twentieth century, this approach was criticized for its ineffectiveness to control crime. This appraisal along with the 'ontological insecurity' (Giddens 1991) experienced in late-modern societies (Garland 2001; Harcourt 2001) contributed to a paradigmatic shift towards preventive forms of policing. Zero-tolerance policing or broken windows policing sought to tackle not only physical disorder, but also social disorder which included control of those social segments whose activities were seen as nuisances to the mainstream society. The shift of focus from crime to the criminal also expressed itself in intelligence-led policing (ILP) where the objective was to gather information about activities of fecund criminals (Innes 2003). Furthermore, modern technologies have exponentially increased the capacity

of states to gather information about people thereby creating a surveillance society (Lyon 2001; Gary 2017) These approaches to policing represent a risk-based, anticipatory form of social control geared towards people. However, the case of Pakistan is different in two respects. First, the state lacks the financial and technical resources to enhance surveillance on lines of the UK and the USA. Secondly, policing has largely been a reactive activity in the country except for when it comes to organised crimes and terrorism. Of late, surveillance cameras have been installed on the main roads of Lahore (Rana and Bhatti 2018), but, at a neighbourhood level, the colonial policing model persists, thereby leaving communities to deal with issues on their own before making a formal complaint at the local police station. Hence, this study does not include these 'postmodern policing practices' which are only exercised to a limited extent in Pakistan.

Policy transfer and control of people

Repressive control is more profound in some parts of the developing world where police have authoritarian structures and historical trust deficits exist between the public and the police (Stone and Ward 2000; Mars 2002; Arias 2009). That is why some developing countries could not adapt to Western models of democratic policing (Baker 2009; Dinnen and Allen 2013), at least in the manner in which they were implemented. In a number of developing countries, including Latin American and Caribbean states, democratic modulations and institutional reforms have concurred with rising crime rates, which the states have generally responded to with repressive means (Sain 2004; Davis 2008). Referring to the case of the Dominican Republic, Bobea (2012) noted that the continuation of high handed policing impedes integration of democratic policies into the security apparatus. Similarly, police in Argentina and Brazil struggled to transform its authoritarian character, even decades after military rule (Hinton 2005). One reason for this failure is that the developed world is more concerned with transnational crime in these developing countries, such as drugs and terrorism (Neild 1999), than the democratisation of basic police functions. In Pakistan, a lot of international assistance was directed towards the Pakistani military after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The military has conducted several operations in the last two decades to restore normalcy, but, once it withdraws, police forces are expected to maintain order. However, neither the national government nor the international actors have made considerable attempts to build police capacity. When the police resort to repressive measures, there actions are often seen as the lack of willingness to reform rather than a constraint on resources (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006).

Some interventions in developing countries have been successful. Alves and Arias (2012) conducted an impact assessment of a two-tiered homicide control program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The program was a collaborative venture wherein a community policing initiative was taken together with social programmes led by civil servants. These programmes provided young people with work and leisure opportunities in order to prevent them from engaging in antisocial behaviours. This arrangement resulted in increased accountability and an integrated response against crime (Alves and Arias 2012). Similarly, a study conducted in Durban, South Africa, that examined policing in the post-apartheid era found that, despite some isolated cases of violent actions against people, the policing delivered was significantly democratic and people friendly (Marks 2002). Successful attempts at democratic policing require a certain level of police legitimacy and trust in the police forces (Tankebe 2008a; Tankebe 2010). The police in Pakistan have not yet established "minimal effectiveness and integrity" (Jackson et al. 2014, p. 1067) which is a fundamental obstacle to any policy transfer aimed at democratisation of the police institution.

Notwithstanding marked variations between its different versions, community policing is primarily concerned with building police-community relations in order to understand the priorities of the people regarding police functions and to foster community based controls (Fielding 2005). The functions of community policing seem quite detached from the ILP's focus on criminals involved in serious offences. However, Bullock (2013) notes that in the UK, these policing strategies overlap with each other as community policing practices are used as a source to gather local intelligence. It can be inferred from this discussion that all these late-modern policing practices (ZTP, ILP, community policing) include elements to control people. In this regard, there is an odd similarity between the contexts of Pakistan and the UK. The police stations in Pakistan are not obliged by law to consult residents in matters of policing. In cases where police officers take personal initiatives to introduce community policing in their jurisdictions, they often culminate in informal intelligence networks to control crime. The terms 'police informer' or 'police tout' are widely used in Pakistan to refer to those people who coordinate with the police to inform them of crimes happening in the area or act as intermediary between the police and the public in matters of taking bribes.

The policing strategies and their relative success or failure largely depend on the neighbourhood context in which they are applied. As elaborated by Terrill and Reisig (2003) and Kennelly (2011), the context and the perceived sensitivity of places influence policing

practices. In a study conducted in New Zealand, Darroch and Mazerolle (2013) found that, amongst other factors, successful integration of ILP depended on the community context and officers' perceptions about neighbourhood factors. Nonetheless, like many similar studies, their study did not explore how the social organization and informal control mechanisms employed by a community facilitate or impede the uptake of policing innovations.

In the context of urban neighbourhoods in Pakistan, police reforms generally follow a top down approach, and the implementation of these measures at the neighbourhood level is almost negligible. Nonetheless, policing practices at the neighbourhood level worldwide vary according to the dispositions of police officers, neighbourhood context, and broader socio-political environment.

Control of people in context of this study

The review of different trends in research, concerning the control of people, reveals a consistent gap concerning the intersection between formal and informal control mechanisms. The research drawing from labelling theories tends to focus on self-concepts of labelled individuals and groups or examines the effects of labelling in a life course perspective. Although a number of studies point to the restricted conventional opportunities for officially labelled individuals, they do not examine in detail the reactions of community to officially labelled individuals and vice versa, that is the interplay of informal and formal labelling. Similarly, studies focusing on informal control mechanisms for controlling people have not generally examined their confluence with formal control mechanisms. Another strand of research shows the differential treatment of poor, ethnic minorities, and young people by the police. The police in Pakistan are considered to be highly politicised, and their use of aggressive force against marginalized people or groups is often criticized in public discourse. Similarly, religious and ethnic minorities in Pakistan face discrimination in a number of social arenas. Additionally, community mechanisms to supervise adolescents and the willingness to intervene for the collective good seem to be affected either positively or negatively by the policing practices. These observations form the basis of the present study in the context of neighbourhoods in Karachi and Lahore, with each city facing a unique set of problems related to crime and deviance.

Control of places

In the early part of the twentieth century, Burgess's zonal modal mapped the areas in the city of Chicago where crime was most likely to happen (Burgess 1925). A number of works

have followed since, such as Louis Wirth's 'Urbanism as a way of life', which suggested that spatial qualities of places are one of the important factors which influence criminal conduct. The control of places or what is more commonly called Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a prominent feature of modern urban organization.

In his research on Chicago, Bursik (1986) noted that changes in racial composition in neighbouring areas affected crime rates in a neighbourhood, even after controlling for other factors as identified in Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory. Coleman (1985) went on to say that crime control could be only achieved through changes in physical design of space. Coleman's view was criticized by a number of later authors who emphasized the importance of human agency in mediating the relationship between physical design and crime (for example, Sampson 2012). However, in late modern urban societies, it is commonplace to observe that controls have been introduced into the physical environment in order to prevent crime (Innes 2003). These controls primarily aim to reduce the opportunities for crime which can be done by increasing the likelihood of being apprehended e.g. by installing CCTV or by restricting the access of potentially deviant people to certain places. Braga and Bond (2008) conducted a randomized control study involving 34 crime and disorder hotspots. Half of these hotspots were subjected to treatment involving policing disorder with a problem-oriented policing approach. The study found significant reduction in crime with no substantial displacement effects in the treatment places as compared with the control places. Moreover, the study found that the situational prevention component of treatment was most efficacious in accounting for the reductions in crime and disorder. For the purpose of the present study, it is important to note that, in Braga and Bond's study, the lieutenants and sergeants assigned to carry out treatment in hotspots interacted with community members to track potential problems and likely strategies. Although the present study does not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of SCP incentives and their displacement or diffusion effects, it does offer an opportunity to understand how the interaction processes involving control of places lead to different outcomes in terms of crime and the balance between formal and informal control.

Social interventions directed towards places

The importance of spatiality in the police's treatment of young people is elaborated by Kennelly (2011) who noted that police perceive the riskiness of individuals partly by the place in which the individuals are found. Furthermore, the police try to contain certain people to locations where their perceived riskiness is neutralized. Framing her research

within Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' and neo-liberal conception of citizenship, Kennelly (2011) found that culturally grounded conceptions of 'legitimate citizenship' are important determinants of police treatment of people; young people, in particular, are often accorded stern treatment as either 'citizens in waiting' or 'non-citizens', mostly when their adolescent status is supplemented by poverty and ethnic minority status. Similarly, Terrill and Reisig's (2003) study in Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida, found police treatment is dependent upon the neighbourhood in which those people are found; the neighbourhood context even mediates the relationship between race and treatment by the police. While the developed countries, such as the UK, have a legislative basis for restricting access in form of Serious Crime Prevention Order -- an elite criminal equivalent of the Anti-social Behaviour Order -- the police in Pakistan implement such practices in an informal way. In this study, I examine the ways in which space is controlled by formal and informal actors with a view to enhance security.

One of the important aspects of control of places is the presence of people on streets. Jacobs (1961) argued that mixed use land and dense population may enhance natural surveillance in public spaces, hence deterring crime. In a study drawing from the Jacobs argument, Browning and Jackson (2013) set out to examine the relationship between active streets and violence in Chicago. They found that beyond a threshold level, the prevalence of active streets reduced the chances of exposure to violence. Interestingly, the study also found that this was independent of neighbourhood social organization, particularly collective efficacy and anonymity.

The prevalence of active streets as a control measure of place is relevant to this study as most urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan are densely populated, and the prevalence of active streets may be quite high. Aqil (2015) in his study of urban neighbourhoods in Lahore, Pakistan, found that people regularly kept watch on activities of strangers, and this was an important source of informal social control in community settings. In a number of incidents in urban Pakistan, it was observed that when police used aggressive tactics e.g. to dispel a mob, citizens kept to their homes, leaving the streets empty, which then led to mass burglary and looting. The 'eyes on the street' and other community-based SCP activities are a focus of this study, especially how these activities are supplemented or contrasted with formal control activities.

Physical interventions or Situational Crime Prevention

In Los Angeles, Davis (1990) documented the compartmentalization of certain urban spaces and significant re-arrangement of physical spaces to address the perceived insecurity of LA citizens. Albeit following different trajectories, the methodologies for the control of places are becoming increasingly intricate in cities across the world, to the extent that places like Canary Wharf in London and mega shopping centres are literally privately owned. SCP requires pragmatic measures which are largely dependent on the context; however, it has theoretical influences derived from rational actor theory (Clarke and Mayhew 1980), defensible space theory (Newman 1972), and routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979). The interest in control of places within criminology marks a paradigmatic shift from offender centred approaches to situation focused approaches. Nonetheless, Weisburd (2015) contends that research in criminology is still heavily inclined towards people rather than places. Although there is empirical evidence to suggest the concentration of crime in a small proportion of areas (crime hotspots) and the effectiveness of hot spots policing (Groff et al. 2015), controls introduced in the physical environment have been criticized for displacement effects, indiscrimination, failure to tackle crimes which are independent of place, and expense incurred in introducing some SCP interventions (Innes 2003).

Cornish and Clarke (2003) documented 25 techniques which manipulate the physical qualities of a situation with a view to prevent crime. While this classification system is perhaps the most exhaustive in the current literature, there are theoretical and practical possibilities of many more techniques. In the present study, I explore the SCP techniques used by formal and informal agents of control in urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan. More importantly, a number of activities which may be categorized as involving the control of places require cooperation between public, private, and community-based institutions. For instance, improving street lighting as a SCP intervention may ideally involve an agreement between police, municipality administration, and community representatives. Thus, understanding the processes underlying control of places in the study area can provide a landscape where formal and informal agents of control interact, which is a central tenet of this study.

An extensive review of different SCP programs as they existed at that time was conducted by Eck (2003) who found nuisance abatement and improved street lighting as the most effective interventions to control crime. Among the 'promising' ones, Eck identified CCTV, neighbourhood watch, and street closures. With regard to nuisance abatement, Mazerolle et al. (1998) compared the results of 50 places where civil remedies were used to control

crime and disorder with 50 control places. The study found that crime and disorder decreased in the treatment places. The civil remedies in the study included forcing owners to clean up disordered places and citations for sidewalk. These measures approximate community policing and 'broken windows policing', and generally involve community-police coordination. Because the control of places almost invariably affects the entire population, public support is needed to effectively execute SCP measures.

Drawing from the findings from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighbourhoods (PHDCN), Sampson (2012) has convincingly shown that, despite concerns of authors such as Jane Jacobs and Louis Wirth regarding modern urban planning, place still remains a defining feature in terms of crime and disorder. Emphasizing importance of the place, Sampson went on to say that "what is truly American is not so much the individual but neighbourhood inequality" (Sampson 2012;356) and that not only the neighbourhood, but the neighbourhood's neighbours could explain the level of crime and collective efficacy. Silver and Miller (2004) have argued that structural disadvantage has a significant bearing on offending rates, whereas, according to Sampson, spatial interdependence accounts for a number of community level factors, including structural disadvantage.

In Pakistan, use of mediated surveillance at the neighbourhood level is rare, and it is mostly confined to commercial centres and government installations. However, in the wake of terrorist violence, there has been a surge in the control of places. The nature of terrorist violence is such that it is difficult to identify and track the suspected perpetrators. As a result, formal and informal agents of control have relied on SCP activities which included metal scanners, security check points at entry and exit routes, barricades and street closures. More often, these activities are aimed to protect sensitive places, such as mosques, political gatherings, and cultural events. Of late, boundary walls of schools have been raised to protect school children from attacks. These initiatives were mostly uncoordinated, based on risk-based crime prevention, and did not fulfil the extensive conditions laid out in the West for a 'good' theory of crime prevention (see Tilley and Sidebottom 2017, p. 5), However, most of these activities require input from the communities, and, as argued above, community support is one of the factors which contributes to the success of such activities. This study identifies the activities undertaken by the community or the police (or both) to control places and attempts to understand the extent to which coordination between formal and informal agents of control account for the effectiveness of control of places.

Intervening processes

In the preceding sections, I discussed the ways in which control of people, places, and problems could be enacted in the context of urban neighbourhoods. The central premise of this study is that the relative success or failure of the formal and informal social control efforts at the neighbourhood level depend on the intersection of these efforts. This standpoint is substantiated by Robert Sampson and colleagues' efforts to quantify social control without necessarily differentiating between formal and informal control. These authors have emphasized the reciprocal role of both structure and agency in the production of social control through local institutions (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). The nature and extent of formal and informal control as well as crime and disorder are largely influenced by neighbourhood characteristics, independent of the macro-structural accounts. In this study, the neighbourhood factors are conceived of as an overarching influence on the relationship between informal and formal control and, hence, I call them intervening processes.

Social disorganization theory is arguably the pre-eminent of the frameworks developed to understand the uneven spatial distribution of crime in cities. The Chicago School sociologists, Park and Burgess showed how migration patterns in Chicago led to the inability of some neighbourhoods to exert effective social control over their members (Park et al. 1925). Building on earlier work by the members of the Chicago School and their own empirical work, Shaw and McKay (1942) formulated social disorganization theory and identified three structural characteristics, namely, economic disadvantage, high residential mobility and ethnic heterogeneity as the factors which contributed to the weakening of traditional institutions in inner city zones, which, in turn, led to lower social control and, hence, crime.

Social disorganization theory led to a myriad of research studies in other parts of the world. Despite criticisms, social disorganization theory can be credited with highlighting the influence of community characteristics in controlling crime irrespective of the unique cultural values which each community may hold. In the present study, urban neighbourhoods in Lahore and Karachi have distinct characteristics in terms of ethnic composition and residential mobility. Karachi is ethnically more diverse than Lahore, and a significant proportion of criminal violence in Karachi is attributed to ethnic divisions. In terms of residential mobility, although we do not have extensive quantitative data available, it appears that Karachi has greater population turnover than Lahore. Thus, in the

present study, the propositions of this version of social disorganization theory are tested in urban contexts with significantly different structural characteristics.

The next significant development in terms of community characteristics to enact social control came in the latter half of the twentieth century. Robert Putnam's notion of 'bowling alone' referred to the declining state of civic engagement in the American society and its need to revive the concept of 'social capital' (Putnam 1995). Putnam defined social capital as the ties between individuals that foster coordination among them for public good. A large number of studies followed this concept which showed that high levels of social capital at a community level are significantly associated with reductions in crime (Kennedy et al. 1998; Takagi et al. 2012). The importance of this concept lies in its appreciation of the idea that, although social ties themselves may not be sufficient to trigger social control, the ties which encourage cooperation for mutual benefits are. This consideration is relevant in the present study because, although it seems that urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan are characterized by dense social ties, it remains to be examined if those social ties actually translate into civic participation in activities intended to draw social benefits. Additionally, some researchers have suggested that social capital may also exist among deviant groups and may serve functions for them which could be detrimental to the social order (Patillo-McCoy 1999).

An influential development in the contemporary configuration of social disorganization theory was made by Robert J. Sampson and others with the concept of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997). Collective efficacy is defined as "…social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good…" (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 918). While the concepts of social capital and collective efficacy are sometimes used interchangeably, collective efficacy denotes the processes of mobilizing community resources of social capital to enact social control for the control of crime. Thus, collective efficacy establishes a link between social capital and social control by developing empirically testable measures (Bruinsma et al. 2013). Sampson (2012) underlined the importance of institutions for collective action and focused on the extent of social control among groups. Although this conceptualization of social control made it convenient to measure social control in quantifiable terms, it downplayed the importance of individual agency or 'self-help' (Black 1983), which may be important in context of a weak state, such as Pakistan.

With regards to Pakistan's urban neighbourhood, it is important to examine the extent to which collective efficacy accounts for the differences in crime. In a study of urban neighbourhoods in Lahore, Aqil (2015) found high levels of collective efficacy among community residents. However, a review of the literature on collective efficacy did not reveal any similar study conducted in Karachi. Of late, Sampson (2012) has conducted an extensive study on the neighbourhood effects in Chicago, and, on the basis of unprecedented data sets, he highlighted the importance of local institutions for collective civic actions. In the context of Pakistan, it is important to examine the presence of such institutions and the placement of these institutions in the formal control apparatus.

The inclusion of these concepts in the meta-narrative of this study is based on a number of factors. First, the informal control practices employed by the community are largely based on the structural characteristics of the neighbourhoods as well as the nature of social ties among community members. For instance, hiring private policing services and using SCP measures such as gated communities are features of affluent urban neighbourhoods in Pakistan. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that formal control practices are also dependent on neighbourhood characteristics (Terrill and Reisig 2003; Lersch et al. 2008). Thus, in this research, where I aim to examine the intersection of formal and informal controls, it is imperative to examine the social organization of communities in which these controls operate. In study contexts where substantial research has already been undertaken on neighbourhood crime prevention, we may not need to revisit these intervening processes to address the research questions. But in the context of Pakistan, where criminological research is still evolving, the research objectives may not be met without keeping the neighbourhood dynamics in consideration.

Democratic Policing

Although the concept of democratic policing is inherently problematic (Bonner 2019), most international assistance to developing countries for police reform, at least since the 1990s, has aimed at fostering democratic practices in police organisations (Bayley 2006). Although democratic policing was defined for the first time by the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) in 1996 (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996), there are now several models of democratic policing. These models are similar in content but tend to place differential emphasis on some democratic principles over others (Jones 2011). However, some major principles which most scholars seem to agree upon include conformity to law, internal and external accountability, responsiveness to the needs and complaints of citizens, and inclusivity (Jones et al. 1996; Bayley 2006; Manning 2016). The

subjective nature of these principles makes it difficult to operationalise them in absolute terms. Consequently, it is perhaps more useful to use the concept of democratic policing for comparison between police forces in countries with similar democratisation trajectory. In this research, the concept has not been operationalised but used as a normative standard which the police could aspire to meet.

The police can be reasonably expected to adhere to democratic practices only to the extent these practices are followed in other state institutions and, more importantly, in the way political power is negotiated at the highest level. Munck (2015) argues that, in post transition Latin-America, the consensus on democratisation was limited to electoral votes and little was achieved beyond this minimalist standard. Pakistan's case is no different, as the democratic process has been intermittently interrupted by military interventions. Moreover, despite three successive elections, the supremacy of the constitution and adherence to democratic principles are still elusive. In this context, whether the police force in Pakistan is democratic probably is not the right question to ask. Rather, a more meaningful question would be: whether and if at all, the concept of democratic policing, as understood in the West, is transferrable to Pakistan?

A practical objective of this research is to provide starting points for democratisation of policing services in the target population. To do this, an indirect approach is taken whereby existing practices of the police forces, intersection between formal and informal social control, and people's perceptions of police offer insight into the pathways through which the police could be progressively made to function democratically. Therefore, the findings chapters in this thesis do not discuss democratic policing in detail but rather describe and discuss the situations in which police may or may not be acting democratically. However, the final chapter synthesises the observations made during the fieldwork to present an argument about what seems possible in terms of democratic policing, given the contemporary socio-political context of Pakistan.

Conclusion

Apart from a few studies such as Patrick Carr's (2005) Clean Streets, a review of the literature on social control in urban contexts is neatly divided into studies relating to policing and those concerning informal control by the communities. This is problematic as social order is an aggregate concept configured by the intersection of all the sources of social control. While the literature on policing practices generally emphasizes the importance of community participation, it does not take into account the informal control

practices for the production of mutually enacted social control. On the other hand, research studies on informal control tend to isolate themselves from the formal control mechanisms. In order to retain its focus on the intersection of formal and informal control in the substantially less studied context of urban Pakistan, this study draws from a wide range of literature. The three avenues where most of the formal and informal control is practiced are people, places, and problems, whereas the neighbourhood characteristics are the intervening processes which influence the production and conduct of control.

With respect to the control of people, this analysis does not deal with individual-centric theories such as those concerning offender characteristics, life-course events, and self-control. Rather, it focuses upon community processes through which certain individuals and acts come to be defined as unacceptably deviant. For this purpose, the concept of moral panics and signal crime and disorders have informed this study.

The control of places literature is largely based on pragmatic measures to protect spaces from criminal opportunities. In this chapter, I have argued that certain deliberate SCP interventions may not be in place in the context of Pakistani cities but of course, social intervention directed at places is important. The control of places in Pakistan originate from both formal and informal sources, and in the wake of recent law and order situation, there could be friction between formal and informal control of places. This study has examined the processes of coordination or contradiction between police and community with regard to control of places. As a result, it has delineated the factors which contribute to the success or failure of such measures.

The literature on control of problems is heavily influenced by POP and the evaluations of its versions in different contexts. There is a dearth of studies which examine the control of what are considered to be problems by the community. Consequently, the intersection of formal and informal control practices with regard to 'problems' is under-studied. While POP as a formal policing practice is not in place in Pakistan, it remains to be seen how chronic and recurring crimes are dealt by the police and community. Finally, the study has drawn from the rich literature on community agency i.e. social disorganization, social capital, and collective efficacy to understand the extent to which these are applicable in understanding the relationship between formal and informal control in the context of urban Pakistan.

Chapter 2 Research Design and Field Experiences

This chapter explains the research design, the process of data collection, and my experiences with the fieldwork. Most studies undergo transformations during their research cycle, especially during fieldwork (Gerring 2001; O'Brien 2006). In exploratory research, the focus is primarily on discovery than trying to immerse the findings in 'ill-fitting a priori categories' (Gerring 2001, p. 231). Even in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighbourhoods (PHDCN), one of the most extensively planned research projects in the history of social science, a 'neighbourhood based' approach was preferred over a variable-based approach for a holistic understanding of how structures and social processes work to form the reality of a social space (Sampson 2012, p. 23). This approach is perhaps more relevant in the case of Pakistan where socioeconomic conditions are markedly different than the countries where most social science research takes place. This study is no exception in that I encountered several challenges in the fieldwork which led to some adjustments in the research design.

In this chapter, I outline how I went about doing the fieldwork and what I was able to achieve. This study sought to examine the exercise of informal control in urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan and its intersection with formal control mechanisms. In order to do so, a comparative case study design was adopted. Yin (2014, p. 16) defined a case study as following:

> A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in-depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. In other words, you would want to do case study research because you want to understand a real world case and assume that such an understanding is likely to involve important contextual conditions pertinent to your case.

I understand that the exercise of informal control and its intersection with formal control systems in a neighbourhood is based on neighbourhood effects, spatiality and the overall socio-political context of the city. Hence, a case study design was suited to answer the research questions. Qualitative studies in general and case studies in particular are often criticised for the idiosyncratic nature of their findings and for their low generalisability. Robert Yin contends that a case study design is generalisable to theoretical propositions (Yin 2011). While he cautioned against statistical generalisation through case studies, I think that the theoretical insights generated as a result of a case study research may well

be used in other cases. Furthermore, a comparative case study design addresses the generalisability problem to a considerable extent.

Four neighbourhoods, two from high crime areas and the other two from low crime areas, were chosen from the cities of Karachi and Lahore. The rationale for this design lies in its ability to examine the context specific dynamics of individual neighbourhoods in terms of social control while allowing for a generalized view by comparing those neighbourhoods (Yin 2017). While this design provides a built-in opportunity to control extraneous variables by comparison, it also poses the challenge of ensuring uniformity in methodological procedures across different study sites. This drawback perhaps accounted for a number of issues encountered during the fieldwork.

The Chicago School

The subject of this study and its focus on neighbourhoods as units of analysis would inevitably remind most informed readers about the early works conducted by the Chicago School tradition, especially Park, Burgess, and McKenzie. Indeed, the Chicago School is credited with introducing the first generation of case studies (Platt 1992). In addition, although these researchers were not expressly interested in crime, they were concerned with patterns of social organisation and disorganisation in urban settings, which is broadly the subject matter of this study. The methodology of this study also owes a debt to the ethnographic community studies undertaken at the Chicago School during the early part of the previous century. I used field notes, extensive fieldwork, and social mapping to study the neighbourhoods; methods that are traditionally associated with the Chicago School as its members were concerned more with understanding the social dynamics of urban areas than preferring certain methods over others.

Similar to works undertaken by members of the Chicago School, for example Shaw and McKay (1942), I used official crime data to identify high and low crime areas (neighbourhoods, in my case). The comparative case study design of this study is also inspired by the Chicago School's studies of 'natural areas' (Park Robert 1915, p. 6), 'zones of transition' (Park et al. 1925, p. 51), and ghettos (Wirth 1928). But along with high crime neighbourhoods, the current study also included areas of relative stability and low crime rates, an endeavour which was not typical of the first generation of the Chicago School. A substantial body of work inspired by the first generation of Chicago School has followed in criminology, and it is now difficult to generalise any aspect of the work done in this tradition. Whether it be seminal ethnographies of Alice Goffman and Mitchell Duneier or

testing of social disorganisation theory through complex quantitative analyses, the legacy of the Chicago School in terms of methods and concepts remains relevant (Duneier 2001; Goffman 2014; Warner and Sampson 2015). This study has benefitted from several such studies undertaken in the Chicago School tradition where the substance of discoveries made in the field took precedence over the hypothesis-oriented approach to scientific inquiry. Becker (2009, p. 548) has also asserted that a flexible theoretical framework and methods allow for theoretical ideas to apply on unexpected findings, and it should be considered a strength and not a weakness of the qualitative research. Furthermore, the spirit of work by the Chicago School lies in centrality of views held by the people about whom the research is conducted. I maintained this disposition throughout the fieldwork.

While the selection of sites and study design are inspired by the works conducted by the Chicago School, there are some important distinctions to make. The methods I used did not have anthropological overtones or the 'open-air' ethnography approach (Van Maanen 2011, p. 16) espoused by early students of the Chicago School. I relied more on the experiences of the neighbourhoods' residents as told by them than on my own observations or participation in their cultural activities. This deviation can be accounted for by the fact that fieldworkers in the Chicago School were on an exploratory mission inspired more by the philosophical tradition of pragmatism than by their interests in any particular characteristic of the population. The current study is exploratory to the extent that there are few studies examining social organisation in Pakistani neighbourhoods. However, I also had specific research objectives and knew the kind of questions I needed to ask from the interviewees to that effect. On the contrary, the early work on deviant populations conducted by the Chicago School was impelled by situational factors (Galliher 1995). A focus on observation and participation lends itself well to the situations where the researcher is oblivious of population and research objectives. This was largely not the case in this study. However, I stayed at the study sites during my fieldwork, and my observations and informal discussions with the residents along with my observations form an important part of this study.

A frequent criticism levelled at the Chicago School studies concerns the lack of theoretical focus in their work (Davis 1980). While it might be incorrect to generalise this to all the members of the Chicago School, Gusfield indeed remarked, "There was, and remained, a certain indifference, even disdain, for the endless efforts of sociologists to develop refined theory or methodological rigor." (Gusfield 1995, p. xi). Whatever merits this criticism may hold, not many criminologists would dispute the fact that a number of later theoretical

standpoints, including control theory, sub-cultural theory and labelling theory were inspired by the Chicago School. The present study has benefitted from several theories developed since the early work of the Chicago School, and these had implications on the study's methodology, particularly in terms of developing the interview guide.

Another criticism of the Chicago School concerns their ecological model of the city (Tierney 2013), especially their deterministic views on ecological patterning of social relationships. Although I find this criticism largely unjustified, as many Chicago School sociologists did not even cite the ecological model, this issue was not at stake in the present study as it did not exclusively seek ecological explanations of social control. In line with the ecological model, this study considered neighbourhood as "… a locality with sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own."(Park 1984, p. 6). However, this study also takes into account factors outside the neighbourhood (and independent of its geographical location) to interpret the findings. There are at least two reasons for this approach. Firstly, as this study looks at formal control, it inevitably draws on the police institution which exists across society and not just the neighbourhoods under study. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine the growth and development of Karachi and Lahore with the 'Concentric Zone Model' (Park et al. 1925, p. 55). Even in the Western city of Sheffield, Baldwin et al. (1976), using the concentric zone model, found that offender and offense rates were spatially distinct, a finding inconsistent with earlier studies done in Chicago.

Urbanisation is occurring at a faster pace in developing countries than in developed countries whereas industrialisation and economic progress does not. This process of 'overurbanisation' (Clinard and Abbott 1973, p. 78) alone challenges the applicability of Western frameworks used to conceptualise cities and neighbourhoods in the Global South. Another important factor that distinguishes the development of cities in the Global South is that of colonial legacy and its footprints on the physical and social dynamics of postcolonial cities (Legg 2007; Bigon 2009). For example, after the British left the Indian subcontinent, Karachi received more migrants from India than Karachi's original population. Furthermore, the 'militarisation of public space' (Davis 1992), a relatively recent phenomenon in the West, has been in effect in postcolonial societies in the shape of 'colonial towns' for some two centuries (Home 2014). In terms of crime, it is difficult to disentangle the aftereffects of colonial policing on violence in the Global South (Tankebe 2008a; Dinnen and Allen 2013). Such factors have indirectly influenced how I selected the study sites or neighbourhoods.

Among many other developments since the Chicago School, policy transfer has become an interesting line of inquiry in contemporary criminology. Jones and Newburn (2006) argued that similar political and economic conditions in neo-liberal democracies provide enabling conditions for the transfer of rhetoric and ideas in relation to crime and justice. However, there is a dearth of research on the processes and influences which drive policy transfer to developing democracies in general and post-colonial states in particular. Because Anglo-American studies still dominate the contemporary criminological scene, there is a need to problematize the applicability of theoretical frameworks derived from these studies to non-Western contexts. Steinberg (2011) and Tankebe et al. (2014) have pointed at the risk of 'hubristic failure' (Loader and Walker 2007, p. 114) when transferring Western conceptions of crime and policing, whether in terms of theory or policy. In this context, an infusion of pragmatic and formalist approach, espoused by the Chicago School, could help us delineate what works for all and what works for only a few.

The affinity of this study with the Chicago School has some contextual reasons as well. The Chicago School is considered as the first formal and systematic attempt to practice sociology in real life situations. It was a reaction to the predominance of abstract theorising in American sociology which was evident in the works of Franklin H. Giddings and William G. Sumner. Before the Chicago School, sociology was, in the overblown words of Albion Small, "…more of a yearning than a substantial body of knowledge…" (cited in Downes and Rock 2011, p. 51). A parallel to this situation can be drawn with the contemporary state of criminology in Pakistan. There is a huge amount of material written on disorder, anti-social behaviour, crime and policing, but most such work can be classified as, what is called, 'proto-criminology' (Downes and Rock 2011, p. 49). The arm-chair mode of criminological inquiry is the norm, and people from a wide range of professions practice it. They are assisted in this 'hobby' by sporadic and inconsistent data, mostly produced by organisations with vested interests. Nonetheless, there have been some encouraging developments of late. A research society on criminology was founded in 2008 by Pakistani academics and law enforcement officers. The society has regularly published *The Pakistan Journal of Criminology* since 2009. Although not indexed in the Web of Science or having an impact factor, the journal is recognized by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. Furthermore, several research articles on issues related to criminology have been published in recent years by Pakistani authors, even if some of those articles are published in journals belonging to disciplines other than criminology (see Esser 2004; Shagufta et al. 2015; Madhani et al. 2017; Iram et al. 2019; Murshid and Critelli 2020). Overall, op-eds and

books based on the experiences of people affiliated with law enforcement agencies dominate the criminology landscape in Pakistan.

Tools

This study employed qualitative data collection techniques using an interview guide. It also included field notes of my observations. Although not envisaged in the preliminary research design, I also noted casual conversations with people in the field. The interview guide aimed to understand the subjective experiences of neighbourhood residents by focusing on narratives related to the objectives of this study. The purpose of conducting in-depth interviews was to acquire detailed information on the theoretical constructs and to gain insights into those facets of social control which cannot be adequately addressed with a quantitative approach. The average time of an interview was around one hour. I asked open-ended questions relating to characteristics of neighbourhood, social interaction, crime, informal control mechanisms, and policing. Regarding field notes, I took them throughout the field work, usually at the end of the day in the field. The notes included information, such as the size of the streets, the housing structure, number of children playing in the streets, and neighbours' interaction with each other. I started noting down informal conversations with people as soon as I realised that some people were not comfortable talking with a voice recorder present. These notes later became an important source of data as I struggled to elicit candid responses from some interviewees, for reasons outlined later in this chapter.

Selection of study sites

As this study uses a comparative case study design, an initial task in the fieldwork was to establish a criterion for selecting neighbourhoods within the enormous cities of Karachi and Lahore. As the police did not have neighbourhood level crime data, a multi-stage process had to be followed to select neighbourhoods. Since I wanted to select neighbourhoods based on crime levels, a number of possible data sources came under consideration, such as hospital records, media reports and court cases. However, I preferred to avoid these sources for various reasons, including data availability, forms, access and reliability. An obvious solution was to consult the official crime statistics. An online search in this regard only returned city level crime data; the micro level data were not publicly available. However, the online search did reveal the structure of the police organisation in the cities under consideration.

Police divisions

The organisational structures of the police in Karachi and Lahore were similar with the police force divided into divisions which covered specific areas of the city. Each division covered a population of well over a million people as Lahore had six police divisions and a population of more than 10 million. These divisions were further divided into subdivisions with each subdivision having a number of police stations under its jurisdiction. Police stations were the primary unit of police organisation in both cities although each police station distributed its workforce into 'beats' which represented even smaller jurisdictions. Before going to the field, one police division in each city was randomly selected. This selection technique was plausible because each police division covered a very large area of the city, which almost invariably included a wide spectrum of neighbourhoods in terms of socio-economic characteristics, spatial arrangements and ethnic composition. That is why a purposive selection of police division (as planned in the earlier stages of research) would not have made a significant difference.

Police stations

After having selected the police division, the next step was to obtain police crime data for those divisions. Several attempts were made by phone to procure data from the police but to no avail. The telephone operators did not forward my calls to the officers concerned; the usual responses were, 'Sir is busy' and 'Appear in person'. In January 2016, I travelled to Lahore and visited the divisional office (commonly called the Superintendent of Police (SP)'s office) for procuring crime data. The SP office is not one of those ordinary government offices where anybody can enter or leave at will. The barricades placed in front of the gate with armed policemen standing just behind them could be seen from a distance. The heavy metal gate, the body search, the submission of identity card, and registration of details before entering the main building made me realise that it was not very prudent of me to try to contact the SP by phone. In the SP's office, most people were too busy to listen to me. After waiting for around three hours, an official asked me to write an application for what I wanted, and he would forward it to the SP. One week after submitting the application, I went to the office again but this time, that official was not present, and nobody could tell me about the status of my application. There I realised that I needed to contact my friend, who was a senior police officer, to help me. He called the SP office and asked me to go there the next day. Upon my arrival, I was pleasantly surprised to see an official waiting for me to arrange the data I required. Although I had to go there

twice thereafter, I was never greeted without tea and biscuits. Based on this experience, I contacted my friend frequently when I wanted help from the police.

I obtained the station-recorded crime data of the selected police division in Lahore for the years 2013-2015. As expected, some police stations had recorded considerably higher numbers of crime than the others. However, the size of area under the jurisdiction of police stations also varied. Although I could not obtain the data about the exact area each police station covered, I was able to get a fair idea of their relative size by talking to officials in each police station over the telephone. Another factor affecting the utility of police station crime records was the unavailability of data about the number of people living in the jurisdiction of a police station. The last census in Pakistan was held in 1998[1], and it was common knowledge that population dynamics in Lahore had substantially transformed since that period. Both the area and population factors could be risk factors to correct identification of high and low crime neighbourhoods. Given these constraints and general academic criticisms of official crime statistics, I took some mitigating measures. First of all, I asked a random sample of police staff at the divisional office about crime levels in different police stations after accounting for area and population factors. Then I compared their opinions with official crime records and identified those police stations which were categorized by both data sources as either high or low crime. Additionally, being a native resident of the city, I had personal knowledge of population density in different areas. Drawing on all these sources, I was able to select a high crime and a low crime police stations in the selected division. After the fieldwork was conducted, it appeared that the crime records of the police stations were in fact not a good measure of crime as the police stations tend to keep the recorded crime in each year at a consistent level, for reasons I have discussed in the findings section.

Neighbourhoods

The next task was to identify the areas within those police stations which would become the research sites for this study. The idea was to select a high crime neighbourhood within the high crime police station and a low crime neighbourhood within the low crime police station for each city. At the SP office in Lahore, I was given access to a computer program which mapped different crimes to the locations of their occurrence. Although the computer program made the task easier, it was still under development. Thus, I also sought the

---

[1] After I conducted the fieldwork, census was held in 2017. However, the detailed results of 2017 census have not been announced by the government to date.

opinion of police personnel posted in both police stations as well as some local residents regarding this matter. Once the areas were identified, I walked around those areas for a few days in order to understand their spatial dynamics and to ask people what geographical area they considered as comprising their neighbourhood. Thereafter, I made a rough sketch of the neighbourhoods as per the residents' perceptions and defined the exact site within which the fieldwork would be conducted.

A similar process was followed in Karachi. However, there were some differences, the first being that the Karachi police did not have (or did not give me access to) any computer program mapping crimes onto the place of their occurrence. Thus, I had to rely solely on the opinions of police personnel in the selected police stations and residents of the area. Secondly, local residents initially considered me an outsider and a considerable number of them did not give satisfactory answers to my question about which neighbourhood in the area they considered to be high or low crime. Consequently, some later adjustments had to be made during the fieldwork in terms of areas which would constitute the research sites. Later in the fieldwork, when I came to better understand the neighbourhood dynamics in Karachi, I realized that asking this question directly to people was not a viable option in the socio-political circumstances which existed at that time. While I had difficulty in determining high and low crime areas within selected police stations, it was relatively easier to identify different neighbourhoods in those areas. I found that spatial awareness was quite high in Karachi and most people identified territorial boundaries of their neighbourhoods with remarkable precision.

Sampling

The inclusion criterion for this study was that the respondent must be eligible to vote (i.e. 18 years of age and older) and must have lived or worked in the neighbourhood for the last three years. For the interviews, I used a purposive sampling technique based on the identification of key informants in each neighbourhood. More often than not, these key informants included local politicians, community organisation representatives, barbers, rickshaw drivers, traders' representatives, police officers, Imams and other community notables. In total, 58 in-depth interviews were completed from all the four neighbourhoods. There were some incomplete interviews as well, but I could not keep an exact record of their number. In such cases, however, either the interviewee had to go somewhere urgently, or they refused to be interviewed further when I started asking specific questions about crime in their neighbourhood. The table below shows a summary of the collected data.

Table 1: Summary of interviews conducted

Neighbourhood	1		2		3		4	
City	Lahore		Lahore		Karachi		Karachi	
Type	High crime		Low crime		High crime		Low crime	
Duration of Field work	3 Weeks		2 Weeks		7 Days		2 Weeks	
In-depth Interviews	Refused	2	Refused	5	Refused	2	Refused	4
	Incomplete	3	Incomplete	4	Incomplete	5	Incomplete	1
	Completed	14	Completed	15	Completed	16	Completed	13

Data Analysis

All the interviews that I recorded were in Urdu language, although some questions were answered in Punjabi language by the interviewees in Lahore. I listened to all the interviews twice. Some of the incomplete interviews or those with unsubstantial answers were discarded. Some incomplete interviews had some important pieces of information which I noted down on paper. The rest of the interviews were transcribed by hand. Then, I typed the transcriptions in a soft format by using an Urdu lnPage 2009, an Urdu language typing software. These transcriptions were changed into a Portable Document Format (PDF) before uploading them in QSR International's NVivo 11 and Nvivo 12 qualitative data analysis software. I categorised the interviewees in each neighbourhood under a 'case', and each piece of information in an interview was coded as 'nodes'. Using the nodes, I then searched for patterns and themes manually since NVivo software does not support Urdu language for automatic coding. Once the themes were identified in each neighbourhood, they were used as sections in each chapter and data was presented under them.

This thematic analysis approach is one of the most widely used techniques in analysing qualitative interviews (Guest et al. 2011). However, as the number of interviews in each neighbourhood was small, I have not hesitated from mentioning an important finding even if only two of the interviewees talked about it. In those cases, I have expressly mentioned that the said information has come from only a few sources. I have used pseudonyms for all direct quotations. Along with that, I have frequently mentioned the occupation or age of interviewees to reflect the social status of the interviewees. I have also compared and contrasted findings from the interviews with my fieldnotes and handwritten accounts of my informal interaction with residents of a neighbourhood. In most cases, these sources are used when interpreting the findings from interviews.

Ethical considerations

As per regulations of Cardiff University, approval was obtained from School Research Ethics Committee prior to commencement of the fieldwork. An aspect of this study involved interviewing people in high crime neighbourhoods and to seek their opinions about crime and social control. Although I did not ask interviewees about their personal histories of crime and instead focused on mechanisms of social control, it was still important to ensure their anonymity given the potentially fragile security situation in high crime neighbourhoods.

At the outset, this study made use of crime records as secondary data to identify high and low crime neighbourhoods. These were aggregated data sets which provided only the number of crimes recorded by the police under different categories in a specified period of time. Thus, these data contained non-classified information which could be made available to any person who had an interest in analysing them. The next consideration in the fieldwork was to negotiate access to the field. This was done through the gatekeepers who were briefed about my identity and the purpose and scope of the study. Once access to neighbourhoods was gained, interviews were conducted only after informed consent of the interviewees. A participant information sheet was read out to the interviewees which outlined their rights of voluntary participation, opting out, confidentiality of information and anonymity of their identity. When the interviewees agreed to proceed further, the consent form was read out to them. In most cases, the interviewees were not asked to sign the consent form. The literacy rate in Pakistan is quite low and social science research is rare. Due to these reasons, it was anticipated that interviewees would be apprehensive of signing the consent form. This predisposition turned out to be true after some interviewees refused to sign a consent form early in the fieldwork.

The anonymity of interviewees was ensured by not asking any information which could be used to identify them. The interview guide did not include any space for names and contact details. In some cases, such as elected politicians or Station House Officers (SHO), one can identify the interviewees based on the time period in which the interviews were held. However, where identity disclosure was at stake, I have taken care not to include any information which could implicate those interviewees. In some in-depth interviews, names and other identifiable information came up in the recordings, but these were either replaced with pseudonyms or deleted from the transcripts. Where possible, it was ensured that interviews were done in private settings so that confidentiality of information could be achieved. In some instances, interviewees were adamant on being accompanied by their

fellows and, in these cases, interviews were conducted in the presence of others. Some of the interviewees opted out of the interviews for various reasons. The incomplete interviews were deleted at the end of each field day. Interviewees were contacted only once for their consent and I did not try to convince them if they refused. However, if interviewees asked for some time to make a decision, they were contacted again at their stated time.

Doing fieldwork in a high crime neighbourhood can always carry the risk of being victimised either due to the researcher's presence as an individual in the neighbourhood or due to his/her research activities. In the high crime neighbourhood in Karachi, I had my mobile phone stolen while I was making a payment inside a bank. I reported the incident to the police and bought a new mobile phone on the same day in order to keep in contact with the police and my family should any adverse incident happen again. I also faced an imminent danger of getting into a confrontation with members of a drug racket in this same neighbourhood. In this scenario, I left the fieldwork immediately ensuring my safety. As a safety measure, I kept the local police station, my family, and friends in Karachi informed of my location in all the neighbourhoods.

Field experiences

Talking to people and observing them in real life situations tend to yield new insights into an issue which may not be anticipated in the pre-fieldwork phase. My fieldwork was an interactive process which frequently made me reflect on my research design and modify it in view of practical considerations. This section describes some issues I faced in all the study sites to varying degrees. It is not possible for me to list all of the issues; I have discussed here only those which had some implications on the fieldwork.

Patronage

The patronage offered by my friend who helped me to procure crime data from the SP office proved necessary in other situations. My next encounter with the police was at one of the selected police stations in Lahore. It was a high crime police station as per the crime record and I needed to discuss the characteristics of different areas with the police officials posted there and to identify crime hotspots. At the reception office, I was waiting for the officer to finish his conversation with some other people when another officer came inside shouting at somebody I could not see. As he entered the reception area, he immediately turned towards me and yelled, 'What is your problem?' Shaken by his attitude, I instantly, and perhaps involuntarily, told him my friend's name and designation, and that I wanted to

meet the in-charge of the police station. Upon hearing my friend's designation, the officer became visibly confused and remained apologetic throughout my stay at the police station. I was able to get an overall impression of the area from the police officials fairly quickly but I imagine that the outcome could have been very different had I met them only as a student and not as a friend of a senior police officer. I visited different offices of the police in Karachi and Lahore multiple times for various reasons, but I was never asked to make any formal application for my requests. All I needed was to reference someone who the concerned officer felt worthy of obliging. Being a citizen of Pakistan, I had some idea that I would not be facilitated without any references, but I still thought that it would be a worthwhile experience to visit them in my capacity as a research student. At the least, this experience provides a glimpse of how public institutions operate in Pakistan.

Patronage is not only required in getting things done in public institutions, but it is also important in daily social life. In the settled urban neighbourhoods of Lahore and Karachi, it is probably not a very wise idea to wander around the streets when you do not know anyone in the neighbourhood. During the early stages of the fieldwork, I was roaming around a selected area in Lahore when I happened to pass through a street twice when some young men standing at the corner of the street stopped me. "'Paai Jaan' (Brother)! what are you looking for here?" the elder among them asked me in Punjabi language. "I want to conduct some interviews and I am just trying to get a feel of the area," I replied in Urdu language. While some of them were still trying to make sense of my answer, one boy said, "O, Ok Ok, hmm. Would you like to have something [tea or cold drink]?" I politely refused and walked by them. My decision to respond to them in Urdu was based on a common perception in Lahore that the people who talk in Urdu are generally well qualified and gentle. Additionally, speaking Urdu to a person talking in Punjabi sometimes creates a social distance in which the latter person usually tries to withdraw from conversation. Thus, it was a deliberate attempt by me to reaffirm my status of being an interviewer. Although I was not stopped by anybody in the other areas, I could see that people keenly observed my presence. Their tacit approval of my presence in their area could be the result of many factors which might include the stationery I carried with me or my clothing which I think gave an impression of a student or a white-collar worker.

