The Noble Rebellion at Antioch, 1180‒82: 
A Case Study in Medieval Frontier Politics 

Andrew D. Buck

Andrew D. Buck (andrewdbuck1987@googlemail.com), School of History, Queen Mary University of London (UK)

Acknowledgements: My thanks to Peter Edbury, Bernard Hamilton, Thomas Asbridge, and Stephen Spencer for their invaluable help in the formation of my ideas and execution of this article, and to the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their kind and constructive suggestions.

Abstract: In late 1180, after the death of Emperor Manuel Komnenos, Prince Bohemond III of Antioch put aside his imperial bride, Theodora Komnena, to marry an Antiochene woman named Sybil. What followed was an internal uprising against the ruler encompassing the entire breadth of the principality’s Church and most of its aristocracy, led by Aimery of Limoges, patriarch of Antioch, and Renaud II Masoir, lord of Margat. This fracture likely endured until early 1182 and had far-reaching implications, but has received only piecemeal historical attention. Nevertheless, the rebellion of 1180‒82 reveals a great deal about the political climate of the Latin frontier in twelfth-century northern Syria, demonstrating the dynamic realities of power in the principality of Antioch.

Keywords: Antioch (principality); Bohemond III, prince of Antioch; Byzantium; nobility; frontiers; power and authority; settlement of disputes; William of Tyre, historian

On 24 September 1180, Manuel Komnenos, emperor of Byzantium for nearly forty years, died in Constantinople. His death marked the beginning of a disastrous period of dynastic strife within the empire, for Andronikos Komnenos soon seized power, killing both Manuel’s widow-regent, Maria of Antioch (r. 1162‒82), and his heir, Alexios II (r. 1180‒82).1 Its consequences were also felt elsewhere. William of Tyre, the great chronicler of the Latin East and contemporary of these events, noted that, upon hearing of the emperor’s demise:

Dominus Boamundus Antiochie princeps, relictam domina Theodora, uxorem sua, domini imperatoris nepte, quandam Sibillam, maleficiis utentem ut dicitur, ecclesiastica severitate contempta in uxorem ducere presumptis.2

1 Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 222‒29.
2 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, p. 1012. On William’s chronicle, see Edbury and Rowe, William of Tyre.
The lord Bohemond [III], prince of Antioch, abandoned the lady Theodora, his wife, niece of the lord emperor [Manuel], for a certain Sybil, who, it was said, practised sorcery, and disdained ecclesiastical censure in having presumed to take [her] in marriage.

There followed a violent rupture between Bohemond III (r. 1163‒1201) and the Antiochene Church, with the patriarch, Aimery of Limoges (r. c. 1142‒96), excommunicating him for bigamy. Bohemond responded by directing a series of attacks against ecclesiastical possessions within Antioch, forcing Aimery and the clergy to flee the city. Some took refuge in the patriarchal castle of Qusair, but not before the entire principality was placed under interdict, with all religious services curtailed. Meanwhile, certain Antiochene nobles rose up in opposition to the prince, led by Renaud II Masoir, lord of Margat (r. c. 1140‒c. 1186), the castle where the rebels and other exiled churchmen gathered. A high-level envoy was then dispatched from Jerusalem by King Baldwin IV (r. 1174‒85), an event which William of Tyre claims was delayed by fears that an overzealous response would cause Bohemond to ally himself with the Ayyubid Sultan Saladin (r. 1174‒93). An agreement was eventually forged after a series of discussions, first at Latakia and then in Antioch, whereby church possessions were restored and peace was re-established. Soon after this, a number of Bohemond’s most trusted advisors were expelled from the principality, taking refuge at the court of Rupen III, the Armenian ruler of Cilicia (r. c. 1175‒87).

These events were remarkable in Latin-held northern Syria, both in terms of the levels of violence inflicted on ecclesiastical possessions and the rebellion of Antiochene nobles. They are also well covered by contemporary sources. Alongside William of Tyre, there is the highly valuable chronicle of Michael the Syrian, the Jacobite Christian patriarch of Antioch (r. 1166‒99) who travelled widely throughout the region and may even have been an eyewitness, as well as a colophon contained in a late twelfth-century Armenian manuscript. Further to these are certain thirteenth-century texts like the Old French translation of William of Tyre, known as Eracles, which at times diverges from the Latin original; the Syriac work of Gregory Bar Ebroyo, whose text is often very similar to Michael the Syrian’s; and finally the Lignages d’Outremer, a record of the great families of the crusader states, the earliest manuscript of which dates to after 1250.

Despite this, historians have offered only piecemeal analysis of the wider implications of the revolt, and have for the most part focused on how it related to Antioch’s ties with Byzantium or the kingdom of Jerusalem. The major exception is Hans Mayer, whose thorough and important study of the rebellion concluded that it was relatively short-lived — ending in April 1181 — and that the nobles were incited to act by the anti-Church violence. Mayer’s conclusions nevertheless

---

3 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1012‒16.
4 An uprising involving Antiochene nobles had occurred in 1132, but this was not directed against a recognized ruler of Antioch. See Asbridge, ‘Alice of Antioch’.
5 Michael the Syrian, Chronique, ed. and trans. by Chabot, iii, 388‒89; Weltecke, Die ‘Beschreibung der Zeiten’ von Mör Michael Dem Grossen; Stone, ‘A Notice about Patriarch Aimery of Antioch in an Armenian Colophon of 1181’.
8 Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 162‒83.
warrant further consideration. This article will thus aim to re-examine a number of the underlying assumptions behind modern evaluations of the causes and effects of the revolt, and to offer alternative explanations which, while remaining sensitive to the complexities of Antiochene attitudes towards Byzantium, also recognize the influence of the principality’s fluid power structures. Most significantly, therefore, it will be argued that the rebellion of 1180–82 suggests that the modern historiographical belief that the princes of Antioch were highly powerful, autocratic rulers requires revision. Indeed, in light of recent scholarship which has stressed the diversity and adaptability of medieval governance — particularly on contested frontiers where the strength of central authority could often be tested by the dynamism of local politics — there is a demonstrable need to re-evaluate the principality’s political structures. Above all, these events show that the experience of rulership in Latin-held northern Syria was far from clear-cut.

The Cause of the Dispute

It was noted earlier that Bohemond’s rejection of Theodora in favour of Sybil acted as the catalyst for the rupture, but there remains some debate regarding who was princess of Antioch in 1180. This stems from the fact that, although William of Tyre and Michael the Syrian both detailed that it was Theodora, certain manuscript traditions of the Lignages d’Outremer recorded that it was actually a certain Orgeuillse, daughter of the lord of the castle of Harim. While most historians follow the traditional narrative, Wipertus Rudt de Collenberg and Natasha Hodgson have used the Lignages to argue that Theodora actually married Bohemond much earlier — probably in the 1160s — and had been put aside long before 1180. This approach is open to challenge, not least because it values the later, problematic material of the Lignages over contemporary texts, but also because, like these earlier sources, the Lignages is still consistent in dating Theodora’s rejection to after Manuel’s death, not before. It is true that Bohemond had married Orgeuillse, for she appears in five princely charters between 1171–76 and, given the mention of sons in the last of the documents, was undoubtedly mother to Princes Raymond II and Bohemond IV, but her death is implied by her subsequent disappearance after this. Likewise, the fear of an overly strong alliance between Byzantium and Antioch, as expressed by Pope Alexander III (r. 1159–81) in a letter to

---


10 On this, see Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century; Power, The Norman Frontier in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries.

