The Conflicts of Duty:
The opinions and actions of the
British Society of Friends in the
Middle East, 1936-1958

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores the challenges the British Society of Friends (Quakers) faced in their missionary-humanitarian work in Palestine and neighbouring countries. The influence of nationality on their faith-based policies is a central theme. The core questions proposed focus on Quaker attempts to align their faith as Christian pacifists with their role as British citizens, how their sense of duty was constructed in such terms and the challenges they faced in adhering to both philosophies, especially in their reactions to violence, which differed depending on the perpetrator – British, Arab or Jewish. The actions of the British government repeatedly forced Quakers to consider their identity and their efforts to influence foreign policy, providing an opportunity for historians to investigate what was British and what was Quaker in this context.

The research involved analysing particular projects and individual experiences through the Quaker press as well as private documents. The Quakers’ sense of duty as British citizens and substantial confidence in their individual and collective ability to reconcile warring parties produced outcomes that significantly impacted their status in the region. British Quakers, who referred to themselves as Friends, used their multiple connections to senior British, Jewish, and Arab officials during several attempts at reconciliation. However, their loyalty to Britain saw certain individuals and groups act as Christian pacifists who assisted British hegemony, demonstrating a paternalist or orientalist attitude. The Arab Revolt, the creation of Israel, the humanitarian emergency that followed, and the Suez Crisis are the main case studies explored. This allows the thesis to not only investigate British Quaker activities in the Middle East, which has been little studied hitherto, but also to add to British imperial history and the history of humanitarianism.
**Acknowledgements**

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Thank you Mum and Dad for always being there for me no matter what.

Finally, to my wife Rebecca, who deserves this as much as I do. I could have never done this without you. T.Y.F.L.M.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFSC</strong> American Friends Service Committee</td>
<td>American Quaker-founded foreign and domestic relief organisation headquartered in Philadelphia, USA (1917-Present)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FPC</strong> Friends Peace Committee</td>
<td>Quaker committee established to form links with the wider peace movement (1888-1965)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FRS</strong> Friends Relief Service</td>
<td>Official arm of the British Quakers established to relieve civilian distress in war time (1941-1946) – previously the Friends War Victims Relief Committee (FWVRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FSC</strong> Friends Services Council</td>
<td>British Quaker-founded relief organization (1927-1979) – now Quaker Peace &amp; Social Witness (QPSW, 2001-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FWCC</strong> Friends World Committee for Consultation</td>
<td>Global Quaker body headquartered in London, UK (1937-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICC</strong> International Christian Committee</td>
<td>Jerusalem area committee of the NECCRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICRC/IRC</strong> International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>Global independent humanitarian organisation for victims of armed conflict, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland (1863-Present)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LRCS</strong> League of Red Cross Societies</td>
<td>Global independent humanitarian organisation for victims of disasters and health emergencies (1919-1991) - now the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland (1991-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NECCCRW/NECC</strong> Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Work</td>
<td>Humanitarian program established to assist Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (1952-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PWC</strong> Palestine Watching Committee</td>
<td>Quaker committee established to achieve peace in Palestine (1935-1941, 1945-1951)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>QUNO</strong> Quaker United Nations Office</td>
<td>Quakers’ UN consultants (1948-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN</strong> United Nations</td>
<td>Global organisation established after World War II (1945-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNESCO</strong> United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
<td>UN agency for world peace through education and culture (1945-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNRPR</strong> United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees</td>
<td>UN precedent to UNRWA, established to provide emergency relief (1948-1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNRWA</strong> United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
<td>UN agency specifically for the support of Palestinian refugees (1949-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WCC</strong> World Council of Churches</td>
<td>Global fellowship of churches headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland (1948-Present)</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

Friends, commonly known as Quakers, participated in missionary-humanitarian endeavours in the Middle East, especially Palestine, during the early to mid-20th century. During this period, they identified themselves as Christian pacifists, but also as British citizens bound by a sense of duty. This duty saw them embroiled in an ideological struggle that made some question their loyalty to the British government whilst also facing accusations of being imperialists. As an organisation, the Quakers forged relationships with British politicians through what Quaker historian Frederick Tolles termed, their role as ‘divine lobbyists’.¹ They were Christian pacifists hoping to make the world a better place through reconciliation and education. However, their belief in Britain’s role as the world’s policeman created many difficulties when interacting with Arabs and Jews. Quakers continually attempted to align their faith and nationality towards the same goal: peace. There were frictions over the partition of Palestine, but efforts were made to still work with the government and tolerate its policies. The post-Second World War period became fixed in armed conflicts of decolonisation.² As the Suez Crisis emerged and developed, the British government’s imperialist attributes became further evidence, revealing to many Quakers that their faith and nationality could not support the same goals.

The Quakers began as a radical movement in the English Republic in the mid-17th century, led by their founder George Fox, whose prophetic teachings taught those who followed him the ideal of inward experience: that guidance by God through direct revelation without the need of pastors or priests was the necessary approach to salvation.³ Quakers believed revelation was available to anyone who sought it, and this open attitude in turn moulded their belief in equality.⁴ Rank or social status, although vital in society’s eyes, was not

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² Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, 'Empire and Globalisation: From 'High Imperialism' to Decolonisation', The International History Review, 36 (2014), 142-70. p.144
⁴ Ibid. p.5
important to Quakers. What mattered was the inward spiritual experience known as the Inner Light that would lead believers to find God and be guided upon the true Christian path. They would communicate and dress in a plain manner to illustrate their single-minded focus on religion, distinguishing themselves from other Christian movements.\(^5\) This was part of what Quakers referred to as Corporate Discipleship, whereby Friends, through testimonies concerning peace and simplicity, were held accountable and even disciplined in search of the ‘Truth’.\(^6\) Discipline has remained a core value as it allows Friends to maintain standards they set for others as well as themselves. The book of *Quaker Faith and Practice*, which through personal and corporate experience tries to express ‘Truth’, is also commonly known as the *Book of Discipline* by Quakers.\(^7\) British Quakers worked towards commencement rather than conversion, meaning that through their good deeds, non-Quakers would be attracted to Quakerism more organically rather than forced to via a form of indoctrination. Firmly focusing their beliefs on certain principles, Quakers referred to themselves as a ‘society’ rather than a church, with unity to one another based not through doctrine but by attitude.\(^8\) Through this non-dogmatic approach, they hosted worship events known as meetings, a type of religious assembly held monthly, quarterly or annually, in which Friends would wait in silence until someone experienced a spiritual calling to speak. No professional minister existed in any capacity and anyone was allowed to communicate in the meeting.\(^9\) Female ministers were always recognised with their status as Christians never questioned.\(^10\) From the beginning, women attended meetings and were treated as absolute equals. In both humanitarian and educational work, several women play leading roles in this thesis.

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\(^5\) Ibid. p.10  
\(^10\) John Punshon, *Portrait in Grey*. p.1
In 1869 the Society of Friends as an organisation began its endeavours in the Middle East, or Near East as it was then known, by creating schools for girls in the Christian villages across the region, including those surrounding the Ramallah district. In 1889 the Friends Girls School opened as the Girls Training Home of Ramallah with a Boys Training Home founded later in 1901.\textsuperscript{11} The schools were supported through a transatlantic collaboration between British and American Friends to provide high-quality education to children based on Quaker values. Prior to this, in the villages of Mount Lebanon, Syria, a German-Swiss Protestant missionary called Theophilus Waldmeier raised enough funding from friends in Switzerland and Quakers in Britain to open a Friends Girls School in 1873 and Boys School in 1876. Waldmeier visited England in 1874 and officially joined the Society of Friends during this period.\textsuperscript{12} In 1892 a school for young Arabs at Ras-el-Metn was also transferred to the Friends Mission in Brummana.\textsuperscript{13} In 1898 Waldmeier’s efforts in the region expanded to include healthcare when he founded the Lebanon Hospital for the Insane in Asfuriyeh.\textsuperscript{14} Due to the relative peace during this period, several decades’ worth of work had been established prior to the First World War and the Sultan’s eventual abdication of the Ottoman Empire in 1922. The First World War caused disruptions leading the schools in Brummana to operate at reduced capacity whilst the Ramallah institutions closed in 1914 but re-opened in 1919. Following the end of the war Quakers continued developing the schools to match the growing demand for their services.\textsuperscript{15}

During the industrial revolution, Quaker families were some of the richest in England.\textsuperscript{16} British Quakers held considerable influence in politics and business. Quaker industrialists and bankers, driven by a social duty to help others, became significantly involved in

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{14} Unknown, \textit{Lebanon Hospital for Mental and Nervous Disorders Archive}, <https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/62861523-7761-3aa0-97ca-ba81d7191ada> [accessed February 2022]
\bibitem{15} Christina Jones, \textit{Friends in Palestine}. pp.59-77; Brummana High School, \textit{Brummana High School History}
\bibitem{16} John Punshon, \textit{Portrait in Grey}. p.1
\end{thebibliography}
philanthropy. Notable examples of this were responses to the Irish famine, prison reform and the movement for the abolition of slavery. British Quakers became part of Britain’s golden age of prosperity and commercial dominance with colonising efforts aimed at developing civilised, enlightened democratic institutions. This responsibility for ensuring peace was referred to as the Pax Britannica, with British Quaker efforts reflecting their nation’s position in the world. The Society of Friends as an organisation held a platform in terms of wealth and influence that defied its size. By 1935, 41.67 percent of male British Quakers belonged to the financial elite, whilst only 3.86 percent of their Church of England counterparts could say the same. Despite having small numbers compared to other Christian denominations they maintained several key political and social networks. There were two clear forms of unofficial political involvement by Quakers. Many were both involved in local electioneering and held strong political affiliations, while others committed themselves to direct action unaffiliated to any party, acting as a pressure group that sought to influence government officials. The latter was particularly prominent in the Middle East during the early to mid-20th century.

1.2. Literature Review

One of the fundamental principles for Quakers was the Peace Testimony, committing them to the pursuit of peace and adjuring participation in war. It was a core belief containing several flexible key concepts that featured heavily in individual and collective Quaker consciousness. Michael Freeden, in his analysis of morphology and ideas, argued that key concepts, though omnipresent, carry different proportional weightings depending on the manifestation of the instigated ideology. For Quakers the Peace Testimony was a flexible

18 Margaret Post Abbott, Mary Ellen Chijioke, Pink Dandelion, and John William Oliver-Jr, Historical Dictionary of the Friends (Quakers). p.259
19 John Punshon, Portrait in Grey. p.183
21 John Punshon, Portrait in Grey. pp.236-37
principle that was influenced by factors such as the location, nationality, faith, and reasons behind a particular conflict. For example, in the Second World War, only 15 per cent of suitable young male British Quakers enlisted in the military, with a strong focus on conscientious objection playing a pivotal role. Conversely, most of their North American peers enlisted.\(^{23}\) These decisions illustrate a difference concerning specific nationalities. What made Palestine unique was that it contained all key factors, with the conflict between Arabs, Jews and the British military demonstrating just how elastic the Peace Testimony was. The conflict created various opinions that proved not all causes were equal, with the Arab uprising during the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) often viewed sympathetically by concerned British Quakers. By contrast, the actions of Jewish militias were often interpreted far more negatively, even leading to anti-Semitic tropes amongst individuals.

Though there has been research on the role of British Quakers with Jewish refugees in Europe, there is a lacuna of knowledge concerning the Quaker relationship with Jews in the Middle East. This issue proves the most divisive and controversial in this analysis due to the subject’s sensitive nature, particularly around anti-Semitism. There appears to have been hesitancy amongst Quakers and scholars to explore this subject. The issue of Zionism, the nationalist ideological movement that sought the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, created a divide amongst Quakers like few others. A combination of supersessionism and millenarian theological interpretation, combined with pro-imperial sentiment, saw heated debates in Quaker publications, with some individuals decades later still resenting the outcomes of the creation of Israel. The works of Benny Morris, Ilan Pappe and Avi Shlaim, sometimes referred to as the ‘Israeli revisionists’ or ‘new historians’ due to their analysis of previously unreleased Israeli archives in the 1980s, helped create a level of understanding regarding the debate over the 1948 conflict between Arab and Jewish forces.\(^{24}\) For several

\(^{23}\) Margaret Post Abbott, Mary Ellen Chijioke, Pink Dandelion, and John William Oliver-Jr, *Historical Dictionary of the Friends (Quakers)*. p.262

decades the standard Zionist version of events surrounding the conflict dominated not only Israeli but also Western narratives, with only those in the Arab world contesting it.\textsuperscript{25} Morris, Pappe and Shlaim challenged these narratives, but it is important to note since then Morris has significantly changed his stance from being a left-wing critic to a right-wing equivalent, scaling back his criticism of Israeli forces during 1948.\textsuperscript{26} Though the impact of ‘new historians’ was significant, the 1970s was already witnessing a greater emphasis on Palestinian perspectives, most notably through the work of Edward Said.\textsuperscript{27} During this period, Quakers and like-minded pacifists began to release their memoirs detailing their experiences during the conflict and already began to challenge pro-Zionist narratives.\textsuperscript{28} This thesis examines eyewitness testimonies from British Quakers, whose pacifist beliefs were tested due to the nature of the conflict. Arabs were often portrayed as noble in their aspirations, whilst Zionist Jews were often viewed with suspicion. Combined with the relief work that followed the creation of Israel, this study examines how Quakers responded to a crisis whereby a group of victims (Arabs) directly suffered at the hands of another group of victims (Jews).

It can be suggested that the Israel-Palestine conflict is the thermometer of international relations. When tensions increase or heat up, the rest of the world both witnesses and experiences the fallout. Certain topics, such as human rights, terrorism and anti-Semitism, have often been the focus of controversy in discussing the history of the Middle East, and this has often had implications for discussions in the historiography too. In addition to Morris, Pappe and Shalaim, the writings of Israeli writer Amos Oz, and research from historians such as Leonard Dinnerstein and Norman Finkelstein, provide a backdrop to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Avi Shlaim, 'The Debate About 1948'. p.288
\item \textsuperscript{26} Barry Shapiro, 'The Strange Career of Israeli 'New Historian' Benny Morris', \textit{Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture}, 20/21 (2015), 154-60. p.158
\end{itemize}
discussion that follows.\textsuperscript{29} The analysis of such controversial themes cannot be shied away from, but rather allows British Quakers to re-examine a neglected part of their history.

The missionary-humanitarian activities of British Quakers in Europe have received some academic coverage. However, British Quaker endeavours in the Middle East have been greatly understudied. This thesis aims to shine a light on the challenges British Quakers faced during a period when the sun was setting on the British Empire. Works by Jennifer Carson, Rose Holmes, Sharif Gemie and Fiona Reid, Farah Mendelsohn, Sian Roberts, Tammy Proctor, and Ben Holmes have previously focused on Quaker European relief efforts.\textsuperscript{30} These works, when centred on the Quaker relationship with refugees and the principles behind their endeavours, provide useful insights for this study. Carson, Roberts and Proctor’s studies provided the most opportunity to compare the Quaker humanitarian work in Europe to that in Palestine, when applicable. Still, the research of Ilana Feldman, Enaya Othman, and especially Asaf Rominorwsky and Alexander Joffe, and Nancy Gallagher provided the most direct contribution to the research for this thesis as they focused specifically on Quaker endeavours in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{31} Othman’s work focused on the difficulties Quaker missionaries initially had when trying to understand Arab customs, particularly when


working with women. Though misconceptions still occurred, Othman argued that Quakers learned to appreciate these customs more, demonstrating the importance of longevity in creating a ‘middle ground’.\(^{32}\) Gallagher’s analysis made extensive use of the American Friends Service Committee’s (AFSC) archive in Philadelphia, USA, as well as oral history interviews with surviving members from 1992 to analyse the difficulties Quakers faced in their humanitarian endeavours, both as individuals and collectively.\(^{33}\) Feldman made use of the same material but channelled the investigation into a more specific theme, titled ‘ethical labour’, whereby Quaker humanitarian workers endured constant ethical dilemmas due to their political and practical surroundings.\(^{34}\) In another article, Feldman focused on the citizen or refugee dynamic in Gaza and the implications of being identified as a refugee by again examining AFSC activities.\(^{35}\) Feldman’s work proved helpful when analysing the tensions front line Quaker relief workers faced due to their lofty expectations. Both Gallagher’s and Feldman’s research were critiqued by Rominorwsky and Joffe, whose own analysis focused on the AFSC’s political interactions with the US government and the organisation’s internal decision making through the use of AFSC and the US State Department archives. The methodological benefits from studying these works were valuable in analysing how individual accounts were compared to one another or used to reinforce a particular argument. The significant advantages came when investigating what the authors considered to be the key themes and the contrasting opinions that followed. For example, Rominorwsky and Joffe provided a more critical perspective of Quaker humanitarian efforts, describing Gallagher’s analysis as tendentious and hagiographical.\(^{36}\) Furthermore, Rominorwsky and Joffe heavily criticised what they called ‘scholarship-advocacy’ whereby the Palestinian cause was championed by Western academics and new-Israeli historians, like Pappe, Shliam and Morris, at the expense of the Israeli narrative.\(^{37}\) Rominorwsky and Joffe were so adamant on this issue that they would later publish two online articles accusing

\(^{32}\) Enaya Othman, ‘Meeting at Middle Ground: American Quaker Women’s Two Palestinian Encounters’. p.61

\(^{33}\) Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.ix

\(^{34}\) Ilana Feldman, 'The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief'.


\(^{37}\) Ibid. pp.12-17
Quakers of abandoning their religious principles to anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic beliefs.\(^{38}\) Rominorwsky and Joffe’s arguments, when compared to Gallagher’s in particular, helped inform this thesis by providing opportunities to look at the humanitarian work of Quakers in a different context. The findings of Feldman, Othman, Rominorwsky and Joffe, and Gallagher will be supplemented but also challenged through analysis of the following contexts: the influence of over-confidence before and during Quaker relief efforts, analysis of British Quaker activities within the AFSC as well as the individual humanitarian endeavours of Friends separate from the AFSC, the impact of the refugee crisis on the status of Quaker women, and the activities of British Quakers following the end of major relief efforts in 1951.

As the above suggests, the emphasis in academic studies to date has been very much on the activities of the American Society of Friends. The research of Gallagher, Othman, Feldman, Rominorwsky and Joffe provides little analysis of the differences between British and international Quaker policy and action, nor how British Quakers’ nationality may have influenced their opinions of different Arab groups and Jews. There is a historiographical gap about British Quaker activities in the Middle East concerning the role of the empire, mandates, and missionary-humanitarian activity. The interactions between faith and nationality on both an individual as well as the collective level created multiple points of discussion. The policies of the British government during the mandate and post-mandate periods forced Quakers to constantly wrestle with their identity as both Christian pacifists and British citizens. According to Quaker historian Robert Byrd, Friends at times vigorously attempted to improve, extend or ‘fill in the gaps’ of governmental activity.\(^{39}\) They were not confined to accepting or opposing acts of government. Instead, they opted for what they believed was the appropriate response.\(^{40}\) British Friends were substantially impacted by the


\(^{40}\) ibid. p.37
actions of the British government to maintain its declining dominance over its colonies. Initially, there was a collective belief amongst those British Quakers that British policymakers could provide the best platform upon which to build peace. However, the government’s overseas policy created tensions that led to violence between multiple communities, forcing Quakers to question if this remained the case. This worsened during the Suez Crisis with both their lives and the institutions they built at significant risk. Internal ideological struggles created by British overseas policy also created complications when working with Quakers from other countries, particularly their American peers, who were concerned at the actions of the British government regarding Israel and the Suez Canal.

The Royal Society of Asian Affairs, the National Archives, the Woodbrooke Quaker Study Centre, Haverford College, the British Library and the Cardiff University Special Collections and Archives were accessed to gather research for this thesis, with the Library of the Society of Friends in London proving the most significant. The library contains journals of several Quaker-funded magazines published during the period in question. The largest accessible resource was *The Friend* magazine (*Friend*), founded in 1843 and produced weekly for the last 125 years. Throughout the period being studied, a weekly issue consisted of 32 pages, including six dedicated to advertisements, with a large focus on themes such as peace, education, and correspondence with Quakers around the world regarding their activities. The *Friend* is a crucial source in understanding the issues that influenced the opinions of Quakers as it was, and still is, the official forum for British Quakers to discuss social and political issues as well as local and overseas activities. Though the contents in the *Friend* and other journals were often varied, the collective Quaker mind-set was particularly focused on maintaining the Society of Friends’ tradition of promoting peace in areas of conflict and pacifist values. Quakers viewed collective ‘concern’ as an act of religious impulse that could not be denied. The term ‘concern’ was referenced by Roger C. Wilson, a former BBC employee who was dismissed in 1940 as a conscientious objector and later became General

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41 Elinor Smallman, The Friends House Library, interviewed by Alexis Constantinou, 10 January 2018
42 George Penaluna, The Friends House Library, interviewed by Alexis Constantinou, 10 January 2018
Secretary and travelling Commissioner of the Friends Relief Service (FRS). As part of the annual Swarthmore lecture series held in conjunction with the London Yearly Meeting, Wilson argued that the word ‘concern’ was to commonly be used by Friends to express a strong desire, when it was ‘a Gift from God...something which the Lord would have done, however obscure the way, however uncertain the means to human observation’. In the 1930s, an estimated 3,500 Quakers subscribed to the Friend, with an approximated average of at least two people per subscription reading the texts. Therefore, between 7,000 to 10,000 Quakers likely read the magazine weekly, out of a total British Quaker population of roughly 25,000. Though occasionally some articles in the Friend were not written by Quakers, the overwhelming majority were. This provided an opportunity to study in depth who British Quakers were and how they engaged with ideas of Britishness, pacifism and values. However, it was unable to illustrate at the same level of detail how non-Quakers viewed their ideas and actions. None of the key actors from the period in question are alive, so interviews could not be arranged, although healthy communications did develop with Kim Brengle, the great-granddaughter of one of the most prominent Quakers featured in this study, Daniel Oliver.

Quakers provided their ‘impressions’, which were often first-hand accounts, of events around the world to the Friend. The tone of the writing was formal, with the level of Quaker theological analysis regarding the topic dependant on the author’s intentions. Some would directly link their faith to the topic, whilst others wrote in a manner that gave little impression the author was a Quaker. For the period of analysis, two British Quakers were the chief editors of the magazine - Hubert W Peet from 1932 to 1949 and Bernard H Canter 1950 to 1958. Both men had extensive experience in journalism and encouraged free expression and the widest variety of viewpoints from those who submitted letters and articles to the Friend. Canter, in his obituary, was described as having a slight bias towards including opinions that refuted his own as this would encourage more discussion amongst

44 ibid. p.12
45 Ian Kirk-Smith, The Friends House Library, interviewed by Alexis Constantinou, 8 January 2018
46 George Penaluna, interviewed by Alexis Constantinou
47 Kim Brengle, 'Generation of Nomads Contact' (Email to Alexis Constantinou, 7 August 2020).
readers. As part of their role as editors, they wrote the ‘London Letters’, which were articles describing the latest British Quaker activities published in the US based *Friends Intelligencer*, later *Friends Journal* (the *Intelligencer* was published from 1944 to 1955 and then became the *Friends Journal*). Published weekly, the *Friends Journal* is still the primary publication of the American Quaker movement. Its mission is to discuss the Quaker experience as a means to develop and join spiritual lives. The *Intelligencer* and *Journal* provide further insight into British Quaker activities through the eyes of their American peers. In addition to these journals, articles written in the *Wayfarer* and *Friends Quarterly* magazines have also been analysed. The *Wayfarer*’s chief editor, Horace Pointing, described the monthly magazine as having a smaller audience than the *Friend*. Published home and abroad in conjunction with the Friends Service Council (FSC), the monthly publication aimed to survey Friends’ interests and learn their tendencies with ‘special interest in those who may be said to be on the periphery of the society and want to know more, and understand more, of what Quakerism means in thought and action’.

Published every three months, the *Friends Quarterly* is the sister publication to the *Friend*. It developed articles focused on the international endeavours of Quakers and these tended to concentrate on material written by authors who had significant experience and knowledge of the subject they were discussing.

The minutes of Quaker meetings provided opportunities to study the attitudes of local groups who represented the Society. Meetings were, and still are, an essential component of Quaker religious worship. They provided the platform for Quakers to discuss how they would put their faith into action and how to enhance the Quaker reputation for trustworthiness through oversight of members’ financial affairs. The *Dictionary of Quaker Biography* in the Friends House provided further background information such as date of

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52 Mark Freeman, ‘Quakers, Business, and Philanthropy’. p.3
birth, occupation, location and further information regarding family. The *Yearly Meeting Proceedings* contain multiple reports concerning the Middle East, including developments in Quaker schools, the annual minutes of the Palestine Watching Committee and the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting. Reports for both meetings also sporadically appeared in the *Friend* and the Lucy Backhouse Papers, the latter primarily focused on Quaker activity in Palestine during the late 1930s as well as the plight of Armenian refugees in the 1920s. The Backhouse Papers contain over 40 letters between Quakers and government officials, as well as the eyewitness accounts of several Quakers living in the region, the majority of which were written during the Arab Revolt. In addition, the Daniel Oliver Papers provided by the Haverford College Library detail Oliver’s peacebuilding endeavours. Oliver became the British Society of Friends’ official representative by the start of the Arab Revolt and was described by the editor of the *Friends Intelligencer* as a leading Quaker figure in the region. The Oliver papers span from 1936 to 1951, detailing his correspondence with Quakers and government officials. Further information from government officials as well as various personnel from humanitarian organisations was found in the National Archives ‘Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ records. The material gathered was mainly used in the analysis of Quaker relief efforts during the Palestinian refugee crisis. The Mary Sime Papers contain letters and articles published in Quaker and non-Quaker publications during the 1950s by the British Quaker and teacher, Mary Sime. The 27 documents available detailed her experiences not only in Palestine but also Egypt and Nigeria. The personal correspondence, memoirs and diaries of several Quakers who lived in the Middle East during the period have also been analysed, thanks to the help of staff at the Friends House Library in London. The memoirs of Christina Jones and Kanty Cooper provided eyewitness accounts of their day to day experiences, with Jones’ memoir also containing her diary entries during the period. The decision to start this thesis from 1936 was due to the availability of archival material and other sources. From 1936 onwards, the Quaker journals display a marked increase in interest in activities in the Middle East, and this has been

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chosen as a starting point for this particular study. The end point in the late 1950s enables analysis of responses to the Suez Crisis and forms a natural periodisation, with the creation of the United Arab Republic.

The mid to late 19th century saw a surge in Christian missionaries from Great Britain, France and the United States travelling to foreign lands. Cultural historian Stuart Ward stated that during the period of late Victorian political culture, the empire gradually influenced ideas regarding British nationality and the national interest.54 This growing humanitarian sensibility with an international outlook would continue into the 20th century.55 Historians Emily Baughan and John Mackenzie stated that, following the end of the First World War, the inter-war years saw awareness of empire hit its peak in British popular culture and public opinion.56 Empire Day and the 1924 Empire Exhibition, the latter being the first radio broadcast by a British Monarch, were attempts by the government to demonstrate the positive global role played by British imperialism.57 As a result, British migrants often brought an element of Britishness to their transnational endeavours.58 British imperial authorities actively encouraged settlers in foreign lands to view themselves as part of a global link of kith and kin, harnessing a strong sense of ethnocentrically motivated global Britishness that would serve both cultural and economic ends.59

57 Emily Baughan, ‘Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!’ Empire, Internationalism and the Save the Children Fund in Inter-War Britain’. p.116, The British Library, King George V Opens the British Empire Exhibition, 23 April 1924, (London: The British Library) <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/king-george-v-british-empire-exhibition#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20first%20broadcast,as%20the%20'unfavourable%20weather'.> [accessed September 28 2021]
59 Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, 'Empire and Globalisation: From 'High Imperialism' to Decolonisation'. pp.145-46
In Palestine, relations between missionaries and Palestinians were negative due to a lack of cultural understanding. Othman’s research detailed these initial difficulties, though her analysis focused on American Quakers and not their British peers. Nonetheless, this paternalist attitude was regularly featured in British Quaker publications and individual accounts throughout the period of study. Terms such as ‘simple’ were used by individuals when describing Arabs, with Quakers referring to them using interventionist or even orientalist language. The terms ‘orientalism’ and ‘orientalist’ are used within this thesis to describe the feeling of intellectual superiority that those from Western civilisation believed they had over those from the Orient. As Edward Said had described, orientalism was not, ‘expressive of some nefarious Western imperialist plot to hold down the oriental world’. It was an inherently used instrument as part of an economic, political, and militarily based imperialist agenda.

This study uses a combination of Palestinian historian A.L Tibawi’s model, which concentrated on the lack of understanding of Islamic culture, and Said’s interpretation of orientalism. It considers the individual orientalist mind-set of the ‘us versus them’ mentality and the belief in intellectual, and sometimes racial, superiority that mentality created. As an instrument of the imperialist-driven policy of Western governments, the works of British poet and journalist Rudyard Kipling, such as Fuzzy Wuzzy, were referenced. Though Kipling’s writing did not refer to Palestine, the mind-set of the White Man’s Burden certainly influenced certain Quakers. When discussing works specifically on Palestine, British Quakers described reading Arabian Nights or of the adventures of T.E. Lawrence, whilst for others, the only knowledge they had of the Orient came from the Bible. Bart Moore-Gilbert argued that orientalism did involve a pursuit of

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60 Enaya Othman, ‘Meeting at Middle Ground: American Quaker Women’s Two Palestinian Encounters’; Enaya Othman, Negotiating Palestinian Womanhood: Encounters between Palestinian Women and American Missionaries, 1880s-1940s; Enaya Othman, ‘Deconstructing the Dogma of Domesticity: Quaker Education and Nationalism in British Mandate Palestine’.


62 ibid. p.12


64 For a list of Kipling’s poems see: The Kipling Society, Kipling’s Poems, <https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems.htm> [accessed February 2022]

hegemony over India but sympathised with Kipling, stating that he was ‘trapped by the political realities out of which orientalism emerged’.

The actions and observations of Quakers focused on the influence of dominion and hegemony. British Quakers, like many other British citizens, were influenced by the era. Therefore, there is credence in arguing that Quakers were vessels who, on occasion, inadvertently helped maintain British rule. However, this approach benefits from significant hindsight. This study aims to balance fair criticism with an understanding that British Quakers were a product of their time. This allows a better opportunity to appreciate the complexities of comparing fundamental Quaker ideologies to those of the larger British imperial perspective - for example, Quaker peace efforts and influence of the Pax Britannica. The national context behind British orientalist thinking is considered but, due to the individuality of Quakers, examples of collective imperial discourse reflected more of an attitude rather than any specific literary inspiration. The viewpoints of the individuals concerned are central to developing the arguments for this thesis. Therefore, the perceptions surrounding orientalism are more accurately examined through the individual than as part of a more extensive socio-political analysis.

The impact of orientalism, of which Edward Said’s analysis proved the most influential, helped create new gateways and creative interpretations of the history of imperialism. Saidian cultural analysis became part of the post-1980s upsurge of cultural studies concerning the history of empires. It proved instrumental in the creation of the new imperial history academic movement championed by Antoinette Burton, Catherine Hall and John Mackenzie. However, its focus on networks, culture, and power, has not been without its detractors. Critics of Burton and cultural historians such as Stuart Ward have

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68 ibid. pp.5-7
70 Gareth Curless, Stacey Hynd, Temilola Hynd, and Katherine Roscoe, 'Editors' Introduction: Networks in Imperial History'. p.723
stated their grievances. Matthew Stanard suggests that terms such as ‘new imperial history’ need to be jettisoned as they are unnecessarily provocative. This attitude is similar to the position taken by John Darwin, who does not favour terms such as ‘cultural’, ‘imperial’ or ‘post-colonial history’. This difference in opinions led to fierce debates amongst leading academics, such as Burton, Darwin, and Andrew Porter, on the subject. According to Stephen Howe, new imperial historians have been guilty of focusing on religious groups and educational institutions without specifying ‘the relationship of the project to the colonial power’. This study focuses in depth on the relationship of British Quakers to the colonial power, in this case, the British government. It demonstrates a keen interest amongst certain British Quakers regarding the actions of their government and Quaker attempts to directly lobby and influence foreign policy. Though this study does not want to be shoehorned into a particular field, the ‘British World’ concept is relevant. Similar to key theoretical and conceptual insights from new imperial history, the British World concept analyses important areas of focus relevant to this study, such as the commercial and cultural experiences of British settlers and the nature of British identity in the Anglophone world during the 20th century. Nonetheless, this field is not without its critics, with Mackenzie stating the focus on British identity excludes Welsh, Scottish, and Irish identities. However, the British World concept was used by new imperial historian Andrew Thompson to investigate how pride in the empire allowed the English, Welsh, Scottish and

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75 Stephen Howe, The New Imperial Histories Reader. p.8
76 Gareth Curless, Stacey Hynd, Temilola Hynd, and Katherine Roscoe, ‘Editors’ Introduction: Networks in Imperial History’. p.714
77 ibid. p.715
Irish people to transcend their differences to agree upon a national character. In recent historical writing, Thompson stated that the British World concept has gained far more currency, that for significantly varied reasons, different people could still embrace an imperial identity. The British World is more fluid and broader than the British Empire concept. The empire concept focused on subordination and compulsion in colonies primarily, whilst the British World includes more formal and informal practices used in British dominions. For British Quakers, their actions were similar to that of other British protestant missionaries with international objectives often viewed through global, not colonial, perspectives. The complication for this study was that Palestine was under mandate control. Mandates were part of a re-imagined empire that was a peaceful moral force rather than an aggressive expansionist coloniser. Susan Pedersen’s work on Britain’s role in the League of Nations and the mandates that followed examined how, despite attempts to respect the rights of inhabitants in its overseas territories to self-determination, significant measures were always in place to protect Britain’s colonial assets against internal uprisings, including the use of force when necessary. This means that the mandate for Palestine had certain hallmarks similar to a dominion but often behaved more like a colony with subordination and violent oppression taking place. Therefore, the British World concept has certain limitations; nonetheless, it considers the multiple elements involved in assuming British identity that could be shared between people from the British Isles.

Alongside the development of new imperial history, the last 20 years have witnessed a significant expansion in literature analysing the history of humanitarianism. Initially, the first 10 years saw a surge in popular texts heavily criticising the intentions and actions of

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79 Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back?* p.201
81 Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back?* p.106
82 Emily Baughan, ‘Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!’ Empire, Internationalism and the Save the Children Fund in Inter-War Britain’. p.137
humanitarian organisations. Following this wave of critical literature, a revival of historical focus on the subject emerged. If there was one text that proved the most significant in this historical revival, it would be *Empire of Humanity*, written by the political scientist Michael Barnett. Barnett’s work helped inform this study about the global nature of humanitarian networks and the influence of western narratives and perspectives on aid workers. However, its most considerable impact was its positive influence on several other studies that significantly influenced this thesis. Historians Rob Skinner and Alan Lester described Barnett’s work as a milestone in understanding the Eurocentric influence behind humanitarian intervention that allowed historians of empire to build on.

Historians began to increasingly distance themselves from studies of the nation-state, preferring to focus on transnational topics such as Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), diasporas and migration, international development, and human rights, as well as social and political activism. Several of these areas, particularly human rights, social and political action, have long been associated with the British Society of Friends. New journals, such as *Humanity* founded in 2010, are devoted to the historical analysis of humanitarianism, with others such as *Past and Present*, *Imperial and Commonwealth History* producing issues focused exclusively on the history of humanitarianism. In addition, the Cambridge University Press series ‘Human Rights in History’, and the *International Society for First*

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88 Rob Skinner and Adam Lester, ‘Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas’. pp.730-731

89 Gareth Curless, Stacey Hynd, Temilola Hynd, and Katherine Roscoe, 'Editors' Introduction: Networks in Imperial History'. p.705

90 Matthew Hilton and others 'History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation'. p.1
World War Studies special issue on ‘Humanitarianism in the Era of the First World War’ have also provided further platforms for historians and non-historians to produce the results of their research.\(^\text{91}\)

Historians were relative latecomers to this new body of scholarship that interrogated the histories of humanitarianism and human rights.\(^\text{92}\) This helped create cross-discipline approaches that led to new discoveries of the ways humanitarianism and new imperial history studies could benefit. For example, Andrew Thompson argued that leading humanitarian organisations have shown a keen interest in learning their past.\(^\text{93}\) Though these opportunities have proven beneficial to historians, they have not been without their challenges. Thompson noted the definitional difficulties involved in humanitarianism and human rights research.\(^\text{94}\) Fellow historian Johannes Paulmann stated that terms regarding humanitarian aid are often a multifaceted constellation of concepts and definitions, that situating humanitarian aid amongst broader concepts would allow a better understanding of related contexts.\(^\text{95}\) Therefore, the question that needs to be answered for this thesis is where do British Quaker endeavours in the Middle East fit amongst this explosion of new literature combining multiple concepts and historical approaches?

According to Skinner and Lester, the international causes of concern humanitarians demonstrated within the British Empire could consistently be linked to the central politics of nation-state formation and the empire itself.\(^\text{96}\) Many inter-war humanitarians refused to

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\(^{92}\) Matthew Hilton and others ‘History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation’. p.9


\(^{94}\) Ibid. p.333

\(^{95}\) Johannes Paulmann, ‘Conjectures in the History of International Humanitarian Aid During the Twentieth Century’. pp.215-16

\(^{96}\) Rob Skinner and Adam Lester, ‘Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas’. p.731
undermine the imperialist projects they were entangled in. British Quakers showed a keen interest in imperial politics and at various stages directly tried to influence British foreign policy through lobbying and the formation of pressure groups. These endeavours were partly done to help ensure the British Mandate maintained its authority. The other reason was due to Quakerism moving further towards pacifist internationalism following the First World War. Though this process had already begun in China and Africa in the late 19th century, the First World War became the most formative experience for British Quakers in the 20th century, galvanising their pacifist values through many individuals’ use of conscientious objection to avoid military service. The period of analysis for this study begins almost 20 years after the end of the First World War, nonetheless, there were a couple of works produced regarding Quaker humanitarian activities during the war that proved beneficial. Sian Roberts’ biographical case study on British Quaker women exercising authority during and after the war was compared to the changing roles Quaker women in the Middle East faced during the Arab refugee crisis. Tammy M. Proctor’s article in the special issue of *First World War Studies* on British participation in US food relief programmes focused on collaborative tensions between British and American Quakers. These communal tensions also emerged during Quaker relief efforts in Palestine following the Arab refugee crisis.

As mentioned earlier, defining humanitarianism has proven a challenge for scholars. Historians Kevin O’Sullivan and Enrico Del Lago argued that humanitarianism should be understood as applying to any activity that involves improving the lives of those less fortunate. Sullivan and Del Lago suggested that instead of looking at humanitarianism from the top down – as was usually described in grand narratives – a bottom-up analysis of

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99 ibid. p.11
101 Tammy M. Proctor, ‘An American Enterprise? British Participation in Us Food Relief Programmes (1914-1923)’.
specific contexts by historians should be the way forward. This study incorporates this approach by analysing the individual eyewitness accounts of British Quakers, who, as an organisation, held a long-standing tradition of ‘witnessing’ first-hand the impact of colonialism. For example, British Quakers James Backhouse and George Washington Walker travelled the Antipodean Colonies from 1832-1841 ‘under concern’ to support matters concerning penal reform, slavery and education. As part of Penelope Edmonds’ study on this subject, she described wanting to view the activities of Backhouse and Walker ‘on the ground’ as this provided a more intimate understanding of their motivations. In Britain, there was a proud tradition stretching back to the late 18th century for campaigning on behalf of people deprived of their rights. British Quakers applied a disproportionately large amount of influence in human rights activism. For them, a ‘concern’ for those less fortunate drawn by conscience created opportunities to participate in social and political activism. They were leaders in human rights reform and their detailed first-person accounts of what they witnessed in their global endeavours provided opportunities to investigate through their own eyes the challenges they faced. This thesis is uniquely positioned to analyse the tightrope walked by British Quakers attempting to support local communities in Palestine and neighbouring countries, in what historian Emily Baughan called the ‘practices of liberal internationalism on the ground’. This was alongside attempts to navigate political and social elites towards peace, whilst trying to ensure their ability to function as an organisation in specific regions remained intact.

In November 2018, Past and Present published a ‘conversation’ amongst several leading scholars including, O’Sullivan and Baughan, regarding the role of history, humanitarianism and empire. O’Sullivan argued that a ‘North-South’ approach to the history of humanitarianism could help move beyond the paradigm of empire and focus on the

103 ibid. p.10
104 Penelope Edmonds, 'Travelling 'under Concern': Quakers James Backhouse and George Washington Walker Tour the Antipodean Colonies, 1832-41 ', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40 (2012), 769-88. p.771
105 Tom Buchanan, Amnesty International and Human Rights Activism in Postwar Britain, 1945-1977. p.1
106 ibid. p.11
107 Matthew Hilton and others 'History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation'. p.3
108 ibid. pp.1-38
relationships between the recipient ‘other’ and their donors.\textsuperscript{109} However, this thesis remains within the ‘East-West’ focus on empire. As has been demonstrated, the history of humanitarianism is a relatively new field with multiple case studies and contexts yet to be analysed. Moving beyond Western narratives and the influence of empire is premature, especially in this study’s case, where little investigation into British Quaker activities in the Middle East has been conducted. Barnett himself was transparent in his bias on Western narratives in \textit{Empire of Humanity}, carefully avoiding writing a book focused on all types of global humanitarianism.\textsuperscript{110} O’Sullivan and Baughan provided a solution beneficial to this thesis by encouraging scholars to ‘read against the grain’ and look for moments when those engaged in humanitarian endeavours were pushed back, even rejected, by those in need.\textsuperscript{111} Applying this approach allows this study to avoid what Paulmann described as ‘the achievements of outstanding individuals that are woven into a narrative in a partly biographical and usually hagiographic way’.\textsuperscript{112}

Pioneering scholars of humanitarianism such as David Reiff, Liisa Malkki, and Fiona Terry have seen their works used by Quaker scholars like Feldman, Gallagher, Romininovsky and Joffe, Reid and Gemie, for new research into how the Society of Friends operated within a humanitarian environment.\textsuperscript{113} Though Reiff, Malkki and Terry’s research was also analysed for this thesis, the research of Marc Weller, Barbara Ann Reiffer-Flanagan and Thomas G. Weiss, proved the most useful with the latter’s ‘maximalist’ definition of the type of relief work Quakers participated in helping to answer where the Society of Friends fitted within the global humanitarian landscape.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[109] ibid. p.16
\item[111] Matthew Hilton and others 'History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation'. pp.25-27
\item[112] Johannes Paulmann, 'Conjectures in the History of International Humanitarian Aid During the Twentieth Century'. p.218
\end{footnotes}
Britain’s participation in global affairs during the 19th and 20th centuries was debated in new ways because humanitarian action created a space in which the nature of empire could be investigated.\textsuperscript{115} The study of historical humanitarianism, concerning empire, has allowed scholars to explore how the concept of ‘doing good’ for distant others often came with cultural assumptions and expansionist aims.\textsuperscript{116} Quakers indeed demonstrated contemporary cultural assumptions but were not expansionist in their aims. They sought to help those less fortunate without destabilising British imperial rule through its protectorates, dominions, colonies and, in Palestine’s case, mandates. The British Society of Friends were part of what Ward described in the first half of the 20th century as a phenomenon of linear progress and shared ‘British’ destiny that, by the early 1950s, became increasingly obsolete due to political and ideological changes.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{1.3. Methodology}

The last few decades, partly due to the ‘cultural turn’ in the humanities, have witnessed biography as a genre being reassessed. The ability of biographies to link the ‘individual’ with ‘society’ means changes in society and general trends can be examined. An emphasis on the relationship between context and subject means individuals are no longer portrayed as being totally independent from their social context.\textsuperscript{118} In the same period, the subject of transnational lives has also become more evident in historical research concerning diasporic minorities and imperial biographies.\textsuperscript{119} The ability to shift engagement and identities in transnational dialogue is well suited to biographical and prosopographical studies. Yet the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{The Relativity of Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality}, \textit{American Society of International Law}, 91 (1997), 441-50.}
\footnote{ibid. p.728}
\footnote{Stuart Ward, ‘Transcending the Nation: A Global Imperial History?’, p.47}
\footnote{ibid. pp.2-3}
\end{footnotes}
importance of nationality still played a crucial role in the identity of humanitarian agents and the results of the work they did.\textsuperscript{120}

As a means of understanding the fundamental strengths and weaknesses of prosopography, the works of T.F. Carney and, especially, Lawrence Stone have helped this thesis. Stone argued that prosopography is well suited to a doctoral thesis, with the flexibility to increase or decrease the sample size.\textsuperscript{121} His focus on the importance of identifying sub-divisions to avoid lumping individuals together has been influential.\textsuperscript{122} This approach helped differentiate more clearly between the experiences of Quakers living in Britain and those in the Middle East, of British Friends and their American peers, and of Quakers and non-Quakers who often belonged to other Christian sects. Carney’s direct response to Stone’s arguments regarding prosopography has brought further clarity to the methodology. The stimulus – perception – response model that Carney defines has helped create a useful platform for this research. The model asks what caught British Quakers’ interest, how they perceived the event in question and how they responded to it, but also demonstrates the complexity of such an approach, particularly when looking at the motivations to respond.\textsuperscript{123} However, Carney warned that prosopography can make a scholar’s attempts to ignore evidence that debunks a certain hypothesis easier.\textsuperscript{124} Contemporary literature regarding prosopography has seen collective biography become heavily intertwined in its meanings. According to Katherine Keats-Rohan, this has created an unhappy relationship with numerous definitions and idiosyncratic uses of terminology.\textsuperscript{125} Krista Cowman also recognised a large degree of imprecision in the terms employed.\textsuperscript{126} The study of transnational lives and humanitarian history has also become a terminological minefield due to academics from historical, social science, and anthropological backgrounds using

\textsuperscript{120} Enrico Dal Lago and Kevin O'Sullivan, 'Prosopographies, Transnational Lives, and Multiple Identities in Global Humanitarianism', \textit{Moving the Social}, 57 (2017), 159-74. p.160
\textsuperscript{121} Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', \textit{Historical Studies Today}, 100 (1971), 46-79. p.71
\textsuperscript{122} ibid. p.60
\textsuperscript{123} T. F. Carney, 'Payoffs and Pitfalls', \textit{Classical Association of Canada}, 27 (1973), 159-79. p.165
\textsuperscript{124} ibid. p.176
biographies as an integral source for their research. Nevertheless, an interest in the ‘ordinary’ individual experience appears to be a relatively unifying area that scholars believe is worthy of far greater analysis as mentioned by Del Lago and O’Sullivan:

The lives of countless rank-and-file humanitarian activists who remain largely unknown are as significant...We need to move away from “heroic” tales towards collective prosopographies that include the multitude of aid workers whose activities constituted the everyday practice of humanitarianism on the ground. In doing this, we will finally be able to understand the complex real life experiences of the majority of those engaged in humanitarian activity, in their specific historical context.127

The British Society of Friends consistently based their social and political endeavours on equality, not only for those they sought to help but also for each other. Due to some Friends having more experience and deeper knowledge of a particular subject, they could be classed as ‘thought leaders’, meaning their opinions would have held a particular sway amongst other Friends due to their knowledge. However, those who were not as experienced were still given appropriate attention for their viewpoints. This study analyses the motivations and actions of many previously unknown Quakers, focusing on their multiple identities and the complications they faced. Though ‘heroic’ or hagiographical tales still provide valuable benefits to scholars, it is the complications, tensions, and fractures within organisations that provide a more comprehensive and realistic analysis. This thesis investigates these tensions amongst British Quakers to discover what historians Bronwyn Davies and Susanne Gannon called ‘local and situated truths’.128 Because British Quakers lived in several areas in the Middle East and Great Britain, and the extensive travel some individuals participated in, the idea of ‘local truths’ has proven beneficial. Individual witnessing of specific events, particularly those involving violence, was a personal experience that created a specific kind of truth that influenced not only Quaker opinions, but their sense of identity as well.

