Anglo-American crisis management during the Belgian Congo Crisis and Yemen Civil War (1958-1965)

Tierney Culley

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Abstract

This thesis uses fine-grained policy tracing to investigate Anglo-American management of the Belgian Congo Crisis and the Yemen Civil War (1958-1965). Drawing upon extensive primary sources gathered from multiple archives in the UK and the US, it examines policy formation and execution through different layers of the British and American bureaucracies and across multiple changes of government on both sides of the Atlantic. This approach provides new insights into the case studies and, more broadly, the practice and resilience of Anglo-American relations. Particular attention is paid to a *modus operandi* of Anglo-American exchange that evinced unusual degrees of informality, emphasis on personal relationships and willingness to share confidential information.

Acknowledgements

Like all major projects, this thesis is a product of long hours, sleepless nights, laughter, love, and heartbreak, and of which I have accrued many debts along the way. My deepest thanks go foremost to my family, for their support and patience as they saw this thesis through- though trying at times! To my dear friends, Alex, Julia, and Sam, for providing safeguard and welcome distraction in my greatest times of need. To the staff at LSW, for their encouragement, support, and for supplying all the food. Finally, to my academic 'squad': Geir, for his welcome reminders to 'keep writing'; Professor Robert Hendershot, for encouraging my scholarly rants, and to my supervisor, Dr Steve Marsh, for his steadfast support, painstaking supervision, and for juggling all the 'hats' (supervisor, mentor, confidant, and colleague) so seamlessly. Thank you!

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-I miss you, my bee charmer.

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Introduction

Aims

This thesis has two principal aims. The first is to contribute to a growing body of literature that argues traditional (neo-) realist and functional analyses of Anglo-American relations need to be supplemented with other approaches to fully appreciate their character and conduct. The second is to demonstrate the importance of Anglo-American bureaucratic interweaving and of lower-level government exchange therein to explaining how the two countries manage crisis situations. By using fine grained policy tracing of Anglo-American handling of the Belgian Congo Crisis and Yemen Civil War (1958-1965) the thesis seeks to shed new light both upon these crises and, more generally, why lower levels of US-UK official exchanges warrant consideration alongside those of Prime Ministers and Presidents at the apex of the so-called 'coral reef'.

Locating the study

This thesis is grounded in the traditions of diplomatic history but inspired by a new wave of scholarly works that break with traditional preoccupations of diplomatic historians and International Relations (IR) writers. Its starting premise is that to understand why and how officials took the decisions they did requires more than consideration of power and calculations of mutual utility. The calculation of interests, decision-making and policy execution are human exercises, and as such they need to be considered within the context that they were undertaken. Anglo-American traditions of thought, values, ideas and cooperative practices, though hard to quantify, can and do affect perception and action. How this approach is different to previous dominant modes of interpreting Anglo-American relations is illustrated below.

One traditional avenue of investigation of Anglo-American relations is through the notion of a 'special relationship'. Some, such as Edward Ingram, simply reject there being a special quality shared between the UK and US altogether.[1] In a similar vein, Beloff famously bemoaned an apparent need to 'dress up' Anglo-American relations 'as though national self-interest were something which should play no part in this branch of international politics.'[2] Others, though, adopt a more rigorous theoretical approach to the concept of 'specialness'. In some cases, this is done comparatively. For instance, in their edited volume, *America's 'Special Relationships'*, John Dumbrell and Axel Shafer present 13 essays that consider the concept of specialness from varying angles including domestic politics, traditional US bilateral relations such as the UK-US, Israel-US, and Canada-US, and non-traditional US relationships such as Iran-US and Russia-US.[3] Others seek to identify characteristics or establish criteria that define or measure 'specialness'. Alex Danchev, for instance, identifies 10 key features of a special relationship: transparency, informality, generality, reciprocity, exclusivity, clandestinity, reliability, durability, potentiality and mythicizability. He then applies these to Anglo-American relations and compares them with 9 other US bilateral relations, including those with Japan, Canada, Iraq and Mexico.[4]

IR theory has also been used to explain the conduct of Anglo-American relations. Applying Alliance Theory, Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosencrance argue that the way in which the relationship developed in the Second World War (WW2) from a shared perception of a Nazi threat leading to close UK-US collaboration and information sharing through the Combined Boards and continuing into the Cold War period can be explained through canons of realist thought, namely mutual utility and shared interests. Yet, the manner in which Anglo-American relations continued post-1949, through the 1956 Suez Crisis especially,

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[1] Edward Ingram, 'The Wonderland of the Political Scientist' *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997) pp:56-57.

[2] M. Beloff, 'The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth', in M. Gilbert (ed.), *A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950: Essays for A.J.P. Taylor* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966) p.170.

[3] See particularly the Introduction in John Dumbrell and Axel Schafer, (eds) *America's 'Special Relationships': Foreign and domestic aspects of the politics of alliance,* (London: Routledge, 2009) pp: 1-7.

[4] Alex Danchev, 'On Specialness' *International Affairs,* Vol. 72, No. 4, (1996) p. 743.
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cannot.[5] Similarly, Ruike Xu highlights the unique quality of UK-US 'alliance persistence' that has been demonstrated in the post-Cold War era. [6] For John Baylis and Coral Bell in their respective works, the longevity of the post-war Anglo-American relationship can be explained primarily in terms of balance of power, mutual utility and shared interests – albeit both concede also that other factors such as a shared language, tradition, history, culture and intellectual bedrock have some impact.[7]

As might be expected, diplomatic historians have been concerned less about theorising or predicting the conduct of Anglo-American relations than analysing US-UK cooperation and the conditions under which it has developed and evolved. Voluminous work seeks consequently to track and trace functional cooperation across time and a host of domains, especially those widely attributed as in some ways being 'special'. Of particular interest have been the UK-US military, nuclear, and intelligence relationships[8] – albeit the economic relationship has also been well scrutinised, especially that in the aftermath of WW2 through

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[5] Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosencrance, 'Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance' *World Politics,* Vol. 19, No. 1, (1966) pp: 21, 48, 51.

[6] Ruike Xu, *Alliance Persistence within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

[7] John Baylis, 'The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory' *International Relations,* Vol. 8, No. 4, (1985) pp. 368-379; Coral Bell, *The Debatable Alliance,* (London, Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 129.

[8] See for instance, John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984: The Special Relationship,* (London: Macmillan 1984); Duncan Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: America Military Power in Britain*, (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, *The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UK-USA Countries*, (Hemel Hempstead, UK: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Ian Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Michael Goodman, *Spying on The Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Richard Moore, *Nuclear Illusion and Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64*, (London: Palgrave, 2010); Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, (London: John Murray, 2001); Richard Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, (London: Harper Press, 2010); Adam Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11*, (London: Routledge, 2010).

to the collapse of Bretton Woods.[9] Many other works have focused on particular case studies of Anglo-American relations in action – ranging from select aspects of WW2 cooperation,[10] through the Suez crisis, Vietnam and Falklands war, and on to more recent crises such as post 9/11 military intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.[11] Still, other work has focused instead on particular sectors of activity, including oil and aviation.[12]

Not all work exhibits balance and non-partisanship[13] but a common theme running through much of the IR and Diplomatic History literature on Anglo-American relations is the

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[9] See for instance, Richard Gardner, *Sterling Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Alan P. Dobson, *The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship*, (Sussex, UK and New York: Wheatsheaf and St. Martin's, 1988); Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, *Goodbye, Great Britain: The 1976 IMF Crisis,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[10] For instance, Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945*, (London: Macmillan 1964); Alan Dobson, *US Wartime Aid to Britain*, (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

[11] Peter Busch, *All the Way with JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Sylvia Ellis, *Britain, America, and the Vietnam War*, (Westport: Praeger, 2004); Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the U.S., and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991); Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations during the Suez and Falklands Crises*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 1996); Sally-Ann Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations*, **(**Edinburgh**:** Edinburgh University Press, 2015); Alex Danchev, 'Tony Blair's Vietnam: The Iraq War and the "Special Relationship" in Historical Perspective', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2007, pp. 189–203; Warren Chin (2017) Anglo American military cooperation in Afghanistan 2001–2014, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (2017) pp: 121-142; Andrew Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance: The Special Relationship on the Rocks*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Philip Berry, *The War on Drugs and Anglo-American Relations: Lessons from Afghanistan, 2001-2011*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).

[12] Gavin Bailey, *The Arsenal of Democracy: Aircraft Supply and the Evolution of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1938-1942*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Alan Dobson, *FDR and Civil Aviation: Flying Strong, Flying Free*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); Steve Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Fiona Venn, *The Anglo-American Oil War: International Politics and the Struggle for Foreign Petroleum, 1912-1945*, (London: IB Tauris, 2014).

[13] Mark Curtis, *The Great Deception: Anglo-American Power and World Order*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998).

predominance of (neo-)realist precepts. This has had a number of implications for the field. First, there is a heavy emphasis in the literature on rational calculations of mutual utility based on tangible factors that include power and national interest. Second, considerable attention has been paid to detailing how the quantity and / or quality of Anglo-American functional cooperation has changed over time. Third, key assumptions have been applied to Anglo-American relations that were derived from more general conclusions about state behaviour within an international system absent a Leviathan. For example, Mearsheimer suggested that survival would be the dominant objective of a state and that its behaviour would be determined by the anarchic international system, chronic uncertainty about state intentions, the distribution of offensive military capability, and the rationality of decisions.[14] Indeed, Charles Kupchan was struck in this context by how exceptional was the relatively peaceful transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana in the early twentieth century.[15] Finally, (neo-) realist thinking, very deliberately in some cases, minimised the scope for individuals to make a difference in the conduct of state relations. Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, argued explicitly that 'A realist theory of international politics will … avoid the … popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of statesmen with his philosophy or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter.'[16]

Diplomatic historians have been less prescriptive, having concerns different to IR theorists, and not all have been indifferent to what Robert Hendershot and Steve Marsh refer to as 'intangibles of specialness'.[17] For the likes of Harry C. Allen, Robert. Mowatt, Lionel M. Gelber, Bradford Perkins and Denis William Brogan, longstanding shared values, culture, language, democratic principles and kinship formed a strong sentimental dimension to

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[14] John J. Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp: 79-80.

[15] Charles A Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[16] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp: 6-7.

[17] Robert Hendershot and Steve Marsh eds., *Culture matters: Anglo-American relations and the intangibles of 'specialness'*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming.

Anglo-American relations. These sentimental ties then encouraged habits of cooperation and shared attitudes about how to deal with international issues in WW1 and WW2 from which also developed parallel styles of diplomatic action and consultation in government.[18] Nevertheless, the heavy influence of realism remains manifest in the many studies of Anglo-American relations that have foregrounded utilitarian interest. Scholars such as Christopher Thorne, C.J. Bartlett, Ian Clark, Johnathan Coleman, Sylvia Ellis, Nigel Ashton and David Reynolds, all see overlapping national interests forming a utility or functionally-based relationship. Though passing references are made to intangible sources of influence,[19] for these scholars an Anglo-American special relationship remains contingent upon there being sufficiently compelling common interests and persuasive mutual utility to defend it.[20]

One product of these extensive, and inconclusive, debates about the Anglo-American relationship has been the emergence of what Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh call a Manichean-like division between the schools of sentiment and interest.[21] They make a case instead for the resilience of Anglo-American relations lying in the 'mutually supportive strength of shared interests and sentiments'. These features include but are not limited to

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[18] See for instance, Harry. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783-1952* (London: Odhams Press, 1955) p. 27; Robert, Mowatt, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1925); Lionel M. Gelber, *The Rise of the Anglo-American Friendship*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1938); Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914*, (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Denis William Brogan, *America in the Modern World* (New Brunswick: Mutgers University Press, 1960).

[19] Dumbrell and Shafer, *America's 'Special Relationships'*, p. 4.

[20] Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979); Cristopher, Bartlett, *The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992); Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship*; Jonathan Colman, *A 'Special Relationship'? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B Johnson and Anglo-American Relations 'at the Summit'? 1964-1968* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Ellis, *Britain, America and the Vietnam War*; Nigel Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War', *International Affairs,* Vol. 62, No.1, (1985/86) pp. 1-20.

[21] Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, 'Anglo-American relations: End of a Special Relationship?' *The International History Review,* Vol. 36, No.4, (2014) p. 682.

feelings of overlapping identity, friendship, moral and political values as well as strategic cooperation and diplomatic collaboration within the nuclear, defence and intelligence facilities. [22] On some levels, this should come as no surprise. After all, an often-cited historical marker for the discursive construction of the post-war Anglo-American special relationship is Winston Churchill's famous 'Sinews of Peace' speech at Westminster College, Fulton Missouri in March 1946. Here, to counter a perceived growing threat from the Soviet Union, he called for a special relationship between the UK and US and for a fraternal association of English-speaking peoples that was rooted in overlapping strategic interests, entwined historical experience, and shared language, culture and values.[23] However, until relatively recently the sentiment side of this equation has been neglected under the weight of realist thinking and in the face of what even Harry C Allen conceded was the inherent difficulty of measuring the impact of shared UK and US sentiments.[24]

The inspiration and design of this thesis owe to recent breakouts from these predominant canons of realist thought in scholarship on Anglo-American relations. The principal drivers of this are twofold. First, the unexpected end of the Cold War exposed fragilities in the narratives and assumptions of (neo)realist thought.[25] Second, the cultural turn in International Relations and diplomatic history, which was developed originally in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to 'elitist' approaches and assumptions of 'unchanging rationality' considered to be central to conventional political theories, very belatedly gained traction in studies of Anglo-

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[22] Ibid. p. 683.

[23] Robert Hendershot, 'Manipulating the Anglo-American civilization identity in the ear of Churchill' in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017) pp. 64-95; Anna Marchi and Steve Marsh, 'Churchill, Fulton and the Anglo-American special relationship: setting the agenda?' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 4. (2016) pp: 365-382.

[24] Allen, *Great Britain and the United States*, p. 129.

[25] See for instance, Morten Valborn, 'Before, during and after the cultural turn: a 'Baedeker' to IR's cultural journey' *International Review of Sociology,* Vol. 18, No. 1, (2008) pp: 55-82; Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice (Paris, Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, 2013); Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

American relations.[26] Scholars including Robert Hendershot, Srdjan Vucetic, Sam Edwards, Steve Marsh, David Haglund and David Ryan have thus emphasised increasingly the importance to understanding Anglo-American relations of their cultural dimension broadly defined. Their work foregrounds facets such as ethnicity, race, gender, identity, memory and discourse as a necessary complement to, and facilitator of, functional UK-US cooperation.[27] Furthermore, Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh recently led a collective investigation of notions of an Anglo-American political tradition to help cast light upon what H.G. Nicholas called the UK-US 'common cast of mind'.[28]

Adopting this approach allows for deeper and wider examination of the practice of Anglo-American relations – the interaction between UK and US citizens, financial institutions, philanthropic societies, media and government officials alongside the internal and external factors that influence how they work.[29] Indeed, it is hardly coincidental that alongside these

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[26] Akira Iriye, 'Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations,' *Diplomatic History*, 3:2 (1979), pp. 116–18; Thomas Field, 'Transnationalism meets Empire: The AFL-CIO, Development, and the Private Origins of Kennedy's Latin American Labor Program', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2018), 306.

[27] See for instance, Robert Hendershot, *Family Spats: Perception, Illusion and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship,* (Germany: Verlag, 2008); Srdjan Vucetic, 'A Radicalized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special' *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. 7, No. 3, (2011) pp. 403-421; Sam Edwards, 'From here Lincoln came': Anglo-Saxonism, the special relationship and the anglicisation of Abraham Lincoln, c. 1860-1970' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 11, No. 1, (2013) pp: 22-44; David Haglund, 'Is there a 'strategic culture' of the special relationship?: Contingency, identity, and the transformation of Anglo-American Relations' in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds) *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013) pp: 26-51; *Anna Marchi, Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Steve Marsh,* 'Churchill's inter-subjective special relationship: a corpus-assisted discourse approach', in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh eds, *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017) pp: 171-201; David Ryan, 'Curtains, culture and 'collective' memory', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol.14, No. 4. (2016) pp: 401-415; Steve Marsh, 'Anglo-American relations and the past present: insights into an (ongoing) mythologisation of a special relationship' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 17, No.3. (2019), pp: 310-340.

[28] Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh eds, *Anglo-American Relations and the Transmission of Ideas: towards a political tradition?*, (New York: Berghahn, forthcoming); H. G. Nicholas, *The United States and Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) p.1.

[29] Sam Edwards, *Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration, c.1941–2001*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Dana Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations,*

broadening avenues of enquiry have emerged recent studies emphasising the importance to Anglo-American decision making of like thinking and institutionalised habits of cooperation between UK and US officials. For instance, Wyn Rees and Lance Davies have used theories of institutionalism to explain the durability and conduct of the contemporary Anglo-American military relationship. They argue that most telling for UK-US military crisis management is that during peacetime interaction, UK military officers are embedded within the US military chain of command and perform roles that would normally be carried out by US personnel. This means that when crises occur UK officials are *in situ* with US theatre commanders and consequently present and able to exert some degree of influence over US crisis policy formulation and execution.[30] Similarly, Alison Holmes' work on ambassadors demonstrates that on some levels, the privileged position shared between UK and US officials in defence facilities has been institutionalised within the political arena too. Moreover, these diplomatic 'back channels' of communication are particularly important during crises. When communication at upper echelons of government becomes stifled, back channels provide ambassadors a possible means to circumvent conventional departmental or party lines and convey information or personal messages to policymakers in a timely manner. In addition, Holmes notes that UK and US ambassadors have also been known to cultivate 'inside' contacts across the Atlantic so as to obtain access to memos, acquire allied support in bureaucratic power struggles and even to attain information regarding other departments of their own government.[31]

1865-1945, (Kent, OH, US: Kent State University Press, 2014); Mark Glancy, *Hollywood and the Americanization of Britain: From the 1920s to the Present*, (London: IB Tauris, 2013); Donald MacRalid, Sylvia Ellis and Stephen Bowman, 'Interdependence day and Magna Charta: James Hamilton's public diplomacy in the Anglo-world, 1907-1940s', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol 12. No.2, (2014) pp:140-162. V. Markham Lester, 'The Effect of Southern State Bond Repudiation and British Debt Collection Efforts on Anglo-American Relations, 1840-1940', *Journal of British Studies,* Vol. 52, No. 2 (2013) pp:415-440; Paul Jonathan Woolf, *Special Relationships: Anglo-American Love Affairs, Courtships and Marriages in Fiction, 1821-1914* (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2007); Charlie Whitham, *Post-War Business Planners in the United States, 1939-48: The Rise of the Corporate Moderates* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016); Stephen Bowman. *The Pilgrims Society and Public Diplomacy, 1895-1945*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).

[30] Wyn Rees and Lance Davies, 'The Anglo-American military relationship: Institutional rules, practices, and narratives' *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2019) pp. 312-334, see pages 322-324 in particular.

[31] Alison Holmes, 'Transatlantic diplomacy and 'global' states' in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds) *Contemporary Perspectives,* pp: 105-128. See also Alison Holmes and Simon Rofe eds, *The*

From these recent scholarly developments flow important considerations for this thesis. First, agency is once more being given intellectual space within explanations of state conduct. As Richard Lebow once noted, neo-realism had 'denuded Realism of its complexity and subtlety, appreciation of agency and understanding that power is most readily transformed into influence when it is both masked and embedded in a generally accepted system of norms.'[32] Second, so-called 'first principles' of shared language, values, entwined histories, and so forth are being treated as newly important in explaining the decisions and conduct of Anglo-American officials. Third, greater emphasis is being placed on institutionalised patterns of cooperation and the collaborative structures within which this takes place. One product of this is to underscore the importance of looking beyond personal leader relations at the apex of what John Dumbrell refers to as the 'coral reef' of Anglo-American relations to consider also bureaucratic interweaving in the middle and public-level cultural interactions at the base.[33]

Methodology and Structure

This thesis is not interested in modelling Anglo-American decision-making and policy implementation. Neither is it concerned with the special relationship as a concept nor in theorising its existence and / or conduct. Use of the nomenclature special relationship is solely in the uncritical tradition of media shorthand. This thesis deliberately eschews, therefore, the application to Anglo-American relations of any IR paradigm or policymaking model. Rather, it aims to cast light upon how and why Anglo-American officials reached particular decisions during crisis situations and how they managed their consequent bilateral

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Embassy in Grosvenor Square: American Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, 1938–2008 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012); Michael Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John Young (eds.), *The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States 1939 and 1977*, (Palgrave: NY & Basingstoke, 2009).

[32] Richard Ned Lebow, 'Classical Realism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (editors), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 59.

[33] John Dumbrell, 'Personal Diplomacy: Relations between prime minister and presidents' in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds) *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary perspectives* (London, Routledge: 2013) p. 82.

relations as these decisions were affected. This follows very much the call of scholars like Alexander Wendt for a more thorough understanding of historical causation being attained by placing geopolitical concerns into context with the cultural discourses that shape identity, perception and interpretation.[34]

The thesis adopts a case study approach and focuses on crises in Congo and Yemen across the period 1958-65. These case studies were selected on the following grounds. First, they both span an era of so-called transition in Anglo-American relations when personal relationships developed at the zenith of the special relationship in WW2 slowly exited the diplomatic scene. This should reveal the impact, if any, of this generational shift in leadership upon Anglo-American management of the two selected crises. Second, the case studies are taken from two different regional theatres – Africa and the Middle East – to maximise insight into how different national priorities and historical associations might impact Anglo-American management of their bilateral relations. Third, both case studies play out across multiple changes of administration on both sides of the Atlantic. The ambition here is to detect any impact on policy caused by the changes of government in the UK and US and the extent to which these high-level political shifts affected Anglo-American cooperation or otherwise at lower levels of the 'coral reef.'

Fine grained policy tracing is conducted of the case studies using standard methods in diplomatic history, reconstructing images of the policy processes as best possible from the evidence available. The work that follows consequently rests fundamentally on extensive archival research conducted at the UK and US National Archives, the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Presidential Libraries and the Bodleian Library. Sitting awkwardly between political science and the humanities, Diplomatic History has often been criticised for its lack of theoretical sophistication and reliance on documents whose value neutrality might be contested. In the mid-twentieth century especially Diplomatic History incurred considerable negative academic bias and some of this persists to the present.[35] However, Diplomatic

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[34] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 21, 60, 371; Thomas Zeiler, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field', *Journal of American History,* 95:4 (2009).

[35] Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries." *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1997) pp: 5–

History has recently undergone something of a re-invention as diplomatic historians (re-) embrace multi-archival research and profit from the opening of new archives after the end of the Cold War, accelerated document declassification and digitisation, and new opportunities to expand their concerns beyond the state and into topics such as global governance and social movements. There is talk, even, of a New Diplomatic History.[36] As Matthew Connelly noted in 2015: 'Just thirty years ago, the more traditional form of diplomatic history seemed to be on the edge of extinction. It has not only survived, but thrived by reinventing itself as part of a vastly expanded field of research on the history of world politics.'[37] Moreover, invigorated by the faltering of structural theories when confronted with the end of the Cold War, growing interest is evident in human dimensions of diplomatic practice, including relational or interactional elements of sociality. Nicholas Wheeler, for example, has argued that processes of face-to-face diplomacy help overcome the classic security dilemma through development of interpersonal bonded trust.[38]

That this thesis adopts a multi-archival diplomatic history approach is not, though, simply a case of hopping on a fashionable academic bandwagon. Rather, it is the method most appropriate to the objectives of this thesis. As a form of what Martin Hollis and Steve Smith

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21; David Paull Nickles, 'Diplomatic History and the Political Science Wars', *Perspectives on History, (*May 2011) [online] available from < https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2011/diplomatic-history-and-the-political-science-wars> (accessed 10/12/2019); Marc Trachtenberg, 'Theory and Diplomatic History', *Historically Speaking*, Volume 8, Number 2, (November/December 2006) pp:11-13.

[36] William R. Keylor, "The Problems and Prospects of Diplomatic/International History", *H-Diplo Essay,* No. 126 (2015) [online] available from < https://networks.h-net.org/system/files/contributed-files/e126.pdf> (accessed 11/12/2019);
Giacomo Giudici, 'From New Diplomatic History to New Political History: The Rise of the Holistic Approach', *European History Quarterly*, Vo. 48, No. 2, (2018) pp: 314-324.

[37] Matthew Connelly, « The Next Thirty Years of International Relations Research: New Topics, New Methods, and the Challenge of Big Data », *Les cahiers Irice*, Vol. 14, No. 2. (2015) pp: 85-97, particularly page 85; Brenda Gayle Plummer, "The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A Literature Review," *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 3, (2005) pp: 385–400.

[38] Nicholas Wheeler, "Investigating Diplomatic Transformations" *International Affairs,* Vol. 89. No.2 (2013), 477–96; Nicholas Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: International Relationships in International Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

term the 'inside' way of dealing with behaviour,[39] diplomatic history offers an important counterpoint to extremes of theorization that abstract events from their human context. As Charles Reynolds explains, this 'inside' way provides explanation through 'the understanding, reasoning and perceptions of the actors and not in any pattern, theoretical or colligatory, superimposed on action and events by "observers" or "narrators".[40] Still more importantly, it provides the optimum means by which to explore Anglo-American decisions, negotiations and interaction in an historical context.[41] Within the selected case studies, calculations of power and interest can be considered within the abiding context of their making and of their inherent human dimension. Indeed, Herbert Butterfield once summed up this operational premise neatly when constructing a defence of diplomatic history. It is, he said, a way to 'be sure that the world does not lose sight of the other side of the truth: the role of human rationality and will—the importance of the decisions men actually make.'[42]

Finally, a brief word on structure. The first chapter sets out the general condition of Anglo-American relations during the period of the two cases studies at the global level and in the regional African and Middle Eastern theatres. This grounds the study within the key literature on this period and establishes broad contours of Anglo-American relations, which in turn might be seen as setting broad parameters within which officials needed to conduct crisis management in Congo and Yemen. The following two chapters constitute the two case studies, which trace in considerable detail Anglo-American management of their bilateral relations in the Congo and Yemen at both macro and micro levels of the 'coral reef'. Finally, the conclusion pulls together the principal research findings and reflects upon how this work might be taken further beyond the confines of a PhD.

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[39] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

[40] See Charles Reynolds, 'Explaining the Cold War' in Alan P. Dobson, Shahin Malik and Graham Evans (eds) *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) pp: 63-64.

[41] For more on methods in Diplomatic History and debates about its relative merit see Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[42] Herbert Butterfield, *In Defence of Diplomatic History*, p.4, cited in, Karl Schweizer and Jeremy Black, "The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield", *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* 17:3, (2006) p.4.

Chapter One

Anglo-American Relations 1958-1965: setting the context

The period of Anglo-American relations under investigation is bookended by crises – Suez and deepening division over Vietnam respectively – and often interpreted in the literature as being an era of transition. British and American officials were busy redefining a bilateral relationship now characterised by growing asymmetry, strategic dissonance and a new generation of elites, whose views were consequently less informed than hitherto by the personal experiences, relationships and collaborative practices established at the zenith of the Anglo-American relations in WW2. In addition, they were doing so in a period of increasing international uncertainty. Alongside crises, including those in Berlin and Cuba and about the multilateral force (MLF), there were more general challenges arising from shifts in international relations, such as decolonisation, a diffusion of economic power especially, and the emergence of influential organisations and non-state actors. Furthermore, Britain and America both encountered strengthening domestic pressures and political instability. Britain's relative decline encouraged a complex blend of national angst, pressure on overseas spending, and a divisive debate about potential entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) – tensions that were reflected in Prime Minister Macmillan's radical government reshuffle in the so-called 'Night of the Long Knives' on 12 July 1962.[1]

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[1] This saw him dismiss one-third of his Cabinet in a wholesale reshuffle that eventually involved 52 people and 39 of the then 101 ministerial posts. 'New Faces Likely in Coming Government Changes', *The Times*, 12 July 1962.

Meantime in the US, Kennedy's assassination shocked the nation and Johnson's Great Society reforms reflected growing domestic discontent about welfare and relative opportunity as well as civil rights, youth culture and gathering opposition to war in Vietnam.

This chapter consequently takes the temperature of Anglo-American relations during the period of analysis of this thesis at the global level and within the regional theatres of the Middle East and Africa. The underlying premise for this is that analysis of the macro and regional level contexts will help establish the broad priorities and parameters within which Anglo-American officials had to address, and negotiate bilateral responses to, the Congo and Yemen crises. The first section engages ideas of transition in Anglo-American relations,[2] examines an evolving divergence of national strategic imperatives, assesses broad implications flowing from relative British decline and analyses competing visions of Britain and UK-US relations that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic in this period.[3] The two subsequent sections examine the Middle Eastern and African contexts with a view to teasing out the extent to which Anglo-American global relations were mirrored in these theatres and / or whether particular national differences in priority, concern and approach also came into play. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the global and regional contexts established broadly

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[2] See for instance, L.B. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World.* (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd: London, 2002) p. 135; John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Powers in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1991); Alan Dobson, 'The years of transition: Anglo-American relations 1961-1967', *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 16, No.3 (1990) pp. 239-258; Alan Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of friendship, conflict and the rise and decline of superpowers* (London: Routledge, 1995) pages 124-143 in particular; H. C. Allen, 'The Anglo-American Relationship in the Sixties' *International Affairs,* Vol. 39, No. 1. (1963) pp: 37-48; David Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American relations' *International Affairs,* Vol. 65, No. 1. (1988) pp: 89-111; Nigel Ashton, *Crisis of Interdependence.*

[3] Emphasis within the literature on this period of Anglo-American relations differs on the timing and the principal causal factors of transition. Nigel Ashton, for instance, speaks of a 'crisis of interdependence' and a subsequent 'erosion of trust' that developed between UK and US officials at senior levels of government during the Winter of 1962-1963. The principal factors, Ashton credits to UK and US diverging concepts of their national interests and consequent difficulties experienced through ideology, culture, bureaucracy, domestic politics and public opinion as the UK and US shifted from a mutually exclusive relations to one of asymmetrical dependence. David Reynolds, John Darwin and L.J. Butler argue, in their respective work, that the change in Anglo-American relations was due primarily to the UK's relative decline. For Darwin and Butler, the principal factor herein was the UK's relinquishment of empire during the later 1950s and throughout the 1960s. Alan Dobson argues that the 1960s presented the culmination of a long transition as the UK and US adjusted from their halcyon days of unique and extensive bilateral cooperation in WWII to a new form of relationship, more accepting of multilateral forums through which to cooperate.

positive parameters for Anglo-American relations that UK and US officials had to respect – sometimes to their frustration – as they sought to manage the Congo and Yemen crises.

Anglo-American Relations post Suez

It is quite possible to interpret the period of Anglo-American relations under investigation as one of decay and reciprocal frustration – especially when contrasted to the halcyon days of intense cooperation during WW2. Then, of course, Anglo-American power was brought to bear upon common problems and in the pursuit of joint solutions to an extent quantitatively and qualitatively never previously – or since – seen between two major global powers. Much later, US President Barak Obama referenced this period of Anglo-American relations as that where 'Roosevelt and Churchill could sit in a room and solve the world's problems over a glass of brandy'.[4] By 1958 the fortunes, challenges and priorities of Britain and the US all looked very different. Even in the optimistic discourse of British Prime Minister Macmillan, Anglo-American relations were bound in interdependence rather than in Churchill's vision, expressed at Fulton, Missouri in 1946, of fraternal association based on a relationship of equals between the two great Anglo-Saxon powers.

One source of strain was a growing divergence of strategic priorities. The British still retained important interests in and concern for the Middle East but Europe was increasingly their focus. This reflected in part the priority of homeland defence, anxiety about which flared periodically in response to events such as the Berlin Crisis and to difficulties in NATO. Arguably more immediately pressing, though, were British economic woes that, somewhat ironically, the Americans damagingly exposed to the world during the Suez crisis by pressurising British withdrawal of its so-called peace-keeping force from the canal zone through selling sterling and simultaneously blocking potential relief from the International Monetary Fund. Britain lost from its reserves in November 1956 the equivalent to a whole year's export earnings – approximately $280 million.[5] Thereafter it was clearer than ever that the British government needed to address urgently an uncompetitive economy, large overseas debts and ongoing overstretch.[6] Europe, or more specifically the European Economic

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[4] 'Obama's speech to UK Parliament, in full, with analysis', BBC News, 25 May 2011, [online] available from < https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-13549927> (accessed 10/11/2016).

[5] Dobson and Marsh, 'End of a Special Relationship?' pp. 676-677.

[6] Susan Strange, *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) pages298-326 in particular.

Community (EEC), was the only viable option given decolonisation, weakening British traditional markets in the Commonwealth/empire, the relative failure of the European Free Trade Association, and the economic pull of the West German 'economic miracle'. In the face of considerable domestic opposition, Prime Minister Macmillan duly applied for British membership of the EEC in July 1961 – only for French President DeGaulle to veto British entry in 1963 and again in 1967.[7]

Across the Atlantic a combination of European weakness, events, and President Kennedy's Flexible Response strategy drew US attention increasingly to Asia and the American 'backyard'. Under the preceding Eisenhower administration's New Look strategy, the US had sought burden sharing security arrangements in the Asian theatre and in 1955, had become party to the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).[8] That same year, amid fallout from French defeat by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent Geneva Conference in 1954, Eisenhower launched the official beginning of American involvement in the war in Vietnam when he dispatched a low-key Military Assistance Advisory Group to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Thereafter, the US was pulled progressively deeper into a war whose legacy reverberates through to the American present day and that at the time, divided the US from key allies, consumed huge American physical and psychological resources, and eventually helped within the US to end the post-WW2 bipartisan consensus and transform domestic politics. Though the UK was the most helpful American ally throughout the crisis in Vietnam, and US officials recognised the public opinion and resource constraints experienced by British Prime Ministers, the absence of the British flag alongside the Stars and Stripes was nevertheless periodically a source of

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[7] See for instance, Kristian Steinnes, 'The European Challenge: Britain's EEC Application in 1961' *Contemporary European History,* Vol. 7. No. 1. (1998) pp: 61-79; Lindsay Aqui, 'Macmillan, Nkrumah and the 1961 Application for European Economic Community Membership' *The International History Review,* Vol. 39, No. 4, (2017), pp: 575-591.

[8] See for instance, Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61,* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Harry Howard, 'The Regional Pacts and the Eisenhower Doctrine' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science,* Vol. 401. No. 1. (1972) pp: 85-94; Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945,* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) pp: 35-36.

considerable tension.[9] As US Secretary of State Dean Rusk put matters: 'When the Russians invade Sussex, don't expect us to come and help you'.[10]

Kennedy's Flexible Response included a battle for 'hearts and minds' in the Developing World but the American focus therein was drawn swiftly homeward by events.[11] Cuba was the catalyst. Following the overthrow of the Batista government in 1959, Fidel Castro converted Cuba into the first one-party, communist state in the Western Hemisphere. In 1962, once the Kennedy administration's fear of communist contagion had helped sponsor the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion and driven Castro deeper into the Soviet orbit, the Cuban missile crisis dominated world affairs. Thereafter, Cuba remained a very sensitive domestic political and foreign policy issue for the US – something exemplified in Anglo-American friction over Macmillan's decision to sell Leyland buses to Cuba in 1963 and the successor Home government's resolve to continue these sales into 1964.[12] It is also important to note, however, that issues other than Cuba also held American attention to the Western hemisphere in this period. These issues included the 1964 Panama crisis,[13] the outbreak of civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1965[14] and the protracted negotiation of independence for British Guiana.[15]

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[9] Peter Busch, *All the Way with JFK.*

[10] David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1988) p. 270.

[11] 'Analysis of changes in international politics Since World War II and their implications for our basic assumptions about U.S. foreign policy' 20 October 1969, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), available online < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41> (accessed 10/12/2018).

[12] Christopher Hull, '"Going to War in Buses": The Anglo-American Clash over Leyland Sales to Cuba, 1963-1964' *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 34, No. 5. (2010) pp: 793-822.

[13] Michael Latham, 'Imperial Legacy and Cold War credibility: Lyndon Johnson and the Panama Crisis,' *Peace & Change* Vol. 27, No. 4. (2002) pp. 499-527.

[14] Lawrence Greenberg, 'The US Dominican Intervention Success Story' *Army Center of Military History* (1987) pp.18-29.

[15] Stephen Rabe, *U.S, Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Stay,* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

Running alongside and throughout diverging Anglo-American strategic priorities was a thorny question of burden sharing. This was not a new issue in Anglo-American relations. Washington had long been conscious that the British were prone to reduce overseas burdens by offloading them either directly or indirectly upon the US. As early as 1950, confronted by a socialist Attlee government in Britain, the US Chiefs of Staff had argued that the British 'cannot transfer external responsibilities to us without limitation…We have the right and duty to protest if we really believe that the pursuit of dogma is prejudicing the creation of those conditions which are necessary to recovery and peace.'[16] Of course, British calculation was less dogma than realpolitik. During WW2 they had undertaken a major rethink of Anglo-American relations that crystallised in a paper entitled 'The Essentials of an American Policy'. Britain could no longer balance the power of America and with the latter unlikely to return fully to isolationism there was new opportunity to 'help steer this great unwieldy barge, the United States of America, into the right harbour.'[17] Translated, this meant recruiting American muscle in support of British interests – or as Singh has put it in an analysis of Anglo-American relations in Asia, a policy of 'American means to achieve British ends'.[18] Indeed, in June 1952, the British noted explicitly that Britain's prestige and interests would best be served 'the more gradually and inconspicuously we can transfer the real burdens from our own to American shoulders'.[19]

However, by the late 1950s / 1960s economic strains on both sides of the Atlantic were further sensitising where and how the burdens of providing for international security should fall. The British, for instance, presented the British Army on the Rhine as a deployment of reassurance to West European allies and wanted economic relief for its costs. Also, much to American concern, the 1957 Sandys Defence Review responded to a combination of financial pressure and the advent of the missile age by shifting British emphasis to nuclear deterrence and making radical

[16.] Chief of Staff U.S Army to Jt. Chiefs of Staff, 19 Apr. 1950, Enclosure B, Jt. Chiefs of Staff Geographical file 1951-53, RG 218, Box 20, US National Archives (hereafter USNA) cited in, Marsh, *Cold War Oil,* p. 15.

[17.] 'The Essentials of an American Policy', 21 Mar 1944, cited in Steve Marsh and John Baylis, 'The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus of International Relations', *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* Vol. 17, No. 1. (2006) pp: 173-211.

[18] A.I. Singh, *The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56,* (Pinter: London, 1993), p.127.

[19.] 'British overseas obligations', 18 June 1952, CAB 129, UK National Archives (hereafter UKNA).

reductions in conventional forces. By 1960 these cuts, alongside the Macmillan government's decision to end conscription, meant that the size of the UK's army had diminished 90% from that at the end of WW2 to just 315,000 people[20] and that its consequent capacity to sustain a military campaign beyond Europe was seriously eroded – something evidenced in Britain's inability to react militarily to Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965.[21] Conversely, Eisenhower's concern for the US economy and about the industrial-military complex had helped drive a strong emphasis on nuclear weapons together with covert operations, psychological warfare and various alliances and regional agreements across the globe. When Kennedy's Flexible Response and commitment to closing a perceived missile gap removed some of the shackles upon US defence expenditure it did so at a time of growing pressure on the American economy. By 1965, the American balance of payments was US $1.3 billion in the red.[22] In addition, US domestic politics exerted growing pressure on the capacity and will of American leaders to sustain the raft of overseas responsibilities that had steadily accumulated since the decision in NSC-68 to globalise containment policy.[23] President Johnson's Great Society reforms demonstrated newfound domestic priorities for a nation gripped by the traumas of Kennedy's assassination and Vietnam, and riven by civil rights and counterculture movements. Even for the West's hegemon the costs of providing international public goods and funding global containment were becoming beyond American means.

All of this inevitably focused attention upon questions of mutual utility within the Anglo-American relationship and on implications flowing from Britain's ongoing relative decline. By the time that Harold Wilson's Labour Party entered government in October 1964, the UK's balance of payments deficit was approximately £800 million[24] and the British defence

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[20] Bartlett, '*The Special Relationship'* p. 92.

[21] For the significance of resource constraint see, for example, John Baylis, *British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Ritchie Ovendale, *British Defence Policy Since 1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).

[22] Dobson, 'The years of transition', pp. 239-258, 253.

[23] For NSC-68 see, for instance, Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (New York: OUP, 1982).

[24] Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations,* p. 131.

budget could never be immune from broader spending cuts necessitated by economic weakness. A principal difficulty herein was that British assets of particular value to the Americans were often those that British strategic priorities rendered most vulnerable, including those East of Suez. Indeed, a frequent diplomatic refrain from American officials in this period was, in President Johnson's words, that the US should not be left to 'man the ramparts all alone' beyond Europe.[25] Reciprocally, some military and intelligence assets that the British deemed red lines in budget cuts were viewed differently in Washington. Of particular contention was Britain's nuclear deterrent, which consumed huge British resources and, from an American perspective, made little or no difference to the East-West strategic balance. Such views became apparent and contentious within Anglo-American relations once US officials sponsored the Multilateral Force concept (MLF) as a solution to nuclear sharing issues within NATO.[26] Neither Macmillan nor Home were prepared to integrate Britain's nuclear deterrent fully into NATO and by 1965 Wilson's government was pushing a much looser Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) as a policy alternative.[27]

More broadly, US concerns deepened about British ability to continue their post-war roles in underpinning the key structures of Western international relations. This was especially pronounced in the economic domain where sterling's role as a reserve currency in the Bretton Woods system appeared increasingly vulnerable. Admittedly, close UK-US political relations were demonstrated in 1964 in the support by US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the pound during the UK's sterling crisis.[28] Yet it soon became clear that the weakness of sterling was systemic rather than temporary and although

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[25] Western Europe, Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, 11 January 1968, *FRUS, 1964–1968* [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d289> (accessed 15/09/2018).

[26] For the MLF see Timothy Sayle, *The Enduring Alliance of NATO and the Postwar Global Order* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2019); Andrew Priest, *Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance 1962-68* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[27] J.J. Widen and Jonathan Coleman, 'Lyndon B. Johnson, Alec Douglas-Home, Europe and the NATO Multilateral Force, 1963-64' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 5, No 2. (2007) pp: 179-198; David James Gill, 'The Ambiguities of Opposition: Economic Decline, International Cooperation, and Political Rivalry in the Nuclear Politics of the Labour Party 1963-1964' *Contemporary British History,* Vol. 25, No. 2. (2011) pp: 251-276.

[28] Colman, *A 'special relationship'?,* p.14; Dobson, *Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship,* p.216; Philip Ziegler, *Wilson: The Authorised Life* (London: HarperCollins, 1993) p.224.

the Americans recognised the interdependence of sterling and the dollar, this also raised an issue of reciprocity within Anglo-American relations. Consider in this light, for instance, US National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy's famous comment in July 1965 that he would like to tell the Wilson government that 'a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling.'[29]

It is also the case that Anglo-American relations experienced throughout the period under investigation a series of policy differences and shocks. Macmillan broke with previously agreed UK-US policy when he visited Moscow independently in 1959.[30] This perceived snub to Washington was reciprocated in June 1961 when President Kennedy met with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev without Macmillan.[31] The following year Macmillan felt personally betrayed by the Kennedy administration's decision to sell Hawk ground-to-air missiles to Israel.[32] There were also arguments around a possible resumption of US atmospheric nuclear testing on British territory at Christmas Island, whether or not military force should be used in Berlin and how best to deal with political and social instability in Laos.[33] Meantime problems in functional cooperation were evidenced in both the disassembly in the spring of 1959 of Joint Working Groups (JWOGS) created after the Suez crisis to promote UK-US coordination[34] and in set-backs to intelligence sharing following repeated breaches in, and scandals about, UK security. These included unmasking of the spy George Black in 1961[35],

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[29] Colman, *A Special Relationship?* pp: 80-1.

[30] John Gearson, *Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958-62,* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) p. 57.

[31] Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart,* p. 246.

[32] Vladimir Rumyantsev, 'Unrequited interdependence? The Anglo-American collusion over the supply of missiles to Israel, 1960-1962' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 3. (2016) pp: 252-271.

[33] Nigel Ashton, *The Irony of Interdependence;* Nigel Ashton, 'Harold Macmillan and the "Golden Days" of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63' *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 29, No. 4, (2005) 691-723. For more information on these policy disagreements see also Toshihiko Aono, 'It Is Not Easy for the United States to Carry the Whole Load': Anglo-American Relations during the Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962' *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 34, No. 2, (2010) pp: 325-356; Gearson, *Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis,* p. 57.

[34] Matthew Jones, 'Anglo-American relations after Suez, the rise and decline of the working group experiment, and the French challenge to NATO, 1957-59' *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003) pp: 49-79.

[35] Lord Home, *The Way the Wind Blows,* (London: Collins, 1976) p. 176.

the arrest of John Vassall- a young Civil Servant in the Admiralty – in September 1962, Soviet granting of political asylum to Kim Philby in July 1963 and the Profumo scandal that broke in March 1963.[36]

The two biggest shocks, though, were certainly the Suez and Skybolt crises. For some, like Scott Lucas, the Suez crisis was a watershed moment for Anglo-American relations. The debacle demonstrated clearly the UK's dependence on the US and challenged fundamentally Whitehall's perception that they could count on Washington in times of need.[37] David Reynold's eloquent quip perhaps best sums up the broader implications: 'for the Egyptian ex-colonial to twist the lion's tail, and get away with it, was a palpable and lasting blow to national self-esteem and international prestige.'[38] British official and popular angst was palpable and flowed into the period being investigated in this thesis. Some 130 Conservative MPs publicly censured the Eisenhower administration for gravely endangering the alliance.[39] Similarly, Home Secretary Rab Butler threatened to withdraw support for US bases located in the UK.[40] Favourable public opinion of the US plummeted; Britons who said they trusted the United States a 'great deal' to side with Britain in international disputes fell in 1957 to just

[36] Peter Catterall, *The Macmillan Diaries, Volume II: Prime Minister and After, 1957-1966* (London: Macmillan, 2011) pp, 549, 569.

[37] For the quotations see Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain and the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991).For Suez's regional implications for the UK see, John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995); Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003). For global implications see, Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Kathleen Burk, *Old World New World: The Story of Britain and America* (London: Abacus, 2009); John Darwin, *The Empire Project*; Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); William Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007).

[38] Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled,* p. 205.

[39] Dobson and Marsh, 'End of a Special Relationship?' p. 677.

[40] Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations,* p. 118.

25%.[41] Importantly, too, Anglo-American recrimination was not uni-directional. According to William Clark, Anthony Eden's press secretary, upon hearing of the invasion Eisenhower had telephoned to ask personally whether the Prime Minister had lost his mind.[42] Potentially more significant still in policy terms, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advocated fervently in a National Security Council meeting for a distancing of US foreign policy from what were perceived to be outdated European colonial policies.[43]

Other scholars see the Skybolt affair as being a crisis for Anglo-American relations more serious than Suez.[44] The independent nuclear deterrent was a source of British prestige and access to the top table of world powers. As Foreign Secretary Bevin had put it when Britain first committed to developing its own atomic bomb, 'We've got to have the bloody Union Jack flying on top of it.'[45] However, still more was at stake once the Americans made public at the end of 1962 major technical and overspend problems with Skybolt – the delivery system for British warheads agreed by Eisenhower and Macmillan in 1958. Another perceived American-inspired crisis would likely be devastating for Macmillan's government and for the UK-US relations, especially when considered against the twin backdrops of Suez and the post-WW2 nuclear 'betrayal' that had seen the US terminate all Anglo-American atomic cooperation with passage through Congress of the McMahon Act – despite the 1943 Quebec Agreement.[46] Also, the Cuban missile crisis had demonstrated how British and American strategic interests overlapped but were by no means identical; Britain could not be guaranteed US intervention in a limited nuclear exchange in Europe and both countries feared being dragged by the other into

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[41] Robert Hendershot, '"Affection is the Cement that Binds Us": Understanding the Cultural sinews of the Anglo-American Special Relationship' in A. Dobson and S. Marsh (eds.), Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 53.

[42] Of course, this anecdote may have become exaggerated over time. Robert James, *Anthony Eden* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986) p.568.

[43] Dulles at NSC, 1 November 1956, cited in Wm Roger Louis, 'American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire' in Wm Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.) *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) p. 277.

[44] Bartlett, *'The Special Relationship'* p. 99. For more information on the Skybolt crisis see, Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship*; Robert Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II,* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990) pp. 61-68.

[45] Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol.3*, (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 352.

[46.] Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence,* p.320.

nuclear exchanges under circumstances not critical to their national interests.[47] Furthermore, revelations about Skybolt proceeded hand-in-hand with both US Defence Secretary McNamara's public advocacy of western nuclear capability being placed under centralised control and ideas for the MLF. Linkage of the two was at least plausible and a consequent source of much suspicion in British quarters.

Ultimately, of course, in December 1962 Kennedy overruled an ardent Europeanist bloc within his administration to grant Macmillan's government access to Polaris.[48] Nevertheless, Skybolt illuminated some of the deeper currents running through Anglo-American relations at this time. On the one hand, the outcome reaffirmed the 'special relationship' and, to the minds of some, the importance therein of close personal relationships between Presidents and Prime Ministers, and between their immediate senior officials. In the aftermath of the Nassau summit Macmillan wrote to Kennedy describing the nuclear deal poignantly as 'the nice balance between interdependence and independence' if sovereign states are to work in partnership.[49] On the other, British vulnerability to American policy had once more been demonstrated, as also had debates within the US administration about the extent to which they believed Britain now should, or could, sustain a global as opposed to European vocation. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson then famously fanned the flames of this debate publicly in December 1962 when in his West Point speech, he declared that Britain had lost an empire and was yet to find a role.[50]

Was US Ambassador to Britain David Bruce right, then, in his gloomy assessment in 1966 that 'The so-called Anglo-American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology, although the underground waters of it will flow with a deep current'?[51] The

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[47] Len Scott and Gerald Hughes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal* (Routledge: London, 2015).

[48] Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart,* p.257; Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship* p. 284-295; George Ball, *The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1968) in particular pages 69-90.

[49] Dobson and Marsh, *End of a Special Relationship?* p. 682.

[50] Douglas Brinkley, 'Dean Acheson and the "Special Relationship": The West Point Speech of December 1962', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (1990), pp. 599–608.

[51] Memo Bruce to Rusk, NSF Country File Box 208-9, folder: UK memos, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL).

following two quotes from US officials, one from each end of the period under examination, suggest not, or at least not to the extent that Bruce ruminated upon:

> The most important objective is to restore confidence in the Anglo-American relationship…As far as Governments are concerned, this objective means re-establishing the practice of prior consultation with the British on the basis of frank interchanges of views wherever this practice was interrupted as a result of our recent difference over the Middle East.[52] (Position paper prepared for the March 1957 Bermuda Conference by the US Bureau of European Affairs)

> we need the support and sympathy of the British… We touch one another at too many points and are still affected by what the other does in too many situations to be able to dispense with mutual support of some kind.[53] (US position paper prepared in 1966 for the future prospects of Anglo-American relations)

Overall, Anglo-American relations did remain valued in Washington regardless – and sometimes because – of tensions and evolutions in the relative strengths of the US and Britain. As for the British, they concluded rapidly from the Suez crisis that Britain's interests depended upon 'hugging the Americans close' – a decision that set them on a contrary path to the French and one that has held good ever since.[54] Eisenhower, the day after securing a second term as President, was keen to minimise the fallout from Suez, assuring Eden that the whole affair was very much in the spirit of a 'family spat.'[55] He was subsequently helped in

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[52] Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs, Bermuda Meetings, 21-24 March 1957, 13 Feb. 1957, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v27/d257> (accessed 10/09/2019).

[53] 'A View of US-UK Policy Relations' 23 May 1966, RG 59 1964-66, POL 1, UK-US, Box 2786, USNA.

[54] Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'special Relationship'* (Virginia: Politico's Publishing Ltd, 2003).

[55] Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower in Washington and Prime Minister Eden in London, 7 November 1956, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, Volume XVI, 536,

the task of rebuilding confidence within Anglo-American relations by Eden stepping down as Prime Minister and being replaced by Harold Macmillan in January 1957.[56] Eisenhower and Macmillan were 'old friends', having first become acquainted during WW2 when Macmillan served as Eisenhower's UK political adviser in Algiers.[57] This personal dynamic undoubtedly contributed to what Eisenhower later recounted as an 'atmosphere of frankness and confidence' within which Anglo-American relations were discussed at the March 1957 Bermuda Summit and subsequent Washington Conference in October the same year.[58] Both leaders were keen to shore up UK-US lines of policy communication at all levels of government. At the apex of the Anglo-American 'coral reef' this meant Eisenhower resurrecting with Macmillan the regular and informal sharing of notes and ideas that Churchill had assiduously cultivated previously with the US president. It also meant permitting more 'visits by senior officials across the Atlantic'[59] to reduce potential for miscommunication, build trust and maximise cooperation. These enhanced contacts were to be further buttressed by the establishment of the short-lived but well-intentioned JWOGS that spanned foreign policy issues ranging from defence and intelligence sharing to Anglo-American crisis management in Syria, Hong Kong and Algeria.[60]

Furthermore, the loss of British popular confidence in US leadership sensitised management of the public face of Anglo-American relations. Eisenhower and Macmillan were keen to re-establish the imagery of the US and UK standing side by side in a shared mission to protect common values and shared interests. For instance, in the wake of the Bermuda talks

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FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d536 (accessed 7 June 2018).

