Time and Space in the Battle of the Camel: Revolution, Transition and Tourism in Egypt

Abstract (250): This article asks how the 25 January 2011 revolution in Egypt led to the entrenchment of existing forms of privilege and marginality. To answer this question, critical scholars have taken for granted the revolution’s linear temporality and focused largely on institutional processes at the state level following the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. In contrast, I provide an original take on this question through extensive ethnographic engagement focusing on moments of rupture and urban spaces of contestation at the time of the revolution and beyond. More specifically, I trace the significance of a specific understudied moment during the revolution: the ‘battle of the camel’, when horse/camel drivers who sell rides to tourists at the Pyramids charged at protestors in Tahrir Square. An ethnography of this moment allows me to draw out the complex temporalities of the revolution by recognizing diverse moments of contestation by marginalized subjects at its different ‘stages’. This article traces how these alternative temporalities were driven but also obscured by longer-term patterns of tourism and urban development. It finds that relations of power and marginality were reproduced through tourism and elite Egyptian visions of temporality and ‘authenticity’ in the urban spaces relevant to this battle – the Pyramids of Giza and Tahrir Square. These sites were positioned as spaces of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future respectively, reinforcing a colonial and neoliberal narrative of development that made possible the protection of tourism and elite priorities and the remarginalization of ‘underdeveloped’ camel drivers and street vendors in these sites.

Keywords: Revolution; Egypt; Cairo; elite transition; tourism; temporality; space; contestation; Battle of the camel; Pyramids of Giza; Tahrir Square; marginality; authenticity; urban development; colonialism; neoliberalism

INTRODUCTION

With the fall of President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011, many Egyptians had hoped to build a more equal and fair society. This article makes a novel contribution to the question of how the 25 January 2011 revolution in Egypt actually led to the entrenchment of existing forms of privilege and marginality. To answer this question, critical scholars have focused on the deep state, legacy of authoritarianism and flawed transition process, which have taken for granted the revolution’s linear temporality and focused largely on institutional processes at the state level following the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. In contrast, I provide an original take on this question through long-term and extensive ethnographic engagement focusing on moments of rupture and urban spaces of contestation at the time of the revolution and beyond.

More specifically, I contribute to ethnographic work in this area by tracing the context and significance of an understudied moment during the revolution: the so-called ‘battle of the camel’ on 2 February 2011. This battle occurred early on during what is known as the ‘mythical’ 18 days of the
revolution, an in-between stage characterized by ‘communitas’ or a temporary condition of connection, equality and possibility. On this day, many pro-Mubarak Egyptians, along with government-sponsored thugs or ‘baltagiyya’, held rallies and attacked demonstrators across Cairo. The battle was named after the horse/camel drivers involved who sell rides to tourists at the Pyramids, and who charged at protestors in Tahrir Square. Horse and camel drivers were expelled from Tahrir Square by protestors who outnumbered them and ultimately won ‘the battle of the camel’. By 11 February 2011, these protestors had toppled the regime. An ethnographic contextualization of this moment allows me to draw out the complex temporality of the revolution, insofar as its ‘mythical’ 18 days of communitas included moments of counterrevolution by actors who were, like protestors, seeking redress for their marginality. In addition, the revolution was not necessarily ‘over’ with the fall of Mubarak; its ‘completion’ was contested by some of Cairo’s most marginalized actors. This article traces how these alternative temporalities were driven but also obscured by longer-term patterns of tourism and urban development, shaped by particular temporally-defined conceptions of ‘authenticity’. It finds that relations of power and marginality were reproduced through tourism and elite Egyptian visions of temporality and ‘authenticity’ in the urban spaces relevant to this battle – Tahrir Square and the Pyramids of Giza.

This article proceeds by outlining critical analyses of Egypt’s elite transition, making the case for ethnographic methods and a focus on the ‘battle of the camel’. It goes on to examine how, despite being on opposite sides of this battle, horse/camel drivers and protestors (specifically street vendors) were motivated by their marginalization within international tourism and urban development projects at the Pyramids and Tahrir Square. Through their participation in this battle, they were contesting both the temporally defined elite/tourism visions of ‘authenticity’ in these spaces - which position the Pyramids and Tahrir Square as representing Egypt’s past and future respectively - and the purity of the transformative ‘in-between’ stage of revolutions/tourism. After this, the article discusses how contestations by horse/camel drivers and street vendors continued after the fall of Mubarak, challenging their exclusion from these sites and the notion that the revolution had reached its ‘final’ stage. However, at this time, elite-driven tourism projects articulated with assumptions about the revolution’s completion to remarginalize these actors. The Pyramids and Tahrir Square were reshaped as sites of international tourism, and of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future, emphasising ‘authentic’ monuments and protestors respectively. This article underscores throughout how the marginalization of horse/camel drivers at the

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1 As will be discussed further below, many academic, government and popular conceptions of tourism and revolutions understand them as involving linear ‘stages’, with defined beginning, in-between (or liminal) and end conditions, that bring about a transformation. Similarly, tourist and academic accounts see tourism as resulting in change through ‘authentic’ experiences in ‘other’ spaces, while the revolution involves a transformative ‘in-between’ period and a return to ‘order’.
Pyramids and street vendors in Tahrir Square was justified by their positioning as part of Egypt’s ‘underdeveloped’ present, as backward and threatening to tourism and Egypt’s development.

The assumed linear stages of tourism and the revolution, and temporality of the Pyramids and Tahrir Square therefore articulated productively not only to motivate the battle of the camel but also to conceal and repress contestations that ensued in both spaces after the fall of Mubarak. These contestations represented a bid for political and economic, and indeed symbolic, inclusion on the part of marginal subjects in both sites. The article concludes by drawing together how elite/tourism visions of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future, with its present as aberration, reinforced a colonial and neoliberal narrative of development that made possible the protection of tourism and elite priorities and the remarginalization of horse/camel drivers and street vendors in these sites. Studying the ‘battle of the camel’ represents an opportunity to access alternative temporalities and possibilities for both tourism and the revolution, but also to study how these were suppressed in ways that restored elite/tourism visions and priorities.

THE REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTRIBUTIONS

The 2011 revolution in Egypt called for ‘bread, freedom and social justice’, an end to the poverty, repression and corruption associated with Mubarak’s regime. Prior to the fall of Mubarak, protestors demonstrated and battled with police throughout Egypt for 18 days, from the 25 January to the 11 February 2011, refusing all concessions until the president resigned. Tahrir Square was one of the main sites of protest, and it took several days of battles with security forces, hired thugs and pro-Mubarak supporters – including the ‘battle of the camel’ on 2 February – before it was occupied by protestors. At the same time, plans for Mubarak’s son Gamal’s succession, and the over-concentration of wealth within the Mubarak family and his network of crony capitalists, had alienated other elites, including the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and Islamists (Stein 2012; Allinson 2015). Therefore, after some uncertainty about its role, the SCAF sided with the protestors against Mubarak, endorsing the ‘legitimate demands’ of protestors on 10 February and presenting Mubarak with the option to ‘step down voluntarily or be forced out’ (Stein 2012: 50).

