Between Byzantium and Jerusalem? The Principality of Antioch, Renaud of Châtillon, and the Penance of Mamistra in 1158

In the summer of 1158 Manuel I Komnenos, Emperor of Byzantium, brought a large force into Cilicia to quell Armenian resistance and to seek retribution for an attack launched on the Byzantine island of Cyprus by Renaud of Châtillon, prince of Antioch. In haste, Renaud came to the city of Mamistra, and performed a humiliating penance before agreeing to imperial overlordship. Historians have long conceived of this act as one forced on Renaud by Manuel and King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, and as marking the creation of a political condominium which divided Antioch between these two rulers. This article seeks to challenge the established opinion by drawing attention to the diplomatic skill demonstrated by the Antiochenes, and the independence with which they pursued and secured close and favourable ties to Byzantium.

Keywords: Antioch (principality); Manuel I Komnenos (Byzantine emperor); Baudouin III, king of Jerusalem; Renaud de Châtillon, prince of Antioch; diplomacy; settlement of disputes.

Introduction

In the summer of 1158, Renaud of Châtillon, prince of Antioch (r. 1153–61), came to the Cilician city of Mamistra to carry out an act of penance at the feet of Manuel Komnenos, emperor of Byzantium (r. 1143–80), so humiliating that the Jerusalemite chronicler William of Tyre lamented that ‘the glory of the Latins was turned to shame’.¹ There followed an agreement to implement Greek overlordship over the principality, as well as an imperial triumph into Antioch, during which Renaud acted as the emperor’s groom and King Baldwin III of Jerusalem (r. 1143–63), who had come north to meet with Manuel, rode nearby.² The root cause of the prince’s submission was his attack on the Byzantine island of Cyprus, launched in conjunction
with Thoros of Armenia (d. 1168) in 1156, and historians have suggested that this assault heralded an agreement between Manuel and Baldwin III – who had formed a marriage alliance in 1157 – to allow Byzantium to extend its influence over Antioch. Indeed, the renowned historian of the principality, Claude Cahen, envisaged the creation of a new political world, arguing that:

Antioch thus formed the transition between the two political systems [of Byzantium and Jerusalem] … [as] the alliance of Manuel and Baldwin … allowed the Antiochenes to admit, through Baldwin’s protection, to a suzerainty which otherwise they had considered intolerable … [Now] there was exercised over Antioch a sort of *condominium* of the two princes.3

Although not all modern commentators have gone quite this far, the assumption which underpins the argument – that the Antiochenes, staunchly anti-Greek in their outlook, were simply powerless to stop the coercion of Jerusalem and Byzantium – remains largely unchallenged.4 The aim of this article, therefore, will be to re-assess the primary evidence for 1158, as well as the general relationship between Antioch, Jerusalem, and Byzantium in the twelfth century, and to advance an alternative position. It will be suggested that, rather than being intractably opposed to amicable relations with the empire or politically impotent, the Antiochenes were actually at the very heart of events, and that through their astute and careful diplomacy, the prince and ruling elites of the principality secured an the agreement with Manuel, which, although favourable to the empire, was made on their terms, not Jerusalem’s.

---

Alexios I Komnenos and the Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1096–1118

2
In order to better understand these events, though, we must first examine the background of relations between Byzantium and Latin Antioch. The initial cause of conflict resulted from the First Crusade (1095–99), the leaders of which, in contravention of an agreement made with Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) to return former imperial territories to him, instead allowed the Norman adventurer Bohemond of Taranto (r. 1098–1105) to keep Antioch – a city to which Byzantium had long held a claim – and to set up a new Latin principality. Alexios retaliated by attacking the port of Latakia, and also sought to supplant Norman interests in Cilicia by allying with its Armenian inhabitants. Yet, imperial military success was forestalled by Bohemond’s indomitable nephew and fellow crusade veteran, Tancred of Hauteville (r. 1105–1112), who acted as prince after the former returned to Europe in 1105 to gather support for a campaign against Byzantium. Bohemond successfully secured such aid, but the emperor defeated him near the Adriatic port of Dyrrachium in 1108, and forced the prince to accept the chastening treaty of Devol, in which it was agreed he would act as an imperial satellite ruler in northern Syria until his death. However, Bohemond did not return to Antioch, and Tancred seemingly never recognized these terms, despite the fact that Alexios continued to push for military supremacy in Cilicia until 1111. In reality, the treaty was a dead letter almost as soon as it had been issued, and the emperor appears to have recognized the futility of aggressive tactics, with suggestions that a marriage alliance was being discussed, probably involving his son, the future John II Komnenos (r. 1118–43), on the eve of Alexios’ death in 1118. This proved unsuccessful, but it perhaps set the path for the following years.