[56] See for instance, Ritchie Ovendale, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (London: Red Globe Press,1998) p. 120; John Baylis, *Anglo-American relations since 1939: The enduring alliance,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p. 84; Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations* pp: 118-119; John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

[57] Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,1956- 1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 120.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] John Baylis, 'The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence', *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol. 31, No. 3, (2008) pp. 425-466; Jones, 'Anglo-American Relations after Suez') pp: 49-79.

Macmillan told the British Parliament that bolstered UK-US channels of communication would enable at the very least a better understanding of the policy constraints and additional obstacles each country faced. It ought to hopefully prevent, too, UK and US differences being aired first in international fora like the UN. [61] A more public demonstration of renewed Anglo-American solidarity came in May 1960 when Macmillan and Eisenhower drove through Paris in an open-topped car in the aftermath of a collapsed summit meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and France's President, Charles de Gaulle. [62] Three months later an Eisenhower visit to London drew such enthusiastic crowds that Prime Minister Macmillan repeatedly told the President 'I never would have believed it'.[63] Public opinion polls in the summer of 1961 suggested that favourable British opinion of America had already returned to pre-Suez levels, with 56% of Britons reporting a 'great deal' of trust in the United States.[64]

When Kennedy became president in January 1961 the recently improved tone and imagery of Anglo-American relations seemed initially to be in doubt. Kennedy and Macmillan were of different generations and there was no wartime bond to underpin either personal amicability or reverence of the joint UK-US sacrifice and practices. Such doubts, though, were soon dispelled and the 'Mac and Jack' relationship transpired to be one of the closest enjoyed by post-war British Prime Ministers and US presidents. According to Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's official biographer, although over twenty years his senior Macmillan was the Western leader Kennedy 'liked best and saw most often – four times in 1961 alone, seven times altogether.'[65] Fortunately, especially given that administration figures such as Under Secretary of State George Ball favoured a Eurocentric role for Britain, the President-Prime Minister relationship was bolstered significantly by the UK Ambassador to Washington,

[61] 'Bermuda Talks' HC Deb 01 April 1957 vol. 568 cc37-170.

[62] Harold Macmillan c.t in Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan: 1957-1986,* Vol. 2, (London: Macmillan, 1989) p. 229.

[63] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,* 119.

[64] Hendershot, "Affection is the Cement which Binds us", p. 65.

[65] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Limited, 1965) p. 558.

David Ormsby-Gore. A long-standing friend of Kennedy's, Ormbsy-Gore often received privileged access to the President, including during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.[66]

The British were under no illusions that more than an improved tone to Anglo-American relations was needed if their interests were to be safeguarded. A Cabinet paper in 1960, for example, acknowledged explicitly that only the US had the power to support British interests and that Britain's international status would depend increasingly on American willingness to treat Britain specially.[67] The most obvious post-Suez recovery in Anglo-American relations came in the nuclear realm, especially once Britain became the third thermonuclear power in May 1957. Following the Bermuda Summit, Eisenhower's administration amended the Atomic Energy Act and in 1958 concluded the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). This effectively repealed the 1946 McMahon Act, salvaged important nuclear cooperation and paved the way for Britain to maintain the appearance at least of being an independent nuclear power.[68] From 1959, the UK also played host to US nuclear bombers, made the Holy Loch submarine base available to the US Navy's Ballistic Missile Fleet and enabled an early-warning spy station at Fylingdales, Yorkshire.[69] Also, in 1963, there was the UK-US Polaris Agreement and diplomatic cooperation in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and later came US facilitation of the UK Naval Ballistic Missile System in 1968. [70]

None of this necessarily meant a reduction in areas of Anglo-American friction. US anti-colonialism continued to ranker with the British on several fronts. For instance, Macmillan's

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[66] Lord Harlech recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, Oral History Program, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter JFKL), p. 11-12.

[67] Cited by Rees, W. (2001). Britain's Contribution to Global Order. In Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees & Mathew Uttley, *Britain and Defence 1945-2000: A Policy Re-evaluation* (Harlow: Pearson, 2001), p.36.

[68] For more details on the MDA see for instance, Steve Marsh, 'The Anglo-American defence relationship' in Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds) *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary perspectives,* (Routledge: London, 2013), pp. 180-181; Ritchie Ovendale, *Anglo-American Relations,* p. 122; John Baylis, 'The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence' *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol. 31, No. 3. (2008) pp: 425-466.

[69] Marsh, 'Defence Relationship' p. 182; Dobson, *Twentieth Century Relations,* 120.

[70] For details on the facilitation and impact of the 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement see, J. Baylis, 'The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement', pp: 425-466.

advisers were concerned by US courtship of an increasingly unwieldly UN [71] and it was perplexing to find the US sometimes in opposition to its own rhetoric – such as in British Guiana where the British government wished to exit commitments post-haste. Similarly, differences continued over strategic embargo policy and China, regardless of the Sino-Soviet split.[72] Nevertheless, greater care was taken post-Suez to explain and tolerate different Anglo-American positions as both sides recognised their continuing interdependence, however imbalanced.

It is difficult to overstate the psychological impact and new sense of vulnerability that Sputnik delivered to the US in October 1957, let alone the subsequent large diversion of economic and technical resources necessitated by perceived Soviet advantage in the nuclear race.[73] Meantime, the US found Western Europe more difficult to manage as the region recovered economic strength, defined strategic priorities different to America's and periodically challenged American leadership. American support of British membership of the EEC strengthened consequently as the so-called chicken war in the early 1960s signalled the rising economic power of the Community and Washington's need of allies within the trade bloc. Britain and the US were also drawn together in opposition to French President de Gaulle's ideas of Europe operating as a third force between the two superpowers. The Kennedy administration viewed with considerable alarm, for instance, the 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Indeed, Kennedy himself called it 'an unfriendly act'.[74] Furthermore, while the British soft-pedalled the life out of the MLF concept, their cooperation within NATO was nevertheless important in holding West Germany within the

[71] Macmillan-Kennedy talks, 4-9 April 1961, RG 59 Records of the United Arab Republic Affairs Desk 1956-1962, Box 30, USNA.

[72] For more information see Sergey Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet split' in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp: 349- 372.

[73] John Lewis Gaddis, 'Grand Strategies in the Cold War' in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 11.

[74] Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p.68.

organisation at a time of angst over nuclear sharing and when de Gaulle both withdrew France from the military command structure and pressed ahead with the *Force de Frappe*.[75]

More generally, Anglo-American officials found the New World Order that they had helped to establish at the end of WW2, and from which the UK and US benefitted from handsomely, to be challenged increasingly by new and altered actors on the world stage. For instance, in what was dubbed the 'Development Decade',[76] rapid decolonisation created some problems for UK-US relations but it also encouraged Anglo-American cooperation in the UN as they sought to address issues and manage their public images in the face of a swelling General Assembly and a growing non-aligned movement.[77] Developing world nationalism and decolonisation also placed a premium on secure bases, overflight rights and capacity to manage independence processes through to a conclusion such that opportunities for communist gains were minimised. All of this enabled Britain to demonstrate that even with reduced global reach it still had utility to the US, including Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, Aden in the Persian Gulf and Cyprus in the Mediterranean. Also, the Commonwealth remained an influential grouping, even if less immediately amenable to British direction or directly beneficial to Britain's economy,[78] and important residual British counterinsurgency capabilities were amply demonstrated in Malaya.

Arguably the strongest demonstration of entwined Anglo-American fortunes in this period, though, was the interdependence of sterling and the US dollar as keystones of the Bretton Woods system.[79] According to Dobson, US Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and

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[75] Piers Ludlow, 'European integration and the Cold War' in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp: 186-187.

[76] United Nations Development Decade. A Programme for international economic cooperation, 1710, XVI, (1961), Resolution adopted on the reports of the Second Committee [online] available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1710%20(XVI) (accessed 13/06/2018).

[77] 'US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa' 19 January 1960, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central and East, Dwight. D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDE).

[78] Philip Alexander, 'A Tale of Two Smiths: the Transformation of Commonwealth Policy, 1964-70' *Contemporary British History,* Vol. 20, No. 3. (2006) pp: 303-321

[79] Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century,* p. 125.

McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 'regarded the possibility of a sterling devaluation with almost as much horror as did the British themselves.'[80] President Johnson, too, was acutely aware of the inter-related dangers posed to the US by the weakness of sterling. In summer 1965 he regarded 'the special situation of the United Kingdom' as a 'major foreign policy concern' and ordered a study group to assess how the US might alleviate pressure on sterling 'so as to give the United Kingdom the four-or-five-year breathing space it needs to get its economy into shape, and thereby sharply reduce the danger of sterling devaluation or exchange controls or British military disengagement East of Suez or on the Rhine.'[81]

Looking at the gamut of Anglo-American relations across the period 1958-65 reveals a much changed but still mutually valued special relationship. The cultural underpinnings of the relationship remained steadfast, if not intensified as developments in media especially opened new reciprocal vistas upon UK and US societies. Diplomatic relations generally remained strong too and these ran deep throughout the 'coral reef', one lesson drawn from Suez being the importance of consultation and exchange to the effective management of inevitable tensions arising from divergent strategic priorities, Britain's relative decline, and growing constraints on American largess. Wilson and Johnson may not have had the personal chemistry of Kennedy and Macmillan, nor the wartime bond of Eisenhower and Macmillan, but both were shrewd politicians and their relations were generally warm and cordial. Perhaps most important was that Anglo-American interdependence was tangible in US anxiety not to be left manning the ramparts alone outside of Europe and in concerted action to support sterling and, by extension, Bretton Woods. Even the impact of divergent Anglo-American strategic priorities was ameliorated to some extent by new or intensified concerns where UK-US interests overlapped, notably in managing the changing character of the UN and negotiating challenges in West Europe within NATO and to American leadership, particularly those posed by de Gaulle.

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[80] Dobson, Years of Transition, p.252.

[81] Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Vantage Point: Perspectives of the* Presidency, 1963-1969 (Washington: Henry Holt & Company) pp. 597-8.

UK, US, and the Middle East

Britain and the US had very different historical experiences of, and interests in, the Middle East. Britain first competed with Russia for influence in the region and effectively became its hegemon once the Bolshevik revolution reduced great power competition there. British interest in the region at the outset was predominantly strategic. The Middle East formed a land bridge to three continents and allowed control of the sea routes to India, the Far East and beyond. However, commercial and political interests soon combined to anchor Britain deeper into the Middle East, not least shipping through the Suez Canal, the discovery of oil, and the development of banking, insurance, construction and mining enterprises.

In the aftermath of WW2 Britain was determined, in Reynolds' words, to transform the Middle East into the 'new keep and stronghold' of empire.[82] This reflected in part the severe wartime disruption incurred to Britain's Far Eastern colonies. It also reflected the extent to which British security and economic fortunes were seen to be entwined with stability in the Middle East and access to the resources and commercial opportunity there. Of paramount importance was Middle Eastern oil, with British oil interests holding a monopoly on Iranian oil[83], a 75% share in the important offshore oil fields of the Trucial sheikdoms and major concessions in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. Persian Gulf oil was of a gravity particularly suited to UK industry, brought substantial tax and dividend revenue to the British Treasury and, because this was sterling oil, made a vital contribution to Britain's balance of payments.[84] Furthermore, residual British power in the Middle East still seemed sufficient to safeguard these interests. In addition to the huge Suez base in Egypt, which in the early 1950s housed more than 70,000 troops, there was Royal Navy presence in Aden, Bahrain, Cyprus, Malta, and the Suez Canal, and Royal Air Force facilities in Ismailia, Bahrain, Sharjah, Masirah, Amman, on the Shatt-el-Arab border and in Iraq at Habbaniya and Shaibah.

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[82] David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"?, p.6.

[83] The UK had a monopoly on Iranian oil prior to the nationalisation crisis. This was broken in the 1954 oil consortium settlement.

[84] Donald Maclean, *British Foreign Policy Since Suez,* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1970) p.172; Marsh, *Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran.*

The Suez crisis may not have been the watershed moment for Britain in the Middle East that some have suggested but it certainly constituted a huge blow to British aspirations and prestige. Just as importantly for this thesis, it had significant legacies too. The first was an initial acceleration of apparent British decline in the Middle East. King Saud bin Adbulaziz of Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with the UK in response to Suez and in reaction to an Anglo-Saudi territorial dispute over the Buraimi oasis, which the UK claimed on the behalf of Muscat and Oman.[85] In addition, pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan appeared susceptible to collapse and the execution of the Anglophile Hashemite monarchy and of Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id during the Iraq Revolution of July 1958 dealt the UK another 'devastating blow.'[86] Second, British domestic and parliamentary politics became highly sensitive to further challenges to British interests and prestige in the Middle East. This was epitomised by the 'Aden Group', which advocated strongly the UK's continued political, economic and military presence in South Arabia as a bulwark against Egyptian President Nasser's Arab nationalism. The Macmillan and Home Conservative governments both struggled to contend with this Group, not least because it drew support from influential Conservative backbenchers and from some officials in the Colonial Office and Macmillan's Cabinet. Key members thereof included the Minister for Aviation, Julian Amery, the Minister of Health, Enoch Powell, Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, Defence Secretary Peter Thorneycroft, Colonel Neil McLean, Colonel David Smiley and the Secretary of State for Air, Hugh Fraser.[87] In addition, some members of the Aden Group had close personal relations with members of the Conservative Government. Eugene Rogan and Tewfik Aclimandos, for instance, have placed particular emphasis on Amery's relations with Macmillan and on Smiley's 'direct connections' to Foreign Secretary Lord Home.[88]

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[85] See for instance, Michael Morton, *Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence, and Oil in Arabia* (I.B. Tauris, London, 2013); For context of the crisis see J. B. Kelly, 'The Buraimi Oasis Dispute' *International Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 3, (1956) pp: 318-326.

[86] Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm* (London: Macmillan, 1971) p. 511; Stephen Blackwell, 'A Desert Squall: Anglo-American planning for military intervention in Iraq, July 1958-August 1959' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 35, No.1 (1999) p. 3.

[87] Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations,* (London: Fourth Estate, 2006), 677-683; Uzi Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification,* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 46-47.

[88] Julian Amery was Macmillan's son-in-law. Eugene Rogan and Tewfik Aclimandos, 'The Yemen War and Egypt's War Preparedness" in *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences,* Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 160-161.

Whilst Britain valued its Middle Eastern interests and rated the region's defence as second only to the homeland,[89] the US initially had no established regional military presence to speak of. Before WW2 it had been determined primarily to support philanthropic and missionary activities and to ensure equality of economic opportunity for US overseas companies. Growing American economic interest was evidenced in the 1944 Culbertson Mission[90] but outside of oil company activities these interests in the Middle East remained limited. As for initial American security engagement with the Middle East, this was actually forced primarily by Stalin's delayed post-war withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran and consequent US support of Iranian independence in line with the 1943 Teheran Declaration.[91] Once this crisis was resolved there was little appetite for any American further security commitment to the Middle East.

Even after the Truman Doctrine and controversial US endorsement in 1948 of the state of Israel, the US military especially continued to view American military strategic interests in the region as being 'almost negligible in light of interests in other areas.'[92] American Middle Eastern policy consequently developed around an assumption that any meaningful US military force in, or rapidly deployable to, the region was highly unlikely. The product was a rather inchoate policy mix of containment strategy, defence of US economic interests, growing of American political influence, a special relationship with Israel, working with Arab nationalist movements, supporting established colonial powers in the Middle East, and using American oil companies especially – such as the Arabian–American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia – as conduits for foreign aid outside of Congressional scrutiny.[93] Furthermore, the relatively new

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[89.] Memo on policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean by the British Group, Vol. 5, p. 580, FRUS.

[90.] J.A. DeNovo, 'The Culbertson Economic Mission and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1944-1945', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 63, No. 1. (1976-77) pp: 913-36.

[91.] G.R. Hess, 'The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.69, No. 3. (1974) pp: 117-46. For the text of the Clifford Memorandum see Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years in the Firing Line*, (New York: Funk and Wagnolls, 1968), Appendix A.

[92.] Chief of Programme Staff MDAP (Bray) to Deputy Director MDA (Ohly), 25 January 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 5. cited in S. Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil,* p.25.

[93] Dobson and Marsh*, US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p 96; I. H. Anderson, *ARAMCO, The United States, and Saudi Arabia. A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy 1933-50*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 143.

US presence in the Middle East impacted considerably upon American diplomatic representation. Many US officials had little cultural identification with the region nor understanding of the vast and rich tribal, religious and socio-cultural nuances that defined it. Indeed, it has been suggested that although US diplomatic legations opened in most countries in the Middle East in the 1940s, Arab leaders through to the late 1950s preferred still to negotiate policies with US private oil officials. [94]

The Middle East was riven by religious differences, deep social unrest, a clash between modernisation and traditionalism, splits between royalists and republicanism, the Israeli issue, a rising tide of nationalism, and inter-state tensions – including between Iran and Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria, Turkey and Greece, and Aden and Yemen. As the US scoured the region for potential sources of stability, and economic opportunity, so it focussed on particular countries and movements. Israel was an obvious partner given US sponsorship of its creation and that the Jewish lobby was already a significant force in Congress and American domestic politics. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, for instance, the Eisenhower administration felt little alternative but to reach out publicly to Tel Aviv in rebuilding US-Israeli relations, even though this risked alienating Arab nationalists especially.[95] At the same time, the US was keen to court Saudi Arabia. Led by House Saud, the country was staunchly anti-communist, played host to ARAMCO and in 1957 concluded a five-year agreement for the US to use the air facilities at the Dhahran airfields. These provided vital refuelling facilities for access to the Far East.[96] Furthermore, Egyptian President Nasser and pan-Arab nationalism were forces that some US officials, including John S. Badeau as US Ambassador in Cairo and Robert Komer as a Middle East specialist on the National Security Council, wanted to harness against communism. This, however, ran contrary to Saudi and

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[94] Jeffrey Macris, *The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region* (London: Routledge, 2010) p.67.

[95] Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003) p. 131.

[96] 'Summary report of current situation in Arabian Peninsula' Saudi Arabia Policy Papers 14. 1960, Box 2, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, USNA.

British concerns. Both feared Nasser's strong inclinations towards Arab Nationalism in light of the contemporaneous Arab Cold War. [97]

Following the 1952 Egyptian revolution, the Royalist – Republican divide became a central source of discord in South Arabian politics, with President Nasser broadly spearheading the movement towards Arab nationalist republicanism and Saudi Arabia generally supporting traditional Middle Eastern monarchies.[98] As for the British, Nasser was a longstanding thorn in their side; Eisenhower later recalled in his memoirs 'the blinding bitterness' that Macmillan expressed towards the Egyptian president.[99] To compound the humiliation of Suez, Nasser aggravated UK sensitivities by concluding in 1958 a union between Egypt and Syria. Subsequent formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) raised in British minds a spectre of a future pan-Arab super-state.[100] It also complicated their ambition to establish a Federation between tribal regions in the Western Arab Protectorate (WAP) and, eventually, to merge this with the Aden Colony, thereby strengthening UK influence in the region whilst also saving important resources. Though in June 1958 WAP leaders agreed to merger plans and the UK began outlining a 'Federation of Arab Emirates to the South',[101] it was a complicated issue. Charles Johnson, the Governor of Aden in 1962, likened Federation merger plans to 'modern Glasgow' meeting the '18th century highlands'.[102] The Aden Colony was economically developed and boasted a long-established legislative council whilst the Protectorates had their own political identities, maintained only limited institutional and state

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[97] PM Macmillan's Visit to Washington, Conference Files 1949-1963, CF 2087, Box 285, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, 4/27-29/62 Chronology 2 of 2, USNA; Ashton, *The Irony of Interdependence,* p.94.

[98] Parker Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998) p. 73.

[99] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,* p.122.

[100] Macmillan, *Riding the Storm,* pp. 505-506; Blackwell, 'A Desert Squall' p. 1.

[101] The idea had been initially proposed in 1952 by Kennedy Trevaskis, the Political Agent and Adviser for the Western Protectorate but was shelved after coming under pressure from rather unenthusiastic Federation Rulers and international critique following Suez. Kennedy Trevaskis, *Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 44.

[102] Letter from Johnston to Reginald Maulding, 20 May 1962, FO 371/162785, UKNA.

infrastructures and were run by tribal chiefs. [103] Consequent British efforts to cultivate political unity and to establish feelings of nationhood within the Federation provoked fervent opposition and nationalist movements. Macmillan's government was particularly concerned by the formation of the UAR-supported South Arabian League (SAL) within the Sultanates of Lahej and Fadhli, which drew considerable support also from the Aden Colony and worked to promote tribal rebellion against UK rule. [104] Also, in June 1962 an anti-colonial trade union movement, the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) and its extended political arm, the People's Socialist Party, were formed as a result of anti-imperial messages emanating from Cairo. [105] Furthermore, following the establishment of the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) in January 1963, Nasser trained and supported economically and militarily the National Liberation Front, an insurgent group within the FSA set on ridding Aden of the UK's colonial presence. [106]

Despite the bitterness surrounding the Palestine Mandate issue and Truman's stance on Israel, [107] British and American officials concluded in November 1949 that there was sufficient coincidence of UK-US interest in the Middle East for their regional objectives to be considered as being 'identical' and that 'American interests were parallel and not competitive' with Britain's. [108] To some extent this spoke to Anglo-American regional interdependence. In Kuwait for instance, US companies shared oil production with UK companies, and in 1958 active resource exploration was undertaken by UK and US oil firms in the Trucial states. [109]

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[103] Jonathan Walker, *Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in Yemen 1962-67* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2014) p. 24.

[104] 'Sultan Ali of Lahej (Withdrawal of Recognition) Hansard, HC Deb 10 July 1959, vol. 591 cc. 588-90.

[105] Walker, *Aden Insurgency*, pp. 25-36.

[106] Robert McNamara, 'The Nasser factor: Anglo-Egyptian relations and Yemen/Aden crisis 1962-65' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 53, No.1, (2017). pp: 51-68.

[107.] Ritchie Ovendale, *Britain, the United States and the End of the Palestine Mandate 1942-48*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1989).

[108.] Statement by the US and UK Groups, 14 November 1949, vol 6, FRUS, p. 62 cited in Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil*, 22.

[109] 'Summary Report of Current Situation in Arabian Peninsula' n.d 1958, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Saudi Arabia, 14. Policy Papers, USNA, p.3.

The Eisenhower doctrine pronounced on 5 January 1957 also had the effect of tying Anglo-American fortunes together, not least because of Britain's remaining post-Suez military assets. For instance, sitting amid the main shipping routes between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, Aden hosted a major deep-water bunkering port and a large military base which, given the loss of UK bases in India and looming liquidation of East African bases, [110] the British determined to maintain as a means to safeguard the Gulf, support allied Sheikdoms and stage forces to Kuwait, East and Central Africa, South-East Asia and Hong Kong.[111] Still more importantly, Washington viewed primary US security interests as lying in in the Far East[112] and thus looked to Britain to retain the primary responsibility for Middle Eastern defence.[113] Even as British power waned the US consistently preferred to rely on a combination of Britain and regional initiatives – including the Northern Tier concept, the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1959.[114]

In reality, though, matters were more complicated than the 1949 agreement allowed. Not unreasonably the British expected US political and economic support in carrying the burden of being the primary western provider of Middle East defence. Washington accepted the *quid pro quo* in principle. For example, in December 1951 American officials laid out the situation thus: it should be 'our constant endeavour to make it possible for [the] UK to play [a] maximum role in [the] ME and for [the] US to make up [the] minimum deficiency between what is required for area defense and stability and what [the] UK in [its] present straitened circumstances is able to bring to bear on [the] sit[uatio]n.'[115] Nevertheless, this did not translate into automatic US support of British positions. Rather, the inherent inconsistencies in US Middle Eastern policy encouraged

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[110] Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) p.33.

[111] See John Ducker and Maria Holt, *Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006) pp. 8-60.

[112] The Taiwan Straits crisis for instance. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace 1956-1961,* pp.182-185.

[113] Accounts that also take this view include: Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"?; Simon C. Smith, 'Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956-71', *Contemporary British History,* Vol. 21, No. 1 (2007), pp: 1-23.

[114] See for instance, Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945,* p.120; Wyn Rees, *Anglo-American Approaches to Alliance Security, 1955-60* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) pp: 76-106.

[115.] Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil*, p.99.

unpredictable short-term expediency and Anglo-American relations to be buffeted by contradictory American imperatives – a problem compounded by the seemingly uncanny symbiosis between containment policy and the advance of American economic interests, sometimes at British expense. During the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis in the early 1950s, for instance, the British wanted US support of a hard-line response to Iran's nationalisation of AIOC Iranian assets but were undercut repeatedly by American attempts to work with Iran's nationalist leadership. Nor did the ultimate resolution do anything to allay British fears about American willingness to exploit Britain's difficulties to US advantage. Iran became a US client state, the British monopoly on Iranian oil was destroyed and the final international oil consortium included a number of hitherto excluded US oil companies.

However, these tensions reflected the inchoate nature of US Middle Eastern policy rather than a lack either of overlapping Anglo-American concerns or agreement that Britain should retain as much regional influence as possible. For example, in 1958 joint strategic planning for the region resulted in a clear affirmation that adumbrated US military support if the UK so required.[116] Set against the backdrop of the Iraq Revolution, the UK and the US moved to protect regional stability. The UK used its military forces, with covert US backing, to bolster King Idris and his regime in Libya against domestic nationalist revolt.[117] Likewise, in a manoeuvre carefully coordinated to avoid as best possible parallels being drawn from the intervention in Suez, the US moved independently into Lebanon to support President Camille Chamoun's regime whilst the UK used its base in Cyprus to deploy at King Hussein's invitation 2000 troops to Jordan.[118] Additionally, at the Macmillan government's request, the Kennedy administration authorised in 1961 a US Navy task force to Kuwait to assist in Operation Vantage.[119]

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[116] Talking Points for Assistant Secretary Talbot in US-UK meeting on Persian Gulf Policy, 23-24 April 1963, Persian Gulf (General) Box 2, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, RG59 General Records of the Department of State, USNA.

[117] Stephen Blackwell, 'Saving the king: Anglo-American strategy and British counter-subversion operations in Libya, 1953-59' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 39, No. 1, (2003) pp: 1-16.

[118] Louise Kettle, 'Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan's Management of the Eisenhower Administration during the Intervention in Jordan, 1958' *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* Vol.27, No. 1, (2016) pp: 45-64.

[119] Miriam Joyce, 'Preserving the Sheikhdom: London, Washington, Iraq and Kuwait, 1958-61' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 31, No.2, (1995), pp: 281-292.

Furthermore, US officials were not blind to the dangers that Arab nationalism potentially posed to their own as well as British interests. Saudi Arabia is a good example of this. Riven with personal animosities and facing a severe financial crisis, it was possible that House Saud would be over-thrown in a social revolution. Between 1958 and 1960 opposition organisations and Saudi press openly defied strict Saudi censorship and published and distributed articles attacking House Saud and openly promoted Egyptian-backed Arab nationalism.[120] This domestic instability was accompanied by a significant change in the political inclinations of House Saud too. By 1958, King Saud had virtually abdicated authority to his half-brother Prince Faisal, who concerned the US in his apparent downgrading of the US-Saudi relationship and a potential threat to ARAMCO's long-term stability. Faisal appointed 'Tariki', a graduate student from the University of Texas, as the Director-General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs. Known to be a radical nationalist and admirer of Nasser, US officials feared that Tariki would nationalise ARAMCO and bring other oil companies into the Saudi oil industry.[121]

Finally, it needs to be noted that Anglo-American relations in the Middle East were conditioned in part by regional changes during the period of investigation. The immediate post-Suez years were particularly turbulent with major questions about Britain's power and British determination to remain in the region, instability amongst some important pro-western governments and rebuilding of key relationships to be done. The Kennedy administration's interest especially in working with nationalist governments added grist to the Anglo-American mill insofar as these foregrounded contradictions inherent in the multiple strands of US Middle Eastern policy and made more difficult the public presentation of Anglo-American solidarity. At the same time, however, Vietnam drew US attention increasingly towards the Far East and in so doing re-emphasised the importance of British commitments to the Middle East, along with regional organisations and key bilateral relations with the likes of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Meanwhile, though the Buraimi Oasis crisis continued well into the 1970s, UK and US differences were eased when Saudi-UK diplomatic relations were restored on 17 January 1963.[122] Also, by winter 1963, two Ba'thist coups in Iraq and Syria

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[120] Mordechai Abir, *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration,* 2nd ed (Oxon: Routledge, 2019).

[121] Abir, *Regime and Elites,* p.101; Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States,* 84; 'Status of Matters Flowing from Meeting Between the President and King Saud at the White House on February 13', Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 4 June 1962, RG 59, Saudi Arabia (1962), USNA.

[122] 'The Yemen', Record of a meeting at Admiralty House, 10 January 1963.UKNA, FO 371/168822.

had weakened Nasser's monopoly of the Arab revolution and, consequently, his attraction to US policymakers as a potential bulwark against communism.[123] Perhaps fortuitously, too, for Britain, US ability to court Nasser was compromised by Senate's passing of the Gruening Amendment in October 1963. This was a first step in a series of political manoeuvres to increase Congressional control over US foreign aid and brought to an immediate halt US economic programmes in Egypt.[124] It also thereby alleviated a key sore in Anglo-American relations. The Johnson administration's relations with Nasser quickly deteriorated to a point where in December 1964 Nasser advised all Egyptians to throw US aid into the Red Sea.[125]

UK, US, and Africa

In ways reminiscent of the Middle East, Britain and the US approached African affairs with very different historical experiences of the continent and with very different levels of extant economic and political interest there. Britain was a longstanding colonial power in Africa and had consequently a significant number of interests, responsibilities and established relationships there. The US was very much a newcomer, especially south of the Sahara, and it struggled both to define national interests there consistently and to negotiate their protection in the absence of both traditional influence and likely significant resource allocation. Indeed, one commentator noted in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1962 that 'for American diplomacy [Africa] is virtually a new continent' and whilst American emotional, intellectual and political interest there had gathered 'monumentally' in recent years, 'concrete and identifiable American interests are sparse.'[126]

Immediately after WW2 British African possessions were seen as a potential key to returning Britain to the top table of world powers following what were initially perceived, in some

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[123] Rory Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2009) p. 298.

[124] Asher Orkaby, 'The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968' (2014) Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, p. 237.

[125] 'Nasser Angered by Criticism, Says U.S. Can 'Jump in Lake' *New York Times,* Dec. 24, 1964.

[126] Rupert Emerson, 'American Policy in Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962, [online] available from < https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/1962-01-01/american-policy-africa> (accessed 10/15/2018).

quarters at least, as temporary wartime setbacks. In October 1948, for example, British Foreign Secretary Bevin urged that 'if we only pushed on and developed Africa, we could have the United States dependent on us, and eating out of our hand, in four or five years...'.[127] By the late 1950s, of course, British calculations had changed enormously. International trade patterns had developed differently to those imagined. Flows to and from the old empire dwindled relative to the strengthening dynamic of intra-European trade and, especially, the EEC's customs union. Meanwhile developing world nationalism strengthened and the costs of maintaining Britain's colonial possessions and responsibilities became disproportionately negative. Coupled with Britain's sluggish economic performance and the vulnerability of sterling, these considerations transformed British policy to one of offloading formal African responsibilities as fast as possible whilst seeking in the process to safeguard as best possible British interests and influence in the successor independent states. Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' speech signalled this newfound commitment to rapid but responsible exit from Africa;[128] in 1960, in what was dubbed 'the Year of Africa', seventeen countries including the UK's Nigeria grained independence. [129] Other countries followed in quick succession: Tanganyika in 1961, Burundi and Uganda in 1962, Kenya in 1963, and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in 1964.[130]

Britain's residual economic and strategic interests in Africa were considerable. The UK had a significant military base in Kenya and a naval base in South Africa, and communist control and/or political instability in East, Central and Southern Africa would likely jeopardise British sea communications in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.[131]

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[127] Jack Gallagher, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 146.

[128] For a collection of perspectives on this speech see L. B. Butler and Sarah Stockwell, eds. *The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2013).

[129] Ritchie Ovendale 'Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960' in *The Historical Journal* Vol. 38. No. 2 (1995) pp: 465.

[130] Billy Dudley, 'Decolonisation and the Problems of Independence' in J. D. Fage and R. Oliver (eds) *The Cambridge History of Africa,* Volume 8, c. 1940-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 54-55.

[131] Ovendale, 'Wind of Change' p. 446; 'Statement of US Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960' National Security Council Report. 23 August 1957, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d24> (accessed 16/06/2018).

Economically, by the mid-1960s UK investment in sub-Saharan Africa totalled approximately £900 million.[132] The bulk of this was directed towards the mining of strategic minerals and other primary resources including gold, diamonds, uranium and coal. Oil refining and distribution was prominent in South Africa and Nigeria too. Of the major UK private companies, Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch consumer goods company, had in 1960 over £100 million invested in the West Coast of Africa. Through its subsidiary, the United Africa Company, Unilever operated a network of plantations, purchasing agencies, warehouses and breweries. Above all, though, it was the copper-belt region – located predominantly in Northern Rhodesia – that attracted most private UK interest. Most notable here were the Oppenheimer group and Tanganyika Concessions (Tanks).[133]

British policies toward Africa were complicated by two further considerations. The first concerned the presence of white-settler dependencies in East and Central Africa, where the Central African Federation (CAF) presented the principal problem. Established in 1953 to promote regional economic development and as a mechanism to block the northward advance of Afrikaner racial policies, the CAF had fused together the white-settler and self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia with the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Although initially heralded as a showpiece of the UK's commitment to multiracialism, by 1960 white settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia refused to consider black-majority or even black parity rule, having become alarmed by the speed at which independence and pan-African ideas had spread across West Africa.[134] The resulting negotiations between the Macmillan and later Home governments, the Premier of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Edgar Whitehead, and the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, of the CAF's constitutional reform antecedent to its independence continued without resolve until the Federation imploded in December 1963. Throughout these discussions, potential risk of racial conflict and / or that Welensky would rely on military force to preserve the white-settler

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[132] Maclean, *British Foreign Policy Since Suez,* pp.197-198.

[133] Ibid.

[134] See for instance, John Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London: Longman, 1996); L. J. Butler, 'Britain, the United States, and the Demise of the central African federation, 1959-63' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* Vol. 28, No. 3, (2000); Claire Melland, 'The Anglo-American Special Relations and the Decolonisation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1957-1963' (PhD Thesis, University of Leicester, 2015).

interests in the region caused severe anxiety for officials in Whitehall.[135] As the responsible colonial power, white-settler forces would have risked UK prestige and reputation with newly independent African states. Moreover, close contacts forged between the UK armed forces and Rhodesian military during and after WW2 meant that, if conflict did break out, there was a good probability that the UK armed forces might refuse an order to fight their 'kith and kin'.[136]

The second complicating consideration was the powerful influence of pro-Rhodesia forces within the British Conservative Party, with which Welensky maintained good personal relations. Prominent Conservative party members of the so-called 'Rhodesia Lobby' included Major Patrick Wall, R. H. Turton, the Federal Minister of Justice, Julian Greenfield and former Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Lord Cloyton, and the Lord of Salisbury, founder of the Conservative Monday Club and of the subsequent 'Watching Committee'. The former was established in 1961 partly in reaction to decolonisation policies. The latter was a mechanism through which Conservative MPs could critique Macmillan's policies in Africa. Influential members of these groups included Major Patrick Wall, John Biggs-Davidson, Paul Williams, Neil McLean and Anthony Fell.[137] All of this meant that Prime Ministers Macmillan and Home had constantly to guard their flanks against internal Conservative Party criticism of their African policies and to be alert to indications of potential open revolt.

The US was slow to consider let alone to organise in terms of Africa. The State Department did not create an African Bureau until 1958[138] and the CIA created a separate Africa Division within the Deputy Directorate of Operations only in 1960.[139] This is unsurprising given US

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[135] Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-1963* (London, Macmillan, 1973), particularly page 309; Alec Douglas Home, *The Way the Wind Blows,* p.130.

[136] See for instance, Philip Murphy, 'An Intricate and Distasteful Subject': British Planning for the Use of Force against the European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952-65' *The English Historical Review,* Vol. 121, No 492, (2006) p. 748.

[137] Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonisation: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964* (London: Clarendon Press, 1995) pp. 84, 92 and 102-103.

[138] Editorial Note, FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d7 (accessed 25/09/2019).

[139] Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy*, p. 113.

priorities elsewhere and that identification of American strategic interest in Africa was, initially at least, indirect. The Eisenhower administration acknowledged US interdependence with Western Europe and, in turn, considered Western Europe to have critical dependencies on Africa. This was especially so in terms of minerals and agricultural products. In February 1958, Julian Homes, a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, summed up Washington's line of thinking in a memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles. He warned that the 'genuine danger' were Africa lost to Communist influence was that Europe would 'be so weakened and out-flanked' its defence would be rendered 'impossible.'[140] Neither were American economic interests compelling of greater direct US commitment to Africa. In 1958, US private investment in the continent amounted to just $500 million,[141] a considerable portion of which lay in shareholdings in UK businesses. American Metal Climax (AMAXX) for instance, owned 50.6% of the Rhodesian Selection trust, which alongside the Anglo-American Company- a multinational mining company- also had large investments in Tanks.[142] In 1960 the entire African continent, including the United Arab Republic, accounted for just 4 % of US exports and 3.7 percent of American imports. Furthermore, potential growth of American economic interests was limited by discriminatory trade and investment practices that favoured the metropolitan powers in Africa. For the most part, East, Central and South Africa in particular were viewed primarily as key sources of US strategic minerals, including asbestos, cobalt, columbite, industrial diamonds and chemical chromite.[143] In 1956, for instance, the US imported 25% of its iron ore requirements from Africa – the majority of which came from Liberia.[144] In 1958 Andrew N. Kamarck of the International Bank summed up matters succinctly, arguing that 'We could get along without

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[140] Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles, 6 February 1958, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d1> (accessed 26/09/2019).

[141] 'Statement of US Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960' National Security Council Report. 23 August 1957, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d24> (accessed 16/06/2018).

[142] Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974)*,* p.30.

[143] Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy,* p.111.

[144] G. Shepherd, 'The Conflict of Interests in American Policy on Africa', *The Western Political Quarterly* Vol. 12, No. 4, (1959), p .998.

African commodities and African markets with an imperceptible ripple in our standard of living.'[145]

It has been suggested that the American interests in Africa that US policymakers began to identify from the late 1950s fall into six broad categories and that these received different emphases at different times, namely: anti-colonialism; strategic minerals; Africa's place in the western European security system; bases; proxies; and 'signal-sending'.[146] For Washington all of these issues were developed within a Cold War frame, albeit US domestic racial politics exerted a complicating influence on policy. The British view encompassed concern about potential communist gains but reflected also greater sensitivity to African politics, the limitations imposed by Britain's extant interests and obligations, and issues of race and identity within Africa itself. Britain's domestic political constraints on Africa policy were primarily imperial / prestige, particularly within the Conservative governments.

These overlapping but by no means identical frames, together with Africa's long-standing colonial history and rich ethno-linguistic diversity, drew shared Anglo-American concern about the potential for decolonisation to unleash political and economic disintegration upon the continent and / or to bring to the fore political forces antipathetic to the West. By 1958, all states in Northern Africa, save for Algeria had gained independence.[147] Here the brutal Algerian War of Independence between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) that had begun in 1954 raged on.[148] There were counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere too. Portugal, for example, was trying to suppress the armed nationalist movements of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

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[145] Rupert Emerson, 'American Policy in Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962,[online] available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/1962-01-01/american-policy-africa> (accessed 11/06/2015).

[146] Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy,* p. 111.

[147] See for instance, David Birmingham, *The Decolonisation of Africa* (London: UCL Press Ltd 1995).

[148] By 1962, when the war ended, more than a million Muslim Algerians died in the conflict and as many European settlers were driven into exile. See for instance, Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New Yok: New York Review Books, 2006).

(PAIGC).[149] Meantime ethnic conflict and border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Mali and Senegal created instability in the East and North West of Africa. Furthermore, South Africa's apartheid policies stoked racial tensions through Southern Africa and beyond.

Recent scholarship has cautioned the extent to which communist influence and material support was initially accepted by African leaders.[150] Indeed, in 1972 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Robert Smith, penned an open article on the nature of American interests in Africa in which he argued that 'Contrary to our early anxieties, African leaders have shown keen appreciation of their sovereignty and independence, and have been remarkably zealous in resisting the threat of communism in replacing the former colonialism.[151] Nevertheless, fear of communist penetration of the continent stalked the corridors of power in Whitehall and Washington. By March 1957, the Soviet Union had implemented diplomatic missions in Libya, Ethiopia and Sudan.[152] In addition, there were discernible Soviet ties with the South African Communist Party (SAPC), FNLA and FRELIMO, and suspected Soviet penetration of labour unions in West Africa.[153] Communist China also offered ideological and material support for African nationalist movements. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had argued that a shared experience of colonialism, exploitation and racial contempt made China a natural leader for non-aligned nations of the developing world. Though the principal drive of this diplomacy was concentrated naturally on Asia, it has been argued that Chou also cultivated close relations with Egypt and the Algerian FLN.[154] By 1957, the Chinese Communist Party

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[149] Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to War on Terror* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp: 79-103.

[150] Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* p. 226.

[151] Robert S Smith, 'The Nature of American Interests in Africa', *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Vol.2, No. 2 (1972), 37-44, at 37.

[152] Memorandum of Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club Conference Room, Bermuda, 23 March 1957, FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d18 (accessed 18/06/2018).

[153] Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960' 26 August 1958, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d8> (accessed 26/09/2019).

[154] John Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa,* p.226.

(CCP) – based out of its embassy in Cairo – provided material and arms support to Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Ghana. It also funded and facilitated African independence movements. In Algeria, for instance, the CCP provided arms to the FLN, trained its fighters in China and, in 1958, extended diplomatic recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government.[155]

Britain and the US were thus agreed upon the importance of responsible European decolonisation so as to bequeath stable, united and independent African governments that remained reasonably well disposed toward the West.[156] During the 1957 Washington Conference, Anglo-American roles in Africa were designed specifically so that respective UK and US African policies could be complementary to one another. Whilst officials in Whitehall needed to establish appropriate social and political institutions within UK African colonies, Eisenhower's State Department would supplement these social reforms with US educational, technical and administrative training through the use of voluntary organisations and cultural exchange programs.[157] This arrangement reflected clearly the different levels of historical commitment to Africa and the Eisenhower administration's New Look preference for burden sharing Cold War responsibilities. It also meant that the UK's African bases were encompassed within Washington's geostrategic interests; their loss would reverberate not only through Africa but also potentially jeopardise the Mediterranean littoral and weaken the southern flank of NATO. [158]

Just as in the Middle East, however, broad Anglo-American agreement on objectives, threats and responsibilities did not mean lack of friction or divergent paths in particular

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[155] Joshua Eisenman, 'Comrades-in-arms: the Chinese Communist Party's relations with African political organisations in the Mao era, 1949-76' *Cold War History,* Vol. 18, No. 4, (2018) pp: 429-445.

[156] National Security Council Report, 26 August, 1958, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d8> (accessed 24/09/2019).

[157] For more details on the Eisenhower Administration's cultural programmes in Africa see Fawaz Gerits, 'Hungry Minds: Eisenhower's Cultural Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1953-1961' *Diplomatic History,* Vol.41, No. 3, (2017) pp. 594-619.

[158] Ovendale, 'Wind of Change' p. 446; 'Statement of US Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara prior to Calendar Year 1960' National Security Council Report. 23 August 1957, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d24> (accessed 16/06/2018).

circumstances. An important complicating factor was that traditional US anti-colonialism sat in stark contrast to Whitehall's imperial past and continued African responsibilities.[159] Washington's desire to hasten the end of colonial rule within a framework of continued cooperation with European metropolitan powers involved in any case a delicate balancing act. In addition, Britain was cognisant of both anti-colonial sentiments in the UN General Assembly and, unlike in the Middle East, of US anti-colonialism in Africa resonating through US domestic race relations. Indeed, the delicacy of this balancing act was reflected within the US foreign policy bureaucracy, where American officials loosely divided along 'Africanist' and 'Europeanist' lines. Those officials who worked closely with European countries preferred to downplay support for African nationalist leaders and remained sensitive to the UK's vested interests in the region. Conversely, officials in the Bureau for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, which later became the State Department's African Bureau, adopted views more reflective of those emanating from the UN General Assembly and Africa.[160] The sensitivity of the latter group to anti-colonial opinion was all the more problematic for Macmillan's government once the UN accelerated its critique of colonialism. For example, in 1960 the UN passed Resolution 1514 which called upon colonial powers to transfer governing rights to all 'territories which have not yet attained independence.'[161] The following year it established a Special Committee (C24) with the specific purpose of pressurising remaining colonial powers to implement Resolution 1514 with immediate effect.[162]

This situation inevitably injected tension into Anglo-American exchanges, especially where UK white-settler responsibilities in Africa were involved. Officials in Eisenhower's administration noted that US aid, foreign assistance and increased influence in Africa was

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[159] Cited in Crawford Young, 'United States Policy Toward Africa: Silver Anniversary Reflections', *African Studies Review,* Vol.27, No. 3. (1984) p. 2.

[160] `See for instance, John Kent, 'The United States and Decolonization of Black Africa, 1945-63' in David Ryan and Victor Pungong (eds) *The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom* (London: Palgrave, 2000) p. 173.

[161] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 'Declaration on the granting of independence of colonial countries and peoples' [online] available from < https://www.sfu.ca/~palys/UN-Resolution%201514.pdf> (accessed 2/10/2019).

[162] James Mittelman, 'Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24' *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 1. (1976) pp: 41-64.

generally accepted by the European metropolitan powers. Yet, it was treated with 'suspicion' where white-settler dependencies existed such as Kenya, Tanganyika, and the CAF.[163] This threw up an acute tension. On the one hand, responsible decolonisation warranted the investment of significant time in seeking to develop successor arrangements that respected and could accommodate deep racial divides. On the other, criticism of Britain from the UN General Assembly and from elements at least of US administrations emphasised a need of speed in the process of African liberation. For instance, in UK-US bilateral discussion on Africa in November 1959 State Department officials argued that 'while the movement in the Federation [CAF] might be generally in the right direction, the pace was altogether too slow.'[164]

The Kennedy administration, with its 'New Frontier' and sensitivity to domestic civil rights movements, was a particular challenge for British management of Anglo-American relations in Africa. Keen to distance himself from Eisenhower's African policies, Kennedy not only sought to strengthen US ties with Africa[165] but also appointed officials sympathetic to African nationalism. Most notable here was Adlai Stevenson as the US Ambassador to the UN. However, the State Department's Africa Bureau, hitherto a relative backwater in US policymaking, was given new clout with the appointment of G. Mennen 'Soapy' Williams as its Assistant Secretary of State. Tellingly of administration priorities, Williams was informed about his position even before Dean Rusk was appointed Secretary of State. Moreover, actions followed that were consistent with this altered approach to Africa. The US imposed sanctions for the first time on South Africa in response to apartheid, placed restrictions on Portuguese diversion of US-supplied NATO weaponry to counterinsurgency operations in Africa and, in 1961, supported a UN vote that encouraged an end to Portuguese rule in Angola. In addition, on a tour of East Africa in February 1961, Williams made a series of

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[163] Report of the Operations Coordinating Board, 23 April 1958, FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d3 (accessed 24/09/2019).

[164] H.S. H. Stanley, British Embassy, Washington to E.B. Boothby, head of Foreign Office African Department, 5 November 1959, UKNA, FO 371/137970.

[165] According to L.J. Butler, Kennedy's State Department came to regard Kennedy's aspirations to remove domestic racial discrimination at his 'greatest asset' in Washington's relations with Africans. Butler, 'Demise of the Central African Federation' p. 135.

unguarded references to 'Africa for the Africans'.[166] This aggravated white-settler communities in Kenya and the CAF and affirmed a growing perception in Whitehall that the Kennedy government had little sympathy for what it considered to be the UK's outdated and unrealistic colonial attitudes. [167]

In the main, though, the Kennedy administration did want to work with the British, and the British recognised that the new American tone was likely to bring specific rather than systemic differences into play. For example, in February 1961 the UK Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, explained clearly Whitehall's expectations from Kennedy's administration: the UK did not expect 'blanket support' from Washington on African policy, only that the US should judge circumstances in each colony on their merits, provide public support when they approved and keep criticism private when they did not.[168] It is also the case that internal bureaucratic tensions and inconsistencies in the Kennedy administration's Africa policies helped Britain. Despite increased public support of African national movements and the Afro-Asian group in the UN, Kennedy's African policy demonstrated in practice significant continuity with those of the Eisenhower administration. Take South Africa for instance. According to Zoe Hyman, although US officials publicly opposed apartheid on moral and political grounds, in private Kennedy's administration maintained cordial relations with the National Party and during its term investments by US banks and multinationals n South Africa actually increased.[169] In addition, there was little inclination to push African issues where potential losses might be incurred consequently elsewhere. Hence by late 1962 Kennedy had reverted to favouring the status quo in Angola and Portuguese interests, which was due in part to Portugal's threat to terminate US and NATO access to key bases in the Azores.[170]

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[166] Caccia to Home, 10 February 1961, PREM 11/3600, UKNA; Sir Patrick Renison, Governor of Kenya to Macloed, 27 February 1961, Ibid.

[167] Caccia to Stevens, 8 January 1961, FO 371/154713, UKNA.

[168] 'Anglo-US Talks on African Questions' 23 February 1961, FO 371/154733, UKNA.

[169] Zoe Hyman, 'To have its cake and eat it too:" US policy toward South Africa during the Kennedy administration' *The Sixties,* Vol. 8, No. 2, (2015) p; 143.

[170] Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy,* p. 117.

Over time, US interests in and perceptions of Africa changed from their being an extension of European security to being an integral security system within global containment and world stability.[171] Increasingly, therefore, Anglo-American ability to cooperate in Africa depended on international developments and how the US interpreted events in Africa through a superimposed prism of Cold War containment. For example, in January 1975 British Ambassador to Washington, Peter Ramsbotham, advised the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that US Secretary of State Kissinger 'seems to regard African affairs as peripheral and tends to adopt a quote crisis management unquote approach to them.'[172] Nevertheless, problems in the 1960s arising specifically from US anti-colonialism and the New Frontier ethos diminished significantly as Africa fell off the radars of senior political officials in both Washington and Whitehall, especially following Kennedy's assassination. By this time, the majority of UK African colonies were independent and in Britain Prime Minister Wilson was tackling issues deemed to be of much greater importance, including domestic reform and the weakness of sterling. Reciprocally, President Johnson had little personal interest in Africa and faced much more pressing domestic and international problems, including Great Society reforms and war in Vietnam. All of this was reflected in the fact that although problems continued in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, these did not consume the attention of senior level officials. In fact, the Johnson administration was willing to adopt a supportive secondary role to Britain, including working as closely as possible with South African and Rhodesian leaders to help safeguard UK vested interests.[173]

Conclusion

The Anglo-American relationship of 1958 to 1965 was undoubtedly different to that of WW2. The impact of wartime experiences and practices upon Anglo-American relations had begun to fade away, as had the generation of leaders most touched by them. Britain's relative decline had accelerated and Whitehall was still learning how to play a role of junior partner to the US. Moreover, the coincidence of British and American strategic priorities had been reduced, in part by the contraction of British power but also by US attention being drawn

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[171] Peter Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 27.
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[172] Ramsbotham telegram, 22 January 1975, FCO 82/576, UKNA.

[173] Telegram from Rusk to State Department, 22 March 1965, National Security Files, Box 207, LBJL.

increasingly by the Vietnam war to the Far East. On both sides of the Atlantic debates were to be heard within and outside of government about whether Britain's vocation remained global or more Eurocentric.

British management of relative decline inevitably drew priorities different to those of the US and opened plenty of opportunity for recrimination and suspicion. A broad policy of using US power to British ends meant inviting the Americans into areas and responsibilities traditionally belonging to Britain. Sometimes by design, more often by default, American power often eventuated in supplanting rather than bolstering British interests. Equally, divergent strategic priorities meant different ideas about what Britain could and could not cut from its overseas commitments without causing major damage to western interests and to Anglo-American relations.

Ultimately, though, neither British nor American officials – at least in the majority – wanted in this period to accept a European rather than global Britain. Their relationship had become asymmetric but mutually recognised interdependence was evident across multiple domains, including the battle for sterling, Polaris and profound American dismay at the scenario of being left to 'man the ramparts' beyond Europe alone. The post-Suez bounce-back in intimate Anglo-American diplomatic exchange and popular British identification with their US counterparts was also remarkable – and all the more so when contrasted with the French experience and de Gaulle's challenges to US leadership.