11 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1012–13; Michael the Syrian, see Chronique, ed. and trans. by Chabot, III, 388–89; Lignages d’Outremer, ed. by Nielen, pp. 83, 93–94, 144–45.

12 Rudt de Collenberg, ‘A Fragmentary Copy of an Unknown Recension of the “Lignages d’Outre-Mer”’, pp. 311–19; Hodgson, ‘Conflict and Cohabitation’, p. 93. For historians who accept it was Theodora, see notes 7 and 8.

13 Lignages d’Outremer, ed. by Nielen, pp. 83, 93–94, 144–45.

14 Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscano, ed. by Müller, pp. 15–16, no. 13; Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers (henceforth CGOH), ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, 1, 303, 324–27, nos 437, 472, 475; Rey, Recherches géographiques, pp. 22–23. See also Lignages d’Outremer, ed. by Nielen, pp. 83, 93–94, 144–45.
the patriarch and clergy of the principality in 1178, which called for the prince’s excommunication should he try to place the Antiochene Church under the patriarch of Constantinople’s authority, infers that something had recently occurred to strengthen ties between the two powers, such as a marriage alliance. With Orgeuilse’s disappearance in 1176, and the letter of 1178, Bohemond’s marriage to Theodora thus almost certainly dates to this period. By consequence, there is no particularly compelling reason to doubt the words of William of Tyre or Michael the Syrian, and the events of 1180‒82 should be examined with the acceptance that they related to the rejection of Theodora, not Orgeuilse.

The key question to investigate, therefore, is that of how it came to pass that links between the prince, Church, and nobility descended into conflict? For Claude Cahen and Hans Mayer, Bohemond’s actions represented an attempt to break free of the Byzantine yoke forced upon him by political weakness, while the principalty’s nobles, who are viewed as distinctly anti-Greek, intervened only as a reaction to violence against the Church. Bernard Hamilton has supported the former assertion, but, like Ralph-Johannes Lilie, has also questioned whether the nobles ‘had political as well as personal reasons for objecting to Sibyl’. Jonathan Phillips has posited that one such reason would have been noble fears of Greek reprisals. Regarding the motivations of the Church, most historians — with Hamilton foremost among them — have explained Patriarch Aimery’s actions as a demonstration of his respect for canon law, rather than any desire to defend Theodora; although, as will be discussed further below, Miriam Tessera has suggested that Aimery actually acted to protect ties with Byzantium. The aim here will be to re-examine these hypotheses and to explore another avenue of enquiry: the role of the nobility in princely governance.

Perhaps the most obvious issue in regard to the cause of the rupture is that of Antioch’s stance towards Byzantium. It cannot be denied that Bohemond’s actions imply a willingness to risk damaging ties with the Greeks. What is more, Mayer’s belief in a wider Antiochene apathy towards the empire even appears to be supported by William of Tyre’s comment that ‘unde quidam de magnatibus regionis illius, eius non ferentes insaniam, cognoscentes se plus debere deo quam hominibus ab eo mente et corpore recesserunt, eius maleficia detestantes’ (certain of the nobles of those regions, knowing they were to owe more to God than to men, [and] not bearing his [Bohemond’s] insanity, withdrew from him mind and body, detesting his evil). Coupled with the chronicler’s suggestion that the aristocratic response to Bohemond’s actions came only once the patriarch and clergy fled Antioch, rather than in the immediate aftermath of the marriage, it is evident that William’s text portrays an opposition predicated on spiritual matters, not diplomatic ones, especially as no mention was made of concerns over the imperial reaction. Yet, the inevitability of anti-Byzantine feeling within Antioch is far less obvious than has been argued: ties between the two powers had actually increased in the preceding years, which helps to explain

15 Papsturkunden für Kirchen im Heiligen Lande, ed. by Hiestand, pp. 278–79. See also Tessera, Orientalis ecclesia, pp. 368–69.
18 Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, p. 245.
20 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, p. 1014.
Alexander III’s letter. Full overlordship of the principality had originally been established by Manuel in 1158 — although the processes began as early as the 1130s — and ties were strengthened by his marriage to Maria of Antioch in 1162. The emperor also paid Bohemond III’s ransom following his capture at the Battle of Artah in 1164, and had used this opportunity to introduce a Greek patriarch, Athanasios, at Aimery of Limoges’ expense — although the Orthodox prelate died in an earthquake in 1170 and was never replaced. Manuel offered further support by marrying the Antiochene princess Agnes to Bela III of Hungary, and taking Bohemond’s half-brother, Baldwin, into imperial service until the princeling’s death at the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176. It has been advanced that the emperor’s defeat at Myriokephalon left Byzantium unable to support the Latin states, but the far-reaching consequences of this reverse have been exaggerated. It certainly did not end ties, as at around the same time as Bohemond’s marriage to Theodora, a joint envoy from Byzantium and Antioch was present at the court of King Henry II of England, probably seeking western recognition of Manuel’s son, Alexios II, and support for the Latin East. The opportunity for close and beneficial links endured even beyond Manuel’s death, with Maria of Antioch now imperial regent. In truth, there was little need for the prince to cause a rupture based on the weight of imperial overlordship, at least not until Andronikos Komnenos usurped power in 1182. In relation to wider Antiochene views of Byzantium, Miriam Tessera has recently argued that the threat of a new, imperially sponsored patriarch had been negated by Manuel’s apparent recognition of Patriarch Aimery’s status, while Maria, a Latin, was unlikely to have pursued an Orthodox religious policy. That Aimery, who would certainly have been outraged at Bohemond’s contravention of canon law, might also have sought to limit the antagonism of Constantinople by protecting Theodora — and in doing so ensure his own security and the long-term prevention of a Greek patriarch — is thus distinctly plausible. Antioch’s aristocracy, meanwhile, rather than demonstrating unreserved opposition to Byzantium, had actually played a central part in establishing diplomatic contacts with the empire during the twelfth century, often showing a cautious, yet clear willingness to work with the emperors. It would be an overstatement to argue that the principality’s elites were unswervingly pro-Byzantine, but the historical assumption of their anti-Greek stance overlooks important evidence to the contrary. The possibility that Bohemond was not driven by a quest to overthrow the imperial yoke, or that the rebels were sensitive to the diplomatic implications of his actions, must therefore remain open. It can even be questioned whether an act of princely aggression against the Antiochene Church would have provoked an extreme aristocratic reaction. The extent of the rupture between Bohemond III and the Church was certainly a deep one — especially in relation to the extent of

plundering and the religious censures issued — although this was not the first time an Antiochene ruler had fallen into public dispute with the patriarch. For example, during the reign of Raymond of Poitiers (r. 1136–49), this prince had enjoyed a tempestuous relationship with the patriarch, Ralph of Domfront (r. c. 1135–42), reportedly arresting him in late 1137 and then instigating his deposition in the early 1140s.  