Immediately following the fall of President Mubarak, there was a sense of hope for a more equal and democratic future and a break from recent repressive governments, with a transition to democracy overseen by the SCAF. The Justice and Freedom Party (JFP) under Mohamed Morsi won the parliamentary and presidential election of June 2012 and governed under a power sharing agreement with the SCAF until 3 July 2013, when they were deposed by the SCAF following demonstrations against the government. The SCAF consolidated power when the former head of the armed forces, Abdul Fatah al-Sisi won the presidential elections in 2014.
Although there was not a straightforward restoration of the old regime after the fall of Mubarak, the revolution’s outcome has left political and economic relations of power and the state apparatus intact, marginalizing the demands of those outside the most elite sectors of society (Armbrust 2017; De Smet 2014; Beinin 2011; Joya 2017). The FJP and SCAF continued to pursue free market goals in a way that maintained their stake in the market, encouraged by international financial institutions, Western and regional actors (Kaboub 2014; Joya 2017; Stein 2012; Armbrust 2017; Allinson 2015; Hinnebusch 2015a). The result has been a large amount of continuity in terms of the system, its beneficiaries and those it disadvantages. Indeed, as Adam Hanieh predicted, the result of an ‘orderly’ transition after the fall of Mubarak was a society that at a superficial level takes some limited appearances of the form of liberal democracy but, in actuality, remains a highly authoritarian neoliberal state dominated by an alliance of the military and business elites’ (2011; see also Hinnebusch 2015a). The Egyptian transition indicates the continued privileging of Egypt’s military, political and economic elites.

Critical analyses of this elite transition have largely focused on processes taking place in or affecting the state level following the fall of Mubarak. Authors have analyzed, for instance, how the transition was facilitated through the resilience of the ‘deep state’ – the set of institutions that indirectly runs the country, dominated by military elites but supported by the bureaucracy and security apparatus. They argue that the army and allied wealthy business families took advantage of the absence of an organized revolutionary coalition, and divisions between secularists and Islamists, to not only ignore demands for democracy and wealth redistribution, but to consolidate their control over significant sectors of the state and economy (Hinnebusch 2015b; De Smet 2014). Linked to this, Egypt’s history of authoritarian governments, its centralized executive power and authoritarian laws and institutions, had weakened secular opposition and civil society, allowing authoritarian actors to play a key role in the transition (Hinnebusch 2015a; Brown 2013). The flawed transition and constitution process also facilitated the restoration of an elite regime. These processes lacked transparency, consultation and consensus-building by the leadership, giving too much power to the military high command (Brown 2013). In addition, the focus on elections and referenda after the fall of Mubarak demobilized the economic struggles of workers, farmers and urban poor, reorienting revolutionary politics to the top-down controlled domains of the state (De Smet 2014; Hinnebusch 2015a, Brown 2013; Kaboub 2013). These factors were compounded by the fact that prerevolution actors did not offer unified demands nor develop into an organisational entity to lead the democratic transition process (Hinnebusch 2015a). These approaches to the transition largely take for granted the revolution’s linear stages, assuming an identifiable start (revolution), middle (transition) and end (regime consolidation). Authors have pointed out how the focus on ‘institutional set-up and timing’ can occlude the agency and contributions of actors like workers’ movements (Allinson 2015), while the assumption that violence within
revolutions only occurs as a temporary moment of uncertainty means that its productive role in regime re-making is obscured (Stacher 2015).

In contrast, an ethnographic approach allowed me to gain a distance from taken for granted disciplinary approaches to the elite transition and to study the context of this battle through several years of ethnographic fieldwork in Cairo, analyzing the observations, interviews and documents I gathered during this time. Aradau et al. emphasize how ‘method’ is not merely a set of techniques used to extract data but a productive practice embedded in power relations within a field of study (2014: 6). Ethnography and fieldwork specifically allow one to take a critical distance from one’s disciplinary field, its taken for granted categories, concepts, frameworks theories and phenomena, to recognize how these shape our understanding of objects of study and our research problematics (Coleman and Hughes 2014). Critical research therefore involves ‘experimentally bringing together concepts, questions, and controversies distinct to empirical sites’ (Aradau et al. 2014: 9) in new and unexpected ways, to draw out and disrupt power relations that could otherwise be left unexamined. An ethnographic approach can help shed light on what is taken for granted as it requires the researcher to engage with what Mike Crang and Ian Cook call “real world” messiness, challenging ‘the erroneous neatness of distanced, abstract, theoretical understandings of social, cultural, economic and other processes’ (2009: 13-14). Fieldwork allowed me to question the temporality and spaces of revolution, which have largely been assumed by those engaging with my research problematic on the elite outcomes of the revolution.

Indeed, ethnographic work on this question largely challenges the taken for granted the spatiality of the Egyptian revolution and transition by focusing on the urban, street, neighbourhoods, and villages (Makram-Ebeid 2019; Abu-Lughod 2012; Armbrust 2019; Bayat 2017). Focusing on such spaces draws attention to groups of revolutionaries generally ignored within the literature, such as daily-waged workers and people in villages (Makram-Ebeid 2019, Abu-Lughod 2012). Studies draw attention to the way that these actors differently understood, engaged with/refused, and shaped the revolution. Dina Makram-Ebeid argues that ignoring diverse marginalized people played a role in the revolution’s failure insofar as ‘the dismissal of precarious workers’ engagements with the revolution…forfeited an opportunity to make complex class dynamics at the forefront of redistributive revolutionary politics’ (2019: 142). Walter Armbrust’s ‘ethnography of the revolution’ (2019) emphasizes the revolution’s various ‘spatial dimensions at a variety of scales’ to understand why the revolution was vulnerable to trickster politics and actors, which take advantage of and enhance uncertainty, pretending to solve it through violence and empty or exaggerated promises. Asef Bayat’s ethnography (2017) explores how urbaniy produced ‘revolutions’ or non-movements, which involved the reform of existing institutions and governmental authority rather than their transformation, largely because people could not see past the neoliberal paradigm to overturn it.
In terms of temporality, however, many of these authors follow the critical transition literature in assuming a beginning, middle and albeit ambiguous ending for the revolution. Armbrust (2019) underscores this temporality most explicitly with his focus on the ritual process of the revolution, which traces a breaking away from normal social relations and entry into a liminal phase. Here actors were connected through a condition of solidarity or ‘communitas’, represented by the ‘mythical’ 18 days of the revolution prior to the fall of Mubarak. He argues that the revolution did not have a conventional conclusion where participants were reintegrated into an (albeit transformed) ‘normal society’ or ‘normal leadership standards’, but has been trapped in permanent liminality, where communitas is divided and conflict begins (2017; 2019). Despite exploring moments and states of ambiguity rather than focusing on end results, Armbrust characterizes this situation as one of ‘permanent liminality’, which can occur in each of the three stages of the ritual (2017), functioning to reify rather than disrupt the idea of ritual stages. Indeed, with very few exceptions (see Abaza 2016), ethnographic studies describe the 18 days of the revolution as representing communitas, an exceptional or liminal reality, or ‘a time out of time’ that opened up new political and social possibilities (Sabea 2013; Bayat 2017). Underlying these studies is therefore the assumption that revolutionary stages involve a break from the past, a utopian 18 days, followed by an (ambiguous) resolution, reflecting the linear chronology embedded within dominant and critical approaches to the transition. The ‘battle of the camel’ is mentioned briefly by those who carry out ethnographic work on the revolution but is rarely expanded upon in terms of its complex participants or implications for the elite outcomes of the revolution (Abaza 2016; Sabea 2013; Bayat 2017; Armbrust 2019). My ethnography of this battle draws on the work above to focus on urban spaces and marginalized subjects but disrupts the assumed temporality of the revolution, studying instead the way that its linear ‘stages’ were contested.