These broadly positive conclusions about the evolving asymmetric Anglo-American relationship were generally mirrored in the Middle East and Africa. In both theatres, too, there were similarities in the starting positions of Britain and the US. Both countries accorded greater relative importance to the Middle East than to Africa, and in neither theatre did the US want to assume British security responsibilities. Britain was well established in the Middle East and Africa, had considerable existing economic and security commitments and was a target of developing world nationalism and anti-colonialism. The US was a propagator of anti-colonialism, had no history in either region as a security provider and had limited established economic interests – albeit those in the Middle East, especially oil, clearly outstripped African holdings. Anglo-American relations would almost inevitably therefore be framed in a context of consequences for Britain of American power entering these regions, overlapping but rarely identical objectives, and the degree to which traditional US ideals –

especially anti-colonialism – would impact the tenor of exchange and / or actual cooperation. In addition, the UK and the US would both need to respect domestic political opinion. However, this opinion would respond to different stimuli. In Britain the dominant considerations would flow primarily from residual imperialist sentiment and the balance of resource resolved upon in budget cuts between overseas commitments and domestic expenditure. Influences upon the US would be more amorphous. Anti-colonialism would play out in both the Middle East and Africa, but only the latter would gain additional purchase from US domestic race relations. Conversely, organised public opinion would be felt more directly by US administrations in Middle Eastern affairs, especially from the Jewish lobby.

By and large then, as the UK and the US looked out upon crises in Yemen and the Congo, the global and regional pattern of relations suggested that broad UK-US cooperation could be expected, albeit punctuated by consequences flowing domestic political troubles and different policy emphases and philosophies. In both cases Britain was the logical lead nation, carried most extant responsibility and potentially had most to lose – at least if calculated on a national rather than global containment basis. In both cases, too, US interest was framed primarily in Cold War terms, albeit in Yemen the fundamental contradictions in US policies were most likely to be exposed. How Anglo-American officials negotiated these contradictions and different emphases within overall broad agreement, together with the unfolding of events, would reveal more about UK-US relations in the period 1958-65.

Chapter Two

Anglo-American Relations in the Belgian Congo Crisis

On 5 July 1960, the newly independent Belgian Congo collapsed into political, military and social chaos. Soldiers mutinied and in a show of support workers began to strike, inspiring civil and military disorder throughout the country. Rivalries between different ethnic groups in the capital city of Leopoldville compounded matters in maintaining order and on 9 July, the Belgian military intervened. They did so, however, without first acquiring full support from either Congo's Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba or President, Joseph Kasavubu.[1] Then on 12 July, Katanga, the country's most prosperous province, declared its secession under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. Cumulatively, the speed and ferocity at which these events came together prompted the Congolese leadership to seek international support to remove the Belgian troops and help restore order and stability to the country. They first approached the UN but when assistance was not immediately forthcoming, both leaders turned to the Soviet Union and asked that Khrushchev monitor the situation closely lest Soviet-bloc intervention was necessary.[2]

Such were the events that established the Congo civil war, a crisis which has garnered much scholarly attention concerning the examination of neo-colonialism and its broad implications

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[1] Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 9 July 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1952–1961, International Series, Box 3, Congo (1), DDE.

[2] 'An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis' report by Department of State, 27 January 1961, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 86, (LBJ), 4–6. For various interpretations of initial crisis events see: Alessandro Iandolo, 'Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961' *Journal of Cold War Studies,* Vol. 16, No. 2. (2014) pp:32-55; William Mountz, 'The Congo Crisis: A Reexamination (1960-1965)' *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa,* Vol. 5, No. 2, (2014), pp: 151-165; Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: U.N. Force in Action,* (California: Brookings Institute, 1965); Helen Kitchen, 'The Linchpin Gives Way: Revolt of the Force Publique' in Helen Kitchen (ed) *Footnotes to the Congo Story: An 'African Report' Anthology* (New York, Walker and Company, 1964) pp: 19-25; Robert Good, 'Four African Views of the Congo Crisis' ibid, pp: 45-59.

for nation-building[3] or for particular aspects thereof. In the timeframe of this study, Patrice Lumumba's assassination and the death of the second UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, have understandably accumulated the most focus.[4] There is also a burgeoning collection of literature that emphasises the Katangese secession and its repercussions for the UN, Belgium, and/or post-colonial nation-building elsewhere in Africa.[5]

Scholarship focused on Anglo-American relations in the Congo is more limited in nature and within what exists a broad trend has developed whereby the crisis is treated as prompting malaise within bilateral relations and periodic ferment at senior levels of UK and US government. The focus herein often centres upon Anglo-American policy discord as to how best reintegrate Katanga in December 1962; Kennedy's administration supported the UN mission, Operation Grandslam whereas Macmillan's government did not. For Alan James, this was 'little short of a diplomatic disaster' for Britain.[6] Likewise, John Kent argues that following Grandslam, American officials found more utility working alongside Belgian

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[3] See for instance, Reno, William, 'Congo: From state collapse 'absolutism', to state failure,' *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 27, No. 1, (2006), pp.43-56; John Kent, 'The Neo-colonialism of Decolonisation: Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* Vol. 45, No. 1. (2017) pp: 93-130.

[4] For work focused on Patrice Lumumba see: Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (London : Harvard University Press, 2015); Leo Zeilig, *Lumumba: Africa's Lost Leader* (London,: Haus Publishing, 2008); Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba,* (London:Verso, 2001); Rene Lemarchand, 'Patrice Lumumba in Perspective' in Helen Kitchen (ed) *Footnotes to the Congo Story,* pp:35-45.

For work on Hammarskjold see, Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjold?: The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa,* (London: C Hurst Publishers, 2011); Paul B Rich, 'The Death of Dag Hammarskjold, the Congolese Civil War, and decolonisation in Africa, 1960-1965) *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* Vol. 23, No. 2. (2012) pp: 352-375; David Gibbs, 'Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960-1: a Reinterpretation' *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies,* Vol. 31, No. 1, (1993) pp: 163-174; Rajeshwar Dayal, *Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[5] See for instance, Christopher Othen, *Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Wages War on the World: Katanga 1960-63* (Gloucester: History Press, 2015); Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes, 'Rethinking the Katangese Secession', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* Vol. 42, No. 4. (2014) pp: 741-761; David Gibbs, 'The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of 'impartiality': revisiting the Congo operation of 1960' *Cambridge University Press,* Vol. 38, No. 3, (2000) pp. 359-382. Alanna O'Malley, 'Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960-1' *The International History Review,* Vol. 37, No. 5, (2015) pp: 970-990.

[6] Alan James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1963* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) p. 195.
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officials rather than the British. Resultantly, in subsequent events and, especially, in the hostage crisis of 1964, Whitehall was 'classed with the French'- a phrase used to denote the UK's secondary and subservient role to Washington rather than its being actively involved in the formulation and implementation of Congo crisis policy-making.[7]

Set against this background, this chapter re-examines Anglo-American crisis management in the Congo and the subsequent handling of UK-US bilateral relations in five sections. The first section establishes the necessary context of the crisis. It sets the scene, details UK and US interests in the Congo and determines likely areas of UK and US policy coordination and discord therein. Sections Two, Three, Four, and Five then trace the formulation of UK and US policy in the Congo through crisis developments. Here, particular attention is placed on the impact of senior level administrational changeovers and Anglo-American flashpoints or alternatively, examples of UK-US cooperation that have been hitherto neglected in previous scholarship. Ultimately, this chapter acknowledges diverging UK and US crisis policies at the point of Operation Grandslam. Yet, it also argues that clear communication carried out by senior officials in Washington and Whitehall meant that Anglo-American relations did not suffer lasting malaise from these policy differences. Furthermore, and unlike many previous accounts have suggested, there was actually significant cooperation and burden sharing performed at all levels of UK and US government throughout the crisis.

Independence, Mutiny and Katanga's Secession: UK-US interests and considerations in the Congo

'I ask you unconditionally to respect the life and the property of your fellow citizens and of foreigners living in our country. If the conduct of these foreigners leaves something to be desired, our justice will be prompt in expelling them from the territory of the Republic; if, on the contrary, their conduct is good, they must be left in peace, for they also are working for our country's prosperity.'[8]

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[7] John Kent 'Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63: The not so Special Relationship' in Young et. al. (eds) *Britain in Global Politics,* Volume 2, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) pp: 133-135.

[8] Jean Van Lierde, (ed), *Lumumba speaks: The speeches and writings of Patrice Lumumba* 1958-1961 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp.220-1.

Patrice Lumumba's impromptu speech during the Congo's 30 June 1960 independence celebrations is renowned for laying before the world the tenuous post-colonial relations experienced between the Belgians and the Congolese. Delivered before state dignitaries and broadcast live on radio, reception of the Congolese Prime Minister's speech was unsurprisingly mixed. Baudouin Albert Charles, the King of Belgium was so infuriated that he had to be persuaded not to walk out of the ceremony altogether.[9] Resultantly, Benoit Verhaegem, a Belgian academic in the Congo declared the speech an 'unpardonable error.'[10] For revolutionary African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and human rights activists like Malcolm X, however, the speech fuelled further the drive towards African independence. For Malcolm X, Lumumba was subsequently deemed the 'greatest black man who ever walked the African continent.'[11] Yet, for the Congolese, Lumumba's concluding remarks bequeathed a lingering uncertainty of post-independence Congolese-Belgian relations. In acknowledgement of this unease, Ralph Bunche, the UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs purportedly noted a distinct lack of jubilation and an 'eerie calm' that lingered after the independence events.[12]

The Congolese were not politically, economically or socially prepared for independence. Immediately prior to the independence celebrations, the Congo was saddled already with a financial deficit equivalent to $50 million US dollars, boasted only 15 native University graduates and had experience neither of self-governance nor democracy.[13] Traditionally, responsibility for such disregard has been ascribed to Belgium's long-term 'paternalistic'

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[9] 'Toast to King' *Birmingham Daily Post,* 1 July 1960, p. 23; Lise Namikas, *Battleground Africa Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013) p.63; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (Doubleday Publishing: New York, 1964) p. 334.

[10] J. Willame, 'Du portrait au personage. La diabolisation symbolique de Patrice Lumumba dans La Libre Belgique' in Halen and Riez (eds), *Patrice Lumumba entre dieu et diable* (Editions L'Harmattan, 2000) p.193; Zeilig, *Lumumba,* p.100.

[11] Kwame Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo,* (Panaf Books: London, 1967) p.14; A. M. Babu, *The Future that works* (Africa World Press: Trenton, 2002) p. 66.

[12] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 63.

[13] Albert Disdier, 'Economic Prospects at Independence: Myths and Realities' in Kitchen, Helen (ed) *Footnotes to the Congo Story: An 'Africa Report' Anthology* (Walker and Company: New York) p. vii;), Robinson McIlvaine, Oral History, 7 July, 1978, DDE, p. 23.

governance over the Congo. [14] The region had been awarded to King Leopold II of Belgium as the 'Congo Free State' at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. After twenty-three years of what Madeleine Kalb refers to as 'unbridled exploitation and fabulous profits' of the Congo's rubber and ivory resources, international criticism eventually forced Leopold to yield his private domain.[15] The Belgian government subsequently acquired the region in 1908 for approximately 220 million Belgian francs and renamed it the 'Belgian Congo'.[16] Thereafter it was administrated by a 'colonial trinity' comprising of the colonial administration, foreign business and the Roman Catholic Church.[17] The latter provided one of the few unifying institutions in the country and brought some education to its citizens. In fact, the Congo had the best literacy rate in the sub-Saharan Africa.[18] Catholic missions however had trained pupils only for administrative participation in the workforce and had actively discouraged studies that did not fit with Belgium's economic needs.[19] It was not until the second quarter of the twentieth century that Catholic missions began to offer secondary education. Accordingly, by 1960, there were only two Universities in the Congo, the University of Lovanium in Leopoldville and the University of Elisabethville in Katanga. Even then however, Congolese students had been discouraged from studying courses like Politics and Law.[20]

For some, the manner of Belgium's withdrawal suggests a neo-colonial policy designed to preserve Belgian government and commercial interests following the Congo's formal award

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[14] Alan James, A. "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 3 (2000): 152–168.

[15] Madeleine, Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa-from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (Macmillan Publishing Co: New York, 1982) p. xxi.

[16] Gerard and Kuklick, *Death in the Congo,* p.8

[17] Olawale Olaopa and Victor Ojakorotu, 'Conflict about Natural Recourses and the Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) '*The Journal of Social Studies,* Vol. 49, No. 3. (2016), p. 247.

[18] Othen, *Katanga 1960-1963:* p. 27.

[19] Gerard and Kuklick (2015) *Death in the Congo,* 9.

[20] Ibid.

of independence.[21] There is some substance to these claims. The way in which the Congo's democratic edifices were established clearly left leeway for at least residual Belgian control. This is certainly true in terms of continuing Belgian business and mining rights in Katanga. The province was mineral rich and dominated economically by a Belgian Mining Company called Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), which supplied eighty percent of Katanga's revenues. Belgian colonists, most of whom were tied to the UMHK had been wary of the consequences the Congo's independence might bring. Foremost to Belgian concerns however, was that the Congo was a shareholder with voting powers within the UMHK. European countries consequently had to operate without the full powers that were usually accorded to boards of management. This arrangement had worked well during Belgium's colonial rule but there were concerns as to what would happen after independence. Therefore, the transfer of Belgium's economic rights in the Congo and their linkage to private Congo companies had been deliberately neglected within drafting of the *Loi Fundamentale* – the provisional constitution duly created by Belgian and Congolese elites in January and February 1960 – and left as a matter for future negotiation. [22]

Although Lumumba and the *Mouvement National Congolaise* (MNC) party won a plurality of votes in the Congo's first democratic elections in May 1960, the Belgians had also attempted to design the Congo's central government so as to discourage the country from falling under his leadership. Driven, charismatic, well-read, and thought to adhere to radical pan-Africanist ideology, the prospect of Lumumba's full control over the Congo caused extreme angst amongst Belgian colonists. Indeed, Lumumba had impressed Nkrumah and other like-minded leaders at the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, Ghana in December 1958 with his ability to work eighteen-hour days. By 1960, Lumumba had also been arrested twice; once in 1956 for embezzlement of the equivalent of $2 500 US dollars from the Post Office and again in 1959 for the disruption of peace – inciting an anti-colonial riot which had killed twenty-six people. In fact, Lumumba had only served six-months of his second stay in jail when he was released upon popular Congolese demand. Further

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[21] Olaopa and Ojakorotu, 'Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo', 247; Anne-Sophie Gijs, 'Fighting the red peril in the Congo': Paradoxes and perspectives on an equivocal challenge to Belgium and the West (1947-1960) *Cold War History,* Vol. 16. No. 3. (2016) p. 283.

[22] See for instance, G. E. Millard to Sir Roderick Barclay, 27 Feb 1964, FO 371/176725, UKNA; Summary- Round Table Conference on the Congo: January 20-February 20' 11 March, 1960, FO 371/146631, UKNA; Kent, 'Neocolonialism of Decolonisation'; pp: 96, 101.

enhancing his populist zeal, upon his discharge, he had delivered his first campaign speech barefoot and wearing his prison uniform. [23] For the Belgians, these considerations meant Lumumba's potential power had to be checked in government. Consequently, the Belgians selected Kasavubu, founder of the *Alliance des Bakongo* (Aboko) party, with responsibility for forming a Cabinet. It was only when Kasavubu was unable to garner enough Congolese political support to do so that Lumumba appointed himself as Prime Minister and Kasavubu, as President. Understandably, these developments served to initiate long-term tension within the Congolese political elite; relations between the two leaders were described as 'strained' and 'hostile' even during the independence celebrations. [24]

The speed at which the Congo's independence developed, coupled with the Congo's complex social structure, also served to complicate the independence process. Considered previously as a 'model colony' the Belgian government had initially conceived of a gradual shift towards Congolese independence. The resulting 'Ten-Year-Plan' adopted in 1950 had fittingly initiated major economic and industrial transformations in the Congo including improved public infrastructure and agricultural and industrial reforms.[25] However, such investment also inspired substantial demographic and social change, including a new 'autochthonous' culture and political organisations as the Congolese moved to burgeoning cities to work for new enterprises. For Belgium then, De Gaulle's announcement in 1958 of the neighbouring Republic of Congo's imminent independence came a few years too early. Inspired by this development, the swift onset of anti-colonial violence, riots, and protest in Leopoldville and other Congolese cities harried independence preparations considerably.[26] The Congo's social disunity, with over 200 mutually suspicious tribal groups complicated matters further. While the Aboko party in central Congo and Tshombe's party, *Confederation d'Associations Tribales du Katanga* (Conokat) vied for a Federal system of government which would have allowed for considerable regional autonomy, Lumumba's MNC party was steadfast in opposition. The result was a rather rushed compromise – a Legislature composed

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[23] Zeilig, *Lumumba,* pages 52-56,86; Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 173.

[24] For the quote see James, 'Congo Crisis', p.154. Also see, Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* 59.

[25] Reno, 'Congo: From state collapse' p. 45; Gijs, 'Fighting the red peril in the Congo' p. 278.

[26] Young, *Politics in the Congo,* p. xxi.

of a Chamber of Representatives and a Senate. This forced the already small and inexperienced political elite to divide itself further among several different echelons of government. [27]

Under these conditions, it is understandable how and why the crisis swiftly ensued. Fervent distrust and opposition between the Congo's leading political parties taken together with an untrained Congolese population, and the lingering Belgian colonial presence generated the heightened tension Bunche had perceptively recognised at the independence celebrations. In fact, it only took the infamous comment scribbled on a blackboard by army chief, General Émile Janssens that 'before independence = after independence' to provoke such indignation within the Congolese population and resentment amongst Congolese soldiers towards their Belgian officers to inspire the onset of crisis events on 5 July. [28] Moreover, although Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed for UN support on 12 July, neither leader would have realised the normal duration of time it takes for the UN to respond, nor for that matter, how long it takes to organise and facilitate an UN mission, especially given the relative inexperience of the organisation at the time.[29] On some levels then, the Congolese approach to the Soviet Union is also reasonable given that on 13 July, Belgian troops occupied the airport in Leopoldville and the Congolese leaders had yet to receive word from the UN.[30]

Also exacerbating tensions considerably was that Katanga's succession was partially driven by Belgian neo-colonial interests. Although the Belgian government officially rejected Tshombe's request for financial, technical and military support, the UMHK helped to underwrite Katanga's bid for independence. The company not only provided Tshombe with financial support but also organised the breakaway state, institutionally representing it in

[27] Othen, *Katanga,* pp. 31-32; Ritchie Calder, *Agony of the Congo*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1961) p. 127.

[28] Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 64; and De Witte, *Assassination of Lumumba*, 6.

[29] The ONUC was one of the UN's first military interventions. See for instance, Robert West, 'The United Nations and the Congo Financial Crisis: Lessons of the First Year' *International Organization,* Vol. 15, No. 4. (1961), pp: 603-617.

[30] Lawrence Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007) p. 38; and Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 68.

Brussels and recruiting a Belgian scholar to draft Katanga's new constitution.[31] From the perspective of the Central Congolese Government—and many other African states—Katanga's secession marked an effort by Western commercial interests to retain their neo-colonial position and thereby both impede the Congo's full independence and deny the state a major source of revenue.

Reaction to these crisis developments was broadly similar in Whitehall and Washington. The Congo's sheer size, ample mineral riches and central African location meant that both the UK and the US feared consequences that would flow either from the Congo's disintegration or it falling under unsympathetic African nationalist leadership. Located athwart key air and sea routes to the Far East, potential communist influence in the Congo threatened not only Western strategic interests in the region but also exposed the Catholic Church on account of its close association with the Belgian state. Soviet-bloc activity in Africa in the late 1950s, together with the Lumumba and Kasavubu's approach to Khrushchev, seemingly substantiated these fears. By December 1958 there were established Soviet diplomatic missions in Libya, Ethiopia and Sudan, and plans were afoot to establish a mission and diplomatic staff in Ghana.[32] There was also speculation surrounding Lumumba and the extent of his affiliations with the Soviet Union. Members of Eisenhower's National Security Council and Marion W Boggs, the Deputy NSC Executive Secretary in particular suspected that Lumumba had solicited Soviet economic backing to fund the MNC and secure both his release from prison and position in government. [33]

There were British and American economic interests to consider too, especially in Katanga and the bordering region of Kasai. In 1959, the Congo produced 9% of the West's copper, 49% of its cobalt, 69% of its industrial diamonds and 6.5% of its tin in addition to a variety of specialised metals used in the nuclear and electrical industry. Of this, three-quarters of

[31] 'Recognition of Katanga as independent' comment by Belgian PM, memo by African Department, 13 July 1960, FO 371/146659, UKNA; Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 66.

[32] Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club Conference Room, Bermuda, 23 March 1957, FRUS [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d18 (accessed 26/04/2017).

[33] 'Editorial Note' FRUS, Volume XIV, doc 106 [online] available from <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d106> (accessed 03/03/2019).

mining production came from Katanga and industrial diamonds from South Kasai.[34] Indeed, some 45% of UK investment in Congo was concentrated in Katanga, which included British firms such as Unilever, the British-American Tobacco Company and Shell Oil.[35] The single most important concern, though, was Tanganyika Concession (Tanks) – a London-based holding company that also had a 14.5% shareholding in the UMHK. According to Captain Charles Waterhouse, Chairman of Tanks and a member of the UMHK's board of directors, the UK's financial interest in the area was 'of the order of £180 million'.[36]

Although American investment in the Congo totalled less than $20 million in the early 1960s private American stakeholders were active in the region. American Metal Climax (AMAXX) for instance, owned 50.6% of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which alongside the Anglo-American Company, a multinational mining company with large stakes in Tanks, resided on the Copperbelt on the Rhodesian side of the border. In addition, by 1960, Lazard Frères, a New York investment house had approximately $500 000 invested into the UMHK, the Ryan-Guggenheim group held shares in jewel diamond mines in South Kasai and General Motors had its sole Congo distributorship in South Katanga.[37] Furthermore, given that Western Europe was almost entirely dependent upon Katangese and Rhodesian mines for its copper imports, interdependence assured that Washington had a vested interest in their continued stability. Indeed, any protracted closure of the UMHK or other mining companies in the region would have been considerably damaging not only economically but also to NATO.[38]

These considerations cumulatively stimulated Anglo-American agreement on three key objectives. First, both London and Washington needed to establish in the Congo a stable, united and independent government that was reasonably friendly with the West. Second, they

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[34] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy,* p.28.

[35] James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis,* p.31; Matthew Hughes, 'Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis, 1958-1965' *The International History Review,* Vol. 25, No. 3, (2003) p. 595.

[36] 'British Business Interests in the Katanga', report by E.B. Boothby, 20 July 1960, FO 371/146640, UKNA.

[37] Andrew Kamarck, *The Economics of African Development* (New York: Praeger, 1967) p.264-267; Weissman, *American Foreign Policy,* pp. 30-34

[38] Weissman, *ibid,* p.30.

needed to secure Katanga's reintegration into the Congo so as to dampen potential international criticism of Western neo-colonial policies in the Congo and ensure the CAF did not become militarily involved. Third, both countries needed to prevent the Congo from becoming an 'arena of Cold War competition,'[39] especially given Lumumba's potential Communist undertones. The UN was therefore seen as the best means to ensure these objectives and the *Operations des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC) was duly established on 14 July 1960.[40]

Beyond these shared objectives though, different levels of interest and responsibilities in, as well as varying historical experiences of the Congo, portended different preferences, priorities and capabilities within UK and US policy approaches. American officials for instance, were extremely ill-equipped to deal with the crisis. During WW2, the Belgian Congo has been the principal supplier of the West's uranium. Consequently, throughout and immediately after the war, US access to the Congo's strategic minerals like cobalt, uranium and cooper had been declared a national security priority. Yet, these interests had not been longstanding. Discovery of uranium in Canada and South Africa in the late 1950s had drawn Washington's interests elsewhere. [41] The upshot of all this was that US economic and defensive interests had not been translated into either diplomatic knowhow or investment in diplomatic infrastructure in the region. In preparation for the Congo's independence celebrations for instance, Eisenhower, upon learning that the country housed more than eighty political parties, admitted that he 'did not know that many people in the Congo could read.' [42]

Worse still for American ambassadorial officials in the Congo, the American Embassy was immensely ill-equipped for crisis management. The newly constructed building in

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[39] 'The Situation in the Congo' memo by African Department, 14 September 1960, FO 371/146644, UKNA; 'Washington Talking Points: Congo', brief by the Foreign Office, 20 March 1961, FO 371/154964, ibid.

[40] 'An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis' report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, p.8, LBJ.

[41] Statement of US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa, 19 January 1960, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central and East, DDE.

[42] Editorial Note, 101, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d101> (accessed 11/03/2019).

Leopoldville had been walled with glass. Though a fabulous display of architecture, US officials were rather horrified to realise when the crisis started that they could be seen clearly inside the building by rioters outside. In the first week of the crisis, a situation became rather precarious when Belgian tourists, who had taken refuge in the American Embassy started taking photographs of Congolese soldiers. The act provoked such aggression from the Congolese that American Embassy officials feared rioters would shatter the glass and storm the building. Tensions eventually subdued – American officials offered the demonstrators cigarettes in lieu of their ransacking the Embassy – but the State Department nevertheless received a stiff reminder from Leopoldville: 'Glass houses are vulnerable.'[43] Also telling of relative American unpreparedness, by 1960 the State Department did not have the ability to communicate directly with their American Ambassador in the Congo, Clare Timberlake. Rather, US messages from the Congo were sent via the US Embassy in Brussels. And even this process was problematic. In order to access transmitter signals strong enough to reach the Congo, US officials in Brussels had the 'ignominious' task of 'going over secretly to somebody's attic to make use of a 'ham radio operator' and subsequently relaying this information back to Washington.[44]

Meantime, although the British favoured an UN presence in the Congo, the plethora of colonial and domestic constraints upon the formulation of UK Congo crisis policy meant that Macmillan's government were much more limited than what might be expected in their ability to provide support. For a start, UN activities in the region threatened to set unwanted precedents for UK colonies elsewhere in Africa. This was complicated considerably by South Africa and some UK colonial states providing cautious diplomatic, economic and limited military support for Katanga's independence. This was in order to bolster white minority power in South and Central Africa, prevent anti-colonial counter-violence and guard against the Congo setting a precedent for UN intervention in Africa.[45]

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[43] 'Congo' n.d., Dulles, Eleanor Lansing Papers, 1880-1973, Box 52, Drafts: Belgian Congo (2), DDE.

[44] Oral History Interview with William A.M. Burden, January 20, 1968, Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), International Series, Box 25 (a), p. 25. DDE.

[45] Lazlo Passemiers, "Safeguarding White Minority Power: The South African Government and the Secession of Katanga, 1960-1963", *South African Historical Journal,* Vol. 68, No. 1, pp: 70–91.

Here though, the CAF's previously established close relations with Tshombe and the repercussions which might potentially flow from these were the UN to intervene militarily in Katanga presented the principal concern. As Northern Rhodesia and Katanga shared the 'copper belt border', the security of the UMHK and Tshombe's continued leadership were of great importance to the white-settler leadership of the CAF. The Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, sent regular letters to Macmillan and Lord Home arguing this point. In one such letter for instance, he informed Home that Tshombe was 'an implacable enemy of communism' and could be a 'very good friend to the West if only they showed him the slightest support and encouragement.'[46] In fact, throughout 1958 and 1959, the potential merger of Katanga into the CAF had been seriously deliberated by Tshombe and Welensky. [47] Although nothing at this point had come to fruition, now, Macmillan's government had every right to fear that harsh UN policies enacted against Katanga would push Welensky and Tshombe into a military alliance. This would have created an incredibly powerful and autonomous copper belt region, upset CAF independence plans and caused considerable embarrassment to the UK's regional reputation and prestige. [48]

There were also influences of strong pro-Katanga forces within UK domestic politics to consider, particularly within the Conservative party and with which Welensky and Waterhouse maintained strong relations. Indeed, Waterhouse who was previously a Conservative member of parliament sent frequent letters to Foreign Office officials and repeatedly emphasised the importance of ensuring the UMHK's continued stability and that forced entry into Katanga by UN forces would jeopardise the investments of many British stakeholders.[49] Additional UK members on the Union Minière's board of directors included Sir Uleck Alexander and Lord Selbourne, both of whom were members of the Conservative Rhodesia Lobby.[50] There were other Conservative party members with private interests in the

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[46] Letter from Sir Roy Welensky to Lord Home, West and Central African Department, 21 April 1961, FO 371/154954, UKNA.

[47] Hughes, 'The Congo Crisis', p. 598.

[48] substitute for MS. Macmillan dep, d 46, 5 August 1962, MMS, Oxford Bodleian Libraries, Macmillan dep; Harold Macmillan diary note, 5 August 1962, cited in, Horne, *Harold Macmillan,* 405.

[49] 'British Business Interests in the Katanga', report by E.B. Boothby, 20 July 1960, FO 371/146640, UKNA.

[50] Hughes, 'Fighting for White Rule in Africa', p.595.

CAF too. For instance, John Fare, founder of the Conservative Commonwealth Council and Minister of State for Colonial Affairs from 1955 to 1956 was a smallholder in a farming syndicate in Southern Rhodesia. Lord Selbourne was also involved in this venture alongside two prominent members of the Rhodesia Lobby; Lord Salisbury and Lord De La Warr.[51]

Links between the Conservative party, Tanks, Union Minière and the CAF also led to the establishment of the Katanga Lobby in July 1960 which, from 1961, also drew considerable support from the Monday Club. Prominent members of the former also included Waterhouse, Lords Selbourne and Salisbury, Lords Alexander and Clitheroe- both Conservative Privy Councillors and a member of Tanks. These policy constraints cumulatively placed Macmillan's government in an awkward position. Though the government appeared to have the ability to apply significant pressure on Belgium and Tshombe via the use of economic and political contacts in Tanks, Katanga and the CAF, in reality the government was exceedingly limited in supporting policies that went beyond securing peaceful measures of conflict resolution.

British and American officials consequently operated within subtly different frames, even if their overall objectives were broadly aligned. Lacking both experience of Congo and diplomatic infrastructure there, Washington was predisposed to rely on the UN to achieve political stability and Belgian withdrawal. This approach also enabled the US to avoid a choice between being identified with European metropolitan policies or championing anti-colonialism at the expense of important European allies' interests. Whitehall also supported the ONUC in the Congo but for different reasons. Any unilateral UK military action, even if feasible, would consume dwindling British resources and be represented easily by critics as an imperial defence of British interests in the CAF. At the same time, though, British support for UN action would have to be calibrated to avoid stirring opposition in the CAF and Northern Rhodesia and on the Conservative party backbenches.

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[51] Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization,* p.99.

What to do with Lumumba? Anglo-American Cooperation under Eisenhower and Macmillan

Whitehall's and Washington's different policy positions were immediately played out in negotiation of the first UN mandate. This mandate called on Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorised Hammarskjold to take the necessary steps in consultation with the Congolese government to provide UN military and technical assistance until 'the national security forces…may be able…to meet fully their tasks.'[52] Whereas Eisenhower's administration voted in favour of the mandate on 14 July 1960, Macmillan's government thought the mandate too critical of Belgium and feared that it would set unwanted precedents for British African colonies elsewhere. Resultantly, Britain abstained from voting for the mandate alongside China and France.[53]

Nevertheless, and as has been noted in previous literature, American and British differences demonstrated in the passing of the first ONUC mandate were a portent of differences to come rather than rather than a cause of immediate upset in Anglo-American relations. The general scholarly consensus here is that more significant developments in the crisis helped to paper over Anglo-American differences until Kennedy's administration assumed power in 1961.[54] As will be detailed below, this is valid to some degree. Neglected within these arguments however is that close communication shared between British and American officials at the UN Headquarters in New York, and through the State Department and Foreign Office also meant that both sides remained well informed and accepting of the different considerations and pressures their counterparts faced.[55]

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[52] 'An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis' report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, p.9, LBJL.

[53] Note that this was Guomindang China that abstained. Brief by the Foreign Office, 14 July 1960, FO 371/146769, UKNA.

[54] See for instance, Alanna O'Malley, "'What an awful body the UN have become!!': Anglo-American-UN relations during the Congo Crisis, February-December 1961', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 1. (2016) pp: 26-46. Kalb, *Congo Cables,* p. 13; Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 73; James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, pp: 64-77.

[55] For observations of UK and US efforts to concert their Congo policy see Telegram from Sir H. Caccia in Washington to Foreign Office, 14 July 1960, FO 371/146683, UKNA.

For a start, the speed at which the crisis developed coupled with bureaucratic infighting, lack of African policy contingency planning and poor American diplomatic infrastructure in the Congo resulted in Ambassador Timberlake taking the lead in the establishment of the initial US crisis policy. Indeed, the American Ambassador in Belgium, William Burden, recalls in his Oral History a 'complete lack of coordination between the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs when negotiating Washington's initial Congo crisis policy.[56] According to Burden, although the Bureau of European Affairs were responsible for policies that involved Belgium, the department had little power in the formulation of Washington's Congo policy because Foy David Kohler, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, did not work well with Secretary of State Herter nor Eisenhower.[57] Likewise, the Bureau of African Affairs carried less weight within the State Department due in part to its relatively new formation and also because the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, had only limited experience of Africa.[58]

Meantime, recognising that Belgium's unilateral militarily intervention would be perceived negatively by the Congolese and also internationally, Timberlake shrewdly assessed Whitehall and Washington's rather limited policy options. A 'do nothing' policy was unrealistic given Lumumba and Kasavubu's appeal to Khrushchev and that both the UK and the US wanted to 'keep the [Russian] bears out of the Congo caviar'.[59] Likewise, the rapid unfurling of the crisis meant that African countries were unlikely to offer neither military nor economic support quickly enough to justify limiting crisis mediation to African states. UN involvement was therefore the only remaining option. Resultantly, Timberlake is said to have raced through 'restless and angry groups of people' on the back of a bakery truck to meet Lumumba and Kasavubu at Leopoldville airport. Upon arrival, he informed the Congolese leaders that the best way to ensure international support was to appeal directly to the UN and request for 'technical assistance'. Here, the phrasing was all-important; technical assistance

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[56] William Burden, Oral History Interview, p. 17, DDE.

[57] Ibid, p. 17

[58] Prior to acquiring this position, he had served as the US Ambassador in Ceylon and Burma. James, Hubbard, *The United States and the end of British Colonial Rule in Africa,* (New York: McFarland & Company Inc, 2010) pp. 153-154.

[59] Belgium (Burden) to State, quoting Timberlake, 9 July 1960, *FRUS* 1958-1960, vol.14, p.287.

would keep the operation within the competence of the Secretary-General and away from a potential Security Council vote which would undoubtedly delay the mission and where a potential veto threatened to derail assistance entirely.[60] Timberlake's rather astute decision making therefore not only drove crisis events – Lumumba and Kasavubu made a suitable appeal to the UN the following day – but also effectively established Washington's initial policy in Congo. Timberlake's actions were duly affirmed at the highest of diplomatic levels. Upon learning of the developments, Eisenhower confirmed 'we are always willing to do our duty through the UN.'[61]

Throughout this period, officials in Whitehall remained well informed of the circumstances Timberlake faced and supported his stance. Macmillan personally informed the House of Commons on 14 July that the implementation of an UN mission in the Congo was by 'far the best way of helping the situation.' [62] Also telling of British support for the ONUC was that Macmillan's government voted in favour and alongside the US for resolutions passed on 22 July and 8 August. The latter is particularly noteworthy as it was contentious for European metropoles. Its call upon Belgium to 'withdraw <u>immediately</u> its troops from the Province of Katanga' drew abstentions from metropolitan powers including France and Italy. [63]

Therefore, initial UK and US differences in the Congo were caused primarily by the particular circumstances each country faced rather than by any fundamental difference about objectives. In response to Tshombe's declaration of Katanga's secession, Welensky had publicly declared the CAF government's right to 'use their force in any way which would best serve the interests of the peoples of the Federation.' [64] The problem, as Macmillan relayed it to his government, was that the UN mandate asked for a withdrawal of Belgian

[60] 'The Congo-Necessary Steps' 29 April 1965, Eleanor Lansing Papers, Box 52, Drafts: Belgian Congo (1), DDE.

[61] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter' 12 July 1960, FRUS [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d117 (accessed 30/04/2017).

[62] 'Congo (United Nations Resolution)' HC Deb, 14 July 1960, vol. 626, cc1602-6.

[63] 'United Kingdom votes on the Congo at the United Nations' FO Minute, 24 November 1960, FO 371/146784 UKNA.

[64] "Sir Roy to Britain: 'Not Your Concern', 12 July 1960, *Birmingham Daily Post*.

forces without also establishing that the ONUC would first be in a position so to safeguard the country. [65] Potential Belgian military withdrawal without an UN presence thus risked direct CAF intervention into the crisis in defence of political and economic interests in Katanga. As responsibility in this event for an intervention would still be ascribed to Whitehall, this was a potential scenario that Macmillan's government felt they had to prevent as best possible.[66]

However, as previous literature has also noted, developments in the Congo also served to draw British and American positions closer together. On 17 July, Lumumba and Kasavubu delivered an ultimatum to Bunche stating that if the UN did not discharge the Belgian military mission within seventy-two hours the Congolese would be 'obliged to call on the Soviet Union to intervene.' [67] The ultimatum was dropped upon the establishment of the ONUC mission but the damage was done. The US Embassy in Leopoldville concluded that Kasavubu was 'under [Lumumba's] thumb' and was not himself a threat to US interests. [68] Lumumba though was perceived differently. US Chief of Station in the Congo, Larry Devlin recalls that although there was no reason to believe Lumumba was a Soviet agent or even a communist, he was still 'too close to the Soviet Union and its allies for comfort.'[69] On 21 July, the NSC went further characterising Lumumba as a 'Castro or worse.'[70]

Interpretation of Lumumba in Macmillan's government was slower to evolve. On 19 July for instance, the British Ambassador to Leopoldville, Sir Ian Scott, promptly warned the Foreign

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[65] 'Congo (United Nations Resolution)' HC Deb, 14 July 1960, vol. 626, cc1602-6.

[66] 'Use of Central African Federation Forces' HL Deb 14 July 1960 vol 225 cc287-8.

[67] 'Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State' 18 July 1961, FRUS [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d132 (accessed 09/03/2017).

[68] See footnote four in, Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 18 July 1960, FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d132 (accessed 09/03/2017).

[69] Devlin, Larry, *Chief of Station, Congo,* p.25.

[70] Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 July 1960 [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d140 (accessed 20/11/2017).

Office of the American's tendency to partake in rash decision making. Focused on Timberlake in particular, Scott cautioned:

> 'He sees things black and white and is convinced Lumumba is mad…Lumumba is not mad. He is an astute politician likely to become an extreme African Nationalist. He has not slept properly for two months and is frustrated generally by the course of events which he had been unable to control'.[71]

On 1 August, Khrushchev responded to the Congolese request. The first Soviet ambassador, Mikhail D. Yakovlev was appointed to Leopoldville and in a public statement made in *Pravda,* the Soviet Union duly promised large-scale economic assistance including technicians on a bilateral basis and threatened military action 'In the event of aggression against the Congo continuing'. [72] Cumulatively, these developments sensitised Whitehall's perception of Lumumba at the highest of diplomatic levels. On 6 August, Macmillan wrote in his diary, '[T]he great dangers now is that the Congolese extremists (Lumumba and co) will try to defy the U.N. forces…and call in Russian or Russian satellite troops.'[73]

A convergent Anglo-American threat perception of Lumumba was fundamental for the British and American crisis policy coordination that subsequently followed. First, Washington's preferred policy position on Katanga reflected more clearly that of Whitehall's. Despite the Secretary of State Herter's initial decision on 16 July that the US would not support Katanga's bid for independence, Lumumba's direct appeal to the Soviet Union forced Eisenhower's administration to hedge its bets rather than simply ride traditional US anti-colonialism. This did not necessarily equate however, as has been previously suggested, to the Eisenhower administration still having 'an eye on following its European allies.'[74] US

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[71] Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 19 July 1960, FO 371/146639, UKNA.

[72] C.t in Kalb, *Congo Cables,* 41.

[73] Macmillan, c.t in Catterall, *The Macmillan Diaries,* p.320.

[74] Kent, 'Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo', p. 108.

records make clear the administration's determination to prevent a militant and / or independent Katangese leadership as well as to combat Lumumba.[75]

Early in the crisis, the American Ambassador in Belgium, William Burden, had advocated an independent Katanga as a potential policy option – albeit that the State Department considered this proposal so dangerous that G. Mennan 'Soapy' Williams, upon becoming Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in Kennedy's administration, requested that the document be burned.[76] With the crisis deepening, more officials in Eisenhower's administration came to view Katanga as a potential solution to the Congo crisis. For example, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans and Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon speculated in August 1960 whether Tshombe's efforts to assimilate other areas of the Congo might be quietly supported as a step toward reorganising the country into a loose confederation. To do so at this stage was less politically dangerous to the US given that Belgian troop withdrawals were diminishing the impression of Tshombe being a puppet of colonial interests. In addition, Katanga offered a potential bulwark in the event that Congo disintegrated or fell under Soviet influence. As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles advised the NSC in 1960, if the assets of Katanga could be retrained, then the economy of the Congo could be throttled and the Soviets left with a very expensive and difficult task in maintaining the rest of the Congo as a viable asset.[77]

For both Macmillan's government and Eisenhower's administration then, the ideal solution remained a united Congo under pro-western leadership and this was still the publicly maintained line. Privately, though, both governments had become sceptical that this was feasible under existing circumstances and their focus turned upon Lumumba. Their broad shared premise became 'there was no Katanga problem between Tshombe and Kasavubu…only with Lumumba.'[78]

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[75] Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 10 November 1960, Minutes of Special Group Meetings, US National Security Council Records, Presidential Records, Intelligence Files 1953-61, Box 1, DDE.
[76] Burden, Oral History, p.38, DDE.

[77] 456th Meeting of the NSC, August 18, 1960, Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, NSC Series Box 13, DDE.

[78] Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, 26 August 1960, FRUS, [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d190> (accessed 29/10/2016).

To date, much scholarly attention has been paid to the roles that US, Belgian and UN officials played in Lumumba's political downfall. Timberlake and various Belgian officials, for instance, are said to have worked fervidly to convince Kasavubu of the importance in overthrowing Lumumba.[79] These efforts paid partial dividends when on 5 September, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba over the radio and subsequently accorded Joseph Ileo, President of the Senate, powers to establish a new Congolese government.[80] However, this plan was immediately rendered obsolete. According to Lise Namikas, Lumumba simply waited until the Congolese President had gone to sleep before using the same radio channels to dismiss Kasavubu and call upon the Chamber of Representatives to select a new Congolese leader.[81] On 14 September 1960, Belgian, US and UN officials therefore initiated a second two-pronged approach to un-seat Lumumba. First, military colonel, Joseph Mobutu seized control of the Congo, neutralised the governing powers of Kasavubu, Lumumba and Ileo, and gave Soviet officials forty-eight hours' notice to leave the Congo.[82] Meantime, CIA agent Sydney Gottlieb, also referred to as 'Doctor Death' or 'Joe from Paris', flew to Leopoldville with orders to leave poison ready for a future 'hit' on Lumumba.[83] The latter ultimately proved unnecessary though as Lumumba was captured, imprisoned, and killed by Mobutu's forces in January 1961.[84] Devlin admits to jettisoning the poison in the Congo River.[85]

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[79] For Timberlake's conversations with Kasavubu see Kalb, *Congo Cables,* p.52, 61, 64-66. For Belgian efforts to work with Kasavubu see Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba,* p.18-26.

[80] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p.97.

[81] Lumumba used the same radio channels to dismiss Kasavubu and subsequently called upon the Chamber of Representatives to charge Kasavubu with exceeding his powers in the *Loi Fundamentale.* Ibid, p.97.

[82] According to Namikas, Hammarskjöld issued a release for $1 million to pay soldiers and win their loyalty to Mobutu. Belgium also provided approximately $400 000 for coup. Ibid., p.106. Also see, Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba,* p.42-51; Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo,* p.95-99.

[83] 'The Congo' by H.F.T. Smith, 28 September 1960, FO 371/146650, UKNA.

[84] For a detailed account of Lumumba's demise, see Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba.*

[85] Kalb, *Congo Cables,* p.100-102.

Somewhat surprisingly, the extant literature has completely neglected to mention UK knowledge or indeed, sanction of these plans. Upon determining that Lumumba posed the principal threat to Anglo-American interests in the Congo, officials at the UK Embassy in Leopoldville and at the UN were advised to coordinate their activities closely with their American counterparts.[86] Archival records make clear that the British Ambassador in Leopoldville, Ian Scott at least acted upon these instructions and became actively involved in contingency planning discussions with Timberlake and Belgian officials. For example, a telegram sent on 28 September briefed Foreign Office officials of a meeting with Timberlake in which they had discussed previously attempted and subsequently failed plans to overthrow Lumumba: 'we have been through all possibilities envisaged therein, namely a civil coup d'état by President Kasavubu [and] a military coup d'état by Colonel Mobutu…with M. Lumumba continuing to ride it out, although now in a very tight circle indeed.'[87] Another telegram on 27 September reveals also that two UK contingency plans prepared by Foreign Office officials had been sent to Scott for further discussion with Timberlake. One plan proposed arresting Lumumba for 'treason', the other dispatching him abroad as a Congolese Ambassador.[88]

Perhaps even more startling is that British officials were aware of and may have quietly supported Washington's assassination plans. In fact, on the document detailing the two UK contingency plans that were sent for US discussion on the 27 September, there is also a hand-written note scribbled by H.F. T. Smith from the African Department which reads: 'There is much to be said for eliminating Lumumba…'[89] However, it is discussions shared at the highest levels of British and American government that are most revealing of shared UK-US preferences when it came to fate of the Congolese Prime Minister. On 19 September, Eisenhower confessed to Home that he wished 'Lumumba would fall into a river of crocodiles.' Home's response was equally sanguinary. The best way to deal with Lumumba,

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[86] Telegram from Foreign office to Leopoldville, 10 September 1960, FO 371/146643, UKNA.

[87] Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 27 September 1960, PREM 11/2885, ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] 'The Congo' by H.F.T. Smith, 28 September 1960, FO371/146650, UKNA.

Home suggested, might be to test out 'the techniques of old-fashioned diplomacy.'[90] Of course, the conversation may have been tongue-and-cheek as no further plans were recorded in the meeting. Yet, another telegram sent by Home to Eisenhower on 26 September was more direct and revealed no indication of jest or jibe: 'now is the time to get rid of Lumumba.'[91] That 'Doctor Death' arrived in Leopoldville just a few days later stretches the credulity of coincidence.

At this stage of the crisis, there was now much more to Anglo-American exchange than an agreement to disagree with the passing of the first UN mandate in the Congo. The different voting preferences during the first ONUC mandate were recognised as a product of particular UK and US circumstances in the region. The US were unprepared and unwilling to deal unilaterally with crisis events and wanted to avoid identification with European neo-colonial policies. Conversely, the UK had responsibilities in the CAF and Macmillan's government was susceptible to individuals with considerable interests in maintaining Katanga's political and economic stability. Nevertheless, Anglo-American crisis policies remained broadly similar and British and American officials were not only appreciative of the constraints and considerations their transatlantic counterparts experienced but also actively sought to coordinate policy around these obstacles. Resultantly, despite some differences, there was little indication during the initial stages of the crisis for policy discord or breakdown in Anglo-American relations.

Operation Morthor, Canberra Bombs and Operation Grandslam: Evolving Policy Divergence under Macmillan and Kennedy

Scholarship generally treats handling by the Macmillan government and Kennedy administration of the Congo crisis as demonstrating growing tension and culminating in a breakdown of relations in December 1962 at the Nassau Summit and / or with the onset of Operation Grandslam. Reasoning here is usually ascribed to the different frames through which American and British officials perceived crisis events and the different, often discordant, crisis policies that were developed consequently in Whitehall and Washington. These claims are not without substance. As detailed in Section One, varying levels of interest

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[90] Conversation between President Eisenhower and Foreign Secretary Lord Home, 19 September 1960, Editorial Note, FRUS, Africa, 1958-1960, p. 496.

[91] Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 28 September 1960, DDE Diaries, Box 53, DDE.

in, and responsibilities for the Congo meant that American and British officials were predisposed to perceive UN activities there differently, especially concerning securing Katanga's reintegration. As such, this section traces Whitehall's and Washington's evolving differences in the Congo and, in accordance with the extant literature, to examine afresh the growing emotions experienced in both Macmillan's government and Kennedy's administration from January 1961 through to the onset of Operation Grandslam in December 1962.

When President John F Kennedy assumed office in January 1961 the Congo was in the midst of a political leadership crisis which threatened both Washington's political prestige and the credibility of the UN in Africa. The Congo still did not have a constitutionally recognised government. Kasavubu had convened a Round Table of Congolese leaders following Mobutu's September 1960 coup d'etat but the meetings had not produced consensus as to who would serve as the Congo's new Prime Minister. [92] Although Lumumba was already deceased, public perception was that the Congolese leader was still imprisoned. This was a cause of much disappointment and frustration for Afro-Asian nationalists and who in turn accused the US and the ONUC of supporting Belgian neo-colonial interests in the crisis. Threats were also made by countries including Guinea, UAR, Morocco and Indonesia to withdraw their military contributions from the ONUC. This was not an inconsequential risk for the UK and US given that 82.4% of ONUC forces came from Afro-Asian states and that collectively the most important contributing states – India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia and Ghana – provided 61.2% of total ONUC forces. [93]

In addition, Lumumba's assassination did not offer the automatic solution to the Katangese succession for which Eisenhower's administration and Macmillan's government had previously hoped. [94] On 15 December 1960, Antoine Gizenga, President of a pro-Lumumba

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[92] 'Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo', Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, JFKL.

[93] Ibid.; Ernest Lefever, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960-1964: An Analysis of political, executive and military control* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1966) p. 22-23.

[94] Currently, there is no consensus as to when Kennedy was informed of Lumumba's death. Lumumba's return to power continued to be debated within Kennedy's administration into mid-January 1961. First reports indicated suspicions of Lumumba's death emerged in 17 January 1961 but the official announcement of Lumumba death was made on 13 February. Special National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, FRUS , [online] available from <

political party in Stanleyville called the *Parti Solidaire African,* a left-wing political party that enjoyed strong support among the rural regions in Kwango and Kwilu, proclaimed himself to represent the lawful government of the Congo. Resulting US intelligence reports suspected that this statement was probably designed to encourage diplomatic recognition and material aid from the Soviet and the Afro-Asian blocs.[95] This support duly arrived when Kennedy was in office. In late January 1961, pro-Lumumba Afro-Asian states gathered at the Casablanca conference and called for the transfer of Casablanca troops from the ONUC to Gizenga.[96] By early February, China and Cuba had also formally recognised Gizenga's authority in the Congo. Additionally, Gizenga had sent requests to Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, leader of the German Democratic Republic for military aid. He subsequently used German and Soviet-provided artillery to launch attacks on Northern Katanga, forcing Tshombe to rely increasingly on open Belgian assistance to maintain the secession.[97]

In response to the heightened crisis, the new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, summoned influential individuals within the 'Africanist' division of the State Department – Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs, Harlan Cleveland, US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson and Kennedy's Ambassador-at-large, Averell Harriman – to develop a new Congo policy unbound by precedents set by Eisenhower's administration.[98] The result was a 'New' policy centred upon three objectives. The first called for a strengthened UN mandate which would give the ONUC authority to bring under control all principal military elements in the Congo and thereby neutralise the role of Congolese forces in the country. Under this new mandate, the UN would also be expected to increase its efforts to prevent all outside military

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d2> (accessed 27/11/2016); ibid, Editorial Note, [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d6> (accessed 27/11/2016); JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General, 1/61-4/61, Statement by US Representative in Security Council, 13 February 1961.
[95] Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President, 15 December 1960, White House Office files, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol II (7), DDE.

[96] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p.123.

[97] Telegram from Havana to the Foreign Office, 5 February 1961, FO 371/154928, UKNA; Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Counties, Congo General 1/61-4/61, JFKL.