The process of negotiating access to the field for data collection was similar in all the four neighbourhoods. I tried to find acquaintances in or around the neighbourhood through my personal contacts who could help me access the field. In Lahore, I was able to find such gatekeepers, whereas, in Karachi, I talked to a few well-known people in the

neighbourhood and either one or two of them acted as gatekeeper for me. The most useful of these gatekeepers in each neighbourhood were local politicians who had just contested local elections. I also tried to approach people independently for interviews, but this method was mostly unsuccessful. What worked for me in most of the situations could be called a variant of snowball sampling where I asked my interviewees (who I had contacted through gatekeepers) to help me in gaining access to other key informants or to refer me to those people who could help me gain that access. By using this method to conduct my interviews, I was making a choice about the people I would see and consequently the data I would collect. I was only made aware of the limitations of this approach when a subordinate of a local politician in the first neighbourhood informed me that another politician did not give honest answers to my questions. In order to manage this issue, I sought the help of not one but at least a few gatekeepers to introduce me to interviewees. The gatekeepers would typically introduce me to potential interviewees with statements which went something like, "This guy needs help with his studies; tell him what he asks." Most people seemed content to give interviews when asked by a neighbour especially if the person asking them had a higher social status. I frequently had to persuade the more influential people in the neighbourhoods to give me interviews. For instance, in all four neighbourhoods, I could not find persons who could negotiate access on my behalf with the Imams (religious leaders). A system of social hierarchy was on overt display in the neighbourhoods where people obliged requests of other people on the basis of their social status.

Before the interviews, I read out the information sheet for all the interviewees. They were almost invariably disinterested in its contents and a sizable number of them interrupted me with statements such as "This is all fine, brother. Get on with the interview." Most of the people who showed no interest in knowing the contents of the information sheet were those who were asked by someone in the neighbourhood to participate in the interview. To be asked by a respectable person in the neighbourhood was reason enough for them to consent to the interview. In fact, a rickshaw driver said, "'Haji Sahib' [the elder] has ordered [me to give the interview]; now it is up to you what you do with it [interview recording]." However, the approval of fellow residents had its limitations. During fieldwork in the first neighbourhood, my requests to sign the consent form were vehemently refused by the interviewees. There were two instances out of my four attempts where interviewees refused to give interviews at all after being asked to sign the consent form. To this, my gatekeeper murmured, "I do not know how people here sign their marriage certificates;

you are asking them to sign something they do not know a thing about." Although this response from people did not come to me as a total surprise, the next section would highlight probable causes of their apprehensions.

Spy on a mission

In a country where around half of the people are illiterate, it is unreasonable to expect people to know a good deal about social research. Before the fieldwork, I practiced different ways of communicating my identity and purpose of visit to residents in the neighbourhoods. However, my strategies did not turn out to be as effective as I had hoped. I probably look somewhat older than my age and the beard that I had grown did not do me any favour in this regard. Regardless, there would not be many people of my age still studying in the neighbourhoods I studied. Therefore, my contention of being a university student was not received well by the neighbourhood residents. "Three of my children are university graduates," argued an old man, "but none of them interviewed people in their studies." I had a range of answers to such enquiries depending on my perception of other person's knowledge about education and research. My responses or my choice of responses faltered at times and a sense of confusion about my identity prevailed, to a varying degree, in all the four neighbourhoods. Even my gatekeepers, who in some cases had been my friends for a long time, did not have an exact idea of what I was up to. I could not help but think that in the Western world, research is underpinned by a whole host of background assumptions and understandings. Results of surveys and studies often feature in mainstream media and are discussed by analysts. Most people I met in the UK knew what a research thesis means and the importance of research in informed policy making. On the other hand, the abysmal rate of literacy among my potential interviewees meant that, when giving interviews, people were mostly giving a favour to a young man who might be able to land a job with their contribution. Some people asked me how my research would benefit them or their neighbourhood. I clarified that this research is for academic purposes and one cannot expect any immediate relief from its findings. In most cases, people were disappointed and asked me to carry on with the interview. How people view the importance of a work may impact how they respond to it, in this case the interview questions. While it was not something I was focused on, understanding this premise could be an interesting research proposition to address.

Many people thought of me as a kind of journalist who would take the interview but would not publish it in their names. Of course, this was not an accurate perception about me, and I needed to rectify it. However, an even more problematic misunderstanding among some

people was that I belonged to a government agency or more specifically, an intelligence agency. This was especially true of Karachi where a paramilitary operation was going on against 'hardened' criminals and terrorists. Since I did not want to be a passive recipient of these labels, I attempted my hand at some impression management tactics. During fieldwork, I wore clothes which were not very different from what an educated middle-class person would wear in those neighbourhoods. Except for the first two days of the fieldwork, I did not bring my car to the field and used a motorbike instead. All of these efforts were directed at attaining a degree of anonymity in the neighbourhoods. During interviews, I tried to talk in the language or style of the interviewees. For instance, in Lahore, most young and educated interviewees spoke in Urdu whereas the older or lesser educated people spoke in Punjabi. In my informal conversations with people, especially those of my age group, I often used profane words which could not probably be used by a person who only had a remote connection with such neighbourhoods. My electronic vaping device also attracted interest of some residents in the first neighbourhood to the extent that one boy, albeit in a lighter mood, remarked to his fellows: "Beware boys, it [the vaping device] does not only emit smoke, it can also take your pictures." As a result, I had to quit vaping through the fieldwork. In addition to all these measures, I also sought the help of those few people in the neighbourhood who knew something about research, thesis or fieldwork. I requested them to accompany me to potential interviewees and explain my work to them in a way the interviewees could understand with ease. Almost all such people in the neighbourhoods were pleased to offer their services perhaps because it gave them a chance to reinforce their status as educated residents in the neighbourhood.

Despite these efforts, I could not convince all the people that I was just doing academic research. A local political leader, after initially consenting, refused to give an interview just as I was about to start asking questions. I showed him my institution card upon his request which somehow could not convince him that I was a trustworthy person. "How would I know that you are not an undercover agent of the opposition [rival political party]? They are very active these days and I cannot risk my position by saying anything which I should not say." I later found out that a survey team had visited the area before a very high-profile election held a few months earlier and asked people about their voting preferences. Residents alleged that names of people who said they would vote for the opposition party's candidate were removed from the voters list. The local politician, who refused to give me an interview, probably was concerned that people from the opposition party would try to avenge what they alleged to be pre-poll rigging by the ruling party.

The most consequential impacts of confusion about my identity came in a neighbourhood of Karachi. During fieldwork in this neighbourhood, the response rate fell considerably, and I was finding it difficult to meet my sampling target for this neighbourhood. It turned out that non-cooperation by the people was deliberate, as a resident told me, "They think you are from an [intelligence] agency and some notables have warned people not to provide you with any information." He did not reveal the names of people who had warned the residents, but he advised me to finish the fieldwork soon. I got a few more interviews in the next two to three days, but I could feel that the people were trying to avoid me. The shopkeeper who used to offer me a water bottle whenever I entered the neighbourhood was busy with other customers. The boy who would accompany me to the field all day also had some other work to do. The peon outside the election office could not help me locate the address of an interviewee even when I told him the house number. Adding to this, the last three interviews were not very revealing, and most information provided by the interviewees was redundant.

I sat on one of the benches at a crossroad and was thinking about wrapping up the fieldwork in this neighbourhood when an old man remarked that he had not seen me in the area before. I told him about the purpose of my visit, and we started talking on the subject of crime. "There are more illegal things in this area than there are legal things, Son. But nobody is going to tell you that. Do you see that [pointing towards a house]? They sell drugs here and the location of their house is such that they keep an eye on everyone coming in or going out. They have...." The old man stopped talking suddenly as if he observed someone or something not conducive to the conversation and started reading the newspaper lying by his side. It was my last scheduled interview in a while, and I preferred to leave rather than wait for the old man to continue conversation. It was not until completion of the interviews that I knew why everything seemed so strange. The last interviewee told me, "Listen! do not look back. A member of a criminal gang is following you and he is outside at the moment. Just leave the area as if you have not noticed him." As I came out of the interviewee's shop, I could see a boy staring at me with a firearm tucked in his trousers. It did not take me a long time to realise that I was being followed for some time and this largely accounted for the unreceptive behaviour of the residents. With fieldwork almost completed and the threat of a firearm in my mind, I wasted no time in leaving the neighbourhood, never to go back again.

Stakes in concealment

From the first to the last study site, there were substantial differences in views expressed by the people in the interview settings or outside of it. The audio recording of interviews did not go well with most of the interviewees and may have affected their responses. Responses to questions on police, crime, suspected offenders and moral entrepreneurs went something like, 'Well, you are more learned than me; you understand how all this goes." Those who talked about the social problems in their neighbourhood before the interviews mostly took a different position during the interviews, noting that their neighbourhood was much better than all the other neighbourhoods around. The lack of 'true' response from a sizable number of people was so demotivating for me that it led me to contemplate cancelling the fieldwork. Janet Foster's early work in London also highlighted this issue where residents did not view their housing estate to be particularly problematic (Foster 1995). However, this predisposition was rather more deliberate in my study and stemmed from the dual concerns about not maligning the image of their neighbourhood and concern with my identity. For somewhat different but obvious reasons, my interviews with some police officers were among the shortest of all the interviews I conducted. The police officers provided one-line answers to most of my questions and those answers seemed to come straight out of the book of law. I had to contact a senior police officer to negotiate access on my behalf and convince the police officers that any identifiable information would remain confidential and their identities would be kept anonymous.

Another perhaps more important issue was that interviewees were not inclined to provide specific details about their neighbourhoods. To most of my questions, they would provide abstract answers but not relate those answers to their personal experiences. An interview in Lahore went like this. "Has anybody in your neighbourhood been victimised in the past few months?" I asked. "Yes, a number of times," he answered. "Could you recall any such incident?" I probed. "There have been a number of incidents," was the reply. "Please tell me about any one of them," I emphasised. "Well, there is nothing special. It is all the same," he persisted. Similarly, most people would readily talk about the performance of the police in general but would not talk about the local police. I can only speculate why interviewees across the four neighbourhoods failed to share details. I observed, however, that interviewees in the high crime neighbourhood and those with a lower socioeconomic status were most likely to talk in abstract or general terms. Time and again, I told interviewees that they did not need to tell me names or any other identifiable information

about the experience or incident they wanted to narrate but some of them were still reticent. In order to mitigate these problems, I spent more time on the streets and talked to people in informal settings. Due to this, I was also able to observe what people did along with what they said.

There were some instances when other people in the neighbourhood hinted that an interviewee was not providing candid answers to questions. During an interview with a barber in his shop, a man came inside and briefly listened to the interview. After a while, he interrupted us and said to the barber, "Why are you wasting his time if you do not want to tell anything?" Then he turned towards me and said, "Brother, I can answer your questions if you want me to. These guys are not born to tell the truth." In another neighbourhood, a person in his 20s almost broke into a fight with another person of similar age because the latter was allegedly lying about his experience of police behaviour. "If you have weaned on your mother's milk, tell your 'father' [interviewer] what the police did with you last month," he challenged the interviewee. In reply, the interviewee refused to acknowledge that any such incident had happened, which resulted in an exchange of verbal abuse between them. I can recall a number of similar instances where interviewees were believed to be concealing information, but the point is why did they do it? Being a citizen of Pakistan, I do not find it a difficult question to answer. In a country where social research is almost non-existent and where you do not need to be at fault for getting caught up in a precarious situation, the prudent way is to perhaps be reserved in your opinions about sensitive issues especially in front of a dubious stranger.

Knocking the trouble

I had planned to visit people at their houses and get appointments for interviews in the neighbourhoods. However, this plan was put off by the local politician who I interacted with in the first neighbourhood. "I will advise you against knocking on doors. Nothing will happen if you do, but still you would not like to have any trouble." In two of the four neighbourhoods, there was a sizable number of Pathans, an ethnic group, whose members were generally considered to be overly protective of their women. Since men were out of the house most of the day, knocking on doors meant that I would be mostly communicating with women. Interaction of females with unknown males is not considered appropriate even in the wider Pakistani society, but Pathans have a reputation of taking offense too easily in this matter. Thus, I decided against going to people's homes in all the four neighbourhoods. When required, I asked children or adults in the streets to knock on my behalf and ask about the potential interviewee. This strategy helped in calling male

members out of their homes, but the problem of ensuring female representation in the sample remained. I dealt with this issue by asking a female friend to interview women on my behalf in the first neighbourhood. Being female, she could go to the doorsteps of residents and interview women. I had to reverse this decision since my friend quickly found herself unwantedly surrounded by men eager to give interviews.

The presence of my female friends in the field was never without incidents. In a neighbourhood in Lahore, a community notable refused to allow the female interviewer in his part of the neighbourhood. Although he was also my gatekeeper, he opined, "Our women know nothing about these things [crime, social control etc.] and people here will not like a woman in immodest dress to enter their homes." During my stay in this locality, I saw women only a handful of times, and they were almost invariably veiled from head to toe. Thus, the community notable's problem with the female interviewer's dress seemed to be understandable, if not justified in my opinion. In a neighbourhood in Karachi, a gatekeeper sent his own daughter with the female interviewer in view of the latter's security. "The people here are very gentle," he said, "but letting females go alone to people's homes is never a safe proposition." Later, the female interviewer told me that the daughter of the gatekeeper was very nervous accompanying her as she had rarely been to other people's houses before. Thus, the female interviewer asked her to stay at one home in the street while she conducted interviews in other homes of those streets. Female interviewers reported that they were treated well by most female residents, but a high number of them did not want to give interviews without the consent of their male family members.

Some females in all the four neighbourhoods tried to convince the interviewers to wear a 'scarf' or 'burka' and that a woman should not be working with men. When asked about her experiences of harassment, a female interviewee jibed at the interviewer, "harassment is only for 'independent' and 'liberal' women; how can anybody harass a woman who lives within the confines of her house?" In a neighbourhood in Karachi, the female interviewer was denied entry to some houses by the females living there. It was later revealed that some burglaries had happened in the area where some females entered houses in disguise as government officials and, upon confirming that there was no male present in the house, they either burgled the houses themselves or called their male accomplices in.

Throughout the fieldwork, interviewing females remained a parallel task to interviewing males. Negotiating access to female residents and arranging interviews was different to

that of males in a number of respects. For instance, in all the neighbourhoods, it took two or three days of male only interviews before I could gain the confidence of neighbourhood residents to visit their homes. Still, almost all the female interviews were conducted by female interviewers, but most of them were very short in length. Most of the times, the answers were 'yes', 'no', or 'I don't know'. The only in-depth interview with one female in Lahore was conducted by me and, despite my efforts, I could not negotiate access to conduct in-depth interviews with any other females. Even if I had secured some interviews, they may not have been of much help for this study because the female interviewers kept telling me in each neighbourhood that female respondents did not have much information about the operation of the police and the informal control at the neighbourhood level. A female interviewer working in a Pathan dominated neighbourhood of Karachi reported, "I met two women today who have never, and I mean never, gone out of their houses since they came here [after marriage]. They did not even know which area they are living in. One of these women had all her six babies born at home." These may well be extreme cases, but they could provide reflections on the peculiarities of gaining access to female respondents in these contexts and perhaps the futility of engaging with them on issues whose understanding requires a certain degree of social interaction outside the home.

Conclusion

In this study, I used those methods and their associated procedures which are well established in criminology. Narrative interviews ought to provide detailed information about the subjective experiences of interviewees. Numerous studies have employed these methods with success and the required information was obtained. I used these methods in four geographically separate neighbourhoods in two distinct cities. In all the neighbourhoods, I consistently found that interviewees were reluctant to talk about crime and the police. My attempts at probing did not encourage some interviewees to narrate crime related stories about their neighbourhood. Similarly, some interviews were visibly apprehensive about sharing their opinions about the police. I noticed that people were concerned that talking negatively about the police may harm them in some way.

In terms of sampling, the importance of maintaining gender balance has become a sacred tradition in the social sciences. However, we are yet to devise comprehensive strategies for negotiating access to females in societies where interacting with males outside the family constitutes deviance for females. Adding to this, what do we make of situations when female interviewees have a very limited idea about how the community mechanisms of conflict resolution or policing works in their neighbourhood? Pakistan is largely a gender

segregated society, and it is likely to remain so for some time. Since most women are homemakers, they could mostly tell about crime and social control only if they have overheard male members of the family talking about it. From my field experiences, I am convinced that we need to revisit methodological procedures and ethical guidelines used in the West to improve the quality of data we need to answer research questions. To concern ourselves with issues of gender balance or keeping audio transcripts for administrative purposes would mean that we restrict ourselves from getting deeper insights into phenomena under study.

Before going into the field, I had foreseen some of the issues I encountered but my concerns were mitigated by the immense amount of previous research which did not had problems. It could be argued that these problems are specific to the Pakistani context and may not have bearing on research in other parts of the world. Indeed, research from Latin America and Africa has not reported such concerns, but when I try to speculate reasons for skewed responses of some of my interviewees, I come up with those factors which exist in a number of developing democracies. In contexts where the police are repressive and insecurity prevails, why would a semi-literate person want to tell a stranger something which could potentially land him/her in trouble? If I did not record the personal details of the interviewees, their recorded voice could still be used against them. The use of pseudonyms on interview guides could be a good strategy to anonymise interviewees but standing at the door of their house, I knew their addresses. I think these are concerns which are not exclusive to Pakistani society. The ICVS City Surveys were conducted in many countries with comparable conditions to Pakistan, but I did not come across any publication which highlighted the methodological challenges faced during these surveys. I suggest that if global criminology is a goal at all, it is imperative that applicability of Western methodologies in non-Western contexts be considered as a line of enquiry alongside policy and rhetoric transfer.

Chapter 3 Context

This chapter introduces the history, demography, culture, and organisation of the police department in the two largest cities of Pakistan. It also provides the legislative background, public perceptions of the police, major organisational challenges, and some of the innovate initiatives undertaken by the police in Pakistan. Following is a map[23] of Pakistan showing its neighbouring countries (Nations Online Project). The locations of Karachi and Lahore are encircled.

Figure 2: Administrative map of Pakistan

Karachi

With a population of over 14.9 million, Karachi is the largest megacity of Pakistan (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). It has the second highest rate of urbanization (36.2%) in South Asia and, since 1947, it has expanded manifold in spatial terms (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre 2014). Karachi is considered the economic lifeline of Pakistan with its

---

[2] Sindh was officially spelled as Sind before 2013. This map reflects the old spelling of this province.
[3] The area mentioned as Fed. Admin. Tribal Areas in the map has been merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province on 31 May 2018.

20% share in national output and 25% share in national tax revenues (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre 2014). Karachi's ports and airport account for 95% of Pakistan's foreign trade (Rahman et al. 2012). The economic activity in Karachi is largely based on trade, manufacturing, shipping and services sectors. Around 75% of Karachi's population is engaged in the informal sector of the economy, which includes small scale manufacturing units and business enterprises (Hasan 2011). The economy of Karachi has been under stress due to a chronic energy crisis and volatile security situation. Around 50% of Karachi's population lives below the poverty line and at least as many live in informal settlements (Hasan 2011). Most of Karachi's poor live in deplorable living conditions with limited access to basic facilities, such as sanitation and clean drinking water.

Although resembling Norton's 'feral city' (Norton 2010) in many respects, Karachi is still one of the livelier cities in Pakistan. It is known as the 'city of lights' due to its vibrant nightlife. The city is characterized by busy roads, traffic congestion, high rise buildings, shopping markets and beaches. Karachi owes its rich literary and performing arts heritage to its diverse population and it has produced some of the best intellectuals and artists in the history of Pakistan. The cultural life of Karachi is enriched by its drama, music and fashion industries, which outmatch all their counterparts in other cities. Karachi is also home to many of Pakistan's print and electronic media groups' headquarters. In addition, several globally acclaimed philanthropic organisations, such as Edhi Foundation, Barni Trust and Orangi Pilot Project, are based in the city. Karachi has some of the best health institutions in Pakistan, such as Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT) and Agha Khan Hospital, which attract people from all over the country. Karachiites are known for their resilience and carefree attitude towards crime. In the last three decades, Karachi has witnessed rising political violence, ethnic violence, and street crimes.

Historical background

Archaeological evidence suggests that humans from pre-historic periods lived in or around what is today known as Karachi. However, the first authentic reference to the modern origins of Karachi can be tracked back to 1728 AD when a group of merchants from a nearby area established a port which they called 'Kolachi' (Hasan et al. 2002). Kolachi was a new settlement and its inhabitants built a wall around it. These walls had two gates, one facing the river, which was called Mithadar (sweet gate), and the other facing the sea, which was called Kharadar (salt gate). In today's Karachi, there are two neighbourhoods with the same names located around the places where the gates were originally built.

Pre-partition

Karachi with its natural harbour and strategic location attracted the attention of the British East India Company. After a couple of exploratory mission, the British forces occupied the town in 1838 and set up a military base there (Hasan et al. 2002). In 1843, British forces defeated the Talpurs, then rulers of Sindh, and annexed Sindh to the British Indian Empire (Hasan et al. 2002). Soon thereafter, Sindh was made a district of the Bombay presidency with Karachi as its district headquarters. A district administration was set up and areas surrounding the military base were developed to cater to the needs of the stationed troops. These developments effectively divided the city into the old, pre-British town and the modern city comprising of Civil Lines, Saddar Bazaar and Cantonment. The first municipal committee in British India was also established in Karachi which led to the construction of numerous buildings, a number of which stand to date. It was during the British period that Karachi's harbour was extensively upgraded and that infrastructural developments turned the town of Karachi into a burgeoning city. The British saw Karachi as a key location for exporting agricultural produce from the Indian subcontinent to Great Britain. Karachi steadily turned into a major port city under British administration and its population increased from 14,000 to 57,000 from 1839 to 1856 (Hasan et al. 2002). Around the same period, its trade volume increased from £ 122,160 to £ 855,103. (Hasan et al. 2002)

During the Independence War of 1857 (also called the Indian Mutiny), native troops of Karachi revolted against the British, but the rebellion was crushed, and the British were in complete control of Karachi. During 1856-1872, Karachi saw its trade volume increase from £ 855,103 to more than £ 5 million (Hasan et al. 2002). This increase could be attributed to the American Civil War when the Sindhi cotton replaced American cotton as the raw material for the British textile industry. During this period, in 1861, a railway system was developed which linked Karachi to surrounding crop producing areas. In 1869, an extension of the railways to Punjab and Northern India began (Hasan et al. 2002). Concomitantly, an extensive irrigation system was quickly developed in Sindh and Punjab, to increase the arable land in those provinces. These developments made Karachi the largest exporter of wheat and cotton in the Indian subcontinent.

Between 1872 and 1901, the population of Karachi increased more than twofold because the railway system was completed by then and agricultural products were increasingly transported through Karachi (Hasan et al. 2002). Along with these changes, rapid

infrastructural developments took place in Karachi. Modern urban facilities, such as water supply and drainage, were developed but these were built outside the old town which led to an out-migration of people from the new areas. During 1901-1911, irrigation related projects were completed which resulted in substantial increase in agricultural production (Hasan et al. 2002). In order to transport the agricultural products, the port of Karachi was further expanded. As a result, a large number of labourers and merchants moved to Karachi for the employment and trade opportunities the project offered. During this period, the population of Karachi increased by 37% (Hasan et al. 2002).

From 1911 to 1947, trade volume in Karachi increased due to further developments in the railway and irrigation systems (Hasan et al. 2002). During the First World War, Karachi was used by the British as a military base for intervention in Central Asia due to its proximity to the Suez Canal and as a gateway to the Russian Empire (Hasan et al. 2002). In 1924, the first airport in the Indian subcontinent was built in Karachi (Hasan et al. 2002). An important development in the history of Karachi came in 1935 when Sindh was separated from the Bombay presidency. Sindh was declared a separate province and Karachi was made its capital. As a result, a number of government offices were established in Karachi which led to further in-migration of traders and aristocrats to the city. During the Second World War, the port of Karachi was used to transport supplies to troops stationed at the Russian front. The city served as a supply line to troops even after the war. The population of Karachi increased by 133.4% during 1911-1941 and most of it was due to migration (Hasan et al. 2002). It is pertinent to note that throughout the colonial period, numerous buildings were constructed in Karachi, including universities, hospitals, churches and markets.

Post-Partition

When Pakistan gained independence from the British rule in 1947, Karachi was designated as the federal capital of the country. This move was not appreciated by the Sindhi legislators and intellectuals as it would strip the province of an important economic resource and cultural heritage. This was the first post-independence tension between Karachi and the Sindhi intelligentsia.

Karachi's demography was dramatically affected by the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The population of Karachi in 1947 was 450,000, of which 51% were Hindus and 42% were Muslims (Hasan et al. 2002). The Sindhi speaking population constituted 62% of the population whereas Urdu-Hindi speaking population was 6.3%. Four years after partition, the population of Karachi increased to 1.137 million people due to an influx of

600,000 refugees who migrated from India (Hasan et al. 2002). In 1951, Muslims
constituted 96% of the population as compared with 2% Hindus; and the Urdu speaking
population increased to 50% as compared with 8.6% Sindhi speaking population (Hasan et
al. 2002). Refugees occupied vast amounts of open land and buildings evacuated by the
Hindu population which had migrated to India. The refugee settlements were located
alongside Saddar Bazaar and comprised diverse populations in terms of class and ethnicity.
With the arrival of the refugees, Karachi, being the federal capital, rapidly became a dense
and multi-ethnic city.

As evident from its history, migration has played a key role in defining the demographics of
Karachi. During the early years of the creation of Pakistan, the increase in population was
due to the influx of Muslim migrants from India. Internal migration from other provinces of
Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s also contributed to the increase in Karachi's
population. After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, a large number of Bihari refugees
from Bangladesh migrated to Karachi (Budhani et al. 2010). Another wave of in-migration in
Karachi occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s (Kazmi et al. 2012). Successive
waves of migration before and after the creation of Pakistan have substantially affected the
ethnic composition, cultural life and political landscape of Karachi.

Crime and violence

Karachi was termed as the most violent mega-city in the world with a homicide rate of 12.3
per 100,000 residents (Gupte 2014). It was ranked 6th on global crime index in 2014, but its
ranking has consistently improved since then and it stands at 95th place as of February 2020
(Ali 2020; Numbeo 2020). Extortions, targeted killings, kidnapping for ransom, sectarian
and ethnic conflicts, gang wars, bomb blasts, and inter-party conflicts are some of the many
facets of criminal violence in this mega-city. A number of factors which are thought to
contribute to this situation include ethnic heterogeneity, unplanned development and high
rates of in-migration (Budhani et al. 2010). Given its strategic and economic importance,
Karachi is a highly significant city in terms of national and regional politics. For this reason,
a number of national and foreign intelligence agencies operate in Karachi which further
complicates its security situation.

Arguably, the phenomenal expansion of Karachi in terms of area and population has
outmatched the state's capacity to provide basic services (Linden 1991). This has led to the
development of a large informal sector which provides services, such as transportation,
access to clean water and residential land. The state apparatus has often operated in

coordination with this informal sector and the writ of state has always been fragile at best. The competition over limited public resources among conflicting interest groups could partly explain the overall security situation in Karachi. Police and other law enforcement agencies are widely thought to have links with criminals (Budhani et al. 2010). It is well known that political parties in Karachi have their armed militant wings who are intricately linked with criminal gangs (Budhani et al. 2010). Over the last few years, numerous kidnappings and extortion activities have been linked with Taliban and other religious extremist organisations (Yusuf 2012). Paramilitary forces have been called several times to control the security situation in Karachi although they have also been allegedly involved in an abuse of power. Recently, Pakistan Rangers (paramilitary force) have been assigned special policing powers till January 2020 under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and it is likely to be extended further. Overall, a complex web of state and non-state actors exists in Karachi, and they switch their positions relative to each other with changing socio-political dynamics.

Administrative division

In 1955, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and tribal areas were merged to form One Unit with Lahore as its provincial capital (Budhani et al. 2010). Three years later, the federal capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad. In 1969, the One Unit system was abolished, and Karachi became the provincial capital of Sindh. Before the devolution plan in 2001, Karachi was a division with five districts including both rural and urban areas. However, with the local government system reforms in 2001, Karachi was recognized as a city district covering all the area of the Karachi division with the distinction between rural and urban areas removed (Kazmi et al. 2012). However, in 2011, the five original constituent districts were demerged, and Karachi Division was restored. Thereafter, in 2013, a sixth district was added by splitting one of the districts (Mansoor 2013). Currently, Karachi division has six districts each of which has two to four towns. There are eighteen towns in total. Each town has a number of basic administrative units called union councils with a total of 178 union councils in Karachi.

Police organisation in Karachi

The police organization in Karachi is headed by an officer at the rank of Additional Inspector General of Police (AIGP) who reports to the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Sindh. Karachi police has divided the city into three zones for administrative and operational purposes: the East zone, West zone and South zone. Each zone has four to eight divisions and is headed by a Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP). Each division

has three to eight police stations and these police stations are the basic unit of police organization. In total, there are 107 police stations in the Karachi division.

The East zone comprises of eight police divisions, with 38 police stations, and it covers three out of the six districts of Karachi, namely East district, Korangi district and Malir district. The West zone comprises of eight police divisions, with 43 police stations, and it covers two districts of Karachi, the West District and Central District. Finally, the South zone comprises of four police divisions, with 26 police stations, and it covers one district of Karachi, the South district. Table 2[4] outlines the district and police administration of Karachi. The South zone was randomly selected for this study. This zone comprises of the old, pre-British town as well as the area near the cantonment which formed the 'British Town'.

Table 2: District and Police administration of Karachi

District administration of Karachi				Police administration of Karachi		
Division						
Karachi	South	Lyari Town	11	South	Clifton	7
					Saddar	7
		Saddar Town	11		City	8
					Lyari	4
	West	Baldia Town	8	West	Baldia	3
		Kiamari Town	8		Kiamari	6
		Orangi Town	13		Orangi	7
		S.I.T.E. Town	9		S.I.T.E.	3
	Central	Gulberg Town	8		Gulberg Town	7
		Liaquatabad Town	11		Liaquatabad Town	7
		New Karachi Town	13		New Karachi Town	5

---

[4] The data provided in this table was procured from the Office of Senior Superintendent of the Police in district South, Karachi in early 2016. The delimitation of electoral constituencies and disputes surrounding this issue may have caused some inaccuracies in this data.

District administration of Karachi				Police administration of Karachi		
Division						
		North Nazimabad Town	10		North Nazimabad Town	5
	East	Jamshed Town	13		Jamshed Town	4
		Gulshan Town	13		Gulshan Town	8
	Malir	Malir Town	7		Malir Town	6
		Bin Qasim Town	7	East	Bin Qasim Town	4
		Gadap Town	8		Gadap Town	5
	Korangi	Korangi Town	9		Korangi Town	3
		Landhi Town	12		Landhi Town	4
		Shah Faisal Town	7		Shah Faisal Town	4
Total	6	18	178	3	20	107

Lahore

With an estimated population of over 11 million, Lahore is the second largest city of Pakistan in terms of population (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). Lahore has the highest population density in Punjab with an estimated 12,700 persons living per sq.km (Demographia 2015). Besides being the capital of the province of Punjab, Lahore is the trade hub for more than 100 million people of the province. Its extensive road and rail infrastructures connect it to the rest of the country. Modern Lahore has various government offices, offices of multinational companies, consulates, universities, tertiary hospitals, sports stadiums and an international airport. Lahore has been relatively less affected by the recent spate of violence in the country. Known for its festivities and vibrant cultural life, Lahore has several cinemas, theatres, shopping malls, restaurants and food markets. The residents of Lahore are known for their love of food, arts and poetry. It is considered as the home of the intellectual and political elite of Pakistan.

The population of Lahore is on a steady rise partly due to the influx of a large number of migrants coming for employment and education purposes. Additionally, outmigration from the city centre has also contributed to urban expansion of Lahore. The old city area, which is also known as the Walled City and which dates back to the Mughal Era, is now merely a small sub-section of Lahore, with a population of around 145,000 in 2008 (Walled City of Lahore Authority 2012). In-migration from neighbouring towns has contributed to peri-urbanization in Lahore. Due to weak urban governance and inappropriate land use, a number of unplanned residential areas have developed (Shah and Abbas 2015), many of which were intermittently regularized by the government.

With an economy of over a trillion Pakistani rupees, Lahore contributes 11.5% to national GDP and 15.1% to federal revenue (Tahir 2017). Lahore has various wholesale markets which supply goods to the rest of the province. Additionally, Lahore has a number of industrial estates which provide employment opportunities for people from neighbouring areas. Lahore has an extensive industrial base with about 9,000 industrial units (Kuroda 2008), manufacturing a large range of goods, including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, textiles, electronics, and chemicals. Moreover, the services sector has grown significantly in recent decades so that around 42% of Lahore's labour force is engaged in the services sector, including banking and finances, social services, and real estate. (Kuroda 2008).

The literacy rates of females and males aged 15 to 24 in Lahore are 84% (Bureau of Statistics 2018, p. 583) and 85% (Bureau of Statistics 2018, p. 585) respectively, which is

significantly higher than the national average. Lahore has some of the most prestigious and oldest education institutes of Pakistan which attract a large number of students from across the province. Lahore has a network of extensive health care facilities which cater to the specialized health needs of people from the province.

Historical background

The first authentic reference to Lahore in the history was made in 1021 AD when Mehmood Ghaznavi conquered the city (Walled City of Lahore Authority). Lahore has always remained politically significant and a number of important dynasties of the Indian subcontinent designated Lahore as their headquarters. While Lahore remained the capital of Punjab for around 1000 years, it was also designated the capital of the Ghaznavi Empire during 1099-1114 AD and the Mughal Empire during 1584-1598 AD (Walled City of Lahore Authority). After the end of Mughal rule in 1752 AD, Lahore fell to the forces of Ahmed Shah Abdali, before being ruled by Sikhs during 1799-1848 (Grewal 1998). The British took control of Lahore from the Sikhs during 1848-1849, and, after 99 years of colonial rule, Lahore became part of Pakistan in 1947 (Walled City of Lahore Authority).

The history of Lahore is a tale of prosperity, peace, conquests and plundering. Lahore attained its glory during the Mughal Era, and the magnificent architecture erected during that period still bears testimony to its elevated status. The major monuments of the Mughal era include the Lahore Fort, Badshahi Mosque, Shalamar Gardens, and Jahangir's tomb. UNESCO designated Lahore Fort and Shalamar Gardens as Wold Heritage sites in 1981 (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015). A large number of tourists come to visit these places every year. The footprints of British rule are still evident in Lahore in the form of government offices, planned housing societies, hospitals, education institutions, railway stations, markets and a cantonment area. Most of the preserved buildings in present-day Lahore have a Mughal-Gothic style. The Great Trunk (GT) Road, which runs from Chittagong (Bangladesh) to Kabul (Afghanistan), also passes through Lahore, making it an important hub of regional trade. Another distinctive feature of Lahore is that it has been home to a number of highly revered Sufi saints. The shrines of these saints attract a large number of people who come to attend the festivities and to attain spiritual wellness. Urbanization of Lahore during the British Raj and post-partition period led to several reshufflings of city boundaries while neighbouring rural areas have steadily become part of the city (Shah and Abbas 2015). Lahore is widely regarded as the cultural capital of Pakistan and it is one of the most developed cities in the country.

Administrative Structure

After the promulgation of Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (ORDINANCE No. XIII OF 2001), Lahore was recognized as a city district consisting of nine towns. Each of these towns has a number of union councils which are the basic administrative units in Pakistan. The list of towns in Lahore is as follows:

1. Ravi Town
2. Shalimar Town
3. Wagah Town
4. Aziz Bhatti Town
5. Nishtar town
6. Data Gunj Bakhsh Town
7. Gulberg Town
8. Samanabad Town
9. Iqbal Town
10. Lahore Cantonment

In accordance with the Local Government Ordinance, 2001, the official distinction between rural and urban areas of Lahore was renounced. However, four of the towns (Ravi Town, Wagah Town, Nishtar Town and Iqbal Town) consist mostly of peri-urban areas with the exception of Ravi Town whose inner boundary contains some areas of old Lahore city. During the last two decades, several residential settlements have developed in these towns. The remaining five towns (Samanabad Town, Shalimar Town, Aziz Bhatti Town, Gulberg Town, Data Ganj Bakhsh Town) are densely populated towns of Lahore which contain older residential settlements and mostly commercial infrastructure. Lahore Cantonment is also a part of Lahore district, but it does not come under the administrative control of City District administration. Lahore Cantonment was established by Lt. Gen. Sir Charles Napier in 1850 as a station for British troops (Lahore Cantonment Board 2013). Modern day Lahore Cantonment covers a large area of Lahore and its administration is overseen by the Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan.

Police Organisation in Lahore

Policing in Pakistan has always been a provincial subject. Police organization in Punjab province is headed by a Provincial Police Officer, also called Inspector General of Police (IGP). At the field level, he is assisted by Regional Police Officers (RPOs) in the case of other districts and by Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) in the case of Lahore. The CCPO is head of

the police organization in Lahore. For administrative purposes, the police have divided Lahore into six divisions, as follows:

   i)   Cantonment division

   ii)   City division

   iii)   Civil Lines division

   iv)   Iqbal Town division

   v)   Model Town division

   vi)   Sadar division

It is pertinent to note that these divisions are independent of the division of Lahore into towns which is done by the city district administration. Each police division has two Superintendents of Police (SP) i.e. SP Investigation and SP Operations. All police divisions are divided into subdivisions (also called 'circles') which are headed by a Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO). Each circle within a division has a number of police stations, and those police stations are headed by a Station House Officer (SHO). A police station can be considered the basic unit of police organization of the province. SHO is directly responsible for maintaining law and order under the jurisdiction of the police station. The other functions of the police station include reporting of crimes, conducting investigations, and arresting the accused.

For this study, Civil Lines division was selected randomly. This division is divided into four circles each of which has two to three police stations. This division also has a women's police station which does not have any specific territory attached to it. Excluding the women's police station, there are ten police stations in the Civil Lines division. The jurisdiction of Civil Lines division includes areas from at least four different towns of Lahore i.e. Data Gunj Baksh Town, Gulberg Town, Shalimar Town and Aziz Bhatti Town. The Civil Lines division consists of densely populated areas of Lahore with various older and newer residential settlements. Additionally, this division contains some of the most developed and most impoverished areas of the city.

Table 3: Police administration of Lahore[5]

Police Divisions	Police Circle	No. of Police stations
Iqbal Town Division (10 police stations)	Muslim Town	2
	Iqbal Town	2
	Samanabad	2

---

[5] This data was obtained from the Office of Inspector General of Police, Lahore in 2016.

Police Divisions	Police Circle	No. of Police stations
	Gulshan-e-Ravi	2
	Nawakot	2
Sadar Division (14 police stations)	Raiwind City	4
	Chung	3
	Sabzazar	3
	Town Ship	4
Cantt Division (20 police stations)	Defence Area	4
	Sarwar Road	3
	North Cantt	4
	Barki	4
	Baghbanpura	2
	Manawan	3
Model Town Division (17 police stations)	Model Town	4
	Garden Town	3
	Ichhra	2
	Gulberg	3
	Kahna	5
City Division (22 police stations)	Islampura	2
	Lower Mall	3
	Tibbi City	3
	Rang Mehal	2
	Naulakha	2
	Gowalmandi	2
	Shahdara	2
	Shafiq Abad	2
	Badamibagh	2
	Missri Shah	2
Civil Lines Division (10 police stations)	Race Course	2
	Qilla Gujjar Sing	2
	Old Anarkali	3
	Mughalpura	3
Total: 6	**34**	**93**

Context of Policing in Pakistan

This section provides a brief overview of the of the police organisation in Pakistan.

Legislative system of the police

Since its inception in 1947 until 2002, the police organization in Pakistan operated under Police Act 1861. This Act was inspired by the Irish Constabulary model and was introduced by the British India authorities in the aftermath of the War of Independence, 1857 (also called the Indian Mutiny). The purpose of this Act was to extend colonial rule through repressive means rather than provide service to the people. Although such a model of policing was unlikely to be compatible with democratic values in an independent country, successive governments in Pakistan continued with this Act for mostly political reasons (International Crisis Group 2014).

In 2002, the then military dictator Pervez Musharraf introduced Police Order 2002 based on the metropolitan policing model, with a view to ensure greater accountability, less political interference and the abolishment of bureaucratic authority over police. However, as the Musharraf regime was itself a controlled democracy, it was discernible that the new legislation did not perform the much needed 'control' function of the government. Consequently, substantial amendments were made to the Police Order 2002 which rendered the reform agenda ineffective (Abbas 2009).

Currently, the province of Punjab still has Police Order, 2002 in place, albeit in adulterated forms (Saeed 2014). The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa promulgated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act 2017 which was appreciated for its focus on community-oriented policing (Bahadar et al. 2019) and external accountability of the police force through Public Safety Commissions (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2019). However, a systematic evaluation has not been conducted to assess the impact of the provisions of this Act on service delivery. It has been argued that the improvement in police governance seen after the passage of this legislation was largely driven by the personal ambition of then Provincial Police Officer (PPO), and the Police Act 2017 was not very different from the National Reconstruction Bureau's Police Order, 2002 (Khan 2018). The province of Sindh has reverted back to Police Act, 1861, whereas the province of Balochistan has promulgated the Police Act of 2011, which is akin to Police Act, 1861 (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 2015). The current ruling political party had police reforms high on its agenda, but no reforms package has been implemented as of January 2020. By way of summary, the policing in Pakistan by and large operates under a

legislative system which was promulgated during the colonial period and which was originally meant to produce a paramilitary organization.

Public perception about the police

The confidence of the public in the police is low, and people tend to avoid contacting the police to lodge their complaints (Abbas 2011; Suddle 2012). Police behaviour towards the public in police stations as well as on the streets is often derogatory. Moreover, people generally consider it disrespectful to visit a police station, even to file a report of some crime. 'Thana culture' (police station culture) is a local term in Pakistan which refers to the cavalier attitude and gross misuse of power by the police (Abbas 2009). Rather than being an organization for upholding law and democratic ideals, people view the police as an unaccountable force serving to protect the interests of powerful segments in society. Across the provinces, police are known for custodial torture to elicit confessions (Abbas 2011; Ahmed 2012). This perception about the police is not only based on people's interaction with the police but also on media portrayals of the police (Haider 2012). Almost all avenues of mass media, such as newspapers, television channels, movies, dramas and social media, depict the high-handedness of the police frequently. In addition to crime control, the police are often tasked to deal coercively with public protests and sit-ins which further deteriorates their public image (Haider 2012). Although the police department is no different from other governmental departments in terms of corruption and inefficiency, its visibility renders it vulnerable and targets it for the poor performance of the rest of state machinery. Consequently, most people in Pakistan perceive the police to be a problem rather than a service provider.

Organisational weaknesses in Police organisation

In response to public criticism, the police organization has created its own set of answers to account for its dismal performance. First, it maintains that there is no well-defined mechanism of transfers and postings of lower ranked police officers which provides room for political meddling (Abbas 2011). In order to enhance their career prospects, police personnel need political patronage (Shigri 2012). Additionally, the police is not well-equipped to meet the mounting challenges of terrorist insurgency, and ethnic, sectarian and political violence (Abbas 2011). Hence, it is not unsurprising that an ill-trained and demotivated workforce resort to disproportionate use of force and extra judicial killings in order to control the rising crime rate. Furthermore, the police often criticize the judiciary for providing undue relief to criminals which results in demotivation among the police ranks.

The police in Pakistan is not trained to counter terrorist violence and their capability to control organized crime is severely limited (Abbas 2011). This situation is further exacerbated by institutional disconnect between the police and other law enforcement agencies. The police has been a frequent target of criminal networks and scores of personnel have died in recent spates of violence. For instance, violence in Karachi claimed the lives of 142 law enforcement personnel in 2014 alone (The Newspaper's Staff Reporter 2015). Furthermore, police to population ratio in mega cities is very low; for example, in Karachi, there is only one police personnel for every 600 citizens (International Crisis Group 2014).

Police personnel are forced to work in deplorable conditions with limited access to basic facilities. They are made to work long hours with very few fringe benefits. The accommodation facilities for the police personnel are almost negligible. For instance, in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), the accommodation for the lower rank officials is less than 5% of the actual requirement (Shigri 2012)**.** Such working conditions, inadequate salaries, insecurity from the criminals, and limited job prospects push police personnel towards corruption and crime. A report quoted a senior police officer saying that around 25% of his subordinate police force is directly involved in criminal activities (Abbas 2009). A number of incidents have been reported in the mass media where police personnel have been accused of involvement in heinous crimes, such as kidnapping for ransom (Mirza 2013; International Crisis Group 2014).

The public in Pakistan considers the police to be one of the worst among all institutions in the country. The police is believed to be working for the political elite (Shigri 2012; Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 2015), riddled with nepotistic recruitments (Abbas 2011), and plagued with chronic corruption (Saeed 2014). According to Transparency International Pakistan (2011), the police was the second most corrupt public sector department in Pakistan, whereas it was consistently at the top in 2009, 2006 and 2002 surveys. The extent of manipulation of the police by the political forces can be gauged by the fact that the posting of a Station House Officer (SHO) in Karachi only lasts 40 days on average (International Crisis Group 2014). Many high level police officers are widely known for having political affiliations with particular parties, and it is the norm for the incumbent government to shuffle the top brass in the police soon after assuming power (Abbas 2009).

Innovative policing initiatives

Although the reform agenda in the policing sector does not seem to be a priority for federal and provincial governments, there have been sporadic attempts to restore the trust deficit between the public and police. Such initiatives were mainly taken either by individual police officers or by the notable community members. Citizen Police Liaison Committees (CPLCs) were established in Karachi, Faisalabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Sargodha, and Sahiwal. Apart from CPLC Karachi and CPLC Peshawar, all the CPLCs were formed under Section 162 of the Police Order, 2002. The main function of these CPLCs was to bridge the social distance between the police and the public and to help the police better discharge their duties. However, apart from CPLC-Karachi and the now defunct CPLC-Faisalabad, none of the CPLCs appears to be instrumental in fulfilling its stated functions. CPLC-Karachi is unique to the extent that it was formed through a Sindh Government notification in 1990 (Saeed 2014). Originally formed as a community policing initiative, CPLC-Karachi has developed into a specialized body which facilitates the police department by keeping statistical records of registered cases, monitoring and reporting police officials' conduct, as well as conducting arrest operations with the police. Thus, the scope of its activities is akin to a wing of the police department.

The concept of community policing in the province of Sindh was introduced by the then Inspector General of Police (IGP) Sindh in 2011. He envisioned 495 community policing centres across the province, but the plan could not be implemented due to a lack of resources (Saeed 2014). In Islamabad Capital Territory, 46 community policing centres were established, but the project also ended in 2013. In the same year, Citizen Police Coordination Committees (CPCCs) were established in all the police stations of Islamabad. The CPCCs consist of notable community members in a vicinity who work in collaboration with a Human Rights Officer (HRO) from the police station (Saeed 2014). The primary function of CPCCs is to oversee the operations of the police in the area and to take cognizance of human rights abuses by the police. Furthermore, CPCCs also serve as an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) forum. A number of initiatives have been taken in some other districts which are similar to contemporary community policing models. A notable example is the Union Council (UC) beat system introduced in some districts of Southern Punjab. A police station generally covers a number of union councils; however, under this initiative, each Union Council was treated as a beat with its designated police staff. The council in each beat consisted of 10 members which coordinated with the police staff to improve law and order situation (Saeed 2014). In 2019, Karachi's Police Chief

announced three pilot projects to develop community policing in Karachi. These included School Safety Division (to build positive relationship between the police and students), Anti-Affinity Theft Unit (to detect and prevent theft by domestic workers by encouraging people to get them registered at the police stations), and Mall Liaison Unit (to work with shopping malls to prevent terrorist attacks) (Perwaiz 2019). These pilot projects were meant to be conducted in the District South, the district where I conducted field work. However, I could not find any information on the outcome of these interventions online.

There may well be other such experiments in other parts of the country, but these are not systemic and are largely based on personal initiatives. Perhaps that is why several past initiatives could not be sustained over time. Also, the paramilitary organizational structure does not allow for the decentralization required for such initiatives. The organizational will to reform policing is also low which further damages the ability to bring operational reforms along democratic lines. An assessment study of community policing initiatives conducted in 2014 sent out questionnaires to 117 District Police Officers (DPOs) out of which only 13 responded back. Even these DPOs did not have any written community policing plan and goals for their respective districts (Saeed 2014). Overall, policing in Pakistan appears to be done on the principles outlined in the Police Act 1861 which is focused on order management through repressive force.

Way forward

Generally, residents in traditional urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan are close-knit, probably because they lived in same houses for generations. The people have routine interactions with their neighbours and participate in each other's ceremonies. There is a dearth of research on the neighbourhood mechanisms of informal social control in Pakistan. However, in the absence of an efficient and friendly police force vis-à-vis high crime rates, it is apparent that communities need to adopt social control practices for their safety. From the context described above, it can be ascertained that the security situation in Pakistan and its policing model are fundamentally different from the countries where most of the criminological literature is produced. Despite isolated and tepid attempts to reform the police system, it still runs under a legislative and administrative system which was designed to address entirely different socio-political realties than those that exist today (Suddle 2012). That is why the modern policing practices and associated concepts serve little to situate the present study in context. Keeping this in view, this study draws more on the work done in similar contexts where paramilitary policing is practiced, and the security situation is relatively unstable.