It is by studying these moments and spaces of contestation that we can understand how the battle was motivated by longer-term patterns like tourism and urban development, which helped also to restore ‘order’ in ways that privilege elite visions and priorities. As such, the article itself focuses less on the intricate details of the battle itself but examines it as a moment of rupture and an opportunity to unravel the complex contestations it represented the exclusions that were subsequently entrenched. To do so, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork in Cairo, conducted in Arabic and English, carried out mainly from 2010 to 2011, with subsequent yearly visits. Drawing from Wanda Vrasti, I define ethnography not as a means of obtaining unmediated empirical ‘accuracy’ but as an intersubjective textual negotiation and translation of meaning ‘where description and interpretation, experience and theory, are inseparable’ (2008: 282). More specifically, my research examines various practices carried out by the tourism industry, Egyptian government, the media

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2 See Ghannam 2012 who uses the battle to understand local interpretations of violence in the revolution.
and tourists themselves. It involved weekly observations at the Pyramids and Tahrir Square, formal and informal interviews, participation in group and individual tours and reading documents from the media, tourism industry, government and other institutions, including non-governmental organizations. In these different contexts, I positioned myself and was interpreted in multiple ways (as a researcher, woman, Canadian, white person, tourist, expat, friend, family member, consumer, and student), which shaped the information I received. Through this process, I produced situated data that I ultimately framed, organized and interpreted. Indeed, Vrasti argues that no particular writing style ‘can absolve ethnographic texts from their inherent violences and vulnerabilities’, about which researchers should constantly be reflexive (Vrasti 2008: 296-7). This article proceeds by examining the ‘battle of the camel’ from the perspective of camel drivers from the Pyramids and of street vendors in Tahrir Square, in relation to temporally-defined elite/tourism notions of ‘authenticity’ in these spaces.

TOURISM AND THE BATTLE OF THE CAMEL: PRODUCING ‘AUTHENTIC’ EXPERIENCES AND RESISTING MARGINALITY

This section examines the background of the battle of the camel and the contestations posed by the horse/camel drivers and street vendors in this moment. Drawing out the complexity of this battle helps us to understand how it disrupted the assumed chronology of revolutions, representing a counterrevolution within the revolution’s ‘liminal’ stage, or ‘mythical’ 18 days. The battle was also more complex than a ‘protestors versus government-paid thugs’ situation as both groups entered this space in a bid for political and economic inclusion, which was being threatened (at least partly) through temporally-defined elite and tourism visions of ‘authenticity’. The battle of the camel therefore disrupts also the transformational ‘in-between’ stage of tourism by revealing and contesting these exclusionary visions. Horse/camel drivers and street vendors represented two sets of marginal actors protesting for inclusion, on opposite sides of the revolution but both similarly excluded within elite/tourism visions of the Pyramids and Tahrir Square. Through informal interviews conducted after the event, I found that horse and camel drivers who initiated the ‘battle of the camel’ in Tahrir Square did so to protest plans to physically and economically marginalize them within the Pyramids site. These plans had been in place prior to the revolution, carried out by the Ministry of State for Antiquities (or MSA) – supported by various Western and international institutions like the World Bank, USAID, UNESCO and the EU (Kuppinger 2006). The site plan for the pyramids has involved building an 18-kilometer-long steel built wall around the Pyramids, up to four meters high in places, with CCTV cameras and infrared motion sensors (Zaater 2008; Kratovac 2008; Hanna 2002). Drivers I spoke with maintained that the wall limits their

1 Due to Egypt’s ongoing political instability, Tahrir Square tourism barely got off the ground, so I therefore focused far more on representations of Tahrir Square tourism found in mainstream news articles than on tourism practices themselves.
working space and hours, and increases police control over the area (informal interviews with drivers on 10 June 2010, 24 November 2010, 23 May 2011, 20 June 2011). The full site management plan, once complete, will include a new entrance further away from the Pyramids from which tourists will be transported around the area in electric cars. Drivers will then be further economically marginalized as they will be restricted to a designated riding area along the electric car route. Drivers I spoke with fear that the new electric cars will ‘break [their] business’ and leave them like ‘fish out of water’ as the cars will take over drivers’ role and routes (informal interview with a driver, 13 January 2011). When I conducted informal interviews about the new site plan with 35 drivers in July 2011, they stated that there would not be enough work to go around for all of the drivers located in the designated area. It was this Pyramids site plan that was being protested in Tahrir square by horse/camel drivers. The mainstream media, protestors and many academics described the horse and camel drivers involved as pro-Mubarak thugs who threatened the positive changes being sought by the revolution. However, according to numerous drivers I spoke with over several months after the ‘battle of the camel’, they were encouraged by a National Democratic Party MP Nasser al Gabfra al Gabry to go to Tahrir Square - some said that they were paid, and others that they were promised continued work at the Pyramids and an end to the new site plan (informal interviews with drivers on 24 February 2011, 1 March 2011, 3 March 2011, 23 March 2011, 4 April 2011, 15 April 2011, 20 April 2011, 20 June 2011). Al Gabry was later arrested and charged with funding and planning the attack on pro-democracy protestors. Drivers who charged Tahrir square were paradoxically supporting the regime which marginalized them and were, like other protestors, seeking economic inclusion.

On the other hand, street vendors were at least partly protesting their exclusion from Tahrir square and (larger) downtown or Khedival Cairo. Prior to the revolution, there were ongoing plans for the revitalization of Khedival Cairo, managed by the General Organization for Physical Planning (Attalah 2010; El-Subaihi 2011; Wood 2010; Attia interview 2011). This plan involved restoring downtown Cairo’s 20th Century European-inspired facades and catering to the priorities of elites and tourists for high-end boutique hotels, restaurants, cafes, galleries and shopping venues (AlSayyad 2011; Attia interview 2011; Al-Gazzar interview 2011). To do so, the government used various tactics to exclude working class actors, like street vendors. This included rent and tax increases, private developers buying and restoring buildings for exclusive purposes, and the police ‘cleaning out’ informal street cafes and vendors, something I observed regularly during my fieldwork (Saleh 2011; Wood 2010; Shahine 2009; Strasser et al 2010; Attalah 2010; Attia interview 2011; Al-Gazzar interview 2011). It was this exclusionary plan for Cairo that had (at least partly) motivated street vendors to protest in Tahrir Square in the first place.