[98] Ibid; Also see, Harlan Cleveland, Oral History p. 2, JFKL.

assistance from entering the Congo. Second, with the Afro-Asians at the forefront, the UN was to have a greater administrative role in the Congo. The overarching goal was to reorient the US position such that it would have the support of 'principal segments of opinion in Africa and Asia.'[99] Third, there needed to be a broadly-based Congolese government. This meant pressing Kasavubu to increase his efforts to establish a cabinet government that was broadly acceptable to the Congolese but held no precepts of potential radicalisation and of strengthening US efforts to sponsor the appointment of a suitable Prime Minister. [100]

These shifts in American policy caused immediate apprehension within Macmillan's government. With Lumumba gone, Foreign Office preference was to encourage further Congolese and African discussions so the crisis could be resolved independent of an unwarranted Western or UN presence. Potential that hard-lined UN policies would be used to secure Katanga's reintegration in the Congo was particularly worrisome. This would likely provoke Welensky to retaliate using Rhodesian mercenary forces. Moreover, expectation that Britain would publicly back and provide economic and military support for ONUC military operations in the Congo threatened to incite the Conservative backbenches. This consideration was not inconsequential. Given their small parliamentary majority at the time, stalwart domestic opposition to ONUC activities in the Congo could potentially topple Macmillan's government. On 15 February, Scott thus shared with the Foreign Office his opinion that Washington's 'New' policy, especially an increased ONUC military presence in the Congo, was 'deluded' and threatened a disservice to Western presence in Africa. The Congolese, after all, maintained a particular 'resistance to being pushed around' by Western powers.[101] Consequently, upon Whitehall's reception of the American's new Congo policy, Rusk and his State Department received a clear cautionary message from E.B. Boothby of the Foreign Office. The British 'entirely agree[d] on the objectives' of the Kennedy administration's policy. Indeed, officials in Washington still wanted to ensure Katanga's reintegration and to safeguard a Western presence in the Congo. However, Boothby also

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[99] Ibid.

[100] The Analytical Chronology Report perhaps best demonstrates that the Kennedy administration's focus on the 'Katanga Issue' was initiated in August 1961, after 'Efforts to Achieve Unity: March 1961-July 1961' 'Congo Chronology' National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo General, p. 25-32, JFKL.

[101] Telegram Scott to Foreign Office, 15 February 1961, FO 371/154939, UKNA.

anticipated 'dangers' for Anglo-American relations concerning the desired methods of the 'American purpose.' [102]

Much like with initial crisis events, British and American differences were brought immediately to the fore through a proposed resolution at the UN Security Council. News of Lumumba's assassination in late February had angered the Afro-Asian states. Their resulting February 1961 proposal, which was led by Egyptian President Nasser, suggested that the ONUC ought to have the right to use force 'if necessary, in last resort' to prevent civil war.[103] Macmillan's government had immediate concerns about the phrasing of the resolution. It did not clearly lay out Hammarskjold's responsibilities for implementing military force, did not mention that the UN's main purpose was to uphold the Congo's sovereignty and independence and did not prohibit outside military assistance from entering the crisis. There were apprehensions, too, that the resolution undermined Kasavubu's residual authority in the Congo and that backing the proposals would isolate the Belgians at the UN. The initial position within the Foreign Office therefore, was to abstain from the vote. On 18 February, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Harold Caccia was duly instructed to pressure Rusk either for an American abstention, or for the US to make necessary amendments to the resolution. Rusk's response was disheartening. Officials in Kennedy's administration were not entirely satisfied with the resolution's phrasing either. However, given the emotional atmosphere in the UN and that moderate countries like Nigeria, India and Tunisia supported the proposals, the resolve in Washington was to support the resolution. Upon receiving this news, and despite the continued protests of the British Representative at the UN, Sir Patrick Dean, this time Macmillan's government rather begrudgingly kept quiet and supported the resolution too. [104]

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[102] Telegram Foreign Office to Washington, n.d, 1961, ibid.

[103] FRUS, Editorial Note, 20-21 February 1961 [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d34 (accessed 28/11/2016).

[104] Sir Patrick Dean especially believed it was better if the UN effort in the Congo ended entirely. See for instance, Telegram Foreign Office to Washington, 18 February 1961, FO 371/155081, UKNA; Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 18 February 1961, ibid; Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 22 February 1961, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d35> (accessed 28/11/2016). FRUS, Editorial Note, 20-21 February 1961 [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d34 (accessed 28/11/2016).

Contrary to the opinion of some scholars, these acknowledged differences did not immediately spell discord for Anglo-American relations.[105] Despite Kennedy's determination to develop a Congo policy that was clearly distinct from his predecessor's, pro-Western Congolese leadership remained Washington's primary concern and Gizenga's ties with the Soviet-bloc were thus problematic. In a search for alternatives, there was an initial flirtation with Joseph Ileo, member of the MNC party who had assumed in principle the Congo's Prime Ministerial role after a second Round Table Conference in January 1961. However, although Ileo had been strongly opposed to Lumumba, his style of leadership was regarded as being too weak by officials in Washington. It appears that the CIA subsequently spent $23 000 to strengthen the political position of Cyrille Adoula, who was aligned with a pro-Western Binza group and whom Devlin recalls as having assisted US attempts in early September 1960 to remove Lumumba via a no-confidence vote.[106] Ultimately, US efforts paid dividends when Adoula was selected as Prime Minister at the Lovanium gathering in August 1961.[107]

Records do not indicate active British involvement in the formation of Adoula's government. Nevertheless, Washington kept their UK counterparts well informed of their progress and of State Department updates on Gizenga. Meantime, officials in Macmillan's government continued to burden share crisis responsibilities with the Americans and strove to sustain the Congo's fragile political and societal stability. As the British suspected, the Security Council resolution of 20-21 February was poorly received by the Congolese. Perception that the resolution requested the immediate disarmament of the ANC, and a direct transferal of the Congo's sovereignty to the ONUC under a UN trusteeship, resulted in riots and

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[105] See for instance, O'Malley, 'Congo crisis' p. 34; James, *Congo crisis,* p.73.

[106] At the July 1961 Lovanium gathering, where the Congolese leaders gathered to elect a new government, the CIA reportedly spent $23 000 in order to strengthen Adoula's position during the closed meetings. Editorial Note, Volume XX, Congo crisis, Document 71, FRUS, [online] available from (accessed October 20, 2016); Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 28 April 1961, Ibid. [online] available from https://history.state.gov/histor icaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d62 (accessed March 9, 2017). For an indication of Adoula's political opposition to Lumumba see Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 70.

[107] Editorial Note, Volume XX, Congo crisis, Document 71, ibid. [online] available from (accessed October 20, 2016); Ibid., Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 28 April 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/histor icaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d62 (accessed March 9, 2017). For an indication of Adoula's political opposition to Lumumba see Devlin, *Chief of Station*, Congo, 70.

demonstrations across the country. Moreover, without suitable diplomatic resources at their disposal, the Americans found themselves struggling to correct Congolese misperceptions.[108] Scott though, was well positioned and sought to impress upon Kasavubu and other like-minded Congolese leaders the positive intentions of the UN's continued presence. This was especially important in March 1961 when the US Embassy in Leopoldville unexpectedly lost its principal source of expertise and influence with Congolese officials and particularly Kasavubu. During a particularly turbulent week with riots and demonstrations rampant across the Congo, Clare Timberlake acted independently of State Department orders and rerouted a US Atlantic Fleet so to avoid them coming into harbour in the Congo's Matadi port. Records do not reveal why the Fleet had been sent. Nevertheless, Congolese fighting in the region was such that Timberlake had feared for the American's safety. However, upon Kennedy and State Department officials learning of his actions, the Ambassador had been immediately removed from his post. Scott effectively filled the consequent vacuum until the Kennedy administration could appoint and dispatch a new Ambassador. [109]

It was in late August that, with Adoula's pro-Western government secured and Gizenga's potential Communist threat seemingly squared away, Kennedy's administration turned their attention to the Katanga problem. Thereafter, British and American officials found themselves and their resulting crisis policies running up against each other with increased pace and frustration.

The successful passage of the Security Council resolution proposed in February 1961 enabled Hammarskjold to approve two ONUC operations in Katanga in late August and early September 1961. The first came on 28 August, with a surprise military campaign against Belgian officers and Katangan troops, codenamed Operation Rumpunch. The initial outcome

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[108] Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 13 March 1961, ibid [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d49> (accessed 18/11/2018).

[109] Due to the uncertainty of events in Leopoldville, on 5 March, Timberlake rerouted Task Force 88 of the Atlantic fleet without consultation with the State Department nor Department of Defence. A subsequent State Department memorandum of action concludes that: 'a decision with serious foreign policy implications was made by a person at the field level without any prior consultation with Washington.' See for instance, Memorandum for Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence, 5 March 1961, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Congo General 1/61-4/61, JFKL; Report on Congo Task Force and Steering Committee Activities, 29 March 1961, ibid.

was seemingly positive. The surprise nature of the attack caught Tshombe off-guard and he agreed to comply immediately with UN requests and reintegrate Katanga with the Congo once the operation was halted. Yet, after the arrival of new mercenary forces in Katanga on 13 September, Hammarskjold initiated a second attack – Operation Morthor. Here, ONUC forces seized control of outposts in Elisabethville and made moves to arrest Tshombe. This time the Katangese were prepared. Fierce fighting broke out in the capital city. In addition, limited Rhodesian political support for Tshombe meant that the Katangan forces were provided with military equipment sufficient to surround the UN troops in Jadotville, bringing the UN campaign precariously and embarrassingly close to defeat.[110]

These developments exposed starkly diverging Anglo-American crisis positions. Macmillan's government faced such animated domestic and international pressure to prevent the use of UN military force in Katanga, and was so angered by the ONUC's impetuous actions that, it considered terminating public support for the ONUC mission if fighting were not immediately suspended.[111] Conversely, Kennedy's administration declared publicly on 17 September their 'continued strong support of [the] UN in [the] Congo'.[112] Even so, Kennedy's administration still remained cognisant of and even empathised with British concerns. Operation Morthor had been initiated without prior consultation with Washington and this had 'deeply concerned' Kennedy and Rusk. Still seen as a counterweight to potential Communist infiltration into the Congo, both Americans had anticipated Tshombe coming to a negotiated and peaceful agreement with Adoula wherein he was to be eventually incorporated within the newly formed Congolese government. Now, though, the ONUC's manifest display

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[110] In Operation Rumpunch, ONUC forces seized the headquarters of the gendarmerie, the radio station and other communications buildings in Elisabethville. On the same day Tshombé agreed to cooperate with the ONUC's withdrawal request and the operation was halted. Hammarskjöld approved Operation Morthor after the arrival of new mercenary forces in Katanga. ONUC forces seized control of outposts in Elisabethville and made moves to arrest Tshombé but Rhodesian intervention precluded this. Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* 150-151; for Belgian and British reactions see footnotes in FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium, 15 September 1961, [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d111> (accessed 08/03/2017).

[111] Minutes of a meeting held at Admiralty House, The Congo, 12 September 1961, CAB 130/178, UKNA.

[112] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium, 16 September 1961, FRUS [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d114> (accessed 08/03/2019).

of force meant the Katangese leader was unlikely to agree to a negotiated compromise and end Katanga's succession easily. The 17 September statement thus owed not to approval of UN action but to wider concern for US standing with developing countries. [113]

Evolving Anglo-American policy differences were nevertheless made clear at the December 1961 Bermuda Summit. Foreign Secretary Home reiterated the British opinion that the UN had exceeded its mandate and had 'gotten itself in a bad way in [the] Congo.'[114] He also expressed concern at the possible prolongation of UN military involvement and urged the Americans to use diplomatic negotiations with Tshombe. The Kennedy administration publicly reiterated American support for a peaceful solution to the Katanga secession[115] but privately three crisis developments meant that officials in Washington considered negotiations with Tshombe no longer possible. First, Adoula, whose appointment as Prime Minister Rusk had called a defeat for the Soviets, was rapidly losing Congolese support. [116] Second, Tshombe continued to equivocate. On 21 December 1961, he and Adoula signed the Kitona Accords which recognised the political unity of the Congo. However, Tshombe quickly reneged upon his commitment, accusing US Ambassador Edmund Gullion of imposing the agreement upon him.[117] Third, Operation Morthor had wider implications for the UN. In an attempt to produce a ceasefire on 17 September, Hammarskjold had flown to Ndola to meet with Tshombe. However, his plane crashed before reaching its destination – there were no survivors and U Thant, his replacement, was known to be a steadfast Afro-

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[113] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 15 September 1961, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d112> (accessed 18/03/2019).

[114] Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 28 December 1961. RG 59, Conference Files, Box 273, CF 2023- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, folder 2 of 2, USNA.

[115] CF 2025- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, Briefing Book, Congo: US - UK. Differences, 18 December 1961, Ibid.

[116] Memorandum for the President, report by Dean Rusk, 3 August 1961, National Security Files, Box 27A, Countries, Congo General 5/61-9/61, JFKL.

[117] Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, 29 December 1961, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28, Congo General 12/21/61-12/31/61, JFKL; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 26 December 1961, FRUS, [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d181> (accessed 20/02/2017).

Asian supporter.[118] Cumulatively, these considerations meant that the Americans now favoured a swift solution to the crisis and were becoming increasingly frustrated with continued British reluctance to exert 'real pressure' on Tshombe.[119]

Still, though, American appreciation of Britain's continuing policy constraints meant that despite some periodic frustration, the period spanning August to December 1961 witnessed little indication of fundamental Anglo-American discord over the Congo. In fact, senior level officials in Kennedy's administration demonstrated clearly their willingness to ease pressure upon the British where possible and to safeguard Macmillan's position in government. Perhaps the best demonstration of the seriousness of Macmillan's problems and Washington's willingness to help therein developed as a direct consequence of the ONUC's near defeat in Katanga. During Operation Morthor, the ONUC realised its military disadvantage when unable to call upon aircraft capable of responding to air attacks from Katanga. Six British-built Canberra bombers were consequently acquired from India. Then, in the latter part of October, Macmillan's government received an UN request to supply twenty-four 100 bombs to fit the planes.[120]

Macmillan thus found his government immediately trapped between the UN and heavy domestic pressure from the Conservative backbenches in Parliament and from within the Cabinet itself. To supply the bombs opened Macmillan's government up to attack from the Katanga Lobby but to withhold the bombs would incite allegations of succumbing to UK business interests and incur political blowback from the UN.[121] On 7 December, Foreign Office officials found a solution. They agreed to supply the bombs under the condition that they were only to be used in 'self-defensive action confined to attacking private aircraft on the ground or destroying runways.'[122] However, this compromise was ultimately scuppered.

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[118] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p.153; FRUS, Editorial Note, 116 [online] available from http://history.state.gob/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63V20/d116 (accessed 29/11/2017).

[119] United States Policy in the Congo Report, 21 September 1961, Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Box 68, Congo General, 2/61-10/61, 5, JFKL.

[120] James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, p.140.

[121] Bombs for the UN in the Congo by K.M. Wilford, 9 November 1961, FO 371/15007, ibid. Telegram from UK Delegation to the UN, 12 December 1961, PREM 11/3168, ibid.

[122] Meeting of Ministers to Consider further the supply of bombs to the United Nations, Foreign Office, note to Mr. Stevens, 7 December 1961, PREM 11/3168, ibid.

Sture Linner, the UN officer in Charge of the Congo proclaimed in an interview with a Swedish newspaper his intent to 'smash' Tshombe and his military forces.[123] Rumours of ONUC attacks on mines, hospitals and private houses also seemingly became reality when Ethiopian ONUC soldiers killed Red Cross workers.[124] With an impending foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 14 December, Macmillan feared that opposition on the Canberra bombs issue would be enough to topple his government through a vote of no confidence. The Prime Minister duly noted in his diary, 'the trouble in the Party is that in addition to the small group of people who really hate me…the anxiety about [the] United Nations performance in the Congo ha[s] spread to the whole *centre* of the Party.'[125]

The British initially contemplated arranging a ceasefire with the UN. However, this proved quickly to be a non-option. In a telegram to the Foreign Office on 11 December, Ambassador Dean warned that it would be virtually impossible to conjure a Security Council meeting and secure seven subsequent votes in time for the Debate. Furthermore, even if the agreement was reached, the process threatened heavy attack from the Afro-Asians who would try to make the UK 'the scapegoat for the United Nations lack of success.' The only possible solution to Whitehall's predicament Dean offered was to convince the Americans to 'take a different view about the present situation in the Congo' and persuade Kennedy to arrange an immediate ceasefire in the area.[126]

Obtaining American consent was no easy task. Kennedy was now coming under increased domestic pressure to end US support for the ONUC. By December 1961, a well-financed Katanga lobby had established itself in Washington. Led by Senator Thomas Dodd and the Senate Minority leader Everett Dirksen, the lobby also initiated on 13 December a Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters. For Kennedy then, prolongation of the crisis now risked fierce domestic pushback alongside inciting critical international opinion of

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[123] Conclusion of a Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1961, CAB 128/35, Ibid.

[124] Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) p.116; O'Malley, 'What an awful body the Un have become!!', p.37.

[125] Extract from H.M.'s letter to the Queen, 13 December 1961, MS. Macmillan dep. C.943, Macmillan, Oxford Bodleian Libraries.

[126] Telegram from Dean to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1961, FO 371/155107, UKNA.

the UN's activities. The best option for Washington therefore was to push-on with ONUC fighting to secure a speedy end to Katanga's succession. [127]

Macmillan decided to approach the President directly. He telephoned Kennedy on 13 December and requested that he initiate an UN ceasefire. He stressed that his Conservative Party was in trouble and that the UN were exceeding their mandate and seemed prepared to quash Katanga's secession through the use of force.[128] When Kennedy continued to vacillate, responsibility to garner Washington's support fell to Ormbsy-Gore and Home. Home's diplomacy was particularly convincing. In relaying the UK's position to Secretary of State Rusk, Home threatened to withdraw British support for the ONUC if fighting continued. Consequently, Rusk telephoned Kennedy from a NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Paris, explaining to the President that the Congo was by far, the most significant issue for the US and advised that the US secure the ceasefire for the UK as soon as possible.[129] Ultimately though, it was Ormsby-Gore who proved successful in attaining the concession. He discussed Macmillan's concerns over a private dinner with the President on 13 December and ultimately came to trumps. With the Ambassador still present, Kennedy telephoned the Under Secretary of State, George Ball and instructed him accordingly: 'I have got David Gore sitting beside me, he will explain what it is the British Government wants done, and I want it done.'[130] The ceasefire was announced by U Thant the following day.[131]

Kennedy thus secured the ceasefire and risked undermining ONUC initiatives in Katanga on a clear basis of British pleas. The diplomatic gesture was well-received by Macmillan and his followers. The same day U Thant announced the ONUC ceasefire in Katanga, Macmillan emerged with a majority of 94 votes in the House of Commons. Upon receiving this news,

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[127] Telephone records, Ball and Cleveland, 31 October 1961, George Ball Papers, Box 1, JFKL; O'Malley, 'Congo crisis' p. 38.

[128] O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis' p. 39.

[129] Kalb, *Congo Cables,* p. 316.

[130] Lord Harlech recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, Oral History Program, JFKL pp. 36-37.

[131] Ibid. Also see, Telecon: Bundy/Ball, 13 December 1962, The Personal Papers of George W Ball, Box 2 of 9, Congo 12/5/61-12/22/61, JFKL; telecon, Gov. Stevenson/Ball, 13 December 1962, ibid.

Kennedy teased: 'Well, that was a pretty good majority; I wonder whether we needed to have gone to all that trouble the other night in order to get it?'[132] For Macmillan's government though, the respite was rather short-lived. The speed with which ONUC officials pushed Adoula and Tshombe to agree to a ceasefire left ambiguity in the established plans concerning Katanga's reintegration into the Congo. Consequently, Tshombe was able to roll back his consent and the crisis continued.

Alanna O'Malley notes that from January to December 1962, the British found themselves increasingly marginalised in the Congo as Kennedy's administration adhered to Afro-Asian opinion in the UN and subsequently implemented progressively hard-lined policies to end Katanga's secession.[133] Given the make-up of ONUC forces, it is true that Afro-Asian sentiments would have been a significant consideration for the Americans. However, it is important to highlight that additional factors were in play too. By March 1961 American officials had become increasingly convinced that diplomatic negotiations held between Adoula and Tshombe would not be enough to resolve the crisis. Moreover, the situation in Congo was quickly eroding. First, economic funding for the ONUC was drying-up. Informing State Department officials that the UN would unlikely be able to fund the Congo mission past March 1963, U Thant had duly pressed them to hurry negotiations along.[134] In addition, Adoula's governing authority continued to weaken. In February 1962, the Congolese Prime Minister even announced that in order to secure his government, he had accepted an invitation to visit Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. The latter event never came to fruition but potential that Adoula would also turn into a Communist puppet would nevertheless have raised alarm bells in Washington.[135]

These developments inspired State Department officials to look again for policy alternatives. In March 1961, Roger Hilsman, the Director of the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research had proposed a policy which suggested the implementation of increased US, UK, Belgian and UN pressure to force Tshombe into cooperation. The plan, in turn, had been sent to senior

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[132] Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986,* p. 403.

[133] O'Malley, 'Congo crisis' p. 40.

[134] Kent, *Cold War Conflict in the Congo,* p. 96.

[135] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 161.

level State Department officials for comment. The line of reasoning was finally adopted in December 1961 by the Under Secretary of State, George Ball. Tshombe would continue to refuse agreements unless he was 'deprived' of his means to maintain [his] independent operation.' In addition, U Thant should recognise that the Congo was now at a stage where the 'upgrading of effort' was both 'necessary and desirable.' On 24 July 1962, Ball's suggestion was therefore transposed by the African Bureau of the State Department into a National Reconciliation Plan.[136] The plan had four incremental phases intended to guarantee its timely implementation. If progress were not made in the drafting and approval of the Congolese constitution (phase one) or in Katanga's acceptance of it (phase two) then economic sanctions (phase three) would be invoked against Katanga. Finally, if economic sanctions did not work, there would be a threat of military coercion (phase four) to ensure the plan's implementation.[137] Stages one and two of the plan were given White House general approval on 6 August and after discussions with U Thant and the French, UK and Belgian Embassies in Washington, the Plan was revised on 11 August, the final version becoming the UN Reconciliation Plan.[138] The most significant change was the deletion of specific measures in phase four with an understanding that if that stage were reached the participating governments would consult with each other and the UN when necessary.[139] This was to prove problematic later in that the in-built ambiguity allowed U Thant to progress military measures against Katanga faster than the Kennedy administration wished. Meantime though, Adoula and Tshombe accepted the plan under heavy US pressure.[140]

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[136] For George Ball's thoughts on the Congo, see, Telegram from the Department of State, 21 July 1962, National Security Files, Box 31, Countries, Congo Cables 7/16/62-7/23/62, JFKL.

[137] Proposal for National Reconciliation, National Security Action Memorandum, 2 August 1962, National Security Files, Box 28 A, Countries, Congo-General 8/3/62-8/10/62, ibid.

[138] The National Reconciliation Plan was also referred to informally as the 'U Thant Plan', the 'conciliation plan' and the 'plan'. Memorandum for the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 11 August 1962, FRUS, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d274 (accessed 20/02/2017).

[139] Although the plan was generally supported by the French, Belgian and British governments, political participation varied significantly. The French refused to participate, the British refused to participate after phase two and the Belgians refused to participate after stage three. Current Status of Proposed Action on the Congo, Department of State Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 11 August 1962, National Security Files, Box 28 A Countries, Congo General 8/11/61-8/27/62, ibid.

[140] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 164.

Despite a series of meetings to find Anglo-American accord, the formulation and incremental progression of the UN Reconciliation Plan finally pushed Macmillan's government and Kennedy's administration into opposing camps. In May for instance, Belgian, UK and US working level officials met to discuss crisis policy options. Although Kennedy pressed upon the American Ambassador in London, David Bruce the importance of finding consensus with the British, the meeting ultimately failed to produce one. Macmillan's government agreed to support Phase One and Phase Two of the plan but Lord Dundee, the British representative at the meeting had been instructed to oppose any policy which threatened to potentially lead to a resumption of hostilities in Katanga. The British therefore refused to implement economic sanctions on Tshombe or agree to the provision of military support. At the culmination of the meeting, Bruce duly informed State Department officials of his favourable impressions concerning the 'mobility and helpfulness' of the Belgians – they had agreed in principle to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tshombe. However, when it came to the Anglo-American conflict resolution in the Congo, Bruce confirmed that Washington's position was still 'far apart from the British.' [141] Similar discussions were tried again at the highest levels of UK government, but Bruce could not find agreement with neither Home, Sir Roger Stevens of the Foreign Office nor Macmillan. [142]

Kennedy's administration tried again to find British agreement with their UN Reconciliation Plan in September 1962. In Washington's view, crisis in the Congo had become acute – failure of the UN Reconciliation plan now threatened imminent ONUC bankruptcy and civil war in the Congo. On 25 September, US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee appealed to Home to uphold the third phase of the plan and apply economic sanctions upon Tshombe alongside Belgium and Washington. Home again demurred, reiterating British objections to sanctions on the grounds that their failure was likely to be followed by the use of military force.[143] This time

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[141] From London to Secretary of State, National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo General Tripartite Congo Talks 5/62, JFKL.

[142] London to Secretary of State, 25 May 1962, National Security Files, Box 28 Counties, Congo General Tripartite Congo Talks, 5/62, JFKL.

[143] Telegram from New York to the Secretary of State, 25 September 1962, National Security Files, Box 32, Countries, Congo Cables 9/24/62-9/30/62, JFKL.

British reserve clearly incited irritation and suspicion amongst their American counterparts. National Secretary Adviser McGeorge Bundy confided in Ball his belief that the Macmillan government's Congo policy was driven by British neo-colonial interests: 'They've all got relatives that belong to Tanganyika Concessions.'[144] Kennedy also conceded his immediate and personal disappointment in Home following the latter's disclosure of previous British promises made to Tshombe that the UK would not apply economic sanctions on Katanga. The President confided in McGhee his conclusion that Home 'wasn't really playing very straight', 'the least the British could have done was to have said nothing and indicate privately to us their views on sanctions.' [145]

These Anglo-American differences were replayed at the highest diplomatic level for the final time at the Nassau summit in December 1962. Kennedy outlined US concerns that the ONUC would collapse; the UN was running out of money and India would be withdrawing its forces from the ONUC in March 1963. The best course of action was to prove to Tshombe that the UN stood behind the UN Reconciliation Plan, even if that risked military action. Kennedy's presentation succeeded only in raising UK hackles. At one stage, Lord Home lost his temper and asked if the 'United States Government would tell Adoula to dismiss the Congolese Parliament and rule by decree. Was the United States going to tell the world this? … "Best idea I have heard in years."' Macmillan also suggested sarcastically that 'the US should take over the Congo and make Tshombe into some kind of Maharajah, with US support.'[146]

The two delegations returned to reconsider the Congo crisis in an improved atmosphere on 21 December. Kennedy's administration, the British were informed, had no intentions of using military force on Katanga anytime soon. The British still feared rapid transition from sanctions to force and resisted consequently applying economic pressure upon Tshombe. Agreement to disagree was the best, and not insignificant, outcome of these talks. Moreover, they were soon overtaken by events in the Congo. On 25 December, Katangese mercenary forces, intoxicated on extra rations of beer started shooting at ONUC soldiers. The UN's

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[144] Conversation between Ball and Bundy, 8 October 1962, The Personal Papers of George Ball, Box 3, Congo, 1/3/62-8.29/62, Ibid.

[145] Memcon to McGhee, 26, September 1962, Ibid. Box 1, Britain 3/31/61-11/20/62, Ibid.

[146] Memcons, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Congo, 19 December 1962, RG59, Conference Files, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan Nassau Meeting, USNA.

response was swift, initiating on 28 December a military mission called Operation Grandslam. The UN Swedish Air Unit attacked the Katangese air base in Kolwezi and destroyed all but a few Katangese aircraft. Then, UN ground forces took command of Elisabethville and forced Tshombe to announce formally the end of the Katangese secession on 14 January 1963. [147]

Discord Reconsidered

With the heated exchanges at the Nassau summit and ONUC's use of military force shortly afterwards in Operation Grandslam, it is understandable as to why examination of British and American exchange in the Congo has led scholars to claim diplomatic breakdown and consequent malaise in Anglo-American relations. There was clearly no meeting of minds at Nassau and the manner in which the ONUC eventually brought an end to Katanga's secession – by the use of force with only limited damage to the UMHK in the aftermath – made UK policy concerns appear rather unfounded. Worse still, in mid-December, Kennedy's administration had implemented a US military observer mission which was led by General Louise W Truman in the Congo. Initially, this was a fact-finding mission designed to determine the likely success of military intervention were it eventually needed. However, international discovery of the mission during Grandslam gave a public impression that Kennedy's administration had misled Macmillan during the Nassau Summit. Indeed, summit press reports queried whether the mission had been prescribed by Washington as a means to pressure or even trick Macmillan at the Nassau.[148]

Frustration and distrust towards officials in Washington and of US Congo policy more broadly were immediately evident at the highest levels of British government. In a letter to Rusk drafted on 30 December 1962, Home duly questioned US fidelity to the British and queried UN motives in Katanga: '…we were told that your Military Mission was purely exploratory against the day when the U.N might have to use stronger measures…Well, now

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[147] Namikas, *Battleground Africa, pp.* 173- 174; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 14 January 1963, FRUS, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d411 (accessed 20/02/2017).

[148] 'American Mission Arrives in Congo' *Birmingham Daily Post,* 22 December 1962; 'The Part Played by the United States Government in the Congo Crisis: December 15, 1962 to January 8, 1963' report by Ormsby-Gore 15 January 1963, FO 371/167241 UKNA.

they have had it, and Tshombe has fled the country. Are the U.N. prepared to occupy the place for years, or put some representative of Adoula in Tshombe's place and keep him there by force of arms, or after a hollow victory to withdraw?'[149] Macmillan, too, was also understandably irked by the events. The Operation had taken place over the Parliamentary recess. Resultantly, upon the government reopening, he had received an onslaught of letters of protest from British citizens and M.P.s against the UN's actions. One such letter dated 7 January 1963 reads 'I think your behaviour, as outlined…is disgusting…Britain will never be herself again until we have got rid of the present cowardly leadership of the Conservative Party, who are selling our Country and all the fine ideals for which it has ever stood for dollars!' Another, dated 3 January 1963, called on Home to stop all UK monetary contribution to the UN: 'U Thant, under pressure from the U.S.A., is a menace to the peace of our world.'[150] No wonder that on 11 January Macmillan confided in his diary of a 'very heavy week', for which he attributed primary responsibility to the ongoing Congo crisis: 'U.N forces – aided and abetted by U.S forces – have defeated Tshombe and produced an internal crisis in the Tory party…'.[151]

O'Malley argues that after Grandslam 'the gulf between London and Washington was unbridgeable'[152] in the Congo and Kent claims that the rift had corrosive effects on the wider special relationship.[153] Yet close examination of hitherto neglected Anglo-American exchanges following Grandslam reveals little evidence of the long-term malaise that extant scholarship often speaks of. British and American officials actually moved swiftly into tension-management mode to preserve as best possible their close bilateral relations. Ball, for instance, immediately expressed his remorse over the awkward situation which the ONUC had created for Whitehall and Washington and appealed to Ormsby-Gore that he 'hoped there was no feeling in London that the United States Government acted in bad faith.'[154] Rusk was

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[149] Letter from Lord Home to Dean Rusk, 30 December 1962, National Security Files, Box 28 A, Congo General 12/18/62-12/31/62, JFKL.

[150] For letters of protest see 'Miscellaneous letters and telegrams commenting on the UN and UK roles in Katanga' Omnibus, JB 1001/3, FO 371/167212, UKNA.

[151] Macmillan, 11 January 1963, c.t in Catterall, P. (ed) *The Macmillan Diaries*, p. .533.

[152] O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis' p. 40.

[153] John Kent, 'The Not so Special Relationship' p. 133.

[154] From Washington to Foreign Office, 3 January 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

particularly determined to clarify crisis developments for the British and to ease lingering suspicions in Whitehall of American betrayal. On 31 December, he reassured Denis Greenhill, a British official in the UK Embassy in Washington that the 'outbreak of shooting caught everyone by surprise', including the Kennedy administration. With British interests in mind, he added that Washington was pressing the UN to end the mission in a timely manner and had made the ONUC guarantee that they would protect UMHK infrastructure and personnel.[155] Additionally, Rusk approached Home the following day. In a telegram, the Secretary of State admitted that the State Department had indeed been 'contemplating some military action' against Katanga. However, this had not been anticipated until the end of January and would have been implemented only if economic sanctions against Tshombe had failed.[156]

Washington's attempts to smooth transatlantic waters were warmly received in Whitehall,[157] even if residual suspicion lingered. Here, and also surprisingly neglected in previous accounts, British officials were extremely important in resurrecting senior level UK-US relations post-Grandslam. Ormbsy-Gore played the principal role, impressing upon Foreign Office officials Washington's sincerity at Nassau. By tracing in acute detail telegrams, records of meetings and newspaper reports of US activities and political discourse concerning the Congo prior to and in the immediate onset of Operation Grandslam, the British Ambassador presented a twenty-one page report explaining US actions for the Foreign Office. His conclusions were as follows: Kennedy's administration had not concealed their Congo policy at Nassau, nor had they worked behind the Macmillan government's back. The Truman Mission had been designed to assess the likely outcome if the UN had to resort to force in Katanga but by working under strict secrecy, even senior officials in the State Department had been ill-informed. This is why many UK officials had not been informed of the Mission beforehand. In addition, Kennedy's administration had not intended to resort to

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[155] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 31 December 1962, FRUS [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d394 (accessed 24/03/2019).

[156] From Washington to Foreign Office, 1 January 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

[157] On 8 January, Lord Home formally accepted Rusk's apology Message from J.O. Wright of the Foreign Office to D.A. Greenhill in Washington, 8 January 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

force in the immediate crisis period and when Washington had supported Operation Grandslam once fighting commenced, its aim had been to ensure a swift end to crisis events and to protect Western interests in the region. Finally, Ormsby-Gore assured Whitehall that Kennedy's administration had been just as 'horrified' by the UN's actions as had Macmillan's government. [158]

Alongside this report, other officials in the British Embassy in Washington afforded further clarification of crisis events and provided guidance to Foreign Office officials as to which levels of US government were best to approach for future policy updates on the Congo. On 8 January, Roger W. H. du Boulay, a British Embassy official in Washington, offered an explanation to the West and Central Africa Department of why Kennedy had pushed the British so hard during their meetings in Nassau. Right-wing press and the Katanga Lobby in Washington had become particularly vocal in their opposition to the Kennedy administration's policies in the Congo but Congressional in-fighting in December had provided Kennedy with a temporary opportunity to secure Katanga's reintegration without rousing sizeable domestic opposition.[159] In addition, on 16 January, du Boulay warned the Foreign Office that differences of opinion within the State Department might be clouding British understanding of US policy. For instance, Du Boulay noted that Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee, had a tendency to 'react off-the-cuff' and 'by and large agree' with Whitehall's position in Congo, meaning that Denis Greenhill was subsequently being given a partial reading of US thinking. Resultantly, du Boulay advised the Foreign Office to 'go straight to the top', referring to Rusk, Ball or Kennedy, 'or to the bottom' referring to desk level officials and US Ambassadors on the ground, '(or both)' when discussing Congo policy with the Americans.[160]

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[158] The size of the report Ormbsy-Gore felt was warranted given 'the importance of the subject.' 'The Part Played by the United States Government in the Congo Crisis: December 15, 1962 to January 8, 1963' Report by David Ormsby-Gore, 15 January 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

[159] Congressional and domestic criticism was based on a premise similar to views held in Whitehall; Tshombé presented the best Congolese bulwark against Communism and that hard-lined UN activities potentially threatened to embroil the West in a lengthy and expensive rehabilitation programme in Katanga especially. 'Impact on domestic politics in United States of the official policy on Katanga', by R.W.H. du Boulay, 8 January 1963, ibid.

[160] 'Administrative reasons for the contradictions in American policies and statements on the Congo' by R.W.H. du Boulay, 16 January 1963, FO 371/167241, ibid.

These efforts did help lift the gloom and suspicion in Whitehall. In response to Rusk's telegram to Home, a Foreign Office telegram informed Washington: 'We are grateful for the frank explanation…We fully shared the Americans' concern about the continuation of United Nations military operations and in particular the occupation of Jadotville without instructions…We have no wish to put the United Nations on the spot and hope to avoid any public reaction that could be distressing to them.'[161] Similarly, Ormsby-Gore's report garnered a positive reception amongst Foreign Office officials. On 25 January, P.M. Foster noted that he agreed with 'Ormsby-Gore's conclusion that the Americans did not deliberately mislead or double-cross us there.' Likewise, G.E. Millard expressed on 29 January that he agreed 'in general' with Ormsby-Gore 'that the Americans did not deliberately mislead us at Nassau nor inspire the recent series of U.N. operations.'[162]

Records further reveal that throughout 1962, Ormbsy-Gore in Washington and officials in the British Embassy in Leopoldville worked to ease American frustrations of particular British officials or of Whitehall's Congo policy more broadly. Following David Bruce's and Lord Dundee's failed attempt to find Anglo-American policy accord in May 1962 for instance, Ormbsy-Gore confessed to Ball he had also thought Lord Dundee a 'fool' for refusing to discuss possible military measures with American officials. [163] Of Whitehall's position in the Congo more generally, Ormsby-Gore coined the term 'ostrich position' in reference to the 'usual' British pragmatism, a 'resolution to let sleeping dogs lie, not to engage in hypothetical or advance planning, to procrastinate.'[164] These were seemingly small acts of shared sentiment but they still held an appeal in Washington. Indeed, Whitehouse staff reused the ostrich position term, though partly in jest, in preparation for suspected British filibustering at the Nassau Summit. [165]

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[161] Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 10 January 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

[162] 'Minutes to Ormsby-Gore's report' 25 and 29 January 1963, ibid.

[163] 'Telecon McGhee/Ball'. The Personal Papers of George Ball, Box 3, Congo-1/2/62-8/29/62, JFKL.

[164] Weekend Reading, 26 May 1962, President's Weekend Reading, Box 5, ibid.; Telegram from London to Secretary of State, 16 May 1962, National Security Files, Countries, Box 30A, Congo Cables 5/14/62-5/19/62, Ibid.

[165] Weekend Reading, 20 November 1962, President's Weekend Reading, Box 5, Ibid.

It is also the case that some British officials sympathised with aspects of Washington's Congo policy and provided tacit support such that American counterparts could achieve their objectives. For instance, continuing atrocities in the crisis meant that by November 1962 officials in the British Embassy in Leopoldville and the British Embassy in Elizabethville favoured progression of the UN Reconciliation Plan and subsequently believed that hard-line measures were necessary to force Tshombe into negotiations. Their attempts to counsel Foreign Office officials in this vein fell upon deaf ears.[166] Nevertheless, in an overt demonstration of UK-US intimacy at Embassy levels, an unnamed British official in Leopoldville broke with diplomatic protocol and advised US Ambassador Gullion confidentially that the US should continue with the UN Reconciliation Plan without official British support. This message was subsequently relayed to the State Department on 26 November alongside an advisory from the British official that he suspected there would be little lasting damage to UK-US bilateral relations if Kennedy's administration were to act alone in the Congo: 'the UK Foreign Office would "give [an] expected squeal" but that "squeal" would not be too loud or insistent.' [167]

This message helps to further explain the American stance at Nassau. Critical public statements of UN activities in Congo emanating from Whitehall strengthened Tshombe's political campaign and aggravated domestic opposition to Kennedy administration policies. Home had refused previous American requests to dampen opposition originating from the UK but prior to Nassau the State Department returned to the issue, noting that all it really needed from Macmillan's government at this time was their 'grudging acquiescence accompanied by silence.'[168] Encouraged by the message from Leopoldville, the Kennedy administration thus pressed harder for Britain's silence at Nassau. After recognising the variances in preferred British and American positions, Home eventually relented and

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[166] Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 26 November 1962, National Security Files, Box 33, Congo Cables, 11/20/62-11/27/62, LBJL.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Congo Scenario, n.d. National Security Files, Box 28 A, Countries, Congo General 14/12/62-171262, JFK.

promised that Britain 'could keep quiet' if economic or military measures were implemented against Katanga. [169]

Anglo-American exchanges following Grandslam do not warrant a conclusion of breakdown in relations. Both sides clearly valued the other's presence in and influence over crisis events and some British officials took calculated risks to urge Washington to continue with the UN Reconciliation Plan and end Katanga's secession. Moreover, by promising to maintain public silence after Nassau, Macmillan's government were still actively helping Kennedy's administration. Indeed, the extent of this undertaking should not be underestimated; Macmillan's government was under renewed pressure from within the Conservative Party to prevent the UN Reconciliation Plan entirely. On 12 December, the pro-Katanga Sir Tufton Beamish passed a motion in the House of Common urging his government to block economic coercion or the use of ONUC military forces in 'any part of the Congo.' The Parliamentary Office feared that the strength of support for the motion amongst Conservative backbenchers would mean it would have to be debated.[170] The UK silence that had become all-important to Washington was nevertheless maintained, Parliamentary members being informed that the Government could not find time to debate the matter before the Recess.[171] Once Parliament returned the decisive moves against Katanga's secession had already taken place.[172]

Scholarly opinion also generally maintains that Macmillan's government had very little to do with the Congo following the onset of Operation Grandslam.[173] This is simply not the case. Rather than a failure in coordinating Anglo-American policy in the Congo, Macmillan's decision not to participate in Operation Grandslam was a shrewd diplomatic manoeuvre. It

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[169] Nassau Meeting, Dec 19-20, 1962, memcons, The Congo, 21 December 1962, RG59 Conferences, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan, USNA.

[170] Resolution urging HMG to refrain from the forcible solution of Congo crisis, motion by Sir Tufton Beamish, 12 December 1962, FO 371/161491, UKNA.

[171] Statement by the Leader of the House, 13 December 1962, Ibid.

[172] Telegram London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963 RG59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263--/1-463, USNA.

[173] See for instance, James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis,* p194; Alanna O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis 1960-1964,* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018) pp: 156-158.

allowed for British officials to continue gathering information from within the Congo and provide important assistance from the side-lines. This, in turn, preserved residual UK influence and offered many opportunities for continued cooperation at all levels of British and American government. [174] Consider, for instance, how UK officials cooperated with the US in ending Katanga's secession during Operation Grandslam. The UN mission had caused Tshombe to abscond to Northern Rhodesia and incite a 'scorched earth' policy which called upon the Katangese to resist ONUC forces by 'all means necessary including speared and poisoned arrows.' [175] Publicly, Tshombe blamed a fear for his personal safety as the predominant motive for fleeing. [176] However, seeing as Tshombe's gendarmerie was facing military defeat in Katanga it is reasonable to suspect the decision was at least partially tactical; an attempt to draw-out the culmination of the operation by refusing to accept legally the end of Katanga's secession. Tshombe's actions troubled the UN and the US. First, Tshombe was considered the only leader capable of preventing clashes between tribal groups within Katanga that were united only in their steadfast opposition against the UN, European states and institutions such as the UMHK. [177] Second, a breakdown in political stability within Katanga threatened to initiate a general exodus of Europeans from the Congo which would in turn would have serious economic consequences for the UMHK and Belgium. Third, Tshombe's absence threatened to force the UN to assume an administrative role in order to ensure Katanga's stability, for which it was ill-equipped. [178] Foreign Office and State Department officials were therefore agreed that once the ONUC operation was finished,

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[174] For further arguments explaining why the Macmillan government's decision to stand-aside during Operation Grandslam should not be seen as a policy failure see, Steve Marsh, and Tia Culley, 'Anglo-American Relations and Crisis in The Congo' *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2018) pp.359-384.

[175] Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962, RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/12-2962--/1-163, USNA.

[176] 'Congo' brief for Cabinet Meeting by West and Central African Department, 2 January 1963, FO 371/167244, UKNA.

[177] Ibid; 'Congo' Brief for the Nassau Conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963', RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263--/1-463, Telegram from the Department of State, 3 January 1963, USNA.

[178] Memo sent State Department, 15 December 1962, Congo General 1 1 63/1/15/63, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28 A, JFKL.

Tshombe must be encouraged to return to Katanga and help manage and legitimise the end of the Katangese secession.[179]

However, Kennedy's administration was now cast in a rather awkward predicament vis-à-vis Tshombe and Katanga and needed Belgium and the UK to take the lead. Having supported Operation Grandslam, US officials had very limited capacity to exert pressure over Katangese political officials, let alone Tshombe. In addition, rising sensitivities to race relations within the US, together with mounting public criticism of American policy in the Congo, meant that Kennedy's administration preferred not to be identified with Tshombe's return.[180] Conversely, though, Macmillan's government was well placed to assist. Tshombe had sought refuge within Northern Rhodesia. This meant the British had diplomatic leverage over him through the British Consulate in Elisabethville and through individuals such as Welensky, Conservative Party members and shareholders of Tanks.

Therefore, previous arguments that Belgium became America's closest ally in the Congo after Operation Grandslam also need further nuance.[181] It is true that Belgian officials played an active role, encouraging Tshombe to return to the Congo and ending Katanga's succession. British officials, though, were also influential, albeit from the side-lines. Recognising the domestic pressures upon Macmillan's government but also wanting to see an end to the crisis, the Foreign Office decided they would exercise their diplomatic influence over Tshombe and convince him to return to the Congo. However, they would need to do this by placing the 'Belgians in the front line', thereby avoiding becoming overtly involved in activities that 'would be unacceptable to public opinion'.[182]

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[179] Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 30 December 1962, Box 33 A, Congo Cables XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, ibid.

[180] For Gullion's reservations for instance, see Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January 1963USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-263--/1-463, USNA. For reservations concerning American public opinion, see Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 8 January 1963, 770.g 00/1-563--/1-863, Ibid.

[181] Kent, 'The Not so Special Relationship' pp: 133-135.

[182] The policy was first put forward by G.E Millard, head of the Western and Central African Department in December 1963. He explained that the idea was 'inglorious' but 'good tactics.' 'Congo' brief for the Nassau conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963, FO 371/167244, UKNA.

Joint British and American messages were therefore sent to Tshombe through British government officials in Rhodesia, the Belgian Consulate and through the UMHK. One such message, drafted by Home and Rusk, warned Tshombe that failure to return to Elisabethville would provide the Russians with an opportunity to enter the Congo. The Katangese leader was urged 'most earnestly to return without delay.'[183] These covert messages continued even after Tshombe's return in early January. On 4 January, a Foreign Office message assured Rusk that there had been constant communication with Tshombe. The UK High Commissioner in Salisbury, 'in some "mysterious" ways' relayed messages by radio to the Katangese leader.[184] Another route was explained on 5 January by a member of the US Consul in Elisabethville, Jonathan Dean. US messages to Tshombe were passed through the UMHK Director Urbain. Responses would then go through Joachim Frenkiel, the Rector of the Elisabethville University to the UK Consulate in Elizabethville, which in turn would pass the message back to the US.[185]

Diplomatic messages alone were insufficient to guarantee the end of Katanga's succession, which meant more opportunities for Anglo-American cooperation in the crisis. When on 30 December, Tshombe acceded to persistent British pressure and agreed to return to Elisabethville, he did so on the condition that the UN would guarantee his personal safety and that of his ministers.[186] This assurance was not easily obtained given that U Thant resolutely refused to negotiate with Tshombe unless he surrendered his 'scorched earth' policy.[187] The UK and US again coordinated their response and shared responsibilities, dividing tasks

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[183] The message was meant to be sent to Tshombé through the British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, Lord Alport but on 4 January the communication route was queried with the Foreign Office ultimately deciding they preferred 'to use the Union Minière Channel.' For details see, Message from HMG to Tshombé, 1 January 1963; Message from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 4 January 1963; Message from Foreign Office to Elisabethville, 4 January 1963, Ibid.

[184] Telegram from London to Secretary of State, January 4 1963, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/1/63-1/5/63, JFKL.

[185] Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 5 January 1963, Ibid.

[186] Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962, Box 33 A, Congo Cables Vol. XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Ibid.

[187] Telegram from the Department of State, 8 January 1963, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Ibid.

according to where their influence was best placed. While the British continued to press Tshombe to end the secession, the Americans focused their attention on the UN, urging members to support Tshombe's safe return.[188] This was achieved one day later when, on 31 December, U Thant relented. He pledged that Tshombe and his entourage would remain safe provided he returned to Elisabethville and took the necessary steps towards integration within a two-week timeframe.[189]

Persistent UK diplomatic efforts finally paid dividends. On 3 January, the Foreign Office informed Rusk that with 'few bargaining points left' Tshombe appeared amenable to cooperation. [190] With UN permission, Belgian plans were consequently made to transport Tshombe to Elisabethville via a sanctuary in Kolwezi. [191] Though continued UN military movement into Jadotville and Kolwezi – integral mining regions in Katanga – delayed the reconciliation process and meant that Tshombe did not formally renounce the end of Katanga's secession until 14 January, by then the US and UK had already achieved their primary objective: Tshombe had returned to Katanga under UN guarantees for his safety and negotiations were enabled.

It is also evident that the US valued not just residual UK influence in the Congo but also the presence and authority of particular UK officials in the Consulate in Elisabethville. This was demonstrated clearly when Prime Minister Adoula and other leading Congolese parliamentarians threatened the expulsion of the UK Consulate in Elizabethville. Directly following Operation Grandslam, Congolese frustrations at what was perceived as London's continued interference in the Congo's internal affairs were so strong that the US Embassy in Leopoldville feared a breach in Anglo-Congolese relations at the beginning of January 1963.

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[188] Ibid.

[189] Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, 368; and Outgoing Telegram from the Secretary of State, 31 December 1962, National Security Files, Countries, Box 33 A, Congo Cables Vol. XV, 12/28/62-12/31/62, JFKL.

[190] Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 3 January 1963, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563--/1-863, USNA.

[191] Sobelair, a Belgian company had a commercial airplane in Elisabethville under UN protection. The UN subsequently permitted the plane to fly to Kolwezi, pick up Tshombé and fly to Kipushi where Tshombé would then make his way to Elisabethville by road. Telegram from New York (Plimpton) to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963, Ibid.

However, Ambassador Gullion interjected on behalf of the UK in an attempt to head off this possibility. In a conversation with the Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko on 2 January, the Ambassador set out the UK's continued importance in Katanga. First, Whitehall's wider responsibilities in Africa meant it would be important in helping the Congolese government negotiate with countries such as Rhodesia. Second, the Congolese had 'good friends' among the British people and parliament. To break relations with the UK would alienate these importance sources of support for the new country, including within the Labour Party that might at some point come to power. Gullion also emphasised the risks to the Congolese government's relations with the wider western world of breaking relations with the UK, especially were this done whilst maintaining relations with the USSR and an impression thereby created that the Congo was gravitating towards the Soviet orbit. This would obviously play badly in influential political circles and likely have negative consequences for future US-Congolese relations. [192]

The Congolese leadership listened but its frustration with the UK was such that at this point it was convinced by neither the US Ambassador nor by UK attempts to ameliorate Anglo-Congolese relations. This included an offer of two million pounds in economic aid. Indeed, Foreign Office officials were informed that the Congo refused to be compared with a 'small child to whom one gives a piece of sugar to keep it quiet.'[193] Caught between US pressure and a majority in the Congolese Cabinet favouring a break of diplomatic relations with the UK, Bomboko elected to expel at 24 hours' notice Derek Dodson of the UK Consulate – the individual most associated with Tshombe's return – rather than the entire UK Consulate in Elisabethville. Dodson was to leave on 10 January, the same day that news of Tshombe's return to Elisabethville reached Adoula's government.[194]

US diplomatic actions upon receiving news of Dodson's expulsion again demonstrated continued value accorded to Anglo-American relations in the Congo as well as the impact

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[192] Message from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January 1962, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo cables 1/1/63-1/5/63, JFKL.

[193] Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office by Mr. Riches, 9 January 1963, FO 371/167244, UKNA.

[194] Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 10 January, 1963, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/1963-1/10/1963, JFKL.

and importance to these relations of UK and US officials at lower levels of government. Indeed, the ultimatum served to Washington a telling choice. Dodson's expulsion would not considerably impact US interests in Katanga and the UK Consulate would remain. Kennedy's administration could thus accept the decision and potentially consolidate relations with Adoula. Conversely, Dodson had obviously played a large role in ending Katanga's secession and, thereby, in securing US policy objectives in the Congo. Jonathan Dean of the US Embassy in Elisabethville told the State Department that he 'had personally seen him repeatedly argue sincerely and forcefully with Tshombe for common GOC, US and UK policy.' He also informed Rusk that it would be damaging to US interests to lose Dodson 'both as [an] UK representative and as [an] individual.'[195] These sentiments evidently resonated with the State Department for Kennedy's administration chose to risk US political standing with the Congolese government and press for a reconsideration of Dodson's expulsion. A State Department telegram was consequently sent instructing the US Embassy to 'assert all possible influence, short of endangering your own position' to achieve a reversal of the Congolese government's decision. [196]

Gullion duly met with Adoula and the new UN officer in charge of the Congo, Robert Gardiner, to urge moderation. This meeting risked angering Adoula and damaging US-Congo relations were the Congolese Prime Minister to perceive the interjection as Washington valuing UK interests in the region above the country's political stability. Nevertheless, Gullion argued that Dodson could 'save the destruction of lives and property' in Katanga and that Congolese public opinion might be assuaged were the government to announce that it had received UK explanations for their policy in Katanga.[197] During the meeting, Adoula was non-committal but Gullion was hopeful of a positive outcome, describing the Congolese Prime Minister as having appeared 'interested' in his argument.[198] Adoula subsequently proposed to defer Dodson's expulsion on condition that 'certain things had to be done.'[199]

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[195] Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963, JFKL.