In 1154, soon after his elevation as prince, Renaud of Châtillon (r. 1153–61) had Patriarch Aimery incarcerated and tortured. Significantly, on neither occasion did this elicit any known response from Antioch’s nobility, even though the intervention of King Baldwin III of Jerusalem (r. 1142–63) was required to settle the rupture of 1154. While we should be mindful of aristocratic sensitivity to the plight of the patriarch and clergy in the early 1180s, there is reason to believe that other motives may lie behind the rebellion.

As such, a number of existing historical opinions are not readily sustainable. Bohemond’s decision to reject Theodora was thus most likely driven by personal rather than political motives — a reality Lilie has hinted at. Mayer’s description of Sybil as a femme fatale is as impossible to prove as accusations regarding her penchant for the occult, but, although the existence of other, unknown influences cannot be entirely ruled out, it appears more plausible that the prince acted out of desire for her rather than a pressing need to break ties with Byzantium, especially given his sister’s position as regent. Yet, even with Maria of Antioch in power at Constantinople, and imperial control in Asia Minor weakened, if not destroyed — making an armed response to Theodora’s plight unlikely — the threat of withholding financial aid is possible. As such, Phillips is probably correct that the impact of Bohemond’s decisions on Latin-Greek relations could have influenced noble behaviour, albeit not just in the way he anticipates. For the principality’s great families, perhaps the more troubling aspect was that the prince’s diplomatically ill-advised choice to take a new bride was seemingly made without their counsel. Although the nobles did not oversee all aspects of governance, it has recently been argued that they were heavily involved in diplomatic relations with Byzantium, and that they had also used the instability of Prince Bohemond II’s (r. 1126–30) untimely death to establish a position of some influence over the processes of princely succession and marriage, appointing Raymond of Poitiers as ruler in 1136. By rejecting Theodora and taking Sybil, Bohemond consequently contravened a number of aristocratic governmental privileges which historians have previously overlooked. Fears may also have emerged because, despite the apparent long-term dynastic security provided by the presence of two male heirs in Raymond II and Bohemond IV, the propensity for early death or incarceration in the ruling house, or even the prospect of direct princely intervention, left open the possibility that any future sons

---


32 Mayer, *Varia Antiochena*, pp. 162–63. In relation to accusations of witchcraft, while this was undoubtedly a gendered barb from William, perhaps as a means to demonstrate the disruptive influence of evil women in politics — a not uncommon theme of his text (see below) — he was not alone in criticizing Sybil, for Michael the Syrian called her a ‘prostitute’.

33 The silence of the Greek sources here suggests some embarrassment, but there are no indications that Bohemond’s actions contributed to Andronikos’s anti-Latin insurrection.


by Sybil — about whom there were evidently distinct reservations — could become ruler. Such an eventuality may have served to entirely destabilize the principality, leading to the sort of dangerous factionalism which followed Bohemond III’s death in 1201, as Bohemond IV rivalled Raymond-Rupen, son of the now-dead Raymond II by his Armenian wife, Alice. It is even plausible that later peace negotiations with the rebels distinctly forbade this situation, as in 1193 Sybil was accused of forging an alliance against Bohemond III with Leon, the Armenian ruler of Cilicia (r. c. 1187–1219), out of a desire to promote the rights of her son, William, whose future prospects were clearly minimal. While Renaud and his allies were perhaps also driven by concern for the Byzantine response, the interdict, and anti-Church violence, or even complaints simply unknown to us, anger at Bohemond’s slight to their privileges, and a desire to prevent Sybil’s influence over the succession, more readily account for the extremity of their actions than any other explanations. This is potentially undermined by William of Tyre’s suggestion that the nobles acted only after the prince had caused the patriarch and clergy to flee, but to commit to open conflict would probably have been considered a dangerous last resort, given the growing threat of Saladin to nearby Aleppo, and it is likely that it had been expected that Bohemond would back down in the face of ecclesiastical censure.

The reasons for the rupture are thus far more complex than has previously been appreciated. Bohemond probably acted out of personal desire to marry Sybil, but in doing so he angered the principality’s Church and nobility. That an aristocratic rebellion arose implies some sensitivity to the plight of the patriarch and clergy, and fears regarding the impact of these events on relations with Byzantium. There are suggestions, however, that the nobles’ true motives related to the prince’s decision to overlook their right to counsel in matters of marriage, diplomacy, and succession. A discussion of these events should therefore also recognize what this conflict reveals about Antioch’s internal power relationships, something which is further elucidated by an examination of the processes which led to the dispute’s eventual resolution.

The Path to Resolution

It has already been noted that, as the rebellion raged, and despite supposed fears of an Ayyubid-Antioch alliance, an embassy came from Jerusalem to oversee talks between the two factions at Latakia and Antioch. A result of these discussions was a settlement concluded between Bohemond III and the Antiochene rebels. About this, William of Tyre commented that, once the prince had:

Refusis tam domino patriarche quam episcopis et locis venerabilibus quecumque amiserant, cesset interdictum et populis ecclesiasticorum sacramentorum restituantur munera, ipse autem in propria

38 La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, ed. by Morgan, pp. 165–72.
39 Mayer has suggested that some tension grew from Bohemond III’s attempt to force Renaud II Masoir to sell his half of the Ruj valley to the Hospitallers in 1168 (Varia Antiochena, p. 180). This is plausible, but charter evidence of 1174 and 1182 shows that the Margat lord could not be coerced into doing so (see CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, i, 313–14, 423, nos 457, 623). See also Buck, ‘On the Frontier of Latin Christendom’, pp. 216–27.
persona ab episcopis latam patienter ferat sententiam aut, si penitus absolvi querit, pelicem abiciat, uxor legitima revocata.\(^{41}\)

Returned whatsoever the lord patriarch, or the bishops and holy places had lost, the interdict would cease and the services of the ecclesiastical sacraments would be restored to the populace; however, he himself must patiently bear the sentence laid upon his person by the bishops or, if he should seek inner absolution, he must throw away his mistress [and] recall his legitimate wife.