128 Bronwyn Davies and Susanne Gannon, Doing Collective Biography, (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2006). p.4
To achieve a better understanding of Quakers’ individual and collective identities, the creation of a biographical index has been used to help identify sub-divisions such as location, nationality, gender, employment, previous humanitarian work experience and education. This defined what information could be examined in detail. Though not every source met the template’s criteria, provided an individual’s nationality and one of the latter three (employment, previous humanitarian work and education) criteria were available then they were eligible to be added to the index. This thesis analyses British Quaker collective opinion but also focuses in depth on the individuals involved to detail the previously untold story of the Society of Friends in the Middle East and the ideological tensions between their faith and identity as British citizens. The names of the individuals in the index were found following an extensive search through multiple memoirs, personal documents, and the contents of several Quaker journals, including the *Friend*, the *Wayfarer*, the *Friend Quarterly*, and the *Friends Intelligencer/Journal*. Once these names were gathered, an analysis of their backgrounds was conducted via a spreadsheet and dramatis personae document. The spreadsheet allowed word searches and certain numerical analyses to be undertaken before it was turned into a dramatis personae to provide a more overall guide to the activities of Quakers, and an alternative way of reading the evidence through a synopsis of each character. The index is not a completely comprehensive ‘who is who’ of British Quakers and the events they witnessed regarding the Middle East. Some Quakers who produced articles on behalf of others or brought attention to fundraising initiatives were not included. The index focuses on those Quakers who either gave their own opinion or held a specific position of crucial relevance to the index, such as the editors of Quaker magazines. The place of residence refers to the location the individual was living in at the time of their public or private opinions being written. Though the index is focused on British Quakers, foreign Friends’ biographical details were also included when the information they provided proved particularly beneficial to this study. Out of the 36 Quakers included in the index only eight are women, however their opinions feature more heavily than the index suggests. Several Quaker women do not appear in the index themselves due to a lack of biographical information, a number of whom were the wives of men featured in the
index. If there were certain themes or developments whereby gender, occupation or location, could be used as a means of analysing Quakers as a collective then it was done so, with the index key in identifying these opportunities. The biographical index was also used as a guide to analyse the ‘baggage’ Friends brought with them, and how they witnessed events in the Middle East and the actions of fellow Quakers.

Historian John Tosh argued that due to editors of magazines only publishing what they thought would gratify their readers and deemed fit for public consumption, historians must go beyond the published word and research confidential documents. The letters, memoirs, diaries of individual Quakers combined with the official minutes of several Quaker meetings were examined to discover undiluted opinions. However, Tosh still argued that the most important primary source remained the press. The *Friend* magazine proved a crucial resource as it was the main building block for this study. By examining the many articles written on Quaker endeavours not only in the Middle East but around the world, the *Friend* provided a means of understanding the scale of Quaker work in specific countries and their interests. According to historian Catriona Pennell in her extensive study of the British public’s response to the First World War, newspapers not only reflect public opinion, they also record public behaviour. Several forms of public opinion and behaviour could be demonstrated through stories, editorials and letters to the editor, providing analysis as well as criticism of events. Likewise, historian Adrian Bingham stated that newspapers offer a ‘spectacular heterogeneity’ of contents that ensures they can be a potentially abundant source of information on wide-ranging subjects. The *Friend* and other Quaker magazines did not rely on political patronage or subsidy. Instead, the editors aimed to satisfy their readership by providing a transparent platform they could give their opinions on. The

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129 Irene Mauger, Rachel Sturge, Hedwig Kappes, Gwen Dobbing and Irene Soltau.
131 ibid. p.66
133 Adrian Bingham, ‘Reading Newspapers: Cultural Histories of the Popular Press in Modern Britain’, *History Compass*, 10 (2012), 140-50. p.142
Wayfarer, Friends Quarterly, and Friends Intelligencer/Journal, provided key evidence regarding the behaviour of British Quakers through the publication of opinion pieces but the Friend magazine stood out due to its encouragement of debate. Whilst the other magazines focused more on individual interpretations of events, the Friend also acted as the official forum for Quakers to engage with each other over similar interests.

When analysing the number of articles and pages produced, via the index in the Friend, regarding other topics related to armed conflicts and colonial efforts, it is possible to broadly gauge the level of Quaker interest regarding the mandate government’s policies and actions in Palestine. Prior to the Second World War the number of articles concerning Palestine, Germany and India was almost equal from a quantitative standpoint with an average of 30 per country produced from 1936-1939. Over the same period, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) gathered the most interest due to active Quaker relief operations in the region, with almost double the number of articles being produced. During the Second World War, the number of articles concerning overseas work reduced; however, in 1945, the number increased once again with the cessation of hostilities. Relief operations in Germany, in particular, saw almost 50 articles produced from 1945-1946, whilst Palestine, which emerged from the Second World War relatively unscathed, received far less attention, with only five published in the Friend. However, by the late 1940s, due to the end of the British Mandate, the birth of Israel and the subsequent Arab refugee crisis, a significant increase in interest emerged with 25 articles published by Quakers, many of whom either lived in the region or had previously visited it. The Quaker focus on Palestine through the Friend depended, as with many overseas interests, on the nature of the events in the region and whether there were other countries that Quakers believed also required their attention. The Wayfarer, Friends Quarterly, and Friends Intelligencer/Journal produced material at a lesser rate than the Friend but they proved useful in supplementing and challenging findings from the Friend.

This earliest period of research benefitted from an article by Rosie Walters that analysed UK newspaper coverage of the shooting of female activist Malala Yousafazi. The article, whilst heavily focused on dominant discourses, British colonial history, and orientalism, brought the most use when displaying indexes of search terms, and how the information found was
then processed. The article used an extensive online search whilst this study involved deep archival data mining. Bar the Friends Journal, which has published its contents online back to 1955, all other Quaker magazines were non-digitised. The articles in the various Quaker magazines, or journals, varied considerably from no more than a couple of hundred words to thousands. However, the content of the articles is the principal focus of the analysis. At times, Quakers, individually and collectively, provided more opinion on key themes in just a few paragraphs than others who wrote pages worth of content. In her thesis on the Labour Woman magazine, Lowri Newman stated that ‘studies of women’s mainstream magazines highlight the way magazines construct an exclusive kind of club for their readers’. The various Quaker journals performed a similar function but with one notable difference. Magazines such as the Labour Woman pushed a clear agenda, in this case increasing women’s role in the Labour Party. Historian Hannah Barker argued that editors believed they were the ‘voice of the people’. The editors of the Friend published articles in the Friends Intelligencer/Journal detailing the activities of British Quakers but they did not write on behalf of their readership, however this started to change during the Suez Crisis. The Friend and the other journals did not deliberately aim to push an agenda on their readers, instead opting for a far more open platform for different opinions to be published. Another critical difference the Quaker publications shared was the focus on peace and self-reflection. Many accounts of the British press during the Boer War (1899-1902), the First World War and after, demonstrated support of imperialism that was jingoistic. Infuriated by the injustice of the Boer War, the famous cocoa industrialist and British Quaker, George Cadbury, bought the Daily News newspaper to campaign against the war. During the First World War, the imprisonment of some Quakers for their rejection of military service and stance as conscientious objectors, as mentioned earlier, roused their pacifist values

137 ibid. p.19
138 Hannah Barker, Newspapers, Politics and Public Opinion in Late Eighteenth Century England. p.4
140 Richard A. Rempel, ‘British Quakers and the South African War’, Quaker History, 64 (1975), 75-95.p.91; Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? p.34
further. These pacifist principles were continuously reflected in the articles written across the Quaker publications analysed.

When analysing the multiple Quaker magazines this thesis gauges the degree of influence specific key themes held over those Quakers who discussed Palestine. It identifies when a collective majority was or was not formed within the articles of the *Friend* and other Quaker journals. Statistical indices that represent the magnitude and direction for a designated period or theme are intermittently used. Linguistic quantifiers such as ‘most’, ‘or ‘more’ or ‘less than’ were used as a weighting vector to determine the proportion of opinions. These are all viable terms to use in the thesis but the need to consistently contextualise each analysis was of equal importance. An example of this was how both the opinions and amount of material produced by British Quakers significantly changed when discussing the actions of the British government. During the Arab Revolt, Quakers concerned with the situation contributed articles and sent letters criticising some of the British government’s policies but still supported the mandate and the government by describing the ideological connection and sense of duty they felt as British citizens. 20 years later, the Suez Crisis saw British Quakers produce a plethora of articles and letters much greater than during the Arab Revolt. The information produced was practically universal in its condemnation of the government’s actions, so much so that the editor of the *Friend* magazine believed that the sheer number of letters he received criticising the government represented the collective common opinion of British Quakers nationwide. The statistical majority and unanimity of Quaker disapproval of the government was conclusive. Quakers placed greater emphasis on their role as purely Christian pacifists rather than missionaries who had formerly supported and attempted to influence the government’s policies in the Middle East. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, in her investigation of public opinion, coined the term ‘the silent majority’ - how a majority could remain silent and be the ‘losing faction’ because the topic in question was

controversial.\textsuperscript{144} This applies to the Quaker stance on Zionism. In collective public statements through the \textit{Friend}, Zionism was referred to as ‘noble’ but British Quakers in the \textit{Friend} and personal correspondence were often vehemently against it. Therefore, the analysis also considers whether Quaker collective opinions developed because they represented what the majority truly believed or were due to pressure to conform to a certain viewpoint. For the British Society of Friends to put actions behind their opinions, the requirement for a common consensus was helpful, but as will be demonstrated, individuals still acted independently. The most critical factor was that whatever type of social action was taken it was done so with Quaker pacifist values and spirit in mind.

The public material available in multiple Quaker magazines, memoirs, and diaries combined with private documents detailing the official minutes of multiple Quaker meetings, and personal correspondence created a platform to work from. To bring the primary evidence together, the flexibility within content analysis allowed both qualitative and quantitative research to be implemented.\textsuperscript{145} Though there are various interpretations of what content analysis means, Klaus Krippendorff’s work and his description that it is a ‘research technique for making flexible and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use’ provided the most benefit.\textsuperscript{146} Part of the research for this thesis involved analysing how the material could be redefined and open to recontextualisation when appropriate.\textsuperscript{147} For example, there was evidence that was used to focus on British policy concerning the Arab Revolt but it was also included in the investigation of Jewish immigration and Zionism. The transferability, rather generalisability, of content analysis allows findings from one content to be applicable to another.\textsuperscript{148} Oppositional or alternative writings were essential in establishing the overall big picture for this study, which was to analyse the conflicts of duty and tensions amongst British Quakers concerning their

\textsuperscript{147} ibid. p.92
\textsuperscript{148} Marilyn Domas White and Emily E. Marsh, 'Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology'. p.36
endeavours in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{149} Content analysis can be used to delve deeper than a perception - response model. Depending on interpretation a linear sequence involving six or seven steps can be applied.\textsuperscript{150} However, for this study a detailed analysis of key words, events and phrases were the initial building blocks that led to an examination of the motivations and backgrounds (stimuli), intended audience, public or private sphere (perception), and answer or outcome (response). This was then contextualised through considering the circumstances surrounding these correspondences or communications to produce specific key questions and themes.\textsuperscript{151} The themes analysed for this thesis have not focused on the absolute rights or wrongs of opinions but rather the influences behind them and whether there was a core argument. This thesis considers non-dominant opinions not just because they add more depth to this study but because these diverse attitudes or memories proved equally valid.

The core questions proposed in this thesis focus on how Quakers attempted to align faith and nationality. Was their sense of duty constructed in such terms or could they not disentangle the two ways of thinking? What was British and what was Quaker in this context? Why was there a discrepancy in Quaker reactions to the violence perpetrated by British, Arab, and Jewish people? To answer these core questions, this thesis has been framed around four main areas of analysis, each answering their own sub-question and with a chapter dedicated to each. In chapter order, these questions are: How did British Quakers react to the British government’s objectives and actions during the Arab Revolt, and the eventual collapse of the mandate for Palestine? Why did Zionism and Jewish immigration into Palestine create significant ideological tensions amongst Quakers? In their relief efforts, how did Quakers handle the ideological and practical requirements of their work? How was British Quaker identity impacted by the British government’s response to the rise of Arab nationalism? In the discussion that follows, these research questions are applied to Quaker

\textsuperscript{149} ibid. p.37
\textsuperscript{151} Klaus Krippendorf, \textit{Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology} p.92
activities involving the British Mandate, Jewish immigration and the establishment of Israel, humanitarian endeavours post the creation of Israel, and the Suez Crisis.

1.4. Structure

During the mandate years a small group of concerned Friends in Britain and Palestine made strenuous efforts to convince the mandate government to consider Arab grievances, but were often ignored. This concern was partly born of increasing Jewish immigration and led to tensions on how to best support Jews but not at the cost of Arabs. The subsequent birth of Israel and the Palestinian refugee crisis saw British Quakers participate in an international humanitarian aid effort alongside Friends from multiple countries. What followed were incidents of hubris, disappointment, and even colonialist thinking. As Arab nationalism increased during the 1950s, culminating in the Suez Crisis, British Quakers nationwide opposed the British government’s involvement in the crisis for two main reasons. The first was from feelings of shame felt as British people because of their government’s actions, the second was the negative impact the crisis had on their missionary and humanitarian work in the region.

A chronological analysis is used to examine the development of Quaker engagement with the Middle East over the period from the start of the Arab Revolt to the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and birth of the Arab Republic. The first chapter explores the response of Quakers to the actions of the British government and mandate administration in Palestine. The chapter reveals how the British Quakers heavily engaged in government correspondence during the Arab Revolt only to see their efforts often dismissed, leading to much less interest in the final years of the mandate apart from a few Friends who remained adamant the mandate could still prosper. The chapter also demonstrates how the Peace Testimony did not create a universally pacifist approach, with Friends often sympathising with the Arab uprising.

The second chapter discusses the tensions Quakers experienced both internally and externally regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine and the creation of Israel. It examines the divide within certain Quaker publications as well as meetings and committees over the issue of Zionism. The chapter analyses how reactions to the conflict, post-Second World
Introduction

War, were influenced by the location of individual Friends and how anti-Semitic tropes emerged when Jews were compared to Arabs.

The third chapter concentrates on how Quaker efforts to combine faith-based humanitarian ideas and practices led to difficulties assisting Arab refugees as well as tensions amongst Quakers about the ethical and spiritual value of the work they were doing. The chapter analyses how these tensions culminated in a paradigm shift in the way British Quaker humanitarian contributions were implemented in the region.

The fourth chapter discusses the reaction of British Quakers to the period of events leading to, during, and post the Suez Crisis. It analyses the almost universal Quaker condemnation of the British government’s decision to seize control of the Suez Canal through military intervention. The chapter examines the decisive challenges posed to Quakers in their commitment and activities in the region, with a negative divergence in status and opportunity developing. The thesis concludes with a summary of the research, highlighting the key findings.

This thesis investigates the previously underexplored story of the activities of British Quakers in the Middle East during the final decades of the British Empire. It demonstrates how a religious group of small numbers attempted to operate in both political and humanitarian circles at levels that would not have been expected of an organisation of such small numbers. Their activities in the Middle East offer a distinct contribution to the history of imperial-humanitarian engagement. Their constant focus on virtue and reconciliation combined with their identity as British people, who at times demonstrated ethnocentric motivations, created a determination to discuss and influence events in the region. However, the British government’s actions in the Middle East harmed their core ideological values based on peace and equality, creating vacillating collective social actions.
2. Perceptions of the British Mandate for Palestine, 1936-1948

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine the opinions of Quakers regarding the policies and actions of the British Mandate government for Palestine from 1936 until its end in 1948. By 1930 the mandate government was already experiencing difficulties maintaining order in the region due to riots by the local Arab population the previous year. The following two decades would bear witness to multiple periods of violence between government armed forces, Arabs, and Jews. It will be argued in this chapter that the British government’s policies and actions in Palestine forced Quakers to debate their sense of duty to, as well as support for, a Westminster government that prioritised its interests ahead of Jewish, and especially Arab, concerns. The period brought into focus the complexities of being a pacifist religious organization attempting to square its members’ position as subjects (citizens) of a nation-state. British Quakers critiqued the government administration’s policies, particularly during the Arab Revolt, however their efforts to lobby senior officials were not as influential as they had hoped for. Post-Second World War Quaker support for the mandate remained but attempts at influence were on a smaller scale with only a few individuals unwavering in their convictions.

2.2. The British Mandate

The British Empire was a series of colonies, protectorates, concessions, occupations, and spheres of influence. As part of an effort by sovereign states after the First World War to move past national hatreds and to develop greater diplomacy, the League of Nations was created, becoming the world’s first international intergovernmental organisation. Formed through the League of Nations, the mandatory system was designed to make imperial rule more humane and uplift perceived backward populations to such a societal and political level that self-determination was achievable. The mandatory system was a significant new

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development in British colonial efforts to ensure the empire was secure. This new form of colonialism was meant to, again in theory, implement democratic principles and respond to the desires of the inhabitants.\(^4\) Britain’s long genealogy with ‘trusteeship’ and imperial tutelage, evidenced by the British anti-slavery movement, of which British Quakers were heavily involved, provided the necessary evidence to justify empire’s role in generalizing humanitarian standards.\(^5\) In reality, it was an attempt, by force if necessary, to transform Palestine to be in line with contemporary European concepts of development. This would in turn allow for the exploitation of local resources, in this case the Dead Sea, which contained key minerals such as potash and bromine.\(^6\) British and French officials who pioneered the mandatory system sought to maintain imperial authority and legitimise alien rule.\(^7\) These efforts towards self-determination were often cynical, with the claims of indigenous people for political rights met with repression.\(^8\) These acts of repression led to questions concerning just how oppressive were the measures enforced by the British Mandate government in terms of justification and in comparison to other imperial powers.\(^9\) For British Quakers, a comparison of the actions of empires was not a concern; however, the justification and use of violence towards the Arab population was a source of debate and challenged pacifist Quaker thoughts.

The British Mandate for Palestine officially began on 29 September 1923, five years after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in late October 1918 by British and Indian forces.\(^10\) In Palestine, the mandate system was viewed by the politicised minority as a blatant betrayal
to wartime pledges supporting Arab independence in exchange for defeating the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{11} This resentment was compounded by the creation of the Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917 - a letter written by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour which later influenced the British government to support the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people within Palestine. As a result, the mandate for Palestine continuously faced the threat of civil disorder escalating into violence. After multiple failed political efforts, Palestinian Arabs in 1936 initiated a campaign of civil disobedience through general strikes in urban areas.\textsuperscript{12} This campaign had little effect and continuing government support for Jewish immigration resulted in the Arab Revolt, which became the largest and most violent anti-colonial insurgency in the Middle East during the interwar years.\textsuperscript{13}

2.3. Responsibility for the mandate

Modern Empires have opened the way for the introduction of science and knowledge, the abolition of poverty and disease, the sharing of the heritage of culture and the universal appreciation of Christian truth...Let us recognize that in many respects the white peoples are more advanced, politically and economically and even culturally, than many of the other inhabitants of this globe...It is the task and the privilege, then, of the white race, and of those coloured people who have already entered into the heritage of modern civilised life, to find the best means of sharing these economic, political and cultural advantages with the other inhabitants of the world.\textsuperscript{14}

The above statement was written by the British Quaker Horace G. Alexander, a former teacher who later headed Quaker relief efforts in India. Alexander’s assertive description of the benefits of modern imperialism came from the success of the Pax Britannica. The British Empire was credited for the creation of a significant amount of global peace during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. As a result, the Pax benefited Christian missionaries immensely by providing access to and security in new territories. This allowed for the spread of education and Christianity, though for British Quakers the interest in education was far more prominent as they did not

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support conversion. However, the Pax owed much of its success to the use of force. The British Empire was based as much on authority imposed through violence as it was on the trade and industry, which propagandists and practitioners claimed subsequently created the benefits of peace.\textsuperscript{15} Meanwhile, the people of India would succeed in their fight for independence (Alexander was a friend of Gandhi and champion of the cause), and Asian countries such as Japan diligently fought to ensure their transition from feudal to modern society was done on their terms.\textsuperscript{16} In Egypt, European travellers viewed the country through two lenses; one was of antiquity and greatness, while at the same time they considered modern Egypt to be medieval and backward.\textsuperscript{17} The nomadic nature of tribes such as the Bedouin plus centuries of Ottoman rule meant a central Palestinian authority could not be established. Therefore, it remained the duty of Europeans to educate and civilise Arabs, with the endeavours of T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell during the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century further demonstrating how Arabs could comply towards British imperial objectives.

Both in articles and personal correspondence, several Quakers referred to the word ‘our’ when describing the British government.\textsuperscript{18} Carl Heath, a columnist who wrote regularly on international affairs in the \textit{Friend}, and former head of the National Peace Council, described how Arab anger was ‘in large measure directed against the mandatory power itself, that is ourselves’.\textsuperscript{19} Heath’s comment did not separate the mandate government from Quakers, he viewed being British and Quaker as similar in this particular context. This view was shared by Daniel Oliver, the British Quakers’ official representative in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{20} He referred to

\textsuperscript{17} Paul Starkey and Janet Starkey, \textit{Travellers in Egypt}, (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2001). p.10
\textsuperscript{19} Carl Heath, ‘Palestine’. p.682
\textsuperscript{20} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to the Chairman of the Fact Finding Committee of the United Nations Organisation, Jerusalem - 26 June 1947
any attempted reconciliation with Arabs by the British government as ‘our duty’.\textsuperscript{21} Alongside his wife Emily, the couple immigrated to the Middle East in the late 19th century and would eventually be responsible for the Ras-el-Metn orphanage in Syria until their deaths in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{22} Oliver consistently reiterated the responsibility British people, including Quakers, held for developing peace in the region. Quakers viewed their participation in politics as part of their religious duty; though many were not inclined to join a particular political party they viewed the state as an instrument that could further human values provided it was not totalitarian or anarchist in its makeup.\textsuperscript{23} They were involved as part of a call to concern to transform moral principles into action.\textsuperscript{24} However, the problem with assisting Arabs was that this attitude could also be interpreted more negatively due to the Quaker ‘our’ and the Arabs ‘theirs’ being almost a form of encroachment by the former over the latter.\textsuperscript{25}

Even when there was disagreement amongst individuals regarding the actions of the mandate government, the belief that they held a certain responsibility in the region was still prevalent. An example of this came when Peter Scott, a British Quaker who had just returned from Palestine, published an article in the \textit{Friend} stating that the British government could solve the crisis because, ‘truth is specially venerated in England’.\textsuperscript{26} Scott’s comments were criticised by a fellow British Quaker called Mary E. Pumphrey, a member of the Friends School in Ramallah. Pumphrey stated in her own article that, ‘Britain has broken her word to them [Arabs] and many would, unhappily laugh to scorn Peter Scott’s suggestion that a love of truth is one of our distinguishing characteristics’.\textsuperscript{27} Pumphrey not only opposed Scott’s definition of the typical English character but also criticised the British

\textsuperscript{21} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 17 October 1936 p.1
\textsuperscript{24} Unknown, \textit{Quaker Faith and Practice: The Book of Christian Discipline of the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain}. 23.01 - 23.04
\textsuperscript{25} Edward W. Said, \textit{Orientalism}. p.227
\textsuperscript{26} Peter Scott, 'The Threefold Task in Palestine - Part 2', p.628
\textsuperscript{27} Mary E. Pumphrey, ‘Threefold Task in Palestine’. p.79
government for not being true to their word with respect to the Arab ambition to set up an independent state. Pumphrey’s comments in rejecting Scott’s analysis of the situation demonstrated how individual Quakers were not driven to be loyal to their fellow Friends just because they shared the same faith or nationality. It also showed how the Friend was a platform where a woman could openly contest the opinions of a man safely and with confidence. Though, crucially to this part of the chapter’s illustration of Quaker duty, it appeared that Pumphrey’s use of the word ‘ours’ was in reference to being British and the values this responsibility held. Quakers may have disagreed over the extent of government faults but nonetheless there remained a belief that they, as British citizens, shared a collective responsibility for the government’s actions in Palestine. This was a British issue, and it was only the British who could solve it. The early period of the Arab Revolt was the peak of British Quakers demonstrating a connection to their sense of duty as British citizens in support of British governance in the region. Their descriptions of the British government as ‘ours’, suggested they held a belief that it was the responsibility of British people to solve the uprising, demonstrating ethnocentric beliefs in the process.

The Quaker focus on the British government was not just because of a keen political interest and sense of loyalty but also due to close-connected affiliations with several significant senior political officials whom Quakers tried to gain influence over. Numerous articles were published in the Friend by the attorney-general of mandatory Palestine and Zionist Norman Bentwich. There was also extensive personal correspondence between Quakers and the British government. The communication during the early years of the Arab Revolt (1936-1937) was so frequent that a select group of Friends were even in competition with each other over who could influence British officials the most regarding government policy. Quakers during this period were far from bystanders or ‘outsiders’ in both their knowledge and opportunities to influence British government policies in Palestine. They were fully

invested in making a difference in Palestine by promoting peace and reconciliation through their ties to the British government.

2.4. The Palestine Watching Committee

Most of the communication with the British government came through the work of the Palestine Watching Committee (PWC). Lucy Backhouse was Clerk of the PWC while John H. Robson, the honorary chief organiser for the Allotments Committee, was its chairman. Robson was one of the first Quakers to publish an article in the *Friend* on 11 May 1934 expressing concern over the growing tensions in Palestine. The committee was founded in 1935 in response to a request from Daniel Oliver and Khalil Totah, principal of the Ramallah School. Its primary purpose was to bring Arabs and Jews together through reconciliation to achieve peace. The PWC also supported the Arab Agency and Palestine Information Centre in London, which aimed to uphold the rights of Arabs in Palestine. In total, the committee met 33 times between 1935 and 1941, when the PWC officially disbanded in what was a period of heightened Quaker activity in Palestine. A significant reason why Quakers were able to contact senior government officials was due to one of the PWC members being the Labour politician and Methodist, Walter H. Ayles. The only non-Quaker on the committee, Ayles worked alongside the Parliamentary Committee of the British Commonwealth Peace Federation (BCPF), which would ask questions in Parliament on behalf of the PWC. Due to Ayles’ connections to high-ranking officials, but excluding him explicitly, PWC members were able to send a signed letter on 15 October 1936 to the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, stating that to maintain its authority, the British government needed to accept it had made mistakes that had caused doubts amongst Arabs and Jews regarding the honesty

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33 Lucy B. Backhouse, ‘Palestine Watching Committee Report to Yearly Meeting’. p.212
of its purpose in Palestine. In the cover letter sent to the Prime Minister, Robson encouraged Baldwin to include an acknowledgement of the mistakes made by the government in one of his upcoming speeches, as this would help bring about ‘a new start and a new spirit’ in attempts to bring peace to the region. The letter received a cordial acknowledgment in reply. Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan (1931-1938), also received a letter from the PWC on 25 January 1937, stressing the importance of reducing Arab bitterness through acts of generosity towards them so that peace could be achieved.

On 29 January 1938, Lucy Backhouse received a letter stating one of the Birmingham Friends discussed the Arab Revolt with the Prime Minister and found him ‘very sympathetic’. However, what the sympathy shown by the Prime Minister was in reference to remains unclear. As Clerk of the PWC, Backhouse was privy to the many discussions held between Quakers and British officials. With the exception of a letter sent from Pumphrey to the Colonial Secretary (which remains undiscovered), Backhouse and Pumphrey were the only women involved during this during these exchanges. The PWC had 11 male members to four females in the summer of 1936 and although the number of members did fluctuate during the Arab Revolt years, there remained a male majority. From analysing the biographical index, most of the women listed during the period were either involved, or soon to be, in education, with Backhouse the exception. Despite Quaker principles on equality between the sexes, there still remained a discrepancy. Political discussion and lobbying remained a male-dominated field overall.

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35 ibid.
38 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 637.4, Palestine Watching Committee Members List - 26 March 1936
The PWC expressed concerns regarding mistakes made by the government and recognition of Arab grievances, however it still maintained a critical support of the government in the hope that it could create peace in the region. The annual minutes of the PWC Meeting stated that members were in 'constant touch' with the Palestine section of the BCPF and, through it, the colonial office. Ayles, on 30 December 1936, sent letters from Totah and Pumphrey to the Colonial office of the Secretary of State, William George Ormsby-Gore (1936-1938). This practice continued with his replacement, Malcolm MacDonald (1938-1940), who personally thanked Robson for forwarding letters to him originally written by Oliver. The plethora of documents dating from the early period of the Arab Revolt illustrated how the PWC and Oliver made a substantial effort as a pressure group to gain influence over government officials, pushing for senior officials to appreciate the Arab point of view and acknowledge mistakes made in the region.

Daniel Oliver was a driving force behind Quaker opinions concerning the British Mandate due to his decades of experience and connections with high-ranking officials in the region. From World War I onwards Oliver became heavily involved in Middle Eastern politics through extensive travels. He was arrested by Turkish authorities in 1914 and 1917, the latter saw him sentenced to be hanged on the accusation of being a British spy. On both occasions the Turkish commander in-chief Ahmed Djemal Pasha intervened. In previous efforts to broker peace between Arabs and Jews following the riots of 1929, Oliver visited the League of Nations in Geneva alongside Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who according to Susan Pederson became the Zionist movement’s most capable leader. Oliver also acted as a go-between for the British High Commissioner and Arabs in the hope of creating an understanding regarding the question of the Wailing Wall. Oliver’s efforts failed but, in a

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41 London, The Friends House Library, Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 511.2.4, Malcolm Macdonald Correspondence - 2 September 1938
42 The Daniel Oliver letters are available at the Haverford College Quaker & Special Collections, USA, and detail the many high ranking royal and political contacts he met over several decades
44 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. p.23
recurring theme, he never gave up on the idea that peace between Arabs and Jews could be found.\textsuperscript{45} For his efforts, Oliver was awarded the Lebanese Order of Merit by the President of Lebanon, Charles Debbas.\textsuperscript{46} Oliver was described by the editor of the \textit{Friends Intelligencer} magazine as a leading figure in Palestine who had done much to better Arab-Jewish relations.\textsuperscript{47} This was illustrated further in an article published in the \textit{Friend} at the start of the Arab Revolt, by which time he had become the official British Quaker representative in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{48} In that article, the PWC cited a telegram Oliver had written stating that he was correct to suggest that Jewish immigration had to be suspended and that a 'gesture of goodwill' from Jews towards Arabs was needed for reconciliation to begin.\textsuperscript{49}

Oliver carried a sense of responsibility as a British citizen and a Quaker to alleviate the distress felt by Arabs and Jews. In addition to co-creating the PWC he also founded the \textit{Lighthouse of the East} magazine in 1936. Written exclusively in Arabic, its ambition was to provide a succession of articles on leading questions regarding international relations. According to Oliver it stood for peace, goodwill, and friendship between nations with the aim of showing the spirit of Jesus Christ and his principles to as many as possible. The magazine also reflected Oliver’s personal stance towards abstinence from alcohol and kindness to animals. The \textit{Lighthouse} had a readership in the thousands every week; the magazine was distributed internationally to West Africa, Brazil, North Africa, and the United States. It was also sent to Arabic readership across the Middle East to Mossul, Kirkurk, Jeddah and Baghdad, Amman, Transjordan, Haifa, Jaffa, and Syria. It received support from Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan. Weekly copies were delivered to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the American University in Beirut with high profile subscribers such as Wauchope, King Ghazi of Iraq, the ruler of Transjordan Abdullah I bin Hussain, and President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Dr

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\textsuperscript{45} Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Efforts on Behalf of Peace between Arabs and Jews - 1949. p.3
\textsuperscript{47} Daniel Oliver, 'Refugees: Their Right to Live'. p.603
\textsuperscript{48} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to the Chariman of the Fact Finding Committee of the United Nations Organisation, Jerusalem - 26 June 1947
\textsuperscript{49} Unknown, 'Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 94 (10 July 1936), 382-83.
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Leon Magnes. The editor of the magazine was Abid Gharouzi, a teacher at the Ras-el-Metn orphanage who previously taught at the American University in Beirut. Teachers in the orphanage also wrote for the magazine alongside Gharouzi and Oliver. A few of the older students translated articles from English magazines in what Oliver called a collective effort to support ‘our paper (it belongs to us all)’.

From July to August 1936, Oliver and Ayles exchanged several telegrams, with Oliver stressing to Ayles that if the government were to suspend Jewish immigration into Palestine, then the Arabs would be willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Oliver’s letters detail meetings with prominent Arab leaders such as the Emir of Transjordan, Amir Abdallah, the head of Arab guerrilla forces in Palestine, Fawiz Bey el Qawuki, and King Abd-ul-Azi, King of Hejaz and Nejd. In doing so he found himself, at least in the eyes of the government officials like Ayles, as a legitimate representative of the Arab voice. As a result, in September, Ayles contacted Ormsby-Gore to request that Oliver’s suggested temporary suspension of Jewish immigration be approved by the government; however, this was outright rejected as the government did not want to be seen as conceding to Arab pressure nor opposing the Balfour Declaration. Daniel Oliver stated to Ayles with some resentment:

Take it from me, my dear Friend, no matter what you see written in letters in the press, that unless immigration is radically dealt with, there is no peace now or in the future on Palestine. The amount of pious wishes and impractical suggestions written by the people to “The Times” and others papers are so entirely beside the point that they are not worth reading [...] but as the Colonial Secretary has said over and over, with a note of defiance, that immigration will not be suspended, and such papers as “The Times”,

51 Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated November 1937, p.4
53 Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 22 September 1936; The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated November 1937
“The Daily Telegraph” and “The Manchester Guardian”, are urging on the government in their leading articles not to suspend immigration.  

 Oliver’s frustration at the way the Arab Revolt was being reported in the British Press was equally matched by his dislike of the vilification of Arabs in British newspapers. According to Oliver, the Jewish point of view was constantly and ably represented in the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Manchester Guardian*. This one-sided representation meant the public were unable to appreciate the Arab point of view in any meaningful way. The argument that press coverage of the crisis provided only an unbalanced analysis was mentioned briefly in the *Friend* by an unknown contributor some five months later. An article titled ‘The Arab-Jewish Problem’ complained that the weekly news-sheet ‘Palestine’ was special propaganda for the Jewish case and that it was this type of coverage that should lead Friends to visit the Palestine Information Centre, which had recently formed in London. It can be suggested that this prejudiced press coverage, independently observed months apart and thus could be considered prolonged, influenced the public in favour of Jewish immigration, which empowered the government to act the same. Ormsby-Gore addressed the House of Commons on 5 November stating that a suspension of immigration was not justifiable on economic grounds and that introducing any changes would hamper any further inquiries by the commission. This rejection was soon marked by a change in tone from Ayles, who reminded the PWC in December that the government never promised to suspend Jewish immigration into the country. Despite this setback, Oliver and other Quakers still pursued the Palestine issue through Ayles’ political connections. On 25 January 1937, a letter from Ayles to Robson demonstrated a clear example of Quakers actively competing with one another over Ayles’ and the government’s approach. Ayles stated that he was swayed by a letter from Heinz Kappes, a German Quaker who immigrated to Palestine in 1936 with help

55 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 17 October 1936 p.2  
56 ibid. p.3  
59 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 511.2.1, British Commonwealth Peace Federation Correspondence - 30 December 1936
from British Friends and was involved in welfare work and teaching in Jerusalem. Kappes, alongside his wife, was also the host of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting.60 Ayles described the letter as ‘much more important’ than Oliver’s and was impressed by the ‘alternative’ policy suggested by Kappes.61 The specific letter that Ayles read is unavailable but, in an article Kappes published in the Friend in 1938 as well as several letters and a short memoir of his life in Palestine, Kappes showed his support for Jewish immigration into Palestine and the idea of a bi-national state, or one-state solution.62 Though the PWC supported Oliver’s view regarding Jewish immigration it was Kappes’ openness towards Jewish immigration that suited the government, which in turn meant he won the battle of influence over Ayles. As a result, and somewhat ironically, those Quakers who shared a collective belief that a temporary suspension of Jewish immigration was appropriate saw their efforts scuppered partly through the actions of one of their own. Though German, Kappes held a close relationship with British Quakers but was not influenced by any patriotic or national leanings, providing an unintentional counterweight to their opinions, especially those of Daniel Oliver.

During this period, the British government sent a team of officials into Palestine. Led by Lord Peel, the Peel Commission sought to establish the causes of the Arab Revolt and find appropriate solutions that would maintain peace in the region whilst also ensuring the government’s control over the region remained intact. When the commission published its findings on 7 July 1937, it confirmed that the Jewish national home in Palestine was ‘no longer an experiment’ and maintained the belief that both sides could successfully benefit

61 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 511.2.1, Palestine Watching Committee Letter to Wauchope - 25 January 1937
As a result of the investigation, the commission recommended the partition of Palestine by concluding that:

It means that neither will get all it wants. It means that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion from the sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them. It means the Jews must be content with less than the Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped to rule again. But it seems possible that on reflection both parties will come to realise that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For, it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security.

The commission was viewed, like previous commissions, with general condemnation by the Arab press. It was met with ‘extreme disappointment’ by Arab leaders who, in a *Memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Secretary of State for the Colonies*, listed a 17 point rebuttal to the commission’s recommendations. Conversely, Chaim Weizmann, who played a prominent role in the Zionist movement and would later become the first president of Israel, viewed it as another step towards establishing the national home for the Jews, though there were many in the Jewish community who disliked the plan as it meant they would be a permanent minority in terms of population.

The Peel Commission’s findings were a significant blow to those Quakers who sought a restriction on Jewish immigration and recognition for Arab grievances. Khalil Totah expressed Palestinian grievances to ‘The Palestine Royal Commission Minutes of Evidence’, describing the major complaints Arabs had concerning their lack of ownership over educational matters, and stating that it was the ‘absolute right’ of Arabs to control the education of their children but that they were being treated unfairly when compared to

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64 ibid. p.35
Jews. Jews had been free from oversight regarding the running of curricula in schools whilst Palestinians by comparison were granted far less freedom due to the British government’s constant fears of Arab nationalism being cultivated. The commission’s attitude towards building peace was briefly discussed in the Friend. However, it was Oliver who pressed the commission hardest for the recognition of Arabs’ grievances. He stressed the importance by stating that if the government did not recognise the complaints of Arabs, then there would be ‘dark stormy days ahead of us’. He sent his final report through the PWC to the commission on 30 March 1937. Oliver, in several letters, also reiterated the importance of the commission. He had incorrectly assumed the commission would recommend limiting Jewish immigration and provide more support for the Arabs, hence, when the commission concluded that Palestine needed to be divided into two separate states, both Oliver and other likeminded Quakers were shocked by the recommendation. No articles supporting the British government’s partition plan were published in the Friend during this period. For Oliver, the partition plan was only going to generate even more unrest amongst the Arabs and destabilise the region further. He commented that ‘Great Britain cannot compel the Arabs to accept the Partition of Palestine. This simply cannot be carried out’. Referring to a comment made by a friend, British diplomat Sir Andrew McFadyean, Oliver compared the partition to a surgeon cutting a patient into three parts with one part kept by the surgeon. The Memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee focused on the ‘erroneous premises’ that the Arab and Jewish claims, historical

74 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated November 1937
75 ibid.
and moral, were of equal measure.\textsuperscript{76} Christina Jones, a Scottish teacher at the Friends School in Ramallah, expressed the same criticism by accusing the commission of not studying the historical and spiritual connection of Arabs to Palestine.\textsuperscript{77} Even Heinz Kappes, who did support Jewish immigration, was against the proposed partition.\textsuperscript{78} He had previously backed the concept of a bi-national state but not what was, in theory, a two-state solution separating Arabs from Jews.\textsuperscript{79} The PWC, Oliver, Jones and Kappes categorically viewed the Peel Commission’s recommendations to the government as a mistake. As a result, this led to a significant change in Quaker-government correspondence.

\subsection*{2.5. Arab grievances}

When the Arab Revolt began in 1936 several articles were published in the \textit{Friend} magazine displaying sympathy for the Arabs.\textsuperscript{80} These articles described how the British government, due to its failure to grant the Arabs an independent state in Palestine after the First World War, had ‘broken her word’, betrayed them, and argued that the Arab use of violence was the result of their requests to be heard being routinely ignored by the government and the British public.\textsuperscript{81} By comparison, only one article argued that the conflict was primarily the fault of Arabs.\textsuperscript{82} A significant reason for this stance was the perceived failures of the government to maintain peace in the region due to its support of mass Jewish Immigration into Palestine. During this period there was resistance shown by some Quakers towards mass Jewish immigration as it was perceived to be a key factor in creating the conflict.\textsuperscript{83} This issue will be examined in the following chapter as some of the criticism was theologically

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Moh. Amin Husseini, \textit{Memorandum Submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Secretary of State for the Colonies}. p.1
\item \textsuperscript{77} Christina Jones, \textit{The Untempered Wind} p.45
\item \textsuperscript{78} Heinz Kappes, 'War or Peace in Palestine'. p.879
\item \textsuperscript{79} Heinz Kappes, \textit{Led by the Spirit: My Life and Work, 1936-1948}. p.62
\item \textsuperscript{80} James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 94 (26 June 1936), 599-600; Carl Heath, 'Palestine'; Paul Mauger, 'Jews in Palestine'; Wadi R. Tazari, 'Jews in Palestine - the Arab Point of View', \textit{The Friend}, 94 (10 July 1936), 647-48; Khalil Totah, 'Peace or Truce in Palestine?', \textit{The Friend}, 94 (6 November 1936), 1048; Unknown, 'Palestine'.
\item \textsuperscript{81} James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine'; Mary E. Pumphrey, 'Threefold Task in Palestine'; Mary E. Pumphrey, 'East Wind in Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 95 (22 January 1937), 79-80.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Peter Scott, 'The Threefold Task in Palestine - Part 2'.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Wilfred Allott, 'Jews in Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 94 (24 July 1936), 706; Carl Heath, 'Palestine'; Paul Mauger, 'Jews in Palestine'; James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine'; Khalil Totah, 'Peace or Truce in Palestine?'; Mary E. Pumphrey, 'East Wind in Palestine'.
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rather than politically motivated. Nonetheless, the articles published during this period suggested there was a pro-Arab stance, and that British Quakers were willing to criticise their own government for its role in the revolt.

The American Quaker, James Edward Sutton, who worked in the American Friends School and Mission at Ramallah for over a decade, stated that despite his rejection of the violence produced by Arabs he felt they had no other option after being ignored by the British government. Sutton noted that the government should not have been surprised by the methods of sabotage employed by the Arabs as it was the British Colonel T.E Lawrence who taught them these tactics during the First World War.\(^\text{84}\) Sutton’s reference to Lawrence, who had previously supported an Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, and the use of what Sutton viewed as a natural resistance by Arabs, was mirrored by Carl Heath, who described how British soldiers were being sacrificed to prevent the Arab ‘resistance’.\(^\text{85}\) His use of the word ‘resistance’ suggested that he saw the Arab Revolt not as terrorism but as a cause that had merit, and this was also mentioned in an article by Irene and Paul Mauger, who had both previously lived in Palestine in the late 1920s. The Maugers described how the British government had dismissed Arab calls for an independent Palestine since the end of the First World War, with the British army’s response involving the ‘dreadful duty of shooting and bombing a people whose cause they understood so well’.\(^\text{86}\) The Maugers’ comment regarding the ‘cause’ that British soldiers understood was in reference to previous conflicts between the British army and other indigenous populations seeking independence, the most prominent being the Irish war for Independence (1919-1921), which was commonly referred to as the ‘cause’ by those who fought the British military. Oliver, in a letter sent to the BCPF, referred to the revolt as a revolution.\(^\text{87}\) Comparing it to the war in Ireland by claiming that Arabs repeatedly told him they had copied methods used by the Irish, he claimed ‘there are no unworthy motives in

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\(^\text{84}\) James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine'. p.600  
\(^\text{85}\) Carl Heath, 'Palestine'. p.682  
\(^\text{86}\) Paul Mauger, 'Jews in Palestine'. p.784  
\(^\text{87}\) Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Mr and Mrs Marriott C. Morris - 6 August 1938, 1-4. pp.1-2
Palestine they are pursuing’. Demonstrating clear sympathy and support for the position of Arabs, Oliver went on to describe how Arabs viewed Jewish immigration as a significant reason for starting the revolt:

There is a very important fact which I should like you and Friends generally to know and to remember, and that is, the Arabs are fighting for their freedom and deliverance from what they consider is being forced upon them by superior force, an alien race...That surely means that the Arabs are fighting for something more than to be brigands or terrorists...the Arabs are conscientious objectors to the country being flooded with immigrants.

Oliver’s comment, along with those made by Quakers in the Friend, illustrated how Quakers, despite their faith’s long primary belief in the Peace Testimony and conscientious objection, viewed the Arab Revolt as a cause that was morally justified. The issue of Jewish immigration was also widely discussed by Quakers during this period. This will be comprehensively analysed in the following chapter, but with regards to Oliver’s reference to Arabs as conscientious objectors, he believed that the violence used by Arabs was, in his opinion at the very least, understandable, and that their cause was noble. By contrast, Kappes, chose to criticise the Arabs heavily for their actions during the Revolt by describing how:

Even before the outbreak of war, there was an escalation of horrible cruelties. In one night all Jews living in Hebron were killed. A price of five pounds was offered on every murdered Jew. England found it very difficult to suppress the revolutionary movement. But the Arabs were very imaginative; many of them disguised themselves as veiled women and had nails with which to make the police vehicles useless. Police stations were burned, and telephone exchanges were bombed.

Kappes laid the blame firmly on the Arab side, especially their violent actions against Jewish settlements. Arab men in the 1930s dressed as women to avoid security checks and carry out assassinations. He argued that the British government had ‘tried to ensure peace by an

88 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 17 October 1936 p.2
89 Ibid. p.2
understanding with the Arabs’, but their ‘cruelties’ meant no such understanding was possible.\textsuperscript{92} Except for one article in the \textit{Friend} by the British Quaker Peter Scott, Kappes’ was the only other critical account of Arab actions written by a Quaker during the revolt.\textsuperscript{93} Though Scott did still understand Arab grievances he did not tolerate their aggressive actions. Despite British Quakers’ firm pacifist stance when dealing with armed conflicts, their reactions to the Arab Revolt demonstrated not only Quaker sympathy with Arabs but even with some of their actions. This appeared quite unusual considering the significance of the Peace Testimony in Quaker thinking; the Arab Revolt had created a re-interpretation of what pacifism meant to those British Quakers who discussed the issue. They were not ardent pacifists against all forms of violence and understood the reasons why Arabs resorted to armed conflict.

In June 1937, Rachel Sturge encouraged collaboration between British Quakers and the Peace Army organisation.\textsuperscript{94} The wife of Paul Sturge, who was head of British Quakers’ overseas work at the time, she worked with the Peace Army to create a better understanding of the conflict between Arabs and Jews as well as to support social services in Arab villages.\textsuperscript{95} This partnership culminated with the Friends House in London hosting the Peace Army Conference in July 1938.\textsuperscript{96} More than 40 organisations gathered at the Friends House to discuss peace-making in Palestine with multiple speakers, including Norman Bentwich, presenting Arab and Jewish perspectives.\textsuperscript{97} The conference brought together many different points of view but the underlying issue remained. How could pacifists, especially Quakers, make a real impact in the region to nullify the escalating violence? This was an ongoing concern for all those involved both in the Middle East and back in Great Britain throughout the period of the Arab Revolt and, despite varied attempts and approaches, this goal was never achieved.