4 Several of these drivers indicated that they had not meant to charge at protestors but had lost control of their animals as they were scared by the crowd and some protestors throwing rocks at them.
The battle of the camel disrupts the assumed chronology of revolutions, depicted as a series of stages – from separation to liminal transition to reincorporation (Turner 1979; Thomassen 2012). Liminality refers to an ‘in-between’ condition, a situation of ambiguity but also of creativity and possibility, where established ideas, orders, rules, and behaviours are suspended and disrupted, to be replaced by new ones. Within revolutions, public forms of liminality challenge and reframe established structures, norms and social realities, and have therefore often been seen as dangers by the ‘powers-that-be’ (Turner 1979: 486). The battle of the camel, however, was a moment of counter-revolution during this liminal transition and ‘mythical’ 18 days, which was quickly rejected by the majority of protestors, but which nonetheless requires exploration in terms of how it came about (in this section) and how its actors were remarginalized (in the next). As mentioned above, this battle cannot solely be explained as the actions of government-sponsored thugs, but is connected with the temporality of tourism. Tourism, like revolutions, has been studied as a liminal process as it is an inversion or suspension of mundane, ordinary life, its routines, norms, and constraints (e.g. obligations, work) occurring largely in in-between time and spaces, where tourists seek the ‘authenticity’ that they cannot access in day-to-day life (Urry 1990; Johnson 1999; MacCannell 1999). The ‘battle of the camel’ represents a moment of contestation partly shaped by tourism’s socially constructed ritual stages, which assume a three stage process of going away, having a liminal experience and returning somehow transformed. Embedded within tourism is an idea that these liminal experiences offer tourists an opportunity to access ‘authenticity’. Significant for this article is the idea that tourists travel to seek authentic experiences in other historical periods or cultures, something they feel has been lost in the shallowness and alienation of modernity and working life (MacCannell 1999). Authenticity in this article is understood not as inherent or innate, deriving from a fixed origin or reality, but as socially constructed through a negotiation between competing interests and interpretations of particular places, people and time periods (Wang 1999). What are seen as authentic tourism experiences at the Pyramids and Tahrir Square articulate with temporally-defined elite and colonial visions of these spaces, contributing to the political/economic marginalizations that were being contested at the ‘battle of the camel’. Within these visions, the Pyramids and Tahrir Square have been imagined and shaped as sites of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future respectively.

The motivation for the new Pyramids site plan is to restore an elite and colonial vision of the site – and image of Egypt – that articulates with tourism discourses about the Pyramids found, for example, in guidebooks and brochures. This vision represents the Pyramids as an authentic site of Egypt’s ‘past’, and indeed of human civilization, as the ‘last surviving ancient wonder of the world’ (for a full study see Wynne-Hughes, forthcoming). The idea, according to one of the main planners Tarek Waly, is to restore the atmosphere that was there 100-200 years ago when the site was rediscovered (Interview 2010). According to Zahi Hawass, former head of the Supreme Council of
Antiquities (SCA, now MSA), these changes will make the area ‘a place of respect’ that seems ‘divine’, ‘giving back the magic of the Pyramids’ (Ross 2007; Kratovac 2008; Hawass interview 2011). The space is therefore being reshaped according to colonial logics, maintaining the narrative that locates the Pyramids as part of world history. Insofar as this definition of the area is privileged, the area is represented and ordered as an outdoor museum for tourists rather than in ways that might open it up to broader usage as a park or recreational area. Indeed, Monica Hanna argues that Hawass focused on protecting these sites as part of world heritage and maintaining ‘Egypt's civilized image on the international scene’, instead of seeing them as community assets that could initiate local development (2002: 14). Similarly, photos in tourism brochures and guidebooks depict the Pyramids as the objects of tourists’ gaze, as unpeopled, empty monuments in the desert for tourists to ‘explore’ and ‘discover’, re-enacting colonial appropriations of this site (see Wynne-Hughes, forthcoming; Wynn 2007). Such reenactments discursively positioned these monuments as part of world heritage, and specifically Western, heritage. Within these assumptions, the Pyramids are disconnected from contemporary Egypt and anything in between, including Greco-Roman and Coptic eras as well as Islamic and modern Egyptian time periods (Reid 2002; Wynn 2007). Contemporary Islam, urban poverty and modern Egyptian subjects are represented as separate from the Pyramids site; they are not included in tourism images or texts describing these sites. This functions to entirely disconnect the Pyramids from Egypt’s present and reinforce ideas that Egypt’s past represents the common past of humanity (Wynne-Hughes, 2012). The idea that the Pyramids represent the world’s past benefits political elites like Zahi Hawass who has gained financially from his high visibility campaigns to protect these monuments (Taylor 2011). The ‘authentic experience’ in this site is therefore tied to the way that this particular space and its objects have been temporalized. Notions of time and place, and the association between them, are therefore key to the social construction of authenticity. As Nuala Johnson argues, ‘it is the relationship between space and time—the awarding of space a past—that is central to heritage tourism planning’ (1999: 189).

In line with the elite and colonial vision of the Pyramids, tourism and Egyptian government representations largely depict horse and camel drivers as intruding upon tourist authentic experiences at this site through their aggressive solicitation practices. They also depict them as threatening the Pyramids themselves, through their uncivilized practices. Tourists, news articles, guidebooks and tour guides largely argue that the reality of this ‘wonder of the world’ does not fit with the ‘authentic’, peaceful experience that one would expect, based on tourists’ experiences of ‘commercial harassment’ by drivers trying to sell them horse and camel rides (Groundwater 2012; Harris 2011; Richardson and Jacobs 2010: 206; O’Neill et al. 2012: 143, 146, 6; interviews with tourists 7 July 2010, 19 October 2010, 28 of October 2010, 4 January 2011; 25 April 2011, 1 May 2011, 5 May 2011, 7 June 2011, 4 July 2011; observations of tours 4 June 2011, 4 July 2011, 6 September 2012; interviews with tour guides 21 January 2011, 29 January 2011). At worst, guidebooks, tour guides, the
media, and even foreign embassies, warn tourists that drivers are threatening to tourists, citing examples of tricks drivers use to cheat and overcharge tourists (Rodgers 2007; Richardson and Jacobs 2010: 164; O’Neill et al. 2012; Embassy of the US in Cairo, 2013; see Wynne-Hughes, forthcoming for a full study). Reflecting dominant tourism discourses, Zahi Hawass has depicted drivers as intruding on the site with their greedy and ‘uncivilized’ practices (Hawass interview 2011; Ross 2007; Kratovac 2008; Zaater 2008). This points to the common understanding held by tourists and Egyptian political elites about the authentic Egyptian past and how it should be protected from drivers, who embody Egypt’s backward ‘present’.