We might also add to these terms the abovementioned suggestion that Sybil’s children were precluded from the succession. Nevertheless, the Jerusalemite chronicler proceeded to lament that the prince ‘in eisdem sordibus obstinatus inrevocabiliter perseverat’ (irrevocably persevered in the same sordid obstinacy) instead of abiding by these agreements.\(^{42}\) This account is not altered in Eracles, and is even supported by Gregory Bar Ebroyo.\(^{43}\) By contrast, Michael the Syrian suggested that:

After a certain time, the counts and many noble men assembled with the patriarch of Jerusalem, and they could hardly find a method of reconciliation: the prince returned all that he had stolen, left that woman, and peace was made.\(^{44}\)

Thus, while the majority of sources suggest Sybil remained in place, Michael, who was a contemporary and potentially even an eyewitness, argued rather that the prince did indeed leave her.\(^{45}\) Importantly, there is further evidence which appears to corroborate his account.

Before examining this, the issue of when the rebellion began and how long it lasted should be addressed, as it helps to provide context for the processes of the resolution. It is undoubted that Bohemond’s initial rejection of Theodora occurred after Manuel’s death on 24 September 1180, yet given that this was at the end of the summer travel period, it is uncertain how long news of Manuel’s death would have taken to reach Antioch from Constantinople.\(^{46}\) An announcement could plausibly have occurred by October, with the marriage of Bohemond and Sybil happening soon after, but it cannot be ruled out that it took longer, either due to winter or if word came by land. How long an armed conflict took to erupt between the prince, Church, and nobility is harder to ascertain, and Patriarch Aimery and Renaud II Masoir’s presence in a princely charter of September 1180 shows that relations were still cordial just before.\(^{47}\) William of Tyre unfortunately did not give a specific timeframe for the conflict, but Michael the Syrian suggested that the rebellion began in the Syriac year 1492 (1181), lasting for ‘a certain time’.\(^{48}\) Michael Stone, meanwhile, has argued that the aforementioned colophon dates the rupture between the patriarch and the prince to the Armenian year 630, which began on 11 August 1181, although its text offers only the vague notion that matters occurred ‘in this time’.\(^{49}\) It is likely that patriarchal censure for

\(^{41}\) William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1015–16 (here 1016).
\(^{42}\) William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. by Huygens, p. 1016.
\(^{45}\) On Michael’s use as a source, see Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. by Chabot, I, pp. i–lx.
\(^{49}\) Stone, ‘A Notice about Patriarch Aimery of Antioch in an Armenian Colophon of 1181’.
the prince would have been issued quite quickly; however, the following disruption may have been delayed by poor weather conditions characteristic of the harsh northern Syrian winters.\textsuperscript{50} Mayer suggested that the entire revolt was over as early as April 1181, citing as evidence for this a charter issued in that month by Bohemond III which confirmed an earlier gift made to the Hospitallers by Renaud II Masoir.\textsuperscript{51} For the prince to affirm an aristocratic charter is taken as proof that tension between the two parties had come to an end.\textsuperscript{52} Importantly, though, Bohemond had not been involved in Renaud’s original charter for this donation, and nor does the Masoir document make reference to the prince’s permission or authority (as did a later charter — see below).\textsuperscript{53} Likewise, the Margat lord was not present to verify the ruler’s document.\textsuperscript{54} The same can also be said of the prince’s later confirmation of another Masoir sale to the Hospitallers originally made on 1 December 1181, which survives only as a later cartulary entry, and is datable to between December 1181 and March 1182.\textsuperscript{55} Given the total lack of evidence for cooperation in these documents, rather than serving as definitive proof of a return to peaceful relations, they are actually more likely to reflect the Hospitallers’ desire to safeguard their possessions, regardless of the outcome of the rebellion, by securing affirmation of their ownership from both sides. With the level of Hospitaller holdings near to Margat, the prince may even have used these affirmations to secure their neutrality in the dispute.\textsuperscript{56} Discussions over finding a resolution to the conflict could consequently have continued until the end of 1181, or into early 1182. The survival of a charter issued by Renaud II Masoir in favour of the Hospitallers, dated by the clause ‘anno verbi incarnati MCLXXXII, kalendis mensis januarii’ (in the year from the incarnation of the word 1182, on the kalends of the month of January), which recognizes Bohemond III’s overlordship and his right to confirm this sale of seigneurial lands, suggests that it was over by this point.\textsuperscript{57} Despite this, Mayer has argued that this document belongs to 1 January 1183 instead, noting that it follows an ‘Easter style’ calendar similar to that utilized by Antioch’s chancellors. This methodology has been convincingly applied to re-date a number of Bohemond III’s charters using the prince’s regnal year, as well as the indiction and epact numbers, but in spite of the use of this style’s characteristic ‘anno verbi incarnati’ clause, the simplistic dating form of Renaud II’s charter means we should be cautious in unreservedly accepting Mayer’s conclusions.\textsuperscript{58} It is at least clear that the rupture lasted longer than Mayer envisaged, and further evidence for this arises from an examination of the Jerusalemite embassy recorded by William of Tyre. This group is said to have included Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem; Monachus, archbishop-elect of Caesarea; Bishop Albert of Bethlehem; Renaud, abbot of Mt Syon; Peter, prior of the Holy Sepulchre; Renaud of Châtillon; Count Raymond III of Tripoli; and the masters of the Military Orders.\textsuperscript{59} The description of Eraclius as patriarch could suggest a possible date of departure as early as November 1180, given that he had been elevated from his position as archbishop of

\textsuperscript{50} Cahen, \textit{Syrie du Nord}, pp. 105–08.
\textsuperscript{51} Mayer, \textit{Varia Antiochena}, pp. 43, 169; \textit{CGOH}, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, i, 417–18, no. 614.
\textsuperscript{52} Mayer, \textit{Varia Antiochena}, pp. 168–70.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{CGOH}, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, iv, 258, no. 595.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{CGOH}, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, i, 417–18, no. 614.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{CGOH}, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, i, 417, no. 613, iv, 261, no. 624.
\textsuperscript{56} Burgtorf, ‘The Hospitaller Lordship of Margat’.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{CGOH}, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, i, 423, no. 623.
\textsuperscript{58} Mayer, \textit{Varia Antiochena}, pp. 31–44, 180.
\textsuperscript{59} William of Tyre, \textit{Chronicon}, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1015–16.
Caesarea by late October. Nevertheless, difficulties in pinpointing the start of hostilities in Antioch means the embassy could plausibly have been dispatched later in 1180 or even in early 1181. Belief that delays occurred to prevent a princely union with Saladin should probably be dismissed, as William was known to use such accusations to discredit those he disliked, although it is certainly unlikely that the new patriarch would have wished to absent himself from the Holy City at Christmas. William of Tyre’s description of Monachus as archbishop-elect (electo) of Caesarea is somewhat problematic in this regard, as it might be assumed he would have been consecrated very soon after Eraclius’s transferral. This hints at a very early date of departure and return. While the patriarch had been elected, he would not have been fully confirmed until his pallium had arrived from Rome, for which he may have had to wait until as late as early summer 1181, because an envoy could not safely depart Outremer by sea before the following spring. Eraclius would thus have been unable to officially place Monachus in his see during the intervening period and would also have had to wait to return to Jerusalem, given that only Antiochene churchmen could perform consecrations within the principality. As such, the period in which Monachus was electus would have stretched throughout his entire time in northern Syria. Significantly, his first Jerusalemite charter appearance as archbishop came in November 1182, which could indicate a rather prolonged stay for the embassy. This is made more probable by the apparent absence from Jerusalem until 1182 of a number of the other envoys. Indeed, Renaud of Châtillon, a frequent attester of royal documents in 1180, did not appear at all in 1181, only returning to court in February 1182, with Raymond III of Tripoli following in April — although the latter also issued charters in favour of the Hospitallers at Tripoli in March and August 1181. Meanwhile, the final documentary witness — before the embassy — of Peter, prior of the Holy Sepulchre, was in September 1178, albeit he also appeared alongside Patriarch Eraclius in a letter sent in c. 1182 to Count Conrad III of Dachau. Added to this, the mention of the Hospitaller Master, Roger of Moulins, in a charter issued by Bohemond III between April and September 1181, might imply that he was in Antioch at this point, and he was certainly at Krak des Chevaliers on 9 November 1181. All this suggests that, while there is no direct documentary evidence attesting to the exact period for the envoys’ presence in Antioch, we can be secure that they were not in Jerusalem throughout 1181, and that a number of them were at least as far north as the county of Tripoli.