\textsuperscript{92} Heinz Kappes, \textit{Led by the Spirit: My Life and Work, 1936-1948}. p.62
\textsuperscript{93} Peter Scott, 'The Threefold Task in Palestine - Part 2'.
\textsuperscript{94} Rachel G. Sturge, 'Reconciliation in Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 95 (18 June 1937), 595-96.
\textsuperscript{95} Joyce Pollard, 'Peace Army in Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 96 (4 February 1938), 98.
\textsuperscript{96} Unknown, 'Peace Army Conference on Palestine', \textit{The Friend}, 96 (1 July 1938).
\textsuperscript{97} ibid.; Unknown, 'Peacemaking and Palestine: Peace Army Conference's Attempt to Help', \textit{The Palestine Post}, (1 July 1938) p. 5.
The Arab Revolt involved two significant phases of British military activity. The first saw the British army deployed in a cautious and subsidiary capacity with British authorities attempting to censor the Arab press through restrictive legislation to maintain internal security.\(^98\) However, as Arab attacks on the British military and police forces increased, the second-phase response became more aggressive from 1938 onwards, with regular acts of reprisal involving the indiscriminate killing of villagers who lived close to where British soldiers had themselves been the victims of terrorism being regularly carried out.\(^99\) During this period, British police and military officials were involved in a multitude of aggressive and humiliating acts towards the local Arab population, with women forced to strip naked to ensure they were not men in disguise and village leaders being tied to trains or the bonnets of vehicles to act as human shields.\(^100\) The torture of suspected opponents to the mandate was common, with victims suffering from waterboarding, being forced to remain in very uncomfortable positions for multiple days, and even enduring the tearing/severing of testicles.\(^101\) This brutal behaviour was justified by an orientalist driven mind-set. Major General Bernard Montgomery, who commanded the Eighth Division of the British army, at one point attempted to ban the kuifya (a traditional Arab headdress) and was glowing in his praise of the conduct of British troops.\(^102\) ‘The British soldier out here is magnificent; there is nothing really curious about this as he is always magnificent anywhere’.\(^103\) He stated further:

There is no doubt that we British are an amazing people. We never seem to learn from past mistakes...The French of course think we are quite mad as regards our

\(^{101}\) Matthew Hughes, 'A History of Violence: The Shooting in Jerusalem of British Assistant Police Superintendent Alan Sigrist, 12 June 1936". p.737
\(^{102}\) Matthew Hughes, 'Women, Violence and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39'. p.503
\(^{103}\) Major General B.L. Montgomery, 'Letter from General Montgomery to DCIGS Dated 4 Dec 38 Giving Further News of the Situation in Palestine, and Reply from DCIGS', *Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office records* (1938), WO216-111. National Archives. London, fol. 1-5. 4
conduct of the war in Palestine. They are expecting trouble themselves in Syria and have everything ready to stamp it out in one day...they will be quite ruthless.\textsuperscript{104}

Montgomery’s statements illustrated a righteous and clinical approach, particularly in reference to the way the French observed British conduct during the Arab Revolt. The comment regarding the British being viewed as ‘quite mad’ is in reference to the perceived use of ‘minimum force’ that soldiers and police engaged in. The British government’s use of violent counter-insurgency methods in Palestine has been extensively studied by Matthew Hughes.\textsuperscript{105} Hughes argued that in comparison to French forces in Algeria (1954-1962), the Japanese campaign in China (1937-1945) and the Soviets later in Afghanistan (1979-1989), British forces were not as severe, as they were not involved in the rape or continuous mass slaughter of civilians.\textsuperscript{106} In his final assessment Hughes concluded that, ‘perhaps the issue is whether one is looking to support or depreciate the British army, its counter-insurgency methods, and imperial rules generally.’\textsuperscript{107} Regardless of whether government forces were too violent or not, the key point to note is the actions of British soldiers and the police, not just during the revolt but since the mandate’s inception, contained substantial elements of violence and racial prejudice.

The latter stages of the Arab Revolt saw several Quakers as well as leading figures in the Christian community criticise the actions of the British government. The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, George Francis Graham Brown, wrote a letter in 1938 to the Chief Secretary of the mandate government, W. D. Battershill, expressing alarm at the levels of violence instigated by British police and military units. He concluded the British police and military forces’ methods implemented in Palestine were ‘correctly described as terrorism’, that


\textsuperscript{106} Matthew Hughes, ‘The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939’. p.354

\textsuperscript{107} ibid. p.351
Christian church members like him contacted the authorities stating, ‘the effects of the actions for which the government is morally responsible, for over eighteen months[...] I can no longer keep silence.’\textsuperscript{108} The criticisms of the government’s actions by those from within the Christian community were also shared by individual Quakers. Christina Jones recalled how the British forces used draconian measures to crush Palestinian opposition during the revolt, expressing sympathy towards the level of suffering that Arabs experienced during the period.\textsuperscript{109} The Quaker theologian Herbert G. Wood expressed dismay at the level of violence, comparing the crisis to Ireland just as Oliver had done previously, and stating that ‘the indecision of British policy is to blame, not the police and the military’.\textsuperscript{110} Wood, in carefully choosing his words, refrained from condemning those who operated on the ground, instead opting to focus on those in the upper echelons of power who were responsible for government policy. In contrast, non-British Quakers were more abrupt in their analysis. The American Quaker Marshall N. Fox, who had lived in the area for 29 years, stated:

> Perhaps they mean well. Perhaps this is unofficial and unsanctioned terrorism, perpetrated by the British private and not by the British official. But I doubt it, for with my own ears I heard the highest British official in Palestine broadcast the most arrogant and strife-stirring speech I have ever heard anywhere under any circumstances.\textsuperscript{111}

The highest-ranking British official at the time was Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope. Fox’s reference to British terrorism was a bold statement that reflected the anger amongst Quaker individuals as to the conduct of the government. Fox was not alone in his staunch criticism. Kappes criticised not only the mandate in Palestine but the entire concept of British imperialism. In a letter, Kappes described how, ‘the result of two decades of mandatory policy in the holy country shows, that we members of the white race are not yet

\textsuperscript{109} Christina Jones, \textit{Friends in Palestine}. p.95
“ripe” for this mandate idea!’. In his observations, Kappes further argued that the mandate, combined with imperialism, was hypocrisy and that the British government was following a policy of ‘divide et impera!’ or ‘divide and rule.’ Divide and rule strategies were a frequently tested formula used to create local rivalries by the British government. Conflicts between local factions of Arab notables were instigated by British officials, while communal institutions based on religion were also used to disrupt attempts at national unity. The Bedouin tribes, which totalled 95 and were estimated to have contained up to 100,000 Arabs, were often targeted by the British government in order to prevent them playing any role in the Arab Revolt. Kappes’ opinions were regularly at odds with some British Quakers, especially Daniel Oliver. He was passionate in his opposition to the actions taken by the British government and it’s administering of the mandate. Yet he would write an article for the Friend questioning whether there was any realistic alternative to the mandate government, concluding that Great Britain would have to maintain its influence but remove its ‘inclusive thinking’ which prevented a settlement to the Palestine issue from developing.

2.6. Settlement for Palestine memorandum and Britain’s diminishing involvement

In January 1939 the PWC published a memorandum signed by 16 British Quakers entitled ‘Settlement for Palestine’ and sent it directly to the Colonial Secretary as well as Arab and Jewish delegates in London. An excerpt from the memorandum stated:

The history of the conflict in Palestine and of parallel situations elsewhere (e.g. Ireland) have shown that repressive force applied before and irrespective of the enunciation of a just policy has embittered the situation rather than improved it. For

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112 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 637.6, Kappes Correspondence - 25 June 1936 p.6
113 ibid. p.3
116 Heinz Kappes, ‘War or Peace in Palestine’. p.879
this reason we believe that His Majesty's Government have been wrong in insisting on order first and a solution afterwards.\textsuperscript{118}

The members of the committee recognised that the repressive actions of the British military deeply hurt British relations with Arabs and only served to worsen the situation. A nine-point dossier was included within the memorandum stating that Quakers desired an abandonment of the proposal for the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one Arab and one Jewish, a temporary limitation on Jewish immigration and a ‘generous, practical and dramatic gesture to the Arabs’.\textsuperscript{119} The memorandum stressed that the ‘spectacle of a great imperial Power effecting such a settlement would have a tonic of influence on the self-respect of the British people’.\textsuperscript{120} This comment regarding the ‘self-respect’ of British people suggested that the PWC’s members felt a sense of collective guilt due to the actions of the government. The failures of the government to quell the revolt, both in policy and actions, and sympathy for the Arabs were dominant themes. The discussion of how to achieve peace and reconciliation in Palestine also featured in most articles, but it was the violent actions of the British military and police forces towards Palestinians that represented a paradox in Quaker thinking. The violence was deemed a fault of the British government and against Quaker pacifist values, yet the forceful actions of Arabs were interpreted as far more justified due to the failure of the government to listen to their grievances, indicating that the Quaker Peace Testimony in this context was not an ethically fixed methodology but open to interpretation.

When adding the Quakers whose names were not on the memorandum but shared similar opinions concerning the errors made by the British government and armed forces, in total 21 Friends had demonstrated a critical support of the British government during this period.\textsuperscript{121} In contrast, only four Quakers in the \textit{Friend}, the other Quaker publications and the personal documents analysed did not criticise the British government or its military

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\textsuperscript{118} William A. Albright and others, ‘Palestine Watching Committee: Settlement for Palestine’, \textit{The Friend}, 97 (20 January 1939), 49-50. p.49
\textsuperscript{119} ibid. p.50
\textsuperscript{120} ibid. p.49
\textsuperscript{121} Herbert G. Wood, Heinz Kappes, Christina Jones, Peter Scott and Marshall Fox
activities. The collective criticism during this period suggests that Quakers who discussed the conflict either through the *Friend* or other texts, were willing to express their disappointment at the conduct of the British government and its use of force to maintain colonial superiority. Nevertheless, there remained a consensus amongst Quakers that the mandate and the British government should maintain its authority in Palestine, but this agreement was coming to be based more on a sense of pragmatism than purely national loyalty or duty.

Once the Second World War began the PWC greatly reduced its activities and disbanded in 1941. Oliver did not mention this in his letters but expressed frustration with both the PWC and British Friends’ lack of support towards the *Lighthouse* magazine. Much of the philanthropic support towards the orphanage came from the Friends community in Philadelphia. This lack of financial support indicated that the Olivers, though sharing the collective Quaker ambition to bring quality education to the region, maintained a significant amount of independence, unlike the PWC which reported to the Quaker Yearly Meeting proceedings. In 1944 the *Lighthouse* was about to close due to financial difficulties but was eventually purchased by two wealthy Arab businessmen. Oliver stated that the paper could have made more money by advocating certain political policies but it was unthinkable to lower the standard. Oliver was unwavering in his principles. This was reflected in the orphanage motto, ‘the difficult things can be done right away, the impossible takes a little longer’. Oliver continued his efforts, with Emily ‘unwavering’ in her support. Emily’s dedication to Oliver remained absolute despite his, at times, unreasonable behaviour. Daniel Oliver never suffered rebuke and was ruthless when required, sometimes to the

123 Lucy B. Backhouse, ‘Palestine Watching Committee Report to Yearly Meeting’. p.135
125 Kim Brengle, ‘Generation of Nomads Contact’ (Email to Alexis Constantinou).
126 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated 6 November 1944
point of cruelty towards Emily. Nonetheless, Emily was described as displaying a deep maternal understanding and tender thoughtfulness, combined with a meticulous approach to the accounts of the orphanage. Prior to co-running the orphanage she had been Acting Head of the Brummana School, and in addition to raising their four children and her other responsibilities, she also taught fine needle work to 50 young Syrian women to help supplement their living through those means. Famous travellers such as T.E Lawrence and Gertrude Bell etched their names into British colonial history. By comparison the Olivers’ endeavours went unnoticed, even amongst Quakers. Their significant contributions saw the Ras-el-Metn orphanage nurture and educate young men who would go on to hold key positions in government and industry. Oliver proudly stated, ‘I have never once been asked for a recommendation for any of our boys. Having been in the orphanage gets them jobs right away’. The Olivers received respite at the beginning of the Second World War. The conflict provided a positive impact in the region with the crisis in Europe forcing Arabs and Jews to be more tolerant of each other in the short term.

British Quaker Rosina Harvey described how Arabs and Jews established better relations with one another: ‘the disaster which has overtaken Europe has come as a great blessing to us’. Kappes stated that no negative effects had come from the Second World War. Totah likewise described how, in early 1940, the violence that plagued the region had substantially reduced. However, the British government had not resolved the longstanding issue of Jewish immigration and continued its stranglehold on Arab educational affairs, providing just enough financial support to suppress the chances of a

128 Lettice Jowitt and Paul D. Sturge, *Daniel Oliver and Emily, His Wife*, p.11
129 ibid. p.17 & p.30
131 Neither Daniel nor Emily Oliver appeared in the Historical Dictionary of Friends (Quakers). Margaret Post Abbott, Mary Ellen Chijioke, Pink Dandelion, and John William Oliver-Jr, *Historical Dictionary of the Friends (Quakers)*.
132 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated 6 November 1944 p.2
135 ibid. p.181
nationalist revolution and its threat to colonial rule. Investment in schools was meagre, with spending falling from between five to six percent of the mandate government's total budget in the 1920s to about four percent from 1936 to 1938, and then even lower during the Second World War. In neighbouring states, such as post-independence Egypt and Iraq, spending was over 10 percent whilst the nations of Syria and Lebanon under French rule received more considerable financial support.\[^{137}\] This factor combined with the increasing desperation of Jews trying to immigrate to Palestine at the end of the Second World War meant the government continued to face Arab resentment over its rule in Palestine.

Published in 1944, an article titled ‘Palestine To-Day’, described how the best hope for any decision made by the British government would be for it to be received with equal disdain from both Jews and Arabs, ‘then we shall have the pleasure of knowing that it is at least impartial’.\[^{138}\] The comment’s pessimistic outlook towards the chances of the British government developing a policy approved by both sides reflected what was to be, in the following years, a growing sense of resignation that peace could not be achieved. At the end of the Second World War the British Quaker, E.B. Castle, who was the Professor of Education at University College Hull, wrote a pamphlet entitled *Reconciliation in Palestine*. Castle followed the opinions of those Quakers who put their names on the ‘Settlement in Palestine’ memo by stating that Britain could no longer put her imperial interests first, and must begin to make the interests of Arabs and Jews her paramount focus: ‘that is why Britain rules Palestine. She has no other justification for being there’.\[^{139}\] His criticism of Britain’s imperial endeavours was matched with a call to fellow British citizens, including Quakers, to ‘examine ourselves very carefully to see whether we have been right all the

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time’, describing how Britain had inherited a ‘thankless task’ with the government unable to appease two distinct opposing communities and retain its overall authority.140

An awareness of the wrongs of the British government was demonstrated by Quakers; however, after the Second World War the amount of dialogue between Quakers, via the *Friend* or personal correspondence, regarding the British Mandate in Palestine diminished rapidly. This was due to Quaker overseas efforts focusing on relief operations in post-war Germany, the end of British colonial rule in India and, as discussed earlier, a recognition that their efforts to influence the British government, especially during the Arab Revolt, had failed. The pride and responsibility Quakers demonstrated as British citizens through the *Friend* and the actions of the PWC were no longer apparent. The sense of duty as British people, not just Christian pacifists, towards solving the conflict waned amongst those involved during the Arab Revolt years. From the few articles in the *Friend* and personal correspondence produced in the post-Second World War era concerning the role of the British Mandate in Palestine, there remained a belief among certain individuals that the mandate, though flawed, was the only logical option available for peace in the region. For example, Kappes still believed, despite previous criticism, that the best solution was an ‘English trusteeship’, in other words the British government should still hold substantial influence in the region.141 Likewise, Oliver continued his peacebuilding endeavours in the region and encouraged his fellow Quakers to keep pursuing reconciliatory efforts.142 However, the lack of Quaker attention during the final years of the mandate was even mentioned by Oliver himself, who expressed his disappointment that Quakers had not contributed more to his efforts in the region.143 Therefore, it could be suggested that the collective Quaker interests, or lack thereof, in the final years of the British Mandate in Palestine indicated that Quakers were no longer willing to contribute a prominent level of support to the government. There remained nominal support for the mandate, but little

140 ibid. p.8
143 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated 6 November 1944
more than this, as there was no realistic alternative. The active discussions and efforts at political influence during the Arab Revolt were no longer being attempted by Quakers as a collective. Instead, it was up to individuals, most notably Oliver, who remained steadfast in his beliefs to bring peace to the region and support the mandate.

2.7. A defiant recognition

There were a few individuals both in the Friend and other non-Friend based Quaker documentation that demonstrated an absolute support for the British government, meaning a lack of recognition for its mistakes in Palestine and seeing only the positive aspects of its policies and actions. In an article published in the Friend on July 17 1936, Bentwich stated neither Arabs nor Jews should rule the country; he argued ‘it is the destiny of Palestine to be, like Canada, South Africa, and Belgium in our day, the country of two people living side by side.’144 Bentwich’s referral to Palestine being like South Africa was significant in demonstrating how he was not remotely aware of how authoritarian the bi-national state was. In South Africa, the black indigenous population had, for decades, suffered economic hardship, racial discrimination, and political subjugation through the Native Lands Act.145 Though not a Quaker himself, Bentwich’s comments were mirrored by Oliver, who also praised the way Britain settled affairs in South Africa after the Boer War, claiming, like Bentwich, that the country became united as a result.146 This typified Oliver’s attitude towards Great Britain and the empire, which was very often glowing in praise according to the letters he wrote. He confidently stated his belief that Britain had the best statesmen in the world and that British statesmanship was equal to any occasion and could solve the question of Palestine.147 Oliver’s comments demonstrated a lack of consideration, or possibly even awareness, towards the efforts of British Quakers during the Boer War.

144 Norman Bentwich, 'The Jews and Palestine - a Reply to the Arabs'. p.670
146 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Mr and Mrs Marriott C. Morris - 6 August 1938 p.4
147 ibid. p.4
Quakers were consistent opponents of the war and part of an outspoken minority cynically labelled ‘Pro-Boers’. Oliver’s comment regarding the high quality of British statesmanship was a unanimous backing of British politicians’ ability to solve the conflict in Palestine and, despite having his recommendations later dismissed by the Peel Commission, he remained, like Bentwich, fiercely loyal to the British government.

Oliver’s peacebuilding activities with Arabs during the Arab Revolt were carried out with what he described as ‘our duty to encourage them to hope and expect better’. Oliver carried with him a sense of responsibility as both a British citizen and a Quaker to alleviate the distress felt by Arabs. His letters praised the efforts of T.E. Lawrence, who was a protean figure viewed by some as a romantic hero and anti-imperialist, but by others, most notably the postcolonial scholar Edward Said, as an agent of imperialism. Oliver lauded Lawrence to the point where he even tried to replicate Lawrence’s role as an Oriental prophet through close connections to Arab militias. Upon being permitted access to visit the military leaders of the Arab Revolt, Oliver met the future leader of the Arab Liberation movement, Fawiz Bey el Qawuki. Qawukji was described as ‘Public Enemy No.1’ in the Belfast Telegraph and, due to his future collaborations with the Nazis, the British Press later called him the ‘Arab Hitler’ who wanted to become a would-be emperor of all Arabs. Oliver’s opinion of Qawukji upon meeting him for the first time was far more positive; Oliver described Qawukji as good looking, cordial, warm hearted, and a man of action. In their meeting, Qawuki told Oliver ‘you English will never understand the Eastern mind’. Oliver immediately told him to stop, telling him that he knew the Arabs before Qawuki was even born and

148 Richard A. Rempel, 'British Quakers and the South African War'. p.75
149 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 17 October 1936 p.1
153 Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 10 March 1937, 1-5. p.3
154 ibid. p.4
‘remember you are speaking to a Scotch Arab’. Oliver’s self-description as a Scotch (Scottish) Arab and confidence in his authority were that of a man who saw himself as a representative of the Arab cause who could achieve peace. His confidence was not unfounded. He had formed better relationships with Arab leaders than other notable Quakers in the region; for example, Kappes attempted to enter the village of Deir Diwan wearing Arab headdress but the Mukhtar (village chief) did not welcome him. Oliver’s buoyancy was further exemplified when he claimed that, after another meeting, the following 24 hours of peace were down to the actions of an ‘old Quaker’, by which he meant himself. His sureness in his own authority was matched by his belief in the integrity of the mandate and British officials.

In a letter sent to Walter H. Ayles on 17 October 1936, Oliver described how he visited a prison in Acre where he was struck by how happy the prisoners were and the affectionate way they greeted the governor of the prison, Major Worsley. Oliver published an article in the Friend on 21 July 1939 entitled, ‘Palestine and the British police’. In the article, he vehemently argued that accusations of torturing prisoners of war and cruelty by British police officers were categorically false; ‘is it possible that men in England who are honourable and upright can become fiends when they come to Palestine? I do not believe it, not a word of it.’ Oliver’s belief in the integrity of Englishmen clearly demonstrated his patriotism and loyalty to the perceived values of people from the United Kingdom, and that honour was such a key personal characteristic within every Englishman it was not possible for them to behave so barbarically. In the same article, this flawed belief was further demonstrated when, upon visiting a concentration camp holding Palestinian prisoners of war, Oliver stated that none of the prisoners complained of ill-treatment, and that they

155 ibid. p.4
157 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Mr and Mrs Marriott C. Morris - 6 August 1938 p.3
158 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 17 October 1936 p.4
159 Daniel Oliver, 'Palestine and the British Police', The Friend, 97 (21 July 1939), 618.
even spoke kindly of the officer in charge. He vehemently defended the British police by concluding:

> From my personal observation and knowledge resulting from many visits to Palestine, I am sure that the atrocity stories said to be committed in camps and prisons are not true...This charge cannot be believed by any fair-minded person because it is so contrary to the well-known characteristics of the ordinary Britisher who is far too good a sportsman to hit his enemy when he is down.\(^\text{160}\)

Oliver believed the British police were faultless in their conduct and principles; as a result, this severely hampered his judgement when observing crimes committed against Arabs, and thus the accuracy of the article his fellow Quakers were to read. When Palestinian prisoners of war told Oliver how well they were being treated by the British, Oliver was happy to accept their comments and believed it validated his belief that the ‘ordinary Britisher’ held too much personal integrity to treat a prisoner badly. Conversely, as soon as he heard complaints regarding the conduct of British soldiers, he refused to consider the accusations may be accurate. Recent historical studies, particularly by Matthew Hughes, have conclusively shown that Arab prisoners were mistreated. Oliver’s account demonstrated that he was unwilling to recognise legitimate criticism of British personnel in the military and prison services. His article, despite being published in July 1939 - almost seven months after the PWC issued the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo recognising the use of excessive force by the British authority - demonstrated that he repudiated any acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the British police in Palestine. Oliver refused to accept the violent actions of the British military and police. Furthermore, despite being one of the chief architects in the creation of the PWC and his influence over its policies, most notably the resistance to mass Jewish immigration, he was not a signatory on the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo. This suggests that he did not agree with the PWC and his fellow Quakers over the conduct of British military and police in the region, remaining absolute in his support of the British government. Oliver’s disagreement and separation from the PWC did not impact his influence or his approach. Rather, it was the PWC who suffered from the loss. Reforming in 1945, the PWC sent letters to the British government protesting the encouragement of

\(^\text{160}\) ibid. p.618

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gambling in Palestine through lotteries.\textsuperscript{161} The following year the committee tried to bring Arabs and a few moderate Jews together to discuss the conflict but there was only a very small turnout. The PWC instead focused its attention towards lobbying the British government to accept more Jewish refugees into Britain rather than reconciliation in Palestine.\textsuperscript{162}

Post-1945, Arab and Jewish military groups’ attempts to violently dominate one another highlighted how the British government failed to bring sufficient order to the region despite what British citizens and government officials saw as progress in the region. Historian D.K. Fieldhouse argued that Jewish settlers and the indigenous Arab population were ‘absolutely determined that there should be no accommodation and neither, before 1948, was able to establish dominance over the other.’\textsuperscript{163} The mandate government’s attempts to develop self-government within Palestine never materialised; instead, rule was implemented through a heavily autocratic colonial system based on a governor and various council branches.\textsuperscript{164} Developments the British government made to the infrastructure of Palestine along with attempted collaborative initiatives failed to appease both the nationalist desires of the Palestinian inhabitants and the newly immigrated Jewish settlers. There were several events in 1947 that proved pivotal, not only regarding the mandate but also the history of the British Empire. On 15 August, India declared independence from the British government and, in doing so, the core of the old empire was removed. In the same month, Great Britain began to reel from a period of unprecedented economic austerity.\textsuperscript{165} In Palestine, mass Jewish immigration to the region in the post-war years saw tremendous acts of violence perpetrated by Jewish paramilitary groups such as the Stern Gang and the Irgun against British military personnel, as well as civilians, bringing the mandate to the brink of collapse.

\textsuperscript{161} Mary E. Pumphrey, ‘Palestine Watching Committee: Report to Meeting for Sufferings’, \textit{Yearly Meeting Proceedings}, (1945), 119-20. p.120
\textsuperscript{164} ibid. p.151
During this period, Oliver, as part of a last-ditch peacebuilding mission, drove to Transjordan to meet the King of Jordan, Abdullah I bin al-Hussein, to obtain a permit, allowing him to be a correspondent when visiting Jewish refugee camps in Palestine and Cyprus.\textsuperscript{166} Henry J. Turtle, a teacher at the Quaker-run Brummana School, described how, during this period, Oliver worked with Arab councils, enjoying the trust of the Bedouin and prominent Arab representatives, and that he was respected by prominent Jewish leaders such as Lord Samuel and Dr Magnus, the president of the Hebrew University.\textsuperscript{167} During a visit to Jerusalem in the summer of 1947, he faced severe criticism because of his British nationality and the content of his arguments. Jewish hostility towards the mandate government and Great Britain had increased since the 1939 White Paper for Palestine, which put restrictions on Jewish immigration and property ownership and is discussed further in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{168} Oliver arrived in Jerusalem in a car which had a badge of the Royal Automobile Club in London, the head of King George V facing all corners and, on the back of the badge, the Union Jack. He first met the Head of the Jewish Agency, M. Shertock, and then a Mr. Agronksy, editor of the \textit{Palestine Post}.\textsuperscript{169} Through various contacts, Oliver met representatives of Jewish militias and stated that he wanted terrorism to cease, claiming it was an act of madness. The response Oliver received was robust, with a militia spokesman stating that the discussions had gone for years without any form of success: ‘we the terrorists, have succeeded in forcing the British government to its knees and to hand over the question of Palestine to the United Nations’.\textsuperscript{170} Whether the spokesman referred to himself as a terrorist is highly debatable. Nonetheless, the British government’s actions were deeply disliked by the local Jewish population and, as a result, Oliver’s attempts to engage in peacebuilding negotiations with the Jewish community often fell on deaf ears because of a combination of his nationality and the substance of his arguments, which often held myopic perceptions concerning the conduct of British forces.

\textsuperscript{166} Lettice Jowitt and Paul D. Sturje, \textit{Daniel Oliver and Emily, His Wife}  p.33  \\
\textsuperscript{168} Tom Segev, \textit{One Palestine Complete}. p.440  \\
\textsuperscript{169} Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, News Items from Palestine and the Lebanon - 10 July 1947, 1-3. p.3  \\
\textsuperscript{170} Daniel Oliver, \textquote{Reconciliation in Palestine}, \textit{The Friend}, 105 (1 August 1947), 621-23. p.622
A clear example of why his arguments were dismissed was his total resistance to the criticism that Britain and its citizens were prospering on a ‘divide and rule’ principle, which was an accusation previously backed by Kappes. The Jewish militia representative suggested that Jews and Arabs could ‘come to an understanding’ if Britain ceased its divide and rule policy, and the British Mandate ended. Oliver vehemently argued this was not the case. ‘The suggestion of divide and rule I resent very much. I do not believe it for a moment...I did my best to clear that up, and I am going to Palestine again to tour all the colonies to try to remove this poisonous idea’. Oliver’s belief that the mandate was a positive influence in the region was yet again unwavering and in his defence, the mandate did receive praise for its improvement to public services, including healthcare, not only from fellow Quakers such as Mary Sime, a teacher from Oxford who worked on various humanitarian projects in the 1950’s, and Sir Henry Gurney, the last Chief Secretary of the Palestine government (1946-1948) but also Palestinian journalist and historian Naser al-Din al-Nashashibi. Oliver’s actions in bringing the various sides together through reconciliation were commendable and in keeping with Quaker spiritual values. However, despite there being positive developments because of the mandate, his refusal to acknowledge the negative impact it also had on the region demonstrated how his allegiance to the mandate hurt his ability to appreciate the perspectives of others, which ultimately hindered progress in his overall goal – to bring peace to the region.

Work can be done, and perhaps can only be done sufficiently on the radio and through the printed page. I receive all the friendly papers, and they are good, read, I hope by a majority of Friends, but do they make any appeal to the outside world? Do Friends realize the value and the power of the printed page? The Jews do. Look what use they make of the press. What could Friends do with articles in, for example, The Manchester Guardian, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, The Sunday Times, etc., etc.? Quiet gathering, meditation, deliberation, and then

171 ibid. p.622
172 ibid. p.622
separating and sometime later repeating the same thing, are good as far they go, but something very much more is needed.\textsuperscript{174}

Oliver’s comments during the period illustrated his inability to recognise the negative influence his patriotism had on his endeavours, yet he was able to determine what he considered to be a significant flaw in British Quaker peacebuilding endeavours in Palestine. The lack of coordination by Quakers to contact the press to express their concerns disappointed Oliver.

Oliver did not mention whom he specifically spoke to when referring to the Jewish militias. However, considering the date of the publication (1 August 1947) the Irgun or Stern gang militias would be the most likely candidates as they were responsible for several acts of terrorism in the region, none of which was more notorious than the King David Hotel bombing the previous year, on 22 July 1946. The attack led to the deaths of 91 people, mostly British civilians as the hotel acted as the central hub to much of the mandate’s administration.\textsuperscript{175} Christina Jones emotionally recalled how Palestine, immediately after the bombing, was in mourning and that, ‘we are all shocked at the immensity of the tragedy…One wonders how long the British can stand this continual harassment and ruthless killing’.\textsuperscript{176} Just over a year later in September 1947, the British government announced its intention to cease its responsibilities in the region, officially ending on 14 May 1948, with British officials often infuriated by the Jewish community in Palestine refusing to reveal the whereabouts and identities of suspected terrorists.\textsuperscript{177} W.G. Fitzgerald, the Chief Justice of Palestine, in a letter written to the former High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, privately confessed to his colleague that he had experienced, ‘a feeling, which does not appear to be shared by other officials, of sadness at this end of the Palestine journey. All that we did or tried to do seems to have gone for naught’.\textsuperscript{178} Fitzgerald’s comment of experiencing a feeling of sadness that was not shared by other officials

\textsuperscript{174} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, News Items from Palestine and the Lebanon - 10 July 1947 p.3
\textsuperscript{175} A.J. Sherman, Mandate Days. p.180
\textsuperscript{176} Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.58
\textsuperscript{177} A.J. Sherman, Mandate Days. p.177
\textsuperscript{178} ibid. p.210
indicated that other British officials were not disappointed to be leaving. As their fellow
countrymen were exiting, or in even stronger terms evacuating, those remaining Quakers
were left to witness the mass expulsion of Arabs from their homes and the subsequent
refugee crisis. Jones recalled her husband Willard telling the boys at the Friends School in
Ramallah that when their grandchildren would ask them what they were doing on 14 May
1948, ‘I want you to say, I was doing my duty, I was in school’.179 Despite the end of the
mandate the Joneses remained steadfast in their sense of duty and continued to instil this
attitude into those under their care.

In the final year of the mandate, both Christina Jones and Daniel Oliver demonstrated a
correlation between the views of British government officials and themselves through a
shared sense of resignation and even bitterness. Government official Sir Henry Gurney used
his diary to detail the last remaining weeks of the mandate in the summer of 1948. In his
journal, Gurney demonstrated his devout loyalty to the empire.180 He criticised President
Truman of the United States of America for supporting the Jewish cause and sacrificing the
Anglo-American alliance as a result.181 Mirroring Gurney’s outlook, Christina Jones described
how the mandate government was, ‘administratively excellent’.182 She criticised the
American government for their involvement in the region, questioning when US officials
would ‘wake up’ to the crisis that their support of Zionism was creating.183 Jones did put
some of the blame at the feet of the British government, but this was only a small fraction
of her criticism, the majority of which targeted the United States government and Zionism.
Jones noted in her diary the feeling of disappointment when listening to the High
Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham’s farewell speech on the radio. She commented how
those British citizens who were in Palestine at the beginning of the mandate till its very end
‘had only sympathy for him as he closed what history will probably say is one of the darkest
moments in British colonial history’.184 Jones’ recognition that British rule in Palestine was

179 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.104
180 Motti Golani, *The End of the British Mandate for Palestine, 1948: The Diary of Sir Henry Gurney*. p.21
181 ibid. p.18
182 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.25
183 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.78
184 ibid. p.100
finished and the similar bitter tone of her writing to Gurney’s demonstrated her unwillingness to fully accept the faults of the mandate. Instead, she opted to deflect the blame towards the United States government and Zionism, though partly accurate, as a means of avoiding the faults of the British government.

Bentwich believed the British government could still protect and govern in the region. After the war had erupted between Palestinians and Jews over the failed agreement of the UN Partition plan in 1947, Bentwich wrote one of the last articles for the *Friend* concerning the role of the mandate in Palestine before its end. Published 13 February 1948, the article stated that ‘the fear in each community of the other is terribly infectious; and it is only in the regions which are purely Arab or purely Jewish...that life is normal’. Much of the article focused on Jerusalem with Bentwich finally recognising the past failures made by the government, but nonetheless he implored Quakers to understand the importance of the British government staying in Jerusalem. He argued that for 30 years the British administration, despite multiple failures, had provided a lot of good to Palestine and that it dare not leave Jerusalem, the centre of the Administration, ‘to be a prey to internecine violence’. Oliver, likewise, continued to argue for the mandate government to remain in control as a means of keeping the peace and, like Bentwich, did concede that the British government had made significant mistakes. ‘Politics have done their best or their worst. A situation has been produced which is, at the moment, utterly beyond control [...] my heart is as heavy as lead.’

Until the very end, Oliver held the government in the highest regard and, despite his absolute loyalty, conceded that the bitterness between all sides (British government included) created an almost untenable situation. Travelling to areas where he was knowingly putting his life in danger well into his late seventies, Oliver negotiated with people from all sides, some of whom history has judged as heroes, others as villains.

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185 His absolute commitment was also apparent in his memoir regarding British rule in Palestine: See Norman Bentwich, *My 77 Years: An Account of My Life and Times 1883-1960*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1961). p.204
186 Norman Bentwich, ‘Beginning at Jerusalem - a First Step Towards Peace in Palestine’. p.129
187 ibid. p.129
188 Daniel Oliver, ‘Call to Prayer for Palestine’, *The Friend*, 106 (30 January 1948), 94-96. p.94
189 Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Margaret M. Morris - 14 July 1948.
For better or for worse, Oliver’s conviction allowed him to embark on a journey that few experienced or could have endured. Oliver was a man of strict discipline who lived very abstemiously. A firm believer in providence, his blunt and direct approach was built upon a desire to put human needs first. His personal letters and articles in the *Friend* demonstrate the actions of a man who was wholly determined to bring peace to the region but also incredibly loyal to the British Empire, and in this sense, he was as much a British diplomat as a Quaker. The eventual end of the mandate and outbreak of war between Arabs and Jews meant Oliver’s peacebuilding endeavours were not successful. This alone would have been a painful experience for him, but in the process of continually defending the government he had even isolated himself from his fellow Quakers, many of whom no longer focused on the mandate maintaining its authority. PWC members, and other Quakers who wrote to the *Friend* or signed the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memorandum, demonstrated a change in behaviour by appearing to have given up demonstrating their concern towards the welfare of the mandate. This left only a few like-minded individuals such as Jones, Oliver and, despite previous criticism, Kappes, to argue for the mandate government remaining actively in control of Palestine. From analysing the biographical index it is likely this remaining concern would have partly been motivated by their locations, as all three still lived in the region, whilst the majority of Quakers who previously discussed the issue did not.

### 2.8. Conclusion

The indigenous Arab population and Jewish settlers were entirely committed to their own causes with neither group before 1948 able to establish superiority over the other. Arab and Jewish attempts to dominate one another highlighted the continuous struggle that the British government failed to mitigate despite what many British citizens, officials and Quakers saw as the rightful duty of the mandate government to do so. The Arab Revolt

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190 Haverford Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to F. Algernon and Anna R. Evans - 6 July 1945.


years were a period of heightened Quaker discussion and activity, both in the *Friend* and other available documents. The early years of the Arab Revolt saw Friends contemplate their role not only as Quakers, but as British nationals, displaying a confidence that they could support the British government in resolving the conflict.

Support for the Arab population and their grievances was evident in addition to discussions on what role the government played in creating the crisis. Those Quakers involved in dialogue and attempts at reconciliation displayed a continuous focus on how peace could be achieved in the region. These attempts at peacebuilding were in keeping with the theological values of the Peace Testimony; however, Daniel Oliver and members of the PWC struggled to gain any significant influence over government officials. Prominent Quakers such as Oliver were no longer on the inside with regards to knowing the thoughts of government officials. Instead, the last decades of the mandate saw Quakers become outsiders looking in.

Specific policies regarding Jewish immigration and the partition were criticised, but there nonetheless remained an overwhelming support for the British Mandate maintaining its authority in Palestine. For Quakers, Britain’s policies, and the actions of its numerous forces in Palestine, created a schism between national loyalty and the reality that their own government prioritised its interests ahead of Jewish, Arab, and even Quaker concerns. Support for the government remained, but there was also criticism of its policies and actions, especially during the Arab Revolt. However, a few individual Quakers continuously attempted to see the positives of what the British Mandate had and could still accomplish in Palestine. Their support continued, but a growing sense of resignation and disillusionment throughout the 1940s at the failure of the mandate to achieve peace saw few Quakers, especially in the *Friend*, willing to discuss publicly the numerous errors made by the British government. Instead, comments made by Quakers in the final years of the mandate often mirrored those of British officials in their disappointment and even resentment at the collapse of the mandate.
3. Jewish immigration into Palestine and the birth of Israel

3.1. Introduction

The notion of a Jewish state in Palestine, inspired by the nationalist ideology of Zionism, became the core focus of multiple groups of European Jews in the late 19th century and early 20th century. This was due to increasing waves of anti-Semitic pogroms in areas such as Odessa. In 1896 an Austrian Jew called Theodore Herzl released a booklet called Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State: An attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question). This text was to be the unofficial blueprint that drove the desire amongst European Jews to establish a Jewish national home. Zionism after the First World War gained a strong following in Eastern Europe following further pogroms against Jews in Russia and the Ukraine. This led to a growing demand from Jews to enter Palestine and created several conflicts with the Arab population, such as the 1929 riots. The growing persecution in Nazi Germany during the 1930s further increased Jewish desperation, eventually leading to the aforementioned Arab Revolt of 1936. Following the holocaust, European Jews embarked on a mass migration to Palestine led by the Zionist movement, culminating in the birth of Israel in May 1948.

This chapter will examine the reasons why members of the Palestine Watching Committee (PWC) and multiple British Quakers based in the Middle East opposed large-scale mass Jewish immigration and rejected the concept as well as eventual establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine. It analyses how and why British Quaker views about Jewish immigration into Palestine did not significantly change before, or after, the Second World War, and how Jewish immigration and Zionism created cracks in Quaker thinking, leading to divergent paths between Quaker opinion leaders and government officials. The British government’s shifting approach to the issue of Jewish immigration created several dilemmas for Quakers. The Quakers were deeply sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish

2 ibid. p.441
people before and after the Second World War but, for multiple reasons, tensions emerged over the immigration of Jews into Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. These tensions saw Quakers struggle to achieve an agreeable collective solution to the issue; some Friends defended Zionism whilst others were so against the movement that they exhibited anti-Semitic tropes. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first, analyses Quaker sympathy for Jews and support for Jewish immigration into Palestine. The second, the rejection of the Zionist claim to Palestine and disagreement with British government policy. The third section addresses British Quakers’ subdued reaction to the birth of Israel and frustration at the lack of recognition of Arab grievances.

The Arab Revolt years (1936-1939) saw the greatest number of articles published in the *Friend* magazine concerning Jewish immigration into Palestine. A total of 23 articles were published during this period, the contents of which suggested that the authors were sympathetic to the plight of Jews in Europe but also against their migration in large numbers into Palestine. Out of the 23 articles, five argued for the mass migration of Jews into Palestine. Only two of the five articles were written by Quakers - Peter Scott, a British Quaker who had visited Palestine in 1937, and Heinz Kappes. The other three were by non-Quakers: Norman Bentwich, who at the time was Professor of International relations at Jerusalem University and was previously co-editor of the *Jewish Review*, Martha Steinitz, a British Jew who described herself as both a socialist and pacifist, and Israel Cohen, who worked in the central office of the Zionist organisation in London. Significantly, the two articles explicitly written by Quakers that were pro-immigration strictly based their support on the concept of a bi-national state or one-state-solution, and not the development of an independent Jewish state. No articles written by Quakers during the Arab Revolt supported the development of a Jewish national home. In fact, eight articles, seven of which were written by Quakers, vehemently opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The

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articles were often highly critical of Zionism, fearing that Jewish self-determination in Palestine could de-stabilise the British Mandate as well as questioning the theological legitimacy of Jews returning to Palestine.

Despite staunch refusal in some quarters to support the desires of Zionist Jews to establish a new state in Palestine, British Quakers still demonstrated a concern towards the suffering Jews faced in Europe and how they could be helped. When focusing on the articles that directly referenced the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 10 were published in the *Friend* from 1936 to 1939 showing Quaker sympathy for the plight of Jews and discussing what could be done to alleviate Jewish suffering. By comparison, over double the number of articles were published concerning the Spanish Civil War and German aggression in Europe, indicating that other international topics acquired more focus from the *Friend*’s readership. Despite concern at the plight of Jews, some of the same articles still rejected immigration entirely, indicating that Quaker sympathy, though evident, did not equate to support for Jewish migration into Palestine. The Arab Revolt period was characterised by British Quakers’ criticism of European anti-Semitism, but also the steadfast rejection of Jews entering Palestine and the establishment of an independent Jewish state.

After the Second World War had ended in 1945, British Quaker magazines still published articles, albeit less frequently, discussing Jewish immigration into Palestine and the development of a Jewish national home. Carl Heath, a British Quaker who was former General Secretary of the FSC and regular columnist in the ‘World Affairs’ section of the *Friend*, wrote an article published September 1949, 16 months after the birth of Israel, celebrating how the ‘chosen race will have accomplished its two thousand years of suffering and returned to the Holy Land’. Before the Second World War, he was against Jewish immigration into Palestine and the birth of Israel.

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Heinz Kappes, 'War or Peace in Palestine'. The non-Quaker article was written by the Palestinian Headmaster of the Birzut high school for boys: Wadi R. Tazari, 'Jews in Palestine - the Arab Point of View'.


immigration and the development of an independent Jewish state but his change of stance after the war reflected an understandable empathy with Jews considering the abhorrent brutal persecution they suffered during the Holocaust. However, his article was the only one published in the *Friend* that supported the creation of an independent Jewish state in the Holy Land. By comparison, five articles published from 1945-1949 still argued against Jews entering Palestine in substantial numbers, citing Zionism and the violent methods by which the Jewish state was developed for their objection.

A substantial portion of British Quakers who discussed the issue of Jewish immigration specifically in the *Friend* before and after the Second World War maintained the belief that Jews should not immigrate in large numbers nor establish a country of their own within Palestine. After the birth of Israel, discussions in the *Friend* no longer focused on Jewish immigration into Palestine or the legitimacy of a Jewish state. Very few articles were produced in the *Friend* post-1949 criticising or supporting Israel. However, individual British Quakers would go on to display resentment towards how Israel was created, even decades after its establishment.

### 3.2. Sympathy and support for the development of a Jewish national home

British Quaker relations with Jews before the birth of Israel were often positive due to the Society of Friends’ belief in supporting persecuted people regardless of whether they were secular or of another faith. British Quakers were heavily involved in developing and implementing the Kindertransport, which involved bringing 10,000 Jewish children from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to Britain from December 1938 until the start of the Second World War. This practical support was also evident during their humanitarian efforts.

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8 Carl Heath, *Palestine*. p.682
endeavours in post-war Germany where the Friends Relief Service (FRS) provided relief to Displaced Persons (DPs), including Jews in the concentration camps of Belsen-Belsen.\(^{12}\) The Quaker-Jew relationship was so healthy that Jane Levenson, the first Jewish relief worker to enter Belsen after liberation, did so as a member of an FRS team.\(^{13}\) British Quakers, as a collective, were sympathetic to the suffering that persecuted Jews endured in Europe before the Second World War, with this compassion remaining evident in the post-war years through their humanitarian work in Germany. However, the predicament of Jewish immigration into Palestine proved far more problematic. Jennifer Carson, in her thesis concerning the philanthropic efforts of Quakers in post-war Germany, referenced an article published in the Quaker magazine, the *Star* (which focused exclusively on European relief efforts), that stated most FRS field personnel either discussed the issue with both Jewish and Arabs’ arguments in mind or avoided the subject altogether.\(^{14}\)

British Quakers supported Jewish refugees and were deeply sympathetic to their suffering. The issue of Palestine and a Jewish state was, however, far more divisive. In 1934, Daniel Oliver and Khalil Totah travelled from Palestine to the Quaker-run London Yearly Meeting to discuss the growing tensions in the area. After multiple discussions with fellow Quakers, the Colonial Minister at Whitehall, and Members of Parliament, Totah bitterly concluded in an autobiographical statement - ‘we accomplished nothing, England, including the English Quakers, were so sympathetic with the Zionists [sic] viewpoint that our visit made no impression’.\(^{15}\) The failure of Totah and Oliver to make an impression was likely to have been a catalyst for their development of the Palestine Watching Committee a year later. In April 1936, Totah and Oliver also visited the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting in Brummana,

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\(^{13}\) Jennifer Carson, *The Friends Relief Service - Faith into Action: Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons Camps in Germany, 1945-1948*. p.86

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p.145

\(^{15}\) Thomas M. Ricks, *Khalil Totah: The Unknown Years*, *Institute of Palestine Studies: Jerusalem Quarterly*, 34 (2008), 51-77. p.64
Syria. They again attempted to sway Quaker opinion towards supporting Arab grievances, however members of the meeting felt ‘they could take no definite action’ due to individuals’ lack of understanding and experience.\(^{16}\) Likewise, Heinz Kappes also hosted a weekly meeting in Ramallah, which included several members of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting. Though a full list of members could not be found, the biographical index indicates that members of the meeting were all based in the region with only two British members participating, meaning that a lack of a British majority existed within the meeting. Heinz Kappes, Khalil Totah, Marshall Fox, James Sutton, Roger Soltau and Daniel Oliver were all members, though in Oliver’s case he appeared to be rarely involved. It could be suggested that due to the location of the meeting and the multiple nationalities - American, German, Palestinian and British - of its members, a collective concern over the mandate, similar to that of the British-based PWC, was not achieved. Kappes stated that there would be no attempt at direct influence on political developments by the Meeting.\(^ {17}\) The PWC stood out in comparison as it was a British Quaker organisation that deliberately sought to influence politics in the region.