John II Komnenos and Antioch, 1130–43
Focused upon securing his position in Constantinople and dealing with military matters elsewhere, John showed little initial interest in Syria until the death of Prince Bohemond II of Antioch (r. 1126–30). In response to this disaster, the principality’s ‘nobles’ (προύχοντες) suggested a union between the emperor’s youngest son, Manuel, and Constance, the Antiochene heiress (d. ca. 1164); though this also failed to materialize. In 1137 John then led imperial forces into Syria, arguably in response to the wedding of Constance and the western nobleman Raymond of Poitiers (r. 1136–49), and in the ensuing conflict Greek forces besieged Antioch. An agreement was soon found which recognized Byzantine overlordship over the principality and offered John the chance to recover the city, should he exchange it for the Muslim sites of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Shaizar. Accordingly, an attempt was made to capture these in conjunction with the Latins in 1138, but he failed to secure any of the stipulated places, despite some initial successes. Moreover, the venture ended in inter-Christian conflict when old tensions re-emerged, perhaps due to Raymond’s reported inactivity at Shaizar, and certainly when the emperor requested Antioch’s citadel be released into his control, at which point a riot broke out, forcing him to retire. John subsequently returned to Syria in 1142, either to renew conflict with the Muslim world or push the Antiochenes to surrender the city. Whatever his plans, John’s death in 1143 during a hunting accident in Cilicia prevented their implementation, and Manuel, elevated to successor at his father’s order, was in no position to push any claims. Historians have often classified John’s reign as the ‘height of conflict’, but this overlooks the fact that his tenure was less violent than Alexios’. Furthermore, the 1137 agreement marked an important step towards forging a close and productive relationship between Byzantium and Antioch.
Despite this, Manuel’s reign began with hostility, as he ordered a land and sea assault on the principality in 1144, seemingly in response to an earlier diplomatic exchange during which Raymond had accused John of seeking to illegally occupy Latin territory. However, when later that year Edessa fell to Zengi, the atabeg of Mosul and Aleppo (r. 1127–46), Antioch’s prince decided to risk a personal visit to Constantinople, where he became Manuel’s ‘liegeman’ (λίζιον) and received a considerable number of gifts, as well as the promise of imperial military support. The latter failed to materialize, but relations had evidently improved, as after Raymond’s death in 1149 Constance approached Manuel for a new husband – although his suitor, the Latin-born Caesar John Roger, was eventually rejected in favour of the western nobleman Renaud of Châtillon, most likely on age grounds. Undeterred, Manuel took the new prince into imperial employ, commissioning him to bring the rebellious Armenian warlord Thoros to heel in 1154. Renaud was successful, yet the emperor refused to pay, probably because the prince had used the campaign to reinstall the Knights Templar into castles in the Amanus Mountains (which divided Syria from Cilicia) rather than singularly promoting Greek interests. In retaliation, the prince allied with Thoros, and together they launched a violent raid on Cyprus in 1156. Meanwhile, in 1157 a marriage alliance was forged between Byzantium and Jerusalem through the union of King Baldwin III and Manuel’s niece, Theodora, at the monarch’s request. On the eve of Manuel’s visit to Antioch, therefore, the tentative advances made towards a close and beneficial relationship had been jeopardized by Renaud’s aggression, while the emperor had used one his many imperial nieces to improve ties to Jerusalem. As will now be explored, these events have greatly influenced modern analysis of the matters which followed. The remainder of this article will thus examine current historiographical opinion, and in doing so offer an alternative assessment.
The Arrival of Manuel in 1158

Manuel’s response to the attack on Cyprus came in 1158, as he entered Cilicia with a large army, scattered Armenian resistance, and established control over the plain, including the city of Mamistra. It was to this metropolis that Renaud then came to seek a resolution, and to make amends through the performance of a humiliating public penance. Both Latin and Greek authors described Renaud’s act of supplication in similar terms, although by far the most elaborate account is that of William of Tyre. He reported that, after a brief exchange of envoys led by Bishop Gerald of Latakia, the prince came to Mamistra to intercept the emperor. It was here, therefore, that:

with the greatest disgrace and shame of our people, barefoot, it was said, clothed in wool with sleeves cut off all the way to the elbow, [and] a rope tied around his neck, he was restored to the Emperor’s merit. Having [his] sword unsheathed in his hand, [and] holding the sword point, he extended the hilt to the lord emperor. He was presented to the lord emperor in the presence of all the legions and having surrendered his sword to the lord emperor there, threw [himself] to the ground before his feet.

The pair then forged an agreement which recognized Manuel’s overlordship of the principality, promised to install a Greek patriarch at Antioch, and stipulated that the Latins would provide unstipulated military service to the emperor. Meanwhile, upon learning of Manuel’s arrival, Baldwin III of Jerusalem rode north in the hope of securing a meeting with his new uncle-in-law, which was duly granted along with his request for a reduction to the Antiochenes’
imperial military service.24 The détente was then solemnized by a procession into Antioch involving the entire range of the principality’s society, as well as the king of Jerusalem, with Renaud acting as the emperor’s groom.25

Most historians have considered these events an accurate representation of the principality’s powerlessness and subservience to the wishes of both Byzantium and Jerusalem.26 Yet the eventual accord, beneficial as it was to imperial prestige, was far less onerous than might have been expected following the assault on Cyprus. Furthermore, a close and careful examination of the underlying political motives behind, and of the ramifications of Renaud’s act – which was a startling piece of theatricalized ritual – can instead reveal an alternative balance of power: one which places the principality at the very heart of matters, not at the periphery.