[196] Telegram Department of State to American Embassy in Leopoldville, 10 January 1963, Ibid.

[197] Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 11 January 1963, 1/11/1963-1/20/1963, Ibid.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1963, Ibid.

What he meant by this was unclear but in any case events took over.[200] By 14 January, Tshombé had allowed the UN freedom of movement in Katanga and legally ended the secession, thereby releasing much of the parliamentary pressure upon Adoula. Dodson's expulsion was forgotten as a result. Nevertheless, the wider implications of the event were not lost on Macmillan's government. As was noted in a Foreign Office memorandum, 'it appeared that…Mr Gullion was instructed to weigh in on Mr. Dodson's behalf and this may have been an element in persuading the Congolese Government to relax [their] pressure.'[201]

State-building, the Hostage Crisis and Operation Dragon Rouge: Continuing Cooperation under Home, Wilson, and Johnson

Katanga's reintegration did not fully resolve the crisis. Unrest once again developed across the country and ethnic fighting, political dislocation and economic troubles ran rampant throughout 1963 and 1964. Adoula's government remained structurally weak and in 1964 it lost control of a large portion of the Province of Kwilu to the *Conseil National de Liberation* (CNL), a powerful opposition party with strong Chinese affiliations.[202] Then, following the ONUC's withdrawal from the Congo in June 1964, Adoula's government collapsed. Kasavubu in turn appointed Tshombe as the new Congolese Prime Minister on 9 July 1964.[203] The situation deteriorated further as Tshombe focused on forming his new provisional government. On 4 August, CNL soldiers, who were commonly referred to as 'Simbas' and known for their brutality, seized control of Stanleyville, the capital of the Orientale province. According to Namikas, it was a bloody affair. The Simbas 'attacked, raped, and killed anyone' associated with the West. When the ANC eventually surrendered Stanleyville, the CNL soldiers then refused to allow approximately 1000 non-Congolese citizens, the majority of whom were of American or European origin, out of the city. Three

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[200] Gullion was also uncertain what Adoula had referred to. When relaying the conversation back to the State Department, he left a question mark after this point. Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1963, Ibid.

[201] Secret memorandum to Philip du Zulueta from Tom Bridges, 14 January 1963, PREM 11/4084, UKNA.

[202] For the quotes see Leopoldville Despatch No. 51 of the 12 July 1963 Visit of the Congolese Prime Minister, Monsieur Cyrille Adoula to London, 12 July 1963. For information on the CNL see, E. M. Rose, FO 167247 UKNA; 'British Policy in the Congo' report by G.E. Millard, 25 February 1964, FO 371/176683, Ibid.

[203] Telegram from Leopoldville (Mr. Rose) to Foreign Office, 10 July 1964, FO 371/176653, UKNA.

members of the US Consulate in Stanleyville – Michael Hoyt, Donald Parkes and Ernest Houle – were included among the hostages.[204]

There is a notable dearth of scholarship on Anglo-American relations during this period, the most likely explanation for which is a general view that Britain disengaged from the crisis after Grandslam. Those that do mention Anglo-American relations paint a negative picture. For instance, Kent and Namikas note the lack of a British role *em passim* within their analysis of the Kennedy and Johnson administration's handling of the hostage crisis. Desperate for bilateral military assistance to help fill the power vacuum left by the ONUC, American officials looked primarily towards Belgium and Britain for support. Overt help was eventually provided by the Belgians in November 1964 vis-à-vis a joint US-Belgian paratrooper mission termed *Operation Dragon Rouge* to rescue the hostages.[205] By contrast, Whitehall's assistance is argued to have been lacklustre; the British reluctantly accepted to stage the paratroopers on their base in Ascension Island but refused to participate militarily.

In the final stages of the Congo crisis, scholarship therefore depicts Belgium and the US as demonstrating close bilateral exchange and cooperation whilst the UK remained largely on the side-lines.[206] It is again understandable why. Following the culmination of Katanga's secession, Britain refused to become actively involved in Congolese affairs. From January 1963 to December 1964, officials in Washington were desperate to maintain order and stability in the country. Despite frequent attempts to convince Britain to engage militarily within the crisis, the Macmillan, Home and Wilson governments consistently refused.

For example, following Grandslam the primary objective for Washington was to ensure Adoula remained in power, which was a major challenge. Faced with continuing civil unrest

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[204] The Simbas attacked the American consulate and tried to shoot down the door. Hoyt et all had to take shelter in a vault. Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p.196-197; Fred Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge: the rescue of hostages in the Congo,* (Michigan, University of Michigan Library 1980) p.20; Telegram from Dar-Es-Salaam to Department of State, 5 August 1964, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3 8/64 [2 of 2], JBJL.

[205] See O'Malley, *Diplomacy and Decolonisation* pages 171-182.
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[206] Ibid; Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* pages 181-224. Scholarship that stops examination of Anglo-American relations before 1964 includes Ashton, *Irony of Interdependence;* James, *Congo Crisis* and O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis'.

throughout the country, complications with securing Katanga's social and economic reintegration, government corruption and a severely weakened economy, the Congolese Central Government looked set for imminent for collapse. After an investigative tour of the Congo in February 1963, Harlan Cleveland, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisations, recommended that the US engage in a 'multilateral coordination' with its allies to supply and train the ANC. The principal objective here was to increase the capabilities of the Congolese government in preparation for a 'rapid' but 'responsible' phase out of ONUC forces. Given Britain's vested interests in maintaining the Congo's political and economic stability, Harlan noted explicitly his belief that Macmillan's government would want to participate. [207]

Cleveland was wrong. Macmillan's government explained that they were sceptical of the decisive influence external forces in the Congo would have on Adoula's political situation. Privately, Foreign Office official Derek Riches likened Cleveland's plan to a 'steam-roller'; 'indifferent to the Congo's realities of tribalism and ignorance [of government].[208] Instead, in March 1963, Adoula signed military agreements with Belgium, Israel and Italy who all provided training, paratroopers and an air force for the ANC.[209] In July, the Kennedy administration also approved Washington's own military assistance for the Congo. Known as COMISH and run by Colonel Frank Williams, its principal purpose was to supply vehicles, aircraft and communication equipment to the ANC. It also recruited 'anti-Castro Cubans' to coordinate operations that were to be conducted under the auspices of the CIA. [210]

Requests for Britain's involvement were renewed when Johnson entered the White House. In contrast to Kennedy, Johnson had very little personal interest in or indeed knowledge of the crisis. As Vice President, he had attended very few high-level meetings concerning the country and participated actively in none. In fact, Johnson often perceived the Congo as his 'distraction', tried to keep the crisis off his agenda and when he could not, sought quick

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[207] 'United States Policy in the Congo Summary: A Plan of Action', Harlan Cleveland, n.d. The Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Congo-Post-1963- Trip, 2/63-3/63, JFKL.

[208] Derek Riches to Foreign Office, 1 February 1963, FO 371/167241, UKNA.

[209] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 176.

[210] 'Revolt in Congo Termed 'Serious' by US Officials' 15 August 1964, *The New York Times.*

solutions so it disappeared from his desk.[211] Decision making therefore fell to lower levels of government, albeit continuity rather than change was the outcome. A newly formed Congo Working Group for instance, headed by Director General of the Foreign Service, Joseph Palmer, recommended bolstering internationally-based solutions to secure Adoula's government.[212] Likewise, Rusk in February 1964, concerned about lack of coordination and unhurried pace at which the Belgian, Israeli, and Italian training programmes were taking place, urged Johnson to consider supplying tactical mobile training teams and approaching Washington's allies again for further support. Upon receiving this request though, Home's government asked only to be kept informed of crisis developments and training updates.[213]

Washington appealed for Whitehall's overt political and / or military support on two further occasions during the hostage crisis. In August 1964 William 'Bill' Shaufele, the officer in charge of Congo Affairs in the State Department approached Dennis Greenhill in the British Embassy in Washington. The subsequent explanation was as follows: the Americans had come to a boiling point in the Congo. The ONUC's withdrawal and Tshombe's assumption of power had made the extent to which Washington was involved in Congolese affairs public. Also, US officials now found themselves supporting a Congolese politician that Kennedy's administration had only recently tried to depose. These developments drew considerable domestic criticism upon Johnson's Congo policies. On 15 August for instance, Senator John Stennis warned publicly that the Congo was becoming the US's 'African Vietnam'. Resultantly, officials in Johnson's administration were desperate that Washington 'pulled their horns' from the country, for which they required urgently either European and / or African military presence. [214]

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[211] Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988) pp: 245-278.

[212] Namikas, *Battlefield Africa,* p. 201.

[213] The Congo, Confidential. Rusk to Johnson, 14 February 1964, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-1, USNA.

[214] Congressional and public criticism of the US's continued presence was unsurprisingly high. On 15 August for instance, Senator John Stennis publicly expressed his concern that the Congo was becoming the US's 'African Vietnam.' 'Revolt in Congo Termed 'Serious' by US Officials' 15 August 1964, *The New York Times*. For the quote see, Interview with Mr. Looram of the State Department, report by R.J.R Jones, 4 August 1964, FO 371/176660, UKNA. Also see, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 August 1964, FO 371/176660, Ibid.

The second American request was sent at the pinnacle of the crisis. Prior to this, and determined to remain as military uninvolved in the Congo as possible, the new American Ambassador to the Congo, George McMurtie Godley, had outlined a three-option approach for US officials. First, the US was to try to convince the Belgians to intervene militarily. Second, if the Belgians refused, the State Department would urge Tshombe to recruit a mercenary brigade with African support. Third, and only in the 'most extreme conditions' would the Americans be prepared to intervene militarily. [215] The first request to the Belgians was partially successful. Belgium's President, Henri Spaak, refused to intervene unilaterally but agreed to support a mercenary mission. Under the codename 'Ommedgang' the brigade was composed of South African, Rhodesian, Belgian, Spanish and Italian recruits and strengthened with US air support; a CIA fleet of T-6s and T-28s with rocket launchers and B-26 bombers. An attack on the CNL in early November was successful in liberating some villages but as forces neared Stanleyville, the Simbas panicked and threatened to 'kill all Americans'. After receiving a particularly gruesome report wherein Simba rebels had claimed they were prepared to 'turn the hearts of Belgians and Americans into fetishes and would make clothes from their skin', State Department officials concluded that the hostages were in 'imminent danger.' [216] The Director General of the Foreign Service, Joseph Palmer approached the Foreign Office and asked if the UK could participate in planning of, and supply two battalions of paratroopers for, the American-Belgian *Operation Dragon Rouge.* Despite there being Britons among the hostages, Home's government refused UK military support and Wilson's government declined to participate in US plans.[217]

However, contrary to traditional scholarly opinion, records do not indicate any crisis within Anglo-American relations resultant from Britain's non-participation in this aspect of the Congo crisis. Rather, American officials remained cognisant of the limitations under which Whitehall operated. For a start, knowledge of Dodson's direct influence over Tshombe in

[215] LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa- Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3, 8/64 [2 of 2] Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 5 August 1964.

[216] Ludo De Witte, 'The suppression of the Congo rebellions and the rise of Mobutu, 1963-5' *The International History Review,* Vol. 39: 1, (2017) pp: 107: 125. For the quote see page 117. Telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 22 November 1964, FO 371/176746, UKNA.

[217] Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 83, Congo, Volume 6 10/64-11/64 [3 of 4], LBJL.

December 1962 and January 1963 had driven Congolese association of Britain with meddling in the country's internal affairs. The ensuing pushback against British Consulate and Embassy staff was severe and left Britain with extremely limited room for diplomatic manoeuvre. On 9 January 1963 for instance, Dodson warned the Foreign Office of his rapidly waning reputation in Katanga. Indeed, Congolese officials were refusing to engage in any form of communication with him or the Consulate in Katanga. This message was followed closely by an attack on the British Embassy in Leopoldville which left 'considerable material damage' and injured Consulate staff. More troubling still, Derek Riches believed the attack had been sponsored by the Central Government. He informed the Foreign Office that Congolese police had refused to respond until 'an hour or so' after the attack had terminated.[218]

The formal dissolution of the CAF on 31 December 1963 also rendered open British participation in the Congo nigh on impossible. This was due to two significant considerations. First was the potential pushback from members of the Katanga and Rhodesia Lobbies. Indeed, that Britain had become involved in ending the Katangese succession had already drawn the ire of the Katanga Lobby. John Biggs Davidson, for example, had delivered two impassioned speeches to the House of Commons on 7 and 11 February 1963. In the former, he demanded an investigative inquiry into the cause and responsibility of Operation Grandslam: 'All allegations should be investigated whether arising from the latest offensive or from the two proceeding offensives. There have been no investigations so far…We require an impartial international investigation and we should make that a condition of continued support for the Congo operations.'[219] In the latter, he and fellow MP Dr Donald Johnson of Carlisle queried whether the UK should continue to support the ONUC economically when they had 'no effective say in what goes on? Is not this an impossible and humiliating situation for a great nation?'[220] Macmillan further noted the extent to which news of the CAF's demise in July 1963 divided the House of Commons and House of Lords. [221]

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[218] 'The Congo', 9 January 1963, West and Central Africa Department, FO 371/167245, UKNA: Attack on H.M. Embassy, Leopoldville, 15 January 1963, P.M. Foster to Lord Dundee, Security Department, ibid.

[219] HC Deb 07 February 1963 vol. 671 cc 677-746.

[220] HC Feb 11 February 1963 vol. 671 cc927-8.

[221] HL Deb 09 July 1963 vol. 251 cc1308-11.

British militarily involvement in the Congo under such conditions would risk serious tension within the Home government and even its overthrow.

Second, developments leading up to, and the collapse of, the CAF placed British officials in a very awkward position at the UN. During elections in December 1962, The Former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Edgar Whitehead was defeated by Winston Field who was member of the right-winged political party, the Rhodesian Front. Field's victory meant that Britain could no longer claim Southern Rhodesia was in the process of reform and thereby robbed British officials of any pretext for a continued colonial presence in the Federation. Therefore, throughout 1963, as Whitehall geared towards the CAF's dissolution, the Macmillan and Home governments were particularly sensitive to UN General Assembly attitude towards Britain's continued colonial presence in Central Africa.[222] Complicating matters still further was that Welensky, and later in 1964 Ian Smith once his Rhodesian Front Party overthrew Welensky, overtly supplied Rhodesian mercenary forces to the Congo. This compounded suspicions in the UN that Britain was attempting to preserve political and economic interests in the region.[223] It also caused Whitehall to worry about Welensky's and Smith's perceptions of crisis events., whom already saw Whitehall as abandoning the CAF to African nationalist sentiments. How would it look if the UK agreed to provide military support for Adoula or Tshombe, two Western-backed leaders in a country that had never been a part of Britain's colonial empire?[224]

US Secretary of State Rusk was especially sympathetic of these constraints and demonstrated a willingness to bolster the UK's weakening position in Africa whenever possible. In late January 1963, he admitted to David Bruce that he fancied the UK's participation in the nation-building stage of the Congo crisis would be 'very low indeed.'[225] Overt participation

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[222] Butler, 'Demise of the central African federation', p. 144.

[223] Hughes, 'Fighting for White Rule in Africa', p: 614.

[224] Outgoing Telegram Department of State, 14 January 1963, Dean Rusk, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/11/63-1/20/63., JFKL. For Welensky's thoughts on the dissolution of the CAF and his opinions of the British government thereafter see Sir Roy Welensky, *4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London: Collins, 1964) pp:330-369.

[225] Outgoing Telegram Department of State 23 January 1963, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/21/63-1/31/63, JFKL.

in post-Grandslam state-building in the Congo threatened to inspire bitter resentment from the Congolese and provoke the Katanga lobby concerning the UK's continued support for the ONUC. Additionally, trouble in the CAF and in South Africa and that both countries had plied the ANC with mercenary forces threatened severe international repercussions were the UK perceived to be overly involved in the Congo. Above all, though, Washington needed Britain to prevent as best possible Southern Rhodesia from declaring unilateral independence and the emergence of white majority rule in Central Africa.

Accordingly, to help ease at least some of Britain's concerns, Rusk instructed all US Ambassadorial stations in Africa to make 'constructive gestures' for Britain across the continent. [226] For the Congo specifically, American ambassadorial officials were asked to use every 'appropriate occasion' to press Congolese officials to make amends with the UK. The American Embassies in Leopoldville and Elisabethville did so willingly. On 4 February for example, Gullion cabled the State Department that he was strongly encouraging the Congolese to reconsider their relations with Dodson especially.[227] Later in February, the American Embassy cabled Washington again to relay diplomacy being undertaken on Britain's behalf.[228] Records reveal too that these efforts paid significant dividends. Whereas in January 1963 Dodson had informed the Foreign Office about his acceptance of his 'weakened position' in the Congo, the situation had improved dramatically by January 1964.[229] Within a year, Adoula had visited London and agreed to repay Britain for damages incurred to the British Consulates in Elisabethville and Leopoldville. Indeed, the Foreign Office could barely contain their bemusement when an end of year report for the Congo summarised that Anglo-Congolese relations were at an 'all time high.' [230]

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[226] Outgoing Telegram Department of State, 14 January 1963, Dean Rusk, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/11/63-1/20/63, Ibid.

[227] Ibid.; JFKL; Incoming telegram Department of State, 4 February 1963, Box 34 A, Congo Cables 2/63, Ibid.

[228] Incoming Telegram Department of State, 25 February 1963, Ibid.

[229] The Congo', 9 January 1963, West and Central Africa Department, FO 371/167245, UKNA.

[230] For overall summary of UK-Congolese relations and reimbursement of damages caused in Operation Grandslam see 'Congo Annual Review 1964' 23 January 1964, FO 371/176640, UKNA. For Adoula's acceptance of economic aid see, 'Meeting with Adoula', 31 October, E.M. Rose, FO 371/167249, Ibid.

British officials still remained of use for Washington. For a start, both Macmillan and Home upheld promises made to Kennedy's administration, suppressing as best possible criticism emanating from Britain towards the UNOC's activities or of US policy in the Congo. At the 7 February 1963 parliamentary debate for instance, Mr Humphrey Berkeley of Lancaster fended off what he referred to as rather heightened 'spluttering' from John Biggs-Davidson and Mr Luke Teeling during discussion of UN and US activities in the Congo.[231] Likewise on 23 January 1964, G.E. Millard of the Foreign Office amended Home's draft state speech so that it removed all statements which implied that the UN and the US had 'overstepped' their mark in the Congo. In explaining his actions, Millard stressed that the statement would have caused the UK unwarranted 'resentment' from Washington. [232]

In addition, American efforts to improve diplomatic conditions for Britain in the Congo allowed UK officials, in turn, to quietly partake in burden sharing activities and ease pressures upon their American counterparts. For example, in August 1964, alongside the Belgian mercenary attack on CNL forces, Johnson's administration also initiated phase two of their crisis plan and sought to press Tshombe to garner African support to establish an African-led mercenary brigade. However, as US relations with Tshombe were tentative at best, a request to approach the Congolese Prime Minister subsequently fell upon Whitehall's doorstep. Home's government doubted the likely success of the plan; the majority of African leaders were 'passionately opposed' to Tshombe and to the Belgium and US presence in the Congo more broadly. Nevertheless, officials in Whitehall and UK Ambassadors in the Congo adhered to American pleas. On 27 August 1964, Michael Rose, the new UK Ambassador in Leopoldville agreed to support Godley's representation to Kasavubu and Tshombe so as to encourage the Congolese leaders to make an approach to additional African states for support. [233]

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[231] HC Deb 07 February 1963 vol 671 cc677-746.

[232] 'Congo' Comments on the Secretary of State's Speech in the Foreign Affairs Debate in the House of Lords on February 6 1964, 'G. E. Millard 1 February 1964, FO 371/167245, UKNA.

[233] 'Congo', 27 August 1964, Memo from John Wilson, FO 371/17660, UKNA.

This small display of solidarity was significant to Washington as Tshombe agreed to the plan. He made several attempts to search for African allies and appealed directly to Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal and the Malagsay Republic for support. [234] When this plan failed,[235] William 'Bill' Schaufele approached the Foreign Office again in September and urged that Whitehall appeal to the OAU directly for their assistance in the Congo. Failing this, Shaufele added that as Uhuru Muigai Kenyetta was Chair of the OAU Commission, it would be 'most welcome' if the UK could discern specifically the 'Kenyan attitude on the whole question of the Congo'.[236] Home's Foreign Office agreed again to the request and were this time successful. The OAU announced their desire to open negotiations between Tshombe's government and the CNL in order to secure a ceasefire.[237] Although this plan too was later dissolved after Kenyetta requested swift US and Belgian military withdrawal from the Congo, Shaufele remained grateful of the UK's efforts. In a message passed through UK officials in Washington he thanked the UK for speaking to the Egyptians, Guineans, Cameroonians, Ghanaians, Kenyans and Swiss and assured that due to the UK's efforts, the State Department 'was somewhat more relaxed.'[238]

Finally, whereas previous literature has accorded only minimal significance to Whitehall's provision of Ascension Island during Operation Dragon Rouge, the implications for Washington and Anglo-American relations more broadly were larger. For a start, the Americans had been using Ascension Island as a base to stage United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft tasked with delivering material support to the Congo from August 1964. Although this was not the first time they had used the British island – the Americans had previously utilised it during the Second World War and again in 1957- in September 1964, US officials were rather shocked to realise that their presence on this occasion had been without a formal agreement. In fact, the existing Anglo-American arrangement provided only

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[234] Ibid.

[235] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 201.

[236] Ibid, p. 202; 'The Congo' 12 September 1964, John Wilson to the Foreign Office, FO 371/176660, UKNA.

[237] Ibid, p. 202.

[238] Owen of British Embassy to Foreign Office, 23 October, 1964, Ibid.

for the use of Ascension for rocket tracking. [239] The Foreign Office, previously unaware that US assistance flights to the Congo had been taking place from the island, was therefore also surprised to receive an apology for Washington's oversight. Nevertheless, the reaction that Johnson's administration received differed significantly from what might be expected between two sovereign states under these circumstances. Prime Minister Harold Wilson's government was supportive. It advised that it 'did not consider any formal exchange of letters was required' and the US were subsequently allowed continued access to the island through to November.[240]

Whitehall's provision of Ascension Island for US purposes in the Congo was therefore not 'begrudging' as previous literature has indicated.[241] Likewise, even though Wilson's government did not engage in the organisation and formulation of Operation Dragon Rouge, British officials did willingly and knowingly allow for its implementation. The significance here is not inconsequential given that potential leaks or discovery of the UK's quiet involvement in the crisis would have brought considerable African and domestic criticism upon Wilson's government. In fact, to allow for the Belgian paratrooper presence on Ascension Island Colonial Office officials were tasked with finding ways to work around legal limitations. Use of Ascension Island was traditionally saved for the provision of 'material assistance' to various crises. The Colonial Office successfully embedded the purpose of the mission in legal jargon, categorising American and Belgian actions as being 'purely humanitarian' and 'in no way intended as interferences in Congolese politics.' [242]

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[239] The Americans had previously utilised the island in the Second World War and again in 1957, CO 968/809, UKNA. Letter to Sir John Field of Plantation House from R.G. Pettit, 27 October 1964; ibid, Letter to Mr. Eastwood from J.D. Higham, 25 November 1964, ibid.

[240] For information on the American letter see, Memo from C.M. Rose to John Higham in the Colonial Office, 30 September 1964, Ibid. For British reaction see Letter to J.D. Higham from C.M. Rose, 13 November 1964, Ibid.

[241] Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, p. 157.

[242] For UK refusal to participate in contingency planning see, Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 83, Congo Volume 6, 10/64-11/64 [3 of 4], LJBL. For UK provision of Ascension Island see, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 November 1964, CO 968/809, UKNA.

Wilson's government also went to considerable lengths to ensure the operation's success. Previous literature neglects to mention that British officials facilitated a complete media blackout from the Island whilst the Operation was taking place. Such a request was initially sent by George Ball to the Foreign Office on 21 November. Potential leaks of the Operation would risk the hostages' lives and draw undue international criticism upon Belgian and American actions. Indeed, it would not be lost on the OAU and in the UN that the objective of Operation Dragon Rouge was to rescue only American and Europeans from further atrocities in the Congo. It would be exceedingly helpful to Washington's purposes, Ball explained, if Whitehall could impose the complete censorship of information to and from Ascension Island whilst the operation took place. [243] This was no small ask. Wilson's government had no legal power to impose the requested media blackout. Moreover, Operation Dragon Rouge spanned from 21 to 24 November, a significant period of time for which British officials would have to account.[244] Nevertheless, Wilson's government met US wishes. Anglo-American exchange passed through Rose and a Colonial Office official referred to as 'Downie' ensured UK officials were updated on the mission whilst also covering for any media speculation of crisis events. [245] The mission's final manoeuvre occurred at daybreak on 24 November. Ten C-130s flew 320 Belgian paratroopers into the Stanleyville airport and within an hour, the Belgians had stormed the Hotel Victoria, where the hostages were being kept. Overall, approximately 1600 hostages were rescued; thirty-nine were killed during the day's events.[246]

Perhaps most telling of continued Anglo-American intimacy though were reactions within Wilson's government to the international and domestic backlash they received from helping their American allies. Despite Britain's efforts to shroud the Operation in secrecy,

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[243] This request was initially sent on 21 November but it was extended until the Operation had been completed on 24 November. See Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension Island (Administrator) 21 November 1964; ibid, 22 November 1964; ibid, 23 November 1964; ibid, 24 November 1964, Ibid.

[244] Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Ascension Island (Administrator), 23 November 1964, Ibid.

[245] A telegram notes that the 'U.S. Government are most grateful for the imposition of the black-out' Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension, 21 November 1964. Ibid.

[246] Namikas, *Battleground Africa,* p. 206.

immediately after the mission the Belgian government released a public statement explaining what had happened – including clear reference to Ascension Island. The news unsurprisingly provoked an emotional response from the House of Commons. On 25 November, Anthony Fell demanded information of the US and Belgium's first 'initiative' in Ascension and whether the UK offered other undisclosed assistance in the Congo. Likewise, MP Tom Driberg of Barking demanded that Wilson's government 'not be so stupid.'[247] Still, though, Britain's response demonstrates none of the frustration or resentment of Johnson's administration claimed in previous literature. In fact, Wilson's government even authorised a further three-month extension on US use of Ascension Island.[248] In similar vein, upon receiving a formal apology from Johnson's administration, Ormsby-Gore – who was now referred to as Lord Harlech – jested with Ball: in dealing with the international repercussions of the Operation perhaps the Belgians 'felt the more people that they got on board the better.'[249]

Conclusion

Broader insights pertinent to overarching thesis research questions will be teased out in the overall conclusion. At this point it is important to draw some more specific conclusions about the Anglo-American experience in Congo and how the analysis provided sheds new light upon bilateral relations during the crisis.

Within the current literature there is a broad consensus that British and American officials came to loggerheads in the Congo. The heated discussions in December 1962 at Nassau and British discovery of a US military observer mission in the Congo are said to have forged an 'unbridgeable rift' between the two countries that was to last throughout the rest of the crisis.[250] Thereafter, officials in Whitehall are interpreted as either refusing to participate in the formulation and execution of Washington's ensuing policies or discovered that they were

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[247] HC Deb 25 November 1964 vol 702 cc1277-80.

[248] Washington to Foreign Office, 28 January 1965, CO 968/809, UKNA.

[249] Conversation between Lord Harlech and Ball, 20 November 1964, Congo III 11/7/64-17/3/66, National Security Files, Papers of George W. Ball, JBJL.

[250] O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis', p. 40.

left on the 'side-lines' as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations found more utility in cooperating with the Belgians.[251] This case is made especially vis—a-vis Whitehall's refusal to follow through with the final two phases of the UN Reconciliation Plan, namely the implementation of economic sanctions and military intervention.

Is this the full picture though? It is true that British and American frustration periodically spilled over at the highest diplomatic levels, including at the Nassau summit. Indeed, sentiments became so charged that discussions had to be postponed until the following day. Misgivings in Whitehall of perceived US activities in the Congo were also evident after international discovery of General Louise W Truman's military mission in Katanga. It is also accurate that as the ex-colonial power, Belgium proved to be an important ally for Washington. Spaak's government agreed, at least in principle, to adhere to the UN Reconciliation Plan, applied overt pressure on Tshombe to ensure his return to the Congo following Operation Grandslam and later assisted the Johnson administration liberate American and European hostages from CNL Simba soldiers.

Nevertheless, fine grain policy tracing beyond as well as during these crisis moments does not support claims of rift or long-term malaise. Rather, Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo continued long past Operation Grandslam. In January 1963 for instance, Kennedy's administration scrambled to prevent the expulsion of Derek Dodson of the British Consul in Elisabethville and worked to improve British diplomatic relations with Congolese officials. The Americans were clearly still willing to take calculated political risks with the Congolese government to ensure the British remained in the country. Conversely, officials in the Macmillan and Home governments were willing to use closely forged relations with Tshombe and with members of the UMHK to help achieve American crisis objectives, especially in ending Katanga's secession. Similarly, Wilson's assistance in the Johnson administration's handling of the Stanleyville hostage crisis in 1964 confirms that Anglo-American relation cooperation continued beyond the revered Kennedy/Macmillan era. Indeed, the informality with which the Americans were granted use of Ascension Island in November 1964 and were allowed to remain on the Island after Operation Dragon Rouge,

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[251] For arguments that the UK became 'side-lined' see Kent, *America, the UN and Decolonisation;* Kent, 'The Not so Special Relationship'; O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis'. For arguments that the UK refused to participate in the crisis see, Namikas, *Battleground Africa;* James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis.*

despite British domestic criticism of previous Anglo-American-Belgian activities in the Congo, is strongly discordant with claims in extant scholarship of Britain's 'begrudging' acquiescence.

Finally, while it is also true that following Operation Grandslam officials in Whitehall were left with only residual diplomatic influence in the Congo, it needs also to be recognised that this was only after, and also as a consequence of, the assistance Macmillan's government had provided in securing the end to the Katangese succession. Even then, there is much more to Britain's subtle diplomatic presence in the Congo crisis than has been hitherto recognised. For example, previous literature has overlooked that the British Ambassador to Leopoldville, Ian Scott, actively participated in US-Belgian contingency planning for the overthrow of Lumumba's government. It has also missed the subtle pressure Home's government placed upon Tshombe and on additional African and European leaders to help the Johnson administration bolster OAU and/or international support to fight against the CNL rebels in Stanleyville. Anglo-American cooperation continued for longer and in more forms than hitherto allowed. There was reciprocal appreciation of the constraints under which London and Washington operated. And when mutual frustrations did spill over, assiduous repair work conducted on both sides of the Atlantic reveals determination to avoid any break in Anglo-American relations.

Chapter Three

Anglo-American Relations and Crisis in Yemen

Arid, economically destitute, and ruled by Imam Ahmad bin Yahya- a tyrannical leader known for his morphine addiction- the Kingdom of Yemen in the early 1950s constituted an ostensibly innocuous political backwater in the Middle East. Yet, all this changed when the Imam's health started to deteriorate in 1955. Freed temporarily from Ahmad's control, the Imam's son, Mohammed al-Badr first established Yemen's bilateral relations with Egypt, the Soviet Union and additional Soviet-bloc countries between 1956 and 1957. Then, when Ahmad died on 19 September 1962, al-Badr became the new Imam of Yemen. However, his rule was rather short-lived. Only one week later, on 26 September, he was overthrown in a coup d'etat.[1]

The revolt was spearheaded by the Commander of al-Badr's bodyguard, Abdullah al-Sallal who, after deposing the Imam, proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and extended control out from the capital city Sana'a, across the second largest city, Taiz, and onward through the majority of Yemeni cities in the south and west of the country.[2] Sallal's regime also benefitted from Egyptian military backing but the coup was only partially successful.

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[1] Victoria Clark, *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2010); Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions* (London: Camelot Press, 1963).

[2] Victoria Clark, *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 63; Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of the Yemen to the Foreign Office, 28 September 1962, FO 371/162954, UKNA; Telegram from Mr. Gandy to the Foreign Office, 1 October 1962, FO 371/162964, UKNA; Dana Schmidt, *Yemen: The Unknown War* (London: Holt, 1968), pp.27-35; Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions* (London: Camelot Press, 1963), p. 130. For scholarship that points to al-Badr's rather unorthodox choice of disguise, see, Marieke Brandt *Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

Despite Yemeni radio announcements proclaiming his death, al-Badr survived. Disguised in an army uniform, or according to some interpretations, women's clothing, he fled to the Saudi Arabian border.[3] Meantime, al-Badr's Uncle, Prince Hassan bin Yahya, returned to Yemen, established a Royalist bulkhead amongst tribal groups, and opposed Sallal's government.[4]

The escalation and subsequent internationalisation of the Yemen Civil War transpired quickly thereafter. Sallal's Republican forces were bolstered by Egyptian and Soviet military and economic support. Similarly, Hassan, and al-Badr, upon his return to Yemen in October 1962, were supplied with sufficient military and economic backing from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to stage sizable counterattacks.[5] In fact, by September 1963, interweaving of the crisis into the contemporaneous Arab Cold War meant that Yemen played host to an impressive range of regional and international actors. This included an Egyptian military presence estimated to be 70 000 strong, Algerian military provisions for Sallal's Republican forces, Israeli and British mercenary support for the Royalists, and the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), which was established in July 1963 as a peacekeeping mission tasked with monitoring prospective Saudi and Egyptian military disengagement from the country.[6]

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[3] Schmidt, *The Unknown War* pp: 27-35; Ingrams, *The Yemen*, p. 130. For scholarship that points to al-Badr's rather unorthodox choice of disguise, see, Brandt, *Tribes and Politics in Yemen*, p. 52.

[4] Edgar O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 83; Schmidt, *Unknown War*, p. 27-35

[5] Al-Badr remained in the caves until he was forced to move by a Republican offensive in August 1964. Edgar O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 83; Schmidt, *Unknown War*, p. 27-35

[6] Although analysis of the Yemen crisis for this study ends in December 1964 in no way does this suggest that civil war ended here. Full Egyptian military withdrawal from the crisis was not achieved until 29 November 1967, with the war ending in principle on 8 February 1968 following the Republican victory in the 'Siege of Sana'a'. For more details on the implementation and operation of the UNYOM see, Norrie MacQueen, 'United Nations Observer Mission (UNYOM)' in Joachim Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen and Paul Williams, (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 179-185; Asher Orkaby, 'The Yemeni Civil War: The Final British-Egyptian Imperial Battleground' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 51, No. 2, (2015) pp. 195-207; Carl Von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (London: Cassel & Company, 1966). For details on how the crisis ended see, See Asher Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) pp: 198-199.

Deservedly so, Yemen's rich history with its tumultuous tribal and religious divisions, longstanding economic deprivation and turbulent experience with governance has attracted burgeoning scholarly attention. Some like Paul Dresch, Shelagh Weir, and Wilfred Thesinger have examined in detail Yemen's complex and distinctive culture, society, and tribal history.[7] Others like Ginny Hill, Victoria Clark, and Uzi Rabi have taken a broader approach, linking the Yemen Civil War or other aspects of Yemen's tempestuous political history to the country's current humanitarian crisis.[8] Through a similar vein, Asher Orkaby, Nahla Yassine-Hamdan, Frederick Pearson and Noman Kassim Almadhagi have used the Yemen Civil War to examine the implications of East-West Cold War power politics, or elements thereof, upon crisis mediation and/or state building in the Middle East. [9]

Scholarship focused on Anglo-American relations in the Yemen Civil War is much more limited in nature. Similar to the Belgian Congo crisis though, what exists has tended to treat the crisis as a brief moment of discord or as being indicative of longer-term malaise within Anglo-American relations at senior levels of UK and US government. Arguments herein often centre upon the inability of Macmillan's government and the Kennedy administration to agree on whether or not to provide diplomatic recognition to the YAR in December 1962; the Kennedy administration recognised Sallal's Republican regime whereas Macmillan's

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[7] Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shelagh Weir, *A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007); Wilfred Thesiger, *Arabian Sands* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).

[8] Isa Blumi, *Destroying Yemen: What Chaos in Arabia Tells Us About the World* (California: University of California Press, 2018); Ginny Hill, *Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017); Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification*; U. Braun, 'Prospects for Yemeni Unity' in B. R. Pridham, (ed) *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background* (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd, 1984) pp. 261-270; Helen Lackner and Daniel Varisco, *Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis* (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018). Clark, *Dancing on the Heads of Snakes.*

[9] Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War*; Nahla Yassine-Hamdan and Frederic Pearson. *Arab Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Mediation, negotiation and settlement of political disputes* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014); Noman Kassim Almadhagi, *Yemen and the United States: A Study of Small Power and Super-State Relationship 1962-1994* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). Also see Manfred Wenner, 'The Civil War in Yemen, 1962-1970' in Roy Licklider. (ed.) *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press, 1993) pp. 95-125.

government did not.[10] This fundamental policy difference it is often claimed, produced a nadir in relations that hampered potential UK-US cooperation in the crisis thereafter.[11]

This chapter examines afresh Anglo-American crisis management in the Yemen Civil War and the subsequent handling of UK-US bilateral relations in four sections. Section One establishes the necessary context of the Yemen crisis. It contours the Yemen's social, political, and economic condition in the late 1950s, details UK and US interests in the Yemen and determines the likely areas of Anglo-American policy coordination and discord therein. Sections Two, Three, and Four then trace the formulation of UK and US policy in the Yemen and British and American handling of their subsequent bilateral relations as the crisis unfolded. Consistent with the objectives of this thesis, particular attention is paid to the impact of senior level administrational changeovers, Anglo-American flashpoints, and examples of UK-US cooperation that have been neglected in previous scholarship. Ultimately, the chapter agrees with Clive Jones's interpretation of events. He argues that a nadir in Anglo-American relations was experienced at senior levels of government, but that this breakdown in relations did not transpire until March/April 1963.[12] However, this analysis goes further still. Whereas Jones argues that Anglo-American cooperation in Yemen ground to a halt when officials in Whitehall and Washington came to logger-heads, this chapter maintains that significant cooperation and burden sharing activities continued at lower levels of UK and US government.

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[10] Literature that focuses on Anglo-American relations and the YAR recognition dilemma includes, or touch upon aspects thereof include: Orkaby, 'The Yemeni Civil War' pp: 195–207; Craig A. Harrington, 'The Colonial Office and the Retreat from Aden: Great Britain in South Arabia, 1957-1967', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2014); Alexander R. Wieland, 'At Odds in 'Arabia Infelix': Anglo-American Relations and the Yemeni Revolution, September 1962-February 1963', Cold War Studies Programme (2009); Tia Culley and Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and a Dilemma Recognition: Royalists, Republicans and Crisis in the Yemen, 1962-1963, *The International History Review,* Vol. 42, No. 1. (2020) pp: 42-59; Taylor Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship' in the Persian Gulf Region, 1961-1963' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 38, No. 4. (2002), Vol. 38, No. 4, 95-122; Taylor Fain, '''Unfortunate Arabia'': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63', *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* Vol 12, No.2. (2001) pp: 125–52; Simon C. Smith, 'Revolution and reaction: South Arabia in the Aftermath of the Yemeni revolution', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* Vol. 28, No. 2 (2000) pp: 193–208; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*: 51.

[11] Accounts that take this view include: Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship' p. 116; Fain, ''Unfortunate Arabia' p. 127; Wieland, 'At Odds in 'Arabia Infelix'.

[12] Clive Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010) p.82-85.

Onset of the Yemen Crisis, UK, US (dis) interests and policy considerations in Yemen

Yemen's political, economic and social conditions were so poor in the late 1950s and early 1960s that A.I. Dawisha has likened the country to a thirteenth-century medieval theocracy.[13] Indeed, Yemen had no paved roads, no modern schools and only one operational bank. The vast majority of Yemen's society was tribal and, according to Edgar O'Ballance, often malnourished and living in squalor. Even Yemen's main cities were antiquated. Both Sana'a and Taiz were fortresses, enclosed within strong walls and with barriers that were locked at night to protect civilians from raids by neighbouring towns or from nomadic tribes domiciled in Yemen's mountainous regions. Nevertheless, raids in the cities were still routine and were facilitated considerably by the poor quality of Yemeni infrastructure. In fact, made traditionally of mud-brick, upper levels of houses were known to wash away during heavy rainstorms.[14] Perhaps unsurprisingly, Yemen's healthcare was equally dire. The country boasted only three hospitals and these were all so chronically short of staff, medicine, and supplies that medical care was, in the words of Fred Halliday, 'something completely unknown to the majority of Yemenis.' Approximately 80 percent of the Yemeni population suffered from trachoma. Outbreaks of malaria and typhus were also common and the infant mortality rate was one of the highest in the world. [15]

Often, Yemen's extreme underdevelopment is ascribed to the restoration of Imamate rule following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The *Zaidi* (Shi'a) rulers are said to have quashed development of civil society and maintained control by manipulating pre-existing sectarian rivalries and ethnic distinctions and promoting the *Zaidi* minority over the *Shafi'i* (Sunni) majority into positions of power in Yemen. To further their command over Yemeni civilians, the first Imam of Yemen following Ottoman rule, Yahya Muhammad Hamid ad-Din and his son and successor, Ahmad bin Yahya maintained a strict isolationist foreign policy, banned the printing press and other forms of technology, and permitted only a few Yemenis abroad. They also developed to a fine art Machiavellian instruments of governance

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[13] A. I. Dawisha, 'Intervention in the Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies' *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 29, No. 1. (1975) p. 48.

[14] O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen,* pp: 24-32.

[15] Fred Halliday, *Arabia without Sultans* (Middlesex: John Wiley, 1974), 92; O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen* p. 24-35.

such as the hostage system, public beheadings for political dissidence and the punitive billeting of soldiers.[16] In fact, to inspire fear amongst Yemeni citizens, Ahmad in his youth is believed to have tied a rope around his neck to make his eyes bulge from their sockets.[17]

Even under these strict conditions, however, Imamate control over the Yemeni population was by no means absolute. By the mid 1950s, the traditional edifices from which the Imamate had ruled Yemen began to disintegrate. Sizeable anti-Imamate opposition movements in and around neighbouring countries to Yemen had developed from the 1930s in response to poor living conditions, the style of governance, and a dire economy. The most notable of these organisations were the Free Yemeni Movement (FYM) which was founded in Aden in 1944, the Grand Yemeni Association (GYM) founded in Cairo in 1946 and the 'Famous Forty' which was established in Aden in 1947.[18] From these organisations had also flowed a number of attempted coups and assassination plots against the Imamate. Imam Yahya was assassinated by his former military general during the Alwaziri coup of 1948[19] and Ahmad survived so many assassination and coup attempts in the 1950s that he was aptly deemed *al-Dijinn* or 'genie'.[20]

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[16] M. Zabarah, 'The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 Seen as a Social Revolution' in B. Pridham (ed) *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background* (London: Croom Helm, 1984) p.77; Robert Burrowes, 'Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990' in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 23, No 4 (1991) p.485.

[17] This anecdote has of course been exaggerated over time. Ahmad also suffered from poor health, including chronic rheumatism. For description of Ahmad's appearance see: Schmidt, *Yemen: the Unknown War,* 37; Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Michigan: Longman, 1983), 121; Ingrams, *The Yemen* p. 14. For information on Ahmad's long-term health problems see Letter to J. E. Fretwell from Oliver Kemp in the Eastern Department, 1 January 1958, FO 371/132950, UKNA.

[18] For more information see, Robert Burrowes, 'The Famous Forty and Their Companions: North Yemen's First-Generation Modernists and Educational Emigrants', *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 59, No. 1 (2005) pp: 81-97. For full details of the establishment and significant of these Yemeni opposition groups see for instance, A.Z. al-Abdin, 'The Free Yemeni Movement (1940-48) and Its Ideas on Reform, *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 1. (1979) pp. 36-48; J. Leigh Douglas, *The Free Yemeni Movement 1935-1962* (Lebanon: The American University of Beirut, 1987); J. Leigh Douglas, 'The Free Yemeni Movement:1935-62' in B.R. Pridham (ed) *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Development* (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd, 1984) pp. 34-46.

[19] O'Ballance, *The War in Yemen,* p. 45.

[20] Asher Orkaby, 'The North Yemen civil war and the failure of the Federation of South Arabia', *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 53, No. 2. (2017) p. 71; Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution* p. 20.

Societal advancements from elsewhere in the Middle East also started to permeate Yemen's borders. Most notable here was the development of a non-tribal urban class in south and west Yemen. With no direct affiliation to the Imam, bordering the main ports of Hodeida and Mocha, and comprised of additional social groups such as artisans and a sizeable Jewish community, this group was known for their challenging ideas of modernism, promoting pan-Arabism and protesting for social change in Yemen.[21] Throughout the 1950s, these groups collaborated with the FYM and GYM to disseminate across the country the anti-Imam newspaper, *Saba* and similarly targeted literature. One widely circulated pamphlet for instance was entitled 'The Demands of the People' and read:

> The rulers of the country have been evil, false and ignorant…No one is left in towns and villages. All live in fear of robbery, bloodshed and rebellion. Foreign powers hope to occupy, colonise and enslave the Yemen, seeing that the Yemenis have no government…'[22]

Under these conditions, Ahmad's contraction of syphilis in 1955 proved problematic for the Imamate. According to Halliday, the Imam became completely dependent on morphine and would often lapse into fits of hallucination for days or even weeks on end.[23] This development was not inconsequential. As Ahmad was feared by Yemeni society his public presence often subdued potential for civil unrest or uprising. In addition, the Imamate maintained a limited Yemeni army but, as the military officers were habitually underpaid for their services, they often supplemented this work by spying on the Imamate for the FYM or GYM. Consequently, the Imamate chose instead to rely on the largest *Zaidi* tribal confederations, the *Hashid* and *Bakil* for their own security and protection. However, unable to leave the confines of his fortress in Sana'a to call for tribal support when needed, Ahmad found himself and his Imamate Kingdom unprotected and precariously susceptible to

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[21] See for instance, Wenner, 'The Civil War in Yemen; p. 98; Robert Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development 1962-1986* (London: Croom Helm, 1987) p. 21; Bat-Zion Eraqi Klorman, *The Jews in Yemen in the Nineteenth Century: A Portrait of a Messianic Community* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993).

[22] Dresch, *Modern Yemen,* p. 79; Orkaby, 'The International History of the Yemen Civil War' p. 56. .

[23] During these bouts Ahmad is said to have been locked in a room decorated with coloured lights and toys from 'where he would play alone.' Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans,* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1974), p.98.

overthrow. Little wonder then that Ahmad swiftly appointed his eldest son, Mohammed al-Badr, the Crown Prince of Yemen in the same year.[24]

Nevertheless, regarded even by his own family as young, naïve, and vain in character, al-Badr's appointment also had significant implications for the future of the Imamate. [25] Indeed, more recent scholarship has pointed to Yemeni society being more complex than simply consisting of tribal rivalries and Shi'a and Sunni religious differences and to the repercussions instead of al-Badr's appointment upon Yemeni society too. [26] First, J. Leigh Douglas maintains that regardless of their shared religious affinities, Yemeni tribal loyalties to the Imamate tended to be primarily pragmatic in nature and were therefore, never guaranteed. In fact, it had taken both Yahya and Ahmad many years of offering the *Hashid* and *Bakil* financial, political, and religious bribes before either leader garnered *Zaidi* tribal acquiescence to protect the Imamate.[27] Even then, the sustainability of this protection remained tentative at best. Both tribal confederations, for instance, supported an attempted coup against Ahmad early in 1955.[28] Second, appointed by his father, al-Badr's ascendency into power also negated traditional *Zaidi* conventions. Although selected from a finite hereditary group, the Imamate were customarily elected by the *Ulama,* learned *Zaidi* men with knowledge of Muslim law and traditions, rather than inheriting governing powers

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[24] Some accounts of Yemeni history claim that al-Badr became Crown Prince in 1959 following Ahmad's medical trip to Italy. See for instance, Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution,* p. 28. Archival documents however begin referring to al-Badr as 'Crown Prince' in 1955. See for instance, Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, 31 October 1955, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Vol. XIII, no. 422, FRUS.. Schmidt also refers to al-Badr as 'Crown Prince' in 1955. Schmidt, *Yemen: The Unknown War,* p.55.

[25] Al-Badr's cousin, Abdullah ibn al-Hussein for instance regarded him as 'dissolute, incompetent, and gullible.' Clive Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010) p. 24.

[26] Blumi, *Destroying Yemen* p. 35-84, M. Brandt, *Tribes and Politics in Yemen* p. 72-86.

[27] Imamate bribes to Yemeni tribal confederations included tax exceptions or permission to practice traditional laws rather than those expounded by Shari 'a Law, which the Imamate imposed upon Yemeni society. Douglas, *The Free Yemen Movement,* p. 5; Burrowes, 'Prelude to Unification', p. 486. For more information on the attempted coup in 1955 see, Orkaby, 'The North Yemen civil war' p. 71.

[28] Orkaby, 'The International History of the Yemen Civil War' p. 61.

through patriarchal lines.[29] Cumulatively, this meant al-Badr's authority had almost no founding basis within Yemeni tribes nor the general population.

Al-Badr therefore, was thrust immediately into a rather hazardous situation. Yemenis seemed ready for revolution and the overthrow of the Imamate. Yet, able to trust the loyalties of neither Yemen's army nor the *Zaidi* tribes, the Prince had few domestic options to turn to for support. Ultimately, al-Badr resolved to break with Yemen's isolationist foreign policy and to cultivate its international relations with non-aligned and Communist countries. In July 1956, Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union and agreed a military aid package that provided the Imamate with aging tanks, armoured personnel carriers, military aircraft, helicopters, small arms and ammunition.[30] Then, following a jaunt through Eastern Europe in November 1957, al-Badr signed aid agreements with China and exchanged diplomatic relations with Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. Full Yemeni-Soviet diplomatic relations were established soon thereafter with the formation of the Soviet Consulate in Taiz in 1958. Finally, in March 1958, Yemen aligned with the UAR on a federal basis, in what was referred to as the 'United Arab States' (UAS). [31]

Unlike in some other Middle Eastern crises such as the oil dispute in Iran in 1950-54, Anglo-American reactions to initial crisis developments were not complicated in the Yemen by significant UK or US established interests. In fact, Yemen's weak economic and social infrastructure alongside its 'archaic governmental machinery' meant that Washington nor Whitehall cared much for the country. [32] Indeed, Yemen fell so low on the Eisenhower administration's political radar that senior level officials were seemingly unaware of the country's existence. When first informed that Imam Ahmad had contracted syphilis for

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[29] Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, pp. 24-25.

[30] Jesse Ferris, 'Soviet Support for Egypt's Intervention in Yemen' *Cold War Studies,* Vol. 10, No. 1. (2008) p. 8.

[31] 'Soviet Penetration of the Yemen' report by D.M. H. Riches, 14 January, FO 371/132950, UKNA Ingrams, *The Yemen,* p. 101.

[32] 'Summary Report of Current Situation in Arabian Peninsula' n.d., RG59, Folder 14. Policy Papers-Saudi Arabia, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 2, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, USNA.

instance the director of the CIA, Allen Dulles is said to have asked his NSC staff, 'Yemen, What's the Yemen?...Imam? Never heard of that either.'[33]

Macmillan's government were, at the very least, cognisant of the Yemen. Nevertheless, Anglo-Yemeni relations were extremely poor. This was owed principally to Yemen's pre-existing claims to Aden and the surrounding Protectorate. A resolution to these claims had been attempted in 1934 with the Treaty of Sana'a, which affirmed that the UK and Yemen would abide by Anglo-Ottoman boundary demarcations. Nevertheless, differences in interpretation of the Treaty and ambiguities as to the exact referent points and demarcation lines had bequeathed a longstanding and unresolved border dispute between the Protectorate leaders, UK officials and the Imamate. Yemeni tribal raids into Protectorate territory occurred regularly, and depending on their intensity and frequency, were occasionally met with RAF bombing and strafing of Yemeni forts. This was a longstanding UK tactic that the Colonial Officer in Aden, Kennedy Trevaskis referred to as 'two tits for every tat.'[34]

Recent scholarship has therefore added the UK's imperialist 'divide-and-rule' strategies and poor relations with the Imam to explanatory factors in Yemen's social and economic underdevelopment. Whitehall, it is argued, limited the country's international relations generally and with the US in particular. Whereas the Imamate established official relations with Italy in 1926, Anglo-American agreements over UK spheres of influence meant that US relations with Yemen had been restricted previously to economic interests.[35] This is true on some levels but it is also important to acknowledge that the Imamate actively discouraged foreign and capital investment through the imposition of high import and export taxes. In addition, with coffee and *qat* as the main exports, Yemen simply offered very little to whet US economic nor political appetites.[36] Indication of Yemen petroleum and mineral resources

[33] Dulles c.t. in Chester Cooper, *In the Shadows of History: Fifty Years Behind the Scenes of Cold War Diplomacy* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005) p. 82; Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* 24.