Before the Arab Revolt British Quakers as a collective, according to Totah, were sympathetic to the claims of Zionist Jews that Palestine, and in particular Jerusalem, was their true home. However, when the Arab Revolt began, a substantial change appeared amongst some British Quakers from demonstrating sympathy to the ambitions of Zionism to doubts and concerns about what it represented. Importantly, this did not mean that Quakers were unsympathetic to the Jewish people’s need to find safety from the suffering they endured. Several articles were published in the *Friend* that were against Jewish immigration during the Arab Revolt yet still expressed a deep sympathy with the plight of Jews in Europe.\(^ {18}\) In December 1938, a statement written by the Quaker Meeting for Sufferings, which was the executive committee of London Yearly Meeting, was sent to church leaders, the press and

\(^{16}\) Rosina D. Harvey, 'Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting', *Friends Intelligencer*, 93 (9 May 1936), 305.

\(^{17}\) Heinz Kappes, 'Friends in Jerusalem', *The Wayfarer*, XVI (October 1937), 233-35. p.235

\(^{18}\) James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine'; Carl Heath, 'Palestine'; Wadi R. Tazari, 'Jews in Palestine - the Arab Point of View'.

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every preparative Quaker meeting condemning anti-Semitism and appealing to Christians to take responsibility for the issue:

The meetings for Suffering – the Executive Committee of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in Great Britain – taking note of the increasingly bitter persecution of the Jews and of those related to Jews in so many countries at the present time and the danger of its spreading to our own, places on record its deep sense of shame at this evil return to the cruelties of the past; and its recognition of the age-long neglect of its responsibility in this matter by the Christian church.¹⁹

The statement’s focus on both the suffering of Jews and blame towards the inactions of the Christian church revealed how British Quakers wanted to express their position on this issue openly. Many Quakers vehemently opposed anti-Semitism and were concerned by the ordeal Jews were experiencing. Significantly though, this concern did not transform into support for Zionism and the development of an independent Jewish state from 1936 onwards. Christina Jones would later recall in her memoir:

He would be hard of heart indeed who does not sympathise with the sufferings of the Jewish people, especially in the days of Hitler, but to ask an innocent predominantly Muslim people to experience exile and suffering to atone for the sins of the Christian West is hardly the way of justice.²⁰

Jones’ quote indicated a deep concern with the consequences of Jewish immigration on Arabs, and as a result, she could not support the Jewish return to Palestine. Daniel Oliver also subscribed to this point of view.²¹ Although recognising the Jewish people’s need for security, he continually argued that Palestine was too small a territory to receive so many, stating that, ‘the only cure - is for the Jews to accept being a minority’²² These concerns over Jewish migration even influenced the two articles written by Quakers that supported immigration into Palestine during this period. Both articles stated that support for the entry

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¹⁹ Meeting for Sufferings, 'Christians and Jews'. p.1130
²⁰ Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.41
²² The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated November 1937 p.5
of Jews into Palestine should only be allowed if they were entering to live in a bi-national state, not an independent Jewish one. The support of a bi-national state was reiterated post-Second World War by Heinz Kappes in an article published in the *Friend* in April 1947. While recognising the suffering of Jews and their desperate need for security, Kappes still stressed the importance for both groups to live together under the mandate. Overall, numerous British Quakers and those closely associated with them like Kappes, though distraught at the persecution of Jews, refused to support the development of an independent Jewish state. Furthermore, only a few individuals supported immigration into Palestine at all, and on the basis of a bi-national state only.

After the Second World War ended, the horrors of the Holocaust were discovered by those who entered the concentration camps, of whom Quakers were some of the first. As a result, the need to provide a home for refugees, especially Jews, became a significant issue for Western governments. Jewish refugees sought safe passage and entry into various countries around the world with Palestine seeing many try to enter. Daniel Oliver visited Cyprus, where Jewish immigrants temporarily resided due to the British government’s strict quota allowing no more than 75,000 refugees per month into Palestine. He described their disappointment at not being allowed to return ‘home’ and regretted how the government could not create a policy that could settle the issue. Oliver’s stance regarding a limitation on Jewish immigration and the bi-national state solution remained, but his sympathy for Jews was also clearly apparent. This stance was mirrored by Mary Pumphrey, who replaced Lucy Backhouse as the Clerk for the PWC. Pumphrey, though not supporting the establishment of an independent Jewish nation in Palestine, stated that the issue of immigration into Palestine had been complicated far more by the murder of millions of

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23 Heinz Kappes, ‘Fortress Country and Holy Land: A Point of View’. p.312
25 Lettice Jowitt with a foreward by Paul D. Sturge. p.33
26 Daniel Oliver, ‘Reconciliation in Palestine’. p.621
Jews, and that their subsequent despair at being stuck in concentration camps or unseaworthy ships as illegal immigrants was a fate they did not deserve.\textsuperscript{27}

In contrast to Oliver, Pumphrey and other Quakers, there was one British Quaker whose sympathy did develop into support for the Zionist cause. Carl Heath, in supporting the development of a Jewish national home, expressed his astonishment at how so few people observed how, ‘we have reached to the end of the marvellous story of Jewish dispersion and of that spiritual mission throughout the world of a stateless, homeless, wandering and suffering people’.\textsuperscript{28} His reference to how few people shared his sentiment could have been about his fellow Quakers or British citizens more broadly; either way, his disbelief in the lack of support for the development of a Jewish home in Palestine suggested that Heath felt isolated in his observations. Despite British Quakers displaying not only compassion for the suffering of Jews but affirmative action through the Kindertransport and their relief work in post-war Germany, the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine still received the backing of very few Quakers with even less encouraging the development of an independent Jewish state.

\textbf{3.3. Concerns about Jewish immigration and the state of Israel}

During the Arab Revolt, it was argued by Jews and non-Jews that immigration would continue to benefit the economy, health, and education in Palestine.\textsuperscript{29} Christina Jones confirmed that she would be regularly asked why the Arabs would not allow the Jews to buy their lands and head to another part of the Middle East: ‘don’t the Arabs need the Jews, for aren’t the Jews making the desert bloom like the rose?’.\textsuperscript{30} The support of Jewish immigration and the development of an independent state because of the skills Jews could bring in agriculture and finance received substantial backing in political circles. In November 1936, the Jewish Agency for Palestine submitted to the Peel Commission a memorandum

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Mary E. Pumphrey, 'Friends and the Palestine Question', \textit{The Friend}, 104 (16 May 1947), 386. p.386
\item Carl Heath, 'The State of Israel', p.43
\item Christina Jones, \textit{The Untempered Wind} p.23
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
Jewish immigration into Palestine and the birth of Israel

titled *The Historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine*. The memo argued that Jews 'have never forgotten' their rightful claim to a national home in Palestine as they were the ancient rulers and the former settlers of Palestine. For Zionist Jews, Palestine represented a sacred heritage that was a core element of their theology. Their efforts to immigrate to Palestine increased further during the Arab Revolt because of Nazi persecution and growing anti-Semitism in Europe.

At the start of the Arab Revolt, British Quakers were often sympathetic to Arab complaints towards the mandate government’s rule and demonstrated certain flexibility when interpreting the Peace Testimony regarding Arab ‘resistance’. The mandate government initially implemented curfews and placed restrictions on the local press to quell the revolt. However, as the conflict grew increasingly violent with troops implementing more violent methods to suppress Arabs, British Quakers did not condemn Arabs and instead turned their attention to how they could influence the British government to find a diplomatic solution. Due to mounting pressure from both sides, the British government was torn between its support for the Balfour Declaration, with its ultimate promise to help Jews create a national home, and quelling the violence created by Arabs, who demanded that immigration be limited to prevent a Jewish electoral majority developing in Palestine. The government, in its desperation to halt the violence in Palestine so that more British troops could be deployed in Europe, eventually submitted to Arab demands by approving the White Paper for Palestine. Produced in May 1939, the White Paper reduced Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the following five years and set restrictions on the transfer of Arab-owned property to Jewish owners. Christina Jones positively described the White Paper as ‘a ray of hope for

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31 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Historical Connection of the Jewish People with Palestine - Memorandum Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission on Behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1936).
32 ibid. p.42
35 Tom Segev, *One Palestine Complete*. p.440
the Palestinians’. Likewise, Oliver also saw the White Paper as an encouraging move in creating peace in the region as it meant the British Mandate could maintain its authority. 

Arguments supporting the historical connections of the Jewish people to Palestine were often dismissed by Quakers in the *Friend*. Alongside this dismissal, there was concern regarding the negative impact of Jewish immigration on Arabs living in the region. As a result of this concern, the PWC’s ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo, in addition to sympathising and requesting the British government attempt to understand the Arab perspective, argued that for the sake of peace in Palestine the ‘temporary cessation of immigration might not be too high a price for Jews to pay’. The memo stated that the Jewish population in Palestine should not be allowed to exceed 35 percent of the total population of the country and that future sales of land should be the responsibility of the mandatory government, ‘who would lease it according to broad Palestinian interests’. The memo was released five months before the White Paper but was similar in its support for restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine and the transfer of Arab property. At the London Yearly Meeting, the MP and member of the PWC Walter Ayles, reported that the PWC memo had been considered by the government and that some of the proposals were accepted. When combining the memo to the reactions of Oliver and Jones it can be proposed that not only were there a group of British Quakers who were certainly in favour of the government’s White Paper, there were members of the PWC who believed they played a role in its creation. It can be suggested this belief came from a need from members of the PWC to still feel that they were capable of influencing government policy. The accuracy of this assumption is debatable; it could have just been coincidence, as the temporary halt to Jewish immigration suited government foreign policy at the time. Nonetheless it illustrated a desire amongst PWC members to believe that they had influenced government policy. For Oliver and Jones, their stance against Jewish immigration

36 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.47
37 Lettice Jowitt with a foreward by Paul D. Sturge.  p.26
38 William A. Albright and others ‘Palestine Watching Committee: Settlement for Palestine’.  p.50
39 ibid.  p.50
40 Horace B. Pointing, ‘Some Notes on Yearly Meeting’, *The Wayfarer*, XVIII (July 1939), 150-52.  p.150
was far more motivated by their day-to-day experience of living in the region, and not a desire to feel influential.

The memo also proved significant in revealing the opinions of British Quakers, given how weak it was in its criticism of the Zionist cause compared to the articles written by individual Quakers in the *Friend*. The memo stated, ‘While we recognise the noble aspirations of the prophetic Zionist position we cannot envisage the fulfilment of the full Zionist programme in so small an area as the present confines of Palestine’.

Unlike the individual articles, which, as will be demonstrated shortly, were highly critical of Zionism, the memo took a far more moderate stance. This contrast was likely due to the memo’s intended audience, with it being sent straight to Arab and Jewish delegates in London. When directly compared to the articles, the memo’s tempered criticism of Zionism highlights the PWC’s concerns over the public response to their views, particularly from Jews. It could be argued that the memo demonstrated the difference between an ‘official’ Quaker position and the less sober assessments of a few, highly interested correspondents, as several of the signatories on the memo, Paul V. Mauger, Mary Pumphrey and Lucy B. Backhouse, heavily denounced Zionism in their own articles. Therefore, it can be reasoned that the deep concerns amongst British Quakers regarding Zionism were apparent enough to force those who created the memo to deliberately redact their denunciation of Zionism as a means of avoiding public criticism and further scrutiny. It can be suggested this was the beginning of the divide between the policies of the British government and the PWC.

The government’s decision for Jewish immigration to be temporarily stopped was made to prevent the issue becoming an unnecessary distraction from the war effort. It was never made as part of a long-term policy not to honour the Balfour Declaration and support for a Jewish home in Palestine remained the objective. As Ayles had previously told the other

41 William A. Albright and others ‘Palestine Watching Committee: Settlement for Palestine’. p.50
42 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 637.5, Palestine Watching Committee Report, April 1938 to April 1939
PWC members, Jewish immigration would continue to be supported by the government.\(^{43}\)

The PWC’s request for a ‘temporary cessation’ to Jewish immigration was carefully worded. The memo ensured a certain amount of diplomatic flexibility when communicating with government officials. However, the negative reaction to the Partition of Palestine and pro-Arab stance suggested that responding to Arab concerns was the priority of the PWC. A ‘temporary’ denial of Jews entering Palestine only delayed an inevitable ideological clash. The PWC would not support the development of a Jewish home in Palestine, but the British government adamantly continued to do so. Quakers disapproved of the heavy-handed approach to the Arab Revolt by British forces whilst remaining supportive of the mandate; however, the government’s support of a Jewish national home was a fundamental conflict of interest and the first significant crack in Quaker-government relations over Palestine.

There appeared to be a grave concern amongst Quakers who wrote into the *Friend* that mass immigration into Palestine was a threat to peace in the area. This was heavily due to a deep suspicion of the intentions of the Jewish immigrants who supported Zionism. Mary Pumphrey stated that Zionist Jews, through gaining more land in Palestine, were in danger of ‘losing their own souls’.\(^{44}\) Oliver, in his correspondence, expressed his concern by stating, ‘Arabs have no problems with Jews but want to crush Zionism’.\(^{45}\) Jones, like Oliver, also made the exact same point.\(^{46}\) This concern regarding the influence Zionism held over Jews was even mentioned by Kappes, who despite supporting immigration, referred to the disturbed and militant mentality Zionism had created in the Jewish community.\(^{47}\) The individual accounts of Quakers suggested that the rejection of Zionism was partly based on a theological stance, whereby their supersessionist interpretation of the New Testament did not support the Jewish return to Palestine. Some British Quakers appeared motivated by the teachings of supersessionism and millenarianism in their criticism of Old Testament history.

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\(^{43}\) Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS S11.2.1, British Commonwealth Peace Federation Correspondence - 30 December 1936

\(^{44}\) Mary E. Pumphrey, *East Wind in Palestine*. p.80

\(^{45}\) The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Walter H. Ayles - 10 March 1937 p.3

\(^{46}\) Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind* p.23

\(^{47}\) Heinz Kappes, *War or Peace in Palestine*. p.880
regarding Zionist claims to return to Palestine. The homecoming of Jews to Palestine in some Christian circles, such as fundamental evangelicalism, is interpreted as being crucial to the second coming of Christ. Supersessionism and millenarianism employed an opposing opinion regarding the Jewish return to the Holy Land. Supersessionism was a theologically conditioned reading of the New Testament that supports the messianic vision rejected by Jews whereby salvation would come through following the teachings of Jesus Christ. The founder of the Society of Friends, George Fox, was himself deeply swayed by millenarianism, with its doctrine of divine intervention and resurrection of Jesus to rule over all people. This inspired Fox to tell his followers, the Quakers, that they were surrogate rulers for Christ.

By contrast, British Quakers, such as Roger Soltau, who was a member of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting and lecturer at the American University in Beirut, having previously taught in Bristol and served in the FAU from 1915-1919, described their admiration of the lack of clergy and status in Islam, and ultimately the focus on personal experience provided much that was attractive to Quakers about the faith. Mary Sime and Daniel Oliver also spoke of the immense privilege they felt watching the Muslim prayer. This view of Islam across the Middle East was evident in the 19th century, with religious writers and critics emphasizing the shared histories of Christianity and Islam. Quakers shared views of a static and unchanging East, Biblical allusions, and romanticized ideas of the noble Bedouin, all of which were products of orientalism. Enaya Othman, in her study of Quaker missionaries in Palestine, described how after World War I, those who visited Palestine romanticised it as the land of the Bible with its people (the Palestinians) the living embodiments of those who existed in the time of Jesus Christ. Christina Jones, upon her arrival to Palestine in 1922, remarked how reading her Bible made her realise just how close to the land the people of

52 Enaya Othman, ‘Meeting at Middle Ground: American Quaker Women’s Two Palestinian Encounters’. p.48
Palestine always lived. Likewise, Mary Sime described Galilee being as fascinating as it was 2000 years ago. Christian missionaries positively viewed local Arab women’s dress when put into a Biblical context and regarded this, along with their hospitality, as a continuance of Jesus’ mother Mary’s culture. The Palestinians and the land they lived on (the Orient) was synonymous with antiquity, boundless distance and even a timeless unchanging eternity. It provided a mystique that, within the Biblical perspective, Quakers greatly admired and were sympathetic towards. Sime described her awe at seeing the Bedouin tribe across a rolling limestone landscape, stating that the sense of mysticism they represented would be shattered by the appearance of several different Western influences, one of which would be the sight of a Jewish Kibbutz. Sime displayed a double standard regarding tradition and modernity. In an article in the *Friends Quarterly* and personal correspondence she described her delight at how anglicized Palestine and Alexandria in Egypt, where she was previously based, had become. Yet when a Jewish Kibbutz was built, this had ‘shattered’ the mysticism of Arabia that she had fondly remembered.

Christina Jones further expressed her frustration at what she viewed as the unfair and unjust support of Zionism over the claims of Arabs by stating:

*In its simplest terms, it is a situation in which the inalienable rights of the people in Palestine, derived from centuries of continuous living in and possession of the land, are being denied them to satisfy the ephemeral rights of a people whose ancestors lived there for a relatively brief span in the history of that land and who were expelled from it nearly two thousand years ago. If such a claim can be seriously recognized and other countries followed suit, our world would be a topsy-turvy one indeed. The Palestinians are being told that they cannot set the clock back thirty years or so, but the Zionists get support for turning the clock back 2,000 years.*

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53 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.26
55 Enaya Othman, 'Meeting at Middle Ground: American Quaker Women’s Two Palestinian Encounters'. p.55
57 E. Mary Sime Papers, 1950, TEMP MSS 990.1, Wandering in Galilee - March 1950
59 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.28
As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, there were Quakers who employed negative stereotypical views of Arabs. However, when viewing them in an orientalist context, Arabs were often far more warmly received than Zionist Jews. Stereotyping was also used by certain individual Quakers to validate their disapproval of Zionism. Wilfred Allott, who was a British Quaker based in Leeds, argued in the *Friend* that Jews had ‘a very limited right’ to claim Palestine as their homeland and was fearful of a Jewish conquest. Allott argued ‘It is a warning to us to see how men of Liberal and Socialist convictions, especially if they are Jews, will support this forceful occupation’. The actions of men of leftist political ideology concerned Allott, but it was his comment regarding ‘if they were Jews’ that suggested he held a certain suspicion of Jews as a people. Likewise, the American Quaker James Sutton, who was Acting Clerk of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting in 1935, questioned European Jews’ ‘newly found rights’ to enter Palestine and establish a Jewish state.

Deeper than this outer veneer of culture there remains the problem of the Jews as a nation set apart. It was the glory of their religion that they were a chosen people, to be kept undefiled by the Gentile. Persecutions by European Christians through the ages have deepened their protective separateness. The world has learned a certain degree of religious tolerance. Can it also learn to tolerate a culture which does not assimilate? Starting as a much persecuted group, Friends have remained a separate people in those matters which have a bearing on their religious faith, but in other affairs they have been able to enter wholeheartedly into the life of their neighbours.

Sutton argued that Quakers started as a persecuted group just like the Jews but that they had successfully assimilated with those who were not of the same faith in the areas in which they were living. Jews by contrast continued to remain intolerant in this regard, according to Sutton. His comment regarding the world learning a certain degree of religious tolerance was highly incorrect. European Jews were suffering one of the most infamous periods of religious persecution in European history. Sutton appeared ignorant of how rampant the persecution of Jews living in Europe was becoming. Furthermore, although the Syria and

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60 Wilfred Allott, ‘Jews in Palestine’. p.706  
61 ibid. p.706  
63 ibid. p.599
Palestine Yearly Meeting declared its unwillingness to take affirmative action, Sutton’s comments suggested that, like the views of several PWC members, he deemed Zionism as theologically weak and antithetical to peace in the region. Although other Quakers did not draw a direct comparison between themselves and Jews, the issue of whether Jews would assimilate or conquer remained a talking point.

Pumphrey suggested that the dominant nature by which Jews interacted with Arabs would hinder their ability to assimilate, describing how Arabs could not cope with the self-assertive nature of Jews.64 Wadi R. Tazari, the Headmaster at the Birzut High School for Boys, in an article published in the Friend, also expressed concerns over the ability of Jews to assimilate. Both Tazari and Christina Jones also claimed that Jewish intentions were not to integrate but rather to conquer. They both referred to a comment made by Chaim Weizmann, the future first president of Israel, who was once quoted as saying, ‘Palestine is to become as Hebrew as England is English and America is American’ to validate their stance.65 There was a genuine fear amongst some Quakers of the threat posed by Zionism and how it could destabilise the region. Norman Bentwich, the Jewish-British politician, dismissed this concern in the Friend, stating that the colonisation of Palestine was not the Zionist ambition. He argued that the phrase ‘Palestine as Jewish as England is English’ was used many years ago and since then Weizmann had recognised that a bi-national state was the way forward to create peace.66 Bentwich questioned Tazari and Sutton’s opinion that Jews would not be capable of assimilating. He argued that the opposite was true in Europe - that they frequently assimilated too well - and this was one of the primary motives behind the persecution carried out by the Nazis in Germany.67

64 Mary E. Pumphrey, 'Threefold Task in Palestine'. p.79
65 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.43; Wadi R. Tazari, 'Jews in Palestine - the Arab Point of View'. p.647
66 Norman Bentwich, 'The Jews and Palestine - a Reply to the Arabs'. p.669
67 ibid. p.670
3.4. Criticism of pro-Jew articles in the *Friend*

Bentwich’s defence of the intentions of Jews immigrating to Palestine was an attempt to quell concerns displayed in the *Friend* but he immediately received disapproval for his support of Jews entering Palestine. Wilfred Allott criticised Bentwich’s article as a ‘suave defence of conquest by a Professor of International Relations!’\(^6\) Likewise, an article produced by the British Quaker Peter Scott that supported the economic benefits of Jewish immigration was heavily criticised by Pumphrey, for its understanding and sympathy towards Jewish but not Arab needs.\(^6\) A Jewish reply to the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo was sent to the *Friend* by Israel Cohen. Cohen argued that British Quakers grossly exaggerated the Arab concerns of being a minority and stressed that Palestine was more than capable of hosting significant numbers of Jewish immigrants and refugees.\(^7\) Despite how heated the debate was becoming the editor of the *Friend*, Hubert W. Peet, still posted the response of Jews such as Cohen as well as an article by Martha Steinitz, ensuring that the debate could continue and enable the readership to understand both sides of the argument. Steinitz questioned Allott’s opinion that the Jewish people’s historical right to Palestine was limited, emphasising that Jewish colonialists had both assimilated and brought greater prosperity to their Arab neighbours.\(^7\) She also stated that ‘my Jewish relatives, complain that Palestine-based Quakers so far did not respond to their appeal for co-operation and conciliation.’\(^7\) Steinitz’s disappointment that Quakers in Palestine were unresponsive to her Jewish relatives’ request for cooperation suggested that they were unwilling to engage with Jews in the region. Though there are no comments from Quakers to validate this accusation, there was indeed resistance to the actions of Zionist Jews displayed by individual Quakers (Totah, Pumphrey, Oliver and Kappes) who lived in, or near to Palestine at the time. Like Bentwich and Scott’s articles, Steinitz soon received criticism through the *Friend* for her stance. Paul and Irene Mauger, who lived in Palestine for three

\(^6\) Wilfred Allott, ‘Jews in Palestine’. p.706
\(^7\) Israel Cohen, ‘A Jewish Reply to the Friends’ Memorandum’. pp.116-17
\(^7\) Martha Steinitz, ‘Jews in Palestine’. p.708
\(^7\) ibid. p.708
years (including the Arab riots of 1929), supported Allott’s criticism of the Jewish right to Palestine being false and argued that Jews such as Steinitz needed to stop forcing this claim on others. Importantly, the Maugers did not dismiss Steinitz’s claim that Quakers in Palestine were unwilling to cooperate. Whether Steinitz meant cooperate with Zionist Jews specifically or all Jews cannot be determined, but it can be suggested that a number of Quakers both in the UK and particularly in Palestine were heavily against Zionism and shared concerns regarding Jewish assimilation.

The negativity towards pro-Zionist articles was most fervently demonstrated by the criticism levelled against the British Quaker Carl Heath, who was the only Quaker contributor to the *Friend* who actively celebrated the birth of Israel. As the previous pro-immigration authors in the *Friend* had experienced, Heath received heavy criticism from fellow Quaker Reginald Reynolds in his own article. Reynolds’ pacifist values were greatly influenced by meeting the leader of the Indian independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi. Reynolds became Secretary of the No More War movement, and registered as a conscientious objector whilst working for the Friends Relief Service during the Second World War. Published just one week after Heath’s article, Reynolds said, ‘there certainly seems to be no point in refusing to recognise a fact’ that Israel had been created, but argued that Heath’s enthusiasm for the present situation was not warranted. Reynolds’ comment regarding there being no point in ‘refusing to recognise a fact’ suggested he had previously wanted to avoid acknowledging Israel’s creation but was left with no choice but to do so. Reynolds also stated in his article that, for Quakers:

> Our interest in this sinister repetition of Old Testament history should surely centre not on the picturesque fulfilment of a prophecy but on the vast new problems created and our responsibility for them. The need for Arab relief should not need to be stressed. There is also a continued need to ease pressure of future Jewish emigration to Palestine by working for the relaxation of restrictions here and in other countries. If we do not take this latter step we may be faced with further war and

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75 Reginald Reynolds, *The State of Israel*. p.74
misery in the Near East, should an expanding Jewish population embark upon those schemes of conquest of which many Zionists have long talked.76

His sarcastic comment regarding the ‘picturesque fulfilment of a prophecy’ and the creation of Israel as a ‘sinister repetition of Old Testament history’ was not only completely at odds with Heath’s interpretation but also dismissed the establishment of a Jewish state, as well as the ideas behind it. The vitriol by which Reynolds described the creation of Israel indicated a deep resentment that the actions of Zionist Jews had helped them to successfully establish a new Jewish state in Palestine. Heath later responded, ‘I wrote upon the advent of the new State of Israel, not in enthusiasm, as one Friend then suggested, but as an object realism’.77 Reynolds’ criticism of Heath’s support for the Zionist movement represented a clash between two Quakers who were both ardent pacifists. As revealed by the biographical index, both men established working relationships with the leader of India’s independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi, and shared similar attitudes through working for international organisations designed to promote peace. Yet Zionism proved a divisive topic with Heath’s article creating a heated public dispute between two Friends. Reynold’s critique was the last publication of a trend that had seen both pro-immigration and pro-Zionism articles immediately criticised in the Friend from the start of the Arab Revolt in 1936 until 1948. The resistance to the few articles that supported Jewish immigration and establishment of a national home in Palestine suggested that British Quakers who wrote articles published in the Friend were quick to heavily criticise this support regardless of whether the author was a British politician, Jewish or even a fellow Quaker. By comparison the articles published in the Wayfarer magazine from 1938-1939 denounced anti-Semitism but did not show a debate amongst readers regarding Zionism.78 The Friends Quarterly followed the same path but with even fewer articles. It can be suggested that due to the Friend being the official forum for Quakers, debates were more likely to emerge than in the

76 ibid. p.75
77 Carl Heath, 'Israel's Emergence', The Friend, 107 (10 June 1949), 476-77. p.476
smaller ‘sister’ magazines. The articles in the Friend often captured individual interpretations of what was going on. The majority came from people who once visited or had lived in Palestine giving their opinions from back in Britain. During the Arab Revolt opinions between British Quakers in Britain and those living in the Middle East were similar. However, as will be demonstrated shortly, several Quakers based in the region saw their resentment and frustration grow further upon the violent birth of Israel and the subsequent lack of concern for Palestinians over several decades.

In addition to denouncing pro-immigration and pro-Zionism articles, certain British Quakers attempted to validate their disapproval by incorporating criticisms against Zionism made by prominent Jews into their arguments. The British Quaker and author, Percy Bartlett, who was imprisoned for being a conscientious objector in the First World War, shaping his desire to work for multiple peace organisations throughout his life, referred readers of the Friend to an article written by Dr Walter Zander, the Secretary of the Friends of the Hebrew University. Zander argued that his fellow Jews failed in their relations with Arabs by not compensating them due to the Jewish focus on returning to Palestine. Lucy Backhouse also referenced Zander’s article to express her disappointment at how many Jews ‘were not as moderate and wise as he’. Likewise, Dr Magnes, the former President of the Hebrew University, also received praise from both the Maugers and Christina Jones for his stance against a Jewish national home being made through force against the will of Arabs. The support given to Jews like Zander and Magnes for condemning Jews who did not understand the Arab perspective and backed the use of force was another method employed by some British Quakers to denounce Zionism, in this case referencing comments made by prominent Jews to validate their opinion that Zionism was an enemy to peace in Palestine.

Driven by religious as well as political motifs, a commonly accepted narrative amongst Western scholars, religious writers and travellers was how the Holy Land, since time

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81 Lucy B. Backhouse, ‘The Crisis in Palestine’. p.719
82 Paul Mauger, ‘Jews in Palestine’. p.785; Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.66
immemorial, had not altered, with the land and people of Palestine described through historicised difference. This in turn allowed Christian scholars to legitimise not only Biblical narratives, but also provide an intellectual reason for the Jews settling in Palestine. These contrasting orientalist perceptions of emphasizing the orient as a Biblical land and focusing on Arab culture demonstrated the robust flexibility orientalism held within Christian scholarship as a method to justify colonialism. Quakers most certainly subscribed to the orientalist idea of Palestine being a land that held an eternal and Biblical significance. However, the information provided in the *Friend* suggests there were those who did not subscribe to the theological and intellectual justification of the Jewish return. The signing of the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo was an attempt to reflect collective opinions of the PWC; however, it did not accurately represent the level of suspicion aimed towards Zionism. The condemnation of Zionism in individual articles in the *Friend*, the immediate criticism of the few articles that were sympathetic to Zionism, and even the use of Jews who criticised the actions done in the name of Zionism all suggested that numerous individual British Quakers, at least through the *Friend*, were very resistant to mass immigration into Palestine and especially the influence of Zionism on the collective Jewish attitude.

### 3.5. The terrorism paradox

During the four years after the Second World War, until the armistice was signed in 1949, the conviction with which some Quakers resisted Zionism created an inconsistency in their approach to violence. The *Reconciliation in Palestine* pamphlet by the British Quaker E.B. Castle acknowledged the strong moral claims of Zionist Jews but nonetheless opposed their mass resettlement in Palestine due to their weak political arguments concerning their return to the Promised Land. Castle argued ‘the claim that this unfading hope constitutes a political right of entry departs from all reality’. An example of this would be the duality concerning land acquisition by the Zionist movement. The territory in Palestine represented the homeland or motherland. It would help forge a collective identity amongst Jews. On the

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84 E. B. Castle, *Reconciliation in Palestine*. pp.1-11, p.6
other hand, certain areas in Palestine provided more significant security and economic benefits than others, ports such as Haifa for example. The latter was often chosen as part of a pragmatic approach by the Zionist movement to ensure stability.\textsuperscript{85} It would provide the best economic and security benefits available whilst leaving Palestinians lacking the same resources. Castle’s attempt at a measured account of the crisis contrasted to several highly critical articles published in the \textit{Friend}. In the same year, an article entitled ‘Palestine Matters’ directly blamed Zionist leaders for encouraging Jewish armed groups to murder as they had done the previous year with the assassination of the British Minister of State, Lord Moyne.\textsuperscript{86} Backhouse displayed a deep distrust of Zionism by scornfully referring to Zionist Jews as ‘usurpers’.\textsuperscript{87} The impact of Zionism created, according to another article written by Bartlett, fundamental shortcomings in the Jewish attitude.\textsuperscript{88} A clear opposition amongst individual Quakers to Zionism remained due to the violence its supporters instigated. This approach was in keeping with universal Quaker pacifist teachings. However, criticism of the force used to create Israel demonstrated a paradox in how Quakers viewed the concept of nationalism, and the struggle for a specific ethnic group to achieve freedom from their oppressors. There was a stark difference in how some British Quakers viewed the violence used by Arabs compared to that deployed by Jews, creating an inconsistency in how the two separate causes were interpreted.

During the Arab Revolt, British Quakers stood by a commitment towards pacifist values, understanding the reasons behind Arab aggression in order to see the good in every person no matter the violent acts they may have committed to their fellow human beings.\textsuperscript{89} Sydney Bailey, a British Quaker who was a conscientious objector during the Second World War and later head of the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), explained the Quaker position regarding the use of violence during the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century:

\textsuperscript{86} Unknown, ‘Palestine Matters’. p.35
\textsuperscript{87} Lucy B. Backhouse, ‘The Crisis in Palestine’. p.719
\textsuperscript{88} Percy W. Bartlett, ‘Is This the Way? A Call to the Jews’. p.272
\textsuperscript{89} Unknown, \textit{Quaker Faith and Practice: The Book of Christian Discipline of the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain}. 1.02.31
So far as I know, no branch of the Society of Friends has ever corporately supported a war against anyone. But while Quakers have themselves renounced the use of armed force, whatever the consequences for themselves and others, they understand very well why people are driven to the military method when peaceful means have not succeeded.90

Bailey’s comment concerning why people are driven to violence if peaceful means have not succeeded suggested rational flexibilities were applied to the Peace Testimony by Quakers. They were not absolute pacifists as they appreciated how people could be driven to take up arms under certain circumstances. What is significant regarding this interpretation of the use of force was how some British Quakers consistently criticised Jewish efforts to create a national home, yet Arab efforts to establish an independent state of their own were seen far more sympathetically.

The state of Israel was officially born at 4 pm, Friday, 14 May 1948, in a meeting of the National Council in the Tel Aviv Museum.91 The announcement confirmed that the aspirations of Zionist Jews to create a Jewish state within Palestine had finally come to fruition. From this time onwards the attitude of some British Quakers towards the state of Israel, and particularly Zionism, transformed from resistance to resentment. They condemned the use of violence by Jewish militias during and after the Arab-Israel conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter concerning the role of the British Mandate, British Quakers showed sympathy for the Arab resistance against the government and Jewish immigration before the Second World War, even if the opposition involved resorting to violent methods. This stance was the opposite of what was shown by individual Quakers towards Jewish arguments and efforts to establish a country of their own in Palestine. In the article ‘Palestine Matters’, which was written by a well-informed correspondent according to the editor of the Friend, the lack of condemnation by Jews towards the actions of militias such as the Stern Gang and Irgun was discussed:

91 Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism. p.586
It is difficult to generalise about the reactions of the Jewish public in Palestine towards the outrages and those committing them. Most people instinctively recoiled from the terrorists and their methods, but there was a sub-current of feeling, even among the most enlightened elements, which can be expressed by the words, ‘Terrible, of course, but our Jewish boys are showing they are not afraid. Brave lads, aren’t they?’ Official Jewish bodies issued protests every time a government building was blown up, or a policeman was killed, but it is difficult to resist the feeling that even the most responsible people were not averse to seeing whether concessions could not be exacted from the British government at the point of a revolver.92

The article suggested that Jews were not entirely against violence being used to influence political matters. Christina Jones also expressed this suspicion by claiming the Jewish Agency did not do enough to control terrorism and stated that ‘if Jewish people in the USA and other countries only understood what is being done in their name, I am sure they would take action. I must think they do not understand’.93 In her diary, the word ‘must’ was italicised to emphasise how she was trying to convince herself that this was the case when she appeared to be suspicious that Jews were apathetic to the violence and may have even supported it. Her diary entries from December 1947 until March 1948 continually referred to Jewish militias as terrorists.94 She focused much of the blame on the actions of Jewish military groups as well as the lack of condemnation demonstrated by the Jewish Agency.

Back in Britain during this period, the diaries of volunteers for Mass Observation (MO), a large-scale anthropological research project, demonstrated a hostile reaction amongst individual members of the British public towards the Palestine crisis, with an infiltration of anti-Semitic attitudes.95 Individuals with no obvious fascist connections led riots against Jewish property and synagogues in cities such as Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester peaking in August 1947.96 However, once British interests were removed from the Zionist movement because of the violence both in Palestine and at home, right-wing anti-Zionism

92 Unknown, ‘Palestine Matters’. p.35
93 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  p.84
94 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  pp.70-84
began to decline and transform into a wave of Pro-Arab sentimentalism.\textsuperscript{97} Jewish reasons and efforts to enter Palestine were referred to by individual Quakers living in Britain, at least through the \textit{Friend}, during the period and the preceding Arab Revolt, as ‘disturbed and militant’. Zionist Jews were labelled ‘usurpers’, ‘losing their own souls’, that the claims of Zionism were ‘historically and geographically illusionary’.\textsuperscript{98} There was clear resistance by some Quakers to the reasons behind the actions of Jews in Palestine but what proved equally significant was how some Quakers saw the Zionist cause so negatively and contradicted themselves in doing so. Instead of criticising Arabs for their actions during the Arab Revolt and labelling them terrorists, they had often been described as honourable people who had no other choice but to fight. Oliver epitomised this attitude by saying, ‘are these (Arabs) simply bandits out to rob and to kill? No, those men are fighting for a cause which to them is dearer than life itself’.\textsuperscript{99} By contrast, an article published by Oliver in the \textit{Friend} in 1947 repeatedly referred to Jews who used violent methods as terrorists and urged them to stop.\textsuperscript{100} Oliver and Jones, as well as several Quakers who discussed this issue in the \textit{Friend}, viewed the two groups’ causes very differently. The Arabs were fighting a noble cause worth dying for while the Jews, inspired by Zionism, were often cast as illegitimate invaders. The quote ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ has poignancy in this regard. Though there were, and still are, no universally agreed dichotomies regarding ‘terrorism’, as well as other similar terms such as ‘human rights’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘criminal responsibilities’, it can be argued that the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ are not mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{101} Much of what defines whether someone is a terrorist, or a freedom fighter depends on the outlook of those judging the methods used. Freedom fighters, or as they may also be known, guerrilla fighters, target military personnel and installations as well as government staff who actively support the military,

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\textsuperscript{97} David Cesarani, ‘Anti-Zionism in Britain, 1922-2002: Continuities and Discontinuities’. p.144
\textsuperscript{99} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Mr and Mrs Marriott C. Morris - 6 August 1938 p.2
\textsuperscript{100} Daniel Oliver, ‘Reconciliation in Palestine’. p.622
\end{flushright}
while terrorists, in addition, deliberately target civilians. Using this explanation, it can be suggested that both Arab and Jewish armed forces at certain points were engaged in terrorist activity. For Quakers, the violent methods used by either side did not provoke their sympathy or condemnation. It was the reasons behind the use of violence by Arabs and Jews that produced a clear difference in their reactions.

A key reason for this discrepancy was the continuing British Quaker support for the British government. The election of the Labour government in July 1945 with Clement Attlee serving as Prime Minister and Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary saw both men, over the following couple of years, display a far from friendly attitude towards Zionism due to the United States President Harry Truman’s support for Zionist demands. The new Labour government refused to allow survivors of the holocaust permission to settle in Palestine, which led to mounting frustration in the Jewish community. From 1943 onwards increasing levels of devastating terrorist activity by the Irgun and Stern Gang military groups occurred in Palestine. The threat posed by Zionist Jews to the future of the mandate and the assistance provided by the United States government to Zionism angered Quakers both in the UK and the Middle East. The United States of America had replaced Great Britain as the world’s leading superpower with their State Department heavily backing the creation of a Jewish national home. Christina Jones lamented over whether American officials were capable of recognising that their support of Zionism was causing such enormous problems in the region. It was not just American officials who were supportive of Zionism; several articles appeared in the US based Friends Intelligencer magazine also supporting the movement. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, British Quakers questioned the actions of their government, but they nonetheless remained supportive of the mandate for Palestine. The actions of Zionist Jews and support from a close ally in the United States

105 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.78
helped put an end to the British government's control over Palestine. It represented a part of the global collapse of the British Empire, and for those Quakers loyal to Britain the loss was profoundly felt.

3.6. Recognition and resentment

The failures to reach an agreement over the UN Partition Plan Resolution 181 (II) on 29 November 1947 immediately led to bitter fighting involving guerrilla skirmishes. The decision by the UN to approve the development of a Jewish national state was a crucial moment in the birth of Israel. However, the UN Security Council mediator, Count Bernadotte, in his progress report, described that the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moshe Shertok’s view was that the borders were an ‘irreducible minimum’. Shertok’s comment represented a strategy amongst Zionist leaders that the new Jewish state aimed to acquire more land than was initially offered by the UN. To many Arabs, the Partition Plan was one of several injustices, analysed in the previous chapter, which they endured following the Balfour Declaration of 1917. By the turn of 1948, the conflict had escalated to the point where significant geographical changes in Palestine occurred within a matter of months. Due to the subsequent exodus of Arabs from their homes in early 1948, the crisis quickly expanded beyond Palestine and into the neighbouring Arab countries of Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt.

The establishment of Israel appeared to create a division, at least privately, amongst British Quakers with Oliver describing how a prominent Quaker told him that Friends were misinformed and that the Quaker concern for the persecution Jews suffered in Europe at the hands of the Nazis meant it became ‘hard for them to see how grievously the Jews are in the wrong now that they are the oppressors’. However, it can be suggested that there

109 Margaret Arakie, *The Broken Sword of Justice: America, Israel and the Palestine Charity*. p.71
were numerous British Quakers who shared the belief that Jews had oppressed Arabs. British Quakers had previously discussed the potential establishment of Jewish colonies in alternative locations that could accept far higher numbers than Palestine.111 Uganda, Ecuador, Brazil, Madagascar, Australia, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom were all described as alternatives.112 Quakers who discussed the issue in the *Friend* often held an ‘anywhere but Palestine’ attitude when it came to Jewish immigration. This mindset was continuously underpinned by a deep distrust of Zionism. However, the creation of a Jewish national home meant the discussion was no longer relevant and, for some Quakers, their resistance transformed into discreet recognition.

Neither the British Yearly minutes nor *Friend* magazine stated an official collective Quaker opinion on the creation of Israel. Hesitancy was also shown by the British government in recognising the new Jewish state. On 17 May 1948 the British Foreign Office stated that it would not recognise Israel for the time being because it did not fulfil the ‘basic criteria’ of an independent state.113 Scorned by the terrorism implemented by Jewish armed groups the establishment of Israel became a monument to defeat.114 It left a bitter taste of failure in the mouths of government officials. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Paget Mayhew, stated on 14 June 1948 in the House of Commons that Great Britain represented ‘the great numerical majority of mankind in that we have not recognised Israel’.115 On 6 December 1948, the Labour MP Norman Smith described the state of Israel as ‘obnoxious and odious to most British working men’.116 In the same debate

111 Unknown, 'Palestine'. p.383
Mayhew expressed his belief that there were other states that were far more deserving of being recognised.\(^{117}\) However, shortly afterwards, on 29 January 1949, the British government did provide Israel with de facto recognition.\(^{118}\) Nonetheless, it remained deeply suspicious of the intentions of Israel into the 1950s.\(^{119}\) Foreign Office papers in the National Archives London contain quotes made by the Welsh politician and founder of the National Health Service (NHS) Aneurin Bevan, stating in a ‘sulky acquiescence’ that, ‘the state of Israel is now a fact, and we have not tried to undo it’.\(^{120}\) His aggrieved language reflected the attitude of those British politicians who had stood against Israel. This type of bitter terminology was like that used by the British Quaker Reginald Reynolds who also stated that it was a ‘fact’ that Israel existed but, like Bevan, did so through gritted teeth.

British Quakers, at least officially as a collective, appeared to distance themselves from the pro or anti-Zionist stances that were dividing British missionary groups in the region. Anglican clergymen as well as Christian evangelicals were predominantly opposed to Zionism but Church of Scotland missionaries, like the Quakers, adopted a strict neutral position over the issue, at least publicly.\(^{121}\) The post-war years saw Christian theology begin to recognise ‘spiritual Israel’ with supersessionist doctrine being critically examined as part of a philo-Semitic turn by Protestant churches worldwide.\(^{122}\) Groups who believed in Christ’s return to the Holy Land, also known as the second coming, such as the pre-millennial dispensationalist, evangelical fundamentalist, and messianic Christian movements as well as those that followed the liberal Protestant interpretations of the Bible, welcomed the return of the Jews to the Holy Land. However, evangelical missionaries in the Middle East


\(^{119}\) Miriam Haron, ‘Britain and Israel, 1948-1950’. p.221

\(^{120}\) Natan Airdan, *Britain, Israel and Anglo-Jewry, 1949-1957*. p.10


recognised Arab national claims to Palestine.¹²³ This polarisation was identified by Christina Jones’ husband Willard, who argued that there was close to a ‘complete dearth’ of productive critical thinking on the matter. He stated that ‘Some can see only the hand of God in the setting up of Israel. Others are blind except for the suffering of the Arabs’.¹²⁴

British Quakers were witnessing a unique event where two ‘others’ were competing for one territory. This complication led not only to conflicting individual interpretations but a dilemma concerning faith, nationality and ideology. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Daniel Oliver questioned why British Quakers did not utilise the power of the printed press.¹²⁵ Almost half of the Quakers in the biographical index graduated from universities, and the majority of those who did not attend a higher education institution still wrote to the Friend, or other Quaker publications, though there was a lack of analysis regarding the conflict in the British-based Friends Quarterly and Wayfarer magazines. The articles in the Wayfarer and Friends Quarterly focused mainly on educational activities in the Friends Schools, the Nobel Peace Prize or relief work. The Friend remained a reliable platform for Quakers to discuss the war between Arabs and Jews. 32 out of 36 of the people in the biographical index published articles in the Friend.¹²⁶ Though not all the articles were concerned specifically with Zionism and Israel, the majority of Quakers who wrote to the Friend did give their opinions on the conflict. Many of the Quakers analysed did not show an inability to discuss the issue, rather it was divisions over the birth of Israel amongst Quakers, and the Christian community as a whole, that appears to have created a hesitation to clarify their position as a collective, and therefore openly express it in the non-Quaker printed press.

Once British Quakers began humanitarian work in December 1949, predominantly in Gaza under the umbrella of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), which will be

¹²⁴ ibid. p.191
¹²⁵ Lettice Jowitt and Paul D. Sturge, Daniel Oliver and Emily, His Wife p.23; The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, News Items from Palestine and the Lebanon - 10 July 1947 p.3
¹²⁶ Christina Jones, Kanty Cooper, Emily Oliver and Howard Wriggins were the exceptions.
examined in detail in the following chapter, field workers soon sympathised with the Palestine Arab refugees’ status as victims and their cause for political recognition that they were wronged. Despite this stance, no Quakers in the AFSC publicly questioned the legitimacy of Israel or accused the new Jewish state of ending Christian civilisation in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{127} The rise of Protestant philo-Semitism halted the chance of missionary-humanitarian workers speaking out on behalf of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{128} However, public criticism regarding Israel’s treatment of Palestinians was demonstrated by AFSC volunteer Mary Sime. Sime directly compared the treatment of the Arab population during the birth of Israel to the ‘extinguishing of the Red Indians by the economic advance of the white race in America’.\textsuperscript{129} Her bold statement, published in the \textit{Friend} on 27 January 1950, of the ‘extinguishing’ of the Native Americans by Western colonialists directly compared their experiences to that of the Palestinians, laying the blame firmly on the new state of Israel. Less than a month later an article entitled, ‘A million Jews in Israel’, was published in the \textit{Oxford Times} detailing a lecture Sime gave on 24 February 1950, that argued that Jews had been ‘shelving’ the Arab refugee problem because they were too focused on their own interests.\textsuperscript{130} A response was sent a week later to the publication by Shimon Applebaum from Oxford. Applebaum argued that both Sime and the Quakers did not attempt to understand the Jewish perspective due to their support of Arabs:

\begin{quote}
It is regrettable that most of the members of the Society of Friends whom I have encountered, and who have been to Palestine, seem only to have ascertained the Arab angle. Their humanitarianism, which I deeply respect, seems to prejudice them against small peoples fighting for the same normal rights of language, culture, economic security and country that they themselves unconsciously enjoy, and causes them to accuse such peoples of “narrow-minded nationalism”.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{128} G. Daniel Cohen, 'Elusive Neutrality: Christian Humanitarianism and the Question of Palestine, 1948-1967'. p.204
\textsuperscript{129} Mary Sime, 'Arab and Jew in Israel', \textit{The Friend}, 108 (27 January 1950), 61-62. p.62
Applebaum’s accusation that ‘most’ Quakers he had met supported Arabs demonstrated the influence visiting or living in the region could have. The Arab Revolt was referred to by several Quakers as a form of resistance that was created due to Arabs not being granted sovereignty over their own state. Zionism and the Jewish right to an independent nation sought the same objective but, according to some British Quakers, were based on politically and theologically weak arguments, and according to Applebaum, deemed as ‘narrow-minded’. From analysing the personal accounts and articles in various Quaker publications it can be suggested that control and lack of influence was a significant reason behind this discrepancy. Due to Arabs receiving a lack of education, mainly due to the Ottoman Empire and mandate government ensuring this was the case, Arabs were perceived by many of the British Quakers analysed as needing assistance in areas such as education, labour, and even hygiene, a subaltern class who could be helped and even learn to appreciate certain Western values. European Jews by contrast were not in need of any such education or assistance; like Quakers they had succeeded in earning significant levels of wealth despite their small numbers. Daniel Oliver described how many Jewish refugees were from the professional classes. There were Jewish refugees who lived in poverty, especially after multiple pogroms and the holocaust, but it can still be suggested they did not require, nor were open to, Quaker influence in educational or cultural matters. As mentioned earlier, there was a concern amongst Quakers as to the ‘self-assertive’ nature of Jews. Their direct approach to solving problems would be in some way too much for Arabs to cope with, though it appeared this issue could also be applied to British Quakers living in the region. Whether the Jewish refugees trying to enter Palestine were from professional or working classes, the theological and cultural differences between British Quakers and Jews meant opportunities to support, or even mould Jews towards a British-Christian perspective were not available. This created significant tensions between British Quakers and Jews entering Palestine.