Tourism and Egyptian government representations position horse and camel drivers as part of the urban chaos and underdevelopment (buildings, traffic, pollution, poverty) that are encroaching on the site and need to be removed. Guidebooks, brochures, tourists and news articles consistently portray the Pyramids site and experience as threatened by modern Cairo’s underdeveloped and chaos, which includes among other things, how its buildings, traffic, garbage, and poverty have spread to the Pyramids site (Richardson and Jacobs 2010: 206; O’Neill et al. 2012: 132, 143, 146; interviews with tourists 22 June 2010; 7 July 2010, 24 October 2010, 25 October 2010, 5 November 2011, 11 November 2010, 13 January 2011, 29 January 2011, 4 June 2011, 4 July 2011, 18 July 2011, 30 August 2011; Ross 2007; see also Wynne-Hughes, forthcoming). These representations articulate with a general international and tourist notion that Egypt, as an underdeveloped country, cannot appreciate, manage and protect its own monuments. This vision for the Pyramids justifies the removal of horse and camel drivers as part of the new site plan. The Pyramids plan requires the physical and economic exclusion of drivers, seen as threatening to tourists and the site itself. This wall was meant to secure tourists from hassling and the area from damage. In Hawass’ statements about the new Pyramids site plan, he makes his priorities clear, arguing ‘now we are protecting both the tourists and the ancient monuments’ (Kratovac 2008; Telegraph 2008) and that ‘the people are angry, but the Pyramids are more important than the people’ (Ross 2007; Hawass interview 2011). Because drivers are positioned as a problem to be excluded, the Pyramids site plan is to be implemented without consulting them, despite their vested interest in protecting the Pyramids and tourists as the source of their livelihood (observation 17 May 2010; informal interviews with drivers 17 May 2020, 20 June 2010, 28 October 2020, 11 November 2010, 15 July 2011). Many drivers acknowledged to me that their solicitation practices are damaging to tourism and have concrete suggestions to change their practices – such as the implementation of rota system, fixed prices, a syndicate, and fines for hassling tourists (informal interviews July 2011). Although there are no exact strategies for the implementation of this site plan, the police are likely to be in charge of moving the horse and camel drivers to the new area, which will require significant force. Indeed, drivers have previously organized demonstrations that blocked the entrance to the Pyramids site when police threatened to stop them from working in the area (informal interviews with drivers 10 June 2010,
11 November 2010, 21 November 2010, 29 January 2011; Waly interview 2010). The Pyramids plan prioritizes tourists and elites, despite the threat they pose to the Pyramids. Tourists damage the monuments through their increased numbers and unsustainable practices, like taking photographs and touching relics (Ross 2007; Wynn 2007: 68; Kratovac 2008; Telegraph 2008). The wall around the Pyramids does not ultimately protect tourists or the monuments, but functions mainly to protect MSA/SCA profits by ensuring an income from tickets (Zaater 2008) as it provides a proper entrance and exit to control the flow of people, tickets and business hours (Hanna 2002). The MSA and Giza Inspectorate officials have been accused of various forms of corruption, including profiting from reusing tickets, events at the Pyramids, souvenir vendor fees, sales of land for real estate after false reports that they do not contain antiquities, and indeed from antiquities theft itself (Wynn 2007: 52; Kamil 2011). Hawass himself has been accused of antiquities sales (Al Ahram 2012) and taking kickbacks from travelling exhibitions (Taylor 2011). Horse/camel drivers in Tahrir Square were contesting this exclusionary vision of Pyramids, hoping their support for Mubarak would be rewarded with an end to the new site plan (informal interviews February to June 2011).

In Tahrir Square, the Khedival Cairo plan reflects an elite and colonially-derived vision for the area to make Cairo a ‘global city’ and reintegrate Egypt into the international economy. In this sense, this site was being shaped to represent Egypt’s authentic ‘future’. These plans were meant, partly through tourism, to help make Cairo into a global city or hub to integrate Egypt into the international economic system (El-Kouedi et al. 2007). This vision reflected the original colonial purpose of the downtown area, which was built under the rule of Khedive Ismail during the Ottoman Empire period as a backdrop for the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869. It was meant to demonstrate Egypt’s Western-style development to the international community, through tourists and other visitors, achieved partly by modelling Cairo on Paris (El-Shahed 2007; AlSayyad 2011; Adham 2004). The area was constructed as a space for elites, expats and tourists, while the previous poorer downtown area was marginalized. The revitalization project aimed to stimulate this integration by hearkening back to colonial times when Khedival Cairo was founded, ‘an era when Egypt was more firmly tied into the world economy, when society was both open to and more accepting of outside influences’ (Samir Raafat in El-Shahed 2007: 49). The new plan envisioned Tahrir Square as ‘Cairo’s Meeting Place’, described as a cultural, entertainment and services space for the meeting of cultures, friends, minds and worlds (AC and AECOM 2010; El-Subaihi 2011; Asharq Al-Awsat 2011). It involved trams to transport tourists from Tahrir Square to the Pyramids and Khan al Khalili – a route dubbed the ‘central spine’ (Elsheshtawy 2004; AC and AECOM 2010; Attia interview 2011; Al-Gazzar interview 2011). This plan thereby reinforced the link between ancient and ‘new’ Egypt, connected through tourist activities. Egypt’s international integration through downtown tourism was therefore premised on colonial and neoliberal/elite rationalities. Tahrir Square tourism practices therefore corresponded with Egyptian gentrification.
practices in a way that reinforced Cairo’s international neoliberal/capitalist integration and urban inequalities. This vision required the aforementioned exclusion of working class subjects, like street vendors through practices aimed to remove low/middle class residences and businesses seen as encouraging polluting and to expel subjects and practices seen as degenerating the area (Adel 2010; Wood 2010; Attia interview 2011). Many of these subjects joined the revolution in various capacities, partly to contest this exclusionary vision of Egypt’s future being implemented in downtown Cairo. Vendors, for example, played a role in occupying urban public space, which was key to the success of the protests in Tahrir Square (El-Shahed 2011). Omar Nagati, co-founder of CLUSTER (Cairo Lab for Urban Studies, Training and Environmental Research), who has been mapping urban informality in Cairo for many years, goes as far as to call the revolution a ‘revolt against urban injustice’, ‘against political injustice manifested through the urban, a geography of injustice if you will, which takes many forms’ (interview 6 June 2011, see also Carr 2011). The marginalization of street vendors will also be discussed below in relation to post-revolution tourism visions.

The contestations that occurred during the battle of the camel were at least party motivated by the elite Egyptian and colonial tourism visions of the Pyramids and Tahrir Square that were shaping these spaces as opportunities for ‘authentic’, transformative experiences in line with the ritual stages of tourism. More specifically, tourism and elite practices at the time articulated to reproduce a particular ‘authentic’ experience of Egypt’s past and future, which symbolically and materially marginalized certain subjects. It was these exclusionary visions of Egypt’s past and future that were contested by those involved in the battle of the camel. The battle of the camel therefore disrupts the assumed linear stages of tourism, insofar as its actors challenge the visions of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future accessed in the ‘liminal’ stage. The battle of the camel represents also a challenge to the assumed temporality of revolutions, and specifically the ‘mythical’ 18 days in Egypt, that cannot simply be explained as a clash between government thugs and protestors. Ignoring this battle means obscuring the revolution’s complex chronology and the role of elite urban and tourism development in the numerous forms of marginality motivating its participants. I will now proceed to discuss how, in response to contestations after the fall of Mubarak, tourism practices articulated with assumptions about the revolution’s completion to remarginalize these subjects.

THE ‘END’ OF THE REVOLUTION AND CONTESTATIONS AT THE MARGINS

The period following the fall of Mubarak was also time of contestation, which challenges the notion that the revolution had reached its final stage. However, the idea that the revolution was in its reaggregation stage functioned to shape responses to contestations after the fall of Mubarak. More specifically, the notion that the Egyptian revolution was ‘over’ and tourists could visit Egypt’s
‘authentic’ future, functioned to reinforce an elite vision and narrative that (re)marginalized vendors and drivers in Tahrir Square and at the Pyramids site.