**The Impetus for the Penance**

A key signifier of the interplay of authority during these events comes from the underlying impetus behind their performance. Renaud’s penance evidently impressed Manuel, for Paul Magdalino has noted that he later demanded a similar abasement from a rebellious Serbian ruler, while one Greek poet boasted that the prince had ‘curled up like a small puppy [at Manuel’s] red-slippered feet’.27 Nevertheless, while Byzantine Christians would not have been unaware of public displays of penance, for example those included in the Bible, or that imposed on Emperor Theodosius (r. 347–95) by St Ambrose in the fourth century, Renaud’s ritual did not draw on any discernible Greek political traditions.28 Indeed, such an act had not been forced on Raymond of Poitiers during his visit to Constantinople in 1145, although he did show humility by praying at John II Komnenos’ tomb.29 The events at Mamistra instead followed the Latin ritual of
supplicatory penance in which religious or political sinners would abase themselves at an altar – or to a person – with a cross in front of them or around their neck; an action which served to re-establish the right order of society following a fracture. Jenny Benham has demonstrated that, after the break-up of the Carolingian Empire, and via high-profile cases such as Henry IV of Germany’s (r. 1056–1105) supplication to Pope Gregory VII (d. 1085) at Canossa in 1077, such rituals ‘became integrated into secular society and [were] no longer performed just on set days before bishops or priests, but became a part of political order’. This was to be confirmed in 1169 when King Henry II of England (r. 1154–89) supplicated himself in the presence of King Louis VII of France (r. 1137–80) at Montmirail in order to diffuse tension over the former’s dispute with Thomas Becket, and also to broker a peace between the two rulers. As Benham has further noted, ‘such a show of penitence and complete submission had to be rewarded with forgiveness and absolution’, and that, ‘had King Louis VII refused the supplication of Henry II, he would have struck at the very heart of his own office … [even if] it is unlikely that Henry with his actions actually conceded anything new’. In abasing himself at the emperor’s feet with an inverted sword in front of him, Renaud had therefore adapted this tradition to suit his purposes, with the impetus for the penance, or at the very least the idea behind using such a ritual for political gain, decidedly Latin.

Although this has not been discussed before, it might appear to fit with existing historiography which holds that Renaud’s abasement was engineered by Manuel and Baldwin III during negotiations for the latter’s marriage to Theodora Komnena in 1157. This stance is primarily based on the mid-twelfth-century Armenian account of Gregory the Priest, who suggested that the Antiochenes had submitted lest they ‘violate the oath taken at the tomb of the Redeemer and the promise given to the king of Jerusalem when he became allied to Manuel
through marriage’. However, this oath and promise related only to the emperor’s assurance that he would come to Syria to fight the Muslims, with no explicit mention made of Antiochene submission. The only other source for these discussions, William of Tyre, alluded to private conversations but did not reveal their nature. William’s silence could be explained by the fact that he remained in Europe until 1164, but it is nevertheless quite problematic to place so great an emphasis on Gregory’s text. This is especially pertinent given that most other sources portrayed Renaud and his advisors as the principal instigators at Mamistra, with no input from Baldwin or guidance from Manuel. Crucially, even William of Tyre lamented that Renaud, reacting hastily to the emperor’s arrival in Cilicia:

had not even been willing to await the presence of the lord king, though it was hoped he would be approaching nearby, although he would certainly have known with trust [that] through his intervention and zeal, and by the grace of the powerful new affinity [between Baldwin and Manuel], he would have managed to receive far better conditions.

An author with a heavily pro-Jerusalem bias, as well as one who held a healthy regard for Manuel Komnenos – which was matched by his dislike of Renaud – there are few obvious reasons for William to have fabricated his account, and we can thus place trust in his belief that the Antiochenes had acted of their own accord. Moreover, the thirteenth-century Old French translation of William’s work known as Eracles – which lacked the same sensitivity to Byzantium – even went so far as to suggest a strong level of Antiochene diplomatic manoeuvring by noting that the bishop of Latakia had:

advised [Renaud] to go before the emperor, who was in Cilicia, without delay, and to cry to him most humbly for mercy because he knew how arrogant the
Greeks were and that they wanted nothing more than that one should do honour to them under duress.40

This evidence therefore places the initiative for the penance firmly in Antiochene hands, which is likewise supported by the Greek chronicler John Kinnamos, who detailed various diplomatic advances made by Renaud before his eventual, surprising appearance at Mamistra.41

**The Involvement of Baldwin III**

Nevertheless, Baldwin III’s arrival at Antioch, probably in late November 1158, means we must seek to examine the nature of his role.42 This is made especially important in light of existing historiographical opinion that places the king at the centre of matters, with Magdalino suggesting that he had become ‘the emperor’s trusted representative and the guarantor for the good behaviour of all the Christian princes in the area’.43