Elfan Rees, a Welsh churchman who was a World Council of Churches (WCC) envoy, visited the Middle East in November 1949. In his internal report to the WCC, Rees was very

132 Daniel Oliver, ‘Refugees: Their Right to Live’. p.603
surprised to find local Christian leaders demonstrating a lack of communion with Jews in the Arab world. He praised the work of Christian missionaries and field workers but argued that their sympathy for the Arab cause produced ‘forms of very positive anti-Semitism’. The report from Rees demonstrated an issue that appeared to influence Christian missionary-humanitarian workers - that once they had witnessed the refugee crisis for themselves, they soon developed pro-Arab anti-Semitic points of view. In Sime’s case, her public lecture did not appear to be anti-Semitic as she neither stereotyped nor dismissed the Zionist claim to the Holy Land; her anger stemmed from the methods used to create Israel. Romirowsky and Joffe, in their analysis of the AFSC, concluded that as an organisation it could not be accused of anti-Semitism. British Quakers as a collective in the British Yearly Meeting, as well as the individuals involved in the AFSC’s operations, showed an awareness of how supporting the Arab cause could directly lead to allegations of anti-Semitism amongst missionaries, as was argued by Rees. This awareness resulted in a lacuna of material in the Friend during the 1950s regarding British Quaker opinion on Israel. However, from the 1970s onwards several memoirs written by British Quakers who lived in the region during the birth of Israel were published. It can be suggested this was not just coincidence. 1967 proved to be a pivotal moment in collective Christian attitudes towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. The annexation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza was soon followed by condemnation in Christian circles. This shift in opinion amongst the Christian community was parallel to a change in attitude by ‘Third World’ constituencies, their anti-colonial supporters in the West and even the United Nations. The shift in international focus away from the Israeli narrative to that of the Palestinians instead allowed those Quakers who had witnessed the conflict first-hand to publicly state their opinions, often for the first time.

Jewish immigration into Palestine and the birth of Israel

The arguments made in the memoirs of multiple British Quakers suggested that their concerns about Zionism and the violent methods by which Israel was created not only remained but, in some cases, increased. Yet this information was only made available several decades later, indicating hesitancy from some Quakers to openly give their opinions for fear of criticism from British Jews, government officials, and citizens who supported Israel. Christina Jones’ memoir, *The Untempered Wind*, offered a unique individual recollection of her experiences in Palestine. It combined both her diary entries written at the time with her memories of the crisis written almost 30 years later. In her memoirs, she referenced the comments of several Zionist leaders, including Menachem Begin who was the former head of the Irgun. Jones paraphrased Begin’s comments in his book, *The Revolt*, that stated due to the, ‘maddened uncontrolled stampede of 635,000 Arabs’ the political and economic importance of the mass migration could not be over-estimated. Jones used Begin’s comment to demonstrate her resentment at what she believed was a sense of glee from Begin that the departure was so beneficial in creating the state of Israel. Jones also referred to a conversation between James G. McDonald, the first United States Ambassador to Israel, and Chaim Weizmann. Weizmann described the mass flight of Arabs from their homes as a, ‘miraculous simplification of Israel’s tasks.’ Scornfully, Jones wrote that, ‘If the use of violence and terrorism against an unprotected people and creating panic constitutes a miracle, then he (Weizmann) was right’. She argued that Israel’s quest to establish a state from the Nile to the Euphrates had been well documented. She repeatedly mentioned the disparity between Arabs and Jews regarding influence in the printing press; the influence of Jews on the media in so many countries meant that both Arabs and the mandate itself constantly faced criticism. Her diary entries and memoirs were highly critical of both Zionism and the violence produced in its name; however, it is

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139 ibid.p.130

140 ibid.p.84

141 ibid. p.51-52, p.62 & p.124
also important to put her opinions in context. Jones spent much of her life in Palestine either living in a war zone or in an area that was on the brink of war, yet she was still expected to carry out her duties as a teacher in the Friends School. She commented how it was a bizarre feeling to be, 'sitting on the rim of a volcano and yet carrying on as if we were in a meadow and all were well with the world'.

The Jonses cared deeply for their students, watching them grow up into young adults and describing their sorrow at the murders of three of their most promising Alumni. The regularity of bombings in Jerusalem and nearby towns such as Haifa and Jaffa forced Arabs into Ramallah to seek any available shelter, including the Friends School. As a result, her opinions were directly affected by her circumstances, which in this case were witnessing the birth of a new country in Palestine and the subsequent expulsion of over 500,000 Arabs from their homes.

The brutality of Jewish paramilitary units such as the Irgun and Stern Gang substantially helped in the evacuation of Palestinians from their villages, with the Deir Yassin massacre on 9 April 1948 becoming one of the most infamous and pivotal moments in the conflict. A confidential report from the British Foreign Office was sent to government representatives across the world on 19 August 1948:

Although the flight of many of these refugees from their homes was precipitous and panic-stricken the primary blame for their exodus must lie with the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang...The intimidation has often taken the form of murdering innocent people, bomb throwing and destruction of property. These acts culminated in the murder of some 200 of the whole population, men, women and children, in the village of Deir Yassin in April by Irgun and the Stern Gang. Haganah, while dissociating itself from terrorism, has also pursued a course of action which caused the Arabs to flee their homes.

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142 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind* p.54
143 Christina Jones, *Friends in Palestine*. p.102
144 ibid. p.107
At the time of the Deir Yassin massacre Jones said ‘it is almost more than one can bear to be so near such a great human tragedy and such sheer brutality’.\(^{147}\) Colin Shindler, in his book, *A History of Modern Israel*, claimed that Irgun ill-discipline caused the massacre and that the event was used as part of a megaphone war by the Arab media, thus creating the catalyst for ‘the psychosis of flight’. It was only when Zionist leadership learned of this that they too began to exploit it for their cause.\(^{148}\) However, Jones stated in her diary entry on 14 April, written only five days after the massacre, that the perpetrators of Deir Yassin initially utilised the megaphone war: ‘We hear that the terrorists are driving through Jerusalem streets using loudspeakers to warn the people to leave or Deir Yassin will be their fate also’.\(^{149}\) According to Jones’ diary entry, the ‘psychosis’ which led many Palestinians to flee their homes was created by the exploitation of the Deir Yassin massacre by those who committed it. Jones’ recollection of her experience through her diary entries demonstrated the great apprehension she felt over the conflict. She had not forgotten her experience and referenced Menachem Begin’s autobiography in her own memoir published almost 30 years later to reinforce both her memories and arguments that the violence was instigated by Zionist Jews.

Kanty Cooper, a former sculptor, had gained previous experience in aid work within Quaker relief teams during the Spanish Civil War and in post-war Germany. From 1953, she undertook relief work in Transjordan, and later published her memoir, *The Uprooted*, in 1979, in which she stated that she saw, ‘no justification for establishing one persecuted people by the deprivation of another’.\(^{150}\) Cooper’s statement regarding the lack of justification was both complicated and dangerous. On the one hand, her comment that a group should not succeed at the expense of the other appeared morally rational, but her belief in ‘no justification’ suggested that she, like Reynolds, Allott and other individual British Quakers did not believe in the idea or support the development of a Jewish national state. Another British Quaker, Eleanor Aitken, who was responsible for an exchange

\(^{147}\) Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.89
\(^{149}\) Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.89
\(^{150}\) Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. p.137
programme between Palestinian and British students in the 1970s, stated that at a Quaker Meeting in Yorkshire she spoke to an elderly lady who was a former headmistress at the Friends Girls School in Ramallah during the conflict. The lady confessed to Aitken that despite seeing many Arab refugees fleeing the towns of Lydda and Ramle, she could not bring it upon herself to tell her friends back in England what she witnessed as it was not appropriate to do so. Aitken stated that she could have wept over the response of the former headmistress as it symbolised to her a concern amongst Quakers at the time not to speak the truth of what really happened in Palestine.\textsuperscript{151} Aitken’s memoir, which was published in 1999, not only criticised Zionism but the ‘smokescreen’ over what happened to the Arabs when Israel was born, expressing her frustrations that so few spoke of what happened during the conflict.\textsuperscript{152} She continually expressed her disappointment that people in the United Kingdom did not realise what had occurred; this was due to a fear amongst those who witnessed the violence being too concerned by the negative responses they might have received from several quarters of British society. One Quaker who did not hesitate to give their opinion was Frank Edmead. Edmead worked for the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) in the Second World War and later as a senior journalist for the \textit{Guardian} newspaper. Creating an editorial line on Palestine, Edmead argued that Zionism appeared to be another European colonial movement and that Palestinians were being punished as a result of the wickedness of European Christians. His argument was credited in producing a ‘dialectical half-nelson from which no subsequent \textit{Guardian} leader-writer was able to escape’.\textsuperscript{153} He left his position at the \textit{Guardian} soon after but his influence on his fellow journalists to include the Palestinian perspective was credited in altering the newspaper’s trajectory.\textsuperscript{154}

Herbert Dobbing, a British Quaker who during the First World War was a conscientious objector who was forcibly enlisted in the military, court-martialled for disobedience and served three prison sentences, would eventually become Principal of the Quaker School in

\textsuperscript{151} Eleanor Aitken, \textit{Ariadne's Thread}, (Cambridge: Cornelian Press, 1999). p.155
\textsuperscript{152} ibid. p.92
\textsuperscript{154} ibid.
Brummana, Lebanon, during the 1940s and 1950s. Dobbing provided another example of someone who was unwilling to divulge his true feelings at the time, but in his case, this created a pent-up frustration that would later become the most controversial observation of any British Quaker. Dobbing’s book, *Cause for Concern*, published in 1970 stated that the support of the United States government and subsequent birth of Israel were the ‘rape of Palestine’. For a Quaker to use such incendiary language highlighted how, even with hindsight, the birth of Israel was still a source of much resentment. Menachem Begin, who had previously been criticised by Christina Jones, was also criticised by Dobbing, who referred to a comment Begin had allegedly made regarding Deir Yassin. Begin was quoted to have said the massacre was ‘not only justified, but there would not have been a state of Israel without the victory at Deir Yassin.’ Regardless of whether Begin made this specific comment or not, Dobbing believed it. This only served to strengthen his criticism of Israel with his analysis being the most critical assessment of Israel by any British Quaker who had lived during the crisis. Importantly, though, his thoughts only became public knowledge, just like other individuals, from the 1970s onwards. Dobbing wrote 15 articles published both in the *Friend* and the *Wayfarer* during the 1950s, which solely focused on work at the Brummana School and never discussed Israel once. His hesitancy in giving his exact thoughts at the time of the crisis provided another example of how some British Quakers felt unable, particularly in public, to display their true and often negative opinions towards Zionism and the birth of Israel.

### 3.7. Conclusion

British Quakers, though very sympathetic to the suffering of Jews in Europe, were concerned with large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and opposed Zionism for

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156 Herbert Dobbing, *Cause for Concern: A Quaker’s View of the Palestine Problem*. p.52

157 ibid. p.29

multiple reasons: a desire for the British Mandate to maintain its authority due to a belief in Britain’s ability to keep the peace and ensure British citizens, including Quakers, could still live in the region; a deep sympathy for the Arab position in Palestine due to failed British promises for independence as well as the great threat to Arab livelihoods from Jewish immigrants; theological arguments inspired by supersessionism that dismissed the Jewish right to return and threatened the spiritual landscape of the Holy Land; and anger at the violent means by which the new Jewish state was to be created, which contradicted Quaker pacifist values and demonstrated how the Peace Testimony was not equally applied to both Arab and Jewish causes.

Zionist Jews represented a threat to peace in Palestine and this created suspicion amongst British Quakers. The assessments that focused on the consequences for the Arab population were pragmatic and justifiable. However, there were others condemning the assertiveness of the Jewish character and their collective inabilities to assimilate that came across as anti-Semitic. Mourning the deaths of young people who individual Quakers cared for from their educational and almost paternal endeavours, to then show anger towards the perceived perpetrators, was an understandable response. Therefore, subsequent criticism of Jewish militias should not automatically be considered anti-Semitic but rather a reaction of those in grief. It was the distrust and criticism of Jewish claims to the Holy Land and negative stereotyping of the Jewish character that was anti-Semitic. The PWC and several prominent individuals based in Palestine could not align themselves with the varying political interests of the British government. The lack of recognition of Arab grievances combined with theological tensions over the Zionist movement created not only fractures with the British government, but cracks in Quaker thinking.

As a collective, British Quaker organisations appeared shrewd when displaying their opinions publicly. The PWC’s ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo was muted in its criticism of Zionism compared to the individual articles written in the Friend at the time. This discreet approach to the issue was later demonstrated by the British Yearly Meeting’s neutrality, which mirrored the actions of the British government following the creation of Israel, as well as the memoirs of several Quakers that only after many decades had passed, openly criticised Zionism and the creation of Israel publicly. Contemporary historian and leading
Jewish immigration into Palestine and the birth of Israel

expert in the field of memory studies, Wulf Kansteiner, described how members of small
groups who have been in direct contact with traumatic events can only shape the national
memory if their visions match the political as well as social objectives of key social groups,
such as political parties, or elites.\textsuperscript{159} For those British Quakers who witnessed the conflict
first-hand in the late 1940s, their individual trauma was magnified through living in a
country whose society and government were, for the following two decades (1950s and
1960s) unaware or even unwilling to appreciate the Palestinian narrative. Once the
opportunity to describe their memories from the 1970s onwards finally materialised, the
involuntary silence had manifested into highly critical and resentful descriptions towards the
state of Israel. As the famous psychoanalyst Carl Jung once said. ‘Everyone carries a shadow,
and the less it is embodied in the individual’s conscious life, the black and denser it is’.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Findings Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies’,
4. An analysis of the ideological objectives and practical outcomes of Quaker relief work in Palestine, 1948-1955

4.1. Introduction

Immediately after the UN Partition Plan was announced, Palestinians began to flee their homes due to the conflict between Jewish militias and Arab forces. The Partition Plan divided Palestine into separate states, one Arab and the other Jewish. Referred to as ‘the nakba’ or catastrophe by Arabs, over 500,000 would eventually flee their homes to live in refugee camps scattered across the West Bank, Gaza, and several neighbouring countries. This chapter will begin with a focus on how Quakers prepared for their involvement with Arab refugees in the late 1940s. It will suggest that, despite lacking certain resources, many Quakers arriving in Palestine for the first time held a highly confident attitude. An analysis of the tensions between ideals and practice will demonstrate how the demands of implementing ambitious objectives created relief endeavours that were discordant with humanitarian and political requirements in the region. Though previous research has relied on the experiences of American Quakers, this chapter will add the neglected accounts of their British counterparts as they provide quite differing experiences. These differences eventually led to a paradigm shift in the approach of Quakers following the end of major operations in 1951. American Friends focused on peacebuilding activities whilst their British counterparts collaborated with other like-minded relief organisations as part of a ‘Christian duty’ to succour Arabs in need.

4.2. Strangers in a foreign land

Our knowledge of Palestine was mostly of the biblical country of our Sunday-school days, and we knew almost nothing of the modern Palestine, of its history since Old Testament times, of its language, of the people who were presently living in it. In fact our ignorance far, far exceeded our knowledge.¹

The above quote from Christina Jones described her first impressions of Palestine upon her arrival in 1922. In the following decades she developed an admiration for the Arab language

¹ Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  p.3
and culture. However, there were Quakers who had never visited the Middle East prior to the refugee crisis. Kanty Cooper expressed her frustration upon her arrival in Jordan at being hastily taught classical Arabic instead of the ‘vulgar’ colloquial Arabic she required, and that she was only interested in the quickest means of communication.² Jorgen Milwertz, who volunteered for the AFSC, described how, just before his arrival, he had never seen an Arab, with his opinions of them based on an unreliable mixture of Arabian Nights, Khalil Gibran, and T.E. Lawrence’s memoirs.³ The lack of experience or prior knowledge of the Middle East amongst Quakers as well as relief workers from other organisations created a culture shock. In the first half of the 20th century relief work and teaching was also built around ending anguish and educational opportunities; however, the influence of colonialism and paternalism was also apparent.⁴ Words such as ‘simple’ and ‘primitive’ were sometimes used to describe Arabs.⁵ These words were not always served with negative connotations in mind. They were occasionally used to describe the farming methods of Arabs or their gracious hospitality. For Quakers, the Arab reaction to their experience as refugees created responses ranging from respect to bewilderment. This was shown by their interpretation of the phrase, the ‘will of Allah’, which was often said to them by Arabs. Jones and Mary Sime considered the phrase a sign of their faith in a higher power as well as a way to galvanise an Arab’s resistance to hardship.⁶ Cooper, in contrast, often saw the phrase as a somewhat perplexing means of acceptance.⁷ Her sense of confusion was shown when describing Arab superstitious curses such as the evil eye, which according to her was trachoma: ‘It was fascinating living in this fairy-tale world where spells were as potent as poison and jinns took a hand in man’s everyday life’.⁸ Both Cooper and Milwertz also described their struggles understanding the nature of blood feuds.⁹ The treatment of Arab women by men proved

² Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. p.138
⁷ Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. p.145-57
⁸ ibid. p.146
⁹ ibid. p.144; Jorgen Milwertz, ‘My Friends the Arabs’. p.42
the most difficult to understand or at least tolerate. According to Cooper, primitive brutality was used to ensure morality was preserved due to custom being stronger than law; if a married Arab woman was expecting an illegitimate baby, it was the duty of the husband to kill her as a matter of honour.\(^{10}\) Milwertz described that to avoid trouble in Muslim countries it was imperative to never touch Arab women or else the person who had would likely find a knife between their ribs.\(^{11}\) Several articles were published in the *Friend* and *Wayfarer* magazines criticising the treatment of women in Muslim countries.\(^{12}\) The customs and behaviours of Arabs came as quite a surprise with reactions from Quakers ranging from confusion to dismay. Regardless of how rational or understandable these reactions were, the importance of prior experience and knowledge was evident. Having these details, and the time to adjust to the surroundings, was crucial to ensure Quakers and those affiliated with their activities could work to the best of their abilities. The problem was many lacked these key skills.

In her analysis of American Quaker missionaries’ activities in Palestine prior to the birth of Israel, Enaya Othman stated that those who arrived in the late 19\(^{th}\) century saw themselves as saviours who could improve the backward conditions Arab women experienced. However, improved linguistic and cultural preparedness as well as longer lengths of time spent in the company of Arab women saw female missionaries achieve a ‘middle ground’ with Arab women. The establishment of this middle ground saw an improved understanding of each other’s differences become far more accepted.\(^{13}\) Mildred White, who arrived in Ramallah to teach at the Friends Girls School in 1922, saw many of her initial negative attitudes towards the indigenous population reshaped due to her eventual knowledge of the Arabic language and interactions with Palestinians.\(^{14}\) Christina Jones appeared to have not held prejudices towards Arabs upon her arrival the same year. Her memoirs and diary entries illustrate that she too developed an appreciation of Arab traditions. This was due to

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\(^{10}\) Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. pp.144-45  
\(^{11}\) Jorgen Milwertz, ‘My Friends the Arabs’. p.43  
\(^{13}\) Enaya Othman, ‘Meeting at Middle Ground: American Quaker Women’s Two Palestinian Encounters’. p.48  
\(^{14}\) ibid. p.60
the great length of time she spent in their company as well as learning their language and customs. Through her experience of living in Palestine and spending decades amongst Palestinians, she stated:

My personal assessment of the Arabs is simply that their vices and virtues may not be identical with ours but are compatible. We are all members of the human family, and if we take time to understand each other we will find that fundamentally we are much alike; environment and language and adjustment to our separate cultures make us seem different, but one is not superior to the other.15

Her assessment was the exact type of attitude that the AFSC required amongst its staff, however Jones was one of the very few Quakers who appeared to show this ethos. Her experience of living with Palestinians meant she could have provided a significant role in not only assisting refugees but also AFSC volunteers in adjusting to their foreign surroundings. However, Jones and her husband, as well as other staff at the Friends School such as Mildred White, and Daniel Oliver in Lebanon, all of whom had extensive experience with Palestinian culture and spoke Arabic fluently, were never involved in the AFSC operation.

Understanding Arab custom, language, and culture whilst trying to maintain a neutral ethical stance proved a significant problem for those lacking knowledge or prior experience in the Middle East. Yet even when an individual did possess prior knowledge of the region, there was the added complication of understanding the nuances of the multiple religious communities who sought humanitarian relief. Cooper described how she was responsible for creating a centre where aid was to be provided not by reference to creed, but strictly on the basis of need with the only criterion being that those helped were refugees.

I soon discovered that this way of working would not be easy in a country where loyalty was built first on the family and then on the religious community. Each religious group was such a self-contained unit that it even had its own civil laws. Every case brought to my notice had to be judged with these prejudices and biases taken into consideration.16

15 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  p.142
16 Kanty Cooper, The Uprooted. p.153
Quakers provided aid for religious communities such as the Druse, Bedouin and Bhai as well as the Christian and majority Muslim communities. Not all of these groups were classed as refugees but Quakers still endeavoured to help them. It was through assisting these differing religious groups that the idea of remaining neutral or achieving a middle ground was further tested. Cooper, notwithstanding her criticism of Muslim culture and its practices, observed how despite their terrible living conditions there was a toughness within Muslim Arabs that was far greater than their Christian counterparts, who even when living in better conditions were overcome with self-pity.17 Before heading to Palestine, Mary Sime had spent six years teaching in Egypt in the 1940s. She described the country as being ‘like a germ, a pleasant one; it works its ways into our systems’.18 She recalled how Alexandria was her home with its metropolitan international feel and the many Egyptian friends she met there.19

I had some ‘educated friends, of course, among families of Egyptian doctors, landowners, engineers and teachers; but with these one passed the afternoon or the evening or the stray hour of conversation very much as with one’s friends in England. They come back to my mind now, not as ‘Egyptians’ but merely as friends.20

The glowing account of Alexandria and the educated friends she made was in stark contrast to her description of the peasants at a local farm in the West Bank she visited. She was bemused by the insistence of locals that she had to drink coffee that was made using boiled canal water her horse was groomed in to avoid offending them. The experience made her state she would refuse to allow ‘these people at the farm to monopolise my memories’.21 Sime’s observations demonstrated how, both on a conscious and subconscious level, her background as a British citizen meant she at times struggled to see those of differing ethnicity or faith equally, even favouring certain subgroups within the same nationality or religion. Experience of culture would certainly have been a positive for a volunteer wanting to help Arab refugees, however Sime’s experiences show that it was specific knowledge of

17 ibid. p.156-57
18 E. Mary Sime Papers, 1952, TEMP MSS 990.1, Memories of Egypt - March 1952 p.2
19 ibid. p.1
20 ibid. p.1
21 ibid. p.1
Palestinians that was most required. Quakers sought to help Arab refugees but, as most of these refugees were Palestinians, to do so effectively they required knowledge and experience specifically of Palestinians and not just Arabs. The unfortunate reality was that few had this specific knowledge and that those that did were never asked to participate.

The observations of Sime and Cooper epitomised another personal difficulty an individual Quaker relief worker could experience: the influence of one’s own national culture and devotion to its values. Cooper, in a meeting with the Bedouin, who had fought alongside T.E. Lawrence in the First World War, stated:

I was taken to see two large framed photographs [of] Lawrence and Glubb Pasha, the latter led the Trans-Jordan Arab legion between 1939 till 1956. “These are our two great heroes”, the lieutenant said. The English, he continued, “taught us humanity. Before they came we used to kill to take a camel…we could neither read nor write, the Turks did nothing for us. Now members of my tribe go to England to study and we have our own schools.”

Cooper was pleased to have met ‘a proud and independent people’ and saw this as proof of British colonial success. She thought the lieutenant’s testimony went a long way towards counteracting much of the criticism she had experienced since she began her humanitarian work. Jones and Sime also praised the Bedouin with the latter complimenting the Druse community by describing them as a ‘dignified and lovable’ people. The Druse had previously assisted British forces during the Arab Revolt. Sime’s particular praise for these groups appeared, like Cooper’s, to come partly from a sense of loyalty to Britain. She praised the British Mandate for modernising the region by stating that a ‘sense of efficiency moderated by the relation of an English country town pervaded, in spite of the call of the muezzeneen [muezzin] mingling with the peal of bells from Christian churches’. Her delight at how anglicised the towns had become suggested that she saw Britain as a modernising force that could also allow Christianity to flourish.

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22 Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. p.164
23 ibid. p.164
25 Mary Sime, 'Arab Refugees - Their Tenth Year in the Camps'. p.163
An analysis of the ideological objectives and practical outcomes of Quaker relief work in Palestine, 1948-1955

The Middle East was not the only area where Sime applauded Britain’s influence and the difficulties posed by an indigenous population. In her description of the Sudanese Hadendoa, a subdivision of the Beja people who fought against British troops in the late 19th century, she referenced the British Journalist Rudyard Kipling’s poem *Fuzzy Wuzzy* and described them as having ‘gollywog’ heads of hair and as ‘a most benighted ‘eathen, but a first class fighting man’. Sime’s description of the Hadendoa combined with her reference to Kipling suggested that she was swayed by the ‘noble savage’ ideal that influenced Kipling’s poem *The White Man’s Burden*. The colour of their skin provided her with a superior ontological status and a sense of power over those she observed. Her eyewitness accounts regularly showed a paternalistic or even orientalist attitude. She described how the way Arab refugees argued with each other was like puppies yelping. Arabs were an ‘excitable but simple-minded peasant people’. In one incident she praised herself for showing a local Arab helper the power of silence when she intervened between two women fighting and did not speak throughout the incident. She claimed the helper, known as ‘noisy Abdullah’, was very impressed by her actions and she had taught him a valuable lesson. As Barnett has argued, humanitarianism is partly paternal as it aims to help those who cannot help themselves. Both Cooper and especially Sime, demonstrated a paternalism inspired by their own western values. The wave of imperial humanitarianism in the 19th century, which centred on colonialism, a civilising sense of mission as well as infantilising language, remained. Living in the Middle East appeared to, at times and in certain individuals, galvanise beliefs in the superiority of their own cultural backgrounds as British Christians.

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29 Mary Sime, ‘Arab Refugees - Their Tenth Year in the Camps’. p.161
32 ibid. p.105
Cooper admitted that the ‘gap between the occidental and oriental standards was not easy to bridge’. 33

The experience of living with Palestinians, knowledge of the Arabic language and the ability to suppress national loyalty, were all key factors that would allow Quakers and those affiliated with them to attain a middle ground or more neutral perspective regarding Arabs. The problem for a significant amount of those engaged in relief work was that many lacked some, if not all these key skills. The culture shock and scale of the crisis impeded their ability to view Arabs through a neutral lens. The American Quaker Howard McKinney, stated that his work as an AFSC volunteer was particularly challenging when dealing directly with Arab refugees:

A number of us tended to say we did not find the Arab people particularly likeable [...] There are traits that we find hard to take. Various individuals we would get acquainted with, but to say that you like Arabs en mass was fairly difficult. I remember I had at some point said something about not finding the Arab traits all that endearing...I was not enamoured of the Arab as a people. 34

McKinney’s reference to several AFSC volunteers struggling to find Arabs as a likeable people suggests they failed to achieve a middle ground. This struggle to adapt was created by the lack of preparation and knowledge of volunteers as well as clashing cultural values. These difficulties were understandable given the rushed nature of the AFSC operation, which was by no means an exclusive issue for Quakers as other humanitarian operations such as the Red Cross experienced similar concerns. 35 However, the problem for Quakers both individually and as a collective, was that their previous success in humanitarian work had been based precisely on being ethically neutral and assisting people regardless of their political, national, or cultural backgrounds. Their neutrality and ability to achieve a consensus was one of their biggest strengths upon entering the Middle East, but assisting Arabs proved the most difficult challenge many had faced, constantly testing their ability to understand, and tolerate, the differences between themselves and those they were helping.

33 Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. p.175
4.3. Principles and Preparations

The conflict in Palestine and subsequent humanitarian efforts presented unique challenges to Quakers. Though the terminology regarding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality do heavily overlap, differences were, and are still apparent. According to the International Red Cross, neutrality is a principle of abstention which does not assist the war effort by either party during a conflict. In theory, humanitarians refuse to take sides in respect to the politics of conflict. A neutral humanitarian organisation cannot be too close to the belligerents on one side as this would directly compromise the organisation’s neutral status. The decision-making process must be neutral, and a humanitarian organisation should not become an extension of a government’s foreign policy. Rieffer-Flanagan, in her analysis of neutral humanitarianism in the Red Cross, focused on the Italian-Ethiopian and Korean Wars as well as the early years of the Cold War as examples of how the Red Cross failed to remain neutral. However, she argued that much of humanitarian neutrality is contextual, emphasising the ‘learning curve’ individuals and organisations had to experience to understand their flaws. Impartiality, by contrast, does not mean that all sides must have the same amount of assistance; rather aid is based firmly on the criteria of need regardless of other considerations, thus solely guided by the needs of those who are suffering.

Following the impartiality principle means the delivery of aid is based on awareness of ethical problems concerning populations, i.e. evaluating scenarios when groups of people are affected by a certain action, providing the greatest good towards the greatest number with as little harm as possible implemented. Rieffer-Flanagan’s description of the ‘learning curve’ humanitarian organisations experienced when implementing ethical principles during the mid-20th century should also include the Quakers, who often referred to their neutrality when involved in relief work, but in the case of Palestine most of their relief work leaned

39 Ibid. p.901
41 Jennifer Leaning, ‘The Dilemma of Neutrality’. p.419
towards an impartial approach. Quakers, like the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations, were still learning how to apply their own ethical principles to their work. The Arab refugee crisis was a challenge that involved a vast array of linguistic, cultural, geographical, and political problems they had previously not experienced. Alongside a focus on impartiality, Quakers also aimed to solve the reasons behind the conflict through a non-partisan approach. This type of humanitarian endeavour would be later referred to as maximalist. According to Thomas G. Weiss:

Maximalists go beyond compassion and charity to argue that the relief of life-threatening suffering can no longer be the sole justification of outside assistance. They are determined to tackle the underlying causes of violence and to reform humanitarianism to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts.  

Creating the necessary platforms for peace to flourish was as much a key component to Quaker endeavours as the relief work. It involved being impartial to help those most in need but remaining neutral when it came to reconciliation by ensuring neither Jews nor Arabs should be supported more than the other.

The AFSC initially focused on religious diplomacy and not refugee relief in Palestine.  

Clarence Pickett, who was the AFSC’s Executive Secretary and, apart from President Hoover, was probably the most well-known Quaker in the United States, visited the region. He led a campaign in March 1948 to have religious leaders of all faiths support an appeal entitled ‘Truce of God’ to halt fighting in Jerusalem. Alongside his attempt at religious diplomacy, Pickett also met Daniel Oliver who, in Pickett’s words, ‘showed up and had received none of my messages’. Oliver asked Pickett to join him in attending a meeting with King Abdullah of Transjordan. Pickett declined the invite, expressing frustration about Oliver’s sudden arrival and concluding that much was being accomplished ‘that Daniel didn’t know

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42 Thomas G. Weiss, 'Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action'. p.17
45 Clarence Pickett, For More Than Bread, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953). p.262
46 ibid. p.282
about’. Pickett’s critical comments were significant in illustrating how Oliver, despite his decades’ worth of experience in the Middle East, was deemed unimportant and was not told what Pickett and the AFSC’s objectives were. Pickett demonstrated how both he and the AFSC wanted to be involved in the region without the assistance of Oliver, instead choosing to work based on their own objectives. Oliver was not the only Quaker to be deemed unsuitable to assist the AFSC.

Colin Bell, a British Quaker who was former personnel director of British Home Stores, worked for the AFSC in China during the Second World War managing a surgical team with the ambulance service and was eventually appointed head of the Palestine project, agreed with Israeli official Arthur Lourie in their joint dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the Palestinian Quaker Khalil Totah. According to Quaker historian Nancy Gallagher, Totah was the primary propagandist for the Arab cause in the United States in the late 1940s. Totah had been the main beneficiary of the devolution initiative whereby Arab nationals were placed into positions of responsibility within the Friends School in Ramallah. However, his relationship with American Quaker officials soured due to his support of Palestinian rights and culture. The AFSC had publicly backed the UN Partition Plan, but the decision created profound despair and shame for Totah, who had moved to America to argue the Palestinian cause. The support of the UN Partition Plan created a clear difference of opinion between the AFSC and Totah. Totah was viewed, not only by an Israeli official (Lourie) but also by an influential British Quaker (Bell), as a problematic figure because of his opinions and nationalist leanings. It is important to consider that Bell could have been agreeing with Lourie to appease him to obtain permission for a Quaker unit to operate in Israel. However, even if this was the case, Bell had still undermined the reputation of another Quaker to gain favour with an Israeli government official. As 1948 progressed, the AFSC began to become more involved in the refugee question with Pickett and Bell influencing matters. Bell’s refusal to disagree with an Israeli official who was suspicious of Totah, and Pickett’s

47 ibid. p.282
48 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.48
50 Thomas M. Ricks, ‘Khalil Totah: The Unknown Years’. pp.70-71
dismissal of Oliver’s offer of collaboration illustrated that the AFSC were not keen to draw on the experience or defend the reputation of certain prominent Quaker individuals. Whether this was due to Oliver and Totah’s involvement in creating the Palestine Watching Committee (PWC) is unknown. Nonetheless, the decision not to pool every possible Quaker resource available to them would later prove a significant issue once relief operations were underway.

Members of the PWC also wanted to be involved in reconciliatory efforts and sought for an appropriate opportunity to emerge. At the beginning of 1948, members of the committee described how little they were able to influence matters in the region, with some Quakers even questioning the purpose of the committee. However, due to the announcement of the Vail/Castle mission in April, committee members regained a sense of optimism that British Quakers could make a positive contribution in the region.51 James Vail, an American chemical engineer, and Edgar B. Castle were to visit Jerusalem to explore the possibility of Quakers becoming active in ‘some reconciling and non-political activity’ to help create a truce between Arabs and Jews.52 Upon observing the upheaval in Jerusalem, Castle and Vail sent a cable to Pickett stating that the city was disintegrating both physically and morally, and that it was soon to face its destruction if the fighting did not end soon.53 In an article entitled ‘Journey to Jerusalem’, Castle described how both he and Vail predominantly found ‘tension, frustration, suspicion, and implacable bitterness’ amongst Arabs and Jews, and that it was ‘impossible’ to quantify what the results of the efforts were.54 The American Quaker Harold Evans, a lawyer from Philadelphia, noted that Vail and Castle still believed, ‘the presentation of the Quaker point of view will have made some contribution towards understanding and goodwill’.55 Vail and Castle’s efforts at diplomacy were undermined by both the scale and complexity of the conflict. However, despite little success being achieved

53 Clarence Pickett, For More Than Bread. p.264
55 Harold Evans, 'Seeking the Path to Peace in Palestine', The Friend, 106 (2 July 1948), 545-46. p.545
they still attempted to see the positives of their humanitarian efforts. Several months later in August, Bernard Lawson, Acting Secretary of the Palestine Emergency Board of the British Friends Service Council (FSC), sent a letter on behalf of British Quakers to the AFSC, stating that British Friends were looking forward to returning to ‘a straight-forward piece of relief work’ rather than the publicised religious diplomacy of Clarence Pickett.\(^56\) Lawson’s letter on behalf of British Friends, in addition to the undermining of Totah and dismissal of Oliver’s efforts by Pickett, illustrated how, both individually and collectively, Quakers disagreed on how best to approach the Palestine issue.

Initial Quaker efforts in Israel had proven impossible to maintain due to strict restrictions put on relief agencies by the Israeli government. Christina Jones recalled how ‘Americans thought the need for relief was all on the Israeli side, and the first people sent out by the AFSC were in these areas’.\(^57\) This was most likely because AFSC staff knew the Jewish position in Palestine far better. Great Britain took the first step through the Balfour Declaration, but it was the political, financial, and military support of the United States government that most significantly helped create Israel.\(^58\) Mirroring the loyalty to their government’s position that British Quakers had shown during the mandate, American Quakers supported their own government’s policy by supporting the UN Partition Plan and the state of Israel.\(^59\) The United States government took 11 minutes to grant Israel de facto status once the mandate ended whilst Britain waited over eight months to follow suit.\(^60\) The AFSC supported the state of Israel whilst some British Quakers, as suggested in the previous chapter, were not only un-forthcoming but even resentful at its creation. The American Quakers in their support for the new Jewish state were keen to help Jewish refugees settle in their new home. This was confirmed in a letter sent to Bell by the executive director of the American Middle East Relief organisation, George M. Barakat, describing how the first AFSC personnel sent out in a humanitarian capacity were three workers instructed to

\(^{57}\) Christina Jones, *Friends in Palestine*. p.125  
\(^{60}\) Colin Shindler, *A History of Modern Israel*. p.43
distribute relief to Jewish immigrants and orphans as well as Jewish prisoners of war. However, this was stopped when the Israeli government took responsibility for the care of Jewish refugees and suggested the AFSC focus exclusively on Arab refugees.  

Quakers on both sides of the Atlantic faced a crucial decision: should they remain neutral in their relief work, meaning that a very small amount of aid could be given due to the Israel government’s restrictions, or do they impartially opt to help those most in need? The latter would leave them open to the accusation of providing preferential treatment to one side. This dilemma was discussed in a letter sent by Paul Sturge of the Friends Service Council (FSC) to Bell on 28 July 1948. Sturge, a conscientious objector who joined the FAU in the First World War and followed his family’s legacy of activism and philanthropy, recommended to Bell that, despite the work being open to criticism that it was one sided, the chance to ‘counteract some of the bitterness’ on the Arab side was too good an opportunity to be missed. Sturge’s comment was similar to the ‘Settlement for Palestine’ memo in its concern for ‘self-respect’. The Arab ‘bitterness’ was not aimed towards Quakers, but to the British government. This motivated Sturge to act not just as a Quaker concerned, but also a British national who wanted to alleviate the negativity towards Britain. Sturge believed that Arab refugees deserved to be allocated a significant number of Quaker resources due to both a sense of guilt and responsibility. In doing so he demonstrated an ‘immediacy bias’ which involves the allocation of a disproportionate number of resources towards a humanitarian crisis based on the arousal of immediate emotions. To ameliorate Arab suffering would allow Quakers to demonstrate their deep concern for Arabs and, as a result, Sturge encouraged Bell to continue searching for relief work opportunities even if it meant abandoning a neutral position when providing humanitarian aid. The initial humanitarian efforts of the AFSC involved reconciliation and

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61 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.119  
63 William A. Albright and others ‘Palestine Watching Committee: Settlement for Palestine’. p.49  
providing relief only to Jewish refugees. There appeared a clear schism in how Quakers viewed the conflict and what needed to be done to alleviate the suffering. Prominent Quakers such as Daniel Oliver and Khalil Totah were either ignored or undermined. The collective reaction of British Quakers to their American counterparts regarding the creation of Israel was also at odds due to both groups supporting their own governments’ policies. This created a stark contrast in opinion with American Quakers supporting Israel but British Friends appearing far more hesitant to do so.

4.4. Confidence but lack of resources

Bell sent a letter to Willard A. Jones, the former head of the Friends Boys School in Ramallah and husband of Christina Jones, on 1 September 1948. Bell described how the Executive Committee of the AFSC’s Foreign Service section received a proposal from the Disaster Relief Programme head Raphael Cilento. The proposal suggested Quakers may be able to serve Arab refugees in Israel or assist in the ‘resettlement of expatriated persons in Israel’.65 This was an ideal opportunity for the AFSC as it entailed small scale relief work that also offered avenues into reconciliatory activities. The AFSC agreed to Cilento’s proposal and soon became one of the first NGOs granted consultative status within the UN, and alongside the invitation to be involved in Israel, the AFSC was asked to participate in a far larger one-year emergency relief programme for refugees outside of Israel.66 In December 1948, a press reception was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva to confirm the AFSC’s involvement. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) focused on refugees in Central and Northern Palestine, and the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) on the neighbouring Arab states. The AFSC would operate almost exclusively in Gaza, in south-western Palestine. Funds from governmental and inter-governmental sources were to be administered by non-governmental bodies in what was described as a ‘significant example of public and private agencies in active co-operation’.67 The AFSC was to be a pioneer in

66 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.51
what would become a common approach towards emergency relief distribution. 68
Continuing a trusted Quaker principle, reconciliation and relief efforts would be combined
to fulfil a significant aim in helping both sides build a better understanding of each other. 69
 Volunteers for the AFSC would aim to find a solution to the refugee crisis and positively
influence the broader Quaker peace mission. 70

British Quakers and the AFSC had worked in partnership as far back as the First World War.
Though they shared commonalities regarding pacifism, there were differences in worship
and practice. Tensions arose over sense of humour, tastes in food as well as war-strained
nerves. 71 American Quakerism had already divided itself into various geographical and
theological branches, with some holding more evangelical beliefs than others. British
Quakers, by contrast, remained collectively tied to the London Yearly Meeting. 72Whilst
British Quakers shared similar hopes and principles to their American counterparts there
were discrepancies over practices, objectives, and the role of women. English Quaker
methods focused on a nurturing spirit of love and sacrifice. The relief work was small in
scale with many volunteers women trained in medicine or social work. They disliked the
cold approach of their American peers that was mostly statistic-based and dehumanised
their aid ministry. 73 American Friends sought recognition for their contributions whilst
British Friends identified their services as Quaker international work. 74 This difference of
opinion also appeared in the earliest stages of AFSC activity in Palestine, with Pickett’s
religious diplomacy causing somewhat unease amongst British Quakers at the high profile
nature of his efforts. 75 By the time of the Gaza mission, British Quaker women had already
been accustomed to assuming leadership positions with Quaker relief teams. This stemmed
from their endeavours during the First World War and was in contrast to the AFSC, who

68 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.56
69 ibid. p.47
70 Ilana Feldman, 'The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief'. pp.689-705, p.696
p.329
72 ibid. p.328
73 Tammy M. Proctor, 'An American Enterprise? British Participation in Us Food Relief Programmes (1914-
1923)'. p.39
74 ibid. p.31
never considered women for leadership roles during the war.76 A network of Quaker women in Birmingham led this development and during the post-war period British Quaker women such as Hilda Clark and Francesca Wilson led relief activities in France, Vienna, and Murcia in Spain.77

In Gaza and neighbouring territories during the late 1940s the responsibilities given to women based in the Friends Schools increased with teachers also becoming relief workers in addition to maintaining their academic responsibilities. For British Quaker women in the AFSC such as Mary Sime and Deen Low, the latter seconded by the FSC to the AFSC, their relief responsibilities in the field were equal to those of their male counterparts. However, leadership positions were occupied exclusively by men such as Pickett, Bell, and Frank Hunt, a former FAU member during the Second World War who was appointed head of an AFSC project in Tur’an, a village near Nazareth.78 Quaker women not working for the AFSC but involved in the humanitarian sphere, such as Christina Jones and Emily Oliver, also saw their husbands acquire greater positions of authority in regards to communication with local and international officials. Emily Oliver previously served as Acting Principal of the Brummana School 1908-1910, Lettice Jowitt served as Headmaster of Brummana School in 1939, and another British Quaker, Sylvia Clark, covered the position of Principal in the Friends Girls School in Ramallah 1947-1949.79 Clark was previously co-Principal at Saffron Walden School, one of the leading Quaker schools in Britain. Yet she still faced concern over her ability to teach mathematics to boys because she was a woman, though according to Christina Jones she quickly eliminated any concerns.80 Quaker women had proven themselves more than capable of leading Quaker educational endeavours despite negative stereotyping, but within the confines of relief work during early years of the Arab refugee crisis (1947-1951) they

76 Tammy M. Proctor, 'An American Enterprise? British Participation in Us Food Relief Programmes (1914-1923)'. p.39
77 Sian Roberts, 'A 'Position of Peculiar Responsibility': Quaker Women and Transnational Humanitarian Relief, 1914-24'. p.244
78 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.120
80 Christina Jones, *Friends in Palestine*. pp.93-94
were still mostly restricted to ‘maternal’ roles focused on assisting families and children, rather than organisational objectives and policies. The one exception was Jowitt, a British Quaker who worked as a tutor at the University of Bristol and was Warden of two settlements during the inter-war years, eventually becoming Treasurer of the Arab Relief Fund and Chairman of the Palestine Committee of the Friend Service Council. Though she was not based in Palestine during the refugee crisis she held a position that was not focused purely on education. Excluding Christina Jones and Emily Oliver, the women analysed during this period - Mary Pumphrey, Mary Sime, Lucy Backhouse, Lettice Jowitt, and Kanty Cooper - did not appear to have had any children. Pumphrey, Backhouse and Jowitt focused primarily on supporting and running Quaker meetings and organisations whilst Sime and Cooper were well-travelled women focused on careers in relief work and education. Though still restricted to roles that often held a focus on education and children, these Quaker women also demonstrated that they were capable of having lives primarily focused on their careers.

The minutes for the AFSC’s Foreign Service Executive Committee included a 'Memorandum on a possible AFSC project in Palestine' written by Bell, stating that the acceptance of the UN request meant Quakers were taking ‘the risk of failure’, but recognising that politicians asked for support from Quakers, ‘because they believe we have something more to offer than merely a politically neutral position’. Bell’s reference to being more than just politically neutral indicated that Quakers believed their unique approach to relief work was recognised by others. Bell’s memo included 19 specific conditions regarding AFSC involvement in refugee relief. The points focused heavily on Quakers requiring assurances from the UN that their demands regarding freedom of movement, transport, supplies and a solution to the issue of Arab resettlement be met. Romirowsky and Joffe, in their analysis of the AFSC, concluded that the conditions were created to maintain as much operational flexibility as possible. The conditions necessitated that AFSC operations be ‘welcomed rather than merely tolerated’ by its hosts and demanded a political settlement be sought.