---

60 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1015–16; Edbury and Rowe, ‘William of Tyre and the Patriarchal Election of 1180’.
61 The same could also be said of Easter, which might suggest either a staggered embassy, with Eraclius and the others temporarily returning to Jerusalem, or that they delayed their departure until after this celebration. On William’s use of Muslim alliances as a tool to discredit figures, see Asbridge, ‘Alice of Antioch’, pp. 34–36.
62 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, pp. 1015–16.
63 Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, pp. 87–88.
64 Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States, pp. 18–85. My thanks to Prof Bernard Hamilton for his advice on these issues.
68 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roux, i, 415–18, nos 610, 614.
A loose period for the troubles in Antioch now emerges, spanning from October 1180 until early 1182. This has a significant bearing on our understanding of the eventual settlement, particularly in relation to whether Bohemond was forced to put aside Sybil. As noted above, Michael the Syrian reported that this was the case, but this is challenged by Sybil’s appearance as princess of Antioch in two charters issued in 1181, the first being the aforementioned document of April–September, and the second dated by Mayer to December 1181–March 1182. For Mayer, who dates the settlement to before these documents, this is proof that Michael was incorrect. It has already been argued here, however, that these charters do not prove that peaceful relations had been restored, and so Sybil’s appearances in 1181 argue instead for a prolonged conflict, and a later date for the agreement. The fact that Sybil was not present when Bohemond issued a document in favour of Notre Dame de Josaphat at Jabala in March 1182, or when the prince offered his assent to Renaud II Masoir’s aforementioned charter issued at Margat on either 1 January 1182 or 1183, could be significant. She was again absent when Bohemond made gifts to the Hospitallers in April 1182, and for his confirmation of Venetian rights in the principality, made between June and September; although the situation is complicated by her appearance in a princely charter issued in May 1183. That Sybil did not then reappear at court until Bohemond’s confirmation of the sale of Margat by Renaud II’s son, Bertrand, in February 1187, after which point she was ever present at court, suggests her position may have been tenuous between 1182 and 1187. It should also be noted, though, that the documents issued after 1183 include a stub entry in a later cartulary that does not carry a witness list, and a charter produced during a princely visit to Acre in 1186: for which Sybil may have remained in Antioch to govern. Nevertheless, it can be argued that, between early 1182 and May 1183, Sybil was not in a strong enough position to participate in princely governance, especially when it was not carried out within the city. The reason for this, I would suggest, is that during negotiations with the rebels, Bohemond had been forced to put aside Sybil, or at the very least not publicly endorse their union.

To understand why the prince was subsequently able to issue charters alongside Sybil in 1183, we should turn to events in Constantinople. As already noted, Andronikos Komnenos seized power from Maria of Antioch and Alexios II Komnenos on the back of a wave of anti-Latin feeling in May 1182 — although there are no suggestions that Theodora’s plight influenced this — with Alexios blinded and Maria murdered soon after. News would have eventually reached northern Syria, either through Italian merchants expelled from Constantinople or the Greek refugees who

---

69 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 417–18, no. 614, iv, 261, no. 624 bis. On the dating of these documents, see Mayer, Varia Antiochena, p. 169.
70 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 423, no. 623; Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 118–21.
71 For the documents of April and June–September, see CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 436–37, no. 648; Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, i, 175–77. For May 1183, see CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, II, 911–12, Appendix no. 23; Mayer, Varia Antiochena, p. 44.
72 For 1187, see CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 491–96, no. 783. For the earlier documents, see Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 121–22; Delaville le Roux, ‘Inventaire de pièces de Terre Sainte l’ordre de L’Hôpital’, p. 69 n. 159.
73 Whether Theodora was recalled is unclear. The Lignages are certain that she fled to Romania (see Lignages d’Outremer, ed. by Nielen, pp. 83, 93–94, 144–45), and there are no suggestions that she sought refuge with her sister Maria, dowager princess of Jerusalem and by this point wife to Balian of Ibelin (see Hamilton, The Leper King and his Heirs, p. 113). However, potential aristocratic sensitivity towards Byzantium could imply that she was recalled, if only briefly or merely in name.
By the summer of 1182 at the earliest, all hopes of Byzantine assistance in Outremer were at an end, with the murder of an Antiochene princess undoubtedly provoking an irrevocable rupture with the new emperor. In this context, Bohemond would have found it easier to definitively and formally end ties to Theodora, and to allow Sybil to appear beside him in government.

This newly advanced timeline and narrative offers a broader understanding of the rebellion, particularly regarding Antioch’s internal power structures. That the prince was made to put aside Sybil suggests some sensitivity to Byzantine opinion, or at least a desire to ensure damage limitation, as well as concern for canon law. This supports Tessera’s findings on the Antiochene Church’s stance, and raises questions regarding the idea that the principality’s aristocracy were unswervingly anti-Greek. More importantly, the notion offered here that the root cause of noble actions was Bohemond’s contravention of their right to counsel over a princely marriage and the succession is further strengthened. Contrary to historical opinion, that such an agreement could be enforced over the prince demonstrates that limits to the exercise of rulership did in fact exist within Antioch, with the aristocracy expecting to exert a strong level of involvement in certain central affairs, especially diplomacy and succession. This has important parallels with events in Jerusalem, as King Amalric had been forced to end his consanguineous marriage to Agnes of Courtney before taking the throne in 1163. Significantly, the influence of the Antiochene nobility was to be further demonstrated in the rebellion’s aftermath.