The foundations for this lie not simply with Baldwin III’s marriage to Theodora, but also the longer term relationship between Jerusalem and Antioch. Indeed, it has become established opinion that the Holy City’s rulers exercised a powerful level of control over the principality, a process which began during King Baldwin II’s (r. 1118–31) seven-year regency following Prince Roger of Antioch’s (r. 1112–19) death at Ager Sanguinis in 1119, and then intensified after Raymond of Poitiers’s death at the battle of Inab in 1149.44 Yet ties between the Latin states were actually more complex than this would imply, and there are suggestions that Jerusalemite political influence was far less secure than some have envisaged. Thus, when Baldwin III sought to impose a new husband on Princess Constance of Antioch in 1152, she publicly thwarted his
efforts at a council in Tripoli, and instead approached Manuel for a suitor. It is true that she eventually wed Renaud of Châtillon, a figure with ties to Baldwin and who had to be released from royal service, but the choice nevertheless appears to have been made independently from royal advice.\(^{45}\) Baldwin faced further embarrassment in 1157 when he tried to install Count Thierry of Flanders (r. 1128–68) as lord of Shaizar, since Renaud refused to sanction this unless homage was first paid to him for the castle. Given that Shaizar was mentioned in Devol, as well as John’s agreement with Raymond in 1137, this could imply Renaud cited ties to Byzantium to protect his position, although this is nowhere overtly mentioned.\(^{46}\) Significantly, the western Count’s refusal to perform an act he claimed he reserved for kings, left Baldwin powerless to overcome this impasse, and the attack fell apart.\(^{47}\) In contradiction to historians who credit the monarch with a strong level of influence over Antioch, his authority actually appears to have been rather limited. Importantly, this was to be further demonstrated in 1158.

Initially, Antioch’s citizens seemingly welcomed the king, with both John Kinnamos and Gregory the Priest suggesting that the city’s populace requested he intercede with Manuel on Renaud’s behalf.\(^{48}\) This implies Baldwin’s potential sway with the emperor was respected, although it could be viewed instead as an act of desperation, and also serves as further evidence that the Antiochenes had instigated the penance without his knowledge. William of Tyre similarly sought to promote royal prestige by commenting that Baldwin then received an imperial message which ‘invited him to come [to Mamistra] without delay … [as a] most beloved son of the empire’.\(^{49}\) However, this is offset by Kinnamos’ assertion that Manuel initially refused the king an audience, since he felt Baldwin hoped to seize Antioch for himself.\(^{50}\) Such motives are not implausible, although, in the context of the above discussion, they were unlikely to have come to fruition. Of greater importance is that this evidence once again
undermines suggestions that Baldwin and Manuel had pre-agreed Renaud’s penance. Moreover, while it is true that the king was eventually allowed into the emperor’s presence (and a personal friendship may well have emerged between the pair), the former’s ability to influence political matters between Byzantium and Antioch was limited to a reduction to the principality’s imperial military service – agreed in principle at Mamistra before Baldwin’s arrival – and came only at the expense of Jerusalemite forces. Manuel had conceded Baldwin a part, but he had done so only in order to extend his own influence over the kingdom. Furthermore, despite the suggestions of William of Tyre and the thirteenth-century Armenian chronicler Sempad the Constable (who may have used the former’s work) that Baldwin was afforded a privileged position in the imperial triumph into Antioch – riding, crowned, at the front of the procession – John Kinnamos argued rather that the king rode at the back without insignia; and some sources, including Niketas Choniates and the Syriac Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon, considered Baldwin’s role to have been so minimal as to not even be worthy of mention. Significant doubts thus remain over the king’s actual influence.

Similar reservations can be raised in relation to another piece of evidence cited as proof of Baldwin’s authority: a coin supposedly issued by Manuel to commemorate the monarch’s role. This coin – which carried a cross and the inscription XRE – has been examined by Michael Metcalf, who concluded that this was a badly rendered form of REX. He thus believed it to be evidence that the emperor wanted to endorse Baldwin’s role as leader of Outremer. Yet, the poor quality of the cast (which Metcalf posits is Armenian) intimates that it was created after Manuel’s arrival in Cilicia – most likely following Renaud’s penance – which contradicts those arguments which claim the decision to accept Baldwin’s chief position pre-dated the campaign. Instead, given the presence of the cross, it is more probable that XRE is a shortened form of
XR[IST]E, or Christ, and represented an attempt to portray the emperor as the head of Christendom to accompany his procession into Antioch. Numismatic evidence is often difficult to interpret, and so we must be wary of reading too much into this coin, especially as only a small number have survived, and Metcalf’s conclusion is difficult to substantiate.