Chapter 4 Two communities in a tangle: The high crime neighbourhood in Lahore

Like any large city, Lahore is a metropolis where people live divergent lives. Modern Lahore offers gated communities and high-rise buildings which can perplex anyone who thinks that Pakistan is struggling to make ends meet. This new Lahore is by no means an aberration; it represents a significant number of people, including those who have migrated from other cities, but also those who moved to the city from older localities. Then, there is that part of Lahore which is often referred to by native residents as the 'original' Lahore or simply the 'city'. This Lahore is characterized by small houses with multiple families, narrow and dark streets, street hawkers calling for customers, and people sitting outside their houses to avoid suffocation during long periods of unannounced yet regular power breakdowns. While localities in modern Lahore are called 'housing schemes', in 'the city' they are called *mohallas* (neighbourhoods). Many of those who have moved to housing schemes still have their votes registered in their mohallas, spend Eid and other festivities there, and prefer burying their loved ones in graveyards next to their mohallas.

A mohalla may or may not have an official status, as administrative divisions in Lahore are often arbitrary and can be based on considerations unrelated to the neighbourhood itself. Even if administrators were more sensitive to local contexts, it would still be difficult to define a mohalla. How people define what constitutes their mohalla could be based on one or several factors, including ethnicity, physical structure, and historical demarcations. It is, therefore, ultimately the residents who define their mohallas based on how they make sense of living in a vast and sprawling metropolis in terms of community and physical space. People living in a mohalla generally have a strong sense of belonging and shared identity with each other. Despite the change brought in by access to information and communication technologies, these neighbourhoods still define the essence of social life in Lahore and embody a clear majority of its population. To examine control exercised by people in their vicinity, I decided to look at neighbourhoods which represented the majority, and not the housing schemes, where relatively fewer people live.

From glory to insignificance

For most of the approximately 11 million people living in Lahore, Begumpura[6] is just another old locality of the city. It can hardly be distinguished in any meaningful way from those numerous old and downtrodden areas in Lahore whose nobility left long ago. Apart from the local historians, I doubt many people know that the area adjacent to Begumpura was one of the poshest localities of the Indian Subcontinent during the reign of Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (1628-1658). Begumpura got its name from Begum Jan Sahiba, mother of Nawab Khan Bahadur Zakriya Khan, who was the governor of Lahore from in the first half of the eighteenth century. Of the two routes leading from the Walled City of Lahore to Delhi (the seat of the Mughal Empire), one route passed through Begumpura. With the construction of Shalimar Gardens (a UNESCO world heritage site) in the 17th century, this route became an alignment of the Grand Trunk Road, which was one of the longest roads in Asia running from Chittagong to Kabul. Over the next hundred years, a series of tombs, shrines, wells, palaces, and mosques were built in Begumpura.

A prominent site in Begumpura is the Tomb of Dai Anga (d. 1671), the wet nurse to Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. The tomb-garden is called Gulabi Bagh (Rosewater Garden), and it predates the construction of the tomb itself. Although the tomb is in a dilapidated condition now, what remains of the exterior tile work and interior floral paintings are reminiscent of what was once a magnificent structure. Just north of this tomb, at about 200 meters (in a straight line), lies Saruwala Maqbara (Cypress Tomb). It got its name from the tiles decorated with images of cypress trees in the upper storey. The Cypress Tomb is an elevated structure which is thought to have been a place of meditation before it housed the body of Sharf-un-Nisa Begum, the sister of Nawab Khan Bahadur Zakriya Khan. Nowadays, both tomb-gardens have been encroached upon by urban settlements. A small garden surrounding the Cypress Tomb is now a place where children play. At a walking distance from the Cypress Tomb is a shrine to a 17th century Sufi Saint, Khawaja Mahmud, popularly known as Hazrat Ishaan. Unlike Dai Anga and the Cypress Tomb, the shrine of Hazrat Ishaan is well-maintained and residents offer prayers in the mosque adjacent to the shrine. These monuments are only a few of the many structures built in and around Begumpura during the Mughal Era. After the fall of the Mughal and the subsequent Afghan rule in Lahore in 1758, most structures were desecrated and plundered by Sikh rulers for

---

[6] Begumpura is the name of a much larger locality of which the neighbourhood I studied is only a small part. To protect the anonymity of respondents, I have called the neighbourhoods by their generic names rather than their specific names.

their tiles and bricks. What remained of these structures, after the arrival of the British in 1846, was annihilated by urban settlements and illegal encroachments.

Begumpura, as it appears today, is one of the poorer neighbourhoods in Lahore. Barring some large and well-built houses near the shrine of Hazrat Ishaan, this neighbourhood is by and large home to less privileged people. It is characterised by narrow streets and haphazard housing. Houses have been built even between the Tomb of Dai Anga and the Cypress Tomb so that no direct passage remains between them. Most streets have poor lighting, making it difficult to walk through those streets at night. Boys play cricket in front of the shrine of Hazrat Ishaan and in a park situated in the middle of the neighbourhood. In the evenings, older people huddle to play cards in those areas of the park where boys are not playing cricket or perhaps where they are not allowed to play. Social life buzzes during the day and people can be seen casually talking to each other at street corners. However, like many other neighbourhoods in Lahore, I did not see many women on the streets, except for a few preteenagers, who seemed to be walking purposefully towards their destinations. I would often see some women standing at their doorsteps, but they hurriedly went inside while adjusting their dopattas (a piece of cloth to cover head and chest) as soon as they noticed my presence in their streets.

As I took a walk in and around the neighbourhood for the first time, I could not find a reason as to why this neighbourhood was considered by the police and outsiders as one with high crime rates. There were of course some issues with regards to road conditions, encroachments, and some litter on the streets, but this neighbourhood was not much different from the relatively peaceful neighbourhood in which I grew up. However, there was one unique characteristic in that a portion of this neighbourhood was inhabited exclusively by members of the Pathan community, most of whom had migrated to Lahore from the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) several decades ago. The Pathan area consisted of even narrower streets and an undistinguished entrance. During my stay in the neighbourhood, I did not see residents from the Punjabi[7] dominated part of the neighbourhood going into this area. See Figure 4.1 below (Google Maps 2020a).

---

[7] This part of the neighbourhood also had people from other ethnicities, including Mohajirs (migrants from India). Similarly, the Pathan area also had some Punjabi residents. However, I have chosen to call them Punjabi and Pathan areas based on their majority population.

Figure 3: In this figure, the Punjabi part of Begumpura is encircled, whereas the Pathan part is shown inside the rectangle.

A friendly market

Begumpura was a high crime neighbourhood according to the perceptions of local police officers and official data available with the local police station. In 2015, recorded crimes against persons in the police station were 78, the highest among all the 11 police stations in Civil Lines division, whereas crimes against property were third highest with 296 reported cases. However, residents' views on the prevalence of crime in their neighbourhood varied significantly. Many agreed that their neighbourhood had some crime problems, but they believed that these were not 'serious'. I found that their views about the seriousness of crime were largely influenced by whether they, or people close to them, had been victimised. Most of the interviewees, despite their views on crime level, thought that their neighbourhood was better than other neighbourhoods in the city. As Irfan, a local political leader, put it: "It is not like other neighbourhoods where boys go out together and come back with one of them dead."

I noticed that most neighbourhood residents were cynical about the outside world and frequently overestimated crime levels in other neighbourhoods. Many respondents would refer to incidents reported in mass media about other neighbourhoods and used them as a

baseline to evaluate the security situation in their own neighbourhood. They would often conclude that their neighbourhood was much safer.

Illicit drug use was the most cited crime in the neighbourhood. According to a local politician, every third or fourth young person in the area used cannabis. Although cannabis is called *Charas* in Urdu, users would refer to it as *pakka cigarette* (hard cigarette) or simply *pakka*. While most residents considered illegal drugs a menace for society, they had a fatalistic attitude towards rising consumption. They thought that drugs were rampant throughout the city and their use was now becoming normalised among the younger population. In their opinion, young people were attracted to drugs because of poverty and unemployment. Many young adults in the neighbourhood either did not have jobs or had jobs with very low pay. They struggled to make ends meet, get married, and support their families. In this state of despair and vulnerability, they fell prey to cheap drugs, such as cannabis. During my stay in the neighbourhood, I also observed that a lot of young people were unemployed, and they would spend their days, standing aimlessly in the streets, near a small shop or at a street corner. Some of the employed ones told me about their monthly salaries which were often less than the average utility bills of a single-family household.

A community elder thought that, although cannabis use had increased among the younger population, it was still better than the past 15 - 20 years when many people were addicted to heroin. Heroin use, according to some, still existed but had significantly reduced since the 1990s. A local politician backed this observation with a popularly held view that the supply of opium-poppy fields in Afghanistan had sharply declined after increased surveillance across Pak-Afghan border (in wake of the US war in Afghanistan). For Umar (the local Imam), the reason for this perceived decline was locally situated: "We were fortunate to have some stern officers posted here who openly laid culprits [heroin peddlers] on streets and thrashed them to admonish others."

On the contrary, a few senior police officers suggested that the supply continued unabated; it was just that the hard drugs market had shifted to more affluent neighbourhoods, especially in Cantonment areas (areas that come under the administrative control of the Armed forces), where users were willing to pay more and there was less enforcement.

Nevertheless, cannabis was freely available in the neighbourhood, and most interviewees believed that it was sold with approval of the local police. They were convinced that no one could sell drugs without connivance of the police and that police actions were only directed at users as the police would stop and search anyone for possession, even those sitting

outside their houses. However, the police would 'never' apprehend the sellers, although everyone in the neighbourhood knew where these drugs were to be found. Haris (a local opposition politician) said:

> Let us be fair, everybody smokes hard cigarettes [cannabis] at least in the company of friends. When they (police) find even a little bit in someone's pocket, they threaten him, take him to a corner and set him free after taking money. Of course, that person did an unlawful act, in that he bought some for his own use after a long day at work. But what about those who are selling it? The police never ask him where did he get that cannabis? They just take money and never ask him to take them [to the peddler].

Asked why the police or public did not act against the drug peddlers, residents clarified that it was not because of any powerful entities behind the sale of drugs in their neighbourhood. In fact, people selling cannabis were average residents of the area whose families were known to other residents. Most of them started using cannabis and later became peddlers. However, people in the area would not try to stop them from selling mainly because most of them did not sell openly to boys in their immediate neighbourhood. They would sell to outsiders, whereas local boys would get their cannabis from sellers in other neighbourhoods. A few residents thought that it was not their business to stop someone from earning bread for their family, even if their means were illegal. Yet others said that they would only try to advise a person who had started using drugs, but such a situation was unlikely since most new users would not use it openly. Parents and immediate neighbours mostly kept an eye on their children in this regard, but they believed that strategy was sometimes ineffective when drugs were so commonplace in the larger society. On the other hand, residents were unanimous in their opinion that the police would not stop drug peddlers simply because they profited from it. When asked to explain this further, Irshad (a local businessman acquainted with this market) provided a concise guideline as to how one could start selling drugs successfully:

> Here, selling drugs is very simple. You give them [the police] money [and start your business]. When they are under pressure [from higher ups], they ask you to hand over a few guys. They would raid your place where you have 8, 10 people already ready to get arrested. Your neighbours would be very pleased that the police have acted. However, those arrested would often be customers who know that they would be released in a matter of days. So, there is no need for any political clout or

influence. You can become influential by spending money. It is not necessary for you to be a Chief Minister to sell drugs; just buy the police station.

Effectively, the interviewee is arguing that the police actions are regulating the market. Many other interviewees also implied that the local police are 'managers' of the drug market, and their intent in targeting drug peddlers is to improve their public image and to maintain their performance records for evaluation by senior police officers. Such intentions are understandable because, unlike the United States (Cooper 2015) and the United Kingdom (Jones and Newburn 2006; Boldt 2010), there was never a drug war rhetoric in Pakistan. The priority which this issue received from formal institutions in the 1980s and 1990s was largely replaced by terrorism in the aftermath of the US war in Afghanistan. However, the way the residents of Begumpura perceived the police's actions, it seemed that the police were struggling to perform their 'reassurance' function (Innes et al. 2004).

The monuments from the Mughal Era in the neighbourhood were safer sites for drug use. The graveyard next to a tomb was particularly infamous for this purpose. On my visit there, I found some used syringes which made me think that heroin use was not as uncommon as thought by the interviewees. An unemployed young person told me that young cannabis users went to these places because they were vacant, and nobody would come there in the night. These were also the places where users became friends and perhaps collaborated for other ventures. Another haven was the convent of a faith healer where visitors could smoke cannabis without fear of consequences. Shrines and convents in Pakistan have traditionally been tolerant of drug users as cannabis was considered a tool for ecstatic enlightenment. In addition, the police rarely raid religious venues in Pakistan as it often becomes difficult for the police to contain the resultant fallout in this conservative religious society. Shah G (a faith healer) candidly told me about his method of procuring drugs: "When 'malangs' [mystics] visit us and we cannot find [cannabis] for them, we ask the police to arrange some material for them. Often, they hesitate at first but later agree to get it from somewhere … The police traditionally carry cannabis, knives, and pistols to make false cases against people they want to arrest."

The first part of this statement was 'allegedly' the interviewee's personal experience. I am not sure if this claim was true, as no other interviewee implicated the police this directly, citing their own experiences. Nonetheless, this perception about the police was not uncommon in the neighbourhood. "They put something on you if they want to arrest you," Ashfaq, a rickshaw driver, said. This view appears to be largely derived from the public

discourse about the police. People living in the rest of the city can often be heard talking about incidents where someone was falsely implicated by the police. So, while the Begumpura police may or may not be engaging in such practices, the perception is likely to remain the same.

Finally, I asked residents how they thought the spread of drugs in their neighbourhood could be reduced. The expected response of tackling corruption in the police or arresting drug peddlers came only from a few people. Residents opposed the police practice of 'intimidating' drug users in their neighbourhood and considered it a tactic to extort money from them. Even the elected union council representative (who I thought showed a social desirability bias during the interview) admitted that he used his influence several times to get 'kids' (drug users) freed from police custody. Most residents were convinced that local police responses were counterproductive and could not yield desired outcomes. In their view, the government needed to stop drugs at their source and act against drug smugglers. They considered it a futile exercise to try to disband any peddler-police nexus in neighbourhoods when tonnes of drugs were smuggled and distributed in the city with impunity. A local police officer corroborated this viewpoint and said that it was not the mandate of the police to stop drug smuggling from Afghanistan. Instead, it was the responsibility of the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) who failed to block bulk supplies of cannabis and heroin entering the metropolises. In these circumstances, the police "could only do so much" given their limited resources.

Reign of Robbers

For some people, talking about drugs was simply a waste of everyone's time. They wanted to discuss the 'real' crime of mugging. My original selection of this neighbourhood was, in part, driven by reports that Begumpura had witnessed a consistent rise in incidents of mugging. As expected, most residents acknowledged that 'street crime' (by which they exclusively meant mugging) was a persistent problem in the neighbourhood, but how much they were concerned about it was a product of their opinion about its incidence in other parts of the city and their experiences of victimisation. In the words of Irfan, "One or two incidents every now and then is not a big issue. God forbid, we don't have murders or crimes like that." He seemed unaware that just two streets away from his office, people were considering leaving the neighbourhood due to this issue. On the other hand, most Pathan residents did not talk much about muggings, as the area inhabited by Pathans did not have this issue. Thus, perceptions of mugging in the neighbourhood were diverse, unlike perceptions of drug use which were more uniform.

The spatial distribution of mugging in the neighbourhood was such that the Punjabi dominated part was affected almost exclusively; moreover, within this area, a large proportion of the muggings were reported from only two streets. According to the Pathan residents, the blanket immunity of their area from mugging was due to their reputation as a fearless community. A young Pathan leader boasted of his peers' resolve not to let trespassers go back 'on their feet'. While these assertions may not be unfounded, probably the physical structure of their part of the neighbourhood also had a protective effect. The entrance was through a wide street flanked by shops, with people sitting around throughout the day. This street led to several narrow residential streets on both sides in which even two motorbikes could not pass simultaneously. To get to the main road through this area was not possible as university's wall almost blocked the other side. The entrance was also the main exit route. There was a way at the back of this settlement to get to the GT road, but one must pass through a lot of narrow streets. Thus, it was not a route for passers-by; consequently, any outsider was likely to be noticed. The funnel shaped structure made it difficult for muggers to exit even if they managed to pass through the main entrance undetected. On the other hand, streets in the other part of the neighbourhood were much wider with many exit routes on either side of the area. The pattern of mugging was simple: those streets which had easier exit routes to main roads were the most affected.

Based on information from the police and residents, I visited two streets which had witnessed the most mugging incidents of late. Residents of these streets were so eager to share their problems that around a dozen of them gathered in the drawing room of a resident to talk to me. Although some of them were disappointed that I could not be of any immediate help, they candidly expressed their views about the crime situation in the neighbourhood. It appeared that people were keen to do something about this menace, but they had not found any forum in which to raise their voice. Usman, who was also an elected councillor, explained the situation in the following words:

> In the last two or three years, dacoity [robbery] has become routine here. Five, six or ten muggings at a time (in a month) are just normal. I was myself victimised…. You know how most people are on the streets after Asar (evening). [Recently] On this road and outside my house, two men were snatching mobile phones [from people] while everybody was watching. They had a pistol on them. Traffic coming from behind stopped there. A man driving a car honked as he could not see what was going on ahead. The muggers went to him in a rage and robbed him and his

wife of all their belongings, including some gold jewellery. Nobody was coming forward to intervene; obviously, when you have a loaded pistol, no one does. Where were the police? We don't know. Whenever there is an incident here, the police are always absent. I do not know what that implies.

According to the residents, most incidents in these streets had occurred in the evening or at night. Boys, as young as 15, would come on motorbikes and stop people at gunpoint. Frequently, they were not in a hurry and would patiently collect mobile phones and wallets from victims before speeding away. Their motorbikes were either without number plates or had fake numbers. Some of them wore helmets or covered their faces with a piece of cloth, but others did not even bother to do that. Most residents thought that the culprits came from other neighbourhoods whereas, according to some, those who covered their faces could be from the neighbourhood, especially from the Pathan inhabited part. Whoever they were, they were usually calm in their act, taking as much time as they required. Women and children would watch muggings from balconies of their houses. Almost every house in those streets had at least one person who was mugged. With some incidents occurring in broad daylight, people were afraid to pass through these streets after sunset. Residents believed that these streets were more vulnerable for three main reasons. Firstly, these streets were connected to a main road on one side with some large localities on the other side. As a result, most people going to these localities had to pass through these streets which meant that these passers-by were victimised more than the residents. Secondly, shops would close early, so that the streets were virtually empty by evening. Thirdly, streets were wider, allowing cars to pass through. People driving cars were a lucrative target for muggers as they were likely to have more cash and expensive mobile phones.

As to what they had done to improve the situation, residents told me that they had held a few meetings with police officials who asked them to install streetlights as their streets were too dark at night. According to the residents, they managed to get some funds from the local union council, and streetlights were installed. In addition, they convinced the management of two schools on the streets to install CCTV cameras. While the cost-benefit analyses of CCTV cameras are still being discussed in the West (Painter and Farrington 1999; Lawson et al. 2018), a meta-analysis of 44 evaluations showed that this crime prevention measure caused a significant decrease in crime (Welsh and Farrington 2009). Several studies on street lighting systems have also found crime reduction effects (Pease 1999; Farrington and Welsh 2002). Furthermore, these measures were even more effective

when applied in crime hotspots (Lawson et al. 2018). Consistent with these studies, mugging stopped for about a month in those high crime streets of Begumpura, but it was disappointing for residents that a few muggings had taken place again recently. It seemed that perpetrators had circumvented the preventative measures as the recent incidents took place just outside the range of CCTV cameras. In addition, there were power cuts in the neighbourhood for several hours a day which provided many opportunities for muggers if they were wary of lights. Some residents thought that there was a need for more cameras in these streets while others were less optimistic. Mani, a political worker living in the neighbourhood, said: "There have been several mugging incidents in this neighbourhood where bare faced muggers looted people in front of CCTVs. Only a mad person would look in the CCTV and commit these acts. But they are not mad; they are no ordinary guys. They have someone's back. I do not say the whole department [police] is like that, but they surely have black sheep amongst their ranks."

While residents in the most vulnerable streets had installed streetlights recently, other streets in the neighbourhood had had them for some time; however, residents were sceptical about their effectiveness in curbing mugging. Firstly, they thought that streetlights could not make any difference when perpetrators had no hesitation in mugging people in broad daylight. Secondly, streetlights were broken several times in some streets. The blame was on a few people in the neighbourhood, thought to be abettors in crime, who broke these lights by hurling stones at them. However, no one was caught in the act. The reasons for breaking streetlights could also be unrelated to crime. According to two interviewees, boys from the neighbourhood did not like streetlights and would break them whenever they got a chance for two reasons. The foremost reason was that neighbourhood girls would return from tuition centres in the evening and this was the only chance for their boyfriends to meet them for a few minutes at street corners. To avoid getting caught by neighbours, they would break the bulbs. A second suspected group were drug users who would not bother to go to their 'designated places' but smoked cannabis on streets at night.

An alternative informal control strategy employed by residents of the most vulnerable streets was to open an office there. The office belonged to an elected councillor and was meant for political purposes, but the choice of location was to ensure the presence of 'capable guardians' (Cohen and Felson 1979; Hollis et al. 2013). Residents thought that having an office open late into the night would encourage people to frequent their street which would otherwise become empty after sunset. However, the establishment of an

office brought its own set of problems. Those police constables who were deputed to patrol the area in the aftermath of muggings started spending their time sitting in the office instead of doing their job. The residents still supported them by offering them tea and drinks so that they would spend more time patrolling their area. However, this arrangement abruptly ended when the policemen accused residents of stealing some papers which were hanging on their motorbikes. This incident resulted in a breakdown of relations between residents and the police.

Understandably, residents of these streets were not satisfied with the performance of the police. The primary policing response to muggings was to establish blockades on locations which were used by perpetrators as entry or exit routes. I was also stopped at a blockade when leaving the neighbourhood one night. The police official asked me to show my identity card and, before I could take it out of my pocket, he asked me to leave. While my encounter with the police was insignificant, several residents shared their unpleasant experiences during snap checks at blockades. There was a unanimous view that the purpose of these blockades was to make money by stopping ordinary residents for trivial infractions. A shopkeeper from whom police officials allegedly took free cigarettes everyday told me that police officials paid their higher ups for getting deputed to blockades. In addition, residents' efforts to protect themselves from crimes were also sabotaged by the police. A friend of Usman, who was present during the interview, told me: "When we go out to buy some groceries, etc., we leave our vehicle documents at home. We do this so that, if we are robbed of our motorbike, we would at least not lose our documents. But when the police stop us, they ask money for not showing them the documents or threaten to confiscate our bike." This problem was perhaps the most manifest illustration of how an informal strategy to mitigate victimisation was under stress due to the police's actions.

According to Usman and his friends, the police did this to them despite knowing that they were residents of the area and not outsiders. "Why would they leave us after taking Rs.100 or 200 if they were convinced that we were suspected offenders?" Mansoor, a young private employee, questioned. Similarly, a few residents claimed that police officials searched them at the blockades not for weapons but to find cannabis. They would search wallets thoroughly to see whether cannabis was hidden there, or they would try to smell if residents were drunk. The stop and search practices of the local police in Begumpura appeared similar to how such powers are used against blacks in the UK (Bowling and Phillips 2007). The only difference I could note was that, unlike the UK, the local police

viewed the entire community with suspicion regardless of their ethnicity. Overall, residents considered police blockades as more of a nuisance for residents than it would be for criminals. However, they were still in favour of blockades in hope that these would deter muggers from entering their neighbourhood.

My questions on how the police followed up on specific incidents often resulted in laughter or counter questions about whether I was born and raised in Lahore. "Brother, you can't be this naïve," was a typical response. During my stay in the neighbourhood, I did not meet a person or anyone they knew who had their mugged or stolen items recovered by the police. Instead, I was told of at least two incidents where the residents caught offenders themselves. Farooq was one of the persons who apprehended two teenagers. He narrated the incident:

> I and some other residents had our mobile phones stolen at a political moot. An hour later, we saw two boys whom we had caught earlier for stealing wires from the electric transformer. We seized them and brought them to our street. When we beat them, they confessed to stealing our phones and informed us about their accomplices. We went with them to a distant area, caught the other two culprits, and recovered our mobile phones. All this while, we did not inform the police. We took these guys to their parents who [were so distraught with their habits that they] asked us to kill them. One of the boys, who was merely 10 years old, was so skilled in pickpocketing that he took a coin out of water in front of us without creating any ripples. In the end, we handed them over to the police who could have apprehended the whole gang and the people who trained them and bought these phones from them. However, I believe that the police set them free because no case was registered against them. Instead, the police rebuked us for thrashing them. Now, you tell me: what should we do to the person stealing our phones; shall we hug them?

The other incident was narrated by Haris whose men caught an armed robber. He did not divulge the exact circumstances in which the offender was caught but shared some important information about alleged involvement of the police in crimes:

> We removed the cloth from his face; he was one of the boys from a nearby neighbourhood who used to come here since childhood. We called the police, but, instead of arresting him, they requested us to forgive him. He was actually their own man. We refused to accept any apology as he did not only attempt robbery,

but he did that with a fire weapon. The police registered a weak case against him. After three months, I saw him sitting at my street's corner. I warned him never to come here again.

Although very few people were forthcoming on this issue, the perception of police-criminal nexus had widespread support and was not limited to the foregoing incident. A community notable claimed that some police officers actively encouraged offenders to commit bigger robberies so they could have their share. According to him, the police would torture arrested offenders first and then convince them to work for them. Then, the police would intentionally leave loopholes in the investigation so that offenders would be acquitted from the courts. Moreover, the police would charge those who did not agree to cooperate, even for those robberies in the area which they had not committed. A more specific allegation came from a local union council member who told me that a resident who was mugged of his mobile phone received a call from the police station a week later to have it back for Rs. 5000. The member tried to convince the boy to reveal the name of the police officer who called him, but the resident declined to involve himself in matters with the police.

Given these circumstances, it was unsurprising that only a small proportion of the people in the neighbourhood reported crimes to the police. A youth organisation representative told me that the standard procedure in the case of any crime incident is to call Police Emergency Service at 15 (like 999 in the UK). However, he witnessed several incidents where the police admonished residents for calling 15 and asked them to call the police station directly. This was because the calls at 15 were logged on a centralised system, and the police had to report the follow up actions to their superordinate. In addition, residents reported that the police used every tactic to avoid registering what is called a First Information Report (FIR). They would ask victims to come to the police station another day for one reason or the other. After visiting the police station several times, victims usually gave up. An NGO worker in the neighbourhood affirmed these assertions and said that ordinary people were too intimidated to face the police. The police officials I interviewed denied these allegations but accepted that lower levels of FIRs from a police station were evaluated positively by their higher ups.

Another world

Almost all the incidents and responses referred to in the foregoing sections came from the Punjabi area of the neighbourhood. My first impression of the Pathan community in this area was that they were the most 'naturalised' Pathans that I had seen in Lahore. Their

young ones spoke Punjabi (the local language) fluently although their ancestral language was Pashto. This was uncommon as most Pathans in the city would speak Urdu (the national language) but not Punjabi. Some of them also chewed Paan (betel leaf with tobacco) and Gutka (a mixture of areca nut, tobacco, and slake lime), which was unusual for Pathans. They seemed to be well integrated with Lahori culture, but they were still a distinct cohort within the neighbourhood.

Not that the Punjabi part of the neighbourhood had planned housing by any stretch of the imagination, but the Pathan locality was called 'katchi abadi' (shanty town housing). The area was regularised in the 1980s by the government, but many current residents did not have their name in the survey list then prepared by the government for the awarding of property rights. According to Pathans, they had settled in this area before or around the creation of Pakistan in 1947. However, other residents thought that it was much later. This discrepancy was significant as the date of their settlement could be an important factor in determining their locus standi. I did not see Punjabis going into the Pathan part of the neighbourhood perhaps because the Pathan area was situated in the corner, and Punjabis had no specific reason for going there. There was no hostility to be seen, but it did not take me long to realise that two distinct communities resided in this neighbourhood.

The housing structures, lifestyles, professions, and crime levels differed significantly between the Pathan and Punjabi areas, to the extent that I could be reasonably questioned for considering them as one neighbourhood. In my effort to find a high crime neighbourhood, official records pointed me to the Punjabi dominated part of Begumpura and rightly so because the Pathan neighbourhood was relatively peaceful in terms of crimes recorded by the police. However, once I visited the area, I realised that the Pathan area could not be viewed as separate from the other part for several reasons. Firstly, the Pathan area only consisted of a bazaar, narrow streets, dense and small houses. Other amenities such as shops, playgrounds, mosques, and parks were shared by them with the other part of the neighbourhood. Secondly, both parts had the same union council and hence the same elected leaders. Thirdly, despite their differences, a wider sense of belonging prevailed between the two parts, with respect to other neighbourhoods. In my view, the shrine of Hazrat Ishaan, which was situated conveniently between and was revered by both communities, contributed to this shared sense of belonging. Finally, and perhaps more importantly for my purpose, the crime landscape of the Punjabi part of the neighbourhood was intricately linked with what went on in the Pathan area.

At first, most Pathan respondents were not comfortable with my questions regarding crime in the neighbourhood. They were concerned whether I had been sent there by other residents of the neighbourhood to inquire whether they were the perpetrators of crime. I assured them that this was not the case and I was asking similar questions from people throughout the neighbourhood. But their concern was not baseless; while most residents in the Punjabi part blamed outsiders for their woes, some interviewees did tell me that young boys from Pathan areas were involved in many incidents of mugging and drug trade. I did not discuss these allegations directly with Pathan interviewees as they already seemed sensitive about these issues. Instead, I began by asking them about crimes that affected them.

All the respondents in the Pathan side of the neighbourhood did not consider mugging a problem in their streets although they realised that such problems persisted in the neighbourhood. They were very confident that such issues would never arise in their part of the neighbourhood, and, if they did, their community had the 'unity' required to address them. But as with the Punjabi residents, they were convinced that the police were involved in muggings. Wahab, a local Pathan leader, laughingly said: "Basically, policemen rob people in plain clothes. They know Pathans are mad people and that we will shoot them. They will never take that risk."

During my interaction with Pathans, I was informed of just one incident in which a bike was snatched from their streets. Some Pathans were furious over the incident and told the head police officer that they would gun down any intruder coming into their area. According to them, no incident occurred thereafter. I asked them why they thought that warning the police made the muggers avoid their area. Some of them said that this was because muggers have their informers in the police department. Others thought that it was because the police had started to keep vigilance on who was entering their area.

With respect to drugs, the attitude of the residents of Katchi Abadi was casual, and they showed significantly less concern than their Punjabi counterparts. Only two interviewees thought that drug addiction was a serious problem in their locality and that society ought to do something about it before it got out of control. However, a majority thought that drug use was an ordinary issue which was blown out of proportion by the police. My interaction with younger persons from the area also revealed that cannabis use had more social acceptance among Pathans than among Punjabis. It was probably because most of them had their roots in KPK where prevalence of cannabis use was almost 11%, the highest

in Pakistan (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013). In the words of Emaan, a female social worker in the area, "Their (Pathan's) kids start using drugs before they learn to walk." Despite these explanations, it was interesting that many Pathan interviewees downplayed an issue which was reported as a serious concern by many people living just on the next street. My search for plausible reasons led me to an array of problems faced by the Pathan community in the neighbourhood.

Established and Outsiders

There was confusion about the circumstances in which Katchi Abadi of Pathans was built in Begumpura, but, surely, they were one of the later entrants. That they were residing in the neighbourhood before partition of the subcontinent was a statement most Pathan interviewees made early in their interviews. There was an obvious sense of insecurity among Pathans regarding their status as residents in the neighbourhood. Shah G (the faith healer) had a very close association with Pathans. He explained their background:

> Most people here have come from Mansehra [a city in KPK province] and Bajaur
> Agency [a tribal area along Pak-Afghan border]. They were workers in the railways
> during the British Era. I came to this neighbourhood in 1974 and I found them very
> hardworking and docile. They would live even in extreme poverty without
> complaining about their circumstances or asking help from anyone. But these
> people came from a tribal lifestyle and they remained loyal to their tribes. So, when
> they settled, they brought their relatives here and their population grew in the
> area.

The problem for many Pathans was that not all of them were long-time residents of the area. While some families settled several decades ago, they kept accommodating their relatives. Since the area was a Katchi Abadi as opposed to planned housing, building regulations were not stringent and newly arrived Pathans kept settling as best they could. At first, the government overlooked this migration of people from KPK province to Lahore to seek work opportunities because they were a cheap labour force known for doing work which involved intense physical labour. However, after 2005, the situation changed dramatically with a spike in terrorist incidents. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal, terrorist violence in Pakistan claimed 1,471 and 3,598 lives in 2006 and 2007 respectively, as compared to 648 casualties in 2005 (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2019). From 2000 to June 23, 2019, a total of 63,898 people have been killed as a result of terrorist violence, including 22,657 civilians (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2019). Most of the terrorists were

identified as coming from Afghanistan, KPK, or FATA. This development made law enforcement authorities concerned about people coming from these areas to large cities. With the passage of time, the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks increased and so did police surveillance on the movement of people from north-western Pakistan to Lahore. The Pathan community in Begumpura was affected by this scenario. The police frequently raided their houses and asked them for their identity cards and records of any tenants living with them. Haider, a Pathan merchant, who traded in used clothing, said:

> The police raid our houses late in the night every other week. One day, they came at 2am and I asked the constable, 'Am I a robber that you have come to my home, knocking at my door so loudly? If you want to come, come in the evening. I go to work at 4am. There is no point in coming so late. I am not your slave.' Then I took that constable to the Station House Officer and told him, 'This is the last time I am sparing your man. Next time, I will throw bricks on his head if he comes this late to my house.'

Some Pathans were angry that, despite living in the neighbourhood for several years, they were not treated as equal citizens. They were disappointed that whenever anything adverse happened in the neighbourhood, they were considered 'usual suspects'. In addition, they faced discrimination from other government departments. Many Pathan interviewees raised the issue of provision of natural gas. They claimed that the pipes installed by the government for natural gas were too old and narrow to cater to the demands of their community. Even after several requests, their pipelines had not been upgraded despite a significant increase in population. As a result, demand had exceeded supply, and they had to use gas cylinders to cook, especially in winter. They also had problems with garbage and litter lying on the streets. The local union council members did not listen to their complaints; sweepers came only occasionally to clear the waste. The Pathan residents admitted that other residents also faced similar problems but stressed that issues related to the Pathan areas were not heeded.

The inefficiency of the local administration as mentioned by the Pathan interviewees was not an extraordinary phenomenon on its own; similar problems could be found in most older neighbourhoods of Lahore. Their emphasis on discrimination against them, however, was substantiated by a unique issue. Pathan residents complained that relevant authorities made it very difficult for them to get their national identity cards (NICs). Without a NIC, it is almost impossible to do anything involving the government, such as employment, college

admission, or obtaining a driving license. The problem was summed up by Chaacha Jee, a railways employee, in the following words:

> When our children go to get identity cards, they ask hundreds of questions. Tell me why? Have we come from India? We are living here before Pakistan was even created. My child went three times [to get his card]. They said to him that he looked like an Afghani. What if someone looks like an Indian; would they treat him as an Indian (as an enemy or spy)? My child even took my government service documents with him to prove to them that we were Pakistanis. In the end, I had to go and threaten them with legal action to get the job done.

Most Pathan interviewees also denied that there were any (Islamic) extremist elements in their neighbourhood, supposedly for which the police visit their area often. However, one of the Pathan interviewees admitted that there had been some elements sympathetic to the cause of Jihad during the Soviet War in Afghanistan, but those were, according to him, not only Pathans but Punjabis as well. He suspected that the government had lists of those men, and that could be the reason for the enhanced surveillance of this area. During my stay, I was told by a Punjabi resident that an arrest had been made on terrorism charges from this neighbourhood recently. On being asked about it, three Pathan interviewees admitted that security agencies had apprehended a local boy from the neighbourhood who was still in prison. Shehroz, a Pathan shopkeeper, said:

> Yes, intelligence agencies arrested a boy from this bazaar, right there in front of us. After 44 days, we saw a news report about him on television, showing that CID Karachi arrested a high-profile terrorist who had come from Waziristan to carry out an explosion. Everybody in our neighbourhood knows that the news was false, and the boy was arrested from here (not Karachi). This is how they portray us.

The stereotyping of Pathans in the wake of terrorist violence in Pakistan warrants a separate study. In some ways, it is similar to the way drugs are intertwined with race/ethnicity in the United States (Cooper 2015). The media consumption has further bolstered this perception in similar ways as news programs on television disproportionately represent African Americans as criminals in the West (Dixon and Linz 2000; Sonnett et al. 2015). There is enough evidence on the effects on such stereotyping on offending and recidivism (Cohen et al. 1982; Johnston and Ward 1996; Dako-Gyeke and Baffour 2016; Hayes et al. 2018). However, there is a dearth of studies which examine the ways in which the labelling of an entire ethnicity as suspected terrorists impact their perception about the

state, citizenship, and social order. In Pakistan, a popular Pathan ethno-nationalist political movement has emerged recently (after I conducted the field work), partially as a consequence of highhandedness of state institutions towards the Pathan ethnicity. In this study, I found that mistrust of state institutions and threats from the formal control systems could significantly affect the trajectory of informal social control.

Tolerance of deviance

Once I had this background information, it was easier to make sense of how informal control functioned in the Pathan area. My conversations with some Pathan residents revealed that some of their young ones were either users or sellers of cannabis. One young man, aged around 20, with whom I had built a rapport told me that he could get even a 'munn' (40kg) of cannabis delivered on a phone call. Although I thought that he was exaggerating, it was obvious to me that some people possessed wholesale quantities of cannabis in the area. As mentioned earlier, most interviewees from Pathan community apparently was not perturbed by cannabis use and many Pathan residents did not see any need to respond to this issue. This attitude remained consistent with other crimes as well, provided those crimes did not disturb the social order of their community or area. Chaacha Jee described the arrest of two muggers from his neighbourhood to substantiate this assertion: "Listen brother! They arrested two boys from here. They were merely 17, 18 years old. Very innocent kids. Children sometimes do these types of things. You know better how easy it is to get a firearm. Those kids were just distracted. Otherwise, there is no such issue here."

To sum up, the Pathan community in the neighbourhood felt deprived and alienated, which led to 'retreatism' (Merton 1938) to some degree. They were looked at with suspicion by the police and other government authorities. Their identity, resident status, and intentions were under scrutiny to the extent that their existence in the neighbourhood was called into question. Most of them were involved in menial occupations, and their houses were poorly built as compared with the rest of the neighbourhood. In addition, the difficulty they faced in getting identity cards meant that it was difficult for their young people to gain employment, not to mention the stereotyping they endured. Some similar concerns were raised by Goffman (2014) in Philadelphia where wanted men were susceptible to committing crimes because their wanted status restricted their ability to find legitimate employment. These circumstances were consequential to the dynamics of social control in the neighbourhood. Pathans were protective of their territory and did not want to provide the police with reasons to extend their influence. The compulsion to protect themselves

against the state institutions prevailed over regulating the behaviour of their members. This predicament created a scenario where deviance flourished with little resistance.

What follows is the story of a Pathan whom I met while having tea at a local tea stall. It was a sunny afternoon and the person I wanted to interview had not turned up. I was making casual conversations with the people sitting with me when two men brought a 'boy' to my table and asked me to interview him. I was reluctant at first, but then everybody insisted, saying that it would be 'fun'. The 'boy' also seemed eager to talk to me. I offered him a cup of tea which he gleefully accepted. He did not know how old he was, but I thought that he must be somewhere between 18 and 25 years. People there started telling me about him, and he affirmed all of what was said. He also added some explanations/justifications of what was attributed to him. Below is a summary of what transpired about him:

Jaadu lost his parents when he was young, and he lived in his parents' house with his elder brother. Somebody told him that Dubai was the place to go as there was a lot of money there. He learnt that a passport is required to travel to Dubai. Thus, he went to the passport office where he was told that first he needed an identity card. The fee to get an identity card was Rs.500. He did not have the money, so he discussed this problem with his friend who lived outside the neighbourhood. The friend gave Jaadu advice on how to get the money. A few days later, his brother's wife asked Jaadu to take her 3 year old daughter to the market as she was crying at home. Acting upon his friend's advice, he kidnapped his niece and sold her for Rs.500 ($5) to a child trafficker disguised as a beggar. In the evening, he returned home crying that he lost his niece in the marketplace. Not believing his story, his brother handed him over to the police. When the police showed him their 'drawing room' (torture cell), Jaadu immediately confessed to the crime and told them where he had met the beggar. The police raided the place and recovered his niece along with some other children. Later, the gang of child traffickers was apprehended.

Just before the union council elections, a candidate offered to help residents get their identity cards if they voted for them. Jaadu was glad to know this and went with a candidate to the registration office. A girl at the registration counter told him that she could not register his details without a birth certificate. He got angry at her, and, after a heated exchange of words, he jumped onto her counter and sexually assaulted her. The candidate accompanying him intervened and took him away. Jaadu justified his act by alleging that the girl said to him, "You Pathans lack honour" and then he showed her what lacking honour meant.

During the elections, Jaadu asked for Rs.1000 from 'Politician A' who refused to pay. To take revenge, Jaadu tore a poster of 'Politician B' which was on display near the residence of Politician A. Then, he went to Politician B and blamed the incident on Politician A. He also told Politician B that his counterpart had also abused him. Enraged to hear this, Politician B gathered his men to attack the office of Politician A with firearms. A violent feud was imminent between the two groups, but, fortunately, somebody had witnessed Jaadu's act, and the conspiracy was foiled.

After this event, Jaadu often came to me during my fieldwork to ask for money for cigarettes. I asked him how he managed to survive without a job as I had known by then that his brother did not support him anymore. He told me that he would buy mobile SIM cards in his name and sold them to people for a profit. As one person could only get five SIM cards against their identity card, he would get those SIM cards cancelled after a few weeks to get new ones which he sold again. The backbone of his business was that terrorists, kidnappers, bookies, and drug peddlers used unregistered SIM cards to communicate. To deter them, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority took stringent measures to ensure each SIM was registered. As it became difficult to procure unregistered SIM cards, Jaadu provided SIM cards to his 'clients' for a few hundred rupees. Of course, no person would need such SIM cards for legitimate purposes.

Notwithstanding the seriousness of some of Jaadu's acts, what surprised me was the response of the community towards him. The people who were telling his story did not condemn his actions or realised the imminent risk his actions posed. Instead, I often saw him wandering with community notables and local leaders. The reluctance of these people to censure Jaadu's actions was a glimpse. I noticed that most other deviants enjoyed similar immunity, and their streets provided a safe haven for them and their activities. I could not conclude whether this immunity was a consequence of their being labelled collectively as 'folk devils' or vice versa, but I observed a community whose foremost priority was to guard their boundaries and reputation. They were not willing to introspect and to take actions against their own members as doing so could cause discontent within their ranks. On the other hand, seeking help from the police was out of the question as it would reinforce stereotypes against them. Therefore, their self-identification and their labelling as a distinct group, along with their need to remain united in wake of external threats, had made them ignore deviance among their members. This finding is very similar to Goffman's (1963) construct of in-group deviants which he used to describe the tendency in small communities to protect their deviants from outside threats. However, the freedom Pathan

residents accorded to their members was limited to those behaviours which affected other parts of the neighbourhood or wider society. It did not include conflicts among themselves where they had a functional body of elders to resolve disputes.

A fortress

The partial disregard of deviance by some members of the Pathan community had also made them formidable against outside perpetrators. Those individuals whose behaviours they overlooked would also return the favour by keeping a watchful eye on outsiders. Even a person like Jaadu would hurl abuses at police officers patrolling their area although Jaadu told me that others often instigated him to do so. The central character responsible for ensuring the safety of the neighbourhood and strive for its rights was Aslam. When I moved from the Punjabi part of the neighbourhood to the Pathan area, I was advised by my gatekeeper to meet Aslam before starting off with anything. A tall man in his early 30s, Aslam was at first suspicious of my objectives to conduct interviews. I was fortunate that Aslam belonged to a political party some of whose leaders I knew personally. He made me call them, and, once they assured him of my identity, he remained cooperative throughout.

Aslam had recently run for the union council elections which he lost by a narrow margin. According to him, almost all Pathans voted for him whereas most Punjabis voted for his opponent; moreover, the Christian votes in the area, who were allegedly 'bought' by the other candidate, made all the difference. On why Pathans selected him to represent them, he had a short reply, "Because I am a '*lofenter*' [an informal term for a hooligan]." I could see his election posters still hanging on the streets throughout the neighbourhood. He told me that nobody dared to pull them off. At first, I thought he was bragging, but when he took me on a tour of his area, I could observe that he wielded considerable influence. Most people came to shake hands with him and offered us seats and drinks. He helped me arrange most interviews; in my view, most Pathans would have not given their consent for an interview had he not persuaded them.

Aslam had a college degree, but I did not see him going to work. He roamed around the neighbourhood or sat at shops throughout the day. He told me that his main job was to help local people get things done with the government departments. He would help other Pathan residents get their identity cards or coordinate with other government departments for issues, such as street lighting, sanitation, and gas connections. I could not figure out how he earned his living, but he told me that he was working for a senior leader of his political party. He would go to political rallies and demonstrations with dozens of his men,

and he was paid for doing so. He occasionally boasted about his 25-30 men strong 'motorbike gang' and how they protected senior leaders from opponents in political clashes. He often referred to police officers with disdain and narrated a few incidents where he forced them out of his area. He would also go to 'settle' matters with the police whenever any of his fellow residents were caught by the police.

During my stay with him, I met other members of his motorbike gang. Many of them were proficient at riding bikes on one wheel and speeding through narrow streets with precision. I could not help but think that these were precisely the skills an evasive mugger needed to have. Aslam told me that all these boys could gather at a half hour notice whenever there was any problem. In my conversation with these boys, they often talked about how cowardly the other residents (Punjabis) were and that Pathans were known for their valour and for safeguarding their territory. Some of the younger ones tried to boast about fights that they had during elections or otherwise with other groups. I could observe that these boys liked to assert their authority in the area, and even if some of them were not involved in any criminal activity, they were certainly disposed towards such acts.

Conclusion

Distinction between the Pathan and Punjabi areas was one of the most salient features of Begumpura. Interviewees from both areas talked about their mutual respect and brotherhood. However, my detailed casual conversations with them revealed that Punjabis and Pathans did not think highly of each other. Generally, Pathans were considered unrestrained people, best avoided. Some Punjabis thought that drug use was a part of Pathan culture and that Pathans were partly responsible for its spread into the rest of the neighbourhood. A woman social worker from the Punjabi area also complained that Pathan boys harassed Punjabi women when they went out while Pathan women were rarely seen outside their houses. On the other hand, Pathans felt proud of their tradition of keeping women in check. Between the lines, they criticised Punjabis for being 'naive' about this issue. Inter-communal marriages were rare, and, in some cases where couples married of their own will, conflicts resulted. Apparently, there was a lack of cultural exchange between the two communities which was exacerbated by substantial differences in their socioeconomic statuses.

In terms of victimisation, there was remarkable difference between the Pathan and Punjabi dominated areas. Streets where Punjabis resided were often a target for muggings and theft. While most interviewees blamed outsiders for these crimes, some Punjabis also

suspected Pathans. Due to sociocultural differences between the two communities, no one was able to enforce uniform social control in the neighbourhood. In addition, the priorities of the two communities were significantly different. While Punjabis just wanted to get rid of muggings and other petty crimes, Pathans were more concerned about their legitimacy and reputation. As a result, Pathans were not particularly keen to act against those members of their community who might be causing problems to Punjabi residents of the neighbourhood. The recent political battle between the two communities was bitter where political preferences subdued superficial exchange of pleasantries between them. The voting pattern represented a clear divide in the neighbourhood, and the election process had left some acrimony between Pathans and Punjabis. Had Pathans won the elections, they could have officially negotiated with the local administration on issues of concern. However, as the situation stood, they were averse to any foreign intervention in their matters even those which could have impact across the neighbourhood.