The Aftermath

With an agreement to settle the dispute in place, it might be assumed that full peace would be restored. Yet, the evidence of William of Tyre suggests that tension remained within Antioch. In his report of the period following the accord, William commented that Bohemond decided:

Eo solo quod eis factum eius dicebatur displicere, fidelium suorum optimos, inclitos et nobiles viros, extra civitatem et omnem terram suam expellere, videlicet constabularium suum, camerarium quoque et Guiscardum de Insula, Bertrandum quoque, filium comitis Gisleberti, et Garinum Gainart, qui ad dominum Rupinum Armenorum principem magnificum de necessario declinantes honestissime ab eo sunt suscepti.

To expel from the city and all of his lands [certain] of his best fideles, illustrious and noble men, simply because it was said they were displeased by his actions: namely his constable, also his chamberlain, and Guiscard of Lille, a certain Betrand (son of Count Gislebert), and Garinus Gainart, who, fleeing to the lord Rupen, magnificent prince of the Armenians, out of necessity, were welcomed by him.

This is not listed by any other contemporary narrative — although Eracles retained the story. However, charter evidence supports the fact that certain elements of the princely household were exiled to Cilicia — an area of Asia Minor which was the site of a great amount of inter-Christian contact, for it was contested by Latins, Byzantines, and Armenians, producing periods of conflict

---

75 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, La espugnazione di Tessalonica, ed. and trans. by Kyriakidis and Lavagnini, p. 56.
76 Hodgson, Women, Crusading and the Holy Land, pp. 144–45.
77 William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. by Huygens, p. 1016.
as well as positive cooperation. Mayer has discussed these individuals and has followed William of Tyre’s assertion that Bohemond acted against those who had supported the nobles. It is nevertheless worth reassessing the available evidence, as it is possible to advance an alternative argument, one in which the balance of power in the principality was not so weighted in the ruler’s favour.

The first person listed by William of Tyre was the constable of Antioch. Although he did not name this office holder, charter evidence from 1180 argues for a certain Baldwin, who disappeared after this point and is almost certainly the ‘Baldwin the Constable’ listed by Sempad the Constable as dying at the siege of the Cilician castle of Prakana in the service of Leon of Armenia in 1189. Interestingly, Baldwin was seemingly not replaced by Bohemond until 1187, in which year Ralph of Mons performed this office, with the absence of a constable between 1181 and 1186 a rarity for princely charters in the wider period. The second, again unnamed figure was the chamberlain, who can be identified as Oliver, witness to Bohemond’s aforementioned charter, issued alongside Sybil in April–September 1181. Oliver then disappears from the historical record until 1187. That he travelled to Cilicia is supported by the fact that, when Bohemond died in 1201, Oliver departed Antioch for the Armenian court of Leon, thus implying he had earlier forged close bonds there. Next is Guiscard of Lille, a figure of some standing within the principality, having served as constable between 1170 and 1172. A regular attester to charters throughout the 1170s, even when not in office, he also witnessed the document of April–September 1181. Guiscard never returned to Antioch, at least not in terms of governance, but the appearance in 1200 of a potential brother, William of Lille, implies that some familial prestige survived, while the fact that the latter also went to Cilicia in 1201, and supported Raymond-Rupen during the Antiochene war of succession, again hints at enduring Rupenid links. William of Tyre also listed Bertrand, son of Count Gislebert. Mayer has argued that he should be identified with a Bartholomew, son of Count Gislebert, who was seemingly absent from Antioch between late August 1179 until his return in early 1187. Given that Bartholomew’s first appearance was in 1179, he cannot be considered a particularly powerful figure — indeed he did not witness any of Bohemond’s charters in 1180 or 1181 — and so it cannot be ruled out that his absence was mere

---

79 Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 170–75.
80 Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 114–17; Sempad the Constable, La Chronique, trans. by Dédéyan, p. 64.
81 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 491–96, no. 783.
82 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 417–18, no. 614.
83 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 490–96, nos 782–83; Sempad the Constable, Chronique, trans. by Dédéyan, 81.
84 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 303, no. 437; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane, ed. by Müller, pp. 15–16.
85 Rey, Recherches geographiques, pp. 22–23; CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 324–27, 356–57, 417–18, nos 472, 475, 522, 614; Delaville Le Roulx, Les Archives la Bibliothèque et le Trésor de L’Ordre de Saint-Jean, pp. 142–44, no. 52. It should be noted that, as Bohemond’s charter of December 1181 survives only as a description in a later cartulary, we are unaware of who witnessed its creation.
86 Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane, ed. by Müller, pp. 80–81; Sempad the Constable, Chronique, trans. by Dédéyan, p. 81; Regesta regni Hierosolimitani, ed. by Röhricht, t, 226, no. 845.
87 Delaville le Roulx, Les archives la bibliothèque et le trésor de L’Ordre de Saint-Jean, pp. 142–44, no. 52; CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, t, 490–96, nos 782–83.
coincidence and of little significance. Moreover, rather than an error on William of Tyre’s part, Bertrand may instead be an otherwise unknown brother of Bartholomew. The final figure mentioned is Garinus Gainart, another somewhat lowly individual who witnessed three princely documents during the period 1175–79 and never returned in this capacity.

Mayer has also identified a number of other figures whose careers changed after 1181, perhaps because of the revolt. The first is William of Cavea, the marshal of Antioch between 1175 and 1179. His witness, without a title, to princely documents of February and August 1179 suggests he may have lost his office, but he retained influence at court. By March 1183, he had been transferred to the position of duke of Latakia, although he appeared without this title a month later in April. Like others listed above, William returned to his former position — marshal — in 1187, but only in this year. It is thus possible that the shift to Latakia was also part of the aftermath of the rupture, although this is not altogether clear. Another whose fortunes altered was Roger of Corbeil, duke of Antioch — albeit only in 1180 — who did not appear again after 1181. He was probably a member of a minor vassallic family first seen in the principality in 1160, and his earliest appearances, without title, were in 1179. His departure could indicate that he had also been demoted, although the involvement in a number of princely charters between 1183 and 1200 of his likely brother, Hugh of Corbeil, could indicate Roger’s death. Simon Burgevins, who served as duke of Antioch between 1174 and February 1179, is also of interest. Witness to a princely charter without title in February 1179, he made a final appearance as duke in Bohemond’s document of April–September 1181, which serves as further evidence that Roger of Corbeil’s disappearance pre-dated the revolt. It is possible that this same Simon Burgevins then acted as chamberlain in 1193 and 1194, although this could have been his son.