[34] Trevaskis, *Shades of Amber,* p. 71. Also see, Stephen Harper, *Last Sunset,* (London: Collins,1978) pp. 29-31. Yemen Border, 23 January 1957, HC Deb, vol 563 cc179-82 [online] available from < https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1957/jan/23/yemen-border > (accessed 22/11/2017).

[35] Blumi, *Destroying Yemen,* pp: 35-84.

[36] Qat is a mildly narcotic plant that plays an important role in Yemeni culture. Though not hallucinogenic, chewing thef leaves serves as a stimulant. The ritual of chewing qat is said to lasted for several hours each day. For more information see, Halliday, *Arabia without Sultans,* p.88-89.

had ignited some interest from US oil companies in the early 1920s but nothing came to fruition. Likewise, in 1955, the Yemen Development Corporation, a small oil exploration company and Mecom Oil signed thirty-year agreements with Ahmad. Ultimately though, both companies were unsuccessful in their oil investigations.[37]

All this meant that Anglo-American appreciation of initial crisis developments in the Yemen was similar insofar as Washington and Whitehall cared little for the country's domestic affairs next to the potential destabilisation of the Arabian Peninsula. Here though, potential that the Yemen would become a Soviet proxy state or that the Imamate would rely increasingly on regional powers antipathetic to the West posed two significant concerns.[38] As was detailed in Chapter One, the fragile political state of both Saudi Arabia and Aden, together with Cold War considerations, meant significant potential repercussions were the Soviet Union or other Communist and / or non-aligned countries to secure a strategic foothold in Yemen. From there they could potentially stage military personnel, upset Whitehall's Aden-Federation merger plans, subvert vitally important UK and US strategic interests in the region, and also threaten Western aligned monarchies like House Saud in Saudi Arabia. British and American starting points were also broadly similar. Neither country had appropriate relations with, never mind leverage over the Imamate. Scope for UK or US manoeuvre was therefore extremely limited. Furthermore, with few British or American officials in Yemen, neither country would have known the reasoning behind al-Badr's approach to Egypt and Soviet-bloc countries. Given the politically tenuous state of the

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[37] According to O'Ballance, Mecom's contracts were cancelled soon thereafter due to perverse Yemeni restrictions and supervision of the company's personnel. For Orkaby the principal causes were 'natural conditions' and the onset of the 1962 Yemen civil war. Oil was later discovered in 1981 in the locations Mecom Oil had initially explored. For information on the initiation of the concession see, 'Summary Report of Current Situation in Arabian Peninsula', n.d., RG 59, Folder 14. Policy Papers-Saudi Arabia, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 2, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, USNA; 'Status of Basic Economic Aid Agreement with Yemen Uncertain', 12 November 1959, RG59, 1959 Weekly Summary of Events, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 1, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Ibid. For information on its cancellation see, Yitzhah Oran, (ed) *Middle East Record, Volume Two*, (Israel, The Moshe Dayan Center, 1961) p.705; O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen,* 54; Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* p. 27.

[38] Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 24 May, 1958, FRUS, Near East Region, Iraq, Iran, Arabian Peninsula, Vol. XII, No. 363.

Middle East at the time, both countries would have been quick consequently to perceive al-Badr as harbouring potential Communist sympathies.[39]

These considerations taken cumulatively produced Anglo-American agreement on two key objectives. First, both London and Washington needed to bolster the West's economic and political position in Yemen so as to counter the already established Soviet military and political presence in the country. Second, both governments needed to lure the Yemen out of the UAS and ensure as best possible that the country's new-found nationalist undertones did not spill over and inspire revolution or upset in Aden or Saudi Arabia.[40]

Beyond these shared objectives though, different regional responsibilities as well as varying historical experiences of the Yemen heralded different preferences, priorities and capabilities within UK and US policy approaches. The Americans, with few responsibilities in the region, were relatively free to cultivate Washington's bilateral relations with the Imamate. At the same time however, the US was also extremely unprepared for this task. In fact, in 1958, the Eisenhower administration did not even have an established American Legation in Yemen. Rather, US officials who had been assigned responsibility for the country had previously resided in either Saudi Arabia or Aden. It was also from Saudi Arabia or Aden that the vast majority of US Consulate responsibilities for Yemen had been undertaken. Indeed, American Consulate staff had only been expected to travel into Yemen for ten days every month.[41]

The immediate demand for an increased American diplomatic presence in Yemen thus meant that US officials, in the initial period of the crisis at least, had to work around a severe lack of diplomatic infrastructure in and knowledge of Yemen. The US Charge d'affaires in Yemen *ad interim,* Charles Ferguson for instance, at the immediate onset of crisis events, had the rather unique experience of initially residing at the Imam's guest house in Taiz so as to

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[39] Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June, 1958, RG 59, General Records of the department of State, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-1963, Box 150, CF 1021, Macmillan Talks, Washington, June, Memcons, USNA.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Herman Frederick Eilts, Oral History Interview, Yemen Country Reader [online] available from https://adst.org/Readers/Yemen.pdf (accessed 22/11/2018) p. 1.

appropriately administer his Consular duties.[42] Moreover, US officials in the already overworked and underfunded American Consulate in Aden found themselves increasingly pressed for time and resources. Indeed, William D. Wolle, a US Consular Officer in Aden recounts in his Oral History that between 1958 and 1960, US Consulate staff in Aden were also responsible for the Aden Protectorates and British Somaliland. The result of all this was that Ferguson could only afford to stay in Taiz for a few weeks at a time, thus making his task of improving Washington's diplomatic relations with Yemeni officials all the more challenging. [43]

Meantime, the sheer amount of colonial and domestic constraints upon the formulation of the UK's Yemen policy meant that Macmillan's government were much more limited than Washington as to the type and extent of support they could provide in order to counter the Soviet presence. For a start, the enduring Aden/Yemen border dispute between the UK and Yemen meant that a bolstered British diplomatic presence in the country was a non-option unless Anglo-Yemeni relations were first improved. Previously made and failed attempts to negotiate a compromise with the Imamate rendered this unlikely. Foreign Office officials had organised a round of discussions between the Imamate, additional Yemeni officers, and British officials in Aden in the Spring of 1957. Ultimately though, the meetings were inconclusive and had inflamed emotions on both sides.[44]

When formulating the UK's Yemen policy, officials in Whitehall also had to be mindful of heightened sensitivities and strong anti- Yemeni perceptions in Aden and the Protectorates and from within the Conservative Party too. In fact, these considerations were so significant that senior level British officials had implemented certain mechanisms to avoid responsibility for the retaliatory actions London authorised against Yemen. According to Spencer Mawby, British covert activities in Yemen were longstanding and dated back to Churchill's Conservative government. Often, acts ranging from sponsored tribal rebellions, gun-running and even air raids could be authorised from within the Colonial Office and subsequently

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[42] William D. Wolle, US Consular Officer in Aden (1958-1959) Oral History Interview, Yemen Country Reader [online] available from https://adst.org/Readers/Yemen.pdf (accessed 22/11/2018).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Brief for Private discussion with Mr. Dulles at Copenhagen, 30 April 1958, FO 371/132968, UKNA.

passed to Protectorate tribal leaders for deployment. Through these measures consecutive British governments had pacified Adeni and Protectorate concerns and opposed Imamate irredentist claims to Aden whilst also keeping as best possible, discussions of such activities off Cabinet records.[45]

Egyptian President Nasser's political connections to the Imamate and differing UK and US threat perceptions thereof portended another concern. Although officials in the Eisenhower administration wanted to draw Yemen away from the UAS, Washington was still willing to consider working alongside Nasser so to prevent further Soviet political and military encroachment into the country. Conversely, while British concern about possible Soviet gains in the Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East were genuine, their strongest representations of this were tactical, being aimed at presumed American over-sensitivity to the communist threat. Nasser's looming shadow over Yemen though and the potential damage he could cause for British interests in the region posed a much more immediate concern. Nasser already supported the SAL. Now, the possibility of a bolstered Egyptian political and military presence in Yemen would mean that Yemen tribes would be better supplied with arms and ammunition to subvert Aden-Federation merger plans. There was also very real potential that Nasser would inspire such strong nationalist sentiments from within some of the Protectorates that they would break from the Federation and join the UAR. In July 1958 for instance, the possibility that Lahej, a large Protectorate bordering Yemen would be pulled from the WAP and align with the Imamate and the UAS posed such a threat to Federation plans that Macmillan's government formally deposed the Sultan of Lahej, Sir Ali Abdul Karim and his family.[46]

British and American officials therefore operated within different frames in Yemen, even if their overall objectives were broadly aligned. Holding no past relations with the Imamate and relatively free of responsibilities in the Arabian Peninsula, officials in Washington could strengthen themselves diplomatically in the country and were potentially able to work with

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[45] Spencer Mawby, 'The clandestine defence of empire: British special operations in Yemen 1951-64' *Intelligence and National Security,* Vol. 17, No. 3, (2002) pp:111-112.

[46] (Withdrawal of Recognition) Hansard, HC Deb 10 July 1959, vol. 591 cc. 588-90 [online] available from < https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1958/jul/10/sultan-ali-of-lahej-withdrawal-of> (accessed 25/11/2018). Also see Harper, *Last Sunset,* p.41.

non-aligned countries like Egypt so to counter the Communist political influence over the Imamate. Although Whitehall also supported bolstering the West's economic and political presence in Yemen, any UK Yemen policy would have to be formulated so to avoid provoking opposition in Aden and the Protectorates as well as from within the Conservative Party and its backbenches. For now though, so long as crisis conditions could be appropriately managed, the UK and US were also well positioned to develop independent yet, complementary policies in Yemen. The Eisenhower administration could focus on establishing an American Consulate presence in Yemen whilst officials in Macmillan's government continued attempts to resolve the Aden/Yemen border disputed with the Imamate. However, as William Crawford, an official at the American Consulate in Aden, rather shrewdly informed State Department officials in September 1958, if crisis developments threatened upset in Aden and the Protectorates, Britain's longstanding covert activities against Yemen would potentially serve as the 'point of greatest divergence' for Anglo-American policy coordination.[47]

Establishing Relations with the Imamate: Initial Policy Consultation and Cooperation Under Eisenhower and Macmillan

Somewhat surprisingly, examination into the Macmillan government's and the Eisenhower administration's handling of Yemen initial crisis developments has been completely neglected within the extant literature. The closest relations study is by Taylor Fain, who uses the Persian Gulf to investigate Anglo-American crisis management and the handling of UK-US bilateral relations within a similar timeframe. Here, he argues that the alliance functioned only when the 'interests and priorities of both members coincided fully.'[48] While this is a rather sweeping conclusion it nevertheless has some applicability for this period of the Yemen crisis. Indeed, close examination into the Anglo-American handling of Yemen's initial crisis developments reveals broadly similar policy preferences in Whitehall and Washington and also, extremely close consultation, cooperation and burden sharing at all levels of UK and US government.

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[47] Telegram from the Consulate in Yemen to the Department of State, 22 September 1958, Near Eastern Region; Iraq; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XIII, 364, FRUS. [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d364 (accessed 12/09/2018).

[48] Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 38, No. 4, (2002) p. 116. Also see, "Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63'.

By 1958, both governments had encountered difficulties in their attempts to bolster relations with the Imamate. For instance, following the UK-Yemen discussions to resolve the Yemen-Aden border dispute in 1957, Yemeni raids into Protectorate territory had been renewed with such ferocity that in April 1958, Foreign Office officials had warned the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles of fears that Britain would soon lose the confidence of Protectorate leaders and as a result, would have to cancel Aden-Federation merger plans.[49] Likewise, Eisenhower's administration were struggling to establish an economic aid program to rival the assistance provided by the Soviet Union and China. Initially, in April 1957, the State Department had offered the Imam a development loan worth $2 million. Ahmad however, had immediately rejected this offer as being 'too small a figure.'[50] James Richards, Eisenhower's Special Representative to the Middle East, had approached Yemen again in December. This time, Washington had offered a $5 million US aerial survey mission to determine the construction of a road from Hodeida to Sana'a and for the subsequent provision of road-making equipment and US engineers. Nevertheless, the Imamate had remained rather unmoved by Washington's new proposal. By late February 1958, US officials were still waiting for news on whether or not their economic aid programme for Yemen had been accepted.[51] There were issues experienced in implementing the American Legation in Taiz too. The Eisenhower administration had first struggled to find suitable accommodation. Then, when an appropriate building was discovered in 1958, the Americans found themselves involved in a bidding war with China as to which would offer the Imamate the most rent for the coveted space.[52]

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[49] Brief for Private discussion with Mr. Dulles at Copenhagen, 30 April 1958, FO 371/132968, UKNA.

[50] 'The Yemen: Annual Review for 1958' draft report from Mr Kemp to Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution, CO 1015/1260, UKNA.

[51] 'The Yemen: Annual Review for 1958' draft report from Mr Kemp to Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution, Ibid. ; Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Rockwell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree), 21 February 1958, Near Eastern Region, Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, 360, FRUS, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d360 (accessed 12/09/2018).

[52] With the Complements of the Under-Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, 17 September, 1959, CO 1015/1268, UKNA.

Throughout this period though, the British and American governments offered support where possible to help their counterparts achieve their policy objectives. For example, in May 1958, David Newson, the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the State Department acted as a mediator of sorts between the Governor of Aden, William Luce and Yemeni officials. In the hopes of finding common ground so the UK and Yemen could renew their discussions over the Aden/Yemen border dispute, Newson engaged in telegram communication with both sides, offering potential solutions for Luce and the Yemenis to deliberate. Ultimately though, the endeavour failed; Adeni and Yemeni positions were in such stark contrast over the issue that the American officials could not find a solution. Nevertheless, Newson's actions were still warmly appreciated in Whitehall. [53]

Likewise, Macmillan's Foreign Office also willingly shared their extensive knowledge of the Arabian Peninsula with the Americans and provided US officials counsel so as to ease the transition of their Legation in Yemen. Indeed, the advice the Americans received ranged from seemingly trivial matters, like how best to manage locust swarms- officials in Macmillan's Arabian Department advised that anti-locust treatment was used early on in the growing season for the poison to take effect[54]- to the best locations in Taiz to find suitable housing and how to deal with Yemeni politics and additional legalities when signing tenancy contracts and negotiating rent. [55]

However, it is important to note that even in the early stages of the crisis, UK and US policy priorities did not coincide fully. Both sides had recognised potential for Anglo-American discord in Yemen from the outset. State Department officials for instance found the UK's hard-lined stance against Yemeni officials a significant cause for concern. In addition to Newson's attempt to find a compromise between Adeni and Yemeni officials, a State Department plan to implement an UN observer mission on the Aden/Yemeni border had also been proposed as a possible policy alternative in April 1958. Yet, the plan had been dropped immediately after Whitehall received fervent opposition from the Governor of Aden, William

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[53] Confidential 'Yemen/Aden', Note by D.M.H. Riches, 12 May 1958, FO 371/132952, UKNA.

[54] Telegram from D.M.H. Riches to Walmsley, 22 April 1958, CO 1015/1260, Ibid.; Letter from Christopher Pirie-Gordon to the Arabian Department, 5 May 1959, Ibid.

[55] With the Complements of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 September 1959, CO 1015/1268, Ibid.

Luce.[56] This had been much to Washington's frustration. Continuing UK retaliatory strikes on Yemen, the Eisenhower administration perceived, not only exacerbated Adeni/Yemeni border tensions but also drew international criticism upon Whitehall's colonial policies.[57]

Similarly, diffidence amongst some UK officials at Washington's new presence in the region was evident. In January 1958, Foreign Office official, Derek Riches confided in Sir Bernard Reilly in the Colonial Office his anxiety concerning the potential implications for the UK if the American economic aid programme was successfully implemented in Yemen. If it were substantial either in sum or design, it would create difficulties for the UK to match in the Protectorate. In addition, Riches feared that the road construction project especially would be potentially manipulated by the Yemenis to facilitate their attacks on Aden and the Protectorate.[58]

Varying threat perceptions of Nasser and the potential repercussions these differences had upon UK-US cooperation in Yemen was also immediately evident. Early on in the crisis, State Department officials resolved that Nasser's influence over the Imamate was much less burdensome to US interests in the region than was the overt Communist military support for Yemen, and that consequently, Washington was potentially willing to work alongside Egypt to steer crisis events in the West's favour.[59] Therefore, on 28 October 1958, the US Ambassador in Cairo, Raymond Hare received State Department instruction to ask Nasser to encourage the Imamate to cooperate with the Americans. This was a low-cost and low-priority request. Still caught in the bidding war over the legation building with China, Washington's approach to Nasser was directed specifically towards securing housing for US officials in Taiz. It had no direct implications for Britain and, in fact, fell so low even on the

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[56] Brief for private discussion with Mr. Dulles at Copenhagen' 30 April 1958, FO 371/132968, Ibid; Note by Sir F. Hoyer Miller in response to Riches memo 'Yemen: Complaint in the United Nations' 16 April 1958, Ibid.

[57] Note by Sir F. Hoyer Miller in response to Riches memo 'Yemen: Complaint in the United Nations' 16 April 1958, Ibid.

[58] 'Confidential' Letter to Sir Bernard Reilley from Derek Riches, 9 January 1958, CO 1015/1265 Ibid.; Soviet Penetration of the Yemen' by Derek Riches, 17 Jan.1958, FO 371/132950, Ibid.

[59] On 28 October 1958, M. S. Weir of the UK Embassy in Washington wrote that 'State Department and Ambassador judge, from all the available evidence that Nasser does not really care about the Yemen and regards it and the regime there as a joke.' 'Top Secret and Personal' M.S. Weir to A.R. Walmsely , 28 October, 1958, FO 371/132639, Ibid.

Ambassador Hare's policy priority list that he was only prepared to make such an approach to Nasser if he were called to discuss additional matters with Nasser that were more substantial to US interests. Nevertheless, even the *prospect* of this plan evidently induced anxiety within Macmillan's government. Upon learning of Hare's instructions for instance, M.S. Weir of the UK Embassy in Washington wrote to the Foreign Office of the potentially 'disturbing' consequences for UK interests in the Arabian Peninsula should the State Department pin their 'hopes on Nasser for any action to improve the situation in Yemen.' [60]

If UK and US policy differences were evident from the outset what then, to borrow Taylor Fain's words, kept the alliance 'functioning' at this stage of the crisis? Beyond broadly similar crisis objectives there are three factors to consider. First, close consultation between British and American officials at senior levels of government helped to facilitate mutual understanding and appreciation of the policy constraints and challenges each side faced. Allen Dulles for example was well aware that the Foreign Office were desperate to end the Aden/Yemen border dispute. Indeed, some British officials including Derek Riches and the Assistant Undersecretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, Harold Beeley had been in favour of the State Department's offer in April 1958 to implement an UN observer mission on the Yemen/Aden border. Nevertheless, increased Yemeni raids into Protectorate territory, Dulles duly informed the National Security Council on 1 May 1958, had made the situation so dangerous that the proposed UN observer mission had been deemed immediately as a non-option. Most importantly, it would have raised suspicion amongst Protectorate leaders of the UK's weakening prestige in the Middle East and heightened international criticism of Britain's colonial presence in Aden. Better to establish a Legation in Yemen and influence events from inside the country, Dulles resolved, then to quarrel with Macmillan's government about how best to solve the border dispute with Yemen. [61]

Second, American resolve not to become too 'bogged down' in Yemen also alleviated matters considerably. Early in 1959, Imam Ahmad responded to the State Department's proposed economic aid programme. The Imamate still thought the programme was too small

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[60] 'Top Secret and Personal' M.S. Weir to A.R. Walmsely, 28 October 1958, FO 371/132950, Ibid.

[61] Editorial Note, 362, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII , FRUS, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d362 (accessed 12/09/2018).

and requested that the US match something similar to the Soviet Union or China. Soviet bloc credits for purchases of military equipment amounted to approximately $20 million while credits for economic development were approximately $40 million. Likewise, China was engaged in a road building programme which housed an estimated 1000 technicians in the Yemen.[62] Officials in Washington though were steadfast that US economic assistance to Yemen was to remain limited in nature and would not be directly associated with US political support for the Imamate. This line of reasoning was summed up by Arwin Meyer, the Director of the Department of Near Eastern Affairs: 'Budgetary support to the Imam would involve [the US] in a never-ending process; it would be …merely the beginning of a long term policy and commitment. The United States already had a heavy burden of this type in such countries as Jordan where at least [there were] competent and well-disposed leaders with whom to deal.'[63] The resulting US economic aid programme, which remained centred upon the construction of a gravel road between Taiz and Sana'a, was ultimately eclipsed by Soviet and Chinese military, technical and financial assistance.[64] In addition, the final product offered nothing which would provoke envy from Protectorate leaders. According to Asher Orkaby, given the gravel surfacing and mountainous terrain, the road was so treacherous upon its completion that Yemeni drivers deemed it 'the American death road.'[65]

In fact, lack of vested US interests in Yemen meant that the UK's covert activities against the Imamate may have also received veiled support at the highest diplomatic levels in

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[62] Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to Acting Secretary of State (Dillon), 7 July 1960, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, vol. XII ed. Edward Keefer, FRUS, doc. 374; 'Soviet Penetration of the Yemen', report by Derek Riches, 14 January 1957, FO 371/132950, UKNA. For information on the Sino-Soviet program see, 'Summary Report of Current Situation in Arabian Peninsula' n.d., RG 59, 5-6, Folder 14. Policy Papers-Saudi Arabia, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 2, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, USNA.

[63] Financial Assistance to Imam of Yemen, 6 November 1959, Memos of Conversations, Box1, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Ibid.

[64] For information on the American economic aid program, see Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to Acting Secretary of State (Dillon), 7 July 1960, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, FRUS, doc. 374; 'Soviet Penetration of the Yemen', report by Derek Riches, 14 January 1957, FO 371/132950, UKNA. For information on the Sino-Soviet program, see 'Summary Report of Current Situation in Arabian Peninsula' n.d., RG 59, 5-6, Folder 14. Policy Papers Saudi Arabia, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 2, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, USNA.

[65] Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* p. 121.

Washington. For example, upon learning from Allen Dulles of the Soviet military presence in Yemen, Eisenhower had suggested in an NSC meeting in May 1958 that the UK should 'start a full-scale war and eliminate Yemen. It was, after all, a small place.' [66] This suggestion may have been tongue-and-cheek and no subsequent policy discussion in this meeting. Nevertheless, a conversation shared between Macmillan, Allen Dulles, and the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles in June 1958 is most suggestive of UK officials receiving US sanction of at least some of their covert activities in Yemen. During the discussion, both governments deliberated a policy option wherein al-Badr would be removed from Yemen and replaced by his Uncle, Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who was known and appreciated by UK and US officials for his desire to cultivate Yemen's bilateral relations with the West. The plan was never implemented but it nevertheless demonstrates the intimacy of UK and US collaboration during this period. Indeed, Macmillan and Allen Dulles especially were prepared to initiate the 'scheme', the latter even suggesting that the US could sound out King Saud to acquire Saudi Arabian assistance in facilitating the plan. [67]

Ironically though, it was the Imam Ahmad and ensuing crisis events which ultimately drew UK and US crisis positions into close alignment. Indeed, Ahmad eased concerns in Washington and Whitehall considerably by complicating Yemen's bilateral relations with Egypt and the Soviet Union. During the Imam's long absences, al-Badr would cultivate Yemen's international relations. Yet, the Imam would often reappear only to negate his son's diplomacy. The ensuing power struggle that developed between the two certainly spelled for unusual interaction for foreign leaders and evidently frustrated Khrushchev and Nasser. According to Edgar O'Ballance, Soviet military aid ended abruptly in August 1958 owing partially to non-payment by the Imamate and partially to Soviet objection to their weaponry being 'left to rust away.'[68] Yemen's relations with Egypt were equally tumultuous. Although al-Badr cultivated amicable relations with Nasser, Egyptian sentiments were not reciprocated with Ahmad. In fact, in 1960, Nasser approached al-Badr to overthrow his father and establish Yemen as an Egyptian proxy-state. Subsequent plans for this coup were

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[66] Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council, 1 May 1958, Box 3, NSC, DDE.

[67] Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June 1958, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-1963, Box 150, CF 1021- Macmillan Talks, Washington, June Memcons, USNA.

[68] O'Ballance, *The War in Yemen,* p. 56.

underway in 1961 when Ahmad learned of the plot. Furious with his son, he punished al-Badr by prohibiting him from leaving the country. Egypt's relations with the Imamate deteriorated swiftly thereafter. Nasser expelled Yemen from the UAS in December 1961 and labelled Ahmad and al-Badr reactionaries alongside King Hussein of Jordan and King Saud. The dissolution of the UAS followed closely thereafter. [69]

Much to Washington and Whitehall's relief, Ahmad's deteriorating health also eased Adeni/Yemeni friction, even if only temporarily. In August 1958, Mr. Oldfield, a British consul official in Taiz, wrote to the Arabian Department in the Foreign Office of his unusual sense of boredom in Yemen. The Imam was more or less indisposed and al-Badr had failed to garner the respect of neither the Yemeni army nor *Zaidi* tribes. The resulting power vacuum meant that Yemenis were waiting for their next instructions on whether or not to attack Aden. In light of these events, British retaliatory air strikes and additional covert activities upon Yemen had also been suspended. Indeed, Oldfield noted an eerie 'state of inertia' that had developed between Yemen and Aden: 'absolutely nothing [is] taking place. Even the rumours are ordinary!' [70]

Therefore, by 1959, senior level government officials in the UK and US could do little else to influence crisis events. Policy objectives on both sides of the Atlantic had either been achieved and / or developments had reduced concern. The American Legation in Taiz for instance opened on 16 March 1959.[71] Likewise, Washington's economic aid programme was underway and although significantly smaller than those provided by Communist countries, this comparative disadvantage was seemingly offset by Yemen's rapidly deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, although the Aden/Yemen border dispute had not been resolved, Yemen's temporary ceasefire quietened Adeni and Protectorate protest sufficiently for the issue to fall down on Whitehall's list of policy priorities. Indeed, it is

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[69] Hill, *Yemen Endures,* p. 21.

[70] Letter from K. Oldfield from the British Legation in Taiz to the Eastern Department, 4 August 1958, FO 371/132952, UKNA.

[71] Telegram from the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of States, 19 March 1959, FRUS, [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d368> (accessed 11/12/2018).

telling of the temporary lull in crisis events that senior level discussions of Yemen slowed considerably between the Eisenhower administration and the Macmillan government.

That said, close collaboration and burden sharing at lower levels of UK and US government increased at the same time as senior level policy discussions tapered off. This is all the more remarkable given that American officials at the American Legation in Taiz had only just established themselves in Yemen. For instance, as he settled into his position and started cultivating US diplomatic relations with Yemeni officials, the American Charge d'affaires *ad interim* in Taiz, Charles Ferguson also formulated a plan, independent of State Department instruction, to help simultaneously improve UK-Yemeni relations. As soon as the American Legation formally opened in Taiz, Ferguson began hosting 'film supper parties' and invited British and Adeni officials as well as Yemeni ministry and local dignitaries. The plan proved so successful that in August 1959, Christopher Pirie-Gordon, the UK Charge d'affaires in Taiz and William Morris, the First Secretary of the UK Embassy in Washington wrote to the State Department to pay compliments to Ferguson's efforts and thanked him for breaking down 'traditional' Anglo-Yemeni reserve and xenophobia. [72]

Perhaps most telling of the intimacy of lower-level Anglo-American exchange though, and also completely neglected within extant literature, is that Pirie-Gordon was able to influence State Department selection of the first official American Charge d'affaires in Taiz. In late January 1960, Ferguson retired from the Foreign Service and the State Department had to select his replacement. [73] Initially, Phillip Ireland was nominated for the position. He was at the time serving as the US Consul General in Aleppo, Syria. However, officials in Macmillan's Foreign Office and UK officials working in Taiz especially were immediately opposed to this decision. Pirie-Gordon in particular believed Ireland was too 'humourless', 'difficult' and 'my good lady' to appropriately influence Yemeni officials and secure US interests in the country. Rather, as an alternative, Pirie-Gordon suggested that the State Department select William 'Bill' Stolzfus, an official in the US Embassy in Aden for the role.

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[72] UK Charge in Yemen Complements American Colleague, 18 August 1959, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 1, 1959 Memos of Conversations, USNA.

[73] William A. Stolzfus, W. Oral History Interview, Yemen Country Reader [online] available from https://adst.org/Readers/Yemen.pdf (accessed 22/11/2018).

Stolzfus already had knowledge of the region and his character, Pirie-Gordon believed, was better suited to deal with Yemeni officials. This appeal was subsequently passed from the Foreign Office to Parker T. Hart, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on 7 January 1960.[74]

Evidently, Pirie-Gordon's request sat uncomfortably with the State Department. In fact, Herman Elits, the US Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs and Near Eastern Regional Affairs in the State Department informed officials at the British Embassy in Washington in private that the US Office of Personnel were reluctant to make the alteration. Ireland was an experienced diplomat who boasted seniority over Stolzfus. Besides, the State Department had already informed him of his pending position in Taiz. Moreover, Stolzfus had not completed his full tour in Aden and members of Congress and Congressman James Rooney in particular, were known to take issue with diplomatic transfers prior to their statutory two years in a post.[75] Ultimately though, Pirie-Gordon and the Foreign Office prevailed. The State Department selected Stolzfus as the first US Charge d'affaires in Taiz on 10 February 1960.[76]

At this stage of the crisis, Anglo-American relations were characterised by relatively brief exploratory high level talks that established similar objectives and an understanding of different considerations bearing upon the policies of Washington and Whitehall. The Eisenhower administration was unprepared and unwilling to become too involved directly with events in Yemen and were willing instead to consider cooperating with Nasser to achieve their policy objectives. The UK had responsibilities in Aden and the surrounding Protectorate, which rendered Macmillan's government sensitive to the perceptions of Adeni officials, Protectorate tribal leaders and Conservative Party backbenchers. British policy would also be conducted under the shadow to the Suez crisis; any perceived weakness could damage British interests and it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to work with

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[74] Letter from Willie Morris to J.C. Edmonds of the Arabian Department, 7 January 1960, FO 371/149229, UKNA; For Pirie-Gordon's quote regarding Ireland see, Letter from R. A. Beaumont to Willie Morris in the UK Embassy in Washington, 1 February 1960, ibid.

[75] Letter to A. R. Walmsley in the Arabian Department from M. S. Weir from the British Embassy in Washington, 4 February 1960, ibid.

[76] Letter from the Chancery to the Arabian Department, 10 February 1960, ibid.

Nasser. Meantime, Anglo-American cooperation at lower levels of government thickened. This ranged from confidential information sharing and efforts to improve UK-Yemen relations through to British influencing of US appointments to Yemen.

Revolution, the YAR, and UK-US Recognition Dilemma: Policy Discord Under Kennedy and Macmillan?

For Whitehall and Washington, appreciations of Yemen's affairs continued relatively unchanged from 1960 through to September 1962. The Soviet and Chinese presence remained vis-à-vis their economic aid programmes. Nevertheless, as newspapers and other forms of media were forbidden by Ahmad, Yemenis were generally unaware of either the American or Communist presence in the country. Likewise, with no serious border incidents, even Anglo-Yemeni relations remained compliant during this period. In fact, in June 1961, the Governor of Aden, William Luce and Ahmad agreed to reopen the Aden/Yemen border dispute for discussions. The meeting however never came to fruition. Luce's helicopter crashed on his journey to meet the Imamate. The Governor survived unscathed but the poor flying conditions meant that Luce never made it to Yemen.[77]

However, Sallal's overthrow of the Imamate dynasty on 26 September 1962 altered conditions in Yemen considerably. The once, isolationist and politically backward country was now politically and militarily divided between two warring factions. In addition, Egyptian backing of the revolution, the extent of its military presence in the country thereafter, and that Saudi Arabia and Jordan immediately supported al-Badr and Hassan's Royalist forces to counter the Egyptian threat meant that Yemen also offered an extremely viable staging point for the escalation of the Arab Cold War. By 1962, Syria had already seceded from the UAR. Of the major Arab states, only Algeria maintained friendly relations with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were united in their fear of Nasser.[78]

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[77] Yemen Annual Review, January 1962, FO 371/156935, UKNA.

[78] Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline in Egyptian Power, (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 28; Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War*, 7.

Scholarship generally interprets Macmillan and Kennedy's handling of their bilateral relations in the initial stages of the Yemen Civil War as demonstrating growing tension and culminating in a breakdown in relations in December 1962. Reasoning here is usually ascribed to the different frames through which UK and US officials perceived crisis events and the emotions that were experienced in Whitehall and Washington as both countries ultimately adopted discordant recognition policies. Indeed, the Kennedy administration provided diplomatic recognition to the YAR in December 1962 and Macmillan's government did not. [79] Taylor Fain for instance, speaks of the recognition dilemma has having 'divided US and British policy makers for much of the autumn and winter [of 1962].[80] Likewise, Asher Orkaby claims that the UK and US were 'pitted' against each other during this period of the Yemen crisis.[81]

At first sight, the gathering differences between the UK's and US's evolving recognition policies lend credence to such interpretations. Indeed, in dealing with the coup, policy differences that had been acknowledged by Macmillan's government and the Eisenhower administration were immediately replayed under Macmillan and Kennedy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, varying threat perception of Nasser's overt military presence in Yemen presented the principal portent of concern. As was detailed in Chapter One, Kennedy was committed to improving diplomatic relations with Nasser. This resolve had been underscored by implementing a number of 'pro Nasser' individuals into strategically important policymaking positions within his administration. John Badeau for instance, was selected as the American Ambassador in Cairo, Robert Komer as the Middle East Specialist on the National Security Council, and Phillips Talbot as the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[82] Resultantly, the British were immediately advised that so long as

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[79] Accounts that take this view include: Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship', p. 116; Fain, ''Unfortunate Arabia' p. 127; Wieland, 'At Odds in 'Arabia Infelix'.

[80] Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship', p. 109.

[81] Orkaby, 'The Yemen Civil War', p.202.

[82] PM Macmillan's Visit to Washington, 4/27-29/62, Chronology 2 of 2, Box 285, RG 59 Generarl Records of the Department of State- Conference Files, 1949-1963, CF 2087, USNA; Roby Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I.B Tauris, 2007) p. 196.

Egyptian relations with the YAR and support for Sallal's government were based on Yemeni sovereignty, 'the nature of the relationship was no concern to the United States.'[83]

This information caused instant anxiety for the Macmillan government. An Egyptian-backed YAR and Nasser's looming revolutionary political presence in Yemen posed a momentous threat to Britain's position in the Arabian Peninsula.[84] With the Aden-Federation merger set for 18 January 1963, foremost to British concerns was that Egypt's military presence in Yemen might potentially inspire a 'Nasserite vanguard in Aden' that would work as a 'fifth column' in Nasser's plan to undermine Britain's presence in the Persian Gulf.[85] As Yemeni emigres constituted one-third of Aden's population, maintained strong ties to their homeland and had no sense of Adeni identity there was a very real possibility that the Yemeni revolution would inspire similar revolutionary movements in either Aden or the surrounding Protectorates. These fears were substantiated considerably by the initial Adeni reaction to the coup d'etat. On 26 September, no more than 12 hours prior to Sallal's overthrow, the Aden Legislative Council had narrowly approved the Aden-Federation merger plan. The vote had been won by such a precariously small margin that Sir Charles Johnson, William Luce's successor as the Governor of Aden was convinced that there would have been a different outcome had the sequence of events been different:

> 'If the Yemeni revolution had come one day earlier, or the Legislative Council
> Vote one day later, I feel pretty certain that the London Agreement would
> never had obtained the support of a majority of local members. In the new
> atmosphere at least one more Government supporter would have defected to
> the opposition.'[86]

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[83] Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir Charles Johnston, 1 October 1962, CO 1015/2150, UKNA.

[84] Implications of the Revolution in Yemen', Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 4 October 1962, Yemen General 10/1/62-10/8/62, Box 207, Countries, National Security Files, JFKL.

[85] See Anthony Nutting, *Nasser,* (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd, 1972), 351; Orkaby, 'The North Yemen Civil War', p. 73.

[86] Johnston, *The View from Steamer Point: Being an Account of Three Years in Aden,* (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd,1964), pp. 124-125.

In fact, British misgivings of Sallal's revolutionary regime were such that they also produced in Whitehall a prompt alteration of the UK's subversive activities in Yemen. Indeed, non-intervention remained the public British position throughout 1962 but privately, this was not considered possible given the YAR's potentially hostile stance towards Aden. Whereas the Macmillan government had previously opposed the Imamate and *Zaidi* forces, now, with Egypt's overt military backing, Sallal was perceived as a more immediate threat to Aden than the Imamate.[87] Urgent meetings between the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence on 5 and 6 October thus produced a broad consensus. Overt UK support for Royalist forces was impractical- this would antagonise Nasser and result in a 'kiss of death' for the Imamate reputation in the Arab world. Nevertheless, the UK was now willing to offer the Royalist forces covert support.[88]

However, contrary to common belief, these differences did not spell for immediate Anglo-American discord.[89] For a start, despite Yemen's significantly altered crisis environment, both countries remained more concerned about regional destabilisation than for the internal condition of the Yemen. This shared perception facilitated broad Anglo-American consensus on two considerations. First, records reveal that, much like the Eisenhower administration, in the early stages of the crisis at least, the Kennedy administration sanctioned covert UK activities in Yemen. In no way however does this imply an overwhelming American accord for these policies. State Department and White House officials were certainly unsettled by news that the UK was covertly supporting Royalist forces. They doubted whether UK support could salvage the discredited Yemeni Imamate dynasty and feared a severe escalation of the crisis if British activities were discovered. [90] Nevertheless, on 10 October 1962, the new

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[87] Incoming Telegram to the Department of State, 28 September 1962, Yemen General 10/1/62-10/8/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

[88] 'Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Aden', 4 October 1962, UKNA, PREM 11/3877; See also a memorandum of conversation, Subject: Yemen, 9 October 1962, RG 59, 786H.00/9-2962, Central Decimal Files, 1960-63, Box 2080, USNA.

[89] See McNamara, 'The Nasser factor', p. 55; Wieland, 'At Odds in 'Arabia Infelix'; Ashton, *Irony of Interdependence,* p.90.

[90] See for instance, 'Yemen Situation and its Implications' Report from Talbot Phillips to the Secretary of State, 9 Oct. 1962, RG 59, 786H.00/9-2962, Central Decimal Files, 1960-63, Box 2080, USNA; 'Outgoing Telegram from Secretary of State, Dean Rusk', 10 Oct. 1962, Yemen General 10/9/62-10/15/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

American Charge d'affaires in Taiz, Robert Stookey seemingly sheltered the UK's activities. Upon receiving complaints of 'British machinations' against the YAR, Stookey countered that the 'British could not be expected to control all of the activities of the Protectorate hot-heads.'[91] Likewise, the State Department agreed on 7 November 1962 to the establishment of a British military training operation for Saudi and Yemeni forces in full knowledge that it would tie the UK to a 'long term commitment' in the Yemen.[92] Potential reasoning for this tacit support is that a British clandestine presence in the Yemen profited wider UK-US policy objectives in the Arabian Peninsula. Rumours of UK support for Hassan for instance had a stabilising effect on potential nationalist movements in Aden and provided a useful tool to improve UK-Saudi diplomatic relations.[93] In addition, limited Israeli involvement in British operations provided Israel with valuable intelligence concerning Egyptian military capacity.[94]

Second, when deliberating diplomatic recognition, neither government wanted to lock itself publicly into a definitive stance. Here, officials in the Kennedy administration especially found themselves in a particularly awkward predicament whereby demonstration of political support for either Republican or Royalist forces in Yemen would directly threaten US relations with potentially important allies. House Saud was still struggling with economic and family strife. To remedy Saudi concerns, the Kennedy administration had established an economic assistance programme in June 1962. Nevertheless, Sallal's coup transpired before the programme could pay dividends. Worse still, the immediate closure of the Yemeni Legation in Saudi Arabia alongside public announcements of the YAR's hostile stance towards the Saudi monarchy induced fears in Washington that the country would soon be overthrown by revolutionaries.[95] Recognising this predicament, Komer astutely set out

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[91] American Information on attitude of Yemeni Arab Republic towards Britain', F.O Minute by B.R. Pridham, 10 Oct. 1962, FO 371/162949, UKNA.

[92] For Robert Strong's reservations see, 'Saudi Request for British Training Officers' Memorandum of Conversation, 2 Nov. 1962, RG 59, 786A. 5/4-862, Central Decimal Files, 1960-1963, Box 2068, USNA. For Dean Rusk's acceptance of the proposal see, Outgoing Telegram, 6 Dec. 1962, ibid.

[93] Telegram 1637, London to Department of State, 19 Oct 1962, Yemen General 10/16/62-10/31/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

[94] Rogan and Aclimandos, *The 1967 Arab-Israel War,* 150. In December 1962, *The Times* reported that the YAR had accused Israel of assisting Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Our Middle East Correspondent, 'Yemen Accuses Israel', *Times* [London, England] 17 Dec. 1962, 7.

[95] 'Status of Matters Flowing from Meeting Between the President and King Saud at the White House on February 13', Memorandum for Mr. Mc George Bundy, 4 June 1962, RG 59, Saudi Arabia (1962)

Washington's problem thus: 'if we come down on the UK/Jordan/Saudi did there goes our new relationship with Nasser; if we come down on [the] other side, we open Pandora's box. If we do nothing, we offend all our friends.'[96]

In Yemen too, both countries recognised their lack of decisive influence over crisis events and needed to buy more time to ascertain on ground conditions. Although both countries had active Legations in Taiz, it was still difficult to develop contacts with Republican forces, or Yemeni citizens for that matter, given that Sana'a was over 150 miles away from Taiz and separated by 'arduous' roads and an 'unreliable' air service. [97] These complications were exacerbated further by the speed at which events unfolded, disrupted communications systems following the coup, and that restrictions of movement were immediately imposed upon UK and US Consulates.[98]

Both countries also initially questioned the legitimacy of the new government. Open Egyptian military and political backing for the Republic raised questions about the effectiveness of Sallal's control and sustainability of the YAR and the extent to which it was accepted by the Yemeni public. Yemeni tribal politics also muddied the scene considerably. Similar to al-Badr's complicated position in Yemen, Sallal was also a *Zaidi,* and, as a son of a blacksmith, he had not been appointed by the *Ulama.* In consequence, both Royalist and Republican forces struggled to maintain the long-term loyalty of Yemeni tribes. In fact, tribal leaders were known to accept bribes off of both Royalist and Republican parties,

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1. President Kennedy- King Saud, Records Relating to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, 1952-1975, Box 9, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, USNA. On 1 November, *The Times* reported that YAR had threatened to attack Saudi Arabia as border skirmishes intensified. Our Correspondent. 'Yemen Threat to Attack Saudi Arabia'. *The Times* [London, England] 1 November 1962, p. 11. American Ambassador in Kartoum, William Rountree informed the State Department that a similar coup might occur in Saudi Arabia 'within ten days'. Telegram 171 from Khartoum to Department of State, 2 October 1962, Yemen General 10/1/62-10/8/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

[96] Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (Talbot), 12 October 1962, 1961-1963, volume XVIII, Near East 1962-1963. doc 79, FRUS.

[97] Christopher Gandy, 'A Mission to Yemen: August 1962- January 1963', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 25, No. 2 (1998) p. 253.

[98] Telegram 1318 from London to Department of State, 28 September 1962, Yemen General 8/61-9/62, Box 207, Countries, National Security Files, JFKL.

purposefully 'shoot to miss' or, change sides entirely during battles.[99] This matter served to obscure the military and political considerably throughout the crisis.

The upshot of all these considerations was that despite different threat perceptions of an Egyptian-backed YAR, initial British and American stances towards the coup remained broadly united. Both acknowledged their limited ability to influence crisis events and accepted that recognition posed potentially their best diplomatic tool over both Royalist and Republican forces. Both countries also needed to ensure that crisis in Yemen did not spill over and upset their vitally important interests in the Arabian Peninsula. `For Macmillan's government, this meant safeguarding Aden and their Aden-Federation merger plans. Meantime, the Kennedy administration toed an extremely fine line in managing America's bilateral relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For the time being then, the preference on both sides of the Atlantic was to 'stand aloof' whilst also trying to ensure that neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia became overcommitted in the civil war.[100]

Therefore, it was crisis events rather than different policies that eventually pushed British and American positions further apart. Concerned about an increased Saudi and Jordanian military presence on the Yemen border, on 10 October 1962, Nasser sent Egyptian representatives to discuss with the American Ambassador in Cairo, John Badeau, the possibility of early US recognition of the YAR. The subtext of the reassurance was clear, Egypt was interested only in the Yemen's internal affairs and did not pose a threat to 'US interests in Saudi Arabia and

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[99] Blumi, *Destroying Yemen,* p. 86; John Peterson, *Yemen: The Search for a Modern State* (London: John Hopkins, 1982); Marieke Brandt, 'A Tribe and its states: Yemen's 1972 Bayhan massacre revisited' *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 55, No. 3. (2019) pp: 319-338.

[100] Early in the crisis, both countries came under sustained lobbying. On 27 September for instance, the Egyptian minister of state, Anwar Sadat, explicitly warned the US embassy in Cairo against supporting Hassan's Royalist forces in Yemen. Conversely, Faisal warned the US would be 'utterly foolish' to respond to Egyptian pressure. Early in October, the King of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal and the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Tell also appealed to both the UK and US to support the Royalist forces. Telegram from Mr Hawley in Cairo to Mr. Walmsley in the Arabian Department, 27 September 1962, FO 371/162945, UKNA; Telegram 984 from New York to Department of State, 1 October 1962, Yemen General 10/1/62-10/8/ 62, Box 207, Countries, National Security Files, JFKL; Telegram 184 from Amman to Department of State, 2 October 1962, ibid; Telegram from Sir R. Parkes of British Embassy in Amman to the Foreign Office, 2 October 1962, FO 371/162945, UKNA. Message from Robert Komer to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 11 Oct., 1962, JFKL, Yemen General 10/09/62-10/15/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files; Telegram from Cairo to Foreign Office, 1 October 1962, FO 371/162945, UKNA.

Aden.'[101] Badeau was far from sanguine about these assurances. Nevertheless, Komer perceived Nasser's approach as an opportunity to negotiate disengagement. Although it was still unclear whether Sallal's forces could resist Royalist opposition alone, it was evident that Egypt was committed to keeping Sallal in power. In order to prevent a serious escalation in the Yemen, Komer thus proposed that the US act as 'umpire' between the concerned parties and incentivise Nasser to 'play ball' with the Saudis, and Jordanians. The latter could be achieved through a PL 480 agreement to provide Nasser with approximately 60 million dollars' worth of wheat and edible oils.[102] Komer's line of reasoning was adopted by the State Department and later transposed into a disengagement plan that was presented to Egyptian, Yemeni, Saudi and Jordanian officials on 16 November 1962.[103]

Composed of two phases, the disengagement plan used the extension of US diplomatic recognition of the YAR as a precursor to the phased withdrawal of outside forces from the Yemen. It was envisioned that once the US recognised the YAR, Saudi Arabia would abandon their support of the Royalist forces and join the US in providing the YAR diplomatic recognition. To initiate the plan, Washington required two official statements- one from Sallal which would reaffirm the YAR's intentions to honour its international obligations and one from Nasser, which would signify a 'willingness' to undertake 'disengagement and [a] phased removal of troops' once Saudi and Jordanian support for the Royalists relented.[104]

Meantime though, Macmillan had determined early in the crisis that hasty recognition of the YAR was a non-option for his Conservative Party. In fact, on 4 October, he told his Foreign Office that he hoped Kennedy's administration would 'be pressed <u>hard</u> not to recognise.'[105]

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[101] The Egyptian official was Mohamed Heikal, the editor of El Ahram. Telegram 600, Cairo to Department of State, 10 October 1962, Yemen General 10/9/62-10/15/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

[102] Robert W. Komer, recorded interview by Elizabeth Farmer, 16 July 1964, Oral History Program, 5–6, JFKL.

[103] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, 16 November 1962, FRUS, vol. XVIII, doc. 100.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Emphasis is made within the original text. Macmillan's letter to the Foreign Office, 5 October 1962, FO 371/162945, UKNA.

This reasoning was based upon three considerations. First, Whitehall's provision of diplomatic recognition to the YAR was complicated by legal concerns. Whereas the US could use recognition as an extension of US foreign policy, the UK's recognition policy was grounded by long-established legal or quasi-legal considerations based upon the domestic affairs of the state in question. Here, UK concerns about the effectiveness of Sallal's control of Yemen were all important. For Whitehall to grant full or *de jure* recognition of the YAR, Sallal's government needed to maintain the 'obedience of the mass of the population', have effective control of the 'greater part of the national territory' and evidence a 'reasonable prospect of permanency.'[106] Although Sallal's regime maintained control of the bulk of the Yemeni population, it was difficult to ascertain the extent to which this extended into the tribal regions in the North and East of the country. Al-Badr's unexpected resurfacing in the Yemen in mid-October 1962, coupled with Royalist successes in the East of the country, complicated the political situation.[107] Egyptian military support for the Republicans also brought into question the criteria of permanency.

Second, there was also stalwart opposition to extending diplomatic recognition to the YAR from elements of Macmillan's Conservative party. His government was already under considerable back-bench pressure over his handling of ONUC Operation Grandslam. The Yemen crisis now added fuel to this fire by inciting members of the Aden Group. Complicating matters further was that influential Conservative Party backbenchers such as the MP for Inverness, Neil McLean and Cabinet officials like the Minister for Aviation, Julian Amery maintained close ties with the Jordanian Hashemite Monarchy and were able to use the latter to garner valuable information that fuelled arguments against recognition.[108] On 26 October 1962 for instance, the Aden Group reported that Sallal had 'little popular support'-especially within the tribal regions. Additionally, they advised that in return for UK

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[106] For details concerning Britain's practice on diplomatic recognition, see John Young, "'States not Governments': Reforming Britain's Practice on Diplomatic Recognition, 1973-1980' *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol. 9, No.1 (2014) pp: 55–74. For differences in UK/US recognition policies, see John Young, *Twentieth- Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, 1963-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 202; 'Recognition' Diplomatic Commentary, Richard Scott, 17 Jan. 1963, FO 371/168822, UKNA; 'De jure and de facto recognition', A.R. Walmsley, 6 Jan. 1963, ibid.

[107] American Information on the Yemen', 16 October 1962, FO 371/162948, UKNA.

[108] Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War*, pp.43–46.

public support, the Imamate would likely drop claims to Aden and silence opposition to the Aden Colony-Federation merger.[109]

Finally, Macmillan had to also consider the perceptions of Adeni officials and Protectorate leaders when deliberating the UK's recognition policy. Here, matters were particularly delicate considering Yemen's longstanding antagonistic stance towards Aden, and that, as Aden and the Federation were still considered British colonial responsibilities, UK recognition of the YAR would be on their behalf too. Macmillan's government remained sensitive to the fact that if UK recognition was granted too early, or indeed, to the wrong side, there was a very real potential that the Protectorate leaders would revolt and thereby scupper Aden-Federation merger plans. Renewed Yemeni hostility in the region thus exacerbated the situation considerably. For example, on 22 October 1962, Yemeni, and more specifically, Yemeni Republican airstrikes killed a child and destroyed two houses in Beihan- a British Protectorate adjacent to Yemen.[110] Then, on 9 November 1962, Sallal publicly called upon Yemeni emigres in Aden to prepare a revolution to depose of UK rule.[111] Unsurprisingly, such actions incensed Adeni and Federation leaders and as Charles Johnson, the Governor of Aden informed the Foreign Office, made it 'most undesirable' to even attempt to convince Adeni and Federation leaders that recognition was also in their best interests.[112]

It is understandable then as to why past literature often treats the YAR recognition dilemma as revealing malaise in Anglo-American relations. From early November 1962, Britain and the US found themselves seemingly locked into opposing camps. Moreover, this adversarial situation threatened to become further solidified by differences over the disengagement plan. Privately, the Americans acknowledged that the plan had limitations. Komer for instance, admitted to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, that the disengagement 'concept' was 'no more than a vague idea. How to phase it, police it,

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[109] Inward telegram from Sir Charles Johnson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October 1962, FO 371/162951, UKNA.

[110] Telegram from Aden to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 Oct. 1962, DEFE 13/398, Ibid.

[111] Telegram from Foreign Office to Taiz, 10 Nov. 1962, PREM 11/3878, Ibid.