The AFSC’s conditions were focused but also indiscreet, demonstrating a great self-

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81 Ilana Feldman, 'The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief'. p.690
confidence in their skills. They expected a positive reception from local officials due to the risks Quakers were assuming in accepting such an operation.\textsuperscript{83} Self-confidence and ambition would prove to be core elements within the Quaker psyche. Bell’s belief that Quakers could offer something more than ‘mere’ relief work only served to further illustrate a growing boldness and ambition in the AFSC approach to the conflict.

The use of the word ‘mere’ in Bell’s memo was similar in connotation to those of Irwin Abrams, who was one of the founders of the AFSC. At the Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective International Peace Conference of May 1991, Abrams described the AFSC’s work with the following statement:

\begin{quote}
This international service is not mere humanitarianism; it is not merely mopping up, cleaning up the world after a war. It is a means of rehabilitation and is aimed at helping the spirit and giving hope that there can be a peaceful world.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

The AFSC continuously refused to define itself as just a humanitarian outfit. Humanitarianism was interpreted as the work of ‘mere’ relief provision. Quaker objectives were broader, aiming to push forward a peace agenda and resolutions to the conditions that created conflicts.\textsuperscript{85} An article written in the \textit{Friend} by Lettice Jowitt questioned whether it was possible to draw a line between reconciliation and relief.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{quote}
But is it really possible to draw the line between relief and reconciliation? And though we think primarily of reconciliation between Jew and Arab, is it not laid upon us to play our part in mitigating the bitterness that both parties feel towards the late Mandatory Power? To bring help to bear on immediate needs may well open the door to a wider and more lasting service of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

The ‘open door’ Jowitt referred to was the opportunity relief work provided, allowing Quakers to then move towards reconciliation between Arabs and Jews. Transforming the method by which people interacted with one another was how Quakers believed the world

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{83} ibid. p.51
\textsuperscript{84} Ilana Feldman, ‘The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief’. p.690
\textsuperscript{85} ibid. p.690
\textsuperscript{86} Unknown, \textit{Lettice Jowitt Biography}.
\textsuperscript{87} Lettice Jowitt, 'The Plight of Arab Refugees', \textit{The Friend}, 106 (17 September 1948), 785-87. p.786
\end{footnotes}
could be remade. Bell’s memorandum explained how Quakers who worked in Bengal were very useful in acting as liaisons between Hindus and Moslems with their neutrality enabling them to help in resettlement. It was hoped the same could be done in Palestine providing the Arabs wanted to return and that the Israeli government would allow them to. Quaker confidence in what they considered their unique approach to relief work and reconciliation came not just from core ethical beliefs but proven success when applying these principles. This was demonstrated, none more so, than when the AFSC and FSC accepted the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1947 on behalf of the Society of Friends worldwide. The Religious Society of Friends had received previous nominations in 1912, 1923, 1924, 1936, 1937 and 1938 for their work with victims of war and famine. During this period they worked in the Balkans (1912), post-war Europe (1923, 1924), and Spain (1936, 1937 and 1938) as well as being involved in the Kindertransport and various endeavours in Asia and Africa. They continued these practices during and after World War II, providing medical support and assisting refugees in concentration camps such as Belsen-Belsen, though they also assisted displaced persons in other parts of the globe, such as Asia. The Quaker commitment to non-violence and relief without discrimination was referenced in a speech by Gunnar Jahr, chairman of the Nobel Committee and Director of the Bank of Norway.

The Quakers have shown us that it is possible to carry into action something which is deeply rooted in the minds of many: Sympathy with others; the desire to help others; that significant expression of sympathy between man, without regard to nationality or race; feelings which, when carried into deeds, must provide foundations of a lasting peace. For this reason, they are today worthy of receiving Nobel’s Peace Prize.

89 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.47
93 Gunnar Jahr, ‘Nobel Peace Prize Speeches’. p.76
Quakers were awarded the prize for their 300 years of efforts to promote peace and help those in need. The chair of the FSC, Margaret Backhouse, in her acceptance speech, stated that the award was to be used by Quakers worldwide as a method to ‘stimulate greater effort’ in their relief work.\textsuperscript{94} The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize was a vindication that the theologically motivated work of Quakers was of a high standard and unique. The AFSC became one of the first NGOs to be granted consultative status within the UN and in the summer of 1948, several members were offered the opportunity to join a United Nations Trusteeship Council to be the Governor, later entitled Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem. Pickett was offered the position but declined the opportunity; as a result, Harold Evans took the position but lasted just six weeks due to the conflict's escalation.\textsuperscript{95} The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize, UN consultative status and Special Municipal Commissioner Position indicated to Quakers that they were a respected organisation within the UN.

As part of their relief work, the AFSC would work in close collaboration with the Egyptian military and a further example of Quaker confidence can be seen here. James Devine of the AFSC sent a confidential memorandum to the US Ambassador to Egypt, Stanton Griffis:

\begin{quote}
As the Quakers can acquire a completely heavenly attitude in dealing with Egyptian officialdom, I am sure that their (Quakers) simplicity, honesty, selfless and naivety will give them a better chance of success than all the high-pressure ideas available in the field.\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

Devine viewed Quakers’ ‘naivety’ and ‘heavenly attitude’ in dealing with the Egyptian military as a positive. Comments such as Devine’s demonstrated a confidence amongst Quakers in how they communicated with others, even if their methods appeared unusual. This attitude partly stemmed from the influence of Rufus Jones, who was prominent in the development of the AFSC and one of the leading Quaker theologians of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{95} Asaf Romirowsky and Alexander H. Joffe, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief. pp.37-38; Clarence Pickett, For More Than Bread. p.265
\textsuperscript{96} Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.66
Jones stressed the importance of Quakers being unique in an article published in the *Friend*. Quakers, he wrote, ‘cannot give up on the idea of being a peculiar people. Only henceforth the peculiarity must not be in outward form; it must be in inward life and power’.  

According to Jones, Quakers were not only meant to be unique but acutely aware of their internal dynamics regarding pacifism, non-political involvement, and equality. In many aspects, Quakers entering Palestine were just as focused on themselves as they were those they intended to help, as this was based on the Quaker principle of the inner light and the power of the individual to hear God. Feldman, in her analysis of the AFSC, compared this ethical practice to that of Foucault’s ‘care of the self’. Continuous self-reflection and critique were deemed essential to the practice of Quakers’ ethics with not only the ‘improvement’ of others but also their own self-development at stake. Based on recent successes and experiences, Quakers were confident that they could make a unique positive impact in both relief work and reconciliation. They were going to Palestine not only to relieve the suffering but were bullish that they could change the way the conflicting sides viewed each other.

Pickett described how the AFSC was responsible for 20 miles of territory from the Egyptian border at the south to Gaza at the north end. The area held about 200,000 refugee Arabs. Another 250,000 refugees in the neighbouring Arab states were the responsibility of the LRCS with the ICRC accountable for roughly 200,000 more refugees in Northern and Central Palestine. Stanton Griffis was selected as the director of the overall Palestinian refugee relief programme, officially titled the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR). The contract between the AFSC and UN was scheduled to terminate in August 1949. It was believed that the refugees would have returned to their homes by then. However, the new government of Israel would refuse the Arab right to return as it was

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97 Rufus Jones, ‘Are We Ready?’, *The Friend*, 102 (16 July 1944), 385-87. p.385
98 Ilana Feldman, 'The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief'. p.690
99 ibid. p.693
101 Clarence Pickett, *For More Than Bread*. p.267
102 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.55
An analysis of the ideological objectives and practical outcomes of Quaker relief work in Palestine, 1948-1955

deemed not feasible to allow so many people into Israel. The AFSC would also provide relief to Arab refugees and non-refugees inside the walls of the old city of Acre, north of Haifa in Israel. Pickett confidently stated that Quakers would deliver both the type of assurance and relief to Arabs that only ‘neutrals’ were capable of providing. Despite not being able to provide direct relief to Jews the smaller Acre operation would allow the AFSC the best opportunity available to avoid being viewed as preferential to Arabs. The project effectively took the burden away from the Israeli government by doing their work for them. A small unit was also established in the Galilee region of northern Israel, and on top of AFSC activity in Gaza and northern Israel, the areas of Ramallah where the Joneses were based and Brummana in Lebanon where another British Quaker Herbert Dobbing lived, were areas where relief work opportunities were available. Daniel Oliver also embarked on several journeys across the region and continued to take in displaced orphans.

Before the first volunteers arrived in Palestine in January 1949, the AFSC already faced significant problems. AFSC officials were deeply concerned that not enough suitable candidates were available to travel to the Middle East. If this were the case, then the result would have meant the AFSC could not live up to its promises, causing refugees to suffer and damaging the reputation of both the UN and Quakers. The AFSC, in addition to struggling to obtain enough suitable volunteers for the Palestine mission, was also struggling to fully staff its various projects around the world. Due to this demand, a substantial number of non-Quakers worked for the AFSC; in fact, as of 1947 AFSC staff worldwide numbered 597 but only 32 percent were actual Quakers. Many others came from similar theologically minded Christian denominations. The AFSC, although led by Quakers such as Bell and Pickett, already had a heavy reliance on non-Quakers to keep the organisation functioning.

104 Clarence Pickett, For More Than Bread. p.261
106 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Margaret M. Morris - 14 July 1948 p.3
107 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.55
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Jowitt described how, after an interchange of letters between the FSC and AFSC, both committees ‘recognised that our present joint commitments are already straining our resources of personnel and finance’.\(^{109}\) Quakers had been involved in a multitude of different projects globally in countries such as Bengal, China, India, and mainly post-war Germany.\(^{110}\) The Palestine mission faced significant difficulties in acquiring the amount of suitable personnel and funds required. The latter was not helped when the AFSC intended to use the Nobel Peace Prize award money ‘to improve Russian-American relations’.\(^{111}\) Theoretically, the money could have been used to publicise the Quaker mission in Palestine and recruit more volunteers. Instead, the growing influence of the Cold War was prioritised. Multiple articles were published in the *Friend* before, and even during, the Palestine project continually appealing for financial support.\(^{112}\) Due to these resources-based difficulties, Quakers, partly in the spirit of collaboration but also due to necessity, would collaborate with other relief agencies as part of private and public organisations working in extensive transnational cooperation with each other to direct resources provided by both governmental and non-governmental sources.\(^{113}\)

When the Quaker humanitarian operation began in January 1949 a dozen volunteers arrived in Palestine – four from Paris, two from London and six from Philadelphia – under the general supervision of Colin Bell. The two British volunteers, Ruth Villiers and Theodora Hodgkin, were qualified nurses.\(^{114}\) Quakers did not want to be identified by their nationalities while serving; they saw nationalism as segregation from their collective concern. The AFSC volunteers in Palestine emphasised that they were not nationalists, and

\(^{110}\) ibid. p.786; Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.47; For more specific financial details regarding British Quakers see the British Yearly Meeting minutes from 1947-1949 in the Friends House Library in London.  
\(^{113}\) Unknown, ‘Help for Refugees in Palestine’. p.1117  
\(^{114}\) ibid. p.1117
that the AFSC were never represented by a national flag.\textsuperscript{115} According to Pickett’s article on 11 March in the \textit{Friend}, there were about 30 AFSC volunteers and staff of multiple nationalities in Gaza, a combination of British, French, American, Dutch, English and Swiss. Egyptian volunteers, who were most likely translators as the majority of AFSC personnel did not speak Arabic, were also included in the figure.\textsuperscript{116} Pickett stated in his memoir that the AFSC representatives had negotiated with the Egyptian government entry for around 50 workers into Gaza.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, Pickett’s own article in the \textit{Friend} stating that only 30 workers were in Gaza clearly showed that the AFSC was not able to fill all possible vacancies within the first few months of its arrival, meaning those who were in Gaza were not able to share responsibilities and efforts as efficiently as they could have. For those British Quakers involved the international nature of the relief effort combined with strained resources meant they were not going to implement any specific theologically inspired approaches, even if they wanted to. The overall mission was to provide relief to refugees but to also build towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict in keeping with Quaker pacifist values.

The inability of volunteers to speak Arabic was part of a significant lack of training when compared to previous missions. Before arriving in Spain and Germany the British based Friends Relief Service (FRS), despite accepting many volunteers with little to no relief work experience, provided a thoroughly intense training programme involving all the essential aspects an aid volunteer would need. The selection for service was strict, only one in 10 of the offers to serve in the FRS were accepted.\textsuperscript{118} The training courses they received in the Mount Waltham House, London, and Spiceland Meeting House in Devon were detailed and organised. Aside from the practical medical training, there was also a focus on knowledge of the country being served. The FRS curriculum contained lectures on Germany and Spain, teaching volunteers the social, political, economic, and spiritual makeup of the country, as

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\textsuperscript{115} Nancy Gallagher, \textit{Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict}. p.115
\textsuperscript{116} Clarence Pickett, 'The Arabs of the Dispersion'. p.189
\textsuperscript{117} Clarence Pickett, \textit{For More Than Bread}. pp.267-68
\textsuperscript{118} Roger C. Wilson, \textit{Authority, Leadership and Concern}. p.22
\end{flushleft}
well as the relevant language courses. There are no records indicating that these types of measures were implemented before British Quakers visited Palestine. A third of the Quakers in the biographical index acquired first-hand relief work experience in either the First or Second World War. Some may have been in their early fifties by the time the AFSC Gaza mission was underway. Only three Quakers were recruited - Colin Bell, Frank Hunt and Howard Wriggins. Members of the FAU team that operated in the Second World War not only received training in England but also Port Said, Egypt, for several weeks before providing humanitarian aid to the El Shat refugee camp at the southern end of the Suez Canal. They then followed the Allied forces into Libya, then Italy. The only Quaker from the FAU who then joined the AFSC Gaza mission was Frank Hunt, and from analysing Jennifer Carson’s study, which provided a list of FRS members, none of those who participated in relief operations in post-war Germany subsequently provided relief in Palestine.

As work commenced supporting refugees in Gaza, the magnitude of the project became something that AFSC staff and observers from other relief agencies were initially shocked to discover. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) published a report on 8 March 1949 which stated:

It is impossible to measure the scale of the problem of refugees in the Middle East regarding statistics. Exact figures indicating the displacement of populations are not available, and even if these figures were available they would not indicate the extent of suffering and dislocation resulting from recent events...The situation is in constant

120 Eleanor Aitken, Colin Bell, Bernard Canter, Kanty Cooper, Frank Edmead, Frank Hunt, Bernard Lawson, Jorgen Milwertz, Reginald Reynolds, Roger Soltau, Paul Sturge, and Howard Wriggins.
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flux and refugees are on the move in search of food, warmth and protection. All estimates are subject to constant revision.\textsuperscript{123}

Raphael Cilento, who made the initial offer to the AFSC to work in Israel, upon visiting those refugees who had managed to make it to camps, described their condition as a ‘human disaster on a lavish scale’.\textsuperscript{124} The enormous difficulty of the task facing the AFSC when trying to setup relief areas in the camps was described by Pickett:

Facilities which our workers usually take for granted in setting up relief projects were almost totally lacking; practically no tools or materials available in the desert locale, even wood being virtually non-existent; with the exception of a few abandoned mosques; no public buildings available as distribution centres; no public welfare or social-service organizations to build on; no local government outside the town of Gaza; communications possible only through UN truce observers’ radio; no telephones; no regular mail delivery.\textsuperscript{125}

David Walker, an affirmed pacifist who was a US military veteran, joined the AFSC mission in Gaza with his wife, Ella. Upon observing the reaction of those around him, Walker stated, ‘I don’t think many of the people who were on the team were prepared for this kind of chaos’.\textsuperscript{126} From those leading the Palestine project, like Bell, to newly arrived field workers, the refugee crisis in Gaza became an event of such vast desperation that many Quakers and non-Quakers in the AFSC were initially overawed by the situation. Daniel Oliver, though not affiliated with the AFSC, described how the Ras-el-Metn orphanage took in as many refugee children as possible, but the enormity of the crisis meant they had to routinely turn away many more.\textsuperscript{127} In Ramallah where the Joneses were based there were, by March 1949, an estimated 54,000 refugees living in the district with most living in caves or overcrowding the houses of residents. There was initially more than 100,000, but the figure dropped due to


\textsuperscript{124} Unknown, ‘Foreign Office Telegram No.345 Intel’, \textit{Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office records} (1948), FO816-139. p.2

\textsuperscript{125} Clarence Pickett, \textit{For More Than Bread}. pp.284-85

\textsuperscript{126} Asaf Romirowsky and Alexander H. Joffe, \textit{Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief}. p.54

the brutal winters the district had suffered the previous two years forcing refugees to seek warmer regions. The size and multitude of challenges in areas like Ramallah, which were administered by the ICRC, created similar difficulties for their relief workers. Christina Jones observed how Red Cross personnel in Ramallah were in ‘unfamiliar surroundings and knew little of the country’. Likewise, the memoir of the ICRC director Jacques de Reynier noted how field personnel lacked knowledge of either geography or languages of the region. The ICRC before January 1948, in fact, had little first-hand experience not just in Palestine but the Arab world in general. Therefore, it was not just the AFSC but also the Red Cross that initially struggled with the magnitude and complexity of the refugee crisis. The state of shock felt by AFSC personnel was exemplified by Alwin Holtz, who was an AFSC volunteer and former Civilian Public Service member. Holtz summed up the initial reaction of multiple relief workers. ‘We had no idea what we were doing…Certainly in the beginning it was confusion and utter chaos’.

For AFSC personnel and other Quakers in the region, the problems they faced could only be dealt with after overcoming the initial first contact with refugees. These problems were magnified by the growing realisation that the refugees would not be returning to their homes. Jones stated that only after seeing the refugees face to face, she realised how desperate their plight was: ‘Now we know what they mean. Women lose their children, babies are born on the way, everyone is exhausted, hungry, some are ill in body, all hopeless in spirit’. Jones’ comment regarding knowing what was meant by refugee suffering illustrated how it was only after experiencing the problem first-hand that she appreciated the gravity of the situation. The hopelessness refugees felt was compounded by the complete failure of the right to return policy, which argued for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Oliver observed how Arab refugees, ‘have lost hope

129 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.111
133 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.114
entirely; they have no expectation of returning to their homes'. Winifred Coate was a British missionary worker who joined the Church Missionary Society (CMS) refugee relief centre in Zerka, Jordan. According to Coate, refugees were losing grip of the ‘vague hopes of return' and experienced a rapid deterioration in both their mental and moral well-being. The confidence that refugees would safely return to their homes also declined amongst Red Cross aid workers. Jones described that by late September 1949, both she and Red Cross members in Ramallah had been ‘too optimistic’ that the refugees would have returned home. The assumption that once the fighting was over the returning refugees could ‘pick up the pieces’ of their former lives had been an orthodox and expected diplomatic solution. However, the refugee crisis in Palestine was not conventional and forced relief workers to adapt to new circumstances. The AFSC had initially agreed to hand over their operation to the UNRPR in August 1949 as it was assumed the refugees would be able to return home within six months. Instead, the question of the Palestinian right to return was to continue. As a result, a focus on resettlement in neighbouring Arab countries or repatriation for refugees became an issue unprecedented in its scale for those concerned to solve.

Before entering Palestine, Quakers demonstrated a strong sense of confidence as well as ambition founded on a combination of experience and success. Mary Pumphrey, in an article published in the Friend, expressed how Quakers’ ‘fundamental conviction’ that God exists in all people meant they were most suited to support the UN in creating peace in Palestine. For those who were to enter Palestine via the AFSC programme there was a genuine belief that, through what they considered the unique Quaker approach to relief and reconciliation, a positive experience for both refugees and themselves could be achieved. Despite several issues regarding resources, there was a commitment from certain British
Quakers such as Bell, Jowitt, and Sturge, and American Quakers like Pickett to be involved in the refugee crisis. This commitment, however, saw some Quakers with large experience in the region ignored or even undermined so the AFSC could achieve its key objectives. The enormity of the crisis and subsequent relief operation shocked not only Quakers but also non-Quaker volunteers in the AFSC, as well as workers for other aid agencies. This was to be compounded by the AFSC’s struggle to fill all available positions with the Gaza mission. As a result, the confidence, and ambitious goals they set for themselves were to be extensively challenged.

4.5. Relief efforts

Individual Quakers on both sides of the Atlantic shared a confidence that their unique brand of humanitarianism could offer more than other voluntary agencies due to the additional focus on reconciliation and peacebuilding. However, this did not mean the Quakers as an international organisation were not equally as committed, or competitive, in their relief work. An example of this would be the issue of providing rations in Gaza; this proved difficult for all voluntary organisations because of the struggle in identifying just how many people were in need of help. The UN Conciliation Commission, in an example of the growing professionalism of relief work, asked the AFSC, LRCS and ICRC to gather a census for their particular areas, focusing on the number of persons within each family as well as the age, gender, education and employment details of refugees. When the census was completed, it revealed a declining number of refugees in Gaza due to many leaving for other Arab countries. The AFSC volunteers reported roughly the attendance of 180,000 refugees and subsequently 90,000 rations. At a conference arranged by the UN, the AFSC representative Emmett Gulley proudly explained how the AFSC had completed the census with far fewer resources than the LRCS and ICRC. This was a clear demonstration of the AFSC’s competitiveness. In his statement, Gulley described how a native worker was placed in every distribution line to gather the necessary information. He stated that, despite officials from other organisations having larger resources and salaries, the Quakers knew

139 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.97
how to get the job done as opposed to other agencies’ staff members, who were weighed down by what Gulley described as the ‘standard technique of procedure’.\textsuperscript{140} However, it is important to note that both the ICRC and LRCS, especially the latter, had a far greater amount of territory to cover than Gaza. Nevertheless, Gulley’s positive statement illustrated how the AFSC, in his opinion, was more than capable of matching the requirements needed for the census without asking for substantial financial assistance. His statement suggested Quakers would not be outdone by the other voluntary agencies in the region and could not only handle the same tasks, but solve them more efficiently.

The desperation of refugees heading to relief areas saw, in the most extreme cases, mothers entering Red Cross milk distribution centres unaware that their babies had already died.\textsuperscript{141} Christina Jones recalled how she gave a mother of six children who was living under a tree a bottle of milk which was prepared under the Red Cross nurses instructions and a small bag of lentils to feed them.\textsuperscript{142} Those who came to the centre to pick up milk often brought kettles, pans, pots, or even broken bottles.\textsuperscript{143} Winifred Coate described that, despite how the rations kept refugees alive, they would only be, ‘alive to a most useless and unproductive existence’ as there was not enough to provide them with any energy, just the bare minimum to survive.\textsuperscript{144} Oliver shared the same concern by observing how in Lebanon despite the Red Cross providing enough supplies to keep the refugees alive, they were ‘not living, but merely existing’.\textsuperscript{145} In fact, two years later he was re-iterating the same issue:

\begin{quote}
I do not think that the people in the West, in Great Britain and America can, and do realise the intense misery, want and hopelessness of the refugees from Palestine;
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{140} ibid. pp.96-97 \hfill
\textsuperscript{142} Christina Jones, \textit{The Untempered Wind} p.123 \hfill
\textsuperscript{143} Christina Jones, \textit{The Untempered Wind} p.126 \hfill
\textsuperscript{144} Winifred Coate, 'Letter to Miss Waterlow', \textit{Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office records} (1948), ED157-366. p.2 \hfill
\textsuperscript{145} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to F. Algernon and Anna R. Evans - 25 August 1949 p.1
and believe me dear friends, a great, great many have lost all faith in God because they say there is no justice, no right, the only thing is “Might is right”.  

The desperation regarding rations and the physical weakness of refugees would then be further exasperated by consecutive harsh winters and the threat of various bacterial infections. A British government report by E.D. Pridie sent on 7 October 1948 described the conditions refugees endured in Ramallah. ‘If the estimated number of refugees is accurate their accommodation or transfer elsewhere during the winter season will present a very significant problem’. The winter season in Ramallah proved problematic for Jones and Red Cross staff. She described how an International Red Cross delegate could not reach the Jalazone refugee camp due to snow with little means of communication because of downed telephone wires. It was only when three men from the camp visited the IRC at the Friends School after completing a four-hour walk, which should have only taken an hour, did she know the full extent of the problem. The conflict combined with the brutal winters and equally harsh summers led vast numbers of refugees to flee in search of food, water, and often overpopulated shelter. As a result, bacterial infections were threatening to spread rapidly throughout the region. In Zerka a Malaria outbreak had started as early as July 1948 due to poor sanitation. In the autumn of 1948, the hill areas of the West Bank saw a typhoid outbreak spread amongst a population of 100,000 people. The city of Amman in Transjordan was also on the brink of epidemics developing due to the area being vastly overpopulated. Due to this growing threat, the AFSC set up public health services to combat the spread of diseases. The AFSC had several members of the medical profession in

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148 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind pp.135-36
their team: Ruth Villiers and Theodora Hodgkin from London, Vreed-Burger who was a nurse from the Netherlands, Marie Halanon from Finland, Vern Pings from Wisconsin, USA, and Jerome Peterson who was a World Health Organisation physician assigned to the AFSC.\textsuperscript{152}

Despite being in Palestine for only three months a draft document was written in March 1949 to be submitted to the UN stating the AFSC’s intention to leave the refugee relief programme at the earliest convenience:

Following a review of the refugee situation in Palestine generally and more particularly in the Gaza strip, the AFSC wishes to state its position regarding the continuance of the refugee relief program. The AFSC wishes to withdraw from direct refugee relief in the Gaza strip at the earliest possible moment compatible with the fulfilment of its moral obligations to the refugee population. It is obvious that prolonged direct relief contributes to the moral degeneration of the refugees and that it may also, by its palliative effects, militate against a swift political settlement.\textsuperscript{153}

The draft document was significant in illustrating how Quakers, despite the many endeavours they were heavily involved in, had fallen into an ethical dilemma whereby their efforts were deemed by themselves as potentially prolonging the suffering of refugees and delaying a possible peaceful political solution. The British writer and researcher Alex de Waal analysed the difficulties humanitarians faced when compromising their dearly held beliefs and how they routinely faced acts of triage.\textsuperscript{154} Despite wanting to help Arab refugees the AFSC could not do so as their endeavours only served to lengthen the suffering of those they wanted to succour. Weiss stressed the importance of voluntary relief agencies understanding context as much as principles because the latter was neither morally absolute nor always achievable.\textsuperscript{155} In this regard Quakers demonstrated a clear understanding of the consequences of their actions. Weiss stated:

There is also a subtle and oft-ignored ‘bright side’ of humanitarian action in that humanitarians can exert a modest positive influence on peace building and conflict resolution. Humanitarians can play diplomatic roles by taking advantage of their local

\textsuperscript{152} Nancy Gallagher, \textit{Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict}. pp. 79-83
\textsuperscript{154} Alex de Waal, 'The Humanitarians' Tragedy: Escapable and Inescapable Cruelties', \textit{Disasters}, 34 (2010), 130-37. p.130
\textsuperscript{155} Thomas G. Weiss, 'Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action'. p.4
connections and knowledge to build bridges among warring parties. Rehabilitation and development undoubtedly can take place concurrently with relief, particularly in parts of a country where relative peace is present.\textsuperscript{156}

Quakers recognised early into their Palestine mission that their relief efforts would not lead to a positive influence that could reconcile Arabs and Jews. To complicate matters further leaving Gaza could potentially de-stabilise the region with refugees in their desperation resorting to violence. Quakers were involved in the long running humanitarian moral dilemma of humanity versus justice.\textsuperscript{157} Political influence would be needed to create justice and though Quakers had demonstrated significant awareness of the political landscape, and despite having the foresight to see the problem, they still became stuck between being responsible for huge numbers of refugees and, in doing so, delaying a just political solution from being achieved. According to Professor of Human Rights Keith Watenpaugh, the experiences of Palestinian refugees in the immediate post-Second World War period was an example of what modern relief workers would describe as the ‘substitution of humanitarianism for politics’.\textsuperscript{158} Humanitarian assistance could only provide a short-term solution. To create a peaceful long term resolution political compromise would be needed. The displacement of so many Palestinians with no final destination meant voluntary agencies such as the AFSC would remain in a state of limbo unless they were able to pass their responsibilities on to another organisation.

The timing of the writing of the document was in stark contrast to the scheduling of the AFSC’s actions in Palestine. Initially, in January 1949, 12 AFSC workers were sent to Gaza, but by March around 30 volunteers were in the area. The Acre project in Israel was also established in March.\textsuperscript{159} Schools for refugee children, according to an AFSC report entitled \textit{Quaker work among the Arab refugees} officially opened on March 31 and expanded capacity over the coming months.\textsuperscript{160} The AFSC was increasing its involvement in Palestine

\textsuperscript{156} ibid. p.13
\textsuperscript{157} Eva Wortel, ‘Humanitarians and Their Moral Stance in War: The Underlying Values’, \textit{International Review of the Red Cross}, 91 (2009), 779-802.
\textsuperscript{158} Keith David Watenpaugh, \textit{Bread from Stones}. p.161
\textsuperscript{159} Asaf Romirowsky and Alexander H. Joffe, \textit{Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief}. p.76
\textsuperscript{160} Nancy Gallagher, \textit{Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict}. p.86
but at the same time also beginning the process required to leave the region. The motivation to leave was due to the inability of the UN to find a solution to the refugee problem but also because open-ended relief without reconciliation could not lead towards peace in the region. There was an internal concern that prolonging relief would eventually harm the Quaker religious ideology, based on pacifism, aid and moral dignity, which the AFSC was founded upon.\(^{161}\) Caught between their moral obligation to support refugees and the realisation that long-term peaceful settlement was highly unlikely, the AFSC remained active in Gaza until it was suitable to hand over both their activities and personnel to another aid agency. The AFSC's initial contract with the UN, which had been set to expire on August 1949, was extended; eventually, 25 volunteers were transferred over to the newly formed United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) on 30 April 1950.\(^{162}\)

Rominorwsky and Joffe stated that no members of the AFSC publicly questioned the legitimacy of Israel or accused the new Jewish state of ending Christian civilisation in the Holy Land.\(^{163}\) However, public criticism regarding Israel’s treatment of Palestinians was clearly demonstrated by Sime. In February 1950, Sime sent a letter to the editor of the *Oxford Times* entitled ‘Jews and Arabs’ and gave a presentation in Oxford detailing her experiences in Palestine. Sime described how wealth had poured into the state of Israel in ‘unbounded quantities’ and how Jewish refugees were provided with ‘all the necessities of life’ allowing them to have a hopeful future.\(^{164}\) In her presentation, ‘A million Jews in Israel’, Sime described the Palestinian people’s state of bewilderment at the loss of their homes and criticised the actions of Jews, commenting that ‘The Jews, in a state of economic excitement, seem to be shelving the problem of these Arabs to a later date’.\(^{165}\) Her condemnation at the lack of Jewish support for Arabs received criticism from multiple readers of the *Oxford Times*. One reader named Eva Stockwell argued that the wealth poured into Israel was far from sufficient and directly blamed the neighbouring Arab states’

\(^{162}\) Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.111  
\(^{165}\) E. Mary Sime Papers, 1950, TEMP MSS 990.1, A Million Jews in Israel - 24 February 1950
attacks for the creation of the Palestinian refugee crisis. Sime was also accused of writing a false impression regarding the experiences of Jewish immigrants in Israel by L. Guttmann. Guttmann, having visited Israel in December 1949, said he could not ‘in any circumstances agree with Miss Sime’s description of the immigration camps as “comfortable” and ‘provided with all the necessities of life‘. Guttmann argued that Jewish immigrants were living in the most awful conditions, that it would be irrational to believe that 360,000 immigrants could not be absorbed into a population of 700,000 without significant hardship. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Shimon Applebaum criticised not only Sime but Quakers living in the region of not understanding the reasons why Jews were so desperate to enter Palestine. The criticism of Sime’s actions in Palestine illustrated how difficult it was to at least appear neutral. Quakers only assisted Arab refugees in Palestine as they were prevented by the Israeli government from helping Jewish refugees. Sime’s actions demonstrate she was upset by the actions of the Israeli government and willing to show her grievances publicly.

One of the most respected pioneers of British Quaker relief work, Francesca Wilson, whose endeavours with European refugees spanned over 30 years from 1916 to 1948, described how ‘anonymity should be the ideal of the relief worker – her reward not only a good task performed, but all the experiences and adventures she has in its performance’. Sime’s public disapproval was not the first time Quaker relief workers had shown their displeasure at a foreign government’s actions. During the Spanish Civil War, the divide between Republican and Nationalist supporters did not bring about an equal measure of assistance from individual Quakers, with some American volunteers in Republican parts of Spain refusing to work once the Nationalists had won the war. Some returned to America to describe to the press their disgust at Franco’s government and its lack of support for

168 ibid.
169 E. Mary Sime Papers, 1950, TEMP MSS 990.1, Arabs and Jews - March 1950
Quakers’ efforts in the region. Sime’s perception that Jewish immigration camps were ‘comfortable’ was supported by other Quakers. AFSC staff member Donald Stevenson described reception centres in Israel for Jewish immigrants as ‘paradises’ compared to the housing Arab refugees lived in, with new tents, beds, kitchen with hot food and clothing provided. Likewise, Oliver observed how Jewish refugees were provided with all the necessary medical support unlike their Arab counterparts. Whether Jewish refugee camps were superior to Palestinian refugee camps is beyond the scope of this analysis. The key issue is how Sime and other Quakers demonstrated contempt for the actions of the Israeli government towards the Arab refugees. Sime would later compare the ‘nakba’ to the extinction of the Native Americans, or ‘Red Indians’ as she referred to them, in North America. Stevenson, in a letter to fellow Quaker Bronson P. Clark, also expressed contempt by stating ‘Because the Jews in Europe have been wronged has nothing to do with justice or lack of justice of robbing the Arabs of their living. Two wrongs do not make a right’. As suggested in the previous chapter some Quakers through the Friend and multiple memoirs showed considerable resentment towards Israel. The above references to the extermination of the Native Americans and robbing of Arabs from AFSC members demonstrated how public criticism of the AFSC as a neutral organisation was not entirely unfounded. Rominorwsky and Joffe in their analysis of the AFSC concluded that Quakers had never made their criticisms of Jews public at the time. However, Sime had clearly done so through giving public lectures in Oxford. The values based on neutrality by which Quakers would not support one side more than the other regarding reconciliatory efforts had been compromised, and in the case of Sime, her association with the Quakers became public knowledge.

172 ibid. p.110
173 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.135
174 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated 15 June 1948 p.2
175 Mary Sime, ‘Arab and Jew in Israel’. p.63
176 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.135
4.6. Struggle for solidarity

Sime’s struggles with the ethical considerations required to be perceived as neutral were just one of several problems she encountered during her involvement with the AFSC. In a letter written on 6 May 1949 she described her great disappointment at what was being accomplished by the team in Galilee:

We need to give mental comfort to these people with the sacks of flour, and as it is, we spend the minimum of time amongst them and waste other precious time at home inventing jobs for ourselves to do. We have painted our jeeps and written reports to other Quakers, but we are only doing the same work as the Red Cross and other non-religious societies, and I am feeling anxious. We had a meeting for worship this morning (Sunday) and I somehow felt it was terribly hollow.\textsuperscript{178}

This small statement within her letter revealed many significant problems she had endured during her time in Galilee. Firstly, she stated that workers in Galilee had to give themselves jobs to do to keep busy, which was the opposite experience of those in Gaza, who described how overwhelmed they were by the scale of the relief work required. Secondly, despite dealing with a far smaller number of those in need, AFSC workers were unable to create the type of close relationships they wanted as they only spent a minimum amount of time with Arab refugees. Thirdly, the relief work that was being done did not possess the unique quality that moved AFSC efforts beyond the type of ‘mere’ humanitarianism Quakers were so keen to avoid. Lastly, the meetings for worship did not provide the sense of empowerment to AFSC staff that was expected. Her description of the meetings for worship as ‘hollow’ was the opposite to Gallagher’s analysis of the meetings AFSC staff in Gaza participated in. Russ Rosene, a non-Quaker who was the AFSC’s communication and transportation officer, described how unprepared he was for the intensity of the AFSC’s team spirit and was so impressed by the ‘one for all and all for one’ attitude of Quakers that he would later join a Quaker meeting for worship.\textsuperscript{179} Likewise, AFSC volunteer Marshall Sutton positively described how staff at the Gaza unit would ‘centre’ themselves at the

\textsuperscript{178} E. Mary Sime Papers, 1949, TEMP MSS 990.1, AFSC Correspondence - 6 May 1949. p.2
\textsuperscript{179} Nancy Gallagher, \textit{Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict}. p.115
meeting, allowing them to do their jobs ‘armed with the Quaker light’.\textsuperscript{180} Gallagher’s appraisal of the Quaker meetings using the recollections of Rosene and Sutton was the opposite of Sime’s experience. The meetings left her feeling ‘hollow’ and isolated as they did not provide the sense of empowerment other volunteers had experienced. Sime’s letter indicated disappointment at the lack of first-hand involvement with refugees. She was deeply concerned about the uniqueness of the work that was being accomplished. Her observations demonstrated a significant disparity between the Gaza relief team’s observations and her own, not just when attending meetings for worship but also in the daily work of the team in Galilee, which even involved creating work to be done to give the appearance of being useful. Deen Low experienced a similar sense of disappointment:

\begin{quote}
It is a terrible responsibility to have to make a decision – or a hundred decisions daily – which may literally mean life or death for many. As a Quaker team we did not seek guidance enough in the usual Quaker way. Only about four per cent of our “team” (of fifty to sixty workers) were actually Quakers; and I don’t think we ever had a meeting for Worship or even a staff meeting at which all the team was present.\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

Sime’s and Low’s descriptions suggest a lack of spiritual practice took place during their relief work. The American Quaker historian and eventual president of the Friends Historical Society, Mary Hoxie Jones, stated that non-Quaker support had been a key factor in the AFSC’s budget with non-Friends playing a significant role as personnel since 1917.\textsuperscript{182} Jones described how the London Yearly Meeting (later known as Britain Yearly Meeting) was the main collective voice of British Friends whilst in the United States, 22 Yearly Meetings plus six associations and conferences all shared the same level of status. This diversification meant there was considerable confusion when statements on behalf of American Quakers were released. ‘Who is saying what to whom?’\textsuperscript{183} The lack of a central Quaker core plus so many non-members meant detailed spiritual discussions could not always be achieved by American Quakers. By comparison their British counterparts in the FSC rarely employed non-Friends and worked under a more central simplified network, which allowed them to

\textsuperscript{180} ibid. p.115
\textsuperscript{181} Deen Low, ‘Not by Bread Alone’, \textit{The Wayfarer}, XXIX (July 1950), 106-07. p.106
\textsuperscript{182} Mary Hoxie Jones, ‘Friends in Great Britain and the United States’. p.329-30
\textsuperscript{183} ibid. p.329
have a greater faith-based dialogue. Preparation was an important factor in creating a strong bond amongst volunteers whereby meetings for worship could have the chance to provide the spiritual guidance Quaker members desired. The FAU and FRS also had a significant number of non-Quakers volunteer during the Second World War. The difference with the FAU and FRS was that the extensive level of training and shared nationality (British) the relief workers had in common meant a more cohesive environment could be created. Carson, in her analysis of Quaker relief work in post-war Germany, stated a team spirit initially instilled in FRS members during training was enhanced in the field through meetings for worship and team meetings. ‘Religion acted not only as a “buffer” against traumatic stress, but as a consolidating mechanism, accentuating shared moral and ethical values’. The AFSC Gaza operation by comparison was a mixture of multiple nationalities, the vast majority of whom did not speak Arabic, and received no formal training specific to the Middle East.

The issue of how useful the work being carried out by Quakers was in both their humanitarian assistance and reconciliatory efforts remained a key theme throughout the AFSC’s time in Palestine. The transfer of 25 AFSC volunteers over to UNRWA signalled the end of the AFSC’s main contribution in Palestine. An article written in the Friend by Lettice Jowitt described the regret felt by Friends and refugees that relief work could no longer continue under its current format. Feldman, in her study of the AFSC, concluded that many volunteers in Gaza believed they succeeded in providing refugees with what was physically needed but were far less confident that they had done this in a uniquely Quaker way. Alwin Holtz observed how many AFSC volunteers were deeply frustrated. ‘We had been there really to do the [repatriation]. Emergency relief was nothing’. Holtz’s

184 ibid. p.330
189 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.110
description of emergency assistance as ‘nothing’ was a very dismissive way of describing the work the AFSC participated in, demonstrating that some individuals viewed the distribution of food, clothes, and medical support as merely humanitarianism. To be associated with only emergency relief alongside the other agencies involved in the region created a genuine feeling of disappointment among some field personnel. Cassius Fenton, in his Palestine report, expressed such dismay that he believed any other NGO such as the Red Cross could have done the same form of relief work the AFSC was involved in.\textsuperscript{190} Sime, in her analysis of the AFSC’s work in Galilee, had stressed the same concern, and in a transcript of an AFSC meeting in July 1949, volunteers described how they regularly found themselves performing as ‘a relief agency and nothing more’.\textsuperscript{191} AFSC volunteer and American Quaker Howard Wriggins recalled evenings were spent discussing how their endeavours could carry a Quaker message.\textsuperscript{192} The idea behind this was that principles such as seeing the inner light (or good) in everyone could manifest itself into their relief work. This in turn would allow them to have closer relationship with refugees and earn their trust. However, in a series of personal communications Wriggins regretted how optimistic Quakers were that they could help find a peaceful resolution; in the end ‘history was too much’.\textsuperscript{193} Though not working for the AFSC, Oliver expressed this concern a year earlier. Oliver praised the noble work being accomplished by Quakers but said, ‘what are we doing to prevent another, perhaps bigger catastrophe from happening?’.\textsuperscript{194} The scale and complication of the conflict was, and still is, a problem many relief workers and campaigners have struggled to achieve success in. In this regard, Quaker criticism of their inability to achieve a conflict resolution illustrated just how confident and ambitious they were in their endeavours.

The success the AFSC achieved in setting up schools, distributing rations and preventing viral epidemics throughout Gaza should have been a positive experience that volunteers took

\textsuperscript{190} ibid. p.138
\textsuperscript{191} Ilana Feldman, 'The Quaker Way: Ethical Labour and Humanitarian Relief'. p.690
\textsuperscript{192} Howard Wriggins, \textit{Picking up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine - Quaker Refugee Relief in World War II}, (Maryland: University Press of America, Ltd, 2004). p.191
\textsuperscript{193} Nancy Gallagher, \textit{Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict}. p.116
\textsuperscript{194} The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to F. Algernon and Anna R. Evans - 25 August 1949 p.2
from their altruistic endeavours, however due to their perceived failure to do more than relief work a constant sense of disappointment permeated through their collective consciousness. Deen Low epitomised this attitude when she summarised her experience working for the AFSC:

Although the team was not as one expected a Quaker team would be, for we failed in many ways, yet we were conscious of our shortcomings and were never satisfied that all was well with us. It was an immense undertaking; and though from the material standpoint we may have been efficient, what we have done is not enough by long chalk...relief work needs stronger roots and a brighter guiding light than mere humanitarianism. It is only in Christ that we can endure all things, and with His grace turn negative wrong into creative light.  

Despite the deep concern that the AFSC was practicing ‘mere’ humanitarianism, most Palestinians who worked with the AFSC valued its efforts in these areas but were also quite unaware of the sense of mission Quakers were trying to implement into their relief work. Once the AFSC’s major operation in Gaza had ended it had succeeded in providing humanitarian aid but failed to do so in a uniquely Quaker fashion. The quality of the relief work done by the AFSC and other charities was acknowledged by the director of UNRWA, Howard Kennedy. Kennedy, in a press release issued on 15 June 1950, stated the importance of religious and private voluntary groups as well as to plead for their continuing support. AFSC volunteers were allowed to transfer over to UNRWA to continue working in the region. UNRWA was not only appreciative but also desperate to acquire as much support as possible. The experience of the AFSCs relief work made them an asset. The relationship between Quakers and UNRWA, within the context of this chapter, illustrated how the self-confidence of certain Quakers was still clearly apparent even when they transferred over to UNRWA. The American Quaker James Keen, in a letter sent to Clarence Pickett dated 14 October 1950, described how an unnamed Norwegian UNRWA officer criticised the level of confidence, almost arrogance, that AFSC volunteers had brought into

195 Deen Low, 'Not by Bread Alone'. p.107
196 Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.117
UNRWA. The UNRWA officer observed how AFSC volunteers considered themselves self-sufficient and that guidance given to them by UNRWA headquarters was more bureaucratic ‘red tape’, stating that ‘their enthusiasm was easily matched with exaggerated self-confidence which did not have an open mind to outside criticism’. The conclusion by the unnamed UNRWA official proved to be more than accurate when adding the opinion of the American Quaker Bronson Clark, who had also transferred over to UNRWA. Clark, in a letter sent 24 September to Cassius Fenton and Corrine Hardesty, boastfully wrote, ‘I think it is safe to say that our suspicion that we were doing a better job than all other areas is a gross understatement…I can say in all modesty that we are terrific’.

Historically, aid workers from Western Christian backgrounds held a belief that they knew the best approaches. What is unique about the AFSC was the confidence they had not only when dealing with Arabs but also other aid organisations. Despite all the drawbacks the organisation endured in terms of its inability to provide the perceived unique Quaker brand of relief work, some volunteers kept the high levels of self-assurance they had before their arrival in Palestine, maintaining a profound sense of pride that their approach to relief and reconciliation was superior to other humanitarian organisations. Alex de Waal commented that the ‘humanitarians' tragedy is not a tragedy of failure. It can be failure of achievable goals’.

De Waal meant that failing at relief work was not in itself a tragedy, but rather the lofty goals set that were never going to be achieved in the first place. This was most certainly the case when analysing the activities of the AFSC in Palestine. The AFSC was not the only relief agency constantly under pressure regarding resources, especially in finance; however, the assets Quakers did have at their disposal were at times not implemented to the consistently high standards Quakers set for themselves.