In the entire neighbourhood, people enjoyed close association with their neighbours. In case of death, neighbours would take responsibility for the funeral proceedings and for food for the bereaved family and other people in attendance. Most residents said that people got together to resolve issues of mutual concern and tried to help each other in difficult circumstances. However, they felt preoccupied with their struggle to make a living and decried the lack of employment opportunities, inflation, and electricity shortfalls. In these circumstances, their close interaction with each other could not translate into robust institutional arrangements which could have helped them engage meaningfully. Local organisations, if any, were dominated by influential people who used these organisations for power politics. Residents felt that their efforts at securing their neighbourhood from crime would not be effective unless supported by government institutions.

The residents' perceptions of police were negative. However, the police officers appeared satisfied with their performance, in part, because they evaluated their performance based on their superiors' assessment of them rather than on residents' perception about which they presumably had little idea since they didn't ask and there were no serious surveys or official complaints. Streets with frequent incidents of victimisation wanted the police to act against muggers whereas the police spent more resources on arresting drug users/peddlers and raiding gambling dens. On the other hand, most Pathans did not want the police to do anything except to leave them alone. There was a consensus among residents that most crimes were directly or indirectly sanctioned by the police. Most residents did not report crimes to the police; as a result, official crime records were significantly flawed. The police's

understanding of high and low crime areas in the neighbourhood were thus largely based on their experiences.

The coordination between the police and public was rudimentary and limited only to politically influential people of the neighbourhood. According to the police officers, peace committees were established in the neighbourhood to keep watch on new residents in the area. However, most residents had never heard of such committees; those who had, claimed that the committees were not operational. "I am a councillor; if there were any such committees, I should have been a part of or at least know about them," Usman exclaimed. In any case, these committees only focused on identifying suspicious tenants in view of terrorism. The police had their informers in the neighbourhood which were petty criminals, and these informers were condescended to in exchange for their services. According to most residents, the police never came to ask about their problems or to discuss a course of action. The police officers I interviewed did not have many ideas on how they could communicate with residents to better perform their duties. In the words of Nimran, a senior police officer, "I meet people when I am on patrol. I do not usually have time to attend any social events there. I am already overburdened with work at hand."

In conclusion, the Punjabi part of the Begumpura was a site of street crimes, an unknown proportion of which may have originated from their Pathan counterparts. The police were seen at best to be incompetent in dealing with those issues, while creating problems for the residents. The residents' efforts at informal control were curtailed by a lack of resources and inefficiency of the police to build upon the resources available. On the other hand, Pathans considered themselves as victims in a system which did not regard them as full citizens. Their perceived inferiority at the hands of state apparatus made them tolerant of infractions by their members. Their view of control was limited to safeguarding their space and defending their members against actions by the police or other residents of the neighbourhood. While they were largely successful in achieving these objectives, this approach had the unintended consequence of overlooking the development of organised deviant groups. This scenario resulted in friction between Pathans and the rest of the residents, and it was symbolised by voting patterns in local elections. Although both communities were aware of the need to maintain harmony and were getting along without any major incident, their indifference towards each other's problems produced a vacuum where crime and the highhandedness of the police found space.

Chapter 5 What causes no crime: The low crime neighbourhood in Lahore

According to archaeological evidence, the city of Lahore was established around 1000 BC and was girded with mud walls. These walls were reinforced during the reign of Mughal Emperor Akbar when he decided to make Lahore his capital in 1584 (Sidhwa 2005). When Emperor Akbar ordered the reconstruction of the modern Lahore Fort along with the extension and creation of markets, Lahore's popularity and importance reached unprecedented heights.

The area of Lahore which is within the walls is called the Walled City of Lahore and is located along the Grand Trunk (GT) Road, which is one of the longest and oldest roads in Asia. The GT road runs from Bangladesh, through to East and North India, and on to Afghanistan. The segment of the GT road that encircles the Walled City is conveniently called the Circular Road. Due to its proximity with the GT road, Lahore has remained a hub of trade activities and the supply centre of goods from nearby towns and villages adjacent to them.

Even during the Mughal rule, most urban quarters were located outside the city walls. Settlements were established just outside the walled city and kept expanding outwards and along the GT road. Currently, Lahore sprawls in all directions, and areas once considered far from Lahore are now part of the city. While anyone residing within the boundary of modern-day Lahore may be called a Lahori for most official purposes, native inhabitants of the city are less generous in conferring this status to later entrants. People living in the Walled City of Lahore and settlements adjacent to it are usually keen to know if one is purely from Lahore, by which they mean people born in or around the Walled City.

Garhi Shahu is one such settlement, dating back hundreds of years, with residents who take pride in belonging to it and being part of its rich history. Today, the remains of a madrasah and a mosque dating back to the 17th Century serve as reminders of this history. Although Lahore shot to prominence due to the magnanimity of Mughal Emperors, Garhi Shahu owes its current status as the heart of Lahore to the advent of the British and their subsequent laying of railway tracks and building of Lahore Junction Railway Station in the 19th Century. Residential settlements were established for British Railway Officers near Garhi Shahu, and this residential area was one of the best settlements in Lahore at that time. The British also constructed the Mayo Road (now renamed Allama Iqbal Road) to link Lahore Railway Station to Lahore Canal. Most traffic from the Cantonment area,

Dharampura, and Canal Road use this road to reach the Railway Station and vice versa. Later, when the British brought Indian Christians on the railways, mostly from other parts of India, Garhi Shahu became a culturally diverse, vibrant neighbourhood. It was a much sought-after residential area then, and its attraction remains intact even today, despite being reduced by the mushroom growth of modern housing colonies in Lahore.

Today, in addition to its being a historical, political, and economic centre, Garhi Shahu is an important centre of education. It has the Convent School of Jesus and Mary, a missionary-run public school founded in 1876 (Convent of Jesus and Mary 2014), which is one of the most prestigious girls' schools in Pakistan. Queen Mary College, named after the Queen Consort of King George V, was established in Garhi Shahu in 1908 (Queen Mary College 2011). Moreover, Garhi Shahu is within touching distance to the famous Aitchison College and the Lahore Press Club.

Garhi Shahu is not far from Begumpura (the first study site). An overhead bridge links Garhi Shahu to GT road and from there, Begumpura is within walking distance. Garhi Shahu Chowk (Square) is the main intersection for traffic to and from the Railway Station and traffic moving between Northern Lahore and the rest of Lahore through the Garhi Shahu bridge. Modern-day Garhi Shahu covers a 3 km stretch from Garhi Shahu Square to Lahore Canal. Most locals, however, will agree that the old Garhi Shahu area is the one around the historic Abul Khair mosque, which is situated in the Garhi Shahu Bazaar. Entrance to the bazaar is from Allama Iqbal Road and it ends in the railway colony, which is effectively at the back of the old Garhi Shahu area.

As the research site for this study, I chose the Garhi Shahu bazaar and its immediate surroundings because this area has a strong identity as a neighbourhood for both locals and outsiders. The only pertinent question was to decide whether to include part of the railway colony in the sampling frame. As might be expected, the railway colony began as a government property and its residents were railway employees. Thus, I anticipated that their identification with Garhi Shahu would be different than the rest of the residents, most of whom own their property and are engaged in business or private jobs. I conducted a preliminary assessment of the area and observed that a sizable number of people had been living in the railway colony for decades. In other words, population turnover in the railway colony was not as high as I had expected. Therefore, I decided to include that part of the railway colony in my sampling frame which was adjacent to Garhi Shahu bazaar. See Figure

5.1 below (Google Maps 2020c) which shows the extent of commercialisation in Garhi Shahu.

Figure 4: The area covered under the triangle is the neighbourhood I selected whereas the circled area is Garhi Shahu Square.

If we pass through the neighbourhood in the direction of the Garhi Shahu square, the road leads towards the Railway Station and the Walled City. Taking a right turn from the square leads to GT road and Begumpura. I had been to the old Garhi Shahu area (hereinafter called Garhi Shahu) numerous times before my fieldwork, so it is difficult to recall what my first impressions of the place were. I knew it to be a place where I could purchase a variety of foods at reasonable rates and where I could play with my friends in any of the various snooker clubs located in the area. Shops were open until late at night and there was never a lull in traffic and noise. Several education institutions have located there in recent times; as a result, many students from nearby neighbourhoods visit Garhi Shahu daily to study there. This non-resident student population is a distinctive feature of Garhi Shahu and contributes significantly to the local economy. There are numerous bookshops and juice corners often crowded with students. During the school and college hours, Garhi Shahu Square presents a spectacular traffic mess that reeks of uncontrolled population growth and subpar urban development policies.

Defining crime

Garhi Shahu had one of the lowest crime rates in the Civil Lines Division as per official crime data from 2013 to 2015. In 2013, the Garhi Shahu police station registered 373 cases, of

which 27 were crimes against persons. The other police station with less reported crime had 680 registered cases, of which 38 were crimes against persons. Similarly, the police station registered 500 cases in 2015 whereas no other police station in the division registered fewer than 650 cases. None of the interviewees could recall a homicide in their neighbourhood in the last three years. Ironically, people seemed to have forgotten the murder of a prominent politician which had happened less than a year earlier. There were no gangs in the neighbourhood, and only one recent incident of firearm injuries was reported to me. Most people I interviewed agreed that Garhi Shahu had very little crime, but there were also those who were cautious in saying so. It appeared that whether a neighbourhood was considered as having high or low crime by a resident was a problematic question depending on several factors. Some interviewees only thought of violent crimes when asked about the crime situation in their neighbourhood while others were keen to draw attention to non-violent crimes or even social infractions. Of course, an individual's definition of crime had a bearing on their perceptions about the level of crime in Garhi Shahu.

The reasons for this variation are difficult to generalise with the sample size I used, but some patterns did emerge. Firstly, those people who frequently mentioned informal deviance as important also talked about the overall moral decline in their neighbourhood. Most of them had a slippery slope notion of crime, and their views on reasons for crime were akin to the broken windows theory. According to Saleem, a community elder, aged 75, an important issue was how 15 to 20 year olds have strange haircuts and beards these days. According to him, these trends had a direct impact on their personality building and their propensity towards deviance. A few interviewees were also wary of mobile phone use among adolescents and considered it a precursor to serious social problems. In the words of Javed, a local social activist:

> It is a grave situation. They [the younger generation] are watching all sorts of unethical material on the internet. I would rather say that our children are being [systematically] exposed to such things. In my opinion, at least girls should not be allowed to have mobile phones. Every other day, you watch or read news that a girl has fled with her boyfriend or a girl was found to be involved in immoral activities. This is all happening because of the 3G/4G internet.

I noticed that it was mostly the older people who were concerned with moral issues. Having a beard, wearing jeans, interaction with the opposite gender, all were important

issues for them. The cultural change that these people witnessed over the last few decades was the reason for the decline of the indigenous value system, which was superior and ensured social order, according to them. Understandably, younger interviewees were not critical of technological developments and did not see them as a threat to social order. Nonetheless, some of them were apprehensive about the snooker clubs in their area where young people went to smoke cigarettes. Of course, those interviewees who felt strongly about such issues had a relatively more cynical view of the state of affairs in their neighbourhood. For example, Iftikhar, a young lawyer, insisted that, "snooker clubs are a breeding ground for illegal activities. There, you can find people who would encourage you to get into heinous crimes. I think these (clubs) should be banned altogether." While such age and class perspectives might well be seen in the UK or elsewhere, the views of these respondents were somewhat aligned with broken windows theory (Kelling and Coles 1997) since they considered these 'incivilities' as precursors to serious crimes.

The second important factor in determining whether a resident considered Garhi Shahu as having a high level of crime was his opinion on non-violent crimes. Cannabis use and gambling were the most frequently cited issues in the neighbourhood, but how important these issues were, in terms of harmony and peace of the area, was contested. For some interviewees, these were not serious issues because they had become common across the country and were not specific to their neighbourhood. Such crimes were for the police to handle just because it was their job to do so. Crimes, for them, were the actions that could directly affect their well-being and not those which were harmful to the neighbourhood at large. "I have been living here for so many years, but nothing has happened to me ever" was the standard response of such interviewees when asked about crime in their neighbourhood. On the contrary, some people showed significant concern that their neighbours were falling prey to marijuana and gambling because of the impact such issues could have. Misbah, a traders' union representative, told me: "A person in our neighbourhood used to gamble. He destroyed his whole business due to this habit. His wife and children left him. Now, you can see him roaming in the neighbourhood asking for Rs.50 or 100 from every other person."

It is difficult to neatly point out why people were at variance over the gravity of such non-violent crimes. Older people were less likely to highlight these crimes, not necessarily because they considered them to be minor offences but because their exposure to such crimes was limited. An elder pointed out that these problems were prevalent in other areas but not in his own neighbourhood as he had "never seen" such problems happening

around him. Some of the younger interviewees also considered non-violent crimes as paltry crimes since they knew several well-meaning people who gambled or smoked marijuana. Ownership of the neighbourhood and a concern about the long-term impact of such deviances on the future generations were important factors in determining an individual's attitude towards these non-violent crimes.

Personal victimisation or witnessing a violent crime was also important in shaping people's perceptions about crime and security in their neighbourhood. Older people, who were less mobile and lived more sheltered existences, considered their area safer than their younger counterparts. Those people who interacted with different people throughout the day were more aware of issues such as mugging and female harassment. The two interviewees who were concerned about the crime situation in Garhi Shahu were either victimised themselves or knew of someone close to them who had been. Merely hearing about a violent crime through a third person did not impact people's perceptions in a similar way. I observed this when discussing a large value robbery that had occurred a few years earlier in Garhi Shahu. Those people who had first-hand information about the incident or who actively followed the case had the whole episode fresh in their minds while the others seemed to think of it as just another incident.

Greater Garhi Shahu area also witnessed two terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban. In 2009, a renowned anti-Taliban Islamic cleric was killed in a suicide bomb attack, while in 2010, militants attacked an Ahmaddiya Mosque in Garhi Shahu leaving at least 70 people dead. These incidents occurred within one kilometre of the neighbourhood I studied. Despite the nature of these incidents, they were not considered signal crimes by the community. People associated them with the wave of terrorist attacks that had spread across the country. As Javed noted: "These incidents could have happened anywhere. Pakistan was exploding at that time. What could the local police or we have done about it?"

Overall, the interviews confirmed that crime levels were low in Garhi Shahu and had always been that way. However, the affirmation of this view by the people had little to do with what the official data said about Garhi Shahu. Because the neighbourhood was stable, crime was not an issue that neighbours discussed frequently among themselves. Public perceptions about the crime situation in their neighbourhood was a product of the residents' views about several issues which may or may not be related to crime. Some people considered their neighbourhood peaceful because it was less violent than the rest.

Others thought that there was no crime at all except minor scuffles among young boys or domestic disputes. There were still those who were content that there were no hooligans and no violent feuds among warring groups in their neighbourhood. Hence, the interviewees did not mean the same thing when they said that Garhi Shahi was a low crime neighbourhood.

How people arrive at their opinions about crime and security in their neighbourhood is a question that still begs a satisfactory answer. Firstly, legal definitions of crime were not important to people in describing the crime situation in their neighbourhood. Their own sense of what may or may not adversely affect them and their neighbourhood was pivotal to their sense of security. Secondly, when people thought of crime, they were in effect talking about a moral order which they would like to see in their neighbourhood. They would often jump the boundaries between crime and morality when describing crime. Thirdly, as the people in Garhi Shahu did not have to worry about heinous crimes, there was a tacit hope among some people that the state would police whatever minor infractions or informal deviances that might occur. Such views have profound implications for policing in less violent neighbourhoods, especially when a reassurance function is expected of the police. A British study might well discuss media treatment of crime as a factor influencing people's perceptions of crime (Altheide 2009; Cohen 2011). I asked questions to the respondents on these lines and discovered that most respondents had informed opinions about the sensationalism in mass media. They would often cite examples when incidents in their area were blown out of proportion by the media whereas, on the ground, the situation was less agitated. Residents did not take media portrayals at face value, especially when the media reported about their own area, probably because most people in Garhi Shahu kept informed about the state of affairs in their neighbourhood due to a high level of social interaction. They were not passive consumers of information distributed by mass media. These observations raise the question that, when we set out to study neighbourhoods based on crime levels, are we really talking about the crime recorded by the police or the 'crime' as judged and experienced by the people living in those neighbourhoods? While the police are obliged to act upon anything codified as crime under the law, public perception of crime is more relevant to the operation of informal social control.

A political hotcake

When I conducted the field work, Garhi Shahu was part of the NA-122 (Lahore-V) constituency of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Imran Khan, the Chairman of Pakistan

Tehreek e Insaf (PTI) and the current Prime Minister of Pakistan who lived in a posh locality near Garhi Shahu, contested the 2002 general elections from this constituency. He was comfortably defeated by the Pakistan Muslim League (N)'s Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, a native resident and member of a respectable business family of Garhi Shahu. Eleven years later, Imran Khan emerged as a serious contender for the post of Prime Minister while Ayaz Sadiq rose through the ranks in his party. In the 2013 general elections, the contest between Imran Khan and Ayaz Sadiq was highly anticipated. A lot of money was spent by both parties in the constituency to appease the voters, and the mass media started reporting from this constituency several months before the elections. Garhi Shahu became the centre of attraction, and its residents were overwhelmed by the attention accorded to their area by the major political parties and news channels. General elections were held in May 2013 and PML(N) won most seats, including NA-122. However, the winning margin was smaller than in 2002.

Although Imran Khan and his party accepted the results of the 2013 general elections despite allegations of rigging, he demanded vote recounts in four constituencies, including NA-122. The ruling party's rejection of this demand spiralled into a crisis where the government could have been overthrown. In August 2015, an election tribunal annulled the victory of Sardar Ayaz Sadiq and ordered fresh elections in NA-122. The by-election became a litmus test for the legitimacy of PML(N)'s government and PTI's allegation of extensive rigging. A loss for PML(N) could have vindicated PTI's stance and a premature ousting of the federal government was on the cards. The by-election was perhaps one of the most expensive elections in the history of Pakistan; billions of rupees were allegedly spent on publicity campaigns, rallies, and election offices. Imran Khan and his wife spent a lot of time in this constituency canvassing for the PTI candidate, while several PML(N) ministers could be seen in the streets of Garhi Shahu and other areas of the constituency in the days leading up to the election. The election was held on 11 October 2015, and PTI's candidate, Abdul Aleem Khan, lost to the PML(N)'s Sardar Ayaz Sadiq by a slight margin.

I conducted the field work in April 2016, just six months after this historic by-election. Banners and posters of candidates were still visible throughout Garhi Shahu. I asked interviewees about the election and how it had impacted their neighbourhood. Most people recalled how prominent politicians visited each street to ask for votes and promised funds for civil infrastructure. They also recalled how election offices were set up by political parties and how local youngsters were given hefty amounts of money by politicians to run those offices and campaign for their parties. An interviewee told me that the

neighbourhood's longstanding demand for clean drinking water was partially solved by a 'private' donation from a candidate. Already well-built roads were uprooted and reconstructed. Every other person in the neighbourhood was politically charged during that time and tensions were high among several local groups who had stakes in the election. As soon as the election was over, everything returned to normal, and people went about their day-to-day business.

Lahore is called the political capital of Pakistan, and Garhi Shahu, being an old settlement of Lahore, is home to many prominent people acquainted with the national political elite. Nonetheless, consecutive high-profile elections in NA-122 gave renewed importance to the residents of Garhi Shahu and increased their social capital. Now, even ordinary residents personally knew people as powerful as the then Speaker of the National Assembly. The people I met and interviewed did not explicitly boast of their contacts with the ruling class, but it was most apparent when they talked about the police. Their opinions about various aspects of policing were very similar to those of the people I interviewed in Begumpura, but the degree of indignation towards the police was lower in Garhi Shahu.

Several interviewees expressed annoyance over the unmannerly behaviour of the police with the public and the way the police handled cases. When I asked how they expected the police to behave if they themselves visited the police station, most of them anticipated that the police would be respectful to them. They often referred to police's shortcomings in relation to 'ordinary' people, not that they were likely to be personally affected by them. Qadri, a travel agent, explained: "Whenever we have a problem, we talk to SP or SSP [district level police officers]. Now, since the local police know that we have access to their seniors, they request us to tell any matter directly to them."

Atif, owner of a famous sweets shop, described how he even felt pity for the police: "Police officials posted in Garhi Shahu call it a 'sweet gaol'. There is nothing for them to do here. They just sit idle and pass their time." Implicit in this statement is the opinion that the police officials liked to be in places where there was a high crime rate and, hence, more opportunities for corruption.

There was a certain degree of empathy for the police among the residents of Garhi Shahu, and I noticed that some people were not anxious about visiting the police station. When I shared this observation with Ashar, a local police officer, he explained how he was welcoming to the people and had instructed his staff to be courteous, but he also said: "Political interference is a big problem in this area for me. People here are well connected.

There are also some TV channels and newspapers which are owned by native residents (of Garhi Shahu). … I arrest criminals and within hours, some politician or journalist comes after them [to get them released]."

The political importance of their constituency and their affiliations with senior politicians also meant that the people of Garhi Shahu had less difficulty in getting their children employed in public or private organisations. In the Railway Colony, many parents had successfully got their children a job in the railways, so that they could hold on to their residence after their retirement. In addition, several people had their own small businesses and shops where they could accommodate their children and, in some cases, other youngsters from the neighbourhood. As a result, many youngsters were in paid jobs rather than hanging around in the streets, a condition which should have an impact on the crime level.

I do not intend to overemphasize the political capital of Garhi Shahu as it was after all a neighbourhood of people belonging to the lower-middle and middle-middle subclasses. Unemployment was still an issue in Garhi Shahu as was poor sewerage, cleanliness, and street lighting. On the other hand, there was wide discontent on how the local police operated and the endemic corruption that existed in the police station. Having said that, a socially integrated neighbourhood with people whose voices were heard more by those in the power corridors made it easier to deal with issues that came their way. Except for those who were personally victimised, there was also less fear of crime among people. Their risk perception was mitigated by their ability to find support within the neighbourhood and the conviction that, in extreme circumstances, they could get local leaders to approach senior bureaucrats and politicians on their behalf.

An extended family

Garhi Shahu is a sought-after residential area in Lahore due to its affordable housing, famous eateries, and proximity to the Walled City, Lahore Railway Station, schools, colleges, and civil courts. Several people I met during the fieldwork had been living there for more than 100 years, although many of them did not know exactly why and from where their forefathers had come. The population turnover in this area was very low in terms of emigration, while a lot of people had moved in, mostly as tenants. When asked to describe their neighbourhood, most people talked about the population explosion and increase in traffic over the last couple of decades. Atif put it aptly: "What happens when you keep pouring water in a glass despite knowing it is full? It overflows. Same has happened with

Garhi Shahu. I saw people renting houses, then portions, and would you believe it, now rooms are being rented for whole families. Outsiders are moving in like never before, and then you hear a new story every day."

The last part of the above statement, "a new story every day" pointed to the problems allegedly caused by tenants in the area. This sentiment was echoed by several interviewees who believed that whatever problems there were, tenants or recently moved permanent residents were mainly responsible for them. It appeared to me a novel case of labelling theory where 'outsiders' were being blamed despite a low level of crime. On the other hand, this apprehension about later entrants also symbolised the trust native residents placed in each other. Knowing each other for generations, people could vouch for their neighbours, and they certainly did in some cases. Hashim, a young student in the Railway Colony area of Garhi Shahu told me:

> A year ago, somebody stole an iPhone from my neighbour's house. They immediately blamed a 12-year-old boy of our neighbourhood and complained to the police. Now you tell me, can a boy that young change the SIM card of an iPhone? We admonished our neighbours for contacting the police before telling us about it. The whole neighbourhood then gave personal assurances about the boy to ward off the police.

Most people talked fondly about the love and affection they shared among themselves. They frequently referred to well-developed areas where nobody knew each other and told of a local politician's sister who moved to such a housing society where she did not know about the death of a neighbour until after several weeks. In Garhi Shahu, however, people claimed to know more about their neighbours than they knew about their relatives. A simple reason they gave for high social interaction was their intergenerational affiliation with their neighbours. All the interviewees told me that they could identify most of the children living in their street or even in the next street. If not by name, most people recognised each other by face even beyond their immediate locality. Shahid, a local politician who contested elections for the provincial assembly seat, told me: "You know the streets near Railway Stadium are dark at night. I was walking along that way when two boys on motorbike held me at gunpoint. When they looked at me closely, they identified me and left without taking anything [from me]."

The extent of social interaction could also be gauged by the following statement of Qadri: "I go to say Eid prayers in my local mosque. It is only a 5-minute walk from my house. Believe

me, it takes me several hours to return to my home after the prayers. I meet so many people on my way that even if I spend 5 or10 minutes with one person, it still consumes a large part of my day."

Most people had attended the wedding ceremonies and funerals of their neighbours and shared feasts with them on social and religious occasions. Those who did not participate had to provide explanations to their neighbours on why they were unable to attend.

Despite sharing close ties with neighbours, several interviewees were concerned that their relationships with their neighbours were in decline. "There was a time when we would eat food from anyone's house as if it was our own," Adeel, an elderly shopkeeper, said. They argued that times had changed and, despite trust, now most women stayed in their homes and did not frequently visit neighbours. The underlying assumption was that values of 'shame' and 'honour' had diminished with the advent of satellite televisions, smartphones, and the internet. This meant that women were not safe in someone else's house. Another aspect of social cohesion which they missed was the presence of influential elders who would decide matters on behalf of the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood still had such elders, but the kind of influence and respect which their forefathers commanded was no longer present. Now, everyone wanted respect on an equal footing, and there was no assurance that a person would comply with the decision of elders in any kind of dispute.

On why the social cohesion and social interaction had 'reduced', people referred to the broader economic situation and how every single person was busy making ends meet. Another often cited reason was the change in lifestyle. Riaz, a member of the union council, recalled how:

> In the good old times, people would sit in the streets and discuss everything under the sun. Then the television arrived in our homes. Those community gatherings declined, and people started spending more time in their homes. But there was still interaction between siblings and between parents and children. After some time, television sets were bought for each room in the house. Now, even the family members hardly interact. Everyone has their choice of TV programs, and there goes your family life and social bonding.

I noted that the decline in social interaction which people gloomily talked about was related to the general effects of urbanisation. When Garhi Shahu was a village, its relations of production were different than the hyper-commercialised Garhi Shahu of today. I would

rather call this decline as a change in patterns of social interaction where the important question to ask is whether the social bonding, as it exists today, is consequential in terms of crime prevention and control. Most people I interviewed would give an affirmative answer to this question. Even in the Railway Colony, where residents do not share a common history, Hashim had this to say about social solidarity:

> A boy from our neighbourhood had some issue with university students. They came to take him away. All our men present at that time came to defend the boy. Those students were in a car and somehow managed to flee, although some of us tried to stop the moving car by standing in front of it. … You know that the police never come on time; only my neighbours will be standing with me in the hour of need. If someone enters this street with evil intentions, he would be very lucky to leave without taking a beating.

All the people I interviewed were willing to intervene on behalf of the neighbourhood. This solidarity shows how the routine social order is manufactured through the exercise of informal social control. In terms of crime prevention, the salience of residents' willingness to address potential problems is hard to overstate. However, the extent of intervention was based upon the kind of problem or disorder. For instance, if someone was harassing a female on the streets, he would very likely receive a beating from almost everyone who witnessed the incident. Teenagers hanging around the street corners or someone caught smoking marijuana would likely get a verbal warning. Unless a neighbour was in disrepute with the neighbourhood, he or she could rely on his or her neighbours to cooperate with him or her in the event of violence. Haider, a private employee, told me: "If I have a belligerent attitude or if my neighbours know me as someone who has shady dealings with outsiders, then of course people will avoid getting into my problems. But if I am respected by my neighbours, they would go to great lengths to help me."

The answers to questions on collective efficacy were strikingly similar and affirmative. Having studied these neighbourhoods and being a resident of a similar one, I thought there was a need to revisit the questions on collective efficacy that we ask in the Western contexts. In general, in any neighbourhood in Pakistan, it is culturally inappropriate to say that we would not intervene if we observed anything wrong happening in our neighbourhood. Islam has also emphasised that one should actively try to stop the 'evil'. Many respondents were aware of this mandate, and some of them even said that it was an 'obligation' to intervene. However, this is not to say that most respondents would stand in

the way of bullets. It is rather the intent to intervene in view of their capabilities and social capacity. Therefore, it is perhaps more suitable to ask questions probing the extent of intervention in any given situation to get a meaningful comparison of collective efficacy within and across neighbourhoods.

Another important factor in prevention of crime and deviance was eyes on the streets. Garhi Shahu Bazaar and adjacent streets (the primary study site) were never short of people sitting around or moving in and outside the neighbourhood. Shops, especially food stalls, remained open until late in the night as the traffic on Allama Iqbal Road runs round the clock. People from other neighbourhoods visiting the bazaar would not have to enter the adjoining residential streets. Neighbourhood residents kept an eye on who was entering their streets; any outsider would be immediately spotted. If a person was standing in a street for a prolonged period, he or she would have to behave as if there was a legitimate purpose for being there. For instance, he could keep looking at his mobile phone to show that he was waiting for someone to come out of a house. Even in the Railway Colony area, which comprised almost exclusively of residential units, some boys could always be found on the streets. Dilawar, a middle-aged employee in the Railway Colony, explained how it worked: "Boys here are out on the streets with their mobile phones even at 2am. 'Why?', I asked.' [Interviewee laughs]. You know better, bro. We have small houses and you can't talk on the phone [with a girlfriend] inside your homes. So, they are out on the streets and they have an eye on everyone."

Among the lower middle-class urban population of Lahore, it is not widely acceptable for unrelated boys and girls to communicate in private. In the Railway Colony, houses are so small that there is no place for boys to talk to their girlfriends without taking the risk of someone in the family finding out about the relationship. An act of deviance, i.e. talking to a girlfriend, was in effect fostering informal social control by keeping vigil as a latent function. A similar argument could also be made about marijuana users in the neighbourhood who would be spotted by those roaming the streets to smoke a cigarette late in the night.

In addition to intergenerational linkages, ethnic homogeneity is an important factor influencing strong social ties among the residents. Unlike Begumpura where Pathans live alongside Punjabis, Garhi Shahu is predominantly a Punjabi settlement. Within the Punjabis, there are mainly two castes: Kumboh and Arain. These groups (called Baradari in Urdu) are loosely organised along caste lines, but their bonding was mainly limited to issues

concerning intra-caste marriages, funeral arrangements or property disputes within families.

According to Hafiz, a shopkeeper whose friend contested local election, noted that "Elections are the only time when you could easily notice the presence of different baradaris. Members of a baradari join hands and nominate some of their members to negotiate with electoral candidates." It is a common practice for people in Pakistan to come together during elections to show their strength. This gives them leverage over individual voters and obligates the candidates to knock on their doors for votes. Then the unified group (usually based on caste) puts certain demands before the candidates, such as getting their children employed in government departments or starting a specific development project in their area. The candidate who fulfils or promises to fulfil these demands after coming to power gets their votes en masse.

Garhi Shahu is no different in this respect, but baradaris are not the defining feature of social organisation by any means. Although Kamboh and Arain are two different castes, they are after all Punjabis and have similar status within the hierarchy of the Punjabi caste system. In fact, it is almost impossible for an outsider to differentiate between the two by observing or communicating with them. Political significance of these castes aside, cultural implications of this divide were nowhere to be seen in Garhi Shahu. Saleem told me: "Mostly we have Arain baradari here. We are Mughals but nobody ever mentioned to me that we were from a different caste. Everybody lives here like siblings."

Only a few people mentioned during the interviews that there were different castes in Garhi Shahu, unlike Begumpura where there was resentment and mistrust between the two ethnic communities. It is difficult to say whether ethnic homogeneity plays a role in fostering solidary and informal control in Garhi Shahu; however, keeping in view the situation in Begumpura, it could be argued that a lack of ethnic heterogeneity in Garhi Shahu prevents problems which could adversely affect social cohesion.

Parochial order

During my first interview in Garhi Shahu, I asked a local businessman what the good things about his neighbourhood were. He replied that his neighbourhood had been blessed with several families who did a lot of philanthropic work in this area. I heard similar statements from other people during my stay in the neighbourhood. Some people referred to the famous eye hospital established by the prominent Sardar family in Garhi Shahu. There were other hospitals run by trusts too where healthcare was provided at minimal charge. During

the election campaign, a politician also renovated schools with his personal funds. One of the interviewees told me that he had been running a school in his building at nominal tuition fees to help those parents who could not afford the expense of a private education. He asserted that he could earn more simply by renting out his building, but profit was not his priority. This and other community infrastructure were mostly run or funded by wealthy families living in or around the greater Garhi Shahu area. As Garhi Shahu was a village outside the Walled City, several feudal and business families settled on the outskirts of the village. These families had since been supporting disadvantaged people in Garhi Shahu by spending a good portion of their wealth on philanthropic projects. This factor set apart Garhi Shahu from the other three neighbourhoods that I studied. The presence of affluent people living alongside their poorer counterparts with a common goal to see their neighbourhood prosper was one of the important protective factors against social decay. The economic assistance extended to vulnerable residents also shaped the social capacity of neighbourhood and increased their capability to engage in informal social control.

Garhi Shahu also had numerous community-based organisations and interpersonal networks to support each other in times of need. The neighbourhood had at least three organisations which kept kitchen utensils, cutlery, sheets, and carpets, among other items. These items were bought through funds raised as donations from the neighbourhood. Residents would contact these organisations in events of marriage or death and get these items free of cost. When there was a funeral, members would even go to prepare graves and arrange meals for the mourners so that mourners would not have to worry about these issues. Three dispensaries were also set up by a local organisation where qualified doctors gave professional advice and medicines. Every Sunday, members of the organisation conducted meetings to discuss issues relating to the dispensaries. Similarly, there were several organisations called Milad Committees which would hold regular religious gatherings and provide food to the people after the ceremony. These events were often funded by wealthier people in the neighbourhood. An organisation was also funding free education for deserving students by raising funds from donors. Management of the organisation ensured that both donors and beneficiaries remained anonymous to each other. In some instances, these organisations also acted as a bridge between local administration and residents to resolve issues. In this regard, a local businessman told me how his organisation encouraged the community not to throw garbage on the streets and ensured that sweepers would visit the streets to collect the waste at a set time every day.

I asked if there were any efforts by these voluntary organisations to deal with crime or disorder. In response, many people told me that there was never a situation in their neighbourhood when they thought that such efforts were necessary. However, Javed narrated a situation where his organisation compelled the police to intervene:

> So, these boys would stand outside the girls' college, and they would harass the girls going in or coming out. We complained to a senior police officer and requested him to depute some police officers especially at the time when girls leave the college. The police officers that they sent started harassing the girls themselves. Then we requested the local police officer to depute older police officers who would feel some shame. Once that was done, we also requested the parents to pick up their daughters on time and encouraged the girls to move in groups.

Many people complained during the interview that there were no community parks or open spaces where people or families could sit together. There was a stadium owned by Pakistan Railways just behind Garhi Shahu Bazaar, but it was in a dilapidated condition. Older interviewees recalled that when there were more open spaces, sports competitions were held throughout the year which kept the people busy in healthy activities. Garhi Shahu produced numerous sportsmen during that era, some of whom represented Pakistan at the international level. Sports events at that time were also organised by voluntary organisations. While there were no grounds or parks where people could sit together or play, the tradition of local organisation was still going strong, performing functions which the state could not.

Despite having a web of community-based organisations in Garhi Shahu, there was no indication that parochial social control was actively exercised by them. These organisations instead fostered social order where marginalised people were not left out and received the assistance they needed from the neighbourhood. In addition, some of these interpersonal networks were instrumental in getting rid of physical disorder in their neighbourhood, such as the one which tried to resolve the garbage problem. Thus, these organisations were, in a sense, providing a protective environment where individual burdens could be shared and problems resolved through collective action.

In his conceptual work, Albert Hunter described public, private, and parochial as ideal types of social order, and how attempts at social control could emerge from them (Hunter 1985). When studying parochial order, studies in community criminology tend to

undermine Hunter's emphasis on 'order' and typically detail the way local networks or institutions respond to an emergent crime problem or how these are specifically formed to prevent crimes that were already happening in an area. A case in point is Patrick J. Carr's ethnographic work in South Chicago in which he explained how gun homicide of teenagers by gang members led to civic activism aimed at social control (Carr 2005). He also explained two previous failed attempts by the community at reclaiming social order before the third attempt proved successful. While Carr's "new parochialism" (Carr 2003, p. 1249) offers important insight into the intersection of formal and informal social control, I wonder how differently his work would have been understood had the third attempt also failed in restoring social order. It could well have failed if any of the numerous factors which led to its success had gone wrong. Once the order is disrupted, its restoration often requires a complex interplay of all three types of social order, provided that external factors remain favourable. Thus, rather than attempting to delineate efficacy of community organisations in face of crime and disorder, it is perhaps more important to ask how the presence of these local institutions can prevent disruptive conditions. In his study of Chicago neighbourhoods, Sampson (2012) also stressed on the capacity of local organisations for collective civic action, without highlighting the specific actions against crimes these organisations might have taken. In Garhi Shahu, for example, the local networks represented the community capital which could take the role of vigilance groups if need be. How successful they would be in dealing with a serious disruption is difficult to predict, but it can be argued that residents of Garhi Shahu would not have to scramble for a response given the parochial structures that existed in the neighbourhood.

Policing for the sake of policing

"We are safe because of our solidarity and brotherhood. If we rely on the police, we are doomed," Zeeshan, a college student told me. People's perceptions of the police in Garhi Shahu could be better understood in terms of a neighbourhood's own capacity to maintain order and expectations that residents had of the police. Garhi Shahu did not have gangs, organised crimes, feuds, or extortion. Odd mugging incidents and rare incidents of robbery were not crimes that people expected the police to address. They often associated such incidents with a decline in family values, wealth inequality, and a lack of legitimate opportunities for material progress. Such crimes were considered inevitable until broader social changes resulted in an educated and progressive society. Moreover, some people argued that the police did not have the requisite resources to deal with crimes. In the words of Ansar (a local businessman):

> What can the police do to control crime? They cannot [do anything]. Police are
> known by their uniforms. Would a student make noise when the teacher is in the
> classroom? Similarly, nobody commits a crime when police are present. And if a
> street crime happens after they are gone, how can they [police] catch the criminal
> without CCTV, tracking technology and intelligence gathering. Our local police are
> too backward in this respect. They can't do a thing.

Whether or not they considered drugs and gambling as serious offences, several people said it was not possible for the police to be unaware of who sold marijuana or took bets in their area. "Of course, the police know everything, but they profit from these enterprises," said Faheem. Despite alleging police involvement in these crimes, people were not forceful about getting rid of the so-called police-crime nexus. There was a realisation that ultimately it was up to families and the neighbourhood to supervise their children and ensure that they would not deviate.

In view of the above, one must ask: what did the people want the police to do? I noted that people had internalised the colonial model of policing where the police was at best a reactive force. The police were not expected to devise innovative strategies to prevent crime. They were not even expected, by a sizeable number of people, to catch criminals. The police were mostly expected to deal with residents with respect and to be fair in resolving disputes among community members. According to the residents, police took minor conflicts between neighbours as opportunities to extort money. Shamshad, a barber, narrated an incident which had recently happened in the neighbourhood:

> A fight broke out between our neighbours. We tried to resolve the issue but one of
> them was insisting on reporting the matter to the police. We then left him on his
> own. He filed a complaint in the police station. Then the police summoned the
> other neighbour [against whom the complaint was filed]. When he arrived, they
> asked him to file a counter complaint against the original complainant. Then, the
> police incarcerated both. They were finally freed after they both withdrew their
> complaints and paid Rs. 10,000 to the police.

This perception that the police would exacerbate interpersonal disputes and profit from them was consistent in all the neighbourhoods I studied. Somehow, similar to Cohen (1983)'s conception of crime as social control, I discovered that the police's corruption also served as a deterrent to conflicts in neighbourhood settings. Residents would try not to escalate their disputes to the extent that a formal intervention was imminent. The fear of

the police was prevalent across the neighbourhoods, and this fear helped in deescalating issues between neighbours. In view of this, police corruption may be also understood as manifestation of social control, at least in interpersonal disputes in neighbourhoods.

A recurrent issue with the police was that they would not register a First Information Report (FIR) whenever someone went to file a complaint. For instance, if someone was robbed of his mobile phone, the victim would report the incident to the police not because he expected to get his phone back but because he did not want any trouble if the phone was later used in any illegal activity. In most cases, the police would refuse to register such complaints. Altaf, a middle-aged businessman, who had recently gone to file a complaint recounted:

> When I told them that I had been mugged, they were reacting as if I was telling them a joke. They [curiously] asked me how I was mugged [as if it was an interesting story]? Why I was keeping such an expensive phone? I felt as if I was a comedian who had just visited them to provide entertainment. … They noted the incident on a soft register and handed me a copy of it. No FIR was registered. … If they ever recover my phone, they will sell it in the market. Why would they return it to me?

On why the police was reluctant to register FIRs, Ashar, the police officer, was surprisingly straightforward: "Out of 30 days in a month, I do not have full strength on 29 days. I must attend courts, and my men are deputed to handle law and order situations (protests and demonstrations). When you are failing and your capabilities are reduced, but you are still held answerable [what would you do?]. This is why you delay recording crimes: to ease the burden on your shoulders."

Most people interacted with the police only when they were stopped at a checkpoint or during a police patrol in their neighbourhood. Most people were in favour of patrolling and considered themselves safe when the police were around. However, some interviewees also mentioned the police's rowdiness during patrols, especially when dealing with street hawkers and small food stalls. A young student told me that the police would randomly raid snooker clubs during patrols and briefly arrest local boys on gambling charges but would release them soon after taking money from them. The checkpoints were infamous among residents as they were allegedly used by the police officers to extort money from teenagers traveling on motorbikes without vehicle registration documents or driving licenses. Many interviewees, including the local police officers, agreed that placing barricades on roads

and stopping and searching every other person was a waste of scarce resources at disposal of the police. Asad, a local police officer, explained: "When you have barricaded a road, criminals can see it from far away and only an insane criminal would try to pass through it. Checkpoints are a nuisance only for the public. This is like signalling to criminals that the whole force is busy at checkpoints and they can easily commit crimes elsewhere. To be honest, our policing is not compatible with the times we are living in."

Overall, perceptions of the police performance were like those in Begumpura, which was understandable since the police operated almost in the same way across police stations, and there was little or no area-wise customisation. Unless an especially committed Station Head Officer (SHO) was posted in the police station, people expected little or no change. The police were seen to be supporting minor crimes for financial gains but incompetent to act against major crimes, even when they wanted to. Almost every person accepted that one had to have money or patronage to get things done in a police station. With regards to a recent directive by the government, asking the landowners to register particulars of their tenants with the police, Hafiz advised me: "I ask you to do a little experiment yourself. Go there and get it done. You will find out how the system works. Your options are to either go with someone who has a say in the police station or give them 500 [rupees]. Else, they will make you visit them so many times that you would not repeat the mistake of not bribing them."

Despite these opinions, many people also thought that the police were overburdened and that there were some very dedicated people in the police service. An interviewee was concerned that the police officers usually lived away from their families as they were frequently transferred from one area to another. Despite perceived incompetence and corruption, there was some ambivalence in the residents' attitude towards the police which was, to some extent, the result of relatively low crime and therefore less need of policing.

When asked whether the police officers visited their neighbourhood to discuss and help resolve issues that they were facing, some people looked surprised at my naivety. They did not seem to know that this was also a way in which policing could be done. Most of the interviewees agreed that it would be immensely helpful if the police and community worked together to prevent crime and improve security, but it had never happened. Some people even discouraged this idea because they thought the police should be a frightening force. Friendly interaction with people would tarnish their image of being stern against

crime and disorder. People were, to some extent, content that the police remained in their office and only interfered when they were asked to do so.

Conclusion

Garhi Shahu is an ethnically homogenous neighbourhood with low population turnover. A common history, shared values, intergenerational linkages, and a sense of ownership define the social organisation of the neighbourhood. Informal social control was high in terms of supervising the behaviour of young people and keeping a watch on tenants and strangers. A watchman patrolled the streets and bazaar at night and collected payment for his services from each house in the neighbourhood. At least two jewellery shops had private security guards and some shops had installed surveillance cameras because the local police pressured them to do so. Except for these measures, I did not observe many proactive efforts at social control, such as installing gates on streets or fixing street lighting for the purpose of crime prevention and control. However, social organisation of the neighbourhood was such that informal social control was unintentionally exercised, e.g. eyes on the streets due to commercial activity all day or boys on the streets talking to their girlfriends on their phones at night.

Perceptions of endemic corruption in the police aside, the political capital of the residents enabled them to adequately engage the police whenever there was a threat to their security. Other than that, the residents were not keen for the police to arbitrate on most issues. People were generally not perturbed by the crime happening in their area and were busy striving for a better lifestyle. A strong sense of social cohesion and the presence of local institutions meant that Garhi Shahu had the potential to protect disruption in its social order. Furthermore, the presence of some affluent families in or around the neighbourhood and the continued support of those affluent families that had left the neighbourhood provided the critical support required by the poorer residents to go about their everyday life without falling prey to criminal activities for sustenance.

Chapter 6 Surviving against odds: The 'low' crime neighbourhood in Karachi

Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan with a population of more than 14.9 million in 2017 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). It is called the economic lifeline of Pakistan due to its port and its industrial and financial zones. In 1941, six years before independence, Karachi's population was 435,877; by 1951, its population rose to 701,780 (Hasan and Mohib 2003), which was due to the influx of around 600,000 immigrants from India (Hasan et al. 2002). The Hindu population in the city decreased from 51% to 2%, whereas the Muslim population increased from 42% to 96% (Hasan and Mohib 2003). Similarly, Urdu, spoken as a mother language, increased from 6.3% to 50% (Hasan and Mohib 2003). The partition of the Indian subcontinent fundamentally changed the demography and culture of Karachi. The immigrants came from various parts of India but were locally identified collectively as Mohajirs (immigrants) which became considered as an ethnicity in Pakistan. While Mohajir is the largest ethnicity in Karachi by population, Karachi is by far the most cosmopolitan city in Pakistan. People from all ethnicities, religions, and sectarian backgrounds inhabit this city in significant numbers. Generally, the ethnic populations of Karachi are not randomly distributed, and some areas have significantly higher concentrations of specific ethnicities in relation to the others.

Mehmoodabad is one such area in Karachi where there is a mixed population. When asked about the prominent features of Mehmoodabad, the first thing that most people mentioned was its ethnic diversity. The experience of visiting this area was like visiting mini-Pakistan. Mohajirs may still be the largest ethnic community, but there are many Punjabis, Sindhis, Kashmiris, Seraikis, Balochis, Pakhtuns, and Christians living in the Mehmoodabad area. This diversity has produced close electoral contests and inconsistent election results. When I conducted the fieldwork, the provincial assembly seat in the area was won by a political party which seldom wins any seats in Karachi. I observed that people living in the same streets or even next to each other had sharply different political views. This is unusual for a city such as Karachi where most neighbourhoods have collective and firm political loyalties.

Most areas in present day Karachi were established or populated after 1947, and Mehmoodabad is one of them. While there is not much written about the history of Mehmoodabad, the area got its name after the creation of Pakistan. Mehmoodabad was named after the Raja of Mehmoodabad, a feudal lord from erstwhile Oudh State, India,

who was an important figure in the movement for independence for Pakistan. Many people I interacted with told me that this area was once a jungle and there were hardly any people living there when their parents migrated to the area. An interviewee also confirmed that most of this area was vacant when he arrived in 1964. People often talked about makeshift houses and dilapidated road conditions when I asked them about the history of this area. However, there was still some distinction between native settlers and later entrants. The residents whose parents arrived in Mehmoodabad decades ago were quick to point out this distinction and set themselves apart from those who moved in recently. Those people whose third generation is living in the same household could be considered indigenous inhabitants in the context of Mehmoodabad.

The area called Mehmoodabad is basically the streets on either side of Mehmoodabad Main Road as illustrated in the following figure. One end of this road where the area of Mehmoodabad begins is called Mehmoodabad Gate. As we move along the road from West to East, the names of the neighbourhoods change to Mehmoodabad 1, Mehmoodabad 2, and up to Mehmoodabad 6, which are essentially the names of the bus stops along the road. The road perpendicular to Mehmoodabad Gate is crowded with restaurants, retail outlets, and other shops of consumer products. The portion of Mehmoodabad Main Road passing through Mehmoodabad neighbourhoods has a lot of commercial activity, while the T-Junction joining the two roads is one of the busiest places in the area. Traffic jams are a common sight during the evenings and traffic congestion is such that it is difficult to walk through.