In the months following the fall of Mubarak, I observed vendors in Tahrir Square playing a role in the continued opposition to the regime. They occupied the space and sold low cost food and drink to poorer protestors who could not afford the expensive Western fast-food options close to the square. Other vendors sold revolutionary paraphernalia (t-shirts, bags, pins, hats, wrist bands, flags etc.) (informal interview with vendors [21 May 2011] and with protestors [28 May 2011]; observations 25 February 2011, 2 March 2011, 15 April 2011, 21 May 2011). Several articles from Egypt Independent praised the vitality, patriotism and creativity of those selling paraphernalia in Tahrir Square, describing them as ‘merchant revolutionaries’ who, according to sociologist Assa Korayem, ‘have immortalized the martyrs and made products inspired by the revolution’ (Shawky 2011). Vendors saw themselves as demonstrating against the regime while making a living, as they could not afford to take time off work to protest (Shawky 2011; Carr 2011). These practices reflect strategies of ‘quiet encroachment’ that are carried out by the 60% of the population who have been driven as a result of neoliberal policies that privilege elites, to engage in informal development and economic practices, in this case taking ‘over public thoroughfares to conduct their business in the vast parallel economy’ (Bayat 1997). The tactics of informal street vendors were intimately connected to the struggle against economic inequalities that are the effect of Egyptian neoliberalism. Their presence in Tahrir was therefore a form of continued resistance against the unequal outcomes of Egyptian neoliberal policies, and indeed enacted the forms of inclusion they were seeking.

Indeed, for many Egyptians, the revolution was not ‘over’ after the fall of Mubarak and they continued to demonstrate for social and economic justice, which were not being provided by post-uprising leaders. For them, the 25 January uprising was not victorious because ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, which in their interpretation required social and economic justice, were not provided by the post-revolution leadership. When I discussed with protestors the plans to make Tahrir Square a tourism site, many told me that the ‘revolution’ was not over so they should leave it for demonstrators’ use until they have obtained equality (informal interviews 22 April 2011, 21 May 2011, 28 May 2011). After Mubarak was deposed, workers were still striking to demand economic rights, including fair wages, benefits, improved public services, better working conditions, permanent contracts, an end to privatization and a removal of corrupt CEOs (Beinin 2011; Omar 2011). These subjects explicitly sought to disrupt the economy because a return to 'stability' for them meant returning to the status quo of neoliberalism, which has been the cause of their immiseration and impoverishment (Antoun 2012; Ali 2011; LeVine and Eletrebi 2012).

However, the period after the fall of Mubarak also involved elites reentrenching their power through calls for stability and order in line with assumptions about revolutionary ritual stages. In Tahrir Square, this occurred at least partly through tourism practices and their specific representation of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ future that constituted tourists’ transformative liminal
experience. The aforementioned plan for the downtown area articulated with tourism practices ‘after’ the revolution, justifying the (re)exclusion of marginal subjects. Immediately after the fall of Mubarak, Tahrir Square was celebrated by politicians, the media, tour operators, tourists and some Egyptians as a ‘new’ Egypt landmark and tourist attraction representing Egypt’s post-revolution future (see Wynne-Hughes, forthcoming for a full discussion). Tourism practices in Tahrir Square after the 2011 revolution included representations of tourists experiencing Egypt’s ‘authentic’ future by interacting with and supporting revolutionaries who had achieved their goals for democracy and freedom. A key component of this experience was interaction with ‘authentic’ Egyptian revolutionaries. Many tour companies, for instance, added some kind of discussion with Egyptian revolutionaries to their itineraries (Myers 2011; interviews with Ziad 2011; Hoff 2011; El-Kady and Sedky 5 July 2011; Morsy 2011). In contrast to drivers at the Pyramids site who were depicted as intruding on tourist experiences and as symbols of underdevelopment, ‘authentic’ revolutionaries at Tahrir Square were positioned not only as part of the attraction but as developed, having achieved freedom and democracy (Farrell 2011; El Halawany 2011). For instance, news articles from the New York Times and Washington Post quoted testimonials from visitors to Egypt who referred to Egyptians’ hope and optimism for the ‘new’ free and democratic Egypt (Hammer 2011; El Halawany 2011). In Tahrir Square itself, some Egyptians celebrating there said that they wanted ‘to tell people that Egypt has changed!’ and that tourists come to see the ‘revolution’ because ‘they love to see how people reached freedom’ (informal interviews 22 April 2011, 21 May 2011). The owner of Flying Carpet Tours similarly stated that tourists visiting Tahrir Square would learn that ‘Egypt is democratic now’ (interview 2011). From my observations immediately after the fall of Mubarak, Egyptians interacting with foreigners replaced their usual ‘Welcome to Egypt’ with ‘Welcome to Free Egypt’ or ‘I hope you like the new Egypt’ (observation 25 February 2011, 2 May 2011). These sentiments were reinforced by Egyptians’ famous clean-up efforts, promoted by the media, which involved sweeping streets, cleaning trash, painting fence railings, removing Mubarak’s name from public places, and replacing anti-regime graffiti with slogans like ‘Welcome to the new Egypt’ (observation 25 February 2011; observation 21 May 2011). These practices indicated that the character of the transition represented the ‘authentic’ desires of its people for democracy and freedom, rendering tourists’ experience of the ‘new’ Egypt all the more authentic, in line with the ritual stages of tourism.

More specifically, news articles and Tahrir Square tourism practices represented ‘authentic’ Egyptian revolutionaries as young, Westernized, technologically savvy, English-speaking elites who took action peacefully through Facebook for ‘freedom’ (Myers 2011; LeVine 2011; El-Mahdi 2011). For these revolutionaries, the revolution was over in 2011, and they encouraged stability for tourism. Wael Ghonim, for instance, the google executive who co-founded the Facebook group ‘We are all Khaled Said’ that helped to spark the revolution, is quoted as arguing, ‘the name of the game is peace and stability
and until the tourist is convinced that security is restored to the country, we will not be able to recoup what we have lost’ (Reuters 2011). It was through representations of positive interactions with Egyptians that ‘post-revolution’ Tahrir Square tourists were depicted by the media, the government, tour companies and Egyptians as welcome and safe, reinforcing the notion that Egyptians were not a threat and that the revolution was over (Myers 2011; Farrell 2011; Champion 2011; El Halawany 2011). The media also publicized government plans to build a monument and an ‘open air’ museum in Tahrir Square, which further indicated the revolution’s completion and the wish to draw in tourists by making it an ‘attraction’ (El-Subaihi 2011; Asharq Al-Awsat 2011; Al Arab al Youm 2011; EE Staff 2011a). The tourism industry, government and media thereby positioned tourists – through their mere presence – as sending positive messages internationally that post-revolution Egypt was safe and stable, actively promoting the ‘end’ of Egypt’s successful revolution internationally.