[112] Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 Oct. 1962, PREM 11/3877, Ibid.

and get it carried out equitably will cause plenty of headache.'[113] Nevertheless, perceived as the only available option to de-escalate the crisis, officials in Washington had resolved to see through its implementation. For officials in Macmillan's government though, the Americans were wrong. The plan offered recognition too soon and lacked the proper mechanisms to secure a full Egyptian military withdrawal.[114] Additionally, there were no guarantees that Saudi Arabia would adhere to the plan and fall-in line with American recognition. Upon learning of the disengagement plan for instance, the British Ambassador to Washington Ormsby-Gore quickly advised the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk of British reservations and especially that Whitehall 'would have little or no confidence in any assurances that the Egyptians might give.'[115]

This initial approach to the US was certainly not the UK's last. Throughout early November, British officials sought for US delay and / or reconsideration of Washington's disengagement plan. On 6 November for instance, Ormbsy-Gore requested that the State Department delayed their planned extension of diplomatic recognition to the YAR 'for about a fortnight.'[116] Then, following Sallal's provocative 9 November speech against the UK, the Foreign Office sent Washington another plea to withhold recognition. Sallal's speech had infuriated members of the Aden Group as well as Federation leaders, Rusk was informed, it would be particularly embarrassing for the UK if the American's recognised Yemen now.[117]

Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was receptive to British concerns but nevertheless, crisis developments had produced more pressing matters. On 3 November, five Saudi settlements along the Yemeni border had been bombed and the aircraft responsible were Egyptian-

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[113] Letter Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 12 Nov. 1962, Yemen 1961-4/63, White House Memoranda, Robert Komer, Box 447, National Security Files. JFKL.

[114] Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-1963,* p. 271.

[115] Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 13 October 1962, FO 371/162949, UKNA.

[116] Telegram Foreign Office to Washington, 2 Nov. 1962, FO 371/162953, Ibid.

[117] Note from Minister of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Duncan Sandys to Macmillan, 10 Nov. 1962, PREM 11/3878, Ibid.

owned.[118] This provoked an emotional response from House Saud. It broke off diplomatic

relations with Egypt and threatened to 'make all necessary arrangements to respond to [the]

barefaced aggression.[119] In addition, Jordan, under a treaty obligation to support Saudi Arabia

if it came under attack, was also prepared to retaliate.[120] Worse still though, an influx of

Soviet experts and equipment into the Yemen suggested that Sallal had turned to Khrushchev

for additional support. [121] With sufficient evidence to perceive the Arab Cold Ear and East-

West Cold War increasingly interwoven, the Americans thus believed that there was no other

option than to proceed with the disengagement plan and recognise the YAR on or around 15

November so to defuse the worsening crisis.[122]

Anglo-American differences therefore culminated in a series of telegram and telephone

exchanges shared between Macmillan and Kennedy from 14-17 November. During these

exchanges, Macmillan explained British reservations about the disengagement plan and

pressed Kennedy to demand a substantial military withdrawal by Egypt from the Yemen

before the US provided recognition to the YAR. His basic argument was that 'if you play

your cards, above all recognition too soon in exchange for mere words, you may lose all

power to influence events.'[123] In response, Kennedy admitted 'I know comparatively little

about Yemen, even where it is.'[124] The conversation was subsequently passed to Robert

Komer. The disengagement plan, Macmillan was informed, was based on the premise that the

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[118] The five locations were: Jablan, Al-Tawal, Samitah, Al-Mawsin and Wayhamah. Telegram 334, Jidda to Department of State, 4 Nov. 1962, Yemen General 11/1/62-11/15/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, JFKL.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Telegram 241, Amman to Department of State, 4 Nov.1962, Yemen General 11/1/62-11/15/62, Countries, Box 207, National Security Files, Ibid.

[121] 'Intelligence Note: Western- Soviet Antithesis in the Yemen Conflict', From Thomas L Hughes to Department of State, 9 Nov. 1962, Ibid.

[122] Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 13 Nov. 1962, PREM 11/3878, UKNA.

[122] 'Proposed United States Recognition of the Yemeni Republican Regime', 2 Nov 1962, FO 371/162953, Ibid.

[123] From Foreign Office to Washington, 14 Nov. 1962, DEFE 13/398, Ibid.

[124] Telephone Conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kennedy at 11:00 PM', 14 Nov. 1962, PREM 11/3878, Ibid.

Egyptians were unwilling to make the first withdrawal from the Yemen. If the Americans demanded anything substantial, they feared Nasser would refuse to cooperate entirely.[125] Two previously known and opposed positions were therefore rehearsed but on neither side was their acrimony. On 16 November, Macmillan accepted differences in UK and US recognition policies and the US need to move ahead with the disengagement plan.[126]

Ultimately then, UK and US Yemen policies diverged at the most fundamental level when on 19 December 1962, the Kennedy administration granted recognition to the YAR and the UK did not. It can also be argued that US recognition was particularly costly for UK interests in Yemen. UK non-recognition incensed Sallal who on 10 February 1963, expelled the British Legation from Taiz. [127] Britain's ability to follow crisis events was severely impaired thereafter. Previous claims of Anglo-American discord are also substantiated in that due to the UK-US policy impasse, frustrations had flared periodically on both sides of the Atlantic. On 13 November 1962 for instance, the Governor of Aden, Charles Johnston proclaimed that 'American recognition would be regarded as a heavy slap in the face for Britain.'[128] Likewise Komer often complained of what he perceived as British 'bitching' about America's recognition policy.[129]

Yet, is this enough to substantiate claims of breakdown and long-term malaise in Anglo-American relations? Closer examination of records reveals otherwise. Beyond Komer and Johnston, the hallmark of Anglo-American exchange during this period was of cooperation and close consultation. Consequently, a good transatlantic understanding had evolved of the different constraints and considerations that both sides operated under. For a start, the Kennedy's administration was well briefed that Macmillan's government agreed with the overall objective of the disengagement plan: full withdrawal of outside forces from the

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[125] Record of conversation between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister 10:55 am', 15 Nov. 1962, Ibid.

[126] Message from the Prime Minister to President Kennedy', 16 Nov.1962, Ibid.

[127] Message from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 12 Feb. 1962, Ibid.

[128] Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Sir C. Johnston, 13 Nov 1962, Ibid.

[129] Message from Robert Komer to Carl Kaysen, 2 Nov. 1962, Yemen 1961-4/63, White House Memoranda, Robert W Komer, Box 447, National Security Files, JFKL.

conflict. Nor, despite the arguments of some, was Whitehall steadfast against recognising the YAR.[130] British officials including the UK Charge d'affaires in Taiz, Christopher Gandy, the UK Ambassador to Egypt, Sir Harold Beeley, and Foreign Office Officials including Sir Hugh Stephenson, A.R. Walmsley and Sir Roger Stevens all argued ardently for the UK's recognition of the YAR throughout this period.[131]

In fact, on 23 October 1962, Macmillan's Cabinet actually approved in principle extending diplomatic recognition to the YAR.[132] That this was not acted upon owed primarily to events in the Yemen. Al-Badr's unexpected resurfacing in the Yemen, coupled with Royalist successes in the East of the country complicated the political situation.[133] Additionally, recognition could not be extended immediately because the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T Hart was struggling to gain assurances about the recognition plan from the Saudi Government. On 22 October, the State Department estimated they needed 'ten days to two weeks' delay.[134] This delay was crucial as it also brought into play the decisive Beihan incident. The British Cabinet had premised its willingness to extend diplomatic recognition to the YAR upon the Governor of Aden, Charles Johnston, convincing the rulers of the Protectorates that such a move was also in their best interests. Though thought to have been a mistake, the raid nonetheless angered the Protectorate rulers and caused them to interpret a Foreign Office refusal to retaliate as a 'symptom of British weakness.'[135] Not surprisingly

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[130] McNamara, 'The Nasser factor', 55.

[131] For more information here see Tia Culley and Steve Marsh, 'To Recognise, or not to Recognise': Macmillan's Yemen Arab Republic question' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 3. (2019) pages 345 and 346 in particular.

[132] 'Yemen' message to the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence, 26 October, 1962, PREM 11/3877, UKNA.

[133] 'American Information on the Yemen' 16 October 1962, FO 371/162948, ibid.

[134] Memorandum of Conversation between Mr Denis Speares of the British Embassy and Mr Robert Strong of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, 22 October, 1962, RG 768.H00/12-1462, Box 2081, USNA.

[135] Charles Johnson, *The View from Steamer Point: Being an Account of Three Years in Aden* (London: Collins, 1964) p. 127.

therefore, the Cabinet duly withdrew prospective British recognition of the YAR on 30 October.[136]

Likewise, the Kennedy administration were frank with Macmillan that they also shared British reservations about the disengagement plan. During their telephone conversation on 15 November for instance, Komer admitted to Macmillan his misgivings that Nasser would stay true to his word. The disengagement plan, the Prime Minister was informed, was based only on 'paper promises.' However, with Saudi Arabia dangerously close to initiating an attack on Egypt and increased Soviet activity in the YAR, the Americans needed to act fast and the disengagement plan was the only policy option they had readily available. Egyptian and Yemeni public statements to honour their international obligations may have only been paper promises but, Komer maintained, they were 'better than nothing.'[137]

From this mutual understanding of the policy constraints and considerations each government faced also flowed important Anglo-American initiatives to help their transatlantic counterparts meet their policy objectives. In fact, Kennedy's administration made a significant concession to the UK when negotiating diplomatic recognition of the YAR. Recognising the awkward position US recognition of the YAR placed upon the UK, Komer, during their telephone conversation on 15 November, had made Macmillan an offer. The disengagement plan required Sallal to made a public statement reaffirming YAR's intentions to honour its international obligations. It may be possible, Komer had proposed, for the US to guarantee 'the territorial integrity of Aden' at the same time.[138] Seeing as Sallal's provocative speech on 9 November had stirred Yemeni émigré opposition and threatened the Aden Colony-Federation merger, that now had to be steered successfully through Parliament, this was a significant US diplomatic gesture towards UK interests. In accepting this offer, Macmillan though made another request, it would be 'undoubtedly be very helpful if Sallal's statement could be filled out a bit in order to reduce the harm done by his recent speech.'[139]

[136] Telegram from London to Department of State, 30 October, 1962, RG 59, 768.H.00/10-2062, Central Decimal Files, 1960-63, Box 2080, USNA.

[137] Record of conversation between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister 10:55 am', 15 Nov. 1962, PREM 11/3878, UKNA.

[138] Ibid.

[139] See 'Alternative second paragraph suggested by C.R.O," n.d., Ibid.

The Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandy's subsequently bolstered this request, specially that, 'we would be especially grateful if you could stipulate…mentions of Aden and the Federation … in [Sallal's] public statement.'[140] In response, the Kennedy administration assured not only that they would 'tell Sallal that their recognition depends on a published statement' but also that he and Nasser would be reminded that 'Aden and the Persian Gulf are joint Anglo-American concerns.'[141]

Washington's acquisition of the YAR public statement that recognised and respected Adeni sovereignty was therefore much more significant than has been previously interpreted. First, the UK had little leverage over Sallal and could not have secured the YAR statement themselves. Second, Kennedy's administration demonstrated Anglo-American solidarity by overtly making US recognition contingent upon the UK Foreign Office's desired phrasing of Sallal's statement and did so without any prior UK commitment to extend recognition in return. Third, Washington tolerated a significant delay in bringing their disengagement plan to fruition in order to help meet Whitehall's concerns. The Imamate dynasty had never officially recognised the legal existence of Aden. Consequently, Sallal's government had refused to make public reference to Aden and the Federation in his public statement for fear of receiving backlash from Yemeni citizens.[142] It took a further month to establish a compromise. The result, Sallal was allowed to state broadly that the YAR would respect 'international obligations, including all treaties concluded by previous governments.' What this actually meant was then spelled out in the corresponding US statement. This noted that YAR's 'reference to the Treaty of Sana'a' and defined it as 'reciprocal guarantees that neither party should intervene in the affairs of the other across the frontier dividing the two countries.'[143]

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[140] Ibid.

[141] Telegram from Foreign Office to Political Office Middle East Command (Aden), 17 Nov. 1962, Ibid.

[142] Telegram 772, Cairo to Department of State, 26 Nov. 1962, Yemen General 11/16/62-11/30/62, Countries, Box 207 A, National Security Files, JFKL.

[143] 'Draft US Statement on Recognition of the YAR', 6 Dec. 1962, Ibid.

Only once the exact phrasing of the statements was established, and the UK's position in Aden protected, did Kennedy's administration proceed to recognise the YAR. This expenditure of US patience and diplomatic effort in securing UK interests in Aden was warmly appreciated in London. On 20 November 1962 for instance, the Cabinet acknowledged that 'the Americans are supporting our Aden and Persian Gulf policy far more deeply than ever before.'[144] Moreover, this cooperation continued even as the disengagement plan faltered- Saudi Arabia and Jordan had no intention of withdrawing their assistance to Royalist forces without a prior reduction of Egyptian forces in Yemen. Conversely, Nasser would not withdraw troops whilst Sallal's government remained vulnerable. Nevertheless, there was only isolated frustration within Kennedy's administration. Herein, Komer remained the most vocal. On 22 January 1963 he inquired of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot, 'shouldn't we cash this due bill now?... We delayed our recognition 6 weeks for their benefits… what more do they want?'[145]

Also neglected within extant literature is that officials in Whitehall were willing to make considerable concessions so to facilitate Washington's disengagement plan. An American request for UK recognition was duly sent at the highest diplomatic levels on 29 January 1963. Here though, the tone conveyed no irritation. Kennedy wrote to Macmillan: 'I recognise that this is an area with which the British Government has had long experience. But I do wish that you would give this matter renewed consideration. Whatever action your judgement dictates will be satisfactory to me.'[146]

In February 1963, Macmillan's government and Foreign Office officials especially, worked diligently to meet Kennedy's recognition request and subsequently developed two recognition plans. The first of these granted the YAR *de jure* recognition provisional upon Sallal's government meeting a series of conditions, principally adherence to the borders specified in the Treaty of Sana'a and living in 'peace and amity' with Aden and the Protectorate. This plan was temporarily suspended when legal advice suggested that the

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[144] 'Cabinet Meeting on Tuesday, November 20: Talking Points on the Yemen', 20 Nov.1962, FO 371/162958, UKNA.

[145] Memorandum for Phil Talbot from Robert Komer, 22 Jan. 1963, Yemen General 1/63, Countries, Box 208, National Security Files, JFKL.

[146] Message for the Prime Minister from the President, 29 Jan. 1963, FO 371/168823, UKNA.

preconditions would have been 'contrary to the principles of international law'.[147] The second plan proposed the withdrawal of *de jure* recognition from al-Badr and the Royalist forces and its replacement with *de facto* or, 'conditional' recognition of both Royalist and Republican governments in the areas which they controlled. In this case UK-Yemeni relations would have been represented through 'agents' without fully fledged diplomatic status.[148] This plan for *de facto* recognition was sent to various Near East posts for comment.[149] Meantime on 8 February 1963, Foreign Office official A.R. Walmsley noted that Home was prepared to override legal objections to support *de jure* recognition of the Republicans 'conditional upon their making a declaration of acceptance of the existence of the South Arabian Federation'.[150]

The significance of these plans should not be understated. UK recognition was deliberated by Foreign Office officials in full acknowledgement of the stalwart opposition they would receive from the Aden Group, Federation leaders and from the Governor of Aden, Charles Johnson. Moreover, both were unconventional and not without risk. Even the *de facto* recognition threatened to set a precedent for recognition of other countries engaged in civil war, such as Vietnam, Korea and Germany.[151] Still though, the Foreign Office had persisted in these deliberations in an attempt to reciprocate American consideration of UK interests. Only after Sallal expelled the British Legation in Taiz did this effort expire. Eight days later Macmillan wrote to Kennedy in words of warmth, appreciation and reassurance: 'I am sorry that the result is that you and we should now seem to be somewhat out of step in our Yemeni policy but as I see it this is due more to differences in our circumstances than to divergence in objectives.'[152]

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[147] 'Note of a Meeting Held by the Secretary of State', 31 Dec. 1962, FO 371/168821, UKNA.

[148] 'De facto recognition of the Yemeni Republicans', 1 Feb. 1963, FO 371/168824, UKNA.

[149] Telegram 3030, London to Secretary of State, 8 Feb. 1963, Yemen General 2/63, Countries, Box 208, National Security Files, JFKL.

[150] 'Recognition of the Yemeni Republicans', F.O Minute by A. R. Walmsley, 9 Feb. 1963, FO 371/168824, UKNA.

[151] See for example, 'Yemen: Alternative Courses of action', Foreign Office Minute from R.S Crawford, 4 Feb. 1963, FO 371/168824, UKNA; Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Aden, 7 Feb. 1963, Ibid.

[152] Outward Saving Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 15 Feb.1963, PREM 11/4357, UKNA.

At no point then, during the early stages of the Yemen Civil War did Anglo-American relations come close to a breaking point. Rather, close consultation shared between senior levels of government of the policy constraints and additional considerations each side faced facilitated mutual understanding of Anglo-American policy differences. Even here though, there was much more substance to Anglo-American exchanges than simply agreement to disagree over the provision of diplomatic recognition to the YAR. Both sides were resolute in navigating around policy differences to achieve Anglo-American cooperation and made, or tried to make, concessions to meet the concerns of the other. In fact, so close were UK-US relations that, the Kennedy administration agreed to represent UK interests in Yemen after learning that they had been expelled from the British Legation in Taiz.[153] Telling of a continued Anglo-American intimacy too, Foreign Office official, A.R. Walmsley was so distraught that Whitehall had been unable to meet the Kennedy administration's request in January 1963 that he preserved all the abortive drafts of UK recognition plans and left a note for future historians in the hopes that the UK would not be interpreted poorly within the UK-US YAR recognition dilemma. [154]

Operation Hardsurface, the Harib Incident and UN Security Council Resolution 188: A Lasting Nadir in Anglo-American Relations?

There is a notable dearth of scholarship on Anglo-American relations after the YAR recognition dilemma. The most likely explanation for this is that scholarship generally perceives a break in senior level UK-US relations due to the fundamental differences in Whitehall and Washington's recognition policy.[155] Those who do look beyond February 1963 interpret Anglo-American relations through a similar lens and argue that fundamental policy differences hampered further crisis cooperation. Nigel Ashton for instance, ends his analysis of Anglo-American relations in Yemen in August 1963 and argues that, after the recognition dilemma, UK-US bilateral relations remained strained due to their fundamental policy

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[153] Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 15 Jan. 1963, FO 371/168822, UKNA.

[154] Recognition of the Yemeni Republicans, Memorandum of Action by A.R. Walmsley, 9 February 1963, FO 371/168824, UKNA.

[155] See for instance, Gandy, 'Mission in Yemen'; Ashton, 'Irony of Interdependence'. A notable counter to this trend is Jones, *Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins*.

differences.[156] Clive Jones interprets the Anglo-American experience in Yemen differently and argues that the real nadir in relations occurred in `Spring of 1964. Home's Conservative government authorised an attack on Harib- a Yemeni fort -without prior consultation with officials in Washington. In consequence, Jones claims that senior level British and American officials remained at such logger-heads in the aftermath that cooperation between the two sides could not be resurrected again in the crisis. [157]

This section acknowledges that policy differences experienced between Whitehall and Washington caused evident friction within Anglo-American relations. Likewise, in accordance with Jones, it argues that a nadir between senior level British and American policymaking officials was indeed reached following the incident at Harib. However, similar to the recognition dilemma, the section also demonstrates that up until this breakdown in relations, British and American officials at all levels of government were still willing to work around policy differences, partake in burden sharing activities and even take calculated risks in order to safeguard the regional interests of their transatlantic counterparts. Moreover, the section also demonstrates that even after a nadir in relations was reached, UK-US cooperation continued at lower levels of government.

By February 1963, the US disengagement, as was envisioned by the Kennedy administration had clearly failed. Egypt's military presence increased following Washington's recognition of the YAR.[158] Egyptian air raids continued against Saudi Arabia while Saudi arms and other military supplies flowed into Yemen to bolster Royalist forces.[159] Worse still for Kennedy's administration, the Yemen crisis also became further encapsulated within the Arab and East-West Cold Wars. Following the Ramadan Revolution of February 1963, Algeria started to deploy troops in support of Sallal's Republican forces. White House officials believed that Iraq would closely follow suit.[160] Then, in late June 1963, Soviet involvement in the crisis

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[156] Ashton, *Irony of Interdependence,* 107.

[157] Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War,* p. 84.

[158] The Yemen, Third Meeting, 5 February 1063, CAB 130/189, UKNA.

[159] Outgoing telegram from Department of State, 29 December 1962, National Security Files, Box 207 A, National Security Files, JFKL.

[160] Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy by Robert Komer, 11 February 1962, National Security Files, Box 208, Yemen General 2/63, ibid.

increased considerably including the presence of Soviet pilots. Khrushchev also signed an aid agreement with Sallal worth approximately $20 million and offered education grants for Yemenis to study in the Soviet Union.[161] Taken cumulatively with the other crisis developments, these considerations produced a significant alteration in the Kennedy administration's perception of the crisis. Forcing swift Egyptian military disengagement from Yemen now risked not only severe repercussions for the US throughout the Middle East but as was recognised by the Under Secretary of State, George Ball and the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell Harriman, a premature Egyptian exit from the country without a fully formed Yemeni government to take control would potentially leave 'Yemen in chaos with [the] Soviets waiting to fill the vacuum.'[162]

In consequence, the Americans resolved in order to end the crisis, House Saud had to first cease its provision of military aid to Royalist forces. From there, Egypt could afford to responsibly remove forces from Yemen whilst Saudi, Egyptian and Yemeni officials formulated a new government for the YAR that was suitable to all parties.[163] Months of concentrated shuttle diplomacy between Saudi and Egyptian officials by the former US Ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker and the UN Secretariat's Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs, Ralph Bunche, produced a revised version of the Kennedy administration's disengagement plan in April 1963. Here, House Saud agreed to terminate all aid to the Royalists whilst Egypt agreed to simultaneously undertake a phased withdrawal from Yemen of troops which had been sent to help the new government since December 1962. Both parties also accepted the establishment of a demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres either side of the demarcated Saudi-Yemen border, to the stationing of impartial observers in that zone to certify the agreement was being adhered to, and, once disengagement was underway, to participate in discussions of Yemen's new government.[164]

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[161] CIA Summary, 2 July 1963, Folder 2, ibid..

[162] Memorandum for Department of State by George Ball, 26 June 1963, Folder 1, ibid.
[163] Memorandum for Record- Presidential Meeting on Yemen, 25 February 1963, Box 208, Yemen General 2/63, JFKL.

[164] For more information of the Bunker and Bunche missions see Saeed Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970* (Oxon: Routledge, 2019); Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States,* pp: 170-175; Schmidt, *Yemen,* pp:184-207.

The United Nation's Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) was thus established in Yemen in July 1963. How effective it was however, has spawned some scholarly debate. Whereas most interpret the UNYOM as having failed its mediation role in the crisis, Asher Orkaby challenges these claims. He argues that the purpose of the mission was not to enforce disengagement but 'to maintain a symbolic presence in the region', the remuneration of which was demonstrated through a series of Egyptian, Saudi and Yemeni peace conferences that were held after the mission was terminated in September 1964.[165] Nevertheless, what is pertinent for this analysis is that the UNYOM's role in Yemen was extremely limited. Faced with severe financial problems and understaffing from the outset and challenged further by the unforgiving Yemen terrain, UN officers could not appropriately observe Egyptian and Saudi activities in the demilitarised zone. [166]

This time though, Washington's disengagement plan also had a built-in mechanism to ensure the disengagement plan was adhered to. Early in the Bunker mission, House Saud had obstructed mediation attempts and refused to negotiate with US, Egyptian or UN officials. Komer though, devised a plan to entice the Saudis to participate. To lure Faisal into cooperating in Bunker's mediation discussions, Komer proposed that Washington provide House Saud with six US fighter jets so long as Saudi Arabia ceased supplying aid to Royalist forces. The reasoning here was that the overt display of US military force in Saudi Arabia would deter further Egyptian air raids against House Saud. In turn, this would help to pacify Saudi concerns of Yemen's crisis events. If Faisal were to break with the disengagement plan, there was also the added bonus that Washington could remove the fighter jets in retribution. [167]

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[165] See for instance, Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* pp: 80-105; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1990) p. 305; Michael Bishku, 'The Kennedy Administration, The U.N. and the Yemeni Civil War' *Middle East Policy,* Vol.1, No. 4, (1992) pp: 116-128.

[166] In late April 1963 for instance, Lieutenant-General Carl von Horn was sent by U Thant to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen for 'exploratory' talks and to discern the 'function and scope' of the mission. In sum, von Horn later recalled Yemen as the 'country which God forgot'; the densely populated 'godforsaken mountains' hampered UN air patrols and made a vast majority of Yemeni terrain completely impenetrable by UN jeeps. See, von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace,* pp 302-304.

[167] Memorandum for Record- Presidential Meeting on Yemen, 25 February 1963, Box 208, Yemen General 2/63, JFKL.

Perceived as the only available means to attain Saudi acquiescence and engage with the Bunker Mission, *Operation Hardsurface* was therefore offered to Faisal in February 1963 and, after being accepted by House Saud, was implemented in June the same year.[168] Nevertheless, the dangers in Komer's plan had not been lost on officials in the Department of Defence. Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense in International Security Affairs cautioned for instance that the plan would be 'highly unpopular with most Arab states' and that if the squadron were used against Nasser, Washington risked losing the confidence of 'the whole of the Middle East.'[169] The potential risks of the plan went beyond Nitze's concerns though. Any escalation of the crisis now potentially risked direct US military engagement in Yemen. This would have also destroyed US-Egyptian relations, provoked international criticism of US interventionism and, given the increased Soviet presence in Yemen, also potentially risked direct US-Soviet confrontation. No wonder then that when learning of the plan, Kennedy made explicit to Komer: 'I don't want the squadron out there until after we are 99 percent certain it won't have to be used.'[170]

Meantime, having refused to recognise the YAR, and, with no UK Consulate officials at the British Legation in Taiz, the British were no longer publicly involved within Yemen's crisis events. Still though, concerns about the stability of the newly formed South Arabian Federation (SAF) meant that officials in Macmillan's government continued to perceive Sallal's Republican forces and Egypt's military presence in Yemen as a significant threat to British interests in the region. Following its successful merger in January 1963, a strong current of pro-Republican Arab Nationalism had surged through the SAF. Through the use of strikes and public displays of Republican solidarity, Yemeni emigres helped spur these budding nationalist sentiments.[171] Indeed, in the first month of the SAF's existence, Sir

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[168] Telegram from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy, 28 June 1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, doc. 284, FRUS.

[169] Memorandum for Record- Presidential Meeting on Yemen, 25 February 1963, Box 208, Yemen General 2/63, JFKL

[170] Komer, Oral History, Interview 2, JFKL.

[171] The journalist Donald Foster, who, according to Spencer Mawby, knew Aden well, described: 'there was hardly a shop in the Crater bazaar that was not flying the new Republic's flag…' Spencer Mawby, *British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955-67: Last Outpost of a Middle East empire* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) p.92.

Charles Johnson, who became the first High Commissioner of the Federationm imprisoned and deported over one hundred Yemenis for breaches in public order. [172]

Continuing Yemeni and Egyptian aggression towards the UK's presence in the SAF exacerbated Whitehall's concerns. In January 1963, Sallal described the UK as 'a hideous old woman whose power was finished' and demanded all Yemeni emigres in the SAF to organise their overthrow. [173] Then, in June 1963, the previously exiled Sultan of Lahej joined his tribes with Egyptian forces to form the National Liberation Army (NLA). This became the military arm of a more radical anti-colonial movement, the National Liberation Front (NLF). Broadly evolved from exiles from Aden, Yemen and the Federation, the NLF enjoyed wide support from tribes in the hinterland of the Federation and consequently worked to inspire rebellion in the SAF and undermine UK rule. [174]

This combination of events obliged officials in Whitehall to re-assess their position in the Arabian Peninsula. Still under treaty agreements to protect the SAF, it was evident that Federation officials required urgent UK military support. The SAF maintained just four battalions of the local Federation Regular Army (FRA). Supported by only one UK Commando Company, a battery of field artillery, a half-battery of light anti-aircraft guns and a squadron of armoured cars, resources were extremely limited. Also, potential for domestic upheaval in the Federation would certainly demand the attention of all the troops at the Aden Garrison, leaving the Federation/Yemeni border unprotected. Moreover, the 'secret cell structures' of the NLF meant that conventional military measures would not be enough to stem the rebellion. According to Jonathan Walker, even from within the NLF, members of each operational unit were unknown to each other with only the cell leader having knowledge of the objectives of each operation. This gave the NLF the ability to penetrate quickly, local government administrations and army's and meant that Federation officials remained unaware of the extent of NLF influence nor of their intentions.[175]

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[172] Aden (Johnson) to Secretary of State, 4 December 1962, 10 January 1963, 10 February 1963, CO 1015/2596, UKNA.

[173] 'The Yemen' Memorandum by Officials, 9 January 1963, CAB129/112, Ibid.

[174] See for instance, Walker, *Aden Insurgency,* pp. 76-77; Orkaby, 'The North Yemen civil war' pp. 69-83; Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars,* pp: 105-108.

[175] Walker, *Aden Insurgency*, p. 124.

Two policies flowed from these considerations. First, covert UK support for Royalist forces had to continue. Bolstered Royalist forces would bog down Sallal's forces in Yemen and potentially distract political attention as well as drain dwindling Egyptian military and economic resources away from the SAF. Accordingly, secret meetings held in April 1963 and attended by members of the Aden Group, the founder of the Secret Air Service (SAS) Colonel David Stirling and Home produced the British Mercenary Organisation (BMO). According to Andrew Mumford, the BMO was deployed to Yemen soon thereafter under the influence and supervision of Smiley, Amery and McLean for the specific purpose of training and supervising Royalist tribesmen as well as equipping them with military supplies.[176] Second, to protect the SAF, Macmillan's government resolved to increase the RAF presence at the Aden base and to rely more on the use of 'proscription bombing' as a form of deterrence against potential Yemeni subversion.'[177] Foreign Office officials duly warned Washington as early as June 1963 that Kennedy Trevaskis, the new High Commissioner of the Federation following Johnson's retirement, was now arranging for the deployment of 'more adequate weapons' into the SAF and that this did 'not exclude the use of aircraft.' [178]

It is clear then, why Ashton describes the tone of Anglo-American relations in August 1963 as strained; Whitehall's and Washington's policy positions were such that potential for policy coordination or consultation at senior levels of government was extremely limited. Poor relations with both Yemen and Egypt meant that UK officials could not directly participate in the Bunker mission. On 28 February, Rusk pressed again for UK recognition of the YAR so officials in Whitehall could 'realistically cultivate [the] best possible relations with [the] YAR' and assist in crisis mediation discussions. Nevertheless, by this point Whitehall's stance on recognition was already well established. Rusk's subsequent request was unsuccessful but nor did the Secretary of State expect otherwise.[179] Conversely, with only a

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[176] Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars,* p. 106; Mawby, *British policy in Aden and the Protectorate,* p. 111. David Smiley, *Arabian Assignment* (London, Leo Cooper, 1975); Tim Bower, *The Perfect English Spy* (London, Heinemann, 1995).

[177] Walker, *Aden Insurgency,* p.58.

[178] Outward Saving Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 21 June 1963, FO 371/168828, UKNA.

[179] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 28 February, 1963, Box 207, Yemen General 2/63, UKNA.

US Legation in the Federation and still respectful of UK spheres of influence, there was little American officials could do to help ease Whitehall's pressures in the SAF. Indeed, Ormsby-Gore shrewdly noted in August 1963 that policy traffic between the State Department and Foreign Office concerning Yemeni affairs was nearly at a standstill.[180]

So too did UK and US officials at senior levels of government find the policies of their transatlantic counterparts rather irksome as they sought to navigate through crisis events. For instance, although Macmillan's government publicly supported the UNYOM mission, in private, the Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys and Secretary of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft feared the UN mission would undermine British prestige in the SAF and suggest to Federation rulers that the UK was no longer capable of protecting the region.[181] Likewise, Britain's continued activities in Yemen were increasingly problematic for the Americans. In July 1963, James Cortada, the new Charge d'affaires in Taiz, informed the State Department that tending to UK interests in Yemen was proving 'more demanding than anticipated.' Whitehall's support for Royalist forces was perceived in Yemen as unduly fanning the crisis and provoking Nasser. Moreover, as Yemenis could not appropriately distinguish between UK and US interests in the crisis these activities were now also damaging America's reputation and prestige. Exacerbating matters still further, Cortada added that Whitehall had not provided additional funds to cover electricity bills or other expenses for their own Legation's maintenance or upkeep. Protecting UK interests in Yemen was therefore limiting the US Legation's already scarce resources.[182]

Growing frustration from these differences was also evident within the Kennedy administration. Perhaps understandably, Cortada requested that Washington abandon their safeguard over the British Legation in Yemen.[183] In mid-September, Boswell, an unidentified

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[180] Cypher from Washington to Foreign Office, by Sir. D. Ormsby-Gore, 22 August 1963, FO 371/168841, UKNA.

[181] Telegram from New York to Foreign Office 15 May 1963, PREM 11/ 4928, ibid.

[182] James Cortada explained that he only had two regular officers. At least one of whom was always in Sana'a. Incoming telegram from James Cortada to Department of State, 15 July 1963, Box 208 a, Yemen General 7/63, JFKL.

[183] Ibid.

official at the American Embassy in Cairo went further and urged the State Department to disassociate from UK policies in Yemen altogether.[184] It was Komer's advice though that remained most scathing. In a September 1963 White House survey of US policy options in Yemen he suggested that the US should 'beat up [the] UK to stop shafting us.'[185]

Yet, despite their differences, closer investigation reveals that UK and US officials handled their bilateral relations so as to limit as best possible friction developing between Whitehall and Washington. Indeed, both sides communicated clearly the obstacles they faced and the reasoning for their subsequent policy decisions. Foreign Office officials for instance, did their utmost to keep the State Department briefed of any possible retaliatory action Federation leaders may have invoked upon Yemeni tribes and made continued assurances that the border issue would be kept to a minimum.[186] These actions, in turn, minimised potential fallout from their divergent policy stances. Ormbsy-Gore in particular was instrumental in diffusing potential misunderstandings between the Foreign Office and the State Department. In October 1963 for example, he explained clearly to a particularly concerned Whitehall why State Department briefings of the Yemen crisis had stalled. This was not, as British officials feared, because the UK had been intentionally shut out of Washington's policymaking machinery. Rather, senior level State Department discussions of the UNYOM had been leaked to Yemeni Republican officials. This had, in turn, necessitated heightened confidentiality procedures in Washington.[187]

Previous literature has also missed that some British officials sympathised with aspects of Washington's Yemen policy and provided tacit support so that the Americans could achieve their objectives. In fact, significant components of the disengagement plan were either formulated or facilitated by UK officials. British Foreign Office official, A.R. Walmsley for instance was the first to raise the idea of implementing a new form of Yemeni government as a potential means to break the Royalist/Republican and Saudi/Egyptian stalemates. His

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[184] Incoming telegram from Cairo to State Department, 18 September 1963, Countries, Box 209, Yemen general 9/63, Ibid.

[185] 'The Next Round in Yemen' by Memo by Komer, 20 September 1963, Ibid.

[186] See for instance, Secretary of State's Talk with Mr Rusk', 7 April 1963, FO 371/168827, UKNA.

[187] Cypher from Washington to Foreign Office, by Sir. D. Ormsby-Gore, 22 November 1963, FO 371/168841, Ibid.

reasoning was predicated on the knowledge that both Sallal and al-Badr were *Zaidi* and that Yemeni tribal leaders had expressed previously to the former UK Charge d'affaires in Taiz, Christopher Gandy, a willingness to accept an Imamate monarchy so long as *Shafi* interests were also 'adequately protected'. On 19 January 1963, Walmsley had brainstormed 'out loud' to David Bruce, the American Ambassador in London his belief that a 'negotiated peace' might be possible between all parties if Sallal and al-Badr stepped aside for another *Zaidi* that had been appointed by the *Ulama* and who was also acceptable to both Saudi and Egyptian officials. The plan would not be 'easy to pull off', Walmsley admitted to Bruce, but it gave Washington's disengagement plan 'at least an outside chance' of success.[188] Walmsley's scheme evidently left a favourable impression for the Americans. After learning of the potential plan, White House officials had initially kerbed the idea due to 'inappropriate timing'-namely the onset of a Royalist counter offensive attack on Republican forces in Winter and Spring of 1963. Nevertheless, by August 1963, Komer was in full agreement: 'while they're talking they'll at least be less inclined to start shooting.'[189] Saudi, Egyptian and Yemeni peace negotiations directed towards implementing a Yemeni government accepted by all parties was therefore worked in as the final stage of the disengagement plan.[190]

British officials also used their newly established relations with Saudi Arabia to help convince Faisal and other Saudi officials to accept Washington's offer of the fighter jets and to adhere to the US disengagement plan. Indeed, US recognition of the YAR had outraged House Saud and fractured Saudi relations with the Kennedy administration such that Saudi officials had remained suspicious of the nature of the American's offer. Fearing that Faisal would reject Komer's fighter jet offer and still refuse to participate in the Bunker mission, Colin Crowe, the UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, without instructions from Whitehall, stepped in to help the Americans. Non-recognition of the YAR and a shared threat perception of Nasser had re-established Saudi confidence and trust in British Embassy officials, which Crowe put to good use. On 8 March 1963, Crowe reassured Faisal of the potential benefits of

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[188] Incoming telegram Bruce to Department of State, 19 January 1963, National Security Files, Countries, Box 208, 1/63, JFKL.

[189] Memo, Komer to Kennedy, 19 August 1963, National Security Files, Countries, Box 208a, Folder 3, Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

Washington's disengagement plan. The UN observer mission would not, as House Saud feared, reflect negatively on Saudi Arabia but would rather, potentially mobilise international opinion against Egypt. In addition, the British diplomat ventured, the US fighter jets would not only deter Egyptian air strikes but also guarantee Washington's preserve over Saudi Arabia's continued stability. Reflecting on the conversation, Crowe later informed the Foreign Office of his confidence that Faisal had been receptive of his counsel and was likely to discuss implementing *Operation Hardsurface* with Washington.[191]

Also neglected within extant literature is that, despite Cortada's expressed frustrations in maintaining the British Legation in Taiz, the Kennedy administration clearly valued Britain's residual influence in the region and were willing to go to considerable measures in order to protect their interests and prestige remained intact. Perhaps the best demonstration of the seriousness of Britain's problems and Washington's willingness to help therein developed as a consequence of the bolstered UK military presence in the SAF. On 22 June 1963, eighteen British servicemen and women from the Aden Garrison were taken hostage in Yemen. Given the tempestuous nature of SAF-Yemeni relations at the time, it is reasonable to assume that the British troops had been assigned to a mission in Yemen. Nevertheless, the explanation provided was that the troops had been permitted leave for a picnic and subsequent training mission in the Protectorate of Lahej. However, upon their return they inexplicably found themselves lost in Yemeni territory when their driver had made a wrong turn and subsequently travelled one hundred miles in the wrong direction.[192]

The aptly deemed 'Picnic Disaster' was a considerable embarrassment for officials in Whitehall and potentially detrimental to British interests in Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere. It provided Nasser and Sallal's Republican forces the perfect opportunity to showcase what would be perceived as British ineptitude to civilians in the Federation and threatened to inspire further anti-colonial sentiments. In addition, if news of the hostage crisis was released, Macmillan's government would no doubt incur fervent international accusation of

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[191] Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, 8 December 1963, FO 371/168841, UKNA; From Jedda to Foreign Office (No. 803). Ibid.

[192] Outgoing Telegram from Department of State, signed by Ball, 23 June 1963, National Security Files, JFKL. 'Incident in the Yemen' HL, Deb 24 June 1963, Vol 251 cc21-4, Hansard [online] available from https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1963/jun/24/incident-in-the-yemen (accessed 23/11/2018).

British meddling in Yemen's internal affairs. Indirectly responsible for UK interests in Yemen, the hostage crisis threatened Washington's position in the Middle East too. Indeed, State Department officials perceived the event as an unnecessary stimulus for Yemen crisis events and feared that it would inspire Soviet criticism of perceived Western interventionism in Yemeni affairs. Most important though, with *Operation Hardsurface* only just implemented in Saudi Arabia, potential that Nasser would react emotionally to Britain's overt presence in Yemen and initiate air strikes on Saudi Arabia and the SAF risked direct US military involvement in the crisis. [193]

Remarkably though, rather than revealing frustration or acrimony towards UK policies in Yemen, Macmillan's government received immediate support from the Kennedy administration. On 28 June, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk informed Foreign Secretary Home and Defence Secretary Thorneycroft that he was looking into all possibilities to 'get the troops out of Yemen without regard to ceremony.' Potential options discussed in the State Department included an American approach to Nasser and even use of US aircraft.[194] That senior level officials in Washington were willing to risk their own military involvement in the Yemen crisis for the sake of the British hostages thus evidences none of the fundamental break in Anglo-American relations that had been hitherto argued in previous literature.

Ultimately, such extreme measures to rescue the British troops did not have to be implemented. Rather, Cortada independently facilitated the timely release of the servicemen. He not only negotiated demands for their safe release – payment of approximately £7500 in total- but also made the 'necessary arrangements' to ensure their wellbeing upon their arrival at the British Legation in Taiz. Indeed, the US Charge d'affaires ordered all US resident officials to donate their beer to the British troops until they were granted formal release from Yemen. The reasoning for his, Cortada tells in his Oral History was to ward off Bilharzia, a parasitic infection that was prevalent in the region.[195] Cumulatively, this too was a

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[193] See for instance, incoming telegram from Jidda to Secretary of State, 20 June 1963, National Security Files, Countries, Box 208A, Yemen General 6/63, JFKL.

[194] The President's European Trip, Memorandum of Conversation, 28 June 1963, Box 318, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Conference Files 1949-1963, CF 2275-President's Trip to Europe 6/23-7/2/63, memcons, USNA.

[195] According to Cortada, this effort was made in order to ward off Bilharzia, a parasitic infection that was prevalent in the region. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, James N. Cortada, Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 1 September 1992,

considerable gesture from the Americans. As was noted above, Yemenis could not distinguish between UK and US policies. Cortada's actions therefore could have potentially undermined US relations with Yemeni officials. Indeed, the significance of Washington's concessions were not lost on Macmillan's government. A telegram of appreciation was duly sent from Parliament expressing Whitehall's thanks to Cortada, Rusk and 'other members' of the Kennedy administration for their support in the rather 'unfortunate affair.'[196]

Despite evident differences in UK and US Yemen policies, close examination of hitherto neglected Anglo-American exchanges during this period reveals little evidence of a lasting tension or strain. Rather, British officials worked around their policy constraints to help their American counterparts where possible to achieve their policy objectives. Likewise, officials in the Kennedy administration moved swiftly into crisis management mode and risked Washington's relations with Yemeni officials to safeguard and rescue the British hostages.

What then, can be said for the Home government's and the Johnson administration's handling of their bilateral relations in the latter stages of the Yemen crisis? Records become rather scant once Johnson assumes office. This may owe, as previous literature has claimed, to Johnson's lack of personal interest in Yemen.[197] However, given the crisis in Vietnam, increasingly fractious relations between Egypt and Israel, and that by 1964 the Yemen crisis had, more or less, culminated in a tentative resolution between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it is conceivable therefore that Yemen was simply relegated to lower down on Washington's priority list. Indeed, close examination of available records reveals that Jones' argument has considerable credence; a breakdown at senior levels of UK and US government did occur between March and April 1964.

There was little that senior level US officials could do at this stage in the Yemen crisis. During the January 1964 Arab League Summit in Cairo, Faisal and Nasser had resurrected Saudi-Egyptian diplomatic relations and declared a willingness to bring the Yemeni conflict

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p. 33 [online] available from https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Cortada,%20James%20N.toc.pdf (accessed 19/11/2018).

[196] Ibid; The Yemen (British Service Personnel) HC Deb 04 July 1963, vol 680 cc601-3, [online] available from < https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1963/jul/04/the-yemen-british-service-personnel> (accessed 23/11/2018).

[197] Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War,* p. 76

to a peaceful end. This declaration was followed by a series of meetings which culminated in April 1964 with a draft Yemeni Constitution. Its principal points were that Sallal and al-Badr were to step down as leaders of the Republican and Royalist forces. The *Ulama* would then select a new Imam with Yemeni citizens electing a Cabinet government boasting an independent judiciary and legislative assembly from which the new Imam would have to work. For Washington then, the remaining objectives now were to encourage continued Yemeni, Egyptian and Saudi negotiations, certify a responsible and gradual removal of Egyptian military forces, and, as best possible, keep outside forces from reawakening Egyptian and Saudi tensions. Komer suitably summarised Washington's more relaxed policy stance to Johnson on 31 January 1964: 'our best guess is that the Yemen flap is over…I may be wrong but I think we can keep this messy little problem off your list of trouble spots.'[198]

Komer was wrong. Developments in the SAF buffeted Whitehall's crisis position so it directly opposed Washington's preferred policy stance. Whereas, the Johnson administration was reasonably content with the nature of the Egyptian military force in Yemen, Nasser's continued military presence in Yemen was considered in London to directly threaten the stability of the SAF and the UK's colonial presence there. On 14 October 1963, NLF dissidents from Radfan, a small mountainous region of the SAF bordering Yemen, threw a grenade into a gathering of British officials. The event marked the beginning of a brutal anti-colonial guerrilla war in the SAF that subjected British officials to increased violence and terrorist acts until the UK left the SAF in 1967. [199] For now though, the Home government was determined to prevent Federation perception of the UK's weakening influence and prestige in the region. Continued Egyptian and Yemeni raids on the Federation exacerbated matters considerably and therefore produced an alteration in Whitehall's approach to the crisis. Whereas UK officials had tried previously to limit UK covert activities and retaliatory strikes in Yemen so as not to undermine Washington's disengagement plan, a hardened stance against these seditious acts was now deemed necessary. On 2 December 1963, a

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[198] Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 31 January 1964, 1964-1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, FRUS [online] available from <history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/3321> (accessed 31/01/2018).

[199] For more information on the so called 'Radfan Revolt' or 'Aden Emergency' see Uzi Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution*; Clive Jones, *Britain and State Formation in Arabia 1962-1971: From Aden to Abu Dhabi* (Oxon: Routledge, 2018); Nick Van Der Bijl, *British Military Operations in Aden and Radfan:100 Years of British Colonial Rule* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2014).

Cabinet meeting held between Home, Foreign Secretary Rab Butler, Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, and Defence Secretary Peter Thorneycroft came to a broad agreement. Egypt could not be perceived as 'winning' the Yemen civil war. To ensure this was not a possibility, Whitehall was prepared to reconsider the UK's 'present support of United States policy [in Yemen] and seek to recover [UK] liberty of action [against Egypt].'[200]

Though records are also limited as to the frequency of British covert activities and military strikes that were sanctioned upon Yemen from December 1963 to Spring of 1964, it is evident that by March 1964, Rusk had become deeply concerned by UK-US policy differences in Yemen. Through a series of meetings and telegrams spanning March 9 to March 17, the Secretary of State tried desperately to convince Ormsby-Gore, now Lord Harlech, of the considerable risks inherent in UK activities. Overt displays of UK military force and the presence of British mercenary forces in Yemen would serve only to fuel the Yemen crisis further and gave the impression that the UK was 'actively supporting [the] restoration of the Imamate'. Of even greater concern for Anglo-American interests in the region though, Rusk feared that UK support for Royalist forces risked the loss to Britain and the US of strategically important bases in Libya and Kuwait. [201]

Ormbsy-Gore eased Rusk's concerns by promising Whitehall would keep air-strikes to a minimum and agreeing to discuss the Home government's policy stance with senior level British officials. [202] However, this undertaking came far too late. Yemeni air raids on Beihan provoked an emotional response from Home's Cabinet. On 28 March 1964, they authorised an airstrike against the Yemeni fort of Harib. Killing eleven people and wounding seven others, the attack infuriated the Arab League who called upon all Arab governments to

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[200] The Yemen' Cabinet Discussion, 2 December 1963, CAB 130/189, UKNA.

[201] Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 17 March 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2, Vol. 1., JLBL, See 'Defence and Overseas Policy Committee- The Yemen and South Arabian Federation' by R. S. Crawford, 24 March 1964, FO 371/174627, UKNA; 'The Yemen and South Arabian Federation- Discussion at the Meeting of Ministers on the 19th March 1964' report by the Foreign Office, 24 March 1964, Ibid; 'Air Attacks on Federation of South Arabia and Yemen' signed by R. A. Butler, 1 April 1964, Ibid.; Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, signed by Rusk, 17 March 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2 Vol. 1, LBJL.

[202] Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 17 March 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2, Vol. 1. LBJL.

'reconsider their relations with Britain in light of her aggressive attitude in Yemen'. Echoing Rusk's concerns, the Arab League also demanded the immediate 'liquidation of British bases in Arab states.'[203] Worse still though for UK and US officials, the YAR's call for a UN Security Council Resolution against the UK's activities and the subsequent Security Council vote for Resolution 188 threatened to broadcast fundamental UK and US differences on the international stage.

At this point in the crisis though, Jones' claim that Harib produced an immediate nadir in Anglo-American relations needs further nuance. As the attack had been initiated without prior consultation with Washington, there is no doubt that the Americans were furious with Home's government. Johnson for instance deemed the attack 'excessive', 'imprudent' and 'unwise'.[204] Likewise, the American Ambassador to Egypt, John Badeau vented to Rusk at the injustice of the British actions. It may have been true that the UK dropped pamphlets warning Yemeni citizens prior to the bombing, but, the Ambassador lamented, it made no difference to 'an illiterate population to read only fifteen minutes before an actual air attack took place.'[205] Nevertheless close examination of UK-US exchanges during the Security Council vote for Resolution 188 reveals that some senior level officials in Johnson's administration were still willing to make significant concessions in order to preserve UK prestige and interests in the region. As this rather remarkable demonstration of UK-US exchange has been hitherto neglected within extant literature, it is traced in considerable detail below.

UN Security Council Resolution 188 was mild in nature - the attack aroused vocal Arab protest but did not acquire sufficient votes in the General Assembly for a serious condemnatory resolution against the UK.[206] In consequence, the Resolution deplored 'the British military action at Harib' and called upon 'the Yemen Arab Republic and the United Kingdom…to exercise the maximum restraint in order to avoid further incidents and to

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[203] See Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, p. 153 and Walker, *Aden Insurgency,* p. 88.

[204] Telephone conversation between LBJ and Adlai Stevenson, 4/9/1964, 1:10 pm, Records and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

[205] Incoming Telegram Badeau to Department of State, 11 May 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 158, UAR Vol. 1 of 4, Ibid.

[206] Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, signed by Rusk, 1 April 1964, ibid.

restore peace in the area.'[207] Nevertheless, as the subsequent debate surrounding the resolution would no doubt inspire international criticism of the UK's colonial responsibilities and potentially spark the interest of the UN Committee of 24 in UK activities in the SAF, emotions were understandably 'very high' in London.[208]

Consensus in Whitehall determined early on that the UK could not prevent the resolution from being passed. Nevertheless, it remained in the UK's interests to 'press hard in [the] wash' for a US abstention. This reasoning was predicated on the fact that US support would help dampen international criticism of UK colonial activities and would be perceived by Nasser and Sallal as an act of solidarity, with Washington accepting the UK's position in the SAF over Egyptian and Republican aggression.[209]

However, in no way was US support guaranteed. The US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, Komer and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, George Bundy had already agreed to support the resolution before British representations were made. Washington had a reputation in the UN of being a steadfast opponent to retaliatory strikes. A US abstention in this instance would almost certainly damage US relations with the Afro-Asians and newly independent states, especially given that the UK was a regional power and the disproportionality of the attack. Moreover, Stevenson in particular expressed the awkwardness of his personal situation seeing as support for the UK would potentially damage his professional reputation within the UN. [210]

Despite the fact, or perhaps, not realising that officials in Johnson's administration had already decided that America would support the resolution, Ormbsy-Gore approached Rusk and asked for the US abstention on 9 April, the same day the vote was scheduled to take

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[207] Resolution 188 'Complaint by Yemen' (1964) *United Nations Security Council Resolutions* [online] available from < http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/188> (accessed 10/12/2019).

[208] Incoming Telegram to the Department of State from US Representative in the UN, Francis Plimpton, 8 April 1964, National Security File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2, Vol. 1. LBJL.

[209] Ibid.

[210] Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 9 April 1964, Vol. XXI, 326, FRUS.