After some consultations with residents, I chose this T-junction and its immediate surroundings as the neighbourhood I set out to study. This neighbourhood included some streets of Mehmoodabad Gate, Mehmoodabad 1, Allama Iqbal Colony, and shops located in those areas. Although the T-junction and its surroundings had different names in administrative terms, the residents identified the selected area as their 'neighbourhood'. As I visited Karachi for the first time and did not know much about Mehmoodabad, the idea was to select a neighbourhood which would tell the most about the entire Mehmoodabad area. This junction was frequented by people from all the neighbouring areas, and its residents and shopkeepers were anticipated to have a broader understanding of local politics, crime, and social control in their vicinity. See figure 6.1 below (Google Maps 2020b).

Figure 5: The circled area shows the Mehmoodabad's main T-junction and its surroundings.

Like most settlements in Karachi, the selected neighbourhood (hereinafter called Mehmoodabad) was densely populated. The average family size was six among the interviewees. There were around 12 streets in Mehmoodabad, and each street had approximately 20 to 25 houses. Most properties on sale were residential flats on the second and third floors. This was in sharp contrast to Lahore where selling individual floors of a housing unit is almost an alien concept. Due to multiple storey buildings, water and gas supply were major issues as the pipelines were not big enough to cater to this housing pattern. The sewerage system was substandard and, according to residents, even moderate rainfall caused a flood-like situation on the streets. Most housing units were 600 to 1000 square feet in size. The streets were narrow, and two cars could hardly pass in opposite directions simultaneously. Encroachment was common and building bylaws were commonly violated. Waste collection was also a frequently cited issue, and heaps of garbage could be found in and around Mehmoodabad.

Most people identified themselves as belonging to the middle class. While it was obvious to me that the area was not inhabited by many upper-class people, the high prices of real estate meant that people from poorer classes were not able to live there either. Several interviewees described how their neighbourhood was in a prime location of the city due to its proximity with the largest public hospital of Karachi, Shahrah e Faisal (busiest traffic serving road of Karachi), an international airport, and the seaside. The areas adjacent to Mehmoodabad include socioeconomically similar settlements, such as Azam Basti and Rehman Colony. Mehmoodabad is approximately 500 metres from the oldest rural settlement in Karachi, called Chanesar Goth. A high-end residential housing scheme called

DHA-Phase 1 is also within walking distance from Mehmoodabad. The steep difference in civic facilities and socioeconomic status of residents living in these two neighbourhoods is reminiscent of the haphazard development trajectory of Karachi.

Anomalous effects of Ethnic Heterogeneity

Classic social disorganisation theory cites ethnic heterogeneity as one of the three ecological factors which contribute to high crime in neighbourhoods. Numerous studies conducted in Western contexts also confirm this postulation (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson et al. 1997; Hipp and Kane 2017). It is generally agreed that heterogenous groups living in a neighbourhood are less likely to build collective responses to crime and disorder than ethnically homogenous groups. The group threat model takes a different premise but affirms that ethnic diversity is related to higher levels of crime (Blumer 1958). However, to what extent this relationship is determined at the neighbourhood level by the specific socio-political context of the city is inadequately addressed. In Mehmoodabad, I found ethnic heterogeneity to be a protective factor against some types of crimes.

Karachi's politics is largely defined by ethnicity. Even mainstream national level parties appear to represent certain ethnic groups over others. Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM), a political party founded to represent Mohajir's political interests in Karachi, has exercised by far the greatest political influence in the city as compared with any other stakeholder. Except for a few areas where Mohajirs are a minority, MQM swept successive elections in the city with huge margins until their winning streak was checked by the current ruling party of Pakistan via the 2018 general elections.

MQM activists had a reputation for locking the city down and vandalising public and private properties whenever their demands were not met by the provincial and federal governments or whenever they found that their influence in the city was at stake. Other political parties in the city followed suit and used similar tactics. As a result, lockdown and vandalism were frequent issues faced by the residents of Karachi. However, residents of Mehmoodabad boast that their neighbourhood was never locked down by any political group for the simple reason that no ethnic population in Mehmoodabad is large enough to subdue other ethnic groups. Interviewees also mentioned that due to this heterogeneity, their electoral constituency is highly prized by political parties since the winning party can claim that they enjoy the support of all ethnic groups in the city.

On the other hand, ethnic diversity had some adverse impacts for the neighbourhood as well. A residential area called TP2 was populated with Mohajirs by MQM in the vicinity of

Mehmoodabad. According to at least four interviewees, this was done to increase the MQM vote bank in this area as it struggled to win a provincial assembly seat due to ethnic diversity. In terms of crime, two interviewees mentioned that due to an influx of outsiders in TP2, prostitution and electricity theft increased in their area. An influential Punjabi businessman of the area told me that TP2 is so densely packed and was so quickly populated that nobody knows their neighbours in that area. Consequently, several militants from Islamist terrorist organisations went into hiding in TP2. He mentioned a few raids by paramilitary forces where terrorists were apprehended or killed in TP2.

Sarfaraz, a tailor who lived near TP2 noted:

> There are 5000 housing units in TP2. Most of them do not pay electricity bills and steal electricity from main transmission lines [by hooking an electric wire with them and connecting it to their house's power supply] by bribing meter readers. Due to them, we have to pay additional electricity bills and cope with power breakdowns. In this country, honest people must pay double the costs for everything: one for themselves and other on behalf of dishonest people.

Babar, a former councillor of Mehmoodabad, explained: "Many of my friends from other areas have started to mock me recently on this issue [of prostitution] in Mehmoodabad. I have been living here for 50 years but I do not know a single household who is doing this business. It is those tenants and settlers in TP2 who are bringing a bad name to our community."

I did not visit TP2 as it was outside the neighbourhood I was studying, but I crosschecked from news websites and police sources that several wanted criminals sought refuge in this area. I could not independently verify the claim that residents of TP2 stole electricity, but it is common knowledge that electricity theft is committed across most of Karachi. Official crime data showed that there were four rape/adultery cases registered in Mehmoodabad in 2015, whereas no other police station in District South had more than 2 registered cases. There were no records regarding prostitution in the community, although the police officers also talked about it. I assume that these cases were either dealt with informally or under 'adultery'. In any case, statements by interviewees about TP2 showed how a political manoeuvre at a higher level could affect the sense of security of a small neighbourhood in intricate ways. A recent study by Wickes and Hipp (2018) shows that change in socio-demographic composition of an adjacent neighbourhood could impact the expectations for informal social control. Those interviewees who mentioned about TP2

were of the view that their efforts to prevent crime originating from TP2 could not be successful due to a high level of anonymity in that area.

I also observed a pattern where interviewees often blamed members of other ethnic communities for crimes in their neighbourhood. Initially, most interviewees said that all ethnicities in Mehmoodabad live in harmony, with no discrimination based on ethnicity. However, when they were asked to explain causes of crimes and disorder in their neighbourhood, many of them said that it was, to some extent, due to certain ethnic groups. Not a single interviewee blamed his own ethnicity; it was always the 'others' who perpetrated crime.

Liaquat, a Mohajir van-driver, blamed the Saraiki community for robberies:

> These [Saraiki] people are very poor. They come here for work and their women work as housemaids. These women collect secrets of the houses they work in, and then they collaborate with robbers. These [Saraikis] people are not bad, but they are extremely poor. If our government would give them facilities in their hometowns, why would they ever come to Karachi.

Aneeq, a Punjabi tailor, thought that immoral practices in his neighbourhood were due to Christians:

> Before 1990, Christians who lived in Mehmoodabad were conservative. Now VIP [modern] Christians have arrived. A good thing about them is that they pay more rent than the market rate and pay their rents on time, which is why houseowners like them. But their girls wear such dresses that boys are forced to tease them. They have damaged our culture, and now our daughters and sisters are getting immoral. Christians are otherwise good people. They do not fight with anyone and keep to themselves. But I have told you what I do not like about them.

Similarly, Sajid, a Punjabi barber, thought that low politics related crimes in Mehmoodabad were due to fewer Pathans in the neighbourhood: "You know, Pathans are belligerent, and they are known to give a hard time to Mohajirs. But in this neighbourhood, there are few Pathans. So, nobody fights with each other."

Hamid, a prominent businessman, reluctantly shared his views on how ethnicity fosters crime: "I do not know if I shall say it [pointing at the voice recorder]. This 'cross' [breeding] is very dangerous. When one ethnicity/caste is interbred with another, it changes the mindset. If you marry within your caste, you know about your blood and background and

you would not deviate (from the right path). When you marry outside of your ethnicity, your heritage is spoiled."

It is pertinent to note that three of these four interviewees who blamed others in explicit terms were involved in menial professions. Other interviewees especially those in politics were measured in their responses and mentioned these issues between the lines. When I asked interviewees about examples which led them to believe that a certain ethnic group is responsible for deviance, they often gave general accounts of stereotypes perpetuated by media and narratives shaped by political parties. In a city where ethnic strife claimed thousands of lives over the last three decades and was tolerated by the state, it is understandable that people had biases against other ethnicities despite not having any personal experiences to this effect. On the other hand, these biases could have materialised into discriminatory actions and actual conflicts if one ethnicity was able to outnumber the others.

The effects of ethnic heterogeneity on Mehmoodabad were not linear in terms of crime and deviance. The ethnic composition of this neighbourhood helped it to avoid political violence which was rampant across the city. Despite some drawbacks which heterogenous composition brings, people were generally relieved that they were spared from lockdowns. This meant that the fear of political violence was a signal crime for residents. On the other hand, attempts by a political party to alter the ethnic balance resulted in tensions which were yet to manifest themselves in concrete terms. Coexistence was still a prominent feature of the neighbourhood but implicit prejudices against other ethnicities persisted. For example, interethnic marriages were still uncommon although marriages by choice (locally called love marriages) were increasingly tolerated. In the following section, I explain how ethnic heterogeneity was related to informal social control in Mehmoodabad.

A not so low crime neighbourhood

Mehmoodabad was a low crime neighbourhood in the research design, and it was selected after a comparative review of the crime data of all the police stations of District South. Mehmoodabad had reported less crime than other police stations with comparable area and population. In 2015, Mehmoodabad police station registered 461 cases as compared with 555 cases in Clifton, 807 cases in Boat Basin, and 735 cases in Darakhshan police stations. When I walked into the neighbourhood for the first time, it looked familiar to me. The hustle and bustle at the T-junction reminded me of Garhi Shahu. Almost all the shops were open in the bazaar and people were going about their everyday life. I felt assured that

the neighbourhood would have a low crime rate. As I progressed through the interviews, it became apparent that my early impression was incorrect: Mehmoodabad had all the crimes that I could think of. This raised questions on the validity of the official crime statistics that I used to select the neighbourhoods. As was the case in Lahore, crime was significantly underreported to the police and interviewees were not reluctant in acknowledging it. The factors influencing the police's cognizance or reporting of a crime in Mehmoodabad were similar to those mentioned by Black (1970) in "Production of Crime Rates" -- actionability of the complaint, relational distance between the concerned parties, perceived legitimacy or regard of the police, and complainant's socioeconomic status. Additionally, active resistance of the police to register complaints was an important reason for low reporting. The police were not keen to register cases because they then would have to report the progress of these cases to their senior officers. Mobile phone or wallet snatching was one of those crimes where the chances of apprehending the offender were particularly low. In such cases, the police would just give the complainant a receipt, acknowledging that their application was received, but would not register the complaint on the crime record register.

Construction of fear

Except for local politicians and police officers, most interviewees were not hesitant to admit that there was a crime problem in their neighbourhood. Every interviewee, except the barber, had had his or his family members' mobile phone snatched. "I have two mobile phones; a low-cost phone for the road and an expensive phone for the home," a social worker told me. Unlike the low crime neighbourhood in Lahore, people did not seem emotionally attached to their neighbourhood; nor were they overly sensitive about its reputation. I did not dig deep into the reasons for this, but it was likely because population turnover was relatively high, and Mehmoodabad was not a place where people were living for several generations. Any differences that I observed in their opinions about the crime level were primarily based on their perceptions of crime levels from a few years ago and their knowledge of crime in Karachi's most violent neighbourhoods. Babar had a unique view on crime rate in Karachi:

> Karachi has a population of 25 million. Of course, there will be crimes; every
> megacity has them. New York is such an advanced country [sic]. A rape occurs
> every three seconds there. People are murdered there as well. Their prisoners are
> so dangerous. I was watching a movie the other day, and they had such a huge

prison and a fort in London, which is called the Prison of London Tower. It was built

by the Queen of England in 1618 [sic]. So, every megacity has crimes.

Regardless of the accuracy of the information that the interviewee had about crime in England and New York, I observed that fear of crime and perceptions of security could be significantly altered by factors which are apparently unrelated to the actual level of crime in the neighbourhoods. Just by watching Hollywood movies, this interviewee concluded that crime is a ubiquitous problem in the modern world, and one has to cope with it. On the other hand, a barber was so paranoid about being victimised that he was visibly trembling when I talked to him. I was told by one of his friends that he had witnessed a murder in another area of Karachi and since then he was extremely afraid of even minor scuffles. During this research, I did not find a pattern to predict fear of crime or sense of security based on the socioeconomic attributes of respondents. The only exception is that the rich were more confident in getting things done through the police station, which could positively affect their sense of security. Other than that, an assessment of people's perception of order or disorder would require an understanding of the meaning-making processes in social contexts.

Crimes perpetrated from neighbouring neighbourhoods

Most interviewees conceded that crime in Mehmoodabad had decreased significantly during the past year. This decline was attributed to a citywide operation by paramilitary forces to rid Karachi of organised crime. However, this crime drop was not reflected in police crime statistics, which again shed light on the problems with crime reporting in the neighbourhood. For some, the relief brought by paramilitary operations was temporary. Moreover, they believed that as soon as the operations ended, the crime rate would rise again. Drugs and mugging were frequently cited crimes in the neighbourhood, but the neighbourhood had also witnessed murders, extortion, robberies, kidnappings, and encroachment of public spaces. Most of these crimes, except encroachment, were allegedly committed by gangs from a neighbouring area called Chanesar Goth. Every interviewee stressed that the neighbourhood would be much more peaceful if crimes from Chanesar Goth were stopped. This view compelled me to visit Chanesar Goth, but some local influentials and a police officer strongly advised me against any such adventure. Khizar, the policeman, said: "It is a lawless hell. Since the gangs are disbanded, this area is even more dangerous as no assurance from anyone inside Goth would guarantee your protection."

Following their advice, I did not venture inside Chanesar Goth; so, most of what I noted about this area came from police officers and residents of Mehmoodabad. Numerous news reports over the past decade portray Chanesar Goth as an economically disadvantaged neighbourhood characterised by narrow streets, poor residents, and a lack of education and civic facilities. 'Goth' in Sindhi language means village, and this area was inhabited by a predominantly ethnic Sindhi population long before the vacant jungle around them turned into Mehmoodabad. While the city developed post-partition, Chanesar Goth could not keep pace with it and is now one of the underdeveloped areas of Karachi. However, a senior national politician had lately emerged from the area and developmental work had been done. "Recently, streetlights were installed in every street of Goth by the newly elected Chairman of Union Council," a police officer told me. Drug peddling has been on the rise in this neighbourhood for at least 30 years and gangs have fought for territory and control over the drug market. Use of automatic firearms, rockets and hand grenades was common and several people were murdered in the process. Such activity earned this area the title of 'mini-Lyari', Lyari being the most violent neighbourhood of Karachi. These gangs allegedly had political and bureaucratic support which further complicated the situation. At the time of fieldwork, paramilitary forces had conducted several raids and apprehended numerous gangsters and drug peddlers, which had resulted in relative calm.

All the interviewees were unanimous in their condemnation of Goth and the crimes associated with it. Some interviewees viewed the crime problem in Goth as a political gambit which made it a sanctuary for target killers associated with some political parties. Others thought that politicians at the highest level directly benefited from the large-scale drug and gambling business. Yet others considered it a deliberately crafted no-go area where law enforcement agencies could dump the bodies of people killed extrajudicially. People also varied in their opinions on how the crime problem in Goth could be solved. But no one doubted that it was the spill over effect from Chanesar Goth that had caused criminal activities in Mehmoodabad. Residents of Goth would snatch mobile phones and money from people with impunity and disappear into narrow streets of their area. Sajid explained how young boys of Goth operated:

> The Goth in our backyard is full of criminals who snatch mobile phones at gunpoint and commit robberies. Then, there are lots of drugs here because of them. Thanks to Allah, since this government was sworn in, we are feeling much better. Otherwise, the way we are sitting now and talking, we could not have done that a few months ago. The fear was such that I can't explain. We were always terrified

that they will come and snatch our money or mobile phone or would terrorise us for no reason. For example, if they came to me for hair grooming, they would pick some fault with their hair cut. Or they would argue over the money charged for our services. Then they would bring 15 and 20 guys with them who would beat us and vandalise our shops.

The youngsters this barber talked about need not belong to gangs. Every other boy in Chanesar Goth was capable of such transgressions, according to Mehmoodabad residents. The gang members would commit more sophisticated crimes, such as murders, robberies and extortion. In the context of Karachi, extortion involved making a threatening phone call or dropping a letter to a wealthy person and asking for a substantial sum in exchange for sparing the victim's life or that of his family. Several interviewees did not know whether someone had been extorted in their neighbourhood, probably because victims typically would not inform any one about it. However, Agha Sahib, a real estate agent, recalled a recent incident which showed that gang activity was still ongoing: "Just last week, two guys came and snatched Rs. 35000 from the milkman just next to this shop. A greengrocer only had Rs. 1300 in his pocket, but they did not even spare him. Then, they went back to their neighbourhood. … Nobody intervened although everybody knew who they are."

I noted that when residents talked about crimes from Chanesar Goth, there was a sense of fatalism in the way they described those crimes. The risk inherent in crimes committed by offenders of Chanesar Goth for an amount as little as Rs. 1300 or for not paying the barber for a haircut also signify fatalism. Young offenders commit such "for the hell of it" (Cohen 1955, p. 26) crimes to gain a sense of control in the face of the constraints and challenges (Greenberg 1977; Agnew 1984; Tittle 1995) they face or to negate the fatalism that their disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances may imply (Brezina 2000). While delinquency as a response to fatalism is well researched or theorised in criminology, it is hardly discussed how fatalism at a group level impacts informal control processes in terms of preventing victimisation. In cases where risks are perceived to be uncontrollable, people tend to adapt and may take the victimisation to be part of life (Sunstein 1998). I observed that such a disposition towards crime had important implications for the construction of social order in the neighbourhood.

Our own criminals

Mehmoodabad residents maintained that their own youth were also corrupted due to organised crime in Chanesar Goth. Some of the boys in Mehmoodabad had friendships with

their counterparts in Goth, and they either participated in or helped them with their crimes. These were mostly boys from a disadvantaged background who found crime an easy way to gain influence and earn quick money. Some of them met Goth boys because they purchased drugs from them. Shaukat, an MQM worker, noted: "Cannabis, gambling dens, and illegal breweries are the hallmarks of Goth. It is obvious that our boys get attracted to these as they are the potential customers for those running these enterprises. No one can remain immune when things are happening around you so openly."

Sarfaraz had something important to say about perpetrators of crime in his neighbourhood: "Brother, if some local commits crime in my area, of course I would recognise him. The [unwritten] rule is that boys from this neighbourhood commit crime somewhere else and outsiders come here [to commit crime]."

In view of these statements and opinions of other interviewees, there were two main overlapping categories of local offenders in Mehmoodabad. Firstly, there were youngsters working in association with criminals from Goth. They could act as informers, facilitate gambling, or sell drugs on behalf of main peddlers. In such cases, people would blame criminal enterprises operating in Goth. Secondly, some boys were suspected to be involved in mugging with or without support from Goth, but they were believed to be operating outside their neighbourhood. This is consistent with Baldwin et al. (1976)'s finding in Sheffield that offence and offenders were concentrated in spatially distinct parts of the city. In such cases, residents of Mehmoodabad were not much concerned as the alleged crimes were not happening in their vicinity. Most interviewees would blame either a lack of parental supervision or unemployment as the main reasons why youngsters in their neighbourhood were getting involved in crime. Their main apprehension about these youngsters was that they would become drug addicts, but residents did not feel particularly vulnerable towards them. Although residents were not keen to protect their own criminals from prosecution or outsiders unlike the Pathan area of Begumpura, this disposition of feeling an affinity with offenders in their area limited the residents' ability to enforce informal sanctions on delinquency in their neighbourhood.

People from other neighbourhoods were also thought to be responsible for street crimes. Some interviewees insisted that tenants living in Azam Basti, Rehman Colony, and TP2 also snatched mobile phones and cash within their neighbourhood. However, this view was not consistent and appeared to be an attempt on the part of the residents to rationalise a high level of street crimes in their neighbourhood. It was unfathomable for most interviewees

that a permanent resident from Mehmoodabad would perpetrate crime around their own house. Consequently, outsiders were stereotyped for their ethnicity, place of residence, and socioeconomic status. This 'othering' of residents from other nearby neighbourhoods had negative effects in terms of controlling crime originating from Chanesar Goth. Even if informal control efforts were insufficient to affect motivated offenders of Chanesar Goth, collective protests by residents of all the other neighbourhoods could have forced the formal control institutions to act. However, no such organised effort was reported to me during my stay in Mehmoodabad.

Politics of Homicide and Extortion

There were incidents of homicide in Mehmoodabad but only a few interviewees felt comfortable talking about them. Residents referred to these incidents as 'target killings' by which they meant first degree murders. Most interviewees lamented such incidents and considered them beyond their scope of comprehension. Homicides were mainly politically motivated or due to financial disputes between parties. These incidents did not affect the perception of security to the same extent as a murder committed during mobile snatching. Interviewees were generally of the opinion that politics is a dangerous business in Karachi, and there is always a chance of victimisation when you are in contention of power. They would talk of murders as rare events and some of them dismissed murder as something which was not related to my research on 'neighbourhood crime'. In other words, they considered murder as something arising out of the broader political scenario of Karachi even when residents of the neighbourhood were directly involved. Nomi, an NGO worker, who was comfortable talking about political violence explained:

> Some of our boys who were political workers later got involved in target killings and large-scale extortion. They lived in Dubai and would visit only to do their 'job'. Even their mothers did not know what business they were involved in. Why would their [mothers] bother when they are getting gold jewellery as presents from their sons? … It is not about poverty; their fathers were employed in reasonable jobs. Once you develop an appetite for easy money, there is no going back.

Sibtain, a spiritual healer, told me about some murders and assassination attempts: "In the recent past, there have been some incidents where MQM workers and activists from another party were murdered. The office where you were sitting [before this interview] was also fired at. Someone tried to assassinate them. MQM office bearers were also attacked. So, there has been that."

Faisal, an MQM Unit In-charge, contradicted this version: "There have been target killings in Mehmoodabad, but those killings were based on financial disputes. For example, the victim owed some money to people from outside the neighbourhood and they killed him. Those murders were not politically motivated. … But [in any case], these incidents were not related to the neighbourhood. The people who did this are still unknown to the police."

According to the spiritual healer, workers of MQM and another political party had been killed. Considering that both these interviewees were referring to the singular incident, it is understandable why the MQM Unit In-charge would not agree to these being political murders. The cause of these murders was difficult to ascertain because asking such questions would have made it difficult for me to get honest answers to the rest of my questions. In any case, it is common knowledge that those political workers in Karachi who perpetrate violence against their opponents are also often involved in other types of crime. So, in cases where the culprits are not caught, one can only speculate the motive behind the killings. But in the larger picture, every nook and corner of Karachi has been politically contested and Mehmoodabad is no different. Despite affirmation by the interviewees that Mehmoodabad was never locked down, Dilshad, a social worker, told me:

> My brother runs a general store in this area. Some incident happened in Karachi, and he was asked by some political activists to shut his shop. I will not name those guys although I know them personally. Now it takes time to close a running store. They did not wait and fired several shots directly at the shop. I thought someone got murdered. I ran to a policeman nearby and asked him for help when they were firing. He told me that he had not received any orders to intervene.

The interviewee further said that the perpetrators were from the neighbourhood. He did not ask them why they had attacked the store; he just avoided all interaction. "In a country where Prime Ministers have been murdered in broad daylight and killers are still at large, who would have listened to us poor people," he explained. In addition to such incidents, political activists were also accused by some of small-scale extortion. During Eid-ul-Fitar celebrations, Muslims are required to donate a certain amount to needy people, and, in Eid-ul-Adha, the hides of sacrificial animals are to be given as alms. On both these occasions, workers of political parties would come and ask for these donations.

Ghulam Nabi, an elder estate agent, in Mehmoodabad explained: "They would give us receipts of animal hides even before we have slaughtered the animal. This would mean that we are compelled to give them or face [adverse] consequences. I personally used to

pay Fitrana [donation on Eid-ul-Fitr] twice [first to political workers and second to poor people for fulfilling the religious obligation]."

This coercion had stopped recently as the crackdown against militant wings of political parties continued. The involvement of political parties in running neighbourhood affairs was extensive and much more than in Lahore. The political-criminal nexus was strong and intertwined in complex ways, but the interviewees would seldom mention it as something significant. It appeared that transgressions by local political groups were internalised by the residents as inevitable. As I explain in the following section, this acceptance had both positive and negative implications for the way informal control was exercised in Mehmoodabad.

Three facets of informal social control

The informal control in Mehmoodabad could be conceptualised into three categories. The first includes the informal sanctions or censure common residents impose on budding delinquents in their neighbourhood, which was limited in scope and extent. The second involves office bearers of political parties who had their own system of managing conflict and violence. However, these political actors could be better described as managers of deviance where their best role was to ensure that the status quo was maintained. The third category include any mechanisms of social control by the residents of Mehmoodabad, which were ineffective against crime perpetrated from Chanesar Goth. However, political leaders had some rudimentary linkages in Goth which restrained the gangs to alter the political order in Mehmoodabad.

Soft Control among neighbours

Sajid: "My brother, this is a city not a village. People talk with each other that women of this or that house are involved in prostitution but that is just for gossip. No one comes forward here to bell the cat."

Majeed (a rickshaw driver): "I am not a fan of dying. Brother, a stray bullet is enough to end your life here. No one would know why you were killed. We just need to keep to earning our living."

Abdul Nabi (Ex-Chairman of the Conflict Resolution Committee): "Instead of boycotting them, people start respecting those who are involved in crime. How can you disconnect with [deviant] people? If you do not talk with them for a few days, they will notice and think how dare he. Then they would offensively brush their shoulder walking past you, or they might say something offensive to you on the street while drunk."

Dilshad: "Of course, we have to keep relations with every person in the neighbourhood. These people [criminals] appear different from the rest. They would wear expensive clothes and watches. Our people see from a distance that someone important is coming. Ordinary people would respectfully ask, "How are you brother?"… Their [criminals] mothers are proud of their sons."

Zulqarnain (a shopkeeper): "What can I as a neighbour do if a person living in my neighbourhood drinks alcohol or uses drugs? At most, I can ask my children to avoid his company."

These statements present a grim picture of a neighbourhood's capacity to exercise informal social control. But it is important to distinguish what kind of crimes people are referring to when talking about informal control. For instance, it was difficult for people to come forward against prostitution, as an unproved allegation could cause problems for the whistle blower. In the other two quotations, interviewees were talking about drug peddlers or bookmakers. Residents generally found it difficult to prevent crimes by people whose livelihood depends on the crime. "Trying to force them into abandoning their work would result in nothing but discord in the neighbourhood. After all they operate at someone's behest," Agha Sahib said.

Informal control efforts at interpersonal levels were more effective against social aberrations e.g. warning teenagers who were roaming the streets at night or smoking cigarettes. But this was also limited to those neighbours who were living in the same street and had cordial relations with their parents. Interviewees agreed that most people know the children in their neighbourhood and might tell the parents if their child is wandering in the area during school timings. However, there seemed a dearth of apolitical initiatives to prevent crime in the neighbourhood. One reason may be that, although people from different ethnicities lived together in a street, they had deeper interpersonal relationships with people from their own ethnicity even if those people were living two or three streets away. Secondly, a significant number of tenants in the neighbourhood meant that a large number of the people had moved in only months or a few years ago; consequently, they did not have the level of social cohesion which may be required to enact social control. In addition, the anonymity accorded by population turnover made it difficult for eyes on the streets to monitor or control deviance.

As compared with neighbourhoods I visited in Lahore, civic facilities in Mehmoodabad were significantly more dilapidated. Issues related to water supply, low natural gas pressure on

upper floors of houses, and dysfunctional sewerage systems kept people occupied after they returned from work. It was also apparent that most people in the neighbourhood were on their own in securing jobs and earning their livelihood. The kind of patronage and social capital owing to the 'Baradari system' (caste-based group solidarity), as witnessed in Lahore, was not present in Mehmoodabad. Political patronage filled this vacuum to some extent, but this then also resulted in divesting community agency to political actors. Overall, community based informal control as observed in Lahore was not to be seen to the same degree in Mehmoodabad.

Informal control via Politics

Soft control exercised by neighbours is only one part of the story of informal control in the neighbourhood. Mehmoodabad had layers of informal control embedded in power politics of local and regional agents. This was evident in the differences of opinion regarding informal control between ordinary residents and those at the helm of affairs in the neighbourhood. Nisar, a union councillor in Mehmoodabad, had the following to say about informal control:

> We [the residents] arrange for our own security in case of an event. We only call the police when we need the crowd to disperse during a fight. … We expel any tenants who cause trouble by talking to landlords. … Before the election day, we call people from all political parties and tell them that polling is only from morning to evening, but we will remain neighbours after that. So, let's forget any animosity as soon as the elections are over.

Abdul Nabi, who belonged to a different political party, also spoke highly of informal control in the neighbourhood:

> Before my political party was stigmatised for being a proxy of RAW [an Indian Intelligence Agency], we had vigilance committees in the neighbourhood. These were groups of youngsters who would roam around the streets, and if they saw any suspicious person on the streets, they would stop him and conduct an identity check. They did not allow any dubious stranger to enter the neighbourhood. This system is still working to some extent, but political workers from my party are now afraid that they may be rounded up by the law enforcement agencies for being militants.

Gujjar, another local influential, who was not involved in electoral politics highlighted his level of engagement:

> A taxi driver's son used to sit with a dacoit. The police arrested him and implicated him in a false case. They then demanded Rs. 70,000 for his release. The taxi driver paid that amount and asked for his son to be released. The police officer said that he can only declare him innocent in the investigation report but, now that the FIR is registered, only the court could set his son free. The taxi driver was furious and filed a complaint in the Anti-Corruption Department. Then the police officer came to me for arbitration. I asked him to return the money but still favour the boy in investigation. I also asked the taxi driver to withdraw his complaint against the officer. I gave personal guarantee and the matter was resolved.

As may be noted from the above statements, informal social control was exercised by notable residents through interpersonal local networks or political capital. Similar efforts were undertaken at a more sophisticated level by MQM who had offices across the city which worked throughout the year for political mobilisation, dispute resolution, and as a bridge between community and the state. These offices, called Units or Union Committees, also had a reputation of organising violent protests and sheltering criminals, but they were also deemed instrumental in managing the affairs of the neighbourhood. When I visited the unit office in Mehmoodabad, people had gathered to resolve a dispute. Both the parties were sitting in front of each other and two functionaries of MQM were adjudicating. During my interviews with MQM office bearers, they shared numerous instances where they helped resolve conflicts between residents and prevented crime and violence. According to them, everything was under control and there was nothing extraordinary about crime in Mehmoodabad. When I asked about Chanesar Goth, Farooq, a senior office bearer of MQM, explained: "Some Goth guys were mugging people in the next street corner. We asked the police and Rangers to control them, but they could not be present there all the time, so we warned the elders of Chanesar Goth. They cooperated with us. … This only happens on a party basis."

People had mixed opinions about the efficacy of the MQM Unit in Mehmoodabad. Sajid had a positive opinion: "Whatever people say about MQM, they swiftly resolve matters. If they ask someone not to beat his wife, he must oblige. If they ask boys to not harass women, they never dare to."

It is apparent that political actors in the neighbourhood are viable agents of informal social control. They use their political or financial influence to settle matters and impose informal sanctions on delinquents. People visit them for help when matters get out of hand, but

who goes to which political actor is determined by several factors, including ethnicity, personal relations, and in some cases the nature of the problem. Here, two questions are important to address. Firstly, what qualifies as delinquency for these political actors may differ from what are generally considered delinquent behaviours by the residents at large because these political actors have coercive power which is intricately derived from people engaged in crime in one way or the other. Consequently, their exercise of social control is skewed in favour of those people. For instance, a union councillor may resolve family disputes or fights between young groups but may not be able to stop extortion. Secondly, ordinary residents of the neighbourhood did not think highly of the way political actors administered justice. Several interviewees told me that poor people are often discriminated against while the rich and strong are favoured against the weak. In the end, these political groups need support to thrive; so, electoral advantage is their primary consideration in settling disputes. I noticed that in cases where these actors found themselves in conflict with each other, diplomacy often prevailed over coercion or violence. Overall, this system of informal social control worked best when a socially modest person was victimised by a person of similar social standing.

Failure of Informal Control

Informal control in Mehmoodabad was probably the weakest when controlling crime that perpetrated from Chanesar Goth. The gangs in Goth switched their political loyalties with change in governments, and they would often be on the right side of the political equilibrium. These gangs were also useful for politicians as they could help them win elections in a city mired by widespread violence. One MQM supporter told me that a bomb was thrown at their election candidate's vehicle when he went inside Chanesar Goth for election campaign. Gujjar also affirmed that gangs enjoyed political backing: "Those who made the current MP win elections are under tonnes of soil now [killed by law enforcement agencies]. He could not have won elections without them." In addition to the immunity they enjoyed due to their political clout, criminals of Chanesar Goth were also capable of unleashing deadly assaults against their adversaries. Mehmoodabad found it overwhelming to prevent crime and violence from Goth through indigenous means.

Two interviewees told me about an incident where a person tried to organise a forum to raise a voice against criminal enterprises in Chanesar Goth. That person was shot dead in the main street when scores of people were watching. The murderer waved his gun in front of the crowd and warned them that the same fate awaited them if they appeared before the courts to testify against him. The murderer was later killed in a raid by Rangers due to

his involvement in gang war. For the two interviewees who narrated the incident, this blatant act of murder was enough to convince them that there was nothing they could do except pray to God that the murderer meets a similar fate. Both were pleased that he was killed by Rangers. I noted that many people I met in Mehmoodabad highly appreciated the Rangers' operations in Karachi even though they realised that the Rangers were operating 'above the law' in the way they went about controlling crime. Two MQM workers told me that some people they knew were 'abducted' by Rangers, and later released for lack of evidence. There was no record of their detention in any police station. In another incident, a person was reported as missing for several months; his family was told by the police officers that they could not help them. However, most respondents were of the view that since the police cannot control crime and the criminal justice system cannot punish offenders, Rangers' acts are not only justified but necessary. I found it paradoxical in the sense that people were willing to concede some of their liberties to the state for their security because the state was unable to provide them security in the first place.

When I asked about measures they had taken to secure their neighbourhood from gangs, many interviewees asked what could they possibly do. Control measures such as street lighting, speed barriers, and patrolling by youth groups were ineffective in this context. I observed that repeated victimisation had constructed fear among the residents, and the situation was hopeless for them. It was only through repeated anti-terrorism operations by Rangers in Goth that people felt relieved, but they were not optimistic for the long term. According to Kifayat, a magazine publisher: "There is a culture of violence in Chanesar. They are just like that. You kill Gang A, Gang B would appear in a few days, then Gang C, Gang D, and so on. I have spent my whole life here. Goth can never be crime free unless there is the political will to bring people out of poverty and educate them."

The only people in Mehmoodabad having some influence over stakeholders in Chanesar Goth were the political actors. They could get compensation or exact an apology from Goth's criminals if they or their close relatives were victimised. A few such incidents were reported to me, including one by a local councillor whose influence in Goth was an exception:

> They snatched a mobile phone and cash from my brother at gunpoint. We knew
> they were from Chanesar. I took my brother with me to Goth and asked him to
> identify those guys. Once he told me who they were, I apprehended them and
> handed them to the police. … I was requested by some quarters to pardon them,

but I do not budge once I take a decision. They (Chanesar Goth's criminals) very well know who I am.

The councillor did not explain to me how he managed to identify and get hold of those armed boys. He just gave me a wry smile in response, but I could imagine that there was some basic level of understanding between power players of Goth and Mehmoodabad. But any such understanding was limited to the protection of lives and properties of powerful political families in Mehmoodabad and, without exception, it did not extend to common residents.

What the police think they do

Mehmoodabad Police Station is just around 300 meters from the neighbourhood. Although it is named after Mehmoodabad, its jurisdiction includes TP2 Colony, Azam Town, Azam Basti, Kashmir Colony, and Chanesar Goth. When I inquired about the Station House Officer (SHO) of the Police Station, I was intrigued to know that his surname was 'Commando'. When I asked him how he got this surname, he replied that he topped his commando training course and he was also part of the commando unit in an infamous 1992 operation against 'anti-social elements'. Residents of Mehmoodabad had a slightly different view; they believed that SHO was called Commando due to his reputation for killing hardened criminals during 'encounters'. A quick google search on the SHO revealed that he had a reputation for being tough on organized crime and was often deputed to areas with spiralling crime crises. I thought he was appointed in Mehmoodabad Police Station to tackle gangs and crime rackets in Chanesar Goth and he emphatically affirmed it:

> I've been posted here for one and a half years. It has been a nice experience. This area started to report a very high level of crime, especially drug carters were huge. I had to do a tough operation here. Lots of criminals were killed, including fugitives, gang war people, and high-profile terrorists. I have recovered record amounts of weapons and drugs from this area. Nowhere in Karachi have such recoveries been made. We have confiscated rocket launchers, heavy machine guns; and light machine guns were confiscated. When I cleared the Chanesar Goth area, I showed 25 entrenchments to the media which they [gangs] had constructed to fight against each other.

In local policing language, 'encounter' means any situation where criminals and police use weapons against each other. SHO stated that he took 'encounter' as a policy in this area. By saying this, he meant that he anticipated armed resistance when raiding the criminals and

was prepared for showdowns. His key strategy for conducting these raids was to gather prior intelligence from local people who were living amidst criminals and wanted to get rid of them. He also mentioned that he had a team of police officers who he gets appointed wherever he is deputed. His team members were ex-army men, skilful in gathering intelligence and conducting operations. They kept an eye on the activities of gangs, Taliban, Daesh (ISIL), and proscribed sectarian terrorist organisations. "There are some 37 churches in my jurisdiction and collective prayers are held there every Sunday. There is imminent threat of terrorist attacks," the officer noted. I was surprised to hear this because most interviewees in Mehmoodabad did not mention the presence of terrorists in Mehmoodabad and its surroundings, whereas police officers talked about them the most during their interviews.

In addition to the crime in Chanesar Goth, infamous criminals from TP2 were settled by a political party, and the police had to conduct several operations to arrest or eliminate them. According to the SHO, he was supported by political parties only to the extent that these parties did not intervene or come after arrested criminals. This was because he took indiscriminate action against everybody, regardless of political affiliation. With regards to Mehmoodabad, he talked about the spill-over effects from Chanesar Goth and TP2. "Some guys started spending time [committing crime] in Mehmoodabad. I have arrested them," he said.

The police officer and his immediate subordinate were strong advocates of community policing. However, they did not like the idea of coordinating with organised informal groups, political or otherwise. He spoke against Pathan's Jirga and MQM's unit system. According to the police officers, it is most important to first ask the residents what they wanted. SHO said that he tries to do community service along with crime control. He almost always attends funerals and tries to attend most community events. He claimed that many people who never visited the police station know him by face due to his engagement with local people. He recalled instances where he helped clear garbage in the area and resolved minor disputes in his personal capacity. SHO further told me that consuming alcohol was a serious issue in his jurisdiction, and people died on every festival due to illegally manufactured liquor. The surrounding area of Mehmoodabad has a large Christian and Hindu population who can drink alcohol legally. The SHO said that he read the Bible and found verses which forbid drinking alcohol. He published brochures including those verses, distributed them among these communities and requested the Pastors to encourage people to quit drinking. He also showed me those brochures that he had

published. According to him, this strategy proved largely successful and around 50% had quit drinking.

What people think about the police

SHO's claim that most people involved in organised crimes have been killed was not denied by any interviewee, although they gave the credit for this to paramilitary forces more than the police. "One and a half years ago, the price of a house had fallen to Rs. 2.5 million, due to high levels of crime. Now it is back to Rs. 5 million," Ghulam Nabi told me. Residents in Mehmoodabad appreciated that the crime situation had improved remarkably, but the problems affecting them the most, such as muggings and drugs, were still not under control. This is understandable since paramilitary and police operations in Chanesar Goth and TP2 were largely an offshoot of a country wide anti-terrorist drive following the 2014 Peshawar School Massacre by Taliban terrorists. Hence, these operations were aimed at arresting and killing high profile criminals and dismantling crime syndicates. Although this undertaking significantly reduced organised crime activities in Mehmoodabad, people were more concerned about crimes that affected their daily lives. As a result, the perception of security had not improved to the degree one would expect after such targeted operations. According to Liaquat, "With all those operations conducted by the police and rangers, the net result is that drugs are now sold on streets as compared to when they were sold at designated places."

People's perceptions of the police were largely similar to those I had found in Lahore. Corruption, patronage of crime, inefficacy, and inappropriate behaviour among residents were frequently mentioned allegations. Some interviewees admitted that the current SHO was proactive in controlling crime, but the larger image of local police in their eyes remained bleak. Most interviewees were oblivious of the concrete steps mentioned by the SHO to control crime. The following are statements made by different interviewees which sum up the people's opinions about the police:

Babar: "Look at that place [pointing at an open space]. You might see a police van there or it might come anytime now. They park their van here and sleep. They patrol the area, but when they run out of fuel, they just try to gather food [money] for their children."

Gulfam: "You will find them getting barbecue or fruits from street vendors for free. This is because these street hawkers encroach onto the road, and they have to oblige the police. When they come to me for a haircut, they pay me whatever they want, but I don't ask them."

Gujjar: "Assume you are sitting on a chair in front of a police officer. What if he asks you to stand up? You will die of shame. This is what they do to people. They kill self-esteem."

I noticed that, despite some extraordinary initiatives by the SHO, the workings of his lower level staff had not changed much. People's attitude towards the police were significantly affected by how police officers are seen to be working, especially in terms of their interaction with the public. Drinking a cup of tea for free from a hotel damaged their reputation more than they could perhaps gain after arresting a criminal. SHO and another senior officer admitted that their staff sometimes took bribes from encroachers. They told me that if someone comes with such a complaint, they ask the concerned policeman to return the money.

Public concerns about the police were of the nature which could be addressed by a committed SHO. Talking politely with people, not taking money or products from street hawkers or for registering a complaint are only small changes which could disproportionately alter public opinion about the police. The more visible a policing action, the more it affects how people view the police as a force. This observation is similar to findings of the research conducted in the UK as part of the National Reassurance Policing Project, which showed that disorderly events in public spaces were considered 'top threats' by interviewees (Innes 2004; Bottoms 2009). The SHO in Mehmoodabad may have apprehended many criminals, but he was not successful in disseminating this information to the people. Despite his claims of outreach towards people, they did not consider police officers to be friendly. This may be because most people interact with officers on patrol and not the SHO.

It appeared that creating a favourable image of the police station through procedural justice was not something SHO was highly concerned about. He was posted on a special assignment i.e. to control organised crime. He would be transferred to another police station after he completed the task. He was answerable to his superiors for the actions that he had taken against criminals, and perhaps not for the way people view the police service in his jurisdiction. In addition, he mentioned how his salary was too low for his expenses and he earned his livelihood by receiving head-money for arresting or killing infamous criminals. On the other hand, even if an officer takes initiatives for community policing, such as the one taken to control alcohol consumption, these were not institutionalised and likely to be discontinued after the concerned officer is transferred. The postcolonial legacy appeared entrenched in policing practices in Mehmoodabad; a lasting transformation

towards democratic policing practices required political will and policy changes at a level beyond the scope of a SHO. Moreover, with different political actors vying for power in Mehmoodabad, arbitrary attempts to involve the community in the police's decision making could result in the police force being more favourable to one group over another.

Intervention: No one wants it

Political leaders in Mehmoodabad talked about instances where the police worked with them to provide security at events or to resolve disputes. In some instances, people expected the police to intervene to a limited extent; however, once the police arrived, the police would deal with the matter in their own way. This made the political office bearers wary of calling the police unless it was deemed necessary. I found certain instances where the police facilitated informal control efforts to control some problems either because they did not deem those problems important or because they did not have the resources to act on their own. For instance, when muggings increased sharply in Mehmoodabad Bazar, a vigilance team comprising of 12 youngsters was formed by an influential businessman to keep watch in the night. Identity cards of the team members were submitted to the police station and the team had informal support of the police. Similarly, police often provided security to participants of political gatherings in cooperation with political activists. In both cases, the police were not keen to work with the local community but did so to reduce the burden of their duties.

I noticed that the police were more likely to act on complaints of organised groups than common individuals probably because, if the action were delayed, these groups could act on their own, making matters worse. The SHO categorically stated that he did not like these groups because they try to run a parallel system of justice. However, on the ground, realities of the neighbourhood meant that he was obliged to consult political groups on certain matters. The Imam of the local mosque was also contacted to discuss the security plan on religious occasions. As far as the general public was concerned, almost all interviewees could not recall a single instance in their lives where their input was requested on policing matters.

Conclusion

Although the police record showed this neighbourhood to have low crime, my findings revealed that residents had a perception of high crime. This neighbourhood was situated just next to one of the most violent neighbourhoods in Karachi. It had a 'full spectrum' of crime problems, ranging from youth delinquency through to murder and terrorism. This

reality in turn raises some contradictions and dilemmas in terms of the configuration of social control. As the graveness of crimes increases, residents' efforts at social control tend to be less effective. Informal sanctions against young neighbours for minor deviances were in effect but in gradual decline as the willingness to intervene was adversely affected by a lack of control over crime. Political groups oversaw the control of intermediate crime problems. While these groups were partially successful in this function, their presence ensured that crime problems would only be managed, not resolved. For more serious crime problems originating from Chanesar Goth, the informal control processes were largely ineffective. There was a realisation among the residents that their immediate concerns were not important to the state and any relief that they could get in terms of crime control was largely a consequence of high-level political decision making.

The story of Mehmoodabad is largely the story of the limits of informal social control. It shows that a community's agency can be eroded to the point of inaction if the community members are frightened that their actions will result in their deaths or harm to their loved ones. In some important ways, social configuration of Mehmoodabad was similar to Baumgartner's (1989) study of 'Hampton' in New York City. Mehmoodabad largely represented a 'disorganised social order' characterised by 'moral minimalism' and avoidance of conflict (Baumgartner 1989, pp. 134-135) . This neighbourhood showed that informal social control mechanisms must be ultimately underwritten by the state's capacity to uphold the rule of law. However, how weak states, such as Pakistan, address this phenomenon has not been explored by Western scholars operating in strong states.

Chapter 7 A promised land: The 'high' crime neighbourhood in Karachi

I was sitting in the office of the Senior Superintendent of the Police (SSP), in Karachi; he was my friend's colleague. He was away for a meeting but had ordered his staff to provide me with the data I needed. I was having tea when his personal assistant (PA) came with print outs of crime data of all the police stations in the district for the past three years.

"Sir, what do you want to do with this data?" the PA asked.

"I want to identify a low crime and a high crime area in this district, areas which are otherwise similar in terms of socioeconomic status of its residents and civic facilities," I replied.

"Hmm. FIRs (First Information Reports) do not tell much about crime level. Let me call Sibtain who has had postings in almost all the police stations of this district. He can guide you better than I could."

Sibtain was probably in the same building at that time since he arrived quickly. I first discussed low crime areas with him. He gave me three or four options and explained the characteristics of each. When I asked about high crime areas in the district, he instantly retorted "Shireen Jinnah Colony". We discussed for at least 10 minutes why he considered the area to be high crime. I told him that I would think and read further about which low crime area I would want to select, but I had decided to take Shireen Jinnah Colony as the high crime neighbourhood for my study. Before I could thank him for his time, he asked "How will you study these areas?" I told him that I would visit those areas, meet the people, roam around, and select interviewees. This answer took him by surprise, and he immediately warned me: "No, no, no. I did not know that you wanted to physically go to these places. Shireen Jinnah is not a place to enter and talk to people. You will get yourself into trouble. O Bhai [Brother], even the police think hard before going there. If you must, just take interviews from the roadside and request SSP *Sahib* to provide you with one or two policemen for security."

SIbtain's concerns did not seem unfounded as Shireen Jinnah Colony falls under the jurisdiction of Boat Basin Police Station which had registered more complaints in 2013 and 2015 than any of the other twelve police stations in district South. In 2013, Boat Basin Police Station registered 740 cases including 63 robberies which were substantially higher than the other police stations in the district. In 2015, Boast Basin Police Station registered

807 cases as compared with 735 cases registered by the police station next to it in terms of crime rate. While neighbourhood crime data was not available, the police officer was convinced that a significant number of crimes reported in Boat Basin Police Station originated from Shireen Jinnah Colony. Nonetheless, I went to Shireen Jinnah after consulting with the concerned SSP who gave me a go-ahead.