Before the AFSC officially arrived in Palestine in January 1949, Quakers with vast experience in the region such as Oliver and Totah were isolated or even criticised, whilst Willard Jones,

199 ibid. p.136
201 Alex de Waal, ‘The Humanitarians’ Tragedy: Escapable and Inescapable Cruelties’. p.131
who was contacted by Bell to discuss AFSC operations before their arrival, was never involved once relief work began. Daniel Oliver visited the Jonses in Ramallah in July 1948, observing how they felt intensely the responsibilities and difficulties of their position but nonetheless continued to teach and look after the children in their care. He described them as ‘fine people doing a fine work, and doing it with faith and courage, and I hope they will have the whole-hearted support of their Board and of the American Friends Service Committee’. However, AFSC support was not provided. Christina Jones’ memoirs do not show any meaningful information regarding collaborative involvement with the AFSC or even moral encouragement. In their separate analyses of the AFSC, Gallagher, Feldman and Romirowisky and Joffe do not provide evidence of the AFSC engaging with Willard or Christina Jones during their relief work. Khalil Totah, bemused by the AFSCs support of the UN Partition Plan and having spent much of his life supporting the Palestinian cause, remained at great odds with their policy. Daniel Oliver, in typical fashion, did not let the AFSCs lack of support deter him. The Lighthouse of the East magazine remained, and he continued to take in orphans, mainly from the Haifa district. The additional money needed to care for refugee orphans was provided by individual Quakers, with a woman in the United States, whom sadly Oliver does not name, the main contributor, although in other correspondence Oliver did express his deep gratitude to an Anna R. Evans from Philadelphia. The Olivers also received support from the Brummana School, with a collection given to the orphans in the Ras el-Metn orphanage. The Brummana School itself took in 80 refugee children. Herbert and Gwen Dobbing, who were both based at the school, wrote an article in the Wayfarer describing how the Palestinian refugee crisis was continuously in front of them and that they tried to help in any small way they could. Another collection of money and clothing started by the children in Brummana was sent to

202 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Margaret M. Morris - 14 July 1948 p.3
203 Thomas M. Ricks, ‘Khalil Totah: The Unknown Years’. p.70
204 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter Dated 15 June 1948 p.4; The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Margaret M. Morris - 14 July 1948 p.3
refugees and orphans in the neighbouring town of Ahliyah.\footnote{Herbert Dobbing and Gwen Dobbing, 'Progress at Brummana', *The Wayfarer*, XXXVIII (September 1949), 135-36. p.136} During this period of support between the two Quaker institutions based in Lebanon, Daniel Oliver embarked on several journeys throughout 1949 in an attempt to galvanise peace and repatriation. His patriotic ways were once again evident when he described that the car he travelled in ‘had our British flag inside the windshield – that flag always gives me a feeling of courage and assurance, because it stands in my mind for the highest and best things among nations’\footnote{The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, A Journey to Palestine on Behalf of Peace and Repatriation - 23 May 1949 p.3}. In May, Oliver travelled to Damascus, Transjordan and Tel Aviv to meet various heads of state. He met the Syrian Foreign Minister, who had previous helped him escape punishment from the Turkish authorities who held him as a prisoner of war, and then later the King of Transjordan. Alongside his peace building endeavours he also visited former students of the orphanage to provide further financial assistance and ask the authorities to exempt them from military service.\footnote{ibid. pp.1-2} Oliver travelled to Tel Aviv to meet Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first Foreign Minister and future Prime Minister. Oliver had corresponded with Sharett previously but on this occasion was not able to see Sharett. Oliver stated ‘I do not feel beaten at all’ and that he would return at a later date to give the Jewish authorities his message.\footnote{ibid. p.4} Oliver’s resilience to setbacks was driven by his faith and self-confidence in his experience. It could also be argued it was driven by a concern to create a world whereby his students, current or former, could flourish. Oliver and his wife Emily, who likely spent more time at the orphanage than Oliver based on the amount of travelling he did, worked tirelessly to support the children in the orphanage, ‘all our time is given to the children, we love them’.\footnote{Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.78 & p.82} The same loyalty was shown by the Jonses in Ramallah who, during the conflict, dealt with armed robberies and bullets hitting the school walls but saw their endeavours as a duty that could not be abandoned.\footnote{Haverford, Haverford College Library, The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to F. Algernon and Anna R. Evans - 17 February 1949. p.2} Under the shadow of the AFSC operation, those Quakers who were not asked to participate in the programme diligently...
worked to support refugees and the Palestinian children in their institutions, and in Oliver’s case, continued to strive for some form of peace in the region.

The Ras-el-Metn orphanage, Brummana School and Friends School in Ramallah, aside from being central hubs for Quaker educational activities, were institutions that created much pride and loyalty. Bernard Lawson, Assistant Secretary of the Friends Service Council (FSC) and Secretary of its Lebanon Field, visited the Brummana School in March 1951. Lawson observed in awe how the school had become a highly thought of centre of influence in the Middle East with students forging careers in political cabinets and as professional leaders.\textsuperscript{213} Likewise, Daniel Oliver described how the orphanage prepared the boys for taking their place as good citizens, with a hope and expectation they use their abilities to become leaders in the country.\textsuperscript{214} Oliver believed the role of the orphanage was to create strong Christian characters but emphasised that British Quakers do not proselytise in any shape or form.\textsuperscript{215} Khalil Totah also argued that Quakers ‘tipped over backwards’ to ensure they did not proselytise.\textsuperscript{216} Their mission, first and foremost, was to raise children to have good moral values and a high standard of education. The result of this meant Quakers had built and created a legacy to be proud of in the Middle East, and despite the ongoing refugee crisis strenuous efforts were made to maintain security and academic excellence. The crisis forced these institutions to adapt and create safe havens for those suffering. However, the amount of orphans and refugees taken in were a miniscule fraction when compared to those in the refugee camps. Oliver, upon visiting one such camp based in Sidon, was informed that between 8,000 to 10,000 refugees were based in Sidon, one of whom was a man who had previously lived at the orphanage.\textsuperscript{217} Oliver attempted to describe the refugee mind-set:

\begin{quote}

\end{quote}
They feel intensely there is no justice in the world, no righteousness and no moral law that is acted upon, and that the great European powers and American are looking after their own political and commercial interests... The universal feeling everywhere is that Great Britain is principally to blame for the situation that should have been settled and arranged years before the catastrophe of war took place.  

This resentment amongst refugees would become far more significant during the 1950s but at that point in time their situation was so dire all they could do was rely on whatever charitable donations and endeavours came their way. For Oliver, the crisis was a relentless struggle he could not alleviate. The same day he returned to the orphanage from Damascus one of the leaders of the refugee committee in Beirut brought 11 orphans with him, which Oliver then accepted into his custody. Oliver was dismayed by what he had experienced but also expressed frustration at how the world viewed the crisis; he argued ‘everyone should acquaint oneself with the facts of the case, not simply the propaganda in newspapers, which may not even be correct themselves’. In the summer of 1950 Oliver met the Presidents of the Lebanese and Syrian republics on another peace building mission to relieve growing political tensions between the two. His endeavours for a man approaching 80 years old were remarkable. Yet, what was also notable was his lack of correspondence with those Quakers who were actively involved in the AFSC mission.

As mentioned earlier, Clarence Pickett ignored Oliver’s request for collaboration, but there was also no correspondence with Paul Sturge and Lettice Jowitt of the FSC. Jowitt, and Sturge in particular, were among the main proponents for British Quakers joining the AFSC operation. They had both visited the Ras-el-Metn orphanage in July 1938 and in 1952 Sturge would meet both Oliver and Dobbing on a tour of refugee camps. Yet rather oddly there were no attempts by Sturge at collaboration or correspondence with Oliver or Dobbing during the AFSC operation that he had so heavily endorsed. The origins of the AFSC

218 ibid. pp.1-2
219 ibid. p.2
220 ibid. p.3
221 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS 637.8, Letter from Daniel Oliver to Lucy Backhouse - 7 July 1950 pp. 1-2
222 The Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage Papers, 1907-1960, Collection 1134, Letter to Mr and Mrs Marriott C. Morris - July 1938 p.3; Paul D. Sturge, ‘A Visit to the Middle East’, The Wayfarer, XXXI (June 1952), 88-90.
An analysis of the ideological objectives and practical outcomes of Quaker relief work in Palestine, 1948-1955

operation in Palestine may have been part of a transnational endeavour but, once relief work was underway, the AFSC significantly lacked consultation with local Friends, with its volunteers often lacking knowledge of the conflict. There was a major disparity between Quakers based in Palestine and Lebanon, from those belonging to the AFSC who travelled to Palestine to carry out relief work. According to Pickett, when at their peak numbers there were 50 AFSC staff members in Gaza. This was to support potentially 180,000 refugees, equalling roughly one AFSC worker for every 3600 refugees. In an article in the *Friends Quarterly*, Jorgen Milwertz’s own estimate was far higher, commenting that on one day he was left alone with 35,000 Arabs and was supposed to provide them with their weekly rations and tents, ensuring they received what they were entitled to but no more. The AFSC used duty-based ethics as a benchmark for its practices, but it struggled to develop solidarity with Arabs because of its focus on the effectiveness or impact of its work. This was compounded by the inability of most field personnel to speak Arabic. The previous major humanitarian operation by Quakers in Germany was deemed a success because field workers regularly engaged with refugees. This was accomplished through learning refugees’ languages as well as being involved in their cultural and social lives. As a result, the accounts of volunteers stated that despite many shortcomings they were able to provide a unique type of relief service. This uniqueness was significantly lacking in Palestine for several reasons: the dearth of volunteers recruited before and during the Palestine mission; the struggle of field personnel to adapt to Arab culture and language to facilitate individual connections with those they sought to ameliorate; and the failure of senior Quaker staff to call upon suitably skilled and experienced Quakers already based in the region, such as Oliver and the Joneses. These issues consequently made the highly ambitious goals set by Quakers difficult to achieve.

224 Clarence Pickett, *For More Than Bread*. p.285
225 Jorgen Milwertz, ‘My Friends the Arabs’. p.42
Former AFSC personnel worked together with Arab, Jewish, and international volunteers on community development projects. However, this was on a far smaller scale compared to their previous endeavours. Instead, the AFSC set its focus upon reconciliatory efforts. In 1955, Elmore Jackson, who was the Quaker observer at the UN, became involved in a series of unsuccessful private negotiations with the Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and the Egyptian President Gamal Abder Nasser. In the same year, an Israeli diplomat asked the Quaker United Nations Office to assist in the release of Egyptian Jews who were imprisoned by the Egyptian government on the charge of spying. The Quakers appealed to the Egyptian government with the Israeli delegation to the UN submitting a letter of appreciation for their efforts. However, years later the truth emerged that Quakers were deceived, that the Egyptian Jews were in fact Israeli agents who were supposed to bomb British and American facilities in Egypt as part of a false flag operation designed to discredit the Nasser regime. This incident would be known as the Lavon Affair. The AFSC, again in 1955, published a new pamphlet entitled, ‘Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker search for an Alternative to Violence’. The pamphlet attempted to reclaim the Quaker connection to pacifism. It sold over 100,000 copies during the 1950s and was discussed extensively in various media outlets. The AFSC was previously the main driving force behind the Quaker humanitarian operation in Gaza, but its approach in the Middle East significantly altered to that of a peace organisation by the late 1950s.

By contrast, British Quakers and the FSC began to seek greater collaboration with other Christian groups to continue providing relief to Arabs. This approach was like the goals the FSC first sought in Palestine prior to the AFSC contacting them in August 1948, subsequently pulling them away from carrying out the more ‘straight-forward’ relief work they initially desired. The British Society of Friends as an organisation preferred their work to be less publicised than their American peers, who during and since the First World War sought recognition for their contributions and continued this approach through Pickett’s ‘Truce of

228 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.144
230 Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.145
An analysis of the ideological objectives and practical outcomes of Quaker relief work in Palestine, 1948-1955

God’ appeal. Colin Bell, the British Quaker who was previously the head of the AFSC relief programme in Gaza, published an article in the *Friend* on 7 September 1951. In the article, Bell summarised Quaker relief work as the ‘search in the drawer for a warming garment, the dedicated tithe of income, the service of Quaker workers in many lands, and the prayers’. Out of these core areas of Quaker relief work the issue of service in foreign lands proved the most problematic. Three months earlier, the FSC announced that it could no longer gather a large group of young Friends to work abroad, though there still was a great requirement for a small number with special talents to offer their services. One Quaker argued in a *Wayfarer* article that a significant reason for the decline was due to young people believing that the only recompense those from the West could make to those ‘simple peoples’, who were so exploited by colonists the previous century, was to let them be.

Several articles published in the *Friend* in 1952 appealing for British volunteers to enter Jordan to support an agricultural project led by AFSC representatives, Paul and Jean Johnson, failed to gather interest from suitable candidates. The project did eventually come to fruition in autumn 1953 due to financial support from the Ford Foundation. Despite the lack of suitable volunteers, several Quakers still participated in ‘hands on’ relief work due to their premises, particularly schools and orphanages housing refugees. The AFSC, despite a great reduction in its activities compared to 1949, still ran some small projects whilst former members worked for secular humanitarian organisations such as UNRWA. One example of this was Deen Low, the former AFSC volunteer whose work with UNRWA was supported by the Friends Service Council. Low received several grants from the FSC to support her development of a Kindergarten in Homs, Syria. Low used the grants to setup a clubroom and to pay a teacher’s salary as well as ensure the kindergarten was kept...
open for several months. However, overall, the lack of new personnel saw British Quaker efforts begin to focus more on providing financial support, clothing, and educational supplies to refugees, particularly children.

Due to the lack of workers needed to create a suitable team for relief work and increasing political tensions, Quakers began to not only collaborate but also praise the efforts of other faith-based and secular organisations in the region. This contrasted with statements made by some AFSC members during large scale operations in Gaza from 1949-1950 which had indicated a competitiveness not to be outdone by other relief organisations. Numerous articles were published in the *Friend* over several years during the 1950s demonstrating a far more positive outlook from British Quakers at the work of other relief groups. The World Council of Churches (WCC), Church Missionary Service (CMS), American Friends Mission, Greek Orthodox Church, International Christian Committee, UNRWA, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, UNESCO, Inter-Church and Service for Refugees Division, Near East Christian Council (NECC), Red Crescent Society, International Red Cross and British Council of Churches were all referenced in the *Friend* during this period. Most significantly, the response from British Quakers to these organisations was unanimously supportive with some articles defending other organisations actions and policies when they received public criticism.

241 Eric W. Johnson, 'From Avenue Mozart'; Mary Sime, 'The U.N. Agencies'.
organisations was created, firstly, by the unavailability of suitably skilled workers who shared the Quaker ethos to carry out direct relief work, and secondly, by the safety in numbers that collaborating with other groups provided due to the increasing turmoil and danger in the region.

In July 1951 at a Conference of Plenipotentiaries held in Geneva, 24 nations created the final document concerning a Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. James Read, an American Quaker who at the time was United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, and Colin Bell, who became a member of the Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC) submitted written as well as oral statements at the conference.\(^{242}\) Bell described how the conference presented a new opportunity for Quakers to assist refugees through international legislation.\(^{243}\) The conference was not without its issues, with Bell describing his disappointment concerning the status of stateless persons. He was concerned at how the thoughts of some national delegates were consumed with the idea of the criminal or undesirable refugee, in doing so excluding the ‘99 just persons’.\(^{244}\) The approval of the convention was a global political action to try and resolve some of the issues surrounding the status of refugees. It also demonstrated how nations and organisations were still trying to agree on the appropriate courses of action regarding the refugee question.

For British Quakers concerned with the refugee question the decision of what to do next was discussed in a meeting at the Friends House in London 25 May 1951.\(^{245}\) During the meeting attendees were made aware of a letter sent by Bell describing his attendance at another international aid committee conference in Beirut earlier that month.\(^{246}\) The meeting continued with various opinions being shared but, unbeknownst to those in attendance, the future of British Quaker relief work in the Middle East had already begun to take shape. Along with Bell, Christina and Willard Jones were also in attendance at the

^{243}\) ibid. p.787  
^{244}\) ibid. p.788  
^{246}\) ibid. p.501
conference. 50 delegates, all of whom were Christian leaders from the West, Far East and Middle East, the majority representing large denominations and organisations, attended the conference held 4-8 May 1951. The conference, organised by the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council at the American University in Beirut, sought to unite ideological divisions in the Protestant community under the umbrella of pragmatic Christian humanitarian action.

The conference has three main purposes: firstly, to show that Christians are concerned about the plight of the Palestine refugees; secondly, to call upon those who can help, to take this need far more seriously than they have done and cooperate in this task. [...] meeting as Christians, we have no other motive in coming together than our desire to serve – no other motive than that command which was received from our Lord and Master. This is a straightforward and direct Christian task to be performed in which we can be at one, if in other ways we are divided.

The WCC aimed to gather as much support from as many different Christian denominations as possible. It proved successful in this aim with Christina Jones recalling the confidence it gave those working in the field through inspiring a sense of hope against the frustrating isolation of the previous few years. The United Missionary Council, the Lutheran World Federation, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Pontifical Mission (later Catholic Relief Services), the YMCA and YWCA had already been operating in the Middle East separately from UNRWA. The conference built upon an already established Christian base with the intention of expanding both the unity and scale of Christian relief operations towards Arab refugees. Jones stated, ‘if the church is prepared to act, it was our duty to co-operate’. Jones sense of duty as a Christian to cooperate in this new initiative would signify the start of British Quaker relief work for Arab refugees moving from a unique Quaker inspired model to a broader Christian endeavour.

249 Christina Jones, *Friends in Palestine*. p.135
250 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind* p.152
251 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind* pp.150-51
252 ibid. p.151
A few months after the WCC conference, Jones recalled how donations of goods and money from multiple Christian bodies had significantly increased.\(^{253}\) In the UK, pamphlets detailing the plight of Arab refugees developed by the Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service of the British Council of Churches had been distributed to local Quaker meetings.\(^{254}\) In late May 1952, a full page advertisement entitled ‘An Appeal to All Christians’ was published in the *Friend*.\(^{255}\) A corresponding article was also published praising the endeavours of other Christian groups such as the Church Missionary Society and the Greek Orthodox Church. It alerted readers to the FSC’s advertisement of the Arab refugee issue which contained the official statement from the WCC Beirut conference.\(^{256}\) The article concluded with an appeal for more support from British Quakers:

> For all this work, and for the baling and shipping of clothing which is being sent by the British Red Cross and the Church Missionary Society, money is needed. The British Council of Churches has chosen this Whitsuntide as an appropriate money to appeal to Christians of every denomination on behalf of these unfortunate refugees. A pamphlet has been printed, and within the support of meeting for Sufferings copies will be sent to Preparative meeting Clerks early in June. We believe Friends will be glad of this opportunity to help the Arab refugees.\(^{257}\)

British Quakers were moving away from their unique Quaker brand of humanitarianism to support a larger Christian relief effort. The reason for this change was not only due to a sense of ‘duty’ described by Jones but also due to growing logistical difficulties. As mentioned earlier, in June 1951 the FSC announced that it, ‘no longer had a large group of young Friends working for it abroad’.\(^{258}\) The lack of new personnel saw British Quaker relief efforts focus on supporting Friends who were already established in the region as well as other organisations.

Due to the deaths of both Daniel and Emily Oliver in the early 1950s, responsibility for the continuation of the Ras-el-Metn orphanage belonged to Boutros I. Khoury, who himself was...

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\(^{253}\) Christina Jones, *Friends in Palestine*. p.136  
\(^{256}\) Elizabeth F. Howard, ‘An Appeal to All Christians’. p.423  
\(^{257}\) ibid. p.423  
an orphan supported by the Olivers, later becoming Daniel’s secretary and right-hand man. The orphanage boarded 50 orphans including 26 Palestinian refugees. Khoury, who also visited various refugee camps in Lebanon, appealed to British Quakers through the *Friend* to provide gifts of money, exercise books and basic stationery for the children in the camps. Prior to the appeal the FSC had already sent a shipment of clothing to the orphanage, which was distributed to 596 families numbering 2,350 refugees. In Ramallah, the Friends Meeting House housed six refugee families and was allowed to be used as a Girls School by the International Christian Committee for Refugee Relief. On an annual basis a small number of refugee children in camps based in Ramallah and Jiffa were also accepted into the Friends School according to Christina Jones. In addition, Jones established the Ramallah Handicraft Co-Operative Society to help Arab women, some of whom were refugees, attain better wages through their work, particularly in the clothing industry. The FSC, alongside sending clothing and educational materials, sent financial donations of 300 pounds to the Joneses and 400 (the rough equivalent of 10,000 pound today) to Khoury in support of his work with Arab refugees. Individual Quakers in the region worked for other relief-based organisations when opportunities presented themselves. As a result of the Beirut conference the Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Work (NECCCRW) was created. Working under the auspices of the WCC it was exclusively engaged in co-ordinating educational, nutritional, and agricultural projects across Gaza, West Jordan, Israel, and host countries. Willard Jones became Executive Secretary of a frontier village refugee relief programme backed by NECCCRW. Christina acted as liaison between the committee and the people from supported villages.

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261 Dorothy H. Wright, 'For Refugee Children'. p.554
262 Bernard H. Canter, 'Clothing for Arab Refugees'. p.294
263 Emile Cortas, 'Near East Yearly Meeting'. p.486
264 Unknown, 'Work among Refugee Children'. p.162
266 Unknown, 'Work among Refugee Children'. p.162
268 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind* pp.146-47
worked for the AFSC, joined a teacher training programme in Jordan for UNESCO. Kanty Cooper, worked for a voluntary agency in the towns of Zerka and Irbid, managing relief supplies which would then be distributed by UNRWA personnel.

Due to their sense of duty as Christians and lack of new personnel, British Quakers viewed their collaborations as well as the efforts of other relief organisations positively. Khoury and Sime both praised the work done by UNRWA in the refugee camps they visited. An article published in the Friend in July 1954 defended UNESCO by describing it as a ‘large and hopeful force for good and is helping to build the sort of world Friends want to see’. The competitiveness and criticism of other relief agencies such as the Red Cross and UNRWA that was demonstrated during their relief work prior to 1951, was replaced with a far more supportive and collaborative stance. For British Quakers, the logistical problems created by a lack of new young volunteers forced them to collaborate but their sense of duty as Christians also played a key role. As a result, they began to distance themselves from attempts to be uniquely ‘Quaker’ in their relief work instead opting for a more over-arching Christian approach.

4.7. Conclusion

The ambitions of Quakers before and during their relief work created a significant impact on their perceptions. The Quakers’ goal to be involved in a conflict in which it proved incredibly problematic to be perceived as neutral, combined with the magnitude of the collaborative humanitarian operation they had agreed to participate in, meant they had a responsibility to deliver on a task of unprecedented difficulty. The information provided by those involved was varied, as individual perceptions often are. Some Quakers expressed pride at the relief work accomplished while others saw it as inconsequential in comparison to being involved in conflict resolution, viewing the provision of humanitarian aid as merely a vessel which allowed them to focus on reconciliation. Disappointment was expressed by both volunteers

270 Kanty Cooper, The Uprooted. pp.137-65
271 Dorothy H. Wright, 'For Refugee Children'; Mary Sime, 'The U.N. Agencies'.
272 Eric W. Johnson, 'From Avenue Mozart'. p.710
at the time and by those who recalled events several decades later. Paradoxically, the ‘mere’ relief work, as some saw it, could have provided a larger sense of pride and accomplishment, yet the failure to deliver a unique brand of humanitarianism overshadowed the opinions of many volunteers, both Quaker and non-Quaker. For AFSC field personnel the implementation of duty-based values built on establishing close connections with those suffering, and reconciliation between Arabs and Jews through their relief work, failed to materialise. However, many Quakers remained steadfast in their beliefs regarding these principles, so much so that when comparing themselves to other relief organisations some individuals demonstrated a competitiveness and confidence, bordering on arrogance, that their approaches were superior.

Quakers showed an almost unwavering conviction in their core ethical principles but conversely a sense of disappointment concerning how they failed to achieve the ambitious goals they set for themselves. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize set their expectations to a level they could not realistically reach. Many were unprepared for the logistical and cultural problems working with Arab refugees entailed with several individuals struggling to find a middle ground with those they sought to ameliorate. The aspiration which served them so well in previous humanitarian endeavours proved counter-productive in Palestine due to the humanitarian and political environment the conflict created. The struggle to deliver on highly ambitious deontological values through relief work, and the transfer of AFSC staff to UNRWA, as well as other Quakers becoming involved in numerous alternative humanitarian endeavours, created a paradigm shift in the Quaker approach to relief work in the Middle East. The AFSC reduced direct relief-based operations in the region, instead focusing its attention on peace building activities and re-affirming the Quaker connection to the Peace Testimony. The FSC and British Friends, in contrast, focused their efforts on the idea of Christian duty and, in doing so, significantly reduced their emphasis on the uniqueness of Quaker humanitarianism.
5. The challenges posed to British Quakers by the British government’s actions in the Middle East, 1951-1958

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will analyze how Quakers living in the West Bank, Lebanon and Jordan experienced growing isolation and danger due to the increased involvement of British and other Western governments. An analysis of the reaction of British Quakers to the Suez Crisis will then suggest that many Friends in Britain opposed the British government’s involvement in the crisis for two main reasons. The first was a sense of shame and suspicion created through shared identity as British people because of the British government’s actions. The second was the damaging impact the crisis had on their missionary and humanitarian work in the region, which led to British Quakers pursuing a repentant approach when communicating with Arabs, as well as distancing themselves from the government. This distinct period in British Quaker history saw Friends move away from being a faith-based organisation that, during the 1930s and 1940s, actively attempted to influence government overseas policy, to becoming an organisation primarily forced to deal with the practical challenges created by a government rapidly losing its grip on the Middle East.

5.2. Arab anger and the threat to Quakers in the region

In December 1948, before AFSC operations commenced in Gaza and north Palestine, Colin Bell and other senior Quakers officials attended a 40-day mourning ceremony following the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi. This was to show Egyptian government officials they were genuinely concerned with the plight of the Egyptian people and to refute any notion that they were agents of Western imperialism.\(^1\) The goal of proving they were not part of an imperialist agenda was crucial because if they could not show this, they would not be able to assist Arab refugees. For the near 18-month period during which the AFSC carried out major relief operations in Gaza and north Palestine, it continuously received negative publicity from the Egyptian press, which was controlled by the Egyptian government.

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\(^1\) Nancy Gallagher, *Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*. p.68
government. Arab suspicions over the intentions of Western governments and organisations were not unfounded. The efforts of Western governments within the Middle East were part of a wider attempt to gain spheres of influence through overt and covert means to develop friendships whilst punishing adversaries. During the 1950s the American government consistently attempted to secure its own political objectives in the region via clandestine operations, most notably in Iran and Jordan. In 1986 previously unreleased archival material allowed historians to reassess the activities of Western governments and in doing so expose a high level of covert action in the Middle East. The belief by many Arabs that Western governments, including Britain, were only focused on their own national objectives saw a substantial rise in radicalism. The war in Palestine and the subsequent influx of refugees had tripled the population of Jordan. As a result, Jordan became a far more politically aware population that was willing to question the elite-based patronal politics of the mandate period openly. The refugee camps became centres of Arab dissatisfaction and suspicion. Due to being geographically dispersed Palestinians rarely worked together under the same political identity, with a new generation supporting various political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), Syrian Nationalist party, Arab Ba’th Social party, Communists and even National Socialists emerging. Richard Wood, who wrote the ‘Internationally Speaking’ section for the Friends Journal, discussed how in addition to Western colonial efforts, the Cold War rivalry between the USA and Russia created a contest whereby the two governments attempted to influence perceived ‘backwards’ people in

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2 Clarence Pickett, *For More Than Bread*. p.285

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countries such as Egypt, allegedly in the name of making things better.\textsuperscript{10} The needs of the Arab people in countries like Egypt were a distant second and were only supported when it benefited certain governments’ policies in the region. Continuing foreign government involvement exasperated Arabs who began to demonstrate their suspicions through actions, which subsequently endangered Quakers living in the region.

In 1953 when visiting a local refugee camp in Zerka, Jordan, Kanty Cooper recalled how a crowd of hostile children surrounded her and that a woman pushed to the front to hiss viciously, ‘Give us back our land, the land you English took from us’, at which point the children all shouted the same comment.\textsuperscript{11} The following year, due to accusations that local elections in Jordan had been fixed, crowds of demonstrators gathered to protest the results but were soon fired upon by the Arab Legion under the instructions of British Commander General Glubb.\textsuperscript{12} Arab hostility was only to increase further due to the Baghdad Pact. On 24 February 1955 Turkey and Iraq, with the support of both Britain and the United States, announced their defensive alliance, inviting other Arab countries to follow suit.\textsuperscript{13} In November 1955, the Prime Ministers of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan met the UK Foreign Minister and an American delegate in the first Baghdad Pact Council meeting. The Egyptian President Gamal Abder Nasser viewed the Pact as a Western device designed to both divide and control the Arab people.\textsuperscript{14} Arab anti-imperialism by this time had become a deep-seated popular movement with media outlets such as Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus openly broadcasting anti-Western outbursts and criticising the Pact.\textsuperscript{15}

In Jerusalem, where Christina and Willard Jones were now based, the British, American, French, and Turkish consulates were all attacked. The Joneses supported the Mennonites in

\textsuperscript{11} Kanty Cooper, \textit{The Uprooted}. p.142
\textsuperscript{15} ibid. p.66
the region by sheltering those willing to travel to their compound after their stores were set on fire and meeting house vandalised.\(^{16}\) Fuelled by anger at the British government’s attempts to put pressure on Jordan to join the Pact, Mary Sime observed how the riots were widespread across Jordan.\(^{17}\) According to Sime, 20,000 refugees broke from a near-by camp and proceeded to destroy it.\(^{18}\) On 11 January 1956, an article in the *Friend* reported that 2,000 rioters attacked the AFSC village development venture in Jordan. Paul and Jean Johnson, who led the project, were evacuated by Jordanian police.\(^{19}\) The reaction of Arab refugees to the Baghdad Pact meant individual Quaker’s lives were in danger, none more so than Cooper who observed how demonstrators called for both the downfall of the Pact and the countries that supported it.\(^{20}\) During an anti-Western demonstration, she was told to lock her door and not enter the terrace of her apartment as people had been killed for doing so.\(^{21}\) According to Cooper most of the demonstrations began in the market directly below her flat:

> ‘Down with the government,’ they shouted. ‘Down with Turkey, Iraq and Britain.’ There were cheers and clapping and then the shooting started. It was a strange feeling being isolated in my flat, quite alone in the middle of a minor battle. The quarter was entirely Arab, my nearest European neighbours a mile or two away. Yet it was not my physical position that worried me but my incompetence with the language. I should never be able to talk myself out of a situation should one arise. An ambulance drew up outside the flats; it was surrounded by soldiers and I could see nothing. At that moment the telephone rang. A woman asked if it were true that a British officer has been killed outside my house. She had heard that his head had been cut off with a knife. Next the British Embassy rang to say that they were worried about me; kind but not very helpful. Then my legs really started to shake. Masses of people, were coming up the stairs. Had they remembered that an Englishwoman, a member of the now hated race, lived among them?\(^{22}\)

Cooper’s remoteness from her European neighbours and inability to speak Arabic saw her become overwhelmed as well as isolated. Her concern that the crowd would remember the English woman who was part of the hated Western race was identical to Christina Jones,

\(^{16}\) Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.170  
\(^{17}\) Mary Sime, ‘Arab Refugees - Their Tenth Year in the Camps’. p.168  
\(^{18}\) ibid. p.168  
\(^{20}\) Kanty Cooper, *The Uprooted*. pp.197-98  
\(^{21}\) ibid. p.193-95  
\(^{22}\) ibid. pp.197-98
who expressed her fear that ‘bullets were flying and the mob might remember we were Americans’. Jones’ comments often had an international outlook. Though she was originally from Scotland and spoke fondly of her Scottish roots she also held a keen interest in America, having left Scotland to be educated at William Penn College, Pennsylvania, where she met her eventual husband, Willard Jones. She referred to the situation for foreigners in Jordan as ‘grave’, while Cooper had managed to find refuge in a friend’s garden in the centre of the British community. Once the riots stopped, Cooper attempted to carry on distributing food but found the atmosphere in the streets ‘distinctly hostile’. The Baghdad Pact and the subsequent violent protests meant Quakers, as well as most Westerners in Jordan, were in a constant state of concern. Cooper was warned by the British Embassy to keep her luggage permanently by her side whilst the committee the Joneses worked for set aside emergency funds in case British and American members needed to flee. Instead of succouring those in need, Quakers living in the region had themselves become in desperate need of assistance.

As 1956 progressed the situation deteriorated even further. An article published in the Friend in March described how in the Middle East impetuous nationalism would not stop under any circumstances. The signing of the Baghdad Pact radicalised and mobilised most of the urban Arab population during a period when radical political parties were readily available. Rioters heeded the call of Nasser in rejecting the Baghdad Pact and supporting an Arab Nationalist movement. On 1 March 1956 King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Glubb, who had headed the Arab Legion for 25 years. Hussein’s decision meant the

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23 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.170
25 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.172; Kanty Cooper, The Uprooted. p.199
26 ibid. p.199
27 ibid. p.202; Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.181
29 Philip Robins, A History of Jordan. p. 92
British government lost significant influence in the country.\textsuperscript{31} For the British government, Glubb’s sacking was a significant blow, but in the following months the problems in Jordan were to be eclipsed by those in Egypt. For Quakers living in the Middle East their focus on assisting Arabs had changed to that of self-preservation. The growth of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism both isolated and forced them to become more reliant on the support of others. This isolation and reliance on others would only worsen further due to the Suez Crisis.

5.3. The Suez Crisis and Quaker reactions

The Free Officers, who were a nine-man group of army officers including Egypt’s future leader Gamal Abder Nasser, attempted to annex pro-British King Farouk from Egypt.\textsuperscript{32} They came to power after a successful coup on 23 July 1952 and introduced a six-point power plan that included an end to colonialism. Their international outlook was officially non-aligned, and much of their rhetoric focused on Arab nationalism spearheaded by Egypt’s National Union for Arab Socialism.\textsuperscript{33} Just over four years after the coup, on 26 July 1956, the Egyptian military took over the Suez Canal Company’s office with immediate effect.\textsuperscript{34} For the Arab people, Suez represented one of the most despised symbols of western imperialism and this was a chance to weaken that imperialist hold.\textsuperscript{35} The nationalisation of the canal provoked the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who stressed that he would take back control from Nasser’s forces by almost any means necessary, including military action. On 12 September, at the House of Commons, Eden attempted to convince those who opposed his aggressive rhetoric by stating:

There was also general agreement that Colonel Nasser's arbitrary action in seizing operational control of the Canal could not be allowed to prevail...The operation, the

\textsuperscript{34} Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East. pp.132-33
\textsuperscript{35} Andrew Lea Eastman, 'Letter from Suez', Friends Journal, 2 (3 November 1956), 702.
maintenance and the freedom of navigation through the Canal touch the lives and the prosperity of everyone in these islands.\textsuperscript{36}

Eden’s full statement to his fellow politicians stressed the importance of the canal in terms of Great Britain’s economic prosperity and imperial status. However, he also argued that precautionary military measures could be an option, but this was met with scepticism. The anti-war song, \textit{Lay down your arms} by Ann Shelton was number one in the UK record sales charts in September 1956, just before Britain went to war with Egypt over the canal.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite growing public concerns, Eden pushed forward with his intention to use force if necessary. Eden’s ultimatum fanned a smouldering fire and the British press, with little exception, heavily criticised the government. Upon the subsequent invasion of the canal every major newspaper turned against Eden.\textsuperscript{38} The reaction of the British people to the Suez Crisis has generated much historical debate, with some historians, such as Price and Potter, questioning how much the crisis and overall concept of ‘empire’ influenced British citizens. Due to differing cultural identities, political leanings, and social status, understanding how British people, as a hegemonic national culture, viewed the Suez Crisis can prove problematic.\textsuperscript{39} Some members of the public remained supportive of Eden’s policies whilst others were openly critical of the government, many of whom viewed the entire episode with a distant sense of disappointment and even bemusement, which created feelings of discontent and loss. For British Quakers, the turmoil that Suez created, to some extent, was part of a more general public uproar. The eventual failure and humiliation associated with Suez, according to historian Stuart Ward, saw the decline in British power and prestige met with ridicule, culminating in a ‘satire boom’ in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{40} The impact of Suez was significant for Quaker activity in the region. Quaker endeavours in the Middle East were


\textsuperscript{40} Stuart Ward, \textit{British Culture and End of Empire}, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001). p.91
heavily dependent on colonial security. The actions of the British government brought this into serious jeopardy.

The Suez Crisis would prove to be another significant blow to the British Empire and sparked a nationwide collective effort by Quakers to condemn the government’s actions. From 1949-1954, four articles were published in the *Friend* magazine acknowledging that the actions of Western governments in the Middle East had helped create Arab hostility. In 1956 however, content in the *Friend* focused far more specifically on the British government with 18 articles questioning British foreign policy in the Middle East. In keeping with the principles of the Peace Testimony, the violent invasion of the Suez Canal forced Quakers to question their support for the government. The material produced in the *Friend* concerning the Suez Crisis demonstrated a collective consensus amongst British Quakers that was of such a large scale, it could be suggested most Friends agreed that the government had made an immense error in the Middle East, echoing the general direction of public opinion. Though Quaker collective attitude was driven by their pacifist values, their response was not just spiritually motivated. Their identity as British citizens was deeply harmed by the actions of the British government. During the Arab Revolt the British Quakers who contributed articles to the multiple journals analysed, and were members of the PWC, displayed a sense of pride in both themselves and their government’s ability to resolve the conflict, but following the Arab Revolt this confidence began to rapidly dissipate. The violent birth of

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Israel and growth of Arab nationalism, which eventually led to the Suez Crisis, saw no Quakers, in the aforementioned journals view their nationality as a positive part of their identity. They wanted their government to still be a force for good but realised this was no longer the case in the Middle East. They were ashamed of the government’s actions. This shame was not just because they were proud Christian pacifists but because their identity as British nationals brought them into disrepute in the eyes of Arabs. The responses of British Quakers to the Suez Crisis appeared, at times, almost bitter in tone. It could be suggested that not only was this due to the government’s blatant betrayal of the British people’s trust, but that the British Society of Friends as an organisation was completely unable to influence the government in any meaningful way.

The editor of the Friend Bernard H. Canter, in an article titled, ‘The Middle East: Action by Friends and other Organisations’, published shortened versions of letters produced by local Quaker Meetings from Aylesbury, Bolton, Bradford, Chelmsford, Finchley, Guildford, Long Sutton (Somerset), Plymouth, Warwickshire and Woodbrooke (Birmingham). In his introduction to the article, Canter wrote the following statement:

The grave situation in the Middle East and the action taken by Britain and France have prompted a host of protest meetings all over the country. Friends have been active in taking part in these meetings, in helping with their holding, in writing to their M.P.s, to the Press, and to the Prime Minister. Many organisations, including local Friends’ groups, have published statements. The Peace Committee, at Friends House, has received a large number of letters indicating the feeling of Friends and setting out what local meetings have done and are doing in the neighbourhood.

Quakers across the country appeared unified in their disappointment and criticism of the government due to the feelings of shame they as British citizens endured because of its actions. In addition to the sense of shame and guilt the crisis also created significant logistical problems. As previously discussed, Arab resentment towards British colonialism had been steadily building before the Suez Crisis, with rioting becoming a regular occurrence, putting British citizens including Quakers who lived in Palestine and

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43 Bernard H. Canter, 'The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations'. pp.1007-09
44 ibid. p.1006
neighbouring countries in danger. As mentioned earlier, in January 1956, an AFSC agricultural project in Jordan was destroyed by 2,000 rioters.\textsuperscript{45} Paul Johnson, who co-headed the project, concluded that, due to the British military’s attack on Port Said in Egypt later in the year, admitting British subjects into Egypt for relief service, or any other purpose, had been ruled out due to safety concerns.\textsuperscript{46} By December 1956 British Quakers could not enter the region without grave risk to their safety. The efficacy of British Quaker activity had already been weakened before the Suez Crisis. The aftermath forced Quakers to find new ways to assist those hurt by the actions of the British government and to do so trust had to be created between themselves and the recipients of their aid. As a result, Quakers attempted to dissociate themselves from their government. Emil Cortas, the Lebanese Chairman of the Brummana High School Committee and recording Clerk of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting, met the Egyptian Ambassador in Beirut on Christmas Eve 1956 to express the profound remorse of British Friends and their desire to help those in need. To demonstrate the scale of this remorse Cortas submitted a written statement on behalf of the Friends Service Council (FSC), which contained copies of seven issues of the \textit{Friend} published during the crisis, as evidence of the collective attitude of British Quakers to both condemn military action in Egypt and their desire to spread goodwill.\textsuperscript{47} The actions of Cortas in enclosing several copies of the \textit{Friend} as a means of illustrating the scale of Quaker disapproval towards the British government, combined with the FSC’s support of his efforts, suggested that many British Quakers were fully committed to disassociating themselves from their government. The \textit{Wayfarer} did not publish any articles relating to the Suez Crisis whilst the \textit{Friend} became an instrument used to illustrate the collective nationwide disapproval by British Quakers towards the actions of their own government. By this period British Quaker access to high-ranking government officials had declined. They still wrote to senior officials, but no responses or recognition of correspondence appeared to have occurred during the Suez Crisis.

\textsuperscript{46} Bernard H. Canter, ‘Egypt’s Hundred and Twenty Thousand Refugees’. p.1185
The actions of the British government before and during the Suez Crisis led British Quakers to collaborate both with each other and like-minded pacifist organisations on an unprecedented scale when compared to previous incidents in the Middle East. On 8 November 1956, a meeting was held at the Friends House by the National Peace Council with Paul Sturje the chair of the meeting. The same day an emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the British Council of Churches, of which the British Quaker Robert Davis was one of its prominent members, was also held.48 The core principles Quakerism stood for regarding peace meant an event such as the Suez Crisis saw them viewed by other Christian denominations as a key collaborative partner. A third of the Quakers in the biographical index were originally from other Christian denominations but then converted during their teenage or early adult years. The Society of Friends as an organisation had a proud history of Christian pacifism driving their policies. This was an attractive element that Christians belonging to other likeminded denominations not only respected but wanted to be a part of.

Friends can underline the foolishness of driving a nation, by hostility, into the wilderness there to feed on its own bitterness and to ally with others similarly alienated. By the same token, it is imperative that as a nation we should show ourselves genuinely willing to co-operate with countries such as Egypt in order to help them solve their own problems, even though it may apparently involve sacrifice on our own part.49

The above statement, published on 3 August 1956, suggested that the Arab people, in particular the Egyptians, had been driven into open hostility against Britain due to the foolish actions of the British government. It also displayed a certain paternalistic attitude that Britain should support the Egyptians because British people could solve problems on behalf of Egypt. This attitude was demonstrated at the meeting hosted in the Friends House on 8 November when the President of the National Peace Council, Richie Calder, wrote ‘Britain has betrayed those who look to us for moral leadership. We had to admit our guilt and be prepared to pay the price for our actions’.50

48 Bernard H. Canter, 'The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations'. pp.1006-07
49 Bernard H. Canter, 'Suez'. p.689
50 Bernard H. Canter, 'The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations'. p.1006
also described its members’ sense of guilt and personal responsibility as Christians.\footnote{Emile Cortas, ‘Near East (a),’ \textit{Yearly Meeting Proceedings}, (1956), 149-50. p.149; Emile Cortas, ‘Near East (B),’ \textit{Yearly Meeting Proceedings}, (1956), 224-25.}

Criticism of the actions of other Western governments, in particular the French, appeared in several articles.\footnote{Gerald Bailey, ‘After the Cease-Fire’; Eric Baker, ‘The Great Aberration’; Bernard H. Canter, ‘Egypt’s Hundred and Twenty Thousand Refugees’; Bernard H. Canter, ‘The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations’.} Quakers on both sides of the Atlantic also criticised the US government according to Sydney D. Bailey, who worked for a Quaker programme at the UN. However, the US government was also praised by Bailey for its attempts to use all resources available within the UN to find a peaceful solution.\footnote{Sydney D. Bailey, ‘A British Friend’s Comment from New York’.} President Eisenhower received several letters of support from the AFSC for his actions in bringing his concern to the UN.\footnote{Bernard H. Canter, ‘Friends and the Middle East - an F.S.C. Statement’.} This would later prove significant in terms of the opportunities to provide relief in the region for American Quakers compared to their British counterparts.

The humiliation inflicted by Suez was aggravated by the fact that the invasion of the canal by British, French, and Israeli forces was clearly premeditated yet constantly denied by those responsible.\footnote{Keith Kyle, ‘Musketeer’, in \textit{Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East}, ed. by Keith Kyle (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 167-79.} Eden’s claim that the invasion of the canal was part of a ‘police action’ was questioned in a debate in the House of Commons on 9 November 1956.\footnote{House of Commons, \textit{Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: The Official Report} (9 November 1956, vol. 560, cols. 517-23) [Online] <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1956-11-09/debates/ac3c79e0-31a3-4017-8f74-55214b533e8a/MiddleEast(broadcasts)> [accessed 9 January 2019].} Eric Baker, a British Quaker who was one of the founders of Amnesty International, stated how the government’s pretence that the police action was genuine, ‘would be a piece of unprincipled dishonesty which could do no good to our moral health’.\footnote{Eric Baker, ‘The Great Aberration’.} Bailey expressed his dismay at how both British and French governments’ assurances that they would reveal evidence which justified the military campaign were not fulfilled and that the rest of the world could hardly be criticised for assuming the plot was prearranged.\footnote{Sydney D. Bailey, ‘A British Friend’s Comment from New York’.} Likewise, Christina Jones described the military assault on the canal as an ‘incredible deception’ that was
difficult to understand, stating further that it seemed ‘stupid’ for both Britain and France to deny their collusion with Israel.\(^{59}\)

The scale of the concern was truly global. Several letters were sent to the *Friend* by British Quakers living in Bangalore, the Gold Coast, Kenya, and Pakistan.\(^{60}\) Likewise, the Peace Committee, a sub-branch of the London Yearly Meeting, reported messages of concern from Friends in Germany, Japan, France, and the Representative Philadelphia Yearly Meeting.\(^{61}\) This was exemplified by Gerald Bailey. A master’s recipient from Cambridge University and Parliamentary candidate for Hampshire constituencies between 1929 and 1935, Bailey was previously Director of National Peace Council, 1930-1949, and then a Quaker observer at the seven General Assemblies of United Nations, 1950-1962.\(^{62}\) Bailey lamented the British government for denying Arab sovereignty through its imperialistic policies, which according to Bailey fuelled Arab nationalism and the global criticism that followed.\(^{63}\)

Though women were treated equally in Quaker meetings and provided their opinions freely, the majority of the documentation discussing Arab nationalism and Suez was written by men. Sydney Bailey, Gerald Bailey, Frank Edmead, Robert Davis, Willard Jones and Bernard Canter, all submitted articles to the *Friend* during the Suez Crisis. All of the Quakers in the biographical index who were some combination of editors, journalists and authors during this period, were men, signifying that certain positions, particularly in the media, remained out of reach for many Quaker women.

In the final few months of 1956, Quakers embarked on a coordinated collective endeavour across Great Britain to publicly denounce the British government's attack on the Suez Canal. The *Aylesbury Local Press, Bolton Evening News, Yorkshire Post, the Bradford Telegraph and Argus,* the West Riding edition of the *News Chronicle, Birmingham Post,* and the *Manchester

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\(^{59}\) Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.186 & p.193

\(^{60}\) Bernard H. Canter, 'The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations'.  p.1009

\(^{61}\) Unknown, 'Middle East Situation',  *Yearly Meeting Proceedings.*  (1957), 4-6.  p.5


\(^{63}\) Gerald Bailey, 'Reflections on the Suez Problem'.  p.769
*Guardian* published letters signed by local Quaker meetings.\(^{64}\) The Bradford Quaker Meeting provided a statement typifying the collective attitude of British Quakers by arguing that the actions of the British government put, ‘military and political expediency before moral justification...such action is not only betrayal of Christian principles but is also a violation of international goodwill and co-operation’.\(^{65}\) As Daniel Oliver had wished for a decade earlier, British Quakers were utilising the power of the press to influence public opinion and set their collective moral position on the issue.