As such, while we can be confident that Baldwin was present, and involved in certain aspects of the diplomatic procedures, we should be careful not to overplay his role, as for the most part he was at the periphery of events. It is true that Manuel was unlikely to have wanted to aggravate the king, and he would have recognized the benefits of fostering close ties with Jerusalem – both to his diplomatic policies in the East and the West – but it is telling that the main negotiations were carried out, and agreed upon, before Baldwin could intervene; a reality Ferdinand Chalandon and Nikita Elisséeff have to some extent both acknowledged. Thus, while Isabelle Augé considered the king’s part in the triumph into Antioch (he on horseback with Renaud acting as Manuel’s groom) the perfect embodiment of the political status quo, and Jonathan Phillips has argued that the king ‘had reason to be content with the outcome’ since his position at the head of Outremer was secured, there is, in reality, insufficient evidence to support such conclusions.

**Manuel’s Intentions**

Another crucial element in our understanding of these events regards Manuel’s intentions. A number of historians, most notably Paul Magdalino and Jonathan Harris, have imputed the emperor’s reserved reaction to the prince’s display to the former’s sensitivity to western opinion, and to his desire to conform to traditional imperial notions of recognition over possession.
short, from the outset Manuel had intended to accept overlordship, rather than inflict a military
defeat. However, although it appears Manuel had adopted a more favourable policy towards
Latin Christendom since his attack on Antioch in 1144, we cannot rule out that he had expected –
or had been expected – to redress the balance of power following Renaud’s attack on Cyprus by
making a show of force similar to his earlier venture or his father’s attack in 1137.

Indeed, the immense size of the emperor’s force is noted throughout the sources. It could be
argued that this reflected his commitment to waging war on the Islamic world, which Gregory
the Priest’s account does suggest; but, while in Syria, the emperor paid more heed to forging
diplomatic ties with Nur al-Din, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus (r. 1146–74), than to seeking
ways of opposing him, given that Muslim envoys were reportedly present at Mamistra, perhaps
to broker possible ties.57 Although a military campaign was nevertheless planned against Aleppo,
it soon foundered – supposedly due to the threat of a coup at Constantinople – and a treaty was
clinched with Nur al-Din for an alliance against the Seljuk Turks, along with the release of a
number of Latin prisoners.58 Significantly, imperial hopes of bringing Islamic leaders into line
may well have relied on Manuel’s ability to demonstrate his magnanimity regarding earlier
tensions. As such, similar to Benham’s aforementioned analysis of Louis VII’s options following
Henry II’s abasement at Montmirail, any act of aggression by the emperor in response to the
prince’s supplication in front of the Muslim envoys could have adversely affected his ability to
convince them to agree to an alliance. Moreover, both William of Tyre and John Kinnamos cited
vengeance for Cyprus as a primary motive, while the latter, who is our most contemporary Greek
author, commented that Manuel rejected an offer to betray Renaud made by Aimery of Limoges,
the patriarch of Antioch (r. ca. 1142–96), stating that ‘he desired to win by war [πολέμῳ] rather
than treachery’.59 Additionally, the aforementioned coin seemingly issued by the emperor further
suggests he had not envisaged an entirely peaceful, pre-arranged entrance into Antioch; otherwise it would have been created *before* he reached Cilicia, not after.

Manuel’s initial intentions for Antioch remain open to some conjecture, but in reality Renaud’s actions at Mamistra left him with few other options than to consent to a peaceful settlement, since a rejection of the prince’s pleas could have severely undermined the diplomatic credentials the emperor evidently sought to promote in his dealings with both eastern and western powers.\(^6\) Furthermore, in examining Henry II of England’s public penance for the murder of Thomas Becket in the 1170s, during which the Angevin monarch forced the monks of Canterbury to observe his public abasement through the streets of the city and in the cathedral, Nicholas Vincent has stated that ‘a king who has to command the observation of his own humility cannot be said to be truly humbled’.\(^6\) Likewise, although the far from onerous terms of Manuel and Renaud’s agreement suggest an emperor who valued the benefits arising from the acknowledgment of his overlordship, we must be prepared to accept that this may have been a reactive, rather than proactive stance; and that Renaud’s ability to dictate the method of his submission limited scope for punishment. Through their careful diplomatic manoeuvring, the Antiochenes had thus played a central role in the proceedings.

A scrutiny of the actions of Renaud and his advisors in quickly initiating his public abasement suggests that the penance of Mamistra was not so much the result of political impotence as a masterstroke that summarily defused Manuel’s wrath, and ensured a settlement far less damaging to Antioch than it might have been. This portrays a principality whose ruling elite were far more willing to work with the Greeks than has hitherto been suggested, and also demonstrates that,
contrary to belief in Baldwin III’s integral role, the Antiochenes’ actions actually prevented the king from intervening, thereby halting Jerusalemite hopes of dictating the future of Latin interaction with Byzantium in northern Syria. As a result, belief in a condominium is difficult to substantiate – a conclusion which is further borne out by an examination of events during the following years.