Shireen Jinnah Colony: A place unknown to Karachiites

Shireen Jinnah Colony (hereinafter called SJ Colony) is situated at the South end of Karachi along the Shahrah e Ghalib Road. Once you cross the SJ Colony through this road, you can only see oil tankers and numerous oil terminals until access is denied to private vehicles. Therefore, SJ colony is the last residential settlement on this road. Commuters on this road are either residents of SJ Colony or those associated with the oil terminals and refineries. Probably for this reason, most people I met during my stay in Karachi had never been to or passed through SJ Colony. They could not tell me much about the colony except that it was an area of Pathans and that people avoided going there. I imagine that in addition to the crime rate, the peculiar geographical location of SJ Colony has contributed to mystifying tales about this area.

Like Mehmoodabad, I could not find any online data on the history of SJ Colony. SJ Colony is named after the sister of the founding father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. I was fortunate to meet Farhan, an elderly social worker, during my fieldwork who was the son of Shireen Jinnah's driver and a founding resident of SJ Colony. The following history of this area is largely his account of how this area developed into a residential settlement.

SJ colony came into being when residents of a squatter settlement near the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi were shifted here in 1971. This resettlement occurred because high-end residential colonies were established around the shrine and residents of those colonies did not like a shanty town amidst their houses. On the other hand, dwellers of the shanty town were living there for several decades and they did not want to leave their homes. Those dwellers used to receive free meals from the shrine and found domestic jobs in upmarket bungalows near them. However, the government regularly sent them evacuation notices until the elders of the area decided that they should negotiate with the government before they were thrown out empty handed. Consequently, discussions between residents of the shanty town and the government concluded in 1971, and the residents' request to allot them land near the seaside was granted. The land on which SJ Colony is located was vacant at that time and roads were built by the government before relocating the shanty

town dwellers. Plots measuring around 700 square feet were allotted at subsidised rates, and people started moving there.

Before people could settle and construct their mud houses in SJ Colony, water lines installed by the government were stolen. Soon thereafter, war between India and Pakistan broke out and further development work could not take place. As the area was near the sea, sand carrying winds were also a major problem for the newly settled dwellers. As a result, a majority of the original allottees sold their plots and moved to other places. Those who left were of different ethnicities but the largest groups among them were Pathans and Hazaras. With the passage of time, new residents kept coming, but the ethnic composition did not change significantly.

In order to get to SJ Colony, I had to pass through Clifton and Boat Basin which are among the most expensive and upscale areas in Karachi. As soon as I passed through Boat Basin and drove past the Ziauddin Hospital Parking Lot, the surroundings changed immediately, and I found myself driving through a dusty two-way road with banks and shops. The offices of goods transport were on my right side, while roadside restaurants for labourers and truck drivers were on the left. I could see small houses behind those commercial enterprises. I drove for 10 minutes on my motorbike and found SJ Colony on both sides of the road. As I entered one side of SJ Colony (also called Block 2), there were retail shops, including a small pharmacy, tobacco shop, and grocery shop, just beyond the entrance. As I walked through those shops, there was an intersection with main streets on each side. The first few houses on each street had shops on the ground floor while the rest of the houses on those streets were mostly residential. These main streets also had smaller streets on each side. Many of these streets had barriers or gates on one end and were closed at the other end. The main streets were 40 feet wide while the smaller streets were 24 feet wide, which is a reasonable size when compared with many other neighbourhoods of Karachi. At the back end of these streets was a non-functional railway line which disconnected SJ Colony from residential settlements across it. See figure 6 (Google Maps 2020d) and 7 below (Google Earth Pro 2019).

Figure 6: A roadmap which illustrates the road leading to SJ Colony and other places.

Figure 7: A satellite image where I have pinned the important places in and around SJ Colony.

My initial impression about the place was of a middle-class neighbourhood. Most houses

had two or three floors; some of the houses were old while others seemed to be newly

constructed. It was 11:00 in the morning and males could be seen on the streets. As I was warned about going inside the area, I immediately asked a shopkeeper about the house of the local councillor. I wanted to be sure that if someone asked me why I was roaming there that I had a reasonable answer. Then, I met the councillor and explained my purpose for the visit. He agreed to the interview and the fieldwork started.

Once I completed interview of the councillor, I went to the other side of SJ Colony which was across the main Shahrah-e-Ghalib Road. This was called Block 1. There were automobile parts and repair shops on this side just after the entrance and some larger houses on the main road which belonged to a prominent Jadoon family. As I passed the main street, there was an open area under which passed the main oil pipeline. Scores of oil tankers were parked around this open area. At the right side of this area was a street which led me to significantly poor housing units and narrow streets with stagnant water and heaps of garbage. This settlement was known as Hindu Para, and most residents were Hindu. In addition to the difference in civic facilities between these two SJ Colony areas, I immediately noticed that women were working or roaming in Hindu Para whereas I did not see a single woman in SJ Colony that day.

Since I had only limited information about SJ Colony beforehand and, given the fact that it was located on both sides of the main road, I did not demark the 'neighbourhood' in this area like I did in the other three neighbourhoods. Moreover, among all the four neighbourhoods that I studied for this thesis, I found it most difficult to get candid views from the interviewees in SJ Colony. Therefore, I tried to conduct interviews that provided representation for the entire SJ Colony. As I was not stringent about interviewing specific people in this neighbourhood, I was able to complete the desired number of interviews in a short period of time. This strategy worked well because I was asked to leave the neighbourhood by my gatekeepers after seven days of fieldwork.

Transporters: Negotiating Coexistence

Once the original allottees of SJ Colony relocated to other parts of Karachi, the land remained vacant for some time, with only a few houses. Due to the proximity to the port and the construction of oil refineries nearby, the oil transport business flourished in the area after some time. Thousands of trucks would arrive with tankers for oil transportation each week as the oil was supplied throughout the country from this port. This enterprise increased the economic significance of SJ Colony, so the area was populated quickly. Many people related with the transport business either bought or constructed houses in the

colony or lived here as tenants. Those people who were already living in SJ Colony were involved in small businesses or private jobs, but the boom in the transport business made some of them switch to it. As the population increased, so did the problems in this area. Tankers were parked on the main road and on the vacant areas inside Shireen Jinnah colony, and people associated with those tankers started spending time in makeshift roadside restaurants. Sometimes, tankers would be parked for days, waiting in queue to be filled. Munir, an elected member of the union council, elaborated on the problems this development caused the residents:

> First of all, the drivers and their support staff are illiterate people. They do not know how to behave. If someone asked them to move their tanker, they would start fighting. Secondly, these tankers are so heavy that they destroy our roads and sewerage system. Sometimes, the trucks touch the overhead electric wires and disconnect them from the main line. Thirdly, they roam around in our streets which we do not like as we live with our families. Finally, criminals and drug addicts hide between these tankers and use them as a shield against the police or residents.

These tankers sometimes blocked roads which caused an inconvenience to the residents. Automobile repair shops were opened in Block 1 due to these trucks which resulted in round the clock noise and waste materials in the area. Despite these problems, residents could not give a collective response as many people among them had also set up their own transport business. Nevertheless, some residents approached the court of law to complain about the illegal parking of tankers, and the Supreme Court had ruled in their favour four or five months before I did the fieldwork. After the judgment was passed, oil tankers no longer parked on the main road; however, some of them continued to park on the vacant area in Block 1. I asked Altaf, a social worker, the reason for this; he responded: "There are clear orders from the Supreme Court that no tankers should be parked in SJ Colony as it is a residential area. The police have only removed tankers on the main road. I think it is just an eyewash. These transporters are powerful people and they can tackle the police due to their political influence and money. In time, tankers will be back on the main road."

There were other more serious problems associated with the transport business. Many interviewees claimed that large amounts of drugs and smuggled products from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan province came into Karachi through these trucks. There were also instances where trucks loaded with weapons were confiscated in SJ Colony. Only two interviewees talked about it, but they stressed that they had got people arrested who were

involved in moving weapons from the port to Karachi city. Irshad, vice-Chairman of the Union Council, narrated one incident:

> Our landline phone was used by our tenant to make a call. Some days later, a driver was caught by the police while transporting a weapons-filled truck to some area of Karachi. The driver's call records showed that he had received a call from my home. Then, the police raided my house and arrested my men. I then went to the police station along with others. We convinced the police that our boys were innocent. Fortunately, the tenant who made the call was unaware of all this development and was sleeping in my house. We apprehended him and handed him over to the police.

Trucks were also loaded at the port for supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan. These trucks were often reported stolen or mugged by the transporters, some of whom were residents of SJ Colony. Some of the interviewees believed that these events were orchestrated by the transporters. As these trucks were insured, they would get substantial amounts from the insurance companies, and they would also sell whatever was in the trucks. "People have earned so much money with this practice that you cannot imagine," Hashmat told me. While this allegation of insurance fraud may not be true, I remember reading several news reports on irregularities in NATO supplies to Afghanistan. I also noticed that, although SJ Colony did not have bungalows and large cars, people were generally well-off and some of the residents were considered very wealthy. A small-scale transporter living in SJ Colony told me that the oil transport business involved a lot of money; as a result, he had to draw large amounts of money each day from the bank. this could explain the existence of many bank branches along the main road.

A foiled attempt

The influx of wealth in SJ Colony did not sit well with some quarters; as a result, extortion calls were made to some of the Colony's residents by a notorious gang in Lyari (the most violent area in Karachi). Cracker bombs were also thrown by the gang members into the neighbourhood to spread fear. The gang wanted to extend its influence in SJ Colony as the rumour spread that the residents had made good money in the transport business. Many interviewees proudly narrated how they resisted this incursion.

"Each one of our boys was on the streets with their weapons. We used to patrol our neighbourhood throughout the day. We were charged as it was about the survival of our area," Jamshed, a young student, told me.

"Announcements were made through the loudspeaker of the mosque. Around 1500 men from SJ Colony and surrounding areas gathered in the mosque. We held a grand Jirga (an informal decision-making body of Pathans) and decided that we would not let the gang enter into this area. Either they would kill us, or we would kill them, but we would not let them settle here.", Munir explained.

"When the Jirga concluded, some of our most fearsome men went to Lyari. They told the gang leader in categorical terms to refrain from seeking extortion money from this area," Haji, a barber, recounted.

This display of solidarity in face of an external threat was only one of the many instances of solidarity that were reported to me during the fieldwork. Despite the problems SJ Colony residents had with transporters, all of them came together to ward off the gang members. One reason for this solidarity was that most residents were Pathans, and they had shared values and cultural traditions. Other ethnicities living in the colony had also adapted to the Pathan culture and many of them spoke Pashtu, the native language of Pathan. The other reason is that most people in SJ Colony had benefitted from the oil and transport business despite their concerns about the degradation of civic facilities. Thirdly, the financial rewards of the transport business in terms of smuggling and the drug trade were such that it was entirely possible for major political players to be a part of it. Thus, even if some residents were opposed to the illegal parking of the tankers, the influence of those operating these tankers was perhaps too great to counter. Consequently, SJ Colony stood as a settlement where organised crime under the garb of the transport business was assimilated into the larger interests of everyone involved.

Drugs Paradox

Residents of SJ Colony were sensitive about the reputation of their neighbourhood, unlike Mehmoodabad. As a majority of residents were Pathans, they were aware that the way their neighbourhood is perceived reflects the way the Pathan community is generally perceived in Karachi. When asked how this neighbourhood is viewed by the outsiders, many interviewees said that their area is often misunderstood in the public discourse because most people had never visited the area. In terms of crime, a sizable number of interviewees claimed that there was no crime problem in this area. However, most people agreed that drugs and street crimes (mugging and motorcycle theft) were common problems in this area, but they also clarified that these crimes had significantly decreased recently.

In all the other neighbourhoods that I studied, drugs were sold discreetly, and most people did not know who was selling drugs in their area. The situation was different in SJ Colony where many residents knew the houses where people came to buy drugs. According to interviewees, there were at least three such places in SJ Colony. Incidentally, I went to interview Dawood, a transport related businessman who lived next to the house of a major drug peddler. Like many other streets in SJ Colony, one side of the street had a barrier like gate while the other side was open and led to narrow streets. Apparently, the police granted permission to install the gate upon the request of the residents. When I asked Dawood about the gate, he had the following to say: "We got it installed because this street was open on both sides and the noise of motorbikes passing through at night disturbed our sleep. … The drug lord does not have any problem with it. He thinks it is good for him as his men can escape if the police or Rangers conduct a raid."

Through my interaction with people living or working around that street, it came to my notice that some people were supportive of the presence of a drug lord in their vicinity. Waseem, aged 23 years, told me that street crimes were lower in this part of the neighbourhood because armed boys who worked for the drug lord patrolled the area until late in the night. Their primary job was to supply drugs to retail customers who came from surrounding areas and to keep watch on any activity by law enforcement agencies. Due to the presence of these boys, muggers could not snatch mobile phones or wallets from people. Furqan, aged approximately 25 years, was even depressed that, due to raids by paramilitary forces, the drug business had decreased which, in turn, had made their area vulnerable towards street crimes. Furthermore, the drug lord had passed stern instructions to his subordinates that no aggression or violence would be tolerated against the residents of this area. If there was some scuffle between his men and the residents, they were required to report to him first before responding. Jamshed told me: "A few weeks ago, a guy passed through this road on a motorbike. He was riding the bike on one wheel. When he returned, he was driving at a high speed. Few of my neighbours stopped and thrashed him. After some time, boys working for the drug lord came and asked us why we had beaten the guy. He was their customer and had come to get drugs. We told him the reason and they left without arguments."

The concept that comes close to explaining the aforementioned phenomenon is that of "perverse social capital" (Rubio 1997; McIlwaine and Moser 2001). It is defined loosely as those norms and obligations embedded in social networks and institutional arrangements which result in 'perverse' or criminal outcomes. However, the current case is different in

some important respects. First, the 'working relationship' between the drug lord and residents is not based on a common value system or norms, as all the interviewees were opposed to the selling and consumption of drugs in their neighbourhood. The arrangement is rather based on expediency and rational choice. Secondly, the outcomes of this arrangement are not necessarily negative or perverse. The boys or men working for the drug lord belonged to the shanty town located beyond the railway line at the back of SJ Colony Block 2. "They are kids of illegal Afghani immigrants and they are born to do this.", Naeem, a tailor, told me. Most customers of this drug enterprise were also from the neighbouring areas. So, this assertion by the residents that the presence of the drug lord increased informal control in their neighbourhood is understandable.

In this context, the question we need to ask about informal social control is what we often ask about the definitions of crime i.e. which principles and values does a group need to regulate? These findings from SJ Colony emphasise the transient nature of normative systems and its consequent effect on construction and reconstruction of informal control mechanisms. The dynamics of order in a neighbourhood may not always correspond to what constitutes order in a city or how order is interpreted by law. It might be the case that every resident of SJ Colony was against the use of drugs (including the drug lord himself) at a higher moral level, but it could also be a rational decision to want to have a drug enterprise for protection from other kinds of crimes. This is 'social control' by most definitions except that the regulation of behaviour does not sit well with the official definitions of crime. Insofar that social control is defined as response to deviant behaviour, it "entails no assumptions or implications concerning the impact of social control upon conformity, social order, or anything else" (Black 1976, 1983). Moreover, terrorist violence can also be understood as a modality of social control since "it defines and responds to deviant behaviour" (Black 1976, p. 105; 2004, p. 10). This non-normative understanding of social control is important to understand the dynamics of a peripheral neighbourhood like SJ Colony where the presence of "governmental social control" is minimal (Black 1983, p. 41).

The story of rudimentary cooperation between the residents and drug lord is limited to one street and its surroundings. There were other drug enterprises in SJ Colony, and the people were vehemently opposed to them. "I can't tell you how many young kids have destroyed the prime of their lives due to these drugs; it pains me to see them die," Farhan told me. In fact, the best friend of a local barber had died by consuming homemade wine sold by one drug enterprise. Despite these tragedies, the ability of residents to act against such issues

was limited due to similar factors that I observed about the crimes in Mehmoodabad originating from Chanesar Goth. Taking on the drug market in SJ Colony could readily turn into a situation where death is a likely possibility. "Every other person has a personal weapon here. Pathans tend to keep weapons even if they do not have bread in their homes," noted Jamshed. In addition, there was a widespread belief among SJ Colony residents that no crime can happen without the support of the police and other powerful quarters. They found this belief so self-evident that they would not answer any further questions about the validity of this claim. But a specific incident was reported. Munir, the local councillor, told me:

> My brother called 15 (the emergency helpline of the police) to complain about one of the drug enterprises. Just a few days later, the drug lord and his men came to our home with weapons. They told us that they had paid Rs. 800,000 to trace the mobile number from which the call was made. They wanted to abduct my brother, but I got a powerful person to mediate between us and them. Thank God, the matter was resolved.

The local councillor whose brother called the police was one of the more influential persons in SJ Colony. The consequences could have been worst if a person of modest means had been caught with this 'transgression'. In the situation where classified records of the police can be accessed by the drug peddlers, it is hard to imagine how informal control exercised by the residents could control the drug trade. SJ Colony was a glaring example that control efforts at the neighbourhood level needed to be augmented by formal control. If crime is conducted with official patronage or if criminals can work their way through the criminal justice system, community agency can be morphed in ways that are suited to the overall well-being of its residents.

The drug business in SJ Colony was severely curtailed by the raids conducted by the Rangers. At the time of my fieldwork, Rangers were regularly arresting and killing criminals in SJ Colony and the shanty town behind it. All the interviewees appreciated the Rangers' operations and most people cited their operations as the only reason that crime had reduced in their area. This was especially true of drugs, as the drug peddlers were conducting their businesses from a fixed location unlike street crimes which were perpetrated mostly by motorbike riders. I met a young person whose elder brother and father had gone into hiding to avoid being arrested by the Rangers. Even that young person said that the Rangers were working in the best interest of Karachi. On why the Rangers

were more effective than the police, interviewees responded that the Rangers did not favour any political group; they were swift and decisive, and there was no respite once they got hold of someone. By the standards of Western democracies, the Rangers were employing disproportionate use of force and frequently undermined the rules of engagement when dealing with criminals. "We cannot operate like them. We are answerable to the courts," Sarwar, a local police officer, remarked. During a recent raid by the Rangers, an interviewee had to take children who were playing in the streets and escort them to their houses as the exchange of fire took place between the Rangers and drug peddlers. Cases were also reported by some residents where the Rangers took innocent people and tortured them, only to release them after finding out that they were not involved in organised crime. However, the residents of SJ Colony were not perturbed by the high handedness of the Rangers. They rather appreciated it as the only viable solution to restoring peace in the city. Residents of Mehmoodabad also had similar views about the Rangers except some MQM workers who thought that they were 'folk-devilled' by the state. This support among the masses for paramilitary operations was largely based on the legacy of postcolonial policing in Pakistan and the overall context of crime in Karachi.

Street Crimes

Mobile phone and wallet snatching at gunpoint were realities that the residents of SJ Colony had come to accept. Many interviewees had personal experiences of victimisation. Many incidents occurred on the main road which connects SJ Colony to the rest of the city. Lights were not installed on the road and muggers took advantage of dark sections of the road. People were also mugged outside their own houses. Typically, two youngsters would come on a motorbike, point a gun at the victims, and snatch whatever valuables they had on them. They would then disappear into the narrow streets at the back of SJ Colony. The whole exercise took no more than a minute and, sometimes, people standing just a few meters away from the victim would not know what had happened. People had also learned not to resist in such situations; they generally handed over their mobile phones and wallets immediately. Some victims also requested the muggers to give back their identity card and mobile SIM; in a few cases, the muggers had obliged.

Many interviewees thought that the muggers came from shanty towns at the back of SJ Colony Block 2. Most of them were Afghan immigrants. In Pakistan, a large number of Pathans have a favourable view towards Afghans and consider themselves and Afghans as belonging to the same ethnic group. Currently, a popular political movement in tribal areas is also protesting the fencing of the Durand line (the border between Pakistan and

Afghanistan) on similar grounds. However, residents of SJ Colony considered the Afghan residents as a nuisance for their area.

Haseeb: "This is what they [Afghans] have been doing for generations. Their kids start stealing things as soon as they start walking. They are hopeless. … They commit crimes because each house has 50 people. They keep making children and have no means to feed them."

Farhan: "It is so unfortunate that Afghanis have [fraudulently] acquired Pakistani identity cards. Now it is impossible to know if they are Afghanis or Pakistanis. The government can't kick them out."

The consensus among residents that the Afghan residents are mostly responsible for street crimes served an important function in terms of informal control. Barriers were installed on streets which lead towards the Afghan shanty town. The barriers caused inconvenience for some residents who had to travel to the shanty town, but the collective animosity or 'othering' of the Afghan community made the consensus possible. Barriers were either funded by contributions from all the residents or, in some cases, rich residents of the streets paid for them. Light bulbs were also installed in streets recently to deter crime. Some of the budget for the lights came from the union council and the rest was collected from the residents. According to the interviewees, street crimes declined after these measures were undertaken.

It is important to note that street crimes were also prevalent in SJ Colony Block 1, which is across the main road. Residents believed that perpetrators working in Block 1 came from different adjacent shanty towns. The hotspot of crime in Block 1 was a patch of 300 meters where there was no lighting at night and the road was broken. Interviewees stated that they simply avoided going into that area after 8 pm as "one would need a lot of luck to come back unscathed." No organised effort had been made to secure that area, probably for two reasons. Firstly, the patch where muggings happened was a vacant area and houses were at some distance. Hence, it was not a 'defensible space' in terms of territoriality, natural surveillance, and milieu (Newman 1976). Secondly, unlike the Afghans, the perpetrators were not a discernible group. Residents were not exactly sure which people they needed to keep an eye on to control crime in that hotspot. It appeared that if a well-defined group is folk-devilled, the propensity to enforce control increases.

Community based initiatives were not the only step residents had taken to deter crime. In some instances, they had apprehended muggers and almost lynched them, especially when muggers were nervous and victims overpowered them. In one incident, a resident saw a mugging happening at a distance and fired at the muggers. This took the muggers by surprise, and while they were trying to flee, people got hold of them. If criminals were caught by the people, the standard practice was to thrash them before handing them to the police. "We know they will get out [of prison] sooner or later. Why not teach them a lesson that they will remember?" was the way in which, Akbar, a private employee, justified this vigilantism. Residents claimed that the police were also tolerant of this practice, and they intentionally arrived late to give them time to vent their anger. In all the neighbourhoods that I studied, SJ Colony was the only one where street criminals were caught by residents frequently. According to residents, this was because Pathans are brave by nature. As per my observation, residents of SJ Colony had developed a "code of the streets" (Anderson 1999) to respond to such situations. Residents affirmed that they would not think twice before getting themselves involved in a situation where their neighbour was being victimised. Only one interviewee said that he would not intervene in a violent situation while five interviewees out of sixteen said that they would avoid participating in a fight involving weapons. Nine other interviewees emphatically stated that they would go to any limit for their neighbours if they were unjustly treated. The level of collective efficacy in SJ Colony was the highest that I observed in any neighbourhood. In the section on informal control, I explain the factors which have contributed to this.

Regarding mugging, residents of Shirin Jinnah had successfully pressured the police to act on certain occasions. On several occasions, residents told me that there were some very influential people in SJ Colony who could approach the higher echelons of power if need be. A politician from the powerful Jadoon family narrated an incident where his mobile phone had been snatched. Within half an hour of the incident, he was sitting with a senior police officer in an official vehicle trying to locate the perpetrators. By the evening, the muggers were apprehended and tortured by the police to the extent that he could hardly recognise them. Similarly, the Vice Chairman of the union council and the Imam of the mosque also said that whenever they called the police, the police were quick to respond possibly because the SHO of the local police station was posted in this area for many years and had developed personal relations with influential persons in the neighbourhood.

Another tactic that residents used to make the police act swiftly was to block the Shahrah-e-Ghalib Road. Younger residents would come on the road, burn tyres, and not let any

traffic pass through. As this road is used for transporting oil to the entire country, the protest would immediately gather media attention so that the police had to disperse the crowd. Dawood told me about the last time they had blocked the road in protest:

> Sometimes when there is scarcity of water, we arrange our trucks with water tankers that arrive at our doors to fill our water tanks. Of course, the gates of our houses have to be open for the pipe to pass through [from the water tanker to the domestic tank]. Robbers sometimes take advantage of this to enter homes. One day, my friend was getting his tank filled when he saw robbers approaching. He fired at them and one robber was injured. They took a U-turn, only to come back from the other side of the street and shot my friend twice. We then blocked the road and staged a sit-in. Those robbers were eventually arrested and are still in jail, I think.

Sarwar, the police officer, also told me that they had taken stern action against muggers. He recounted several 'encounters' that they had conducted where several muggers had been killed. After I concluded the interview and turned the voice recorder off, he told me that street crime had only reduced because he killed repeat offenders. "Otherwise, when I used to present them in court, they had four lawyers standing alongside them and I would be alone," he said. SJ Colony is under the jurisdiction of the police station which is also responsible for the most upscale areas of Karachi. That the police allocated their resources and acted aggressively against muggers committing crime in SJ Colony is a testament to the influence residents enjoy with the police department.

Informal control

High levels of social cohesion and the strength of informal control systems in SJ Colony were evident in dealing with muggers and the way residents stopped the Lyari gangsters from establishing a foothold in their neighbourhood. In theoretical terms, ethnic homogeneity, less population turnover, and better economic status are all positive factors in SJ Colony, factors which may have contributed to higher informal social control. However, perceptions of the interviewees and my own observations in the neighbourhood tell a different story which is rooted in the socio-political dynamics of Karachi.

Outsiders are not welcome

As I have stated earlier, people began moving to SJ Colony in the 1970s; the original allottees were people evacuated from a nearby shanty town. That those shanty town dwellers left SJ Colony due to various civic issues reflects how dilapidated SJ Colony was at

that time. Of course, the new settlers who purchased land from the original allottees were also from disadvantaged backgrounds. Most of them were Pathans who are an ethnic minority in Mohajir dominated Karachi. With respect to the SJ Colony, these Pathans found a safe place at the periphery of the city where they could live according to their customs and traditions.

While most residents were poor, it was mainly the oil and transport businesses which created their upward social mobility. As a result of the transport business, the real estate prices increased manifold in SJ Colony. The time when residents of SJ Colony were progressing in terms of their economic status, Karachi was in a state of perpetual decline. Ethnic, sectarian, and political violence had crippled the economy of the city, and law enforcement agencies were struggling to restore law and order. SJ Colony was not affected by this turmoil primarily because of its geographical location but also because the residents had nothing to achieve by getting themselves involved in political affairs. Most residents in SJ Colony talked about how their area never shuts down even if the whole of Karachi is burning. Interviewees in Mehmoodabad also said the same thing about their neighbourhood, but some of them also explained that they sometimes voluntarily shut down their businesses when strikes were called for by political parties. However, SJ Colony did not budge to external pressures; shops were still open when Benazir Bhutto (ex-Prime Minister) was assassinated. Residents of SJ Colony were consciously aware of how easily the peace in their neighbourhood could be disrupted if they let outside forces venture into their neighbourhood. If they are proactive about controlling mugging, it is not only about the loss of some cash and mobile phones; something sacred is on the line – the peace that they and their elders have maintained over the years through studious efforts.

A manifestation of this phenomenon could be seen in the residents' attitudes towards city politics. Local and national elections are held in SJ Colony just as they are held in the rest of the city. However, people did not talk about the elections in terms of which political party had won or lost and which party had more support in their area. They talked about people who contested the elections. Party affiliation was not to be seen anywhere close to the extent it was observed in Mehmoodabad. Local politicians frequently changed their political affiliations, and their decisions to switch parties were mainly based on their assessments of voters' inclination to vote for a party. I met four active politicians in SJ Colony, and they did not talk about the manifestoes of their political parties or vision of their senior leadership. They discussed mainly the infrastructural issues in the neighbourhood and their efforts to get those issues resolved through the help of district

and provincial governments. They considered themselves first and foremost residents of SJ Colony for whom party affiliation is a tool to get things done. When I interviewed the Vice-Chairman of the union council, he was sitting on a bench outside the house of an opponent. These politicians did not talk against each other and seemed to have a cordial relationship.

Whether it was discord with transporters, issues between politicians or tolerating drug peddlers, residents would resolve every issue through their internal mechanisms. There was a conscious effort to avoid external agents of social control. Some interviewees told me that three years ago, there were some protests in their neighbourhood by members of a political party. Although these protests were peaceful, community elders intervened and asked the protestors to avoid bringing SJ Colony into the spotlight. Interviewees were pleased that no political demonstration had been held since then. There was no unit office of MQM in SJ Colony, and offices of other political parties were basically workplaces for the politicians. Whenever a resident faced any issue related to the police, such as being mugged or getting a rent deed registered, they would contact the local politicians or other influential persons who would accompany them to the police station. Local police officers did not patrol inside SJ Colony and no interviewee said that they should. It was enough for the residents that the police patrol the main road. Issues occurring inside the neighbourhood were to be dealt with by the residents themselves. A young person who I had interviewed a day earlier passed by me on his motorbike holding a bottle of imported liquor. Since possession and consumption of liquor is illegal for Muslims in Pakistan, it was a rare sight to see someone brandishing his bottle in full public view. I believe he intentionally showed it to me to prove his statement that the police have nothing to do with SJ Colony. This does not mean that the police cannot enter the area to arrest a criminal, but it does mean that the police do not roam around the neighbourhood for routine patrols. "What would they get by coming here. Nobody would give them a penny," Naeem said.

How they managed to keep people out

SJ Colony is perhaps not the only neighbourhood in Karachi that would want non-state actors and some state actors to stay outside. In Begumpura, too, the Pathan community living next to Punjabis wanted minimum interference of the police in their affairs. However, residents of SJ Colony were successful in meeting this objective. One of the important reasons for their success was that other ethnicities, living in SJ Colony were in agreement, regarding the need to protect the neighbourhood from outside influences. They had

adapted to the Pathan culture to some degree. "You won't be able to tell if someone is a Pathan or Punjabi in Shireen Jinnah," Haji told me. It is difficult to say if this adaptation was a result of social pressure from the Pathan community, but it resulted in social solidarity to the extent of fostering informal social control in the neighbourhood.

It is reasonable to ask that, even if residents were able to keep the external agents at bay, how were they able to resolve disputes which may arise among them from time to time? These could be disputes on issues such as car parking, loud music, or more serious issues such as harassment of women. Pathans have a traditional system of arbitration and dispute resolution called Jirga, which is basically an assembly of men, usually elders, who sit together to decide issues as per Pathan traditions. It is a kind of community council which may also be found in other neighbourhoods. However, the important difference between an ordinary community council and Jirga is that the decision of Jirga is usually binding. In addition, decisions in Jirga are often taken considering Pathan culture and traditions which may or may not be consistent with the law of the land. Jirga is headed by a mediator who announces decisions after the council has deliberated on matters.

I came to know of two such councils in SJ Colony, one each in Block 1 and Block 2. Both councils were based in mosques and were headed by local Imams. An aggrieved person could go to any one of the Imams and, depending on the scope of the problem or dispute, Imams would call council members and other community notables to decide the issue at hand. However, major issues that could affect the whole neighbourhood were mostly decided by the Jirga in Block 1. The mosque in Block 1 was bigger and its Imam was highly respected. All the interviewees who mentioned him used words which are reserved for someone of the highest social standing. The Imam ran an organisation called 'Islah e Muashra'. Islah refers to 'improvement' in English, but it can also refer to the reformation of something or someone, and Muashra means society. This organisation served as the de facto Jirga, and most interviewees would either name this organisation or Imam or Jirga when I asked them about local dispute resolution mechanisms.

Of all the interviews I conducted in SJ Colony, it was the most difficult to get an appointment with Abdullah, the Imam of Block 1 mosque. It appeared that he was extremely busy with his religious and social duties, and my request for a meeting was forwarded to him after I asked the local police officer for help in this matter. The interview with the Imam was quite short as he was not fluent in Urdu and did not seem inclined to

give detailed answers. However, some of his statements revealed the extent of influence that he had on what went on in the neighbourhood:

"People here used to dance and do celebratory gunfire at weddings. I found it disturbing and asked them to discontinue this practice. … Mobile and television have also corrupted our youth. I have told people to avoid these things. Now, the situation is much better."

"Few days ago, people caught a thief and brought him to me after thrashing him. I called the police and handed him over. Then, the thief's relatives went to the police station for his release. The police told them that Imam Sahib had him arrested and he would not be released unless I gave them permission. So, if such a thing happens, I prefer that the offender be given a chance to reform himself."

"I ask the police to come to me whenever there is a problem. They listen to me and act accordingly. Sometimes, when people go to the police directly, they ask the complainant to visit the mosque and consult me first. … Every issue is resolved here, in this mosque, with mutual consensus. Everybody has to accept the decision."

Abdullah's claims regarding his influence seemed farfetched at first, but when I interviewed the SHO, he reaffirmed that "Imam Sahib handles most of the problems in SJ Colony amicably." He also admitted that the police refer some cases, especially family or neighbour disputes, to the Imam. I noticed that the police had no problem with the Imam and his Jirga acting on their behalf because residents had no complaints about it. "If residents accept the authority of Jirga, why would we want to waste our time and resources," Kamran, a local police officer, said. However, this delegation of authority to the Jirga by the police made it difficult for the police to bypass them even when the police were obliged to act. A few incidents were reported to me by the interviewees where the police should have acted, but the Jirga had settled the issue before the police could take cognizance. For instance, a mugger was caught by the people a few months before the fieldwork. He was a teenager; the Imam pardoned him after warning his parents. The police knew about the matter but did not challenge the Imam's decision. In "The Types of Legitimate Domination," Weber (1978, p. 215) describes three types of pure authority: traditional, legal, and charismatic ('charisma' being a religious term borrowed from early Christianity) . In all the four neighbourhoods that I studied, traditional authority was important. It was exercised mostly by community elders, but the extent of this authority varied according to the specific configuration of social order in each neighbourhood. SJ Colony was different from the others in that it had the institutional mechanism of Jirga to

implement this authority. While Weber considered charismatic authority an antidote to both legal and traditional authorities, the traditional authority coalesced with charismatic authority (derived from the religious credentials of the Imam) in SJ Colony. This helped to amplify the control exercised by Jirga and, more importantly, it kept the legal authority at bay, which was perceived by residents to be important in maintaining the social order of the neighbourhood.

Other moral entrepreneurs including local politicians also worked on similar lines. During the interviews, local politicians told me that they called the police whenever it was necessary, and the police force responded positively. It appeared that the local police were mostly responding to complaints by the residents reactively. During the fieldwork, I saw a deserted check point on the main road just outside SJ Colony. Hareem, a student, told me that it had been established on the request of the residents when street crime had increased on the main road. But when the crime rate dropped, the community asked the police to abandon the check point. It was a different situation as compared to Mehmoodabad where the police would intrude in matters uninvited and would not leave once called. Although the police officers did not say it explicitly, I imagined that this was because of the high level of social cohesion among SJ Colony residents. Any attempt to enforce their writ on SJ Colony, especially in contravention with the Jirga system, would have been met with collective resistance from the residents. The only exception was the Rangers who could act independently, probably because the social capital of the bigwigs of SJ Colony did not extend to them.

The Dark side of the social control

When I came to know that all the major disputes in the neighbourhood were settled by Jirgas headed by Imams, I kept thinking about the Hindu and Christian communities living at a corner of Block 1. I wondered how a Jirga based on Pathan traditions and headed by a conservative Imam could be impartial in delivering justice to Hindus and Christians. I also remembered what Haleem Jadoon, a local politician, had told me in a deeper voice, "Nowhere in the world is there a place where rich and poor are dealt with equally. Of course, the powerful get the better of the weak in Jirga as well." Except for him, however, all the interviewees emphatically rejected any such proposition. "Minorities [religious minorities] respect Imam Sahib and the Jirga system. There is no discrimination on religious grounds," Irshad told me. It was not until I went into Hindu Para (the place where minorities lived) that I realised how the system discriminated against them.

The first thing obvious at the outset was that unlike Muslims (whether they be Pathans, Punjabis, or Mohajirs), Hindus and Christians were living in a separate settlement together. Secondly, the structures of the houses, road conditions, width of streets, and overall outlook of the area were poorer than the rest of SJ Colony. Thirdly, several tankers were parked outside this settlement. Most other tankers that used to be parked in SJ Colony had been removed after the order of the Supreme Court. It was evident from these observations that the inhabitants of Hindu Para did not have the same social capital as their Pathan neighbours.

When I entered this area, some women were outside on the streets in a queue to get water from a public water supply tap. They nervously looked at me before going inside their homes or taking cover as to disappear from me. I immediately realised that my presence was not welcome, and I left the area. Later, I asked the Vice Chairman of the Union Council for help negotiating access to this area on my behalf. He called Madan, union councillor of Hindu Para, who then came to receive me. He told me that most people in this 500 house settlement were illiterate labourers who would not be comfortable giving me interviews, and even if he convinced them somehow, they would try to evade my questions. I could only manage two interviewees from this area; one by the Madan himself and the other with Mohan who was a member of Panchayat (a dispute resolution institution that inhabitants of Hindu Para had created to resolve their internal disputes). However, I casually talked to some residents later, primarily to test the views expressed by these two interviewees.

This settlement was established in 1980 when the Hindu and Christian populations living in a shanty town near the affluent seaside area of Clifton were asked to evacuate. In this respect, the circumstances of the settlement's existence were similar to rest of the SJ Colony. However, they were considered a separate community, and they were not integrated with the rest. They were not usually invited to marriages or other ceremonies by other residents of SJ Colony. When I interviewed the Hindu residents, it was Holi (a religious festival of Hindus) the next day. I wished them well for this event and asked how they planned to celebrate. Mohan answered: "Do you see these tankers and the men sitting around them? These are people from far flung areas and they are living here alone. They leave their families back home when they come here for work. How can we celebrate Holi here? These people will harass our women and pass dirty remarks about them. So, we have decided to celebrate only in our homes or on streets that are deep inside."

Madan also confirmed that female harassment was a longstanding issue for them. "Let alone night, our women cannot go outside even in the day. Our women do not cover their faces like Pathan women. They stare at our women with evil intent." He told me that transporters often roamed in their streets, and the only response they could give is to ask their women to stay inside. When I asked him why his community did not place a barrier like there was in the rest of SJ Colony, he smiled and told me that he and his community did not have that kind of influence with the government.

Both the interviewees told me that they did not participate in the Jirga, and no respectable member of their community was part of it. Some of their community members had registered themselves as Jirga members for their own personal gains but the community had boycotted them. Interviewees believed that the Jirga system was about imposing fines and penalties on offenders involved in heinous crimes. They were of the view that criminal matters should be dealt only by the law. They considered the Jirga to be one of the most important reasons for the prevalence of crime in SJ Colony, as the punishment meted out to offenders was superficial and based on the socioeconomic standing of the victim's family. According to Mohan: "If they apprehend a mugger, they impose a heavy penalty on him i.e. 3 or 4 times more than the amount he has mugged and ask him to publicly apologise. They give that amount to the victim and sometimes ask the offender's family to arrange a feast [to celebrate the resolution]."

Interviewees' opinion of the Jirga was in stark contrast to what mainstream residents of SJ Colony had maintained throughout my fieldwork. However, it was not surprising for me because it was apparent that the primary purpose of the Jirga was to avoid matters going to the police. While the Jirga may be beneficial for the mainstream population of SJ Colony, it did not give relief to religious minorities who relied on the state for their security. According to the interviewees, their concerns were often undermined in such gatherings, and other parties were favoured due to their religious affiliation.

The welfare of the Hindu community was to be secured by the state; in this case, however, state institutions succumbed to communal pressures which left the religious minorities more vulnerable than they might be in a neighbourhood with low informal social control. Again, this situation highlights the relationship between population heterogeneity and violence or criminal outcomes, but the concept of "linking social capital" (based on vertical relationships between poor or marginalised people and those having influence in formal organisations) is particularly important (World Bank 2000; Grootaert et al. 2004). Where

the local notables and political actors do not facilitate these vertical relations in context and where institutional quality is low, poor communities are further marginalised.

Madan recalled the incident of vandalism following the 1992 desecration of Babri Mosque in India by extremist Hindus. This event sparked protests all over Pakistan and numerous Hindu temples were torched by Muslim mobs. A group of 700-800 men also entered Hindu Para and robbed the entire area of whatever valuables they could find. "We were instructed by our elders to let them have whatever they wanted, but if they touch our women, then do whatever you can to save your honour," the councillor told me. The Vice Chairman of the Union Council also mentioned this event in his interview and said that he along with another man of the area tried to protect the Hindus. However, the union councillor said that no resident from SJ Colony had arrived until the whole settlement had been vandalised. The police and Rangers also reached the scene after four hours. The fear that the Hindu residents felt that day was still fresh in their memories along with the conviction that they were on their own. "We are living here with quenched voices," Mohan said in conclusion.

Conclusion

The complex story of this neighbourhood unfolded before me as the fieldwork processed. It was difficult to conduct fieldwork there as some people were unwilling to share anything about their neighbourhood which could be perceived as negative. Once shanty town dwellers, displaced by authorities to preserve the aesthetics of upscale neighbourhoods, they had struggled hard to improve their economic situation. They realised that the secret to their success was not to let state or outside non-state actors manipulate them to their advantage.

I found competing interest groups who were locked in an uneasy settlement among themselves. Despite conflicting objectives, these groups were united in the wake of any external threat. Certain crimes against outsiders were tolerated as manifestation of social control, especially thrashing muggers if they were caught in the act. Similarly, the residents did not take action against drug enterprises both for their safety and also to enforce effective control over other crimes which may impact them more. The signal value of a crime was largely determined in view of its impact on the neighbourhood's social order, not on the seriousness of offences in the eyes of criminal law. This disposition made this area high crime in the view of outsiders and law enforcement agencies, but one of the most peaceful in Karachi for its own residents.

Through the Jirga system, traditional and religious authority dominated at the expense of legal authority. I discovered the limits of this arrangement which excluded certain groups from it. The role of the police in this area was minimal and neighbourhood mechanisms of conflict resolution were de-facto binding on the police as well. Wilkins (1965, p. 281) argued that crime complaints as manifestations of public's desire for the police 'to do something about' a behaviour are a better index of crime than indictable offenses. Policing in SJ Colony operated on similar lines; most of the time, the police only intervened when the public wanted them to. Rangers were an exception, and most residents either remained tight-lipped or appreciated their actions primarily because Rangers were too strong an institution for the residents to resist their intervention in SJ Colony. In addition, Rangers were conducting similar operations in the rest of Karachi, so there was a sense of appreciation among the residents who believed that, in the future, Karachi may be a safer city.

The 'sacred code' of maintaining the social and territorial integrity underpinned the interactive processes in SJ Colony. Collective efficacy was probably the highest that I observed in all the four neighbourhoods, but it was not always directed against crimes or for pro-social outcomes. Many residents kept weapons for self-help, but they were disposed to use them even when someone in their neighbourhood was threatened. The mechanisms of social control were formed and maintained to prevent all kinds of intrusion, by the police or by the criminals. As the state had minimum interference in this neighbourhood, the victims of this social solidarity were religious minority groups who lived in seclusion in one dilapidated corner of SJ Colony.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

This research showed how social order is negotiated between formal and informal agents of control where the very definition of what needs to be controlled is contested. The configuration of social order varied in all the four neighbourhoods, depending on various factors, including ethnic heterogeneity, spatiality, population turnover, and political capital. Poverty or concentrated disadvantage did not appear to be significant in the enforcement of informal control as there were always relatively affluent moral entrepreneurs in the neighbourhoods who addressed the problems that needed to be dealt with.

While the control efforts of moral entrepreneurs were primarily intended to preserve or enhance their social status, the moral entrepreneurs were supported by the common residents who, struggling to make ends meet, considered them as their best bet against repression from the police and against those crimes which were detrimental to the stability and harmony of their neighbourhoods. The quid pro quo in these cases were compromises that had to be made when moral guardians of the neighbourhood became 'rule breakers' (Becker 1963) or were beneficiaries of crime and high handedness of the police.

The residents did undertake some concrete measures to increase the security of the neighbourhoods, but it was mostly the kinship and situated social power that helped define social order. Nonetheless, this research also demonstrated the limits of informal control efforts in situations when such efforts were not buttressed by formal control. Especially in cases where the intensity of crimes went beyond what collective efficacy could possibly control; self-preservation, avoidance, and 'selective fatalism' (Sunstein 1998) took precedence over common good. Furthermore, the differential access that moral entrepreneurs had with regards to the police and other state services meant that marginalisation of disadvantaged ethnic and minority groups was an essential consequence.

 On the other hand, the local police mostly operated in the conventional, tried and tested, manner. Working with constrained resources and under political pressure, there was little motivation in police ranks to contemplate out of the box solutions to crime problems. In most cases, their priority was to regulate the crime market to the extent that alarm bells were not rung higher up the police hierarchy or, what some might call, the 'dream factory' (Tilley 2011, p. 398). In other words, the aim was to sustain 'a suitable amount of crime' (Christie 2004). Although rule of law, procedural fairness, and police legitimacy were seen as substantive issues, which needed institutional transformation, such changes went

beyond the scope of local police. The police were accused of widespread corruption in all the four neighbourhoods and the police officers did not deny it, at least off the record. The image of police as a corrupt institution was so entrenched in the public imagination that the local police had little incentive to behave otherwise. The police routinely worked with moral entrepreneurs and political groups, but these intersections were mostly meant to coproduce social order in ways that maintained the status quo in their jurisdictions.

In this chapter, I discuss some common themes that transpired across all the four neighbourhoods. I conclude by discussing one of the principal components of this research: the prospect of democratic policing in Pakistan.

Moral Panic

Media treatment of crime has garnered consistent interest in criminology, especially since the highly respected work of Stanley Cohen on the conflict between the Mod and Rockers was published in the early 1970s (Cohen 2011). Numerous studies have examined the impact media coverage of crime may have on perceptions of risk and fear of crime (Callanan 2012; Hough 2017; Jewkes and Linnemann 2017; Mastrorocco and Minale 2018). I anticipated that media portrayal of crime would have some effect on the sense of security, and consequently on informal control mechanisms, in urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan. This anticipation was enforced by the fact that mass media in Pakistan, especially the television news channels, have a reputation of exaggerating crime incidents and providing them disproportionate coverage. Although I have used 'exaggeration' and 'disproportionate coverage' to describe the public perception of the media, such terms are problematic constructs in that many criminologists have a mostly puritan 'socialist' concept of what the media ought to be reporting. This expectation undermines the fact that the media are primarily an entertainment and profit business. So, an agreement on 'proportionate' media coverage is hard to come by. However, just after I conducted the fieldwork, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) had imposed a ban on crime re-enactment shows which dramatized serious crimes on national television (Khan 2016). In the interviews, I asked residents how the mass media portrayals of crime and criminals affect their perceptions of crime. To my surprise, very few interviewees stated that such portrayals had a significant effect.

Most residents understood the dynamics of news production and the compulsion of television media outlets to sensationalise crime. Few respondents even talked about Television Rating Point (TRP) and how the viewership affects advertisement revenues of

television channels. When I asked follow-up questions on media treatment of crime, I discovered that news consumption of terrorist incidents had created panic and fear of crime among residents during those years when terrorist incidents were frequently happening in mainstream urban areas of Pakistan. However, with the passage of time and reduction in terrorist attacks, people became accustomed to the coverage of terrorism. Many respondents in Karachi told me that their city is not what people from Lahore, such as myself, think about it (a highly violent city) when watching news. They would emphasise the fact that Karachi has an enormous population and large geographical area; what happens in one street or neighbourhood has no bearing on the thousands of other neighbourhoods in the city.

Respondents still became concerned if a series of crime incidents were reported from other areas of the city, but such news did not create panic in terms of perception of security at a neighbourhood level. Perhaps, the concept of mediated signals was apposite in this context, since while panic might not have been created by mass mediated representation of crime, mass mediated signals might 'frame' the ways in which threats and risks are understood at the neighbourhood level (Innes 2004).

In all the four neighbourhoods, many residents were actively involved in the affairs of the neighbourhood. Most people, who were less socially active, knew other people in their streets by name and people living in adjacent streets by face. Therefore, they did not need the media to tell them if something wrong was happening in their neighbourhood. This finding is in contrast to findings of several studies in the West where moral panics arose frequently in response to a variety of crime related issues (Zatz 1987; Kramer 2010; Schildkraut et al. 2015). The reason for this difference could be that the distance between people and their local societies has generally increased in the West, creating space for mediatisation of issues. Another reason for resistance to moral panic found in this research could be that moral panic is usually followed by expectations of official response; in all the neighbourhoods studied, however, residents had dismal opinions of the state's capacity. Overall, the scrupulous views of respondents about the functioning of mass media across the neighbourhoods were unexpected and warrant a separate study.