Quakers in Great Britain, in addition to letting their thoughts be public knowledge, contacted the root cause of their discontent, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. The Chairman of the Friends Peace Committee (FPC) and author, Robert Davis, sent a letter to Eden in early August describing how the committee was ‘seriously perturbed’ at the proposed threat of British military action to combat the Egyptian government’s nationalisation of the canal.\(^{66}\) Davis argued that peace could be achieved through the ‘immediate acceptance by our country - in fulfilment of its moral obligations – of the resolution of the United Nations Assembly’.\(^{67}\) A month later Davis and the Committee sent another letter stressing the need for negotiation: ‘We beg you to abandon this policy...that our country’s rights ought to be upheld by war, which might well involve the appalling horror of the use of nuclear weapons against our fellow men’.\(^{68}\) The Peace Committee remained concerned for the well-being of Britain but also recognised the potentially disastrous global consequences the invasion of Suez could create. Eden’s actions over Suez deeply upset a significant portion of his own middle-class supporters. Across Britain action committees were created by private individuals and meetings were held with leaflets and posters distributed condemning the Prime Minister’s actions. Furious telegrams were delivered to Downing Street alongside petitions sent to the Prime Minister by universities, schools, factories, and other institutions.\(^{69}\) 23 staff and students at the Quaker-run

\(^{64}\) Bernard H. Canter, ‘The Middle East: Action by Friends and Other Organisations’. p.1007-08  
\(^{65}\) *ibid.* p.1008  
\(^{66}\) Robert Davis, ‘Friends and Suez’. p.756  
\(^{67}\) Unknown, ‘Middle East Situation’. p.5  
\(^{68}\) Robert Davis, ‘Suez: A Letter to the Prime Minister’. p.830  
\(^{69}\) Khalid Mahmood, ‘British Public Opinion and Suez’. p.216
Woodbrooke teaching centre in Birmingham signed a letter sent to Eden expressing their distress at how the government acted independently of the UN, begging him to consider whether such actions right before God were in the best interests of mankind.70 Canter published a letter sent to Eden in its entirety from the Quaker Meeting in Shaftesbury, Dorset. The letter stated that it was expressing, ‘a concern which we believe to be laid upon Friends from up and down this country’.71 Canter, in his introduction, commented that he received many other letters also sent to the Prime Minister. His decision to publish the letter from Quakers in Shaftesbury in its entirety was because it provided, ‘an example of the type of thinking that is going on among Friends at this time’.72 The letter was posted to every household in Shaftesbury as well as the local district.73 The letter’s introduction stated that it expressed the concern of Quakers across the United Kingdom and made three recommendations to the Prime Minister:

1. The maintenance or increase of what is called “the standard of living” by any nation’s community cannot be justified before God if it involves injustice towards, or lack of concern for, the living-standards of other communities.

2. A special responsibility devolves upon our country because of the part we played in the establishment of the State of Israel. Some quite indisputable injustices to numerous individuals, have resulted, and we feel these facts must be frankly faced by both Israel and ourselves...It is a Christian duty to urge for measures which are immediate, generous, and adequate to mend this serious and long-standing human situation.

3. There should be a recognition of the economic weakness and plight of the increasing Egyptian population. This calls for a willingness on the part of Britain and America (in particular) to devise just and sound means of assisting people...Such assistance should be developed in collaboration with Egyptian authorities, and should not, and need not, involve patronage.74

The three recommendations, which have been abbreviated in the quotation above, demonstrated several key issues. The first recommendation argued that Britain should not

72 ibid. p.1058
73 ibid. p.1058
74 ibid. pp.1058-59
put its standard of living requirements ahead of those less fortunate, in this case, Arabs. Great Britain, for roughly two centuries through the success of its empire, increased the living standards of its citizens at the expense of others. As mentioned earlier, Eden himself admitted in his address to Parliament on 12 September 1956 that the economic security of Great Britain would be in jeopardy if it lost access to the canal. The second recommendation pleaded for an acceptance that the creation of Israel by ‘ourselves’ produced great animosity amongst Arabs. The reference to ‘ourselves’ suggested British Quakers, just as some had done during the Arab Revolt, once again did not separate themselves from the actions of the government and believed that the repatriation of Arab refugees was not just a Quaker duty, but a Christian one. The third and final recommendation expanded on this by calling on British and American governments to substantially subsidise the needs of Arabs, in particular Egyptians, with schemes that could benefit them. This final recommendation was most likely about the building of the Aswan Dam, construction of which was abandoned by the British and American Governments due to financial pressures. If developed, the dam would control the flooding of land surrounding the Nile River and provide enormous economic benefits to Egyptians. The failure to fund the dam was referred to by several Quakers regretfully as they believed that its construction may have been enough to have avoided the crisis. The third recommendation also warned of the danger of patronising those in need. This was a rational point, though multiple Quakers did still display a patronising attitude when it came to supporting Arabs.

Skinner and Lester argued that the development of anti-colonial nationalism across the Middle East created a fissure between humanitarian and imperial state networks. Western activists questioned their role in the Middle East, with the traditional tenets of humanitarianism creating a feeling of solidarity with ‘distant others’; this saw them commit to participating in a joint struggle for justice as part of a global civic community. British Quakers, in a collective display of solidarity, opposed the policies and actions of the British government in its invasion of the Suez Canal. In the final months of 1956 Quakers observed

76 Rob Skinner and Adam Lester, 'Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas'. p.739
the Suez Crisis as British citizens as much as they did Friends. A shared sense of personal responsibility resulted in feelings of guilt, humiliation and attempts at unity with Arabs. These feelings were not exclusive to Friends due to the crisis creating a considerable backlash from politicians and the public; however, the invasion of the canal and retaliation by Arabs subsequently developed problems exclusive to Quakers from the United Kingdom, as will be explored in the next section.

5.4. Decline in status

The growth of Arab nationalism and increasingly violent protests created an unprecedented level of danger for Quakers attempting relief work. Westerners in Jordan faced the constant threat of evacuation due to the unpopularity of the Baghdad Pact. The situation would only escalate further as a direct result of the Suez Crisis with Quaker relief work and missionary activity facing total collapse. As a direct result of the British and French invasion of the canal very few British, French, and American citizens remained in Jerusalem by late October, according to Christina Jones.77 The British government’s actions in Egypt meant British Quakers became guilty by association, not only to Arabs but even to fellow Westerners. The International Christian Committee (ICC), an area committee of NECCRW of which Jones was a member, decided it was not appropriate to invite English committee members to meetings whilst the British were attacking Egypt.78 Jones’ husband, Willard, was obliged to personally exclude British committee members from a meeting hosted in the Joneses own house because the British military still occupied Port Said.79 Being British meant that not only was relief work with Arabs unfeasible but in this specific case, collaboration with relief agencies was also unachievable.

Port Said, according to historian Keith Kyle, gained the reputation of being a ‘martyred’ town and, much to Eden’s annoyance, Egyptian propaganda used the occupation of Port

77 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.183
78 Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.185
79 ibid. p.191
Said to gain Nasser an advantage.\textsuperscript{80} The sympathy generated by the occupation of Port Said saw British Quakers try to assist those in the area. Paul Johnson stated in an article published in the \textit{Friend} in December that due to the suffering Egyptians endured because of the British military’s attack, non-British Quakers were forced to ‘rule out the admission of British subjects into Egypt for a service of relief or for any other purpose’.\textsuperscript{81} Even the donation of monies and goods became very problematic. The FSC donated 100 pounds but had to do so by sending the money through Inter-Church Aid to the NECC in Beirut. The donations of materials and monies had to be channelled through a European country first, and to tranship them they could not be ‘tagged’ as a means of indicating the contrition as well as grief of British citizens.\textsuperscript{82} The significance of this effort was not only the failure to ‘tag’ the gifts but also the FSC’s clear intention to express their grief as British citizens towards suffering Arabs. Quakers felt a responsibility as British citizens to both show their sympathy for those suffering and stress that they did not want to be associated with their government. Herbert Dobbing, the Principal of the Friends School in Brummana, Lebanon, stated:

\begin{quote}
It looks as though missionary activity in the Arab lands has suffered a grievous blow, and in particular the future of schools in Syria and Jordan is black indeed. This includes the Friends School at Ramallah, which is threatened with being taken over by the Jordan government. It may be that as there is a community of Arab Friends in existence there the school will be able to carry on under their guidance. The future of the Brummana School is bound up with the continued existence of Lebanon as an independent state or at any rate as autonomous area.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

According to Dobbing’s statement, Quakerism in the Middle East was at the brink of collapse with the Suez Crisis not only significantly damaging Quaker relief opportunities but missionary endeavours too. George Scherer, the American Principal of the Friends’ School in Ramallah observed ‘The British are in disrepute in this part of the world...The way things have worked out it is probably better that we did not find a Britisher’.\textsuperscript{84} British Quakers

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\textsuperscript{80} Keith Kyle, \textit{Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East}. pp.502-03  \\
\textsuperscript{81} Bernard H. Canter, ‘Egypt’s Hundred and Twenty Thousand Refugees’. p.1185  \\
\textsuperscript{82} ibid. p.1185  \\
\end{flushleft}
urgently sought to find a resolution that focused on self-preservation. American Quakers, due to the United States government’s resistance to the invasion of the canal, were able to have far greater dialogue with Egyptian officials. They were allowed to contribute relief materials but could not offer personal service as tensions amongst the refugees still ran high.\textsuperscript{85} According to Elmore Jackson, Friends groups in some of the invading countries pushed for immediate repatriations, but the AFSC’s focus was on the establishment of a form of international machinery implemented by the UN.\textsuperscript{86} Due to American Quakers’ more favourable relationships with the UN and Egyptian officials, Paul Johnson encouraged, as well as offered to support, British Quakers to contact Egyptian representatives so they could show repentance.\textsuperscript{87}

An article published in the \textit{Friend} in February 1957, described how Elmore Jackson and Duncan Wood, a British Quaker theologian who worked at the Geneva Friends Centre, met the Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr Mahmod Fawzi at the UN headquarters in New York on 17 January 1957. The conversation served two purposes: first, to express the heavy sorrow felt by British Quakers due to military action in Egypt, and their concern to assist those who were suffering; and second, to show their gratitude that the Egyptian government was willing to accept the association of British, French, and other Friends with the AFSC’s plans to send relief supplies, including Primus stoves, to victims in Port Said.\textsuperscript{88} Thanks to the support of their American counterparts British Quakers had a lifeline.

The Egyptian authorities, it is learned, have approved a label on every stove bearing in Arabic this sentence: “This is a voluntary gift from the Service Committee of American Friends, in association with members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in North America and Europe”\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{87} Bernard H. Canter, ‘Egypt’s Hundred and Twenty Thousand Refugees’. pp.1185-86
\end{flushright}
The Suez Crisis significantly altered both the collective attitude of British Quakers and the scale of their relief work. The efforts of Wood and Jackson were considered by the FSC an approach parallel to the one adopted by Emil Cortas in his communication with an Egyptian ambassador, which helped produce a favourable response from Egyptian officials.  

British Quakers, thanks in no small part to the support of American Friends, managed to remain involved in relief work in Egypt. They adopted a sincerely apologetic approach to their relief work not only because this genuinely reflected their feelings but also because it was the only feasible way they could assist the suffering Egyptians. The struggle to send relief materials, as well as have them ‘tagged’ as a means of reflecting their remorse, demonstrated how desperate the situation had become. This desperation saw British Quakers become grateful to be ‘associated’ with the endeavours of the AFSC, which was in stark contrast to when the AFSC first entered the Middle East to aid Arab refugees in 1949 as part of a significant collaborative endeavour with British Friends. Eight years later the British government’s actions in Egypt significantly reduced the influence of British Quakers, which was reflected by the wording of the tags attached to the Primus stoves sent to Arab refugees. British Quakers could not even get their nationality on the tags, such was the struggle. This drop in status was further reflected when the FSC received information regarding a potential opening for one or two British young Friends to join an international team of volunteers to support reconstruction work in Egypt. The FSC subsequently informed all Friends meetings across Britain of the opening, as this presented an ideal opportunity to back their words with actions.  

When considering less than a decade earlier British Quakers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their relief work and the sheer scale of the relief operation conducted in Gaza in 1949, the gratitude British Quakers showed eight years later at being allowed to possibly send one or two young Friends to Egypt only served to emphasise how damaging the Suez Crisis was to their reputation and the overall decline of their status in the region.

90 ibid. p.119
91 ibid. p.119
5.5. Post-Suez

Militant Arab-nationalism was emboldened by Nasser’s success in Suez, with a division between the pro-Soviet camps of Egypt and Syria combating their pro-Western counterparts in Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq. In Jordan, the Suez Crisis created a favourable environment, which allowed King Hussein to both terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty as well as liquidate British bases. Despite the British government’s losses in Jordan, it still maintained friendly relations with King Faysal of Iraq. Iraq’s political leader Nuri as-Said Pasha headed or controlled most government coalitions from 1941-1958. He maintained a pro-British policy by aligning Iraq with the Baghdad Pact and granting further British military privileges in the region, but he was only able to do so through ruthless suppression of his opponents. However, the Suez Crisis and his support of Britain destroyed the Iraqi leader’s credibility. In 1958, a nationalist revolution spread throughout the Middle East with the CIA and Britain failing to prevent the collapse of the Iraqi monarchy in July. In Lebanon a few months earlier in April, President Chamoun attempted to amend the constitution for himself to be able to serve a second term. Rioting encouraged by Pro-Nasser supporters broke out across the country. Alarmed by the destabilisation of Pro-Western Arab states the United States government sent troops into Lebanon to stop President Chamoun from being overthrown and assist King Hussein of Jordan in maintaining his authority. During this period the Friends Schools in Ramallah and Brummana managed to weather the storm. The bloody coup in Iraq and the growing unrest in Lebanon created a sense of déjà vu for Christina Jones as there was speculation about both British and American forces

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95 Rashid Khalidi, 'Consequences of Suez in the Arab World'. pp.384-86
97 David Tal, 'Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East'. p.143
The challenges posed to British Quakers by the British government’s actions in the Middle East, 1951-1958

intervening, which again led to many Westerners evacuating. As had been done during the Suez Crisis, British Quakers described their disappointment at the use of military action in the region.

The British Quaker Frank Edmead published two articles in the Friend in 1958. Edmead stressed that, as Christian pacifists, Quakers could not support the sending of troops into the Middle East, acknowledging the many flaws of the British government and that the responsibility was far more on British shoulders than the Arabs, due to Western Governments and companies exploiting oil reserves and preventing Arab independence.

Edmead’s attitude was shared by multiple Quaker organisations and meetings. In July, a statement bearing the signatures of officers of the AFSC, Canadian Friends Service Committee (CFSC) and the London-based Friends Peace Committee (FPC) was distributed by the Quaker programme (QUNO) at the UN to all UN delegations in New York. The statement criticised the British and American governments for failing to consult with the UN when the organisation required as much support as possible from all governments.

The Quarterly Meeting of members of the Religious Society of Friends in Norfolk, Cambridge and Huntingdonshire sent a letter to the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan (1957-1963) and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd (1955-1960), expressing ‘deep distress and regret at the action of our government’.

The letter’s authors argued that for the government to intervene in the Middle East once again without prior consultation with the UN would only lead to further conflict or even another world war.

The Brighton Preparative Meeting, in its letter to MacMillan, commented ‘we, therefore, view with apprehension the building up of a dangerous situation in the Middle East,

99 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  p.206
100 Frank Edmead, 'The Way Forward in the Middle East', The Friend, 115 (15 August 1958), 1032-34; Frank Edmead, 'The Crisis in the Middle East', The Friend, 115 (1 August 1958 ), 977-79.
103 ibid. p.943

195
reproducing all the gravity of Suez in an even acuter form’. The ghost of the Suez Crisis was still very much in the thoughts of Quakers belonging to the Brighton Meeting, and it is rational to argue that it may well have been in the thoughts of Quakers throughout Britain.

The terrible situation in the Middle East, worsening every moment as we go to press, reproduces the gravity of the Suez Crisis in an even acuter form. One must pray that those countries, like our own, whose interests have played their part in creating the harvest of blood being garnered will now act, if it can only be in part, not in those interests, but with forbearance and altruism.

The above statement, published on 18 July 1958 by Canter, demonstrated a deep concern that was magnified by a sense of responsibility. There were few, if any, British Quakers in a better position to judge the collective opinions of Friends than Canter. His position as the editor of the Friend meant he had access to a vast amount of material expressing the opinions of Quakers across Britain. Canter and the previous editor did not push forward their own opinions regarding matters in the Middle East, however, the impact of Suez and the next crisis in 1958 saw Canter, like many Quakers, denounce the actions of the government. The reason for this was Canter’s belief that he was representing the collective concern of British Quakers nationwide due to the plethora of letters he had received from Friends.

An article published in April 1958 in the Friends Quarterly encouraged Quakers to appreciate that Western heritage was not the only ‘significant current’ in the world. Mutuality between Western and Eastern cultures was a long time in the making, whilst understanding other alternative traditions could provide better solutions to the problems facing the world. For those Quakers who lived in the Middle East, the constant sense of turmoil meant their livelihoods and, at certain times, even their own lives became endangered. Herbert Dobbing retired from the Brummana School and education in Arab lands in June 1957. Boutros I. Khoury continued to run the Ras-el-Metn orphanage and assist those less fortunate in the

104 ibid. p.943
107 Brummana High School, Past Principals
same manner the Olivers had, whilst Kanty Cooper along with two other women left Jordan to continue relief work in Asia.\(^\text{108}\) Mary Sime moved to northern Nigeria and expressed her disappointment at how events in the Middle East eventually impacted Quaker work in the region. She believed the most valuable contributions by Friends were before 1948 with the Ras-El-Metn Orphanage and Brummana School receiving praise from her.\(^\text{109}\) Conversely, Christina Jones alongside her husband Willard, believed much had been achieved in spite of the turmoil and continued their humanitarian efforts until they retired in June 1962.\(^\text{110}\) The Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting continued its efforts, with members focusing on their role as Christian pacifists'.\(^\text{111}\)

The impact and aftermath of the Suez Crisis, according to Christina Jones, was, ‘to plague us for a long, long time’.\(^\text{112}\) Having already seen their role as ‘divine lobbyists’ greatly reduced during the mandate period Quakers then endured the additional embarrassment of not being on an equal footing to their American peers in the Middle East following the Suez Crisis, though this would later be somewhat rebalanced due to the American military operation in Lebanon. For Quakers based in the United Kingdom, the debacle of Suez deeply impacted their respect towards their own government. In this aspect they were not alone as the British Prime Minister MacMillan later stated in his memoirs, ‘Great Britain charged into a controversy which led to households being ripped apart and long friendships shattered’.\(^\text{113}\) Suez caused a rift which few other political events could match, with journalist Max Hastings suggesting that in the 60 years since Suez only Brexit created the same scale of division


\(^{110}\) Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind pp.214-18

\(^{111}\) Emile Cortas, 'Near East (C)', Yearly Meeting Proceedings, (1958), 228.

\(^{112}\) Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind p.195

between families and friends. For British Quakers, however, there was not a division between government loyalists and non-loyalists regarding British foreign policy in the Middle East. They were not against imperialism per se, more the wrong kind of imperialism that the Suez Crisis represented. They shared a common shame as British citizens but felt the impact of Suez more acutely due to their constant sense of responsibility and work in the region. Unlike the British Mandate or Jewish immigration, the actions of the British government and military forces in the mid to late 1950s unified British Quakers to collectively respond with their pacifist values at the forefront of their concern, no longer shackled by a shared sense of duty as British people.

5.6. Conclusion

The British government’s actions not only brought about collective shame but directly harmed the efforts of British Quakers in the Middle East, even reducing their status as a relief organisation when compared to their American peers. The British Empire had allowed them to establish a foothold in Palestine and to commence missionary work. The creation of the state of Israel and subsequent refugee crisis presented British Quakers with an opportunity to extend beyond missionary efforts and adopt a far more relief work-based approach. However, the rise of Arab nationalism presented numerous significant difficulties, none more so than being deemed guilty by association with British colonialism. The Arab resistance to Western rule saw Quakers face the genuine threat of being viewed as imperialists, or at the very least, complicit with British colonial activities in the Middle East. This created both danger and isolation for those living in the region, with the Suez Crisis threatening to destroy their missionary and humanitarian work. Before, British Quakers viewed themselves as providers of expert tutelage with a belief in what they described as ‘our’ responsibilities. Instead, they now had to plead not only for forgiveness from Arabs but also for opportunities to support them. The collective nationwide outpouring of disapproval at the actions of the British government saw British Quakers support for Prime

115 Edward W. Said, Orientalism. p.245
Minister Anthony Eden rapidly decline. The themes of responsibility and duty were apparent, but trust in the British government’s policies because of the Baghdad Pact, Suez Crisis, and its support for the occupation of Lebanon by American troops became a source of much strife. This was not only due to a sense of shame Quakers shared as British citizens but also because the chaos created directly harmed their long-standing activities in the region.
6. Conclusion

This thesis reveals the dilemmas British Quakers faced in their missionary-humanitarian work in Palestine and neighbouring countries. The research suggests that nationality is central to understanding the motivations and actions of British Quakers in the Middle East. Their strong sense of duty as Christian pacifists but also British citizens continuously overlapped. The connection between analysing Quaker experiences in the region and their attitudes towards British overseas relations was constant, except for the Gaza relief mission, which focused more on their experiences and the nature of Quaker contributions to those in need. It can be argued that the Arab Revolt revealed how Quakers involved in discussions with government officials became accidental imperialists, combining their dedication to peace whilst attempting to ensure the mandate remained. Many of the Quakers analysed displayed an almost paternalist approach when discussing Arabs, implying that they and their government were responsible for them. The recognition and understanding of Arab grievances not only impacted correspondence with British officials but also directly influenced their perceptions of Jews immigrating to the region.

British Quakers’ theological outlook as Protestant Christian pacifists towards Arabs and Jews produced clear differences regarding the claims of the two groups to create a nation-state in Palestine. Some British Quakers displayed a distinct attitude towards the groups; Arabs were the victims whilst Jews were the usurpers. Their sense of duty as British citizens also influenced their opinions, with some Quakers mirroring the despondent, even resentful, attitude of British officials at the creation of the state of Israel. For those Quakers who lived in the region during the conflict that led to the birth of Israel, the brutality and chaos that ensued led to several Friends decades later describing their frustration that the Arab perspective was never appreciated in Great Britain, showing a level of bitterness that contained anti-Semitic language.

Despite the failure to influence reform in the mandate system there remained a keen interest to support Arab and Jewish refugees. Motivated by their recent Nobel Peace Prize success, British Quakers joined an international humanitarian endeavour to support those in need, but what followed was a struggle to assimilate theory and practice. Hubris, orientalist
thinking, and internal divisions all featured in the Gaza mission, resulting in British Quakers joining likeminded Christian organisations focused on relief work. During their relief endeavours, Quakers faced growing suspicion from Arabs over their association to British colonialism. Though the Arabs did not know of previous Quaker connections to senior British officials, the argument that they were indirectly supportive of British colonial activities certainly had merit. The rise in Arab nationalism and the Suez Crisis forced British Quakers into an unprecedented situation. They saw no other choice than to condemn the British government’s actions. Suez brought shame and repentance. It significantly destabilised their missionary work and, notably, led to them openly criticising British imperialism. However, in doing so, British Quakers demonstrated that they were against Britain’s failed imperialist actions in Egypt, but not British imperialism in general.

The main objective of this thesis was to analyse how faith and national identity combined to influence Quaker ideology and practice. The research revealed how ideology and practice were not against one another, rather constantly changing and adapting to the circumstances. Due to their successful endeavours in business and education, combined with healthy connections with the British government, British Quaker missionaries viewed themselves as well-educated providers of skilled tutelage with a proud history of societal improvement. Additional confidence came from being British citizens. The Pax Britannica created an ideology that influenced Quaker decision making so much that when Quakers referred to ‘our duty’ it was done so with equal responsibility, as both Christian pacifists and British citizens. According to Christina Jones, there was pride in the leadership of Britain and other Western governments at how they created a new era for avenues of learning, trade, science, and technology in Palestine.¹ Stability in the region meant Quakers could confidently work on the numerous missionary opportunities available under the protection of the British Mandate. The growing tensions and collapse of the mandate saw them attempt to reconcile all sides as part of their faith in action or call to service. It was in these efforts that their confidence proved a double-edged sword. Such was the belief of individuals that they could make a difference, several divisions were created. This was

¹ Christina Jones, *The Untempered Wind*  p.19
somewhat surprising because much of the existing scholarship of Quakers in the Middle East often focused on how united they were as a collective. Instead, the amount of autonomy individuals had in putting their faith into action demonstrated how individuals could disagree with larger committees or meetings to follow their own paths, sometimes with greater impact. The actions of Daniel Oliver and Heinz Kappes regarding the mandate and Jewish immigration provided examples of individuals following their own individual objectives. The ways British Quakers managed affairs and were structured as an organisation supported these types of actions. The approach employed by British Quakers to the major issues affecting Palestine and the neighbouring regions involved deep discussion and debate. Though efforts were made to achieve an agreeable outcome at Quaker meetings, an individual could still follow their own instincts provided they did so with the Quaker spirit at the heart of their endeavours. This freedom allowed Friends to continue pursuing their objectives even when others were resigned to defeat; this was notably evident during the final years of the British Mandate and their relief work. Whether it was the belief that the world could heal through understanding the teachings of Christ or in Britain’s diplomatic role as the world’s policeman, individually and collectively, Friends continuously tried to display confidence.

The 1950s saw Quaker confidence began to dissipate and move them from being a faith-based organisation exclusively focused on their own outcomes, to a more collaborative approach with other likeminded Christian groups. The confidence they held inspired them to pursue a variety of actions but also led to several perceived failures concerning attempts to influence senior British officials and the uniqueness of their humanitarian work. These perceived failures came about due to the collective Quaker belief in their exclusivity compared to other organisations. Quakers held a history of trying to distinguish themselves

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from other Christian groups. In Palestine where other Christian denominations had built churches, schools, and hospices, their desire to be distinct remained. Their vision of themselves as leading pacifist Christians whose use of skilled diplomacy could make genuine changes to improve society brought a heavy responsibility with it. When they were successful in their actions - the abolition of slavery in Britain in 1833 and Nobel Peace Prize in 1947 to name a few - this boosted their self-confidence. However, when they could not make the significant positive changes they sought after, it led to much debate and disappointment.

British Quakers openly acknowledged their failures to create peace in Palestine and their relief work with the AFSC. Conversely, the research suggests many were unaware of their struggles to understand the Arab perspective without employing a colonialist mind set. Sympathy and substantial efforts to support Arabs were evident, yet a paternal gaze was often apparent in the language used by Friends. They were a branch of the Pax Britannica. Despite attempting to present themselves as Christian pacifists sympathetic with Arab suffering, the shadow of imperialism was not only difficult to avoid but, amongst some Quakers, a sign of cultural as well as educational superiority. British Quakers consistently represented themselves as both Christians and British citizens. There were continuities in individual accounts regarding how much the British government was to blame for the collapse of the mandate and Jewish immigration, with the greatest divergence developing during the Suez Crisis. At the start of the Arab Revolt, Quakers, though sympathetic to Arab concerns, supported British colonial rule in the region. However, the Suez Crisis in neighbouring Egypt roughly 20 years later, saw an unprecedented collective condemnation of the government, reflecting the same sense of disappointment as most of the British public.

From analysing the ages of British Quakers in the biographical index almost all of them grew up or were already adults, during the peak of an ethnocentrically motivated global

4 Christina Jones, The Untempered Wind  p.13
Britishness promoted by the British government. The index indicated that Quaker women held high status in educational matters but were restricted in other areas such as political lobbying, business and journalism. Nonetheless, Quaker women established themselves prominently within schools and other educational fields through their skill, effort and composure, later expanding these qualities into their relief work.

Though the central focus of this thesis is on the activities of the British Society of Friends, scholars of British imperialism and the Israel-Palestine conflict could also attain beneficial knowledge. This thesis casts a particular light on how an organisation with deep seeded humanitarian principles and experiences reacted to British overseas policies in the Middle East. British Quaker attitudes and experiences were unique because of the tightrope they constantly walked between being a peace organisation that looked to create close relations with Arabs, and a group of people loyal to the belief that their government was a force for good that could ensure peace and prosperity for those under its remit. Friends had been living in the region before the conflict even began and by the 1930s were playing an active role in peace negotiations. It can be suggested they were an offshoot of British colonialism, however their core belief in peace and social action saw them at times attempt to move away from an imperial mind set, reinforcing yet also challenging what Emily Baughan and Bronwen Everill referred to as an ‘on the ground’ analysis of life during one of the most turbulent times in the region’s history. The challenge to recent scholarship comes from the unusual position Quakers were in; many small Christian denominations did not have access to leading policy makers nor the same level of financial backing. The tensions created through being influential Christian pacifists, put them in a distinctive position. Their attempt to reconcile all sides through communicating with locals to high-ranking officials provides an intimate portrait of the major events of the time.

5 Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, 'Empire and Globalisation: From 'High Imperialism' to Decolonisation', pp.145-46
6 Matthew Hilton and others 'History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation', p.3 & p.33
There was a constant emphasis on sample size and sub-divisions. This helped analyse moments when British Quakers collectively, as a smaller meeting or a nationwide organisation, worked towards a common goal but also allowed for individuals who followed their own path to receive equal focus and merit for their efforts. Except for the AFSC operation in Gaza, which still leaned heavily towards American perspectives, research on British Quaker endeavours in the Middle East during the early to mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century has been considerably lacking. This thesis fills this gap in knowledge through analysing the activities of British Quakers, combining it with missionary-humanitarian and imperial studies. This thesis details how British Quakers often viewed themselves as much as British citizens as Christian pacifists. This sense of duty drove Friends to make considerable efforts to lobby for peace and assist those in need. However, they faced regular setbacks in their endeavours, and it can be argued that the end of this period illustrates the significant decline of the British Society of Friends’ role as ‘divine lobbyists’ in the Middle East.

Their opinions and actions demonstrated a somewhat tumultuous relationship with colonialism. Many Quakers showed a keen interest in British foreign policy. Their reactions ranged from being sympathetic accidental imperialists to vehemently opposing their own government’s actions in the region. This connection to the government influenced their response to Jewish immigration and the birth of Israel. Despite research on the role of British Quakers with Jewish refugees in Europe there is a lack of knowledge concerning the Quaker relationship with Jews in the Middle East. This issue proved the most divisive and controversial analysed. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, particularly around anti-Semitism, there appears to have been hesitancy amongst Quakers and scholars to explore this subject. In contrast, though the efforts of the AFSC have previously been studied, the actions of British Quakers who worked for the AFSC and for other organisations has not been researched. This thesis explores the theme of confidence more than previous work and also analyses events after the main AFSC operation ended in much greater detail.

\textsuperscript{7} Lawrence Stone, ‘Prosopography’. p.71
Unfortunately, none of the key figures from this story are alive to detail their experiences though there was productive communication with Daniel Oliver’s great-granddaughter, Kim. Comparison was made between British Quaker humanitarian endeavours in post-war Germany and Gaza, though further research is required. The editor of the Friend, Bernard H. Canter, once referred to English Quakers as a bashful and reserved group. In many ways they were. Holding a core belief in the teachings of Christ and their role as providers of a greater good, they consistently sought to make the world a better place by understanding others. In business, education, and social reform they achieved significant success for a relatively small Christian group. Additionally, the role of British colonialism gave them opportunities to provide their unique approach to Christian teachings to large foreign populations. Proud of their history of Christian pacifism and reconciliatory efforts, British Quakers, individually and collectively, continuously sought to bring social harmony to the Middle East. However, this noble pursuit demonstrated how they were products of their time. Inherent national and theological ideologies created a hubristic introspection that adversely impacted their endeavours.

British Quakers consistently attempted to, effectively, punch above their weight. They lobbied government officials and engaged in unprecedented international humanitarian endeavours. The principles of their faith regarding social action and pacifism were significantly influenced by their nationality. The vast expansion of the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries saw British Quakers venture into foreign lands some had only read of in books. By proxy, the success of colonial expansion produced a great confidence in the cultural and intellectual outlook of Friends. The theological significance of the Middle East stimulated Friends’ interests further. When violence erupted between Arabs, Jews and British forces, Quakers believed they could make a notable difference in creating peace. This did not happen and led to decades of disillusionment and disappointment. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the positive and negative role of their identity as British citizens influencing their endeavours, the story of British Quaker activities in the Middle East during the early to mid-20th century demonstrates how they held a remarkable propensity to honour their core

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faith-based values through encouraging opposing sides to understand each other in the name of peace.
Appendices

Appendix I. Biographical Index

**Eleanor AITKEN**

*Born: 1917, Died: 2005, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Born in India but raised in England. Joined the Society of Friends attracted by their testimony against the Second World War, in early 1940s and met future husband, Michael Aitken, there. In 1945, travelled with Quaker relief workers to Le Havre, France, which had been devastated by British bombing. In the 1950s and 1960s, devoted herself to East-West understanding, Greek political prisoners, and Soviet dissidents. First degree was in French at University College London (in 1966, took another degree in Russian at Cambridge). Trained as a teacher and saw language teaching as a contribution towards international understanding. In 1973, founded the charity UNIPAL (Universities' Trust for Educational Exchange with Palestinians).

**Lucy BACKHOUSE**

*Born: 1882, Died: 1965, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Mainly educated at home except for a year in Dresden, Germany, to study music and improve her German. Married her second cousin, Edward Backhouse, who died in 1922. Regular attendee of Meeting for Sufferings and Clerk of Palestine Watching Committee 1935-1941, generous benefactor to the Claridge House ‘Rest Home’.

**Gerald BAILEY**

*Born: 1903, Died: 1972, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Unknown*


**Sydney BAILEY**

*Born: 1916, Died: 1995, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Born in Hull and left school at 15 years old. A conscientious objector in the Second World War and worked for the Friends Ambulance Service in Burma and China. Converted to

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Quakerism during this period. Self-taught political scientist who, alongside wife Brenda, became a member of staff at the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO). Described as a ‘very personal’ diplomat who worked with people in positions of power. Later wrote several books on international affairs.  

Eric BAKER  
**Born: 1920, Died: 1976, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Unknown**  
Joined British Society of Friends while at school and pursued an academic career together with his peace activism. Worked at the Quaker centre in India 1946-1948, and then became General Secretary of National Peace Council 1954-1959.  

Percy BARTLETT  
**Born: 1888, Died: 1980, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London**  
Joined Society of Friends in 1911 and actively participated in Quaker initiatives for over 50 years. Imprisoned for being a conscientious objector in the First World War. Member of Meeting for Sufferings 1924-1951. Also a member of multiple peace organisations such as the Society of Friends Peace Committee 1928-1965 and Council of Christian Pacifist Groups 1933-1943. A prolific writer who wrote several small pamphlets, two larger works on pacifism and regularly across multiple Quaker journals.  

Colin BELL  
**Born: 1903, Died: 1988, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Liverpool**  
A native of Liverpool and former personnel director for British Home Stores in England. In 1943, Bell went to China to manage a surgical team with the ambulance service. After the war, directed Quaker relief efforts in the Gaza strip then took up posts in Geneva and Philadelphia until his retirement.  

Bernard CANTER  
**Born: 1906, Died: 1969, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London**  
Born in London and educated at King’s College. Began his journalism career in East Anglia in 1931 and registered as a conscientious objector during the Second World War, joining the

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<https://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/special-collections/collections/papers-of-eric-baker/> [accessed February 2021]  
6 David C Lukowitz, ‘Percy W. Bartlett’.  
Friends War Victims relief committee (later Friends Relief Service) in 1941. Editor of the *Friend* magazine from 1950-1965.  

**Edgar CASTLE**

*Born: 1897, Died: Unknown, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Hull*

Headmaster of Leighton Park School then Professor of Education at Hull University, author of *Reconciliation in Palestine* pamphlet, and part of a two-man peacebuilding investigation in Palestine early 1948.  

**Kanty COOPER**

*Born: Unknown, Died: Unknown, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Transjordan*

A former sculptor with previous aid work experience working in Quaker teams in Spain, Solanika in Greece, and post-war Germany. Began relief work in Transjordan in 1953.  

**Robert DAVIS**

*Born: 1883, Died: 1967, Nationality: Irish, Place of residence: Unknown*

Converted to Quakerism in late teens and joined a Friends Foreign Mission Association ‘encouraging, sustaining and teaching’ in 1907. Chairman of Friends Peace Committee from 1952 and a founder member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Closely involved with the formation of British Council of Churches, and one of its first two Quaker representatives. Wrote several books on Quaker worship, the Peace Testimony, and the history of Woodbrooke.  

**Herbert DOBBING**

*Born: 1893, Died: 1970, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Brummana, Lebanon, Syria*

Born in Sunderland. A schoolteacher who was refused by tribunal recognition as a conscientious objector, forcibly enlisted in the military and court-martialled for...
disobedience, serving three sentences in Newcastle and Durham prisons. After the war, taught at Friends School, Great Ayton, Yorkshire then served as Principal of the Brummana School in Lebanon 1948-1957.12

Frank EDMEAD

Born: 1920, Died: 2000, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Unknown

Childhood spent in Kent, educated at Borden School, Sittingbourne, and studied English at University College, London, earning a postgraduate degree in conflict studies. A conscientious objector who worked for the Friends Ambulance Unit in Europe during the Second World War. Converted to Quakerism in 1950, joined Guardian newspaper the same year and later became a senior journalist.13

Marshall FOX


Held a position at the American Board Mission and served as Acting Principal of Brummana School on several occasions from 1910-1928. Lived in the region for several decades and a member of Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting.14

Carl HEATH

Born: 1869, Died: 1950, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London

Joined the Society of Friends in 1916. Former General Secretary of the National Peace Council and joint Secretary of the Friends Service Council. Developed the idea of Quaker embassies after the First World War as a means of linking centres for outreach and reconciliatory work. Worked directly with Gandhi for peace in India.15

Frank HUNT

Born: 1925, Died: 1973, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Unknown

Born in Ilford and raised in a Catholic family. Registered as a conscientious objector and joined the Friends Ambulance Unit in 1943 as a paramedic and driver. After working with UNRRA following the end of the Second World War, accepted by Friends Service Council

14 Lucy Backhouse Papers, 1918-1952, TEMP MSS S11.2.4, Letter to Judge Hanssen - 5 May 1938; Brummana High School, *Past Principals*
15 Margaret Post Abbott, Mary Ellen Chijioke, Pink Dandelion, and John William Oliver-Jr, *Historical Dictionary of the Friends (Quakers).* pp.162-63
(FSC) for service in the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Gaza mission. Later worked for the AFSC in Korea and North Africa.¹⁶

Christina JONES


Born in Greenock, Scotland, moved to USA in 1914, graduated from William Penn College, Pennsylvania, in 1921. Taught History and English at the Friends Boys School in Ramallah. Served various positions as secretary, vice chairman, and chairman of the Near East Christian Council Committee of refugee work from 1952 until retirement in 1962.¹⁷

Rufus JONES

Born: 1863, Died: 1948, Nationality: American, Place of residence: Maine

Enrolled at the Providence Friends School in Rhode Island then studied at the Haverford College in Pennsylvania. Earned a master’s degree from Harvard University and returned to Haverford as professor of Psychology and Philosophy. One of the founders of the American Friends Service Committee in 1917, the AFSC was created as a means of allowing conscientious objectors the opportunity to serve without joining the military. Later travelled to Asia, meeting Gandhi, and pleaded for the better treatment of Jews when visiting leading Nazis in 1938.¹⁸

Willard JONES


Born in Gibson, Iowa. Graduated from William Penn College, Pennsylvania, in 1920 then received MA degree from University of Chicago. Descended from a long line of Quakers and Principal of a small Quaker school in Iowa. He taught briefly at Friends School in Kenya.

¹⁶ Lucy Saint-Smith stated that Hunt was listed on his FAU card as an attender of Quaker meetings. As he moved abroad after the Second World War he wouldn’t have become a member of the Society of Friends in Britain, so if he did officially join it wouldn’t have been a British meeting, and that Friends House Library would not have a record of it. His wife Patricia was a Canadian volunteer who also worked for the AFSC in Gaza. Nancy Gallagher in her study described Hunt as a ‘Quaker leader’. Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israel-Palestine Conflict. p.118; Lucy Saint-Smith, ‘Quaker Biography Query’ (Email to Alexis Constantinou).; Unknown, Frank Hunt Biography, (The Friends House Library: Dictionary of Quaker Biography); Patricia D. Hunt, I Was a Staff Member: Frank Hunt, (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Commitee) <https://peaceworks.afsc.org/frank-hunt/story/327> [accessed February 2022]; Patricia Dunham Hunt, I Was a Staff Member: Patricia Dunham Hunt, (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee) <http://peaceworks.afsc.org/patricia-hunt/story/326> [accessed February 2022]; Liz Nicholson, Quaker Service - Pat Hunt - the Legacy of Quaker Service, (Quaker Voluntary Service, 2017) <https://quakervoluntaryservice.org/quakerservice-pat-hunt/> [accessed February 2022]

¹⁷ Ohio University, Willard and Christina Jones Collection

Appendices


**Lettice JOWITT**

*Born: 1878, Died: 1962, Nationality: British, Places of residence: London and Brummana*

Born into a large Anglican family in Stevenage and the only family member to revert to Quakerism. Educated in Bristol, working as a tutor at the University of Bristol, as well as for the Workers' Educational Association. Co-founded the Bristol University Settlement in 1911, and later recalled as a 'pioneer in the Resident Settlement movement'. During the First World War, undertook relief work in France and after the war, was warden of two settlements from 1919-1937. In 1939, recalled to Brummana in the absence of the headmaster. During the Second World War, worked as Acting Principal at the Friends School in Brummana, and then taught at the American University of Beirut. After the Second World War, for 18 months, was General Secretary of the Friends Relief Service. Became Treasurer of the Arab Relief Fund and Chairman of the Palestine Committee of the Friend Service Council and, on retirement, awarded an MBE for services to education.²⁰

**Heinz KAPPES**

*Born: Unknown, Died: Unknown, Nationality: German, Place of residence: Jerusalem*

Eldest son of a Lutheran minister. Co-operated with Quakers in youth work welfare activities from 1922 onwards. Officially joined the Society of Friends in 1934 and immigrated with his family to Palestine in 1936 with help from British Friends. Involved in welfare work and teaching in Jerusalem until 1948. Member, alongside his wife, of the Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting.²¹

**Bernard LAWSON**

*Born: 1894, Died: 1979, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Unknown*

Joined Friends Ambulance Unit in the First World War and worked for 37 years in British Quaker international service organisations.²²

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¹⁹ Unknown, Willard Jones Biography, (The Friends House Library: Dictionary of Quaker Biography); Ohio University, Willard and Christina Jones Collection; Christina Jones, Friends in Palestine. p.66
²⁰ Unknown, Lettice Jowitt Biography.
²¹ Heinz Kappes, 'War or Peace in Palestine'. p.879
Paul MAUGER


Born in Camden, London. Attended Friends School in Saffron Walden. After passing his architectural qualifications, worked for several firms, and travelled to Europe extensively. With his wife, Irene, worked for three years in Palestine from 1926-29. Member of Palestine Watching Committee.

Daniel OLIVER

Born: 1870, Died: 1952, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Lebanon, Syria

Born in Cathness, Scotland to Presbyterian parentage. In 1890, went to Palestine and studied Arabic at American Mission in Beirut, then sent to the Mission School in Brummana, directed by an English Friend. Stayed there for four years, studying and teaching. Married Emily Wright (see Emily Oliver), a teacher at Friends School Brummana, 19 September 1895. Joined the Society of Friends in 1907. Had four children and founded the Ras-El-Metn Orphanage in 1915. Co-founder of Palestine Watching Committee. Served 24 years as Secretary-Clerk for the Field Committee for Brummana School and dedicated almost 40 years of his life to peace initiatives between warring parties in the Middle East.

Emily OLIVER

Born: 1865, Died: 1954, Nationality: British, Place of residence: Lebanon, Syria

Born in Ackworth, London. Reached Syria in autumn 1890 and soon after began teaching at the Brummana School. Served as Acting Principal of the Brummana School 1908-1910. Settled in the Ras-el-Metn orphanage after marriage (see Daniel Oliver). Responsible for the orphanage during her husband’s long absences (due to his peacebuilding endeavours) and held equal responsibility in his presence. The Olivers were married for 57 years.

Hubert PEET

Born: 1886, Died: 1951, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London


24 Unknown, Daniel Oliver Biography; Kim Brengle, Happy Anniversary, Daniel & Emily Oliver; Lettice Jowitt and Paul D. Sturge, Daniel Oliver and Emily, His Wife pp.1-6

25 Unknown, Emily Oliver Biography; Kim Brengle, Happy Anniversary, Daniel & Emily Oliver; Lettice Jowitt and Paul D. Sturge, Daniel Oliver and Emily, His Wife pp.1-6; Henry J. Turtle, Quaker Service in the Middle East: Brummana High School. p.65

Clarence PICKETT

*Born: 1884, Died: 1965 Nationality: American, Place of residence: Pennsylvania*

Professor at Earlham College, then the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Executive Secretary from 1929 for 22 years. Credited with changing the organization from a small, mostly Quaker volunteer organization to one of the leading voices on social justice and peace globally, with its operations during his tenure spanning 20 countries.²⁷

Mary PUMPHREY


Reginald REYNOLDS

*Born: 1905, Died: 1958, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Born in Glastonbury. Spent two years teaching at Woodbrooke then went to India, where contact with Gandhi greatly influenced him. Abandoned his Christian pacifist principles and allegiance to Quakers due to a deep sense of socialism. Secretary of the No More War movement, and supporter of the anti-fascist movement in Spain. In the Second World War, registered as a conscientious objector and worked for the Friends Services Council (FSC). Joined Christian Civil Defence as an ambulance driver, where his experiences in this period re-united him with Christian pacifism and Quakerism. From 1951-1952, worked as Field Secretary for the Friends Peace Committee and authored multiple books.²⁹

Peter SCOTT

*Born: Unknown, Died: Unknown, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Secretary of the Home Service Committee of the Society of Friends in 1928 and co-created The Brynmawr Experiment, designed to address issues of poverty and unemployment in Brynmawr, South Wales between 1929-1939.³⁰

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²⁹ Unknown, *Reginald Reynolds Biography*.

Roger SOLTAU

*Born: 1887, Died: 1953, Nationality: British, Places of residence: Beirut, Lebanon, Syria*

A historian, author, and political scientist who converted to Quakerism in 1915. A lecturer at Bristol University, 1911–1915, and served with the Friends Ambulance Unit 1915–1919. Returned to lecturing, holding positions at the University of Leeds, London School of Economics, University of Wales and the American University of Beirut. Member of Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting.31

Mary SIME


London University Geography graduate who taught in England. Worked at a college for girls in Egypt for three separate intervals. Joined the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Galilee mission for six months before transferring to UNESCO as a specialist in a teacher training venture for refugees. Became a member of the faculty in the Women’s Training College, Kano, Nigeria in 1959.32

Paul STURGE

*Born: 1891, Died: 1974, Nationality: British, Place of residence: London*

Set up youth hostels in Bristol, joined Friends Ambulance Unit in the First World War and was a conscientious objector. From a family of estate agents and surveyors that were also well known for social reform movements involving the abolition of slavery and pacifist movements. Worked with the American Quaker teams in Germany, organising feeding schemes for starving children in Cologne and Opladen, 1919-1921. In 1937, was instrumental in setting up the Friends World Committee for Consultation. This new body was charged with building and maintaining contacts between the very disparate groups of Quakers around the world. Later became Head of British Quakers overseas work 1935-1956.33

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32 E. Mary Sime Papers, 1960, TEMP MSS 990.1, Sime Biography - 1960
Appendices

James SUTTON

Born: Unknown, Died: Unknown, Nationality: American, Place of residence: Ramallah

Born in Denver and educated at Haverford College. Headmaster of the Bishop’s School at Amman, Transjordan, then member of staff Friends School in Ramallah 1923-1936, and Director of YMCA in Jerusalem. Also Acting Clerk of Syria and Palestine Yearly Meeting.34

Khalil TOTAH


Attended the first classes set up at the newly developed Friends Boys School, Ramallah, in 1901. Continued education at Friends School in Brummana 1903-1905 then earned masters at Columbia University, New York. Became Principal of the Friends School in Ramallah 1927-1944 then returned to New York where he became Executive Director of the Institute of Arab American Affairs. Co-founder of Palestine Watching Committee. 35

Howard WRIGGINS

Born: 1918, Died: Unknown, Nationality: American, Place of residence: Gaza

Attended Germantown Friends School, Philadelphia. Regularly attended Sunday meetings for Worship at the Germantown Quaker Meeting by the age of 16, despite having non-Quaker parents. Was studying International Relations at the University of Chicago in April 1941 but then joined a refugee and rehabilitation training programme organised by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).36

34 James Sutton, 'The Conflict in Palestine'. p.599
36 Howard Wriggins, Picking up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine - Quaker Refugee Relief in World War II. p.4
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