The Marriage of Manuel Komnenos and Maria of Antioch

In the immediate aftermath of Manuel’s visit, there are suggestions of a certain level of inter-Christian unity, as John Kinnamos suggested Baldwin III and Renaud fulfilled their imperial military service in a campaign against the Turks of Asia Minor in 1159/60. Yet, despite modern historical belief that this demonstrated the fulfilment of the condominium – a stance which relies on unsubstantiated notions of royal leadership of the Latin contingents – in reality we cannot even be sure this campaign even occurred. Indeed, during the period in question both rulers issued documents within their respective realms. Moreover, the marriage alliance which then transpired between Manuel and Maria of Antioch in 1162 – the events of which proved to be of great embarrassment for Baldwin – is a significant indicator that, whilst the emperor clearly recognized the potential benefits of preserving amicable ties to Jerusalem, the notion that the kings had any real influence over Northern Syria cannot be substantiated.

The initial impetus for the union came from Manuel, whose German wife, Bertha of Salzburg, died in 1159. He accordingly approached Baldwin III in order to open negotiations over a new Latin bride and William of Tyre recorded that the emperor dispatched an embassy to Jerusalem to inform the king – who had reportedly just returned from Antioch where he had installed
Patriarch Aimery as regent following Renaud of Châtillon’s capture in a raiding expedition of November 1161 – that:

finally, from the favour and consent of all the princes it pleased [us] that we should unite the empire in marriage [with one] from your bloodline, which our empire loves unparalleled; either of your relations, the illustrious woman [Melisende] sister of the count of Tripoli, or the magnificent woman [Maria] younger sister of the prince of Antioch, having all faith in the honest option you may choose for us.66

After some deliberation, William recorded that Baldwin proposed Melisende, with his decision relayed to Manuel for agreement via the envoys.67 This chain of events is supported by some Greek sources, in particular the account of Constantine Manasses – a poet who participated in the embassy to Jerusalem and also visited Tripoli – which was seemingly utilized by Kinnamos.68 However, both Choniates and the Armenian Sempad the Constable noted instead that Manuel chose Maria as early as his visit to Antioch in 1158 and that there was no process of negotiation with Baldwin.69

The king’s decision to recommend Melisende has been interpreted as an attempt to prevent further imperial influence over Antioch, which certainly appears likely – and adds to the growing realization of the limits to royal intervention.70 Whatever his intentions, though, a delay then ensued during which the remaining envoys prevaricated, before an answer eventually came from Manuel that Melisende was unsuitable, with suggestions that this related either to doubts over her birth or her health.71 William of Tyre reported that Baldwin then revisited Antioch, where he discovered Greek envoys in ‘daily and intimate discussions’ with Constance regarding Maria.72 Unable to block these talks, the king is subsequently said to have respectfully aided in the
princess’ departure to Constantinople. Regardless of whether Baldwin acted with such magnanimity, this was an undoubtedly embarrassing moment for a monarch so confident in his position in July 1161 that he had allowed Melisende to use the title of ‘future empress of Constantinople [future Constantinopolitane sedis imperatricis]’ in a royal charter.

The most thorough examination of these events is by Hans Mayer, who has convincingly challenged William of Tyre’s chronology, demonstrating that the initial envoy to Baldwin must have pre-dated Renaud’s capture in November 1161. Mayer has argued that the prince’s incarceration altered the dynamic of the situation, and that, in spite of the initial embassy to Jerusalem in the early summer of 1161, Manuel sought to seize the opportunity to increase his influence at Antioch – a chance which, he states, could only have occurred ‘after the elimination of the less than pro-Byzantine Renaud’. This view is largely shared by Magdalino, who noted that ‘it was fully in the spirit of the settlement of 1159 that Manuel should use Baldwin as his broker in dealings with the other crusader princes’, and that the subsequent delay could only have occurred due to Renaud, at which point ‘at the very least, a show of respect for Baldwin’s wishes was necessary to divert his attention away from the negotiations with Antioch’. However, these arguments rely on certain assumptions which can be challenged: firstly, that Antioch would never have broached a marriage alliance with Byzantium had Renaud remained in power; secondly, that Baldwin held enough authority over Antioch to make this decision; and, thirdly, that Manuel would have been willing to accept a Tripolitan empress.

The first of these stances would, at first glance, appear to be supported by the fact that a union between Constance and an imperial suitor had twice failed, as this suggests a Greek prince – or at least one with distinctly Byzantine leanings – was not an altogether favourable prospect for the Latins. Nevertheless, the political dynamics of a wedding between the emperor and a princess
who was not the heiress to the principality were very different, and were in fact far more beneficial to the Antiochenes than the Greeks. Moreover, the events of 1158, and those leading up to them, demonstrate not only that Antioch’s ruling elite were more than willing to work with Byzantium, but also that they were prepared to do so even to the point of undermining Jerusalemite influence, with Baldwin’s authority in the principality far from secure. Finally, although Alexios Komnenos had attempted to forge an alliance with Tripoli against Antioch in the early 1100s, the Eastern emperors had mostly shown little interest in a polity that, in reality, was a very minor power in the Near East. That Manuel would ever have actually countenanced Melisende as a viable candidate is thus highly unlikely – a view which is supported by Choniates and Sempad the Constable’s aforementioned comments that Maria was the emperor’s only target.