In addition to those who disappeared or moved, we can identify individuals whose careers seemingly commenced at around this point. Mayer has drawn attention to a number of these figures — which include Raymond and Bastardus of Moulins, Walter of Arzghan, William of Hingron, Bernard Soberan, Peter of Loges, William of Mt Cornet, and the marshal, Bartholomew Tirel —

---

88 *Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, ed. by Strehlke, p. 10; *CGOH*, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, 1, 379–80, no. 559.
90 Mayer, *Varia Antiochena*, pp. 170–75.
93 *CGOH*, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, 1, 436–37, no. 648, ii, 911–12, no. 23.
97 *CGOH*, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, 1, 600, no. 948, ii, 911–12, Appendix 23; *I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. by Puncuh, ii, 162–63, no. 343; *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane*, ed. by Müller, pp. 80–81.
100 *CGOH*, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, 1, 600, 613, nos 948, 966.
suggesting that they filled the void left by those who departed for Cilicia. They all made their first appearances at court in either 1182 or 1183, he is undoubtedly correct.

Of interest, however, is that two of William of Tyre’s figures, Oliver the chamberlain and Guiscard of Lille, as well as another who disappeared after 1181, Roger of Corbeil, were still demonstrably with the prince during the rebellion. Rather than joining the rebels at Margat, they continued to support Bohemond in government, appearing alongside Sybil in the aforementioned document of April–September 1181. The suggestion that they had been expelled because they disapproved of Bohemond’s decision to marry Sybil — which is the traditional interpretation of William of Tyre’s statement — thus deserves further enquiry. One possible alternative reading of William’s text is that, instead of showing displeasure at Bohemond’s marriage, those expelled actually voiced concern over the nature of the settlement which, as has been argued above, saw Sybil temporarily removed and Renaud II Masoir returned to influence. Perhaps a more probable scenario is that the men who left for Cilicia — who were invariably taken from the princely household — did so not in response to the agreement made with the rebels, but as part of it. As the prince’s closest advisors, their complicity in Bohemond’s actions is highly likely, especially given the decision to remain in Antioch rather than join the rebels. Importantly, for the rest of the twelfth century, Antiochene princes held a tight control over the composition of their households and the officers of state, so this was a significant reversal. In the process of securing peace, it is unsurprising that their continued presence at court could have been considered dangerous, just as King John was forced to remove negative influences as part of the Magna Carta settlement. Significantly, none of those who eventually returned to Antioch did so before 1187, the year after Renaud II Masoir’s death, at which time they witnessed Bohemond’s personal confirmation of the sale of Margat by the former’s son, Bertrand. They therefore only came back once the leader of the noble rebellion ceased to be a figure of influence in the principality.

Another aspect of these events which could offer an alternative to traditional opinion, which holds that Bohemond angrily expelled them as rebels, regards the destination of those exiled: Cilicia. Indeed, it must be questioned why these men left the principality entirely, rather than renew their affiliation to the nobles with whom they are said to have sympathized. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that, while there is no contemporary evidence to support Hodgson’s assertion that Sybil was of Armenian heritage, she does appear to have had a close affiliation to the Rupenid lords of Cilicia. Sempad the Constable revealed that Leon married Sybil’s niece Isabelle in around 1189, and in 1193 the princess worked with the Cilician ruler to

---

102 For the first appearance of Raymond and Bastardus of Moulins, Walter of Arzghan, William of Hingron, and Bartholomew Trel in 1182, see Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 118–21. For Bernard Soberan in 1183, see CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 436–37, no. 648. For Peter of Loges and William of Mt Cornet in 1183, see Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. by Tafel and Thomas, I, 175–77.
103 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 417–18, no. 614.
106 Magna Carta, ed. and trans. by Carpenter, p. 56.
107 CGOH, ed. by Delaville Le Roulx, I, 491–96, no. 783.
capture and imprison Bohemond, from whom she appears to have become estranged.\(^{109}\) It is unclear whether ties were already in place in 1180, although the fact that the aforesaid Armenian colophon blamed Patriarch Aimery for the dispute, as opposed to the prince, suggests that the Armenian populace supported Sybil’s elevation.\(^{110}\) Moreover, while a strong level of tension later emerged between Bohemond and the Rupenids, in large part due to the former’s invasion of Cilicia and capture of Rupen III in 1185, relations appear to have been cordial in the early 1180s.\(^{111}\) The Antiochene prince even sold the Cilician city of Tarsus to the Armenians in 1183 having recovered it from the Greeks.\(^{112}\) It has been suggested that Rupen III’s decision to harbour the Antiochene rebels soured relations between him and Bohemond, but hostilities took some three years to emerge and did not prevent Tarsus’s sale.\(^{113}\) At the time of their exile, therefore, the rebels departed for the court of a ruler who had close ties to the prince, as well as potentially Sybil, and one with a somewhat ambiguous stance towards Byzantium.\(^{114}\) This appears something of an odd occurrence in the context of William of Tyre’s account, and so, coupled with the above discussion, it might be questioned whether certain underlying motives led the archbishop to offer an altered portrayal of events.

Distinct narrative strategies have certainly been discerned in William of Tyre’s chronicle, for example his desire to promote western sympathy and support for Outremer, his demonization of those, especially women, who challenged his preconceptions of legitimate rule, or his misleadingly tidy portrayal of the Antiochene princely succession before 1130.\(^{115}\) As such, despite the fact that William was a contemporary of the rebellion, a critical examination of his account is required. One possible reason for William to have altered the narrative is his personal view of Bohemond III, a ruler he did not hold in particularly high esteem. On top of the suggested collusion with Saladin, William accused the prince of undermining Baldwin IV’s attempts to utilize the crusading forces of Count Philip of Flanders in 1177, and blamed him for scaring the king, who was a leper and so could not marry, into marrying his sister, the Jerusalemite heiress, Princess Sybil, to Guy of Lusignan — another for whom William held little regard — in 1180.\(^{116}\) It was in the wake of this union that a dangerous factionalism emerged within Jerusalem over the regency of Baldwin, with power handed to Guy as husband of the future queen, instead of William’s ally, Count Raymond III of Tripoli.\(^{117}\) This power shift was to be compounded by Eraclius of Caesarea’s appointment as patriarch, over William’s own candidacy, in October 1180.\(^{118}\) Peter Edbury and John Rowe have noted that, so as to demonstrate Outremer’s continued worthiness of

---

\(^{109}\) Sempad the Constable, *Chronique*, trans. by Dédéyan, pp. 65, 68; *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, ed. by Morgan, p. 165.

\(^{110}\) Stone, ‘A Notice about Patriarch Aimery of Antioch in an Armenian Colophon of 1181’.


\(^{117}\) Edbury, ‘Propaganda and Faction in the Kingdom of Jerusalem’.