[210] From Washington to Foreign Office, 9 April 1964, FO 371/174628, UKNA.

place in the Security Council. [211] Remarkably too, Rusk accepted the request without hesitation and informed Ormsby-Gore that the US would abstain from the vote. The ensuing interaction that took place within Johnson's administration demonstrates clearly the importance of dialogue in periods of potential Anglo-American crisis. During a telephone conversation with Rusk, Johnson was evidently unconvinced that abstention offered the best solution: 'Don't you think they'll pound us like hell all over the United Nations and all over the papers of the country?' Johnson had additional concerns too regarding Stevenson's likely response, 'Stevenson will be running around raising hell like he was about the Venezuela delegation, won't he?' Rusk nevertheless was persistent. Stevenson, he explained, would be 'personally unhappy for two or three days' but that given Yemen's remoteness, US voting in the UN was unlikely to receive significant international attention. US abstention, Rusk added, could also be used as a political warning to Nasser that the Americans were 'coming close to the end of the trail' with Egypt's continued military presence in Yemen and of their activities in Aden. It was, however, only when Rusk informed the President of the promise he had made Ormbsy-Gore that Johnson relented, 'don't know anything else I got to do except go with my Secretary of State when he tells me he feels strongly about it'.[212]

Rusk thus secured for the UK, an US abstention on the Resolution and provided a public impression of Anglo-American solidarity on Whitehall's behalf. This concession was very significant in Anglo-American relations and in the Yemen crisis. It publicly aligned the US with the UK's position and activities in the SAF and Yemen, which threatened to provoke Nasser and Sallal and upset the final stages of the disengagement plan. The abstention also ran contrary to Washington's traditional anti-colonial stance at the UN and threatened to undermine its reputation. Moreover, as Rusk and Johnson had gone against the general consensus in Washington, the debacle had also produced deep tensions within the administration.

It was only after the Johnson administration had secured UK regional interests that the nadir in relations developed. Indeed, Johnson recounted the events as a 'one time act of loyalty'

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[211] Ibid.

[212] Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, 9 April, 1964, Vol. XXI, Doc. 327, FRUS; Telephone Conversation, sound recording, LBJ and Dean Rusk, 4/9/1964, 12:06 pm, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

that was not to be repeated in 'any paralleled circumstance.'[213] Ultimately, the Harib incident had been initiated without prior consultation with officials in Washington and trust and loyalty had been breached. Worse still, rather than making attempts to reconcile relations, officials in the Home government continued to press for further policy concessions. On 9 June 1964 for instance, Sandys asked Ball if the US could publicly demonstrate a more 'robust' position in Aden rather than 'merely take [an] impartial position between [the] two sides.'[214] Ball's response had been unsurprisingly blunt. He reminded Sandy's of Washington's only recent debacle at the UN which had been undertaken only for UK's position in Aden and retorted that US relations with Nasser were strategic and 'not for the sake of his blue eyes.'[215] It was at this point that relations between senior level officials reached their nadir. On 27 July, Rusk no longer saw any point in accommodating the Home government's policies in Yemen and resolved that it was better to wait until after a forthcoming UK General Election so the US could better determine 'which HMG we're dealing with.'[216] In consequence, on 27 July 1964, Rusk employed strict 'ground rules' that limited the extent to which US officials were able to engage with Whitehall over policies concerning Yemen.[217]

What was the extent and impact of this Anglo-American nadir? Jones contends that UK and US differences remained such that Anglo-American policy coordination could no longer be achieved. This claim also needs further nuancing. It is true that restrictions on the State Department with UK officials remained throughout Home's Prime Ministership. However, discussions of potential UK-US policy shared between Michael Stewart from the Foreign Office and Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian

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[213] Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Adlai Stevenson, 4/9/1964, 1:10pm, ibid.

[214] Incoming Telegram from Bruce to Department of State, 9 June 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2, Vol. 1, LBJL.

[215] For Ball's personal feelings of his discussion with Sandys see, 'Personal and Secret meeting from J.E. Katrck to E.H. Peck', 15 June 1964, FO 371/174485, UKNA. For a record of the discussion between Sandys and Ball see 'Record of part of meeting with Mr. Ball. Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office' 9 June 1964, ibid.

[216] Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 24 August 1964, Vol. XXI, Doc. 347, FRUS.

[217] Incoming Telegram from Bruce to the Department of State, 27 July 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen Volume 2, LJBL.

Affairs on 20 November 1964 reveals that these restrictions were lifted immediately after Wilson's government came into power- albeit the gambit paid little dividend. Whitehall's Yemen policy was marked by considerable continuity rather than change. British non-recognition of the YAR remained. Likewise, UK activities into Yemen continued. On 15 December, Lord Caradon, UK delegate to the UN presented an extensive list of alleged UK subversive attacks in Yemen. According to the report, within a span of six weeks, UK authorities had violated Yemeni territory on six separate occasions. The most notable instance being 6 December when four British Hawker Hunter planes attacked the Yemeni post of Jumrok Noaaman, killing a child and two women.[218]

Throughout this period though, it is also important to remember that broadly similar UK and US regional interests still demanded at least public perception of UK-US solidarity. Indeed, this line of thinking was summarised most appropriately by Badeau shortly following the UN Resolution. He informed the State Department thus: 'Whatever problems continued British presence may pose, USG unable to see immediate prospect of replacing it as stabilizing force.' The UK's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf 'could only result in taking off lid from Pandora's Box.'[219] Even during this nadir in relations then, broad forms of Anglo-American cooperation continued. Cortada of course, bore the brunt of these responsibilities. Together with Yemen's bitter resentment of US actions at the UN, UK activities into Yemen continued. On 4 May for instance, Wheelock of the US Embassy in Aden informed the State Department that the UK had added 'some 850 men' and continued 'using aircraft' to attack rebel positions in Yemen.[220] This caused 'great embarrassment' for US officials in Taiz who were still looking after UK interests in Yemen. Nevertheless, on 9 May 1964, Cortada was given strict State Department instructions: 'We strongly urge that we not cease representing HMG in Yemen… it would lend credence to belief that US is basically unfriendly to [UK] interests in Aden and that [UK] have no option but to go it alone.' Ultimately, Cortada was informed, it was better for US interests in the region if US officials urged for 'moderation' to prevent Whitehall from 'over-reacting.'[221]

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[218] Telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 15 December 1964, PREM 13/1923, UKNA.

[219] Incoming Telegram Badeau to Department of State, 10 May 1964, National Security Files, Country Files, UAR, Box 158, UAR Vol 1 of 4, LBJL.

[220] Incoming Telegram for the State Department, 4 May 1964, Box 161, Yemen 1 of 2 Vol. 1, ibid.

[221] Outgoing Telegram from the State Department, 9 May 1964, Ibid.

Most remarkably though, despite the nadir in senior level Anglo-American relations, records reveal three instances where US officials at lower levels of government continued to cooperate with UK officials and / or worked towards protecting UK interests in Yemen and improving Anglo-American relations more broadly. On 27 July 1964, Herman Eilts, who was now working in the US Embassy in London, broke with State Department instructions to share important Yemen crisis updates and State Department lines of thinking, and provide broad policy counsel to the new Head of the Foreign Office's Arabian Department, T. F. Brenchley. The American official was evidently aware of the risk he was taking and of the potentially dire implications to his position were he found out. Throughout the conversation, Eilts urged confidentially and that his name remain off subsequent Foreign Office exchange. Nevertheless, to ensure UK-US relations were not hindered further by lack of communication, he took the gamble. Recent Royalist defeats, he explained, meant that Washington feared Saudi Arabia would resume aid to al-Badr's forces. This would of course, undermine Washington's disengagement plan and mean the Americans would have to threaten withdrawal of *Operation Hardsurface.* Given the jarring state of Anglo-American affairs and current State Department disapproval of the UK's continued activities in Yemen, Eilts therefore urged that should the UK 'at any time consider it necessary to give aid to Yemeni Royalists' UK officials should not do so through House Saud.[222]

Another example demonstrates that some US officials continued to work towards improving the UK's position in the SAF. The significance here, as the Foreign Office was informed, was that these efforts had been undertaken 'unofficially' and 'without authority' from the State Department. On 27 September 1964, Curtis Moore, an Arabian desk officer in the State Department informed Patrick Wright of the Foreign Office that officials from the US Embassy, 'Baylock', 'Quinlan' and an unnamed American officer in Yemen had all sought out senior level Egyptian and Yemeni officials views on the likelihood of finding a settlement to the Aden/Yemen border conflict and easing of tensions between Yemen and the SAF. The response the Americans had received in return would not solve the border dispute but the information nevertheless provided a rare insight into Yemeni line of thinking for the British. Here, the Foreign Office were informed that Yemeni raids into SAF territory would be eased

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[222] Incoming Telegram Bruce to Department of State, 27 July 1964, National Security Files, Country File- UAR, Box 161, Yemen Volume 2, LBJL.

considerably if the British ceased all Adeni radio propaganda towards Yemen and terminated the provision of aid to Royalist forces. Interestingly too, this information came also with a reminder: 'not all Yemenis were in favour of opening a Popular Front in the South.[223]

The final example demonstrates how some US officials also sought out ways to bolster Anglo-American coordination in the region so to ease immediate senior level tensions. In August 1964, Parker T Hart, the American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia recognised that the SAF would soon be granted independence. He thus proposed to the State Department that Washington establish there an economic aid programme and promote their US Consulate to Consulate-General. Neither policy would be implemented until the UK left the region, yet, Hart maintained that similar activities had been undertaken by the State Department after the UK granted independence in Kenya. This had in turn, improved Anglo-American coordination in the country, safeguarded UK and US shared interests in the region and demonstrated a genuine US interest in the stability of the new state. British perception that Washington was not appropriately protecting UK interests in the SAF, Hart offered, may be eased considerably if the US propose such a plan.[224]

Records do not reveal whether Hart was successful in influencing State Department decisions but the Ambassador's activities during this period nonetheless demonstrates continuing UK-US collaboration after a breakdown of senior level Anglo-American relations. For instance, after learning that Hart's proposal had seemingly fallen upon deaf ears in Washington, the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Colin Crowe, asked the Foreign Office if Hart could discuss his plan with officials in Whitehall.[225] The subsequent request was well received by British officials and plans were made to meet the Ambassador in London. Telling of the significance of the plan too, the meeting was initially envisioned as a working supper between Hart and junior level Foreign Office officials. Yet, after learning of his visit, the American Ambassador was granted private access to Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys as well as R.S Crawford from the Foreign Office and Mr. Formoy from the Colonial Office.[226]

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[223] 'Confidential: Yemen' 28 September 1964, UKNA, FO 371/174638, UKNA.

[224] From Jedda to Foreign Office, 24 August 1964, FO 371/ 174485, Ibid.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Views of United States Embassy to Saudi Arabia, 15 September 1964, FO 371 174485, Ibid.

Although there is no official record of the meeting, Foreign Office scribbled notes reveal the Ambassador had planned to press the State Department for a response upon his return to Washington. In addition, during the meeting, the Ambassador had evidently shared with UK officials, considerable details of crisis developments in Yemen and provided important updates of US Yemen policy and current State Department thinking.[227] Hinting at Hart's residual influence too, Washington promoted their US Consulate in Aden to Consulate-General in 1965, b*efore* the British formally withdrew from the SAF in 1967.[228]

Conclusion

Similar to Chapter Two, broader insights into Anglo-American relations garnered from the experience in Yemen will be addressed in the overall conclusion. Rather, this section draws more specific conclusions of how this analysis has added new insights to extant literature on Anglo-American relations in Yemen.

A broad consensus in the current literature determined that British and American officials experienced a nadir in their bilateral relations over the YAR recognition dilemma. Growing frictions experienced over differing UK and US positioned about whether or not to grant diplomatic recognition to the YAR, it is said, could not be resolved even through exchange at the highest diplomatic level, specifically Macmillan and Kennedy's telegram and telephone conversations between 14-17 November 1962. [229] UK and US Yemen policies therefore diverged at the most fundamental levels on 19 December 1962 when Washington formally granted recognition to the YAR and Whitehall did not. Potential for Anglo-American policy cooperation in the crisis is generally perceived to have been severely hampered thereafter.[230] Indeed, only Nigel Ashton and Clive Jones have examined the Anglo-American experience in Yemen beyond recognition. Here though, their conclusions also point to lasting malaise in the relationship. For Jones especially, the real nadir in Anglo-American relations was reached in

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[227] Ibid.

[228] Curtis F Jones, Oral History, Yemen Reader.

[229] Orkaby, 'The Yemen Civil War', p. 202.

[230] Accounts that take this view include: Fain, 'Managing the 'Special Relationship', p.116; Fain, ''Unfortunate Arabia'p. 127; Alexander R. Wieland, 'At Odds in 'Arabia Infelix'.

March 1964 when Home's government authorised the air strike on Harib without prior consultation with the Johnson administration. At this point, Jones contends, UK and US relations became so fraught that subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in the crisis could not be revived. [231]

Anglo-American differences over the provision of diplomatic recognition to the YAR evidently caused issues for Macmillan's government and the Kennedy administration. Frustration experienced from diverging UK and US positions was evidenced in outbursts on both sides of the Atlantic. So too did diplomatic attempts to find consensus over Washington's disengagement plan eventually culminate in Macmillan's and Kennedy's resolve to take separate policy paths. American recognition of the YAR had significant knock-on effects for the UK's crisis position. Indeed, UK officials found themselves expelled from their Legation in Taiz for refusing to recognise the YAR alongside their transatlantic allies. In turn, this meant that Whitehall's ability to influence events in Yemen was severely limited for the rest of the crisis.

With regard to the timing of the nadir in Anglo-American relations – at senior levels of government at least – Jones is correct to highlight the Harib incident of March 1964. Here, the UK retaliatory strike, authorised without prior consultation with Washington caused severe embarrassment and adversity for the Johnson administration. Whereas the tone of senior level exchange over the recognition dilemma remained, on the whole, warm and cooperative, discussions of, or with, the UK following Harib revealed burgeoning acrimony and American frustration. These resulted in Secretary of State Rusk employing strict 'ground rules' and limiting subsequent UK-US discussions of the Yemen.[232]

Nevertheless, fine grain policy tracing demonstrates that this rift was not long-term, nor was there significant detriment to broader Anglo-American interests or even crisis level cooperation. It was not until after the US had salvaged Britain's international reputation by abstaining in the UN Security Council vote of Resolution 188, that Rusk restricted US communication with the British over Yemen policy. Even then though UK-US consultation

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[231] Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War,* p. 84.

[232] Incoming Telegram from Bruce to the Department of State, 27 July 1964, National Security Files, Country File-UAR, Box 161, Yemen Volume 2, LBJL.

and crisis cooperation continued, even if took place at lower levels of government and in some cases, went against State Department instructions. Eilts, Baylock and Quinlan for instance, all provided the Foreign Office information and counsel. Likewise, Hart collaborated directly with UK officials and formulated a plan to relieve Anglo-American tension in Yemen. Moreover, senior level UK and US consultation of the Yemen was eventually reinitiated with the Wilson government, even if Egyptian, Saudi and Yemeni determination to end the crisis necessitated that these discussions remained far and few between.

Finally, it should be noted that opposing UK and US policy positions did not necessarily equate to diplomatic discord in Yemen. Indeed, fine grain tracing of Anglo-American exchange through various administrational changes reveals that the UK's subversive policies against Yemen were constant throughout 1958 to 1965, with variances of intensity dependent upon crisis developments. American concern of these activities also remained throughout all three administrations. Yet, when made aware of the purpose, timing and type of such activities, the British were often provided either with begrudging US acquiescence or tacit support. It was, the lack of consultation with the State Department and UK refusal to ease up retaliatory airstrikes that precipitated the breakdown at senior levels of UK-US government after Harib. Indeed, what infuriated Johnson most was not the act, even though he had thought that it was 'excessive' but rather, that his administration had not been informed beforehand. This, he had later confessed to Stevenson, had been the most 'embarrassing thing.'[233]

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[233] Telephone Conversation between LBJ and Adlai Stevenson, 4/9/1964, 1:10pm, sound recording, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to add value to existing understanding of Anglo-American relations generally and, specifically, of how British and American officials managed crises in Yemen and Congo. Informed by lessons and opportunities afforded by the cultural turn in IR and Diplomatic History, the overriding objective was to complement traditional approaches to scholarship on Anglo-American relations by investigating, through fine-grain policy tracing, the re-conceptualised question of agency in foreign affairs. The consequent principal assumption was that how Anglo-American officials assessed the crises and conducted their bilateral relations might reflect both traditional calculations of interest and mutual utility *and* the underlying cultural context – Anglo-American and third party. A 'common cast of mind' might reasonably be expected to result not just in similar appreciations of international events but also reciprocal identification and distinctive patterns of diplomatic behaviour, especially when grafted onto an evolving post-WW2 coral reef superstructure of dense bureaucratic interweaving and traditions of intimate and informal exchange.

What remains to be done is to draw some final conclusions about what this work has revealed and how it has contributed to existing scholarship. This is done in five sections. The first relates extant interpretations of the global condition of Anglo-American relations in the period 1958-65 to the case studies, exploring what the specific findings therein tell us of the so-called years of transition. Section two examines the impact of government transitions on both sides of the Atlantic to the substance and management of Anglo-American policies toward Congo and Yemen. The third section demonstrates how the detailed policy tracing of these crises helps corroborate and enrich the still limited literature on a distinctive 'modus operandi' within Anglo-American relations and why it is important to extend analysis to low level consular activities as well as to the better documented relationships between Presidents,

Prime Ministers, and their immediate entourage. Section four places the case study analyses in the context of current work on Congo and Yemen, detailing the extent to which traditional interpretations are confirmed, where new revisionist arguments have been made and where important lacunae – be it previously missed events or gaps in archival evidence – have been addressed. Finally, a few closing remarks are offered as to where I have identified future research needs in readiness to expand this work beyond the confines of this thesis.

UK-US Relations and years of transition: lessons from the Congo and Yemen

As was established in Chapter One, the years under investigation in this thesis have been described as a period of transition in Anglo-American relations. Gone were the halcyon days of intimate WW2 cooperation. But what was in their stead? For the likes of Dobson, Anglo-American relations were becoming relatively less important in a global context, attenuated as British decline continued and yet still imbued with elements of cooperation that evinced a special quality. For others, growing Anglo-American strategic dissonance injected friction, reduced interaction opportunity and weakened the relative importance of Washington and London to each other; the US was drawn increasingly to Asia and Vietnam especially whilst Britain reluctantly embraced Europe. For others still, British relative decline had by this time progressed so far that whatever had once been unique – if ever it were – to UK-US relations had been stripped away. Ashton for instance, perceived Macmillan's concept of interdependence as offering a scant fig-leaf for a wasting body of Anglo-American cooperation.

To some extent the Anglo-American experiences in the Congo and Yemen reflect this established narrative of decline. At the onset of both crises the UK was the lead Western power, had greater established interests and boasted stronger expertise and influence. With the Aden Colony and the Protectorates bordering Yemen, and with the CAF adjacent to Katanga, Britain had at the very minimum, a formal diplomatic presence at consulate level in Yemen and the Congo, together with some on-ground understanding of Yemeni and Congolese politics, culture, and society. By contrast, the Americans were grossly unprepared for either crisis. In 1958, Eisenhower and other senior level policymakers in his administration struggled to identify where Yemen was. Nor were there any established facilities for American diplomatic representation in the country. The situation was only

marginally better in the Congo, with which the Americans had pre-established diplomatic relations. The American Embassy still lacked the basic infrastructure to function appropriately and the poverty of understanding of local conditions was profound. This was reflected admirably in American ambassadors in Leopoldville being expected to execute US policies from within the confines of a glass building and where the only means of communicating with the State Department was through a ham radio, located in an attic in Belgium.

As the crises progressed, in both cases the US gradually assumed the diplomatic lead. Indeed, by the time Harold Wilson's Labour Government came into power in October 1964, the UK was cast in both crises firmly in a secondary role. Expelled from the Yemen and, after the disintegration of the CAF struggling to maintain a residual presence in Central Africa, British influence in both regions evidently waned significantly. Conversely, it was the Americans who drove diplomatic recognition of the YAR in 1962 and who in the Congo supported the ONUC Operation Grandslam and formulated the military rescue operation Operation Dragon Rouge. This, at least, is consistent with the wider pattern of British relative decline, whereby the UK's waning regional presences meant that American officials gradually found themselves pulled into spheres of traditional British influence.

However, it is important to note that the UK's transition to secondary actor status did not owe solely to loss of power and influence. Britain's established interests, extant relationships and domestic politics all made it politically difficult for UK governments to be seen to lead Western initiatives in crisis resolution. Britain was too easily exposed to accusations variously of meddling in the Congo's domestic affairs, undermining Protectorate leaders in Yemen and adopting a neo-imperial prioritisation of British economic and strategic interests above developing countries' rights to self-determination. Equally, Conservative governments especially could ill afford domestically to be seen to sacrifice British responsibilities and interests upon the 'wind of change'. Furthermore, the ethos of the Kennedy administration in particular sensitised Whitehall to the negative repercussions of Britain being perceived as an old-fashioned Metropole; American anti-colonialism and domestic race relations constituted a potentially potent political mix that could easily spill over into Anglo-American relations.

It is also important to understand that American officials recognised and respected British reluctance to be 'put out front' in the Congo and why agreement to disagree was necessary

over diplomatic recognition in Yemen. There is little evidence to suggest that their periodic frustrations in understanding these positions equated to any American desire to supplant British interests. Rather, the US considered it important that Britain remain a regional power in Africa and the Middle East, both as a 'responsible de-coloniser' and as a provider of key security assets, including the Aden Colony with its strategically important military base and the navy base in South Africa. Moreover, American officials clearly continued to value British cooperation and influence throughout the Congo and Yemen crises. In the latter, the Americans were bolstered by subtle yet important British diplomatic support and burden sharing of crisis responsibilities. For example, Whitehall's knowledge of Yemen was so valuable to Washington that in 1960, the State Department allowed the UK to influence their selection of the first US Charge d'affaires in Taiz. Similarly, early in the crisis at least, UK subversive activities in Yemen were useful in deterring Soviet infiltration and secured consequent tacit US acquiescence. As for the Congo, Macmillan's government offered important support for the establishment and maintenance of the ONUC, provided tactic support for the elimination of Lumumba in 1960 and not only afforded the US use of Ascension Island for Operation Dragon Rouge but also maintained a controversial media blackout to facilitate its success.

Finally, the case studies do not support the general argument that growing Anglo-American strategic dissonance in this period injected greater tension and / or drift into UK-US relations. Rather, the general pattern was one of burden sharing and broad acceptance that the US would support Britain in retaining responsibilities and interests in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as far as possible. Some US officials periodically queried the pace of British transition to indigenous government but they were equally aghast at the prospect of Britain's relinquishing its responsibilities with undue haste. This was not just a case of Johnson's fear of the US being left to man the ramparts alone beyond Europe. It was also recognition that US influence in Africa and the Middle East was limited, that Britain was a trusted ally and that the beneficiaries of potential power vacuums created by a disorderly British withdrawal would be communists and / or nationalists antipathetical to western interests. It is for these reasons that, despite the Harib incident, Johnson's administration continued thereafter to represent British interests in Yemen and, in the Congo, Kennedy's administration took a calculated risk in pressing Congolese officials to reconsider the expulsion of UK Consulate member Derek Dodson.

Government transitions: continuity or change in policy and Anglo-American relations?

The impact of government transitions on foreign policy, in terms both of content and prosecution, tends to be more pronounced on the US side of the Atlantic where extensive use of political appointments stands in stark contrast to the British permanent civil service. It is in this tradition that some accounts of growing Anglo-American differences in the Congo and Yemen have attributed partial responsibility to the transition from the Eisenhower to Kennedy administration. Kennedy, it is argued, introduced individuals more sensitive to Afro-Asian and nationalist sentiments into his administration and that this helped drive UK and US policies in the Congo and Yemen further apart. The detailed policy tracing conducted in this thesis corroborates such conclusions, at least in part. For example, during the UN Security Council vote for Resolution 188 in April 1963, Home's government faced Adlai Stevenson, the US Ambassador to the UN, who had resolved that it was important the US be perceived as supporting nationalist movements rather than aligning with its Metropole allies. Similarly, during the Nassau Summit of December 1962, George Ball was a steadfast advocate for reintegrating Katanga through force and in Yemen, Robert Komer was an influential champion of the US working with Nasser's Pan-Arab nationalism.

The research in this thesis suggests that these appointments did not destabilise Anglo-American relations but did impact periodically the tone of exchange and how the UK approached the US when in search of a sympathetic hearing and / or insight into American thinking. British officials, it seems, found it easier to work around rather than communicate directly with particular individuals within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for instance, proved a more popular contact for British officials in both case studies than did Undersecretary of State, George Ball, whose policy preferences were compounded by a lack of personal affiliation with Alec-Douglas Home, whom Ball considered rather a 'mean guy'[1]. In a similar vein, following Operation Grandslam the Foreign Office received explicit counsel to avoid discussing Congo policy with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee, owing to his tendency to give only a partial reading of American positions. More generally, changes in personnel brought about by transitions between governments sometimes disrupted influential

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[1] Telecon Ball-Kaysen, 4 October 1962, Britain, 3/31/61-11/20/62, The Personal Papers of George W. Ball, Box 1, JFKL.

Anglo-American personal relationships and contacts. This is well demonstrated by the impact on David Ormsby-Gore, the British Ambassador in Washington, of the transition between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Ormsby-Gore enjoyed close relations with Kennedy but lost his privileged position with the President once Johnson took office, the effect of which is apparent when comparing his ability to handle potential crises in Anglo-American relations in the Congo and Yemen. Immediately following Operation Grandslam, Ormbsy-Gore worked with Kennedy to help impress upon Foreign Office officials Washington's sincerity and subsequent line of thinking at Nassau. However, during the Harib incident, Ormbsy-Gore had to make his diplomatic appeals to Rusk rather than directly to the President and, though still successful in securing Washington's abstention during the subsequent UN Security Council vote, he was markedly less able thereafter to inform Whitehall of Washington's lines of thinking.

It is also the case that transitions between American administrations brought more overt, and sometimes significant, shifts of tone and emphasis in foreign policy than occurred on the British side. Foreign policy continuity in London was safeguarded by the professional civil service, a broadly bipartisan approach to foreign affairs and a consistent rejection of moral absolutes in favour of Hobbesian assumptions. Conversely, US foreign policy has traditionally been buffeted by contending forces of isolationism and internationalism, a morality discourse in American exceptionalism and a political tradition of grand visions that distinguish one administration form another. A bipartisan consensus about the Cold War did not necessarily translate into consistency about how, where and when to wage containment. For instance, Kennedy's replacement of Eisenhower's New Look with Flexible Response disconcerted Whitehall with its stronger anti-colonial ethos and apparent determination to harness developing world nationalist and liberation movements against communism. In the Congo and Yemen this shift was certainly reflected in a re-modulated discourse and greater concern for US standing in the UN.

A caveat, however, should be added here insofar as government transitions on the British side did exhibit some subtle impacts on policy towards the Congo and Yemen. In particular, the Macmillan and Home Conservative governments were more vulnerable than Wilson's Labour government to backbench pressure against Britain's withdrawal from Empire, which occasionally played out strongly in Anglo-American relations at the very highest levels. This is broadly consistent with previous claims that in the Yemen Civil War specifically, Prime

Minister Alec-Douglas Home was particularly susceptible to influence from the 'Aden Group' and developed a hardened stance against Egyptian and Yemeni subversion into Aden as a consequence.[2] In addition, it is evident that on occasion the Americans looked to a potential change of British government to relieve policy blockages in Anglo-American relations. For instance, the Johnson administration became frustrated with British activities in Yemen. However, they deferred entering into discussions with Home's government, preferring to hedge their bets upon the British general election lest they had chance to deal instead with a less 'imperially minded' successor Labour Government.

All of this notwithstanding, though, it is important not to overstate either the quantity or relative impact of changes in policy and / or tone resultant from the transitions in government examined in this thesis. Often diplomatic 'noise' was distinct from actual policy. Take Washington's policies in the Congo for instance. African countries accused Eisenhower's Congo policy of supporting Western colonial interests in Africa by evading the use of military force. Yet, while Kennedy's 'New' Congo policy publicly appealed to Afro-Asian nationalist sentiments and provided the ONUC with greater authority to manage crisis events, close examination reveals that both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations equivocated when it came to committing to hard-lined polices in the crisis. Although Kennedy's administration pressed Macmillan's government to adhere to the UN Reconciliation Plan, Washington's reaction to the ONUC's Operation Grandslam demonstrates clearly that Stage 4, the application of a *threat* of military coercion, was designed more as an ultimatum for Tshombe then for intended use. Likewise, it was only when Johnson's administration had exhausted every possible alternative option, and only when the American and European hostages were perceived to be in grave danger, that Operation Dragon Rouge was operationalised.

Anglo-American discord over how best to reintegrate Katanga at Nassau can likewise be seen as resulting more from policy continuity than change. Despite the public posturing, Kennedy's administration maintained much the same policy priorities as its predecessor. Eisenhower's administration had been determined to prevent an independent Katanga and were in principle at least prepared to support potential ONUC military to achieve this. The first UN military mandate, after all, had authorised the UN Secretary General to take any

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[22] Jones, *Britain and Yemen Civil War,* pp:75-76; Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars*, pp: 106-107.

necessary steps in consultation with the Congolese government to help remove Belgian forces. Only once Washington had secured a pro-Western Congolese government in August 1961 did Anglo-American tension ratchet-up over reintegrating Katanga.

Whitehall's policies in Yemen evince similar continuity across the Conservative and Labour governments. Some have argued that the Macmillan government's decision not to provide diplomatic recognition to the YAR in December 1962 was due to stalwart opposition from the Governor of Aden, Sir Charles Johnston and from within elements of the Conservative party.[3] There is merit to these arguments; Johnston and the Aden Group certainly played a notable role in impressing upon government officials and the wider public arguments that strongly favoured nonrecognition. Nevertheless, even without these constraints, Harold Wilson's government also refused to reconsider Britain's nonrecognition of the YAR. Claims that Home's government were more inclined to impose hard-lined policies against Yemen can be interpreted similarly. It is true that the Harib incident occurred under Home but ultimately it was Macmillan who re-authorised in 1958 the extension of RAF airstrikes into Yemen. Likewise, despite public criticism of the Conservative Party's polices in Yemen, British subversion into Yemen increased under Wilson's Labour government. From November 1964 to December 1964, the Labour government authorised six airstrikes into Yemen in a span of six weeks.

Overall, then, government transitions during the two crises had very limited impact on policies. Even though the Kennedy administration publicly positioned itself as a champion of self-determination, its actions in the Congo and Yemen were broadly consistent with those of the Eisenhower administration. Consequently, while changes in the tone of policy presentation on the US side caused periodic concern in Whitehall, the alarm proved largely ungrounded. Indeed, in terms of Anglo-American relations government transitions were most impactful in terms of disrupting influential personal relationships, affecting at what working level of the 'coral reef' contacts were most beneficial and in conditioning the specific domestic political constraints that UK and US leaders would most need to respect. And even here it is important not to overstate this impact. The likes of Komer and Ball may have been occasional irritants to the British but British officials successfully manoeuvred around them

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[3] McNamara, 'The Nasser Factor', pp. 55-6; Bower, *The Perfect English Spy*, p. 247; Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War,* pp: 31-2.

such that little upset was actually caused to Anglo-American relations. Equally, there were far more powerful drivers of policy and Anglo-American exchange in the two case studies than government transitions. Perhaps most important was simply the unfolding of events, something reflected in the predominantly reactive approaches in Yemen and the Congo. For example, the Macmillan government's decision to suspend granting diplomatic recognition in the YAR in February 1963 was a direct reaction to Sallal expelling UK officials from the British Legation in Taiz. Similarly, it was an overture made by Nasser that inspired the US recognition plan in the first place and a combination of Egyptian airstrikes in Saudi Arabia and Sallal's direct appeal to the Soviet Union for military support that spurred US officials to recognise the YAR in December 1962. Meantime in the Congo, it was only after intoxicated Katangese mercenary forces started shooting at ONUC forces that Operation Grandslam had been initiated.

Congo, Yemen and an Anglo-American *modus operandi*

Speaking before the Royal Institute of International Affairs in May 1982, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted 'The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries.' The wartime habit, he went on to observe, of intimate, informal collaboration had evolved into a permanent practice and the British 'became a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations'.[4] It is this *modus operandi* that helps distinguish Anglo-American relations from many others, the dense yet permeable 'coral reef' facilitating both extensive diplomatic and technical exchanges and a tradition of consultation that extends horizontally and vertically through this superstructure. The analyses in this thesis confirm this *modus operandi* and demonstrate how important it was in securing cooperation, agreeing to disagree where necessary and clarifying positions where miscommunication – or diplomatic blockages – had caused frustration and Anglo-American tensions to rise. They further demonstrate the necessity to understanding Anglo-American management of the Congo and Yemen crises of considering not just the apex of the coral reef but also reaching much further down the diplomatic food-chain to the consular level too.

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[4] Henry Kissinger, 'Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy', *International Affairs,* Vol.58, No. 4. (1982) pp:571-587.

The two crises deliver plentiful examples of how the established practice of intimate and regular exchange between British Prime Ministers and US Presidents, and their principals, served variously to smooth relations, alert counterparts to particular sensitivities and secure politically important concessions. Consider, for example, how Macmillan negotiated his way through the Canberra bombs issue with the Kennedy administration in December 1961. The Prime Minister's first approach to Kennedy may not have secured the policy concession the UK needed. Yet, the President eventually relented and agreed to arrange a ONUC ceasefire when his administration received subsequent appeals from Home and after he had shared a dinner conversation with Ormbsy-Gore. Macmillan also engaged in a series of telegram and telephone conversations with Kennedy 14-17 November 1962. Although Macmillan was unsuccessful in convincing Kennedy to adjust the US disengagement plan, it was through this exchange that he was able to secure Washington's acquisition of the YAR public statement that recognised and respected Adeni sovereignty. Similarly, in April 1964, it was a direct appeal by Ormbsy-Gore to Rusk that secured Johnson's reluctant agreement, against the wishes of Stevenson, Komer, and Bundy and in contradiction to the established position of the US UN International Office and the Department of Near Eastern Affairs, to abstain rather than support UN Security Council Resolution 188. This was the Resolution that deplored British military action at Harib and called upon 'the Yemen Arab Republic and the United Kingdom…to exercise the maximum restraint in order to avoid further incidents and to restore peace in the area.'[5] Unable to prevent its passage, UK officials calculated nevertheless that US abstention would help dampen international criticism and be perceived by President Nasser and YAR leader Sallal as an act of US solidarity against Egyptian and Republic aggression in Aden.

Neither was this practice a one-way affair. For instance, Kennedy and Ball pushed Macmillan and Home hard at Nassau over Operation Grandslam in the Congo and secured their minimum requirement of begrudging British silence. This in turn dampened critical UK public statements of UN activities in Congo that had previously strengthened Tshombe's political campaign. Moreover, this example offers an excellent insight into how issues were sometimes elevated through the coral reef to the highest diplomatic level for discussion and / or resolution. In May 1962 the American Ambassador in London, David Bruce, had

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[5] Resolution 188 'Complaint by Yemen' (1964) *United Nations Security Council Resolutions* [online] available from < http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/188> (accessed 10/12/2019).

unsuccessfully pressed Lord Dundee for UK commitment to the UN Reconciliation Plan. In September 1962 Bruce tried again, this time with Home, Sir Roger Stevens of the Foreign Office and Macmillan. That same month Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee appealed to Home. Still the British stonewalled. Only when Kennedy and Macmillan were face to face did the British give some ground at the Nassau summit.

Records pertaining to these apex actors also reveal the Anglo-American 'common cast of mind', mutual confidence and, sometimes, the inherent shared cultural biases and assumptions that scholars informed by the 'cultural turn' are progressively uncovering.[6] For example, in June 1958 Macmillan, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd , US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, freely discussed a 'scheme' to oust Imam Ahmad in Yemen and install his brother, Prince Hassan bin Yahya, in power instead on account of his 'realistic' views towards the Soviet Union and the Egyptians. Similarly, in September 1960, Home and Eisenhower discussed 'ridding' the Congo of Lumumba. Furthermore, underlying Anglo-American cultural biases occasionally became explicit in the discourse of these principals. For instance, upon learning that the Congolese had more than eighty political parties, Eisenhower advised the NSC that he 'did not know that many people in the Congo could read.'[7] Similarly, on 9 August 1962, when Home discussed with Rusk the Congo and the possible imposition of sanctions on Katanga, the former declared that he did 'not believe in sanctions.' Tshombe 'would rather go back to eating nuts than

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[6] Amongst those historians who have engaged how British and American cultural perceptions and biases have influenced their diplomatic relations with third parties are Mary Ann Heiss, Steven Rabe, Sarah Ellen Graham, Frank Costigliola, and Jason Parker. See Mary Ann Heiss, 'Real Men Don't Wear Pajamas: Anglo-American Cultural Perceptions of Mohammed Mossadeq and the Iranian Oil Nationalization Dispute,' in *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945*, eds. Peter Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001), 178-194; Rabe, *U.S. Interventionism in British Guiana;* Sarah Ellen Graham, 'American Propaganda, the Anglo-American Alliance, and the "Delicate Question" of Indian Self-Determination,' *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 2 (2009): 223-259; Frank Costigliola, '"Like Animals or Worse": Narratives of Culture and Emotion by U.S. and British POWS and Airmen behind Soviet Lines, 1944-1945,' *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 5 (2004): 749-780; Jason Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[7] Editorial Note, 101, FRUS [online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d101> (accessed 11/03/2019).

capitulate…The leading Africans, it is true, have their Cadillacs but they have had nuts much longer and are much nearer to them and they do not worry about returning to the jungle.'[8]

Anglo-American trust and intimate discussion were also evident at lower levels of diplomatic activity. For example, the UK Ambassador in Leopoldville, Ian Scott, actively collaborated with his US counterpart, Clare Timberlake, in contingency planning about how best to overthrow Lumumba's government. Meantime in Yemen, throughout 1959 Charles Ferguson, the US Charge d'affaires *ad interim,* took it upon himself to break down 'traditional' Anglo-Yemeni reserve and xenophobia by hosting 'film supper parties' between British and Yemeni officials. Also, the so-called 'Picnic Disaster', when on 22 June 1963 18 UK service men and women were taken hostage in Yemen, evidenced close on-ground cooperation. While Rusk informed Home and Thorneycroft that he was looking into all possibilities to 'get the troops out of Yemen without regard to ceremony', it was Cortada, the US Charge d'affaires in Taiz, who secured their safe keeping and ultimate release. He negotiated a £7500 fee with their captors and upon receiving all the hostages, ordered all US officials resident in Taiz to donate them their beer in order to ward off Bilharzia, a parasitic infection prevalent in the region. Furthermore, in January 1960 Pirie-Gordon, the UK charge d'affaires in Taiz, even successfully influenced the State Department's selection of its first US Charge d'affaires in Taiz. Pirie-Gordon considered the State Department's first choice, Phillip Ireland, too 'humourless', 'difficult' and 'my good lady' for the role. He advocated instead Bill Stolzfus, a serving official in the US Embassy in Aden. This suggestion was duly passed from the Foreign Office to Richard Crawford, the US Director of Arab-Israeli Affairs in the State Department, and then onto Parker T. Hart - at that time the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Interestingly, Herman Elits, US Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs and Near Eastern regional Affairs, explained in confidence to officials at the UK Embassy in Washington that the State Department had seemingly accepted this suggestion against its own best judgment.

There were also occasions during the Congo and Yemen crisis when the political manoeuvring of the 'big beasts' caused problems for Anglo-American relations that lower echelons of British and American officialdom worked assiduously to mitigate. In the Congo,

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[8] Home discussion with Rusk, 9 August 1962, PREM 11/3629, UKNA.

for instance, the Kennedy administration's sudden dismissal of Clare Timberlake created a void in US representation and understanding of local conditions and events that the UK Ambassador, Ian Scott, stepped in temporarily to help fill. There are even examples of lower level cooperation in defiance of established protocol and direct senior level instructions. Hence, in November 1962 it was an unnamed UK official who advised Ambassador Gullion confidentially that the US should continue with the UN Reconciliation Plan without official British support – information relayed back to the State Department on 26 November and which helps explain the American stance at Nassau. Conversely, after the Harib incident in Yemen and the ensuing UN Security Council Resolution 188, Secretary of State Rusk imposed strict instructions upon State Department officials not to share information with UK officials. Hermen Eilts, an official in the US Embassy in London, nevertheless continued to inform T. F. Brenchely, Head of the Foreign Office's Arabian Department, of developments in Yemen. In addition, Parker T Hart, US Ambassador in Saudi Arabia 1961-1965, sought to regather UK-US cooperation after Harib with a suggestion that the US establish an aid programme in Aden and promote the US Consulate to Consulate-General upon the UK's departure from the SAF. Though the plan floundered within the State Department, the good intent was nevertheless made evident. Hart first discussed his ideas with the UK Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Colin Crowe, and was subsequently granted a meeting with senior officials including Secretary of State for the Colonies Sandys and the Foreign Office Head of the Arabian Department from July 1964, D J McCarthy.

Contribution to case study literature

Whilst this thesis has used the crises in the Congo and Yemen as vehicles through which to analyse the question of agency as re-conceived in the cultural turn, it is worth reflecting upon what, in the process, has also been added to extant understanding of Anglo-American relations in these particular contexts. Hitherto, a broad interpretative consensus exists around three aspects of the UK-US experience in the Belgian Congo Crisis and the Yemen Civil War. First, scholarship claims in both cases a breakdown in Anglo-American relations at senior levels of government. In the Yemen, this nadir is said to have been reached when British refusal to provide diplomatic recognition to the YAR caused high emotions and recriminations to flare in the Kennedy administration. As for the Congo, it is the Macmillan government's refusal to adhere to the UN Reconciliation Plan and apply economic sanctions alongside the Americans on Tshombe that is said to have created a gulf between the UK and

US that was so 'unbridgeable' it had a corrosive effect on the wider relationship.[9] Second, the timing of the claimed breakdown of relations is similar in both cases, specifically between December 1962 and January 1963. Third, responsibility for the alleged failure to maintain aligned Anglo-American policies in the Congo and Yemen is widely attributed to Britain's continuing colonial responsibilities and to Conservative Party politics, especially the influence and connections of the Aden Group, Katanga Lobby and so forth.

Do these interpretations provide the full picture? As was discussed in the concluding remarks of Chapters Two and Three, it is true that UK and US policies diverged in fundamental ways. In Yemen, the Kennedy administration extended diplomatic recognition to the YAR and Macmillan's government did not. Likewise, in the Congo, the Americans supported Operation Grandslam whilst UK officials, stood on the side-lines. Underlying these positions were broader differences of policy and regional responsibilities too. The American's were relatively free to adhere to the UN's progressively militarised activities in the Congo and could use recognition of the YAR as a diplomatic tool to ease crisis developments in Yemen. Conversely, senior level officials in the UK, cognisant of international perception of their foreign policies, domestic political opinion and potential repercussions for wider British interests and responsibilities, could not.

Periodically, these divergences did spawn suspicion, recrimination and frustration that spilled over into Anglo-American exchanges. During the Yemen recognition dilemma, for instance, the Governor of Aden, Charles Johnson, proclaimed that American recognition would be regarded in Aden as a 'heavy slap in the face for Britain.'[10] Reciprocally, National Security Council Staff member, Robert Komer lamented constant British pressure against extending diplomatic recognition and their regular efforts to circumvent US officials whom disagreed. It is in this vein that in November 1962 he shared with the Presidential Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, a concise to-do list concerning Washington's recognition policies, he urged 'we want JFK to…OK recognition of YAR [and] turn

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[9] O'Malley, 'Congo Crisis', p. 40.

[10] Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Sir C. Johnston, 13 Nov 1962, PREM 11/3728, UKNA.

Macmillan off.'[11] Meantime in the Congo, Kennedy thought Home 'wasn't playing very straight'[12] in regards to re-integrating Katanga reintegration and Bundy grossly personalised responsibility for British policy in arguing 'They've all got relatives that belong to Tanganyika Concessions.'[13] Neither were such frustrations confined to the American side, one of the sharpest exchanges being at the Nassau summit when a deeply irked Macmillan sarcastically suggested that 'the US should take over the Congo and make Tshombe into some kind of Maharajah, with US support.'[14] So tetchy had matters become that this meeting was adjourned to the following day to enable the two delegations to cool off and regather.

Thus far, then, the existing literature paints a reasonable picture. However, fine grain policy tracing of these two crises reveals much more nuance to the Anglo-American experience than hitherto allowed. The Macmillan government's policies in Yemen and the Congo were much shrewder and more cooperative than has been previously credited. For a start, it is simply not the case, as previously claimed, that the UK immediately opposed extending diplomatic recognition to the YAR. This measure was actually agreed in principle in October 1962 and its temporary shelving was driven by the Beihan incident and the consequent need to calm Adeni and Protectorate agitation lest this upset passage of the Aden Colony-Federation through Parliament. Indeed, Macmillan noted on 31 October that the Government still considered 'recognition of the new regime was sooner or later inevitable.'[15] Furthermore, Foreign Office officials resumed work on possible recognition in February 1963 until such time that Sallal's expulsion of the British Legation from Taiz relieved pressure upon the Macmillan government to resolve its internal differences on the recognition question – hence Macmillan's relieved diary note on 17 February 1963 that 'The Yemen problem (like so many) has settled itself! The Republicans have got tired of waiting for recognition and have

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[11] Message from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 14 November 1962, White House Memoranda, Robert W Komer, Box 447, National Security Files, JFKL.

[12] Memcon to McGhee, 26, September 1962, Ibid. Box 1, Britain 3/31/61-11/20/62, Ibid.

[13] Conversation between Ball and Bundy, 8 October 1962, The Personal Papers of George Ball, Box 3, Congo, 1/3/62-8.29/62, ibid.

[14] Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Congo, 19 December 1962, RG59, Conference Files, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan Nassau Meeting, Memcons, USNA.
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[15] 'The Yemen' Minutes of a Meeting held at Admiralty House, 31 October 1962, CAB 130/189, UKNA.

closed the embassy. The Foreign Office and Foreign Secretary are rather upset. The Colonial Office is triumphant – so is the Minister of Defence.'[16]

In the Congo, too, Macmillan operated under substantial constraints. In the period preceding Operation Grandslam he faced a possible open rupture with the Kennedy administration, fall of his government, serious damage to Britain's standing in the UN and the potential loss of British interests and influence in the Congo and Katanga. In this context stand aside was an astute diplomatic manoeuvre rather than a 'diplomatic disaster'.[17] It protected Macmillan by distancing the government from the UN mission, preserved a measure of British influence within Katanga and with Tshombe, removed both an important irritant in UK-US relations and an obstacle to the ONUC's entry into Katanga and its enforced reintegration into the Congo, and preserved opportunity for future Anglo-American cooperation by avoiding Britain withdrawing from the crisis entirely. It also helped the UK government vis-à-vis its other African colonial responsibilities, neglect of which would have caused consternation in Washington.

Claims of breakdown in Anglo-American relations at senior levels also warrant reconsideration. In Yemen this did happen but much later than the current literature suggests. The catalyst was not tension over diplomatic recognition policy. Rather, it was after Harib, UN Security Council Resolution 188 and continued UK subversive airstrikes into Yemen that Secretary of State Rusk employed strict 'ground rules' limiting the extent to which US officials were to engage their UK counterparts over Yemen. It is also the case that this break in communication was short-lived and inconsistently adhered to given evidence of continued lower level confidential exchanges, such as that noted above between Hermen Eilts and T. F. Brenchely. As for the Congo, there is no evidence of a fundamental breakdown in relations. Peak pressure points during the crisis evinced mutual Anglo-American frustration but a combination of agreement to disagree, appreciation of each side's operating constraints and timely concessions were sufficient to maintain cooperation in pursuit of broadly similar objectives. Indeed, the current literature overlooks completely the many instances of UK-US cooperation in the Congo after Operation Grandslam. A good example of this is the Wilson

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[16] Macmillan, *At the End of the Day,* p. 275-76.

[17] James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, p. 195.

government's approach to American use of Ascension Island, hitherto noted only by Namikas in a one-line mention of the UK's 'begrudging acquiescence'.[18] Detailed policy tracing reveals much more. First, the Wilson government knowingly accepted a risk of political blowback from African and domestic constituencies were Operation Dragon Rouge to become public knowledge. Second, British officials facilitated a media blackout from the island whilst the Operation was taking place, which was demanding and again hitherto unmentioned in the literature. Third, even after the UK's subtle involvement in the operation was discovered and an emotional response erupted in the House of Commons, the Wilson government not only rode out the storm but also authorised a further three-month extension of US use of Ascension Island. Finally, and firmly in the vein of what Kissinger once called a postwar Anglo-American diplomatic history 'littered with "arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents', US use of Ascension Island progressed with informal familial approval.

Finally, it is important to nuance previous claims that Anglo-American tension and 'breakdowns' owed to divergent policies and domestic constraints – predominantly British. The evidence suggests that both sides were well aware of, and respected, the particular domestic constraints that pertained to UK-US handling of these crises. The Kennedy administration had problems in this respect just the same as did the British Conservative governments, albeit of a different nature. It is also the case that not only were negative implications of divergent policies generally well-managed but also that these divergences actually created opportunities for burden sharing and collaboration. Consider, for instance, the quiet work of Derek Dodson, UK Consulate in Elizabethville, and the Foreign Office in bringing Tshombe back to Katanga after Operation Grandslam. In this task the US had very little leverage following its support of Operation Grandslam. In addition, the Kennedy administration had good reason not to be associated with his return given rising sensitivities to race relations within the US and mounting public criticism of American policy in the Congo. By contrast, Macmillan's stand aside policy meant his government remained able to assist. Tshombe had sought refuge within Northern Rhodesia and the UK had leverage over him through the British Consulate in Elisabethville, Welensky, Conservative Party members and shareholders of Tanks. Moreover, UK officials facilitated his return even at some cost to their own standing. As Dodson explained to the Foreign Office on 9 January 1963, Congolese

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[18] Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, p. 157.

officers were now refusing to engage in any form of communication with him or the Consulate

Wherever Anglo-American frustration boiled over, and the break in Yemen occurred, more often than not these owed less to questions of different policy objectives and tactics than they did to lapses and errors in communication. Consider in this light UK military activities in Yemen. To date the literature has missed that the US gave early tacit support to UK covert activities in Yemen. For instance, - the State Department agreed on 7 November 1962 to the establishment of a UK military training operation for Saudi and Yemeni forces in full knowledge that it would tie the UK into a 'long-term commitment' in the Yemen.[19] These activities were not, then, in and of themselves an issue in Anglo-American relations, which spotlights the Harib incident. Prior to Harib, the US had tolerated a series of British military actions, a quid pro quo being they were consistently given prior knowledge. This prior knowledge was absent in the Harib incident, leading President Johnson to deem the strikes 'excessive', 'imprudent' and 'unwise'. Still, though, he agreed to Rusk's request that the US reverse its intended position and abstain from UN Resolution 188 as a 'one time act of loyalty' that was not to be repeated in 'any paralleled circumstances'.[20]

Way Ahead

Given this thesis constitutes the start rather than the end of my planned research journey, it is perhaps fitting to conclude with a few reflections upon how this work can, should and will be taken further.

It is evident that exploring new vistas opened-up by the cultural turn on agency in Anglo-American relations has great potential to continue adding nuance and levels of understanding to previous literature developed within the more traditional functionalist and IR approaches. It is also clear that doing this exploration through fine grain policy tracing has considerable

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[19] For Robert Strong's reservations, see 'Saudi Request for British Training Officers' Memorandum of Conversation, 2 Nov. 1962, RG 59, 786A. 5/4-862, Central Decimal Files, 1960-1963, Box 2068. For Dean Rusk's acceptance of the proposal, see Outgoing Telegram, 6 Dec. 1962, USNA, RG 59, 786A. 5 4-862, Central Decimal Files, 1960-1963, Box 2068, USNA.

[20] Telephone conversation between LBJ and Adlai Stevenson, 4/9/1964, sound recording. 1:10 pm, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

scope not only to provide revisionist interpretations of Anglo-American relations but also to uncover information hitherto either neglected or overlooked. This is even more the case as archive declassifications continue and institutions respond to freedom of information requests – amongst the pending of which are a large number of my own.

Beyond methodology, two principal directions for future exploration emerge from my thesis. The first is the importance of casting a wider net in terms of which levels of government warrant research and analysis. While the Congo and Yemen crises confirm the importance of apex actors within the coral reef, much interesting, important and overlooked cooperation took place through Embassies and Consulates. To appreciate the impact of individuals and groups within Anglo-American crisis management, evidently tracing policy vertically and horizontally throughout the coral reef will provide new insights and research opportunities. High level tension and sharp exchanges do not necessarily equate to breaches in Anglo-American relations; assiduous repair and maintenance work at lower levels appears too frequently to go unremarked upon – or even noticed.

The second future-facing lesson is that the conclusions derived from these two case studies need now to be tested by examining other examples of Anglo-American crisis management during the same period of analysis. Will similar patterns of behaviour be replicated? Will the broad *modus operandi* persist? Will studies selected from different regions reveal new things about the conduct of Anglo-American relations and the underlying assumptions of policymakers? Fortunately, a number of such further crises offer themselves for analysis. Onward, then, to the Cyprus question and the quest for independence in British Guiana.

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