Significant problems therefore arise in supporting traditional opinion. Mayer is correct to discredit William of Tyre’s chronology, and we can be confident both that the initial envoy pre-dated Renaud’s capture and that Baldwin was not returning from Antioch when it arrived. However, Mayer’s decision to go further, arguing that the king still made two trips to Northern Syria – the first in early 1162 following the prince’s capture, and then again in the summer of that year (at which point he found the Greek embassy in discussions with Constance) – is questionable. It seems more plausible that Baldwin travelled only once, staying from the beginning of 1162 until Maria’s departure in the summer, during which time he was made aware of discussions for the union. That he remained in Antioch for a considerable period is suggested by the lack of surviving charter material issued in Jerusalem during that year, as well as William of Tyre’s comment that Baldwin helped to rebuild the Antiochene fortress of the Iron Bridge – a not inconsiderable undertaking. Moreover, this would help to explain his attempt to oust
Constance from government in favour of the patriarch following Renaud’s capture. With little choice but to acquiesce to Manuel’s desires – which even William of Tyre concluded – Baldwin perhaps attempted to recover some prestige by exacting revenge on the princess by depriving her of power; although his success appears to have been limited.\textsuperscript{79} Importantly, this means that, if talks between Byzantium and Antioch were carried out without the king’s knowledge, as seems to have been the case, they would almost certainly have begun in 1161 and Renaud would undoubtedly have been aware of them. Further difficulties with Mayer’s analysis are the result of the reliance he places on the work of Constantine Manasses. Whilst the poet did participate in the embassy to Jerusalem, he was – by his own admission – poorly informed on the nature of the trip, and Miroslav Marcovitch has described Constantine as ‘a hopelessly lyric and romantic \textit{enfant terrible}… [who] clearly never intended to produce a historical chronicle’.\textsuperscript{80} The extent to which he would have had knowledge of the underlying intricacies of Manuel’s true intentions is thus highly questionable, even if Kinnamos relied heavily on his text.

It cannot be denied that a Byzantine embassy was sent to Jerusalem in 1161, but whether this represented a genuine recognition of Jerusalemite rights over Antioch is now far less secure. Indeed, it seems rather that Manuel had either expected Baldwin to toe the line by promising not to hinder a marriage alliance with Antioch, and that the choice was little more than a face saving exercise; or that, even before Renaud’s capture, it served as a distraction to allow talks with the Antiochenes to progress – an explanation which fits well with the events at Mamistra in 1158. Konstantine Horna has argued that this is so, describing it as a ‘double cross’, as ‘the Byzantine court had once again provided an example of the ambiguous diplomatic skills through which it had so loved to prove its intellectual superiority over inept western governments, especially in the era of the crusades’.\textsuperscript{81} That the Antiochenes were so willing to acquiesce to this, even during
Renaud’s tenure, reveals a great deal about their relations with Jerusalem as well as the nature of the ties to Byzantium; a reality often overlooked by historians. Whereas historiographical belief in the inherent weakness of the principality has shifted the primary focus onto the empire and the kingdom, Antioch had a great deal to gain from this marriage, as it tied Manuel to the principality’s cause, and offered the prospect of a half-Antiochene emperor, which was almost realized with Alexios II Komnenos (r. 1180–83) in the early 1180s. Not only would this have ensured reliable support, but it also altered the dynamic of the relationship, with the Latins now holding a stake in the imperial succession. Conversely, Maria was never likely to gain the Antiochene throne given the presence of a male heir from Constance’s marriage to Raymond of Poitiers, Bohemond III (r. 1163–1201), as well as one by Renaud, a certain Baldwin who entered imperial service and died at Myriokephalon in 1176. In this context it is unsurprising that an offer for such a union would have been actively pursued, and it must not be forgotten that, as in 1158, Antioch had carried out negotiations entirely separate from Jerusalem. Belief in a *condominium*, and Baldwin’s position within it, is once again clearly undermined, as is the suggestion that the Antiochenes were mere bystanders in the political world around them.

**Conclusion**

This article has sought to examine an important issue in the political history of the principality of Antioch in the mid-twelfth century: its relationship with the Byzantine Empire. Traditional historiography has viewed the Antiochenes as inherently distrustful of, and unwilling to work with the Greeks. Moreover, that it was only with increased Latin weakness in northern Syria in the late 1140s and early 1150s that Manuel Komnenos was able to extend his power with the
support of Baldwin III of Jerusalem – the *de facto* regent of the principality. In short, Antioch has been viewed as an impotent pawn, caught between the rival machinations of Byzantium – a state to which it harboured only hatred – and Jerusalem, the premier Latin power in *Outremer*. I have sought to offer an alternative argument, however; one that places the ruling elites of the principality at the very heart of events, guiding the processes of diplomacy with such skill that, through Renaud of Châtillon’s penance at Mamistra, they were able to effectively manage an aggressive emperor seeking retribution for an attack on his territory, as well as to prevent the king from intervening or gaining stipulations which would have furthered his position, rather than Antioch’s. Indeed, the prince’s ritualized supplication, which offered powerful connotations with contemporary Latin Christian traditions, should be viewed not as a sign of total weakness, but as a diplomatic masterstroke. Added to this, the events of the following years, particularly the marriage of Manuel and Maria of Antioch, demonstrate that the relationship created in 1158 was not a Jerusalemite-Byzantine *condominium*. Instead, the agreement made between Renaud and the emperor represented the final culmination of a process of Antiochene-favoured imperial overlordship of the principality, which had begun with John II Komnenos in the 1130s. Far from being a staunchly anti-Greek state hammered into line between two immovable forces, the Latins of Antioch evidently recognized the benefits of imperial overlordship and the distant, financial benevolence it offered, as opposed to the more immediate, interfering suzerainty of Jerusalem.