Transferability of concepts

Notwithstanding the seemingly endless debate on the scientific credentials of social sciences, there is widespread agreement that human social relationships have a degree of commonality in terms of how these relationships form, sustain, and evolve. Thus, we

assume that research findings from a neighbourhood in New York or Cardiff may, at the least, guide us to hypotheses that can be tested in other less familiar contexts. Classic social disorganisation theory and its contemporary configurations, such as the concept of collective efficacy, have originated from Chicago (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson 2012). However, this theory has been tested in various socioeconomic contexts with considerable success (Southall 1980; Breetzke 2010; Kaylen and Pridemore 2013). There are hardly any studies published in high impact journals, which sought to apply aspects of social disorganisation theory to urban cities of Pakistan. While this research was qualitative, unlike mostly quantitative studies conducted in realm of social disorganisation theory, I included concepts such as social capital and collective efficacy with a view to assess their purchase in the context of Pakistan. It was difficult to argue, for example, that high levels of social cohesion would not affect social control and consequently the crime rate. Findings from this research were not generally different from research in other contexts where ethnic heterogeneity, social capital, and collective efficacy have been shown to influence neighbourhood crime (Oberwittler 2007; Bruinsma et al. 2013). However, I discovered some limitations in the measures used to operationalise these concepts in the West.

Collective efficacy and concentrated disadvantage

Sampson et al. (1997) measured informal social control with questions such as the willingness of neighbours to intervene in fights close to their homes or if children were disrespecting an elder or roaming around on streets. To measure social cohesion, respondents were asked to answer questions such as if they considered their neighbourhood as close-knit or if their neighbours shared similar values (Sampson et al. 1997). In Lahore and Karachi, there is a marked distinction between old neighbourhoods and new 'housing societies', the gated settlements where affluent people reside in large houses. The measures of informal social control used in the Western studies could be transferable to those housing societies. However, in the neighbourhoods that I studied, responses to established measures of collective efficacy were mostly affirmative and did not reveal much in terms of explaining informal social control, actual level of social cohesion, or level of crimes. In these neighbourhoods, people actively participated in marriages, funerals, and other social occasions. Their participation was not based on personal preferences but was rather a cultural imperative. Not inviting neighbours to feasts and not helping them in need was immoral and, for some people, constituted deviance. Therefore, asking them whether neighbours would intervene in matters of children's misconduct was not effective. Intervention of this kind was seen as a given in the

neighbourhoods, although some people did say that willingness to intervene had decreased when compared to some decades ago.

It is pertinent to note that this observation is not limited to collective efficacy but holds true for a few other constructs as well. Concentrated disadvantage measured in terms of welfare receipts or racial composition (Sampson et al. 2008, p. 848) is also not applicable to Pakistani society. In addition, income levels of residents cannot be ascertained through tax records as only 2.2 million Pakistanis (around 1% of the total population) filed income tax returns for 2018 (Haider 2019). Furthermore, the government census in 2017 did not include questions about household income, due to the apprehension that it would have led to public resistance against census.

Crime rate or level of crime?

Throughout this thesis, I have described neighbourhoods as having high or low levels of crime instead of describing them as per capita crime rates simply because I did not have population statistics of the neighbourhoods. Detailed results of the 2017 census have not been published yet by the federal government, due to allegations of manipulation by provincial governments of Sindh and Balochistan (Ali 2019). Similarly, the police stations in all of the four neighbourhoods did not have data of reported crimes segregated by neighbourhoods; therefore, I had to rely on the perceptions of local police officers and residents to identify low and high crime neighbourhoods. Consequently, the low crime neighbourhood in Karachi turned out to be high crime when I conducted interviews there.

I noticed that when police officers and residents talked about high crime areas, most of them were not talking about the number of crimes but rather the seriousness of the crimes. Mehmoodabad was considered by the police and its residents to be a low crime area because the area next to it, Chanesar Goth, had more serious crime incidents. In addition, what constitutes as serious crime was also situated in the local context. Indeed, the early debates on crime statistics in the West emphasised the perceived seriousness of crimes as an important indicator for informing official responses (Sellin and Wolfgang 1964; Wilkins 1965). A 'prototypical signal crime'(Innes 2014, p. 72) at a neighbourhood level in Cardiff would be homicide. In Mehmoodabad, residents of the neighbourhood were attuned to political murders and those occurring due to personal financial disputes; these incidents did not raise much concern. However, the signal value of a homicide was much higher when it was committed by a person who was known to both the police and the public, but the police could not enter the area in which the suspect resided due to issues

related to operational capacity, if not due to political pressure. The impunity with which such homicides were committed implied the presence of risk. The idea that the state could be a helpless bystander in unilateral aggression by an individual was a signal event that had profound implications on informal control. On the other hand, physical disorders were not important in terms of how people acted for their security. This finding is apparently in contrast to what Martin Inness and colleague discovered in Surrey (Innes 2004; Innes 2014), and what proponents of the broken windows approach have been emphasising for almost four decades (Kelling and Coles 1997; Xu et al. 2005). There are at least two reasons for this difference: sensitisation and situational factors (Innes 2014). Signs of physical disorder were a permanent feature in at least three of the four neighbourhoods that I studied. Residents were accustomed to encroachments on public spaces, heaps of garbage, and leakages in sewerage systems that intermittently flood their streets. Furthermore, there were also incidents of extortion, terrorist violence (throwing grenades at political rallies), and 'police encounters' in Mehmoodabad. Therefore, in contexts where inefficiency of state institutions is internalised and certain crimes are considered inevitable, it is the 'seriousness index' of crimes that affect the sense of security more than the generic crime rate. The perceived seriousness of crime incidents has implications for what informal social control can and cannot do. Hence, what started as a measurement error in identifying a low crime neighbourhood ended up in insights on how levels of crime are conceptualised in weaker states.

By way of summary, the broader point I want to make is that while some criminological concepts may be applicable to Pakistani society, their measurement needs to be informed by the local socioeconomic realities. With regards to concepts, such as crime level, social capital, and collective efficacy, a baseline study ought to be done before operationalising these concepts for further research in urban areas of Pakistan.

Methodological issues

Brayne (2014) introduced the concept of 'system avoidance' as a response to increased criminal justice surveillance in the USA. She showed that those people who had prior experience with the criminal justice system tend to avoid institutions that keep official records (Brayne 2014). This concept is germane in the context of this research. Respondents in this research were not willing to sign the consent forms before interviews. Given the grim reputation of the police in my neighbourhoods, some residents preferred to avoid talking about the local police regardless of whether they had prior contact with the police. They would talk about the police force in general terms but would hesitate to

mention specific incidents about the police behaviour in their neighbourhood. I used a voice recorder for interviews, and several respondents were not comfortable with it, although some were pleased that their voices would be recorded and might be broadcasted on mass media (although I expressly clarified that was not the case). Whether they were nervous or pleased with the voice recorder, it did have an impact on their responses.

There is an intense debate in the literature about the extent to which Anglo-American criminology is transferable to non-Western contexts. However, most of these debates centre around the transferability of concepts, ideas, and, to a larger extent, policy. The methodological procedures are generally presumed to be independent of context, and the selection of methods is generally informed by the nature of the research questions being investigated. Thus, the relative strengths and weaknesses of a method in relation to another are thought to affect only the kind and depth of information collected. There remains a dearth of literature which challenges the taken-for-granted assumption that a method would more or less reveal what it intended to, if applied in a 'standard' manner.

I discovered that the use of narrative interviews as a tool to collect data from common citizens was probably not the best option. It is a common knowledge among Pakistanis that one does not have to be at fault to be trapped into a problem with the state. Most people who are overcharged on energy bills have to pay them eventually, as the procedure to get the bill corrected is beyond an ordinary person's comprehension. The police are known to arrest the relatives of fugitives to force fugitives to surrender. Opening a bank account can spell trouble in terms of taxes. Thus, respondents have little to no incentive to give a recorded interview about crime and police to a person they do not even know personally. In this context, it is not only important to consider the suitability of a tool for the research questions; it is perhaps more important to ask if a tool would work at all in terms of getting honest responses. I was able to navigate these issues partially because I was born and raised in Lahore and belonged to a migrant, Urdu-speaking family, which reflects most of the population in Karachi. So, people in both the cities might have considered me as one of their own. Still, some respondents were reluctant to name anyone in their neighbourhood who was involved in crime or a police officer who took bribes from them. For future research on topics related to crime, especially when respondents are common lower- and middle-class people, the use of voice recorders could be minimised. Furthermore, non-participant ethnography could provide more insight into mechanisms of informal social control in contexts where 'system avoidance' is the norm. However, ethnographers would

do well to observe but not write field notes on the spot. Some respondents may find it more concerning than voice recording that someone writes down their remarks on a piece of paper.

Democratic Policing

Is the police force in Pakistan democratic? David Bayley provides a simple test for this question: "…do parents teach their children that when the children are away from home and need help, they should seek out the police?" (Bayley 2006, p. 23). This research shows that the answer to this question would be an emphatic 'No'. But similar questions could be asked of other public services: would the same parents trust the public funded health facilities in Pakistan to provide quality treatment to their children? The answer would probably be negative still. In this section, I discuss how the structural impediments to police reforms conflate with the findings of this study, and what this conflation tells us about the prospect of democratic policing in Pakistan.

Maintaining Order

The police force in Pakistan focuses on maintaining order and not on 'order maintenance', which has a different connotation. What constitutes 'order' varies significantly, based on the preferences of political regimes. The police were bystanders when more than 40 people were killed in city-wide political violence in Karachi on 12 May 2007 (Ahmad 2013). The police were directed by the political leadership to patrol the streets of Karachi unarmed on that day despite imminent danger of large scale violence (Hasan 2007). In this case, the 'order' was defined by political leadership, and the police 'maintained' it.

At a neighbourhood level, order may be defined by the Station House Officers (SHOs) or their immediate superiors. The priority for the police officer in Mehmoodabad was controlling organised crimes and terrorism, whereas the SHO of Garhi Shahu was keen to dismantle gambling dens. On the other hand, the police officer in Begumpura was wary of street hawkers who kept crowding the main GT road. When residents talked about successful crime control in the past, they would often mention the name of the SHO who was posted in the local police station at that time. Hence, there is significant flexibility in terms of how SHOs fulfil their job in their respective police stations. However, these officers have little autonomy when they are required to stifle political opposition (Suddle 2012) or cordon off roads during a VIP's movement (Abbas 2012). The recruitment, posting, transfer, and promotion of officers are largely a product of performing these 'duties' diligently (Suddle 2012). But I did not set out to study how the police conduct themselves;

almost everybody in the neighbourhoods and I were aware of their practices. The question which begs an answer is: What could be done about such behaviour?

Centrality of the police

Unlike the established democracies where the police are assumed to be one of the most important public services for political democracy and modern nation statehood (Jones et al. 1996; Marenin 1998), the police in Pakistan are less central to the process of social control and even less central to counter terrorism. The primary role in internal security is assumed by the military-led intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces (Khosa 2012), and most international financial assistance is aimed towards the army and its allied institutions. Most people I interviewed did not expect the police to deal with the Taliban, dismantle organised gangs, or even help recover their property lost in muggings. They generally understood the limitations the police face, in terms of resources and technical abilities to track offenders. Crime prevention strategies by the police, such as those employed in the West, were unknown to many.

A formal police force was introduced by the British Raj in the colonial rule era, and I discovered that this image of the police has been internalised as such and passed down through the generations. Almost all interviewees conceived the police as the coercive arm of the state; most of them thought that this is precisely how the police ought to be and that it is reasonable for the police to use coercion to control crime and enforce the law. They desired a macho police officer in their area who would control crime through repressive actions just as Rangers were doing in Karachi. When I asked 'ordinary' residents if the police had ever come to them to ask about their problems, some of them laughed at me. If I summarise the responses that I got into a single response, it would be something like this: 'What business does the police have to consult ordinary residents about the kind of policing that is required? It would be great if they did, but that is not their job.' Being consulted by the police was not a primary concern of the people. They were content if the police controlled crime by reactively apprehending offenders; how the police did so was a secondary issue.

Crime prevention as a function of informal control

For the residents of my neighbourhoods, the proactive control of crime was fundamentally seen as a domain of informal social control. In SJ colony, possession of weapons by ordinary residents was a manifestation of this control. In Mehmoodabad, people would avoid passing through the road next to the high offender area of Chanesar Goth. In the main

market of Garhi Shahu, traders employed security guards, while in Begumpura, the residents installed CCTV to control mugging. These measures were needed in part because the police were not successful in providing security for the people; more importantly, the residents realised that the protection of one's life and property was first and foremost an individual and group responsibility. Similarly, conflicts within the neighbourhood were to be resolved through internal mechanisms. The police would just prey on such conflicts as they had been doing since their inception. This disposition is not limited to just the police but can be applied to most state institutions which are very limited in their capacity to provide services; as a result, the influence of the state over ordinary people's lives is minimal. The neighbourhoods I studied were in fact small societies where people lived on their own, supported by their kinship networks.

Four elements of democratic policing

Bayley (2006) identified four elements of democratic policing: conformity to law; respect of human rights, especially political rights; external accountability; and addressing the needs of citizens. Based on this research and especially my interviews with police officers, I am of the view that it is highly improbable for the police to adhere to at least three of these elements in the contemporary Pakistani context.

Firstly, conformity to law, at the very least, requires the police to apprehend criminals, file charges, and present the offenders before the court of law as per rules and regulations. All the police officers that I interviewed were critical of the criminal justice system. A majority of them said that it highly demotivated them to see offenders promptly freed on bail after the police made strenuous efforts to arrest them. The SHO of one of the neighbourhoods told me off the record, "In the end, you have to kill those bastards. If you present them in the court, you would be alone and he [offender] would have an army of lawyers to defend him." As the police were under pressure to control crime and as they perceived the criminal justice system to be highly inefficient, they resorted to extra-legal measures, such as 'disciplining' the suspect under detention. Some of the police officers also mentioned instances where they called the parents of young offenders involved in 'minor' crimes and released them after unofficial warnings. According to these officers, they did so to give the offenders a chance to mend their ways, but another reason for this practice could be that the officers did not want to burden themselves further with court appearances in cases where bail was likely and where it would take years for the cases to be decided by the court. Taking the offenders off the streets was their priority which unfortunately did not happen in most cases.

Secondly, the respect for political rights can hardly be ensured when the police officers' appointments and promotions are under the control of the ruling elite. In the Police Order 2002, the SHO has a three-year, fixed tenure. However, this provision was not implemented (Suddle 2012), since it did not sit well with political leaders. A police officer in Shirin Jinnah Colony had spent most of his last 10 years in the same police station whereas one in Mehmoodabad had changed several police stations within the same period. These transfers and postings were apparently based on political expediencies.

Currently, the police are routinely called to disperse demonstrations and sit-ins with the use of batons and tear gas. According to a police officer in Garhi Shahu, these 'law and order' duties harm the public image of the police more than anything else. Thirdly, external accountability of the police through elected representatives, as envisaged under the Police Order 2002, is unlikely to be effective as greater political control over already politicised police would further undermine the internal accountability mechanisms. The fourth element of Bayley's typology, i.e. responding to the needs of citizens, is difficult to operationalise for the purpose of evaluation. However, as I suggest later, this element could be addressed by the police to improve its public standing.

Community Policing as Democratic Policing

In Pakistan, official documents regarding internal workings of the police departments are difficult to obtain. Over the past few years, I have been doing online searches intermittently to find measures taken by the police to incorporate post-modern policing practices. Every three to four months, I see newspaper articles or blogs, mentioning that a senior police officer has introduced community policing projects in his jurisdiction. However, I have rarely come across a follow-up news article regarding the sustainability and assessments of those projects. Police reforms in general and democratic policing in particular are considered synonymous with community policing (CP) in Pakistan. Early in the field work, I noticed that questions about democratic policing made some police officers nervous, but when I asked them about CP, they had detailed views to share. The confluence of democratic policing with CP is not exclusive to Pakistan, and many developing countries, including Latin American countries, have tried to adopt CP as a panacea for their policing woes (Sklansky 2008, p. 82; Müller 2010, p. 22).

Notwithstanding the disagreements on the definition and effectiveness of CP (Müller 2010; Manning 2016; Bonner 2019), its fundamental characteristics include identifying security preferences of the people through consultation and working with stakeholders outside the

police force for coproduction of order (Grabosky 2009). The community policing initiatives in Pakistan have largely been led by the police officers who had a favourable view towards it, and most of these initiatives did not survive once those officers retired or were transferred. In Pakistan, KP Police Act 2017 has provisions for public liaison councils at the neighbourhood level; these provisions are likely to be replicated in other provinces following the police reform package expected from the federal government. However, prior experiences with such bodies suggest that they inconvenience the policing functions (Khan 2018). An important reason for this issue lies in the social organisation of urban neighbourhoods as reflected in those that I studied. The neighbourhoods have a complex system of social hierarchies where people are differentiated based on their financial status, lineage, ethnicity, and political clout. The people with influence in the neighbourhood tend to have more interaction with the local police and often end up being members of these liaison councils. Thus, an arrangement of public liaison councils only results in adding a bureaucratic layer to an already inefficient policing system.

Art of the possible

The projected 2020 Real GDP growth rate in Pakistan is 2.4%, which is the lowest in the last decade (International Monetary Fund 2019). The projected consumer prices are also likely to increase by 13% (International Monetary Fund 2019). The structural adjustment loan of US $6 billion taken by the current government in 2019 is the 22nd such loan taken by Pakistan in its 62-year history. This has resulted in neoliberal economic reforms, which may increase social inequality (Ostry et al. 2016). Economic well-being is one of the important preconditions of social order, and the police cannot be held responsible for creating such preconditions (Reiner 2010). Democratic policing has its basis not so much in policing but in the causes rooted in socioeconomic inequality (Reiner 2012; Bonner 2019). Thus, in the context of Pakistan, democratic policing appears a distant objective. The government requires the police to maintain order while it struggles to address the multiple crises that appear on the political, economic, and social fronts. As Bayley (2006, p. 22) notes, there is inherent tension between order and liberty, and it is likely that this tension will continue to manifest itself in the way the police in Pakistan perform. On the other hand, people just want the police to be more responsive and humane. The kind of democratic ideals espoused by the West are neither required nor expected of the police in Pakistan, as the police has always been conceived as an autocratic and repressive institution.

When I asked the respondents questions along the lines of Bayley's typology, everybody agreed that the police should function in a democratic manner. However, this response

was normative and did not reflect their literal expectations. When people talked on their own about police reforms, they highlighted their concerns which included the police's behaviour with ordinary citizens, the police's taking of bribes for traffic violations or for registering a complaint, and the police not paying local traders for food or household items. I noted that if the police could modify their behaviour with regards to these seemingly less important issues, the public image of the police would significantly improve. For any police reform to be successful, it is critically important to take the local institutional and socioeconomic realities into account. A successful precedent is the community policing project by the Chilean national police force that did not include institutional changes or active participation of the community; instead, the reform focused on improving relations with the public to increase the police's legitimacy and to restore trust in them (Kubal 2012). Equity and the ability to provide a minimum level of security are essential preconditions for democratically responsive policing (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013, p. 500). But even before these basic conditions are met, the police could focus on signal crimes, signal disorders, and by sending control signals to the public (Innes and Fielding 2002; Bottoms 2009; Innes 2014). In addition, policing through local influentials or neighbourhood moral entrepreneurs was already an informal practice used by the police in all four of the neighbourhoods studied. This informal networking could be institutionalised to avoid the adverse effects of informal control mechanisms in terms of marginalisation of certain groups. While ignoring minority rights can be a general consequence of democratic policing, the involvement of formal agents of control in informal control institutions could help protect minorities in the context of urban neighbourhoods of Pakistan. For instance, if the SHO can attend the Jirga of SJ Colony in an official capacity, he may be able to advocate for the rights of the Hindu and Christian minorities living there. Just as the project B2 by DFID did in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Aitchison 2007, p. 336), the international assistance to policing in Pakistan may also look beyond the state's version of security and encourage community involvement in conflict resolution, crime prevention and control. As for the broadest philosophies of democratic policing, it is unlikely that these could be successfully implemented in isolation. Democratisation of the police force can be at best carried out progressively along with the democratisation of the entire political and social structure of Pakistan.

References

Abbas, H. 2009. *Police and law enforcement in Pakistan: crucial for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism success*. Online: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

Abbas, H. 2011. *Reforming Pakistan's police and law enforcement infrastructure*. Online: United States Institute of Peace.

Abbas, H. 2012. Creating a secret service and reforming the intelligence bureau. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilising Pakistan through police reforms*. New York: Asia Society.

Adams, M. S. and Evans, T. D. 1996. Teacher disapproval, delinquent peers, and self-reported delinquency: a longitudinal test of labeling theory. *The Urban Review* 28(3), pp. 199-211.

Adinkrah, M. 2005. Vigilante homicides in contemporary Ghana. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 33(5), pp. 413-427.

Agnew, R. 1984. Autonomy and delinquency. *Sociological Perspectives* 27(2), pp. 219-240.

Agozino, B. 2003. *Counter-colonial criminology: a critique of imperialist reason*. London: Pluto Press.

Ahmad, T. 2013. Denouncing party politics: indignation and domestic confinement in Karachi. In: *Asia Colloquia Papers* Toronto. York Centre for Asian Research.

Ahmed, S. 2012. Police reform in Balochistan. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform*. New York: Asia Society.

Aitchison, A. 2007. Police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: state, democracy and international assistance. *Policing and Society* 17(4), pp. 321-343.

Aitchison, A. and Blaustein, J. 2013. Policing for democracy or democratically responsive policing? Examining the limits of externally driven police reform. *European Journal of Criminology* 10(4), pp. 496-511.

Ali, I. 2020. *Karachi jumps 22 points since last year on global crime index* [Online]. Online: Dawn. Available at: www.dawn.com/news/1533023 [Accessed: 15 February 2020].

Ali, S. A. 2019. *Two years and counting: census results held up by 'common interests'* [Online]. Online: The Express Tribune. Available at: tribune.com.pk/story/2064608/1-two-years-counting-census-results-held-common-interests/ [Accessed: 17 February 2020].

Altheide, D. L. 2009. Moral panic: from sociological concept to public discourse. *Crime, Media, Culture* 5(1), pp. 79-99.

Alves, M. C. and Arias, E. D. 2012. Understanding the Fica Vivo programme: two-tiered community policing in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. *Policing and Society* 22(1), pp. 101-113.

Anderson, E. 1999. *Code of the Street: decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Andreas, P. and Nadelmann, E. 2006. *Policing the globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aqil, N. 2015. Residents' perceptions of neighborhood violence and communal responses: the case of two neighborhoods in Lahore, Pakistan. *Violence Research and Development Project | Papers*. Bielefeld: International Center for Violence Research.

References

Aquilino, W. S. 1993. Effects of spouse presence during the interview on survey responses concerning marriage. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(3), pp. 358-376.

Arias, E. D. 2009. *Drugs and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: trafficking, social networks, and public security*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Bahadar, N. et al. 2019. Community-oriented policing: political, institutional and technical reforms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) police. *Journal of Human Security* 15(2), pp. 41-53.

Baker, B. 2009. A policing partnership for post-war Africa? Lessons from Liberia and southern Sudan. *Policing and Society* 19(4), pp. 372-389.

Baldwin, J. et al. 1976. *The urban criminal: a study in Sheffield*. London: Tavistock.

Baumgartner, M. P. 1989. *The moral order of a suburb*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bayley, D. H. 2006. *Changing the guard: developing democratic police abroad*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Becker, H. 1963. *Outsiders: studies in the sociology of deviance*. New York: The Free Press.

Becker, H. 1995. Moral entrepreneurs: the creation and enforcement of deviant categories. In: Herman, N.J. ed. *Deviance: A symbolic interactionist approach*. Oxford: General Hall, pp. 169-178.

Becker, H. 2009. How to find out how to do qualitative research. *International Journal of Communication* 3, pp. 545-553.

Bellair, P. E. 1997. Social interaction and community crime: examining the importance of neighbor networks. *Criminology* 35(4), pp. 677-704.

Belousov, K. et al. 2007. Any port in a storm: fieldwork difficulties in dangerous and crisis-ridden settings. *Qualitative Research* 7(2), pp. 155-175.

Bigon, L. 2009. *A history of urban planning in two West African colonial capitals*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Black, D. 1970. Production of crime rates. *American Sociological Review*, pp. 733-748.

Black, D. 1976. *The behaviour of law*. New York: Academic Press.

Black, D. 1983. Crime as social control. *American Sociological Review* 48(1), pp. 34-45.

Black, D. 2004. Terrorism as social control. In: Mathieu, D. ed. *Terrorism and counter-terrorism: criminological perspectives*. Vol. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 9-18.

Blumer, H. 1958. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review* 1(1), pp. 3-7.

Bobea, L. 2012. The emergence of the democratic citizen security policy in the Dominican Republic. *Policing and Society* 22(1), pp. 57-75.

Boldt, R. C. 2010. Drug policy in context: rhetoric and practice in the United States and the United Kingdom. *South Carolina Law Review* 62, pp. 261-351.

Bonner, M. D. 2019. What democratic policing is...and is not. *Policing and Society*, pp. 1-17.

Bottoms, A. 2009. Disorder, order and control signals. *British Journal of Sociology* 60(1), pp. 49-55.

References

Bottoms, A. 2012. Developing socio-spatial criminology. In: Maguire, M. et al. eds. *The Oxford handbook of criminology*. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 450-489.

Bottoms, A. and Wilson, A. 2007. Civil renewal, control signals and neighbourhood safety. In: Brannan, T. et al. eds. *Re-energising citizenship: strategies for civil renewal*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bowling, B. et al. 2011. Policing minority ethnic communities. In: Newburn, T. ed. *Handbook of policing*. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, pp. 611-641.

Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. 2003. Policing ethnic minority communities. In: Newburn, T. ed. *Handbook of policing*. Devon, U.K.: Willan Publishing, pp. 528-555.

Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. 2007. Disproportionate and discriminatory: reviewing the evidence on police stop and search. *The Modern Law Review* 70(6), pp. 936-961.

Braga, A. A. 2001. The effects of hot spots policing on crime. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578(1), pp. 104-125.

Braga, A. A. and Bond, B. J. 2008. Policing crime and disorder hotspots: a randomized controlled trial. *Criminology* 46(3), pp. 577-607.

Braga, A. A. and Weisburd, D. 2006. Problem-oriented policing: the disconnect between principles and practice. In: Weisburd, D. and Braga, A.A. eds. *Police innovation: contrasting perspectives*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-152.

Braithwaite, J. 1989. *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brayne, S. 2014. Surveillance and system avoidance: criminal justice contact and institutional attachment. *American Sociological Review* 79(3), pp. 367-391.

Breetzke, G. D. 2010. Modeling violent crime rates: a test of social disorganization in the city of Tshwane, South Africa. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 38(4), pp. 446-452.

Brezina, T. 2000. Delinquency, control maintenance, and the negation of fatalism. *Justice Quarterly* 17(4), pp. 779-807.

Browning, C. R. and Jackson, A. L. 2013. The social ecology of public space: active streets and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. *Criminology* 51(4), pp. 1009-1043.

Bruinsma, G. J. N. et al. 2013. Social disorganization, social capital, collective efficacy and the spatial distribution of crime and offenders: an empirical test of six neighbourhood models for a Dutch city. *British Journal of Criminology* 53(5), pp. 942-963.

Brunton-Smith, I. 2011. Untangling the relationship between fear of crime and perceptions of disorder: evidence from a longitudinal study of young people in England and Wales. *British Journal of Criminology* 51(6), pp. 885-899.

Brunton-Smith, I. A. N. and Sturgis, P. 2011. Do neighborhoods generate fear of crime? an empirical test using the British crime survey. *Criminology* 49(2), pp. 331-369.

Budhani, A. A. et al. 2010. *The open city: social networks and violence in Karachi*. London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Bullock, K. 2013. Community, intelligence-led policing and crime control. *Policing and Society* 23(2), pp. 125-144.

References

Bullock, K. and Tilley, N. 2003. *Crime reduction and problem-oriented policing*. Devon: Willan Publishing.

Bureau of Statistics. 2018. *Punjab multiple indicator cluster survey 2017-2018*. Lahore: Bureau of Statistics, Government of the Punjab.

Burgess, E. 1925. The growth of the city. In: Park, R. et al. eds. *The city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bursik, R. J., Jr. 1986. Ecological stability and the dynamics of delinquency. *Crime and Justice* 8, pp. 35-66.

Bursik, R. J., Jr. and Grasmick, H. G. 1993. *Neighbourhoods and crime: the dimensions of effective community control*. New York: Lexington Books.

Callanan, V. J. 2012. Media consumption, perceptions of crime risk and fear of crime: examining race/ethnic differences. *Sociological Perspectives* 55(1), pp. 93-115.

Carr, P. J. 2003. The new parochialism: the implications of the Beltway case for arguments concerning informal social control. *American Journal of Sociology* 108(6), pp. 1249-1291.

Carr, P. J. 2005. *Clean streets: controlling crime, maintaining order, and building community activism*. New York New York University Press.

Chattha, I. 2012. Economic change and community relations in Lahore before partition. *Journal of Punjab Studies* 19(2), pp. 193-214.

Choongh, S. 1997. *Policing as social discipline*. Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford.

Chriss, J. J. 2013. *Social control: an introduction*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Christie, N. 2004. *A suitable amount of crime*. London: Routledge.

Cicourel, A. V. 1968. *The social organization of juvenile justice*. New York: Wiley.

Clarke, R. V. and Eck, J. E. 2005. *Crime analysis for problem solvers*. Washington, DC: Center for Problem Oriented Policing.

Clarke, R. V. and Mayhew, P. 1980. *Designing out crime*. London: HMSO.

Clinard, M. B. and Abbott, D. J. 1973. *Crime in developing countries: a comparative perspective*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Cohen, A. K. 1955. *Delinquent boys: the culture of the gang*. New York: The Free Press.

Cohen, G. H. et al. 1982. Stereotyping as a negative factor in substance abuse treatment. *International Journal of the Addictions* 17(2), pp. 371-376.

Cohen, L. E. and Felson, M. 1979. Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review* 44(4), pp. 588-608.

Cohen, S. 1985. *Visions of social control: crime, punishment and classification*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cohen, S. 2011. *Folk devils and moral panics: the creation of the mods and rockers*. 4th ed. London: Routledge.

Collins, V. E. 2012. Dangerous seas: moral panic and the Somali pirate. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 45(1), pp. 106-132.

References

Convent of Jesus and Mary. 2014. *History-Convent of Jesus and Mary* [Online]. Convent of Jesus and Mary. Available at: www.cjmk.edu.pk/history/ [Accessed: 24 October 2019].

Cooper, H. L. 2015. War on drugs policing and police brutality. *Substance Use and Misuse* 50(8-9), pp. 1188-1194.

Cordner, G. and Biebel, E. P. 2005. Problem-oriented policing in practice. *Criminology and Public Policy* 4(2), pp. 155-180.

Cornish, D. B. and Clarke, R. V. 2003. Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: a reply to Wortley's critique of situational crime prevention. *Crime Prevention Studies* 16, pp. 41-96.

Dako-Gyeke, M. and Baffour, F. D. 2016. We are like devils in their eyes: perceptions and experiences of stigmatization and discrimination against recidivists in Ghana. *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation* 55(4), pp. 235-253.

Darroch, S. and Mazerolle, L. 2013. Intelligence-led policing: a comparative analysis of community context influencing innovation uptake. *Policing and Society* 25(1), pp. 1-24.

Davis, D. E. 2008. *Challenges of violence and insecurity, beyond the democracy and development mantra.* Harvard Review of Latin America (Winter). pp. 3-5.

Davis, M. 1990. *City of quartz: excavating the future in Los Angeles*. New York: Vintage.

Davis, M. 1992. Fortress Los Angeles: the militarization of urban space. In: Sorkin, M. ed. *Variations on a theme park*. New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 154-180.

Davis, N. J. 1980. *Sociological constructions of deviance: perspectives and issues in the field*. 2nd ed. Dubuque: W.C. Brown Co.

Delamont, S. and Atkinson, P. 2020. Ethnographic Fieldwork. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Demographia. 2015. *Demographia: world urban areas (built-up urban areas or urban agglomerations)*. Illinios: Wendell Cox Consultancy.

Dinnen, S. and Allen, M. 2013. Paradoxes of postcolonial police-building: Solomon Islands. *Policing and Society* 23(2), pp. 222-242.

Dinnen, S. and Braithwaite, J. 2009. Reinventing policing through the prism of the colonial kiap. *Policing and Society* 19(2), pp. 161-173.

Dixon, T. L. and Linz, D. 2000. Race and the misrepresentation of victimization on local television news. *Communication Research* 27(5), pp. 547-573.

Downes, D. M. and Rock, P. 2011. *Understanding deviance: a guide to the sociology of crime and rule-breaking*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Duneier, M. 2001. *Sidewalk*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Dunworth, T. et al. 2000. Police department information systems technology enhancement project (ISTEP). Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates.

Eck, J. E. 2003. Preventing crime at places. In: Farrington, D.P. et al. eds. *Evidence-based crime prevention*. New York: Routledge.

References

Eck, J. E. 2006. Science, values, and problem-oriented policing: why problem-oriented policing? In: Weisburd, D. and Braga, A.A. eds. *Police innovation: contrasting perspectives* Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Eco, U. 1976. *A Theory of semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Embrick, D. G. 2015. Two nations, revisited: the lynching of black and brown bodies, police brutality, and racial control in 'post-racial' amerikkka. *Critical Sociology*, pp. 1-9.

Emerson, R. M. et al. 2011. *Writing ethnographic fieldnotes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Esser, D. 2004. The city as arena, hub and prey patterns of violence in Kabul and Karachi. *Environment and Urbanization* 16(2), pp. 31-38.

Farrington, D. P. and Welsh, B. C. 2002. Improved street lighting and crime prevention. *Justice Quarterly* 19(2), pp. 313-342.

Fielding, N. G. 2005. Concepts and theory in community policing. *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 44(5), pp. 460-472.

Foster, J. 1995. Informal social control and community crime prevention. *British Journal of Criminology* 35(4), pp. 563-583.

Galliher, J. F. 1995. Chicago's two worlds of deviance research. In: Fine, G. ed. *A second Chicago school?* Chicago, pp. 164-187.

Garland, D. 2001. *The culture of control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gary, T. M. 2017. I'll be watching you: reflections on the new surveillance.*Surveillance, Crime and Social Control*. Routledge, pp. 3-11.

Gerring, J. 2001. *Social science methodology: a criterial framework*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giddens, A. 1985. *The nation-state and violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity*. Stanford: Standord University Press.

Girling, E. et al. 2005. *Crime and social change in Middle England: questions of order in an English town*. London: Routledge.

Goffman, A. 2014. *On the run: fugitive life in an American city*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Goffman, E. 1963. *Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Goffman, E. 1972. *Relations in public: microstudies of the public order*. London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press.

Goldsmith, A. 2003. Fear, fumbling and frustration reflections on doing criminological fieldwork in Colombia. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 3(1), pp. 103-125.

Goldstein, D. M. 2003a. " In our own hands": lynching, justice, and the law in Bolivia. *American Ethnologist* 30(1), pp. 22-43.

Goldstein, H. 1990. *Problem oriented policing*. New York: Mcgraw-Hill.

References

Goldstein, H. 2003b. On further developing problem oriented policing: the most critical need, the major impediments, and a proposal. In: Clarke, R.V. ed. *Problem-oriented policing: from innovation to mainstream*. Vol. 15. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, pp. 13-47.

Goode, E. and Ben-Yehuda, N. 2009. *Moral panics: the social construction of deviance*. 2nd ed. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Google Maps. 2020a. *Begumpura - Google Maps* [Online]. Online: Google. Available at: www.google.com/maps/place/Begumpura,+Lahore,+Punjab/@31.5800141,74.3571071,16 z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x39191ad8e30080d7:0xe61b440a6e0a852e!8m2!3d31.580 9821!4d74.3594805 [Accessed: 04 February 2020].

Google Maps. 2020b. *Mehmoodabad - Google Maps* [Online]. Online Google. Available at: www.google.com/maps/place/Mehmoodabad+Karachi,+Karachi+City,+Sindh/@24.854077 4,67.0602839,14z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x3eb33c18f5a0efe1:0x4726ed9af1512866 !8m2!3d24.8527673!4d67.0747573 [Accessed: 02 February 2020].

Google Maps. 2020c. *Railway Stadium - Google Maps* [Online]. Onlline: Google. Available at: www.google.com/maps/place/Railway+Stadium/@31.5631681,74.3458067,17z/data=! 4m12!1m6!3m5!1s0x39191b2ce8a6c1c1:0xc6b7b26b2726f165!2sRailway+Stadium!8m2!3 d31.5650239!4d74.3501841!3m4!1s0x39191b2ce8a6c1c1:0xc6b7b26b2726f165!8m2!3d31 .5650239!4d74.3501841 [Accessed: 03 February 2020].

Google Maps. 2020d. *Shireen Jinnah Colony - Google Maps* [Online]. Online: Google. Available at: www.google.com/maps/place/Block-1+Shireen+Jinnah+Colony+Block+1+ Clifton,+Karachi,+Sindh,+Pakistan/@24.8157515,66.9969225,17z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x3eb 31626d3fae83d:0x5feaa97ddc464b47!8m2!3d24.8153998!4d66.9950779 [Accessed: 04 February 2020].

Gordon, D. R. 1994. *The return of the dangerous classes: drug prohibition and policy politics*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. .

Gordon, H. R. 2009. *We fight to win: Inequality and the politics of youth activism*. NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Grabosky, P. 2009. Community policing, east and west, north and south. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal* 10(2), pp. 95-98.

Greenberg, D. F. 1977. Delinquency and the age structure of society. *Contemporary Crises* 1, pp. 189-223.

Greene, M. G. et al. 1994. The effects of the presence of a third person on the physician-older patient medical interview. *Journal of the American Geriatrics Society* 42(4), pp. 413-419.

Grewal, J. S. 1998. *The Sikhs of the Punjab*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Groff, E. R. et al. 2015. Does what police do at hot spots matter? The Philadelphia policing tactics experiment. *Criminology* 53(1), pp. 23-53.

Grootaert, C. et al. 2004. *Measuring social capital: an integrated questionnaire*. Online: The World Bank.

Guerette, R. T. and Bowers, K. J. 2009. Assessing the extent of crime displacement and diffusion of benefits: a review of situational crime prevention evaluations. *Criminology* 47(4), pp. 1331-1368.

References

Guest, G. et al. 2011. *Applied thematic analysis*. London: Sage Publications.

Gupte, J. 2014. *Policing urban violence: lessons from South Asia*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Gusfield, J. R. 1995. Preface. In: Fine, G.A. ed. *A second Chicago school?: The development of a postwar American sociology*. University of Chicago Press.

Haas, N. E. et al. 2014. Public support for vigilantism, confidence in police and police responsiveness. *Policing and Society* 24(2), pp. 224-241.

Haider, M. 2019. *Tax filers up from 1.4m to 2.2m, says FBR chairman* [Online]. The News. Available at: www.thenews.com.pk/print/505506-tax-filers-up-from-1-4m-to-2-2m-says-fbr-chairman [Accessed: 17 February 2020].

Haider, Z. 2012. Police image and the media. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform*. New York: Asia Society.

Hall, S. et al. 1978. *Policing the crisis: mugging, the state, and law and order*. London: Macmillan.

Harcourt, B. E. 2001. *Illusion of order: the false promise of broken windows policing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hasan, A. 2011. Designing density in Karachi: alternatives to apartment blocks. [Online]. Available at: www.lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/designing-density-in-karachi/en-gb/ [Accessed: 12 November, 2015].

Hasan, A. and Mohib, M. 2003. *The case of Karachi, Pakistan*. Online: Development Planning Unit, University College London.

Hasan, A. et al. 2002. *Understanding Karachi: planning and reform for the future*. 2nd ed. Karachi: City Press.

Hasan, S. S. 2007. *Karachi Police told to go unarmed* [Online]. Online: BBC News. Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6659137.stm [Accessed: 14 February 2020].

Hawdon, J. and Ryan, J. 2009. Social capital, social control, and changes in victimization rates. *Crime and Delinquency* 55(4), pp. 526-549.

Hayes, R. et al. 2018. Black petes and black crooks? Racial stereotyping and offending in the Netherlands. *Contemporary Justice Review* 21(1), pp. 16-32.

Heimer, K. and Matsueda, R. L. 1994. Role-taking, role commitment, and delinquency: a theory of differential social control. *American Sociological Review* 59(3), pp. 365-390.

Hinton, M. S. 2005. A distant reality: democratic policing in Argentina and Brazil. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 5(1), pp. 75-100.

Hipp, J. R. 2013. Assessing crime as a problem: the relationship between residents' perception of crime and official crime rates over 25 years. *Crime and Delinquency* 59(4), pp. 616-648.

Hipp, J. R. and Kane, K. 2017. Cities and the larger context: what explains changing levels of crime? *Journal of Criminal Justice* 49, pp. 32-44.

Hirschi, T. 1969. *The Causes of delinquency*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

References

Hollis, M. E. et al. 2013. The capable guardian in routine activities theory: a theoretical and conceptual reappraisal. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety* 15(1), pp. 65-79.

Home, R. 2014. Shaping cities of the global south: legal histories of planning and colonialism. In: Parnell, S. and Oldfield, S. eds. *The Routledge handbook on cities of the global south*. New York: Routledge, pp. 75-85.

Hough, M. 2013. Procedural justice and professional policing in times of austerity. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 13(2), pp. 181-197.

Hough, M. 2017. The discovery of fear of crime in the U.K. In: Lee, M. and Mythen, G. eds. *The Routledge international handbook on fear of crime*. London: Routledge, pp. 35-46.

Hunter, A. D. 1985. Private, parochial and public social orders: the problem of crime and incivility in urban communities. In: Suttles, G.D. and Zald, M.N. eds. *The challenge of social control: citizenship and institution building in modern society*. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing, pp. 230-242.

Innes, M. 2003. *Understanding social control*. Berkshire Open University Press.

Innes, M. 2004. Signal crimes and signal disorders: notes on deviance as communicative action. *British Journal of Sociology* 55(3), pp. 335-355.

Innes, M. 2005. What's your problem-signal crimes and citizen-focused problem solving. *Criminology and Public Policy* 4(2), pp. 187-200.

Innes, M. 2014. *Signal crimes: social reactions to crime, disorder, and control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Innes, M. and Fielding, N. 2002. From community to communicative policing:'signal crimes' and the problem of public reassurance. *Sociological Research Online* 7(2), pp. 56-67.

Innes, M. et al. 2004. *Signal crimes and reassurance policing*. Guildford: University of Surrey.

International Crisis Group. 2014. *Policing urban violence in Pakistan*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

International Monetary Fund. 2019. *Pakistan and the IMF* [Online]. Online: International Monetary Fund. Available at: www.imf.org/en/Countries/PAK [Accessed: 15 February 2020].

Iram, T. et al. 2019. Socioeconomic acceptability of prostitutes in Pakistan: A diversion from prostitution. *Cogent Social Sciences* 5(1), p. 1646110.

Jackson, J. et al. 2014. Corruption and police legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan. *British Journal of Criminology* 54(6), pp. 1067-1088.

Jackson, J. E. 1990. I am a fieldnote: Fieldnotes as a symbol of professional identity. In: Sanjek, R. ed. *Fieldnotes*. London: Cornell University Press.

Jacobs, J. 1961. *The death and life of great American cities*. New York: Vintage Books.

Jacques, S. and Wright, R. 2011. Informal control and illicit drug trade. *Criminology* 49(3), pp. 729-765.

Jewkes, Y. and Linnemann, T. 2017. *Media and crime in the U.S.* New York: Sage Publications.

References

Johnston, L. and Ward, T. 1996. Social cognition and sexual offending: a theoretical framework. *Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment* 8(1), pp. 55-80.

Jones, T. 2011. The accountability of policing. In: Newburn, T. ed. *Handbook of Policing*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, pp. 693-724.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. 2006. *Policy transfer and criminal justice*. Berkshire: Open University Press.

Jones, T. et al. 1996. Policing and the idea of democracy. *The British Journal of Criminology* 36(2), pp. 182-198.

Kane, R. J. and Cronin, S. W. 2009. Associations between order maintenance policing and violent crime: considering the mediating effects of residential context. *Crime and Delinquency* 59(6), pp. 910-929.

Kaylen, M. T. and Pridemore, W. A. 2013. Social disorganization and crime in rural communities: the first direct test of the systemic model. *British Journal of Criminology* 53(5), pp. 905-923.

Kazmi, S. J. S. et al. 2012. Karachi: the Commercial Capital of Pakistan. In: Misra, R.P. ed. *Urbanisation in South Asia: Focus on Mega Cities*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

Kelling, G. L. and Coles, C. M. 1997. *Fixing broken windows: restoring order and reducing crime in our communities*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Kennedy, B. P. et al. 1998. Social capital, income inequality, and firearm violent crime. *Social Science & Medicine* 47(1), pp. 7-17.

Kennelly, J. 2011. Policing young people as citizens-in-waiting: legitimacy, spatiality and governance. *British Journal of Criminology* 51(2), pp. 336-354.

Khan, R. 2016. *Pemra announces ban on crime re-enactment shows* [Online]. Online: Dawn. Available at: www.dawn.com/news/1259597 [Accessed: 16 February 2020].

Khan, R. 2018. *Reforms and the police force* [Online]. The News. Available at: www.thenews.com.pk/print/370968-reforms-and-the-police-force [Accessed: 13 February 2020].

Khosa, T. 2012. Agenda for reform. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilising Pakistan through police reform*. New York: Asia Society.

Knutsson, J. 2003. Problem-oriented policing: from innovation to mainstream. In: Clarke, R.V. ed. *Crime prevention studies*. Vol. 15. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press pp. 1-11.

Kramer, R. 2010. Moral panics and urban growth machines: official reactions to graffiti in New York city, 1990–2005. *Qualitative Sociology* 33(3), pp. 297-311.

Kubal, M. R. 2012. Transnational policy networks and public security policy in Argentina and Chile. In: Díez, J. and Franceschet, S. eds. *Comparative public policy in Latin America*. Toronto: University of Toronto, pp. 176-202.

Kuroda, H. 2008. Proposed technical assistance loan Islamic Republic of Pakistan: preparing the Lahore rapid mass transit system project *Report and recommendation of the president to the board of directors* [Online]. Available at: www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/65194/40573-pak-rrp.pdf [Accessed: 14 November 2015].

References

Lahore Cantonment Board. 2013. *History* [Online]. Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan. Available at: www.lcb.gov.pk/about.html#Introduction [Accessed: 14 November 2015].

Lawson, T. et al. 2018. A comparison between the cost effectiveness of CCTV and improved street lighting as a means of crime reduction. *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems* 68, pp. 17-25.

Legg, S. 2007. *Spaces of colonialism: Delhi's urban governmentalities*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Lersch, K. M. et al. 2008. Police use of force and neighbourhood characteristics: an examination of structural disadvantage, crime, and resistance. *Policing and Society* 18(3), pp. 282-300.

Linden, J. v. d. 1991. Dalalabad: an inquiry into illegal sub-division in Karachi.*Migrants, Housing and Housing Policy in Karachi, Vanguard, Lahore*. Lahore: Vanguard.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. 2007. *Civilizing security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lopes, G. et al. 2012. Labeling and cumulative disadvantage: the impact of formal police intervention on life chances and crime during emerging adulthood. *Crime and Delinquency* 58(3), pp. 456-488.

Lynch, J. P. and Sabol, W. J. 2004. Assessing the effects of mass incarceration on informal social control in communities. *Criminology and Public Policy* 3(2), pp. 267-294.

Lyon, D. 2001. *Surveillance society: monitoring everyday life*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Lyon, D. 2003. Cyberspace, surveillance, and social control. In: Ho, K.C. et al. eds. *Asia.com: Asia encounters the internet*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 67.

Madhani, F. I. et al. 2017. Women's perceptions and experiences of domestic violence: An observational study from Hyderabad, Pakistan. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 32(1), pp. 76-100.

Maguire, E. R. and King, W. R. 2004. Trends in the policing industry. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593(1), pp. 15-41.

Maguire, E. R. et al. 2015. Problem-oriented policing in Colorado Springs: a content analysis of 753 cases. *Crime and Delinquency* 61(1), pp. 71-95.

Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre. 2014. *The rise of Karachi as a mega-city: issues and challenges*. Lahore: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre.

Maimon, D. and Browning, C. R. 2010. Unstructured socializing, collective efficacy, and violent behavior among urban youth. *Criminology* 48(2), pp. 443-474.

Manning, P. K. 2003. *Policing contingencies*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Manning, P. K. 2016. *Democratic policing in a changing world*. New York: Routledge.

Mansoor, H. 2013. *Korangi notified as sixth district of Karachi* [Online]. Karachi: Dawn Available at: www.dawn.com/news/1054395 [Accessed: 10 November 2015].

Marenin, O. 1998. United States police assistance to emerging democracies. *Policing and Society* 8(2), pp. 153-167.

References

Marks, M. 2002. New methods,new motives? Appraising police behavioral change in a post-apartheid police unit. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 37(3-5), pp. 318-352.

Mars, J. R. 2002. *Deadly force, colonialism, and the rule of law: police violence in Guyana*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press

Mastrorocco, N. and Minale, L. 2018. News media and crime perceptions: evidence from a natural experiment. *Journal of Public Economics* 165, pp. 230-255.

Matza, D. 1964. *Delinquency and drift*. New York: Wiley.

Mazerolle, L. G. et al. 1998. Controlling social disorder using civil remedies: results from a randomized field experiment in Oakland, California. In: Mazerolle, L. and Roehl, J. eds. *Civil remedies and crime prevention* Vol. 9. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

McIlwaine, C. and Moser, C. O. 2001. Violence and social capital in urban poor communities: perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala. *Journal of International Development* 13(7), pp. 965-984.

Merton, R. K. 1938. Social structure and anomie. *American Sociological Review* 3(5), pp. 672-682.

Mirza, J. 2013. Kidnapping for ransom big business in Karachi. *The News*. August 31, 2013.

Mneimneh, Z. N. et al. 2018. Cultural and interviewer effects on interview privacy: Individualism and national wealth. *Cross-Cultural Research* 52(5), pp. 496-523.

Müller, M.-M. 2010. Community Policing in Latin America: lessons from Mexico City. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 88, pp. 21-37.

Munck, G. L. 2015. Building democracy... which democracy? Ideology and models of democracy in post-transition Latin America. *Government and Opposition* 50(3), pp. 364-393.

Murshid, N. S. and Critelli, F. M. 2020. Empowerment and intimate partner violence in Pakistan: results from a nationally representative survey. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 35(3-4), pp. 854-875.

Nations Online Project. Administrative map of Pakistan. Online: Nations Online Project.

Neild, R. 1999. *From national security to citizen security: civil society and the evolution of public order debates*. International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

Newman, O. 1972. *Defensible space: people and design in the violent city*. London: Architectural Press.

Newman, O. 1976. *Design guidelines for creating defensible space*. Washington, DC.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

Norton, R. J. 2010. Feral cities: problems today, battlefields tomorrow? *Marine Corps University Journal* 1(1), pp. 51-77.

Numbeo. 2020. *Current crime index* [Online]. Available at: www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings_current.jsp [Accessed: 10 February 2020].

O'Brien, K. J. 2006. Discovery, research (re)design, and theory building. In: Heimer, M. and Thøgersen, S. eds. *Doing fieldwork in China*. Malaysia: NIAS Press, pp. 27-41.

References

Oberwittler, D. 2007. The effects of neighbourhood poverty on adolescent problem behaviours: a multi-level analysis differentiated by gender and ethnicity. *Housing Studies* 22(5), pp. 781-803.

Osgood, D. W. and Anderson, A. L. 2004. Unstructured socializing and rates of delinquency. *Criminology* 42(3), pp. 519-550.

Ostry, J. D. et al. 2016. Neoliberalism: oversold? *Finance & Development* 53(2), pp. 38-41.

Painter, K. and Farrington, D. P. 1999. Improved street lighting: crime reducing effects and cost-benefit analyses. *Security Journal* 12(4), pp. 17-32.

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2017. *Provisional summary results of 6th population and housing census-2017*. Online: Government of Pakistan.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. *List of Satellite Tv Licence issued by PEMRA* [Online]. Available at: www.pemra.gov.pk/pemra/images/docs/stv/list_of_licences_issued_stv.pdf [Accessed: 7 August, 2015].

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. 2015. *Police, politics, and the people of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency.

Palmer, C. et al. 2005. "Danger lurks around every corner": fear of crime and its impact on opportunities for social interaction in stigmatised Australian suburbs. *Urban Policy and Research* 23(4), pp. 393-411.

Park, R. et al. 1925. *The city*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Park, R. E. 1984. The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behavior in the urban environment.*The city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Park, R. E. 1915. The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behavior in the city environment. *American Journal of Sociology* 20(577-612).

Paternoster, R. and Iovanni, L. 1989. The labeling perspective and delinquency: an elaboration of the theory and an assessment of the evidence. *Justice Quarterly* 6(3), pp. 359-394.

Patillo-McCoy, M. 1999. *Black picket fences: privilege and peril among the black middle class*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Pease, K. 1999. A review of street lighting evaluations: crime reduction effects. *Crime Prevention Studies* 10(1), pp. 47-76.

Perwaiz, S. B. 2019. *Karachi police launch three pilot projects to develop community policing* [Online]. The News. Available at: www.thenews.com.pk/print/439331-karachi-police-launch-three-pilot-projects-to-develop-community-policing [Accessed: 13 February 2020].

Pino, N. W. and Wiatrowski, M. D. 2006. Assessing the obstacles. In: Pino, N.W. and Wiatrowski, M.D. eds. *Democratic policing in transnational and developing countries*. Burlington: Ashgate.

Pino, N. W. and Wiatrowski, M. D. 2016. *Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries*. New York: Routledge.

References

Platt, J. 1992. "Case study" in American methodological thought. *Current Sociology* 40(1), pp. 17-48.

Putnam, R. D. 1995. Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy* 6(1), pp. 65-78.

Queen Mary College. 2011. *Queen Mary college* [Online]. Available at: www.qmc.edu.pk/introduction.html [Accessed: 24 October 2019].

Rahman, S. H. et al. 2012. *Regional integration and economic development in South Asia*. Cheltenham: Asian Development Bank. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Rana, I. A. and Bhatti, S. S. 2018. Lahore, Pakistan–urbanization challenges and opportunities. *Cities* 72(B), pp. 348-355.

Reeves, C. L. 2010. A difficult negotiation: fieldwork relations with gatekeepers. *Qualitative Research* 10(3), pp. 315-331.

Reiner, R. 2010. *The politics of the police*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R. 2012. What's left? The prospects for social democratic criminology. *Crime, Media, Culture* 8(2), pp. 135-150.

Robertson, A. 2005. Criminal justice policy transfer to post-Soviet states: two case studies of police reform in Russia and Ukraine. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 11(1), pp. 1-28.

Rose, N. 1999. *Powers of freedom: reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rubio, M. 1997. Perverse Social Capital—some Evidence from Colombia. *Journal of Economic Issues* 31(3), pp. 805-816.

Saeed, M. B. 2014. *Community policing in Pakistan: an assessment*. Islamabad: Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives.

Sain, M. 2004. A failed state facing new criminal problems: the case of Argentina. In: Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. eds. *Armed actors, organized violence and state failure in Latin America*. London: Zed Books, pp. 127-138.

Sampson, R. J. 2009. Disparity and diversity in the contemporary city: social (dis) order revisited. *The British Journal of Sociology* 60(1), pp. 1-31.

Sampson, R. J. 2012. *Great American city: Chicago and the enduring neighborhood effect*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sampson, R. J. and Groves, W. B. 1989. Community structure and crime: testing social-disorganization theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 94(4), pp. 774-802.

Sampson, R. J. and Laub, J. H. 1997. A life-course theory of cumulative disadvantage and the stability of delinquency. In: Thornberry, T.P. ed. *Developmental theories of crime and delinquency*. Vol. 7. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Sampson, R. J. and Laub, J. H. 2005. A life-course view of the development of crime. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 602(1), pp. 12-45.

Sampson, R. J. and Raudenbush, S. W. 1999. Systematic social observation of public spaces: a new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods. *American Journal of Sociology* 105(3), pp. 603-651.

Sampson, R. J. et al. 1997. Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy. *Science* 277(15), pp. 918-924.

Sampson, R. J. et al. 2008. Durable effects of concentrated disadvantage on verbal ability among African-American children. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 105(3), pp. 845-852.

Schildkraut, J. et al. 2015. Could it happen here? moral panic, school shootings, and fear of crime among college students. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 63(1-2), pp. 91-110.

Scott, M. S. 2000. *Problem-oriented policing: reflections on the first twenty years*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Scott, M. S. 2003. Getting the police to take problem-oriented policing seriously. In: Clarke, R.V. ed. *Crime prevention studies*. Vol. 15. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, pp. 49-78.

Sellin, T. and Wolfgang, M. E. 1964. *The measurement of delinquency*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Shagufta, S. et al. 2015. Latent classes of delinquent behaviour associated with criminal social identity among juvenile offenders in Pakistan. *Journal of Forensic Practice* 17(2), pp. 117-126.

Shah, Q. A. and Abbas, H. 2015. *Livelihoods and access to services: an analysis of peri-urban areas of Lahore, Pakistan*. Lahore: Sustainable Development Policy Institute.

Shaw, C. and McKay, H. 1942. *Juvenile delinquency and urban areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shigri, A. A. 2012. Police corruption and accountability. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform*. New York: Asia Society.

Sidhwa, B. 2005. Intoduction: city Beloved. In: Sidhwa, B. ed. *City of sin and splendour: writings on Lahore*. India: Penguin

Silver, E. and Miller, L. L. 2004. Sources of informal social control in Chicago neighborhoods. *Criminology* 42(3), pp. 551-584.

Sklansky, D. A. 2008. *Democracy and the police*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Sluka, J. 1990. Participant observation in violent social contexts. *Human Organization* 49(2), pp. 114-126.

Sonnett, J. et al. 2015. Priming implicit racism in television news: visual and verbal limitations on diversity. *Sociological Forum* 30(2), pp. 328-347.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. 2019. *Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan 2000-2019* [Online]. South Asia Terrorism Portal. Available at: www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ pakistan/database/casualties.htm [Accessed: 6 February 2020].

Southall, A. 1980. Social disorganisation in Uganda: before, during, and after Amin. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18(04), pp. 627-656.

Steinberg, J. 2011. Crime prevention goes abroad: policy transfer and policing in post-apartheid South Africa. *Theoretical Criminology* 15(4), pp. 349-364.

References

Stone, C. E. and Ward, H. H. 2000. Democratic policing: a framework for action. *Policing and Society* 10(1), pp. 11-45.

Suddle, S. 2012. Obstacles to reform. In: Abbas, H. ed. *Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform*. New York: Asia Society.

Sunstein, C. R. 1998. Selective fatalism. *The Journal of Legal Studies* 27, pp. 799-823.

Sutherland, E. H. 1940. White-collar criminality. *American Sociological Review* 5(1), pp. 1-12.

Tahir, N. 2017. *The size and growth of the economy of Lahore*. Lahore: Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Takagi, D. et al. 2012. Neighborhood social capital and crime victimization: comparison of spatial regression analysis and hierarchical regression analysis. *Social Science and Medicine* 75(10), pp. 1895-1902.

Tankebe, J. 2008a. Colonialism, legitimation, and policing in Ghana. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 36(1), pp. 67-84.

Tankebe, J. 2008b. Police effectiveness and police trustworthiness in Ghana: an empirical appraisal. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 8(2), pp. 185-202.

Tankebe, J. 2010. Public confidence in the police: testing the effects of public experiences of police corruption in Ghana. *British Journal of Criminology* 50(2), pp. 296-319.

Tankebe, J. et al. 2014. Emerging issues of crime and criminal justice in sub-Saharan Africa. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 14(1), pp. 3-7.

Terrill, W. and Reisig, M. D. 2003. Neighbourhood context and police use of force. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40(3), pp. 291-321.

The Newspaper's Staff Reporter. 2015. 78 children among 2,909 people killed in Karachi in 2014: HRCP. *Dawn*. January 7, 2015.

Thomas, J. 2005. The moral ambiguity of social control in cyberspace: a retro-assessment of the 'golden age'of hacking. *New Media and Society* 7(5), pp. 599-624.

Thompson, K. 1998. *Moral panics (Key Ideas)*. Milton Park: Routledge.

Tierney, J. 2013. *Criminology: theory and context*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.

Tilley, N. 2011. Modern approaches to policing: community, problem-oriented and intelligence-led. In: Newburn, T. ed. *Handbook of policing*. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, pp. 373-403.

Tilley, N. and Scott, M. S. 2012. The past, present and future of POP. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 6(2), pp. 122-132.

Tilley, N. and Sidebottom, A. 2017. Theory for crime prevention. In: Tilley, N. and Sidebottom, A. eds. *Handbook of crime prevention and community safety*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, pp. 3-21.

Tittle, C. R. 1995. Control balance: toward a general theory of deviance. New York: Routledge.

References

Transparency International Pakistan. 2011. National corruption perception survey 2011. [Online]. Available at: www.transparency.org.pk/documents/ncps2011.pdf [Accessed: December 28, 2011].

Triplett, R. A. and Jarjoura, G. R. 1994. Theoretical and empirical specification of a model of informal labeling. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 10(3), pp. 241-276.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,. 2015. *Fort and Shalamar Gardens in Lahore* [Online]. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Available at: www.whc.unesco.org/en/list/171 [Accessed: 07 November 2015].

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1996. Commisioner's Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo, BiH: UNMIK.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2013. *Drug use in Pakistan 2013*. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan's Ministry of and Interior and Narcotics Control. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2019. *Report of workshop on the dissemination of findings of study on public safety commissions in KPK*. Peshawar: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Van Maanen, J. 2011. *Tales of the field: on writing ethnography*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Walled City of Lahore Authority. *History of Lahore* [Online]. Lahore: Walled City of Lahore Authority. Available at: www.walledcitylahore.gop.pk/?page_id=350 [Accessed: 10 November 2015].

Walled City of Lahore Authority. 2012. *Fact sheet of walled city Lahore* [Online]. Available at: www.walledcitylahore.gop.pk/?page_id=29 [Accessed: 22 November, 2015].

Warner, B. D. and Sampson, R. J. 2015. Social disorganization, collective efficacy, and macro-level theories of social control. In: Cullen, F.T. et al. eds. *Challenging criminological theory: the legacy of Ruth Rosner Kornhauser*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 215-234.

Warner, B. D. et al. 2015. Racially homophilous social ties and informal social control. *Criminology* 53(2), pp. 204-230.

Weber, M. 1978. The types of legitimate domination. In: Roth, G. and Wittich, C. eds. *Economy and society*. California: University of California Press.

Weisburd, D. 2015. The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place. *Criminology* 53(2), pp. 133-157.

Weisburd, D. et al. 2010. Is problem-oriented policing effective in reducing crime and disorder? *Criminology and Public Policy* 9(1), pp. 139-172.

Wellford, C. F. and Triplett, R. A. 1993. The future of labeling theory: foundations and promises. In: Adler, F. and Laufer, W. eds. *New directions in criminological theory: advance in criminological theory*. Vol. 4. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 1-22.

Welsh, B. C. and Farrington, D. P. 2009. Public area CCTV and crime prevention: an updated systematic review and meta-analysis. *Justice Quarterly* 26(4), pp. 716-745.

References

White, M. D. et al. 2003. The police role in preventing homicide: considering the impact of problem-oriented policing on the prevalence of murder. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40(2), pp. 194-225.

Wickes, R. and Hipp, J. R. 2018. The spatial and temporal dynamics of neighborhood informal social control and crime. *Social Forces* 97(1), pp. 277-308.

Wiley, S. A. et al. 2013. The unintended consequences of being stopped or arrested: an exploration of the labeling mechanisms through which police contact leads to subsequent delinquency. *Criminology* 51(4), pp. 927-966.

Wilkins, L. T. 1965. New thinking in criminal statistics. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 56(3), pp. 277-284.

Wilson, W. J. 1987. *The truly disadvantaged: the inner city, the underclass, and public policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Wirth, L. 1928. *The ghetto*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Woodiwiss, M. and Hobbs, D. 2009. Organized evil and the Atlantic alliance: moral panics and the rhetoric of organized crime policing in America and Britain. *British Journal of Criminology* 49(1), pp. 106-128.

World Bank. 2000. *World development report 2000-2001: attacking poverty*. Online: World Bank Group.

Wright, E. M. and Fagan, A. A. 2013. The cycle of violence in context: exploring the moderating roles of neighborhood disadvantage and cultural norms. *Criminology* 51(2), pp. 217-249.

Xu, Y. et al. 2005. Discovering the impact of community policing: the broken windows thesis, collective efficacy, and citizens' judgment. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 42(2), pp. 147-186.

Yin, R. K. 2011. *Applications of case study research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yin, R. K. 2014. *Case study research: design and methods*. 5th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yin, R. K. 2017. *Case study research and applications: design and methods*. 6th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Young, J. 1999. *The exclusive society: social exclusion, crime and difference in late modernity*. London: Sage.

Yusuf, H. 2012. *Conflict dynamics in Karachi*. Washington: US Institute of Peace.

Zatz, M. S. 1987. Chicano youth gangs and crime: the creation of a moral panic. *Contemporary Crises* 11(2), pp. 129-158.

Zimmerman, G. M. and Messner, S. F. 2011. Neighborhood context and nonlinear peer effects on adolescent violent crime. *Criminology* 49(3), pp. 873-903.

Zorbaugh, H. W. 1983. *The gold coast and the slum: a sociological study of Chicago's near north side*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Appendix One: Guide and Coding Frame

Two separate interview guides were used in this study: one for the residents of the neighbourhoods and another for the police officers. These interview guides, along with a list of the main codes in the coding frame, are presented in this appendix. NVivo does not support right-to-left language scripts; therefore, the Urdu text of the transcripts uploaded as PDF files was manually coded.

Interview guide for residents

Pseudonym	فرضی نام
Gender	صنف
Age	عمر
Birthplace	جائے پیدائش
Ethnicity/Caste	نسل/قوم
Born here/moved here (if moved here, when?	یہیں کی پیدائش /منتقل شدہ (اگر منتقل ہیں تو کب؟)
Duration of living in the neighbourhood	علاقے میں رہائش کا عرصہ
Profession or activity	پیشہ یا کام
Do you work inside or outside of the neighbourhood?	کیا آپ اسی علاقے میں کام کرتے ہیں یا اس سے باہر؟
Residential status (Tenant/landlord/homeless etc.)	رہائش کی نوعیت(کرایہ دار/مالک مکان/بے گھر وغیرہ)
Marital Status/Family Status	ازدواجی حیثیت /فیملی کی نوعیت
Number of children	بچوں کی تعداد
Level of Education	تعلیم
Perceived social class	ظاہری سماجی طبقہ
Member of any National Organization (Party, Union, NGO, etc.)	کسی تنظیم کی رکنیت (جماعت، یونین ، این جی او وغیرہ وغیرہ)
Member of any Neighbourhood Organization/Group	علاقے کی کسی تنظیم /گروپ کی رکنیت
Main Information Sources National (Which newspapers, television channels, internet, radio etc.)	معلومات کے کلیدی ذرائع ، قومی(کون سے اخبار، ٹی وی چینل، انٹرنیٹ، ریڈیو وغیرہ)
Date of Interview	انٹرویو کی تاریخ
Duration and time of day	دورانیہ اور دن کا وقت
Why did I choose this person?	میں نے اس فرد کا انتخاب کیوں کیا؟
Where have I taken the Interview? (Description of situation)	میں نے انٹرویو کہاں کیا؟ (صورتحال کی تفصیل)
Protocol of main Statements	کلیدی بیانات کے پروٹوکول
Summary of Interview	انٹرویو کا خلاصہ

Does the interviewee refer to any mentionable contemporary news (such as elections, incidents, etc.)?	کیا جس فرد کا انٹرویو کیا گیا اس نے کسی قابلِ ذکر حالیہ خبر کا تذکرہ کیا؟ (جیسا کہ الیکشن ، کوئی حادثہ وغیرہ)
Is any contemporary news important for the interview?	کیا کوئی حالیہ خبر انٹرویو کے لیے اہم ہے؟
Is anything about the interviewee and her/ his relation to the situation or the researcher mentionable?	کیا جس کا انٹرویو کیا گیا ، اس کا صورتحال سے تعلق واضح کرنا ضروری ہے؟

Question	**سوال**
Tell me how this neighbourhood was like when you moved here (if native, then 20, 30 years ago)?	جب آپ یہاں منتقل ہوئے تو یہ علاقہ کیسا تھا (اگر مقامی ہے تو 20 سے 30 پہلے)؟
Could you describe the good things about living in this neighbourhood? What are the bad things? Is crime really a problem here?	کیا آپ اس علاقے کی اچھی خصوصیات گنوا سکتے ہیں؟ یہاں کی خرابیاں کیا ہیں؟ کیا یہاں جرائم کا مسئلہ حقیقی ہے؟
How would you personally characterise this neighbourhood in terms of security? What do people outside this neighbourhood think about it?	آپ سکیورٹی کے حوالے سے اس علاقے کو کیا درجہ دیں گے؟ اس علاقے سے باہر لوگ یہاں کے بارے میں کیا سوچتے ہیں؟
Could you tell me about some places in this neighbourhood where people gather, and the activities undertaken there?	کیا آپ اس علاقے کے چند ایسے مقامات گنوا سکتے جہاں لوگ تقریبات کے لیے جمع ہوتے ہوں؟
Can you tell me about the most influential persons or groups in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Why are they important? Follow up: Do they play a role in crime prevention and control? Give me some examples?	کیا آپ اس علاقے کے سب سے زیادہ با اثر فرد یا گروہ کی نشاندہی کر سکتے ہیں؟ فالو اپ: ان کی اہمیت کیوں ہے؟ فالو اپ: کیا یہ جرائم کی روک تھام اور انسداد میں کردار ادا کر تے ہیں؟ کچھ مثالیں دینا پسند کریں گے؟
Which group of people (age, ethnicity, social class etc.) generally commit crime and cause disorder in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Give me some examples of how people around here or police deal with these people? Follow up: Crime commission	لوگوں کا کون سا گروہ (عمر، نسل، سماجی طبقہ وغیرہ) علاقے میں جرائم کا ارتکاب کر کے امن و سکون تباہ کرتا ہے؟ فالو اپ: چند مثالیں دیں کہ یہاں کے لوگ یا پولیس ایسے افراد کا مقابلہ کیسے کرتے ہیں؟ فالو اپ: کرائم کمیشن
What do you think about the media reporting of crime and violence? Follow up: Is it fair? What effects does this reporting have on people's feelings of security/insecurity?	جرائم اور تشدد کی میڈیا کوریج کے بارے میں آپ کی رائے کیا ہے؟ فالو اپ: کیا اس میں انصاف کیا جاتا ہے؟ یہ رپورٹنگ لوگوں کے احساس تحفظ کو کس طرح متاثر کرتی ہے؟
Tell me about what crimes/disorders worry you the most in this neighbourhood? Which crimes/disorders are trivial? Follow up: Why do you think so? Crime commission	بتائیں کہ کون سے جرائم /نقص آپ کے لیے سب سے زیادہ پریشان کن ہیں؟ کون سے جرائم /نقائص اہم ہیں؟ فالو اپ: آپ کے ایسا سوچنے کی وجہ؟ کرائم کمیشن
Tell me about a time in the past year where you or someone in the neighbourhood was victimised. Follow up: Is this a common occurrence? Follow up: When you were victimised, what happened next? Follow up: Did you denounce it to the local authorities? Why?	مجھے گزشتہ برس کے کسی ایسے وقت کے بارے میں بتائیں جب آپ یا علاقے کے کسی دوسرے فرد کو نشانہ بنایا گیا۔ فالو اپ: کیا یہ معمول کا واقعہ ہے؟ فالو اپ: آپ کب نشانہ بنے، اس کے بعد کیا ہوا؟ فالو اپ: کیا آپ نے مقامی حکام کو اس کی اطلاع دی؟ کیوں؟

Which are the places in this neighbourhood where most crimes occur? Follow up: Why?	اس علاقے کے کون سے مقامات ہیں جہاں سب سے زیادہ جرائم ہوتے ہیں؟ فالو اپ: کیوں؟
Tell me about the particular problems for women in terms of crime and disorder?	کیا آپ جرائم اور امن و امان کے حوالے سے خواتین سے مخصوص مسائل کے بارے میں بتانا پسند کریں گے؟
Have you found any instance where you or your family's life was in danger? Is risk higher or lower due to vigilantes?	کیا آپ ایسے حالات سے دوچار ہوئے جب آپ یا آپ کے اہل خانہ کی جان کو خطرہ تھا؟ کیا یہ خطرہ چوکیداروں کے باعث کم ہوا یا زیادہ؟
How much do you interact with people in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Give me examples of the events/gatherings where people discuss issues of mutual concern? What about in comparison with other neighbourhoods in the city?	آپ اس علاقے کے لوگوں سے کس حد تک ملتے جلتے ہیں؟ فالو اپ: ایسی تقریبات/اجتماعات کی مثال دیں جہاں لوگ جمع ہوکر باہمی مسائل پر گفتگو کرتے ہیں۔ شہر کے دیگر علاقوں سے اس علاقے کا موازنہ کیسے کریں گے؟
What measures do the community or individuals undertake to prevent and control crime in the neighbourhood? How does the community reach a consensus to introduce such measures? Give me examples of a time when these measures had favourable outcomes? Are these arrangements sanctioned or supported by police? (Probe: people, places, problems)	علاقے میں جرائم پر قابو پانے کے لیے کمیونٹی یا افراد کیا اقدامات کرتے ہیں؟ ایسے اقدامات متعارف کرانے کے لیے کمیونٹی رائے عامہ کیسے بناتی ہے؟ ایسی مثالیں دیں جب ایسے اقدامات حقیقی طور پر مفید ثابت ہوئے۔ کیا ان اقدامات کی منظوری پولیس سے لی گئی تھی؟ (تفتیش: لوگ، مقامات، مسائل)
How willing are you to intervene in events of crime and violence in this neighbourhood? How confident are you that people around here will intervene if you are in such a situation? Follow up: Could you tell me about some recent incidents?	علاقے میں جرائم اور تشدد کی صورت میں آپ مداخلت کرنے پر کس حد تک تیار ہیں؟ آپ کس حد تک پُراعتماد ہیں کہ اگر آپ ایسی صورتحال سے دوچار ہوئے تو باقی لوگ آپ کی مدد کے لیے مداخلت کریں گے؟ کیا آپ کسی حالیہ واقعہ کی مثال دے سکتے ہیں؟
Tell me about the police in this neighbourhood. Follow up: Have actions of police improved the security situation in this neighbourhood? How do you respond to situations when police seem to be visibly active in performing their duties?	مجھے اس علاقے کی پولیس کے بارے میں بتائیں۔ فالو اپ: کیا پولیس کے اقدامات نے علاقے میں امن و امان کی صورتحال بہتر کی ہے؟ جب پولیس اپنے فرائض انجام دینے میں واضح طور پر متحرک نظر آئے تو آپ کیا کرتے ہیں؟
Can you give me an example of how the police interact with people or did you have a personal experience of interacting with them? Is there any coordination between the police and the community?	کیا آپ پولیس کے لوگوں کے ساتھ طرز عمل کی کوئی مثال دے سکتے ہیں یا آپ کو خود اس کا اتفاق ہوا؟ کیا پولیس اور کمیونٹی کے درمیان کوئی رابطہ قائم رہتا ہے؟
Can you think of some situations in which you would approve the use of violence in the neighbourhood by the people and/or the police? Is there a situation in which you would want police or somebody to use violence on your behalf?	کیا آپ ایسی صورتحال سوچ سکتے ہیں جس میں عام لوگ اور/ یا پولیس تشدد استعمال کر سکتی ہو؟ کیا ایسی کوئی صورتحال بھی ہے جس میں آپ چاہیں گے کہ پولیس یا کوئی اورفرد آپ کی طرف سے تشدد کا استعمال کرے؟
I would like to ask you some questions on how the neighbourhood has changed since you have lived in it. Could you tell me what has been the most noticeable change here? Since you have lived here, has there been a change in violence in the area?	میں اس بارے میں چند سوالات کرنا چاہوں گا کہ جب سے آپ یہاں رہ رہے ہیں، یہ علاقہ کیسے تبدیل ہوا ہے۔ کیا آپ بتا سکتے ہیں کہ یہاں سب سے زیادہ قابل ذکر تبدیلی کون سی آئی ہے؟ کیونکہ آپ یہاں رہتے ہیں، کیا اس علاقے میں تشدد وغیرہ کی صورتحال میں تبدیلی آئی ہے؟

We have now spent the past hour talking about different aspects of your neighbourhood. I have asked you a lot of questions, but sometimes there are questions that are important to ask that I didn't think about. Are there any questions that I didn't ask that you think I should?	ہم نے پچھلے ایک گھنٹے میں آپ کے علاقے کے مختلف پہلوؤں پر بات کی ہے۔ میں نے آپ سے بہت سے سوالات کیے، لیکن بعض ایسے اہم سوالات بھی ہو سکتے ہیں جو شاید میں پوچھ نہیں سکا۔ کیا کوئی ایسا سوال ہے جو آپ سمجھتے ہیں کہ مجھے پوچھنا چاہیے تھا؟
Do you have any questions for me?	کیا آپ کے ذہن میں میرے لیے کوئی سوال ہے؟

Interview guide for police officers

1. Please tell me about your experience in the police department.

2. Since how long are you posted here? Could you please tell me about your experience as SHO in this police station? How is it different to other police stations you have served as SHO?

3. Organization of police station: Personnel, Hierarchy, Responsibilities, Division of labour.

4. Could you describe the good things about this neighbourhood? What are the bad things? Is crime really a problem here?

5. Could you tell me about some places in this neighbourhood where people gather, and the activities undertaken there?

6. Can you tell me about the most influential persons or groups in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Why are they important? Follow up: Do they play a role in crime prevention and control? Give me some examples?

7. Which group of people (age, ethnicity, social class etc.) generally commit crime and cause disorder in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Give me some examples of how people around here or police deal with these people? Follow up: Crime commission

8. What do you think about the media reporting of crime and violence? Follow up: Is it fair? What effects does this reporting have on people's feelings of security/insecurity?

9. Tell me about what crimes/disorders worry you the most in this neighbourhood? Which crimes/disorders are trivial? Follow up: Why do you think so? Crime commission

10. Which are the places in this neighbourhood where most crimes occur? Follow up: Why?

11. Tell me about the particular problems that women face in terms of crime and disorder?

12. How much do you interact with people in this neighbourhood? Follow up: Give me examples of the events/gatherings where you discuss issues of mutual concern with people? What about in comparison with other neighbourhoods in the city?

13. How do you police this area? In what ways is it different from the policing in other areas of this city?

14. What measures do the community or individuals undertake to prevent and control crime in the neighbourhood? How does the community reach consensus to introduce such measures? Give me examples of a time when these measures actually had favourable outcomes? Are these arrangements sanctioned or supported by police? (Probe: people, places, problems)

15. Have actions of the police improved the security situation in this neighbourhood? Do you think people feel secure when police seem to be visibly active in performing their duties? Is registration of FIR a problem for people?

16. Do people testify to crime? Why? Why not?

17. Tell me about coordination between the police and the community? Examples. Have you made attempts to engage community residents to help perform your tasks?

18. Can you think of some situations in which you would approve the use of violence in the neighbourhood by the people? Is it a practice here to physically torture accused persons to extract evidence? Is there a situation in which you would want police or somebody to use violence?

19. Have you found any instance where you felt under pressure to give favourable treatment to criminals? Examples? How did you respond?

20. Please tell me about the vigilante groups. What impact do they have on security situation in this neighbourhood?

21. How do police come to know of crime other than through a formal complaint? What about those criminal activities about which people do not feel bothered to report?

22. Is there some coordination mechanisms between police and other government departments? Which departments? e.g. PTA. Rangers? Is there an overlap of responsibilities? How has Rangers' presence in the city affected police in terms of motivation, for example?

23. What is the threshold level for police encounters?

24. Do you have zero tolerance for all criminals or is some leniency shown to juvenile or first offence criminals? Females?

25. I would like to ask you some questions on how the neighbourhood has changed since you have been here. Could you tell me what has been the most noticeable change here? Since you have lived here, has there been a change in violence in the area?

26. What suggestions do you have to improve the performance of police?

27. Any other thoughts?

Coding frame

Theme	Code number	Code	Description of codes
Neighbourhood characteristics	1	Population	Detail of population density, family size, and other population characteristics
	2	Good things	Pull factors in neighbourhood which make the residents stay.
	3	Bad things	Problems which need to be resolved in neighbourhood.
	4	Important recent changes	How the neighbourhood has changed in the last 5 to 10 years.
	5	Population turnover	Inflow and outflow of residents in the neighbourhood.
	6	Ethnic distribution	Estimated population of different ethnicities and whether there are specific streets in which people belonging to an ethnicity are living.
	7	Crime perception	How big or small a problem is crime. The kinds and frequency of crimes in the neighbourhood.
Informal control	8	Social interaction	Attending funerals, marriages, and other social events. Meeting with neighbours. Sharing feasts. Borrowing or lending.
	9	Social cohesion	Perceived unity and sense of belongingness. Relations and social bonds.
	10	Collective efficacy	Willingness to intervene; mutual trust; regulating behaviour of groups members.
	11	Eyes on the street	Noting the movement of strangers; number of people on streets in day and night.
	12	Vigilantism	Incidents where 'punishment' was meted out by the people. Attitudes and opinions about acting without legal authority.
	13	Manifest control	Activities specifically intended to prevent or control crime.
	14	Control of people	Labelling; stereotyping; warning teenagers, complaining to parents.
	15	Control of places	Defensible spaces; barriers, speed breakers, street lighting
	16	Control of problems	Vigilance groups; collective action; innovation.
	17	Control outcomes	Success and failure of social control activities.

Formal control	18	First information report	Telling the police about a crime incident; attitudes and reactions about going to police station.
	19	Proactive control	Perceptions about police patrols; check posts; stop and search.
	20	Reactive control	Investigation; prosecution; arrest; follow up; recovery.
	21	Performance evaluation	Overall performance of neighbourhood police.
	22	Experiences	Personal experiences with local police.
	23	Reassurance	What crimes and disorders should the police handle at priority?
	25	Capacity issues	What could be done to improve police performance? What are the problems with police training and resources?
	24	Expectations	What should the police do? What are the functions of police?
	25	Rangers	Comparison between paramilitary forces and police.
	26	Control signals	Actions of police which have a negative or positive impact on sense of security.
Intersection of controls	27	Community policing	Relations with police; mutual consultation on matters of crime and disorder; feedback to and from police.
	28	Informal handling	Out of court settlements; corruption; disciplining.
	29	Political actors and police	Relations between police and local politicians; extent of influence over police; using police for political purposes.
	30	Police and organised ISC	Organised informal social control efforts and police response; conflict or harmony.
	31	Conflicting priorities	Contradiction in perception of which crimes are important to handle.
	32	Police crime nexus	Alleged involvement of police in crime; police regulating drug market; extortion from criminals.
Risk perception	34	Moral panic	Mediatisation of issues and its impact on informal social control.
	35	Victimisation	Personal experiences of victimisation and consequences.
	36	Acute risk	Situations when life and property of oneself or closed relatives were threatened.

	37	Crime and gender	Crime issues related to females; harassment; rape; involvement of women in social control efforts.
	38	Signal crimes	Crimes which cause significant distress to respondents; crime which made them do something about the safety of neighbourhood.
Moral entrepreneurs	39	Political positioning	Affiliations with political parties; degree of involvement; extent of influence with wider political environment.
	40	Interpersonal relations	Degree of consensus or conflict among moral entrepreneurs.
	41	Rule creators/enforcers	Process of defining and prioritising crime prevention and control activities; which crimes were more or less important.
	42	Rule breakers	Moral guardians as perpetrators of crime.
Police	43	Administrative structure	Roles and duties; organisational hierarchy in the police station.
	44	Transfers/postings	Process of transfer and posting within and between police stations.
	45	Responsibilities	Key functions of police in the neighbourhood; expectations of higher-ups and public.
	46	Challenges	Problems in successfully carrying out duties.
	47	Democratic policing	Accountability; human rights; rule of law; responsiveness.
	48	Political pressures	Compromises; inability to act against some criminals; pressure to release accused offenders.
Context specific factors	49	Spatiality	Exit and entry routes; neighbourhood's location in the city; neighbourhood's neighbours.
	50	Political economy	Means of production and its relationship with power balance and crime outcomes in neighbourhood.
	51	Ethnic/religious tensions	Impact of ethnic heterogeneity on collective action; anonymity; established and outsiders.

Appendix 2: Additional Detail on Methods

This section includes further information on methods which was either not included in the methods chapter or discussed briefly.

Field notes

Audio recordings are limited in their inscription of social discourse, not least due to reactions of interviewees to recording devices (Emerson et al. 2011). During the fieldwork, I realized that narrative interviews were very difficult to conduct successfully. A formal setting, a voice recorder, questions on crime and policing in the neighbourhood, and an 'outsider' interviewer did not make for a comfortable environment for some interviewees. I noticed that interviewees down the socioeconomic ladder were more likely to provide short and general answers to questions requiring detail. This problem was addressed by taking field notes of my observations and conducting informal conversations with residents of the neighbourhood. These field notes were often taken when I was back at my accommodation, although I sometimes recorded my observations on the voice recorder as I left the neighbourhood. Usually, ethnographers employ this strategy of taking field notes after the fact when they are in unfamiliar contexts and where the priority is to fully participate and observe the social world (Emerson et al. 2011). In fact, Jackson (1990, p. 9) remarked, "Anthropologists are those who write things down at the end of the day". However, I did so because taking field notes while talking to people could have raised similar reservations that were there in formal interviews.

The field notes I took were not as detailed and nuanced as expected in ethnographic research, which involves participation, interaction, and observation as its central tenets (Delamont and Atkinson 2020, p. 2). I was merely trying to make up for those interviews in which I was provided with hints of some substantial event or process, but where my follow-up questions could not extract the required detail. Those field notes were used in this thesis to evaluate views expressed in the interviews and to fill the missing pieces in overall narratives of the neighbourhoods. Therefore, I mostly used "end-point" descriptions (Emerson et al. 2011, p. 106), making use of what I had learned through the interviews. In addition, the writing style of the field notes was a mix of first and third-person variations, and omniscient point of views (Emerson et al. 2011, pp. 97, 100). This approach was apt for my purpose because while I used the inductive approach in the fieldwork, my informal conversations and observations were mostly deductive, at least to the extent that I was trying to find answers to some of the issues I had noted during the interviews. However, in

at least one of the neighbourhoods, I found my field notes as instrumental as the interviews in helping me answer the research questions. In fact, most confessional tales (Van Maanen 2011, p. 73) that I recounted in this thesis alongside realist accounts were largely owing to my field notes. Following is an English translation of a typical field note entry:

> Today is 27.03.2016. I have completed three interviews and, so far, I have not faced any problem (in gaining access to the field). Zain has been very cooperative throughout, although he is busy with the renovation of his house. After the interview with Majeed, he insisted that I have tea with him. He could have had tea with me inside the colony, but he took me to the tea stall on the main road. The only reason I can think of is that he wanted to talk to me outside the neighbourhood, because otherwise the stall was visibly unhygienic and truck drivers were unnecessarily honking while passing through the road. I might not have agreed to go with him if I knew he would ask Altaf to accompany us. Altaf is the same guy who brandished his liquor bottle when I was interviewing the local councillor. Smoking a Dunhill cigarette at the tea stall, Altaf said, "You can even get a rocket launcher here if you want." "Just shut up," Majeed retorted; "I am still not sure if he is a student (laughter)." "Do not get us screwed, brother," Altaf said in a friendly but meaningful tone. I gave him a smile in response. Just a while later, one of them told me about an attempted robbery where a local boy fired at them with his personal weapon; the robbers fled only to come back in a few minutes and shot him. I need to note this incident for the interview with the SHO. Also, I will countercheck with Sajid if this story is true. Majeed and Altaf tend to exaggerate, I think, and they do not even care if those truck drivers at the tea stall are listening to them. I hope they are just curious about my research and not trying to keep me under their watch. I am still not sure about their day job as they are always on the streets.

Analytic coding of qualitative data usually proceeds in two stages: open coding followed by focused coding (Emerson et al. 2011, p. 172). Open coding involves a line-by-line analysis to identify issues, whereas, in focused coding, a line-by-line analysis is conducted based on categories and issues already identified. While I used Emerson et al. (2011)'s approach with interview data, fieldnotes were mostly analysed through focused coding only because the fieldnotes were taken to supplement the interviews and were not initially thought of as an independent data source. When a particularly interesting finding was made through my

fieldnotes, I used that finding as an interview question for the rest of the interviews in the neighbourhood.

Interview settings and transcription

I conducted most interviews at either the workplace or home of the interviewees. In some cases, interviewee was at a friend's shop or sitting at road intersections or tea stalls. Earlier in the fieldwork, I insisted on doing interviews in settings where no one else was present besides myself and the interviewee. However, many people were more at ease in the presence of their friends or family members; some even asked for friends to be present during the interviews. In those cases, it was not possible for me to do private interviews. At tea stalls or road intersections, some bystanders would come close to see what was happening. In those cases, I paused the voice recorder and politely asked them to leave. There were few interviews where friends of interviewees would frequently interrupt the conversation and express their own point of view. I listened to them patiently but once they stopped talking, I resumed the interview from where it was interrupted. Studies examining the impact of a third person's presence on interview responses have returned mixed results (Aquilino 1993; Greene et al. 1994; Mneimneh et al. 2018). Notwithstanding the impact the presence of others may have on conversations, I had little leverage to dictate the conditions in which the interview would be held. Most people consented to the interview because they thought they were helping me complete my studies. Where possible, I suggested the interviewee to communicate with me in private and I remember a few instances where interviewees asked their children to leave the room before the interview began.

Apart from two to three, all the interviews were conducted in the Urdu language. I read out the consent form and participant information sheet before each of the interviews. A few interviewees asked me to skip reading the consent form and directly start the interview. Before starting the interview, I filled an information form which included demographic questions, such as age, birthplace, family size, income, and occupation of the interviewee. Since respondents could have provided identifiable information in response to those questions, I started the voice recorder only after noting answers to these questions on the information form. All the interviews were voice recorded, and I would normally start recording with a description of the place, respondent identifier, date, and time. There were instances where the interviewees wanted to tell something they deemed sensitive and asked me to stop the recording. In those cases, I would write their responses on paper. These handwritten responses were later integrated with the interview transcripts. Once the

fieldwork concluded, a verbatim transcription was done on paper for all the interviews. Then the transcripts were typed in InPage, an Urdu typing software. During typing, transcripts were edited by removing repetitions and stammers. The transcript files were converted into PDF format and uploaded to NVivo for data analysis.

Unobtrusive clothing

In 2014, I conducted a research on two neighbourhoods in Lahore. During the fieldwork of that research project, I went to neighbourhoods in my car and used formal wear. After spending a few days in the field, I realised that I was drawing unnecessary attention to myself. For the present research, I wore jeans and t-shirts on all the days except Friday, when I wore a shalwar kameez. This strategy of wearing unobtrusive clothing was also used by Belousov et al. (2007) during their fieldwork in the shipping industry. In addition, I either used a motorbike or rickshaw for travelling to and from neighbourhoods. These and other such decisions were taken because in all the neighbourhoods (more so in Karachi than Lahore), people were suspicious about my identity. I had to explain to the people on numerous occasions that people as old as me could be students. Moreover, the subject matter was strange to people who think higher education includes only business, medicine, or engineering. Despite the precautions, a certain degree of uncertainty existed about me in at least three of the four neighbourhoods.

Fieldwork in dangerous settings

This research was to be conducted in Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. However, Peshawar was a target of frequent terrorist attacks at that time, so I decided that the research would be conducted in Karachi and Lahore only. By the time the field work started, the security situation had improved considerably. Only in Karachi I had to make decisions which took into consideration my safety. Sluka (1990) has mentioned instances where spies have presented themselves in the field as anthropologists, and intelligence agencies have used fieldwork to plan counterinsurgency operations. I believe this is precisely what the members of a drug cartel thought about me. I was chased by an armed member of a drug cartel in the neighbourhood before I left the field in haste. In another instance, I decided not to enter a neighbourhood which was deemed too dangerous by both residents and police officers. Drawing upon field experiences in a cross national study of the work of inspectors in the shipping industry, Belousov et al. (2007) noted that 'frontier'-like (Giddens 1985, p. 50) character of some research areas and sensitivity of the research topic are two important factors associated with increased personal safety risk for fieldworkers. Goldsmith (2003)'s work in Colombia also highlights the risk of physical danger to

fieldworkers when sensitive questions are asked in settings characterized by weaker control of the police and other state institutions. In both the instances mentioned above, the neighbourhoods had a frontier-like character and formal control was lower than that of other neighbourhoods I studied. I followed the general safety guidelines, such as intermittently sharing my location with family and a police officer, and having a friend positioned at a short distance from research settings. However, whenever I faced imminent risk in pursuing the fieldwork, I preferred my safety above all else.

Gatekeeping and patronage

The role of gatekeepers and sponsors (informal gatekeepers) is foundational in negotiating access to most research settings. It is even more important and challenging to engage gatekeepers in criminological research (Reeves 2010). In the Western tradition, negotiating access is generally about providing gatekeepers a description of research objectives and the activities that would be undertaken (Delamont and Atkinson 2020). In the case of Pakistan, however, it is important to have the patronage of a police officer if one is to expect cooperation from the police department. If it were not for one of my friends in the police, I do not think three of the four SHOs would have given me an interview. Similarly, informal gatekeepers play a significant role in neighbourhoods characterised by patronage. In all the neighbourhoods, I first located influential people who would vouch for me and prevent me from getting into problems. In Lahore, my sponsors were known to me through mutual friends. In one neighbourhood of Karachi, I found a local politician who was born and raised in Gujranwala (a city next to my hometown Lahore). A long conversation with him in Punjabi about various areas of Lahore made him comfortable with my identity. Because of his approval and support, I was able to complete my fieldwork relatively quickly. In the other neighbourhood of Karachi, I could not find someone who would offer me his patronage, and my stay in that neighbourhood was the shortest of all. Patronage and kinship networks are so important that I had to terminate two interviews because the interviewees were visibly uncomfortable with my questioning; they had agreed to the interview because my sponsors, i.e. someone higher up the social hierarchy, had asked them to. Personal contacts are significant in neighbourhoods of Karachi and Lahore, and researchers would do well to contact local moral entrepreneurs through some reference before going into the field.

Western methods in non-Western contexts

As explained in this thesis, criminology is an evolving discipline in Pakistan, and very few people understand what criminological research entails. Most of the issues which I

encountered in the fieldwork might not have occurred if I were asking questions about public health, education, and civic infrastructure. During the interviews, many people were keen to draw my attention to broken roads, electricity shortfalls, and sanitation issues. However, when it came to crime and the police, especially in the neighbourhood context, eyebrows were raised. Major qualitative methods in the field include interviews, focus group discussions, and observations. I have already explained the difficulties faced in getting detailed responses in interview settings. I do not think focus groups would have worked better for similar reasons. If I were to conduct this research again, I would have ideally lived in Shirin Jinnah Colony and Mehmoodabad for a few months and conduct the ethnographic fieldwork. Intersection of formal and informal control can be best understood when a researcher is present in those situations where formal actors work with or against their informal counterparts. However, I could not figure out a way to approach Shirin Jinnah Colony, Pathan area of Begumpura, and Chanesar Goth to negotiate access for an ethnographic study. Pathans of Begumpura would not allow me to live among them even if I am friends with them for a year. If I visit the MQM unit for a few days in Mehmoodabad, I might not be able to sit in the office of a rival politician. A covert researcher in Chanesar Goth, if exposed, could get me shot. The problem is not only due to unfamiliarity of the people with modalities of social science research; it is broader in scope. There is a feeling of ambient insecurity among Pakistanis. The conception of the state of Pakistan is very different to that of the West in that the state is conceived as a stakeholder vying for the same scarce resources as the public. There have been several terrorist incidents, violent protests, and carnages where state institutions have remained largely unresponsive. Trust in state institutions, rule of law, and due process is much lower in Pakistan than in the Global North. In these circumstances, it is entirely conceivable that people would not want to participate in any issue they do not fully comprehend, which in this case is a criminological study about their own neighbourhood. If the study of criminology is to evolve truly as a global discipline, then there is a need to rethink methodological tools and ethical guidelines which are successfully applied in Western contexts but may not be as efficacious in places such as Pakistan.