Tourism and media representations of ‘post-revolution’ stability, and the achievement of freedom and democracy, functioned together with the discourses of post-Mubarak governments in a way that, as mentioned previously, did not result in a break from the past. Instead, these discourses ultimately articulated with and naturalized a neoliberal interpretation of revolutionary goals, supporting one form and beneficiary group of neoliberalism over another, leaving SCAF at the helm. In so doing, they forsook more democratic approaches to building the ‘new’ Egypt, obscuring the possibility of or desire for alternative political and economic trajectories in this country. Moreover, the focus on elite revolutionaries functioned to conceal the aims and tactics of Egyptian workers and the poor in the 25 January 2011 revolution, whose often-violent tactics were aimed explicitly at counteracting the unequal outcomes of Egyptian neoliberal practices (LeVine 2011; LeVine and Eletrebi 2012; Omar 2011; Armbrust 2011; Ibrahim 2011; Ryzova 2011; El-Mahdi 2011). Through the specific depiction of the ‘new’ Egypt and ‘authentic’ Egyptian revolutionaries in Tahrir Square tourism and media discourses, tourists were positioned in solidarity specifically with elite subjects, supporting a neoliberal vision of the ‘new’ Egypt. Tourism in downtown Cairo played a role in both the Khedival period and in 2011 to send positive messages internationally about the country’s stability and Western-style development. In so doing they replayed the colonial era use of this site to reintegrate Egypt into the global capitalist system. The notion that the liminal revolutionary stage was over, and that it was time for a return to ‘order’, thereby articulated with the idea that tourists expect ‘authentic’ experiences, to make possible a very specific vision of Egypt’s ‘future’.

This vision also made possible the remarginalization of street vendors, along with demonstrators, who continued to occupy the square after the fall of Mubarak. At this time, tourists who visited the square encountered the aforementioned vendors selling revolutionary paraphernalia, souvenirs from Egypt, along with food and drink (Observations from February 2011 to September 2012). Insofar as vendors did not fit with the media representation
of ‘authentic’ revolutionaries, government and tourism discourses positioned them not as part of the ‘new’ Egypt but as part of Cairo’s urban underdevelopment that threatened Egypt’s future. Like at the Pyramids, tourism practices represented poorer vendors in Tahrir Square as intruding on tourists’ authentic experiences and as intimidating them through their aggressive sales practices. Tourists positioned vendors who solicited them as threatening their freedom of choice, saying that they felt that they were being ‘taken in’ or taken advantage of (observation 2 May 2011, informal interviews with tourists 28 April 2011, 5 May 2011). The media also positioned vendors as frightening to tourists, with many ‘reports of desperate vendors aggressively touting visitors with their wares’ or of ‘aggressive souvenir hawkers’, leading tour operators to prevent tourist interactions with vendors (Champion 2011; Farrell 2011; Interview Ziad 2011; El-Kady and Sedky 2011; Hoff 2011). Like at the Pyramids, tourism discourses functioned to position vendors as part of Egypt’s backward present that had no connection with, and indeed threatened, Egypt’s glorious future. By focusing only on certain ‘revolutionaries’ as offering tourists an ‘authentic’ experience, Tahrir Square tourism discourses obscured the role and vision of street vendors in the ‘new’ Egypt.

Tourism discourses were in line with broader discourses of stability after the ‘end’ of the revolution, which delegitimized challenges to neoliberalism and Egypt’s integration into the international neoliberal economy. Indeed, the government and elites positioned vendors alongside demonstrators who continued to occupy the square. They were together accused of causing instability, which threatened tourism and the economy (Egypt News 2011; LeVine 2011; Khater and Hussine 2011; Carr 2011). News articles after the revolution lamented the downturn in tourist numbers, blaming the lack of stability and safety caused by demonstrations (Hammer 2011; Reuters 2011; El-Halawany 2011). The head of the Egyptian Federation of Tourism Chambers, El-Zayat, publicly stated that ‘Egypt is threatened with being removed from global touristic brochures if there is not an immediate cessation to the violence taking place in Tahrir Square’ (EE Staff 2011a). Street vendors and protestors were therefore seen as hindering Egypt’s move away from its underdeveloped present to a post-revolution future. Tourism representations that depicted vendors and protestors in Tahrir Square as threatening to Egypt’s ‘future’ also justified their (often violent) exclusion from this space. After the 2011 revolution, police regularly removed and arrested vendors in the square, accusing vendors of being ‘thugs’, of bothering tourists, or of working illegally without required permits (Egypt News 2011; LeVine 2011; Khater and Hussine 2011; Carr 2011; observation 1 June 2011). Moreover, all remaining protestors in the square – mainly the poor and workers – were also violently removed through a new law in March 2011 that criminalized any protests and strikes that hindered the work of public or private institutions and authorities (EE Staff 2011b). The police and army regularly erased signs of the revolution and protests in Tahrir Square, painting over revolutionary graffiti, replanting grass once tents were removed, and replacing bricks in the sidewalk (observation September 2011). Any threats to the stability of the ‘new’ Egypt were thereby
removed or suppressed. Western tourism practices articulated with Egyptian neoliberal policies in a way that privileged the priorities of tourists and of Egyptian political and economic elites who were seen as contributing to the ‘new’ Egypt.

During and immediately after the revolution there was also a moment of rupture and contestation at the site of the Pyramids itself. Tourists who visited the site would have found that it was busier than ever in terms of local people visiting the site, and horse and camel drivers trying to make a living (observations 24 February 2011; 3 March 2011). Many drivers feel both an economic and emotional connection to the Pyramids site as their home and source of income for 200 years (Hanna 2002; informal interviews 10 June 2010, 21 January 2011, 29 January 2011, 23 May 2011). Like drivers’ practices at the battle of the camel, the increased presence and aggressive solicitation practices of drivers at the Pyramids after the revolution were a form of struggle against their previous exclusion and shaped by their precarity due to neoliberal policies. Their post-revolution practices at the Pyramids were a form of resistance insofar as they were part of contesting Egypt’s neoliberal ‘future’. The government’s policies of opening the market and reducing bureaucracy since the 1970s led to a rise in unemployment and inflation, resulting in a reduction of real wages and a corresponding increase in corruption (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009; El-Naggar 2009). Drivers’ aggressive solicitation practices have been shaped by the competition between drivers due to high unemployment and the daily bribes given to the police who allow drivers to enter the area and solicit tourists (Zaater 2008; Ross 2007; Hanna 2002; informal interviews with drivers 22 June 2010, 16 October 2010, 16 October 2010, 15 July 2010, 20 April 2011, 20 June 2011, 13 September 2012). Only a minority of drivers have an ongoing agreement in place with tour guides who bring them clients, and to whom they pay up to 70% commission, which subsidizes guides’ low salaries (observations 4 June 2011, 6 September 2012, 9 July 2011; informal interviews with tour guides 6 September 2011, 22 January 2011; informal interviews with drivers 16 October 2010, 11 November 2010, 4 July 2011; interview with Ziad, Hoff, El-Kady and Sedky 2011. The rest have been left to solicit for clients, competing for the small pool of tourists who are not on an organized tour. Drivers’ practices of paying ‘fees’ to police and commissions to guides were characteristic not only of the Pyramids site but have become part of contemporary Egyptian culture at every level of society as a means of redistributing income after years of corrupt governance and neoliberal policies. Drivers’ precarious positioning in a competitive environment where they were out of pocket from the start of the day therefore limited their possible solicitation practices to those that are pushy, and even aggressive (observations and informal interviews with drivers 20 April 2011, 29 August 2012). The increased number of drivers after the revolution reflected the lack of police presence, which allowed drivers to access the site who had been previously unable to do so (Zaater 2008; Ross 2007; Hanna 2002; observations 24 February 2011; 3 March 2011). This led to increased numbers of drivers competing for fewer tourists as numbers dwindled during and after the fall of Mubarak. These
could be understood as further instances of quiet encroachment of the margins into these sites as it reflects the ‘silent, protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public, in order to survive and improve their lives’ (Bayat 2013: 46). The presence and practices of drivers were therefore, like street vendors in Tahrir, a means of contesting their marginalization through neoliberalism and present an alternative vision for the post-Mubarak ‘future’ of the site that fully includes them. Drivers’ affinity with the site and its future belies the strict separation between ancient and present-day Egypt.