Acknowledgements: Versions of this paper were given in Oxford, London and Leeds. I would like to express my gratitude to the audiences there for their comments and to Prof. Bernard Hamilton, Dr Thomas Asbridge, and Stephen Spencer, for their help in producing this article.

References
Primary Sources


**Secondary Sources**


Notes


Kinnamos, Epitome, 16 (Deeds, 22).

9 Kinnamos, Epitome, 33–5 (Deeds, 35–6); Choniates, Historia, 52 (O City, 31).

10 For this period, see Cahen, Syrie, 227–82; Asbridge, Creation, 92–103; Lilie, Byzantium, 1–95; Harris, Byzantium, 59–85.

11 William of Tyre, Chronicon, 15.19, 700–1; Otto of Freising, Chronica, 354; Kinnamos, Epitome, 22–31 (Deeds, 26–33; Choniates, Historia, 38–47 (O City, 22–7)); Choniates, Historia, 52 (O City, 31).

12 This likely included Baghras, Darbsak, La Roche de Roissel and La Roche Guillaume. See Chevalier, Les Ordres, 56–58.

18 For an overview of this period, see Cahen, Syrie, 368, 371–2, 387–9; Chalandon, Jean et Manuel, vol. 2, 417–26; Lilie, Byzantium, 142–5, 163–6; Harris, Byzantium, 112–6; Magdalino, Empire, 41–2, 66–7; Buck, ‘On the Frontier’, 247–52.
chose fors ce que l'en leur feist en ter merci mout humblement; car il cognoissoit les Grieus de tel maniere que il estoient bobancier, et ne queroient a utre gratia, in causa predicta longe meliores se inventurum conditiones expectare presentiam, cum tamen certo certius nosse poterat eius interventione et studio, e t maxime nove affinitatis it would have been after this date, though. See William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.23, 844–5; William of Tyre said accompanied the king, in Ascalon on 14 November 1158 suggests it would have been after this date, though. See William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.23, 844–5; William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.23, 844–5; ut nec domini regis, quem tamen in proximo venturum sperabat, vellet expectare presentiam, cum tamen certo certius nosse poterat eius interventione et studio, et maxime nove affinitatis gratia, in causa predicta longe meliores se inventurum conditiones. The presence of his brother Amalric, who William of Tyre said accompanied the king, in Ascalon on 14 November 1158 suggests it would have been after this date, though. See William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.23, 844–5; Die Urkunden, vol. 2, 523–4, no. 296, The exact date of Baldwin’s arrival in Antioch is unknown as no royal charters survive from 1158. The presence of his brother Amalric, who William of Tyre said accompanied the king, in Ascalon on 14 November 1158 suggests it would have been after this date, though. See William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.23, 844–5; Die Urkunden, vol. 2, 523–4, no. 296, For Ager Sanguinis, see Asbridge, Creation, 81–9, 126–8; Mayer, ‘Jérusalem’, 717–33. For Inab, see Cahen, Syrie, 384–406; Mayer, Varia, 48; Jotischky, Crusading, 91–2; Asbridge, Crusades, 239–45; Mallett, ‘Inab’, 48–60. Buck, ‘On the Frontier’, 279–92. See notes 7 and 10. Phillips, Defenders, 270–81. Kinnamos, Epitome, 181–7 (Deeds, 139–42); Gregory the Priest, ‘Continuation’, 272–5. William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.24, 846–7: ut regem moneant et invitent ut ad eum venire non pigritetur...imperii dilectissimum filium.


67 Die *Urkunden*, vol. 1, 455–77, nos. 248–61; *Cartulaire Général*, vol. 1, 209, no. 280; *Codice Diplomatico*, vol. 1, 206–7, no. 163.


72 William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, 18.31, 856–7: *cotidianum et familiarem...tractatum*.

30

74 Die Urkunden, vol. 1, 479–86, no. 263.
75 Mayer, Varia, 45–54.
78 William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.32, 858.
79 William of Tyre, Chronicon, 18.30–1, 854–7. Doubts over Baldwin’s success derive from the fact that Constance’s son Bohemond III had to force his way into power against his mother in 1163. See Mayer, Varia, 55–64.
82 Alexios II succeeded his father in 1180, with Maria of Antioch his regent, but both were murdered when Andronikos Komnenos (1183–85) seized power. See Harris, Byzantium, 121–32.
83 Choniates, Historia, 169–70, 180–1 (O City, 96, 102).