\(^{118}\) Edbury and Rowe, ‘William of Tyre and the Patriarchal Election of 1180’.
western military support, William was nevertheless careful to not overly criticize either the king or Eralius, or to stress the divisions amongst the kingdom’s ruling elites.\textsuperscript{119} It is this same impulse which perhaps lies behind William’s account of the settlement between Bohemond III and the Antiochene rebels. For an author at the heart of a power dispute caused by a ruler’s weakness, that Bohemond was forced to back down over Sybil and expel some of his most trusted advisors, potentially warranted suppression to avoid embarrassing parallels with Jerusalem. There is precedence for such alterations within the archbishop’s work, including his aforementioned care in discussing the Jerusalemite troubles of the 1170s and 1180s, and his decision to overlook the events of Bohemond III’s difficult rise to power in the face of opposition from his mother, Princess Constance, in 1163.\textsuperscript{120} This had distinct similarities with Baldwin III of Jerusalem’s tense succession after Queen Melisende (r. 1131‒61) had sought to hold on to influence in the 1140s.\textsuperscript{121} To censure either Bohemond or Constance would have risked undermining William’s carefully narrated coverage of similar events in the kingdom, and damaged the memory of two Jerusalemite figures whom he clearly respected, so he simply remained silent.\textsuperscript{122} It can even be argued that, despite detailing Bohemond’s moral failings, William portrayed a ruler who was secure enough in his power to exile influential figures who had rebelled. In the context of Jerusalem’s factionalism, this was an important message. Moreover, with the kingdom ruled by a leper — a fact William frequently sought to play down, even to the point of apology, but which perhaps caused some tension in the West given leprosy’s status as God’s punishment for sin — the archbishop may have wanted to promote the notion that a ruler’s legitimacy should not be entirely undermined by moral flaws, and that the Latin East still remained worthy of large-scale western aid.\textsuperscript{123} This must remain speculation, but a close study of William’s text not only provides further support for those who have discussed his narrative strategies, but also shows the need — outlined above — to carefully offset his coverage with other accounts and documentary evidence.

An examination of the rebellion’s aftermath thus contributes to the belief that the balance of power within Antioch was not as historians have assumed. Contrary to the established opinion that Antiochene princes had total control over governance and the nobility, it appears instead that Bohemond’s advisors were expelled not for their part in opposing the prince, rather for their involvement in supporting his marriage to Sybil and the subsequent violent rupture. That the Church and nobility could enforce such a decision — at least throughout 1182 in the case of Sybil’s involvement in governance, and until 1187 in terms of allowing the return of the exiled figures — suggests that there existed significant checks to princely authority. Given the unheralded nature of these events in the principality of Antioch, we should be careful not to assume that noble actions relied on fully codified regulations, but it nevertheless demonstrates the need to be more attuned to the complexities and challenges which faced medieval governing elites, particularly those on frontiers.

\textsuperscript{119} Edbury and Rowe, \textit{William of Tyre}, pp. 27‒29, 76‒84; Edbury and Rowe, ‘William of Tyre and the Patriarchal Election of 1180’.
\textsuperscript{120} Michael the Syrian, \textit{Chronique}, ed. and trans. by Chabot, iii, 324; \textit{Anonymi auctoris Chronicon ad A. C. 1234 pertinens}, ed. and trans. by Chabot, Abouna, and Fiey, ii, 119.
\textsuperscript{121} On this, see Mayer, ‘Studies in the History of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem’; Edbury and Rowe, \textit{William of Tyre}, pp. 80‒83.
\textsuperscript{122} Buck, ‘On the Frontier of Latin Christendom’, pp. 128‒32; Mayer, \textit{Varia Antiochena}, pp. 55‒64.
\textsuperscript{123} Edbury and Rowe, \textit{William of Tyre}, pp. 62‒65; Brody, \textit{The Disease of the Soul}, pp. 132‒46.
Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to re-examine the events surrounding the rebellion against Prince Bohemond III of Antioch in 1180–82, and to offer a fresh perspective of its implications to our understanding of the political structures of the principality of Antioch in the second half of the twelfth century. It was established that uncertainties over the order of Bohemond’s wives should be put aside, and that the events of 1180–82 related primarily to his rejection of Theodora Komnena. Furthermore, significant doubts now exist over the influence of anti-Greek feeling within Antioch, with the Church and nobility seemingly showing some sensitivity to the ramifications of Bohemond’s actions to relations with the empire. This article has also challenged assertions that the rebellion was over by March 1181, with an agreement between the two factions unlikely to have been fully ratified until at least late December. Moreover, a critical examination of William of Tyre’s account and a comparison with other sources, demonstrates the need to deploy greater care in determining the effects of the archbishop’s personal agendas on the form of his chronicle. In establishing these matters, an alternative insight can be achieved into these events, and their bearing on the power structures of the principality: the prince of Antioch was subject to greater checks in matters of diplomacy, marriage, and succession than has hitherto been recognized. The nature of the settlement also suggests that Bohemond had overreached his political power by making enemies of Patriarch Aimery and Renaud II Masoir. Indeed, that he was subsequently forced to accept quite stringent terms, which prevented Sybil’s involvement in governance, and altered the dynamics of the princely household by expelling a number of his closest advisors, shows that limits to rulership did exist, despite modern belief to the contrary. That the terms of the accord seemingly endured only until extenuating circumstances — including Andronikos Komnenos’s rise to power in Constantinople and Renaud II Masoir’s death — cleared the way for a return to the status quo of 1181, is indicative of the fluidity that characterized authority in Latin-held northern Syria. The long-term implications of this are hard to discern, mostly because the political dynamics of the region were irrevocably altered by the sale of Margat in 1187, as well as the near-total destruction of the principality by Saladin in 1188; although there is reason to believe that the events of the rebellion in some part contributed to Armenian involvement in the succession crisis of the early thirteenth century. Of greater importance, though, is the demonstrable need to be more alert to the principality’s political dynamism during the twelfth century, with the events of 1180–82 offering a significant contribution both to our understanding of the political climate of the crusader states, but also of the adaptability of authority on medieval frontiers and the relationships of power which underpinned their governance.

---

Bibliography

Primary Sources


*Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane: Coll’ Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’anno MDXXI*, ed. by Giuseppe Müller (Rome: Società multigrafica editrice, 1966)


*La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184–1197)*, ed. by Margaret R. Morgan (Paris: Geuthner, 1982)


*Papsturkunden für kirchen im Heiligen Lande*, ed. by Rudolf Hiestand (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985)


*Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, ed. by Ernst Strehlke (Berlin: Weidmann, 1849)


**Secondary Sources**


Cahen, Claude, La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche (Paris: Geuthner, 1940)


Delaville le Roulx, Joseph, Les archives la bibliothèque et le trésor de l’ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem à Malte (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1883)


Edbury, Peter, and John Rowe, ‘William of Tyre and the Patriarchal Election of 1180’, English Historical Review, 93 (1978), 1–25


—, ‘Ralph of Domfront, Patriarch of Antioch (1135–1140)’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, 18 (1984), 1–21

—, ‘Aimery of Limoges, Patriarch of Antioch (c. 1142–c. 1196), and the Unity of the Churches’, in East and West in the Crusader States: Context, Contacts, Confrontations II, ed. by Krijnie Ciggaar and Herman Teule (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), pp. 1–12


—, The Leper King and his Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)


Harris, Jonathan, Byzantium and the Crusades, 2nd edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2014)

Hodgson, Natasha, Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2007)