The idea of a disjuncture between these historical periods also ignores the ongoing relationship Egyptians have had with Pharaonic monuments. Egyptians visit the Pyramids area on holidays, have historically built their graves, mosques and churches on Pharaonic sites, and employ Pharaonic images in symbols of Egyptian identity and nationalism such as the Egyptian currency (Wynn 2007; Reid 1997). During and after the fall of Mubarak, Egyptians started to visit the site in greater numbers, partly to enjoy it as they would during the holidays – with picnics on the Pyramids and horse/camel rides – and partly as a site to present to tourists their visions for the future of Egypt and, in turn, to promote stability and encourage tourism ‘after’ the revolution (24 February 2011; 3 March 2011). For instance, one group of young men and women held up a poster that said ‘Egypt, land of peace’, where they had asked tourists to write what they had enjoyed about the ‘new’ Egypt. Like Tahrir Square it became a site where people would gather to put forward their ideas for and to publicize the ‘new’ Egypt. The connection between contemporary Egyptians and Pharaonic sites contradicts the notion that drivers do not belong in the Pyramids area, and that this area belongs solely to ancient history.

Like street vendors in Tahrir Square, horse and camel drivers were depicted in tourism discourses at the time as threatening, aggressive, and generally destroying the ‘authentic’ pyramids experience. For instance, in early June 2013, the US Embassy issued a travel advisory warning its citizens about increasing incidents in the Giza Pyramids area, ‘attributed to over-aggressive vendors’ (Embassy of the US in Cairo, 2013). With the return of the regime and the police the newer horse and camel drivers were slowly removed from the site and it has restored to its previous ‘order’. The Pyramids site plan is still in place, which will restore its ‘authenticity’ as a site of the past and leave the horse and camel drivers more precarious. In line with assumptions about revolutionary liminal stages, the government interpreted the fall of Mubarak as the ‘end’ of the revolution and called for stability and order. Tourism practices articulated with assumptions about the revolution’s completion to reassert the elite vision of Egypt’s ‘authentic’ past and future, delegitimizing contestations and indeed justifying the remarginalization of subjects seen as a threat to Egypt’s development. Ideas about tourism and revolutionary ritual liminality thereby shaped elite responses to contestations that might challenge the colonial and neoliberal vision of Egypt.
THE PYRAMIDS AND THE REVOLUTION

The ‘battle of the camel’ was a moment of encounter between subjects from both the Pyramids and Tahrir Square, partly shaped by elite urban and tourism practices. After the fall of Mubarak, tourism discourses made a symbolic connection between Egypt’s Pharaonic heritage as the origins of civilization and the ‘new’ Egypt, depicted as the continuation of Egypt’s positive contributions to the world. Although this was not the only narrative shaped by the revolution, it was a powerful one that reinforced an elite vision by connecting these two sites to produce a particular narrative of Egypt’s development.

Tourism discourses at the time represented Egyptians’ successful uprising as changing the world for the better, highlighting the international significance of the revolution, in line with Egypt’s Pharaonic past, as key moments in Egypt’s history. For instance, a tourism video called ‘Wings of Freedom’ made by Egypt Air and shown on its flights and on YouTube (Egypt Air), featured mainly images from the revolution with a montage of photographs of mainly Pharaonic tourist sites at the end, shaping a connection between these two periods. This video included quotes from world leaders at the time, Silvio Berlusconi, Barack Obama and David Cameron, praising Egyptians for having ‘changed the world’ and ‘made history, like they always did’ (AFP 2011). These quotes were also prominently displayed in the arrivals hall of the Cairo airport (observation September 2012). A ‘Revolutionary Tour’ of Cairo I attended outlined Egypt’s history of revolution, arguing that it started in Pharaonic times (observation 9 September 2012). One Egypt Independent article also described a tour guide connecting ancient Egypt and Tahrir Square in terms of their contribution to world history when he explained to his group that ‘Egyptians have always made history: They made history thousands of years ago, and just a few kilometers away they made history again in Tahrir [Liberation] Square’ (El-Halawany 2011).

These tourism practices articulated with Egyptian government and popular practices that explicitly represented the connection between the revolution and Egypt’s ancient civilizational achievements. Egyptians appropriated Pharaonic symbols for various proposed monuments and for political graffiti that memorialized the martyrs (Adel 2011; observation 30 May 2011; interview About Bakr 2012 and Awad 2012), producing a symbolic link between these two time periods. Exhibitions and theatre at the time, presented a linear history of Egypt from Pharaonic times to the revolution, making a connection between the values in both periods and ‘framing the revolution as the ultimate ending to Egypt’s glorious history’ (Asharq Al-Awsat 2011; Al Arab al Youm 2011; Stuhr-Rommereim 2011). Heritage sites like the Pyramids were therefore key to reproducing the notion that the ‘new’ Egypt ‘derives from a collective inheritance that spans centuries and at times millennia’ (Johnson 1999: 190). The practices of various actors represented the revolution as internationally significant, allowing the ‘new’ Egypt to reclaim its place within the aforementioned elite colonial and neoliberal narrative of development.
CONCLUSION

This article asks how the revolution resulted in the continued privileging of Egypt’s elites and remarginalization of precarious subjects. Rather than focusing on state-level processes, which take for granted the revolution’s linear temporality, it studies the context of the ‘battle of the camel’ through ethnographic methods to understand how revolutionary contestations involved diverse actors and complex chronologies. This article finds that the socially constructed idea of linear stages within tourism and revolution articulated productively to motivate, conceal and repress the contestations expressed through the ‘battle of the camel’ and its aftermath. More specifically, the idea of a linear chronology in tourism and revolutions helped to shape exclusionary visions of Egypt’s particular ‘authentic’ past and future that are part of tourists’ transformative experience. These exclusionary visions worked to produce the urban exclusions that street vendors and horse/camel drivers were contesting at the battle of the camel and after Mubarak’s resignation, and to reestablish order and repress these subjects after the fall of Mubarak.

The article therefore draws together the Pyramids and Tahrir Square spaces to reveal how elite and tourism depictions of their authentic temporalities functioned together to shape and respond to this battle. The notions of authenticity reproduced through tourism contributed to reinforce an elite colonial and neoliberal narrative of development through the symbolic connection between the Pyramids and Tahrir Square, embedding Egypt’s elite transition by positioning tourists and elites together as representatives of Egypt’s future, and as protecting its past. These ideas of authenticity justified the remarginalization of drivers and street vendors seen as part of Egypt’s present that threatened its authentic past and future by endangering ‘authentic’ experiences and holding back Egypt’s development. In so doing, tourism practices made it seem natural that elite subjects would continue to rule Egypt and that more marginal subjects could not be part of decisions about Egypt’s future.

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